

**ROLE PERCEPTIONS AND PARTICIPATION OF
REPRESENTATIVES OF LEGISLATIVE BODIES IN INDIA
WITH SPECIAL FOCUS ON THE MEMBERS OF
ANDHRA PRADESH LEGISLATIVE ASSEMBLY**

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CERTIFICATE

Certified that this thesis is a bonafide work done by Miss V.S. Swarajya Lakshmi, a student of Ph.D. under my guidance and supervision during the academic years 1987-90 at the Department of Political Science, University of Hyderabad - 500 134 (India)

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DECLARATION

I hereby declare that the work presented in this Thesis has been carried out by me under the supervision of Dr.(Mrs) P.Manikyamba and that this has not been submitted for a degree of any other University.

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PREFACE

In the context of widespread misunderstanding of the functions and utility of Legislative bodies after World War II in the developed countries in general, and in the Third World countries in particular, it is very pertinent to analyse the factors influencing legislative behaviour and its outcome. The role of people's representatives in representative government is a topic of continuing relevance as the representative role of legislators has so much to do with the image of the legislature and its credibility as a representative institution, since the legislature is the pre-eminent forum through which people seek to articulate their urges, expectations and grievances through their representatives.

Studies on representation and representatives' participation occupy a prominent place in the understanding of modern political processes. A systemic study of these have gained importance in the period following behavioural revolution. Emphasis on such studies is also laid because of the growing importance given to an examination of Third World political systems most of which have adopted representative institutions of different nature. The utility of such studies becomes all the more important because they do require empirical and interdisciplinary approach for a meaningful analysis of the modern political systems.

Legislative behavioural studies in India are particularly relevant to comprehend the dynamics of Indian political process in the post - Independence era, where there is a general decline of people's **representatives'** '**statesman'** image. Research on Indian legislatures has so far been **mostly** institutional. Hence, the Indian situation provides wide scope for research in legislative behaviour, especially in the area of establishing relationship between role perceptions and **participation** of representatives. Studies of this type endeavour to examine the relationship between background, political socialisation and recruitment pattern, personality factor and role perceptions of representatives on the one hand, and the influence of these factors on their participation, both at **institutional** and constituency levels, on the other. These studies provide splendid opportunity to make a realistic assessment of representative roles. The present study deals with the role perceptions and participation of representatives of legislative bodies in India with special focus on the members of Andhra Pradesh Legislative Assembly. The following is a brief account of the contents of the thesis.

The first chapter deals with the content and nature of participation in the context of and the methodology adopted for the study. It also suggests an analytical frame for examining representatives' participation.

As is well known, there is no agreed view on the concept of representation and the definitions of representation changed over

a period of **time** as various political thinkers and political scientists considered it differently. Hence, an understanding of the emergence and evolution of this concept in different times would be useful. This aspect is discussed in chapter II.

An assessment of what is already done and what is to be done in a particular area of research would form a strong basis for empirical investigation. With this in view, available literature on legislative behaviour is reviewed and the major gaps in this area of research are identified in chapter III.

Political **representatives'** background - social, political and economic; **political socialization**; incentives, motivating factors; personality traits and political ambition levels will have a considerable impact on their perceptions and participation levels. Chapter IV is devoted for examining these factors in the present sample.

Individuals' actions are largely determined by their intentions, influenced by perceptions. An examination of the role perceptions of legislators would highly be useful in assessing the nature of role performance. The role perceptions of representative in the sample are studied in chapter V.

Representatives' intentionality to participate need not necessarily lead to actual participation as it depends also on various institutional - formal and informal, contextual and environmental factors. The opportunities that the representatives in the present sample have to participate in

legislative business and the extent of actual utilisation of them are discussed in chapter VI.

'Constituency - man' role is an important part of representatives' roles. In fact, more emphasis is laid in general on constituency service by the representatives of Third World systems than on institutional participation. Constituency service does have good and real impact on political future as well as reelection prospects of people's **representatives**. Chapter VII is devoted to study the constituency level participation and factors influencing it. This chapter also deals with the impact of background, role perceptions and participation on the immediate political future of the **representatives**.

In the concluding chapter, using the factor analysis interrelationships between various variables is evaluated. An attempt is also made to explain how the analytical frame suggested in the first chapter has been relevant to the present study.

At the appropriate places, the links between a) background and role perceptions b) perceptions and performance and c) background and participation are established with the help of cross - tabulations.

CHAPTER I

INTRODUCTION

Representation is very vital to the functions of legislatures and it provides the base for legislative behaviour. In the capacity of representatives, legislators participate in law-making and other legislative business and the represented generally accept legislative decisions as authoritative. As the elected representatives of the people, legislators provide **legitimacy** to the government.

The Concept Of Representation And Representative :

Traditionally, the concept of representation is referred mainly to the matters of law-making. The normative and classical theories of **representation** could not provide an adequate understanding of this concept which can be applicable to the dynamics of modern political systems and thus became '**obsolete**' in giving correct understanding about the relationship between representative and **represented**. Loewenberg pointed out that representation is an ill defined concept "that has acquired conflicting **meanings** through long use. It may be employed to denote any relationship between rulers and ruled or it may connote responsiveness, **authorization**, legitimation, or accountability. It may be used so broadly that any political institution performs representative functions or so narrowly that only an elected legislature can do so." ² In recent decades, the

concept of representation acquired a broader meaning, which includes many aspects and responses along with law-making functions.

It is difficult to define the term '**representative**' exactly as it includes many aspects. To Birch (1971), the term representative can be generally used in three broad ways - to denote an agent or spokesman who acts on behalf of his principal, to indicate that a person shares some of the characteristics of a class of persons or to signify that a person symbolises the identity or quality of a class of persons. Arguing that none of these usages can provide a complete picture of representative, Birch defines political representative as a person who, by custom or law, has the status or role of a representative within a political system. Pitkin (1967), who did an extensive theoretical study in this area, considered representation as an activity and emphasised that a political representative must exercise independent judgement and explain to the constituency on any conflict between its wishes and the **representatives'** perception of its wishes. ⁴

Representation And Participation:

The concepts of **representation** and **participation** are intrinsically related to the modern form of representative government and inseparably linked to the terminology of political development. Modern developmental theories presumed participatory citizenry as a prerequisite for and a measure of development of a particular political system. Political

participation of the citizens is wide ranging starting **from** voting to holding public office. Participation is the primary device through which consent is granted or withdrawn in a **democracy** and rulers are made accountable and responsible to the ruled.

Political participation can be viewed from two perspectives - narrow and broad. Political Scientists like Almond and Verba (1972) have referred political participation to those legal activities by private citizens that are **more** or less directly aimed at influencing the selection of governmental personnel and the actions they take. Their conception of political participation does not include ceremonial or support participation and their main concern is with the regular and legal ways of influencing **politics**.

Milbrath and **Goel**(1977) defined political participation as those activities of private citizens by which they seek to influence or support government and **politics**. This can be considered to have broader implications as it includes not only active roles that people follow in order to influence the political process and its outcomes but also symbolic and support activities.

Citizens can participate at various levels in political activities. As observed by Woodward and Roper (1956), political activity of citizens includes (i) voting at polls, (ii) supporting possible pressure groups by being a member of them (iii) personally communicating directly with legislators,

(iv)participating in political party activity and (v)engaging in habitual dissemination of political opinions through word to mouth communication to other citizens. ⁷ Roth and Wilson (1980) provide a hierarchy of political participation where holding political or administrative office is at the apex and total apathy at the bottom. Participating in voting, taking general interest in politics, participating in informal political discussion, in public meetings, demonstrations etc., being active or passive member of a quasi-political organisation, and seeking political or administrative office ranges between the apex and bottom of the hierarchy of political activity to them .

It is very essential to note that a successful representative democracy depends on active participatory citizenry and more importantly on participation of political representatives. One of the major lacuna in classical doctrine of democracy is its over-emphasis on the rationality of participatory citizens. A prominent critic of classical democratic theories, Schumpeter (1962) argued that the conception of democracy involves the free choice of leaders to do the governing and not the free participation of citizens in the policy making process. He further observed that the success or failure of a democracy depends, by and large, on the quality of its leadership, not upon the rationality of its ordinary citizens.

In the present century, political leadership which includes political representatives has acquired wide significance and is

given broad connotation. Paige (1977) defined political leadership as the behaviour of persons in positions of political authority at different levels-top, intermediate and lower levels, their competitors and the interaction of these leaders and competitors with other members of society. Leadership exists not only in institutions (eg. party, legislature or bureaucracy) but also in processes (eg. policy decisions, election, or revolution).¹⁰ It may even cut across all of them .

Recent studies on leadership gave importance to situational, contextual, and behavioural aspects of the process of interaction between the leaders and the followers. To Tucker (1981) politics is itself leadership, rather than simply the exercise of power and pointed out that democratic government entails primarily the institutionalised possibility of active public participation and also the possibility of defining problem situations for the political community .¹¹ Gibb (1968) identified four basic elements in the relationship between the leader and the followers. (1) the 'leader', with his characteristics of ability and personality and his resources relevant to goal attainment , (2) the '**followers**' who also have relevant abilities, personality characteristics and resources, (3) the 'situation' within which the relationship occurs and (4) the '**task**' with which the interacting individuals are **confronted**.¹²

Taking rightly legislators as leaders, Burns (1978) argued that individual legislators have to face several constraints from local constituency forces, party pressures and organised interests in their constituencies and said that "whether party

leaders are world famous personalities or obscure local committee members, their political vocation is to recognise the wants and needs of present and potential constituencies, to arouse and intensity expectations, to enlist more persons in the party cause, to win elections and then mobilise the party influence within and outside government to satisfy rising demands, thereby winning more elections and remaining in office" . ¹³ He further observed that the degree to which individual legislators actually realize their potential for legislative leadership depends on four important factors.

- 1) Conflict situation in which they act, in their constituency and in the legislature;
- 2) the roles they assume in the face of varied claims, demands, and expectations;
- 3) the values they hold and the goals derived from them; and
- 4) the extent to which they can manipulate conflict situations and roles to obtain legislation or other **parliamentary** action that helps to realise their **goals**.

In order to comprehend the dynamics of modern representative government, it is useful to examine representative's participation inside and outside the political institution, as the level of **representatives'** participation in law-making and other aspects of legislative business is one of the major factors determining the developmental level of a political system.

In the present context, the term representative refers to those people who are elected directly or indirectly or nominated

to the legislature due to their distinguishing contribution to various fields of science and arts. Participation, here, refers to those **legitimate** activities of these representatives inside and outside the legislature in their capacity as **peoples'** representatives. Representatives can participate both in conventional and unconventional ways.

Within the House, representatives will participate in discussion on legislation, **matters** of urgent public importance and on the merits and demerits of various governmental policies. Moving resolutions, decision - making and in the follow - up action, protesting against irregularities in transacting legislative business and resorting to walk-outs from the House which are considered as unconventional modes of participation, also form part of **representatives'** participation. Heading protest demonstrations outside the legislature can be considered as forms of unconventional participation only in a conservative sense.

Objectives Of Research:

The present study proposes to analyse **representatives'** participation at the institutional and constituency levels. The chief aims are:

- 1) examining the quantity and quality of institutional and constituency level participation of the sampled members of the Eight Legislative Assembly of Andhra Pradesh;
- 2) finding and analysing the personal, contextual and institutional factors that are contributing to or hindering participation levels of respondents;

- 3) linking participation levels of the representatives with their background and perceptions ; and
- 4) establishing relationship between participation and its **outcome**, especially the impact of participation on the **political** future of representatives.
- 5) Last and the most important objective of the research is to develop an analytical frame for comprehending representatives participation , which can be applicable to **representatives'** participation in any political system.

Research Methdology:

The methodology adopted for any study will go a long way in making the study objective. The research is not confined to mere **institutional** and descriptive approaches. It makes use of empirical and analytical methods to make the study meaningful. It ^aende_Xours to adopt inter-disciplinary approach which includes sociological, psychological and statistical approaches.

Research Site:

The Eighth Legislative Assembly of Andhra Pradesh (1985-1989) serves as the research site for the study. The main consideration for selecting this site is that this state Assembly provides an opportunity to study a phenomenon where most of the members are new comers to politics and are guided by a strong charismatic leader Mr. N.T.Rama Rao, who started a regional party (Telugu **Desam** Party) in 1982, and who successfully came to power as the chief Minister after winning two general elections in the state in 1983 and in 1985. Another reason for the selection of

this site is that there are no empirical studies about legislative behaviour with particular **emphasis** on **representatives'** participation in Andhra Pradesh. Hence this offers a promising area for research.

Finally, as the Indian states are re-organised on linguistic basis and the researcher belongs to the state of Andhra Pradesh, it is felt that it would help the researcher to easily communicate and establish good rapport with the respondents, which is so essential for behavioural research studies.

Sample:

The significance of any research depends on the representativeness of the sample studied. To get a reliable representative sample, members of the Eighth Andhra Pradesh Legislative Assembly are divided into sub groups on the basis of their membership in political parties. It is understood from the Pilot interviews that members of the political parties, more or less behave as homogenous groups. A purposive sample of 110 out of 295 **MLAs** is selected.

The number of respondents selected from the ruling party is nearly proportionate to its strength in the House. Respondents selected from the opposition and independents are slightly more than that of their proportion to the total membership. This is done with the expectation that from a TDP dominated House, more useful information could be obtained if the proportion of

respondents from the opposition and independents is more than that of the ruling party.

All the women representatives in the sample with a single exception are from the ruling party. Six out of 11 women representatives in the House are included in the sample with the chief objective of examining gender difference in role expectation and performance.

Four of the six independent members are selected as respondents. The purpose is to examine the nature of perception of members functioning on non-party lines.

It is important to mention that the sample does not include Ministers. It is also to be mentioned that only 8 respondents in the sample have held either party leadership or legislative leadership position.

Research Tools:

The empirical tool of conducting interviews with the help of structured schedule is adopted. The interview schedule is so designed that information relating to socio-economic and political background, personality traits, value orientations and role perceptions of the respondents regarding institutional participation and the constituency service could be obtained.

A majority of the respondents responded in a friendly way and some interviews have extended upto 2 to 2 1/2 hours. As observed by Johnson and Joslyn (1987), interviewing elite is a difficult task and interviewees may give evasive or untruthful

answers. The validity of an interviewee's statement can also be determined by explaining their plausibility, checking for internal consistency, and through corroboration from other interviewees. ¹⁵ The interview schedule is utilised as the major guide line. The representatives' residences and the Assembly premises are the places where the interviews have been conducted. Whenever it is felt that the responses have not been genuine and that the figures given by the respondents are inflated and incoherent, especially in matters relating to income and the number of constituents the respondents meet, the researcher has resorted to probing.

The debates of Eighth Legislative Assembly of Andhra Pradesh provide a very useful source of data to analyse institutional participation of representatives. Information supplied by the Legislature Secretariat Staff has been extremely useful in comprehending the dynamics of institutional participation, especially in some modes of participation such as participation in committee proceedings which are confidential.

To get first hand information regarding institutional participation and to assess the role of informal rules of game which determine, to a considerable extent, representatives' institutional participation levels, the method of direct observation of the proceedings of the Assembly sessions is also undertaken for a number of days.

Data Analysis:

To measure the quantity of the **respondents'** participation - the number of sessions participated, various types of questions asked in the Question-Hour, number of subjects discussed, number of call attention notices and adjournment motions raised to bring matters of public importance to the notice of the House, number of Bills discussed, number of Budget speeches made on the floor of the House by each of the respondents have been tabulated. The party-wise variation among the respondents in participating in various stages of transacting legislative business is noted. To analyse the quality of their participation, **areal** and party linkages of their participation in different forms of legislative process are studied.

The quantity of representatives constituency level participation is measured on the basis of their average number of trips to various parts of their constituency and the number of constituents they meet in a month and the average amount of time they allocate for constituency **matters**. The quality of such participation mainly depends on the nature of demands on the representatives, the **representatives'** ability, the methods used in solving constituents' problems, and the type of relationship they maintain with bureaucracy, ministers and other politicians.

To examine the links between the background, personality traits, ambition levels, perception and participation levels of the representatives, numerous cross-tabulations are made. **Cross** tabulations, as is well known, are beneficial means of analysis.

Factor Analysis:

To establish accurate linkages between background, perceptions and participation, the factor analysis - a very significant statistical tool for social science research, has been made use of. Factor analysis is a technique for analysing **the inter-relationships** among variables. The goal is to reduce a large number of variables to a manageable number by grouping related variables into single factors. Related variables are highly correlated variables that describe a single underlying concept or factor .

Factor analysis is based on the assumption that there are a number of general causal factors which give rise to various relationships between the variables under examination. The number of general causal factors will on the whole be considerably smaller than the number of **relationships**. As pointed out by Schilderinek (1970), "factor analysis is the attempt, based on statistical observation, to determine the qualitative relationships between variables where the relationships are due to separate conditioning factors or general **.causal** factors. By a relationship is meant a certain pattern of motion between two or more of variable under examination. Such a pattern of motion is expressed in **co-efficients** or percentages which indicate to what extent the variance of the variables in question are influenced by a certain general causal **factor**". ¹⁶

The factor analysis model expresses each variable as a function of factors common to several variables and a factor

unique **to** that variable. This analysis has the strength of exposing the order, structure and relationships between variables and extracts shared variations **among** the large, original set of variables as **a** way of **determining** a smaller set of factors. 17

The impact of participation on the political future of the representatives is studied by taking into consideration whether the representatives contested again in the immediate general election and got elected or not.


Representatives' Participation : An Analytical Frame

A systematic approach is an essential prerequisite for the scientific study of representative participation and evolving well designed model useful for conducting empirical investigation becomes an integral part of studies concerning representative behaviour. In the following paragraphs, an attempt is made to detail the approaches adopted so far for analysing **representatives'** behaviour and to suggest an analytical frame to understand the dynamics of **representatives'** participation.

Contemporary approaches in studying legislative behaviour can broadly be divided into three categories - individualistic, group and institutional.

The **individualistic** approaches mainly focusses on the capabilities of individual legislators to think and act deliberately on the basis of rationality. Thinkers like Edmund Burke and Utilitarians like James Mill and **Bentham** considered that an individual legislator is capable of discerning what is

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intensity and duration of such action. Though it is difficult to empirically measure the duration of such action, it is possible to **some** extent to study the intention and intensity of political **action.**The above discussion makes it clear that there is every need to evolve a new model for a realistic assessment of **representatives'** participation.

The analytical frame and its model and its details are given hereunder. Political representatives can participate in a political system mainly at two levels - one at the institutional level and the other at the level of the constituency. As law makers, legislators can actively participate in law-making and **law** effecting activities of legislature. Through institut i **onal** participation, representatives can highlight constituency and state level problems for appropriate governmental action and can act as a check against executive arbitrariness to protect the rights and liberties of the public.

Information from constituents, interest **groups** and mass media help representatives in institutional participation and through institutional participation, representatives elicit data **from** the Ministers and governmental departments which in turn provide useful information for interest groups, constituents and mass media. Thus the link factor in the role of representative is visible.

At the constituency level, representatives are supposed to be responsive to the constituency needs by rendering service to individual constituents and groups, particular communities and to

the development of the constituency as a whole. By means of interaction with constituents, representatives act as **a** very significant bridge between **the** people and political **party** on one hand and people and government on the other. This they do by explaining their party's ideology and governmental activities **and** policies to the constituents and by making government aware of **peoples'** problems.

Representatives' constituency service and their responsiveness to constituents' demands will enhance their support structure as the constituency service is more conspicuous than institutional participation in all political systems and **more significantly** in the Third World and communist systems where law making activities of legislators are limited. Support of legislators will in turn lead to support of the legislature in general, which establishes legitimacy of the political regime. The more successful a representative is in handling constituency demands, the more popular he is in building and sustaining the support structure. Through constituency service, representatives can be responsive, symbolic, allocative and service oriented, which can make their political future more secure.

Institutional and constituency level participation of representatives are not contradictory but complementary to each other. **In** different institutional and contextual settings, representatives tend to place different emphasis on these levels of participation as the intentionality to participate at these levels, largely depends on the structural factors of legislature

which include factors like **form** of government and the number of the Houses in legislature and committees.

Functional aspects or dynamics of working of legislature such as number of sessions held in a year and the number of days per each session and time available for individual legislator to participate in legislative business will influence representatives' participation level.

Institutional participation of **representatives'** further depends on informal rules of institution or 'folk ways' (Matthews, 1960) which include role of political party, party discipline, impact of seniority and the Speakers' discretionary powers. If the informal rules allow them to make the best use of the given opportunities, there is greater possibility of actively participating in the House. Structural facilities have to be coupled with functional dynamics by frequent and long sessions of legislature and equitable distribution of time to the ruling and Opposition party members for high level institutional participation.

Structural opportunities and functional dynamics by themselves may not necessarily lead to active **institutional** participation. Many other factors like pattern of political recruitment, political socialisation and socio-economic and political background, nature of political environment will also play a decisive role on representatives' active participation both at institutional and constituency levels. Groups influencing **representatives'** initial decision to enter political

arena, major source of electoral funding, various stages involved in political **recruitment** and impact of political party and other social agents and personal good will in securing election are some important factors in political socialisation and recruitment process of political representatives.

Environmental factors such as political culture, the primacy of political institutions in comparison with other institutions, the position of legislature and the status a legislator enjoys in social system, nature of social **stratification**, role of organised and unorganised interest groups, caste, communalism, regionalism and nature of constituencies - rural or urban, will have definite bearing on **representatives'** intentionality of participation and on the actual participation levels.

Structural, functional, and environmental factors will differ in different political systems. Representatives of the same political party will also differ from one another as they are influenced by various factors. Differences in their background, personality traits, psychological compulsions, motivating factors, incentives and political ambition levels are some of the important reasons for varied performance.

Study of personality traits of representatives is useful to comprehend their world-view, attitudes and orientations regarding various social, political issues. Their conception about need for affiliation, achievement and power act as motivating forces. Their political ambition levels, social, psychological and economic incentives, the image they want to project and the

inward psychological urges will, to some extent, determine their role perceptions and behaviour.

The social position based on family background, caste membership, religion and community background, political exposure and political experience at various political institutions, economic position which includes money power are **major** pre-requisites for entering politics and contesting for elections, particularly in those political systems where state election funding is not present and where representatives have to depend on personal assets. In political systems where help from primary and secondary groups, caste and community for electoral funding and success are important, representatives have to confront mainly with personal and group demands for which they choose various methods including **participation** at institutional and constituency levels.

Studies in different political systems, western, communist and Third World, reveal that representatives of western countries tend to identify law-making as purposive role while those of Third World countries are mainly **constituencymen**. This makes it clear that institutional factors will determine purposive role perceptions of representatives to a large extent. Educational levels and political experience of representatives and internal locus of control will help them to identify trustee role in representational role perception. In political systems with strong political parties and party oriented politics, political parties will be the major determinant of **representatives'**

political behaviour and representatives show **themselves** to be partisans. Members from rural constituencies prefer to be delegates of people. Nature of constituency, level of constituency development, and presence of organised group interest influences on these members in determining their behaviour within the House.

Representatives' community background, membership in social organisations, activities in cultural associations and their electoral links with various groups inside and outside the constituencies, to a large extent, determine their interest group role perception. Membership in the ruling and opposition parties will have a definite bearing on their partisan and watchdog role perceptions. Moreover, representatives will be more inclined to participate actively at both the institutional and constituency levels if they think that their participation will be very useful for their political career and will yield future benefits. Thus, participatory role of representatives will influence , to a considerable extent, **intentionality** and actual participation level of representatives.

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CHAPTER II

CONCEPT OF REPRESENTATION : EMERGENCE AND EVOLUTION

The concept of representation is used by different writers in various ways and it has been developed more by politicians and propagandists than by political scientists. The concept of representation is vital to the modern representative democracies, where the represented want themselves to be represented while the representatives claim to represent those who elect them. Representative government is commonly identified with democracy, particularly with indirect or representative form of government. On the basis of this concept representatives participate in law-making and in other legislative processes and the represented accept those legislative decisions as authoritative and legitimate.

The word '**representation**' has come into the English language through French derivatives from the Latin word 'representare' which means literally to bring before one, to bring back, to exhibit, to show, to manifest, to display.¹ In classical Latin, it was not a political term but it was primarily applied to concrete objects. Its usage in classical Latin is confined almost entirely to inanimate objects.²

The origins of the concept of representation can be traced back to ancient times. The ancient Greeks elected some officials and sometimes sent ambassadors, involving in those activities which include acts of present conception of representation, though they did not have a corresponding word to representation.

The Romans **had the** word 'representare' **from** which the present word '**representation**' is derived. But they used it to **mean** the literal bringing into presence of something previously absent or the embodiment of an abstraction in an object. They did not apply it to human beings acting for others, or to their political **institutions.**³

Representation as a concept may be understood as the making present again, of some entity whether personal or abstract. Representation, in the sense of human being representing other human being is particularly a modern conception. This development could be seen mainly from the 14th century. This is clear from a detailed linguistic study made by Pitkin. To her, probably late in the fourteenth century, the Oxford English Dictionary used the word 'represent' to mean to bring oneself or another into the presence of some one, to symbolize or embody concretely, to bring before the mind; whereas the adjective 'representative' means 'serving to represent, figure, portray or symbolize. During the fifteenth century, the concept of representation expanded to mean also to portray, depict or delienate. It came to be applied to inanimate objects which stand in the place of or correspond to some thing or some one. At the same time the noun '**representation**' appears to mean image, likeness or picture. Human beings are not entirely absent from these early usages, they appear in these usages primarily in two ways. On the one hand, **representation** was meant as an inanimate object or image standing for a human being, on the other, it was used to represent a human activity of presenting, of depicting,

of painting a picture or staging a play, though not as an activity of acting for others.⁴

Till the 16th century, there are no illustrations of the usage of the concept of representation in **political** sense, atleast in the record **of the** Oxford Dictionary. It was during **this time that it** had **come** to mean to take or fill the place of another in some capacity or for some purpose, to be **a** substitute in some capacity for another person or body, to act for another by deputed right.⁵

The concept of representation is widely used in modern age mainly due to its linkages with other modern concepts like democracy, liberty and equality. In a historical perspective, it could be seen that representative government in itself need not and does not necessarily be republican or democratic government. Though the fathers of the American constitution believed in representative and republican government, they feared the populace as the original sin. One of the fundamental purposes in shaping the form of federal government was to break the force of majority rule at the source in election and in the operation of the government itself.

Representative government, as noted earlier, is commonly identified with democracy, particularly with the indirect democracy though the origins of the two cannot be traced to the same time and though the development of these **two** concepts took place in different contexts. And even though the concept of representation in modern times is intrinsically related to

democratic form of government, historically this concept was often disassociated from democratic notion. A representative body may speak for a narrow class, for about hundreds of years as the British Parliament did. Some of the medieval writers looked upon the absolute monarch as representing the community. To John of Salisbury, the Prince is the representative of the community and owing to his representative character, the acts of the prince are to be deemed as acts of the community, though he is not responsible to the commonwealth for what he does.

Thus, an understanding of the varied meanings given to the word 'representation' till the 16th century helps one to realise that the philosophy of representative government as it is referred to in modern times was unknown to and unfamiliar to the ancient political thinkers but was faintly foreseen by the thinkers of the Middle Ages. As observed by Beard and Lewis (1967), during the thousands of years which we call antiquity, monarchies, despotisms, dictatorships, tyrannies, democracies and aristocracies, with numerous variants arose, flourished and fell; but no where and at no time did representative institution appear, atleast on any impressive scale.⁷

The Concept Of Representation In Ancient Political Thought:

The notion of representation is implicit in almost all political theories dealing with the relationship between the ruler and the ruled. The concept of representation envisaged in ancient Indian, Greek and Roman Political thought is detailed below.

Indian Political Thought:

In ancient India, society was divided hierarchically on the basis of '**chaturvarna**' with the priests or brahmins and the kings or kshatriyas occupied the higher two positions. The existence of autonomous oligarchic city-state is recorded in the earliest Hindu tradition and in contrast to other oriental political systems, the Hindu states were not **theocratic**.⁸ Religious norms and principles did not come in the way of political authority. The offices of the king and the priest were not contradictory but complementary to each other.

In the Hindu political thought, king was not considered as an absolute monarch and the Indian conception of monarchical authority differed from that of European feudalism, where the king had authority over all persons and things in his domain. In India, the king just had the right to collect taxes, such as land revenue. Though authority was personified in the ruler of the state, the ruler as a person was subject to restraints and was liable to punishment as any other individual was, thus giving only limited powers to the kings with a system of proper checks and **balances**. Ancient Hindu thought considered the power of public as greater than that of the king and approved popular revolts against tyrannical emperors.

Kingship, which was originally elective, became hereditary according to the rule of primogeniture. With few exceptions, women are generally excluded from this succession.¹⁰ In ancient Indian society, the ruler was known as '**Praja Pratinidhi**' meaning

peoples' representative. It is clear that the concept of representation is used since ancient times though the nature of functions associated with representatives differed from **time** to time for so many centuries . Till the British rule got entrenched in Indian soil, the elite structure of Indian society remained '**authoritarian**, monarchical, feudal and charismatic'.¹¹ Thus, ancient and medieval Indian society and thought envisaged a monarchical system where the king ought to pay heed to public opinion and show proper respect to the rights and liberties of the self-governed village **communities**.

Ancient Greek Political Thought:

The Greeks and the Romans conducted public business through representative institutions, but their political theories could not provide adequate understanding of **representation** as an instrument of power. To some recent political scientists, in the Greek Political thought, which served as an ideology of defence of master-slave system, predominant by Plato's time, the concept of representation could not be **accomodated** in a teleological system of **thought**.¹² The Greeks conceived of small city-states in which all citizens could assemble at one place and participate in its activities.

The ancient Greek conception of law was different from that of modern view point. They did not consider laws as deliberate creation of a legislature. They considered nature as the source of laws and human reason as the means through which nature's wishes could be discovered. The function of the state was

generally believed to be the application rather than the creation of law.¹³ Plato's political thought was **mainly** concerned about the characteristics and education of a **philosopher-king**. He felt that the **philosopher-king** need not follow any laws or regulations as he can act by virtue of his **wisdom**. He argued , " laws by their very definition are general rules, their generality at once their essence and their main defect, because generality implies an average, and such rules can never meet exceptions that are always arising, as can be unfettered discretion of an all-wise ruler".¹⁴

Jellinek, while claiming that Greek magistrates were regarded as representatives in the execution of policies adopted by popular assemblies, holds that the Greeks had no notion of representation as applied to the creation of legislative assemblies.

Aristotle, the father of Political Science, described the state as rational and necessary institution where individual could find his fullest expression. Since the end of the state is to promote good life, he held that the greater share of authority should be exercised by those who contribute most to the state. He believed that **propertied-classes** should play a large role in the government and through their assembly, citizens should pass upon fundamental questions, choose the magistrates and hold them to account for their official action.

As observed by Gewirth, to Aristotle, "the legislator or the primary and proper cause of the law, is the people or the whole

body of citizens, or the weightier part thereof, through its election or '**will**' expressed by words in the general **assembly** of citizens, **commanding** or determining that something be done or omitted with regard to human civil acts, under temporal pain or punishment. The aforesaid whole body of citizens or the weightier part thereof is the legislator regardless of whether it makes the law directly by itself or entrusts the making of it to some person or persons who are not and cannot be the legislator in the absolute sense, but only in a relative sense and for a particular time and in accordance with the authority of the primary legislator".¹⁶ Thus, Aristotle considered legislator as primarily a law-maker whose law-making functions include passing of new legislation and repealing of unnecessary laws. In saying that the legislator is the people, or the whole body of citizens or the weightier part thereof, he did not specify about who is a legislator. A reference to elected representatives could also be noted in this context. Law-making function, according to Aristotle, could be exercised directly by the legislators or could be delegated to some person or persons who exercise the law-making power on behalf of the legislator. Thus the persons to whom this function is entrusted are not the legislator in the absolute sense. But they became legislators only in a relative sense as they function only as agents. This gives an idea of representative as delegate and representation as an instrument limiting the power of the ruler.

Though Aristotle does refer to the fact that democracies, such as those that existed at **Mantineia**, did exercise the power of

elected magistrates and thus acted "through representatives elected in turn out of the whole people".¹⁷ He is mainly concerned about direct democracy in small city-states rather than representative democracy, as it exists in large nation -states.

Ancient Roman Thought:

Like ancient Greeks, the Romans favoured a more democratic form of government. Their conception of state lies between the organic theory of state, where state fully includes the individual, and Epicurian conception, which considered state as a non-essential institution, giving the highest place to individual freedom. The Roman thought conceived state as a natural institution, allowing the possibility of creating laws, where new laws were enacted in the form of an agreement between the magistrates and the people in their assemblies.

Polybius and Cicero favoured a mixed type of government with appropriate checks and balances. Polybius adopted the Greek **classification** of government into monarchy, aristocracy and democracy but believed that for order and stability, it is essential to combine the better elements of all these forms. Accordingly in the Roman constitution, the consuls represented the monarchic principle, the senate was essentially aristocratic and the popular assemblies were democratic. He also envisaged an elaborate structure of checks and balances, so that no single branch of government becomes dominant to ignore the opinion of others. Polybius speaks of the responsibility of the consuls to the senate and to the people, and of the responsibility of the

senate and tribunes to the **people**. But he does not look upon the **Roman** officers of state as peoples' representatives. He does not also consider the actual **composition** of the Roman senate as representative in any modern sense.

Thus though it would not be correct to say that representatives were utterly foreign to Greek and Roman politics and thought as observed by Beard and Lewis (1967), practical illustrations of it were few and these few could be considered as exceptions rather than rule and in all these cases, modern legislative bodies have no historical connections with Greek and Roman representative agencies.

Medieval Thought:

It is difficult to find the notion of popular representation in early medieval thought which was dominated by religion. With the starting of the Holy Roman Empire in the 10th century. Thinkers like **St. Augustine** and John of Salisbury developed an edifice of an ideal system of government on the basis of the necessary subordination of the secular to the religious authority.

The unquestionable moral authority of papacy over the secular political authority found its expression in the writings of **St. Thomas** Aquinas. Despite his respect for reason, he believed that the highest truths could be conceived only through faith and accordingly he empowered the church, the final authority on matters of belief and predominance over any secular

power or reason. To him, it was the duty of the political ruler to administer secular affairs in such a way as to function God's will and to this extent the officials of the state must be subject to the priests and to the divine law of the church.²⁰

Throughout the Middle Ages, there seem to be two views about the origins of political authority - descending and ascending theories of authority which were to some extent, pertinent to the problem of representation. According to the descending theory, the authority of some men over others could only be regarded as rightful if it were divinely sanctioned. **St. Thomas Aquinas**, the major exponent of this thought, conceived of representation in hierarchical terms with unlimited powers based on '**universalistic**, sacerdotal and traditional outlook of **society**'. The King or Prince represented in his person the realm of the whole secular sphere, just as the pope impersonated the whole Christendom, thus making representational theory as a theory of **personification**.²² But this holistic theory of **personification** of representation could not contain the emerging group conflicts within the society, during the period and gave way for secular and constitutional government.

The ascending theory of political authority developed during the later medieval period, the chief exponent being Marsilio of Padua who considered that authority originated with the people and was delegated by them to the rulers. Marsilio of Padua made a clear distinction between the ultimate source of sovereignty in the state which he located in the people and the form of government chosen to execute the laws. He preferred an elective

monarch for this purpose whose duty was to interpret and administer law rather than making it. The monarch, in his view, was just a delegate of the people who acts on behalf of his people in upholding their laws. He subordinated the church to state though he does not intend to build an egalitarian society in any modern sense. He felt the need for secular state in the sense of need for the separation of state from the authority of the church.²³ This secular line of thought found its fullest expression in the writings of Machiavelli, who completely freed the state from the clutches of religion.

Maude Clarke, in her study of the origins of representation in the Middle Ages, found that different kinds of representation such as personification and specific acts, undertaken for reasons of administrative convenience and political action bearing directly upon public laws could be seen in this period.

The concept of representation of classes emerged in medieval Europe as a device of administrative convenience, where the king summoned the parliament for the purpose of levying taxes. Beard and Lewis (1967) traced four principal stages in the development of representative government in England. The first parliaments were called by monarchs primarily for the purpose of voting taxes for the royal treasury and represented the estates of the realm, mainly two estates-land and commerce. In the second stage, the tax-voting body became a law-making body where the members of parliaments began to list their protests in the form of petitions to the king for redressal. If the king approved a petition, then

it became a law, binding on his officers and subjects. The third stage was reached by a gradual process culminating in the revolution of the seventeenth century, when the king was substantially deprived of law-making and tax-voting powers, and his civil and military administration was confined within the limits laid down in constitutional measures. During the final stage, under the influence of the French Revolution and American Revolution which declared all men were equal and that each one was entitled to an equal share in governing and with the gradual extension of the suffrage, the modern concept of representative government finally emerged. To Beard and Lewis, this extraordinary outcome, entirely unforeseen by the founders of representative institution, was largely evolved from a movement of economic, intellectual and educational forces outside the sphere of legislation and administration.²⁵

Theories Of Contractualists:

At the beginning of the modern age, the Social Contractualists namely Hobbes, Locke and Rousseau asserted that state was not a divine creation and that political authority is something which has been conferred on the government by the people. Thus, they made people the source of power. Their emphasis on the problems of political authority and obligation regarding the formation and legitimisation of the state led each of them refer to the concept of representation.

Thomas Hobbes propounded an unilateral contract where the people, out of fear of anarchy in the state of nature entered

into a contract which produced a 'Leviathan' who is not a part of the contract but only the result or outcome of it. Hobbes' analysis of representation proceeds from the notion of a person to distinguish between natural and artificial persons. He concludes that a representative is a kind of artificial person. To him "a multitude of men, are made one person, when they are by one man, or one person, represented, so that it be done with the consent of every one of the multitude in particular".²⁶ He defined representative as an agent who has the right or authority to make the represented obliged to whatever actions or policies that the representative thinks appropriate. Thus, the authorization given to the sovereign is unlimited as each man who contracts "authorizes all the actions and judgements of the

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representative" as if they were his own". The state of nature led Hobbes defend political absolutism and to try to convince people that they are morally obliged to obey the orders of the 'Leviathan' whom he called as their representative. Hobbes' conviction of representative appropriately fits into his political thought but gives only a partial definition which is applicable only under certain set of conditions.

John Locke in his "Two treatises on Civil Government" endeavours to provide more rights to represented than to the representatives, and to make representative in some sense responsible to the represented by placing the right to change the government in the hands of the people, though he never defined the terms representative or representation as such. He conceived of two treatises - the first one dealing with the formation of

state and the second regarding the formation of government based on the principle of majority. But there is ambiguity in his development of the legitimacy concept of government, as however unpopular it is, it would remain legitimate until its citizens actively revolted against it. As pointed out by Birch (1971), even then Locke could be considered the first exponent of representative government, not due to his ideas regarding government but because of his emphasis on consent and the rule of majority. °

Rousseau, the major exponent of direct democracy in modern times, argues that political representation is not possible as it involves 'willing for other' which is not feasible in actual practice as no man can will on behalf of others. He considered that real freedom is not possible in a representative form of government as a representative might look after another person's interests, if they were clearly known, but he would hardly formulate another individual's will. To solve this problem, he expounded the theory of General will, which is neither a majority will nor the sum of individual wills. To avoid the dilemma, as Eulau said, if the individual is the unit of any representational relationship, the problem is how clearly it can be linked to the community that is represented, while taking the individual as the unit of representational relationship. Rousseau was though aware of the problem, evaded any reference to it in his political thought.³⁰

The social contrctualists even though provide **some** useful insights into **some** aspect of political representation, failed to **make** concrete contribution to comprehend the essentials of the concept of representation and could not bring about clearly **the** vital links between the representative and the represented.

The Levellers And The Whig Theorists:

During the 17th and 18th centuries, two theories - theory of **the** Levellers and the Whig theory was developed in England. The Levellers, one of the groups of radical puritans, believed that man is rational and that the law of reason is inviolable by representatives of any sort. This belief naturally led to their conception of the delegate role of representative. To them the only true representation is a relationship of 'delegation, tight control and ready recall'.³¹ The tenets of the Whig theory contrasted with those of the levellers in respect of the role given to the representative. They perceived a role of trustee for the **members** of parliament.

Burkean Conception:

Edmund **Burke's** trustee conception of representation was, in a sense, a further extension of the Whig theory of representation which considered parliament as a deliberative body, representing **the** whole nation as against the Leveller's concept of olitical representation according to which a representative is an agent or delegate sent to the national parliament by various classes and communities, whom they represent.

For Burke, political representation is the representation of interest which has an objective, impersonal and unattached reality and government should rest on wisdom but not on will, as the good of nation emerges not from a general will but from the general reason of the whole. The major tenets of his 'political thought - ability and superiority of the representative who represents reason rather than will forms the basis of his trusteeship style of representative, focussing on national interest rather than on parochial local interest. He considered that if government were a matter of will upon any side, then the representative will ought to be subservient to the will of the constituents, but maintained, "government and legislation are matters of reason and judgement and not of inclination".

Burke emphasised that a representative should be and capable of conceiving broad based and relatively fixed interests such as agricultural interests, mercantile interests rather than particularised and narrow interests like individual businessman's interest or a single farmer's interest. He felt, "it ought to be the happiness and glory of representative, to live in the strictest union, the closest correspondence and the most unreserved communication with his constituents... But his unbiased opinion, his mature judgements, his enlightened conscience, he ought not to sacrifice to you, to any man or any set of men living". He believed that there is no need for a representative to blindly follow 'authoritarian instructions' and mandates issued as against his 'clearest conviction of his judgement and conscience'.

Burke conceived that representation has a substantive content, and election of **members** of parliament is intended to supply this content and bring about an effect of virtual representation. To him, "virtual representation is that in which there is a communion of interests, and a sympathy of feeling and desires, between those who act in the name of any description of people and the people in whose name they act, though the trustees are not actively chosen by **them**". To him, such representation is even better than the actual representation as "the people may err in their choice, but common interests and common sentiments are rarely mistaken".³⁵ Thus, various sets of ideas - elite representation of nation, actual and virtual representation of constituencies, parliamentary deliberations, accurate reflection of popular feelings together give rise to comprehensive Burkean theory of political **representaion**.³⁶

Some critics argued that **Burke's** whole orientation to politics was a kind of aristocratism which had found 'institutional expression in an incipient party **system**' by the third quarter of 18th century and his trustee conception has implicit seeds of party politics and **representation**. The Burkean conception was formulated during a period of limited government, when modern conception of party politics and responsible party government cannot be seen.³⁸ So, his formulation is not entirely suitable to modern governments which are dominated by party politics.

The Federalists:

In the Federalist, Madison and Hamilton set up a well-defined theory of general interest to which no voice of any particular representation can be ascribed, which is '**neither** the great and full voice of the people nor the authoritative voice of the organic **state**'.³⁹ Madison considered interests as plural and changing unlike the definite and specific interests perceived by Burke. And these pluralistic and shifting interests play an **important** role in Madison's theory of representation. While Burke considers representation as a device for arriving at the right solution in parliament with the hope that people will eventually accept the action, Madison does not seem to have such an optimistic view. Madison looked at representation as a way of stalemating action in legislature, and thus in society. The federalist favoured some kind of shifting, adhoc representation, which is neither conservative, particularly as with Burke, nor a mirror-like reflection as with the English Radicals or Jefferson, but rather a balancing relationship which bargains with one interest with another.

The Federalists Madison, Hamilton and their supporters were not successful in their efforts to arrive at a final theory of representation. As pointed out by De Grazia, although they **may have** wanted certain interests in society to be finally and definitely represented in the structure of government, they could **not** imagine how that would be possible.⁴⁰

Views Of Bentham, James Mill - The Concept Of Representation In The Utilitarian Theory:

The Utilitarians and the Individualists of England not only favoured the representation of persons, but also **made** interest an increasingly personal concept. They provided for a highly individualistic conception of representation.

The Utilitarians glorified the concept of personal interest held by individuals and believed that **men** are generally motivated by their enlightened self-interest. After classifying private and public interests, **Bentham** maintained that in every society there is a '**universal interest**' which is **common** interest of the society and the good of the whole society, though he was aware of the fact that common good does not always spontaneously evolve from private **pursuits**.

Based on their conception of pleasure and pain, Bentham and James Mill put forward the microcosmic view of representation, where the representatives share the interests of the represented. To them the representative should be able to recognise the common interest of the society and should have enough motivation in terms of his own private interest to enact the appropriate legislation. In the words of James Mill, "as the community cannot have any interest opposite to its interest, the interest of the representatives to be identified with those of the **community**".⁴² Thus representatives, while pursuing their own public interest and happiness would automatically maximise the interest of the community as a whole. The Utilitarians treated

government and community in similar lines to that of an individual and assumed that if the representatives are sufficiently part of the community, they will definitely share community's interest.

Bentham argued in favour of frequent annual elections to keep representatives alert, to keep them under the control of the represented and to see that they would not be given enough time to develop distinct interests of their own, different from those of community in their capacity of politicians. James Mill held that 'the benefits of the representative system are lost in all cases in which the interests of the choosing body are not the same with those of the community'.⁴³ The point is that the Utilitarians did not work out any feasible means through which typical representatives can be identified and elected and through which a proper representative assembly could come into existence.

Views Of J.S.Mill:

To J.S.Mill, representative government is "the only government which can fully satisfy all the exigencies of the social state in which the whole people participate".⁴⁴ He advocated representative form of government, extended suffrage through proportional representation as devices to safeguard fundamental human freedoms.

J.S.Mill visualised representative government as the ideal form of government, with proper weightage given to the better educated and more responsible members of the community, denying illiterates and non-tax payers the right to vote. To him, "the

meaning of representative government is that the whole people, or some numerous portion of them exercise through '**deputies**' periodically elected by **themselves**, the '**ultimate** controlling power' which in every constitution must reside somewhere".⁴⁵ He did not consider legislature as a law-making body, as parliament in his view , is not expected, nor even permitted to originate directly either taxation or expenditure. All it is asked for is "its consent and the sole power it posses is that of **refusal**",⁴⁶ as he felt that '**a** numerous assembly is as little fitted for direct business of legislation as for that of administration'.⁴⁷

He did not specify the exact term for the members of Parliament. He argued, "the member ought not to have so long tenure of his seat as to make him forget his responsibility, take his duties easily, conduct them with a view to his own personal advantage, or neglect those free and public conferences with his constituents which, whether he argues or differs with them, are one of the benefits of representative government". ° He also added that a representative should have "such a term of office to look forward to as will enable him to be judged, not by a single act, but by his course of action. It is important that he should have the greatest latitude of individual opinion and discretion compatible with the popular control essential to **free government**".⁴⁹

He supported trustee role of the representative and believed that the representative should be more educated and experienced than the represented and that while the representatives owed to

their electors the benefit of their wisdom, they should not **be** bound to follow their **constituents'** judgement.

Representation in some other theories:

Idealist political thinkers like **T.H.Green** and Bernard Bosanquet rejected individualistic assumption of the Utilitarians and viewed the purpose of the representative process as similar to the political process as a whole. To them, representation is **not** to encourage or emphasize diversity of opinion but to reduce such difference by harmonizing various conflicting sectional interests in a society or community. Their argument can be best summarised in Ernest Barker's opinion, who considered the real basis of democracy as the "discussion of competing ideas, leads to a compromise in which all ideas are reconciled and which can be accepted by all because it bears the imprint of all". ⁵⁰ . On the basis of the common will, **T.H.Green** claimed, "Will, not force as the basis of the state".

According to the Marxian conception, in a class bound society where political system and institutions among others is the superstructure, whose base is the mode of production, representative institutions of liberal democracies work as stooges in the hands of ruling class, which works for perpetuating its own class interests. Marxists rule out the possibility of real representation in a class bound society.

The Collectivists and the Guild socialists like G.D.H. Cole and David Truman viewed modern society, distinct from feudal and

agrarian society, is composed of sections and groups with overlapping interests and **affiliations**. This pluralistic **view of** society led **them** to believe **that** elected representatives will **inevitably** act, to **a** considerable extent, as delegates of particular interests.

Thus, an attempt has been made to briefly examine certain aspects such as nature of the state, form of government, concept of law and law-making of various political theories in order to comprehend their views and contribution regarding the theory of representation and the relationship between the representative and the represented. These theories differed from one another in their conception and definition of the concept as these theories were developed during different times by political thinkers of various countries under the influence of changing social norms and political culture.

The above analysis makes clear that no political theory provides comprehensive answers to some of the basic questions like who are the representatives? What are their characteristics? What is the relationship between the representative and the represented? What is the mode of recruitment of the representatives? and what are their functions, style and focus?

Views Of Modern Political Thinkers Regarding Representation:

After analysing essentialism in the Greek case, holism in the medieval case and rationalism in **Burke's** case, Heinz **Eulau** (1978) concluded, "our conception of representation are

'obsolete' and inspite of many centuries of theoritical effort, we cannot say what **representation is**".⁵² He is convinced about the presence of crisis in the existing theories and felt that if there is a crisis, still it is a crisis in the theory of representation and not in the institution of representation .⁵³ To **him**, in the context of modern government, neither responsibility nor reponsiveness can be assured through the technique of representation as a representative cannot possibly be responsive to each of the hundreds of thousands of constituents he represents and for the same reason it is practically impossible for the electorate to hold the representative responsible for his decisions. He felt that the **Burkean** conception and other **nomative** theories of representation are obsolete as they are based on the behavioural assumption that responsibility and reponsiveness are assured by "some similarity, achieved mechanically through relevant psychological processes, between the characteristics, attributes, attitudes, or goals of the representative and represented". He argued that such an assumption is false and a viable theory of **democratic** representation must be based on the **assumptioin** of an inevitable status **difference'** between the representative and the represented.

Pitkin (1967), who has made a comprehensive study on the concept of representation, assumed that representation has an identifiable meaning applied in different but controlled and discoverable ways in different contexts. She considered political representation as primarily a public, institutionalised

arrangement involving **many** people and groups operating in complex ways of large scale social **arrangements**, as the modern representative acts within an elaborate network of pressures, demands and obligations.⁵⁵ She considered representation as acting in the interests of represented in a manner responsive to them and it is necessary that both representative and represented must act independently and in case of conflict, it is the representatives that should act in a way which prevents conflicts. In the event of conflicts, an explanation by the representatives is to be called for.⁵⁶ Pitkin's study is useful in that it laid emphasis on the need for responsiveness, but she failed to give guidelines which will be useful to measure or assess the level of responsiveness.

Another prominent writer on representation, **A.H. Birch** (1971), has studied the development of the concept since medieval times. He did not believe in trying to establish that all forms of representation are essentially aspects of the same thing, which can be defined as the "real nature of representation".⁵⁷ He classified four different types of representation which can be described as symbolic representation, delegated representation, microcosmic representation, and elective representation of which delegated representation is more certainly responsive than other types of representation to the wishes of those they **represent**.

Alfred de Gracia (1951), in his "Public and Republic," agreed that it is difficult to comprehend any individual's degree of representation in his government as there are a number of ways of

representing and being represented, varying from **time** to time both in form and **in significance**. He suggested that the search for broader **mēnings** of representation both in the **present** and the past, must be conducted at three levels-community level, discussion level and administration level.⁵⁹

Cain and Jones (1986), analysing the theories of representation in their attempt to evolve '**pragmatic approach**' which they hoped would be useful to close the logical gap between what is the case and what ought to be, pointed out that four important factors should be studied while analysing the theories of representations. These factors include the theorist's preferences regarding the representative's disposition, his assumption about human nature, his beliefs about what behaviour is likely, and specific **recommendoins** for **implementing** representation.

Modern Conception Of The Concept of Representation :

Along with the shift in the conception of functions and position of legislature in modern world, especially after second world war, there is a considerable shift in the conception of representative as a law-maker to communicator and ombudsman. The role of reppresentative largely depends on the importance that legislature has in the political system. Due to the technicalities of modern legislation, over burdened work of legislatures and due to emergence of welfare state concept, legislature in modern context can be viewed as law effecting bodies rather than law-making bodies **performing** various other

functions such as legitimisation, socialisation, recruitment, redressal of grievances and administrative and executive oversight. As R.B.Jain pointed out the presence of legislature itself by virtue of its popular character, represents 'the embryo of responsible government'.⁶¹ Legislators through their debates and suggestions can improve the quality of legislation and can create public awareness about legislation through their participation in various stages of the passing of bills. Thus, the shift in the role of legislatures and representatives is interesting and has considerable impact on the modern conception of representation.

Concepts of Support, Demand and Congruence:

Miller and Stokes (1963) argue that the presence of high degree of congruence in views regarding policy issues between represented and the representatives is a major sign of representation. They also observed that the degree of popular influence differs considerably in different issues, the influence being negligible in relation to foreign affairs but very considerable in relation to civil rights.⁶² This model is generally called "demand-input model". Wahlke (1978) observed that much of the disillusionment and dissatisfaction with modern representative government is mainly due to the fascination with the policy decisions of representative bodies which reflect a 'policy demand-input' conception of government in general, and the representative process in particular. He concluded that his data did not provide evidence to treat

citizens as significant sources of **making policy demands**. He observed that citizens are not specially informed or interested about the policy activities of the representatives as such and that relatively fewer citizens have any clear notion that they are making policy demands or policy choices when they vote. Thus, he concluded that the simple '**demand-input model**' is deficient and that '**support-input model**' might be more appropriate to study the concept of representation.⁶³ This line of argument was also supported by Eulau, who said that given the limited capacity of the represented to formulate policy, the research should begin from the assumption of a '**built-in status difference**' between representative and represented in which the former rather than the latter gives direction to the relationship.⁶⁴

Concept of Responsiveness:

As noted earlier, Pitkin stressed on the importance of responsiveness as the critical characteristic of representation but did not specify the content of responsiveness and left the term undefined. Miller and Stokes (1963) realised that there are possible targets of responsiveness other than policy issues but did not specify what they are.⁶⁵ Eulau and Karps (1978) suggested four possible components of responsiveness - policy responsiveness where the target is the great public issues that agitate the political process; service responsiveness which involves the efforts of the representative to secure particularised benefits for individuals or groups of his constituency, allocative responsiveness which refers to the representative's efforts to

obtain benefits for his constituency as a whole through **pork-barrel** exchange or through **adminstrative** intervention and **symbolic** representativeness which involves public gestures of a **sort that** creates a sense of trust and support in the relationship between the representative and represented.⁶⁶ But it is difficult to **measure**, empirically the congruence of these various components of responsiveness are more visible in certain political systems than in others.

Prewitt and Eulau (1978) felt that despite the proliferation of representative governments over the past century, theory about representatioin has not **moved** much beyond the eighteenth century **Burkean** formulation and that there is a need to break this spell of **Burke's** vocabulary over scientific work on representation. Laying stress on the need to have a fresh look at the concept of representation, they said that it is essential to focus on the unresolved conflict between two aspects of **representational** relationship, inter-individual relationship and inter group relationship. Here representation is regarded as a relationship between any one individual, the **representative** and another individual, the represented. In an inter-group relatioinship representatives are treated a as a group and brought together in an assembly, to represent the interest of the community as a whole.⁶⁷ It seems appropriate that for evolving an acceptable theory of representatioin, both these views have to be synthesised.

The above discussion makes clear that most of the theories of representation have been concerned over the issues of role and

functions of representatives. There has been an unending debate among political thinkers and politicians regarding 'style' and 'focus' of representatives. There is no agreed view about what a representatives should **represent-local** or national interest. As to the style of representation, some would argue that representatives should act on their own **judgemnet**. **Some** others hold that representatives are only the agents of the constituents and hence should function as their delegates. None of the theories has provided adequate insights into various aspects of representatioin associated with a modern political processes. The existing theories are also not comprehensive enough to conduct empirical studies. **Therefore,one** has to be careful **in** choosing indicators for conducting empirical research regarding **representation**.

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CHAPTER III

LITERATURE REVIEWED

Research on representation and **representatives'** participation occupy a **prominent** place in the understanding of modern political processes. The background, perceptions, personality traits, functions and performance of representatives are some of the crucial aspects that attracted contemporary researchers for identifying analytical frame works. It would now be useful to give some details of the available research findings in this area of research.

Studies about representation and representatives could broadly be divided into two categories -normative and empirical. Normative studies were mainly concerned in suggesting what the representatives ought to perform for the proper functioning of the government. These studies prescribed a set of rules and guidelines for **representatives'** role performance. The empirical studies are mainly concerned with comprehending the reality. In other words they give preference to existentialism.

Theoretical Studies On Representation And Representatives:

Some ancient, medieval and modern political thinkers like Plato, Aristotle, Kautilya, Polybius, Cicero, St. Thomas Aquinas, Hobbes, Locke, Rousseau, Burke, Bentham, James Mill, J.S.Mill, Madison, **T.H.Green** and Karl Marx in their classical works, explicitly or implicitly, commented on the roles and functions of representatives and the nature of representative

government, in general. Their writings had influenced the modern political thinkers like de Gracia, Pitkin, Eulau and Birch, who tried to analyse various political theories concerning the relationship between representatives and represented to find out how these theories help to enhance our understanding of these concepts in modern political systems. De Gracia (1951) considered representation as a 'state of mind' . While Eulau (1978) categorically pointed out that our conception of representation became 'obsolete' and these theories failed to provide proper information to comprehend the concept of representation². Pitkin (1967), considering the general picture of understanding about representation in various political theories as inadequate, gave her own definition of representative and representation . Birch's (1971) endeavour was not to give any general definition of representation, but to classify representations and representatives into categories and tried to enlist various functions of representation in a modern political systems .

The Changing Context Of Legislative Behaviour Research:

As noted earlier, with the emergence of empiricism and behaviouralism in social sciences, legislative behavioural studies took a new direction in the 20th century. The role assigned to legislatures in the developed world has also changed and the need to enumerate new roles to legislatures of developing third world and communist political systems arose. Legislatures are **no** longer regarded as only the traditional law-making and

deliberative bodies. The new roles assigned to legislatures in modern political systems as explained well by **Packenham** (1970) include various political functions such as "latent and manifest legitimization, tension release, **recruitment** socialization, training, law-making, exiting, interest articulation, administrative oversight, patronage and **errand-running**".⁵ Many scholars began to take interest in studying legislatures in a comparative and developmental perspective⁶. Institutionalization, **role-differentiation** of legislature, functioning of these bodies under varying social and economic conditions have been the subject matter of these studies.

The first modern **empirical** study on legislative behaviour by Lowell (1902) tried to establish the relationship between party and voting patterns in the British parliament, the U.S. Congress and several state legislatures⁷. Rice (1928) and Beyle (1931) suggested legislative roll calls as a fertile field of data to be explored by new quantitative methods. These writers questioned the adequacy of normative theories and formal and legal descriptions and emphasized on the need for more empirical studies. It is in the late 1950s and early 1960s that another trend started in the studies of legislative behaviour taking the individual legislator as the basis of analysis and comparison. La Polambara considers Heinz **Eulau** as the prime-mover of academic interest in the field of legislative behaviour. Heinz Eulau **emphasized** that the basic unit of analysis in **comparative** politics must be man, man behaving in the multitude of institutional and contextual situation.

Responsiveness - The Chief Determinant Of Representative Institutions:

One important characteristic feature of representation i.e., responsiveness as identified by Pitkin (1967) has become an important subject in empirical research studies of the writers like **Wahlke** (1978), **Eulau & Prewitt** (1973) and **Eulau and Karps** (1977). Miller and Stokes (1963) in their '**demand-input** model', maintained that the presence of policy congruence of representative and represented is the sign of existence of representation in that political system⁸. **Wahlke** (1978) in his empirical study to find out the relationship between representatives and represented pointed out that simple demand-input model is inefficient to comprehend this relationship. He added that it has to be supplemented with '**support-input**' model⁹. **Eulau and Prewitt** (1973) examined the representatives of city councils with the help of the concept of responsiveness and found that members of the responsive councils were more likely to be in communities where the electoral conditions, maximised accountability of the councillors. **Eulau and Karps** (1977) identified four types of responsiveness policy, allocative, service and symbolic which are useful to conduct empirical studies on representation¹⁰. **Loewenberg and Kim** (1978) compared the responsiveness of parliaments in six countries-Kenya, Korea, Turkey, Belgium, Italy and Switzerland and found five types of parliamentary representativeness: participatory (Belgium and Italy), elitist (Switzerland), parochial (Kenya),

authorized(Korea) and limited (Turkey), on the basis of some institutional and organizational aspects of these political systems .

Political Socialisation And Recruitment Analysis:

There have been studies that examined the background, incentives, motivating factors, personality traits and recruitment process of political representatives. Many of the studies on demographic characteristics of political representatives have tabulated and described the socio-economic and political backgrounds of representatives at a particular institutional setting and at a particular point of time. And few of them tried to **comprehend** the political power structure of a society and its transformation over a period of time. These empirical studies in different countries of the world, both in developed and developing countries showed that, almost everywhere in the world representatives belong to a higher socio-economic and political strata than the represented . The widespread prevalence of this phenomenon can be easily explained. Entering into political arena and contesting in general elections in modern political systems require huge money power and high social status, which are available only to a privileged few in any society. It can also be seen that the gap between the backgrounds of representatives and represented is wider in the developing countries than in developed countries.

It is also evident that only a minority of public in any political system are getting attracted towards politics, contesting in the elections and getting elected. These few, 'the gladiators' in the words of Milbrath and Goel (1977) are active combatants, the small number of party activists and office holders. Their research findings indicate that the gladiators constitute only 5 to 7 per cent of the American population. And apart from the gladiators, there would be 'apathetics' - persons who are withdrawn from political process, 'spectators' - persons who are nominally involved in politics, who seek information and vote and that the spectators form the largest part of the American public .

Motivating Factors And Incentives:

It is only a few studies that tried to examine the incentives and motivating factors of the people aspiring and contesting for political careers. Almond and Verba (1972) found that more extensive or higher the individual's education, the more is the likelihood of his high level of political participation. Two important studies regarding incentives of legislators, conducted in America and France by Payne (1972) and Woshisky (1973) , respectively, seek to establish links between personal incentives of these legislators to the structural factors of the political institutions.

Political **Personality And Ambition:**

The pioneering works of Lasswell concerning theory of power and psychoanalysis of political leaders gave boost to the emerging discipline of political psychology, consequent upon which a few interesting studies have been conducted to **compare** and contrast personality types of political traders and common public. **Lasswell's** (1948) emphasis is that power is expected to overcome low estimates of the self and that politicians have a certain type of personality and psychological compulsions which motivate individuals to contest for elections or to seek public office. To him, the "politician displaces his private motives upon public objects, and rationalizes the displacement in terms of public **advantage**" .

To **Dahl** (1969), political influence is unevenly distributed among adult members of a political system. Through the analogy between power and money, he argues that the motive for power is not pathological or abnormal but has an instrumental character. He contends that political power is not an end in itself and it can be used to gain different ends depending on culture, society, economy and political system, and to acquire fame, reverence, security, respect, affection, wealth and many such values¹⁵.

The above studies inspired some scholars mainly American, to take up empirical research. **Mc Conaughty's** (1950) personality study of state legislators of South Carolina and two small control groups of non politicians found that **politicians** are not suffering with low estimates of self and that they are more **self-**

sufficient and dominant than the control group¹⁶. The study of Browning and Jacob (1964) on the U.S. state legislators and two **small** control groups of non politicians also observed that there are no prominent differences between politicians and non **politicians**¹⁷. Another important **empirical** research on legislative personalities, conducted by Di Renzo (1967) on Italian deputies, found that representatives have more dogmatic, power oriented, and authoritarian personalities than the represented. Another study of his (1977) on the U.S. State Legislators proved that the U.S. state legislators were less dogmatic and authoritarian than the U.S. **non-politicians**.

Thus, **Lasswell's** theory of political personality did not find evidence in later empirical research. It is also interesting to note that Lasswell (1954) himself was convinced later that power is not the dominant factor for individuals becoming politicians and subsequently modified his position, suggesting that power as a non-primary motive for entering politics is too flexible or rigid proposition which lacks much **explanation**.¹⁹

Available empirical evidence in the U.S. suggests that persons with higher power motivation are not likely to enter politics and if they do, they are not likely to be very successful. The research has found a correlation between achievement motive and holding public office in political system, where the office had high achievement potential. **Milbrath** and **Goel** (1977) pointed out that despite the rash of studies, there

is **relatively little reliable** evidence in the form of substantiated propositions about the impact of authoritarianism **on political** behaviour. To them, "after all these years of research one is still required to say that the concept is not satisfactorily operationalised, no clear and precise definition **of the** trait (if it is one) can be given, and evidence about the relationship of the concept to political behaviour is highly **inconclusive**".²⁰

Schelsinger's (1966) ambition theory provides a very useful and interesting hypothesis regarding links between legislative behaviour and political ambition level of representatives. To him, ambition to obtain and hold public office is universal and a legislator who has no further political ambition behaves differently from another legislator who views the assembly as a stepping stone to some higher level. Some **empirical** evidence to support this theory can be found in the study of Barber (1965), who classified legislators into four major categories as law-makers, spectators, advertisers and reluctants, on the basis of participation and perceptions of the representatives. **Mayhew** (1974), who also took ambition as the basis of **study**, suggests **that** a direct link can be established between the roles congressmen assume to their political ambition to get re-elected.

Environmental Factors:

One of the important factors influencing representatives behaviour is the environmental factor, comprising political culture, form of government, electoral and party system, nature

of constituency rural or urban and level of political awareness among general public, has **not** received adequate attention. Only occasional reference to this aspect in legislative studies research could be seen.

Role Perceptions:

Studies about role **perceptions** of representatives have considerably increased in recent decades. This can be directly attributed to the influence of the research work conducted by Wahlke et al (1962). These writers used 'role' as a concept that would integrate behavioural and institutional aspects of a representative and defined and distinguished a number of role sectors and specific role orientations of representatives of four American state legislatures. Studies on role perceptions of representatives focussed on individual legislators as the unit of analysis and tried to make generalisations about assemblies. Frank (1966), Davidson (1969), Hopkins (1970), Clarke and Price (1981), Proctor (1988) studied role perception of legislators in different political systems, with emphasis on the '**style**' and '**focus**' of representatives.

It can be observed that many of the problems of defining concepts and finding good empirical indicators for them are evident in role analysis. As Jowell (1985) correctly pointed out, "most of the research on legislative roles has simply classified legislators according to their role orientation. There are few efforts to identify variables that help to examine particular role orientations and veryfew efforts to identify behavioural

consequence of role orientations".²¹ Thus one **major** lacuna in role perception studies is their '**profoundly** non-behavioural **quality**'.

Formal And Informal Rules Of The Game:

It is generally held that formal and informal rules of political institutions would influence representatives' intention to participate or not to participate. Individual legislator's perceptions regarding participation depends upon some important structural factors such as the extent of institutionalization, organizational attributes of the legislative institution, relationship between executive and legislature, **formal** rules and procedural opportunities available for individual legislator, legislative staff and resources provided for representatives.

There are many studies regarding the structural factors of legislatures with limited focus on individual legislators behaviour. Legislatures' **formal** features or structural aspects such as number of chambers and separation of powers can be identified without specific reference to individual members but these formal rules will set the boundaries and define the context in which representative behaviour takes place.

Robinson (1970) observed that legislative information requirements may vary according to the stage of development of the legislature and the political system. To him, important distinguishing variables are legislature's prominence vis-a-vis other institutions of government, the opposition parties and the

affluence of the society. **Meller's** (1973) study focussed on legislative institutionalization, independence of legislatures and individual legislators in developing countries. He observed that staff is particularly important in **pre-modern** legislatures, where **members** have few other resources of aid and where legislatures are generally **undifferentiated** from other political sub-systems. His study distinguishes two system variables: the form of government -Presidential or Parliamentary and the level of legislative institutionalization and two staffing variables-supportive **identification** with legislator and the organizational position of the staff group assisting legislator. **Ranney** (1981) finds that changing staff support will change the **legislators'** job, and changing the job requires different levels of staff support. He observes that more staff to parliamentary backbenchers could result in more intra party splits.

In a comparative study of legislative staff in Britain, France and Germany, **Aberbach, Putnam and Rockman** (1981), agree on the point that increased staff availability will increase the efficiency and **effectiveness** of legislatures and also of individual legislators. **Baaklini and Heaphey** (1975) in their study on legislative institution building in Brazil, Costa Rica and Lebanon point out that neutral staff, insulated from partisanship may not be adequately responsible to legislators needs. **Baaklini** (1975) notes that expert staff tend to help legislators who have similar training and tend to consider most legislators as not worthy of help. Similar trend can be seen in most of the developing countries. **Baaklini and Heaphey** (1975)

find that the relationship between representative and bureaucracy **in the** Third World countries like Brazil and Costa Rica **may** even weaken the linkage between the representatives and the represented and thus staffing patterns typical of many developing countries may be **'dysfunctional'**.

Some studies **made** by Barker and Rush (1970), Rush and Shaw (1974), Van Schendelen (1976) Brandley (1980) focused not on staff in general but on legislators information needs and requirements.

Apart from formal rules, the intentionality and actual participation of representatives depend on informal rules or 'folk ways' of the institution such as party organisation, party discipline and nature of party leadership, Speaker's use of discretionary powers in time allotment to members of various political parties and his propriety in conducting the business of the House, seniority system (Hinckley, 1971) and the relationship between the legislators and the ministers.

Among the above aspects, the nature of party structure, leadership, functioning and its influence on **representatives'** behaviour attracted the attention of some scholars. The studies of Sartori (1976), Clausen and **Holmberg** (1977) and Fukni (1978) are important among these. They examined individual legislator's behaviour in political systems where strong party discipline prevails. Mezey (1979) discussed the impact of political party on representatives behaviour in terms of the degree to which members anticipate sanctions and disciplinary

action by the party leadership. Because of the strict party discipline and party cohesion prevalent in **many non-american** legislators, it is **assumed** that party predictates individual representative's decision making. Epstein (1980) in political parties in Western Democracies found that in **Britian**, the impact of party on individual voting behaviour is derived from a set of norms shared by legislators and that these correspond to the party solidarity necessary to parliamentary systems of government. Similar findings could be seen in Di **Palma's** (1977) study of Italian political party system. Crowe (1980) who studied the voting pattern in the British House of Commons from 1945 to 1974 concluded that members career objectives could be linked with their perception and that they had very limited role in policy making.²²

Collie (1985) noted that while research in the American setting sought to explain why and under what conditions legislators arrive at decisions in general, rather than why they voted for or against their party in non-American setting, researchers tried to explain the basis of party loyalty and disloyalty, a topic which reflects their understanding of the importance of legislative parties in parliamentary system of **government**.

Institutional Participation:

Representatives can participate at both the institutional and constituency levels and their participation at these two levels is not contradictory but complementary to each other. In

different institutional and contextual settings, representatives tend to place different types of emphasis on these levels of participation. Till the 1970s, most of the research on legislative behaviour, conducted by western scholars was mainly concerned with institutional participation of legislators with particular emphasis on the roll call behaviour. Roll call does represent one form of measurable behaviour and even in the U.S. the best indicator to measure how law-makers vote is based on their party affiliation. As representatives invariably vote on party basis in the communist countries where there are one party systems, and in some developing countries like India, where there is strict party discipline and anti-defection law, there is an absolute need for the selection of new indicators to study the participation of representatives in legislative process along with the roll call behaviour. Judge's (1981) study on the backbenchers' specialisation in the House of Commons provides some useful criterion to study the aspect of specialisation in institutional participation of representatives.

Most of the research on legislative behaviour in the western countries focussed on institutional participation of representatives. Polsby (1971) studied congressional behaviour in policy making. Taking policy-making as the focus of his study, Clausen (1973) examined how congressmen decide on policy issues, what are the pressures and considerations they will face in making policy decisions. Frantzich's (1979) chief focus was on the distribution of power in the U.S. House of Representatives. Using the decision-making approach and taking

the ability to get bills passed into laws, he tried to **measure the** power of representatives. He concluded that democrats, leaders, senior **members**, electorally secure and ideologically moderate congressmen are all over represented among the **legislatively** effective members and that legislative effort and success do not contribute to electoral strength and security.²⁴

Legislative Studies In Communist Systems:

In communist countries, law-making is not the primary function of legislative institutions and hence legislators or deputies of these countries do not have specific law-making functions. Some communist legislatures appear to have extended beyond their representational and **socialization** functions to activities that are at the periphery of law-making, as in the case of Yugoslavia and Poland. In these countries, laws can be and have been refined, legislative committees do study laws and supervise their implementation, and the legislature as a whole generally adopts a more active posture.

Cohen (1982) in his study on "Legislative **Professionalisation** and Participation in Yugoslavia", concluded that the legislative decision makers who demonstrated the greatest interest and success in scrutinising the activities of state administrators were professional politicians with long experience and specialisation in the assembly system. He further observed that transient **amateur** political decision makers, no matter how highly educated or specialized in their own non-

political professions, will have great difficulty in controlling the public bureaucracy in a **modern** state.²⁵

Studies regarding legislative behaviour of representatives of **communist** countries are very scarce. One important work on communist legislatures is "Communist Legislatures in Comparative **Perspective**" edited by Nelson and White (1981). In this work Nelson observed that these legislatures fulfil the basic linkage function by symbolically linking the rulers to the ruled which function is particularly vital in communist **systems**.²⁶ To Bihari (1970), socialist representation is a form of indirect democracy which is increasingly completed with a series of direct democratic institutions and which is absorbing these institutions.

Third World Legislative Systems:

A review of literature on Third World legislatures reveals that the role of an individual representative in the legislative institutions lies some where in between the true law-maker concept of the Western countries and the totally passive role of the communist deputy. Blondel (1973) in his comparative study on legislatures, argued that the involvement of legislators in law-making varies with the type of issues being considered in different political systems. There may be less legislative influence on broad policy questions and greater influence on more narrowly defined issue in the case of third world political system. This argument is further expanded by **Mezey** (1979) who differentiated legislatures on the basis of the constraints they

are capable of placing on the policy-related activities of executives. To him, the nature of these constraints could vary with the policy-making stage (formulation, deliberation and oversight) as well as with the nature of policy - making arena. Compared with western legislatures, those of the Third World are likely to be more involved at the deliberative stage of policy-making process than at the policy formulating and decision making stages and more involved on narrow and practical matters than on major policy questions.

Constituency Service Or 'Home Style':

At the constituency level, representatives, act as communicators and mediators between the government and the people. As people's representatives, they have to be responsible to the people who elected them and responsive to their wishes. Available research makes clear that while representatives of western legislatures tend to give more importance to law-making and policy affecting activities, representatives of Third World countries and communist countries are prone to give more importance to constituency level participation. In his study of role perceptions and participation of MPs of Tanzania, Hopkins (1970) found that a majority of these representatives perceived their main duty as work within the constituency. Kumbhat and Marican (1976), in their study on constituent orientation among Malaysian state legislators, found that seniority in the legislature, place of socialisation, and extent of organizational affiliation account for most of the variation in constituency

orientation among these representatives.²⁸ Jahan (1976) pointed out that **MPs** in Bangladesh perceived their major role as brokers between the government and the people. He also observed that all of them noted their role in obtaining jobs, licenses, permits, ration cards, and relief materials for their constituents.²⁹ **Morell's** (1979) study made clear that the Thai legislators regularly intervened with the bureaucracy on matters relating to the nature and **implementation** of local development projects.

Very few studies in Third World countries provided information concerning the ways in which representatives perceive their **districts'** needs and maintain contact with them. Kim et al (1983) in a comparative study of legislatures in Kenya, Korea and Turkey provided useful information in this regard. As observed by **Mezey** (1985), literature on Third World legislatures is widely scattered. Numerous case studies are conducted by scholars who followed independent methodologies in geographically dispersed research sites and time limits, which **makes** it difficult to organize them under a broad theoretical base.³⁰

Nelson (1980) pointed out that representation in communist legislatures can be characterised most accurately as a contact function. To him, in a few communist states, constituency service by deputies is quite real and the deputies serve as intermediaries between citizen and bureaucracies, dispensing favours sometimes to the point where a **patron-client** relationship is established. Some evidence could be seen even in the Soviet case, for deputies intervene with agencies to remedy the

grievances of citizens. To White (1982), in the Soviet Union, **atleast** an **embryonic** form of 'linkage politics', with deputies increasingly concerned to direct what additional resources are available towards the categories of expenditure of most immediate and obvious benefits to their constituents and of whose importance they are likely to have been **reminded** in their meetings, correspondence, and other contacts with those who nominally elect them.³¹

While tentative links are established regarding constituency service in the communist countries, it is interesting to note that starting with Fenno's (1978) study, many American researches began to probe into the varied 'errand-boy' activities performed by representatives. Studies of Johannes (1984), Parker (1986) focused on the growth in constituency case work and district projects dealt with by the members of the **U.S.Congress** and on the increasing attention the U.S. Senators and **representatives** are paying to their constituencies, respectively. Taggart and Durant (1985) in a longitudinal analyses have examined the house style of a U.S. senator, considering factors like what activities he pursued in his house and state, how he allotted his time among various activities and what strategic considerations were important.³² Halligan, Krause, Williams and Hawker (1988) compared the constituency service behaviour of Australian state and Canadian provincial legislators. Their study explains the variation in such behaviour, both at the individual and the system levels.³

Participation And Re-Election Prospects:

It is interesting to find out the impact of participation levels on representatives political future. Studying representative's political future on the basis of success or failure in the **immediate** election is one type of analysis.

Studies on this aspect in the U.S. have revealed the presence of increasing advantage of incumbency in reelection. Some studies which tried to find out the reasons for such phenomenon pointed out that **representatives'** increased skills, development of more interest in constituency service and successful dealings with bureaucracy as some of the reasons.

The conclusions of empirical studies conducted on casework of representatives in the U.S. are of varying nature. **Yiannaki's** (1981) study noted that casework has only partial impact on reelection and reelection of a candidate is determined more by the effects of party, policy and candidate's personality than on the case work done.³⁴ Johannes and Adams (1981) concluded that case work did not have significant impact neither on individual voter's behaviour nor on aggregate voter's **behaviour**. In Britain, party control over the selection and election of candidates got revealed in various studies.

An interesting work by Cain, Ferejohn and Fiorina (1987) tried to assess the full range of constituency activities carried out by representatives of both the U.S. Congress and the British Parliament. This study paying particular attention to the

electoral impact that legislator can make in the constituency, found that there is wide difference regarding this issue between these two countries. They also examined the possibility of a representative having '**personal-vote**' irrespective of party affiliation and support and found that while large proportion of the U.S. voters crossed party lines to vote for **incumbents**, in Britain, a much smaller proportion of voters disregard party loyalty to support representatives.

Legislative Studies In India:

Both at the national and sub-national levels, legislative studies in India concentrated more on the institutional aspect than on behavioural aspect of legislatures. Studies on Indian Parliament, whether of both the Houses, or of a single House, have tried to examine the utility and the nature of working of these institutions.

Many studies are concerned with the socio-economic and political backgrounds and recruitment of the Members of Parliament and the state legislators. But the links between background and behaviour of representatives have not been established. However, one important study on "Parliamentary Participation in the Indian Lok Sabha, 1957-74" by Berry (1979) attempted to measure several aspects of **parliamentary** participation and to relate them to various extra-parliamentary activities with the background characteristics of individual **MPs**.³⁷ Some studies conducted on constituency service of members of **Indian** Parliament and state legislatures provide data on the

amount of time **MPs** spent in the districts and the number of communications of various kinds they receive **from the constituents.**³⁸

At the **states'** level, **Jha's** (1977) study on the members of Bihar Legislative Assembly, **Puri's** (1977) work on the members of Rajasthan Legislative Assembly and P.D. **Sharma's** (1984) study on the members of Haryana Legislative Assembly emphasised on the socio-economic and political backgrounds of legislators and their values, attitudes and perceptions on different socio-economic and political problems at the national and state levels. Narain and Puri (1976) have measured the frequency and methods of contact between constituents and the members of Rajasthan State Assembly.³⁹ Sisson and **Sharder's** (1977) study provides data on Rajasthan Legislative Assembly members' perceptions of constituency affairs. Even these studies failed to connect the value orientations and role perceptions of legislators to their actual participation inside and outside the legislature. They have not suggested a conceptual framework useful for a comparative study of legislative behaviour.

It is the above situation that led R.B.Jain to point out that there is a 'large gap' in this field in India, which remains to be filled and that there is not a single study of legislative behaviour, even with reference to a single institution, either of the Union or of the States, leaving aside the comparative aspect which could be suggested to have incorporated any specific framework studying legislative behaviour.

Gaps;

A brief review of literature on the factors **determining representatives'** participation, both at the institutional and constituency levels, reveals that most of the empirical research in this area is conducted by American political scientists and is related to **American** legislatures. However, there has been limited effort to study state and local level representatives in the U.S. Similar trend is visible in the studies conducted in the Third World countries also. In these countries, concentration has been more on institutional factors than on behavioural aspects.

There has been little emphasis on studying legislative behaviour from a comparative perspective. Studies in this field, both in the developed and developing countries are primarily case studies of single legislatures, at a particular point of time.

There has been limited effort to give a comprehensive view of legislature behaviour from different dimensions. The existing studies are concerned with **exmining** either the socio-economic and political background or the behavioural aspect without proper base on individual aspects like political socialisation, role perceptions, roll call analysis, constituency linkages and orientations of representatives.

Another major gap in this field is that most of these studies have failed to contribute substantially to theory building.

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CHAPTER IV

SOCIO-ECONOMIC AND POLITICAL BACKGROUND.

SECTION 1

There seem to be two lines of thinking among political scientists and politicians regarding what should be the characteristics of representatives. Some argue that a representative should be bestowed with those qualities which are superior to those of the represented. Plato's '**philosopher king**' and Burkes 'trustee' provide the best illustration of the this view. This view could be characterised as that which supports representation by the privileged.

To some others, representatives should reflect the main characteristics of the represented. This line of thinking could be regarded as 'the exact reflecting view'. According to this conception, the interest represented and the characteristics possessed by the representatives should be exactly similar to those of the represented. Such interests and characteristics, to those thinkers, could be identified by studying a sample which is carefully selected through statistical methods. To Swabey (1937) the principle of sampling is displayed at three levels in a modern representative government. First, the voters are to be considered as a sample of all the people; second, the majority of the voters are to be taken as a sample of all the **voters**; and finally, the public officials who are elected are to be considered as a sample of the nation¹. Some of the Federalists, utilitarians and proponents of proportional representation have also supported this point of view.

As pointed out earlier, available research findings indicate that, all over the world, legislators are chosen from higher **socio-economic** and political background than that of the **represented.** Some studies endeavour to explain this phenomenon, as to why and how do representatives were chosen from more privileged background than represented . While some of them pointed out that factors explaining this phenomenon are personal factors, some others held the institutional factors to be responsible. Prewitt (1970) argued that self-selection of representative and the importance of his prior political interest are the two major factors resulting in this process. In a comparative study of bureaucrats and **parliamentarians**, Aberbach, Putnam and **Rockman** (1981) noted that inequality in access to higher education is the primary reason for the difference in Western Europe. But as pointed out by Matthews (1984), this finding is not applicable to all political systems, as the U.S. has considerable status gap between congressmen and citizens though its social system has a more egalitarian higher educational system .²

Theoretically, in a representative democracy with universal suffrage, all citizens have equal opportunities to contest and hold public office. In practice, public elections means tough competition, which requires enormous amounts of money and muscle power making it impossible for common citizens to contest. Readily available and adequate financial support and numerous social affiliations become indispensable for contesting elections

as the contestant has to meet the major portion of his/her election expenses in countries like India. This situation gives scope only to citizens from higher socio-economic strata to enter the election fray and mostly eliminates the lower strata's opportunity in this regard.

Reviewing the literature on legislative recruitment and career in Western countries, Matthews (1984) observed that the social status of an average legislator tends to be higher in national legislatures with much formal authority than in local or regional bodies with authority. And the status gap between legislators and citizens tends to be far greater in developing countries than in developed countries. He also pointed out that while legislators, as a group, enjoy high social status, they tend to be less typical in their social backgrounds than the chief executives, top level civil servants, or economic elites.

Relevance Of The Study Of Backgrounds Of Representatives:

An analysis of social and political backgrounds of representatives of any political system is essential mainly for two reasons. First, it enables to comprehend the dynamics of political leadership of the system and to find out what type of people are successful in political recruitment in the political game. Secondly, such an analysis to some extent, reveals the political culture of the society also.

As correctly noted by Yogendra Singh (1986), the elite structure of a society reflects not only the basic values of

society but also the extent to which these values find concrete expression in the power structure and in the decision making process of society.⁴ Lasswell, **Larner** and Rothwell (1952) rightly argued , " the **manner** in which the leadership is chosen, the breadth of the social base from which it is recruited, the way in which it exercises the decision making power, the extent and nature of its **accountability** - these and other attributes are indicators of the degree of shared power, shared respect, shared well-being and safety in a given society at a given **time**". By learning the nature of the elite, we learn much about the nature of the society.

Thus, by examining the nature of political leadership, whether parochial or charismatic or rational or whether highly educated and urban oriented or uneducated and rural based, one can comprehend the political culture of the society on the one hand and the values and expectations of the represented, on the other.

Another factor, which makes the study of backgrounds of representatives important, is that it is useful to find out the linkages between the backgrounds and behaviour of political representatives. Representatives with different backgrounds tend to behave differently and their institutional and constituency level participation may vary **significantly** because of their different backgrounds. Mere descriptive data regarding backgrounds of representatives and tabulations of their characteristics are not sufficient. Such information is only

significant, if their backgrounds affect the content or form of laws. This **makes** the need to correlate background of representatives with their behaviour-

Analytical studies that examined the relationship between background and behaviour of political representatives are very few. It can be noted that linking backgrounds of representatives to their legislative behaviour, particularly to roll call behaviour, is especially an American phenomenon. Some studies by political scientists such as Githens and Prestage (1978) and Mezey (1979) examined the differences, if any, in institutional behaviour and roll call behaviour of male and female legislators. Berry's (1979) study of institutional participation of Indian **MPs** from 1950-74 finds that high education and **urbanism** might **differentiate** those who participate actively in the Lok Sabha from those who do not, and MPs recruited from disadvantaged communities (Scheduled Castes and Scheduled Tribes) could be found grouped primarily within a particular participatory mode. This study also observed that the background characteristics of representatives such as college education, incumbency, associational ties, affiliation to traditional rulers or disadvantaged ^{as} communities are linked to participation. The absence of college experience does **seem** to provide an obstacle to active institutional participation.

Elitism In Indian Social Structure:

In traditional Indian society, the structure of political elite was based on the principles of 'hierarchy, holism and

continuity ' as noted by Singh (1986), and was dominated by the king and the priest who derived cultural and moral strength **from** the prevailing caste system. The principle of hierarchy was evident in the traditional Indian society as the priest's role was legitimately assigned only to the brahmins and the king's role only to the kshatriyas, both occupying the upper two segments of the varna system. Circulation of elite structure was visualised by philosophers like **Swami** Vivekananda who held that this would be in accordance with '**Yuga Dharma**', which to the Hindu traditions functions in accordance with the principle of continuity.

Singh (1986) identified three major stages of transition in the elite structure of Indian society. The first is that which prevailed till the British established their superiority. The elite of this period is characterised by him as the monarchical feudal elite of traditional type legitimising their authority on the basis of traditional status honour and charisma. During the second stage, i.e., during the British rule, the nationalist - liberal educated elite emerged. This group of elite did not belong to feudal - monarchical class or landed aristocracy but to an emerging professional middle class, and imbued with Western ideology of liberal humanism, democracy, egalitarianism, nationalism and industrialism. In the third stage, **i.e., in** the post-independence period, a new elite with political populist orientation and with more pragmatic and specific policy orientation emerged from the agricultural and lower class and caste backgrounds .

It is clear **from** the above that the elite structure in India has registered a change in its characteristics and also in respect of orientation in the second half of the twentieth century. It is now proposed to examine the social and political background of the respondents in the sample.

Political Party:

In Indian political **culture, charismatic** leadership and place of political party have very prominent roles. Ever since the national movement under the eminent and charismatic leadership of national leaders like Mahatma Gandhi, Jawaharlal Nehru and BalGangadhar **Tilak** , the Indian National Congress played a significant role in winning independence and the trend of giving importance to party labels , keeping in view the charismatic leadership and personality factor of the leader (personality cult) seems to continue.

In a political system like India, where representatives have to depend, to a large extent , on party leadership and party labels to contest and to get elected in general elections, membership in various political parties will have a major bearing on **representatives'** political behaviour. It is very essential to consider political party membership of the respondents to comprehend parties' influence on their participation levels.

In Andhra Pradesh, the Indian National Congress had been the dominant political force for nearly three decades. It formed

government after all the general elections of the legislative assembly till 1983. The **continōus** Congress rule in this state was challenged by a regional party (Telugu **Desam** Party) founded by the charismatic cinema star, **Mr.N.T.Rama** Rao in 1982. As observed by Jha (1988) one of the reasons for the rise of Telugu Desam Party as any other regional party in India was the failure of both the Congress and all the Indian Opposition parties to gauge the feelings of the people at regional level. ⁷ **Mr.N.T.Rama** Rao's efficient and successful use of regional symbols such as Telugu **language,culture** and self-respect is another important reason.

The Telugu Desam Party formed the government for the first time in 1983 but this government could not complete its total tenure due to untoward conditions and in another general election held in 1985 the party again came to power with a thumping majority. In this assembly, which is the research site for the present study, more than two-thirds of the House consists of the Telugu Desam Party members. The political party-wise distribution of the Eighth Legislative Assembly of Andhra Pradesh and of the present sample is shown in Table 4.1.

Age:

The behaviour of the representatives would be determined, to an extent, by their age. It is generally felt that age of representatives has some bearing upon their ideological commitment and that young representatives tend to be more radical in their ideology than the middle aged , who generally follow a moderate

TABLE 4.1

PARTY WISE DISTRIBUTION OF THE MEMBERS OF THE EIGHTS
LEGISLATIVE ASSEMBLY OF ANDHRA PRADESB AMD THE PRESENT SAHPL

POLITICAL PARTY	8th APLA		PBESNT SAHPL	
	HO.	%	HO.	X
TP	22	68.47	65	59.09
CONG-I	50	16.95	22	20.00
CPI	11	3.73	4	3.64
CPI(M)	11	3.73	7	6.36
BP	8	2.71	4	3.64
JP	3	1.02	2	1.82
HM	4	1.36	2	1.81
MCPI	1	0.34	-	.
INDT	5	1.69	4	3.64
TOTAL	295	100.00	110	100.00

SOURCE: Who's who of Andhra Pradesh Legislative Assembly 1985.

TABLE 4.2

AGE-WISE DISTRIBUTION OF MEMBERS OF APLA FROM 1967 TO 1985 ADD THE PRESENT SAMPLE

AGE	1967		1972		1978		1985		PRESENT SAMPLE	
GROUP	NO.	%	NO.	%	NO.	%	NO.	%	NO.	%
25 - 30	4	1.39	6	2.08	12	4.07	11	3.73	2	1.82
31 - 40	40	13.89	67	23.26	62	21.02	88	29.83	14	12.73
41 - 50	90	31.25	85	29.51	87	29.49	73	24.75	57	51.82
51 - 60	49	17.01	48	16.67	68	23.05	50	16.95	22	20.00
61 (Above	19	6.60	10	3.48	20	6.78	22	7.45	15	13.63
Not Known	86	29.86	72	25.00	46	15.59	51	17.29	-	
TOTAL	288	100.00	288	100.00	285	100.00	295	100.00	110	100.00

SODRCE: Who's Who of Heibers of Andhra Pradesh Legislative Assembly 1967, 1972, 1978 and 1985 and Personal Interviews.

ideology, while old aged are **more** prone to be conservatives **with** fixed world-view, owing to their long experience.

The **minimum** age limit prescribed by the Indian Constitution **for** contesting as an MLA is 25 years. An examination of the age-wise distribution of the members of the Andhra Pradesh Legislative Assembly from 1967 to 1985 as given in Table 4.2 reveals that a majority of them belong to the age group of 41-60.

The present sample shows a similar trend as noted in Table 4.2 and 4.3. 71% of the respondents in the sample belong to the age group of 41-50 and 51-60. Only 13% of them are above 61 years and 13.5% are below 41 years out of which only 1.8% are between 25 to 30 years. Table 4.3 reveals that the age-wise distribution of members belonging to different parties does not show significant variation.

Education:

Educational **qualifications** will have an impact on the behavioural pattern of the legislators as highly educated representatives are more likely to possess the quality of understanding, confidence and to be better leaders than less educated and uneducated persons.

There is an unending debate over the necessity or other wise of imposing any minimum educational **qualifications** for a representative. Those who would argue in favour of imposing certain minimum educational **qualifications** for legislators say that as the duties of representatives inside the House include

law-making and transaction of other legislative business which are filled with numerous technicalities, it is essential for a representative to possess a reasonably good educational background. But the **counter-argument** is that the job of representatives needs practical wisdom and general awareness of the political processes and of the functions associated with representative roles can be acquired without formal education. They further argue that **imposing** minimum educational **qualification** for representatives would amount to depriving opportunities to the uneducated to contest in general elections, which is particularly unjust in the case of developing countries where more than 50% of the population is illiterate.

This issue was discussed at length in the Constituent Assembly of India. Its chairman, Dr. Rajendra Prasad, and some other members were of the opinion that there should be some educational **qualifications** for legislators. But a majority of members of the Assembly expressed that as the verdict of the people is in itself final, prescribing academic **qualifications** for representatives will lead to eliminating and discriminating many otherwise eligible people from the privilege of becoming representatives.⁸ Supporting this view point Kashyap (1988), the Secretary General of Indian Lok Sabha argued, "the House of People is a representative body, its function is to represent people and the credentials of every Member of Parliament is that he represents **people**".⁹ He also added that the election of an MP by some lakhs of people will itself becomes a credential and there is no need for any other credentials.

TABLE 4.3

PARTY - WISE DISTRIBUTION OF RESPONDENTS' AGE-PROFILE

POLITICAL PARTY	25 - 30		31 - 40		41 - 50		51 - 60		61 AND ABOVE		TOTAL							
	NO.	PER%	NO.	PER%	NO.	PER%	NO.	PER%	NO.	PER%	NO.	PER%						
TDP	1	50.00	1.54	10	71.43	15.38	35	61.40	53.85	10	45.45	15.83	9	60.00	13.85	65	59.09	100.00
CONG-I	-	-	-	3	21.43	13.64	10	17.54	45.45	6	27.27	27.27	3	20.00	13.64	22	20.00	100.00
CPI	1	50.00	25.00	-	-	-	3	5.26	75.00	-	-	-	-	-	-	4	3.64	100.00
CPI(M)	-	-	-	-	-	-	4	7.02	57.14	2	9.09	28.57	1	6.67	14.29	7	6.36	100.00
BJP	-	-	-	1	7.14	25.00	1	1.75	25.00	1	4.54	25.00	1	6.67	25.00	4	3.64	100.00
JP	-	-	-	-	-	-	1	1.75	50.00	1	4.54	50.00	-	-	-	2	1.82	100.00
MIN	-	-	-	-	-	-	1	1.75	50.00	1	4.54	50.00	-	-	-	2	1.81	100.00
INDT	-	-	-	-	-	-	2	5.71	50.00	1	4.54	25.00	1	6.67	25.00	4	3.64	100.00
TOTAL	2	100.00	1.81	14	100.00	12.73	57	100.00	51.82	22	100.00	20.00	15	100.00	13.64	110	100.00	100.00

NOTE:- V.P.% - Vertical Row Percentage

H.P.% - Horizontal Row Percentage

TABLE 4.4

EDUCATIONAL BACKGROUND OF THE MEMBERS OF ANDHRA PRADESH LEGISLATIVE ASSEMBLY
FROM 1967 TO 1985 AND THE PRESENT SAMPLE

LEVEL OF EDUCATION	1967		1972		1978		1985		PRESENT SAMPLE	
	NO.	%	NO.	%	NO.	%	NO.	%	NO.	%
TILL HIGH SCHOOL/	35	12.5	97	33.68	32	10.85	31	10.51	33	30.00
MATRICULATION										
INTERMEDIATE	60	20.83	62	21.53	48	16.27	73	24.75	13	11.82
GRADUATES	32	11.11	41	14.24	75	25.42	80	27.12	50	45.45
P.G. AND ABOVE	50	17.36	49	17.01	68	23.05	86	29.15	14	12.73
NOT KNOWN	111	28.55	39	13.54	72	24.41	25	8.47	-	-
TOTAL	288	100.00	288	100.00	295	100.00	295	100.00	110	100.00

SOURCE:- Who's Who of Andhra Pradesh Legislative Assembly 1967, 1972, 1978, 1985 and Personal Interviews.

In Andhra Pradesh, the education levels of the members of the Assembly from 1967 to 1985, as shown in Table 4.4 would make clear that the number of representatives who are educated till graduation and above has gradually increased from 28.5% in 1967 to 56.5% in 1985.

In the present sample, 58.3% of members include graduates, professionals, post graduates and those with higher qualifications than post graduation. The party-wise distribution of the respondents on basis of educational levels as indicated in Table 4.5 reveals that while 38.4% of the ruling party members are graduates, and 13.85% post graduates and professionals, 68.18% of the members of the Congress-I, the main Opposition party in the House are graduates and 13.63% of them are post graduates and professionals. Thus in the sample, a majority of the members with higher educational qualification are from the parties other than the ruling party and independents.

Occupation;

Occupation can mould individuals opinion and attitudes and would have an impact on behaviour. It is generally believed that certain professionals like lawyers, educationists and journalists are more suited to the job of legislators as their professions provide the necessary background. According to Max Weber (1946) the ease with which lawyers can combine politics with their profession is one of the primary reasons for the predominance of lawyers in legislatures. ⁰ Scholars like Lasswell

TABLE 4.5

EDUCATIONAL BACKGROUND AND PART I OF THE RESPONDENTS

POLITICAL PARTY	TILL HIGH SCHOOL			MATRICULATION INTERMEDIATE			GRADUATES			PGs AND PROFESSIONALS			TOTAL		
	NO.	VR%	HR%	NO.	VR%	HR%	NO.	VR%	HR%	NO.	VR%	HR%	NO.	VR%	HR%
TDP	24	72.73	36.92	7	53.85	10.76	25	50.00	38.46	9	64.29	13.84	65	59.09	100.00
CONG-I	3	9.09	13.63	1	7.69	4.54	15	30.00	68.18	3	21.43	13.63	22	20.00	100.00
CPI	-	-	-	1	7.69	25.00	2	4.00	50.00	1	7.14	25.00	4	3.64	100.00
CPI(M)	2	6.06	28.57	1	7.69	14.28	4	8.00	57.14	-	-	-	7	6.36	100.00
BJP	2	6.06	50.00	2	15.38	50.00	-	-	-	-	-	-	4	3.64	100.00
JP	1	3.03	50.00	-	-	-	1	2.00	50.00	-	-	-	2	1.82	100.00
MIN	1	3.03	50.00	-	-	-	1	2.00	50.00	-	-	-	2	1.81	100.00
INDT	-	-	-	1	7.69	25.00	2	4.00	50.00	1	7.14	-	4	3.64	100.00
TOTAL	33	100.00	30.00	13	100.00	11.82	50	100.00	45.45	14	100.00	12.73	110	100.00	100.00

TABLE 4.6

OCCUPATIONAL DISTRIBUTION OF THE MEMBERS OF ANDHRA PRADESH LEGISLATIVE ASSEMBLY FROM 1967 TO 1985

OCCUPATION	1962		1972		1978		1985	
	NO.	%	NO.	%	NO.	%	NO.	%
AGRICULTURISTS	120	41.67	123	42.71	156	52.88	152	51.53
LAWYERS	50	17.36	27	9.38	38	12.88	48	16.27
POLITICAL AND SOCIAL WORKERS	23	7.99	38	13.20	4	1.36	14	4.75
TEACHERS & EDUCATIONISTS	-	-	3	1.42	2	0.68	8	2.71
JOURNALISTS & WRITERS	-	-	2	0.69	2	0.68	2	0.68
DOCTORS & ENGINEERS	5	1.73	9	3.13	8	2.71	20	6.78
OTHERS	4	1.39	21	7.29	19	6.44	12	4.06
NOT KNOWN	86	29.86	65	22.57	66	22.37	39	13.22
TOTAL	288	100.00	288	100.00	295	100.00	295	100.00

SOURCE:- Who's Who of Andhra Pradesh Legislative Assembly 1968, 1972, 1978 and 1985.

and **Mc Dougal (1948)**, Gold (1961), and **Osion (1981)** stressed on the capability level of representatives and said that legal training and experience enable them to acquire appropriate skills to discharge the legislative roles. **Nomination** of lawyers in legislative assemblies seems to be predominantly an American phenomenon. To Bogue and others **(1976)**, lawyers constitute 40 to 65 per cent of the members of American Congress since 1798 and one can find various explanations to **this**.¹¹

In India, lawyers dominated the Indian political scene during national movement and their strength in and influence over legislatures gradually declined after independence. As India is primarily an agrarian society with more than 70 per cent of its population living in villages it is interesting to note that agriculturists constitute a considerable majority of the membership i.e., 38.3% in the Eight Lok Sabha.¹² Similar trend can be seen in Andhra Pradesh Legislative Assembly also. The percentage of agriculturists in the Assembly has registered a slow increase till 1972. But the increase is marked in the later elections as given in Table 4.6.

The present sample consisted of 46.4% of agriculturists but 6.4% of them are lawyers by profession. 9.1% of the sample, though **lawyers, identified** agriculture as their major occupation. There are 10.9% of **professionals** (doctors, doctorates, and engineers) and 14.5% have identified business as their major occupation. Rest of them are either teachers or political and social workers or house-wives. The party-wise break up of the

sample on the basis of occupation as given in Table 4.7 does not show any striking differences among members of the ruling and other parties as well as independent members in this regard.

Political Experience:

Politics as a profession needs certain knowledge regarding the rules of this game and how to play it efficiently and effectively depends on individuals' personal capabilities, experience and exposure to political arena. As political skills are not ascribed but have to be achieved, it is generally perceived that political experience in various public bodies such as legislatures, executives, municipalities, panchayats and at local, state and national levels would greatly enhance representatives' capability in the successful performance of their numerous duties.

An examination of Table 4.8 reveals that the number of members without political experience has remarkably increased from 23.26% in 1972 to 54.42% in 1985. This difference can primarily be explained by taking party politics of the state into consideration. That the newly emerged regional party TDP in 1982 attracted many freshers towards state politics provide a good explanation to this phenomenon. This Table also indicates that most of the members had political experience at local levels than at the state and national level.

The present sample also projects a similar trend. The party-wise break-up of the respondents in the sample regarding

TABLE 4.7

OCCUPATIONAL BACKGROUND AND PARTY OF THE RESPONDENTS

POLITICAL PARTY	AGRICULTURISTS			BUSINESSMEN			LAWYERS			DOCTORS & ENGINEERS			OTHERS			TOTAL		
	NO.	PER%	HR%	NO.	PER%	HR%	NO.	PER%	HR%	NO.	PER%	HR%	NO.	PER%	HR%	NO.	PER%	HR%
TDP	30	58.82	46.15	11	68.75	16.92	10	58.83	15.38	7	58.33	10.76	7	50.00	10.76	65	59.09	100.00
CONG-I	9	17.65	40.91	4	25.00	18.18	4	23.53	18.18	3	25.00	13.64	2	14.29	9.09	22	20.00	100.00
CPI	2	3.92	50.00	-	-	-	1	5.88	25.00	1	8.33	25.00	-	-	-	4	3.64	100.00
CPI(M)	5	9.80	71.42	-	-	-	1	5.88	14.29	-	-	-	1	7.14	14.29	7	6.36	100.00
BJP	2	3.92	50.00	1	6.25	25.00	-	-	-	-	-	-	1	7.14	25.00	4	3.64	100.00
JP	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-
NIN	1	1.96	50.00	-	-	-	-	-	-	1	8.34	50.00	-	-	-	2	1.81	100.00
INDT	2	3.92	50.00	-	-	-	1	5.88	25.00	-	-	-	1	7.14	25.00	4	3.64	100.00
TOTAL	51	100.00	46.36	16	100.00	14.55	17	100.00	15.45	12	100.00	10.91	14	100.00	12.73	110	100.00	100.00

TABLE 4.8

POLITICAL EXPERIENCE OF THE MEMBERS OF ANDHRA PRADESH LEGISLATIVE ASSEMBLY FROM 1967 TO 1985 AND THE PRESENT SAMPLE

POLITICAL EXPERIENCE	1967			1972			1978			1985			PRESENT SAMPLE		
	NO.	PER%	HR%	NO.	PER%	HR%	NO.	PER%	HR%	NO.	PER%	HR%	NO.	PER%	HR%
PARLIAMENT	4	1.39	5	1.74	7	2.37	3	1.02	-	-	-	-	-	-	-
STATE	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-
LEGISLATURE	83	28.82	75	26.04	76	25.76	28	9.49	23	20.91	-	-	-	-	-
LOCAL BODIES	92	31.94	137	47.57	87	29.49	85	28.81	25	22.73	-	-	-	-	-
NO EXPERIENCE	23	7.99	67	23.26	85	28.81	160	54.24	62	56.36	-	-	-	-	-
NOT KNOWN	86	29.86	6	2.08	40	13.37	19	6.44	-	-	-	-	-	-	-
TOTAL	288	100.00	288	100.00	295	100.00	295	100.00	110	100.00	-	-	-	-	-

SOURCE:- Who's Who of Andhra Pradesh Legislative Assembly 1967, 1972, 1978 and 1985.

political experience as Table 4.9 makes it clear **that** while 72.3% of the ruling party **members** are without political experience, only 18.8% of the major Opposition party and 47.83% of other parties and independents do not have experience in political institutions.

Community Background:

The Indian Constitution has provided reservations for the Scheduled Castes and Scheduled Tribes in legislatures as a measure of protecting their rights and giving them an opportunity to integrate themselves in the mainstream of development. Reservation of seats to the underprivileged would give scope to members elected from such seats to focus the interests of these sections in particular and the interests of the community in **general**.

As shown in Table 4.10, 12.2% members of the Eighth Legislative Assembly belong to the Scheduled Castes and Scheduled Tribes and 17.3% in the sample belong to these communities. Table 4.11 reveals that a majority of members from reserved communities are from the ruling party.

Membership in Social Organisations:

Membership in social **organisations** would increase representatives' social affiliations and contacts. This in turn, is likely to lead to their effective participation.

TABLE 4.9
PARTY - WISE DISTRIBUTION OF RESPONDENTS POLITICAL EXPERIENCE

POLITICAL PARTY	STATE LEGISLATURE			LOCAL BODIES			BOTH LEVELS			NO POLITICAL EXPERIENCE			TOTAL		
	NO.	VR%	HR%	NO.	VR%	HR%	NO.	VR%	HR%	NO.	VR%	HR%	NO.	VR%	HR%
TDP	5	21.74	7.69	13	61.91	20.00	-	-	-	47	75.81	72.31	65	59.09	100.00
CONG - I	12	52.17	54.55	4	19.05	18.18	2	50.00	9.09	4	6.45	18.18	22	20.00	100.00
CPI	1	4.35	25.00	1	4.76	25.00	-	-	-	2	3.23	50.00	4	3.64	100.00
CPI(M)	2	8.70	28.51	1	4.76	14.29	1	25.00	14.28	3	4.84	42.86	7	6.36	100.00
BJP	2	8.69	50.00	-	-	-	-	-	-	2	3.23	50.00	4	3.64	100.00
JP	-	-	-	1	4.76	50.00	-	-	-	1	1.61	50.00	2	1.82	100.00
NIM	1	4.35	50.00	-	-	-	-	-	-	1	1.61	50.00	2	1.82	100.00
INDT	-	-	-	1	4.76	25.00	1	25.00	25.00	2	3.22	50.00	4	3.63	100.00
TOTAL	23	100.00	20.91	21	100.00	19.09	4	100.00	3.64	62	100.00	56.36	110	100.00	100.00

TABLE 4.10

COMMUNITY - WISE DISTRIBUTION OF THE MEMBERS OF THE EIGHTH
ANDHRA PRADESH LEGISLATIVE AND THE PRESENT SAMPLE

COMMUNITY	EIGHT APLA		PRESENT SAMPLE	
	NO.	%	NO.	%
S.C	28	7.79	12	10.91
S.T.	13	4.41	7	6.36
OTHERS	259	87.80	91	82.73
TOTAL	295	100.00	110	100.00

SOURCES:- Who's who of the Eighth APLA 1985 and Personal Interviews.

TABLE 4.11
COMMUNITY - PROFILE OF THE RESPONDENTS AND THEIR PARTY AFFILIATION

POLITICAL PARTY	SCHEDULED CASTE MEMBERS			SCHEDULED TRIBE MEMBERS			OTHERS			TOTAL		
	NO.	VR%	HR%	NO.	VR%	HR%	NO.	VR%	HR%	NO.	VR%	HR%
TDP	11	91.67	16.92	3	42.86	4.62	51	56.04	78.46	65	59.09	100.00
CONG-I	1	8.33	4.55	1	14.29	4.55	20	21.98	90.90	22	20.00	100.00
CPI	-	-	-	-	-	-	4	4.39	100.00	4	3.64	100.00
CPI(M)	-	-	-	1	14.28	14.29	6	6.59	85.71	7	6.36	100.00
BJP	-	-	-	2	28.57	50.00	2	2.20	50.00	4	3.64	100.00
JP	-	-	-	-	-	-	2	2.20	100.00	2	1.82	100.00
NIM	-	-	-	-	-	-	2	2.20	100.00	2	1.82	100.00
INDY	-	-	-	-	-	-	4	4.40	100.00	4	3.63	100.00
TOTAL	12	100.00	10.91	7	100.00	6.36	91	100.00	82.73	110	100.00	100.00

TABLE 4.12
LINKS BETWEEN MEMBERSHIP IN SOCIAL ORGANISATIONS AND POLITICAL PARTY OF THE RESPONDENTS

POLITICAL PARTY	MEMBERS OF SOCIAL ORGANISATIONS			NOT MEMBERS OF SOCIAL ORGANISATIONS			TOTAL		
	NO.	VR%	HR%	NO.	VR%	HR%	NO.	VR%	HR%
TDP	19	41.30	29.23	46	71.88	70.77	65	59.09	100.00
CONG-I	13	28.26	59.09	9	14.06	40.91	22	20.00	100.00
CPI	2	4.36	50.00	2	3.13	50.00	4	3.64	100.00
CIP(M)	6	13.04	85.71	1	1.56	14.29	7	6.36	100.00
BJP	1	2.17	25.00	3	4.69	75.00	4	3.64	100.00
JP	2	4.35	100.00	-	-	-	2	1.82	100.00
NIM	1	2.17	25.00	1	1.56	25.00	2	1.82	50.00
INDY	2	4.36	50.00	2	3.12	50.00	4	3.63	100.00
TOTAL	46	100.00	41.82	64	100.00	48.18	110	100.00	100.00

In the present **sample** 41.8% of the respondents are **members** of various social organisations such as trade union, Lion's Club, fisherman's association and **farmers'** association and some caste **and** religious associations. Table 4.12 shows that members of the Opposition parties and independents have a definite edge over the members of the ruling party in this regard.

Region-wise Distribution:

Representatives' participation is influenced, to a certain extent, by environmental characteristics of the area to which they belong.

There are three distinct regions in the state of Andhra Pradesh -the Coastal Andhra, Telangana and Rayalseema occupying the first, second and third places respectively in terms of development.

It can be observed from Table 4.13 that the percentage of the representatives from these regions are nearly equal in the Eighth Assembly and also in the sample. The ruling party members are proportionately more in Coastal Andhra region than those in the two other regions. This can be seen from Table 4.14. More than 60% of the representatives of Telangana region are from the non-ruling parties.

Nature of Constituency:

Representatives from urban constituencies tend to be more active in institutional participation than representatives

TABLE 4.13

REGION - WISE DISTRIBUTION OF THE MEMBERS OF THE EIGHTH APLA
AND THE PRESENT SAMPLE

REGION	EIGHTH APLA		PRESENT SAMPLE	
	NO.	%	NO.	%
ANDHRA	134	45.42	47	42.73
RAYALASEEMA	53	17.97	21	19.09
TELANGANA	108	36.61	42	38.18
T O T A L	295	100.00	110	100.00

SOURCE:- Who's Who of the APLA 1985.

TABLE 4.14

REGIONAL PROFILE AND POLITICAL PARTY OF THE RESPONDENTS

POLITICAL PARTY	ANDHRA			RAYALASEEMA			TELANGANA			TOTAL		
	NO.	VR%	HR%	NO.	VR%	HR%	NO.	VR%	HR%	NO.	VR%	HR%
TDP	37	78.72	56.92	13	61.90	20.00	15	35.71	23.08	65	59.09	100.00
CONG-I	6	12.77	27.27	8	38.10	36.36	8	19.05	36.36	22	20.00	100.00
CPI	-	-	-	-	-	-	4	9.53	100.00	4	3.64	100.00
CPI(M)	2	4.25	28.57	-	-	-	5	11.90	71.43	7	6.36	100.00
BJP	1	2.13	25.00	-	-	-	3	7.14	75.00	4	3.64	100.00
JP	-	-	-	-	-	-	2	4.76	100.00	2	1.82	100.00
NIM	-	-	-	-	-	-	2	4.76	100.00	2	1.82	100.00
INDT	1	2.13	25.00	-	-	-	3	7.14	75.00	4	3.64	100.00
TOTAL	47	100.00	42.73	21	100.00	19.09	42	100.00	38.18	110	100.00	100.00

from rural background, who would be more interested in constituency service.

In the sample under study 65.5% are elected from rural constituencies and 34.5% from urban constituencies. Table 4.15 makes this point clear. A majority of the members of the TDP and the Congress I have rural base. A very high percentage of representatives from the CPI (M) and the BJP are elected from rural constitutencies while the MIM has a predominantly urban base.

Sex-Wise Distribution:

Women are generally under represented in legislative bodies all over the world. Even in the developed Western European countries and in the U.S., so far, the percentage of women in legislative bodies is very limited. Bullock and Heys (1972) made an interesting study in which they pointed out that 41% of all women members who served in the American Congress prior to 1969 were appointed to vacancies created by the death of their husbands and these women are not interested in making politics as their careers. Women are better represented in some of the Scandinavian countries and communist countries, while in Western and Third World countries their number in legislatures is negligible. To Matthews (1984), structural inadequacies of political systems may be responsible for the existence of such differences. He observed that in countries with stronger political parties, nominations controlled by established party leaders, and proportional representation based election, facilitates easy electoral success for women candidates.¹⁴

TABLE 4.15

LINKS BETWEEN NATURE OF CONSTITUENCY AND POLITICAL PARTY OF THE RESPONDENTS

POLITICAL PARTY	RURAL CONSTITUENCY			URBAN CONSTITUENCY			TOTAL		
	NO.	VR%	HR%	NO.	VR%	HR%	NO.	VR%	HR%
TDP	44	61.11	67.69	21	55.26	32.31	65	59.09	100.00
CONG-I	14	19.44	63.64	8	21.05	36.36	22	20.00	100.00
CPI	2	2.78	50.00	2	5.26	50.00	4	3.64	100.00
CPI (M)	6	8.33	85.71	1	2.63	14.29	7	6.36	100.00
BJP	3	4.17	75.00	1	2.63	25.00	4	3.64	100.00
JP	1	1.39	50.00	1	2.63	50.00	2	1.82	100.00
NIM	-	-	-	2	5.27	100.00	2	1.82	100.00
INDTS	2	2.78	50.00	2	5.27	50.00	4	3.63	100.00
TOTAL	72	100.00	70.91	38	100.00	29.09	110	100.00	100.00

TABLE 4.16

SEX-WISE DISTRIBUTION OF RESPONDENTS AND THEIR PARTY AFFILIATION

POLITICAL PARTY	MALE			FEMALE			TOTAL		
	NO.	VR%	HR%	NO.	VR%	HR%	NO.	VR%	HR%
TDP	61	58.65	93.85	4	66.67	6.15	65	59.09	100.00
CONG-I	21	20.19	95.45	1	16.67	4.45	22	20.00	100.00
CPI	4	3.85	100.00	-	-	-	4	3.64	100.00
CPI(M)	7	6.74	100.00	-	-	-	7	6.36	100.00
BJP	4	3.85	100.00	-	-	-	4	3.64	100.00
JP	2	1.92	100.00	-	-	-	2	1.82	100.00
NIM	2	1.92	100.00	-	-	-	2	1.82	100.00
INDTS	3	2.88	75.00	1	16.66	25.00	4	3.63	100.00
TOTAL	104	100.00	94.55	6	100.00	5.45	110	100.00	100.00

Like their counterparts elsewhere, women are disproportionately under represented in the Indian Parliament.¹⁵

Similar is the situation in Andhra Pradesh. There are only 11 women members out of 295 members in the Eighth Legislative Assembly. Six of the eleven **women** members form part of the present sample and their party-wise break up is provided in Table 4.16.

Party Position:

Political party leaders, either at local or state level will have a definite advantage over ordinary members of the Legislative Assembly and their position as leaders will have an impact on their participation levels.

In the present sample, eight of the respondents are in leadership position either at state or local levels. The party-wise distribution of these leaders is given in Table 4.17.

Economic Background:

As noted earlier, higher economic status coupled with personal ability to bear election expenses has become an essential pre-requisite for assuming roles of political representatives in all political systems, specially in those where contestants have to depend on private assets and contacts and where state funding of elections is absent.

In the case of more than 90% of the respondents in the sample, the annual income ranges between Rs.25,000 to **Rs.40,000**

which obviously is a high income. In the present context there are no significant variations in incomes which permit grouping of members into low, middle and high . Hence, the economic factor is not taken as one which determines the participation levels of the respondents.

As is generally found in political systems, representatives in the present **sample** are mostly drawn from higher social and economic strata of society, predominantly male, and are affiliated to one political party or the other. A majority of them are ordinary members of the party and freshers to political arena. Most of them are from rural constituencies with agricultur as the major occupation and are not members of social organisations.

SECTION II

POLITICAL SOCIALIZATION AND RECRUITMENT PATTERN:

The socio-economic and political background of the members in the sample was discussed in the previous section. This section would focus on **representatives'** initial decision to enter politics, sources of election funding, causes for electoral success, personality traits such as locus of control motivating factors and ambition levels.

Members of legislative bodies have numerous important roles and functions to perform as popular representatives. Their effective role performance is dependent on ascriptive and

achieved factors like socio-economic and political background, patterns of recruitment into roles, personality, attitudes, values, knowledge, motivating factors, incentives, position in party, sex and level of ambition. In simple terms, entry **into** political roles and role performance are influenced by political **socialisation** processes and political culture as political socialisation of representatives has an important bearing on their political recruitment and participation.

Political **socialisation** involves and links individuals, groups and society as a whole in a learning process. Political **socialisation** of political representatives is basically a continuous learning process through various agencies like family, **peer** group, educational institutions, caste, religion, region, interest groups, social organisations and not the least, political parties. It is evolved out of constant interaction of personality and politically relevant experience of individuals. On the one hand, personal experience of an individual moulds personality and on the other, personality plays a decisive role in his/her perceptions. Thus, personality and personal experience mutually influence each other.

Initial Decision :

In order to comprehend how political socialisation influences political recruitment processes, the respondents are asked to identify factors or groups that have played prominent role in their initial decision to enter political field and to

contest in election. Information provided by the respondents is classified under four heads namely personal factor , primary group influence , secondary group influence ,and political party influence as shown in Table 4.18.

'Interest in politics', 'leadership roles in school and colleges', 'personal liking towards politics as a means of serving people', 'inspiration derived from the ideals and service of leaders like Gandhi, Nehru and Tanguturi Prakasam' have been some of the factors leading to entry into political careers of those who identified personal factor as the chief factor. One respondent said, "entering into political arena to serve people is my cherished ideal ever since my childhood". To another, "I am very active and a sociable person since school days. I worked as the class representative, school pupils' leader and served as college president. So, I feel contesting for election is only a continuation of my earlier roles".

The responses of the members who identified primary group as their main source of encouragement can be divided into two categories. In the first category family members- grandfathers, fathers or uncles were politicians and political job was something that was ascribed to them. In the second category, family members and peer groups helped and encouraged the respondents to become politicians. The reply of a respondent who said, "my father was an MLA for two terms and died while in office. My family members, relatives and friends forced me to contest for bye- election. This is how I was induced to enter

politics. But once I got elected **and** entered politics, I got interested in it and now it **became almost my career**", can be given as an example of the first category. Another respondent who **felt**, "I owe a lot to my family members and close friends who constantly encouraged me by providing the necessary help to enter politics. Without their affectionate help, my dream of becoming an **MLA** could never have been realised," serves as an illustration of the second type.

The respondents from reserved and backward communities, in general, identified secondary group i.e., community and caste as the major source of inspiration for their decision to contest. To a respondent, "my inclination to serve my community and the co-operation I got from my community members greatly influenced my decision to stand as a candidate in general election".

It is interesting to note that in the case of more than 50% of the respondents belonging to the ruling party, their party served as the chief influencing factor. One TDP member said, "the call of the new regional party (TDP) under the dynamic leadership of Mr. N.T.Rama Rao with progressive ideology has been the main source of inspiration to me". To another, "the unbounded corruption of the Congress-I regime, stagnation in developmental activities all over the state necessitated immediate political change in the state. Our party emerged at the right time with a right purpose and incited many of our party members to enter political arena and work for the betterment of the state politics".

8.18% of the respondents could not distinguish which particular factor helped their decision. One member said, "I cannot point out any single factor in this regard. Everything worked out so dramatically and it is certainly not a premeditated plan or long cherished goal". To some of them, their entry into politics is due to '**unexpected opportunity**'.

The party-wise distribution of the responses in this regard as shown in Table 4.18 reveals that there is observable difference in the ruling and other party members' perceptions regarding personal factor as the main reason leading them to contest. While 46.67% of the respondents belonging to other parties identified personal factor's influence, only 6.15% of the ruling party members identified this factor as the decisive factor. Cent percent of Janata Party respondents and 75% of the BJP members and independents indentified this as the chief factor.

Major Source Of Election Funding :

Money power matters heavily in elections and in absence of state funding an individual who is willing to contest has to bear most of the election and campaign expenditure.

From the data, it is evident that personal investment is the primary source. Among other sources of campaign funding, investment by primary groups, secondary groups and by political party has been helpful to 46.36%, 20% and 24.56% of the respondents in the sample, respectively. 9.09% of them have not

TABLE 4.17

NATURE OF MEMBERSHIP OF RESPONDENTS IN VARIOUS POLITICAL PARTIES

POLITICAL PARTY	ORDINARY MEMBERS			PARTY LEADERS			TOTAL		
	NO.	VE%	HE%	NO.	VE%	HE%	NO.	VE%	HE%
TDP	63	61.76	96.92	2	25.00	3.08	65	59.09	100.00
CONG - I	20	19.62	90.91	2	25.00	9.09	22	20.00	100.00
CPI	3	2.94	75.00	1	12.50	25.00	4	3.64	100.00
CPI (M)	6	5.88	85.71	1	12.50	14.29	7	6.36	100.00
BJP	3	2.94	75.00	1	12.50	25.00	4	3.64	100.00
JP	1	0.98	50.00	1	12.50	50.00	2	1.82	100.00
MIN	2	1.96	100.00	-	-	-	2	1.82	100.00
INDTS	4	3.92	100.00	-	-	-	4	3.63	100.00
TOTAL	102	100.00	92.73	8	100.00	7.27	110	100.00	100.00

TABLE 4.18

LINKS BETWEEN FACTORS INFLUENCING INITIAL DECISION OF RESPONDENTS AND POLITICAL PARTY OF THE RESPONDENTS

POL. PARTY	PERSONAL INTEREST			PRIMARY GROUP			SECONDARY GROUP			POLITICAL PARTY			OTHERS			TOTAL		
	NO.	VE%	HE%	NO.	VE%	HE%	NO.	VE%	HE%	NO.	VE%	HE%	NO.	VE%	HE%	NO.	VE%	HE%
TDP	4	14.81	6.15	16	94.12	24.62	3	42.86	4.62	37	74.00	56.92	5	55.56	7.69	65	59.09	100.00
CONG-I	11	40.74	50.00	-	-	-	3	42.86	13.64	5	10.00	22.73	3	33.33	13.64	22	20.00	100.00
CPI	2	7.41	50.00	-	-	-	-	-	-	1	2.00	25.00	1	11.11	25.00	4	3.64	100.00
CPI(M)	2	7.41	28.57	-	-	-	-	-	-	5	10.00	71.43	-	-	-	7	6.36	100.00
BJP	3	11.11	75.00	-	-	-	-	-	-	1	2.00	25.00	-	-	-	4	3.64	100.00
JP	2	7.41	100.00	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	2	1.82	100.00
MIN	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	2	1.82	100.00
INDT	3	11.11	75.00	1	5.88	25.00	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	4	3.63	100.00
TOTAL	27	100.00	24.55	17	100.00	15.45	7	100.00	6.36	50	100.00	45.45	9	100.00	8.18	110	100.00	100.00

identified **the primary** source of election funding. This is clear from Table 4.19.

The party-wise break up associated with election funding reveals that 58.46% of the ruling party members relied mainly on personal and primary group finance while 54.54% of the Opposition relied on personal and party funds. It is interesting to note that independents' major source, with no single exception, is family and personal money while the source of finance of the two Janata Party members is personal and secondary group.

It would now be useful to illustrate **representatives** responses in this regard. To one ruling party member, "money is the primary and the most important factor in politics than ideology and personality. Sufficient economic background and financial status is a must to become a politician". Another member said "politics is a risky and unpredictable business. One should be in a position to invest lakhs of rupees while success is uncertain." "My personal savings, financial help from family members and loans from friends and relatives formed a major part of my election expenses", said yet another member. A respondent from a backward community stated, "my personal assets and contribution by my community members have been helpful to meet the election expenses." "The help that I received from my party is only partial. I had to bear myself the rest of the expenditure", pointed out an Opposition party member.

TABLE 4.19
PRIMARY SOURCE OF ELECTION FUNDING AND POLITICAL PARTY OF THE RESPONDENTS

POLITICAL PARTY	PERSONAL AND PRIMARY GROUP			PERSONAL AND SECONDARY GROUP			PERSONAL AND POLITICAL PARTY			OTHERS			TOTAL		
	NO.	PER%	HE%	NO.	PER%	HE%	NO.	PER%	HE%	NO.	PER%	HE%	NO.	PER%	HE%
TDP	38	74.51	58.46	13	59.09	20.00	9	33.33	13.85	5	50.00	7.69	65	59.89	100.00
CONG-I	6	11.76	27.27	1	4.55	4.55	12	44.44	-5.55	3	30.00	13.53	22	20.00	100.00
CPI	1	1.96	25.00	-	-	-	3	11.11	75.00	-	-	-	4	3.64	100.00
CPI(M)	1	1.96	14.29	3	13.64	42.85	2	7.41	28.57	1	10.00	14.29	7	6.36	100.00
BJP	1	1.95	25.00	2	9.09	50.00	1	3.71	25.00	-	-	-	4	3.64	100.00
JP	-	-	-	2	9.09	100.00	-	-	-	-	-	-	2	1.82	100.00
MIN	-	-	-	1	4.54	50.00	-	-	-	1	10.00	50.00	2	1.82	100.00
INDT	4	7.84	100.00	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	4	3.63	100.00
TOTAL	51	100.00	46.36	22	100.00	20.00	27	100.00	24.54	10	100.00	9.09	110	100.00	100.00

TABLE 4.20

LINKS BETWEEN PRIMARY REASONS FOR ELECTORAL SUCCESS AND POLITICAL PARTY OF THE RESPONDENTS

POLITICAL PARTY	PERSONAL CAPABILITIES			POLITICAL PARTY'S INFLUENCE			PERSONAL AND POLITICAL PARTY			OTHERS			TOTAL		
	NO.	PER%	HE%	NO.	PER%	HE%	NO.	PER%	HE%	NO.	PER%	HE%	NO.	PER%	HE%
TDP	8	25.00	12.31	34	97.14	52.30	15	60.00	23.08	8	44.44	12.31	65	59.89	100.00
CONG-I	12	37.50	54.55	1	2.86	4.55	3	12.00	13.63	6	33.33	27.27	22	20.00	100.00
CPI	2	6.25	50.00	-	-	-	2	8.00	50.00	-	-	-	4	3.64	100.00
CPI(M)	3	9.35	42.86	-	-	-	1	4.00	14.28	3	16.67	42.86	7	6.36	100.00
BJP	2	6.25	50.00	-	-	-	2	8.00	50.00	-	-	-	4	3.64	100.00
JP	-	-	-	-	-	-	1	4.00	50.00	1	5.56	50.00	2	1.82	100.00
MIN	1	3.15	50.00	-	-	-	1	4.00	50.00	-	-	-	2	1.82	100.00
INDP	4	12.50	100.00	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	4	3.63	100.00
TOTAL	32	100.00	29.09	35	100.00	31.82	25	100.00	22.73	18	100.00	16.36	110	100.00	100.00

Winning The Game : The Primary Factor :

As shown in Table 4.20, nearly equal number of respondents have considered personal and party factors as the primary reasons for their electoral success. 54.54% of the Congress-I respondents and cent percent of the independents ascribed success to their personal characteristics while 52.30% of the ruling party members have identified party as a decisive factor in their success.

Some of the Opposition members felt that the ruling party members got elected mainly due to the Telugu Desam 'wave' factor and to the charisma of its leader but not because of the personal merit of the members. Some of the ruling party members said that their party's electoral promises that social welfare measures and developmental activities would be implemented have been a source of attraction to people and won people's confidence in their party and this served as a major factor for their electoral success. To one of the ruling party respondents, "people wanted a change as they were fed up with the corrupt congress rule for 30 years". He also added, "our party's genuine social welfare measures like the supply of rice at a very low price of Rs. 2/- per kilogram, was appreciated by people and our party's programmes helped us to win ". Some representatives from the CPI, CPI (M), BJP, and MIM have also felt that along with their personal capabilities, their party ideology has been, to some extent, responsible for the success.

Most of the respondents from Opposition parties and all independent **members** identified personal factor as the major factor. To an Opposition party member with political experience, "it is my service to my constituents that produced confidence in them that I would function as their representative and that I have the capability to deliver the goods they need. It is this situation that helped me to withstand the strong N.T.Rama Rao wave". "More than the party label, people look for a person who is capable of representing their interests and who can act in a responsive manner", said an independent **member**. A respondent who got elected for six times from the same constituency noted , "a representative should not hide his identity under the party label. He should convince people about his personality and capabilities to become a successful politician. He should gain the confidence of the people through his personal characteristics such as sincerity and responsibility".

Some of the respondents from the reserved constituencies identified their community as the major factor for their success. "Encouragement from my **community** coupled with **peoples'** confidence in my integrity enabled me to win the electoral battle", said a Scheduled Caste representative.

16.36% of the respondents have identified some other factors such as family status, caste factor, politically useful personal contacts with various groups and communities in the constituency, leading to success.

Personality Factor :

It **is** widely accepted that personality of an individual has a definite bearing on his/her attitudes, perceptions and behaviour. It is also the generally held view, especially since Lasswell (1948) propounded his theory of political personality that a person who enters politics will have a special type of personality which can be called as political personality. But there is no consensus regarding the range of various types of personality and no theory to suggest how to predict the behaviour of an individual having certain types of personality traits. And very few **empirical** studies have linked traits and behaviour.

Lasswell (1948) identified four personality types - 'the political agitator', who is skilled in the area of personal contact and in arousing political emotions; 'the political administrator; who is skilled in the manipulation of organisation and situation; '**the** political theorist', who is skilled in the manipulation of ideas; and 'the bureaucrat', who overemphasizes formal rules and organisation and responds habitually to a given **situation**. To him, 'power is accentuated in personalities under conditions of motivation, skill, and opportunity'.¹⁷

"The Authoritarian Personality " by Adorno et al (1950) can be regarded as one of the best known attempts to postulate a particular type of personality. In this work, authoritarian personality is characterised by dominance, impatience and intolerance. **Hyman (1969)**, who studied the political behaviour of the U.S. citizens from three angles - participation, political

orientation and democratic or authoritarian tendency observed that political behaviour is influenced by learning, motivation and emotion, and perceptual or cognitive process and asserted that "individuals are socialized into politics on the basis of their experiences in given groups and environments, but they are not victimized by such experience. They learn, they receive ideas - but they also actively judge the environment and select **experience.**"¹⁹

Milbrath and Goel (1977), applying psychological approach to study political participation of the U.S. citizens concluded that '**political gladiators**' who are the most participant citizens are confident of their knowledge and skills, possess strong egos, and are astute, sociable, and responsible. ¹⁹ **Browning** and Jacob (1964) note that there are no distinguishable personality traits for politicians and non-politicians and "simply being a politician does not entail a distinctive concern for power or for achievement or **affiliation.**" ²⁰ Bullett (1977) observed that a politician's personality has become a substantial condition of his success for winning and holding office. To Bullett, a personality having the characteristics of moderation, sincerity and warmth is preferable. ²¹

There have been some attempts to study the distinctive characteristics of democratic and dictatorial personalities. Eysenck (1954) envisaged a two - dimensional approach to study political personality with the help of a two attitude scale - 1) Radicalism - Conservative Syndrome (the R - factor) and 2) Tough

- **minded** and Tender - minded Syndrome (the T - factor) . The **R** factor is self explanatory, consisting of assessing the degree to which an individual holds radical or conservative views. The T - factor includes some pairs of traits. The tender - minded personality, which is democratic will be a nationalist, intellectualist, idealist, optimist, religious, free - willist, monoistic and dogmatic while the tough - minded, which is dictatorial, possesses traits that are opposite to the tender - minded. To **Eysenck**, the tough - minded tend to be **more** associated with extroversion and the tender - minded more with introversion.²²

Eysenck and Wilson (1975), have constructed a scale ranging from 0-30 to identify 7 major traits of individuals - activity, sociability, risk-taking, impulsiveness, expressiveness, reflectiveness and responsibility to find out the extrovert and introvert nature of a personality. In this scale, those with high scores in the case of activity , sociability, risk-taking, impulsiveness and expressiveness are considered as extroverts and those scoring high in the case of reflectiveness and responsibility as introverts.

The existing theories of political personalities have been useful in suggesting a few models. But yet, the problem of associating the political personalities (the traits of which have been identified through empirical research) with one or the other

of the models continues to remain because of the fact that either some traits connected with the models are found to be absent or some more are evident.

Locus Of Control :

By locating the 'locus of control'- internal or external, one can comprehend the nature of personality of individuals.

Persons with internal locus of control will be internally resourceful and depend on themselves in problem solving and they will initiate, decide and determine to act. Individuals with internal locus of control feel that they can successfully handle the external resources and situations. Individuals with external locus of control tend to give more importance to external factors.

The present study attempts to identify the locus of control of the respondents on the basis of their level of self confidence. On the basis of their answers, the respondents are classified as internally oriented and externally oriented. As shown in Table 4.21, 54.45% of the respondents are externally oriented while 45.54% are internally oriented. The party- wise distribution in this context shows that the ruling party members have a slight edge over the Congress - I respondents in internal locus of control but on the whole, 46.67% of the respondents other than the ruling party members have internal locus of control which is slightly more than that of members from the ruling party.

TABLE 4.21

LINK BETWEEN LOCUS OF CONTROL AND POLITICAL PARTY OF THE RESPONDENTS

POLITICAL PARTY	EXTERNAL LOCUS OF CONTROL			INTERNAL LOCUS OF CONTROL			TOTAL		
	NO.	VR%	HR%	NO.	VR%	HR%	NO.	VR%	HR%
YDP	38	62.29	58.46	27	55.10	41.54	65	59.09	100.00
CONG - I	14	22.95	63.64	8	16.34	36.36	22	20.00	100.00
CPI	3	4.92	75.00	1	2.04	25.00	4	3.64	100.00
CPI (M)	4	6.50	57.14	3	6.12	42.86	7	6.36	100.00
BJP	1	1.64	25.00	3	6.12	75.00	4	3.64	100.00
JP	-	-	-	2	4.08	100.00	2	1.82	100.00
NIM	-	-	-	2	4.08	100.00	2	1.82	100.00
INDT	1	1.64	25.00	3	6.12	75.00	4	3.63	100.00
TOTAL	61	100.00	100.00	49	100.00	100.00	110	100.00	100.00

TABLE 4.22

LINKS BETWEEN LOCUS OF CONTROL AND EDUCATIONAL LEVELS OF THE RESPONDENTS

EDUCATION LEVEL	EXTERNAL LOCUS OF CONTROL			INTERNAL LOCUS OF CONTROL			TOTAL		
	NO.	VR%	HR%	NO.	VR%	HR%	NO.	VR%	HR%
TILL HIGH SCHOOL	20	32.79	60.61	13	26.53	39.39	33	30.00	100.00
MATRICULATION OR INTERMEDIATE	10	16.39	76.92	3	6.12	23.08	13	11.82	100.00
GRADUATION	26	42.62	52.00	24	48.98	48.00	50	45.45	100.00
POST GRADUATION & PROFESSIONAL & ABOVE	5	8.20	35.71	9	18.37	64.29	14	12.73	100.00
TOTAL	61	100.00	55.45	49	100.00	44.55	110	100.00	100.00

Some of the responses of the externally oriented members are:

"Nothing is **in our** hands. An individual can never change a **system**".

"As individuals, we are entirely helpless and are driven by **circumstances**".

"Change should come from external sources. Only some revolution can change the present system".

The internally oriented responses include:

"There is nothing that is impossible. Any major change in a system will first start at **individuals'** level. If you want to change the world, you have to first change yourself".

"A gradual change in the system is possible through **individuals'** initiative. It may take a long time but it is not impossible".

"Everything depends on us. It depends on our thoughts and actions".

Links between Locus of Control and Representatives' Education and Position in the House:

It can be said that education will have an impact on the locus of control of members, creates self confidence and that it develops internal orientation. In the present study, one does notice direct link between the level of education and the level of **self-confidence** and internal locus of control, as shown in

Table 4.22. Similar links are found in the case of **member's** position in the House. As Table 4.23 makes it clear, 75% of **the** leaders are with internal locus of control while 42.15% of ordinary members of the sample are internally oriented.

Motivating Factors :

Desire for power is inherent in human nature. The power motive is all the more evident in the political arena and precisely because of this politics is defined by some as the shaping and sharing of power. Desire for power has both positive and negative connotations. Psychologists, sociologists and political scientists have recognised power motive as an important and influencing factor in human behaviour. Winter (1973), in his "The Power Motive" said that striving for power is an important disposition in individuals. By power motive he meant, "a disposition to strive for certain kind of goals, or to be affected by certain kinds of incentives". ²³

To **Thrasymachus**, the ancient Greek philosopher, in all states men deliberately seek power for reasons of self interest. Similar expressions can be seen in the writings of political thinkers like **Hobbes**, **Bentham** and **Marx** . **Lasswell** (1948) argued that yearning for power is predominant in politicians and he asserted that politicians will have 'an intense and ungratified craving for deference where power is expected to overcome the low estimates of the self by changing either the traits of **lthe** self or the environment in which it functions'.²⁴ **Lane** (1969) argued on similar lines and assumed , "men seek power over the

other (to satisfy doubts about themselves) through political charms and seek to defend and improve their self esteem through political activity". 25

Mc Clelland (1969) pointed out that individuals tend to derive great satisfaction in being told that they have high drives to achieve, or to affiliate, but they experience guilt if they are told that they have a high drive to achieve power. He argued that drive for power is not essentially negative and that there is another side of power motive which focuses on the beneficial reasons. The motive behind acquiring power need not be the desire to harm others and people may seek power to survive and control their own worlds. May (1972) in his "Power and Innocence" asserted , "man's basic psychological reason for living is to affirm himself, to struggle for selfesteem, to say I am, to do this in the face of nature's magnificent indifference". So, to him, power motive is positive in nature, as the reason for seeking power does not have to centre around the goal of dominating and exploiting others but can spring from the assertion of one's own individuality. Robert Dahl's (1969) analysis of power reveals that acquisition of political power is not an end in itself but can be "used to gain different ends depending on culture, society, economy and political system. Power can be used to acquire fame, reverence, security, respect, affection, wealth and many others" 28

Apart from the inclination towards power, another motive to enter politics is the need for affiliation. To Lane (1969),

political activity facilitates easy interpersonal relations as "politics **may** offer to the **lonely** man new opportunity **for** association **with** others - the excuse **may** be politics, the need may be politics, the need may be fear of isolation". ²⁹ Maslow (1954), dividing human needs into lower level (physical and safety) **and** higher level (affection, respect) and self actualisation considered self actualisation among the latter as the highest. People will enter politics with ambition for achievement. As Lane (1969) observed "political participation and involvement are the products of the need for meaning, both as a source of satisfaction in itself and as a **means** of satisfying other needs" . This yearning in politicians is identified as the need for achievement in the present context. Browing and Jacob (1964) pointed out, "in communities where politics and political issues are at the centre of attention and interest, men attracted to politics are likely to be more strongly power and achievement motivated than in communities where politics commands only peripheral interest." ³¹

With this background, it will be now useful to study the motivating factors of the respondents. As shown in Table 4.23 desire for power and for affiliation have motivated 34.54% and 38.18% of the respondents, respectively. Desire for achievement has played a relatively less significant role as a factor of motivation in the present situation.

The party - wise distribution of the respondents in this regard reveals that the number of ruling party members who

TABLE 4.23

LINKS BETWEEN LOCUS OF CONTROL AND LEADERSHIP POSITIONS OF THE RESPONDENTS

POSITION OF THE MEMBERS	EXTERNAL LOCUS OF CONTROL			INTERNAL LOCUS OF CONTROL			TOTAL		
	NO.	VR%	HR%	NO.	VR%	HR%	NO.	VR%	HR%
LEADERS	2	3.28	25.00	6	13.95	75.00	8	7.27	100.00
ORDINARY MEMBERS	59	96.72	57.84	43	86.05	42.16	102	92.73	100.00
T O T A L	61	100.00	55.45	49	100.00	44.55	110	100.00	100.00

TABLE 4.24

LINKS BETWEEN MOTIVATING FACTORS AND POLITICAL PARTY OF THE RESPONDENTS

POLITICAL PARTY	DESIRE FOR AFFILIATION			DESIRE FOR ACHIEVEMENT			DESIRE FOR POWER			OTHERS			TOTAL		
	NO.	VR%	HR%	NO.	VR%	HR%	NO.	VR%	HR%	NO.	VR%	HR%	NO.	VR%	HR%
TDP	23	54.76	35.38	11	39.29	16.92	29	76.32	44.62	2	100.00	3.08	65	59.09	100.00
CONG-I	8	19.06	36.36	7	25.00	31.82	7	18.42	31.82	-	-	-	22	20.00	100.00
CPI	2	4.76	50.00	2	7.14	50.00	-	-	-	-	-	-	4	3.64	100.00
CPI(M)	2	4.76	28.57	4	14.29	57.14	1	2.63	14.29	-	-	-	7	6.36	100.00
BJP	3	7.14	75.00	-	-	-	1	2.63	25.00	-	-	-	4	3.64	100.00
JP	-	-	-	2	7.14	100.00	-	-	-	-	-	-	2	1.82	100.00
NIM	2	4.76	100.00	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	2	1.82	100.00
INDT	2	4.76	50.00	2	7.14	50.00	-	-	-	-	-	-	4	3.63	100.00
TOTAL	42	100.00	38.18	28	100.00	25.45	38	100.00	34.55	2	100.00	1.82	110	100.00	100.00

exhibited power **motive** **more** than that of the respondents from **the** Opposition and **the** independents, who had showed achievement motive considerably. This can be seen in Table 4.24.

The data has made clear that power, affiliation and achievement motives are evenly distributed in the case of representatives elected from the reserved seats. 57.14% of the Scheduled Tribe respondents have exhibited the power motive and 28.5% of them have affiliation motive. Among the members elected from general seats, affiliation motive is slightly more visible **than** the power motive.

Incentives :

Incentives provided to representatives are very **much** linked with their motives as individuals will be motivated by the desire or wish to achieve certain goals. Psychologists held that individual's decision to behave in a certain way under certain circumstances depends on the perception of the outcome of that particular behaviour, whether reward or punishment.

Incentives for political representatives to enter politics can be broadly categorised into three heads - social, psychological and economic. The assumption of the roles of peoples representative will enhance the social status of an individual and this enhanced status, in turn, enables him/her to increase social contacts as well as prestige. The status of the representatives gives them increasing opportunity **to** serve people and solve social and economic problems. This provides them with

ample psychological satisfaction. As rightly noted by Kipnis (1977), if a power holder's **aim** is to increase his reputation, or to make friends, he will be tempted to dispense his resources to achieve the end. ³⁴ The economic interpretation of politics is that a man adopts those opinions and undertakes those activities which advances his material conditions. Some people will be attracted towards politics due to economic incentives resulting from political activity.

Coming to the sample, 36.36% of the respondents felt that the status of politician will improve their prestige and social position. One member said, "the positions of an **MLA** commands high respect in the society and will increase the prestige. This is the major incentive for any one to become a politician". 40% of the respondents believed that the status of representative enables them to serve various kinds of people and groups and from the service they render great psychological satisfaction is derived. Only 18.18% of the respondents perceived the economic factor as the major incentive.

The party-wise break up of the respondents on the basis of their incentives, as given in Table 4.25 shows that a majority of the members from the TDP, CPI, CPI (M) perceived the psychological factor as the chief incentive. To a majority of members belonging to the Congress-I and the BJP, social incentive is the prominent factor.

TABLE 4.25

LINKS BETWEEN MOTIVATING FACTORS AND COMMUNITY OF THE RESPONDENTS

COMMUNITY	DESIRE FOR AFFILIATION			DESIRE FOR ACHIEVEMENT			DESIRE FOR POWER			OTHERS			TOTAL		
	NO.	VR%	HR%	NO.	VR%	HR%	NO.	VR%	HR%	NO.	VR%	HR%	NO.	VR%	HR%
S.C.	4	9.76	33.33	4	14.81	33.33	4	10.26	33.34	-	-	-	12	10.91	100.00
S.T.	2	4.88	-	-	-	-	4	10.26	57.14	1	33.33	14.28	7	6.36	100.00
OTHERS	35	85.36	38.46	23	85.19	25.27	31	79.48	34.07	2	66.67	2.20	91	82.73	100.00
TOTAL	41	100.00	37.27	27	100.00	24.55	39	100.00	35.45	3	100.00	2.73	110	100.00	100.00

TABLE 4.26

LINKS BETWEEN POLITICAL AMBITION AND POLITICAL PARTY OF THE RESPONDENTS

POLITICAL PARTY	AMBITION FOR SIMILAR POSITIONS			AMBITION FOR HIGHER POSITIONS			NO FURTHER POLITICAL AMBITION			TOTAL		
	NO.	VR%	HR%	NO.	VR%	HR%	NO.	VR%	HR%	NO.	VR%	HR%
TDP	43	58.11	66.15	10	45.45	15.38	12	85.71	18.46	65	59.09	100.00
CONG-I	16	21.62	72.73	6	27.27	27.27	-	-	-	22	20.00	100.00
CPI	3	4.06	75.00	1	4.55	25.00	-	-	-	4	3.64	100.00
CPI(M)	5	6.76	71.43	2	9.09	28.57	-	-	-	7	6.36	100.00
BJP	3	4.05	75.00	1	4.55	25.00	-	-	-	4	3.64	100.00
JP	-	-	-	2	9.09	100.00	-	-	-	2	1.82	100.00
NIM	2	2.70	100.00	-	-	-	-	-	-	2	1.82	100.00
INDY	2	2.70	50.00	-	-	-	2	14.29	50.00	4	3.63	100.00
TOTAL	74	100.00	67.27	22	100.00	20.00	14	100.00	12.73	110	100.00	100.00

TABLE 4.27

LINKS BETWEEN POLITICAL AMBITION AND POLITICAL EXPERIENCE OF THE RESPONDENTS

POLITICAL EXPERIENCE	AMBITION FOR SAME POSITIONS			AMBITION FOR HIGHER POSITIONS			NO FURTHER POLITICAL AMBITION			TOTAL		
	NO.	VR%	HR%	NO.	VR%	HR%	NO.	VR%	HR%	NO.	VR%	HR%
LOCAL BODIES	10	13.51	47.62	10	45.45	47.62	1	7.14	4.76	21	18.09	100.00
STATE												
LEGISLATURES	12	16.62	52.17	9	40.91	39.13	2	14.29	8.70	23	20.91	100.00
BOTH LEVELS	1	1.35	25.00	3	13.64	75.00	-	-	-	4	3.64	100.00
FRESHERS	51	68.92	82.26	-	-	-	11	78.57	17.74	62	56.36	100.00
TOTAL	74	100.00	67.27	22	100.00	20.00	14	100.00	12.73	110	100.00	100.00

Ambition Levels :

One important dimension **that** should be examined in legislative behaviour is the link between **ambition** level and behaviour of representatives. This aspect has received considerable attention of the American researchers since the 60s. Barber (1965), Schelesinger (1966), and **Mayhew** (1970) held **that the** movement of **the** U.S. politicians in and out of national, state **and** local offices is patterned and is predictable on the basis of their ambition level.

In the sample under study, a large number of representatives, 67.27%, said that they want to contest again. 20% of them have the ambition to occupy higher positions. It is only 12.72% of the respondents that did not show the desire for re-election. The details can be seen from Table 4.26.

Hain (1988) observed that though the relationship between age and ambition is not linear, "the older a politician is the less likely he is to express ambition to advance, to seek advancement or to advance." ³³ But this observation does not hold good in the present context as a huge majority of the respondents are middle aged (41-60) and a majority of these expressed ambition for similar or higher positions.

The data has revealed positive links between previous political experience and political ambition levels. As shown in Table 4.27 more than 90% of the respondents with political experience wanted to continue as politicians and it is

interesting to note that the respondents without political experience have not shown interest in contesting for national parliament.

From **the** above it can be seen that a significant proportion **of the** representatives regarded political party as the major factor influencing their initial decision to enter politics and **for** electoral success. Their personal assets are **the** important source of their election funding. They are more motivated by the desire for power and affiliation than by the desire for achievement. Social and psychological incentives are frequently identified by them. A considerable number of representatives are with external locus of control. A predominant majority of them are having political ambition, either for similar or higher positions.

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CHAPTER V

ROLE PERCEPTIONS

In every political system, people's representatives have certain roles to perform. As the behaviour of an individual legislator in a legislative system is not only based on his or her idiosyncracies but also should conform to certain rules and regulations. Representatives of different political systems perceive varied roles, depending on demographic, personal and environmental characteristics. Both the political theorists and the politicians do not have an agreed view regarding the roles representatives have to perform, especially the 'style' and the 'focus' of representatives.

Role perceptions as a useful concept for analysis is developed and became popular in legislative behaviour research since the 1960s. Wahlke et al (1962) defined role as "a coherent set of 'norms' of behaviour which are thought by those involved in the interactions being viewed, to apply to all persons who occupy the position of legislator".¹ They identified four role sectors - core, clientele, specialized and incidental and studied in detail the purposive, representational and consensus roles which are part of the core role sector.

The purposive role perception of representatives is concerned with how representatives perceive their primary role and function. Some important factors which influence representatives' purposive role perception include the status of legislature and its relationship with the executive branch of

government; role of political parties and organised groups; and **constituents'** level of political awareness and articulating abilities. To **Wahlke et al** (1962) since '**law-making**' is accepted as the central function of American legislatures, participation in the making of decisions is not only expected of the legislator but he/she is also authorized and legitimized for **the** same by his or her occupancy of the official **positions**. They identified '**tribune**', '**ritualist**', '**inventor**', '**broker**' and '**opportunist**' as major purposive role perceptions of four state legislatures in the U.S. and pointed out that tribunes are in a majority. Another major study on the **U.S.legislators** conducted by Davidson (1969) revealed that tribune and ritualist role perceptions are common in the U.S. Congress.

Some studies in non-western countries by political scientists such as Kim (1969) and Chee (1976) also **made** use of the purposive role concept. Studies in the Third World countries showed that representatives lay more emphasis on the constituency service-man role than law-maker role. Based on the motivation of representatives, Woshinsky (1973) identified three categories of French deputies - mission participants, concerned mainly, with ideology; program participants, having higher levels of political ambition and interested in attaining higher positions; and obligation participants, motivated by the moral aspect of politics. **Mishler and Mughan** (1976) in their study of Scottish and Welsh **MPs.**, associated purposive role with legislative activity, party loyalty and pork-barrel activities (activities on behalf of the constituency and constituents).³ Kornberg and

Mishler (1976) identified three types of Canadian **MPs**-**'insiders'**, **'gadflies'** and **'committee** activists'. The first of these emphasize more on legislative process and participate actively in the House by taking prominent part in debates. The gadflies gave more importance to law-making and introduce most of the private bills; and the committee activists, appear to be amateurs but are interested and actively take part in committee work.

As noted earlier, in the developing countries representatives tend to give preference to constituency service and to identify this as their major **responsibility**. The importance of constituency service as a purposive role can be inferred from the actual time and effort devoted for this purpose by political representatives in these countries. Several studies in the developing countries like Phillipines, Mexico and India made similar findings. A large number of MPs of Kenya, Korea and Turkey, (Kim et al., 1983) identified three activities to which they devote much of the time. These activities include, obtaining government projects for the district, interceding with bureaucracy to help constituents and representing the views of constituents in the districts. Thus, these activities of the representatives are directly related to constituency service. Hopkin's (1970) division of the MPs of Tanzania into locals, intellectuals, silent partisans and politicians is largely based on career length, mode of selection and political obligation. He noticed that a majority of MPs regarded constituency service as their main duty and bringing constituency needs and demands before the government was the second most frequently mentioned

task. Very few legislators among these perceived their role as **law-maker** and as a critic of government. **Musolf** and Springer (1979) found that Malaysian MPs spend more time on constituency service and in solving constituents problems.

The above **classifications** connected with purposive role perceptions would provide the base to identify the categories associated with the purposive role perceptions of the respondents in the sample. The roles perceived by the respondents in the present study could be divided into 1) law-maker role, 2) **community-spokesman** role, 3) **communicator role**, 4) **entrepreneurial role**, 5) **ritualist** role, and 6) **watch-dog** role. To law-makers, evidently, legislation is the primary role of a legislator. Community spokesman's role relates to safeguarding and working for the interest of the community to which the representative belong. The communicator role refers to acting as mediator between government and people and between party and public. The entrepreneurial role is connected with getting projects for the constituency and constantly working for its development, by making use of all available avenues. The ritualist role lays emphasis on strict adherence of rules and regulations connected with the functioning of the legislative system. The watch-dog role gives importance to overseeing the executive-both political and permanent. Some respondents have identified more than one role and it should be pointed out here that while including the respondents in the sample in the categories mentioned above, the primary role identified by them is taken into account.

Table 5.1 makes clear that those respondents who perceived communicator role as their primary role figure prominently. Scheduled Castes', Scheduled Tribes', Backward Castes' representatives tend to prefer community spokesman's role. Interestingly only 6.4% of the legislators identified law-making as their major role.

As regards the party - wise distribution of the respondents, as shown in Table 5.1, communicator role perception is prominent among the TDP, BJP and MIM members; the watch-dog role is perceived by a good number of the Congress I, Janata Party and BJP representatives. Among the CPI and CPI (M) legislators, the entrepreneurial role perception is more obvious. The data confirms the general belief that the members of Opposition tend to prefer watch-dog role. This is not so among the members of the ruling party.

Responses From Interviews:

Law-Maker Role:

"Since democracy is based on the principle of peoples' sovereignty, the role of a legislator in a democracy is to represent the people and the legislator's primary function is to enact legislation."

"Every legislator's primary role is law-making. He has to enact legislation, draw attention to financial problems and make legislation keeping in view the needs and problems of the public".

Community Spokesman Role:

"As I am elected from a reserved constituency and belong to a scheduled **community**, I feel it is my primary duty to look after and safeguard the interests of the **community I represent**."

"**My** primary role is to serve my community and strive for its development".

"My community people helped me a lot for what I am today. I feel that service to my community is the most important function I have to **form**".

Communicator Role:

"My major role is to act as a link between the constituency and the legislature and executive branches by conveying **constituents'** problems to the government and the governmental policies to the public'.

"In a democratic set up lik ours, legislator, who is the elected representative of people, is the most important and vital link between the government and the people".

"Our major role is to act as a bridge between the government and the people. We have to bring **peoples'** problems to the notice of the government and pursue the issue till the problem got solved".

Entrepreneurial Role:

"Peoples' representative should develop the constituency and educate the constituents by constant contact with them and by **implementing** as many developmental plans as possible for speedy development".

"As a ruling party **member**, my role inside the House is limited and disciplined. So, I concentrate more on constituency oriented activities and I will actively work for getting more facilities like roads, electricity and drinking water".

Ritualist Role :

"As a responsible representative of the people, I feel it is my primary duty to participate in the work of legislature by making full use of the available opportunities with proper understanding of the rules and procedure and by maintaining the decorum of the House".

Watch-dog Role:

"It is my major responsibility to safeguard the interests of the people who elected me with lots of hope and confidence. It is my duty to be constantly vigilant that power hungry politicians and bureaucrats do not encroach upon the rights of citizens".

Table 5.1

Links Between Purposive Role Perception And Political Party Of The Respondents

Political Party	Law-maker	Community spokesman	Communicator	Entrepreneur	Ritualist	Watch-dog	TOTAL														
	NO.	VE%	HE%	NO.	VE%	HE%	NO.	VE%	HE%	NO.	VE%	HE%	NO.	VE%	HE%	NO.	VE%	HE%			
TDP	5	71.43	7.69	8	66.67	12.31	29	70.73	44.62	10	58.83	15.38	10	62.50	15.38	3	17.65	4.62	65	59.99	100.00
Cong I	-	-	-	1	8.33	4.55	7	17.07	31.82	2	11.76	9.07	4	25.00	18.18	8	47.06	36.36	22	20.00	100.00
CPI	1	14.28	25.00	-	-	-	-	-	-	2	11.76	50.00	-	-	-	1	5.88	25.00	4	3.64	100.00
CPI(M)	-	-	-	1	8.33	14.29	2	4.88	28.57	3	17.65	42.86	1	12.50	14.28	-	-	-	7	6.36	100.00
BJP	-	-	-	-	-	-	2	4.88	50.00	-	-	-	-	-	-	2	11.76	50.00	4	3.64	100.00
JP	1	14.29	50.00	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	1	5.88	50.00	2	1.82	100.00
NM	-	-	-	1	8.33	50.00	1	2.44	50.00	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	2	1.82	100.00
Indts	-	-	-	1	8.84	25.00	-	-	-	-	-	-	1	12.50	25.00	2	11.76	50.00	4	3.63	100.00
TOTAL	7	100.00	6.36	12	100.00	10.91	41	100.00	37.28	17	100.00	15.45	16	100.00	14.55	17	100.00	15.45	110	100.00	100.00

Table 5.2

Links between Purposive Role Perception and Level of Education of the Respondents

Level of Education	Law-maker		Community Spokesman				Communicator				Entrepreneur				Ritualist				Watch-dog				TOTAL
	NO.	VE%	HE%	NO.	VE%	HE%	NO.	VE%	HE%	NO.	VE%	HE%	NO.	VE%	HE%	NO.	VE%	HE%	NO.	VE%	HE%		
Till High School	3	42.86	9.09	3	25.00	9.09	15	36.58	45.45	4	23.53	12.12	3	18.75	9.09	5	29.41	15.15	33	30.00	100.00		
Matriculation or intermediate	-	-	-	2	16.67	15.38	5	12.20	38.46	-	-	-	2	12.50	15.38	4	23.53	30.76	13	11.82	100.00		
Graduation	3	42.86	6.00	6	50.00	12.00	15	36.59	30.00	11	64.71	22.00	5	29.41	10.00	10	62.50	10.00	50	45.45	100.00		
Professionals																							
Post Graduation and above	1	14.28	7.14	1	8.33	7.14	6	14.63	42.86	2	11.76	14.29	1	6.25	7.14	3	17.65	21.43	14	12.73	100.00		
TOTAL	7	100.00	6.36	12	100.00	10.91	41	100.00	37.28	17	100.00	15.45	16	100.00	4.35	17	100.00	15.45	110	100.00	100.00		

Links Between Purposive Role Perception And Background Of Representatives:

In the following paragraphs the links between purposive role perceptions and education, occupation, community, sex and the respondents' position are detailed.

Education: The relation between purposive role perceptions and education, as given in Table 5.2 shows that educational levels do not have notable impact on representatives' perceptions.

Occupation: It is generally held that lawyers tend to perceive law-maker's role as they will have the necessary knowledge in this regard. In the present study, more number of advocates are communicators followed by ritualists. This is because of two reasons-awareness regarding the implications of present institutional and structural factors, thereby following more practical and general trend and secondly, because of their ritualist role perception, which emphasises on following rules and regulations in transacting legislative business.

The occupation-wise distribution of the respondents on the basis of this role perception reveals that a majority of them with different occupational backgrounds perceived communicator role and Table 5.3 makes this point clear. Among others, equal number of the respondents (21.32%) who engaged in social service, teaching and household duties are communicators, entrepreneurs and ritualists.

TABLE 5.3

Links between Purposive Role Perception and Occupational Background of the Respondents

Occupation	Law-maker			Community spokesman			Communicator			Entrepreneur			Ritualist			Watch-dog			TOTAL		
	NO.	PER%	HE%	NO.	PER%	HE%	NO.	PER%	HE%	NO.	PER%	HE%	NO.	PER%	HE%	NO.	PER%	HE%	NO.	PER%	HE%
Agriculturalists	3	42.86	5.88	6	50.00	11.76	19	46.34	37.25	7	41.18	13.73	7	43.75	13.73	9	52.94	17.65	51	46.36	100.00
Businessmen	-	-	-	2	16.67	12.50	8	12.51	50.00	2	11.76	12.50	1	6.25	6.25	3	17.65	18.75	16	14.55	100.00
Advocates	1	14.29	5.88	1	8.33	5.88	6	14.63	35.29	3	17.65	17.65	4	25.00	23.53	2	11.76	11.77	17	15.45	100.00
Doctors & Engineers	1	14.28	8.33	2	16.67	16.67	5	12.20	41.67	2	11.76	16.67	2	12.50	16.66	-	-	-	12	10.91	100.00
Others	2	28.57	14.28	1	8.33	7.14	3	7.32	21.43	3	17.65	21.43	2	12.50	14.29	3	17.65	21.43	14	12.73	100.00
TOTAL	7	100.00	6.36	12	100.00	10.91	41	100.00	37.28	17	100.00	15.45	16	100.00	14.55	17	100.00	15.45	110	100.00	100.00

TABLE 5.4

Links between Community and purposive role perceptions of the respondents

Community	Law-maker	Community Spokesmen			Communicator			Entrepreneur			Ritualist			Watch-dog			TOTAL				
		NO.	PER%	HE%	NO.	PER%	HE%	NO.	PER%	HE%	NO.	PER%	HE%	NO.	PER%	HE%	NO.	PER%	HE%		
S.C.	2	28.57	16.67	2	16.67	16.67	3	7.32	25.00	2	11.76	16.66	3	18.75	25.00	-	-	12	10.91	100.00	
S.T	-	-	-	-	-	-	5	12.20	71.43	-	-	-	1	6.25	14.28	1	5.88	14.29	7	6.36	100.00
Others	5	71.43	5.49	10	83.33	10.99	33	80.48	36.26	15	88.24	16.48	12	75.00	13.19	16	4.12	17.58	91	82.73	100.00
TOTAL	7	100.00	6.36	12	100.00	10.91	41	100.00	37.27	17	100.00	15.45	16	100.00	14.55	17	100.00	15.45	110	100.00	100.00

Community : It is useful to establish links between community and purposive role perceptions of the respondents. Table 5.4 shows that only 16.67% of the Scheduled Caste representatives identified **community** spokes man's role. There is not even a single Scheduled Tribe representative who has identified himself with this role. Out of ten members elected from unreserved seats, who perceived the community spokesman's role, six are from backward communities and two are Muslims. It is also interesting to note that 71.42% of the respondents from Scheduled Tribes are **communicators**.

Sex: The sex-wise distribution of the members on purposive role perceptions, as given in Table 5.5 shows that 50% of the lady representatives are ritualists while 33.33% and 16.67% of them perceived communicator and community spokesman's role, respectively.

Leadership Position In The House: The purposive role perception of representatives has positive links to their leadership position in the House. This is more evident in law-maker role perception. Table 5.6 makes this clear. 37.5% of the respondents in leadership position are law-makers while only 3.92% of the ordinary members of the House identified this role. A majority of the members who do not assume leadership roles, are **communicators**.

TABLE 5.5

Links Between Sex And Purposive Role Perception Of The Respondents

Sex	Law-Maker			Community Spokesman			Communicator			Entrepreneur			Ritualist			Watch-dog			TOTAL		
	NO.	VP%	HP%	NO.	VP%	HP%	NO.	VP%	HP%	NO.	VP%	HP%	NO.	VP%	HP%	NO.	VP%	HP%	NO.	VP%	HP%
Male	7	100.00	6.72	11	91.67	10.58	39	95.12	37.50	17	100.00	16.35	13	81.25	12.50	17	100.00	16.35	104	94.55	100.00
Female	-	-	-	1	8.33	16.67	2	4.88	33.33	-	-	-	3	18.75	50.00	-	-	-	6	5.45	100.00
TOTAL	7	100.00	6.36	12	100.00	10.91	41	100.00	37.28	17	100.00	15.45	16	100.00	14.55	17	100.00	15.45	110	100.00	100.00

TABLE 5.6

Links between purposive role perceptions and party leadership position of the respondents

Party position	Law-maker			Community Spokesman			Communicator			Entrepreneur			Ritualist			Watch-dog			TOTAL		
	NO.	VP%	HP%	NO.	VP%	HP%	NO.	VP%	HP%	NO.	VP%	HP%	NO.	VP%	HP%	NO.	VP%	HP%	NO.	VP%	HP%
Ordinary members	4	57.14	3.92	12	100.00	11.76	39	95.12	38.24	16	94.12	15.68	15	93.75	14.71	16	94.12	15.69	102	92.73	100.00
Leaders	3	43.66	37.50	-	-	-	2	4.88	25.00	1	5.88	12.50	1	6.25	12.50	1	5.88	12.50	8	7.27	100.00
TOTAL	7	100.00	6.36	12	100.00	10.91	41	100.00	37.28	17	100.00	15.45	16	100.00	14.55	17	100.00	15.45	110	100.00	100.00

Locus Of Control: There is significant difference between the respondents with internal locus of control and external locus of control in the case of **communicator** role perception, as given in Table 5.7. While 58.33% of the respondents with internal locus of control are communicators, only 27.86% of those with external orientation associated themselves with this role.

Representational Role Perception:

While purposive role perceptions of representatives provide information regarding what they want to do, representative role perceptions enable one to comprehend how representatives want to perform their roles. An understanding of these role perceptions provide scope to identify the 'style' of representatives- how they take decisions, whether they depend on their own conscience (**trustees**), or information from constituents (**delegates**), or the directives of political party (**partisans**), or more than one of these, depending on the circumstances (**politicos**).

Representational role perceptions as Riemer (1967) has pointed out are vital to comprehend the central theme of the concept of representation. After a systematic review of studies related to representational role perceptions, Mezey (1979) concluded that in Belgium, Japan, an Indian state, Kenya, Phillippines and Switzerland, most of the **representatives** perceived trustee style of representation while representatives of Canada, Korea and in a Japanese province more representatives accepted delegate style of functioning. Jcwell (1985) noted that Scottish and Welsh members of the British House of commons

TABLE 5.7

Links between purposive role perceptions and locus of control of the respondents

Locus of control	Law - water			Community Spokesman			Communicator			Entrepreneur			Ritualist			Watch-dog			TOTAL		
	NO.	VE%	HE%	NO.	VE%	HE%	NO.	VE%	HE%	NO.	VE%	HE%	NO.	VE%	HE%	NO.	VE%	HE%	NO.	VE%	HE%
External	4	57.14	6.56	8	66.87	13.12	17	41.46	26.87	12	70.59	19.67	8	50.00	13.12	9	52.94	14.75	61	55.45	100.00
Internal	3	43.86	6.12	4	33.33	8.16	24	58.54	48.98	5	29.41	10.20	8	50.00	16.32	8	47.16	16.32	49	44.55	100.00
TOTAL	7	100.00	6.36	12	100.00	10.91	41	100.00	37.28	17	100.00	15.45	16	100.00	14.55	17	100.00	15.45	110	100.00	100.00

TABLE 5.8

Links Between Representational Role Perceptions And Political Party Of The Respondents

Political party	Trustee			Delegate			Partisan			Politico			TOTAL		
	NO.	VE%	HE%	NO.	VE%	HE%	NO.	VE%	HE%	NO.	VE%	HE%	NO.	VE%	HE%
TDP	7	33.33	10.77	14	60.87	21.54	33	75.00	50.77	11	50.00	16.92	65	59.09	100.00
Cong-I	8	36.10	36.36	5	21.74	22.73	5	11.36	22.73	4	18.18	18.18	22	20.00	100.00
CPI	2	9.52	50.00	1	4.35	25.00	1	2.27	25.00	-	-	-	4	3.63	100.00
CPI (M)	1	4.76	14.28	1	4.35	14.29	2	4.55	28.57	3	13.64	42.86	7	6.36	100.00
BJP	2	9.53	50.00	-	-	-	2	4.55	50.00	-	-	-	4	3.64	100.00
J.P.	1	4.76	50.00	-	-	-	-	-	-	1	4.54	50.00	2	7.82	100.00
MIM	-	-	-	1	4.35	50.00	1	2.27	50.00	-	-	-	2	1.82	100.00
INDYS	-	-	-	1	4.34	25.00	-	-	-	3	13.64	75.00	4	3.64	100.00
TOTAL	21	100.00	19.09	23	100.00	20.91	44	100.00	40.00	22	100.00	20.00	110	100.00	100.00

are predominantly trustees;⁶ French deputies are **more** often trustees, with variations by party, Dutch legislators are also more likely to be trustees, though many are sensitive to party pressures.⁷

In the present sample, 40% of the respondents favoured partisan style of functioning and more or less equal number of the remaining members supported trustee, delegate and **politicoo** styles of functioning and decision making. Table 5.8 makes this clear.

Responses From Interviews:

Trustee:

"The first duty of a legislator is to fearlessly and effectively express his views, remembering always that loyalty to his own conscience transcends all other loyalties."

"Today our country is in need of true trustees. Now-a-days, as soon as one becomes an **MLA**, he or she will submit himself/herself to their party to the extent of becoming a '**yes person**'. With all their initiative killed and functioning against their conscience, they will not have the courage to oppose the ruling of their own party. This action is a crime not **only** against themselves but also against the people who elected them. So, the primary role of peoples' representatives should be to depend on their own conscience and to take full responsibility of their decisions and actions."

Delegate:

"As a representative of the people, a legislator has to feel the feelings, hopes, aspirations and necessities of the constituents and as far as possible should go by their guidance in projecting their interests inside the Assembly.

"I always want to behave in the way, the people want me to behave. The question of sacrificing my individuality does not arise. If any such thing arises, I will go according to the wishes of the people, as it is my primary role to represent them. "

Partisan:

"The foremost thing that a legislator should bear in mind is to be true in thought, word and action to the pledge given by him on behalf of the political party to which he belongs. He is duty bound to abide by the directions issued to him by his party".

"As an **MLA** of ruling party, my major duty is to work in conformity with the ruling of the party and party leader. While following the party principles and decisions, I will be very careful about my behaviour and statements I make inside and outside the House".

"My party played a very vital role in my election and has the lion's share in my success. So, I feel that it is my primary duty to adhere to its rules and principles and behave accordingly."

Politico:

"My first responsibility is towards the constituents whom I am representing as an **MLA**. Secondly, I have responsibility to my party, because the party gave me ticket and on that basis I could come to Assembly. I have the personal responsibility of satisfying my **own** conscience and finally I have a responsibility to the state as a whole."

"MLAs represent so many conflicting interests at a time. To become a successful politician, one has to harmonise various conflicting interests and demands coming from various communities, constituents and party directives and mold the behaviour according to the situation."

Representational Role Perceptions And Party:

The party-wise distribution of representative role perceptions of the respondents, as given in Table 5.8, shows that partisan style of functioning is predominant among the ruling party members and that the number of trustees and **politicos** in other parties and among the independents is comparatively more. This can be attributed to the wave politics, as most of the ruling party members are freshers. This is also due to strict party discipline and the pivotal role of the party leadership.

Links Between Representational Role Perceptions And Background Of The Representatives:

Age: A significant portion of the respondents, 42.10% and 60% from age groups 41-50 and above 61, respectively, are partisans as Table 5.9, makes it clear. Both of the very young respondents are delegates while equal number of respondents between 31 to 40 years of age are trustees and partisans and those between 51-60 years are politicos and partisans.

Education: As education will widen one's mental horizons and individual decision-making capabilities, it is generally believed that representatives who are highly educated will tend to perceive themselves as trustees. Jewell (1985) in his review of studies on role perceptions observed that legislators are more likely to be trustees if they are well educated and have previous legislative experience. This does not hold good in the present sample. But some positive links between political experience and trustee role perception could be seen.

A majority of the post graduates and professionals in the sample are partisans and politicos, as shown in Table 5.10. Among the graduates, no particular representational style is dominant. While a majority of the respondents who are educated upto high school level are partisans, equal number of respondents who studied upto matriculation and intermediate are trustees and partisans.

T A B L E 5.9

Links between representational role perceptions and age of the respondents

Age	Trustee			Delegate			Partisan			Politico			T O T A L		
	NO.	VR%	HR%	NO.	VR%	HR%	NO.	VR%	HR%	NO.	VR%	HR%	NO.	VR%	HR%
25 - 30	-	-	-	2	8.70	100.00	-	-	-	-	-	-	2	1.82	100.00
31 - 40	5	23.81	35.71	3	13.05	21.43	5	11.36	35.71	1	4.55	7.15	14	12.73	100.00
41 - 50	10	47.62	17.54	9	39.13	15.79	24	54.55	42.12	14	63.64	24.56	57	51.82	100.00
51 - 60	5	23.81	22.73	4	17.39	18.18	6	13.63	27.27	7	31.82	31.82	22	20.00	100.00
61 and above	1	4.76	6.67	5	21.74	33.33	9	20.45	60.00	-	-	-	15	13.63	100.00
T O T A L	21	100.00	19.09	23	100.00	20.91	44	100.00	40.00	22	100.00	20.00	110	100.00	100.00

T A B L E 5.10

Links between Representational Role Preceptions and Educational level of the Respondents

Educational level	Trustee			Delegate			Partisan			Politico			T O T A L		
	NO.	VR%	HR%	NO.	VR%	HR%	NO.	VR%	HR%	NO.	VR%	HR%	NO.	VR%	HR%
Till High School	5	23.81	15.15	7	30.43	21.21	17	38.64	51.52	4	18.18	12.12	33	30.00	100.00
Metriculation															
or Intermediate	5	23.81	38.46	2	8.70	15.39	5	11.36	38.46	1	4.55	7.69	13	11.82	100.00
Graduation	10	47.62	20.00	14	60.87	28.00	15	34.09	30.00	11	50.00	22.00	50	45.45	100.00
Professionals															
Post Graduation															
and above	1	11.76	7.14	-	-	-	7	15.91	50.00	6	27.27	42.86	14	12.73	100.00
T O T A L	21	100.00	19.09	23	100.00	20.91	44	100.00	40.00	22	100.00	20.00	110	100.00	100.00

Political Experience: Table 5.11 reveals links between representative role perceptions and political experience of the respondents. 61.9% of the respondents who perceived trustee style of representative role are having political experience and only 34.75% of the **members** are delegates. 59.09% of the respondents without political experience are partisans and politicians. But a majority of the respondents who are politically experienced are partisans and politicians.

Community: It is interesting to note that the largest number (42.85%) of the Scheduled Tribe representatives are trustees, as shown in Table 5.12. A majority of representatives from Scheduled Castes and other categories are partisans.

Sex: The sex-wise break up of the respondents on the basis of representational role perception, as given in Table 5.13, makes clear that there are no trustees among lady **MLAs**. The number of partisans among male as well as female representatives is considerable. But the point is that women representatives are predominantly partisans. This can be ascribed mainly to their greater dependence on political party for electoral success compared to their male counterparts. There are nearly equal number of trustees, delegates and politicians among the male **representatives**.

Locus Of Control: It is commonsensical to think that representatives with internal locus of control will be trustees and those with external locus of control will be delegates. But in the present study, there are no such positive links between

TABLE 5.11

Links between Representational Role Perceptions and Political Experience of the Respondents

Political Experience	Trustee			Delegate			Partisan			Politico			T O T A L		
	NO.	VR%	HR%	NO.	VR%	HR%	NO.	VR%	HR%	NO.	VR%	HR%	NO.	VR%	HR%
Local Bodies	5	23.81	23.81	4	17.39	19.05	9	20.45	42.86	3	13.63	14.28	21	19.09	100.00
Legislature	8	38.09	34.78	4	17.39	17.39	8	18.18	34.78	3	13.64	13.05	23	20.91	100.00
Both Levels	-	-	-	-	-	-	1	2.27	25.00	3	13.64	75.00	4	3.64	100.00
No Experience	8	38.10	12.90	15	65.22	24.19	26	59.10	41.94	13	59.09	20.97	62	56.36	100.00
T O T A L	21	100.00	19.09	23	100.00	20.91	44	100.00	40.00	22	100.00	20.00	110	100.00	100.00

TABLE 5.12

Links between Representational Role Perception and Community of the Respondents

Community	Trustee			Delegate			Partisan			Politico			T O T A L		
	NO.	VR%	HR%	NO.	VR%	HR%	NO.	VR%	HR%	NO.	VR%	HR%	NO.	VR%	HR%
S C	1	4.76	8.33	4	17.39	33.33	4	9.09	33.34	3	13.64	25.00	12	10.91	100.00
S T	3	14.29	42.86	-	-	-	2	4.55	20.57	2	9.09	20.57	7	6.36	100.00
OTHERS	17	80.95	18.68	19	82.61	20.00	38	86.36	41.76	17	77.27	18.68	91	82.73	100.00
T O T A L	21	100.00	19.09	23	100.00	20.91	44	100.00	40.00	22	100.00	20.00	110	100.00	100.00

TABLE 5.13

Links between Representational Role Preceptions and Sex of the Respondents

Sex	Trustee			Delegate			Partisan			Politico			T O T A L		
	NO.	VR%	HR%	NO.	VR%	HR%	NO.	VR%	HR%	NO.	VR%	HR%	NO.	VR%	HR%
Male	21	100.00	20.19	22	95.65	21.16	40	90.91	38.46	21	95.45	20.19	104	94.55	100.00
Female	-	-	-	1	4.35	16.67	4	9.09	66.66	1	4.55	16.67	6	5.45	100.00
T O T A L	21	100.00	19.09	23	100.00	20.91	44	100.00	40.00	22	100.00	20.00	110	100.00	100.00

TABLE 5.14

Links between Representational Role Perceptions and Locus of Control of the Respondents

Locus of Control	Trustee			Delegate			Partisan			Politico			T O T A L		
	NO.	VR%	HR%	NO.	VR%	HR%	NO.	VR%	HR%	NO.	VR%	HR%	NO.	VR%	HR%
External	14	66.67	22.95	12	52.17	19.67	25	56.82	40.98	10	45.45	16.40	61	55.45	100.00
Internal	7	33.33	14.28	11	47.83	22.45	19	43.18	38.78	12	54.55	24.49	49	44.55	100.00
T O T A L	21	100.00	19.09	23	100.00	20.91	44	100.00	40.00	22	100.00	20.00	110	100.00	100.00

these two. From Table 5.14, it is evident that there is no congruence between personality factors and representative role perceptions. In the sample, more number of representatives with external locus of control perceived trustee roles than that of internally oriented representatives though there is no wide difference.

Areal Role Perception:

Eversince Burke emphasised that representatives should focus on national interest rather on local and narrow interest, enigma regarding the focus of representatives continues and many modern scholars conducted empirical investigations in this regard. Studies of Wahlke et al (1962), Davidson (1969), Jewell and Patterson (1977) concerning the areal role perceptions of the American congressmen and state legislators found that the district as the area of concentration. The representatives of the Canadian Parliament seem to be focussing more on national interest than on constituency and its interest (Kornberg, 1967).

Responses From Interviews:

State Oriented :

"Legislators should not confine themselves to representing and looking after the interests of their constituencies. They should see the welfare of the state and work for the development of the state as a whole".

"Getting elected from certain area or constituency does **not mean** that a representative should represent only those who voted for him. As a people's representative, he/she should behave as a representative of the whole state as a member of **state** legislative assembly".

"A legislator should not focus his attention just on the issues and problems in his constituency, but he should try to solve the crucial **problems** confronting the state".

District Oriented:

"I give more attention to my region and particularly to my district as it is very much underdeveloped in comparison to other districts in other regions".

"Along with the other MLAs of my party from my district, I always work out to project the problems of the district in the Assembly and to get developmental projects implemented".

Constituency Oriented:

"**My** first and foremost duty is service to the constituency and the electorate which elected me to power by bestowing full confidence in me".

"As a member of Andhra Pradesh Legislative Assembly I will take part in the deliberation of the House and work for the welfare of the state. But I have a very **important** and personal responsibility towards the constituency and the people whom I represent".

"In a political system like ours, the primary role and function of a legislator is to serve his constituency. The saying that one should protect family interest before trying to protect public interest should be remembered".

Links Between Background And Areal Role Perceptions:

Party: A majority of the respondents perceived the state as their main focus in performing their legislative roles. The party-wise distribution of the respondents on the basis of this role perception as given in Table 5.15, shows that all the CPI and Janata Party members and a majority of the Congress-I representatives are with state orientation. All the MIM representatives in the sample are constituency oriented.

Nature Of Constituency: It is interesting to note that a majority of representatives from urban constituencies are interested on concentrating on the issues which are of state-wide importance. Out of 27 respondents who identified constituency as the main focus, 21 (77.78%) of them belong to rural constituencies. Thus, the data reveals direct relationship between constituency orientation and rural background. This is clear from Table 5.16.

Region: More number of respondents from Andhra and Rayalaseema are state and district oriented, while representatives from Telangana regions are mainly state and constituency oriented, as shown in table 5.17.

TABLE 5.15

LINKS BETWEEN AREAL ROLE PERCEPTIONS AND POLITICAL PARTY OF THE RESPONDENTS

POLITICAL PARTY	STATE			DISTRICT			CONSTITUENCY			TOTAL		
	NO.	VR%	HR%	NO.	VR%	HR%	NO.	VR%	HR%	NO.	VR%	HR%
TDP	29	51.78	44.62	18	66.67	27.69	18	66.67	27.69	65	59.09	100.00
CONG - I	13	23.22	59.09	8	29.63	36.36	1	3.70	4.55	22	20.00	100.00
CPI	4	7.14	100.00	-	-	-	-	-	-	4	3.63	100.00
CPI (M)	4	7.15	57.14	-	-	-	3	11.11	42.86	7	6.36	100.00
BJP	2	3.57	50.00	1	3.70	25.00	1	3.70	25.00	4	3.64	100.00
JP	2	3.57	100.00	-	-	-	-	-	-	2	1.82	100.00
NIM	-	-	-	-	-	-	2	7.41	100.00	2	1.82	100.00
INDTS	2	3.57	50.00	-	-	-	2	7.41	50.00	4	3.64	100.00
TOTAL	56	100.00	50.90	27	100.00	24.45	27	100.00	24.55	110	100.00	100.00

TABLE 5.16

LINKS BETWEEN AREAL ROLE PERCEPTIONS AND NATURE OF CONSTITUENCY OF THE RESPONDENTS

NATURE OF CONSTITUENCY	STATE			DISTRICT			CONSTITUENCY			TOTAL		
	NO.	VR%	HR%	NO.	VR%	HR%	NO.	VR%	HR%	NO.	VR%	HR%
RURAL	34	60.71	47.22	17	62.96	23.61	21	77.78	29.17	72	65.45	100.00
URBAN	22	39.29	57.89	10	37.04	26.32	6	22.22	15.79	38	34.55	100.00
TOTAL	56	100.00	50.90	27	100.00	24.45	27	100.00	24.55	110	100.00	100.00

TABLE NO. 5.17

LINKS BETWEEN AREAL ROLE PERCEPTIONS AND REGION OF THE RESPONDENTS

REGION	STATE			DISTRICT			CONSTITUENCY			TOTAL		
	NO.	VR%	HR%	NO.	VR%	HR%	NO.	VR%	HR%	NO.	VR%	HR%
ANDHRA	23	41.07	48.94	13	48.15	27.66	11	40.74	23.40	47	42.73	100.00
RAYALASEMA	12	21.43	57.14	7	25.92	33.33	2	7.41	9.53	21	19.09	100.00
TELANGANA	21	37.50	50.00	7	25.93	16.67	14	51.85	33.33	42	38.18	100.00
TOTAL	56	100.00	50.90	27	100.00	24.45	27	100.00	24.55	110	100.00	100.00

TABLE 5.18

LINKS BETWEEN AREAL ROLE PERCEPTIONS AND SEX OF THE RESPONDENTS

SEX	STATE			DISTRICT			CONSTITUENCY			TOTAL		
	NO.	VR%	HR%	NO.	VR%	HR%	NO.	VR%	HR%	NO.	VR%	HR%
MALE	55	98.21	52.88	26	96.30	25.00	23	85.18	22.12	104	94.55	100.00
FEMALE	1	1.79	16.66	1	3.70	16.67	4	4.82	66.67	6	5.45	100.00
TOTAL	56	100.00	50.91	27	100.00	24.54	27	100.00	24.55	110	100.00	100.00

Sex : The sex-wise distribution of the respondents on the basis of **areal** role perception reveals that a majority, 66.67% of the **female** representatives are constituency oriented and a **majority** (55.58%) of the male representatives are state oriented. It can be seen in Table 5.18.

Position In the House: Positive links between leadership position in the Assembly and state orientation can be seen in the sample as shown in Table 5.19. District and constituency orientations are equally perceivable in the case of ordinary members of the House.

Interest Group Role Perception:

Representatives, in general, will focus not only on areal but also on group interest, which loyalty transcends the geographical boundaries of their constituencies and districts. The pressure from organised financial, commercial and occupational groups on legislature is less prominent in India than that in western democracies. In India where parochial and charismatic political culture prevails, factors like caste, community, region, religion and recently gender are acting as interest groups in articulating interests. This does not imply that there is **iscomplete** absence of organised groups. Some groups like Chamber of Commerce, Karshaka Parishad, Non-Gazzetted Officers Association, Teachers Association, 'Kapunadu', SCs and BCs Associations and Women's Organizations are acting as powerful lobbies in the state, exerting influence on the government to safeguard their interest. In this context, it will be useful to

analyse the inclinations **and** perceptions of legislators **in** representing these group interests. It is interesting to **note** that most of **the** respondents felt that group **interests'** influence can be either positive or negative. Positive projection of group interests will be in the direction of safeguarding the rights and liberties of the groups and trying for its development. Another type of interests aiming at protecting caste and **communal** interests may produce negative impact on the overall development and hinder the progress of the state.

Responses From Interviews :

Facilitator:

"When there are lakhs of voters and constituents, it is practically impossible to solve individual problems. It is easy to understand and solve their problems when people are organised in groups. I will act as a facilitator to group interests, not in the way of supporting one group against the benefit of another but for the development of all the groups and the state as a whole".

Resistor:

"Any group interest will be selfish and harming the interests of others in leading factionalism and separatism. So, I am against representing any group interest."

TABLE 5.19

LINKS BETWEEN AREAL ROLE PERCEPTIONS AND PARTY POSITION OF THE RESPONDENT

PARTY POSITION	STATE			DISTRICT			CONSTITUENCY			TOTAL		
	NO.	VR%	HR%	NO.	VR%	HR%	NO.	VR%	HR%	NO.	VR%	HR%
ORDINARY												
MEMBER	50	89.28	49.01	26	96.30	25.49	26	96.30	25.50	102	92.73	100.00
LEADER	6	10.72	75.00	1	3.70	12.50	1	3.70	12.50	8	7.27	100.00
TOTAL	56	100.00	50.91	27	100.00	24.54	27	100.00	24.55	110	100.00	100.00

TABLE 5.20

LINKS BETWEEN INTEREST GROUP ROLE PERCEPTIONS AND POLITICAL PARTY OF THE RESPONDENTS

POLITICAL PARTY	FACILITATOR			RESISTOR			NEUTRAL			TOTAL		
	NO.	VR%	HR%	NO.	VR%	HR%	NO.	VR%	HR%	NO.	VR%	HR%
TDP	25	52.00	38.46	12	70.59	18.46	28	62.22	43.00	65	59.09	100.00
CONG-I	11	22.92	50.00	1	5.88	45.45	10	22.22	4.55	22	20.00	100.00
CPI	3	6.25	75.00	-	-	-	1	2.22	25.00	4	3.63	100.00
CPI(M)	5	10.42	71.43	1	5.88	14.28	1	2.22	14.29	7	6.36	100.00
BJP	2	4.17	50.00	1	5.88	25.00	1	2.22	25.00	4	3.64	100.00
JP	1	2.08	50.00	1	5.88	50.00	-	-	-	2	1.82	100.00
NIM	1	2.08	50.00	-	-	-	1	2.23	50.00	2	1.82	100.00
INDTS	-	-	-	1	5.89	25.00	3	6.67	75.00	4	3.64	100.00
TOTAL	48	100.00	43.64	17	100.00	15.45	45	100.00	40.91	110	100.00	100.00

Neutral:

"I am **not for or** against any group. I will act according to the situation and as far as possible I want to stay away from conflicting forces".

In the sample, nearly equal number of the respondents are facilitators and neutrals i.e., 43.6% and 40.9% and only 15.5% of the representatives are resistors.

The party-wise break up of the respondents, in this context, reveals that more number of respondents other than the ruling party members are facilitators and a majority of the **ruling** party respondents are neutrals in interest group role perception, as given in Table 5.20.

Links Between Background And Interest Group Role Perception:

Community: It can be seen in Table 5.21, that 50% of the respondents belonging to SCs, 57.14% of those from ST perceived the facilitator role, while a majority of the respondents from other communities identified neutral role.

Sex: A majority i.e., 66.67% of the women representatives are with neutral interest group role perception and 45.19% of the male representatives identified facilitator role which is followed by neutral role, as shown in Table 5.22.

Membership In Social Organisations: The sample establishes close relationship between these two. Table 5.23 makes clear that 56.52% of the respondents having membership in social organisations are

TABLE 5.21

LINKS BETWEEN INTEREST GROUP ROLE PERCEPTIONS AND COMMUNITY OF THE RESPONDENTS

COMMUNITY	FACILITATOR			RESISTOR			NEUTRAL			TOTAL		
	NO.	VR%	HR%	NO.	VR%	HR%	NO.	VR%	HR%	NO.	VR%	HR%
S.C.	6	12.50	50.00	2	11.76	16.67	4	8.89	33.33	12	10.91	100.00
S.T.	4	8.33	57.14	1	5.88	14.29	2	4.44	28.57	7	6.36	100.00
OTHERS	38	79.67	41.76	14	82.36	15.38	39	86.67	42.86	91	82.73	100.00
TOTAL	48	100.00	43.64	17	100.00	15.45	45	100.00	40.91	110	100.00	100.00

TABLE 5.22

LINKS BETWEEN INTEREST GROUP ROLE PERCEPTIONS AND SEX OF THE RESPONDENTS

SEX	FACILITATOR			RESISTOR			NEUTRAL			TOTAL		
	NO.	VR%	HR%	NO.	VR%	HR%	NO.	VR%	HR%	NO.	VR%	HR%
MALE	47	97.92	45.19	16	94.12	15.38	41	91.11	39.43	104	94.55	100.00
FEMALE	1	2.08	16.66	1	5.88	16.67	4	8.89	66.67	6	51.45	100.00
TOTAL	48	100.00	43.64	17	100.00	15.45	45	100.00	40.91	110	100.00	100.00

TABLE 5.23

LINKS BETWEEN INTEREST GROUP ROLE PERCEPTIONS AND MEMBERSHIP IN SOCIAL ORGANISATIONS

MEMBERSHIP SOCIAL ORGANISA- TIONS	FACILITATOR			RESISTOR			NEUTRAL			TOTAL		
	NO.	VR%	HR%	NO.	VR%	HR%	NO.	VR%	HR%	NO.	VR%	HR%
MEMBERS	26	54.17	56.52	8	47.06	17.39	12	26.67	26.09	46	41.82	100.00
NON MEMBERS	22	45.83	34.37	9	52.94	14.07	33	73.23	51.56	64	58.18	100.00
TOTAL	48	100.00	43.64	17	100.00	15.45	45	100.00	40.91	110	100.00	100.00

facilitators while 51.56% of those without **membership** in these organisations are neutrals. Among the resisters, representatives who are not having membership in social associations and organisations are more than those with membership. But **the** difference is marginal.

Position In The House: There is direct link between the leadership position and facilitator role preception. This is evident from Table 5.24. 87.5% of the respondents in leadership positions are facilitators and there are no resisters **among** the leaders. In the case of ordinary members facilitator and neutral role is more or less equally distributed.

Participatory Role Perceptions:

Representatives' perceptions regarding the impact of **participation** on their political future have considerable influence on **intentionality** to participate and on actual participation levels.

Nearly 50% of the respondents considered that active participation at the institutional and constituency level will have very beneficial impact on political future. Only 4.5% of the representatives said that active participation can even have harmful or negative impact on their political career. Table 5.25 makes clear that equal number of respondents view that their participation will have a good and only a marginal effect on their political future.

Responses From Interviews :

Very Beneficial:

" It is a privilege of political representative to participate actively in the legislative business. Through active institutional participation legislators will earn respect **among** their colleagues and reputation in their political party. Active constituency service is very essential for a legislator to win **peoples'** confidence and regard. Effective Participation at these two levels will have a beneficial **impact** on **representatives'** political future".

Good :

•'Attentive and intelligent institutional participation on the one hand, good reputation that a representative earned in the constituency that he/she is efficient on the other, will have a good influence on **representatives'** political career, specially for fresh members who want to establish themselves there".

Marginal :

"Legislators' participation, however active it may be, will have only a marginal bearing on their political career as it depends on various other factors and forces like caste, community and party label".

Harmful :

"In a political system where money and muscle power are very essential for electoral success, voters give utmost consideration

for party leaders and party labels instead of capabilities of individual contestants, active participation of representatives will have even **harmful impact** on their political future, as **legislators'** are not allowed to voice any opinion contrary to that of the **partys**".

Links Between Background and Participatory Role Perception of the Respondents :

Political Party : Table 5.25 reveals that a majority of representatives from the Opposition party and most of the members from other groups regarded their participation as very beneficial and that it will have positive impact on their reputation, influence and political **carers**. More or less equal number of respondents from the ruling party considered that their participation will have beneficial marginal and good influence on their political **future**. it is interesting to notice that 80% of the respondents who considered that participation may have even harmful effect are from the ruling party. This view is due to strict party discipline and adherence to party's fiat.

Education : The data reveals that representatives with higher education tend to feel that active participation will be very beneficial as 50% of the graduates and more than 50% of those who have done **post-graduation** and above, perceived that their participation will have very positive impact on their political future. To 46.16% of the respondents who are either matriculates or have passed intermediate, their participation will have only marginal significance and equal percentage of those who are

TABLE 5.24

LINKS BETWEEN INTEREST GROUP ROLE PERCEPTIONS AND PARTY POSITION

PARTY	FACILITATOR			RESISTOR			NEUTRAL			TOTAL		
POSITION	NO.	VR%	HR%	NO.	VR%	HR%	NO.	VR%	HR%	NO.	VR%	HR%
ORDINARY MEMBERS	41	40.20	40.20	17	100.00	16.67	44	97.78	43.14	102	92.73	100.00
LEADERS	7	59.80	87.50	-	-	-	1	2.22	12.50	8	7.27	100.00
TOTAL	48	100.00	43.64	17	100.00	15.45	45	100.00	40.91	110	100.00	100.00

TABLE 5.25

LINKS BETWEEN PARTICIPATORY ROLE PERCEPTIONS AND POLITICAL PARTY OF THE RESPONDENTS

Political Party	Very Beneficial			Good			Marginal			Harmful			TOTAL		
	NO.	VR%	HR%	NO.	VR%	HR%	NO.	VR%	HR%	NO.	VR%	HR%	NO.	VR%	HR%
TDP	22	41.15	33.85	18	69.23	27.69	21	80.77	32.31	4	80.00	6.15	65	59.09	100.00
CONG-I	13	24.53	59.09	6	23.08	27.27	2	07.69	09.09	1	20.00	4.55	22	20.00	100.00
CPI	3	5.66	75.00	1	3.84	25.00	-	-	-	-	-	-	4	3.63	100.00
CPI(M)	7	13.21	100.00	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	7	6.36	100.00
BJP	4	7.54	100.00	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	4	3.64	100.00
JP	2	3.77	100.00	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	2	1.82	100.00
NIM	1	1.89	50.00	-	-	-	1	3.85	50.00	-	-	-	2	1.82	100.00
INDTS	1	1.89	25.00	1	3.85	25.00	2	7.69	5.000	-	-	-	4	3.64	100.00
TOTAL	53	100.00	48.18	26	100.00	23.64	26	100.00	23.64	5	100.00	4.54	110	100.00	100.00

educated till high school viewed that their participation **will** have good and marginal influence. **Table 5.26** makes this clear.

Community : Nearly 50% of **the** respondents who are elected **from** unreserved constituencies and nearly equal percentage (42%) of **the** respondents elected **from** the constituencies reserved for **SC's** and ST's regarded that their participation will be **very** beneficial. From Table 5.27 it can **be** seen that equal number of representatives elected from SC seats viewed that their participation will have good and marginal impact and not even a single ST representative felt that participation may lead to negative results.

Political Experience : The study shows positive links between political experience at the state level and perception regarding participation. As shown in Table 5.28, 60.87% of respondents with previous political experience in state legislature and 75% of those with political experience in local bodies and state legislature considered their participation as very beneficial. It is surprising to note that 40% of those who felt that participation may have even harmful impact are the ones with political experience in local bodies. The principle of political hierarchy that is followed in the Indian political system, in general, could be regarded as an important factor explaining this situation. A majority of those without political experience perceived that their participation will have either good or marginal effect on their political future.

T A B L E 5.26

LINKS BETWEEN PURPOSIVE ROLE PERCEPTIONS AND EDUCATIONAL LEVEL OF THE RESPONDENTS

EDUCATIONAL LEVEL	Very Beneficial			Good			Marginal			Harmful			T O T A L		
	NO.	VR%	HR%	NO.	VR%	HR%	NO.	VR%	HR%	NO.	VR%	HR%	NO.	VR%	HR%
TILL HIGH SCHOOL	15	28.30	45.46	8	30.77	24.24	8	30.77	24.24	2	40.00	6.06	33	30.00	100.00
MATRICULATION	5	9.43	38.46	2	7.69	15.38	6	23.08	46.16	-	-	-	13	11.82	100.00
& INTERMEDIATE	25	47.17	50.00	13	50.00	26.00	9	34.61	18.00	3	60.00	6.00	50	45.45	100.00
GRADUATION															
PROFESSIONALS,															
POST GRADUATION															
AND ABOVE	8	15.10	57.14	3	11.54	21.43	3	11.54	21.43	-	-	-	14	12.73	100.00
T O T A L	53	100.00	48.18	26	100.00	23.64	26	100.00	23.64	5	100.00	4.54	110	100.00	100.00

T A B L E 5.27

LINKS BETWEEN COMMUNITY AND PARTICIPATORY ROLE PERCEPTION

COMMUNITY	Very Beneficial			Good			Marginal			Harmful			T O T A L		
	NO.	VR%	HR%	NO.	VR%	HR%	NO.	VR%	HR%	NO.	VR%	HR%	NO.	VR%	HR%
S.C.	5	9.43	41.67	3	11.54	25.00	3	11.54	25.00	1	20.00	8.33	12	10.91	100.00
S.T.	3	5.66	42.85	1	3.85	14.29	3	11.54	42.86	-	-	-	7	6.36	100.00
OTHERS	45	84.91	49.45	22	84.61	24.18	20	76.92	21.98	4	80.00	4.39	91	82.73	100.00
T O T A L	53	100.00	48.18	26	100.00	23.64	26	100.00	23.64	5	100.00	4.54	110	100.00	100.00

T A B L E 5.28

LINKS BETWEEN POLITICAL EXPERIENCE AND PARTICIPATORY ROLE PERCEPTIONS

POLITICAL EXPERIENCE	Very Beneficial			Good			Marginal			Harmful			T O T A L		
	NO.	VR%	HR%	NO.	VR%	HR%	NO.	VR%	HR%	NO.	VR%	HR%	NO.	VR%	HR%
LOCAL BODIES	9	16.98	42.86	6	23.08	23.57	4	15.38	19.05	2	40.00	9.52	21	19.09	100.00
STATE LEG.	14	26.42	60.87	6	23.08	26.09	3	11.54	13.04	-	-	-	23	20.91	100.00
BOTH LEVELS	3	5.66	75.00	-	-	-	1	3.85	25.00	-	-	-	4	3.64	100.00
NO EXPERIENCE	27	50.94	43.55	14	53.84	22.58	18	69.23	29.03	3	60.00	4.84	62	56.36	100.00
T O T A L	53	100.00	48.18	26	100.00	23.64	26	100.00	23.64	5	100.00	4.54	110	100.00	100.00

T A B L E 5.29

LINKS BETWEEN PARTICIPATORY ROLE PERCEPTIONS AND SEX OF RESPONDENTS

SEX	Very Beneficial			Good			Marginal			Harmful			T O T A L		
	NO.	VR%	HR%	NO.	VR%	HR%	NO.	VR%	HR%	NO.	VR%	HR%	NO.	VR%	HR%
MALE	50	94.34	48.08	25	96.15	24.05	24	92.31	23.07	5	100.00	4.81	104	94.55	100.00
FEMALE	3	5.66	50.00	1	3.85	16.67	2	7.69	33.33	-	-	-	6	5.45	100.00
T O T A L	53	100.00	48.18	26	100.00	23.64	26	100.00	23.64	5	100.00	4.54	110	100.00	100.00

Sex : There is a slight variation in the participatory role perception of male and female representatives in the sample. This is evident as not even a single female representative considered that participation has harmful impact on political future. The variation can also be noted because 33.33% of women representatives viewed that their participation will have only marginal effect while a considerable majority of the male representatives felt in a similar way, as shown in Table 5.29.

Membership In Social Organisations : The data establishes direct relationship between membership in social organisations and positive participatory role perception as 71.74% of the legislators who believed that their participation will yield very beneficial results are those with membership in one or more social organisations. It is also appropriate to point out here that a majority i.e., 62.26% of the representatives who are members of social organisations have very positive perceptions regarding participation. Table 5.30 shows close link between non-membership in social organisations and negative perception about participation. Cent percent of the representatives who felt that participation may lead to harmful results are not having membership in social organisations and predominant majority (76.92%) of the respondents who are not members of any social organisation perceived that their participation may have only marginal impact. But 73.08% of the respondents who are not members of social organisations considered that their participation will have good influence on their political career.

T A B L E 5.30

LINKS BETWEEN PARTICIPATORY ROLE PERCEPTIONS AND MEMBERSHIP OF THE RESPONDENTS IN SOCIAL ORGANISATIONS

MEMBERSHIP IN SOCIAL ORGANISATIONS	Very Beneficial			Good			Marginal			Harmful			T O T A L		
	NO.	VR%	HR%	NO.	VR%	HR%	NO.	VR%	HR%	NO.	VR%	HR%	NO.	VR%	HR%
MEMBERS	33	62.26	71.74	7	26.92	15.22	6	23.08	13.04	-	-	-	46	41.82	100.00
NON MEMBERS	20	37.74	31.25	19	73.08	29.69	20	76.92	31.25	5	100.00	7.81	64	58.18	100.00
T O T A L	53	100.00	48.18	26	100.00	23.64	26	100.00	23.64	5	100.00	4.54	110	100.00	100.00

T A B L E 5.31

LINKS BETWEEN PARTICIPATORY ROLE PERCEPTIONS AND POSITION OF THE RESPONDENTS IN PARTY

POSITION IN PARTY	Very Beneficial			Good			Marginal			Harmful			T O T A L		
	NO.	VR%	HR%	NO.	VR%	HR%	NO.	VR%	HR%	NO.	VR%	HR%	NO.	VR%	HR%
ORDINARY MEMBERS	46	86.79	45.10	25	96.15	24.51	26	100.00	25.49	5	100.00	4.90	102	92.73	100.00
LEADERS	7	13.21	87.50	1	3.85	12.50	-	-	-	-	-	-	6	7.27	100.00
T O T A L	53	100.00	48.18	26	100.00	23.64	26	100.00	23.64	5	100.00	4.54	110	100.00	100.00

T A B L E 5.32

LINKS BETWEEN PARTICIPATORY ROLE PERCEPTIONS AND LOCUS OF CONTROL.

LOCUS OF CONTROL	Very Beneficial			Good			Marginal			Harmful			T O T A L		
	NO.	VR%	HR%	NO.	VR%	HR%	NO.	VR%	HR%	NO.	VR%	HR%	NO.	VR%	HR%
EXTERNAL	30	56.60	49.18	15	57.69	24.59	12	46.15	19.67	4	80.00	6.56	61	55.45	100.00
INTERNAL	23	43.40	46.94	11	42.31	22.45	14	53.85	28.57	1	20.00	2.04	49	44.55	100.00
T O T A L	53	100.00	48.18	26	100.00	23.64	26	100.00	23.64	5	100.00	4.54	110	100.00	100.00

T A B L E 5.33

LINKS BETWEEN PARTICIPATORY ROLE PERCEPTIONS AND AMBITION LEVEL OF THE RESPONDANTS

POLITICAL AMBITION	Very Beneficial			Good			Marginal			Harmful			T O T A L		
	NO.	VR%	HR%	NO.	VR%	HR%	NO.	VR%	HR%	NO.	VR%	HR%	NO.	VR%	HR%
SIMILAR POSITION	34	64.15	45.95	21	80.77	28.38	15	57.69	20.27	4	80.00	5.46	74	67.27	100.00
HIGHER POSITION	16	30.19	72.73	3	11.54	13.64	2	7.69	9.09	1	20.00	4.54	22	20.00	100.00
NONE	3	5.66	21.43	2	7.69	14.28	9	34.62	64.29	-	-	-	14	12.73	100.00
T O T A L	53	100.00	48.18	26	100.00	23.46	26	100.00	23.64	5	100.00	4.54	110	100.00	100.00

Position In The Party : The study reveals very positive links between party leadership and participatory role perception. No party leader regarded that their participation will have either marginal **or** harmful impact. 87.5% of them considered participation as very beneficial. Among the respondents who are ordinary members of a party, 45.10% and 24.51% respectively thought that participation will give rise to very beneficial and good results. Table 5.31 makes this clear.

Locus Of Control : More are less equal percentage of the respondents with external and internal locus of control felt that their participation will have very beneficial and good impact. One can observe direct links between external locus of control and negative participatory role perception in the present sample, as 80% of those who perceived that participation will be even harmful are with external locus of control. This can be seen from Table 5.32.

Political Ambition Level : The study finds positive relationship between high political ambition level and participatory role perception, as shown in Table 5.33. 72.73% of the respondents who are aspiring for higher positions and 45.95% of those desiring similar positions they are occupying at the time of interview, regarded that their participation will have very positive impact on their political career. It is interesting to note that 64.27% of the respondents with no further political ambition thought that participation will have only marginal **significance**. It is rather surprising that 80% of the

respondents who felt that participation will have negative effect are aspiring for **similar** positions in the future and the **remaining** 20% desiring for higher positions. This is due to that perception that a representative can be re-elected or occupy political executive positions without participating. They have cited some examples to drive this home.

The above discussion makes clear that political background, environmental factors, support structures, the party to which they belong and their position in it, political socialization, recruitment pattern, motivating factors, **incentives, personality** traits and political ambition have considerable impact on the role perception of representatives.

Notes:

- 1) **Wahlke** John C, Heinz **Eulau**, William Buchanan and Le Roy C.Ferguson. 1962. "The Legislative **System**," **P.8**.
- 2) Ibid., **p.246**.
- 3) **Mishler**, William and Anthony Mughan. 1978. "Representing the Celtic Fringe : Devolution and Legislative Behaviour in Scotland and Wales": Legislative Studies Quarterly 3 : 377-408.
- 4) Hopkins, **Raymond.F.** 1970. "The Role of the **M.P** in Tanzania", American Political Science Review 64:754-771.
- 5) **Mezeg**, Michael L. 1979. "Comparitive **Legis.latures**", **P.197**.
- 6) Jewell, Malcolm E.1985. "Legislators and Contituents in the Representative Process", in Gerhard Loewenberg, Samuel C. Patterson and Malcolm E.Jewell, eds., " Handbook of Legislative Research ", **P.106**.
- 7) Ibid., **P.105**.

CHAPTER VI

INSTITUTIONAL PARTICIPATION

In a representative democracy, legislature is the **pre-eminent** forum in which people seek to articulate their urges, expectations and grievances through their representatives and to see that the government is carried on in accordance with their wishes. Political **representatives'** interest and inclination to participate or not to participate in the law-making and other legislative business inside the House depend both on institutional and personal factors.

Every political institution will have certain rules and procedures to transact its business. The behaviour of representatives is influenced to a considerable extent, by the structural factors, the powers and opportunities given to them in the institutional set-up and on the personal abilities and skills which facilitate the best use of the available **opportunities.**

Legislatures' procedures and functions of representatives inside the House differs in different political systems. The modern role of **peoples'** representative is wide - reaching and complex. This role includes making and breaking the government; safeguarding and **promoting** the best interests of the nation and its people by putting forward pertinent matters and issues in the course of business before the House; initiating and debating on the nature and merits of the legislation put before them by

suggesting appropriate **amendments**; exercising vigilance over governmental expenditure by scrutinising financial proposals and by examining public accounts to ensure that public money is spent in the best interest of the tax payer; critically evaluating governmental policy; functioning as members of standing **and** select committees **for** the purpose of informed inquiries and reporting the development and use of procedures which will enable the House to discharge its functions in the most effective form.

Representatives' institutional participation depends on how frequently the legislature holds its sessions, the number of days per each session and the time available for each legislator to participate in the House. In the communist systems the plenary meetings of the legislatures are short and infrequent and legislatures in these political systems are not considered as the major law-making bodies. Deputies in the communist systems are given fewer powers than those in democratic countries and in some third world countries like India.

In countries with liberal democracies, such as the U.S., Britain, Australia and Canada, representatives are given various opportunities to initiate private **Members'** Bills as well as to participate in the debates on the government bills and making amendments to them. They are given opportunities to ventilate the grievances of the public and to check administrative and executive lapses through many procedural facilities.

In order to carry out legislative business **smoothly** and effectively, every legislature will have its rules and procedures. It **embodies** the voluntary surrender of all parties to common considerations of business. The rules require that:

1) Deliberations should be so arranged as to avoid **members** being taken by surprise, that is not without prior notice to the members of the House;

2) There must be sufficient deliberation for a reasonably sufficient time;

3) The majority must have the ultimate power to pass laws and administer;

4) The minority must have equitable opportunities to express their point of view;

5) Deliberations must be orderly and be purposeful;

6) The good faith of all speakers must be assured; and

7) The system of government, parliamentary discussions and decisions are accepted as proper and **incontrovertible**.

Formal rules of legislatures provide certain basic guidelines for the behaviour of representatives. Pointing out the importance of the rules and norms on the behaviour of legislators, Truman clearly pointed out , "these norms, values, expectations, '**rules of game**' largely define the institution of government along with other institutions of the society. For the legislator, they set the appropriate limits within which his discretionary behaviour may take place".²

There are many procedural similarities among the Commonwealth countries in transacting legislative business, such as the first hour in these legislature bodies is devoted for questions by legislators to Ministers which is followed by governmental business.³ In the case of the Indian Parliament each House is the final authority to decide how best to utilise the available time for different items of legislative business. In actual practice, it is the government, with the tacit consent of all parties and groups of the House, that plays a leading part.

According to the Rules of Procedure and Conduct of Business of the Andhra Pradesh Legislative Assembly, the following opportunities are given to the members of the House.

1) Private Member Business: This includes question hour, call attention notices on matters of urgent public importance, motion for adjournment on a definite matter of public importance, half-an-hour discussion on a matter of public importance arising out of answer to a question, motion of no-confidence in the council of Ministers, statement by a member who has resigned the office of Minister and statutory resolutions.

2) Legislation: This includes initiating bills, discussion on principles of bills, debates on the reports of select committees on bills, amendments to the clauses of bills.

3) Financial Procedure: It consists of discussion on budget, demands for grants, budget motions, cut motions, appropriation

bill, supplementary demands, excess grants, and Vote on account in lieu of regular budget.

4) Committees: These include participating in committees like Public Accounts Committee, Estimates Committee, Committee on Public Undertakings, Committee on subordinate legislation to name a few.

Representatives' institutional participation will be influenced to a large extent by time factor- how frequently the legislature holds its sessions, the number of days per each session and the amount of time available for each legislator to participate in the proceedings of the House. The Eighth Legislative Assembly of Andhra Pradesh held twelve sessions on the whole and 18.72 days and 118.49 hours on an average per each session. The particulars are given in Table 6.1.

QUESTION - HOUR:

Question -Hour plays a vital role in **parliamentary** forms of government where the executive is responsible to the legislature. Questions are the most effective means through which continuous legislative scrutiny over the acts of the executive can be exercised. Ministers will be made answerable and accountable to the House by legislators, through this practice of putting questions.

While asking questions legislators should keep in mind that questions must be short and to the point, concerning with facts and not opinions. The form and content of the questions should

Table 6.1
Particulars of the Eighth APLA Sessions

No. of Session	From	To	No. of Days	No. of Hours	No. of Minutes
1	11.03.85	20.03.85	9	53	45
2	30.04.85	-	1	3	48
3	12.04.85	29.09.85	30	211	-
4	19.02.86	03.04.86	30	185	57
5	14.07.86	01.08.86	15	102	10
6	05.01.87	24.01.87	11	78	30
7	21.03.87	10.04.87	11	66	-
8	11.07.87	14.08.87	27	160	-
9	11.12.87	18.12.87	6	46	45
10	22.03.88	06.04.88	10	64	-
11	23.07.88	29.08.88	26	180	30
12a	18.02.89	31.03.89	31	187	45
12b	06.09.89	19.09.89	11	81	40
T O T A L			218	1421	50

Source : - A P L A Journals from 1985 to 1989

Table 6.2
Number of Questions Answered in the Eighth A P L A

No. of Sessions	No. of SQ answered Orally	No. of supplementary	No. of answers to U.S.Q placed (Printed list)	No. of answers to SQ Placed on table of the House	No. of answers to U S Q placed on table of the House	No. of Short Notices Q answered
1	-	-	-	-	-	-
2	-	-	-	-	-	-
3	294	NA	180	99	60	46
4	293	2136	600	122	154	56
5	98	605	200	56	82	17
6	100	590	220	46	29	14
7	96	547	200	79	37	6
8	207	1341	370	77	65	22
9	59	295	137	45	42	-
10	91	473	158	47	40	10
11	235	1436	262	97	44	22
12	327	NA	385	98	90	25
T O T A L	1600	7423	2712	766	569	272

be permissible and be within the agreed parliamentary procedure and language. The subject matter of a question must be one for which the government is responsible.⁵

Question-Hour is a very lively and the most frequently utilised device by the members of the Andhra Pradesh Legislative Assembly. Questions are of three types - starred, unstarred and short notice questions. The purpose of questions could be information seeking and pressing for action pointing out administrative lapses. A member who desires an oral answer to his question should distinguish it by an **astrik** or a star and not more than two questions given by the same member shall be allowed in one day. But the final power of allowing the number of starred questions and that of supplementaries, keeping the time factor in view, is at the discretion of the Speaker of the House. When there is time constraint, the Speaker may change the starred questions to an unstarred questions for which written answers are given. A question relating to a matter of public importance may be asked with shorter notice and if the Speaker is of the opinion that the question is of an urgent character, he may direct the Minister concerned to answer the questions on a date to be fixed by the Speaker which shall be within 8 days from the date of receipt of the question. Details of the number of questions answered in the Eighth Legislative Assembly of Andhra Pradesh are given in Table 6.2.

The respondents in the sample showed considerable interest in putting starred questions as these questions enable them to

elicit face to face information and to probe further through supplementary questions. Questions are raised individually by a single legislator or collectively by two or more representatives from the same or different parties. Generally, when questions relating to particular subjects or a specific issues such as construction of a school building, increasing bed strength in a hospital and protection of extinct species in a particular area are asked by single legislators.

The questions asked by the representatives are mainly information seeking and are divided into parts for more clarity. Some examples of starred, unstarred and short notice questions raised on the floor of the House would enable one to comprehend the nature of questions raised. It will be now useful to illustrate a starred question raised by three CPI respondents to seek information from the Minister of Panchayat Raj regarding the change in recruitment policy connected with the department of Panchayat Raj having state-wide importance. The question is: Will the Minister of Panchayat Raj be pleased to answer.

- a) Whether there is any proposal to change the recruitment policy in the Zilla Parishad from the existing selection procedure to the one based on marks, performance in games, etc., and
- b) if so, the details thereof⁷ .

It would be seen that questions related to the issues of wider scope affecting general public of the state are raised by more than two legislators from different districts and parties.

For example, 10 members belonging to the TDP and the **CPI** asked the Minister of Animal Husbandary and Fisheries for information, **clarification** and action taken regarding the provision of exgratia to the fishermen in the state . This question was discussed in detail and nearly 20 **supplementaries** have been raised on **this**.

To have fuller access to specialized information available in **ministerial** departments or on the request of the members of interest groups to elicit reliable information related to their interest, legislators asked questions which are information seeking. For example, members in the sample sought information regarding the amounts earmarked for the payment of unemployment allowance to the disabled in Andhra Pradesh for the financial year 1985-86, reduction of mineral tax on limestone, proposals to lay circular railway line in Hyderabad city, and proposal for constructing an electronic industrial estate in the state. Some of the information seeking questions are also suggestive in nature. Some suggestions are for **nationalising** rice mills to save farmers from loss, imposing regulations on marine fishing, increasing the number of scholarships to meritorious students in rural areas and starting a new agricultural college.

The representatives made a good use of the question-hour to point out and check executive and **administrative** lapses. Questions regarding the malpractices of administration in issuing industrial licenses in the state, corruption of local bureaucrats and intervention of middlemen in land distribution at the Mandal

level, constitution of expert committees to control industrial pollution and action against selling of adulterated food, can be given as examples in this context. It is interesting to note that a question asked by a member from the opposition regarding the pilferage of power in the state, has led to considerable concern in the House regarding the Pilferage of electricity and evasion of paying money by private management in two specific cases. This question further probed to find out the persons involved, both officials and **non-officials**, and the action taken in the matter. The Minister agreed that Rs. 15.57 lakhs worth power has been pilfered and as many as 606 cases were registered and in the specific cases of misappropriation, management of the institutions were found guilty of misuse and no officials are involved in it. Some of the respondents from the opposition party and other groups in the House criticised the government for not taking proper action and shielding officials. They urged for proper explanations from the Minister for such irresponsible administration which resulted in misappropriation worth crores of rupees and asked what the government and administration are doing and whether they are sleeping while so much of power is pilfered. And they doubted the possibility of huge power pilferage without the notice and help of officials. They demanded the Minister to take immediate **action**.^a

Answers for written or unstarred questions are brief and are generally given yes or no type of answers. A few examples could now be given. A respondent from ruling party asked a question seeking information relating to his constituency. The question is

Will the Minister for Roads and Buildings be pleased to state

- a) Whether there is any proposal to construct a bridge across the river '**Thandava**' near Tuni, in East Godavari district;
- b) if so, the **time** by which it is likely to be completed.

Answer - a) Yes, **Sir**,

- c) After the issue of administrative sanction by the government, two years period is proposed for completion of works from the date of commencement of **work**.

The Leader of the Opposition party asked an information seeking question which is related to Andhra Pradesh State Finance Corporation. The question is will the Chief Minister be pleased to state.

- a) Whether it is a fact that the Andhra Pradesh State Finance Corporation has sanctioned **Rs. 60.000** lakhs to any individual in less than 24 hours after filling loan application;
- b) Whether it is also a fact that within 24 hours of sanction the cheque for **Rs. 60.000** lakhs was delivered to him;
- c) Whether the said person belongs to Andhra Pradesh; and
- d) if not, the details of the person?

Answer - a) No Sir,

(b), (c) and (d) does not arise.¹¹.

Question - Hour reveals the articulating capabilities and skills of both the Ministers and the legislators. Making the best use of the question-hour depends on the knowledge and the experience of representatives in discerning the spurious replies

of Ministers and on the intelligent probing with supplementaries to extract correct and pertinent information.

There are **some** incidents in the Eighth Legislative Assembly of Andhra Pradesh when a short notice question was discussed for nearly one and half hours and the Minister concerned had to face tough time to withstand the spate of supplementaries from the members of Opposition. A representative from the BJP asked the Minister for Major and Minor Irrigation, a short notice question regarding the irregularities of water supply from Sriramsagar project to Dhawaleswaram barrage. This question gave rise to heated discussion in the House. Some members alleged that instructions were given in the absence of the concerned Minister, when the **Minister** was on tour. The members insisted on knowing whether any action was taken against the officials who were responsible for misuse of power. A Janata Party member asked, 'Is the government sleeping when the officials are working in their own way?' Another opposition member observed that the answer given by the Minister is 'very vague and evading'. He wondered whether any official can issue a Government **Order**. and the subordinates implement it without any order of the Minister. Another member of the Congress-I alleged that the Chief Minister is involved in it and the government is making officials scape-goats. The Minister assured that necessary action will be taken.¹²

Calling Attention To Matters of Urgent Public Importance:

Next in **importance** to Question-Hour, call attention notices is oft-used device by the **members**. Representatives of Andhra Pradesh Legislative Assembly with the previous permission of the Speaker are entitled to call the attention of the Ministers to any matter of urgent public importance.¹³ The call attention notices raised by them are mainly concerned with problem of law and order, strikes, illegal encroachments and agricultural and industrial labourers. The respondents also drew the attention of the government towards matters like lock-outs, mismanagement in industrial sector, grabbing of land from tribals in the agency areas, illegal occupation of lands in urban areas, unsatisfactory law and order conditions, mismanagement of private schools and colleges, drought relief measures and **non-cooperation** of Nationalised Banks in extending financial aid to the **unemployed** youth under **Gramodaya** scheme.

The party - wise break up of the respondents on the basis of the number of call attention notices raised, is given in Table 6.3. 44.54% of the respondents never raised call attention notice and 5.45% of them raised more than sixteen times. Non-utilisation of this device to the full extent by most of the ruling party members is clearly noticeable. Out of 16 respondents who are very active in this regard, 14 are from the Opposition. Two BJP, one **Congress-I**, one **CPI** , and one CPM respondents raised more than 20 call attention notices. A CPI member in the sample raised as many as 27 call attention notices.

TABLE 6.3
PARTY - WISE DISTRIBUTION OF CALL ATTENTION NOTICE

POLITICAL PARTY	Ø	NO. VET	ER%	NO. VET	HE%	NO. VET	HE%	NO. VET	HE%	NO. VET	HE%	NO. VET	HE%	NO. VET	HE%	TOTAL
		1 - 5	6 - 10	11 - 15	16 AND ABOVE											
TDP	40	81.64	61.54	18	58.06	27.69	5	35.72	7.69	1	10.00	1.54	1	16.66	1.54	65
INC (I)	5	10.20	22.73	6	19.35	27.27	4	28.57	18.18	5	50.00	22.73	2	33.33	9.91	22
CPI	-	-	-	1	3.23	25.00	1	7.14	25.00	2	20.00	50.00	-	-	-	4
CPI (M)	1	2.04	14.28	1	3.23	14.29	2	14.29	28.57	2	20.00	28.57	1	16.67	14.29	7
BJP	1	2.04	25.00	1	3.23	25.00	1	7.14	25.00	-	-	-	1	16.67	25.00	4
JP	-	-	-	-	-	-	1	7.14	50.00	-	-	-	1	16.67	50.00	2
MIN	-	-	-	2	6.45	100.00	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	2
INDTS	2	4.08	50.00	2	6.45	50.00	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	4
TOTAL	49	100.00	44.55	31	100.00	28.18	14	100.00	12.73	10	100.00	9.09	6	100.00	5.45	110

SOURCES: ANDHRA PRADESH LEGISLATIVE ASSEMBLY DEBATES (1985 - 89)

Table 6.4
Number of bills introduced and passed in the Eighth APLA

No. of Sessions	From	To	No. Bill Introduced	No. of Bills Passed
1	11.03.85	20.03.85	14	11
2	30.04.85	-	-	-
3	12.04.85	25.09.85	22	19
4	19.02.86	03.04.86	15	16
5	14.07.86	01.08.86	19	17
6	05.01.87	24.01.87	22	20
7	21.03.87	10.04.87	17	17
8	11.07.87	14.08.87	16	11
9	11.12.87	18.12.87	17	7
10	22.03.88	06.04.88	12	11
11	23.07.88	29.08.88	18	13
12a	18.02.89	31.03.89	18	15
12b	06.09.89	19.09.89	23	27
TOTAL	-	-	197	167

Source : - A P L A Journals from 1985 to 1989

By raising call attention notices, the members could strengthen their support from the affected sections of society and persuade the government to take proper action to solve urgent problems.

Participation In Legislation:

As the name itself implies, law-making or legislation is the primary function of a legislator. In the context of participation of members in the law-making process, four stages could be identified. These are - initiation or introduction of bills, participation in the clause-wise discussion, proposing amendments and participation in final discussion.

The possibility of the representative's active participation in law-making in the present context gets limited on account of several factors. The parliamentary model in which legislation is largely initiated by the executive, strict party-discipline, technicalities and complexities involved in modern legislation, inadequate staff assistance, non-availability of information, insufficient time and the lack of representative's interest are important constraints. Tables 6.4 & 6.5 make this point very clear. In the sample 46.36% of the respondents never participated in law-making activity, i.e. initiating, discussing and suggesting amendments. Members of the Janata Party and the CPI are very active in law-making activities. It is interesting to note that one CPI(M) representative with watch-dog role perception participated in the discussion of 56 bills and another

TABLE 6.5

PARTY - WISE DISTRIBUTION OF NUMBER OF BILLS DISCUSSED

POLITICAL PARTY	0		1 - 5		6 - 10		11 - 15		16 AND ABOVE		TOTAL	
	NO.	PER%	NO.	PER%	NO.	PER%	NO.	PER%	NO.	PER%	NO.	PER%
TDP	41	80.39	63.08	20	57.14	30.77	2	24.57	3.07	2	40.00	3.08
INC (I)	5	9.80	22.73	8	22.86	36.36	2	24.57	9.09	2	40.00	9.09
CPI	-	-	-	1	2.86	25.00	2	24.57	50.00	-	-	-
CPI (M)	2	3.92	28.51	1	2.86	14.28	-	-	-	1	20.00	14.29
BJP	3	5.89	75.00	-	-	-	-	-	-	1	8.33	25.00
JP	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	2	16.67	100.00
MIN	-	-	-	1	2.86	50.00	1	14.29	50.00	-	-	-
INDTS	-	-	-	4	11.42	100.00	-	-	-	-	-	-
TOTAL	51	100.00	46.36	35	100.00	31.82	7	100.00	6.36	5	100.00	4.55
											12	100.00
											10.91	110
											100.00	100.00

SOURCE: ANDHRA PRADESH LEGISLATIVE ASSEMBLY DEBATES (1985 - 89)

representative from the Opposition party, **Congress-I**, participated in **the** discussion of 40 bills suggesting amendments to 19 bills. The **amendments**, however, have been negated by the TDP dominated House.

Non-participation of the ruling party respondents in discussing bills is conspicuous as 63.07% of the respondents did not take part at all. Apart from the absolute majority of the ruling party in the House and prevalence of strict party discipline, the limited participation in law-making activities is due to the existing trend among the respondents. The feeling, that the representative body should be **more** concerned with keeping the day to day working of the government in good order and check the executive, than with devoting its time to law-making, is present among members. It is interesting to note a response from one of the ruling party members regarding law-making. He said, "the Chief Minister initiates legislation, the cabinet approves and the legislature ratifies".

Participation In Financial Business:

As it is well known, finance is the fuel which keeps **the** wheels of administration moving . It is the representative bodies that have the exclusive privilege of granting money to various departments. It is only in accordance with the decision of the popular representatives that governmental departments could spend on developmental works.

To understand the **respondents'** level of participation in financial business, the **number** of times they discussed the general budget and the demands for grants is examined. It can be seen from Table 6.6 and 6.7 that more number of representatives participated in the discussion relating to demands for grants than in the discussion of general budget. Non-participation of the ruling party respondents is quite prominent in both cases. However, this trend is more visible in the case of general budget discussion as only 11.81% and 4.54% of the respondents participated more than four times in the discussion on demands for grants and of the general budget, respectively. It is interesting to note that both the Janata Party **members** in the sample are very active in these two types of discussion.

The Opposition party members introduced many cut motions as a means of showing their opposition to government's financial policy. One **Congress-I** member observed on the floor, "the figures in the budget reveal the style and method of functioning of the government as well as the Finance wing of this government. I am sure, the Honourable Minister of finance is quite a capable man. . . . He is not able to express what he wants to say. Neither the officials nor the ministers are able to say. I had to say this as a proprietary concern because in this there are only solos and there are no duets and no chorus." He further quoted certain facts and figures. The argument of this member was at the personal level and the member alleged that the running of the government is very irresponsible, from the point of view of rural development, district administration, public services, municipal

TABLE 6.6
PARTY - WISE DISTRIBUTION OF RESPONDENTS' DISCUSSION ON BUDGET

POLITICAL PARTY	0			1 - 2			3 - 4			5 & ABOVE			TOTAL		
	NO.	VER%	HE%	NO.	VER%	HE%	NO.	VER%	HE%	NO.	VER%	HE%	NO.	VER%	HE%
TDP	47	72.31	72.31	15	53.57	23.08	3	25.00	-	-	-	-	65	59.09	100.00
INC (I)	9	13.85	40.91	8	20.58	36.36	4	33.33	18.18	1	20.00	4.55	22	20.00	100.00
CPI	2	1.82	50.00	-	-	-	2	16.67	50.00	-	-	-	4	3.63	100.00
CPI (M)	1	1.54	14.28	3	10.71	42.88	1	8.33	14.29	2	40.00	28.57	7	6.36	100.00
BJP	2	1.82	50.00	1	3.57	25.00	1	8.33	25.00	-	-	-	4	3.64	100.00
JP	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	2	40.00	100.00	2	1.82	100.00
MIN	-	-	-	1	3.57	50.00	1	8.34	50.00	-	-	-	2	1.82	100.00
INDTS	4	3.64	100.00	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	4	3.64	100.00
TOTAL	65	100.00	59.09	28	100.00	25.45	12	100.00	10.91	5	100.00	4.55	110	100.00	100.00

SOURCE: ANDHRA PRADESH LEGISLATIVE ASSEMBLY DEBATES (1985 - 89)

TABLE 6.7

PARTY - WISE DISTRIBUTION OF RESPONDENT'S DISCUSSION ON DEMANDS OF GRANTS

POLITICAL PARTY	0			1 - 2			3 - 4			5 AND ABOVE			TOTAL		
	NO.	VE%	HE%	NO.	VE%	HE%	NO.	VE%	HE%	NO.	VE%	HE%	NO.	VE%	HE%
TDP	41	80.39	63.08	16	51.61	24.62	7	46.67	6.36	1	7.69	1.54	65	59.09	100.00
INC (I)	6	11.77	27.27	10	32.26	45.45	1	6.66	4.55	5	38.46	22.73	22	20.00	100.00
CPI	-	-	-	2	6.45	50.00	2	13.33	50.00	-	-	-	4	3.63	100.00
CPI (M)	1	1.96	14.28	1	3.23	14.29	1	6.67	14.29	4	30.77	57.14	7	6.36	100.00
BJP	1	1.96	25.00	2	6.45	50.00	1	6.67	25.00	-	-	-	4	3.64	100.00
JP	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	2	15.39	100.00	2	1.82	100.00
MIN	-	-	-	-	-	-	2	13.33	100.00	-	-	-	2	1.82	100.00
INDTS	2	3.92	50.00	-	-	-	1	6.67	25.00	1	7.69	25.00	4	3.64	100.00
TOTAL	51	100.00	46.36	31	100.00	28.18	15	100.00	13.64	13	100.00	11.82	110	100.00	100.00

SOURCE: ANDHRA PRADESH LEGISLATIVE ASSEMBLY DEBATES (1985 - 89)

services, amenities point of view, farmers point of view and **from the industrialists'** point of view.¹⁴

Some of the speeches made by the respondents are very lengthy and have revealed their awareness of the **technicalities** of financial matters, anxiety to make the most profitable use of the public funds and the concern for the development of backward and downtrodden sections of the state.

Discussion On Motion Of Thanks On Governor's Address:

Under article 176(1) of the Indian Constitution, at the commencement of the first session after each general election to the Assembly and at the commencement of the first session of each year, the Governor shall address the Legislative Assembly and the Speaker in consultation with the Business Advisory Committee shall allot time for the **discussion**. During the time allotted, the House shall be at liberty to discuss the matters referred to in such Address on a motion of thanks moved by a member and seconded by another **member**.

The Governor's speech is important from the point that it reflects governmental policies and its implementation and discussion on it will provide an opportunity to the ruling and opposition party members to express their opinions on the governmental policies and activities. Partisan role and **identification** can be clearly be seen in this mode of **participation**.

In the sample, 34.65% of the respondents participated at least once in the discussion on Governor's Address. The party - wise break up of the respondents in this regard as shown in table 6.8 reveals that 83.07% of the ruling party respondents and 41.46% of the other parties' members and independents never took part in this motion. The respondents from the CPI and the JP made a good use of this opportunity.

The Opposition members made a profitable use of this provision by pointing out loopholes in governmental policies. Their participation reflected their 'own parties' ideology and commitments. Speeches of some respondents revealed their knowledge of issues, efforts to prepare and effective presentation. In one context, the Opposition party leader called the Governor's speech as that which was drafted and approved by the cabinet, read by the Governor and as a 'false promise'.

It is to be noted that at the beginning of the 10th session of the Eighth Andhra Pradesh Legislative Assembly, the Chief Minister was absent from the House when the thanks giving motion on the Governor's speech was being discussed. The Ministers supporting the absence of the Chief Minister, on the ground of some other important work, said that they will report the happenings in the House to the Chief Minister as there is collective responsibility of the Cabinet. The Opposition members insisted that the Chief Minister should be present as it is a discussion on governmental policy. The Leader of the Opposition party refused to speak as a protest against the absence of the

TABLE 6.8

PARTY WISE DISTRIBUTION OF RESPONDENTS' PARTICIPATION IN MOTION OF THANKS TO GOVERNOR

POLITICAL PARTY	0			1			2			3 AND MORE			TOTAL		
	NO.	VP%	HP%	NO.	VP%	HP%	NO.	VP%	HP%	NO.	VP%	HP%	NO.	VP%	HP%
TDP	54	75.00	83.08	10	43.48	15.38	1	14.29	1.54	-	-	-	65	59.09	100.00
INC (I)	14	19.44	63.64	3	13.04	13.64	2	28.57	9.09	3	37.50	13.63	22	20.00	100.00
CPI	1	1.39	25.00	1	4.35	25.00	-	-	-	2	25.00	50.00	4	3.63	100.00
CPI (M)	1	1.39	14.29	3	13.04	42.85	2	28.57	28.57	1	12.50	14.29	7	6.36	100.00
BJP	-	-	-	1	4.35	25.00	2	28.57	50.00	1	12.50	25.00	4	3.64	100.00
JP	-	-	-	1	4.35	50.00	-	-	-	1	12.50	50.00	2	1.82	100.00
MIN	1	1.39	50.00	1	4.35	50.00	-	-	-	-	-	-	2	1.82	100.00
INDTS	1	1.39	25.00	3	13.04	75.00	-	-	-	-	-	-	4	3.64	100.00
TOTAL	72	100.00	65.46	23	100.00	20.91	7	100.00	6.36	8	100.00	7.27	110	100.00	100.00

SOURCE: ANDHRA PRADESH LEGISLATIVE ASSEMBLY DEBATES (1985 - 89).

Chief Minister. A **Congress-I** representative, sharply reacting said , "when there is one hero and the rest are Zeros, how can it be collective responsibility."¹⁸. The Chief Minister who came after 45 **minutes**, in his 50 minutes reply and in his usual emotional and dramatic style **said, "people** are our gods. Society is our temple. I left everything and entered politics. I am not a politician with political skills and expertise. I came to power with my goodness and good intention. I want to serve the people."¹⁹

In the deliberations of the House following Governor's Address revealed close relationship between party ideologies and **areal** linkages on the one hand and the speeches on the other is noticed. A **CPI** representative made inquiries about land reforms and matters relating to ceiling on urban land which reflected his party linkages. The Deputy Leader of the Congress-I was critical of the poor **electrification** of Scheduled Caste localities in his district, irregularities in the barrage construction near his constituency and these indicated his areal **focus**. A Janata Party representative proposed five amendments to the speech but none of these are accepted by the House.

Committees: Legislative committees are devised for detailed discussion on legislation and other important inquiries as the time of the House is limited. In Andhra Pradesh Legislative Assembly there are both permanent and adhoc committees.

Leadership positions in the House and community linkages are prominent in the case of committee appointments. The party-wise distribution of the representatives on the basis of their

membership in standing committees, as shown in Table 6.9, reveals that **only seven** of **the** respondents, six of whom occupying party leadership positions in the House are members of more than three committees. While 62.72% of the respondents are not members of any standing committee. Some of the respondents in leadership positions are members in nine committees. Committee chairmanship positions are also occupied by those representatives in leadership positions. Only four of the respondents without leadership positions held committee chairmanship out of whom two are from SCs and STs, respectively.

The above discussion Shows that the representatives in the present sample are more active during Question-hour than in discussion on bills and other modes of participation. This is due to two reasons - party discipline is limited during this mode and representatives of all parties are encouraged to raise intelligent questions. As rightly observed by Chester and Bowning (1962), "questions remain much the most personal of all the activities of the House, reflecting much more closely than any other form of procedure the everyday activities of Members, the **problems** that concern them, their personal predilections and idiosyncracies".

Greater interest in one mode than in others may be due to another important reason i.e., calculation of cost of preparation **and** of results. To Judge (1981), participation costs and efficiency are primary factors that influence a backbencher's choice of procedure in the British House of Commons. Each

TABLE 6.9

PARTY - WISE DISTRIBUTION OF RESPONDENTS' MEMBERSHIP IN LEGISLATIVE COMMITTEES

POLITICAL PARTY	0			1			2			3 AND MORE			TOTAL		
	NO.	PER%	HE%	NO.	PER%	HE%	NO.	PER%	HE%	NO.	PER%	HE%	NO.	PER%	HE%
TDP	48	69.57	73.85	20	58.82	30.77	6	60.00	9.23	1	14.28	1.53	65	59.09	100.00
INC (I)	15	21.73	68.18	4	11.76	18.18	1	10.00	4.55	2	28.57	9.09	22	20.00	100.00
CPI	2	2.90	50.00	1	2.94	25.00	-	-	-	1	14.28	25.00	4	3.63	100.00
CPI (M)	2	2.90	28.57	3	8.82	42.85	1	10.00	14.29	1	14.29	14.29	7	6.36	100.00
BJP	-	-	-	2	5.88	50.00	1	10.00	25.00	1	14.29	25.00	4	3.64	100.00
JP	-	-	-	1	2.94	50.00	-	-	-	1	14.29	50.00	2	1.82	100.00
MIN	-	-	-	1	2.94	50.00	1	10.00	50.00	-	-	-	2	1.82	100.00
INDTS	2	2.90	50.00	2	5.88	50.00	-	-	-	-	-	-	4	3.64	100.00
TOTAL	69	100.00	62.74	34	100.00	30.91	10	100.00	9.09	7	100.00	6.36	110	100.00	100.00

SOURCE: ANDHRA PRADESH LEGISLATIVE ASSEMBLY DEBATES (1985 - 89)

procedure holds distinct advantages for the promotion of differing legislative objectives and **representatives'goals**. He further observed that any advantage **to** be gained from the use of one procedure to another mainly depends upon the skill and technique of an individual backbencher and due to their style and motive, to representatives may obtain totally different effect in asking same **question**.

Level Of Participation:

All representatives, in the sample, participated atleast one or more time in the proceedings of the House - participating either in question - hour, or in raising calling attention notices, or in legislation, or in financial business, or in committees.

For assessing the level of participation of the respondents, the number of sessions participated is taken as the main basis. The representatives in the present context are divided into three groups.

- 1) Respondents with low level participation (whose participation range is between 1 - 4 sessions).
- 2) Respondents with medium level participation (whose participation range is between 5 - 8 sessions).
- 3) Respondents with high level participation (whose participation range is between 9 - 12 sessions).

Of the 110 respondents, 46 (41.81%) have shown low level participation. The participation of 35 members (31.81%) is one of medium level and high level participants are only 29 (26.30%).

The party-wise break up of the representatives on the basis of their level of participation, as given in Table 6.10 clearly shows that a majority of the ruling party representatives and independents have only low participation level. A majority of the CPI, CPI(M) and the Janata Party members are high level participants. Among the Congress - I respondents high and medium level participants are more or less equally distributed.

Links Between Institutional Participation Levels And Background Of The Representatives:

In order to comprehend the real dynamics of representatives' participation, one has to go beyond the analysis of institutional participation and find out the links between the level of participation and the demographic characteristics of the legislators.

Age: It is interesting to note that both of the very young respondents in the sample are very active, 50% of the respondents in the age group of 31-40 are low level participants while 59% of the representatives whose age is between 51 to 60 participated in 5 to 8 sessions. Among representatives above 60 years medium and high level participants are in equal numbers. This can be seen in Table 6.11.

TABLE 6.10

PARTY - WISE DISTRIBUTION OF RESPONDENTS' PARTICIPATION IN SESSIONS

PARTY	1 - 4			5 - 8			9 - 12			TOTAL		
	NO.	VR%	HR%	NO.	VR%	HR%	NO.	VR%	HR%	NO.	VR%	HR%
TDP	33	71.74	50.77	22	62.86	33.65	10	34.48	15.38	65	59.09	100.00
INC (I)	5	10.87	22.73	8	22.86	36.36	9	31.03	40.91	22	20.00	100.00
CPI	1	2.17	25.00	-	-	-	3	10.35	75.00	4	3.63	100.00
CPI (M)	2	4.35	28.57	1	2.85	14.29	4	13.79	57.14	7	6.36	100.00
BJP	2	4.35	50.00	1	2.86	25.00	1	3.45	25.00	4	3.64	100.00
JP	-	-	-	-	-	-	2	6.70	100.00	2	1.82	100.00
NIM	-	-	-	2	5.71	100.00	-	-	-	2	1.82	100.00
INDTS	3	6.52	75.00	1	2.86	25.00	-	-	-	4	3.64	100.00
T O T A L	46	100.00	41.82	35	100.00	31.82	29	100.00	26.36	110	100.00	100.00

SOURCE: ANDHRA PRADESH LEGISLATIVE ASSEMBLY DEBATES (1985 -89)

TABLE 6.11

AGE - PROFILE OF RESPONDENTS AND THEIR INSTITUTIONAL PARTICIPATION

AGE	LOW			MEDIUM			HIGH			TOTAL		
	NO.	VR%	HR%	NO.	VR%	HR%	NO.	VR%	HR%	NO.	VR%	HR%
25 - 30	-	-	-	-	-	-	2	6.90	100.00	2	1.82	100.00
31 - 40	7	15.22	50.00	5	14.28	35.71	2	6.90	14.29	14	12.73	100.00
41 - 50	23	50.00	40.35	18	51.43	31.58	16	55.17	28.07	57	51.82	100.00
51 - 60	9	19.56	40.91	8	22.86	36.36	5	17.24	22.73	22	20.00	100.00
61 AND ABOVE	7	15.22	46.67	4	11.43	26.68	4	13.79	26.67	15	13.63	100.00
TOTAL	46	100.00	41.82	35	100.00	31.82	29	100.00	26.36	110	100.00	100.00

Education: The data shows **that level** of education has relevance **in** determining levels of participation. A good majority 60.% and 62.06% of the medium and high level participants are graduates or post graduates. But the data also reveals that factors like time constraints, the Speakers discretion, seniority and party discipline prevail over representatives, though they have reasonably good educational levels, and make them low level participants. Presence of 54.34% of graduates and post graduates in low level participants, as shown in Table 6.12, is due to above mentioned reasons.

Occupation: The respondents who are professionals in the sample doctors and engineers are more active participants than lawyers who are taken as a separate group in the sample. This is shown in Table 6.13. It is because of the fact that more than 50% of the lawyers are mainly agriculturalists with rural background while doctors and engineers are from urban constituencies. It can also be seen that a significant proportion of representatives with agricultural and business occupations are low level participants while a good number of respondents who are engaged in social service, teaching and household activities are medium level participants.

Community: It is interesting to note the links between community and participation levels of the respondents. Representatives of the Scheduled castes are predominantly (75%) low level participants as Table 6.14 makes it clear. A majority i.e., 57.14%, of the Scheduled Tribes representatives are medium level

TABLE 6.12

EDUCATIONAL BACKGROUND AND ITS BEARING ON INSTITUTIONAL PARTICIPATION

LEVEL OF EDUCATION	LOW			MEDIUM			HIGH			TOTAL		
	NO.	VR%	HR%	NO.	VR%	HR%	NO.	VR%	HR%	NO.	VR%	HR%
HIGH SCHOOL	15	32.61	45.45	12	34.29	36.37	6	20.69	18.18	33	30.00	100.00
MATRICULATION	6	13.04	46.15	2	5.71	15.39	5	17.24	38.46	13	11.82	100.00
OR INTERMEDIATE	19	41.31	38.00	18	51.43	36.00	13	44.83	26.00	50	45.45	100.00
GRADUATION	6	13.04	42.86	3	8.57	21.43	5	17.24	35.71	14	12.73	100.00
POST-GRADUATION + PROFESSION												
T O T A L	46	100.00	41.82	35	100.00	31.82	29	100.00	26.36	110	100.00	100.00

TABLE 6.13

OCCUPATION - PROFILE AND ITS IMPACT ON INSTITUTIONAL PARTICIPATION

OCCUPATION	LOW			MEDIUM			HIGH			TOTAL		
	NO.	VR%	HR%	NO.	VR%	HR%	NO.	VR%	HR%	NO.	VR%	HR%
AGRICULTURE	24	52.17	40.06	17	48.57	33.33	10	34.48	19.61	51	46.36	100.00
BUSINESS	7	15.22	43.75	5	14.29	31.25	4	13.79	25.00	16	14.55	100.00
LAWYERS	9	19.57	52.94	3	8.57	17.65	5	17.24	29.41	17	15.45	100.00
PROFESSIONALS												
DOCTORS &												
ENGINEERS	3	6.52	25.00	4	11.43	33.33	5	17.24	41.67	12	10.91	100.00
OTHERS	3	6.52	21.43	6	17.14	42.86	5	17.25	35.71	14	12.73	100.00
T O T A L	46	100.00	41.82	35	100.00	31.82	29	100.00	26.36	110	100.00	100.00

participants and **more** or less equal **number** of respondents elected from unreserved seats are low, medium, and high level participants.

Political Experience: The data establishes positive link between political experience and high level participation, as given in Table 6.15. 75% of the respondents with political experience at both state and local levels are active. It is also clear that political experience at the state level is more conducive to active or high level participation than that at the local level. Among the respondents without political experience only 19.35% are high level participants and 50% are low level participants.

Nature Of Constituency: The relationship between the nature of constituency and participation level does show conspicuous differences between the respondents from urban and rural constituencies. The percentage of respondents from rural constituencies with low, medium and high participation rates shows a descending trend while that of the respondents from urban constituencies does not show a similar trend. This can be seen from Table 6.16.

Region: The region wise distribution of the respondents on the basis of their participation levels reveals that the respondents from Telangana region are very active participants than those from **Rayalaseṃa** and Andhra regions. This is precisely because of the fact that a majority of the respondents from Telangana are from the Opposition and majority of those from Andhra region

TABLE 6.14

COMMUNITY-BACKGROUNDS AND ITS IMPACT ON INSTITUTIONAL PARTICIPATION

COMMUNITY	LOW			MEDIUM			HIGH			TOTAL		
	NO.	VR%	HR%	NO.	VR%	HR%	NO.	VR%	HR%	NO.	VR%	HR%
S.Cs	9	19.57	75.00	3	8.57	25.00	-	-	-	12	10.91	100.00
S.Ts	3	6.52	42.86	4	11.43	57.14	-	-	-	7	6.36	100.00
OTHERS	34	73.91	37.36	28	80.00	30.77	29	100.00	31.87	91	82.73	100.00
T O T A L	46	100.00	41.82	35	100.00	31.82	29	100.00	26.36	110	100.00	100.00

TABLE 6.15

POLITICAL EXPERIENCE OF RESPONDENTS & ITS IMPACT ON INSTITUTIONAL PARTICIPATION

POLITICAL EXPERIENCE	LOW			MEDIUM			HIGH			TOTAL		
	NO.	VR%	HR%	NO.	VR%	HR%	NO.	VR%	HR%	NO.	VR%	HR%
LOCAL BODIES	9	19.57	42.86	7	14.29	33.33	5	17.24	23.81	21	19.09	100.00
STATE												
LEGISLATURE	5	10.87	21.74	9	25.72	39.13	9	31.03	39.13	23	20.91	100.00
BOTH	1	2.17	25.00	-	-	-	3	10.35	75.00	4	3.64	100.00
NO EXPERIENCE	31	67.39	50.00	19	54.29	30.65	12	41.30	19.35	62	56.36	100.00
T O T A L	46	100.00	41.82	35	100.00	31.82	29	100.00	26.36	110	100.00	100.00

TABLE 6.16

LINK BETWEEN NATURE OF CONSTITUENCY AND INSTITUTIONAL PARTICIPATION

CONSTITUENCY	LOW			MEDIUM			HIGH			TOTAL		
	NO.	VR%	HR%	NO.	VR%	HR%	NO.	VR%	HR%	NO.	VR%	HR%
RURAL	33	71.74	45.83	21	60.00	29.17	18	62.07	25.00	72	65.45	100.00
URBAN	13	28.26	34.21	14	40.00	36.84	11	38.93	28.95	38	34.55	100.00
T O T A L	46	100.00	41.82	35	100.00	31.82	29	100.00	26.36	110	100.00	100.00

TABLE 6.17

LINK BETWEEN REGION OF THE RESPONDENTS AND INSTITUTIONAL PARTICIPATION

REGION	LOW			MEDIUM			HIGH			TOTAL		
	NO.	VR%	HR%	NO.	VR%	HR%	NO.	VR%	HR%	NO.	VR%	HR%
ANDHRA	19	41.30	40.43	16	45.71	34.04	12	41.38	25.53	47	42.73	100.00
RAYALASEEMA	9	19.57	42.86	9	25.72	42.86	3	10.34	14.28	21	19.09	100.00
TELANGANA	18	39.13	42.86	10	28.57	23.81	14	48.28	33.33	42	38.18	100.00
T O T A L	46	100.00	41.82	35	100.00	31.82	29	100.00	26.36	110	100.00	100.00

belong to the ruling party. Table 6.17 shows that there are more low level participants in all the three regions.

Sex -Wise Distribution: The relationship between gender and participation levels of the respondents is that a majority of the female representatives are medium level participants and there are no high level participants among them. As shown in Table 6.18 more number of the male representatives are low level participants and equal number of them are medium and high level participants.

Membership In Social Organisations: Direct link between membership in social organisations and institutional participation is quite obvious in the sample as Table 6.19 reveals . A majority of the respondents without membership in social organizations are low level participants while more number of the respondents with membership in social organisations are high level participants.

Leadership Position In The House: The data reveals a very close relationship between high level institutional participation and occupation of leadership positions. 62.5% of the respondents in leadership positions are very active participants. The corresponding percentage of ordinary members is only 23.53%. This can be seen in Table 6.20.

Political Ambition Level: The data has interesting revelations regarding ambition and participation levels. From Table 6.21, it can be noted that among the high level participants, a very high

TABLE 6.18

SEX OF THE REPRESENTATIVES AND ITS BEARING ON INSTITUTIONAL PARTICIPATION

SEX	LOW			MEDIUM			HIGH			TOTAL		
	NO.	VR%	HR%	NO.	VR%	HR%	NO.	VR%	HR%	NO.	VR%	HR%
MALE	44	95.65	42.31	31	88.57	29.81	29	100.00	27.88	104	94.55	100.00
FEMALE	2	4.35	33.33	4	11.43	66.67	-	-	-	6	5.45	100.00
T O T A L	46	100.00	41.82	35	100.00	31.82	29	100.00	26.36	110	100.00	100.00

TABLE 6.19

MEMBERSHIP OF RESPONDENTS IN SOCIAL ORGANISATIONS AND ITS IMPACT ON INSTITUTIONAL PARTICIPATION

MEMBERSHIP IN SOCIAL ORGANISATION	LOW			MEDIUM			HIGH			TOTAL		
	NO.	VR%	HR%	NO.	VR%	HR%	NO.	VR%	HR%	NO.	VR%	HR%
MEMBER	8	17.39	17.39	17	48.57	36.96	21	72.41	45.65	46	41.82	100.00
NON-MEMBERS	38	82.61	59.38	18	51.43	28.12	8	27.59	12.50	64	58.18	100.00
T O T A L	46	100.00	41.82	35	100.00	31.82	29	100.00	26.36	110	100.00	100.00

TABLE 6.20

POSITION OF RESPONDENTS IN PARTY AND ITS INFLUENCE ON THEIR INSTITUTIONAL PARTICIPATION

POSITION IN PARTY	LOW			MEDIUM			HIGH			TOTAL		
	NO.	VR%	HR%	NO.	VR%	HR%	NO.	VR%	HR%	NO.	VR%	HR%
ORDINARY												
MEMBERS	44	95.65	43.14	34	97.14	33.33	24	82.76	23.53	102	92.73	100.00
LEADERS	2	4.35	25.00	1	2.86	12.50	5	17.24	67.50	8	7.27	100.00
T O T A L	46	100.00	41.82	35	100.00	31.82	29	100.00	26.36	110	100.00	100.00

TABLE 6.21

POLITICAL AMBITION - LEVEL OF THE RESPONDENTS AND ITS BEARING ON INSTITUTIONAL PARTICIPATION

POLITICAL AMBITION LEVEL	LOW			MEDIUM			HIGH			TOTAL		
	NO.	VR%	HR%	NO.	VR%	HR%	NO.	VR%	HR%	NO.	VR%	HR%
SIMILAR												
POSITION	34	73.91	45.95	25	71.43	33.78	15	51.72	20.27	74	67.27	100.00
HIGHER	4	8.70	18.18	5	14.28	22.73	13	44.83	59.09	22	20.00	100.00
POSITION	8	17.39	57.14	5	14.29	35.72	1	3.45	7.14	14	12.73	100.00
NONE												
T O T A L	46	100.00	41.82	35	100.00	31.82	29	100.00	26.36	110	100.00	100.00

percentage aspire for higher positions in future. It is only one respondent that did not show any desire for future political career has been a high level participant. A significant majority of the respondents with low level participation have shown ambition to occupy positions similar to those they have been currently holding.

Locus Of Control: The data makes clear that representatives with internal locus of control tend to be more active than those with external locus of control in the context of institutional participation cannot be generalised. Table 6.22 reveals that high level participants with external locus of control have a slight edge over high level participants with internal locus of control.

Incentives: The incentives for representatives taking politics as a career, as the data shows, are mainly two - social status and psychological satisfaction derived through public service. It can be said that members who enter political career with these two incentives in the background will be active participants. But at the institutional level not all those who are influenced by these incentives need be active. Interestingly in the sample, as shown in Table 6.23, a majority of the respondents who are inspired by one or other of these two incentives are either medium or high level participants.

Motivating Factors: The study reveals that desire for power and affiliation is seen more among low and medium level participants.

TABLE 6.22

LOCUS OF CONTROL AND INSTITUTIONAL PARTICIPATION

LOCUS OF CONTROL	LOW			MEDIUM			HIGH			TOTAL		
	NO.	VR%	HR%	NO.	VR%	HR%	NO.	VR%	HR%	NO.	VR%	HR%
EXTERNAL	24	52.17	39.34	20	57.14	32.79	17	58.62	27.87	61	55.45	100.00
INTERNAL	22	47.83	44.90	15	42.86	30.61	12	41.38	24.49	49	44.55	100.00
T O T A L	46	100.00	41.82	35	100.00	31.82	29	100.00	26.36	110	100.00	100.00

TABLE 6.23

LINK BETWEEN INCENTIVES AND INSTITUTIONAL PARTICIPATION

INCENTIVES	LOW			MEDIUM			HIGH			TOTAL		
	NO.	VR%	HR%	NO.	VR%	HR%	NO.	VR%	HR%	NO.	VR%	HR%
SOCIAL	16	34.78	40.00	11	31.43	27.50	13	44.83	32.50	40	36.36	100.00
PSYCHOLOGICAL	18	39.13	40.91	17	48.57	38.64	9	31.03	20.45	44	40.00	100.00
ECONOMIC	9	19.57	45.00	5	14.29	25.00	6	20.69	30.00	20	18.18	100.00
OTHERS	3	6.52	50.00	2	5.71	33.33	1	3.45	16.67	6	5.46	100.00
T O T A L	46	100.00	41.82	35	100.00	31.82	29	100.00	26.36	110	100.00	100.00

As against this, desire for achievement is significant among the high level participants. Table 6.24 makes these points clear.

Links Between Role Perceptions And Participation Levels:

It is useful to establish links between role perceptions and participation levels of the representatives as they reveal whether the representatives practise what they perceive or say. In the following paragraphs the relationship between perceptions and performance at the institutional level is detailed.

Purposive Role Perception: The study reveals positive relationship between law-maker role and **watch-dog** role with high participation level. A majority of communicators and community spokesmen have low participation levels. Table 6.25 points out that the respondents with entrepreneurial and ritualist role perception are essentially medium level participants. It is also observable that medium level participants are slightly more than those with high level participation among representatives with entrepreneurial role perception.

Representational Role Perception: Among the representatives who perceived themselves as trustees, a significant portion, i.e. 42.85% are high level participants. It is interesting to note that among the high level participants in the sample, the percentage of trustees is more and has a slight edge over that of partisans, as shown in Table 6.26. Thus one can observe a close link between trustee role and high level **institutional**

TABLE 6.24

LINK BETWEEN MOTIVATIONAL FACTORS AND INSTITUTIONAL PARTICIPATION

MOTIVATIONAL FACTORS	LOW			MEDIUM			HIGH			TOTAL		
	NO.	VR%	HR%	NO.	VR%	HR%	NO.	VR%	HR%	NO.	VR%	HR%
DESIRE FOR AFFILIATION	17	36.96	40.48	14	40.00	33.33	11	37.93	26.19	42	38.18	100.00
DESIRE FOR ACHIEVEMENT	9	19.56	32.14	6	17.14	21.43	13	44.83	46.43	28	25.45	100.00
POWER	19	41.30	50.00	15	42.86	39.47	4	13.79	10.53	38	34.55	100.00
OTHERS	1	2.18	50.00	-	-	-	1	3.45	50.00	2	1.82	100.00
T O T A L	46	100.00	41.82	35	100.00	31.82	29	100.00	26.36	110	100.00	100.00

TABLE 6.25
LINKS BETWEEN PURPOSIVE ROLE PERCEPTION AND INSTITUTIONAL PARTICIPATION

PURPOSIVE ROLE PERCEPTION	LOW			MEDIUM			HIGH			TOTAL		
	NO.	VR%	HR%	NO.	VR%	HR%	NO.	VR%	HR%	NO.	VR%	HR%
LAW-MAKER	2	4.35	28.57	1	2.86	14.29	4	13.79	57.14	7	6.36	100.00
COMMUNITY SPOKESMAN	5	10.87	41.67	4	11.43	33.33	3	10.44	25.00	12	10.91	100.00
COMMUNICATOR	24	52.17	58.54	10	28.57	24.39	7	24.14	17.07	41	37.28	100.00
ENTREPRENEUR	4	8.69	23.53	7	14.28	41.18	6	17.14	35.29	17	15.45	100.00
RITUALIST	5	10.88	31.25	9	25.71	56.25	2	6.89	12.50	16	14.55	100.00
WATCH-DOG	6	13.04	35.29	4	11.43	23.53	7	24.14	41.18	17	15.45	100.00
T O T A L	46	100.00	41.82	35	100.00	31.82	29	100.00	26.36	110	100.00	100.00

TABLE 6.26

REPRESENTATIONAL ROLE PERCEPTION AND INSTITUTIONAL ROLE PERCEPTION

REPRESENTATIO- NAL ROLE PERCEPTION	LOW			MEDIUM			HIGH			TOTAL		
	NO.	VR%	HR%	NO.	VR%	HR%	NO.	VR%	HR%	NO.	VR%	HR%
TRUSTEE	6	13.04	28.57	6	17.14	28.57	9	31.03	42.86	21	19.09	100.00
DELEGATE	8	17.39	34.78	8	22.86	34.78	7	24.14	30.44	23	20.91	100.00
PARTISAN	22	47.82	50.00	14	40.00	31.82	8	27.58	18.18	44	40.00	100.00
POLITICO	10	2.15	45.45	7	20.00	31.82	5	17.24	22.73	22	20.00	100.00
T O T A L	46	100.00	41.82	35	100.00	31.82	29	100.00	26.36	110	100.00	100.00

TABLE 6.27

LINKS BETWEEN AREAL ROLE PERCEPTION AND INSTITUTIONAL PARTICIPATION

AREAL ROLE PERCEPTION	LOW			MEDIUM			HIGH			TOTAL		
	NO.	VR%	HR%	NO.	VR%	HR%	NO.	VR%	HR%	NO.	VR%	HR%
STATE	27	58.70	48.21	12	34.29	21.43	17	58.62	30.36	56	50.91	100.00
DISTRICT	8	17.39	29.63	13	37.14	40.15	6	20.69	22.22	27	24.54	100.00
CONSTITUENCY	11	23.91	40.74	10	28.57	37.04	6	20.69	22.22	27	24.55	100.00
T O T A L	46	100.00	41.82	35	100.00	31.82	29	100.00	26.36	110	100.00	100.00

participation. Low, medium and high level participants among partisans and politicos are seen in a descending order.

Areal Role Perception: The data shows that a **majority** of high level participants are interested in focusing their attention on the state as a whole, while equal number of the remaining high level participants are district and constituency oriented. Table 6.27 makes this point clear. But it can be seen that nearly half (48.27%) of the representatives with state orientation are low level participants. The study makes clear that more number of representatives with district as the major areal focus are medium level participants and more or less equal number of those focused on constituency matters are low and medium level participants, respectively.

Interest Group Role Perception: It is generally held that representatives who are facilitators for interest groups will be more active participants at the institutional level than those who perceive themselves as resisters to interest group activities. The data provides evidence to this. A good majority (65.51%) of the high level participants are facilitators. It is also interesting to note that a majority of the resisters and nearly half of the neutrals in the sample are low level participants. Table 6.28 also shows that a majority of the medium level participants are interested in remaining neutral to interest group activities.

TABLE 6.28

LINKS BETWEEN INTEREST GROUP ROLE PERCEPTION AND INSTITUTIONAL PARTICIPATION

INTEREST GROUP ROLE PERCEPTION	LOW			MEDIUM			HIGH			TOTAL		
	NO.	VR%	HR%	NO.	VR%	HR%	NO.	VR%	HR%	NO.	VR%	HR%
FACILITATOR	15	32.61	31.25	14	40.00	29.17	19	65.52	39.58	48	43.64	100.00
RESISTOR	9	19.57	52.94	3	8.57	17.65	5	17.24	29.41	17	15.45	100.00
NEUTRAL	22	47.82	48.89	18	51.43	40.00	5	17.24	11.11	45	40.91	100.00
T O T A L	46	100.00	41.82	35	100.00	31.82	29	100.00	26.36	110	100.00	100.00

TABLE 6.29

LINKS BETWEEN PARTICIPATORY ROLE PERCEPTION AND INSTITUTIONAL PARTICIPATION

PARTICIPATORY ROLE PERCEPTION	LOW			MEDIUM			HIGH			TOTAL		
	NO.	VR%	HR%	NO.	VR%	HR%	NO.	VR%	HR%	NO.	VR%	HR%
VERY BENEFICIAL	14	30.43	26.42	18	51.43	33.96	21	72.41	39.62	53	48.18	100.00
GOOD	10	21.74	38.46	9	25.71	34.62	7	24.14	26.92	26	23.64	100.00
MARGINAL	17	36.96	65.38	8	22.86	30.77	1	3.45	3.85	26	23.64	100.00
HARMFUL	5	10.87	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	5	4.54	100.00
T O T A L	46	100.00	41.82	35	100.00	31.82	29	100.00	26.36	110	100.00	100.00

Participatory Role Perception: The data makes clear that members' positive perceptions regarding the utility of participation in the legislature has considerable influence on the level of participation. In the sample, cent percent of the respondents, who felt that institutional participation is not only 'not useful' but also may be 'harmful', have been low level participants. And a very high percentage of the representatives who are convinced that institutional participation is very beneficial have been high level participants. From Table 6.29 it is noticeable that slightly more than half of the medium level participants considered their participation as very beneficial. Nearly equal number of the remaining 48.52% of the medium level participants considered institutional participation as having good and marginal utility.

Subject Specialisation And Institutional Participation: One way of analysing the content of representatives' participation is on the basis of the number of subjects interested them during their participation in various stages of transacting legislative business. The representatives participated during discussion on various subjects like Excise, Panchayati Raj, Municipal Administration, Civil Supplies, Major and Minor Irrigation, Revenue, Finance, Transport, Social Welfare, Tribal Welfare, Co-operation, Agriculture, Home, Small Scale Industries, Education, Environment, Housing, Commercial Taxes, Mines, Youth Services and Technical Education, Law, Power, Forests; and Medical and Health.

The respondents in general restricted their attention on a small number of subjects, concentrated on subjects which are linked to their party ideology. For example, the **CPI** and **the CPI(M)** members have been more active in participation when matters concerning industrial and agricultural labour and land reforms and constituency matters are discussed.

In the present sample, only two of the representatives participated in the discussion on a variety of subjects and in various parts of the legislative business. The percentage of the respondents who have taken part in the discussion of 10 or less than 10 subjects is very high.

Links Between Subject Specialisation And Education: Positive links can be established between the level of education and the number of subjects discussed by individual representatives. It is seen that higher the level of education, greater is the level of participation. Table 6.30 makes clear that, 72.72% of the respondents who participated in the discussion of more than 10 subjects (11 to 15) are graduates or post graduates and 71.42% of those who participated in more than 15 subjects have done graduation or above. It can also be seen that a majority of the respondents who have studied upto high school level participated in 6 to 10 subjects and more **number** of matriculates and intermediates participated only in 1 to 5 subjects.

Political Experience: A majority, 71.42% of the respondents who have participated in more than 15 subjects are with political

TABLE 6.3D

LINK BETWEEN EDUCATION OF RESPONDENTS AND NO. OF SUBJECTS RAISED

EDUCATIONAL LEVEL	1 - 5		6 - 10		11 - 15		16 AND ABOVE		TOTAL		
	NO.	PER%	NO.	PER%	NO.	PER%	NO.	PER%	NO.	PER%	
HIGH SCHOOL	11	31.43	33.33	17	36.96	51.52	3	13.64	9.09	2	28.57
MATRICULATION									6.06	33	30.00
OR INTERMEDIATE	6	17.14	46.15	4	8.69	30.77	3	13.64	23.08	-	-
GRADUATION	13	37.14	26.00	21	45.55	42.00	11	50.00	22.00	5	71.43
POST GRADUATION									10.00	50	45.45
& PROFESSIONAL	5	14.29	35.71	4	8.70	28.57	5	22.72	35.72	-	-
									-	14	12.73
TOTAL	35	100.00	31.82	46	100.00	41.82	22	100.00	20.00	7	100.00
									6.36	110	100.00

TABLE 6.31

LINKS BETWEEN POLITICAL EXPERIENCE OF THE RESPONDENTS AND NO. OF SUBJECTS RAISED

POLITICAL EXPERIENCE	1 - 5		6 - 10		11 - 15		16 AND ABOVE		TOTAL						
	NO.	PER%	NO.	PER%	NO.	PER%	NO.	PER%	NO.	PER%					
LOCAL BODIES	7	20.00	33.33	9	19.56	42.86	5	22.73	23.81	-	21	19.09	100.00		
STATE															
LEGISLATURE	5	14.29	21.74	10	21.74	43.48	4	18.18	17.39	4	57.14	17.39	23	20.90	100.00
BOTH	1	2.85	25.00	-	-	-	2	9.09	50.00	1	14.29	25.00	4	3.64	100.00
NO EXPERIENCE	22	62.86	35.48	27	58.70	43.55	11	50.00	17.74	2	28.57	3.23	62	56.36	100.00
TOTAL	35	100.00	31.82	46	100.00	41.82	22	100.00	20.00	7	100.00	6.36	110	100.00	100.00

TABLE 6.32

LINK BETWEEN SEX OF THE RESPONDENTS AND NO. OF SUBJECTS RAISED

SEX	1 - 5		6 - 10		11 - 15		16 AND ABOVE		TOTAL						
	NO.	PER%	NO.	PER%	NO.	PER%	NO.	PER%	NO.	PER%					
MALE	34	97.14	32.69	41	89.13	39.43	22	100.00	21.15	7	100.00	6.73	104	94.55	100.00
FEMALE	1	2.86	16.67	5	10.87	83.33	-	-	-	-	-	-	6	5.45	100.00
TOTAL	35	100.00	31.82	46	100.00	41.82	22	100.00	20.00	7	100.00	6.36	110	100.00	100.00

TABLE 6.33

LINKS BETWEEN POSITION OF THE RESPONDENTS IN PARTY AND NO. OF SUBJECTS RAISED

POSITION IN PARTY	1 - 5		6 - 10		11 - 15		16 AND ABOVE		TOTAL						
	NO.	PER	NO.	PER	NO.	PER	NO.	PER	NO.	PER					
ORDINARY															
MEMBERS	34	97.14	33.33	44	95.65	43.14	19	86.36	18.63	5	71.43	4.90	102	92.73	100.00
LEADERS	1	2.86	12.50	2	4.35	25.00	3	13.64	37.50	2	28.57	25.00	8	7.27	100.00
TOTAL	35	100.00	31.82	46	100.00	41.82	22	100.00	20.00	7	100.00	6.36	110	100.00	100.00

TABLE NO. 6.34

LINK BETWEEN POLITICAL AMBITION LEVEL OF THE RESPONDENTS AND NO. OF SUBJECTS RAISED

POLITICAL AMBITION LEVEL	1 - 5		6 - 10		11 - 15		16 AND ABOVE		TOTAL						
	NO.	PER%	NO.	PER%	NO.	PER%	NO.	PER%	NO.	PER%					
SIMILAR															
POSITION	23	65.71	31.08	37	80.43	50.00	11	50.00	14.86	3	42.86	4.06	74	67.28	100.00
HIGHER	4	11.43	18.18	5	10.87	22.73	9	40.91	40.91	4	57.14	18.18	22	20.00	100.00
NONE	8	22.86	57.14	4	8.70	28.57	2	9.09	14.29	-	-	-	14	18.92	100.00
TOTAL	35	100.00	31.82	46	100.00	41.82	22	100.00	20.00	7	100.00	6.36	110	100.00	100.00

experience, as given in Table 6.31. It is also noticed that 75% of the respondents with political experience at both state and local levels discussed more than 10 subjects. But more number of respondents with and without political experience participated in 6 to 10 subjects.

Sex: The sex-wise distribution of the respondents on the basis of the **number** of subjects discussed reveals that all female representatives participated on the discussion of 10 or less subjects, as shown in Table 6.32. This is due to their emphasis on subjects like social welfare, education, women and child welfare and on backward and downtrodden sections of the society.

Position In The House: Leadership position and participation are found to be correlated. A majority of members occupying leadership positions have discussed more than 10 subjects, while a predominant portion of ordinary members are found to be participating in the discussion of 10 or less than 10 subjects, as shown in Table 6.33.

Political Ambition: The study has revealed that political ambition is one of the major factors influencing institutional participation. Table 6.34 clearly shows that a predominant majority (81.08) of the respondents who participated in the discussion of 10 or less than 10 subjects have said that they prefer to continue in the positions which they have been holding at the time of interview. 59.08% of the respondents who have expressed desire for higher political positions participated in more than 11 subjects.

Thus, institutional participation and subject specialisation of the representatives are influenced by the nature of representative, the nature of political system, and the role perceptions on the one hand and the institutional, environmental and contextual factors on the other.

Motes:

1. **"Time** of the House: Focus on Important Issues, " Third Regional Seminar on Parliamentary Practice and Procedure For Asia, South East Asia and Africa Regions of the Commonwealth Parliamentary Association under the auspices of the Indian Branch of the CPA in New Delhi, **Jan-Feb.1984**, pp . 1-2.
2. Quoted in **John.C. Wahlke**, Heinz **Eulau**, William Buchanan and Le Roy C.Ferguson. 1962 .**"The Legislative System"**,**p.8**.
3. "Time of the House : Focus on Important Issues", op.cit., pp.10 - 38.
4. Rules of Procedure and Conduct of Business in the Andhra Pradesh Legislative Assembly. 1985. **Rule.43**.
5. Ibid.
6. Ibid., **Rule.51(1)** .
7. Andhra Pradesh Legislative Assembly Debates, 23-7-88.
8. Ibid., 27-7-88.
9. Ibid., 25-8-88.
10. Ibid., 25-3-88.
11. Ibid., 6-4-88.
12. Ibid., 28-3-88.
13. Rules of Procedure and Conduct of Business in the Andhra Pradesh Legislative Assembly. 1985. **Rule.74(1)** .
14. Andhra Pradesh Legislative Assembly Debates, 30-3-88.
15. Rules of Procedure and Conduct of Business in the Andhra Pradesh Legislative Assembly. 1985. Rule.17&18.
16. Ibid., **Rule.19**.
17. Andhra Pradesh Legislative Assembly Debates, 25-8-88.
18. Ibid., 25-3-88.
19. Ibid.
20. Judge, David. 1981. **"Backbenchers'** Specialisation in the House of Commons", **p.70**.
21. Ibid., **pp.71-76**.

CHAPTER VII

SERVING THE CONSTITUENTS

SECTION - 1

Research on constituency service gained **momentum** with the awareness of the fact that **law-making** is not the primary role of legislators and that a significant number of legislators in a majority of legislatures in the world are involved in several **activities** other than law-making. The role of representatives as bridges between the rulers and the ruled is generally emphasised not only in the developing countries but also in the developed countries, since the last two decades. Researchers have begun to focus on a variety of activities performed by representatives outside the House and other representational functions emphasised by democratic theories.

Constitutency level participation of political representatives has a significant role in the context of maintaining legitimacy of the legislature in particular and of the political system in general. The concept of 'support', introduced by David Easton(1965) provides a useful tool to analyse the strength and stability of nations and of political institutions. Easton distinguished between specific and diffused support. While specific support can be derived from satisfaction with the performance of governmental institutions, diffused support can be achieved through a general support to the political institutions of a country that exists apart **from** attitudes towards public policies of any particular government.¹.

These two types of support are interrelated, one leading to another. By taking specific support as an analytical tool to comprehend the relationship between the representative and represented, Wahlke (1967) found that policy demands of the represented do not form an effective support structure as only few voters have specific policy demands, position or expectations and suggested diffused support as a useful device to study the link between the representative and the represented.² **Mezey** (1976) observed that there must be support for legislators 'before there is support for legislatures' as legislators have to deal with tremendous violence of particularised demands. To him, the way in which individual legislator responds to and effectively handles constituency demands is likely to be the only aspect of legislative activity perceptible to most citizens and it is clearly such activity that must be considered as the embryo of support.

Constituency service of legislators has assumed greater importance in recent decades, mainly owing to its symbolic responsiveness. Though legislators in some Third World and communist countries may not be having policy, allocative and service responsiveness, their links with the represented serve as symbolic responsiveness. Even in liberal democracies, such as the U.S. and Britain, constituency service is viewed as symbolic representational style. Cain, Ferejohn and Fiorina(1979) found that 'person to person' style of representative has played a major role in building up the morale of the local party and in helping to make the seat of a legislator safe. To illustrate

symbolic responsiveness of representatives, the authors **gave the** example of **a** representative, writing a letter to **the** minister regarding his **constitutents'** problem, though he knows fully **well that** it is difficult to solve that particular problem. The Minister writes back a reply; in many cases expressing inability to help and the representative sends a photocopy of the minister's letter to the constituents. In spite of the fact **that the constituents'** problem does not get solved, he/she will be at least happy on knowing that his care has received attention at the highest levels and the representative in turn acquires the reputation of being a good constituency man who cares for his **constituency**.

Taggart and Durant (1985) examined the first **term** home style of a U.S. Senator with the help of the senator's personal travel itineraries and selected memoranda composed by his staff, to explain his symbolic representational style. They measured the home style on the basis of how attentive the representative is personally and on how the representative allocates his or her resources. To them, the symbolic and significant gestures of representatives in their constituencies demonstrate their constituency orientation. They found out that the senator's activities were highly consistent and that he followed a particular pattern. They noted that the six-year election cycle allows a senator to move sequentially from a campaign or political **mode** (first two years) to an issue oriented or statesman period (middle two years) and then back to a campaign style (last two years).⁵

Jewell (1982), who analysed the allocation and service roles of legislators in nine **American** states, found that **most** of the legislators are active in getting projects to districts but they differ in the extent of their constituency service. Legislators who are more service oriented are found in states where constituency service norms are strong and more staff resources are available and in **single-member** districts where constituency demand is high. The legislator's own sense of priorities also seems to have an impact.⁶

Barker and Rush (1972), Richards (1972) and Dowse (1972) described the service activities performed by British MPs in their '**surgeries**' (meetings held in constituencies). Provincial level studies by political scientists like Price and Krause (1975) and Clarke (1978) showed that the Canadian legislators devote substantial time to constituency **service, though** some representatives devote more time than others. These variations can be explained by individual legislator's background , perceptions and institutional factors.

Representatives of Third World countries emphasise more on constituency serviceman role than on law maker role and many research findings in these countries reveal that most of them spend considerable time and energies for constituency oriented activities. This is because of two factors; limited powers in law-making and high expectation and demands from the constituents. Countries where constituency activities of legislators occupy prominence include Tanzania (Hopkins, 1970),

Vietnam (Goodman, 1975), national and state levels in India (Maheswari, 1976, Narain Puri, 1976), Bangladesh (Jahan, 1976), Malaysia (Ong 1976; Musolf and Springer, 1979) and Afghanistan (Weinbaum, 1977).

Constituency service of legislators in Third World countries provides for systemic support also. Weinbaum (1977) observed that **the** constituency service of Afghanistan representatives give them an opportunity to act as mediators or intermediaries between **the** citizens and the national and provincial governments, thereby adding some support to the fragile parliamentary system in the country.⁶ Kim et al (1983) argue that in performing constituency service roles, legislators will act as important links between central and local governments, which brings increased support to the **government.**

With this in the background, the time allotted by the legislators , in the **sample,**to constituency service, visits undertaken by them, nature of problems received and dealt with, mode of communication and problem solving methods adopted are discussed here under.

Time Allocation: In order to comprehend how important constituency service is to the representative in the present sample, it is necessary to know how much time they spend on these activities. A majority (65.45%) of the respondents said that they devote 50% of their time for constituency service, as shown in Table 7.1. 25.45% of the respondents spent between 50% to 75% of their time to constituency oriented activities, while only a

very small percentages 3.63% and 5.45% of the respondents said that they will spend more than 3/4th of their time and 1/4th of their time in these activities respectively. The party-wise break up of the respondents on the basis of time allocation reveals similar trend and there is no wide difference among representatives of various parties and groups. It is interesting to note that 50% of the respondents, who spend more than 75% of their time are from Congress-I, while 83.33% of those who spend 25% and below are from the ruling party as given in Table 7.1.

Links Between Time Allocation And Background Of The Representatives:

Education: Education levels of the respondents have positive links with allocation of time for constituency service mainly in the case of those who spend 26.50% and 51.75% of their time to constituency activities. Table 7.2 shows that 50% of the respondents who have spent 1/4 and more than 3/4 of their time to constituency service are graduates and post graduates respectively. And a good majority of graduates and post graduates are devoting more time to constituency service than those who are undergraduates. 75% of those who have spent 51 to 70% of their time for constituency service are graduates and post graduates.

Occupation: It is interesting to note that the representatives with agriculture as the main occupation allotted more time to constituency service than those from other occupations. Half of the respondents who devoted 1/4, 1/2 and more than 3/4 of their

TABLE 7.1
PARTY - WISE DISTRIBUTION OF RESPONDENTS' ALLOCATION OF TIME FOR CONSTITUENCY SERVICE

PARTY	0 - 25%			26 - 50%			51 - 75%			76% AND ABOVE			TOTAL		
	NO.	VEX	HFX	NO.	VEX	HFX	NO.	VEX	HFX	NO.	VEX	HFX	NO.	VEX	HFX
TDP	5	83.33	7.69	44	61.11	67.69	15	53.57	23.08	1	25.00	1.54	65	59.09	100.00
INC (I)	-	-	-	15	20.83	68.18	5	17.86	22.73	2	50.00	9.09	22	20.00	100.00
CPI	-	-	-	2	2.78	50.00	2	7.14	50.00	-	-	-	4	3.63	100.00
CPI (M)	-	-	-	4	5.56	57.14	3	10.72	42.86	-	-	-	7	6.36	100.00
BJP	-	-	-	2	2.78	50.00	1	3.57	25.00	1	25.00	25.00	4	3.64	100.00
JP	-	-	-	1	1.38	50.00	1	3.57	50.00	-	-	-	2	1.82	100.00
MIS	1	16.67	50.00	-	-	-	1	3.57	50.00	-	-	-	2	1.82	100.00
INDTS	-	-	-	4	5.56	100.00	-	-	-	-	-	-	4	3.64	100.00
TOTAL	6	100.00	5.45	72	100.00	65.45	28	100.00	25.45	4	100.00	3.65	110	100.00	100.00

TABLE 7.2
LINK BETWEEN EDUCATIONAL BACKGROUND OF RESPONDENTS AND THEIR CONSTITUENCY SERVICE

EDUCATIONAL BACKGROUND	0 - 25%			26 - 50%			51 - 75%			76% AND ABOVE			TOTAL		
	NO.	VEX	HFX	NO.	VEX	HFX	NO.	VEX	HFX	NO.	VEX	HFX	NO.	VEX	HFX
HIGH SCHOOL	3	50.00	9.09	22	30.56	66.67	7	25.00	21.21	1	25.00	3.03	33	30.00	100.00
MATRICULATION	-	-	-	12	16.67	92.31	-	-	-	1	25.00	7.69	13	11.82	100.00
& INTERMEDIATE	1	16.67	2.00	30	41.66	60.00	18	64.29	36.00	1	25.00	2.00	50	45.45	100.00
GRADUATION	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-
POST GRADUATION	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-
OR PROFESSIONAL QUALIFICATION	2	33.33	14.29	8	11.11	57.14	3	10.71	21.43	1	25.00	7.14	14	12.73	100.00
TOTAL	6	100.00	5.45	72	100.00	65.45	28	100.00	25.45	4	100.00	3.65	110	100.00	100.00

time in constituency activities and 35.71% of those who have spent between 1/2 to 3/4 of their time to this are agriculturists, as shown in Table 7.3. Among the representatives from agricultural background 70.58% have spent 50% of their time on these activities. It can also be noted that 41.17% of the respondents who are lawyers spent 50-75% of their time on constituency service.

Nature Of Constituency: It is generally assumed by researchers in the area of legislative behaviour that representatives from rural background will concentrate more on constituency oriented activities than those from urban constituencies. The data provides positive evidence to this generally held view. A good majority of the respondents, 71.42% and 75% of those who spent 50 to 75% and more than 3/4 of their time on constituency service are elected from rural constituencies, as given in Table 7.4. But it can also be seen that 66.67% and 62.5% of the respondents who have devoted 1/4 and 1/2 of their time on constituency service are also from rural constituencies.

Sex: Table 7.5 shows that the female representatives spent 1/4 to 1/2 and 1/2 to 3/4 of their time to constituency activities and 64.42% of the male respondents devoted 26 to 50% of their time to constituency service. There is gender difference in respect of time spent for constituency service.

Position In The House: It is interesting to note that all the four representatives who said that they will spend more than 75% of their time for constituency service are ordinary members of the

TABLE 7.3

OCCUPATIONAL BACK-GROUND OF RESPONDENTS AND ITS IMPACT ON CONSTITUENCY SERVICE

OCCUPATION	0 - 25%			26% - 50%			51% - 75%			76% AND ABOVE			TOTAL		
	NO.	VR%	HR%	NO.	VR%	HR%	NO.	VR%	HR%	NO.	VR%	HR%	NO.	VR%	HR%
AGRICULTURE	3	50.00	5.88	36	50.00	70.89	10	35.71	19.61	2	50.00	3.92	51	46.36	100.00
BUSINESS	-	-	-	10	13.89	62.50	5	17.86	31.25	1	25.00	6.25	16	14.55	100.00
LAWYERS	1	16.67	5.88	9	12.50	52.94	7	25.00	41.18	-	-	-	17	15.45	100.00
PROFESSIONAL															
(ENGINEERS+DOCTORS)	2	33.33	16.67	7	9.72	58.33	3	10.71	25.00	-	-	-	12	10.91	100.00
OTHERS	-	-	-	10	13.89	71.43	3	10.72	21.43	1	25.00	7.14	14	12.73	100.00
TOTAL	6	100.00	5.45	72	100.00	65.45	28	100.00	25.45	4	100.00	3.65	110	100.00	100.00

TABLE 7.4

NATURE OF CONSTITUENCY AND ITS BEARING ON CONSTITUENCY SERVICE

NATURE OF CONSTITUENCY	0 - 25%			26 - 50%			51 - 75%			76% AND ABOVE			TOTAL		
	NO.	VR%	HR%	NO.	VR%	HR%	NO.	VR%	HR%	NO.	VR%	HR%	NO.	VR%	HR%
RURAL	4	66.67	5.56	45	62.50	62.50	20	71.43	27.78	3	75.00	4.16	72	65.45	100.00
URBAN	2	33.33	5.26	27	37.50	71.05	8	28.57	21.05	1	25.00	2.64	38	4.55	100.00
TOTAL	6	100.00	5.45	72	100.00	65.45	28	100.00	25.45	4	100.00	3.65	110	100.00	100.00

House, and Table 7.6 makes this point clear. Equal number of respondents (50%) in leadership positions held that they will spend 26 to 50% and 51 to 75% of their time to constituency activities out side the Assembly. Absence of representatives who have spent more than 75% of their time to constituency service, among the members in leadership position is due to their need to concentrate more on institutional participation.

Purposive Role Perception: The data reveals that a majority of the respondents with entrepreneural role perception are spending 3/4 of their time on constituency service and more number of respondents who spent 3/4 of their time to constituency activities are with entrepreneural role perception as given in Table 7.7. Out of six respondents who said that they will spend only 1/4th or less than that time to constituency service, 5 (83.33%) of them are with communicator role perception. But a majority of the respondents with communicator role perception are spending nearly half of their time to constituency service. Except one, all the respondents with community spokes man role have devoted half of their time to constituency service. A very good majority i.e., 88.23% of the respondents with watch dog role and 71.42% with **law-maker** role are also spending half of their time for constituency work. Equal number of the respondents with communicator, entrepreneural and watch-dog roles have allocated more than 75% of their time to their respective constituencies.

TABLE 7.5

LINK BETWEEN SEX OF THE CANDIDATES AND CONSTITUENCY - SERVICE

SEX	0 - 25%			26 - 50%			51 - 75%			76% AND ABOVE			TOTAL		
	NO.	PER%	HR%	NO.	PER%	HR%	NO.	PER%	HR%	NO.	PER%	HR%			
MALE	6	100.00	5.77	67	93.06	64.42	27	96.43	25.96	4	100.00	3.95	104	94.55	100.00
FEMALE	-	-	-	5	6.94	83.33	1	3.57	16.67	-	-	-	6	5.45	100.00
TOTAL	6	100.00	5.45	72	100.00	65.45	28	100.00	25.45	4	100.00	3.95	110	100.00	100.00

TABLE 7.6

LINK BETWEEN POSITION OF RESPONDENTS IN PARTY AND CONSTITUENCY - SERVICE

POSITION IN PARTY	0 - 25%			26 - 50%			51 - 75%			76% AND ABOVE			TOTAL		
	NO.	VR%	HR%	NO.	VR%	HR%	NO.	VR%	HR%	NO.	VR%	HR%			
ORDINARY															
MEMBERS	6	100.00	5.88	68	94.44	66.67	24	85.71	23.53	4	100.00	3.92	102	92.73	100.00
LEADERS	-	-	-	4	5.56	50.00	4	14.29	50.00	-	-	-	8	7.27	100.00
TOTAL	6	100.00	5.45	72	100.00	65.45	28	100.00	25.45	4	100.00	3.65	110	100.00	100.00

Communication Methods And Contacting Places: It is now essential to understand how the legislators maintain contacts with the constituents and what is their major mode of contact.

A predominant percentage i.e., 83.63%, of the respondents said that on an average ,**during** a month once or twice they will visit to some important parts of their constituencies. Only 9.09% and 2.72% of the respondents said that they will visit their constituencies four and five times, respectively, in a month. The party-wise distribution of the respondents on the basis of the number of visits to respective constituencies is shown in Table 7.8.

Based on the responses, four primary places of contact between the representatives and the represented are identified. They are **members'** residence, constituency tours, precincts of the Legislative Assembly, party offices and others which include public meetings, ZPP meetings and MPP meetings. 40% of the respondents identified their constituency visits and Assembly as major places of contacting constituents. 31.81% of the respondents said that they will meet constituents mainly at their residence (local and head quarters) and during Assembly sessions. Only 28.18% of the representatives have mentioned about other places. This can be seen from Table 7.9.

The communication is channelled mainly through face to face conversations, and occassionally through mediators and correspondence. The party-wise distribution of the respondents, in this context, is that in the case of the ruling party

TABLE 7.7

LINK BETWEEN PURPOSIVE ROLE PERCEPTION AND CONSTITUENCY - SERVICE

PURPOSIVE ROLE	0 - 25%			26 - 50%			51 - 75%			76% AND ABOVE			TOTAL	
	NO.	PER%	HR%	NO.	PER%	HR%	NO.	PER%	HR%	NO.	PER%	HR%	NO.	PER%
LAW-MAKER	-	-	-	5	6.94	71.43	2	7.14	28.57	-	-	-	7	6.36
COMMUNITY	1	16.67	8.33	11	15.28	91.67	-	-	-	-	-	-	12	10.91
SPOKESMAN	5	83.33	12.20	26	36.11	63.41	9	32.14	21.95	1	25.00	2.44	41	37.27
COMMUNICATOR	-	-	-	6	8.33	35.30	10	35.72	58.82	1	25.00	5.88	17	15.45
ENTREPRENEUR	-	-	-	9	12.50	56.25	6	21.43	37.50	1	25.00	6.25	16	14.55
REALIST	-	-	-	15	20.84	88.24	1	3.57	5.88	1	25.00	5.88	17	15.45
WATCH-DOG	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-
TOTAL	6	100.00	5.45	72	100.00	65.45	28	100.00	25.45	4	100.00	3.65	110	100.00

TABLE 7.8

PARTY - WISE DISTRIBUTION OF RESPONDENTS' VISITS TO CONSTITUENCY

PARTY	1			2			3			4			5			TOTAL	
	NO.	PER%	HR%	NO.	PER%	HR%	NO.	PER%	HR%	NO.	PER%	HR%	NO.	PER%	HR%	NO.	PER%
TDP	31	73.81	47.69	27	54.00	41.54	1	20.00	1.54	5	50.00	7.69	1	33.33	1.54	65	59.09
INC(1)	5	11.90	22.73	11	22.00	50.00	3	60.00	13.64	2	20.00	9.09	1	33.33	4.55	22	20.00
CPI	1	2.38	25.00	3	6.00	75.00	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	4	3.63
CPI(M)	1	2.38	14.28	5	10.00	71.43	-	-	-	1	10.00	14.29	-	-	-	7	6.36
BJP	1	2.38	25.00	1	2.00	25.00	-	-	-	1	10.00	25.00	1	33.34	25.00	4	3.64
JP	-	-	-	2	4.00	100.00	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	2	1.82
MIN	1	2.38	50.00	-	-	-	-	-	-	1	10.00	50.00	-	-	-	-	-
INDTS	2	4.77	50.00	1	2.00	25.00	1	20.00	25.00	-	-	-	-	-	-	4	3.64
TOTAL	42	100.00	38.18	50	100.00	45.45	5	100.00	4.55	10	100.00	9.09	3	100.00	2.73	110	100.00

respondents, no place or method **mentioned** above is having a predominant role. But all the members of the **CPI** and 75% of the members of the BJP mentioned constituency tours, party offices and Legislative Assembly precincts as important places of contacting. The respondents belonging to the Congress I party, have identified constituency tours, **representatives'** residence and Assembly precincts as frequently used places of contact.

Nature Of Constituents' Problems: The nature of political demands made by the constituents in different political systems varies depending on the articulating capabilities of the public, structural facilities and individual capabilities of representatives in solving problems and also on political culture. As **Mezey** (1976) pointed out, a political demand is made, if a group or a person directs a request for assistance, support or some other service, to a political actor and such political demands could be viewed from two dimensions- 1) generalised or particularised and 2) organised or individual. Mezey considered that the volume of demands that legislatures receive will vary with the magnitude of the difference between the accessibility to the legislature and the **accessability** to institutions more capable than the legislature.⁸ In the absence of well organised pressure groups and with the prevalence of **patron-client** relationships, political demands on representatives are mainly at the personal level. This observation is confirmed by many studies in the Third World countries.

In the present context also, a good **majority**, i.e., 65.45% **of** the respondents said that constituents approach them primarily **for** the solution of their personal problems, as given in Table 7.10. Some respondents informed that **constituents'** demand for financial assistance and allotment of house sites and for the issue of ration-cards, licenses, and permits. To some others constituents approach them for private favours which include public employment, promotions and confirmation of transfers . It is very interesting to note that while some constituents in urban areas meet their representatives for small but important favour like a admission of their children in public schools or in professional colleges, constituents in rural areas approach their representatives seeking mediation in land disputes, marriage proposals and disputes and for reconciliation between contending parties.

Demands of a general nature for the development of constituencies also come before the representatives. Demands for facilities (such as roads, bridges and **electrification**) and educational and social welfare benefits (like providing schools, colleges, hospitals and hostels for SC and BC students) occupy a prominent place in this **context**. Only 17.27% of the respondents identified constituency demands as the primary demand on them. 10% of the respondents recognised group interests such as interests of NGOs, fishermen, castes, community as the major demands. 27% of the respondents did not mention any demand which can be characterised as major.

TABLE 7.9

Party - Wise Distribution Of Respondents' Contacting Places With Constituents

POLITICAL PARTY	HOME & ASSEMBLY			CONSTITUENCY TOURS & ASSEMBLY			CONSTITUENCY TOURS			ASSEMBLY			OTHERS			TOTAL		
	NO.	VR%	HR%	NO.	VR%	HR%	NO.	VR%	HR%	NO.	VR%	HR%	NO.	VR%	HR%	NO.	VR%	HR%
TDP	22	62.86	33.85	20	45.45	30.77	10	76.92	15.38	10	83.33	15.38	3	50.00	4.62	65	59.09	100.00
INC(I)	10	28.57	45.45	12	27.27	54.55	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	22	20.00	100.00
CPI	-	-	-	4	9.09	100.00	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	4	3.63	100.00
CPI(M)	3	8.57	42.86	4	9.09	57.14	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	7	6.36	100.00
BJP	-	-	-	3	13.63	75.00	-	-	-	-	-	-	1	16.66	25.00	4	3.64	100.00
JP	-	-	-	1	2.27	50.00	-	-	-	1	8.33	50.00	-	-	-	2	1.82	100.00
MIN	-	-	-	-	-	-	1	7.69	50.00	-	-	-	1	16.67	50.00	2	1.82	100.00
INDTS	-	-	-	-	-	-	2	15.39	50.00	1	8.34	25.00	1	16.67	25.00	4	3.64	100.00
TOTAL	35	100.00	31.82	44	100.00	40.00	13	100.00	11.82	12	100.00	10.91	6	100.00	5.45	110	100.00	100.00

TABLE 7.10

LINKS BETWEEN NATURE OF PROBLEM AND CONSTITUENCY SERVICE

POLITICAL PARTY	PERSONAL			INTEREST GROUP			CONSTITUENCY			GENERAL			TOTAL		
	NO.	VR%	HR%	NO.	VR%	HR%	NO.	VR%	HR%	NO.	VR%	HR%	NO.	VR%	HR%
TDP	46	63.89	70.77	6	54.55	9.23	8	42.10	12.31	5	62.50	7.69	65	59.09	100.00
INC(I)	16	22.22	72.73	2	18.18	9.09	3	15.79	13.64	1	12.50	4.54	22	20.00	100.00
CPI	1	1.38	25.00	1	9.09	25.00	2	10.53	50.00	-	-	-	4	3.63	100.00
CPI (M)	4	5.56	57.14	2	18.18	28.57	-	-	-	1	12.50	14.29	7	6.36	100.00
BJP	2	2.78	50.00	-	-	-	2	10.53	50.00	-	-	-	4	3.64	100.00
JP	1	1.39	50.00	-	-	-	1	5.26	50.00	-	-	-	2	1.82	100.00
MIN	1	1.39	50.00	-	-	-	1	5.26	50.00	-	-	-	2	1.82	100.00
INDTS	1	1.39	25.00	-	-	-	2	10.53	50.00	1	12.50	25.00	4	3.64	100.00
TOTAL	72	100.00	65.45	11	100.00	10.00	19	100.00	17.27	8	100.00	7.27	110	100.00	100.00

It is pertinent to point out that 70.76% of the ruling party members and 72.72% of the Congress - I members identified personal demands from the constituents as the primary demands. This is clear from Table 7.10. As many as 63.88% of the respondents who recognised demands for personal favors as the major demand belong to the ruling party. Half of the members of the CPI, BJP, MIM and JP and Independents said that constituents approach them with requests for the development of their constituencies.

Problem Solving Methods: Legislators, as responsive representatives of people, have to pay considerable attention to solving the problems of their constituents. At the same time, they cannot ignore the interests of the community in general. The possibility of solving problems depends on important factors like personality, capability, accessibility to the concerned authorities, resource availability and the methods chosen. The methods used by representatives differ in different political systems and from representative to representative. Ability to solve problems enhances the reputation and influence of representatives. This in turn leads to an increase in the demands made on the representatives for the solution of a problem.

The available data reveals that representatives use the following methods in their efforts to solve constituents' problems:

- 1) Contacting bureaucrats;
- 2) Seeking **Ministers'** help;

- 3) Channelling through political party leaders and other politicians at local, state and national levels; and
- 4) Focusing on the floor of the House.

Of the above, the **most** widely used **method** is contacting the bureaucrats followed by second, third and the fourth methods. The following are some interesting responses during interviews:

"Problem solving capability of a representative depends on his style of functioning and on how he maintains relationships with others. I always adopt democratic style of functioning. I always try to solve problems and approach people in a pleasant and amicable way and it has given good results".

"When constituents come with some problems, I will try to solve them then and there as far as possible, by making in front of them a phone call or writing a letter to the concerned department and so on so that they will get the confidence that their **MLA** is really taking interest and is genuinely trying to solve the problem".

"Many a time, **constituents'** problem solving will lead to conflict between us and the local and state level bureaucrats. If we speak to them on phone or personally in this context, the bureaucrats think that we are doing it because of our selfish interests and they tend to forget that we are people's representatives and it is our duty to care for **constituents'** matters".

"Some bureaucrats view people's representative as intruding into their work, unnecessarily delaying it and encouraging **nepotism** and red-tapism. But this is not always true. They should realise the personal integrity and real interest of an MLA, when he or she tries to resolve the problems of constituents in the capacity of representative".

The methods used by the representatives include appeal, discussion, persuasion, use of pressure and use of power. During the process, depending on the nature and importance of an issue, either one or more of these would be used. For instance, when a representative opts to get things done through the bureaucrats discussion and use of power would be mostly used. If the matter needs Minister's help, the **representatives'** request will be in the form of an appeal. The methods of discussion and persuasion would be used for solving a problem through political leaders, colleagues and other politicians at various levels.

It is quite interesting to study variations in the choice of methods in different party representatives, as shown in Table 7.11. 77.78% of the respondents who said that they will contact the concerned ministers to solve the constituency matters, belong to the ruling party. Their responses revealed that representatives more frequently meet those Ministers who are influential and are having close contacts with other ministers and the chief Minister. The ruling party members' direct link with the Ministers can be explained by taking two factors into consideration. As in parliamentary form of government, executive

TABLE 7.11

LINKS BETWEEN PARTY OF THE RESPONDENTS AND PROBLEM-SOLVING METHODS

POLITICAL PARTY	BUREAUCRACY			MINISTERS			PARTY LEADERS			ASSEMBLY			MORE THAN ONE			TOTAL		
	NO.	VE%	HE%	NO.	VE%	HE%	NO.	VE%	HE%	NO.	VE%	HE%	NO.	VE%	HE%	NO.	VE%	HE%
TDP	19	83.33	29.23	28	77.78	43.08	6	60.00	9.23	2	9.09	3.08	10	83.33	15.38	65	59.09	100.00
INC (I)	6	20.00	27.27	4	11.11	18.18	2	20.00	9.09	8	36.36	36.36	2	16.67	9.09	22	20.00	100.00
CPI	1	3.33	25.00	1	2.77	25.00	-	-	-	2	9.09	50.00	-	-	-	4	3.63	100.00
CPI (M)	2	6.67	28.57	-	-	-	1	10.00	14.29	4	18.18	57.14	-	-	-	7	6.36	100.00
BJP	1	3.33	25.00	-	-	-	-	-	-	3	13.64	75.00	-	-	-	4	3.64	100.00
JP	-	-	-	1	2.78	50.00	-	-	-	1	4.55	50.00	-	-	-	2	1.82	100.00
MIN	-	-	-	1	2.78	50.00	1	10.00	50.00	-	-	-	-	-	-	2	1.82	100.00
INDTS	1	3.34	25.00	1	2.78	25.00	-	-	-	2	9.09	50.00	-	-	-	4	3.64	100.00
TOTAL	30	100.00	27.27	36	100.00	32.73	10	100.00	9.09	22	100.00	20.00	12	100.00	10.91	110	100.00	100.00

TABLE 7.12

PARTY - WISE DISTRIBUTION OF NUMBER OF VISITORS TO RESPONDENTS

POLITICAL PARTY	0 - 50			51 - 100			101 - 150			151 - 200			201 AND ABOVE			TOTAL		
	NO.	VE%	HE%	NO.	VE%	HE%	NO.	VE%	HE%	NO.	VE%	HE%	NO.	VE%	HE%	NO.	VE%	HE%
TDP	40	72.73	61.54	13	43.33	20.00	6	35.29	9.23	5	83.33	7.69	1	50.00	1.54	65	59.09	100.00
INC (I)	8	14.55	36.36	9	30.00	40.91	4	23.53	18.18	-	-	-	1	50.00	4.55	22	20.00	100.00
CPI	-	-	-	3	10.00	75.00	1	5.88	25.00	-	-	-	-	-	-	4	3.63	100.00
CPI (M)	1	1.81	14.28	2	6.67	28.57	3	17.65	42.86	1	6.67	14.29	-	-	-	7	6.36	100.00
BJP	2	3.64	50.00	-	-	-	2	11.77	50.00	-	-	-	-	-	-	4	3.64	100.00
JP	-	-	-	1	3.33	50.00	1	5.88	50.00	-	-	-	-	-	-	2	1.82	100.00
MIN	1	1.82	50.00	1	3.33	50.00	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	2	1.82	100.00
INDTS	3	5.45	75.00	1	3.34	25.00	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	4	3.64	100.00
TOTAL	55	100.00	50.00	30	100.00	27.27	17	100.00	15.45	6	100.00	5.46	2	100.00	1.82	110	100.00	100.00

is formed from the majority party in the legislature, MLAs of the ruling party will have close affinity with the Ministers as they belong to their own party. Apart **from** this, there is a noticeable convention that a ruling party member should not raise any issue which will put the government in an **embarrassing** position. The respondents, who said that they will frequently take the help of Ministers, will either write a letter or speak to the Minister on phone or meet them personally depending on the importance of the issue involved.

More or less equal percentage of the respondents from different parties and independents informed that they will contact the bureaucrats of the concerning departments both at the local and state levels. The role of informal rules and norms in the House is conspicuously evident in the case of the respondents who utilised Assembly as the major forum to look after **constituents'** matters. Among respondents who said that they will raise the issue on floor of House 90.90% are from the Opposition parties and groups and only 9.09% belong to the ruling party. 75% of the BJP rspondents, 57.14% of the **CPI(M)** and half of the **CPI**, JP and Independent members wanted to highlight grievances in the House for ventilation. 10.90% of the representatives did not identify the most frequently used means to solve **constituents'** problems.

Average Number Of Constituents Representative Meets In a Month:

It is **commonsensical** to observe that constituents approach those representatives who are responsive to their demands and have the inclination to listen and ability to solve their problems. One respondent said, "I will spend most of my time in solving **peoples'** problems. The **more** I work, the more I can win their confidence. The number of constituents a representative meets every day is an indication of his/her popularity in the constituency".

In the present context, the average number of constituents a representative meets in a month is taken as a useful tool to measure the constituency level participation. The respondents are divided into low level (1 to 50), medium level (51 to 100) and high level (101 and above) participants. Some responses which seem to have given inflated figures are cross checked by means of probing and the extent of reliability of the figures is **judged**.

The data reveals that half of the respondents are low level participants and the remaining 27.27% and 22.73% are medium and high level participants, respectively. The party-wise break up of the sample on the basis of their level of constituency service as given in Table 7.12, shows that a large majority of independents and the TDP members and a significant portion of **CPI** members and a considerable number of **CPI (M)** respondents are low, medium and active or high level participants respectively. Only

5.45% and 1.81% of the respondents said that they will **meet** more than 150 **and** 200 people respectively, on an average per month. It can also be observed that the respondents from parties other than the ruling party have a slight edge over the ruling party members both in the case of medium and high level participants.

Links Between Constituency Participation Levels And Background Of The Representatives:

Political Experience: Political experience of the representatives has some positive links only in the case of low level and medium level participants, while the respondents without political experience have a slight edge over those with experience in the case of high level participants as Table 7.13 makes this point clear. Only 32.72% and 60% of the respondents who have low level and medium levels participation respectively have political experience.

Region: Equal percentage (44%) of the respondents from Andhra and Telangana regions are found to be high level participants as shown in Table 7.14. Out of 8 respondents who met more than 150 constituents per month 6 are from Andhra region. But it is also noticeable that more number of representatives with low level participation are from Andhra region and those with medium level participation are from Telangana region. One cannot establish direct links between levels of participation and the region from which members come.

TABLE 7.13

LINKS BETWEEN PREVIOUS POLITICAL EXPERIENCE OF THE RESPONDENTS AND NO. OF VISITORS

PREVIOUS POLITICAL EXPERIENCE	1 - 50		51 - 100		101 - 150		151 AND ABOVE		TOTAL						
	NO.	PER%	NO.	PER%	NO.	PER%	NO.	PER%	NO.	PER%					
LOCAL BODIES	9	16.36	42.86	7	23.33	33.33	4	23.53	19.05	1	12.50	4.76	21	19.09	100.00
STATE															
LEGISLATURE	8	14.55	34.78	9	30.00	39.13	5	29.41	21.74	1	12.50	4.35	23	20.91	100.00
BOTH LEVELS	1	1.82	25.00	2	6.67	50.00	-	-	-	1	12.50	25.00	4	3.64	100.00
NO. EXPERIENCE	37	67.27	33.64	12	40.00	10.91	8	47.06	7.27	5	67.50	4.55	62	56.36	100.00
TOTAL	55	100.00	50.00	30	100.00	27.27	17	100.00	15.45	8	100.00	7.28	110	100.00	100.00

TABLE 7.14

REGION - WISE DISTRIBUTION AND NUMBER OF VISITORS

REGION	1 - 50		51 - 100		101 - 150		151 AND ABOVE		TOTAL						
	NO.	PER%	NO.	PER%	NO.	PER%	NO.	PER%	NO.	PER%					
ANDHRA	25	45.45	53.19	11	36.67	23.40	5	29.41	10.64	6	75.00	12.77	47	42.73	100.00
RAJASTHANA	11	20.00	52.38	7	23.33	33.33	2	11.77	9.53	1	12.50	4.76	21	19.09	100.00
TELANGANA	19	34.55	45.24	12	40.00	28.57	10	58.82	23.81	1	12.50	2.38	42	38.18	100.00
TOTAL	55	100.00	50.00	30	100.00	27.27	17	100.00	15.45	8	100.00	7.28	110	100.00	100.00

Community: The data reveals that a predominant majority of the respondents from SCs, 75% are low level participants and a majority of the ST participants (57.14.%) are high level participants, as given in Table 7.15. Among the respondents elected from the. unreserved seats, low level, medium level and high level participants are in the descending order.

Locus Of Control: The data provides very limited positive link between internal locus of control and high level participation as the respondents with internal locus of control have only a slight edge over those with external locus of control in the context of high level participation. 53.06% of the respondents with internal locus of control are low level participants. It can also be noticed that 66.67% of the medium level participants are with external locus of control This can be seen from Table 7.16.

Role Perception And Constituency Service:

Purposive Role: A positive link between entrepreneurial role and high level participation in constituency service can be established as more number of the representatives with high participation levels are entrepreneurs and more number of respondents with enterprenuerial role perception are high and medium level participants as shown in Table 7.17. A majority of respondents with communicator, community spokesmen and watch-dog role perception are low level participants. Equal number of ritualists are low and medium level participants.

TABLE 7.15

COMMUNITY - BACKGROUND OF THE RESPONDENTS AND NO. OF VISITORS

COMMUNITY	1 - 50		51 - 100		101 - 150		151 AND ABOVE		TOTAL						
	NO.	PER%	NO.	PER%	NO.	PER%	NO.	PER%	NO.	PER%					
S.C.	9	16.36	75.00	2	6.67	-	-	1	12.50	8.33	12	10.91	100.00		
S.T.	3	5.45	42.86	-	-	3	17.65	42.86	1	12.50	14.28	7	6.36	100.00	
OTHERS	43	78.19	47.25	28	83.33	30.77	14	82.35	15.38	6	75.00	6.60	91	82.73	100.00
TOTAL	55	100.00	50.00	30	100.00	27.27	17	100.00	15.45	8	100.00	7.28	110	100.00	100.00

TABLE 7.16

LINKS BETWEEN LOCUS OF CONTROL AND NO. OF VISITORS

LOCUS OF CONTROL	1 - 50		51 - 100		101 - 150		151 AND ABOVE		TOTAL						
	NO.	PER%	NO.	PER%	NO.	PER%	NO.	PER%	NO.	PER%					
EXTERNAL	29	52.73	47.54	20	66.67	32.79	7	41.18	11.48	5	62.50	8.19	61	55.45	100.00
INTERNAL	26	47.27	53.06	10	33.33	20.41	10	58.82	20.41	3	37.50	6.12	49	44.55	100.00
TOTAL	55	100.00	50.00	30	100.00	27.27	17	100.00	15.45	8	100.00	7.28	110	100.00	100.00

Representational Role Perception: One can observe that a majority of delegates and partisans are low level participants and a considerable number of trustees are high level participants as given in Table 7.18. Equal number of **politicos** are low and medium level participants and high level participants are absent among them. It is pertinent to point out that even though delegates felt that it is necessary to consult constituents before taking major decisions regarding them, a majority of them in present context are not low level participants.

Areal Role Perception: The study reveals interesting links between state orientation and high level constituency service among the respondents. As shown in Table 7.19, a predominant majority (72%) of the high level participants are state oriented and nearly equal percentage (70.77) of the constituency oriented representatives are low level participants. A prominent portion of district oriented representatives are medium (48.14%) and low (37.03%) level participants.

Interest Group Role Perception: The data shows direct relationship between facilitator role and high level participation, on one hand, and neutral and resistor role and low level participation, on the other. Table 7.20 makes this point clear. It can be seen that while 68% of the high level participants are facilitators, 62.22% of the neutrals are low level participants. More or less equal number of resisters are low and medium level participants.

TABLE 7.17

LINKS BETWEEN PURPOSIVE ROLE PERCEPTION AND NO. OF VISITORS

PURPOSIVE ROL PERCEPTION	LOW			MEDIUM			HIGH			TOTAL		
	NO.	VR%	HR%	NO.	VR%	HR%	NO.	VR%	HR%	NO.	VR%	HR%
LAW-MAKER	3	5.45	42.86	2	6.67	28.57	2	8.00	28.57	7	6.36	100.00
COMMUNITY SPOKESMAN	7	12.73	58.33	4	13.33	33.33	1	4.00	8.34	12	10.91	100.00
COMMUNICATOR	26	47.27	63.41	6	20.00	14.64	9	36.00	21.95	41	37.27	100.00
ENTREPRENEUR	3	5.45	17.65	7	23.33	41.17	7	28.00	41.18	17	15.45	100.00
RITUALIST	7	12.74	43.75	7	23.33	43.75	2	8.00	12.50	16	14.55	100.00
WATCH-DOG	9	16.36	52.94	4	13.34	23.53	4	16.00	23.53	17	15.46	100.00
T O T A L	55	100.00	50.00	30	100.00	27.27	25	100.00	22.73	110	100.00	100.00

TABLE 7.18

LINKS BETWEEN REPRESENTATIONAL ROLE PERCEPTION AND COMMUNITY SERVICE

REPRESENTATIVE ROLE PERCEPTION	LOW			MEDIUM			HIGH			TOTAL		
	NO.	VR%	HR%	NO.	VR%	HR%	NO.	VR%	HR%	NO.	VR%	HR%
TRUSTEE	7	12.73	33.33	5	16.67	23.81	9	36.00	42.86	21	19.09	100.00
DELEGATE	13	23.64	56.52	4	13.33	17.39	6	24.00	26.09	23	20.91	100.00
PARTISAN	24	43.64	54.55	10	33.33	22.72	10	40.00	22.73	44	40.00	100.00
POLITICO	11	20.00	50.00	11	36.67	50.00	-	-	-	22	20.00	100.00
T O T A L	55	100.00	50.00	30	100.00	27.27	25	100.00	22.73	110	100.00	100.00

TABLE 7.19

LINKS BETWEEN AREAL ROLE PERCEPTION AND CONSTITUENCY SERVICE

AREAL ROLE PERCEPTION	LOW			MEDIUM			HIGH			TOTAL		
	NO.	VR%	HR%	NO.	VR%	HR%	NO.	VR%	HR%	NO.	VR%	HR%
STATE	26	47.27	46.43	12	40.00	21.43	18	72.00	32.14	56	50.91	100.00
DISTRICT	10	18.18	37.04	13	43.33	40.15	4	16.00	14.81	27	24.55	100.00
CONSTITUENCY	19	34.55	70.37	5	16.67	10.52	3	12.00	11.11	27	24.55	100.00
T O T A L	55	100.00	50.00	30	100.00	27.27	25	100.00	22.73	110	100.00	100.00

TABLE 7.20

LINK BETWEEN INTEREST GROUP PERCEPTION AND CONSTITUENCY SERVICE

INTEREST GROUP PERCEPTION	LOW			MEDIUM			HIGH			TOTAL		
	NO.	VR%	HR%	NO.	VR%	HR%	NO.	VR%	HR%	NO.	VR%	HR%
FACILITATOR	19	34.55	39.58	12	40.00	25.00	17	68.00	35.42	48	43.64	100.00
RESISTOR	8	14.55	47.06	7	23.33	41.18	2	8.00	11.76	17	15.45	100.00
NEUTRAL	28	50.90	62.22	11	36.67	24.44	6	24.00	13.34	45	40.19	100.00
T O T A L	55	100.00	50.00	30	100.00	27.27	25	100.00	22.73	110	100.00	100.00

Participatory Role Perception: From Table 7.21, it can be seen that nearly equal number of respondents who perceived their participation at the constituency level as very beneficial to their political future are medium and high level participants. It is also interesting to note that 88% of the high level participants and 80% of the medium level participants have considered their constituency service as very beneficial to them. Interestingly cent percent of those who felt that their participation may be harmful and those who regarded that it will have marginal or no impact on their political careers are low level participants. It can also be seen that among the respondents who perceived that their participation will have a good impact on their reelection (65.3%) are low level participants.

POLITICAL FUTURE: INFLUENCE OF PERCEPTIONS AND PARTICIPATION

SECTION - 2

It is clear from the preceeding discussion that the background and perceptions have an impact on participation levels of representatives. Participation in turn will have an impact on **representatives'** institutional and constituency level participation and on their political future .

An examination of the impact of participation especially at the constituency level, on the political future of representatives is a recent development in the general area of legislative behaviour . Research studies of this nature are very

few in number. Further, such studies are conducted **mainly** in Western democracies like the U.S.A. Cain and others (1979) study of British MPs revealed that though the British parliamentary system supposedly denies MPs the electoral incentives and staff resources to engage in constituency service comparable to those of members of the U.S. Congress, there are some resemblances between **'Homestyles'** of the U.S. and the U.K. representatives, and that nearly all the MPs believe that attention to their constituencies can protect them against national electoral swings. The authors also found that constituency service will have considerable effect on their electoral fortune and that they allocate more efforts to it. In this study it is observed that representatives in both countries face hard choices about how to spend a great deal of time on constituency matters and that the **'electoral connection'** exists in the U.K.

In a recent book "The Personal Vote: Constituency Service and Electoral Independence", by the same authors (1988), attempts to examine the constituency service methods and incentives of representatives of both the U.S. Congress and the British Parliament, with particular emphasis on the electoral impact that a representative can make in the constituency, are made. They have considered personal vote of representatives as that portion of a **candidates'** electoral support as a result of his or her personal qualities, **qualifications**, activities and records as against other influencing variables such as party affiliation and party discipline, fixed voter characteristics and local, state and national conditions. It is found that though

the British **MPs** are becoming more professional and are devoting more attention to districts for constituency service, the British political system continues to have a number of characteristics such as majority party control, inadequate staff assistance and resources that restrain **MPs'** constituency service and in turn restrict their independence to gain personal vote. It is further observed that "the electoral advantage which accrues to a **hard-working** congressman is far greater than that accruing to a similarly hard-working **MP.**"¹⁰

One way of analysing the impact of **participation** on political future of representatives is studying whether they could get party ticket to contest in the immediate general election both at the state and national level and whether they got elected in the **elec**tion or not. **Representatives'** ability to secure party tickets and getting reelected depend not only on their participation levels but also on various contextual factors which are influential at the time of issuing party tickets and also on the mood of the electorate and their perceptions regarding various political parties at the time of election.

In the case of the respondents studied, the factor of incumbency, (position as legislator in the present context) is playing a prominent role in giving party tickets for the next elections and in getting reelected. Out of 110 respondents, 66.36% contested again. It is relevant to note that a predominant majority of the **Congress-I, CPI, BJP and CPI (M)** respondents who contested twice or more are comparatively more

TABLE NO. 7.21

PARTICIPATORY ROLE PERCEPTION AND CONSTITUENCY LEVEL PARTICIPATION

CONSTITUENCY SERVICE	VERY BENEFICIAL			GOOD			MARGINAL			HARMFUL			TOTAL		
	NO.	VR%	HR%	NO.	VR%	HR%	NO.	VR%	HR%	NO.	VR%	HR%	NO.	VR%	HR%
LOW LEVEL	7	13.21	12.73	17	65.38	30.91	26	100.00	47.27	5	100.00	9.09	55	50.00	100.00
MEDIUM	24	45.28	80.00	6	23.08	20.00	-	-	-	-	-	-	30	27.27	100.00
HIGH	22	41.51	88.00	3	11.54	12.00	-	-	-	-	-	-	25	22.73	100.00
TOTAL	53	100.00	48.18	26	100.00	23.64	26	100.00	23.64	5	100.00	4.24	110	100.00	100.00

TABLE 7.22

PARTY - WISE DISTRIBUTION AND RE-ELECTION OF RESPONDENTS

POLITICAL PARTY	CONTESTED			NOT CONTESTED			TOTAL		
	NO.	VR%	HR%	NO.	VR%	HR%	NO.	VR%	HR%
TDP	40	54.79	61.54	25	67.57	38.46	65	59.09	100.00
INC (I)	18	24.66	81.82	4	10.81	18.18	22	20.00	100.00
CPI	3	4.11	75.00	1	2.70	25.00	4	3.63	100.00
CPI(M)	5	6.85	71.43	2	5.41	28.57	7	6.36	100.00
BJP	3	4.11	75.00	1	2.70	25.00	4	3.64	100.00
JP	1	1.37	50.00	1	2.70	50.00	2	1.82	100.00
MIN	1	1.37	50.00	1	2.70	50.00	2	1.82	100.00
INDTS	2	2.74	50.00	2	5.41	50.00	4	3.64	100.00
TOTAL	73	100.00	66.36	37	100.00	33.64	110	100.00	100.00

than those of the ruling party **members**. Table 7.22 makes this point clear. 67.56% of those who did not contest in the **immediate** general election belongs to the ruling party.

The study reveals interesting links between the factor of incumbency and electoral success. Out of the 73 contested respondents 58, i.e. 79.45%, got elected. In the sample 52.72% got reelected and the remaining percentage includes defeated members and members who have not contested. The party-wise distribution of the respondents, in this context, shows that 75% of the representatives who are not elected belong to the ruling party and independents while a predominant majority of the other **parties'** members got elected, as given in Table 7.23.

Links Between Reelection And Background:

Age: Both of the very young respondents in the sample, and a majority of those above 61 years in particular and those between 41 to 60 years have won again. A majority of those in the age group of 31 to 40 did not get elected. This is clear from Table 7.24.

Education: The data reveals direct link between higher educational levels and reelection. It can be seen from Table 7.25 that 65.52% of those who secured reelection are either graduates or post-graduates. It can also be noticed that 59.37% of the representatives who have done graduation or above got elected.

TABLE 7.23

PARTY - WISE DISTRIBUTION AND RE-ELECTION OF THE RESPONDENTS

POLITICAL PARTY	ELECTED			NOT ELECTED			TOTAL		
	NO.	VR%	HR%	NO.	VR%	HR%	NO.	VR%	HR%
TDP	26	44.83	40.00	39	75.00	60.00	65	59.09	100.00
INC (I)	19	32.76	59.09	3	5.77	40.91	22	20.00	100.00
CPI	2	3.45	50.00	2	3.85	50.00	4	3.63	100.00
CPI (M)	5	8.63	71.43	2	3.85	20.57	7	6.36	100.00
BJP	3	5.17	75.00	1	1.92	25.00	4	3.64	100.00
JP	1	1.72	50.00	1	1.92	50.00	2	1.82	100.00
NIM	1	1.72	50.00	1	1.92	50.00	2	1.82	100.00
INDTS	1	1.72	25.00	3	5.77	75.00	4	3.64	100.00
T O T A L	58	100.00	52.73	52	100.00	47.27	110	100.00	100.00

TABLE 7.24

AGE - WISE DISTRIBUTION AND RE-ELECTION OF THE RESPONDENTS

AGE	ELECTED			NOT ELECTED			TOTAL		
	NO.	VR%	HR%	NO.	VR%	HR%	NO.	VR%	HR%
25 - 30	2	3.45	100.00	-	-	-	2	1.82	100.00
31 - 40	5	8.62	35.71	9	17.31	64.29	14	12.73	100.00
41 - 50	30	51.72	52.63	27	51.92	47.37	57	51.82	100.00
51 - 60	12	20.69	54.55	10	19.23	45.45	22	20.00	100.00
61 & ABOVE	9	15.52	60.00	6	11.54	40.00	15	13.63	100.00
T O T A L	58	100.00	52.73	52	100.00	47.27	110	100.00	100.00

Occupation: Table 7.26 shows that a **majority** of the lawyers and agriculturalists and 50% of businessmen got elected.

Sex: It can be seen that only 33.33% of the female representatives got reelected while 53.85% of the male representatives secured reelection as given in Table 7.27. It can be said that female representatives are not as stabilizing in political careers as their male counterparts.

Political Experience: Political experience of representatives seems to have a strong bearing on their reelection. 82.61% of those who served as legislators before and 75% of those who has political experience at the state and local levels won again and 61.29% of those without political experience are not elected. Table 7.28 makes this point clear. This is due to the fact that a majority of respondents who are freshers to politics belong to the ruling party and the percentage of the ruling party members securing reelection is not that significant as that of the opposition parties and groups. This can be attributed to the reason that the strong pro-TDP trend prevalent at the time of 1985 election got diminished by the year 1989. Further, the political culture is in tune with giving long careers to members of established political parties. The initial spectacular success of the TDP is mostly due to the charismatic personality of its founder-leader and the hope of the people that the new government would bring a better tomorrow.

Community: The data shows that the representatives from SCs and STs are not successful in their political careers. This can be

TABLE 7.25

LINK BETWEEN EDUCATION OF RESPONDENTS AND RE-ELECTION

LEVEL OF EDUCATION	ELECTED			NOT ELECTED			TOTAL		
	NO.	VR%	HR%	NO.	VR%	HR%	NO.	VR%	HR%
HIGH SCHOOL MATRICULATION	14	24.14	42.42	19	36.54	58.58	33	30.00	100.00
OR INTERMEDIATE	6	10.34	46.15	7	13.46	53.85	13	11.82	100.00
GRADUATION	31	53.45	62.00	19	36.54	38.00	50	45.45	100.00
POST-GRADUATION	7	12.07	50.00	7	13.46	50.00	14	12.73	100.00
T O T A L	58	100.00	52.73	52	100.00	47.27	110	100.00	100.00

TABLE 7.26

LINK BETWEEN SEX OF THE RESPONDENTS AND RE-ELECTION

SEX	ELECTED			NOT ELECTED			TOTAL		
	NO.	VR%	HR%	NO.	VR%	HR%	NO.	VR%	HR%
MALE	56	96.55	53.85	48	92.31	46.15	104	94.55	100.00
FEMALE	2	3.45	33.33	4	8.69	66.67	6	5.45	100.00
T O T A L	58	100.00	52.73	52	100.00	47.27	110	100.00	100.00

TABLE 7.27

LINKS BETWEEN OCCUPATION BACKGROUND AND RE-ELECTION

OCCUPATION	ELECTED			NOT ELECTED			TOTAL		
	NO.	VR%	HR%	NO.	VR%	HR%	NO.	VR%	HR%
AGRICULTURE	29	50.00	56.86	22	42.31	43.14	51	46.36	100.00
BUSINESS	8	13.79	50.00	8	15.38	50.00	16	14.55	100.00
LAWYERS	10	17.24	58.82	7	13.46	41.18	17	15.45	100.00
PROFESSIONALS (DOCTORS & ENGRS.)	5	8.62	41.67	7	13.46	58.33	12	10.91	100.00
OTHERS	6	10.34	42.86	8	15.3	57.14	14	12.73	100.00
T O T A L	58	100.00	52.73	52	100.00	47.27	110	100.00	100.00

TABLE 7.28

LINKS BETWEEN PREVIOUS POLITICAL EXPERIENCE AND RE-ELECTION

PREVIOUS POLITICAL EXPERIENCE	ELECTED			NOT ELECTED			TOTAL		
	NO.	VR%	HR%	NO.	VR%	HR%	NO.	VR%	HR%
LOCAL BODIES	12	20.69	57.14	9	17.31	42.86	21	19.09	100.00
STATE									
LEGISLATURE	19	32.76	82.61	4	7.69	17.39	23	20.91	100.00
BOTH	3	5.17	75.00	1	1.92	25.00	4	3.64	100.00
NO EXPERIENCE	24	41.38	38.71	38	73.68	61.29	62	56.36	100.00
T O T A L	58	100.00	52.73	52	100.00	47.27	110	100.00	100.00

seen from Table 7.29. Only 33.33% of the SCs and 42.86% of the STs representatives secured reelection and a **majority** of those from unreserved seats are reelected.

Nature Of Constituency: It is apposite to mention here that representatives from rural constituencies have an edge over those from urban constituencies, in the present context. This can be due to their emphasis on constituency service.

From Table 7.30, it can be observed that 56.94% of the representatives from rural constituencies are reelected and that they constitute 70.69% of the representatives who have secured reelection.

Region: A predominant majority, 64.27%, of the representatives from Telangana region and a majority of the representatives from **Rayalaseema** region are reelected while 57.45% of those from Andhra region could not retain their seats, as given in Table 7.31. This is due to prevalence of the ruling party members in Andhra region and more number of opposition belong to Telangana region.

Membership In Social Organisations: Membership in social organisations has a positive impact on the reelection of the representatives, as shown in Table 7.32. It is useful to note **that** 71.74% of the representatives with membership in social organisations secured reelection. And a majority of those who won in election are members of one or more social organisations.

TABLE 7.29

LINKS BETWEEN COMMUNITY OF THE RESPONDENTS AND RE-ELECTION

COMMUNITY	ELECTED			NOT ELECTED			TOTAL		
	NO.	VR%	HR%	NO.	VR%	HR%	NO.	VR%	HR%
S.C.	4	6.90	33.33	8	15.38	66.67	12	10.91	100.00
S.T.	3	5.17	42.86	4	7.69	57.14	7	6.36	100.00
OTHERS	51	87.93	56.04	40	76.93	43.96	91	82.73	100.00
T O T A L	58	100.00	52.73	52	100.00	47.27	110	100.00	100.00

TABLE 7.30

LINKS BETWEEN NATURE OF CONSTITUENCY AND RE-ELECTION

NATURE OF CONSTITUENCY	ELECTED			NOT ELECTED			TOTAL		
	NO.	VR%	HR%	NO.	VR%	HR%	NO.	VR%	HR%
RURAL	41	70.69	56.94	31	59.61	43.06	72	65.45	100.00
URBAN	17	29.31	44.74	21	40.39	55.26	38	34.55	100.00
T O T A L	58	100.00	52.73	52	100.00	47.27	110	100.00	100.00

TABLE 7.31

REGION - WISE DISTRIBUTION OF RE-ELECTION OF THE RESPONDENTS

REGION	ELECTED			NOT ELECTED			TOTAL		
	NO.	VR%	HR%	NO.	VR%	HR%	NO.	VR%	HR%
ANDHRA	28	34.48	42.55	27	51.92	57.45	47	42.73	100.00
RAJALASEEMA	11	18.97	52.38	10	19.23	47.62	21	19.09	100.00
TELANGANA	27	46.55	64.28	15	28.85	35.72	42	38.18	100.00
T O T A L	58	100.00	52.73	52	100.00	47.27	110	100.00	100.00

TABLE 7.32

LINKS BETWEEN MEMBERSHIP IN SOCIAL ORGANISATIONS AND RE-ELECTION

MEMBERSHIP IN SOCIAL ORGANISATION	ELECTED			NOT ELECTED			TOTAL		
	NO.	VR%	HR%	NO.	VR%	HR%	NO.	VR%	HR%
MEMBERS	33	56.90	71.74	13	25.00	28.26	46	41.82	100.00
NON-MEMBERS	25	43.10	39.06	39	75.00	60.94	64	58.18	100.00
T O T A L	58	100.00	52.73	52	100.00	47.27	110	100.00	100.00

Position In The House: More than half of the ordinary members as well as those in leadership positions are reelected. But it is pertinent to state that the representatives in leadership positions have a definite edge over the ordinary members in this regard. This can be clearly seen from Table 7.33.

Political Ambition: Ambition levels of representatives have a definite effect on political future, especially in the case of getting reelected, as shown in Table 7.34. 68.18% of those with higher political ambition level and 54.08% of those who aspired from similar positions they are holding won the election. It is also appropriate to mention that 78.57% of those who said that they are not inclined to continue in politics are not successful either in getting party ticket or in winning reelection.

Locus Of Control: The number of successful respondents with external locus of control is slightly more than those with internal locus of control. In the present sample, 54.10% and 51.02% of those with external and internal locus of control, respectively, got reelected. This can be seen from Table 7.35.

Role Perceptions And Reelection:

Purposive Role Perception: The study reveals very close links between entrepreneurial, watch-dog and ritualist role perceptions of the representatives and their securing reelection. From Table 7.36 it can be seen that a significant portion of the representatives with entrepreneurial role (82.35%), watch-dog role (76.47%) and 62.5% of those who are ritualists have got

TABLE 7.33

LINK BETWEEN POSITION OF RESPONDENTS IN PARTY AND RE-ELECTION

POSITION IN PARTY	ELECTED			NOT ELECTED			TOTAL		
	NO.	VR%	HR%	NO.	VR%	HR%	NO.	VR%	HR%
ORDINARY MEMBERS	53	91.38	51.96	49	94.23	48.04	102	92.73	100.00
LEADERS	5	8.62	62.50	3	5.77	37.50	8	7.27	100.00
T O T A L	58	100.00	52.73	52	100.00	47.27	110	100.00	100.00

TABLE 7.34

LINK BETWEEN POLITICAL AMBITION OF THE RESPONDENTS AND RE-ELECTION

POLITICAL AMBITION LEVEL	ELECTED			NOT ELECTED			TOTAL		
	NO.	VR%	HR%	NO.	VR%	HR%	NO.	VR%	HR%
SIMILAR POSITION	40	68.97	54.05	34	65.38	45.95	74	67.27	100.00
HIGHER POSITION	15	25.86	68.18	7	13.46	31.82	22	20.00	100.00
NONE	3	5.17	21.43	11	21.16	78.57	14	12.73	100.00
T O T A L	58	100.00	52.73	52	100.00	47.27	110	100.00	100.00

TABLE 7.35

LINKS BETWEEN LOCUS OF CONTROL AND RE-ELECTION

LOCUS OF CONTROL	ELECTED			NOT ELECTED			TOTAL		
	NO.	VR%	HR%	NO.	VR%	HR%	NO.	VR%	HR%
EXTERNAL	33	56.90	54.10	28	53.85	45.90	61	55.45	100.00
INTERNAL	25	43.10	51.02	24	46.15	48.98	49	44.55	100.00
T O T A L	58	100.00	52.73	52	100.00	47.27	110	100.00	100.00

TABLE 7.36

LINKS BETWEEN PURPOSIVE ROLE PERCEPTION AND RE-ELECTION

PURPOSIVE ROLE PERCEPTION	ELECTED			NOT ELECTED			TOTAL		
	NO.	VR%	HR%	NO.	VR%	HR%	NO.	VR%	HR%
LAW-MAKER	3	5.17	42.86	4	7.69	57.14	7	6.36	100.00
COMMUNITY									
SPOKESMAN	5	8.62	41.67	7	13.46	58.33	12	10.91	100.00
COMMUNICATOR	13	22.41	31.71	28	53.85	69.29	41	37.27	100.00
ENTREPRENEUR	14	24.14	82.35	3	5.77	17.65	17	15.45	100.00
RITUALIST	10	17.24	62.50	6	11.54	37.50	16	14.55	100.00
WATCH-DOG	13	22.42	76.47	4	7.69	23.53	17	14.45	100.00
T O T A L	58	100.00	52.73	52	100.00	47.27	110	100.00	100.00

reelected in the **immediate** general election at the state as well as the national level.

Representational Role Perception: An overwhelming majority of politicians (86.36%) and a considerable majority of trustees (57.14%) have proved to be successful in the immediate elections, as shown in Table 7.37. It can also be seen that more or less equal number of those who got elected again are with partisan and politico role perceptions.

Areal Role Perception: It can be noticed from Table 7.38 that 62.9% of the representatives with district as major areal focus won the reelection. Direct link between state orientation and reelection can also be established as 50% of the reelected are with state orientation and 51.78% of the representatives with state orientation are successful in the immediate election.

Interest Group Perception: A considerable portion (60.41%) of the respondents with facilitator role are successful in winning reelection. A majority of resistors are not elected. Table 7.39 shows this clearly. It is also interesting to note that the reelected and not elected among the neutrals are equal in number.

Participatory Role Perception: The study reveals conspicuous affirmative links between positive participatory role perception and reelection, as given in Table 7.40. It is very useful to mention that 84.90% of the representatives who considered their participation, especially at constituency level, as very beneficial to their political future secured reelection and all

TABLE 7.37

REPRESENTATIONAL ROLE PERCEPTION AND RE-ELECTION

REPRESENTATIO- NAL ROLE PERCEPTION	ELECTED			NOT ELECTED			TOTAL		
	NO.	VR%	HR%	NO.	VR%	HR%	NO.	VR%	HR%
TRUSTEE	12	20.69	57.14	9	17.31	42.86	21	19.09	100.00
DELEGATE	7	12.07	30.43	16	30.77	69.57	23	20.91	100.00
PARTISAN	20	34.48	45.45	24	46.15	54.55	44	40.00	100.00
POLITICO	19	32.76	86.36	3	5.77	13.64	22	20.00	100.00
T O T A L	58	100.00	52.73	52	100.00	47.27	110	100.00	100.00

TABLE 7.38

LINK BETWEEN AREAL ROLE PERCEPTION AND RE-ELECTION

AREAL ROLE PERCEPTION	ELECTED			NOT ELECTED			TOTAL		
	NO.	VR%	HR%	NO.	VR%	HR%	NO.	VR%	HR%
STATE	29	50.00	51.78	27	51.92	48.22	56	50.91	100.00
DISTRICT	17	29.31	62.96	10	19.23	37.04	27	24.54	100.00
CONSTITUENCY	12	20.69	44.44	15	28.85	55.56	27	24.55	100.00
T O T A L	58	100.00	52.73	52	100.00	47.27	110	100.00	100.00

TABLE 7.39

LINK BETWEEN INTEREST-GROUP ROLE PERCEPTION AND RE-ELECTION

INTEREST GROUP ROLE PERCEPTION	ELECTED			NOT ELECTED			TOTAL		
	NO.	VR%	HR%	NO.	VR%	HR%	NO.	VR%	HR%
FACILITATOR	29	50.00	60.41	19	36.54	39.59	48	43.64	100.00
RESISTOR	7	12.07	41.18	10	19.23	50.82	17	15.45	100.00
NEUTRAL	22	37.93	48.89	23	44.23	51.11	45	40.91	100.00
T O T A L	58	100.00	52.73	52	100.00	47.27	110	100.00	100.00

TABLE 7.40

PARTICIPATORY ROLE PERCEPTION AND RE-ELECTION

PARTICIPATORY ROLE PERCEPTION	ELECTED			NOT ELECTED			TOTAL		
	NO.	VR%	HR%	NO.	VR%	HR%	NO.	VR%	HR%
VERY BENEFICIAL	45	77.59	84.90	8	15.38	15.10	53	48.18	100.00
GOOD	12	20.69	46.15	14	26.92	53.85	26	23.64	100.00
MARGINAL	1	1.72	3.85	25	48.08	96.15	26	23.64	100.00
HARMFUL	-	-	-	5	9.62	100.00	5	4.54	100.00
T O T A L	58	100.00	52.73	52	100.00	47.27	110	100.00	100.00

TABLE 7.41

INSTITUTIONAL PARTICIPATION AND RE-ELECTION

INSTITUTIONAL PARTICIPATION	ELECTED			NOT ELECTED			TOTAL		
	NO.	VR%	HR%	NO.	VR%	HR%	NO.	VR%	HR%
LOW	12	20.69	26.09	34	65.38	73.91	46	41.82	100.00
MEDIUM	19	32.76	54.28	16	30.77	45.82	35	31.82	100.00
HIGH	27	46.55	93.10	2	3.85	6.90	29	26.36	100.00
T O T A L	58	100.00	52.73	52	100.00	47.27	110	100.00	100.00

TABLE 7.42

LINK BETWEEN CONSTITUENCY SERVICE AND RE-ELECTION

CONSTITUENCY SERVICE	ELECTED			NOT ELECTED			TOTAL		
	NO.	VR%	HR%	NO.	VR%	HR%	NO.	VR%	HR%
LOW	12	20.69	21.82	43	82.69	78.18	55	50.00	100.00
MEDIUM	26	44.83	86.67	4	7.69	13.33	30	27.27	100.00
HIGH	20	34.48	80.00	5	9.62	20.00	25	22.73	100.00
T O T A L	58	100.00	52.73	52	100.00	47.27	110	100.00	100.00

the respondents who perceived that active participation may be **harmful** and 96.15% of those who felt that participation will have no **impact** on their political future are not elected again. But a majority (53.84%) of the representatives who **regarded** their participation would yield good results are not elected.

Institutional Participation And Reelection: One can establish a direct link between high level institutional participation and future political gains as more than 90% of the high level participants and a majority (54.28%) of the medium level participants are reelected. Table 7.41 makes this point clear. It can also be seen that a predominant part (78.26%) of the low level participations are not elected again.

Constituency Service And Reelection: In the context of constituency level participation also, positive relationship between high level participation and reelection can be noticed. Table 7.42 reveals that 80% and 86.67% of the high and medium level participants respectively are reelected, while 78.18% of those with low participation levels are not successful in their immediate political future.

The above discussion indicates that background and role perceptions have clear impact on constituency service and that background and constituency service are among the major factors influencing political future of representatives.

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FINDINGS

Representatives' participation is a complex phenomenon resulting from various explicit and implicit calculations depending on different factors such as individual, institutional, contextual and environmental factors. In the preceeding chapters, the links between background, personality, perceptions and participation levels of the representatives are examined and analysed. In order to comprehend the order, structure and relationships among these variables, a modern statistical technique - the factor analysis is made use of.

The factor analysis model expresses each variable as a function of factors common to several variables and a factor unique to that variable. This analysis involve three basic steps:

- 1) computing the correlations between the variables;
- 2) extracting the factor loadings; and
- 3) rotating the factors and compute the factor scores for each.

For the present study, factor analysis is done with the help of the principle component method and rotated to **varimax** solution in SPSS (Statistical Package for Social Sciences) and 10 factors are which account for 70.2 percent of variance are extracted out of 27 **variables**.The details are given in Table 8.1.

TABLE 81

VARIABLE	COMMONITY	FACTOR	EIGEN VALUE	PERCENTAGE OF VARIANCE	CUMULATIVE PERCENTAGE
POLITICAL PARTY	.70873	1	5.04644	21.7	21.7
AGE	.66925	2	2.06458	7.6	29.3
EDUCATION	.62880	3	1.74963	6.5	35.8
OCCUPATION	.67177	4	1.59250	5.9	41.7
COMMUNITY	.62959	5	1.52131	5.6	47.3
POLITICAL EXPERIENCE	.40322	6	1.42943	5.3	52.6
NATURE OF CONSTITUENCY	.79538	7	1.28898	4.8	57.4
REGION	.71600	8	1.19766	4.4	61.8
MEMBERSHIP IN SOCIAL ORGANISATION	.64889	9	1.14588	4.2	66.1
PARTY-POSITION	.66509	10	1.11475	4.1	70.2

The factor loadings range **from** +1 to -1. They show the degree of association of each variable with the factor. The factors are rotated to make them more interpretable. The rotated factor matrix and the factor loadings are shown in Table 8.2. The factor scores are **co-efficients** for each factor, and they give the relative account of each factor that the case possesses. Both positive and negative loadings which are more than .25 on the 10 factors extracted are underlined. Factors can be named after analysing the variables comprising them. The name is subjective summarising the common concept underlying the variable.

Factor 1 can be named as institutional participation factor as high loadings on this factor discriminate between those variables indicating institutional participation - i.e., number of sessions participated, number of subjects discussed, number of bills discussed, number of call attention notices raised, number of matters of public importance raised, participation in general budget, membership in committees and other variables. This shows that various modes of institutional participation are very much interrelated. Two variable - membership in social organisations and participatory role perceptions are negatively loaded, though the loadings are not high. This is due to the fact that a majority of the respondents who are not members of social organisations and most of the respondents who perceived that their participation will have good impact on their political future are low level participants.

TABLE 8.2

ROTATED FACTOR MATRIX

VARIABLES	FACTOR 1	FACTOR 2	FACTOR 3	FACTOR 4	FACTOR 5	FACTOR 6	FACTOR 7	FACTOR 8	FACTOR 9	FACTOR 10
POLITICAL PARTY	.16619	.04365	.04579	.77385	.11545	.19749	.07279	-.11176	.01361	-.00926
AGE	-.01102	.06230	.00253	-.02266	.79173	-.03789	.14879	-.01252	.02541	-.11381
EDUCATION	.05545	.17751	.43503	.01499	-.55998	.01379	.26093	.07962	-.12831	.00935
OCCUPATION	.03234	.04598	-.03661	-.01535	-.09489	.79969	-.07213	.04862	.07256	.07676
COMMUNITY	.24920	-.11144	.52350	-.05255	.16120	.30871	.04321	-.38807	-.04548	-.04911
POLITICAL EXPERIENCE	-.16562	-.09281	.34075	-.01866	-.31832	.07372	.22157	.18230	.09672	.22863
NATURE OF CONSTITUENCY	-.02249	-.09473	.26149	.15268	.12130	.22619	-.11940	.22155	.71345	.21285
REGION	.15748	.03647	-.06320	.70482	.13343	.15342	-.05160	.12151	.09061	-.00477
MEMBERSHIP IN SOCIAL ORGANISATIONS	-.39188	-.29247	-.00216	-.10630	.13616	-.55796	.13510	-.18261	.12453	.03730
PARTY POSITION	.16491	.33294	.07123	-.09032	.13666	-.06870	.52459	-.01851	.34734	-.30595
MOTIVATING FACTORS	.03703	-.02027	.11234	.04426	-.00278	.06770	-.03502	.81623	.05609	.14777
INCENTIVES	.06266	.14885	.01000	-.09930	-.12611	.01228	.03300	.10081	.06124	.77290
POLITICAL AMBITION	.04444	-.06018	-.26091	.01384	.11040	-.16646	.01643	.15332	.70717	-.07800
LOCUS OF CONTROL	-.09038	-.15754	.01468	.17065	-.09014	.33483	.28675	.48334	-.18492	-.18161
PURPOSIVE ROLE PERCEPTION	.11656	.10201	.33409	.26608	.37884	.05091	.04606	.10829	-.19225	.42419
REPRESENTATION ROLE PERCEPTION	.00312	-.12564	.04930	.04409	.01819	-.10774	.84936	.02274	-.11000	.12775
AREAL ROLE PERCEPTION	-.02824	-.07432	-.82297	.04025	.12120	.11687	.03351	-.20878	-.01641	-.03979
PARTICIPATORY ROLE PERCEPTION	-.37938	.72953	.06133	-.13514	-.00376	.15326	-.10931	.09837	.12612	.03959
NO. OF SESSIONS PARTICIPATED	.85239	.23547	-.00787	.05466	.04818	.17349	.03262	.10394	.10257	.00120
NO. OF SUBJECTS DISCUSSED	.89125	.21673	.00381	-.03738	-.00629	.15135	.07986	-.08578	.01752	.00959
NO. OF BILLS DISCUSSED	.84108	.01636	.00429	.11792	.16179	.05200	.12152	.07367	.02793	.02277
NO. OF CAME RAISED	.86743	.00509	.13298	.11621	-.07677	.03309	-.00289	.06145	-.01612	-.03027
NO. OF RULE 304 & 329 RAISED	.89529	.06435	.13532	.16899	-.03900	.00197	.13441	-.01137	.01926	.00688
MEMBERSHIP IN COMMITTEES	.47677	.12099	.18785	.16986	.25407	.08320	.02706	.16191	-.00124	-.40398
PARTICIPATION IN BUDGET	.55721	-.00828	-.00846	.25691	.22707	.13499	.21634	-.13350	-.18476	.22713
TIME ALLOTTED FOR CONSTITUENCY SERVICE	-.02076	.84041	-.04303	.02510	.00238	-.03813	-.18274	.06677	-.04493	.16131
NO. OF CONSTITUENTS MEETS AVERAGE PER MONTH	.25992	.84514	.11146	-.02208	-.06414	.07933	.03743	-.06840	.02893	.03229

On factor 2, high loadings are seen in constituency service activities - i.e., time allotted for constituency service and the number of constituents the representative meets on an average in a month. The party position of the representatives is also positively loaded on this factor. Participatory role perception is highly negatively loaded on this factor which reveals a clear gap between perception and participation in this regard.

On factor 3 community and education are loaded highly. Purposive role perception and nature of constituency are loaded to some extent. This factor reveals the relationship between purposive role perception and community, nature of constituency and education level.

Political party and region are loaded highly on factor 4. This is because most of the ruling party respondents are from Andhra region whereas representatives from the opposition party and groups are mostly from Telangana region. The purposive role perception and participation on general budget discussion are also positively loaded on the factor.

Age followed by purposive role perception is highly loaded on factor 5. Education and political experience are negatively loaded on this factor. Community is loaded highly on factor 6. It is having positive links with locus of control but on this factor membership in social organisations is negatively loaded. Representative role perception and **representatives'** position in political party are loaded highly on factor 7. Locus of control and educational level are positively linked on this factor.

Factor 8 reveals high loadings of motivating factors and locus of control. **Community** is, however, negatively loaded on this factor. Nature of constituency and political ambition levels of representatives are highly loaded on factor 9. On this factor party position of the representatives is also reasonably positively loaded. Factor 10 indicates high loadings of incentives along with purposive role perception. But membership in committees and party position are negatively loaded.

The Analytical Frame:

The frame of analysis for **representatives'** participation which is detailed in the first chapter is applicable to the study. In the present context, **representatives'** political background more than their social and economic background has a definite impact on participation, especially at the institutional level. Political party affiliation, political experience and party position proved to be the dominant factors in determining **representatives'** institutional participation.

In the existing political atmosphere influenced by political culture, where representatives' initial decision to enter political arena and their electoral success are largely dependent on political party, party's influence on **representatives'** political socialization and recruitment processes are evident. Among the environmental factors, nature of constituency seems to have a good impact on representatives' choice of participation at both the institutional and constituency levels. The study reveals that representatives **from** rural constituencies are

inclined towards constituency service while those from urban constituencies are interested in institutional participation. Though region's **impact** on **representatives'** participation can be seen, the variation is mainly because of party distribution.

Social and psychological incentives and desire for power and affiliation are dominant in the sample. But their impact cannot definitely be established in the present study, except in the case of those who have desire for achievement as the motivating factor leading to high level participation at the institutional level.

Representatives' political ambition levels had a definite impact on their participation levels and ambition acted as the major incentive for participation. **Representatives'** locus of control does not have very direct link with their participation levels.

Nature of representative, particularly background has a perceivable influence on representatives' role perceptions. Political party, community, party position of the representatives and their locus of control had an impact on their purposive role perception. While most of the representatives from the ruling party identified communicator role, those from opposition perceived watch-dog role and representatives from reserved community recognised community spokesman role. A majority of the communicators have internal locus of control. Direct link between representatives' purposive role perception and participation is observable. Most of the representatives with

law-maker and watch -dog role perceptions are high level participants at the institutional level and most of those with entrepreneurial role perception **are** very active at the constituency level.

Political party's role on representational role perception is quite evident as **a majority** of representatives from the ruling party are partisans. The study establishes positive relationship between political experience and trustee style of functioning. More percentage of female representatives perceived partisan role than their **male** counterparts. Representatives with trustee role perception are high level participants, both at the institutional and constituency levels.

Representatives' nature of constituency has considerable influence on their **areal** role perceptions. A predominant majority of the representatives who wanted to concentrate on constituency as areal focus are from rural constituencies. A majority of the respondents identified state as major focus and a majority of those with state-wide areal focus are high level participants. Membership in social organisations and **representatives'** party position have a close impact on their facilitator interest group role perception. Facilitator role perception has positive influence on their participation levels.

Participatory role perception is influenced by background and personality factors like education, political experience, party position **and** political ambition levels. But positive participatory role perception of representatives does not lead to

their active institutional and constituency level participation. **This shows that** intentionality to participate by itself does not result in actual participation as it will be influenced by environmental and contextual factors also.

Factors such as general decline in institutional participation, nature of working of the parliamentary system, both at the centre and in states, general impatience of executive to be answerable to legislature, decline in the number of sittings during sessions, absence of Prime Minister or Chief Minister from legislature during sessions, increase in the number of Ordinances, reduction in time for discussing bills and general haste in passing legislation are among the environmental **constraints**. Contextual factors such as limited time and research facilities, informal rules like seniority, party leadership position and party discipline are, to some extent responsible for the lack of congruence between intention and action at institutional level. Vast geographical area to be covered, lakhs of constituents, limited staff and resources, personality factor, absence of influential party position are some of the constraints for **representatives'** active constituency service.

Some trends noted in the study are similar to those in other Third World countries. The representatives in the sample wanted to give more emphasis to constituency service than to institutional participation and have allotted considerable time to constituency oriented activities. They expressed that

constituency service will be more beneficial than institutional participation to their political careers. Prevailing political culture is also conducive to foster such feelings. Constituents are **mostly** eager to get their personal problems solved through representatives and very few of the constituents are actually interested in legislative process as such. Support structure such as organised and unorganised groups also demanding representatives to get things done, not necessarily through institutional participation. In the present system, **possibilities** to get quick results through private contacts instead of institutional participation are evident. Some respondents candidly admitted the presence of this phenomenon.

Even in institutional participation, the representatives are participating more frequently in particular modes of **participation** - Question-hour and raising matters of urgent public importance, which involves low cost of preparation and high **effectiveness** than other modes of participation such as **participation** in legislation and financial business, where efforts do not match with **effectiveness**.

Representatives with high socio-economic and political background and politically ambitious found to be successful in establishing political careers. The factors of incumbency and active participation are conducive for winning immediate election.

That the political party is the prime factor in determining representatives' role performance, particularly at the level of the institution is made crystal clear by the study. Given the background of contextual and environmental constraints and also of control mechanisms, participation of the legislators in the House is satisfactory. The fresh members have essentially been learners. Government's willingness to allow itself to be criticised and to rectify defects are very much visible. The Opposition's role was neither totally obstructive nor constructive. Barring a few exceptions, a tendency on the part of the ruling party and the Opposition members as well as independents favouring orderly conduct of legislative business is seen. The so called '**institutional crisis' argument** does not hold good in the context of the Eighth Legislative Assembly of Andhra Pradesh as the terms representation and representatives' participation should properly be understood before resorting to think in terms of the presence of any crisis situation.

APPENDIX

Schedule for Conducting interview

Part - I Socio - economic and Political Background :

1. Name
2. Party
3. Age
4. Education :
5. Annual Income
6. Occupation
7. Community
8. Political Experience : a)Local b) State c) Both levels
d)No Experience
9. Region : a)Andhra b)Telangana c)Rayalaseema
10. Nature of constituency : a)Rural b)Urban
11. Are you a member in social organisations?
a)Yes b)No
12. What is your position in the Party?
a)Leader b)Ordinary member

Part - II Political Socialization and Recruitment

13. What are the factors or who are the persons influenced your initial decision to enter Politics?
14. What is your primary source of election funding?
15. In your opinion what is the primary reason for your electoral success?
16. Please indentify the most prominent factor that motivated you to become a politician?
17. What are the major incentives you are expecting from your position as a politician?
18. In a world of corruption and opportunism do you think that individual initiative can bring positive change in the situation? (a) Yes (b) No.
Reasons thereof.

19. What are your future political plans? Do you want to continue in Politics? a) Yes b) No.
If yes, at what level? **a)Higher b)Similar** position.

Part - III Role Perceptions:

20. As an **M.L.A.** and **peoples'** representative, how do you perceive your **major** role?
21. Which factor is the most decisive in your participation in the proceedings of the House and constituency service?
a. Conscience
b. Advice or opinion of the constituents
c. Party ideology and principles
d. Different factors depending on the situation.
22. What is your **areal** focus in taking part in various stages of the Legislative Processes?
a) State b) District c) Constituency
23. As an **M.L.A.** , how do you respond to the **demands** of various interest groups ?
a) Positively b) Negatively c) Neutral

Part- IV Institutional and Constituency Service

24. As people's representative, you participate in institutional and constituency activities. How much time do you spend for constituency activities?
a) 0 - 25% b) 26 - 50%
c) 51 - 75% d) more than 75%
25. How many visits do you make to your constituency in a month on an average?
26. What are the major places where you meet the constituents?
27. What are the problems with which constituents approach you?
28. What methods do you adopt to solve constituents' problems?
29. How **many** constituents do you receive on an average in a month?
30. What would be the effect of your institutional participation and constituency service on your political future?

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