Kantian Aesthetics:

A Study of Beauty in Nature and Art

A thesis submitted to the University of Hyderabad in partial fulfillment of the requirements for the award of the degree of

Doctor of Philosophy in Philosophy

by

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CERTIFICATE

This is to certify that the thesis entitled **Kantian Aesthetics: A Study of Beauty in Nature and Art** submitted to the University of Hyderabad in fulfillment of the requirements for the award of the Degree of Philosophy in Philosophy is a bonafied record of original work done by **Mr**. **Ali Asghar Mollazehi** during the period of his study in the Department of Philosophy, University of Hyderabad, under my guidance and supervision and that the thesis has not been submitted to any other University or Institute of learning for the award of any degree.

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DECLARATION

I hereby declare that this thesis entitled **Kantian Aesthetics: A Study of Beauty in Nature and Art** submitted for the award of the degree of Doctor of Philosophy in Philosophy to the University of Hyderabad, embodies the result of bonafied research work carried out by me under the supervision and guidance of **Prof. S. G. Kulkarni.** It has not been submitted for any other degree to any other University or Institute of learning.

signature of the Candidate

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To my

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CHAPTER-I

THEMATIC AND HISTORICAL PRELIMINARIES

I.1 the Reemergence of Aesthetics

By and large, all civilizations display a sense of values by considering certain things to be valuable in them. Friendship, concern for others, loyalty to the collective to which they belong, respect for knowledge and other higher pursuits of life, etc., have enjoyed the status of values. However, three values are taken to be the fundamental values, namely, Truth, Goodness, and Beauty. It is, therefore, not surprising that philosophers in different civilizational contexts have focused their attention on these values. In both western and eastern philosophical traditions one finds a serious engagement with these fundamental values.

The philosophical concern with beauty has taken into account beauty as it is found both in nature and human artifacts. As everyone knows, the philosophical engagement with art in the western intellectual tradition has a long history. However this history is a chequered one. Unlike Metaphysics and Epistemology, Aesthetics didn't emerge with the inception of Philosophy itself, in the works of early Greek thinkers like Thales and his successors. This is because these thinkers concerned themselves exclusively with the first principle/s underlying Nature. As Greek naturalistic philosophies evolved, they developed a strong tendency to reject poetic discourse as a legitimate cognitive

enterprise. The poets of the times challenged this view. The bone of contention became the issue "Who has monopoly over Truth, the philosophers or the poets?" In fact, the philosopher Anaximenes seems to have said about the poet, Hesiod, "People think that this is the wisest man an earth but he doesn't know the difference between day and night". Aesthetics as a philosophical engagement with Beauty has its beginning in the controversy over who has monopoly over truth, philosopher or poets.

However, a detailed and somewhat systematic philosophy of Beauty is to be found in the works of Plato, who in spite of his high level of artistic sensibility shared the negative view of his predecessors regarding art as a creative human endeavor. His negative view of art is grounded in his metaphysical and epistemological doctrines. Even while recognizing the popular perception of art as an embodiment of creativity Plato made its creativity itself the target of his attack since the creativity involved in the production of art itself is responsible for its being removed twice from reality. Thus, the beginnings of philosophy of Beauty in western tradition are not only belated, as we just noted, but also are anything but positive.

As we shall see, the belatedness and negative thrust of its birth have been more than compensated by the rich work of Aristotle whose ideas in the philosophy of art laid firm foundations for the subject. Aristotle did not dismiss art as an inferior endeavor. However, his followers over centuries till the beginnings of modern philosophy in the 17th century relegated Aristotle's works on art to the background, thanks to their exclusive valorization of his metaphysics and, in particular, his theology. At best their concern with art was confined to the religious and theological context. It is an irony in the

history of ideas that the periods which saw best work of art could not produce path working in the philosophy of art.

The condition of philosophy of art didn't undergo any change for the better with the rise of modern philosophy in the 17th century. Modern philosophers who set for themselves the epistemological project of providing new and firm foundations to knowledge didn't have much to say about matters aesthetic. The idea of beauty or any of its cognate concepts didn't figure in their scheme of innate ideas. The empiricists construed experience so narrowly that their epistemological canvas didn't have any place for the aesthetic dimension of our experience. David Hume, the most consistent empiricist, no doubt, dwelt upon aesthetic experience but ensured that the aesthetic dimension of our experience remained outside the bounds of our cognitive endeavor and was dumped in the realm of the emotive. It was only Kant, as we shall see, who resuscitated the philosophical engagement with Beauty. Aesthetics, so revived by Kant, had its body enriched by Hegel who, however, provided art a metaphysical significance by taking art as an expression of Spirit in its process of self-realization as Absolute.

However, after Hegel work on aesthetics was continued only by those philosophers who were not part of the mainstream. The philosophical concern with art suffered a major set back with the rise of Positivism which dominated the first half of the 20th century. Central to the positivist philosophy are two related tenets: fact-value dichotomy and the verification theory of meaningfulness. According to the positivists, aesthetic discourse has only an emotive significance as it is bereft of any cognitive content. But even after positivism collapsed the philosophical engagement with Beauty couldn't come to full life. In fact, Aesthetics didn't occupy a position in the mainstream of philosophy. For

instance, the widely read text book in philosophy, *An Introduction of Philosophical Analysis,* by John Hospers contained a chapter on Aesthetics in its first edition. But this chapter disappeared in the subsequent editions.

However, significantly there is a revival of interest in aesthetics. The sustained attacks on the fact-value dichotomy and the related tenets like literal-metaphorical dichotomy-the vestiges of the past-are responsible for this revival in the Anglo-American world. The emergences of philosophical schools like phenomenology and Hermeneutics have added vigor to the vibrant growth of aesthetics. It is this changed fortune of aesthetics that has motivated this work.

After looking at the trajectory of aesthetics marked by periods of prolonged hibernation, it is necessary to take a glance at various problems which constitute the subject - matter of aesthetics.

I.2 Aesthetics and philosophy of art

Before we proceed, a few words about the distinction between aesthetics and philosophy of art are in order. This distinction is drawn in various ways by various scholars. According to Stephen Davies, aesthetics maintains "that consideration of the aesthetic in art is adequate for art's appreciation as art. Reflection on a work's artistic properties is not relevant to its proper reception" (2006, 55),whereas the philosophy of art, denying this, "maintains that awareness of a work's of artistic properties is crucial not only to understanding it but also to identifying it as the art work it is"(*Ibid*).

However, Davies himself adds a warning that not everyone made the distinction that he has made. But Davies is right in categorically stating that the term 'philosophy of art' is associated with a change that accrued in the middle of 20th century in the Anglo-American philosophers' reflection on art. But he seems to be wrong when he asserts that such a change is to be traced to the transition from aesthetic functionalism to institutional theory that treats art objects as socio historical products. This is because not all approaches in the philosophy of art fall into intuitional mode of understanding. According to one view philosophy of art can be taken to include 'aesthetics' which is a normative inquiry in to the nature of beauty. Aesthetics seeks to identify the standards which should be met by in an experience to be aesthetic and a work of art to be beautiful. Philosophy of art is an epistemology of art in the sense it inquires into the nature of cognition of art object and the cognitive statues of aesthetic judgements. So construed philosophy of art incorporates aesthetics since to answer the epistemological questions regarding art one needs to presuppose adequate conception of standards of aesthetic experience and aesthetic success of works of art.

However, a more simple and convincing distinction between aesthetics and philosophy of art deems aesthetics to be wider field than philosophy of art and in fact the later is included in the former. According to this view, aesthetics is a normative inquiry into the nature of beauty both in nature and in art where as philosophy of art is that part of aesthetics which studies beauty in art and in that sense 'aesthetics' is an umbrella term which designates a field which has philosophy of art as one of its two parts, the other part being the study of beauty in nature. Obviously, the former is more epistemologically oriented than its counterpart in aesthetics. In fact, philosophy of art is taken to be one of

special epistemologies like philosophy of Science, Philosophy of Religion, etc, which are inquires into the nature and limits of specific kinds of knowledge. This conception of the relation between the aesthetic and the philosophy of art may suggest the idea that nature as the object of aesthetics experience and a work of art as an object of aesthetic experience may not have anything common experientially and in fact the two are distinct as the latter has a strong a epistemic dimension which the former lacks. This may not be convincing to many. However, Kant to a great extent overcomes this difficulty by relating art and nature when he says, "art can only be termed beautiful, where we are conscious of its being art, while yet it has the appearance of nature" (1952, 306, 167). As we shall see, Kant has shown that our experience of Beauty in nature is no less epistemically charged than our experience of Beauty in art even though the contention that attributed to him that aesthetic judgements are non-cognitive is highly problematic.

Before we proceed further, we may note that though philosophy of art as theory of beauty in art is one of the two streams of aesthetics whose other stream is theory of beauty in nature. Philosophy of art is more than aesthetics of art this is because philosophy of art deals with questions which are tenuously or at least less organically linked to the question of beauty in art some of such questions are as follows:

a) How is a work of art related to its medium?

b) Can a work of art be an object of knowledge?

c) Given that the purpose of art is both representation and expression, how are they related?

d) How is representation in art to be distinguished from non-artistic representation?

e) How is expression in art to be distinguished from non-artistic expression?

f) Is expression in art only expression of feeling?

g) What is the distinction, if any, between form and style?

h) What is the relation between form and content? Does is coincide with medium and subject matter?

i) Given that there are many arts, can we answer the question "what is art"?

j) What is the purpose of art? How to figure out the purpose of art so as to shed light on its relation to everyday life?

It is to credit of Kant that he not only addresses the question concerning the nature of beauty in art (in addition to the nature of beauty in nature which for him is the paradigmatic instance of beauty) but also some of the questions mentioned above or questions akin to them though answers may have an embryo form. In other words his philosophy of art is something more than aesthetics of art in short one can find in Kant an insightful study of (1) Beauty in nature, (2) Beauty in art and non-aesthetics dimension of art. Of course, in Kant's view extent of importance and hence, the extent of his engagement with them differs in degree.

I.3 Pre-Kantian Aesthetics: A Bird's Eye-View

To facilitate our elaborate discussion of Kantian aesthetics and to place it within an intellectual tradition that has a long history it is necessary to take a birds-eye-view of the pre-Kantian philosophical engagement with Beauty. In this connection we discuss the views of Plato, Aristotle and Hume, whose works constitute mail stones in the history of aesthetics. However, it may be noted that there aesthetic engagement had an almost

exclusive focus on art with the result aesthetic and the philosophy of art almost completely coincided.

I. 3. A Plato

Plato's Aesthetics is significant for a verity of reasons. First of all, the very idea of Plato that philosophy should attempt to arrive at definitions that represent the Essences which he called 'Forms' has been applied to the phenomenon of Beauty including and epically in Art. As Gordon Graham pointed out "Plato held that everything has an eternal unchanging 'Form' which the things we see around us mirror or imitate. In a similar way, it can be argued, philosophical aesthetics suppose that there is universal unchanging form called 'Art' which can be apprehended at any and every time" (2000, 182). Secondly, for the first time in the history of western philosophy, Plato worked out a fully fledged theory of art by placing art within his own frame work informed by metaphysics, an epistemology, an ethics and a philosophical anthropology. Thirdly, his theory of art has a strong bearing on the views of Tolstoy and Gombrich who took certain Platonic notions about art in certain directions not anticipated by Plato. Fourthly, Plato's ideas about art have a parallel in the Aesthetic theory of Kant, which will be the focus of this study. Fifthly, as Iris Murdoch points out, "we may perhaps find a parallel to Plato's attitude in the dignified Puritanism of Islam with its reservations about 'figures' and 'objects' and its rejection of role-playing theater" (1977, 71).

As noted earlier, Plato's view of art was highly negative. Of course, he was aware of the impact art can have on our collective life. This is clearly brought out in his famous words in the Republic "When the modes of music change the laws of state shall change".

But this didn't dilute his harsh indictment of art and artists. According to Plato, an artist is no doubt capable of getting inspiration that results in the divine frenzy which makes works of art more than the products of techniques. It is not that Plato denigrates inspiration as a source of knowledge. As Elias points out "For Plato something like a divine visitation is indispensable, by all means, but the human science is hermeneutics-deciphering the oracle. Plato's *theoria* demands the ultimate rationality of the world-episteme is knowledge in the sense that its propositions are logically demonstrable and binding on all rational minds. But the poets, who merely transmit the massage of the Muse and garble it in transmission, disclaim responsibility for the outcome, and are a mixed blessing" (1984, 5). Moreover, the artists don't know what they are talking about. Even when they express great truths, it is by mistake. The artistic representations are mimetic i.e. imitations producing illusions so as to induce false beliefs about reality, stirring emotions detrimental to reason. He is particularly convinced that the illusory nature of art is the result of deliberate deception and hence morally vicious. In the worlds of Elias "the poets (in all artistic media), like the Sophists and the rhetors , do not rise from the surface of appearance; they offer reflected images of appearance, not a penetrating illumination of reality – in Yeats' striking phrase, they are a mirror, not a lamp(1984:4). But construing art in terms of mimesis does not account for its creativity and Plato knew this and that is why he takes recourse to inspiration to which one can trace artistic creativity, though such creativity can be intellectually and morally damaging.

Plato's attack on art is based not just on his commitment to political stability which artists might subvert. It has deeper philosophical grounds. According to him, the world of

day-to-day objects, that is, the objects of ordinary perception, no doubt gives rise to problems and stir our intelligence to solve them. But these objects are not only unstable but also embody contradictions. A philosopher who should be a "spectator of all times and existence" cannot treat them as objects of knowledge, but must treat them as objects of opinion. He must transcend the world of particulars which are the objects of perception in favor of abstract, contradiction- free objects of thought. Art relies on perception and hence does not deserve the status of knowledge. In fact, it is twice removed from reality, *vis-à-vis* ordinary objects which are once removed from Reality which is constituted by forms. As Iris Murdoch says "the spiritual ambiguity of art, its connection with the 'limitless' unconscious, its use of irony, its interest in evil, worried Plato"(1977, 86). But Plato's deep worry has its basis not only in his conservative political theory but certain conviction regarding Reality and Knowledge, and, equally importantly, a theory of man as well as a theory of morals. According to him human life is a pilgrimage from appearance to Reality, a journey from sense experience to an enlightened understanding of Reality and oneself by a contemplative engagement by mean of reason. Hence, reason is the essence of man and emotions either have to be gotten rid of or to be subordinated to reason. Art is detrimental to higher part of the soul because it gratifies the lower aspect of soul by feeding on our base emotions. Perhaps he meant that the relation between art and beauty is only contingent, that is, art was sought to be degraded on the ground that beauty is not constitutive of the essence of art. Hence those who valorize art are guilty of a category mistake. It is significant to note that some art theorists of today seem to accept Plato's view but move in a reverse direction. According to them art has fundamental value, not because of its essential relation to beauty but to something else.

However, in the *Philebus*, Plato seems to locate art within the context of beauty. *Philebus* discusses the nature of pleasure. After attacking Hedonism, Plato attempts to show that the only the pleasure that is controlled by reason is good and true. The distinction between good/true and bad/false, pleasure is grafted on the distinction between pure and impure pleasure. In spite of his rejection of Hedonism, Plato eschews anti-hedonism according to which all pleasures are impure. Plato endeavors to show that at least some pleasures are pure, by relating some pleasures to reason which is defined in terms of measure, moderation and harmony. Pleasure is thus saved from total condemnation. Plato associates pleasure so circumscribed with beauty. He grants that at times art can embody a beauty. As Murdoch points out "The area of acceptable art where pure pleasure, true beauty and sense experience overlap is very small. Decent art must obey truth; and truth is expressive of reality … and is pure, small in extent, and lacking in intensity" (1977, 12).

From what has been said till how it is very clear that Plato's view of art is, at deeper level, more nuanced and subtle in contrast to what strikes as negative without qualification. Perhaps he was aware that his claim that art as a whole is imitation does not hold for all arts equally as in the case of painting. He might have also realized that tracing all art to inspiration is off the mark because such a characterization is ill at ease with the fact of improvisation which every artist displays in his evolution; after all, "better inspiration" and "better intuition" don't make any sense. However Plato continued to stick to his position that philosophy with its dialectic concerns Logos, whereas art, including and especially poetry, concerns Mythos. The former involves the narrative of demonstration and the latter involves the narrative of dramatization. The former triggers

reason and the latter stirs emotion. But this position of Plato is also qualified by him subsequently. As Elias point out "Plato's writings contain and imply an acknowledgement of the indispensability of poetry" (1984, 1). Elias traces such a recognition by Plato to his realization that "where the logic of discourse is incapable of definitive demonstration, we fall back of necessity on poetry to persuade" (1984, 2). Elias elaborates his point by saying that Plato "was aware of the limitations of dialectic as applying demonstrable and irrefutable knowledge in any area including mathematics. Certainly the use of myth in the middle dialogues implies that at this period at least he was skeptical of the power of dialectic in the perennially insoluble problems of ethics and metaphysic" (1984, 34). Perhaps Elias means that Plato realized that all genuine knowledge is demonstrative and the credibility of the premises be established by myths, however indirectly.

All this shouldn't give us the impression that Plato fundamentally compromised on his view of art which was basically negative. The distinction between good art and bad art which is valorized by scholars like Murdoch and Elias hides more than what its revealed, as we see. While making room for this distinction Plato places art within the limits set by his metaphysical, epistemological and ethical ideas. To the extent he sets such limits within which art gets a 'no objection certificate' from Plato it loses its autonomy. It has nothing to say on its own about reality; it epistemic status becomes derivative; and it cannot give rise to moral principles from within. It submits itself to the principles prescribed by philosophy in order to be on the side of virtue. Hence, central to the negative character of Plato's stance on art is the derecognition of its cognitive and ethical and even aesthetic autonomy (as beauty for him is *essentially* related only with

reason). Thus, our characterization of Plato's philosophy of art, the first systematic reflection on art, as negative must be construed only in the sense of rejection of its autonomy and recognition of its significance in its being subservient to something extra-artistic. Though Plato initiated a view of art that negated the autonomy of art, by making it an instrument for serving a higher purpose such a view is repeatedly supported by many subsequent thinkers. In fact, as Murdoch point out, "The Greeks lacked what Bosanquet calls the 'distinctively aesthetics standpoint', as presumably everyone did with apparent impunity until 1750" (1977, 7). This means Plato only systematically and elaborately adumbrated with a philosophical sophistication a view which was quite widely shared in his time. In his celebrated work, *What is art?* Tolstoy stresses the need to control art so as to make its emotional impact promote moral and spiritual life. Tolstoy replaces Plato's philosophical aim by spiritual and indeed religious aim construed in a non-institutionalized Christian way. In fact, Tolstoy praises Greeks who, according to him, considered art good only when it served good ways. For Tolstoy the function of art is to communicate the highest religious perception of the age. Hence, art must be simple so as to facilitate moral clarity. Like Plato, he detested products of art that were complex and grand. Going by the criteria of purity, simplicity, truthfulness and unpretentiousness Tolstoy went to the extent of condemning almost all of his own works as bad. This was for the reason "complex or 'grand' art affects us in ways we do not understand, and even the artist has no insight into his own activity, as Socrates says with sympathetic interest in the *Apology* and airy ridicule in the *Ion*" (Murdoch 1977, 17). We end this discussion by noting that whereas for Plato beauty as an object of enrolling experience of the soul was

too important to be left to art, for Tolstoy art as the source of spiritually evaluating experience is too important to be subsumed under beauty.

I. 3. B Aristotle

Aristotle's ideas on aesthetics worked out mainly in his *Poetics* but also in *Politics* and *Rhetoric* constitute a milestone in the history of the subject. This is due to the fact that Aristotle gives for the first time a theory of art, which was positive, systematic and elaborate. His significance is heightened by the fact that his position regarding the nature, status and value of art had a formative influence on the succeeding generations of aestheticians. It is said that his theory stands diametrically opposite to that of Plato even though he shared some of the crucial doctrines of Plato. Of course, it is generally thought that Aristotle's views are a radical departure from those of Plato against whose doctrines of art Aristotle directly reacted. Although there is some truth is this widely shared characterization of Aristotle's theory of art "the relation between the two is more complex and a qualified judgement is needed" (Halliwell 1992, 11) and unlike his successors in the field of aesthetics, Aristotle reflected on not one art but many arts like literary arts such as poetry, and non-literary arts like painting, sculpture, music, dance and drama. Like Plato he regards all of them to be mimetic. As we proceed we shall see where he departs from Plato in fundamental ways.

Aristotle's theory of art can be said to address two central questions of Aesthetics, namely, "What is art?" and "what is the value of art?" At a certain level his answers to these questions get organically related. The most central concept that figures prominently

in his answer to the first question is ‘mimesis’’. This means that mimesis constitutes the essence of art. However, there are two conflicting views regarding Aristotle’s construal of the relation between art and mimesis. According to scholars like Norman Gulley, for Aristotle mimesis is unique to arts. These scholars maintain that, according to Aristotle, a work on medicine or natural science is not imitative and so is a work on history and therefore they are not works of art, even if they are in verse form (*cf.* Gulley 1979, 167-168). However, according to the rival view maintained by among others, Stephen Halliwell, Aristotle considers all undertaking which involved *techne* as mimetic, hence not only arts but even medicine and carpentry are productive processes which follow intrinsically rational principles that guide the imposition of a form upon the respective medium and the form is consciously conserved by the maker. However, only arts have a specific purpose of the production of representation or fictional rendering of the world. They may represent either an actuality, past or present or our conceptions of the world or our ideas about what ought to be. Both these rival interpretations have textual basis. If we accept the second interpretation Aristotle can stands far from Plato on the issue of mimesis because Plato attributes mimesis exclusively to arts. But the first interpretation brings Aristotle close to Plato. But this is only an apparent and not real proximity. This is because of the obvious reason that Plato has a negative view of mimesis and hence he debunks art, but Aristotle has a positive view of mimesis and hence he holds art in high esteem. As Graham says, “while Plato decried art because it did no more than repuduce the appearance of things, Aristotle made the activity of representing things the distinguishing character of what we call the arts” (2000, 93).The question is, “Why does Aristotle hold mimesis in very favorable light?”. First of all, if for Plato imitation is a

perversion of mind, for Aristotle it is a natural human tendency that can be traced to childhood. Secondly, imitation is a way of learning that brings us knowledge by getting a thing right in the simplest possible manner. More importantly, Aristotle recognizes certain epistemic features that figure in art as mimesis. And this the reason why mimesis in art cannot be reduced to imitation as conventionally understood. This needs some elaboration.

Aristotle, unlike Plato, maintains that the mimetic character of art is of a special kind because of which art productions possess an internal rational standard and goal which can be explained and justified in theoretical terms. Further, according to Aristotle, the images and characters one finds in a work of art are generalized images and characters and their generalized nature brings out the presence of universals, thanks to which all art necessarily involves cognition. After all, cognition deals with universals. If it is pointed out that it is difficult to accept the talk of universals in art because paintings, sculptures, poetry deal with particulars, one can say, as some philosophers have done art deals with concrete universals. The component of the universals is what makes art distinct from a historical narrative which deals with particulars. Further, because art can free itself from particularity, it can deal with both actual and possible worlds simultaneously. The cognition of the relation between the actual and the possible in a work of art is both a challenge and an achievement for an aesthetic subject. Further, the mimesis in art has a unitary character in so far as such a mimesis involves representation of unitary object. It is for these reasons that the mimetic character which a work of art possesses displays a capacity to invite interpretations in terms of broader concepts and larger conceptions which structure experience and understanding so much so that

Aristotle brings art, particularly poetry, closer to philosophy than to many other human enterprises.

We now come to Aristotle's answer to the second question viz., "What is the value of art?" Just as the concept of mimesis captures the essence of his answer the first question, the concept of catharsis occupies the central place in his answer to the second question. In fact both the concepts of mimesis and catharsis figure equally prominently in his definition of tragedy as an art form right at the start of his work *Poetics*: "Tragedy is the mimesis of a serious and complete action of some magnitude in language embellished in various ways in its different parts; in dramatic, not narrative, form, achieving, through pity and fear, the catharsis of such passions" (quoted in Pappas 2001, 16). So this means that catharsis is the aim of art. Hence catharsis in a literary or dramatic narrative must be presented appropriately and in right measure so as to arouse pity and fear in order to be poured out. Feeling pity will get solidified leading to sentimentality and fear of the misfortune of the character will lead to loss of faith in the moral order of the world. The question is, "What is catharsis?" The conventional answer gives a medical reading of this concept treating it as a medical equivalent to psychological purgation. But such a medical reading of catharsis is very much off the mark. No doubt, it appeals to us because we normally believe that pent up passions ruin our mental health. But Aristotle does not consider emotions in *quantitative* terms like the warmth of the body which if increases beyond a point turns out to be a symptom of disease or disorder; that is to say, he does not fix a degree beyond which if they go, emotions will be detrimental to health and therefore need to be released. In fact, according to him, frequent acts of purging out of emotions by expressing them of and on will only strengthen them. For example, those

who express their anger regularly will become more and more irascible. Further, the medical reading of catharsis entails that according to Aristotle the goal of art is to liberate as from passions and emotions. But this is inconsistent with Aristotle's valorization of temperance which consists in avoiding extremes. Hence, a proper reading of catharsis in the light of virtue of temperance must understand it as avoiding the extremes of celebrating emotions and becoming free of emotions. The latter extreme can be associated with the ideal man of Plato. This means that catharsis must be understood as a proper regulation of emotional life which requires training for calibration and fine tuning. This is the new reading of catharsis. Scholars like Nussbaum construe catharsis in terms of clarification of emotions. This non-medical reading of catharsis brings out the fundamental difference between Plato for whom emotions undermine reason and Aristotle who held that emotions when calibrated strengthen reason. It may be argued that catharsis cannot be equated with clarification because in the *Politics* Aristotle speaks of catharsis as relief, and "making soul settle down". But this objection is weak because one gets a sense of relief and feels settled down when one become clear of confusions. There are scholars who strongly feel that catharsis understood either in medical terms or in non-medical terms cannot establish the cognitive states of art because catharsis even as clarification does not amount to understanding (*cf*. Pappas 2001, 18-19). This objection has some force because Aristotle's view of catharsis as aim of art puts him under aesthetic subjectivism which means that the function of art is not to reveal any characteristics of art object at all, but rather do something valuable to our psyche. However, this objection against Aristotle losses its force when we realize that catharsis, according to Aristotle, is not the only purpose of art. Aristotle does claim that, as Aldrich, who rises this objection,

points out, “We turn to art for a fuller contemplative realization of the terrible and pitiful condition of human life. Thus we do come into a sort of understanding not only of the objectified emotions themselves, but also of the nature of human enterprise in its cosmic setting. This understanding is “truer” than the sort that history and empirical psychology and sociology give us” (1963, 13). Though such an understanding is taken to be the purpose of art *in addition* to catharsis, there is nothing wrong if we can broaden the concept of catharsis to include such an understanding.

The clinical concept of catharsis has been broadened to include a clarificatory dimension by modern scholarship on Aristotle, as we have seen. There is nothing wrong if we can broaden it so as to provide a cognitive dimension in terms of understanding as has been suggested by Aldrich. Such a step reinforces the positive content of catharsis totally overlooked by a clinical interpretation of catharsis. At the same time, the cognitive dimension of catharsis in no way nullifies the emotive dimension of art experience which consists in eliciting responses in which emotions like pity and fear are balanced and integrated, such a position enables us to recognize both cognitive and affective significance in the Aristotelian framework.

The above discussion brings out the point that Aristotle's philosophy of art stands against aestheticism. His anti-aestheticism becomes even more pronounced with the ethical import of his theory of art. For him the field of operation for artistic representation is human behavior. As Gulley, summarizing Aristotle's view of ethics-art relation, points out “Aristotle’s point is that the aspects of human behavior which are fundamental for the artist's purposes are those which are capable of engaging our moral sympathy or antipathy in any way (1979, 169).

Aristotle's anti-aestheticism has to be understood in relation to his conception of beauty and its relation to art. No doubt, he rejected Plato's contention that beauty was too important to be associated with art. Yet, he does not consider beauty as constituting the essence of art. Nor is beauty unique to art. According to him, all living things have beauty because in so far as they have designs suited to the purpose of sustaining their life and promoting reproduction, different kinds of thing have different kinds of beauty. The beauty possessed by an art object is one of the kinds. Nor is it what makes a work artistic. Beauty for him is context- dependent without being subjective. As Pappas points out "Aristotle's beauty is real but equivocal … Aristotle tends to speak only in passing of beauty itself" (2001, 25).However, to quote Pappas again, "Even if Aristotle develops a philosophy of art independently of beauty, he does not belong among puritans wary of aesthetic experience" (*Ibid*). It is this elusive nature of the relation between art and beauty in Aristotle's framework that makes his aesthetics highly thought provoking and even provocative.

I. 3. C Hume

The discussion of David Hume's aesthetic views is necessary in view of the fact that he departed from the Aristotelian tradition that dominated the scene before him. The modern philosophers who preceded him didn't engage in aesthetic reflection since rationalist confined themselves to metaphysics and epistemology and empiricists who preceded him were concerned with epistemology exclusively. Hume's philosophy sharpened the views of one of the most prominent aesthetician of his times, Alexander

Gottlieb Baumgarten according to whom the purpose of art is to produce beauty and beauty is an ordered relationship between the parts of a whole. Baumgarten understood beauty as that which gives us pleasure and thus arouses desire. The highest aim of art, according to him, was to imitate nature since it is only in nature that beauty is found in its pristine purity.

The normative approach in aesthetics attempts to deal with two questions namely, one, "How ought we to distinguish between art and non art so as to capture the essential nature of art?" and two, "What ought we to expect to get from art, that is, what to ought we recognize to be valuable in art?" Unlike his classical predecessors and his contemporary Enlightenment thinkers. Hume, following Baumgarten, responded to the first question and hence did not attempt a definition of art. Like Baumgarten he responded to the second question. Again, like Baumgarten he identified the value of art in its being a source of pleasure. Further, he construed the relation between art and pleasure it produces to be necessary i.e. non-contingent and thus the ability to give pleasure is constitutive of the very essence of art. Further, like Baumgarten, he identifies beauty with ordered relationship between parts of a whole. Bringing together these two points in the section "of Beauty and Deformity" in his *Treatise of Human Nature*, he says "beauty is such an order and constitution of parts as either by the primary constitution of our nature, (or) by custom, or by caprice is fitted to give pleasure and satisfaction to the soul"(quoted in Kenny 2007, 250). It may be noted that Hume draws a parallel between moral judgements and aesthetic judgements. They are akin to each other since both concerns what is pleasurable and what is not.

However such a pleasure does not have its locus in the objects. As he says, in his famous essay of 1957 entitled 'of The Standard of Taste', "The pleasure we derive from it, [i.e. a work of art] … is a matter of *our* sentiments, not its intrinsic nature" (1963, 238). Judgements about good and bad in art are not judgements at all, because "sentiment has a reference to nothing beyond itself, and is always real, wherever a man is conscious of it" (*Ibid*). Hence, "to seek the real beauty, or the real deformity, is as fruitless an enquiry as to seek the real sweet or the real bitter" (*Ibid*, 239). The diversity of opinions about works of art, according to Hume, decisively confirms his contention that aesthetic preferences are expressions of taste and not statements about objects. Hence, aesthetic judgements do not involve any knowledge of truth or falsity. Aesthetic and moral judgements are akin to each other because both concern what is pleasurable and what is not.

Before we proceed to look at how Hume seeks to ensure that he does not land into subjectivism and relativism, we may note his use of the word 'soul' in relation to the entity to which pleasure and satisfaction are fitted. Neither such a location nor the expression 'primary constitution of our nature' fits well with Hume's thoroughgoing empiricism. Unlike many of his contemporaries he refuses to acknowledge a distinctive faculty of taste for the simple reason that such a talk is organically linked to the notions of soul and mind that empiricism rejects. Equally strange is his contention that art and pleasure are necessarily related. No doubt, Hume acknowledged the difficulty in characterizing the relation between art and pleasure in purely contingent way. Yet, he is unclear about the non-contingent relation between them. After all, empiricism rejects any notion of necessity other than analytical necessity, associated with propositions which are factually empty. Hume has to maintain that. As we know Hume sought to jettison

causality of necessity by reducing the causality to regularity by showing that the necessity traditionally associated with causality has only a psychological and not a logical basis.

Hume cannot give such a psychologistic interpretation of necessity in connection with the necessary link between perception of a work of art and the production of pleasure that follows it. If Hume seeks to provide an account of necessity that is different from analytical necessity and pure regularity he has to compromise his commitment to empiricism. This will be self-defeating because of his commitment to empiricism that seeks to locate the value of art in pleasure, rather than in any thing transcendental. Since the latter option paves the way for rehabilitation of metaphysics. The major criticism against Hume's position comes in the wake of his attempt to overcome this difficulty. As we know, Hume traces the value of art to the pleasure it gives rise to. However, he realized that there is a need to distinguish between correct and incorrect aesthetic judgements since pleasure produced by a work of art may be sometimes due to lack of education and may even due to caprice. In other words, he was convinced, on the one hand, that aesthetic judgements being judgements of taste do not involve knowledge of truth and falsehood and hence possessed no truth-value; they are based on sentiments. He was, on the other hand, convinced that taste cannot be reduced to mere subjective preference because some works of art are in themselves superior to others. In other words, Hume seeks to make room for the objectivity of aesthetic judgement without invoking the idea of truth-value. Hume also knows that he cannot resolve this contradiction by taking resource to any *a priori* aesthetic principle since such a move goes against his empiricist commitment. One finds in Hume's writings two ways of

overcoming this difficulty: a. the criteria of an aesthetic judgement's correctness should be established by identifying the features of a work of art which are most pleasing to the educated, refined and qualified connoisseurs; b. since human beings share a common nature and hence mostly they likes the same things, some particular forms or qualities, from the original structure of the internal fabric of the human mind are calculated to please, and others to displease (1963, 271). The deviant aesthetic responses made by people who favor non-beautiful things will eventually disappear. This strategy is significant because it links human nature with aesthetic experience and according to Hume this link is so strong that one can appreciate art only if one has a sound knowledge of human nature, and, Hume adds, the cultivation of artistic sensitivity increases our knowledge of human nature.

However, both the strategies fail. The first strategy implies that the judgements based on good sense of cultivated persons are sure guides for discrimination between good and bad works of art. But 'good sense' itself is an evaluative concept and therefore Hume actually replaces one normative concept by another. Further, Hume is guilty of circularity: a taste is good if it ranks works of art on the basis of the pleasure derived from the best art and the best art is that which provides pleasure to persons with good taste.

The second strategy fares no better. This strategy refers to commonalties of taste located in a uniform human nature. But there is no justification for moving from common taste to the standard taste. In other words, just because there are feelings shared by many or almost all the people whom they express in identical circumstances, it does not automatically follow that everyone is rationally bound to do so. In other words, if we

want to say that someone's judgements about a work of art is mistaken, we cannot make that mistake rest on human feelings about art because human feelings are just what they are and therefore our judgement about the mistake should be related to the art work itself. Further, our evaluations of aesthetic responses which concern 'ought', at least from Hume's perspective, cannot be based on the human nature as it is. After all, it is Hume who insists that 'ought' cannot be derived from is. To overcome this difficulty Hume must acknowledge a normative dimension to our understanding of human nature, but such an admission is ill at ease with his empiricist epistemology.

Further, there is a basic problem with Hume's identification of aesthetic experience with pleasure or agreeableness. Such a construal of aesthetic experience suffers from major defects. Even if we grant that Hume's conception of aesthetic experience is not too narrow because there is no aesthetic experience which does not involve pleasure, that is, all aesthetic experience involves pleasure, it does not follow that all experience of pleasure is aesthetic. For instance, a hot water bath an a cold day gives us a kind of pleasure which by no stretch of imagination can be considered as aesthetic. Thus Hume's characterization of aesthetic experience is too broad.

However it is to the credit of Hume that he brought to the center stage a problem that has remained fundamental for modern aesthetics. That problem concerns what we may call the 'subjective universality of judgement of the beautiful'. The problem is these aesthetic judgements are subjective in the sense they are about our feelings of pleasure or agreeableness. Yet, they are universal in the sense such judgements have validity for others as well. When I say “Taj Mahal is beautiful” I am claiming not only of my experience of pleasure, but also of the experience of others who see it. The question is

“How is it possible for a judgement to be both subjective and universality valid?”. However, it is very clear that Hume's solution to this problem is highly problematic. This is because he has to explicate the universal validity of aesthetic judgements either in contingent terms or in the terms of necessity. Hume's himself is dissatisfied with the first strategy. But his resort to the second strategy conflicts with his commitment to empiricism.

The overall purpose of the above discussion was to highlight the views of some of the pre-Kantian aesthetics so as to clear the ground for a detailed discussion of Kantian aesthetics which occupies the subsequent chapters. However it is in the fitness of things that before we enter the main bodies of Kantian aesthetics brief remarks are made regarding the overall significance of Kant's path breaking work in aesthetics which has remained a millstone in the history of the subject.

I.4 the Significance of Kantian Aesthetics

“Sensibility changes from generation to generation. But expression is altered only by a man of genius”-T. S. Elliot.

It is universally accepted that Immanuel Kant was a genius who changed expression in philosophy by providing a new lexicon for the subject. In doing so, Kant gave such a turn to philosophy that philosophy could never be pre-Kantian. The critical philosophy of Kant took philosophy in an entirely new direction. In this work an attempt is made to understand how Kantian philosophy provided a new idiom to our aesthetic discourse.

We may begin our discussion of the significance of the Kantian aesthetics by noting that Kant's concern with aesthetics by pre-dated his classic *Critique of Judgement* whose first part brings out his aesthetic theory in its full fledged from Kant's aesthetic reflections began during the pre-critical phase of his philosophical carrier as evidenced by his 1764 work *Observations on the Beautiful and the Sublime*. However, Kant was not the first philosopher to engage in a deep reflection on problems of aesthetics even during modern period. Nor was he the first to build a full scale system of aesthetics. Yet he has been recognized as the father of modern aesthetics. Before we deal with some of the core issue of his aesthetics in general and philosophy of art in particular it is in the fitness of things to provide some reasons which account for the enormous significance acquired by the Kantian aesthetics.

First of all, the aesthetic system of Kant has a rich variety of core concepts figuring in it. The concept of taste, beauty, judgements of beauty, judgements of taste, sublimity, genius, aesthetic experience, aesthetic ineffability are some of them. The range of the concepts analyzed and illuminated speaks of the breadth of Kantian aesthetics. Secondly, the canvas of the Kantian aesthetics has an unparallel comprehensiveness as evidenced by his engagement with issues pertaining to the relation of art to the domains of morality and religion. Thirdly, Kantian aesthetics is organically linked to the central concepts of aesthetic education. In this connection if may be noted that Kant worked out a theory of aesthetic education different from the one provided by his romantic successors like Schiller, which set the trend for future philosophical work on aesthetic education. Though the romantic view of aesthetic education became more entrenched in the philosophical common sense of aesthetic of education such a view was worked out by its proponents

only in and through their reaction to the Kantian theory of aesthetic education. Fourthly, Kant's aesthetics had a formative influence on the romantic philosophers of art, who nurtured the discipline of aesthetics in a way that the discipline continued to remain vibrant. Particularly important in this connection are Kant's ideas of sublime and aesthetic ineffability. Fifthly, Kant transformed the very notion of pleasure as an aesthetic category. It is true that the notion of pleasure in relation to aesthetic experience has always been central to philosophical reflection on art. However, the precise nature of that concept was not explicated. It has even been treated as primitive, that is, indefinable. If not, it has been defined in a manner that is logically questionable. For instance, as we have seen, Hume's explication of the concept of the beautiful in terms of pleasure or agreeableness was too broad and hence, could not identify the specific kind of pleasure which is uniquely aesthetic. This is the task which Kant sought to accomplish. The question whether his attempt was convincingly successful should not come in the way of recognizing the freshness which he brings to his effort. In other words, Kant redraws the logical geography of the concept of aesthetic pleasure which is the fountainhead of aesthetic reflection. Sixthly, Kant highlighted in a original way the relation between aesthetics and ethics "by showing how the very autonomy of aesthetic experience from external constraint, including didactic constraint by morality, allows it to serve as a palpable experience of the freedom that is the essence of morality" (Guyer 1998, 27). Seventhly, though he like his empiricist predecessors like Hume, Hutcheson and others, did consider taste as the core concept of his aesthetic theory "he is content at last not to offer an explanation of the grounds of the aesthetic in terms of the psychology of the individual subject" (Kirwan 2004, 2). Eighthly, Kantian aesthetics, exhibits the synthetic

or syncretic spirit of his whole philosophy. As we know, Kant's epistemology sought to brings together rationalism and empiricism and his ethics combined together perfectionist doctrine of duties advanced by Wolff and the doctrine of moral science put forth by Adams Smith. Similarly in aesthetics he brings together, to quote Guyer again, " many of the insights of both empiricists like Hutcheson and his British successors as well as rationalists such as Baumgarten and Moses Mendelssohn, while seeking to place these insight within a radically new … framework" (1998, 27). Finally, the post-Kantian aesthetics which was inaugurated by Hegel and Schilling whose aesthetics was metaphysically charged and still inspires many contemporary aestheticians emerged as reaction to Kant's aesthetic ideas. As Kirwan points out " the metaphysical aspirations of the aestheticians immediately succeeding Kant gave them a vested interest in embracing the proposition that, from a non-metaphysical point of view, the aesthetic was inscrutable" (2004, 4). Kirwan here has in mind Kant's contention that the supersensible substrate of humanity in which lies the determining ground of taste is itself indeterminate and therefore incomprehensible.

However the significance of the Kantian aesthetics outstrips the points mentioned above, however important they may be. The crucial reason that explains the significance of Kantian aesthetics lies in the central orientation or spirit of Kantian aesthetics. It is a coin whose two sides are: (a) The basic nature of his inquiry and (b) The fundamental problem which he sought to address. This needs some elaboration.

a) Like any aesthetician Kant focuses primarily on the nature of aesthetic experience. But he approaches aesthetic experience in a novel way which is akin to the way he treats the nature of knowledge in his Epistemology. As we know, modern

philosophers prior to Kant sought to answer the question "What is the nature of knowledge?" by answering the question "What is the source of knowledge?" Kant replaced the latter question by the question "How is experience possible?" In doing so he provided a new direction to Epistemology itself. By this question he meant "What are the *a priori* conditions of the possibility of experience?" Here by "experience" Kant does not mean hailstorm of impressions. He meant by "experience" "knowledge". Thus "experience" and "knowledge" are equated in Kant's lexicon. Experience, according to Kant, is of three kinds, namely cognitive, moral and aesthetic which correspond to truth, goodness and beauty- the three fundamental values. Thus the application of Kant's question regarding the possibility of experience to the third kind of experience, results in the question "How is aesthetic experience possible?" This is to say "What are the *a priori* conditions of the possibility of aesthetic experience?" Thus Kant radically recasted the traditional question of aesthetic, namely, "What is the nature of aesthetic experience?" As we know, according to Kant, the philosophical explanation of the possibility of cognitive experience and hence identifying the *a priori* conditions of the possibility cognitive experience amounts to discovering the *synthetic a priori* principles underlying the cognitive experience. The same holds for both moral as well as aesthetic experience. Thus, the philosophical explanation of possibility of aesthetic experience and hence the identification *a priori* conditions of the possibility of aesthetic experience set Kant on the task of discovering the synthetic *a priori* principles underlying aesthetic experience. It is this uncovering the *synthetic a priori* principles underlying aesthetic experience that makes Kant's treatise on aesthetics a *critique* of aesthetic judgement.

It is, of course, true that Kant equates cognitive experience with knowledge. But he does not do the same with moral and aesthetic experience. This has led some people to trace fact-value dichotomy which was propagated in the twentieth century by the positivists to Kant. Whether this is correct or not it is difficult to decide since Kant does not unequivocally deny epistemic status to moral and aesthetic experience. However, he is very clear that moral experience and aesthetic experience do not belong to the same domain as cognitive experience. According to Kant, judgements of fact are anchored in cognitive experience which Kant calls objective experience, but moral judgements and aesthetic judgements concern moral experience and aesthetic experience which are not objective experience. So moral judgements and aesthetic judgements are not objective judgements and therefore either do not have cognitive status or do not have a cognitive status in the same sense in which judgements of facts have. But even so they have a universal validity just as the judgements of facts do. This enables Kant to come out with the second central problem which lends uniqueness to his aesthetic theory and contributes to his status as the father of modern aesthetics.

b) The second problem goes as follows; judgements of the beautiful are related to our aesthetic response which pertains to our feeling of pleasure. Since, like any feeling they are subjective and hence the judgements of beautiful are subjective. But yet they demand agreement of every one and hence acquire universality. Thus aesthetic judgements are both subjective and universal. The subjective universality of the judgements of beautiful is a paradox and this philosophical puzzle needs to be resolved by answering “How can they be both subjective and universal?” No doubt, Kant was not the first to recognize the puzzle nor is he first to resolve. In his own way Hume resolves

this problem. Hume construes the claim of universality by the aesthetic judgement to be theoretically, factual whereas Kant construes such a claim to be normative. In other words, unlike Hume, Kant grounds universality of the judgement of the beautiful in a kind of necessity whereas Hume provides the explication of such universality in purely contingent terms. It is this normative explication of the universality of aesthetic judgement that enables Kant to put forth the first distinctively modern conception of the beautiful. This is achieved by Kant in a manner that completely reflects the fundamental spirit of his philosophical system. It is Kant's conviction that aesthetic Judgement "has an *a priori* principle related to feeling in a way analogous to that in which the *a priori* principles of the understanding are related to knowledge of empirical fact and those of practical reason to desire. To prove this conjecture is one of the tasks of the third *Critique*" (Körner 1955, 176).

We end this chapter with some remarks on the way Kant's aesthetic theory in particular and his third *Critique* in general decisively contribute to the cohesiveness of his whole philosophical system. As all students of Kant's first *Critique* know, Kant tries to show that cognitive experience presupposes *synthetic a priori* principles which govern the application of categories and these principles underlie a conception of nature as a mechanistic system governed by necessity. It is also known that the second *Critique* attempts to demonstrate that if moral action is not an illusion we must assume that we are free. As Körner says, the first two *Critiques* of Kant together "show that the theoretically necessary principles, which apply to phenomena, and the particularly necessary principles, which refer to noumena, are logically compatible" (1955, 177). But it is not sufficient to show that natural necessity and moral freedom are merely logically

compatible, for the simple reason that when we act we find that our freedom realizes itself in nature through our actions. Hence, it is necessary to show that the compatibility is real, and not just possible, by identifying a connection between the realms of freedom and natural necessity. To quote Körner again " In the third *Critique* Kant sets out to show that reflective judgement has a priori principle which, among other things, also establishes the required harmony between nature and freedom" (*Ibid*). Thus, Kant's aesthetic theory cements the integrity of Kant's philosophical system as a whole. The above point can be articulated in another way. The first *Critique* concerned the mechanistically determined world which is the world of necessity and which is the subject-matter of objective empirical knowledge. The second *Critique* concerned the moral domain central to which is freedom. The third *Critique* seeks to bridge the gap between necessity and freedom i.e. the gap between the first and the second *Critiques*. As Crowther points out, "Kant's reasons for doing this are complex, as are the principles whereby the gulf between nature and freedom is bridged. In the most general terms, however, the key connecting term is that of teleology …[however] aesthetic factors play a decisive role in this teleological mediation between nature and freedom" (1996, 109). In other words, Kant's aesthetic theory provides Kant's philosophical system strong and profound sense of coherence and thus a unitary character which would have been otherwise lacking.

CHAPTER-II

KANT'S THEORY OF AESTHETIC JUDGEMENTS

Kant's view of the nature of aesthetic judgments provides the most effective entry point into his aesthetics. In fact, such a view functions as the *leit motif* of his aesthetic system. This is because it is his position on the nature of aesthetic judgments that determines his departure from the views of his predecessors. In fact this theme is so central to his aesthetic theory that, as Allison points out with some exaggeration, "In spite of its title, the Analytic of the Beautiful is concerned not with the nature of beauty *per se*, but rather with the *judgement* through which the beauty (or lack thereof) of a particular object of nature or art is appraised" (2001, 68).

I I.1Aesthetic Judgements as Reflective Judgements

We may begin by pointing out that Kant speaks of faculties of mind in working out his whole philosophy. The problem here is that not only contemporary philosophers are allergic to the locution of 'faculty' but also Kant overuses the term. He even speaks of desires and tastes as faculties, apart from many other mental phenomena. Overlooking Kant's ubiquitous use of this term, we may confine it to what he might have considered to be the four fundamental faculties, namely, Sense, Understanding, Reason and Judgment. Of these, sense is a passive faculty since it only apprehends *a posteriori* particulars by receiving perceptions in space and time and *a priori* particulars, *viz.* space and time

themselves. Because of its passive nature sense can be called a faculty only nominally. As against sense, understanding is an active faculty which, among other things, applies *a priori* concepts called 'categories' to perceptions so as to make our experience objective. Reason which is the third faculty is responsible for regulating, by means of theoretical ideas, our thinking about matters of fact and, by means of practical ideas our thinking about matters of conduct. Reason is thus an active faculty though it tends to be hyperactive by pretending to apply theoretical ideas to alleged objects of experience and thus producing metaphysical hallucinations. Judgment (used with capital J) is the fourth fundamental faculty of mind; it is a capacity for making judgments. According to Kant, to judge is to think a particular as being contained in a universal. A universal may be a law or a principle or a theory or a rule. In other words, a judgment concerns the relation between a particular and a universal. If the universal which may be a rule or a law or a theory or a principle, is given, then the faculty of Judgement seeks to subsume the particular under it and when Judgement does so, it is called by Kant 'Determinant Judgement'. If the particular is given to which Judgement seeks to find the universal then Kant calls it 'Reflective Judgement'. Hence, we may say that Judgement which is the capacity to produce judgements can be either Determinant or Reflective. We may also say that judgements produced by Determinant Judgement may be called 'determinant judgements' and judgements produced by Reflective Judgement may be called 'reflective judgements'. Thus, judgements can be broadly classified into determinant judgements and reflective judgements which are traceable to Determinant Judgement and Reflective Judgement respectively.

A judgement like “This stone is heavy” which Kant calls an 'objective empirical judgement' (as distinct from “This stone seems to be heavy” which is the corresponding

subjective empirical judgement and which is only nominally a judgement because of its being subjective) is a determinant judgement. This is because in making this judgement we subsume manifold of perceptions under categories which are prior to those manifolds of perceptions. That is to say, we are first given the universals called 'categories' under which we subsume a manifold of percepts by employing Determinant Judgement. It is by such a subsumption that a manifold comes to constitute an object whose description is an objective empirical judgement. Similarly, moral judgements, that is, judgements about rightness or wrongness of a particular action can also be considered determinant judgements. This is because they involve subsumption of a particular act under a universal, namely, the moral law (via the maxim on which the action is based). The moral law is given to us prior to the action because it has its locus in our rational nature. Like objective empirical judgements such moral judgements are also objective, though their objectivity is different from that of the former. The objectivity of latter is due to the practical objectivity of the moral law since the moral law determines our will whereas the objectivity of the former is due to the application of categories in them, and the objectivity resulting from the application of the categories is theoretical. Of course, moral judgement may be false even though they are objective just as empirical judgements can be false though they may be objective.

The scheme of reflective judgements is not simple. This is because there is a variety of reflective judgements. By and large they are: (1) Laws of Nature- empirical or theoretical laws-which Reflective Judgement seeks to identify when particulars are given; (2) Aesthetic judgements or judgements of taste; and (3) Teleological judgements.

Before we proceed further, a couple of points need to noted:

(1) In the *Critique of Pure Reason* Kant has identified the *synthetic a priori* principles corresponding to one kind of determinant judgements *viz*. objective empirical judgements. Kant also has identified how those principles which he calls 'principles of pure understanding' govern the application of categories. The question is, "What is/are the *synthetic a priori* principle/s corresponding to Reflective judgements? The central question of the *Critique of Judgement* is to answer this question.

(2) The three active faculties of mind, namely, Understanding, Reason (that is practical reason), and Judgement (that is Reflective Judgement) Kant relates to what he calls Cognition, Desire and Feeling respectively. The *synthetic a priori* principles of pure understanding which figure in the *Critique of Pure Reason* legislate or determine our cognition and the principle/s which figure in the *Critique of Practical Reason* do so for desire. The task of the *Critique of Judgement* is to identify the principle/s which determine or legislate for feeling (of pleasure or displeasure). However, Kant's association of Reflective Judgement with feeling should be taken with a major qualification. As mentioned above, there are, by and large, three kinds of reflective judgements, that is, judgements produced by Reflective Judgement. Associating Reflective Judgement with feeling sets at naught both general laws of nature as well as teleological judgements. The third *Critique* should have been titled *Critique of Reflective Judgement* because Kant deals with determinant judgements only in the first two *Critiques*. Even here, going by the central task of the third *Critique* its title should have been the *Critique of Aesthetic and Teleological Judgement*, that is, a critique of the faculty of Reflective Judgement as confined to the aesthetic and teleological domains. In this sense, the title of third critique overshot the content of the work.

Yet, we must not forget the reason why Kant brings these disparate kinds of judgements under the rubric 'reflective judgements'. No doubt, on the one hand, he not only recognizes the distinction between these three kinds of reflective judgements but even seeks to identify distinct *synthetic a priori* principles corresponding to them to account for their distinctness. On the other hand, he traces the common thread that runs through such disparate judgements which makes all of them the result of one and the same faculty called 'Reflective Judgement'. How does he do so?

Slightly modifying Kant's own position on this question, we can say that the judgements produced by Reflective Judgement concern *Purposivity*. Purposivity expresses itself in three ways:

1. Purpose and purposiveness;

2. Purposiveness without purpose; and

3. Purpose without purposiveness

The first kind of judgements produced by Reflective Judgement which are the universals like laws of nature-empirical or theoretical-concern Purposivity of the first variety, namely, purpose and purposiveness. This needs some elaboration. According to Kant, the "particular empirical laws must be regarded … *as if* an understanding (though it be not ours) had supplied them for the benefit of our cognitive faculties, so as to render possible a system of experience according to particular natural laws" (1952, Introduction, IV, 19/180 AE). In other words, the *synthetic a priori* principles underlying the first kind of judgements (which constitute the body of natural science which according to Kant is Physics) pertains to the harmony between nature and our capacity i.e. understanding. It is an assumption that nature purports to fit itself to the need of our discovering the network

of natural laws. Without this assumption we have to admit the futility of our search for natural laws. Equally important assumption is that nature has a purposiveness i.e. a certain design that express itself through the laws which are being discovered by us. That is to say, as Körner remarks "In [so] employing Reflective Judgement we demand purposive organization and proceed *as if* nature and its contents were so organized"(1955, 180). The two assumptions regarding purpose and purposiveness mentioned above are not unrelated. The requirement that nature adopts itself to our purpose of understanding her implies, as Körner brings to our notice, that according to Kant there is a further requirement "that nature specify its general laws in conformity with a principle of purposiveness for our cognitive faculty, that is to say, a principle of adaptation to the human understanding in its necessary function" (*Ibid*). That is what Kant called 'finality in nature' i.e. the purpose of nature to fit into our need for understanding her. Discovering the laws of nature is organically linked to nature's design i.e. its purposiveness displayed in its lawful structure. The word '*as if* ' which figures in the above quote from Kant clearly indicates that such a principle is neither theoretically necessary nor is a description of an empirical fact i.e. it is not a judgement produced by Determinant Judgement. Kant calls such a principle "merely a subjective *a priori*" (1952, Introduction, III, 15/177 AE). In other words, according to him, such a principle is only heuristic. As Körner says "It embodies the fundamental and indispensable As-If of any search for a scientific system" (1955, 179).

The second kind of judgements produced by Reflective Judgement are judgements of taste or aesthetic judgements which involve the notion of purposivity as purposiveness without purpose- a point which we discuss in the third chapter. Here we are confining ourselves to only one kind judgements of taste *viz*. pure judgement of taste or judgement

about the beautiful. We will see shortly how they are distinct from other kinds of judgement of taste. Equally importantly, they, like the first kind of reflective judgements, involve the notion of *as if*, as we see in the next section.

The third kind of judgements produced by Reflective Judgement is the judgements that figure in teleological explanations provided most notably for biological phenomena. Such judgements involve the concept of purposivity as purpose without purposiveness. Kant deals with such judgements in the second part of the *Critique of Judgement* called 'Critique of Teleological Judgement' wherein he seeks to reconcile his mechanistic theory of explanation in science with the prevalence of teleological explanations in biology of his times which was pre-Darwinian. But this reconciliation was in favor of the mechanistic theory of explanation which Kant accepted in toto as displayed in the first *Critique*. According to Kant, teleological explanations of biological phenomena, unlike mechanistic explanations, are not constitutive of the objects of explanation since they have only a regulative function. In other words, though there are no purposes in nature since nature is a mechanistic system, it is necessary to act in our scientific inquiry into the biological word *'as if* ' there are purposes in nature. Such an *as if* thinking facilitates our inquiry by identifying relevant questions and plausible answers. The notion of *as if* associated with teleological judgements reminds us of the connection this notion has with *synthetic a priori* principles of theoretical reason that correspond to the theoretical ideas of Soul, World (totality) and God. As we shall see, the notion also appears in relation to one kind of judgements of taste which concern beauty. In view of the significance the notion of *as if* possesses in the Kantian system Vaihinger explicitly acknowledges his debt to Kant in working out his *Philosophy of As If*. However, it is necessary to note that Kant does not associate the notion of *as if* with the practical ideas like moral freedom,

immortality of the soul and God as a morally perfect being and so with the postulates of practical reason. No doubt, some scholars think that according to Kant these ideas are useful fictions and thus involve the notion of *as if*. As Körner has shown such an interpretation is wrong. This is because "To state that freedom, immortality, and God *exist* is to say that our having duties implies that the notions have instances which, since they cannot be phenomenal, must be *noumenal* and therefore unknowable" (*Ibid*, 164). That is to say, the practical ideas correspond to entities in the realm of faith, whereas this is not so in the case of objects of either teleological judgements or aesthetic judgements, and hence they should not be construed in term of *'as if* '.

To sum up the above discussion, the three kinds of reflective judgements, namely, laws of nature, pure judgements of taste or pure Aesthetic Judgements and Teleological Judgements used to explain human behavior and biological phenomena constitute a unity. This unity is grounded in the concept of purposivity which, therefore, is the common thread that runs through all the three kinds of reflective judgements though the concept of purposivity figures in the three kinds of reflective judgements in three different ways. This unity is reinforced by the fact that the notion of *as if* is organically linked to all the three kinds of reflective judgements. That is to say, in making the first kind of reflective judgement namely, laws of nature we think as if nature purports to fit itself to our understanding and as if nature has a design to express in terms of a lawful structure. In making a teleological judgement we assume as if nature has purposes. Finally, in making a pure judgement of taste which is a judgement of taste proper we believe as if beauty is an objective features of a thing described as beautiful.

It is necessary in this connection to point out that Kant seeks to cement the relation between the two kinds of reflective judgements; *viz.* pure aesthetic judgements and teleological judgements both of which constitute the foci of Kant's attention in the *Critique of Judgement*. To do so Kant invokes the notion of 'teleological' in a broad sense. Taking 'Teleological' in a broad sense Kant distinguishes between four kinds of teleological judgements. Such a classification of teleological judgements is made by him by invoking the notions of formal, material, subjective and objective, though his use of these concepts is somewhat opaque and does not square with his use of these concepts in other parts of his philosophy. Teleological judgements are material if they refer to existing things and formal if they don't; teleological judgements are subjective if the refer to feelings and objective if they don't. Thus, we have four kinds of teleological judgements:

1. Formal and subjective teleological judgements of which pure aesthetic judgements are paradigmatic cases.

2. Material and objective teleological judgements, that is, judgements about purposes in nature that figure in our explanation of biological phenomena.

3. Material and subjective teleological judgements which are judgements explaining purposive human behavior.

4. Formal and objective teleological judgements of which certain judgements in pure mathematics are his only examples.

It is obvious that the second kind of teleological judgements are teleological judgements in a narrow or specific sense in which Kant uses the term to describe the

judgements with which he deals in the second part of his *Critique of Judgement*. In fact, teleological judgements of the type of (2) and (3) are teleological judgements in the specific sense. They both involve the notion of purpose in relation to the biological world in the case of (2) and human world in the case of (3). The distinction between them is important for Kant because his aim in the second part of the third *critique* was to accommodate the prevalence of purpose-oriented explanations (that is explanations which are 'teleological' in the narrow sense) with his commitment to a full-fledged mechanistic philosophy of nature. Of course, Kant did anticipate the possibility of mechanistic explanation of even biological phenomena in future.

Secondly, he brings pure aesthetic judgements and teleological judgements (two of the three kinds of reflective judgements) under the rubric designated by the term 'teleological' used in a broad sense, so as to bind them together even while considering differences between them so crucial as to constitute two distinct parts of the third *Critique*.

Thirdly, he also brings judgements of pure mathematics and judgements about human purposes under the umbrella of 'teleological judgements' understood in a broad sense. As Körner rightly points out “Whether or not this classification is as neat as he believed, Kant makes it quite clear why he regards all aesthetic judgements, some mathematical judgements, and all judgements about human and non-human purposes as teleological. In the illuminating modern fashion of speaking, introduced by Wittgenstein, we might say that by calling all the above-mentioned types of judgements 'teleological' Kant has drawn attention to important general family resemblances between all of them and to even closer resemblances between those which he classifies under the same

heading" (1955, 200). Of course, one wishes that Kant had included the first kind of reflective judgements, namely, laws of nature, instead of some judgements of pure mathematics so as to provide a further glue binding all the three kinds of reflective judgements. Also, it is somewhat surprising that Kant treats (some) judgements of pure mathematics as objective just because they don't concern feelings. (In fact, it is somewhat artificial to treat them as teleological judgements). After all, according to Kant mathematical judgement concern space and time which according to him are subjective- a point on which he differed from Newton with whom he sided against Leibniz in claiming that space and time were absolute.

I I.2 the Logical Features of Pure Judgements of Taste

As we have seen till now, aesthetic judgements or judgements of taste are the products of the Reflective Judgement. They are one of the three kinds of judgements which we owe to the faculty of mind called 'Reflective Judgement'. Aesthetic judgements or judgements of taste have the characteristic of appearing to be involving a determination of the object whereas as a matter of fact they involve the determination of subject and its feeling. Aesthetic judgements or judgements of taste can be of four types. They can be about the agreeableness or the beautiful or the sublimity or the goodness, the last one to be taken in non ethical sense. "What these judgements have in common is that in them we discover what is purely subjective in the representation of an object, that is, what constitutes its reference to the beholder, independent of any determination of the object for the purpose of knowledge" (Kirwan 2004, 13-14). Of these four kinds of judgements of taste, judgements of beauty and judgements of sublimity are considered by

Kant to be pure judgements of taste or pure aesthetic judgements. However, our discussion of Kant's theory of pure judgements of taste or pure aesthetic judgements basically concerns Kant's view of judgements of beauty. Kantian scholars differ over the question whether the class of pure judgement of taste is confined to the judgements about the beautiful, or can include judgements about the sublime David Whewell adopts the former position (*cf*. 1992, 250) whereas Henry Allison adopts the latter position. This thesis accepts Allison's position. Of course, taking into account the reasons Whewell has given one can consider judgements about the sublime as quasi-pure judgements of taste. However, in this chapter and the next, by 'pure judgements of taste' or 'pure aesthetic judgements' we mean judgements about the beautiful. What distinguishes a pure judgement of taste from the judgement of good and agreeableness is that though all of them concern the feeling of pleasure and displeasure; in the case of pure aesthetic judgements the pleasure stands independent of any interest in the object. According to Kant, in contrast to pure aesthetic satisfaction "any satisfaction that we associate with the idea of the object's real existence is interest and, as such, is always connected with desire. In this way Kant sets beauty in contrast to both the agreeable, which gratifies, and the good which is esteemed" (Kirwan 2004, 14). This means pure aesthetic judgements unlike non pure aesthetic judgements do not concern objects and hence are unrelated to interest. What does this mean?

A judgement of taste about the good may be about a thing which is good for something when i.e. it is pleases as a means or it may be good in itself i.e. when it pleases on its own account. In either case, according to Kant, the pleasure is mediate because the object pleases us by means of a concept and therefore is related to an interest. The judgement of taste which is about what is agreeable concerns an object that, no doubt,

gives immediate pleasure but like the good it is determined by the relation between the subject and real existence of an object. Hence, it is "only in the apparently *contemplative* satisfaction associated with the beautiful that no concept is involved, and only this satisfaction, in contrast to the pleasure we take in either the agreeable or the good, can be properly termed 'immediate', in the sense of disinterested and aconceptual" (*Ibid*, 14). This means that pure aesthetic judgements which primarily concern the beautiful are connected with the feeling of the pleasure which is necessarily characterized by disinterestedness and this is ensured by the fact that the judgement is not about an object but its representation. This does not mean that the aesthetic subject (that is the experiencer of the beautiful) is completely indifferent to the object. That is, it is not necessary that the subject of aesthetic experience should not desire it; in other words, a particular object may be at the same time both desired by and be beautiful to a subject provided that the pleasure experienced by the subject is not related to the satisfaction of the desire but is related to the representation of the object. One can find a parallel to this in Kant's account of moral experience. According to Kant moral experience is the experience of the categorical imperative. Suppose I help someone. My act can be moral only if I do it as my duty and for the sake of duty and not because I love that someone. This does not mean one cannot act morally towards others if one loves them. It may be that when one acts for the sake of duty, he may also have love for the other. All that Kant says is that the moral worth of an act is determined by our sense of duty and not whether we love the person we are acting towards. Similarly, even if we desire an object while getting pleasure out of its representation our experience being aesthetic has nothing to do with our desire for the object. In other words, just as we can experience duty with or without the desire to help someone in need, we can experience beauty with or without the

desire to possess that object of beauty. This is what is meant by saying that aesthetic experience has to be disinterested unlike the experience of the agreeableness or the good.

A question may arise regarding why Kant considers the three types of judgements, namely, about agreeableness, good (in the not ethical sense) and beauty under the same rubric of 'judgements of taste'. All the three kinds of judgements are judgements of taste because they concern pleasure. The pleasure associated with the agreeable is effected by the stimuli that act upon the sense organs and it concerns personal joy and aversion. The second kind of pleasure related to the good concerns a things being a means for an end or an end in itself. As Crowther remarks, " pleasure in the good … always presupposes that the particular item is judged in relation to its utility for, or conformity to, some function or standard which is, in a sense, *external* to it" (1996, 110). The third kind of pleasure which concerns the judgement about the beautiful is disinterested in the sense unlike the other two, it does not pertain to the real existence of the objects of pleasure but their representation. The nature of the object or its bearing on our practical interest and even whether it is real have no relevance to our pleasure which has its source in its mere appearance. To quote Crowther, "Kant's major point of philosophical substance … is that disinterestedness is a *logical* characteristic which separates pure aesthetic judgements from those of the agreeable and good. Such aesthetic judgements are, in logical terms, indifferent to the real existence of the object" (*Ibid*, 111). The concept of disinterestedness, it must be noted, is not a psychological concept in spite of Kant's additional characterization of pure aesthetic judgements as contemplative. That is, Kant has not given a psychological account of pure aesthetic judgements. To quote Crowther again, "The key *logical* significance of the pure aesthetic judgement lies in what it does *not* presuppose in order to be enjoyed" (*Ibid*, 112). Psychological factors and even

physical factors as well as practical considerations may impinge upon our aesthetic pleasure. But, "such factors are not *logical* preconditions of our enjoying beauty. They are contingent elements. We do *have* to take account of them in appreciating formal qualities for their own sake" (*Ibid*, 112). But they have whatsoever no bearing on the judgement's logical status *qua* purely aesthetic. In what follows we try to identify the nature of pure aesthetic judgements in term of their further logical features.

According to Kant, aesthetic judgements are subjective. However well Kant might have distinguished the kind of pleasure corresponding to the pure judgement of taste from the kinds of pleasure associated with impure judgements of taste, the pure judgements of taste remain subjective for the simple reason that they concern feeling of pleasure. This is clear from Kant's own words, " the judgement of taste …[is] aesthetic-which means that it is one whose determining ground *cannot be other than subjective*" (1952, §1, 41-42/203 AE). In considering judgements about the beautiful to be judgements of taste, Kant stands squarely within the tradition he inherited. That tradition, best articulated by Hume, refuses to draw the line between what Kant calls judgements about the agreeable and judgements about beautiful. In an important sense, according to that tradition, there can be no such things of judgement of the beautiful. This is because judgements expressing our praise are constituted by the feelings themselves. In fact, feelings and judgements concerning them are inseparable. In that sense pure aesthetic judgements are mere exclamation and therefore are judgements within quotes. As Graham points out "Kant locates aesthetic judgement halfway between the logically necessary (an example would be mathematical theorems) and the purely subjective (expression of personal taste)" (2000, 12). This shows how Kant breaks away from the tradition he inherited. According to Kant, judgements of taste or aesthetic judgements can be expressions of a

mere liking or can be something more than that. For example, when referring to a flower or a picture I say “It is beautiful” by which I mean “I like it”, I am making an aesthetic judgement of the first type. When I say so I do not mean that others too like it, or if someone does not like it something is wrong with him. But if I say “it is beautiful”, I mean others also like it or if someone does not like it something is wrong with him. The pure aesthetic judgement I am putting forth is of the second type.

That according to Kant judgements about the beautiful are subjective is clear from the very fact that he calls them ‘judgements of taste’. But even in Kant's own time 'taste' did not merely mean personal like and dislike. In other words, he was not radically departing from the thinking current in his time that taste is something more than personal like or dislike. In this respect “he was very much a man of his time, even though …this did not prevent him from breaking with the orthodoxy of the day on a number of crucial points regarding taste” (Allison 2001, 1). Thus, Kant's departure from the dominant view of aesthetic judgements as judgements expressing personal likes, was facilitated by the prevailing ideas of taste as something more than personal like and dislike. Kant's crucial break from the orthodoxy consists is not giving a new content to the concept of taste but in demonstrating how taste as something more than personal like or dislike can deserve a critique.

Be it as it may, the distinction between a judgement of taste as a judgement about agreeable or liking and the judgement about the taste which is the judgements about the beautiful which Kant calls 'pure judgements of taste', corresponds to the distinction between a subjective empirical judgement like “This stone seems to be heavy to me” and objective empirical judgement like “This stone is heavy” which Kant's makes in the first

Critique. According to him, the objective empirical judgements, unlike subjective empirical judgements, possess objective reference and (therefore) universal validity. This is a result of the application of *a priori* concepts which Kant calls 'categories'. The pure aesthetic judgements too have universal validity like the objective empirical judgements. But their universal validity is not due to objective reference involved in them. Thus, though 'This rose is beautiful' is similar to 'This stone is heavy' (just as 'This stone seems to be heavy to me' is similar to 'I like this rose'), they are dissimilar in the sense the former, unlike the latter is not objective and, is therefore, subjective.

Before we proceed further it is necessary to note what Kant means by characterizing pure aesthetic judgements as subjective. At the first level, as we have seen, for Kant aesthetic judgements are subjective because their determining ground can only be subjective. By this he means that a pure judgement of taste is not about an object but its representation. Kant, while agreeing that "Every reference of representations is capable of being objective", makes it clear that "the one exception to this is the feeling of pleasure or displeasure. This denotes nothing in the object, but is a feeling which the Subject has of itself and to the manner in which it is affected by the representation" (1952, §1, 42/204 AE). Organically related to this point is Kant's contention that pure aesthetic judgements are not based on concepts and, hence, there are no objective criteria to determine whether or not an object is beautiful. The person who makes the judgement has to feel the pleasure himself. The reference to his own pleasure or displeasure is decisive. The judgement of others even if backed by reason has no bearing on the judgement of the concerned individual making a judgement that something is beautiful. To quote Kant again "If any one reads me his poem, or brings me to a play, which, all said and done, fails to commend itself to my taste, then let him adduce *Batteux* or

Lessing, or still older and more famous critics of taste, with all the host of rules laid down by them, as a proof of the beauty of his poem … I stop my ears: I do not want to hear any reason or any arguing about the matter"(*Ibid*, §33, 140/284 AE). In other words, one can legitimately claim that an object is beautiful only if he or she experienced it himself or herself. Pure aesthetic judgements are in this sense subjective.

But, what is it which distinguishes a pure judgement of taste, that is, a judgement about the beautiful, from a judgement about the agreeable, though both of them are subjective? According to Kant a pure judgement of taste has universal validity in spite of its being subjective. The concept of universal validity is extremely crucial for Kantian aesthetics and hence needs to be elucidated. Characterization of a pure judgement of taste as possessing universal validity is so basic in Kantian aesthetics that it constitutes the first phase of his engagement with the nature of pure aesthetic judgement. Guyer characterizes this phase as 'analytic phase' which is followed by an explanatory and a justificatory phase. In the second phase the pure judgement of beautiful is treated as being about a pleasure produced by the free play of imagination and understanding and the third phase concerns demonstrating that the free play accrues to all persons under the same condition stated by *synthetic a priori principle* of taste, that is, the principle that underlies aesthetic experience whose articulation is not as clear or convincing compared to Kant's articulation of the *synthetic a priori principles* underlying cognitive or moral experience.

To claim that a pure judgement of taste is universally valid is to claim that the pleasure one gets and expresses in terms of such a judgement can be universally communicated and thus can be shared by others. Such a shareability has necessity about it; that is, the agreement is not contingent and thus the pleasure is a necessary pleasure.

As Kirwan points out, "there is a sense in which the very making of this claim to universality (though not its legitimation) is implicit in the way in which we experience the beautiful as an object of *necessary* pleasure. Since the satisfaction the subject feels in beholding beauty is 'not grounded in any inclination of the subject (nor in any other underlying interest), but rather the person making the judgement feels himself completely *free* with regard to the satisfaction that he devotes to the object, he cannot discover as grounds of the satisfaction any private conditions, pertaining to his subject alone'" (2004, 15). The concept of necessity is inseparable from the concept of 'ought'; thus, universal assent associated with pure judgements of taste is not one of prediction of similar reaction in others but is one of requirement. That is, others ought to agree, whether or not they do so. Judgements of agreeable might at best aspire for general validity and do not have 'ought' hidden in them. In addition the pure judgement of taste presupposes a necessary connection between representation and satisfaction.

The philosophical significance of Kant's contention that pure judgements of taste possess universal validity needs to be emphasized here since in making this claim Kant is not simply identifying a logical feature of pure judgements of taste. By means of such identification Kant takes us to the heart of his philosophical anthropology. This is because the question naturally arises "What is the locus of that universal agreement?" Now, Kant himself says "where anyone is conscious that his delight in an object is with him independent of interest, it is inevitable that he should look on the object as one containing a ground of delight for all men" (1952, §6, 50/211 AE). This means that if one's delight in the beautiful is not determined by anything peculiar to himself (unlike in the case of needs and desires) then one must assume that it is grounded on something which one shares with all human beings. It is this common human nature that constitutes

the basis of Kant's Transcendental Deduction of the judgement of the beautiful. This deduction does not establish the objectivity of the pure judgements of taste, unlike the transcendental deduction of categories in the *Critique of Pure Reason* which establishes the objectivity of our empirical judgements thanks to the of application of *a priori* concepts called 'categories'. The transcendental deductions of judgements of taste demonstrates how that judgement is directed towards that subjectivity which can be presupposed in all man. In doing this Kant had hit two birds with one stone: on the one hand, he has shown that the universal human nature which modernity of which Kant was the main spokesman has an aesthetic dimension, apart from a cognitive dimension as demonstrated in the first *Critique* and a moral dimension as demonstrated in the second *Critique*; on the other hand, he frees the aesthetic from cultural/contextual relativism.

However, such a necessity is a subjective necessity which "takes the form of an insistence that everyone ought to agree" (Kirwan 2004, 15) and hence what a pure judgement of taste possesses is a subjective universal validity. The subjectivity of universal validity is obscured by the fact that the subject speaks of beauty *as if* it were a quality of objects. It is significant to note in this connection a point Kirwan makes when he says "the claim to the agreement of others, 'as if ' the judgement were objective, is present, then, only as implicit in the subject's *feeling* that the beauty belongs to the object: it is another way that this feeling of objectivity, definitive of the judgement of taste, could be formulated" (*Ibid,* 16).

From what is said above it is clear that Kant wants pure aesthetic judgement to be subjective. There are two ways in which the subjectivity of a pure judgement of taste is understood: (a) It is about a subject who judges rather than about an object which is

judged, (b) It holds only for the individual who judges and is not binding on others. Obviously, a judgement about agreeable which is not a pure judgement of taste is subjective in the sense of (b) and the pure judgement of taste is subjective in the sense of (a) Thus pure aesthetic judgements can remain subjective without the risk of being arbitrary or idiosyncratic. However, their subjectivity remains intact for the simple reason that " there is a marked absence of general principles to which to appeal when one wants to show that a given aesthetic appraisal, assessment, estimate or judgement is the right one: … Rather, appeal is made essentially to *how* something is experienced, and this may be expressed by saying that an aesthetic appraisal has a strongly subjective element" (Schaper 1992, 209-210). The subjective principle related to the *how* in the above quotation concerns what Kant calls 'Form of finality' which can only be felt and not known in the way the properties of a thing can be.

A very interesting and philosophical puzzling point emerges from what Kant has said about the pure judgements of taste, namely, they being both subjective and universally valid. On the one hand as we have seen, the subjectivity demands that one does not change one's a judgement of beautiful even in the face of contrary reason given by others including a specialist. This is what Kant means when he says, "Taste lays claim simply to autonomy. To make the judgements of others the determining ground of one's own would be heteronomy" (1952, §32, 137/282 AE). Yet, the requirement of universal validity is that the judgement be necessarily shared by others. Do not autonomy and necessary shareability contradict each other? Does not a pure judgement of taste involve the satisfaction of opposite conditions? It is difficult to find in Kant an explicit resolution of this contradiction. Perhaps he did not recognize this as a contradiction.

Given that pure judgements of a taste have subjectivity and universal validity, the question arises whether any concepts are involved in them. It is clear that they do not involve the application of categories since they are not objective empirical judgements. But they are not purely subjective in the sense of a judgement about agreeable such as "I like that picture" and hence there must be some concepts involved in them. According to Kant, they are indeterminate concepts. They do not involve determinate concepts. The notion of indeterminate concept is related to the idea of purposiveness which we discuss in the next chapter. It is sufficient here to only indicate the distinction between determinate and indeterminate concepts. A determinate concept has instances in experience such as the concept of a horse. In fact, even the concept of unicorn is a determinate concept, since it *can* have direct presentation, though it does not have one. As Cohen points out, "Indeed, it is precisely because the concept of a unicorn is what Kant calls a determinate concept that we know just what a unicorn would be if there were any, and hence that we know there are none" (2002, 10). When the concept is indeterminate there is no way to say what would mark its genuine instance. It is a concept that we can apply to know possible experience. Beauty, as we shall see, is necessarily purposiveness without purpose and Kant considers 'purposiveness' as an indeterminate concept whereas 'purpose' is a determinate concept. Given that purposiveness is subjective, to say that a pure judgement of taste involves only an indeterminate concept is to say that they do not concern "a perceptible property of an object, a property that an object has in its own right, independently of how it is disposed to affect human beings" (Budd 2001, 259). In other words, to call something 'beautiful' is not to describe it in the way we do when we call something 'white'. It is to respond to its presentation as a purposive whole. Malcolm Budd thinks that according to Kant beauty is a relational

property. This is somewhat misleading because many relational properties are designated by determinate concepts such as 'being son of '.

A question arises whether pure judgements of taste are objective in any sense, if not in the sense of objective empirical judgements like 'this stone is heavy'. Before we take up this issue we may note the way Kant resolves what he calls 'antinomy of taste' the antinomy results from Kant's contention that pure judgement of taste do not involve determinate concepts and, hence, the thesis of the antinomy is "a pure judgement of taste is *not* based on concepts because if it were so it can lead to disputes". The antithesis is: "a pure judgement of taste is based on concepts for otherwise these could not even be any disagreement about it".

Kant resolves the antinomy by showing that the contradiction is only apparent. The thesis should be re-formulated as "the pure judgement of taste is not based on *determinate* concepts". The antithesis should be re-formulated as "the pure judgement of taste is based on indeterminate concepts". So re-formulated, the thesis and antithesis seem to be consistent and thus the contradiction disappears.

We now can come to the question whether in some sense or the other the pure judgements of taste are objective. Of course, according to Kant, in a strict and precise sense of the term 'objective' they are not. He emphasizes this point by saying that "they cannot be other than subjective" and explicitly states that they contain "merely a reference of the representation of the object to the subject" (1952, §6, 51/211 AE). However, according to some scholars 'objectivity ' as used by Kant is too narrow as it is confined to empirical judgements like ' This stone is heavy'. According to them, the Kantian distinction between two kinds of aesthetic judgement namely, judgement about

the agreeable (for example: 'I like this painting') and a pure judgement of taste, that is, a judgement about beautiful (for example: 'This painting is beautiful') itself makes room for some kind of objectivity in the sense the latter possesses it unlike the former which is, therefore, purely subjective. For example, Körner speaks of such a non-empirical objectivity as 'aesthetic objectivity' (*cf*, 1955, 183). This is in spite of the fact that Kant's own distinction between two kinds of judgements of taste is made on the basis of universal validity possessed by the latter and Kant speaks of subjective universal validity in their connection, in opposition to objective universal validity possessed by judgements like 'This stone is heavy' which Kant calls objective empirical judgements. Of course, when we make a pure judgement of taste we speak *as if* the judgement is about an objective feature of a thing. The question is "Can we speak of objectivity in some sense regarding a pure judgement of taste, even if Kant himself is allergic to it?" Zimmerman, while conceding Kant's point that our judgements about the beautiful "are *not* objective in that they simply refer to an objective property", maintains that "they *are* objective in referring to the power which the art-object has of producing certain emotions in a normal subject" (1992, 165). According to Zimmerman a pure judgement of taste records "not, of course, what is antecedently there in experience but what occurs in the interaction between what is there and the subject who experience what is there"(*Ibid*). Is not this interaction itself objective? Can we not, therefore, speak of objectivity as being a logical feature of the pure judgement of taste?

There are Kantian scholars who vehemently oppose the view that Kant did make room for objectivity of pure judgements of taste. For example, Vandenabeele opposing Kulenkampff, Amriks, Wiggins and McDowell for whom beauty concerns some aspects of the fabric of the world claims that according to Kant judgements about the beautiful

are not objective since they are not based on (determinate) concepts. In this connection he draws our attention to Kant's claim "The judgement of taste determines its object in respect of delight (as a thing of beauty) with a claim to the agreement of *every one,* [emphasis in the original], just *as if it were objective* [emphasis added]" (1952, §32, 136/281 AE). But Kant also says "Proofs are no avail whatever for determining the judgement of taste, and in this connexion matters stand just as they would *were* [emphasis added] that judgement simply *subjective* [emphasis in the original]"(*Ibid*, §33, 139/284 AE). Vandenabeele himself accepts that according to Kant "pure judgements of taste seem to be neither (purely) objective nor purely subjective: they are, *as it were*, objective and it is *as if* they were subjective" (2008, 412). This shows that Kant's position on the objectivity of pure judgements of taste is equivocal, if not vague. It must be noted that Kant does not confine 'objectivity' to the objective empirical judgements whose objectivity, according to him, is theoretical. Kant concedes objectivity to moral judgements whose objectivity according to him is practical because the moral law determines the will. Can we not make a claim for another kind of objectivity which we may call 'aesthetic objectivity'? A positive answer to this question may not be found in Kant but is definitely not inconsistent with his overall position. (After all, he does not identify objectivity with theoretical objectivity). In fact, the idea of aesthetic objectivity is neither strange nor incoherent. Many Kantian scholars have invoked it. For instance, Körner says "the nature and justification of the claim to *aesthetic objectivity* [of a pure judgement of taste as distinct from a judgement of personal taste] can be discovered only by a careful examination of the whole class of judgements which implicitly make that claim" (1955, 183, emphasis added). The idea of aesthetic objectivity fits in well the Zimmerman's view mention above.

Graham makes an important point when he says, as we have already noted, that Kant locates pure judgement of taste halfway between logically necessary judgements such as mathematical theorems and purely subjective judgements which are expressions of personal taste. This means they are not purely subjective. But the question is 'What is it to be not purely subjective?' Is it necessarily to be non objective? That is, is there no sense in which they cannot be objective? No doubt, Kant claims that they 'cannot be other than subjective'. But the specific sense in which they are subjective (which is not the customary sense in which the expression is used as, for example, in the case of judgements expressing personal like and dislike) may be compatible with some sense of 'objective'. Do not empirical judgement possess objectivity in spite of their being result of the application of non-mathematical *a priori* (subjective) concepts *viz.* categories? Graham may be right in saying that, according to Kant, "To call something beautiful is *not just* to describe it but to react to it" (2000, 13). In fact, Graham is right in summarizing Kant's position in this way. But he presumes that such a reaction is in no sense can be objective. After all, he himself says that a pure judgement of taste is *not just* a description. This means that it is description but also something more than that, namely, it is our reaction or response. It may be noted that Graham does not say that pure judgements of taste are not descriptions at all but only reactions. For he knows that if he says so the line between the pure judgement of taste and judgements about the agreeable virtually disappears. There is no convincing ground for saying that our reactions or responses are merely subjective.

Graham's indirect admission that pure judgements of taste are descriptions. (If not just descriptions) can be connected with the position of Eva Schaper. According to Shaper, Kant's idea that pure judgement of taste do not involve any determinate concepts

such as categories and, therefore, are pre-categorial in nature is to be found in *prolegomena* written earlier than the third *Critique*, but not in the third *Critique* itself. She makes a strong case against Kant's view that the pure judgements of taste are pre categorial in nature. Her point is that, Kant himself admits that understanding has a role in producing pure judgements of taste. But understanding does not function without the application of categories. Pure judgements of taste "are singular judgements and simply by virtue of that fact must involve categories. What is distinctive about them in contrast to other judgements of sense-perception is that the categories play no *justificatory* role in assessing their validity or invalidity. For, while categories are supposed to underpin the application of empirical concepts to objects, this is not a *determining* feature of the validity of an aesthetic judgement" (Schaper 1992, 229). However, Kant in the *Critique of Judgement* does not characterize pure judgements of taste as not involving categories. According to Schaper "in this respect his later position is a vast improvement on the description of" (*Ibid*, 228) pure judgements of taste provided in the *prolegomena*. Schaper makes a significant point that according to Kant's new description of the pure judgements of taste given in third *Critique*, the distinction between objective empirical judgement and the pure judgements of taste revolves around the direction of reference. A pure judgement of taste has its referential direction towards feelings whereas the referential direction to of an empirical judgement is towards an object. From the fact the feelings are subjective it does not follow that the referential direction towards them and, therefore, pure judgement of taste are only subjective. Hence, Schaper contends that "an aesthetic judgement may be about an object that is also an object available for description" (*Ibid*, 230).

Our contention that objectivity is a logical feature of pure judgement of taste does not conflict with the contention of the Kantian scholars, no doubt faithful to Kant, that the pure judgement of taste have singularity* as their logical feature. They valorized this feature because if the shareability of pleasure "is not to be converted into objective common agreement about classes of things and thereby lose what is distinctive to judgement of taste, a judgement of taste must be 'invariably laid down as a singular judgement upon the object'" (Graham 2000, 13-14). By the feature of 'singularity' they mean that a pure judgement of taste is not a logical judgement, that is, a general judgement in the following sense: when an object is said to be beautiful the judgement has no reference to the kind to which object belongs, that is, the object must not be perceived as falling under a kind. In Graham's words "When I declare something to be beautiful, I am not placing it which a general category of 'beautiful things' as I place 'aspirin' within the category 'painkiller' I am focused upon and 'delighting' in this particular object" (*Ibid*, 19). This means that though in judging an item as beautiful we may not help recognizing it as being something of a certain kind, such recognition should not figure in our judgement of it as beautiful. In other words, the judgement must concern the form of the object abstracted from the kind of thing it is. The ability for such an abstraction needs training and our cultivation of it is the first lesson in aesthetic education.

An important implication follows from the thesis that the pure judgements of taste are singular. It is that a general judgements like 'All roses are beautiful' or 'Some roses are

* As we have seen in Kant's writing and the writings of the Kantian scholars the word singular is used in two ways: (1) to characterized the subjective nature of pure aesthetic judgements brought by the fact that when someone judges that a thing is beautiful he refuses to alter his judgements by the counter of agreements given by the others; (2) as we see below, as non general (i.e. universal or particular) judgements involving the word 'beautiful'.

beautiful' or 'Roses in general are beautiful' are not aesthetic judgements. This means that 'beautiful' in a pure judgement of taste like 'This rose is beautiful' and a general/logical judgement like 'All roses are beautiful' does not have the same meaning. 'Beautiful' in the latter connotes a concept whereas in the former it does not. If so, according to Kant, 'beauty' can be a concept though it does not function in that way in a pure judgement of taste. But this leads to a problem. Some scholars think that the logical judgements mentioned above can also be taken as pure judgements of taste because they result from generalizing over a number of pure judgements of taste which are singular. But since any generalizations is an objective empirical judgement based on some singular objective empirical judgements 'All roses are beautiful' cannot be said to be a generalization based on pure judgements of taste. In other words, pure judgements of taste are not premises of an inductive argument whose conclusion is a logical judgement. Thus, the pure judgements of taste do not provide inductive grounds for a logical judgement involving 'beautiful'. Of course, Kant himself does not say so. Scholars like Cohen find it very difficult to accept that Kant can be clear on this. In fact they charge Kant with sloppiness Cohen admits that he is "left thinking that Kant's sense of a connection between 'This rose is beautiful' and 'Rose in general are beautiful' is a logical misapprehension" (2002, 8). Townsend is right when he says, "All that Kant is claiming [is] that 'beauty' as it appears in the purely singular 'This rose is beautiful' refers to a judgement of taste, while 'beauty' as it appears in 'Rose in general are beautiful' refers to the aesthetic ground of a logical judgement" (2003, 77). In fact, Townsend connects this idea to Kant's projects itself. It is worth quoting Townsend in this connection "One cannot get from judgements of taste to logical judgements. But one can get from aesthetic experience to logical judgements" (*Ibid*, 79). According to Townsend there is nothing remarkable about this

from a logical point of view and Kant noticed that. From the point view of Kant's transcendental philosophy it is remarkable because "it shows the existence of a wholly different kind of universal judgement that is different from the logical judgements produced. That, of course, was the 'discovery' that led Kant to add a critique of judgement to what he had thought to be an already completed critique of reason (*Ibid*).

Leaving the above point we may now ask the question whether pure judgements of taste are *synthetic a priori* judgements in view of the fact that they are neither *analytical a priori* nor *synthetic a posteriori*. Of course, if they are judgements at all and if there are only three kinds of judgements then it follows that they are *synthetic a priori*. This claim is not a contrived one because it is consistent with the way Kant defines '*synthetic*' and *'a priori*' Some Kantian scholars have sought to give a substantial content to this claim. Notable in this connection is the view of Eva Schaper. No doubt, Schaper admits that this may sound bizarre but she takes the support of Kant's own statement "A judgement to the effect that it is with pleasure that I perceive and estimate some object is an empirical judgement. But if it asserts that I think the object beautiful, i.e. that I may attributes that delight to every one as necessary, it is then an *a priori* judgement" (1952, §37, 146/289 AE). Of course, Schaper acknowledges that Kant has introduced a conception of *a priori* "for which even his prolific uses of that term in earlier works have scarcely prepared us" (1992, 203). But she also notes that "Kant nowhere suggests that the sense of the term *'a priori'* is in any way peculiar to the third *Critique*" (*Ibid*). Hence, the test of *synthetic a priori* character of the pure judgements of taste is whether they have necessity in the way Kantian *synthetic a priori* judgements have. It is generally recognized that such a necessity being non-analytical can be considered epistemic or epistemological. But Schaper does not explicitly characterize such a necessity as epistemological.

Vandenabeele is one of the Kantian scholars who make a strong claim that necessity embodied by pure judgement of taste is epistemological and strictly so. Vandenabeele brings to our attention an important point that 'ought' in an aesthetic judgement is different from the way it figures in moral judgement. In a moral judgement the 'ought' designates not only a requirement but also a command whereas in the case of an aesthetic judgement it designate only a requirement. Vandenabeele draws our attention to two statements of Kant in this connection:

(1) "The *absolutely good* (the object of moral feeling), as judged subjectively by the feeling it inspires, is the ability of the subject's powers to be determined by the conception of a law that *obligates absolutely*. It is distinguished above all *by its modality*: A necessity that rests on a priori concepts and contains not just a *claim* but also a *command* that everyone approve".

(2) "The judgement of taste itself does not *postulate* everyone's agreement …, it merely requires this agreement from every one" (quoted in Vandenabeele 2008, 417).

This means the universal agreement is, as Kant himself says, only an idea. So in Vandenabeele's view in the Kantian framework 'necessary' or 'ought' associated with pure judgements of taste is weaker than its ethical counterpart. From this Vandenabeele considers the necessity associated with the former to be only subjective. But this is questionable. Though pure judgements of taste are subjective, thanks to their being about feeling of pleasure, their necessity need not be subjective. The kind of necessity involved in pure judgements of taste may be characterized as, aesthetic *sui generis*. A pure judgement of taste can be taken to be, as Hannah Ginsborg says "a formal and self-

referential judgement that claims, not the universal validity of an antecedently given feeling of pleasure, but rather is own universal validity with respect to the object" (quoted in Vandenabeele 2008, 422). In other words, a pure judgement of taste is about the normativity of one's own mental state. That is, the 'ought' concerns our need for others' recognition of this normatively, that is, that the object is judged as it ought to be judged.

Whether Ginsborg's way of construing aesthetic necessity is adequate or not, the very idea of aesthetic necessity as non subjective has its philosophical utility. It does justice to the fact that aesthetic experience and therefore an aesthetic claim has a transcendental element. In having aesthetic experience I transcend my individuality in the sense my getting pleasure is inseparable from what others ought to experience as pleasure. That is to say, the pleasure I derive from experiencing what I perceive as a beautiful object is supplemented by the pleasure I get from the fact that others too ought to have it. And these two pleasures are equally constitutive of an aesthetic experience that a judgement of the beautiful is about. In this sense a pure judgement of taste is about something which is self transcending. Secondly, it mitigates ego-centric construal of pure judgement of taste which consists in claiming that a pure judgement of taste expresses two claims, namely, I won't change my judgement whatever others might say *and* others should ought to share my pleasure and hence judge like me.

Hence, what distinguishes a pure judgement of taste from a mere judgement about the agreeable is this: aesthetic necessity is involved in the former only even though both are subjective. Aesthetic necessity itself cannot be considered to be subjective, unless, one equates 'subjective' with 'aesthetic' which if accepted makes the whole argument about the subjectivity of aesthetic necessity circular and therefore trivial.

I I.3 the Epistemic Status of Pure Judgements of Taste

In this section we deal with a highly contentious issue. The issue concerns whether the pure aesthetic judgements have any cognitive content at all. An overwhelming number of Kantian scholars claim that they do not. They justify their position taking support from Kant's own statements. They claim that, according to Kant, a pure judgement of taste such as 'This painting is beautiful' has only an appearance of cognitive judgements, that is, judgements about how things actually are. The task is to find out whether this majority view can be sustained.

Before we proceed to consider the majority view which is anti-cognitivist it must be made clear that Kant in spite of some of his anti-cognitivist remarks does recognize the cognitive content of pure aesthetic judgements. This is particularly explicit when speaking about universal delight and it universal communicability in the second 'moment' he says "if … the determining ground of the judgement as to this universal communicability of the representation is to be merely subjective, that is to say, is to be conceived independently of any concept of the object, it can be nothing else than the mental state that presents itself in the mutual relation of the powers of representation so far as they refer a given representation *to cognition in general" (*1952, §9, *57-58/217 AE*. emphasis in the original). What does '*cognition in general*' signify except that the pure judgements of taste have a cognitive status different from the objective empirical judgements which are cognitive in a *specific* sense. The pro-cognitivist thrust of Kant's position regarding judgements about the beautiful in object of fine arts is very affectively brought out in the following statement of Kant "The description 'agreeable art' applies

where the end of the art is that the pleasure should accompany the representations considered as mere *sensations*, the description 'fine art' where it is to accompany them considered as *modes of cognition*" (*Ibid*, §44, 165/305 AE).

Be it as it may, we may start our discussion of anti-cognitivist thesis with the position of Eva Schaper according to whom, as we have noted in the previous section, the pure judgements of taste are objective. But she maintains that they are not epistemic/epistemological claims, that is, they do not have cognitive content since "in appraising the object *aesthetically* we make no epistemological claim" (1992, 230). This means that pure judgements of taste are objective like empirical judgements though they are, unlike the latter, are non-cognitive. Thus, we still can retain the core contention of Kant's epistemology that only empirical judgements are objective in a full-fledged sense. Hence, she assures us that "what the third *Critique* adds cannot therefore, be wholly divorced from Kant's epistemology. On the contrary, it needs that a doctrine in order to show that knowledge-claims, important as they are, are not everything we can express in judgement form about our experience of living in a knowable world" (*Ibid*).

The question "Is there any strong reason in support of the claim that pure judgements of taste are non-cognitive even it we concede that objectivity of pure judgement of taste will not automatically establish their status as cognitive judgements?" The reason which Schaper advances in defense of her claim is that the pure judgements of taste "refer feelings to a subject as their 'determining ground'; descriptive empirical judgements take the objective turn by referring sense representations to an object as 'determining ground'" (*Ibid*, 229). But this reason advanced by Schaper is not convincing. As we have seen in the previous section, she claims that pure judgement of taste can be

akin to empirical judgements in being objective though their objectivity is distinct from that of empirical judgements. If so, can we not say that pure judgements of taste also have cognitive status which is distinct from the cognitive status enjoyed by empirical judgements? The fact that the pure judgements of taste have a referential direction to our feeling of pleasure or displeasure and not objects does not prove their non-cognitive status. After all, to have a feeling of pleasure is to recognize that it is pleasure in a manner to have cancer is not necessarily recognizing the cancer. But can we not say "No recognition without cognition" just as, as Quine's dictum goes, "No entity without identity"? This does not mean that every time we have a feeling of pleasure we recognize it. We may not recognize the feeling when we are completely engrossed in the experience of pleasure or overwhelmed by an object of beauty. All that is meant is that it should be possible for us to recognize a feeling when we have one. This point is analogous to Kant's claim in the first *Critique* that the necessary condition of the unity of the subject in perceiving and thinking is not that the subject must be aware of manifold of perceptions; all that is required is that it should be *possible* for the subject to be aware of the manifold which according to Kant consists in the *possibility* of "I think" accompanying the manifold and Kant calls this relation "pure apperception".

The above discussion has shown that just because pure judgements of taste are directed towards feelings or are based on them does not itself warrant the claim that aesthetic judgements are non-cognitive. The point that there is no reason to think that pure judgements of taste are non-cognitive can be reinforced by considering Whewell's position that pure judgements of taste do not have, in the Kantian scheme, any cognitive content. Whewell's first argument is that according to Kant "judgements of beauty … are based on the feeling of pleasure or displeasure which denote nothing in the object … such

judgements can be neither true nor false since to discriminate on the basis of feeling alone is to contribute nothing to knowledge" (1992, 251). This argument has been sufficiently countered above. However, Whewell has another argument in favor of his contention that Kant is a non-cognitivist and this argument is fairly typical. According to Whewell "when an object pleases aesthetically in the Kantian sense, it does so apart from any concepts" (*Ibid*, 253). This argument deserves examination. In this connection the views Paul Crowther are of central relevance.

Crowther takes into account Kant's at least apparently inconsistent characterization of pure judgements of taste as being 'apart from any concept', and as involving 'no determinate concept'. Crowther rightly says "if Kant's theory is to do any useful philosophical work, we must read those contrasting characterizations as differences of emphasis rather than substance" (1996, 113). How does Crowther substantiate his claim?

According to Crowther, in Kant's aesthetic framework a pure judgement of taste has its origin in a harmonious interaction between the cognitive faculties called 'imagination' and 'understanding'. In this connection he quotes the following passage from Kant: "a representation whereby an object is given, involves, in order that it may become a source of cognition at all, *imagination* for bringing together the manifold of intuition, and *understanding* for the unity of concept uniting the representations" (*Ibid*, 112). Though this passage is from the third *Critique*, it is one of the central tenets of the first *Critique*. According to Kant such an interaction generates images and hence imagination acts as productive. This is common to both objective experience as well as aesthetic experience. However, "in its normal highly specific *employments*, it [that is, productive imagination] is tightly directed by a relevant concept, and functions in a fundamentally 'reproductive'

way. For example, in conceptualizing something as a 'dog', our application of the concept will be informed (tacitly or explicitly) by expectations based on associations between the present creature and our previous experience of dog-type appearances and behavior" (*Ibid*, 112-113). The reproductive function that imagination performs while interacting with understanding is the basis of what Crowther calls 'normal specificatory judgements ' and objective empirical judgements are such judgements. The specificatory judgement, according to Crowther, "have definiteness of sense, and are the bases of every day cognitive life" (*Ibid*, 113). Because they involve definite concepts the context in which they occur are characterized by Crowther as discursively rigid.

But this is not the case with pure judgements of taste. Even though the cognitive faculties called 'imagination' and 'understanding' produce by their interaction the pure judgements of taste, their interaction is one of free play. In other words, such judgements are not normal specificatory judgements. This is not because such judgements do not have conceptual content but they have something more which is what is denoted by the term "apart from any concept". Crowther very well expresses this point by saying that "such judgements focus *on the possibility of a manifold's conceptualizability per se*, rather than its relation to a definite concept" (*Ibid*, 113). What does this mean? It means that when we judge, for example, a bird as 'beautiful' we identify it in terms of formal configurations characteristic of that bird. Hence, our pure aesthetical judgements, Crowther says, entail that the forms of representations "have relations of unity and diversity which are amenable to sustained *cognitive exploration*" (*Ibid*, 114, emphasis added). This cognitive exploration involves categories, especially of quantity and quality. However Crowther points out that these categories interact in less explorative ways. No doubt, a configuration which we call beautiful is "cognitively unstable. However, this is

not a loss of intelligibility- a kind of cognitive breakdown. Rather, we have, as it were, cognition *in the making*" (*Ibid*, 115).

Crowther's cognitivist position hinges upon, as we have seen, his idea that the role of understanding lies in the application of categories though the application of categories in the case of pure judgements of taste is different from the application of categories in the case of objective empirical judgements. This point has been strongly endorsed by Ted Cohen. Cohen recognizes that in Kant's view understanding supplies various concepts and imagination arranges perceptions in a manner that fits them such that the two faculties by mutual agreement produce determinate judgements such as 'This rose is red'. Thus, in the case of an objective empirical judgement imagination is instructed by the understanding. But in the case of pure judgement of taste such as 'This rose is beautiful' the conformity of imagination to understanding is free and not instructed. Since the active role of understanding does figure in aesthetic experience concepts, that is, categories must figure in the case of pure aesthetic judgements. Cohen rightly asks "If the understanding is not proffering concepts, then what is it doing? …. Does it simply refuse to apply any of them, restraining itself?" (2002, 2). As Cohen says "That sounds ridiculous … but even if it were the truth, it would be a description of what the Understanding is *not* doing, not of what it *is* doing relative to the object engaged in Imagination" (*Ibid*). Cohen's own answer to this question is that "in making a [pure] judgement of taste the Understanding accepts the task not of taking the measure of an object by subordinating it to a concept, but of doing full justice to the object in terms of all there is to it, in terms of all the object's aspects" (*Ibid*, 3). Cohen frames this answer in an alternative way by saying that "in an experience of beauty, one is attending to the absolute and complete particularity of the beautiful object. Beautiful things … are thus

unique" (*Ibid*). What this means is the following: in the case of an objective empirical judgement understanding applies categories via the application of what Kant calls 'objective empirical concepts' that is concepts which imply a category such as 'house' which implies the category of substance. In the case of a pure judgement of taste the categories are applied directly rather than through objective empirical concepts. This means in the judgement 'This rose is beautiful' the subject term 'this rose' does not connote an objective empirical concept. It may be treated as being akin to a place-marker. This means that the way in which the synthetic unity brought about by the application of categories in the case of objective experience is different from the synthetic unity brought about by the application of categories in the case of aesthetic experience which is also 'objective, as we have seen, though in a sense different from that of empirical experience. This point can be related to a significant observation made by Malcolm Budd. To quote Budd "rather than simply pairing off the imagination with manifoldness and the understanding with unity and expecting that to provide the required explanation, it must be a matter of the *manner* in which the manifold is united in a beautiful object" (2001, 257).

The cognitive status of the pure judgements of taste can be reinforced by according important place to the concept of universal communicability of aesthetic experience. After all, it is a central contention of Kant's aesthetics that the aesthetic subject must regard his experience "as resting on what he may also presuppose in every other person; and therefore he must believe that he has reason for demanding a similar delight from everyone" (1952, §6, 51/211 AE). Kant very aptly says that making a pure judgement of taste is speaking with a universal voice. The very locution is a cognitive locution. Guyer rightly points out that Kant's phrase "'speaking with a universal voice' means: it is

'imputing feelings of pleasure to others on the basis of one's own feeling'" (1997, 127). But 'universal communicability' that is entailed by 'universal voice' presupposes the awareness of others as communicating agents and in that sense as rational beings. The cognitive claim of pure judgements of aesthetic can thus be established on the basis of communicative rationality. It may be noted that Vandenabeele who brings out the centrality of the concept of universal communicability (*cf.* 2008, 417) rejects the cognitive status of the pure judgements of taste (*cf. Ibid*, 419, *fn.*29).

The above mentioned argument in favor of cognitivism in Kantian aesthetics needs to be supplemented with the effective way in which Marcus Verhaegh establishes how the pure judgements of taste can have truth value and thus claim cognitive status. However, in order to clear the grounds for the discussion of such a claim a few words about aesthetic disagreements are in order. It is commonly accepted that aesthetic disagreements cannot be resolved in the usual sense of 'resolution'. Kantian scholars have argued that this is so even for Kant. Whewell brings out this point lucidly when he says on behalf of Kant "an object cannot be judged beautiful or ugly on the basis of a general description of it …Thus aesthetic disagreements cannot be settled by rational argument … this is to say, 'there can be no rule according to which any one is to be compelled to recognize anything as beautiful'" (1992, 253). This point is very well elaborated or rather supplemented by Kirwan. Kirwan rightly points out that, according to Kant, beauty should please not only immediately but also universally. However, he recognizes that according to Kant "The judgement of taste itself does not *postulate* the agreement of every one …, it only *imputes* this agreement to everyone … the universal voice is therefore, only an idea" (1952, §8, 56/216 AE). Kirwan interprets this statement of Kant as meaning "The claim to the agreement of others, 'as if ' the judgement were objective, is

present, then, only as implicit in the subject's *feeling* that the beauty belongs to the object" (2004, 16). So interpreted Kirwan's construal of the irresolvability of aesthetic disagreements, as Kant conceives it, becomes clear. According to Kirwan, "Kant must ultimately claim that differences in taste are somehow attributable to some subjects' failure to recognize that their pleasure is based on an interest …[Hence], interest or ignorance maybe supposed to sometimes distort taste, any taste that is demonstrably disinterested and informed must be 'correct'" (*Ibid*, 18). But is impossible to demonstrate genuine disinterest and consequently to identify conclusively whether a pure judgement of taste put forth by a subject is true or not.

What Whewell and Kirwan have established is that aesthetic disagreement which involves a clash of two contradictory pure judgements of taste cannot be resolved by demonstrating one of them to be true and the other false. No doubt, sometimes aesthetic disagreements are resolved but that is not by proving that one of the contending judgement is false but by persuading the holder of that judgement to give up his position. What both Whewell and Kirwan point out is that the truth value of the pure aesthetic judgements is not propositional. One who claims that pure aesthetic judgements have cognitive content has to say either that such a cognitive content is devoid of truth-value or that it involves the standard propositional truth-value (characteristically associated with objective empirical judgement) or it involves non-standard propositional truth-value. Verhaegh chooses the third option in his attempt to make room for truth in the case of pure judgements of taste.

Verhaegh acknowledges that there is much in Kant which supports the contention that pure judgements of taste do not have cognitive content. He also acknowledges that

the customary ways of establishing the claim that Kant makes room for cognitive content of pure judgements of taste do not go very far. For instance, it is argued by some that Kant does not negate the cognitive status of pure judgements of taste because pure aesthetic judgements involve universality and communicability of pleasure. We may interpret Kant as establishing a link between pure judgements of taste and cognition "because he sees a value to sharing in a universally communicable pleasure: for instance, because sharing in such a pleasure might motivate individuals to recognize a commonality that transcends their differing desires and differing conceptions of their own good" (Verhaegh 2001, 374).

Dissatisfied with approaches like the one word above, Verhaegh adopts a different strategy central to which is what he calls 'the principle of the equivalency of cognitive enhancement and truth claims', or 'the essential spectrum principle'. This principle posits a spectrum with "totally general enhancements of cognition on one end, and the determinate enhancement offered by a true proposition at the other. The less general a cognitive enhancement is, the more like a propositional truth claim it is" (*Ibid*, 375). Thus, at one end of this spectrum we have determinate judgements such as an objective empirical judgement which have a cognitive status in the sense their truth in propositional. These judgements are most determinate and least general. At the other end of the spectrum we have judgements which are most general and least determinant. Verhaegh has probably in mind certain kinds of reflective judgements (other than judgements of taste) such as principle teleological judgements which have cognitive content or what Verhaegh calls 'cognitive enhancement character' but they're not propositions, in any sense "It is the in-between areas of the spectrum that are most interesting in considering a connection between truth and art within the limits of Kantian

aesthetics. These can be thought of as domain-specific enhancements of cognition" (*Ibid*). The pure judgements of taste in this sense are partly general because "the enhancement identified in a judgement of taste must have a quality of *inexhaustibility* to it" (*Ibid*, 377). This means that when we are asked why an object is beautiful when it is judged to be so we can't enumerate a finite set of characteristics. Such an inexhaustibility Verhaegh rightly traces to the idea of beauty that figures in a pure judgements of taste and that has its source in the imagination rather than the understanding. They are partly determinate because they are about an object or more precisely a *representation* of an object and hence they possess truth. Verhaegh insists that "by no means must the enhancement identified in a judgement of taste be totally general. And to the degree it lacks complete generality, there is room for the enhancement to have qualities of meaning and 'aboutness', and thus of truth: for again, the more specific an enhancement, the more like a propositional truth claim it is" (*Ibid*, 378). Thus, according to Verhaegh, aesthetic judgements posses a cognitive content which is propositional but the propositionality, unlike determinate judgements, is not a standard one. Hence, a pure judgements of taste expresses a non standard proposition.

Verhaegh's articulation of the nature of the cognitive content of pure judgement of taste has an important merit. It makes clear what Kant means by the expression of 'critique of aesthetic judgement' which is the title of the first part of the third *Critique*. In the Kantian scheme (and the subsequent uses of the locution by the successors of Kant) 'critique' means 'showing the limits of '. Hence, it is clear that Kant wanted to show the limits of pure judgements of taste, as we can understand from Verhaegh, which are drawn by Kant in terms of determinate judgements on the one hand and the most general judgements like non-aesthetic reflective judgements (teleological judgement) on the

other. Such a demarcation which Kant draws has a positive content as in the case of the first two *Critiques*. That is to say, Kant seeks to display, as Verhaegh points out, the autonomy of the aesthetic. In the first *Critique* Kant established the autonomy of factual knowledge including and especially, scientific knowledge. In the second *Critique* he establishes the autonomy of the moral. The first part of the third *Critique* provides an account of truth-revelatory role of the aesthetic. To quote Verhaegh "Such an account involves respecting the autonomy from morality and knowledge of nature that Kant assigns the aesthetic" (*Ibid*, 374).

We end this chapter by recapitulating the central theses of the Kantian theory of the pure judgements of taste. Aesthetic judgements or judgements of taste are one kind of reflective judgements. Pure judgements of taste are one kind of aesthetic judgements or judgements of taste. Judgements about the beautiful are the paradigmatic cases of pure judgements of taste; that is, they are pure judgements of taste *proper*, whereas judgements about the sublime are not pure judgements of taste *proper*, and they may be called 'semi-pure judgements of taste'. Secondly, the pure judgements of taste are subjective in the sense they concern feelings of pleasure and displeasure. This claim of Kant is logically equivalent to the Kantian position that they do not involve determinate concepts but only indeterminate ones. Thirdly, though they subjective they are universally valid; however, their universal validity is not same as that of the empirical judgements. Fourthly, their universal validity involves the notion of necessity and locus of this necessity is the common human nature. Fifthly, the kind of necessity they involve brings them close to *synthetic a priori* judgements though the notion of *synthetic a priori* when applied to them is stretched beyond what Kant could envisage. Sixthly, they are singular judgements in the sense they are not about a class or subclass of objects. Finally,

the thesis maintains, in spite of opposition by many Kantian scholars that objectively in a non-empirical sense is a logical features of pure judgements of taste. And the thesis substantiates the point that we have to make room for a kind of objectively which can be justifiably call 'Aesthetic' which does justice to the fact that they are not about the objects but about their presentation.

After, delineating the above mentioned logical features of the pure judgements of taste we inquired into the question whether pure judgements of taste have cognitive content at all. After considering various positions and arguments, the chapter concludes that they have cognitive content though 'cognitivity' in their case is not same as the 'cognitivity' associated with empirical judgements.

We end this chapter by noting the crisp manner in which Graham distinguishes pure judgements of taste from other kinds of judgements when he says that a pure judgements of taste is " to be distinguished (1) from a judgement of fact because it is subjective, (2) from the merely subjective because it commands the assent of others, (3) from a judgement grounded in practical rationality because the beautiful has no practical purpose, and (4) from the merely fanciful or superficially attractive because it has the mark of purposefulness"(2005, 18).

CHAPTER-III

KANT'S THEORY OF BEAUTY

III.1 Some Preliminaries

This chapter, in an important sense, is continuous with the previous one for more than the simple reason that beauty and the judgements about it are two sides of the same coin. This reason apart, the continuity can be seen in relation to the fact that our claims regarding the logical and cognitive status of the pure judgements of taste in the last chapter get reinforced by our discussion in this chapter in the sense those claims are made both palpable and plausible.

However, apart from reinforcing what is said in the last chapter this chapter has independent themes concerning, most importantly, the nature of aesthetic experience. As all students of Kant know, one of the central questions which Critical Philosophy sought to answer was "How is experience (as something more than a mere hailstorm of sensations) possible?" By this question Kant meant "What are the *a priori* conditions of the possibility of experience?" Students of Kant also know that by classifying experience into objective/cognitive, moral and aesthetic, Kant decomposed this question into: (1) What are the *a priori* conditions of the possibility of objective/cognitive experience? (2) What are the *a priori* conditions of the possibility of moral experience? and; (3) What are the *a priori* conditions of the possibility of aesthetic experience? The first two questions

are answered in the first two *Critiques* respectively. The most significant aspect of the first part of the third *Critique* lies in Kant's attempt to answer the third question and the answer is related to, but distinction from, his views on the nature of pure aesthetic judgements.

It must be noted that Kant confines his reflections mainly on beauty to natural beauty. The experience of beauty in art is not central to his concern with aesthetic experience. The paradigmatic status of the natural beauty, no doubt, makes beauty in art somewhat secondary to his concern. This position of Kant is reinforced by his demand that a work of art must resemble an object of nature. But, this does not prevent him from having a deep philosophical engagement with art, as we shall see in chapter IV.

Be it as it may, there remains the question regarding the primacy which Kant accords to natural beauty vis-à-vis artistic beauty. One answer can be the following: the *Critique of Pure Reason* provides the philosophical contours of a mechanistic theory of nature which has no place for freedom. In the second *Critique* Kant has shown that since moral action is not an illusion, we must assume that we have *freedom* to choose between desire and duty. As Körner says "Together they show that the theoretically necessary principles, which apply to *phenomena*, and the practically necessary principles, which refer to *noumena*, are logically compatible" (1955, 177). However, since our freedom finds realization in nature through our actions, natural necessity and moral freedom are not just logically compatible but they must be grounded in reality in the sense that it must be possible for us to make a transition from the way of thinking in terms of the laws of nature to the one related to freedom. An important dimension of the third *Critique* is to

identify such a ground by establishing the required harmony between nature and freedom. Obviously it is natural beauty, and not the artistic one, which foots the bill.

The primacy which Kant gives to beauty in nature vis-à-vis beauty in art should also be understood in relation to his view that beauty is a symbol of morality and since here Kant means by 'beauty' primarily 'natural beauty', natural beauty acquires paradigmatic status for the simple reason that the question of morality is central to Kant's thinking. A question might arise: "What sense can we make of Kant's claim that nature to be beautiful must look like a work of art?" As Rueger points out "Kant's statement does not mean that we should find art forms in nature; it means … that a natural form, in order to be beautiful, has to agree with a form we, in our imagination, could have produced freely" (2007, 153). Kant's position regarding the primacy of natural beauty was opposed by Hegel according to whom aesthetics has to be primarily a philosophy of (fine) art since an adequate aesthetic theory needed objective categories that could be found only in art history and not in natural history. We do not find any pre-Kantian aestheticians propounding the primacy of natural beauty over the artistic one. However, the 20th century philosophers like Heidegger and Adorno find a deep meaning in Kant's claim though for different reasons.

We may end this section by noting that it is Kant's analysis of beauty which brought him the label 'father of Formalist aesthetics'. One of the central aspects of Kant's analysis of the beautiful concerns the formal features of the object of beauty as distinct from the content such an object might have. This aspect of Kant's theory of beauty has had formative influence on the early champions of abstract art. However, another aspect of Kant's analysis of beauty concerns what he called 'contemplative disinterestedness'

which distinguishes aesthetic appraisal from ethical or pragmatic evaluation. This is “the thesis which every proponent of an alternative account has left compelled to combat first since Kant articulated it two centuries ago” (Cooper 1997, 96).

III.2 Kant on the Experience of the Beautiful

The question is, “Given that the pure aesthetic experience is the experience of the beautiful, what is it to be beautiful or what is beauty?” Kant's answer to this question is the best entry point into his analysis of pure aesthetic experience i.e. the experience of beauty. Kant works out his theory of beauty in close relation with his analysis of pure aesthetic judgements. According to him, aesthetic judgements have, analogous to objective empirical judgements, what are called Quantity, Quality, Relation and Modality, each of which yields a partial definition of beauty and a complete definition that contains all the four partial definitions constitutes the *synthetic a priori* principle underlying aesthetic experience. This very attempt of Kant to work out a theory of beauty in relation to the logical kinds of pure aesthetic judgements should have dispelled any doubt about the cognitive content of pure aesthetic experience and consequently of pure judgements of taste. It is surprising that many scholars not only question such a cognitive content but even deny it in the name of Kant.

Be it as it may, Kant's first partial definition of beauty concerns what he calls 'Quality' of pure judgements of taste. According to this partial definition the pleasure connected with the experience of a beautiful object is without any interest whatsoever. The object of a delight which is disconnected from any interest whatever is called 'beautiful'. By 'interest' Kant means the pleasure associated with the existence of an

object. This means that in pure aesthetic experience we are concerned with, not an object but with the mere presentation of an object. This partial definition is logically linked to Kant's basic contention that pure judgements of taste involve neither an *a posteriori* concept (even though aesthetic experience is an experience of a manifold of presentations) and nor the application of categories.

The second partial definition which concerns 'Quantity' states that "the beautiful is that which, apart from concepts, is represented as the Object of Universal delight" (Kant 1952, §6, 50/211 AE). This partial definition is important because it distinguishes pure aesthetic experience i.e. experience of the beautiful, from the subjective experience. It must be noted here that the experience of the beautiful invokes a normative dimension in so far as the demand that others necessarily have a feeling of pleasantness is woven into the very fabric of pure aesthetic experience. This enables Kant to argue for a common human sense which we may call 'aesthetic sense' which is built into our very nature as human beings. As we all know, the idea of a universal human nature is the crux of modernist ethos which was shared by Kant and to which he gives a new content in terms of not only a categorical framework as in the first *Critique*, a locus for the moral law as in the second *Critique,* and, equally importantly, the aesthetic sense, in the third *Critique*, as we have just seen. Equally significantly, Kant has rejected by means of this partial definition not only aesthetic subjectivism but also aesthetic relativism which maintains that aesthetic evaluations are culture-specific.

The third partial definition which concerns 'Relation' states that "Beauty is the form of *finality* in an object, so far as perceived in it *apart from the representation of an end*" (*Ibid*, §17, 80/236 AE). By this Kant means that beauty concerns form of purposiveness

in an object apart from the presentation of a purpose. Here, by purposiveness Kant means a design that exhibits a harmonious relation between parts and between parts and the whole as distinct from the purpose it may serve. By 'finality' Kant means 'purposiveness' or 'being a purposive whole'. As he says, "A flower … such as a tulip, is regarded as beautiful, because we meet with a certain finality in its perception, which, in our estimate of it, is not refereed to any end whatever" (*Ibid*). Thus, beauty in nature concerns the form (of purposiveness) of an object and beauty in art concerns the human representation of that form. This means, that whereas the content is privately given, form concerns public features of aesthetic experience. In this sense the experience of beauty is public and, therefore, trans-subjective. The third partial definition brings out the formalist thrust of Kantian aesthetics apart from his rejection of any relation between an object of aesthetic experience and the purpose it may serve, social or spiritual.

The last partial definition provided under the rubric 'Modality' states that "The beautiful is that which, apart from a concept, is cognized as object of a *necessary* delight (*Ibid*, §22, 85/240 AE). This definition reiterates what is already said by the second partial definition viz. a thing of beauty is an object of universal delight. The fourth partial definition characterizes the universality of that delight as necessary one and not contingent- as assertion that emphasizes Kant's contention that there is in human nature something called 'aesthetic sense' in which the necessary relation between pleasantness and the perception of purposiveness is grounded.

The four partial definitions of beauty Kant calls four 'moments'. Three of the crucial concepts in the complete definition of beauty are: (1) 'Universal and necessary pleasure';

(2) Disinterestedness; and (3) Form of finality/purposiveness. Some discussion about them is needed to complete the picture of beauty that Kant has drawn.

(1) The significance of the concept of necessary and universal pleasure/delight lies in the fact that the aesthetic pleasure involves a free interplay between imagination and understanding. Aesthetic pleasure is made possible by the freedom with which imagination plays with understanding even though it is constrained by the understanding[1]. In other words, while pleasure is the heart of experience of beauty, that pleasure is the result of the free play of imagination and understanding. Thus, in the experience of beauty pleasure is the result of that free play of imagination and understanding which Kant calls the harmonious relation between two faculties of imagination and understanding. As Kemal points out "the particular grasp of the object … of beauty … occasions a feeling of pleasure resulting from a 'harmony of faculties' (as contrasted with a determinate relation between faculties)" (1998, 32). Two facts that led Kant to think that the pleasure associated with the beautiful is due to the harmony of the two faculties in free play are: a) it can only be based on a state related to cognition; b) it is a feeling and hence cannot actually be a cognition and its universality cannot be derived from the universality of a determinate concept as no such concept is involved

[1] As is well known, Kant makes room for imagination in his analysis of empirical experience in his first *Critique*. According to his analysis of empirical experience, the first stage is the occurrence of a manifold of presentations constituted by perceived, remembered and imagined data. The second stage is the suitable collection or synthesis of the manifold by imagination. In Kant's own words "synthesis, generally speaking, is … the mere operation of the imagination –a blind but indispensable function of the soul, [or mind] without which we should have no cognition whatever, but of the working of which we are seldom even conscious" (1934, p.78).(This will be followed by the third and the fourth stages in which understanding which applies a posteriori concepts and categories respectively; the application of the latter results in synthetic unity and consequently objective reference of the manifold of presentations). The word 'blind' used in connection with the function of imagination shows that the role of imagination in empirical experience is mechanical or quasi-mechanical whereas in aesthetic experience it is not so and this is what makes aesthetic experience unlike its empirical counterpart.

either in the experience of or the judgement about the beautiful. As Kalar says "What the combination of these two facts requires is a mental state that is *akin to* cognition, without actually *being* cognition. Free play, as Kant describes it, fits the bill" (2006, 39). Of course, not all pleasures are due to such a harmonious relation between imagination and understanding. But, according to Kant, aesthetic pleasure definitely is. This distinctive mark of aesthetic pleasure is linked to its distinctive character, namely, its necessary universality. Kantian scholars like Kemal invoke the concept of harmonious relation to account for the communicability of aesthetic experience which logically follows from its necessary universality. Kemal draws our attention to Kant's uneasiness produced by the fact "that subjects' internal reflection is corrigible because it can confuse disinterested pleasure with pleasure in charm, emotion, sensation, moral connotations, or successful communication" (1998, 32). In other words, two aesthetic subjects might experience the same pleasure but for different reasons, one for wrong reason and another for right one. That is, Kant feels the need to propose that the subject "must seek confirmation for the putatively universally valid subjective judgement through agreement from other subjects when they, too, make the same pleasurable judgement" (*Ibid*, 33). This shows that aesthetic experience needs confirmation and hence could be false. Kant, thus, insists on the cruciality of communication. According to him, as Kemal says, "We gain confirmation when subjects successfully communicate their feeling of pleasure or displeasure, enabling another subject to make the same judgement and , based on that communication, to agree about the beauty of the object" (*Ibid*). The above discussion can be summarized in the words of Kalar, "The notion of free play is thus evidently intended to provide a link between cognition, on the one side, and aesthetic pleasure, on the other.

This is the link that will supply the basis for the universal validity of pleasure in the beautiful" (*Ibid*, 39).

The above discussion of the concept of pleasure has shown how pleasure in the Kantian's scheme has a cognitive dimension via its relation, in particular, to the free and harmonious interplay between imagination and understanding. It is necessary to recapitulate the point that imagination and understanding involved in the production of aesthetic experience account for two apparently contradictory aspects of aesthetic pleasure. The role of imagination explains the freedom involved in aesthetic pleasure whereas the role of understanding consists in putting constraints on imagination and hence, limit freedom and thus can explain the necessity or unfreedom in aesthetic pleasure. It is obvious that central to Kant's analysis of aesthetic pleasure is the recognition of the dual aspect of aesthetic pleasure namely, freedom-cum-necessity. It is in this way Kant shows how necessity which characterizes the domain of nature and freedom which characterizes the domain of morality are co-present in the domain of the aesthetic which, therefore, is grounded in the intimate relation between necessity and freedom-a relation which is more than merely one of logical compatibility. Thus, the third *Critique* provides a thematic unity to the whole of Critical Philosophy.

We end this discussion of pleasure in the Kantian scheme by noting two more points about it. These points are made by Kant himself either directly or indirectly:

a) It is a truism to say that pleasure is a feeling. The question is "What is its hallmark?" According to Kant, pleasure as a feeling is a very special faculty of discrimination and, hence, involves appraisal. In this connection Allison mentions Kant's idea of appraisal as an act of reflection which "compares the given representation in the

subject with the entire representational faculty of which the mind becomes conscious when it feels its own state" (*cf.* 2001, 69). In other words, aesthetic pleasure is not an ordinary pleasure wherein we simply receive pleasant sensations. Kant relates this unique feature of aesthetic pleasure to its central element which he characterizes as contemplation of the beautiful which 'reinforces' and 'reproduces' itself. According to Allison, this enables Kant to explain the fact that pure aesthetic experience and a pure judgement of taste expressing it are two sides of the same coin such that, as Kant repeatedly emphasizes, feeling functions as a predicate in a judgement of taste. As Allison aptly puts it "If feeling is itself regarded as a faculty of discrimination and appraisal … it then becomes natural to link it with judgement" (*Ibid*, 70). In short, the intimate relation between the feeling of pleasure and pure aesthetic judgements is due to the fact that the feeling itself is in some sense judgemental. Hence, the relation between a feeling of aesthetic pleasure and the corresponding pure judgement of taste is not like the relation between a fact and its corresponding proposition. This is one important way of distinguishing between what a pure judgement of taste is *about* and what an objective empirical judgement is *about*.

b) The next question about pleasure as feeling is "What kind of feeling pleasure is?" Allison draws our attention to Kant's characterization of pleasure as "feeling of life" (*cf.* Allison 2001, 69) in his writings subsequent to the third *Critique*. By this expression Kant means that pleasure is a feeling of the promotion of life and displeasure as the feeling of hindrance to life. Allison in this connection makes reference to Kant's characterization of the concept of pleasure as "the idea of the agreement of an object or an action with the subjective conditions of life" (*Ibid*). Allison rightly points out "Kant understands by pleasure and displeasure something like a sense of the increase or

diminution of one's level of activity, particularly one's activity as a thinking being" (*Ibid*). We can compare Kant's idea of hindrance to life and promotion of life as well as his ideas of disagreement with the subjective conditions of life and agreement with the subjective conditions of life mentioned by Allison above, with Marx's concepts of alienation and the overcoming of alienation. Marxist aestheticians seek to show how art and literature help us in overcoming alienation at least for the time being (though complete and permanent overcoming is possible only after the collapse of the class society). Engels expresses this idea when he says that art and literature make us 'feels at home' in a hostile world. Of course, we must keep in mind the fact that promotion of life effected by aesthetic experience is not the purpose of our aesthetic endeavor since according to Kant aesthetic pleasure is disinterested-a point we discuss below.

2) The concept of Disinterestedness is so crucial to Kant's conception of the beautiful or rather experience of the beautiful that, as we have seen, it figures in the very first moment or partial definition of the beautiful. That the pure aesthetic experience is devoid of any interest and hence essentially involves contemplation was not a majority view in Kant's time and hence in an important sense it is a claim which is a original contribution of Kant. We can at least say that he was the first to bring it to the forefront of aesthetic discourse. Yet it is one of the problematic contentions of Kant. As we have seen, according to Kant, to say that pure aesthetic experience is free from any interest is to say that pure aesthetic pleasure is indifferent to the existence of objects described as beautiful. Now the problem is this: How can someone who takes pleasure in beauty be indifferent to the existence of the very object which is the source of the pleasure. Allison's straightforward answer is that "appearances to the contrary, the disinterestedness thesis does not really require that one be" (*Ibid,* 94). Hence, Kant's

disinterestedness thesis pertains to "the quality of the liking (or disliking) *by means of which* an object is deemed beautiful (or non-beautiful)" (*Ibid*, 94-95). That is to say, if aesthetic value is determined by interest it loses its autonomy and hence purity since it becomes a means of realizing some other value. Genuine aesthetic appreciation thus involves autonomy and is opposed to heteronomy in the same way in which genuine moral experience involves autonomy and is antithetical to heteronomy. Just as an action's moral worth is determined by whether it is based on a will which freely submits itself to the moral law, the genuineness of an aesthetic experience is determined by whether it is based on a disinterested liking.

What does Kant mean by interest? He means "The pleasure we feel in the existence of an object because it satisfies a desire or some moral purpose. When we have an interest, we assess how well objects can serve these purposes" (Kemal 1998, 31). The question is, "Why does Kant bring in the existence of an object or it representation in his conception of interest? After all, an object satisfies an interest because of its properties, and not by its existence. Kant's answer may be that an object must first exist to possess a property which is why existence is not one of its properties. This is what Kant means when he says that 'existence' is not a predicate in his attack on the ontological argument for the existence of God in the Transcendental Dialectic in *Critique of Pure Reason.*

However, Kant's characterization of aesthetic experience in terms of disinterested pleasure goes beyond the contention that it should be based on a liking free from all interests. According to Kant, disinterestedness consists, in addition, in not giving rise to any interest i.e. not being a ground for an interest. This claim of Kant looks contrary to facts because many people who enjoy a pleasure not based on any interest do tend to

develop interest in the existence of things. For example, they value objects which give such a pleasure and admire museums which house them. Before we can answer this objection against Kant it is necessary to note what Kant means when he says that pure aesthetic experience is not only based on interest but also it should not give rise to any interest. Kant wants to elucidate the notion of disinterestedness by juxtaposing pure experience of beauty on the one hand and experience of the agreeable and moral experience, on the other. The presence of interest in the case of the experience of the agreeable is obvious. After all such an experience involves pleasant sensations easily traceable to an object. The contrast with moral experience is very interesting especially in view of the fact that there is a parallel between moral experience and aesthetic experience which we have noted. To repeat the point already made, both moral and aesthetic experiences are alike in not being based on interest. Yet, they are different because whereas moral experience can and does give rise to an interest whereas aesthetic experience does not. As Allison points out "it is only because the law generates an interest that pure reason can be practical. But this entails that its capacity to give rise to an interest is at least partly constitutive of our 'liking' for it, which Kant terms 'respect'" (2001, 96). The interest that is given rise to is the promotion of the moral good which is for Kant only goodwill. According to Allison the existence of such a thing is constitutive of moral experience. Allison rightly concedes that aesthetic experience also may give rise to an interest in the sense of a liking for existence of something but that interest is only incidental to and not constitutive of aesthetic experience. Thus, to say that aesthetic pleasure is disinterested is to say that an interest (in the existence of things liked) is not a "part of the determining ground of the liking itself" (*Ibid*).

Though Allison's contention that the interest (in the existence of things) to which pure aesthetic pleasure gives rise is not constitutive of that pleasure is acceptable, it is strange that he characterizes the relation between such an interest and such a pleasure as merely *incidental*. First of all, the term 'incidental' has a negative ring about it in the sense of denying an organic relation between the two. Secondly, and more importantly, in Kant's own lexicon 'constitutive' is juxtaposed to 'regulative'. Can we not say that the idea of such an interest is an idea *regulating* our thinking about aesthetic matters, just as theoretical ideas regulate our thinking about matters of fact and practical ideas regulate our thinking about matters of contact, as Kant labored hard in his first two *Critiques* respectively? Of course, the way in which the regulation of our thinking about matters aesthetic may be radically different from the regulation by the theoretical and practical ideas. It is a task for Kantian scholarship to elucidate the notion of aesthetic regulation by the idea of an interest (in the existence of things) produced by aesthetic pleasure of which that interest is definitely not constitutive.

We may end our discussion of the concept of disinterestedness by looking at some important observations made by Paul Guyer. According to Guyer, Kant's contention that pure aesthetic experience, that is, experience of beauty, should not be based on any interest is well taken as it perfectly squares with our common intuitions. But he contends that Kant's claim that pure aesthetic experience should not be a ground for an interest (i.e. pure aesthetic experience should not only be not caused by an interest but also should not result in an interest) is not convincingly established by him in the third *Critique* for the reason his definition of 'interest' in terms of the pleasure caused by the existence of an object is inadequate in substantiating his claim. According to Guyer, we must go to the *Critique of Practical Reason* for a definition of 'interest' for the purpose of substantiating

Kant's claim. Guyer brings to our notice Kant's definition of interest in the second *Critique*, namely, "An incentive of the will so far as it is presented by reason" (quoted in Guyer 1992, 244). Further, Guyer refers to Kant's definition of determining ground of the will in terms of "The conception of an object and its relation to the subject, whereby the faculty of desire is determined to seek its realization" (quoted in *Ibid*). Treating the definiendum as equivalent to 'interest' Guyer says that "An interest is not itself a feeling of pleasure, but rather a kind of concept of an object. A feeling of pleasure is, in a way, a possible incentive for the will, but for a will determined by reason, the feeling of pleasure must be linked to a concept to serve as an incentive" (*Ibid*). In other words, according to Guyer, Kant's contention that pure aesthetic experience should not give rise to an interest should be understood in the light of the conceptual point that, "A desire for the existence of an object is an interest only when that object can be represented as an object of desire under some concept" (*Ibid*).

Guyer's re-articulation of Kant's position on disinterestedness of pure aesthetic experience is both adequate and fits well with Kant's claim that aesthetic experience is free from the application of determinate concepts. However, it does not take into account the fact that in aesthetic experience we do not prevent an interest entering into the aesthetic situation but allow it to enter to be warded off. When I see a beautiful rose I definitely feel like possessing it. In fact, I cannot experience its beauty without desiring to possess it. But I ward off that desire to do justice to my aesthetic experience in order to preserve it and perpetuate that experience. Hence, detachment in aesthetic experience is in this sense *de-attachment*. In other words, aesthetic experience involves a will to overcome an interest rather than not allowing it to enter. After all, we are not wary of the possibility of interest entering into us. Rather, we are confident of clearing it away. The

situation reminds us of what Wittgenstein says about metaphysics, namely, we should not be afraid of metaphysics but rather we should withdraw when we are tempted to do metaphysics.

3) As we have seen, the experience of beauty, according to Kant, is the experience of a purposive whole, that is, a design. The design concerns "The structure of elements, their order, complexity, and unity, their coherence, meaning, and expression, the balance between the elements of the presentation, and the features that make up these items" (Kemal 1998, 32). More specifically, Kant speaks of purposiveness without purpose or form of purposiveness or form of finality. Kalar who seeks to provide a phenomenological interpretation of Kant's aesthetic theory rightly points out that in Kant's theory "The fundamental concept … is his notion of the 'mere form of purposiveness' or, alternatively, 'purposiveness without a purpose'" (2006, 65). The significance of this concept which figures in the third partial definition of the Beautiful lies in the fact that it concerns the relation between the judging subject and the judged object, that is, the re/presentation of the object. As Allison says, the basic question underlying Kant's discussion here is, "How are we to characterize this relation, such that" it can account for the possibility of a universally communicable pleasure" (2001, 119). It is in this way the third partial or moment definition brings in the object, that is, its representation into the picture whereas the first two partial definitions which concern the concept of pleasure and the concept of the universal delight respectively concern only the subject. Kalar rightly considers the beautiful object as 'the objective pole' of Kant's theory of beauty (*cf.* 2006, 66).

As we have already noted, according to the third partial definition of beauty, beauty is the form of purposiveness of the re/presentation of an object in so far as it is perceived in the object *without the representation of a purpose*. The question that arises now is: "What is purposiveness (without purpose) and what is the form of purposiveness?"

Kant starts by first elucidating the concept of a purpose. In doing so, he relates it specifically to will. Will is defined as something that can be determined only by concepts and is equated with acting in conformity with the representation of a purpose. This means, to will is to set a purpose for oneself and hence a purpose is an object of volition. Coming to the concept of purposiveness, he insists that it does not necessarily presuppose the representation of a purpose though we may grasp the possibility of purposiveness only in relation to a will, human or otherwise. So purposiveness without a purpose is a distinct possibility. Kant's elucidation of the concept of purposiveness is substantially negative. He speaks of two kinds of purpose, namely, subjective purpose and objective purpose. By the former he means our interest in the agreeable and the latter he relates to our interest in the (non-ethical) good. Pure aesthetic experience has nothing to do with either of the two types of purpose which are exhaustive. Kant also makes a distinction between subjective purposiveness and objective purposiveness. Since, according to Kant, "Any determination of an *objective* purposiveness presupposes the concept of some purpose that an object is to serve, it follows that there is no place in the Kantian scheme for the notion of an objective purposiveness without purpose" (Allison 2001, 126). That is to say, objective purposiveness is invariably associated with either a subjective purpose or an objective purpose and hence it cannot be purposiveness without purpose. Therefore, only subjective purposiveness can be purposiveness without a purpose. In fact, as Allison says, "'subjective purposiveness' and 'purposiveness without purpose' are equivalent

expressions" (*Ibid*). Since, according to Kant, purpose is an object of will and since experience of beauty is the experience of purposiveness without purpose, it follows that the will has no rule to play in aesthetic experience. The question now is, "How is the form of purposiveness related to beauty and our experience of the beautiful?" Allison gives satisfactory answer to this question when he says that since "for Kant to regard something as purposive without assigning a definite purpose to it is basically to view it as if intended (by a will), it is not a significant stretch to equate being subjectively purposive with exhibiting the 'form of purposiveness', in the sense of seeming as if designed" (*Ibid*, 126-127).

Subjective purposiveness as purposiveness without purpose is characterized by Kant as 'Merely formal purposiveness'. The contrast between subjective/formal purposiveness and objective purposiveness lies in this: objective purposiveness is, as lucidly pointed by Kalar, "is a form of liking that stems from the recognition that an object is in conformity with a rational concept; it is, in the lingo of the Third Moment, the recognition that the object constitutes a purpose or end. Merely formal purposiveness, on the other hand, 'is quite independent of the concept of the good'" (2006, 68). This contract highlights the fact that the experience of the beautiful does not involve the kind of pleasure which emanates from the recognition of the realization of an intended pleasure. This does not mean that formal purposiveness and purpose cannot go together. All that means is that even if it fulfills an actual purpose which may even be intended, one must be able to disconnect that purpose from one's contemplation of the object. Kalar brings out this point very ably when he says that subjective or formal purposiveness can be "thought of as a feature of the subject's *approach* to the object, rather than of the object itself. It describes the way in which the object *seems* to the subject, as if it were

designed *for something*, without the subject connecting that appearance with the thought of a definite purpose" (*Ibid*, 69). This means that purposiveness without purpose is a mental state. But the question arises "What connection does the object have with the formal purposiveness?" This question is all the more pressing because Kant himself includes objects as items under the rubric of purposiveness without purpose. We cannot say that the object causes such a mental state because according to Kant the relation between the mental state of purposiveness and the object is *a priori*. Allison seeks to solve this problem by relating the object to the mental state of purposiveness by saying that the object occasions the interplay between imagination and understanding which in turn accounts for the mental state of purposiveness.

In our opinion this answer is unsatisfactory because the difference between occasioning and causing is not deep enough to carry the burden of Allison's point. The problems remain so long as we overlook the fact that the object in the aesthetic context, according to Kant, is not the phenomenal object itself but its presentation/representation. Purposiveness can have locus both in the mental state and in the representation of the object. The main reason for completely or substantially confining formal purposiveness to a mental state is the fear that any alternative to such a position undermines the subjectivist interpretation of Kantian aesthetics theory which is taken to be *the* authentic interpretation. According to this dissertation, pure judgements of taste (as shown in the second chapter) and, therefore, pure aesthetic experience are in some sense objective and in doing so the thesis accepts the interpretation of Kant provided by Karl Ameriks (*cf*. 1983, 3-5) locating purposiveness with purpose in both mental state and representation of an object. We can avoid the idea of beauty as an empirical property of things (and also subjectivism) for the simple reason that representation of an object is not objective in the

empirical sense. In fact, the notion of objectivity has been broadened by making room for non-empirical objectivity of the experience of beauty. In the articulation of this position this dissertation has laid high premium on 'purposiveness (without purpose)' because the pleasure associated with aesthetic experience has such purposiveness integral to it. As Kant says "The consciousness of mere formal finality in the play of the cognitive faculties of the subject attending a representation whereby an object is given, is the pleasure itself" (1952, §12, 64/222 AE). This means, aesthetic pleasure is primarily an awareness of purposiveness. A mental state is not purposive because it is a state of pleasure but rather it is pleasurable because it is purposive (*cf*. Allison 2001, 130-131). However, the subjectivity of aesthetic experience so engendered is offset by the locus of purposiveness in the representation of an object which concerns its form and form is not subjective in the way mental states are.

III.3 Free and Adherent Beauty

The above discussion of Kant's theory of the experience of the beautiful takes us to the important distinction between 'free beauty' and 'merely adherent beauty' or merely 'dependent beauty'. In fact, he characterizes them as pure and applied beauty. The word 'merely' used in the case of adherent/dependent beauty gives the impression that it is the lower kind of beauty and so does the term 'dependent'. In fact, Kant describes free beauty as 'self-subsisting' and adherent beauty as 'conditional' and this description sounds as if Kant considers the former as absolute and the latter as relative. Whether this impression is intended by him we will consider later. According to Kant, beauty is adherent if the beautiful object is associated with a specific purpose and free if it is not. Since 'purpose'

is associated in the Kantian scheme with a determinate concept under which an object is subsumed so as to be specified what kind of object it is. It is, clear that adherent beauty is associated with a concept. Kant explicitly says that free beauty "presupposes no concept of what the object should be" and adherent beauty "does presuppose such a concept" (1952, §16, 72/229 AE). To this he significantly adds that the adherent beauty concerns "perfection of the object" and it "is ascribed to Objects which come under the concept of a particular end" (*Ibid*). Elucidating his point he says "flowers are free beauties of nature. Hardly anyone but a botanist knows the true nature of a flower, and even he, while recognizing in the flower the reproductive organ of the plant, pays no attention to this natural end when using his taste to judge of its beauty" (*Ibid*). This means that for an ordinary man a flower, that is, its re/presentation is a thing of free beauty because he is not aware of the purpose which the purposive whole serves. But for a botanist the same flower i.e. its re/presentation is an object of adherent beauty because he is aware of the purpose it serves though his aesthetic experience of the flower has nothing to do with his awareness of the purpose in the sense he has abstracted that purpose from that purposive whole.

Now, the question is whether the distinction between the two kinds of beauty concerns objects or our approach to them. According to Körner "the distinction between free and adherent is … not a classification of things but rather a distinction between two modes of apprehending 'purposive' wholes" (1955, 189). However, the issue on which Körner has taken a clear stand is not as simple as he thinks. This is because Kant himself classifies aesthetic objects as objects of free beauty and objects of adherent beauty. In fact, he gives examples of objects belonging to one of the two kinds, though some of these examples may look somewhat arbitrary. Flowers, some birds, ornaments, non-

verbal music are objects of free beauty since they possess no meaning and represent nothing. Objects such as human beings, horses, buildings like churches and palaces are objects of adherent beauty.

However, the most difficult issue concerns the question whether Kant is justified in making room for adherent beauty whose characterization by Kant seems to be completely ill at ease with the core of his theory of beauty. This point needs to be elaborated.

Kantian scholars like Körner who maintain that the distinction between free and adherent beauty concerns not aesthetic objects but our modes of apprehending them seem to think that experience of adherent beauty involves awareness of the purpose which is abstracted from experience. A flower is experienced by a botanist as beautiful because he experiences it as purposiveness without purpose. However, that flower is an object of adherent beauty because he is aware of the purpose which that purposive whole serves though he disconnects or abstracts his awareness of that purpose from his experience. First of all, it is very difficult to understand how one can disconnect or abstract the awareness of the purpose. Secondly, even if it is possible to do so in the case of some objects like flower it is next to impossible in the case of most of the aesthetic objects. For instance, it is impossible to appreciate the beauty of a church without associating the object with its function. "The purposes intrinsic to the objects themselves … limit the way we may judge their beauty" (Kalar 2006, 84). If this is so, experience of an object of so-called adherent beauty involves reference to a purpose and hence a concept. Consequently, a judgement about an object of adherent beauty becomes what Kant calls a judgement about perfection which is about an object which serves a definite purpose. Kant explicitly maintains that a pure judgement of taste is no way akin to a judgement about perfection which is in fact is akin to an 'impure' judgement of taste, *viz.* judgement

about the (none-ethical) good. This is the main trust of Kant's contention that pure judgements of taste do not involve determinate concepts and the representation of ends.

All this shows how the very notion of adherent beauty is too problematic to be glossed over by saying that the distinction between free and adherent beauty is only one of our modes of apprehending the purposive wholes. One has to admit that such a distinction concerns the aesthetic objects themselves. But the object of adherent beauty conflicts with Kant's idea of beauty as purposiveness without purpose. Either Kant has to confine beauty to only objects of free beauty and hence disavow the very distinction between free and adherent beauty or he has to give a very weak content to the notion of 'presupposing a concept of what the object is meant to be'-a notion associated with objects of adherent beauty. Obviously, Kant would prefer the latter option which is articulated by Kalar. According to Kalar, such a concept which involves subsumption of the object under the concept of its purpose provides "merely a *necessary*, but not a sufficient condition for its being an instance of adherent beauty. That is, thinking the object through the concept of a purpose of which it is the fulfillment somehow *circumscribes* or *constrains* the freedom of the imagination in making the judgement of beauty, but is not sufficient in itself to occasion a pleasure" (2006, 85). The trouble with Kalar's strategy is that when we experience beauty or make a pure judgement of taste we do not go by considerations of necessary and sufficient conditions. Kalar's strategy in no way does justice to the real situations of our aesthetic life. Kalar's approach is similar to the now discredited positivist attempt to explicate theoretical concepts in science in terms of the necessary and sufficient conditions of their application. The post-positivist philosophers of science like Kuhn and Feyerabend have shown that neither such conditions can be specified, nor even if they are specified, they are irrelevant to actual

application of those concepts. A better strategy in favor of Kant is provided by Allison. According to him, to say that an object of adherent beauty presupposes a concept (in referring to a purpose) is to say that it is "an ingredient in a larger whole, which involves the thought of the purpose served by the object" (2001, 142) (Whereas an object of free beauty is apprehended in its own terms). Allison's strategy does justice to the fact that it is very difficult to abstract or completely play down the purpose of a purposive whole in looking upon the latter as an object of beauty. A minor problem with Allison strategy is that while it rightly rejects the claim of scholars like Körner that the distinction between free and adherent beauty concerns our moods of approaching the purposive wholes or our modes of judgement about them, it reject the Kantian idea that the distinction concerns the aesthetic objects themselves. However, Allison has provided a plausible ground for retaining the distinction. One may ask, "Why Kant's distinction between free and adherent beauty be retained at all instead of rejecting the very notion of adherent beauty?" After all, it is only objects of free beauty that fit perfectly the Kantian scheme of the beautiful central to which is his claim that the apprehension of the beautiful does not involve the application of a determinate concept. Free beauty is free in the sense its experience is not constrained by a concept.

One answer to the above question is that Kant himself maintains that adherent beauty is an instance of ideal of beauty. We may overlook Kant's point because he is not clear about the ideal of beauty[1] . The second answer to the above question can be more convincing. Kant himself is convinced that the distinction between the free and the adherent beauty can be invoked effectively in the analysis and resolution of aesthetic disagreements. If two parties differ in their aesthetic judgement and if neither party can

[1] In fact, his idea of human figures as the ideal of beauty is, to say the least, is simply baffling.

be said to be correct, one way of resolving the conflict is by saying that one party is making a judgement about free beauty and the other of adherent beauty and hence the evaluations can be consistent with each other.

III.4 Beauty and Ugliness

In this section we deal with a contentious issue. The issue concerns the question whether Kant's aesthetic scheme has a place for our experience of ugliness. According to many Kantian scholars, Kant's aesthetic scheme does not have a proper place for ugliness even though he seeks to provide some place to it. It is natural that Kant does intend to give some place to it for the simple reason that it is a matter of fact that we do experience ugliness and, consequently, make judgements about ugliness. This apart, at a more fundamental level the idea of ugliness has a deep philosophical meaning evidenced by the fact that philosophers of religion and religiously oriented philosophers have considered the problem of evil to be a challenging one and evil expresses itself not only as error in logic, and sin in ethics but also as ugliness in aesthetics. Allison rightly points out that if Kant does not recognize ugliness his insistence "that we can quarrel about taste, though we cannot dispute about it, would lose its sense" (2001, 71).

Allison alludes in this connection to Kant's characterization of ugliness as "negative beauty" (*Ibid*) though Kant uses this term in connection with sublimity (*cf.* 1952, §23, 91/245 AE). He draws our attention to the fact that in his later writings Kant invokes what can be called 'a three valued logic of taste'. He quotes Kant's remark "That which pleases through mere intuition is *beautiful*, that which leaves me indifferent in intuition … is *non-beautiful*; that which displeases me in intuition is ugly" (Allison 2001, 72).

Allison draws our attention to Kant's characterization of the relation between virtue and vice as one of real opposition and the relation between virtue and non-virtue as one of mere logical opposition and rightly points out that "there is no reason to expect that he would not also characterize the opposition between the beautiful and the ugly in the same way" (*Ibid*), i.e. as real opposition.

But from all this it does not necessarily follow that Kant has logical space for accommodating ugliness in a manner that fits negatively into his lexicon of beauty. In other words, we face the question; "Does he consider our judgements about ugliness as *negative* pure judgements of taste standing in a reversal relation with positive pure judgements of taste, i.e. judgements about the beautiful?" and, what amounts to the same thing, "Does he consider experience of ugliness as negative pure experience of beauty in opposition to positive pure aesthetic experience, that is, experience of the beautiful?" The majority of Kantian scholars give a negative response to this question since according to them Kant's characterization of ugliness as negative beauty is too facile a basis for a positive answer to this question. Before we discuss this response in detail let us recall that the four partial definitions or moments which Kant has given about beauty and its experience are supposed to distinguish a pure judgement of taste from impure judgements of taste (i.e. judgements about the agreeable and judgements about non-ethical good) and hence pure aesthetic experience from impure aesthetic experience (i.e. experience of mere agreeableness and experience of functional perfection of a thing liked by us). For this reason a judgement about the ugliness cannot be considered to be an impure judgement of taste and experience of ugliness cannot be considered to be impure aesthetic experience. This means that a judgement about ugliness/experience of ugliness must share some features of the judgements about the beautiful/experience of the

beautiful even while traversing the opposite ground by not sharing some of the other features of the latter.

Let us assume for the time being that in Kant's aesthetic scheme this is actually so. As we have seen, in a nutshell, Kant's characterization of experience of beauty involves (a) a feeling of universally shareable pleasure that arises out of a harmonious and free play of imagination and understanding; (b) disinterestedness in the sense of not involving the application of a determinate concept; (c) purposiveness without purpose and (d) a delight whose universal shareability is necessary (not contingent) thanks to its having a locus in our human nature. If Kant's scheme can accommodate our experience of the ugly it "must be structurally identical to … the beautiful and differentiated only in that it is based on the feeling of displeasure rather than pleasure, feelings that both come about through the harmonious free play of the faculties" (McConnell 2008, 207). In other words, it seems as though we can resolve the issue mentioned in the beginning of the section by saying that in the Kantian scheme experience of the ugliness involves (a) the feeling of universally sharable displeasure arising out of harmonious and free play of imagination and understanding, (b) disinterestedness, (c) purposiveness, and (d) necessary displeasure. The (b) and (c) make the experience of ugliness stand on par with the experience of beauty and therefore make it a pure aesthetic experience. But (a) and (d) make it so non-congruent with the experience of beauty that it stands on the opposite pole.

However, the matter is not as simple as it is made above. This is because a contradiction is involved in such a resolution of the issue. The experience of the ugly must involve universally and necessarily sharable displeasure so as to radically differ from the experience of the beautiful. But such displeasure must be taken to have arised

out of a harmonious and free play of imagination and understanding since without the latter the experience of the ugly will not be a pure aesthetic experience. In other words, we are forced to admit that both the experience of ugliness and the experience of beauty involve a harmonious and free play between imagination and understanding which in one case produces universally and necessarily sharable pleasure and in another case its exact opposite. Perhaps Kant himself anticipated such a contradiction and hence maintains that there was a necessary relation between pleasure on the one hand and harmonious and free play between imagination and understanding, on the other.

But if we go by the position of Kant mentioned above we cannot make room for experience of ugliness as a pure aesthetic experience. This has led to the view best articulated by Guyer according to which a judgement about the ugliness is not a pure aesthetic judgement, that is, pure judgement of taste but is an impure one and consequently experience of ugliness is an impure aesthetic experience. This view is un satisfactory because the locutions like impure judgements of taste and impure aesthetic experience fit judgements about and/or experience of merely agreeable or merely perfect (not-ethical good). But the judgements about and experience of ugliness has nothing to do with judgements about and experience of the merely agreeable and the functionally perfect.

Guyer's contention that there cannot be, in the Kantian scheme, such a thing like *negative* pure aesthetic judgement/*negative* pure aesthetic experience because there is a necessary relation between pleasure, on the one hand and the harmonious and free play between of imagination and understanding, on the other, has been opposed by many Kantian scholars. Some of them claim that the Kantian scheme can accommodate ugliness by characterizing ugliness as involving absence of contra-finality or contra-

purposiveness produced by disharmonious and free play of imagination and understanding. This is the view of Wenzel and Allison (*Cf*. Wenzel 1999, 421 and *Cf*. Allison 2001, 54). According to Allison the relation between imagination and understanding "need not be harmonious, as is evident not only from Kant's characterization of the potential for conflict between the 'two friends', but also from … [Kant's claim] that the imagination and understanding can either further or *hinder* one another. In short, by including the latter as something that can be felt in reflection, presumably with a sense of displeasure, Kant provides the basis for negative judgements of taste" (2001, 54).

But Allison's notion of disharmonious and free play of imagination and understanding is highly problematic. In Kant's own framework the two faculties need harmonization to have a free play. In empirical experience imagination and understanding, according to Kant, have a harmonious play but the play is not free and Kant calls it 'just a play'. He reserves the epithet 'free' to the harmonious play of imagination and understanding in aesthetic experience. This means play unlike free play takes place where understanding constraints imagination by the application of determinate concepts. Thus, according to Kant, the harmony of imagination and understanding is a precondition of both objective and aesthetic experience. As McConnell says "For Kant, the term 'harmony' or 'harmonious' is just a marker for correct or proper intellectual endeavor on the part of the imagination and the understanding: the attempt, successful or not, but with the real potential to be successful, to gain knowledge" (2008, 215).

Hence, it is not correct to distinguish experience of ugliness from experience of beauty by saying that the kind of play of imagination and understanding in the former is

disharmonious and in the latter it is harmonious. So, Guyer has not convincingly shown that the Kantian scheme of the aesthetic has a place for experience of ugliness in the negative pole as opposed to the positive pole in which we can locate our experience of beauty. In other, words he has not shown how our experience of ugliness is a pure aesthetic experience in a negative way.

Some Kantian scholars like Wenzel and Hudson adopt a different strategy to achieve what Guyer failed to achieve. The strategy may be called the strategy of *contra-purposiveness*. According to their view "ugly is an object's form of *contra-purposiveness* insofar as it is perceived in the object *without* the presentation of a purpose" (Hudson 1991, 93). This is to say that our experience of ugliness is pure, though negative, aesthetic experience because it involves all the elements of the experience of the beauty that Kant has identified except that of purposiveness; in fact, it involves the opposite of purposiveness. However, this strategy is inadequate because the object of ugliness so construed will frustrate the role of imagination which consists in detecting an order or a law which is different from what understanding can do in empirical experience. In other words, an object of aesthetic experience, beautiful or otherwise, must be able to display a design imposed by imagination which is recognized but not formulable by understanding since formulizability involves application of determinate concepts. This is what Kant meant by 'a law without a law'. As McConnell says "For Kant, in order to be an object of representation, an object must have some form, it must promise some rule that the understanding can grasp in order for it to come to the attention of the finality-detecting imagination in the first place" (2008, 216). If imagination is deprived of this role we cannot have anything like pure aesthetic experience. For, the object then will be devoid of anything like a form. It can't even be formless because we do not consider object of

ugliness to be formless since ‘formless’ is not a negative concept. McConnell considers ‘deformed’ as a suitable concept in connection with ugliness.

In the light of the above considerations we will be forced to go beyond Kant's characterization of beauty in order to accommodate our experience of ugliness within his aesthetic scheme. In short we cannot construe ugliness as the opposite pole of beauty. This does not mean that we have to go beyond the very framework of Kantian aesthetic provided we consider that framework to be something more than Kant's definition of beauty. The most promising notion in this connection is that of aesthetic ideas. To quote Kant himself “by an aesthetic idea I mean that representation of the imagination which induces much thought, yet without the possibility of any definite thought whatever, i.e. *concept*, being adequate to it, and which language, consequently, can never get quite on level terms with or render completely intelligible” (1952, §49, 175-176/314 AE). Equally fundamental is Kant's claim “Beauty (whether it be of nature or of art) may in general be termed the *expression* of aesthetic ideas” (*Ibid*, §51, 183/320 AE). It is to the credit of McConnell who has brought these ideas of Kant for an adequate Kantian characterization of the ugliness. McConnell is right in concluding that an object of the experience of ugliness is something whose form fails to *express* an aesthetic idea. The displeasure it produces is due to its failure to *express* an aesthetic idea and not because it is not a product of the harmonious and free play of imagination and understanding; nor is it because it fails to possess the form of purposiveness. Our experience of ugliness is pure aesthetic experience because it does involve the features just mentioned. But it is diametrically opposed to that of pure experience of beauty because it involves the failure to express an aesthetic idea. Hence, what distinguishes our experience of ugliness from the experience of beauty is not purity but failure to express an aesthetic idea.

III.5 Beauty and Sublimity

In our discussion of the various kinds of aesthetic judgements or judgements of taste in chapter II we briefly dealt with the judgements about the sublime. In that connection it was pointed out that judgements about the agreeable and judgements about (non-ethical) good, that is, judgements about perfection (of a liked object as a means to a desired end) may be called impure judgements of taste or impure aesthetic judgements whereas judgements about the beautiful may be called, as Kant himself does, pure judgements of taste or pure aesthetic judgements. It was also pointed out that Kant has an ambiguous position on the question whether the judgements about the sublime are pure or not. In view of Kant's ambiguous stance we characterized judgements of sublime as semi-pure judgements of taste. Our characterization is justified because the judgements about the sublime are definitely not impure aesthetic judgements because they are neither judgement about mere agreeableness nor are they judgements about 'existence' of objects. Further they share many of the defining features of pure judgements of taste, that is, judgements about the beautiful, as we shall see. As we shall also see the former do not share some defining features of the latter. Form this it follows that the experience of the sublime is partly pure and partly not.

It must be admitted that 'sublime' did not remain a significant theme in the post Kantian aesthetics. Of course, today it is not even a point of discussion. There may be many reasons for this development. One reason, according to Körner, "for its fading away from the philosophic scene is … mainly the recognition that a neat dichotomy of aesthetic experience into those of the beautiful and those of the sublime misrepresents their great variety and their affinities" (1955, 189). Körner also accounts for the waning

of interest in the sublime as a result of general decline of interest in aesthetics among philosophers. However, the discussion of Kant's view of the sublime can be important today because we can transform Kant's distinction between the beautiful and the sublime in a way "which admits of a large region of hybrids between the beautiful and the sublime [which can be useful and illuminating]" (*Ibid,* 190). Secondly, the present day decline of the interest of philosophers in aesthetics need not warrant a complete indifference to Kant's idea of sublimity. This is because philosophical interest in aesthetics may be revived and in fact has already revived. Metaphysics suffered a complete indifference by philosophers in 20th century, particularly in the Angelo-American world. But there is a tremendous revival of interest in metaphysics even in the analytical tradition. In fact, the condition of aesthetics is much better even today than that of metaphysics till recently. Unlike metaphysics it was neglected but not reviled.

After these remarks made above regarding contemporary relevance of the Kantian view of the sublime it is necessary to note two points: (a) Kant's concerns with the sublime was not incidental to his aesthetics engagement but central to it, as evidenced by his conviction that the sublime is more primarily related with morality or moral experience than does the beautiful; and (b) Kant's engagement with the sublime very palpably expresses an approach unique to his mode of philosophizing. Some of the predecessors of Kant like Longinus and his contemporaries like Edmund Burke engaged in a deep reflection on the nature of the sublime. Hence, Kant was not the first to initiate such on endeavor but his importance in relation to a philosophical engagement with sublimity lies in providing a new approach to it. He convincingly shows how their approach to sublime was physiological and psychological and therefore not philosophical, in the same way in the which Locke's approach to knowledge which

according to Kant was only physiological and psychological. Such a recognition led Kant to what he called a transcendental inquiry in the nature of the sublime, thus squarely fitting with the fundamental spirit and orientation of his philosophical system as a whole.

Kant confines sublimity to nature with which beauty is also associated (whereas in the works of art there is no place for sublimity). The question is, "How does Kant distinguish between the experience of the beautiful and the experience of the sublime?" Of course, both experiences involve a kind of feeling of pleasure which is generalizable and disinterested in the specifically Kantian sense of not having anything to do with the existence of an object and hence the application of any determinate concepts; both kinds of experience are described by singular judgements; further, like experience of and judgement about beauty, experience of and judgement about the sublimity have an *a priori* principle underlying them. However, according to Kant, beauty and sublimity differ in some important ways. First of all "The beautiful in nature is a question of the form of the object, and this consists in limitation, whereas the sublime is to be found in an object even devoid of form, so far as it immediately involves, or else by its presence provokes, a representation of *limitlessness*, yet with a super-added thought of its totality. Accordingly the beautiful seems to be regarded as a presentation of an indeterminate concept of understanding, the sublime as a presentation of an indeterminate concept of reason" (1952, §23, 90-91/244 AE). In this way Kant strengthens the architectonic structure of his system.

Before going to the second point we may note that some scholars think that because the sublime does not concern form it has only to do with feeling rather than taste. For instance, Kirwan says, "Kant does not … propose categorizing the sublime as a taste, but rather as a *feeling*. One of the principle reasons for this distinction is the difference he

posits between the beautiful and the sublime in their respective relationships to form (2004, 59-60). However, Kirwan contradicts himself when he argues that the sublime which according to him does not concern taste is akin to dependent beauty which being one kind of beauty concerns taste. More importantly, if Kant considers the sublime as unrelated to taste but only related to feeling he would not have insisted upon the cultivation of the sense of the sublime. After all, we cultivate taste and not feelings. This is clear when he emphasizes this point in view of the fact that it is easier to get concurrence of others regarding a judgement about beautiful than regarding the judgement about the sublime. As he says, unlike in the case of judgement about the beautiful "in respect of our judgement upon the sublime in nature we cannot so easily vouch for ready acceptance by others. For a far higher degree of culture, not merely of the aesthetic judgement, but also of the faculties of cognition which lie at its basis, seems to be requisite" (1952, §29, 115/264 AE).

Secondly, though both the experience of beautiful and the experience of the sublime have the feeling of pleasure at their core, the nature of the feeling of the pleasure is different in the two kinds of experience. Pleasure in the case of the former is directly connected to the furtherance of life and therefore it is undiluted. Hence, Kant claims that though beauty is different from charm, experience of beauty is compatible with it. By contrast the feeling of pleasure associated with the sublime is a diluted one. In fact the state of mind associated with the sublime swings between attraction and repulsion and hence sublimity is incompatible with charm. This is what Kant means when he says "since the mind is not simply attracted by the object, but is also alternatively repelled thereby, the delight in the sublime does not so much involve positive pleasure as admiration or respect, i.e. merits the name of a negative pleasure" (*Ibid*, §23, 91/245 AE).

The experience of a beautiful flower is one of admiration whereas the experience of stormy sea is one of sublimity because the pleasure associated with is mixed with a feeling of horror or awesomeness.

Thirdly "Whereas natural beauty (such as is self-subsisting) conveys a finality [i.e. purposiveness] in its form making the object appear, as it were, preadapted to our power of judgement, so that it thus forms of itself an object of our delight, that which, without our indulging in any refinements of thought, but, simply in our apprehension of it, excites the feeling of the sublime, may appear, indeed, in point of form to contravene the ends of our power of judgement, to be ill-adapted to our faculty of presentation, and to be, as it were, an outrage on the imagination, and yet it is judged all the more sublime on that account" (*Ibid*). This means that the sublime is devoid of purposiveness which is so central to the beautiful. Since purposiveness is associated with form, obviously beauty concerns form and sublimity concerns the formless (and, as we have seen, ugliness concerns what is deformed). In this connection Allison uses the term 'counterpurposive' in connection with Kant's characterization of sublimity as devoid of purposiveness. However, since the experience of the sublime is an aesthetic experience it must involve some kind of purposiveness. So, Kant has to claim that sublimity involves counterpurposive purposiveness. In this connection Allison says "if the paradox underlying Kant's account of the beautiful is that of a purposiveness without purpose, underlying the sublime is the seemingly even more paradoxical conception of a *counterpurposive purposiveness*" (2001, 310). However, Allison seems to be off the mark. The first one is not a paradox at all as purposiveness concerns only the form or design which is so well elaborated by Kant. The second paradox Kant has resolved by invoking the concept of 'higher finality' or 'higher purposiveness' when he says that in

the case of the sublime "the mind has been incited to abandon sensibility, and employ itself upon idea involving higher finality" (1952, §23, 92/246 AE). Of course, we must admit that Kant in resolving the second paradox makes a puzzling claim. According to him, sublimity is to be found only in the mind. To quote Kant "the sublime, in the strict sense of the word, can not be contained in any sensuous form … [T]he broad ocean agitated by storm can not be called sublime" (*Ibid*, §23, 92/245 AE). This is to say sublimity is to be ascribed to ourselves, that is, to our capacities and ideas; it is ascribed to nature only derivatively or by what Kant calls 'subreption'.

In fact, it is here that we face a puzzle and not so much where Allison finds. As we have seen, according to Kant, it is sublime and not beauty which is in the mind. For "we express ourselves on the whole inaccurately if we term any *Object of nature* sublime, although we may with perfect propriety call many such objects beautiful" (*Ibid*, §23, 91-92/245 AE). In fact, Kant makes this even more explicit when he says "For the beautiful in nature we must seek a ground external to ourselves, but for the sublime one merely in ourselves and the attitude of mind that introduces sublimity into the representation of nature" (*Ibid*, §23, 93/246 AE). This is puzzling because according to Kant the object of pure aesthetic experience is not an object but the purposive form of the objects' representations; that is to say, beauty is not one of perceptual features of the object. This puzzle is stronger for those who maintain that pure judgements of taste are only subjective and the experience of beauty is partly subjective, though the puzzle is not so strong for those who maintain the view espoused in this thesis, namely, that pure judgements of taste and hence pure aesthetic experience, that is, experience of beauty, are objective in non-empirical sense. However, even the latter faced the challenge of explaining Kant's puzzling statement that beauty is about objects and sublimity is not.

Allison seems to explain Kant's position by saying that in the case of the sublime "the liking arises *in spite of* the appearance of the object, not because of it" (2001, 311). By this he means that in the case of the beautiful the liking arises because of the appearance of the object. In other words Allison's point is that whereas what is liked in the experience of the beautiful is the form of its representation whereas "What is actually liked in the experience of the sublime is, rather, the feeling of one's supersensible nature that is occasioned by the perception of such objects as stormy oceans, snow covered mountains, or erupting volcanoes" (*Ibid*). Allison's point is well taken. However, a more Kantian way of dealing with the puzzling character of his view mentioned above is the following: as we have seen, according to Kant, when we call something beautiful the referent is not the object but the purposiveness of its form. What is involved in such an instance is the idea of '*as if* ', that is to say, when we speak of beauty we are speaking 'as if' we are speaking of a perceptible feature of an object without being aware of that fact and therefore 'as if' is constitutive of our judgement about the beautiful. That is the reason for Kant to consider our belief that when we speak of beauty we are speaking of an object with beauty as its attribute to be understandable though not philosophically justified. But the 'as if' is not available to our judgements about the sublime. For Kant it does not even make sense to speak of objects *as if* they are sublime. It is conceptually incoherent to do so.

What is said above speaks of the complexity of sublimity and its experience. It is this complexity which is responsible for the paradoxes, puzzles and obscurities which many scholars read in Kant's exposition of the sublime. The complexity has its roots in the contradiction-ridden relation between the sublime and the aesthetic agent. This point deserves some elaboration.

It is clear that the sublime strikes us by reminding us of the limitations of our sensuous relation with nature but at the same time "the sense of limitation entails the sense of it's opposite, the fact that we also have a capacity for Reason not limited by sensuousness" (Bowie 1990, 37). We feel our limits and thereby feel what is not limited in us. In fact, without the latter the former would be impossible. To quote Bowie again "the sublime only provides a reminder that whatever our sensuously based thinking produces is inherently inadequate as a means of understanding the supersensuous basis of *ourselves and nature*" (*Ibid*, 38, emphasize added). Kant is at his poetic best when he says speaking of the mighty forces of nature, "provided our own position is secure, their aspect is all the more attractive for its fearfulness; and we readily call these objects sublime, because they raise the forces of the soul above the height of vulgar commonplace, and discover within us a power of resistance of quite another kind, which gives us courage to be able to measure ourselves against the seeming omnipotence of nature" (1852, §28, 110-111/261 AE). While realizing our own limitlessness even while experiencing our limits in the face of mighty nature, our encounter with the sublime has to generate the feeling of fear without being so scared as to turn away. Kant says that it is like fearing God while not being afraid of Him. Further, being an aesthetic experience our experience of the sublime involves the role of imagination. But at the same time our imagination is mocked at by the object that produces the feeling of the sublime. Added to this is the demand that we distance ourselves from any fear that we feel even while contemplating its fearfulness. It is such pulls in opposite directions in more than one way that makes our experience of the sublime most complex unlike the experience of the beautiful.

This brings us to the end of our discussion of Kant's theory of beauty including Kant's theory of the sublime. The thesis has not touched upon, in this chapter, Kant's views regarding the relation between the beautiful and the sublime on the one hand and morality/moral experience on the other. This will be discussed in chapter V wherein we dwell upon the bearing of Kant's aesthetic theory on aesthetic education.

CHAPTER- IV

KANT'S THEORY OF ART

IV.1 Some Preliminaries

As we have seen in the first chapter, aesthetics comprises both a study of beauty in nature and a study of beauty in art. Pre-Kantian aesthetics provided primacy to the latter. Post Kantian aesthetics starting from Hegel treated aesthetics and philosophy of art as being "virtually synonymous" (*cf*, Allison 2001, 271). What is significant about Kant's engagement with aesthetics is that, unlike most of his predecessors and almost all of his successors, he focused his attention on beauty in nature. This is because, as we have seen, in the Chapter III the aim of Kant's engagement with aesthetics was to ground both necessity found in nature and freedom without which the moral domain can hardly exist within a certain facet of human experience and aesthetics, according to him, could foot the bill. It is not, therefore surprising that he found the experience of natural beauty to be paradigmatic.

However, Kant did not neglect beauty in art completely. Though he preoccupies himself with art in the sections from 43 to 53 of the third *Critique* there are references to art in the preceding sections despite they being sporadic and sketchy. This has led some Kantian scholars to think that Kant's concern with art is too peripheral to constitute a philosophical account of beauty in art. For instance, maintaining that Kant was not

concerned with what is now the central concern of aesthetics, namely, art, Kirwan says, "While Kant has many interesting things to say about art, the construction of a philosophy of art is manifestly not the object of the *Critique of the Aesthetic Power of Judgement.* It is now generally acknowledged that to read Kant's work translating each proposition concerning 'beauty' or 'taste' into one about the grounds of our enjoyment or evaluation of art can only lead to conclusion that Kant has, at the very least, started from the wrong place"(2004, 12). It may also be noted that upholding in this connection a view akin to, if not identical with, that of Kirwan, Allison maintains that Kant's theory of art, that is, fine art, is extrinsically related to his theory of beauty which is nature-centered. Allison accounts for this fact by claiming that Kant's primary concern is with aesthetic judgements and hence his aesthetics was reception-aesthetics and not creation aesthetics even while engaging with the relation between artistic production and genius (*cf,* 2001, 217). In the opinion of this thesis these views regarding the marginal character of Kant's concern with art vis-à-vis Kant's whole aesthetic framework are off the mark, as our discussion in this chapter will show. In fact, Kant himself has pre-empted such a talk of marginality of art to his aesthetic concerns when, speaking of the objects of natural beauty and objects of artistic beauty, he says, "in the judgement of mere [pure] taste [they] could scarcely contend with one another for a superiority" (1952, §42, 159/300 AE). In fact, Kant uses the word 'nature' in more than one way with the result some of them include objects of the art world (*cf,* Garcyk 1998, 41-42).

The view that art is of marginal interest to Kant because his aesthetics is nature-Centered is based on the alleged fact that Kant considers nature to be aesthetically superior to art. It is true that according to Kant the beautiful objects of nature arouse a direct interest in morality in a way works of art can not. In Kant's own words, "the

interest in the *beautiful of art* … gives no evidence at all of a habit of mind attached to the morally good, or even inclined that way. But … to take an *immediate interest* in the beauty of *nature* … is always a mark of a good soul" (1952, §42, 157/298 AE). Hence, "The superiority which natural beauty has over that of art … accords with the refined and well-grounded habits of thought of all men who have cultivated their moral feeling" (*Ibid*, §42, 158/299 AE). However, the so called aesthetic superiority of nature over art is based on something extrinsic to aesthetic factors, namely, moral considerations. Secondly, since moral judgements that are judgements about morally good are determinate judgements, pure judgements of taste, that is, judgements about the beautiful can not be so organically linked to them as to adjudicate between natural beauty and artistic beauty. Consequently, as Gracyk points out, "this claim of nature's superiority to fine art is not a general endorsement of the superiority of natural beauty and it is consistent with Kant's position that in a pure judgement neither is superior" (1998, 43-44). In other words, valorization of nature over art conflicts with the very idea of a pure judgement of taste as Kant construes it. Further, Kant's contention regarding the superior status of natural beauty mentioned above is off set by his own statement to the contrary: "in all fine art the essential element consists in the form which is final for observation and for estimating. Here the pleasure is at the same time culture, and disposes the soul to ideas, making it thus susceptible of such pleasure and entertainment in greater abundance" (1952, §52, 190-191/326 AE). Finally, if the beauty of nature is superior to that of art Kant has to face the question "Why do we need art when there is nature?" that is to say "When we have superior kind of beauty in nature why do we seek to produce beauty which is supposed to be inferior to that of nature?" In fact, there are enough hints in Kant's own writings that purport to tilt the balance in favor of art *vis-à-vis* nature,

aesthetically speaking. Kemal very ably brings out and elaborates on such hints. According to him there is enough evidence in Kant to show the following:

a) We valorize art because the constructive and purposive character of aesthetic object is more clearly seen in art "[T]hat we can at all understand nature when it is beautiful is because of its analogy with art in general and with fine art in particular" (Kemal 1992, 109).

b) Works of art have more capacity for embodying imaginative freedom than are objects of nature.

c) Art can transform what is given by nature in such a way that it can outclass nature, as Kant acknowledges when he says "the material [that] can be borrowed by us from nature … be worked up by us into something else-namely, what *surpasses* nature" (1952, §49, 176/314 AE).

d) Works of art "have more extensively conceptualized universality than do natural objects" (Kemal 1992, 115).

e) Even while having its basis in nature art is indispensable part of culture such that "our cultural experience and responses to art circumscribe our approach to nature and its beauty" (*Ibid*, 124).

So much regarding the criticism that art is peripheral to Kant's aesthetic concerns.

Another criticism against Kant's philosophy of art is that Kant's canvas is too narrow since art based on his reflection on art are based on very limited art forms. And even regarding those limited arts forms his treatment was heavily colored by his own

taste and preferences. For instance, in poetry he heavily inclined towards Milton, Pope, Montaigne and Haller and had no sympathy for Romantic Poetry. But, as Körner says, "Kant's lack of perception for some works of art [and some art forms] is no reason in itself for condemning his aesthetic theory. This would be as mistaken as the condemnation of *Gestalt* psychology on the ground that one of its exponents proved to be incapable of perceiving some type of *Gestalt*" (1955, 193-194).

With these preliminary remarks we are enter into Kant's theory of art. Central to our discussion of his view are his position on the nature of art and his stand on the value of art.

IV.2 Kant on the Nature of Art

We may start our discussion of Kant's view of the nature of art with a brief look at the way he demarcates art from other areas of human endeavor. According to him, art is practical whereas science is theoretical as art involves practical skill. It is obvious that such a demarcation between art and science is totally arbitrary since science also involves practical skill, particularly in sharpening observations, constructing instruments and designing experiments; also, production of art objects involves theoretical understanding which may though be distinct from its scientific counterpart. To such an arbitrarily drawn distinction Kant's adds another one when he distinguishes between arts and craft by simply saying that art needs higher degree of talent, thanks to the fact that art objects unlike the products of craft are not determined by a functional concept. This distinction of Kant losses much of its weight when he brings to our mind the fact that successful works of art embody a high level of craftsmanship, best example being the production of

sculpture. Kant seems to be off the mark when he considers the value of a work of craft to be in the function it serves but not the admiration it wins because, of, for instance, its filigree work. However, while placing art on a pedestal higher than that of craft he does not treat all art to be of the same stature. He makes a distinction between mechanical artifacts and aesthetic artifacts. No doubt, both kinds of artifacts are art objects since they are products of a specialized skill and intentional endeavor. However, whereas the former is a products of an effort at actualizing a possible object which answers our needs, cognitive or otherwise, the latter concerns simply the arousal of pleasure. Kant goes further to distinguish between those aesthetic artifacts which provide pleasure in the sense of mere agreeableness and those aesthetic objects which give pleasure which is more than mere agreeableness. The latter fall under the kind designated by the term 'Fine Art'. In working out his theory of art Kant focuses exclusively on fine art. In other words, fine art, according to Kant, is art *proper*, with the result Kant's theory of art is theory of fine art. From now on in our discussion of Kant in this chapter by 'art' we mean only fine art, unless otherwise indicated. If objects of mechanical art involve the notion of perfection or non ethical good and aesthetic objects which are not objects of fine art are object of mere agreeableness, objects of fine art embody pure aesthetic pleasure. It is the products of fine art that exhibit beauty on the lines of the Kantian construal as delineated in chapter III. Like beautiful experience of nature the products of fine art provide a kind of pleasure which is located in reflection unlike the pleasure associated with mere liking or agreeableness which is located in sensations. Secondly, as in the case of their natural counterparts the pleasure produced by them is a product of the harmonious and free play between our faculties of imagination and understanding. Thirdly, as in the case of natural beauty, "Fine art … is a mode of representation which is intrinsically final" (1952, §44,

166/306 AE). Finally, the universal communicability which characterizes natural beauty becomes more crystallized in the case of objects of fine art because the way of representing in the case of fine art "although devoid of an end, has the effect of advancing the culture of the mental powers in the interests of social communication" (*Ibid*).

The above discussion sketchily has brought out the parallelism between objects of natural beauty and objects of artistic beauty. Let us now start looking at how Kant construes art objects vis-à-vis, beautiful objects of nature. This is important because in Kant's view the difference between natural beauty and artistic beauty is as important as what unites them.

First of all, according to Kant "A beauty of nature is a *beautiful thing*; beauty of art is a *beautiful representation* of a thing" (*Ibid*, §48, 172/311 AE).This statement of Kant fits into his aesthetics scheme to a limited extent. To be more precise, Kant should have indicated that what an art object represents is not a thing but a thing which is aesthetically perceived and hence a thing which is already an object of representation and not a phenomenal object. Therefore an object of artistic beauty is a representation of a thing which is already represented; that is, it is a representation of a representation. In other words, an object of art, in the Kantian scheme, is twice removed from a phenomenal object. This remind us of Plato's characterization of an artistic production as twice removed from reality, though Plato, unlike Kant devalues as an art object for that very reason. Hence, the production of beautiful representations of the representation of the things is a distinctive task of art. Further, as Graham points out, Kant's statement confines art to only figurative painting. Lyrical poetry is beautiful not because its

representative of something but it is *expressive* of something. Kant himself goes beyond his representational account of fine art when he goes beyond figurative painting in his account of fine art in terms of aesthetic ideas. Such art forms "are non-visual representations of non-physical things such as love, or death or envy, which it seems clear the literary arts can embody, including, even, lyric poetry. Perhaps a more difficult case is music. Music can be beautiful, but can it be the representation of anything? And surely architecture is functional rather than representative?" (Graham 2005, 22). This means that according to Kant some forms of fine art like figurative painting are representative whereas most of other art forms are expressive, and hence Kant's own distinction between beautiful objects of nature and beautiful objects of art is inaccurate even from his own point of view.

Secondly, there are certain locutions which are applicable to art objects and not to nature. They are concepts like intentionality, rule-freedom, originality, spontaneity, exemplariness and ineffability. It is not that the negations of these concepts are applicable to nature. It is simply that it does not make sense to apply them or their negation to the beautiful objects of nature. What is most important in this connection is that Kant relates all these concepts to the idea of genius whose role is central to Kant's theorization of art. Since genius is concerned with the production of art objects Kant's theory of art transforms the question "What is art?" into "How is art created?" This show how questionable is Allison's view that Kant's aesthetics is reception-aesthetics and not creation-aesthetics (*cf*, Allison 2001, 217). This is not to say that Allison is completely wrong; after all, Kant's central preoccupation with pure aesthetic judgements about both natural and artistic beauty supports Allison's view. However, Kant's focus on genius in the creation of art goes against Allison's identifications of the central orientation of

Kant's aesthetics. It is, therefore, reasonable to say that reception-aesthetics and creation aesthetics are two sides of same coin. The significance of work on Kantian means of art consists in displaying how one-sided is its characterization as only reception-centric.

In view of the fact that the concept of genius is the center of gravity of Kant's theory of art, this chapter discusses in detail Kant's view of genius in art. However, before we do so, let us look at Kant's enigmatic statement about the relation between nature and art. The statement runs as follows:

"A product of fine art must be recognized to be art and not nature … nature proved beautiful when it wore the appearance of art; and art can only be termed beautiful, where we are conscious of its being art, while yet it has the appearance of nature" (Kant 1952, §45, 166-167/306 AE). This means that according to Kant, (1) nature is beautiful when it looks like art; (2) art is beautiful if it looks like nature; and (3) a work of art must be recognized as art and not nature. What do these claims add up to?

Taken together (1) and (2) may point to a common ground that underlies both beauty in nature and beauty in art. Central to the common ground is the idea of purposiveness without purpose and hence involving no determinate concept. As Guyer points out, it means that "the processes of appreciation and evaluation which lead to the conclusion that an object, whether a work of art or otherwise, is beautiful, are the same in all cases, and the paradigm for those processes must be that which is furnished by the appreciation and estimation of a natural beauty free of all intervention by concepts" (1994, 275). Two problems arise in connection with such an interpretation which can join (1) and (2) and both the problems concern fine arts. In the case of a work of fine art it may be very difficult not to take into account the purpose behind the creation of a work

of art. Thus a problem arises because such a purpose may be mostly intrinsic to that work and not extrinsic one like a commercial motive. After all, representing a beautiful form may be the purpose of an art work and it is impossible not to take this into account (this problem does not arise in the case of a beautiful object of nature). This problem can be solved by considering representation as purpose to be relevant only for interpreting a work and not evaluating it. As Ranjan Kumar Ghosh points out "to *interpret* a work of art is not the same as to *evaluate* it; so in approaching a work of representational painting one might interpret it in terms of its purpose, that is, what it depicts, but its evaluation as a work of art (or beauty of art) is not parasitic on its interpretation. Such a work would be beautiful or not depending as it would on whether or not it pleases by its form alone that is the condition conductive for the harmony between the faculties" (2004, 239). In other words, interpretation involves what is intended whereas evaluation involves what is realized. Further, representation as associated with purpose in art is, to quote McCloskey, "such a generalized notion in Kant's writing that it could be treated as making …no more than the fact that the *artist makes, and does not find* or is not 'given', the object in question" (quoted in Ghosh 2004, 240, emphasis added). That is the reason why even "non-representational specimens of art such as abstract paintings may also be subsumed under the rubric of 'representation'" (*Ibid*). Hence, 'representation' is too general a notion to carry the burden of 'purpose'.

The second problem is that the conjunction of (1) and (2) so interpreted makes Kant's theory of art ultra-formalist one, consequence of which is Kant is made to derecognize content such as a color to be relevant. Such a construction of Kant's position does not do justice to Kant who "assumes, a work of art typically has not only a form but also a content which is or is associated with a concept, but precisely in such a way that

both form and content jointly and freely produce the harmony of the higher cognitive faculties in spite of the role of concepts in both the recognition of the general intention making the object a work of fine art and the apprehension of its particular content" (Guyer 1994, 278). It may be noted in this connection that Haskins maintains that Kant does not include color as integral to form since colors can only give us charm and agreeableness. However, Haskins clearly states that "What Kant is explicitly distinguishing design from is not representational or symbolic content … [I]t is not form/content (in the sense of *representational* content) distinction which underlies Kant's formalism" (1989, 53). In short, the second problem can be answer by pointing out that Kant's notion of form is too broad to be of any use to the formalist. As we shall see Kant further enriches his theory of art by supplementing such a broad concept of form with the concept of aesthetic expression.

The conjunction (1) and (2) can also be interpreted without taking into account the common ground of purposiveness. Kant's contention that nature to be beautiful must look like a work of art must not be taken to mean that nature when beautiful contains art forms but "that a natural form, in order to be beautiful, has to agree with a form we, in our imagination, could have produced freely" (Ruger 2007, 153). Similarly, Kant's contention that a work of art is beautiful if its look like nature should be taken to mean that a work of art should be like, not as a fabrication involving rules but as a product of spontaneous creation like a pleasing natural phenomenon-'free formations of nature'. Thus, neither art is a copy of nature nor nature is our projection.

We now came to the claim (3) made by Kant, namely, a work of art must be recognized as art and not as nature. This means that to respond to a work of art

aesthetically we must be conscious that it is art even while it should be seen like nature. One way of understanding this claim of Kant is to look at an art object as a product of conscious intent of the artist. In other words, to be a work of art is to be a product of artist's intention. Obviously, by no stretch imagination we can associate intention with an object of nature, say, sunset. But at the same time it must be seemed like an object of nature which is spontaneous or in Kant's words unintentional. Therefore, our experience of an object of art is an experience of an object which is both intended and unintended. This looks like a paradox. Allison point out that there is nothing paradoxical in this (*cf*, 2001, 275). But there is no need to deny that there is a paradox here. In fact art experience is what it is because of its paradoxicality. However, such a paradox which lies at the heart of our experience is not a paradox in the usual sense. Customary paradoxes are sought by us to be resolved. But we do not seek to resolve the paradox that characterizes our art experience; rather, we leave it because it enlivens the aesthetic dimension of our life.

Whether such a paradox is real or, as Allison thinks, only apparent is less important than the fact that it provides, for Kant, an entry point into the seminal notion of genius which is what draws the line between natural beauty and artistic beauty. This notion effects a perspectival shift from reception-aesthetics to creation-aesthetics in the Kantian thought on art. It is this pivotal idea that we now turn to.

Kant starts his discussion of genius by explicitly stating that "fine arts must necessarily be regarded as arts of *genius*" (1952, §46, 168/307 AE). To this he adds "The concept of fine art, however, does not permit of the judgement upon the beauty of its product being derived from any rule that has a *concept* for its determining ground, and

that depends, consequently, on a concept of the way in which the product is possible. Consequently fine art can not of its own self excogitate the rule according to which it is to effectuate its product" (*Ibid*). Hence, genius according to him, "is a *talent* for producing that for which no definite rule can be given" (*Ibid*). It is genius to which one must trace creativity and originality but since a original work can be idiosyncratic nonsense a work of fine art must avoid this pitfall by proving itself to be exemplary in the sense of being models. Thus, the product of genius must be both original and exemplary. The freedom from rule-governedness is what makes a work of art an artistic production. This is because unlike a straight forward representation it must be suggestive-a point which Kant does not mention but takes for granted. Rulebundness is antithetical to new possibilities of interpretation that may be suggested by a work of art.

At the same time Kant affirms that "a product can never be called 'art' unless there is a preceding rule" (*Ibid*). This means that a work of art is bond by rules. Kant seeks to resolve the contradiction between his two assertions, namely, (1) 'a work of art is rule free', and (2) 'a work of art is rule governed' by claiming that a work of art is rule free in the sense it is free from manmade rules and it is rule bond in the sense it is bond by rules which nature has given to the genius to which a work of art owes its creation. Hence, "*Genius* is the innate mental aptitude (*ingenium*) *through which* nature gives the rule to art" (*Ibid*). Yet a work of art is uniquely a human creation and not a production of nature. A hive constructed by bees might be spellbinding due to its amazing design which no human being can duplicate is not at all a work of art. Since "no rational deliberation forms the basis of their labour" (*Ibid*, §43, 163/303 AE).

What is the basis of saying that the rules which govern the creation of a work of art are given to the genius. "Who is the creator by nature and are not the products of the genius itself?" Kant answer to this question is that an artist who follows those rules can not formulate them and hence can not teach them. The ineffability evidences the fact that those rules do not involve determinate concepts unlike the rules which govern the products of, say, carpentry. Also, nature might possess beautiful object but it can not produce works of art which are produced only by genius to which nature might prescribe rules. Such rules govern the genius in the expression of what Kant calls 'aesthetic ideas', apart from the skill to express them. "By an aesthetic idea I mean that representation of the imagination which induces much thought, yet without the possibility of any definite thought whatever, i.e. *concept*, being adequate to it, and which language, consequently, can never get quite on level terms with or render completely intelligible" (*Ibid*, §49, 175-176/314 AE). Here, Kant contrasts an aesthetic idea with a rational idea which is a determinate concept and "to which no *intuition* … can be adequate" (*Ibid*, §49, 176/314 AE). The imagination whose representation is an aesthetic idea is productive in the sense it creates, "as it were, a second nature out of the material supplied to it by actual nature" (*Ibid*). The expression 'as it were' should not lead us to think that the work of fine arts is a non-cognitive work, that is, a work of make –belief. Any such interpretation is set at naught by the fact that he characterizes the imagination he associates with genius "as a productive faculty of *cognition*" (*cf, Ibid*. emphasis added). The cognitive significance such a work is difference from that of the work of common sense and science. Our thought about the latter are determinate as the concepts involve in them are determinate. In saying this Kant is making a very important point regarding what makes a work of art valuable. As Ghosh points out, "Not only is it important for art to be beautiful, it should

also be able to induce or communicate much thought in the mind of the viewer of art … This is how an 'exemplary' work inspires other kindred artists to create more works of art" (2004, 242). Further, the indeterminateness of the thoughts prompted by aesthetic ideas to which the genius gives a phenomenal form explains why no language can express them completely.

The above discussion shows why, according to Kant, aesthetic ideas constitute the core of a work of fine art and why he relates genius to the 'animating principle' of creative imagination without which a work of art will be soulless. Even admitting that natural beauty can expresses aesthetic ideas sans genius. But it must be noted that Kant's idea of genius is not romantic, though romantic movement in art valorized the notion of genius. The success of genius in presenting aesthetic ideas requires something more than mere creative imagination. In particular it needs cultivation of taste. Kant emphatically says that "Genius can do no more than furnish rich *material* for products of fine art; its elaboration and its *form* require a talent academically trained, so that it may be employed in such a way as to stand the test of judgement" (1952, §47, 171-172/310 AE). In other words, genius needs to be cultivated so as not to conflict with the judgement of taste. Mere "imagination … entitles an art to be called an *inspired* (*geistreiche*) than a *fine* art. It is only in respect of judgement [of taste] that the name of fine art is deserved" (*Ibid*, §50, 182/319 AE). Taste must limit imagination since untrammeled or uncontrolled imagination is self defeating. The importance Kant attaches to the cultivation of taste *vis-à-vis* creative imagination which has it locus in genius has led some scholars to think that according to Kant though genius is necessary for the production of art objects taste without genius is sufficient for the purpose. But what is said above indicates that in Kant's view genius in necessary but not sufficient and genius and taste together constitute

a sufficient condition. Perhaps, Allison is right in attributing to Kant two conceptions of genius-a thick one and a thin one. The thick conception of genius includes taste whereas the thin one is limited to a mere imaginative capacity. According to Allison, the function of the latter is "largely polemical" in so far as it is used to emphasis the "dangerous flight of fancy". It is the former which does justice to his account of fine art and his "creation aesthetics" (*cf*. 2001, 301).

IV.3 Kant on the Value of Art

We now came to the views of Kant regarding the value of art. This discussion is important because it is generally maintained because Kant defines beauty (whether in nature or in art) in terms of purposiveness without purpose, Kant is autonomist regarding the status of art. The concept of autonomy of art implies that art has no value outside itself. The value it has is only its intrinsic value. The autonomist interpretation of Kant made him one of the key figures of 'Art for Art's sake' movement. Of course, there are Kantian scholars who questioned this interpretation. According to them, in Kant's view the value of art consists not only in its intrinsic significance but also in its facilitating broader human goals such as edification or widening of our intellectual horizons, etc.,.

The autonomist interpretation of Kant's stand on the value of art lays high premium on what it is considered to be the formalist view of art. On the other hand, the non-autonomist interpretation of Kant emphasizes his expressivist view of art, according to which the essence of art consists in its ability to express aesthetic ideas. Hence, any answer to the question whether Kant is an autonomist or not depends of on our answer to

the question whether Kant is a formalist or is an expressivist. Therefore, we first take up the latter question.

Murray's assertion that "Kant was a strict formalist with regard to beauty in nature and in art" (2007, 206) is a typically characterization of Kant's view of art. Crawford declares that "in the parts of the *Critique of judgement* in which form is emphasized as the essential aspect of beauty, Kant is consistently a pure formalist, in the sense that every non-formal feature of an object is completely irrelevant to its beauty and is usually … also a positive distraction and interferes with the aesthetic experience of beauty" (1974, 100). The plausibility of such a characterization of Kant is understandable for the following reasons. First of all, the scholars who provided such a characterization find it an easy way of demarcating Kant's position from the traditional view fathered by Aristotle who identified art with *mimesis*, on the one hand, and, the subjectivist view of art propounded by Hume and others according to whom beauty is identical with agreeableness. Secondly, the formalist interpretations get its force from Kant himself. For instance, Kant is forthright in saying "in all fine art the essential element consists in the form which is final for observation and for estimating" (1952, §52, 190/326 AE). After all, Kant's stated aim of deduction of judgements of taste is to demonstrate how "one who feels pleasure in simple reflection on the form of an object, without having any concept in mind, rightly lays claim to the agreement of every one" (*Ibid*, Introduction, VII, 32/191 AE). Finally, Kant's theory of knowledge is rightly taken to be structuralist and structuralism in epistemology and formalism in aesthetics go hand in hand.

But two questions arise in connection with this plausible interpretation of Kant as a formalist. They are: (1) "Does Kant mean that only form is constitutive of beauty?" and

(2) "Whether or not this is does, is the value of art consists only in beauty?" We take up the first question. Suppose beauty of a work of art consist exclusively in its form (of purposiveness). Suppose further we have an extraordinarily beautiful work of painting. Suppose also that we have another painting which is a perfect copy of the former. If both of them are said to be equally beautiful, that is, the latter is in no way aesthetically inferior to the former, we will be forced to say that genius involved in the first work of art is not constitutive of the artistic beauty. But such a conclusion goes against Kant's declarations that "fine arts must necessarily be regarded as arts of *genius*" (*Ibid,* §46, 168/307 AE), and Kant does not include even perfect copying as a constitutive element of genius. After all, even a perfect copy is a mechanical production involving known rules. Hence, even while accepting that form is a basic constituent of beauty we have to qualify this statement in order to make room for the role of genius in the creation of artistic beauty.

We now came to answer question (2) which is about whether the value of a work of art consists in something more than its beauty which is the function of both the form of purposiveness and the role of genius, the latter involving both creative imagination and highly cultivated taste. Of course, Kant's answer is very clear. According to him, a work of fine art must express aesthetic ideas which give rise to thoughts albeit indeterminate. Those works of art which express aesthetic ideas are considered by him to be possessing 'spirit' (geist) and hence are better works of art than those which do not. Also, it is the expressiveness of aesthetic ideas which distinguishes, according to Kant, fine art from merely agreeable art. In the case of agreeable art the pleasure is accompanied by mere sensations whereas the pleasure produced by a work of fine art is accompanied by what Kant calls 'modes of cognition' (*cf. Ibid*, §44, 165/305 AE) Kant associates a work of

fine art with modes of cognition because by expressing aesthetic ideas a work of art ignites indeterminate thoughts. However, Kant is not clear about the relation between beauty of a work of art and its ability to express aesthetic ideas. Of course, he is clear that it is not a necessary condition. This is because, first of all, expression of aesthetic ideas is not unique to works of fine art since even objects of natural beauty do so. Secondly, mere expression of aesthetic ideas is not sufficient for something to be beautiful. In fact, aesthetic expressiveness and aesthetic worth of an object are not directly proportional to each other. In spite of all this, the expression of aesthetic ideas is organically linked to the aesthetic value called 'beauty', though the expressiveness of aesthetic ideas itself may not be constitutive of the aesthetic value. This is clearly brought out in the following passage dealing with the employment of a universal language of sensations which can be understood by every human being: "the art of tone [music] wields the full force of this language wholly on its own account, namely, as a language of the affections … But, further, inasmuch as those aesthetic ideas are not concepts or determinate thoughts, the form of the arrangement of these sensations (harmony and melody), taking the place of the form of a language, only serves the purpose of giving an expression to the aesthetic idea of an integral whole of an unutterable wealth of thought that fills the measure of a certain theme forming the dominant *affection* in the piece (*Ibid*, §53, 194/329 AE). This passage is significant as it brings out a complete correlation between form and expression. As Allison says for Kant such a relation is even more intimate in other art forms (*cf*, 2001. 289).

The question is "How are beauty and aesthetic expressiveness related?" Whatever may be the intimacy between them the latter is not constitutive of the former. Hence, the value of a work of art consists in its being more than embodying beauty. This means if

for Plato beauty is too important to be left to art, for Kant the value of art can not be exhausted by beauty. This takes us to the question with which we started, namely, "Is Kant a purist, that is, an autonomist?" Before we answer that question directly, let us summarize our discussion of the question whether Kant is a pure formalist.

Having a design, that is, a purposive form is necessary but not sufficient for a work of fine art to be beautiful. It is only by being accompanied with genius that it can render a work to be beautiful. Hence, it is not a sufficient condition for the beauty of a work of art. To the extent Kant considers the purposive form to be a necessary condition of the beauty of an object of fine art, Kant is a formalist. But, his formalism becomes highly qualified when he considers purposive form to be insufficient for the beauty of a work of fine art. His position on the nature of art becomes more than formalist when he asserts that a work of fine art, unlike a work of agreeable art, must be capable of *expressing* aesthetic ideas. Thus, expressivism becomes a component of his position that complements the formalist component. Two points are to be noted here. The expressivist component of his position Kant perhaps owes to Herder, a contemporary of Kant, who was the father of the Expressivist movement. Of course, Kant was not an expressivist unlike Herder. After all, Herder rejected modernity in toto, whereas Kant sought only to modify the tents of modernity and even to reject them. Secondly, the formalist dimension of Kant's position on the nature of art which concerns the beautiful in a work of art is very intimately related to the expressivist dimension of his position. We should bear in mind the fact that, according to Kant, the expressiveness of a work of fine art concerns *aesthetic* ideas. Thus, the formalist and expressivist dimension of his position are welded together.

The above discussion regarding the characterization of Kant's position on art paves the way for judging whether he is an autonomist/purist as is usually thought. Though 'autonomy' has been used in the literature of aesthetics in many ways, the term signifies the idea that the value of a works of art is devoid of any practical import, that is, the value of art has only to do with its aesthetic worth, viz., beauty and has nothing to do with its instrumental value. The instrumental value need not be crude like monitory gain or social status or even means of political or religious propaganda. It may concern more exalted purposes. Such a view may be called, following Casey Haskins, strict autonomism. As opposed this view, we may have strict instrumentalism according to which the value of art has much less to do with its aesthetic worth than its extra-artistic significance. Such a view finds its expressions, for instance, in the following word of Tolstoy "Art like speech is a means of communication and therefore of progress, that is, of the movement of humanity forward towards perfection …[A]rt renders accessible to men of the latest generations all the feelings experienced by their predecessors and also those felt by their best and foremost contemporaries" (quoted in Haskins 1989, 47). If the strict autonomist looks upon any consideration other than aesthetic worth to be extraneous to and even antithetical to art and its value, the strict instrumentalist considers the concern with beauty in a work of art to be mere indulgence which undermines the value of an art work. Following Casey Haskins we may characterize Kant's position as being neither strict autonomist nor strict instrumentalist but 'instrumental autonomist' (*cf*, 1989, 43). This is because Kant's views on the issue we are discussing take into account with equal measure both aesthetic and instrumental components of art. The aesthetic components concerns all that Kant has identified, namely, disinterested and universally shareable pleasure, born out of contemplation on the form of purposiveness generated by the free

and harmonious play of imagination and understanding. In connection with the significance Kant attaches to the instrumental component of art, Haskins draws our attention to the following passage from the Kant "But should the feeling of pleasure be what it has immediately in view it is then termed *aesthetic* art. As such it may be either *agreeable* or *fine* art. The description 'agreeable art' applies where the end of the art is that the pleasure should accompany the representations considered as mere *sensations*, the description 'fine art' where it is to accompany them considered as *modes of cognition* … Fine art … is a mode of representation which is intrinsically final, and which, although devoid of an end, has the effect of advancing the culture of the mental powers in the interests of social communication" (1952, §44, 165,166/305,306 AE).

Before we come to the elaboration of 'social communication' that Kant associated with work of fine art vis-à-vis, agreeable art, let us note the significance Kant attaches to it. According to Kant fine art, and not agreeable art, possesses Würde (which Meredith translates as 'intrinsic worth' and Haskins translates as 'dignity') precisely because a work of fine art expresses aesthetic ideas that generate indeterminate thoughts whose communication itself can be a source of additional pleasure. Hence, the value of a work of art is directly related to the social communication that it generates or at least facilitates. Kant, of course, does not provide an empirical description of such a social communication. This is because his aesthetic undertaking is not an empirical inquiry but a transcendental one in the sense it inquires into the *a priori* conditions of the very possibility of aesthetic experience and consequently aesthetic judgement. However, he identifies the desirable phenomena that the social function of fine art brings about. In giving the theoretical elements of such a sociology of art Kant points out the following: firstly, the social communication made possible by art enables the members of a

community to exhibit what he calls 'common sense' (senses communes) by which is Kant understands "the idea of a *public* sense, i.e. a critical faculty which in its reflective act takes account (*a priori*) of the mode of representation of everyone else, in order, *as it were*, to weigh its judgement with the collective reason of mankind, and thereby avoid the illusion arising from subjective and personal conditions which could readily be taken for objective" (*Ibid*, §40, 151/293 AE). In other words, such a social communication enables us to overcome personal prejudices and facilitates critical thinking. Secondly, such communication to an extent reduces social fragmentation by bringing together different sections of society into a common reciprocity. The result is a sense of solidarity, produced by a feeling of belonging to a common ethos. Thirdly, such a communication heightens our sense of what it is to be moral; as the aesthetic ideas which constitute the fulcrum of such a communication symbolizes moral ideas. In this sense Kant might agree with Ruskin who says that "taste is highest morality". Finally, since such a communication concerns indeterminate thoughts it has a cognitive or at least proto-cognitive significance even though such communication is non discursive. The aesthetic idea which is figure in such a communication enlarges our discourse. Such ideas include "invisible beings", "the kingdom of the blessed", "hell", "eternity", "creation", "death" such a communication makes us sensitive to "not merely the supersensible but also the *relation* between the supersensible and sensible aspects of experience" (Haskins 1989, 48). Haskins very aptly says "It provides quasi-cognitive insights into aspects of human existence which are beyond the means of ordinary discursive thought" (*Ibid*, 51).

It is true that Kant has exaggerated the cultural significance of fine arts. But what is important is the way he relates the value of what art *is* with the value of what art *does*. They are aesthetically welded because the ideas which figure in social communication

pertaining to fine arts are aesthetic ideas. Thus, Kant's position is that fine art has an autonomy undoubtedly and hence it is valuable for its own sake. But, art acquires a value beyond itself. However, since the latter concerns the social communications of ideas which are aesthetic it is not trans-artistic totally. This is how Kant overcomes the dichotomy between strict autonomism and strict instrumentalism. Thus, against the conventional understanding, Kant is not a purist in aesthetics, though, he may be purist in ethics. He may maintain duty for the sake of duty but not beauty for the sake of beauty. However, this did not take him to the other extreme of down playing the autonomy of art and intrinsic value of artistic beauty.

We end this chapter by making a critical comment on a crucial point in Kant's theory of art. This concerns the water-tight distinction he makes between science and art. No doubt, Kant is right in making that distinction but the way he makes it smacks of a view of science which is virtually discarded, thanks to the post-positivist developments in philosophy of science. First of all, Kant's idea that in science, unlike in art, we proceed with rules which constitute the cannons of scientific method stand discredited today. On the one hand, Thomas Kuhn has shown that such cannons or rules underdetermine our choice of theories in the sense more than one theory simultaneously satisfies those cannons so, that our choice of a theory of judgement depends more than the rules. Paul Feyerabend, on the other hand, has gone further by showing that history of science is full of instances were new theories are chosen by violating any imaginable rule and creative breakthroughs where possible only by such violations. This shows that Kant's idea of genius which he associates exclusively with art exclusively can be applicable to science also. Further, Kant's idea that scientific theories are real/literal descriptions of the phenomenal world whereas artistic creations are not, has been called into question today.

The incommensurability thesis of Kuhn and Feyerabend has shown that the relation between our theories and reality is not one of one –to-one correspondence. Today, it is accepted that reality is at least partly constructed by our theories which described them. Ironically, the supports of the view that in science reality is determined by the language which science uses at a specific time-the view generally called Internal Realism -find a parallel and even motivation in the thoughts of Kant himself. Many philosopher of science, hence, today argue convincingly that our scientific theories are related to the world in the way metaphors are related to what they describe. As in the case of metaphors, the value of a scientific theory consists in, not correspondence, but aptness. Further, a theory is rejected not so much because it is proved to be experimentally false, but because it fails to suggest new directions of research. Hence, as in the case of a work of art, so in the case of a scientific theory it is suggestiveness that is crucial. Hence, the line between science and art which Kant has drawn is rendered very thin. Of course, Kant's idea of science is central to the ideology of Enlightenment of which he was a great champion. In spite of his major reservations about some aspects of that ideology, his idea of science is not a departure from the image of science which that ideology built. Hegel's words "you can not be better than your age though you can be your age at its best" holds in the case of Kant at least so far as his idea of science-art distinction is concerned. But this in no way diminishes the significance of his philosophy of art.

CHAPTER- V

KANT'S ON AESTHETIC EDUCATION

V.1 Some Preliminaries

In this chapter we explore the bearing of Kant's aesthetic theory on aesthetic education. It is true that Kant does not, directly deal with the question of what constitutes a desirable and effective aesthetic education. In fact, the expression 'aesthetic education' does not figure in his works. Yet, the implications of his aesthetic theory for aesthetic education are highly significant since the latter constitutes a field for the application of the former. In fact, Kant was very particular about the application of his theoretical ideas. Even while he was engaged in the project of critical philosophy he looked forward "for men of impartiality, insight and the real gift of popular explanation to devote themselves to giving it true elegance" (quoted in Körner 1955, 175). By way of showing the practical significance of his philosophical theory after completing *Critique of Judgement* he writes at the end of his 'Preface' that with the completion of the third *Critique*, he is bringing his "entire critical undertaking to a close … [and would] hasten to the doctrinal part" (1952, Preface to the first edition, 7/170 AE). The doctrinal part pertains to "the cultivation of those regions of which, as he believed, the critical philosophy had rightfully taken possession" (quoted in Körner 1955, 175). One of those regions, according to this thesis, is aesthetic education. This chapter seeks to show how Kant's aesthetic theory provides aesthetic education a breadth and depth which it needs and deserves. Kant's aesthetic

theory provides a philosophy of aesthetic education by identifying its cognitive, cultural, spiritual and moral dimensions. And in this sense, for Kant, aesthetic education is something more than mere acquisition of skills for appreciation of beauty in nature or in art. Particularly significant in this connection is his convincingly successful attempt to relate aesthetic experience/thought with moral experience/thought. Equally importantly, he deepens that relation by not confining to beauty in art but extending the scope of 'aesthetic' to beauty in nature and sublimity.

We may begin our discussion of Kant's philosophy of aesthetic education by noting the differences between the orientation of Kant and Friedrich Schiller. Schiller was the first in the modern times to provide a philosophy of aesthetic education. He did so in his celebrated work *The Aesthetic Education of Man* in (1795) which was a series of letters by him. Kant and Schiller have many points of affinity though, as we shall see, fundamental differences. Expressivists like Herder and Romantic philosophers who adopted anti-rationalist position in their critique of modernity unlike Kant who while critically responding to the philosophy of Enlightenment never compromised his valorization of Reason. Against the main stream of modern philosophy which is called philosophy of Enlightenment Kant put forth a theory of human nature the core of which was the concept of rational autonomy whereas Kant's opponents came out with a theory of man central to which was the idea of man's expressive unity with nature. Schiller stands in between Kant on the one hand and expressivists and romantics on the other. Unlike the latter "he did not rush into a monist ontology, and seek a unified foundation in being. Schiller remains with a rough approximation to the Kantian account of subjectivity: we form as subjects the stuff which we receive through the senses" (Taylor 1975, 37). But central to the Schiller's conception of man was his idea of play by which

Schiller understands free creativity and self-expression of man in a harmonious interaction with nature. To quote Taylor again "We can recognize here the ideal of the expression [Expressivist] theory, an expressive harmony in which natural desires and the highest human forms are effortlessly united in a single élan" (*Ibid*, 38). However, "Schiller is not generally classed as [an Expressivist or] a Romantic, although he shared their hunger for unity; and this is partly because he would not take the ontological step, either as philosopher or writer, to a divinized nature" (*Ibid*, 42).

The above discussion was necessary to put in context the affinities and differences between the Kantian and the Schillerian approaches to aesthetic education. Like Kant, Schiller maintains that aesthetic education serves the purpose of realization of morality and hence promotes the establishment of a free society. As Tauber says "This view is in line with an assertion found in Kant's writings, implying a possible pedagogical link between aesthetics and ethics" (2006, 23). However, Tauber's assertion is premised on the interpretation of Kant as one who is not a complete autonomist.(Of course, as we have seen, there are statements of Kant which strengthen the ultra-autonomist interpretation of Kant- an interpretation which this thesis has rejected in chapter IV). It may be noted that on the basis of this point of affinity that Schiller expresses his indebtedness to Kant but the affinity ends here and differences outweigh affinity. First of all, Schiller construed along with the Romantic philosophers, the aim of education to be self-formation and self-cultivation. That is, the purpose of aesthetic education was the development of rich personality unique to each individual. Such an objective of aesthetic education was taken to be morally edifying by Schiller. Thus the orientation of aesthetic education for Schiller must be individualistic as it is the individual realizing his aesthetic potential *as an individual* who is the end of such an education. By contrast, for Kant

"aesthetic education was supposed to help strip from a person that which is merely individual, thus facilitating one's transition to the universal standpoint needed for morality" (Kabeshkin 2011, 1). In other words, "Schiller and the Romantics aimed to achieve the development of rich and harmonious individuality by means of aesthetic education while Kant endeavored to strip from a person that which is merely individual, thus facilitating one's transition to the universal standpoint" (*Ibid*, 6). Another major difference is that according to Schiller "The aesthetic experience is conceived ... as an end in itself, for even morality and the principle of the free society are formulated in aesthetic terms" (Tauber 2006, 23). Such a primacy of the aesthetic is not consistent with Kant's position however much, as we shall see, he vouches for a bond between the aesthetic and the ethical.

The above discussion regarding the fundamental differences between Schiller and Kant give us an entry point into Kant's philosophy of aesthetic education. In what follows we discuss the way in which Kant adds significant dimensions to the philosophical underpinnings of aesthetic education. Those dimensions concern cognitive, cultural, spiritual and moral facets which aesthetic education must make room for in order to be intellectually and practically wholesome and rewarding. We discusses this faces under the two following sections.

V.2 Extra-Moral Dimension of Aesthetic Education

This section deals with extra-moral dimension of aesthetic education which comprises cognitive, cultural and spiritual aspects of aesthetic education which as Kant

visualizes it. Recognition of the cognitive component by Kant sets as naught the view attributed to Kant that aesthetic experience and pure aesthetic judgements are non-cognitive. Crowther brings out this point very effectively. When he says, "the aesthetic can be felt as a release and a renewal … one might say that the primordial significance of the pure aesthetic judgement is disclosed intuitively through its felt contrast with the routines of everyday life" (Crowther 1996, 119,120). Our experience of transcending day-to-day life which aesthetic experience embodies is primordial in the sense that "the motive for non-determined infant cognitive behaviour is aesthetic. It is a curiosity-for-its-own-sake which can be characterized as disinterested in so far as the infant has not yet fully articulated the categorial basis of either the world or its own self" (*Ibid*, 119). Those who read only socio-political meaning in our judgements of taste do not recognize their cognitive content and the fail to explain how our aesthetic judgements are efficacious in promoting those socio-political purposes to which our aesthetic judgements are reduced by way of an exclusively sociological explanation. The centrality of the cognitive in the aesthetic can be reinforced by our acknowledging that the appreciation of a work of art demands the recognition of human intentionality. Such a recognition concerns what Kant calls 'aesthetic value' the possession of which distinguishes fine art from what he calls 'agreeable art'. The cognitive content of an aesthetic object gets further reinforced by the communicative competence it promotes. As Haskins says, according to Kant "when our cognitive and sensuous faculties are engaged by fine art, the mental activity which results promotes a state of affairs beyond itself, a state of affairs referred to … as 'social communication'" (1989, 45). The cognitive component of a work of art and its capacity to enrich communication are inseparable. Both are organically linked to what Kant calls 'common sense' which is a capacity to weigh one's judgements with the "collective

reason of mankind". Common sense is not common understanding. Its existence is the presupposition of our aesthetic experience and judgements.

We now come to the cultural component of the extra-moral dimension of aesthetic education. The exercise of taste which promotes communication of ideas strengthens the culture of a community, provides a glue in the form of a common culture weakening the hold of social barriers. As Haskins says, "Rather than separating upper and lower economic classes, the experience of art binds their members together by engaging their sense of belonging to a common humanity. In so doing, works of art at once constitute and promote common culture in the deepest sense of the term. And insofar as a genuine work of fine art can and will speak to all within a society, the standard of taste, sociologically speaking, is a democratic one" (*Ibid*, 46-47). By claiming that our aesthetic judgements have a universal validity in the sense we take it as axiomatic that others are capable of appreciating an aesthetic object we treat them with regard and in doing so attach value to them intrinsically. Such an attitude is the aesthetic counterpart of the moral idea of treating other human beings as ends in themselves.

We end this section by noting the spiritual component of the extra-moral dimension of aesthetic education we are discussing. We have already noted how Crowther reminds us of the way aesthetic experience lifts us from drab day to day life, and thus provides spiritual edification. As Allison points out, weans "us from an excessive attachment to sensuous interests and egocentric involvements in the world" (2001, 219). However, this does not lead us an other-worldly realm. Rather, as Crowther says aesthetic experience "embodies and discloses fundamental truths about the human mode of inhering in the world" (1996, 110). It makes us feel *at home* in the world in spite of its demands of

sensuousness. Yet, aesthetic experience provides us with a sense of transcendence akin to religious feeling. This is very well brought out by Allan Lazaroff. Though he makes this point in connection with our experience of the sublime, it holds equally good about our experience of the beautiful.

The feeling of sublimity is basically an aesthetic feeling since, as we have seen. Such a feeling is one of pleasure. No doubt such a feeling of pleasure is inseparable from the feeling of awe verging on fear. Keeping this contradictory emotion associated with sublimity we have called it 'semi-pure aesthetic feeling' and the corresponding judgement a 'semi-pure aesthetic judgement' as distinct from experience of the beautiful which is a pure aesthetic experience and corresponding judgement is a pure aesthetic judgement. But the semi-pure aesthetic character of sublimity is still aesthetic. Thus, aesthetic element is the first element, according to Lazaroff, of Kant's idea of the sublime. The second element is the feeling of the numinous which is a religious feeling. As Lazaroff says "sublimity contains a unique element which is not aesthetic at all but religious … Though the judgement of the sublime has basic characteristics which are aesthetic, these converge with an equally basic feeling which is numinous" (1992, 367). Lazaroff has taken the term 'Numinous' from Rudolf Otto who invokes this term in his classic *The Idea of the Holly* to designate what he takes to be a non-rational feeling characteristic of religious experience. According to Lazaroff, Otto's 'numinous' is similar to the Kantian sublime in three respects: (a) both involve contradictory feelings of joy and dread which, however, are harmonized; (b) both draw us magnetically with the feeling of the ecstasy unlike a mere feeling of pleasure; and (c) a mysteriousness defying reason.

The above facts concerning the experience of the numinous and the sublime establish, according to Lazaroff, that the Kantian sublime is something more than aesthetic, as it incorporates the religious. The sublime in so far as it is akin to numinous and hence religious points outside or beyond, transcending the ordinary. Lazaroff makes an important point when he says "Kant did not recognize this numinous feeling as uniquely religious because his philosophy represents an extreme rationalization of the religious feeling" (*Ibid*, 368). Lazaroff, therefore, concludes that "Kant rationalized this numinous feeling by making its object the realm of morality" (*Ibid*, 372). In other words, Kant provides a rationalist interpretation to that aspect of the sublime which is akin to the religious and connects such an account to his idea of the moral which for him is inseparable from the rational nature of man. This points of Lazaroff facilitates our discussion of the relation between the aesthetic and the moral in the next section.

V.3 Moral Dimension of Aesthetic Education

The moral dimension constitutes the crux of Kan's philosophy of aesthetic education. This has contemporary relevance because in the present education system what is called 'value education' has nothing to do with aesthetic values since it is confined to ethical values. On the other hand, aesthetic education which usually confines itself to art appreciation has nothing to do with ethical value of art. The rupture between the ethical and the aesthetic makes our education, aesthetic or moral, inadequate and lopsided. It is here Kant has an important lesson by relating the aesthetic and the ethical. We discuss this theme in what follows. Since Kant considers the beautiful and the

sublime as two distinct aesthetic categories we discuss their relation to the moral separately.

V. 3. A: Beauty and Morality

Before we discuss the relation between beauty and morality in the Kantian aesthetic framework we must note that Kant attempted to avoid two extreme views regarding the relation between them. According to one extreme view morality, that is, moral rightness and beauty are inseparable from each other in the sense taste is the highest morality *and* nothing is more aesthetically satisfying that moral life. According to the other extreme view attributed, among others to Rousseau, morality and beauty are antithetical to each other in the sense those who are aesthetically inclined are liable to be morally corrupt. Kant, like the former, sees an affinity between beauty and morality but unlike the followers of the first view he does not see such an affinity as an inner one (*cf*, Allison 2001, 227). Similarly, he agrees with the second extreme view by accepting that the aesthetic and the ethical are non-equivalent. But he differs from it by rejecting the idea that the relation is antithetical. Though he was an admirer of Rousseau he undertook a project of connecting beauty and morality. Most importantly, he maintains that it is only natural beauty and not artistic beauty that is related to morality. Kant makes his position very clear when he says "I do maintain that to take an *immediate interest* in the beauty of *nature* … is always a mark of a good soul… [such an interest] is indicative of a temper of mind favorable to the moral feeling" (1952, §42, 157/298,299 AE). As we shall see, Kant could not confine the relation between the moral to natural beauty. However, what induced Kant to recognize the relation between natural beauty and the morally good is his

idea that both seek to undo the tendency in us which Kant calls 'radical evil'. In the case of ethical life the radical evil expresses itself in our strong inclination to prefer desire over duty. The radical evil expresses in the aesthetic domain in our tendency to destroy natural beauty. As Allison says, in Kant's view "the capacity to sympathize with the plight of others, is best characterized as a moral facilitator. Moreover … it is precisely because of humanity's inherent propensity to evil that such a facilitator is required" (2001, 234).

Any discussion of Kant's view regarding the organic link between beauty and morality must start with the consideration of his claim that beauty is the symbol of morality. Before doing so we may note the *a posteriori* concepts are exemplified whereas the (non-mathematical) *a priori* concepts called 'categories' by him in the first *Critique* can not be exemplified but can only be schematized. The ideas of reason can neither be exemplified nor schematized. As Körner says "They can, however, be indirectly represented by means of analogies, that is to say, they can be *symbolized"* (1955, 192). Kant has something akin to this in mind when he says that beauty is the symbol of morality. What does he mean?

First of all, Kant does not mean that the objects of aesthetic experience provide us the moral norms of conduct. The relation of beauty and morality is quite loose. This is the reason why he looks upon the relation as one of symbol and symbolized. This is in spite of the fact that both the morally right and the beautiful involve freedom, universality, immediacy and disinterestedness, though these might offer grounds for a symbolic relation between them. Kant gives some hint regarding the nature of the symbolic relation when he says, "the beautiful is the symbol of the morally good, and only in this light (a

point of view natural to every one, and one which every one exacts from others as a duty) does it give us pleasure with an attendant claim to the agreement of every one else, whereupon the mind becomes conscious of a certain ennoblement and elevation above mere sensibility to pleasure from impressions of sense" (1952, §59, 223-224/353 AE).

What does Kant means by 'symbol' and 'symbolization'? The symbol, according to Kant, is primarily an analogy that indicates agreement "merely in the form of reflection, and not in the content" (*Ibid*, §59, 222/351 AE). In this connection Kant gives example of monarchy symbolized as a living body and a despotic state symbolized as hand mill. However, it is difficult to see any analogy here. As Tauber points out, the symbolic relation involves analogous objects "A crucial problem may arise here: If the symbol, being determined by analogy, indicates a certain similarity between one object and another ... then the issue of similarity or analogy between them is unclear, as it were, for they are seemingly "entirely other" to one another" (2006, 25). Hence, we have to accept that Kant has to extend the scope of 'analogy' to include completely heterogeneous entities. This brings his concept of analogy in terms of which he explicates the symbolic relation very close to a metaphorical relation and many Kantian scholars have accepted this. Thus, "the essential difference between them lies, first and foremost, in the different ontological levels on which each one is actualized" (*Ibid*, 26). Greater the difference in ontological levels, higher the suggestive quality of a metaphor. This is the reason why 'nature' and 'selection' in the theory of evolution by natural selection, and 'nature' and 'machine' in the Cartesian theory which was so crucial for modern science proved to be metaphors of a fertile kind. The ontological distance between nature and moral life is what facilitates natural beauty in becoming a symbol of morality. In Rueger's words "Only if nature is such a different realm can we see a 'hint' or 'sign' in it concerning our

moral interest; and only if nature is sufficiently different, can we make aesthetic judgements that are more than merely subjective" (2007, 155). What Kant means when he affirms a symbolic/analogical relation between the beautiful and the moral is not that certain locutions are used in both the domains or certain locutions are used between the two domains interchangeably. Rather, it is that, "taste, experienced by an individual subject and applied (as a postulate) to all human beings, is analogically similar to the practical rule that is elevated to the level of a moral general law through the reason and will of an individual subject and is also applied to all humanity" (Tauber 2006, 29).

Thus, the relation between the aesthetic and the moral termed as symbolic by Kant is neither too intimate as to subsume one under the other, nor is it too distant to be connected with each other. The aesthetic and the ethical are akin to each other in the sense "Taste makes, as it were, the transition from the charm of sense to habitual moral interest possible without too violent a leap" (1952, §59, 225/354 AE). On the other hand it is also true that "the true propaedeutic for laying the foundations of taste is the development of moral ideas and the culture of the moral feeling" (Ibid, §60, 227/356 AE). In what follow we elaborate on these points.

From what is said above regarding the relation between beauty and morality it is clear that the symbolic relation is too lose to construe the relation to be one of formal analogy though it is analogical in a broad sense. Hence, it is inappropriate to consider that relation to be one of isomorphism, as does Allison (*cf*, 2001, 255), since isomorphism concerns a structural relation. After considering the symbolic relation between beauty and morality, Allison himself raises an important question: "how can the mere reflection on a sensible intuition, which *ex hypothesi* is not governed by a determinate concept, be

viewed as *formally* analogous to the explicitly rule-governed reflection on the corresponding intellectual object?" (*Ibid*, 256, emphasis added). As has been said, Allison's question is misplaced, unless the words 'formal' and 'formally' are used in an extremely loose sense. But his answer to this question is extremely significant in illuminating the nature of symbolic relation between beauty and morality as Kant conceives it. Central to Allison's answer is the notion of an aesthetic idea which Kant defines, as we have already seen, "representation of the imagination which induces much thought, yet without the possibility of any definite thought whatever, i.e. *concept*, being adequate to it" (1952, §49, 175-176/314 AE). Aesthetic ideas in this sense are different from ideas of reason or what Kant calls 'rational ideas'. Yet, like rational ideas, they are transcendental in the sense "that no concept can be wholly adequate to them as internal intuitions" (*Ibid*, §49, 176/314 AE). In simple terms, both rational and aesthetic ideas are not determinable by concepts of understanding. And in this sense they concerns the supersensible. It is obvious that among rational ideas Kant includes the moral law. It is here that Allison captures the essence of Kant's thought about beauty-morality relation when he says, "aesthetic ideas may serve as indirect exhibitions of their rational counterparts precisely because they necessarily involve a striving toward transcendence, either in the sense of endeavoring to depict something inherently supersensible or of attempting to approximate imaginatively the completeness or totality that is thought in the idea but not attainable in experience" (2001, 257). In fact, aesthetic ideas serve rational ideas by being substitutes for their 'logical exhibition'. Allison identifies this as the sense of Kant's calling aesthetic ideas as symbols of ideas of reason.

Now let us take Kant's central contention that "Beauty (whether it be of nature or of art) may in general be termed the *expression* of aesthetic ideas" (1952, §51, 183/320

AE). This means artistic beauty like natural beauty, expresses an idea and hence as much related to morality as natural beauty is. No doubt, unlike in the case of natural beauty "with beauty of art this idea must be excited through the medium of a concept of the Object" (*Ibid*, §51, 183-184/320 AE). But it must be noted that the concept of an object serves us as the medium of the expression of the aesthetic idea and does not at all determined the expression of the aesthetic idea. Of course, Kant does not consider all objects of artistic beauty to be symbolizing morality. For example those poems or painting which depict envy or ill will such as those objects of art which celebrated racial hatred in Nazi Germany. This qualification does not apply to objects of beauty in nature. The privileged position which natural beauty occupies in the Kantian scheme in this connection does not undermine the relation of artistic beauty to morality.

The relation of beauty with morality in the Kantian scheme as discussed above in no way entails that beauty or taste can be elevated to the status of an ingredient of morality. Nor is it a sufficient or necessary condition of a moral life. Experience of beauty is a preparation of morality. It initiates us into the experience of the supersensible as a first step towards a morally rich life. It is in this preparatory role that the significance of aesthetic education lies.

From the discussion till now it is obvious that the preparatory role of aesthetic education for a genuine moral life is promoted by the fact that judgements of the beautiful and the experience of the beautiful objects mark a shift from interest oriented and ego-centric life to the modes of engagement that call for freedom from interest and as well as trans-personal standpoint. The latter are the exemplified, though in different ways, by both aesthetic and moral aspects of our life. Genuine aesthetic education helps us in

discriminating between the mere charming and the beautiful and hence in discriminating between what pleases us and what constitutes our duty. Tauber brings out this point when he says "Aesthetic education, whose essence is an experience in view of an image of reality, following relatively unmediated instructions of "what and how" (rather than a mere intellectual comprehension following disciplinary instructions of "universal rules"), is supposed to develop a mental state within the "pupil"" (2006, 30). Kant's recognition of the way cultivation of taste for beauty enhances our moral sensitivity constitutes a "direct textual support for the argument that an implicit idea of aesthetic education exists in Kant's third *Critique*" (Kabeshkin 2011, 4).

V. 3. B: Sublimity and Morality

The theme of this section is significant because it deals with the bearing of Kant's idea of sublimity on aesthetic education. Aesthetic education has not accorded a significant place to sublimity. In fact, it does not even consider it to be an autonomous aesthetic category and hence sublimity has no place in present aesthetic pedagogy. Student, younger or adult, is not enabled to distinguish between the aesthetic categories of the beautiful and the sublime. For example, even elders fail to associate Niagara Falls with primarily the sublime and only secondarily with the beautiful. Kant's idea of sublimity is important for aesthetic education not only because he vouches for the autonomy of the sublime vis-à-vis the beautiful, but also because through that idea he reinforces the moral dimension of aesthetic education. In fact, according to Kant, sublimity stands in a more direct and intimate relation to morality than does the beautiful. Kant himself makes this point when he says that to present the morally good aesthetically

"we must represent it not so much as beautiful but rather as sublime, so that it will arouse more a feeling of respect (which disdains charm) than one of love and familiar affection" (quoted in Allison 2001, 341). In fact, John Zammito claims that "The sublime was added late and added precisely to establish a much more substantive relation between the aesthetic experience and the ethical one" (quoted in Kabeshkin 2011, 7, end note 24). Kant's contention that the difference in the degree of intimacy between the beautiful and the moral, on the one hand, and the sublime and the moral, on the other, is based on the way he identifies the distinction between the beautiful and the sublime -"the beautiful prepares us for loving something and the sublime for esteeming". Since morality involves both love (for those towards whom we act) and respect (for the moral law) both beauty and sublimity constitute the preparatory ground for moral life. Yet, we may act morally towards someone whom we do not know but we can not act morally without respecting the moral law. Therefore, the feeling of respect is more fundamental for moral feeling. Hence, greater intimacy between the sublime and the moral than the beautiful and the moral. Equally importantly, unlike the beautiful the sublime, as we have seen in chapter III, by the very act of overwhelming us makes us aware of our supersensuous nature and therefore the sublimity of our nature as rational beings and hence, of our noumenal status. Further, unlike the feeling of the beautiful, the feeling of the sublime resembles moral feeling in the sense that both the moral feeling and the feeling of the sublime involve contradictory feelings. As we have seen, the sublime pleases or attracts us, on the one hand, and intimidates us by creating a sense of awe. Similarly, the moral feeling produces in us a pain of guilt for inclining towards desires, even while obeying the moral law: after all, unlike holy beings, we face the moral law as an imperative, and this is in the reason we face conflict between desire and duty. Yet is creates a feeling of edification as a result

of our affirmation as rational beings by obeying it freely. Lazaroff brings out this point aptly when he says "The moral feeling, therefore, like the feeling of the sublime, is also a dual contradictory one, a negative feeling in regard to our sensible nature and a positive one in regard to our supersensible role" (1992, 364).

Yet, the feeling of the sublime, like the feeling of the beautiful is completely aesthetic. It is analogous to moral feeling and not either same as or constitutive of the moral feeling. That is why the respect that sublimity involves is entirely different from the respect associated with the moral law. The two kinds of respect are different "casually and phenomenologically" (Allison 2001, 341).

Though both the beautiful and the sublime provide the preparatory ground for moral life, how do the two modes of preparation differ? The difference in the preparatory function between the two is related by Allison to the two kinds of duties which Kant distinguishes. Beauty, that is natural beauty, is related to imperfect duties whereas the sublime is related to the perfect duties. Kant calls those duties imperfect which "require merely a sincere commitment to [morally required] ends, rather than the performance … of particular actions" (Allison 2001, 342). The failure to perform those actions may be due to serious obstacles created by nature or our inability to overcome our self-interest or social factors which render our actions futile. The perfect duties are those which involve refraining from certain actions like lying or breaking a promise or committing suicide. Hence, perfect duties are positive whereas imperfect duties are negative and hence the latter one easy to perform. Allison concludes that "the sublime is morally significant because it provides us with an aesthetic awareness of precisely what morality requires of us with respect to *all* duties, and of what is *sufficient* for the perfect duties that constitute

the veritable foundation of the moral life for Kant. Otherwise expressed, the sublime puts us in touch (albeit merely aesthetically) with our 'higher self'" (2001, 343).

Allison's effort to establish the preparatory role of the sublime in relation to moral life by invoking the concept of perfect duty may not convince everyone. This is because the relation between the concepts of perfect duty and the sublime is too tenuous to bear the weight of Allison's contention. However, Allison's move is not necessary to establish the distinction between the beautiful and the sublime as moral facilitators. That task can be accomplished in other ways which we have already noted.

The thrust of this chapter was to highlight those aspects of Kantian aesthetics which have bearing on a wholesome idea of aesthetic education, formal or informal. The fundamental point is that genuine aesthetic education has a significance that goes beyond a training in art appreciation. Aesthetic education, in so far as it is informed by Kantian ideas, enables us to comprehend what it is to be in the world as human beings *aesthetically* and how such as aesthetic involvement is inextricably related to cognitive and moral dimensions of human engagement with the world. Unless aesthetic education recognizes the possibility of acquiring cognitive, cultural, spiritual and moral dimensions it losses its human significance. Working out the idea of such an aesthetic education with its broad canvas that includes artistic beauty, natural beauty and sublimity with which nature dazzles us and its deep significance, moral and extra-moral, is what is bequeathed to us by Kant. No doubt, it is difficult to work out in all the pedagogic details on Kantian lines. But that does not matter. After all, Kant has given us in the form of his theory a set of regulative ideals between whom and our pedagogic practices these can not be a perfect much. After all, a theory can not have its mirror image in its application. The guiding

principles that broadly shape the formation of and nurture our aesthetic taste remain as the legacy of the parthbreaking work of Kant.

It is in the fitness of things to end this thesis with the words of Kant himself:

> The propaedeutic to all fine art [we may add natural beauty and sublimity] … appear to lie … in the culture of the mental powers produced by a sound preparatory education in what are called the *humaniora* – so called, presumably, because *humanity* signifies, on the one hand, the universal *feeling of sympathy*, and, on the other, the faculty of being able to *communicate* universally one's inmost self-properties constituting in conjunction the befitting *social spirit* of mankind, in contradistinction to the narrow life of the lower animals. (1952, §60, 226/355 AE).

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SUMMARY

Of the Ph.D thesis titled **Kantian Aesthetics: A Study of Beauty in Nature and Art** being submitted by *Ali Asghar Mollazehi* (*09HPPH08*), Research Scholar, Department of Philosophy, School of Humanities, University of Hyderabad in June 2012.

This doctoral thesis aims at a constructive and critical study of the central theses of the parthbreaking work of Immanuel Kant in the field of aesthetics. The significance of Kantian aesthetics lies in the fact that it makes a radical break with the past and also in the fact that in doing so it give such a new idiom to the subject that aesthetics can never be pre-Kantian. Further the Kantian aesthetics is an integral part of hic overall philosophical position called 'critical philosophy' which even today has a fundamental bearing on philosophical reflection all over the world.

Chapter I begins with a brief discussion of the nature, scope and significance of aesthetics in general and philosophy of art in particular. This is would be followed by highlighting the thoughts of the pre-Kantian philosophers – Plato, Aristotle and David Hume. The chapter ends with a discussion of what constitutes the significance of Kant's aesthetics.

Chapter II discusses in detail Kant's theory of aesthetic judgements in general and pure judgements of taste in particular. Its seeks to delineate to logical and epistemic features of Judgements about the beautiful as identified by Kant in his aesthetic framework.

Chapter III which deals with Kant's theory of beauty in detail and in particular the defining feature of pure aesthetic experience and different kinds of beauty. The chapter ends with Kant's identification of the distinction between beauty and sublimity.

Chapter IV focuses on Kant's theory of art with special reference to his conceptions of creativity and genius and the relation of art to other aspects of human life.

Chapter V deals with the bearing of Kant's aesthetic theory on aesthetic education. In doing so it brings out the cognitive, cultural, spiritual and moral dimensions which aesthetic education can acquire it its philosophical basis is informed by Kantian thought. The chapter ends with a brief discussion of the relation between moral experience and

experience of the sublime with a view to do justice to Kant's conviction that the sublime constitutes a genuine and independent aesthetic category. The aim of this chapter is to emphasize the point that Kant's aesthetic theory can not only stand on its own right due to its theoretical richness but also can have significant application in aesthetic pedagogy. Behind the rich and complex conceptual network which the Kantian aesthetics embodies, lies the *leit motif* that the philosophical engagement with the aesthetic domain should identify how our consciousness of the beautiful and the sublime is an important way of being in the world aesthetically and thereby realize our supersensuous dimension.

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