SAMANVAYA OF ADVAITA OF

BHARTṚHARI AND ŚAṄKARA

Thesis submitted to the University of Hyderabad

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Doctor of Philosophy

in

Sanskrit Studies

By

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DECLARATION

I hereby declare that the thesis entitled "Samanvaya of Advaita of Bhartṛhari and Śaṅkara " submitted by me under the guidance and supervision of Prof. K. Subrahmanyam, Centre for Applied Linguistics and Translation Studies (and Joint Faculty, Department of Sanskrit Studies), School of Humanities, University of Hyderabad, Hyderabad, India is a bonafide research work which is also free from plagiarism. I also declare that it has not been submitted previously in part or full to this or any other university or institution for the award of any degree or diploma.

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Abbreviations

Ai. Up. –   Aitareya Upaniṣad

Br. Up. –   Bṛhadāraṇyakopaniṣad

Ch. Up. –   Chandogya Upaniṣad

comm. –   Commentary

Ka. Up. –   Kaṭhopaniṣad

Ke. Up. –   Kenopaniṣad

Ma. Up. –   Māṇḍūkya Upaniṣad

Mu. Up. –   Muṇḍaka Upaniṣad

Pr. Up. –   Praśna Upaniṣad

Tai. Up. –   Taittirīya Upaniṣad

Scheme of Diacritical Marks

The scheme of transliteration used in the present paper is:

अ आ इ ई उ ऊ ऋ ॠ ऌ ए ऐ ओ औ अं अः ऽ (*avagraha*)
a ā i ī u ū ṛ ṝ ḷ e ai o au aṃ aḥ '

क् ख् ग् घ् ङ् च् छ् ज् झ् ञ् ट् ठ् ड् ढ् ण् त् थ् द् ध् न् प् फ् ब् भ् म्
k kh g gh ṅ c ch j jh ñ ṭ ṭh ḍ ḍh ṇ t th d dh n p ph b bh m

य् र् ल् व् श् ष् स् ह्
y r l v ś ṣ s h

Different authors used different schemes of transliteration in their books. While quoting Sanskrit text, the above scheme has been used, not that of the author. However, while quoting English sentences of any author, for the Sanskrit words and names of texts, the scheme used by the particular author has been retained.

Chapter 1: Introduction

1.1 Advaita and Indian Philosophy

Within Indian Philosophy, while there are many schools, Vedānta sits at the pinnacle and is known as Vedāntakesarī, the lion called Vedānta. Within Vedānta, while there are multiple schools, the one expounded by Śaṅkarācārya is considered very important. George Thibaut, the translator of the commentaries on Brahmasūtras by Śaṅkarācārya and Rāmānujācārya, states (1890, xiv, xv):

> In the first place, the Śāṅkarabhāṣya represents the so-called orthodox side of Brahmanical theology . . . In the second place, the doctrine advocated by Śaṅkara is, from purely philosophical point of view and apart from all theological considerations, the most important and interesting one which has arisen on Indian soil . . . In the third place, Śaṅkara's bhāṣya is, as far as we know, the oldest of extant commentaries . . . The Śāṃkarabhāṣya further is the authority most generally deferred to in India as to the right understanding of the Vedāntasūtras, and ever since Śaṅkara's time the majority of the best thinkers of India have been men belonging to his school.

Within Advaita, it is well known that Śaṅkarācārya's commentary on the principal Upaniṣads, Brahmasūtras and Bhagavadgītā constitute the primary texts with sub-commentaries, glosses and other meta-texts upon them being widely available. Śaṅkarācārya is referred to only as an exponent of the

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philosophy of the Upaniṣads and not as the "founder" of Advaita Vedānta. He is also not credited as the first writer / commentator of the Advaita tradition, whose work is available today. Usually that position is reserved for Gauḍapāda, who has composed *Kārikā*s on the Māṇḍūkyopaniṣad[1].

However given the remarkable similarities between Sphoṭavāda and Advaita Vedānta, there might be a case for treating Bhartṛhari or Patañjali as the first exponent of Advaita Vedānta. Sphoṭavāda is first seen in *Mahābhāṣya* of Patañjali. In his introduction to the book, *Paspaśāhnika,* he defines *Śabda* at two levels. The definition (Vol. 1.17) *yenoccāritena sāsnālāṅgūlakakudakhuraviṣāṇinām sampratyayo bhavati sa śabdaḥ* corresponds to *Sphoṭa* and the definition (Vol. 1, 19) *atha vā pratītapadārthako loke dhvaniḥ śabda ityucyate* refers to Śabda at the *vaikharī* level. In his commentary under the Sūtra *taparastatkālasya* (1.1.69), under Vārtika No. 403 *siddham tu avasthitāḥ varṇāḥ vaktuścirāciravacanāt vṛttayaḥ viśiṣyante* he introduces Sphoṭa by saying (Vol. 1, 563) "*sphoṭaḥ śabdaḥ dhvaniḥ śabdaguṇaḥ*" and explains (Vol. 1, 564) the concept further in his commentary on the next Vārtika No. 404 *bheryāghātavat* with an example. He mentions Sphoṭa at a couple of other places as well and in other places comments on Sūtras in conformity with Sphoṭavāda. Yet, the bulk of the book is not devoted to establishing Sphoṭavāda. Sphoṭa is discussed in great detail in Bhartṛhari's *Vākyapadīya*[2]. There are also other books like *Sphoṭasiddhi* which present *Sphoṭa,* yet, it is the *Vākyapadīya* which is seen as establishing Sphoṭavāda.

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[1] In the view of Advaitins. Others treat some or all of the same *kārikā*s as Śruti.

[2] There are differences of opinion as to what constitutes *Vākyapadīya*. Without prejudice, for the sake of this thesis, Vākyapadīya refers to the book with three Kāṇḍas - *Brahmakāṇḍa, Vākyakāṇḍa,* and *Padakāṇḍa* (with fourteen *samuddeśa*s). This is also referred to as *Trikāṇḍī*. For instance, see Ashok Aklujkar, 1992.

Traditionally, the thought that Patañjali might have first expounded Advaita is not encouraged because Sphoṭavāda is amongst the Darśanas specifically refuted by Śaṅkarācārya, in his commentary under the Sūtra 1.3.28. Also in the *Sarvadarśanasaṅgraha*, Mādhava presents Sphoṭavāda as one of the earlier views, indicating that it is a *pūrvapakṣa* to Advaita[3]. Against this dominant view, there is a view amongst teachers of grammar, especially the philosophy of grammar, that Advaita is what is taught in Sphoṭavāda. Here an attempt is made to study the two systems and offer a Samanvaya. First, different views on Bhartṛhari are given to show that there is a need for this Samanvaya.

1.2 Different Views on Bhartṛhari

S. Radhakrishnan, celebrated Indian philosopher and former President of India, describes Bhartṛhari as a Buddhist in his book *Indian Philosophy* (Vol. 2, 465):

> His great philosophical work is *Vākyapadīya,* which is more or less Buddhist in its tendencies. I-Tsing relates that Bhartṛhari became several times a Buddhist monk and as often lapsed. His teachings are not inconsistent with this story. His insistence on the phenomenality of the world and detachment from things is strongly Buddhist in tone. . . . The world, with all its distinctions, is imagined (kālpanikam). Things of the world are

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[3] As is well known, the book presents sixteen schools of thought arranged in such a way that the latter school refutes the earlier, till the view of Advaita is established as *siddhānta.* Thus, first the Cārvāka view is presented, which is refuted by Buddhists, whose views are presented in the next chapter and so on till the Advaita view is presented in the sixteenth chapter.

soulless (nairātmya), though words give them individuality.
Bhartṛhari is however, unlike the Buddhists when he posits the
reality of Brahman and views the whole world as a vivarta, or a
phenomenon based upon it."

However, the Buddhists themselves refer to Bhartṛhari as a Vedāntin
or a Brahmavādin. Hajime Nakamura in his monumental work "A History of
Early Vedānta Philosophy" (Part 2) consistently refers to Bhartṛhari as a
Vedāntin (pp 9-25; pp 457-459). Nakamura summed up his views on
Bhartṛhari as follows (Part 2, 459):

> Thus Bhartṛhari was regarded as a Vedāntin not only in the
> orthodox Brahminical world but also by Buddhists and Jains,
> and in addition he himself was a professed orthodox Vedāntin.
> He is known as a Grammarian, and as we shall see, he was
> influenced by Buddhism, but in philosophy he was a Vedāntin.

Bhartṛhari calls himself[4] an *ekatvadarśin* and a *trayyantavedin*:

> prakṛtau pravilīneṣu bhedeṣvekatvadarśinām |
> dravyasattvaṃ prapadyante svāśrayā eva jātayaḥ || 3.1.43 ||
> yatra draṣṭā ca dṛśyaṃ ca darśanaṃ cāvikalpitam |
> tasyaivārthasya satyatvaṃ śritāstrayyantavēdinaḥ || 3.3.72 ||

The commentator Helārāja interprets the word *ekatvadarśin* in the above
Kārikā 3.1.43 as *advaitin.* According to Nakamura (Part 2, p19)[5], the Jain

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[4] That is one view; it could be also argued that Bhartṛhari is merely presenting the views of
*ekatvavādin*s. This researcher is of the view that based on Bhartṛhari's position on *ekatva* at
other places, it could be said that the *kārikā* presents the *siddhāntapakṣa*.

scholar Prabhācandra calls Bhartṛhari a *śabdabrahmavādin,* and the Śaiva
Bhaṭṭa Nārāyaṇakaṇṭha describes Bhartṛhari as a *vivartavādin.* There are other
views, but the above sample suffices to show that whereas many works in
Sanskrit quote Bhartṛhari, there seems to be no consensus about which school
he belonged to.

Even when Bhartṛhari is accepted as a Vedāntin, again different views
obtain as to whether he is an Advaitin, Viśiṣṭādvaitin or a Dvaitin. For
instance, Ashok Aklujkar, in his "The Word is the World", opines (p. 462):

> As far as the creation of the world from the language principle
> is concerned, what principally sets Bhartṛhari apart from the
> Vedantins is that he has two versions of this creation. We may
> call them a weak version and a strong version. According to the
> latter, even the physical things of the world could be said to
> come from brahman. If they so come without changing the
> nature of brahman, they will have only an illusory or relative
> existence. Bhartṛhari would be a language monist very much in
> the fashion of Śaṃkara's Advaita. If the physical things come
> as a real transformation of brahman – a transformation in which
> brahman generates physical things, continuing into them
> without losing its own nature – Bhartṛhari would be close to
> Vallabha's Śuddha Advaita. . . . Does the weaker version make
> Bhartṛhari a dualist, since it contains the physical world and the

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[5] What Nakamura takes as evidence of agreement with a view, is considered as a fairly neutral
position by traditional thinkers. For instance, he writes "in . . . Viśiṣṭa Advaita tradition, in
later times, Bhartṛhari is seen as an authority on Vedānta" (Part 2, 457) because
Raṅgarāmānujācārya (A. D. ~16th century) quotes Bhartṛhari, with the words "*uktaṃ ca
Hariṇā*". However, it is perfectly possible for an Acārya to quote the words of a thinker from
the opponent's school as long as it is not opposed to *siddhānta.* So, the views of Nakamura,
when not verified, need to be seen in this light, with a touch of provisionality.

language principle as the two ultimates of his philosophy? Jan Houben (1995, p. 17 n. 40)[6] has suggested this as a consequence of attributing the version to Bhartṛhari.

Though modern researchers have these various views about Bhartṛhari's philosophy, in traditional circles, Bhartṛhari is held to be an Advaitin. Both Helārāja and Puṇyarāja, the ancient commentators on the Padakāṇḍa hold Bhartṛhari to be an Advaitin, as does Raghunatha Sharma, the twentieth century commentator on the entire Vākyapadīya. To the orthodox pundits, who learn Vedas, do *nityakarma*, teach grammar and subscribe to Śaṅkarācārya's teachings, Bhartṛhari is indeed an Advaitin. Author of the great doxographical work *Sarvadarśanasaṅgraha,* Mādhavācārya refers to the *sphoṭavādins* as "*vedāntanipuṇāḥ*" (p309):

tadāhur**vedāntanipuṇāḥ**:

yathā svapnaprapañco' yaṃ mayi māyāvijṛmbhitaḥ |

evaṃ jāgratprapañco'pi mayi māyāvijṛmbhitaḥ ||

1.3 Samanvaya

The word Samanvaya is formed by prefixing the prefixes *sam* and *anu* to the root *i* (īṅ gatau) and adding the *kṛt* affix *ac* in the sense of *bhāva*. It denotes an order, a connected sequence etc. In the present work, the intended sense is "mutual connection". Samanvaya of two schools would show that

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[6] The work referred to is: Houben, Jan E. M. 1995: "Bhartṛhari's Perspectivism (2): Bhartṛhari on the Primary Unit of Language." In *History and Rationality. The Skōvde Papers in the Hisoriography of Linguistics,* pp. 29-62, edited by Klaus D. Dutz and Kjell-Ake Forsgren. Munster: Nodus.

exposition of a topic by one school complements and supplements the treatment by the other, with both feeding off each other. Nyāya-Vaiśeṣika, Sāṅkhya-Yoga, and even Purvamīmāṃsā-Uttaramīmāṃsā are examples of such a Samanvaya amongst Darśanas. Thus a Samanvaya of the philosophies of Bhartṛhari and Śaṅkarācārya would show how the two are mutually connected. The connection could be analysed further into the heads of similarities, differences, and supplements and complements.

1.4 Arrangement of the Thesis and a few Preliminaries

In the following chapters, first a summary of Advaitavedānta is presented, followed by a resume of Bhartṛhari, covering the summary of Sphoṭavāda. Then in the fourth chapter, the similarities between Advaita and Śabdādvaita are listed followed by differences in the fifth chapter. In the sixth chapter, the complements and supplements in each of the schools are presented, leading to the conclusion, presented in the last chapter.

A few words about certain conventions used in the present thesis are in order. Firstly, important Sanskrit words are not translated because words like Śabda are not translatable. Further they are not italicised because these words are central, and not foreign, to the present thesis. However to set them apart, they are written with an initial capital letter. Familiarity with the technical words of Advaita is the basic pre-requisite to understand the Samanvaya between Śabdādvaita and Advaita. Advaita used without a qualification refers to the Advaita expounded by Śaṅkarācārya and Vedānta used without a qualification refers to Advaita. Brahmasūtrabhāṣya, without any further

qualification, refers to the Bhāṣya by Śaṅkarācārya on the Brahmasūtras. Sphoṭavāda and Śabdādvaita refer to the System expounded by Bhartṛhari.

Almost all Sanskrit sentences quoted are translated. Short Sanskrit texts are included in the running text. In such cases, usually translation is enclosed in brackets, or (rarely) incorporated in the main text while introducing the Sanskrit text quoted. Longer Sanskrit sentences are offset by an inch from the left margin and the translation is given below the text, again with an offset of one inch. All translations are by the researcher, except where attributed. Though some very good translations are available, especially for Vākyapadīya and Brahmasūtrabhāṣya, the researcher's own translation was preferred because general translations have either readability as a major objective or involve an explanation, whereas the present researcher exclusively focussed on fidelity in translation, while preferring his own explanation as a part of his analysis. Also, own translation would indicate the extent to which the researcher has understood the concepts of the texts.

It may be noted that this thesis includes a summary translation of *Vedāntasāra* (Section 2.2), a nearly complete translation of the *Brahmakāṇḍa* (Appendix A), a complete translation (with explanation at a few places) of the *Dravyasamuddeśa* (Section 3.2) and a summary translation of Śābarabhāṣya in the *Śabdanityatvādhikaraṇam* of Pūrvamīmāṃsā (Section 4.8).

Chapter 2: Advaita

2.1 Sources for Summary of Advaita

In traditional circles, Advaita without qualifications refers to the system expounded by Śaṅkarācārya in his Prasthānatrayī, i.e. commentaries on Upaniṣads, *Brahmasūtras* and *Bhagavadgītā*. Tradition also accepts many Prakaraṇa works (like *Upadeśasāhasrī* and *Vivekacūḍāmaṇi*) and many stotras (like *Bhajagovindam*) as written by Śaṅkarācārya[7]. Western scholars usually hold the view that there is more than one Śaṅkara and that only some of the works, traditionally attributed to Śaṅkarācārya, as the works of Śaṅkara who authored the *Brahmasūtrabhāṣya*. For instance, Karl Potter (Vol. III, p. 116) summarizes:

> The upshot of the most careful scholarship to date on the works of Śaṃkara, therefore, is that the following may without question be accepted as the work of the author of the *Brahmasūtrabhāṣya*: the *Brhadāraṇyakopaniṣadbhāṣya,* the *Taittirīyopaniṣadbhāṣya* and the *Upadeśasāhasrī.* There seems no real reason to question the inclusion of *Aitareyopaniṣadbhāṣya,* the *Chāndogyopaniṣadbhāṣya,* the *Muṇḍakopaniṣadbhāṣya* and the *Praśnopaniṣadbhāṣya* in this list. Beyond this point, however, is only speculation.

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[7] For instance, in the twenty volumes of "Complete Works of Śaṅkarācārya" printed by Vani Vilas Press in early twentieth century, sanctioned by Śṛṅgeri Mutt, twelve volumes are devoted to Prasthānatrayī, two each to Prakaraṇagranthas and Stotras, two volumes to *Prapañcasāratantra* (some consider this a Tāntric work) and one volume to commentary on *Viṣṇusahasranāma* and *Sanatsujātīya.*

In this thesis while nominally the Prasthānatrayī is taken as the corpus of Śaṅkarācārya's works, in practice it will be the seen that the works consulted are both narrower and deeper: narrower because, not all the works within Prasthānatrayī are consulted and deeper because often the commentators of Śaṅkarācārya and later scholars in that lineage are consulted. There is a reason for this – as the adage from *Mahābhāṣyam* says: *vyākhyānato viśeṣapratipattiḥ,* the special meaning is to be known from the commentary (under the first Vārtika, *siddhe śabdārthasaṃbandhe,* while asserting that the word "siddhaḥ" means "Nitya").

Having established the Prasthānatrayī as the source, a summary, then should be a summary of these works. However that, being too lengthy, is impractical. Then a short summary, such as the one given by Potter (Vol. III, pp. 6 to 8) might be in order. If this is deemed to summarise the points of interest to the particular summarizer, then the present researcher may give his own summary. Such an approach would suffer from a sampling bias. Hence a traditional summary is preferred. The question is whether such a traditional summary is available. Some say that the *Mahāpūrvapakṣa* in Rāmānujācārya's *Śrībhāṣyam* is one of the most comprehensive and accurate summaries of Advaita; yet, M. Hiriyanna (xi) has shown that the *Mahāpūrvapakṣa* is a summary of *Iṣṭasiddhi* of Vimuktātman. This gives a clue as to where a reliable summary of the system, from a sympathiser, may be found. Of all the Prakaraṇagranthas, one of the most popular and friendliest is the Vedāntasāra of Sadānanda Yati. Even though this is a short work, it has been further summarized by the researcher in the following section. Later, in the third section, some aspects not covered in Vedāntasāra are presented.

2.2 Summary of Vedāntasāra

In this section the Vedāntasāra is summarized by the present researcher. The attempt was to be faithful to the original, even if at the cost of readability for the purpose was to present the views of a traditional scholar. For this reason, the translations available were not resorted to. Further, rather than summarize the entire paragraph in the own words of the researcher, first sentences or sentence segments from Vedāntasāra which summarize the content of a given paragraph were taken and then the select text was translated. Numbers in parenthesis at the end of each paragraph refer to the paragraph number in the Nirnaya Sagar edition.

1.	Vedānta is that which is taught by the Upaniṣads and explicated by Śārirakasūtras (=Brahmasūtras) and others (3).

2.	Adhikārī, the person eligible to study Vedānta, must have accomplished the following:

	a.	Study of Vedas and Vedāṅgas

	b.	Understanding the meaning of Vedas

	c.	Cleansing of his Antaḥkaraṇa, the innermost instrument of cognition i.e. Citta or intellect, achieved by avoidance of Kāmya Karmas (rites performed to fulfil particular desires) and Niṣiddha (Prohibited) Karmas (rites), performance of Nitya (obligatory) Karmas (rites), Naimittika (occasioned by a particular event) Karmas, Prāyaścitta (Expiatory) Karmas, and Upāsanas (mental activities focussed on Saguṇa Brahman such as Śāṇḍilyavidyā) in this birth or earlier births

	d.	Be endowed with the Sādhanacatuṣṭaya, the quartet of means required to realise Brahman, namely

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<ol type="i" start="1">
The ability to discriminate between the Eternal and the ephemeral
Disinterest in the enjoyment of results of one's deeds, in this world or the other.
The six qualities of Śama (control of mind), Dama (control of sense organs), Uparati (cessation of engagement with worldly matters, or renunciation), Titīkṣā (equanimity towards opposing pairs such as sorrow and joy), Samādhāna or Samādhi (steadfastness of the fixation of mind in Brahman) and Śraddhā (faith – in Guru and Śāstra).
Possessing the desire to be liberated (4)

3. Subject matter is the identity of Jīva and Brahman and the entity to be known is the Pure Consciousness (Śuddha-caitanyam). (4)

4. The relation between the Pure Consciousness to be known and the texts that teach it, namely the Upaniṣads and other texts, is the relation between the thing to be known and that which teaches it. (4)

5. The benefit of studying Vedānta is the removal of nescience (Ajñānam) about the thing to be known and obtaining the bliss arising from the knowledge of one's own true form. (4)

6. The Adhikārī, scorched from the fire that the cycle of births and deaths (Saṃsāra) is, bearing appropriate gifts in his hands, approaches a Guru well versed in Vedas (Śrotriya) who having abandoned all rites is focussed solely in Brahman (Brahmaniṣṭha) and follows that Guru, like a man whose head is on fire approaches a body of water. (5)

7. The Guru, then with great grace, instructs the seeker through the method of deliberate attribution (Adhyāropa) and its subsequent withdrawal (Apavāda)[8]. (5)

8. Adhyāropa (Superimposition) is the superimposition of that which does not exist on that which actually exists, the way a snake is superimposed on a rope. (6)

9. The entity which exists is Brahman, which is Sat (the really Existing), Cit (consciousness), Ānanada (bliss), Ananta (endless) and Advaya (without a second). That which does not exist is the entire collection of insentient things starting with Ajñāna (ignorance or nescience). (6)

10. Ajñāna is an entity (i.e. not merely an absence of Jñāna), opposed to Jñāna (cognition), made up of the three qualities of Sattva, Rajas and Tamas, and cannot be described as either existent or non-existent. (6)

11. This Ajñāna is said to be one when it is treated as the collective, and is considered to be many when it is treated severally. (7)

12. Caitanya (pure consciousness) which has the collective Ajñāna as its adjunct (Upādhi) is endowed with the qualities such as omniscience, lordship over all and control over all, and is called variously as Īśvara (Lord), Jagatkāraṇam (cause of the world), Antaryāmī (Soul, the internal controller) and Avyakta (the unevolved)[9]. This collective Ajñāna is called the Kāraṇaśarīra (the causal body) of Īśvara because it is the cause of everything; Ānandamayakośa (the sheath of bliss) because it covers, like a sheath, the Caitanya, full of bliss, within and

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[8] *sampradāyavidāṃ vacanam - adhyāropāpavādābhyāṃ niṣprapañcaṃ prapañcyate* – Śāṅkarabhāṣya on Bhagavadgītā 13.14.

[9] Avyakta meaning unmanifest would be Śuddhacaitanyam, i.e. Brahman, but here Avyakta means "unevolved", the primary principle, and the rest being Vyakta, or evolved from this primary principle. In Sāṅkhya, Prakṛti has this place. Compare: *hetumadanityamavyāpi sakriyamanekamāśritaṃ liṅgam, sāvayavaṃ paratantraṃ vyaktaṃ viparītamavyaktam* - Sāṅkhyakārikā, 10)

the difference between the adjunct and the object is not understood; and Suṣupti (Dissolution)[10] as it is the place of cessation of everything; and for that reason it is also called place of dissolution of all gross and subtle bodies. (7)

13. Caitanya which has the individual Ajñāna as it adjunct (Upādhi) has qualities like knowing little (Alpajñatvam) and not being the lord (Anīśvaratvam) is called Prājña[11], one who knows little, as it illuminates only one Ajñāna. Prājña's smallness is on account of the limited illumination, which is due to the lack of clarity in its adjunct. It is called the Kāraṇaśarīra (causal body) of the individual, because it is the cause of Ahaṃkāra (ego); Ānandamayakośa (the sheath of bliss) because it covers, like a sheath, the Caitanya, full of bliss, within and the difference between the adjunct and the object is not understood; and Suṣupti (dreamless sleep) as it is the place of cessation of everything, i.e. the waking and dream states; and for that reason it is also called place of dissolution of the gross and subtle body. (7)

14. There is no difference between the collective and individual Ajñāna, just like there is no difference between trees and a forest, or between a water body and its waters. Similarly, there is no difference between Īśvara and Prājña, both being nothing but the Caitanya with these two kinds of Ajñāna as adjuncts, just like there is no difference between Ākāśa, space, delimited by the trees or forest; or Ākāśa, sky, reflected in a water body or its waters. (8)

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[10] Normally Suṣuptiḥ means "sleep", but in the current context, it is the "great sleep" or Pralaya (Dissolution) as everything including Ākāśa etc. is said to dissolve in this state, as explained in the commentary. *Vidvanmanorañjanī* of Rāmatīrtha reads: *sarva ākāśādaya uparamante'sminniti sarvoparamo'jñānam. tādṛgbhāvātsuṣuptirmahāsuṣuptiḥ pralaya iti yāvat.*

[11] *Prājñaḥ* is explained by the commentator Rāmatīrtha as *prāyeṇa ajñaḥ,* "more or less ignorant".

15. The substratum of Ajñāna and the Caitanya associated with Ajñāna (or which has Ajñāna as an adjunct), that which does not have any adjunct is called the Fourth State or Turīya. This Śuddhacaitanya, Pure Consciousness, when indistinct from Ajñāna or Caitanya associated with Ajñāna, just like iron and fire are indistinct in a hot iron ingot, is the literal meaning (Vācya) of Mahāvākyas, and when distinct is the indicated meaning (Lakṣya) of Mahāvākyas. (9)

16. This Ajñāna has two Śaktis (capacities) called Āvaraṇaśakti (the capacity which covers up Reality) and Vikṣepaśakti (the capacity which projects concepts). Just like a cloud which, even though small, obstructs the Sun which is many miles wide from the sight of the observer as if enveloping it, the Āvaraṇaśakti is that capacity which, even though it is delimited, obstructs the Ātman, which is not delimited by anything, from the thought of the observer as if enveloping it. Only when Ātman is associated with this Āvaraṇaśakti, is it possible for it to have the trifling worldly ideas[12] consisting of agency, enjoyership, joy, sorrow and delusion (moha), just like it becomes possible for snakeness to occur in rope covered with one's own Ajñāna (nescience). The Vikṣepaśakti is that capacity of Ajñāna which projects the world of details such as projection of the sky etc. on the Ātman covered by itself (Ajñāna), just like the Ajñāna related to the rope projects snake etc. on the rope covered by itself. (10)

17. Like the two capacities, Caitanya (Consciousness) covered by Ajñāna becomes the efficient cause (of the world) when It Itself is considered, and the material cause when its adjunct is considered, just like a spider

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[12] *Tucchasaṃsārabhāvanā* is the original world. Saṃsāra is the continuous cycle of birth and death, which belongs to the domain of Ajñāna. As long as one is trapped in this cycle notions of agency, enjoyership etc. persist. This is considered *tuccham,* vain, empty or trifling as the ultimate truth is that the Ātman is immutable and is always only the witness (sākṣī).

is the efficient cause of its web when it itself is considered and is the material cause when its body is considered. (11)

18.   Ākāśa (space) is created from Caitanya associated with Ajñāna with the Vikṣepaśakti and in which the Tamoguṇa is dominant[13]; from Ākāśa, Vāyu (air) is created; from Vāyu, Agni (fire); from Agni, Āp (water); and from Āp, Pṛthivī (earth). Dominance of Tamoguṇa in the Cause follows from the predominance of inertness in the effect. Then, the three Guṇas of Sattva, Rajas and Tamas arise in Ākāśa etc. from the Guṇa of the cause. These subtle elements, i.e. Ākāśa etc., when not quintupled[14] are called Tanmātras. From these, the subtle bodies and gross bodies are born. (12)

19.   The subtle bodies (Sūkṣmaśarīras), also called Liṅgaśarīras, have seventeen constituent limbs, namely the five sense-organs (eyes, ears, nose, tongue and skin), the five organs of action (mouth (all the sub-systems involved in speech), hands, legs, anus and genitals), the five airs (Prāṇa, Apāna, Vyāna, Udāna and Samāna), Buddhi (intellect) and Manas (heart). Buddhi is the decisive mode[15] of the Antaḥkaraṇa (innermost organ)[16]. Manas is that mode of the Antaḥkaraṇa which

[13] All matter, *Prakṛti,* is held to be a combination of three Guṇas, qualities: Sattva, Rajas and Tamas; all the three may be in equal proportion, or as is more usual, one quality dominates. Since Ajñāna is a Bhāvapadārtha (a positive entity, i.e. not merely an absence of Jñāna) it also consists of three Guṇas, and that Ajñāna in which the *tamoguṇa* is dominant is *tamaḥpradhānājñāna.*

[14] Following the *trivṛtkaraṇa* described in *Chāndogyopaniṣad 6.3.2,* Advaita holds that all matter is quintupled, i.e. the gross element of Space is made up of one half of the subtle element of space and the other half consisting of the other four subtle elements (air, fire, water and earth) in equal proportions. Similarly, the gross element of air is made up of the subtle element of air (one half) and the subtle elements of space, fire, water and earth occurring in equal proportions in the other half. This is called Pañcīkaraṇa, quintupling.

[15] The original word used here is *vṛtti.* In the Advaitic epistemology, the Citta takes the form of the thing that is being cognized, thus Cittavṛtti is of the form of a pot, when the eyes see a pot.

[16] Buddhi is that mode (Vṛtti) of the Antaḥkaraṇa which firmly asserts that "I am Brahman" and Manas is the mode, in which doubts such as "Am I Brahman, the pure Consciousness, or the body" arise, as explained by the commentator, Rāmatīrtha. Manas is the seat of emotions, popularly referred to as "heart", and Buddhi corresponds to "head".

wishes for something and in which doubts arise. Citta (the seat of remembrance) and Ahaṃkāra (ego) are also a part of Buddhi and Manas. This Buddhi along with the sense-organs is the Vijñānamayakośa (the sheath of intelligence). This person is said to be the Jīva, the one who transacts in the world with qualities of agency, enjoyership, happiness, sorrow, and a sense of "I"ness, and is the one who enjoys the fruits in this world. Manas along with sense-organs is the Manomayakośa (the sheath of emotions). The five airs (prāṇapañcakam) along with the five organs of action is the Prāṇamayakośa (the sheath of vitalitas, or the vital sheath). Amongst these sheaths, the Vijñānamayakośa is of the form of agent and has the capacity for cognition. Manomayakośa is of the form of instrument and has the capacity to desire. Prāṇamayakośa is of the form of work and has the capacity to act. The three sheaths together are said to be the Sūkṣmaśarīra, the subtle body. (13)

20.   Here also, when viewed as one, just like a forest or a water body, the Sūkṣmaśarīra is collectively one, and when viewed severally, like trees and water, it is manifold. (14)

21.   The Sthūlabhūtas (gross elements) are quintupled[17]. From these quintupled gross elements is created, the Brahmāṇḍa (universe) consisting of the seven worlds of i) Bhūḥ, ii) Bhuvaḥ, iii) Svaḥ, iv) Mahaḥ, v) Janaḥ, vi) Tapaḥ and vii) Satyam, each one progressively above the preceding, and the seven nether worlds of viii) Atala, ix) Vitala, x) Sutala, xi) Rasātala, xii) Talātala, xiii) Mahātala, and xiv) Pātāla, each progressively beneath the preceding; and within that universe, the four kinds of gross-bodied creatures and food etc.

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[17] This is from paragraph 15 in the text of Vedāntasāra.

appropriate to these creatures. The four kinds of gross bodies are a) Jarāyuja (born by piercing the placenta), b) Aṇḍaja (born from an egg), c) Svedaja (born from sweat) and d) Udbhijja (born by piercing the earth and shooting upwards). Jarāyujas are born from the Jarāyu[18] (placenta, or the ectoderm, the outer skin of an embryo), for instance humans and mammals. Aṇḍajas, like birds and snakes, are born from eggs. Svedajas like lice and flies are born from sweat[19]. Udbhjjas like trees and creepers are born by piercing the earth. (16)

22. Here also, the Sthūlaśarīra of all the four-fold creatures is one like a forest or water body when viewed jointly, and is manifold when viewed severally like trees or water. (17)

23. The combination of the worlds of the Sthūlaśarīra, Sūkṣmaśarīra and Kāraṇaśarīra is one Mahāprapañca, great world, just like a great forest range is a combination of many forests, and a great lake system is the combination of many water bodies. Caitanya, Consciousness, associated with this Mahāprapañca, from Vaiśvānara to Īśvara, is one only just like the Ākāśa delimited by many forests is one, or the Ākāśa reflected in many water bodies is one. When the Caitanya is not differentiated from the Mahāprapañca and the Caitanya associated with the Mahāprapañca, like iron and fire are not differentiated in a hot lump of iron, It (Caitanya) is the literal meaning (vācyārtha) or primary sense of the Vedic sentence "sarvaṃ khalvidaṃ brahma" and when it is

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[18] Jarāyu is etymologically "that which withers away", like the skin shed by a moulting snake. It could mean placenta or ectoderm. The idea is that these creatures, like mammals, are born with all organs fully developed.

[19] Modern biology has shown that both lice and flies are also born from eggs. Since body warmth is essential for lice, they may have been held to be born from sweat. The ancient term was *abigenous* creatures, referring to life which evolved spontaneously, i.e. from non-organic sources. One of the earliest sources of this four-fold classification of creatures is found in the Āyurveda text, Suśrutasaṃhitā, Sūtrasthāna, Chapter 1: *tatra caturvidho bhūtagrāmaḥ saṃsvedajajarāyujāṇḍajodbhijjasaṃjñaḥ.*

differentiated, it is the secondary meaning.[20] In this way the superimposition of Avastu (not the Thing, i.e. Mahāprapañca) upon Vastu (the Thing, i.e. Brahman or Caitanya), called Adhyāropa, is generally demonstrated. (18)

24. Apavāda (dissolution of error) is the dissolution of Avastu, and the world projected due to nescience, which is only the apparent modification of Vastu, and the ascertainment that Vastu, Caitanya, alone is the Truth which remains, similarly to the dissolution of the apparent modification of the rope into snake, and the ascertainment that rope alone is. It is said that "Vikāra, modification, is the wrong knowledge of a thing due to the change in the thing (such as milk turning to curds), and Vivarta, apparent modification, is the wrong knowledge of a thing though there is no change in the thing itself (such as a rope being mistaken for a snake)". (21)

25. Now the meaning of the Mahāvākya is being described[21]. This sentence, "Tat tvam asi" (that thou art) conveys the undivided meaning (akhaṇḍārtha) through three relations, namely having the same substrate (i.e. the two words – *tat* and *tvam* – refer to the same entity), the relation of qualifier and qualified between the entities denoted by the two words, and the relation of a Lakṣya (indicated meaning or extended meaning) and Lakṣaṇa (indicator or the word whose extended

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[20] "sarvam khalvidam brahma" (Chāndogyopaniṣad 3.14.1) means "all of this is Brahman". If Caitanya and its adjunct, the Mahāprapañca, are considered as one (tādātmyabhāva) then the meaning of the sentence is tenable, and hence it is held to be the primary sense. When the two, Caitanya and its adjunct, are considered as separate, the question arises as to how everything can be Brahman. Only Caitanya can be Brahman and the adjunct, Mahāprapañca, needs to be something other than Caitanya. To resolve this, here the secondary sense of "sarvam" namely "all that is Real, which persists after nescience is removed" is to be taken.

[21] The reason for taking up the discussion is that the sentence "tat tvam asi" (that thou art) and other such Mahāvākyas seem, at first cut, to be absurd or incorrectly framed. For instance, when we say "Apple is an orange", what are we to understand? If apples and oranges were different, then their identity, and hence the sentence proposing their identity, is absurd, because they are different by definition. If they are the same, the sentence is absurd because it is against the worldly practice of having two distinct words meaning two different entities.

meaning is the Lakṣya) between the two words and the Inner Self (pratyagātman). . . . The relation of having the same substrate is as follows. In the sentence "that Devadatta is this"[22] the signifier (vācaka) *that* - which denotes the Devadatta qualified by *that* time period − and the signifier *this* − which denotes the Devadatta qualified by the present time period − are related by having their purport (tātparya) in the same entity, that is both signifiers have the same substrate. Similarly in the present sentence "tat tvam asi" that signifier *tat* which denotes the Caitanya qualified by imperceptibility (parokṣatva) etc. and the signifier *tvam* which denotes the Caitanya qualified by immediateness etc. (aparokṣatva) are related by having their purport in the same Caitanya. The relation of qualifier and qualified is now described. In the example sentence ("that Devadatta is this") the one denoted by the signifier *that* − i.e. the Devadatta qualified by *that* time period − and the one denoted by the signifier *this* − i.e. Devadatta qualified by *this* time period − are mutually related as qualified and qualifier because they differentiate Devadatta from other instances of Devadatta and others as well.[23] In the present sentence as well ("tat tvam asi"), the one denoted by signifier *tat* − i.e. the Caitanya qualified by imperceptibility (pakrokṣatva) etc. − and the one denoted by the signifier *tvam* − i.e. the Caitanya qualified by perceptibility (aparokṣatva) − are mutually related as qualified and qualifier because

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[22] The Sanskrit sentence is "so'yaṃ devadattaḥ". The sense of the sentence is that *this Devadatta* being perceived in front is the same person as was seen earlier: *that Devadatta*.

[23] A *Viśeṣaṇa* (qualifier) is defined as that which differentiates. Thus the adjective "blue" in the phrase "blue lotus" differentiates the flower lotus from lotuses of other hues such as white and red. Now, in the case of Devadatta, let us say that there are n instances of Devadatta: D_1, D_2, D_3, . . . D_i, D_j, . . . D_n (each corresponding to each year of Devadatta's life, say). Let us further assume that we refer to D_i when we say "*that* Devadatta" and to D_j by "this Devadatta". Now when we say "that Devadatta is this", we are saying that $D_i = D_j$. Here D_i is a qualifier of D_j because from the sentence we get that meaning that D_j is the same as D_i, and not D_1, D_2 etc., or for that matter that D_j is not Yajñadatta, Viṣṇudatta etc. In other words, D_i is differentiating D_j from both D_1, D_2 etc. and also others like Yajñadatta and Viṣṇudatta. Similarly D_j is a qualifier of D_i, because it differentiates D_i from others.

they differentiate each other from others. The relation of Lakṣya and Lakṣaṇa between the Inner Self and the signifiers *tat* and *tvam* is now explained. In the example sentence, being qualified by *that* time period and *this* time period, are the *Aṃśas* (parts) which are contradictory in the two signifiers *that* and *this,* or the entities denoted by them. The signifiers abandon these Aṃśas in conflict, and have the relation of Lakṣaṇa and Lakṣya, with the non-contradictory Aṃśa, namely, the entity Devadatta.[24] This is called Bhāgalakṣaṇā. (23)

26. Therefore, the sentence "that Devadatta is this" or its meaning indicates, by extension, the non-contradictory Aṃśa of Devadatta alone, abandoning the Aṃśa of qualification by *that* time period and *this* time period, as there is a contradiction in part of the sentence-meaning which equates Devadatta qualified by *that* time period and Devadatta qualified by *this* time period. Similarly, the sentence ("tat tvam asi"), or its meaning, indicates, by extension, only the non-contradictory impartite Caitanya[25], abandoning the Aṃśa of qualification by imperceptibility and perceptibility, as there is a

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[24] In other words, the two signifiers denote the non-contradictory Devadatta (not qualified by any time period) through the denotation process called Lakṣaṇā. While various definitions exist for the denotation process called Lakṣaṇā, a summary of denotation processes from *Kāvyaprakāśa* may be useful. Poeticians hold that a signifier denotes meaning through three process of denotation: Main Denotation, *Abhidhā*; Secondary or Extended denotation, *Lakṣaṇā*; and Suggestion, *Vyañjanā*. In Abhidhā, a word denotes a meaning directly, as in a tree or a fruit. In Lakṣaṇā, the meaning denoted is not direct, but an extended meaning, i.e. *Lakṣya*, as in the sentence "New Delhi ordered a probe", the signifier *New Delhi* denotes the Government of India, and not the city of New Delhi, which is the direct meaning. Mammaṭa, the author of *Kāvyaprakāśa* defines Lakṣaṇā as that in which a) there is hindrance for the main denotation process (i.e. New Delhi cannot possibly mean the city), b) but the intended meaning is related to the main meaning (i.e. Government of India has its seat in New Delhi, say unlike Mumbai); and c) there must be a purpose in using it or an established general usage to that effect (it is a common established usage to refer to the Government of a particular country by the name of its Capital). In Vyañjanā, there is no hindrance to the main meaning, but the suggested meaning extends way beyond the main meaning. For instance in the famous poem *Stopping by Woods on Snowy Evening* by Robert Frost, the line "And miles to go before I sleep" indicates something far more significant than the distance to the home of the poet. Advaita proposes an additional process of Denotation of Partial Extension (*Bhāgalakṣaṇā*), wherein a partially extended meaning is denoted. This is also called Jahadajahallakṣaṇā.

[25] Impartite Caitanya, Akhaṇḍacaitanya, means the Caitanya devoid of any parts, such as the one qualified by imperceptibility etc., or that qualified by perceptibility.

contradiction in a part of the sentence-meaning which equates the Caitanya qualified by imperceptibility and perceptibility. (27)

27. Now the meaning of the sentence "aham brahma asmi" (I am Brahman) is being explained. When, after thus making clear the meaning of the signifiers *tat* and *tvam* by way of Adhyāropa and Apavāda, the Ācārya has made the student understand the Impartite meaning[26] through the sentence, then, in the Adhikārin (eligible person) a Cittavṛtti made to the assume the form of the Impartite Brahman arises through the comprehension that "I am the eternal, pure, intelligent, unbound, true Brahman, the one without an end, without a second and Supreme Bliss itself. . . . (28)

28. Since till such a Consciousness, which is the real nature of Self (svarūpacaitanya) is realized, practice of Sravaṇa (listening), Manana (contemplation), Nididhyāsana (firm establishment) and Samādhi is required, they are also described. Sravaṇa means understanding, through the six means of ascertaining meaning[27], the real purport of all Vedāntas, i.e. Upaniṣadic sentences in the One Brahman, that is without a second. Manana is constantly meditating about the Brahman, without a second, which has been heard earlier, using logic appropriate to Vedāntic sentences[28]. Nididhyāsana is the constant stream of cognition of the Thing without second, i.e. Brahman, due to the absence of any cognition of anything which is opposed to Brahman.

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[26] Impartite meaning (Akhaṇḍārtha) of the sentence indicates the Impartite Caitanya, as explained in earlier passages.

[27] *upakramopasaṃhārāvabhāso'pūrvatā phalam| arthavādopapattī ca liṅgaṃ tātparyanirṇaye*‖ (Attributed to Bṛhatsaṃhitā, which is presently unavailable. The roots of this can be found in Pūrvamīmāṃsā). The six marks for fixing purport are i. Beginning and ending, ii. Repetition, iii. Uniqueness, iv. Consequence, v. Eulogy and vi. Reasoning.

[28] In Vedānta, only logic which is sanctioned by Śruti – Śrutyanugṛhītatarka – is accepted as a valid means of knowledge. See Section 2.3.4 *Only reasoning not opposed to Śruti is a valid Pramāṇa* of this Thesis for a detailed discussion.

Samādhi (profound meditation) is of two types, Savikalpasamādhi and Nirvikalpasamādhi. Savikalpasamādhi is the firm establishment of one's thought processes (cittavṛtti), which are of the same form of Brahman, in Brahman, the One without second, without the requirement for dissolution of differences such as the knower, known and knowledge. In that state even in duality, the non-dual Thing appears, just like mud being the one which appears in an earthen elephant. In Nirvikalpasamādhi, on account of the dissolution of the differences such as knower, known and knowledge, the thought process, which as earlier is as the same form of Brahman, is so firmly established in Brahman that it is non-different from Brahman. There only Brahman, the One without a Second, appears due to non-appearance of the thought process, caused to be of the same form as Brahman, just like (in salt-water) salt caused to be of the same form as water does not appear and water alone appears. (30)

29. The Aṅgas – constituent elements – of (Nirvikalpa) Samādhi are: i) Yama (Restraint), ii) Niyama (Observance), iii) Āsana (Posture), iv) Prāṇāyāma (Breath regulation), v) Pratyāhāra (Abstraction), vi) Dhāraṇā (Concentration), vii) Dhyāna (Contemplation) and viii) Samādhi (profound meditation). The last one, i.e. Samādhi, is the Savikalpasamādhi which has already been described.[29] (31)

30. There are four obstructions which occur to the Nirvikalpasamādhi, namely, i) Laya (merging of mind in sleep), ii) Vikṣepa (diversion of mind to objects other than Brahman), iii) Kaṣāya (hidden desires) and iv) Rasāsvāda (experience of the bliss of Samādhi)[30]. (32)

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[29] These eight are as listed in the Yogasūtra 2.29, and described in detail in the Yogasūtras 2.30 to 3.3.

[30] These four obstacles are mentioned by Gauḍapāda in *Māṇḍūkyakārikā* (3.44 to 3.46)

31.   When the Citta, mind, which is unobstructed by the above four obstacles, is steady like the flame of a lamp in a place without air, and situated only in the Undivided Consciousness, that state is known as Nirvikalpasamādhi. Now the Jīvanmukta is described. Jivānmukta is the one situated in Brahman (Brahmaniṣṭha), the one who is free of all bonds as his nescience is removed and so are the causes of the nescience, namely Sañcitakarma (accumulated karma, the result of all one's actions – good or bad – in all previous births), doubt (about Brahman), reversion (from Brahman) etc. His nescience is removed because he realized his own form, the Undivided Brahman, by knowing the Undivided Brahman and by harassing the nescience about Brahman. (34).

2.3 Few Aspects of Vedānta not covered in Vedāntasāra

Vedāntasāra does not cover a few topics, which will be covered here:

i.   Nityatva of Śabda – that Śabda is eternal

ii.   Śabdaprabhavatvam of Jagat – that Śabda is the source of this universe

iii.   Śruti being the Pramāṇa to know Brahman

iv.   Only Śrutyanugṛhītatarka – reasoning which is not opposed to Veda – is a valid Pramāṇa

v.   Upāyatva of Veda – that Veda is an Upāya to know Brahman. An Upāya, a device, is that which is used to accomplish the desire object and then later is discarded, like the use of scaffolding while building something.

vi.   Multiple levels of reality

vii.   Two levels of unreal

viii.   Ajātivāda

2.3.1 Śabdanityatva

Following the stance of Pūrvamīmāṃsā, Advaita holds Śabda to be
Nitya, eternal or immutable. While this topic is treated in full in the
Śabdanityatvādhikaraṇa of Ślokavārtika, it is reaffirmed in Brahmasūtra 1.2.29
(*ata eva nityatvam*). The arguments are not substantially different and hence
are not being elaborated here. Within Pūrvamīmāṃsā, Śabda, Artha and their
relationship is taken to be *autpattika* i.e. natural. The concept of Śabdanityatva
is central to achieve an independent status as a Pramāṇa to Veda. Since Śruti
occupies a central place as a Pramāṇa in both Pūrvamīmāṃsā and
Uttaramīmāṃsā (See Section 2.3.3 *Śruti is the only means to know Brahman*
starting on p26 for a detailed discussion), the arguments of Pūrvamīmāṃsā
may be taken as acceptable to Advaita as well.

2.3.2 Śabda is the Source of the Universe

That Śabda is the source of the Universe is clearly stated – *ataḥ
prabhavāt* – in Brahmasūtra 1.3.28 (*śabda iti cenna, ataḥ prabhavāt
pratyakṣānumānābhyām*). This does not mean that Brahman ceases to be the
Upādānakāraṇa (material cause) and Nimittakāraṇa (efficient cause) of the
world. As Śaṅkarācārya explains in the commentary on the Sūtra

> na cedaṃ śabdaprabhavatvaṃ brahmaprabhavatvavad
>
> upādānakāraṇatvābhiprāyeṇocyate. kathaṃ tarhi? sthite
>
> vācakātmanā nitye śabde nityārthasambandhini

śabdavyavahārayogyārthavyaktiniṣpattiḥ 'ataḥ prabhavaḥ'
ityucyate.

This origination [of the world] form Śabda is not spoken of in
the sense of origination from a material case, as is done in the
case of origination [of the world] from Brahman. How, then, [is
it spoken of]? Only when the immutable Śabda capable of
expressing a meaning, with an eternal relation to its Artha
exists, would the production of a particular or an individual (i.e.
any given entity), fit to be denoted by the use of a given Śabda,
happen? Hence, it is said to originate from Śabda.

This is later substantiated within the commentary on the same aphorism, on
how Brahman pronounces "bhūḥ" and creates "bhūḥ" (earth) and so on.
Elsewhere that Brahman is the material cause of the world is established in
great detail in the *Prakṛtyadhikaraṇam* (1.4.23 to 1.4.27). In the commentary
on 2.3.13, the discussion is about whether the elements (space etc.) create their
own products by themselves or whether it is Brahman, existing as the soul of
these elements, who produces the effect. On strength of Liṅga, indicatory
mark, it is established that it is Brahman who creates everything.

It may be noted here that while Brahman is repeatedly asserted as the
source and cause of this world, the exact relation of other "causes" such as
Śabda to Brahman are not mentioned in detail. It may be further noted that this
omission need not imply identify. There are two possibilities, at least. First,
the other causes may be taken as Śaktis of Brahman, or they might be taken as
associated with Brahman, for creation to happen.

2.3.3 Śruti is the only means to know Brahman

26

Amongst the Pramāṇas, there is a general order. Pratyakṣa is stronger than Anumāna, except in a few cases such as *alātacakra* (when a firebrand, i.e. a piece of burning coal or wood, is tied to a thread and rotated, or when children rotate a burning sparkler during Dīpāvalī, one gets an impression of a circle of fire, which is not true) and *ādityagati* (the movement of Sun, which cannot be directly perceived but only inferred by observing the position of Sun at two different points in time). Only when a particular object is not accessible to both these Pramāṇas is Veda taken to be a valid Pramāṇa. This is stated clearly in Sāṃkhyakārikā –

> sāmānyatastu dṛṣṭādatīndriyāṇāṃ pratītiranumānāt ǀ
> tasmādapi cāsiddhaṃ parokṣamāptāgamāt siddham ǁ 6 ǁ
>
> Generally, [an object is known] through Perception. Knowledge of that which is beyond the sense organs is from Inference. That which is not obtained from Inference as well is known through the testimony of a reliable person.

Śabarasvāmin while commenting on Pūrvamīmāṃsāsūtra 1.1.5 (*autpattikasūtram)* enunciates a similar position. Specifically he says (37)

> śāstraṃ śabdavijñānād asannikṛṣṭe'rthe vijñānam.
>
> Śāstra is the means of knowing an entity (Artha) not in contact [with the sense organs] through the knowledge of Śabda, i.e. through Verbal Testimony.

In his commentary on the Aitareyabrāhmaṇam, Sāyaṇācārya quotes a verse (1):

pratyakṣeṇānumityā vā yastūpāyo na budhyate।

enaṃ vindanti vedena tasmādvedasya vedatā॥

The "means" [of obtaining knowledge] (Upāya) which is not understood through Pratyakṣa and Anumāna, that means is known through Veda; and hence the Veda-ness (i.e. the property of providing knowledge) of Veda.

In these discussions, one aspect is not emphasised but is nevertheless important. Each of the Pramāṇas has its own sphere of influence, or to put it more accurately, valid Pramāṇas do not contradict each other; whenever there is a seeming contradiction, one Pramāṇa prevails over the others. For instance, in the Bhāṣya on Bhagavadgītā 18.66 (p560, Vol. 12, Complete Works of Śaṅkarācārya):

na hi śrutiśatamapi " śīto'gniraprakāśo vā " iti bruvat prāmāṇyamupaiti. yadi brūyāt " śīto'gniraprakāśo vā " iti, tathāpi arthāntaraṃ śruteḥ vivakṣitaṃ kalpyam, prāmāṇyānyathānupapatteḥ, na tu pramāṇāntaraviruddhaṃ svavacanaviruddhaṃ vā.

Not even a hundred Vedic sentences stating "Fire is cold or dark" would obtain validity. If they do state "Fire is cold or dark", even then a different meaning, not contradicting other Pramāṇas or the words of the sentence needs to be offered.

The same idea – that each Pramāṇa has its own sphere of application is to be found in the commentary on 2.1.13:

yadyapi śrutiḥ pramāṇaṃ svaviṣaye bhavati, tathāpi

pramāṇāntareṇa viṣayāpahāre'nyaparā bhavitumarhati, yathā

mantrārthavādau ; tarko'pi svaviṣayādanyatrāpratiṣṭhitaḥ syāt,

yathā dharmādharmayoḥ

Even though Śruti is a Pramāṇa in its own domain, in matters

falling under the sphere of applicability of another Pramāṇa,

Śruti deserves to be interpreted accordingly (i.e. without

contradicting the other Pramāṇa), like in the case of Mantra and

Arthavāda[31]. Similarly Tarka is also not established in topics

other than where it is applicable, for instance in Dharma and

Adharma[32].

Śaṅkarācārya himself states very clearly that Veda is the only means

available to know Brahman, in his commentary on 1.1.2

vākyārthavicāraṇādhyavasānanirvṛttā hi brahmāvagatiḥ,

nānumānādipramāṇāntaranirvṛttā

The realisation of Brahman is achieved only by the

ascertainment of the true meaning of Vedāntic sentences, which

itself results from a deliberation on those sentences and not

from other Pramāṇas such as Inference.

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[31] Pūrvamīmāṃsā divides Vedic sentences into four (or five): Vidhi (+Niṣedha), Arthavāda, Mantra and Nāmadheya. Vidhi sentences are the injunctions laid down by Veda. Arthavādas are corroborative statements, which support Vidhivākyas. Arthavādas are, accordingly, not interpreted literally but in a secondary or figurative manner. Mantra is a Jñāpaka, or that which reminds. Nāmadheya is the residual category. Only Vidhivākyas are to be taken literally, not others. In a sentence like "svargakāmo yajeta" (one desirous of heaven ought to perform a sacrifice), the injunction is that if one wants to attain heaven, a sacrifice ought to be performed. However in a sentence like "vāyurvai kṣepiṣṭhā devatā" (Taittirīyasaṃhitā 2.1.1.1) (Vāyu, the wind god, is the fastest), it is not to be taken literally that Vāyu is the fastest amongst gods. Rather, it is interpreted as "Vāyu, as a benefactor, is very quick" thereby supporting the original Vidhivākya exhorting the hearer to perform a sacrifice.

[32] This is the statement by an opponent, but it is perfectly acceptable to the Siddhāntin. This is a case where an opponent tries to arrive at a conclusion at variance with the view of the System, while using a rule which is acceptable to Vedānta.

Another instance is to be found under 2.1.3

> tattvajñānaṃ tu vedāntavākyebhya eva bhavati
>
> Knowledge of the Noumenon (Brahman) is possible only through the sentences of Vedānta.

Another instance is found in commentary on 2.1.6.

> yattūktaṃ pariniṣpannatvād brahmaṇi pramāṇāntarāṇi sambhaveyuriti, tadapi manorathamātram; rūpādyabhāvāddhi nāyamarthaḥ pratyakṣasya gocaraḥ; liṅgādyabhāvācca nānumānādīnām ; āgamamātrasamadhigamya eva tvayamartho dharmavat.
>
> Whatever is said about other Pramāṇas being possible in knowing Brahman due to Its perfect and complete existence, that is merely one's imagination. This entity (Brahman) being devoid of form etc. is not at all amenable to Perception; not to Inference etc., due to the absence of Liṅga (or hetu or sādhana, which indicates the existence of something to be inferred). This entity (Brahman) is to be known only through Āgama (=Veda) like Dharma.

Then Śaṅkarācārya goes on to quote a number of Śruti and Smṛti sentences in support. There are other such statements of Śaṅkarācārya to be found in the commentary on 2.1.27 (śabdamūlaṃ ca śabdapramāṇakaṃ brahma nendriyādipramāṇakam), 2.1.31 (śrutyavagāhyamevedamatigambhīraṃ brahma na tarkāvagāhyam), 2.3.1

(śrutiśca naḥ pramāṇamatīndriyavijñotpattau[33]), in his commentary on Bhagavadgītā verse 2.18 (śāstraṃ tvantyaṃ pramāṇam) the usage of the phrase *śāstrapramāṇakatvam brahmaṇaḥ* in commentary on 1.1.4, or the second explanation of the Sūtra *śāstrayonitvāt* 1.1.3. In fact the entire exercise of writing a commentary on Brahmasūtras is an assertion of the fact that Brahman can be known only through Śruti, as explained below.

The structure of Brahmasūtras is that there are 555 Sūtras divided into 191 Adhikaraṇas (according to the text followed by Śaṅkarācārya). Each Adhikaraṇa deals with five aspects[34]:

i.   Viṣaya (the topic which is discussed)

ii.   Saṃśaya (doubt)

iii.   Pūrvapakṣa (the erroneous explanation of the opponent)

iv.   Siddhānta (thesis)

v.   Saṅgati (context of discussion)

Most Adhikaraṇas have one or more Vedic sentences (viṣayavākyas) as the topic of discussions. In other words, the entire Brahmasūtras are devoted to fix the meaning of certain Vedic sentences. This is the reason why Vedānta is called Uttaramīmāṃsā: it is but a continuation of Pūrvamīmāṃsā in that it is also an exegesis of Veda. In fact Śaṅkarācārya himself states this unambiguously in the commentary on 1.1.2 – *vedāntavākyāni hi*

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[33] Actually this is the statement of an *Ekadeśin,* i.e. one who knows only part of the complete true picture and goes on to argue that Ākāśa cannot be thought of as being created as such a statement is not heard in the Vedas. However in the present case, we are more concerned with Śaṅkarācārya not disputing this *Ekadeśin's* statement about Śruti being the Pramāṇa for entities like Ākāśa which are beyond sense-organs.

[34] The traditional verse which defines as Adhikaraṇa is:

      viṣayo viṣayaścaiva pūrvapakṣastathottaram| saṅgatiśceti pañcāṅgaṃ śāstre'dhikaraṇaṃ smṛtam||

sūtrairudāhṛtya vicāryante (here in this work, only sentences from Vedānta are taken and discussed by the Sūtras). Indeed the Brahmasūtrabhāṣya of Śaṅkarācārya refers to "2,523 quotations, of which 2,060 are derived from the Upaniṣads, 150 from other Vedic scriptures, and 313 from non-Vedic literature" as per the index prepared "not without labour" by Paul Deussen (29).

If Brahman could be established by reasoning alone, there would be no need to write such an exegetical text, especially given the number of Bhedaśrutis, which are explained as secondary by Śaṅkarācārya. Even if it be argued that following the strong preference of his times, Śaṅkarācārya did not want to alienate his "innovation" from the Vedas (which enjoyed a large following) and therefore interpreted the Vedas to suit his Siddhānta, a cursory reading of his Brahmasūtrabhāṣya, where he repeatedly states that Brahman is beyond sensory perception and that only such logic as is compatible with Veda (Śrutyanugṛhītatarka) is to be employed, would show beyond any doubt that neither Perception nor Inference is capable of making Brahman known, according to Śaṅkarācārya. Further we see that both Sāṃkhya and Nyāya also accept Śruti as a Pramāṇa but do not depend on Śruti to derive their main entities – Puruṣa and Pradhāna, and Īśvara respectively[35]. Thus though there was an option to resort to Tarka – rational argument – unrelated to Veda to establish his thesis, Śaṅkarācārya depended only on Śruti to establish Brahman. This makes it clear that as far as Advaita is concerned, Veda is the only Pramāṇa for knowing Brahman.

2.3.4   Only Reasoning not opposed to Śruti is a valid Pramāṇa

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[35] Both use Anumāna to prove the existence of their central entities.

Though Śruti is the only means to know Brahman, Tarka or reasoning also has a role to play, but only as long as it does not come into conflict with Śruti. Such a non-contradictory reasoning is called Śrutyanugṛhītatarka. That Tarka cannot be used to determine an entity that can be known only through Śruti is discussed under the Sūtra "tarkāpratiṣṭhānādapyanyathānumeyamiti cedevamapyavimokṣaprasaṅgaḥ" (2.1.11). In fact, in the next two Sūtras as well, Tarka-based propositions are refuted. At many places Śaṅkarācārya makes it clear that Tarka has a place in knowing Brahman, that Śruti itself ordains it, but only as long as it is not opposed to Śruti. A few such statements are given below:

Sūtra	Statement	Meaning
1.1.1	tasmādbrahmajijñāsopanyāsamu-khena vedāntavākyamīmāṃsā **tadavirodhitarkopakaraṇā** niḥśreyasaprayojanā prastūyate	Therefore, starting with a deliberation on Brahman, exegesis of Vedāntic sentences, **assisted by reasoning unopposed to them**, and with Liberation as the purpose, is commenced
1.1.2	satsu tu vedāntavākyeṣu jagato janmādikāraṇavādiṣu, tadarthagrahaṇadārḍhyāya **anumānamapi vedāntavākyāvirodhi** pramāṇaṃ bhavat, na nivāryate, śrutyaiva ca sahāyatvena tarkasyābhyupetatvāt	When there are Vedāntic sentences stating the cause of origin etc. of the world, then for the sake of firmly establishing their meaning, if **reasoning not opposed to those sentences** is a Pramāṇa, it is not opposed; as such reasoning is accepted by Śruti itself as an aid.
2.1.6	yadapi śravaṇavyatirekeṇa mananaṃ vidadhacchabda eva	Even though it was said that Veda itself, while ordaining "reflection" after

Sūtra	Statement	Meaning
	tarkamapyādartavyaṃ darśayatītyuktam, nānena miṣeṇa śuṣkatarkasyātrātmalābhaḥ sambhavati ; **śrutyanugṛhīta eva hyatra tarko**'nubhavāṅgatvena **āśrīyate**.	"hearing", shows that reasoning is also to be considered, it is not possible for Śuṣkatarka[36] to find application through this excuse. **Only that reasoning which is sanctioned by Śruti is here resorted to**, as a subsidiary of experience (realisation of Brahman).
2.2.17	tadevamasārataratarkasandṛbdhat-vādī**śvarakāraṇaśrutiviruddhat vāt** śrutipravaṇaiśca śiṣṭaiḥ manvādibhiḥ aparigṛhītatvād atyantameva anapekṣā asmin paramāṇukāraṇavāde kāryā śreyo'rthibhiḥ.	Thus, since the doctrine of atoms being the cause is based on comparatively essenceless reasoning, **since it is opposed to Śruti sentences stating Īśvara to be the cause**, since it is not accepted by elites such as Manu who are devoted to Śruti, it is to be ignored by all those who desire the highest good (Mokṣa).
2.3.18	vaiśeṣikāditarkaśca śrutivirodha ābhāsī bhavati. tasmānnityacaitanyasvarūpa eva ātmeti niścinumaḥ	And, reasoning of Vaiśeṣika etc., being opposed to Śruti, is proven to be false. Therefore, we ascertain that Ātmā is that which has eternal consciousness as its nature.
3.3.40 3.3.41	In the first Sūtra, Jaimini's view that Dharma (i.e. Karma) and not Īśvara is the reason for results is stated using reasoning, but in the latter Sūtra, it is refuted based on statements from Śruti and Smṛti and the reasoning that Īśvara acts, i.e. grants results, taking into account the karma of a being.	

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[36] Etymologically "dry reasoning", here it means "reasoning opposed to Śruti".

Sūtra	Statement	Meaning
4.3.14	Here, at one stage the Pūrvapakṣin presents the following: "one can perform Nitya and Naimittika karmas to avoid Pratyavāya[37] and avoid Kāmya and Niṣiddha karmas so as to avoid Svarga and Naraka. Then having exhausted the karma results by experiencing them in the present body, one can get Mokṣa after death". This logic is refuted by the Siddhāntin saying that there is no support of any statement of Śruti to such an effect.	

Apart from its use in knowing Brahman, reasoning has an important place in Advaita, in refuting a null-hypothesis. An example is to be found in Sūtra 2.1.4, where the opponent proposes that Brahman, which is pure Consciousness (as described by Vedas) cannot be the cause of the insentient universe – this is refuted by using reasoning. The entire second Pāda of the second Adhyāya uses reasoning to refute Sāṅkhya etc. without resorting to Śruti.

Another observation may be made here, regarding the role of Anumāna in Advaita. Inference or reasoning[38] is used to establish the validity of Smṛti. We come across one such instance in the commentary on 1.2.25. It is not as if this is a peculiarity of Śaṅkarācārya. Sūtrakāra himself uses the word "Anumāna" to mean "Smṛti" in 1.3.28 (śabda iti cenna, ataḥ prabhavāt pratyakṣānumānābhyam). Further, this has a basis in Pūrvamīmāṃsā, whose toolkit is generally appropriated by Vedānta. In the *Smṛtyadhikaraṇam* of Pūrvamīmāṃsā (1.3.1 – 2) and the following five Adhikaraṇas, Smṛti is

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[37] Pratyavāya is that sin which acrrues if ordained rites are not performed. One analogy would be that of a debt: one accures sin if one does not repay debt. This is a simplistic presentation for easy understanding. There are fine differences in how Pratyavāya is explained by Mīmāṃsakas and Vedāntins, consistent with their other positions.

[38] Sometimes a difference is maintained between Anumāna and Tarka, as in when Tarka is meant as a specific technique of Nyāya; at other times they are used interchangeably. In the context of the present discussion, interchangeability is intended.

deduced to be right under certain circumstances by giving the benefit of doubt to authors of Smṛtis[39].

Thus, the proper usage of Tarka in Vedānta is threefold: a) to understand the meaning of Vedic sentences better, b) to establish the authority of Smṛti statements and c) to refute other views. However, reasoning by itself is not sufficient to establish or realise Brahman.

2.3.5   Veda is an Upāya to know Brahman

Though Śruti occupies such a central place in the literature on Advaita, it is only an Upāya, a means which can be discarded after reaching the destination, like scaffolding used for building a house, or a raft used to cross a stream. In other words, for one who has attained the destination of Brahman, the Veda is no longer of any use, and therefore not binding. Upāya is defined[40] by Bhartṛhari as "upādāyāpi ye heyāstānupāyānpracakṣate" (2.38, Vākyapadīyam), i.e. those devices which, though expressly adopted to serve a purpose, are fit to be discarded after the purpose is served are called Upāyas.

Śaṅkarācārya makes the same point in the *Adhyāsabhāṣya*, the introduction to his commentary on the Brahmasūtras, by stating that all Pramāṇas and Śāstras including Vedas have as their locus a man who is subject to Avidyā – *tasmādavidyāvadviṣayāṇyeva pratyakṣādīni pramāṇāni śāstrāṇi ceti*. Later, having shown that a learned man is no different from an

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[39] The same benefit of doubt is denied to the authors of Kalpaśūtras in the next Adhikaraṇa.

[40] This verse is quoted by Kaiyaṭa (Mahābhāṣyam Vol . 3, p141) under 3.1.96 *tavyattavyānīyaraḥ* in his Pradīpa. Nāgeśa commenting on the verse says that it gives the Vyutpatti, etymology, of the word Upāya – *upādāyāpi ye heyā iti. upāyaśabdavyutpattiḥ. pṛṣodarāditvātsādhuḥ.* Thus the etymology of the word "Upāya" may be taken as *upādāya heyaḥ upāya. pṛṣodarāditvātsādhuḥ..*

animal, he takes the Vedic injunction "brāhmaṇo yajeta" (a Brāhmaṇa ought to perform a sacrifice) and argues that it becomes tenable only when attributes such as Varṇa (chosen profession), Āśrama (stage of life such as student, householder etc.), Vayaḥ (age) and Avasthā (condition) are superimposed on Ātmā (which cannot have any of those qualifiers) –

> 'brāhmaṇo yajeta' ityādīni śāstrāṇyātmani
> varṇāśramavayo'vasthādiviśeṣādhyāsamāśritya pravartante.

Such being the case, what would happen when a person realises Brahman, realises that Ātmā cannot have such qualifiers? Such a person would be beyond the Veda. In the commentary on 4.3.1, Śaṅkarācārya clearly states that in the state of enlightenment, there is absence of both Pratyakṣa etc. and Veda:

> yadapyuktam — adhikāryabhāvaḥ pratyakṣādivirodhaśceti, tadapyasat, prākprabodhāt saṃsāritvābhyupagamāt, tadviṣayatvācca pratyakṣādivyavahārasya; 'yatra tvasya sarvamātmaivābhūttatkena kaṃ paśyet' (Bṛ. Up. 2.4.14) ityādinā hi prabodhe pratyakṣādyabhāvaṃ darśayati. pratyakṣādyabhāve śruterapyabhāvaprasaṅga iti cet, na, iṣṭatvāt; 'atra pitā'pitā bhavati' (Bṛ. Up. 4.3.22) ityupakramya, 'vedā avedāḥ' (Bṛ. Up. 4.3.22) iti vacanāt iṣyata eva asmābhiḥ śruterapyabhāvaḥ prabodhe.
>
> Whatever has been said about the violation of Pratyakṣa etc. and the absence of eligible persons (to practice Vedānta), that is not so, for the transmigratory state is accepted before enlightenment, and transactions such as Pratyakṣa are valid

within that state on the strength of the Upaniṣadic statements like "But when everything to this knower of Brahman becomes Ātmā itself, then what is to be seen by whom?" (Br̥. Up. 2.4.14) which show the absence of Pratyakṣa in the enlightened state. If it be said that in the absence of Pratyakṣa etc., the contingency of Vedas also being absent arises, we (Vedāntins) say that it is not a defect; rather, it is agreeable to us. The absence of Vedas in the state of enlightenment is admitted by us on the strength of Upaniṣadic statements like Br. Up. 4.3.22 starting with "Here, father is no father" and ending with "The Vedas are not Vedas".

Even though they are beyond the Veda, the actual practice of enlightened souls is that they do follow the usual norms. The reason is stated in Bhagavadgītā:

yadyadācarati śreṣṭhastattadevetaro janaḥ ǀ

sa yatpramāṇaṃ kurute lokastadanuvartate ǁ3.21ǁ

Ordinary people in society do whatever the best person in society does. The standard set by the best person is followed by others.

2.3.6 Multiple levels of Reality

In the commentary on 2.1.4 Śaṅkarācārya clearly defines two levels of Reality, the Pāramārthika and the Vyāvahārika. The Noumenon, the Reality that is, or the Ultimate Reality is the attributeless Brahman which cannot be described by words, and there is nothing else but Brahman. This is the

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Pāramārthika Reality or Pāramārthikasattā. As opposed to this, in the empirical world, Vyāvahārikasattā, there is diversity and Brahman conditioned by Māyā is described as "ruler of all beings", "protector of all beings" etc.

In fact the world, Pramāṇas etc. belong to the domain of Vyāvahārikasattā. These are two levels of Reality. So everything which is Real in Vyavahāra, i.e. at the empirical or transactional level, does not exist in the Paramārtha level. Say, A is the father of B. This is true only at the level of Vyavahāra, and cannot be so at the level of Paramārtha, for both A and B are subject to transmigration and would have taken, and would take in future, many births and they do not share a father and child relationship in those births. At the Ultimate level, that of Paramārtha, the truth is that both A and B are non-different from Brahman. In this way, it is established that nothing in the Vyāvahārika world, apart from Brahman, is Satyam. From this arises the position that "this world", i.e. the world which is being seen, is Mithyā. The sentence "jaganmithyā"[41] is often translated as "this world is an illusion" and gives an incorrect picture of the place that the seen world has in Śaṅkarācārya's system. This world is very real, as the word "real" is normally understood in English, as long as one is subject to Avidyā. However in Advaita, "Real" – Satyam – is specifically defined as something that which was there earlier, which is now there, and which is going to be there in the future.

In the Māṇḍūkyakārikā 2.6, Vitathā – the not Real – is defined as that which is not there in the beginning, end and the middle. In the Brahmānandavallī of the Taittirīyopaniṣad, commenting on the famous

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[41] Some say that Śaṅkarācārya himself did not every use the phrase, *jaganmithyā*. That may be so, but he definitely stated the concept that the world is not Real in the Pāramārthika level. For instances, see the next section on Ajātivāda.

"definition" of Brahman – *satyam jñānam anantaṃ brahma* – Śaṅkarācārya defines Satyam as:

> satyamiti yadrūpeṇa yanniścitaṃ tadrūpaṃ na vyabhicarati, tatsatyam. yadrūpeṇa yanniścitaṃ tadrūpaṃ vyabhicarati, tadanṛtamityucyate.
>
> Whatever is determined to be of a certain form, that which never deviates from, that form is Satyam; that which deviates from that is called Anṛtam.

Thus the changeless entity alone is Real. This is the highest Reality; rest, including the world, is Unreal. This unreality persists as long as the observer is subject to Avidyā. Once Avidyā is removed, the Ultimate Real, i.e. the unconditioned Brahman alone, remains. However, as long as one is subject to Avidyā, which includes practically everybody in the world, the world is real.

Sometimes three levels of Reality are proposed to make this concept easier to digest: the highest – Pāramārthika level – perceivable only to the enlightened; the second – Vyāvahārika level – perceived by the almost all the people; and the third – Prātibhāsika level – which involves erroneous perception of mirages etc. In the English language the word "illusion" is usually understood to refer to the third level; the second level of Reality described above does not really have a word and it would be best to retain the word "Vyāvahārika". These three levels are mentioned by Śaṅkarācārya while commenting on the mantra "satyaṃ cānṛtaṃ ca satyamabhavat" (Tai. Up. 2.6). Therein the first term "Satyam" is explained by Śaṅkarācārya as "Vyavahāraviṣayam", in the sense that water is real with reference to a mirage,

which is not; the second term "Anṛtam" is defined as that opposed to it (Vyāvahārikasatyam – water), i.e. the mirage. The third term "Satyam" is described as the "Paramārthasatyam", i.e. Brahma. Thus, it is possible to represent Reality as having three levels:

> Paramārthasatyam – the Ultimate Reality
>
> Vyāvahārikasatyam – the Transactional Reality
>
> Anṛtam – not real

The last one has been termed as Prātibhāsikasatyam by later writers in Advaita.

2.3.7 Two levels of Unreal

The concept of multiple levels of Reality can also be presented as Real on one hand and two levels of Unreal on the other hand, as explained by Śaṅkarācārya in his commentary on the Taittirīyopaniṣad (asadvā idamagra āsīt‌ 2.7 – In the beginning there was Asat, the Unreal):

> asaditi vyākṛtanāmarūpaviśeṣaviparītarūpam avyākṛtaṃ brahma ucyate; na punaratyantamevāsat . na hyasataḥ sajjanmāsti.
>
> By "Asat" is meant the undifferentiated Brahman as opposed to the entity differentiated by name and form, and not the Absolutely Unreal (Atyantāsat), as the birth of Real cannot be from the Unreal.

In the above, the word "idam", i.e. "this" refers to the world, as the world is seen. If this be taken as real, then the state of the undifferentiated Brahman which cannot be seen has to be taken as Unreal. The Unreality is

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only relative to the Reality of the seen world. This Unreality is different from the Absolutely Unreal entities like mirages. Then the three categories are:

Real – Sat: the seen world – jagat

Unreal – Asat: undifferentiated Brahman –
avyākṛtabrahma

Absolutely Unreal –   entities which do not exist at all like a
mirage

(Atyantāsat)

If one considers these only at a superficial level, it will look like a mere play of words. One might even object that this kind of "creative interpretation" violates the common convention about what Real is, and what Unreal is. The answer to such an objection is that since Śabda is at once both incapable of describing Brahman and yet the only means to know Brahman, one has to resort to the device of reference frames and show how the same entity can be both seen as "Real" and "Unreal" depending on one's point of view. Further, it will be seen that in the *Abhāvādhikaraṇam* (2.2.28 – 2.2.32), Śaṅkarācārya refutes the views of Buddhists (Vijñānavādins) who hold that the external world does not exist. There again the difference between Atyantāsat and the world becomes clear.

2.3.8   Ajātivāda

The concept that there is no creation is called Ajātivāda, usually called the doctrine or theory of Non-origination. It does not mean, like the Mīmāṃsakas hold, that the world is beginningless; rather the contention is that the world does not exist, because it is Unreal. What does not exist is not

created. It immediately becomes clear that this stance is from the point of view of Paramārtha.

In the *Māṇḍūkyakārikā* it is proposed in 2.31 that those well-versed in Vedānta view this world as a celestial city seen in a dream, i.e. as unreal. The next Kārikā (2.32) states that there is neither origination nor cessation [of the world], neither the bound, nor the seeker; neither the one desirous of liberation, nor the liberated and that this is the Ultimate Truth. Thereafter this is repeated in the next two chapters as well (3.27, 38 and 4.57, 58).

This is a good example of how different levels of Reality are applied. Obviously, if a person is writing and if a person is reading and meaning is being comprehended, and all this happening in this world, it is downright foolish to say that this world does not exist. Yet, that is exactly the position of Advaita. This is reconciled by appreciating that the reality of the transactional world is at the level of Vyavahāra, and the unreality of the same transactional world is at the level of Paramārtha. Those subject to Avidyā perceive only Vyāvahārika Reality; such persons have to overcome their perception depending on Śruti such as

> yatra vā asya sarvamātmaivābhūttatkena kaṃ jighrettatkena kaṃ paśyettatkena kaṃ śṛṇuyāttatkena kamabhivadettatkena kaṃ manvīta tatkena kaṃ vijānīyāt. (Br. Up. 2.4.14 = 4.5.15)
>
> When everything is Ātmā to him [the one who has realised Brahman], then what should one smell through what? What should one see through what? What should one listen to through what? Whom should one talk with through what? What should be understood? What should be known through what?

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2.4 Later Developments in Advaita

As Advaita literature flourished, certain questions not considered by Śaṅkarācārya were discussed at great length. Of all the topics treated by later writers, the most important is Avidyā and its locus. While for Śaṅkarācārya Avidyā is Anirvacanīya and a Bhāvapadārtha, other questions are not entertained. Some said that the individual is the locus of Avidyā; others said that Brahman itself is the locus. Two types of Avidyā – Mūlāvidyā and Tūlāvidyā were proposed and their role discussed. Consequent to these differences, other differences in positions arose. These got broadly crystallised as two schools of Advaita: the Vivaraṇa school and the Bhāmatī school. Another school, that of Sureśvara, is admitted by some. These are discussed at length in Potter, Vol. XI (pp 7 to 14); the discussion is summarised below so that one gets an idea of the kind of differences that exist within Advaita:

S. No.	Question	Vivaraṇa	Sureśvara	Bhāmatī
1	What is the locus and content of Avidyā?	Brahman is both the locus and content of Avidyā	Brahman is not something that can be or cannot be a locus	Brahman is the content of Avidyā; Jīva is the locus
2	How many Mūlāvidyas are there?	There are many Jīvas but only one Mūlāvidyā	Ignorance is not a thing, so the question does not arise	At least one Mūlāvidyā for each Jīva
3	How can one Brahman cause many things?	Reflection model, like reflections in a mirror etc.	Brahman does not cause anything	Delimitation model, like Ākāśa delimited by pots etc.
4	How many Śaktis does a	One Mūlāvidyā has many Śaktis	Question does not arise	Avidyā is the only Śakti that

	Jīva have?	pertaining to many Jīvas		a Jīva has
5	Relation between Śrutijñāna and Mokṣa	Śrutijñāna is the direct (Aparokṣa), immediate and primary means of gaining liberation, since through it one directly cognizes Brahman		Śrutijñāna is an indirect means, as one has to meditate after realisation
6	Jīvanmukti (Liberation while living)	Possible		Not possible
7	Is Manas a sense-organ?	No	Does not matter	Yes
8	Can one cognize Nirupādhikabrahman in Mokṣa?	Yes; pure Brahman can be a content of mental activity, ex. as in deep sleep.	No; pure Brahman is not a content of any awareness; only conditioned Brahman can be cognized. In deep sleep one does not cognize anything.	
9	Is *śrotavayo mantavyo* etc. a Vidhi?	Yes	No	
10	Karma, Vividiṣā and Vidyotpāda	Karma is conducive to both	Karma can be conducive to Vividiṣā but not to Vidyotpāda	

In addition to the above, other divisions within Advaita may be mentioned. Maṇḍanamiśra presents one version of Advaita in his *Brahmasiddhi*, which reconciles aspects of Pūrvamīmāṃsā to Vedānta by accepting Jñānakaramsamuccaya (the position that both Karma (rites) and Jñāna (knowledge) play a role in attainment of Mokṣa) and also reconciles Sphoṭavāda to Advaita. Śaṅkarācārya does not accept Jñānakaramsamuccaya at all and holds that the role of Karmas is in generating Cittaśuddhi only and not in attainment of Mokṣa. Maṇḍanamiśra is held in high esteem and often followed by Vācaspatimiśra, the author of Bhāmatī. Then there are modern versions of Advaita, often referred to as Neo-vedanta, which tends to focus more on the rationality of Advaita.

Thus, it is seen that within Advaita there are a fair number of differences, with different versions having differing levels of acceptability and popularity. This being so, it is important to stress that it is possible to reconcile these differences. The pedagogy of Advaita is the method of Adhyāropa and Apavāda, wherein a certain aspect is presented as the truth, and later the same is negated. In fact this technique is found in Śruti itself in Pañcakośavidyā of the *Taittiriyopaniṣad* and *neti neti* in *Bṛhadāraṇyakopaniṣad* (2.3), as it is not possible to describe the pure unconditioned Brahman. So whatever is not Brahman is first presented and then rejected. In this way Advaita literature continues to develop with Acāryas explaining the concepts using newer and newer examples (say the projection of moving pictures) to modern audience.

Chapter 3: Advaita of Bhartṛhari

3.1 Philosophy of Bhartṛhari

Having set out the basic tenets of Advaita, the system of Bhartṛhari will be described in some detail in the present chapter. There are two ways of doing it – either summarise the *Brahmnakāṇḍa* or present it topic-wise. Both have their merits because while *Brahmakāṇḍa* lays out the essence of Śabdādvaita, the topic-wise discussion allows treatment of aspects not directly mentioned. So while the summary is given as Appendix A, the philosophy of Bhartṛhari is given topic-wise here under the heads frequently used to discuss philosophy in English. While some Kārikās are quoted, translated and (sometimes discussed) within the main text, often many Kārikās are only referred to. These references are to the Telugu Akademi edition of Vākyapadīya, which might not be accessible to all. Therefore, all the Vākyapadīya Kārikās referred to in this thesis are given in Appendix B.

3.2 Highest Principle

The highest principle is Brahman identified with Śabda. Brahman is one, without beginning, without end, has Śabda as Its essence and is imperishable. The Brahman has many Śaktis and is not different from Its Śaktis. Brahman is seen to have various states like birth etc. due to its Kālaśakti. This world is a transformation of Brahman. Veda is a reflection of Brahman. (1.1 – 1.5). Brahman is Real (Satya), Pure (Viśuddha), of the nature of knowledge alone (Vidyaikapadāgama) and in the form of Praṇava.

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Brahman is alone (kevala), is the source of Vedas and has Veda as Its body. (1.9, 1.17) Brahman is beyond difference of forms and actions and is pure illumination (Prakāśa) beyond Vidyā and Avidyā (1.19). Brahman is described as Mahāsattā, the Jāti amongst Jātis and that which is seen as many Jātis when associated with adjuncts:

saṃbandhibhedātsattaiva bhidyamānā gavādiṣu ।
jātirityucyate tasyāṃ sarve śabdā vyavasthitāḥ ॥ 3.1.33 ॥
tāṃ prātipadikārthaṃ ca dhātvarthaṃ ca pracakṣate ।
sā nityā sā mahānātmā tāmāhustvatalādayaḥ ॥ 3.1.34 ॥

Sattā (= Existence = Mahāsattā, Parabrahman) itself is being divided due to the difference in the related [limiting adjuncts] into cow etc. and is being called as Jāti. All the words are within that Sattā (33). That [Sattā] is called the meaning of a prātipadika and dhātu. That is eternal. That is the Great Ātman; and That is what is expressed by the affixes *tva*, *tal* etc. (34).

Having shown that the Sattā amongst all Jātis is Brahman itself following the Jātivāda of Vājapyāyana, Bhartṛhari then presents Vyāḍi's Dravyavāda, which holds that Śabda denotes Dravya, an existing entity. In the *Dravyasamuddeśa*, Bhartṛhari establishes the view that ultimately Brahman is the entity that is denoted by all Śabdas, as Brahman is the underlying Reality of all entities. This is a short Samuddeśa and is worth being presented in full.

ātmā vastu svabhāvaśca śarīraṃ tattvamityapi ।
dravyamityasya paryāyāstacca nityamiti smṛtam ॥ 3.2.1 ॥

The words Ātmā, Vastu, Svabhāvaḥ, Śarīram and Tattvam (used in other Systems) are all synonyms for Dravya, which is said to be eternal.

satyaṃ vastu tadākārairasatyairavadhāryate ǀ
asatyopādhibhiḥ śabdaiḥ satyamevābhidhīyate ǁ 3.2.2 ǁ
The True Entity, i.e. Brahman, is determined by the unreal ones which have a similar form. Truth (Brahman) alone is being denoted by Śabdas which have unreal adjuncts.

adhruveṇa nimittena devadattagṛhaṃ yathā ǀ
gṛhītaṃ gṛhaśabdena śuddhamevābhidhīyate ǁ 3.2.3 ǁ
For instance, [the way to] the house of Devadatta is indicated by signs [such as crow] which are not stable. The Pure Entity "house", i.e. without its adjuncts [crow etc.], is being denoted by the word "gṛha".

suvarṇādi yathā bhinnaṃ svairākārairapāyibhiḥ.
rucakādyabhidhānānāṃ śuddhamevaiti vācyatām ǁ 3.2.4 ǁ
Another instance is that the Pure Entity "gold", which is differentiated by its own changing shapes, obtains denotation by the words "rucaka" and others.

ākāraiśca vyavacchedātsārvārthyamavarudhyate .
yathaiva cakṣurādīnāṃ sāmarthyaṃ nāḍikādibhiḥ ǁ 3.2.5 ǁ
The capacity of words to denote all entities is limited as they are restricted by forms, like the capacity of eyes and others is limited by hollow tubes. (Normally the eye has a wide field of

vision; however when we want to focus on a particular object, or a particular area, a hollow bamboo or such other hollow tube is kept close to the eye restricting the otherwise wide field of vision to a narrower field). This answers the following objection: "If Brahman is what is denoted by all Śabdas, then every Śabda should denote everything."

teṣvākāreṣu yaḥ śabdastathābhūteṣu vartate .
tattvātmakatvāttenāpi nityamevābhidhīyate ‖ 3.2.6 ‖

The Eternal (Brahman) only is denoted even by those words [such as *saṃsthāna*, *sanniveśaḥ* etc.] which are used in the sense of those forms which have the adjuncts only as their nature, because those words also denote concepts which have Tattva, i.e. Dravya, as their form.

This requires some explanation. This Kārikā is in answer to the following objection: "If you say that Śabdas like Rucaka always denotes Brahman delimited by the shape of Rucaka, then there should ideally have been a schematic where all Śabdas always denote only Dravya except those like *saṃsthāna and sanniveśa,* which would denote shape etc. (however in reality it is not so, so your view is incorrect)." All schools differentiate Dravyas (entities) and Guṇas (attributes), Guṇa is something that a Dravya has, like in the sentence *the pot is black*. Here *pot* is the Dravya (or Dharmin, to use the terminology of Mīmāṃsā and Nyāya) and *black* is the Guṇa (or Dharma). Here we see that Śabdas denote both Dravya (the entity *pot*) and Guṇa (the colour *black*). Against this well-known position, the Siddhāntin is proposing all that Śabdas denote only Dravyas (i.e. Brahman), which is against Lokavyavahāra. The answer of Bhartṛhari is that there is no difference

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between Dharma and Dharmin, i.e. Guṇas are not different from Dravyas and so they also refer to Brahman only.

> na tattvātattvayorbheda iti vṛddhebhya āgamaḥ .
> atattvamiti manyante tattvamevāvicāritam ǁ 3.2.7 ǁ
>
> The tradition received from elders is that there is no difference between Tattva and Atattva; the eternal Tattva (Brahman) itself is thought of as Atattva due to improper consideration.

Helārāja's explanation of the above Kārikā is illustrative of the purely Advaitic manner adopted by the traditional commentators in explaining the views of Bhartṛhari. A small extract of Helārāja's commentary is reproduced below:

> ayamarthaḥ. naihādvaitanaye satyāsatye dve rūpe staḥ, advaitahāniprasaṅgāt. kintu pāramārthikamekamevādvayaṃ tattvam. taccānādisiddhāvidyāvilasitasahaṃ pramātṛviṣayatayā yathātattvamanavabhāsamānamityanekavikalpaparighaṭitākārarūpatayā vyavahārmavatarati.
>
> This is the meaning: Here, in the view of Advaita, two distinct entities called Satya and Asatya do not exist, as that would cause hindrance to non-duality (if Asatya is different from Satya, then there are at least two entities, not one as Advaita proposes). In the ultimate view, there is only Noumenon without the second. That (Brahman) enveloped by the beginningless Avidyā, gives rise to Vyavahāra by taking the various forms corresponding to various entities conceived in

such a manner as to make the Noumenon indiscernible and by becoming the object of a knower.

In the next Kārikā Bhartṛhari states that the undifferentiated Brahman itself obtains differentiation.

vikalparūpaṃ bhajate tattvamevāvikalpitam.
na cātra kālabhedo'sti kālabhedaśca gṛhyate ǁ 3.2.8 ǁ

The undifferentiated Tattva (Brahman) itself obtains differentiation. There is no difference based on time, in It (Tattva, i.e. Brahman); and [yet], difference based on time is cognised.

yathā viṣayadharmāṇāṃ jñāne'tyantamasambhavaḥ .
tadātmeva ca tatsiddhamatyantamatadātmakam ǁ 3.2.9 ǁ
tathā vikārarūpāṇāṃ tattve'tyantamasambhavaḥ .
tadātmeva ca tattattvamatyamntamatadātmakam ǁ 3.2.10 ǁ

Just like it is impossible for the attributes of an object [being completely different from Jñāna, cognition] to take the form of cognition (cognition is of the form of consciousness, whereas attributes like white and black are insentient; these two can never mix), and yet the one (Jñāna) which is completely different from it (attribute), appears as if it is in its form (9), similarly, the forms of modifications cannot at all belong to Tattva, yet that Tattva, which is completely different from limiting adjuncts like forms, appears as if it has the form of those limiting adjuncts (10).

satyamākṛtisaṃhāre yadante vyavatiṣṭhate .

tannityaṃ śabdavācyaṃ tacchabdāttattvaṃ na bhidyate   ‖ 3.2.11 ‖

That which remains when all forms are withdrawn is the Truth, which is eternal, which is the denoted by Śabda and which is non-different from the nature of Śabda (Brahman).

na tadasti na tannāsti na tadekaṃ na tatpṛthak.
na saṃsṛṣṭaṃ vibhaktaṃ vā vikṛtaṃ na ca nānyathā   ‖ 3.2.12 ‖

It (Brahman) neither exists, nor does it not exist; It is neither One, nor is it different; It is neither co-mingled, nor in a separated state; neither is it modified, nor is it other than modified. (This is the Pāramārthika level description)

tannāsti vidyate tacca tadekaṃ tatpṛthakpṛthak.
saṃsṛṣṭaṃ ca vibhaktaṃ ca vikṛtaṃ tattadanyathā   ‖ 3.2.13 ‖

It (Brahman) is not and yet, it is known; It is One and yet, many; It is co-mingled, and yet, in separate forms; It is a modification and yet, unmodified. (This is the Vyāvahārika level description).

tasya śabdārthasambandharūpamekasya dṛśyate .
taddṛśyaṃ darśanaṃ draṣṭā darśane ca prayojanam ‖ 3.2.14 ‖

Śabda, Artha (Meaning) and Śabdārthasambandha (the relation between the two) are being seen as the forms of the That (Brahman) which is One. That (Brahman) [itself] is the Dṛśya

(seen), Darśana (the act of seeing), Draṣṭā (the agent of seeing) and the purpose of seeing.

vikārāpagame satyaṃ suvarṇaṃ kuṇḍale yathā .
vikārāpagame satyāṃ tathāhuḥ prakṛtiṃ parām ‖ 3.2.15 ‖

Just as gold is the truth that remains in ear-ring etc., when all modifications are removed; in a similar way, when all modifications are removed that Truth which remains is said to the Parā Prakṛti.

vācyā sā sarvaśabdānāṃ śabdāśca na pṛthaktataḥ.
apṛthaktve ca sambandhastayornānātmanoriva ‖ 3.2.16 ‖

That (Parā Prakṛti) is the denotation of all Śabdas; Śabdas themselves are not different from That. Though those two (Śabda and Dravya, i.e. Brahman) are non-different, it appears as if their relation is like the relation between those which are not identical with each other.

ātmā paraḥ priyo dveṣyo vaktā vācyaṃ prayojanam.
viruddhāni yathaikasya svapne rūpāṇi cetasaḥ ‖ 3.2.17 ‖
ajanmani tathā nitye paurvāparyavivarjite.
tattve janmādirūpatvaṃ viruddhamupalabhyate ‖ 3.2.18 ‖

Just like the one consciousness takes mutually opposed forms of self and other; dear and hated; speaker and spoken; and purpose; in a similar way, opposite forms of birth etc. obtain in the Tattva (Brahman) which is without birth, Eternal, and devoid of prior and posterior.

3.3 Individual Soul

Śabda is the consciousness which exists in all living beings and also outside. Without Śabda, a man is considered as good as a log. This Self is also called the Great Bull (*mahān vṛṣabhaḥ*) with which union is sought (1.126, 1.127). Therefore one who knows the correct form of Śabdas attains Paramātmā and he who knows the way Śabda functions enjoys the immortal Brahman (1.132).

3.4 Relation between Individual Soul and Brahman

Both Brahman (1.1, 1.18) and Individual Soul (1.126, 1,127) are described as Śabda. It is the one, kevala, Brahman which manifests as enjoyer, enjoyed and enjoyment (1.4). Thus, Bhartṛhari identifies the Soul completely with Brahman. That being so, the apparent difference needs to be explained. The manifoldness of Brahman is said to be due to the different Śaktis, but Brahman is said to be non-different from Its Śaktis (1.2). Everything in the world is described as the modification of Brahman and union with Brahman is said to be the final goal (1.131). As seen in the first Kārika of *Dravyasamuddeśa* above, Bhartṛhari uses Ātmā as a synonym of Brahman. A similar synonymous usage is seen in the *Sambandhasamuddeśa:*

> ekasmādātmano' nanyau bhāvābhāvau vikalpitau ॥ 3.3.60 ॥
>
> From the one Ātmā Bhāva (existing entity) and Abhāva (absence or the non-existence of an entity), which are mutually non-different, are conceived.

Here, *Ātmā* refers to Brahman. The idea is that based on the adjuncts, Brahman is conceived as, i.e. "seen as" Bhāva and Abhāva. Helārāja's commentary expresses the same point:

> tasmādekamevādvayaṃ tattvamātmaśabdavācyaṃ vyavahāre vikalpadaśāyāṃ bhābhāvopādhirūpavibhaktaṃ cakāsti.
>
> Therefore only the One Noumenon (Tattvam), without the second, and denoted by the word "Ātmā", from the worldly point of view (Vyavahāra point of view) while in the stage of the seeing imaginary things, shines forth as divided by the adjuncts of Bhāva and Abhāva.

Bhartṛhari states that the world seen outside is a part, Aṃśa of the Noumenon that resides inside:

> dyauḥ kṣamā vāyurādityaḥ sāgarāḥ sarito diśaḥ ।
> antaḥkaraṇatattvasya bhāgā bahiravasthitāḥ ॥ 3.7.41 ॥
>
> Sky, earth, air, sun, oceans, rivers, directions – all these are the Aṃśas of the inner Noumenon (Antaḥkaraṇatattva) that exists outside. (In other words, Brahman is what resides inside, and Brahman is what is seen as the world).

3.5 The World

The World is a transformation of Brahman (1.1). This transformation is explained as due to various Śaktis. This discussion is taken up at two places –

in the introductory verses (1.1-1.4) and in the eulogy of Śabda (1.118, 1.120 and 1.125) taken up immediately after explaining Sphoṭa and the process of its manifestation according to different schools. The same is reiterated in explaining Śruti and Smṛti (1.146), where it is said that the Vedic Ṛṣis are a transformation of the undivided Śabda (avibhāgād vivṛttāḥ).

In the *Sambandhasamuddeśa,* after discussing Bhāva and Abhāva at some length, Bhartṛhari shows that both Satkāryavāda and Asatkāryavāda are untenable, thus showing that the only explanation for the seen world is that it is a Vivarta of Brahman.

> abhāvasyānupākhyatvātkāraṇaṃ na prasādhakam l
>
> sopākhyasya tu bhāvasya kāraṇaṃ kiṃ kariṣyati ll 3.3.62 ll
>
> Since Abhāva is not the subject matter of perception, Cause cannot beget Effect. (This is a refutation of Asatkāryavāda which holds that Cause and Effect are different and specifically that Effect does not exist before it is caused"). On the other hand, when the existing Effect is already being perceived, then what is the use of the Cause? (Cause is supposed to beget Effect, but if Effect already exists – as per Satkāryavāda – then no purpose is served by Cause).

The implication[42] of the above, when the world is the Effect, is that we cannot say it did not exist before; we also cannot say that it did not exist.

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[42] The implication is not something imagined by the present Researcher. Helārāja in the Avatārikā to the verse expounds this clearly:

> tatraitat syāt – kathaṃ bhāvābhāvau vikalpitau ityucyate. kāraṇabhedāt satyabhūtau yathā-vabhāsaṃ kasmānna bhavata ityāśaṅkya sadasatpakṣabhedena kāryakāraṇabhāvānupapatti-pratipādanapūrvakaṃ dvaitadarśanamapodya vivartāśrayeṇa advaitanayaṃ svamatena siddhāntayitumupakramate.

Vivarta, then, provides the answer: the world is a Vivarta of the Ultimate Principle. A similar implication is found in 3.3.78. This is further clarified, repeated and established in the next few verses:

na tvavasthāntaraṃ kiñcidekasmātsatyataḥ sthitam ‖ 3.3.63 cd ‖

There is no state other than the one Reality (Satyam), without the second.

advayecaiva sarvasmin svabhāvādekalakṣaṇe ।
parikalpeṣu maryādā vicitraivopalabhyate ‖ 3.3.65 ‖

Even as everything (i.e. the world) is the homogenous One without the second (i.e. Brahman), the state of manifoldness obtains in imaginary concepts.

catasro' pi yathāvasthā nirupākhye prakalpitāḥ ।
evaṃ dvaividhyampyetadbhāvābhāvavyapāśrayam ‖ 3.3.66 ‖

The duality of Bhāva and Abhāva is imagined [in Brahman] in the same manner that four states have been imagined in the formless (=Abhāva; Naiyāyikas divide Abhāva, non-existence, into four: prior non-existence (Prāgabhāva), destruction (Pradhvaṃsābhāva), difference (Anyonyābhāva) and absolute non-existence (Atyantābhāva)).

śabdāstasmādasatyeṣu bhedeṣveva vyavasthitāḥ ‖ 3.3.73 cd ‖

Here it may be said thus: "Bhāva and Abhāva are both real entities which are independently perceived due to difference in Cause. Such being the case, how could they be labelled as imagined concepts?" Having anticipated this objection, [Bhartṛhari] sets out to establish Advaita as his thesis (Siddhānta) by resorting to Vivarta and by establishing the untenability of Cause and Effect in both Satkāryavāda and Asatkāryavāda, thus refuting the school of Duality.

Therefore (i.e. as Śabda is incapable of capturing the whole of any entity, namely Brahman) Śabdas denote only the Unreal differences.

atyadbhutātviyaṃ vṛttiḥ yadabhāgaṃ yadakramam ।
bhāvānāṃ prāgabhūtānāmātmatattvaṃ prakāśate ॥ 3.3.81 ॥

The nature of entities (Bhāvas), which did not exist earlier, but whose innate essence (Ātmatattvam), though devoid of parts or order, shines forth, is most wondrous. (Entities like pot, which are unreal, are perceived; in reality, it is Brahman itself which is perceived in such a manner due to Avidyā. This is the wonder[43].).

vikalpotthāpitenaiva sarvo bhāvena laukikaḥ ।
mukhyeneva padārthena vyavahāro vidhīyate ॥ 3.3.82 ॥

All the transactions being done by people arise out of imaginary concepts only and are carried out as if the entities (denoted by Śabda) are the main ones (i.e. in fact they are not the main entities, Brahman alone is Real and hence the only Main Entity).

bhāvaśaktimataścaināṃ manyante bhāvavādinaḥ ।
bhāvameva kramaṃ prāhuḥ na bhāvādaparaḥ kramaḥ ॥ 3.3.83 ॥

Therefore (since Brahman alone is Real), those who posit Brahman as the only Reality (Bhāvavādinaḥ, here Bhāva refers

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[43] It is significant that the word Māyā has the sense of "wondrous powers". For instance, in 1.11.7, 1.51.5, 1.64.7, 1.144.1, 2.17.5, 3.27.7, 3.34.6, 3.53.8 and 3.60.1 in Ṛgveda. For other instances, refer to Prabhu Dutt Shastri's *The Doctrine of Māyā.*

to the one existing entity Brahman), hold that all this (worldly transactions) as the power of Brahman (Bhāvaśakti). The temporal order (Krama) seen in entities is also said to be Bhāva only.

tasmācchaktivibhāgena nityassadasadātmakaḥ ।

eko' rthaḥ śabdavācyatve bahurūpaḥ prakāśate ॥ 3.387 ॥

Therefore (as there is no Abhāva different from Bhāva), the Eternal Entity, when denoted by Śabda, obtaining the form of Bhāva and Abhāva due to the division of its Capacities (Śaktis) is seen as many.

3.6 Vivarta and Pariṇāma

To describe the transformation of Brahman into the world, Bhartṛhari uses both the words "*vivartate*" (1.1, 1.18, 1.120) and "*pariṇāmaḥ*" (1.120). In later literature, these two words carry different meanings. The definition given in the *Bhāṣyaratnaprabhā* (a gloss on Śaṅkara's commentary on the Brahmasūtras) includes examples (J. L. Shastri, p. 401, in the avatārikā to the Sūtra *ātmani caivaṃ vicitrāśca hi*, 2.1.28):

pūrvāvasthānāśenāvasthāntaraṃ pariṇāmaḥ yathā dugdhasya dadhibhāvaḥ । pūrvarūpānupamardenāvasthāntaraṃ vivartaḥ, yathā śukteḥ rajatabhāvaḥ ।

Pariṇāma is the change of state involving the destruction of earlier state, like the way milk transforms into curds. Vivarta is

the change of state without the destruction of earlier state, like the perception of silver in nacre.

The difference is not unimportant, as the example shows. If *vivarta* is the change in Brahman, then the World would be *mithyā*, neither absolutely real, not absolutely unreal, as Śaṅkara's Advaita holds it.[44] On the other hand, if the change in Brahman is *pariṇāma* then we have the system of Rāmānuja[45].

Thus, though both these words carry different meanings with far-reaching consequences in the view regarding the reality of the world, it remains that Bhartṛhari uses both the words, in a more or less, similar sense. In fact, in 1.120 both words are used in the same Kārikā:

śabdasya **pariṇāmo'** yamityāmnāyavido viduḥ ǀ

chandobhya eva prathamametadviśvaṃ **vyavartata** ǁ 1.1.20 ǁ

The sharp difference in both terms seems to have been acquired after Śaṅkarācārya[46], but we cannot draw any conclusions about Bhartṛhari's views regarding the reality or otherwise of the world based on these usages. We need to look at other usages of *vivarta* to establish the meaning more clearly. The

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[44] For instance, the sentence after the above quotation in the Ratnaprabhā is: *tatra brahmaṇo vivartopādānatvaṃ svapnasākṣidṛṣṭāntena draḍhayan māyāvādaṃ sphuṭayati sūtrakāraḥ ātmani ceti ǀ* (Sūtrakāra explains clearly in the next Sūtra that Brahman is the Upādāna cause which undergoes Vivarta to strengthen *māyāvāda* through the example of witness of dreams)

[45] The change of Brahman is explained, at amongst other places, in the *Śrībhāṣya* on the Sūtra *pariṇāmat,* 1.4.27 (numbering as per Rāmānujacārya's commentary).

[46] In some texts, say J. L. Shastri's edition (pp 413-414) there is the following description of Sāṅkhya by Śaṅkarācārya on the Sūtra 2.2.1 - *yatsukhaduḥkhamohātmakaṃ sāmānyaṃ tattriguṇaṃ pradhānaṃ mṛdvadacetanaṃ cetanasy puruṣasyārthaṃ sādhayituṃ svabhāvenaiva vicitreṇa vikārātmanā vivartata iti.* Since Sāṅkhya is well-known for its Pariṇāmavāda, it is concluded that the words "Vivarta" and "Pariṇāma" mean the same to Śaṅkarācārya. However in other editions, notably the Vani Vilas Press edition (Vol. 2, p 350) the word "pravartate" is found, instead of "vivartate". So the least that one could say is that the difference between the usages of "Vivarta" and "Pariṇāma" seems to have developed after Śaṅkarācārya.

word is used in 1.1 (***vivartate' rthabhāvena prakriyā jagato yataḥ***), which the *Svopajñavṛtti* of Harivṛṣabha makes clear:

> ekasya tattvādapracyutasya bhedānukāreṇa
>
> asatyavibhaktānyarūpopagrāhitā vivartaḥ.
>
> svapnaviṣayapratibhāsavat.
>
> Like the apparent appearance of an object of dream, the
>
> perception of the One Unchanging Entity in a different form
>
> with false divisions as if different from it is Vivarta.

This leaves no scope for any doubt as to whether Vivarta or Pariṇāma, as understood by later readers, is the process of modification meant by Bhartṛhari. The Vṛttikāra is traditionally taken to be Bhartṛhari himself. Other scholars think that Harivṛṣabha is different from Bhartṛhari. Either way, everybody agrees that this is the earliest commentary available on Brahmakāṇḍa and it is unambiguously advaitic in nature.

There is another problem to deal with. Vyākaraṇa is useful for all Śāstras and often limits the inquiry to the extent it is related to language. For instance, in the bhāṣya on the Sūtra *samarthapadavidhiḥ,* 2.1.1, Patañjali under the sixth vārtika *tatra nānākārakānnighāyuṣmadasmadādeśpratiṣedhaḥ* says (Vol. 2, p. 335): "yacchabda āha tadasmākaṃ pramāṇam" – whatever is expressed by Śabda, that is the truth for us. Commenting on this, Bhartṛhari in his Mahābhāṣyadīpikā says: *kimasmākaṃ vastugatena vicāreṇa? arthastvasmākaṃ yaḥ śabdenābhidīyate* [47] – What purpose of ours is served by the deliberation on objects? For us, whatever is conveyed by Śabda, that is the object. Thus one view is that Vaiyākaraṇas deal only with the world as

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[47] Quoted by Tandra Patnaik, p. 16.

revealed by language and that they in fact believe that the world can only be known to the extent it is revealed by the language.

In addition to the reluctance to add unnecessary material, Vaiyākaraṇas tend to be accommodative of other views rather than be polemical. For instance, Bhartṛhari himself says that Vyākaraṇa is the first amongst the subsidiaries of Veda (1.11) and that it shines in all Vidyas (1.14). Even Nyāya accepts Vyākaraṇam as one of the Śaktigrahas[48]. Due to this "perspectivism", there is scope for interpretation left open. For instance, Ashok Aklukjar (2001, pp 461-464) shows how Bhartṛhari's views could be construed as being similar to those of Śaṅkara, Vallabha and Dualists.

It might seem on the face of it that Bhartṛhari has not stated his views on the reality of the world; but there are enough pointers in Vākyapadīya for us to draw a conclusive picture. First Bhartṛhari cannot be a dualist or a Realist because he states that Kāla is one, but looks like it is divided and that all differences in this world are due to the apparent divisions in Kāla. Second he makes it clear that Brahman is not different from Its Śaktis thought it seems like It is different. Kāla is one Śakti. So what we see as the world is a "projection" due to the operation of Kāla. We get clues to this from his views on the Prakriyā of Śabda on how the unreal leads to the Real.

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[48] In Nyāya, the thesis is *śaktam padam*, i.e. Pada is the potent, and meaning (Padārtha) is *śakya* (that which can be signified) and the relation between Pada and Artha is potency, Śakti. This relationship is said to be known from eight (Vyākaraṇam, Upamāna, Kośa, Āptavākya, Vyavahāra, remainder of the sentence, explanation of sentence [by commentators], and proximity to a word whose meaning is known):

śaktigrahaṃ vyākaraṇopamānakośāptavākyāt vyavahārataśca |

vākyasya śeṣādvivṛtervadanti sāṃnidhyataḥ siddhapadasya vṛddhāḥ ||

Thus one would have to say that though the words Vivarta and Pariṇāma are synonymous for Bhartṛhari, their meaning is "apparent transformation" such as is seen in the rope-snake analogy.

3.7 Creation

From 1.3, the creation process is understood like this: Brahman has Kālaśakti. This is actually one, but parts (*kala*s) are imposed upon it; the source of differences in Brahman is the six modifications (*janma* etc.) which resort to the Kālaśakti of Brahman upon which manifoldness is imposed. The concept of Time being one and how manifoldness is imposed on it etc. is discussed in the *Kālasamuddeśa* of the *Padakāṇḍa* where amongst others, Time is said (3.9.4) to be the Sūtradhāra of the Lokayantra who pulls the strings of some and releases others thereby causing differences in the world.

In 1.120, it is reiterated that the seen world is the modification of Śabda. This is so because objects are cognized as objects due to language and all thoughts are based on language; so language is what goads people into any purposeful activity. Thus, if the world is revealed by Speech in the wakeful state, in the dream state, Speech also becomes the object of all activity as all cognition is dependent on language. (1.128). The ability of language to "project" things is independent of the whether the object exists or not. Thus, even an object like "circle of fire" (alātacakra) which does not exist at all in reality, is seen clearly in the mind to Śabda (1.130). Śabda is Nitya and so even survives pralaya. After pralaya, it is from Śabda that Ṛṣis are born who see Dharma (Veda) and then codify it for the benefit of others (1.147). This is

the process of *jagataḥ prakriyā* that is referred to in 1.1, as emanating from Brahman whose nature is Śabda.

3.8 Salvation

Salvation is *sāyujya*, union, with the Great Bull which resides in every being (1.131). Mokṣa is also spoken of as attaining Paramātman and that state is described as without end - Brahmāmṛtam (1.132).

3.9 Means of Salvation

Veda is not only another form of Brahman but it is also the means of knowing Brahman (1.5). Here, the word used for "means" is *upāya*. Upāya is like scaffolding which is discarded after its use. Once Brahman Itself is known there is no need for Vedas which are another form of Brahman. Since Smṛtis are not opposed to Vedas and are compiled out of compassion by Ṛṣis, Vyākaraṇa, considered a Smṛti (1.142) is also a means to attain Brahman. Vyākaraṇa helps in differentiating sādhuśabdas from asādhuśabdas; use of sādhuśabdas increases Abhyudaya (1.140) once one is Samskṛta by Śabda, one attains Siddhi of Paramātman (1.132). Thus it is said that Vyākaraṇa is the first step on the ladder to salvation (1.16) and as in fact the royal highway to salvation. Thus usage of correct Śabdas and reflection upon Śabda to know its true form are two components that a Sādhaka ought to follow.

Even though Vyākaraṇa is the "royal highway" to Mokṣa, Bhartṛhari is very clear that in all Śāstras only Avidyā is described (2.233 ab) – *śāstreṣu*

prakriyābhedairavidyaivopavarṇyate (Amongst Śāstras, Avidyā only is described through different methods). This characterisation applies equally to the linguistic and philosophical aspects of Vyākaraṇa. At the level of language, Bhartṛhari's view is that sentence alone is real and that words are not (1.73) whereas at the philosophical level no Śāstra can teach Brahman as such which is beyond words.

This gives us a clue as to the method to salvation that Bhartṛhari is teaching. On the face of it, notwithstanding the grand claim in 1.16 (*mokṣamāṇānāmajihmā rājapaddhatiḥ*), the actual method of achieving liberation, *sādhanā* as it is called traditionally, is not described. Bhartṛhari did mention Śabdayoga (*śabdapūrveṇa yogena*) in 1.20, but what is missing in rest of Vākyapadīya is what exactly this Śabdayoga is, and how it ought to be practised one might say. A perspective view of Vākyapadīya without getting lost in the details might give the answer.

First we have to realise that all of the world is based on Śabda, is an apparent modification of Śabda and is permeated by Śabda. Then when we analyse the correct form of Śabda, it is seen that all division within Śabda is not real. Then what is real? The undivided Śabda, devoid of temporal and spatial divisions, devoid of adjuncts, in its form of pure consciousness alone (1.126) is Real. To grasp this, one needs to realize that underlying every word is Brahman, whether we follow the Jātivāda of Vājapyāyana (explained in *Jātisamuddeśa*) or the Dravyavāda of Vyāḍi (*Dravyasammmudeśa*); that the operation of language, whether it be through the concept of Kāla (time), Dik (space), Kriyā (action) or Sādhana (the agent, object, instrument etc. of action) is through the Śakti(s) of Brahman, non-different from Brahman itself. As the Sādhaka mediates upon the form of Śabda every time that he uses, slowly the realisation will dawn that all apparent qualifications are imposed and that the

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underlying Noumenon is Brahman. Once Sādhaka realises Brahman all the apparent qualifications vanish. Bhartṛhari states this clearly:

> yatra draṣṭā ca dṛśyaṃ ca darśanaṃ cāvikalpitam ।
>
> tasyaivārthasya satyatvaṃ śritāstrayyantavedinaḥ ॥ 3.3.72 ॥
>
> Those who know Vedānta resort to the Truth of such an Entity in whom the difference of seer, seen and seeing is not superimposed.

By teaching the true nature of Śabda and its various apparent components and categories, and showing them all to be false, Vākyapadīya is teaching the path to salvation. This focus on Śabda and the effort to see beyond the apparent divisions, to reach the higher realms of Śabda such as Madhyamā and Paśyantī, and through them Parā, is then Śabdayoga.

3.10 Pramāṇas and their relative importance

For Bhartṛhari, Śrutipramāṇa is the highest Pramāṇa. If Brahman is the highest principle, then the means to obtaining Brahman is Śruti (1.5) and hence the highest of Pramāṇas. This is in marked contrast to Naiyāyikas and Sāṅkhyas who accept the Prāmāṇya of Śruti but use Anumāna to prove Īśvara, and Puruṣa and Pradhāna respectively. Thus, along with Mīmāṃsakas and other Vedāntins, Bhartṛhari accords the highest status amongst Pramāṇas to Śruti. In the view of those who accept the Prāmāṇya of Śruti, Śruti reveals those which cannot be known through Pratyakṣa and Anumāna. Bhartṛhari's stance is consistent with that because he says the Yogipratyakṣa of Ṛṣis is also based on Veda (1.30). Since Smṛti is based on Śruti and propounded by Āptas, Smṛti has a place similar to Śruti, in the order of Pramāṇas. In the discussion

of Sādhutva of Śabdas, he says the correct form of Śabdas cannot be determined through Anumāna (1.32). Finally, he makes Inference subordinate to Śabda allowing only Veda-śāstra-avirodhi tarka as a Pramāṇa (1.136).

Though it is not stated in so many words in the *Brahmakāṇḍa,* Pratyakṣa is agreeable to Bhartṛhari. Pratyakṣa is usually seen as a more powerful testimony than Anumāna, though there are well-known exceptions like Ādityagati (Sun's movement is not seen and has to be inferred) and Alātacakra (the 'circle of fire' which is visible is an illusion). Within Pratyakṣa, he includes Yogipratyakṣa and says that it is no different from Pratyakṣa (1.37).

Anumāna is said to be the "eyes" to grasp the meaning of a sentence (1.136). Though inference is criticized in many Kārikās, as long as it is not opposed to Śabdapramāṇa, inference is indeed agreeable to Bhartṛhari. Heavy criticism is directed against *suṣkatarka*; though no example is cited by Bhartṛhari himself, arguments like those of the Cārvākas who ridicule Vedic rites[49] may be taken as examples.

In addition to the above three Pramāṇas, Upamāna and Arthāpatti are also agreeable to Bhartṛhari as is Pratyabhijñā, according to the forthcoming book "Pramāṇas in Indian Philosophy" by Prof. K. Subrahmanyam. Bhartṛhari also cites Abhyāsa, Adṛṣṭa, and Yogipratyakṣa, which are going to be discussed in some detail in Section 5.4 *Number of Pramāṇas* starting on p171 of this thesis.

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[49] mṛtānāmapi jantūnāṃ śrāddhaṃ cettṛptikāraṇam| nirvāṇasya pradīpasya snehaḥ saṃ vardhayecchikhām || *Sarvadarśanasaṅgraha*, Chapter 1 || (If Śrāddha performed for the dead causes satisfaction to them, then oil poured in an extinguished lamp should make its flame brighter) is one example.

3.11 Epistemology

As discussed above, Śabdapramāṇa occupies the highest place amongst means of acquiring knowledge. Smṛtis derived from Vedas are comparable sources of knowledge (1.10). He elaborates this by saying that if knowledge were to be natural, then there would be no need for any Śāstra and if it be held that if Dharma (i.e. one's Puṇya) is the reason for knowledge, then Veda is the source of knowing that Dharma (1.135). Bhartṛhari while explaining the nature of Śabda uses knowledge as an analogy: "In knowledge, both the form of object (such as pot or cloth) and the form of knowledge are seen; similarly in Śabda, both the form of meaning and that of Śabda are seen (1.50)." From this we see that Bhartṛhari has a view of knowledge where knowledge takes the form of the object. Further, knowledge is actually one undivided whole, but seems to be delimited by the object which is being known; thus, pot-knowledge seems to differ from cloth-knowledge (1.86). The known objects are Bauddhārthas, concepts, and not Bāhyārthas (objects outside the mind). In the *Sambandhasamuddeśa,* it is shown at length (3.3.39 – 3.3.51) that all Vyavahāra is based on Upacārasattā, i.e. the concept of Artha that exists in one's mind. The tradition of grammar is that it is only Bauddhārthas are what are revealed by Śabda. Thus, is it possible for us to perfectly understand a "circle of fire" (alātacakra) though it does not exist in reality (1.130), or discuss such other non-existent entities like Śaśaśṛṅga (hare's horn), Khapuṣpa (sky-flower) etc. Further, knowledge is in the form of Śabda (language):

> There is no knowledge in this world which is devoid of contact
> with Śabda; all kinds of knowledge shines forth as if permeated
> by Śabda. Knowledge does not shine if the Vāgrupatā (the

property of having the form of vāc, speech) of knowledge goes away as that Vāgrupatā is what makes Pratyavamarśa or Anuvyavasāya (first one knows a pot, and then in the second instance gets the knowledge "I know a pot" – this knowledge of the second instance is the Pratyavarmarśa or Anuvyavasāya) possible. (1.123, 124)

Sphoṭa plays an all important role in communication. First the speaker has in his mind some object to communicate; at this stage this is in the form of Sphoṭa, without any order in its Varṇas etc. Then he chooses appropriate Vaikharī sounds to illuminate the Sphoṭa. The Vaikharī sound is heard by the listener and it again triggers the exact object that the speaker had in his mind. This is explained in 1.47:

> In whatever meaning the Madhyamā Śabda (=Sphoṭa) is fixed in the mind before pronunciation, the same sense is expressed by the Vaikharī Śabda produced by speech-organs. (That is why, the word *ghaṭa* cannot convey the meaning conveyed by *paṭa*, though Madhyamā is one and undivided).

For Bhartṛhari, Yogyatā and Pratibhā also play an important role in acquisition of knowledge. There is a *siddhā niyatā yogyatā*, i.e. settled and regulated capability between the Nādas and Sphoṭa, just like eyes have a settled and regulated capability to perceive colour and similarly other sense organs (1.97). The relationship between Śabda and Artha cannot be man-made and has to be natural (3.3.38). It has been well established that what is communicated is the Vākyārtha, sentential meaning and not meaning of words or morphemes. Pratibhā, said to be a Buddhiviśeṣa, is the form of this Vākyārtha (2.143). Pratibhā may be summarised as an inexplicable

(Anirvacanīya) entity that is born of Abhyāsa in earlier Janmas, is present naturally in all living beings (that is why fish know how to swim and a child knows how to produce speech) and limits the knowledge of all entities (2.146).

3.12 Theory of Error

Bhartṛhari's theory of error has two aspects. The first is concerned with perception of objects; an object is at first not clear and knowledge of the object increases with more exposure. For example an object seen from afar is initially not clear; as one comes nearer one would get a clearer view and finally perceives the true nature of the object. Similarly the Sphoṭa revealed by the first Varṇa of the Vaikharī would be indistinct and the proper form of the Sphoṭa can be established only after the last varṇa is pronounced (1.89).

The second aspect is related to the imposition of the attributes of the manifester (Nāda) on the manifested (Sphoṭa) which is explained with the examples of reflections in different media taking the properties of the media (1.49), and knowledge taking the form of its object (1.86). Bhartṛhari does not offer any reasoning in Brahmakāṇḍa beyond the examples as to how and why this error occurs. We have to deduce from other parts that this happens due to Avidyā.

One reason could be that the pedagogy of Bhartṛhari can easily accommodate errors and in fact could be seen as a graded arrangement of truths, each progressive state being truer than the earlier one. Grammar is called the Padaśāstra (the word-science) but is based on the premise that Padas are not real. The only real entity is the Vākyārtha and everything else - Varṇa,

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Pada, individual Vākyas – is only an Upāya – temporary means of achieving an aim – used to attain the real. Many view Vyākaraṇa as about 4,000 Sūtras teaching how the nearly 2,000 roots could combine with about 400 affixes of 8 types, but Vaiyākaraṇas would be the first ones to say that the affixes and roots are not ultimately real and are only Upāyas created for the sake of Lāghava – ease of teaching – the correct form of Śabdas. They even admit that words like *rāmaḥ, pacati* could be analysed differently than using the *sup* and *tiṅ* affixes taught by Pāṇini; the test is only in whether such a different Vyākaraṇa teaches the correct forms of *rāmaḥ, pacati* etc. This practice of graded teaching, and using entities which are not true to teach the truth, is not unique to Vyākaraṇa and does not start with Vyākaraṇa. The Veda itself has many such devices. Bulk of the Veda consists of "Arthavādas" which are subordinate to Vidhi and are intended to either praise a Vidhi or censure a Niṣedha. Then they are "Vidyā"s like the *pañcakośavidyā* found in Taittirīyopaniṣad where the student is asked to meditate on Brahman and he progressively discovers that Anna, Prāṇa, Manas, Vijñāna and Ānanda are Brahman. In reality, none of them constitute a complete description of Brahman but they are pedagogically useful tools. The division of Mahāvākya into Vākyas, Vākyas into Vṛttis, Vṛttis into words, and words into Prakṛti and Pratyaya are similar "Upāyas". In the words of Bhartṛhari

> upāyāḥ śikṣamāṇānāṃ bālānāmapalāpanāḥ।
> asatye vartmani sthitvā tataḥ satyaṃ samīhate ॥ 2.238 ॥
> upādāyāpi ye heyāstānupāyānpracakṣate।
> upāyānāṃ ca niyamo nāvaśyam avatiṣṭhate ॥ 2.38 ॥

> Upāyas conceal the truth from those who are being trained. The student stays for a while in the false path, and from there attains truth (2.238).

Those devices which, though expressly adopted to serve a purpose, are fit to be discarded after the purpose is served are called *upāya*s. There is no fixed rule with respect to upāyas [since these do not in any way affect the goal]. (That is instead of x, one could adopt y as an Upāya, as long as the purpose is served; to take an example from Vyākaraṇa, instead of "su" as the affix for nominative singular, one could take "ar" or any other affix and combine it with rules other than those laid down by Pāṇini, as long as one can derive the forms used by Śiṣṭaloka). 2.38.

Thus, Bhartṛhari is not unduly worried about the truth during the stage of teaching and does not have a particular theory of error such as *akhyātivāda* or *anyathākhyātivāda*. In fact he recognizes the fact that pure Knowledge of the form of consciousness cannot be the content of Śabda in Vyavahāra (2.139, 2.297, 3.3.55,56) and that even Brahmajñānis are like lay men in both understanding others and communicating their ideas, in that they have to resort only to Śabda which denotes the Ultimate Reality limited by adjuncts.

3.13 Metaphysics

The metaphysics of Bhartṛhari is spread all over the Vākyapadīya and topics discussed above give a fair view of that. At this place only a summary of that is appropriate:

- There is one Brahman which is seen as being apparently transformed into this world due to Its Śaktis, mainly Kālaśakti.

- The Brahman exists in all beings as their Ātman.

- Merger with this Ātman / Brahman is the highest goal: Mokṣa.

- That is achieved by perfecting Vyākaraṇa.

- Usage of correct Śabdas increases Abhyudaya and leads to Mokṣa.

- All purposeful activity is propelled by Śabda and our ability to perceive and think is limited by Śabda.

- Śabda has three aspects that are discussed: Paśyantī, discernible only to Yogis, Madhyamā which is in the Buddhi as one without temporal divisions, and Vaikharī which is spoken and heard. Madhyamā and Vaikharī have a *vyaṅgya-vyañjaka* (manifested-manifester) relation.

- We cognize only the world revealed by Śabda

- Objects revealed by Śabda are conceptual, i.e. Bauddhārthas.

- There are Universals (Jātis); another Jāti within Jāti (*jātau jātiḥ*) is also accepted as Mahāsattā pervades all Jātis.

- Pratibhā, an aspect of intellect, which cannot be explained, has the form of Arthabodha, is caused by Abhyāsa in earlier births and limits comprehension.

- Ātman, Vastu, Svabhāva, Śarīra, Tattvam and Dravya are synonyms and Nitya; and refer to Brahman.

- What exists at the end, that is true, permanent, expressed by Śabda and non-different form Śabda. That neither is, nor is not; neither one nor many; neither combined, nor different; neither a modification nor its own state. This is Śabda, Artha and the relation between the two; it is the seen, seer and the act of seeing. (3.2.11 - 3.2.14)

- Time is the string-puller of the Lokayantra (3.9.4). When a string is "permitted", objects are born or continue to exist; when a string is pulled, objects decay or perish.

- Like a water-wheel the permanent and undivided time keeps turning (kalayati) fragments (kalāḥ) (3.9.14).

3.14 Relation with other Darśanas and Vidyas; Theology and Ethics

Vyākaraṇa is at once a Darśana and a Vedāṅga. As a Vedāṅga Vyākaraṇam is useful for all other Śāstras, as pointed out in p62 of Section 3.6 *Vivarta and Pariṇāma* and therefore tries to be accommodative. Thus we see that in almost every section, Bhartṛhari explains the operation of various language principles based on the worldview of Mīmāṃsā, Nyāya, Vaiśeṣika, Sāṅkhya and different schools of Buddhism. This has been termed as the "Perspectivism" of Bhartṛhari in literature on Bhartṛhari. One implication is that refutation of other views is not done unless it is necessary; when it comes to establishing the Noumenon, only the view of Vyākaraṇa is stated without refuting the other views.

Vyākaraṇadarśana covers the topics covered by other Darśanas and is thus a full-fledged Darśana. Since it subscribes to the Prāmāṇya of Vedas, it has to be qualified as an Āstikadarśana. The strong belief in Vedas, the use of Vedas to establish Brahman and unity with Brahman being the goal makes it clear that it propounds Vedānta. The view of all ancient commentators and related authors – Harivṛṣabha (if he be taken as someone other than Bhartṛhari himself), Maṇḍanamiśra, Puṇyarājā, Helārāja, Kaiyaṭa – and the Navyavaiyākaraṇas – Bhaṭṭojidīkṣita, Kauṇḍabhaṭṭa, and Nāgeśa – is that Bhartṛhari is an Advaitin. Many modern commentators like Pandita Raghunatha Sarma, Prof. Gaurinath Sastri and Prof. K. Subrahmanyam also hold the same view. In this tradition, the Devatā worshipped varies from occasion to occasion, be it Agni, Vāyu etc. in Vedic rites or Viṣṇu, Śiva etc. in Naimittika Karmas; it can be said confidently that the same is agreeable to

Bhartṛhari as well. For instance, the extensive treatment of Yajña in the Jātisamuddeśa shows the earnestness with which Bhartṛhari establishes the framework of Vyākaraṇa to achieve the same object as that of the Mīmāṃsakas.

It is seen that Vyākaraṇa is completely allied with other Vidyas and Smṛtis and so does not teach theology, ethics etc. which are the proper domain of other Śāstras. Also, ethics are usually common across all Matams in India. Within the orthodox (Āstikadarśanas) systems, the common practice is taken as a given, and only the frameworks to explain them are different, especially with reference to Ontology. Whether it be the Sāṅkhyas or Vaiśeṣikas, or the Mīmāṃsakas and Vedāntins, notwithstanding their differences about the Ultimate Principle, relation between individual soul and this Ultimate Principle, there is no difference of view about observations of rites, acceptable behaviour etc. In fact, when it comes to the major unorthodox systems also, Buddhism and Jainism, the ethics are broadly the same, as are belief in rebirth, Karma, Dharma etc., though there is difference of view on their exact nature and mechanism of operation. These three – rebirth, Karma and Dharma – together constitute the basic frame-work for ethics of religions and beliefs originated in India; though there is difference in some details, they are on the whole very similar to each other.

3.15 Summary of Bhartṛhari's Philosophy

The views of Bhartṛhari can be summarised thus: Brahman is one, without beginning, without end, of the nature of Śabda which apparently transforms into the world through its Śaktis without changing Its own form.

The machine that this world is controlled by the puppeteer called Time. The Self is the same as Brahman and merger with Brahman is Mokṣa. Since Brahman is not differentiated as enjoyer, enjoyed and enjoyment, knowing Brahman is nothing but attaining Brahman. Veda is the means to know Brahman. Smṛtis are based on Vedas. Vyākaraṇa which teaches the nature of Śabda, the very essence of Brahman, is the royal highway to salvation. Usage of Sādhuśabdas increases Abhyudaya, hence one should not resort to Apaśabdas even in mundane conversations. A constant meditation on Śabda reveals that all differences are superimposed, and that the underlying basis is Brahman alone.

4. Similarities

4.1 Brahman is the Highest Principle

In both the systems Brahman is the highest principle. This is well
known in the case of Advaita. That this is the situation with respect to
Vyākaraṇa as well is clearly established in Section 3.2 *Highest Principle*
(p47). Bhartṛhari uses many names like Tat, Ātmā and Bhāva as Synonyms of
Brahman, but at every point it is absolutely clear that the Highest Principle
remains Brahman.

Gaurinath Sastri (1959, pp. 8 – 12) first proposes that "the Vedāntist
declares that the Supreme Reality in his system is of the nature of bliss" (p8)
and then considers the point whether the highest principle of the Grammarian,
the Eternal Verbum (as Śabdabrahman is translated by Gaurinath Sastri) is of
the nature of bliss. His conclusion is that "there is no definite statement in the
writings of Bhartṛhari that would unmistakably warrant the conclusion that he
is conscious of the logical necessity of admitting the identity of consciousness
with bliss" (p8); and that "Helārāja appears to suggest that the Ultimate
Reality is of the nature of bliss while Puṇyarāja does not appear to think that
the same can be identified with bliss." (p12). During the discussion, he asserts
that while in Nyāya and Vaiśeṣika, the Supreme Reality is not of the nature of
bliss and that emancipation (Apavarga) in those systems is the attainment of
Kṣema, welfare or good; in Sāṅkhya, the Supreme Reality is consciousness,
not bliss (bliss being an effect of Sattva, one of the three Guṇas, which are
transcended by the Puruṣa). Though he states that his preference is to leave the
issue open, the questions raised may as well be considered.

First the assertion that in Vedānta consciousness has to necessary equal bliss may be examined. The statement quoted by Gaurinath Sastri is from the *Saṃkṣepaśārirakam* (1.187)[50] of Sarvajñātman which explains how the two "essential" qualities are tenable. In fact that particular context of *Saṃkṣepaśārirakam* in fact deals with how sentence meaning should be determined using "Bhāgalakṣaṇā" or "Jahadajahallakṣaṇā" while explaining sentences like "*tattvamasi*". This has been dealt at length in Paragraph 25 of Section 2.2 *Summary of Vedāntasāra* in p19 of this Thesis. The treatment in *Saṃkṣepaśārirakam* is not substantially different. The innovation is that a similar treatment is extended to sentences like "satyam jñānam anantam brahma" (Tai. Up. 2.1.1). Actually, Sarvajñātman lists ten essential characters of Brahman:

> nityaḥ śuddho buddhamuktasvabhāvaḥ
>
> satyaḥ sūkṣmaḥ sanvibhuścādvitīyaḥ |
>
> ānandābdhiryaḥ paraḥ so' hamasmi
>
> pratyagdhāturnātra saṃśītirasti || (1.173, Saṃkṣepaśāriraka)
>
> There is no doubt that I am the root "pratyag" (innermost) that which is qualified as eternal, pure, consciousness, liberated, true, subtle, existing, all-pervasive, without-a-second, and bliss.

Of the ten qualities, "liberated" may be counted as a quality missing in Vyākaraṇa-darśana along with "bliss" pointed out by Gaurinath Sastri.

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[50] ānandatve jñānatā jñānatāyāmānandatvaṃ vidyate nirviśaṅkam |

satyapyevaṃ nātirekāvakāśaḥ pūrṇe tattve jñānasaukhyopapatteḥ || (1.187, Saṃkṣepaśāriraka)

This should not be refuted as being the opinion of one of the Ācāryas of Advaita and not Śaṅkarācārya himself, as the particular line of treatment is well-known in other works of Advaita, including the one summarised in this Thesis and has its basis in the writings of Śaṅkarācārya himself (say in the commentary on *satyaṃ jñānamanantaṃ brahma*). Further there are Śruti statements like *anando brahmeti vyajānāt (*Tai. Up. 3.6.1) and *vijñānamānandaṃ brahma* (Br. Up. 3.9.28). Further this topic has been discussed in the *Ānandamayādhikaraṇa* (1.1.12 – 1.1.17) in the Brahmasūtrabhāṣya. So the objection is perfectly valid.

However, this need not be a shortcoming, if Vedānta and Vyākaraṇa are seen as complementing each other. That is the approach taken in this thesis. Both Bhartṛhari and Śaṅkarācārya are clear that Śabda can never capture the full glory of Brahman (for details, see Section 4.14 *Brahman is beyond Śabda* on p126 below); so, one aspect of Brahman may be treated in the other Śāstra. In fact this is the reason the learned Professor Gaurinath Sastri left the issue open.

So the possible criticism that Śabdabrahman is not of the nature of bliss and so is different from Parabrahman need not be considered and the similarity between the two schools on this count remains unhindered.

4.2 Identity of Brahman and Ātmā

Again this principle is well known in Advaita as exemplified by the "Mahāvākyas" *tattvamasi* (Ch. Up. 6.8.7)*, aham brahmāsmi* (Br. Up. 1.4.10) and *ayamātmā brahma* (Ma. Up. 1.2). As shown in Section *3.4 Relation*

between Individual Soul and Brahman (p55), the exact same position obtains in Śabdādvaita. Further the nature of Ātmā is Pure Consciousness.

4.3 One Brahman Perceived as Manifold due to Avidyā

While the notion of Avidyā in Advaita is well known, it has been disputed by modern scholars that the Avidyā of Śaṅkarācārya is substantially different from Avidyā or its equivalents propounded by Bhartṛhari. In light of this opinion, this question would be explored in some detail. First the description of Avidyā by Śaṅkarācārya is presented, followed by that of Bhartṛhari's. Thereafter the modern views about the difference in the two concepts would be examined.

4.3.1 Avidyā in Advaita

As expounded by Śaṅkarācārya at many places, the One Brahman is perceived as many due to Avidyā. A couple of instances from the Brahmasūtrabhāṣya are given below:

> sarvajñasyeśvarasyātmabhūte ivāvidyākalpite nāmarūpe
> tattvānyatvābhyāmanirvacanīye saṃsāraprapañcabījabhūte
> sarvajñasyeśvarasya māyāśaktiḥ prakṛtiriti ca
> śrutismṛtyorabhilapyete, tābhyāmanyaḥ sarvajña īśvaraḥ.
> (2.1.14)

Name and Form, which are imagined as if they were of the same as the omniscient Īśvara, which cannot be determined as the same as Brahman or otherwise[51], which are the seeds of every aspect of the empirical world, are found in Śruti and Smṛti mentioned as Māyāśakti and Prakṛti. The omniscient Īśvara is different from those two.

avidyākalpitena ca nāmarūpalakṣaṇena rūpabhedena vyākṛtāvyākṛtātmakena tattvānyatvābhyāmanirvacanīyena brahma pariṇāmādisarvavyavahārāspadatvaṃ pratipadyate; pāramārthikena ca rūpeṇa sarvavyavahārātītamapariṇata-mavatiṣṭhate, vācārambhaṇamātratvāccāvidyākalpitasya nāmarūpabhedasya.

Brahman is seen as being subject to all transactions such as modifications due to the difference in forms, consisting of Name and Form, which are imagined due to Avidyā, which are differentiated or undifferentiated, which cannot be determined to be the same as Brahman or otherwise. [However,] From the ultimate point of view, Brahman remains unchanged and beyond all transactions. (2.1.27)

In fact in the beginning of his commentary, in a section known as the *Adhyāsabhāṣya*, he clarifies that mutual superimposition of the unreal upon the Real is what is called Avidyā: *tametamevaṃlakṣaṇamadhyāsaṃ paṇḍitā*

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[51] The word used in the original is "tattva-anyatvābhyām anirvacanīye". Here "tattva" could be taken as "real" or "Brahman". The latter is taken to be the meaning based on the view of commentators. The *Bhāṣyaratnaprabhā* glosses: nāmarūpayorīśvaratvaṃ vaktumaśakyaṃ jaḍatvāt. nāpīśvaratvād anyatvaṃ kalpitasya pṛthaksattāsphūrtyoḥ abhāvādityarthaḥ. (This is the sense: Due to the inertness of Name and Form, it is not tenable to posit them as possessing the qualities of Īśvara. Nor is it possible for them not to possess the qualities of Īśvara, due to the absence of any manifest existence other than that of Īśvara.)

avidyeti manyante. Śaṅkarācārya asserts in the same section that all Śāstras – including Vedānta – operate only as long as there is Adhyāsa, i.e. only as long as Avidyā operates.

4.3.2 Avidyā according to Bhartṛhari

Though Bhartṛhari does not use the term "Avidyā" very often in the Kārikās[52], the entire Padakāṇḍa from the fifth Samuddeśa onwards is actually a description of how this Avidyā operates with respect to use of Śabda (Language) for transactions (Vyavahāra). Thus it is not surprising that his commentator Helārāja uses the term "Avidyā" very often, as illustrated earlier in p51, while explaining 3.27 and on the commentary on 3.9.62 given below. Further, the Vṛtti by Harivṛṣabha, whom tradition identifies with Bhartṛhari, while explaining the first Kārikā, quotes sentences and verses which use the term liberally.

First, the usage by Bhartṛhari is shown. In the Vākyakāṇḍa, after explaining the different schemes of divisions of words (Padas) into four and five, Bhartṛhari starts the discussion on whether subsidiary elements in a Pada are meaningful, ultimately establishing that only the Akhaṇḍavākyārtha is real. The question then arises as to why the Science of Grammar teaches various Pratyayas and the correct form of words. Bhartṛhari's answer is that Pratyayas etc. are only Upāyas and that in a different Grammar different Pratyayas could be used. In fact the entire Śāstra with its division of words into Prakṛti and Pratyaya does not teach the Reality, i.e. the Akhaṇḍavākyārtha.

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[52] He uses it only in two places: 2.233 and 3.9.62. In 1.19 "tamas" is to be understood as "Avidyā "

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śāstreṣu prakriyābhedairavidyaivopavarṇyate ।

anāgamavikalpāttu svayaṃ vidyopavartate ॥ 2.233 ॥

In Śāstras, Avidyā only is described through different methods.

True knowledge without the imaginary constructs of Śāstra

shines forth by itself (once Avidyā is destroyed).

Clearly this cannot be taken to mean that it pertains to that part of Grammar which is concerned with derivation of the correct form Śabda, for if Vidyā is to shine by itself (svayaṃ vidyopavartate), there is no point in teaching the untrue division of the impartite sentence-meaning into words and word-meanings. What is being done is that from the mundane, a generalisation is being derived – that Śāstras are always anchored in Avidyā. This stance is strikingly similar to the exposition of Śaṅkarācārya in the *Adhyāsabhāṣya*: *tasmādavidyāvadviṣayāṇyeva pratyakṣādīni pramāṇāni śāstrāṇi ceti* (Therefore, all Pramāṇas and Śāstras including Vedas have as their locus a man who is subject to Avidyā). Such a stance inevitably gives rise to the question as to how this Avidyā arises. The answer given by both Ācāryas is similar: it is natural. Bhartṛhari says:

svabhāva iva cānādirmithyābhyāso vyavasthitaḥ ॥ 2.235 cd ॥

The practice of learning Śāstra, which is false, is present as if by nature.

Śaṅkarācārya says at the end of *Adhyāsabhāṣyam*:

evamayamanādirananto naisargiko' dhyāsaḥ

mithyāpratyayarūpaḥ.

Thus, this Adhyāsa, having the form of false knowledge, is without beginning or end, and is natural.

The second instance of usage of the word "Avidyā" by Bhartṛhari is more pertinent to the subject matter at hand. In the Kālasamuddeśa, starting the discussion on different philosophical views about Kāla, he clarifies upfront that views about Kāla are valid only in the stage of Avidyā, and not after the dawn of knowledge:

> prathamaṃ tadavidyāyāṃ yadvidyāyāṃ na vidyate ‖ 3.9.62 cd ‖
> That which is not there after the dawn of knowledge is the first in the stage of Avidyā.

Here the commentary of Helārāja is of some interest:

> niṣkramaṃ hi brahmatattvaṃ
> vidyāmayamakālakalitamavidyāvaśāt kramarūpopagraheṇa
> yathāyathaṃ vivartata iti kālānuvedhātpadārthānāṃ krameṇa
> pratyavabhāso'nādisiddhajīvātmagataḥ, sarvasya ca
> bhedajātasyāvidyāmayatvāt. kālenāpi darśanabhedena yo'
> yamṛtpravihbhāgaḥ, so' pyavidyāvijṛmbhitameva.
> āvirbhūtāyāṃ tu vidyāyāṃ sarvasya
> bhedaprapañcasyāpagamādayamapyaiti.

> The Jīvātmā who is beginningless, due to permeation by Kāla gets the apparent perception that various entites are possessed of sequence, on account of the Noumenon Brahman, which is without sequence, is of the nature of knowledge, and is not enveloped by Kāla, being associated with sequence and

apparently transforming into various entities, due to Avidyā. This is so since everything which is different constitutes of Avidyā.

Now, the occurrence of the term "Avidyā" in the Vṛtti on Brahmakāṇḍa is discussed. While commenting on the first Kārikā, quotes the following

> mūrttikriyāvivartau avidyāśaktipravṛttimātram tau vidyātmani tattvānyatvābhyāmanākhyeyau. etaddhi avidyāyā avidyātvam.
>
> (Raghunatha Sharma, Vol. 1, p5)[53]

> There are two types of Vivarta – one in which Brahman is apparently transformed into an object or entity, which is embodied; the other in which Brahman apparently transforms into action. This happens due to the general tendency of the Avidyāśakti of Brahman. These two when they occur in the Ātmā which is of the nature of knowledge, cannot be said to be either Brahman or not. This is the nature of Avidyā.

Here the similarity of the terms "tattvānyatvābhyāmanākhyeyau" used by Harivṛṣabha, or Vṛṣabhadeva as he is called, and the term "tattvānyatvābhyāmanirvacanīyena" used by Śaṅkarācārya in his commentary on 2.1.14 and 2.1.27 as shown above, and in commentary on 1.1.5, is remarkable[54]. Later the Vṛttikāra describes how the Pure Consciousness is

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[53] Pandit Raghunatha Sharma explains the sentence as dividing Vivarta into four, rather than two. No harm is done to Siddhānta in either view.

[54] This term is to be found in Buddhist literature – in the second and third *Bhāvanākrama* works of Kamalaśīla, who flourished a generation before Śaṅkarācārya. These texts are available at the Digital Buddhist Canon (http://www.dsbcproject.org/node/7892). A similar usage is also found (under Kārikā 1.64) in the *Pramāṇavārttikavṛtti* of Dharmakīrti.

enveloped by Avidyā in four verses starting with *śāntavidyātmakaṃ*

yoṃ'śtatadu haitadavidyayā (p9) to *kaluṣatvamivāpannaṃ bhedarūpaṃ*

vivartate ‖ (Raghunatha Sharma, Vol. 1, p10).

In the *Vaiyākaraṇasiddhāntalaghumañjūṣā,* Nāgeśabhaṭṭa discusses

the "māyikatvam" (being constituted of Māyā) of this world at length (pp 260

– 322). That particular segment reads like a Vendāntic text as Nāgeśa quotes

various Brahmasūtras, copious segments from the Bhāṣya of Śaṅkarācārya and

quite extensively from *Paramārthasāra*[55]. On one rare occasion, he

summarizes Bhartṛhari (p312):

ata eva "sarvaśabdānāṃ brahmaiva vācyaṃ vācakam ca" iti

hariṇā siddhāntitaṃ saṅgacchate. (*Laghumañjūṣā,* p.312)

Therefore the thesis established by Bhartṛhari that Brahma is

both the denoter, and that is which is denoted by all Śabdas is

in concurrence.

This is a powerful summary of Bhartṛhari, befitting a scholar of

Nāgeśa's status, and bears some explanation. The burden of both

Jātisamuddeśa and *Dravyasamuddeśa* is that whether it be accepted that

Śabda denotes Jāti or Dravya, it is ultimately Brahman that is denoted. This is

reiterated elsewhere as well. This much is straight forward. Śabda itself is

normally the denoter, then how could Brahman be spoken of as the denoter of

Śabda? This is so, because Sphoṭa is ultimately the Vācaka, the denoter, and

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[55] This book, said to be written by Ādiśeṣa, is a manual of Advaita set out in eighty seven
Āryas. In his introduction to the book S. S. Suryanarayana Sastri shows that the author's time
is between Gauḍapāda and Abhinavagupta, and is inclined to place him nearer Gauḍapāda
and Īśvarakṛṣṇa, as their works represent independent expositions of philosophical systems in
verse, sitting between the Sūtra period and the period of commentaries. From Nāgeśa's
quotations, it seems that he takes Ādiśeṣa to be a Grammarian, if not an Avatāra of Patañjali
himself; yet, the book itself is a pure Advaita manual.

Sphoṭa is Brahman. When Sphoṭa and Śabda are used in the same sentence as Vācaka and Vācya, they refer to Madhyamā and Vaikharī respectively. Madhyamā is the denoter because only that Vaikharī Śabda which has a corresponding concept in the listener's mind is meaningful. Nāgeśa also quotes the Vṛtti on Brahmakāṇḍa (pp. 316-317) as if it were written by Bhartṛhari himself.

Thus it is seen that ancient and modern Grammarians understand and interpret Avidyā (Māyā) in a manner consistent with the usage of Śaṅkarācārya. Further this understanding is grounded in a reasoned interpretation, and not merely due to the influence of Advaita as is speculated sometimes.

4.3.3 Differences According to Modern Scholars

According to modern scholars, there is a difference in the Avidyā of Advaita and the Avidyā and related concepts of Bhartṛhari. Kālaśakti carries out many of the functions in Bhartṛhari's view that Avidyā does in Śaṅkarācārya's view, and accordingly the comparison is between Kālaśakti and Avidyā. According to Gaurinath Sastri (1959, pp. 13-14)

> *Kālaśakti* in the system of the grammarian appears to be different from *avidyā*, the power of the Absolute, in the system of Śaṅkara. The latter states in unambiguous terms that the power of the Absolute is false, that is, neither real (*sat*) nor unreal (*asat*). But the grammarian does not say that *Kālaśakti* is false. It is only the difference between the Eternal Verbum and *Kālaśakti* which is declared to be superimposed. And when this

seeming difference is removed with the dawning of discriminating knowledge at the time of emancipation, *Kālaśakti* does not disappear like *avidyā* in the philosophy of Śaṅkara.

In fact, Gaurinath Sastri makes a much stronger point in summarising the discussion (p24)

> The commentators, however, have read Śaṅkara's ideas into the text. They define the relation between the Brahman and the powers as anirvacanīya, that is to say, logically indefinable as identity or non-identity, as real or not real. But we have not been able to light upon a single word in the text of Bhartṛhari that can lend the remotest countenance to such an interpretation. Bhartṛhari has not declared that the Powers of the Absolute are not real. On the contrary he is unmistakably positive that the Powers of the Eternal Verbum are eternally present in the relation of identity.

Further, another difference seen is that where the Kālaśakti is seen as dynamic, that which propels, Avidyā of Advaita is seen as passive, that which conceals. Harold G. Coward and K. Kunjunni Raja in their introductory chapters to the Fifth Volume of *Encyclopedia of Indian Philosophies* write (40):

> For the Advaitin, the focus is on *māyā's* obscuring of Brahman; for Bhartṛhari, it is the projective power of driving force of time that occupies centre stage. While this difference may at first appear to be merely a question of emphasis, a substantive

distinction appears when the ontological status of the phenomenal projection itself is analysed. While for Advaita the projected world of *māyā* is neither real nor unreal but inexplicable (anirvacanīya), the time-driver world of Bhartṛhari, though increasingly impure as it becomes manifested as worldly phenomena, never loses its direct ontological identity with Brahman. The relation between the phenomenal world and Brahman for Bhartṛhari is continuous and does not have the mysterious break of an "all or nothing" sort that Śaṅkara's *māyā* doctrine requires. Whereas superimposition (*adhyāsa*) is a fitting term for Śaṅkara, it does not seem appropriate to Bhartṛhari. The illustrations offered in the *Vākyapadīya* are more often associated with images of Śabda Brahman bursting forth in illumination (*sphoṭa*), of pregnancy (the peacock egg producing all the colors of creation), and of driving force like the pushing –up or lifting-up action of the waterwheel (*kalayati*).

They also, as with Gaurinath Sastri, believe that Śaṅkara's ideas are read into Bhartṛhari's texts – only this time by modern scholars.

It is probably open to question whether the term *avidyā* meant the same for Bhartṛhari as it came to be defined by Śaṃkara some centuries later. Modern commentators sometimes incorrectly apply concepts they have learned from Advaita Vedānta when interpreting the *Vākyapadīya.*

Their proposal is that "we may make more progress by staying with the words of the verses and the clear illustrations offered in the commentary."

4.3.4 Resolution of Differences

The caution of these learned scholars about not reading too much of Advaita into Bhartṛhari is well taken. Indeed one must be careful at every stage against this particular influence. Even so, it seems that an essential similarity is being missed out.

First the ontological status of the world according to the two Ācāryas may be clarified. Now, it is well understood that "the world is an illusion" is a wrong portrayal of Śaṅkarācārya's position. Rather it is not Ultimately Real like Brahman, nor Ultimately Unreal like hare's horns. In the fourth Chapter of Brahmasūtras, three topics deal with the relationship between knowledge and karma. First in the *Tadadhigamādhikaraṇa* (4.1.13), it is established that Brahman-knowledge destroys all "agha", i.e. Pāpam or sin – both past and future; then in the next topic, the *Itarasaṃśleṣaṇādhikaraṇa* (4.1.14), it is shown that the opposite, i.e. Puṇyam (merit) also does not stick to the knower of Brahman. Finally in the *Anārabdhādhikaraṇam* (4.1.15), it is clarified that non-applicability of Pāpa and Puṇya to a knower of Brahman is only with respect to those which have not yet begun to yield their results. Karma is divided as Sañcita (accumulated), Prārabdha (the starting karma, i.e. at the beginning of a particular birth) and Āgāmi (future). The Prārabdhakarma is the starting balance of karma, with which Jīva starts a particular janma. The Siddhānta of Advaita is that knowledge of Brahman sublates Sañcitakarma and Āgāmikarma, but not Prārabdhakarma, because it has started to yield result and will "continue like the potter's wheel till its momentum is exhausted". Thus it is said in the commentary on 4.1.15

api ca naivātra vivaditavyam — brahmavidā kañcitkālaṃ śarīraṃ dhriyate na vā dhriyata iti. kathaṃ hi ekasya svahṛdayapratyayaṃ brahmavedanaṃ dehadhāraṇaṃ ca apareṇa pratikṣeptuṃ śakyeta?

Further, there should be no argument about whether a knower of Brahman holds on to his body for a while or not. When a person in his own heart knows Brahman and holds on to the body, how is it possible for another person to deny that?

Now, if the world were a mere illusion, at a given instance both knowledge of Brahman and the existence of world cannot be possible for a given person. Yet, that is precisely what Śaṅkarācārya is saying in the above text segment. Also, this is not a difficult text segment being "explained away" or "glossed over". This is an important position of Advaita, or at least in the Vivaraṇa school and in the view of Śaṅkarācārya and Sureśvarācārya, that there are Jīvanmuktas, the living-liberated. This idea is repeated in Bhagavadgītā as well. Śaṅkarācārya himself says (in his commentary on the Brahmasūtra 4.1.15) that the topic of Sthitaprajña (2.53 to 2.72) in Bhagavadgītā treats the same topic. In Bhagavadgītā 3.20 also, while explaining *lokasaṅgraham evāpi sampaśyan* (having the objective of preventing the world from taking to evil path), Śaṅkarācārya adds the word "Prārabdhasamāyattaḥ" (being subject to Prārabdhakarma), i.e. even a Brahmajñānī, subject as he is to Prārabdhakarma, needs to perform Karma with the objective of preventing the world from taking to evil path. In the fourth Adhyāya, verse 4.20 describes a Brahmajñānin doing Karma without a sense of agency. The phrase "śārīraṃ kevalaṃ karma" from Bhagavadgītā 4.21 is often quoted, with reference to the Karma of a Brahmavid, whose

limited purpose is to hold the body. In the commentary on Bhagavadgītā 5.13, Śaṅkarācārya writes:

> utpannavivekajñānasya sarvakarmasaṃnyāsino'pi gehe iva
> dehe eva navadvāre pure āsanam
> prārabdhaphalakarmasaṃskāraśeṣānuvṛttyā.
>
> The existence of even the person who has given up all Karmas and in whom the knowledge of discrimination has risen, is in the body with nine doors only, as if in a house.

One could similarly quote the commentary on *Chāndogyopaniṣat* 6.14.2. It can be said that across the Prasthānatrayam the idea that even after the dawn of knowledge, such a Jñānin continue to do Karma is reiterated. Thus an important position of Advaita hinges upon the reality of the world, even from the viewpoint of a Brahmajñānī. That is the reason why it is said that world is not Atyantāsat, like a mirage. It is only a mistake of the illustrations (of rope-snake, dream-world etc.) even though again Śaṅkarācārya himself clarified that such illustrations are applicable only to a certain extent.

Just like Śaṅkara's "illusory world" is not really illusory, Bhartṛhari's "Real World" is not really real in the ultimate analysis. He repeatedly stresses that Brahman is One, seen as many. In the ontological scheme which ultimately has space for "one" only, what is the status of anything else? How real is the existence of a second entity in such an ontological scheme? Thus, upon reflection, it would be seen that the apparent differences between Bhartṛhari and Śaṅkara are only a matter of emphasis.

Regarding the "activeness" of Kālaśakti and "passiveness" of Avidyā, as has been noted by the scholars who offered the criticism themselves, Avidyā also has an aspect called the "Vikṣepaśakti" which is indeed very active. Apart from that the view points of the Ācāryas are indeed different. Where Bhartṛhari's focus is on explaining how Vyavahāra happens, Śaṅkarācārya's focus is on the steps to be taken to get out of Vyavahāra. It is to explain the worldly transactions involving language, that Bhartṛhari, after establishing Brahman as the Dravya denoted by all the Śabdas in the *Dravyasamuddeśa*, adds a second chapter on Dravya, called the *Bhūyodravyasamuddeśa* with only three Kārikās, merely to state that as far as the worldly transactions are concerned that which is referred to by a pronoun is Dravya (3.4.3). On the other hand, Śaṅkarācārya clearly states upfront in the introduction to his commentary on the Brahmasūtrabhāṣya that Vedānta aims to remove the ill-effects of Adhyāsa (such as sorrow, rebirth etc.).

> evamayamanādirananto naisargiko'dhyāso mithyāpratyayarūpaḥ kartṛtvabhoktṛtvapravartakaḥ sarvalokapratyakṣaḥ . asyānarthahetoḥ prahāṇāya ātmaikatvavidyāpratipattaye sarve vedāntā ārabhyante.

> In this manner, there is this superimposition, which is without beginning and end, natural, of the form of false cognition, the driver of agency and ownership [of actions], and is directly perceived by all. In order to remove the ill-effects of this, and for making known the unity of Ātmā, all Vedāntas are being started.

Thus a difference of approach has to be accepted, but there is no need to say that there is a significant difference in the systems. The differences in

approach result in differing emphasis and different categories of illustrations, but these are surface-level differences and do not imply differences at a deeper level.

4.4 Vivartavāda

It is noteworthy that amongst all systems of Indian thought, only two schools Advaita and Vyākaraṇam subscribe to Vivartavāda. Others resort to Pariṇāmavāda (that a cause modified into effect propounded by Sāṅkhya etc.), Ārambhavāda (the Naiyāyika view that cause and effect are different, and effect emanates from the cause), Śūnyavāda (Buddhist view that everything in Śūnya) etc. It is true that neither Bhartṛhari nor Śaṅkarācārya particularly differentiate between the two words *Pariṇāma* and *Vivarta,* and it is later scholars who have sharply differentiated the two. However, this does not take away from the fact that both Ācāryas advocate a model, which later came to be established as Vivarta. The various instances where Bhartṛhari propounds Vivartavāda have been given at length in Section 3.6 *Vivarta and Pariṇāma* starting on p60. Here the fact that the Vivartavāda is restricted to only these two Darśanas is the point of interest.

4.5 Śruti is the Highest Pramāṇa

While Śruti is accepted as a Pramāṇa by all Āstika schools, there is a difference in the importance given to it. Whereas it is the highest Pramāṇa in Vyākaraṇam and the two Mīmāṃsās, for other Āstika Darśanas it is not the main Pramāṇa, i.e. it is not the Pramāṇa to know the highest principle. Both

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Sāṅkhya and Nyāya establish their highest principles – Puruṣa and Īśvara – through Anumāna. In the Sāṅkhyakārikā (1ˢᵗ half of the 8ᵗʰ verse), it is clearly said

> saukṣhmyāttadanupalabdhirnābhāvāt kāryatastadupalabdhiḥ
>
> Prakṛti and Puruṣa are not perceived due to minuteness etc., but not because they do not exist. They are obtained through their result.

That is, the existence of Prakṛti and Puruṣa is to be deduced from the existence of the seen world which is the effect.

In *Nyāyasūtras* 4.1.19 to 4.1.21, the concept of Īśvara is discussed, but purely based on reasoning, not based on Śruti. Later Udayanācārya establishes the existence of Īśvara using Anumāna in his book *Nyāyakusumāñjali*. There is an anecdote that when once Udayana visited Puri and could not get Darśana of the Lord, in a fit of rage, he composed a poem:

> aiśvaryamadamatto' si māmavajñāya vartase l
> upasthiteṣu bauddheṣu madadhīnā tava sthitiḥ ll
>
> Drunk with lordship you dwell without taking note of me; [but remember], as long as the Buddhists are present, your existence is dependent on me.

This anecdote is offered here to record the popular perception. Swami Ravi Tirtha, in the introduction to his English translation of the *Nyāyakusumāñjali* (pp. xiii, xiv) tries to reconcile the Nyāya view with the Vedānta view.

It is not the real thesis of the author that God comes legitimately within the scope of logical proof. He recognises and acknowledges that God has to be realised and experienced directly. …. When there is a doubt in the mind of man about God, how can there be worship and contemplation? Perception and possible inferences on the contrary are obstacles to faith, and these obstacles can be removed only by reasoning. . ... The first stage in God-realisation is to hear about God from the scripture and also from those who know. Then, in order to develop faith in the validity of such testimony, it is necessary to apply one's reasoning faculty to remove the obstacles from the way. The next stage is to worship and to contemplate upon God. It is the second stage that is attempted in this work.

While it is very much workable for agnosts in today's world, at the time of composition of *Kusumāñjali*, a thousand years ago, such an attitude towards Vedas did not obtain, as shown at length in Section 2.3.3 *Śruti is the only means to know Brahman* starting with p26. Further a perusal of the discussion about God in Nyāya literature also shows that Anumāna was what was used to establish the existence of Īśvara. A good summary of these discussions is available (pp. 100 - 111) in the 2nd volume of *Encyclopedia of Indian Philosophies*. Even so, the contrast with a Vedāntin, whose response would be "God exists because the Veda says so", is stark.

4.6 Only Śrutyanugṛhīta Tarka is Acceptable

A corollary of ascribing the highest place to Śruti is that Anumāna would have to be subsidiary to Śruti. While Śaṅkarācārya repeatedly stresses this point, as shown in Section 2.3.4 *Only Reasoning not opposed to Śruti is a valid Pramāṇa* starting with p32, Bhartṛhari holds a similar position:

> na cāgamādṛte dharmastarkeṇa vyavatiṣṭhate ।
>
> ṛṣīṇāmapi yajjñānaṃ tadapyāgamapūrvakam ॥ 1.30 ॥
>
> Dharma cannot be established by reasoning alone without the help of Scripture. Even the knowledge of Ṛṣis is preceded by Veda.

Further, he goes on to show why Anumāna is fallible in super-natural matters. This will be discussed in more detail in Section 6.3 *Censure of Tarka* starting on p190.

4.7 Śruti is an Upāya

Even though Śruti is the highest Pramāṇa, and there is no other means of knowing Brahman, Śruti is given the status of an Upāya, a device which has to be discarded after the desired object is established. The details have already been presented in Section 2.3.5 *Veda is an Upāya to know Brahman* (p36) and Section 3.10 *Pramāṇas and their relative importance* (p67) of this thesis. Bhartṛhari says this specifically (1.5) – prāptyupāyo'nukāraśca tasya vedaḥ (Veda, itself a reflection of Brahman, is the means (upāya) to attain Brahman).

This position is unique to these two schools, because of their particular stance about the world. The entire empirical world, along with all the

Pramāṇas, obtains only as long as Avidyā prevails. Bhartṛhari is very clear that in all Śāstras only Avidyā is described (2.233 ab) – *śāstreṣu prakriyābhedairavidyaivopavarṇyate* (Amongst Śāstras, Avidyā only is described through different methods). Śaṅkarācārya emphasises the same point in his introduction to the commentary on Brahmasūtras:

> prāk ca tathābhūtātmavijñānāt pravartamānaṃ
> śāstramavidyāvadviṣayatvaṃ nātivartate (*Adhyāsbhāṣyam*)
>
> Śāstram which operates only till the [dawn of] knowledge of such an Ātmā (which is beyond hunger and thrust, birth and death and differentiation as Brāhmaṇa, Kṣatriya etc.), cannot transcend the limit that it is applicable to only those subject to Avidyā.

It bears repetition that though Vedas are not applicable to the Brahmavid, he continues to operate (till his Prārabdha is exhausted) as per Śāstra for the sake of Lokasaṅgraha (preventing the society from resorting to an evil path).

4.8 Śabda is Nitya

It is well known that Nyāya does not hold Śabda to be Nitya. Nyāyasūtras (2.2.13 – 59) refute Śabdanityatā at length; this is also to be found in Vaiśeṣikasūtras 2.2.21 – 37). While the Sāṅkhyakārikā does not discuss the Nityatā or otherwise of Śabda, the Sāṃkhyapravacanasūtras (5.58 – 5.60) specifically hold that Śabda is Anitya. The Yogasūtras do discuss the nature of Śabda (3.17) but do not take a specific stance on Śabdanityatā.

The nature of Śabda is taken up in Nirukta – *indriyanityaṃ vacanamaudumbarāyaṇaḥ* 1.1 (Śabda persists only as long as it is perceived by the sense organ) but, according to Durgācārya, the commentator of Nirukta, Yāska's words can be interpreted in light of both the Nityatva and Anityatva of Śabda

> yadi nityo yadyanityaḥ padacatuṣṭvādi sarvamupapadyate eva
>
> (Line 18, p 22, Niruktam, Anandasrama Edition).
>
> Whether it be Nitya or Anitya, everything including the four-fold division of words is tenable.

Against these views, Mīmāṃsakas, Vedāntins and Vaiyākaraṇas hold Śabda to be Nitya. Mīmāṃsā has a Sabdanityatādhikaraṇam devoted to prove the Nityatva of Śabda and offers the most detailed arguments to prove the Nityatva of Śabda, which may be summarised here. In Jaimini's Sūtras, the objections are put forth in six Sūtras: 1.1.6 – 1.1.11, which are then countered in the six Sūtras (1.1.12 – 1.1.17) that follow them. Those objections and refutations (based on the commentary of Śabara on the Sūtras) are:

Objection to Śabdanityatā	Refutation of Objection
Śabda is transient because it is heard only after an effort is made, from this it is deduced that Śabda is produced by the effort. Whatever is produced is transient because it does not exist before its production. It also cannot be accepted that there is *abhivyakti* – manifestation of an existing entity, because there is no Pramāṇa for the prior existence of Śabda before the effort to produce	Whether Śabda is produced or manifest, the fact that it is heard only after an effort is made, is common in both cases. So, if the Nityatva of Śabda is established by clear reasons, then the fact that Śabda is heard only after an effort is made would be because the effort manifests the eternal Śabda. (1.1.12).

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it is made. (1.1.6)	
Śabda does not persist; it perishes immediately after it is uttered. It cannot be said that Śabda persists but is not perceived because no restrictions to its perception such as a barrier are to be found. The possibility that Śabda has not attained its substratum, Ākāśa, is not tenable because Ākāśa is all-pervading; further Śabda is not perceived in the Ākāśa that exists in the ear's cavity. (1.1.7)	Here also, if the eternality of Śabda is clearly established, then it would be seen when a certain cause is present, the eternal Śabda is manifest and is therefore perceived. Śabda is manifest due to compressions and expansions (*saṃyogavibhāgau*) which are transmitted in air like ripples in a lake. When the vibration of air particles reaches the ear, Śabda is manifest; otherwise, not (1.1.13)[56].
It is observed that statements like "make a sound" and "do not make noise" are used and are understood. Therefore, Śabda (=sound) is something which could be made, or not, and is hence non-eternal. (1.1.8)	Once it is established beyond doubt that Śabda is Nitya, then the meaning of "make" is the sense of "use". Thus "make a sound" actually means "use sound" and so on. Similar usages are found in statements "make cow dung" where the sense is "collect cow dung" (1.1.14).
It is observed that the same Śabda is uttered and perceived simultaneously at many places, which would not be possible if Śabda is one and eternal. Whatever is eternal, Śabda in the present context, has to be only one (only in the presence of special circumstances can the Eternal be many). On the other hand, something which is manufactured can be produced many times at many places. Therefore Śabda is not eternal (1.1.9).	The simultaneity of perception of Śabda is like that of the Sun, which though one is perceived simultaneously at many places. Now it might be explained that since Sun is at a great distance, its location is not perceived and hence the confusion. Then, it may be noted that a similar confusion prevails regarding the location of Śabda. If it be held that the sense organ of hearing, namely the ear reaches the place of compression and expansion[57] and perceives Śabda, then it could be said that Śabda is perceived at the place where it is made, and if be produced in many places, then the statement that Śabda is heard at many places is meaningful. However, ear does not reach out to the place of compressions and expansions. It is clear that the organ of hearing is in the ear-drum. That is, Śabda is heard only in

[56] This description is exactly the same as that of modern Physics.

[57] This is so according to the epistemology of Sāṅkhya (Sāṅkhyapravacanasūtra 5.104).

	the ear, wherever an effort be made to manifest it. Since the compressions and expansions of air are not visible, they are not perceived even when they reach the ear-drum and this gives rise to the false notion that Śabda is heard at some other place, or even many places. Therefore it is only an illusion that Śabda occupies many places. Śabda's substratum is Ākāśa, which is only one. Due to this reason as well, Śabda cannot be in many places. Further, when Śabda is but one, the multiplicity of places where Śabda is heard, indicates that the places are many, not Śabda. Therefore this also is not a fault (1.1.15).
It is observed that Śabda undergoes modification, for instance in *dadhyatra*, the letter "i" is the base form, which modified to the letter "y". Whatever undergoes modification is transient. Further the similarity between "y" and "i" also shows that one is the modified form of the other (1.1.10).	There is no modification of "i" into "y", they are different Śabdas. When something like a mat is made from a base, such as *vīraṇa* (a type of grass), then somebody desirous of making a mat starts by taking up the grass reeds. It is not seen that somebody desirous of uttering "y" similarly starts out with "i", therefore, it cannot be said that "y" is a modification of "i". Further, similarity between two objects cannot be the reason for saying that one is the modification of the other. One does not look at a box of curd and understand it to be a box of *kunda* (jasmine) flowers. Therefore this is also not a flaw (1.1.16).
An increase in the volume of Śabda is observed when many people utter it together. If an existing Śabda was being manifest by utterance, (like an existing jar being manifest when light is shone upon it) the increase in effort would not cause an increase in the object being	When compressions and expansions occur with little or no gap, then what is increased is the *nāda*[58] not Śabda. There are no constituent parts in a Śabda, for we cannot perceive any. Since there are no parts, there is no question of parts combining to increase the loudness of Śabda. When one person utters a Śabda

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[58] In modern physics, this is called amplitude – i.e. the extent to which the air molecules vibrate from their mean position. So, in a home theatre *amplifier* the amplitude of the sound is increased, while maintaining its frequency and timbre. Frequency determines the *Svara,* whereas timbre is that property of sound which helps the human ear to distinguish sounds of same amplitude and frequency from different sources (say from Vīṇā and Harmonium).

manifest. Therefore it must be surmised that each speaker produces a part of the Śabda and when combines together, it results in a loud Śabda. (1.1.11)	it is soft, when many utter the same Śabda, it is perceived to be loud, and as if it has constituent parts. The continuous expansions and vibrations which manifest Śabda are known as *nāda.* When many people utter the same Śabda, the increase is that of *nāda,* not Śabda (1.1.17).

The arguments seen in the above refutations of objections are what may be called the negative arguments. They refute the position that Śabda is Anitya, but they do not establish Śabdanityatā. In fact, 1.1.12, 1.1.13 and 1.1.14 base their refutation on the premise that Nityatā of Śabda will be clearly established by some other means. The next three Sūtras deal with the physics of Śabda and take a position that "i" and "y" of *dadhi atra* and *dadhyatra* are altogether different sounds, but no reasons are given for Śabdanityatā. The positive arguments are given in the next six Sūtras. Śabarasvāmī's commentary on them is summarised below:

Śabda is Nitya because it is uttered for the sake of conveying the meaning to another person. If Śabda were to perish immediately after being uttered, then it would not be possible for anybody to convey any meaning to other persons and so it would not be possible to utter the Śabda for the sake of others. Therefore it follows that Śabda does not perish and by hearing it many times, meaning is comprehended. If it be argued that meaning is comprehended due to similarity with other Śabdas uttered earlier (which conveyed a meaning), the problem would be that no Śabda would be meaningful as every Śabda would be new. If it be said that there might be some ancient who has created an artificial relation between a particular Śabda and its

meaning, then the same is not possible for reasons stated earlier[59]. Further, if similarity with a Śabda uttered earlier were to be the basis of comprehending meaning, then there is the danger that one understands *mālā* (garland) when the Śabda *śālā* (building) is uttered as both the Śabdas are similar. The relation between *mālā* and *śālā* is not like the relation between *gauḥ* and *gāvī*[60], where the desire was to utter the Śabda *gauḥ*. Moreover, if a Śabda is uttered once, it cannot both convey its own form and create a relation with its meaning[61]. Therefore, since Śabda is uttered for the sake of others, it is Nitya. (1.1.18)

When the Śabda *gauḥ* is uttered knowledge of all cows happens simultaneously. Therefore Śabda denotes Ākṛti (class or universal or genus, also called Jāti or Sāmānya). Now it would not be possible to create a relation between Śabda and Ākṛti, because the creator of such a convention would have to point out to Ākṛti of cow, i.e. cowness, but in the body of a cow, there are many Ākṛtis (such as earthiness, substanceness, the property of being existent, tailness and others) so the particular

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[59] The "earlier" context refers to Śābarabhāṣya on the *autpattikasūtram* (1.1.5). There it is argued that there can be no creator of a convention between Śabda and Artha who first set a convention going and then wrote the Veda, because if such a person were there, he would be remembered, as creators of great things like Himalayas are remembered even though builders of minor things like a wall are forgotten. In the case of Śabdas as well, the creator of convention is remembered when the Śabda is used – for instance, when the Śabda *vṛddhiḥ* is used, the creator of the convention (that vṛddhiḥ is the name for ā, ai, and au) is remembered. Further even it be admitted that the creator of a convention is forgotten, without a proof, such a creator cannot be admitted. For instance, a hare's horn is not admitted merely because it is possible. The proof given by the opponent for the existence of a creator of convention is that if convention were not invented, then people should understand the meaning of a Śabda when they hear it first as Śabda is supposed to be inherently meaningful. This objection is rejected because an alternate plausible explanation for the learning the relationship between Śabda and Artha is available: that of usage by elders.

[60] When one intends to utter the Śabda *gauḥ* either through incapacity or ignorance the Śabda *gāvī* is uttered, but the listener infers that *gauḥ* is the Śabda intended to be uttered and comprehends the meaning. Such is not the case with *śālā* and *mālā*.

[61] This is a principle of the Mīmāṃsakas – that one action will have only one result.

cowness cannot be pointed out[62]. Now if Śabda is Nitya, when the Śabda gauḥ is repeated many times, since it has been heard earlier, it is recognized as the same Śabda. By repeating the same Śabda many times and by pointing to different individuals, with the help of positive and negative concomitance (anvaya and vyatireka), it would be possible to determine cowness and thereby the meaning of the Śabda gauḥ. Therefore it would be possible to connect a Śabda with a meaning only if Śabda is Nitya. (1.1.19)

In ordinary usage it is said "*gośabda* has been uttered eight times", and not "eight *gośabdas* were uttered". This usage shows that all the eight utterances are recognized as utterance of the same gośabda. This recognition is possible only if Śabda is eternal. (1.1.20)

An entity is recognized as Anitya, if one finds the reason for its destruction, even if the actual process of production of the particular entity is not seen. For instance, by looking at cloth, even if one did not look at the weaving process, it would be possible to know that it is perishable because the cloth would be understood as arising out of the close proximity of threads and that if the proximity of the threads is destroyed or the threads themselves are destroyed, then the cloth ceases to exist. However in the case of Śabdas no such material causes are seen, whose destruction would destroy Śabda. (1.1.21).

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[62] pārthivadravyasattādilāṅgūlatvādisaṅkarāt | vinā prayogabhūyastvaṃ na syādgotvāvadhāraṇā ||360|| (Śabdanityatādhikaraṇam, Ślokavārtikam). Because of the admixture of many classes (Jātis) such earthiness, substance-ness, existence, tailed-ness etc., without multiple usage [of the word *gauḥ*] the cowness of the Artha cannot be established.

If it be proposed that Śabda is caused by air, or as Śikṣā puts it[63], Śabda is indeed the air which undergoes such modifications such as compressions and expansions, then the Mīmāṃsaka's reply would be that it is not possible for a) no particle of air is recognized as a constituent of Śabda in the way that cloth is understood as being made of yarn, b) Śabda is not perceived by the tactile organ (skin) in the way that air is perceived, and c) it is not possible to touch the air particles that make up Śabda. So Śabda cannot be a product of air, and no is Nitya. (1.1.22)

Finally there is a mark of Nityatā seen in the Vedas: *vācā virūpanityayā* – by Speech which is eternal. Even though this is related to some other topic, the sentence does reiterate the eternality of Śabda. Therefore Śabda is Nitya. (1.1.23)

Thus it is seen that the positive arguments for Śabdanityatā are that Śabda cannot convey a meaning, if it perishes after being uttered; it denotes Ākṛti and a convention between Śabda and Ākṛti cannot be established if each "performance" of Śabda makes it a new one; in Lokavyavahāra Śabdas like

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[63] ātmā buddhyā sametyārthān mano yuṅkte vivakṣayā.
manaḥ kāyāgnimāhanti sa prerayati mārutam ‖ 6, Pāṇinīyaśikṣā ‖
mārutastūrasi caranmandraṃ janayati svaram ‖ 7 ab ‖
sodīrṇo mūrdhnyabhihato vaktramāpadya mārutaḥ ‖
varṇāñjanayate teṣāṃ vibhāgaḥ pañcadhā smṛtaḥ ‖ 9 ‖

The inner mind, having joined Arthas with Buddhi (Grammarians here explain that Artha is the mental construct and Buddhi is the *manovṛtti*, a mode of the Manas) with a desire to speak, mind is appointed. Mind propels the fire in the body; that fire drives the air; the air, in turn, while moving slowly in the chest generates a sound. Such an air being pushed upwards, having hit the palate, having reached the mouth, generates letters. Their division is said to be five-fold by scholars. – This is the translation of Prof. K. Subrahmanyam from his article on Śikṣā written for the Jijñāsa Foundation and available at www.ancientwisdom.com

gauḥ are recognized to be the same as the Śabda uttered earlier; the constituents of Śabda are not known; Śabda is not made of air because skin does not perceive Śabda; and on strength of Vedic texts.

What is clear from the above is that Śabda which is said to be Nitya is not what is known as "sound" in English. It is something over and above what is referred to as "sound". This is an important distinction, which makes the arguments of Śabdānityatvavādins and other Sabdanityatvavādins against Sphoṭa completely different. The former, for instance those offered in Nyāyasūtras cited above, are based on the deliberate understanding of Śabda as sound. The latter, chiefly offered by Mīmāṃsakas, most elaborately in the Sphoṭavāda in Ślokavārtika, differ completely. There, the chief point is that Sphoṭa cannot be perceived by sense-organs and imagining such a concept, there is Gaurava – prolixity – in Sphoṭa, when Varṇas are sufficient to explain the empirical observations. The Grammarians reply is that whereas Sphoṭa as an entity exists, Varṇas do not.

Vedānta completely accepts the Nityatva of Śabdas and the same is codified by Bādarāyaṇa in the Brahmasūtras

> śabda iti cenna; ataḥ prabhavāt,
>
> pratyakṣānumānābhyam ‖ 1.3.28 ‖
>
> If it be said that it [the stance that Devatās possess a body] might create a contradiction with respect to [the Nityatva of] Śabda, it is not so due to the origin of the world from there only [i.e. from Śabda only], ascertained through supporting sentences are seen in the Veda and Smṛtis.

It is in the commentary under this Sūtra that Śaṅkarācārya refutes Sphoṭavāda and supports Varṇavāda in complete alignment with Mīmāṃsā.

As to the Grammarians from the first Vārtika *siddhe śabdārthasambandhe ...,* the stance that Śabda is Nitya is very clear and this underlies the entire Vākyapadīya. As would be seen from the arguments in Śābarabhāṣya, the concept of Śabdanityatva is necessary to achieve the Prāmāṇya of Vedas. Kumārila states this in so many words:

> tasmādvedapramāṇārthaṃ nityatvamiha sādhyate ॥ 7 cd ॥
>
> (Śabdanityatādhikaraṇam, Ślokavārtikam)
>
> Therefore, for the sake of establishing the Veda as a valid means of knowledge (Pramāṇa), Śabda is being proved to be eternal."

As does Bādarāyaṇa: *ata eva nityatvam* ॥ 1.3.29 ॥ (Veda's Nityatvam flows from the fact that the entire world consisting of gods (Devatās) etc. originates from Veda).

Thus it is seen the concepts of Śrutiprāmāṇya, Śabdanityatva and Śabdaprabhavatvam are all closely linked with each other.

4.9 Jagat is born from Śabda

The views of the two schools have already been described – that of Advaita in Section 2.3.2 *Śabda is the Source of the Universe*, starting on p25, and that of Vyākaraṇa in Section 3.7 *Creation*, starting on p64 . While there is

agreement in both schools that the world is created from Śabda, there is considerable difference in the mechanism proposed. The most elaborate description of Creation in Vākyapadīya is found in the *Kālasamuddeśa* with Kāla, a Śakti of Brahman playing an important role. In the Brahmasūtrabhāṣya the emphasis is on portraying Brahman as the Creator and everything else is made subsidiary to Brahman, as described earlier. Even so, this is proposed as a Similarity between the two Darśanas for two reasons:

In both schools it is accepted that the end is the Truth, means need not be true (as elaborated in Section 4.16 *Akhaṇḍavākyārtha* below, starting from p129). So it is perfectly plausible that different presentations teach the same Truth. Within the Brahmasūtras, many seemingly contradictory Śrutis about creation (of the world, of primordial elements and Prāṇas) are reconciled in the third and fourth Pādas of the second Adhyāya. That shows the direction that the focus should be on the main thrust, and not on specific model stated.

4.10 Levels of Reality

It has been shown earlier in Section 2.3.6 *Multiple levels of Reality* starting on p38, and Section 2.3.7 *Two levels of Unreal*, staring on p41, that in Advaita there are two or three levels of Reality, or two levels of the Unreal. All these are of course different ways of slicing the same reality and presenting it.

In this section, it will be shown that Bhartṛhari also uses two levels of Reality – the Pāramārthika and the Vyāvahārika. In the Brahmakāṇḍa, there are instances where two seemingly different statements are made about the

same entity, as illustrated below. In all those cases, it should be noted one state is the Pāramārthika, and the other Vyāvahārika.

> ekameva yadāmnātaṃ bhinnaṃ (1.2)
>
> Brahman is one (at the Pāramārthika level), but is said to be many (at the Vyāvahārika level).

> ekasya sarvabījasya yasya ceyamanekadhā ।
>
> bhoktṛbhoktavyarūpeṇa bhogarūpeṇa ca sthitiḥ ॥ 1.4 ॥
>
> Brahman, though single is the source of the entire universe and manifests as the enjoyer, enjoyed and enjoyment.

> asataścāntarāle yāñchabdānastīti manyate ।
>
> pratipatturaśaktiḥ sā grahaṇopāya eva saḥ ॥ 1.85 ॥
>
> Sphoṭa does not have temporal divisions but appears to have divisions of length of vowels (hrasva, dīrgha and pluta) and of tempo (druta, madhya and vilambita vṛttis) due to the divisions in Dhvanis, which manifest Sphoṭa.

Some should be understood as presenting the Pāramārthika view:

> pade na varṇā vidyante varṇeṣvavayavā na ca ।
>
> vākyātpadānāmatyantaṃ pravibhāgo na kaścana ॥ 1.74 ॥
>
> Varṇas (phonemes) are not seen in a word; nor, subsidiaries in Varṇas. There is no absolute separation of words from the sentence.

And those contradicting such views should be taken to be Vyāvahārika view, such as the verse reproduced below:

nārthavattā pade varṇe vākye caivaṃ viśiṣyate ।
abhyāsātprakramo'nyastu viruddha iva dṛśyate ॥ 2.398 ॥

The property of being meaningful is, thus, not different in word, phoneme or sentence. Due to prolonged usage, other methods seem to be contradictory. (The sense is that while impartite sentence-meaning alone is Real in the ultimate view, from a transactional point of view, used as we are to words being meaningful, a contradiction between this usage and the ultimate might be perceived. However there is no contradiction because what is ultimately one is divided into many in practice for ease of teaching Śāstra.)

Sometimes this needs to be understood, from the commentaries usually; in other instances, Ācārya himself specifies that, like in the following:

etāvatsādhanaṃ sādhyam etāvaditi kalpanā ।
śāstra eva na vākye'sti vibhāgaḥ paramārthataḥ ॥ 3.8.45 ॥

In Śāstra, an imaginary division that "this is the Sādhana (Kāraka)" and "this is the Sādhya (Kriyā)" is made; however ultimately there is no such division within a sentence.

Similarly, there are a number of Kārikās in *Jātisamuddeśa* (20, 21, 22, 23, 33, 34, 36, 38, 39, 40), the *Dravyasamuddeśa* (2, 6, 7, 8, 11, 12, 13, 14, 16) etc. which require a shifting from one frame of reference to the other. For instance, see 3.2.12 and 3.2.13 quoted and translated on p53, where one has to

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switch between one reference frame to the other. Another technique of Bhartṛhari, especially in the Padakāṇḍa from the fifth Samuddeśa onwards is to first discuss the nature of a particular category, then establish its nature from the Pāramārthika point of view thus ending the first philosophical part, and then taking up the discussion about usages of that particular aspect. This will become clear with an example.

The *Sādhanasamuddeśa*, which discusses Kāraka (called Sādhana here) can divided into two sections: Verses 1 – 42 (or 44) in the first section dealing with how Kāraka is a Śakti of Brahman and the second section 44 – 167 dealing with different Kārakas (Karma: 45 – 89, Karaṇa – 90 – 100, Kartā: 101 – 124, Hetu: 125 – 128, Sampradāna: 129 – 135, Apādāna: 136 – 147, Adhikaraṇa: 148 – 155, Śeṣa: 156 – 162, Sambodhana: 163 – 164, Conclusion: 165 – 167). At the end of the first section, the Pāramārthika view is presented:

paramārthe tu naikatvaṃ pṛthaktvādbhinnalakṣaṇam ǀ.
pṛthaktvaikatvarūpeṇa tattvameva prakāśate ǁ 3.7.39 ǁ
In the ultimate (Pāramārthika) view, oneness is not different from diversity. The Noumenon alone (Brahman) shines forth as the One and the Manifold.

yatpṛthaktvamasaṃdigdhaṃ tadekatvānna bhidyate ǀ
yadekatvamasaṃdigdhaṃ tatpṛthaktvānna bhidyate ǁ 3.7.40 ǁ
Diversity that has been ascertained does not differ from Oneness. Oneness that has been ascertained does not differ from Diversity. (The idea here is that once one understands the true nature of Diversity as the manifestation of the One

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Brahman, it is seen as non-different from Brahman. Similarly, once Brahman is understood as the base of all diversity, it is seen as non-different from the manifold.)

dyauḥ kṣamā vāyurādityaḥ sāgarāḥ sarito diśaḥ ।
antaḥkaraṇatattvasya bhāgā bahiravasthitāḥ ॥ 3.7.41 ॥

Sky, earth, air, sun, oceans, rivers, directions – all these are the Aṃśas of the inner Noumenon (Antaḥkaraṇatattva) that exist outside. (In other words, Brahman is what resides inside, and Brahman is what is seen as the world).

kālavicchedarūpeṇa tadevaikamavasthitam ।.
sa hyapūrvāparo bhāvaḥ kramarūpeṇa lakṣyate ॥ 3.7.42 ॥

That One alone is established as delineated by Kāla. That which is devoid of the prior and anterior is seen indeed as possessed of sequence.

In rest of the *Samuddeśa*, the detailed presentation has to be understood as the Vyāvahārika view. Bhartṛhari does not always use the words – *Pāramārthika* and *Vyāvahārika* – but it becomes clear from the preceding discussion that throughout Vākyapadīya discussions are presented at two levels. The only way to reconcile these two planes is through the framework of two levels of realities.

It is not as if these two are imagined by medieval commentators or modern scholars under the influence of Advaita. During the time of Bhartṛhari there was a different term called "Saṃvṛtisatya", popular in Buddhist literature. It means "relative reality" or the "concealed or false conception"

and is actually used by Gauḍapāda in the *Alāntaśāntiprakaraṇa* (which is full of Buddhist terminology, not merely relative to later literature, but even relative to the first three Prakaraṇa in the *Māṇḍūkyakārikā*) in five Kārikas: 57, 58, 73, 74 and 87. There Śaṅkarācārya defines Saṃvṛti as *saṃvaraṇam saṃvṛtiḥ avidyāviṣayo laukikavyavahāraḥ* (Samvṛti is covering up, it is the worldly transaction subject to Avidyā). Thus, it is not surprising that Bhartṛhari used a similar technique. Not merely this technique, there are others like analogies and pedagogic techniques which are drawn by different schools.

4.11 Idealistic Schools: Bāhyārtha is Secondary

That Vyākaraṇa believes that Artha is primarily conceptual – Bauddhārtha (the entity which exists in the mind) – is so well known that it is not contested by those who are familiar with the Ārthikabhāga (Philosophical aspect) of Vyākaraṇa. Still, the distinction between Bāhyārtha and Bauddhārtha is not given a top priority in Advaita, and it would be useful to briefly notice the main tenets of the Grammarian's thinking before introducing the stance of Advaita.

Artha – the entity which corresponds to a Śabda – may exist or may not exist (for certain Buddhists, for instance). If it exists, it may be a real, external object which is called Bāhyārtha in Sanskrit, or it could be a mental construct, one's own imagination, referred to as Bauddhārtha. To give an example, when we use a, sentence such as "the rose is red", both the entity "rose" and colour "red" exist. People do not use sentences like "the *oser is *der" for no object call "oser" or colour called "der" exists. This is the view of Realists, who hold that a Bāhyārtha exists and that Śabda denotes such an

Artha. In the Indian tradition Naiyāyikas and Mīmāṃsakas are famous as Realists. It is to be noted, however, that Mīmāṃsakas believe that Śabda denotes Jāti, called *genus* or *universal* or *class*. Jāti might not be tangible, but it is real nevertheless in the view of Mīmāṃsakas. This is the Jātivāda.

The usual opposite of Realism in Western Philosophy is Nominalism, which does not subscribe to the idea that universals or abstracts concepts exist. They believe that only particular instances, i.e. Vyaktis (individuals) exist in reality. This is called Vyaktivāda.

However in Indian philosophy, at least in the Āstikadarśanas, Realists are pitted against a group called Idealists, who believe that everything in the world is a mental construct or a modification of mind and so we can "know" only the mental constructs. In other words, what the mind cannot conceive, the knower (Pramātā) individual cannot know. Often a distinction is made between the actual reality of the world, and that which can be known by the individual. So some idealists believe that nothing but the mental construct exists, while other idealists believe that even if there be a reality beyond mental construct, only that which can be conceived by the mind is every known. Usually amongst Indian philosophers, Advaitins are called Idealists; Grammarians are also Idealists. For an idealist, then, the meaning of Śabda is a mental construct, Bauddhārtha.

The Siddhānta of Mīmāṃsā, Vedānta and Vyākaraṇam is that Śabda, Artha and their Relation are all Nitya. Śabdanityatva, as explained above in Section 4.8 *Śabda is Nitya* (p99), is tenable if an entity which is different from "sound' is accepted as Śabda. However when it comes to establishing Artha as Nitya, there is a problem. Everyday objects like "pot" cannot be Nitya. Mīmāṃsā works around this problem by saying that Śabda denotes Jāti and

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that Jāti is Nitya. However in Vyākaraṇam since it is accepted that Dravya could also be denoted by Śabda, a complication arises. Dravyas are perishable; so, Artha cannot be Nitya. The resolution offered is that the Dravya denoted is the substratum of everything, namely Brahman. While this is fine, if every Śabda denotes Brahman, ordinary transactions are not possible. "Bring a cow" would then be understood as bringing Brahman, take away the horse would be understood as "take away the horse". The Grammarian's resolution to this problem is that the basis of all, Brahman is limited by an Upādhi, an adjunct, in daily transactions. Thus the word "cow" denotes Brahman delimited by "cowness" and so on. Further, this delimited Brahman is a mental construct and its existence is secondary, Upacārasattā. This is established in the Sambandhasamuddeśa at length from 3.3.39 to 3.3.51. The first Kārikā setting out the thesis is given below.

> vyapadeśe padārthānāmanyā sattaupacārikī |
> sarvāvasthāsu sarveṣāmātmarūpasya darśikā ‖ 3.3.39 ‖
> The secondary existence (Aupacārikī Sattā), which is different [from the existence of the entity in the real world] is the one which shows its own form and all the entities (including their absence) in all states (past, present and future) [when Śabda is used] in communication.

Further, in other parts of Vākyapadīya, that Bauddhārtha is the meaning of Śabda is reiterated.

> atyantamatathā bhūte nimitte śrutyupāśrayāt |
> dṛśyate' lātacakrādau vastvākāranirūpaṇā ‖1.130‖
> Even in cases like Alātacakra (the apparent circle of light formed by rotating a firebrand tied to a thread) though the

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cause [of perception] is absolutely unreal, by resorting to Śabda delineation of the form of the entity is seen. (The idea is that there is no actual circle of fire called Alātacakra, but the perception of such a circle of fire is clear – it is so because Śabda denotes Bauddhārtha, not Bāhyārtha).

sādhanavyavahāraśca buddhyavasthānibandhanaḥ |
sannasanvārtharūpeṣu bhedo buddhyā prakalpyate ‖ 3.7.3 ‖
The use of Kārakas (like Kartā, Karma etc.) is based on mental constructs. Whether something exists or not (in the world), difference in the form of Artha is being imagined by the mind.

In the next two Kārikās (3.7..4 and 3.7.5), Bhartṛhari shows how the Pāṇinisūtra 2.3.42 pañcamī vibhakte and the Vārtika ākhyānāt kṛtastadācaṣṭe under the Sūtra 3.1.26 hetumati ca are both not required in the view of Patañjali as the intended meaning is the Bauddhārtha.

In the Vṛttisamuddeśa, Bhartṛhari once again shows that Bauddhārtha is the one preferred by Patañjali by invoking the Mahābhāṣyam under the Sūtra 1.3.2 upadeśe' janunāsika it –

aṅgadī kuṇḍalī ceti darśayan bhedahetubhiḥ |
caitramīdṛśamityāha buddhyavasthāparigrahāt ‖3.14.568‖
[In the sentence "aṅgadī kuṇḍalī – caitra īdṛśaḥ" (one with bracelets on upper arms, and rings in his ears – Caitra is like this)], while showing Caitra to be with bracelets on upper arms and with ear-rings, due to the image (of a man with bracelets on upper arms and ear-rings) that flashes in the mind, the Caitra who is "like this" is spoken of.

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In Advaita this topic is not given much importance but there are a couple of pointers available. In the commentary on the Māṇḍūkyakārikā 4.26, Śaṅkarācārya, following the original of Gauḍapāda, denies the existence of Bāhyārtha and says: cittameva hi ghaṭādyarthavadavabhāsate yathā svapne (Citta – consciousness itself is apparently seen as entities like pot etc., like in the dream-state). In the Laghumañjūṣā (p 247), Nāgeśa points out that Vācaspatimiśra in the Bhāmatī agrees with that Śabda denotes Bāhyārtha.

> janmādisūtre vācaspatirapyāha – cetano hi nāmarūpe buddhāvālikhya ghaṭa iti nāmnā kambugrīvādinā rūpeṇa ca bāhyaṃ ghaṭaṃ niṣpādayati. nirvartyasyāpi ghaṭasyāntaḥsaṅkalpātmanā siddhasya karmakārakatvaṃ ghaṭaṃ karotīti. yathāhuḥ – "buddhisiddhaṃ tu tadasad" iti.
> In the Janmādisūtra of Brahmasūtras (i.e. 1.1.2 janmādyasya yataḥ) Vācaspati has said thus: "Consciousness itself draws name and form in the mind and generates the outside form with a narrow neck etc. by the name 'pot'. In the sentence "[he] makes a pot", the pot is yet to be made [and so cannot be the object, as it does not exist at the time of the sentence being uttered], but it becomes the object as it exists through the conception inside. Likewise, it is said – 'Whatever is obtained only in the mind, that is Asat (non-existent)'. (Nyāyasūtra 2.4.50)."

That this is indeed the situation is to be grasped from purport of Advaita. Referring back to the discussion on the Nityatva of Artha, while Advaita follows the school of Kumārila at the transactional level, Jāti would be admitted as that what is denoted by Śabda, but as will be shown in the next

section, in the ultimate analysis, Advaita does not accept that Jāti is Nitya; Brahman alone is the Eternal. So, if Jāti also is not Nitya, there would be danger to the doctrine of Nityatva of Śabda, Artha and their Sambandha; if this triad is not Nitya, as shown earlier, there would be violation of the Pramāṇatā of Vedas. So, it follows that in the ultimate analysis Jāti is not what is denoted by Śabda, and that as indicated in the segments quoted above, it is Bauddhārtha which is denoted.

4.12 In the Pāramārthika View, Jāti is not real

Vaiyākaraṇas accept that Śabda denotes Jāti or Artha. Under the *sarūpasūtra,* in the Mahābhāṣya there is a Vārtika: *ākṛtyabhidhānādvaikaṃ vibhaktau vājapyāyanaḥ* (p 90, Vol. 2) which expresses the view of Vājapyāyanaḥ that Śabda denotes Jāti (Ākṛti in this context means Jāti). Later another Vārtika (p 94, Vol. 2) reads: *dravyābhidānaṃ vyāḍiḥ* expressing the view of Vyāḍi that Śabda denotes Dravya. Patañjali opines that Śabda conveys both and that in a given context, one is primary and the other secondary. Accordingly Bhartṛhari treats both views in *Jātisamuddeśa* and then *Dravyasamuddeśa*, the final Siddhānta as taught traditionally being that the eternal Dravya is what is denoted by Śabda.

There is a hint of this in the following Kārikā from the *Jātisamuddeśa.*

prakṛtau pravilīneṣu bhedeṣvekatvadarśinām ।
dravyasattvaṃ prapadyante svāśrayā eva jātayaḥ ॥ 3.1.43 ॥

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In the view of Monists (Ekatvadarśins), when all differences merge into the primordial Prakṛti, all Jātis resort to themselves and obtain existence in Dravya (=Brahman). (The idea is that during Pralaya, when the entire world dissolves into Prakṛti, only Brahman remains and cowness etc. also have to be thought of existing as Brahman; or to the Jñānī, when all differences are sublated in Brahman, Jāti is no longer applicable).

In Advaita, Jāti is admitted to exist only as long as one does not realise Brahman. In the Chāndogyopaniṣat there are a series of statements showing the state in which Jāti is no longer valid:

apāgādagneragnitvam (Chāndogyopaniṣat 6.4.1)

apāgādādityādādityatvam (Chāndogyopaniṣat 6.4.2)

apāgāccandrāccandratvam (Chāndogyopaniṣat 6.4.1)

apāgādvidyuto vidyuttvam (Chāndogyopaniṣat 6.4.1)

Firehood of Fire vanishes (6.4.1); Sun-ness vanished from Sun (2); Moon-ness vanished from Moon (3); lightning-ness vanished from f lightning (4).

In the commentary on these passages, it is explained in the context of Trivṛtkaraṇa, the idea that everything that is seen consists of three subtle elements – Subtle Fire, Subtle Water and Subtle Earth. Trivṛtkaraṇa is one model describing how the undifferentiated Brahman is differentiated into name and form. If one is able to realise that the seen world is a result of this Trivṛtkaraṇa, then both name and form cease to exist, as explained by Śaṅkarācārya in the commentary on Chāndogyopaniṣat 6.4.1.

. . . rūpatrayavyatirekeṇa agniriti yanmanyase tvam, tasyāgneragnitvamidānīm apāgāt apagatam. prāgrūpatrayavivekavijñānāt yā agnibuddhirāsīt te, sā agnibuddhirapagatā agniśabdaścetyarthaḥ

Whatever you think of as "Agni" (fire) which is beyond the three colours (red of Subtle Fire, white of Subtle Water, and black of Subtle Earth), the Agnitvam (fireness) of that Agni has vanished. The meaning is that the sense or concept of Agni that one had before the knowledge of discriminating the three colours, that sense or concept of Agni has vanished, as has the Śabda Agni.

This is referred to as a source of support by Śaṅkarācārya in other instances. While commenting on Chāndogyopaniṣat 2.23.1, the conduct of a person who has realised Brahman (who does not do rites like Agnihotra) comes up for discussion and the opponent puts up an objection:

nanu agnyutsādanadoṣabhāk syāt parivrajan — 'vīrahā vā eṣa devānāṃ yo'gnimudvāsayate' (Taittirīyasamhitā 1.5.2) iti śruteḥ

While renunciating, he would become guilty of the sin of giving up his Fire[64] on account of the Śruti (Taittirīyasamhitā 1.5.2): "He who gives up Agni is the killer of the sons of gods"

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[64] A person who is eligible to learn the Veda has the duty of keeping Fire forever aflame in his house after marriage and of offering oblations twice a day.

Śaṅkarācārya refutes the above objection by quoting the Śruti

apāgādagneragnitvam (Ch. Up. 6.4.1) discussed above.

> na, daivotsāditatvāt, utsanna eva hi sa ekatvadarśane jāte —
> 'apāgādagneragnitvam' (Ch. Up. 6.4.1) iti śruteḥ. ato na
> doṣabhāk gṛhasthaḥ parivrajanniti
>
> No, because the abandonment [of fire] itself is Daivam (fate) –
> it becomes given up once realisation of Oneness [of the seen
> world, in the form of Brahman] arises, on account of the Śruti
> *apāgādagneragnitvam* (Ch. Up. 6.4.1). Therefore when a
> householder renunciates, he does not incur any sin.

Therefore, in the Pāramārthika view, Jāti is not real in either Advaita or

Vyākaraṇa Darśana.

4.13 Belief in Pralaya

That Advaita believes in Pralaya is so well known that it hardly

requires any substantiation. Even so, for the sake of consistency, if a few

references are to be known, one need not look beyond the

Janmādyadhikaraṇam (1.1.2) where the third state is *Laya* (Dissolution). In

the *Devatādhikaraṇam* which will be discussed at some length later, the

concept of *Mahāpralaya* comes up for discussion.

This belief of Advaita in Pralaya is different from that of Mīmāṃsā

which does not admit of Pralaya, or Creation. Śabarasvāmin in his

commentary on the fifth Sūtra of Pūrvamīmāṃsā (called *autpattikasūtra*)

refutes the view that there could be a creator of convention between Śabda and Artha, on the grounds that such a person would be remembered, just like Pāṇini is remembered for creating the convention between "Vṛddhi" and "āt, aic" and the Piṅgala for creating the convention between *ma* and the triad of long vowels ("*ma-gaṇa* consists of three *gurus* according to *Chandaśśāstra*)[65]. This doctrine is further elaborated by Kumārila in the *Sambandhākṣepaparihāra* section of the *Ślokavārtikam* from 42cd (p 650) to 113 (p 673). A few lines are quoted below:

sargādau ca kriyā nāsti tādṛkkālo hi neṣyate ǁ 42 cd ǁ

As to the action [of creating a convention] at the beginning of Creation, such a time is not desired (= admitted by us).

saṃhārecchāpi caitasya bhavedapratyayāt punaḥ ǀ 57ab ǀ

Even if the desire to destroy of this [Creator] be there, then again [Pralaya is not possible] because of the unreasonabless [of such a desire].

pralaye' pi pramāṇaṃ naḥ sarvocchedātmake na hi ǀ 67 ab ǀ

Regarding Pralaya of the nature of annihilation of everything, we find no Pramāṇa.

tasmādadyavadevātra sargapralayakalpanā ǀ
samastakṣayajanmabhyāṃ na siddhyatyapramāṇikā ǁ 113 ǁ

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[65] This is the gist of text in *Śābarabhāṣya* starting with *apauruṣeyatvātsambandhasya siddhamiti* (p53) and ending with *tasmādapauruṣeyaḥ śabdasyārthena sambandha iti* (p55).

Therefore, here the theory of Creation and Dissolution involving birth and death of everything at once is without a Pramāṇa, and is similar to present day (transactions of continuous birth and death of various entities one by one, but not simultaneously).

The above idea is captured in a pithy line "*na kadāpyanīdṛsaṃ jagat*" (the world was never unlike what it is now – i.e. there can be no creation or destruction of all simultaneously) and is quoted as the Mīmāṃsā position, but this researcher is unable to trace the quote to any source.[66]

Advaita cannot agree to such a position and maintains that Īśvara is both the creator and the destroyer, and that Īśvara is the one who dispenses the fruits of Karma, as expounded in the *Phalādhikaraṇam* (3.2.38 to 3.2.41).

Bhartṛhari also believes in Pralaya, though he does present the model of how language works in case one does not believe in Pralaya also. In the Brahmakāṇḍa in the process of establishing Vyākaraṇaśāstra as a Smṛti, he explains how Smṛtis are based on Śruti; there he explains the process first following the view of Mīmāṃsakas and then propounds the Siddhānta view.

anādimavyavacchinnāṃ śrutimāhurakartṛkām ǀ
śiṣṭairnibadhyamānā tu na vyavacchidyate smṛtiḥ ǁ 1.145 ǁ

Śruti is said to be without beginning, without a break, and without an author. Though Smṛti is composed by Śiṣṭas (from

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[66] There is another *nyāya* with a similar import – *yaḥ kalpaḥ sa kalpapūrvaḥ* (every creation is similar to the earlier creation). This again is quoted often, but the source is untraceable.

time to time), (they ensure that) it is without a break (and does not deviate from Śruti).

avibhāgādvivṛttānāmabhikhyā svapnavacchrutau |
bhāvatattvaṃ tu vijñāya liṅgebhyo vihitā smṛtiḥ ‖ 1.146 ‖

For those who are the apparent manifestation (Ṛṣis) of the Undivided (Brahman), knowledge of Śruti is like in a dream (i.e. without involving sense organs). Smṛti has been composed by them from the indicators in Śruti, after having known the nature of Veda.

In the above, the first view is following the views of Mīmāṃsakas that there is no Pralaya. The second one is following the view that there is Sṛṣṭi and Pralaya, and hence explains how the first knowledge of Śruti arises. Here a question might arise as to how we know that the latter is the Siddhānta view. The answer would be from internal textual evidence. The internal textual evidence is the usage "avibhāgāt vivṛttānām" (of those who are apparent manifestations from the Undivided). As shown earlier, Vivarta is the Creation Model agreeable to Bhartṛhari and hence the latter is the thesis.

Then we have the Kārikā in *Jātisamuddeśa* where language very similar to the commentary of Śaṅkarācārya on the Chāndogyaśruti *apāgādagneragnitvam* (Ch. Up. 6.4.1) is used:

prakṛtau pravilīneṣu bhedeṣvekatvadarśinām |
dravyasattvaṃ prapadyante svāśrayā eva jātayaḥ ‖ 3.1.43 ‖

In the view of Monists (Ekatvadarśins), when all differences merge into the primordial Prakṛti, all Jātis resort to themselves

and obtain existence in Dravya (=Brahman). (The idea is that during Pralaya, when the entire world dissolves into Prakṛti, only Brahman remains and cowness etc. also have to be thought of existing as Brahman; or to the Jñānī, when all differences are sublated in Brahman, Jāti is no longer applicable).

Thus it is seen that for both Śaṅkarācārya and Bhartṛhari, Pralaya is acceptable – in contrast to the Mīmāṃsakas.

4.14 Brahman is beyond Śabda

The view of Advaita is that Nirguṇabrahman is beyond words and conception by Manas based on Śrutis like *yato vāco nivartante aprāpya manasā saha* (Tai. Up. 2.9.1), *neti neti* (Br. Up. 2.3.6), *yatra nānyat paśyati nānyatccṛṇoti nānyadvijānāti sa bhūmā* (Ch. Up. 7.24.1) etc.

Bhartṛhari has a similar view – that the unqualified Brahman cannot be the subject matter of Śabda, that is Brahman cannot be expressed by Śabda.

ṛṣīṇāṃ darśanaṃ yacca tattve kiñcidavasthitam ।
na tena vyavahāro' sti na tacchabdanibandhanam ॥ 2.139 ॥

The Darśanam (knowledge) of Ṛṣis which is somewhat situated in the Noumenon, that knowledge is neither conveyed by Śabda nor is there any transaction (Vyavahāra) with it. (In other words, Ṛṣis might know Brahman permanently or keep lapsing from that state; either way, no worldly transaction is possible

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with such knowledge and such knowledge cannot be the reason for the use of Śabda.)

yaccopaghātajaṃ jñānaṃ yacca jñānamalaukikam।
na tābhyāṃ vyavahāro' sti śabdā lokanibandhanāḥ ॥ 2.297 ॥

Worldly transactions are governed by Śabdas and cannot occur either through the cognizance born of defects in sense organs or the unworldly ultimate knowledge. (Śabdas can only convey a limited aspect of the Artha and so is incapable of conveying the Undivided Whole that Brahman is).

rūpaṇavyapadeśābhyāṃ laukike vartmani sthitau ।
jñānaṃ pratyabhilāpaṃ ca sadṛśau bālapaṇḍitau ॥ 3.3.55 ॥

A Paṇḍita (who has realised Brahman) and a lay person are equal in the Vyāvahārika level in conceiving an Artha and denoting it by Śabda and in understanding the view of others and cognizing it in the mind and then expressing it with Śabda. (The idea here is that though the Jñānī realises Brahman, he has to resort to unreal adjuncts while in the plane of Vyavahāra).

Based on her study of Bhartṛhari, Patnaik reaches a similar conclusion (p 184):

Ultimately he shows that no language can say anything about the Reality, be it the linguistic reality or be it the reality of the phenomenal world. Our sentences are nothing more than the fragments and bits of meaning-whole. The principle of language as such, is not **sayable**, for whatever is sayable is only

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a part of the whole, that our mind selects for practical and worldly transactions. … Whatever is **sayable** is finite and differentiated manifestation of the one śabda-tattva. (Emphasis is by Tandra Patnaik).

Thus it is seen that both Bhartṛhari and Śaṅkarācārya state that Brahman is beyond Śabda, even as they maintain that Śabda (in the form of Śruti) is the only means to know Brahman. This is the reason, that in their pedagogy, unreal devices are used to make the Reality known, as no truly Real device is accessible to those who are subject to Avidyā.

4.15 Pedagogy: True Reality taught through Untrue Devices

The pedagogy of Advaita is known as the method of Adhyāropa (proposing something as Brahman) and Apavāda (removing it as not Brahman). This method is seen repeatedly used in the Upaniṣads – in the Pañcakośavidyā in the Taittirīyopaniṣad (both *Ānandavallī* and *Bhṛguvallī*), by *neti neti* in the fourth Brāhmaṇa of the second Adhyāya of Bṛhadāraṇyakopaniṣad etc. While commenting on Bhagavadgītā 13.13, Śaṅkarācārya quotes:

> tathā hi sampradāyavidāṃ vacanam —
> 'adhyāropāpavādābhyāṃ niṣprapañcaṃ prapañcyate' iti.
>
> There is the saying of those who know tradition well – "by superimposition and subsequent removal, that which is devoid of manifoldness is described in detail."

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The idea is that the true Reality is taught through untrue devices, because there is no other way to teach the indescribable. This is stated explicitly by Bhartṛhari:

upāyāḥ śikṣamāṇānāṃ bālānāmapalāpanāḥ ।
asatye vartmani sthitvā tataḥ satyaṃ samīhate ॥ 2.238 ॥
To the lay people, who are being trained, Devices (=Śāstras) are expedient ruses. Having stood in the untrue path, from there Truth is being obtained.

Vyākaraṇam holds that sentence alone is real, and that words and phonemes are unreal (1.73); yet it focuses on the correct forms of words so much that it is called "padaśāstram".

4.16 Akhaṇḍavākyārtha

As shown in Section 2.2 *Summary of Vedāntasāra*, paragraphs 25 and 26, (pp. 19 - 21) of this Thesis, Advaitins hold that in case of Mahāvākyas like *tattvamasi* the Akhaṇḍa-vākyārtha, i.e. the impartite sentence meaning should be understood. In a sentence like *tattvamasi* the partial meanings are the meanings of the words *tat* (that, Brahman), *tvam* (thou) and *asi* (art). When we take partial meanings, there is an apparent contradiction in that *Brahman* and *thou* are apparently different. However in the impartite meaning, the Noumenon denoted by *Brahman* and that denoted by *thou* are not differentiated; it is one only and that alone (Akhaṇḍacaitanya) is the meaning of the sentence.

Grammarians hold the exact same view. In the Vākyakāṇḍa, there is a lengthy discussion of the views of the Grammarian and the Mīmāṃsaka, starting with the statement of the position of Vyākaraṇa and Mīmāṃsā in 2.57:

abhedpūrvakā bhedāḥ kalpitā vākyavādibhiḥ ।
bhedapūrvānabhedāṃstu manyante padadarśinaḥ ॥ 2.57 ॥

Differences (in the form of words) are devised, on the basis of non-difference (within a sentence), by the sentence-proponents (i.e. Vaiyākaraṇas those who propound sentence as the true entity). On the other hand, the word-proponents (Mīmāṃsakas) hold the sentence as one, on the basis of its differentiation into words.

From 2.57 to 2.112, Bhartṛhari discusses the various objections of Mīmāṃsakas and establishes that Sentence alone is real and has one meaning. Then, he takes up the meaning of the impartite sentence and shows that Pratibhā is the Akhaṇḍavākyārtha.

vicchedagrahaṇe' rthānāṃ pratibhānyaiva jāyate ।
vākyārtha iti tāmāhuḥ padārthairupapāditām ॥ 2.143 ॥

When meanings (of words) are considered separately, something other than them called Pratibhā arises, which is made manifest by word-meanings and is called the sentence-meaning.

The same concept of impartite-meaning is held by the Vaiyākaraṇa to be the meaning of a compound word, by the name Ekārthībhāva.

arthasya vinivṛttatvāllugādi na virudhyate ।

ekārthībhāva evātaḥ samāsākhyā vidhīyate ॥ 3.14.45 ॥

As meaning (of individual components of a compound) would vanish, the elision of *sup* Pratyayas (in compound formation) is not a hindrance. Therefore, the meaning of Samāsa is ordained in Ekārthībhāva only.

Ekārthībhāva is the concept wherein the constituents of a compound lose their individual meaning and together denote something else altogether. In the compound *rājapuruṣaḥ* (king's man, a State Official), the two constituents lose their meaning. As a result a Rājapuruṣa is different from both Rājā and Puruṣa; the constituents together denote something new altogether called the State Official.

Thus we see that in terms of ascertaining the meaning of the most important Vedic sentences (from an Advaita point of view), Advaita abandons the Mīmāṃsā method of Varṇavāda (and the Abhihitānvayavāda of Bhāṭṭas) and resorts to Akhaṇḍvākyārtha. If it sticks to Varṇavāda, then resort to Bhāgalakṣaṇā has to be taken. In Vidhivākyas, Lakṣaṇā cannot be taken according to Mīmāṃsā. No doubt, the Mahāvākyas are not Vidhivākyas[67], but still resorting to Lakṣaṇā (secondary meaning) to explain the main Śrutis weakens the case. Further within Abhihitānvayavāda, a new innovation called Jahadajahallakṣaṇā has to be invented. In the method of Śāstra, all this is Gaurava – prolixity; that might be the reason that later Ācāryas of Advaita

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[67] According to Vedānta, sentences teaching Brahman merely state a fact about what exists and are not injunctions. In the case of injunctions, it is possible to follow the injunction, not do anything, or do in a manner different from what is ordained – however such options are not possible in the case of knowledge. See Śaṅkarācārya's commentary on 1.1.4 (p 26, Vol. 1): *jñānaṃ kartumakartumanyathā vā kartumaśakyam. kevalaṃ vastutantrameva tat ; na codanātantram, nāpi puruṣatantram*

preferred Akhaṇḍavākyārtha, while also presenting the Bhāgalakṣaṇā (or Jahadajahallakṣaṇā).

4.17 Yuṣmad and Asmad

Śaṅkarācārya begins his Brahmasūtrabhāṣya with the word *yuṣmadasmadpratyayagocarayoḥ* which is translated by Swami Gambhirananda (1965, p1) as "which are fit to be the contents of the concepts 'you' and 'we'". Here the intended meaning is that the Śabda "asmad" indicates the Pratyagātman and the Śabda "yuṣmad" indicates everything other than that. This choice of words is discussed at some length in the commentaries. Date (pp 1 – 2) provides a very good summary of those discussions in his first footnote:

> The word "asmad" conveys undoubtedly the meaning of the subjective aspect in experience. The word "yuṣmad" however presents a difficulty. On the one hand, being a personal pronoun like "asmad" it also suggests the presence of an intelligent experiencing subject, and therefore may not be supposed as necessarily contradicting the impact of the word "asmad". On the other hand, it falls outside the scope of the meaning of the word "asmad" just as truly as any other non-intelligent thing of the world falls outside it. Any centre of experience denoted by "yuṣmad" is not directly cognised as the "I" is cognised. It is therefore on a par with other subjects of the world. And yet the word "yuṣmad" is more useful than "this" or "Idam" in bringing out the absolute contrast in nature

between the subject and object. "Idam" may be combined with "asmad" as in "idam aham" (it is I), but the word "yuṣmad" cannot be so combined. Apart from this usage of language, "yuṣmad" is a word which can be used only while addressing our fellow beings who fall outside the scope of the "I" in us, but also be used in an act of introspection for anything which, in a way, does not belong to the subjective side, except the pure self illuminating subject Itself. Thus, one may address (not metaphorically but literally) in an act of introspection, his own indriyas, mind, intellect and ahaṃkāra by the same endearing epithet "thou". One can mentally dissociate oneself from these and address them, as if they were one's own fellow beings. The mind, the Buddhi etc. are not merely separate from the Ātman; they are, according to Śaṃkara, of the nature of un-ātman. The word "yuṣmad" therefore is as useful to convey this un-ātmic side of the mental or intellectual life as of the bodies of our fellow men in social life. The extension of the meaning of the word "yuṣmad" to cover the ordinary, inanimate objects of the world is easy to understand. The world is un-ātmic, on the face of it, and if the word "yuṣmad" can be used to denote one or two parts of the world, viz. our fellow beings, and our own senses, intellect etc. because they are un-ātmic, it can legitimately be used to denote the other part of it, viz. the inanimate objects on account of the same reason.

As it were a similar sense is expressed in the *Puruṣasamuddeśa,* the tenth Samuddeśa of *Vākyapadīya.* There it is stated that "asmad" expresses Pratyaktva (the nature of the inner-most, i.e. Ātman), and "yuṣmad" expresses *parabhāva,* the sense of the other (3.10.1). This fits Śaṅkarācārya's words like

a glove. It is further stated that Caitanya – real or imaginary – is conveyed by these two Śabdas only and that third person does not operate in the sentient part (3.10.2). The remaining part of the Samuddeśa explains these concepts in greater detail using examples occurring at the edge of these concepts.

In this manner it is possible to show that many such minute aspects – like the careful usage of Śabda – are similar between the two Darśanas. Not only are these similarities, but also show how one Darśana can be supported and strengthened by the other. Normally many commentators quote the Prakriyā part of Vyākaraṇam profusely to support their interpretation, but the Ārthika part, i.e. the philosophical aspect is not much quoted. As shown here in the case of Advaita, it would be enriching if support from the Ārthikabhāga is also shown.

4.18 Summary

Thus it is seen there are many closely inter-related similarities between the two Darśanas, so much so that the following account would be equally applicable to both systems.

The one Brahman alone is Real, rest of it is not. This Brahman is apparently manifest (undergoes Vivarta) into the world. The perceived manifoldness, due to Avidyā, is not true. Ātmā and Brahman are the same, and that realisation is liberation or salvation.

Śruti is the highest Pramāṇa and Brahman can be known only from Śruti. Only Tarka not contradictory to Śruti is acceptable as a Pramāṇa. Even

so, Śruti is only an Upāya to attain Brahman. Śabda is Nitya and the world is born from Śabda. There are multiple levels of reality.

Brahman is beyond Śabda and cannot be described determinatively. Therefore the true Brahman has to be necessarily taught through untrue devices. Śabda denotes Bauddhārtha not Bāhyārtha. In the ultimate level, Jāti is not real. Sentence denotes the impartite-sentence-meaning. There is a Pralaya (great dissolution) and hence it is admitted that there is Svarga and a Creator of the phenomenal world.

5. Differences

In this Chapter, the main differences between the two Darśanas are presented, namely the direct criticism of Sphoṭa by Śaṅkarācārya, criticism of Śabdādvaita by other Ācāryas of Advaita, the difference in the doctrine of Māyā of Advaita and of the Śaktis of Brahman, the number of Pramāṇas and difference in views if Śabda is taken as a Pratīka. What are not discussed are minor differences. For instance, Śaṅkarācārya sets out who the Adhikārin (person eligible to study the Śāstra) is and what his qualifications are which Bhartṛhari does not. Similarly Bhartṛhari tries to show that differences in points of view are because differences in what constitutes Arthavāda, thus trying to show that all Darśanas are similar, whereas Śaṅkarācārya does not concede anything of that sort, though later Ācāryas have arranged other Darśanas as a series of stepping stones to reach Advaita. These kinds of differences do not stand upon deep analysis and only serve to add to the bulk of the present thesis. So they are avoided.

5.1 Sphoṭavāda vs. Varṇavāda – criticism in Devatādhikaraṇam

While the main-stream position is that Śaṅkarācārya has refuted Sphoṭa in the *Devatādhikaraṇa*, there is also a view that Śaṅkarācārya is neutral. Prof. Mulakaluri Srimannarayana Murthy has propounded such a view (pp. 80) in his book, *Bhartṛhari, the Grammarian*.

> The eternality of *śabda* came up contextually while
> commenting on as to how the *śabda* gave birth to the deities
> who are eternal. When the deities are eternal, *śabda* – their

source – should also by corollary be eternal. Just as Patañjali offers all possible solutions, more than one, for a given problem, Śaṃkara refers here to two theories, namely the *Sphoṭa* theory and the *varṇa* theory, both of which advocate eternality of the *śabda*. First he gives the *Sphoṭa* theory beginning with *tasmāt sphoṭa eva śabdaḥ*. After establishing it, he turns to the *varṇa* theory with: '*varṇa eva tu śabdaḥ*' *iti bhagavān upavarṣaḥ*. He also compares the two theories and remarks: *varṇāś ceme krameṇa gṛhyamāṇāḥ sphoṭaṃ vyañjayanti sa sphoṭo'rthaṃ vyanaktīti garīyasī kalpanā syāt*. Next he ends up his discussion with the concluding remark: *tataś ca nityebhyaḥ devādivyaktīnāṃ prabhava ity aviruddham*.

The method of argument of Śaṃkara confirms that he was not particularly in favour of any one of the two theories. The discussion of the eternality of the *śabda* is indeed incidental and whatever be the theory preferred between the two the position of the Advaitin does not change with regard to the concept of *mokṣa*. As E. R. Sreekrishna Sarma opines, 'Śaṃkara is not a thinker who would refute or approve a theory for its own sake, unless it goes against his own position'. Hence both the theories on *śabda-nityatva* are acceptable as far as Śaṃkara is concerned.

An opinion such as this is extremely important in the context of this thesis, which attempts a Samanvaya of the two schools. The biggest hindrance to this Samanvaya is the refutation of Sphoṭa by Śaṅkarācārya himself. Now, if this refutation itself could be shown to be not a refutation, or an

interpolation, or based on a wrong representation of Sphoṭa then it would be a great advantage. Accordingly the Devatādhikaraṇam is examined in this section, starting with the possibility that it is an interpolation. Then, it is examined whether it is based on a wrong presentation of Sphoṭa before examining the view set above – that Śaṅkarācārya is neutral.

5.1.1 Is the Devatādhikaraṇam an Interpolation?

The question is not altogether without basis. Swami Sivananda (77) in the synopsis of the third Pāda of the first Adhyāya says "the next two Adhikaraṇas are of the nature of a digression", referring to *Devatādhikaraṇa* and *Apaśūdrādhikaraṇa*. In the introduction to the Apaśūdrādhikaraṇa (106), his views are clearly stated: "The whole of this Adhikaraṇa about Sudras together with the preceding one about the Devas appears to be an interpolation of some later author." This view, then, relies on internal evidence, or the text itself to speculate about interpolation. So, it would be useful to place the particular Adhikaraṇa and the Sūtra of interest in proper context.

There are four Adhyāyas in the Brahmasūtras:
Adhyāya 1 (Samanvayādhyāyaḥ) shows that all Vedic
sentences have their purport in Brahman.
Adhyāya 2 (Avirodhādhyāyaḥ) which shows that there is no
contradiction between Vedānta and other Śāstras.
Adhyāya 3 (Sādhanādhyāyaḥ) lays the means to attain
Brahman.
Adhyāya 4 (Phalādhyāyaḥ) describes the result of attaining
Brahman.

The first four Sūtras of the first Adhyāya – each of which is an
Adhikaraṇa by itself – set out the basic tenets of Vedānta. The Bhāṣya on the
fourth Sūtra – *tattu samanvayāt* – shows that all Vedic sentences teach
Brahman. The rest of the first Adhyāya expands this section by examining
individual sentences. The fifth Adhikaraṇa – *Īkṣatyadhikaraṇam* – refutes the
arguments of Sāṅkhyas and establishes Brahman as the cause of the universe.
The fourth Pāda is related to this Adhikaraṇa in that it examines sentences that
Sāṅkhyas quote to show that Pradhāna is the Mukhyakāraṇa and shows that
those sentences also refer to Brahman only. In the remaining part of the first
Pāda of the first Adhyāya, words usually used in a different sense, but clearly
denoting Brahman (spaṣṭabrahmaliṅgāni – *ānandamayaḥ*, *hiraṇyagarbhaḥ*,
ākāśam, *prāṇaḥ* and *jyotiḥ*) in the context of their usage are shown by reason
as denoting Brahman. In the second and third Pādas, words – again usually
used in a different sense – but whose denotation of Brahman is not very clear
(aspaṣṭabrahmaliṅgāni) are discussed.

The second Pāda has seven Adhikaraṇas which establish that
manomayaḥ, *attā*, *guhāṃ praviṣṭaḥ ātapaḥ*, *akṣiṇi puruṣaḥ*, *antaryāmī*,
adṛśyatvādiguṇakaḥ and *vaiśvānaraḥ* all refer to Brahman, within the context
of the Vedic sentences in which they are used. What is common to the above
seven is that they refer to the saguṇa aspect of Brahman.

There are thirteen Adhikaraṇas in the third Pāda of the first Adhyāya:

    i.   Dyubhvādhikaraṇam (Sūtras 1-7) – *dyubhvādyāyatanaṃ*
        brahma – the repository of heaven, earth etc. in *yasmindyauḥ*
        pṛthivī cāntarikṣametaṃ manaḥ saha prāṇaiśca sarvaiḥ.

tamevaikaṃ jānatha ātmānamanyā vāco

vimuñcathāmṛtasyaiṣa setuḥ (Mu. Up. 2.2.4) is Brahman.

ii.   Bhūmādhikaraṇam (Sūtras 8-9) – Bhūman in *bhūmā tveva*
      vidijñāsitavya iti bhūmānaṃ bhagavo vijijñāsa iti. yatra
      nānyatpaśyati nānyacchṛṇoti nānyadvijānāti sa bhūmā'tha
      *yatrānyatpaśyatyanyacchṛṇotyanyadvijānāti tadalpam (*Ch.
      Up. 7.23.24) is Brahman.

iii. Akṣarādhikaraṇam (Sūtras 10-12) - Akṣara in *kasminnu*
      khalvākāśa otaśca protaśceti. sa hovācaitadvai tadakṣaraṃ
      gārgi brāhmaṇā abhivadantyasthūlamanaṇu (Br. Up. 3.8.7, 8)
      is Brahman.

iv.   Īkṣatikarmavyapadeśādhikaraṇam (Sūtra 13) – Puruṣa denoted
      by *ōṃ in punaretaṃ trimātreṇomithyetenaivākṣareṇa paraṃ*
      puruṣamabhidhyāyīta (Pra. Up. 5.2.5) is Parabrahman.

v.   Daharādhikaraṇam (Sūtras 14-21) – The daharākāśa
      mentioned in *atha yadidamasminbrahmapure daharaṃ*
      puṇḍarīkaṃ veśma
      daharo'sminnantarākāśastasminyadantastadanveṣṭavyaṃ
      tadbhāva vijijñāsitavyam. (Ch. Up. 8.1.1) is Brahman.

vi.   Anukṛtyadhikaraṇam (Sūtras 22-23) – The one with whose
      light the luminous objects are described as shining in *na tatra*
      sūryo bhāti na candratārakaṃ nemā vidyuto bhānti
      kuto'yamagniḥ. tameva bhāntamanubhāti sarvaṃ tasya bhāsā
      sarvamidaṃ vibhāti' (Mu. Up. 2.2.10) is Brahman.

vii.   Pramitādhikaraṇam (Sūtras 24-25) – The
Aṅguṣṭhamātrapuruṣa in *aṅguṣṭamātraḥ puruṣaḥ madhya*
ātmani tiṣṭhati (Ka. Up. 2.1.12) is Brahman.

viii.   Devatādhikaraṇam (Sūtras 26-33) – Devas also have Adhikāra
for Mokṣa.

ix.   Apaśūdrādhikaraṇam (Sūtras 34-38) – Śūdras do not have
Adhikāra for knowledge through Vedas, but can get
knowledge by listening to Smṛti on account of merit accrued
in earlier births.

x.   Kampanādhikaraṇam (Sūtra 39) – Prāṇa in everything which
vibrates, as said in *yadidaṃ kiñca jagatsarvaṃ prāṇa ejati*
niḥsṛtam. mahadbhayaṃ vajramudyataṃ ya
etadviduramṛtāste bhavanti (Ka. Up. 2.6.2) is Brahman.

xi.   Jyotiradhikaraṇam (Sūtra 40) – Jyotiṣ in *eṣa samprasādo'*
smāccharīrātsamutthāya paraṃ jyotirupasaṃpadya svena
rūpeṇābhiniṣpadyate (Ch. Up. 8.12.3) is Brahman.

xii.   Arthāntaratvavyapadeśādhikaraṇam (Sūtra 41) – Ākāśa which
reveals names and forms in *ākāśo vai nāma*
nāmarūpayornirvahitā te yadantarā tadbrahma tadamṛtaṃ sa
ātmā (Ch. Up. 8.14.1) is Brahman.

xiii.   Suṣuptyutkrāntyadhikaraṇam (Sūtras 42-43) - Vijñānamayaḥ
in *katama ātmeti yo'yaṃ vijñānamayaḥ prāṇeṣu*
hṛdyantarjyotiḥ puruṣaḥ (Br. Up. 4.3.7) is Parabrahman.

A perusal of the above thirteen Adhikaraṇas shows that the eighth and
ninth Adhikaraṇas, namely the *Devatādhikaraṇa* and the *Apaśūdrādhikaraṇa*

are different from the rest of the Adhikaraṇas, which discuss the Aspaṣṭabrahmaliṅga-words.

However, a closer reading of the text, especially the earlier Adhikaraṇas shows that these Adhikaraṇas are a logical continuation of the topic being discussed. The first Sūtra (24. *śabdādeva pramitaḥ*) of the *Pramitādhikaraṇa* discusses whether the Aṅguṣṭhamātrapuruṣa refers to Brahman or not. The problem is like this: "*na hi anantāyāmavistārasya[68] paramātmanaḥ aṅguṣṭhaparimāṇamam upapadyate*" (surely, the possibility of thumb-sized-ness of Paramātman of infinite proportions does not arise). The Siddhāntin replies that Brahman is to be understood as limited (*pramitaḥ*) from the text itself (*śabdādeva*). The text referred to is the broad context of *Kaṭhopaniṣad* from where the Viṣayavākyas are taken.

> aṅguṣṭhamātraḥ puruṣo madhya ātmani tiṣṭhati ।
> īśāno bhūtabhavyasya na tato vijugupsate ॥ 12 ॥ and
> aṅguṣṭhamātraḥ puruṣo jyotirivādhūmakaḥ ।
> īśāno bhūtabhavyasya sa evādya sa u śvaḥ ॥ 13 ॥ "

Even if the context of the text dictates that *aṅguṣṭhamātraḥ puruṣaḥ* is to be understood as Brahman, the contradiction between infiniteness of Brahman and the limitedness of the Aṅguṣṭhamātra remains to be resolved, and hence the next Sūtra is taught: "*hṛdyapekṣayā tu manuṣyādhikāratvāt* ॥ 25 ॥ " – the limitedness is from the point of view of Brahman being in the heart of human beings, since only human beings have the Adhikāra to study Veda. Here, reference is to the first Pāda of the sixth Adhyāya of

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[68] *āyāmo dairghyaṃ, vistāro mahattvamiti bhedaḥ* – Bhāṣyaratnaprabhā. The difference between āyāma and vistāra [in the compound ananta-āyāma-vistāra] is that the former is length and the latter refers to "greatness" [in space, from the context]

Pūrvamīmāṃsā, which discusses the eligibility to perform sacrifices etc. in thirteen Adhikaraṇas and fifty two Sūtras. The conclusion is that men of the three Varṇas - Brāhmaṇas, Kṣatriyas and Vaiśyas – are eligible, with women of the three Varṇas having a limited role, and that Devas are not eligible to perform sacrifices because Gods cannot make over offerings to themselves.

Here, there is a difference between what the Pūrvamīmāṃsā says, and what the Vedāntin intends. The former deals with Adhikāra for performing sacrifices, whereas Vedānta is concerned with Mokṣa which cannot be attained by performing sacrifices[69]. In fact, Bādarāyaṇa opines that Devas also have Adhikāra for Mokṣa. This marks the beginning of the Devatādhikaraṇa. Therein, after much discussion it is shown that Devas also have bodies. Śaṅkarācārya at the end of the Devatādhikaraṇa says "*tasmāt upapannaḥ mantrādibhyaḥ devādīnāṃ vigrahavatvādi avagamaḥ*" (Therefore, the understanding from mantras etc. that Devas etc. are embodied etc. is tenable.). It follows, then, that with reference to Devas, the *aṅguṣṭhamātraḥ puruṣaḥ* is of the dimension of the thumb of Devas. Now, the Pūrvapakṣin extends this argument and says that just like the eligibility of Devas etc. was shown to study Vedas, it might be shown that Śūdras also have eligibility to study the Vedas; the next Adhikaraṇa (*Apaśūdrādhikaraṇa*) is started to dispel such a notion, as explicitly stated by Śaṅkarācārya at the beginning of Sūtra 1.3.34:

> yathā manuṣyādhikāraniyamamapodya devādīnāmapi vidyāsu
>
> adhikāraḥ uktaḥ tathaiva dvijātyadhikāraniyamāpavādena

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[69] It may be noted that within the first Pāda of the sixth Adhyāya of Pūrvamīmāṃsā, the teacher Bādarāyaṇa is quoted (in 6.1.8) – approvingly, according to Śabarasvāmin – as opining that Jāti is indicated by the word "svargakāmaḥ" in "svargakāmo yajeta" The Siddhānta of both the Vedāntin and Mīmāṃsaka regarding Adhikāra for performing sacrifices is that man and wife should together perform sacrifices, with the woman having a limited role.

śūdrasyāpi adhikāraḥ syāt iti etāmāśaṅkāṃ

nivartayitumidamadhikaraṇamārabhyate.

This topic is begun to dispel the notion that it could be shown by denial of only the twice-born to acquire [Vedic] knowledge that Śūdras also have eligibility, just as it was shown that Devas etc. have eligibility to acquire [Vedic] knowledge by refuting the eligibility of humans alone[70].

Thus, internal evidence does not indicate that the two Adhikaraṇas in question are interpolations. If we want to take external evidence, there is absolutely no scope. All main sub-commentaries on Śaṅkarācārya's Bhāṣya – *Bhāmatī*, *Nyāyaratnaprabhā*, *Nyāyanirṇaya*, *Brahmāmṛtavarṣiṇī* of Rāmakiṅkara and *Dīpīkā* of Śaṅkarānanda comment on the Adhikaraṇas; modern translators – K. M. Banerjea, George Thibaut, Paul Duessen, Swami Vireswarananda, S. R. Radhakrishnan, V. H. Date, V. M. Apte and Swami Gambhirananda – have not expressed such an opinion. Further, there is an *Apaśūdrādhikaraṇam* in Pūrvamīmāṃsā (the 7th Adhikaraṇa of the first Pāda of the sixth Adhyāya, consisting of Sūtras 25 to 38) which supplies the name and theme of the second of the two topics. Thus, it is clear that the two Adhikaraṇas are not interpolations. The implication is that the refutation of Sphoṭa by Śaṅkarācārya cannot be wished away as an interpolation.

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[70] Here, it might be pertinent to note that the Adhikaraṇa ends with the assertion "*yeṣāṃ punaḥ purvakṛtasaṃ- skāravaśāt viduradharmavyādhaprabhṛtīnāṃ jñānotpattisteṣām na śakyate phalaprāptiḥ pratiṣeddhuṃ, jñānasyaikāntikaphalatvāt 'śrāvayeccaturo varṇān' iti ca itihāsapurāṇādhigame cāturvarṇyasya adhikārasmaraṇāt. vedapūrvakaḥ tu nāsti adhikāraḥ śūdrāṇām iti sthitam ..*" (However, with respect to those like Vidura and Dharmavyādha in whom knowledge dawns on account of the Saṃskāra of good deeds done earlier [in previous births], the attainment of result [i.e., Mokṣa] cannot be prohibited as there is, but, one result of Knowledge. Further, the eligibility of all the four Varṇas in studying Itihāsa and Purāṇas is mentioned in statements such as "this [Mahābhārata] ought to be read out to all the four Varṇas." However, the position that Śūdras do not have eligibility to Knowledge by studying Vedas remains.)

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5.1.2 Contents of *Devatādhikaraṇam*

Having examined the context of the *Devatādhikaraṇa*, the views on Sphoṭa expressed within that topic may be better understood by examining the contents of the Adhikaraṇa more closely. The Sūtras which constitute the Adhikaraṇa and their translation by Swami Gambhirananda are given below:

taduparyapi bādarāyaṇassambhavāt ॥ 26 ॥

Bādarāyaṇa thinks that beings higher than those (men) (are also qualified for knowledge), for that is possible.

virodhaḥ karmaṇīti cennānekapratipatterdarśanāt ॥ 27 ॥

If it be objected that this (corporeality of the gods) will give rise to a contradiction (in the matter of gods being associated) in rites, then we reply: Not so, for in the Vedas are noticed the assumption of many bodies.

śabda iti cennātaḥ prabhavāt pratyakṣānumānābhyām ॥ 28 ॥

If it be objected that this contradicts the validity of Vedic words, then not so, for the universe arises from this, which fact is proved by direct revelation and inference.

ata eva ca nityatvam ॥ 29 ॥

And from this very fact follows the eternality (of the Vedas).

samānanāmarūpatvāccāvṛttāvapyavirodho darśanāt smṛteśca ॥ 30 ॥

And there is no contradiction, since similar names and forms are repeated even in the revolution of the world cycles, as is known from the Vedas and the Smṛti.

madhvādiṣvasambhavādanadhikāraṃ jaimineḥ ॥ 31 ॥

Jaimini asserts (that the gods and others have) no competence (for knowledge of Brahman), owing to the impossibility of their competence for Madhu-vidyā etc.

jyotiṣi bhāvācca ॥ 32 ॥

Because of the occurrence of the words in respect of a sphere of light.

bhāvaṃ tu bādarāyaṇo'sti hi ॥ 33 ॥

Bādarāyaṇa upholds the existence of competence (for the gods); for (the requisite for competence) exists (in them).

In the 26ᵗʰ Sūtra, the eligibility of gods is proposed, because a) it is possible; b) it is not contradicted by anything in the Śruti; c) the lack of Upanayana is not a hindrance because Śruti is directly perceived by Devas; d) since Śruti speaks of their undergoing Brahmacarya; and e) because unlike in rites, Indra and others do not have to do anything with reference to other Indra etc. to gain knowledge. The 27ᵗʰ Sūtra takes up for discussion the objection (which follows a position of Pūrvamīmāṃsā that Devas cannot have corporeal bodies) that Indra etc. do not have corporeal bodies as they are not associated with a rite by virtue of their physical presence (*na hīndrādīnāṃ svarūpasaṃnidhānena karmāṅgabhāvo'bhyupāgamyate*) nor is it possible for one Indra to be physically present at many rites bodily at once (*na ca sambhavati. bahuṣu yāgeṣu yugapadekasyendrasya*

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svarūpasaṃnidhānatānupapatteḥ). This is rejected on account of Devas having the ability to assume many forms. Śruti and Smṛti texts are quoted in support. Another explanation is that even an embodied entity can participate in many rites just like a single Brāhmaṇa is saluted at once by many people (*eko'pi vigrahavānekatra yugapadaṅgabhāvaṃ gacchati, yathā bahubhirnamaskurvāṇaireko brāhmaṇo yugapannamaskriyate.*).

Now, the Pūrvapakṣin changes tracks and objects to the corporeality of Devas on the ground that there will be conflict with the eternality of Vedas. If Devas were to be embodied, it implies that they are also subject to birth and death, that is they are not eternal; yet, since words, their meanings and the relation between words and meanings is eternal, it implies that Vedas are not eternal, as the Devas spoken by Vedas are themselves not eternal. The Vedāntin refutes this objection on the ground that the world is created from Śabda and this is known from Śruti and Smṛti. It may be noted here that both Vaiyākaraṇas and Mīmāṃsakas accept that the world was born from Śabda – their difference is only with respect to the nature of Śabda. Since Śabda is proposed as the cause of the Universe, the nature of Śabda is taken up for discussion (*yaduktaḥ jagataḥ śabdaprabhavatvaṃ tadākṣipati kimātmakamiti. – Nyāyanirṇayaḥ* – J. L. Shastri, 253). Here first the view of Vaiyākaraṇas that Śabda is of the nature of Sphoṭa is presented and then refuted by quoting the view of Mīmāṃsakas, as propounded by "Bhagavān Upavarṣaḥ" which shows the Kalpanā of Sphoṭa is not required.

The next Sūtra (29th one) establishes the eternality of Vedas based on the fact established in the earlier Sūtra – that the Universe (including Devas etc.) is born from Śabda. Even if it is accepted that Universe is born from Śabda, there arises a difficulty because everything – including names and forms – perishes during Pralaya; then, how is it possible to say that Veda is

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beginningless. However, this does not pose a difficulty to the Siddhāntin, as the names and forms in different cycles of the Universe are similar, and there are statements in Śruti and Smṛti with the same purport.

The next two Sūtras – 30th and 31st – raise a different set of objections to the Devas' Adhikāra for Brahmavidyā. According to Jaimini, it is not possible for Āditya to have another Āditya to meditate upon (Madhuvidyā requires the Sādhaka to superimpose honey on Sun and meditate) and so Āditya does not have competence for Madhuvidyā. , and Sun cannot meditate upon himself. Similarly Vasus, Rudras, Ādityas, Maruts and Sādhyas are said to subsist on the *amṛtam* that exists in Āditya. The Upāsaka is asked to meditate on this *amṛtam* and know the five types of Devas who subsist on this *amṛtam*. Now, the problem that arises when Vasus etc. are the Upāsakas is this: which other Vasus etc. should they know as enjoyers of this *amṛtam*? (*vasvādayastu kānyanyānvasvādīnamṛtopajīvino vijānīyuḥ*). Further, the opponent continues in Sūtra 31, bright bodies in the sky are given names such as Devas etc. It is not possible for these spheres of light to be connected to a body with heart etc. or to a desire (to have Mokṣa) by having Cetanā, as the heavenly bodies are known to be insentient like earth. (*na ca jyotirmaṇḍalasya hṛdayādinā vigraheṇa cetanatayārthitvādinā vā yogo'vagantuṃ śakyate mṛdādivadacetanatvāvagamāt.*)

In the last Sūtra of the Adhikaraṇa, Bādarāyaṇa responds by saying that it might not be possible for Āditya, Vasus etc. to practice Madhuvidyā, but there are other means to Brahman for which they are qualified. It is seen that Brāhmaṇas are not qualified to perform Rājasūya, but this disqualification does not take away their qualification for other sacrifices. Regarding the other objection that words denoting Devas actually denote celestial orbs of light, it is replied that that it may be so; but it is said clearly in the Veda that these

words refer to sentient Devas who can assume the form of the particular celestial body, as well as any other form.

Thus, we see that *Devātādhikaraṇa* has two parts – the first one comprising of the first five Sūtras where the Pūrvapakṣin says that corporeality of Devas results in conflict in rites, eternality of Vedas and the cycle of Destruction and Creation and these objections are refuted on the basis of reasoning, Śruti and Smṛti. In the second part, the Objector resorts to the impossibility of Devas meditating upon themselves and Jaimini's view of them being insentient, which are duly refuted by the Vedāntin. The main thrust is on the eligibility of Devas etc. for Brahmavidyā, which is established by refuting the various objections. The same is captured in the verses of *Vaiyāsikanyāyamāla* –

> nādhikriyante vidyāyāṃ devāḥ kiṃ vādhikāriṇaḥ ।
> videhatvena sāmarthyahānernaiṣāmadhikriyā ॥
> aviruddhārthavādādimantrāderdehasattvataḥ. ।
> arthitvādeśca saulabhyāddevādyā adhikāriṇaḥ ॥

> Are Devas eligible or not for knowledge [of Brahman]? There is no eligibility of these as they do not possess a body or the ability [to acquire knowledge]. Devas are eligible as the embodiment of Devas spoken of in Arthavāda and Mantra texts are not opposed, as Devas etc. have the desire, and the felicity [to acquire knowledge].

Within the 28th Sūtra, it will be recollected that the opponent objects to the corporeality of Devas as that would obstruct the Nityatva of Vedas, to which the Sidhāntin replies that the world is created from Śabda. Since Śabda

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is given such a prominent place, the context for discussion of the nature of Śabda arises. First it is proposed that Sphoṭa is Śabda. In presentation of the Sphoṭavāda, Śaṅkarācārya gives the reasons why Sphoṭa is said to exist (letters do not convey a meaning, nor is it possible for all letters to be grasped at once, as the letters occur in a specific order) and also gives the main features of the Vaiyākaraṇa's refutation of the Mīmāṃsā and Nyāya views. It cannot be said that Sphoṭavāda is misrepresented in this section.

The refutation of Sphoṭa also follows the main line of Mīmāṃsā which holds that just like individual Vyaktis are different but their Jāti remains the same, each individual 'performance' of a Varṇa – as a Linguist might put it – might be unique, but the Varṇajāti (such as *gatva* in the pronunciation of the letter *ga*) remains the same. Thus, there is no problem in the position that Varṇas are Nitya. Individual letters uttered in a certain sequence have a definite denotation and hence the concept of Sphoṭa is an unnecessary Gaurava.

As has been shown earlier in this thesis, both Mīmāṃsakas and Vaiyākaraṇas accept an entity over and above what is normally referred to as "sound". The difference is about what this entity is – it is Sphoṭa according to Grammarians, while Varṇas (letters) are sufficient for the Mīmāṃsakas. Thus, it is seen that it cannot be said that the views of a pseudo-Vaiyākaraṇa are presented in Devatādhikaraṇa before being refuted. What is refuted is Sphoṭavāda proper.

5.1.3 Is the Vedāntin Neutral?

Here one possibility arises that Śaṅkarācārya might have merely presented two views about the nature of Śabda in reply to the question "*kimātmakaṃ punaḥ śabdamabhipretyedaṃ śabdaprabhavatmucyate*" (What, again, is the nature of Śabda keeping which in mind, this concept of creation of world from Śabda is being spoken of?) without preferring any one. This is not totally new – in the *Śāstrayonitvādhikaraṇa* (1.1.3), we see that the Sūtra "*Śāstrayonitvāt* ॥ 1.1.3 ॥" is interpreted in two ways, without any preference being shown to any one explanation. In fact, in the immediately preceding Sūtra, i.e. "*virodhaḥ karmaṇīti cennānekapratipatterdarśanāt* ॥ 1.3.27 ॥" the last part *anekapratipatterdarśanāt* is interpreted in two ways, without preference for any interpretation.

There are other reasons to believe that Śaṅkarācārya does not prefer any of the two views regarding the nature of Śabda. Sphoṭavāda is started by the sentence "*sphoṭamityāha*" ([answering the question about nature of Śabda], it is said to be Sphoṭa) without any indication that this is the view of a Pūrvapakṣin. Then, later the Mīmāṃsā view is presented without any indication that the Mīmāṃsā view is the preferred view of Śaṅkarācārya. However, the Mīmāṃsā view is introduced with the sentence: "*varṇā eva tu śabdāḥ" iti bhagavānupavarṣaḥ.* (According to the venerated Upavarṣaḥ, "Varṇas only are Śabdas"). On the face of it, it looks like that there are two pointers of Śaṅkarācārya's preference – the usage of the word "tu" and the honorific "bhagavān" applied to Upavarṣa. In many Sūtras (example "tattu samanvayāt ॥ 1.1.4 ॥") "tu" indicates refutation of the earlier view; but here we need to understand that "tu" is the sentence of Upavarṣa and not Śaṅkarācārya. Secondly, more significance than what is necessary need not be read into the honorific because ultimately the main Pūrvapakṣin in the entire

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Adhikaraṇa is the Mīmāṃsaka[71], not the Vaiyākaraṇa. Thus, the two aspects – usage of "tu" and "bhagavān" – do not imply that Varṇavāda is preferred by Śaṅkarācārya. The decisive factors are the commentators, who inform us that Śaṅkarācārya prefers Varṇavāda. We have three[72] commentaries on Śaṅkarācārya's bhāṣya: Vācaspatimiśra who wrote *Bhāmatī*, Govindānanda, the author of *Bhāṣyaratnaprabhā,* and Ānandagiri, who wrote *Nyāyanirṇaya* and all of them indicate that Varṇavāda is the preferred one.

Bhāmatīkāra introduces (J. L. Shastri, p254, ln. 8 in *Bhāmatī*) the section in Śaṅkarācārya's commentary treating Sphoṭa with the remark: "*ācāryadeśīya āha - sphoṭamityāheti* ". (Ācāryadeśīya says, "it (the nature of Śabda) is said to be Sphoṭa"). Ācāryadeśīya is somebody who is somewhat inferior to an Ācārya[73]. This does not mean that the views expressed by the Ācāryadeśīya are acceptable. This is made amply clear when Vācaspatimiśra introduces (p255, ln. 6) the section on Varṇavāda with the remark: "*tadetadācāryadeśīyamataṃ svamatamupapādayannapākaroti – varṇa eva tu śabda iti*" ([Śaṅkarācārya] now refutes the view of Ācāryadeśīya to establish his own view – by saying "Varṇa only is Śabda").

The Bhāṣyaratnaprabhā introduces (J. L. Shastri, pp.253, 254) the Sphoṭa section with the sentence: "*tatra varṇānāmanityatvātsphoṭasya*

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[71] There are many types of Mīmāṃsakas; when it comes to Devas' corporeality both Prābhākaras and Bhāṭṭas hold that Devas are not embodied, but we cannot say that Upavarṣa held a similar view – especially when he is held to have written a Vṛtti on both the Mīmāṃsās. Unfortunately, the work of Upavarṣa is not available and so we cannot ascertain his views.

[72] Others are not detailed. Those like *Pañcapādikā* or *Pañcapādikavivaraṇa* comment only on the first four Sūtras. Others like *Brahmāmṛtavarṣiṇī* of Rāmakiṅkara and *Dīpikā* of Śaṅkarānanda explain the Sūtra, and do not explain the Bhāṣya of Śaṅkarācārya in full.

[73] According to the Pāṇinisūtra 5.3.67 *īṣadasamāptau kalpabdeśyadeśīyaraḥ*, the Taddhita suffix "deśīyar" is used after words which are characterized by *īṣat asamāpti,* "a little incompleteness". Thus Ācāryadeśīya would be somebody who is almost an ācārya. In works like *Mahābhāṣyam* (or for that matter in *Śaṅkarabhāṣyam*), there are three kinds of participants in – an objector, the Ācārya and Ācāryadeśīya. Inevitably the solution proposed by Ācāryadeśīya is less than perfect and would need amendments by the Ācārya.

cāsattvānnajagaddhetutvamityākṣepe dvitīyapakṣaṃ vaiyākaraṇo gṛhṇāti -

sphoṭamiti " (in view of the objection that [Śabda] is not the cause of the

world due to the impermanence of Varṇas and the non-existence of Sphoṭa,

the Grammarian picks up the latter [for defence]). The section on Varnavāda is

introduced (pp. 255,256) by the remark: "*ācāryasampradāyoktipūrvakaṃ*

*siddhāntayati – **varṇa eveti**.*" ([Ācārya] states the Siddhānta as enunciated in

his tradition). So, Ratnaprabhākāra is very clear that Śaṅkarācārya is following

the Pūrvamīmāṃsā tradition[74], following the maxim "*vyavahāre bhāṭṭanayaḥ*"

(in Vyavahāra, [Advaita follows] the view of the followers of Kumārila

Bhaṭṭa). *Nyāyanirṇaya* follows the lead of *Ratnaprabhā* and introduces (J. L.

Shastri, pp. 253, 254) the Sphoṭa section thus:

> yaduktaṃ jagataḥ śabdaprabhavatvaṃ tadākṣipati –
>
> **kimātmakamiti**. varṇātiriktaṃ śabdamupetya tato vā
>
> jagadutpattiriṣṭā varṇebhyo vā. nādyaḥ, varṇātirikte vācake
>
> śabde manobhāvāt. netaraḥ, varṇānāmutpannapradhvaṃsināṃ
>
> jagaddhetutvāsiddherityarthaḥ. tatra vaiyākaraṇo vakṣyamāṇam
>
> mānaṃ matvādyaṃ pakṣamālambate – **sphoṭamiti**.
>
> [The objector] criticizes the birth of the world from Śabda by
>
> asking about the nature [of Śabda]. The birth of world is either

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[74] Vedānta is called Uttara Mīmāṃsā because the techniques of Mīmāṃsā are used to establish that the main purport of Veda is the teaching of Brahman, rather an exhortation to sacrifice. For instance, see Johannes Bronkhorst where he says (p36): "It is to be emphasised that Śaṅkara does not express disagreement with the basic principles of Mīmāṃsā. On the contrary, he agrees with all of them. He only maintains that in applying these principles the traditional Mīmāṃsakas overlook something. They are, to be sure, right in thinking that the Veda should never be in conflict with other means of knowledge. They are also correct in maintaining that the injunctions, by their very nature, cannot be in conflict with any other means of knowledge and must therefore be taken literally. He only adds that the same reasoning applies to the passages that provide information about Brahma, for Brahma, too, cannot be known by any other means of knowledge. . . . Put differently, traditional Mīmāṃsā is completely correct but for the fact that its very principles should oblige it to include among the statements that will have to be taken literally, beside injunctions, also Upaniṣadic sentences pertaining to Brahma. Śaṅkara, far from being a critic of Mīmāṃsā, presents himself here as an even more conscientious applier of Mīmāṃsā principles than the traditional Mīmāṃsakas themselves."

desired by a 'Śabda' different from Varṇas, or from Varṇas directly. The first cannot be as there is 'manobhāva' in Śabda[75] different from Varṇas; the other view is also not [tenable] as world-causality of Varṇas which are destroyed after they are produced does not result.)

Ānandagiri introduces the Varṇavāda section with the statement: "*ācāryasampradāyoktipūrvakaṃ siddhāntamāha – **varṇā iti**"* (([Ācārya] states the Siddhānta as enunciated in his tradition).

It is seen that the words of Śaṅkarācārya could be interpreted as either preferring Varṇavāda, or being neutral. When there is a doubt, the established principle is to refer to commentators. In the present case, all of them are uniform in their view; so, one has to conclude that Śaṅkarācārya prefers Varṇavāda.

5.1.4 Summary of Refutation of Sphoṭa by Śaṅkarācārya

In the previous sections it was seen that

i.   The two Adhikaraṇas dealing with eligibility of Devas and Śūdras for Brahmavidyā are not interpolations.

ii.   The views of Grammarians are presented faithfully and it cannot be argued that either a weak argument was presented or the main points were ignored.

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[75] Or, should it be *śabde mānābhāvāt* – as there is no 'māna' - Pramāṇa or proof - in the case of Śabda which is different from Varṇas? The printed text has "manobhāvāt".

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iii.   On the strength of the remarks of the authors of sub-commentaries, the possibility that Śaṅkarācārya might be indifferent to Sphoṭavāda or Varṇavāda has to be ruled out.

Thus, Śaṅkarācārya's refutation of Sphoṭa cannot be explained away as an interpolation or misrepresentation. Having said that, one has to appreciate that it is far more critical for the Mīmāṃsaka to refute Sphoṭa, than it is for the Advaitin. As Kumārila Bhaṭṭa points out in Ślokavārtika (137, the last kārikā of Sphoṭavāda)

varṇātiriktaḥ pratiṣiddhyamānaḥ padeṣu mandaṃ phalamādadhāti l

kāryāṇi vākyāvayavāśritāni satyāni kartuṃ kṛta eṣa yatnaḥ ‖137‖

The entity other than Varṇas (i.e. Sphoṭa) which is being refuted places very little result in words. In order to make the rites which are dependent on subsidiaries of a sentence, this attempt (to refute Sphoṭa) has been made. Here Vākya has to be understood as Mahāvākya and the Avayavas are to be understood as Avāntaravākyas, sentences which constitute the Mahāvākya.

The "*avayavas*" of (Mahā)vākya that Kumārila refers to in the above Kārikā are Prayājas etc., which are subsidiary rites of Darśapūrṇamāsa sacrifices. There is the main sentence, or *aṅgivākya* called *darśapūrṇamāsābhyāṃ svargakāmo yajeta* (the one desirous of heaven may perform the sacrifices of Darśa (new moon) and Pūrṇamāsa (full moon)). This sentence has expectancy of procedure (technically called

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kathaṃbhāvākāṅkākṣā), even as it states the result (*phala*) of performing such a sacrifice (attainment of heaven). The five sacrifices called Prayājayāgas need to be performed first; these sacrifices are taught by *aṅgavākyas* (constituent sentences) such as *samidho yajati, tanūnapātaṃ yajati* and *iḍo yajati*, but these sentences have the expectancy of result (*phalākāṅkṣā*), even as they lay down the procedure. So, the *aṅgi* and the *aṅga* sentences are fused into one Mahāvākya[76] such as *prayājādyaṅgābhyāṃ darśapūrṇamāsābhyāṃ svargakāmo yajeta* (the one desirous of Svara may perform Darśa and Pūrṇamāsa sacrifices, with the five Prayājas as subsidiaries). When there is mutual expectancy (*ubhayākāṅkṣā*) in sentences, with an Aṅgāṅgibhāva (the relationship of subsidiary and the main), a Mahāvākya is formed by joining them. Now in the Mahāvākya both the result and the procedure are available. This is called Prayogavidhi. If only Vākyasphoṭa were true, then these subsidiary elements will not be *satya* and hence Sphoṭa has been refuted by Kumārila. Other than this, there is little purpose.

With respect to Śaṅkarācārya, it is hard to fathom the purpose that would be served by refutation of Sphoṭa. The Devas whose Adhikāra for Brahmavidyā was established in the Devatādhikaraṇa, remain equally eligible if one resorts to Sphoṭa. Now it may be pointed out that the process of combining an *aṅgivākya* with *aṅgavākyas* is applicable in Vedānta also as discussed in the Sarvavedāntapratyayādhikaraṇam (3.4.1 to 3.4.4). That is indeed true. In fact not merely Vedānta, all the Śāstras operate through formation of Mahāvākyas, including Vyākaraṇam as has been discussed at length in the book *Mahāvākyavicāraḥ* by Prof. K. Subrahmanyam. In fact

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[76] In Mīmāṃsā, *Mahāvākya* refers to combination of sentences which have mutual expectancy. In Vedānta, the term has become popular as referring to sentences such as *tattvamasi*. In the former the *mahattvam* is that of the sentence, i.e. length, whereas in the latter the *mahattvam* is that of the meaning. In the present context, the term *Mahāvākyam* is used in the sense of "a combination of sentences". Technically, the Mahāvākya is called *discourse* in Linguistics.

Bhartṛhari himself anticipated this objection, and of course, he does not wish that the Sūtras of Pāṇini be inapplicable (as they will be if a Mahāvākya is not formed by combining Vidhisūtras like 6.1.84 *iko yaṇaci* with Paribhāṣasūtras like 1.1.49 *ṣaṣṭī sthāne yogā*). So he clarified that propounding the reality of Akhaṇḍavākyārtha does not mean that the Avāntaravākyas are unreal.

avibhakte'pi vākyārthe śaktibhedādapoddhṛte |

vākyāntaravibhāgena yathoktaṃ na virudhyate ॥2.88॥

Though the sentence-meaning (discourse-meaning) is without division (into words or constituent sentences), since Vākyāntaras (=Avāntaravākyas, constituent sentences) or words are mentally separated (from the impartite sentence-meaning) due to the difference in the Śakti, whatever is said (in Nyāyas and sentences such as the present one) is not contradicted. That is, though the impartite sentence-meaning is accepted as the Truth, due to difference in Śakti, we are able to identify the components separately, identify them and then use it in our Vyavahāra.

This construct allows for application of Śāstra in Vyavahāra, while denying it in Paramārtha. This is the exact position of Śaṅkarācārya. Prayājas etc. are useful in cleansing the mind of the seeker and making him ready for Brahmajñāna, but after Brahman realisation, the Vedic rites are no longer applicable.

As shown in the previous chapter there are many similarities between the two schools and none of them get affected whether Sphoṭa is refuted or not. Also the place where the refutation happens – the second Adhyāya where

other Darśanas are refuted – but in the middle of a discussion regarding words which denote Brahman is curious to say the least. May be for these reasons, it is held in tradition77 that the refutation of Sphoṭa has the purpose of precluding Sparśabrahman, Rūpabrahman, Rasabrahman, Gandhabrahman etc. in addition to the Śabdabrahman, so as not to dilute the concept of nitya, śuddha, buddha, mukta Brahman. The rules regarding Pratīkopāsana (meditating upon symbols), presented in Section 5.5 *Śabda as Brahman vs. Brahman as Śabda* below (p179) are also relevant. Whatever be the reason, the fact that Śaṅkarācārya refuted Sphoṭavāda cannot be wished away.

5.2 Criticism of Śabdādvaita by other Advaitins

There are many books written on Advaita over a thousand years, but refutation of Sphoṭa is to be found in very few works. In one of the important doxographical works in the Advaita tradition, *Sarvadarśanasaṅgraha*, there is no effective criticism of Sphoṭa. Apart from the three glosses on Brahmasūtrabhāṣya mentioned earlier, we find criticism of Sphoṭa in two other texts: the *Iṣṭasiddhi* of Vimuktātman, and *Tattvaśuddhi* of Jñānaghana. The criticism of Sphoṭa in these texts will be presented below, followed by the treatment in *Sarvadarśanasaṅgrah*. Finally in the last sub-section, it will be shown that these criticisms are either not effective, or that they are based on a wrong interpretation, or that they follow the Mīmāṃsā line of Varṇavāda.

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[77] This view was expressly stated by Brahmaśrī Vedamūrtulu Rāṇi Narasimhaśāstry gāru, the teacher of my teacher Br. Ve. Prof. K. Subrahmanyam gāru. In the unbroken tradition of teaching the philosophy of Vyākaraṇam, it is maintained that Śaṅkarācārya's refutation of Sphoṭa has the limited purpose mentioned in the main text and that there is no fundamental contradiction between Advaita and Śabdabrahmavāda.

5.2.1 Criticism of Sphoṭa in *Iṣṭasiddhi*

Iṣṭasiddhi is an early Prakaraṇagrantha (written about 1,000 A. D.) written in verse with an auto-commentary called Vivaraṇa dealing with theories of error and Māyā. Prof. Hiriyanna, in his English introduction to his edition of the work, shows (p. i) that the work is important throughout the literature of Advaita and also that of opponents. Rāmānujācārya's *Mahāpūrvapakṣa* in the *Śrībhāṣya*, for instance, is shown to be based on *Iṣṭasiddhi* primarily.

Sphoṭavāda is criticised in the context of refutation of Asatkhyāti (of Śūnyavādins or Mādhyamika Buddhists). In 1.72, the Siddhāntin criticises the Asatkhyātivādin by saying that if "Asat" is denoted by the word *asat* then it would have an existence different from the word, and the result is that Asat exists. If Asat is not different from the word *asat* then there can be no denoter-denoted relationship. It is in this context that a so-called "Grammarian" is introduced (with the words: *āha ca vaiyākaraṇaḥ* - it is said so by the Grammarian) who proposes non-difference between Śabda and Artha.

> āha śabdaḥ svayaṃ vācya iti śābdo na tattathā ।
> aikye hi vaktṛtā vā syādvācyasya vā na tūbhayam ॥ 1.73 ॥
>
> It is said [by the Grammarian] Śabda itself is the signified, but nature of Śabda is not such. In one Śabda there may be signifier-ness, or signified-ness but not both.

Then in the next Kārikā and its *Vivaraṇa* the author explains why Śabda and Artha cannot be same. His point is that if Śabda and Artha are not different, then every Śabda will denote every Artha and no Vyavahāra is possible. Then he goes back to the refutation of Asatkhyātivādin. The

appropriation of Grammar by the Asatkhyātivādin is indeed not appropriate, but then the imposition of the views of the Asatkhyātivādin on the Grammarian is also not right. For the Asatkhyātivādin, nothing exists, but for the Grammarian, Brahman exists and is the substratum of everything. As if recognising this, as a digression, the proponent of Śabdabrahman is taken on directly in 1.75.

> śabdabrahmavivartatvādvācyavācakayorbhavet ।
>
> śabdatvamiti cenmaivamaśabdaṃ brahma hi śrutam ॥ 1.75,
>
> Iṣṭasiddhi ॥
>
> [If it be said that] Both the signifier and the signified could be Śabda due to the Vivarta (apparent manifestation) of Śabdabrahman, [then it is not so because] Brahma is spoken of as not being Śabda in Śruti.

There are two points here – first there are Śrutis which say that Brahman is not Śabda and second, by implication, no Śrutis exist to show that Brahman is Śabda. This is a more substantial criticism. While Vimuktātman goes on to list Śrutis which talk of Brahman not being of the nature of Śabda, there are also Śrutis which speak of Brahman as the Śabda but those Śrutis are explained as having their purport elsewhere.

In the Vṛtti, Vimuktātman has the opponent taking recourse to *anādinidhanam brahma ...* and suggesting that like the Advaitin holds everything is Ātmā (*ātmaiva sarvamitivat*, p. 173) similarly in the view of the Grammarian, everything is Śabda and hence it is both Vācaka (signifier) and Vācya (signified). Here Vimuktātman challenges the opponent by saying that there is no Śrutipramāṇa for this.

na ca śabdo brahmeti śrutirasti. yadi nāmāsti tathāpi sā anyaparā. na tu śabdasya brahmatvaṃ brahmaṇo vā śabdatvaṃ vadet. . . . "yadvācānabhyuditaṃ yena vāgabhyudyate" (Ke. Up. 1.5) "yacchrotreṇa na śruṇoti" (Ke. Up. 1.8) "aśabdamasparśam" (Ka. Up. 1.3.15) "ityāderna śabdo brahma nāpi śabdavaditi śrutam. ataḥ śabdo brahmetyanuktam. . . . ato na śabdādvaitasiddhiḥ." (Vṛtti on I.75, Iṣṭasiddhiḥ, p 174)

There is no Śruti saying that Śabda is Brahman. Even if it is there, it has a different purport; it neither talks of Brahmanhood of Śabda or Śabdaness of Brahman. … From the following Śrutis, neither is Śabda Brahman, nor is Brahman of the nature of Śabda: "That which is not expressed by speech, but by which speech arises" (Ke. Up. 1.5), "That which is not heard by the ears", "That which is not Śabda, which is not touch" (Ka. Up. 1.3.15) etc. Therefore Śabdādvaita does not result.

Vimuktātman offers a second criticism in the Vṛtti on 1.76.

ajñaṃ bodhayatā śabdasyāpratyaktvāt apratyaktaivoktā syāt. . . . śabdo brahmetyukte parāgeva brahma uktamajño manyate na tu pratyak. ātmaśabdenānuktatvācca. ato'haṃ brahmeti dhīrna bhavati, anātmā brahmeti vā dhīrbhavet. tadā "ahaṃ brahmāsmi" (Br. Up. 1.4.10) ityādi śrutivirodhaḥ. . . . tasmād-ātmādvaitameva sidhyati, na śabdādvaitaṃ ghaṭādvaitaṃ veti siddham.. (Vṛtti on 1.76, Iṣṭasiddhiḥ, pp 175-176)

While teaching a lay person (not a Jñānin who realised Brahman), since Śabda is not the inner-most principle, only that

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which is not the inner-most obtains. When it is said Śabda is
Brahman, the lay person will think that only the external
Brahman is taught, not the inner-most, as the word "Ātmā" is
not used. Therefore, the thought that "I am Brahman" will not
occur, but the thought "something other than Ātmā is
Brahman" will occur, which would be against the Śruti "I am
Brahman" (Br. Up. 1.4.10). Therefore only Ātmādvaita obtains,
neither Śabdādvaita nor Ghaṭādvaita (Pot-advaita).

It is true that Śabda when used in Vyavahāra is seen as something not
inside but as an external entity, but as ably explained by Bhartṛhari it is
perfectly possible to teach that every thing in the world is permeated by Śabda.

Thus it is seen that Vimuktātman's criticism of Śabdādvaita is two-
fold: one, that there are no Śruti statements stating that Śabda is Brahman
(those that may be proffered by the Vaiyākaraṇa are held to have a different
purport) but there are Śrutis to the effect that Brahman is not Śabda. Secondly,
since Śabda denotes only an external entity, a statement such as "Śabda is
Brahman" can denote only an external entity; consequently, it is not capable of
teaching the Pratyagātman, the inner-most dweller. Therefore Śabda cannot be
the Pratyagātman.

5.2.2 Criticism of Sphoṭa in *Tattvaśuddhi*

Tattvaśuddhi is a Prakaraṇa work in prose, divided into 46 chapters.
The author Jñānaghana is sometimes identified as the fourth generation
disciple of Śaṅkarācārya, who headed the Śṛṅgeripīṭha. If so his date would be

around 900 A.D. Others hold that he flourished a hundred and hundred and fifty years later.

The 17th chapter of this work, called *Sphoṭanirākaraṇam*, is devoted to refutation of Sphoṭa. It closely follows the arguments between Mīmāṃsakas and Vaiyākaraṇas, which were presented in a summary fashion in the *Devatādhikaraṇam* by Śaṅkarācārya, and establishes Varṇavāda.

5.2.3 Sphoṭavāda in *Sarvadarśanasaṅgraha*

In the *Sarvadarśanasaṅgraha*, every preceding Darśana is criticized and refuted by the next Darśana presented. Mādhava, the author of *Sarvadarśanasaṅgraha* presents material from both the *Mahābhāṣyam* and *Vākyapadīyam* giving the debate between Sphoṭavāda and Varṇavāda a lot of prominence. Later Vivartavāda is also presented, after quoting 3.2.15 and 3.2.16 (quoted and translated in p54 of this thesis). Mādhava quotes (p 270) the following Kārikā (source not traceable, but described as a saying of Vedāntavādanipuṇāḥ by the author of *Sarvadarśanasaṅgraha*) as the view of the Grammarian:

> yathā svapna prapañco'yaṃ mayi māyāvijṛmbhitaḥ l
> evaṃ jāgratprapañcaśca mayi māyāvijṛmbhitaḥ ll
> In the same way that the dream world has unfurled in me
> through Māyā, the waking-state-world has unfurled in me.

It will be seen that there is no difference at all in the Vivartavāda of Advaita or Sphoṭavāda (or Pāṇinidarśana as Mādhava identifies it) as presented in the Sarvadarśanasaṅgraha.

The curious thing about Sphoṭavāda in the *Sarvadarśanasaṅgraha* is that it is not criticised at all at any place, except through a refutation of Vivartavāda (on p. 325) as a part of the Sāṅkhyadarśana and establishment of Sāṅkhya's Pariṇāmavāda. Now, since ultimately Pariṇāmavāda stands refuted by Advaita (the last Darśana), the consequence is that Sphotavāda is not effectively refuted in *Sarvadarśanasaṅgraha*.

5.2.4 Reconciliation of Differences

Based on the foregoing material it is seen that there are three criticisms of Sphoṭavāda by Advaitins. The first and the most prominent is the rejection of Sphoṭavāda and support of Varṇavāda by Śaṅkarācārya, and other Ācāryas including Jñānaghana following him. Secondly Vimuktātman shows that Śruti says that Brahman is not Śabda. Finally there is the accusation that there are no supporting Śrutis or that they are Anyaparavākyas (having their purport in something other than the identity of Śabda and Brahman).

Regarding Śaṅkarācārya's criticism of Sphoṭa and support for Varṇavāda, as explained in p155 refutation of Sphoṭa is not central to the doctrine of Advaita. Secondly the same gaurava which is cited as the reason for rejecting Sphoṭa occurs in fixing the meaning of Mahāvākyas, necessitating the invention of a new category called Jahadajahallakṣaṇā, as elaborated in Section 4.16 *Akhaṇḍavākyārthha* on p131 of this thesis. These two reasons suggest that the refutation might have been grounded in practical matters (such as avoiding confusion etc.) rather than purely in doctrine.

Now, the Śrutis quoted by Vimuktātman as determining Brahman as not Śabda may be examined. Commenting on the Śruti *yadvācānabhyuditaṃ yena vāgabhyudyate* (Ke. Up. 1.5) cited by Vimuktātman, Śaṅkarācārya in his commentary identifies the Vāk as a) the speech-organ, which is attached to the eight places of articulation and which presided over by Agni is the expresser of letters (*jihvāmūlādiṣvaṣṭasu sthāneṣu viṣaktamāgneyaṃ varṇānāmabhivyañjakaṃ karaṇam*) or b) letters, which are delimited by the meaning to be conveyed as being so many and used in such and such order (*varṇāścārthasaṃketa-paricchinnā etāvanta evaṃkramaprayuktā iti*) or c) the Śabda which is expressed by letters, and called as "Padam" (*evaṃ tadabhivyaṅgyaḥ śabdaḥ padaṃ vāgityucyate*). It is seen that in all the three cases, the Śabda of Vaiyākaraṇas is not meant. Commenting on this, Ānandagiri identified the third as *Padasphoṭa*. This identification is debatable especially in the original context of the Mantra. Setting that debate aside, when the Vaiyākaraṇa explicitly holds Śabda to be Brahman, his interpretation of the above Mantra would assign a different meaning to Śabda to be consistent with his overall system, in the same manner that many Bhedaśrutis are differently explained by the Advaitin. As such this is not a refutation of Śabda of the Vaiyākaraṇa by Śruti.

Similarly in the second Śruti, *yacchrotreṇa na śruṇoti* (Ke. Up. 1.8), the Śabda proposed by the Grammarian is not what is heard by ear. What is heard by the ear is what is known as "sound', the Śabda of Naiyāyika. In fact even the Śabda that is held to be Nitya by the Advaitin – i.e. Varṇajāti cannot be heard by the ear.

In the third Śruti, *aśabdamasparśam* (Ka. Up. 1.3.15) the Śabda is intended to be the Guṇa of Ākāśa, as becomes clear from the Avatārikā to the Mantra written by Śaṅkarācārya himself. Thus, it becomes clear that it is only

a straw-man that is demolished by Vimuktātman and not the correct view of the Vaiyākaraṇa.

As to the charge that there are no Śrutis in support of the doctrine that Śabda is Brahman, it is not true. The following Śrutis clearly support it.

> *omiti brahma.* Tai. Up. (1.8.1)
>
> The Śabda "Om" is Brahman.

> etadvai satyakāma paraṃ cāparaṃ ca brahma yadomkāraḥ
>
> <div align="right">(Pr. Up. 5.2)</div>
>
> This Brahman which is Param (ultimate) and Aparam (not ultimate), Satyakāma, is indeed "Om".

> sarve vedā yatpadamāmananti
>
> tapāṃsi sarvāṇi ca yadvadanti ।
>
> yadicchanto brahmacaryaṃ caranti
>
> tatte padaṃ saṅgraheṇa bravīmyomityetat ॥1.2.15, Ka. Up.॥
>
> That destination which all Vedas teach, that all austerities speak of, desiring which the life of celibacy and studies is undertaken, I shall teach you completely that destination called "Om".

These and such other kinds of statements are no doubt well-known to Vimuktātman and he precluded them by saying that they are interpreted differently in the system of Advaita, which is indeed true. In all the above examples, Śaṅkarācārya treats "Om" as a symbol (Pratīka) of Brahman, but not Brahman itself. However that does not preclude the Vaiyākaraṇa from offering a different interpretation which is reasonable and consistent on the

whole and claiming that these statements indeed teach the unity of Śabda and Brahman. There is nothing in the context of these Śrutis which would pose any difficulty if there were interpreted as teaching Brahman. In the available literature, to the extent that this researcher has studied and is exposed, these are not cited as a Śruti support for Sphoṭavāda. Rather, the following Ṛk is most often referred to.

> catvāri śṛṅgā trayo asya pādā dve śīrṣe sapta hastāso asya |
> tridhā baddho vṛṣabho roravīti maho devo martyāṁ ā viveśa ‖
>
> <div align="right">(Ṛgveda 4.58.3)</div>
>
> The great bull that Śabdabrahman is, which has the four kinds of words (noun, verb, prefix, particle) as horns, three tenses (past, present, future) as feet, the two types of Śabdas (Nitya and Kārya) as heads, the seven Vibhaktis as hands, which is bound at three places (chest, neck and head) [places of articulation] makes a great sound and enters the mortals.

This verse as such is not refuted by Advaitins, again to the extent that this researcher is exposed, but one can easily see the way in which it could be done, if so desired. This Ṛk has been commented variously starting with Yāskācārya to Dayananda Saraswati, the founder of Arya Samaj, with each Ācārya reading whatever is dearest to him being hinted in the Ṛk. The Advaitin would have to simply show these myriad interpretations, and say that there is a wide-spread difference of view. The other reference to be found usually is the following verse which occurs both in the Maitryupaniṣad and the Mahābhārata:

> dve brahmaṇī veditavye śabdabrahma paraṃ ca yat |

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śabdabrahmaṇi niṣṇātaḥ paraṃ brahmādhigacchati ॥

(Maitryupaniṣat, 6.22 and Mahābhārata 12.224.60)[78]

Two Brahmans are to be known – Śabdabrahman and Parabrahman. The one who is deeply versed in Śabdabrahman attains the Parabrahman.

Again, while the researcher has not come across a refutation of this verse by an Advaitin, there are two grounds on which this could be rejected. Maitryupaniṣad is not something on which Śaṅkarācārya commented or quoted. So, while a Neo-vedāntin might cite this and reject is as Śruti, an orthodox Vedāntin would not normally take recourse to such an option, for this is a text found in the Maitrāyaṇī recension of the Kṛṣṇayajurveda; further this is quoted in a Smṛti, i.e. Mahābhārata which is often quoted from by Śaṅkarācārya himself. Thus, he would readily accept Śabdabrahman as the lower Brahman, for two Brahmans are indeed acceptable to the Advaitin and make Śabdabrahman the Pratīka (symbol) of Parabrahman, based on the following words of Śaṅkarācārya found in the *Kāryādhikaraṇam* (commentary on the Sūtra 4.3.24)

kiṃ dve brahmaṇī paramaparaṃ ceti ? bāḍhaṃ dve — 'etadvai satyakāma paraṃ cāparaṃ ca brahma yadoṃkāraḥ' (Pr. Up. 5.2) ityādidarśanāt. (Brahmasūtrabhāṣyam, 4.3.24)

[Opponent asks:] Are there two Brahmans, Para and Apara? [Siddhāntin replies:] Yes, two – based on Śruti sentences such as "This Brahman which is Param (ultimate) and Aparam (not ultimate), Satyakāma, is indeed "Om" (Pr. Up. 5.2)".

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[78] According to the critical edition of Bhandarkar Oriental Research Institute

It may be noted that "Om" is the subject matter of the Śruti quoted above, giving support to the suggested response of the Advaitin. So, while it is possible that the Advaitin would not agree with the Vaiyākaraṇa about the interpretation of Śrutis, his argument that Śruti teaches Brahman not to be Śabda and that there are no Śrutis which teach Brahman to be Śabda are based on his own interpretation and are open to refutation by a different interpretation. Such a criticism is not conclusive and is more a feature of polemics.

Thus, it is seen that while the refutation by Śaṅkarācārya of Sphoṭavāda and support of Varṇavāda is curious and unusual, the other objections raised by other Advaitins against Sphoṭa are not conclusive but merely polemical.

5.3 Māyā / Avidyā vs. Śaktis of Brahman (Kāla, Dik, Kriyā etc.)

Many authors, including Bishnupada Bhattacharya, Gaurinath Sastri, Coward and Coward and Raja, have noted the parallel between the concepts of Māyā / Avidyā in Advaita on the one hand and the various Śaktis of Brahman, especially the Kālaśakti. Where "Śaṅkara has sought the help of *māyā* for explanation of plurality and other appearances in the world of phenomenon", Bishnupada Bhattacharya explains (p. 11), "Bhartṛhari has tried to explain it by having recourse to the concept of *śakti* or power inherent in *śabdabrahman*." Gaurinath Sastri also compares Kālaśakti with Avidyā, but holds that they are different (p 13): "*Kālaśakti* in the system of the

grammarian appears to be different from *avidyā,* the power of the Absolute, in the System of Śaṅkara." Coward opines (pp 127-128)

> As in *Advaita Vedānta,* the metaphysical principle of beginningless ignorance or *avidyā* is held to be the initial cause of the One manifesting itself as many. . . . it is the power of time in producing sequence in our experience of the really unitary word-consciousness that results in the division of the *sphoṭa* into word-sentences which makes communication possible.

Coward and Raja also note (p 39) the similarity and substantiate the comparison by quoting others:

> To one familiar with Advaita Vedānta, the preceding description of time sounds very similar to Śaṃkara's notion of *māyā* in relation to Brahman. This view is certainly held by two eminent contemporary interpreters of the *Vākyapadīya,* Gaurinath Sastri and K. A. Subramania Iyer.

Having noted the parallel, the following differences between Māyā / Avidyā on the one hand and Śaktis on the other hand are discussed, most elaborately by Gaurinath Sastri, whose thesis is the doctrine of *ābhāsa* of the philosophers of Kashmir, and not Advaita is the closest to the system of Bhartṛhari. The main differences enumerated may be summarised as:

i.   Śaktis are positive; Māyā is primarily seen as negative (though the Vikṣepaśakti admitted in Vivaraṇa school is noted by some).

ii. Śaktis are the same as Brahman, whereas Māyā is never equated with Brahman.

iii. Śaktis are real (at least as long as Avidyā operates), whereas Māyā is Anirvacanīya.

iv. Kālaśakti is described as the Creator in *Vākyapadīya*, whereas only Īśvara is said to be the Creator in Advaita.

v. Kālaśakti is described as independent (Svātantryaśakti) whereas Māyā is never described as independent.

vi. Plurality of Śaktis is discussed but not that of Māyā.

All these are indeed valid differences in how the creation and operation of the phenomenal world are described in the two systems. This difference in the model of the phenomenal world is what has prompted modern scholars like Bishnupada Bhattacharya and Gaurinath Sastri to opine that while Bhartṛhari teaches Monism, it is different from the system of Śaṅkara.

5.4 Number of Pramāṇas

While Śaṅkarācārya accepts six Pramāṇas following Kumārilabhaṭṭa[79], Bhartṛhari accepts more Pramāṇas, upto ten. The six Pramāṇas acceptable to Advaita are:

Pratyakṣa:	Perception
Anumāna:	Inference
Upamāna:	Analogy

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[79] It may be noted here that Pūrvamīmāṃsā treats Veda as if it were independent of Śabdapramāṇa. The nuances are intricate and quite removed from the subject of this thesis, and so are not being given.

Śabda:	Statement
Arthāpatti:	Presumption
Anupalabdhi:	Absence

These are not listed as such by Śaṅkarācārya in any of the Prasthānatraya-bhāṣyas, but are listed by later Ācāryas like Dharmarājādhvarīndra, the author of *Vedāntaparibhāṣā*. Against the above six Pramāṇas agreeable to Advaitins, Vaiyākaraṇas accept ten Pramāṇas[80]:

Pratyakṣa:	Perception
Anumāna:	Inference
Upamāna:	Analogy
Śabda:	Statement
Āgama (=Smṛti):	Remembrance by authoritative persons, Śāstra
Arthāpatti:	Presumption
Abhyāsaḥ:	Practice
Adṛṣṭam:	Invisibility
Yogipratyakṣam:	Extra-sensory perception available only to Yogis
Pratyabhijñāpratyakṣam:	Perception through recollection

Most of the Pramāṇas are mentioned in Brahmakāṇḍa. The five which are different from those common with Advaita are discussed below.

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[80] The ten Pramāṇas of Vyākaraṇam in this section, along with the supporting citations, are based on the forthcoming book of Prof. K. Subrahmanyam: *Pramāṇas in Indian Philosophy.*

5.4.1 Abhyāsa

Abhyāsa is practice. There are certain skills, of recognising an underlying entity based on what is seen apparently, which can only be acquired by great practice. Bhartṛhari uses the example of gemology to make this clear:

> pareṣāṃ asamākhyeyaṃ abhyāsādeva jāyate l
> maṇirūpyādivijñānaṃ tadvidāṃ nānumānikam ‖ 1.35 ‖
> The knowledge of experts in gems etc. about gems, silver etc.,
> which cannot be explained to others, is born of Abhyāsa, not
> Anumāna.

Stripped to its bare essentials, it will look like Anumāna, as the knower has a set of symptoms or Liṅgas, which he analyses and arrives that which is to be determined, Sādhya, corresponding to the concept of *liṅgaparāmarśa* of Nyāya. At best the difference could be that instead of the knowledge of three instances of *vyāpti* (concomitance of the *liṅga* and *sādhya*) required in *liṅgaparāmarśa,* gemology and such subjects might require more instances of knowledge of *vyāpti*. Even if the framework as such is not different from that of Anumāna, there is a practical difference that this *Anumānaprayoga*, if it be accepted as one, is not available to everyone, and is limited to only those who dedicate their life to it. In the context of Vyākaraṇam then, the correct form of Śabdas can be ascertained only by somebody who dedicates his life to it. The nearly four thousand Sūtras of *Aṣṭādhyāyī*, with hundreds of Paribhāṣas and dozens of Nyāyas guiding their application, make for an exceedingly complicated pattern of application, with scope for difference in view

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continuing to this day, at least more than two millennia after Pāṇini composed the Aṣṭādhyāyī.

Another application of Abhyāsa can be found in the theory of error. According to Bhartṛhari, the truth becomes clearer as more information is available. In explaining how Sphoṭa gradually manifests (1.82 – 1.84), he uses the example of recitation where a particular paragraph becomes clear after repeating it ten times.

> Just as a paragraph or verse is apprehended after only repeating it ten times, but not after each repetition, Sphoṭa is apprehended only after all the Dhvanis are uttered in a sentence. Just like each recitation makes the paragraph or verse clearer, each Dhvani makes Sphoṭa clearer, though not completely. Each previous Dhvani sows the seed for Sphoṭa and all these attain maturity once the last Dhvani is uttered and Sphoṭa becomes clearly apprehended. (1.82 – 1.84)

5.4.2 Adṛṣṭa

Adṛṣṭa is etymologically that which is not seen. In normally usage, this is used as the synonym of "luck" in Indian languages, but it actually refers to the results of one's previous actions. In other words Adṛṣṭa is the result of Karma and is more commonly referred to as Puṇya and Pāpa. This is also established as a separate Pramāṇa by Bhartṛhari.

> pratyakṣamanumānaṃ ca vyatikramya vyavasthitāḥ।
> pitṛrakṣaḥpiśācānāṃ karmajā eva siddhayaḥ ॥1.36॥

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The powers of Pitṛs, Rākṣasās and Piśācas are born of their earlier Karmas and are beyond perception or inference.

Pitṛs etc. cognise objects which are otherwise not perceived by ordinary perception, and can know thoughts, intentions etc. which cannot be inferred without sufficient indicatory marks. These are some of the "Siddhis" that they have, which can only be explained as the result of deeds done by them earlier. The enumeration of this Pramāṇa has its purport in supporting the next one, which is Yogipratyakṣa.

5.4.3 Yogipratyakṣa

The concept of Yogipratyakṣa is that certain Yogins, through austerities and the result of previous Karma, attain powers to "see" objects, events etc. which are distant in time and space, and otherwise not accessible to ordinary people.

> āvirbhūtaprakāśānāṃ anupaplutacetasām l
> atītānāgatajñānaṃ pratyakṣānna viśiṣyate ॥ 1.37 ॥

> The knowledge of past and future of those [Yogis] whose mind is unafflicted and in whom the light of knowledge has dawned is not any different from Pratyakśa, the direct perception of ordinary people.

> atīndriyānasaṃvedyān paśyantyārṣeṇa cakṣuṣā l
> ye bhāvān vacanaṃ teṣāṃ nānumānena bādhate ॥ 1.38 ॥

> The words of Ṛṣis who see entities that are beyond sense organs and are unknowable (or those which cannot be

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experienced as a sensation or feeling) are not thwarted by Inference.

5.4.4 Pratyabhijñā

Pratyabhijñā is the recollection of something seen earlier. This Pramāṇa can be taken to be agreeable to Bhartṛhari, because it has been accepted in the tradition of grammar. Pāṇini himself used the word *abhijña* to mean Pratyabhijñā in the Sūtra 3.2.112 *abhijñāvacane lṛṭ*[81]. Further the application of the Pāṇinisūtra 5.4.17 *saṃkhyāyāḥ kriyābhyāvṛttigaṇane kṛtvasuc* presupposes Pratyabhijñā. The Sūtra ordains the use of *kṛtvasuc* after Saṅkhya when counting the repetition of actions. Example: *pañcakṛtvo bhuṅkte* (he eats five times). The Jaiminisūtra 1.1.20 *saṅkhyābhāvāt* corresponds to this Pāṇinisūtra, as the Bhāṣya of Śabarasvāmin makes it clear.

aṣṭakṛtvaḥ gośabda uccarita iti vadanti, na "aṣṭau gośabdā" iti. kimataḥ yadyevam? anena vacanenāvagamyate – pratyabhijānātīti, vayaṃ tāvat pratyabhijānīmaḥ.

It is said that the word "cow" has been uttered eight times, not "eight cow-words". [The objector enquires] so what? From this usage, it is understood that the same Śabda is recognised.

Further under the Māheśvarasūtra 1. *ai uṇ* and 2. *ṛ ḷk,* Kaiyaṭa shows the application of Pratyabhijñā. This Pratyabhijñā is similar to the one used by Mīmāṃsakas in Varṇavāda. Thus, it follows that the difference between

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[81] Meaning of the Sūtra: The simple future affix *lṛṭ* occurs when words denoting recollection are used. Example: *abhijñāsi / smarasi / buddhyase devadatta kaśmīreṣu vatsyamaḥ* - You would remember, Devadatta, when we lived in Kashmir.

Vaiyākaraṇas and Mīmāṃsakas is not based on a difference about whether the same Varṇas (i.e. Varṇajātis) are "recognised", (i.e. Varṇajāti is admitted to have a limited reality by Grammarians) but rather it is based on the existence (or otherwise, according to Mīmāṃsakas) of Sphoṭa.

5.4.5 Significance of Difference in Pramāṇas

It is seen that Anupalabdhi is acceptable to Advaita but not to Vyākaraṇam, but nothing needs to be made out of it. Bhartṛhari views that both Bhāva and Abhāva have a similar ontological status, in that both are mental conceptions.

ekasmādātmano' ananyau bhāvābhāvau vikalpitau ‖ 3.3.60cd ‖

From the one Ātmā Bhāva (existing entity) and Abhāva (absence or the non-existence of an entity), which are mutually non-different, are conceived.

On the other hand, the Mīmāṃsakas accepting the reality of existence of entities are forced to consider absence as a separate category resulting in acceptance of Anupalabdhi. Advaita does follow Mīmāṃsā in matters of Vyavahāra and accepts the applicability of Anupalabdhi in Vyāvahārika matters. However, there is no difference with Grammarians at the Paramārtha level, on account of accepting this Pramāṇa which is restricted to the Vyāvahārika level.

To be sure, it will be seen that some of the additional Pramāṇas listed by Bhartṛhari are acceptable to Śaṅkarācārya as well. For instance in the

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Devatādhikaraṇa, while establishing Varṇavāda, Śaṅkarācārya accepts the perception of Varṇas through Pratyabhijñā, recognition or recollection.

Similarly, he accepts Yogipratyakṣam at many places. While commenting on Māṇḍūkyakārikā 3.47, where realisation of the Self is described as *akathyam* (indescribable, comparable to the *asaṃvedyān* of Bhartṛhari in 1.38), Śaṅkarācārya describes the ultimate bliss as *tadyogipratyakṣameva* (that is Yogipratyakṣa only, i.e. perceivable only to Yogins, not others). A similar usage is found in the commentary on the Bṛhadāraṇyakopaniṣad Mantra 1.2.1, which describes creation starting with the statement that "there was nothing here in the beginning" (*naiveha kiñcanāgra āsīt*). This occasions a discussion on how something can be created from nothing. Śaṅkarācārya presents the view that Cause exists for the Effect to be produced, and also that the Effect exists but is not perceived. In this context, he cites Yogipratyakṣa in support: *yogināṃ cātītānāgatajñānasya satyatvāt* – as the knowledge of Yogis about past and future is true. Once again the description is strikingly similar to what Bhartṛhari says in 1.37.

Smṛtis are eminently acceptable to Śaṅkarācārya as evidenced by the copious quotations from Smṛtis and the fact that the Bhagavadgītā, a Smṛti, is considered an important text in the system of Advaita. Adṛṣṭam, referred to as Pāpa and Puṇya, is without doubt acceptable to Śaṅkarācārya, because his entire argument for rejection of Jñānakarmasamuccaya is based on the fact Karmas give rise to Adṛṣṭam, and one has to be born again to enjoy / suffer the consequences – good or bad – of that. However it is customary to show that six Pramāṇas are acceptable to Advaita, may be because Kumārila listed six Pramāṇas separately, though he does accept Adṛṣṭa, Yogipratyakṣa and Pratyabhijñā (the latter two are included under Pratyakṣa and the first one is nothing but Apūrva).

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However there is one Pramāṇa – Abhyāsa – for which this researcher could not find any indication of acceptance within Mīmāṃsā or Vedānta. It is also not without implication, in that Abhyāsa has some significance as far as the theory of error is concerned. Then, the difference in number of Pramāṇas boils down to the fact Abhyāsa accepted as a Pramāṇa by Bhartṛhari is not accepted as such by Śaṅkarācārya which has an implication about the theory of error acceptable.

5.5 Śabda as Brahman vs. Brahman as Śabda

In Brahmasūtras 4.1.4 and 4.1.5, two aspects of Pratīkopāsana are treated. Pratīka is a symbol. There are many Upāsanas of such symbols taught in the Śruti. A few are discussed in the fourth Pāda of the third Adhyāya, including Sun, Akāśa, Agni, food, mind, Prāṇa, Puruṣa residing in the eye, the empty space in heart (Daharākāśa) and Om. In all these the Upāsaka should not think of himself as non-different from the Pratīka, rather he should think of himself only as non-different from Brahman (4.1.4); further the Pratīka can be viewed as Brahman, but not the other way round (4.15). Thus, one objection to the description of Śabdatattvam of Brahman is that Brahman cannot be said to be of the nature of Śabda, but if Śabda is said to Brahman, Advaitins have no objections. Similarly if Śabda is taken as a Pratīka of Brahman, the seeker should not identify himself with Śabda, rather he should identify himself with Brahman, according to the Advaitin.

This gives a clue as to why Śaṅkarācārya had to reject Sphoṭavāda: Holding Brahman to be Śabda goes against the principles of Pratīkopāsana. If

Brahman is said to be of the nature of Śabda, others such as Rasa and Gandha would follow. Not only will this confuse the seeker, it also goes against the teaching of the Sūtrakāra.

5.6 Theory of Error

Theories of Error are much discussed in the Indian Philosophy under the head of epistemology. For example, Śaṅkarācārya in his *Adhyāsabhāṣya* refers to four theories, though not by name: i) Anyathākhyāti, ii) Ātmakhyāti, iii) Akhyāti and iv) Asatkhyāti. To this list, the v) Anirvacanīyakhyāti of Advaita is added and five Khyātis are listed in a traditional verse.

ātmakhyātirasatkhyātirakhyātiḥ khyātiranyathā l

tathā'nirvacanakhyātirityetat khyātipañcakam ll

Anyathākhyāti, the view of Naiyāyikas, is knowing the seashell as silver due to some defect in the eye etc. Here it is held that what obtains is the remembrance of the earlier knowledge about silver and not that of the seashell which is actually present. Ātmakhyāti is the position of Vijñānavādins (Buddhists) who hold that everything that exists outside is Vijñāna only. According to them the silver-consciousness and seashell-consciousness are mixed up, and silver-consciousness obtains in the place of seashell consciousness. Akhyāti is the concept of Mīmāṃsakas who follow Prabhākara, who hold that knowing the seashell to be silver is considered as Bhrama (delusion) of the knower in the world, but in reality there is no erroneous perception. What actually happens is that the seashell is not cognised due to some defect in factors concerned, and the remembrance of

silver seen elsewhere obtains due to some similarities. Asatkhyāti is the view of Buddhist Śūnyavādins who hold that neither seashell nor silver exist in reality and so the error is about something which does not exist. The view of Śaṅkarācārya is called Anirvacanīyakhyāti because silver can neither be accepted nor rejected. If it is there, then it will not be sublate when true knowledge obtains; if it were not there, it should not have been perceived. This description also fits the world, which cannot be said to exist or not exist, for exactly the same reasons.

The theory of error of Bhartṛhari is described as a gradual dawning of the truth. Various views about Bhartṛhari's theory of error are summarised by Harold G. Coward and K. Kunjunni Raja (pp. 54 – 58), which in turn is based primarily on the work of Gaurinath Sastry. In the example of how Sphoṭa is perceived, it is said that with each subsequent Varṇa, Sphoṭa becomes clearer till the last Varṇa makes it burst forth.

First it is accepted that the seashell-silver analogy or the rope-snake analogy is similar to how the phenomenal world is perceived in the systems of both Bhartṛhari and Śaṅkarācārya. Then it is said that while in the system of Śaṅkarācārya the error is negated in one stroke, in the case of Bhartṛhari the error is gradually removed. As suggested earlier, the applicability of the Pramāṇa of Abhyāsa here is possible.

While this difference in the process and recognition of the stages is indeed there, it is noteworthy that dawn of knowledge itself is an instantaneous event with Bhartṛhari as well. Sentence meaning is perceived as Pratibhā, intuition. And in all earlier stages, if the question be asked whether the knower understands it, the answer has to be given in the negative. In fact this is often experienced by modern students who read Sanskrit works. Often

times, the meaning of a sentence is not clear; it becomes less unclear as one spends more time, till at last the sentence meaning dawns upon the student. Now, if we ask the student when he did not fully comprehend the sentence, as to whether he understood the meaning or not, the honest answer has to be "no"; it is true that his error might be less than that of somebody else, but it is an error nonetheless. Similarly in the case of a person who mistook a rope to be a snake in the dark, before he realises that it is a rope, he would get some doubt, surely, say as to why there is no movement. As time passes he gets more courage and might do something like shining a torch to ascertain the fact. During these stages, he is still in error, but the error is progressively reducing. Such a description would be agreeable to both Advaitins and Vaiyākaraṇas.

Thus, while the difference in the model is indeed true, it does not affect the conclusion or applicability of the analogies to the situation of the world. In Bhartṛhari's case, the process of grasping Sphoṭa upon hearing a sentence occasioned the description of the intermediate stages, whereas no such necessity arises in Advaita. However, sometimes the significance of this difference is overstated. Coward and Raja write (p54)

> Whereas the overcoming of error for Śaṃkara takes a negative form, for Bhartṛhari, it is positive.

This is a clear case of over-reach. On the face of it, it does look like the Sādhaka makes an attempt to reduce his error and it might look positive, but in reality it is not. The true import of the above statement is that while for Śaṅkara Avidyānivṛtti (removal of Avidyā) is required for proper knowledge, for Bhartṛhari proper knowledge when acquired removes the error. However such a situation does not obtain. There is no text which when studied would

remove error according to Bhartṛhari. In fact he says (2.233) *svayam vidyopavartate* (Vidyā shines by itself). As shown in Section 4.14 *Brahman is beyond Śabda* starting on p126 of this thesis, according to both Śaṅkarācārya and Bhartṛhari, Brahman cannot be described and therefore there is no positive way of realising Brahman.

6. Supplements and Complements

6.1 Difference in Emphasis

When one looks at the two systems which teach Brahman, the difference in the topics covered and the difference in emphasis is noteworthy. Advaita, also called Māyāvāda, seems to be denying the reality of the world, whereas the world seems to be presented as real in the Vākyapadīya. Similarly while Bhartṛhari explains in the greatest detail how language functions, Śaṅkarācārya focuses a lot of attention on Sādhana. It will be seen that while this is no more than a difference in emphasis, the topics so covered are very complementary, completing what is treated very briefly or not at all in the other Śāstra. In this section, a few examples of difference in emphasis are briefly discussed, showing the way in which many other such differences in emphasis in the two systems should be understood as being mutually complementary, rather than as differences.

6.1.1 Mithyātva vs. Reality of Jagat

As discussed earlier in Section 2.3.6 *Multiple levels of Reality* (p38), the concept that Jagat is Mithyā is applicable only at the Pāramārthika level; at the Vyāvahārika level, i.e. to almost everybody in the universe, it is very much real. Yet it is commonly believed that Śaṅkarācārya taught the world to be an illusion. Against this, though Bhartṛhari holds similar views about the world, it is held by some that he portrays the world as a real entity. Thus, while holding essentially similar positions about the ontological fact, two mutually opposed labels have come to be stuck to them. This comes about due to the difference

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in elaboration. While Bhartṛhari is seen as using more "positive" illustrations such as Kāla being the Sūtradhāra of the Lokayantra (Vākyapadīya, 3.9.4) or the waterwheel Vākyapadīya (3.9.14), the rope-snake analogy and such others of Śaṅkarācārya seem to be emphasising the "negative" aspect. This is not accidental and flows from the aims of the two Ācāryas, as stated in p94 of this thesis. Bhartṛhari's focus is on how transactions occur in the apparent world, though the Noumenon is the One, who is never subject to change. On the other hand, Śaṅkarācārya's objective is to teach how to remove the Avidyā which is the cause of the perceived multiplicity of the world. Once this fact is realised, then it is seen that the two approaches are complementary to each other, in the same manner that Sṛṣṭikrama and Saṃhārakrama are resorted to in Śrīvidyā[82]

6.1.2 Theory of Language

Historically Vedānta adopted the Theory of Language of the Mīmāṃsā and Śaṅkarācārya continued the tradition. Later developments such as Navyanyāya have significantly expanded the horizons of Theory of Language, with a minute analysis of the usage of language now being made available from a Realistic school. The language of Navyanyāya has been adopted by later Advaitins as well, as exemplified by the author of *Vedāntaparibhāṣā*. An effective rebuttal of the Realistic point of view on how language operates is not possible by depending on the Mīmāṃsā framework. The fundamentals of Nyāya and Mīmāṃsā such as a) *nissāmānyāni sāmānyāni* (or *jātau na jātiḥ*), which postulate that Sāmānya or Jāti as a concept within which another Sāmānya or Jāti is not possible, and b) the Nityatā of Jāti, are not acceptable to

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[82] Though it is labeled as a Tantra in academic circles, most of the Upāsakas of Śrīvidyā, at least in South India, are staunch Advaitins often affiliated to traditional maths like the Śṛṅgeri Math or the Kanchi Math. There, in the Kalpa of Śrīcakrārcanā, the worship is offered in the two orders stated. This is supposed to make it easier for the seeker to understand the *mithyātva* of the phenomenal world.

Vedānta. As seen from the Vācārambhaṇaśruti (Ch. Up. 6.4.1), quoted and explained on p120 of this thesis, Brahman remains when Jāti vanishes (Brahman is the firehood of fire, and remains when firehood vanishes).

Such being the situation, there is a ready explanation of how language operates from the Advaita point of view available in the form of Bhartṛhari's Vākyapadīya and elaborated by Navyavaiyākaraṇas such as Kauṇḍabhaṭṭa and Nāgeśabhaṭṭa. Today, when many of India's best and brightest are accessing the heritage of India through the medium of English, and not through their mother tongues, the influence of the Western Philosophy of Language cannot be ignored. Philosophy in the western world has taken a linguistic turn and has blossomed from Frege and Russell to Wittginstein to Jacques Derrida. In such a situation, the western reader or any reader exposed to western philosophy would also have an interest in approaching the philosophy of Advaita from a linguistic point of view. For such a person, the Mīmāṃsā framework is more a hindrance than an aid; they would find in Bhartṛhari a sure-footed and reliable guide to approach Advaita. Many of the recent debates in the western world, between essentialists and existentialists, between analytical and continental philosophers, between structuralists and post-structuralists etc. have parallels in the ancient Indian thought. To anchor Advaita in such a situation, it is much better to resort to the Theory of Language of the Grammarians rather than that of Pūrvamīmāṃsā. In this way, Śabdādvaita aids the understanding of Advaita.

6.1.3 Sādhana: Path of Liberation

When it comes to the path of liberation, the Sādhana required, Bhartṛhari has given the broad strokes and no more. The commentators

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elaborate the Śabdayoga to a certain extent but not in great detail. The following two accounts by Gaurinath Sastri capture just about all the details of Sādhanā that one can glean from Vākyapadīya and commentaries on it.

> Bhartṛhari tells us that the Ultimate Reality is reached through a process which he calls communion through word (*śabdayoga*). According to the grammarian it is the knowledge of purification of words (*śabdasaṃskāra*) which may be described as the attainment of Supreme Soul. Now what is meant by purification of words and how is it effected? Purification of words means discarding unchaste words, by which the grammarian means *apabhraṃśa* forms, and adherence to chaste words. Puṇyarāja tells us that strict adherence to chaste forms gradually results in the emergence of a special kind of merit leading to permanent spiritual advancement. Use of chaste words enables us to be initiated into a form of determinate communion, the determinant being in the nature of word. Such communion ultimately reveals the Absolute, the principle of beings, which is the matrix of all changes and origin of the phenomenal world. Puṇyarāja adds that with this revelation the devotee attains the *summum bonum* of human existence. (1959, pp 9-10)

> The spiritual aspirant reaches the Essence of Speech – the pure luminous Eternal Verbum, which lies beyond the vital plane (*prāṇavṛttim atikrānte*) by withdrawing his mind from the external nature (*ātmani*). This entails the dissolution of temporal sequence of thought-activity (*krama-saṃhāra-yogena*). The purification of the Verbum results from this and

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the aspirant enters into it having severed all his ties with the material objective plane. This leads him to the attainment of the internal light and he becomes identical with the undying and undecaying Spirit, the Word-Absolute. Evidently such a conception of the individual self as being merged with the World-Soul, of the unification of the individual consciousness with the Supreme Consciousness is capable of one interpretation, viz., the individual has essential identity with the Absolute beyond which and besides which nothing exists. (1980, p95)

The idea is that as one employs only Sādhuśabdas and ponders over their nature every time one uses them, say along the lines of every verb being anchored in time, which is without temporal sequence, or that every Subanta being used is expressing only one of the Śaktis and so on, the reality that Brahman alone is, will dawn. It is easy to see how this kind of constant meditation is a very powerful tool because it does not demand a place and time; when it becomes a habit, one meditates on the nature of Brahman every time one uses a word – in fact every time that one thinks, for thought happens *in* language. Bhartṛhari could boldly declare Vyākaraṇam as the *ajihmā rājapaddhatiḥ*[83] to salvation because of this immersive nature of Śabdayoga.

Now what if such an immersive meditation is not possible for the seeker, who for the most part of his life might speak in modern languages? No

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[83] This should not be misunderstood as Bhartṛhari saying that other Upāsanas are more difficult. Sentences like these are called Arthavādas (ex. *vāyurvai kṣepiṣṭhā devatā* [Taittirīyasaṃhitā 2.1.1.1] – Vāyu is the fastest to bestow gifts). Such sentences should be understood as praising the subject matter of the context – in this case, Vyākaraṇam – and should not be taken as literally true. In the Vedic sentence, the superlative does not mean that there is a comparison between Vāyu and other deities such as Agni, and it was decided that Vāyu is the fastest.

other technique is available. This is in contrast to the large number of Vidyas enunciated in Advaita. For instance two sentences teaching Brahman are incorporated in Sandhyāvandanam (worship offered at dawn, noon and dusk) – *asāvādityo brahma* and *omityekākṣaraṃ brahma*. Whereas the former may invoke the Annamayakośa of *Taittirīyopaniṣad* corresponding to the law of conservation of matter-energy[84], the latter might very well invoke Śabdabrahman himself. Many such Upāsanas and Vidyas are mentioned in the Brahmasūtras, Upaniṣads and Bhagavadgītā. Advaita then offers a rich choice of meditations to suit a seeker's situation and inclinations, and so complements the Śabdayoga favoured by Vyākaraṇam.

6.2 Results of Karma

While Karma is very much accepted by Bhartṛhari (usage of Sādhuśabdas gives rise to Abhyudaya), the logically consequent questions are not raised or answered. Good Karma or bad Karma is done in many births, which gets accumulated and is called *sañcitakarma.* One enjoys/suffers a part of that in this birth and while doing so new Karma is accumulated; so one will have to be reborn to enjoy / suffer the remainder; in this fashion, the incessant cycle goes on. How is this cycle to be broken? What happens to all the accumulated Karma at the time of realising unity with Brahman? Is one supposed to do Karma or not? These questions are discussed and answered at

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[84] Brahman is defined as the source, sustenance and destination of all creatures (Brahmasūtras 1.1.2). Creatures are born from matter; they grow by consuming matter and finally dissolve into matter. Even while all this is happening, food comes from conversion of energy into matter in plants. In all other processes, matter is being converted into energy. For instance when some work is done, muscles create potential energy by lifting something; these muscles are moved by cells which burn fuel in the form of sugar by combining it with the oxygen that blood supplies; the sugar is nothing but food processed to its essential form as fuel by the digestive system. All machines work on the same concept. Thus it is the Sun who by supplying the required energy, keeps the whole system running, who is the source, sustenance and destination of all creatures. Therefore, asau = this seen, Ādityaḥ, brahma = is Brahman.

length in Advaita. One has to continue doing Karmas till one attains enlightenment, but without desire (Niṣkāmakarma). Jñāna burns all accumulated Karma, but Prārabdha has to be enjoyed / suffered.

By providing elaborate answers on such important topics, Advaita complements Vyākaraṇadarśana. As much as Advaita needs Vyākaraṇa to provide a theory of language, Vyākaraṇa needs Advaita to analyse the common questions and doubts of seekers in a systematic manner within a well-structured framework.

6.3 Censure of Tarka

While both schools admit only Reasoning which is not opposed to Śruti, Bhartṛhari offers a logical reason why it is so, in the following Kārikās.

> dharmasya cāvyavacchinnāḥ panthāno ye vyavasthitāḥ ।
> na tān lokaprasiddhatvātkaścittarkeṇa bādhate ॥ 1.31 ॥
>
> Nobody can assail through reasoning the paths of Dharma, established by unbroken tradition as they are well known in the world.

This becomes clearer if an example is used. Even if a Cārvāka argues forcibly that Veda is a compiled document and an elaborate sham designed for the livelihood of priests, and that therefore one need not bother about Puṇya and Pāpa, ordinary people do not accept the argument and will continue to follow the paths of Dharma. The underlying idea here is that all reasoning and philosophising will have to ultimately find application in terms of acceptance

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and implementation by people. This could be called the Practicability test. All ancient Indian schools of thought give very high importance to *lokavyavahāra* and present models to explain it. Thus the practices remain the same, but the explanations differ.

> avasthādeśakālānāṃ bhedādbhinnāsu śaktiṣu ǀ
>
> bhāvānāmanumānena prasiddhiratidurlabhā ǁ 1.32 ǁ
>
> When the potencies of substances vary, due to differences in their state, place and time, it is difficult to determine their properties. (If such is the situation with worldly objects, determining the nature of the One beyond the reach of sense-organs is well nigh impossible.)
>
> nirjñātaśakterdravyasya tāṃ tānarthakriyāṃ prati ǀ
>
> viśiṣṭadravyasambandhe sā śaktiḥ pratibadhyate ǁ 1.33 ǁ
>
> The capacity of a particular substance, well known in causing certain effects, is obstructed when it is associated with a special substance.[85]

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[85] While this criticism is directed against the Vaiśeṣika school of Bhartṛhari's time pointing out that their knowledge of substances is limited, the main thrust that there are infinite permutations and combinations of various substances possible and that it is not possible to determine the properties of all of those, remains applicable today. For instance, even in modern times, one cannot determine which substances are allergic to a particular person, without actually testing the combination. In other words, even if we can map the DNA of the person, and even if we can have a fine analysis of a given substance, it is not possible with the current state of knowledge, to determine if a substance would trigger an allergic reaction in a person. Such is the state of knowledge even with respect to inert substances. For instance, this paragraph (p 35) from Jack A. Collins' *Failure of Materials in Mechanical Design: Analysis, Prediction and Prevention* rev. ed. New York: John Wiley & Sons, 1993. Print, is typical of most materials used in the modern world such as steel: "For example, in 1929 Frenkel utilized a simple atomic model to estimate the theoretical yield strength to be … around 3×10^6 psi for steel alloys. Observed yield strength values of one or two orders of magnitude less than this are commonly observed in the laboratory. Other materials exhibit even greater discrepancies, ranging to five orders of magnitude in some cases." In scientific terms 3×10^5 psi is one order of magnitude less than 3×10^6 psi, and 3×10^4 is two orders of magnitude lesser. Thus the actual strength of steel etc. is ten times to hundred times lesser than the theoretical strength. This happens due to impurities in the material and due to its granular nature. This is a modern example of remarkable change in properties when a particular Dravya comes in contact with some other Dravya. Even today, our understanding of materials and properties is a work in progress.

yatnenānumito'pyarthaḥ kuśalairanumātṛbhiḥ ।

abhiyuktatarairanyairanyathaivopapādyate ॥ 1.34 ॥

Even the meaning reasoned with great effort by skilled

logicians, could be shown to be different by those who are even

more skilled. The purport is that if we are to depend on

reasoning to determine what is Dharma, such an interpretation

is not stable because more skilled logicians might establish it to

be different, and therefore, we should not resort to reasoning to

determine Dharma.

Bhartṛhari then cites other Pramāṇas like Abhyāsa and Adṛṣṭa, which

have been discussed in Section 5.4 *Number of Pramāṇas* starting on p171 of

this thesis. Before, closing the topic he again criticizes Anumāna:

hastasparśādivāndhena viṣame pathi dhāvatā ।

anumānapradhānena vinipāto na durlabhaḥ ॥ 1.42 ॥

Like a blind man running in an uneven path depending on his

sense of touch, ruination is not difficult for somebody who

makes Anumāna his primary Pramāṇa.

In addition to the general refutation of Tarka, Bhartṛhari has also

explicitly taken a position that if Tarka is made the main Pramāṇa, ruination is

inevitable. While the position of both the schools of Advaita and Śabdādvaita

is similar on this matter, the arguments forwarded in Vākyapadīya are much

stronger and supplement the position of Advaita.

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6.4 Purport of Veda lies in Brahman

Though Vyākaraṇam bases itself completely on Śruti, when it comes to showing support for the final theses from Śruti, or even for Brahman, very little material is available in the Vyākaraṇam tradition. In addition to the Śrutis quoted in Section 5.2.4 *Reconciliation of Differences* starting on p164 of this thesis, the other Śrutis quoted in traditional literature are very rare, except for an extensive discussion on Śrutipramāṇa (pp 27 – 42) in the third *pariccheda* of the *Sphoṭasiddhi* of Bharatamiśra. On the other hand, in Advaita dozens of Abhedaśrutis propounding Brahman are quoted and discussed firmly establishing that the purport of Veda is in Brahman. Even though much of the discussion is based on the Nyāyas of Mīmāṃsā, all the interpretations of Upaniṣads by Śaṅkarācārya would be acceptable to a Grammarian. Thus Advaita is invaluable as a complement to Śabdādvaita, when it comes to establishing Brahman from Śruti.

6.5 Explanation of Kāla, Dik etc.

The perceived reality of the world is based on the fact that both time and space are accepted as real. What if these two were not real? This is what causes difficulty in understanding Advaita. All notions of Realism are not possible, if time and directions / space, called Kāla and Dik were to be imaginary. In fact it is difficult to even conceive a situation devoid of time and space, much less communicate. In fact Bhartṛhari says that Vyavahāra is not possible even for a Paṇḍita without using these concepts (see translation of 3.6.19 given below). Yet these concepts are not explained at any great length in Advaita. It is stated very briefly in the commentary of Śaṅkarācārya on 2.3.7:

etena dikkālamanaḥparamāṇvādīnāṃ kāryatvaṃ vyākhyātam.

By this it is explained that Dik (direction), Kāla (time), Manas (mind), Paramāṇu (atom) and others are effects.

This occurs in the last Sūtra of the Viyadadhikaraṇam (2.3.1 – 2.3.7) where the question of whether Ākāśa is created or not is taken up (others like Naiyāyikas treat Ākāśa as Nitya, because it does not have *avayavas,* and is hence uncreated). The Adhikaraṇam presents Śruti statements and arguments to show that Ākāśa is indeed a Vivarta of Brahman. One of the arguments is that it is an effect (Kārya), and all effects are by definition created. This argument is extended to other entities held to be Nitya by other systemists. The treatment of space in this Adhikaraṇa, when compared to the treatment of direction in *Diksamuddeśa* shows how each Śāstra supplements and complements the other.

Śaṅkarācārya relies on Śruti and acute reasoning to prove that space was created. In comparison, Bhartṛhari examines how Dik, Kāla etc. are essential for Vyavahāra and reconciles this apparent reality with the Siddhānta view that Dik is without differentiation, and is a Śakti of Brahman even as he shows that neither the Vaiśeṣika view nor the Vijñānavādin view is tenable. Thus if one wants "proof" in a formal way, *Brahmasūtrabhāṣya* is a great resource, whereas to gain an understanding of these concepts, and to know the method of dealing with these apparent realities like Space and Time while reconciling them to the ultimate Reality of only Brahman being true, *Vākyapadīya* is of great help. Two verses are quoted below, to give a feel of the approach of Bhartṛhari. First, he shows that these concepts are indispensable in Vyavahāra.

saṃkaro vyavahārāṇāṃ prakṛteḥ syādviparyaye ।

tasmāt tyajannimān dharmān[86] punarevāvalambate ॥3.6.19॥

There would be confusion in Vyavahāra if the opposite of the natural state is accepted. Therefore, even the one who gives up these categories like direction and space, resorts to them again.

This is a good example of the so-called "positive bias" of Bhartṛhari. Here, he is actually saying that though direction, space etc. are not true at the Pāramārthika level, they are essential in the plane of Vyavahāra, but the choice of words – *prakṛteḥ viparyaye* (something other than the natural state of affairs) – emphasises that Vyavahāra is seen as real. However if this "natural state of affairs" were the true state, i.e. with temporal sequence in Kāla and dimensional difference in Dik, there would be no need for him to explain in *Brahmakāṇḍa* 1.2 that the One Brahman is said to be many (*ekameva yadāmnātaṃ bhinnam*) and that though Brahman is not different from Śaktis (*apṛthaktve' pi śaktibhyaḥ*), It is situated as if different from Śaktis (*pṛthaktveneva vartate*). It may also be noted that designation of Vyavahāra as *sat* is also to be found in Vedānta as shown in Section 2.3.7 *Two levels of Unreal* starting on p41 of this thesis. Thus showing the need for Vyavahāra, Bhartṛhari presents the Siddhānta that Dik, though one, is supposed to be many due to the adjuncts.

tasyāstu śakteḥ pūrvādirbhedo bhāvāntarāśrayaḥ । .

bhinnā diktena bhedena bhedāyaivopakalpate ॥3.6.20॥

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[86] bhāvān is another reading found, for instance in the text commentated by Pandit Raghunatha Sharma.

The difference of anterior and posterior in that Śakti (i.e. Dik) is based on other objects. By that difference, the differentiated Dik is being supposed, for the sake of the differentiated world.

Here again the choice of the verb used "*upakalpate*" (to be suitable for, to take the form of) is quite different from the terms found in Advaita such as *adhyāsa*, superimposition, and shows the "positive bias" of Bhartṛhari.

In this way, the two schools complement and supplement each other, with one giving the formal proofs, and the other presenting a detailed model to help understand fundamentally unsettling notions such as time without sequence. This is seen clearly in the case of Kāla. In the *Kālasamuddeśa,* we have a most detailed presentation of how Time is not real apart from Brahman, that it is without sequence etc., and how such an entity is related to Vyavahāra. Even after noting the difference in views about the model, Śaktis of Brahman vs. Māyā, elaborated in Section 5.3 *Māyā / Avidyā vs. Śaktis of Brahman (Kāla, Dik, Kriyā etc.)*, starting on p169 of this thesis, it cannot be denied that Vākyapadīya's treatment of time would be helpful in understanding how the concept called Kāla operates and therefore how the true nature of that concept as one without sequence could be realised.

6.6 Refutation of views of Opponents

While establishing one's own Siddhānta, it is required to refute other Śāstras as well. A beginner who reads various views on a particular topic, say on what exactly Śabda denotes will be convinced with whatever Śāstra he reads. When a different Śāstra is read on the same issue, the other view seems

very convincing. For instance the presentation of the view that Śabda is Nitya in Mīmāṃsā, and the view of Nyāya that Śabda is Anitya are equally convincing. Only when the student realises that both systems refer to different entities by the word Śabda can reconciliation become possible. At other times such reconciliation would not be possible, say between Buddhist Apoha and the Jātivāda of Mīmāṃsā. In such cases it is easy for many to be confused when presented with concepts from other Śāstras.

To avoid this possibility, the key arguments of other Śāstras are presented and refuted in Śāstras so that the correct path is shown to the student. Of course, not all objections could be anticipated and that is how the body of literature multiplies. As an example, if we see the literature on Apoha, the development may be depicted as shown below.

There is a controversy about the relative dates of Vācaspati Miśra and Jayanta Bhaṭṭa; the date of Diṅnāga is difficult to determine exactly and so on. Even so, the broad chronological arrangement is in line with present scholarship, and reflects the main point being made about the multiplication of literature based on formulation-refutation-defence-refutation-rejoinder-refutation etc. pattern. The dates of Buddhist writers and Udyotakara are from Dunne (87), and Vācaspati Miśra and Jayanta Bhaṭṭa from Nakamura (Vol. 1, p 65). Regarding Kumārila Bhaṭṭa, Ganganatha Jha (xliv) and tradition consider him a senior contemporary of Śaṅkarācārya, but his date is shown here going by the date of Śāntarakṣita taken from Dunne.

Buddhist Writers on Apoha | AD | Nyāya / Mīmāṃsā Writers

Dignāga formulates Apoha

450

500 — Udyotakara criticises Dignāga's view

Bhāvaviveka develops a similar theory

550

Dharmakīrti (DK) reformulates Apoha — 600

650

Devendrabuddhi, comm. of DK

Śākyabuddhi, comm. of DK — 700 — Kumārila refutes Apoha

Śāntarakṣita (SK) - refutes Kumārila

Kamalaśīla – comm. of SK — 750

800

850 — Vācaspati Miśra criticises Śāntarakṣita

Jayanta Bhaṭṭa criticises Śāntarakṣita

900

950

Karṇakagomin

Jñānaśrīmitra — 1000

Ratnakīrti composes Apohasiddhi

Mokṣākaragupta — 1050

1100

It may not be thought that extensive refutation of other schools is an innovation of Śaṅkarācārya in Advaita, in line with the general practices of the day because the refutation is that of Sūtrakāra, Bādarāyaṇa himself. The fourth Pāda of the first Adhyāya and the first two Pādas of the second Adhyāya are mainly devoted to refutation of other schools, though the opponent makes an appearance in every Adhikaraṇa. This focus on refutation is usually not seen

in Vākyapadīya or the Mahābhāṣya. While we do find refutation of other views the rule is to accommodate the views of other schools as well, and refutation is done only when absolutely necessary. The lack of refutation of other schools, however, could give rise to confusion. In this matter, extensive material is available in Advaita to remove the confusion of the seeker about difficult concepts like Vivarta of Brahman, multiple levels of reality and so on. In this way, Advaita bolsters the arguments of Vyākaraṇa.

6.7 Positive presentation of Advaita

Bhartṛhari shows how Advaita can be presented in a "positive" manner without focussing on the illusory nature of world. While this is not desirable for proponents of Advaita, as Vairāgya (detachment), an important prerequisite for Mokṣa would not be generated by such a presentation, a positive presentation is still useful for beginners because it takes the student from the seen, real world to the unseeable Real One in a gradual manner. It is common in both traditional schools and modern universities to introduce Advaita through a Prakaraṇagrantha like *Vedāntasāra* (summarised in Section 2.2 *Summary of Vedāntasāra* starting from p11 of this thesis), *Vedāntaparibhāṣā* (suitable for those trained in Nyāya), *Upadeśasāhaśrī, Vivekacūḍāmaṇi* and *Vedāntapañcadaśī* where the Siddhānta is presented without getting into too many intricacies of refutation of other schools. The student is expected to study the Śāstra in more detail at a later stage.

A similar role may be played by Sphoṭavāda. Introduction to the philosophy of Grammarians would help the student to intuitively understand the relative reality of the world and its evolution from the Absolute. This

increases Śraddhā and aids understanding. For a student who approaches philosophy in middle life or later, this approach is even more appropriate. Advaita would be more easily internalised by a person who is trained to understand that this world is a Vivarta of Brahman, that every word denotes Brahman, that Jāti is a superimposition on it and therefore affixes like *tva* and *tval*, that Kāla, Dik, Kriyā and Kāraka are Śaktis, that they are seen as many due to adjuncts, and that Akhaṇḍavākyārtha is what is real. In this way, Vākyapadīya complements Advaita in a practical manner.

6.8 Summary

From the foregoing discussion, it is seen that on one hand, Advaitadarśana supports Vyākaraṇadarśana in terms of describing the various Upāsanas, working out the relationship between Karma and Jñāna, in showing Śruti sentences to support the Siddhānta, in showing that the purport of Veda is in Brahman and in refutation of views of opponents. On the other hand, Vyākaraṇam in turn bolsters Advaita by providing an Idealistic theory of language, by censure of Tarka, by providing detailed explanations of tricky concepts like direction and time and by portraying Advaita and the seen world more "positively". There are other such aspects (such as the detailed description of result – *phala* – that accrues by following various Upāsanas, or the Nyāyas useful in deciding the meaning of a sentence) which need to be seen as mutually complementary and supplementary.

To summarise, where Śaṅkarācārya establishes the Darśana of Advaita in its full glory, and supplies all the essential elements that the establishment of a Darśana requires, Bhartṛhari provides the Linguistic Framework, which is

so important to show how Advaita is tenable and also provides for an alternate presentation without the so-called negative aspects, which have become very prominent in Advaita.

7. Conclusion

In the preceding chapters, after presenting the systems of Advaita and Śabdādvaita, the similarities between the systems have been discussed at length. It was shown that the following are common to both the schools:

- Brahman is the Highest Principle

- Brahman and Ātmā are identical

- One Brahman is perceived as manifold due to Avidyā

- Vivartavāda – the world is a Vivarta of Brahman

- Śruti is the Highest Pramāṇa

- Only Śrutyanugṛhītatarka is acceptable

- Śruti is an Upāya to know Brahman

- Śabda is Nitya

- Jagat is born from Śabda

- There are different levels of Reality

- Bāhyārtha is secondary

- In the Pāramārthika view, Jāti is not real

- Sṛṣṭi, Sthiti and Laya occur in a cycle

- Brahman is beyond Śabda

- Brahman, the True Reality is taught through untrue devices

- Akhaṇḍavākyārtha alone is real

In the above, some of the positions are disputed by other scholars. Some say that Avidyā is very different for Bhartṛhari compared to Śaṅkarācārya. Others have argued that the Vivartavāda is similar to Ābhāsa of Kashmiri Saivism, whereas yet others opined that the Vivarta is of the Prakriyā of Jagat, and not Jagat itself and hence has different implications. Similarly the Śabdaprabhavatvam of Jagat could be said to be quite different

in Sphoṭavāda and Advaita. That Bāhyārtha is secondary in Advaita is not immediately apparent and some prefer Bhāgalakṣaṇā instead of Akhaṇḍvākyārtha. Against these positions it was shown that these should be seen as similarities, rather than differences.

In terms of differences, it was shown that notwithstanding the attempts of scholars to deny the refutation of Sphoṭa by Śaṅkarācārya in *Devatādhikaraṇam*, it is a fact that Śaṅkarācārya has roundly rejected Sphoṭa. It was also shown that this criticism occurs at an unusual place, is not occasioned by any hindrance caused by Sphoṭa to the Siddhānta, and that tradition holds that refutation is meant to preclude Rasabrahman, Gandhabrahman etc. It was further shown that other criticisms of Sphoṭa by Ācāryas of Advaita tradition are based on the Varṇavāda of Mīmāṃsā (which is what Śaṅkarācārya does in *Devatādhikaraṇam*), or is based on a different notion of what Śabda is, or that it is ineffective. Further the principles of Pratīkopāsana were pointed out and it was shown that while it is acceptable to the Advaitin to posit Śabda as Brahman, the reverse is not agreeable.

The number of Pramāṇas agreeable to the two schools was discussed and it was shown that effectively Abhyāsa, agreeable to Bhartṛhari, is about the only difference and that this has implication for the theory of error. The proposed difference in the theories of error was shown not to be material. As a result the irreconcilable differences that remain are the refutation of Sphoṭa by Śaṅkarācārya and the principles of Pratīkopāsana.

Another major difference noted is the difference between Śaktis of Brahman expounded by Bhartṛhari and Māyā of Advaita. The differences in the model of reality are substantial in that Śaktis are real, the same as Brahman and plural, whereas Māyā cannot be said to be real (it is indescribable) and

Śaṅkarācārya does not state anything about the unity or plurality of Avidyā. Similarly where Kālaśakti is described as both the "creator" and as independent, such description would not fit Māyā.

A Samanvaya would be offered in this Chapter which will show how to site these three differences. While it has been shown that Advaita and Vyākaraṇa are mutually supplementary and complementary in the sixth chapter, the actual situation is that while Vyākaraṇam would accept Advaita without hesitation, the reverse is not true. It is suggested in the section after Samanvaya that for this to happen, Śabdabrahman should be seen as the Lower Brahman. The implication that the same would not be acceptable to Bhartṛhari is discussed in the section after that, before closing the thesis with the proposal that Sphoṭavāda may be seen as the substitute for Bhaṭṭanayaḥ, which also would be the one major area for future research.

7.1 Samanvaya

The so called differences, between Kālaśakti and Māyā, discussed in Section 5.3 *Māyā / Avidyā vs. Śaktis of Brahman (Kāla, Dik, Kriyā etc.)* starting on p169 of this thesis, can also be seen as mutually complementary aspects. Indeed, this is the Samanvaya that is proposed in this thesis. When every way of teaching Brahman is not real and ultimately only an Upāya, then obviously there would be differences in different ways of approaching Brahman. If the Ajātivāda of Gauḍapādācārya is at one extreme, the realistic model of Bhartṛhari would be at the other. Each would be valid and true from a particular view point. The models might be different but that does not make

the entity being taught about any different, nor does it mean that the differences are irreconcilable

Three different ways of reconciliation are possible. Two of them are noted by Gaurinath Sastri (1959, footnote 57, pp. 13 - 15) based on the commentary of Puṇyarāja and the commentary of Helārāja, and the third is a suggestion of this researcher. The view of Helārāja is:

> Helārāja appears to suggest that the grammarian acknowledges both *kālaśakti* and *avidyāśakti* and that they have different functions. Thus while *kālaśakti* holds the phenomena in temporal succession, *avidyāśakti* shuts out the vision of the Absolute and projects the phenomenon[87]. … But Helārāja maintains in positive terms that both the powers are false – in

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[87] Here Gaurinath Sastri quotes (1959, p14) the following sentences of Helārāja (page numbers have been changed based on Pandit Raghunatha Sharama's edition of Vākyapadīya Vol. 3, Part 1):

tatraiva kramābhāsanaṃ kālākhyasvātantryaśaktikṛtameva (on 3.3.83, p331) (there, the appearance of temporal sequence is due to the independent Śakti called Kāla)

aprakāśastu tamo' vidyā (on 3.2.7, p 204) (darkness is Avidyā)

sarvasmin paridṛsyamānabhedajāte svabhāvāt parmārtharūpāt sāmānyasamāveśavaśādeksvabhāve brahmamaye citreṣu vikalpeṣu bhāvābhāvādinānātvena anādiniyatiśaktiniyamiteyam avidyāvaśānmaryādā vyavasthā nānārūpā dṛśyate. (on 3.3.65, p315) (Even though all the seen world with apparent difference is in the ultimate viewpoint – and not in the view where various Jātis are co-existent – by nature is of one form, i.e. constituting of Brahman alone, a differentiated existence in the form of Bhāva, Abhāva etc. obtains in various conceptions due to Avidyā which is governed by the Śakti of the beginningless entity which is fundamentally and by its own nature inevitably found). Here the description of Avidyā as *anādi-niyati-śakti-niyamitā* indicates that in the view of Helārāja, Avidyā is the Śakti of an entity which is Niyati, i.e. Adṛṣṭa. Pandit Raghunatha Sharma explains this *niyati* as *niyamyate svāśrayeṣū dharmaviśeṣā yayā sā niyatiḥ adṛṣṭaṃ svabhāvarūpā prakṛtirvā iti kāvyaprakāśīyamaṅgalapadyavyākhyāvasare pradīpaḥ,* interpreting *niyati* as Īśvara, rather than as Adṛṣṭa or Prakṛti might be more appropriate in the present context.

krame' pi brahmaṇā bhedāvabhāsanamavidyākṛtam . This researcher is unable to decipher this sentence. Probably it is an error. According to Pandit Raghunatha Sharma, the sentence is *akrame'pi brahmaṇi bhedāvabhāsanamavidyākṛtam* (on 3.3.83, p331) (Apparent perception of difference in the Brahman without temporal sequence is due to Avidyā), which is appropriate for the context.

fact, he believes that all powers are false (… anirvācyā eva
bhedābhedābhyāṃ sarvāḥ śaktayaḥ, Op. cit. p. 172)[88]

The view ascribed to Helārāja above, that "both the powers are false"
is not what results from the text, or the context. The correct translation of the
text is: "all Śaktis are indescribable on account of difference and non-
difference." The context is the Kārikā (3.6.27) being explained. The first half
of the Kārikā says that there is no difference in Śaktis (*na śaktīnāṃ tathā
bhedaḥ*), as is to be found with the possessors of Śaktis, i.e. objects like pot
and cloth (*yathā śaktimatāṃ sthitiḥ*). The idea is that a pot is different from a
cloth, but their capacities are not different from their base. So there is no
difference in Śaktis. The second half of the Kārikā says that "but in the world,
unity or non-difference is not seen in the forms of these Śaktis" (*na ca
laukikamekatvaṃ tāsāmātmasu vidyate*). It has been shown in the
Sādhanasamuddeśa that a pot has many Śaktis like that of being an agent, of
being an object, of being an instrument etc. In any given usage only one of
these Śaktis is spoken of (such as "the pot is empty", "bring the pot", "pour
water with the pot" …), so it cannot be said that Śaktis are one with the object.
This is the context in which Helārāja says that Śaktis cannot be spoken of as
either being different or non-different from the underlying base. In fact
Helārāja mentions this while introducing the Kārikā by saying *śakteśca
bhedābhedavicārānarhatā ityāha* (and since there is the ineligibility of
discussion of Bheda and Abheda of Śaktis [from their base], [Ācārya
Bhartṛhari] says). Gaurinath Sastri also misses out the generalised conclusion
that Helārāja draws from the above discussion. Helārāja writes:

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[88] This is found in p84 of Pandit Raghunatha Sharma's edition, Vol. 3, Part 2, in the
commentary on 3.6.27.

ata evāvidyāśaktirbrahmaṇo bhedaṃ na vidhatte, yena dvaitāpattiḥ (Helārāja's comm. on 3.6.27, *Diksamuddeśa,* p84 of Pandit Raghunatha Sharma's ed., Vol. 3, Part 2)

Therefore, the Avidyāśakti of Brahman does not render difference, by which there could be the peril of duality.

From here extension to the concept of Avidyā being neither different nor non-different from Brahman, is but one step. However Gaurinath Sastri completely misses out on this reasoned conclusion based on the Kārikā by Bhartṛhari. After continuing the discussion about Bhartṛhari's philosophy and differentiating it from Śaṅkarācārya, he passes the following remarks (1959, p24):

> … The commentators, however, have read Śaṅkara's ideas into the text. They define the relation between the Brahman and the powers as *anirvācya,* that is to say, logically indefinable as identity or non-identity, as real or not real. (As proof he quotes – in footnote 93 – two sentences, the one quoted immediately above in this thesis, and the sentence from Puṇyarāja's commentary on 1.4: *tattvābhyānyatvābhyāṃ sattvāsattvābhyāṃ cānirvācyā* śaktirūpā – present researcher.) But we have not been able to light upon a single word in the text of Bhartṛhari that can lend the remotest countenance to such an interpretation. Bhartṛhari has not declared that the Powers of the Absolute are not real. On the contrary he is unmistakably positive that the Powers of the Eternal Verbum are eternally real and eternally present in the relation of identity.

In coming to the above conclusion, the learned Professor, Gaurinath Sastri, seems to have overlooked two aspects. Firstly, in a Śāstragrantha, when something is not specifically mentioned by the original author, it is the commentator's prerogative to explicate. Those commentaries which are useful (i.e. which give the needed clarifications and nothing else) survive the ravages of time, others do not. The only reasonable test is that the commentator's view must be in consonance with that of the original author. Such an agreement has been shown in Helārāja's commentary on 3.6.27 connecting it to the view that Śaktis and Avidyā are indescribable. Thus, the denial of even lending of the "remotest countenance" to this view is unfounded. Secondly, the compound *tattvānyatve* does not necessarily mean real and unreal, it could also mean Brahman and not-Brahman. Further ontological existence and conceptual existence are not the same. For instance in Advaita, as mentioned in Paragraph 10. (p13) of Section 2.2 *Summary of Vedāntasāra*, Ajñāna (=Avidyā) is a Bhāvapadārtha, i.e. it is not the absence of the counterpositive, Vidyā, but is a positive entity conceptually, though the question of whether it exists or not is unanswerable (for reasons mentioned in the presentation of the Anirvacanīyakhyāti of Śaṅkarācārya in Section 5.6 *Theory of Error* starting on p180 of this thesis).

Even if there is some disagreement, the views of Gaurinath Sastri on the resolution offered by Helārāja may still be considered. The resolution offered is that Kālaśakti and Avidyā are different entities.

The second resolution, by Puṇyarāja (according to Gaurinath Sastri, 1959, fn 57, pp. 13 – 15) is that both Kālaśakti and Avidyā are the same:

> It is interesting to note that Puṇyarāja seems to identify
> *Kālaśakti* with *avidyā* as in the system of Śaṅkara. It is

extremely difficult to ascertain the status of *Kālaśakti* and also of *Avidyā* (or *Avidyāśakti*) in the system of the grammarian and whether they are identical or different. . . . In the commentary on the opening verse of the *Vākyapadīya,* he speaks of *avidyā* as a power of the Absolute which gives rise to the phenomenal order of plurality. It is indubitably certain that this phenomenal plurality has no independent status of its own apart from the Absolute in and from which it emerges into being. It is asserted that the Absolute is one, undivided essence but comes to assume manifold forms by reason of a multiplicity of powers which are not only inherent in the Absolute but also spoken to be non-disparate. The disparity is only an appearance. In the third verse the plurality of powers is definitely asserted to be bound up with and derived from *Kālaśakti.* Again, in the fourth verse, the multiform manifestation of the Absolute as enjoyer, enjoyment and the object of enjoyment – in other words, as subject, object and cognition – is asserted to be due to *Kālaśakti.* Thus *Kālaśati* is virtually observed to be the primal and original power. And *avidyā* also is asserted to be the power of the *Brahman* which makes plurality possible. The taciturnity of Puṇyarāja regarding the status of these two powers makes it difficult to ascertain whether the two are identical or different.

The third way of resolution would be to treat the Śaktis as being the Śaktis of Īśvara, the Lower Brahman. By implication, it would mean that Śabdabrahman then has to be equated with the Lower Brahman. These would be discussed in the next two sections.

Having thus shown that the differences in models are reconcilable, the position arising from Pratīkopāsana that Brahman cannot be seen as Śabda, and the fact of refutation of Sphoṭa by Śaṅkarācārya remain to be resolved, if a Samanvaya is to be achieved. The third position suggested above, that Śabdabrahman be considered as the Lower Brahman, is also effective in resolving the present differences. This aspect would be discussed in some detail in the next section.

7.2 Śabdabrahman as Lower Brahman

It is well known that Śaṅkarācārya accepts two Brahmans. In the commentary on 4.3.14, Śaṅkarācārya accepts two Brahmans and defines them:

> kiṃ dve brahmaṇī paramaparaṃ ceti? bāḍhaṃ dve — 'etadvai satyakāma paraṃ cāparaṃ ca brahma yadoṃkāraḥ' (Pr. Up. 5.2) ityādidarśanāt. kiṃ punaḥ paraṃ brahma kimaparamiti, ucyate — yatra avidyākṛtanāmarūpādiviśeṣapratiṣedhād asthūlādiśabdairbrahmopadiśyate, tatparam; tadeva yatra nāmarūpādiviśeṣeṇa kenacidviśiṣṭam upāsanāyopadiśyate — 'manomayaḥ prāṇaśarīro bhārūpaḥ' (Ch. Up. 3.14.2) ityādiśabdaiḥ, tadaparam.
>
> Pūrvapakṣin: Then, do you accept two Brahmans, the Higher Brahman and the Lower Brahman?
>
> Siddhāntin: Very well, two it is, on account of Śrutis like "Satyakāma, this [Brahman], which is Highest and Lower, is indeed the symbol *Om*"(Pr. Up. 5.2).

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Opponent: What, then, is the Highest Brahman and what is the Lower Brahman?

Siddhāntin: That Brahman which is taught by prohibition of qualifications such as name and form caused by Avidyā, and that which is taught by words like *asthūlam* (not gross), that is the Highest Brahman. The very same entity with name and form, when qualified by anything, and taught for the sake of meditation, like the Brahman taught in the Śruti "that which is one with Manas, that which has Prāna for its body, and radiance as form" (Ch. Up. 3.14.2) that is the Lower Brahman.

The Lower Brahman called Saguṇabrahman or Īśvara (personal god) is usually the focus of various meditations. Apart from the Vidyas taught in Śāstra, the personal god worshipped by normal people is also this Īśvara, variously called Brahmā, Viṣṇu, Maheśvara, Indra, Agni, Vāyu and so on. The Advaitin is not very particular about the name and form used to describe the Lower Brahman. And, if it be Śabdabrahman there would be no objection.

Still the question might arise as to what the Pramāṇa is for such a position. One cannot postulate whatever one fancies, in order to reconcile differences. True, one would need support from Śruti and Smṛti, for which one need not look beyond the following.

> dve brahmaṇī veditavye śabdabrahma paraṃ ca yat ।
> śabdabrahmaṇi niṣṇātaḥ paraṃ brahmādhigacchati ॥
>
> (Maitryupaniṣat, 6.22 and Mahābhārata 12.224.60)

Two Brahmans are to be known – Śabdabrahman and

Parabrahman. The one who is deeply versed in Śabdabrahman

attains the Parabrahman.

This could not be stated in plainer language, or more directly. Further,

within Vākyapadīya, Bhartṛhari talks only about three levels of Vāk –

Paśyantī, Madhyamā and Vaikharī, but not about Parā[89], the highest stage.

vaikharyā madhyamāyāśca paśyantyāścaitadadbhutam ।

anekatīrthabhedāyāstrayyā vācaḥ paraṃ padam ॥ 1.143 ॥ [90]

This wondrous Śāstra of Vyākaraṇa is the best means to know

Śabda, differentiated at many places and in the forms of

Vaikharī, Madhyamā and Paśyantī.

Though it is well known that Vāk has four stages, only three stages are

mentioned by Bhartṛhari, and the fourth stage Parā is omitted. It is said that

this is so because the fourth being the Parabrahman is beyond language and

cannot be described. Thus on the basis of Śruti and Śāstra, it is known that

Śabdabrahman corresponds to the Lower Brahman described by Śaṅkarācārya.

It is significant that in the Śruti that Śaṅkarācārya quotes in support of two

Brahmans – Para and Apara – the Pratīka used for Brahman is *om.*

Additionally, Śrutis such as those quoted in support of Śabdabrahman in

Section 5.2.4 *Reconciliation of Differences* starting on p164 , of this thesis are

all interpreted by the Advaitin as referring to the Lower Brahman. Since Śabda

is well known as a Pratīka in Śāstra, the Upāsana of Śabdabrahman – i.e.

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[89] Strictly speaking, it is not true. From the first verse *anādinidhanam* onwards the highest
stage, Parā is indeed described, according to the tradition of Grammarians. The presentation
here is from an Advaita point of view.

[90] Numbering is as per the Telugu Akademi edition. In Pandit Raghunatha Sharma's edition,
the same Kārikā is 1.142.

Śabdayoga – would be as per the tenets of Śāstra and would find place amongst other Brahmavidyas like Avasthātrayaparīkṣā or Pañcakośavidyā.

Śaṅkarācārya's refutation of Sphoṭa would then be taken an indication to know that Śabdabrahman cannot be worshipped as the Highest Brahman.

7.3 Is Śabdabrahman the Lower Brahman for Bhartṛhari?

It might be very well from an Advaitin's point of view to posit Śabdabrahman as the Lower Brahman, but the question of whether such a proposition would be agreeable to Bhartṛhari needs to be examined. The best way to do this is to examine the statements available in Vākyapadīya regarding Brahman and see if they refer to the Lower Brahman or the Highest Brahman. While some of Bhartṛhari's statements can be taken as referring to the Lower Brahman, at many instances he refers only to the Highest Brahman. So the idea of Śabdabrahman as the Lower Brahman would not be acceptable to Bhartṛhari.

However this does not pose a problem to the present context. The Samanvaya proposed is from an Advaita point of view; i.e. it is being suggested that Śabdādvaita, as applicable at the level of Lower Brahman, is agreeable to Advaita. Now, for the Grammarian, there is no denial that Śabdādvaita also applies at the level of Īśvara, upto which point the Advaitins are in agreement with the Vaiyākaraṇa. When the application is extended to Parabrahman, the refutation by Śaṅkarācārya will stop Advaitins from accepting the extension. On the reverse side, there would be no reservations for the Grammarian. Grammarians recognize that Vyākaraṇa is both a

Vedāṅga and a Darśana and so are always accommodative of viewpoints of other schools. As seen in Vākyapadīya at various places, the concepts are explained according to the positions of different schools – whether they be dualistic schools or Śūnyavāda schools; in such a situation the additional material made available by Advaita would be welcomed with open arms by the Grammarian. However in terms of Upāsana, Śabdayoga would be recommended as the preferred method, but difference in methods of meditation was never a reason to say that there is a difference in theses.

Thus we see that if Advaitins accept Śabdabrahman as the Lower Brahman, there would be no problem to either side. The advantage is that a most advanced theory of language, completely in sync with Advaita, becomes available as set out in the next section. Additionally, one more way of explaining the non-eternality of the apparently real world becomes available, which is especially useful for those approaching Advaita in a non-traditional manner.

7.4 Sphoṭavāda as a substitute of Bhaṭṭanayaḥ

For nearly a thousand years, the standard position of Advaita was *vyavahāre bhāṭṭanayaḥ* (the system of Kumārilabhaṭṭa is to be followed at the Vyāvahārika level). Though there were deviations in different sub-schools, this generally held true. The phrase was first used by Citsukhācārya in his *Tattvapradīpikā* (p 155) in support of Abhihitānvayavāda: *vyavahāre bhaṭṭanaya ityaṅgīkārāt* (since it has been accepted that the system of Kumārilabhaṭṭa is to be followed at the Vyāvahārika level). There he shows two reasons in support. First is that Śaṅkarācārya himself supports

Abhihitānvayavāda; the second reason is that both Bhāṭṭas and Advaitins accept Lakṣaṇā in Vākyārtha.

Citsukhācārya quotes the following sentence of Śaṅkarācārya from the *Samanvayādhikaraṇam* (1.1.4)

> na ca tadgatānāṃ padānāṃ brahmasvarūpaviṣaye niścite samanvaye' vagamyamāne arthāntarakalpanā yuktā, śrutahānyaśrutakalpanāprasaṅgāt.
> [Context: Śaṅkarācārya while explaining the meaning of the Sūtra *tattusamanvayāṭ* 1.1.4, as "the purport of all Vedic sentences is Brahman" quotes five sentences in support and then states:] It is not proper to concoct another meaning when the words in those sentences are well understood and established as having their purport in denoting the nature of Brahman, as it will result in contradiction of what is stated, and in imagining what has not been stated.

Thus in sentences like "sadeva somya idamagra āsīt ekamevādvitīyam" (Ch. Up. 6.2.1) and "brahmaivedamamṛtaṃ purastāt" (Mu. Up. 2.2.12), Śaṅkarācārya's contention is that the word "sat" and "brahma" denote Brahman. Since the meaning of words is being talked of without their correlation to the rest of the words in the sentence, Citsukhācārya states that Śaṅkarācārya accepts Abhihitānvayavāda. Similarly, the Bhāṭṭa school's procedure of first determining the meanings of words and then arriving at the meaning of sentence as Lakṣaṇā is followed as seen in the determination of *tattvamasi* in paragraphs 25. and 26. on p19 in Section 2.2 *Summary of Vedāntasāra* of this thesis.

One can imagine a number of reasons for this position of Advaita. First and foremost is that both Śāstras are concerned with fixing the meaning of Veda; secondly, both take Śabda to be Nitya; thirdly, Śruti is given the highest importance in both systems; and so on. Yet, this similarity does not hold throughout; so the *nayaḥ* was restricted to Vyavahāra. This restriction is not a great constraint because all discussions about Pramāṇas have to necessarily happen at the Vyāvahārika level. Thus Advaita follows the system of Mīmāṃsā, especially with reference to theory of language in its discussion, practically everywhere.

Meanwhile, a number of developments happened within India and elsewhere after Śaṅkarācārya's time. Firstly, the growth of Mīmāṃsā Darśana slowed down as Yajñas became rarer and rarer, and even studying the Veda became less common. At the same time, Nyāya and Vaiśeṣika got fused into Navyanyāya which blossomed in India during the second millennium after Christ and developed its own unique style of precisely signifying various objects and properties. By the fifteenth century authors of other schools started using the language of Navyanyāya, for instance, Dharmarājādhvarīndra in *Vedāntaparibhāṣā* and Kauṇḍabhaṭṭa in *Bhūṣaṇasāra* etc. During the same period Advaita literature also has witnessed a huge amount of productivity with emergence of two schools and the multiplication of sub-commentaries, independent treatises, and polemical works. Within Vedānta, many branches like Viśiṣṭādvaita, Dvaita and Śuddhādvaita evolved. Yet, the position *vyavahāre bhaṭṭanayaḥ* continues

It will be observed that even as opponents of Advaita emerged within the Vedānta school, their tool kit has also been tremendously developed in Navyanyāya. This has given rise to some difficulties in refuting newer

criticisms, especially those based on use of language. The example of the doctrine of Akhaṇḍārtha was discussed earlier in Section 4.16 *Akhaṇḍavākyārtha* starting on p129 of this thesis showing how Varṇavāda became restrictive.

Along with the developments in India, there was tremendous growth in philosophy in Europe during the Renaissance which developed in sophistication during the bountiful years of Industrial revolution. Then, in the twentieth century, Philosophy in the West took a "linguistic turn". From the time of Raja Ram Mohan Roy, an increasing number of Indian thinkers began writing about philosophy in English, in the process trying to engage with new thoughts emerging in the west. One such example of a deeply learned scholar dealing with later developments in India and abroad and finding it difficult to refute the criticisms within the Mīmāṃsā-framework of language is given below as an illustration.

S. S. Suryanarayana Sastri is a scholar renowned for his translation of *Paramārthasāra* (of Ādiśeṣa, a very early manual of Advaita on the lines of *Māṇḍūkyakārikā* and *Sāṅkhyakārikā*), *Bhāmatī* (on Catussūtrī), *Vivaraṇaprameyasaṅgraha* (of Bhāratītīrtha), *Vedāntaparibhāṣa* (of Dharmārajādhvarīndra) and *Siddhāntaleśasaṅgraha* (of Appayya Dīkṣita) in Advaita; *Mānameyodaya* (of Nārayaṇabhaṭṭa) in Mīmāṃsā; of *Sāṅkhyakārikā* and many books on Śivādvaita and Pratyabhijñādarśanam. Some of the works he translated are very difficult – like the *Vedāntaparibhāṣā* due to its use of Navyanyāya language; and the *Siddhāntaleśasaṅgraha* due to the intricate differences in different sub-schools of Advaita, that are accessible only to somebody who devoted a large part of his life to the study of the original texts so masterfully arranged, summarised and discussed by Appayya Dīkṣīta. In

translating difficult works on Philosophy into English, some very heavy lifting was done by Śrī S. S. Suryanarayana Sastri.

He also wrote a short paper *Word and Sense* where he explores Śabda and Artha from an Advaita point of view. After briefly reviewing Jātivāda (presented here as the theory of Advaitins, not mentioning that it was taken from Mīmāṃsakas), in opposition to the views of Nyāya, he arrives at the following position:

> The only truly significant word will thus be the Absolute, the Infinite, Brahman or some other synonym. All other words can be significant only in a smaller degree or as themselves ultimately signifying the concrete Real. … Brahman is sarva-śabda-vācya. (p426)

Having thus arrived at the position worked out by Bhartṛhari (though he does not mention Bhartṛhari or even hint at awareness that such a position has already been thoroughly established earlier), he notes that this is not acceptable to the "thoroughgoing absolutist" as Parabrahman is beyond words and arrives at the position of Advaita: that Saguṇabrahman is the primary denotation (vācya) and the Nirguṇabrahman is the secondary denotation (Lakṣya). Then he considers the criticism by Vedāntadesika[91]:

> avācyamiti vācyaṃ cedbrahma vācyatvamṛcchati ।
> avācyamityavācyaṃ cedbrahma vācyatvamṛcchati ॥

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[91] The source is not indicated in the original paper, but this is from the book *Śatadūṣaṇī* of Vedāntadeśika. It occurs at the beginning of the last paragraph in the 45th Vāda called *Śabdāvedyatvanirāsavādaḥ*, on p213. Translation of the verse is by the researcher as with all other unattributed translations.

If Brahman is denoted by the word *avācyam* (the property of being incapable of denotation by a word), then It obtains denotability (on account of being denoted by the word *avācyam*). If Brahman is not denoted by the word *avācyam* (because It is beyond words), then (the word *avācyam* does not apply to Brahman; whatever is not *avācyam* has to be *vācyam* and so) It obtains denotability.

To answer the above criticism S. S. Suryanarayana Sastri offers the following solution:

… the Advaitin might reply that Brahman is both vācya and avācya with a difference of sense; it is word-identifiable, but not word-describable. In so far there is an appearance of the latter, it is secondary. (pp 429-430)

He also considers the theory of A. H. Gardiner (set out in *The Theory of Proper Names*) that the primary function of all language is identification, with distinction being secondary and arrives at his final position in the paper:

… our views as to the primary and secondary usage of words[92] will have to suffer a change; the nirguṇa would be vācya in the primary sense; for to that alone does a name properly apply; the saguṇa is vācya in the secondary sense. And the adoption of such a view, if possible, would have the merit of conforming to the wider implications of the doctrine of akhaṇḍārtha; for if the theory of impartite sense is to hold its ground, it must be a

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view, not of possible sense, but of the only possible sense, though it is most often hidden from view by our own laziness or practical indifference. There will be the need to revise Advaita terminology, but the core of Advaita doctrine will remain unaffected and will perhaps be strengthened by its association with modern speculations in Logic and the science of language. (p430).

If at all a projection of project of revising the terminology of Advaita, while retaining the core of Advaita doctrine and strengthening it by association with newer developments, is to be taken up, it is suggested that the Theory of Language of Vyākaraṇa is an excellent starting point, as discussed in some detail in Section 6.1.2 *Theory of Language*, starting on p185 of this thesis.

In fact the task for future research could be two-fold: develop the doctrines of Mīmāṃsā beyond what has been done, to verify whether it is a hindrance or restriction to Advaita or not. This researcher has himself undertaken one such study, by investigating the doctrine of Śabdanityatā in light of the modification of Śabdas seen in Sandhi (*dadhi + atra = dadhyatra*, *i → y*), compounds (*rājñaḥ puruṣaḥ rājapuruṣaḥ, ñaḥ → a*) etc. and found that the resolution offered by Grammar (that all changes are essentially substitutions and that all substitutions are mental, such as in the Sūtra 3.4.86 *eruḥ* which ordains that one should mentally replace *i* in *bhavati* with *u* to obtain the form *bhavatu*) is much more elegant than that offered by Mīmāṃsā (*dadhi* and *dadhy* are different Padas, and the Sūtra 6.1.84 *iko yaṇaci* ordains replacement of words ending in *i,* with words ending in *y* when a vowel follows). Many similar deeper investigations could be carried out. Another set of projects would be with reference to adoption of the Vyākaraṇa-framework

and revisiting some major language-based criticism of Advaita by other Śāstras.

The advantage of adopting the theory of language of Vyākaraṇa is that criticisms of opponents which are based on use of language can be more effectively countered. It is now recognised in the west that language is not merely a tool to "do philosophy" but that it informs, influences and shapes philosophy. In fact the way a language operates is philosophy itself. Then, in the modern world, Advaita has to address language more fully than is possible with the Mīmāṃsā framework and a sophisticated theory of language is readily available in Vākyapadīya, which ought to be adopted by all Advaitins to better engage with the seekers of the modern, or rather, post-modern world.

Appendix A: Summary of Brahmakāṇḍā

A.1 Kārikās 1 – 43: Prolegomenon

This first section deals with the Sambandhacatuṣṭaya, which could be further divided into three sub-sections. The first sub-section gives the Prayojana (Mokṣa) and Sambandha (Vyākaraṇa is the means to salvation); the second sub-section lists the eight topics dealt with in Vyākaraṇa, while the third sub-section gives the Pramāṇas used in the Śāstra .

A.1.1 Kārikās 1 – 22: On Śabdabrahman, Vedas and Vyākaraṇa

A.1.1.1 Kārikās 1 – 5: Śabdabrahman

Brahman is without beginning, without end, of the nature of Śabda, imperishable, manifests into objects and is the source of this world. Though one, It is depicted as many in the Vedas due to It being the basis of many powers; though Brahman is non-different from Its powers, It is seen as being different. Brahman is seen to have different states due to the six modifications – birth etc. – which in turn are due to the temporal power (Kālaśakti) of Brahman. Brahman, though single is the source of the entire universe and manifests as the enjoyer, enjoyed and enjoyment. Veda, itself a reflection of Brahman, is the means (*upāya*) to attain Brahman. The Vedas are seen as many though in reality, it is only one.

A.1.1.2 Kārikās 6 – 10: Vedas, Smṛtis, Darśanas and Vedāṅgas

Though each branch of the Vedas is manifold, they are subordinate in a single ritual; thus it is seen that Śabdas have a fixed meaning in the different branches. The various Smṛtis with seen and unseen purposes are based on Vedas. Different schools of the Monists (*ekatvinām*), Dualists etc. are formed by resorting to the *arthavāda* sentences of the Vedas. In Vedas is propounded Brahman, real, pure, of the nature of knowledge alone, leading to a single goal, in the form of "Om" and not contradicted by any Vedic sentence. Veda is the creator of the worlds; its different *aṅgas* and *upāṅgas* and Vidyas, which are the cause of knowledge and refinement, are spread by Ṛṣis.

A.1.1.3 Kārikās 11 – 13: Five-fold purpose

Vyākaraṇa is the most important of all aṅgas, the nearest to Brahman (Rakṣā, Ūhāḥ), and the highest tapas (Āgamaḥ). It is the shortest path to attainment of the highest essence (rasa) of Vāc that has become differentiated into sentences, words, phonemes etc. (Laghu) Objects like pot, cloth, heaven and liberation are meaningful to the extent they govern practical and purposeful activities; Śabdas are the sole guide to these objects. The nature of such Śabdas cannot be understood without Vyākaraṇa. (Asandehaḥ)

A.1.1.4 Kārikās 14 – 17: Vyākaraṇa leads to Mokṣa

Vyākaraṇa is the door-way to *apavarga* (Liberation), a cure for defects in language, the purest of all Vidyas, and shines as the basis of all Vidyas. Just like Arthajātis depend on Śabdajātis, all Vidyas depend on this Vyākaraṇa. It is the first rung on the ladder

to Siddhi and the straight highway to Liberation. The one who has perfected Vyākaraṇa and has through that understood the purport of Vedas (Chandasyaḥ) sees the highest principle – Brahman or Parāvāk, which is the source of Vedas, has Veda as its body, and which is Kevalā, alone.

A.1.1.5 Kārikās 18 – 22: Brahman is attained by mastering Vyākaraṇa

Vyākaraṇa is the highest form of the undifferentiated speech; whose form of pure illumination seems to have manifested in several forms in this darkness called Vaikharī. Vyākaraṇa teaches Sphoṭa which is worshipped as being beyond the differences caused by space and time inVaikharī and which is in the form of pure illumination beyond the light and darkness that *prākṛta* and *vaikṛta* Dhvanis are; in which the signs of Prākṛtadhvani (like *ka, ga* etc.) shine like reflections due to close association, in the same way that red colour is seen in a crystal due to proximity of a red gem; in which various letters and Svaras of the four Vedas [seem to] exist with distinct identities; which is one but is divided into many by different Prakriyas. By mastering such Vyākaraṇa one attains Brahman.

A.1.2 Kārikās 23 – 29: Introduction to Vyākaraṇaśāstra

A.1.2.1 Kārikā 23: Śabda, Artha and their Relation is Unchanging

The relation between Śabda and Artha has been described as eternal by Maharṣis Pāṇini, Kātyāyana and Patañjali.

A.1.2.2 Kārikās 24 – 26: Topics treated in Vākyapadīya

The following topics are treated in Vyākaraṇa Śāstra: the nature of Śabda, Artha, the two relationships between Śabda and Artha (relation of cause and effect and that of yogyatā) and the purpose of the science (knowledge of meaning and Dharma). Vyākaraṇaśāstra has been formulated with the object of identifying the correct form of Śabdas (as it cannot be known otherwise).

A.1.2.3 Kārikās 27 – 29: Vyākaraṇa teaches the correct form of Śabdas

Sādhuśabdas known from Śiṣṭas and scriptures are a means of attaining Dharma (i.e. Mokṣa), while Apaśabdas though capable of conveying meaning are the opposite (i.e. do not help in attaining Mokṣa). Whether Śabdas are eternal or manufactured (and hence not permanent), their beginning cannot be seen, just like in the case of living beings.

A.1.3 Kārikās 30 – 43: Refutation of Inference as the main means of knowledge

A.1.3.1 Kārikās 30 – 34: Correct form of Śabdas cannot be inferred

Dharma cannot be established by reasoning alone without the help of Scripture. Even the knowledge of Ṛṣis is preceded by Veda.[93] The unbroken tradition of attaining Dharma (= Mokṣa) practised by Śiṣṭas and respected by the world cannot be assailed by logic. It is not easy to determine the properties of substances as they vary

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[93] Some rationalists see Vedas as the collected wisdom of Rishis; the orthodox believe that Veda is eternal and Rishis only "see" part of the Veda, which already existed.

with their state, place and time. The property of a substance also changes when it comes into contact with another specific object (such as fire losing its ability to burn when in contact with *candrakāntaśila*). If Dharma were to be determined by logic, then the logic of a great intellectual would be trumped by another more capable one, and the final settled form of Dharma would not be known.

A.1.3.2 Kārikās 35 – 40: Abhyāsa, Adṛṣṭa, Yogipratyakṣa and Āptavākya

The knowledge of gems, coins etc. comes from practice (abhyāsa), not inference. The powers of Pitṛs, Rākṣasas and Piśācas are due to their karma in previous births (and cannot be explained by perception or inference). The knowledge of yogis who can see the past, present and future is no different from direct perception. The word of those who perceive what is beyond sense organs through Ṛṣi's eyes cannot be challenged by inference. For a person who believes in such sages, the knowledge handed down by tradition is as good as one's own perception and cannot be proved otherwise by anybody. In the world, we see that for all humans upto the Caṇḍāla, little purpose is served by the Śāstra in determining what is *puṇya* and what is *pāpa* (rather, it is known through the words and behaviour of Śiṣṭas). So, *āptavākya* is even more effective than *āgama*. (Thus, the science of Vyākaraṇa, handed down in such a tradition is a Pramāṇa beyond any question).

A.1.3.3 Kārikās 41 – 42: Inference is ineffective

One who worships / practices the āgama (=Śabda) which exists without any interruption being self-illuminating, like Caitanya

(consciousness), is not disturbed by logical arguments. For a person who depends mainly on inference, meeting with one's own downfall is not difficult, just like in the case of a blind man running on an uneven path relying solely on his sense of touch.

A.1.3.4 Kārikā 43: Scripture alone decides Dharma
Therefore, Śabdānuśāsana is being started by resorting to the Apauruṣeya Veda and Smṛti which is based on that. (This science teaches both sādhuśabdas and Śabdabrahman and both cannot be determined using logic; rather, Śruti and Smṛti are the valid means of knowledge).

A.2 Kārikās 44 – 101: Exposition of Sphoṭa, Dhvani and their relation

In this section, the main body of the chapter, Sphoṭa, Dhvani, the relation between Sphoṭa and Dhvani, and the types of Dhvani and types of Sphoṭa (universal and particular) are presented following the position that Śabda is permanent.

A.2.1 Kārikās 44 – 54: Two types of Śabdas and their relationship

There are two kinds of Śabdas; one (Vaikharī) illuminates the other (Madhyamā = Sphoṭa), which is used to convey meaning. Some ancients hold these to be different; others hold them to be one but perceived as different. In the same way that the intrinsic fire in *araṇi* (the wooden receptacle in which fire is ignited through friction) ignites

another fire, the Śabda which resides in one's mind (Madhyamā) is the cause for speech sounds (Vaikharī). In whatever meaning the Madhyamā Śabda is fixed in the mind before pronunciation, the same sense is expressed by the Vaikharī Śabda produced by speech-organs. (That is why, the word *ghaṭa* cannot convey the meaning conveyed by *paṭa*, though Madhyamā is one and undivided). Even though Sphoṭa-śabda is without order, it is seen as if it possesses order (of Akṣaras) as Vaikharī which expresses it is born in a certain sequence, just like a reflection in water seems to move when the water moves (though the original is not moving). In knowledge, both the form of object (such as pot or cloth) and the form of knowledge is seen; similarly in Śabda, both the form of meaning and that of Śabda are seen. Just like the yolk in an egg develops into a bird with many parts, similarly Madhyamāśabda evolves into the Vaikharīśabda with order of Varṇas etc. When a painter draws a form, first he observes the various parts of the form, then forms a unified view in which the parts cannot be differentiated and then while drawing the form, draws each part separately; similarly Śabda exists in the three states – i.e. having many parts, order etc. when it is first heard by a person, without any parts or order when it is in the mind of the hearer, and with parts and order, when it is spoken again by the same person. The speaker has in his mind the meaning to express, but before speaking he makes an effort to produce Śabdas (and not Arthas); similarly the listener's effort also is in grasping Śabdas (and not Arthas, which are made known by the Śabdas grasped), though finally he is also interested only in the Artha. Once Śabdas express Artha, they exhaust their potential and are not perceived because they have become secondary to the expressed sense.

A.2.2. Kārikās 55 – 57: Two Śaktis of Śabda.

Like light, Śabda has two Śaktis (capacities) – the ability to be known (*grāhyatva*) and the ability to make other objects known (*grāhakatva*). They are seen as different Śaktis though they are, but, a single undifferentiated Śakti of Śabda. The Artha of a Śabda cannot be known if the association between a Śabda and an object (such as a pot) is not known (i.e. a word whose association with an object is unknown to the listener does not convey any sense); Śabdas by their existence alone cannot illuminate Arthas. (Some objects like fire are operative, i.e. fire burns, even if a person does not know it.) Therefore when a Śabda not hitherto known to the listener is uttered, that is in the absence of knowledge of Śabda, though it is heard clearly by the listener, he still asks "what did you say?" In other words, Śabda makes both the Artha and itself known, and it is operative only when both the form of Śabda and its Artha are known. This is not the case with sense-organs, which make any existing object known without the need to know the form of the sense-organs themselves.

A.2.3 Kārikās 58 – 67: On *svaṃ rūpaṃ śabdasyā'śabdasaṃjñā* (1.1.68)

Both the Śaktis of Śabda – *grāhyatva* and *grāhyakatva* are used in Vyākaraṇa, as suits the situation. In the Sūtra *vṛddhirādaic*(1.1.1), the Sañjñā "vṛddhi" denotes the word "vṛddhi" only and has a name-named (sañjñā-sañjñī) relationship with the *sañjñīs ā, ai* and *au*. However, in *agnerḍhak* (4.2.33), the Śabda "agni" is itself the *sañjñā* and *sañjñī*. The Śabda "agni" in the Sūtra is the name (sañjñā) and the Śabda "agni" in the Lakṣya "agnirdevatā asya" is the named (sañjñī). This is possible

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because of the differentiation of the two Śaktis. The Śabda uttered in a Sūtra is itself not an object of the grammatical operation, but its ability to convey the other form is not obstructed. Since the Śabda in a Sūtra is used to denote its Artha, that Artha is the main entity and the Śabda used in the Sūtra is secondary. So, the affix taught in a Sūtra is applied to the Śabda in the example, which is the main entity. A Śabda always conveys its own form, and so is capable to taking the nominative and genitive affixes before it is connected to the thing it means.

A.2.4 Kārikās 68 – 69: What does a Śabda refer to – Jāti or Vyakti?

In *svaṃ rūpaṃ śabdasyā'śabdasaṃjñā* (1.1.68), Śabdavyakti denoted by Śabdas in Vyākaraṇasūtras is the *sañjña* and the Śabdatvajāti denoted by Śabdas in examples is the *sañjñī*, according to some. According to others, Śabdas in Sūtras refer to Jāti, whereas Vyaktis are found in examples.

A.2.5 Kārikās 70 – 74: Four views on nature of Śabda

Both among those who hold Śabda to be eternal and manufactured (and hence not permanent), Śabda is held to be both single (i.e. every utterance is of the same Śabda) and plural (there are as many Śabdas as there are utterances). The Mīmāṃsakas hold that Śabda is permanent. In different words, a varṇa is always recognised as such; similarly in different sentences, a given word is always recognised as such; therefore Śabdas – specifically, Varṇas or phonemes – are permanent. Words are created from phonemes and sentences are created from words – and so,

both are created and hence not permanent. Grammarians also hold that Śabda is permanent, but that only the Sentence is Real and that words and phonemes are artificially created. Just like there are no parts in phonemes, there are no phonemes in a word, nor words in a sentence. The observed world is described by different schools by following different theories; what is the main theory for one school is totally unacceptable to the other.

A.2.6 Kārikās 75 – 77: Sphoṭa is one and undivided

Sphoṭa does not have temporal divisions but appears to have divisions of length of vowels (hrasva, dīrgha and pluta) and of tempo (druta, madhya and vilambita vṛttis) due to the divisions in Dhvanis, which manifest Sphoṭa. Differences in length of vowels are due to Prākṛtadhvanis and the differences in tempo are due to Vaikṛtadhvanis, both of which are attributed to Sphoṭa.

A.2.7 Kārikās 78 – 80: Manifestation of Sphoṭa by Dhvanis

Amongst those who say that Sphoṭa is manifest (abhivyaktivādins), some hold that the ears get refined by Dhvanis making them ready to grasp Sphoṭa, like an ointment or concentration prepares the eyes to see better; others hold that it is Śabda which is refined, like water sprinkled on earth or oil kept in sunlight which makes it possible to know the smell of earth or oil; yet others hold that both Śabda and sense-organs are refined, just like light acts upon both the object and eye making it possible for the eye to perceive an object in the dark.

A.2.8 Kārikās 81 – 92: The process of manifestation of Sphoṭa

Some hold that Dhvanis are perceived as non-different from Sphoṭa; others hold that Dhvanis are instrumental in manifesting Sphoṭa but are not cognized themselves; yet others hold that Dhvanis are independently cognized before they manifest Sphoṭa. Just as a paragraph or verse is apprehended after only repeating it ten times, but not after each repetition, Sphoṭa is apprehended only after all the Dhvanis are uttered in a sentence. Just like each recitation makes the paragraph or verse clearer, each Dhvani makes Sphoṭa clearer, though not completely. Each previous Dhvani sows the seed for Sphoṭa and all these attain maturity once the last Dhvani is uttered and Sphoṭa becomes clearly apprehended. Before the undivided Sphoṭa is apprehended, some think that there are intermediate Śabdas. In reality, these Śabdas do not exist, they are only a means of conveying the *akhaṇḍa* Sphoṭa, and are cognized to be existing due to the incapacity of the hearer. Knowledge is a single unit, but is qualified by what is known as pot-knowledge etc.; similarly, Sphoṭa is undivided, single and without sequence, but the properties of Dhvani which manifests Sphoṭa are imposed on Sphoṭa. Knowledge of prior numbers is required to know later numbers; here the numbers are different and prior numbers are merely a means of knowing the desired number – similarly, apparent parts in speech are different from Sphoṭa but are still instrumental in manifestation of Sphoṭa. The Vyañjakas, namely phoneme, word and sentence, are entirely different from each other and function independently but seem to operate together as a unit because their Śaktis are combined. An object is misconstrued (a rope might be taken to be a snake or a trunk might be taken to be a man)

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when one sees from afar or in darkness and is later properly established

to be the object (rope or trunk); similarly, before a sentence is

manifested fully, the mind functions in such a way as to grasp the units

which reveal the sentence in their different forms and once the sentence

is comprehended, the earlier false knowledge disappears. A fixed

sequence is observed in the transformation of milk into curds and a seed

into a tree; similarly there is a fixed sequence in the perception of

phonemes, words and sentence in the hearer's mind before Sphoṭa is

manifest. This sequence amongst the units of Dhvani is necessary in the

manifestation of sentence-sense whether one holds the undivided part-

less Sphoṭa alone to be real or whether phonemes, words etc. are held to

be real.

A.2.9 Kārikās 93 – 94: Jātisphoṭa and Vyaktisphoṭa

Some believe that Sphoṭa is the Śabdatvajāti which is suggested by a

number of Varṇavyaktis. Others hold that Sphoṭa is one which does not

change and it is this eternal Sphoṭavyakti that is revealed by Dhvanis,

just like a lamp's light reveals, but does not create, objects like pot etc.

A.2.10 Kārikās 95 – 101: Objections to manifestation of Sphoṭa answered

If it be argued that revealed objects are non-permanent like the pot, it is

replied that there is no requirement for revealed things be only non-

permanent, as is seen in the non-permanent objects like ghaṭa and paṭa

revealing the eternal *ghaṭatva*, *paṭatva* Jātis. One objection to

manifestation of Sphoṭa is that for manifestation to occur both the manifester and the manifested need to be physically together, as is the case with lamp and object (if the object is not near the lamp it would not be illuminated). It is replied that only embodied objects can occupy space whereas Śabda and Dhvani are not delimited by space, though sometimes limitation of Śabda or Dhvani to a particular place is artificially created (as in the sentence "he is speaking in the room"). It is seen that a manifested object (vyaṅgya) can be manifested by many manifesters (vyañjakas), just like an object can be revealed by the light from a lamp, gem or Sun, but if the relation is that of *janya-janaka* (created-creator), then this multiplicity of causes is not possible. Therefore the relation between Sphoṭa and Nāda must be a *janya-janaka* relation, not a vyaṅgya-vyañjaka relation. It is answered by showing that the means of perceiving, such as a sense organ must have a regulated competence to grasp the perceived, such as an object; same is the case with Sphoṭa and Nāda. Another objection is that differences in the manifester (such as a light which reveals a pot) should not cause a difference in the manifested (such as the pot), but it is seen that the apparent difference in Dhvanis like ghaṭa and paṭa cause difference in the manifested Sphoṭa; therefore, the manifester-manifested relation between Sphoṭa and Dhvani is not tenable. It is answered by pointing out that the reflected object takes on the properties of the medium such as oil or water (a face reflected in oil looks dark, that reflected in water seems clean and so on). Further, it is impossible for large objects like mountains to be "born" on the surface of a gem or a mirror which are much smaller; so, it cannot be that Sphoṭa and Nāda have a janya-janaka relation, but if follows that they have a vyaṅgya-vyañjaka relation. Therefore though there is no temporal difference in (Sphoṭa in the form of) phoneme, word and sentence; due to the difference in vowel lengths

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and tempos of Nāda, the Vyañjaka, they are imposed on the Sphoṭa, the vyaṅgya.

A.3 Kārikās 102 – 117: Kāryaśabdavāda and production of Śabda

Having expounded Sphoṭa from the view point that Śabda is Nitya, Bhartṛhari discusses Sphoṭa, Dhvani, and the production of Śabda following the position that Śabda is produced (that is, it is not permanent) and gives three different views on the production of Śabda.

A.3.1 Kārikās 102 – 106, Nature of Sphoṭa, Dhvani and Nāda in Kāryaśabdavāda

Others hold that the sounds first produced by speech organs are Sphoṭa (these are called Prākṛtadhvanis by those who hold Śabda to be eternal), and the sounds produced thereafter are Dhvanis (called Vaikṛtadhvanis, in the earlier view). Whether the śabda (= Dhvani in this view) be "small" (= short) or "big" (= long), there is no difference in the time-measure of Sphoṭa, but the *śabdasantāna*, the sounds subsequently produced can be *pracayātmaka* (of the nature of increasing in volume) or otherwise. In another view, Śabda and Dhvani are born together like lamp and light; from a long distance, only the light of the lamp is seen, not the lamp – similarly, from a long distance, only the Dhvanis are heard, not the Śabda. This difference between Śabda and Dhvani is clearly seen when a bell is rung; first, Śabda is born and other sounds are born thereof – those are Dhvanis. The dīrgha and pluta sounds are different from each other and are born when the means of producing

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sound are struck; when the vibration ceases, the Nādas are born which cause the difference in tempo. Others view this differently and hold that even before the vibration ceases, Dhvanis are born from Sphoṭa, just like a flame is born from another flame (even as the "source" flame burns and is not extinguished).

A.3.2 Kārikās 107 – 117: Different views on the production of Śabdas

The source of Śabdas is differently held to be Vāyu (Śikṣā), Aṇus (Jainas) and Jñāna (Patañjali). According to Śikṣā, air is set into motion by the desire to speak, and then it strikes the various places of pronunciation and becomes Śabda. The Vāyu becomes different sounds as its concentrated form falls on the places of pronunciation and splits into many. According to Jainas, Aṇus which have all capacities, can unite and separate, and thus change into shadow, light, darkness and sound. Paramāṇus called Śabdas, propelled by the effort of speaker, collect together, like (water drops collect together to form) clouds, revealing their innate capacity. According to Patañjali, the inner knower existing in the subtle form of speech transforms into Śabda in order to manifest his form. He first becomes the mind, and then enters Vāyu in the form of Tejas and causes the Vāyu to travel upwards from stomach. The Vāyu suffused with the properties of the mind transforms with the help of Tejas into different sounds manifesting the Varṇas and merging into them[94]. It is observed that air is spread everywhere but is perceived or "felt" only when a specific cause like a fan manifests it; similarly, Śabda is always present, but it is not always perceived due to its

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[94] It may be seen that the view of Patañjali is an elaboration of the view given in Śikṣā and is not in any way opposed to it.

subtleness and is manifest only due to a specific cause. It assumes distinct forms (Varṇas etc.) in the different places of pronunciation due to its inherent capacity found in both Vāyu and mind.[95]

A.4 Kārikās 118 – 132: On the greatness of Śabda and Mokṣa, liberation

The Śakti which is the cause of this seen world has Śabda as its base, and it is through the eye of Śabda that the multi-fold lokavyavahāra which has Pratibhā (intuition) as its soul is seen. It is due to the same capacity that the various notes like *ṣaḍjama* and others are differentiated; it is due to this capacity that objects are differentiated. Those who know Vedas know that this world is a transformation of Śabda; this world has been transformed first from the Vedas. In this world, all understanding of what is to be done (itikartavyatā) is based on Śabda, which is known even by babies due to *saṃskāra* of earlier births. Without the imagination of this *itikartavyatā* in the form of Śabda (śabdabhāvanā), a baby would not be able to perform for the first time, the complex task of producing speech, which involves intricate movement of organs, the upward propagation of air and restricting this flow at the appropriate places of pronunciation. There is no knowledge in this world which is devoid of contact with Śabda; all kinds of knowledge shines forth as if permeated by Śabda. Knowledge does not shine if the *vāgrupatā* (the property of having the form of vāc, speech) of knowledge goes away as that vāgrupatā is what makes *pratyavamarśa* or *anuvyavasāya* (first one knows a pot, and then in the second instance gets the knowledge "I know a pot" – this

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[95] By proposing that Śabda is present everywhere, both Śikṣā and Vyākaraṇa hold that Śabda is eternal and the process of generation of Śabda proposed is actually only the process of manifestation. These theories are clubbed with production theories of those who hold Śabda to be Anitya under one heading for the sake of comparison.

knowledge of the second instance is the *pratyavarmarśa* or *anuvyavasāya*) possible. Speech (vāc = Śabda) is the basis of all branches of knowledge, crafts and arts and it is due to its capacity that everything that is produced is classified. The consciousness of all living beings does not go beyond Speech, which exists inside and outside of all beings. Speech (or consciousness in the form of Speech) is what propels all embodied beings into purposeful action; devoid of such Speech, the unconscious man is seen as if he were a log. Just as Speech is reason for all activity in wakeful state, it is also the object (in addition to being the reason) of all activity in dream state. Just like Speech establishes objects in the form of knowledge, whether one object is shown as two or two objects are shown as one, it similarly establishes meanings in the mind. Even an object like "circle of fire" (alātacakra) which does not exist at all in reality is seen clearly in the mind to Śabda. It is said that Śabda exists within the speaker as the Self (Ātman); this is called the Great Bull[96] with which union is desired. Therefore one who knows the correct form of Śabdas attains Paramātmā and he who knows the way Śabda functions enjoys the immortal Brahman.

A.5 Kārikās 133 – 147: The Pramāṇatā of Vyākaraṇa

An Āgama is never considered to be Apauruṣeya; Vedas are the seed of all Āgamas and will exist even when all the Āgamas perish. Even when all the Smṛtis and their authors perish, Śiṣṭaloka does not violate Dharma taught by Vedas and Smṛtis. If knowledge of what is Dharma and what is not were natural then there would be no purpose served by Śāstras; if we say that

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[96] catvāri śṛṅgā trayo asya pādā dve śīrṣe sapta hastāso asya. tridhā baddho vṛṣabho roravīti maho devo martyāṁ āviveśa ǁ Ṛgvedaḥ, 4.58.3 ǁ

Dharma is the cause of knowledge, then we will have to accept Vedas as the source of Dharma (otherwise there would be an infinite regress of performance of Dharma depending upon knowledge of Dharma and that knowledge itself being dependent on performance of Dharma). The sense of a Vedic sentence is not immediately apparent; for those who cannot see the sense of such Vedic sentences, logic not opposed to Vedas is like eyes. Tarka provides many methods of interpreting Vedic sentences. Logic which is against Āgamas and which does not follow Śabda is not effective in deciding meaning; thus, human reasoning is nothing but a Śakti of Śabda. Just like *rūpa* (colour), *rasa*, *gandha* and *sparśa* have a definite effect when they act upon other substances, *śabdas* have a definite effect in reversing the effect of poison etc. Sādhuśabdas have a similar capacity in matters of Dharma; therefore those who are desirous of Abhyudaya ought to utter only sādhuśabdas. Everybody knows unseen results like attainment of heaven only through Vedas; it is possible to contradict those sentences using logic (but such logic is not accepted in the world). This Vyākaraṇasmṛti which shows which Śabdas are *sādhu* is based on the unbroken tradition of Śiṣṭas. This Vyākaraṇa is the most wonderful and highest station of Speech which is situated at many places (Kaṇṭha, Prāṇa and Budhhi for instance; others cite various "Cakras" as the place of various aspects of Śabda) and in the three forms of Vaikharī, Madhyamā and Paśyantī, Sages who know the real nature of things and are capable of seeing the capacities of Śabda made this Vyākaraṇa by sometimes splitting words into base and affix and sometimes giving its final form. That which does not have a beginning, that which does not have an author and that which is available in an unbroken tradition is called Śruti. Smṛtis are compiled by Śiṣṭas and are handed down in an unbroken tradition. For those Ṛṣis who have transformed from the undivided Śabdabrahman, knowledge of Śruti, like dreams, is not dependent on their sense organs. Smṛtis have been written by them based on the Vedas. The sciences of Cikitsā (Āyurveda), Lakṣaṇā

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(Vyākaraṇa) and Ādhyātma (Yoga) are the cures for blemishes of body, speech and intellect.

A.6 Kārikās 148 – 156: Discussion of Asādhuśabdas

A.6.1 Kārikās 148 – 149: Definition of Apabhraṃśas

When a person devoid of the knowledge of correct Śabdas uses a word to mean a particular object, in the place of a correct word like *gauḥ*, such a word is called an Apabhraṃśa. Words like *asva* and *goṇī* are correct in a different context (*asva = na sva*, not one's own; *goṇī* is a jute bag used to store rice); therefore, correctness depends on the context.

A.6.2 Kārikās 150 – 154: View of Naiyāyikas

Apabhramśas used in the place of correct words cause knowledge by recollecting the correct words; it seems that they identify themselves completely with the correct forms and make the meaning known. Apabhraṃśas are by themselves not expressers of meaning because they are neither used by Śiṣṭas as synonyms of sādhuśabdas nor sanctioned by Vyākaraṇa. When a baby makes indistinct sounds intending to mean a particular thing, those who know baby-talk recognise the correct word and understand the meaning. In this way, even when an Apabhraṃśa is used in the place of a Sādhuśabda, the correct meaning is being conveyed through the recollection of the correct word. If Apabhraṃśas become popular in communities of speakers incapable of pronouncing

the correct words, then sādhuśabdas do not convey meaning in such communities.

A.6.3 Kārikās 155 – 156: View of Grammarians

This divine speech has been corrupted by incompetent speakers (and so an effort has to be made to use correct form of words), but those who hold that Śabda is not permanent hold contrary views (that Śabda has a limited purpose of conveying meaning). If both sādhuśabdas and Apabhraṃśas are held to be handed down in an unbroken tradition (i.e. there is no divinity associated with the correct forms of words), if a word is used in place of the other, the other word's meaning is not conveyed; (so, words should not be used indiscriminately and the view of Naiyāyikas is not proper).

Appendix B: Vākyapadīya Kārikā Referred to in the Thesis

The Kārikās of Vākyapadīya that are referred to only by number are listed here. Those of Dravyasamuddeśa (3.2.1 to 3.2.18) are not listed because they have been reproduced along with translation in Section 3.2 *Highest Principle* in pp 48 – 54 of this thesis. Both the text and the numbering are based on the Telugu Akademi version of Vākyapadīyam.

anādinidhanaṃ brahma śabdatattvaṃ yadakṣaram ।
vivartate'rthabhāvena prakriyā jagato yataḥ ॥ 1.1 ॥
ekameva yadāmnātaṃ bhinnaṃ śaktivyapāśrayāt ।
apṛthaktve'pi śaktibhyaḥ pṛthaktveneva vartate ॥ 1.2 ॥
adhyāhitakalāṃ yasya kālaśaktimupāśritāḥ ।
janmādayo vikārāḥ ṣaḍbhāvabhedasya yonayaḥ ॥ 1.3 ॥
ekasya sarvabījasya yasya ceyamanekadhā ।
bhoktṛbhoktavyarūpeṇa bhogarūpeṇa ca sthitiḥ ॥ 1.4 ॥
prāptyupāyo'nukāraśca tasya vedo maharṣibhiḥ ।
eko'pyanekavartmeva samāmnātaḥ pṛthakpṛthak ॥ 1.5 ॥
satyā viśuddhistatroktā vidyaivekapadāgamā ।
yuktā praṇavarūpeṇa sarvavādāvirodhinī ॥ 1.9 ॥
vidhātustasya lokānāmaṅgopāṅganibandhanāḥ ।
vidyābhedāḥ pratāyante jñānasaṃskārahetavaḥ ॥ 1.10 ॥
idamādyaṃ padasthānaṃ siddhisopānaparvaṇām ।
iyaṃ sā mokṣamāṇānāmajihmā rājapaddhatiḥ ॥ 1.16 ॥
atrātītaviparyāsaḥ kevalāmanupaśyati ।
chandasyaśchandasāṃ yonimātmā chandomayīṃ tanum ॥1.17॥
pratyastamitabhedāyā yadvāco rūpamuttamam ।
yadasminneva tamasi jyotiḥ śuddhaṃ vivartate ॥ 1.18 ॥

vaikṛtaṃ samatikrāntā mūrtivyāpāradarśanam |

vyatītyālokatamasī prakāśaṃ yamupāsate || 1.19 ||

yatra vāco nimittāni cihnānīvākṣarasmṛteḥ |

śabdapūrveṇa yogena bhāsante pratibimbavat || 1.20 ||

na cāgamādṛte dharmastarkeṇa vyavatiṣṭhate |

ṛṣīṇāmapi yajjñānaṃ tadapyāgamapūrvakam || 1.30 ||

avasthādeśakālānāṃ bhedādbhinnāsu śaktiṣu |

bhāvānāmanumānena prasiddhiratidurlabhā || 1.32 ||

āvirbhūtaprakāśānāmanupaplutacetasām |

atītānāgatajñānaṃ pratyakṣānna viśiṣyate || 1.37 ||

vitarkitaḥ purā buddhyā kvacidarthe niveśitaḥ |

karaṇebhyo vivṛttena dhvaninā so'nugṛhyate || 1.47 ||

pratibimbaṃ yathānyatra sthitaṃ toyakriyāvaśāt |

tatpravṛttimivānveti sa dharmaḥ sphoṭanādayoḥ || 1.49 ||

ātmarūpaṃ yathā jñāne jñeyarūpañca dṛśyate |

artharūpaṃ tathā śabde svarūpañca prakāśate || 1.50 ||

pade na varṇā vidyante varṇeṣvavayavā na ca |

vākyātpadānāmatyantaṃ praviveko na kaścana || 1.73 ||

yathānuvākaḥ śloko vā soḍhatvamupagacchati |

āvṛttyā na tu sa granthaḥ pratyāvṛtti nirūpyate || 1.82 ||

nādairāhitabījāyāmantyena dhvaninā saha |

āvṛttaparipākāyāṃ buddhau śabdo'vadhāryate || 1.84 ||

bhedānukāro jñānasya vācaścopaplavo dhruvaḥ |

kramopasṛṣṭarūpā vāgjñānaṃ jñeyavyapāśrayam || 1.86 ||

yathaiva darśanaiḥ pūrvairdūrātsantamase'pi vā |

anyathākṛtya viṣayamanyathaivādhyavasyati || 1.89 ||

grahaṇagrāhyayoḥ siddhā niyatā yogyatā yathā |

vyaṅgyavyañjakabhāvena tathaiva sphoṭanādayoḥ || 1.97 ||

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śabdeṣvevāśritā śaktirviśvasyāsya nibandhanī |

yannetraḥ pratibhātmāyaṃ bhedarūpaḥ pratīyate || 1.118 ||

ṣaḍjādibhedaḥ śabdena vyākhyāto rūpyate yataḥ |

tasmādarthavidhāḥ sarvāḥ śabdamātrāsu niśritāḥ || 1.119 ||

śabdasya pariṇāmo'yamityāmnāyavido viduḥ |

chandobhya eva prathamametadviśvaṃ vyavartata || 1.120 ||

na so'sti pratyayo loke yaḥ śabdānugamādṛte |

anuviddhamiva jñānaṃ sarvaṃ śabdena bhāsate || 1.123 ||

vāgrūpatā cenniṣkrāmedavabodhasya śāśvatī |

na prakāśaḥ prakāśeta sā hi pratyavamarśinī || 1.124 ||

sā sarvavidyāśilpānāṃ kalānāṃ copabandhanī |

tadvaśādabhiniṣpannaṃ sarvaṃ vastu vibhajyate || 1.125 ||

saiṣā saṃsāriṇāṃ saṃjñā bahirantaśca vartate |

tanmātrāmanatikrāntaṃ caitanyaṃ sarvajantuṣu || 1.126 ||

arthakriyāsu vāksarvānsamīhayati dehinaḥ |

tadutkrāntau visañjño'yaṃ dṛśyate kāṣṭhakuḍyavat || 1.127 ||

pravibhāge yathā kartā tayā kārye pravartate |

avibhāge tathā saiva kāryatvenāvatiṣṭhate || 1.128 ||

atyantamatathābhūte nimitte śrutyupāśrayāt |

dṛśyate'lātacakrādau vastvākāranirūpaṇā || 1.130 ||

api prayokturātmānaṃ śabdamantaravasthitam |

prāhurmahāntaṃ vṛṣabhaṃ yena sāyujyamiṣyate || 1.131 ||

tasmādyaḥ śabdasaṃskāraḥ sā siddhiḥ paramātmanaḥ |

tasya pravṛttitattvajñastadbrahmāmṛtamaśnute || 1.132 ||

jñāne svābhāvike nārthaḥ śāstraiḥ kaścana vidyate |

dharmo jñānasya hetuścettasyāmnāyo nibandhanam || 1.135 ||

vedaśāstrāvirodhī ca tarkaścakṣurapaśyatām |

rūpamātrāddhi vākyārthaḥ kevalānnāvatiṣṭhate || 1.136 ||

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yathaiṣāṃ tatra sāmarthyaṃ dharme'pyevaṃ pratīyatām |

sādhūnāṃ sādhubhistasmādvācyamabhyudayārthibhiḥ ‖1.140 ‖

sādhutvajñānaviṣayā saiṣā vyākaraṇasmṛtiḥ |

avicchedena śiṣṭānāmidaṃ smṛtinibandhanam ‖ 1.142 ‖

kāyavāgbuddhiviṣayā ye malāḥ samavasthitāḥ |

cikitsālakṣaṇādhyātmaśāstraisteṣāṃ viśuddhayaḥ ‖ 1.147 ‖

upādāyāpi ye heyāstānupāyānpracakṣate |

upāyānāṃ ca niyamo nāvaśyaṃ avatiṣṭhate ‖2.38‖

ṛṣīṇāṃ darśanaṃ yacca tattve kiñcidavasthitam |

na tena vyavahāro' sti na tacchabdanibandhanam ‖2.139‖

vicchedagrahaṇe'rthānāṃ pratibhānyaiva jāyate |.

vākyārtha iti tāmāhuḥ padārthairupapāditām ‖2.143‖

sākśācchabdena janitāṃ bhāvanānugamena vā |

itikartavyatāyāṃ tāṃ na kaścidativartate ‖2.146‖

śāstreṣu prakriyābhedairavidyaivopavarṇyate |

anāgamavikalpāttu svayaṃ vidyopavartate ‖2.233‖

yaccopaghātajaṃ jñānaṃ yacca jñānamalaukikam |

na tābhyāṃ vyavahāro' sti śabdā lokanibandhanāḥ ‖2.297‖

bhinnā iti paropādhirabhinnā iti vā punaḥ|

bhāvātmasu prapañco'yaṃ saṃsṛṣṭeṣveva jāyate ‖3.1.20‖

sarvaśaktyātmabhūtatvamekasyaiveti nirṇaye |

bhāvānāmātmabhedasya kalpanā syādanarthikā ‖3.1.22‖

tasmāddravyādayaḥ sarvāḥ śaktayo bhinnalakṣaṇāḥ|

saṃsṛṣṭāḥ puruṣārthasya sādhikā na tu kevalāḥ ‖3.1.23‖

yathaiva cendriyādīnāmātmabhūtā samagratā |

tathā saṃbandhisaṃbandhasaṃsarge'pi pratīyate ‖3.1.24‖

saṃbandhibhedātsattaiva bhidyamānā gavādiṣu |

jātirityucyate tasyāṃ sarve śabdā vyavasthitāḥ || 3.1.33 ||

tāṃ prātipadikārthaṃ ca dhātvarthaṃ ca pracakṣate |

sā nityā sā mahānātmā tāmāhustvatalādayaḥ || 3.1.34 ||

saiva bhāvavikāreṣu ṣaḍavasthāḥ prapadyate |

krameṇa śaktibhiḥ svābhirevaṃ pratyavabhāsate || 3.1.36 ||

tirobhāvābhyupagame bhāvānāṃ saiva nāstitā |

labdhakrame tirobhāve naśyatīti pratīyate || 3.1.38 ||

pūrvasmātpracyutā dharmādaprāptā cottaraṃ padam |

tadantarāle bhedānāmāśrayājjanma kathyate || 3.1.39 ||

āśrayaḥ svātmamātrā vā bhāvā vā vyatirekinaḥ |

svaśaktayo vā sattāyā bhedadarśanahetavaḥ || 3.1.40 ||

nitye'nitye'pi vāpyarthe puruṣeṇa kathaṃcana |

sambandho'kṛtasambandhaiḥ śabdaiḥ kartuṃ na śakyate || 3.3.38 ||

vyapadeśe padārthānāmanyā sattaupacārikī |

sarvāvasthāsu sarveṣāmātmarūpasya darśikā || 3.3.39 ||

sphaṭikādi yathā dravyaṃ bhinnarūpairupāśrayaiḥ |

svaśaktiyogātsambandhaṃ tādrūpyeṇeva gacchati || 3.3.40 ||

tadvacchabdo'pi sattāyāmasyāṃ pūrvaṃ vyavasthitaḥ |

dharmairupaiti sambandhamavirodhivirodhibhiḥ || 3.3.41 ||

evaṃ ca pratiṣedhyeṣu pratiṣedhapraklptaye |

āśriteṣūpacāreṇa pratiṣedhaḥ pravartate || 3.3.42 ||

ātmalābhasya janmākhyā satā labhyaṃ ca labhyate |

yadi sajjāyate kasmādathāsajjāyate katham || 3.3.43 ||

sato hi ganturgamanaṃ, sati gamye pravartate |

gantṛvaccenna janmārtho, na cettadvanna jāyate || 3.3.44 ||

upacarya tu kartāramabhidhānapravṛttaye |

punaśca karmabhāvena tāṃ kriyāṃ ca tadāśrayām || 3.3.45 ||

athopacārasattaivaṃ vidheyastatra lādayaḥ |

janmanā tu virodhitvānmukhyā sattā na vidyate ||3.3.46||

ātmānamātmanā bibhradastīti vyapadiśyate |

antarbhāvācca tenāsau karmaṇā na sakarmakaḥ ||3.3.47||

prākca sattābhisambandhānmukhyā sattā kathaṃ bhavet |

asaṃśca nāsteḥ kartā syādupacārastu pūrvavat ||3.3.48||

tasmādbhinneṣu dharmeṣu virodhiṣvavirodhinīm |

virodhikhyāpanāyaiva śabdaistaistairupāśritām ||3.3.49||

abhinnakālāmartheṣu bhinnakāleṣvavasthitām |

pravṛttihetuṃ sarveṣāṃ śabdānāṃ aupacārikīm ||3.3.50||

etāṃ sattāṃ padārtho hi na kaścidativartate |

sā ca saṃpratisattāyāḥ pṛthagbhāśye nidarśitā ||3.3.51||

rūpaṇavyapadeśābhyāṃ laukike vartmani sthitau |

jñānaṃ pratyabhilāpaṃ ca sadṛśau bālapaṇḍitau ||3.3.55||

sarvārtharūpatā śuddhirjñānasya nirupāśrayā |

tato'pyasya parāṃ śuddhiṃ eke prāhurarūpikām ||3.3.56||

apade'rthe padanyāsaḥ kāraṇasya na vidyate |

atha ca prāgasadbhāvaḥ kāraṇe sati dṛśyate ||3.3.78||

vastūpalakṣaṇaṃ yatra sarvanāma prayujyate |

dravyaṃ ityucyate so'rto bhedyatvena vivakṣitaḥ ||3.4.3||

na śaktīnāṃ tathā bhedo yathā śaktimatāṃ sthitiḥ |

na ca laukikamekatvaṃ tāsāmātmasu vidyate ||3.6.27||

tamasya lokayantrasya sūtradhāraṃ pracakṣate |

pratibandhābhyanujñābhyāṃ tena viśvaṃ vibhajyate ||3.9.4||

jalayantrabhramāveśasadṛśībhiḥ pravṛttibhiḥ |

sa kalāḥ kalayan sarvāḥ kālākhyāṃ labhate vibhuḥ ||3.9.14||

śaktyātmadevatāpakṣairbhinnaṃ kālasya darśanam |

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prathamaṃ tadavidyāyāṃ yadvidyāyāṃ na vidyate ǁ3.9.62ǁ

pratyaktā parabhāvaścāpyupādhī kartṛkarmaṇoḥ ǀ

tayoḥ śrutiviśeṣeṇa vācakau madhyamottamau ǁ3.10.1ǁ

sadasadvāpi caitanyametābhyāmeva gamyate ǀ

caitanyabhāge prathamaḥ puruṣo na tu vartate ǁ3.10.2ǁ

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Synopsis of

Samanvaya of Advaita of Bhartṛhari and Śaṅkara

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The present work is the thesis of the researcher submitted for award of the degree "Doctor of Philosophy", in which a comparative study of the two schools of Philosophy – Śabdādvaita of Bhartṛhari and Advaita of Śaṅkara are studied and a "Samanvaya", i.e. mutual connection between the two schools in the manner that Nyāya and Vaiśeṣika have is attempted. The procedure followed is to first present the summaries of the two schools, then discuss the similarities, differences and complementary aspects between the two, leading to the establishment of "mutual connection".

First the researcher presents his understanding of the two schools in the second and third chapter after an introductory chapter dealing with the place of Advaita within Indian philosophy as one of the most important schools, the different views about Bhartṛhari, the definition of Samanvaya and overall structure of the thesis. In the first chapter, while various views about Bhartṛhari – from being a Buddhist to a Dvaitin – are listed, there is no attempt made to disprove any of those. It is noted that traditionally, i.e. by commentators of Vākyapadīya etc., it is held that Bhartṛhari is thought of as an Advaitin.

The second chapter about Advaita has two parts. In the first part Advaita is summarised based on the book *Vedāntasāra.* This summary is the English translation of selected Sanskrit sentences from the book, including a brief presentation of how the Mahāvākyas such as "tattvamasi" are interpreted, using the concept of Bhāgalakṣaṇā, where both the words "tat" and "tvam" denote through partial *lakṣaṇā* the Parabrahman. The identity sought to be established is that of this underlying non-contradictory secondary denotation. In the second part, certain aspects of Advaita not covered in

Vedāntaśara, viz. Śabdanityatā, *sabdaprabhavatvam* of the world, Śruti accepted as the only means to know Brahman, Śrutyanugṛhītatarka, Veda being an Upāya to know Brahman, multiple levels of reality, two levels of unreal and Ajātivāda, are presented. It is shown with proofs from Prasthānatrayī that Śaṅkarācārya accepts Śruti as the only Pramāṇa to know Brahman; that Veda is an Upāya which can be discarded after obtaining Brahman; that Advaita believes in both the concepts of Śabdanityatvam and that this universe was created from Śabda; and that different levels of reality (*pāramārthitaksatyam*, *vyavahārikasatyam*, *pāribhāsikasatyam*) and the unreal (*asat =* something other than the seen world, i.e. Brahman, *atyantāsat =* non-existent entity such as hare's horns) are central to Advaita. The Ajātivāda, a concept which says that there is no origin of the universe, is shown how different presentations of truth are possible in Advaita due to the difference in the reference frames used. Finally the later developments in Advaita along the lines of Vivaraṇa and Bhāmatī schools is summarised to show the difference of views within Advaita, so that the differences between Śabdādvaita and Advaita can be compared to these differences within Advaita.

In the third chapter, a similar summary of the "Advaita of Bhartṛhari" is presented, but in a different structure. *Brahmakāṇḍa,* the first of the three books of *Vākyapadīya* contains the details of the Advaita of Bhartṛhari. This is summarily translated and presented as Appendix A, and divided into six main headings and eighteen sub-headings such that a perusal of the headings and sub-headings itself constitutes a quick summary. In the main part of the text, the system of Bhartṛhari is presented by arranging it into topics such as Highest Principle, Relation between Individual Soul and Brahman, Vivarta and Pariṇāma, Epistemology and Metaphysics. This chapter could be summarised thus: "Brahman is one, without beginning, without end, of the nature of Śabda which apparently transforms into the world through its Śaktis without changing Its own form. The machine that this world is controlled by the puppeteer called Time. The Self is the same as Brahman and merger with Brahman is Mokṣa. Since Brahman is not differentiated as enjoyer, enjoyed and enjoyment, knowing Brahman is nothing but attaining Brahman.

Veda is the means to know Brahman. Smṛtis are based on Vedas. Vyākaraṇa which teaches the nature of Śabda, the very essence of Brahman, is the royal highway to salvation. Usage of Sādhuśabdas increases Abhyudaya, hence one should not resort to Apaśabdas even in mundane conversations. A constant meditation on Śabda reveals that all differences are superimposed, and that the underlying basis is Brahman alone." While many of these positions are stated in a plain language by Bhartṛhari, others need to be understood from a consideration of the different parts of *Vākyapadīya* and fixing their purport. For instance, the exact nature of Vivarta that Bhartṛhari proposes is not explicit, but becomes clear from a consideration of the *Sambandhasamuddeśa* that it is similar to the one proposed in Advaita. Similarly, the Siddhānta position of Bhartṛhari that every Śabda denotes Dravya, i.e. the unchanging, one eternal Brahman, is to be understood only from an overall consideration of the text. These are clearly brought out in the third chapter.

In the fourth chapter a number of similarities are discussed. Some aspects shown as differences, such as Avidyā are actually considered as similarities in the present thesis. Supporting material is provided under the respective sections. Some aspects such as the levels of Reality for Bhartṛhari corresponding to the levels of Reality of Śaṅkarācārya; that Advaita prefers Bauddhārtha to Bāhyārtha, that both subscribe to Akhaṇḍavākyārtha, which are not well-known are included. As a pointer to the many other similarities at a micro level, the two words *yuṣmad* and *asmad,* occurring in the very first word (compound) used by Śaṅkarācārya in his *Brahmasūtrabhāṣya* are discussed and it is shown that there is perfect agreement between the two systems. The chapter is summarised in the last section by giving an outline of a philosophy which is applicable equally to both schools.

Differences between the two schools are taken up in the fifth chapter. Six differences are discussed. Firstly the difference between Sphoṭavāda and Varṇavāda is

taken up, as this becomes the basis on which Śaṅkarācārya refutes Sphoṭa in the *Devatādhikaraṇam.* This refutation is considered at great length, to see if it can be "explained away" before reaching the conclusion that it cannot be. Secondly, criticism by other Advaitins is taken up. There it is shown that the criticism by Vimuktātman in *Iṣṭasiddhi* is based on a wrong interpretation of Śabda as the physical sound. In reality, Mīmāṃsakas, Advaitins and Vaiyākaraṇas hold Śabda to be something beyond the physical sound. For the Grammarians this entity beyond sound is Sphoṭa, whereas Varṇajāti suffices for the other two. So the criticism of Vimuktātman is unfounded. While Jñānaghana in his *Tattvaśuddhi* echoes the arguments of the Śaṅkarācārya in the *Devatādhikaraṇam,* it is shown that Mādhavācārya in his *Sarvasiddhāntasaṅgraha* does not effectively criticise Śabdādvaita. Later the differences between Māyā / Avidyā of Advaita and the various Śaktis of Brahman propounded in Vyākaraṇam are briefly presented before discussing the number of Pramāṇas, Pratīkopāsanā and Theory of Error. It is shown that Abhyāsa, practice, is one additional Pramāṇa accepted by Bhartṛhari that is not accepted in Advaita, and this leads to a slight difference in the theories of error. Thus, while both should be classified as *anirvacanīyakhyāti* the difference is that the stages of perception within erroneous knowledge are not discussed in Advaita, whereas they are also considered in Vyākaraṇa. In the *Brahmasūtrabhāṣya* it is said that a *pratīka,* symbol, like Śabda can be worshipped as Brahman, but the reverse is not allowed, i.e. Brahman cannot be worshipped as Śabda.

These differences are mostly reconciled in the next chapter on Supplements and Complements, where some of the so-called differences are shown to be differences in emphasis. This difference in emphasis flows from the different objectives. It is shown in the chapter that "where Śaṅkarācārya establishes the Darśana of Advaita in its full glory, and supplies all the essential elements that the establishment of a Darśana requires, Bhartṛhari provides the Linguistic Framework, which is so important to show how Advaita

is tenable and also provides for an alternate presentation without the so-called negative aspects, which have become very prominent in Advaita"

In the final chapter, first the differences that could not be reconciled are discussed. It is accepted that Sphoṭavāda has been rejected by Advaita in favour of Varṇavāda, though there is no difference in the central tenets of the two systems; that the rules about Pratīkopāsana prohibit an Advaitin from accepting Brahman being described as *śabdatattvam* and that the difference between Māyā / Avidyā and Śaktis persists. All the three differences are resolved by proposing that Śabdabrahman be accepted as the Lower Brahman within Advaita. The advantage of such a Samanvaya is that Advaita gets a new Theory of Language which is necessary. Whereas they have been many developments related to Theory of Language within India and outside, after Śaṅkarācārya expounded Advaita, Advaita continues to rely on the Theory of Language supplied by Pūrvamīmāṃsā, a realistic school. Replacing the "Bhāṭṭanayaḥ" with "Vaiyākaraṇanayaḥ" will make it easier for Advaita to deal with the enormous developments in Navyanyāya within India and in Linguistic Philosophy outside India. An example, citing the writing of a great scholar of Advaita S. S. Suryanarayana Sastri, is given to show that to deal with all these developments, "there will be the need to revise Advaita terminology, but the core of Advaita doctrine will remain unaffected and will perhaps be strengthened by its association with modern speculations in Logic and the science of language."

Thus the thesis brings out a reasoned argument for viewing Bhartṛhari as an Advaitin, and shows how the two systems are mutually complementary, while reconciling the traditional position that Śaṅkarācārya refuted Sphoṭavāda not because of any doctrinal differences, but to avoid other proposing Sparśabrahman, Rasabrahman etc. Without attempting to gloss over the refutation of Sphoṭavāda by Śaṅkarācārya, it is shown that it would be acceptable to Advaita to treat Śabda as a Pratīka for Brahman and to accept Śabdabrahman as the Lower Brahman. Finally, it is argued that to keep up with times, Advaita needs to replace "Bhāṭṭanayaḥ" with "Vaiyākaraṇanayaḥ".