

STABILITY AND SHIFTS IN PARTY SUPPORT IN INDIA

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in

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By

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DECLARATION

I hereby declare that the work embodied in the present thesis entitled, "*Stability and Shifts in Party Support in India*", is an original research work carried out by me under the supervision of Prof. K. C Suri, Department of Political Science, for the award of Doctor of Philosophy in Political Science from University of Hyderabad.

I declare to the best of my knowledge that no part of this thesis has been earlier submitted for the award of research degree or diploma in part or full to this or any other university or institutions.

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This is to certify that Ms Rajshree Dutta (Registration No: 10SPPH03) has carried out the research work embodied in the present thesis entitled “*Stability and Shifts in Party Support in India*”, under my supervision and guidance for the fulfillment of the requirements for the award of Doctor of Philosophy degree in Political Science.

I declare to the best of my knowledge that this thesis is an independent work and no part of it was earlier submitted for the award of research degree or diploma in part or full to this or any other university or institutions.

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List of Acronyms

Acronyms Used for Parties, Indicators, Electoral Systems, Countries, Institutions, and Associations

AAGSP: All Assam Gana Sangram Parishad

AAP: Aam Admi Party

AASU: All Assam Students Union

ABLTC: Akhil Bharatiya Lok Tantrik Congress

AD: Apna Dal

AGP: Asom Gana Parishad

AIADMK: All India Anna Dravid Munnetra Kalagham

AIICT: All India Indira Congress (Tiwari)

AIMIM: All India Majlis-I-Ittehad-ul-Muslimeen

AITC: All India Trinamool Congress

AIUDEF/AUDEF: All India United Democratic Front

ASDC: Autonomous State Demand Committee

BC: Bangla Congress

BJD: Biju Janata Dal

BJP: Bharatiya Janata Party

BJS: Bharatiya Jana Sangh

BKD: Bharatiya Kranti Dal

BLD: Bharatiya Lok Dal

BPF: Bodoland People's Front

BPP (S): Bodo People's Party (Sangsuma)

BSP: Bahujan Samaj Party

BVA: Bahujan Vikas Aaghadi

CFD: Congress for Democracy

CPC: Closeness of Party Competition

CPI: Communist Party of India

CPIM(L): CPI (Marxist- Leninist)-Liberation

CPM: Communist Party of India (Marxist)

CSDS: Centre for the Study of Developing Societies

CSP: Congress Socialist Party

DMK: Dravida Munnetra Kazhagam

DSP: Democratic Socialist Party

ENP: Effective Number of Parties

EV: Electoral Volatility

FB: Forward Bloc

FPTP: First Past the Post

GC: Gan Congress

GP: Gantantra Parishad

HJCBL: Haryana Janhit Congress (Bhajan Lal)

HVC: Haryana Vikas Congress

HVP: Haryana Vikas Party

ICS: Indian Congress Socialist

INC: Indian National Congress

INC(I): Indian National Congress (Indira)

INC(O): Indian National Congress (Organization)

INC (T): Indian National Congress (Tiwari)

INC(U): Indian National Congress (Urs)

INLD: Indian National Lok Dal

IUML: Indian Union Muslim League

JC: Jana Congress

JD: Janata Dal

JD(S): Janata Dal (Secular)

JD(U): Janata Dal (United)

JKD: Jharkhand Dal

JKNC: Jammu & Kashmir National Conference

JKNPP: Jammu & Kashmir Panthers Party
JKPDP: Jammu & Kashmir People's Democratic Party
JMM: Jharkhand Mukti Morcha
JNPS/JPNS: Janata Party Secular
JP: Janata Party
JSP: Lok Janshakti Party
KCP: Karnataka Congress Party
KEC/KC: Kerala Congress
KEC(M): Kerala Congress-Mani
KLP: Kerela Lok Party
KMPP: Kisan Mazdoor Praja Party
LBP: Lok Bhalai Party
LD: Lok Dal
LDF: Left Democratic Front
LF: Left Front
LJSP/LJNSP: Lok Jan Shakti Party
LKD: Lok Dal
LSP: Lok Satta Party
MADMK: MGR Anna Dravida Munnetra Khazagham
MDMK: Marumalarchi Dravida Munnetra Khazagham
MGP: Maharashtrawadi Gomantak Party
MNF: Mizo National Front
MNP/MPP: Manipur People's Party
MPVC: Madhya Pradesh Vikas Congress
MRP: Manipur Revolutionary Party
MSCP: Manipur State Congress Party
MUL: Muslim League
NAGP: Natun Asom Gana Parishad
NC: National Conference
NCO: National Congress Organisation
NCP: Nationalist Congress Party
NDA: National Democratic Alliance
NF: National Front
NNO: Naga National Organization
NPC: Nagaland People's Council

NPF: Naga People's Front
NPP: National Panthers Party
OBC: Other Backward Caste
OECD: Organisation for Economic Co-operation and Development
PC: Party Coalitions
PDA: People's Democratic Alliance
PDP: People's Democratic Party
PDS: Party of Democratic Socialism
PMK: Pattali Makkal Katchi
PR: Proportional Representation
PRAP: Praja Rajyam Party
PSP: Praja Socialist Party
PT: Party Turnover
PWP: Peasants' and Workers Party
RJD: Rashtriya Janata Dal
RLD: Rashtriya Lok Dal
RLSP: Rashtriya Lok Samata Party
RPD: Rashtriya Parivartan Dal
RPI: Republican Party of India
RPI(A): Republican Party of India (Athvale)
RSP: Revolutionary Socialist Party
SAD: Shiromani Akali Dal
SAD (M): Shiromani Akali Dal (Simranjit Singh Mann)
SAP: Samata Party
SC: Schedule Caste
SCF: Schedule Caste Federation
SDF: Sikkim Democratic Front
SHS: Shiv Sena
SJP: Samajwadi Janata Party
SMPS: Single Member Plurality System
SP: Samajwadi Party
SSP: Samyukta Socialist Party
ST: Schedule Tribe
SWA: Swatantra Party
TDP: Telugu Desam Party
TDP(LP): Telugu Desam Party (Lakshmi Parvati)
TF: Third Front
TMC: Tamil Maanila Congress
TNC: Total Net Change

TPS: Telangana Praja Samiti
TRS: Telangana Rashtra Samiti
TUS: Tripura Upajati Juba Samiti
UC: Utkal Congress
UDF: United Democratic Front
UF: United Front
UFN: United Front of Nagaland
UGDP: United Goans Democratic
Party
UK: United Kingdom
ULFA: United Liberation Front of
Assam
UMF: United Minority Front

UNPA: United National Progressive
Alliance
UPA: United Progressive Alliance
USA: United States of America
UTC: Utkal Congress
VCK: Viduthalai Chiruthaigal
Katchi
VI: Volatility Index
VT: Voter Turnout
WBSP: West Bengal Socialist Party
YSRCP: Yuvajana Sramika Rythu
Congress Party

Chapter-1

Introduction

1.1 Significance and Objectives of the Study

Party systems have been a key factor in the study of political parties and more broadly in comparative political analysis. Political parties competing with each other for elective office and control of government form a party system. Political scientists have sought not only to characterize them, but also to understand their causes and consequences, particularly their sources in electoral laws and cleavage structures and their effects on government and system stability, and more broadly, the quality of democracy (Wolinetz, 2006:51).

Democracies in the modern times have evolved around party systems in which two or more than two political parties compete for political power (Diego and Gonzalez, 2004: 28). While we see stable party systems in the developed western democracies, we see considerable instability in the party systems of the developing countries. This is often characterized by extensive shifts in voter support to political parties, different degrees of ideological polarization or convergence. So the question of party system and stability of electoral support acquires greater importance in developing democracies than the developed ones.

In India, we find frequent party splits and mergers as well formation of new parties, leading to a significant increase in the number of parties at national and state levels. This increase in the number of parties may lead to increase in instability in the party support. This may further result in increase in voter turnout, closeness of party competition, party turnover and formation of party coalitions. However, the increase in the number of parties should not be always looked upon with alarm or as a threat to the stability of democracy. Viewed positively, the entry of more parties introduces vibrancy as well as fluidity in the party system (Suri, 2007:54).

Much of the work relating to the area on party system change and stability of party support has been done by the scholars in Western democracies (Duverger, 1954; Sartori, 1976; Pedersen, 1983; Gallagher, 1991; Lijphart, 1999; Taagepera, 2003; Grofman, 2003; Mainwaring, 2007; and Zoco, 2007). There has been considerable work on the nature of and changes in India's party system since independence (Weiner, 1957; Kothari, 1964; Arora, 2002; Manor, 2002; Hasan, 2002; Mehra, 2003;

Yadav, 2003; Palshikar, 2003; Chibber, 2004; Sridharan, 2004; Sarangi, 2005; and Suri, 2005). While the works on Indian party politics analyze the factors for party system change, there are hardly any studies that measure the extent, direction and nature of party system change. Most of the studies done in India are either in the form of political commentary, descriptive accounts and critical interpretation based on the field research.

The present study uses quantitative data on general elections in India to find out the relationship between stability of party support and party system change. The objective of the study, therefore, is to understand stability and shifts in party support in India and how it is related to the party system change, firstly, at the national level and secondly, at the level of states. The stability model of competition refers to the parties' ability to maintain relatively stable electoral support from one election to the next. The greater the variations, within each party and overall, the less stable the party system. It is generally believed that when there is an increase in the effective number of parties, the party system becomes unstable. The scholars who work in this area find several factors that lead to party system change and stability. Among the factors voter turnout, closeness of party competition, party turnover and party alliances are the most important. The thesis will further make an attempt to examine and analyze the patterns of shifts in party support in terms of these variables that prevails at different points of time.

The study basically deals upto 2009 Lok Sabha elections. Since the results of 2014 Lok Sabha elections came out by the time I was completing the work, I have tried to include data relating to the recent election. Detailed discussion on the character of India's party politics at the national and state levels is largely confined to the period preceding the 16th general elections.

1.2 Research Questions

In the study of relationship between party system change and stability of party support, what gains importance is that journalistic as well as academic writing in the last one and a half decades has focused on the increasing importance and influence of number of parties at the national as well as state levels of politics. So also is the focus of Indian party politics. This process has been viewed in two different ways: one as a positive sign potentially indicating a deepening of the democratic process through an

increased pluralism of political forces. A second and contrary view treats this as a potential sign of increasing fragmentation of the Indian electorate and as an indication of increasingly unstable and complex dynamics of electoral competition, i.e. the deinstitutionalization of parties.

The amount of scholarship devoted to this recent trend of increase in the fragmentation of parties in party politics demonstrates the question why there is such a strong academic interest at different levels to find out the relationship between stability of party support and party system change. In case of India, what becomes importance is to understand in what way stability/instability of party support is related to party system change since the first general elections. In other words whether increase/decrease in the effective number of parties has any relationship with the increase/decrease of the electoral volatility at national and state levels over a period of sixteen general elections i.e. 1952-2014.

One possible explanation in the literature which has led to the increase in the number of parties and greater instability in the party support might be the way in which the regional political leaders runs the state governments and the visible prominence of the regional parties at the state level. Especially in the second half of the 1990s and at the turn of the millennium the perception was that regional politicians and regional parties were becoming more important while national parties and politicians with a more all-Indian outlook were on the decline. This increase in the number of regional parties has led to the increase in the effective number of parties. But the question is whether this increase in the effective number of parties or party system change has led to the instability in the party's electoral support.

Therefore, it is necessary to know about the theories of party system change and stability of party support (explained in detail in chapter-2). The understanding of the various theories will contribute towards a fuller understanding of the Indian party system using the measure of effective number of parties and volatility index developed in the west. There have been many studies which deal with factors and nature of party system change in India but in the literature there are very limited studies to measure the direction of party system change and stability of party support especially at the level of states. With the use of these indices in Indian context it will

be easier to know the way in which the party system has been evolving and how far the stability is affected due to this change.

The changing nature of politics is particularly marked in the domain of party politics. Not only party politics changes over time and across space, so do the common definition. The concept of a “party system” describes the salient characteristics of party competition, cooperation and other interparty relationships, such as the absolute number of parties competing in a given political system, the relative strength of parties in terms of seats or votes, patterns of ideological distance between parties or groups of parties in systems where ideology is an important distinguishing feature. Thus, party systems when properly understood, allow us to distinguish the relatively more enduring features and patterns in relationships (Kitschelt 2007: 523).

Party system has undergone tremendous changes in India because of its various features/reasons since the country began its life as a democratic republic. India today has several vibrant political parties both at national and state levels. What began as a one-dominant party system has evolved over the years into a full-fledged multi-party system. The effective number of parties and the variations of party system in different states made political scientists wonder whether India fits into any one type of party system traditionally known in the literature of party politics and whether there is one type of party system in the country or we should speak of multiple party systems in the country (Suri, 2005:7). The greater the variations, within each party and overall, the less stable the party systems model of competition and the less institutionalized the system (Diego and Gonzalez, 2004:29). In the literature of party politics, the stability/instability of party support is often related to effective number of parties.

Based on this the main research question is to examine the relationship between party system change and stability of party support in the Indian context. Such a study assumes importance because the diverse and dynamic country like India represents an example of large-scale and continuing transformation since the past few decades. In such a condition, it is necessary to know the extent of change that has come in the arena of party politics over the years. It is generally believed that when there is increase in the effective number of parties, the party system becomes unstable. The stability model of competition which refers to the parties’ ability to maintain relatively stable electoral support from one election to the next, gets disturbed not

only due to the increase in the number of parties but also due to other factors/variables. These key variables i.e. voter turnout, closeness of party competition, party turnover and coalition politics affect the stability and shifts in party support as found from the literature. It is generally believed that (a) increase in voter turnout results in increase of electoral volatility; (b) greater the closeness of party competition, greater is the electoral volatility; (c) party turnover results in increase in the electoral volatility; and (d) party coalitions result in increase in electoral volatility.

Therefore, in addition to the main research question stated earlier, the study also attempts to answer the following questions in relation to stability of electoral support in India's context:

- (i) How voter turnout affects stability of party support?
- (ii) How closeness of party competition is related to electoral volatility?
- (iii) What is the relationship between party turnover and stability of party support?
- (iv) How party coalitions affect electoral volatility?

1.3 Sources of Information and Methodology

The present study is based on aggregate data analysis relating to general elections in India between 1952-2014. This is done by comparing the trends at the national level and at the level of states. At the state level, it is done by looking at patterns of party support and the nature of party system individually in each state and later on drawing comparison across states. The newly formed states of Chhattisgarh, Jharkhand and Uttarakhand are not taken into consideration as they have undergone only three general elections and it is difficult to find any pattern of relationship in these states. Finally, the patterns that are found at the state level are compared with the patterns at national level. Data needed for this analysis has been taken from the Election Commission of India (i.e. Electoral Data).

The analysis of the electoral data is done using two measures developed by political scientists and applied to the democratic politics in the world. They are: (i) Volatility Index, which tells us about the shifts in electoral support that parties enjoy from one election to another; and (ii) Effective Number of Parties, which tells us about the decrease or increase in the number of parties that play an effective role in shaping party politics in a country or in a political unit. The Volatility Index (VI) and the index of Effective Number of Parties (ENP) show the nature and changes in the party

system in different countries. The indices of volatility and number of parties are calculated both in terms of votes and seats for an election to find out stability/instability of electoral support and party system change in India. In this study, I will refer only to ENP and VI calculated in terms of votes. To know in what way the two variables discussed above are related to each other, i.e. in a positive/direct or in a negative/inverse way, correlation coefficient is calculated between VI and ENP.

The index of closeness of party competition is used to measure the closeness of competition between two parties. Information on voter turnout, party turnover and party coalitions has been compiled and how these factors affects stability of party support are examined using data across election time periods and across states.

1.4 Chapterization

The thesis is organized into seven chapters. The second chapter on “*Theories of Party System Change and Stability of Party Support*” provides an overview of the state of knowledge in relation to the stability of party support and party system change. It explains the major concepts, theories, factors and indices used in analyzing stability of party support and party system change.

The third and fourth chapters “*Stability of Party Support: National Level*” and “*Stability of Party Support: State Level*” seeks to interpret party system change and stability of party support from independence to recent times by looking at the way in which the effective number of parties and electoral support has changed over the years firstly at the national level; secondly at the level of states because we see different party dynamics and trajectories of the development of party system at the state level; and thirdly, by drawing comparison between the two (i.e. at national and state levels).

The fifth and sixth chapters on “*Elements Affecting Stability of Party Support: National Level*” and “*Elements Affecting Stability of Party Support: State Level*” examine and analyze the stability and shifts in party support in terms of variables such as voter turnout, closeness of party competition, party turnover and party coalitions that prevail at different points of time in a comparative way at the national level and at the level of states.

The last/seventh chapter “*Conclusion*” presents a summary of the main findings of the study and suggests additional questions and themes for further investigation regarding stability of party support and party system change. It indicates the questions that need to be answered by means of further research on stability and shifts in party support in India.

A few appendices are provided at the end of the thesis. The first and second appendices demonstrate the procedure followed in the calculation of ENP and Electoral Volatility (EV). The third appendix provides the electoral volatility in terms of seats at the state level in order to show the net change in the seat shares gained or lost by each party from one election to the next. The fourth appendix provides the detail data of seats and votes won by parties at national level and at the level of states. These data are extensively discussed and referred in chapter three to six.

Chapter-2

Theories of Party System Change and Stability of Party Support

2.1 Introduction

This chapter opens up with the discussion of various theories on party system change and stability of party support. Political parties play a unique and crucial role in our democratic system of government. A country's history, national character, culture, traditions, philosophy and economy influence the parties in the way they shape up and function. Also, the legal framework, the electoral system and the political environment influence the working of the parties (Suri, 2005:13). Political competition demands that at least two parties, which forms a party system effectively contest an election. The party system of any democracy is a never-ending dynamic process in itself. Parties are instruments of change as well as being themselves subject to change. By competing in elections and mobilizing citizens behind particular visions of society as well as through their performance in the legislature, parties offer citizens meaningful choices in governance, provides opportunity for political participation and to shape the country's future.

The chapter is organised into six sections: the second section of this chapter discusses the meaning of party system and its types and how the electoral system affects a party system. The third section explains the meaning of party system change and the indicator to measure party system change. The fourth section focuses on stability of party support, various factors affecting stability of party support and the index to measure stability of party support. The relationship between party system change and stability of party support is brought out in the fifth section. The last section summarizes the main points of the chapter.

2.2 Party System and Party System Types

2.2.1 Party system

Political parties competing with each other to control government forms a party system. A party system consists of regular and recurring interactions among its component parties. Party systems involve both competition and co-operation between the different parties in that system. Thus, party systems have been a key factor in the study of political parties and more broadly in comparative analysis and research. One of the first 'systemic' uses of the term 'party system' can be found in Duverger's

Political Parties. Duverger (1954: 203) argues that: “with the exception of the single-party states, several parties co-exist in each country: the forms and modes of their co-existence define the ‘party system’ of the particular country being considered”.

The focus of party systems literature has changed over time. Initially, the emphasis was on continuity, more recently, it has been on changes in party systems. In addition, transitions to democracy have sparked interest in how party systems become entrenched or institutionalized (Mainwaring and Scully, 1995: 52-53). Duverger says that “a party system is defined by a particular relationship among all characteristics like numbers, respective sizes, alliances, geographical location, political distribution and so on” (Duverger, 1954: 203). According to Sartori, “Parties makes for a ‘system’ only when they are parts (in the plural); and a party system is precisely the system of interactions resulting from inter-party competition” (Sartori, 1976:44). Thus Duverger and Sartori stress upon the number of parties and classification of different types of party systems.

2.2.2 Classification of party systems

However, in classifying party systems the first issue that needs to be addressed is which parties should be included and which excluded as being within the party system. Sartori has devised a ‘criterion of irrelevance’ for determining which parties should be included and which excluded when classifying party systems. His criterion involves two conditions for inclusion, if a party meets neither of them it should not be counted as part of the party system: (a) coalition potential: the party must be needed, on at least some occasions for forming a coalition that can control government; and (b) blackmail potential: the party’s existence may affect the tactics of party competition of those parties that do have coalition potential. This criterion solves the problem of inclusion and exclusion of a party in the particular party system.

Alan Ware (1996) has identified four important factors that needs to be taken into consideration while classifying different types of party systems: (a) the extent to which parties penetrate in the society: party penetration in society affects competition between parties in two ways, firstly, the less penetration there is, the easier it will be for new parties to emerge and compete with existing parties and secondly, the greater the social penetration of parties, the more they can concentrate on retaining the support of their loyalties; (b) the ideologies of the parties: how a party system behaves

also depends on the ideologies of the parties in that system or rather on the particular combination of ideologies represented; (c) the ability of the parties towards the legitimacy of the regime: accepting the legitimacy of a regime and the legitimacy of claims by other groups in that regime makes for greater stability in a party system even when ideological distance remains fairly high. Moreover, a failure to accept the legitimacy of others in the political arena may produce great instability; and (d) the number of parties in the system: the party systems are classified only by taking into account the number and not the relative sizes of parties. Taking into consideration the number of parties, as also initially adopted by Sartori, there are mainly four kinds of party system (Ware, 1996: 150-58).

Based on the number of parties, broadly there are two types of party systems: Non-competitive party systems and Competitive party systems. Non-competitive systems indicate non competitive situation which cannot be detected solely on grounds that a candidate wins unopposed. A system is non-competitive if it does not permit contested elections. Competitive type of party system basically encompasses two or more than two relevant parties. The two broad categories of party system can be further divided into the following types. The Non-competitive party system includes:

- (A) One-party system
- (B) Hegemonic party system
- (C) Predominant party system

In One-party system a single party holds governmental power for an extended period of time. Empirically speaking, there are three types of these: (a) One Party Authoritarian: It is an authoritarian political system dominated by a single, monolithic, ideologically oriented but non-totalitarian party. The examples would be South Vietnam, Ghana and Guinea during 1950s and 60s; (b) One Party Pluralistic: It is a quasi-authoritarian system dominated by a single party which is pluralistic in organization, pragmatic rather than rigidly ideological in outlook and absorptive rather than ruthlessly destructive in its relationship to other groups. Examples: Senegal, Sierra Leone, and Ivory Coast during 1950s and 60s; and (c) One Party Totalitarian: In this political system the state itself is an instrument of a monolithic party which has a single ideological goal, i.e. the total use of power for the

restructuring of the society's social and economic system. Examples: Soviet Union, North Vietnam, Communist China (LaPalombara and Weiner, 1966:37-41).

The Hegemonic System is the second type of non-competitive party system. This is one in which over an extended period of time the same party, or coalitions dominated by the same party, hold governmental power. Hegemonic systems involving one party in exclusive control of governmental machinery would include the United States during the years of New Deal and Indian politics dominated since independence by the Congress party. However, it is also possible to speak of hegemonic systems in instances where the power holding situation involves a coalition. The two major examples of this configuration would be West Germany and Italy since the Second World War, where coalition governments have been clearly dominated by Christian Democratic parties (LaPalombara and Weiner, 1966:35).

The third type of non-competitive party system is the Predominant Party System. It is actually more-than-one party system in which rotation does not occur in fact. It simply happens that the same party manages to win, over time, as an absolute majority of seats (not necessarily of votes) in parliament. A predominant party system is one in which the major party is consistently supported by winning majority (the absolute majority of seats) of the voters. Sartori argues that a party becomes a predominant party if it wins absolute majorities in three consecutive elections, provided the electorate appears stabilized, the absolute majority threshold is clearly surpassed and the interval is wide. Thus a predominant party system can arise either from a two-party format or from a highly fragmented format. Examples: Sweden, Norway and Japan (Sartori, 1976:192-201).

The competitive party system can be divided into four types:

- (A) Two-Party System
- (B) Moderate Pluralism
- (C) Extreme Pluralism
- (D) Atomized Pluralism

Among the competitive party systems, two-party system is considered to be an important one. The lenient conditions for a system that functions according to the rules of two partism would thus be the following: (a) two parties are in a position to

compete for the absolute majority of seats; (b) One of the two parties actually succeeds in winning a sufficient parliamentary majority; (c) the winning party is willing to govern alone; and (d) alteration or rotation in power remains a credible expectation. In two-party system, the third party does not affect, in the long run and at the national level, the alteration in power of the two major parties. The system is bipolar which means that the actual working of the party system pivots around two poles. The bipolar systems tend to converge toward the centre and are therefore centripetal. Examples: United States, Britain and New Zealand (Sartori, 1976:185-192).

In party systems, where three or more than three parties are relevant, Sartori classifies them as plural system. Plural systems are of three types:

- (A) Limited or Moderate pluralism
- (B) Extreme or Polarized pluralism
- (C) Atomized Pluralism

Moderate or limited pluralism is demarcated, at one boundary, by the two-party system and, at the other, by extreme and polarized pluralism. The class basically encompasses from three to five relevant parties. Because of this limited number of political parties it is called moderate or limited pluralism in contradistinction to extreme pluralism. The major distinguishing trait of moderate pluralism is coalition government. The structure remains bipolar. Instead of two parties, we generally find bipolar alignments of alternative coalitions. The competition remains centripetal and there is relatively small ideological distance among its relevant parties. Examples: Belgium and Ireland (three-party format); Sweden and Iceland (four-party format); Switzerland and Norway (five-party Format) (Sartori, 1976:173-185).

Extreme and polarized pluralism resides in the presence of relevant anti-system parties. A party can be defined as being anti-system whenever it undermines or seeks to undermine the legitimacy of the regimes it opposes. In this type of party system there is maximal ideological distance. When one finds a large ideological space, it follows that the polity contains parties that disagree not only on policies but also, and more importantly, on principles and fundamentals. There is likely presence of the centrifugal drives over the centripetal ones and presence of irresponsible oppositions.

Examples: France (6 parties); Italy (6-7 parties); Chile (5-7 parties); India (6 parties) (Sartori, 1976:131-172).

The last type of competitive party system is Atomized Pluralism. This type of party system enters the classification as a residual class to indicate a point at which we no longer need an accurate counting, that is, a threshold beyond which the number of parties: whether 10, 20 or more makes little difference. The atomized party systems can be defined in the same way as atomistic competition in economics, that is, as a situation where no firm has any noticeable effect on any other firm. Example: Malaysia (Sartori, 1976:125-126).

Classification of party systems was usually done earlier on the basis of number of parties. For a considerable time, especially in the 1950s, 1960s and 1970s, most political scientists believed that there is limited number of types of party system to be found among the liberal democracies. The earliest classifications gave us only a distinction between two-party and multiparty systems. The later classifications, such as Sartori's were far more complex than the earlier typologies. But common to all of them was the attempt to explain the distinctive kind of party behaviour that was associated with each of the different types of party system.

In recent times, students of party systems have moved beyond numbers. They have attempted to construct typologies and classifications of party systems which capture relationship and interactions. This can be done in different ways: (a) combining number of parties with information about their relative size¹ and strength, as Jean Blondel (1968) and Alan Siaroff (2000) have done; (b) looking at patterns of government formation and party interaction as Rokkan (1970) and Dahl (1966) and more recently Peter Mair (1997) do; and (c) in case of Sartori (1966/1976), considering polarization and internal dynamics as well as the number of parties. All these considerations lead to party system change (Wolinetz, 2006:55). At this point, it may be interesting to look into the factors contributing to different types of party system. The following section looks at the interrelationship between party systems and electoral systems, as electoral system is considered to be an important factor affecting the party system.

2.2.3 Electoral systems and party systems

Electoral systems are vital component in understanding party systems. A well-designed electoral system can add to the momentum of political change, encourage political participation and enable the emergence of legitimate representatives who are capable of handling a wide range of needs and expectations, immediately and in future. It can also derail progress towards democracy or even political stability, if the design is not proper. The 1990s saw an explosion of innovation and reform in electoral system, especially as the new democracies in Africa, Asia and Eastern Europe along with Latin America and the former Soviet Union began actively reforming their political and electoral systems (Reynolds, Reilly and Ellis, 2005:1-10).

Of all the attributes of electoral system, electoral formula is the most important. Generally based on the electoral formula, electoral systems are categorized into three broad families:

- (A) Plurality or Majority systems
- (B) Proportional Representation System
- (C) Mixed System

The distinguishing feature of the Plurality or Majority system is that they usually use single-member districts. Under this the following are included: (a) First Past the Post (FPTP): In this system the winner is the candidate with the most votes. Examples: India and United States; (b) Block Vote: When this system is used in multi-member districts it becomes the block vote. Voters have as many votes as there are seats to be filled and the highest-polling candidates fill the positions regardless of the percentage of the vote they achieve. Examples: Thailand and Palestine; (c) Party Block Vote: The system with the change that the voters vote for the party list instead of individual candidates. Examples: Singapore and Djibouti; (d) Alternative Vote: In this the voters are asked to indicate their first preference, second preference and so on. If a candidate receives an absolute majority in the first preference, he or she is elected. If there is no such majority, the ballots with first preference for the weakest candidate are transferred to the second preferences. This procedure is repeated by excluding the weakest candidate and redistributing the ballots in question to the next highest preference in each stage of the counting, until a majority winner emerges. Examples:

Australia and Ireland; and (e) Two Round System: In this system the winning candidate receives an absolute majority (over 50%). In the event that no candidate receives a majority of votes, the first two candidates winning largest number of votes will run again in elections so that one of them gets a majority. Examples: France and Congo.

Under Proportional Representation Method, a party gets roughly the same proportion of seats in legislature as its vote share in the General Election. Thus the disparity between a party's share of the national vote and its share of the parliamentary seats is minimum under the Proportional Representation system. There are mainly two variants of this system: (a) List Proportional Representation: In this proportionality is often seen as being best achieved by the use of party lists, where political parties present lists of candidates to the voters on a national or regional basis. Examples: Indonesia and Latin America; and (b) The Single Transferable Vote: In this, the voters rank-order candidates in multi-member districts. Examples: Ireland and Malta. If members of National Legislature are chosen on the basis of both Plurality and Proportional Representation system, such a system is known as Mixed System (Reynolds; Reilly and Ellis, 2005: 29; and Lijphart, 1999: 145).

Different electoral systems have varying impacts on party systems, but as Rae emphasizes, they also have important effects in common. In particular, all electoral systems, not just the plurality and majority ones, tend to over represent the larger parties and under represent the smaller ones. Three important aspects of this tendency must be distinguished: (a) all electoral systems tend to yield disproportional results; (b) all electoral systems tend to reduce the effective number of parliamentary parties compared with the effective number of electoral parties; and (c) all electoral systems can manufacture a parliamentary majority for parties that have not received majority support from the voters.

All three tendencies are much stronger in plurality and majority than in proportional representation systems. The disproportionality of proportional representation systems is much lower than that of plurality and majority systems. These disproportionalities are not random but systematic, they systematically advantage the larger parties and disadvantage the smaller parties and especially in plurality and majority systems. That is why elections generally, but plurality and majority elections in particular, reduce

the Effective Number of Parties. We can also expect a strong negative relationship between the disproportionality of the electoral systems and the effective number of parliamentary parties. As disproportionality increases, the effective number of parties decreases. A 5% increase in disproportionality is associated with a reduction of about half a party in the effective number of parties (Rae, 1967: 67-129).

However, we cannot say that there is a direct relationship between electoral system and party system. We find that in spite of the reductive effects of their disproportional electoral systems multipartism prevails in countries like India, and this may be attributed to the high degree of social pluralism and the number of groups into which a society is politically divided. Another plural system, Switzerland has even more multipartism than could be expected from its proportional election system. The opposite effect can be seen in Austria, and in Malta. In these countries, two-party and two-and-a-half party system have co-existed with highly proportional representation system. Two of the presidential systems, France and Venezuela, are also relatively deviant, with considerably more parties than expected on the basis of the disproportionalities of these systems (Lijphart, 1999:169-170). In relation to all the above Duverger's Law plays an important role.

Duverger's Law suggests a nexus between a plurality system and an electoral system. A proportional representation system and a two-ballot system like the French majority-plurality method create the electoral conditions necessary to foster party development. While a plurality system marginalizes many smaller political parties, resulting in a two-party system. Duverger explains the differential effects of the electoral systems in terms of 'mechanical' and 'psychological' factors. The mechanical effects are related to how votes are translated into seats and how a party can win a high proportion of votes in a district but still fails to win the seat. When aggregated at the national level, the disproportionality can result in a party winning a large share of the vote but only a small number of seats in the legislature. The psychological factors, on the other hand, concern how electoral rules influence the aggregation of votes. This is based on the tendency of voters, political leaders and donors to abandon their preferred parties in favor of less preferred parties that have a better chance of winning. And, over time, the party system is expected to move

towards some sort of equilibrium where two parties get all or almost all the votes (Duverger, 1964:217-226).

However Duverger's Law has been criticized because some countries with single member plurality system have more than two parties at the national level. Examples: Canada and India. It has been argued that the law does not explain the number of parties. However, it has been pointed out by many scholars that Duverger's Law applies at the district level but not at the national and regional levels (Wildavsky, 1959; Sartori, 1976; Cox, 1997; Gaines, 1999; and Chhibber and Kollman, 2004). In recent years some researchers have modified Duverger's Law by suggesting that electoral systems are an effect of party systems rather than a cause. It has been seen that changes from a plurality system to a proportional system are typically preceded by the emergence of more than two effective parties, and are typically not followed by a substantial increase in the number of effective parties. In this context it becomes necessary to understand the party system change and the various indices employed in measuring these changes.

2.3 Party System Change and Index to Measure Party System Change

2.3.1 Party system change

Party system change is defined as the change in the prevailing structure of competition. That is, a party system change when there is a change in the pattern of government coalitions, when a new governing coalition emerges, and/or when a new party or alliance of parties gains access to office for the first time. It follows that for any such change to occur and be noted, there must have already existed a prior and well-established pattern of competition, and the importance or weight of any change will depend on how stable and well established that prior pattern proved to be (Smith, 1989:349-64). What is important in party system change is change at the core rather than at margins.

There are two approaches which provide us with a perspective to understand party system change. Both have quite distinct implications for how party system change is treated. The traditional comparative perspective approach developed by Duverger, Blondel and Sartori aims at characterising party systems into distinct classes or types, such as two-party systems, systems of moderate pluralism and multi-party systems. Following this approach, party systems scarcely change at all, in that change of party

system necessarily involves the case in question moving from one category to another i.e. from one party to multi-party system (example: India); or from two-party to the multi-party category (example: Colombia) or from moderate to polarized pluralism (example: Switzerland, Netherlands) and so on (Mair, 1997:63-72).

The other approach to classify party systems avoids the issue of classification and instead emphasizes continuous variables to summarize or define the party system, usually for the purpose of cross-national enquiry. These continuous variables are almost always based on a calculation of the number of relative sizes, whether electoral or parliamentary, of the parties present in the system. In the earlier literature, the preferred version was Rae's (1968) Index of Fractionalization². However, scholars after 1970s tended to prefer a modified version of this index. This is known as the Effective Number of Parties (ENP) developed by Laakso and Taagepera in 1979. Following this approach, differences between party systems is treated as a continuous phenomenon, which enables us to identify the moments of transition from one type to the other.

From the classification of party systems, we often find different classes or types of party systems such as one, two and multi-party systems. The Sartori's framework provides us a starting point for examining party systems. It helps us to simplify the real world of party systems by providing a limited number of classes of systems and linking these classes to patterns of party behaviour. We also know from the literature on the classification of the party system that there are some party systems which fall between these three points, such as one-and-one-half, two-and-half party systems³. However, political scientists have felt a need to measure party system more precisely in accordance with the understanding that party systems are not static but dynamic.

2.3.2 Index to measure party system change

To know the changes or in order to exactly know how many effective parties are there in a party system, or how many parties cause changes in party system from one form to another, it is necessary to take a look at the index of Effective Number of Parties (hereafter, it will be referred by its acronym, i.e. ENP). The index tells us how many parties play an effective role in the party systems.

ENP can be calculated by the proliferation of votes secured in an election or seats secured by parties in the legislature. The index was developed by Markku Laakso and

Rein Taagepera (1979) taking into account the relative size of the parties in the party system. This is now used widely by comparativists in political science. It is calculated as:

$$N=1/\sum p_i^2$$

Where, 'N' is the effective number of parties which can be calculated in terms of either votes or seats; 'p' is the proportion of seats/votes secured by 'ith' party in an election; 'Σ' stands for the summation of components.

The problem of how to count parties of different sizes is solved to some extent by using the effective number measure. It can be easily seen that if one-party secures all votes or almost all votes, the ENP would be 1 or close to 1. Thus, in a one-party dominant system, ENP will be always less than 2. In a two-party system with two equally strong parties, the effective number of parties is exactly 2.0. Similarly, with 3 exactly equal parties, the effective number of parties yields a value of 3.0. If one of these parties is weaker than the other two, the effective number of parties will be somewhere between 2.0 and 3.0 depending on the relative size of the third party. Thus, if the ENP value is between 2.5 and 5, the party system is moderately pluralized or a two-plus party system. If the ENP value is 5 or greater, it is highly pluralized or there is the existence of multipartism.

A large ENP implies that several different viable coalitions can be formed at any time. The existence of such a large number of alternatives can increase voter turnout, competitiveness/closeness of party competition, make the incumbent government more fragile in the sense of increasing the likelihood of votes of no-confidence to be cast and/or by making partners threat to withdraw support and join in another of the several possible coalitions available.

Therefore, the effective number of parties is based on the parties in the legislature when it first meets after the election. In most cases, there is difference between the seats contested by parties in an election and the seats they occupy in the legislature. Whether closely allied parties or fractionalized parties are counted as one-and-a-half parties or, more conventionally as two parties and one party respectively, also affects how parties are classified and it affects the calculation of electoral

disproportionality/stability. The electoral disproportionality/stability is dealt in detail in the following section.

2.4 Stability of Party Support and Index to Measure Stability of Party Support

2.4.1 Stability of party support

A relatively stable party system has several important consequences for democratic politics. A stable party system makes clear what the range of governing options is and usually provides considerable structure to democratic politics (Sartori, 1976). Stability signifies voter's satisfaction with the range and performance of established partisan options, but it may also be attributable to the monopolization of resources by incumbents, an absence of perceived alternatives, voter dependence on patronage distributions or institutional constraints on voter choice (Roberts, 2005: 20-21).

An ongoing debate in political science research focuses on the degree to which democratic party systems are stable. One set of authors argues that political cleavages in party systems endure, and thus party systems themselves show few significant signs of instability (Bartolini and Mair, 1990; Klingemann and Fuchs, 1995; and Mair, 1997). Another group of authors argues that since the 1970s, political cleavages have weakened and system stability has decreased (Pedersen, 1983; Dalton, 1985; Crewe and Denver, 1985; Franklin, 1999; and Dalton and Wattenberg, 2000).

Rose and Urwin (1970) analyze party system stability with three main indicators: electoral volatility, elasticity and variability of party support. They applied these indicators to measure stability across 92 parties in 19 democracies for the period 1945-1970. The first indicator, electoral volatility, is calculated by regressing a party's share of the popular vote against the period of time that the party contested elections. A second measure of party support is elasticity. Elasticity is calculated by the percentage difference between a party's best and worst performances. Finally, variability of party support is calculated as the standard deviation of the party's performances across the set of elections under study.

However, a common indicator of party system stability is electoral volatility which determines the total net change of vote share between parties in sequential elections. The measure was constructed by Mogens Pedersen (1979), which will be described later in this chapter. High electoral volatility indicates that a party system is not stable,

since voters change their support from one party to another between elections (Centellas, 2007:16).

Electoral volatility refers to the aggregate turnover from one party to others, from one election to the next (Pedersen, 1983; Shamir, 1984; Bartolini and Mair, 1990; Roberts and Wibbels, 1999; Birch, 2003; Madrid, 2005; and Tavits, 2005). Volatility reflects both changes in voters' electoral preferences and elite-driven changes such as party mergers and splits and party switching by individual politicians (Mainwaring and Zoco, 2007: 158). Volatility is linked to two factors: shifts in voting preferences for established parties and the entry or exit of relatively young parties. As observed by Dalton and Anderson (2011: 16), volatility in party offerings makes it difficult for voters to make meaningful choices, and to reward or punish political parties on programmatic grounds. It reflects the inability of coalition members to build loyal constituency over time, which is critical for party development in a democracy (Resnick, 2011: 9).

Volatility can be due to (a) vote-switching between parties, which might be permanent convert to a new party; (b) a persistent floater; (c) a temporary protestor against his or her usual party; (d) or a 'homer' returning to the party fold after temporarily straying at the previous election. However, if a substantial proportion of volatility turns out to be permanent converts, the election marks a major change in the party system: either the balance of support between parties has been jolted into a new pattern, or the social bases of party support have shifted, or both (Crewe, 1985: 12).

Volatility is a term that can be expressed both in terms of votes and seats. The relationship between volatility of votes and volatility of seats is determined by the electoral system. Under a pure proportional system the volatility in vote shares and seat shares will be identical. Deviation from proportional representation (PR) means the difference in party vote shares and party seat shares in some given elections. In the single-member, simple plurality (SMSP) systems, small shifts in a party's share of the vote tend to generate a much larger turnover of seats (Crewe, 1985: 8-9). Thus, we can say electoral volatility is a multi-layered and multi-dimensional concept. The changes may occur at different levels of the representative system and take different forms. Changes at one level or dimension, i.e. national or state are not necessarily

matched by changes on other levels or dimensions. Thus, we can have different forms of volatility at different levels.

The concept of electoral volatility therefore, is multi-faceted. However, to describe somebody as volatile is to describe someone who not only changes temperament, perhaps dramatically, but who does so suddenly, unpredictably and on the smallest of pretexts. A volatile electorate might also be regarded as sensitive, i.e. one which not only or necessarily switches votes without any reasons but also does so in response to certain circumstances. For example: the identical increment of unemployment or inflation might produce increasing amounts of vote-switching over time (Crewe, 1985: 10-13). It can be said, therefore that one or many factors are behind the cause of volatility, which results in shifts in party support.

2.4.2 Factors affecting electoral volatility/stability of party support

Electoral volatility is subject to increase/decrease in voter's electoral support to different parties contesting in elections. A number of factors would influence electoral volatility: (a) Time: electoral volatility diminishes over time. As argued by Converse (1969) the length of support for a party and of exposure to elections explained deepening attachment over time to parties. By implication, newly established party systems would become more stable over time as voters had more time to identify with parties; (b) Party fragmentation: Electoral volatility increases as party fragmentation increases. Pedersen (1983) argued that as party fragmentation increases, electoral volatility should increase; (c) Parliamentary systems: presidential systems personalize the vote for the head of government. The incentives to develop party organization and to build enduring ties between parties and voters might be weaker, leading to higher electoral volatility. In contrast, in parliamentary systems the assembly elects the head of government, making parties the gateway to controlling executive power. The incentives to build strong linkages between parties and voters should be stronger in parliamentary systems, leading to lower electoral volatility.

Electoral volatility also depends on the time period of the coming up of a democracy. Electoral volatility is lower in democracies that were inaugurated earlier. According to Mainwaring (1999); Mainwaring and Torcal (2005); Pizzorno (1981); and Schmitter (2001), democracies that were created by the early twentieth century had stronger party organizations, and voters had stronger attachments to parties. These

stronger attachments helped forge stable patterns of party competition. Alan Ware (1996) argues that the composition of electorates also affects the stability of party support. He states there are three main ways in which the electorate of a state can change from one election to another: firstly, when there is migration to and from the state, secondly, when there is a territorial change in the state, i.e. with new lands being added or existing lands being ceded to other states or being granted independence; and thirdly, when there is generational change in the state i.e. when the older generation of voters dwindle and new generation of voters get enfranchised.

Drawing upon the argument of Lipset and Rokkan (1967) on *Party Systems and Voter Alignments*, Alan ware (1996) talks of the role of social cleavages and their impact on party system stability. He highlights three points in relation to social cleavages: firstly, a gradual transformation of parties from representatives of conflicting groups in the society into teams of politicians who compete for power for themselves and who must mobilize mass electorates to do so (i.e. parties as office-seekers); secondly, the development of new lines of division in society that will prompt an organizational response in the form of new parties that represent these interests (i.e. new cleavage and new parties); and thirdly, existing cleavages will decline but not disappear completely but new lines of division may well emerge. Existing parties will survive and their leaders will seek to develop these new cleavages to obtain power (i.e. the persistence of parties) (Ware, 1996: 220-26).

Four other factors are considered important to understand the stability of party support. The following factors have been extensively discussed in the literature of party politics:

2.4.2.1 Voter turnout

Voting in national parliamentary elections is one indicator of people's participation in their community's life. The most popularly used indicator to measure participation of individuals to the electoral process is the voter turnout. Voter turnout is the absolute number of people voting in the election or as the share of the population that has cast its vote (Geys, 2006: 638) or it is the ratio of the percentage of eligible citizens who actually vote (Lin, Tseng and Wang, 2011:2). The phenomenon of voter turnout in an election is interesting for two reasons. First, it addresses the question of why a voter votes, what drives an individual to participate in a political decision making process

and register his/her voice. Secondly, if the government can be thought of as a public good, voter turnout in an election would reflect people's perception about the importance of this public good.

There are two traditional explanations of voter turnout in the literature. The older one is known as the "calculus of voting" theory which was initially developed by Downs (1957) and extended by Riker and Ordeshook (1968). According to this theory, a voter finds it worthwhile to vote whenever he/she thinks that there is a possibility of a tie between the first two candidates and his/her decision might affect the outcome of the election. The theory thus predicts that the propensity to turn up in an election goes up as the perceived closeness of the election increases. There is an alternative explanation of voter turnout. The literature (Cox and Munger, 1989) claims that there is a positive relationship between the campaign effort by the political parties and the proportion of voters turning up in elections.

Earlier studies (Gosnell, 1927) assume that turnout depends on the character of the election itself, rather than on voters. For example, lower turnout is expected where parties do not clearly communicate their policies to the voters and a higher turnout is expected when policies are well presented, or where electoral competition is expected to be close. Recent studies on turnout focus more on the parties' efforts to mobilize electoral support (Diwakar, 2008: 76). If states want to improve turnout, one measure they could take would be to increase confidence in the electoral process. The most obvious means of achieving this end is to improve the conduct of elections. States that are actively engaged in cleaning up their elections also need to make efforts in the area of voter education to inform their people of their activities and to convince them that the quality of elections has in fact improved.

The next question that arises is what elements explain the oscillation in the support for parties in consecutive pairs of elections? In other words, what are the elements that explain the electoral volatility? Some authors seem to emphasize economic and political factors as important predictors of this phenomenon. Studies such as Kramer (1971) show that electors tend to vote retrospectively based upon the macro-economic performance of the incumbents seeking re-election. As a consequence, given that their oscillation tips the balance in favour or against the governing parties, variables such as inflation and unemployment normally explain the volatility levels (Remmer, 1991;

and Robert and Wibbels, 1999). Politico-institutional variables such as the creation of new parties or the disappearance of old ones as well as the migration from party to party of key political figures with large number of followers (Mozaffar and Scarritt, 2005) play an important role.

It is expected that the increase in the number of parties would enhance the volatility levels. Needless to say, from the voter's perspective, the emergence of a new party or new parties increases substantially the information and decision costs. It seems to be easier to rely on information shortcuts in long-standing bipartisan systems than environments where even the better informed citizen cannot realistically keep track of all the existing labels and their differences. This focus on the voter's perspective is of vital importance. In the end, electoral volatility is the result of the collective action (Olson, 1965) of individuals taken as an aggregate. The basic idea behind the notion of electoral volatility, as it appears in the works of Pedersen (1979; 1983), Przeworski (1975) and Bartolini and Mair (1990), is that, in stable party systems, voters tend to remain loyal to their favourite parties in the elections over time. The same behaviour is not found in the context of new party regimes. Therefore, despite the fact that the analysis centres on a macro-social decision (i.e. the election results), the starting point is always micro-social, e.g. the individual. However, at this time it is necessary to take into consideration different factors affecting voter turnout.

Voter turnout has long been of interest in American politics literature (Downs, 1957; and Riker and Odershook, 1968) and, more recently, in comparative literature (Geys, 2006; Jackman, 1987; and Powell, 1986). Interest in turnout is rooted in varying concerns about the implications of low voter turnout for democratic theory and practice. Some scholars argue that low voter turnout decreases the legitimacy of democracy (Powell, 1986; Teixeira, 1992; and Wattenburg, 2002). If voters do not fulfil their civic duty and vote, it is an indication of apathy toward democracy as a system. Others argue that low voter turnout decreases the representativeness of democracy. Studies of voter turnout also reflect concerns regarding democratic stability and the overall health of democracy (Franklin, 2004). Powell (1986:36) points to the argument made by some democratic theorists that high turnout brings out "the often undemocratic values of the less educated, thereby creating unstable political systems (e.g. Weimar Germany and postwar Italy), although he finds that higher turnout actually leads to less political violence and instability (Powell, 1982).

Numerous studies indicate that political institutions play an important role explaining variation in voter turnout across countries (Fornos, Power and Garand, 2004; Franklin, 2004; Jackman and Miller, 1995; Jackman, 1987; and Perez-Linan, 2001). Institutions are one of the most prominent factors. Despite the widespread recognition of the role that institutions play, empirical studies of institutions and those of turnout have focused on just a few factors: district competitiveness, proportionality, multipartism, bicameralism, and compulsory voting. Of course, institutions are not the only influence on turnout. Culture, socioeconomic environment, economic performance, and non-institutional characteristics of the political context also affect turnout rates (Fornos, 2004; Franklin, 2004; Gray and Caul, 2000; and Powell, 1986). So, we can identify three sets of variables that affect voter turnout.

(a) Socio-Economic Variables: The socio-economic factors include the following:

- (i) *Population Size*: the greater the size of the community, the smaller the probability becomes that one single voter will make a difference. This decreases the expected utility from voting and makes it more likely that one abstains. Therefore population size has a statistically significant negative effect on turnout (Owen and Grofman, 1984; and Muller, 2003);
- (ii) *Population Concentration*: it is generally the difference between urban and rural areas. Inclusion of this variable in turnout models is based on the theory that urbanisation leads to weakening of interpersonal bonds, primary social structures and consensus on norms. The argument holds that cities are more individualistic in nature such that there is less social pressure to turnout and cast a vote in densely populated city communities. This social pressure argument builds on the idea that voting is a civic duty, non-compliance with which is a loss of social prestige for the individual. In low density areas people are more likely to know all the candidates and what they stand for, thus lowering the information costs of turning out in these areas (Riker and Odershook, 1968; and Overbye, 1995);
- (iii) *Population Stability*: population stability can be expected to increase turnout rates for two reasons. Firstly, a stable population increases the feelings of identification and group solidarity and thereby social pressure towards voting. Secondly residing in the same area for a longer period tends to improve one's knowledge of local issues and candidates (Hoffman and Martinot, 1994; and Ashworth, 2002);
- (iv)

Previous Turnout: people who voted in the past are more likely to repeat this action in future elections. This is especially likely when individuals are reinforced by the result of their action through the victory or defeat of their favoured candidate (Kanazawa, 2000; Green and Shachar, 2000; and Plutzer, 2002).

- (b) *Political Variables*: The political variables include the following: (i) *Closeness*: the closer the election is expected to be, the higher becomes the probability that one vote affects the outcome. This increases the expected utility of voting and thereby turnout (Matsusaka and Palda, 1993); (ii) *Campaign Expenditure*: campaign expenditure might have a positive effect on turnout rates. This is because campaign increase information and awareness levels within the electorate and decrease the costs of information acquisition. Both increase the probability of turning out (Dawson and Zinser, 1976; and Chapman and Palda, 1983); and (iii) *Political Fragmentation*: a large number of parties enrich the choice offered to the electorate, increasing the probability that voters can identify with some party. This increases the competitiveness of the party system which may enlarge the benefits of voting to the individual (Seidle and Miller, 1976; Blais and Carty, 1990; and Hansen, 1994).
- (c) *Institutional Variables*: The electoral procedure that governs the course of the elections in a country consists of the following elements: (i) *Electoral System*: the electoral system is the means by which votes are translated into seats in the process of electing politicians into office. Whether one uses majority, plurality or proportional representation is generally believed to have an effect on the number of people turning out (Farrell, 2001; and Ladner and Milner, 1999); and (ii) *Compulsory Voting*: turnout at the polls is significantly higher where compulsory voting⁴ laws exist (Perea, 2002; and Brockington, 2004).

The literature on voter turnout thus can be summarised in the form of following propositions: (a) increase in voter turnout leads to increase in electoral volatility; (b) increase in the number of parties leads to increase in voter turnout; (c) increase in population size leads to decrease in voter turnout; (d) voter turnout is higher in urban areas than in rural areas; (e) the more stable the population, the high is the voter turnout; (f) increase in closeness of party competition leads to increase in voter turnout; (f) increase in campaign expenditure leads to increase in voter turnout; and

(g) voter turnout is high in countries with compulsory voting than the countries with no compulsory voting laws. This study aims to examine the relationship between voter turnout and stability of party support in the Indian context.

2.4.2.2 Closeness of party competition

Political competition is an important determinant of democracy. Free, fair, and competitive elections are seen as the minimal precondition in order for a country to be a democracy (Dahl, 1971; Przeworski, 2000; Sartori, 1987; and Strom, 1992). Democratic theory considers political competition in at least two different ways: On one hand, it is viewed as the mechanism that ensures responsiveness (Powell, 2004) and accountability (O'Donnell, 1994). On the other hand, it is seen as the essential characteristic of control by the people. In representative democracies, vertical control is exercised by means of elections (Manin, 1999). An effective election must be competitive. Only when there are several parties which compete for political power in elections, there is a chance to win and lose elections.

The often used understanding of competition in electoral research is termed as the closeness of the race. For instance, in participation research, it is argued that the probability that an electoral race will be close enhances an individual's willingness to go to the polls because there is the chance that this voter's choice can influence the final outcome of the elections. There is a second psychological effect of close races at the party level. The more uncertain an electoral outcome, the bigger the probability that incumbents will lose and the opponents will win, leading to a shift in support loyalties for the parties.

Measures of competitiveness have been developed by a number of scholars over the years around the concept of closeness between leading parties (Silberman and Durden, 1975; Cox 1988; Cox and Munger, 1989; and Alvarez and Nagler, 2000). Closeness between leading parties is especially relevant for those who consider voting as a rational act: if a voter wants to maximize the utility and pick the best option available, what matters is not the number of existing parties in an election but the distance between leading parties (Bodet, 2010:6). The competitiveness of the contest, as Rosenstone and Hansen (1993) argue, may influence the behaviour of candidates as well as the behaviour of the voters.

There are three different measures of closeness: the closeness of election results based on vote difference, the degree of concentration of parliamentary seats and the balance of power between government and opposition. The often used measure for the closeness of the race is the difference in the votes obtained by the two strongest parties (Blais, 1996). Closeness of party competition is measured as vote share of winning party minus vote share of runner up party. It is the difference in votes obtained by the top two parties or it is defined as the ratio of the margin between the top two parties to the total number of votes cast (Ghosh, 2006: 6-11). Let the vote shares of the first two parties as a proportion of the total number of valid votes be V_1 and V_2 , Closeness, then is given by $V_1 - V_2$. In other words, Closeness = $\% \text{Votes}_i(1) - \% \text{Votes}_i(2)$, where $\% \text{Votes}_i(1)$ is the percentage of votes the winning party receives and $\% \text{Votes}_i(2)$ is the percentage of votes the runner up party receives. The difference of the percentage of votes received measures the distance between the first two leading parties. When the value of closeness is small, it implies the race is perceived to be tight.

When the incumbent party cannot be sure to gain the majority of the votes, it will be obliged to act in a responsive way (i.e. to do what all citizens want). Responsiveness further grows as a result of close races because, from a rational choice point of view, it also raises turnout. Close races foster the probability of the importance of a single vote and may result in increase in instability in the party support. Thus, the closer the race, the higher the turnout and electoral volatility (Blais, 2010; and Franklin, 2004).

A decrease in the value of closeness quotient as calculated using the above formula would indicate an increase in the competitiveness of the election and therefore is likely to result in an increase in turnout (Diwakar, 2008: 98). The rational model theory as proposed by Downs (1957) implies that people are more likely to vote when the election is perceived as close. A vast empirical literature tests whether closeness includes participation (Matsusaka and Palda, 1993; Kunce, 2001; Geys, 2006; and Grant and Toma, 2008). One of the main implications of the rational choice model is that turnout should be influenced by the closeness of the electoral contest (Riker and Ordershook, 1968). Yet a number of recent studies (Denver, 1995; Kunce, 2001; Matsusaka and Palda, 1993; and Pattie and Johnston, 1998) conclude that closeness does not have a significant effect on turnout.

However, closeness can be measured differently. Depending on the electoral system, there can be a close race concerning the votes which parties obtain that is, nevertheless, not reflected in the seat difference. Therefore, the second measure of closeness is to consider the seat difference between the two strongest parties. The third measure of closeness depends on the party system. In two-party systems with single-party governments, closeness indeed measures the vulnerability of the government. In multi-party systems with coalition governments, however, we should not only consider the difference between the two strongest parties, but also the balance between the government and opposition parties. When there is no chance to change the government coalition, vulnerability is low even when the two strongest parties in the government are very close with respect to the number of votes and seats (Buhlmann and Zumbach, 2010: 14-15).

The vote gap between the first and second party in the race has become somewhat the standard measure for the closeness of the party competition. The smaller the gap between the two parties, the closer the election and the higher turnout rates are expected. Closeness by far is the most analysed element in the turnout literature. The closer the election is expected to be, the higher becomes the probability that one vote affects the outcome. This increases the expected utility of voting and thereby voter turnout. Matsusaka and Palda (1993) refer to this as Downsian Closeness Hypothesis. Cox and Munger (1989) and Kirchgassner and Schulz (2004) provide an alternative explanation for the same prediction. More precisely, they follow Key (1957) and Denver and Hands (1974) in arguing that close elections provoke more political elite mobilization efforts.

Turnout, as discussed in the earlier section is influenced by the closeness of the electoral contest (Riker and Odershook, 1968). Yet a number of recent studies, for example: Denver (1995); Kuncz (2001); Matsusaka and Palda (1999); and Pattie and Johnston (1998) conclude that closeness does not have a significant effect on turnout. The findings of Helin and Nurmi (2004) are mixed. In sum the existing empirical evidence on the closeness hypothesis is perhaps best described as mixed. However, as Glazer and Grofman (1992) have pointed out, it is possible that the strength of the relationship is underestimated due to methodological issues.

Closeness has found to increase turnout in most of the studies that have tested the relationship in many different settings and with diverse methodologies. There are strong reasons to believe that more people vote when the election is close. It is possible that the impact of closeness is underestimated because the variable is not adequately measured. The standard indicator is the vote gap between the leading and second parties. The indicator makes sense, although it is not clear whether it is the seat or the vote gap that matters. In most cases it is the vote gap that has been taken into consideration because the voters receive much information about vote intentions from polls and because many have a poor understanding of how votes are translated into seats. Furthermore it is always assumed that the relationship between closeness and turnout is linear. Or perhaps it is only very close elections that excite voters and boost turnout (Blais, 2006: 119-20).

Reviews on the relationship between closeness and turnout (Matsusaka & Palda, 1993; and Mueller, 2003) show that the estimated coefficients are generally statistically significant and indicate turnout to increase with closeness. It is so because, firstly, the effect of closeness on electoral turnout and party system stability works to affect the probability for the voter to be decisive. It is intuitively clear that this probability will be higher in an electoral contest between two parties expecting 50% of the votes than in an election where one of the parties is expected to obtain an 80% vote share. Secondly, several authors have pointed out that closer elections lead to increased mobilisation efforts by political elites (Key, 1950; Denver and Hands, 1974; Cox and Munger, 1989; Aldrich, 1993; Shachar and Nalebuff, 1999; and Kirchgassner and Schulz, 2005). These increased campaign efforts, engaged in by the competing parties to tilt the balance in the appropriate direction, lead to higher turnout rates (Ashworth, Geys, and Heyndels, 2006: 386).

In elections, therefore, the closeness of the contest has been identified as a crucial determinant of political turnout. In a context of instrumental voting, the shape of this relation is straightforward. If, in a two-party context, both parties are expected to obtain more or less equal amounts of votes, the individual voter will be more likely to turn up as this implies a higher probability of being decisive. In a context of expressive voting, however, the role of closeness is ambiguous and depends on the precise nature of the underlying preferences of the electorate.

The prediction in Downs' model⁵ of instrumental voting is unambiguous: turnout will increase if elections are closer. In the context of expressive voting, several elements can be brought forward to expect a relation between voter turnout and election closeness. In the previous section on voter turnout, for example, it was already shown how increased mobilisation efforts by parties may induce expressive voters to turn out in larger numbers. Moreover, and again demonstrating the similarities of electoral contests and sports games, it may be that voters are more likely to turn out in an election just because it is close as "playing in an election is simply more exciting when the game is less predictable" (Schuessler, 2000: 110). From this perspective closeness encourages people's participation irrespective from the instrumental effect of the probability that a single vote is decisive.

Fiorina (1976) demonstrates that for some voters, closeness in the election may discourage turnout. To be more precise, Fiorina (1976) shows how so-called "loyalist cross-pressured" citizens will be less likely to vote in close elections. Cross-pressured voters are those for whom the party identification and party differential conflict. These are, for example, voters who have partisan preferences for party X but who find that in the current election the platform of party Y is more attractive than that of party X. So, while in general they prefer X, they now prefer Y's platform. Loyalists are those who vote for their own party if they vote. So a loyalist cross-pressured voter votes for his all time favourite party despite the fact that in the present election it offers a less attractive platform than the opposition party. The intuition is that a voter who is loyal, votes for his/her favourite party and derives utility from that. Once the voter gets distracted from this platform, there is possibility for party system instability.

Schuessler (2000) develops a model in which the expressive utility of voting is a non-monotonic function of the number of other voters supporting the same candidate or party. Voting is an act by which voters identify with a given candidate and/or attach themselves to a collective of fellow voters with similar preferences. As a general rule, expressive utility from voting is positively related to the number of other voters for the same candidate/party. Previously, Hinich (1981:135) had presented a model based on the assumption that the voter's utility increases if he votes for the winner, or decreases if he votes for the loser. Hence, initially, the expressive utility increases with the number of other voters for the same party. Still, after some point an increase

in this latter number decreases expressive utility. The reason is that, if no other voter votes for a given party, then, voting for this party is not an instrument to identify oneself as member of a group. If, in contrast, all voters vote for the same candidate then the individual voter cannot express himself as belonging to a well-defined group. The crucial thing to note is that the maximum level of expressive utility is reached for levels of support that are significantly higher than 50% (the percentage where in a two party context, closeness is at its highest level) (Ashworth, Geys, and Heyndels, 2006:388).

From the above discussion on theories of closeness of party competition, the following propositions can be derived: (a) increase in closeness of party competition results in increase in voter turnout; and (b) increase in closeness between parties results in increase in electoral volatility. This study aims to find out the relationship between closeness of party competition and electoral volatility in the Indian context.

2.4.2.3 Party turnover

Political parties play a unique role in any political system. In order to fulfil the democratic functions of providing accountability, policy preference predictability and aggregation of interests in society, the configuration of political parties must be more durable and institutionalized rather than fluid electoral vehicles of power-seeking entrepreneurs. Following Mainwaring and Scully (1995), a patterned interaction exists in the competition among parties' and the focus is on the durability of parties and the extent of their support over time. It is often captured by the degree of electoral volatility in the system, the number of political parties, and whether parties possess strong roots in society as a consequence of their programmatic or ideological orientations. Among the political parties, the incumbent party has the principal role in decision-making processes and through its various initiatives, it tries to keep the electoral support flowing towards it. With the disruption of the support base, the incumbent party is likely to lose an election.

We come across several alternative definitions of incumbency effect. One could think of incumbency at the individual candidate level rather than at the party level. One could also think of incumbency in terms of being in power at the national or state level rather than holding the constituency itself. One may advocate the use of probability of winning as opposed to change in vote share as the measure of

incumbency effect. Furthermore one could raise the questions about measuring incumbency effect when an incumbent party wins the seat more than once. The literature on incumbency effects on election results is extensive and the focus is more on candidate incumbency (Erickson, 1971; Alford and Hibbing, 1981; Jacobson, 1987; Cox and Katz, 1994; and Levit and Wolfram, 1997).

Thus the literature in the area of turnover is not vast and most of the studies as stated above are concerned with the candidate turnover rather than party turnover. From the literature we come to know that turnover can be of four basic types : (a) party turnover of seats: it is the share of seats that are won by a different party; (b) pre-electoral turnover: it is the share of Members of Parliament who do not return as candidates for their own party; (c) electoral turnover: it is the share of Members of Parliament who stand in the election and lose; and (d) total turnover: it is the share of Members of Parliament who do not return to Parliament for whatever reasons. Studying the pre-electoral turnover can provide us with much valuable information about the power dynamics within the political parties. By its very nature, this issue cannot be studied until a country has gone through at least two consecutive parliamentary elections (Ohman, 2006:10). This study focuses on party turnover. Party turnover is defined as the defeat of the incumbent party as a result of the decline in the proportion of seats and votes polled by the party from what it had gained in the previous election.

Political parties and elections play an important role in the analysis of politics in developing countries and are used as a measure of the consolidation of a society's democracy. As an external standard, there is a "two-turnover" criterion (Huntington, 1991). By this criterion, a democracy may be considered to be consolidated if a party that takes power in an election at the time of transition to a democracy loses a subsequent election, not necessarily immediately following the first election, and if the subsequent ruling party then loses a later election. From a deeper perspective, it is when elections involve the true competition of political parties based on their proposed policies and platforms, and not the popularity of individual political candidates or voting based on special interests, then consolidation of democracy is advanced (Kitschelt, 1995; and Mainwaring, 1999). Huntington contends that democracy becomes consolidated when an electoral regime is fully entrenched and capable of delivering free and competitive elections. He argues that there is

consolidation if “the party or group that takes power in the initial election at the time of transition loses a subsequent election and turns over power to those election winners, and those election winners then peacefully turn over power to the winners of a later election”.

The Huntington’s measure of democratic consolidation has been criticised from many angles the most influential of which is Diamond’s (1996) disagreement that in many of the world’s new democracies, competitive elections have not ensured liberty, responsiveness and the rule of law. Rose and Shin (2001) argue that institutionalising electoral competition is not sufficient for the consolidation of democracy. This argument is widened with their contention that countries in the first wave of democratisation initially became modern states, establishing the rule of law and institutions of civil society before introducing universal suffrage. By contrast, third wave democracies have democratised backwards, introducing free elections before establishing rule of law and institutions of civil society. Rose and Shin refer to a minimalist definition of democracy as being the “fallacy of electoralism”, that is, privileging elections over all other dimensions of democracy (Mottiar, 2002:2-3).

Parties, without which the elections cannot be imagined, can be seen as the core organizations linking society to the state that developed concurrently with the establishment of democracy. The interaction between parties in a democracy is necessary to achieve the main goals: votes seeking, policy seeking and office seeking. The first goal represents behaviour of parties with respect to the electorates in maximizing their presence and degree of dominance in parliament. The second goal is to direct government what is in the party’s interest and reflects their ideas how society ought to be shaped by means of policy formation. The third goal is gaining access to the executive by competing with other parties for office, i.e. participation in government. Policy seeking behaviour is not feasible without having votes and offices i.e. having seats in parliament and participation in government (Keman, 2011:2-3).

Political parties have been considered by many scholars to be the major mechanism in the process of turnover. Changes of legislative majorities and party changes in government maintain elite circulation, offer opportunities for aspirant groups and lead to changes in public policy. Parties, not the legislature as a whole, are the main indicators of institutionalization (Matland and Studlar, 2004: 88-89).

Institutionalization means voters in an election are presented with the choice among a manageable number of stable parties with familiar coalition building preferences. Party systems that meet these criteria provide the conditions for building coherent governments and credible oppositions. However, only rarely have post-Communist party systems provided these conditions. The elections held in an institutionalized party system discipline governing parties by allowing voters to punish or reward them. During under institutionalization, there is more possibility of party turnover. Rather than having to choose from a manageable number of familiar and relatively stable parties, voters are faced with too many party choices, many of them new, unfamiliar, and having uncertain prospects.

An under institutionalized party systems are characterized by extreme multipartism, unstable party organization and unfamiliar patterns of coalition building. Thus less party system institutionalization means: (a) high fractionalization; (b) high volatility; (c) high party turnover; and (d) party system is open. Less Institutionalization⁶ results in highly fragmented and volatile party systems resulting in party turnover. The electoral volatility and party turnover are taken into consideration to measure party's organizational stability. In volatile systems, parties lack stable support bases, and their vote shares fluctuate sharply from one election to the next. Related to volatility, turnover measures the inflow and outflow of parties across elections. High turnover means that the cast of competing parties differs from one election to the next (O'Dwyer, 2004:530-36). In more institutionalized systems voters are more likely to identify with a party, and parties are more likely to dominate patterns of political recruitment. In fluid systems, a larger share of the electorate votes according to personal image or personal connections more than along party lines, antiparty politicians are more able to win office. Thus, populism and antipolitics are more common in weakly institutionalized systems.

Party roots in society and electoral volatility, while analytically different, are intertwined. The two dimensions are closely related because strong party roots in society limit electoral volatility and anti-incumbency. If most citizens support the same party from one election to the next, there are fewer floating voters and, hence, less likelihood of the massive electoral shifts that are reflected in high volatility. Where parties are deeply rooted in society most voters support the incumbent party over time and in different elections. There are profound differences in the

‘rootedness’ of parties in society. Notwithstanding some erosion of party voting in recent decades, in most of the advanced industrial democracies parties have strong roots. In these countries, over half of the voters identify with and vote for the incumbent party over time (Dalton, Flanagan, and Beck, 1984). In contrast, in Russia, Brazil, and Peru party roots in society are weak, and only a small minority of voters are loyal to the same party election after election. These differences in party rootedness have significant implications for democratic politics (Mainwaring, 1998:16-17).

According to Lindberg (2007), the most important aspect of party system institutionalization is stability and interaction among the political parties, which can be measured using eight different indicators.

- i. *The number of parties in the legislature* which offers basic information on the composition of the party configuration. The primary purpose is not to classify party systems into two-party, multiparty or fragmented systems, but to distinguish between institutionalized party systems, de-institutionalized and fluid party systems that are still in flux, configuration and/or change. If the number of parties in the legislatures changes significantly upward or downward over a series of elections, then there is an indication that the party system is still fluid. One, two or even three more or fewer political parties in the legislature may not necessarily indicate a major lack of stability whereas more changes usually does.
- ii. *The number of new parties* in the legislature is an indicator of stability versus fluidity in the party system. ‘New’ is defined as a party that did not have legislative representation in the previous elections. Stable party systems can accommodate one or two new parties entering the legislature every now and then, but if a larger number of parties are repeatedly winning seats, this indicates a certain amount of fluidity.
- iii. *The share of new parties* in the legislature. The share/percentage of new parties is calculated from the total number of parties in the legislature after the election.
- iv. *The number of party/parties voted out* of the legislature is an important indicator since a situation of changing party configuration would typically also be characterized by at least one party which is incumbent being voted out of

the legislature, which indicates a certain amount of fluidity. Again, the total number of parties in legislature is crucial in determining the significance of new and outgoing parties.

- v. *The share of parties voted out* due to losing in legislative elections. The share/percentage of parties voted out is calculated from the total number of parties in the legislature after the election.
- vi. *The share of seats in the legislature occupied by the largest party*
- vii. *The share of seats in the legislature held by the runner-up*; and
- viii. *Legislative seat volatility* is the final indicator of stability, measuring the share of seats that changed between parties from one election to the next. Legislative seat volatility is not always the same as party system fluidity, or weak institutionalization, since two or more established parties can trade substantial amounts of seats from one election to the next without necessarily deinstitutionalizing the system.

When there are more parties in the legislature and/or a significant number of parties are thrown out and one or both of the two largest parties is also new, high volatility further indicate the extent of fluidity in the system. In different ways these eight indicators indicates the level of stability versus fluidity in each country and thus speak to the extent to which parties are institutionalized. In addition to give us an idea about how dominant the largest party is, the runner-up measure also further indicates the level of fluidity within the system. Stability is indicated if neither of the largest or the runner-up parties represent different or new parties; if the runner-up but not the winner was new it indicates a moderate to low level of fluidity; if the winning party was new but the runner-up was not it indicates a moderate to higher level of fluidity; and if both the winner and the runner-up were new it tells us that the level of fluidity is very high as measured by these indicators (Lindberg, 2007: 222-25).

Electoral change and the related degree of electoral volatility are thus important features of being a party of government and remaining incumbent (Mair, 2002a), for it also matters where the other votes go to considering the party differences between electoral winners and losers affecting the composition of the new government (Laver and Shepsle, 1996).

In many definitions of democracy, it is assumed that the party composition of government changes regularly as a result of electoral shifts or having lost parliamentary support to continue in office (Dahl, 2000: 139-40). Some parties appear to be more crucial than others to make parliamentary government feasible and viable (Katz, 1986; and Keman, 2006). Within a party system, parties are of two types 'central' and 'dominant'. A 'central' party is that party which is closest to the median given the Left-Right and Progressive-Conservative distribution of a party system. A 'dominant' party is the one with most seats in parliament (Laver and Shepsle, 1996; and Roozendaal, 1997). Parties which are both central and dominant are labelled as 'pivot parties' (Keman, 1994), which play a crucial role in forming and running government. Notwithstanding the fact that both centrality and dominance define 'pivotness' of a party, this type of party will remain dependent on voters and on other parties to continue its life in government.

The most established parties representing the mainstream party families like Christian Democracy and Social Democracy are often a central or a dominant actor within the party system and in government. Hence, both vote and office seeking strategies help to become and remain a pivot of government. Once a party has achieved a pivot position, it is more likely to stay in government for longer periods. Well-known examples are the Christian Democratic parties in multi-party systems like Belgium, Italy and Netherlands (Keman, 1997; and Mair, 2002b). In Scandinavia, Social Democratic parties have been dominant in parliament and government for long.

Thus, a party with ample resources such as an electoral organization, financial means, loyal voters and a more or less established position within the party system is likely to be incumbent for longer periods and thereby developing considerable weight in both parliament and government. In other words, incumbency of such parties may well breed enduring incumbency (Keman, 1994; and Hazan, 1997). Yet, this strategy is not feasible for all parties, even if they are regularly participating in government. What makes the difference is that many parties are not yet in a central and dominant position to remain in government, they are not yet a pivotal party. This implies that non-pivotal parties remain more dependent on other parties to prolong their office seeking behaviour successfully (Keman, 2011:5-6).

From the above discussions on theories of party turnover, the important propositions that can be derived are: (a) the more institutionalized the party system, the lesser is the electoral volatility; (b) the less institutionalized the party system, the greater is the fragmentation in the political parties; (c) the less institutionalized the party system, the greater is the electoral volatility; and (d) party turnover/voting out of the incumbent party results in an increase in the electoral volatility. From the propositions stated, this study aims to find out the relationship between party turnover, which occurs due to the electoral defeat of the incumbent party and stability of party support in Indian context.

2.4.2.4 Party Coalitions

The term coalition as is generally used in political science has gained currency out of the requirements of a multi-party system in a democratic setup. It is a phenomenon of multi-party government when a number of minority parties join hands for the purpose of running the government. A coalition⁷ is usually a temporary union between two or more groups, especially political parties, for the purpose of gaining more influence or power than the individual groups or parties can hope to achieve on their own. By focusing on their common objectives and goals, all of the members present in a coalition can build their strength and get an advantage on issues of common interest. With a particular objective in mind i.e. winning an election, passing a particular piece of legislation, or forming a government, coalitions have a limited life span until the objectives are achieved. All of the partners should feel as they are winning or getting benefits out of the coalition. This can be done by combining votes in an elected body or by combining resources during a political or civic campaign. Working together, the groups or parties are able to accomplish more than they would on their own.

There are different types of coalitions that can play a role in politics: (a) *Coalitions between two or more political parties*: political parties may agree to work together in order to maximize their gains in upcoming elections or strengthen themselves in the legislative area; (b) *Coalitions between elected officials*: elected officials may agree to work together or at the least not oppose one another for mutual benefit. These coalitions may be blocs of political parties in a legislative body or they may be politicians from a particular region that agree to work together towards a certain goal; (c) *Coalitions between a political party and civic organizations*: civic organizations

may form coalitions with political parties in order to assist the political party and advance their particular agenda; and (d) *Coalitions between civic organizations*: civic organizations may agree to combine forces in the political arena in order to affect the outcome of an election or vote on a particular piece of legislation (O'Day, 2009: 2-3). Coalitions can also be pre-electoral or post-electoral. Political parties which wish to exercise executive power generally enter into some form of coalition. A pre-electoral coalition with other party/parties prior to the election is formed with a hope of governing together afterward if successful at the polls. Post-electoral coalition is formed among parties who become successful after the elections and are interested in forming a government (Golder, 2006:195; and Dhillon, 2003:4).

Recent theorising on minority governments and surplus majority coalitions are based on the concepts of size or dominance on the one hand, and centrality or ideological location on the other. Roozendaal (1992) predicts that if the same player is dominant (in size) and (ideologically) central it will form a minority government. Crombez (1996) argues that the type of government formed is a function of the largest party's size and ideological location. He predicts that the larger and more central the largest party, the more likely is a minority government, and the smaller and more off-centre the plurality party, the greater the likelihood of a surplus majority coalition, with minimal winning coalitions falling in-between.

Minority governments are signs of the largest party's strength, and surplus majority coalitions are due to the possibility of defections in no-confidence motions and signs of the largest party's weakness, deriving from its off-centre location and relative smallness. Surplus majority coalitions are more likely when a vote of confidence is an investiture requirement and minority governments are those when there are only votes of no-confidence (Sridharan, 2008:11).

Coalition governments, which are frequently found in multiparty countries like India, France, Italy and many other countries of the world, are formed when no single party is strong enough to obtain an electoral majority. A coalition government might also be created in a time of national difficulty or crisis, for example during wartime, to give a government the high degree of perceived legitimacy. Coalition governments usually do not appear in countries in which the cabinet is chosen by the executive rather than by a lower house such as in United States. In semi-presidential countries like France,

where the president formally appoints the prime minister but the government itself must still maintain the confidence of the parliament, coalition governments occur quite regularly (Pandey, 2010:59).

In parliamentary democracies a crucial dimension of political instability is the frequent termination of governments before the end of the legislature. There is a large consensus among scholars that political instability may have severe consequences on economic performance and growth. This observation has motivated a growing research interest in understanding the determinants of government instability. While the existing empirical literature focuses on the political and economic factors affecting government termination (King, 1990; Warwick, 1994; and Merlo, 1998), the dominant approach does not consider that the dissolution of the cabinet is the outcome of a strategic interaction among political parties. In fact, in multiparty parliamentary democracies the government is typically formed by a coalition of parties, and the stability of the government crucially depends on the ability of parties to maintain a political agreement within the coalition and retain a majority support in the Parliament. Moreover, in the political negotiation process, what determines the attractiveness of dissolving the current government are the expected future electoral prospects, which can be predicted by electoral opinion polls (Iorio, 2007:2).

When parties expect an electoral gain, the incentive to terminate the government increases if they can perfectly forecast future electoral prospects. Similarly, in the presence of an electoral loss, the attractiveness of remaining in power is higher without electoral uncertainty, especially for the party of the prime minister since the identity of the future prime minister is unknown. As a consequence, a prime minister that expects an electoral loss is well-motivated to find a compromise with the ruling coalition partners to ensure the survival of the government even if it might be very costly when the coalition partners expect an electoral gain. With a surplus government, the likelihood of survival may increase because the prime minister does not need the support of all the coalition parties in order to retain a majority.

Parties may value differently the potential coalition partners because the surplus generated from holding office varies across coalition types, its allocation depends on the number and size of the coalition partners and the partisan composition of the coalition determine the number and identity of parties the proposer can renegotiate

within the future. In addition, while selecting a coalition, there is a trade-off between ‘stability’ (larger coalitions are expected to last longer) and ‘control’ (the fraction of benefits received by each member decreases with the number of coalition parties). In any period before the end of the legislature, parties receive information regarding possible shifts in the electoral support through electoral polls. Whether the government terminates depends on all the parties’ incentives to seek early elections because the cabinet has to retain a majority support in the parliament, and the ruling coalition needs to maintain an agreement on the allocation of office-holding benefits.

Parties’ incentives to terminate the government depend not only on the future electoral prospects, but also on the current distribution of parliamentary seats, the partisan composition of the ruling coalition, the age of the government, and the institutional features (such as the length of the legislature). In fact, coalition parties may differently value their current and potential coalition partners because the surplus generated from holding office varies across coalition types, and its allocation depends on the number and size of the coalition partners. In addition, coalition and opposition parties may evaluate differently the future electoral prospects because of the uncertainty about the identity of the future prime minister and the ruling coalition that will be formed. For example, if poll ratings are high the incentive of seeking early elections is lower for a coalition party than for an opposition party, especially for the prime minister party. On the contrary, an opposition party may have an incentive to seek early elections even in the presence of an electoral loss, if the expected probability of being in a ruling coalition is high enough in the future (Iorio, 2007:14-15).

The scenario in many parliamentary democracies is of interest since it is unusual for a single party to control more than half the seats in parliament. In a study of 313 elections in 11 democracies in Europe from 1945-1997 (Diermeier and Merlo, 2004), it was found that only 20 of the elections returned a single party with more than half the seats in parliament. Hence, coalition governments naturally emerge. Furthermore, coalition governments are fairly diverse in nature.

A study of 15 post World War II European democracies by Gallagher, Laver and Mair (2005) reveals that about 35% of coalitions are minimal winning (i.e. they have just the required number of parties needed to constitute a majority), 36% are minority

coalitions (i.e. the coalition members constitute less than half the seats in the legislature) and the rest of the coalitions (29%) are surplus (i.e. they have more than the required number of parties needed to constitute a majority). From the point of view of ideological closeness such democracies also show diversity in coalitions that are not necessarily ideologically connected and may often leave out the median party.

There is a fundamental difference in terms of how these minority situations can play themselves out. Parliamentary democracy in the broadest sense comes in two types: positive and negative parliamentarism, a difference⁸ which came under scrutiny relatively late in the history of the study of parliamentarism. The basic difference between the types is that in countries with positive parliamentarism, a new government must win a vote of investiture by a majority while in countries with negative parliamentarism, there is no vote in the parliament before a new government assumes power (Bergman, 1993; and Molder, 2014). In the latter the parliament can bring the government down instead of bringing it into office. Under negative parliamentarism, where a government can take office without passing an explicit vote of investiture in parliament, coalition negotiation periods tend to be shorter and the prevalence of coalitions between parties that do not hold a majority in the parliament tend to be remarkably higher. It has also been noted that minority coalitions have the lowest cabinet duration (Lijphart, 1999:137).

Data collected across 479 governments in 17 West European countries over a 60 year period indicate that coalition governments are the norm. There is a growing trend in the last 20 years for executive power to be shared between two or more parties. With the exception of a single three year period in the late 1950s, in at least half the cases, two or more parties shared power in government. In comparison, in about a third of the cases, a single party held executive power. In most of these cases, a single party has governed with a minority of the seats in the legislature. The frequency of coalition government does not appear to be entirely unique to Western Europe. Currently, 17 out of the 30 OECD (Organisation for Economic Co-operation and Development) member states are governed by multiparty coalition governments. Across a more diverse set of countries, coalitions are even more common in occurrence i.e. about 65% of the time (Armstrong and Duch, 2010; and Vowles, 2010).

Coalition governments are a regular occurrence in Luxembourg, Belgium, the Netherlands, Austria, Germany and Iceland. Some of these cases are characterized by broadly shared power, as in the case of Austria which has a history of “grand coalitions” with the government holding on average 72% of the seats. In Belgium and the Netherlands, governments typically share power with more than three parties on average which are typically more inclusive than necessary (i.e. a surplus majority). In comparison, coalitions in Germany are more likely the result of minimum winning coalitions comprised of the fewest number of parties needed to hold a majority of seats. Single-party minority governments are common in Spain, Sweden, Norway and Denmark. While single majority governments have occurred in 11 of the 17 countries at least once in the past 60 years, they are only a common feature in the United Kingdom, which has a single party majority government in all but one of the last 23 governments and to a lesser extent in Greece. Britain’s first-past-the-post electoral system can be credited to produce a manufactured majority. Similarly, with Greece, a system of reinforced proportional representation electoral system provides a bonus to the largest party to promote stability thereby ensuring single majority governments (Hobolt and Karp, 2010:300).

Thus the most usual analyses of coalitions in politics deal with the formation of multiparty cabinets in parliamentary regimes. In government coalitions, several political parties cooperate, usually during a legislative term between two elections. Regarding the party composition of cabinets, single-party majority cabinets tend to last longer than multiparty coalition or minority cabinets. In single-member governments, conspiracies among party members to replace the incumbent prime minister are relatively less, especially if party members expect to have better electoral prospects with a new candidate. In contrast, in multiparty coalition governments, internal party cohesion tends to increase, but coalition partners are more willing to work against the incumbent. For coalition cabinets, the more the number of parties and the broader the ideological distance between them, the most vulnerable to splits and departures and less durable they should be expected to be.

From the above discussions on theories of coalition politics, the proposition that can be derived is formation of a coalition results in greater instability of party support. In the majority of the world’s parliamentary democracies, coalition government is the norm. The prevalence of these governments has created a complex situation which

may result to a greater electoral volatility due to shifts in the electoral support for the parties. So also is the case of India as the norm of one-party dominance is no longer applicable. It requires special understanding to grasp the meaning of complexities and interactions of the parties operating in India. The Indian party system is of a complex nature where a large number of parties exist representing multiple interests, identities and cultures. These political parties clash with each other many a time at various levels for capturing power by entering into a coalition.

In chapters five and six, we will turn to these factors to see how they affect stability of party support in the Indian context. At this point, it is relevant to know how to measure electoral volatility. The most important measure which is often used is the Pedersen index.

2.4.3 Index to measure stability of party support

The stability or regularity of patterns of inter-party competition can be measured through the index of electoral volatility or the Pedersen index as proposed by Mogens N. Pedersen in 1979. It provides one single quantitative index of the changes in electoral support received by parties from one election to the next (Suri, 2007: 54). It is computed by adding the absolute value of change in percentage of votes/seats gained or lost by each party from one election to the next, then dividing the sum by two. Accordingly, for a given election, electoral volatility (EV in the equation) is calculated as the sum of each party's absolute change in vote and seat shares (Pedersen 1983; and Przeworski, 1975). Thus in a party system with 'n' parties:

$$EV = TNC/2$$

Where 'TNC' is the total net change in party support. Similarly, it can be calculated in terms of seat share. The electoral volatility thus has a range of '0' or perfect stability when there is no change at all in party preferences of voters, to '100' or perfect instability, where there is total shift of voters from one party to the other.

Thus, the index measures the net change in the vote (and seat) shares of all parties from one election to the next. For example: suppose in a prior election party A receives 60% of the votes and party B receives 40%, while in the current election party A receives 40% and party B receives 60%. In this case, the volatility between these two elections is 20%. Party A loses 20% of the votes and party B gains 20% for

a net change of 20%. Volatility can result either from shifts in the vote (and seats) from a given group of parties to another, or from the appearance or disappearance of parties (Payne, Zovotto, Florez and Zavala, 2002: 131).

There are three main ways in which volatility index can be calculated. First, the split or merged parties could be considered as one in the election where they ran separately, thus calculating the volatility score between the total vote share and the vote share the parties each received separately. Second, the basis of calculation could be the largest parties when separated, the basis of calculation thus being its vote share when running separately as opposed to the vote share when running together with other parties. In this case, the votes for smaller partners are considered lost for a new party and hence the volatility score is higher than in the first case. Third, merged or split parties could be completely detached from their predecessors or successors. In this case, all the votes cast for them are considered to go to new parties and the volatility score is even higher. Among the three approaches, the third approach is likely to produce excessive volatility scores. The first approach is the superior because it is the most appropriate case where both splits and mergers have occurred by pooling the vote shares of the relevant parties on both elections. In addition, the index of aggregate volatility should be, first and foremost, a reflection of the sum of individual vote changes (Sikk, 2005: 394).

In principle, volatility is an index that reflects the extent of vote transfers between subsequent elections. The index of volatility approximates the level of individual vote shifts quite well (Bartolini and Mair, 1990: 20-34). It is not only a good indicator to observe vote switches from one party to another in subsequent elections, but it is an indicator of relative strength and social rooting of leading parties as well. Accordingly, it has been argued that volatility is the single most important indicator of presence or absence of party system stabilization. Unquestionably there is a connection between the level of volatility in a country and the stability of its party system (Sikk, 2005:392).

The score of volatility determines the stability of party system. Applying this index to Latin American countries, Payne, Zovotto, Florez and Zavala (2002) says that if the Volatility Index (hereafter, it will be referred by its acronym, i.e. VI) is between 0 and 15 percent, we may consider the stability of party support as less volatile; if it is

between 15 and 25 percent, it is moderately volatile; and if it is greater than 25 percent, it is highly volatile. Instability of party systems stems from the inner dynamics of incumbent actors than from the rise of new contenders. The less the volatility index, the greater the stability of the party system in a state or a country. Low volatility index indicates longevity of the parties as well as high intensity of party competition.

The Pedersen index, however is subject to criticisms. The index can be used to calculate electoral volatility for a single party, party blocs or entire party system. But at the same time, the index factors out negative signs, and thus, eliminate any information regarding the direction of a party's volatility. In other words, the result explains the magnitude of electoral volatility, but not the direction (Drummond, 2002:2).


After studying the literature separately on party system change as measured with effective number of parties' index and stability of electoral support as measured with the volatility index, it is necessary to know the relationship between stability of electoral support and party system change, which is dealt in the following section.

2.5 Relationship between Stability of Party Support and Party System Change

While the volatility index tells us the changes that the parties undergo in their electoral support, the index of effective number of parties tells us the number of parties that play an effective role in a polity. So party system change and change in the pattern of electoral support (electoral stability) for political parties are closely related.

Pedersen (1983) linked party system format to electoral volatility, arguing that there exists a positive relationship between the number of parties competing in the system and the level of electoral volatility. This hypothesis finds empirical support in studies of Western Europe (Bartolini and Mair, 1990; and Pedersen, 1983) Latin America (Mainwaring, 1998; Remmer 1991; and Roberts and Wibbels, 1999); and the Post-Communist states (Bakke and Sitter, 2005; and Tavits, 2005). It was found that if a party system in a given state changes, such that a two-party system splinters into a multi-party system or vice-versa, we would expect electoral volatility to be affected. The recent literature on party system change (Crewe and Denver, 1985:16) in western

democracies is frequently based on implicit model which might be represented as follows:



The existence of electoral volatility does not guarantee party system change and its absence does not preclude it. The party superstructure can change despite a stable electoral base. Small fluctuations of support from one or more parties are consistent with slow, cumulative trends in favour of one or at the expense of another. The impact of party superstructure, as distinct from the electoral base, on electoral volatility is a reminder of the importance of political institutions as shapers of party systems. The institutional profile of the party system, the number of parties, their relative strength, their ideological location and formal links with churches, trade unions and other mobilising institutions has an independent impact on electoral volatility which rebounds back onto the party system (Crewe, 1985: 18-19). In case of India, caste and religion have an important role to play. They both stratify Indian society along many different and sometimes competing lines. Many political parties explicitly mobilise their supporters along caste-community lines and this is reflected in their social bases.

A relatively stable party system seems to be important because it has several consequences for democratic politics. First, it fosters more effective programmatic representation. Contemporary representative democracy is based on the idea that citizens choose representatives who will advance the interests of their constituents or of the country. In systems with high volatility, party labels provide weaker programmatic cues. Parties that were electorally significant in one election get crushed in the next, while new parties emerge. Citizens are less likely to be able to identify what the parties are and what they stand for. Second, persistent high volatility introduces more uncertainty regarding electoral outcome and it probably weakens some democratic regimes. The level of uncertainty about who will govern and what

kind of government and policies is related with a stable party system and heightened with high volatility. Third, high electoral volatility alters elite strategic calculations in presenting candidates for political office and citizens' strategic behaviour. Information cues are less clear with weakly institutionalized systems and voters have less information about likely outcomes. Electoral systems affects typically found in established democracies may hold in countries with weakly institutionalized party system, and poorly developed sources of political information (Moser, 2001: 4).

In more institutionalized systems, parties have strong roots in society, and most voters conversely have strong attachments to parties. Most voters identify with a party and vote for it most of the time and some interest associations are closely linked to parties. Strong party roots in society help provide the regularity in electoral competition that institution entails. Party roots in society and electoral volatility, while analytically separable, are intertwined because strong party roots in society limit electoral volatility. If more citizens support the same party from one election to the next, there are fewer floating voters, hence less likelihood of massive electorate shifts that are reflected in high volatility. Conversely where parties have weak roots in society, more voters are likely to shift electoral allegiances from one election to the next, thus bringing about greater potential of high electoral volatility (Mainwaring and Torcal, 2005: 4-5).

Thus, we find that several factors influencing the change in electoral support for political parties and pattern of party competition. The above discussion also shows how to measure the party system change and change in electoral support with the use of indices like ENP and volatility index. These indices bring some precision in characterizing a party system in a country and understanding the extent of shifts in party support in quantitative terms. For example with the application of volatility index we can say that volatility is low in industrialized democracies, and it tends to be high in the developing countries which have electoral democracies. There can be several reasons for this high rate of volatility such as anti-incumbency, emergence of new parties, politicization of social cleavages, mobilization of new voters into the electoral arena, and formation of electoral alliances. Similarly, the index of effective number of parties would tell us the changes in a party system although there is no change in the type of the party system. While several political scientists in India's case seek to describe the changes and shifts in electoral support, it is necessary to

measure such changes and shifts. We can gainfully employ these indices to that of Indian situation to enrich our understanding in analyzing party system change and stability of electoral support in Indian context.

2.6 Conclusion

From the above discussion, we find that different types of party systems prevail in different countries. Several factors influence how party competition takes place in different countries. We also saw that party systems are not static, in other words one-type of party system that prevails in a country at a point of time may change into another type. So the classification of the party systems into two or plural party systems need not be treated in a frozen manner.

The chapter also shows that specialists in party politics usually explain how and under what circumstances party systems change. Some political scientists have further developed indices to measure the magnitude and nature of such a change. These indices brought some precision in characterizing a party system in a country. For example, the effective number of parties would tell us the changes in a party system although there is no change in the type of the party system. We can use these indices to that of Indian situation to enrich our understanding to the nature and changes of India's party systems.

Thirdly, the chapter also discusses about how to measure changes in electoral support for political parties. This has been done by using electoral volatility index. We can say that volatility is generally low in industrialized democracies, and it tends to be high in the developing countries which have electoral democracies. There can be several reasons for these shifts in electoral support like such as anti-incumbency, emergence of new parties, politicization of social cleavages, mobilization of new voters into the electoral arena, and formation of electoral alliances. While several political scientists seek to describe the changes and shifts in electoral support, it is necessary to measure such changes and shifts. Electoral volatility index provides us such a tool which can be gainfully employed in analyzing party stability and support in Indian context.

In the following chapters we shall see party system change and changes in electoral support by applying these indices to the Indian context at the national level and at the level of states.

Endnotes

1. Based on the relative size of parties, there are four main types of party system: (a) Two-and-a-half party systems: in this system there are three parties, two of which are much larger than the other one. Examples: Australia, Canada, and Germany; (b) Systems with one large party and several much smaller parties: in these systems the largest party usually wins at least 45% of seats in the legislature. Example: Norway and Sweden; (c) Systems with two larger parties and several smaller ones: in these systems, the two largest parties are much larger than any of the others but neither of them can hope to obtain parliamentary majorities for themselves i.e. the two main parties receive over 65% of the seats between them. Example: Israel, and Italy; and (d) Even multiparty systems: in this system, there are more than two parties but where there is neither a single large party. Example: France, and Netherlands (Ware, 1996: 161-67).
2. Rae's (1968) index of fractionalization can be calculated both in terms of votes and seats. It is computed by formula: $F=1-\sum (s_i)^2$, where 's_i' is the proportion of the parliamentary seats of party 'i' and $\sum$ stands for summation. The more the value of the Rae index comes closer to unit (its maximum value), the more fractionalized the system is. For instance, when 5 parties get each 20% of the available seats, that is a proportion of 0.2 each, the Rae index will amount to 0.80, thus indicating a highly fractionalized party system, as we have to add all five squared proportions of seats and withdraw this result from 1. If one party gets all the seats, thus getting a proportion of 1, it is easy to see that the Rae index will point to 0 (its minimum value), indicating no fractionalization and the existence of a completely concentrated party system. Thus, the fractionalization index designed by Rae does summarize important information about the number of parties and their relative size.
3. Of late a number of writers have spoken about one-and-one-half party system (example: Japan); one-and-two-halves system (example: Australia); two-and-one-half system (example: Germany); two-and-two-halves system (example: Canada) (Lijphart, 1999: 62-89).
4. All democratic governments consider participating in national elections a right of citizenship and a citizen's civic responsibility. Some consider that participation in elections is also a citizen's duty. In some countries, where voting is considered a duty, voting at elections has been made compulsory and has been regulated in the national constitutions or electoral laws. Some countries impose sanctions on non-voters. Compulsory voting is not a new concept. Belgium, Argentina and Australia were among the first countries to introduce compulsory voting laws (Gratschew, 2002:105).
5. Downs (1957) focuses on voting as an instrumental act (as a means to influence the election outcome). Doing so, he convincingly shows that rational voters would most likely abstain as the probability for their vote to be decisive is close to zero in most elections.
6. Weak institutionalization is typically associated with a variety of problems, this does not imply that extreme institutionalization is desirable. To the contrary, very high levels of institutionalization may result from a stultified party system. The relationship between party system institutionalization and the quality of democracy, then, is far from linear. An institutionalized party system is hardly a panacea (Mainwaring, 1998:10).

7. The coalition agreement has been considered as an instrument for “pre-cooking” decision-making between parties with different preferences (Moury, 2009:126). Governmental declarations and coalition agreements are not only inter-party tool to pre-cook decisions and reduce conflicts (Timmermans, 2003; and Timmermans and Moury, 2006), they may also serve to reduce agency-loss, as they stipulate the legitimate expectations of the principal vis-a-vis the agent. For example, Blondel and Cotta write: In coalition governments the life and authority of the cabinet depend on agreements negotiated among the parties which typically cover policy issues. The existence in some countries of detailed coalition agreements means that cabinet action is strongly determined by party guidelines (Blondel and Cotta, 1996: 255).
8. The distinction between the two types of parliamentarism has been used, like party policy, as an independent variable in the analysis of various kinds of government characteristics. Thus it has been used in models predicting aspects of coalition bargaining, the existence of coalition agreements, coalition formation, portfolio allocation disproportionality, the number of cabinet ministers, government termination and durability (Strom, Muller and Bergman, 2008). The clearest associations of this characteristic of parliamentarism, however, seem to have been with minority governments, shorter government formation periods (Bergman, 1993) and a lower share of parliament seats by government parties (Bergman, 1993:61).

Chapter-3

Stability of Party Support: National Level

3.1 Introduction

In the previous chapter, the focus was mainly to understand various theories of party system stability and change in general. This chapter opens up the discussion of party system change and stability specific to India.

The Indian party system has witnessed several important transformations over the past 65 years. Due to the emergence of new parties and decay of old parties, the party system has changed significantly. There is a large difference in the party system at the time of independence and that of today. The two views which emerge from this are: firstly, it is natural to have change in party system in a diverse and heterogeneous country like India; secondly, the existence of large number of parties may pose a danger to democracy, to the unity of the country and the stability of governments. However, what can be stated is, the Indian party system has evolved over the years from a one-dominant party system into a full-fledged multi-party system (Suri, 2005:7). The most recent changes are fragmentation, regionalization or federalization of the party system and a decline in the ideological polarization of political parties (Arora, 2000: 176-206; Sarangi, 2005:71).

The chapter is organized in five sections. The second section discusses how and why the Indian party system has changed over the years. An attempt is made to interpret these changes by measuring the nature and magnitude of the party system at the national level. In the third section, changes in the stability of party support over time at the national level are discussed and measured. A comparison between party system change and stability of electoral support for India and few other Latin American, Western European and South Asian countries is presented in the fourth section. The last section presents the main points that emerge from the discussion in this chapter.

3.2 Party System Change in India

The Indian party system has been a witness to a number of significant changes over the past decade. By the time the first General Election was held in 1952, India was vibrant with several parties like the Indian National Congress (INC), Communist Party of India (CPI), Bharatiya Jan Sangh (BJS), Praja Socialist Party (PSP),

Samyukta Socialist Party (SSP), Kisan Mazdoor Praja Party (KMPP), National Conference (NC), Forward Bloc (FB) and Revolutionary Socialist Party (RSP), articulating different standpoints and positions. The INC remained the dominant party till the late 60s. Ever since the decline of the INC became apparent, two features of Indian politics have attracted the attention of the students of party politics, media as well as the scholarly writings. One is the emergence of multi-party competition. The other is the rise of many smaller and regional parties to prominence to national level politics (Suri, 2005:14; Palshikar, 2003:306).

In 1950s and 60s, Kothari, Weiner, and Morris-Jones had talked about one-party dominance system. But it is now more or less settled. India has multi-party system with two alliance structures in which several state based and small parties float freely. However it is a matter of interest to find out that due to the continuous party fragmentation and intensified party competition what is the situation of Indian party system in contemporary times, i.e. whether it can be termed as one of moderate pluralism or extreme pluralism type and how do we quantify this process.

Party fragmentation can be viewed from different standpoints. In literal sense, it is seen as the splitting of parties and the emergence of new parties. But one can also see it in the sense in which Sartori defined fragmentation, i.e. in terms of existence of many parties where none are in a position to achieve effective majority. Fragmentation of parties could also be due to possibilities that open up in the times of hung parliament, alliances and unstable governments. The Indian party system has also experienced a continuous trend of fragmentation. The party splits in India are too many to be listed. There has been a proliferation of parties and the ongoing process of splitting, coming together and splitting again within the Indian party system. As a consequence of the proliferation and fragmentation, there has been increase in the number of parties. The increase in the number of parties leads to increase in the competition for power and electoral support (Suri, 2007:37).

To understand these competitions, change and stability of electoral support, there are certain indicators developed by scholars of Western countries. In case of India, these indicators are hardly used. Hence there is a need to use these quantitative indicators in Indian context. The two indicators which are most popularly used are 'Effective Number of Parties (ENP)' and 'Volatility Index (VI)'. The ENP and the VI show how

the party system in different countries has changed over the years. Similar changes can also be noted in case of India and its party system since the first General Election of 1952.

The first indicator is ENP. As explained in chapter two, it is used to understand party system change. The ENP can be calculated both in terms of seats and votes. But I will refer only to ENP calculated in terms of votes. The ENP is different for different periods in the evolution of Indian party system. Table 3.1 shows ENP at national level in terms of percentage of votes secured in India's Lok Sabha, since the first general elections of 1952 to the sixteenth general election of 2014. In Appendix 1, we see, as an example of the procedure used in this study to calculate ENP for 2014 elections.

Table 3.1
Effective Number of Parties in Terms of Votes at the National Level, 1952-2014

Year of election	ENP in terms of votes
1952	4.5
1957	4.0
1962	4.4
1967	5.2
1971	4.6
1977	3.4
1980	4.2
1984	4.0
1989	4.8
1991	5.1
1996	7.1
1998	6.9
1999	6.7
2004	7.6
2009	7.7
2014	6.9
Mean	5.4

Source: Election Commission of India, http://eci.nic.in/eci_main1/ElectionStatistics.aspx, retrieved on 1st June, 2012.

India has a markedly stable democratic polity with its attendant political parties during 1950s and 1960s. Among the political parties of India, INC stood out like 'Gulliver among the Lilliputians' (Bjorkman, 1987:51). In the first three General Elections to the Lok Sabha, the INC won over two-third majority of the total seats. It also came out with majority of all existing states from 1952-1962. Exceptions were Jammu and Kashmir, Nagaland and Kerala where the National Conference (NC), Independents and the CPI were the major contenders of power respectively. In three states it fell a little short of majority: in Odisha (1952-57), Madhya Pradesh (1962)

and Madras (1952). The INC among the several parties dominated the scenario. The other parties with a few seats were CPI, Peasants' and Workers Party (PWP), BJS, Dravida Munnetra Kazhagam (DMK), Muslim League (MUL) and Shiromani Akali Dal (SAD).

The strength of the Congress System until mid 1960s, named by Kothari (1964) could be explained by the capacity of the organisation of the INC networking the dominant social groups through factions and linking them with the party structure. The Congress system was considered to be an effective channel for mobilising popular support in the election and also putting popular demand on a higher political level (like the Lok Sabha or the Vidhan Sabha). Many scholars studied it extensively like Weiner (1957), Brass (1965), Sirsikar (1970), Sission (1972) and Kondo (2007).

The Congress system argument underlined the catch-all and consensual nature of politics. This description was factually correct. The catch all character and the nature of consensus helped the Congress system in two respects. In the first place, the Congress system sought to make compromises with upper castes and allow their domination in the political realm. On the other hand, the catch all character of the INC won elections for it, without forcing any change in its policies or leadership pattern. The INC was supported by the masses, which belonged to various social backgrounds. This gave the party the famous tag of a catch-all party. At the same time, the party worked to keep the dalits, adivasis, peasants and workers, at a distance from positions of power. The party would symbolically incorporate the various social sections, but party's upper class-upper caste leadership was recognized as legitimate and as representative of the masses. In other words, the Congress system was not really as open as its theorists thought it was. It was as much about exclusion as it was about inclusion (Palshikar and Yadav, 2003: 16-17).

Alongside the INC dominance, we also find during this phase emergence of new opposition parties in the 1950s and 60s. Several leaders within INC, who were disgruntled with the policies of the party or denied access to power, went out of it and formed separate parties: Socialist parties like the PSP, SSP, KMPP, Krishikar Lok Party (KLP), Bangla Congress (BC), Kerala Congress (KC), Jana Congress (JC) and Swatantra party (SWA) are some examples. Other parties rooted in long-standing anti-INC orientations, also began to gain strength: SAD in Punjab, MUL in Kerala,

DMK in Tamil Nadu, NC in Jammu and Kashmir, etc. The Communist Party too split on the question of support to the INC. Those who took a vehement anti-INC position, maintaining that defeat of the INC was necessary for people's democracy in the country, formed the Communist Party of India Marxist (CPM) in 1964. The CPM within three years of its formation became the ruling party in West Bengal and Kerala (Sridharan, 2002:481; Suri, 2005:17-18). During this phase, the ENP in terms of percentage of votes varied between 4 and 4.5. It is found that in different elections even though the seats won by the smaller parties is less, the percentage of votes they secured is more, i.e. KMPP (5.79%), PSP (10.41%), BJS (3.07%) and KLP (1.08%).

The INC was not the dominant party even in the first two decades after India became independent. This is because if we look at India's party system in terms of votes we have to characterize it as one of moderate pluralism. The effective number of parties stood at 4.5, 4.0 and 4.4 for 1952, 1957 and 1962 elections respectively. Only in terms of seats secured, the INC represented itself as the dominant party. There were four factors that accounted for INC dominance: (a) the party acquired a tremendous amount of good will and political capital from its leadership of the nationalist struggle; (b) it was the only party with an organisation extending across the nation and down to the village level; (c) it achieved its position of political dominance by creating an organisation that adjusted to the local circumstances rather than transformed them, after reaching the village through local men who controlled village vote bank; and (d) patronage was the oil that lubricated the party machine. The growing pool of opportunities and resources in the country facilitated the party's ability to accommodate conflict among its members and attracted new supporters.

The stability of the Congress-centric one party dominant system was shaken in the 1967 general elections when INC for the first time suffered a major setback both in the centre and in many states. The possibility of change in the ruling party of the centre thus grew large. For the first time since India had become independent, destabilization of the Congress system and the increasing possibility of changes in the ruling party through elections attracted the interest of many political scientists and journalists. This resulted in the upsurge in the election studies (Kondo, 2007:4).

In 1967 elections the INC lost power in six states. The competition had grown too severe because the opposition parties formed coalition alliances. The dissident

congressmen played an important role in the weakening of the party in every state in which INC lost the election, except in Tamil Nadu. This brought a number of opposition parties like CPM, SWA, DMK, PSP, Socialist Party, MUL and BJS fully into the market place. The competition that had previously occurred within the INC was now brought into the realm of inter-party conflict. Another new phenomenon after 1967 was the emergence of the defector market. The focus was more on the disintegrative function of the factions, centralization of power and organizational weaknesses of the INC (Morris-Jones, 1978: 156). Therefore we find the ENP rising to almost 5.2 in 1967 as opposition parties gained electoral support and the number of seats they won in Lok Sabha. A multi-party system was taking shape.

What the Indian political scientists Rajni Kothari has called “the Congress System” ended with the general elections of 1967. The profound changes in India’s polity also contributed to the decline of INC¹. The rapid growth of the electorate which increased by 45% from 1952 to 1967, brought an influx of new voters who were less appreciative of the INC role in the independence movement. Moreover, the simultaneous spread of democratic values produced a political awakening that mobilized new groups and created a more pluralistic group of political interests. The development of new and more differentiated identities and patterns of political cleavage made it virtually impossible for INC to contain the competition of its members within its organisation. Dissidence and ultimately defection greatly weakened the INC’s electoral performance. The first four elections from 1952-1967 falls under the first electoral system. The elections in this period were not seriously competitive. The period was marked by a low level of electoral participation. The choice was between the omnipresent INC and its regionally fragmented opposition. The 1967 elections had already signalled a transition from the monopoly of the INC to a competitive system (Yadav, 1999: 2393-94).

The party system was moving from one party dominance system to multi-party competition, from social cohesion to fragmentation, from a stable pattern to fluidity, from order to chaos as the principle of party competition. Since the 1960s a commonsense had evolved about the nature of party political competition through the first decade and a half of India’s democratic experience (Kothari, 1964; Gopal Krishna, 1967; and Morris-Jones, 1964). The most powerful formulation of this commonsense was, of course, captured by the term, ‘Congress system’ (Kothari,

1964: 152-199). Developed in the mid-60s, this formulation served to summarize India's competitive politics through the 1970s. It was a bold attempt to theorise the unique party system that India had developed that did not fit the straightjacket of one party system or multi-party competition.

The period between the 1967 Lok Sabha election and that of 1977 was a period of increasing turbulence and fundamental transformation of Indian politics in accordance with deep-rooted socio-economic changes in Indian society. Hitherto downtrodden people, like scheduled castes (SCs), scheduled tribes (STs) and other backward classes (OBCs) began to assert themselves in a more dignified manner within the context of a weakening tie of feudalistic social relations and social modernization. With increasing social conflict and political turmoil, this period of transformation was also a period of decline in the ruling party's ability to govern. Kohli (1991) provides a good illustration of this turbulent process of transformation.

The 1971 elections saw a restoration of two-third INC majority in the Lok Sabha with 43.7% votes and 352 seats. The unprecedented electoral victory of INC in 1977 election was initially seen as the restoration of the INC dominance, in retrospect that the election looks like a beginning of the second electoral system. The INC that Indira Gandhi led to power in 1971 was a new party that had to negotiate a new terrain of electoral politics. The move towards the new system was triggered off by the first democratic upsurge in the 1960s. The upsurge brought a great many new entrants from the middle castes or the OBCs into the game of electoral politics and turned it truly competitive (Yadav, 1999: 2394).

But the agitations led by Jayaprakash Narayan, the imposition of Emergency in 1975-1977, and finally the formation of the Janata Party (JP) in 1977 brought far-reaching changes in the structure of party competition. The JP itself came through the merger of different parties: Socialist Party, Bharatiya Lok Dal (BLD), BJS and the INC (Organisation). These parties had long-standing mutual opposition but now united to defeat the INC. The CPM, which strongly opposed the imposition of emergency and blamed the INC for authoritarianism, had joined hands with the JP to unseat the INC from power. Thus the joint opposition became redoubtable.

The emergence of a viable non-Congress party and its capturing of power at the Centre raised the hope of a two-party system taking shape. The INC secured lowest

share of seats and votes compared to the earlier elections. The JP won a majority of seats in Lok Sabha. We find the ENP during the 1971, 1977 and 1980 varied between 3 and 5 due to the presence of other parties like CPI, CPM, BJS, DMK and SWA respectively along with the presence of INC and JP in different election years. In 1980, INC restoration took place following the disintegration of the JP. The INC came out with absolute majority. Indira Gandhi's returned to win the 1980 general elections after forming a new party, the INC (Indira) in 1978. The INC(I) succeeded in reconstructing the traditional INC electoral support base of Brahmins, Muslims, SCs and STs that had kept INC in power during three decades prior to 1977. Yet political scientists like Myron Weiner observed the INC that won in 1980 was not the INC that had governed India in the 1950s and 60s or even early 1970s. The party was organizationally weak and the electoral victory was primarily of Mrs. Indira Gandhi rather than the party.

The early 1980s saw the emergence of a multi-party system. The Bharatiya Janata Party (BJP), formed in 1980, began to gain strength as the major opposition to the INC at the national level and in some states. The Bahujan Samaj Party (BSP) began to take shape in the north as the representatives of dalits. New regional parties sprouted and captured power in states such as Telugu Desam Party (TDP) (1983) in Andhra Pradesh and Asom Gana Parishad (AGP) (1985) in Assam. Due to the emergence of major regional parties, fragmentation of some parties like SAD, DMK, AIADMK, Republican Party of India (RPI) and KC, a big change in India's party system took place in the 1980s. Within the above process, the Congress system finally disappeared, and an era of frequent changes in the ruling parties, development of a multi-party system, and formation of a coalition government at the centre emerged at the end of the 1980's.

The 1984 election, held in the aftermath of Mrs. Indira Gandhi's assassination, was another 'exceptional' election. It saw the highest ever INC share of seats (415 out of 543) and votes (48.1%). But the ENP was 4.0. This is due to the presence of parties like CPM and regional parties like TDP and All India Anna DMK (AIADMK). With this political context around, the party system since 1952 was close to moderately pluralised type till 1984 as we can notice from the table 3.1. The exception was the 1967 election year when the ENP was 5.2.

The 1989 election proved to be a turning point in India's electoral history. The vote share of INC dramatically went down. There was the emergence of a large number of opposition, splinter and regional parties. We see here the beginning of multi-party system in India characterized by moderate pluralism where near about 5 parties played the effective role. No single party was in a position to capture power and play a prominent role. Scholarly interest in party politics and elections increased after the Lok Sabha election of 1989, indicating a second upsurge in election studies. The structural transformation of the party system and frequent changes of the ruling party/coalition through elections probably attracted scholarly attention to electoral politics. Research intensified again, and many election studies, especially on the Lok Sabha election emerged.

In 1990s, the one-party dominant politics in India gave away to a coalition system wherein no single party can expect to achieve a majority in the Parliament to form a government. Rather it was necessary to depend on a process of coalition building with other parties to form a block and claim a majority to be invited to form the government. This had been a consequence of strong regional parties which ride on the back of regional aspirations. While parties like TDP and AIADMK had traditionally been strong regional contenders, the 1990s saw the emergence of other regional players like Lok Dal (LD), SP (Samajvadi Party), BSP and the JD (Janata Dal). These parties are traditionally either based on regional aspirations like Telangana Rashtra Samiti (TRS) or are strongly influenced by caste considerations like BSP, which claim to represent the Dalits. The other dimension of the structural transformation of the early 1990s was a reconfiguration of the party system. The Congress system gave away to either a neat two party competition or a multi party system in different states. Suddenly there was not only space for new parties or for the old, but marginalized ones to gain new salience. The same development made formation of electoral alliances and post-poll coalition both desirable and necessary (Yadav, 2004).

In 1991, with the support of the 11-member AIADMK and some smaller allies, the INC was able to form a minority government. The ENP was 5.1 (the votes were shared by INC, BJP, CPM, CPI and JD). Apart from these five parties, the TDP also got a low percentage of votes. Thereafter, the INC began adding to its members by splitting small parties such as TDP and Ajit Singh's faction of the Lok Dal, itself a

breakaway for the JD after the defeat in 1991. The party competition was clearly marked as one of multi-party type during 1989-1991.

In 1996, the INC seats and votes shares declined further. For the first time, INC was overtaken as the single largest party, by the BJP. From 1996 onwards we see the emergence of a phase of high pluralism. From the table 3.1, it can be observed that the ENP in 1996 was high i.e. 7.1. This is because of two reasons: firstly, due to coming up of large number of regional and minor parties like Haryana Vikas Party (HVP), United Goans Democratic Party (UGDP), Karnataka Congress Party (KCP), Shiv Sena (SHS) and Mizo National Front (MNF). These parties began to appear on the centre stage of Indian politics. They were called upon to play an important role in running the government and they heralded new patterns of party competition. Secondly, BJP could form government only for thirteen days. It failed to win parliamentary support from other parties to form even a minority or coalition government. Therefore, it became clear that it is necessary for BJP to expand its social base in its stronghold states, in order to come to power. This was what it attempted to do in 1998 and 1999 elections (Sridharan, 2003:487-488).

Post 1996 is marked by continued bipolarization of party system combined with hung parliaments, a multi-party system and coalition politics at the centre. In 1999, the ENP was 6.7, it further increased to 7.6 after 2004 elections. No party on its own was in a position to form the government in 1996, 1998 and 1999 elections. Even BJP worked harder in 1998 and succeeded in putting together a 24-party coalition consisting of BJP, SHS, TDP, DMK, Pattali Makkal Katchi (PMK), TRS, SAD etc. The INC and allies consisted of INC, RJD (Rashtriya Janata Dal), AIADMK, Rashtriya Lok Dal (RLD), MUL etc. The National Democratic Front (NDA) had a decisive victory and decided to form the government with TDP opting to support it from outside. But in 1999, the BJP-led NDA government fell by one vote because one of the allies, i.e. AIADMK, was pulled out of the coalition (Mehra, 2003: 36-37).

The decline of INC dominance did not result in the emergence of dominance by an alternative party. Instead a heterogeneous set of parties replaced the INC. Broadly speaking, three or four types of parties have filled the spaces vacated by the INC:

- a. First, alongside the previously left-of-the centre Congress, a centrist party leaning to the left emerged by way of the JP in 1977, later the JD in 1989, but in the 1990s it suffered hopeless fragmentation.
- b. The second category of parties to occupy the space vacated by the INC was the major party of the right wing, namely, the BJP. The merger of the BJS with the JP and the subsequent splitting of the BJP from it, mark some important landmarks of political realignment in the country. It has won and lost power in several states in this period and headed the coalition governments at the centre formed in the wake of the 1998 and 1999 Lok Sabha elections.
- c. A third category of non-Congress parties is the left wing consisting of a number of parties headed by the CPM and CPI. The Left Front (LF) was a partner in the United Front (UF) governments. The UF was led by the JD and comprised the LF and some regional parties like SP, RJD, BJD etc.
- d. The last category of non-Congress parties are regional or state parties, which can be sub-divided into two major classes, mainly old regional parties and the new ones. The examples of the former are DMK, AIADMK, SAD, NC, JMM (Jharkhand Mukti Morcha) etc. The direct or indirect roots of these parties go back to the nationalist movements during the British Raj. The new regional parties like TDP, AGP, AITC (All India Trinamool Congress), and parties of the north-east have all emerged in the post-independence period, especially after the decline of the INC (Singh and Saxena, 2003: 252-54).

In 2004 election, the INC-led United Progressive Alliance (UPA) managed to overtake the NDA. It won over the LF to extend the support. While INC improved its tally in terms of seats, its vote share actually fell by 1.8% between 1999 and 2004 elections. Election 2004 also marks the closure of a historical possibility that arose at the beginning of the 1990s, i.e. the possibility of competitive politics providing space for exercise of substantial choices by ordinary citizens. By now it is clear that the earlier system of INC hegemony has been replaced by a system of multi-party convergence that does not meaningfully expand the range of choices available to and exercised by the citizens. The post-INC was marked by a participatory upsurge of the lower classes and lower castes. Electoral politics witnessed higher participation of the

hitherto marginalized groups, i.e. first OBCs and dalits and then women and adivasis (Yadav, 2004).

The 2009 election saw electoral competition around three alliances, namely the NDA (BJP and its allies like SHS, AGP, RLD), the UPA (INC and its allies like DMK, NCP, JMM); and the Third Front (TF), which was basically a collection of some national and large number of regional parties which were neither in UPA or in NDA like BJD, CPI, CPM, TDP and AIADMK. Most of the constituents of this TF were those who were earlier part of the United National Progressive Alliance (UNPA). There was also a Fourth Front consisting of the SP, RJD and the Lok Jan Shakti Party (LJSP), but these three parties fared poorly in the elections. The UPA led by INC formed the government after obtaining the majority of seats where results were strongly in its favour such as Andhra Pradesh, Karnataka, Maharashtra, Rajasthan, Tamil Nadu, Uttar Pradesh and West Bengal. External support came from the BSP, SP, JD (Secular), RJD and other minor parties. Thus, in the Lok Sabha formed after 2009 election, the ENP was 7.7.

In the recent 2014 elections, the ENP continues to be high but it is less in comparison to the 2009 elections. It is interesting to note that as if after the recent elections, the Indian polity is returning back to the era of single-party majority with the coming up of the BJP, securing a majority of seats. The BJP and its allies like TDP, SHS, SAD, DMDK, PMK, MDMK etc formed the largest majority government. The BJP secured 282 seats and 31.1% votes. The ENP in 2014 is 6.9 due to the presence of parties like INC, AIADMK, CPM, AITC, SP, TDP, which were capable of securing certain amount of vote percentage. Thus the period between 1996-2014 had the highest ENP in comparison to any other period. Therefore, we can term the period from 1996-2014 as one of high pluralism type.

Based on the table 3.1, we can classify the evolution of parties and party system in India into three periods:

- (A) 1952-1984: Period of moderate pluralism.
- (B) 1989-1991: Period of emergence of multi-party system.
- (C) 1996-2014: Period of high pluralism.

An overview of all the sixteen General Elections and the analysis of table 3.1 brings to limelight that the ENP calculated on the basis of votes seems to be high for several election years. There exists disproportionality between seats and votes secured by a party. The ENP calculated in terms of votes is always high in comparison to the ENP calculated on the basis of seats. Table 3.2 shows ENP calculated in terms of seats at the national level.

Table 3.2
Effective Number of Parties in Terms of Seats at the National Level, 1952-2014

Year of election	ENP in terms of seats
1952	1.8
1957	1.8
1962	1.8
1967	3.1
1971	2.1
1977	2.6
1980	2.2
1984	1.7
1989	4.1
1991	3.6
1996	5.8
1998	5.3
1999	5.9
2004	6.5
2009	5.0
2014	3.5
Mean	3.6

Source: Election Commission of India, http://eci.nic.in/eci_main1/ElectionStatistics.aspx, retrieved on 1st June, 2012.

The disproportionality of vote/seat ratio may be because of two reasons: firstly, it is possible that a large number of parties which secure considerable votes may not be successful in getting seats in proportion to the percentage of votes they secure in an election. Secondly, the disproportionality is also the result of the electoral system that India follows, i.e. FPTP. Under this system, the candidate who gets the maximum votes in a constituency emerges as victorious. According to Hardgrave and Kochanek (2008: 206), ‘this system can result in a large representation gap between an electorally strong but highly fragmented opposition and a nationally organized party or coalition of parties’. The disproportionality between seats won and votes cast was particularly noticed in the 2014 elections. The 2014 elections raise questions about whether or not the formally and legitimately representative Lok Sabha represents in its composition the spread and range of voters support across the country.

In this context, the applicability of Duverger's Law to India's situation comes to our mind. India follows FPTP or single member plurality system (SMPS), but has many parties (not just two), especially at the national and state levels. This situation has led many scholars treating India as an exception to Duverger's Law. While this proposition is generally valid, Rekha Diwakar says that India approximated to Duverger Law only in 1977 (2007: 539-561). However, our analysis shows that 1971 and 1980 may also be treated as approximating to Duverger's Law as seen from the ENP in terms of seats after the election, although the same cannot be said if we take into account the ENP in terms of votes. Therefore, by relating the Law to the Indian case, it is observed that there is no clear movement towards the Duvergerian Equilibrium. The Indian party system is highly pluralized. Many large Indian states exhibit multipartism rather than the predicted two-party competition. Thus the Law seems to be a distant reality for the Indian case (Diwakar, 2007: 539-557; Nikolenyi, 2008: 212-213).

As noticed from the table 3.1, the last seven elections between 1991-2014 have seen a move towards a more competitive Indian party system leaving behind the idea of two-party system. The present reality is Indian party system is of multi-party type. An understanding of the transformation or transformations in India's party system and the stabilization of multi-party system in the country can be enhanced by linking this process with the patterns of electoral support that various parties enjoyed over the years. As explained in the previous chapter, the analysts of party politics attach importance to the stability/instability in party support while dealing with transformation in party systems. Now we will turn to a discussion on measuring stability of party support by using Volatility Index².

3.3 Stability and Shifts in Party Support in India

Most analysis of Indian politics has focused on the increasing number of parties in the Parliament. The recent governing coalitions (such as the BJP-led NDA or the INC-led UPA) have been composed of at least ten parties. These changes have affected the stability of party support at the national level. The fragmentation of parties, electoral volatility and the anti-incumbency sentiments of the electorate have been well documented and commented on by researchers (Chibber and Kollman, 2004; Chibber and Nooruddin, 2008; Sridharan, 2004; and Yadav, 2000, 2004). Bartolini and Mair (1990) argue that European party system have been fairly stable if one examines

block volatility³ rather than total volatility. Similar claims about the influence of coalitional politics in influencing electoral results in India are made by Sridharan (2004) and Heath (2005).

In this analysis, the focus is on party level electoral volatility, because coalitional politics are relatively recent phenomenon in Indian politics. Table 3.3 show the electoral volatility at national level in India by percentage of votes secured over a time span of 1952-2014. Electoral Volatility can be calculated both by votes and seats. But I will refer to only electoral volatility by votes. The numbers of elections periods are 15 for 16 general elections beginning from the first national elections of 1952. Appendix 2 provides an example dealing with procedure to calculate electoral volatility for the election period 2009-2014.

Table 3.3
Electoral Volatility by Votes at the National Level, 1952-2014

Number of Election Periods-15	
Election period	EV by votes
1952-1957	23.4
1957-1962	16.2
1962-1967	17.6
1967-1971	18.2
1971-1977	44.3
1977-1980	45.3
1980-1984	23.9
1984-1989	28.2
1989-1991	12.9
1991-1996	20.7
1996-1998	20.0
1998-1999	16.7
1999-2004	14.0
2004-2009	15.6
2009-2014	23.0
Mean Volatility	22.7

Source: Election Commission of India, http://eci.nic.in/eci_main1/ElectionStatistics.aspx, retrieved on 1st June, 2012.

Note: ‘EV’ indicates electoral volatility

When we calculate the volatility rate, it is necessary to have an idea as to how we treat a particular level of volatility as low and as high. Following scholars like Pedersen (1983); Payne, Zovotto, Florez and Zavala (2002) who have talked about the cut-off values of volatility rate as mentioned in chapter two, it can be said in case of India because of its diversity, heterogeneity and party pluralism, that the party system is stable, if the volatility rate (VR)⁴ is less than 20 percent; it is moderately

stable/volatile if the volatility rate is between 21-30 percent; if the rate is between 31-50 percent, then the party support is highly volatile; and if the volatility rate is above 50 percent, we can term it as very high volatility at that point of time.

In the 1950s and 60s, we find a low level of party competition. The choice was between the all powerful INC and nationally fragmented opposition. Therefore we find from the table 3.3, the electoral volatility remained around 20%, if we take the average. This trend continued for four election periods (i.e. 1952-57; 1957-62; 1962-67; and 1967-71) respectively. The INC obtained an absolute majority of seats in the Parliament in the first four general elections, representing an era of stability in party support. In this connection Rajni Kothari (1964) analyzed the Indian party system from the comparative perspective of the distinction between one, two, and multi-party system. He argued that the one-party dominance expressed India's party system more accurately than the term one-party system, which more precisely described the authoritarian type of party system for instance that in Ghana. He formulated a new conceptual category, the 'Congress System' to characterize India's party system. If INC got 40% of votes between 1952-71, the other parties got less than 10% votes, for example: CPI, CPM, RSP (Revolutionary Socialist Party), MUL, SAD, BJS, DMK, PSP, Bharatiya Kranti Dal (BKD) etc. Thus, we can say that the party support was stable if we calculate the mean volatility rate for first four elections.

In the study of Chibber (1999), who insisted that the increased competitive nature of electoral politics and the decline of the INC's electoral fortune after 1967 were due to the decreasing loyalty of the party's supporters that resulted from the generational change of people in the context of socio-economic transformation. According to him, the mobilization of new voters by major parties reached a saturation point by the end of 1960s. He indicated that in the national elections after 1971, new voters were not brought into the electorate, but voters were switching allegiances between the INC and other parties. In another article on party competition and fragmentation (1999), he showed that the increased competitiveness between parties was not a result of turnout but rather the increased vitality of second parties. He further emphasized the importance of regional context (Kondo, 2007:6).

In the 1970s and the early 1980s, Indira Gandhi's macro mobilisational strategy was challenged mainly from two quarters. Charan Singh continued to press for the rural-

urban cleavage as the principal division of India and uphold agrarian interests throughout the 70s and the 80s. The BJS and later the BJP sought to shape a counter cleavage around the issue of Hindu nationalism. These challenges however, remained on the periphery. Indira Gandhi's defeat in 1977 came about through an entirely different route. Non-Congressism was turned into an electoral platform producing the momentary displacement of the INC. But this moment could not produce an alternative master cleavage for politics to stabilize around it and as a result, INC could reassert itself electorally in 1980 (Palshikar and Yadav, 2003: 47-48).

Thus in the 1970s and 1980s, party competition had increased. This led to increase in importance of electoral politics, political participation and the non-Congress parties gaining strength. Opposition parties formed coalitional government in several states. The period from 1967-77 marked the beginning of the passage from one-party dominance to a multi-party system. The 1977 election was the harbinger of a new era in the party system. It created new openings for the opposition parties. The period witnessed an intensification of conflict and competition between political parties. There also began a period of acute instability in the party system. The volatility rate was around 45% for 1971-77 and 1977-80 election periods. There was intense competition among parties to capture power. Many new parties like INC(Urs), AIADMK, National Congress Organisation (NCO), SWA, SAD, and JP also came into existence. Thus, the electoral support for the parties was highly volatile.

Volatility rate came down during the 1980s. Although it continues to be high, it was relatively low in comparison to the earlier period of the 1970s. In 1980-84, the volatility rate was below 25% as can be noticed from the table 3.3. Once again INC was split in 1978, and the INC(I) had emerged as the major contender of power in 1980 as well as in 1984 elections. By the late 1980s there was a political vacuum in Indian politics. The INC still remained the only party able to command greater extent of support in the country, but its share of vote declined dramatically. Thereafter, it saw further decline.

The Congress system was being redefined during the leadership of Rajiv Gandhi, both ideologically and in terms of the social basis of politics. The 1980s also witnessed the entry of new sections of Indian society into the political process. Rajiv Gandhi was successful in attracting the urban, middle class sections into the process of shaping the

political agenda. These sections now started dominating and legitimating the agenda of politics and influenced the thrust of the decisions of the government. His efforts to resolve the Punjab, Assam and Mizo disputes forced him also to redefine the terms of political competition between the INC and the regional political parties. In retrospect Rajiv Gandhi's attempt at redefinition of the INC contained within itself seeds of the erosion and decline of the Congress system (Palshikar and Yadav, 2003: 48).

If the 1960s were characterised by the first democratic upsurge, the 1990s witnessed the second democratic upsurge. The fundamental force which has given rise to the second democratic upsurge is the enfranchisement of the backward castes. By drawing more people and politicising them, the electoral mechanism does provide a base for radicalisation of democracy, it also created necessary though insufficient conditions for the forging of political cleavages which cut across social cleavages and thus contribute to democratic consolidation (Yadav, 1996:98).

The 1990s have witnessed a succession of minority or coalition governments and hung parliaments. The intensification of competitive politics has changed the party system from being a rivalry between national parties into one between alliances and coalitions of national and state parties. The governments formed in 1989, 1991, 1996, 1998 and 1999 were coalitions of several parties. The volatility rate in 1984-89 was somewhat high i.e. 28.2% in comparison to 1980-84, with the coming up of JD. The other parties which marked their presence were BJP, BSP, TDP, and AGP. Political stability remained elusive because of the shifting alliances of rival parties in the political arena. This raised doubts about the viability of coalitions in a situation of rapidly changing alliances. We find that the party system was moderately stable/volatile between 1984-89.

Since 1989-91 onwards, the party system appears to be stable, contrary to the earlier periods of heightened instability. The 1998-99 period was marked by the BJP's rise to prominence in Indian politics as the single largest party, with the INC losing out in the race. The BJP was able to broaden its electoral base, by aligning with regional parties. Alliances have helped the geographical expansion of the BJP. It had an electoral presence in most states by the end of 1999 elections, Kerala being one of the exceptions. The party system was stable, inspite being a multi-party one. The volatility index calculated was 16.7%.

The series of surveys and analyses by the Centre for the Study of Developing Societies (CSDS) has revealed various important facts through which the direction of the transformation of people's political perception about parties can be understood. According to CSDS, the long term transformation of the support bases of the major parties is very important for determining to what extent and how the upper caste, OBCs, SCs, STs, Muslims, Christians, the rich, the poor, the illiterate, the educated and other groups have shifted their support from INC to other parties in the four decades and assessing in which social stratum the BJP increased its support. One of the major changes resulting in long-term erosion of the support base of INC is the shift of allegiance of the OBCs from INC to other parties, including the BJP. Although the situation is different depending upon time and place, caste and religions of voters are the most important determinants of party support (Kondo, 2007: 9-10).

The two election periods of 1999-2004 and 2004-2009 were characterized by the stability in party system. The rate of volatility remained around 15%. These two periods marked the INC-led UPA alliances coming to power. While the INC acquired new allies, the BJP lost allies between 1999 and 2009. The nationwide vote and seat shares of the two alliances were far from evenly spread.

Thus, as seen from the table 3.3, since 1991 the volatility rate has come down. This is partly because the party system has gone through a substantial reconfiguration and has been stabilizing (Hasan, 2002: 4-33). However, the 2014 elections mark a reversal of the stabilization trend which was setup since 1991. The electoral volatility has increased to 23%. This was mainly due to the shifts in the electoral support from INC to BJP. The vote share of the INC declined from 28.6% to 19.3% and the vote share of the BJP increased from 18.8% to 31.1% between 2009-2014.

Thereby, based on the electoral volatility by votes as observed from the table 3.3, the stability of party support can be classified into following five periods:

- (A) 1952-1971: Period of stability.
- (B) 1971-1980: Period of instability.
- (C) 1980-1989: Period of moderate stability/volatility.
- (D) 1989-2009: Period of stabilization.
- (E) 2009-2014: Period of reverting to moderate stability/volatility.

As we have noted earlier, electoral volatility is a phrase to indicate changes in party preferences within an electorate. These preferences are responsible for the eroding of a party support base and it is likely that the party may lose its seats and votes shares. The relationship between volatility of votes and volatility of seats is determined by the electoral system. Under a system of pure proportional representation the volatility of seats-votes shares will be identical (Crewe, 1985: 8-9). In a plurality system like India, there is likely to be variations between volatility by votes and seats. The variation in the electoral volatility by seats between 1952-2014 can be noticed from the table 3.4

Table 3.4
Electoral Volatility by Seats at the National Level, 1952-2014

Number of Election Periods-15	
Election period	EV by seats
1952-1957	10.2
1957-1962	10.3
1962-1967	23.1
1967-1971	20.6
1971-1977	61.4
1977-1980	61.4
1980-1984	18.3
1984-1989	51.2
1989-1991	19.6
1991-1996	30.1
1996-1998	23.1
1998-1999	16.2
1999-2004	29.0
2004-2009	29.0
2009-2014	49.5
Mean Volatility	30.2

Source: Election Commission of India, http://eci.nic.in/eci_main1/ElectionStatistics.aspx, retrieved on 1st June, 2012.

Therefore it is interesting to note that the stability of party support, as measured with the help of volatility index, is high in India since 1991 despite its high pluralism in the party sphere and the growth in the ENP over the periods under examination. However, in 2014 elections, it is observed that the stabilization trend setup since 1991 seems to be disturbed with the increase in electoral volatility. This can be attributed to the huge victory of the BJP and the precipitous fall of the INC and several regional parties.

After the discussion on party system change and stability of party support specific to Indian context, it is necessary to know the position of India in terms of party system

change and stability of party support with respect to some other countries of the world. The following section deals with party system change and party support stability in a comparative perspective.

3.4 Party System Change and Party Support Stability in India in a Comparative Perspective

A better understanding of the changes in party system and stability in party support in India would be possible, if we locate them in a comparative perspective. This we can do by comparing the ENP and volatility index that we discussed in the earlier sections with the ENP and volatility index that we find in the developed democracies of the west and democracies in Latin America and Asia (by selecting a few countries randomly). Table 3.5 shows the average ENP (in terms of seats) and average volatility rate (in terms of votes)⁵ for different countries of the world. It is derived by dividing the sum of ENP values by the number of elections. The same procedure is followed while calculating average volatility rate.

From the table 3.5, it becomes clear that party systems in several countries are characterized by multipartism: especially Brazil, Chile, Bolivia, Pakistan, Italy, Netherlands, and Belgium. Countries like India, France, Sweden, Panama and Portugal are moderately pluralized. The other countries with fewer parties or nearly two-party system are United Kingdom, Honduras, Mexico, Costa Rica, Bangladesh and Austria. The country with the highest ENP is Brazil (6.7) followed by Chile (5.1). The countries with the lowest ENP are Bangladesh (2.0) followed by United Kingdom and Honduras (2.1).

Similarly, by analyzing the mean volatility rate from the table 3.5, it becomes clear that Western European countries⁶ have low volatility in comparison to South Asian and Latin American countries. In case of South Asian countries, the mean volatility rate is highest in case of Pakistan (40.9%) followed by Bangladesh (36.3%). In case of Latin American countries, the electoral volatility is highest in case of Brazil (37.6%) followed by Bolivia (34.3%). In case of Western European countries, Austria (6.6%) and United Kingdom (6.8%) have witnessed a low rate. As far as the position of India is concerned it stands in between with a moderately pluralized party system and moderately stable/volatile electoral support for the parties with the mean ENP of 3.6 in terms of seats and mean volatility of 22.7% by votes for the period 1952-2014, as seen from the table 3.5.

Table 3.5
Average Effective Number of Parties and Average Electoral Volatility of
Western European, Latin American and South Asian Countries

Countries	Number of elections	Average ENP (by seats)	Election periods	Average volatility rate (by votes)
United Kingdom	14	2.1	1951-2001	6.8
Ireland	15	2.8	1951-2002	10.9
France	10	3.4	1951-2002	15.3
Italy	14	4.9	1946-2001	15.1
Germany	13	2.9	1949-2002	8.7
Austria	16	2.5	1953-2002	6.6
Sweden	16	3.3	1952-2002	9.0
Netherlands	15	4.7	1952-2002	11.7
Belgium	17	4.3	1950-2003	9.2
Spain	07	2.8	1977-2000	17.0
Portugal	08	3.3	1975-2002	15.2
Bangladesh	06	2.0	1973-2001	36.3
India	15	3.6	1952-2014	22.7
Pakistan	05	4.4	1977-2002	40.9
Srilanka	08	2.7	1956-2004	15.1
Hondorus	05	2.1	1981-1997	6.2
Mexico	08	2.3	1979-2000	21.4
Costa Rica	06	2.3	1978-1998	9.9
Panama	03	3.8	1994-1999	23.0
Bolivia	05	4.4	1980-1997	34.3
Chile	03	5.1	1989-1997	22.2
Brazil	04	6.7	1986-1998	37.6

Source: Lijphart, 1999: 76-77; Payne, Zovotto, Florez and Zavala, 2002: 132-145; Mainwaring and Zoco, 2007: 159-60; Suri, 2007: 53-56; Morgenstern and D'Elia, 2007: 150.

3.5 Conclusion

To conclude this chapter, it can be stated that Indian party system after independence is characterized by the proliferation and fragmentation of parties. There has been the emergence of multi-party systems and coalitions. But inspite of having a large number of parties, stability seems to be growing in the party system between 1991-2009. The 2014 elections somewhat proved to be an exception to the stabilization trend which was setup since 1991 elections.

Coming to the nature of Indian party system at the national level, India can be characterized as one of high pluralism based on the ENP as calculated in table 3.1. Inspite of having a large number of parties, it would be a problem to call Indian party

system as an extremely plural party system, as we should do if we go by Sartori's classification of party systems. It is so because India being a country of continental size, great diversity and also due to the somewhat stabilizing democracy, this number may not be as alarming as it would be in a small and ethnically homogeneous nation. Therefore, in characterizing India's party system we can use the term 'high' pluralism instead of extreme pluralism (as was done by Sartori, 1976).

In spite of huge party system change, the party system is gaining some stability in recent decades as seen in relatively low volatility rate from the table 3.3 till 2009 elections. The 2014 elections noticed some amount of fluctuations in the electoral support for parties. However, the extent of deviation of volatility for each election⁷ in case of India is not so high as compared to some other democracies. Exceptions were 1971-77 and 1977-80 election periods due to the extraordinary realignment of political forces.

Thus, the above analysis shows that an increase in party fragmentation may not necessarily contribute to instability of party support. In other words, the ENP and volatility rate are not always in direct relationship as seen between 1991-2009 election periods. Although one finds intense political competition encouraging parties to constantly search for new support leading to change in party system, the fluctuations in the electoral support for the parties is relatively less within the Indian party system.

Endnotes

1. In India, a day before his martyrdom, Gandhi wrote in a note published in 15 February, 1948 under the title 'His Last Will and Testament' that the Indian National Congress having attained India's freedom ought to be dissolved. This was necessary for keeping out unhealthy competition with political parties and communal bodies. He, instead, proposed the formation of a Lok Sevak Sangh as India had still to attain social, moral and economic independence in terms of its several villages as distinguished from its cities and towns. After Gandhi, two other Indian political thinkers and activists: Jayprakash Narayan and M.N Roy, advocated a party less democracy (Singh and Saxena, 2003:268-69).
2. The volatility index of each country is the average of the volatility for all elections periods in the country. Since the mean volatility may conceal variation, the extent of variation can be understood by the corresponding Standard Deviation for each country.
3. We find frequent formation of coalition government in case of India since 1989. In case if the block is taken into consideration, it may be difficult to calculate electoral volatility or block volatility. This is because a party within the fold of NDA coalition in 1999 may shift to UPA coalition in 2004. In other words, there is no certainty in case of party 'A' to be in the

same coalition for a longer period of time. Thereby problem may arise to find out the shift in case of party A from one election to another, in case of calculation of block volatility. For example: DMK was a partner of NDA in 1999 elections but it shifted its allegiance to UPA in 2004 elections. However, the above problem may not arise when the calculation of net volatility is done.

4. In order to calculate electoral volatility rate, the most popularly used index is the Pedersen's index. Besides Pedersen index, a huge number of other indices are suggested by different scholars like Rae (1967); Loosemore and Hanby (1971); Lijphart (1984); Taagepera and Shugart (1989); Monroe (1994); Gallagher (1991); Cox and Shugart (1991) and Pennisi (1998) to measure electoral volatility. Therefore, the zoo of indices proposed and used by researchers, points out parallel developments in measuring volatility and possible extension toward systematic measurement of vote splitting (Taagepera and Grofman, 2003: 662-65).
5. The average ENP by seats is taken into consideration because the parties which secure seats in the legislature are those who rule and are considered to be important. The average VR by votes are taken into consideration because the shifting of electoral support for the parties can be more clearly marked when the votes for the respective parties are taken into account from one election to the next.
6. In comparison to Western European countries, at least half of the Latin American countries experienced very high electoral volatility. In terms of the period averages, more than two-thirds of the Latin American countries experienced more electoral volatility than the most volatile European democracy (Payne, Zovatto, Florez and Zavala, 2002:133).
7. It should be observed that, in addition to studying average election-to-election volatility, volatility should also be calculated and comparison should be made for some distant elections. Sometimes election-to-election differences are picking up random aspects of electoral change and might be blind, say, to patterns of oscillation in power between two major parties (or grouping of parties) or to long-run patterns of realignment that are too subtle to catch over a short time frame. Another measurement issue has to do with the scale on which analysis are performed. For example, the average disproportionality or volatility measured at the district level will not be the same as the total disproportionality/volatility observed in terms of national seat and vote shares (Taagepera and Grofman, 2003: 675).

Chapter-4

Stability of Party Support: State Level

4.1 Introduction

This chapter deals with understanding party system change and stability at the level of states. Ever since the decline of Congress became apparent, two features of Indian politics have attracted the attention of students of Indian political process. One is the coalition-based structure of party politics and the other is the rise of many smaller and regional parties to prominence in national level politics. What is remarkable about these features is that INC was not being replaced by any single party. A wide range of regional formations at the state level has become the centrepiece of the emerging party system.

Given their size and socio-cultural and ethnic specificity, states in India have become the sites of political action and political competition. For a majority of politicians and people, what seems to be important is what happens at the state level or who controls the state governments. Analyzing the changing nature of party competition, Yadav and Palshikar observe that on the whole the scenario of the state politics in India presents three patterns. Initially, just after the constitution of the Indian union, when inter-state variation was moderate, intra-state variation was very high. This was followed by a period, during the second life of the INC, of low inter-state variation coupled with moderate intra-state variation. Finally, we are now witnessing a phase when inter-state variation has increased, but intra-state variation has become insignificant. This, according to them, sums up the story of the rise of states as the authentic node around which political competition becomes intelligible. But then, it is precisely the mixed balance sheet of possibilities and anxieties that make the study of state politics an exciting and important enterprise (Yadav and Palshikar, 2003:33).

Attempts have been made to understand almost every election over the past two recent decades by looking at the states. But for this purpose, it is necessary to know how many parties are playing effective role within a party system in each state and how far the party system has changed and is stable at the state level. For this purpose, the two indices, Effective Number of Parties (ENP) and Volatility Index (VI), which are used at the national level to measure party system stability and change, are again used for the state level.

The chapter consists of seven sections: the second section focuses on the increasing importance of states as an arena of political competition. In the third section party system change at the state level over the sixteen general elections will be discussed and measured. In the fourth section stability of party support over time at the level of states will be discussed and measured. Relation between party system change and stability of electoral support will be brought out in the fifth section. It establishes the relationship between party system change and stability of electoral support treating them as two variables with the use of statistical method i.e. correlation coefficient. The sixth section will present a comparative study between party system change and stability of party support at national and state levels by means of calculating averages and combined averages. The last section brings out the main points that will emerge from the discussion of this chapter.

4.2 States as Arena of Political Competition

During the last two decades Indian parties and the party system have undergone remarkable changes. The changes are not simply in the number of parties or their relative strength. There has been a qualitative transformation in the manner in which each party perceives its role in politics and in its interaction with other political parties. It is not strange that states are becoming more important when it is taken into consideration that patterns of social mobilization of the electorate have developed in line with the socio-economic variety and vastness of states. In the era of multi-party system and coalition governments, regional parties, which are closer to the people, have become more important. Their importance in elections is not only for turnout but also for the party preferences (Kondo, 2007:8).

Along with the changes in the nature of parties, there is a qualitative change in the nature of party competition as well. Scholars of Indian politics argue that Indian polity has reached a 'Post-Congress' phase. In the first two decades, it was the INC's dominance and, in the next two decades, it was the nature of opposition to the INC which defined the party system. After the later half of the 1960s, it was difficult for INC to maintain its heterogeneous social base. For example: In the state of Uttar Pradesh, where the backward castes saw INC as a party of the forward castes and the forward castes saw the INC as a party of the backward castes and dalits. This resulted in the collapse of the INC in the state.

After 1970s, the social base of parties in a state got clearer. The important factors that distinguish the social base of a party include caste, religion and class. Once other political parties could divide society differently, the INC found it difficult to defend catch all politics. Most likely, this led to the transformation from a catch-all to a cleavage based party system. It was, according to Chibber (1999), a basic reason for the downward trend of the INC. He has revealed the transformation of a catchall party system centering on the INC to a cleavage based party system. But since the late 1980s, the sharp decline of the INC has resulted in a transformation of the party system. The decline of the INC is not simply evident in the electoral returns, but more importantly, in the way the party and its leaders perceive their role in the political process. This has redefined the grammar of party competition in India (Sarangi, 2001:128-31).

As the popularity of once dominant INC has gradually decreased, the peculiar pattern of party preference of each state in India in line with the particular socio-political situation, especially castes, religions, backwardness and others has come into the surface. As a result, there has been clear differentiation of the party system since the 1980s and the era of multi-party systems and coalition governments has come. Many parties have grown based on particular ethnic groups such as caste and religion (Kondo, 2007:14).

The 1989 general election verdict appeared no different from the earlier elections. The rise of the V.P Singh had galvanized the opposition to the INC. The anti-INC wave in North India followed the same logic of opposition unity as the 1977 wave. The INC and the opposition tried their old social alliances. Yet there were signs of the new order yet to be born. Under the umbrella of the JD, state wide political formation had already begun to exercise a significant role in national politics. The election result also carried signs of shifting social basis of politics. Muslims in Uttar Pradesh and dalits and OBCs in Bihar had already begun to upset the given social equations for political parties (Yadav, 1999: 2394).

With the end of the Congress System, trend towards the regionalization of Indian politics has become more manifest and the states have become increasingly important and powerful units of the Indian political system. As distinct developments in party domain at the state level had unfolded during the 1960s and later, interest in

understanding party politics increased both among political scientists as well as commentators on Indian politics. The inadequacy of analysis of Indian politics focusing exclusively on the national level became apparent during the 1990s as states actually started playing a crucial role in shaping the so-called national level politics. Thus, studies on individual state politics began more seriously after the 1990s. Yadav and Palshikar call the 1990s as the decade of the states. This is because the theatre of politics shifted to the states. After 1990s, states were recognized as the main theatre for politics, state parties became the focus of attention and state-level electoral verdicts came to be analyzed for explaining national electoral outcomes (Yadav and Palshikar, 2009:48).

According to Chibber and Nooruddin (2008), it is at the state level that the future analysis of Indian politics must concentrate. The developments in the 1990s and scholarly response to them have contributed to the emergence of state politics as the frontier discipline essential for a nuanced understanding of Indian politics (Yadav and Palshikar, 2003:9-10).

The signs of a fresh beginning were made in 1990s in the direction of a truly comparative study of state politics that could lead to a reappraisal of Indian politics. The growing literature includes three kinds of works. First there are some studies that focus on a single state, but use it to develop a larger argument about Indian politics (Christophe Jaffrelot on Madhya Pradesh, Narendra Subramanian on Tamil Nadu, K.C Suri on Andhra Pradesh, Zoya Hasan and Sudha Pai on Uttar Pradesh, and Ghanshyam Shah on Gujarat and Peter deSouza on Goa); secondly there are some studies that offer direct comparison of politics in more than one states (Atul Kohli, Aseema Sinha, Robert Jenkins); and thirdly, some analysts have attempted to offer an overview of the trends and patterns of party politics across a number of states (E. Sridharan, Yogendra Yadav and Christophe Jaffrelot).

In view of these developments and growing importance of the state level parties in the politics of India during the 1990s, it becomes an interesting exercise to review the role played by the state level parties. Parties operating at the state level have not been a rarity in Indian politics. What is new is the all-India role of these parties and their relationship with the all-India parties. No government could come to power without the support of the state level parties. Barring a few states like Rajasthan, Gujarat,

Madhya Pradesh, all the states now have their political space divided between the all-India parties and some state level party or parties. In states like Tamil Nadu or Jammu and Kashmir, political process is centred around the state level parties. These state level parties represent wide range of social forces and have brought about a change in the field of representation and ideology (Palshikar, 2004: 1477).

In the last two decades, state politics has broken free of the logic of national politics and has acquired a rhythm and logic of its own. The features which have emerged are: (a) states have emerged as the effective arena of political choice; (b) the nature of political choice varies from state to state because at the state level we can find all kinds of contest: bipolar, triangular, four-cornered or fragmented ones; (c) the regional party system or state based party system have become more salient than ever before; (d) state level politics is freer of the control of national politics and is often in a position to dictate terms to national politics. This happens in the most visible manner when statewide parties determine the agenda of national politics or enjoy upper hand in their bargain with national party system; (e) a long term process of differentiation of political communities has ensured that the citizen's identity has crystallized around states (Yadav and Palshikar, 2009:46-48); (f) the rise of the middle castes, who were mostly peasant communities and the communities which demanded greater autonomy for their respective states; and (g) the ideological depolarization, regionalization and fragmentation are likely to be reinforced by the economic reform process. The economic reform process initiated during the 1990s decade had influenced political institutions and culture and the processes of political mobilization. Political parties responded to this regionalization of the political culture by regionalizing national party systems or establishing new regional parties (Sarangi, 2005:78).

One could, therefore, characterize the party system in India today as one of segmented pluralism. It has three distinct features. Firstly, there is multiplicity of parties with varying strengths. These include the national, regional and local parties. Secondly, the party system is segmental, but not polarized. The ideological distance among the parties is minimal. Though they have become closer ideologically, the distance in the sphere of other cleavages has increased. This distance, and therefore competition, is determined by a multidimensional pattern of cleavages. Thirdly, the party system is

generally centrifugal rather than centripetal. There is a trend towards regionalization of the party system. Several regional parties have emerged and have become electorally important, and the national parties have tended to view their regional units as the focal points in inter-party competition (Sarangi, 2001:132-33).

4.3 Party System Change at the State Level

Analyzing the development of party politics in different states, Yadav and Palshikar deal with how state politics have evolved over time on two dimensions of divergence and convergence. From their analysis we see that there emerged basically two types of party competition in the states. One is bipolar competition. It again includes two types. The first one is a bi-party competition between BJP and the INC in states like Rajasthan, Gujarat, Madhya Pradesh and Himachal Pradesh. A second one is multipartism but a bipolar competition between two principal alliances like in Tamil Nadu, West Bengal and Maharashtra. In the second category the competition could take place between two national parties heading the alliances, or between a national-party and a regional party led alliance such as in Odisha, or between two alliances led by regional parties as happens in Tamil Nadu. The other is multipolar competition in states such as Uttar Pradesh and Bihar (Yadav and Palshikar, 2003: 35-36).

Sridharan (2002) says that states can be divided into four types based on party system polarity that emerged during the 1990s. First, most states remained bipolar. Examples: Himachal Pradesh, Madhya Pradesh, Rajasthan, Gujarat and Kerala. There are states with three or more poles which seemed to be collapsing into bipolarity due to the newly forged alliances, sometimes as a result of splits in existing parties. Examples: Odisha, Karnataka and Bihar. Third, there are states like Uttar Pradesh where a four-cornered contest continues. In the fourth category, in a number of apparently bipolar and two-party states, if we look at the vote shares, we find the presence of a significant, often growing, third party having a vote share in double digits but not yet large enough to win significant number of seats. This third party reduces the vote shares of one or both of the two main parties or alliances. Examples: BJP in Assam, Odisha, Goa and West Bengal; BSP in Punjab and Uttar Pradesh.

According to Roy (2004), in the two decades from 1967, changes in the party systems have brought into existence four types of party systems in the states, which may be described as: (a) Bi-party system: it is in operation in states like Gujarat, Madhya

Pradesh, Karnataka and Rajasthan. It is mainly two parties that have dominated the political and electoral proceedings and formed the government. One of them is INC. The second party in these states is either a national party like BJP or a regional party like TDP or JD; (b) Bi-coalitional system: it is in operation in states like Kerala, West Bengal, Maharashtra and Tamil Nadu. In this two polarized political formation exist, each being led by two different and dominant parties. Each political formation must have electoral understanding, jointly contesting elections, sharing seats and forming alternate coalition governments. Examples: Left Democratic Front (LDF) and United Democratic Front (UDF) in Kerala; (c) A third category of party system which is in operation in states like Uttar Pradesh and Bihar is the shifting coalitions of multiple parties, major and minor, contesting Assembly and Parliamentary elections. There is no fixed number of coalitions and there are many parties contesting elections independently. Example: In Bihar, JD alliance during 1990s and RJD alliance in 2000; and (d) Finally, there is one party versus an alliance system operational in states like Odisha, Andhra Pradesh. In these states the INC has single handedly contested against the combines of BJP and Biju Janata Dal (BJD) in Odisha, TDP and BJP in Andhra Pradesh in 1998 and 1999 (Roy, 2004:138-146).

Keeping these studies on classification of party systems in mind, change in party system at the state level can be analyzed by calculating ENP as was done in the previous chapter for national level for sixteen general elections to find out the change in party system experienced by each state in contemporary times. Table 4.1 shows ENP in terms of votes at the state level.

From the table 4.1, it is observed that there seems to be considerable fluctuations in the ENP values. The states are classified into three different categories based on the ENP values as noticed from 1989 elections. The 1989 general election is taken into consideration because it marks the beginning of the phase of the increasing importance of regional parties. In eight states we find a near two-party system. Thirteen states come under the second category, where the party system is moderately pluralized, and in four states, we find highly pluralized party system in recent years.

Table 4.1
Effective Number of Parties at the State Level in Terms of Votes

States	Year of Elections															
	1952	1957	1962	1967	1971	1977	1980	1984	1989	1991	1996	1998	1999	2004	2009	2014
States with two-party system																
Arunachal Pradesh	--	--	--	--	--	5.9	2.7	3.2	2.7	1.9	8.8	2.6	2.6	2.9	2.4	2.6
Gujarat	--	--	2.9	2.6	2.8	2.2	2.3	2.9	3.2	2.8	2.6	2.6	2.1	2.4	2.5	2.2
Himachal Pradesh	3.2	4.1	2.0	3.7	1.7	2.1	2.5	2.0	2.6	2.5	2.2	2.3	2.6	2.1	2.2	2.2
Madhya Pradesh	3.4	3.1	4.7	3.9	3.1	2.3	3.1	2.4	3.2	2.6	3.6	2.7	2.4	2.8	2.8	2.4
Nagaland	--	--	--	1.0	1.9	2.0	4.2	2.0	2.0	2.1	2.6	1.3	2.0	1.7	1.7	1.8
Rajasthan	5.2	3.3	5.4	4.1	3.4	1.9	3.3	2.9	3.4	2.7	2.9	2.7	2.3	2.4	2.8	2.5
Sikkim	--	--	--	--	--	1.0	2.3	14.9	2.1	1.2	1.7	1.8	2.2	1.8	2.0	2.2
Tripura	2.2	2.4	2.2	1.9	3.1	3.2	3.4	2.2	2.1	1.4	2.5	2.4	2.7	2.0	2.1	2.2
States with moderately pluralised party system																
Andhra Pradesh	--	3.4	3.4	3.9	2.9	2.3	2.8	2.7	2.6	3.1	3.5	3.5	2.8	3.4	4.1	4.8
Assam	3.9	3.1	4.0	4.2	3.0	2.6	--	5.1	--	6.6	4.9	4.3	3.9	4.6	5.0	4.1
Goa	--	--	--	2.4	4.0	2.9	4.4	3.9	3.0	2.5	3.8	3.7	2.4	3.0	3.3	2.4
Haryana	--	--	--	4.1	3.2	1.9	3.4	2.8	2.7	4.3	6.3	5.1	3.4	3.8	4.0	4.2
Karnataka	--	2.9	3.2	3.8	1.9	2.1	2.5	2.6	3.0	3.4	3.6	3.8	3.2	3.3	3.0	2.7
Kerala	--	3.7	3.9	4.5	5.0	5.3	6.0	4.9	3.9	4.4	4.7	4.4	4.0	4.2	3.7	6.1
Meghalaya	--	--	--	--	--	7.8	--	2.6	3.2	3.1	3.4	3.2	4.2	3.4	2.9	4.7
Mizoram	--	--	--	--	--	7.3	5.7	1.0	2.7	3.2	3.1	5.1	0.0	3.6	2.3	4.2
Odisha	3.6	3.7	2.7	4.2	4.1	2.4	2.7	2.3	2.5	3.1	3.2	3.4	3.3	3.4	3.6	3.2
Punjab	4.7	3.1	4.6	4.7	3.2	3.1	2.9	3.5	5.7	3.2	4.5	4.8	4.1	3.9	3.0	4.1
Tamil Nadu	--	4.4	3.8	3.2	4.1	4.8	4.4	3.7	3.7	3.5	3.1	3.1	3.9	5.5	6.4	3.8
Uttar Pradesh	3.2	3.8	5.0	5.6	3.6	1.9	3.8	3.2	4.1	4.9	4.8	3.8	4.8	5.0	5.1	3.7
West Bengal	4.9	3.6	3.2	4.9	4.6	4.7	3.3	2.7	3.0	3.6	3.2	4.4	4.3	4.4	4.3	4.1

Table 4.1 (continued)
Effective Number of Parties at the State Level in Terms of Votes

States	Year of Elections															
	1952	1957	1962	1967	1971	1977	1980	1984	1989	1991	1996	1998	1999	2004	2009	2014
States with highly pluralised party system																
Bihar	3.8	3.9	4.0	5.5	4.8	2.1	4.4	3.3	4.2	4.7	5.3	5.6	5.2	5.6	7.5	6.0
Jammu & Kashmir	--	--	--	2.8	3.2	6.7	5.0	3.3	3.9	--	6.7	3.9	4.6	5.1	5.7	4.7
Maharashtra	--	--	3.3	3.7	2.4	3.1	2.9	3.4	3.6	3.4	4.9	3.5	4.7	5.4	7.0	5.6
Manipur	6.4	10.4	5.8	5.2	7.3	3.6	8.0	5.9	4.0	4.2	5.3	5.4	5.2	10.0	4.0	4.0

Source: Election Commission of India, http://eci.nic.in/eci_main1/ElectionStatistics.aspx, retrieved on 1st June, 2012.

Notes: 1. The Effective Number of Parties for each election year for different states is calculated based on the data collected from the website of Election Commission of India.

2. Andhra Pradesh, Karnataka and Kerala (First General Elections in 1957); Gujarat (First General Elections in 1962); Haryana, Goa and Jammu and Kashmir (First General Elections in 1967); Arunachal Pradesh (First General Elections in 1977); Tamil Nadu (First General Elections in 1957); Maharashtra (First General Elections in 1962); Meghalaya, Mizoram, Sikkim (First General Elections in 1977); Nagaland (First General Elections in 1967).

3. In Assam, elections were not held in 12 Parliamentary constituencies in 1980 and 14 Parliamentary Constituencies in 1989, therefore ENP cannot be calculated for 1980 and 1989. In Meghalaya, election was not held in 1 Parliamentary constituency in 1980, therefore ENP cannot be calculated for 1980. In Jammu & Kashmir, election was not held in 6 Parliamentary constituencies in 1991, therefore ENP cannot be calculated for 1991.

4. In North-Eastern states, the ENP in some elections is very high because no party secured majority of votes. In these elections, the Independents secured the majority of votes.

However, in classifying the states into different categories it is found that in some states for some elections, the ENP is greater than 5 and still they are placed in the moderately pluralized category. For example: the ENP in Kerala in 2014 is 6.1, but it is placed in the second category by taking into account the *majority of instances*, when the ENP value is less than 5. Similar problems are encountered for one or two elections in other states while categorising the states into three different categories. In states, where the number of elections in which the ENP is less than 5 and the number of elections in which the ENP is greater than 5 are equal, in such cases the *average mean* is taken into consideration for classification. For example: in Maharashtra, the ENP is less than 5 for four elections (i.e. 1989, 1991, 1998 and 1999) and the ENP is greater than 5 for rest four elections (i.e. 1996, 2004, 2009 and 2014) between 1989-2014. In this case the average mean of ENP for the elections when the ENP value is greater than 5 is more than the average mean of ENP for the elections when the ENP values is less than 5. Therefore, Maharashtra is placed in the third category. After the discussion on the problems with relation to the classification of states into different categories, let us have a look at few of these states from each of the category in order to understand the pattern of party system change over time and across states. The analysis of party system change for different states is done by taking into consideration the ENP calculated since the first General Elections of 1952.

While we notice three categories of states, we also notice that the party system change did not take place uniformly across states. We notice fluctuations or ups and downs in the ENP in some states. For example: In Odisha, the ENP by votes was 4 or above in 1960s and 1970s due to the existence of parties like CPI, Ganatantra Parishad (GP), SWA, PSP, along with the presence of INC as the dominant party. Then in late 1970s, the ENP value was less than 3 indicating a consolidation of a two-party competition between INC and the second party like Utkal Congress (UTC) in 1971; BLD in 1977; Janata Party Secular (JNPS) in 1980; JNP in 1984; JD in 1989 and 1991.

Non-Congress politics in Odisha has often been based around localized forces. Although the SWA party played an important role in state politics between 1967 and 1972, formulation of government depended upon Gan Congress (1967-1971), Utkal Congress (UC) and Jharkhand Party (1971-72). It has been argued that the middle class-upper castes nature of the Odia political elites has contributed to the

consolidation of region-based politics in Odisha. The JD unit of Odisha under Biju Patnaik always functioned independently. It belonged to the all-India party primarily in order to pave the way for the regional leader to enter the national political arena. The JD unit in the state quickly disintegrated after the death of Biju Patnaik and gave way to the formation of a state-level party BJD under the leadership of Naveen Patnaik who promptly aligned with BJP. This decision was based on two considerations. One was the logic of anti-Congressism, which drove Naveen Patnaik towards BJP. The other was an aspiration to play a role at the all-India level (Kumar, 2004:19).

The ENP value in Odisha hovers just above 3 since 1991 due to the contest between INC, JD and BJP till 1996 and between BJD, BJP and INC after the formation of BJD in 1997. BJD won 9 seats in the 1998 general elections and thereafter it increased its seat share to 14 in 2004 elections. However the BJD parted ways with the BJP for both the Lok Sabha and Assembly elections 2009 citing differences in seat sharing. In 2014 elections, the BJD secured the highest ever seat share i.e. 20 and 45.2% votes.

In the state of Haryana, there was moderately pluralized party system in 1967 and 1971 with ENP value above 3.0. The contest was between INC, BJS, SWA and SSP in 1967 and between INC, NCO and BJS in 1971. However in 1977, the party system was a single party type with BLD sweeping the floor with 70.4% of votes and 10 seats. INC had emerged as the dominant player in Haryana electoral politics immediately after Haryana attained statehood in 1966 and continued to be so till 1977 when as a result of Janata wave, the INC was completely wiped out in the Lok Sabha elections in 1977. After 1977, there has been a steady decline in the INC performance.

Haryana politics did not develop a straight two party competition between the INC and the BJP that characterizes most of its Hindi-speaking neighbours (Himachal Pradesh, Delhi and Rajasthan). It has also not witnessed a sharp rise of mandal and dalit politics witnessed by its other large neighbour like Uttar Pradesh. To an outside observer, Haryana politics appears to be constituted by a series of absences. Underlying all this absence is a deeper lack, i.e. lack of a coherent party system. Right from its constitution, this state has not developed the attributes one associates with a party system, i.e. a stable structure of party competition, an enduring character of the

parties and a long term alignment of the different sections of the voters with their respective political parties (Yadav, 2003:143).

According to Heath and Yadav (2002), the support for the INC is more or less evenly spread among different communities. But it is somewhat weak among the peasantry, especially the Jats. The largest support for the INC comes from the SCs, some 50% of which voted for it. The BJP was weak everywhere. Only 18% of the upper castes, which are considered the backbone of BJP support voted for it. The BSP is yet to pick up as a party of the SCs in Haryana. The Lok Dal has made steady progress since the late 1980s in the electoral politics of the state. Between 1984-1991, the party system was moderately pluralized type with INC being the party with highest votes and seats for three consecutive general elections except in 1989, when the JD won the majority of seats (i.e. 6) replacing INC. The state has also experienced highly pluralized party system in 1996 and 1998 with ENP above 5.0. The contest was between INC, BJP, HVP, SAP, JD, and Indian National Congress-Tiwari (INCT) (in 1996) and INC, BJP, BSP, HLDL and HVP (in 1998). From 1999 onwards the party system is moderately pluralized type with the contest between INC, BJP, BSP, INLD, HVP and Haryana Janhit Congress Bhajan Lal (HJCBL) respectively for different election years.

Tripura is what scholars describe as the state of two plus competitive format, with the two main political formations i.e. the INC and the Left front (CPM, CPI and Forward Bloc). Political competition in the state has often been between the CPM-led Left front and the INC, which had provisional alignments with tribal regional parties, being organisationally weak in the tribal belts. The communists retain significant support in rural areas. The crushing of the tribal insurgency is supported by a governance model that emphasises development, improvement in the quality of life and grassroots democracy. The Left has been aided by factionalism and organisational disorder in the INC (Roy, 2005:2178).

The state of Tripura experienced two-party system till 1967 general elections. The competition was mainly between two largest party of the state at that time i.e. INC and CPI till 1962 and then between INC and CPM till 1967. For the next three election years i.e. 1971 and 1980, the party system was moderately pluralized with ENP above 3.0. The contest was between INC, CPM, CPI in 1971; INC, CPM, BLD in 1977; and INC, CPM, Tripura Upajati Juba Samiti (TUS), JNP in 1980. Between

1984-89, the state reverted to two party system competition till 1989. The contest regained between INC and CPM. In 1991, the INC won the majority of votes and seats making the party system to be a single-party type. From 1996 onwards Tripura has two-party system. The contest is now mainly between CPM and INC.

In Bihar, the party system was moderately pluralized between 1952-62. The contest was mainly between the leading party INC and SOC, JKD, PSP, SWA, CPI respectively for different election years. In 1967 and 1971, with the coming up of BJS, SSP, NCO the party system looked highly pluralized with ENP nearly 5. In 1977, with BLD securing 52 out of 54 seats and 65% votes, the party system appeared to be two-party type. BLD was followed by the second place party i.e. the INC. From 1980-91, again the party system reverted to the moderately pluralized type with the appearance of the parties like BJP, LKD (Lok Dal), JD, JMM in the electoral scenario.

The society and politics of Bihar is essentially about castes. Since 1990s, the politics in the state is largely the politics of reassertion and reaffirmation of old caste cleavages, deepened further to capture political power. People now tend to vote more for identity of caste than taking into consideration the issues like good governance. The 1990s marked a complete breakdown of the INC in the state and witnessed major transformation in the social basis of the political power. Between 1996-2014 with the appearance of parties like RJD, JDU, SAP, LJNSP, the electoral arena was crowded with multiplicity of parties. The present ENP is 6.0 and the contest is mainly between INC, BJP, JDU, RJD, along with the presence of other small parties.

The party system change is also not uniform in terms of votes and seats. Due to the first-past-the-post system, there has been no direct relation between the vote cast and seats won. There exists a discrepancy in ENP values when calculated in terms of votes and seats. Table 4.2 shows ENP in terms of seats for 25 states alphabetically. The nature of party competition looks different if we take ENP in terms of votes and ENP in terms of seats. For example: In case of Andhra Pradesh, if we look at ENP in terms of votes, since its first general election of 1957, the party system was moderately pluralized till 1967. The area of contest remained mainly between INC, CPI and SWA. However from 1971, the ENP was between 2-3.

Table 4.2
Effective Number of Parties at the State Level in Terms of Seats

States	Year of Elections															
	1952	1957	1962	1967	1971	1977	1980	1984	1989	1991	1996	1998	1999	2004	2009	2014
Andhra Pradesh	--	1.3	1.5	1.4	1.9	1.0	1.0	1.9	1.2	2.2	2.4	2.7	2.0	2.0	1.6	3.7
Arunachal Pradesh	--	--	--	--	--	4.0	1.0	1.0	1.0	1.0	1.0	1.0	1.0	1.0	1.0	2.0
Assam	1.2	1.7	1.7	1.8	1.2	1.8	--	2.8	--	2.8	3.7	1.9	1.9	2.2	2.9	2.9
Bihar	1.5	1.6	1.8	2.3	1.8	1.1	2.9	1.3	2.7	2.5	3.4	3.6	3.2	2.8	2.8	2.9
Goa	--	--	--	4.0	2.0	2.0	2.0	1.0	2.0	1.0	2.0	1.0	1.0	2.0	2.0	1.0
Gujarat	--	--	1.8	2.2	2.3	1.9	1.1	1.2	2.5	1.6	1.9	1.6	1.6	2.0	2.0	1.0
Haryana	--	--	--	1.6	1.6	1.0	2.4	1.0	1.9	1.2	3.4	3.6	2.0	1.2	1.2	1.9
Himachal Pradesh	1.0	1.0	1.0	1.0	1.0	1.0	1.0	1.0	1.6	2.0	1.0	1.6	1.6	1.6	1.6	1.0
Jammu & Kashmir	--	--	--	1.4	1.4	2.8	3.3	2.0	2.8	--	2.0	2.6	1.8	4.0	2.8	2.0
Karnataka	--	1.3	1.1	2.1	1.0	1.2	1.1	1.3	1.1	1.4	2.5	2.9	2.1	2.0	1.9	2.1
Kerala	--	2.7	4.2	3.5	3.6	2.5	5.1	2.1	1.9	2.4	4.3	3.5	2.9	2.5	2.1	4.2
Madhya Pradesh	1.2	1.1	2.2	2.0	2.4	1.2	1.3	1.0	2.0	1.8	2.0	1.6	1.9	2.5	2.1	1.1
Maharashtra	--	--	1.2	1.5	1.1	2.9	1.5	1.2	2.5	1.6	3.0	2.0	4.3	4.1	4.1	2.6
Manipur	2.0	4.0	2.0	4.0	1.0	1.0	2.0	1.0	1.0	2.0	1.0	2.0	2.0	4.0	1.0	1.0
Meghalaya	--	--	--	--	--	4.0	--	1.0	1.0	1.0	4.0	1.0	2.0	2.0	2.0	2.0
Mizoram	--	--	--	--	--	0.0	0.0	1.0	1.0	1.0	1.0	0.0	0.0	1.0	1.0	1.0
Nagaland	--	--	--	1.0	1.0	1.0	0.0	1.0	1.0	1.0	1.0	1.0	1.0	1.0	1.0	1.0
Odisha	2.7	3.9	1.9	3.4	1.7	1.8	1.1	1.1	1.7	2.1	1.6	2.8	2.4	2.5	1.9	1.1
Punjab	1.2	1.1	2.2	1.9	1.6	1.9	1.2	2.0	4.0	1.2	2.2	2.3	2.4	2.2	2.1	3.8
Rajasthan	4.3	1.3	2.3	3.1	2.4	1.1	1.8	1.0	2.1	2.0	2.2	1.8	1.9	1.4	1.5	1.0
Sikkim	--	--	--	--	--	1.0	1.0	0.0	1.0	1.0	1.0	1.0	1.0	1.0	1.0	1.0
Tamil Nadu	--	1.7	1.7	2.2	2.4	2.8	2.3	2.0	1.8	1.7	1.1	2.0	2.5	3.8	3.2	1.1
Tripura	1.0	2.0	1.0	1.0	1.0	2.0	1.0	1.0	1.0	1.0	1.0	1.0	1.0	1.0	1.0	1.0
Uttar Pradesh	1.1	1.5	1.9	3.0	1.3	1.0	2.1	1.0	2.2	2.2	2.4	2.0	4.0	3.6	4.3	1.3
West Bengal	1.9	2.3	2.3	5.8	2.8	3.2	2.1	2.9	2.2	2.2	2.6	2.6	3.2	2.4	3.6	1.5

Source: Election Commission of India, http://eci.nic.in/eci_main1/ElectionStatistics.aspx, retrieved on 1st June, 2012.

Note: The Effective Number of Parties for each election year for different states is calculated based on the data collected from the website of Election Commission of India.

The state had a near two-party system till 1989. The INC was the dominant party. The second largest party was Telangana Praja Samiti (TPS) in 1971; BLD in 1977; JNP in 1980; and TDP in 1984. TDP in 1984 overtook INC both in terms of votes and seats. But again in 1989 INC regained its position and the TDP was the second largest party. Again from 1991 onwards the party system was moderately pluralized type which is in continuation till now. In 2009 elections, the INC was the major party followed by TDP, Praja Rajyam Party (PRAP), TRS and All India Majlis-I-Ittehad-ul-Muslimeen (AIMIM). The ENP was nearly 4 in 2009. In 2014, the ENP was around 5 vote wise due to the presence of TDP, BJP, TRS, INC, AIMIM and coming up of a new party into the electoral contest i.e Yuvajana Sramika Rythu Congress Party (YSRCP).

But if we look ENP in terms of seats the state of Andhra Pradesh had more or less one-party dominant system beginning from its first General Elections of 1957, in the unified state of Andhra Pradesh, to 1989 elections. This is because the INC dominated the state till 1980. After INC, a regional party TDP made its dominant presence in 1984 election. Again in 1989, INC won over TDP. Thus, till 1989, the ENP was less than 2. The 1990s witnessed the emergence of two-party system in the state. The contest was mainly between INC and TDP. So the ENP was around 2 till 2004.

In 2004 elections, the ruling TDP-BJP combine were routed. The result was a landslide victory of UPA which won 34 out of 42 seats. INC had contested in alliance with (TRS) and the communist parties. The 2009 results were a repeat of the last election, where the INC and the UPA, won 34 out of 42 seats, resulting in a landslide victory. The newly formed Third Front, that consisted of the TDP and the NDA (BJP and TRS), and the PRAP, proved to be a non-factor in this election.

The 2004 and 2009 elections were marked by the victory of the INC. But the party did not come out with a big majority because of the fragmentation of the two-party system into a multi-party system and entry of new players into the political scenario. The ENP value was around 2 in 2009. In 2014 elections, the ENP increased and it was nearly 4 seat wise. The three main parties which captured the maximum seats in Andhra Pradesh in 2014 elections were TDP, TRS and the newly formed YSRCP.

Similarly if we also look at the state of Punjab, we can mark variation in the ENP values both in terms of votes and seats. In terms of votes, the party system can be

categorized into three different phases. In the first phase, which continued till 1984 elections, the state experienced moderately pluralized party system with INC being the majority party followed by SAD, BJS, CPI, BLD and JP for different election years. The ENP was above 3.0. During the second phase which was only for 1989 elections, no party was capable of winning the majority so the party system became extremely pluralized with the contest between INC, Shiromani Akali Dal-Smiranjit Singh Mann (SADM), BSP, JD, BJP, CPI and CPM. In the third phase i.e. from 1991 to 2014, the party system became moderately pluralized with INC being the leading party in 1991 and 1996; SAD in 1998, 1999 and 2004; and INC regaining in 2009 respectively. The 2014 elections saw a tight contest between INC, SAD, the newly formed AAP (Aam Admi Party) and BJP.

In terms of seats, the party system of Punjab experienced frequent change in its party system. It had single-party system in 1952 and 1957, with the INC capturing the maximum number of seats. In 1962, the state had two-party system with the coming up of parties into the arena of contest like BJS and SAD. The ENP in 1962 is 2.2. Between 1967-1980, the state witnessed single party system with INC being the dominant party in 1967, 1971 and 1980 followed by SAD in 1977. In 1980, again there was a two-party competition between INC and SAD. The ENP in 1989 is 4.0 making the party system to be moderately pluralized type because the arena of contest was between SADM, INC, BSP and JD. With the INC winning the majority of seats in 1991, the party system was single-party type. Between 1996-2009, the state experienced two-party system with ENP value above 2.0. The contest is mainly between SAD and BSP (in 1996); SAD and BJP (in 1998); INC and SAD (in 1999); SAD and BJP (in 2004); and INC and SAD (in 2009) respectively. In 2014, the ENP increased to 3.8 seat wise with the distribution of seats between INC, SAD, AAP and BJP.

Voting behaviour is usually explained in terms of party loyalty, and this loyalty in turn is decided by multiple factors like caste, social class, religion and regionalism. The base of caste and religion like other parts of India, have not much of significance in the North-Eastern state of Manipur. But the concept of social class in terms of occupation, income, education, ethnic factor, hill-valley dichotomy and division into indigenous and migrant's population have influenced the voting behaviour in the

small state of Manipur. In terms of ENP by votes, between 1952-2004, the state experienced highly pluralized party system with ENP as high as 10 in 1957 and 2004 respectively. This draws our attention to the Sartori's categorization of party system. According to Sartori (1976), when the number of parties is more than 10, the party system is categorized as atomized pluralized type. No single party won absolute majority of votes. The important role was played by the Independents which resulted in greater ENP for some election years. Out of 16 elections, if we go by the ENP in terms of votes, only in 1977, 1989, 1991, 2009 and 2014 elections, the party system was moderately pluralized.

From 1952 to 1971, the party system was extremely pluralized, with INC being the ruling party, followed by CPI, PSP (in 1957); CPI, PSP, SOP (in 1962); CPI, SSP (in 1967); and CPI, Manipur Revolutionary Party (MRP), NCO, SSP (in 1971) along with the Independents in all respective elections. In 1977, the ENP came down to 3.6 making the party system to be moderately pluralized type. This is because the percentage of votes won by INC was 15% higher (i.e. 45.3%) in comparison to what it won in the earlier elections (i.e. nearly 30%). The other main parties in terms of votes in 1977 elections were BLD, CPI and MRP. In 1980 and 1984 elections, the competition was highly pluralized due to the presence of parties like INC, INCU, JNP, CPI, MRP and Independents in 1980 and between INC, BJP, CPI, LKD, MRP and ICS (Indian Congress Socialist) in 1984. The moderately pluralized party system regained in 1989 and 1991, with INC being the leading party with highest percentage of votes. However, the INC did not remain in majority position after 1996 elections, as a result of which many other parties in the state gained importance. The party system became extremely pluralized. The ENP in 2004 was as high as in 1957 i.e. 10. But in 2009 and 2014 elections with INC regaining its position and securing the highest percentage of vote i.e. 42.96% in 2009 and 41.7% in 2014 respectively, the party system became moderately pluralized. Apart from INC, the other parties present in the electoral scenario were CPI and People's Democratic Alliance (PDA) in 2009 and CPI and BJP in 2014.

In terms of seats, Manipur had two-party system in 1952 and 1962 with ENP 2.0. The contest was mainly between INC and Socialist Party in 1952 and 1962 respectively. As the independents are not taken into consideration in the calculation, the ENP in

1957, 1967 and 2004 becomes 4.0. The contest was mainly between INC and Independents in 1957, 1967 and 2004 elections respectively. For 1971 and 1977 elections, the state had one-party system, with INC ruling the state. With the coming up of CPI into existence in 1980, the party system was two-party type. INC regaining its position in 1984 and 1989, once again there prevailed one-party system. In 1991, with INC and MRP capturing one seat each, the state underwent a two-party system. In 1996, INC was the dominant party with two seats. For 1998-1999, the state experienced two-party contest between CPI and Manipur State Congress Party (MSCP) in 1998; and MSCP and Nationalist Congress Party (NCP) in 1999. In 2009 and 2014, INC was able to regain power capturing both the Lok Sabha seats. The ENP since 2009 is 1.0 seat wise.

Therefore, the analysis of party system change based on ENP in terms of votes¹ presents a complex picture at the state level. From the table 4.1, we can notice that in several states, the ENP value has gone up with few exceptions such as Gujarat, Madhya Pradesh, Rajasthan, Himachal Pradesh, Nagaland, Arunachal Pradesh, Sikkim and Tripura where the competition is between two parties. From 1980s onwards there is an increasing trend towards multipartism. In several states, the party system is moderately pluralized. In addition to the major ruling parties, the minor parties have also an effective role to play in the political competition. This indicates that there has been rise in the number of parties even at the state level. Thus, in what ways increasing number of parties impinge on the stability of party support at the state level is an interesting aspect in this context. The following section looks at the stability of party support over the years since first general election.

4.4 Stability of Party Support at the State Level

According to Yadav (2003), the sudden demise of the Congress system created a room in different states for the entry of new political forces or for rearranging the format of party competition. It created an opportunity for new issues and demands to be articulated effectively within the party political arena. New opportunities of political bargaining were created for various communities and groups that were traditionally affiliated to the INC. In particular it left INC vulnerable to aggressive sectional mobilization of these groups. This had implications for the political strategy of the INC and its rivals. As the opponents of the INC pursued successfully the path

of sectional mobilization, the INC found that its catch-all strategy was increasingly not viable. In response to the sectional mobilization by its rivals, the INC too became more of a sectional party than it was ever before. This affected the stability of the party support in different states.

The stability of party support at the state level can be measured by using volatility index as was used in chapter 3 for national level. Electoral volatility can be calculated both by votes and seats (see appendix 3 for electoral volatility by seats at the state level). The general understanding of pattern of electoral support is made by taking into consideration electoral volatility by votes. Tables 4.3 shows electoral volatility by votes at the state level. The states are placed in three different categories based on the same criteria as was adopted for the classification of states based on ENP by votes. Like ENP, taking into consideration the *majority of instances* from 1989 elections, the states are grouped into three categories. In some states like Bihar, Karnataka, Nagaland, for some election years, the electoral volatility seems to be very high and for some election years, the electoral volatility appear to be less. In such states, the *mean volatility* of eight elections between 1989-2014 is taken into consideration to place the respective states under moderately stable/volatile category. Similar instances are also found for some other states.

From the table 4.3, it is observed that the pattern is not uniform in terms of stability of support across Indian states. A high amount of fluctuations in the electoral support of the parties is noticed at the state level in the states like Haryana, Punjab, Goa, Manipur and Nagaland. The states where we find a near two-party system like Gujarat or Himachal Pradesh or where there are bi-coalitional arrangements like Kerala, or where the two parties like INC and TDP in Andhra Pradesh have somewhat consolidated their support bases, the electoral support for the parties appears to be stable in recent years. Now let us have a look at few of these examples from each category in order to have an idea about stability/instability of electoral support for the parties. The analysis of stability/instability of party support for different states is made by taking into consideration electoral volatility calculated since the first General Elections of 1952.

Table 4.3
Electoral Volatility by Votes at the State Level

States	Election Periods														
	1957	1962	1967	1971	1977	1980	1984	1989	1991	1996	1998	1999	2004	2009	2014
States which appear to be stable															
Andhra Pradesh	--	23.4	10.3	25.1	33.3	32.3	46.9	14.1	8.6	11.6	13.4	14.0	11.2	17.7	47.8
Gujarat	--	--	16.5	40.6	50.5	50.0	24.2	37.6	33.7	16.5	10.0	13.4	6.3	2.0	13.3
Himachal Pradesh	25.1	34.2	25.5	25.8	57.5	56.9	39.6	31.8	5.8	11.9	16.3	9.5	14.9	6.9	7.2
Kerala	--	6.1	50.5	31.1	19.7	22.7	11.4	16.9	9.4	4.9	5.4	11.4	24.8	16.2	18.1
Madhya Pradesh	29.6	16.5	21.4	11.8	56.2	57.1	40.0	23.9	8.4	15.8	10.4	6.3	9.5	7.7	11.0
Maharashtra	--	--	20.3	18.8	38.5	42.2	27.3	28.7	10.1	20.7	9.6	24.0	9.0	13.1	15.1
Odisha	19.3	15.8	39.5	38.3	54.4	54.9	23.2	53.5	16.9	10.1	36.7	11.3	8.2	11.5	14.3
Rajasthan	25.5	22.6	13.6	16.7	60.8	63.7	46.2	33.8	21.9	9.7	6.6	7.4	5.6	10.0	19.8
West Bengal	22.0	18.6	31.6	26.5	32.8	26.5	12.7	8.9	11.1	6.2	28.1	3.7	15.2	14.1	19.1
States which appear to be moderately stable/volatile															
Assam	38.5	9.2	11.4	18.6	33.9	--	--	--	--	21.4	22.1	7.8	16.4	20.8	22.4
Bihar	32.8	22.7	34.8	19.2	63.4	64.7	40.7	47.6	8.6	24.7	36.0	28.7	15.6	13.7	17.9
Jammu & Kashmir	--	--	--	21.0	46.8	18.0	24.8	45.5	--	--	40.5	8.6	25.5	13.7	14.7
Karnataka	--	12.1	18.0	29.5	39.8	40.9	20.4	42.0	25.9	21.8	20.2	34.6	20.7	9.6	5.1
Nagaland	--	--	--	60.5	100	25.5	71.5	36.7	16.0	36.9	18.9	16.6	62.5	4.0	1.8
Punjab	31.7	27.4	16.3	22.1	26.4	33.5	24.0	52.3	45.4	35.0	17.4	25.0	15.7	13.0	13.0
Tamil Nadu	--	19.3	22.7	44.9	41.4	24.3	12.9	7.8	6.3	36.1	35.5	14.6	24.9	16.4	24.8
Tripura	21.4	7.7	57.2	15.5	20.9	29.8	21.0	10.0	33.8	52.7	9.5	27.8	14.5	18.4	16.6
Uttar Pradesh	29.3	19.2	19.5	34.0	66.7	66.6	48.0	49.6	33.3	38.0	11.5	14.5	12.5	12.3	25.8

Table 4.3 (continued)
Electoral Volatility at the State Level

States	Election Periods														
	1957	1962	1967	1971	1977	1980	1984	1989	1991	1996	1998	1999	2004	2009	2014
States which appear to be volatile															
Arunachal Pradesh	--	--	--	--	--	27.0	10.8	5.8	42.5	38.1	31.8	43.2	51.1	46.5	20.4
Goa	--	--	--	67.2	50.1	42.4	45.5	38.7	26.9	28.6	18.0	37.5	15.4	10.0	28.0
Haryana	--	--	--	27.0	69.3	76.2	60.5	41.4	36.4	49.0	32.8	22.2	17.8	21.8	48.1
Manipur	36.3	17.7	29.4	19.2	26.4	41.7	34.6	21.0	32.9	41.2	51.2	41.4	52.0	40.0	27.3
Meghalaya	--	--	--	--	--	--	--	4.1	2.3	8.1	24.1	30.2	49.4	45.1	39.6
Mizoram	--	--	--	--	--	39.6	71.0	51.1	28.0	15.7	10.8	34.4	29.4	60.5	7.6
Sikkim	--	--	--	--	--	98.0	61.8	52.8	17.1	70.3	32.0	41.8	40.9	8.5	37.6

Source: Election Commission of India, http://eci.nic.in/eci_main1/ElectionStatistics.aspx, retrieved on 1st June, 2012.

Notes: 1. The volatility rates for each election period in different states is calculated based on the data collected from the website of Election Commission of India.

2. In Assam, elections were not held in 12 Parliamentary constituencies in 1980 and 14 Parliamentary Constituencies in 1989, therefore EV cannot be calculated for 1980-1991 election periods. In Jammu and Kashmir, elections were not held in 6 Parliamentary Constituencies in 1991, therefore EV cannot be calculated for 1991 and 1996 election years. In Meghalaya, elections were not held in 1 Parliamentary constituency in 1980, so EV cannot be calculated for 1980 and 1984 election years.

In case of Andhra Pradesh, beginning from its first General Elections of 1957, the party support was unstable since the formation of the state. There were parties like SWA, Communists, TPS and BLD in the electoral fray securing considerable support from the electorate which shifted from one-party to the other at different points of time. However, the parties were not able to convert this electoral support into seats either due to the fragmented nature of opposition or because of the FPTP system where INC used to come first in the electoral race. In 1984 elections, with the emergence of the regional party i.e. TDP as a major contender for power, the electoral support became highly volatile with a rate of 46.9%.

The TDP marked the beginning of the era of prominence of regional parties. The TDP has successfully polarized Andhra politics between itself and the INC. In the 90s the party assumed a significant role at the all-India level. In order to retain that position, Chandrababu Naidu swiftly switched over to the NDA from the United Front. The TDP, right from its inception, has proved to be a rallying point for Andhra's peasant OBCs although it does not invoke the ideology of OBC uplift. As a result of N. T. Rama Rao's charismatic appeal and populist policies, TDP earned popularity among the poor, rural voters, especially among women. It was also supported by SCs and OBCs. Substantial support among tribals and very large support among peasant OBCs accounted for the electoral success of TDP (Suri, 2004: 1481; Palshikar, 2003: 12).

The TDP consolidated itself in 1980s and the state since 1989 experienced more or less distribution of electoral support between the two principal contenders of power in the state i.e. the TDP and the INC, which probably contributed to a low volatility since 1989 elections. However, in 2014, the electoral volatility increased to 47.8% due to the shifts in electoral support from INC to the TDP. The INC suffered a dramatic decline and its space was occupied by regional parties like TDP followed TRS and newly formed YSRCP.

Kerala presents a different scenario. Politics in Kerala takes place in a multi-party democratic framework. The state holds an unbroken position of having largest politically aware population, who participate in state's politics actively. It is dominated by two political fronts: the Communist party led LDF and the INC led UDF since late 1970s. Most of the major political parties in Kerala, except for BJP, belong to one or the other of these two alliances, often shifting allegiances a

number of time. In Kerala, it is difficult for a single party to contest and win even a single seat, because the voter perception is towards voting for a front. The political alliance has strongly stabilized in such a manner that, with rare exceptions, most of the coalition partners stick their loyalty to the alliance. As a result to this, the power has been clearly alternating between these two fronts without any change characterised by continually shifting alliances, party mergers and splits, factionalism within the coalitions and within political parties, and numerous splinter groups.

The state of Kerala has experienced the most frequent changes of governments. In 1957-62, the volatility was low. But with the change of the government in 1967, the volatility rose to 50.5%. In 1967, the INC replaced CPI as a ruling party. Between 1967-71, it saw the emergence of alliance parties. The LDF was led by the CPM, and comprised a few smaller parties such as the CPI, one or the other faction of KEC and MUL. The UDF was led by the INC, and comprised a few state based parties. It is interesting to note that despite the presence of a large number of parties in Kerala's electoral arena, volatility had been low from 1970s onwards till recently. Probably the alliance politics enabled the major and minor parties in the state to entrench themselves and also to retain their popular support.

The party system of West Bengal in 1952 was moderately stable due to the INC emerging victorious with majority till 1962 elections. The volatility rate however increased to 31.6% during 1967 because the INC lost its majority. Other parties like FBL, SWA, CPM, RSP and SSP found greater space in the electoral arena. Some parties also went out of the scene like FBM and KMPP. So there were a lot of fluctuations in this period. The rate came down in 1971 due to the continuation of the same parties with more or less same number of seats and percentage of votes. With the coming up of the non-Congress government in 1977 i.e. CPM replacing INC as the ruling party in the state, the electoral volatility was high at 32.8%. The period also saw the emergence of parties like BLD, parties in the Left Front (LF)² and decaying of BJS, SSP and FBL. Since 1977, the electoral volatility came down because of the continuation of the rule of LF.

Since the LF has been the ruling front in West Bengal from 1970s onwards, politics in the state revolves around Left and anti-Left poles. It has been further observed that success of LF is attributable to the typically Bengali identity acquired and nurtured by

Left parties. In this sense, politics in West Bengal had already become regionalized. The INC in West Bengal was divided between two factions, one trying to associate with the all-India perception of politics leading to anti-BJP strategy and another faction rooting its politics firmly in the trajectory of state level politics which led to a tacit understanding with BJP.

The emergence of AITC brought important changes in Bengal's party system and stability of party support. Although the new party did not enter into an alliance with BJP, it had only seat adjustment in 1998 and finally it allied with BJP in 1999. It draws heavily on Bengali nationalism but identifies itself with minorities and poorer sections of the state. Survey data show that more men vote for the party than women. Secondly, the larger support to the party comes from voters in the age group of 26 to 35 years. In fact, it has reasonably good support among SCs and OBCs, support among the Muslims is quite weak (Palshikar, 2003:13). In 1998, the electoral volatility increased to 28.1% with the coming up of AITC. In 1999, due to almost same amount of distribution of electoral support between AITC, CPM and INC, the electoral volatility dropped to 3.7%. Between 2004-2014, the electoral volatility has increased in comparison to 1999 but there is somewhat stability in electoral support. Since 1998, the electoral support keeps fluctuating between AITC, CPM and INC till 2009. In 2014 elections, the BJP replaced INC as the third place party after AITC and CPM.

Assam experienced a high electoral volatility since its first general elections i.e. 38.5%. This is because though INC was the dominant party but there were many other minor parties like BJS, SOC, KMPP, PSP etc which secured certain percentage of votes in 1957. However the volatility dropped in 1962 with the situation remaining the same i.e. INC remaining the majority party. The state continued to have low volatility rate till 1971. But in 1977, the electoral volatility increased because of BLD coming to the scenario. Although INC secured highest percentage of votes and seats but BLD became the second largest party in the state with 3 seats and 35.8% of votes. In 1984, for the first time a regional party i.e. AGP marked its presence in the state's politics with 7 out of 14 seats and 33.4% of votes.

The AGP owes its political existence to the regional issues of the state. Many even thought the end to the one-party dominance by the INC, made way for a bi-polar

competition between the INC and the AGP. In parliamentary elections held in 1991, the INC staged a remarkable comeback, remarkable not for the size of its majority, but the recovery staged in the aftermath of the Assam movement³. This however, did not actually reflect a resurgence of support for the INC. The main reasons for its victory, despite a poor vote share, were the division of the pro-Assamese nationalist votes between the AGP and Natun Asom Gana Parishad (NAGP), a breakaway faction of the AGP, and the unprecedented performance of the BJP. It could be argued that these three formations put together polled more votes than the INC. The debacle of the AGP in this election was predictable. Rampant factionalism had culminated in a split in the party. Another factor that contributed to eroding the regional image of the AGP was the sudden upsurge in the activities of the United Liberation Front of Assam (ULFA). In 1996, the INC found itself in a difficult situation, facing charges of unprecedented corruption and an indiscriminate use of the repressive machinery of the state. Meanwhile, the AGP and NAGP united. The other opposition parties, including the Left parties and even the United Minority Front (UMF), a party claiming to represent the interests of the religious and linguistic minorities joined hands with other regional forces. The alliance ensured a strong presence for the AGP in all the regions of the state since it had forged a rainbow coalition cutting across ethnic lines (Goswami, 2012).

The INC recovery in the state began in the late 1990s. This is evident from the performance of the INC since the 1998 elections. But it was no longer an umbrella organization that accommodates the various ethnicities and communities of the state. The decline of INC dominance was caused by the emergence of multipolar party competition and the assertion and realignment of ethnic identities. Even as the INC appeared to have consolidated its position, the more significant development was the emergence of the BJP as an important electoral force. On the whole, the mandate was against the AGP led alliance, clearly indicative of its declining support base among the Muslim, SCs and STs communities.

The BJP failed to make any significant breakthrough in terms of seats as its organizational base was relatively weak and the party was devoid of capable leaders. The regional party, AGP, managed to regain its recognition at the national level by winning two seats after its debacle in the 1998 and 1999 elections, when it won no

seats. The split in the AGP led to a major break-up in its traditional vote bank, which undoubtedly benefited both the INC and the BJP. The electoral volatility reached its lowest in 1999 because the party support was almost same as compared to 1998, when there were two main national party i.e. INC and BJP sharing the political space and gaining certain amount of strength from the regional party i.e. AGP. However the party system in Assam is acquiring some stability since 1999. There exists a three-cornered contest between INC, BJP and AGP.

In the 2009 election, the INC got away with a minor loss of 2 seats from its tally of 9 in the 2004 elections. Moreover, the party managed to retain more or less retain its vote share. The decline of INC vote share was due to the presence of the All India United Democratic Front (AIUDF earlier AUDF), which contested the Lok Sabha election for the first time and strengthened the process of polarization among Muslims, both domiciled and immigrants. It posed a challenge to the INC base among religious minorities. In 2009 and 2014 elections, the electoral volatility increased to 20.8% in 2009 and further to 22.4% in 2014. This was because BJP was able to increase its support base in 2009 and further it improved its seat and vote tally in 2014 elections.

The state of Haryana was moderately stable/volatile in 1971. But in 1977, there was a very sharp increase in the electoral volatility to 69.3% due to the total shift of party loyalties from INC and other small parties like VHP and BJS in 1971 to BLD in 1977. The volatility was further high in 1980, when BLD lost against INC, JNP and JNPS in terms of seats. BLD was incapable of securing even one seat. The electoral volatility remained high even in the succeeding elections because of the fluctuating party support between INC, JD, BJP, HVP, INLD and BSP. In 2004, the electoral support appeared to be stable. The electoral volatility dropped to 17.8% with the continuation of three-cornered contest between INC, BJP and INLD as in 1999. Between 2009-2014, the electoral volatility increased. In 2009, the INC was the leading party, but we find a shift firstly from BJP to BSP and secondly, a shift was noticed towards HJCBL. In 2014, we find major shifts towards BJP and INLD from INC, BSP and HJCBL.

The state of Punjab was moderately stable/volatile in terms of votes till 1984. The contest was mainly between INC followed by BJS, CPI, SOC, PSP, SAD, CPM, JP respectively for different election years. During this period INC secure the majority in

comparison to other parties in the electoral fray. Active and central to Punjab political scene since the mid-60s, the SAD has forged a social base of rural peasantry of Punjab. Almost three fourth of its supporters come from the rural population. The party draws support from diverse sections in terms of caste and community. However, more than half of its votes are from the Sikh community. A sizable proportion of OBCs support the party. The social base is marked by weak support from dalits. The party draws equal support from men and women. Since the SAD is a well-established regional party of Punjab, it has a slight edge among middle aged (36-45yrs) voters but the party is not exactly popular among young voters (up to 35 years of age) (Palshikar, 2003:8).

Between 1989-1999, due to repetitive turnover of electoral fortunes between INC and SAD, the electoral volatility remained high. Thereafter we see electoral volatility decreasing to 15.7% in 2004 and declining further to 13% in 2009 elections. The volatility rate remained same at 13% even in 2014 elections. This is because a bipolar contest between INC and SAD has come to characterize the state politics of Punjab with other parties acquiring a small space in the political arena of the state.

The electoral volatility in Goa was very high since its very first general election of 1967. This was because of absence of any single party securing majority of votes. The situation continued till 1999 election. The contest was mainly between INC and UGDP, Maharashtrawadi Gomantak Party (MGP), BLD, INCU, BJP, JD and Independents respectively for different election years. Between 2004-2009, the electoral volatility declined because the contest was mainly between INC and BJP, with BJP continuing its rule in the state since 1999 elections. In 2014, we notice electoral volatility rising to 28%. This is due to the increase in the vote shares of the two national parties i.e. BJP securing 53.5% votes followed by INC, which secured 36.6% votes.

It can be said that the party system in Goa went through the following four phases. In the first phase from 1962-1977, the party system in Goa exhibited the pattern of a two party alternating system where one party, the MGP, formed the government and the other party, the UGDP, formed the opposition. This produced a contest between the two local parties, each with distinct social bases that they sought to mobilize and consolidate behind them. The main support base for the UGDP came from the

Catholics of Goa and upper-caste Hindus. The UGDP had never won an election. It splits first in 1967 and the second time in 1977. Its decline corresponded with the rise of the INC. Finally it merged with the INC. The second phase from 1977-1989 was when the UGDP declines suddenly as a party and the INC, first as INC(U) and then INC(I), when all the INC(U) legislators defect to the INC(I) era begins. This spells the end of the two regional party system since then the contest is between a national and a regional party i.e. INC and MGP. This third phase from 1991-98 was marked by defections in the legislature, party splits, several changes in chief ministers. The fourth phase from 1999-2014 marks the playing field of the two national parties, the BJP and the INC (DeSouza, 2004).

In Himachal Pradesh, the electoral volatility was quite high between 1957-89 elections. INC was the largest party in the state during this period but other parties also played some amount of role in the political arena. The important parties which were able to gain certain amount of electoral support were Scheduled Caste Federation (SCF), BJS, KMPP in 1952; CPI, PSP, SCF in 1957; BJS, SWA, RPI in 1962 and 1967; BJS, CPI, NCO, LKP in 1971; BLD in 1977; JNP, JNPS in 1980; BJP in 1984 and 1989 respectively. From 1991 onwards, the electoral volatility is less because the state has two party contests i.e. between INC and BJP. The socio-economic factor coupled with historical antecedent have all along shaped politics in the state, particularly its electoral politics. The most significant impact of these factors has been the emergence of clear cut two party system in the state since 1967. The contest for power in this state is between the INC and the BJP, with the former drawing its support base from old areas (upper areas of Himachal) and the latter from the new areas (lower areas). There is no regional party in the state and third parties if any have only a nominal existence. It is only in the recent years that a regional outfit, the HVC (Himachal Vikas Congress) has come to play a balancing role.

The beginning of electoral politics in the state drew attention to the existence of regional, economic, caste and class cleavages in the state. Throughout the 1990s, these cleavages tended to resurface and seemed to acquire a new salience. But in the following election, these cleavages were rendered less significant. Therefore, as one would expect in a two-party system, the social divisions have not acquired intense articulation in politics. The very small size of the OBCs, as compared to other North

Indian states, has meant that the state has remained unaffected by Mandalisation. This factor has also contributed to the low salience of social cleavages in Himachal (Sharma, 2003:173). In present times, the state is governed by BJP. The state has come to have a stable two-party system and no regional party has been able to get a durable foothold in the state. This trend is likely to continue. Secondly, the support base of both the major parties is almost equal and a little swing can tilt the scales.

In Manipur, since 1957, for most of the elections, the electoral volatility is quite high with few exceptions of 1962, 1971 and 1989 elections. The INC was not able to secure the majority of votes. The other parties like CPI, SOC, AMNU, CPI, PSP, SSP, BLD, CPI, MRP, BJP, JD, MPP, NCP and Independents also played a prominent role in the state politics at one or the other election years. One of the former governors of Manipur wrote that in Manipur some politicians changed parties as many as six times a year. A Chief Minister changes his party three times in one month and his coalition partners three times in 48 hours (Marwah, 2003:508). This obviously implies grave political instability leading to indifference of the electorate. Change in party loyalty, shifting alliances both in the individual and collective levels are so frequent and ruthless that the state has witnessed frequent change in government, ever since it became full-fledged state in 1972.

Electoral politics in Nagaland has been historically shaped by the Naga national question. An important feature of the state's electoral politics has been the relationship between the legal and ideological forces representing the Naga people. If regional parties like the Naga People's Front (NPF) have willingly displayed their nationalist aspirations and sympathy for the ideological representatives, national parties like the INC shared a distant cordiality with them. Even as electoral politics is restrained by a violent social web that has limited the capacity of the electorate, competitive politics has assisted in formalising a promising institutional political culture. The maturing of a democratic political process is evident from the fact that today the electoral agenda in Nagaland is no longer dominated by competitive expression over the Naga national question. It is now shaped by questions of development and governance. The electorate seems to have genuine expectations from democratic politics. This is evident in popular discourse and the political agenda of leading political parties like the NPF and the INC (Dev, 2013:2).

Nagaland had its first general elections in 1967, since then the state is experiencing high electoral volatility. The party system is perfectly unstable during 1977 elections, when there was a total shift in party loyalties from United Front of Nagaland (UFN) and Naga National Organisation (NNO) to INC and UDF. Even for the rest elections, the state has witnessed a greater electoral volatility. Only for 1991, 1998 and 1999 elections, the party system appears to be somewhat stable. In 1991, the state had two party contests between INC and NPC; in 1998 and 1999, the INC was able to secure absolute majority of votes. In 2004 elections, the volatility increased to 62.5% with the coming up of the regional party NPF and the defeat of the INC. The regional party, NPF is able to continue in power securing about 70% votes between 2004-2014 elections. From 2009 onwards, the electoral volatility is below 5%.

Thus, taking the above cases into consideration, we find that the electoral volatility appears to be high in several states for different election years. As noticed from the table 4.3, leaving the states where we find a near two-party competition like Gujarat and Rajasthan or where there has been consolidation of support for parties like CPM in West Bengal or INC and CPM in Kerala, the party system in several other states appears to be moderately stable/volatile or volatile in recent decades.

The earlier categorisation of states was made on the basis of ENP calculated in terms of votes for different states in table 4.1. Similarly, in table 4.3, the states were categorized taking into account the electoral volatility by votes for different states. Further, the states can be categorized taking into consideration both the nature of party system and pattern of electoral support. This is done to see the extent of fluctuations in the party support for the parties in different states which may have either two party competition or a plural party competition. Table 4.4 shows nature of party system and pattern of electoral support at the state level.

Thus, as stated in earlier sections, we find in several states, the ENP has increased after 1980s. With few exceptions like Bihar, Jammu and Kashmir, Maharashtra and Manipur, which have highly pluralized party system and other states like Madhya Pradesh which have a near two-party system, in about 13 states we find moderately pluralized party system or the extent of multipartism is less on one hand. On the other hand, as observed from the table 4.3 and 4.4, the electoral volatility appears to be high in states which have two-party system like Arunachal Pradesh or moderately

pluralized party system like Uttar Pradesh or a highly pluralized party system like Manipur.

Table: 4.4
Nature of Party System and Pattern of Electoral Support at the State Level

	Stable	Moderately stable/volatile	Volatile
Two-party system	Gujarat, Himachal Pradesh, Madhya Pradesh and Rajasthan	Nagaland and Tripura	Arunachal Pradesh, and Sikkim
Moderately pluralised party system	Andhra Pradesh, Kerala, Odisha and West Bengal	Assam, Karnataka, Punjab, Tamil Nadu and Uttar Pradesh	Goa, Haryana, Meghalaya and Mizoram
Highly pluralised party system	Maharashtra	Bihar and Jammu & Kashmir	Manipur

If we compare the ENP and VR at the national and state level, we find an interesting feature, on one hand, in several states the ENP is less in comparison to the national level and on the other hand, electoral volatility is high at the state level as compare to the national level. After 1989, about 16 states have either moderately stable/volatile or highly volatile electoral support for the parties. The states which are considered to have lesser electoral volatility are those, which seems to be acquiring stability over time like Gujarat, Kerala, Madhya Pradesh, Odisha, Rajasthan and West Bengal or have experienced a decrease in the electoral volatility since 1989 i.e. over a period of two decades like Andhra Pradesh or Himachal Pradesh.

A better understanding between party system change and stability of party support can be noticed by calculating the average of ENP and VR for the national level and at the level of states. Before that it is necessary to find out in what way party system change and stability of electoral support are related to each other. The following two sections firstly, examine the relationship between these two variables by the use of correlation coefficient and secondly, an attempt is made to understand party system change and stability at both the levels in a comparative way. This is done by calculating average effective number of parties and average electoral volatility.

4.5 Relation between Party System Change and Stability of Electoral Support

The relation between party system change and stability of party support has been well-documented by political scientists of party politics. According to Weiner (1957:273-76), political stability is a situation in which one or a group of political parties can control the government for a reasonable length of time. Since India's constitution provides for a federal system with powers distributed between states and central government, therefore if there is political instability then it has to be seen as a state as well as a central problem.

According to Sridharan (2004:67), the birth, death, splits and mergers of the important large and small parties in India brings out the unstable and weakly institutionalized character of most Indian parties. The one important factor, though not the sole one, in the instability of coalitions in India, is the split proneness or unstable character of most parties. According to Sarangi (2005:87), the proliferation of political parties and the regionalization of the party system have often been blamed for the instability at the centre. However, it is the stability of the party system at the state level that has prevented the development of anarchy at the centre. According to Suri (2005:7), a situation has been reached where too many parties stampede and jostle for space in the party domain. Some see it as a natural, if not desirable, development due to the dynamics of the world's most populous democracy marked by great diversity, cultural pluralism and economic underdevelopment. Others see in it fragmentation and decay of polity, and apprehend a danger to democracy, to the unity of the country and the stability of governments. According to Nooruddin and Chhibber (2008: 1073), the Indian party system dominance by the INC, has fragmented considerably in recent years. At the state level, electoral volatility has not increased since the 1990s. In other words, although electoral volatility has increased since the 1990s at the national level, this is not the case at the state level where electoral volatility has been a relatively consistent or declining characteristic of the states.

Thus after analyzing the literature, party system change as measured by effective number of parties and stability of party support as measured by volatility index, it becomes necessary to know in what way both are related to each other, i.e. in a positive/direct or in a negative/inverse way. To know the type of relationship, correlation coefficient is calculated between effective number of parties (ENP) and volatility index (VI), treating them as two variables. The correlation coefficient is

considered to be statistically significant when the value lies between ± 3 (Taylor, 1990; Dumont and Caulier, 2003). Table 4.5 shows correlation coefficient for the national and state levels.

Table: 4.5
Values of Correlation Coefficient between ENP and EV at
National and State Level

National Level	Correlation Coefficient
	-0.55
States	Correlation Coefficient
West Bengal	+0.52
Manipur	+0.35
Goa	+0.29
Meghalaya	+0.29
Sikkim	+0.24
Kerala	+0.19
Punjab	+0.18
Gujarat	+0.17
Jammu & Kashmir	+0.08
Arunachal Pradesh	+0.07
Andhra Pradesh	+0.03
Tamil Nadu	-0.01
Himachal Pradesh	-0.04
Nagaland	-0.04
Rajasthan	-0.04
Madhya Pradesh	-0.09
Tripura	-0.09
Odisha	-0.25
Haryana	-0.27
Karnataka	-0.35
Assam	-0.46
Maharashtra	-0.47
Bihar	-0.63
Mizoram	-0.67
Uttar Pradesh	-0.67

Note: The Correlation Coefficient is calculated from the ENP and EV rates as seen in Tables 4.1 and 4.3 respectively.

From the table 4.5, it is observed that there appears to be three clusters of states. One is where there is a direct relationship between ENP and EV. Examples are West

Bengal and Manipur. The other cluster of states is marked by a tendency where the stability of party support increases with an increase in the ENP. In other words ENP and EV are inversely related, examples: Karnataka, Assam, Maharashtra, Bihar, Mizoram and Uttar Pradesh. In the third cluster of states, the relationship between party system change and stability of party support appears to be statistically insignificant or no clear pattern is marked in the relationship. Examples: Goa, Meghalaya, Sikkim, Kerala, Punjab, Gujarat, Jammu & Kashmir, Arunachal Pradesh, Andhra Pradesh, Tamil Nadu, Himachal Pradesh, Nagaland, Rajasthan, Madhya Pradesh, Tripura, Odisha and Haryana. At all India level, we find an indirect relation between party system change and stability of party support.

4.6 Comparison of Party System Change and Stability of Party Support between Nation and States

In this section, an attempt is made to understand party system change and stability at the two levels i.e. national and states in a comparative way. This is done by calculating average effective number of parties and average volatility rate. The procedure followed is given below:

Firstly, the average ENP at national level is calculated following Lijphart's procedure as seen in his *Patterns of Democracy*⁴. It is derived by dividing the sum of ENP values for each Lok Sabha since the first General Elections by the number of elections. Secondly, the average ENP of each state is calculated. It is derived by dividing the sum of ENP values for each General Election held in the relevant state by the number of elections. The number varies depending on the year in which a state came into existence. It varied from 11 to 16. Thirdly, the combined average ENP for 25 states is calculated. It is derived by dividing the sum of the values of the average ENP for all states by the number of states. This procedure has been followed to calculate the average ENP and combined average ENP for all states on the basis of votes secured by parties in the legislatures. The same procedure is also used to calculate average volatility rate for national level, average volatility rate for each state, and combined average volatility rate for all states put together. Table 4.6 shows average ENP at national and state (in descending order) levels.

Table: 4.6
Average Effective Number of Parties at National and State Level

National level	No. of general elections 16	Average ENP 5.4
State level	No. of general elections	Average ENP
Manipur	16	5.9
Bihar	16	4.7
Jammu and Kashmir	13	4.6
Kerala	15	4.6
Assam	12	4.2
Maharashtra	14	4.1
Uttar Pradesh	16	4.1
Tamil Nadu	15	4.0
West Bengal	16	4.0
Meghalaya	10	3.9
Punjab	16	3.9
Haryana	13	3.8
Mizoram	11	3.4
Andhra Pradesh	15	3.3
Arunachal Pradesh	11	3.2
Goa	13	3.2
Odisha	16	3.2
Rajasthan	16	3.2
Karnataka	15	3.0
Madhya Pradesh	16	3.0
Sikkim	11	2.8
Gujarat	14	2.6
Himachal Pradesh	16	2.5
Tripura	16	2.4
Nagaland	13	2.0
Combined average ENP of all states		3.4

Note: The average ENP for national and state levels is calculated from the ENP values obtained from Tables 3.1 and 4.1.

From the table 4.6, it is observed that the state with highest average ENP is Manipur followed by Bihar and lowest average ENP is Nagaland followed by Tripura. Besides this, if the combined average of ENP of all states and that of average ENP at the national level is compared, it is found that the ENP is less at the level of states i.e. 3.4 in comparison to the ENP at the national level i.e. 5.4. Even if comparison is made by simply looking at the average ENP of each state and at national level, instead of combined average of ENP, it is found that the ENP is less at state level (with Manipur as an exception) than the ENP at the national level.

Let us now look at the average volatility rate at the national and state levels. Here I have followed the procedure employed by scholars like Payne, Zovatto, Florez and Zavala (2002), Mainwaring and Zoco (2007) and Suri (2007)⁵. The procedure followed to calculate average and combined volatility is same as the one followed to calculate average and combined ENP. Table 4.7 shows the mean electoral volatility at national and state (in descending order) levels.

Table: 4.7
Average Electoral Volatility at National and State Level

National level	No. of election periods 15	Average EV 22.7
State level	No. of election periods	Average EV
Sikkim	10	46.1
Haryana	12	41.9
Nagaland	12	37.6
Mizoram	10	34.8
Manipur	15	34.2
Goa	12	34.0
Arunachal Pradesh	10	31.7
Bihar	15	31.4
Uttar Pradesh	15	32.1
Odisha	15	27.2
Punjab	15	26.5
Jammu and Kashmir	10	25.9
Meghalaya	08	25.4
Himachal Pradesh	15	24.6
Karnataka	14	24.3
Rajasthan	15	24.3
Gujarat	13	24.2
Tripura	15	23.8
Tamil Nadu	14	23.7
Andhra Pradesh	14	22.1
Madhya Pradesh	15	21.7
Maharashtra	13	21.3
Assam	11	20.2
West Bengal	15	18.5
Kerala	14	17.8
Combined average EV of all states		27.8

Note: The average EV for national and state levels is calculated from the EV values obtained from Tables 3.3 and 4.3.

From the table 4.7, we observe that the average electoral volatility is highest in Sikkim followed by Haryana and lowest is Kerala followed by West Bengal. If the combined average electoral volatility of all states and average volatility rate at national level is compared, it is found that the electoral volatility is more at the state level i.e. 27.8% than at national level i.e. 22.7%. If the average electoral volatility of each state is compared individually with the average electoral volatility at the national level, it is found that the electoral volatility at national level is less in comparison to several states. However, there are few exceptions like Andhra Pradesh, Madhya Pradesh, Maharashtra, Assam, West Bengal and Kerala. In these states, the average electoral volatility is less than the average electoral volatility at the national level.

From tables 4.6 and 4.7, we notice that at the national level the party system change is huge in comparison to the state level. Similarly, the stability of party support is higher at the national level than at the state level. One reason for such a situation is that same parties are not in the electoral fray in all states. When these multitudes of different parties are added, the number of parties at the national level becomes larger. In other words, a large number of parties, both at the national and state based are present in the electoral arena at the national level. Only smaller number national and/or state based parties are present in the electoral arena at the state level. For instance the party competition in Odisha takes place between BJD, BJP and INC. In Tamil Nadu, it is mainly between DMK, AIADMK, PMK, Marumalarchi DMK (MDMK) and INC. In Maharashtra, it is between INC, NCP, SHS and BJP. In West Bengal, it is between CPI(M), INC and AITC. But all these parties get counted at national level. That is the reason why the ENP at the national level tends to be high compared to the state level.

We also need to explain as to why electoral volatility tends to be less at the national level compared to the electoral volatility for most of the states, although the number of parties in the electoral arena is always larger at the national level. Two factors seem responsible for this. Firstly, the vote fluctuation for a national party in different states may cancel out each other to some or large extent in such a way that at the aggregate level these movements of party support do not count in one direction in a substantial manner as they do when we take a state as one unit. Secondly, in several states regional parties play a major role in elections at the state level. Often there had been extreme fluctuation in the support in an election. However, a substantial share of vote

by a state-based or regional party in a national election at the state level constitutes only a very small proportion of votes polled in a national election. For example, the vote share of BJD at state level in 2014 is 45.2% compared to 37.3% in 2009, showing a shift of 7.9%. The same BJD received a vote share of 1.7% in 2014 at national level compared to 1.6% in 2009, showing a shift of a meager 0.1%, and when squared this contributes only an insignificant value to the summated squares of the party shares of electoral support.

4.7 Conclusion

A proper understanding of Indian party system⁶ need to be centered around states and its party systems. The evolution of party system at the state level represents one of continuing transformation. On the one hand there is a trend towards opening of the competitive format, i.e. single party dominance is now an exception rather than a rule, a large number of states have shifted to a two-party or two-plus or multi-party competition. In recent decades there are many bipolar and few multipolar systems than before and this trend continues. On the other hand, several states are undergoing a greater electoral volatility which results in unstable party system.

We also find that the pattern of electoral volatility differs across states. Some states like Maharashtra, Rajasthan witnessed greater stability of party support in the decades after independence, but experienced greater instability in the 1980s and 1990s, and later experienced a relative stability. Other states like the states belonging to north-east which experienced greater stability for a longer time have gone through a period of greater instability in recent times. It may be because of the emergence of small parties, frequent alteration of power and/or active role of Independents demanding for more political space. A more clear picture of party system change and stability of party support can be noticed when a comparative study is made between national level and at the level of the states.

Thus, it can be stated that the party system change appears to be huge at national level in comparison to the state level and shifting of electoral support from party to party is likely to be more or electoral support undergoes greater fluctuations at the state level in comparison to the national level. According to some political scientists like Weiner (1957), Pedersen (1983), Bartolini and Mair (1990), Mainwaring (1998), Tavits (2005), Suri (2005), Sarangi (2005), and Nooruddin and Chibber (2008) increase in

party fragmentation results in increase in the instability of party support. But this chapter shows that party system change may not necessarily result in increase in instability of party support. It is found that the ENP and electoral volatility varies differently over time. It may not be always correct to link both of them in a direct relationship.

Endnotes

1. Although ENP is calculated both in terms of votes and seat, ENP in terms of votes is most of the cases is taken into consideration for the categorization of states because in the literature of party politics, we find scholars like Mainwaring, Zoco, Lijphart, Payne, Suri, Sarangi, Kumar considers ENP by votes mainly to understand the changing nature of party competition over different periods of time.
2. The Left Front partners are Forward Bloc (FB), Forward Bloc (Marxist), Revolutionary Socialist Party (RSP), Revolutionary Party of India (RPI), Communist Party of India (CPI), Ashim Chatterjee's Naxalite Group; the non-Marxist parties are: Biplabi Bangla Congress, Democratic Socialist Party (DSP) and West Bengal Socialist Party (WBSP).
3. The Assam Movement led by All Assam Students Union (AASU) and the All Assam Gana Sangram Parishad (AAGSP) was a popular movement against undocumented immigrants in Assam. Later on the agitated leaders of the movements formed Asom Gana Parishad (AGP), which came to power in the state in the Assembly elections of 1985.
4. Lijphart in *Patterns of Democracy* (1999:76) have calculated average, lowest and highest effective number of parliamentary parties resulting from elections in thirty-six democracies from 1945-1996.
5. Payne, Zovotto, Florez and Zavala (2002:132) have calculated average volatility rate for Latin American countries. Mainwaring and Zoco (2007:159) have calculated average volatility rate for 47 democracies and semi-democracies. Suri (2007:55) has calculated average volatility rate for South Asian countries.
6. The main features of the present party system seem to be the following: (a) The INC no longer is the centre of the system; (b) Two national parties (INC and BJP) now contest for alliance leadership; (c) A third front functionally equivalent to a third major party no longer exists. Efforts are made by parties to reconstitute the third alternative to the BJP and the INC. But it is unlikely that they will succeed in the foreseeable future; (d) Regional parties now hold the balance of power necessary for the formation of a ruling coalition; (e) Niche parties representing small segments of the electorate continue to split off from existing political parties; and (f) Leadership, rather than the institutionalization of parties, appears to be of increasing importance (Wallace, 2003:8).

Chapter-5

Elements Affecting Stability of Party Support: National Level

5.1 Introduction

In the previous chapters, we find that the increase in party fragmentation may not necessarily result in instability of party support. Apart from the relationship between party system change and stability of party support, the scholars have studied several other factors which are likely to disturb the support base of parties. This chapter discusses about the various factors affecting stability of party support in Indian context at the national level. Among these factors voter turnout, closeness of party competition, party turnover and party coalitions are the most studied ones in the literature of party politics.

It is generally understood that voter turnout increases when competing political parties mobilize new voters or new sections of voters or new social groups. Specifically, the number of parties and the degree of competition among parties in each election affect voters' decisions of whether to show up at the polls. One might expect that where there are a greater number of party alternatives on the ballot, it is more likely that there is a party close to individual voters' preferences. With the increase in the number of parties and political competition, the vote margin of victory for a party has dropped. Elections have become more competitive or there is more closeness in party competition. Due to closeness of party competition, it is likely that the support base may get tilted and there may result in the replacement of the incumbent party by a new party. Therefore, in order to retain the support base, parties find coalitions to be an important and useful way to increase power and enlarge resources. Thus, it is proposed that all these factors would normally lead to variation in the stability of support that parties hitherto enjoyed in elections.

This chapter is organised into six sections: the second section deals with the impact of voter turnout on stability of party support. In the third section, the relationship between closeness of party competition and electoral volatility is examined. The fourth section analyzes the impact of party turnover on stability of party support. The relationship between party coalitions and electoral volatility is brought out in the fifth section. The last/sixth section summarizes the main points of the chapter.

5.2 Voter Turnout

Indian electoral politics have witnessed an explosion in political competition in recent years. In such a scenario, voter turnouts have been rising. But the question is whether they have increased to the extent to significantly affect stability of party support. The participation of masses in Indian elections brings into limelight three important aspects: First, the turnout does not follow the global trend of a steady decline over the years. Voting levels have either gone up or remained stable in India. Second, unlike most other democracies, the turnout does not go down in India as one goes down the tiers of government. In other words, the Assembly and panchayat elections record higher levels of participation than the national elections. Third, unlike the Afro-Americans, the homeless and ethnic minorities in the West, the citizens at the lower end of social and economic hierarchy in India do not vote less than those at the top. The reverse is more true, a poor, dalit and minority citizen is more likely to vote in India than an upper caste, upper class Hindu. Indian democracy has seen a democratic upsurge from below in the last 15 years (Yadav, 2004).

While turnout has generally been declining in most Western democracies, it has actually increased in India since its first general elections in 1952. This upward trend (i.e. 55% and above) has been highlighted as an important factor in the sustenance of Indian democracy, where citizens participate in increasing numbers to choose their governments election after election. Yadav (2000) disaggregates turnout statistics in India in terms of regions and prominent social groups to understand the changing nature of political participation in India in the 1990s. Yadav's key thesis is that although overall turnout figures have not increased dramatically (in the 1990s), the composition of those who vote has undergone a major change. In particular, he notes that there is a democratic upsurge among the socially under privileged i.e. the SCs and STs, while this increase in participation rates has not been seen in some other disadvantaged groups, for instance Muslims and women. He concludes that Indian is perhaps the only large democracy in the world today where the turnout of the lower orders of the society is well above that of the most privileged groups (Yadav, 2000:133).

In the first two elections i.e. 1952 and 1957, turnout was low. During this period parties were not especially strong and the Indian party system both at the national and state level was dominated by the INC. The period 1962-1967 witnessed a large

increase in turnout and was characterized by development of opposition to INC and a move towards a decline of a party system dominated by one party. As Yadav (2000:121) notes the decade of the 1960s which by all accounts marked the first democratic upsurge following the establishment of Indian democracy. Voter turnout went up at all levels as political competition became serious and alternatives to the one-party dominance of the INC began emerging. The strengthening of party system and mobilization of voters by the parties seems to be an important reason for this large increase in turnout seen in this period. Table 5.1 shows voter turnout and electoral volatility at the national level since the first general elections of 1952.

Table 5.1
Voter Turnout and Electoral Volatility at the National Level

Election Year	Voter Turnout (in terms of percentage)	EV
1952	44.9	--
1957	45.4	23.3
1962	55.4	16.2
1967	61.0	17.6
1971	55.3	18.2
1977	60.5	44.3
1980	56.9	45.3
1984	63.6	23.9
1989	62.0	28.2
1991	56.7	12.9
1996	57.9	20.7
1998	62.0	20.0
1999	60.0	16.7
2004	58.1	14.0
2009	58.0	15.6
2014	66.5	23.0

Source: Election Commission of India, http://eci.nic.in/eci_main1/ElectionStatistics.aspx, retrieved on 1st June, 2012.

From the literature mentioned in the chapter two, we saw that the increase in the voter turnout leads to instability in party support. But a cursory look at the figures in the table 5.1 does not lend support to that for all election years. It may be because even if people turning up more in elections due to increase in their political awareness over time, the preference for different parties among the electorate remains limited. On one side, India witnessed tremendous variation in electoral volatility, sometimes less than 20% and sometime more than 40%. On the other side, no huge variation in voter turnout is marked.

The level of voter turnout has varied considerably over the years from the first general election of independent India till now. The political and economic situations, which affect the decisions of a voter, have not remained the same during this span. There have been major changes in the demographic characteristics of the Indian electorate. Important political events have also taken place, both within the country and also in the outside world. These have influenced the conditions prevailing in certain elections. For example: the declaration of emergency in 1975 had a great impact on the outcome of the following parliamentary election of 1977. Almost every election is unique in this respect.

Now let us take a look at different election years. In the 1952 elections for national parliament, the INC won an overwhelming majority of seats in parliament and in every state legislature. The mandate was given for INC to rule, and for the opposition to legitimately hold it accountable. The next two sets of elections held in 1957 and 1962 followed the same pattern, with the INC surviving the major political crisis that ended with the reorganization of the states, a substantial redrawing of the map of India based on language. The voter turnout increased in 1957 and further to 55.4% in 1962. The electoral volatility dropped between 1957-62. The voter turnout in this period was not so high and the reason may be lack of political awareness or unfamiliarity with the process of democratic elections, or conservative nature of the people at that point of time.

Dissatisfaction with the performance of the INC began to arise in 1967. It is only in 1967 that the non-Congress parties gathered enough support. As marked from the table 5.1, the voter turnout was above 60%. It is not always correct to say that the INC recruits a representative cross-section of the electorate. There does not seem to be a fairly stable social profile to the INC support in 1967 election. The OBCs were less inclined than other groups to support the INC while the dalits and advasis were more inclined towards the INC than were other community groups. The only exceptions are the Muslims, whose pattern of support appears to have been somewhat variable over time (Heath and Yadav, 2002: 121). In the 1967 election, however, the INC met defeat in many major states, bringing opposition to power. With the increase in voter turnout in 1967, electoral volatility also increased. The volatility rate rose by 1.4% in comparison to 1962 elections. INC remained ruling party with 40% of votes, which

was 5% less than what it had secured in 1962 (around 45%). The propensity of the various community groups to support the INC in 1967 varied, but only slightly.

The defeat of the INC was one factor that caused a split in the party in 1969. Prime Minister Indira Gandhi, adopting a populist electoral appeal, swept aside the other INC splinter, and in the aftermath of India's successful war against Pakistan in 1971, won victories in states lost in 1967 and in several other mid-term elections. By 1971, Indira Gandhi's actions seemingly re-established Congress hegemony.

After the defeat of the INC in several states and weakening of its strength in 1967, the New Congress under Mrs. Gandhi changed strategies to build electoral support. The period between 1971-1980 saw the opposition coming to power defeating INC. The voter turnout was low in 1971 in comparison to 1967 election year. The turnout rates went down by 6% in 1971. The reason was the disillusionment with the ruling party due to series of economic and political crisis. The electoral volatility further increased to 18.2% inspite of fall in turnout rates. This was because INC secured majority in comparison to other parties and continued to rule. But this period also marked the appearance of new parties like NCO and there was decline in the vote share of parties like SWA and PSP.

The middle castes provided the central core of opposition to the INC in most states in 1977. In response to this Mrs. Gandhi adopted the strategy of uniting the opposite extremes of the social spectrum i.e. the upper castes and lower dalit castes against the middle castes. The victory of the Janata experiment in 1977 could be seen as the reassertion of the middle castes once again (Brass, 1985). In 1977 and 1980, the volatility rate went as high as 45% with the shifting electoral fortunes from INC to JP in 1977¹ and from the JP to INC in 1980. The voter turnout was high in 1977 in comparison to 1971. The unexpected defeat of Mrs. Gandhi and the INC in the 1977 election constituted a rejection of an authoritarian rule and the INC faced a credible political alternative at both national and state levels (Oldenburg, 2007:5-11). Moreover, since 1977, the highest proportion of turnout is always recorded in the mixed constituencies, where the rural electorate is up to 50%. In this sense, the turnout in semi-rural/semi-urban constituencies consolidates the trend of higher voter turnout in rural areas (Palshikar and Kumar, 2004:5413).

Democratization of politics underlined political processes during the 1960s and 1970s. The 1980s saw a trend towards regionalisation of politics and political parties. When the Janata phase declined, the middle castes extended support to the regional formations. Thus we see in the 1980s the emergence of several regional parties. The phase from 1984-1989 experienced the highest ever voter turnout, which was around 63.6% in 1984 and 62% in 1989 respectively. But with the INC regaining some of its lost support, the electoral volatility decreased in 1984. In 1989, the turnout dropped by 1.6%. People extended their support to the JD government. With the party turnover, the electoral volatility increased by 28.2% in 1989 elections. Consequently, the 1990s constituted a decisive shift, a period of transition, when there was the collapse of the older polity dependent on single-party dominance.

The 1990s, which is termed as the post-Congress period saw INC as no more a pole around which the political competition is structured. Intense mobilisation (both caste and communal), a more competitive electoral arena and arousal of interest in the elections caused by the rise of local players in the form of state-based parties, may have contributed to the turnout of around 60% in the 1989, 1998 and 1999 elections. During this period many state based parties gained their importance. This period also saw the rise of BJP to prominence in Indian politics as the single largest party. The BJP was able to broaden its electoral base, by aligning with regional parties. The expansion and consolidation of the BJP was mainly at the cost of declining in the vote share of INC.

According to Palshikar and Kumar (2004), the 1990s brought about two changes. One was the overall increase in turnout, and the other was the change in the composition of the voters. Both these may be seen as gains in terms of the consolidation of the democratic norm. The 1990s saw the women, dalits, adivasis, and OBCs relying more and more on the vote as an instrument of democratic assertion. Now, if the men, upper castes, and upper and middle classes also employ the vote as their counter-weapon, then the 'democratic upsurge' of the 1990s may recede in the years to come. Instability associated with coalitions after the 1989 election was noticed when a coalition called the Third Force (i.e. neither INC-led nor BJP-led) took power. The same thing happened in 1996-98. The BJP-led coalition that won in 1998 came apart, but a new version won in 1999 and served a full term. The electoral volatility in 1998 and 1999 decreased with the continuation of the BJP rule. The voter turnout decreased

by 2% between 1998-99. The secular growth of participation and involvement in elections projects that the 'democratic upsurge' in this respect is likely to continue and perhaps become stronger.

As a result of the 'democratic upsurge', democratisation of the profile of voters has taken place, but this process has not necessarily penetrated participation in campaign related activity. Thus, there exists a paradox. Diversification of voters is not matched by a broadening of the social base of participants and the active citizens. Active participants are still from the more privileged sections of society. Education and class are the determinants of who will be the participants in politics and who will be the more involved citizens. However, in one respect, some advance has taken place. In the group of active participants, the OBCs have forced their entry. But still one finds that the dalits, adivasis, poor and women are mostly outside the threshold of active politics (Palshikar and Kumar, 2004:5417). In the 2004 elections, these factors were either absent or were routinised and had lost their initial attraction. No new leader on the horizon, no new scandals and no new issues arose in the campaign. The election was just an ordinary one, perhaps a pale continuation of the previous two or three elections. Given this fact, the turnout dropped by almost 2% i.e. 58% in comparison to the 1999 elections (Palshikar and Kumar, 2004:5412).

The INC led coalition won narrowly in 2004 and it managed to stay together and continue its rule even in 2009 elections. In 2004, the electoral volatility decreased because the vote share of the main parties remained more or less same between 1999-2004. The 2009 election had witnessed some decline in the turnout among dalits and adivasis, the turnout among the Muslims remained more or less same and there was an increase in the turnout amongst middle class voters. In 2009, the voter turnout remained same as in 2004 elections but the electoral volatility increased. The vote margin between INC and BJP got widened by 10% in comparison to 2004 elections. The INC increased its vote share, whereas the vote share of the BJP decreased between 2004-09.

In 2014 elections, the voter turnout was the highest that India has ever seen in the national elections i.e. 66.5%. One of the major reasons for the polling percentage going up has been the increased participation of women. The participation was also high among middle and upper class voters in cities. The other interesting participation

was observed from the seats with high SC and ST population proportions. The overall polling was higher compared to the turnout in seats with lesser SC and ST proportions. This pattern perhaps indicates high voter turnout by non-SC and non-ST communities in seats where SCs and STs dominate (Kumar and Sardesai: *The Hindu*, 27th May, 2014). A huge shift was marked in the electoral support was noticed from the INC to BJP; there was the emergence of new parties like YSRCP, AAP; increase in the vote share of the parties like AIADMK in 2014 elections. All these factors resulted in the electoral volatility rise by 7.4% in 2014 in comparison to 2009 elections.

Therefore, from the table 5.1, we can notice that the polling percentage has always remained above 55% since the Lok Sabha elections of 1962. Since 1962 general elections, the scenario at the national level is for some election years (i.e. 1967, 1977, 1996 and 2014) when there is increase in voter turnout, there is increase in the electoral volatility. In these elections, generally we find party turnover as in 1977, 1996 and 2014 or decline in the performance of the incumbent party as in 1967. People turning up more in these elections search for party alternatives, therefore the electoral volatility is likely to increase in these respective years. In three election years i.e. 1962, 1984 and 1998, an increase in voter turnout does not necessarily contribute to increase in electoral volatility. This is because people turning up more extend their support to the incumbent party i.e. INC as in 1962 and 1984 elections or the two main parties i.e. INC and BJP are able to gather more or less greater amount of electoral support in 1998 elections. As a result of which the electoral volatility remained low in these elections. We also find that for some election years (i.e. 1971, 1980, 1989, 2009), the electoral volatility increased with the decrease in voter turnout. Similarly, for 1991, 1999 and 2004 elections, we find a decrease in voter turnout resulting in decrease in electoral volatility. Table 5.2 shows voter turnout and electoral volatility in a comparative perspective.

Thus, we find that voter turnout does not necessarily result in increase in electoral volatility for all elections. An increase in voter turnout may not necessarily mean that voters are switching their party loyalties or changing their electoral support frequently. The emergence of new parties into the political scenario may not provide a medium for the voters to shift their party loyalties.

Table 5.2
Voter Turnout and Electoral Volatility in a Comparative Perspective

Increase in VT+ Increase in EV			Increase in VT + Decrease in EV			Decrease in VT+ Increase in EV			Decrease in VT+ Decrease in EV		
Elections	VT	EV	Elections	VT	EV	Elections	VT	EV	Elections	VT	EV
1957	45.4	23.3	1962	55.4	16.2	1971	55.3	18.2	1991	56.7	12.9
1967	61.0	17.6	1984	63.6	23.9	1980	56.9	45.3	1999	60.0	16.7
1977	60.5	44.3	1998	62.0	20.0	1989	62.0	28.2	2004	58.1	14.0
1996	57.9	20.7				2009	58.0	15.6			
2014	66.5	23.0									
Average of EV		25.8	Average of EV		20.0	Average of EV		26.8	Average of EV		14.5

Note: ‘VT’ indicates voter turnout

However, if the averages of the electoral volatility in case of increase in voter turnout and increase in electoral volatility and increase in voter turnout and decrease in electoral volatility is compared from the table 5.2, we find that when there is increase in voter turnout, the electoral volatility is likely to be high (average is 25.8%). Thus, when there are more party alternatives, it is likely that the voter turnout may increase. With the increase in the number of political players, the vote victory margin between the winner and runner-up party may decrease or the elections are perceived to be close. The following section examines the relationship between closeness of party competition and stability of party support at the national level.

5.2 Closeness of Party Competition

Indian politics provide an excellent example in which there is increase in competitiveness of political system through development of opposition parties as well as the efforts of the parties to mobilize voters. Over last six decades, the Indian party system has witnessed many changes. The most important change has been entry of more and more parties in the political competition. The average margin of victory has decreased over time. The votes polled and seats won by the main opposition party as well as regional parties during the last few national elections have increased manifold; the influence of national parties has declined. Emergence of strong regional parties has made it difficult for the national parties to win majority of seats in parliament in national elections. This may thereby threaten the electoral support for the parties. When the number of parties seeking and winning representation in parliament has steadily increased, so has the closeness of elections between the winner and runner-up parties in an election. In such a context, it is necessary to know the relationship

between closeness of party competition and stability of party support. This is because more closeness may lead to increase in instability in support bases of different parties.

Keeping in view the closeness of party competition rate in different countries by different scholars such as Diwakar (2008) and Ghosh (2006) on India, Lin, Tseng and Wang (2011) on Taiwan, Indridason (2008) on France, Helin and Nurmi (2004) on Finland and Britain, and Franklin (2004) on the U.S.A, we can assume when the rate of vote difference is between 1-10%, the party competition between two parties is closer. If the difference is between 10-30%, then two parties are moderately close, and if the difference is above 30%, the two parties are not close. For calculating closeness of party competition, I have taken into account the vote difference of the two leading party. In case of coalitions, instead of finding the closeness between two coalitions, I have taken into consideration the closeness between the two leading parties heading two different coalitions. Table 5.3 shows closeness of party competition and electoral volatility at the national level since the first general elections of 1952.

Table 5.3
Closeness of Party Competition and Electoral Volatility at the National Level

Election Years	Largest Party in terms of vote percentage (P₁)		Second Largest Party in terms of vote percentage (P₂)		Closeness (P₁-P₂)	EV
1952	INC	45.0	SP	10.6	34.4	--
1957	INC	47.8	PSP	10.4	37.4	23.3
1962	INC	44.7	CPI	9.9	34.8	16.2
1967	INC	40.8	BJS	9.3	31.5	17.6
1971	INC	43.7	NCO	10.4	33.3	18.2
1977	BLD	41.3	INC	34.5	6.8	44.3
1980	INC(I)	42.7	JNP	19.0	23.7	45.3
1984	INC	48.0	BJP	7.4	40.6	23.9
1989	INC	39.5	JD	17.8	21.7	28.2
1991	INC	36.6	BJP	20.0	16.6	12.9
1996	INC	28.8	BJP	20.3	8.5	20.7
1998	INC	25.8	BJP	25.6	0.2	20.0
1999	INC	28.3	BJP	23.8	4.5	16.7
2004	INC	26.5	BJP	22.2	4.3	14.0
2009	INC	28.6	BJP	18.8	9.8	15.6
2014	BJP	31.1	INC	19.3	11.8	23.0

Source: Election Commission of India, http://eci.nic.in/eci_main1/ElectionStatistics.aspx, retrieved on 1st June, 2012.

From 1952-1971, the closeness between parties was less. Indian politics during this period was dominated by INC. The INC, which functioned as a broad-based nationalist movement before independence, transformed itself into the dominant

political party of the nation. Although a number of opposition parties came into existence, it was recognized that the INC was the chief party representing a historical consensus and enjoyed continuing basis of electoral support and political trust. The observers of Indian politics, like Morris-Jones, described the Indian system as a system of “one party dominance”, whereas writers like Rajni Kothari went to the extent of calling it the “Congress System”. This so-called one-party dominance or Congress system was, no doubt, a competitive party system. But the competing parties played rather dissimilar roles. According to Rajni Kothari, Congress system consisted of a party of consensus and parties of pressure. Between 1952 and 1967, INC was a very hard-to-challenge dominant party. Even after 1967, INC remained firmly in control of the national and state political scene.

India had been described as one party dominance system on the basis of INC electoral performance from 1952 to 1971. It always secured majority of seats in the Lok Sabha. This, it has been argued, was because of the ‘first-past-the-post system’, which benefited the INC. Even though the INC obtained majority of seats in the Lok Sabha, yet its electoral percentage share was not in proportion to the number of seats it won. For example, in the 1952 elections, INC got 364 seats on the basis of only 45% of votes polled; in 1957, 371 seats with 47.8% votes; in 1962, 361 seats with 44.7% votes; in 1967, 283 seats with 40.8% votes; and in 1971, 352 seats with 43.7% votes respectively (Bhambhri, 2008:36). The asymmetry between votes and seats increases as the vote/seat gap between the winner and runner-up party increases. Thus, we find between of 1952-71 the gap between INC and the second largest party was very wide above 30%.

During 1952-71, we find the electoral support for the parties was somewhat stable as the electorate remained loyal to INC. The volatility rate was below 20% on an average between 1957-1971. The election results of 1967 were dramatic. The INC failed to secure majorities in many states, and its majority at the Centre was reduced to a narrow margin. There was neither a viable alternative to the INC nor a clear cut polarization of political forces. Gains were registered by both forces of the Right and the Left. The highly fragmented opposition found an opportunity to come to power through coalitions. Consequently the results of the 1971 mid-term parliamentary elections turned out to be as unexpected as in 1967, putting the ruling party back to its

position of dominance. The people's response to INC in 1971 was not just a response based on emotional attachments as it had been immediately after independence. It was a conditional response, on the basis of a promise based on the slogan of "Garibi Hatao".

The phase 1967-1977 witnessed increasing tensions between the parties in the electoral fray on account of the breakdown of the consensus culture that had been so evident in the earlier years. Non-Congress governments were voted to power in the states on the one hand and Indira Gandhi attempted to assert her authority within the INC on the other. This period also ushered a new phase of decoupling national elections and elections to state Assemblies. Frequent elections in some states of India led to instability of party support. The victory of the JP in the 1977 national elections was assumed by many as the emergence of a new and welcome phase in India's electoral politics. It was hoped that the developments of 1977 were an expression of the clear emergence of a truly competitive electoral system. In 1977 there was a drastic increase in the closeness between INC and the second largest party BLD in terms of vote percentages. The rate of closeness was 6.8%, which was around 30% less than what the country experienced during 1957-1971 period. However, the volatility rates went as high as 44.3% in the corresponding year.

The volatility rate further increased to 45.3% in 1980. It can be argued that the process of democratic re-engineering which the developments of 1977 sought to usher in were reversed as a result of the electoral politics of the 1980, with the return of the INC party to power at the national level and in many of the states (Shastri, 2003:3-4). The rate of closeness decreased to 23.7% in 1980 from 6.8% in 1977. On the basis of 1980 elections one may say that the Indian party system was again seemingly restored to what Morris Jones described as the "one-party dominant system", Rajni Kothari as the "Congress system" and Joseph La Palombara as "the predominant party system".

The party competition was the least intense in 1984, with the closeness rate of 40.6%. The volatility rate decreased to 23.9% in this election. With the assassination of Mrs. Gandhi in 1984, INC was able to convince people that the India was in danger; the opposition parties had aggravated this danger and the INC alone could protect the country against it. Normally a change means a vote for the Opposition, but in the 1984 elections, the most credible agent of change seemed to be Rajiv Gandhi. Many

people, who might have voted against Indira Gandhi, voted for Rajiv Gandhi for they were in a desperate search for a leader who could modify and correct the declining political and moral standards. The impression that he stood for change with preserving the continuity in the system won him the support both of those who were dissatisfied with the system and those who benefited from it and wanted it to continue. Thus INC under Rajiv Gandhi not only got back to power but it secured the highest ever vote percentage and number of seats in the INC history. Once again there was the restoration of the one party dominance or Congress system as it was in 1950s. But as it turned out, such restoration was only short-lived one.

In the 1989 elections, INC was defeated by an opposition coalition of the National Front/JD. During this time, the BJP was slowly expanding its space to become a dynamic political force in the Indian party system. In the 1989 elections, it emerged as the third largest party in the Lok Sabha after the JD and the INC. The gap between the INC and JD was 21.7%. The volatility rate increased from 23.9% in 1984 to 28.2% in 1989. Since 1989, regional parties have grown in number and electoral strength, and forced a change in the 'go-it-alone' temperament of the two larger national parties: the INC and the BJP. As a result of which the two national parties began to look for the support of regional allies (Singh and Koh, 2010: 333).

In 1991, the closeness increased to 16.6% in comparison to the earlier election but the margin was still high. In 1991, riding on the wave produced by the rath yatra of its leader, L.K Advani and the movement to construct a temple to lord Ram in Ayodhya, the BJP achieved its greatest electoral victory since its formation, becoming the second largest party in the Lok Sabha with 20% votes after INC which secured 36.6% votes (Brass, 1990:87).

Thus, it is observed that except for the INC, BJP and the Communists, none of the other national parties had continued. Moreover, the second place party has changed in every election since 1952, when the Socialist party came in second with 10.6% of the vote. Many of the so-called national parties did not have a genuine national spread at all. In general, therefore, despite the considerable evidence of the INC electoral decline, INC was the only party with a base all over the country and that no national alternative to the INC existed (Brass, 1990:102). After 1991, the BJP began to emerge as an enduring polity-wide party similar to that of the INC.

During the 1990s party fragmentation continued to increase, but coalition politics also became the norm. The party system moved towards a multi-party system with two dominant blocs, led by INC and the BJP. However, it has also been difficult for the resulting coalition or minority governments to last for their full term, leading to four general elections between 1991 and 1999. The 1990s was called as a decade of frequent elections. This decade provided an opportunity to the Indian voter to express his/her preference in four national elections held in quick succession. However, what needs to be stressed is that the 1990s was a period of political flux and each electoral outcome provided ample proof of the clear emergence of a phase of genuine and irreversible competitive electoral politics (Shastri, 2003:6). The party system was becoming more competitive on one hand but on the other there was not a single party after 1989 which could secure majority and form government single-handedly. The 1991, 1996, and 1998 elections saw a period of consistent growth for the BJP and its allies, based primarily on political expansions in terms of developing stronger and broader alliances with other previously unaffiliated parties and regional expansion which had seen the NDA become competitive and even the largest vote takers in previously INC dominated areas.

The electoral volatility between 1996-98 remained around 20%. The closeness in 1998 was the highest at 0.2%. This was because the vote polled by the INC was 25.8% and of BJP was 25.6%. In 1999, the volatility rate declined to 16.7% and further to 14% in 2004. In 2004, the battle was more of a head-to-head contest in the sense that there was no viable third front alternative. Largely the contest was between BJP and its allies on one hand and INC and its allies on the other.

In 1999 and 2004 elections, the closeness gap remained around 4.5% between two leading parties: INC and BJP. In 2009, there was marginal increase of volatility rate to 15.6%. This was because of declining of BJP vote from 22.2% to 18.8% and a rise in INC vote from 26.5% to 28.6%. The 2009 elections saw the INC-led UPA retain power, with a remarkable increase of seats in the Lok Sabha. A declining trend of NDA and BJP was marked in 2009. The vote share of the regional parties went up to 28.4% in 2009. As a result of this, the closeness between the winner party i.e. INC and the runner-up party i.e. BJP decreased from 4.3% in 2004 to 9.8% in 2009. The closeness rate further decreased in 2014 to 11.8%. The victory vote gap of BJP from INC got very wide in 2014 elections in comparison to 2009 elections. In 2014

elections, the electoral verdict was reverse as compared to 2009 elections. The BJP increased its vote share from 18.8% to 31.1% and the vote share of the INC decreased from 28.6% to 19.3%.

Therefore, from the table 5.3, it is observed that when there is increase in closeness between parties, electoral volatility may not necessarily increase. For the 1967, 1977, 1989 and 1996 elections when the closeness between parties increased in comparison to the previous year of each of the four elections, in those respective years, the electoral volatility also increased. The decline in the performance of the INC in 1967, the change in the incumbent party in 1977, the reversal of the dominance trend set up by INC with the coming up of JP in 1977, the defeat of the INC by JD in 1989 and the succession of the three governments in 1996 resulted in the increase in the electoral volatility. Similarly, for 1962, 1991, 1998 and 2004 elections, we find that the closeness of party competition increased in comparison to the previous year of each of the four elections, but there was decrease in the electoral volatility. This is due to the continuance of the INC as the dominant party in 1962 and the ability of the INC and the BJP to garner maximum amount of vote in 1991, 1998 and 2004 elections respectively.

For 1957, 1971, 1980, 2009 and 2014 elections, when the closeness of party competition decreased in comparison to the previous year of the each of the five elections, the electoral volatility increased and for 1984 and 1999 elections, the decrease in closeness of party competition resulted in decrease in electoral volatility. However, taking into consideration the cut-off values as found from the literature, it can be observed that only in 1977 and between 1996-2009, there was greater degree of competitiveness between parties i.e. the rate of closeness was below 10%. Table 5.4 shows closeness and party competition and electoral volatility in a comparative perspective.

Thus, increase in closeness between party competition may not necessarily contribute to instability in party support for all election years as noticed from the table 5.4. When there is more closeness between the first and the second party, the electoral volatility may also decrease.

Table 5.4
Closeness of Party Competition and Electoral Volatility in a
Comparative Perspective

Increase in CPC +Increase in EV			Increase in CPC + Decrease in EV			Decrease in CPC+ Increase in EV			Decrease in CPC+ Decrease in EV		
Elections	CPC	EV	Elections	CPC	EV	Elections	CPC	EV	Elections	CPC	EV
1967	31.5	17.6	1962	34.8	16.2	1957	37.4	23.3	1984	40.6	23.9
1977	6.8	44.3	1991	16.6	12.9	1971	33.3	18.2	1999	4.5	16.7
1989	21.7	28.2	1998	0.2	20.0	1980	23.7	45.3			
1996	8.5	20.7	2004	4.3	14.0	2009	9.8	15.6			
						2014	11.8	23.0			
Average of EV		27.7	Average of EV		15.8	Average of EV		25.1	Average of EV		20.3

Note: ‘CPC’ indicates closeness of party competition

However, if the averages of the electoral volatility in case of increase in closeness of party competition and increase in electoral volatility and increase in closeness of party competition and decrease in electoral volatility is compared from the table 5.4, we find that when the degree of competitiveness between parties is more, the electoral volatility is likely to be high (average is 27.7%). When the degree of competitiveness increases, it is likely that there may result party turnover due to the defeat of the incumbent party. The following section analyzes the relationship between party turnover and stability of party support at the national level.

5.4 Party Turnover

Indian elections are frequently marked by an anti-incumbency effect since 1977. Anti-incumbency, as measured by a decline in the proportion of seats and votes polled by the incumbent party is indeed a salient feature of Indian elections. It has been considerable and statistically highly significant. The pattern of anti-ruling party bias in the polls is far from consistent and varies from year to year in different elections resulting in shift in support base of the parties. The distinction is important since the winner in Indian elections is often determined by the number of main contenders in an election. An incumbent party may increase his share of seats and votes and still lose an election simply because his political rivals may have agreed to put up a unified front against it.

The anti-incumbency sentiment of Indian voters may be because of any one of the four factors (a) it may represent a vote against the ruling party at the centre (national government incumbency); (b) it may represent a vote against the party of government in the state in which the constituency is based (state government incumbency); (c) it

may represent a vote against the party which won the seat in the previous election, regardless of whether the party forms the government at the centre or in the state (party incumbency); (d) it may represent a vote against the sitting member of parliament (candidate incumbency) (Borooah, 2006:1). This section focuses on incumbent party, the defeat of the incumbent party resulting in party turnover and thereby its impact on electoral volatility. Table 5.5 presents party turnover and electoral volatility at national level between 1952-2014.

Table 5.5
Party Turnover and Electoral Volatility at the National Level

Election Year	Name of the incumbent party/party heading coalition	Incumbent Party Won/Lost	EV
1952	INC	Won	--
1957	INC	Won	23.3
1962	INC	Won	16.2
1967	INC	Won	17.6
1971	INC	Won	18.2
1977	INC	Lost	44.3
1980	JP	Lost	45.3
1984	INC	Won	23.9
1989	INC	Lost	28.2
1991	JD	Lost	12.9
1996	INC	Lost	20.7
1998	JD	Lost	20.0
1999	BJP	Won	16.7
2004	BJP	Lost	14.0
2009	INC	Won	15.6
2014	INC	Lost	23.0

Source: Election Commission of India, http://eci.nic.in/eci_main1/ElectionStatistics.aspx, retrieved on 1st June, 2012.

From the table 5.5, we observe that for the first two decades there was no party turnover. The period from 1952-67 was a period of one-party dominance based on the “Congress system”. The volatility rate during 1957-71 was below 20% on an average. The opposition did not constitute an alternative to the ruling party but functioned from the periphery in the form of parties of pressure. The one-party dominance system had two prominent characteristics: first, there was plurality within the dominant party which made it more representative, provided flexibility and sustained internal competition. At the same time, it has prepared to absorb groups and movements from outside the party and thus prevented other parties from gaining strength (Hardgrave and Kochanek, 2008:270).

Electoral defeat in many states in 1967 and a reduced majority in the Lok Sabha with 283 seats and 40.8% votes revealed a breakdown in the Congress system. The efforts of Mrs. Indira Gandhi in 1971 helped the party to regain its lost position which it lost in 1967 election. The volatility rate was still less in 1971. The new INC was apparently centralized and personalized. It altered its traditional political style from accommodation to confrontation.

India experienced its first party turnover in 1977. The defections of 1977 was the result of Indira Gandhi's oppressive policies followed during the period of emergency rule from 1975-77. Those who left the INC formed a number of new parties: the BLD, INC(O) and Congress for Democracy (CFD). These INC fragments united with the socialists and the BJS in 1977 to form the JP, which brought a temporary end to 25 years of INC rule. This thereby led to a massive realignment of electoral support base of political parties, especially a shift away from the INC.

In 1977, as noticed from the table 5.5, the volatility rate rose to 44.3% from 18.2% in the previous election. In 1980, a second party turnover happened, with the electoral restoration of INC. The volatility in this year further increased to 45.3%, with the shifting electoral fortunes from JP to INC. In the landslide victory, INC secured 351 seats and 43% of votes. Although the voters responded in terms of immediate self-interest, the verdict was a plea for an effective government. In 1984, the INC secured massive victory under the leadership of Rajiv Gandhi. The INC maintained its support base among people. The electoral volatility dropped in 1984.

The 1989 general elections led to third party turnover and marked the beginning of a new era in the Indian party system. The INC that once used to command formidable majorities in Lok Sabha lost its hegemonic position. The elections of 1989 marked India's entry into a phase of fragmented multipartism. With the fragmentation of the INC, many regional parties began to assert for political space. Since 1989, coalition or minority governments have governed India. The volatility rate increased to 28.2% in 1989. For, the first time since independence, no single party was able to secure a majority in the Lok Sabha. Although the INC remained the largest party in Parliament with 197 seats, it was unable to form a government. Instead, the JD, which had 143 seats, united with its National Front (NF) allies to form a minority government dependent on the support of the BJP and the Communist parties from outside.

Although the INC lost more than 50% of its seats in Parliament, its share of the vote dropped only from 48.1% in 1984 to 39.5% in 1989.

The fourth party turnover was in 1991. In 1991, the vote polled by the INC remained more or less same leading to a drop in the volatility rate. The 1991 elections returned the INC to power but did not reverse important trends in the party's decline. The INC won 227 seats, up from 197 in 1989, but its share of the vote dropped from 39.5% in 1989 to 36.6% in 1991. Greater division within the opposition rather than growing popularity of the INC was the key element in the party's securing an increased number of seats.

The general election in 1996 once again led to the defeat of the incumbent party. The BJP and its allies and the UF (comprising of the LF and the JD), were the INC main rivals in the election. The election saw the BJP emerging as a major political force at the national level, cutting away the vote base of rival parties. The volatility increased to 20.7%. The election was marked by internal factionalism within INC, which led to a large number of defections and five years of INC rule had reignited anti-Congress opposition unity. On the eve of the elections, a group of leftist and regional opposition parties came together to form a NF-LF coalition. On the right, a resurgent BJP was confident that its new found popularity would enable it to replace the INC as the nation's largest party. BJP attempted to form a coalition government with the support of regional allies but was still short of a majority. The INC suffered the worst defeat in the history. JD leader Deve Gowda formed a UF coalition government. His government lasted for 18 months. Next I.K Gujaral with the outside support from INC formed the UF government (Nikolenyi, 1998: 368).

The sixth party turnover was marked in 1998. The volatility rate remained more or less the same i.e. 20% as in the previous election. The BJP was able to form the government. Determined to avoid the isolation that led to the fall of its 13 day government in 1996, the BJP entered into a major alliance with over a dozen of regional parties. Although, the elections produced another fractured mandate and a hung parliament, the BJP was able to win 25.6% of the popular vote and 179 seats and still fell short of majority. The resumption of the upswing in support in the 1998 elections was the result of the personal popularity of Vajpayee, a spilt in the anti-BJP

vote between the INC and the UF and most important was the success of party's alliance strategy (Hardgrave and Kochanek, 2008:338).

The 1991, 1996, and 1998 elections saw a gradual rise of the BJP and its allies, based primarily on political expansion in terms of cultivating stronger and broader alliances with other previously unaffiliated parties. The regional expansion had seen the BJP-led NDA become competitive and even the largest vote taker in previously INC dominated areas. These factors proved decisive in the election outcome of 1999. The volatility rates dropped to 16.7%. This is because of the effort made by the BJP and the regional parties to maintain their electoral support. In 1999, due to lack of cohesion in the 24-party NDA, the BJP fell short of a single vote due to the withdrawal of one of their coalition partners, the AIADMK. The main opposition party, the INC, could not muster enough support to form a majority government with regional and Left-wing groups.

Since the 1990s, India seemed to have entered into a "Post-Congress phase" of its political history. The INC lost its capacity to rally groups, which sometimes were poles apart, like the upper castes, the dalits and the Muslims. Indeed, until the early 1990s, the INC dominance formula relied upon this capacity to encompass contending social groups. It was a genuine 'catch-all party'. The all India opinion polls conducted by the CSDS show that till the 1980s, the INC was able to attract between 35.8% and 50.5% of the voters from any social group. In 1989, the Brahmins, the SCs, the STs and the Muslims were still overrepresented within the INC electorate. Where the INC won 39.5% of the valid votes, it received the support of 41% of the Brahmins, 44.2% of the SCs/STs, and 45.8% of the Muslims. The 1990s witnessed an erosion of the INC support amongst all sections. The BJP and a large number of regional parties were the chief beneficiaries of this decline, of this disintegration of the social coalition that sustained the party's electoral success (Chibber, 1999; Jaffrelot, 2003; and Chandra, 1999). And as the INC could not play the role of a catch-all party anymore, the national character of Indian politics had changed (Yadav, 2000).

Along with a fall in the number of INC incumbent seats, both in absolute terms and as a proportion of seats contested, the chances of the INC losing a seat in which it was the incumbent increased dramatically since 1996. There did appear to be an anti-incumbency factor working against the INC from the 1996 election onwards. In the

1998 elections, the INC lost in nearly half, and in the 1996 and 1999 elections the INC lost in nearly two-thirds, of the constituencies in which it was the incumbent party. However, from the 1996 election onwards the INC had, at best, a 50-50 chance of being elected from seats which it held in the previous election. This reflected not so much anti-incumbency towards the INC but, rather, a general worsening of the party's fortunes.

Borooah (2006) proposes four ways of assessing the extent of anti-incumbency sentiment against INC after 1996: one way of assessing is to set the electoral performance of the INC as an incumbent party alongside its general electoral performance (i.e. the ratio of incumbent wins to losses to total wins to total losses). It was found out that in the 1996 and in the 1999 elections, the chances of an INC win being an incumbent party were almost twice as great the chances of an INC loss being an incumbent party. So, on this measure, there was no anti-incumbency sentiment towards the INC. A second way is to set the electoral success of the INC as an incumbent party and non incumbent party alongside the representation of incumbents and non-incumbents in the total number of seats contested by the INC. It was found that in the 1998 and 1999 elections, the chances of an INC win being a non-incumbent party were greater than the chances of an INC win being an incumbent party. So, on this measure, and for these elections, there was anti-incumbency sentiment towards the INC. A third way is to examine its electoral performance in its marginal seats both as an incumbent party and as the main challenger. It showed that the INC performed better in its marginal seats when it was the incumbent party than when it was the main challenger. Lastly, the vote share for the INC in seats in which it was the incumbent party and in seats in which it was the challenger was examined. This showed that winning INC incumbents had larger vote shares than winning INC non-incumbents and that losing INC incumbents had larger vote shares than losing INC non incumbents (Borooah, 2006:16-17).

Following the two Lok Sabha elections in the first decade of 21st century, the ongoing fragmented character of the party system more or less continued. The seventh party turnover was experienced in 2004 elections, with the coming up of INC as a ruling party once again. The defeat of the BJP in 2004 elections brought the remarkable rise of the BJP to a halt. BJP's setback was compared by many to the unexpected defeat suffered by the INC in 1977. The election of 2004 compared to all the other Lok

Sabha elections of the 1990s, saw more of a head-to-head battle between INC and BJP as there was no viable Third Front alternative. The fight was between the BJP and its allies on the one hand and the INC and its allies on the other. Interestingly, the volatility rate had decreased in this election. It was because not much fluctuation was noticed in the vote share of INC and BJP from 1999 elections. In fact, both the parties experienced a decrease in the votes polled. The vote percentage of INC decreased from 28.3% in 1999 to 26.5% in 2004, and the vote percentage of BJP decreased from 23.8% in 1999 to 22.2% in 2004. The performance of INC slightly improved in 2009 elections. The volatility rate increased to 15.6%. Between 2004 and 2009 elections, the INC consolidated itself by increasing its strength from 145 seats in 2004 to 206 seats in 2009.

In 2014, with the turnover from INC to BJP, the electoral volatility rose by 7.4%. The performance of INC declined dramatically with 44 seats and 19.3% votes and the performance of the BJP increased to such an extent that it became capable of forming single-party government. The BJP alone was able to secure 282 seats and 31.1% votes in 2014 elections.

Therefore as noted in the table 5.5, party turnover is noticed in case of eight elections, when the incumbent party or party heading the coalition had lost. In five out of eight election years (i.e. 1977, 1980, 1989, 1996 and 2014) when there is party turnover, the electoral volatility increased in the corresponding election year as compared to the previous election year. In these years, there resulted a shift in the support base of the political parties along with party turnover. In rest three elections (i.e. 1991, 1998 and 2004) party turnover do not necessarily contribute to greater electoral volatility. This may be due to the ability of the two main parties: INC and the BJP to consolidate electoral support. The difference in the vote victory margin between the two main parties was not very wide. Table 5.6 shows party turnover and electoral volatility in a comparative perspective.

Thus we do not have conclusive proof that party turnover is always a consequence of huge shifts in electoral support base of the contending parties. When there is party turnover, it may not necessarily result in instability of party support for all election years as noticed from the table 5.6. When there is party turnover, the electoral volatility may also decrease.

Table 5.6
Party Turnover and Electoral Volatility in a Comparative Perspective

PT+Increase in EV			PT+Decrease in EV		
Elections	PT	EV	Elections	PT	EV
1977	JP	44.3	1991	INC	12.9
1980	INC	45.3	1998	BJP	20.0
1989	JD	28.2	2004	INC	14.0
1996	JD	20.7			
2014	BJP	23.0			
Average EV		32.3	Average EV		15.6

Note: 'PT' indicates party turnover

However, if the averages of the electoral volatility in case of party turnover and increase in electoral volatility and party turnover and decrease in electoral volatility is compared from the table 5.6, we find that when there is defeat of the incumbent party, the electoral volatility is likely to increase (average is 32.3%). The incumbent party in order to escape from defeat by a new party may enter into coalitions in order to increase its power. The next section focuses on the relationship between party coalitions and stability of party support at the national level.

5.5 Party Coalitions

The nature and dynamics of the party system in India are unique. Indian politics represents a multiparty system, but for long periods of modern India's electoral history, it has been characterized by one dominant party system with INC occupying the centre stage. Since 1970s Indian party system has become highly competitive both at the centre as well as in the states. The puzzling pluralities of political formations and interests have been developed into full-fledged political parties. A notable feature of the electoral outcomes from 1989 onwards has been the fractured mandate leading to the emergence of hung parliament as well as multi-party coalitions. There has been the end of the era of single party governments in the wake of the formation of multi-party coalitions at the national level and also in several states. The different type of complexities has resulted in political instability where one may find frequent shifts in the party support for political parties in India.

Coalitions in India primarily owe their existence to a set of determined people, who combine to govern for personal and party ends. The unifying force is power. Both experts and political parties agree that the era of coalition politics has just begun and it seems that now this will be the norm for the country. After having worked through a one party dominant system, the Indian political system is currently working through a

system of coalition politics under which several political parties are simultaneously sharing power both at the centre and state levels. The regional political parties are assuming significance and the days of single party rule are over, there is no escape from coalition politics. Experts are of the view that coalition politics² is result of the rise of regional parties and agendas of national importance.

One of the reasons for the growing importance of regional parties has been their success in articulating the interests of the assertive backward castes and dalits or untouchables. These parties remain regional in terms of geographic location, but are national in terms of issues relevant to the country as a whole. Their role within the national coalition is also indicative of a more competitive and polarised party system. The continuity of coalition governments like NDA and UPA confirms not merely the decline of one party rule and rise of regional and smaller parties, but a crisis of majoritarian political culture, based on dominance of a single party led by a charismatic leader over. Thus the era of coalition government has given both positive and negative impacts according to Arora (2002); Roy (2004); Sridharan (2008); Singh (2008); Pandey (2010); and Kumar (2011). This section mainly focuses on the relationship between party coalitions and thereby its impact on the stability of party support in 1989 and between 1996-2014 election years. Table 5.7 presents single-party government, party coalitions and electoral volatility at the national level between 1952-2014.

From the table 5.7, it is found that from 1989 onwards, India has experienced repeatedly fractured verdicts resulting in the formation of minority or coalition government. Since 1989, no single party has won a majority of seats in the Lok Sabha. This period stands in contrast to the preceding three and a half decades of Indian democracy, when the INC won a majority of seats and formed single party cabinets in seven out of first eight elections between 1952-1984. In 1977, the INC lost for the first time to an alliance of almost the entire opposition. The Janata Party won the election. There were five main parties in the Janata Party group to forge an all India alternative to the INC: the INC(O), the BJS, the BLD, the Congress for Democracy (CFD) and the Socialist Party. Other supporting parties were CPI and CPM. But the Janata Alliance did not last as a party and it began to disintegrate into separate parties by the end of 1979.

Table 5.7
Single-Party Government, Party Coalitions and Electoral Volatility at the National Level

Election Year	Single Party Government	EV
1952	INC	--
1957	INC	23.3
1962	INC	16.2
1967	INC	17.6
1971	INC	18.2
1977	JP	44.3
1980	INC	45.3
1984	INC	23.9
1991	INC	12.9
Election Year	Party Coalitions	EV
1989	JD ⁺	28.2
1996	JD ⁺	20.7
1998	BJP ⁺	20.0
1999	BJP ⁺	16.7
2004	INC ⁺	14.0
2009	INC ⁺	15.6
2014	BJP ⁺	23.0

Source: Election Commission of India, http://eci.nic.in/eci_main1/ElectionStatistics.aspx, retrieved on 1st June, 2012.

In the succeeding election of 1980 the INC(I) re-established its position of dominance thereby leading to a shift in the electoral support from Janata Alliance to INC(I). In 1980, the INC(I) managed to win enough seats to form a majority government. Throughout the 1980s, there were continuing efforts to merge the constituents of the JP and to forge opposition unity but to no advantage. With the assassination of Indira Gandhi in October 1984, the focal point that might have brought the opposition together was gone. In 1984, the opposition to INC(I) remained fragmented, regionally dissimilar and involved in continuous process of fission and fusion. The results virtually wiped out the opposition in Parliament (Hardgrave and Kochanek, 2008: 322).

From the table 5.7, it is observed that, the electoral volatility seems to be high at 25.2% on an average during 1957-84 and 1991, when there were single party governments. This is because this phase found strong anti-incumbency wave, when there was a major shift from INC to JP in 1977 and again from JP to INC in 1980, which led to a very high electoral volatility. In rest election years we find the INC ruled as the incumbent party. It is also observed from the table 5.7 that the electoral volatility appears to be less on an average i.e. 19.7% during 1989 and from 1996-

2014, when there were party coalitions. This is because the two main polity-wide parties i.e. INC and BJP garnered near about 50% votes in their favour inspite of being part of different coalitions. However, the exception was the 1989 elections when the JD government was formed and the electoral volatility was high in comparison to other elections when there were party alliances. Now let us turn to the respective election years when there were party coalitions.

With the formation of JD in 1989, the process of alliance formation got a significant boost. Under the leadership of V.P Singh, who was expelled from the INC, the JD was a combination of two Lok Dals, led by Ajit Singh and Devi Lal in North India and the JP of R.K Hegde in Karnataka. Supporting the strategy to give the INC one-to-one opposition, the JD was a successful pre-electoral alliance that revived the concept of a coalition as a viable alternative. This was a two-level alliance. At the first, a formal pre-electoral coalition was formed comprising the National Front (the JD, the two Lok Dals and the JP), three regional parties: TDP, DMK and AGP and the Congress (Socialist). The second level was a more informal seat adjustment between the National Front and the BJP on the one hand and the Left parties, on the other, even though they were ideologically incompatible (Chakrabarty, 2006:5-6).

The 1989 National Front was a novel coalition for India. Learning from the JP's experience of 1977-79, it did not try to unify very different parties into a single party. Instead it put together a coalition of distinct parties based on common manifesto. In doing so, it brought into the coalition explicitly regional parties and accommodated the Left. In addition, it reintroduced the concept of 'seat adjustments', first used in 1977 by the opposition against the INC. It tried to strike a balance between two ideologically opposite forces. Its collapse was attributed to the growing distance between the BJP and other National Front constituents, which finally culminated in the withdrawal of BJP support to the government (Sridharan, 2003:139). With the formation of the National Front government, the volatility increased in comparison to 1984 elections. The change from INC in 1984 to JD government in 1989 was a predicted one. In 1977, when the INC for the first time lost to JP, it had secured 154 seats and 35% votes than in 1989, when INC secured 197 seats and 40% votes. This proves the shifts in the electoral support were more in 1977 than in 1989 elections. The JD government could not last long and at the end of 1990 itself V.P Singh was

replaced by Chandra Shekhar who continued as care taker Prime Minister till June 1991.

In contrast to the BJP during the late 1980s and early 1990s, the INC was in a phase of steady decline. The INC in the post-independence period had a strong party machine and internal discipline, which began to be eroded in the 1960s. Under Mrs Indira Gandhi there had been gradual erosion of inner party democracy, increasing use of centralising institutional devices and interference in the working of state governments leading to loss of autonomy, de-institutionalisation and even weakening of the party organisation in the states in the 1980s. Despite its massive victories in 1980 and 1984, the party did not regain its dominant position in the Hindi heartland especially among the SCs and minorities, leading to progressive shrinking of its regional and social base in the states, providing space for the growth of regional/state parties. The deep divisions within the body politic, that were intensified by the communal mobilisation of the BJP which failed to form a government and the collapse of the INC, encouraged regional parties to join hands and experiment with a 'Third Front' distinct from either the declining INC or the communal BJP.

Following the collapse of the JD National Front government in 1990, opposition unity collapsed again as it had in 1979 and the constituents units of National Front fought the 1991 elections. With the victory of INC in the elections, the JD government remained dormant. The volatility rate decreased to 12.9% with the returning of the INC to power with a majority produced mainly by a sympathy wave created due to the assassination of Rajiv Gandhi during the process of election. The 1991 elections was a three cornered contest with roughly the same electoral alliances but with the National Front confronting the BJP as well as the INC. With the external support of the 11-members AIADMK and some smaller allies, the INC was able to form single-party minority government. It began adding to its numbers by splitting small parties such as the TDP and Ajit Singh's faction of the Lok Dal. By 1991, the consolidation of the BJP upper caste Hindu constituency reached its limits and proved insufficient to win a national majority. After 1991, the INC disintegrated due to its failure to integrate regional elites. In this vacuum, many independents and regional parties emerged, some attempting to form small alliances among themselves (Carroll, 2008:11).

The year 1996-1999 was a period of turmoil in the federal government marked by several short-lived alliances. The electoral volatility during this period was near about 20% on an average. The party system was stable which may be due to the development of a bi-nodal framework led by INC and BJP. These two dominant multi-state parties form the two nodes of the political system. They attract partners usually for strategic rather than for ideological reasons. The INC and the BJP are the two dominant multi-state parties or polity wide parties in the country today. The INC was for a long time the only multi-state polity-wide party and it is only in 1996, that the BJP joined in this category. The share of the two dominant multi-state parties taken together has almost remained constant with small variations. At the same time, the share of the other multi-state parties has showed a greater variation. It is also noticed that the share of single-state parties and Independents has gradually increased over the years. The space for polity wide multi-state parties has been captured by the INC and the BJP and other multi-state parties have gradually been edged out (Arora and Kailash, 2011:8-9).

Due to no party being able to gain a majority in the 1996 Lok Sabha elections, two short-lived, unstable, coalition governments were formed by the United Front, headed by Deve Gowda and I.K.Gujral with the outside support of the INC. Two debatable issues in both were attempts to formulate a common economic programme and the inter-relationship among the partners. The failure of these two experiments in the mid 1990s, led to a realisation that a combination of national and regional parties was required to form a stable coalition at the centre.

In 1996, the National Front-Left Front coalition was formed. The JD coalition won by forming a broad front, post election coalition government somewhat comparable to 1989 National Front. The key components of the coalition were the JD, the SP, CPI, CPM, Forward Bloc and the RSP. These parties in turn entered into electoral adjustments with a variety of regional parties. The 1996 elections saw BJP winning the largest number of seats i.e. 161 seats. The President of India called upon the party to form the government. The BJP faced solid opposition from secular opposition parties determined to prevent the formation of a Hindu nationalist government. As a result the BJP government lasted for 13 days and was forced to resign. The National Front-Left Front government made negotiations with the secular and regional parties

leading to the formation of the United Front (UF) coalition of 14 parties to replace the BJP depending on the outside support of INC. The major components of the UF were the JD, SP, CPI, CPM, RSP, Forward Bloc, Tamil Manila Congress (TMC), DMK, TDP, AGP, All India Indira Congress (Tiwari), Karnataka Congress Party (KCP) and the Madhya Pradesh Vikas Congress (MPVC) (Hardgrave and Kochanek, 2008:329-30). This time there was not any ideological conflict between the left and the right as in 1989. The problem was that the INC was the principal political opponent of many of the UF's constituent parties. This made the INC inherently 'uncoalitionable' which was to become a serious liability. In 1997 the INC withdrew its support and this led to the 1998 elections (Sridharan, 2003:140).

In 1998, the BJP formed a truly viable national political alliance with 13 parties named as National Democratic Alliance (NDA-I). The parties which were within its fold were AIADMK, PMK, MDMK, TRC, Janata Party of Tamil Nadu; Samata Party of Bihar; Samata Party of Uttar Pradesh; BJD of Odisha; SAD of Punjab; TMC of West Bengal; SHS of Maharashtra; Lok Shakti of Karnataka; and HVP of Haryana. The post poll allies consisted of HLDR of Haryana; ARC of Arunachal Pradesh; SDF of Sikkim; and TDP of Andhra Pradesh. It also consisted of Independents from Rajasthan, Uttar Pradesh, Punjab, Assam and Anglo-Indians from Tamil Nadu and Karnataka (Pai, 1998: 836-37). The main results were improvement in the seat and vote tally of BJP. Two features which was noticed in the 1998 election was: first, despite emerging as the single largest party and forming a coalition government, the BJP and its allies have only succeeded in replacing the UF coalition with another short lived coalition. Second, several regional parties have emerged by forming pre and post poll alliances determining to a great extent the shape of the national party system. With the early loss of a key NDA-I ally i.e. AIADMK, new elections were called and the BJP placed even greater emphasis on establishing a viable pre-electoral coalition, capable of achieving majority.

Running on a common manifesto in 1999, the BJP led NDA-II strengthened itself by bringing together 24 regional parties like TDP, Janata Dal United (JDU), SAD, DMK, PMK, MDMK, BJD, SHS, HVP, INLD, Sikkim Democratic Front (SDF), MNF, MSCP, SAP, TMC, Jammu and Kashmir National Conference (JKNC), Lok Shakti and including splinters from INC. The victory of the NDA-II in the 1999 elections

was marked by a restoration of political stability as the BJP-led coalition became the first non-Congress government to survive a full five year term. According to Lefebvre and Cyril (2009), the formation of the BJP-led NDA represents a landmark as the party system moved significantly towards stable coalitions composed of national and state based parties. The NDA represents a new phenomenon in the sense that it has strengthened the federal character of national polity. Previous coalitions represented the opposition between the INC and all other parties and did not have the federal character of the NDA or UPA in the following elections of 2004 and 2009.

The volatility rate during 2004-2009 further declined to 14% in 2004 and slightly increased to 15.6% in 2009. In 2004, the seat share of the INC and the BJP was 13 seats less i.e. 283 added together than 296 in 1999. The vote share of the INC increased and the vote share of BJP decreased in 2004. Not much difference was noticed between the parties in terms of vote share. The INC secured 28% votes in 1999 which got reduced to only 27% in 2004. In 1999, the BJP secured 24% votes which got reduced to 22% in 2004 approximately. The fluctuation in the electoral support was not so wide in terms of vote percentage received by INC and BJP respectively between 1999 and 2004.

For the 2004 elections the INC managed to form a pre-electoral coalition consisting of 17 parties. The 2004 elections brought the remarkable rise of the BJP to a sudden halt and the party's setback was compared by many to the unexpected defeat suffered by the INC under Indira's Gandhi leadership in 1977. The NDA-II lost control of the government and was defeated by the United Progressive Alliance (UPA-I) led by INC. The other members in the UPA-I coalition were MDMK, PMK, DMK (these three parties moved from NDA-II in 1999 to UPA-I in 2004), IUML, JMM, KCM, MUL, NCP, RPI(A), AC, JKPD, LJNSP, Party of Democratic Socialism (PDS), Rashtriya Parivartan Dal (RPD), RPI and TRS. The coalition got outside support from the Left Front led by CPM. The balance between the BJP and the INC shifted decisively to the advantage of the INC in 2009. In this election, the voters delivered a significant verdict with the INC resulting in 1.6% i.e. 15.6% increase in the electoral volatility from 2004. The alliance pattern was stabilized in the vote shares, indicating that alliances have clearly become the dominant strategy for parties striving for viable status. The UPA-II led by INC was formed in 2009 with NCP, RLD, JKNC, IUML, KCM with the external support from SP, BSP, RJD, JD(S), SDF, Bodoland People's

Front (BPF), All Indian United Democratic Front (AIUDF) and Bahujan Vikas Aaghadi (BVA).

In the 2014 elections, the BJP-led NDA coalition was formed with all together 29 member parties. Some of the important members in the alliance were DMDK, PMK, MDMK, TDP, SHS, SAD, Swabhimani Paksha, LJSP, RLSP, HJC, Apna Dal, NPP and NPF. This election marked a huge victory for BJP-led NDA. The electoral volatility increased to 23% with the anti-incumbency wave against the INC-led UPA-II formed in 2009.

Therefore as noticed from the table 5.7, the trend of coalition politics has begun in India in some form way back in 1977. It received a halt in 1980 and 1984. From 1989 onwards, it is difficult to think of India without coalition governments. This was because of the gradual decline of the Congress system accompanied by the fragmentation of parties. For 1989 elections, electoral volatility increased with the formation of National Front coalition in 1989. Again, in 1996, with the formation of JD alliance, the electoral volatility increased in comparison to 1991. In 1998, the volatility rate remained almost same with a marginal variation of 0.7% from 1996 elections. With the continuation of the same coalition as in 1998, the electoral volatility dropped in 1999. The vote share of BJP and INC did not vary much between 1999 and 2004, resulting in decrease of electoral volatility, inspite of the defeat of the BJP-led NDA-II coalition in 2004. From 2009 onwards, the fluctuations in electoral support seem to be more between INC and BJP, and this was more clearly noticed in 2014 elections. This resulted in the increase in electoral volatility to 15.6% in 2009 and further to 23% in 2014 elections.

Thus, party coalitions do not necessarily contribute to an increase in electoral volatility as observed from the 1998, 1999 and 2004 election years. This may be because of the stabilizing tendency of electoral support bases of the two national parties: INC and BJP, heading two different coalitions UPA and NDA at the national level. The electoral support for the two main parties remained more or less same since 1996 without huge variations, both the parties are able to secure about 50% of votes. The parties are able to keep intact their support bases as they share political power. The exception was the 2014 elections, although the two parties were able to poll together nearly 50% votes, the maximum support was garnered by BJP. Table 5.8

presents shifts in electoral support of the parties heading the coalition at the national level between 1989-2014.

Table 5.8
Shifts in the Electoral Support of the Parties heading the Coalition at the National Level

Parties	Year of Elections							
	1989	1991	1996	1998	1999	2004	2009	2014
INC	39.5	36.6 (-2.9)	28.8 (-7.8)	25.8 (-3.0)	28.3 (+2.5)	26.5 (-1.8)	28.6 (+2.1)	19.3 (-9.3)
BJP	11.3	20.0 (+8.7)	20.3 (+0.3)	25.6 (+5.3)	23.8 (-1.8)	22.2 (-1.6)	18.8 (-3.4)	31.1 (+12.3)
JD	17.8	11.8 (-6.0)	8.1 (-3.7)	--	--	--	--	--
Total Votes Polled by INC and BJP	50.8	56.6	49.1	51.4	52.1	48.7	47.4	50.4

Source: Election Commission of India, http://eci.nic.in/eci_main1/ElectionStatistics.aspx, retrieved on 1st June, 2012.

Note: 1. (+) indicate Gain and (-) indicate Loss in electoral support.

2. In 1991, there was no party coalitions but in order to show the shift, the 1991 column is included.

5.6 Conclusion

To conclude, this chapter examined the impact of different elements on stability of party support at the national level. The different factors are voter turnout, closeness of party competition, party turnover and party coalitions respectively. The literature on each of the above factors arrives at the proposition that all these factors are likely to increase instability of party support. But this chapter shows that a mixed trend is noticed in the relationship of each of these factors and stability of party support.

Examining the relationship between voter turnout and electoral volatility, it is found that the electoral volatility seems to be high for five (i.e. 1957, 1967, 1977, 1996 and 2014 respectively) out of eight elections, when there is increase in voter turnout. The increase in the electoral volatility in the initial election years of 1957 and 1967 may be due to the partial shift from the party in power because of disillusionment and dissatisfaction with the government and appearance of new parties like PSP, SWA and RPI which were capable of securing certain amount of vote percentages. The polling percentage during 1957 and 1967 increased may be because of the increase in the political awareness and interest in the process of democratic elections. In rest elections held in 1977, 1996 and 2014, the electoral volatility seems to be high due to availability of party alternatives apart from INC for the mobilized electorate.

However, for the rest elections (i.e. 1962, 1984 and 1998) when there was an increase in the voter turnout, the electoral volatility seems to be less.

The relationship between closeness of party competition and electoral volatility also presents a mixed trend. It is found that in four (i.e. 1967, 1977, 1989 and 1996) out of eight election years, when the closeness of party competition increased, the electoral volatility also appears to be high. In these four elections, the degree of competitiveness appears to be high between the first and the second place parties like INC and PSP in 1967; JP and INC in 1977; INC and JD in 1989 and 1996 elections respectively. The electoral volatility seems to be high due to the dissatisfaction in the INC performance in 1967 or due to defeat of the incumbent party in 1977, 1989 and 1996. In rest four (i.e. 1962, 1991, 1998 and 2004) elections, when there is increase in closeness of party competition, the electoral volatility seems to be less. However, going by the closeness of party competition cut-off values, it is found that there is more closeness of party competition in 1977 and between 1996-2009 election years, when the closeness rate is below 10%.

Turning to party turnover and electoral volatility, it is found that in five (i.e. 1977, 1980, 1989, 1996 and 2014) out of eight elections, with the party turnover, the electoral volatility appears to be high. The anti-incumbency wave results in shifts from the incumbent party to a new party with a view to bring change in the government. When the support base getting tilted there result in the defeat of the incumbent party as in 2014 elections (defeat of INC by BJP). A greater amount of fluctuations is found in the electoral support during party turnover, as a result of which the electoral volatility appears to be high. However, for the rest three (i.e. 1991, 1998 and 2004) elections, party turnover does not necessarily contribute to a greater electoral volatility. This is because since 1991, we find some amount of closeness of party competition between INC and BJP, so even if a different incumbent party like JD in 1991 is defeated, the electoral support remained more or less confined to the INC as the first place party and the BJP as the second place party between 1991-2009.

Analysing the relationship between party coalitions and stability in party support, it is found that in four (i.e. 1989, 1996, 2009 and 2014) out of seven elections, party coalitions results in greater electoral volatility. In 1989, with the formation of the first successful coalition government at the Centre, the electoral volatility appeared to be

high. Suddenly the rule of INC was shattered and a shift was marked towards the JD government. In 1996, again a shift was marked from INC to JD alliance, resulting in instability of party support. In 2009, the distribution of electoral support between the INC-led UPA-II and the BJP-led NDA-II got widened and the vote victory gap between the two parties leading two different coalitions tends to increase and further it got widened in 2014 elections. This resulted in increase in electoral volatility in 2009 and 2014 elections respectively. In rest three (i.e. 1998, 1999 and 2004) elections, we find closeness of party competition between the INC and BJP heading two different coalitions. As a result the electoral volatility appears to be less.

Thus, a mixed pattern of relationship is noticed in the relationship between the above mentioned factors and stability of party support. For some election years, these factors are likely to result in greater electoral volatility and for some election years, they may not necessarily contribute to instability of party support. How far these propositions, as found in the literature hold true in the context of states is examined in the succeeding chapter.

Endnotes

1. It was hoped that the developments of 1977, was an expression of the clear emergence of a truly competitive electoral system. Kothari has succinctly articulated the changes that were underway in the country. An electoral democracy that had broadened its social base and shown special regard for diverse types of minorities and hence gained so much legitimacy got eroded over time. The erosion of parliamentary, party and federal institutions and decline of authority of the state and of the national political leadership has also been one of the reasons for the rise of new actors on the scene, new forms of political expression and new definitions of the content of politics (Kothari 1988: 28, 175).
2. Studying the recent experience of coalitions might address two lacunae in the vast literature in political science on coalitions: first, although there are many studies on coalition government, there has been little theoretical and empirical research addressing pre-electoral coalitions and interaction between electoral behaviour and the politics of coalition. Second, in data sets on parliamentary democracies, the Indian case is often not included as case studies, usually the focus is on western industrialized democracies (Lefebvre and Cyril, 2009, <http://samaj.revenues.org/index2795.html>, retrieved on 20th July, 2013).

Chapter-6

Elements Affecting Stability of Party Support: State Level

6.1 Introduction

The previous chapter dealt with the relationship between different factors like voter turnout, closeness of party competition, party turnover, party coalitions and stability of party support at the national level. This chapter opens up with the discussion of the relationship between each of the above mentioned factors and stability of party support in context of states. Keeping in mind, the increasing importance of the states and regional parties over the past two decades, it becomes necessary to know how far the stability of the party support at the level of states is influenced by each of the four elements. It is also necessary to draw a comparison over time and across states by looking at the pattern of relationship between each of these factors and stability of party support since 1989.

The 1989 elections is considered as a benchmark for the categorisation of the states because this election heralded the end of single party rule in India and the rise of multi-party coalition government, which is likely to continue for the foreseeable future. This further incentivized the growth of regional parties, whose leaders recognized that they could exercise considerable influence in the formation of governments with a relatively small numbers of seats in Parliament. The number of parties contesting elections jumped from 38 in 1984 to 117 in 1989, a watershed year in Indian politics. The dramatic surge in 1989 is explained by the proliferation of regional parties, which formed in direct response to popular disenchantment with INC rule and the lack of representation for lower and backward castes, minorities, regional and sub regional interests. After this election, BJP too made its first major national impact.

This chapter is organised into six sections: the second section analyzes the relationship between voter turnout and stability of party support. The third section brings out the relationship between closeness of party competition and electoral support. The relationship between party turnover and instability of party support is brought out in the fourth section. The fifth section examines the relationship between party coalitions and electoral volatility. The last/sixth section summarizes the main points that emerge from the chapter.

6.2 Voter Turnout

India's democratic system is characterised by the regular elections that see the participation of over a hundred political parties and the largest electorate in the world larger than all the potential voters in North America, Europe and Australia combined. Recent voter turnout rates in India have been comparable to other major democracies (about 60%) but are still trending upwards, unlike in the older democracies where rates are generally falling along with growing voter indifference. Even more surprisingly, the most enthusiastic voters in Indian elections are not the well-educated urban middle classes but those who are the poorest, most discriminated against, and less educated, mainly living in villages and small towns. Further, the more local the election, the higher the turnout, again exceeding global trends (Diwakar, 2008:79).

This section focuses on voter turnout and its impact on stability of party support in the Indian states, which have become the dominant players in influencing national politics and government formation at the central level. Table 6.1 shows voter turnout and electoral volatility at the state level between 1989-2014.

From the table 6.1, firstly, we observe that voter turnout varies widely across the Indian states and also over time. The voter turnout in several states is above 55%. Secondly, an increase in voter turnout may not always contribute to a greater electoral volatility. The states are grouped into different categories based on the *majority of instances* an increase in voter turnout has resulted in increase or decrease of electoral volatility. For example if in a state, out of eight election years between 1989-2014, in four elections, an increase in voter turnout has resulted in the increase in electoral volatility; in one election, if an increase in voter turnout has resulted in decrease in electoral volatility; and in three elections if decrease in voter turnout has resulted in decrease in electoral volatility, then, the state is placed in increase in voter turnout+increase in electoral volatility category, for example: Tamil Nadu. The 1984 election year is taken as the base year to indicate the pattern for 1989 elections.

Table 6.2 shows the pattern of relationship between voter turnout and stability of party support.

Table 6.1
Voter Turnout and Electoral Volatility at the State Level

States		Year of Elections								
		1984	1989	1991	1996	1998	1999	2004	2009	2014
Increase in VT + Increase in EV										
<i>Andhra Pradesh</i>	VT	69.0	70.4	61.4	63.0	66.0	69.1	70.0	72.4	74.5
	EV	46.9	14.1	8.6	11.6	13.4	14.0	11.2	17.7	47.8
<i>Himachal Pradesh</i>	VT	61.5	63.9	57.4	57.6	66.4	56.8	59.7	58.4	64.4
	EV	39.6	31.8	5.8	11.9	16.3	9.5	14.9	6.9	7.2
<i>Maharashtra</i>	VT	61.8	59.9	48.8	52.5	57.1	61.0	54.4	49.2	60.9
	EV	27.3	28.7	10.1	20.7	9.6	24.0	9.0	13.1	15.1
Increase in VT + Decrease in EV										
<i>Arunachal Pradesh</i>	VT	75.5	59.2	51.3	55.0	59.2	72.2	56.4	65.0	78.6
	EV	10.8	5.8	42.5	38.1	31.8	43.2	51.1	46.5	20.4
<i>Meghalaya</i>	VT	54.5	51.9	53.8	61.6	74.4	56.2	52.7	64.4	68.6
	EV	--	4.1	2.3	8.1	24.1	30.2	49.4	45.1	39.6
<i>Mizoram</i>	VT	0.0	58.3	58.6	73.4	70.0	65.3	63.6	51.0	61.7
	EV	71.0	51.1	28.0	15.7	10.8	34.4	29.4	60.5	7.6
<i>Punjab</i>	VT	67.4	62.7	24.0	62.3	60.1	56.1	61.6	70.0	70.6
	EV	24.0	52.3	45.4	35.0	17.4	25.0	15.7	13.0	13.0
<i>Tripura</i>	VT	77.3	83.9	67.3	79.1	80.9	68.1	67.1	84.0	84.7
	EV	21.0	10.0	33.3	52.7	9.5	27.8	14.5	18.4	16.6
<i>West Bengal</i>	VT	78.6	80.0	76.7	82.7	79.2	75.1	78.1	79.0	82.2
	EV	12.7	8.9	11.1	6.2	28.1	3.7	15.2	14.1	19.1
Decrease in VT + Decrease in EV										
<i>Goa</i>	VT	71.8	58.2	42.4	56.3	61.7	45.1	58.8	55.4	77.0
	EV	45.5	38.7	26.9	28.6	18.0	37.5	15.4	10.0	28.0
<i>Gujarat</i>	VT	57.9	54.6	44.0	35.9	59.3	47.0	45.2	48.0	63.6
	EV	24.2	37.6	33.7	16.5	10.0	13.4	6.3	2.0	13.3
<i>Madhya Pradesh</i>	VT	57.5	55.2	44.4	54.1	61.7	54.9	48.1	51.3	61.6
	EV	40.0	23.9	8.4	15.8	10.4	6.3	9.5	7.7	11.0
<i>Rajasthan</i>	VT	57.0	56.5	47.3	43.4	60.3	53.9	50.0	48.5	63.4
	EV	46.2	33.8	21.9	9.7	6.6	7.4	5.6	10.0	19.8
<i>Tamil Nadu</i>	VT	73.0	66.9	63.9	67.0	58.0	58.0	60.8	72.5	73.7
	EV	12.9	7.8	6.3	36.1	35.5	14.6	24.9	16.4	24.8
No Pattern between Voter Turnout and Electoral Volatility										
<i>Assam</i>	VT	77.4	--	75.3	78.5	61.1	71.3	69.1	69.7	80.1
	EV	--	--	--	21.4	22.1	7.8	16.4	20.8	22.4
<i>Bihar</i>	VT	58.8	60.2	60.4	59.5	64.6	61.5	58.0	44.3	56.3
	EV	40.7	47.6	8.6	24.7	36.0	28.7	15.6	13.7	17.9
<i>Haryana</i>	VT	66.8	64.4	65.8	70.5	69.0	63.7	65.7	67.7	71.4
	EV	60.5	41.4	36.4	49.0	32.8	22.2	17.8	21.8	48.1
<i>Jammu and Kashmir</i>	VT	66.4	25.7	--	49.0	44.2	32.3	35.2	40.0	49.7
	EV	24.8	45.5	--	--	40.5	8.6	25.5	13.7	14.7
<i>Karnataka</i>	VT	65.7	67.5	54.8	60.2	65.0	67.6	65.1	59.4	67.2
	EV	20.4	42.0	25.9	21.8	20.2	34.6	20.7	9.6	5.1

Table 6.1 (continued)
Voter Turnout and Electoral Volatility at the State Level

States		Year of Elections								
		1984	1989	1991	1996	1998	1999	2004	2009	2014
No Pattern between Voter Turnout and Electoral Volatility										
Kerala	VT	77.1	79.3	73.3	71.1	70.7	70.2	71.5	73.3	73.9
	EV	11.4	16.9	9.4	4.9	5.4	11.4	24.8	16.2	18.1
Manipur	VT	85.8	71.8	70.0	75.0	56.8	65.7	67.4	79.8	79.6
	EV	34.6	21.0	32.9	41.2	51.2	41.4	52.0	40.0	27.3
Nagaland	VT	66.5	74.7	77.1	88.3	45.4	76.3	91.8	90.2	87.8
	EV	71.5	36.7	16.0	36.9	18.9	16.6	62.5	4.0	1.8
Odisha	VT	56.3	59.3	53.8	59.2	58.0	55.6	66.1	63.4	73.8
	EV	23.2	53.5	16.9	10.1	36.7	11.3	8.2	11.5	14.3
Sikkim	VT	57.6	72.0	58.8	77.4	67.1	81.7	78.0	82.0	83.4
	EV	61.8	52.8	17.1	70.3	32.0	41.8	40.9	8.5	37.6
Uttar Pradesh	VT	55.8	51.3	49.2	46.5	55.5	53.5	48.2	46.5	58.4
	EV	48.0	49.6	33.3	38.0	11.5	14.5	12.5	12.3	25.8

Source: Election Commission of India, http://eci.nic.in/eci_main1/ElectionStatistics.aspx, retrieved on 1st June, 2012.

Note: Data on voter turnout for Mizoram in 1984 elections is given as 0 in the volumes of Election Commission of India

Table 6.2
Pattern of Voter Turnout and Stability of Party Support

	Increase in electoral volatility	Decrease in electoral volatility
Increase in voter turnout	Andhra Pradesh, Himachal Pradesh, and Maharashtra	Arunachal Pradesh, Meghalaya, Mizoram, Punjab, Tripura and West Bengal
Decrease in voter turnout	--	Goa, Gujarat, Madhya Pradesh, Rajasthan and Tamil Nadu
No pattern: Assam, Bihar, Haryana, Jammu and Kashmir, Karnataka, Kerala, Manipur, Nagaland, Odisha, Sikkim and Uttar Pradesh		

From the table 6.2, it is observed that in three states, we find an increase in voter turnout is likely to result in instability in party support. In six states, we find an increase in voter turnout may not necessarily contribute to a greater electoral volatility. In five states, we find lesser voter turnout resulting in lesser electoral volatility. In eleven states, it is difficult to notice any pattern of relationship. Let us take the case of one state as an exemplar of the different trends mentioned in the table 6.2.

Increase in voter turnout is likely to result in increase in electoral volatility in some states like Maharashtra. In 1989, we find a declining electoral support for INC. In this

year first time a non-Congress alliance was formed between BJP-SHS. The vote share of the INC dropped in comparison to the 1984 elections and the electoral volatility was 28.2%. The voter turnout was nearly 60%. The BJP-SHS coalition was formed in 1989. This was the period when the BJP was already identified with the ideology of Hindutva but was yet to get fully involved in the Ramjanmabhoomi agitation. In Maharashtra, no party was willing to ally with the SHS because of its anti-dalit, anti-minorities stand and inclination for aggressive and violent direct action. But it was also the time when the SHS had started spreading to the rural parts of the state. Therefore, the coalition of these two parties quickly got identified as a coalition of Hindutva forces (Palshikar, Birmal and Ghotale, 2010:13).

In 1991, the state experienced the lowest ever voter turnout in the history. The events like the assassination of Rajiv Gandhi, issues like corruption, decline in the rate of urbanization and other scandals affected the polling percentage. The electoral volatility was less in comparison to the 1989. It is because the INC, BJP, JD and SHS remained the four main contenders of power as in 1989 elections. The 1996 election was a three-party contest between INC and BJP-SHS alliance. The BJP-SHS led the polls and there was widespread rebellion against the INC, which led to the increase in electoral volatility. The voter turnout increased by 3.7%. In 1998, with the move of INC to join RPI (Athvale) and SP, helped the INC and its allies to increase its vote and seat shares. The voter turnout increased with the concern over secularism and in order to oppose BJP and its communal politics.

In 1999, the NCP made its appearance into the state politics. The vote share of the INC declined and the BJP-SHS increased their vote share. Being new to Maharashtra politics, the NCP was able to secure 21.6% votes. This resulted in the increase in electoral volatility in 1999 elections. The NCP formed an alliance with INC and won the election. The alliance helped the two parties to add the total vote base and hold their traditional vote. The voter turnout increased to 61% in 1999.

With the continuance of the bipolar competition between INC-NCP and SHS-BJP, the electoral volatility dropped to 9% in 2004 elections. But if we look at the voter turnout rates, it dropped by 7% and further by 12% in 2009. In the 2004 elections, on one hand, there was fragmentation among the voters and on the other hand increasing competitiveness in the electoral politics of the state which challenged the pattern of

INC dominance in the state. The Lok Sabha elections produced a split verdict with the INC-NCP alliance winning 22 seats and the BJP-SHS alliance winning 25 seats (Palshikar and Birmal, 2009:108-09).

In 2009, it is a split verdict again. This time the INC-NCP alliance won 25 seats while the BJP-SHS alliance could get only 20 seats (Deshpande and Birmal, 2009:137). In 2009 election, the INC-NCP alliance got 38% votes from the upper castes, one-third votes from the Maratha-Kunbi section, which is considered to be the backbone of the INC in the state. The vote share of BJP-SHS was nearly 40% among the upper caste and it made gains from the Maratha-Kunbi section in this election. The vote share of INC among women is more as compared to the BJP and the men have been equally divided among the four major parties (Palshikar, Deshpande and Birmal, 2014: 441-42). The electoral volatility rose by 4% with certain amount of churning in the support base of the parties. In the 2014 elections, further an increase in the electoral volatility by 2% in comparison to the 2009 elections was noticed with the win of the BJP-SHS alliance. The slum and Muslim votes have long been fractured and no longer formed the INC vote bank. The voter turnout was 11.7% high in comparison to 2009 elections.

There are some states where we find that an increase in the voter turnout may not necessarily result in increase in instability of party support. For example in Arunachal Pradesh, For example in Arunachal Pradesh, the voter turnout has gone up since 1989 and it touched 72.2% in 1999. Thereafter it dropped to 56.4% in 2004 and further there was a rise to 65% in 2009. If we look at the volatility rates, there is a high fluctuation in the electoral support for the parties.

The study of electoral politics in Arunachal Pradesh is incomplete if we ignore how ethnicity plays an important role. Voters tend to vote by and large on ethnic lines, though the fact of party label seems to also exert some influence. The ethnic factor gets a bit weak in parliamentary elections simply because of the geographical area that constituency covers and the different ethnic groups that may be present in a constituency. The INC was the only party to participate in the first general elections in Arunachal Pradesh (Bath, 2009:158).

The INC continued to dominate and win Lok Sabha seats in the 1980, 1984 and 1989 Lok Sabha polls. As a result of which the state experienced a stable party system till

1989. In 1991, the volatility increased to 42.5%. This is because the JD and BJP became strong contenders for the seat. The turnout was low during 1989-1998 periods, largely attributed to the low performance of the INC during this period. The 1996 Lok Sabha elections in the state reversed the tradition of smoothly electing INC candidates since 1980. The Independent candidates began to compete for the political space.

The indigenous people of the state feel threatened by an increasing sense of being marginalized by culturally and ethnically different groups. In fact, it is the refugee issue that gave birth to a regional political party in the name of the Arunachal Congress (ARC) in 1996. The 1998 elections took place after the formation of ARC. It was for the first time that the ARC captured both the Lok Sabha seats in the electoral history of the state. In 1999, the volatility rate further increased to 43.2% in 1999. In the same year, the voter turnout was also the highest in the state i.e. 72.2%. It was because the INC regained its lost glory and people tend to get back their lost association with the INC. The party which was rejected on earlier two elections i.e. in 1996 and 1998, secured more than 55% of valid votes polled (Bath, 2009:360).

In 2004, the BJP won both the seats of the state with 53.85% of votes resulting in increase in electoral volatility to 51.1%. If we look at the turnout rate, it dropped from 72.2% to 56.4%. This may be because the people were not in favour of a new party coming into the scenario of Arunachal politics. In the following election, the turnout increased to 65%, which proves dissatisfied with BJP, the electorate supported INC. The volatility was high at 46.5% but less than the earlier elections. The BJP is found to be strong among all sections irrespective of social levels and popular across classes. It is important to record that in spite of the apparent disenchantment with the ruling party amongst government employees at the time of the elections, the INC appears to have enjoyed greater support than the BJP when it came to people's choice of who they preferred in power in the state. The voters were favourably inclined towards the INC government rather than the previous BJP in 2004 (Bath, 2009:158).

The 2009 Lok Sabha elections from Arunachal Pradesh continued to endorse a trend that has been seen in the state acknowledging the claims of the ruling party in the state. A departure from the past was the more intense nature of competition between the major political players (Bath, 2009:159). In 2014 elections, the voter turnout

increased, but the electoral volatility dropped to 20.4% because the state witnessed the continuation of bipolar competition involving two national parties i.e. the BJP and the INC.

There are few states where decrease in voter turnout results in decrease in electoral volatility. For example: if we take the case of Gujarat, in 1989, the state witnessed three party contests, with BJP leading the competition. The volatility rate on one hand went up to 37.6% on one hand. On the other hand due to confusion created by the presence of three parties: INC, BJP and JD, each trying to prove its efficiency, the voter turnout dropped below 55%. Since 1991, the BJP has emerged as the dominant player and the volatility rate has dropped thereafter. The turnout in 1991 and 1996 came down to about 40%. This was because the BJP'S dominance in the state was, however, with cracks and factional fighting. Its misrule and factional fighting disillusioned people. From 1996, the party system appears to be stable because the state has only two major parties i.e. BJP and INC. As Yadav (1995) has observed, 'a neat two party system' has crystallized and institutionalized in the state. The voter turnout increased from early 1990s but it is still low in comparison to other states. The disillusionment with the ruling parties and a situation of credible alternatives has compelled the voters to abstain from voting. The low turnout shows low levels of interest in politico-electoral mobilization and poll-related processes, campaigns and activities.

Thus, the party system in the state has witnessed a change over the past three decades. From a complete one-party dominance of the INC in the 1980s, it changed to a three party contest during 1989 and 1991 polls between INC, BJP and JD. Then the 1990s saw the sudden emergence of two-party system. Thereafter, the two-party system was strengthened and stabilized. As a result of which we see that the voter turning up in the elections changed according to the changing nature of the party system in the state. The state saw complete electoral dominance first by the INC in the 1980s and then by the BJP in the 1990s. Since 1991, BJP has retained its electoral dominance. What explains the dominance of the BJP is its skilful and strategic use of caste and communal identity of Hindutva, on the one hand, and forging an ideological consensus, on the other hand (Patel, 2009:151).

The domination of the BJP is evident from an almost 10% lead of the party over the INC in all elections in the state except in 2004. During the 2004 polls, the difference between the BJP and the INC vote share was just 3.5%. This background makes the contest between the two parties quite intense. The political competition in Gujarat draws greater attention also because of the politics of communal mobilisation on which much of the success of the BJP in the state appears to be based.

In the 2009 Lok Sabha elections, normal politics came to play a key role. Caste equations and their support to political parties became the key factors deciding their political fate. Over the years, the BJP has garnered support from both Patidars and the Other Backward Classes (OBCs). In fact, the BJP receives the votes from across the divisions of caste groups. This alone allows the party to receive more than 40% vote share in the state. Consequently, a small shift among various caste groups or a shift within one caste group can produce a substantial impact on the outcome. Kshatriyas, dalits, adivasis and Muslims supported the INC in 2009 election. While “Moditva” dominates state elections, the context of a national election allowed the voters to consider normal, routine issues (Jani, 2009:135-36). In 2014 elections, the BJP made a clean sweep in the state capturing all the 26 seats and 58.7% votes. The INC was unable to secure even 1 seat and its vote share also declined by almost 10%. This led to the increase in the electoral volatility to 13.3%. The voter turnout also increased by nearly 15% due to the increase in the youth participation as compared to the 2009 elections.

In some states like Odisha, we do not find any pattern of relationship between voter turnout and electoral volatility. For example: in Odisha, in 1989, the state experienced one of its highest ever voter turnout. Dissatisfied with the performance of the INC government, people choose to vote for a new government by showing their presence in large numbers. The INC suffered a setback during the 1989 Lok Sabha elections, when the JD won 16 Lok Sabha seats from the state, leading to an increase in the volatility rate to 53.5%. In 1991, JD continued its rule with 34.6% votes. The JD unit of Odisha under Biju Patnaik always functioned independently. It belonged to the all-India party primarily in order to pave the way for the regional leader to enter the national political arena.

In 1996, the INC regained its position with 44.9% votes followed by JD which secured 30.1% votes. In this period we also find BJP emerging in the state politics by becoming a popular choice among the OBC voters. In 1996, we find the voter turnout to be high at 59.2%. The electoral volatility was less as the votes fluctuated only between INC and JD as in the previous elections of 1991. We find that the upper castes begin seriously departing the INC following the 1996 Lok Sabha elections. A large number of upper castes moved to the JD. In Odisha, the newly formed BJD drew huge support from the upper castes and could not get backing from OBC voters.

In 1998, the state marked the coming up of the BJD, the regional party of the state. BJD replaced JD and became the second largest party after INC with 9 seats and 27.5% votes. JD in Odisha followed a trajectory that was shaped largely by factors internal to the state. For instance, the JD at the national level supported the recommendations of the Mandal Commission but in Odisha the party unit was very much against it. It is the process of regionalisation that made the BJD the true heir of JD in Odisha (Mohapatra, 2000: 1353). The JD unit in the state disintegrated after the death of Biju Patnaik and gave way to the formation of a state-level party i.e. BJD under the leadership of Naveen Patnaik who promptly aligned with BJP. This decision was based on two considerations. One was the logic of anti-Congressism, which drove Naveen Patnaik towards BJP. The other was an aspiration to play a role at the all-India level. With the demise of United Front, a regional party could gain access to national centre of power only by aligning with BJP. Naveen Patnaik has thus consolidated anti-Congress politics in the state with BJD as the main nucleus of anti-Congressism (Palshikar, 2003:9). The volatility rate increased to 36.7% in 1998, with certain amount of shifts and distribution of votes between INC, BJD and BJP.

During the 1999 Lok Sabha elections, nearly 65% of the upper caste voters voted for the BJD and 15% voted for the BJP. Only 10% of the upper castes voted in favour of the INC during 1999 election. The voter turnout dropped to 55.6% and the volatility rate got reduced to 11.3%. The state experienced a three-party contest as in the 1998 elections. The BJD-BJP coalition had put up an impressive show in the 1999 and 2004 Lok Sabha polls. The voter turnout was the highest in the state in 2004 elections. In the same year the state experienced the lowest volatility rate i.e. 8.2%. The players of 2004 elections were same as that of the 1999 elections with certain amount of change in the vote share between INC, BJD and BJP.

The voter turnout reduced in 2009 elections as compared to 2004 elections. The volatility rate also increased by 11.2%. This was because breaking off BJD long partnership with the BJP, the INC proved too incompetent to take advantage of the changed political scenario, while the BJP found itself pushed out of the picture. A major factor that contributed to the BJD victory was Chief Minister Naveen Patnaik's personal popularity. The electoral arena mainly had three contestants the BJD and its new friends, the INC and the BJP (Misra, 2009: 148). Given the overall success of the BJD, it is clear that the party was popular across various social sections. But, on the whole, the party draws balanced support from voters of all age groups. The BJD has good support among urban voters. Its supporters comprise of large sections of illiterates and the well-educated voters. This combination is perhaps well explained by the caste composition of BJD voters. More than half of its voters come from upper castes and a quarter comes from the OBCs. In contrast, BJD has a weak base among SCs and a non-existent base among Odisha's tribal population (Palshikar, 2003:9).

The 2014 elections saw the highest ever voter turnout in the state. The BJD increased its vote share in the rural areas and among the OBCs and Dalits. The BJP increased its vote share in the urban areas and among the upper castes. The INC received the maximum support from the Dalits. The electoral volatility increased to 14.3% with the increase in the vote share of the BJD followed by the BJP. The vote share of the INC declined. The INC was not able to secure even a single seat and it ended up with 24.8% votes.

It is difficult to categorise Odisha because for 1989 and 2014 elections, with the increase in voter turnout, the electoral volatility increased. In 1996 and 2004 elections, with the increase in voter turnout, the electoral volatility decreased. For 1991 and 1999 elections, with the decrease in voter turnout, the electoral volatility decreased and for 1998 and 2009 elections, the electoral volatility increased with the decrease in the voter turnout. Similarly, it is difficult to find any pattern in the relationship between voter turnout and stability of party support in about eleven states like Assam, Bihar, Haryana, Jammu & Kashmir, Karnataka, Kerala, Manipur, Nagaland, Uttar Pradesh and West Bengal.

Thus, voter turnout and electoral volatility in India at the state level reveals a large variation across different states and different election periods. Turnout has increased

in several Indian states accompanied by either high or low levels of volatility rates over time. A low turnout and high levels of electoral volatility tends to be associated with citizens lack of interest in the democratic process and an indication of shifting support base for the parties. Thus, at the state level, increase in voter turnout is likely to result in greater electoral volatility in some states and in some other states the electoral volatility appears to be less with increase in voter turnout. However, there are certain exceptions to both of these trends. Thus, when there are more party alternatives, it is likely that the voter turnout may increase. With the increase in the number of political players, the vote victory margin between the winner and runner-up party may decrease. The following section examines the relationship between closeness of party competition and stability of party support at the state level.

6.3 Closeness of Party Competition

India remains an enormous and complicated political system due to the changes which it has witnessed in the last few decades. The most important being the regular appearance and maintenance of regional political parties. These parties, which are often confined to a single state, but are nonetheless powerful political contenders for control of state and local governments. Since 1989, no single party has been successful in the elections to command absolute majority in Lok Sabha. The result being that the state parties have begun to play a major role in forming alliances and coalitions, before or after the election, in combination with the formation of the governments at the Centre (Jain, 2006; 10).

At the present time approximately one-third of India's states are under the political control of state parties. These state parties give a tough competition to a national party by becoming the second largest party in some states or the ruling party pushing a national party to the second place in some other states. This section focuses on closeness of party competition and its impact on stability of party support in the Indian states. Table 6.3 shows closeness of party competition and electoral volatility at the state level between 1989-2014. In case of coalitions, the vote percentage of the leading party in the coalition is taken into consideration.

From the table 6.3, we observe that there is a wide variation across states based on the relationship between closeness of party competition and electoral volatility. We also observe that an increase in closeness between the first and the second party may not

necessarily result in increase in electoral volatility at the level of states. Based on the data presented in table 6.3, we can group states into different categories as noticed in table 6.4 on the basis of the relationship between closeness of party competition and electoral volatility. The states are grouped into different categories based on the *majority of instances* an increase in closeness of party competition has resulted in increase or decrease of electoral volatility. For example out of eight elections between 1989-2014, if in four elections a state experiences an increase in closeness of party competition with increase in electoral volatility; in three elections, if the decrease in closeness of party competition has resulted in decrease in electoral volatility; and if in one election, increase in closeness of party competition has resulted in decrease in electoral volatility, then the state comes under increase in closeness of party competition+increase in electoral volatility category, for example as we see in Andhra Pradesh. The 1984 election year is taken as the base year to indicate the pattern for 1989 elections.

Table 6.3
Closeness of Party Competition and Electoral Volatility at the State Level

States		Year of Elections								
		1984	1989	1991	1996	1998	1999	2004	2009	2014
Increase in CPC + Increase in EV										
Andhra Pradesh	CPC	3.0	16.5	13.3	7.1	6.5	2.9	8.4	14.0	0.2
	EV	46.9	14.1	8.6	11.6	13.4	14.0	11.2	17.7	47.8
Kerala	CPC	11.0	18.8	18.1	16.8	17.7	11.5	0.6	9.7	9.5
	EV	11.4	16.9	9.4	4.9	5.4	11.4	24.8	16.2	18.1
Maharashtra	CPC	39.1	21.7	28.2	13.0	21.1	8.1	1.2	0.3	9.2
	EV	27.3	28.7	10.1	20.7	9.6	24.0	9.0	13.1	15.1
Meghalaya	CPC	58.7	50.6	49.7	44.6	22.1	4.8	17.3	11.1	15.7
	EV	--	4.1	2.3	8.1	24.1	30.2	49.4	45.1	39.6
Increase in CPC + Decrease in EV										
Arunachal Pradesh	CPC	8.7	14.8	44.2	11.4	28.6	40.3	33.9	13.9	4.9
	EV	10.8	5.8	42.5	38.1	31.8	43.2	51.1	46.5	20.4
Gujarat	CPC	34.6	6.7	21.4	9.8	11.8	7.1	3.5	3.1	25.5
	EV	24.2	37.6	33.7	16.5	10.0	13.4	6.3	2.0	13.3
Himachal Pradesh	CPC	44.3	3.3	3.4	14.7	9.5	6.7	7.7	4.0	12.7
	EV	39.6	31.8	5.8	11.9	16.3	9.5	14.9	6.9	7.2
Jammu & Kashmir	CPC	16.0	8.9	3.4	9.9	7.6	2.6	4.8	4.6	9.5
	EV	24.8	45.5	--	--	40.5	8.6	25.5	13.7	14.7
Karnataka	CPC	16.5	20.6	13.3	4.6	14.5	18.2	2.1	4.0	2.2
	EV	20.4	42.0	25.9	21.8	20.2	34.6	20.7	9.6	5.1
Madhya Pradesh	CPC	27.1	2.0	3.4	10.3	6.3	2.6	14.1	3.3	19.1
	EV	40.0	23.9	8.4	15.8	10.4	6.3	9.5	7.7	11.0

Table 6.3 (continued)
Closeness of Party Competition and Electoral Volatility at the State Level

States		Year of Elections								
		1984	1989	1991	1996	1998	1999	2004	2009	2014
Increase in CPC + Decrease in EV										
<i>Nagaland</i>	CPC	35.3	20.6	8.4	--	73.4	66.1	47.3	40.6	38.6
	EV	71.5	36.7	16.0	36.9	18.9	16.6	62.5	4.0	1.8
<i>Rajasthan</i>	CPC	29.0	7.4	3.1	1.9	2.8	2.1	7.6	10.6	24.5
	EV	46.2	33.8	21.9	9.7	6.6	7.4	5.6	10.0	19.8
<i>Tamil Nadu</i>	CPC	14.6	12.4	17.0	34.3	1.1	14.6	5.2	2.2	25.0
	EV	12.9	7.8	6.3	36.1	35.5	14.6	24.9	16.4	24.8
Decrease in CPC + Increase in EV										
<i>Assam</i>	CPC	9.8	--	10.9	4.4	14.5	8.6	12.1	18.7	6.9
	EV	--	--	--	21.4	22.1	7.8	16.4	20.8	22.4
Decrease in CPC + Decrease in EV										
<i>Bihar</i>	CPC	38.1	8.3	9.9	11.4	2.6	5.2	8.3	4.7	9.3
	EV	40.7	47.6	8.6	24.7	36.0	28.7	15.6	13.7	17.9
<i>Goa</i>	CPC	15.9	19.5	37.1	7.6	1.6	12.5	17.0	21.5	16.9
	EV	45.5	38.7	26.9	28.6	18.0	37.5	15.4	10.0	28.0
<i>Haryana</i>	CPC	35.9	7.3	11.8	2.9	0.1	5.7	19.7	26.1	10.3
	EV	60.5	41.4	36.4	49.0	32.8	22.2	17.8	21.8	48.1
<i>Mizoram</i>	CPC	--	17.1	4.0	4.9	8.0	2.1	50.6	64.6	45.9
	EV	71.0	51.1	28.0	15.7	10.8	34.4	29.4	60.5	7.6
<i>Sikkim</i>	CPC	24.8	58.9	87.2	47.6	32.6	10.5	42.4	33.7	50.6
	EV	61.8	52.8	17.1	70.3	32.0	41.8	40.9	8.5	37.6
<i>Tripura</i>	CPC	4.9	13.8	76.3	18.3	6.7	41.7	54.5	30.9	48.8
	EV	21.0	10.0	33.3	52.7	9.5	27.8	14.5	18.4	16.6
No Pattern between Closeness of Party Competition and Electoral Volatility										
<i>Manipur</i>	CPC	17.3	27.9	18.4	27.6	4.9	0.4	5.8	26.2	21.8
	EV	34.6	21.0	32.9	41.2	51.2	41.4	52.0	40.0	27.3
<i>Odisha</i>	CPC	25.5	11.1	9.5	14.8	13.5	12.3	10.4	4.5	20.4
	EV	23.2	53.5	16.9	10.1	36.7	11.3	8.2	11.5	14.3
<i>Punjab</i>	CPC	0.4	2.7	29.6	6.4	7.0	9.8	0.1	11.4	6.8
	EV	24.0	52.3	45.4	35.0	17.4	25.0	15.7	13.0	13.0
<i>Uttar Pradesh</i>	CPC	29.4	4.1	11.2	12.6	7.8	3.5	2.1	4.2	20.1
	EV	48.0	49.6	33.3	38.0	11.5	14.5	12.5	12.3	25.8
<i>West Bengal</i>	CPC	12.3	3.0	1.0	3.4	11.0	9.6	17.5	19.7	16.7
	EV	12.7	8.9	11.1	6.2	28.1	3.7	15.2	14.1	19.1

Source: Election Commission of India, http://eci.nic.in/eci_main1/ElectionStatistics.aspx, retrieved on 1st June, 2012.

Note: 1. In case of coalitions, the vote percentage of the leading party in the coalition is taken into consideration.

2. In case of Mizoram, in 1984 elections, the INC won absolute majority of seats and votes i.e. 1 seat and 100% votes. So closeness of party competition cannot be calculated for 1984 elections.

Table 6.4
Pattern of Closeness of Party Competition and Electoral Volatility

	Increase in Electoral Volatility	Decrease in Electoral Volatility
Increase in Closeness of Party Competition	Andhra Pradesh, Kerala, Maharashtra and Meghalaya	Arunachal Pradesh, Gujarat, Himachal Pradesh, Jammu & Kashmir, Karnataka, Madhya Pradesh, Nagaland, Rajasthan and Tamil Nadu
Decrease in Closeness of Party Competition	Assam	Bihar, Goa, Haryana, Mizoram, Sikkim and Tripura
No Pattern between Closeness of Party Competition and Electoral Volatility	Manipur, Odisha, Punjab, Uttar Pradesh and West Bengal	

From the table 6.4, it appears that there exists a mixed pattern of relationship between closeness of party competition and stability of electoral support. Let us take one example from each category to mark the different trends precisely.

In some states like Kerala, we observe when there is increase in closeness of party competition, the electoral volatility increases. From 1989 onwards the margin of votes received by the winner i.e. INC and the second place party i.e. CPM is quite wide. For example in 1989, when INC received 41.7% votes, CPM received 22.9% votes; in 1999, INC received 38.7%, CPM received 21% votes. The electoral support fluctuated between INC and CPM. Almost all governments in the state are coalition government.

The bipolar divide was clear since the 1980s with the formation of LDF led by CPM and the UDF led by the INC. Since then, the leadership of the state politics has swung alternatively between the two main coalitions, the UDF and LDF¹. The bipolar coalition arrangement left little space for the BJP to enter the state politics (Kumar, 2009: 95). The electoral volatility in 1991 and 1996 decreased with increase in closeness of party competition. In 1998 and 1999, the electoral volatility increased with increase in closeness of party competition.

In the 2004 elections, the state experienced the highest degree of competitiveness in its history with closeness rate of 0.6%. In this election, the INC won 32.1% votes and CPM won 31.5% votes. The volatility rate increased to 24.8% in 2004 with the presence of parties like BJP, MUL, JDS, KEC and other small parties along with

CPM and INC. This election also witnessed a decline in the vote share of INC and increase in the vote percentage of CPM as compared to 1999 elections. As we know the state has long bi-polar coalition arrangements, in 2004, ignoring the national trend of the bipolar choice between BJP led NDA and the INC led UPA, the voters of Kerala preferred the CPM led LDF. The overall result brought two major surprises: first, in the history of the state, the INC drew blank. It lost seats by a big margin due to prevalence of intense factionalism and poor performance of the government; second, for the first time, an NDA candidate got elected. The LDF's performance was beyond expectations, the CPM won the majority seats (Kumar, 2009: 92).

In 2009, we find again the closeness rate decreasing to 9.7%. This year again there was the drop in the vote share of CPM to 30.5% and increase in the vote share of INC to 40.1%. The volatility rate decreased to 16.2%, as the two strong national parties i.e. the INC and the CPM polled together about 70% of votes. The internal dynamics within the dominant party and within the LDF alliance and an overall expression of disapproval of the state government's record helped the INC-led UDF reap a large share of the seats. The setback suffered by the LDF in Kerala in the 2009 Lok Sabha election was not a new phenomenon in state politics.

The 2009 verdict was just opposite to the 2004 verdict. The negative verdict to LDF government was due to two reasons: the disappointing performance of the government and the deep crisis that developed within the LDF. The UDF victory could not have come about without the strategic shift of BJP voters to the UDF and some of the traditional LDF voters who also voted for the UDF (Ibrahim, 2009:118). In 2014 elections, both the closeness and volatility rates increased marginally. The closeness between INC and CPM increased merely by 0.5% and there was only 1.9% increase in the electoral volatility.

In some states, we find when the competition between the winner and runner-up party is close, the electoral volatility seems to be less. For example, in Rajasthan, the elections were less competitive from 1952 to 1984. From 1989 onwards, the closeness of party competition has increased in Rajasthan. Since 1989, the state is experiencing a two-party competition, with the alteration of power between INC and BJP. In 1989, the closeness rate was 7.4%, the volatility rate was still high but it was gradually

declining from the previous election years. It was from this time the people of the state have a clear-cut option in their mind. They go for either INC or BJP.

According to Yadav and Palshikar (2003), progressive expansion of BJP and the erosion of non-Congress parties have transformed the nature of political competition in the state from being an INC dominated multi-party system into a neat bipolar contest involving the INC and the BJP. The degree of competitiveness was very high till 1999. As we can see from the table 6.3, the closeness rate increased and the volatility rate decreased correspondingly till 1999. This is because the BJP and the INC have emerged as the two principal political players, sharing more than 90% of the popular votes between them.

The closeness margin between BJP and INC decreased in 2004 to 7.6%. In 2004, not only the BJP added 5 seats to its tally compared to the 1999 elections but also it registered almost 2% increase in its vote share i.e. 49% from 47.2% in 1999. The verdict of the 2004 elections once again proved that Rajasthan remains an arena of bipolar contestation as the BJP and the INC not only shared all the 25 seats between them but also secured more than 90% of the votes. Their combined vote share for the 1998 and 1999 elections was 86% and 92% respectively.

The closeness of party competition decreased to 10.6% in 2009. In 2009, we find INC ruling the state, so there was a change from 2004, when BJP was the ruling party. The volatility rate increased slightly to 10% in 2009. This was because of a declining trend in the vote share of BJP from 49% in 2004 to 36.6% in 2009 and an increase in the vote share of INC from 41.42% in 2004 to 47.19% in 2009.

The outcome of the 2009 elections² had a national bearing. More than one-fourth of the increased strength of the INC has been contributed by the state. From a demoralising performance in the 14th Lok Sabha elections, the party emerged triumphant in as many as 20 parliamentary constituencies out of a total strength of 25. This is the first time since the 1984 elections that the party could achieve more than 45% of the vote share. After a remarkable performance in 2004 elections (21 of 25 constituencies), the BJP performed dismally in 2009. In terms of number of seats, it was the worst ever performance of the party since 1989.

Three factors which were responsible for the INC triumph in Rajasthan were: a positive evaluation of the central government's performance, sustained campaigning by state Congress leadership, and thirdly, serious infighting and factionalism within the BJP. The stability of the bipolar electoral system was reinforced in the 15th Lok Sabha elections. It is also argued that the INC victory in Rajasthan was mainly because of the performance of its government in the state. A new government and its leadership normally enjoy high levels of support among the people (Lodha, 2009: 186-87). In 2014, the anti-incumbency wave against the INC helped the BJP to regain its thumping majority, capturing all the 25 seats and nearly 55% of votes. The INC ended up with 30.4% votes. This resulted in the increase in the electoral volatility to 19.8%. The degree of competitiveness in 2014 was the least in the state since 1989 elections.

Only in Assam, we find when there is decrease in closeness of party competition, there is increase in electoral volatility. Due to the disturbances that prevailed in the state, elections did not take place in Assam in 1989. In 1991, leaving behind the regional party AGP, the INC staged its victory by winning 8 seats and 28.5% votes. The AGP was the second place party with 17.6% votes. In 1996, the degree of competitiveness between INC and AGP increased. The most important political development in 1996 was that the AGP came to understand the importance of keeping at least some minority groups with it like the UMF, Autonomous State Demand Committee (ASDC) and the Bodo

People's Party Sangsuma (BBP-S). Thus the alliance which the AGP formed in 1996 comprised of the left, regional forces, the ethnic and religious minorities (Goswami, 2013: 201). With the continuation of the two main players in the state politics i.e. the INC and the AGP, the electoral volatility was somewhat less in 1996 elections.

The 1998 and 1999 elections represented a shift in the power balance from a national and regional party to two national parties. In 1998, we find the electoral volatility increasing on one hand. On the other hand, there was the decline in the performance of the AGP as the second place party. BJP replaced AGP with 24.5% votes. The winning party was INC with 39% vote share. The closeness decreased between INC and BJP and the vote winning margin was wide at 14.5%. In 1999, the two national

parties remained the main players in Assam, thereby resulting in the decrease of electoral volatility and increase in competitiveness between the two parties.

In 2004, we find there was some amount of decline in the vote share of the INC and BJP, from which AGP benefitted. The results thus reflected the signs of resurgence to a certain extent of regionalism in the state. The revival of the AGP may be credited to the change in leadership and the return of dissident leaders to its fold (Goswami, 2013:205). The closeness again declined and the volatility increased in 2004 elections. In 2009, we can notice the emergence of new parties like AUDF, ASDC and BPF in the Assam electoral scenario, resulting in the increase in the electoral volatility to 20.8%. The BJP and the AGP struck a power sharing deal so as to avoid the split in their votes in the election. The closeness of party competition decreased between the first place party i.e. INC and the second place party i.e. BJP. The new parties which made their presence were able to secure certain amount of vote percentage. Even AUDF vote share was more than AGP in 2009 elections.

In 2014 elections, the BJP replaced INC as the first placed party. The degree of competitiveness between BJP and INC increased. BJP was able to secure 36.5% vote and INC secured 29.6% votes respectively. The AUDF somewhat was able to retain more or less nearly 15% of vote share. The vote share of AGP fell down to 3.8%. The future prospect of the AGP lies not on short-term political alliances but on how it works for the dormant political desire of the hitherto unrepresented social forces under a larger federal political umbrella that can effectively strike a balance between the ruling segments and the minorities (Goswami, 2013:209).

In states like Goa, we find decrease in electoral volatility with decrease in closeness of party competition. Between 1989-1991, the degree of competitiveness between the parties in Goa was less. In 1989, the INC secured 47.4% votes and MAG secured 27.9% votes respectively. In 1989, we also mark the emergence of JD into the electoral politics of Goa. JD was capable enough to secure 18.1% votes. The electoral volatility was high in 1989 with a three party contest between INC, MGP and JD.

In 1991, we find INC maximising its electoral support, which was capable enough to secure 57.7% votes. This led to decrease in electoral volatility. The second place party was MGP which reduced its vote share from 27.9% to 20.6%. Another shift in electoral support from JD to BJP was marked in this election. The BJP secured 15.6%

votes. The closeness of competition between INC and MGP decreased in 1991 elections.

In the following two elections of 1996 and 1998, we find there is closeness of party competition between INC and MGP in 1996; and INC and UGDP in 1998 elections respectively. In 1996, INC reduced its vote percentage in comparison to the previous election year and MGP gained some amount of electoral support. In 1998, the UGDP took the position of MGP as the second place party increasing its vote share to 24.9% from 22.7% in comparison to 1996 elections. The vote share of MGP fell dramatically to 13.2%. The closeness value stood at 7.6% in 1996 and 1.6% in 1998 elections respectively.

From 1999 onwards, we find the national parties gaining importance. Since 1999, BJP is the major player in the state politics in Goa. The politics of instability and MGP's falling image helped BJP to gain entry into Goan politics. The BJP with its soft Hindutva offering managed to drain the MGP vote bank (DeSouza, 1999:2437). BJP entrance was expected to give a new image to the Goan politics i.e. good governance and political stability, the two ingredients lacking in Goan politics.

In 1999, the electoral volatility increased to 37.5% because we find a shift from INC to BJP. The BJP emerged as the winner party securing 51.5% votes in 1991 elections and the runner-up party was INC which secured 39% votes. There was the transition from regional to national party politics, the consolidation of INC with erstwhile MGP and UGDP vote bank, the INC politics of defection and instability, and the emergence of BJP with a clean slate into the Goan politics and its failure to resist the politics of pragmatism of engineering defections and splits. All these proved significant in understanding the 2004 elections (Rodrigues and Silva, 2009: 135).

The BJP remained as the first place party even in 2004 elections. We find the electoral volatility decreasing to 15.4% in 2004 and further to 10% in 2009 respectively. In 2004, the BJP continued to be the leading party with 46.8% votes and the INC was the runner-up party with 29.8% votes. In 2009, the BJP continued to be the first place party but NCP replaced INC as the runner-up party securing 23.3% votes. An apparent lack of enthusiasm for either of the two main political parties in Goa was evident in the Lok Sabha elections. The 2009 Lok Sabha poll saw the two major players in the Goan politics, sharing the spoils of victory evenly (Rodrigues,

2009:131). The degree of competitiveness was 17% in 2004 and further it got reduced to 21.5% in 2009.

In 2014, the closeness between the BJP and the INC increased. The BJP secured both the seats and increased its vote share to 53.5% and the INC vote share fell to 36.6% in comparison to 2009 elections. This resulted in the increase of electoral volatility in 2014 elections.

In some states like Punjab, we fail to mark any pattern in the relationship between closeness of party competition and electoral volatility. In Punjab, for the 1989 elections, the volatility rate was the highest for the state i.e. 52.3%. In this year, the state experienced a multi-party competition. Each of the two large parties in this period i.e. SAD and INC secured less than 30% votes. In 1991, the closeness rate decreased to 29.6%. INC was the ruling party with 49.3%. This time SAD was replaced by BSP as the second leading party with 19.7% votes. The volatility rate was also high at 45.4% but it was less in comparison to the earlier period. This was because at least in 1991 election, INC secured about 50% of votes, which was not the case in the earlier election of 1989.

Parliamentary elections since 1996 have continued to reflect a shift in the electoral politics of SAD in the sense that politico-economic issues replaced the ethno-religious issues like Anandpur Sahib Resolution, transfer of Chandigarh to Punjab, and anti-Sikh riots. The end of militancy and revival of democratic institutions witnessed the new found Akali focus on Punjabi identity as has been reflected in the common minimum programmes of SAD and BJP. Also distinct was the shift from anti-centre stand to cooperative federalism and from a politics of confrontation to peace and Hindu-Sikh unity as mentioned in all the SAD election manifestos (Kumar 2005: 111).

From 1996-2004, Punjab experienced competitive elections². This is because a bipolar party system has come to stay in the state, where power has been alternating between SAD and INC, the two main contenders for power. The volatility rate during this period increased with decrease in closeness rate and decreased with the increase in the rate of closeness between parties. In 2004, SAD secured 34.28% votes and INC secured 34.17% votes. The closeness rate increased to 0.1%. According to Yadav (2004), the most important reason for the defeat of the INC in 2004 was the coming

together of the different factions of the Akalis and factionalism, disunity and adverse perceptions of the people about the performance of INC.

In 2009 election, the closeness rate dropped to 11.4%, with the increase in the difference in the votes polled by the two large parties in the state i.e. INC and SAD. The volatility rate decreased to 13% from 15.7% in 2004 elections. This was because the party system became moderately pluralised type in 2009. The main parties in the decreasing order of vote percentages were INC, SAD followed by BJP and BSP. The party system in 2004 was extremely pluralised party system. The main parties in the decreasing order of vote percentages were SAD, INC, BJP followed by BSP, CPI, CPM, SADM, Lok Bhalai Party-LBP. The INC improved significantly on its electoral performance in Punjab as compared to the previous Lok Sabha elections. The slight lead in terms of votes polled enabled the INC to march ahead of the SAD-BJP combine in terms of the number of seats won. The inability of the BSP to mobilise the Dalit vote also helped the INC which had a relatively good support base amongst the Dalits in different religions. The INC also benefited from the gradual slide of the Left parties, its erstwhile electoral allies (Kumar and Sekhon, 2009:183).

In 2014 elections, the electoral volatility remained the same as in the previous elections and the degree of competitiveness increased between INC and SAD, with INC securing 33.1% votes and the second place party SAD securing 26.3% votes respectively.

It is difficult to categorise Punjab because for 1989 and 1999 elections, decrease in closeness of party competition results in greater electoral volatility. In 1991, 1998 and 2009 elections, decrease in closeness of party competition results in decrease in electoral volatility. For 1996, 2004 and 2014 elections, increase in closeness of party competition results in decrease in electoral volatility. Similarly, it is difficult to categorise other states like Manipur, Odisha, Uttar Pradesh and West Bengal.

Therefore, the relationship between closeness of party competition and stability of party support at the state level present a mixed trend. In four states, an increase in the closeness of party competition corresponds to increase in the electoral volatility. In nine states, we find an increase in closeness between parties does not result in huge shifts in electoral support for the parties. In Assam, we find a decrease in the closeness between parties may result in increase in instability of party support and in

six other states, a decrease in the closeness of party competition may not necessarily result in increase in electoral volatility. In five states, it is difficult to notice any trend in the relationship between closeness of party competition and electoral volatility. Thus, when there is increase in closeness of party competition, there is possibility of defeat of the incumbent party resulting in party turnover. The following section analyzes the relationship between party turnover and stability of party support at the state level.

6.4 Party Turnover

Indian states display markedly different characteristics both in terms of the nature of their respective party systems and the degree to which these party systems are stable or volatile. The political contests are relatively competitive. State after state experienced the rise of competitive politics in the 1990s. This was marked by the entry of new occupants in the political space. In recent years scholars have pointed out that the Lok Sabha election result is an aggregation of the outcomes of state-level elections. The state wide parties have begun to play a significant role. The regional or state wide parties have become more significant than before. One cannot think to play the favourite national sport of 'kaun banega PM' without taking into the considerations these regional parties like TDP, BJD, DMK, AIADMK, TMC, SAD, AGP and many more in the list. These regional parties have put up a strong contest against the national parties at the state level or proved to be stable allies of the UPA or the NDA. These factors have made the elections in states quite competitive (Yadav and Palshikar, 2009:47).

It is quite likely that in states where elections are more competitive, incumbents might find it harder to hold on to their seat and vote shares. Also there may be different political factors which may affect how the incumbency disadvantage varies across states. However, Chhibber and Nooruddin (2004) argue that in a multiparty system, incumbents may win more easily because with more parties in a plurality electoral system³, such as in India, incumbents have to obtain a smaller vote share to win. This would mean that a greater level of political competition leading to an increase in the electoral volatility may result in a smaller incumbency disadvantage (Uppal, 2009:22).

This section aims to find out the relationship between party turnover and stability of electoral support at the state level. Table 6.5 presents party turnover and electoral volatility for the 25 states. In this chapter, for analysing party turnover, I have taken into consideration the electoral volatility calculated for the Assembly elections from 1989-2014. The Lok Sabha elections data can only show loss/gain of votes and seats, but not party turnover for the states. A party which loses seats/votes at the national level may still continue to be the ruling party at the state level and may win the next state elections.

From the table 6.5, we observe in several states, party turnover is likely to result in greater electoral volatility. The states are grouped into different categories taking into consideration the *average electoral volatility* of the election years when there is party turnover and comparing with the average electoral volatility of the election years when there is no party turnover.

If in a state, the average electoral volatility of elections when there is party turnover is greater than the average electoral volatility of elections when there is no party turnover, then the state is placed in party turnover+increase in electoral volatility category. Similarly, there are some states, in which the average electoral volatility of elections when there is party turnover is less than the average electoral volatility of elections when there is no party turnover. Such states are placed in party turnover+decrease in electoral volatility category.

For each state, the previous election that took place prior to 1989 is taken as the base year to indicate the pattern of turnover for the succeeding election. For example in case of Andhra Pradesh, the 1985 election; in case of Gujarat, the 1985 election; in case of Kerala, the 1987 election is taken as the base year to indicate the pattern for the succeeding election held in 1989 in case of some states or after 1989 in case of some other states.

Table 6.6 presents the pattern of relationship between party turnover and electoral volatility between 1989-2014 assembly elections.

Table 6.5
Party Turnover and Electoral Volatility at the State Level

<i>States and Year of Elections</i>	<i>Incumbent Party/Party Heading the Coalition</i>	<i>Incumbent Party Won/Lost</i>	<i>Electoral Volatility</i>
Party Turnover + Increase in Electoral Volatility			
Andhra Pradesh			
1989	TDP (1985-TDP)	Lost	11.8
1994	INC	Lost	13.9
1999	TDP	Won	07.0
2004	TDP	Lost	10.7
2009	INC	Won	18.2
2014	INC	Lost	44.8
Assam			
1991	AGP (1985-AGP)	Lost	30.6
1996	INC	Lost	19.2
2001	AGP	Lost	16.8
2006	INC	Won	16.5
2011	INC	Won	24.2
Bihar			
1990	INC (1985-INC)	Lost	38.8
1995	JD	Won	18.0
2000	JD	Lost	43.3
February 2005	RJD	Won	27.8
October 2005	RJD	Lost	09.2
2010	JDU	Won	11.4
Gujarat			
1990	JD (1985-INC)	Lost	43.7
1995	BJP	Lost	24.3
1998	BJP	Won	09.6
2002	BJP	Won	14.2
2007	BJP	Won	03.9
2012	BJP	Won	04.4
Haryana			
1991	JD (1987-JD)	Lost	43.5
1996	INC	Lost	39.3
2000	HVP	Lost	42.5
2005	INLD	Lost	13.4
2009	INC	Won	12.4
Himachal Pradesh			
1990	INC (1985-INC)	Lost	23.5
1993	BJP	Lost	15.6
1998	INC	Won	10.2
2003	INC	Won	07.9
2007	INC	Lost	12.8
2012	BJP	Lost	10.0

Table 6.5 (continued)
Party Turnover and Electoral Volatility at the State Level

<i>States and Year of Elections</i>	<i>Incumbent Party/Party Heading the Coalition</i>	<i>Incumbent Party Won/Lost</i>	<i>Electoral Volatility</i>
Party Turnover + Increase in Electoral Volatility			
Kerala			
1991	CPM (1987-CPM)	Lost	12.7
1996	INC	Lost	06.3
2001	CPM	Lost	09.5
2006	INC	Lost	23.0
2011	CPM	Won	11.6
Madhya Pradesh			
1990	BJP (1985-INC)	Lost	21.0
1993	INC	Won	09.2
1998	INC	Won	04.1
2003	BJP	Lost	12.4
2008	BJP	Won	09.1
2013	BJP	Won	10.8
Maharashtra			
1990	INC (1985-INC)	Lost	32.9
1995	BJP	Lost	13.4
1999	SHS	Lost	21.3
2004	INC	Won	11.4
2009	INC	Won	10.0
Manipur			
1990	INC (1984-INC)	Won	26.0
1995	INC	Won	22.8
2000	INC	Lost	50.1
2002	MSCP	Lost	27.3
2007	INC	Won	45.0
2012	INC	Won	33.6
Mizoram			
1989	MNF (1987-MNF)	Lost	20.6
1993	INC	Won	14.8
1998	INC	Lost	26.1
2003	MNF	Won	19.1
2008	MNF	Lost	22.6
2013	INC	Won	10.7
Odisha			
1990	INC (1985-INC)	Lost	54.8
1995	JD	Lost	19.3
2000	INC	Lost	43.3
2004	BJD	Won	05.3
2009	BJD	Won	12.9
2014	BJD	Won	09.4

Table 6.5 (continued)
Party Turnover and Electoral Volatility at the State Level

<i>States and Year of Elections</i>	<i>Incumbent Party/Party Heading the Coalition</i>	<i>Incumbent Party Won/Lost</i>	<i>Electoral Volatility</i>
Party Turnover + Increase in Electoral Volatility			
<i>Punjab</i>			
1992	SAD (1985-SAD)	Lost	35.9
1997	INC	Lost	36.9
2002	SAD	Lost	13.8
2007	INC	Lost	11.7
2012	SAD	Won	05.4
<i>Tamil Nadu</i>			
1989	AIADMK (1984-AIADMK)	Lost	19.3
1991	DMK	Lost	30.5
1996	AIADMK	Lost	38.4
2001	DMK	Lost	19.0
2006	AIADMK	Lost	18.5
2011	AIADMK	Won	11.3
<i>Uttar Pradesh</i>			
1989	INC(1985-INC)	Lost	42.1
1991	JD	Lost	28.8
1993	BJP	Won	22.3
1996	BJP	Won	19.0
2002	BJP	Lost	20.2
2007	SP	Lost	12.2
2012	SP	Won	13.2
Party Turnover + Decrease in Electoral Volatility			
<i>Karnataka</i>			
1989	INC (1985-INC)	Won	45.3
1994	INC	Lost	29.5
1999	JD	Lost	43.1
2004	INC	Won	20.1
2008	INC	Lost	08.3
2013	BJP	Lost	17.6
<i>Rajasthan</i>			
1990	INC (1985-INC)	Lost	30.1
1993	BJP	Won	17.8
1998	BJP	Lost	10.6
2003	INC	Lost	13.6
2008	BJP	Lost	09.3
2013	BJP	Won	14.2

Table 6.5 (continued)
Party Turnover and Electoral Volatility at the State Level

<i>States and Year of Elections</i>	<i>Incumbent Party/Party Heading the Coalition</i>	<i>Incumbent Party Won/Lost</i>	<i>Electoral Volatility</i>
No Party Turnover			
<i>Arunachal Pradesh</i>			
1990	INC (1984-INC)	Won	29.8
1995	INC	Won	30.2
1999	INC	Won	27.0
2004	INC	Won	16.5
2009	INC	Won	30.8
2014	INC	Won	30.1
<i>Jammu and Kashmir</i>			
1996	JKNC (1987-JKNC)	Won	17.9
2002	JKNC	Won	21.7
2008	JKNC	Won	19.3
<i>Meghalaya</i>			
1993	INC (1985-INC)	Won	12.8
1998	INC	Won	44.5
2003	INC	Won	26.8
2008	INC	Won	08.7
2013	INC	Won	24.8
<i>Tripura</i>			
1993	CPM (1988-CPM)	Won	07.2
1998	CPM	Won	04.5
2003	CPM	Won	14.4
2008	CPM	Won	06.3
2013	CPM	Won	02.0
No Pattern Between Party Turnover and Electoral Volatility			
<i>Goa</i>			
1989	INC (1984-INC)	Won	13.2
1994	INC	Won	21.7
1999	INC	Won	18.8
2002	INC	Won	15.4
2007	INC	Won	12.1
2012	INC	Lost	13.8
<i>Nagaland</i>			
1989	INC (1984-INC)	Won	45.0
1993	INC	Won	08.9
1998	INC	Won	19.2
2003	INC	Won	37.3
2008	INC	Lost	18.0
2013	NPF	Won	19.2

Table 6.5 (continued)
Party Turnover and Electoral Volatility at the State Level

<i>States and Year of Elections</i>	<i>Incumbent Party/Party Heading the Coalition</i>	<i>Incumbent Party Won/Lost</i>	<i>Electoral Volatility</i>
No Pattern Between Party Turnover and Electoral Volatility			
Sikkim			
1989	SSP (1985-SSP)	Won	12.5
1994	SSP	Lost	45.6
1999	SDF	Won	15.2
2004	SDF	Won	41.8
2009	SDF	Won	04.5
2014	SDF	Won	41.3
West Bengal			
1991	CPM (1987-CPM)	Won	12.8
1996	CPM	Won	07.3
2001	CPM	Won	34.6
2006	CPM	Won	09.0
2011	CPM	Lost	16.7

Source: Election Commission of India, http://eci.nic.in/eci_main1/ElectionStatistics.aspx, retrieved on 1st June, 2012.

Table 6.6
Pattern of Party Turnover and Electoral Volatility

	Increase in Electoral Volatility	Decrease in Electoral Volatility
Party Turnover	Andhra Pradesh, Assam, Bihar, Gujarat, Haryana, Himachal Pradesh, Kerala, Madhya Pradesh, Maharashtra, Manipur, Mizoram, Odisha, Punjab, Tamil Nadu and Uttar Pradesh	Karnataka and Rajasthan
No Pattern between Party Turnover and Electoral Volatility	Goa, Nagaland, Sikkim and West Bengal	
No Party Turnover	Arunachal Pradesh, Jammu & Kashmir, Meghalaya and Tripura	

From the table 6.6, it is observed that in 15 states, party turnover is likely to result in instability in party support. In two states, party turnover may not result in greater electoral volatility. In four states, the same incumbent party wins in the elections held between 1989-2014. In rest four states, it is difficult to notice any pattern in the relationship between party turnover and electoral volatility. However, from the table 6.6, we find that in several states when there is party turnover, the electoral volatility tends to increase. Let us take one example from each category and observe the pattern of relationship between party turnover and stability of party support.

In states like Andhra Pradesh, electoral volatility increases with party turnover. The state has experienced four party turnovers between 1989-2014. The TDP formed in the state in 1982 was the ruling party in the state in 1983 and 1985 Vidhan Sabha elections with 198 seats and 46.3% votes in 1983 and 202 seats and 46.2% votes in 1985 elections respectively.

The emergence of TDP is interpreted in four different ways: first, due to the long standing political rivalry between the Reddis and Kammas, the two main peasant communities in the state. Since the INC control of power in the state, the Reddis supported the INC. The Kammas tried to come to power through the Communist party initially and latter through other parties like SWA, but failed to succeed. With a hope to come to power the Kammas supported TDP; secondly, growing dissatisfaction among certain social sections with the INC; thirdly, the regional bourgeoisie classes supported INC and lastly the centralization of power and decay of the INC were the factors that contributed to the rise of TDP. Discontentment with the INC rule reached high proportions. Factionalism in the party was rampant. Electoral support for the INC shrunk. All these factors helped INC to go to the backstage and helped TDP to occupy the stage of state politics (Suri, 2013:166-68). It can be said that the TDP marks the beginning of the present era of prominence of regional parties in India. The TDP has successfully polarized Andhra politics between itself and the INC. In the nineties the party assumed a significant role at the all-India level.

After 1985 elections, a turnover was noticed with the coming up of the INC in 1989, winning 181 seats and 47.1% votes, thereby making TDP as the second place party with 74 seats and 36.6% votes. The difference in the votes polled by the two parties was 8.7% in 1985 and 10.5% in 1989 elections respectively. The electoral volatility in 1989 was not so high because the difference in the vote share between INC and TDP was just a swing of 1.8% between 1985 and 1989 elections.

In 1994, the next party turnover was noticed in the state, when TDP won defeating INC by aggressively opposing the economic reforms introduced by the INC government at the state and central levels. The TDP assured the reintroduction of welfare programmes that were implemented prior to 1989. Thus, in 1994, it was a battle between welfare agenda of the TDP and the reforms agenda of the INC (Suri, 2009:65). The volatility rate in 1994 increased to 13.9% as compared to 11.8% in

1989. During 1994, TDP polled 44.1% votes and won 216 seats and INC polled 33.9% votes and secured only 26 seats. The other parties in the electoral competition also tried to increase their vote share from 1989 election, but the votes polled by the other parties like the BJP and the Left were not so much to influence the electoral outcome of the TDP. The electoral volatility dropped to 7% in 1999 elections with TDP retaining power with 180 seats and 43.9% votes. The seat secured by the TDP decreased due to splits and departures from the party but the votes polled by the party between 1994 and 1999 remained more or less same.

A major change in the TDP's relation with non-Congress parties came in 1998, when Chandrababu Naidu chose to support the BJP-led NDA government after the Lok Sabha elections as he wanted to prevent INC from coming to power at the Centre. The Left parties were inclined to support the INC as they did not want BJP from coming to power. This was not acceptable to TDP, since INC was its principal contender. This ended the 15 years long journey of TDP with the Left parties. The loss of friendship with Left parties affected the image of TDP. Together with the INC, Left parties agitated against TDP government before 2004 elections. This was partly responsible for the defeat of TDP in the 2004 elections (Suri, 2013:174).

Unlike 1999, in 2004 the TDP government could not throw the opposition into confusion and influence the electorate with a shower of welfare schemes on the eve of elections. The political situation in 2004 was different from that in 1999. For the first time, two alliances: INC alliance with the Left parties and the TDP-BJP alliance stood against each other developing a polarized situation in the state (Suri, 2009:67). The INC secured 185 seats and 38.5% votes. The situation was such that INC could have won the election even without an alliance. The electoral volatility in 2004 increased to 10.7%, with the shifting of electoral support from the once two dominant parties of the state: INC and TDP, towards the Left parties. The vote share of the TDP as well as the INC declined in 2004.

After the fell out with the UPA government at the Centre, the Left parties once again moved closer to the TDP. But this could not help TDP to come to power in 2009 elections. Over the years there has been the emergence of many regional parties in the state like the TRS, AIMIM, PRAP (Praja Rajyam Party), LSP (Lok Satta Party), which have complicated the image of TDP in the state. The format of party

competition has changed to a great extent. In 2009 elections, the TDP has lost its position as the sole regional party in the state. It is forced to compete with other national as well as regional parties (Suri, 2013:175). This tendency of a decline in the vote share of the main parties of the state continued even in 2009 but this time it is only the TDP which has to solely face a decline in its vote tally. The vote share of the INC remained almost same i.e. 38.6% in 2009 as in the previous elections. The volatility rate increased in 2009 to 18.2%. The shift in the support was noticed from TDP towards the Left parties. The Left parties were successful enough to secure 22.9% votes and 36 seats in 2009 elections.

In 2014 elections, the TDP regained its position by securing 117 seats and 32.5% votes. With this turnover, the electoral volatility increased to 44.8%. The other reason for instability of party support was the emergence of new parties like YSRCP, which polled 27.9% votes and secured 70 seats. The TRS also increased its vote and seat tally. We also notice in this period a dramatic decline of INC with only 21 seats and 11.7% votes.

In states like Rajasthan, party turnover may not necessarily contribute to a greater electoral volatility. In Rajasthan, except for 1993 assembly elections, we can find frequent party turnover between 1989-2014. Since 1990, political power in the state fluctuates between INC and BJP. The BJP first came to power in 1990 and returned to power in 1993 (Lodha, 2014:123). The electoral volatility was less in 1993 in comparison to 1990 elections with the continuation of the BJP in power. From 1993 onwards, we can assume that there is not much fluctuations in the electoral support in the state. As a result the electoral volatility appears to be less from 1993 onwards in comparison to 1990 elections. This is because the two main contenders: the INC and the BJP has somewhat consolidated their electoral support in the state.

In 1998, the INC gave its best ever performance winning 153 seats and 45% votes and BJP ended up only with 33 seats and 33% votes. In 2003 elections, the BJP emerged as the winner with 120 seats and 39% votes but in 2008 due to infighting within the BJP, the INC became victorious. In 2008 elections, the INC swept the floor with 36.9% votes and 96 seats adding 40 seats to its 2003 seat tally of 56. A number of explanations are predicted for the defeat of the BJP government. The INC described the loss of BJP due to the excessive misgovernance and lack of coordination between

party and government as well as the decisive politics pursued by the government and the operation of a strong anti-incumbency factor. However, the loss of the BJP, therefore, was more than the gain of the INC. The remainder was garnered by the BSP and others. This is what prevented a clear majority from emerging. There was no wave in favour of anyone or against anyone (Lodha, 2009:23).

Following the two decades since 1993, no political party has remained as incumbent in the state to form the government. The 2013 elections also followed the same trend. In 2013 elections, the state repeated its past history of not supporting the same party in the state for two consecutive elections. The BJP won by a very large difference. BJP got 163 seats and 45% of votes and INC ended up with 21 out of 200 seats and 33% votes. The BJP broke the record of the INC performance in 1998 assembly elections. In 2013, the electoral volatility increased to 14.2% with the shift from INC to BJP.

In some states like West Bengal, we do not find any pattern in the relationship between party turnover and electoral volatility. This is so because between 1989-2014, the state has undergone only one turnover in 2011 elections, when the AITC replaced the dominance of the CPM. From 1971 onwards, CPM has emerged as the largest party. The CPM from 1971 onwards continued to be the dominant player in the state till 2007. West Bengal is unique in India's democracy where the same coalition got elected repeatedly for about three decades, giving rise to what can be called as 'permanent incumbency' ((Bhattacharya, 2009: 326). As the CPM had the best organizational machinery among the left parties, it eventually received the popular base in the state as well as countryside (Bhattacharya, 2013: 217).

The electoral volatility was less in 1991 elections with the continuance of the CPM as the ruling power as in 1987 elections. In 1991, it secured 189 seats and 36.9% votes. The second place party INC was able to secure 43 seats and 35.1% votes. The Left was well established in government with the efforts through its agrarian policies and a good blend of political mobility and institutional stability that turned governance in the state into a reasonably orderly process. In 1996, of the 294 seats, the CPM had got 150 and the LF in all 203 seats. Some seats were lost but by making a breakthrough in circumstances of stiff challenges, the success has been without precedent and encouraging. With the almost same vote share of CPM and INC in 1991 and 1996

elections, the volatility further declined in 1996 elections to 7.3%. CPM was able to secure 37.9% votes and INC secured 39.5% votes respectively in 1996 elections.

In 2001 elections, the electoral volatility increased to 34.6%. In this year a new party, AITC secured 60 seats and 30.7% votes following CPM. The INC was reduced to a minority position securing only 26 seats and 8% votes. The seats and votes drained towards AITC from INC. The INC in West Bengal was divided between two factions, one trying to associate with the all-India perception of politics leading to anti-BJP strategy and another faction rooting its politics firmly in the trajectory of state level politics which led to a tacit understanding with BJP. The AITC emerged from this scenario in 1997 (Palshikar, 2003:13). In 2001, an alliance was built between AITC and INC, together the alliance could secure only 86 seats and 38.7% votes in comparison to the LF and the main party of the front i.e. the CPM, which was able to secure solely 143 seats and 36.6% votes.

With the phenomenal victory of the LF led by CPM, the electoral volatility dropped to 9% in 2006. The electoral support for the CPM in 2006 remained almost same as in 2001 with 37.1% votes, whereas AITC secured 26.7% votes. As far as the seat tally is concerned, the seat share of CPM increased to 176 in 2006 from 143 in the previous election. The seat share of AITC was almost half i.e. 30 seats in comparison to what it secured in 2001 elections.

After 2006 elections, the state entered into unexpected period of political crisis. It was found that the LF in general and the CPM in particular have witnessed dramatic setback in their electoral fortune. This is mainly due to the tremendous electoral success of the AITC. The electorate realized that to move out of the industrial stagnation of the 1980s and the exhausted potential of the first wave of agrarian reforms, a fresh beginning was necessary. With the growing influence of market forces in the national economy and the heightened competition between states to attract private capital, the Left found it difficult to match with its anti-corporate and anti-globalization style with the practice of competitive federalism. Political continuity, was felt, no more guarantee for innovative policies (Bhattacharya, 2009:328; 344). As a result of all these issues, a turnover from CPM to AITC was noticed in the 2011 elections. The AITC was able to secure 184 seats and nearly 39%

votes in comparison to 30 seats and 26.7% votes in 2006 elections. The CPM declined both its seat and vote share in 2011 elections.

In the states like Tripura, Jammu and Kashmir, Meghalaya and Arunachal Pradesh, we find no party turnover but there exists instability in the party support. Between 1989-2014, the electoral politics in Tripura is marked with the continuation of the incumbent party i.e. CPM; in Jammu and Kashmir, the JKNC has made its strong holds; in Arunachal Pradesh and Meghalaya, the INC has occupied its position as the incumbent party. If we compare the average electoral volatility in these states, it is found that the average electoral volatility is highest in case of Arunachal Pradesh followed by Meghalaya, Jammu & Kashmir and Tripura respectively.

Thus, in several states, party turnover is likely to result in greater electoral volatility. We also notice party turnover does not result in greater instability of party support in two states. Some states have experienced party turnover only once, so it is difficult to mark any pattern in the relationship. In some states, the same party continues to rule since 1989, thus these states have no experience of turnover. In states which experiences frequent turnover, the incumbent party in order to escape from defeat by a new party may enter into coalitions in order to increase its power. The following section focuses on the relationship between party coalitions and stability of party support at the state level.

6.5 Party Coalitions

Understanding coalition politics in India requires a background in which we find the evolution of the major and important minor parties that play an important role today, especially the game of splits and mergers. An important part of the coalition game in India is not just the forging of alliances between existing parties but the breaking of parties into splinter groups to facilitate alliances. All major parties in India have undergone splits in the electoral politics since Independence. The party system at the national level has become increasingly fragmented since 1989; while party systems at the state level have become bipolar (in terms of two-party system or two coalitions) hence less fragmented. National parties, if they are to win enough seats to stand a fair chance of forming a government at the Centre either on their own or in a coalition, have to form pre-electoral coalitions with regional parties in a number of states ignoring ideological differences.

All the coalitions since 1996 have been inter-state territorial coalitions. The period since 1991 has also seen the growth and sustenance of intra-state alliances either based on ideology (like the BJP-SHS) or based on territorial compatibility of two kinds: first, alliances in which the regional party allies with the state unit of the national party with the regional party getting the maximum share of both Lok Sabha and Assembly seats. Second, an alliance between a minor state party and a national party in which the latter gets the maximum share of both Lok Sabha and Assembly seats. The clear emphasis of alliances since the nineties has been on territorial compatibility at the expense of ideological compatibility, particularly the BJP's alliances of 1998, 1999 and the INC's alliances of 2004, 2009 and even the UF coalition. However, the most important point to be noted in this history of coalitions is that, with the exception of the Left Front limited to three states, coalitions have been driven by the imperative to aggregate votes to win and not by ideological or programmatic cleavages except for differences between the INC and the BJP on secularism (Sridharan, 2008:16).

Over time, more and more states have developed two-party systems, many of which have in fact two coalitions, but they are not necessarily the same two parties (or coalitions) that are competing. The INC remains a force in almost all states, but the BJP's strength is confined mostly to northern and western states. The CPM has won every election in West Bengal since 1977, and in Tamil Nadu, the two major contestants are the two Tamil nationalist parties, the DMK and the AIADMK. Other major parties include the SP and the BSP, the party whose core is the people once considered outside and beneath the Hindu castes (the Untouchables), many of whom now use the term Dalit in Uttar Pradesh; the SAD (party of the Sikhs) in Punjab; the cultural nationalist TDP in Andhra Pradesh; and the RJD (a middle-caste based party) in Bihar. These regional parties are part of the alliances led by either INC or the BJP. The coalition politics is making its way at the level of states. This section aims to find out the relationship between party coalitions and electoral volatility at the state level.

Out of 25 states of India, we find party coalitions mainly in large states like Andhra Pradesh, Bihar, Haryana, Jammu & Kashmir, Karnataka, Kerala, Maharashtra, Odisha, Punjab, Tamil Nadu, Uttar Pradesh and West Bengal. These 12 states can be grouped into one category. The second category consists of Arunachal Pradesh,

Assam, Goa, Gujarat, Himachal Pradesh, Madhya Pradesh, Manipur, Meghalaya, Mizoram, Nagaland, Rajasthan, Sikkim and Tripura, which have no experience or are not in the frequent race of party coalitions. Table 6.7 shows party coalitions and electoral volatility for 12 states between 1989-2014.

Table 6.7
Party Coalitions and Electoral Volatility at the State Level

States		Year of Elections								
		1984	1989	1991	1996	1998	1999	2004	2009	2014
Party Coalitions + Increase in Electoral Volatility										
<i>Andhra Pradesh</i>	PC	--	--	--	--	--	TDP ⁺	INC ⁺	--	TDP ⁺
	EV	--	14.1	8.6	11.6	13.4	14.0	11.2	17.7	47.8
<i>Kerala</i>	PC	--	--	--	CPM ⁺	INC ⁺	INC ⁺	CPM ⁺	INC ⁺	INC ⁺
	EV	--	16.9	9.4	4.9	5.4	11.4	24.8	16.2	18.1
<i>Maharashtra</i>	PC	--	--	--	BJP ⁺	INC ⁺	BJP ⁺	BJP ⁺	INC ⁺	BJP ⁺
	EV	--	28.7	10.1	20.7	9.6	24.0	9.0	13.1	15.1
<i>Odisha</i>	PC	--	JD ⁺	--	--	BJD ⁺	BJD ⁺	BJD ⁺	BJD ⁺	--
	EV	23.2	53.5	16.9	10.1	36.7	11.3	8.2	11.5	14.3
<i>Uttar Pradesh</i>	PC	--	JD ⁺	--	BJP ⁺	BJP ⁺	BJP ⁺	SP ⁺	SP ⁺	BJP ⁺
	EV	48.0	49.6	33.3	38.0	11.5	14.5	12.5	12.3	25.8
Party Coalitions + Decrease in Electoral Volatility										
<i>Jammu & Kashmir</i>	PC	--	--	--	--	JKNC ⁺	JKNC ⁺	INC ⁺	JKNC ⁺	--
	EV	--	45.5	--	--	40.5	8.6	25.5	13.7	14.7
<i>Karnataka</i>	PC	--	--	--	JD ⁺	BJP ⁺	--	BJP ⁺	--	--
	EV	--	42.0	25.9	21.8	20.2	34.6	20.7	9.6	5.1
<i>Punjab</i>	PC	--	--	--	--	SAD ⁺	INC ⁺	SAD ⁺	--	SAD ⁺
	EV	--	52.3	45.4	35.0	17.4	25.0	15.7	13.0	13.0
<i>Tamil Nadu</i>	PC	--	INC ⁺	INC ⁺	DMK ⁺	AIADMK ⁺	DMK ⁺	DMK ⁺	DMK ⁺	--
	EV	12.9	7.8	6.3	36.1	35.5	14.6	24.9	16.4	24.8
<i>West Bengal</i>	PC	--	CPM ⁺	CPM ⁺	CPM ⁺	CPM ⁺	CPM ⁺	CPM ⁺	AITC ⁺	--
	EV	12.7	8.9	11.1	6.2	28.1	3.7	15.2	14.1	19.1
No Pattern between Party Coalitions and Electoral Volatility										
<i>Bihar</i>	PC	--	JD ⁺	JD ⁺	JD ⁺	BJP ⁺	BJP ⁺	RJD ⁺	JDU ⁺	BJP ⁺
	EV	40.7	47.6	8.6	24.7	36.0	28.7	15.6	13.7	17.9
<i>Haryana</i>	PC	--	--	--	BJP ⁺	HLDR ⁺	BJP ⁺	--	--	BJP ⁺
	EV	--	41.4	36.4	49.0	32.8	22.2	17.8	21.8	48.1

Source: Election Commission of India, http://eci.nic.in/eci_main1/ElectionStatistics.aspx, retrieved on 1st June, 2012.

Note: (+) indicates the party heading the coalition.

After having a brief overview of the states experiencing party coalitions, it is necessary to know whether formation of party coalitions results in greater electoral volatility in these 12 states. Based on the *majority of instances*, when party coalitions

resulted in increase or decrease in electoral volatility, the states are grouped into three categories as noticed in table 6.8. For example in Maharashtra, for four elections, party coalitions resulted in increase in electoral volatility and for two elections, party coalitions did not contribute to a greater electoral volatility, so it is placed in party coalitions+increase in electoral volatility category. The 1984 election is considered as the base year in order to indicate increase or decrease in the electoral volatility for the 1989 election in case of Odisha, Uttar Pradesh, Tamil Nadu, West Bengal and Bihar, as these states experienced party coalitions in 1989. Table 6.8 shows the pattern of relationship between party turnover and electoral volatility for 12 states.

From the categorisation, a mixed trend is noticed in the relationship between party coalitions and electoral support. In five states, the average electoral volatility seems to be high when there are party coalitions. In five other states the average volatility rate appears to be less with the formation of party coalitions. In two states, it is difficult to mark any pattern in the relationship. Now let us see why does a mixed pattern of relationship is noticed in these states by selecting one state from each category.

Table 6.8
Pattern of Party Coalitions and Electoral Volatility

	Increase in Electoral Volatility	Decrease in Electoral Volatility
Party Coalitions	Andhra Pradesh, Kerala, Maharashtra, Odisha and Uttar Pradesh	Jammu & Kashmir, Karnataka, Punjab, Tamil Nadu and West Bengal
No Pattern	Bihar and Haryana	

The first category consists of those states where party coalitions results in increase in electoral volatility in comparison to the period when there are no party coalitions. For example in Uttar Pradesh, in 1989, the JD emerged as the majority party securing 54 seats and 35.9% votes with the support of the Left and other secular parties. The volatility rate was high at 49.6% in 1989. In 1989, we also noticed two important parties trying to occupy the political space in the state: BJP securing 8 seats and 7.6% votes and BSP securing 2 seats and 9.9% votes. This shows the extent to which the INC was losing its social base in the state. 1989 is also the turning point in the electoral history of the successor parties. The BJP surged ahead between 1989 and 1991, and has since become the single largest party in Uttar Pradesh. The JD, newly

created in 1989, obtained the majority of parliamentary seats and a plurality of seats. The SP was born in 1992 out of a series of splinters in the JD. The BSP, created in 1984, also obtained a burst of support in 1989. Consequently by the early 1990s, the INC had experienced further decline leading to its collapse by the middle of the decade.

The Ayodhya issue did figure during the 1989 elections, but acquired a national colour only in 1991 General Elections. The excesses committed by the government of Mulayam Singh during his first tenure as Chief Minister of the state not only brought the Ayodhya issue to the front but proved to be politically advantage for the BJP. As a result of this, for the first time BJP came to power in Uttar Pradesh and also significantly improved its seats in Lok Sabha (from 8 in 1989 to 52 seats in 1991) and vote share (from 7.6% in 1989 to 32.8% in 1991) (Verma, 2003:257). In 1991 elections also the third front consisting of JD, CPI, CPM and AIFB marked its presence. Therefore we find the volatility rates decreasing in 1991. In 1996, BJP continued remaining the largest party with the same number of seats as in 1991 and a slight increase in its vote share to 33.4% in 1996. A major shift in electoral support was noticed from JD towards the second largest party in 1996 elections i.e. the SP followed by BSP. This resulted in the increase in electoral volatility to 38%.

Since 1996, the state has experienced repeated coalition governments till 2009. During 1996 the SP-BSP coalition was formed in the state. But it was not powerful enough to win. The BJP dominated the state from 1996 forming an alliance with the Samata Party (SAP) which captured 1 seat. The SAP's electoral graph soared with its performance in U.P, and in 1998 it formed a coalition government at the Centre on the back of an incredible tally of 57 seats from the State. The INC suffered a complete loss of support in 1998 elections when it secured only 6% votes.

Post-Congress politics in Uttar Pradesh, seen from the vantage point of the 1998 elections, is characterized by two transformations: the second democratic upsurge and the ethnification of the party system. The second democratic upsurge refers to the dramatic surge in participation in the political process by members of subordinate social groups. The ethnification of the party system refers to the emergence of a party system in which all major parties make open appeals to ethnic identity central to their political campaigns (Chandra, 1999:55). To revive the attempts of the INC, Sonia

Gandhi decided to assume leadership of the central party organization and direct its electoral campaign after the 1998 elections. Her entry stopped factionalism, resignations and defections from the party in UP and gave an impetus to its campaign for the Lok Sabha elections in 1999, revitalizing a demoralized leadership (Pai, 2013:117). The elections in 1999 proved vital for the INC which managed to win 10 seats with 14.75% votes, a significant achievement against the 1998 elections. In 1998 the coalition of BJP and SAP continued to rule in the state.

In 1999, an alliance was formed between BJP, JDU, Akhil Bharatiya Lok Tantrik Congress (ABLTC) and an Independent. The BJP's remarkable run ended in the 1999 general election, with the party's seat tally to 29 seats. That year the BJP returned to power helped by its allies, but by 2004 its luck had run out. Over the past decade, the BJP has hit rock bottom in the state coinciding with the spectacular rise of the SP and the BSP. In 2004, the people mandate was not in favour of NDA or UPA. It marked the decisive victory of the regional party, SP. The major players were SP, INC, BSP and BJP. In 2004, the BJP (10 seats) formed alliance with JDU (1 seat) and the INC (9 seats) formed alliance with LJNSP. The seat tally of the two alliances was less in comparison to the seats secured by the SP. A new secular bloc aligned neither to INC nor has the Third Front been formed before the polls with RJD and LJNSP aligning with SP. The SP was successful in securing 35 of the total 80 seats and 27% votes. The decline of the exclusionary politics and the beginning of the inclusive politics of the SP and BSP was a significant bench mark in the 2004 elections (Verma, 2009:287).

The main contenders in 2009 elections were the NDA, INC, BSP and the Fourth Front. NDA consisted of the BJP and RLD, whereas the fourth front consisted of SP, RJD and LJNSP. In 2009 elections, the general assumption had been that the contest in the state was going to be bipolar, that is, between the BSP and the SP, as the INC was assumed to be in terminal decline. To everyone's surprise, national parties INC and BJP did extremely well, while regional parties, SP and BSP, did worse than expected. The big story of this election in UP, however, is the return of the INC with the external support of SP. This has been the party's best performance in the last two decades. It raised its vote share to 18% and doubled the number of seats won. There was a positive swing of 6.2% in its vote share from 2004. After the party's unprecedented success in 1984 (83 seats out of 85 with 51% votes), it declined in UP,

winning no seats in 1998 but re-emerging in 1999 to secure 10 seats and retaining its position with 9 seats in 2004 (Beg and Kumar, 2009:190-91). The volatility rate between 1998-2009 is below 20%. This is because the distribution of electoral support in the state was consolidated between four main contenders: BJP, SP, BSP and INC. However, in 2014, the electoral volatility increased to 25.8%. The BJP formed an alliance with Apna Dal (AD). The major swing was in favour of BJP in this election.

Now let us take an example from the states where formation of party coalitions may not necessarily contribute to a greater electoral volatility. For example in Tamil Nadu, the state has experienced repeated party coalitions since 1967. A 'two and a half party system' became established in the 1980s, in which the INC, as the 'half' party largely influenced the state politics while securing a substantial share of seats in alliance with the DMK in 1980 and the AIADMK in 1984, 1989 and 1991 (Harriss and Wyatt, 2013: 181-82). For the 1989 and 1991 elections, there was stability in the alliance partners and also the electoral support seems to be stable towards INC and AIADMK. In 1989, INC secured 27 seats and 39.9% votes and AIADMK secured 11 seats and 17.1% votes and in 1991, INC secured 28 seats and 42.6% votes and AIADMK secured 11 seats and 18.1% votes respectively.

The electoral volatility increased in 1996 and 1998. The reason was formation of United Front (UF) coalition in 1996 and NDA coalition in 1998. The UF coalition including DMK, TMC and CPI was able to secure 39 out of 39 seats and above 50% votes. In 1998, the power shifted towards NDA coalition consisting of BJP, AIADMK, PMK and MDMK together capturing 28 seats and the Third Front consisting of DMK, TMC, CPI and CPM, which was able to capture only 8 seats. In 1999 the volatility decreased to 14.6% with the continuation of the NDA coalition in power. The NDA was able to secure 26 out of 39 seats and INC-AIADMK-CPI-CPM coalition could secure 13 seats.

With the coming up of the UPA coalition in 2004, the volatility increased to 24.9%. The UPA consisted of INC, DMK, PMK, MDMK, CPM and CPI securing all the 39 seats with 57.4% votes. The BJP-AIADMK coalition was not able to secure even a single seat and ended up with 34.8% votes. The UPA coalition continued to rule in 2009 consisting of INC, DMK and Viduthalai Chiruthaigal Katchi (VCK), together securing 27 seats and 42.5% votes. The coalition in opposition was Third Front

consisting of AIADMK, MDMK, CPM, CPI and PMK capturing 12 seats and 37.3% and NDA coalition consisting of BJP-JDU securing no seats and only 5.4% of votes. Thus, we find in Tamil Nadu frequent shifts in alliance partner.

The logic of stitching a large coalition of political parties, each with its social base, to ensure an electoral victory in Tamil Nadu seems to be a thing of the past in the state. One widespread perception, and probably a fact, about Tamil Nadu politics⁴ and elections was that, since 1998, party alliances have played a decisive role in determining the electoral outcome and whoever puts together a larger alliance would win the election in the state. The electoral contest in the state has been between two major rival alliances in the state, each headed by the DMK and the AIADMK. However, the alliances are not been stable as partners have kept changing from time to time (Prasad, 2009: 121-22). In 2014, the AIADMK emerged as the sole winner capturing 37 out of 39 seats and 44.3% votes respectively. With the shift towards AIADMK, the electoral volatility increased to 24.8%.

In Bihar and Haryana, it is difficult to mark any pattern in the relationship between party coalitions and electoral volatility. For example, in Bihar, we can notice formation of party coalitions for each election year between 1989-2014. In 1989, the JD, which was a member of the Third Front, came to power capturing 31 seats and 36.4% votes. The other members of the Third Front were CPI, CPM, and JMM. The same coalition dominated even in 1991 elections. In 1991 elections the JD secured 32 seats and 34.1% votes. The volatility rate in 1989 was high but with the continuation of the same coalition even in 1991, electoral volatility decreased to 8.6%. In 1996, there was some shifting from Third Front coalition towards the BJP-SAP alliance. JD of Third Front lost some seats to BJP, but the vote percentage remained more or less same. This election year a new party SAP, a breakaway faction of the JD was found to contest the elections in alliance with BJP. SAP secured 6 seats and 14.5% votes. The volatility increased to 24.7% in 1996 and further increased to 36% in 1998. The INC contested the two Lok Sabha elections (in 1991 and 1996) in Bihar without electoral allies and its vote shrank to 13% in the 1996 Lok Sabha elections. It was during the 1998 and 1999 Lok Sabha elections that the INC entered into an alliance with the RJD⁵. Though the INC managed to win 5 and 4 seats in 1998 and 1999 elections, its vote share went down to 7.3% and 8.8% respectively. The political vacuum created by the INC was filled largely by the RJD, the BJP and the SAP.

Bihar is a state where the BJP grew successor through coalition's upto 2000 to attain a dominant position in Lok Sabha elections. In 1998, power shifted from Third front to NDA. In 1998, there were three powerful coalitions in the state: NDA consisting of BJP and SAP, INC alliance with RJD and the declining Third Front consisting of JD, CPI and CPM. The JD which dominated from 1989-96 was defeated by the NDA coalition. The largest party in the NDA coalition, BJP secured 20 seats and 24% votes whereas the largest party in the Third Front, JD was reduced to a position of 1 seat and 8.7% votes in 1998. In this period the INC-RJD alliance was also strong enough to secure together 22 seats and 33.9% votes. But the BJP-SAP alliance was able to put together 30 seats and 39.7% votes. The RJD's strong performance in 1998 general election was one of the principal reasons for which the BJP and its pre-election allies failed to win a majority in parliament. The volatility rate decreased to 28.7% in 1999 with the coming up of NDA coalition once more in power. The Third Front existence declined from 1999 election. This time BJP made alliance with JDU and both the parties secured 41 seats out of 54 and polled together 43.9% votes. The INC-RJD alliance was able to secure 11 seats and 37.1% votes.

The electoral volatility decreased to 15.6% in 2004 and further to 13.7% in 2009. This was because although there was presence of coalition government in the state for the two elections but the main contenders of the states since 1999 remained the same: BJP, INC, RJD and JDU and the vote percentage secured by the parties did not vary much since 1999. In 2004, the NDA consisting of BJP and JDU was defeated by UPA consisting of INC, RJD and LJNSP. The UPA coalition secured 29 seats and 43.4% votes. The NDA coalition secured 11 seats and 37% of votes. The BJP-JDU alliance was reduced to a junior partner status and lost to the INC-RJD alliance.

In 2009, BJP-JDU alliance registered an impressive victory defeating the UPA coalition which consisted of INC, NCP and JMM. The BJP-JDU coalition secured 32 seats and 38% of votes. The results from Bihar did not surprise many, which was more or less on expected lines. What has come as a surprise is the way the RJD-LJNSP alliance got routed in this election. In 2009, the RJD broke its alliance from UPA when seat sharing talks failed. RJD formed its alliance with Ram Vilas Paswan's LJNSP and Mulayam Singh Yadav's SP what the media dubbed as the Fourth Front. The RJD-LJNSP alliance managed to win only 4 Lok Sabha seats (all 4 won by the RJD) and polled 25.8% votes (RJD secured 19.3% votes and LJNSP secured 6.5%

votes) (Kumar and Ranjan, 2009:142). In 2014, the BJP formed an alliance with Rashtriya Lok Samata Party (RLSP) and LJNSP, as a result of this shift the electoral volatility increased in 2014 as compared to 2009 elections.

Thus, if we look into the electoral history of Bihar, there has been frequent breaking of alliances and shifting of electoral support. However, it is difficult to mark any clear pattern in the relationship between party coalitions and electoral volatility in Bihar. This is because for four (i.e. 1989, 1996, 1998 and 2014) elections, formation of party coalitions resulted in increase in electoral volatility and for four (i.e. 1991, 1999, 2004 and 2009) other elections, formation of party coalitions resulted in decrease in electoral volatility. Similarly, it is difficult to mark any pattern in the relationship between party coalitions and electoral volatility in case of Haryana. Thus, we notice a mixed trend in the relationship between party coalitions and electoral volatility at the level of states.

6.6 Conclusion

To conclude this chapter examined the impact of different factors like voter turnout, closeness of party competition, party turnover and party coalitions on stability of party support at the state level. The literature on each of the above factors arrives at the proposition that all these factors are likely to increase instability of party support. But this chapter shows that a mixed trend is noticed in the relationship between voter turnout, closeness of party competition, party coalitions and stability of party support. However, it is noticed that party turnover is likely to result in greater electoral volatility in several states.

Analyzing the relationship between voter turnout and stability of party support, it is noticed that in some states like Maharashtra, people turning up more do not maximize their support towards one or two parties. The voters in Maharashtra more or less distribute their votes for the four main contenders in the electoral politics of the state i.e. BJP, SHS, INC and NCP. In some states like Arunachal Pradesh, increase in voter turnout do not necessarily contribute to greater electoral volatility because people extend their support in huge number to party which comes to power whether it is INC in 1991 or ARC in 1998 or BJP in 2004. The percentage of votes received by the winning party is nearly 55%. In states, like Gujarat, due to less voter turnout, we do not find greater instability of party support till 2009. The 2014 election in Gujarat was

marked by both increase in voter turnout and certain amount of instability in the party support. In some states like Odisha, it is difficult to mark any pattern in the relationship between voter turnout and electoral volatility.

The relationship between closeness of party competition and stability of party support presents a mixed trend at the level of states. In some states like Kerala, when the closeness between INC and CPM increases, the electoral volatility tends to increase. It may be because the two parties heading two different fronts may have more or less the same preference by the electorate. The electorate get more or less divided between these two parties. Any one of the two parties fails to attract more electoral support in its favour. In some states like Madhya Pradesh, the increase in closeness between INC and BJP may not necessarily result in greater electoral volatility because of the consolidation of the support base of the two parties in the state. Apart from these two trends, we find in Assam, when there is decrease in closeness of party competition, the electoral volatility is likely to increase and in some states like Goa, decrease in closeness of party competition may not necessarily result in greater instability of party support. In five states, it is difficult to mark any pattern in the relationship between closeness of party competition and electoral volatility.

Coming to the relationship between party turnover and stability of party support, it is observed that several states undergo greater electoral volatility whenever there is party turnover. The defeat of the incumbent party and replacement of the incumbent party by a new party is likely to result in greater fluctuations in the electoral support for the parties like in Bihar or Punjab. Only in Rajasthan and Karnataka, the average electoral volatility of the elections when there is party turnover is less in comparison to the average electoral volatility of the elections when there is no turnover. In four states, we find the same party remaining incumbent since 1989 like CPM in Tripura. In four other states, for instance, in West Bengal, due to single party turnover between 1989-2014, it is difficult to mark any pattern in the relationship between party turnover and electoral volatility.

Examining the relationship between party coalitions and electoral volatility, it is found that in five states, party coalitions is likely to result in increase in electoral volatility. It may be because the shift is huge when there is turnover to the party heading the coalition, e.g. shift towards TDP-BJP alliance in 2014 elections in Andhra

Pradesh or due to frequent change of coalition between LDF and UDF in Kerala. In some other states like West Bengal, the Left Front has been for a long period dominated the electoral politics of the state or in case of Tamil Nadu where inspite of being part of different coalitions, the two regional parties i.e. DMK and the AIADMK have consolidated their support base in the state. Therefore, party coalitions in these states may not necessarily result in greater instability of party support. In case of Bihar, between 1989-2014, in four elections party coalitions resulted in greater electoral volatility and in rest four elections, party coalitions did not result in increase in electoral volatility. Therefore it is difficult to mark any pattern in the relationship between party coalitions and electoral volatility in case of Bihar and similarly for Haryana.

Thus, a mixed pattern of relationship is noticed in the relationship between the above mentioned factors and stability of party support at the level of states as was noticed at the national level. In some elections, these factors are likely to result in greater electoral volatility and in some other elections, they may not necessarily contribute to instability of party support. However, a direct relationship is noticed between party turnover and electoral volatility at the level of states.

Endnotes

1. The Left Democratic Front (LDF) consists of Communist Party of India CPI(M), Communist Party of India (CPI), Janata Dal (Secular) (JD-S), Revolutionary Socialist Party (RSP), Kerala Congress (KEC) (Joseph), Nationalist Communist Party (NCP), Congress (S), besides tactical understanding with the Indian National League (INL) and People's Democratic Party (PDP). The United Democratic Front (UDF) consists of the Indian National Congress (I), Muslim League (MUL), Kerala Congress (KEC) (Mani), Revolutionary Socialist Party (RSP) (Bolshevik), Kerala Congress (KEC) (Jacob), Communist Marxist Party (CMP), Janadipatya Samrakshana Samithi (JSS), Kerala Congress (KEC) (Balakrishna Pillai) (Kumar, 2009:92-93).
2. In terms of electoral politics, Punjab stands among the states of India. This is because, unlike other states, there are not one or two but a whole range of factors like religion, caste, kinship, region, language and leadership that act as determinants in the electoral politics of the state. What adds to the uniqueness of the Punjab politics is that these factors combine differently in different elections to produce contrasting outcomes, which in their complexities become difficult to be explained (Kumar, 2009: 231).
3. Duverger (1954) and Riker (1968) theorise that the plurality or first-past-the post system of electoral representation generally results in a two-party system, while a proportional system commonly produces a multi-party system. In the words of Riker, when the definition of

‘winning’ forces candidates to maximise votes in order to win, as in plurality system, then the strong motives to create a two-party system develops. But when the definition of ‘winning’ does not require them to maximise votes as in the proportional representation. Then this motive for two parties is absent. This proposition is largely borne out in culturally homogeneous Western liberal democracies. The Indian experience does not bear this out. For the homogenising effect of the nationalist movement against colonial rule engendered a one-party dominant system earlier, and subsequently as this legacy became weak there emerged a multiparty system. In both these phases India consistently followed plurality electoral law. However, this proposition needs to be tested with data from the party system in Indian states (Singh and Koh, 2010: 341).

4. Tamil Nadu has a distinctive political culture which supports two regional parties that govern in the state. The pattern in which the INC or the BJP rotates in office with a regional party does not apply in this state. Important changes have taken place in Tamil politics, particularly over the last two decades, but neither the INC nor the BJP have been able to expand their support. Smaller parties have proliferated and the pattern of alliance politics encourages cooperation. The ability of the Dravidian parties has given the state a prominent position in national politics (Harriss and Wyatt, 2013:194).
5. The Rashtriya Janata Dal (RJD) came into existence in the year 1997, when Laloo Prasad Yadav left his earlier party Janata Dal. This party in coalition with the INC is under the leadership of world famous politician, Laloo Prasad Yadav. During his leadership, the party dominated the whole political domain of Bihar. RJD was acknowledged as a nationalized party of Bihar in the year 2008 for its remarkable work in north-eastern India. Though, it was again degraded as one of the state level Bihar political parties on July 30, 2010 (<http://www.mapsofindia.com/bihar/government-and-politics.html>, retrieved on 14th March, 2014).

Chapter-7

Conclusion

The nature of the party system and the stability of electoral support that parties enjoy in a democracy are among the major concerns of political science researchers all over the world. While the party systems have acquired considerable degree of stability both in terms of effective parties and electoral support, the same cannot be said of democracies in developing countries. Scholars have pointed out that democratic transformation and consolidation in developing countries result in a dynamic political situation marked by a high degree of fluidity. As a result party system change and shifts in electoral support characterise these polities. The present study makes an attempt to examine this question in India's context. It seeks to measure the extent of changes in the party system and stability of electoral support and analyze the relationship between the two.

An important element of the competitive interaction between parties is the shape of party systems. The three main elements of the morphology of party systems are: (1) the number of competing units, that is, parties; (2) the size of these units; and (3) stability of electoral support for the parties i.e. how many are the players and how strong are they? The number and strength of parties can be observed at two levels: the votes parties get in elections and the seats in legislature. This in turn determines the electoral stability for the parties. The study made an attempt to examine and analyze the patterns of the shifts in party support in terms of variables such as voter turnout, closeness of party competition, party turnover and party alliances that prevail at different points of time. These factors are mentioned in detail in different chapters. Each factor has an important role to play which led to a change in the perception that we have regarding the relationship between each of the variables and stability of party support.

It is well-stated that much of politics is ever changing and much of the change is short-lived. What is true about politics more generally is equally true about party politics in particular. Not only party politics changes over time and across space, so do the common definitions. The concept of "party system" describes the salient characteristics of party competition, cooperation and other interparty relationships, such as the absolute number of parties competing in a given political system, the

relative strength of parties in terms of seats or votes, patterns of ideological distance between parties and stability of electoral support for the parties.

If we look at how party politics in India has changed at the national and state levels over the past few decades, the most striking feature we notice is the shift from one-party dominance system to that of multi-party system where regional parties have come to play an important and effective role. The last few decades witnessed enormous increase in the number of regional parties. As a result of this trend the effective number of parties has been increasing from one election to the other. When we come across the literature on Indian party politics (Weiner, 1957; Kothari, 1964; Arora, 2002; Manor, 2002; Hasan, 2002; Mehra, 2003; Yadav, 2003; Palshikar, 2003; Chibber, 2004; Sridharan, 2004; Sarangi, 2005; Suri, 2005) we know about the different factors which has given a sudden leap in the number of parties. This somewhat solves the problem of 'why there has been a change'? But in order to express in a more precise way, what seems important is to know 'how many has caused the change'? or 'how much change is effective'?

The political scientists working on party politics in western democracies (Duverger, 1954; Sartori, 1976; Pedersen, 1983; Gallagher, 1991; Lijphart, 1999; Taagepera, 2003; Grofman, 2003; Mainwaring, 2007; Zoco, 2007) in order to find a answer to the above question are able to measure the changes that occurs within the arena of party politics with the help of certain indices. Effective Number of Parties (ENP) tells us about the changes in the party systems and Volatility Index (VI) tells us how far the changed/changing party systems are stable/unstable. Generally, these two indices are used in characterizing a party system in a country. In order to have a better understanding of the extent and direction of the changes in India's party system, these indices are employed in this present study.

Based on these indices, it is found that over the past 65 years India's party system at the national level has moved from one-party dominance to multi-party system in which party competition takes place around a few alliances. Over time the effective number of parties has been increasing. In 2009 elections it reached a figure of 7.7 in terms of votes and 5.0 in terms of seats. However, in 2014, the effective number of parties reduced to 6.9 in terms of votes and 3.5 in terms of seats in comparison to the previous election. Here the question arises as to how one can characterize the

emergent party system in India. One way is to go according to the received knowledge on characterization of party systems in the old democracies of the West or the emerging democracies of Latin America. In the western context, for example, Sartori (1976) considers a political system with 5 or more than 5 effective number of parties as extremely plural. However, Western nations are generally homogeneous in terms of culture and ethnicity and also small in population size when we compare them with India. In India, a country of a continental size and huge diversity, we may have to rethink about the values of ENP when we attempt at characterizing party system. Probably, we may have to slightly modify or push upward the ENP value while we employ the categories developed by the Western scholars. We may consider a value less than 6 as moderate pluralism and ENP of 6 and above as high pluralism. This leads us to characterize the format of party political competition at present as one of high pluralism.

When we examine the results at the state level, we find that extent of multipartism in the states, overall, is low compared to the one that prevails at the national level. We also find that the format of party competition at state level is not uniform. In some states we find a two-party competition (examples: Madhya Pradesh, Rajasthan and Gujarat); in some we see a transition to moderate pluralism, with political competition remaining principally between two parties (example: Odisha); in some other states we see a multi-party system is in place or taking shape where party competition takes place around a few alliances, analogous to what is happening at the national level. The emergence of multi-party system is due to the emergence of new parties either because of fragmentation of existing parties or formation of new parties based on regional, ethnic, religious and caste identities (examples: Assam, Uttar Pradesh and Bihar).

Despite the fragmentation of the electorate and breakdown of the single party system, major parties such as the INC and the BJP still have ambitions of coming to power alone. Regionalisation of the party system has made this virtually impossible, necessitating coalition between national and regional parties. For the first time, the BJP in 2014 general election could secure a majority of seats in the Lok Sabha, although it secured less than one-third of the total votes polled. On the other hand, regional parties, despite demanding a share in central governance, still treat the

regional political arena as the primary arena in order to strengthen their position in their own home states. There is greater realisation after the mid 1990s, of the necessity of forming stable and broad-based coalitions inclusive of all social classes and regions, but differences between parties has made this difficult.

The changing nature of the party system in India has aroused an interest in studies on electoral politics in general and party politics in particular. There are two important concerns on the present moment of transformation of party system. The first concern is to explain the nature of political competition, electoral successes and failures of parties, the changing nature of the parties support bases and the nature of emerging coalitions. The other concern is to understand the implications of the changing nature of party competition on the working of the democratic political system in India, as parties have always remained the main agents in the democratic process.

The scenario is such that no political party in near future is unlikely to emerge as a dominant party on the lines of the INC, as it was in the first two decades after independence. The reasons for the development of the INC into an all-India party, dominant both at the centre and in a large number of the states, in such a vast and diverse country, lie in the peculiar circumstances under which it was formed in the colonial period. The presence of the imperial power brought political leaders onto a common platform, their main aim being to attain independence. Hence, the INC developed into a broad movement that enabled it to be identified with the newly formed Indian State. After independence, no party has been able to develop into an all-India party with a base in all the major regions, as existing diversities between regions have sharpened and crystallised with formation of linguistic states and the impact of democratisation and regionalisation. In the states, distinct party systems, which have a complex inter-locking relationship with the national party system, have developed.

The single party system described by scholars such as Rajni Kothari and Morris Jones in the 1960s has now been replaced by a highly fragmented multi-party system in which both national and regional parties are playing an important role. We notice that at the national level the effective number of parties is high in comparison to the state level. One reason for such a situation is that same parties are not in the electoral fray in all states. When these multitudes of different parties are added, the number of

parties at the national level becomes larger. In other words, a large number of parties, both at the national and state based are present in the electoral arena at the national level. Only smaller number national and/or state based parties are present in the electoral arena at the state level. For instance the party competition in Odisha takes place between BJD, BJP and INC. In Tamil Nadu, it is mainly between DMK, AIADMK, PMK, MDMK and INC. In Maharashtra, it is between INC, NCP, SHS and BJP. In West Bengal, it is between AITC, CPI(M), and INC. But all these parties get counted at national level.

Thus, the party competition at the national level and in some states appears to be highly plural going by the effective number of parties that join the electoral arena. There is a feeling that in India's elections too many parties jostle for electoral support and gain access to political power. However, if we look at the distribution of seats by successful parties in the Lok Sabha or Vidhan Sabha in the states, we find fewer effective parties. This means several parties that gain considerable support in elections do not get represented in an equal measure in the legislatures.

This draws our attention to the related aspect, the discrepancy between the vote percentages parties get in an election and seats they win in the legislatures. While we know that the first-past-the-post (FPTP) system results in disproportionality between votes and seats, what is relevant here is the fact that the high pluralism of party competition gets moderated due to the FPTP system in India. Had there been a Proportional Representation (PR) system in India, the legislatures would have been populated by a greater number of parties where there would be high pluralism both in the electoral and the legislative arenas. Arguments over disproportionality between votes and seats will continue but the concern is looking at the 2014 elections results what seems important is whether the Lok Sabha represents in its composition the spread and range of voters support across the country.

When we examine the stability of electoral support and success of parties in the elections, we find there has been unevenness in the volatility of electoral support for parties, which reached very high levels during the 1970s due to the reconfiguration of political forces at that time. Contrary to what is generally perceived, there has been stabilization of volatility rate in the 1990s and later despite increase in the effective

number of parties at the national level. It is also interesting to note that the stability of party support is more at the national level than at the state level.

The shifts in party support at the state level indicate a greater volatility when compared to the national level. Two factors seem responsible for this. Firstly, the vote fluctuation for a national party in different states may cancel out each other to some or large extent in such a way that at the aggregate level these movements of party support do not count in one direction in a substantial manner as they do when we take a state as one unit. Secondly, in several states regional parties play a major role in elections at the state level. Often there had been extreme fluctuations in the support in an election. However, a substantial share of vote by a state-based or regional party in a national election at the state level constitutes only a very small proportion of votes polled in a national election. For example, the vote share of AIADMK at state level in 2014 is 44.3% compared to 22.9% in 2009, showing a shift of 21.4%. The same AIADMK received a vote share of 3.3% in 2014 at national level compared to 1.7% in 2009, showing a shift of a meager 1.6%. Similarly, in Odisha, the vote share of BJD at state level in 2014 is 45.2% compared to 37.3% in 2009, showing a shift of 7.9%. The same BJD received a vote share of 1.7% in 2014 at national level compared to 1.6% in 2009, showing a shift of a meager 0.1%, and when squared this contributes only an insignificant value to the summated squares of the party shares of electoral support.

If we juxtapose the ENP and the electoral volatility for the nation, we notice an interesting feature. A higher ENP does not necessarily result in greater instability of political support. Similarly, when we juxtapose the ENP and the electoral volatility for the states, we again notice an interesting feature, which is in contrast to what we see at the national level. A low ENP does not necessarily mean greater stability of political support. Some political scientists like Pedersen (1983), Bartolini and Mair (1990), Mainwaring (1998), Tavits (2005) of western democracies and some of the specialists in study of Indian party politics like Weiner (1957), Sridharan (2004), Suri (2005), Sarangi (2005), Kondo (2007) and Nooruddin and Chibber (2008) have observed that due to fragmentation of parties or the emergence of new ones or demise of parties, India's party system has been threatened by instability. While the effective number of parties has increased in India over time, we find that stability of party

support has actually increased during the recent decades, although it defies our general commonsensical understanding of the relationship between party fragmentation and stability of party support. However, the same cannot be said in the context of the states. In 2014 elections some amount of instability in the electoral support for the parties is observed at the national level in comparison to the previous election. While at the state level, several states are moderately pluralised with variation in electoral volatility after the recent election.

A detailed analysis of the above mentioned facts are presented in the third and fourth chapters. Testing the proposition that increase in party fragmentation leads to decrease in the stability of party support, it is observed that the Indian party system after independence is characterized by the proliferation and fragmentation of parties. There has been the emergence of multi-party systems and coalitions. But inspite of having a large number of parties, stability seems to be growing in the party system at the national level. However, this stabilization trend is somewhat disturbed in 2014 elections. At the state level, it is found that the evolution of party system represents one of continuing transformation. On the one hand there is a trend towards opening of the competitive format, i.e. single party dominance is now an exception rather than a rule, a large number of states have shifted to a two-party or two-plus or multi-party competition. In recent decades there are many bipolar and a few multipolar systems than before and this trend continues. On the other hand, several states are undergoing a high volatility rate which leads to unstable party system at the level of states.

The elements affecting stability of party support are examined in the fifth and sixth chapters at the national and state levels. The different factors are voter turnout, closeness of party competition, party turnover and party coalitions. The literature on each of the above factors arrives at the proposition that all these factors are likely to increase instability of party support. Testing the proposition that increase in voter turnout results in increase in electoral volatility, we find that at the national level for five elections (i.e. 1957, 1967, 1977, 1996 and 2014) when there is increase in voter turnout, the electoral volatility is likely to increase. The fluctuations in party support are due to increase in number of voters as a result of increase in political awareness and interest in the process of democratic elections, disillusionment and dissatisfaction with the government or by the appearance or disappearance of parties. For the rest

three elections (i.e. 1962, 1984 and 1998), the electoral volatility seems to be less with the increase in voter turnout. This is because of the majority win of INC as in 1962 and 1984 elections or the stabilization of the electoral support around the two main parties i.e. INC and BJP as in 1998.

At the state level, analyzing the relationship between voter turnout and stability of party support, it is observed that in three states, an increase in voter turnout is likely to result in instability in party support. For instance, in Maharashtra, the voters are distributed between the four main contenders in the state i.e. BJP, SHS, INC and NCP. In six states, an increase in voter turnout may not necessarily contribute to a greater electoral volatility. For instance, in Arunachal Pradesh, people extend their support in huge number to the party which comes to power. Whether it is INC in 1991 or ARC in 1998 or BJP in 2004, the percentage of votes received by the winning party is nearly 55%. In five states, we find lesser voter turnout resulting in lesser electoral volatility. For instance, in Gujarat, we find consolidation of electoral support for the two main parties i.e. BJP and INC. In about eleven states, for instance, in Odisha it is difficult to notice any clear pattern of relationship between voter turnout and electoral volatility.

Testing the proposition that increase in closeness of party competition results in increase in electoral volatility, it is found that for four elections (i.e. 1967, 1977, 1989 and 1996), when the closeness of party competition increases, the electoral volatility also appears to be high. In these elections, the degree of competitiveness is high between the winner and runner-up party and the electoral volatility is high due to dissatisfaction with the INC performance as in 1967 or the defeat of the incumbent party as in 1977, 1989 and 1996 elections. In four other elections (i.e. 1962, 1991, 1998 and 2004) when there is an increase in closeness of party competition, the electoral volatility seems to be less. This is because of the maximization of electoral support by the INC as in 1962 and the ability of the two main parties i.e. INC and the BJP to keep intact their support bases in 1991, 1998 and 2004 elections respectively. However, going by the closeness of party competition cut-off values, it is found that there is more closeness of party competition in 1977 and between 1996-2009 election years, when the closeness rate is below 10%.

At the state level, it is found that in four states, an increase in the closeness corresponds to increase in the electoral volatility. For instance, in Kerala, the electoral support more or less gets divided between the two parties i.e. INC and CPM. Any one of the two parties fails to maximize greater electoral support in its favor. In nine states, we find an increase in closeness between parties does not result in huge shifts in electoral support for the parties. For instance, in Madhya Pradesh we find consolidation of the support base of the two main parties i.e. INC and BJP. The electorate seems to be divided between these two parties without opting for a third party. In Assam, we find a decrease in the closeness between parties may result in increase in instability of party support. In Assam, apart from the two main parties: INC and BJP, we find the loss and gain of other regional parties like AGP, ASDC, AUDF and BPF contributing to greater instability in party support. In six other states, a decrease in the closeness of party competition may not necessarily result in increase in electoral volatility. For instance, in Goa, the electoral support remains consolidated between three parties. Apart from two national parties i.e. INC and BJP, the third party in the state may be MGP, UGDP or NCP for different election years. In five states, for instance in Punjab, it is difficult to notice any clear trend in the relationship between closeness of party competition and electoral volatility.

Testing the proposition that party turnover results in increase in instability in party support, it is found out that at the national level in five elections (i.e. 1977, 1980, 1989, 1996 and 2014) due to the shift from the incumbent party, the electoral volatility appears to be high. In these elections when the support base getting tilted there result in the defeat of the incumbent party, as in 2014 elections (defeat of INC by BJP). For the rest three (i.e. 1991, 1998 and 2004) elections, party turnover does not necessarily contribute to greater electoral volatility. This is because since 1991, we find some amount of closeness of party competition between INC and BJP, so even if a different incumbent party like JD in 1991 is defeated, the electoral support remains more or less confined to the INC as the first place party and BJP as the second place party.

Examining the relationship between party turnover and stability of party support at the state level, it is noticed that fifteen states experience greater electoral volatility with party turnover. For instance, in Punjab, whenever there is party turnover, the

electorate shift is huge number from the incumbent party to the new party or greater degree of fluctuation in the electoral support for the parties is noticed. In two states party turnover did not result in greater electoral volatility. For instance, in Rajasthan, the alteration of power takes place between INC and BJP. The electoral competition is mainly between these two parties. In four states, for instance, in Tripura, there is no party turnover as the same incumbent party i.e. CPM wins every elections held between 1989-2014. In four states, for instance, in West Bengal, it is difficult to notice any clear pattern in the relationship between party turnover and electoral volatility. However, we find that in several states when there is party turnover, the electoral volatility tends to increase.

Testing the proposition that party coalitions result in greater electoral volatility, it is found that at the national level in four (i.e. 1989, 1996, 2009 and 2014) elections, party coalitions result in greater electoral volatility. In 1989, 1996 and 2014 elections due to anti-incumbency wave against the incumbent party, the electoral volatility appears to be high. In 2009, the distribution of electoral support between the INC-led UPA and the BJP-led NDA got widened and the vote victory gap between the two parties leading two different coalitions tends to increase and further the gap got widened in 2014 elections. In rest three (i.e. 1998, 1999 and 2004) elections, we find closeness between the vote shares of INC and BJP heading two different coalitions. As a result the electoral volatility appears to be less.

At the level of states, party coalitions are often noticed in case of 12 states. In five states, the electoral volatility seems to be high when there are party coalitions. For instance, in Kerala, we find frequent change of coalition and power keeps alternating between UDF and LDF resulting in greater instability in party support. In five states, the volatility rate appears to be less with the formation of party coalitions. For instance, in West Bengal, the Left Front since a long period of time had dominated the electoral politics of the state which resulted in lesser electoral volatility. In two states, for instance, in Bihar, for four election years party coalitions resulted in greater electoral volatility and in rest four election years, party coalitions did not result in increase in electoral volatility. Therefore it is difficult to find any pattern in the relationship between party coalitions and electoral volatility in case of Bihar and similarly for Haryana.

Thus, we do not find a unidirectional relationship between stability of party support on the one hand, and factors such as voter turnout, closeness of party competition, party turnover and party coalitions on the other. A mixed pattern of relationship is noticed in the relationship between the above mentioned factors and stability of party support both at the national level and especially at the level of states. For some election years these factors are likely to result in greater electoral volatility and for some election years, they may not necessarily contribute to instability of party support. However, a direct relationship is noticed between party turnover and electoral volatility at the level of states. We fail to notice any clear pattern in the relationship between the respective variables and stability of party support both at the national and especially at the level of states.

The different factors mentioned above once again indicate the diverse, dynamic and socially pluralized nature of India as was found in the relationship between party system change and stability of party support. It is difficult to find any single trend in the relationship between each of the variables and stability of party support. This lack of a clear pattern presents India to be an example of a country where we notice continuous transformation, dynamism and huge complexities that characterizes the vary nature of the political parties at nation and states.

In the end, one can say that the significant increase in the effective number of parties in India's party system over the past three decades has not led to massive instability in electoral support at the national level. On the contrary, India saw a decline in instability of electoral support or a decline in the rate of electoral volatility. However, certain states of India have witnessed greater fluctuations in electoral support, and in some cases the electoral support enjoyed by parties remained highly unstable. While factors such as voter turnout, closeness of party competition, party turnover and party coalitions do contribute to significant shifts in electoral support both at the national and in several states, we do not find any clear pattern of a direct relationship between these factors and stability of party support in case of several other states. We might conclude that notwithstanding the sudden increase in electoral volatility in 2014 election due to the extremeness of BJP's victory, the trend of stabilisation of India's party system and moderate levels of electoral volatility may continue in the decades to come.

APPENDICES

Appendix 1: Sample Description of ENP Index *Effective Number of Parties for 2014 Election by Votes and Seats*

Party	Percentage of votes secured	Pi	pi ²	Seats won	Pi	pi ²
INC	19.3	0.193	0.037249	44	0.081031	0.006566
BJP	31.1	0.311	0.096721	282	0.519337	0.269711
JDU	1.08	0.0108	0.000117	2	0.003683	0.000014
CPI	0.78	0.0078	0.000061	1	0.001842	0.000003
CPM	3.24	0.0324	0.00105	9	0.016575	0.000275
BSP	4.14	0.0414	0.001714	0	0	0
AITC	3.83	0.0383	0.001467	34	0.062615	0.003921
NCP	1.56	0.0156	0.000243	6	0.01105	0.000122
SHS	1.85	0.0185	0.000342	18	0.033149	0.001099
AAP	2.04	0.0204	0.000416	4	0.007366	0.000054
IUML	0.2	0.002	0.000004	2	0.003683	0.000013
JDS	0.67	0.0067	0.000044	2	0.003683	0.000013
SP	3.37	0.0337	0.001136	5	0.009208	0.000084
RSP	0.3	0.003	0.000009	1	0.001842	0.000033
SAD	0.66	0.0066	0.000043	4	0.007366	0.000054
JMM	0.3	0.003	0.000009	2	0.003683	0.000013
INLD	0.5	0.005	0.000025	2	0.003683	0.000013
AIADMK	3.27	0.0327	0.001069	37	0.06814	0.004643
TDP	2.54	0.0254	0.000645	16	0.029466	0.000868
PMK	0.33	0.0033	0.000011	1	0.001842	0.000033
DMK	1.74	0.0174	0.000303	0	0	0
SDF	0.03	0.0003	0.000000	1	0.001842	0.000033
AIMIM	0.12	0.0012	0.000001	1	0.001842	0.000033
JKPDP	0.13	0.0013	0.000002	3	0.005525	0.000031
LJNSP	0.41	0.0041	0.000017	6	0.01105	0.000122
RJD	1.34	0.0134	0.00018	4	0.007366	0.000054
TRS	1.21	0.0121	0.000146	11	0.020258	0.00041
KCM	0.08	0.0008	0.000000	1	0.001842	0.000034
NPP	0.1	0.001	0.000001	1	0.001842	0.000034
AUDF	0.42	0.0042	0.000018	3	0.005525	0.000031
NPF	0.18	0.0018	0.000003	1	0.001842	0.000034
BJD	1.71	0.0171	0.000292	20	0.036832	0.001357
AINRC	0.05	0.0005	0.000000	1	0.001842	0.000034
SWP	0.2	0.002	0.000004	1	0.001842	0.000034
RLSP	0.19	0.0019	0.000004	3	0.005525	0.000031
YSRC	2.52	0.0252	0.000635	9	0.016575	0.000275
OTHERS	4.4	0.044	0.001936	0	0	0
Total	100		0.145919	543		0.289809
ENP			6.9			3.5

Note: The Effective Number of Parties (ENP) (denoted as 'N') is calculated using Laakso and Taagepera formula which is as follows:

$$N = 1/\sum p_i^2$$

Where 'Σ' stands for the summation and 'p_i' stands for the proportion of the 'ith' party. Therefore in the above case the ENP by Votes (N) = 1/0.145919=6.853117, rounded off to 6.9, i.e. to the nearest one decimal fraction and by Seats (N)=1/0.289809=3.450548, rounded off to 3.5, i.e. to the nearest one decimal fraction.

Appendix 2: Sample Description of Electoral Volatility Index
Electoral Volatility for the Election Period 2009-2014 by Votes and Seats

Party	2009	2014	Change	2009	2014	2009	2014	Change
	% of votes secured	% of votes secured		Seats won	Seats won	% of Seats won	% of Seats won	
INC	28.56	19.3	9.26	206	44	37.93738	8.103131	29.83425
BJP	18.81	31.1	-12.29	116	282	21.3628	51.9337	-30.5709
JDU	1.52	1.08	0.44	20	2	3.683241	0.368324	3.314917
CPI	1.43	0.78	0.65	4	1	0.736648	0.184162	0.552486
CPM	5.33	3.24	2.09	16	9	2.946593	1.657459	1.289134
BSP	6.17	4.14	2.03	21	0	3.867403	0	3.867403
AITC	3.2	3.83	-0.63	19	34	3.499079	6.26151	-2.76243
NCP	2.04	1.56	0.48	9	6	1.657459	1.104972	0.552486
RLD	0.44	0.5	-0.06	5	2	0.92081	0.368324	0.552486
JDS	0.82	0.67	0.15	3	2	0.552486	0.368324	0.184162
RSP	0.38	0.3	0.08	2	1	0.368324	0.184162	0.184162
FBL	0.32	0	0.32	2	0	0.368324	0	0.368324
JKNC	0.12	0	0.12	3	0	0.552486	0	0.552486
SAD	0.96	0.66	0.3	4	4	0.736648	0.736648	0
JMM	0.4	0.3	0.1	2	2	0.368324	0.368324	0
DMK	1.83	1.74	0.09	18	0	3.314917	0	3.314917
TDP	2.51	2.54	-0.03	6	16	1.104972	2.946593	-1.84162
AGP	0.83	0	0.83	1	0	0.184162	0	0.184162
SDF	0.43	0.03	0.4	1	1	0.184162	0.184162	0
AIMIM	0.04	0.12	-0.08	1	1	0.184162	0.184162	0
RJD	1.27	1.34	-0.07	4	4	0.736648	0.736648	0
TRS	0.62	1.21	-0.59	2	11	0.368324	2.025783	-1.65746
MDMK	0.27	0	0.27	1	0	0.184162	0	0.184162
BJD	1.59	1.71	-0.12	14	20	2.578269	3.683241	-1.10497
SHS	1.55	1.85	-0.3	11	18	2.025783	3.314917	-1.28913
MUL	0.21	0.2	0.01	2	2	0.368324	0.368324	0
SP	3.43	3.37	0.06	23	5	4.235727	0.92081	3.314917
HJCBL	0.2	0	0.2	1	0	0.184162	0	0.184162
JVM	0.23	0	0.23	1	0	0.184162	0	0.184162
AIADMK	1.67	3.27	-1.6	9	37	1.657459	6.813996	-5.15654
KCM	0.1	0.08	0.02	1	1	0.184162	0.184162	0
BPF	0.16	0	0.16	1	0	0.184162	0	0.184162
AUDF	0.52	0.42	0.1	1	3	0.184162	0.552486	-0.36832
NPF	0.2	0.18	0.02	1	1	0.184162	0.184162	0
VCK	0.18	0	0.18	1	0	0.184162	0	0.184162
BVA	0.12	0	0.12	1	0	0.184162	0	0.184162
SWP	1.45	0.2	1.25	1	1	0.184162	0.184162	0
AAP	0	2.04	-2.04	0	4	0	0.736648	-0.73665
PMK	0	0.33	-0.33	0	1	0	0.184162	-0.18416
JKPDP	0	0.13	-0.13	0	3	0	0.552486	-0.55249
LJNSP	0	0.41	-0.41	0	6	0	1.104972	-1.10497
NPP	0	0.1	-0.1	0	1	0	0.184162	-0.18416
AINRC	0	0.05	-0.05	0	1	0	0.184162	-0.18416
RLSP	0	0.19	-0.19	0	3	0	0.552486	-0.55249
YSRC	0	2.52	-2.52	0	9	0	1.657459	-1.65746
OTHERS	0	4.4	-4.4	0	0	0	0	0
Total	100	100	45.9	543	543			99.07919
Volatility			23.0					49.5

Note: The Electoral Volatility (EV) is calculated by using formula given by Pedersen, which is as follows:

$$EV = TNC / 2$$

Where 'TNC' is the Total Net Change in party support. The Total Net Change (by ignoring the signs of the deviations) is divided by 2. In the 2009-2014 election period, the electoral volatility rate is $45.9 / 2 = 22.95$, rounded off to 23.0 (by percentage of votes) and $99.07919 / 2 = 49.539595$, rounded off to 49.5, i.e. to the nearest one decimal fraction (by percentage of seats).

Appendix 3: Electoral Volatility by Seats at the State Level

States	Election Periods														
	1957	1962	1967	1971	1977	1980	1984	1989	1991	1996	1998	1999	2004	2009	2014
Andhra Pradesh	--	12.8	12.6	25.6	30.5	2.4	84.6	79.8	33.4	9.5	11.9	47.6	73.8	12.0	73.8
Arunachal Pradesh	--	--	--	--	--	25.0	0.0	0.0	0.0	0.0	100	100	100	100	50.0
Assam	20.9	4.2	7.2	21.5	25.0	--	--	--	--	28.6	50.0	14.3	14.3	25.0	39.3
Bihar	15.4	16.1	26.4	14.2	98.2	97.2	36.1	88.0	15.8	39.0	47.2	41.7	51.2	55.0	47.5
Goa	--	--	--	75.0	50.0	50.0	100	50.0	50.0	100	100	100	50.0	0.0	50.0
Gujarat	--	--	52.1	43.8	61.6	61.6	3.9	84.6	42.3	19.3	11.6	3.8	23.1	3.9	42.3
Haryana	--	--	--	5.6	100	100	50.0	60.0	60.0	65.0	55.0	50.0	90.0	10.0	90.0
Himachal Pradesh	0.0	0.0	0.0	0.0	100	100	0.0	75.0	25.0	50.0	75.0	25.0	75.0	50.0	25.0
Jammu & Kashmir	--	--	--	8.3	33.3	33.4	25.0	8.3	--	--	66.7	16.7	58.4	16.7	91.7
Karnataka	--	9.6	33.4	33.4	7.1	7.2	10.7	14.3	17.9	67.9	50.0	42.9	42.9	7.2	5.4
Kerala	--	19.5	68.0	65.8	27.7	52.5	52.5	30.0	25.0	30.0	10.0	10.0	57.5	72.5	22.5
Madhya Pradesh	3.5	27.8	18.6	8.1	90.9	95.0	11.3	78.8	48.8	46.3	11.3	5.0	16.2	31.0	37.9
Maharashtra	--	--	12.2	16.7	58.4	58.4	15.7	37.5	26.1	50.0	47.9	55.2	13.6	12.5	43.8
Manipur	25.0	25.0	75.0	75.0	0.0	50.0	50.0	0.0	50.0	50.0	100	50.0	75.0	25.0	0.0
Meghalaya	--	--	--	--	--	--	--	0.0	0.0	25.0	25.0	50.0	50.0	50.0	50.0
Mizoram	--	--	--	--	--	0.0	0.0	0.0	0.0	0.0	50.0	0.0	50.0	100	0.0
Nagaland	--	--	--	100	100	50.0	50.0	0.0	100	100	0.0	0.0	100	0.0	0.0
Odisha	22.5	32.5	62.5	52.5	78.6	78.6	4.8	85.7	47.6	19.1	76.2	14.3	33.4	19.1	33.3
Punjab	11.1	36.4	15.1	23.1	92.3	92.3	46.1	73.1	65.4	76.9	34.6	73.1	61.6	46.2	38.5
Rajasthan	33.2	22.8	27.2	21.8	91.7	96.0	28.0	100	52.0	4.0	30.0	42.0	20.0	36.0	82.0
Sikkim	--	--	--	--	--	100	50.0	50.0	0.0	100	0.0	0.0	0.0	0.0	0.0
Tamil Nadu	--	9.8	74.0	30.8	62.8	55.2	37.2	7.7	2.6	100	75.7	44.9	51.3	30.8	76.9
Tripura	50.0	50.0	100	100	100	100	0.0	100	0.0	100	0.0	0.0	0.0	0.0	0.0
Uttar Pradesh	12.2	14.0	22.0	29.1	98.8	99.4	39.4	81.2	55.3	28.8	13.0	35.3	28.0	18.8	78.1
West Bengal	17.3	15.3	35.7	30.0	50.0	36.9	28.6	28.6	2.4	9.5	21.5	9.5	33.4	61.9	31.0

Source: Election Commission of India, http://eci.nic.in/eci_main1/ElectionStatistics.aspx, retrieved on 1st June, 2012 (the electoral volatility for each election period for different states is calculated based on the data collected from the website of Election Commission of India).

Appendix 4: Lok Sabha Election Results, 1952-2014
Seats/Votes Share of Parties at the National Level, 1952-2014

Parties	Year of Elections															
	1952	1957	1962	1967	1971	1977	1980	1984	1989	1991	1996	1998	1999	2004	2009	2014
INC	364/ 45	371/ 47.8	361/ 44.7	283/ 40.8	352/ 43.7	154/ 34.5	353/ 42.7	415/ 48.1	197/ 39.5	244/ 36.6	140/ 28.8	141/ 25.8	114/ 28.3	145/ 26.5	206/ 28.6	44/ 19.3
CPI	16/3.3	27/8.9	29/9.9	23/5	23/4.7	7/2.8	11/2.6	6/2.7	12/2.6	14/2.5	12/2	9/1.8	4/1.5	10/1.4	4/1.4	1/0.8
SOP	12/10.6	--	--	23/4.9	--	--	--	--	--	--	--	--	--	--	--	--
KMPP	9/5.8	--	--	--	--	--	--	--	--	--	--	--	--	--	--	--
PDF	7/1.3	2/0.9	--	--	--	--	--	--	--	--	--	--	--	--	--	--
GP	5/0.9	7/1.1	4/0.3	--	--	--	--	--	--	--	--	--	--	--	--	--
SAD	4/1	--	3/0.7	--	1/0.9	9/1.3	1/0.7	7/1.0	--	--	8/0.8	8/0.8	2/0.7	8/0.9	4/10	4/0.7
RLD	--	--	--	--	--	--	--	--	--	--	--	--	2/0.4	3/0.6	5/0.4	--
ABHM	--	--	--	--	--	--	--	--	--	--	--	--	--	12/1.8	--	--
HMS	4/1	1/0.9	1/0.7	--	--	--	--	--	1/0.07	--	--	--	--	--	--	--
TNT	4/0.8	--	--	--	--	--	--	--	--	--	--	--	--	--	--	--
BJS	3/3.1	4/6	14/6.4	35/9.4	22/7.4	--	--	--	--	--	--	--	--	--	--	--
RRP	3/2	0/0.4	--	--	--	--	--	--	--	--	--	--	--	--	--	--
JKD	3/0.7	6/0.6	3/0.4	--	1/0.2	--	1/0.1	--	--	--	--	--	--	--	--	--
RSP	3/0.4	--	2/0.4	3/0.5	--	4/0.5	4/0.7	3/0.5	4/0.6	4/0.6	5/0.6	5/0.6	3/0.4	3/0.4	2/0.4	1/0.3
SCF	2/2.4	6/1.7	--	--	--	--	--	--	--	--	--	--	--	--	--	--
PWP	2/0.9	4/0.8	0/0.6	2/0.7	0/0.5	5/0.6	--	1/0.2	--	--	--	1/0.1	1/0.2	--	--	--
LSS	2/0.3	--	2/0.2	--	--	--	--	--	--	--	--	--	--	--	--	--
FBM	1/0.8	2/0.6	--	--	--	--	--	--	--	--	--	--	--	--	--	--
MUL	1/0.1	--	2/0.4	2/0.3	2/0.3	2/0.3	2/0.2	2/0.3	2/0.3	2/0.3	2/0.2	2/0.2	2/0.2	3/1.5	2/0.2	2/0.2
JDS	--	--	--	--	--	--	--	--	--	--	--	--	1/0.9	36/4.3	3/0.8	2/0.7
RPI	0/0.1	--	3/2.8	1/2.5	1/0.1	--	--	--	--	--	0/0.4	4/0.4	--	1/0.1	--	--
JKPDP	--	--	--	--	--	--	--	--	--	--	--	--	--	1/0.1	--	3/0.1
LJNSP	--	--	--	--	--	--	--	--	--	--	--	--	--	4/0.7	--	6/0.4
FBL	0/0.1	--	2/0.7	2/0.4	2/0.7	3/0.3	3/0.5	2/0.4	3/0.4	3/0.4	3/0.4	2/0.3	2/0.4	3/0.4	2/0.3	--
PSP	--	19/10.4	12/6.8	13/3.1	2/1.0	--	--	--	--	--	--	--	--	--	--	--

SWA	--	--	18/7.9	44/8.7	8/3.1	--	--	--	--	--	--	--	--	--	--	--
DMK	--	--	7/2	25/3.8	23/3.8	1/1.7	16/2.1	2/2.3	0/2.3	0/2.1	17/2.1	6/1.4	12/1.7	16/1.8	18/1.8	0/1.7
CPM	--	--	--	19/4.4	25/5.1	22/4.3	36/6.2	22/5.7	33/6.6	35/6.1	32/6.1	32/5.2	33/5.4	43/5.7	16/5.3	9/3.2
BCP	--	--	--	5/0.8	1/0.4	--	--	--	--	--	--	--	--	--	--	--
JKNC	--	--	--	1/0.1	--	2/0.3	3/0.3	3/0.4	3/0.02	--	--	3/0.2	4/0.1	2/0.1	3/0.1	--
NCO	--	--	--	--	16/10.4	3/1.7	--	--	--	--	--	--	--	--	--	--
TPS	--	--	--	--	10/1.3	--	--	--	--	--	--	--	--	--	--	--
KEC	--	--	--	--	3/0.4	2/0.3	1/0.2	--	1/0.1	1/0.1	0/0.1	0/0.1	1/0.1	1/0.1	--	--
BLD	--	--	--	--	--	295/41.3	2/2.4	--	--	--	--	--	--	--	--	--
AIADMK	--	--	--	--	--	19/3	--	12/1.6	11/1.5	11/1.6	0/0.6	18/1.8	10/1.9	--	9/1.7	37/3.3
JNPS	--	--	--	--	--	--	41/9.4	--	--	--	--	--	--	--	--	--
JNP	--	--	--	--	--	--	31/19	10/6.7	0/1	--	--	1/0.1	--	--	--	--
INCUI	--	--	--	--	--	--	13/5.3	--	2/3.3	6/0.5	--	--	--	--	--	--
TDP	--	--	--	--	--	--	--	30/4.1	--	13/3	16/3	12/2.8	29/3.7	5/3.0	6/2.5	16/2.5
AGP	--	--	--	--	--	--	--	7/1	--	1/0.5	5/0.8	0/0.3	--	2/0.5	1/0.4	--
ICS	--	--	--	--	--	--	--	5/1.6	--	--	--	--	--	--	--	--
LKD	--	--	--	--	--	--	--	3/5.7	--	--	--	--	--	--	--	--
BJP	--	--	--	--	--	--	--	2/7.4	86/11.3	121/20	161/20.3	179/25.6	182/23.8	138/22.2	116/18.8	282/31.1
JD	--	--	--	--	--	--	--	--	142/17.8	60/11.8	46/8.1	6/3.2	--	--	--	--
SADM	--	--	--	--	--	--	--	--	6/0.8	--	--	--	--	--	--	--
SDF	--	--	--	--	--	--	--	--	--	--	--	--	--	1/0.04	1/0.04	1/0.03
AIMIM	--	--	--	--	--	--	--	--	--	--	--	--	--	1/0.1	1/0.07	1/0.1
BSP	--	--	--	--	--	--	--	--	3/2.1	3/1.8	11/4	5/4.7	14/4.2	19/5.3	21/6.2	0/4.1
JMM	--	--	--	--	--	--	--	--	3/0.3	6/0.5	1/0.4	0/0.4	--	5/0.5	2/0.4	2/0.3

SHS	--	--	--	--	--	--	--	--	--	4/ 0.8	15/ 1.5	6/ 1.8	15/ 1.6	--	11/ 1.6	18/ 1.9
AITC	--	--	--	--	--	--	--	--	--	--	20/ 2.2	7/ 2.4	8/ 2.6	2/ 2.1	19/ 3.2	34/ 3.8
SP	--	--	--	--	--	--	--	--	--	--	17/ 3.3	20/ 4.9	26/ 3.8	--	23/ 3.4	5/ 3.4
SMT	--	--	--	--	--	--	--	--	--	--	8/2.2	12/1.8	--	--	--	--
INCT	--	--	--	--	--	--	--	--	--	--	4/1.5	--	--	--	--	--
HVP	--	--	--	--	--	--	--	--	--	--	3/0.4	1/0.2	--	--	--	--
RJD	--	--	--	--	--	--	--	--	--	--	--	17/2.8	7/2.8	24/2.4	4/1.3	4/1.3
TRS	--	--	--	--	--	--	--	--	--	--	--	--	--	5/0.6	2/0.6	11/1.2
BJD	--	--	--	--	--	--	--	--	--	--	--	9/ 1	10/ 1.2	11/ 1.3	14/ 1.6	20/ 1.7
INLD	--	--	--	--	--	--	--	--	--	--	--	4/0.5	5/0.6	--	--	2/0.5
PMK	--	--	--	--	--	--	--	--	--	--	--	4/0.4	5/0.7	6/0.6	--	1/0.3
MDMK	--	--	--	--	--	--	--	--	--	--	--	3/0.4	4/0.4	4/0.4	1/0.3	
JDU	--	--	--	--	--	--	--	--	--	--	--	--	21/ 3.1	8/ 2.4	20/ 1.5	2/ 1.1
NCP	--	--	--	--	--	--	--	--	--	--	--	--	8/2.3	9/1.8	9/2	6/1.6
HJCBL	--	--	--	--	--	--	--	--	--	--	--	--	--	--	1/0.2	--
JVM	--	--	--	--	--	--	--	--	--	--	--	--	--	--	1/0.2	--
AAP	--	--	--	--	--	--	--	--	--	--	--	--	--	--	--	4/2
RLSP	--	--	--	--	--	--	--	--	--	--	--	--	--	--	--	3/0.2
YSRCP	--	--	--	--	--	--	--	--	--	--	--	--	--	--	--	9/2.5
AUDF	--	--	--	--	--	--	--	--	--	--	--	--	--	--	--	3/0.4
OTHERS	4/3.4	3/0.8	5/1.2	6/0.2	6/5.9	4/1.8	2/1.4	5/2.4	8/4.4	8/4.3	8/4	16/6.1	12/4.5	7/1.5	7/2.8	5/5

Seats/Votes Share of Parties in Andhra Pradesh, 1957-2014

Parties	Year of Elections														
	1957	1962	1967	1971	1977	1980	1984	1989	1991	1996	1998	1999	2004	2009	2014
INC	37/ 51.5	34/ 48	35/ 46.8	28/ 55.7	41/ 57.4	41/ 56.2	6/ 41.8	39/ 51	25/ 45.6	22/ 39.7	22/3 8.5	5/ 42.8	29/ 41.6	33/ 39	2/ 11.5
BJS	0/0.1	0/1.2	0/1.4	0/1.6	--	--	--	--	--	--	--	--	--	--	--
CPI	2/12	7/21	1/11.4	1/5.9	0/2.7	0/3.7	1/1.9	0/2	1/1.9	2/2.4	2/2.6	0/1.3	1/1.3	0/1.6	--
PSP	0/3.6	0/0.1	0/0.20	--	--	--	--	--	--	--	--	--	--	--	--
SCF	0/1.2	--	--	--	--	--	--	--	--	--	--	--	--	--	--
PDF	2/11	--	--	--	--	--	--	--	--	--	--	--	--	--	--
PP	0/1.5	--	--	--	--	--	--	--	--	--	--	--	--	--	--
SWA	--	1/14.9	3/13.8	0/4.6	--	--	--	--	--	--	--	--	--	--	--
RPI	--	0/1	0/0.5	--	--	--	--	--	--	--	--	--	--	--	--
CPM	--	--	0/7.4	1/2.8	0/4.7	0/3.6	1/1.8	0/2.4	1/2.4	1/2.9	0/2.9	0/1.4	1/1	0/1.3	--
NCO	--	--	--	0/5.6	--	--	--	--	--	--	--	--	--	--	--
TPS	--	--	--	10/14.3	--	--	--	--	--	--	--	--	--	--	--
BLD	--	--	--	--	1/32.3	--	--	--	--	--	--	--	--	--	--
INCU	--	--	--	--	--	1/7.2	--	--	--	--	--	--	--	--	--
JNP	--	--	--	--	--	0/15.2	1/1.2	0/0.1	0/0.3	--	--	--	--	--	--
JPNS	--	--	--	--	--	0/6.4	--	--	--	--	--	--	--	--	--
BJP	--	--	--	--	--	--	1/2.2	0/2	1/9.6	0/5.7	4/18.3	7/9.9	0/8.4	0/3.8	3/8.5
TDP	--	--	--	--	--	--	30/44.8	2/34.5	13/32.3	16/32.6	12/32	29/39.9	5/33.1	6/24.9	16/29.1
JD	--	--	--	--	--	--	--	0/1.6	0/0.5	--	1/0.9	--	--	--	--
MIM	--	--	--	--	--	--	--	1/2.1	1/1.8	1/1.1	1/1.5	1/1.3	1/1.2	1/0.7	1/1.4
TRS	--	--	--	--	--	--	--	--	--	--	--	--	5/6.8	2/6.1	11/13.9
PRAP	--	--	--	--	--	--	--	--	--	--	--	--	--	0/15.7	--
YSRCP	--	--	--	--	--	--	--	--	--	--	--	--	--	--	9/28.9
OTHERS	--	--	0/0.4	0/1.3	0/0.1	0/0.1	1/1	0/1.7	0/1.5	0/12	0/1.4	0/2	0/2.4	0/3.7	0/0.3

Seats/Votes Share of Parties in Arunachal Pradesh, 1977-2014

Parties	Year of Elections										
	1977	1980	1984	1989	1991	1996	1998	1999	2004	2009	2014
INC	1/41.3	2/44.1	2/42.3	2/50	2/68.9	0/28.8	0/23.9	2/56.9	0/10	2/51.1	1/41.2
INCUI	--	10.9	--	--	--	--	--	--	--	--	--
PPA	--	0/40.2	0/34.6	0/35.2	--	--	--	--	--	--	0/7.9
JNP	--	--	0/4.2	--	--	--	--	--	--	--	--
BJP	--	--	--	--	0/6.1	0/17.4	0/21.7	0/16.3	2/53.9	0/37.2	1/46.1
JD	--	--	--	--	0/24.7	--	0/1.9	--	--	--	--
ARC	--	--	--	--	--	--	2/52.5	0/16.6	0/19.9	--	--
NCP	--	--	--	--	--	--	--	0/7.8	--	--	0/1
AITC	--	--	--	--	--	--	--	--	0/1.6	--	0/1.5
SP	--	--	--	--	--	--	--	--	0/1.3	--	--
SAP	--	--	--	--	--	--	--	--	0/1.3	--	--
AAP	--	--	--	--	--	--	--	--	--	--	0/0.6
OTHERS	--	--	--	--	--	--	--	0/2.4	--	0/11.1	0/0.7

Seats/Votes Share of Parties in Assam, 1952-2014

Parties	Year of Elections													
	1952	1957	1962	1967	1971	1977	1984	1991	1996	1998	1999	2004	2009	2014
INC	11/45.7	9/51.7	9/45.2	10/45.8	13/57	10/50.6	4/23.6	8/28.5	5/31.6	10/39	10/38.4	9/35.7	7/34.9	3/29.6
BJS	0/6.1	--	--	0/5.5	0/2.5	--	--	--	--	--	--	--	--	--
SOC	1/19.2	--	--	--	--	--	--	--	--	--	--	--	--	--
KMPP	0/10	--	--	--	--	--	--	--	--	--	--	--	--	--
TS	0/4.4	--	--	--	--	--	--	--	--	--	--	--	--	--
APP	0/1.4	--	--	--	--	--	--	--	--	--	--	--	--	--
CPI	--	0/10.3	0/7.1	1/8.3	0/5.7	0/1.4	0/1.4	0/2.2	--	0/1	0/0.6	0/1.7	--	--
PSP	--	2/20	2/19.2	2/12.8	0/4.6	--	--	--	--	--	--	--	--	--
SSP	--	--	--	0/3.8	0/1.4	--	--	--	--	--	--	--	--	--
AHL	--	--	1/3.7	1/3.8	1/3	--	--	--	--	--	--	--	--	--
NCO	--	--	--	--	0/2.9	--	--	--	--	--	--	--	--	--
CPM	--	--	--	--	0/1.4	0/2.9	0/3.6	1/4.7	1/3.9	0/3.3	0/1.8	0/0.7	--	0/0.7
RCP	--	--	0/1.3	--	--	0/1.2	--	--	--	--	--	--	--	--
BLD	--	--	--	--	--	3/35.8	--	--	--	--	--	--	--	--
INCU	--	--	--	--	--	--	--	--	--	--	--	--	--	--
JNP	--	--	--	--	--	--	0/3.5	0/0.7	--	--	--	--	--	--
BJP	--	--	--	--	--	--	0/0.4	2/9.6	1/15.9	1/24.5	2/29.8	2/22.9	4/16.2	7/36.5
AGP	--	--	--	--	--	--	7/33.4	1/17.6	5/27.8	0/12.7	0/11.9	2/20	1/15	0/3.8
UMFA	--	--	--	--	--	--	1/13	--	--	1/4.3	--	0/0.6	--	--
JD	--	--	--	--	--	--	--	0/5.2	0/0.7	0/0.1	--	--	--	--
ASDC	--	--	--	--	--	--	--	1/1.7	1/1.9	--	--	0/1	0/1.0	--
INCT	--	--	--	--	--	--	--	--	0/3.4	--	--	--	--	--
CPIML	--	--	--	--	--	--	--	--	--	--	1/2.3	0/1.1	--	--
AUDF	--	--	--	--	--	--	--	--	--	--	--	--	1/16.1	3/14.8
BPF	--	--	--	--	--	--	--	--	--	--	--	--	1/5.4	0/2.2
SP	--	--	--	--	--	--	--	--	--	--	--	0/1.1	0/0.2	--
RSP	--	--	--	--	--	--	--	--	--	--	--	0/0.11	--	--
OTHERS	0/13.7	--	0/2.9	0/1	--	0/0.5	2/10.9	0/15.6	0/3.7	1/5.6	0/5.8	0/3.7	0/1.1	0/2.5

Seats/Votes Share of Parties in Bihar, 1952-2014

Parties	Year of Elections															
	1952	1957	1962	1967	1971	1977	1980	1984	1989	1991	1996	1998	1999	2004	2009	2014
INC	45/ 45.8	41/ 44.5	39/ 43.9	34/ 34.8	39/ 40.1	0/ 22.9	30/ 36.4	48/ 51.8	4/ 28.1	1/ 24.2	2/ 13	5/ 7.3	4/ 8.8	3/ 4.5	2/ 10.3	2/ 8.4
BJS	0/0.4	0/0.5	0/2.3	1/11.1	2/12.1	--	--	--	--	--	--	--	--	--	--	--
CPI	0/0.4	0/5	1/6.4	5/9.9	5/9.9	0/5.6	4/7.3	2/8.2	4/7.9	8/7.6	3/5.1	0/3.4	0/2.7	0/1.2	0/1.4	0/1.2
SOC	3/21.3	--	--	--	--	--	--	--	--	--	--	--	--	--	--	--
JKD	3/7.5	6/7.5	3/4.7	1/1.3	1/0.9	0/0.5	1/0.7	--	--	--	--	--	--	--	--	--
PSP	--	2/21.6	2/12.7	1/7.4	0/1.1	--	--	--	--	--	--	--	--	--	--	--
SWA	--	--	7/18.2	0/3.4	--	--	--	--	--	--	--	--	--	--	--	--
SOP	--	--	1/6.1	--	--	--	--	--	--	--	--	--	--	--	--	--
CPM	--	--	--	0/0.3	0/0.8	0/0.2	0/0.9	0/1.1	1/1.4	1/1.4	0/0.8	0/0.4	1/1	0/0.8	0/0.5	
SSP	--	--	--	7/17.8	2/9.5	--	--	--	--	--	--	--	--	--	--	--
NCO	--	--	--	--	3/11.5	--	--	--	--	--	--	--	--	--	--	--
BLD	--	--	--	--	--	52/65	--	--	--	--	--	--	--	--	--	--
INCUI	--	--	--	--	--	--	4/6.8	--	--	--	--	--	--	--	--	--
JNP	--	--	--	--	--	--	8/23.6	1/6.7	0/0.9	0/5.9	--	--	--	--	--	--
JPNS	--	--	--	--	--	--	5/16.6	--	--	--	--	--	--	--	--	--
BJP	--	--	--	--	--	--	--	0/6.9	9/13	5/16	18/20.5	20/24	23/23.1	5/15.6	12/13.9	22/29.4
LKD	--	--	--	--	--	--	--	1/13.7	--	--	--	--	--	--	--	--
JMM	--	--	--	--	--	--	--	0/1.3	3/3.2	6/4.5	1/2.9	--	--	--	--	--
JD	--	--	--	--	--	--	--	--	31/36.4	32/34.1	22/31.9	1/8.7	--	--	--	--
SAP	--	--	--	--	--	--	--	--	--	--	6/14.5	10/15.7	--	--	--	--
BSP	--	--	--	--	--	--	--	--	--	--	--	0/0.5	0/1	0/3.6	0/4.4	0/2.1
RJD	--	--	--	--	--	--	--	--	--	--	--	17/26.6	7/28.3	22/30.7	4/19.3	4/20.1
JDU	--	--	--	--	--	--	--	--	--	--	--	--	18/20.8	6/22.4	20/24.1	2/15.8
CPIML	--	--	--	--	--	--	--	--	--	--	--	--	0/2.5	0/2.4	0/1.9	0/1.3
LJNSP	--	--	--	--	--	--	--	--	--	--	--	--	--	4/8.2	0/6.5	6/6.4
RLSP	--	--	--	--	--	--	--	--	--	--	--	--	--	--	--	3/3
OTHERS	3/11.6	3/5	0/0.5	--	0/5	1/1.2	0/0.3	1/1.9	2/4.8	0/3.5	1/5.8	1/11.4	0/7.7	0/8.2	0/3.9	0/5.2

Seats/Votes Share of Parties in Goa, 1967-2014

Parties	Year of Elections												
	1967	1971	1977	1980	1984	1989	1991	1996	1998	1999	2004	2009	2014
INC	0/5.5	1/24.4	1/40	0/12.2	2/46.2	1/47.4	2/57.7	0/34.4	2/31.6	0/39	1/29.8	1/22.6	0/36.6
CPI	0/2.1	--	--	--	0/1.5	--	0/1.5	0/0.9	--	0/2.9	0/2.2	0/2.4	0/1.2
UGS	1/36	--	--	--	--	--	--	--	--	--	--	--	--
PSP	0/1.9	--	--	--	--	--	--	--	--	--	--	--	--
NCO	--	0/0.7	--	--	--	--	--	--	--	--	--	--	--
UGDP	--	1/24.8	--	--	--	--	--	1/22.7	0/24.9	--	0/1.1	0/3	--
MAG	--	0/23.1	1/40.5	1/36.1	0/20.3	1/27.9	0/20.6	1/26.8	0/13.2	--	0/1.4	0/1.2	--
BLD	--	--	0/14.7	--	--	--	--	--	--	--	--	--	--
INCUI	--	--	--	1/27.6	--	--	--	--	--	--	--	--	--
JNP	--	--	--	0/6.9	0/3.1	0/0.6	--	--	--	--	--	--	--
JPNS	--	--	--	0/3.4	--	--	--	--	--	--	--	--	--
BJP	--	--	--	--	0/3.1	0/0.7	0/15.6	0/13.7	0/30	2/51.5	1/46.8	1/44.8	2/53.5
LKD	--	--	--	--	0/1.3	--	--	--	--	--	--	--	--
JD	--	--	--	--	--	0/18.1	0/1	--	--	--	--	--	--
BSP	--	--	--	--	--	0/1.3	--	--	--	--	--	--	--
NCP	--	--	--	--	--	--	--	--	--	0/3.8	0/16	0/23.3	--
SHS	--	--	--	--	--	--	--	--	--	--	0/1.1	--	--
AITC	--	--	--	--	--	--	--	--	--	--	--	--	0/1.5
AAP	--	--	--	--	--	--	--	--	--	--	--	--	0/3.3
OTHERS	0/0.6	--	--	--	0/0.4	--	0/0.15	0/0.1	--	0/0.13	--	--	--

Seats/Votes Share of Parties in Gujarat, 1962-2014

Parties	Year of Elections													
	1962	1967	1971	1977	1980	1984	1989	1991	1996	1998	1999	2004	2009	2014
INC	16/52.6	11/46.9	11/44.9	10/46.9	25/54.8	24/53.2	3/37.2	5/29	10/38.7	7/36.5	6/45.4	12/43.9	11/43.4	0/33.2
BJS	0/1.4		0/2.2	--	--	--	--	--	--	--	--	--	--	--
SWA	4/25	12/39.9	2/5.5	--	--	--	--	--	--	--	--	--	--	--
PSP	1/7.1	0/1.5	0/1.6	--	--	--	--	--	--	--	--	--	--	--
SOP	0/0.1	--	--	--	--	--	--	--	--	--	--	--	--	--
NJP	1/3.7	--	--	--	--	--	--	--	--	--	--	--	--	--
RPI	0/0.9	0/2	--	--	--	--	--	--	--	--	--	--	--	--
SSP	--	0/0.2	--	--	--	--	--	--	--	--	--	--	--	--
NCO	--	--	11/39.7	--	--	--	--	--	--	--	--	--	--	--
BLD	--	--	--	16/49.5	--	--	--	--	--	--	--	--	--	--
INCUI	--	--	--	--	0/1.7	--	--	--	--	--	--	--	--	--
JNP	--	--	--	--	1/36.9	1/16.6	0/0.2	0/0.6	--	--	--	--	--	--
JNPS	--	--	--	--	0/2.9	--	--	--	--	--	--	--	--	--
CPI	--	--	--	--	0/0.2	0/0.1	--	--	0/0.1	0/0.1	0/0.1	--	--	--
BJP	--	--	--	--	--	1/18.6	12/30.5	20/50.4	16/48.5	19/48.3	20/52.5	14/47.4	15/46.6	26/58.7
LKD	--	--	--	--	--	0/2.3	--	--	--	--	--	--	--	--
JD	--	--	--	--	--	--	11/27.8	0/3.4	0/0.4	0/2.9	--	--	--	--
JDG	--	--	--	--	--	--	--	1/13.1	--	--	--	--	--	--
INCT	--	--	--	--	--	--	--	--	0/1.9	--	--	--	--	--
GAVP	--	--	--	--	--	--	--	--	0/1.7	--	--	--	--	--
AIRJP	--	--	--	--	--	--	--	--	--	0/10.2	--	--	--	--
JDUI	--	--	--	--	--	--	--	--	--	--	0/0.4	0/0.9	0/0.4	0/0.4
NCP	--	--	--	--	--	--	--	--	--	--	0/0.5	0/1.2	0/0.3	0/0.9
BSP	--	--	--	--	--	--	--	--	--	--	--	0/1.6	0/1.6	0/0.9
AAP	--	--	--	--	--	--	--	--	--	--	--	--	--	0/1.2
OTHERS	0/0.3S	--	0/0.5	--	--	0/0.9	0/0.14	0/0.6	0/0.12	0/0.9	0/0.4	0/4.7	0/4.7	0/2.9

Seats/Votes Share of Parties in Haryana, 1967-2014

Parties	Year of Elections												
	1967	1971	1977	1980	1984	1989	1991	1996	1998	1999	2004	2009	2014
INC	7/44.1	7/52.6	0/18	5/32.6	10/55	4/46.2	9/37.2	2/22.6	3/26	0/34.9	9/42.1	9/41.8	1/22.9
BJS	1/19.9	1/11.2	--	--	--	--	--	0/0.4	0/0.2	--	--	--	--
CPI	0/1.7	--	0/0.6	--	0/0.9	0/0.3	--	--	--	--	--	--	--
CPM	0/0.8	0/0.1	--	--	--	--	--	--	0/0.3	0/0.2	--	0/0.2	--
SWA	0/5.6	--	--	--	--	--	--	--	--	--	--	--	--
SSP	0/5.5	0/2.9	--	--	--	--	--	--	--	--	--	--	--
RPI	0/2.3	--	--	--	--	--	--	--	--	--	--	--	--
PSP	0/0.4	--	--	--	--	--	--	--	--	--	--	--	--
NCO	--	0/11.3	--	--	--	--	--	--	--	--	--	--	--
VHP	--	1/9.2	0/4.7	--	--	--	--	--	--	--	--	--	--
RPK	--	0/1.1	--	0/0.1	--	--	--	--	--	--	--	--	--
BLD	--	--	10/70.4	--	--	--	--	--	--	--	--	--	--
JNP	--	--	--	1/28.1	0/1.4	0/0.7	0/25.4	--	--	--	--	--	--
JNPS	--	--	--	4/33.5	--	--	--	--	--	--	--	--	--
BJP	--	--	--	--	0/7.5	0/8.3	0/10.2	4/19.7	1/18.9	5/29.2	1/17.2	0/12.1	7/34.7
LKD	--	--	--	--	0/19.1	--	--	--	--	--	--	--	--
ICJ	--	--	--	--	0/10.5	--	--	--	--	--	--	--	--
JD	--	--	--	--	--	6/38.9	0/12.5	0/1.5	0/0.4	--	--	--	--
BSP	--	--	--	--	--	0/1.6	--	--	1/7.7	0/2	0/5	0/15.8	0/4.6
HVP	--	--	--	--	--	--	1/5.4	3/15.2	1/11.6	0/2.7	0/6.3	--	--
INCT	--	--	--	--	--	--	--	0/2.3	--	--	--	--	--
SAP	--	--	--	--	--	--	--	0/19	--	--	--	--	--
HLDR	--	--	--	--	--	--	--	--	4/25.9	--	--	--	--
INLD	--	--	--	--	--	--	--	--	--	5/28.7	0/22.4	0/15.8	2/24.4
AAP	--	--	--	--	--	--	--	--	--	--	--	--	0/4.3
HJCBL	--	--	--	--	--	--	--	--	--	--	--	1/10	0/6.1
OTHERS	--	0/1.8	0/0.2	0/0.3	--	0/0.4	0/3.8	0/9	0/7.8	0/0.7	0/3.9	0/1.7	--

Seats/Votes Share of Parties in Himachal Pradesh, 1952-2014

Parties	Year of Elections															
	1952	1957	1962	1967	1971	1977	1980	1984	1989	1991	1996	1998	1999	2004	2009	2014
INC	3/ 52.4	4/ 47.3	4/ 68.6	6/ 48.4	4/ 75.8	0/ 38.6	4/ 52.1	4/ 67.6	1/ 42	2/ 46.2	4/ 54.3	1/ 41.9	0/ 39.5	3/ 51.9	1/ 45.6	0/ 40.7
BJS	0/10.7	--	0/4.5	0/19.1	0/10.6	--	--	--	--	--	--	--	--	--	--	--
SOC	0/7.5	--	--	--	--	--	--	--	--	--	--	--	--	--	--	--
KMPP	0/12.3	--	--	--	--	--	--	--	--	--	--	--	--	--	--	--
SCF	0/8.5	0/8.6	--	--	--	--	--	--	--	--	--	--	--	--	--	--
CPI	--	0/2.7	--	0/2.1	0/1.6	0/1.4	0/1.9	0/0.9	0/1.3	0/0.7	0/0.4	0/0.6	0/0.5	--	--	--
PSP	--	0/11.8	--	0/0.7	--	--	--	--	--	--	--	--	--	--	--	--
SWA	--	--	0/12.8	0/4.4	0/0.9	--	--	--	--	--	--	--	--	--	--	--
RPI	--	--	0/6.6	0/2.3	--	--	--	--	--	--	--	--	--	--	--	--
NCO	--	--	--	--	0/3	--	--	--	--	--	--	--	--	--	--	--
LKP	--	--	--	--	0/5	--	--	--	--	--	--	--	--	--	--	--
BLD	--	--	--	--	--	4/57.2	--	--	--	--	--	--	--	--	--	--
JNPS	--	--	--	--	--	--	0/5	--	--	--	--	--	--	--	--	--
BJP	--	--	--	--	--	--	--	0/23.3	3/45.3	2/42.8	0/39.6	3/51.4	3/46.2	1/44.2	3/49.6	4/53.4
JD	--	--	--	--	--	--	--	--	0/7.3	0/7	0/0.2	0/0.3	--	--	--	--
JP	--	--	--	--	--	--	0/36.4	0/3.6	0/0.2	0//1.1	--	--	--	--	--	--
DDP	--	--	--	--	--	--	--	--	0/2	0/0.4	0/1.6	--	--	--	--	--
SP	--	--	--	--	--	--	--	--	--	--	0/0.7	--	--	0/0.3	0/0.1	--
BSP	--	--	--	--	--	--	--	--	--	--	0/0.7	0/1.1	0/0.3	0/1.7	0/1.6	0/1.6
CPM	--	--	--	--	--	--	--	--	--	--	0/1	--	--	--	0/0.8	--
HVC	--	--	--	--	--	--	--	--	--	--	--	0/3.6	1/12.4	--	--	--
AAP	--	--	--	--	--	--	--	--	--	--	--	--	--	--	--	0/2.0
OTHERS	--	--	--	0/0.6	--	0/0.8	0/0.3	0/1.3	0/0.13	0/0.3	0/1.6	0/0.4	0/0.6	0/0.2	0/0.9	0/2.0

Seats/Votes Share of Parties in Jammu & Kashmir, 1967-2014

Parties	Year of Elections											
	1967	1971	1977	1980	1984	1989	1996	1998	1999	2004	2009	2014
INC	--	5/54.1	3/16.4	1/18.7	3/30.2	2/39	4/27.5	1/19.3	0/17.8	2/27.8	2/24.7	0/22.9
BJS	--	0/12.2	--	--	--	--	--					
JKN	--	--	2/33.9	3/36.9	3/46.2	3/6.8	--	3/36.3	4/28.9	2/22	3/19.1	0/11.1
DNC	--	--	--	--	--	--	--	--	--	--	--	--
SAD	--	0/1.1	--	--	--	--	--	--	--	--	--	--
PSP	--	0/0.5	--	--	--	--	--	--	--	--	--	--
BLD	--	--	0/8.2	--	--	--	--	--	--	--	--	--
INCUI	--	--	--	1/14.5	--	--	--	--	--	--	--	--
JNP	--	--	--	0/8	--	0/1.1	--	--	--	--	--	--
BJP	--	--	--	--	0/1.7	0/7.2	1/19	2/28.7	2/31.5	0/23.4	0/18.6	3/32.4
JPP	--	--	--	--	0/4.3	0/2.2	0/4.8	--	--	0/3	0/2.8	0/1.2
JD	--	--	--	--	--	0/30.1	1/17.6	0/0.5	--	--	--	--
BSP	--	--	--	--	--	--	0/6	0/5	0/4.8	0/2.2	0/3.1	0/1.5
CPM	--	--	--	--	--	--	--	--	0/1	0/0.8	--	--
JKAL	--	--	--	--	--	--	--	--	0/1.8	0/0.07	--	--
JKPDP	--	--	--	--	--	--	--	--	--	1/11.9	0/20.1	3/20.5
JKPC	--	--	--	--	--	--	--	--	--	--	0/2.5	0/2
OTHERS	--	--	--	--	0/0.2	0/4	0/0.8	0/3	0/4.6	0/1.7	0/2.9	0/1.2

Seats/Votes Share of Parties in Karnataka, 1957-2014

Parties	Year of Elections														
	1957	1962	1967	1971	1977	1980	1984	1989	1991	1996	1998	1999	2004	2009	2014
INC	23/55.5	25/52.7	18/49	27/70.9	26/56.8	27/56.3	24/51.6	27/48.9	23/42.1	5/30.5	9/36.2	18/45.4	8/36.8	6/37.7	9/40.8
BJS	0/2.5	0/2.7	0/2.3	0/1.9	--	--	--	--	--	--	--	--	--	--	--
CPI	0/1.5	0/1.5	--	0/0.1	0/0.4	0/0.3	0/1	0/0.8	0/0.6	0/0.4	0/0.1	--	--	--	--
PSP	1/18.7	0/14.5	2/5.1	0/1.3	--	--	--	--	--	--	--	--	--	--	--
SCF	½	--	--	--	--	--	--	--	--	--	--	--	--	--	--
SWA	--	0/7.8	5/14.3	0/3.7	--	--	--	--	--	--	--	--	--	--	--
LSS	--	1/3.3	--	--	--	--	--	--	--	--	--	--	--	--	--
RPI	--	0/3.9	0/3.1	--	--	--	--	--	--	--	--	--	--	--	--
CPM	--	--	0/1.6	0/0.6	--	0/0.2	0/0.1	--	0/0.2	0/0.4	0/0.1	0/0.1	--	--	--
SSP	--	--	1/2.6	0/1	--	--	--	--	--	--	--	--	--	--	--
NCO	--	--	--	0/16.4	--	--	--	--	--	--	--	--	--	--	--
BLD	--	--	--	--	2/39.9	--	--	--	--	--	--	--	--	--	--
RPK	--	--	--	--	0/0.3	--	--	--	--	--	--	--	--	--	--
INCUI	--	--	--	--	--	0/16.7	--	--	--	--	--	--	--	--	--
JNP	--	--	--	--	--	1/22.9	4/35.1	0/10.6	1/3.8	0/0.2	--	--	--	--	--
JPNS	--	--	--	--	--	0/1.2	--	--	--	--	--	--	--	--	--
BJP	--	--	--	--	--	--	0/4.7	0/2.6	4/28.8	6/24.9	13/27	7/27.2	18/34.5	19/41.7	17/43
JD	--	--	--	--	--	--	--	1/28.3	0/18.5	0/1.6	3/21.7	--	--	--	--
KRS	--	--	--	--	--	--	--	0/2.7	0/2.9	--	--	--	--	--	--
RPK	--	--	--	--	--	--	--	0/1.3	--	--	--	--	--	--	--
KCP	--	--	--	--	--	--	--	--	--	1/3.1	--	--	--	--	--
BSP	--	--	--	--	--	--	--	--	--	--	0/0.6	0/0.7	0/1.2	0/1.7	--
LKS	--	--	--	--	--	--	--	--	--	--	3/11.5	--	--	--	--
KTVF	--	--	--	--	--	--	--	--	--	--	0/1.8	--	--	--	--
JDS	--	--	--	--	--	--	--	--	--	--	--	0/10.9	2/20.5	3/13.6	2/11
JDU	--	--	--	--	--	--	--	--	--	--	--	3/13.3	0/1.9	--	--
OTHERS	--	--	--	--	--	--	0/0.5	0/0.3	0/0.3	16/34.9	0/0.2	0/0.6	0/3.7	0/1.4	0/2.8

Seats/Votes Share of Parties in Kerala, 1957-2014

Parties	Year of Elections														
	1957	1962	1967	1971	1977	1980	1984	1989	1991	1996	1998	1999	2004	2009	2014
INC	6/34.8	6/34.3	1/36.2	6/19.8	11/29.1	5/26.1	13/33.3	14/41.7	13/38.8	7/38	8/38.7	8/39.4	0/32.1	13/40.1	8/31.1
CPI	9/37.5	6/35.5	3/8	3/9.1	4/10.4	2/6.5	0/7.4	0/6.2	0/8.1	2/8.2	2/8.3	0/7.6	3/7.9	0/7.4	1/7.6
PSP	1/7.3	0/9.9	--	--	--	--	--	--	--	--	--	--	--	--	--
RSP	0/5.1	1/3.5	--	--	--	--	--	--	--	--	--	--	--	--	1/2.3
BJS	--	0/0.7	0/1.4	0/1.4	--	--	--	--	--	--	--	--	--	--	--
MUL	--	2/4.5	--	--	--	--	--	--	--	--	--	--	1/4.9	2/5.1	2/4.5
SWA	--	0/0.2	0/2.3	--	--	--	--	--	--	--	--	--	--	--	--
CPM	--	--	9/24.6	2/26.2	0/20.3	6/19.1	1/22.3	2/22.9	3/20.7	5/21.2	6/21	8/27.9	12/31.5	4/30.5	5/21.6
SSP	--	--	3/8.2	0/0.9	--	--	--	--	--	--	--	--	--	--	--
KEC	--	--	0/5.1	--	--	--	--	--	--	--	--	--	1/1.4	0/2.1	--
LDF	--	--	0/12.6	1/14.5	0/15.9	1/9.1	1/10.9	0/13.9	1/10.1	2/7.2	1/11.4	1/4.5	--	--	--
NCO	--	--	--	0/1.4	--	--	--	--	--	--	--	--	--	--	--
UDF	--	--	--	7/24.7	5/14.6	2/13.9	4/15.5	2/5.7	3/10.4	3/7.7	3/7.4	3/6.7	--	--	--
BLD	--	--	--	--	0/7.2	--	--	--	--	--	--	--	--	--	--
INCUI	--	--	--	--	--	3/15.9	--	--	--	--	--	--	--	--	--
JNP	--	--	--	--	--	0/6.7	1/2.1	0/0.3	0/0.1	--	--	--	--	--	--
BJP	--	--	--	--	--	--	0/1.8	0/4.5	--	0/5.6	0/8	0/6.6	0/10.4	0/6.3	0/10.3
LKD	--	--	--	--	--	--	0/1.7	--	0/4.6	--	--	--	--	--	--
JD	--	--	--	--	--	--	--	0/1.9	0/4.5	1/4.4	0/3.9	--	--	--	--
BSP	--	--	--	--	--	--	--	--	--	--	0/0.1	0/0.1	0/0.5	0/1.3	--
JDU	--	--	--	--	--	--	--	--	--	--	--	0/1.4	--	--	--
JDS	--	--	--	--	--	--	--	--	--	--	--	--	1/2.3	--	0/1.7
KECM	--	--	--	--	--	--	--	--	--	--	--	--	--	1/2.5	0/2.4
OTHERS	--	--	0/0.3	0/0.7	0/0.2	0/0.1	--	2/2	0/1.6	0/3.1	0/0.9	0/1	0/13.2	0/0.9	0/6

Seats/Votes Share of Parties in Madhya Pradesh, 1952-2014

Parties	Year of Elections															
	1952	1957	1962	1967	1971	1977	1980	1984	1989	1991	1996	1998	1999	2004	2009	2014
INC	27/ 51.6	35/ 52.1	24/ 39.6	24/ 40.8	21/ 40.8	1/ 32.5	35/ 47.2	40/ 57.1	8/ 37.7	27/ 15.3	8/ 31	10/ 39.4	11/ 43.9	4/ 34.1	12/ 40.1	2/ 34.9
BJS	0/4.9	0/14	3/17.9	10/29.6	10/29.6	--	--	--	--	--	0/0.7	--	--	--	--	--
CPI	0/0.4	0/0.4	0/0.9	0/1.4	0/1	0/0.5	0/0.5	0/0.9	0/0.6	0/0.4	--	0/0.7	--	--	--	--
SOC	0/12.2	--	--	--	--	--	--	--	--	--	--	--	--	--	--	--
KMPP	0/6.3	--	--	--	--	--	--	--	--	--	--	--	--	--	--	--
HMS	0/0.3	1/4.9	0/3.8	--	0/0.4	--	--	--	--	--	--	--	--	--	--	--
RRP	0/5.5	0/3.3	1/4.8	--	--	--	0/0.1	--	--	--	--	--	--	--	--	--
PSP	--	0/16.1	3/12.3	--	--	--	--	--	--	--	--	--	--	--	--	--
SWA	--	--	0/0.7	0/5	0/1.2	--	--	--	--	--	--	--	--	--	--	--
SOP	--	--	1/5.3	1/2.7	--	--	--	--	--	--	--	--	--	--	--	--
SSP	--	--	--	0/3.7	1/1.6	--	--	--	--	--	--	--	--	--	--	--
NCO	--	--	--	--	0/2.3	--	--	--	--	--	--	--	--	--	--	--
BLD	--	--	--	--	--	37/57.9	--	--	--	--	--	--	--	--	--	--
RPK	--	--	--	--	--	1/1.3	0/0.4	--	--	--	--	--	--	--	--	--
JNP	--	--	--	--	--	--	4/31.3	0/2.7	0/0.1	0/0.6	--	--	--	--	--	--
JNPS	--	--	--	--	--	--	0/7.8	--	--	--	--	--	--	--	--	--
INCUC	--	--	--	--	--	--	0/1.3	--	--	--	--	--	--	--	--	--
JD	--	--	--	--	--	--	--	--	4/8.3	0/4.2	0/1.1	0/1.2	--	--	--	--
BSP	--	--	--	--	--	--	--	--	0/4.3	1/3.5	2/8.2	0/8.7	0/5.2	0/4.8	1/5.9	0/3.8
DDP	--	--	--	--	--	--	--	--	0/1.3	0/0.3	--	--	--	--	--	--
INCT	--	--	--	--	--	--	--	--	--	--	1/4.7	--	--	--	--	--
MPVC	--	--	--	--	--	--	--	--	--	--	1/1.5	--	--	--	--	--
SP	--	--	--	--	--	--	--	--	--	--	--	0/0.7	0/1.4	0/3.2	0/2.8	--
BJP	--	--	--	--	--	--	--	0/30	27/39.7	12/41.9	27/41.3	30/15.7	27/46.5	25/48.1	16/43.5	27/54
GGP	--	--	--	--	--	--	--	--	--	--	--	--	--	0/3.1	--	--
AAP	--	--	--	--	--	--	--	--	--	--	--	--	--	--	--	0/1.2
OTHERS	0/6.9	0/1.3	0/2.3	0/3.2	0/0.4	--	0/0.1	0/1.1	0/0.4	0/0.5	0/1.9	0/2.3	0/1.6	0/2.8	0/2.8	0/2.9

Seats/Votes Share of Parties in Maharashtra, 1962-2014

Parties	Year of Elections													
	1962	1967	1971	1977	1980	1984	1989	1991	1996	1998	1999	2004	2009	2014
INC	41/52.9	37/48.5	42/63.2	20/47	39/53.3	43/51.2	28/48	38/48.4	15/34.8	33/43.6	10/29.7	13/23.8	17/19.6	2/18.1
BJS	0/4.4	0/7.4	0/5.2	--	--	--	--	--	--	--	--	--	--	--
CPI	0/4.1	2/5.1	0/1.9	0/0.7	0/0.5	0/1	1/1.9	0/1	0/0.6	0/0.1	0/0.1	0/0.1	0/0.1	--
SWA	0/0.3	0/1	--	--	--	--	--	--	--	--	--	--	--	--
PSP	1/5.4	1/2.6	--	--	--	--	--	--	--	--	--	--	--	--
RPI	0/11.7	--	--	--	0/1.7	--	--	--	0/4.9	4/4.1	--	1/1	--	--
PWP	0/6.3	2/7.5	0/5.3	5/6.1	0/2.6	1/2.1	0/2.3	0/1.3	--	--	--	--	--	0/1
SSP	--	2/3.7	0/2.2	--	--	--	--	--	--	--	--	--	--	--
NCO	--	--	0/2.7	--	--	--	--	--	--	--	--	--	--	--
CPM	--	--	0/0.5	3/3.6	0/1.4	0/1.5	0/1.2	1/1.3	0/1.1	0/0.6	0/0.5	0/0.7	0/0.5	
FBL	--	--	1/2.5	--	--	--	--	--	--	--	--	--	--	--
BLD	--	--	--	19/31.4	--	--	--	--	--	--	--	--	--	--
RPK	--	--	--	1/4.3	--	--	--	--	--	--	--	--	--	--
INCUI	--	--	--	--	1/11.8	--	--	--	--	--	--	--	--	--
JNP	--	--	--	--	8/20.4	1/7.6	--	0/0.7	--	--	--	--	--	--
JPNS	--	--	--	--	0/1.1	--	--	--	--	--	--	--	--	--
BJP	--	--	--	--	--	0/10.1	10/23.7	5/20.2	18/21.8	4/22.5	13/21.2	13/22.6	9/18.2	23/27.3
ICS	--	--	--	--	--	2/12.1	--	--	--	--	--	--	--	--
JD	--	--	--	--	--	--	5/11	0/10.5	0/3.3	0/1.7	--	--	--	--
SHS	--	--	--	--	--	--	1/1.2	4/9.5	15/16.8	6/19.7	15/16.9	12/20.1	11/17	18/20.6
BSP	--	--	--	--	--	--	--	--	--	0/0.8	0/0.3	0/3.1	0/4.8	0/2.6
NCP	--	--	--	--	--	--	--	--	--	--	6/21.6	9/18.3	8/19.3	4/16
MNS	--	--	--	--	--	--	--	--	--	--	--	--	0/4.1	0/1.5
SWP	--	--	--	--	--	--	--	--	--	--	--	--	0/1.3	1/2.3
AAP	--	--	--	--	--	--	--	--	--	--	--	--	--	0/2.2
OTHERS	0/0.7	0/12.7	2/8.2	0/0.8	0/2.2	0/0.12	0/5.3	0/2.9	0/7	1/4.5	3/6.4	0/6.5	0/7.0	0/4.2

Seats/Votes Share of Parties in Manipur, 1952-2014

Parties	Year of Elections															
	1952	1957	1962	1967	1971	1977	1980	1984	1989	1991	1996	1998	1999	2004	2009	2014
INC	1/23.8	1/28	1/30.9	0/32.7	2/30	2/45.3	1/23	2/35	2/45	1/38.4	2/40.2	0/18.6	0/25.3	1/14.9	2/42.9	2/41.7
CPI	0/8.6	0/11.1	0/8.1	1/28.9	0/15	0/11.5	1/9.7	0/9.5	0/5.6	--	0/4	1/20.5	0/4	0/10.1	0/14.9	0/14
SOC	1/19.3	--	--	--	--	--	--	--	--	--	--	--	--	--	--	--
AMNU	0/14.5	--	--	--	--	--	--	--	--	--	--	--	--	--	--	--
KNA	0/8	--	--	--	--	--	--	--	--	--	--	--	--	--	--	--
PSP	--	0/7.3	0/4.1	--	--	--	--	--	--	--	--	--	--	--	--	--
SOP	--	--	1/26.3	--	--	--	--	--	--	--	--	--	--	--	--	--
SSP	--	--	--	0/5.8	0/5	--	--	--	--	--	--	--	--	--	--	--
NCO	--	--	--	--	0/9	--	--	--	--	--	--	--	--	--	--	--
MRP	--	--	--	--	0/12	0/23.4	0/6.9	0/17.7	0/17.1	0/20	--	--	--	--	--	--
BLD	--	--	--	--	--	0/8.6	--	--	--	--	--	--	--	--	--	--
INCUI	--	--	--	--	--	--	0/16.6	--	--	--	--	--	--	--	--	--
JNP	--	--	--	--	--	--	0/17.6	--	--	0/0.7	--	--	--	--	--	--
BJP	--	--	--	--	--	--	--	0/7	0/2.3	0/8.1	0/5.3	0/12.6	0/1	0/20.7	0/9.5	0/11.9
LKD	--	--	--	--	--	--	--	0/0.8	--	--	--	--	--	--	--	--
ICS	--	--	--	--	--	--	--	0/4.1	--	0/10.9	--	--	--	--	--	--
JD	--	--	--	--	--	--	--	--	0/1.5	0/18.6	0/1.8	--	--	--	--	--
KNA	--	--	--	--	--	--	--	--	0/12.6	--	--	--	--	--	--	--
INCT	--	--	--	--	--	--	--	--	--	--	0/3.9	--	--	--	--	--
FPM	--	--	--	--	--	--	--	--	--	--	0/12.6	--	--	0/8.5	--	--
MPP	--	--	--	--	--	--	--	--	--	--	0/6.7	0/15.4	--	--	0/7.7	--
MSCP	--	--	--	--	--	--	--	--	--	--	--	1/25.4	1/24.9	0/7.4	--	--
JDU	--	--	--	--	--	--	--	--	--	--	--	--	0/3.2	0/3.6	--	--
NCP	--	--	--	--	--	--	--	--	--	--	--	--	1/13.5	0/10.4	0/6	0/4.4
AITC	--	--	--	--	--	--	--	--	--	--	--	--	--	0/1.9	--	0/3.7
PDA	--	--	--	--	--	--	--	--	--	--	--	--	--	--	0/16.8	--
NPF	--	--	--	--	--	--	--	--	--	--	--	--	--	--	--	0/19.9
OTHERS	0/16.8	--	--	--	--	--	--	--	0/3.7	0/0.2	0/2.4	0/6.9	0/21.5	--	0/0.6	0/0.9

Seats/Votes Share of Parties in Meghalaya, 1977-2014

Parties	Year of Elections										
	1977	1980	1984	1989	1991	1996	1998	1999	2004	2009	2014
INC	1/35.9	1/74.3	2/62.4	2/55.4	2/56.6	1/53.7	2/47.6	1/32.8	1/45.6	1/44.8	1/37.9
CPI	--	0/6.3	0/3.7	0/4.8	0/1.3	0/1.4	0/1.4	0/0.7	--	--	--
AHL	--	0/11.8	--	--	--	--	--	--	--	--	--
BJP	--	--	--	--	0/6.9	0/9.1	0/9.0	0/9.5	0/8.7	--	0/8.9
NCP	--	--	--	--	--	--	--	1/28.0	--	1/18.8	--
UDP	--	--	--	--	--	--	0/25.5	0/16.4	--	--	--
PDP	--	--	--	--	--	--	0/6.0	--	--	--	--
AITC	--	--	--	--	--	--	--	--	1/28.3	--	--
NPP	--	--	--	--	--	--	--	--	--	--	1/22.2
OTHERS	--	--	--	--	--	--	0/10.5	0/11.8	--	0/33.8	0/11.4

Seats/Votes Share of Parties in Mizoram, 1977-2014

Parties	Year of Elections										
	1977	1980	1984	1989	1991	1996	1998	1999	2004	2009	2014
INC	0/37.1	--	1/100	1/48.4	1/38.1	1/42.5	0/34.9	--	--	1/65.6	1/48.6
PPC	--	0/42	--	--	--	--	--	--	--	--	--
MNF	--	--	--	0/31.3	0/34.1	0/37.6	0/26.9	0/2.9	1/52.5	--	--
DP	--	--	--	0/19.3	--	--	--	--	--	--	--
JD	--	--	--	--	0/23.5	--	--	--	--	--	--
BJP	--	--	--	--	--	--	0/2.9	--	--	--	--
RJD	--	--	--	--	--	--	0/0.3	0/0.7	--	--	--
EU	--	--	--	--	--	--	--	--	0/1.9	--	--
NCP	--	--	--	--	--	--	--	--	--	0/1.0	--
AAP	--	--	--	--	--	--	--	--	--	--	0/2.7
OTHERS	--	--	--	--	--	--	--	0/0.8	--	--	--

Seats/Votes Share of Parties in Nagaland, 1967-2014

Parties	Year of Elections												
	1967	1971	1977	1980	1984	1989	1991	1996	1998	1999	2004	2009	2014
NNO	1/100	0/39.5	--	--	--	--	--	--	--	--	--	--	--
UFN	--	1/60.5	--	--	--	--	--	--	--	--	--	--	--
INC	--	--	0/48.3	--	1/64.6	1/60.3	0/44.3	1/62.3	1/86.7	1/71.2	0/25.8	0/29.4	0/30.1
UDF	--	--	1/51.7	0/49	--	--	--	--	--	--	--	--	--
NND	--	--	--	--	0/29.3	--	--	--	--	--	--	--	--
NPC	--	--	--	--	--	0/39.7	1/52.7	--	--	--	--	--	--
BJP	--	--	--	--	--	--	0/3	--	--	0/5.1	--	--	--
LKS	--	--	--	--	--	--	--	--	0/13.3	0/0.8	--	--	--
NPF	--	--	--	--	--	--	--	--	--	--	1/73.1	1/70	1/68.7
JDS	--	--	--	--	--	--	--	--	--	--	--	--	--
TMC	--	--	--	--	--	--	--	--	--	--	--	0/0.7	--
SOP	--	--	--	--	--	--	--	--	--	--	--	--	0/0.9

Seats/Votes Share of Parties in Odisha, 1952-2014

Parties	Year of Elections															
	1952	1957	1962	1967	1971	1977	1980	1984	1989	1991	1996	1998	1999	2004	2009	2014
INC	11/ 42.5	7/ 40	14/ 55.5	6/ 33.3	15/ 38.5	4/ 38.2	20/ 56.1	20/ 57.5	3/ 38.4	13/ 44.1	16/ 44.9	5/ 41	2/ 36.9	7/ 40.4	6/ 32.8	0/ 24.8
CPI	1/5.8	1/4.8	0/5.1	0/3.9	1/4.3	0/3.1	0/0.8	0/1.5	1/3.7	1/3.1	0/0.3	0/1	0/1.2		0/2.6	
SOC	1/15.4	--	--	--	--	--	--	--	--	--	--	--	--	--	--	--
KMPP	0/1.4	--	--	--	--	--	--	--	--	--	--	--	--	--	--	--
GP	5/26.2	7/29.1	4/17.4	--	--	--	--	--	--	--	--	--	--	--	--	--
PSP	--	2/15.4	1/15.5	4/16.1	--	--	--	--	--	--	--	--	--	--	--	--
SWA	--	--	0/1.2	8/30.9	3/15.9	--	--	--	--	--	--	--	--	--	--	--
SOP	--	--	1/2.7	--	--	--	--	--	--	--	--	--	--	--	--	--
BJS	--	--	--	0/0.6	0/0.2	--	--	--	--	--	--	--	--	--	--	--
SSP	--	--	--	1/4.5	0/1.8	--	--	--	--	--	--	--	--	--	--	--
NCO	--	--	--	--	0/2.2	--	--	--	--	--	--	--	--	--	--	--
CPM	--	--	--	--	0/1	½	0/0.9	0/1.8	1/3	1/2.1	0/1.7	0/0.4	0/0.2	--	--	--
UTC	--	--	--	--	1/23.6	--	--	--	--	--	--	--	--	--	--	--
BLD	--	--	--	--	--	15/51.8	--	--	--	--	--	--	--	--	--	--
INCUI	--	--	--	--	--	--	0/2.1	--	--	--	--	--	--	--	--	--
JNP	--	--	--	--	--	--	0/14.1	1/32	0/1.2	0/3	--	--	--	--	--	--
JPNS	--	--	--	--	--	--	1/19.6	--	--	--	--	--	--	--	--	--
BJP	--	--	--	--	--	--	--	0/1.2	0/1.3	0/9.5	0/13.4	7/21.2	9/24.6	2/19.3	1/16.9	1/21.5
LKD	--	--	--	--	--	--	--	0/1	--	--	--	--	--	--	--	--
JD	--	--	--	--	--	--	--	--	16/49.5	6/34.6	4/30.1	0/4.9	--	--	--	--
SAP	--	--	--	--	--	--	--	--	--	--	1/1.6	--	--	--	--	--
JMM	--	--	--	--	--	--	--	--	--	--	0/1.6	--	0/1.7	1/1.5	0/1.8	--
BJD	--	--	--	--	--	--	--	--	--	--	--	9/27.5	10/33	11/30	14/37.3	20/45.2
OTHERS	--	--	--	--	0/10	0/0.6	0/1.7	0/0.2	0/0.8	0/1.4	0/0.7	0/3.6	0/0.13	0/2	0/6.5	0/5.4

Seats/Votes Share of Parties in Punjab, 1952-2014

Parties	Year of Elections															
	1952	1957	1962	1967	1971	1977	1980	1984	1989	1991	1996	1998	1999	2004	2009	2014
INC	16/42.8	21/51.3	14/41.3	9/37.3	10/46	0/34.9	12/52.5	6/37.6	2/26.5	12/49.3	2/35.1	0/25.9	8/38.4	2/34.2	8/45.2	3/33.1
BJS	0/5.6	0/16	3/15.2	1/12.5	0/4.5	--	--	--	--	--	--	--	--	--	--	--
CPI	0/5	1/16.8	0/4.7	0/4.3	2/6.2	0/1.7	0/1.3	0/3.8	0/2.1	0/1.6	0/1.6	0/3.4	1/3.7	0/2.6	--	--
SOC	0/2.2	--	--	--	--	--	--	--	--	--	--	--	--	--	--	--
SAD	2/11.4	--	3/12.2	3/22.6	1/30.9	9/42.3	1/23.4	7/37.2	--	0/2.6	8/28.7	8/32.9	2/28.6	8/34.3	4/33.9	4/26.3
ZP	0/5.8	--	--	--	--	--	--	--	--	--	--	--	--	--	--	--
PSP	--	0/0.6	--	--	--	--	--	--	--	--	--	--	--	--	--	--
SCF	--	0/4.1	--	--	--	--	--	--	--	--	--	--	--	--	--	--
SWA	--	--	0/4.3	0/4.7	--	--	--	--	--	--	--	--	--	--	--	--
SOP	--	--	1/2.3	--	--	--	--	--	--	--	--	--	--	--	--	--
HLS	--	--	1/1.7	--	--	--	--	--	--	--	--	--	--	--	--	--
CPM	--	--	--	0/1.9	--	1/4.9	0/2.5	0/3	0/3.9	0/4	0/2.7	0/1.1	0/2.2	0/1.8	--	--
SADM	--	--	--	0/4.4	0/2.2	--	--	--	6/29.2	--	--	0/2.7	1/3.4	0/3.8	--	--
NCO	--	--	--	--	0/4.6	--	--	--	--	--	--	--	--	--	--	--
BLD	--	--	--	--	--	3/12.5	--	--	--	--	--	--	--	--	--	--
INCUI	--	--	--	--	--	--	0/2.6	--	--	--	--	--	--	--	--	--
JNP	--	--	--	--	--	--	0/10	0/2.2	0/0.1	0/0.9	--	--	--	--	--	--
JNPS	--	--	--	--	--	--	0/2.2	--	--	--	--	--	--	--	--	--
BJP	--	--	--	--	--	--	--	0/3.4	0/4.2	0/16.5	0/6.5	3/11.7	1/3.8	3/10.5	1/10.1	2/8.7
JD	--	--	--	--	--	--	--	--	1/5.5	0/1.3	0/2.7	1/4.2	--	--	--	--
BSP	--	--	--	--	--	--	--	--	1/8.6	1/19.7	3/9.4	0/12.7	0/3.8	0/7.7	0/5.8	0/2
AAP	--	--	--	--	--	--	--	--	--	--	--	--	--	--	--	4/24.4
OTHERS	0/8.6	--	0/6.5	0/3	0/0.4	0/0.4	0/0.2	--	0/7.2	0/0.1	0/5.8	0/0.5	0/7.8	0/2.5	0/2.8	0/1.7

Seats/Votes Share of Parties in Rajasthan, 1952-2014

Parties	Year of Elections															
	1952	1957	1962	1967	1971	1977	1980	1984	1989	1991	1996	1998	1999	2004	2009	2014
INC	9/ 41.4	19/ 53.6	14/ 37.6	10/ 40	14/ 50.3	1/ 30.6	18/ 42.6	25/ 52.7	0/ 37	13/ 44	12/ 40.5	18/ 44.5	9/ 45.1	4/ 41.4	20/ 47.2	0/ 30.4
BJS	1/3	0/11.2	1/9.3	3/10.3	4/12.4	--	--	--	--	--	--	--	--	--	--	--
CPI	0/0.2	0/4.8	0/3	0/0.7	0/0.5	0/0.5	0/0.5	0/0.3	0/0.2	0/0.1	0/0.2	0/0.6	0/0.4	--	--	--
SOC	0/3.4	--	--	--	--	--	--	--	--	--	--	--	--	--	--	--
KMPP	0/0.9	--	--	--	--	--	--	--	--	--	--	--	--	--	--	--
RRP	3/9.4	0/1.6	1/3.7	--	--	0/0.1	0/0.1	--	--	--	--	--	--	--	--	--
KLP	1/10.1	--	--	--	--	--	--	--	--	--	--	--	--	--	--	--
PSP	--	--	--	0/0.1	--	--	--	--	--	--	--	--	--	--	--	--
SWA	--	--	3/18.1	8/27	3/14.7	--	--	--	--	--	--	--	--	--	--	--
SOP	--	--	0/3.7	--	--	--	0/0.1	--	--	--	--	--	--	--	--	--
CPM	--	--	--	0/2.1	0/0.7	0/0.4	0/0.2	0/0.2	1/2.1	0/0.7	0/0.4	0/1.3	0/0.5	--	0/1.3	--
SSP	--	--	--	0/2.6	0/2.5	--	--	--	--	--	--	--	--	--	--	--
RPI	--	--	--	0/0.2	--	--	--	--	--	--	--	--	--	--	--	--
NCO	--	--	--	--	0/1.7	--	--	--	--	--	--	--	--	--	--	--
BKD	--	--	--	--	0/3.9	--	--	--	--	--	--	--	--	--	--	--
BLD	--	--	--	--	--	24/65.2	--	--	--	--	--	--	--	--	--	--
INCU	--	--	--	--	--	--	1/6	--	--	--	--	--	--	--	--	--
JNP	--	--	--	--	--	--	4/31.7	0/3.9	0/0.4	0/3.2	--	--	--	--	--	--
JPNS	--	--	--	--	--	--	2/12	--	--	--	--	--	--	--	--	--
BJP	--	--	--	--	--	--	--	0/ 23.7	13/ 29.6	12/ 40.9	12/ 42.4	5/ 41.7	16/ 47.2	21/ 49	4/ 36.6	25/ 54.9
LKD	--	--	--	--	--	--	--	0/11.2	--	--	--	--	--	--	--	--
JD	--	--	--	--	--	--	--	--	11/25.7	0/6.2	0/2.6	0/2.3	--	--	--	--
INCT	--	--	--	--	--	--	--	--	--	--	1/3.6	--	--	--	--	--
BSP	--	--	--	--	--	--	--	--	--	--	0/1.4	0/2.1	0/2.8	0/3.2	0/3.4	0/2.3
JDU	--	--	--	--	--	--	--	--	--	--	--	--	0/1.6	--	--	--
OTHERS	0/2.4	0/1.3	0/0.2	--	0/1	0/0.1	--	0/1.2	0/1.5	0/0.11	0/1.7	0/3.7	0/0.10	0/2.7	0/2.3	0/4.5

Seats/Votes Share of Parties in Sikkim, 1977-2014

Parties	Year of Elections										
	1977	1980	1984	1989	1991	1996	1998	1999	2004	2009	2014
INC	1/100	0/1.8	0/25.8	--	--	--	0/33.1	0/4.8	0/27.4	0/29.6	0/2.3
SJP	--	1/61.7	--	--	--	--	--	--	--	--	--
SCR	--	0/22.6	--	--	--	--	--	--	--	--	--
JNP	--	--	0/0.7	--	--	--	--	--	--	--	--
CPI	--	--	0/1.0	--	--	--	--	--	--	--	--
SSP	--	--	--	1/68.5	1/90.1	0/24.5	--	0/42.1	--	--	--
RIS	--	--	--	0/9.6	--	--	--	--	--	--	--
CPM	--	--	--	--	0/2.9	--	--	--	--	--	--
SDF	--	--	--	--	--	1/72.1	1/65.7	1/52.6	1/69.8	1/63.3	1/53.0
BJP	--	--	--	--	--	--	--	--	--	0/1.8	0/2.4
SHRF	--	--	--	--	--	--	--	--	0/1.3	--	--
OTHERS	--	0/9.9	--	--	--	--	--	--	0/3.9	0/3.9	0/40.9

Seats/Votes Share of Parties in Tamil Nadu, 1957-2014

Parties	Year of Elections														
	1957	1962	1967	1971	1977	1980	1984	1989	1991	1996	1998	1999	2004	2009	2014
INC	31/ 46.5	31/ 45.3	3/ 41.7	9/ 12.5	14/ 22.3	20/ 31.6	25/ 40.5	27/ 39.9	28/ 42.6	0/ 18.3	0/ 4.8	2/ 11.1	10/ 14.4	8/ 15.0	0/ 4.3
CPI	2/10.1	2/10.2	0/1.9	4/5.4	3/4.6	0/3.6	0/3.4	1/2	0/2	2/2.3	1/2.5	0/2.6	2/3	1/2.9	--
PSP	0/3.6	0/1.7	--	--	--	--	--	--	--	--	--	--	--	--	--
BJS	--	0/0.1	0/0.2	0/0.1	--	--	--	--	--	--	--	--	--	--	--
SWA	--	0/10.5	6/9.2	--	--	--	--	--	--	--	--	--	--	--	--
DMK	--	7/ 18.6	25/ 35.8	23/ 35.3	1/ 18.1	16/ 23	2/ 25.9	0/ 27.5	0/ 25.6	37/ 52.6	8/ 40.3	22/ 40	16/ 24.6	18/ 25.1	0/ 23.6
FBL	--	1/1.4	--	1/1.3	--	0/0.7	--	--	--	--	--	--	--	--	--
CPM	--	--	4/6.9	0/1.6	0/1.5	0/3.2	0/2.8	0/3.7	0/2.5	0/1.8	0/0.6	1/2.4	2/2.9	1/2.2	--
NCO	--	--	--	1/30.4	3/17.7	--	--	--	--	--	--	--	--	--	--
SSP	--	--	--	0/0.9	--	--	--	--	--	--	--	--	--	--	--
AIADMK	--	--	--	--	18/30.6	2/25.4	12/18.4	11/17.1	11/18.1	0/7.8	26/39.2	10/25.7	0/29.8	9/22.9	37/44.3
JNP	--	--	--	--	--	0/8	0/4.2	0/0.1	0/0.2	--	--	--	--	--	--
BJP	--	--	--	--	--	--	0/0.1	0/0.3	0/1.7	0/2.9	3/6.9	4/7.1	0/5.1	0/2.3	1/5.5
JD	--	--	--	--	--	--	--	0/1.4	0/2.9	0/1.5	--	--	--	--	--
INCT	--	--	--	--	--	--	--	--	--	0/2.2	--	--	--	--	--
PMK	--	--	--	--	--	--	--	--	--	--	--	--	5/6.7	0/5.7	1/4.4
MDMK	--	--	--	--	--	--	--	--	--	--	--	--	4/5.9	1/3.7	0/3.5
JDU	--	--	--	--	--	--	--	--	--	--	--	--	0/3.1	--	--
VCK	--	--	--	--	--	--	--	--	--	--	--	--	--	1/2.4	0/1.5
DMDK	--	--	--	--	--	--	--	--	--	--	--	--	--	0/10.1	0/5.1
OTHERS	--	0/4.7	0/0.3	0/9.3	--	0/0.1	0/1.9	0/5.7	0/3	0/7.5	0/3.2	0/9.8	0/1.4	0/3.9	0/4.3

Seats/Votes Share of Parties in Tripura, 1952-2014

Parties	Year of Elections															
	1952	1957	1962	1967	1971	1977	1980	1984	1989	1991	1996	1998	1999	2004	2009	2014
INC	0/25.6	1/46	0/42.8	2/58.2	0/36.3	1/39.7	0/22.6	0/45.6	2/55.5	2/82.8	0/34.1	0/42.1	0/13.9	0/14.3	0/30.8	0/15.2
BJS	0/6.1	--	--	--	0/0.5	--	--	--	--	--	--	--	--	--	--	--
CPI	2/61.3	1/45.1	2/51.3	--	0/6.8	0/2.2	--	--	--	--	--	--	--	--	--	--
PSP	--	--	0/2.0	--	--	--	--	--	--	--	--	--	--	--	--	--
EIT	--	--	0/3.9	--	--	--	--	--	--	--	--	--	--	--	--	--
CPM	--	--	--	0/41.8	2/43.5	0/34.1	2/47.5	2/50.5	0/41.7	0/6.5	2/52.4	2/48.8	2/56.2	2/68.8	2/61.7	2/64
BLD	--	--	--	--	--	1/17.8	--	--	--	--	--	--	--	--	--	--
TUS	--	--	--	--	--	0/6.1	0/13.5	--	--	--	0/4.1	--	--	--	--	--
INCUI	--	--	--	--	--	--	0/0.6	--	--	--	--	--	--	--	--	--
JNP	--	--	--	--	--	--	0/1	--	--	--	--	--	--	--	--	--
BJP	--	--	--	--	--	--	--	0/0.8	0/0.6	0/3.0	0/6.5	0/8.2	0/12.8	0/7.8	0/3.4	0/5.7
AMB	--	--	--	--	--	--	--	--	0/1.1	0/3.0	0/1.2	0/0.5	0/0.6	0/1.1	--	--
CPIML	--	--	--	--	--	--	--	--	--	0/0.6	--	--	--	0.5	--	--
TRMC	--	--	--	--	--	--	--	--	--	--	--	--	0/14.5	0/5.1	--	0/9.6
OTHERS	--	--	--	--	--	--	--	--	--	0/0.2	0/0.8	0/0.1	0/0.6	--	0/2.2	0/3.4

Seats/Votes Share of Parties in Uttar Pradesh, 1952-2014

Parties	Year of Elections															
	1952	1957	1962	1967	1971	1977	1980	1984	1989	1991	1996	1998	1999	2004	2009	2014
INC	81/ 53	70/ 46.3	62/ 38.2	47/ 33.4	73/ 48.6	0/ 25	51/ 35.9	83/ 51	15/ 31.8	5/ 18.3	5/ 8.1	0/ 6	10/ 14.7	9/ 12	21/ 18.3	2/ 7.5
BJS	0/7.3	2/14.8	7/17.6	12/22.2	4/12.3	--	--	--	--	--	--	--	--	--	--	--
CPI	0/0.3	1/1.7	2/3.6	5/3.3	4/3.7	0/1.1	1/1.6	0/1.7	2/1.4	1/1	0/0.2	0/0.2	0/0.3	--	--	--
SOC	2/12.9	--	--	--	--	--	--	--	--	--	--	--	--	--	--	--
HMS	1/1.9	--	1/1.4	--	--	--	--	--	1/0.6	--	--	--	--	--	--	--
PSP	--	4/15.3	2/10.3	2/3.7	0/1.4	--	--	--	--	--	--	--	--	--	--	--
SWA	--	--	3/5	1/4.8	--	--	--	--	--	--	--	--	--	--	--	--
SOP	--	--	1/8.6	--	--	--	--	--	--	--	--	--	--	--	--	--
RPI	--	--	3/4.3	1/4.1	--	--	--	--	--	--	--	--	--	--	--	--
CPM	--	--	--	1/1.2	0/0.2	0/0.1	0/0.1	--	1/0.5	0/0.7	0/0.7	0/0.2	0/0.1	--	--	--
SSP	--	--	--	8/10.3	0/4.1	--	--	--	--	--	--	--	--	--	--	--
NCO	--	--	--	--	1/8.6	--	--	--	--	--	--	--	--	--	--	--
BKD	--	--	--	--	1/12.7	--	--	--	--	--	--	--	--	--	--	--
BLD	--	--	--	--	--	85/68.1	--	--	--	--	--	--	--	--	--	--
JNP	--	--	--	--	--	--	3/22.6	0/3.6	0/1	4/10.1	--	--	--	--	--	--
JPNS	--	--	--	--	--	--	29/29	--	--	--	--	--	--	--	--	--
BJP	--	--	--	--	--	--	--	0/6.4	8/7.6	52/32.8	52/33.4	57/36.5	29/27.6	10/22.2	10/17.5	71/42.3
LKD	--	--	--	--	--	--	--	2/21.6	--	--	--	--	--	--	--	--
JD	--	--	--	--	--	--	--	--	54/35.9	22/21.6	2/4.3	0/0.5	--	--	--	--
BSP	--	--	--	--	--	--	--	--	2/9.9	1/8.7	6/20.6	4/20.9	14/22.1	19/24.7	20/27.4	0/19.6
AD	--	--	--	--	--	--	--	--	--	--	--	--	--	0/1.4	--	2/1
SAP	--	--	--	--	--	--	--	--	--	--	--	2/0.8	--	--	--	--
SP	--	--	--	--	--	--	--	--	--	--	16/20.8	20/28.7	26/24.1	35/26.7	23/23.3	5/22.2
LKDA	--	--	--	--	--	--	--	--	--	--	--	--	2/2.5	--	--	--
JDU	--	--	--	--	--	--	--	--	--	--	--	--	--	1/0.8	--	--
RLD	--	--	--	--	--	--	--	--	--	--	--	--	--	3/4.5	5/3.3	--
OTHERS	0/13.3	0/0.4	0/0.8	--	--	0/0.3	0/2.1	0/2.9	0/2.9	0/1.6	3/5.2	1/3.4	3/5	2/3.9	0/5.8	0/3.9

Seats/Votes Share of Parties in West Bengal, 1952-2014

Parties	Year of Elections															
	1952	1957	1962	1967	1971	1977	1980	1984	1989	1991	1996	1998	1999	2004	2009	2014
INC	24/ 42.1	23/ 48.2	22/ 46.8	14/ 39.7	13/ 28.2	3/ 29.4	4/ 36.5	16/ 48.2	4/ 41.4	5/ 36.2	9/ 40.1	1/ 15.2	3/ 13.3	6/ 14.6	6/ 13.5	4/ 9.6
BJS	2/5.9	0/1.4	0/1.1	0/1.4	0/0.9	--	--	--	--	--	--	--	--	--	--	--
CPI	5/9.5	6/19	9/29.4	5/9.1	3/10.6	0/6.5	3/4.3	3/3.8	3/3.9	3/3.7	3/3.8	3/3.6	3/3.5	3/4	2/3.6	0/2.3
SOC	0/2	--	--	--	--	--	--	--	--	--	--	--	--	--	--	--
KMPP	0/8.9	--	--	--	--	--	--	--	--	--	--	--	--	--	--	--
HMS	1/4.3	0/5.4	--	--	--	--	--	--	--	--	--	--	--	--	--	--
RSP	2/2.4	--	1/2.6	--	--	--	--	--	--	--	--	--	--	3/4.5	2/3.6	0/2.4
FBL	0/4.5	2/6.4	1/6.3	2/4.9	½	--	--	--	--	--	--	--	--	--	2/3	0/2.1
PSP	--	2/5.7	0/4.5	--	--	--	--	--	--	--	--	--	--	--	--	--
SWA	--	--	0/1	0/0.8	--	--	--	--	--	--	--	--	--	--	--	--
CPM	--	--	--	5/15.7	20/34.3	17/26.1	28/39.9	18/35.9	27/38.4	27/35.2	23/36.7	24/35.4	21/35.6	26/38.6	9/33.1	2/22.7
SSP	--	--	--	1/1.5	0/0.9	--	--	--	--	--	--	--	--	--	--	--
BCP	--	--	--	5/9.4	¼	--	--	--	--	--	--	--	--	--	--	--
NCO	--	--	--	--	0/7	--	--	--	--	--	--	--	--	--	--	--
BLD	--	--	--	--	--	15/21.5	--	--	--	--	--	--	--	--	--	--
LF	--	--	--	--	--	6/8.2	7/9.8	5/8.8	8/10	7/8.2	7/8.2	6/7.8	5/7.7	--	--	--
SUC	--	--	--	--	--	0/1.4	0/1.2	--	--	--	--	--	--	--	--	--
INCUI	--	--	--	--	--	--	0/1.2	--	--	--	--	--	--	--	--	--
JNP	--	--	--	--	--	--	0/4.5	--	0/0.1	0/0.3	--	--	--	--	--	--
BJP	--	--	--	--	--	--	--	0/0.4	0/1.7	0/11.7	0/6.9	1/10.2	2/11.1	0/8.1	1/6.2	2/16.8
JD	--	--	--	--	--	--	--	--	0/0.5	0/1.1	0/0.4	--	--	--	--	--
AITC	--	--	--	--	--	--	--	--	--	--	--	7/24.4	8/26	1/21	19/31.2	34/39.4
AIFB	--	--	--	--	--	--	--	--	--	--	--	--	--	3/3.7	--	--
OTHERS	0/1.9	--	1/2.2	1/2.2	1/6.3	0/0.1	0/0.10	0/0.9	0/1.9	0/1.7	0/1.9	0/2.4	0/0.9	0/2.4	0/2.9	0/2.6

Source: Election Commission of India, http://eci.nic.in/eci_main1/ElectionStatistics.aspx, retrieved on 1st June, 2012.

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