

Consciousness and Mind-Body Problem: A Dualistic Approach in Philosophy of Mind

A thesis submitted during 2015 to the University of Hyderabad in partial fulfillment of the award
of a Ph.D., degree in Philosophy

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Dedicated
To
My Parents

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I, Velpula Sunkanna, hereby declare that this thesis entitled “**Consciousness and Mind-Body Problem: A Dualistic Approach in Philosophy of Mind**” submitted by me under the guidance and supervision of **Prof. Ramesh Chandra Pradhan** is my bona fide research work and is free from plagiarism. I also declare that it has not been submitted previously in part or in full to this or any other University or Institution for the award of any degree or diploma. I hereby agree that my thesis can be deposited in shodhganga/INFLIBNET.

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Acknowledgement

First of all, I wish to express my sincere gratitude to Prof. Ramesh Chandra Pradhan for teaching me in my M.A. programme. I am highly indebted for his supervision, guidance and discussions at every stage of this research. This thesis would not have been in any sense possible without his encouragement and support.

I am very much grateful to my doctoral committee members Prof. Amithabha Das Gupta and Prof. Prajit K. Basu for their thoughtful comments and suggestions regarding various problems throughout this work. I am thankful to the Head of the Department Prof. K. S. Prasad for his kind approval to submit the thesis. I am thankful to all my teachers in the department for helping me and being the source of inspiration when I am in need. I would also like to thank all the non-teaching staffs of the department for their helps.

It gives me immense pleasure to acknowledge some of my friends Shinumol. T. C, Bijoy. K. S, Dr. Vineet Sahu, Dr. Sreekumar, Dr. Philos Koshi, Dr. Prasanna. K. V, Dr. Ashoka Kumar Tarai, Dr. Ali Asghar, Robin, Joly Thomas, Alem Temjen, Roshan, Dr. Indira Priyanka, Dr. Murali Manohar. G, Dr. Balaji Belekere, Chittibabu Padavala, Chelli Nageswar Rao, Chelle Raju, Pilli Vasanth, Joseph Alugula, Venkatrao. E, Gummadi Prabhakar, Parameshwarudu Pulatota who helped me in various ways during my Ph.D., tenure.

I am grateful to Mam (Mrs. Pradhan) for her inspiration and love. She is always very generous, affectionate and very much supportive like a mother during my miserable circumstances. The support I got from Prof. Pradhan and Mrs. Pradhan during my Ph.D., tenure is immeasurable. I would like to thank each and every person who helped me directly or indirectly and whose name couldn't find a mention here, I will always remain grateful to them.

Last but not of course in the least I must acknowledge my parents and family members. I express my sincere gratitude to my parents and other members of my family for their inspiration, psychological encouragement and support during the every stage of this work and every stage of my life.

Velpula Sunkanna

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INTRODUCTION

A river never dries just by bailing water with a picota¹; a pot never fills just by incessant sobs. In the same way the quest in philosophy is not going to end, it doesn't matter how long we have been doing philosophy. As well whatever we have learned cannot be enough to fill the desire of knowing our own nature. Even though the *Mind-Body* problem is, as John Searle says, "*the source of so much controversy over the past two millennia,*" yet the philosophy needs to be reflected upon again and again. The *Mind-Body* problems raises questions like, "*Are human beings a duality of Mind and matter, or are they simply physical beings? If the humans are no more than heaps of atoms, then how does one square this notion with issues like personal identity, life after death, human rationality, and morality? If a person is a Mind that has a body, how do these two existents interact with each other? Is it possible, in this framework, to know other minds? How could the Mind, totally lacking in physical properties, cause things to happen in the body or vice versa?*" The aim of my research is to understand the problems of *Mind*/consciousness and try to address the problem by going through the varieties of solutions that have been offered by classical as well as contemporary philosophers of *Mind*.

When we talk about the *Mind*, either from a philosophical point of view or a psychological point of view or from a scientific point of view, the first question to be raised is; what is *Mind*? We will find different kinds of answer to this question. Some says that *Mind* is a substance; some others say that it is a form of energy or a kind of force; some others say that *Mind* is part of the *Soul*; some have treated *Mind* and *Soul* as identical, some others have treated them as entirely different entities; some recognize the *Soul* from a religious point of view and some others recognize *Mind* from psychological point of view. Some others ignore the existence of the *Soul* completely; dualists say that the *Mind* is an independently existing incorporeal substance; materialists say that the *Mind* is an ordinary piece of matter. In the context of contemporary research the concept

¹. A device for bailing water for irrigation

of *Soul* is more controversial than that of the *Mind*. In the past it was the *Soul* which was central to religious beliefs; it was the *Soul* which was thought of as immortal, capable of transmigration, capable of existing after the death of the *Body*. However, in the present context, it is *Mind* which attracts our attention. With these many characterizations the concept of *Mind* has become too difficult to analyze. As a result *Mind* seems to be the greatest mystery for man.

With these many challenges and mysteries I have began my first chapter to know and understand the notion of the *Soul* from a historical point of view. The first chapter begins by introducing the ancient Greek notion of the *Soul* and its transformation along with the human evolution. How it was defined and what kinds of features were attributed and how its definition and features were changing time to time has been discussed. The aim of this chapter is to show that the notion of *Mind-Body* dualism was not a Cartesian notion but philosophically it had a long history. The notion of dualism began in the early days of human thinking and it has undergone many changes to reach the present notion of dualism. In this chapter I have discussed the views of Thales, Pherecydes of Syros, Anaximander, Anaximenes, Hermotimus, Pythagoras of Samos, Heraclitus of Ephesus, Parmenides, Anaxagoras, Democritus, Socrates, Plato and Aristotle. On the basis of these philosophical views, I have explained the gradual transformation of the notion of the *Soul*. Though the word '*Soul*' declined from philosophical discussions but its features, almost all, are attributed to the word '*Mind*.' But the first chapter discusses the notion of the *Soul* at great length; so the discussion of *Mind* is given very less importance. The ancient Greek's notion of *Soul-Body* Dualism was not just a philosophical notion but it also had influences on the Religious, Social and Political life of the people. I have used both the terms, *Mind* and *Soul*, in this chapter. But I have not used them as synonyms; in some philosophical theories they are representatives of two different metaphysical realities. In some philosophical theories there is only one reality, *Mind* or *Soul*.

The notion of the *Soul* is the central principle of Christianity because it is part of Trinity (*Father, Son and the Holy Spirit*). It was the period in which not only Philosophy but also the state was under the control of Christianity. And it was the period in which Christianized Aristotelian philosophy was widespread. It was the 17th century philosophical quest which could free the philosophical inquiry from religious bondage and showed the rational path for the philosophy. And it was Descartes from this period, who totally ignored using the word '*Soul*' and all of its attributes were transferred to the word '*Mind*'. The second chapter of my thesis discusses the Cartesian dualism between *Mind-Body*. At the same time it was the period from where the full-fledged philosophical notion of *Mind-Body* dualism began. I mean to say that before Descartes it was either *Soul-Body* dualism or the dualism of the *Soul* and the primitive matter. It was Descartes who was leading this movement and he took it into its highest level. That is why it has become the base for those who argue for *Mind-Body* dualism. Though there are various types of dualistic approaches but the Cartesian dualism moved ahead as the substance dualism. According to this philosophy there are two kinds of substances; the thinking substance and the extended substance. The whole theory is the explanation of the similarities and dissimilarities between the two substances and the union of *Mind* and *Body*. The second chapter consists of four units. In the first unit I introduced the Cartesian dualism then I enter into the second unit where I explain about *a thinking thing*. It also involves the Cartesian method of doubt. After explaining Cartesian notion of what a thinking thing is, I enter into the discussion of the real distinction between *Mind* and *Body*. The last unit of this chapter deals with the Cartesian epistemology where Descartes opts for a reason based theory of knowledge. He rejects the naïve realist theory of knowledge because he believes that senses are not reliable source of knowledge because once perception goes wrong more often than not. But at last he says "*we never go wrong when we assent only to what we clearly and distinctly perceive.*"

The naturalistic approach of consciousness is discussed in the third chapter. The discussion is based on 20th century philosophical quest. It is the period where two thousand years of philosophical quest and scientific development reached a point where

we can answer some unsolved philosophical questions. How the collaboration of scientific development with philosophical inquiry could lead the philosophy of *Mind* will be discussed. This chapter exclusively deals with the naturalistic approach of consciousness and *Mind-Body* problems. There are four units in this chapter and consciousness is the central theme. I deal with John Searle's, Daniel Dennett's and David Chalmers's notions of consciousness and their way of explaining *Mind-Body* problem. Before entering into the main discussion of three naturalistic approaches, such as *Biological Naturalism*, *the Multiple Drafts Model theory* and *the Hard Problem of consciousness*, a brief introduction is given on what consciousness is. Then, different notions and approaches of consciousness and its definitions will be discussed. These naturalist philosophers have mainly questioned the Cartesian *Mind-Body* dualism and have presented a scientific view of the *Mind* within a naturalistic framework.

The aim of the forth chapter is to discuss the naturalistic approach of Intentionality, particularly within John Searle's naturalistic approach. Intentionality as the property of mental states is *directedness* or *aboutness*. It indicates that Intentionality is a mental phenomenon. According to Searle mental phenomena are biologically based. It leads to the conclusion that Intentionality is also biologically based. How Intentionality works as a biologically based mental phenomenon is the central theme of this chapter based on John Searle's biological naturalism. For Searle Intentionality is intrinsic to the mental states. How an Intentional mental state originates and how an Intentional mental state influences an Intentional act will be part of discussion. This chapter discusses language, consciousness and Intentionality based on the concepts of *the Background*, *the Network* and *the conditions of satisfaction*. The role of language in explaining Intentionality is very crucial because, for Searle, a sentence is a syntactical object having Intentionality. That is why John Searle says that the language is essentially a social phenomenon and that the forms of Intentionality underlying language are social in nature. Intentionality of mental states, Intentionality of causation, Intentionality of cognition and Intentionality of action are the important themes of this chapter. The discussion of Intentionality proceeds systematically. First section of this chapter deals with the meaning and the definition of

Intentionality. The second section deals with the conditions of satisfaction and the third section deals with Background and Network in relation with conditions of satisfaction. The fourth section deals with Intentional action. The last section of this chapter deals with naturalization of Intentionality based on biological naturalism.

The theories discussed already left many questions unanswered. These questions are like, whether the scientific development is sufficient to solve the *Mind-Body* problem? If not sufficient then, whether scientific method can solve *Mind-Body* problem? Whether consciousness is the subject matter of science or not? and so on. After analyzing the whole philosophy of *Mind* from Thales to David Chalmers, I defend *Mind-Body* dualism in the fifth chapter. The first, second, third and forth sections of this chapter are designed to discuss the drawbacks of Cartesian dualism, the Biological naturalism, the Multiple Drafts Model theory and the hard problem of consciousness respectively. The fifth section of this chapter deals with the possible dualistic approach. The journey of the philosophy of *Mind* has completed around 2600 years. If our answers to the philosophical problems in these many years, whether scientific or philosophic, are not satisfying then what is the way left to us to deal these problems? We are still in a state of confusion in dealing whether our approach should be dualistic or non-dualistic. In this Thesis, however, I defended *Mind-Body* dualism. What are the reasons which led me towards dualism will be discussed in the last section of fifth chapter.

Chapter-1

The Mind-Body Problem: The Historical Background

Philosophy in general and philosophy of *Mind* in particular, is the product of the human quest to know about the reality in general and to know about their own *Mind* in particular. This quest has a long history which began in the early days of human thinking. It is therefore important to know the history of philosophy, especially the philosophy of *Mind*. It is not the case that began with Rene Descartes because it began in the pre-Cartesian era, giving rise to the problem of the *Mind-Body* dualism. Here we have to be very particular about one thing that *the notion of Dualism was not solely due to Descartes*, because dualism is evident in the oldest literatures of human history. Though that history has passed away from us but the dualism which was deeply rooted in the human *Mind* has not gone. This chapter is about the transformation of the concept of the *Soul* into *Mind*, which has been neglected by the present generation of scholars and the readers of the Philosophy of *Mind*. It's all about the *Mind* which was treated as intrinsic part of the *Soul*. Why do we not talk about the concept of the *Mind* when we talk about the Platonist or Aristotelian concept of the *Soul*? Do we think that there is nothing about the *Mind* in their philosophy? Is it mandatory that we have to start the *Mind-Body* Dualism or the study of the Philosophy of *Mind* with Rene Descartes? All most all text books in Philosophy of *Mind* starts with a discussion on Descartes. But, the legitimate question is, why? Giving a particular answer is very difficult but I can postulate one reason that exclusively contemporary philosophy of *Mind* is concerned with the *Mind-Body* problem; it is concerned with the problem of how conscious experience, rationality and meaning are related to a physical world. They think that Descartes was first to formulate this problem. Of course it is true; for Descartes there is a problem or a set of related problems regarding how the *Mind* and *Body* are related. But these problems were not formulated by Descartes because these problems were there before Descartes. Descartes tried to deal with these problems through a different method which was not used before him. Here we have to keep one thing in our mind that I am neither going against to Descartes nor his *Mind-Body* problem but I just want to try to show that we can

trace the roots of this set of problems or at least some of the problems in the set to the ancient Greek Philosophy and the medieval philosophy/scholasticism. I feel and believe that it is necessary to have a closer look or a better understanding of the ancient and medieval metaphysical thoughts if we want to have a good foundation for the Philosophy of *Mind*. As it has been rightly said, *the greatest achievements of humanity lie in the past*. So, if we start the philosophy of *Mind* without the background of all these interrelated notions then that will be like a house without foundation so that it can collapse at any time. The contemporary issues of the *Mind-Body* Dualism might be solved by appealing to the scientific data but without knowing its foundations we cannot draw any philosophical conclusions from these data. My main aim of this chapter is to introduce the gradual developments of the notions of the Philosophy of *Mind* in general and the Philosophy of Dualism in particular as the results of the particular periods of Religious, Social and Political circumstances. Knowing something as it is always differs from knowing something by analyzing or understanding its surrounding circumstances.

The Philosophy of *Mind* is one of the most exciting and innovative areas in Philosophy in the current era. Philosophy of *Mind* makes an effort for a comprehensive and systematic understanding of the *Mind*, which thinks and experiences. It tries to understand what *Mind* is, what it does, and how we can uncover it. Consciousness, intentionality, subjectivity and causation of mental states are the main features or characteristics of the *Mind/Soul*. We think ourselves as conscious and rational creatures; this notion of *Mind* which we have stands for our mental phenomena or mental states. To have an idea of our own mental phenomena we need not to have any training, it is a thing which we inevitably learn as we learn a language. The mental phenomena constitute our mental life without these we cannot be conscious of ourselves as thinking beings. It is therefore imperative that philosophy studies our mental life and its underlying structure. Philosophy of *Mind* is the threshold through which we can enter into temple of our intellectual treasures. Without the philosophy of *Mind* man cannot understand his own nature. This philosophy of *Mind/Soul* originated in Greek philosophy and is still continuing our time.

If we try to understand the historical background of the philosophy of *Mind* then that will show us the chronological development of the four important movements in the history of Philosophy which are part of Philosophy of *Mind*; they are Dualism, Materialism, Idealism, and Functionalism. Dualism is the doctrine about the relationship between *Mind* and matter, which begins with the claim that mental phenomena are, in some respects, non-physical. Materialism holds that there is only one substance that is the physical substance. For them all mental states like pains, beliefs, desires, etc. are fundamentally physical states or else we can say that they are caused by physical substance. All things are composed of matter and all phenomena (including consciousness) are the result of material interactions. In Idealism, all of reality is reducible to one fundamental substance, the mental substance. The human spirit is the most important element in life and the universe is essentially non-material in its ultimate nature. Functionalism follows a middle path between Dualism and Materialism. It is a theory about the nature of mental states. According to this, mental states are identified by what they do rather than by what they are made of. Functionalism goes against materialism by denying that mental states are identical to physical state and go against Dualism by holding that *Mind* is not something that exists apart from the physical. The total view of the concept of the functionalism is that it is not the physical substance itself that is important, but rather the way in which the physical substance is organized. These four fundamental thoughts are very important to understand the developments in the philosophy of *Mind*.

1.1. Philosophy of Mind of the Pre-Socratic Thinkers

The Pythagoreans, Socrates, Plato, Aristotle, and almost all philosophers who adhered to the rationalist view of man tried to transcend the materialist way of talking about the *Mind*. They recognized the immaterial character of the *Psyche* and tried to make sense of this new conception. Philosophically no one would attempt to deny that the Greeks left an imperishable legacy of literature and art to the European world. The Pre-Socratic philosophy can be divided into two major parts; we can divide them between *philosophical and non-philosophical or pre-philosophical and philosophical or pre-*

Homeric and post-Homeric. It doesn't matter through which names we are categorizing them but what matters is what they said. Pre-philosophical Greek attitudes toward the *Soul* and the thoughts for surviving bodily death were found in *Homer's* literature, that is *Iliad* and *Odyssey*, and subsequently in the mystery cults of *Dionysus*² and *Orpheus*³. But the earliest philosophical quest for such issues occurred hundreds of years later, that is in the second half of the 7th century or 6th century B. C., primarily in the philosophies of Thales, Pythagoras and Heraclitus. Anyhow in the pre-Socratic period, whether it was philosophical or pre-philosophical, the speculative notions of *Soul* of the general mass was guided by three leading influences; they are, first, *a religious feeling or the sentiments of God*, second, *love of poetry and*, third, *a way of life and customs which arose out of their popular civil and political institutions*. These three significant things constitute the basis of the speculative philosophy of the Greeks. Another important thing I want to mention here is that “*in every department of Grecian speculation we find that mental inquiries were viewed through the medium of theological principles.*”⁴

At the same time a kind of *Animism*⁵ (belief in Souls) was very much popular and widely spread in the ancient period. It was not limited to any particular region or religion, this concept was there in all religions and regions of the world. Whether it was an “Innate Idea” or this kind of idea was “simultaneously developed in all the regions of the world” is an unanswerable question. But in the process of civilization the concept of the *Soul* was also given much importance. The concept of the *Soul* was one of the central issues of that society, without which neither philosophical, nor political, nor religious nor even social issues were shaped. But some questions like, what is the *Soul*? Whether human beings only have *Souls* or all other animals too? If there are *Souls*, What are the features of the *Soul*? What about death? Whether the *Soul* survives death or not? If the *Soul* survives death then either it goes to heaven or transmigrates into another body? What do they look

². The Greek God of wine, fruitfulness, and vegetation, worshipped in orgiastic rites.

³. A Poet, credited with the authorship of the poems forming the basis of Orphism. Orphism is a mystery religion of ancient Greece, widespread from the 6th century BC.

⁴. Robert Blakey. A.M., *History of the philosophy of mind* (London: Longman, Brown, Green and Longmans, 1850), vol. 1, p. 06.

⁵. Animism derived from a Latin word called ‘Anima’ which means ‘Soul’ or ‘Self’.

like? Where are they located? All these questions around the notion of the *Soul* were haunting the ancient people. The Hebrew authors of the *Old Testament* and the Homeric author of the *Iliad* and the *Odyssey* repeatedly call attention to the cognitive and affective aspects of human nature which indicate an inner, personal dimension, something which is hidden from others but open to one's own awareness.⁶ This is the period from which we have received the concept of the *Soul*. That's why there is no doubt that the concept of the *Soul* had a long history and the *Hebrews* are one of the earliest peoples to formulate such a concept. The ancient Hebrews say that it is the *Soul* in a body which makes it alive, makes it a living thing rather than a dead thing. MacDonald says that, "there is an astonishing correspondence between the *Hebrew* term *Nephesh* and the *Greek* term *Psychē*."⁷ For Hebrews the *Soul* is an animating principle. This *Soul* continues to exist after death. When a person dies the *Body* dies and there is a sense in which the *Soul* ceases to control the movement of the *Body*, but the *Soul* does continue to exist.

It is Greece which gave us the concept of man as an intellectual being which decisively influenced the subsequent evolution of European thought. The concept of the *Psyche* (the *Soul*) was well-known to the ancient Greek thinkers. Pre-philosophical Greek attitude toward the *Soul* and its prospects for surviving bodily death found expressions in Homer. For Homer, *Psyche* is the force which keeps the human being alive. Concerning the *Psyche* Homer says that it leaves the *Body* at the moment of death, and then it flutters about in Hades. Besides, he adds that,

*"The Psyche of the living and of the dying man; for one thing, it leaves its owner when he is dying, or when he loses consciousness."*⁸

Consciousness, which is an essential property, according to the contemporary philosophy of *Mind*, is attributed to the *Psyche*. According to the Homeric poems the *Psyche* leaves the *Body* through the mouth or through the wound and Homeric writings show that the *Psyche* is similar to the breath. For Homer even animals too possess the *Psyche*; the way

⁶. Paul S. Macdonald, *History of the Concept of Mind* (USA: Ashgate Publishing Limited, 2003), p.2.

⁷. Ibid, p.11.

⁸. Bruno Snell, *The discovery of the mind: in Greek philosophy and literature* (New York: Unabridged Dover Republication, 1982), p.08.

the *Psyche* enters and leaves the human *Body* in the same way it enters and leaves the animal *Body*. Here the fundamental thing which we have to observe is the phenomena of consciousness. In case of consciousness a clear-cut division was made by Homer between the *Self*, *Psyche* and the *Body*. *Body* alone cannot hold consciousness, at the same time the *Psyche* too cannot hold consciousness alone but as an animating principle the *Psyche* can only bring life in the *Body* and it is the life principle without which we cannot imagine the motion of the *Body*. There are two other words, like *Psyche*, which have been used in Homer poems to explain the non-physical activities of the man, they are *Thymos* and *Nous*. Some philosophers as well some philologists claim that the word *Thymos* stands for ‘motion and emotion’ whereas the word *Nous* stands for ‘the recipient of images or understanding.’ The *Nous* may be generally said to be in charge of intellectual matters and *Thymos* is the in charge of emotional things. Karl R. Popper says that,

*“Of the foremost importance in Homer is Thymos, the stuff of life, the vaporous breath Soul, the active, energetic, feeling and thinking material related to blood. It leaves us when we faint or, with our last breath, when we die. Later this term is often restricted in meaning, so as to mean courage, energy, spirit, vigour.”*⁹

But in which sense Homer used this words exactly no one knows. But one thing is very clear here is that motion, emotion, life, consciousness, intellect, etc. are related to the *Psyche*, *Thymos* and *Noos*. The *Iliad* and the *Odyssey* (epic poems), which stand at the source of the Greek tradition, speak to us with a strong emotional appeal. Plato’s *Phaedrus* and *The Republic* also discuss *Thymos* as one of the three constituent parts of human *Psyche*. In *the Republic* (Book IV) the *Soul* has been divided into *Nous* (intellect), *Thumos* or *Thymos* (passion), and *Epithumia* (appetite). Though the *Pre-Socratic* Philosophy is considered as Natural Philosophy or Physical Philosophy, we cannot take the Homeric thoughts as part of Natural Philosophy. First of all the *Soul* was not taken as natural phenomenon and second, it is purely a speculative principle which explains the totality of the human existence. Therefore the concept of the *Soul* is embedded in the Greek religion and culture.

⁹. Karl R. Popper, *The World of Parmenides* (New York: Routledge Publications, 1998), P. 229.

1.1.1. Thales

Some philosophers say that the Greeks were aware of a *Soul-Body* problem but not of a *Mind-Body* problem but how far it can stand as true is uncertain. But one thing is true that what sort of activities are attributed to the *Mind* in the Cartesian and the post-Cartesian philosophy, are the same activities which are attributed to the *Soul* in Greek philosophy. Anyhow one thing is sure that the Greek philosophers not only talked about the *Soul* but also talked about the *Mind* (*Nous*). The main philosophical investigation of the philosophy of *Mind* begins from Thales' (640 B.C.), of Miletus. There is a strong reason to say this because Thales was the first thinker to try to give an account for the nature of the world without appealing to the wills and whims of anthropomorphic and Homeric Gods. Thales was one of the most influential philosophers of the ancient Greek and is considered as one of the *Seven Sages* of Greece. He was also regarded by many philosophers as the first philosopher or the father of philosophy, most notably Aristotle¹⁰. Bertrand Russell also says that philosophy begins with Thales'.¹¹ Though Thales and some of his successors did not speak particularly about the *Mind* but we cannot ignore their contribution in developing philosophy of *Mind*. He was the one who turned their attention towards the philosophy of *Mind* by rejecting the mythological explanations and showed a path for the scientific revolution. And he was also the first to define general principles and set forth scientific hypotheses regarding the nature of the universe.

Though none of his writings has been transmitted directly from him, we have some information regarding his philosophy through some of his successors. Plutarch, a Greek historian from 1st century A.D, defines Thales' notion of *Soul* as 'it is a thing possessing self-conditioned or perpetual motion.' Aristotle also attributes the same thing in '*De Anima*', that,

¹⁰. *Metaphysics*, Alpha, 983b18.

¹¹. Bertrand Russell, *The History of Western Philosophy* (New York: Simon & Schuster, Inc., 1967), Chapter – 1.

*“Thales, too, apparently, judging from the anecdotes related of him, conceived soul as a cause of motion, if it be true that he affirmed the loadstone to possess soul, because it attracts iron.”*¹²

But Strabo, another Greek historian from 1st century B. C., attributes the *motion* to the *Mind* but not to the *Soul*. He says; “*that Mind, according to Thales, was that which contained self-will or motion.*”¹³ Understanding these two contradicting statements is not that easy because how one thing (motion) could become the feature of two different entities. Though we have very few fragments available about Thales’ Philosophy but among them we have an important fragment available which can bring these contradicting views together and give a possibility to understand the notion of *motion* and also make a way to construct a relation between *God* and the *Soul*. Aristotle says that, the *Soul* is intermingled in the universe, which is perhaps the reason why Thales also thought that all things are full of Gods.¹⁴ Here we have to add another important idea that the *Mind (Nous)* of the world is God.¹⁵ It shows that the words *Mind* and God were used to refer to one thing only but nowhere it is mentioned to which it refers. There is a possibility to conceive that the *Mind/God* is the source of knowledge. But there is no possibility to attribute consciousness to the *Mind* because there are no individual *Minds*. This *Mind* (God) can animate the *Self* or awake the *Self* but cannot hold consciousness. For Thales, all things are full of daemons, though it doesn’t matter whether it is a stone or a tree or a living *Body*. From this what could be inferred is that after death a *Body* can turn as non-living *Body* but still it is part of the universe. For Thales *there is no ultimate coming to be or passing away* because all things are ultimately water. From Thales’ point of view, change is mere appearance and is not ultimately real. So, in that case we may ask, *when Body loses its consciousness and the Soul leaves the Body*, then what will be there in the matter? As I said above, it doesn’t matter whether it is a living-thing or non-living-thing; *all things are full of daemons* so a dead *Body* (inanimate) also can have daemons but it cannot have consciousness. So the universal thing God or *Mind* cannot hold consciousness. So also the *Soul* cannot hold consciousness because it leaves the *Body* when *Body* loses its consciousness but it’s not the case that when *Soul* leaves the

¹². R. D. Hicks, *Aristotle’s De Anima* (Cambridge: Cambridge University press, 1907), p. 17.

¹³. Robert Blakey. A.M., *History of the philosophy of mind*, Vol. 1 (London: C. F. Hodgson, Printer), p.08.

¹⁴. Aristotle, *De Anima*, 411a7.

¹⁵. Paul S. MacDonald, *History of the Concept of the Mind* (Aldershot: Ashgate, 2003-2007), p. 25.

Body then *Body* loses its consciousness. So neither *Body*, nor *Soul*, and nor *Mind* alone can have consciousness. But there should be something which can hold consciousness, cognition and perception. What can it be?

What is the role of Thales' principle element *Water*? According to Thales, water is the principle of things, water is the origin of all things, everything emerges from water and everything will return to water; moreover, all things ultimately are water. The seeds of all things have a moist nature, and that water is the origin of the nature of the moist things. Without water life cannot be imagined, without the *Soul* there will be no motion and without *Mind* there will be no self-will. The most essential thing in *Philosophy of Mind* is the role of consciousness. Moist, the eternal principle, cannot hold consciousness because *Body* cannot have the motion without the *Soul*, so if a motionless *Body* holds consciousness then all other things, which do not have motion, also should have the consciousness which is absurd. Thales observed that (presumably) living things depend for their growth (and movement) on the presence of moist seeds, whose principle of action is derived from water. Without moist there can be neither cognition nor perception. So the integration and coordination of the *Mind*, *Body*, *Soul* and *Moisture* is responsible for the operation of cognition and perception. In the available fragments there is nothing about the word '*Self*' but for the understanding of consciousness I want to apply here. It would seem that Thales might have thought that the *Self* has *Mind*, *Body*, *Soul* and *Moisture* as integral parts and has consciousness of its own and of the external world. Attributing consciousness to either one of the four integral parts of the *Self* may lead us away from Thales' point of view. That's why I don't want to dare to do that. Due to the lack of authentic sources we are unable to get the full-fledged notions of Thales but the above information is sufficient to throw light on Thales' philosophy of *Mind* and *Soul*.

1.1.2. Pherecydes of Syros

Pherecydes of Syros was a 6th Century B.C., Greek Philosopher from the island of Syros. He was traditionally held to be the teacher of Pythagoras. As we have seen earlier,

Thales was the first person to hold the *Soul* as immortal. Some other sources show that Pherecydes was the first person to hold the notion of immortality of the *Soul*. There is an example to support this,

*“Pherecydes centuries later was routinely recognized by Latin writers as the first author to hold that the human Soul was immortal.”*¹⁶

But Herodotus, the Greek historian says that the Egyptians were the first to hold that the *Psyche* of man is immortal and that, when *Body* perishes, it always enters into another animal that is being born. The *Psyche* is then said to enter into all creatures of land, sea and air before returning again to the *Body* of a man that is being born.¹⁷ According to Pherecydes, the immortal *Soul* passes from one *Body* to another after the death of the flesh. The human *Soul* can enter into an animal and vice versa. What we can understand here is that, based on available fragments of their notions, there is not much difference between *Thales* and Pherecydes. Pherecydes brought a change in Greeks thought by claiming that the *Soul* transmigrate from one *Body* to another against to the traditional view of the immortality of the *Souls* in Hades. Though some myths and religious beliefs involved in explaining the *Soul* in case of Thales, Pherecydes and some other Greek philosophers, we need not to ignore their theories because, as Karl R. Popper has said, myths and religious beliefs are attempts to explain to ourselves theoretically the world we live in – including the social world – and how this world affects us and our ways of living. So, all aspects are necessary in analyzing the concepts of particular philosophers and particular periods but our final view on any theory should be based on rational grounds. “Though Thales and Pherecydes are materialist philosophers but they did not give up the non-materialistic aspect of the man and other beings. Thales holds the immortality of the *Soul* in Hades whereas Pherecydes holds the immortality of the *Soul* as transmigrating from one *Body* to another *Body*. It seems that by giving importance to both aspects, materialistic and non-materialistic, they both remained in dualism.”

¹⁶. Ibid, p. 23.

¹⁷. Dorothea Frede and Burkhard Reis, *Body and Soul in Ancient Philosophy* (Germany: Hubert & co. GmbH & Co. KG Gottingen, 2007), p. 27.

1.1.3. Anaximander

Thales was more famous than his successors; and he seems to deserve his reputation as a Great inquirer. But Anaximander (610 B.C.) of Miletos, who was a friend, associate and disciple of Thales, was the first truly great speculative thinker. He introduced the philosophical term '*Principle*' (*archê*), referring to the origination substance and also the first Greek philosopher who produced a written account called *Concerning Nature*. He developed the concept that the *infinite* (*Apeiron*) as the first *Principle* of things. *Infinite* is principle and also an element of things that exist. This is the thing from which the world comes into being. It is the *principle* for everything and is eternal; it surrounds everything and governs everything. The functions which are attributed to the *Principle* are like the functions of ancient Greek God but the *Principle* is not God but it seems like the element of Thales (*Water*) which can fulfill the purpose of Anaximander's principle. There are many interpretations regarding the word *infinite*, to which it refers. Aristotle materializes the term, and makes it stand for *matter*; all things are produced by, and immerge into it. But it cannot be taken purely as material stuff because the basic stuff cannot be identical with material stuff. Anaximander characterized his basic stuff as that which has no limitation, infinite in time and space and is not conceptually delimited. We can understand the *Principle* (*infinite*) as the basic stuff existing outside our world because it cannot be comparable with the worldly elements. Another thing is that it is unchangeable but all the changes in the world are just modifications of the same stuff. The *Principle* exists outside the world yet is the cause of the world. The integration and disintegration of the worlds happen within the *Principle*. It is said that Anaximander was the first philosopher of antiquity who announced the famous axiom that *out of nothing, nothing can be made*.¹⁸

We have no evidence of whether he spoke about the nature of the *Psyche* or not, but still there is a reason for mentioning him here. While discussing about the pre-Socratic thinkers Aristotle mentions that they were searching for a element which

¹⁸. Robert Blakey. A.M., *History of the Philosophy of Mind*, Vol. 1 (London: C. F. Hodgson, Printer), p.10.

constitutes all things; while each philosopher gave a different answer as to the identity of this element (where as *Water* for Thales and *Air* for Anaximenes) but Anaximander understood that “*the beginning or first principle to be an endless, unlimited primordial mass.*” He also explains the four elements (air, earth, water and fire) of ancient physics and says that they cannot be the first principle of the universe. The first principle is other than these four elements. Thus there was a great revolution in Greek thought. The transformation of thought from materialistic substance to metaphysical substance is a remarkable change in the history of the Greek thought because of which the Greek concept of reality including *Mind* got a new meaning.

1.1.4. Anaximenes

Anaximenes (556 B.C.), a companion of Anaximander, also holds the view that the underlying nature is one. He followed Anaximander and said that the first principle of all things is *infinite*. But Anaximenes has taken a step forward and specified what that first principle is; he has taken *Air* as the underlying principle of the universe, from which all things are engendered, into which all things are resolved. Anaximenes the underlying stuff, according to Anaximenes, is a physical stuff which is contrary to Anaximander’s immaterial substance and he thus replaced the metaphysical substance by the materialist substance. At first sight Anaximenes seems to have taken a step back from the more abstract conception of *Anaximander* towards the more concrete and myth-based conception of Thales. Thales’ underlying stuff, *Water*, is myth-based. Because it is said that,

*“If Thales finds this something in water—still very similar to the Homeric myth which declares the God Oceanus as the origin of all things.”*¹⁹

What is new in Thales’ philosophy is that he has given a materialist cosmological explanation of the universe. Like Thales, *Anaximenes* also has given a materialist explanation by referring to *Air* as the first principle. But still we cannot say that *Anaximenes* was totally away from the myth-based beliefs because at that time there was

¹⁹. Hans Kelsen, *Society and Nature: A Sociological Inquiry* (New Jersey: The Lawbook Exchange, Ltd. 2009), p. 234.

a traditional belief that *Air* or *Breath* is the *Soul-stuff*, which is the carrier of consciousness. But once its (*Air*) definition includes the explanations from Physical sciences and cosmology, we cannot consider his theory as fully myth-based, though it seems to be myth-based. We can infer that the traditional myth-based concept could have become the base for his cosmological explanation. Another thing is that we cannot even say that he is totally away from the abstract conception of the *Psyche*. The relation which he explains between the individual *Psyche* and worldly *Psyche* is totally an abstract conception. Though the inside *Breath (Psyche)* and outside the *Wind (worldly Psyche)* are the synonyms of the vivifying principle *Air*, but whatever he said about their relation and their functions is totally an abstract notion. When it comes to the main issue of the concept of the *Soul*, he believed that the breath is connected to the concept of the *Psyche*. *Anaximenes* announced that the *Air* is nothing but *Psyche*. He says that,

“Our *Psyche*, being *Air* or *breath*, holds together and controls us (our bodies) like *Wind (breath)* or *Air* enclose the whole world and controls it. The *Air* holds us from inside and the world from outside.”²⁰

This type of concept we can see even in ancient Indian tradition too. In *Vedas*, the oldest scriptures of *Hinduism*, the *Atharva Veda* says that *Prāna*, life or breath, personified as the supreme spirit. *Prāna*, to whom all this universe is subject, who has become the Lord of the all, on whom the all is supported. This Sanskrit word *Prāna* is equivalent of Greek word *Pneuma*, stands for the principle, which supports the entire universe. “*Prāna*, in whose power is this all, who is the Lord of all, on whom all is based.....in air is what has been and what is to be; everything is based on air” (*Atharva Veda* 11.4). Even if we go back to the Homeric period we can see the traditional or the religious aspect of the concept of the *Psyche*. *Homer* also explains the *Air* or *Breathe* as *Psyche*.²¹ The traditional view of the *Psyche* has been repeated once again by *Anaximenes* but from a philosophical perspective but not from the religious perspective. The life principle and motive force of man is, traditionally, *Pneuma*²², *Pneuma* is treated as *Wind* in external world, so the life-principle of the external world is *Pneuma*. Therefore, *Wind*, *Breath*, *Air* is the life and substance of all things. Here *Air* holds the *Body* means that the *Psyche*

²⁰. Paul S. MacDonald, *History of the Concept of the Mind* (Aldershot: Ashgate, 2003-2007), p. 27.

²¹. Ibid, p. 27.

²². An ancient Greek philosophical word for *Breath* and in a religious context it is used for *Spirit* or *Soul*.

possesses the *Body*, that is, it permeates the whole *Body* and thus controls it. The most important thing in Anaximenes is the analogy of nature and man. The *Psyche* (breath), holds together and controls man. So whatever holds together and controls the world must also be breath or air, because the world is like a large-scale man or animal. Another important thing is that wind, breath or air is the life and substance of all things. The physical nature of the man and the world is same as the life principle of the man and the world.

Thales' declaration of *Psyche* as the mover, Anaximander is declaration of '*Infinite*' as the underlying principle and Anaximenes' declaration of *Breath* as the *Psyche* and *Wind* as the *world Psyche* are the basic sources of the *Law of causality*. Pre-Socratic philosophers are the natural philosophers and they were interested in the inquiry of the causes of things. The theory of causality is an important development in Greek thought. So whatever pre-Socratic philosophers have done is all about and around the theory of causality. Thales, Anaximander and Anaximenes through their underlying principle tried to explain causal notions and this tradition continued further.

1.1.5. Hermotimus

Another philosopher Hermotimus (520 B.C) was a distinguished early metaphysician, and first proposed the idea of *Soul* being fundamental in the cause of change. He proposed that physical entities are static, while the *Soul* causes the change. That is why Robert Blakey mentioned that Hermotimus entertained the idea that the *Soul* often quits the *Body*, and wanders to a great distance from it, in order to obtain that knowledge which is denied to it whilst residing in its earthy tenement.²³ Here we have to seriously look into the idea that the *Soul often quits the Body*. It doesn't mean that the *Soul* frequently leaves the *Body*, but that it leaves the *Body* at the time of death. Then it wanders far from the earthly attachments. After the wandering it returns back to the

²³. Robert Blakey. A.M., *History of the Philosophy of Mind*, Vol. 1 (London: C. F. Hodgson, Printer), p.13.

earthly attachments by entering in another *Body*. According to him the *Soul* is the animating principle or that which brings motion into the *Body*.

1.1.6. Pythagoras of Samos

Pythagoras of Samos (570-c. 495 BC), who was the founder of great religious movement called Pythagoreanism, was also a Greek Philosopher and mathematician. Pythagoras was not only the most famous thinker in the history of philosophy before the great period which includes Socrates, Plato and Aristotle; he was also one of the most fascinating and mysterious figures of ancient times. Though Pythagoras inspired legends he personally wrote nothing. We have very little reliable information about Pythagoras from the secondary sources. Aristotle often referred to the Pythagoreans but not to Pythagoras as such. By common agreement Pythagoras was arguably the first mathematician, the first philosopher and the first metempsychosist.²⁴ It is not just because he was the first person to use numbers, not because he was the first person to seek a rational explanation of the world, or not because of the first person to believe that the *Soul* is immortal, but because of the belief that all Pythagorean concepts began from Pythagoras. Pythagoras is the founder of a new school of philosophy.

When it comes to mathematics he is very famous for a mathematical theory called the *Pythagorean Theorem*. Even though his mathematical theorems cannot be discussed here, we can show how his mathematical theorems subsequently led to the theory of the transmigration of the *Soul* which is central to the philosophy of Pythagoras. As a mathematician whether he was the first mathematician or not is a big question because there is confusion among the scholars. While talking about his theorems and authorship obviously three doubts will be raised in our mind. At first, whether Pythagoras was Greek or Chinese? Secondly, if he was not Chinese then who was the author of Pythagorean Theorem? Thirdly, did he learn it from India? The first doubt, *Was Pythagoras Chinese?*,

²⁴. Metempsychosis is a philosophical term in the Greek language referring to transmigration of the Soul.

arises because of his theorem which was also available in China before 6th century BC. Some people say that,

*“He was not even the first to discover it: the theorem had been known to the Babylonians, and to the Chinese, at least a thousand years before him.”*²⁵

There are good evidences to show that the mathematical theorem (which is known to this world as Pythagorean Theorem) first appeared in the *Chiu Chang Suan Shu*²⁶ which was the most important mathematical books in China; it includes the mathematical history of Chinese from 1261 BC. Some other says that the Pythagorean Theorem has been known in China as the *Kou-Ku* (right angles) theorem and it appears in numerous problems in Chinese writings.²⁷ It is also said that,

*“The problem of the Kou-ku of the Chiu Chang indicates that the Chinese had accumulated a wealth of experience in working with the right triangle in various mathematical situations well before the Christian era.”*²⁸

Even the *hsuan-thu* diagram of the *Chou pei* represents the oldest recorded proof of the Pythagorean Theorem. That’s why the author of “*Was Pythagoras Chinese?*” finally says that the authorship of the Pythagorean Theorem is indisputably Chinese. He also declares that if we now scrutinize the claim for Pythagorean authorship of the theorem that bears that name, we find that it rests mainly on tradition – a tradition that is founded on the realization that much of western societies’ ethical, political, philosophical, and early scientific theories originated in the eastern Mediterranean region.

When it comes to the question, *Does Pythagoras learn it from India?* then there are some evidences to support this argument. The historian of ancient Greek mathematics Thomas Heath states that this type of proof was alien to Greek geometrical methods and modes of thinking. He expressed the doubt that this mathematical theorem might have

²⁵. Eli Maor, *The Pythagorean Theorem* (Princeton and Oxford: Princeton University Press, 2007), p. xi.

²⁶. It was translated into English as “Nine chapters on the mathematical are.”

²⁷. Eli Maor, *The Pythagorean Theorem* (Princeton and Oxford: Princeton University Press, 2007), p. 64.

²⁸. Frank J. Swetz and T. I. Kao. *Was Pythagoras Chinese?* (University Park: The Pennsylvania State University Press, 1988), p. 66.

been developed outside the Greek and Greeks might have adopted it at the earliest stage. Swetz and Kao state that,

*“While Greek origins for such a proof remain in doubt, it is known to have appeared in the works of the Indian mathematician Bhāskara in 1050 BC.”*²⁹

That’s why if we go back into the history of Eastern mathematics, through some available evidence, it seems that *Bhāskara* was influenced by ancient Chinese mathematical works.³⁰ The earliest *Hindu* writings on mathematics were an offspring of *Hindu* religious practices. A group of writings known collectively as the *Śulbasūtras* deal with the dimensions of sacrificial altars (*vedi*), a subject of great importance in *Hindu* religion. One of these *Śulbasūtras*, by an author named *Baudhāyana*, dates back to perhaps 600 BC or earlier, to the time of *Thales*, gives instructions on how to *square a rectangle* (how to construct a square equal in area to a given rectangle which resembles Pythagorean Theorem). The later *Śulbasūtras* of *Kātyāyana* states the similar theorem. Also in the *Śulbasūtras* there are instructions on how to construct a square whose area is the sum of two given squares.³¹ After observing all of these evidences we can estimate that the Indians also had the knowledge of the Pythagorean Theorem at least as early as *Pythagoras*. These evidences show that *Pythagoras* might have learned it from India. Some other says that, although *Pythagoras* may not have travelled as far as Persian or India, he may well have become aware of the teachings of the Brahmins when passing through Phoenicia on his way to Babylon³² because there are number of evidences to show that he visited Babylon. Some other says that,

*“He has been prolonged for nearly thirty years, to visit the Arabians, the Syrians, the Phoenicians, the Chaldeans, the Indians, and the Gallic Druids.”*³³

Another thing is that the Pythagorean Theorem was not in use for five hundred years after the death of *Pythagoras*. It was Cicero and Plutarch who attributed the theorem to

²⁹. Frank J. Swetz and T. I. Kao. *Was Pythagoras Chinese?* (University Park: The Pennsylvania State University Press, 1988), p. 14.

³⁰. *Ibid*, p. 14.

³¹. Eli Maor, *The Pythagorean Theorem* (Princeton and Oxford: Princeton University Press, 2007), p. 67.

³². Paul Strathern, *Pythagoras & his Theorem* (London: Arrow, 1997), p. 23.

³³. Edward Pococke, *India in Greece; or, Truth in Mythology* (London: John J. Griffin and Co., 1852), p. 353.

Pythagoras, though according to Sir Thomas L. Heath, there is no attribution by Pythagoras himself during his lifetime.

But my purpose here is not to find out who was the author of the Pythagorean Theorem. My purpose here is to show how the radically different civilizations in India, China and Greece regarded right triangles in a remarkably similar way. In case of Pythagoras the similarity was there not only in mathematics but also in religious and philosophical aspects. The concept of transmigration of the *Soul* was not an alien notion for Indian philosophical as well as *Hindu* religious systems. What I just want to remind is that the *Hindu thought* also showed a great influence on Greek thought as M.E. Pococke shows in his book *India in Greece*. It is believed that besides Pythagoras, Appolonius, Democritus, Anaxarchus and Pyrrho also visited India. According to some other philosophers, the Golden Philosophy first descended upon "the Indians, the mightiest nation upon the earth". The central purpose of Pythagoras was to purify the *Soul* of man and to guarantee a happy immortality by a special discipline. As I have already mentioned, Pythagoras and Pythagoreans held the doctrine of metempsychosis, as the *Hindus* do the same tenet, of the transmigration of *Soul*.³⁴

Pythagoreans followed the *Orphic* traditions and followed the traditional practice of purifying the *Soul*. They also suggested a deeper idea of what such purification might be. They believed that physical sensuality contaminates the *Soul*; the noblest means of purification is intellectual activity which liberates the *Soul*. For the Pythagoreans, purification partly consisted in the observance of ascetic rules of abstinence from certain kinds of food and dress and intellectually, the purification of the *Soul* by the contemplation of the divine order of the world which includes the mathematical activity. Health was considered to be greatly improved by music, when used in a proper way. To understand the Pythagorean concept of the *Soul* first we have to understand his concept of the universe. While his contemporaries, Anaximander and Anaximenes, tried to

³⁴. Ibid, p. 363.

demonstrate the nature of the supreme divine power in their philosophical ways, Pythagoras demonstrated it through the mixture of religious, philosophical and scientific ways. The Pythagoreans are not only known for their theory of the transmigration of *Souls* but also for their theory that numbers constitute the true nature of things which is connected with the human life and the universe at large. The way Anaximenes proposed divine *Air* as the cause of an apparent diversity in the same way Pythagoras proposed divine *Fire* as the cosmogenetic God, the source of immortal life and the substance of the universe. But there is a twist,

*“Pythagoras identified the divine Fire with the divine One and by this puzzling identification of substance with number caused endless trouble to all who attempt to understand Pythagoreanism without being Pythagoreans.”*³⁵

The *One* seemed to *Pythagoras* to have inexhaustible power and was like the *Infinite* and *Indeterminate* of Anaximander. The *One* is an affirmation of divine causal unity set against the plurality of changing things within the cosmos. When Pythagoras declared that the supreme God was the *One*, he did not in the least intend to deny that the supreme God was *Fire* and was the source of all life and of the universe. The *One* was the source of all unity as well as the first cause of all numbers and the determining principle in all diversity.³⁶ Here the *Pythagorean* concept of *One* resembles Anaximander’s principle of *Infinite* since the Pythagoreans *One* too is infinite and indeterminate.

According to Pythagoras the *One* is *Fire*, and the *One Fire* is forming the Universe. It explains all the phenomena that come into being in the universe. For Pythagoras, on Earth we men are imprisoned, being surrounded by bodies, by constant change and imperfection; but we have Life (*Psyche*) within us, and are therefore akin to the *One Fire*. The purest part of the Life or *Soul* within us is *Mind* or reason, and we may speak of it as a fragment of the *One* which is the source of all order.³⁷ *Mind* has been treated as part of the divine *One* and the source of knowledge. The *One* produces many particular things;

³⁵. Roy Kenneth Hack, *God in Greek Philosophy To the Time of Socrates* (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1969), p. 48.

³⁶. Ibid, p. 50.

³⁷. Ibid, p. 53.

and not only man but every particular thing shows forth the handiwork of the *One*, since the *One*, in producing it, has arranged it in a particular order, and not only man but everything in the universe is a microcosm. The *One* thus binds and produces order. Our *Souls* are immortal; but the portion of the *One* that they contain is too feeble to make this binding with our bodies permanent. Its dissolution is the 'release' in death. If we consider all these saying of Pythagoras in the pure philosophical sense, the *One* which was seen as *Fire*, as well as the supreme God, will appear as pure substance. But some philosophers say that the Pythagorean *Fire* is going away from the substance theory towards the theory of causality. Because the *One* is the most powerful of all causes; it is so to speak progressively withdrawing itself from substance although it still clings to *Fire*. The *One* does not grow, but it is the cause of growth. It does not change, but it is the cause of change. Another important thing which Pythagoras comprised is that our supreme God is the *One Fire*; the Stars, the Planets, and the Sun are clearly of kindred *Fire*, and are the principal subordinate Gods; they dwell in a pure region, where there is less change and life is more nearly perfect.³⁸

The most important thing that we have to keep in our minds is that the *Soul* is incorporeal in nature and that is a spiritual entity. For Pythagoras the doctrine of the *Soul* explains the spiritual nature of man. All *Souls* come from the *One* divine source and runs through all human forms of life. Each *Soul* involved in the conflict of good and evil seeks to escape from the purgatorial round of lives and deaths into a better world of unity and rest. If *Body* is capable of having life could serve as the home of *Soul* and the *Soul* comes from the divine and returns to the divine. Pythagoras and early Pythagoreans used the *Psyche* to refer to the transmigrating *Soul*, the *Soul* that is the center of the personality during life. They believe that the *Soul* after withdrawing from one *Body* will transmigrate into another. The activity of transmigration will be going on as long as the *Soul* has bodily attachments and worldly desires. But there is a possibility to overcome the wheel of transmigration.

³⁸. Ibid, p. 53.

*“The power of mental concentration, and of metaphysical abstraction, are therefore the highest intellectual gifts, and quietism, or the absorption of our nature in God, is the last stage of virtue. ‘The end of man,’ said Pythagoras is God.”*³⁹

Pythagoras believed that the release from the *wheel of birth* is possible. There are some evidences that Pythagoras was associated with Orphism. We cannot talk about the authenticity of these evidences but it is true that, according to him or his religious movement, the *Soul* persist when *Body* dies; those persisting *Souls* that were pure remain permanently with God. But death, in the *wheel of transmigration*, is merely withdrawal of the animating force from the *Body*. On the basis of the above reference also we can establish the end of the man is God and the purity of the *Soul* means making itself like the *One* supreme God, who is perfect purity. In this way there will be possibility for *Soul* to attain purity. There is another reference which indicates the immortality of the *Soul*.

*“Our Souls are deathless; when they leave their former home, always new habitations welcome them to live afresh.”*⁴⁰

But this wheel of transmigration is to help the *Soul* to become pure to join with the perfect purity that is *One* supreme God. Pythagoras not only considered *Soul* as life principle, like his predecessors, but also regarded it as a Psychic faculty; the intellect and reason are also ascribed as the chief attributes which is really a revolution in the ancient time that began with Pythagoras. But after the transmigration whether it will get higher order life or lower order life will depend on the purity of the *Soul*. Every entrance of the *Soul* into a *Body* is a punishment imposed by the *One* supreme God, and resembles entrance into a tomb or a prison; if the *Soul* fails in purity, it may be sent into the *Body* of a lower animal, and if its failure be grave, it will undergo especial punishment in Hades. Whether Pythagoras was influenced by other scholars of thought is not clear, but one thing is sure that a new beginning had taken place with Pythagoras in the theory of *Soul*. The way Indian philosophical schools turned as religious sects, in the same way ancient Greek philosophical schools either were established on religious grounds or turned as religious movements because the influence of religion was in high degree. As the founder

³⁹. William Edward Hartpole Lecky, *History of European Morals from Augustus to Charlemagne*, Vol. 1 (New York: D. Appleton and Company, 1869), p. 347.

⁴⁰. Charles H. Kahn, *Pythagoras and Pythagoreans: A Brief History* (Indianapolis/Cambridge: Hackett Publishing Company, Inc. 2001), p. 147.

of the religious movement Pythagoras has come up with a new practice of dividing the *Soul*.

“He was an astronomer and mathematician who was said to have originated the doctrine of the tripartite soul, which resurfaced in the philosophy of Plato.”⁴¹

Whether it is the division of man (mental and material combination) or the division of only mental entity is not clear. But some references indicate that it is the division of man as *Mind (Nous)*, *Body (Soma)* and *Soul (Psyche)*. Whether Pythagoras’s philosophy is religious or non-religious is not main issue because most of the philosophers were somehow influenced by religious faiths and beliefs. In case of Pythagoras it happened from both the sides that he was influenced by Orphic religion (there are some other religions too) and also established his own religious movement called Pythagoreanism. But there was a vital difference between the *Orphic* thinking and the thought of Pythagoreans. *Orphics* understood the universe purely in religious ways on the basis of few simple doctrines, but Pythagoreans worshiped knowledge and wisdom as the source of salvation. That’s why the pursuit of wisdom acquired a new beginning and meaning from *Pythagoras*. He believed like the Indians that only by purifying the *Soul* we can attain divine powers and at the end merge with divinity. Hence, he insisted that a disciple should first be formally initiated by a preceptor who himself must be pure so that he can impart knowledge to others. Pythagoras taught that the study and the contemplation of the universe is the supreme religious duty of man, it was the means by which man could become like God.

Pythagoras performed purification rites and also followed and developed various rules of living which they believed would enable their *Souls* to achieve a higher rank among the Gods. As a prophet of God and a spokesman of Apollo, Pythagoras turned philosophy totally into a mystery religion that can be clearly seen in all that is known of his life and of his doctrines. Much of his mysticism concerning the *Soul* seems inseparable from the Orphic tradition. The whole school of Pythagoras made chastity one

⁴¹. Raymond Martin & John Barresi, *The Rise and the fall of Soul and Self* (New York: Columbia University Press, 2008), p. 10.

of its leading virtues, and even labored for the creation of a monastic system.⁴² That's why the whole school of *Pythagoras* objected to sacrifices.⁴³ The division of *Mind (Nous)*, *Body (Soma)* and *Soul (Psyche)* is clearly seen in Pythagorean philosophy. Not only the division but also the attributes of the *Mind*, *Body* and *Soul* are shown such as that the *Soul* as psychic faculty, *Mind* as the rational faculty and the *Body* as having sensations and thought.

1.1.7. Heraclitus of Ephesus

Heraclitus of Ephesus (535 – 475 BC) was the most significant philosopher of ancient Greek. But the details of Heraclitus personal life are almost completely unknown. He was just before what historical tradition calls the golden Age of Greece, a period which has come to reflect popular notions of culture and politics for Western civilization. He for the first time in the history of Greek thought recognized that man has a central *Self*: a single, vital faculty in terms of which sense-perception, language, ethical behavior, and ultimately death, must be understood. Heraclitus neither belongs to any school of Philosophy nor founded any school of his own. There is no one in the history of Greek philosophy to claim as his disciple. Heraclitus concerns with the meaning of human existence, that is why he declared that *I have searched myself* (Fragment-101) and learned everything about myself. He rejected the traditional ways of inquiries and tried to give better access to the truth. Loneliness of his life and the obscurity and misanthropy of his philosophy could cause to call him as the *dark philosopher* or *weeping philosopher*.

*“The Peripatetic Theophrastus (D.L.IX.6) diagnosed Heraclitus as “melancholic” (manic-depressive), on the ground that he left some things half-finished, and contradicted himself; later Greeks named him “the obscure.””*⁴⁴

Though he was characterized with all negative attributes but, in purely philosophical context, we can call Heraclitus as investigator or natural philosopher. In real sense an

⁴². William Edward Hartpole Lecky, *History of European morals from Augustus to Charlemagne*, Vol. 1 (New York: D. Appleton and Company, 1869), p. 109.

⁴³. Ibid, p. 167.

⁴⁴. *The Cambridge Companion to Early Greek Philosophy*, Edit. A.A. Long (Cambridge, UK: Cambridge University Press, 1999), p. 88.

instigator, at that time, is one whose mission is to prod sleeping minds to the waking state, to elevate minds to a higher level of consciousness. Only around one hundred and twenty of Heraclitus aphorisms survived. His most memorable statement is that “*you cannot step into the same river twice*” (Fragment 91). It means everything is in a constant flux, *all is becoming*. One cannot step into the same river twice because the river is a flowing stream and is never static. To say whether this kind of understanding of the nature was new for the ancient Greeks or not is a difficult task but he was the first philosopher who spread this. Another important thing here is that it is similar to the teachings of the *Buddha* who flourished around the time of *Heraclitus*.

I think it would make the understanding of the *Soul* easy if we have a brief introduction of the *Logos* before entering into Heraclitus’s notion of the *Soul*. *Logos* which is the central principle of his philosophy is the dynamic unity of reality. Since it is related to the notion of the *Soul* we have to know a little about it otherwise analyzing Heraclitus’s concept of the *Soul* will not be possible.

“Logos, which appears here and elsewhere in significant contexts in Heraclitus, was a commonly used Greek word. It basically meant ‘what is said,’ that is, ‘word’ or ‘story’; however, even in ordinary Greek speech it had rich ramifications of meaning.”⁴⁵

The *Logos*, through which all things come to be, is eternal; it is a pattern or law, or a directing force. It is ‘common’ in two senses: it is Universal, and it is equally understandable by all. It can be understood through his fragment (F-78) that human nature has no real understanding; only the divine nature has it. The divine nature of man, *Psyche*, according to them, may be common. The apprehension of the *Logos* is wisdom, and the chief content of the *Logos* is that all things are one. It pervades everything, and everything shares in it. The *Logos* is the principle according to which all things change and which determines the nature of the flux that resides in all things and beings. It is obvious to Heraclitus that *the world is uncreated*. So everything from eternity happens according to the equally eternal *Logos*. It ever was and is and will be: ever-living fire, kindling in measures and being quenched in measures. Etymologically speaking the word

⁴⁵. Ibid, p. 91.

Logos was there before and after Heraclitus but in which sense it was used differs from each other. If we go back before Heraclitus, there was a verb *Legein* on which the noun *Logos* is based which meant ‘collect.’⁴⁶ In Heraclitus’s time the *Logos* meant the Wise Thing; the *Wise Thing* is, what it does, and how it works by means of *Logoi* (plural of *Logos*) to bring everything to unity, to oneness. This is what Heraclitus has heard and heeded—we would say, discovered.⁴⁷

Here I want to introduce some fragments which can exhibit the real nature and importance of the *Logos*. There is a reason to give this much importance because the *Psyche* is inseparable from the *Logos*. I want to mention here a few fragments of Heraclitus one after the other which will give us the full view of *Logos*, unity and diversity.

*“Listening to the Logos rather than to me, it is wise to agree that all things are in reality one thing and one thing only.”*⁴⁸

*“Although this Logos is eternally valid, yet men are unable to understand it — not only before hearing it, but even after they have heard it for the first time. That is to say, although all things come to pass in accordance with this Logos, men seem to be quite without any experience of it — at least if they are judged in the light of such words and deeds as I am here setting forth. My own method is to distinguish each thing according to its nature, and to specify how it behaves; other men, on the contrary, are as neglectful of what they do when awake as they are when asleep.”*⁴⁹

*“Things which are put together are both whole and not whole, brought together and taken apart, in harmony and out of harmony; one thing arises from all things, and all things arise from one thing.”*⁵⁰

*“An unapparent connection is stronger (or: better) than one which is obvious.”*⁵¹

“As a single, unified thing there exists in us both life and death, waking and sleeping, youth and old age, because the former things having

⁴⁶. Eva Brann, *The Logos of Heraclitus*, (Philadelphia, Pennsylvania: Paul Dry Books, Inc. 2011) p. 10.

⁴⁷. Ibid, P. 18.

⁴⁸. Heraclitus, *Fragments*, Trans. Robinson. T.M. (London: University of Toronto Press, 1987), p.37.

⁴⁹. Ibid, p.11.

⁵⁰. Ibid, p.15.

⁵¹. Ibid, p.39.

*changed are now the latter, and when those latter things change, they become the former.”*⁵²

For Heraclitus all things are one only because there is no space for second thing; everything is being and becoming. But it is very difficult to understand this unity in diversity. As long as we are away from the understanding of *Logos*, understanding of unity will not be possible. For Heraclitus an unapparent connection is *Logos*. Through all these fragments, and some other fragments which I did not mention here, Heraclitus particularly propounds that we do and think everything by partaking in the divine *Logos*. That is why one must follow that which is common (Universal) and those who speak with sense must rely on what is common to all. Therefore it is necessary to follow the common (the *Logos* which is Universal). For him all sensible things are ever in a state of flux so no knowledge about them possible, but it doesn't mean that the change is unreal. But to prove that *knowledge can be achieved* he adopted the relativist view. Heraclitus says that opposites are the same because they can inhere simultaneously in the same object. He says that the polluted and the pure are one and the same thing and that the drinkable and the undrinkable are one and the same thing. Good and bad are the same, the hot and the cold, the son and the father, the dry and the moist, and every opposite is not essentially different, as it appears to be. Finally, he wants to say that in everything the opposite thing is inherent and due to flux it will be undergoing changes. But the essential thing, by which they are produced and in everything which is pertained, is *Logos*. So when we understand the *Logos* then the attainment of the knowledge is reached. Knowing the permanent and unchanging character of the sensible things is the main task. On the basis of this only Heraclitus drew the conclusion that there can be no knowledge of sensible objects, since they lack permanence.

Logos is one and indivisible, un-limited and timeless. That's why he believes that the hidden harmony is better than the obvious. We experience the nature of the *Logos* when we accurately experience the world. We exist through it, because of it, and we take our sense of meaning from its qualities. Indeed, our logging for immortality is nothing

⁵². Ibid, p.50.

more than the eternal nature of the *Logos* manifesting itself in our nature. Thus, true human nature is *Logos* nature in microcosm.⁵³ *Logos* is also closely related to the noun ‘thought’ and the verb ‘drive.’⁵⁴ Some say that *Logos* is a material principle; it is fire permeating matter. Some others claim that it is vapor but we don’t have clarity on exactly what it is. But the word *Logos* which was introduced by Heraclitus has become a technical term in Philosophy. Finally, according to Heraclitus, we can come to one conclusion and take the *Logos* as not only a speech but a Speaker, for he is audible to us.

*“Listening not to me but to The Speaker, there is a wise Thing to agree with—One: Everything.”*⁵⁵

But this speaker is not the creator of this universe because the universe was not created. One of the important fragments of Heraclitus makes it clear.

*“World, the same for all, no god or man made, but it always was, is, and will be, an ever living fire, being kindled in measures and being put out in measures.”*⁵⁶

This universe is the same for all and was not been made by any God or man. It is an ever-living fire, kindling itself by regular measures and going out by regular measures. In this way we may suppose that the *Logos* is an animating principle in the universe but not like the *Psyche* of other philosophers as an animating principle of individuals.

Accordingly, as I have already mentioned, *Logos* meant *what is said*, but we can also understand it as a *word* or *story* or *thought* or *speech* or *account* or *reasoning* or *intelligence* or *law* or *drive* etc. If we take it in this sense it has so much of similarity with the *New Testament* of Bible, which says that: *In the beginning there was the word, and the word was with God, and the word was God.*⁵⁷ According to this Biblical notion there is no difference between the word and the God; they are the synonyms of the same kind. In case of Heraclitus’s notion of *Logos* there is similar kind of possibility. One group of

⁵³. Richard G. Geldard, *Remembering Heraclitus* (USA: Lindisfarne Books, 2000), p.55.

⁵⁴. Ibid, p.56.

⁵⁵. Eva Brann, *The Logos of Heraclitus* (Philadelphia, Pennsylvania: Paul Dry Books, Inc. 2011), p. 17.

⁵⁶. Heraclitus, *Fragments*, Trans. Robinson. T.M. (London: University of Toronto Press, 1987), p. 25.

⁵⁷. *Bible, New Testament*, John, Chapter 1, Vers-1(King James Version).

Christian people identify this *Logos* as *Theos*.⁵⁸ Some others identify *Jesus* as the incarnation of the *Logos*. The *Stoic* philosophers identifies the term with the divine animating principle pervading the Universe. So in which sense it was used by Heraclitus is not clear to us. However, as I have already mentioned, the *Logos* related fragments of Heraclitus permit us to analyze very briefly what the *Logos* can be:

“the Logos can ‘hold’ and be ‘heard’ and ‘understood’ and things ‘come to be in accordance with it’ (F.1), that it is ‘common’ (F.2), that it is wise to ‘listen to it’ (F.44), and that it can be ‘so deep’ (F.104) that its limits can never be discovered.”

The important thing here is what kind of relation does *Soul* has with it? In respect of our discussion of the concept of *Soul*, Heraclitus was the first philosopher who could project the notion of *Soul* in a new way, different from his predecessors. He too calls the *Soul* of man as *psyche*; according to his view, man consists of *Body* (*Soma*) and *Soul*, and the *Soul* is endowed with qualities which differ radically from the physical qualities. To know the relation between the *Soul* and *Logos* first of all we have to know what the *Soul* exactly is. The conception of *Soul* found most often in the Pre-Socratics up to this point has been the *breath-Soul*, composed of *Air* and having the function of rendering the *Body* it inhabits alive. Heraclitus went further and tried for integrating his view of the *Soul* with his Cosmology. The *Psyche* is itself Fire and it is distributed throughout the *Body* and is un-measurable. Its changes of state are manifested by waking, sleeping, and death; these conditions depend on the ration of moisture to fire in the *Soul*. Like cosmic fire, *Soul* fire is in some ways nourished by moisture, although how this happens is not explicitly described. It seems likely that Heraclitus envisions two kinds of death for the *Psyche*: one by fire for those cut down by violence in the prime of life (whose *Psyche* is fiery) and the other one is by water for those whose *Psyche* gradually become moist through disease and degeneration. While discussing about Heraclitus’s notion of the *Soul* Aristotle also says that,

*“He identifies it with the vapour from which he derives all other things, and further says that it is the least corporeal of things and in ceaseless flux.”*⁵⁹

⁵⁸. It is a Greek term which means Deity or God.

⁵⁹. R. D. Hicks, *De Anima: by Aristotle* (Cambridge: Cambridge University press, 1907), p.17.

Heraclitus says that the *Soul* is *Fire* and the *Fire* is endowed with rationality, which has the fullest expression in the existence of the *Soul*. As I have discussed in previous paragraphs that we cannot discover the limits of *Logos*, it can be so deep, in the same way, since *Logos* is inherent in everything including the *Soul*, we cannot discover the limits of the *Soul*, not even if you travel every road: so deep is its *Logos*. The *Fire* is the best and the most powerful and the purest and finest process. If *Logos* is inherent of *Psyche* as Heraclitus said then *Logos* cannot be taken as Material principle. Since the *Fire* is ever-living and constitutes the states of *Psyche*, it will be there as eternal *life-force*. That is why Heraclitus says that the *Soul* is *exhalation* of which everything else is composed. The *exhalation* must be dry because Aristotle assumes that there are two kinds of exhalation. Heraclitus's statement also supports the assumption of Aristotle that *a dry Soul is wisest and best*. And it follows that "*a drunken man has to be led by a boy, whom he follows stumbling and not knowing whither he goes, for his Soul is moist*" (F-117). In his doctrine *Fire*, which pervades everything, is the *Arche*.⁶⁰ So the dry *exhalation* of which everything else is composed must be *Fire*.

The Human nature (*Senses/Body*) has no real understanding; only the divine nature (*Psyche*) has it (F-78). When *Earth* has melted into *Sea*, the resultant amount is the same as there had been before *Sea* became hardened into *Earth* (F-31). In same manner, it is death to *Souls* becoming *Water*, and it is death to *Water* to become *Earth*. Conversely, *Water* comes into existence out of *Earth*, and *Souls* out of *Water* (F-36). *Fire* lives in the death of *Earth*, *Air* in the death of *Fire*, *Water* in the death of *Air*, and *Earth* in the death of *Water* (F-76). *Soul* has its own inner laws of growth and it pertains to all men to know themselves and to be temperate. Heraclitus says that the sense data is worthless unless one has proper understanding of one's true nature, *Souls* that do not understand the language or significance of the sense data. Understanding comes when one turns from the outward, from the objects of inquiry, and contemplates oneself; in so doing one discovers one's true nature, the key by which all else makes sense. On other hand the dry *Souls* only reach to the *Heads*, for these dry *Souls*, understand the '*One wisdom*' thus one can

⁶⁰. It is a Greek word with primary sense 'beginning', 'origin', 'first cause' and 'power'.

conclude that for Heraclitus, the immortal *Souls* become mortal when joined with mortal bodies and they live the death of these mortal bodies; that is, because human life always meets with death, human life is life unto death, human life is death.

So, for the *Soul*, knowing the *Logos* is the ultimate wisdom. If the *Soul* fails in understanding the *Logos* then it cannot attain immortality after the departure from the *Body*, otherwise it turns, as I have already mentioned, into physical matter. For Heraclitus, our *Soul* will have an afterlife only if it is pure when we die. The *Soul*'s purity determines what happens to it at death. When it comes to the matter of dead *Body* then Heraclitus says that, corpses should be thrown out quicker than dung. That means the *Body* has nothing to do with *Soul* after departure of the *Soul*. One important statement I want to make here is that though the *Soul* departs from the dead *Body*, but the *Logos* still remains in it because *Logos* is inherent in every matter or the object of the world. Heraclitus concept of the *Soul-Body* relation seems to me like the Cartesian concept of the *Mind-Body* dualism. The *Logos* is inherent in the *Body* as well in the *Psyche*. In Cartesian dualism the point of interaction between the *Mind* and *Body* is the pineal gland. It seems that the *Logos* played the role of pineal gland in Heraclitus concept of *Soul-Body* dualism, or else I can say that the duality between human nature and divine nature. In Pythagoras psychic abilities are attributed to the *Psyche* (*Soul*) but rational abilities are attributed to the *Nous* (*Mind*). This division is not seen in Heraclitus notion of dualism. Pythagoras is a generation earlier than Heraclitus, so that it might seem natural that his conception is not as developed as that of Heraclitus.

1.1.8. Parmenides

After Heraclitus, Parmenides (515-450) was the most important philosopher who was the follower and disciple of Xenophanes.⁶¹ Though Parmenides was a disciple of

⁶¹. Xenophanes, a near contemporary of Pythagoras and fellow immigrant from Ionia to the Greek, was a groundbreaking thinker with wide-ranging interests who subsequently came to be seen as the founder of the “*Eleatic School*” of philosophy.

Xenophanes he did not follow him. He was also associated with Ameinias⁶² son of Diochaites and it was rather Ameinias whose disciple he became. Parmenides authored an obscure metaphysical poem that has earned him a reputation as the most profound and challenging thinker in the Pre-Socratic philosophy.

*“Plato saw in Parmenides a forerunner of the ontological and epistemological distinctions central to his own philosophical outlook.”*⁶³

Later development of materialism depends on his view of reality that is why some philosophers treat him as the father of Materialism. We may consider Parmenides as ‘Materialist’ but the word ‘Materialist’ here is a term that is convenient but not wholly satisfactory, because there was no genuine materialism in early Greek natural philosophy. Parmenides too could not restrict his theory only to a material world. His only known work, conventionally titled *On Nature*, was a poem and divided into three sections: 1. Prologue; 2. The Way of Truth; the teaching in the ‘way of truth’ contain the celebrated refutations of coming-into-being in nature, 3. The Way of Human Opinion. But we have now only nineteen quotations of Parmenides’ lost poem found and with these quotations Parmenides’s text has been reconstructed.⁶⁴ The central theme, whatever he was taught by the goddess, was that “only *Being* is; not-being cannot be.” This “*Being* that is” turns out to be a single, undivided whole, alike in every direction and throughout, one and unchanging. It can be grasped by reason, perhaps supplemented with a kind of intellectual intuition; but it cannot be observed in our common-sense world or expressed in ordinary language.

When it comes to the matter of cosmology, Parmenides’s point of view is totally different from his predecessors. Although Parmenides, in the beginning, was influenced by Xenophanes’s notion of one God and Pythagoreanism but later he has gone away from them as well as from all previous philosophical thoughts. Parmenides for the first time posed the problem of *Being* in the Greek philosophy and even in the West. His deduction

⁶². When he died, Parmenides built a shrine for him, being himself a man of noble birth and wealth, and it was Ameinias, not Xenophanes, who converted him to the quite life.

⁶³. John Palmer, *Parmenides & Presocratic Philosophy*, (New York: Oxford University Press, 2009) p. 1.

⁶⁴. Nestor-Luis Cordero, *By Being, It is: The Thesis of Parmenides*, (Las Vegas: Parmenides Publishing, 2004) p. 15.

of the nature of reality led him to conclude that “*the reality (is), and must be, a unity in the strict sense and that any change in it (is) impossible and the world as perceived by the senses is unreal.*” But here we have to observe an important aspect which was adopted by Parmenides that radically differs Heraclitus’s point of view. Heraclitus maintained that everything changes but Parmenides stated exactly the opposite view that nothing ever changes.

*“Being is an expression for saying ‘what is’ and, as Parmenides saw it, what is, simply is, and what is not, simply is not.”*⁶⁵

The *Being* is the representation of the reality. The fact of *Being* manifests itself in that which is; if there is that which is, then the fact of being is assumed and what is not there is simply not the reality. He further says that,

*“Without the fact of being, there would not be things that are.”*⁶⁶

These sorts of statements constitute the central philosophy of Parmenides. In the ancient times, in most of the cases, the verb ‘*to be*’ has more abstract value. Some say that ‘*to be*’ means to ‘exist’ or ‘be present’ and some other says that this means ‘existing in the strong sense of the term.’ So Parmenides retook the original meaning of ‘*to be*’ and gave to it an absolute and necessary character, making it the central concept of his system. In the passages of the poem where the verb appears on its own, or at most accompanied by a subject, the meaning ‘be present,’ ‘exist,’ ‘possess effective reality’ prevails. So *Being* is the word which Parmenides wants to use as a synonym for the ancient Greek use of ‘*to be*.’ He used it to refer that *there is* or that *exists*, or *that is*, or *that is being*, or *that there is (a) presence*. But, what is that there is? What is that there exists? And what is it that is present? Parmenides’s main intention was to explain the presence and the effectiveness of the fact of *Being*. His intention was not to refer to the primordial entity or the root of the present nature through this *Being*. There is a commonsensical way to define it in a ordinary sense: *there is being* (just as “it is raining” means “there is rain—now”), it is to say that *the fact of being is present*. The exact concept of ‘*Being*’ we possess even in another way too, which is, the negation of not-being. So the concept of *Being* can be

⁶⁵. Oliva Blanchette, *Philosophy of Being: A Reconstructive Essay in Metaphysics* (The Catholic University of America Press. 2003), p. 12.

⁶⁶. Nestor-Luis Cordero, *By Being, It is: The Thesis of Parmenides* (Las Vegas: Parmenides Publishing, 2004), p. 60.

understood through these two formulas namely, *impossibility of non-existence* and *necessity of existence*. Parmenides's *Being* is ungenerated because what is generated can only have arisen from nothing which is illogical from the ontological point of view.

Parmenides was the first who seriously investigated the difference between reality and appearance and consequently postulated one true unchanging reality behind the changing appearance. For him the appearances of multiplicity and motion, empty space and time, are illusions. Another important thing is that Parmenides's way of truth seems awkward because if appearances are illusions then there will be no goddess, no philosopher, no mystic way, and appearances don't appear, for they are pure nothing. But Karl R. Popper explains this in his own way of understanding that Parmenides based his theory of an unchanging reality on something like a logical proof; a proof which can be presented as proceeding from the single premise, *what is not is not*. From this we can derive that the *nothing* – that which is not – does not exist; a result which Parmenides interprets to mean that the void does not exist. *So the world is full; it consists of one undivided block*, since any division into parts could only be due to separation of the parts by the void. In this full world there is no room for motion. Only the delusive belief in the reality of opposites – the belief that not only *what is* exists but also *what is not* – leads to the illusion of a world of change. Parmenides says that there is no *becoming* in reality but there is in seeming.

But when it comes to the matter of *what is*, according to Parmenides, is what can be spoken and thought of. The whole subject of Parmenides's philosophy lies between *what is* and *what can be talked and thought about*. For Parmenides the object of speech and thought must exist because *prima facie* it can exist; it cannot therefore be nothing, since 'nothing' *cannot exist*; but if it is something, it exists. Its point is that *what is*, is, and cannot ever not be. To maintain this is to go against all common belief, according to which there is such a thing as genesis, the process of coming into *Being*. But this process demands that the same thing at one time is not and at another time is; also that it is at one

time the same and at another not the same. Thus men imagine things as passing back and forth between being and not being.

*“Fire is the nearest to Being in the phenomenal world, hence its predominance brings the mortal Mind as close as it can come, without divine revelation, to the perception of Being.”*⁶⁷

What the *Soul* is composed of *Fire* has been taught by other Pre-Socratic philosophers, as well as the identity of *Nous* and *Soul*. After Pythagoras, Parmenides too believed that the *Soul* is *Earth* and *Fire*. For him the *Soul* and *Mind* are the same. Thought is the essence of the *Mind/Soul*. He speaks of sensation and thought as the same. We can put it in another way that the ‘thinker’ and the ‘thought’ are one and the same. Hence memory and forgetfulness too are due to these two elements through their mixture. In general, everything that exists has some awareness.⁶⁸ Perception and understanding have entirely physical causes, and their clarity or otherwise depends on the condition of the *Body*. Preponderance of *Fire* or *Light* in the perceiving subject brings about better and clearer perception, and since like is known by like, this means the perception of more light and less darkness.⁶⁹ However, it must not be forgotten that all this takes place in the deceitful world of seeming. Everything that exists, according to Parmenides, has some awareness. On the nature of the *Psyche* there are only a few fragments of indirect information, not altogether consistent. But it is said to be *Fiery*, as one would expect, but also, as I have quoted, to be made of *Fire* and *Earth*, and located in the breast. This ought to be taken with the statement that Parmenides, Empedocles and Democritus identified *Mind* and *Psyche*, and according to them all living creatures are with reason.⁷⁰ As well the human *Body* is regarded as a compound of the opposites, light and dark or heat and cold and their correlatives. The 16th fragment of Parmenides says that;

*“For as each has a tempering of graceful limbs,
So present in man is mind. For the same thing
With whatever thinks is the nature of limbs in men,
Both every and all, for more than this is mind.”*⁷¹

⁶⁷. W.K.C. Guthrie, *A History of Greek Philosophy*, Vol. 2 (Great Britain: Cambridge University Press, 1965), p. 72.

⁶⁸. Ibid, p. 67.

⁶⁹. Ibid, p. 68.

⁷⁰. Ibid, p. 69.

⁷¹. Aristotle, *The Metaphysics*, Trans. John H. McMahon (New York: Dover Publications, 2007), p. 79.

As on each occasion there is a mixture of the much-wandering limbs, so is *Mind* present to humans. It is the constitution which thinks, and thinking is governed by excess. Aristotle quotes these lines to support his claim that Parmenides did not distinguish between thought and perception. Parmenides affirms that *Nous*, or the cognitive organ of being, is capable of knowing all there is of *Being*. The transcendent can be grasped by the *Nous* because the *Nous* is an organ of *Being*, just as the *Logos* is an attribute of *Being* as well.⁷² For thinking and *Being* are the same. Thought and *Being* exist eternally in his formulation, and whatever is possible for a human being to think is identical to what is possible to be because the *Nous* is a faculty of *Being* through which its *Logos* is articulated.⁷³ The important formulation here is that *Nous* for Parmenides lies outside the narrow confines of human attribute. The *Nous* is similar in kind to the idea of Universal *Mind*. It seems like the purely *Fiery* part is reason, and every living creature possesses some quota of warmth, rationality may have been thought to be only question of degree.

1.1.9. Anaxagoras

Anaxagoras (500-428 B.C.) is also an important Pre-Socratic Philosopher and Scientist. His opinions on *Mind* are few and limited, and they are handed down to us by Aristotle and Sextus Empiricus. When we talk about the *Being* or the origin of the world there is nothing particularly valuable feature because he just followed his ancestors with a little difference. But when we talk about the power or force that is responsible for forming of things out of the first mass then we have very peculiar contribution of Anaxagoras to the Philosophy. Because, how eminently we treat Descartes as the first person who introduced extremely a unique dualistic approach in philosophy of *Mind*, in the same way, even though the concept of *Nous (Mind)* was there before Anaxagoras, the great importance was brought to the notion of *Nous* by Anaxagoras. But his concept of the *Mind* is totally different from the present concept of the *Mind*. Anaxagoras's theory of *Mind* follows from his theory of cosmology. By using *Mind* in the material sense, like

⁷². Richard G. Geldard, *Parmenides and The Way of Truth* (New York: Monkfish Book Publishing, 2007), p. 44.

⁷³. Ibid, p. 44.

Parmenides, he makes us to think and find the essence of Life, essence of the Motion and the Emotion, essence of the Knowledge and the Self in the matter itself through the *Mind*. Like Empedocles, Anaxagoras accepted the Parmenidean principles that there is no empty space and that coming-into-being and perishing into not-being are impossible.

One of the main concerns of Anaxagoras is to refute the views of Pythagoras and Heraclitus. He asserts that physical matter is infinitely divisible, that is, it is composed of all sensible bodies, and that the principles of all things were infinite in number. We have already seen the different notions of primary element. For Thales *water*, for Heraclitus *fire*, for Anaximander *Apeiron* (Unlimited), but for Anaxagoras the elements of his predecessors were not elementary enough. He understood their *elements* as the mixture of still simple things. Those numerous simplest things have not originated from one thing, but are dependent upon one thing for their existence, and that thing is present in the external world and imperceptible to us. He gave up the idea of the oneness of a primary substance and accepted a plurality of ultimate elements of the world. But he did not assign any definite number of elements, he just said they are numerous and diverse. There are numerous particles or numerous elements. According to Anaxagoras things neither come into existence nor annihilated, but remain everlasting.

“Anaxagoras says clearly in the first book of the Physics that coming-to-be and passing-away are combining and dissociating, writing this: ‘The Greeks do not think correctly about coming-to-be and passing-away; for no thing comes to be or passes away, but is mixed together and dissociated from the things that are. And thus they would be correct to call coming-to-be mixing-together and passing-away dissociating.’”⁷⁴

In its strict sense there is a true coming into existence, that is, out of nothing. What is commonly so designated is only a mixing and severing of elements which themselves are eternal. It's all about interdependence of the elements, the interdependence of the elements implies that no particles exists alone, and that each belongs to a molecular union (as we should call it today) in which all the elements are represented. There are in all the

⁷⁴. Patricia Curd, *Anaxagoras of Clazomenae: Fragments and Testimonia* (Canada: University of Toronto Press, 2007), p. 27.

grown-togethers (molecule) many and manifold seeds (*Moiras*) and *seeds*⁷⁵ of all elements.

Anaxagoras is famous for introducing the cosmological notions of *Nous* (*Mind*). We can even call Anaxagoras the father of philosophy of *Mind*. Not a single philosopher before him gave this much importance for the notion of *Mind*. Though they have attributed some activities to the *Mind* but the main focus and importance was given to the *Psyche*. Anaxagoras made *Nous* as an important theme in his cosmic speculation as Heraclitus made *Psyche*. For Anaxagoras,

*“Nous is itself infinite in extent, self-ruled, and mixed with nothing, alone by itself. It is the finest and purest of all things, it has knowledge about and power over all things and its power is manifest through its control of movement in living things.”*⁷⁶

He imposes *Nous* over the other elements as a ruler element. This reigning element alone really is ‘self upon itself.’ It is the only one beyond the relation of interdependence. *Nous* is the only element thoroughly pure, not mixed with any of the others.

*“Nous likewise, exactly as the other elements, has spatial extensiveness. Hence Nous can readily be called, in a quite literal sense, not only the purest, but even the “thinnest” of all the elements.”*⁷⁷

But *Nous* is not a creator, everything is there as eternal. No element comes into existence nor is annihilated. Every (piece of) *Nous* is homogeneous, a larger as well as a smaller one. Nothing else, however, is homogeneous in itself, but its homogeneity does not depend on the unit of measurement. *Nous* is an infinite and autocratic being and is not mixed with any element. The elements are penetrable to each other means that they do not resist each other. If *Nous* is mixable with the other elements, that is to say, if they are penetrable to *Nous*, it would not be able to rule over them, i.e., to move them. If they do not resist *Nous*, it certainly can move itself as it likes. Anaxagoras maintains that there is nothing equal to *Nous* in power. The motive power of *Nous* is just an ingredient of *Nous*

⁷⁵. The term “Seeds” is not synonymous with “elements” but is used in its other meaning, that is, as a term for the particles of the elements.

⁷⁶. Paul S. MacDonald, *History of the Concept of the Mind* (Aldershot: Ashgate, 2003-2007), p.31.

⁷⁷. Felix M. Cleve, *The Philosophy of Anaxagoras* (New York: King’s Crown Press, Columbia University, 1949), p. 21.

sovereign nature, it belongs to *Nous*. *Nous* is a being that rules out of an original plenitude of power of its own that is why it is an autocratic being. *Nous* is not omnipotent; it is only the most powerful and its power has limitations. *Nous* can by no means deal with the ruled elements by arbitrary will. For they have the cause of their existence in themselves, exactly as *Nous* has the cause of its existence in itself. If they were not for all eternity, *Nous* would not be able to create them; since they exist already, *Nous* cannot annihilate them. *Nous* is cognizant of all the possibilities of development. That is why *Nous* has knowledge not only of itself, but of all the other things as well. *Nous* is a being that works consciously. *Nous*, not being a creator, is only cognizant of what will result from his interferences. *Nous* knows all the mechanical possibilities lying in the elements.

There are no isolated *Nous-individuals*; that the whole, boundless *Nous* is still one and infinitely large being; that *Nous* is the only person in the whole Universe. *Nous* is the Life principle and is a regulating thing.

*“In everything there is a share of everything except Nous, but there are some things in which Nous, too, is present.”*⁷⁸

In two fragments Anaxagoras says that; all things have a share of everything” and “there is a share of everything in everything. These two remarks make the same point, but from different perspectives; one from the item that has shares of everything, and another from the ingredients that are in every item. The principle of *everything-in-everything* holds for all the stuffs and opposites (the basic ingredients) and for all things constructed from them. But one important turn he takes here that *Nous* has an exception from the principle of *everything-in-everything*. He is quite emphatic about exception of *Nous* from the general principle. *Nous* is a rational moving principle, so in some cases the presence of *Nous* explains why the thing in question has a mind; in others, it is merely the motive quality of *Nous* that is present. In all cases the presence of *Nous* is adduced to account for ordered change and repeatability. Although *Nous* is not subject to the *everything-in-everything* principle, it is present to some things, although here we are not told what

⁷⁸. Ibid, p. 97.

things contain *Nous*. In a fragment (B12) Anaxagoras says that *Nous* controls all things that have *Souls*, and this suggests that it is therefore in those things. *Nous* is not to be considered as simply one more ingredient among all the other or on an equal footing with them. Its role as mover and knower makes it significantly different from every other things. *Nous* is not the part of the original mixture as an ingredient, but is rather the ruler and controller of the ingredients.

Anaxagoras, even though admitted that both *Mind* and *Soul* as of one nature and the power of knowing and that of moving both are one principle, distinguished the *Soul* from the *Mind*.

"Psyche" is a designation for breath; not for the air exhaled and inhaled, but for the respiratory movement, for breathing. From the linguistical standpoint, also, "psyche" is not a designation for a thing, originally, but a substantival designation for an occurrence."⁷⁹

All those having *Psyche*, a larger one as well as a smaller one, are ruled over by *Nous*. *Psyche* served also as a representative name for the total of the *somatic activity* of *Nous*, for the total of the *working-functions* preserving the organism from decay. *Nous* necessarily is unmixable, in order to *rule*, that is, in order to know. Touching (without penetrating) is a condition to *Nous* not only for moving the *mereias* (elements), but also for knowing and cognizing. *Nous* not only moves the things and not only knows the moved or touched, but also perceives and discerns all possibilities hidden therein, and resolves accordingly. Anaxagoras maintains that the senses by themselves discern nothing, but transmit (all) to the *Nous*, as he makes *Nous* the principle of all. Which means that to Anaxagoras the senses are mere messengers, incompetent to *discern and cognize* the messages they convey to the *Nous* confined in the hollow spaces of the brain, and that these messages become sensations not until they are *discerned and cognized* by the little *Nous-individual*. According to Anaxagoras the only difference between death and sleep is that in death the embedding *World-Nous* entirely ceases to exercise *Psyche*, the *working-functions*, thereby abandoning the organism to decay; while sleep is

⁷⁹. Ibid, p. 83.

conditional only upon a temporary relaxation of those functions exercised by the embedding *Nous*.

The shift of the attributes of the *Soul* (motion, emotion, sensation, wisdom, life principle and etc.) to the *Mind* is really a great turn in the history of the mental philosophy. Anaxagoras *Nous* functions very much like a God. It is immortal and has power over all living things. It first sets in motion the primordial mass, which causes the constituents in the primordial mass to begin to separate and recombine to form the parts of the physical cosmos. *Nous* is both transcendent, in that it is not “mixed” into any other substance, and immanent, in that it is “present in” some things, presumably living things (things that possess the *Soul*), and is very much now preset where all other things are. Almost all philosophers before Anaxagoras, except Parmenides, characterize the *Soul* by three of its attributes: the power of movement, of sensation and of incorporeality but Parmenides and Anaxagoras reduced the importance of the *Soul* and tried to ascribe the attributes of the *Soul* to the *Mind*. Though the word *Nous* was used before Anaxagoras but, I believe that, the real foundation for the philosophy of *Mind* began from Anaxagoras. Because for which purpose the word *Mind* is being used in contemporary philosophy of *Mind*, was used in Anaxagoras philosophy for the same purpose around 2500 years ago.

1.2. Philosophy of Mind in the Great Period (470 - 322 B.C.)

The period between 470 - 322 BC was really a great period in the history of philosophy and also in the history of all fields; whose ideas and ideals dominated western civilization for the past two thousand years and continue to influence speculation to this day. This period was in a need of reformers to set aside the disordered notions and it was the period which has undergone many changes. That’s why Frank Thilly says, while writing about 5th century BC philosophical circumstances, that...

*“A man was needed to bring order into the intellectual and moral chaos of the age, to sift the true from the false, the essential from the accidental, to set men right and to help them to see things in their right relations – a peacemaker who might hold the balance even between the ultra-conservatives and the ultra-liberals.”*⁸⁰

Who are those men and how could they influence the quest of that period and what are their significant contributions will be discussed in this section. From this great period I am taking very few philosophers to understand the development of philosophy of *Mind*, which could work as a bridge between pre-Socratic and post-Aristotelian notions of philosophy, they are *Democritus*, *Socrates*, *Plato* and *Aristotle*. For me this great period begins with Socrates and ends with Aristotle. Before entering into Socratic notion of mental philosophy I briefly discuss about Democritus.

1.2.1. Democritus

Democritus (450 – 370 BC), the father of the first atomic hypothesis, was one of the first philosophers who warned about the subjective qualities of our cognitions, scorned numerous superstitions of his times, and asserted that “*Belief in an afterlife is a laughable fiction.*” For his philosophy just as Heraclitus earned his nickname as ‘*Weeping Philosopher*’ in the same way, for this medieval commentator sometimes described him as ‘*laughing philosopher.*’ Democritus was the greatest and most consistent materialist thinker. He explained all natural and psychological processes mechanically, by the movement and the collision of atoms and by their joining or separating, their composition or dissociation. In Democritean atomic physics the *Soul* consists of the smallest atoms. They are (according to Aristotle, *De Anima* 403b31) the same atoms as those of fire (Clearly it shows that Democritus was influenced by Heraclitus.) They are round and best able to slip through anything and to move other things by their own movement. The small *Soul* atoms are distributed throughout the *Body* in such a way that atoms of the *Soul* and *Body* alternate. More precisely, the *Soul* has two parts; the one, which is rational, is located in the heart, while their unreasoning part is dispersed

⁸⁰. Frank Thilly, *A History of Philosophy* (New York: Henry Holt and Company, 1914), p. 50.

throughout the whole *Body*. This is no doubt an attempt to solve certain aspects of the *Mind-Body* problem.

1.2.2. Socrates and Plato

Socrates (469 – 399 BC) was one of the greatest Greek philosophers. We have very less information about the historical figure of Socrates but as a great influential philosopher we have good account of Socrates through his disciples and contemporaries. At the same time we have no information about his teacher but it seems, after knowing his philosophical life, that he was acquainted with Parmenides, Anaxogoras and Heraclitus. He was not just a philosopher but also believer that the philosophical life should achieve practical results for the greater well-being of society. We have no information of Socrates through Socrates because he never put his philosophical notions into writings and whatever is available to us is through his contemporaries and disciples. But some people expressed their doubts on Plato's creation of Socrates. At the same time how far Plato's Socrates could stand when it comes to the matter of real Socrates is also subject to doubt. Sometimes it is very difficult to distinguish the notions of Socrates and Plato. But I am not going to enter into that inquiry because it leads to another debate to which there are no sufficient evidences. That is why without entering into that debate I adopted some Plato's writings as the base to understand and formulate the Socratic notions of *Soul*. At the same time here I am not going to question the authenticity of Plato's creation of Socrates but just following for the sake of information.

William Ellery Leonard, while discussing about Socrates, talks about “*Socrates, the Jesus Christ of Greece*.” Some people compared Jesus with Buddha, because just as Buddha stood as the religious reformer in ancient India in the same manner Jesus too stood as the religious reformer of the ancient kingdoms of Judah and Samaria. But I really wonder; how far the statement “*Socrates, the Jesus Christ of Greece*” can stand as valid, because the historical Socrates was not at all a religious leader. But after reading some other related notions what I understood is that there is striking parallelism in the

lives of these two characters because both have come from a country which geographically very small and yet both had great in achievements. Socrates was connected with Athens, the most cultured of early cities, where the first public library was established. Jesus was connected with Jerusalem, the most religious city of antiquity. Father of Socrates was a sculptor and father of Jesus was a carpenter. Both were teachers of the common people, both loved to go where the masses meet. Both wrote nothing. So far as we know only thing Jesus wrote was what he scribbled on the ground when Pharisees brought into his presence a fallen woman for condemnation. Socrates, when asked one day why he did not put his words into writing, said that "*I would rather write on the hearts of living men than on dead sheep's skins.*"⁸¹ Their similarity meets even in their causes of deaths too. Before their death they both were in prison, both were given chance to escape from the death if they accept that whatever they taught was wrong but they did not accept. However there are similarities in all these aspects but philosophically their paths are different.

Plato (427-347 BC), disciple of Socrates and the teacher of Aristotle, was one of the most influential Greek philosophers. Here I am not going to separate the ideas of Socrates and Plato; in all of his writings *through Socrates only Plato is speaking*, so looking into their philosophical notions by separating them may not produce good results, instead it may lead us in wrong direction. Both of them followed the same path and carried the same method and believed the same truth; that is why I thought of having the discussion of their philosophical notions together. To have a discussion or debate on any of their notions then first of all we have to know their theory of Forms or Ideas because whatever they taught, whether it was the theory of knowledge or the theory of Ethics or the theory of Psychology or the theory of beauty or the theory of political state or the theory of mental philosophy, was based on the theory of Forms or Ideas. For both of them, any object or any quality in reality has a Form and Forms are true representatives of reality and stand to answer the question, what is that? For them the reality consists of

⁸¹. William F. Bostick, *The Biblical World*, Vol. 47, No. 4 (The University of Chicago Press, Apr., 1916), p. 248.

two realms; on the one hand there is the physical world that which can be observed through the senses, on the other hand there is a world made of eternal perfect Forms or Ideas. The Forms are perfect templates that exist somewhere in another dimensions. These Forms are the ultimate reference points for all objects we observe in the physical world and they are more real than the physical objects we see in the world because only Forms can be known.

The theory of knowledge or theory of Forms goes along with the theory of *Opposites*. According to them every quality come into being based on the existence of its *Opposite*. On the basis of the theory of *Opposites* they argue that death must come from life and life from the death because the birth, the death and the rebirth is the endless cycle. At the same time the Knowledge of Forms must be innate and must have been gained by our *Souls* before we born. The main reason for this belief is the endless cycle of birth, death and rebirth, so obviously it carries the belief that the *Soul* pre-existed the *Body*. The carrier of the belief, experience and knowledge from one birth to the next birth is the *Soul*. That is why the *Soul* only plays key role in understanding Forms and establishing knowledge. The Forms are the absolute representations of all temporal phenomena and only these ideas are completely real; the physical world possesses only relatively reality because the world is in a state of constant flux which does not provide us the reality. The notion of constant flux was the pre-Socratic notion and I strongly believe that Socrates and Plato were influenced by Heraclitus notion of change. But there is a claim that Plato was also influenced by Pythagoras.

*“Aristotle claims that Plato’s own philosophy was profoundly influenced by Pythagorean teachings, and later authors regard Pythagoras as the creator of the Platonic tradition in Philosophy.”*⁸²

Here we need not to enter into the discussion of whose influence strongly worked on Plato because in the evolution process many things were adopted and many more things were left behind, so what he believed is more important than whose influence it was. When it comes to the matter of Forms, though the knowledge of Forms is innate but

⁸². Charles H. Kahn, *Pythagoras and the Pythagoreans: A Brief History* (Indianapolis/Cambridge: Hackett Publishing Company, Inc. 2001), p. 1.

learning or knowing comes from recollection. The *Phaedo* clearly explains that the senses never yield knowledge evidently because senses do not yield knowledge of the Forms. The knowledge of Forms is the only thing that Plato counts as knowledge. Forms are universal and particular things share the universals in them or universals are present in particulars. The Form itself is one thing that is common to many examples of it, whereas the particular thing is itself an example. It is believed that before being born in this world we all had some acquaintance with the Forms which we do in some way recollect.

Plato believed that each individual has a *Soul* and that *Soul* survives the death and it is immortal. As I have discussed in previous paragraph that every quality has a Form, in the same way there is a Form of *Soul* which plays a central role in explaining mental phenomena. The *Soul* as an animating principle intimately is connected to the Form of life and this animating principle makes the *Body* alive. For most of the pre-Socratic philosophers the literal meaning of the term *Soul* (*Psyche*) is breath but for Socrates and Plato the *Soul* is the deepest reality of man and spread through the *Body*. When the *Soul* ceases to animate the *Body* consequently death occurs. That is why, in *Phaedo*, it is argued that philosophers should concern about the *Soul* but not the *Body* because the *Body* plays no role in attainment of knowledge and the *Body* is only concern with pleasures. But it doesn't mean that the *Body* has nothing to do with the *Soul* because the *Body* plays key role in keeping the *Soul* in touch with the Forms of the world. Since the Forms are invisible and not reachable through the sense the *Body* has nothing to do with Forms. Forms make up the real world and Forms are the entities that provide us with standards. So the attainment of knowledge is possible only through the *Soul*. That is why Socrates and Plato identify the best condition of the *Soul* with *wisdom and truth*. But we should not forget one thing here that through the Forms only we recognize things in this fluctuating and illusionary world because the Forms are eternal, unchanging and perfect. So whatever knowledge we attain that we get through the Forms; this knowledge is unchanging, concrete and eternal but the knowledge we grasp through senses varies person to person. That is why they believed that relying on sensory information would

never lead us towards reality and truth. Reality and knowledge can be found in our *Souls* only through the Forms and they tried to explain it through his method that knowledge is inside of our *Souls* and is independent of our sense organs. The *Body* is given very less importance; the *Body* needs an invisible self (*Soul*) to rule it and without that there is no life and motion. The *Body* is the cause of suffering; that is why both say that separation from bodily attachments is the main task.

*“Socrates believed that philosophy is best achieved when one tries to release and separate the Soul from the body.”*⁸³

This separation can be attained in two ways; on the one hand it can be attained through wisdom and on the other hand it can be attained at the time of death. His statement also supports this notion.

*“Death is the separation of soul and body, and the state of being dead as the state in which soul and body exist separately from one another (64c4-8).”*⁸⁴

One important thing here we have to understand that at the time of death the *Soul* can be separated from the *Body* but it cannot be destroyed. They argue that *Souls* themselves are neither generated nor destroyed; but at the same time the *Soul* participate in generation and destruction by acquiring and losing properties. But it is not discussed anywhere in *Phaedo* how the *Body* is connected with the *Soul*. But the *Soul* is immortal and it transmigrates from one *Body* to another. Plato's *Phaedo* includes the immortality of the *Soul* also as one of the most important topics. There are four fundamental arguments to support the immortality of the *Soul*; the theory of opposites, the theory of recollection, the affinity argument and the argument from Form of life. However, some statements contradict many other statements of his. In case of death what Socrates said in *Phaedo* contradicts with his previous statement of *Apology*. In *Apology* he says that,

*“Death is one of two things. Either it is annihilation, and the dead have no consciousness of anything; or, as we are told, it is really a change: a migration of the soul from this place to another.”*⁸⁵

On the last day before his death in *Phaedo* Socrates says that,

⁸³. E. M. COPE, *PLATO'S PHAEDO* (Cambridge: at the University Press, 1875), p. 20.

⁸⁴. David Bostock, *PLATO'S PHAEDO* (New York: Oxford University Press, 1986), p. 21.

⁸⁵. *Plato: The Last Days of Socrates – The Apology, Crito, Phaedo*, Trans. Hugh Tredennick and Harold Tarrant (England: Penguin Books, 1993), p. 65.

*“The soul exists after death and retains some active force and intelligence. Death is neither annihilation nor simply a migration of the soul to Hades; it is, instead, part of a cycle of reincarnation.”*⁸⁶

After the death whether the *Soul* possesses consciousness and intelligence or not is subject to doubt on the basis of these two statements because in this regard both the statements are contradicting but one important thing is carried in these two statements; that is reincarnation or transmigration of the *Soul*. The real purification of the *Soul* from all the bodily passions is achieved by the separation from the *Body* altogether. It is the *Body* of which Socrates is least concern about, that is why he says; it will not be Socrates who will be buried but only Socrates’ *Body* of which I have not concerned after the death (115c4-116a1). Finally, according to Socrates, the *Soul* can discover the reality only in thought but not in cognition. The ideas and the true essences of things are the objects of thought but not of perception.

Plato’s the *Republic* is the main source for his theory of the *Soul* where he discussed about tripartite *Soul*. The main reason for the notion of tripartite *Soul* is that, Plato believes that, if a person has conflicting motives then it indicates that a person has different parts in his *Soul*. *The Republic* establishes the notion of the *Soul* that has three parts: the rational *Soul*, the spirited *Soul* and the appetite *Soul* (439d-e). And each of these three parts has its particular role to play and these three are independent parts. Plato’s division of the *Soul* also indicates three types of people in the society. Those who have the appetite *Soul*, which is known as *Epithymia*, their nature is governed by all of our myriad desires for various pleasures and bodily satisfactions.

*“I mean we called it the appetitive element because of the intensity of its appetites for food, drink, sex, and all the things that go along with them. We also called it the money-loving element, because such appetites are most easily satisfied by means of money (581a)”*⁸⁷

⁸⁶. Ibid, p. 124-127.

⁸⁷. PLATO, *The Republic*, Trans. C. D. C. Reeve (Indianapolis/Cambridge: Hackett Publishing Company, Inc. 2004), p. 281.

Those who have the spirited *Soul*, which is known as *Thymos*, seek honor and prestige; those who are governed by the spirited *Soul* they loves to face and overcome great challenges. Here the word spirited is not used in the sense of spiritual (religious).

*“I imagine, then, that we call each individual courageous because of the latter part—that is, when the part of him that is spirited in kind preserves through pains and pleasures the pronouncements of reason about what should inspire terror and what should not (442c).”*⁸⁸

And those who have the rational *Soul*, which is known as *Nous (Mind)*, seek and love wisdom, knowledge and truth. It is the *Nous* that thinks, analyzes, rationally weighs options and tries to judge what is best and truest.

*“Socrates says that reason ought to rule the Soul or make the decisions and direct the actions of the person (441e). The rational element is wholly aimed at knowing the truth, and thus that it is appropriately called learning and wisdom-loving (581b).”*⁸⁹

Desire is the common feature of each part of the *Soul* but they differ in what kind of desire it is. Each type of person is guided primarily by one or another type of their *Soul*. The main task of human beings is to recover the knowledge buried deep within the recesses of the *Soul*. For both of them the ultimate meaning of human life is the recovery of the knowledge of the true nature of things that lies hidden in the *Souls* of every human being which brings the harmony and justice in both within the individual and society. Plato’s tripartite *Soul* is to keep his analogy together between the justice in the state and the justice in the individual. The rational part of the *Soul* engages us in thought, deliberates, and makes judgments and difficult decisions. Plato thought that the best type of human is guided mostly by Reason. Ultimately Plato could carry forward his *Mind-Body* dualism very successfully; though the *Soul* has been divided into three parts and the reality has been divided in to two parts (Forms and Objects).

⁸⁸. Ibid, p. 131.

⁸⁹. Ibid, p. 130 & 282.

1.2.3. Aristotle

Aristotle (384-322 BC) is also one of the intellectual figures from ancient Greek philosophy or from western civilization. Aristotle, a disciple of Plato, disagreed with Plato and provided a closer relationship between the *Soul* and the *Body*, which goes against to the Plato's notion of the *Soul*. Aristotle had an enormous influence on both the evidence and the narrative that shapes our vision of Pre-Socratic philosophy. After Plato, Aristotle was, directly or indirectly, responsible for the survival and transmission of most of what we now know about early Greek philosophy. His intellectual range was not limited to any particular subject because his investigation entered into most of the sciences which includes physics, logic, ethics, history, political theory, psychology, zoology, metaphysics, philosophy of science and *Soul*. That is why Aristotle was not only regarded as a philosopher but also as a scientist. That is why John Gribbin says,

*“Aristotle was the first genuine scientist in history, the first author whose surviving works contain detailed and extensive observations of natural phenomena, and the first philosopher to achieve a sound grasp of the relationship between observation and theory in scientific method. Not only every philosopher but also every scientist is in his debt. He deserves the title Dante (1265-1321) gave him: the master of those who know.”*⁹⁰

When it comes to the matter of our topic, the notion of mental philosophy, *De Anima* is one of the most important writings of Aristotle on the nature of living things and the *Soul*. In explaining the *Soul*, it seems that, Aristotle followed three levels of inquiry; the first one is knowing the basic biological facts, the second one is the integration of ideas with the basic principles of the philosophical systems, and the third one is analyzing the notions of predecessors. It can be seen very clearly in *De Anima* that he has taken all of his predecessors' account of mental philosophy and introduced the themes of the doctrine of the *Soul* in Book-1. Book – 1 of *De Anima* is the witness to support the statement that Aristotle is responsible for the survival and transmission of most of what we now know about early Greek philosophy. In *De Anima* Aristotle restates the philosophical traditions and their way of understanding the *Soul* and its attributes. It is

⁹⁰. John Gribbin, *The Britannica Guide To The 100 Most Influential Scientists* (UK: Constable & Robinson Ltd. 2008), p. 12.

very natural that whoever deals with the notion of the *Soul* they have to face the first basic question, what is *Soul*? Aristotle begins his account the *Soul* from Book – 2 of *De Anima*. When we talk about the essential qualities of the *Soul* particularly then it seem that Aristotle’s answer to this question do not differ with his predecessors because he also believes that the *Soul* is in some way to the governing principle of living things (*De Anima*-402a). But understanding in which way Aristotle differs from Plato and some of his predecessors is most difficult task.

The Aristotelian notion of the *Soul* is very complex. He begins Book – 2 with a statement that, we are handed down so much of theories by our ancestors but let us make a fresh beginning and determine what the *Soul* is and what will be its most comprehensive definition. But before dealing with the definition of the *Soul* we have to know three important things; the matter, the Form and the composition of both. Aristotle, unlike his teacher (*Plato*), believed that the Form of an object is not a kind of abstract ideal but the Form of an object is contained within the object itself; it means the Form is within the structures of an object itself.

“Now there is one class of existent things which we call substance, including under the term, firstly, matter, which in itself is not this or that; secondly, shape or form, in virtue of which the term this or that is at once applied; thirdly, the whole made up of matter and form. Matter is identical with potentiality, form with actuality.”⁹¹

In this reference Aristotle tried to summarize his arguments for Form and matter which he argued in his *Metaphysics*. The combination of Form and matter is substance. As it is mentioned in this reference that matter is associated with potentiality and Form is associated with actuality. Form is a thing, in virtue of which there is in actuality an individual thing. The Form of a thing is its shape, its appearance and its pattern of reaction. The Form of living thing is its *Soul*. There are varieties of living things and according to their faculties they will have *Soul*. *Plants have Vegetative Souls, animals have Sensitive Souls and humans have Rational or Intellectual Soul.*⁹² According to

⁹¹. Aristotle, *DE ANIMA*, Trans. R. D. Hicks (Cambridge: The University Press, 1907), p. 49.

⁹². Ibid, p. 59 and 61.

Aristotle Forms are universal; they are universal in the sense that the same Form can be instantiated in many different things.

There are two types of natural bodies; some have life and growth in them and some others not. Life means self-nutrition and growth; it indicates that every natural *Body* that has life in it is a substance in the sense of composite.

*“Substance is so spoken of in three ways, as we have said, and of these cases one is form, another matter, and the third the product of the two; and of these matter is potentiality and form actuality (De Anima 414a14).”*⁹³

The Form is the actuality of the *Body* and the *Body* is the matter and the combination of the both is the third substance. For Aristotle there can be no Form without matter; there could be primary matter or stuff that has no particular Form. Though the matter and the Form are part of substance but they are not dividable parts because they are not material parts of substance. Aristotle believes that every material thing has a Form, without a Form the matter will have no properties or activities. The matter and the Form always go together; the matter is formed by a Form to make a material substance. In this respect Aristotle goes against to his teacher Plato. That is why Plato's theory of Forms, which was considered as higher or eternal reality, is criticized by Aristotle. For Aristotle Form is a kind of essence of a thing that exists in real things but for Plato Form is the only reality. Finally it indicates or leads to the conclusion that the Form of an object can be perceived through the senses. If we take the example of a table then the wood is the matter of the table, Form is the structure of the table (that particular table but not some abstract universal).

Aristotle goes against the Plato's (*Phaedo*'s) claim that the *Soul* is an independent entity and different from the *Body*. For him the *Soul* is a system of abilities manifested by animate bodies of structure. We have to understand the Aristotelian Form of the *Soul* as

⁹³. Aristotle, *DE ANIMA: Books II and III*, Trans. D. W. Hamlyn (Oxford: Clarendon Press, 1993), p. 14.

the *first actuality* of a natural *Body* furnished with organs. The *Soul* and the *Body* are united into a substantial whole, so the *Soul* is not independent of the *Body*.

*“We have here body with a certain attribute, namely, the possession of life, the body will not be the soul: for the body is not an attribute of a subject, it stands rather for a subject of attributes, that is, matter. It must follow, then, that soul is substance in the sense that it is the form of a natural body having in it the capacity of life. Such substance is actuality. The soul, therefore, is the actuality of the body above described.”*⁹⁴

The *Soul* is the Form of the *Body* because the *Soul* is the structure of the *Body*. The Form is nothing but the bodily function and its organization. So the *Soul* is simply the total operations of a human being. Here there is no Cartesian problem about what is the connecting principle of the *Mind* and *Body* and how do they interact with each other. By differing with his teacher Plato, Aristotle proposed that the *Soul* and the *Body* are not two distinct entities but they are only different parts of the same thing. As we have already discussed that the *Soul* is the Form of the *Body*, the *Soul* doesn't exist without the *Body*. Having the capacity of life is meant possessing the *Soul* and the *Soul* is the actuality of a natural *Body* having life potentially within it. What kind of actuality is this *Soul*?

*“Since the whole made up of the two is endowed with soul, the body is not the actuality of soul, but soul the actuality of a particular body. Hence those are right who regard the soul as not independent of body and yet at the same time as not itself a species of body. It is not body, but something belonging to body, and therefore resides in body and, what is more, in such and such a body.”*⁹⁵

He believes that the *Soul* is not a substantial being as something existing completely independently, but believes the *Soul* as a substantial Form of the living *Body*. This notion leads us to a conclusion that the *Soul* is not any other category of being but it is substance of a peculiar sort. If the *Soul* is to be then be realized in matter of a particular kind. The *Soul* is inseparable from physical matter and thought; it is an actuality like knowledge. It seems that the *Soul* is a set of capacities; the capacity of nutrition, sense-perception and thought. All these capacities are related to each other in intimate ways to form a unity.

⁹⁴. Aristotle, *DE ANIMA*, Trans. R. D. Hicks (Cambridge: The University Press, 1907), p. 4.

⁹⁵. Ibid, p. 59.

It is very difficult to give any particular definition to the *Soul* because the Plants have only nutritive faculty but other creatures have nutritive faculty and also the faculty of sense perception. Due to sense perception they do have desire; this desire causes wanting, passion and wishing. All animals have at least one of these senses and some animals have more than one sense. Some animals have the faculty of movement in respect of place. Some others, for example men and anything else which is similar or superior to man, have the faculty of thought and intellect. On the basis of this analysis Aristotle suggests us that we must examine each case separately. Instead of this if we expect any common definition of the *Soul* then it will become foolish act from our part. Defining the *Soul* as the *Soul* of plant, as the *Soul* of animal, or as the *Soul* of man will exactly represent the individual. The way Aristotle compares the *Soul* with eye sight makes good sense for his explanation of the *Soul* than trying for any particular definition.

*“If the eye were an animal then sight would be its soul. Sight is the capacity of the eye for seeing, just as the soul is the capacity of the organism for the actions that characterize life.”*⁹⁶

Vegetative *Soul*, being as the reproductive, is the most primitive and widely distributed power of the *Soul*; it is part of all beings but the rational *Soul* is not part of all other beings. The *Soul* is the cause or the first principle of the living *Body* that is animating the *Body*. The *Soul* is the cause of its *Body* similar in all three senses; it is (1) the source or origin of motion, it is (2) the final cause, it is (3) the substance of the whole living *Body* (*De Anima* 415b8). All natural bodies are organs of the *Soul*; the *Soul* as the substance is cause of all existence and cause of its end. Nothing originates or grows naturally except what feeds itself, and nothing feeds itself except what has a share of the *Soul* in it.

When it comes to the matter of sensation or sense perception then Aristotle says that faculty of sense perception does not exist through activity but through potentiality only. On the basis of this, Aristotle says, sense perception does not occur just as fuel does not burn by itself without something that can burn it. He further says that...

“Since we speak of perceiving in two ways (for we speak of that which potentially hears and sees as hearing and seeing, even if it happens to be

⁹⁶. Ibid, p. 51.

asleep, as well as of that which is actually doing these things); perception too will be so spoken of in two ways, the one as in potentiality, the other as in actuality."⁹⁷

For Aristotle what has the power to see or hear would see or hear, even though it is in the state of sleeping. Second thing is that, what is actually seeing or hearing would see or hear. Knowledge and sensation are identical with their objects. Other than the five senses, the sense of sight, of hearing, of smell, of taste, and of touch, there is no sixth sense. According to Aristotle the perception that we perceive is by senses. The actuality of the sensible object is one and the same with that of the sense. The activity of the object of perception and of the sense is one and the same; actual sound and actual hearing are the same. Actual knowledge is identical with its object but potential knowledge in the individual is in time prior to actual knowledge but in the universe it has no priority even in time; for all things that come into being arise from what actually is.

Aristotle distinguished things on the basis of life; that which have the *Soul* and which doesn't have. It is the life that distinguishes the animate from the inanimate. But life is so spoken of in many ways; a thing lives if it posses at least one of these qualities, nutrition, intellect, perception, motion and rest. Plants have only nutritive faculty but it is common for each and every life. Only humans have rational faculty along with other faculties but other animals lack the rational faculty. While talking about the motion, feeling, thinking and some other acts Aristotle says that...

*"It would be better not to say that the soul pities or learns or thinks, but that the man does so with the soul: and this, too, not in the sense that the motion occurs in the soul, but in the sense that motion sometimes reaches to, sometimes starts from, the soul."*⁹⁸

According to Aristotle the essence of the *Soul* is not a material thing; the *Soul* is determined by the faculties of nutrition, perception, movement and thought. At the same time there are two different characteristics by which the *Soul* is principally defined; firstly its motion and the secondly its thinking and judging and perceiving. As I have

⁹⁷. Aristotle, *DE ANIMA: Books II and III*, Trans. D. W. Hamlyn (Oxford: Clarendon Press, 1993), p. 22.

⁹⁸. Aristotle, *DE ANIMA*, Trans. R. D. Hicks (Cambridge: The University Press, 1907), p. 33.

already discussed all these characters or qualities are common for each and every living thing but all these are determined based on the organization of particular sense or senses.

“The soul never thinks without an image and all imagination is movement resulting from the exercise of the power of sense. All thinking requires a body as a condition of its existence. So the soul cannot exist independent of body (De Anima 431a17, 429a2 and 403a7-10).”⁹⁹

For Aristotle the matter as it is in itself is without Form; in virtue of itself the matter is neither *this* nor *that* but in virtue of having a Form it will be either *this* or *that*. With which the *Soul* knows and understands is the intellect which is considered as the part of the *Soul*. We have to consider what differentiates this part and how thinking is possible. For Aristotle this thinking part of the *Soul* must be capable of receiving the Forms of an object. That is why he says that, which can think, thinks the Forms in images (*De Anima* 431b2). Since it is a thinking thing, *intellect* must be related to what is thinkable, as sense is related to what is sensible. In this regard Aristotle says,

“That part of the soul, then, called intellect (and I speak of as intellect that by which the soul thinks and supposes) is actually none of existing things before it thinks. Hence too, it is reasonable that it should not be mixed with the body; for in that case it would come to be of a certain kind, either cold or hot, or it would even have an organ like the faculty of perception; but as things are it has none. Those who says, then, that the soul is a place of forms speak well, except that it is not the whole soul but that which can think, and it is not actually but potentially the forms.”¹⁰⁰

As it is clearly mentioned in this reference, the *Soul* is not mixed with anything and it was nothing before thinking. At the same it is just a part of the *Soul* and not the whole *Soul*. The faculty of sensation is dependent on the *Body* but *Mind* (the rational part of the *Soul* or the intellect) is separable from it and is capable of thinking itself. The intellect is potentially the object of thought, although it is nothing before it thinks. Intellect is itself an object of thought; that which thinks and that which is thought are identical. The actual knowledge is, for Aristotle, identical with the thing known.

“Intellect has no intermittence in its thought. It is, however, only when separated that it is its true self, and this, its essential nature, alone is immortal and eternal. But we do not remember because this is impassive,

⁹⁹. Ibid, p. 7, 129 and 141.

¹⁰⁰. Aristotle, *DE ANIMA: Books II and III*, Trans. D. W. Hamlyn (Oxford: Clarendon Press, 1993), p. 57.

while the intellect which can be affected is perishable and without this does not think at all."¹⁰¹

The intellect is actually none of existing things before it thinks and it will become none of existing things after its separation but when it is separated, it enters into its true essence; this true essence alone is immortal and eternal. When it is entered in the *Soul* then the *Soul* is unified in its essence. Though Aristotle, from the beginning, advocates for the immaterial and mortal *Soul* but at the end he introduced immortality of the *Soul*. And it is not the whole *Soul* but rational part of the *Soul*. No perishable thing can persist numerically as one and the same but they share in them in so far as each can, some more and some less; and what persists is not the thing itself but something like itself, not one in number but one in species.

Aristotelian immortality of the *Soul* caused so much of confusion over the centuries and caused rivalry between different schools of thought. It is an obscure argument among his philosophical arguments. Aristotelian notion of the *Soul-Body* cannot be a dualistic approach because, according to him, the *Soul* is not ontologically distinct from the *Body*. It cannot even be a materialist notion because the *Soul* is the Form of living organism. The way he explains the organism as a whole, as the unity of the *Soul* and *Body*, as an object for the study is itself contrary to both the materialism and the dualism. He also rejects the atomist view according to which everything is composed of tiny fundamental building blocks of matter and the change is a rearrangement of these fundamental units. But in 19th century his philosophy was named as Hylomorphism, according to which every natural *Body* consists of two intrinsic principles; immaterial *Soul* and the Material *Body*.

It is clear with evidence that the Greeks involved in solving the *Soul-Body* problem, but not *Mind-Body* problem. The way *Mind* played key role in Cartesian and post-Cartesian philosophical investigations, in the same way the *Soul* played key role in

¹⁰¹. Ibid, p. 135.

Greek philosophical thought. Though it was attributed with different faculties by different philosophers and in different periods but its ultimate nature was that it was an entity, a substance, which sums up the conscious experience of the self.

Chapter-2

THE CARTESIAN DUALISM: MIND, BODY AND SELF

In the first chapter it has been explained how the concept of the *Soul* evolved and what are the features attributed to the *Soul* and the *Body* and so on. Due to many historical reasons the concept of the *Soul* could not continue with the same attention it used to have, and this is true not only in day-to-day life but also in the technical fields of philosophy, Psychology, literature and some other sciences. At present, except in religious practices, in all other fields the existence of such a non-physical entity inside our *Body* has been mostly ignored and the reputation of *Soul* has come down due to the development of scientific knowledge of human anatomy. Not only the scientific development but also some other socio-cultural reasons led to the decline of the concept of the *Soul*. Since the notion of the *Soul* is associated with most of the religious sects and the respect towards the religious faith has lost its ground is also another cause for the decline of the concept of the *Soul*. The human advancement in different fields showed its impact on the respect for such concepts and consequently the countdown has begun to the concept of *Soul*. The usage of the word *Soul* in ordinary language almost disappeared, just as the gradual development of the philosophy and other sciences denied such a metaphysical concept of the *Soul*. The decline of the *Soul* has begun from the post-Socratic era in Philosophical and other scientific discussions, for example in Anaxagoras who ignored the importance of the *Psyche* and praised the importance of *Nous*. But the decline of the notion of the *Soul* could not completely remove the beliefs in the immaterial forces on human *Body*. At the same the immaterial aspect of man could not disappear from the philosophizing of human nature but it has taken another turn; the turn towards the notion of *Mind*.

If we go back once again and search for the reasons of belief on immaterial aspect of the men, as I have discussed in the first chapter, we can find many important reason for holding the notion of immaterial aspect of men as the ruler of the *Body*. People still have strong belief that the annihilation of the Self cannot be ended with the death of the

Body. Death is the central point for any kind of metaphysical and religious arguments; death worked like a bridge or connecting thing of life before death and life after death. Death has become historically a topic of major religious, social and philosophical concern because death constitutes crisis for the society as well as for individuals and groups. Death is a crucial point in many aspects. Philosophically the notion of death can deal with the problem of reincarnation, transmigration, mortality, immortality, heaven, hell and so on; at the same time death is a ubiquitous event in all cultures and is assimilated into the structure of social life. It can be seen very clearly in Indian cultural systems. There are many rituals to be performed on the occasion of birth and death. So philosophizing the death is not the new concept because the whole ancient Greek philosophy of *Mind*, as I have discussed in the first chapter, is constructed around the phenomena of death. That is why we can say that the birth and death are two main pillars for metaphysics and religion. Mostly people believe death as a gateway to an afterlife. That is why the belief in life after death has become almost universal. Cultural practices around death combined with the ideas about what happens after death form the basis of religion, which is one of the cornerstones of all civilizations. It is the physical corpse that rots away, whereas the *Soul*, according to many belief systems, is free from bodily attachments and lives forever. Those who accept the classification between mental and physical, for them passion pertains to the *Body* and thought to the *Soul*. *Body* can thus make a man a slave to passion while the contemplative power of his spirit sets him free.

The Greeks despaired over death because life and the *Body* offer so many pleasures and they also realized that completely surrendering to the *Body's* demands for pleasure leads to the suffering and death. Whether it was ancient Greek philosophical system or ancient Indian philosophical system or any religious system, the central theme is to address how to control *Body's* excesses. That is why some philosophers term the classical Greek approach as a *moral problematization of food, drink and sexual activity*. In Greek thought, the goal was for the human not to be ruled by the passions of the *Body*, but rather to temper the *Body's* passions with reason. Later the Christianity of the middle ages despised the *Body*. Mysticism thrived among the monks of that period; practitioners

sought to overcome anxieties about death by ignoring the welfare of the *Body*, allowing it to suffer and using that suffering as a path to freeing the spirit from the flesh. After this scholastic period the era of Descartes begins; Descartes argued that we need not fear death because the *Mind* is eternal; the decay of the *Body* need not imply the destruction of the *Mind*. He reintroduced his predecessor's way of understanding death to explain the *Mind-Body* relation. How Descartes could explain the nature of *Mind* and what are the arguments for the *Mind-Body* dualism will be the main theme for this chapter.

It was not the death alone which was baffling and causing terror in day-to-day activities of a human kind as a whole. So many social, political, cultural, religious and philosophical aspects are involved in it. Before Descartes, I mean during the medieval period, lots of important things happened. It was very important period where lot of new philosophical and religious changes began. It was the period in which the rejection of Aristotelian philosophy was very much visible, which was causing for many conceptual and philosophical difficulties. At the same time it was the time where the filling of these gaps began through the Christianization of Aristotle's philosophy. During 13th century, saint Thomas Aquinas incorporated the works of Aristotle and Ptolemy into Christian thinking. Aquinas insisted that there must be no conflict between faith and reason, and he blended the natural philosophy of Aristotle with Christian revelation. The idea of an Earth-centered universe fit comfortably with literal biblical interpretation, for it placed humans at the center of God's creation—the ultimate expression of the divine will. The idea of a central, unmoving Earth was natural for the early humans. Through the work of Aquinas, this easily accepted idea was shown to fit perfectly with Christian beliefs. So Aristotle's science—and with it the Ptolemaic model—became even more entrenched in Western culture. It was no longer just a natural, normal way of thinking about the world, but was part of Christian thinking and religious dogma. A very important characteristic of the middle ages was a great reliance on authority, particularly on authorities of the past. Aquinas relied on the authority of the Bible, the authority of earlier churchmen, the authority of his superiors in the Church, and the authority of Aristotle. Arguments were

often settled by reference to authorities rather than by personal experience or independent experimentation.

The beginning of modern philosophy has led to the decline of the Christianized Aristotelian philosophy. This is the period in which people started attacking Aristotle view on empirical grounds which gave rise to the empiricist movement. It was the beginning of modern philosophy which could gift us three eminent personalities to change the philosophical, religious and scientific systems. While dealing with the pre-occupied notions of the medieval period they could show the way into new philosophical and scientific movement, they are, Galileo, Rene Descartes, and Newton. The development of new science, that is Galileo's invention of Telescope, has become the new tool for the people to look around things with the scientific point of view. The empirical ground on the basis of which they were attacking Aristotelian view was the invention of Telescope. Another important development of this period was that the rise of Heliocentric view of the universe, according to which the Sun will be at the center of the universe, against to the earlier view or the Aristotelian view that the Earth is at the center of the universe and everything moves around it. Galileo was excommunicated and house arrested because of publishing this views. This led to the tension between science and religion. Another major attack on Aristotelian views was the rejection of the idea that heavier objects fall faster than the lighter objects, which was just a commonsensical view. But Galileo really wanted to test this empirically; finally he found that the heavier objects hit the ground harder than the lighter objects but they will be going at the same speed. These types of differences between the sciences and religion laid the foundation for the Empiricist movement.

2.1. Introduction to Cartesian Dualism: What does it mean to be certain?

Before entering into Cartesian dualism we have to understand a little about its background. Despite the fact that great philosophical debates and dualistic notions are traced back to the ancient Greeks but there is no exaggeration in saying that the thoughts of French philosopher Rene Descartes could dominate intellectuals during the early modern period, not only in his native country but elsewhere in the continent. He lived in a period of great philosophical excitement and period of change. The change is natural in philosophy but the change could continue neither for one day, nor for one month, nor for a year, not even for a decade but the change could continue for centuries. Whatever philosophical fort Greeks could build for thousands of years was destroyed by the medieval philosophers. Whatever they could construct was demolished by early modern philosophers. And whatever the philosophical forts they could construct are cracking now; the change is natural. Descartes, as the founder of Cartesian dualism, could built his philosophical fort from the demolition of medieval philosophical notions. That is why he was considered as the father of modern philosophy and he could give the first systematic account of *Mind-Body* relationship. As a result a new international philosophical movement has spread in the name of *Cartesianism*. It was the Cambridge Platonist Henry More who introduced the term *Cartesianism* for this movement — from the Latin form of Descartes' name, Cartesius — into English language. Nearly four hundred years separate us from Descartes and for the progress in philosophy which is a long stretch of time—yet we are perplexed by the problem which stirred the *Minds* of our forgotten ancestors four hundred years ago. We can still learn many valuable things from a careful study of the *Meditations*. Another important thing is that these four hundred years scientific and philosophical progress could not be made outdated; as scientific progress has made Descartes' *Meteors*¹⁰² and large parts of his *Dioptrics*¹⁰³ as outdated. That is why we must frankly admit that philosophy moves slowly but keeps progressing.

¹⁰². A work on meteorology.

¹⁰³. A work on optics.

Descartes was very much interested in science and lots of his early works were on Physics and Mechanics, and he was a great mathematician. But he was also very much interested in metaphysics; that is, he was interested in metaphysics partly because he wanted foundations for science, he wanted reliable basis on which Physics and other sciences could be built. He began his philosophical investigation by using the *method of doubt* but he was not a skeptic because he was committed to the project that there is certainty. The first thing to discuss is that we need to situate Descartes in the history of philosophy. Descartes was courageous because he could recommence the whole subject from the very beginning and constituted afresh the groundwork on which philosophy is based. At the same time Descartes was known as a rationalist philosopher and rationalism is an epistemological view which says that we can understand the world on the basis of reason. The second thing is that he was the first man of having high philosophical capacity because there was freshness in his philosophy that was not found in any previous eminent philosophers since antiquity.

If one tries to find out the universal truth in the light of religion that may lead me into the dark, and if one follows a path in search of universal truth in the light of others opinions it may turn them into a blind because blinds only needs someone's help to move. But if one is accustomed to see the universal truth in the light of his own reasoning it can lead him or her in the real path towards universal truth and makes him feel it as certain. Accordingly Descartes followed his own reasoning and began the investigation for truth by questioning his own existence. The uncertainty of his own existence forced Descartes to search for the certainty. In the search of truth which method he followed and what is new and what is old in his method that will be explained clearly in addition. But the main theme of this chapter is Cartesian dualism. Descartes argues that *Mind* is one thing and the *Senses* are another. What the *Mind* knows for certain does not come from the senses. Throughout the *Meditations* Descartes describes the *Mind* as completely separate entity from the *Body*. Such a sharp distinction between *Mind* and *Body* has been labeled as *Cartesian Dualism* and it is an important legacy in the history of philosophy. The skeptical argument which he used in the first *Meditation*, to reach what is *Mind*, was

not a new concept in the Philosophy. It has a small historical background in the history of philosophy. In the beginning it was said by Sextus Empiricus in the second century A.D. Ancient skepticism was most centrally about belief, not knowledge. The ancient skeptics argue that, *if we cannot confidently claim knowledge, we should hold back from any kind of truth-claim*. This was the base for Descartes to introduce this concept again for the certainty of the knowledge claim.

After understanding all the earlier philosophical thoughts of life, of death, of Soul and of duality, Descartes thought that all those philosophical concepts are misleading in understanding the human nature and as he decided to raise one question: *What is a person?* For centuries philosophers struggled with this question but it raised many more difficult questions while dealing with it. How does your brain, your *Body*, your *Mind*, or your *Soul* play a part in who you are? Are you essentially a physical creature? Or, Are you essentially a thinking thing? What is the most important aspect of your Self? What about animals? If animals have feelings and thoughts and have the ability to communicate, does that qualify them as persons? Or, does it allow us to say that they have *Mind*? Is thinking sufficient to qualify machines as persons? What are the criteria to label something as a person? All these questions really baffled the philosophers including Descartes and we are still struggling to answer these questions. After all these the most important question is: what makes you who you are? What are the features that define your human nature? From these types of baffling questions Descartes tried to answer the first question that is, *what is a person?*

Dualism is a set of views about the relationship between *Mind* and matter, which begins with the claim that mental phenomena are, in some respects, non-physical. There is a standard account of Cartesian dualism according to which human beings are composed of two distinct substances, a material substance and immaterial substance, and the latter is a necessary and sufficient condition for (most) mental events. So for Descartes the *Mind* and the *Body* are two distinct substances. Descartes thought that these

are completely distinct substances on the basis of which it was called as substance dualism. Though there are many philosophical works of Descartes, like; *Private Thoughts* (1619), *Rules for the Direction of the Mind* (1628), *The World and Treatise on Man* (1629), *Principles of Philosophy* (1640), *Description of the Human Body* (1647), and *The Passions of the Soul* (1649) but his major philosophical works are *Discourse on Method* (1637) and *Meditations on First Philosophy* (1641).

*“In addition to his philosophical writings Descartes made important contributions to mathematics. He linked algebra and geometry by means of a coordinate system that still bears his name: Cartesian.”*¹⁰⁴

Now we can have a brief sketch of *Meditations*. In the first *Meditation* we can see the skeptical arguments for having certainty about particular things. In the second *Meditation* Descartes doubts that there are any bodies but at the end of the second *Meditation* Descartes will be able to say that I can doubt everything except the *Self*, the *Mind*, the “*I*” that doubts. In third *Meditation* he takes the task of the demonstration of the existence of God. Here he argues that, *from the certainty of the self comes the certainty of God*. In the fourth *Meditation* he continues the arguments of the existence of God and His characteristics. Main argument is that, *a God who deceived would not be perfect, that is, would not be God*. In the fifth *Meditation* he offers two additional proofs for the existence of God and begins to consider the reality of the sensible world that he has doubted so vigorously throughout the previous *Meditations*. In the sixth *Meditation* he deals with the existence of the physical things, for which he argued in the second *Meditation* too, and the distinction between the *Mind* and the *Body*.

Descartes’s theory of dualism begins with the theory of certainty. But, what makes Descartes not to have certainty? And, what makes Descartes to doubt everything in search of unshakable truth about the reality? One common example may help us to understand Descartes’s problem and his passion for finding unshakable truth of reality. Let’s say you have had a friend since childhood. You have trusted this friend entirely and told your friend all your deepest secrets. You never knew your friend to lie to you or

¹⁰⁴. Christopher Biffle, *A Guided Tour of Rene Descartes’ Meditations on First Philosophy*, (Mountain View, Calif.: Mayfield Publishing, 1996) p. 1.

deceive you. A thousand times, your friend has proved reliable. Then one day, in an important issue, your friend deceives you deliberately and completely. Could you ever again have the same complete faith and trust in your friend as you had before this deceit? I would honestly say no. Personally I would try to forgive the friend, but I would never honestly trust my friend again. Descartes was in a similar but worse situation. He believed many things about material world and was wrong; every time his senses deceived him or he dreamt. How a deception breaks the precious unity between you and your friend, in the same way error breaks the precious unity between the philosopher and reality. To have certainty on his every belief he began to doubt the foundations of every belief. In the process finally he reached *Mind-Body* dualism. How and what are the sources that we discuss now.

Descartes really wanted to have a foundation on which all knowledge can be built and in order to find a foundation Descartes urges one to demolish everything completely and start again right from the foundations. Here he agrees with Plato that knowledge requires certainty but he rejected the Plato's idea that the physical world is not knowable. Plato's argument was that the physical world is changing constantly and real knowledge requires an unchanging world. Descartes wants to have both, knowledge requires certainty on the one hand and he wants to reject the idea that we don't have real knowledge of physical world on the other hand. Here he wants to connect these two ideas together that knowledge requires certainty and we can have real knowledge of physical world. To combine these two things first of all Descartes needs to find one thing which is certain but, what does it mean to be certain? For Descartes certainty means; *it is being unable to doubt*. This is an important move that Descartes makes here. Descartes begins his *First Meditation* by asking, *Is there anything of which I can be certain?* The notion of uncertainty occupied him and forced him to be in search for the certitude. In search of certainty he begins doubting everything, but going through each and every particular thing and checking the possibility for doubt and knowing that whether there is certainty or not will be an endless task. So here he understood that the task is enormous which he cannot even complete in his lifetime. Instead of going through each and every thing he

just decided to target the foundation itself. That is why he says, once the foundations of a building are undermined, anything built on them collapses of its own accord; so he decided to go straight for the basic principles on which all his former beliefs rested.

Here Descartes is talking about the certainty of knowledge. Whatever the knowledge we have and whatever we believe as certain we acquired if either through the senses or by senses. But with one doubt all beliefs and all knowledge collapse. So whatever we were reported by our own senses could be false. On the basis of this Descartes doubted the five senses because there is possibility that senses can mislead us. He says, in our day-to-day life we are witnesses of our own sense activities where our senses misled us. He really wants to say here that our senses are unreliable. For example, our senses deceive us with respect to the objects which are very small or very far. Straight things look bent in water, Round things look oval when held that in angle, Square things look round from far, Mountains look purple, the Sun actually looks very small when in fact we know by reason that Sun is many times bigger than earth. So whatever independently presented by the senses is false. Therefore Descartes wanted stress one thing that the sense alone cannot provide the true knowledge. He even went further and says; how can I believe that I am here, sitting by the fire, wearing a winter dressing-gown, holding this piece of paper in my hands, and so on, are certain. Here he introduces the *dreaming argument* according to which there is a possibility that I might be sleeping somewhere else and dreaming that I am here, sitting by the fire, wearing a winter dressing-gown, holding this piece of paper in my hands and so on. If I am really dreaming then all these things cannot be true. From this Descartes infers that there are no signs by means of which being awake can be distinguished from being asleep.

After dealing with the inability of the senses to ensure certainty, Descartes wants to give a reasonable conclusion that physics, astronomy, medicine, and other sciences too which depend on the study of composite things with the help of senses are doubtful. But the arithmetic, geometry and other sciences of the same class which regard the simplest

and most general objects, regardless of whether they really exist in nature or not, contain something certain and indubitable. For whether I am awake or dreaming it remains true that two and three make five, and a square has four sides, it does not seem possible that the truths so clear and apparent can be suspected of any falsity. It does not matter whether I am in a state of dream or awake but $2+2=4$. But here he introduces the Evil demon argument, which says, imagine that there is an all powerful, all malicious Evil demon and this Evil demon has the power to deceive us of everything. According to this argument it may be that the malicious demon deceives me about the external objects like tables, chairs, even the planet Earth. He even has the power to deceive us about the truths of mathematics. The Evil demon tells us that $2+2$ doesn't really equal four and we will be able to believe that $2+2$ doesn't equal four because the Evil demon has the capacity to manipulate my reasoning capacity.

In the beginning Descartes suspects whether God, who is Omniscient, Omnipotent and Omnipresent, can deceive me in case of mathematical truths who made me the kind of creature that I am. And he further tells how do I know that I am not deceived by myself in adding $2+2$, as I sometimes think that human beings deceived themselves in the things which they believe that they know best. There is a possibility for deceiving myself if I am an independent being. But in case of God it is not possible, perhaps God cannot desire that I should be deceived, because God is said to be supremely good. However, if it is contrary to His goodness to have made me such that I constantly deceive myself, at the same time it would also appear to be contrary to His goodness if He deceives me. So I cannot doubt that God cannot be a deceiver. With an example he says that, if you have a basket of apples, some of which are bad and will spoil and poison the rest, you have no other means than to empty your basket completely and then take and test the apples one by one, in order to put the good ones back in your basket and throw away those that are not. In the same way, those who have never philosophized correctly have various opinions in their *minds* which they have begun to store up since childhood, and which they have reason to believe may in many cases be false. In the same way Descartes too throws away all his beliefs and searches for one thing which is very certain. In this

process Descartes first doubts the senses or sense perception, secondly doubts whether we can make a difference between the real world and the dream world, and thirdly he doubts on the truths of mathematics.

So to be certain means there should not be any chance to doubt. Plato interprets the certainty criterion metaphysically; objects must be unchanging. But Descartes is putting more emphasis on the epistemological side of things, he is not making metaphysical claims. Here he wants to say that the real certainty means that the knower should be unable to doubt the thing that they know. Descartes *Method of Doubt* is simply a method; it is a strategy or a way of coming up with something which is real knowledge. This method instructs us to take our beliefs and subject them to doubt. If it is possible to doubt those things then we treat the particular belief or a set of beliefs as false. And we repeat this until we find something that we are unable to doubt. But this does not mean that he thinks that they are actually false. It's very important to take some caution here because Descartes never thinks these things are actually false. He is not going to say that these things are literally false but only that they cannot serve as the foundation. So he wants to treat them as false until he finds a foundation which is indubitable. So he has gone through several stages of doubting and tried to show that all the stuff which we doubted, all the stuff which we are treating false can be eventually reclaimed once we find a foundation which is secure and allow us to bear the weight of knowledge. This is what Descartes thinks about certainty; what is certain and how it is going to be the foundation for the all knowledge claim that will be discussed.

After finding mathematical truths too as uncertain, Descartes moves further in search of certainty. The efforts of Descartes could not give any certainty in the first Meditation, so once again he begins the same path whatever he started in the first Meditation in search of certainty and says that I feel as if I have fallen unexpectedly into a deep whirlpool which tumbles me around so that I can neither stand on the bottom nor swim up to the top. But I will not give up until I recognize something certain, or, if

nothing else, until I at least recognize for certain that there is no certainty. In the process he considers that everything I see is spurious; I believe that my memory tells me lies, and that none of the things that it reports ever happened. I have no senses; no *Body*, no shape, no extension, no movement and no place are creation of my imagination. But finally what remains? May be just one fact that there is nothing certain. Does it not follow that we too do not exist? Descartes says no;

“If I convinced myself of something¹⁰⁵ then I certainly exist. But there is a deceiver of supreme power and cunning who is deliberately and constantly deceiving me. In that case too I undoubtedly exist, if he is deceiving me; and let him deceive me as much as he can, but he will never bring it about that I am nothing so long as I think that I am something.”¹⁰⁶

That is why in his famous work ‘*Discourse on Method*’, written in French in 1637, he reaches his famous pronouncement “*JE PENSE DONC JE SUIS*” which means “*I am thinking therefore I exist*” later he expressed it in his Latin translation of the Discourse as “*COGITO ERGO SUM*” which means “*I think, therefore I am.*” In *Meditations* which is his philosophical masterpiece he just use the same formulation and arrives at a very subjective or private point of view that “*I am, I exist and this is certain*” So this is the first thing which is very much certain that ‘*I am*’ or ‘*I exist.*’ What is this ‘I’ which exists and what it does will be discussed in next section (that is 2.2). But when it comes to the matter of the ‘knowledge of certainty’ that ‘I exist’ that which is ‘certain’ is known by reason, but not by abstraction from experience. The way Descartes reached this certainty is a kind of reductionist argument. Here we have to keep one thing in our *Mind* that though the *Meditations* is an epistemological work but metaphysics is its subject-matter. Here his views go against to the Aristotelian view because Aristotelian tradition believes that the truths of mathematics and metaphysics are abstracted from experience. Finally this *Cogito* has become his foundational claim.

¹⁰⁵. ‘.....or thought anything at all’ (French version).

¹⁰⁶. Daniel E. Flage and Clarence A Bonnen, *Descartes and Method* (London: Routledge, 1999), p. 143.

2.2. A Thinking Thing: what does it mean?

Some people may think that Descartes could not stand on his own promise which he made in the beginning of the first Meditation that,

“several years have now passed since I first realized how numerous were the false opinions that in my youth I had taken to be true, and thus how doubtful were all those that I had subsequently built upon them. And thus I realized that once in my life I had to raze everything to the ground and begin again from the original foundations, if I wanted to establish anything firm and lasting in the sciences.”¹⁰⁷

At the end of the first Meditation it was found that at least one thing which is very certain, on which we can establish the knowledge of the external and internal entities. People may say that even after finding mathematical truths as certain he could not take them as foundation. Just for the sake of avoiding it he introduced the evil demon argument. It does not matter whether you are in a state of dream or in a state of awake, the mathematical truths are certain. By introducing the Evil demon argument he counters the certainty of mathematical truths and then moves further in search of certainty. If we find fault in Descartes's search for the certainty then it shows that we misunderstood him or we are not seriously following Descartes. There were mainly two strong reasons for Descartes to deny the mathematical truths as the foundation. First thing is that we have prima facie reasons to consider the mathematics in general as a reliable science but neither numbers nor geometrical figures exist in the world or outside of our thoughts. Second thing is that Descartes can doubt mathematical certainty only by supposing the Evil demon to be a deceiver. If the Evil demon is not a deceiver then mathematical truths are indubitable. If you take mathematical truths as the foundation by supposing that there is no Evil demon then one important doubt will be raised: Does anything follow from mathematical truths? Nothing follows from it, neither my own existence nor the physical world. Mathematical certainty can neither prove the existence of mental entities nor material entities; so it cannot be served as the foundation. These

¹⁰⁷. Rene Descartes, *Meditations, Objections, and Replies*, Edit and Trans. Roger Ariew and Donald Cress (Indianapolis: Hackett Publishing Company, 2006), p.17.

two were the main reasons for Descartes not to take mathematical truths as the foundation and to go further.

Though Descartes in the '*Discourse on Method*' had accepted without further caveat that the typical evidence of mathematical propositions would enable us to formulate a trustworthy criterion to search for truth but here, in First Meditation, he denies the mathematical truths as the foundation. Here we can understand it in different ways; first, he might have changed his opinion of mathematical truths afterwards, or second, that just to reach the concept of 'I', on which he wanted to establish all other truths, Descartes might have denied the mathematical truths, or third, as he said in the first Meditation that to resolve the problem of uncertainty I need to demolish all my previous beliefs so accordingly he might have done (but in reality he just pretended for a time that these former opinions are utterly false and imaginary), or fourth ultimately he might had an interest in revisiting what is called '*Pyrrhonian Skepticism*',¹⁰⁸ according to which we cannot establish a reliable criterion of truth. If we consider the first Meditation seriously then Descartes's ideas go with third opinion. Anyhow in the process, of argument, he reaches the state which he really wanted to reach, that is '*I am*' or '*I exist*' which is certain and at any state, whether waking or dreaming, cannot be dubious as long as I think that I am something.

After reaching that extreme of doubt Descartes reasons one thing absolutely certain that he, the doubter, must exist or he must be there in some sense in order to entertain doubts, he must be there to be deceived. Still there is no sufficient clarity about what is this "*I*" which must exist? From the first person point of view; Descartes questions himself, what then am I? I must be careful not to substitute some other thing in place of myself. Am I a thing that thinks? What is that? Is it a thing that doubts, understands,

¹⁰⁸. It was a school of skepticism founded by Aenesidemus in the 1st century BC and recorded by Sextus Empiricus in the 2nd century AD. But Pyrrho of Elis is usually credited with founding this school. The main theme of this 'ism' is that nothing can be known for certain. Another thing is that there are some evidences which shows that Pyrrho traveled to India and studied with the 'gymnosophists' (naked lovers of wisdom), which could have been any number of Indian sects. From there he brought this knowledge and spread.

affirms, denies, is willing, is unwilling, and also imagines and has sensory perception? Am I man? But what is a man? Shall I say 'a rational animal'? In this process Descartes again raises several questions like what 'animality' and 'rationality' mean and so on.

So instead of raising unending questions, Descartes proposes to concentrate on what comes into our thoughts spontaneously and quite naturally whenever we think of ourselves. Descartes says that the first thought which comes to my mind is that I have a face, hands, arms, and this whole mechanism of limbs, such as we see even in corpses, I call the human *Body*. The next thought is that I was nourished, that I walked, that I sensed, that I thought: these actions I attribute to the *Soul*. But as to the nature of this *Soul*, either I did not think about this or else I imagined it as something rarefied and subtle, like a wind or like a fire, or like thin air, permeated into my bodily parts. Descartes further says that I had no doubts about the *Body* itself because I thought that I knew its nature distinctly; if I had attempted to describe how I conceived it in my mind then I would have explained as follows: by *Body* I understand all that which can be defined by a certain figure; something which can be confined in a certain place, and which can fill a given space in such a way that every other *Body* will be excluded from it; which can be perceived either by touch or by sight or by hearing or by taste or by smell; which can be moved in many ways not by itself but something else which is foreign to it. But the power of self-movement, like the power of sensation or the power of thought, are quite foreign to it. But here Descartes stops for a moment and questions himself; what shall I now say that I am, when I am supposing that there is some supremely powerful Evil demon, who is deliberately trying to trick me in every way he can? Can I affirm that I possess the slightest things of all those that I have just attributed to the nature of the *Body*?

Now Descartes turns to the *Soul* and discusses the attributes of the *Soul*. He asks: What about taking nourishment or moving? But since now I do not have a *Body*, these are mere illusions. What about sensing? Surely this too does not take place without a *Body*;

and I seemed to have sensed in my dreams many things that I later realized that I really did not sense. What about thinking? Here Descartes says at last I have discovered it – thought; this alone is inseparable from me. I am; I exist—this is certain. But for how long? For as long as I am thinking; if I were to cease from all thinking it might also come to pass that I should altogether cease to exist. Finally he says that I am now admitting nothing except what is necessarily true; it is true that, *I am only a thinking thing, that is, a Mind, or a Soul, or an intellect, or a reason*. But for all that I am a thing which is real and which truly exists – words whose meaning I have been ignorant of until now. But what kind of a thing? As I have just said – a thinking thing or a conscious being (*Mind*). This was the foundation for Descartes to say that “*the nature of the human Mind is better known than the body*.”¹⁰⁹

Descartes goes further and says that I am not that structure of limbs which is called a human *Body*; I am not even some thin subtle air which permeates the limbs; nor a wind, nor a fire, nor a vapor, nor a breath, nor anything I devise for myself. But still I am something though I have supposed all these things to be nothing; I can only make judgments about things which are known to me. I know that I exist; the question is, what is this ‘I’ that I know? If the ‘I’ is understood strictly as we have been taking it, then it is quite certain that knowledge of it does not depend on things of whose existence I am as yet unaware; so it cannot depend on any of the things which I invent in my imagination. I know for certain that I exist, at the same time it could be the case that all these images, and in general everything that belongs to the nature of *Body*, are nothing but illusions. So whatever I grasp by means of imagination has nothing to do with this knowledge I have of myself, and that I need to withdraw my mind from such things as thoroughly as possible, if it is to perceive its own nature as distinctly as possible.

“Am I not the very person who is now “doubting” almost everything; who “understands” something and “asserts” this one thing to be true, and “denies” other things; who “is willing” to know more, and “is unwilling” to be deceived; who “imagines” many things, even involuntarily, and perceives many things coming as it were from the “senses”? Even if I am

¹⁰⁹. Justin Skirry, *Descartes: A Guide for the Perplexed* (London: Continuum International Publishing Group, 2008), p. 41.

all the while asleep; even if my creator does all he can to deceive me; how can any of these things be less of a fact that my existence? Is any of these something distinct from my consciousness? Can any of them be called a separate thing from myself?"¹¹⁰

It is so clear that it is 'I' who doubts, understands; it is 'I' who imagine; even no imagined object is real, yet the power of imagination really exists and is part of my thinking. Finally, it is 'I' who have sensations, or who perceive corporeal objects as it were by the senses. Thus I am now seeing light, hearing a noise, feeling heat. These objects are unreal, if I am asleep; but I certainly seem to see, to hear, and to be warmed. This cannot be unreal; and this is what is properly called my sensation; sensation is nothing but thinking (Consciousness). Thinking includes not only pure intellectual acts (doubting, affirming, denying, and knowing), but also emotions, volitions, imaginations and even sensing. Descartes obviously regards all mental acts as '*thinking*' under the pretext that they all participate in the contents of our consciousness. That it could be easily verified in the self-examination of one's mind. I am introspectively aware that *they reside and are found with certainty in myself* (my subjectivity). The *Mind* (Consciousness) is the substantial container of all '*thinking events*' in the aforementioned sense (from sensations and imaginations to judgments and propositions). Conversely, these 'modes of thought' determine the nature of the *Mind* as its accidents and modifications. Viewed reflectively and objectively, these mental contents make up the realm of direct knowledge whose evident presence translates into the conclusion reached by the second Meditation; *I am a thinking being*.

According to Descartes the 'I' which thinks is the *Self*. Here the word *Mind* is used to refer to the immaterial aspect of the self, so we need not worry about the name; we can call it *Self*, *Soul* or *Spirit* or Will or Understanding or Rationality, and so on. There is no problem in giving name but there will be problem in cases in which it refers. *Mind* is conceived as a *Conscious Ego* that possesses capacities such as intellection, willing, imagining, affirming, and denying; he uses the word *thinking* in a very wide sense to cover all of the activities of Consciousness. By thinking the *Cogito ergo sum* in the

¹¹⁰. Howard Rachlin, *The Escape of the Mind* (New York: Oxford University Press, 2014), p. 40.

second meditation Descartes was able to put down metaphysical doubts, as a result he succeeded in having initial victory over skepticism (the victory based on natural reasons). After conceiving the *Mind* as *Conscious Ego* Descartes, on the other hand, conceived the *Body* as Matter, and its operation is fundamentally mechanical. Till now it is not clear that it is the *Mind* that possesses the characteristics traditionally ascribed to the *Soul*; *Mind* is seen not only as something entirely distinct but also as something essentially independent and autonomous of the *Body* and its physical environment. Descartes thus draws a clear-cut metaphysical distinction between *Mind* (the *Soul*) and *Body*

2.3. The Real Distinction

One of the most lasting contributions of Descartes to Philosophy is his well-known arguments for dualism between *Mind-Body*. At the same time one of the central doctrines of Descartes's Metaphysics is his division of world into two kinds of stuff: thinking substance and extended substance. Each substance has one, and only one, principal attribute. An attribute makes a substance the type of substance that it is. An attribute is defined in his *Principles of Philosophy* as that which "constitutes its nature and essence, and to which all its other properties are referred". In the case of God, Angels and *Souls* (*Minds*), the principal attribute is *thought*. In the case of bodies, or even all matter taken as one *Body*, the principal attribute is *extension*. This argument continues to attract attention, not just from historians of Philosophy, but from the philosophical community at large.

With Descartes a different way of conceiving the relationship between *Mind* and *Body* is developed and the modern Philosophy began to separate itself from its alliance with theology and place itself in the service of the emerging new science. His philosophy of *Mind* was motivated partly by a concern to respect the distinctive place of the mental within a metaphysical framework encompassing this new philosophy. However, if we want to raise the question, what *Mind* is?, then first we have to ask the question, what a person is? Then only it will be possible to define what *Mind* is. At the same time any

discussion about the *Mind* presents very interesting problems. If the *Mind* is not physical things, such as the Brain, can it be found? If the *Mind* is beyond perception, how can we know what it does? Such questions are interesting, but, if the answers are not obvious, we may wonder whether there is a problem with the questions themselves. For Descartes reality is made up of two separate substances, they are *Mind* and Matter each of which possesses a different essence. The essential property of divinity is perfection. In order to count something as matter, it must possess the property of extension; that is, it must exist in space. The essential property of *Mind* is thought. *Mind* and Matter, having different essential properties, can be conceived apart from one another.

Descartes posited a metaphysical dualism, distinguishing the substances into mental and physical. These two substances in his system are independent of each other and irreducible. In previous section it is clearly discussed about a 'thinking thing' but regarding the *Body*, the extended substance or the other half of Cartesian substance dualism, we have to discuss its real nature in order to understand the real distinction between the *Mind* and *Body*. That is why Descartes was not happy only with the certainty that *I exist* but also wanted to go ahead for the certainty of other things. What about Science? What about Physics? What about the external world? These questions were haunting him, at the same time, for, according to his ordinary beliefs though he had the answers for these entire questions but there was no certainty. So Descartes really wants to get out from himself back to the world. *Meditations on First Philosophy* worked like a magical tool in removing uncertainty from Descartes *Mind* to bring him back to the normal world. But here when we talk about the *Body* then three important questions will be raised; what our bodies are? Are our bodies no more than an assemblage of flesh, bones and organs? Are our bodies no more than animated corpse? In Cartesian point of view *Body* in the *Mind-Body* dichotomy has played a secondary and oppositional role in relation of the *Mind*. We need to realize that *Body*, taken in general sense, is a substance and hence it too can never perish. The nature of the *Body*, matter in general, consists not in its being something which is hard or heavy or colored, or which affects the senses in any way, but simply in its being something which is extended in length, breadth, and

depth. Regarding the physical objects, he says, I had no doubts about them and I thought I distinctly knew its nature, which, if I had attempted to describe how I conceived it in my *Mind*, I would have explained as follows (as I have mentioned in the previous chapter):

*“when I call something a physical object, I mean that it is capable of being bounded by a shape and limited to a place; that it can fill a space so as to exclude other objects from it; that it can be perceived by touch, sight, hearing, taste, and smell; that it can be moved in various ways, not by itself, but by something else in contact with it.”*¹¹¹

In general the power of moving itself, and also power of sensation or of thought does not belong to the nature of physical objects; but in case of life holding bodies, such as human and animal bodies and other creatures, the source of the movement is the *Mind* itself. But the inanimate bodies like sticks and stones have their own material force which moves them move. That is why he has taken a piece of wax as an example to explain the physical objects.

He says that the wax which has been taken from the honeycomb has yet not lost the flavor of its honey; it retains some of the scent of the flowers from which it was gathered; when we examine wax, we can list off its properties and we know what we are referring to. It is solid, has color, taste, and scent. It is cold, easy to touch, and it makes a sound when tapped. All these things we recognize as belonging to the thing we call wax. But we have to notice one thing that, as Descartes said, when heat is applied it loses its form; it becomes liquid; it becomes difficult to touch; it no longer makes a sound when tapped. The scent and taste disappear and the color also changes. The thing now has totally different properties, and yet we still call it wax. How can two things have different properties and yet be the same? Descartes says, we must say that it does; no one denies it; no one thinks otherwise. So what was there in the wax that was so distinctly grasped? He says “*certainly none of those things that I reached through the senses, for whatever fell*

¹¹¹. Christopher Biffle and Ronald Rubin, *A Guide Tour of Rene Descartes' Meditations on First Philosophy*, (Mountain View, Calif.: Mayfield Publication, 1996) p. 25.

within the scope of taste, smell, sight, touch or hearing has already changed. The wax remains.”¹¹²

When a person refers to the wax, do they mean that first (*Solid*) substance? Or, do they mean the second (*Liquid*) form? Or, is there something else which holds its identity? What is it that we truly mean when we call something wax? For example, if we take one of the Hindu religious practices then we can understand it very critically. Think of a corpse in place of wax, which is also solid (for the most part); when the corpse is burnt that corpse does not become liquid. At the very most, the solid exterior would become fuel for the flame and the remains would become ashes. When fire is removed, the corpse is still solid, but will never function again in the same way but the wax, however, can. This brings us back to the question: what is the essential property of an object? Because though the corpse has become ashes, the ashes still represent the person whose *Body* it was. After examining this example it seems that there seems to be some essence that continues, in spite of physical changes in an object. It is to say that this was not that sweetness of honey, nor that agreeable scent of flowers, nor that particular color, nor that figure, nor that sound, but simply a physical *Body* that once appeared to me one way and now appears differently. Descartes then says that let's pay careful attention and remove everything that doesn't belong to the wax, and see what's left. He means to say that the qualities of wax like sweetness, hardness, flavor, color etc. can be taken away from the wax. Then, certainly nothing remains except an *extended, flexible and changeable* thing. But what is it to be flexible and changeable? Is it what our imagination shows it to be so: namely, that this piece of wax can change from a round to a square shape or from the latter to a triangular shape? He says, of course not; I understand that the wax is capable of innumerable changes of this kind, yet I am unable to run through the immeasurable number of changes in my imagination. Therefore my understanding of these properties is not achieved by using the faculty of imagination. What about the thing that is 'extended'? He says, surely I know something about the nature of its extension. The extension of the wax increases when the wax melts, increases again when the wax boils, and increases still

¹¹². Rene Descartes, *Meditations* (London: Penguin Books, 2010)

more when the wax gets hotter. I will be mistaken about what wax is unless I understand and believe that it can undergo more changes in extension. Finally Descartes concludes the explanation of 'image' by saying that '*I must therefore admit that I do not have an image of what the wax is – that I grasp what it is with only my Mind.*' But what is this wax which is perceived or grasped by the *Mind* alone? He says that,

*"The perception of it is not sight, touch, or imagination, and never was, although it seemed to be so at first: it is an inspection by the mind alone, which can be either imperfect and confused, as it was before in this case, or clear and distinct, as it now is, depending on the greater or lesser degree of attention I pay to what it consists of."*¹¹³

The object continues, in spite of the physical changes. This conclusion is all about Descartes's dualism, the union of the physical with the mental. I do not know whether any word or any name is available or will be suitable for this physical entity which represents the identity of the Wax. Because of lack of a better word, some people give different names to this unchanging identity but Descartes says that it can be understood only by the rational capacity of *Mind*, not by any means. When the wax is present, we say that we see the wax itself, but not that we infer its presence from its color and shape. So Descartes wants to get rid of the conclusion that '*I learn about the wax by eyesight rather than by purely mental inspection.*' He further says that if I happen to look out of the window and see men walking along the street; normally I say that I 'see' them, just as I say that I see the wax. But what do I really see other than hats and coats, which could be covering robots? But I judge that they are men. Thus I understood solely with my faculty of judgment which is in my *Mind*. Some scholars say that it is the spiritual quality that Descartes was searching for with his wax analogy. Whatever it is and whether we are in a position to give it any name or not does not matter. It cannot be understood through the senses but it can be understood only through the mental faculty of ours. Thus Descartes found the primacy of the *Mind* on matter.

¹¹³. Rene Descartes, *Meditations on First Philosophy*, Trans. Michael Moriarty (New York: Oxford University Press, 2008), p. 23.

On the one hand we have understood that the '*I*' a thinking thing does exist and on the other hand the *Body* also exists, which can be understood through its extension. So the essence of '*I*' or the *Mind* consists in one thing that *I am a thinking thing*. Although I have a *Body*, which is also very closely connected with me, I noticed nothing else to belong to my nature or essence except that I am a thinking thing. Then what about the *Body*? According to the Cartesian point of view, a complete thing is 'a substance endowed with those forms or attributes which are sufficient for recognizing it as a substance.' The *Mind* can be perceived distinctly and completely, or sufficiently for it to be regarded as a complete thing, without any of those forms or attributes from which we recognize that *Body* is a substance, as it is sufficiently shown in the second Meditation. Once the *Mind* is conceived as complete without any corporeal attributes, it shows that the thought is sufficient for the *Mind* to be a substance. In the Meditations what Descartes really wants to show is that thought is not a mode of *Body*, because a mode depends not only ontologically but also epistemically on the attributes. A mode cannot be conceived clearly and distinctly without the substance of which it is the mode or without the attribute of that substance. Once it is shown very clearly the *Mind* as only a thinking thing and it is certain that I am really distinct from my *Body* then, what is the role of a *Body* in *Mind-Body* dichotomy?

From the beginning Descartes was interested in establishing the modal claim that *Mind* and *Body* are separable, accordingly he could establish the idea that *Mind* can exist without *Body*. Even though we could make a distinction between the *Mind* and the *Body* but here it was not the only, *Mind-Body*, distinction about which Descartes was talking. It is a general distinction between two substances such as *Mind* and *Matter*. Descartes's distinction was not about individual entities but it was about two independent substances which includes all particular things. In particular we could see here the distinction between the *Mind* and the *Body* but in general they are not simply one *Mind* and one *Body*; they are two distinct substances which cannot be reduced to one another. This is what the real distinction between two substances in general is which we have to discuss now.

According to the Cartesians, as we have seen, there are two substances and each substance has a principal attribute; it is a property which constitutes its nature or essence, and other properties of the substance are its modes. The modes of a substance presuppose this attribute; they cannot exist nor be clearly and distinctly understood without it. While talking about the '*I*' in previous sub-chapter I have mentioned the fact that '*I exist*' and at the same time *I noticed that nothing else at all belongs to my nature or essence; my essence consists in one thing that 'I am a thinking thing'*. Though I have a *Body* which is very closely connected with me but I am only a thinking thing not an extended thing. Insofar what I have understood about a *Body* is that it is only an extended thing so it is certain that I am really distinct from my *Body*, and can exist without it. Although I find in me the faculties for certain special modes of thinking, the faculties of imagining and sensing, I can clearly and distinctly understand myself as a whole without these modes; but it cannot be vice versa like understanding myself without the '*I*'. Descartes's main argument was that the sensation and imagination belong to the *Mind*; the faculties for changing location, taking on various shapes, and the like belong to a corporeal substance. So the idea that the *Mind* and *Body* are different kinds of substances with different kinds of modes is very important to the Cartesian perspective because it allows assigning to the *Body* only those modes that can be dealt with by a mechanistic explanation. So here we have to understand very clearly the idea that *Mind* and *Body* are substances with different types of properties, and not their ability to exist apart.

As we have seen in the first chapter the notion of the real distinction was not new and it had its roots in the ancient and the scholastic philosophy. Although Descartes characterization of the *Mind* and *Body* sometimes go very closely with some ancient philosophers and some other times go against to them but his perspective was unique. The word '*thing*' is used by different philosophers in different ways but Descartes's use of the word '*thing*' refers only one particular thing that is substance. Though the substance includes one principle attribute and the modes but the word '*thing*' neither refers to the attribute nor to the modes, it can only refer to the substance that is either a thinking substance or an extended substance. So whatever the distinction about which we

are talking should be understood as the distinction between two substances but not between particular individual entities. So *Mind* and *Body* are two distinct substances and they are separable. There is a strong reason for establishing that *Mind* can exist without *Body*, or can exist without being extended. The *Mind* and *Body* are different subjects of inherence, each of which actually has an entirely different set of properties.

In the '*Principles of Philosophy*' Descartes defines substance a thing that so exists that it needs nothing else in order to exist. At the same time a substance simply consists in having the ability to exist apart from anything else. This is what generally we understand about the substance in the Cartesian theory. Descartes's ontology contains basically substances and modes. A mode exists in or through something else, that is, a substance, whereas a substance exists through itself. He quite frequently characterizes substances as things existing through themselves. Each thing in which inheres immediately, as in a subject, or through which exist something that we perceive, that is, some property, or quality, or attribute (that is what we have perceived in wax after all the changes also), of which a real idea is in us, is called substance. A substance can exist without anything else because it has existence in its own right; *per se*. Modes are different because they exist by virtue of inherence in something else. Consequently, a mode cannot exist without such a subject of inherence. In non-Cartesian terms the idea is very simple; the world contains things and properties, the primary entities are things, which exist in their own right, whereas properties don't; they exist by belonging to things. The basic idea of the distinction between these two categories does not consist in modal claims about separability, but it does have modal consequences. To take an arbitrary example, a piece of wax is a thing, which exists in its own right. Its shape and size are properties of it, which exist by belonging to the piece of wax. As a result, if one were to destroy the piece of wax, the shape and the size would disappear. But the piece of wax itself is not a property of something else such that its existence depends on that entity in this way. But what Descartes wants to establish, regarding *Mind* and *Body*, is that each is a thing in its own right, and they are different kinds of things.

In the *Principles of Philosophy* in the first part while talking about the substance Descartes's says that there is one principal property for each substance, which constitute its nature and essence and to which all the other ones are referred. Namely, extension in length, width and depth constitutes the nature of corporeal substance; thought constitutes the nature of thinking substance. For everything else that can be attributed to *Body* presupposes extension and similarly anything we find in the *Mind*, is only one of the different modes of thinking. So, for instance, figure can only be understood in an extended thing, motion in extended space; and imagination or sensation or the will only in a thinking thing. But on the other hand, *extension cannot be understood without shape or motion, and thought without imagination or sensation and so on*—as is obvious to anyone who attends to the matter. The principal attributes determines what properties a substance has. Descartes does not use the term principal attribute in the *Meditations*. As we have seen in the sixth Meditation sensation and imagination are modes of the *Mind*. Descartes says,

*"I find in myself faculties of thinking in various specific ways—namely, the faculties of imagination and sensation—without which I can understand myself clearly and distinctly as a whole. But the converse is not true—I cannot understand them apart from an intelligent substance in which they inhere."*¹¹⁴

And he claims that motion, shape, and size are modes of *Body* because their clear and distinct conception contains extension. Descartes view is a particular version of the idea that a substance has a nature that determines and explains what properties that substance has. Questions about the essence of *Body* and especially the essence of *Mind* play an important role in the real distinction argument. So the real distinction of which we are talking is between 'thought and extension' in a broad sense. Anyhow in case of distinction the relationship between modes and attributes is very important. There are two views, namely, a view one might call the Bare Subject view (this view can be found in Locke) and the Aristotelian Scholastic conception of corporeal substance. On the Bare Subjective view a substance just is a subject of inherence of properties. Properties inhere in the subject, but are not constituents of a substance. The subject constitutes the entire

¹¹⁴. Rene Descartes, *Meditations on First Philosophy*, Trans. Michael Moriarty, (New York: Oxford University Press, 2008) p. 56.

substance. According to the Aristotelian Scholastics, on the other hand, a corporeal substance is a composite of prime matter and substantial form. Prime matter is a bare subject in the sense that it, too, is in itself featureless and the bare subject for substantial form. But an important difference with the Bare Subjective View is that prime matter is just one constituent of the substance besides substantial form. Descartes clearly rejects the Bare Subject view and agrees with the Aristotelian in thinking that the substance itself is more than just a bare subject: he thinks it contains the principal attribute. Thus on several occasions he makes it clear that in order to think of something as a complete thing, that is, a substance, one must include the principal attribute.

“Thought and extension can be regarded as constituting the nature of intelligent substance and corporeal substance; they must then be considered as nothing else but thinking substance itself and extended substance itself – that is, as Mind and Body.”¹¹⁵

“Thought and extension may also be taken as modes of a substance, in so far as one and the same Mind is capable of having many different thoughts; and one and the same body with its quantity unchanged, may be extended in many different ways. The distinction between thought or extension and the substance will then be a modal one; and our understanding of them will be capable of being just as clear and distinct as our understanding of the substance itself, provided they are regarded not as substances (that is, things which are separate from other things) but simply as modes of things. By regarding them as being in the substances of which they are modes, we distinguish them from the substances in question and see them for what they really are.”¹¹⁶

It is the principal attribute which determines what kinds of modes belong to a substance. For Aquinas and some other philosophers the substantial form is what gives the substance its being, its actuality. It makes something a substance. But for Descartes the principal attribute makes something a substance, a being in its own right, as opposed to a mode, which has being though something else. Thus the Cartesian argument is that the extension constitutes the nature of *Body* and is its principal attribute just as thought constitute the

¹¹⁵. Rene Descartes, *The Philosophical Writings of Descartes – 1*, Trans. John Cottingham and others (London: Cambridge University Press, 1985), p. 215. (Rene Descartes, *The Principles of Philosophy*, part – 1.63).

¹¹⁶. Ibid, p. 215. (Rene Descartes, *The Principles of Philosophy*, part – 1.64).

essence of the *Mind*. Consequently, *Mind* and *Body* are not identical because of the difference in their attributes.

2.4. The Cartesian Epistemology: The Role of Self

In general there are two types of properties; the properties of objects in the external world and the mental properties. Naïve realism basically states that properties of objects in the external world correspond to the mental properties. It's a direct relation or correspondence between the objects in the external world and the ideas. Descartes, however, is not a naïve realist, though realist he is in his approach to knowledge. Descartes wants to overcome naïve realism by propounding what may be called metaphysical realism. As a rationalist philosopher Descartes really wants to use his reason to arrive at truth but if we follow naïve realism we may be misled, since there is a possibility for senses-inability in some cases. So once perception goes wrong then the whole knowledge based on that particular perception goes wrong. Though in one way the Naïve realism seems good but misperception or illusion it fails to provide knowledge with certainty. That's why Descartes opts for a reason based theory of knowledge. So senses can never produce the knowledge of external world but can work like an instrument. For example, there is a device called binocular; it can show us things very clearly which is very far but it cannot produce the knowledge of those things.

We erroneously regard many sensory perceptions as obvious and certain although their objects are not perceived clearly and distinctly (for instance, the earth, the sky, the stars and all other things I perceive through the medium of my senses appear in a form that deviates from scientific conceptions). When we accept these perceptions as the most evident facts, we mistake the presence of those ideas in our *Mind* (which is undeniable), for clear and distinct perceptions of the objects themselves or we simply assume that external objects must be responsible for the existence of these ideas (which is questionable). In doing this, we only extrapolate the habit of believing in the external existence of objects into allegedly clear and distinct apprehension of them.

For Descartes the '*idea*' is whatever the *Mind* '*perceives*' or the '*idea*' is everything that is of mental nature. Mental phenomena can be either *acts* or *objects*. While talking about the contents of our consciousness, in relation with *acts*, Descartes uses the word '*idea*' to denominate any '*form of thought*', including sensations, emotions, judgments and imaginations. In relation with '*objects*' Descartes says that, '*ideas*' are only complete and distinct cognitive acts that represent something. We may wish that Descartes had reserved the term '*idea*' only for this objective usage, but he has not. Instead, he speaks about '*ideas*' in three different ways: (1) as operations of the *Mind* (material aspect), (2) As awareness of a thought (formal aspect) and (3) as the subject-matter of a thought (objective aspect). (a) *Material Aspect*. Every idea in the material sense is a mental act occurring in the *Mind*. Taken as mental acts all our ideas are equal. Contrary to some ordinary notions, ideas in this capacity cannot be true or false; they become true or false only by virtue of our judgments about their content (extrinsically). An *idea* is true if its object is conceived as it really exists. Strictly speaking though, truth and falsity are characteristics of assertions and propositions, not of ideas and concepts. (b) *Formal Aspect*. When the word '*idea*' denotes 'the form of any thought', then it refers solely to the aspect of consciousness of any mental act. For the self-reflecting subject ideas are 'modes of thought' (*states of consciousness*) one is directly aware of. Ideas are directly related to the *Mind* by representing to us internal objects of thought. (c) *Objective Aspect*. On the other hand, with regard to their content and meaning, ideas are images (*mental representations*) of the 'things outside of me'. *Ideas* are like pictures and there can be no ideas which do not seem to us to represent objects. In this sense each and every *idea* is distinctly delineated from others. However, when speaking about representations Descartes does not mean only sensible images, but rather general objects. He does not think that we perceive real things directly. We know them through our own *ideas* produced by means of external stimulation of our organs.

When we grasped clearly and perfectly what the wax is? Was it when I first looked at it and believed my knowledge to come from external senses, or at least by so called common sense, that is the power of having mental images? Or whether I perceive it better now, after I have more carefully studied what it is and how it is known? What was distinct in my original conception of the wax? How did the conception differ from that had by the lowest animals? Descartes says that,

*“when I distinguish the wax from its external forms, as if stripping it of its clothing, and look at the wax in its nakedness, then, even though there can be still an error in my judgment, nevertheless I cannot perceive it thus without a human mind.”*¹¹⁷

The Question which Descartes ultimately raises is: what should I say of this *Mind* that has the ideas? Is the *Mind* something other than myself? Yet I admit nothing else to be in me over and above the *Mind*. What I have said about the wax applies to everything else that is outside me. Furthermore, if my perception of the wax seemed more distinct after it was established not just by sight or touch but by many other considerations, it must be admitted that I now know myself even more distinctly. And there is not a single consideration that can aid in my perception of the wax or of any other *Body* that fails to make even more manifest the nature of my *Mind*. The *Mind* has so much in it by which it can make its conception of itself distinct and thus makes myself clear to me as a thinking being. “I now know that physical objects are not grasped by the senses or by the faculty of imagination, but by the understanding alone. Physical objects are not perceived in virtue of their being tangible or visible but grasped in virtue of their being understood. I know that I can’t grasp anything more easily or plainly than my *Mind*. The idea of matter or of *Body* does not and cannot include consciousness. *Body* is neither less nor more than extension; and extension can only be an object of thought, not its subject.” For Descartes, Ideas are innate insofar as their content derives from the nature of the *Mind* alone, as opposed to deriving from sense experience. This wax example is a kind of thought experiment to illustrate a procedure to ‘dig out’ what is innate. The thought experiment purports to help the *meditator* achieve a ‘purely mental scrutiny,’ thereby apprehending more easily the innate idea of *Body*. Our *Minds* come stocked with a variety of

¹¹⁷. Rene Descartes. *Meditations, Objections, and Replies*, Edit and Trans. Roger Ariew and Donald Cress, (Indianapolis: Hackett Publishing Company, 2006), p. 18.

intellectual concepts—ideas whose content derives solely from the nature of the *Mind*. These ideas form the foundations of human knowledge.

Descartes famously believed that our knowledge of our own mental events is more certain than any other knowledge. He recognized that there is something unique about human beings, that they are a subtle unity of the two and not merely an accidental union. The experience of our everyday lives teaches us that human beings are a compound of these two substances. Our *Mind* is not simply housed as a foreign element in our *Body* but is intimately connected with it because when *Body* is damaged *Mind* is not simply aware of the fact intellectually but it feels the pain. As far as Cartesian dualism is concerned, the *Mind* is self-contained because it is an immaterial substance and thus a “*mental state*”, that is thought. Thought is essentially a modification of this immaterial substance. The mental states are necessarily conscious states. As Descartes says,

*“Thought. I use this term to include everything that is within us in such a way that we are immediately aware of it. Thus all the operations of the will, the intellect, the imagination and the senses are thoughts.”*¹¹⁸

Sensations and imaginations were thought by Descartes to belong to the *Mind* which were not exclusively mental but something that could only be understood in the context of both mental and physical categories. This seems to suggest that, with respect to these phenomena, the exclusive nature of the dichotomy between *Mind* and body is compromised, at least to some degree: that the body is not simply a machine external to the *Mind*, at the same time the *Mind* itself is not a completely autonomous entity (when it is embodied with physical nature). Indeed he occasionally goes so far as to say that these attributes “*cannot belong to the Mind simply in virtue of it being a thinking thing; instead, they can belong to it only in virtue of its being joined to something other than itself which is extended and moveable – namely what we call the human body.*”¹¹⁹ In other words, the autonomy of the *Mind* is reinstated since sensation, sense perception and

¹¹⁸. Rene Descartes, *Descartes: Selected Philosophical Writings*, Trans. John Cottingham (UK: Cambridge University Press, 1988), p. 152.

¹¹⁹. Rene Descartes, *Philosophical Writings of Descartes*, Vol. 1, Trans. John Cottingham (UK: Cambridge University Press, 1998), p.224.

imagination are, strictly speaking, modes of thought and thought is the essence of the *Mind* alone but not of the body or, we can even say that, not of the *Mind-Body* union.

When it comes to the matter of the Self or the 'I' then we have to talk about both *Mind* and *Body* and what happens to myself when I am dead. The question arises; do I cease to exist when the body is dissolved? Or should I know that "I" am existing without my *Body*? Neither "I" is knowing his own existence nor are others knowing someone's *Mind* after the death of the *Body*. If the *Mind* does exist after the death of the *Body* then the *Mind* itself does not know whether it is existing or not. Even if it exists, it cannot show any affect on this physical world because of lack of intimate connection with the world. So thinking of the existence of the *Mind* after the death of the *Body* seems problematic. But, it doesn't mean that there is no place for dualism. It doesn't mean that there is no *Mind*. It only means that it is not in our capacity to know whether the *Mind* exists after the death of the *Body*. As a limited being we should clearly know our boundaries while thinking of something which is beyond our knowledge claim. In defending dualism Descartes has imagined *Self* as a thinking substance. Descartes associates the *Self* with the *Mind*. He is of the view that I could continue to exist apart from my *Body*, although I could not engage in a fully human existence, because the sensations that human beings undergo would no longer be fully available to me. These experiences of sensation are not part of my personal identity, and given that this is so, their lack would not obstruct my continued existence as a *Self* in the form of a disembodied *Mind*. Then, according to Descartes, the *Mind* may continue to exist in the absence of the *Body* while maintaining personal identity, and so there is a possibility to think about existence after the *Body* dies in terms of the existence of disembodied *Minds*. What is important for my continuing existence is the survival of my *Mind*, and the resurrection of my *Body* is of secondary importance or may be entirely neglected. Because our *Minds* are the bearers of our personal identities, their continuing existence is enough to assure us that we need not die when our *Bodies* die. But we should have two levels or categories of understanding of the Self; once it is attributed to the union of *Mind* and *Body* and later attributed to the *Mind* alone. While talking about the union Descartes

says that I am very tightly bound to my *Body* and so “Mixed up” with it that we form a single thing. Further he says that if this weren’t so, I—who am just a thinking thing—wouldn’t feel pain when my *Body* was injured. So this is one level of understanding of the *Self* and other one is that the disembodied *Mind* is *Self* that is after the death of the *Body*.

According to Descartes we possess only two modes of thinking; *perception or the operation of the intellect, and volition, or the operation of the will*. Our cognition, imagination and the understanding are regarded as various modes of perception. Our desires, aversion, assertion, denial and doubt are various modes of willing. All these features can be attributed to tightly bounded union (*Mind-Body*), but all these features cannot be attributed to the disembodied *Mind* but some. In the *Mind-Body* union “*we fall into error only when we make judgments about things which we have not sufficiently perceived*”¹²⁰ and “*our errors cannot be imputed to God.*”¹²¹ Because God is not directly caused for our perceptual errors but we can say that he did not give us an omniscient intellect, this makes him the author of our errors. It is of the nature of a ‘created intellect’ (that is, the principal attribute thought) to be finite; and it is of the nature of a finite intellect that its scope should not extend to everything. Descartes further says that “*we never go wrong when we assent only to what we clearly and distinctly perceive,*”¹²² so for our perceptual errors cannot be attributed to God because God is not a deceiver, and so the faculty of perception which he has given us cannot incline to falsehood; and the same goes for the faculty of assent, provided its scope is limited to what is clearly perceived. And even if there were no way of proving this, the minds of all of us have been so moulded by nature that whenever we perceive something clearly, we spontaneously give our assent to it and are quite unable to doubt its truth.

¹²⁰. *The Philosophical Writings of Descartes*, vol. 1, Trans. John Cottingham and others (London: Cambridge University Press, 1985), p. 204. (Rene Descartes, *The Principles of Philosophy*, part – 1.33)

¹²¹. Ibid, p. 205.

¹²². Ibid, p. 207.

I feel that *Meditations* on first philosophy as a perfect introduction to enter into philosophical world. The way he used the method of doubt to have a truth that is absolutely certain leads to a state that there are no definite signs to separate dreaming experience from the waking experience. Finally, as I have discussed, it leads to a conclusion which is certain that as long as there is experience then the experiencer must exist, that is *I think therefore I am*. There is no doubt that Descartes has succeeded in dividing human personality as *Mind* and Body. Another important thing is that the *Mind* is indistinguishable because it is just a thinking thing and does not have any parts to divide but the body is distinguishable because it has parts. So *Mind* and body are entirely different types of things but they are causally connected and understanding of its union is very hard. Descartes dualism not only changed our conception of *Mind* but also changed our conception of Body and the physical world. The physical world should be understood in terms of a large mechanism and causal relations within it as a function of material objects extension. There are two principles governed bodily movements; the first one is a *Causal-Mechanical Principle* by which the motion of a body can be explained without reference to the *Mind*. The *Mind* can neither create the motion in the world, in general, and the motion in the Body, in particular, nor removes any of it from the world but can change the direction of the motion of the Body. But move without *Mind* is treated like the acts of madmen. The second is the *Will*, which he calls a faculty of the rational *Mind*. When it comes to the matter of qualities then he was not claiming that these qualities such as the color, sound, flavors, and pain are unreal, but that they are not real qualities. Through the sensation we have the mental images of these qualities. He understood real qualities as entities that had the same status as substances. Wherever we perceive some properties there we must necessarily find a thing or substance to which they belong. The power of sensation alone cannot provide the knowledge unless there is the power of understanding which is the most eminent property of the *Mind*. So I am a thinking thing that has sensation and mental images. These sensation and mental images are the modifications of thought.

Chapter-3

THE NATURE OF CONSCIOUSNESS: NATURALISTIC APPROACHES

3.1. An Introduction to Consciousness

In the past two thousand or three thousand years of history of human kind our ability in understanding the nature is continuously growing. This growth has led to many ground-breaking discoveries which led to scientific paradigm shifts, from the beginning of 20th century. Due to this constant growth we have found many of our scientific beliefs and explanations outmoded. This is so not only in science but also in philosophy which has raised such issues like *Mind, Body, Soul, Matter, Consciousness, Intentionality, Subjectivity* and so on. In this process we have given many things and adopted many more things but our quest for the truth is not yet completed. We have evolved scientifically from Descartes' era, but in the case of consciousness, Intentionality and Subjectivity we are still lagging behind. Whether consciousness is the feature of Subjectivity or Neurobiological process in the Brain? If consciousness is feature of Neurobiological process of Brain then how could we have phenomenal experience? If consciousness is the feature of the Subjectivity, which is a non-physical entity, then how could it influence the Neurobiological process of the Brain which is a physical entity? Such questions still bother us because we have not got the correct explanation of these phenomena. That is why Paul Churchland begins his book *Matter and Consciousness* with the following remarks:

“The curiosity of man and the cunning of his Reason have revealed much of what Nature held hidden. The structure of space time, the constitution of matter, the many forms of energy, the nature of life itself; all of these mysteries have become books to us. To be sure, deep questions remain unanswered and revolutions await us still, but it is difficult to exaggerate the explosion in scientific understanding we humans have fashioned over

the past 500 years. Despite this general advance, a central mystery remains largely a mystery: the nature of conscious intelligence."¹²³

Churchland and many others sharing the scientific view of the universe provide a naturalist theory of *Mind*. They present a new radical view of man, by rejecting the traditional view of man accordingly to which man is union of the *Soul* and *Body*. It's not just the belief of any social community or cultural community but it is a belief of most of the religions that man is made up of two entities. Even after having this much of scientific development people believe that there is immaterial *Soul*. But the new approach in the name of Naturalism has begun to understand the nature of consciousness and subjective experience which broadly says that "all known phenomena interact with the universe, governed by the laws of causation and this includes life. We are connected with this nature but not with any mystical entity". That is why some scholars call Naturalism as "anti-supernaturalism". According to this view everything can be explained by the spatial, temporal, causal and explanatory relations in the physical realm. The basic idea is that we should not posit Gods or Ghosts or any supernatural entities to explain events occurring in the domain. David Hume is an inspiration to many philosophers and specifically to those who wanted to understand everything that could be understood in terms of natural phenomena. In the 20th century we have many advocates of the naturalistic world view. When we come to an American influential Naturalist philosopher Wilfrid Sellars (1912-1989) we find a slogan that is quite a parody of Protagoras. Sellars said that "science is the measure of all things; of what it is that is and what is not that it is not". So Sellars certainly was suggesting a global version of Naturalism. David Armstrong is another philosopher who advocates strict naturalism by proposing that ideal physics has an ultimately privileged explanatory role. According to Armstrong,

"strict naturalism is "the doctrine that reality consists of nothing but a single all-embracing spatio-temporal system." Contemporary physicalism or materialism (the view that everything that exists is physical or material in nature) is a form of strict naturalism and maintains that the single, all-embracing temporal system contains nothing but the entities recognized by the most mature physics."¹²⁴

¹²³. Paul M. Churchland, *Matter and Consciousness: A Contemporary Introduction to the Philosophy of Mind* (London: A Bradford Book, The MIT Press, Cambridge, 1988), p. 1.

¹²⁴. Stewart Goetz and Charles Taliaferro, *Naturalism* (Cambridge, UK: Wm. B. Eerdmans Publishing Co., 2008), p. 15.

From Descartes to the contemporary period, philosophers like Daniel Dennett, John Searle and David Chalmers, have come forward to explain the notion of consciousness with different ideas and arguments. They offer a scientific and broad naturalist account of *Mind* and consciousness. In this process some naturalist philosophers have taken consciousness as a feature of the natural world. Some others have rejected the attribution of consciousness to the *Mind* and held consciousness as the result of neural process in the brain. Some other philosophers have argued that consciousness is an illusion. But after having brief overview of the study of consciousness in the history of philosophy of *Mind* there is no wonder in saying that philosophers, psychologists, scientists and some other scholars from different branches of science, who were really interested in doing investigation on deeper nature of man, have struggled for many years with this concept.

Now we are in a better position to study the mysteries of consciousness; for that we should be very thankful for the recent advancement in interdisciplinary research which has caused to an impressive rising of interest in the study of consciousness. But it doesn't mean that the mystery of consciousness has disappeared; instead the study of consciousness has gone as deep as ever. In spite of advances in Neuroscience and Cognitive sciences some philosophers, like Thomas Nagel, Colin McGinn and David Chalmers, say that we are not even nearer to achieving a scientific understanding of Phenomenal consciousness. These philosophers claim that Naturalizing consciousness, i.e., including it under our scientific research/study, is either impossible (at least without radically reforming our current scientific practices) or perhaps beyond our cognitive grasp or beyond our cognitive capacity. So the only advantage of this scientific development is that we know much about the brain processes to face the questions about consciousness.

By integrating methodologies and perspectives of psychology, philosophy, neuroscience, cognitive science, and some other disciplines and by keeping in mind the successes and failures of the past, we should be able to reach a higher advantage point

and to see more broadly and more deeply than has ever before been possible. In this process Naturalism has become very prominent in the study of consciousness by including a number of disciplines and methods; at the same time Naturalism has become highly controversial too. Naturalism emphasizes that a proper science of consciousness is possible. The impetus for this view comes from a number of directions, including developments in biological sciences, linguistics, artificial intelligence, and cognitive science. To many theorists it seems increasingly clear (or at least plausible) that the *Mind* is as fully a part of nature as anything else. Therefore, according to the naturalists, the *Mind* is not “outside of nature”. It operates in accordance with principles fundamentally like those that govern other natural phenomena. It requires no commitments to the existence of entities and properties other than those recognized in the sciences.

3.2. Different notions of Consciousness and its Definition

When we talk about consciousness immediately one common question appears in front of us; why does consciousness keep appearing as an unsolved puzzle for philosophy and science? Not only in the discipline of philosophy but also in any discipline if you want to study consciousness then up to a certain level it will be easy for you to go ahead but at the end you will not be in a position to hold the real pulse of consciousness. Everyone agrees that consciousness is a very special phenomenon, unique in several ways; but how long we should move with these puzzling mental states? When we talk about consciousness, in general, we feel that there is nothing to worry to explain it; it is only possible to explain if you restrict the scope of consciousness just as having sensations and awareness of the surroundings of an individual. If the nature and the scope of our study of consciousness go beyond the sensations and awareness of the surroundings then consciousness seems to be so unearthly, intangible, and deceptive as when we try to take hold of it, it escapes from our grip. That’s why earlier some philosophers regarded consciousness as a mere epiphenomenon of matter. Whether this epiphenomenon of matter belongs to the subjective aspect of a man or the objective aspect of man is another area of research which is no less interesting. So consciousness is

an ambiguous term, referring to many different phenomena. Each of these phenomena needs to be explained but some are easier to explain and others are not.

In order to solve the problem of consciousness we need to be clear about what the term refers to. When it comes to the matter of the etymological meaning of consciousness then, in general, according to the *Oxford Dictionary of Psychology* consciousness is,

*“the state of being conscious; the normal mental condition of the waking state of humans, characterized by the experience of perception, thoughts, feelings, awareness of the external world, and often in humans self-awareness (but not necessarily in other animals).”*¹²⁵

So whatever complex biological and neural processes go on backstage, it is my consciousness that provides the theatre where my experiences and thoughts have their existence, where my desires felt and where my intentions are formed. The ‘I’, or the ‘Self’ that is the spectator is at any rate the owner of this theatre. This definition is very much acceptable and also reliable. There is nothing problematic in accepting this definition but the real problem arises when we talk about the properties of the ‘I’, in the sense that whether this ‘I’ is the *Body* or other than the *Body*; the problem arises when we talk whether consciousness belongs to the subjective aspect of the man or the objective aspect of the man. In this regard different philosophies and philosophers have expressed different opinions.

In the Indian philosophical realm the discussion of consciousness had begun from the *Upanishads* period. If we go through the philosophers belonging to different Vedic and the non-Vedic *darśanas* they have argued for centuries about the nature and functions of consciousness. *Upanishads*, the earliest and the most basic scriptures of *Hinduism*, are formally parts of *Vedas*. The discussions of consciousness in the *Upanishads* arise in the context of explaining the real nature of the *Ātman* or the Self. The *Sanskrit* term for consciousness is ‘*Cit*’. In the *Upanishads*, both *Cit* and *Ātman* refer to pure consciousness, a kind of trans-empirical consciousness, which not only is different

¹²⁵. Andrew M. Colman, *Oxford Dictionary of Psychology* (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2000, 2003).

from the empirical consciousness, but also forms the basis of the latter. As we have discussed in the first chapter, in ancient Greek philosophy people used to talk about consciousness as the quality or one of the features of the *Soul*, in the same way ancient Indian philosophical tradition ascribed consciousness to the *Soul* but not to the *Mind*. The Sanskrit word *Manas* generally translated into English as *Mind*, *Manas* which has been construed as the *inner sense* (*antahkarana*) in Indian philosophy, is distinguished from consciousness and knowledge. It seems that in Indian philosophy Carvaka, Nyaya, Vaiśeṣika, and Mimamsa schools are prime examples of the empirical and objectivist philosophy of consciousness; Advaita Vedanta and Samkhya-Yoga are the subjectivist transcendental philosophies of consciousness; and Yogacara Buddhism is partly an objectivist and partly a subjectivist philosophy of consciousness. Between Yogacara and Advaita Vedanta, there are several different schools of Vedanta. The schools of Mimamsa and Vedanta have made the notion of self-luminousness (*svayamprakāśatva*) of consciousness the cornerstone of their epistemology and metaphysics.

When it comes to the matter of Western Philosophy traditionally there are two important views on consciousness; according to the first view, it is the tradition of dualism (some philosophers call it as the religious dualism), according to which consciousness is not part of physical world but it is part of the spiritual world. It belongs to the *Soul/Mind* which is not the part of the physical world. This is the oldest tradition of God, *Soul* and immortality. According to the second view, which is opposite to dualism or religious dualism, we are heavy-duty scientific materialists and for us consciousness is a part of the physical world. For the materialists consciousness does not exist at all or if it exists then it is something else like a function of the brain. Due to these strong and contradicting views of consciousness there was a big gap between these two points of views. In view of this it is necessary to raise the questions again: whether consciousness exists at all? If it exists, what is consciousness exactly? What is the relation between consciousness and the brain? What are some of the features that an empirical theory of consciousness should try to explain? and so on.

There are different versions of materialism regarding consciousness; though I am not going to discuss all of the varieties but I just want to give a brief sketch of the materialists' point of view on consciousness. Materialism seems, as John Searle says, "*to deny the existence of any irreducible mental phenomena in the world.*"¹²⁶ The materialists want to deny that there are any irreducible phenomenological properties, such as consciousness or qualia. For materialists the only thing that exists is matter; all things are composed of *matter* and all phenomena, including consciousness, are the result of material interactions. Some scientists today believe that they can explain the '*Mind*' by just analyzing the mechanisms of the '*Brain*'. They seem to believe that by finding how neurons interact with each other we can fully understand the nature of human consciousness. The materialists say that unintelligent bits of matter can produce Intelligence or consciousness or Intentionality because of their organization. The unintelligent bits of matter are organized in certain dynamic ways, and it is the dynamic organization that is constitutive of the Intelligence and so on.

There are some important questions related to the notion of consciousness, like; what is consciousness exactly? Does consciousness exist at all? Whether consciousness is the feature of *Mind* or *Body*? And so on. But before answering those questions we have to understand one important thing that the theories about the evolution of consciousness are linked to the theories about distribution of consciousness. We have to understand the distribution of consciousness in the sense whether humans are the only conscious beings or consciousness is distributed among other living things too; like animals, insects, birds, plants and so on. Philosophers and scientists have expressed many different views on this matter. Some of the philosophers in the past have denied consciousness to animals. The view that only humans have consciousness has a long history in theology, following from the doctrine that only human beings have *Souls*. Here I am not going to discuss about whether humans only have consciousness or other living things too have consciousness. Without discussing, what consciousness is? What are the features of consciousness? And how it works? We cannot explain how consciousness is distributed. In general if we take

¹²⁶. John R. Searle, *The Rediscovery of the Mind* (Cambridge, London: MIT Press, 1992), p. 27.

the period from 17th century then the concept of consciousness was variously considered. Some philosophers regarded it as a kind of substance, some philosophers considered it as ‘mental stuff’ quite differently from the material substance of the physical world. Those who considered consciousness as a substance they considered the states of consciousness to be the states of the substance. Conceived in this way, consciousness may be implicitly taken to be the same as what one calls the *Soul* or the *Mind*, that is, a spiritual substance. Some other philosophers thought of it as an attribute characterized by sensation and voluntary movement, which separated animals and men from lower forms of life and also described the difference between the normal waking state of animals and men and their condition when asleep, or in coma, or under anesthesia. Some other philosophers described consciousness as a form of relationship or act of the *Mind* towards object in nature. In this regard here it is important to pay attention to some important definitions which can help us in understanding the meaning and the nature of consciousness. As it was discussed in the second chapter Descartes’ defines ‘*Thought*’ in terms of consciousness. He uses the term ‘*Thought*’ to include everything that is within us in such a way that we are immediately aware (conscious) of it.

*“Thinking is to be identified here not merely with understanding, willing and imagining, but also with sensory awareness. For if I say ‘I am seeing, or I am walking, therefore I exist’, and take this as applying to vision or walking as bodily activities, then the conclusion is not absolutely certain. This is because, as often happens during sleep, it is possible for me to think I am seeing or walking, though my eyes are closed and I am not moving about; such thoughts might even be possible if I had no body at all. But if I take ‘seeing’ or ‘walking’ to apply to the actual sense or awareness of seeing or walking, then the conclusion is quite certain, since it relates to the mind, which alone has the sensation or thought that it is seeing or walking”*¹²⁷

Thus all the operations of the will, the intellect, the imagination and the senses are ‘*Thoughts*’. A ‘*Thought*’ is something ‘*in us*’ of which we are conscious. I am conscious of *what my thoughts represent*. For example, suppose I see a paper lying on the table. The *Thought*, according to Descartes, is ‘*in me*’ in such a way that I am conscious *of it* (i.e., the thought). But, phenomenally, it seems rather that I am conscious of *the paper*, not *the*

¹²⁷. Rene Descartes, *The Philosophical Writings of Descartes – I*, Trans. John Cottingham and others (London: Cambridge University Press, 1985), p. 195.

thought of the paper. Here we can see consciousness from two sides: first thing is that if I am conscious of my ‘*Thoughts*’ (i.e., within me) so we need not include sensations as part of consciousness. Second thing is that if I am conscious of something which is not internal then here thinking has to be identified not merely with understanding, willing and imagining, but also with sensory awareness (sense-perception). According to Descartes, *only humans* have consciousness because humans are a combination of the stuff of consciousness (i.e., thinking) and material stuff (i.e., *body/senses*). That is why Descartes said that we can doubt the existence of anything in the world; I can doubt the existence of you, I can doubt the existence of physical things, I can doubt the existence of my body but one thing I cannot doubt is ‘*my Consciousness*’. *I am conscious, therefore, I am*. My consciousness is more directly presented to me than anything in this world. Though, as Descartes said, consciousness is directly presented to me, it is very difficult to understand it.

After Descartes we can take John Locke as a serious philosopher who talked about consciousness and Identity. Locke was widely known as the *father of classical liberalism* whose theory of *Mind* is generally cited as the origin of modern conceptions of identity and the self. In particular the origin of the modern concept of consciousness is often attributed to his work *Essay Concerning Human Understanding* (1690). Descartes says, as I have already mentioned, by the word *Thought* I understand all that of which we are conscious as operating in us and half a century later, John Locke has taken more cautious line for equating the *Mind per se* with consciousness. For Locke “*Consciousness is the perception of what passes in a man’s own Mind.*”¹²⁸ But, what passes in a man’s own *Mind*? He describes the *Mind* at birth as a blank slate (*Tabula Rasa*) then filled later through experiences. Whatever is gained through experience will remain in memory. Memory will be there as a power of the *Mind*; for Locke,

¹²⁸. John Locke, *An Essay Concerning Human Understanding: With Thoughts on the Conduct of the Understanding*, Vol. 1, (Edinburgh: Allen & West, 1795), p. 83.

“The mind has a power to revive perceptions, which it has once had, with this additional perception annexed to them, that it has had them before.”¹²⁹

The connection between consciousness and memory in Locke’s theory has earned the title of the *memory theory of personal identity*. Despite criticism, Locke’s memory theory of personal identity is a prominent subject of discussion in the modern philosophical circles. The basic idea is that the consciousness over time is enough to constitute identity. Locke’s central contribution to work on personal identity is his insistence that identity must be defined in terms of sameness of consciousness rather than sameness of substance. In his *Essay* Locke suggests that the self,

“which, I think, is a thinking intelligent being, that has reason and reflection, and can consider itself as itself, the same thinking thing, in different times and places”¹³⁰

He continues to define personal identity simply as *the sameness of a rational being*. So long as one is the same self (the same thinking thing, in different times and different places), the same rational being, then one has the same personal identity. Given this assertion, any change in the self reflects a change in personal identity, and any change in personal identity implies that the self has changed. Locke goes on to suggest that one’s personal identity extends only so far as one’s consciousness. He offers the argument that because in order to be a Self, one must be a thinking thing, and that because *Consciousness always accompanies Thinking*, the Self with which one personally identifies extends and persists only as far as one is conscious. Consciousness can be equated with memory. This assumption is supported by Locke’s assertion that,

“as far as this consciousness can be extended backwards, to any past action or thought, so far reaches the identity of that person; it is the same self now, it was then; and it is by the same self with this present one, that now reflects on it, that that action was done.”¹³¹

More explicitly stated, if one can remember some experience, then he in fact had that experience. It is by this reasoning that Locke arrives at the most controversial portion of

¹²⁹. Thomas Reid, *Philosophical Works*, Vol. 1, (Edinburgh: Georg Olms Verlag, 1967), p. 355.

¹³⁰. Alfred Howard, ESQ., *The Beauties of Locke* (London: T. Tegg, 1834), p. 83.

¹³¹. John Locke, *An Essay Concerning Human Understanding: With Thoughts on the Conduct of the Understanding*, 27th Edition (London: T. Tegg and son, 1836), p. 226.

his theory which suggests that the converse of the previous argument is true: if one cannot remember some experience, then one did not have that experience. Therefore memory is a necessary condition of personal identity. So Locke's memory theory of personal identity would therefore conclude that memory is both a necessary and sufficient condition of self, and, therewith, of personal identity. To find wherein personal identity consists, we must consider what "person" stands for; which, I think, is a thinking intelligent being, that has reason and reflection, and can consider itself as itself, the same thinking thing, in different times and places; which it does only by what consciousness which is inseparable from thinking; it being impossible for anyone to perceive, without perceiving that he does perceive. When we see, hear, smell, taste, feel, meditate, or will anything, we know that we do so. These conscious activities constitute that we call our 'Self'. For since,

*"consciousness always accompanies thinking, and it is that that makes everyone to be what he calls Self; and thereby distinguishes himself from all other thinking things; in this alone consists personal identity, i. e. the sameness of a rational Being."*¹³²

*"To remember is to perceive anything with memory or with a Consciousness that it was known or perceived before: without this, whatever idea comes into the Mind is new and not remembered; this Consciousness of its having been in the Mind before which distinguishes remembering from all other ways of thinking. Whatever idea was never perceived by the Mind was never in the Mind. Whatever idea is in the Mind, is either an actual perception, or else, having been an actual perception, is so in the Mind, that by the memory it can be made an actual perception again."*¹³³

According to him, there are two levels of perceptions; one is the sense perception and another one is a Higher-Order Perception; in a simple way we can call it as an 'inner sense perception' theory. It was reintroduced in our era by Armstrong (1968), and has been defended more recently by William G. Lycan (1987, 1996). On this account, we not only have a set of first-order senses charged with generating analog / non-conceptual representations of our environments and the states of our own bodies, but we also have a

¹³². John Locke, *An Essay Concerning Human Understanding: In Four Books* (London: Awnsham & J. Churchill, 1706), p. 223.

¹³³. John Locke, *The Works of John Locke: In Nine Volumes*, 12th Edition (London: C. Baldwin Printer, 1824), p. 69.

faculty of *inner* sense, which scans the outputs of those first-order senses(i.e. perceptual experiences) and generates higher-order analog / non-conceptual representations of (some of) them in turn. Our first-order perceptual states become phenomenally conscious by virtue of being targeted by higher-order perceptions, produced by the operations of our faculty of inner sense. The whole idea is that what makes a mental state conscious is that it is the object of some kind of higher-order-representation.

*“A mental state M becomes conscious when there is a HOR of M. A HOR is a “meta-psychological” state, i.e. a mental state directed at another mental state. So, for example, my desire to write a good introduction becomes conscious when I become “aware” of the desire. It seems that conscious states, as opposed to non-conscious ones, are the mental states that I am “aware of” some sense.”*¹³⁴

It seems very much similar to the Cartesian theory of consciousness where Descartes says that *“I am not conscious of the paper on the Table but I am conscious of the thought of the paper.”*

Leibniz was another important philosopher from the seventeenth-century who discussed more on the subject of nature and functions of perception and consciousness. Most of the seventeenth-century philosophers discussed about consciousness within the context of substance dualism or the cartesian view that *Mind* and *Body* are different kinds of substance. But Leibniz remained fundamentally opposite to any form of dualism. Leibniz held that there is only one type of substance in the world, consequently *Mind* and *Body* are composed of the same kind of substance (a version of monism). But he also held that *Mind* and *Body* are metaphysically distinct. There are a variety of interpretations of what this metaphysical distinctness consists in, according to Leibniz. Leibniz saw the fundamental mechanism of consciousness as that of representation. He responded to Descartes saying *I think therefore I am* with the deductive *I represent that I represent, therefore I represent*. To understand Leibniz’s views of consciousness first of all we have to understand the meaning and the representation of three important words, they are *perception*, *apperception* and *reflection*. The passing condition, which involves

¹³⁴. Rocco J. Gennaro, *Higher-Order Theories of Consciousness: An Anthology* (Amsterdam, Netherlands: John Benjamins Publishing, 2004), p. 1.

and represents a multiplicity in the unit or in the simple substance, is nothing but what is called perception. It is the inner state of the monad representing external things, which is to be distinguished from apperception. One of the better-known terms of Leibniz's philosophy, and of his philosophy of *Mind*, is apperception. A famous definition is presented for apperception in section 4 of the *Principles of Nature and of Grace* (1714).

Leibniz says, while talking about perception, that,

*“Each monad, together with a particular body, makes up a living substance. Thus, there is not only life everywhere, joined to limbs or organs, but there are also infinite degrees of life in the monads, some dominating more or less over others. But when a monad has organs that are adjusted in such a way that, through them, there is contrast and distinction among the impressions they receive, and consequently contrast and distinction in the perceptions that represent them (in the monads), then this may amount to sensation, that is, to a perception accompanied by memory—a perception of which there remains an echo long enough to make itself heard on occasion. Such a living thing is called an animal, as its monad is called a soul. And when this soul is raised to the level of reason, it is something more sublime, and it is counted among the minds.”*¹³⁵

*“It is true that animals are sometimes in the condition of simple living things, and their souls in the condition of simple monads, namely when their perceptions are not sufficiently distinct to be remembered, as happens in a deep, dreamless sleep or in a fainting spell. But perceptions which have become entirely confused must be unraveled again in animals. Thus it is good to distinguish between perception, which is the internal state of the monad representing external things, and apperception, which is consciousness, or the reflective knowledge of this internal state, which is not given to all souls nor at all times to a given soul.”*¹³⁶

Leibniz is commonly thought to hold a Higher-Order-Thought (HOT) theory of consciousness. According to the higher-order theory, a mental state becomes conscious when another, higher-order, mental state takes it as its object. Put in another way, when one has a perception of apperception then one becomes consciously aware of the intentional content of the lower-order perception. While elaborating his theory of monads Leibniz explains that an unconscious perception becomes conscious when it is accompanied by an apperception of it. Apperception is best understood as a form of

¹³⁵. Gottfried Wilhelm Freiherr Von Leibniz, *G.W. Leibniz Philosophical Essays*, Trans. Roger Ariew and Daniel Garber (Indianapolis: Hackett Publishing, 1989), p. 208.

¹³⁶. Ibid, p. 208.

self-consciousness, and reflection is best understood as a sophisticated form of apperception.

According to Leibniz, a monad is a living organism having the body and the *Soul*, the *Soul* being the entelechy which animates the body.

*“Now this body of living organism or of an animal is always organic; for, since every monad is a mirror of the universe in its own way, and the universe is regulated in a perfect order, there must be also an order in the representer—that is, in the perceptions of the soul, and consequently in the body—through which the (whole) universe is represented there (represented in the Soul) ”*¹³⁷

Accordingly Leibniz envisions three hierarchical levels of organic existence among aggregated substances: 1. (mere) organism: an integrated aggregated dominated by an entelechy, 2. (mere) animal: an organism dominated by a *Soul*, 3. Intelligent creature: an animal dominated by a spirit. Organisms have (bare) perceptions; animals have consciousness or feeling; intelligent creatures have self-consciousness. Since all monads have an envioning *Body* (entourage) of some sort, Leibniz’s philosophy is pan-organic. And every one of these organisms is, in its own characteristic (and imperfect) way, a *living mirror of the whole universe*.¹³⁸ Not only *Souls* but also animals cannot be generated and cannot perish. They are only unfolded, enfolded, unclothed, and transformed; *Souls* never entirely leave their body, and do not pass from one body into another that is entirely new to them. There is therefore no *metempsychosis*, but there is *metamorphosis*.¹³⁹

After Leibniz we can find discussion on philosophy of *Mind* in Brentano’s (1838-1917) writings; he was an inspirational and influential philosopher and psychologists from Germany, whose influence was felt by other great thinkers like Sigmund Freud, Husserl and some other philosophers who followed and adapted his views. He was a well

¹³⁷. Nicholas Rescher, *G. W. Leibniz’s Monadology: An Edition for Students* (Pittsburgh: University of Pittsburgh Press, 1991), p. 218.

¹³⁸. Ibid, p. 220.

¹³⁹. Ibid, p. 209.

known for the reintroduction of the notion of *Intentionality* to contemporary philosophy through his work '*Psychology from an Empirical Standpoint*'. He emphasized the role of experience in knowledge. He noticed that consciousness is not merely contrasted with unconsciousness; we also speak of being conscious of this or that, as in "*He was conscious of the tingling in his scalp.*" It was Brentano's claim that "consciousness was always consciousness of something, that it always was *about* something and *directed towards* that something. It was this *aboutness* which he held to be the essential characteristic of consciousness; any mental state must have this characteristic, and no physical state could have it."¹⁴⁰

After Brentano another important philosopher at Oxford who authored *The Concept of Mind* (1949), was Gilbert Ryle. He has made significant contribution to philosophy of *Mind* through his '*Logical Behaviorism*'. He was a typical empiricist philosopher who criticized *Cartesian Dualism* because of *category-mistake* and says that we can explain things such as *Minds* in terms of things we can actually experience. According to Ryle, the *Mind* is categorically different from the *Body* but are treated by Descartes as if they belong to the same category of substance. For Ryle, a category-mistake lies in using the same terms to describe properties of the *Body* and those of the *Mind*. Ryle shows this point by offering a series of illustrations of category-mistakes. For example a foreigner comes to visit the universities of Oxford for the first time. After being given a tour of the member colleges, libraries, science labs, administrative buildings, etc. the foreigner asks to see the 'university.' This is like asking, 'where is the Mind? According to Ryle, the foreigner has made a category-mistake by assuming that the 'university' is a separate entity over and above (or of the same logical type) as the facilities which he has been shown in the tour. The university is simply an abstract concept which is instantiated by the member colleges, libraries, administrative buildings, etc. His project is analytical but he also introduces the epistemological concepts of '*knowinh-how*' and '*knowing-that*' to distinguish between two types of knowledge with regard to *Mind* and *Body*. Ryle's criticism was distinct from previous critiques of

¹⁴⁰. Jerome A. Shaffer, *Philosophy of Mind* (Englewood Cliffs, N.J.: Prentice-Hall, 1968), p.23.

dualism, which focused primarily on the apparent problem of *Mind-Body* interaction. He said that the main problem of dualism is that it leads to logical absurdities. This is because our use of common language concerning consciousness often leads us to mistakenly categorize consciousness into the wrong logical type. Ryle's logical behaviorism asserts that mental terms can be defined in strictly physical or behavioral terms. For him the *Mind* and the *Body* are of two distinct logical descriptive types, not similar types that vary by degrees. This is not to say that *Mind* and *Body* are separate as a Cartesian dualist would claim but that they have different properties that integrate in a fashion to produce intelligent action. *The workings of the Mind are not distinct from the actions of the body; they are simply the same.*

*"Vocabulary commonly used to describe the Mind or mental processes are merely a different manner of describing action. The theory of the separability of Mind from the body is described by Ryle as the dogma of the ghost in the machine."*¹⁴¹

He explains that there is no hidden entity called the *Mind* inside a mechanical apparatus called the body. But there are some problems with Ryle's 'Logical Behaviorism'; isn't there a difference between being in pain and acting as if you are in pain? Can't you feel pain without showing it? Do I not know whether I am in pain without having to observe my own behavior? Ryle is not a behaviorist in the empiricist sense, but he analyses the concept of *Mind* in terms of other concepts which give a sharp meaning to the mental terms.

While talking about consciousness Ryle says that if someone says that 'I was conscious that the furniture had been rearranged' or 'I was conscious that he was less friendly than usual' then he is conscious of maybe a physical fact or a fact about someone else's state of *Mind*. In another case if an anaesthetized person is said to have lost consciousness from his feet up to his knees then in this use 'conscious' means '*sensitive*' or '*sentient*' and 'unconscious' means anaesthetized or insensitive. We say that a person has lost consciousness when he had ceased to be sensitive to any slaps, noises, pricks or

¹⁴¹. Gustav Tjgaard, *Alexander Archipelago: A Dozen Rain Forest Sketches in Twelve Non-sequential Acts* (USA: Strategic Book Publishing and Rights Co, LLC. 2014).

smells. Here we are not talking about the consciousness of sensation or awareness of the surroundings but the consciousness of the Self or the internal or the first-person experiences. Ryle contended that consciousness is an abstract concept, which is instantiated by multifarious components acting in concert with the brain to produce first-person experience. Assuming that the *Mind* is something over and above these components would be akin to assuming that an entity called the “University of Oxford” exists apart from the institutions that comprise it. He says,

*“Consciousness was imported to play in the mental world the part played by light in the mechanical world. In this metaphorical sense, the contents of the mental world were thought of as being self-luminous or refulgent.”*¹⁴²

For Ryle mental processes are merely intelligent acts. There are no mental processes that are distinct from intelligent acts. The operations of the *Mind* are not merely represented by intelligent acts but are the same as those intelligent acts. Acts of learning, remembering, imagining, knowing, or willing are not merely clues to hidden mental processes or to complex sequences of intellectual operations but are the way in which those mental processes or intellectual operations are defined. Logical propositions are not merely clues to modes of reasoning; they are those modes of reasoning. Ryle argues that there is no hidden entity called the *Mind* inside a mechanical apparatus called the Body. The workings of the *Mind* are not distinct from the actions of the body and are better conceptualized as a way of explaining the actions of the body.

Consciousness might be analyzed into what Ryle calls *episodes* of behavior. These episodes of behavior are events that actually occur and so can be empirically observed. In addition when we describe people we do so in terms of dispositions to behave in certain ways, which means that they will do certain things if a certain situation arises. Therefore, their ‘mental’ state of belief and knowledge can be analyzed as potential behavior, which would be observable if it occurred. Ryle uses the example of cigarette-smoking to show that actually smoking a cigarette is an episode but to say that someone is a cigarette

¹⁴². Gilbert Ryle, *The Concept of Mind: 60th Anniversary Edition* (London and New York: Routledge, Taylor & Francis Group, 2009), p. 141.

smoker is to say that he has a disposition to smoke because we do not mean anything about his consciousness, merely that he has a disposition to buy cigarettes and smoke them. For Ryle knowledge is when a person 'knows' something he has a disposition to be right about it when the situation arises. Ryle criticizes the theory that the *Mind* is a place where mental images are apprehended, perceived, or remembered. So sensations, thoughts, and feelings do not belong to mental world which is distinct from the physical world. Knowledge, memory, imagination, and other abilities or dispositions do not reside 'within' the *Mind* as if the *Mind* is a space in which these dispositions could be situated or located. Furthermore, dispositions are not the same as behavioral actions; actions may, however, be explained by dispositions. Thus Ryle has rejected the behaviorist's false assumption that you can interpret all mental states strictly in relation to observable behavior.

Thomas Nagel, after Gilbert Ryle, also one of the most important and influential philosophers; he has tried to explain the subjective aspect of consciousness. He is well known for his critique of the reductionist theories of *Mind*. Although his philosophical quest began before 1970s but his paper "*what it is like to be a bat?*" (1974) brought him into the main stream philosophy of *Mind*. According to him without consciousness *Mind-Body* problem would be much less interesting but with consciousness it seems hopeless; because consciousness presents a problem for evolutionary reductionism because of its irreducible subjective character. At the same time he believes that the most important and characteristic feature of conscious mental phenomena is very little understood, that is why no currently available reductionist theories can explain consciousness. But he also does not speak about consciousness in a straightforward way, but shows that consciousness cannot be tracked in a mechanical way. He claims that for an organism to be conscious there must be something it is like to be the organism. He has argued that there is irreducibility subjective aspect of consciousness. However he goes to some extents to explain that no materialist theory can accommodate *subjective feature* of consciousness.

According to the materialist understanding of biology or neurobiological science, consciousness would have to be regarded as a brute philosophy about the world. But for Nagel “*Conscious subjects and their mental lives are inescapable components of reality not describable by the physical science.*”¹⁴³ Before writing the paper “*what it is like to be a bat?*” or before taking bats as a case study he believed that bats have conscious experience. That is why Nagel tries to explain throughout his paper that he has no idea of what it is like to be a bat, but he can imagine that it feels like something. On the other hand he can imagine that it doesn’t feel like anything to be a rock. And he further says that when we say that people and bats are conscious and rocks are not conscious, this is what we are referring to. X is conscious if it is like something to be X. Nagel does not deny the causal theory that conscious mental states and events cause behavior; he does not deny ascribing functional characterizations to causation. But, in his book *Mind and Cosmos*, he specifies that “*I believe that the role of consciousness in the survival of organism is inseparable from intentionality: inseparable from perception, belief, desire, and action, and finally from reason.*”¹⁴⁴ It shows that; although causation plays key role in conscious mental states but consciousness itself to subjective aspect, cannot be ignored. Nagel’s whole argument is that the reductionist theory can succeed only if the first person or subjective point of view is omitted from what is to be reduced. But omitting the species-specific viewpoint which is the essence of the internal world will leave the question “*what it is like to be a bat?*” without any answer. The subjective point of view will remain a mystery.

After Thomas Nagel a well-known American philosopher John Searle has came up with different kind of argument that consciousness is entirely caused by neurobiological processes and is realized in brain structures. Searle says that “*the essential trait of consciousness that we need to explain is unified qualitative subjectivity.*” Consciousness thus differs from other biological phenomena in that it has a subjective or first-person

¹⁴³. Thomas Nagel, *Mind and Cosmos* (New York: Oxford University Press, 2012), p. 41.

¹⁴⁴. Ibid, p. 68.

ontology, but this subjective ontology does not prevent us from having an epistemically objective science of consciousness. So he advocates that we need to overcome the philosophical tradition that treats the mental and the physical as two distinct metaphysical realms. While responding to the people, those who says that consciousness is an illusion and it doesn't really exist, John Searle asks: How would one go about refuting the view that consciousness does not exist? Should I pinch its adherents to remind them that they are conscious? Or, should I pinch myself and report the results in the *Journal of Philosophy*? He further says, by consciousness I simply mean those subjective states of awareness or sentience that begin when one wakes up in the morning and continues through the period that one is awake until one falls into a dreamless sleep, into a coma, or dies or is otherwise, as they say conscious (Searle 1990). Hence it seems that John Searle's views on consciousness could fill those gaps between Dualism and Materialism. Searle's ideas are very much important because he has made countless contributions to contemporary thinking about Intentionality, Consciousness, Artificial Intelligence and Rationality. When it comes to the subject of consciousness his work could bring out the philosophical community from the state of confusion. How Searle's theory of consciousness is helping to reduce the gap between the Dualists and the Materialists that I will discuss clearly in following sub-section "*Biological Naturalism*".

Daniel Dennett's notion of consciousness, after John Searle's, is the most important one in the philosophy of *Mind*. In *Consciousness Explained*¹⁴⁵ Dennett presented the *Multiple Drafts Model* theory of consciousness which is an empirical theory of brain function. Whatever the scientific development has happened till 1991 has become the base for Dennett to explain consciousness in terms of an empirical theory of brain functioning in a naturalistic way. He says that we need to stop thinking of brain as if it had a single functional summit or central point; in order to do so Dennett recognized the need of a new possible method. His efforts could form the structure of the *Multiple*

¹⁴⁵. Daniel C. Dennett, *Consciousness Explained* (New York: Back Bay Books/Little, Brown and Company, 1991).

Drafts Model theory, according to which all varieties of perception are accomplished in the brain by parallel, multi-track processes of interpretation and elaboration of sensory inputs. Information entering the nervous system is under continuous editorial revision. So once a particular “observation” has been made by a specialized, localized portion of the brain then the information need not have to be re-discriminated by some “master” discriminator. On the basis of this Dennett maintains that there is no single point in the brain where the information streams in, where it all comes together for central processing. Dennett didn’t give any definite answer to the question; what is consciousness? That is why Dennett postpones the question of what consciousness is until the question of how consciousness works has been settled. That is why the whole book *Consciousness Explained* is dedicated to explain how consciousness works rather than what it is. In this process he introduced the *Multiple Drafts Model* and some other methods. But the main problem begins from here. Elaborate discussion on his views on consciousness will be discussed in following sub-section “*The Multiple Drafts Model Theory*”.

David Chalmers says that “*we know Consciousness far more intimately than we know the rest of the world, but we understand the rest of the world far better than we understand the Consciousness.*”¹⁴⁶ He argues that if one is to take consciousness seriously then one should endorse a dualistic theory like his *Property Dualism* because materialism cannot explain how consciousness could amount to physical structures and processes. And later he explains that the term consciousness is ambiguous, referring to a number of phenomena. Sometimes it is used to refer to a cognitive capacity, such as the ability to introspect or to report one’s mental states. Sometimes it is used synonymously with *awakeness*. Sometimes it is closely tied to our ability to focus attention, or to voluntarily control our behavior. Some other times *to be conscious of something* come to the same thing as *to know about something*. All of these are accepted uses of the term, which significantly point to the multiple use of the term ‘consciousness.’ however

¹⁴⁶. David J. Chalmers, *The Conscious Mind: In Search of a Fundamental Theory* (USA: Oxford University Press, 1996), p.03.

Chalmers means by ‘consciousness’ the subjective quality of experience which has a ‘*what it is like*’ structure.¹⁴⁷ He believes that unlike most of the physical world, which can be broken down into individual atoms or organisms which can be understood in terms of cells, *Consciousness is an irreducible aspect of the Universe, like space and time and mass*. Instead of reducing consciousness to something else, *Chalmers believes that Consciousness should be taken for granted, the way that space and time and mass are in physics*. According to this view, a theory of consciousness would not explain what consciousness is or how it arose; instead, it would try to explain the relationship between consciousness and everything else in the world. This aspect also will be explained in following sub-section *the hard problem of Consciousness*.

Max Velmans, is well known for his theory of consciousness which is called *Reflexive Monism*.¹⁴⁸ It is a modern version of an ancient view according to which the basic stuff of the universe manifests itself both physically and consciously. For Velmans a person is conscious if he *experiences something*; conversely, if a person experiences nothing he is not conscious. Elaborating slightly, we can say that “*when consciousness is present, phenomenal content is present. Conversely when phenomenal content is absent consciousness is absent*.”¹⁴⁹

3.3. Naturalism and different Varieties

Naturalism is a term which is adopted by various disciplines such as science, social science and humanities. Each discipline defines it distinctively according to their subject matter. If we restrict its boundaries to philosophy then Naturalism relates scientific methods to philosophy by affirming that all beings and events in the universe are natural. It is an approach to philosophical problems that interprets them as tractable through the methods of the empirical sciences. According to Naturalism all knowledge of the

¹⁴⁷. Ibid, p.06.

¹⁴⁸. Max Velmans, *Understanding Consciousness*, 2nd Edition (London: Routledge/Psychology Press, 2009), p. 289.

¹⁴⁹. Ibid, p. 08.

universe falls within the scope of scientific investigation. Naturalism presumes that nature is in principle completely knowable. There is in nature regularity, unity, and wholeness that imply objective laws, without which the pursuit of scientific knowledge would be impossible. While naturalism has often been equated with materialism, it is much broader in scope. Materialism is indeed naturalistic, but the converse is not necessarily true. Strictly speaking, naturalism has no ontological preference; *i.e.*, no bias toward any particular set of categories of reality. So long as all of reality is natural, no other limitations are imposed. Naturalists have in fact expressed a wide variety of views, but ultimately Naturalism asserts that nature is reality, the whole of it. There is nothing beyond, nothing “other than,” no “other world” of being.

Different periods in the history of philosophy stand as witness for the emergence of different notions in philosophy; if we investigate from ancient period then we can see in every generation a new version of philosophical account of nature and reality. There are reasons also for why different issues were at the forefront at different times. At the same time to deal with the problems at different periods different methods and ideas were developed simultaneously but some methods only could win the hearts of the philosophical community and some could not. In ancient times, basic questions about the constitution of reality motivated various conceptions about the material substance of things. While talking about the principles of reality Thales of Miletus, Anaximenes, Anaximander, Heraclitus, Democritus of Abdera speculated different entities as the principles of reality. In this approach from Thales to contemporary philosophy many ideas and methods have stood in the forefront to solve the problems of different periods at different places and also to solve the problem of the relation between matter and whatever else might be constitutive of reality. In Naturalism we can see different versions developed to deal different philosophical problems at different periods in the past. We can see, as I have discussed in the first chapter, different periods and emergence of different notions and different philosophical systems in the area of philosophy of *Mind*, so also we can see various versions in the Naturalistic approach through different philosophers from different periods.

We can trace the roots of naturalistic philosophy to the pre-Socratic philosophy; the ideas and assumptions of naturalism were seen first in the Ionian philosophers, the school which includes philosophers like Thales and Anaxagoras. Democritus was another philosopher who tried to explain the reality through the naturalistic method and formulated an atomic theory for the universe. From pre-Socratic tradition it was Thales who was considered to be the father of natural science, the first philosopher to give explanations of natural events without use of supernatural causes. Other pre-Socratic philosophers who were labeled as ‘Natural Philosophers’ sought to explain everything by reference to natural causation alone, often explicitly excluding any role of gods, spirits or magic in the creation or operation of the world. These kinds of notions in post-Socratic period eventually led to fully-developed systems such as Epicureanism which was developed by the teachings of Epicurus. Epicurus, who was an atomic materialist following the steps of Democritus, sought to explain everything that exists as the product of atoms moving in a void. In the later period *Strato of Lampsacus* who was a Peripatetic¹⁵⁰ philosopher also sought to explain everything that exists as the inevitable outcome of uncreated natural forces or tendencies. However, in later periods Plato’s philosophy has become the center point for non-naturalistic approach concerning *Soul/Mind* and all related issues concerning man. This trend continued and led to the origin of many more non-naturalistic trends in philosophy. This process finally caused for the rise and dominance of Christianity and the decline of secular philosophy in the West during the middle ages in which metaphysical naturalism became heretical and eventually illegal. In 17th and 18th centuries Descartes and Kant are excellent examples of non-naturalism concerning the *Mind*. Plato’s, Descartes and Kant’s theories differ in important ways, but they all share the principle that the *Mind* and its activities are not physical and are not governed by the laws of nature. This is not because of pre-scientific ignorance or lack of sophistication. It is because they found it virtually or literally incoherent that awareness, comprehension, and the activity of thought should just be part

¹⁵⁰. The peripatetic school was a school of philosophy in Ancient Greece. Its teachings were derived from its founder Aristotle, and Peripatetic was a name given to his followers.

of what goes on in the natural order. We can say that Plato, Descartes and Kant do not differ with each other in kind but differ in degree. With the simultaneous development through cultural movements of intellectuals, which is known as the ‘*Age of Enlightenment*’ in 17th and 18th centuries, emphasis on reason and individualism, rather than the tradition, began in Europe. It was only when the political advances of the *Age of Enlightenment* made genuine free speech possible again that a few intellectuals publicly renewed the case for metaphysical naturalism, under the label of materialism. “*In this period only the Naturalism has become as a view of the world and view of man’s relation to it, in which only the operation of natural laws and forces are admitted or assumed.*”

But according to many defenders of naturalism, philosophy is not discontinuous with science. They say that there are no separate philosophical problems that need to be addressed in a distinctive manner. Moreover, philosophy does not yield results that are different in content and kind from what could be attained by the sciences. Thus, in being a view about the world, naturalism is also a view about the nature of philosophy. In the discussion on naturalism we will see that the affirmation of science as the only genuine approach to acquiring knowledge is often a feature of naturalism. But naturalism is not always narrowly scientific. If we talk about the scope of the naturalism then the debate about naturalism ranges across many areas of philosophy, including metaphysics, epistemology, ethics, and philosophy of *Mind*. But there are two basic dimensions in which the debate takes place. One of them concerns *what there is*, and the other concerns *methods of acquiring belief and knowledge*. When it comes to the matter of *what there is*, according to the naturalist, an accurate, adequate conception of the world does not include reference to supernatural entities or agencies.

But according to some naturalists, there are no Platonic forms, Cartesian mental substances, Kantian noumena, or any other agents, powers, or entities that do not (in some broad sense) belong to nature. In a very loose characterization, it may suffice to say that nature is the order of things accessible to us through observation and the methods of

the empirical sciences. If some other method, such as a priori theorizing, is needed to have access to the alleged entity or to the truth in question, then it is not a real entity or a genuine truth. According to the naturalist, there is *only* the natural order. There is *only* the physical natural order, even if there are various constituents and aspects of it that are to be described in their own non-reducible vocabularies. When it comes to the matter of *methods of acquiring belief and knowledge*, the naturalists says that the acquisition of belief and knowledge is (broadly) a causal process within the natural order, and a priori norms, principles, and methods are not essential to the acquisition or justification of beliefs and knowledge. But Descartes held that the norms and the method of belief acceptance must be independent of experience, and must have their grounds in reason alone; otherwise they would be vulnerable to exactly the sorts of skeptical objections that led to the search for epistemic principles in the first place. Naturalists explains our acceptance of beliefs on the basis of habits of association—causal tendencies that we can reflectively articulate into rules of epistemic practice. There are processes of belief acquisition and acceptance, but they are not underwritten by principles formulated a priori, nor are they structured by such principles. Epistemology is part of the overall science of human nature. It is not a project that is prior to or independent of the empirical sciences.

3.4. The Naturalistic approach of Consciousness

Plato, Descartes, and Kant were non-naturalists who shared the view that *Mind* itself is not a part of the natural world. But Naturalism goes exactly in opposite direction to this view. The claim that *Mind is not a separate substance* is the fundamental notion of almost all naturalist theories. Naturalism is not the view only about what is relevant to explain or understand a certain range of phenomena but it is a view about what is sufficient to explain or understand a certain range of phenomena. In this context, as I have discussed in the previous paragraphs, there is a broad range of views, many of them are naturalistic and many of them are not, so there is no single, prevailing naturalistic theory of *Mind*. But the debates about what naturalism says about *Mind* look like very much open and ongoing. Among the many versions of naturalism some are explicitly

scientific and some are not. When it comes to the matter of the approach of naturalism, exclusively in philosophy of *Mind*, it is another area in which naturalistic views have been prominent and highly controversial in recent times. Many naturalistic theorists hold that whatever categories, concepts and vocabulary we use to explain consciousness, experience, thought and language are derived from natural sciences. The impetus for this view comes from a number of directions, including developments in biological sciences, linguistics, artificial intelligence, cognitive science and some other areas. That is why for many naturalistic theorists it seems increasingly clear, or at least plausible, that the *Mind* is as fully a part of nature as anything else. They hold that though the properties and processes of mental life may have distinctive features (which may be especially difficult to study and to understand) but they are not ultimately inexplicable by the methods of the sciences. The study of the mental properties or mental processes is especially complicated because of the ways in which biochemical, physiological, social, developmental, and many other processes and events interact. But according to most of the naturalist, the *Mind* is not “outside of nature” and it operates in accordance with principles fundamentally like those that govern other natural phenomena. One important thing here we have to remember is that a naturalist need not be a reductionist physicalist. The naturalistic theorist of *Mind* may be a non-reductionist physicalist (taking the view that the mental supervenes on the physical) or not take an explicit stand on physicalism one way or the other. There is a possibility for one thing that the naturalist with respect to philosophy of *Mind* may emphasize the claim that the study of *Mind* does not involve any methods other than those recognized in the various natural sciences but some other naturalists emphasize that this is the only method for the study of the *Mind*. They argue that it requires no commitments to the existence of entities and properties other than those recognized in the sciences. Keeping in *Mind* these many difficulties and contradictions within the naturalism, I have chosen three philosophers such as Searle, Dennett and Chalmers to deal with the problem of *Mind* and consciousness. The problem of consciousness will be dealt with only in relation to the human consciousness. As Max Velmans says, the precise mix of sensory, perceptual, cognitive and social processes found in each species is likely to be species-specific, so it might be reasonable to suppose that only humans can have full human consciousness. But it is equally reasonable to

suppose that some non-human animals have unique, non-human forms of consciousness. The later issue is outside the scope of my study.

3.4.1. Biological Naturalism

In response to all these traditional and earlier theories of consciousness and theories of Naturalism John Searle introduced another theory of consciousness according to which consciousness is a '*Neurobiological Phenomenon*'. Proving how this 'neurobiological Phenomenon' of consciousness could be the cause of subjectivity is the main task of his philosophical discourse. In 1980s through his paper "*Minds, Brains, and Programs*" he challenged the fundamental assumption in artificial intelligence that cognition can be re-created by the manipulation of physical symbols according to a formal program. For the first time in this paper he presented his famous thought experiment "*The Chinese Room*" argument. Perhaps Ned Block's *Chinese Nation* paper influenced John Searle to develop the *Chinese Room* thought experiment, though Searle does not agree. The main strength of Searle's theory is that he is apparently able to justify through his theory that the physical causes the mental and that the mental is supervenient to the physical in the way that the mental depends on our physical processes for its existence. Though philosophy of language was his first area of interest, he could not analyze the language without the intentionalistic notions like intention, belief and desire. In this process he was forced to enter into the studies of philosophy of *Mind* to understand the intentionalistic notions. This was the main motivating force which prompted Searle to work on *Intentionality* (1983), which later led him to write *The Rediscovery of the Mind* (1992), the later containing consciousness as the central problem. In this whole process he finally could give a solution to the *Mind-Body* problem; mental phenomena are caused by neuro-physiological processes in the brain and are themselves features of the brain. To distinguish this view from the many others in the field, he calls it "*biological naturalism*."¹⁵¹ I will discuss now in detail how this "*biological naturalism*" solves the *Mind-Body* problem that.

¹⁵¹. John R. Searle, *The Rediscovery of the Mind* (Cambridge, London: The MIT Press, 1992), p. 01.

According to Searle, consciousness should be understood as a natural biological phenomenon. The existence of consciousness is part of complex phenomena going on in the brain; it is a higher level biological phenomenon and grounded in lower level cellular structure. When I want to raise my arm, my conscious intention and action causes my arm to go up; anything that causes my arm to go up must cause secretion of acetylcholine. But that can only be done by something that was itself neurobiological. So my consciousness, intention and action are neurobiological phenomena. There are, according to Searle, some important features of consciousness; they are like, every conscious state has qualitative feel, conscious states are ontologically subjective, conscious states are always unified states and consciousness is of something or about something. Consciousness has the qualitative features because they can exist only when they are experienced by a subject. “*Subjectivity necessarily involves the what-it-feels-like aspect of conscious states.*”¹⁵² When I drink a glass of water then I get the feeling or sensation of drinking water. That feeling or sensation is qualitative. This qualitative feature of drinking water is different from the features of water. At the same time the sensation of drinking water is different from the sensation of listening to music or the sensation of pain and etc. These qualities only exist in so far they are experienced by a subject; by human or animal subject. So the qualitative character implies what is termed as ontological subjectivity. It is the subjective mode of existence. Another feature is that consciousness has unified conscious states we can have varieties of conscious feels at a time. I can feel at a time that I am sitting in chair, typing the thesis, I can feel the winds coming through the window, I feel the touch of the floor against to my feet, and so on and they occur to me as one single conscious feel. In this way consciousness functions causally on our behavior. The sequence of neuron firings determinate the cells to secrete the motor functions; this is how consciousness functions causally.

There are four propositions by which we can explain the whole Biological Naturalism. Naturalism as an approach to the *Mind-Body* problem goes against the traditional notion of *Soul* as a supernatural entity. One important thing that we have to

¹⁵². Ibid, p. 132.

keep in our minds is that Searle rejects the notion that '*science is objective and Consciousness is subjective*' therefore there cannot be a science of consciousness. To explain Searle's notion of consciousness these are the four propositions we have to follow...

1. Consciousness and mental states are *real and irreducible*,
2. Consciousness is entirely caused by the *neurobiological processes in the brain*,
3. Consciousness and mental processes are going on in the brain and *realized in the brain*, and
4. Consciousness *functions causally*,

According to the first proposition consciousness and mental states are real and irreducible. The distinction between the reality and illusion is not relevant when we talk about the existence of consciousness. The distinction between the reality and illusion refers to the distinction between how things consciously seem to us and how they really are. But when I talk about the existence of consciousness it means that I am talking about the mental states where one understands that he is conscious; if it consciously seems to you that you are conscious then you are conscious. It is the first-person's subjective-qualitative-mental-state. Conscious states cannot be the states of illusion but there is a possibility to have illusions in a state of consciousness; I mean to say that we can be mistaken about the content of the conscious mental states but we cannot be mistaken about our own conscious state. This explanation is followed by most of the philosophers who accept the morality of consciousness. Indeed we owe it to Descartes who said "*we cannot doubt the existence of our own consciousness.*"

John Searle is no exception on the above notion; he too follows Descartes definition in this respect and says that consciousness is real and it cannot be an illusion. But the main task of the first proposition, *Consciousness and mental states are real and irreducible*, is to prove that the Artificial Intelligence (AI) cannot produce mental states. I think The *Chinese Room* argument would be the right tool to start the remarkable

discussion about the foundations of AI and cognitive science. Searle's main objection on AI is that the computational model of *Mind* leaves out crucial things about the *Mind* such as consciousness and Intentionality, so he wants to prove that AI cannot provide the full account of consciousness and Subjectivity. Although the *Chinese Room* argument was originally presented as a reaction to the statements of AI researchers but it is not an argument against the goals of AI research; at the same time the *Chinese Room* argument does not ignore the amount of intelligence that a machine can display. Here we have to understand the AI at two levels: Strong AI says that a computer programmed in the right way is really a *Mind*; it can understand and have other cognitive states and the programs can truly explain human cognition. Weak AI says that the computer is a useful tool for the study of the human *Mind*; it helps us to formulate and test our hypotheses in a more precise and rigorous way. Here Searle has no problem with Weak AI but has problem with the Strong AI. Any attempt to produce *Mind* purely with computer programs leaves out mental and semantic contents which are the essential features of the *Mind*.

The outcome of Chinese room argument is that the person in the Chinese room could pass the *Turing Test* because s/he could respond purely based on syntax (formal symbol manipulation). At the same time the digital computer or Robot doesn't have whatever is necessary and sufficient for having *Mind*. The digital computer program is based on the *binary number system*; digital computer can respond properly to the input based on syntactical program. But the syntax alone is not sufficient for semantics. Simply Physics alone is not sufficient for syntax because the facts about physics are symbolic and symbols only relative to the interpretation. Syntax requires someone who treats the objects as symbols, as meaningful entities. Treating symbols as syntactical entities is observer relative. The notion of a computer program is only relative to interpretation, it's not a notion that is intrinsic to the system. The computer is just a symbol manipulating device; a symbol manipulator in the *Chinese Room* or a symbol manipulating digital computer doesn't produce any mental state. At the same time symbol manipulating by itself is not sufficient for having mental states and processes. On the basis of this we can find one thing that semantics is not intrinsic to syntax and syntax is not intrinsic to

physics. The digital computer or the Robot or the *Chinese Room* can answer all the questions based on syntax without understanding anything.

After reading the above paragraph certainly one question will be raised in our minds; how does the *Chinese Room* argument solve the *Mind-Body* problem? To get answer to this question we have to go through the notion of *Silicon Brains*, a thought experiment in *The Rediscovery of the Mind* where Searle explained silicon brains thought experiment as a result of three possibilities. He asks us to read three possibilities of silicon brains thought experiment from the first person point of view. The silicon brains thought experiment is presented as a treatment for blindness due to deterioration of the brain. In a series of operations the neurobiological process of the brain are progressively replaced by silicon chips, until eventually the brain is entirely composed of silicon. The replacements are always such as to preserve the behavioral disposition of the person, and the functional organization needed to sustain these. After all it turns out that the silicon chips restore vision to its normal state. Searle asks us to imagine further that our brain, depressingly, continues to deteriorate and the doctors continue to implant more silicon chips. Finally we imagine that our brain is entirely replaced by silicon chips. After the replacement we still continue with our behavioral dispositions; it doesn't affect our mental life (thoughts, experiences, memories and so on, which we had previously). So here we can imagine that silicon chips have the power not only to duplicate our input-output functions, but also duplicate the mental phenomena that are normally responsible for our input-output functions. Searle says that the first possibility of silicon brains, as a matter of fact, is empirically absurd to suppose that we could duplicate the causal powers of neurons entirely in silicon, but this cannot be ruled out a priori. So the thought experiment remains valid as a statement of logical or conceptual possibility.

According to the second possibility of silicon brains thought experiment, as Searle said, if the silicon is progressively implanted into our dwindling brain; we will find that

the area of our conscious experience shrinks but this does not show any effect on your external behavior. Searle writes:

*“You find, to your total amazement, that you are indeed losing control of your external behavior. You find, for example, that when the doctors test your vision, you hear them say, “We are holding up a red object in front of you; please tell us what you see.” You want to cry out, “I can’t see anything. I’m going totally blind.” But you hear your voice saying in a way that is completely out of your control, “I see a red object in front of me.”*¹⁵³

On the basis of this second possibility of silicon brains thought experiment we can imagine that our conscious experience slowly shrinks to nothing; while our externally observable behavior remains the same but we have no control on our external behavior and from the inside we are gradually dying or are eventually mentally dead. But while we are dying, another consciousness is taking over our body; the speech acts we faintly hear our body uttering are not ours, but they are also not nobody’s. They are the speech acts of a new consciousness, remarkably willing to call itself by our names and recall our memories, exploit our skills, etc., but just not we.

According to the third possibility of silicon brains thought experiment we can imagine no change in our mental life after the implantation of silicon chips, at the same time we are progressively more and more unable to put our intentions, feelings and thoughts into action. Neither the body responds to the thoughts nor can thoughts work on the body. Eventually it leads us suffer to from total paralysis, even though our mental life is unchanged. So in this case Searle says that we might hear the doctors saying:

*“The silicon chips are able to maintain heartbeat, respiration, and other vital processes, but the patient is obviously brain dead. We might as well unplug the system, because the patient has no mental life at all.”*¹⁵⁴

Here as the first person observers we know that the doctors are totally wrong. In this situation we really want to shout out and say that

¹⁵³. Ibid, p. 66.

¹⁵⁴. Ibid, p. 68.

“No, I’m still conscious! I perceive everything going on around me. It’s just that I can’t make any physical movement. I’ve become totally paralyzed.”¹⁵⁵

After presenting these three possibilities of silicon brains thought experiments he says that *epistemically*, we can know conscious mental states of a person partly from their behavior but not completely; *causally*, however, consciousness serves to mediate the causal relations between input stimuli and output behavior; from the *evolutionary* point of view, the conscious *Mind* functions causally to control behavior. But from the *ontological* point of view, behavior, functional role, and causal relations are irrelevant for the existence of conscious mental phenomena. The mental phenomena can exist completely and have all of its essential properties independent of any behavioral output. The ontology of the mental is essentially first-person ontology and mental states only exist as subjective, first-person phenomena.

“The capacity of the brain to cause Consciousness is conceptually distinct from its capacity to cause motor behavior. A system could have Consciousness without behavior and behavior without Consciousness.”¹⁵⁶

So on the basis of these two thought experiments (*Chinese Room Argument and Silicon Brains*) we can conclude that consciousness and mental states are ontologically *real and irreducible*. Because the syntactic representations of the *Chinese Room* and the neural duplicating powers of Silicon brains could not represent the mental states of an individual, so we cannot reduce the mental states or consciousness to the silicon chips. *Any system capable of causing consciousness must be capable of duplicating the causal powers of the brain.* The digital computer program which contains binary number/syntactical content cannot duplicate the causal powers of the human brain which contains semantic causal network. From these three possibilities of Silicon brains thought experiment we have to understand one important thing that though the external behavior is stable but the conscious states are shrinking to nothing.

“Consciousness is not a “stuff,” it is a feature or property of the brain in the sense, for example, that liquidity is a feature of water.”¹⁵⁷

¹⁵⁵. Ibid, p. 68.

¹⁵⁶. Ibid, p.69.

¹⁵⁷. Ibid, p. 105.

Though we know some conscious states through external behavior but it clearly shows that *Behavior is neither necessary nor sufficient* to have consciousness and mental states. Consciousness is an indivisible feature of neurobiological processes of the brain. The way we cannot see water without liquidity, in the same way we cannot expect the existence of consciousness without brain processes. So consciousness is real and irreducible and it is right there in the brain. But, according to Searle there is a possibility that consciousness is reducible in a causal way. He writes:

*“Consciousness is a causally emergent property of the behavior of neurons, and so consciousness is causally reducible to the brain processes.”*¹⁵⁸

The way Searle advocates the causal reduction of consciousness is different from the standard reduction of the materialists. For Searle, consciousness is the emergent feature of the behavior of neurons so there is nothing wrong in reducing consciousness to the causal powers of the brain. In a sense, it is not a reduction which denies the reality of consciousness but the one in which consciousness as a qualitative feature is attributed to the neurological processes.

Now I will enter into the second proposition, according to which consciousness is entirely caused by the *Neurobiological processes in the brain*. As I have discussed in the second chapter, Descartes was the first person to divide *Mind* and *Body* very systematically, according to which division consciousness is entirely a property of the *Mind*. Searle believe that contemporary *Mind-Body* problem begins in seventeenth century because the separation between *Mind* and matter, which was done by Descartes, was a useful heuristic tool that facilitated a great deal of the progress that took place in the science. It's almost 400 years have passed and so much of scientific development had taken place in this regard. Comparatively we have better possibilities to understand the *Mind-Body* problem due to this scientific development. That is why Searle says, to situate consciousness within our understanding of the world, we have to situate it with respect to the atomic theory and the evolutionary theory of biology.

¹⁵⁸. Ibid, p. 116.

*“According to the atomic theory, the world is made up of particles. These particles are organized into systems. Some of these systems are living, and these types of living systems have evolved over long periods of time. Among these, some have evolved brains that are capable of causing and sustaining consciousness. Consciousness is, thus, a biological feature of certain organisms in exactly the same sense of “biological” in which photosynthesis, mitosis, digestion, and reproduction are biological features of organism.”*¹⁵⁹

To give this definition he heavily depends on two scientific theories, the atomic theory of physics and the theory of evolutionary biology. On the one hand, the atomic theory not only explains that big systems are made up of smaller ones, but many features of big systems can be causally explained by the behavior of the little ones. On the other hand, he believes that as the products of the evolutionary process, organisms, are made of subsystems called “cells,” and some of these organisms develop subsystems of nerve cells, which we think of as “nervous systems.” Some extremely complex nervous systems are capable of causing and sustaining conscious states and processes. Specifically certain big collections of nerve cells (brains) cause and sustain conscious states and processes. Atomic theory and evolutionary theory of biology in this way had become the strong base for Searle to define consciousness as a neurobiological process in the brain. On the basis of this understanding Searle says:

*“Consciousness is a causally emergent property of systems. It is an emergent feature of certain systems of neurons in the same way that solidity and liquidity are emergent features of systems of molecules. The existence of consciousness can be explained by the causal interactions between elements of the brain at the micro level, but consciousness cannot itself be deduced or calculated from the sheer physical structure of the neurons without some additional account of the causal relations between them.”*¹⁶⁰

On the basis of this, for Searle, consciousness is emerges out of the neurobiological processes in the brain. The subjective and qualitative features of consciousness have the neuronal base. Here we have to understand the role of first-person and third-person point of view and also the subjective and objective aspects of consciousness. It is true that a complete description of the third person objective features of the world would not be the

¹⁵⁹. Ibid, p. 93.

¹⁶⁰. Ibid, p. 112.

descriptions of the first-person subjective features. When we enter into the scientific explanation of subjective features of consciousness, there is a common doubt that science is objective, and consciousness is subjective and has the subjective features, then there cannot be a science of consciousness. But from Searle's point of view there are two different senses; epistemological sense and ontological sense of the notion of subjectivity such that.

*"subjective" refers to an ontological category, not to an epistemic mode. Consider, for example, the statement, "I now have a pain in my lower back." That statement is completely objective in the sense that it is made true by the existence of an actual fact and is not dependent on any stance, attitudes, or opinions of observers. However, the phenomenon itself, the actual pain itself, has a subjective mode of existence, and it is in that sense which I am saying that consciousness is subjective."*¹⁶¹

Consciousness is indeed ontologically subjective because it can only exist when it is experienced by the subject. But, as Searle says, this does not prevent us from having an epistemically objective science of consciousness. Every object in the world the way it has physical features, in the same way it has qualitative features too; the qualitative features of consciousness or qualitativeness implies the ontological subjectivity. Every object has a perspective which has qualitative features without which we know nothing about the object. We cannot know this qualitative feature either by the epistemological sense or by the causal mechanism. By epistemological and causal mechanism we know the objective features and processes of a mechanism but qualitative features are not reachable by this; they only exist when they are experienced by the subject. At the same time we cannot explain consciousness without taking into account the epistemological and ontological aspects of consciousness. If you question Searle how does it work? Searle says that all of the mental states and consciousness are caused by neurobiological processes in the brain. If we go ahead with this notion then the inadequacy of the traditional categories becomes evident. But as long as we associate consciousness with the traditional categories and vocabulary we will never be in a position to give a solution to the *Mind-Body* problem. Searle further says that whatever I have been describing is a piece of biology; but in addition to the biological features it also has mental features. For example, I make a

¹⁶¹. Ibid, p. 94.

conscious decision to raise my hand then my hand goes up. My conscious decision caused my hand to go up. But now we know independently that anything that cause the hand to go up has to cause the secretion of certain neurotransmitters. We can explain these features in a causal mechanism. It is similar to the liquidity of water. The liquidity is not something extra juice squirted out by the H₂O molecules. It's a condition that the system is in. Just as the jar full of water can go from liquid to solid and solid to liquid depending on the behavior of the molecules. So brain can go from the state of being conscious to the state of being unconscious depending on the behavior of the molecules. These all are part of the unified conscious experience. The brain causes mental states by the bottom up processes going on in neuronal level but the computational program is not the causal process; the program is implemented in a causal mechanism in a systematic way.

"The implemented program has no causal powers other than those of the implementing medium because the program has no real existence, no ontology, beyond that of the implementing medium. Physically speaking, there is no such thing as a separate "program level.""¹⁶²

The structure of the computational program is based on binary number system and this way of functioning causes the program from one particular functioning stage to the next stage by following the instructions in the program but it can never have the mental states and experience. It's not that easy to believe as AI scientists believed that a computer can have feelings. A computer cannot have the sensation like pain, cannot fall in love and other sensations. We cannot believe as AI scientists believe that we can simulate any mental state by a computational program. As I have discussed before that silicon chip may have the capacity to simulate some neuronal process of the brain but the silicon chip cannot have all the capacities to represent whatever the capacity neural process is having; so simulation is not the same as duplication. Only a machine could think – only a machine with the same causal powers as a brain. So consciousness is entirely caused by the neurobiological process in the brain and so it cannot be duplicated.

¹⁶². Ibid, p. 215.

Now I will enter in the third proposition that consciousness and mental processes are going on in the brain and *realized in the brain*. I think it would be more comfortable if I discuss it along with the fourth proposition that consciousness *functions causally*. The third and fourth propositions are inter linked; we cannot have discussions of one without the other so I will explain both the propositions together. Before entering into the discussion of third and forth proposition I want to mention one important thing that we should not treat functional level and causal level as separate states. The functional level, for Searle, is not a separate level at all but simply one of the causal levels described in terms of our interests. Coming to the main point; how does consciousness and mental processes are *realized in the brain*? Here I have to introduce Searle's notion of unconscious mental phenomena.

*"The notion of an unconscious mental state implies accessibility of consciousness."*¹⁶³

Searle believes that unconscious mental processes are more important than the conscious ones because the notion of unconscious mental state implies accessibility of consciousness. But we don't yet have a clear idea of unconscious mental states. To understand unconscious mental state first of all we have to separate it from the conscious mental states. Perhaps there is a possibility to err in dividing conscious and unconscious mental states but Searle, in this regard, introduced an idea that.

*"Pre-theoretical notion of an unconscious mental state is the idea of a conscious mental state minus the consciousness."*¹⁶⁴

According to this unconscious mental states are equal to conscious mental states. The way he explains unconscious mental states is very much impressive; even an ordinary man who never studied philosophy can also understand it very easily. In a very normal language he puts it as follows:

"Unconscious mental states in the mind are like fish deep in the sea. The fish that we can't see underneath the surface have exactly the same shape they have when they surface. The fish don't lose their shapes by going under water. Another simile: Unconscious mental states are like objects

¹⁶³. Ibid, p. 152.

¹⁶⁴. Ibid, p. 152.

stored in the dark attic of the mind. These objects have their shapes all along, even when you can't see them."¹⁶⁵

Here it's very much clear what he is talking about but there is no clarity as to how it is related to the notion that *Consciousness and mental processes are going on in the brain and realized in the brain*. What does it really indicate? Whatever the point he wants to establish on the basis of this reference is clearly understood. According to this there are two states; conscious mental states and unconscious mental states. If I am in a state of consciousness then my subjectivity represent the conscious mental states. If I am unconscious then who will represent my mental state? How do my mental states sustain when I am unconscious? What makes *something mental* when it is not conscious? Knowing answers to these questions is a turning point in explaining consciousness; this itself would show the path to explain third and forth propositions. To understand the distinction between conscious mental states and unconscious mental states we have to add one more thing, that is, the non-conscious states. In addition to this I am going to introduce Searle's notion of *Intentionality*. I will discuss about Intentionality very elaborately in next chapter but here I just want to make a brief note. For a state to be an Intentional mental state certain conditions must be met. For Searle every Intentional state has a certain *aspectual shape*; this aspectual shape is part of its identity, this aspectual shape is part of what makes it the state that it is. Suppose that there are two states; my belief (when I am not thinking about it) that Washington, D.C. is the capital of USA and *myelination* of the axons in my central nervous system. Here both the states are unconscious but my belief that Washington, D.C. is the capital of USA is an unconscious intentional mental state and the *myelination* of the axons in my central nervous system is a non-conscious state; it doesn't contain any mental state. Intentional states represent their conditions of satisfaction under certain aspects. Here both the states, conscious and unconscious mental states, have intentional mental state and this intentional state has aspectual shape as its feature. This is the distinction and similarity between Consciousness, Unconsciousness and Non-conscious. In this regard Searle says that.

"There is a distinction between intrinsic intentionality and as-if intentionality; only intrinsic intentionality is genuinely mental. Unconscious intentional states are intrinsic. Intrinsic intentional states,

¹⁶⁵. Ibid, p. 152.

whether conscious or unconscious, always have aspectual shapes. The aspectual feature cannot be exhaustively or completely characterized solely in terms of third-person, behavioral, or even neurophysiological predicates. None of these is sufficient to give an exhaustive account of aspectual shape. But the ontology of unconscious mental states, at the time they are unconscious, consists entirely in the existence of purely neurophysiological phenomena. The notion of an unconscious intentional state is the notion of a state that is a possible conscious thought or experience. The ontology of the unconscious consists in objective features of the brain capable of causing subjective conscious thoughts. When we describe something as an unconscious intentional state, we are characterizing an objective ontology in virtue of its causal capacity to produce consciousness.”¹⁶⁶

This reference makes it clear what is going on in Searle’s mind. At the same time it makes easy our understanding of third and fourth propositions. Intentional states, whether conscious or unconscious, have aspectual shapes but at the level of the neurons there is no aspectual shape. The only fact about the neurobiological structures that corresponds to the ascription of intrinsic aspectual shape is the fact that the system has the causal capacity to produce conscious states and processes where those specific aspectual shapes are manifest. So consciousness is a feature or property of the brain in the sense that liquidity is a feature of water. Unconscious Intentional states also real because, like conscious states, they too have intrinsic aspectual shape which implies neurobiological processes. They imply the neurobiological processes because they only maintain my intentional mental states when I am not conscious of them. The future of my unconscious intentional mental states depends on purely neurobiological phenomena. Searle has strong reasons to believe this notion; for him the unconscious mental states imply the possible conscious mental states. It was not the subjective phenomenon which was sustaining the unconscious Intentional mental states when I was in deep sleep or in coma or in a state of anesthesia but it was the neurobiological phenomenon. That is why Searle says,

“The ontology of the unconscious is strictly the ontology of a neurophysiology capable of generating the conscious.”¹⁶⁷

¹⁶⁶. Ibid, P. 156-160.

¹⁶⁷. Ibid, p. 172.

Unconscious mental phenomena are sustaining purely as the objective features of the brain which is capable of causing conscious mental states. The neurobiological phenomena (the objective ontology) in virtue of its causal capacity produce consciousness. Conscious states exist in the brain in a causal mechanism and they are realized in the brain as the higher level or system features. For example, suppose that my conscious thoughts of my childhood friends are occurring in the brain, but, as far as we know scientifically, no single neuron can cause or realize thoughts of my childhood friends. Consciousness is a feature of the brain at a level higher than that of individual neurons. It is the neural structure or the combination of neurobiological structure which causes the mental states but not the single neuron.

“It seems mysterious because we do not know how the system of neurophysiology/consciousness works, and an adequate knowledge of how it works would remove the mystery.”¹⁶⁸

The whole phenomena, the lower level neurobiological processes and the higher level brain processes, *functions causally* as it was mentioned in previous paragraphs therefore the brain processes cause mental states by bottom up processes and they are right there in the brain. Without one causing the other there cannot be any mental phenomena. But, Searle says, we are still lacking the scientific explanation for the higher level brain processes. But the point is clear that there are no deep unconscious intentional states. All intentional mental states are conscious mental states. All our conscious states without exception are caused by neurobiological processes in the brain and they are realized in the brain as the higher level or system features. Finally, Searle says that if you expect the neurobiological solution to the problem of consciousness then it is so difficult and we don't yet know the answer; we know parts of the answer only. So on the basis of the present scientific development Searle tried to philosophize consciousness and the mental phenomena.

¹⁶⁸. Ibid, p. 102.

3.4.2. The Multiple Drafts Model Theory

Daniel Dennett, a well-known naturalist in contemporary philosophy of *Mind*, has put so much of efforts on *Consciousness Explained* to discuss how consciousness works as a natural phenomenon. His theory of consciousness is aimed to annihilate the dualistic approach of consciousness. The chief concern of *Consciousness Explained* is to introduce the scientific development in explaining mental phenomena to prove that consciousness is nothing but the processes of multiple neural impulses in the brain. Another chief concern is to remove the puzzles raised by dualists and some other philosophers related to consciousness. With this goal Dennett begins his theory by saying that *human Consciousness is just about the last surviving mystery* and it can be solved. Like consciousness there were many great mysteries in the world; as we have discussed in previous chapters the origin of the universe, the mystery of life and reproduction, the mysteries of time, space, gravity and so on were the mysterious things. Though we could not yet give final answer to any of these questions but they have been tamed by our scientific developments. Now it's time to eradicate the doubts on consciousness which are baffling us again and again. When we enter into his book *Consciousness Explained* there we do not find any definition of consciousness. Dennett did not define consciousness though he went on explaining how consciousness emerges and how it works. He has proceeded explaining consciousness without defining, what consciousness is; it shows how much strong he was on what he believes and at the same time he was in a state of belief that once the question, how consciousness works?, has been settled then that itself will define what consciousness is. That is why he did not define consciousness. Instead of going straight to the notion of consciousness Dennett has tried to approach it from another direction and questioned the basic things regarding consciousness.

*“What, then, is the mystery? What could be more obvious or certain to each of us than that he or she is a conscious subject of experience, an enjoyer of perceptions and sensations, a sufferer of pain, an entertainer of ideas, and a conscious deliberator? That seems undeniable, but what in the world can consciousness itself be? How can living physical bodies in the physical world produce such phenomena?”*¹⁶⁹

¹⁶⁹. Daniel C. Dennett, *Consciousness Explained* (New York: Back Bay Books/Little, Brown and Company, 1991), p. 25.

Dennett's approach to the problem of consciousness is firmly reductive and materialistic; he believes that the physical facts about the brain are sufficient to account for all of the facts about consciousness. But his opponents' main argument is how could my consciousness, my experience, my pain, my joy and all my mental phenomena be reduced to the combination of electrochemical processes in my brain? I too feel that way; is it just neuronal process in the brain or is there anything above that? Dennett believes that, like any other phenomena, consciousness too cannot be dealt with alone because it too works by depending on its related phenomena; like love and money consciousness is a phenomenon that depends, to a surprising extent, on its associated entities. Love has an elaborate biological base and the most significant features of money are related to social life in the same way consciousness as a mental phenomenon, even though it is purely known by the first-person subjective experience, has some base or involves other entities in understanding it. Let's see whether Dennett's notion of consciousness could solve the *Mind-Body* problem or will leave out crucial questions unanswered.

Consciousness, according to Dennett's naturalistic approach, is not only a phenomenon like love and money but it is also a kind of event that happens in our stomach or in our liver. The difference between conscious events and events in our limbs is that; brain events produce conscious events and events of the limbs cannot produce conscious events. Just as we are not aware of events in our limbs in the same way we are not aware of brain events but we are aware of the outcome of the brain events, that is, the mental phenomena. There is no agent in our limbs to determine or to witness the neurobiological process; in the same way there is no one in our brain to determine brain processes. While talking about conscious events Dennett says:

"Events in consciousness, on the other hand, are "by definition" witnessed; they are experienced by an experience, and their being thus experience is what makes them what they are: conscious events. An experienced event cannot just happen on its own hook, it seems; it must be somebody's experience. For a thought to happen, someone (some mind) must think it, and for a pain to happen, someone must feel it, and for a

*purple cow to burst into existence “in imagination,” someone must imagine it.”*¹⁷⁰

So conscious events are experienced or imagined by the conscious agent without this agent we cannot register any thought process or mental phenomena. Though his approach, in explaining consciousness, is absolute rejection of dualism but in respect of ‘conscious agent’ he could not go against the notion of Cartesian dualism that is “I think therefore I am.” We must be there to experience everything. While explaining how consciousness works Dennett gives a clue as to what consciousness must be:

*“For ourselves, it seems, consciousness is precisely what distinguishes us from mere “automate.” Mere bodily “reflexes” are “automatic” and mechanical; they may involve circuits in the brain, but do not require any intervention by the conscious mind. It is very natural to think of our own bodies as mere hand puppets of sorts that “we” control “from inside.” When we think of our minds this way, we seem to discover the “inner me,” the “real me.” This real me is not my brain; it is what owns my brain (“the self and its brain”).”*¹⁷¹

What is this *inner me* which holds my conscious mental phenomena? Naturally our brain processes act independently and not determined by any external or internal forces. In case of the *Self* or the *Soul* or the *Mind* every philosophical group has its own version of explanation. The dualist philosophers also set criteria to understand the notion of *inner me* because there must be someone to own the phenomena produced by brain processes. For the dualist the *inner me* is not different from the *Mind* stuff. That is why while talking about dualist notion of *Mind* Dennett says that those who believe on *Mind* stuff as a separate entity from the brain have to fulfill the following criteria.....

*“We have found four reasons for believing in mind stuff. The conscious mind, it seems, cannot just be the brain, or any proper part of it, because nothing in the brain could (1) be the medium in which the purple cow is rendered; (2) be the thinking thing, the I in “I think, therefore I am”; (3) appreciate wine, hate racism, love someone, be a source of mattering; (4) act with more responsibility. An acceptable theory of human consciousness must account for these four compelling grounds for thinking that there must be mind stuff.”*¹⁷²

¹⁷⁰. Ibid, p. 29.

¹⁷¹. Ibid, p. 32.

¹⁷². Ibid, p. 32.

The dualists seriously believe that human consciousness must account for these four claims. It seems that the dualists' principle is to expand the boundaries of mental phenomena and to try to ascribe the mental phenomena to a special kind of stuff. Dennett believes that the dualists cannot give any reasonable account for it. Therefore he respects the legitimacy of dualism. Dennett says; *how can mind stuff both elude all physical measurement and control the body?* For Dennett there is only one kind of stuff that is matter (the physical stuff) and the *Mind* is nothing but a physical phenomena. He believes that *anything that can move a physical thing is itself a physical thing*. He criticize the dualists' notion as it doesn't have any theory to explain how *Mind* works, by pushing *Mind* beyond the philosophical realm. He writes:

*"This fundamentally antiscientific stance of dualism is, to my mind, its most disqualifying feature, and is the reason why in this book I adopt the apparently dogmatic rule that dualism is to be avoided at all costs."*¹⁷³

Thus, from Dennett's point of view, accepting dualism is like giving up explaining consciousness. At the same time we should be rational to accept that no account could satisfy others in explaining mental phenomena. For Dennett, however, Cartesian dualism is far from obvious because there is no single point in the brain where the information funnels in, where it all comes together for central processing. He discarded the role of the function of central processing. He suggests that we need to stop thinking of brain as if it had a single functional summit or central point.

The study of human consciousness in general recognizes the mental phenomena as subjective. But Dennett rejects this approach. If you ask Dennett; whether phenomenological items are really events in the brain? Dennett says, yes. He believes that consciousness can be studied objectively because people are the objects of scientific study but we need to have a right method to study these objects. Since we do not have a proper method to study consciousness we are simply ascribing it to some entity which does not exist at all. In this process he has come up with a new method and termed it as

¹⁷³. Ibid, p. 37.

*Heterophenomenological*¹⁷⁴ method which consists of applying the scientific method with an anthropological bent; it is a way of interpreting behavior (including the internal behavior of the brains, etc.). The notion of Heterophenomenology is the main principle of Dennett and it plays key role in explaining consciousness. For Dennett Heterophenomenology means phenomenology of *another* not oneself; its approach in the study of conscious mental states, from a third person point of view as contrasted with the first person point of view. Though Dennett wanted to include subjective and objective methods in the study of consciousness, he was skeptical about the reliability of first-person ascriptions of conscious experience. Since he is skeptical about the subjective experiences and beliefs, he thought of including other methods in studying consciousness. Inclusion of subjective and objective methods could become strong base for his method of Heterophenomenology. This method neither challenges nor accepts the assertions of subjects as entirely true but maintains constructive and sympathetic neutrality with the hope of compiling a definitive description of the world according to the subject. It remains neutral with regard to the debates about subjective versus objective approaches of phenomenology and the physical or nonphysical reality of phenomenological items.

Heterophenomenology combines the subject's self-report with all other available evidence to determine their mental state and how the subjects see the world him- or herself. The Heterophenomenological method work like this; *“whatever the subject believes to be true is about his or her conscious experience enables us to compose a catalogue. This beliefs fleshes out the subject's Heterophenomenological world, the world according to subject—the subjective world of one subject—not to be confused with the real world. The total set of details of Heterophenomenology, plus all the data we can gather about concurrent events in the brains' of subjects and in the surrounding environment, comprise the total data set for a theory of human Consciousness. It leaves out no*

¹⁷⁴. Ibid, p. 66.

objective phenomena and no subjective phenomena of Consciousness."¹⁷⁵ Dennett says that the tactic of neutrality is only a temporary way station on the path to devising and confirming an empirical theory that could in principle vindicate the subject. As I mentioned he is skeptical about the beliefs of first-person assertions that led him to study consciousness with the combination of first-person and third-person point of views. Dennett believes that once the subjective and objective methods are combined in studying consciousness there will not be any gaps or obstacles in reaching first-person conscious mental states.

According to Dennett there are four data forms that comprise a person's conscious experience and his introspection about said experiences. 1. *Conscious experiences themselves* 2. *Beliefs about these experiences* 3. *'Verbal judgments' expressing these beliefs* and 4. *Utterances of one sort or another*. These four data forms can be constructed purely on the basis of first-person subjective point of view. What subjects believe themselves to be experiencing will be there as data for the study of consciousness but not conscious experiences themselves. *Beliefs about these experiences* will be taken as the data in Heterophenomenology. At the same time he opposes the notion that scientists alone can study *conscious experiences themselves*. Dennett argues that the subjects don't have any way of *seeing* (with inner eye) the processes that govern their assertions but that doesn't stop the subjects from having their own opinions to express and to believe. Once these beliefs are conjoined with other data then the study of consciousness is achieved. For Dennett Heterophenomenological data/objects are, like centers of gravity or the Equator, *abstracta*, not *concreta*. They are not idle fantasies but hardworking theorists' fictions. In explaining the method of Heterophenomenology he includes on the one hand his theory of Objectivity and intentional stance, phenomenology on the other hand. His neutral method for investigating and describing mental phenomena involves extracting and purifying texts from speaking subjects and use those texts to generate the subject's Heterophenomenological world. This Heterophenomenological

¹⁷⁵. *The Oxford Companion to Consciousness*, Edit. Tim Bayne, Axel Cleeremans, Partick Vilken (New York: Oxford University Press, 2009), p. 345.

world is populated with all the images, events, sounds, smells, hunches, presentiments, and feelings that the subject sincerely believes to exist in his stream of consciousness. As a neutral method Heterophenomenology represents *what it is like to be that subject* – in the subject's own terms. The objective facts about someone's subjectivity are precisely the subject matter of what is called Heterophenomenology.

Up to here I have discussed Dennett's method of Heterophenomenology, which includes in it the method of intentional stance, objectivity and some other related concepts. Now it's time to enter in to his argument for consciousness against to dualistic approach. To avoid the notion of a central processing unit Dennett introduced a new model; the *Multiple Draft Model*. According to this method mental phenomena exist and these mental phenomena can be studied by science which goes against to the dualistic notion that mental events cannot be studied by science. Contrary to this method, Thomas Nagel says that there are things about the world, about the life and about ourselves but these things cannot be adequately understood from objective point of view; he further adds that if we try to give complete account of the world from the objective point of view, then it may detach us from the reality and leads to false reductions. The main criticism is that such a theory is impossible because that theory will have to be constructed from the third-person point of view, as the whole science is constructed from that perspective. But Dennett accepts this challenge to construct a theory of mental events by using data that scientific method permits.

When we enter in to the notion of Multiple Drafts Model the first question that arises is: is there a single point in the brain where all information funnels in? Dennett's answer is no; because he believes that there is no single point in the brain to where all impulse passes. He says that we are not far away from knowing what is going on in neurobiological level; the input and output can be mapped to a certain extent. When we have a sensation, then respective sense organ sends impulses to the relevant part of the brain and then nerves send impulses back to senses to act accordingly. This method is

developed to prove that dualism is wrong and there is no central processing unit in the brain. As I have discussed in the second chapter, it was Descartes who introduced the notion of the central point (*pineal gland*) in explaining consciousness and believed that the central point serves as the gateway to the conscious *Mind*. For Descartes it is the only organ in the brain that processes the information gathered from the senses. According to Descartes for a person to be conscious of something, impulses from the senses had to arrive at pineal gland, where it immediately causes a special transaction to occur between the person's material brain and immaterial *Mind*. According to this, there is a crucial finish line in the brain where the order of arrival equals the order of presentation in experience because what happens there is what you are conscious of. But Dennett says that the functional role of pineal gland is quite mysterious and it is unclear what the pineal gland does. The theory of a centered locus in the brain for the mind's point of view is named by Dennett as *Cartesian materialism*; He further says that.

*"Descartes's ghostly res cogitans is discarded, there is no longer a role for a centralized gateway, or indeed for any functional center to the brain. The pineal gland is not only not the fax machine to the Soul, it is also not the Oval Office of the brain, and neither are any of the other portions of the brain. The brain is Headquarters, the place where the ultimate observer is, but there is no reason to believe that the brain itself has any deeper headquarters, any inner sanctum, arrival at which is the necessary or sufficient condition for conscious experience. In short, there is no observer inside the brain."*¹⁷⁶

Dennett is very critical about the notion of pineal gland which he named as *Cartesian Theatre*. The Cartesian Theater is a metaphorical picture of how conscious experience must sit in the brain. One of the most important tasks of Dennett in *Consciousness Explained* is to demolish the *Cartesian Theatre* model of consciousness. For him there is no deeper headquarters in the brain; instead he believes that the brain itself is the headquarters. He further argues it as an outdated view of consciousness and it should be rejected along with dualism. The most fundamental idea of Cartesian dualism is that a conscious *Mind* is that it cannot be separated from a point of view – a point from which *input* can be considered and from which *output* can be preceded. At the end of this discussion Dennett says that.

¹⁷⁶. Ibid, p. 106.

“We must stop thinking of the brain as if it had such a single functional summit or central point. This is not an innocuous shortcut; it’s a bad habit. In order to break this bad habit of thought, we need to explore some instances of the bad habit in action, but we also need a good image with which to replace it.”¹⁷⁷

Dennett believes that the idea of pineal gland in the brain has spoilt our attempts in explaining consciousness. If Cartesian materialism is true or if there is a special brain area that stored the contents of conscious experience, then it should be possible to ascertain exactly when something enters conscious experience. So such a special center in the brain is neurologically implausible. Instead, to avoid the failures of Cartesian materialism, Dennett introduced an idea according to which the cognitive processing is spread throughout the brain, there is no specific region containing all and only the information we are consciously aware of.

“According to the Multiple Drafts model, all varieties of perception – indeed, all varieties of thought or mental activity – are accomplished in the brain by parallel, multitrack processes of interpretation and elaboration of sensory inputs. Information entering the nervous system is under continuous “editorial revision.”¹⁷⁸

The cognition process in Multiple Drafts Model has different stages of discriminations and it is a continuous process. There is no single stream of consciousness because there is no central Headquarters, no Cartesian Theater where ‘*it all comes together*’ for the scrutiny. In this continuous process the sensory input will be under continuous discrimination in every stage. Once the information content is fixed, there is no need of sending it somewhere to be rediscriminated by some master discriminator. There are multiple channels in which specialist circuits try, in parallel processes, to do their various things, creating Multiple Drafts as they go. It completely avoids the mistakes of supposing that there must be a single narrative. As soon as discrimination in each stage is accomplished, the knowledge of that particular sensation is reached and that input will be available for eliciting a behavior. Most of these fragmentary drafts of “narrative” play short-lived roles in the modulation of current activity but some get promoted to further functional roles, in swift succession. Different stages of the input processing occur in

¹⁷⁷. Ibid, p. 111.

¹⁷⁸. Ibid, p. 111.

different places of the brain and different parts of the neural processing assert more or less control at different times. The neural impulses move through different parts of the brain, as there is no central processing unit. The distributed content-fixations in the brain are precisely locatable in both space and time, but their onsets do not mark the onset of consciousness of their content. This stream of contents is like a narrative because of its multiplicity; at any point in time there are multiple “drafts” of narrative fragments at various stages of editing in various places in the brain. The stream of content discrimination in every stage is based on a principle that *cause must precede the effect*; multiple Drafts Model theory’s multiple distributed processes editorial work of the brain is accomplished on the basis of this principle. The Multiple Drafts are composed by processes of content fixation playing various semi-independent roles in the brain’s larger economy of controlling a human body’s journey through life.

*“Visual stimuli evoke trains of events in the cortex that gradually yield discriminations of greater and greater specificity. At different times and different places, various “decisions” or “judgments” are made; more literally, parts of the brain are caused to go into states that discriminate different features, e.g., first mere onset of stimulus, then location, then shape, later color (in a different pathway), later still (apparent) motion, and eventually object recognition. These localized discriminative states transmit effects to other places, contributing to further discriminations, and so forth.”*¹⁷⁹

According to this method all these trains of events in neural processing do not reach or need not to reach together in any particular time and place to produce a conscious state of a particular sensation. It is continuous process and some processes have short time life and some other have long time survival, it depends on its role in producing a particular conscious state. Dennett says that.

*“Some of these distributed contentful states soon die out, leaving no further traces. Others do leave traces on subsequent verbal reports of experience and memory, on “semantic readiness” and other varieties of perceptual set, on emotional state, behavioral proclivities, and so forth. Some of these effects – for instance, influences on subsequent verbal reports – are at least symptomatic of consciousness. But there is no one place in the brain through which all these causal trains must pass in order to deposit their content “in consciousness.”*¹⁸⁰

¹⁷⁹. Ibid, p. 134.

¹⁸⁰. Ibid, p. 135.

Whatever Dennett is talking about events at neural level is purely having scientific base but whether that scientific base is sufficient for explaining consciousness is a big question. As Dennett say, neural phenomena is a multitrack process and occurs over hundreds of milliseconds, during which time various additions, incorporations, emendations, and overwriting of content can occur, in various orders. In this process it produces an understanding of the content carried by neural process. How a thought process will have a continuous editorial process before assertion or belief formation, parallel to this the content of neural processes editing will be going on. The way our thought process changes its content by leaving the previous content or enter in to another content on the basis of present content, the content of neural process also die somewhere or the present neural content become base for further neural content; this process proceeds on causal principle. In this regard Dennett says:

“Contents arise, get revised, contribute to the interpretation of other contents or to the modulation of behavior (verbal and otherwise), and in the process leave their traces in memory, which then eventually decay or get incorporated into or overwritten by later contents, wholly or in part. This skein of contents is only rather like a narrative because of its multiplicity; at any point in time there are multiple drafts of narrative fragments at various stages of editing in various places in the brain.”¹⁸¹

The method Dennett has chosen to explain indicates that consciousness cannot have any abstract level of reality but can be reduced to neuronal process. I am not sure whether Dennett will agree with the notion of reduction but the way he explained the qualia indicates that he does not agree. According to Dennett there are no qualia; he means to say that mental states do not have intrinsic, ineffable properties distinct from the functional roles they play, instead he says that these functional dispositions are sufficient to account for all of the claimed facts about qualia, including their supposed ineffability. The way he explains qualia as indistinguishable from functional roles, in the same way he might say that there is no need of reducing conscious mental phenomena into neuronal process because these two cannot be seen separately. Qualia are replaced by the complex dispositional states of the brain and qualia are neither more nor less than dispositional properties of cognition.

¹⁸¹. Ibid, p. 135.

It is a purely neural mechanism of evolution that designed our *Mind*. As Dennett believes, the notion of conscious *Mind* is the product of three successive evolutionary processes; genetic evolution, phenotypic plasticity, and memetic evolution. In course of evolution for thousand years we are with the present state of the conscious *Mind* but it was not the same case when evolution began. In this evolution process each state vastly swifter and more powerful than its predecessor. These three evolutionary processes have contributed a lot to the design of human consciousness. As it is discussed in the Multiple Drafts Model theory that some neural processes have short-lived roles and some other have long-lived roles, these short-lived and long-lived roles play crucial role in his theory and shows its impact on consciousness. That is why he believes that one of the striking features of consciousness is its discontinuity. The discontinuity of consciousness is striking because of the apparent continuity of consciousness. Dennett claims that his theory of consciousness is unique in being able to get rid of the old dualistic notion about consciousness which made explaining consciousness impossible. He himself says what he could do by this new method.

*“I haven’t replaced a metaphorical theory, the Cartesian theater, with a nonmetaphorical (“literal, scientific”) theory. All I have done, really, is to replace one family of metaphors and images with another, trading in the Theater, the witness, the Central Meaner, the Figment, for Software, Virtual Machines, Multiple Drafts, a Pandemonium of Homunculi. It’s just a war of metaphors, you say—but metaphors are not “just” metaphors; metaphors are the tools of thought. No one can think about consciousness without them.”*¹⁸²

So metaphors are the real tools which helped in explaining consciousness and he indicates that without metaphors we can build nothing in philosophy. So we should be equipped with the best set of tools in explaining consciousness. As I have discussed in the beginning, he didn’t define what consciousness is but in the last chapters of his book, *Consciousness Explained*, he questioned the mystery and says that there is no mystery at all since mystery exists because of our prejudices or because of the way of our thinking about it. The notion of two entities; *that there are the things that have Consciousness and the things that don’t have it* is the deepest error in consciousness studies. He believes that the way solids and liquids and gases can be explained in terms of things that are not

¹⁸². Ibid, p. 455.

themselves solids or liquids or gases, in the same way consciousness can be explained surely by the neuronal processes of the brain, which are not conscious. Another important thing is that, according to his method the gap between phenomenology and physiology shrinks. We see that some of the obvious features of phenomenology are not real at all. There is no filling in with figment, no intrinsic qualia, no central fount of meaning and action, and no magic place where the understanding happens. In fact, there is no Cartesian Theater. But his only appeal is that, if you want to explain consciousness through Multiple Drafts Model then you need to be neutral in describing the data.

Another most important thing in Multiple Drafts Model is the role of *Self*. For thousands of years socially and philosophically we have been maintaining the *Soul/Mind* as a distinct entity from the body. In ancient times the *Soul*, *Mind* and the *Self* were treated as different entities but in later philosophical developments the gap between these entities disappeared. The *Soul* and the *Mind* have been reduced to consciousness and the *Self* has become the carrier of the identity of that conscious agent. *Self* is being treated as the ruler of the body but, for Dennett, *Self* is not our boss and not a internal observer. It is our brain that generates our *self* representations.

*“Selves are not independently existing soul-pearls, but artifacts of the social processes that create us, and, like other such artifacts, subject to sudden shifts in status. The only “momentum” that accrues to the trajectory of a self, or a club, is the stability imparted to it by the web of beliefs that constitute it, and when those beliefs lapse, it lapses, either permanently or temporarily.”*¹⁸³

For Dennett the *Self* is a construction created by the brain out of web of words and deeds. A *Self* is an abstraction defined by the myriads of attributions and interpretations (including self-attribution and self-interpretations) that have composed the biography of the living body whose Center of Narrative Gravity it is;

1. It is we who define ourselves by telling stories to ourselves and others about who we are.
2. It is through narratives we express our experiences to ourselves and others.

¹⁸³. Ibid, p. 423.

3. It is our narratives that are the life-blood of the illusion we call the *Self*.

It is not that we sit down and figure out what narratives to tell others but rather there are projections of the *Self* in our day to day activities; it is the product of the stories we tell. The *Self* is a fiction and created by my brain but not by me. Acting in consort over the years with my parents, siblings and friends, it is our web of beliefs that make up our self. ‘What you are’ is that agent whose life you can tell about. It is the brain processes do the thinking and telling. Dennett thus takes the materialist position that matter is the one stuff that things are made of. While talking about the selves of other animals, Dennett says:

*“Our human environment contains not just food and shelter, enemies to fight or flee, and conspecifics with whom to mate, but words, words, words. These words are potent elements of our environment that we readily incorporate, ingesting and extruding them, weaving them like spiderwebs into self-protective strings of narrative.”*¹⁸⁴

Language plays the key role in constructing the *Self* and its beliefs and experiences. The language constitutes *what it is like to be that Self*. He sees our brains as information processing systems. According to this Multiple Drafts Model theory we have a biological *Self*; the biological *Self* is the principle of organization. Dennett says that we are the authors of our mental processes and thus constitute our Selves. The *Self*, whatever it is, would be invisible under a microscope, and invisible to introspection, too. *Self* will exist as long as consciousness exists; consciousness exists, but not independently of behavior and behavioral disposition, which can be studied through Heterophenomenology. The main thrust of Dennett theory is to apply a widely accepted thesis about the relation between *Mind* and brain – non-homuncular¹⁸⁵ functionalism – in a program of philosophical therapy to rub away a variety of puzzles raised by both philosophers and experimentalists about consciousness. The most extreme variety of homuncularism is the dualist ghost in the machine: no matter how good an explanation of mental function you may produce in terms of brain processes, a committed dualist will complain that it is incomplete because it fails to explain that aspect of mentality which is non-physical. If someone offers a functional account of natural language understanding, for example, a

¹⁸⁴. Ibid, p. 417.

¹⁸⁵. A homuncular theory is one that proceeds to explain some cognitive (conscious) ability or process by first producing some functional analysis that appears to make progress for a time, but then, when things get messy, simply invents an internal agent – a homunculus – which turns out to have all the abilities that needed explaining in the first place.

homuncular dualist will insist that in addition to all of that (whatever it may be), there must be a creature in the middle of it all that has the real understanding, namely the *Mind*.

3.4.3. The Hard problem of Consciousness

David Chalmers, another contemporary philosopher of *Mind*, argues for consciousness as a separate entity from physical entity. Dennett says that science can explain consciousness but Chalmers says that consciousness is probably the largest outstanding obstacle in our quest for a scientific understanding of the universe. Even though both are naturalist philosophers but I feel that their approach of consciousness goes in an opposite direction. While discussing Chalmers's notion of consciousness simultaneously I will be discussing the similarities and differences between Chalmers and other naturalist philosophers. At present most of the philosophers, in philosophy of *Mind*, are predominantly reductionists but against to this view Chalmers maintains that consciousness can only be understood within a non-reductionist science of the *Mind*. Actually we do not just lack a detailed theory of consciousness; we are in the dark about what a theory of consciousness would even look like. But we need not search for any epistemic or scientific evidences to prove that consciousness exists. In this regard he says that,

*"The problem of consciousness lies uneasily at the border of science and philosophy. I would say that it is properly a scientific subject matter: it is a natural phenomenon like motion, life, and cognition, and calls out for explanation in the way that these do. But it is not open to investigation by the usual scientific methods."*¹⁸⁶

Though he says that consciousness is the subject matter of science but his way of explaining it goes beyond the boundaries of scientific understanding. Chalmers believes that materialism has failed to account for consciousness in the universe. All naturalist philosophers believe that everything in the world can be reductively explained. Chalmers believes reductivist methods ultimately fail. For him a science of consciousness has to be

¹⁸⁶. David J. Chalmers, *The Conscious Mind* (USA: Oxford University Press, 1996), p. xi.

non-reductive because the mental phenomena cannot be subjected to the crude methods of reduction.

What consciousness is? In answer to this question, Chalmers says that my perception, my thinking, and my acting have distinct experienced quality. There is a causation and information-processing in all aspects of my cognition and thinking. In this processing there is an internal aspect; there is something it feels like to be a cognitive agent. This internal aspect, according to Chalmers, is conscious experience. He calls this inner conscious experience the inner life of the *Mind*; the subjective quality of experience: *qualia*. For Chalmers,

*“A mental state is conscious if it has a qualitative feel—an associated quality of experience. These qualitative feels are also known as phenomenal qualities, or qualia for short. The problem of explaining these phenomenal qualities is just the problem of explaining consciousness.”*¹⁸⁷

We have to be very careful while dealing with his definition of consciousness. Chalmers is not dealing with the definition of consciousness the way it was dealt by Dennett. In his whole explanation Dennett didn't define what consciousness is, but Chalmers wants to give a clear definition of consciousness. When he talk about consciousness he meant to say that he is only talking about the subjective quality of experience: *what it is like to be a cognitive agent*. A mental state is a conscious state; with this notion there is no difference among philosophers. But differing one with another occurs when we ascribe it to something else. Some materialist and naturalists like Dennett says that it is nothing but the neural processes in the brain which is against to the dualists' view. But Chalmers differ with Dennett and other naturalist philosophers' in the characterization of consciousness and says that there is a phenomenal state above the psychophysical states where the states of consciousness or the states of conscious experiences take place and that those state are not reachable to the third-person point of view; they exist just because we feel them, our experience of consciousness enables to know that we are conscious. The way Descartes tried to explain the existence of *I* by his statement that *I think therefore I am*, in the same way Chalmers too says that there can be nothing in the *Mind*,

¹⁸⁷. Ibid, p. 4.

in so far as it is a thinking thing, of which it is not aware, this seems to be self-evident. According to Chalmers conscious mental states are always accompanied by awareness, but awareness need not to be accompanied by consciousness. For example, one can be aware of a fact without any particular associated phenomenal experience. It may be possible to constrain the notion of awareness so that it turns out to be coextensive with phenomenal consciousness, or nearly so.

There are conscious experiences in our world and there are features of the world over and above the physical features. The facts about the conscious experience in our world are further facts over and above the physical facts and materialism is false because it failed to talk about the phenomenal reality. Our grounds for belief in consciousness or conscious experience derive solely from our own experience of it. As Descartes said that my knowledge of consciousness comes from my own case but not from any external observation. So consciousness as a first-person experience has mysterious subjective experience. Although conscious states play various causal roles, these conscious states cannot be defined by their causal roles. Here we are not talking about the functional roles of conscious states but what makes these states as conscious states, which has a certain phenomenal feel and this feel is not something that can be functionally defined away. That is why we should not characterize consciousness as a functional property. Since consciousness has different set of properties the study of consciousness requires a different set of laws. The materialist scientific world view cannot provide different set of laws, so Chalmers opposes materialism. Chalmers's final argument for consciousness is that a theory of consciousness should be non-reductive. How a non-reductive theory addresses the problem of consciousness will be the main theme of this section. Whatever Chalmers is arguing for seems a kind of dualistic approach to consciousness. Even Chalmers himself agrees that it's a form of dualism that is *property dualism*.

"Conscious experience involves properties of an individual that are not entailed by the physical properties of that individual, although they may depend lawfully on those properties. Consciousness is a feature of the world over and above the physical features of the world. This is not to say it is a separate "substance"—the issue of what it would take to constitute a dualism of substances seems quite unclear to me. All we know is that

there are properties of individuals in this world—the phenomenal properties—that are ontologically independent of physical properties.”¹⁸⁸

For Chalmers there are no two types of substances; instead there is only one substance but that substance has two separate sets of properties, one is physical and the other one is mental. The physical property includes the brain and its cognitive processes and the mental property is just a conscious state. Though there are other varieties of property dualism but Chalmers property dualism is different and unique. The property dualism that he advocates invokes fundamentally new features of the world. When he speaks of property dualism it doesn't mean that he is talking about physical properties. Every individual has phenomenal properties in this world and these phenomenal properties of the conscious *Mind* are ontologically independent of physical properties. To understand clearly what a phenomenal property is, we need to enter into the discussion of Qualia.

Qualia are the subjective phenomenal experiences. Without knowing qualia moving further will make our quest for understanding of consciousness difficult. It is called as the phenomenal experience of a subject because the conscious experience or the phenomenal state only has access to the first-person. Only the subjects can have access to its own qualitative feel. There is another version of explaining consciousness based on three principles through which we can have access from third-person point of view but that will be discussed later. Here I am just discussing about the subjective experience. Explaining qualia is explaining consciousness because without consciousness qualia is impossible. The phenomenal character of an experience is what it is like subjectively undergo the experience. To be conscious is synonymous with *to have qualia* or *to have subjective experience*. The notion of qualia is seriously debated because it is central to a proper understanding of the nature of consciousness. But neither materialism nor reductionism could explain consciousness because neither reductionism could provide full account of conscious experience nor is materialism in a position to reach the details of consciousness. Chalmers's main argument against to the possibility of functionalistic reductionism is that we know about the existence of qualia because we are directly aware

¹⁸⁸. Ibid, p.110.

of them. If it was not the case then just by examining the brain processes we would never be in a position to infer such things as qualia. Even though the subjective experience has physical base but it cannot be explained by the functional organization of the physical medium. Though subjective experience has physical base but it doesn't matter in explaining phenomenal state. What matters is *the brain's abstract causal organization*. The functional organization is best understood as the abstract pattern of causal interaction between various parts of a system, and perhaps between these parts and external inputs and outputs. Chalmers believe that we cannot explain consciousness by any of the existing patterns; the study of consciousness requires a different set of laws, just because consciousness has a different set of properties.

For a better understanding of consciousness Chalmers introduced a division and it is different from the earlier divisions. He divides the *Mind* itself into two separate categories; phenomenal and psychological, both are real and distinct aspects of *Mind*. According to him every mental property is either a phenomenal property or a psychological property; "*phenomenal concepts deal with the first-person aspects of the Mind and the psychological concepts deal with the third-person aspects.*"¹⁸⁹ Along with these two there is one more category which is the combination of both phenomenal and psychological; since it includes both we should not treat it as third category. In a simple way we can say that the mental states which are accessible to the third-person come under psychological aspect and those do not have access to third-person will come under phenomenal aspect. But ultimately the psychological and the phenomenal together constitute the central aspects of the *Mind*. That is why Chalmers says,

"It is a fact about the human mind that whenever some phenomenal property is instantiated, some corresponding psychological property is instantiated. Conscious experience does not occur in a vacuum. It is always tied to cognitive processing, and it is likely that in some sense it arises from that processing. Whenever one has a sensation, for instance, there is some information-processing going on: a corresponding perception, if you like. Similarly, whenever one has the conscious

¹⁸⁹. Ibid, p. 16.

experience of happiness, the functional role associated with happiness is generally being played by some internal state."¹⁹⁰

Even though the phenomenal and the psychological aspects of the *Mind* have different properties, though we use different methods to constitute their aspects but they are not opposite to each other. A third-person need to be in his phenomenal state to approach the psychological aspects of others and a first-person need to have base on psychological state to have his own phenomenal state. We can say that they are inter-dependent; we can say that there is an invariable relation between phenomenal and psychological aspects of *Mind*. But the notion of *two concepts of Mind* separates the study of cognition from the study of consciousness because Chalmers believes that these two can be studied separately. The phenomenal state of *Mind* is consciously experienced mental state and the psychophysical state of *Mind* is a causal or explanatory basis for behavior; a state is mental in this sense if it plays the right sort of causal role in producing behavior or play appropriate role in explaining behavior. Once the psychological and phenomenal facts about an individual are fixed then all the mental facts about that person are also fixed. That is why after explaining them separately Chalmers again tried to explain the relation between these two properties. Chalmers says that,

*"On one side, the content of conscious experiences are closely related to the contents of our cognitive states. Whenever one has a green sensation, individuated phenomenally, one has a corresponding green perception, individuated psychologically. On the other side, much cognitive activity can be centered on conscious experience. We know about our experiences, and make judgments about them; as I write this, a great deal of my thought is being devoted to consciousness. These relations between consciousness and cognition are not arbitrary and capricious, but systematic."*¹⁹¹

Chalmers believes that a systematic study of consciousness and cognition, in which sense they are related and in which sense they are separated, provides so much of information for the better theory of consciousness. As it is mentioned already, the notion of cognition has a central place in conscious experience and it plays a key role in conscious experience because it is through cognition that we get a handle on consciousness in the first place. We should be very careful in one important thing that when he talks about the

¹⁹⁰. Ibid, p. 20.

¹⁹¹. Ibid, p.160.

psychological aspect of *Mind*, he refers only to the psychological aspects of consciousness or awareness. But Chalmers main concern is not about psychological consciousness but phenomenal consciousness. That is why we should be very clear that whenever he talks about consciousness it means that he is only talking about phenomenal consciousness but not psychological consciousness. There is a strong reason for Chalmers to believe that consciousness means only phenomenal consciousness. For him, consciousness is an irreducible mental property (similar to physical properties like time, mass, and space) that exist at a fundamental level and cannot be understood as the sum of its parts. But psychological properties are reducible to cognitive processes. If Chalmers's notion of consciousness refers to psychological consciousness then it can be reducible. Once consciousness is reducible then his whole theory will collapse. So his concern is only about phenomenal consciousness which is irreducible.

Both, psychological and phenomenal, properties are very important in explaining consciousness that is why we should not treat them as opposite properties. There is no deep further aspect over and above these two. The fundamental basis of a theory of consciousness will be a set of psychophysical laws governing the relationship between consciousness and physical processes. Since I am talking about the fundamental link between the psychological and phenomenal properties, I think it is right time to discuss Chalmers's notion of *supervenience*. Because these psychophysical laws will explain how consciousness supervenes on physical and will tell us what sort of experience will be associated with different sorts of physical process. But, how can we discover the psychophysical laws that will constitute a theory of consciousness? If we want to develop a theory of consciousness as it supervenes naturally on the physical, then we have to focus on the relation between phenomenal property and psychological property which is constituted by cognitive structure. In this process many lawful relations between conscious experience and cognition can provide much of what we need to get a theory of consciousness. What is supervenience? According to Chalmers supervenience is a dependence relation between two properties. Even though we have made a significant advance in our quest to understand *Mind-Body* problem still there are long pending

questions to be answered. Does consciousness naturally supervene on the physical? Chalmers says that,

*“It remains plausible, however, that consciousness arises from a physical basis, even though it is not entailed by that basis. The position we are left with is that consciousness arises from a physical substrate in virtue of certain contingent laws of nature, which are not themselves implied by physical laws.”*¹⁹²

The notion of supervenience has come up because of our failure in explaining consciousness based on physical properties. The reason is that even after explaining the whole physical system scientifically and cognitively still there remains a question to be answered; how does this physical system can have phenomenal properties? If we deal directly, like Descartes, with the phenomenal properties still we have to face a question; how do you construct a relation between mental and physical? To avoid this problem Chalmers introduced the notion of supervenience. Supervenience is metaphysical in character and independent of the problem of consciousness. Since it is metaphysical in character its explanation has become mysterious. Explaining how the mental phenomena supervene on the physical structure or processes is the main task.

*“Supervenience is a relation between two sets of properties: B-properties—intuitively, the high-level properties—and A-properties, which are the more basic low-level properties.”*¹⁹³

Supervenience can be used to develop a theory in precise way in which the phenomenal depends on the physical. Based on some *possible situations* Chalmers distinguishes *supervenience* into different categories. *Local supervenience* is about individuals' possible situations; according to this any two possible individuals that instantiate the same A-properties instantiate the same B-properties. *Global supervenience* is about entire world; according to this there are no two possible worlds identical with respect to their A-properties but differing with respect to their B-properties. *Logical supervenience* is about logical possibility; according to this no two logically possible situations are identical with respect to their A-properties but distinct with respect to their B-properties. Something is logically possible iff it is conceivable. *Natural supervenience* is about the natural possibility; according to this any two naturally possible situations with the same A-

¹⁹². Ibid, p.111.

¹⁹³. Ibid, p. 30.

properties have the same B-properties. Something is naturally possible iff it is consistent with the laws of nature that hold in the actual world. If one can explain consciousness in terms of physical functioning then one must establish that it is logically supervenient. But Chalmers argue that nearly everything in the world except phenomenal consciousness is globally logically supervenient on the physical. For him consciousness is naturally supervenient on the physical.

“It is not clear that consciousness is logically supervenient on physical properties, however. It seems logically possible, at least to many, that a creature physically identical to a conscious creature might have no conscious experiences at all, or that it might have conscious experiences of a different kind. (some dispute this, but I use it for now only as an illustration.) If so, then conscious experience supervenes naturally but not logically on the physical. The necessary connection between physical structure and experience is ensured only by the laws of nature, and not by any logical or conceptual force.”¹⁹⁴

On the basis of this reference it is clear that, for Chalmers, consciousness is not logically but naturally supervenience on physical. Natural supervenience occurs when two sets of properties are systematically and precisely correlated in the natural world. One important thing here to remember is that logical supervenience implies natural supervenience but not vice-versa. There is no way for consciousness not to arise in our universe, given our physical laws and our universe's initial conditions. The psychological states can be explained scientifically and logically because there we can apply the causal mechanism but phenomenal states cannot be defined by the causal roles that they play. It follows that explaining causal role is not sufficient for explaining consciousness. It doesn't mean that we cannot explain consciousness; Chalmers says that it cannot be explained the way the physical science explains everything by its reductionist model.

For Chalmers supervenience law is a fundamental law. He says that sometimes we cannot give explanation for fundamental laws. We cannot explain natural supervenience the way we can explain logical supervenience. Logical supervenience will be explained based on certain rules but natural supervenience is an exception. How a physical

¹⁹⁴. Ibid, p. 34.

configuration gives rise to experience cannot be explained with fundamental physical laws, we cannot find any connection how it works. Finally he believes that things simply happen in accordance with the law but beyond a certain point physical laws cannot explain anything.

*“Consciousness is not logically supervenient on the physical, so we cannot claim that a physical or functional explanation implicitly involves consciousness, or that consciousness inherits explanatory relevance by logically supervening on the properties involved in such an explanation. A physical or functional explanation of behavior is independent of consciousness in a much stronger sense. It can be given in terms that do not even imply the existence of conscious experience. Consciousness is conceptually independent of what goes into the explanation of our claims and judgments about consciousness.”*¹⁹⁵

Though there are different versions of materialist explanations, these could not succeed in explaining consciousness with their methods. According to Chalmers consciousness cannot be explained reductively but might be non-reductively explained in terms of further laws of nature. When Chalmers started explaining consciousness there was only one problem that is explanatory problem. But the division between phenomenal and psychological has the effect of dividing *Mind-Body* problem into two categories based on their accessibility; easy problem and hard problem. By explaining physical and computational functioning of a conscious system we can solve the problems of psychological consciousness. But by solving it we will not be free from the problem. The real problem arises from phenomenal consciousness. After explaining the whole system still there will be a question; why the system has conscious experiences? It is phenomenal consciousness which constitutes *the hard problem* but not the psychological consciousness; the phenomenal consciousness that is central.

Entering into the hard problem of consciousness without knowing what the easy problem is may create some confusion in defining it. Easy problem of consciousness is a notion of what Artificial Intelligence researchers and neuroscientists do in their laboratories: figuring out how matter, be it microprocessors and memory chips or neurons

¹⁹⁵. Ibid, p.166.

and glial cells, can be arranged in such a way that conscious behavior emerges. Chalmers says that they are only concerned with explaining cognitive abilities and functions of reports on internal state which is called as reportability. To explain internal access, we need to explain how a system could be appropriately affected by its internal states and use information about those states in directing later processes. To explain integration and control we need to explain how a system's central processes can bring information contents together and use them in the facilitation of various behaviors. These are the problems in explaining functions. Chalmers also believe that neurophysiological and cognitive modeling can give satisfying explanation. If we want further deep details of functioning then we can even explain through computational mechanism. By the explanation of various functions we can construct a system which has the capacity for verbal reports of internal information. At the same time for a system to be awake means to be appropriately receptive to information from the environment and be able to use this information in directing behavior in an appropriate way. This is what the reductive explanations work in the scientific world, especially in lower level physical explanation. Chalmers too doesn't have any problem in accepting these lower level physical explanations. But the real problem is the hard problem; explaining consciousness or conscious experiences.

The hard problem of consciousness cannot be explained by these sorts of functional explanations because these functional or causal explanations are not sufficient for explaining consciousness or conscious experience. It is hard and unique because it goes beyond the problems of performance and functioning. As it was said earlier conscious experience is a *fuzzier object* altogether and constitute the hard problem. The real problem lies in explaining how the performance of functions is accompanied by experience? Why doesn't all this information-processing go on *in the dark, free from any inner feel?*¹⁹⁶ Why does the sensation not arise without conscious experience? Scientifically and cognitively we know that consciousness arises when these functions

¹⁹⁶. David J. Chalmers, *Facing up to the problem of Consciousness* (Journal of Consciousness Studies, 2 (3), 1995), p. 203.

are performed but the very fact that it arises is the central mystery. There is an *explanatory gap* between the functions and experience, and we need an explanatory bridge to fill this gap or to cross it. Here we are not making any statement that functioning and cognitive processes have nothing to do with conscious experiences but only one thing that there is no cognitive function such that we can say in advance that explanation of that function will automatically explain experience and vice-versa. Since the usual scientific and cognitive approaches failed to fill the gap, we have to recognize the need of a new method to explain conscious experience.

The first obstacle we face, while dealing with the problem of consciousness, is lack of data to construct a theory, second obstacle is the reductive explanation of consciousness according to which explanation of consciousness doesn't go beyond physical properties. Chalmers suggests that to overcome these two obstacles we have to include in our investigation *our own experience, indirect evidences (verbal reports from others), thought experiments, philosophical analysis and scientific data*. Along with these we have to have a right method to analyze all these. According to Chalmers there are three principles which play key a role in explaining the theory of consciousness but we have to be clear that these three principles are not fundamental. Chalmers takes these three principles as the components of the theory of consciousness. He believes that a non-reductive method will be the right one rather than the reductive method because a non-reductive theory of consciousness consists of psychophysical principles; *principles connecting the properties of physical processes and the properties of experience*. These principles concern the way experience arises from the physical.

The first one is *the principle of structural coherence*; it is a principle of coherence between the structure of consciousness and the structure of awareness. The principle of structural coherence provides an enormously useful explanatory relation between the physical and the phenomenal. The first step in this process is that, any information that is consciously experienced will also be cognitively represented. It goes like this; the fine-

grained structure of the visual field will correspond to some fine-grained structure in visual processing, the same thing goes for experience in other modalities and even for non-sensory experiences. Internal mental images have geometric properties and emotions have structural properties, such as relative intensity; these things correspond directly to a structural property of processing. The structural properties of experience are accessible and reportable; those properties will be directly represented in the structure of awareness. How is the structural properties of experience represented in the structure of awareness? The second step in this process is that, awareness refers to the functional processes that make information available for the control of behavior and verbal report. Here it is to say that the isomorphism, between the structure of awareness and the structure of consciousness, constitute the principle of structural coherence. He further says that,

*“Alongside the general principle that where there is consciousness, there is awareness and vice versa, we have a more specific principle: the structure of consciousness is mirrored by the structure of awareness, and the structure of awareness is mirrored by the structure of consciousness. I will call this the principle of structural coherence. This is a central and systematic relation between phenomenology and psychology, and ultimately can be cashed out into a relation between phenomenology and underlying physical processes.”*¹⁹⁷

Wherever conscious experience is, there is awareness. Wherever information is available for control of behavior and reporting, there is consciousness. Along with this the other important thing is that the neural processes that explain awareness will at the same time be the base for consciousness. Though facts about cognitive processes do not entail facts about conscious experience, consciousness and cognition are intimately connected. Here we have to remember one important thing that not all properties of experience are structural properties, for example intrinsic redness of red. So Chalmers believe that the structural coherence is useful principle for indirect explanation of conscious experience in terms of physical processes.

The second one is the principle of *organizational invariance*. Through the principle of organizational invariance Chalmers tried to explain his notion that conscious

¹⁹⁷. David J. Chalmers, *The Conscious Mind* (USA: Oxford University Press, 1996), p.208.

experience is a further fact of nature over and above physical phenomena and it also naturally supervenes on physical phenomena. This principle enables us to use physical facts to predict and even to explain certain facts about conscious experience. According to this any two systems with the same fine-grained functional organization will have identical conscious experiences. The nature of conscious experiences is fully determined by the mere abstract functional organization of the physical states. Therefore, systems that are functional isomorphs of each other will have identical conscious experiences; for example, Chalmers says that,

*“Even if our neurons were replaced with silicon chips, then as long as these chips had states with the same patterns of causal interactions as we find in the neurons, the system would produce the same behavior.”*¹⁹⁸

Based on this Chalmers wants to say that, it is the abstract pattern of causal interaction between its components that matters for the rise of conscious experience but not the specific physical makeup of a system. Through this thought experiment he tried to show that the coherence between consciousness and the cognitive processing yields a strong conclusion about the relation between conscious experience and physical structure. The only physical properties directly relevant to the emergence of conscious experience are organizational properties.

As I have discussed the first two principles of Chalmers are non-basic, high-level principles. In addition to that basic principles are needed to explain the high-level principles. Third principle, *the double-aspect theory of information*, is the basic principle. The most important thing in this discussion is *information space*; for Chalmers an information space is an abstract space consisting of a number of states which we can call information states. The double aspect theory of information starts with noticing the isomorphism between *physically embodied information spaces* and *phenomenal information spaces*. Then it leads to the hypothesis that information has both physical and phenomenal aspect. He further says that,

“As I have defined them, information spaces are abstract spaces, and information states are abstract states. They are not part of the concrete

¹⁹⁸. Ibid, p.132.

physical or phenomenal world. But we can find information in both the physical and the phenomenal world, if we look at things the right way. To do this, we need to discuss the various ways in which information spaces and states can be realized in the world."¹⁹⁹

It would be clear if we can discuss physically realized information states and phenomenally realized information states separately. The physical realization is the most common way to think about information embedded in the world; physical information is a *difference that makes a difference*. But the most difficult one is the phenomenally realized information. Chalmers says that the states of experience fall directly into information spaces in a natural way. There are natural patterns of similarity and difference between phenomenal states, and these patterns yield the difference structure of an information space. Thus we can see phenomenal states as realizing information states within those spaces.

*"Any given experience corresponds to a specific location within this space. A specific red experience is one phenomenally realized information state; a specific green experience is another. More complex experiences, such as experiences of an entire visual field, fall into information spaces with a complex combinatorial structure. When I look at a picture, for example, my experience falls into a space with (at least) the combinatorial structure of a two-dimensional continuum, with each element in that continuum having (at least) the three-dimensional relational structure of simple color space."*²⁰⁰

The double-aspect theory of information, the combination of physically realized information and phenomenally realized information, explains an important link between the physical and the phenomenal states; that physical changes that correspond to changes in experience involve informational changes. Whenever we find information space realized phenomenally, we find the same information space realized physically. At the same time when an experience realizes an information state, the same information state is realized in the experience's physical substrate. This whole thing works in virtue of certain laws, the way mass and charge works. At the same time the information need not to be primitive like mass and charge. The most important thing here is how to connect these two domains. Information seems to be a simple and straightforward construct that is well-

¹⁹⁹. Ibid, p.264.

²⁰⁰. Ibid, p.267.

suited for this sort of connection, and may hold the promise of yielding a set of laws that are simple and comprehensive. Chalmers says that if such a set of laws could be achieved, then we might truly have a fundamental theory of consciousness.

Chapter-4

SEARLE'S NATURALISTIC APPROACH OF INTENTIONALITY

4.1. What is Intentionality?

Brentano's theory of *aboutness*, in contemporary philosophy of *Mind*, has turned as the theory of *Intentionality*. Intentionality is the property of many mental states and events by which they are directed at or about or of objects and states of affairs in the world; Intentionality is a mental phenomenon. As I have discussed in previous chapters, for Searle, mental phenomena are biologically based. Mental phenomena are caused by the operations of the brain and realized in the structures of the brain. At the same time that consciousness is part of human biology, has been discussed earlier. In the same way Intentionality is also part of human biology as digestion or the circulation of the blood is. How there are debates regarding defining consciousness, in the same way there are debates regarding defining Intentionality; some are accepted and some are not. But here I don't want to go into all those discussions. Since I am dealing with the naturalistic approach of Intentionality I directly enter into the discussion of Searle's naturalistic approach of Intentionality. According to Searle, intentionality is that,

*"If, for example, I have a belief, it must be a belief that such and such is the case; if I have a fear, it must be a fear of something or that something will occur; if I have a desire, it must be a desire to do something or that something should happen or be the case; if I have an intention, it must be an intention to do something. And so on through a large number of other cases. I follow a long philosophical tradition in calling this feature of directedness or aboutness "Intentionality"..."*²⁰¹

With this definition we may come to conclusion that all mental states are intentional states. But, if we consider all mental states as intentional states then that will lead us in a wrong direction. For example, beliefs, fears, hopes, and desires are intentional because these mental states are formed with an intention. There are some other mental states like

²⁰¹. John R. Searle, *Intentionality* (USA: Cambridge University Press, 1983), p. 1.

nervousness, elation, and undirected anxiety which are not intentional because they do not carry any intentionality. If we talk about *mental states and Intentionality* then it shows that all Intentional states are mental but all mental states are not intentional but some mental states intentional. Whatever the mental state whether it is belief or desire, or hope, or fear must always be about something; *the directed cases are intentional*. If we talk about *Consciousness and Intentionality* then it shows that all conscious states are not intentional states, in the same way, according to Searle, all intentional states are not conscious. Suppose I may have many beliefs about my past, about my ancestors, I may have fear of some animals, fear of water, I may have desire of something; all these intentional states need not to be conscious all the time. At the same time while dealing with Intentionality we should not be confused with the words *intending* and *intentionality*. Intentionality is directedness and intending to do something which is just one kind of intentionality among others. To avoid the confusion Searle cited many mental states which are intentional:

*“Belief, fear, hope, desire, love, hate, aversion, liking, disliking, doubting, wondering whether, joy, elation, depression, anxiety, pride, remorse, sorrow, grief, guilt, rejoicing, irritation, puzzlement, acceptance, forgiveness, hostility, affection, expectation, anger, admiration, contempt, respect, indignation, intention, wishing, wanting, imagining, fantasy, shame, lust, disgust, animosity, terror, pleasure, abhorrence, aspiration, amusement, and disappointment.”*²⁰²

It will be difficult for us to go through this list of intentions and again there will be varieties of beliefs, varieties of fears, varieties of hopes and desires come on the way. So Intentionality is something that will have a content to refer something or about something. There will always be a possibility to misunderstand Intentionality. For example, many people think that Intentionality is always related with language. But Searle says that by explaining intentionality in terms of language we do not mean that Intentionality is essentially and necessarily linguistic because infants and many animals do not have any language and cannot perform any speech acts but they have intentional states. On the basis of this we have to understand one important thing that mental states are more primitive than the language use; language is secondary to Intentionality or the content of intentional states. Then, what really matters for Intentionality? To get the right

²⁰². Ibid, p. 4.

answer for this question we have to enter into the deep discussions of Intentionality. There are certain features of Intentionality like *conditions of satisfaction, directions of fit, the Network and the Background*. There are many statements; some are true and some are false. There are many orders; some are obeyed and some are disobeyed. There are many promises; some are kept and some are not. That is why Searle says that, a statement is satisfied if and only if it is true, an order is satisfied if and only if it is obeyed, and a promise is satisfied if and only if it is kept, and so on. To have a validity of something it has to go along with the features of Intentionality. The notion of conditions of satisfaction, according to Searle, is that,

“The speech act will be satisfied if and only if the expressed psychological state is satisfied, and the conditions of satisfaction of speech act and expressed psychological state are identical. Thus, for example, my statement will be true if and only if the expressed belief is correct.”²⁰³

4.2. Conditions of Satisfaction

Our speech acts are the representations of our intentional mental states of beliefs, desires, fears, hates, love and so on. Any statement of a belief will be true if and only if expressed belief is correct. The conditions of satisfaction of a statement are internal to that speech act. The conditions of satisfaction of the internal state are internal to the intentional state. These Intentional states consist of representational content in a certain psychological mode. According to Searle, the way speech acts represent objects and states of affairs in the same way Intentional states represents objects and states of affairs. For example,

“Just as my statement that it is raining is a representation of a certain state of affairs, so my belief that it is raining is a representation of the same state of affairs. Just as my order to Sam to leave the room is about Sam and represents a certain action on his part, so my desire that Sam should leave the room is about Sam and represents a certain action on his part.”²⁰⁴

In Searle’s model of Intentionality the notion of representation and the notion of conditions of satisfaction plays key role. A representation is defined by its content and its

²⁰³. Ibid, p. 10.

²⁰⁴. Ibid, p. 11.

mode but not by its formal structure. Suppose if I say that a belief is a representation, it means (it implies) that the belief has a propositional content and a psychological mode; its propositional content determines a direction of fit of its propositional content. Every intentional state consists of an intentional content in a psychological mode. The intentional content determines the conditions of satisfaction. Up to this point we have two important things; the content and the conditions of satisfaction. To explain these two notions Searle gave a good example; if I have a belief that it is raining, the content of my belief is: that it is raining. The conditions of satisfaction are: that it is raining but not that the ground is wet. Just the way the mental phenomena are caused by the operations of the brain and realized in the structures of the brain, in the same way intentional states are caused by and realized in the structure of the brain.

In explaining Intentionality the role of perception should not be ignored, that is why Searle wants to place the account of perceptual experience within the context of the theory of Intentionality. In this process he treats perceptual experience and forms of Intentionality as separate entities and then study them comparatively. If we talk about the similarities between these two entities then, for Searle, the notion of perception involves the notion of succeeding in a way that the notion of experience does not and one can have experience without succeeding, i.e., without perceiving. But all the perceptual experiences have Intentionality. The way Intentional states have conditions of satisfaction and states of affairs in the same way perceptual experiences too have conditions of satisfaction and states of affairs. That is why for Searle the “*of*” in “*experience of*” is in short the “*of*” of Intentionality. So the point here is that the perceptual experiences are intrinsically intentional, it means that they have conditions of satisfaction which are determined by the content of the states. Visual perception, like belief, always has *Mind*-to-world direction of fit. If the conditions of satisfaction are not fulfilled then it is the visual experience which is at fault but not the world. At the same time without saying what it is an experience of, we cannot describe visual experience. The main point here is that,

*“There are perceptual experiences; they have Intentionality; their Intentional content is propositional in form; they have mind-to-world direction of fit; and the properties which are specified by their Intentional content are not in general literally properties of the perceptual experiences.”*²⁰⁵

Till here I have discussed the similarities between visual experience (we can say cognition) and forms of Intentionality like belief, desire, etc. but here I want to concentrate on some differences between them. Conditions of satisfaction, intentional content, direction of fit, etc, are the basic features either for intentional states like belief, desire, etc, and for perceptual experience. But perceptual experience has further more features in order to characterize their Intentionality. Perceptual experiences have all the features those are there for representation; along with these they have other intrinsic features. Perceptual experiences are conscious mental events, without consciousness they are not possible. But we can have beliefs and desires when we are not thinking about them; Searle says that we can even have such states while sleeping also. He further says that,

*“Intentionality of a perceptual experience is realized in quite specific phenomenal properties of conscious mental events. For this reason the claim that there are visual experiences goes beyond the claim that the perception has Intentionality, since it is an ontological claim about how the Intentionality is realized; it is, in general, realized in conscious mental events.”*²⁰⁶

Whether it is perceptual experience or desire or belief or any other intentional act but all of them represent some object or content. Here perception will have privilege to have direct access with the external world but desires and beliefs don't have. On the basis of its features (directness, immediacy and involuntariness) Searle calls perceptual experiences as *presentations* because they not only represent them but also directly present to us. Another distinction between the Intentionality of belief and the Intentionality of perceptions is that, the intentional content of visual experience must be caused by the rest of its conditions of satisfaction, that is, by the state of affairs perceived. Therefore the content of visual experience is self-referential. So, perceptual experience is

²⁰⁵. Ibid, p. 45.

²⁰⁶. Ibid, p. 45.

intentional and it involves causal transaction between *Mind* and the world; direction of fit is *Mind*-to-world and the direction of causation is world-to-*Mind*.

4.3. Background and Network

According to Searle there are three elements involved in perception; the perceiver, visual experience, and the object perceived. Along with these there are other two important things which play a key role in perceptual experience. The way intentional states depend on the Network and the Background, in the same way the Network and the Background of the Intentionality are related to the character of the visual experience. Firstly the Network and the Background affect the content of perception. For example, different beliefs cause different visual experiences with different conditions of satisfaction, even given the same optional stimuli. For example, a stone can change the content of visual experience based on its place; if it is in the wall then its content of visual experience differs with the same stone if it is in the temple. Secondly, if the content of belief and the content of visual experience are inconsistent still our belief remains constant. It can be explained by Searle's example; the appearance of the moon on the horizon looks bigger than it does when it is directly overhead. So, according to Searle, material objects and events are characteristically the objects of perception and they can only be the objects of visual perception because the perception has an intentional content, and the vehicle of the intentional content is a visual experience. The elements which are involved in perception are the perceiver, visual experience, and the object perceived. The relation between these three elements is *Intentional* and *causal*. This is the relation between *Perception* and *Intentionality*.

The Background plays a role in Searle's theory of Intentionality because the mental states have a background which participates in the operations of the mental states. Searle says that,

"When, for example, I see my own station wagon, the conditions of satisfaction require not merely that there be some station wagon or other

satisfying my Intentional content, but rather that it be my very own. Now the question is; how does this particularity gets into the Intentional content of the perception?”²⁰⁷

The way perception and Intentionality are dependent on representational and nonrepresentational things, in the same way when we perceive something that perception involves four things; *Network*, *Background*, *Intentional causation*, and *Indexicality*. These four involve in perception and determine the conditions of satisfaction, whether it is particular or general. I want to explain it very briefly and clearly. For example, if you and I are having a shared visual experience of the object is not required that we see it under the same aspect. In seeing of particular object or even if there are twins, still we will have different aspects of individuals. As I have discussed in previous paragraphs that a stone will have different aspects based on its place, in the same way we, normal human beings, will have particular aspects to indicate particular objects. To form these particular aspects on individuals, every individuals Network (representational object), Background (non-representational object), Intentional causation (intrinsic state) and Indexicality play key role. Indexicality indicates that each of my experiences is not just an experience that happens to someone; it is rather *My* experience. The Network and Background of Intentional states that I am aware of are *My* Network and Background capacities I make use of have to do with *My* Background.

4.4. Action and Causation

After the discussion of the role of perception in Intentionality another important thing is *Action*. Is there any relation between action and Intentionality? The way there are the conditions of satisfaction in case of perception and Intentionality in the same way we have to have conditions of satisfaction in case of action. Searle says that,

“Just as my belief is satisfied iff the state of affairs represented by the content of the belief actually obtains, and my desire is satisfied iff the state of affairs represented by the content of the desire comes to pass, so my intention is satisfied iff the action represented by the content of the intention is actually performed.”²⁰⁸

²⁰⁷. Ibid, p. 62.

²⁰⁸. Ibid, p. 79.

So there is a relation between intention and action, and the intention is satisfied if and only if the intentional action is actually performed. But there are several asymmetries between action and intention, and the relation between the other intentional states and their conditions of satisfaction. Searle says that a theory of intention and action ought to explain the asymmetries otherwise it will become an obstacle in explaining action and intention. There are several examples, given by Searle, to explain asymmetries but I am going to take two examples. According to the first example, Oedipus's marrying his mother. His intention was to marry Jocasta but not his mother. He performed action of marrying Jocasta intentionally but marrying his own mother was not the intention. There are many states of affairs without corresponding beliefs and desires but there are no actions without corresponding intentions. According to the second example, Bill intends to kill his uncle, then it might come about that he kills his uncle and yet the conditions of satisfaction of his intention do not obtain. Suppose that Bill is driving and thinking about how he is going to kill his uncle. His intention to kill his uncle makes him nervous and he accidentally runs over and kills a pedestrian who happen to be his uncle. In many events we have seen that there are no actions without intention. So it is important to explain this type of puzzle, otherwise explaining Intentionality will become problematic.

To explain this puzzle we need to explain two important notions: prior intention and intention. All intentional actions will have intentions in action but the problem is about prior intentions. According to Searle, prior intention and intention in action both are causally self-referential in the same sense that perceptual experiences and memories are causally self-referential. Like perception, action is also a causal and intentional transaction between *Mind* and the world. Searle says that for every conscious intentional action there is the experience of performing that action because that intention will be satisfied in that action and that experience has an intentional connection. So there is difference between prior intentions and intentions in action. Searle says that there can be actions without corresponding prior intentions, for example, it is possible that I may haul off and hit somebody without any prior intention to hit him. But there cannot be any

actions, not even unintentional actions, without intentions in action. If we take the example of Bill, though there was no intention of hitting his uncle and killing him but the intention in action was to drive to his uncle's place. From this example we have to keep one important thing in our *Mind* that actions necessarily contain intentions in action, but are not necessarily caused by prior intentions.

The relation between Intentionality and causation is another important aspect in philosophy of *Mind*. According to Searle causality is generally regarded as natural relation between events in the world. Contrary to this Intentionality is often regarded as something transcendental, something stands over and beyond, but not part of the natural world. If it is the case then, how can we construct a relation between Intentionality and causation? The important thing here is that first we have to *intentionalize causality* then we have to *naturalize Intentionality*. In every causation there will be two events one is causes and the other one is caused (effect). We don't actually see or observe any causal connection between the first event and the second event but we only observe one event followed by another event. Searle says that this observation supports us to say that the two members of the pairs are causally related events even though we cannot observe any causal relation. As it is discussed in previous paragraphs that, in case of *Intentionality of perception* we have seen one type of conditions of satisfaction and direction of fit, in case of *intention and action* we have seen another type of conditions of satisfaction and direction of fit. Visual experience will be caused by an encounter with the object in the world and action (movement of the body) will be caused by the intentional state. The direction of fit to one is *world-to-Mind* and the other one is *Mind-to-world*. In the same way *intentional causation* too has conditions of satisfaction and direction of fit. According to Searle, there is logical and internal connection between cause and effect. If we take the example of Searle then it shows that,

"Thirst, regardless of how described, contains a desire to drink, and that desire has as conditions of satisfaction, that one drinks; an intention in action to raise one's arm, regardless of how described, has as part of its conditions of satisfaction, that one's arm go up; a visual experience of a

flower, regardless of how described, has as conditions of satisfaction that there be a flower there."²⁰⁹

Cause and effect are intentionally and internally related for the presentation, representation and conditions of satisfaction. The cause can be the representation of the effect in the same way the effect also can be the representation of the cause. In every case of cause and effect there is an intentional content that is causally related to its conditions of satisfaction. The cause and effect are related by intentional content and conditions of satisfaction.

On the basis of this Searle says that we can directly experience the causation because the cause and the effect are intentional; every experience of acting or perceiving is precisely an experience of causation. The most important thing here is that the relationship of causation (between cause and effect) is part of the content (intentional content) of the experience. Another important thing is that if the relationship of causation is relationships of making something happen, then it is a relationship we all experience whenever we perceive or act. Making something happen only occurs if there is an intentional event. If there is an intentional event then it must be experienced when we act or perceive something. So we directly experience the causation. The content of the experience is that it is the experience of something causing or being caused. When we talk about experience of causation, we are directly aware of causation. Searle says that,

*"Actions and perceptions are in my account are causal and Intentional transactions between mind and the world, but that the transactions are actually taking place is not up to the mind. And indeed this fact is a consequence of the fact that there is nothing subjective about causation. It is really there."*²¹⁰

Searle argues that the causation or the experience of causation is part of our action and perception. Our actions and perceptions are intentional and they have subjective experience but causation is not intentional. The causality is just limited to a relationship of cause and effect but we should not forget that causation is part of intentional content.

²⁰⁹. Ibid, p. 121.

²¹⁰. Ibid, p. 130.

The way conditions of satisfaction, directions of fit, Background, and Network play key role in Intentionality, in the same way causation too has its key role to play, without which there will be no action and perception. So, for Searle, there are two important elements in causation: one is the primitive experience of causation in action and perception, and the other one is that the existence of regularities in the world, some of which are causal and some are not. Our most fundamental ways of coping with the world are through action and perception, and these ways essentially involve Intentional causation.

4.5. Naturalization of Intentionality

According to the causal account of Intentionality, Intentionality is an intrinsic feature of consciousness which is caused by the neurological processes. For Searle Intentionality is not a transcendental entity but is causally related to the nature. The way Searle tried to explain consciousness through neurobiological features of the brain and body, in the same way, since Intentionality is intrinsic part of consciousness, he tried to explain Intentionality in the same way. As I have discussed in previous paragraphs every intentional states will have content, that content determines the conditions of satisfaction in relation to numerous other intentional states. The numerous other intentional states which determine the content of an intentional state are called Network. Without the Network of Intentional states we cannot form any intentional state. Along with Network there is another important thing which play key role in Intentionality is *Background*.

“The background is a set of nonrepresentational mental capacities that enable all representing to take place. Intentional states only have the conditions of satisfaction that they do, and thus only are the states that they are, against a Background of abilities that are not themselves Intentional states.”²¹¹

In contrast with other mental states the Background is nonrepresentational mental capacity. It is pre-intentional; it is a precondition or a set of preconditions of Intentionality. The way we have intentional states which represent intentional content, in

²¹¹. Ibid, p. 143.

the same way there are some nonrepresentational mental capacities; capacities, abilities, tendencies, habits, dispositions, cultures, taken-for-granted presuppositions and so on. Nonrepresentational mental capacities are called Background. Intentional states are not independently determined, but depend on other states in the Network and the Background. Any intentional state requires for its functioning a Network of other intentional states; in this relationship only their conditions of satisfaction are determined. So Intentionality cannot function as a separate mental capacity. Intentional states function the way they are given against a presupposed set of Background capacities, but the Background itself is pre-intentional. Searle says that the Network is a part of the Background. For example, we have to see the door in order to open the door, but the ability to recognize the door and the ability to open the door are not themselves further representations. For Searle even taste metaphors (for example, sweet person) and temperature metaphors (for example, warm welcome) are non-representational mental capacities. Without Background intentional mental states cannot function, at the same time there could be neither perception, nor action, nor memory, nor conditions of satisfaction, nor direction of fit. There will be no intentional states at all; that is why Background pervades entire intentional states. Even performing the speech acts dependent on Background. The Background functions causally and provides necessary but not sufficient conditions for understanding, believing, desiring, and other intentional states.

Now I am coming back to the notion of Intentionality after the discussion of the relation between Intentionality and other mental states, like perception, action, causation, Background, Network and some other conditions of satisfactions. The way how Searle was defining consciousness as biological phenomena, in the same way he says that Intentionality is biological phenomena, like lactation, photosynthesis, mitosis, or digestion. Mental phenomena are real and mental states are caused by biological phenomena and in turn cause other biological phenomena. Searle even suggest a name, if anyone want to label it, as I have discussed in the third chapter, then they may call it as the “Biological Naturalism.” Now the only problem Searle has to deal with is that the

relation between mental and physical. If a mental content can cause an action, how does mental affect the physical and vice-versa? According to Searle, mental states are both caused by the operations of the brain and realized in the structures of the brain, including all the nervous system. Searle says that if we think mental and physical as entities of two different phenomena then obviously the causal problem will remain forever because we cannot construct a causal relation between mental and physical in this sense (treating them as two different ontological entities). So we have to stop thinking that there are two ontological entities and we have to take mental and physical as two levels of the reality e.g. water and liquidity. The way we treat water as one entity but having different features based on the mobility of molecules, in the same way mental and physical belong to one ontological entity. We cannot separate mental from the physical (body), the way we cannot separate water from the liquidity. Liquidity and solidity (ice) are the features of water and mental states are the features of the operations of the brain. At the same time all the forms of Intentionality including the content formation are part of the basic features of consciousness. Intentionality is an intrinsic feature of the mental; it is the feature of certain mental states and events that consists in their being directed at, being about, being of or representing certain other entities and states of affairs. It is a property of all the mental states and events which represents something about the external and internal world.

Chapter-5

IN DEFENSE OF MIND-BODY DUALISM

Whatever I have discussed in four chapters under the umbrella of Philosophy of *Mind* is based on the philosophical developments which have taken place in the history of philosophy. I have traced out the ideas concerning *Mind* and *Body* which have been developed by philosophers. Now it's time to have critique of some of philosophical theories which have been discussed in the previous chapters. In this chapter I will develop arguments in defense of the *Mind-Body* dualism which is the main theme of my thesis.

5.1. Critique on the Cartesian Dualism

I begin here the critique of Cartesian dualism which adopted some traditional philosophical notions and also introduced new methods in the philosophy of *Mind*. Though the philosophical notion of dualism is not a new concept, as it is discussed in the first chapter, but the present *Mind-Body* dualism obviously differs with the ancient notion of dualism. The ancient notion of dualism mostly deals with the relation between the primitive matter and life/*Soul*. Later it changed its direction and turned into *Soul-Body* dualism throughout the scholastic philosophy. We can even say that, though there were some religious influences on the ancient philosophical notions such as in Plato but in medieval period more religious influences were working on the philosophical ideas. Descartes was well aware of the differences between the *Soul* and the *Mind*, and he was the first philosopher to explicitly abandoned all of the conceptual baggage associated with the word *Soul* in favor of a radically new term, *Mind* and its principal attributes. Though there was the notion of *Mind* before Descartes but whatever the capacities Descartes attributed to the *Mind* were divided and some were attributed to *Mind* (*Nous*) and some were attributed to the other parts of the *Soul*. The role of Anaxagoras also cannot be ignored in developing the notion of the *Mind* in pre-Socratic era. The notion of

the *Soul* is still playing its dominant role in religious and spiritual practices but its role in other fields is totally ignored. There are many reasons for the demise of the concept of the *Soul*. Two important reasons can be stated here; first its association with religious practices, and second it is surrounded by some cultural, traditional, local and some other prejudices. It is the Cartesian theory of *Mind* which has taken the first brave step in the direction of removing the *Soul* completely from the explanations of human nature and we can even say that it has led to a more scientific understanding of the human reality. But still there are some issues in Cartesian dualism which do not seem to be acceptable.

1. I begin with the dreaming argument where Descartes says that we cannot differentiate dreaming state from waking state. But I feel that our rational *Mind* has the capacity to see them as separate states. When we enter into waking state from sleeping then we realize that whatever had happened was a dream but not real. But when we enter into dream, in a state of sleeping, we never realized that whatever had happened (in waking state) was a dream. So our rational *Mind* can clearly discriminate dreaming state from waking state.
2. Descartes introduced wax example to explain what really plays the key role in understanding a particular object. He says that if we bring the wax close to the fire then its properties like the smell fades; the flavor evaporates; the color changes; the shape changes; it becomes liquid; it becomes warm; it extends specially and it cannot be touched. After all these changes we still call it wax. To make us understand what is really going on, he asks us to take away all the properties of the wax. After taking away all the properties of the wax whatever will remain there that is the essence of the wax which plays a key role in understanding wax after having undergone many changes. But I feel that empirically there will remain nothing to understand after taking away all the properties. it can be argued that when all the properties of the wax are removed, then is nothing there to be understood. I feel that the idea of looking at what is left after taking away all the properties of the wax is mistaken notion. This is not how the object is conceived.
3. As I have discussed in second chapter there are two substances, *Mind* and Body; the essence of *Mind* is *thought* and the essence of body is *extension*. And the

physical stuff, to which the properties are attached, has something permanent in it which is essential for its existence.

But in our understanding we never encounter either physical or mental substances without their accompanying properties. It seems absurd to think of any object without its properties because these properties too have existential status. Neither object can exist without properties nor can the properties exist without the object. It is an invariable relation between the object and its properties. There will be no substance if there are no properties. For example, milk has certain properties without those properties we cannot call it as milk. After boiling if we add a spoon of curd to it then after few hours it will become curd. We call it as curd but not as milk. If we churn curd then we can make butter out of it. If we melt butter with heat then we get Ghee.²¹² In these four levels the stuff is the same, we haven't add anything additional to it but it has undergone many changes and four different names for four different states. If I call these four different states with one name then it seems absurd. If Descartes says that these four states have the same essence in it then it should have the capacity to get back into the state of milk; which is impossible. So along with the properties the essence of a particular thing also changes simultaneously. It is not just extension that is essential to objects but they also always have some observable attributes. So proposing the existence of substance as the foundation on which properties reside is an unnecessary complication because there is no way of discovering such a substance empirically; the empiricists like Hume do not find it as a necessary condition.

4. Another important problem in Descartes explanation is concerning the interaction between *Mind* and *Body*. The pineal gland which is at the center of the brain. I think the pineal gland has caused for more problems than solving the *Mind-Body* problem. If anyone asks whether pineal gland is physical or non-physical and if the answer is physical then immediately we have to face a primary question, how it could be different from any part of the brain. But Descartes could not give a

²¹². Clarified Butter

satisfactory answer. He says in a letter written to Princess Elizabeth of the Palatinate that,

*“The union of mind and body is best understood by not thinking about it, and that it is just one of those mysteries that has to be accepted without being comprehended.”*²¹³

5. While talking about the *Mind* Descartes says that I am not the bodily structure, not the air, not the wind, not the thing which walks or senses, not this and not that but I am a *thing* that thinks; I am a *thinking thing*, a thing that doubts, affirms etc. In the second Meditation Descartes says that we can know better about our *Mind* than the body. If it is the subjectivity of a person that Descartes is talking about then it can be argued that the subject/*Self* is already embodied as it cannot exist apart from the body. But Descartes says that the *Mind* can exist without the body. However, Descartes should explain to us what sort of thing this ‘*I*’ (the mental substance) who thinks really is which can exist without embodiment. I feel that though Descartes tried his best to say what the *Mind* is not but he could not succeed in explaining what the *Mind* is. There is more to the *Self* than mere thought.
6. How can Descartes notion of God, in relation with the *Mind*, be accepted as a rational thing? Descartes believe that,

*“Since I am a thinking thing with the idea of God in me, my cause, whatever it is, must be a thinking thing having in it the idea of every perfection that I attribute to God.”*²¹⁴

If we accept it as rational then there are two problems; the first problem with the statement is that since I am a thinking thing so the substance of thinking thing must be a thinking thing. In this regard Descartes has to explain why he needs the God as the cause of the thinking thing. If God, the infinite *Being* is the cause of the thinking things the latter must be identical in other thinking capacity. But that is not the case.

²¹³. H. P. Richard & S. Avrum eds., *Philosophy Made Simple* (London: W. H. Allen, 1956), p. 99.

²¹⁴. Neil Tennant, *Introducing Philosophy: God, Mind, World, and Logic* (New York: Routledge, 2015), p. 282.

The second problem is that if my cause is a thinking thing and also having in it an infinite perfect thinking thing which is attributed to God, then how could it cause me to be finite and imperfect in thought? And another thing is that if I am finite and my intellect doesn't have the capacity of conceiving of infinity then it obviously shows that I have certain limitations. How can limited being like me can think of an infinite *Being*, that is, God. What kind of logic we can apply to this conclusion? At the end of third Meditation he says that,

*"All that remains for me is to ask how I received this idea of God. For I did not draw it from the senses; it never came upon me unexpectedly, as is usually the case with the ideas of sensible things when these things present themselves (or seem to present themselves) to the external sense organs. Nor was it made by me, for I plainly can neither subtract anything from it nor add anything to it. Thus the only option remaining is that this idea is innate in me, just as the idea of myself is innate in me."*²¹⁵

If we consider the idea of God as innate then everyone should have this innate idea without having any difference. But we differ amongst ourselves regarding the idea of God.

7. Descartes says that in the idea of an infinite God has more objective reality than in the idea of a finite thing. But the idea of God is a mere conceptual entity, which has no more reality than our own *Mind* which is thinking.
8. However, the Cartesian dualism stands vindicated because we can never reduce *Mind* to the *Body* and therefore *Mind* has to be treated as an independent reality in the metaphysical sense.

5.2. Critique on Biological Naturalism

By challenging the artificial intelligence that cognition cannot be re-created by the manipulation of physical symbols *John Searle* has entered into philosophical investigation. His famous thought experiment *The Chinese Room* argument has made him

²¹⁵. Rene Descartes, *Meditations, Objections, and Replies*, edited and trans. Roger Ariew and Donald Cress, (Indianapolis/Cambridge: Hackett Publishing Company, Inc., 2006) p. 28.

a popular philosopher in present era. Through his *Biological Naturalism* he could argue that the mental phenomena are caused by neuro-physical processes in the brain and are themselves features of the brain. John Searle has really done a great job by introducing silicon brains thought experiment to prove that causal powers of the brain cannot be duplicated. It is true that an artificial thing or Chinese room cannot produce mental phenomena. If we take an incident of year-2011 where Dr. Billy Cohn and Dr. Bud Frazier came up with a device called LVAD (Left Ventricular Assist Device) which would allow blood to circulate throughout the body. Due to some heart problem a 55 year old Craig Lewis has hospitalized. The situation was very critical; to save the patient's life doctors were forced to do something. In such a critical situation they implanted LVAD in the place of heart. Few hours after the replacement of the heart by LVAD the patient become conscious and started behaving normally. The patient was discharged from the hospital but he was lacking heart beat and pulse; all other behaviors were normal. LVAD could not duplicate all the activities performed by the heart. It's true that only a machine could think – only a machine with the same causal powers as a brain. On the basis of Searle's Chinese room argument we can say that a machine cannot have the mental life because it works on the basis of step by step syntactical (symbolic) or binary number causal implementation. But our mental phenomena are based on semantic causal processes. Another important thing is that the method he has chosen to prove that all the mental states are conscious mental states is highly appreciable. Combining the notions like *conscious*, *unconscious* and *non-conscious* together and explaining them how they work then finally declaring that there are no unconscious mental states and projecting that "*all unconscious intentional states are in principle accessible to consciousness*" as the connecting principle is really a thought provoking step. But he could not succeed fully in explaining *Mind-Body* problem. His rejection of the notion of dualism has not been completely successful.

1. Searle's silicon brains thought experiment clearly shows that silicon chip can duplicate the causal powers but cannot duplicate all other features of neurobiological processes. Here once again I want to quote the same reference which I used to explain the second and third possibilities of silicon brains thought

experiment. According to the second possibility of silicon brains thought experiment;

“You find, to your total amazement, that you are indeed losing control of your external behavior. You find, for example, that when the doctors test your vision, you hear them say, “We are holding up a red object in front of you; please tell us what you see.” You want to cry out, “I can’t see anything. I’m going totally blind.” But you hear your voice saying in a way that is completely out of your control, “I see a red object in front of me.””²¹⁶

According to the third possibility of silicon brains thought experiment we can imagine no changes in our mental life after the implantation of silicon chips, at the same time we are progressively more and more unable to put our intentions, feelings and thoughts into action. Neither body responds to the thoughts nor can thoughts work on the body. Eventually it leads us to suffer from total paralysis, even though our mental life is unchanged. So in this case, Searle says, that we might hear the doctors saying...

“The silicon chips are able to maintain heartbeat, respiration, and other vital processes, but the patient is obviously brain dead. We might as well unplug the system, because the patient has no mental life at all.”²¹⁷

Here as first person observers we know that the doctors are totally wrong. In that situation we really want to shout out and say that...

“No, I’m still conscious! I perceive everything going on around me. It’s just that I can’t make any physical movement. I’ve become totally paralyzed.”²¹⁸

My point here is that an individual can have only one conscious mental state in a particular space and time but in Searle’s silicon brain thought experiment it seems like there are two conscious mental states (two subjects); one is the neurobiological brain state and the other one is the silicon brain state. The problem is that once my brain processes are replaced by the silicon chips then I cannot have there any neurobiological brain process; all the processes whatever

²¹⁶. John R. Searle, *The Rediscovery of the Mind* (Cambridge, London: The MIT Press, 1992), p. 66.

²¹⁷. Ibid, p. 68.

²¹⁸. Ibid, p. 68.

are there are just silicon brain processes. Then, according to second possibility of silicon brains, how can I have one mental state that responds and says that “*I can see red object*” and another mental state which want to say that “*I cannot see anything*”? According to the third possibility of silicon brains: On the one hand, Searle says that, we can imagine no change in our mental life after the implantation of silicon chips, it means the neurobiological process which causes the mental phenomena are replaced by the silicon chips. So there is only one mental phenomenon that is the silicon brain mental phenomena. On the one hand, Searle says that; Doctors say that though silicon chips are able to maintain heartbeat, respiration and other functions but the patient is brain dead. Besides, he also says that, there are mental phenomena and the patient wants to shout out and say that, *No, I’m still conscious! I perceive everything going on around me.* The problem is that if it is silicon brain mental phenomena then doctors must know it by its program. Since doctors found that there is no mental phenomena they have declared that the patient is brain dead. But according to Searle there are mental phenomena. After implantation of silicon chips, how can the conscious mental phenomenon arise in the silicon brain? Searle’s silicon brain thought experiment can help us to know that silicon chips cannot duplicate all the features of neurobiological processes but it could not help us in solving the *Mind-Body* problem; in this respect his silicon brain thought experiment has not succeeded in showing how the mental phenomena are possible at all.

2. According to Searle, there are two levels in the emergence of the *Mind*. The lower level brain processes and the higher level mental phenomena. The latter brings in an ontology of subjective experience. But the question is: how can subjectivity be caused by the lower level brain processes?
3. Everyone agrees that there are no mental phenomena if there is no subjective experience. I don’t have any prejudice go against to the notion of subjectivity but the way Searle tries to explain it is not convincing. He could not bridge the gap between the subjectivity and the neurobiological phenomena.
4. According to Searle we have to distinguish unconscious mental states from non-conscious processes going on in the brain. We should not confuse unconscious

mental states with non-conscious brain processes which has no psychological reality at all. Secretions of neurotransmitters are non-conscious neurobiological processes in the brain. For Searle consciousness is just higher level physical property of nervous-system; the higher level features of physical particles have a separate level of causal reality. Consciousness is the higher level physical state of the brain. But when I am in deep sleep or in coma or in anesthesia the only thing works is the neurobiological process, not even higher order brain process. Then, how can the neurobiological processes maintain the subjective mental phenomena? Can subjectivity itself be a physical property of the brain?

5. Searle says that the philosophical tradition makes the *Mind-Body* problem difficult because of its traditional way of dealing with the problem; with the preoccupied notions of *Mind* as a subjective apart from the body. Until we come out of the traditional way we will never be able to solve the problem. The notion of higher level brain processes, which he introduced to explain the subjective experience, is a kind of connecting principle between the neurobiological processes and mental phenomena. The higher level brain process seems to me like the Cartesian *pineal gland*; science accepts neither the pineal gland nor the higher level brain process; it just accepts the neurobiological processes but nothing more than this. Even if we accept Searle's notion of higher level brain processes we cannot fill the gap between the neurobiological processes and the mental phenomena.
6. Does empirical neurobiological phenomenon really imply ontological mental phenomena? According to Searle, the answer is yes. Searle could separate lower level functional features of neurons from higher level functional features. If the lower level neurobiological processes could cause the secretion of mental phenomena there itself, then what is the need of higher level brain processes? It seems, according to his own principles, there is no need to introduce the higher level brain process but still he did. It shows that at any cost he thought of filling the gap between the mental and the physical.
7. Searle says that "*Once you recognize the existence of bottom-up, micro to macro forms of causation, the notion of supervenience no longer does any work in*

philosophy”²¹⁹ but he himself divided the brain processes as lower level and higher level process is. He further says that they are higher because they have ontological reality. But the question is, how does the ontological reality emerge from the brain processes?

8. Searle says that his view definitely is not a form of dualism and he rejects both property dualism and substance dualism; reject materialism and monism as well. But he still moves around a form of dualism in the explanation of a lower level and higher level brain process. What distinguishes Searle from other contemporary materialists (identity theorists, functionalists and eliminative materialists), and what unites him with Descartes, is his firm insistence that *mental phenomena form an ontologically distinct class of natural phenomena*, which are caused by and interact with, but cannot be reduced to, any of the familiar classes of physical phenomena – dynamical, electrical, chemical, biological etc. Though he is not a kind of Cartesian dualist but he is dualist in another way. *Descartes says that the consciousness is the feature of subjectivity but Searle says that consciousness has a feature that is subjectivity*. The objective physical reality is same for both of them.
9. According to Searle, consciousness functions causally. The higher level brain processes cause conscious mental states. But he could not explain how the higher level causal functioning works the way he explained the lower level neurobiological causation cause the secretion of acetylcholine.
10. When it come to the notion of Intentionality, Searle holds that Intentionality is biological and hence is caused by the brain. But Intentionality itself cannot be reduced to the brain processes. So it is difficult to make Intentionality causally dependent on the brain. It is another matter that Searle accepts intentional causation because intentions do causes actions. But that does not explain how Intentionality itself is caused by the physical processes of the brain.
11. While talking about the Background of Intentionality Searle says that Background is nonrepresentational but I feel that it cannot be true. For example, suppose that if I have the ability of understanding certain things differently based on my cultural

²¹⁹. Ibid, p. 126.

abilities and capacities then here I am representing a cultural view of my Background as well, Background cannot be nonrepresentational, because it is the source of all representations.

Even if we take Searle's temperature metaphors for emotional states, for example "warm welcome", though it doesn't represent literally but the notion of warm welcome has certain qualitative features which represent the way welcome is accorded in a society.

12. Searle says that we can experience the causal relation between cause and effect because, for him, causal relation is an intentional relation. But it seems to me that it may not be the case always. If we take the example of raising hand, what we experience here is a mental content (that I want to raise my hand) and physical movement (that I have raised my hand). But the real problem is how does this mental content caused physical movement? Do we really have the experience of that causal relation? Perhaps the answer is, 'not always.'
13. Thus Searle cannot avoid dualism of some sort between the physical processes of the brain and the mental phenomena per se.

5.3. Critique on Multiple Drafts Model Theory

Another naturalistic approach of consciousness which was explained by Daniel Dennett is the Multiple Drafts Model Theory. Dennett, as I have discussed in third chapter, by placing scientific development as the foundation established his theory of consciousness. He tried to explain how consciousness emerges and functions without defining what consciousness is. There are many difficulties with Dennett's theory of consciousness.

1. In the study of consciousness a Heterophenomenologist has to listen to the subjects and take what they say seriously, and then compare it with the brain events of subject and surrounding environment. But there is a possibility for the assertion of subject to go wrong. As Descartes pointed out in *Meditations* that he has believed many falsehoods in his life. So the subject's belief which plays the

key role in Heterophenomenology may take us away from the reality. Another important thing is that there is a possibility that subjects make mistakes in verbalizing their beliefs. Interesting thing here is that Dennett himself is skeptical about subject's assertions that he clearly mentioned in his book. Then, how can Dennett's Heterophenomenology study consciousness?

2. In his Heterophenomenology Dennett clearly talk about two things; 1. Scientists should interpret a subject's first-person reports as expressions of the subject's beliefs (about their consciousness experience) and 2. Scientists should treat people as incorrigible about what it is like to be them. But here the second proposition that scientists should treat people as incorrigible about *what it is like to be them* seems to contradict with his own claim. On the one hand he says that,

*"You are not authoritative about what is happening in you, but only about what seems to be happening in you, and we are giving you total, dictatorial authority over the account of how it seems to you, about what it is like to be you"*²²⁰

On the other hand he says that,

*"...there are circumstances in which people are just wrong about what they are doing and how they are doing it. It is not that they lie in the experimental situation, but that they confabulate; they fill in the gaps, guess, speculate, mistake theorizing for observing. The relation between what they say and whatever it is that drives them to say what they say could hardly be more obscure, both to us heterophenomenologists on the outside and to the subjects themselves. They don't have any way of "seeing" (with an inner eye, presumably) the processes that govern their assertions, but that doesn't stop them from having heartfelt opinions to express."*²²¹

Here my objection is that, in case of *what it is like to be them*, on the one hand he is giving full authority to subjects and assertions and on the other hand he is skeptic about them.

3. While explaining Heterophenomenology whatever distinction he made between "*subject's beliefs*" and "*subject's conscious experience*" is not clear. But whatever

²²⁰. Daniel C. Dennett, *Consciousness Explained* (New York: Back Bay Books/Little, Brown and Company, 1991), p. 96.

²²¹. Ibid, p. 94.

- the subjects experience consciously that creates a belief in the subjects, and consequently that belief will become assertion of subjects' experience. So it is not clear how "*subjects' beliefs*" and "*subject's conscious experience*" are not the same. At any rate they are connected, even if they are not exactly the same.
4. As Chalmers argued, Dennett reserved many pages in his book for outlining a detailed cognitive model, which he puts forward as an explanation of consciousness. On the face of it, the model is centrally a model of the capacity of a subject to verbally report a mental state. Really Dennett is reducing consciousness into the cognitive processes in the brain processes rather than explaining how consciousness comes into being from the brain processes.
 5. The way Dennett tried, through an objective science of consciousness, to understand or to explain the subjective conscious mental states really changes the notion of subject as if there is nothing other than computational processes in the brain. It seems to me that the *Multiple Drafts Model* is not about consciousness, but rather it is a third-person account of the brain activities.
 6. Some philosophers declare that he is the only one who denies the *existence* of the consciousness. In one sense it seems that they are right; the way he explained qualia, as not different from functional roles they play, shows that there are no qualia. In the same way if Dennett says that consciousness is nothing but merely operations of the brain, then there is no place for consciousness as separate entity. But it appears he cannot talk about the subjects' experiences without accepting the existence of consciousness.
 7. It is acceptable for all kinds of philosophers that there are qualitative features of consciousness. But the main thing here is that we need a neurobiological account of exactly how micro-level brain processes *cause* qualitative states of consciousness, and how exactly those states are *features* of neurobiological systems. Scientifically we have knowledge of only a small subset of input and processing. Just on the basis of this how can we construct a theory of mental phenomena? As Thomas Nagel says "*a theory of Consciousness that doesn't include mental events is like a book about Picasso that doesn't mention his*

paintings,”²²² Dennett also says that mental phenomena are caused by neurobiological processes but he does not explain how it is possible.

8. We all have adopted different definitions of consciousness. Whenever we use the word ‘consciousness’ we use it according to the definition we have adopted. Dennett, however, does not offer any definition of consciousness. How can we explain something if we cannot even say or define what it is?
9. According to his theory we/even he cannot distinguish between human beings and unconscious zombies who behave exactly as if they were human beings.
10. Dennett’s explanation of consciousness neither seems like any new discovery in the study of consciousness nor seems like the possibility of explaining consciousness but it seems like a form of intellectual pathology. The aim of his account seems like fixing consciousness at any cost as nothing but neuronal processes in the brain.
11. The idea that only things that can be scientifically verified really exist is called *Verificationism*. For Dennett whatever we say about mental phenomena should be verified by science. On the basis of this Dennett denies that there can exist any phenomena that have first-person ontology. He denies first-person point of view because scientific verification always takes the third-person point of view, and nothing exists which cannot be verified by scientific methods. This is the deepest mistake in the Dennett’s theory. That is why it seems to me that his theory is not a model of consciousness, but a model of content and the way in which content relates to consciousness.
12. Dennett’s *Consciousness Explained* doesn't explain what consciousness is or where it comes from, but rather explains how it operates and the illusions it generates. That is why some people even parody the title of the book as “Consciousness Explained Away” and the conclusion is that it cannot recognize the existence of subjective states of consciousness.
13. All creatures have conscious states, though their consciousness differs in degrees. Our conscious mental phenomenon has a special feature that is language.

²²². Thomas Nagel, *Others Minds: Critical Essays 1969-1994* (New York: Oxford University Press, 1995), p. 88.

Language plays vital role in explaining consciousness. Our beliefs, thoughts and actions are shaped by the language. My question to Dennett is; *who it is that who assigns meaning to words and texts?* If there is no conscious entity other than neurobiological processes then it is difficult to explain how the words and texts get the meanings they have.

14. Dennett's theory has not finally refuted dualism because there is still a subject of experience as distinguished from the physical world and the brain.

5.4. Critique on Hard problem of Consciousness

1. What is the difference between the phenomenal consciousness and awareness? As it is already discussed, according to Chalmers, awareness is the psychological state of consciousness. Whenever we are aware, we have access to information about the object we are aware of. Awareness is that *access*. It is a psychological state that has a *causal nature*. We can consider *Awakeness, Introspection, Reportability, Self-Consciousness, Attention, Voluntary control, and Knowledge* etc. as psychological properties. consciousness is appropriately reserved for the phenomenal aspect of consciousness. The phenomenal sense of consciousness includes emotions, pains, sensations etc. According to this, to be conscious is just to instantiate some phenomenal quality.

There is a possibility that many of these psychological states are associated with phenomenal states of consciousness too. It seems that a clear-cut division between psychological and phenomenal states cannot be made, since every psychological state can have phenomenal qualities.

2. Chalmers believes that if our neural organization were duplicated in silicon then it would have the same experiences as we have. But John Searle strongly opposes this notion and says that the silicon brain cannot have the subjective aspect because consciousness is tied to a specific biology. Because of that a silicon isomorph of a human will have no consciousness.

3. Chalmers has failed in explaining what is the abstract pattern of causal interaction between the specific physical makeup of a system which is responsible for the rise of conscious experience.
4. From the beginning he believes that consciousness is irreducible to the brain processes because conscious experiences are not identical with physical brain features. But while talking about three principles he has tried to link physical and phenomenal together. This leads to a form of dualism.
5. While talking about qualia Chalmers says that though subjective experience has physical base but it cannot be explained by the functional organization of physical. But while talking about the principle of organizational invariance, he links fine-grained functional organization with qualitatively identical experiences. He also says that, conscious experience does not occur in a vacuum. It is always tied to cognitive processing, and it is likely that in some sense it arises from the processing.²²³ But this only corroborates a form of dualism.
6. According to Chalmers what matters in explaining consciousness is the brain's abstract causal organization. But this proposal is not explained to fill the explanatory gap between mental and physical. He accepts the explanatory gap between the brain processes and the states of consciousness.
7. The third principle of Chalmers is *the double-aspect theory of information* which categorizes information space into two parts. Here an information space is an abstract object; this abstract information space is embedded in physical processing and in conscious experience. The double-aspect theory suggests that the phenomenal aspect of the information space cannot be collapsed into the information space itself. From this one cannot infer that the physical processing is itself the phenomenal information space. So the division between physical and phenomenal information space will make room for dualism, though not in the Cartesian sense.

²²³. David J. Chalmers, *The Conscious Mind: In Search of a Fundamental Theory* (USA: Oxford University Press, 1996), p. 20.

8. The ‘hard’ problem of consciousness does not eliminate the Cartesian problem, it rather accentuates it by making room for a ‘phenomenal consciousness which is irreducible, fundamental and is ontological real.

5.5. The Possible Dualistic Approach

Some people may say that accepting dualism means accepting defeat but I want to say the opposite; going away from dualism is going away from the reality. For the last so many years the naturalist philosophers and the natural scientists have been attacking the philosophical theory of dualism. In the same way the present day neuroscientists and cognitive scientists are trying their level best to explain consciousness through science. Still, after so much of scientific development in the brain studies, the mechanism of brain which is being treated as the key for explaining human consciousness remains hidden. Explaining human consciousness is going beyond the scientific development; at the same time it seems that there is no guarantee that we can explain consciousness even if we know all the brain processes. I think we need to adopt a paradigm-shift in understanding consciousness which is different from the previous and existing approaches. Because consciousness is not just about the brain processing or neural mechanism but it’s about the first person subjective awareness and its relation with the external world. It doesn’t mean that we should explain consciousness away from the brain but it only means that it is more than the neural mechanisms in the brain. Every explanation of consciousness must follow different method. As Dennett says,

“The neuroscientists are right to insist that you don’t really have a good model of consciousness until you solve the problem of where it fits in the brain, but the cognitive scientists (the AIers and the cognitive psychologists, for instance) are right to insist that you don’t really have a good model of consciousness until you solve the problem of what functions it performs and how it performs them – mechanically, without benefit of Mind.”²²⁴

In the same way dualist too have a method of explaining consciousness; obviously it differs from other methods. Dualism believes that explaining consciousness on the basis

²²⁴. Daniel C. Dennett, *Consciousness Explained* (New York: Back Bay Books/Little, Brown and Company, 1991), p. 256.

of causal mechanism or on the basis of neural functioning is just correlating consciousness with causal mechanism or neural functioning, but it is not the right way of explaining mental phenomena. By knowing causal mechanism or neural functioning we may correlate the brain and *Mind* but correlation cannot be considered as explanation. Neural processing cannot be a thought processing because neurons are not *Thoughts*. As a matter of fact, there is no one in the brain to determine the brain process; no one is there to determine the neurobiological process in the body; there is no one in the heart to determine the blood-pumping; there is no one in kidneys to determine to remove excess organic molecules from the blood and to remove waste products of metabolism. There is no one in the body to regulate our bodily mechanisms like temperature, adjusting our metabolism. Seriously there is no one in mother's womb to determine the process of reproduction; the whole process is done without any order, neither from inside nor from outside. We are not even sure when consciousness entered in embryo. Each and every organ of our body or organ of any other animal species has a special functioning but there is no one in the body or in that particular organ to determine their respective functioning. These organs do not have any conscious mental states but they have conscious functional states. These organs have their essential feature; they do not function by order but functioning is its nature. Liquidity is the quality of water and flowing down is its natural function. No one determines water to flow down; it functions according to its natural capacities. But there is someone to determine the thought processing of conscious mental phenomena. That thought process is determined by a subject and experience by that subject. Consciousness is always someone's conscious mental state, and it is of something. Wherever consciousness is present there is presence of a subject because there cannot be consciousness without the present of a subject. Thus, explaining neural processing and causal mechanism, or explaining correlations between neural processes and thought processes, cannot be the true explanation of consciousness.

Thought processing is the main activity in a conscious state. Thought processing and the neural processing are two different aspects. Our scientific theories are just trying to correlate the neural processing with thought processing. By doing that the problem of

consciousness cannot be solved. For example, food and the feeling of hunger are two different things. Hunger is not caused by the food but caused by the biological processing. In the same way neural processing can cause further neural processing but cannot cause '*thought*' because neurons are neurons and electrons are electrons. A thought is a thought and it cannot be made of materials because thought is different from matter. Neuroscience and cognitive science can only explain the functional processing or functional mechanism but consciousness cannot be explained through the functional definition. Neuroscience may explain the functions of cognition but consciousness cannot be fixed in functional mechanism. Explanations of our conscious experience in terms of our neuronal functioning will never explain our experience because we don't experience our neurons and our neural processing, or causal mechanism doesn't know who we are. Our experience is something more than the individual neuron activity. Our neurons don't carry our identity but they can only carry the cognitive processes.

Whether my senses are in touch with my conscious state are not is not the criteria to have mental states and to carry on my identity. Mental phenomena and the senses are two different entities. It is true, as Descartes says, that I am not conscious of the paper lying on the table but I am conscious of the thought of the paper in my *Mind*. So cognitive processing and thought processing are two different entities and cognitive processes can be known through third-person point of view but thought-processing has only accesses to the first-person point of view. Some say that dreaming state is a conscious state; some say dreaming state is not a conscious state, and some others say semi-conscious state. But I am not clear which state it is but my dreaming state maintains my identity. In dreaming state, though my cognitive processes are not involved, I maintain my identity and it represents me only. So there is a clear-cut division between the cognitive processing and thought processing. My dreaming state represents only me, that is, what I represent myself when I am awake. The body alone cannot account for consciousness. Here we should not forget the Cartesian notion that the essence of the mental is thought and the essence of the body is extension.

In a thought processing, *who it is that who is assigning meaning to words and texts?* Obviously it cannot be neural processing or brain functioning. We can agree up to a point with naturalist philosophers that the conscious states are dependent on the brain states. Thinking or thought processes, however, are not physical. Reducibility of consciousness or thought processing to the brain processing cannot explain mental phenomena. As I have already discussed on the basis of Searle's silicon brain thought experiment, the mental phenomena cannot be duplicated through the silicon brain processes or any other processes. Mental phenomena are natural and they will remain natural as no artificial intelligence researcher can inject it in me through any process. On the basis of this we may conclude that reducing mental phenomena to physical causal processing is not possible. If it is possible then silicon brain thought experiment would have produced positive results. The silicon brain processing could not replace all the mental phenomena. This reality was being recognized thousands of years back even in Indian philosophical systems.

*"The unity of the two, the self and the reality, resulted in pure being, free from all determinations, indescribable by any concepts, or describable only by negations (BrhadaranyakaUpansad)"*²²⁵

It is true that consciousness is the process of mental phenomena that invites everybody to recognize the primacy of consciousness. Consciousness is not everything but it is just an entrance or threshold to have everything. Consciousness creates an observer independent reality; it creates the reality of anything in the world, like money, festivals, games, parties and so on. They are created by the conscious subject and their existence is observer relative; they are relative to the conscious agent. Consciousness is something that is above the atoms and molecules that compose the brain and it is not a scientifically investigatable principle. The hidden structure of consciousness lies beyond the scientific investigation and it may probably be inaccessible to us. The reason is, as Searle say,

"The difference is that Consciousness has first-person ontology; that is, it only exists as experienced by some human or animal, and therefore, it

²²⁵. Bina Gupta, *CIT Consciousness* (Oxford University Press, 2003), p. 2.

cannot be reduced to something that has third-person ontology, something that exists independently of experiences. It is as simple as that."²²⁶

So we have to be very careful while dealing with mental phenomena or thought process because it has no third person reality or accessibility. It is purely a subjective phenomenon. The thought process has nothing to do with cognition, cognition is purely a biological phenomena. In thought process the *reason* or *rationality* plays key role in understanding the external world in the *conscious journey*. The subject/subjectivity moves with that rational capacity in understanding the external world. It cannot be understood from the third-person objective point of view. The most influential thought experiment about consciousness is Thomas Nagel's "*what is it like to be a bat?*" He claims that no amount of third-person knowledge could tell us what it is like to be a bat. In support of Thomas Nagel Searle says,

*"The ontology of the mental is essentially first person ontology. That is just a fancy way of saying that every mental state has to be somebody's mental state. Mental states only exist as subjective, first-person phenomena."*²²⁷

Like consciousness, *reason* or *reasoning* is inseparable from mental phenomena. *Reasoning* seems necessarily a feature of the functioning of the whole conscious subject, and cannot be conceived of as composed of neural processings or causal mechanisms. This would mean that reason is an irreducible faculty of *Mind* that exists in higher animals. This rational capacity of the human beings differs in degree with other beings and other species. Another important thing which is a drawback of scientific explanation is that there is no Cartesian *Self*. According to all the scientific explanations, there is no central processing point anywhere in the brain. For them each part of the body is connected with some part of the brain but there is no central point where all brain processing meets and produce some mental state. If it is the case then, how can a cognition which involves more than one sense in perceiving something produce a unified mental state? How could the unified output be possible? For a dualist it doesn't even matter whether there is a central processing unit or not. Because I am not trying to locate consciousness in causal preprocessing but in a person or self, those who try to locate

²²⁶. John Searle, *Journal of Consciousness Studies* (Imprint Academic, 2002), Vol. 9, pp. 57-64.

²²⁷. John R. Searle, *The Rediscovery of the Mind* (Cambridge, London: The MIT Press, 1992), p.70.

consciousness in a causal mechanism have to explain how these cognitive processes interact to produce unified mental phenomena. But the dualist is not concerned about the central processing unit or any Cartesian theater in Dennett sense. For me, consciousness is above all these biological or neural processes.

There is *Mind* above all the bodily mechanisms and above all the neural processes. But, as to the question; whether it is mortal or immortal? To say that *Mind* exists after the death of the *Body* does not make any sense because one doesn't know that someone's *Mind* existing after the death of his *Body*. But neither I am knowing my own existence after the death of my *Body*. If the *Mind* does exist after the death of the *Body*, then the *Mind* itself should know whether it is existing or not. Even if it exists, it cannot have any affect on this physical world. So thinking of the existence of *Mind* after the death of the *Body* seems meaningless. It doesn't mean that there is no place for dualism. It doesn't mean that there is no *Mind* but it only means that it is not in our capacity to know whether the *Mind* exists after the death of the *Body*. Knowing others' *Mind* through third-person point of view itself is not difficult. But expecting to know other *Minds* after their departure from the body is not in our capacity.

On the basis of above discussion the *Mind-Body* dualism seems logical and rational. Consciousness is not an accidental reality of the causal mechanism but a fundamental part of reality existing permanently. No matter how much neuroscience we learn, we will never be in a position to explain consciousness; it can never be explained by anything physical, biological, or chemical. The complex qualities of *Mind*, like reason, emotion, reflection and decision-making cannot be found in the behavior of our neurons. Language plays an enormous role in the structuring of the human *Mind*. However the languageless creatures do not cease to be conscious. As I have already mentioned, all creatures have consciousness and rational capacities but their conscious states and rational capacities differ in degrees but are not completely absent.

CONCLUSION

Throughout the history of philosophy most of the philosophers have adopted some kind of dualism. It is even common for most of the western and non-western cultures and their religious practices. The major religions are almost all dualist: Christianity and Islam believe in an eternal, non-physical *Soul*, and Hindus believe in the *Atman* or divine self within. Among the existing religions, Buddhism alone rejects the idea of a persisting inner self or *Soul*. So whether we are monist or dualist or pluralist or whatever we are, but when we enter into the realm of consciousness the fundamental thing we have to understand is that, on the one hand, there is an invariable relation between mental and physical, on the other hand they are two separate independent entities. Once we ignore this we go in a wrong direction. On the basis of this whatever we construct will collapse in no time.

The classical Greek philosophical thought was dualistic except the materialist thought. As I have discussed in the first chapter, almost all Greek philosophers are dualists, but some dualists talk about the relation between the *Soul* and *Body* and some others talk about the *Soul* and the primitive matter. Ancient philosophers wanted to explain the nature of the universal through a single principle. For Thales it was water, for Heraclitus it was Fire, for Anaximenes it was Air, and for Empedocles it was four elements together (*earth, Water, Fire, and Air*). By relating the life principle or the *Soul* with these primordial matters they were explaining evolution. They were dualists but not in the sense in which we are talking about dualism now. At a later stage philosophers shifted their attention from primordial matter to individual bodies. But they didn't give up immaterial aspect of man. The greater period in ancient philosophical thought was the era of Socrates, Plato and Aristotle. They too didn't give up dualistic aspect of philosophy. Plato, though he was not the father of dualism but he could defend the dualist doctrines of his predecessors and provide strong arguments for dualism. Aristotle also followed the path of his predecessors but tried to explain it in a different way. For the whole scholastic

philosophy, the immaterialist aspect of man or the *Soul* was the central principle, without which they could not move forward.

It was in 17th century that a drastic change had taken place in philosophizing human nature. It was Descartes who could change the whole scenario of philosophizing things and paved a way for a new kind of investigation. His influences are shall strongly working in our philosophical quest. That is why he is called the father of modern philosophy. As I have discussed in the second chapter he was purely a dualist philosopher. But contemporary philosophy has tried to deviate from the dualistic approach and explain mental phenomena in a naturalistic ways. In this process Daniel Dennett's theory has completely gone away from the dualistic approach because Dennett has tried to correlate consciousness and mental phenomena with neural and causal mechanism, and tried to explain it from objective, third-person point of view. But his Hetrophenomenological method could not escape from criticisms by the dualists. But John Searle and David Chalmers, though they have tried to explain consciousness and mental phenomena in a naturalistic point of view, they could not completely deviate from the dualistic stand. Though they have claimed that their stand is not dualism but explanation of the subjective mental phenomena by Searle and hard problem of consciousness of Chalmers are keeping them very much in the dualist realm. Subjective mental phenomena can only be reachable or knowable through first-person point of view. Though the naturalists have tried their level best to eliminate *Mind*/consciousness as a separate entity but at the end they could not explain everything in objective third-person point of view. Though the naturalists could locate the neural functioning and causal mechanism spatially but they could not locate thought processing or conscious experiences spatially, because the later do not have physical properties. They are purely subjective and accessible only from the first-person point of view.

As Heraclitus says that everything is in a state of constant flux, we all are in that process only. In that constant flux we are still maintaining our identity. In this constant

flux the neural processing or causal mechanism cannot maintain our personal identity because they do not know who we are. It is me “a thinking thing” which maintains what I am. It is that thinking thing which is responsible for all my physical and mental activities. The continuity of my *Self* identity is carried purely through my subjective mental phenomena but not by the neural processing. That is why I am responsible for what I did. That is why I am awarded for what I achieved and punished for doing wrong in the past. So we have to believe that there is something beyond all these physical processings which holds mental phenomena and carry my identity throughout the changes.

At any cost dualism cannot be eliminated because there is an irreducible, first-person, subjective feel that, as Thomas Nagel questioned in his paper “What it is like to be a Bat?”, cannot be captured in an objective, third-person point of view. *Mind* and body are two independent realities but it doesn’t mean that they can exist separately. It only means that they have separate way of functioning; one has objective reality and another one has subjective reality; one can be reachable from third-person point of view and another one is reachable only from first-person point of view; one works through neural functioning based on causal mechanism but another one exists purely in consciousness through thought processing. The way bodily functioning works according to its natural capacities, in the same way *Mind* too has its own way of functioning. The only difference is that there is no one in the body to determine the bodily functioning but there is someone to determine our thought processing or our mental phenomena. At the same time psychological and physical laws are two different realms and cannot be the same and they cannot be related. The *Mind* has its own nature; it cannot be identified through any point of view except first-person point of view.

Reducing *Mind* (bundle of mental events) or mental properties to matter is not acceptable. And here I am not taking the *Mind* far away from the body; they are very much related and bound closely together though they are independently real. Wherever there is *Mind* there has to be a *Body* but not vice-versa. Another important thing we have

to remember whenever we talk about mental and physical phenomena. How do these two different phenomena interact with each other? What is the connecting principle? It is true that epistemically or scientifically it is impossible to explain the interaction of these two different phenomena. But logically or rationally we can understand the problem. These two entities are independent in their functioning, they are separate entities; one is mental and another one is physical. But ontologically they are united. We cannot understand their independent existence by separating them. An invariable relation binds them together and their relation is bound in such a way that one cannot exist without the other. If we try to take one away from the other then the existence of both ceases. So separating them and trying to know the connecting principle is a difficult thing for any kind of approach. They are there and they are invariably united but they are not one.

If we speak of *Mind* and *Body*, the way we speak of the reality of worldly things, then *Mind* and *Body* are ontologically two separate independent entities. Explaining, epistemically how they function is an easy task but explaining their relation or their unity in epistemic sense is a very difficult task and beyond our capacity. Our rational capacity and our scientific development cannot go into that deep. We can only say that we are the combination of two separate independent entities; one is based on our conscious mental phenomena and the other based on the neural functioning. On the one hand our scientific development can only explain our cognitive capacities; on the other hand our rational capacity can only explain the subjective mental phenomena. But beyond these aspects suggesting an account of how they are bound together is a difficult task. Their unity is ontological unity. We cannot explain that unity but, somehow, we can contemplate that there are two separate independent realities. This is the duality which is unreachable scientifically but our rational capacity can grasp this duality. We can say that we cannot explain and express the relation between *Mind* and *Body*, and to borrow a phrase from Indian philosophical thought, we can say that it is *anirvacaniya* or ineffable.

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