

**INSURGENCY MOVEMENTS IN SOUTH ASIA: A
CASE STUDY OF THE MAOIST INSURGENCY
MOVEMENT IN NEPAL (1996-2005)**

*A thesis submitted to the University of Hyderabad
in fulfillment of the requirements for the award of*

DOCTOR OF PHILOSOPHY

BY

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2009



DECLARATION

I, hereby, declare that the research embodied in the present thesis entitled, '**Insurgency Movements in South Asia: A Case Study of the Maoist Insurgency Movement in Nepal (1996-2005)**' is an original research work carried out by me under the supervision of Prof. Md.Moazzam Ali, Department of Political Science, for the award of Doctor of Philosophy in Political Science from the University of Hyderabad.

I declare to the best of my knowledge that no part of this thesis was earlier submitted for the award of research degree in part or full to this or any other university.

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CERTIFICATE

This is to certify that Anshuman Behera has carried out the research work embodied in the present thesis entitled '**Insurgency Movements in South Asia: A Case Study of the Maoist Insurgency Movement in Nepal (1996-2005)**', for the degree of Doctor of Philosophy in Political Science is prepared under our supervision.

We declare to the best of our knowledge that no part of this thesis was earlier submitted for the award of research degree in part or full at any university.

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
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CONTENT


	Page
Declaration	
Certificate	
Acknowledgement	
Preface	1-2
CHAPTER- I	3-26
Introduction	
CHAPTER-II	27-70
Insurgency Movements in South Asia: A Theoretical Overview	
CHAPTER-III	71-104
Maoists of Nepal: Historical background	
CHAPTER-IV	105-144
Maoists Insurgency in Nepal: Ideological and Strategic Dimensions	
CHAPTER-V	145-202
Maoist Insurgency in Nepal: Responses from India and China	
CHAPTER-VI	203-210
Conclusion	
BIBLIOGRAPHY	227-241

Maps and Appendix

Maps		Page No
Map No. 1	75 Districts, 14 Zones and 5 Regions of Nepal	x
Map No. 2	Strongholds of the Maoists at the Initial Stage	xi
Map No.3	Districts under the Maoists' Influence by 2005	xii

APPENDIX

Appendix-I	40 Point Demands of the Maoists	211- 214
Appendix-2	Strategy and Tactics of Armed Struggle in Nepal	215-220
Appendix-3	Major Incidents of Violence in Nepal: 1999-2005: A Calendar of Major Events	221- 2005



Preface

In this thesis an attempt is made to study the Maoist insurgency in Nepal in particular, although we have sort to touch the insurgency movements in South Asia in general. South Asia experiences different types of violent movements and remains prone to political violence. Throughout we have concentrated on the violent movements that would be characterized as insurgency movements. While studies made in this regard or touched upon, we have sort to study this phenomenon some what differently. While cognizant of different definitions given to the term insurgency, we have sort to define the phenomenon which is consistent with the nature of the study done here. Before proceeding any further we have outlined a preferred definition. Nepal's insurgency movement is than studied in its multifaceted dimensions.

Methodologically historical and analytical dimensions are kept in mind. A fair amount of empirical work which was made possible by a field trip to Nepal constitutes part of the study. In this regard I owe a word of gratitude to Krishna Kriti Foundation, Hyderabad for financial help. During my stay in Nepal I was able to meet a large number of politicians, leading Maoists involved in the movement and also members of Nepali Congress. Although many of them insisted animonity, I would like to record my thankfulness to all of them.

The information collected has been used in this thesis wherever necessary. It goes without saying that many documents of the Maoists and the documents of the government of Nepal are part of the primary sources used in this thesis. The bibliography provided at the end of the thesis makes mention of secondary and tertiary sources which include books, articles, journals and other periodicals besides websites.

The structure of the thesis to be outlined as follows:

In the chapter one the difficulties of conceptualizing the term have been highlighted. However, we have given a definition keeping in mind the specificities of Nepal in particular and South Asia in general. The attributes, methods of warfare involved in an insurgency and important variables are also highlighted.

In the chapter two different aspects of insurgency with regard to Nepal have been put in place. For the systematic study of the Nepal's insurgency, the origin and evolution of the communist movement and the Maoist movement have been studied. The factors leading to the emergence of the Maoists include social factor, economic factor and political factors are all studied.

Chapter three highlights the ideological dimensions/inspirations of the Maoist group in Nepal. A central focus of this chapter includes the dimensions of the Prachanda Path. The strategic phases the Maoists passed through are also discussed.

In chapter four responses from India and China to the Maoists of Nepal are discussed. We have highlighted various factors responsible for China's withdrawal of support to the Maoists In spite of ideological affiliations. India's change in policy towards Nepal, reaction to the presence of western countries in Nepalese soil and India's anti- Maoist stand are all highlighted in this chapter.

In the chapter comprising conclusion we have sort to summarize the work done and findings made.

CHAPTER ONE

Introduction

South Asia has had a long history of witnessing different types of violent political conflicts in general and the intra-state ones in particular. Starting from the mighty country in the region, India, to the poorest of the region, Nepal, each state experience these violent political conflicts in one form or the other. These violent political conflicts have been addressed differently, mostly under the demanding situation of the concerned country or by the scholars of different orientations. Every time these problems being studied, there have been different aspects emerged, on the question how to understand them or how to resolve the same. However, these conflicts refuse to die in spite of all the initiatives taken by the authorities of the state or of different interpretations or understanding by the scholars. Of all the violent political conflicts being talked here the prominent ones have been the LTTE of Sri Lanka, Maoist Insurgency Movements in Nepal, various similar kinds of movements in India and Bangladesh and the Baluchistan Movement in Pakistan. Whatever the international scenario talks on the matter of terrorism especially the cross border ones, these internal political conflicts, starting from India to Sri Lanka to Nepal to Pakistan, have become more dire.

The above mentioned violent political conflicts are termed differently by many scholars. They are termed as insurgency, terrorism, extremism, revolution, civil war, naxalism, guerrilla warfare, coup d'état etc. Mostly these terms are used interchangeably with each other. There need not to be any doubt that every term that has been mentioned above is different from the other and has its own connotations. However, the present study is an attempt to study the

insurgency movements being faced by the different countries of South Asia. To be more specific on the area of this research, it studies in detail the Maoist insurgency in Nepal. There have been a number of questions on the Maoist movement in Nepal. And how such a movement affects the South Asia in general and India in particular?

It is important to note that, the Maoist insurgency in Nepal, with all its devastating results in the ten years of operation, emerged in the second poorest country in the world. Since its emergence in the year 1996, the Maoists of Nepal have not only created a political instability in the country but also challenged the legitimacy of an established government and a centuries old monarchy. Thousands of lives have been lost; many have been displaced through the process of the insurgency and the counter insurgency measures by the government.

The Maoists of Nepal had not only affected the socio-politico and economic sphere of Nepal but also it had its spillover effect in the South Asia region in general and the state of India in particular. Links between the likeminded groups of the Maoists in Nepal and the other countries of South Asia were matter of concern for all the South Asian countries. The ideological orientations of the Maoists of Nepal, as the name suggests, forced the countries like India to think over its policy towards Nepal in relation to china. The present study is an attempt to study the insurgency movement in South Asia with a special reference to Nepal. The time period is from 1996 to 2005. The rationale behind the time period chosen is that 1996 was the year when the Maoist movement emerged and continued till 2005. Though the Maoists were very much active after the year 2005, but they were more into a peace talk than into insurgency activities. Because in the year 2006, the Maoists of Nepal laid down their arms and took part in the

democratic process along with the other political parties of Nepal. These parties had formed an alliance called Seven party Alliance (SPA). The present study is divided into six chapters including the introduction and conclusion.

The second chapter of the thesis deals with the issue of ‘insurgency’ in general and the insurgency movements in South Asia in particular. We have first attempted to define the term insurgency. This chapter also tries to differentiate between the terms like insurgency and related terms like revolution, upsurge, terrorism, civil war, naxalism, guerrilla warfare, coup d’état etc. The typologies of the insurgency movements and their characteristics in South Asia are also explained. An attempt is made to explore the national peculiarities among the insurgency movements in South Asia. This chapter also seeks to find out the objectives of an insurgency movement and its popular base. Defining the term ‘insurgency’ is not only a difficult task but also tricky. Because the term insurgency most of the time has been intertwined and confused with other terms like, subversion, coup d’état, terrorism, guerrilla warfare, revolution, civil war, etc. The understanding of the term insurgency was first attempted by the military experts of US in 1960s. They thought that an insurgency is a political and social consequence of discrimination, exploitation and injustice of a country. Hence they did not give any specific importance to the word as a separate facet of war making or as a separate strategic thought. In the process of understanding the term, there have been continuous refinement and redefinition. The first ever study to deal with insurgency as a separate concept was that of David Galula. In his book *Counterinsurgency Warfare*, he defined insurgency as, “... insurgency is a protracted struggle conducted methodically, step by step, in order to attain specific intermediate objectives, leading

finally to overthrow of the existing order”.¹ There are many scholars who tried to define ‘insurgency’. Donald Hamilton in his book, *Art of Insurgency*, defined insurgency as a “political-military conflict waged against a specific faction(s) implementing irregular military actions in support of a unified political outcome, short of revolution and civil war”². On the objective of an insurgent movement Hamilton adds that, “the objective of an insurgency is to force political social upheaval in an organized fashion for the express purpose of validating a cause and therefore justifying its violent means”³. Bard E O’Neill explains an insurgency as “a struggle between a non-ruling group and the ruling authorities in which the former consciously employs political resources, (organizational skills, propaganda and or demonstrations) and instruments of violence to establish legitimacy for some aspect of political system it considers illegitimate”⁴. Insurgency, according to Paul Wilkinson, is “a relatively value-neutral concept denoting a rebellion or rising against any government in power or the civil authorities”⁵.

From the definitions given above one may find out some common elements. The most striking and important common element contained in of all the definitions is the aspect of use of violence against the ruling groups. Most of the scholars also place stress on the guerrilla warfare as an inescapable element of the insurgency movement. But some way or the other the definitions mentioned earlier are not able to give a generalized kind of definition that would deal

¹ . See David Galula, *Counter-insurgency Warfare: Theory and Practice*, as cited in Donald W. Hamilton’s *The Art of Insurgency*, (Prager, Westport, London), 1998), p. 15.

² . For details see Donald W. Hamilton’s *The Art of Insurgency*, (Prager, Westport, London), 1998), p. 21.

³ . *ibid.*

⁴ . For details see Bard E. O’Neill. *Insurgency: A Framework for Analysis* in Bard E. O’Neill, William R. Heaton and Donald J. Alberts (ed), *Insurgency in the Modern World*, (West view Press, Colorado, 1980), p. 1.

⁵ . See Paul Wilkinson, *Terrorism versus Democracy*, (Frank Cass Publishers, London, 2001), p. 2.

with the insurgency holistically. Because to define insurgency merely as an armed struggle against any government, state or an authority would definitely not do justice to the term. While the armed struggle is an inescapable element of an insurgency, there are some other factors like the method of warfare, strategy, ideological affiliation, also matter a lot. The definitions mentioned here only speak about the guerrilla warfare as the method of warfare in an insurgency. But it is important to mention that, with the development of the information technology and the accessibility of the modern arms to the non state actors the insurgents are also capable of waging a fully fledged conventional war against the state or the government.

Insurgencies, worldwide in general and in South Asia in particular, have different affiliations. Sometimes an insurgency group can be a secessionist, nationalist, ethno-nationalist or conservative in nature. Insurgency movements are also mobilized by an ideology. There are many factors that give rise to an insurgency. One of the major factors in this regard is the legitimacy crisis. Legitimacy of an authority gives the moral and rational ground on which it may demand obedience from the citizens. Hence, legitimacy crisis, can give rise to an insurgency like situation in a country. Apart from the legitimacy crisis, the other factors that give rise to an insurgency are: the appearance of a systematic crisis in the political system; the occurrence of series of precipitants of accelerators of the crisis; the emergence of counter elite groups; the formulation of an insurrectionist ideology.

One of the terms that has been often used as an equivalent to insurgency is ‘revolution’. The politics of substituting ‘revolution’ with insurgency is that, individuals who are associated with an insurgency group directly or indirectly in an insurgent movement take a negative view of

the term insurgency. However, revolution, as it has been widely understood, is a sudden development in any field. Revolution is a concept which is more comprehensive. Politically it is a sudden change of decision makers. It is a drastic cut from the past socially, economically and politically as well. Accordingly, revolution does not confine itself into the political sphere only. Insurgency, as defined earlier, is political in nature with an aim to change the regime or the government which it thinks as illegitimate. In addition to this a political revolution takes place as sudden phenomena aiming not necessarily a total change in the government, though the factors responsible for the revolution are long pending.

Another term that has been used as a substitute to insurgency is 'terrorism'. One of the basic distinctions between these two terms is, unlike the insurgents the terrorists are divided into small compartmentalized groups and the objectives and the methods of warfare are never open. These small groups carry out their activities as anonymously as possible. On the lines of the direct fight with the state army and police, having popular support, an insurgency differs from terrorism. It is not surprising that the insurgent groups also apply terror methods in their operations. Terrorism is more a method of struggle than a category of its own.

Civil war is another important term which has been used as a substitute with insurgency. Unlike insurgency, a civil war splits resources and even territory divided for a further contest of power conventional process over the entire country⁶. However, all the insurgencies may develop their strength to a capacity which may lead to civil war in a country. The insurgents can become

⁶. For details see David Galula, *Counter-insurgency Warfare*, as cited in LT. Col. V. K. Anand's , *Insurgency and Counter Insurgency: A Study of Modern Guerrilla Warfare*, (Deep and Deep Publications, New Delhi, 1981), p. 23.

a parallel power force only when there is a weak army, weak government or the insurgent group having extra-ordinary military power and people support.

So far as the forms of warfare of an insurgency are concerned, the insurgent groups adopt the methods according to the suitability of the circumstance and the stage of the insurgency. Broadly the insurgencies adopt two types of warfare methods. The first one is the Guerrilla warfare and the second one is the Terrorist warfare. Guerrilla warfare is an important form of warfare in most of the insurgency movement. Since the primary aim and the objective of an insurgency is to overthrow the government through an armed struggle, the insurgency fights the state army which is comparatively superior and more powerful than the insurgents. Hence at the initial stage and /or for a long time of the insurgency, guerrilla warfare remains to be the major form of warfare for an insurgency. An insurgency also adopts and uses the terrorist form of warfare, where either the state is more powerful than expected by the insurgents or in order to get the popular support through the use of force. Apart from these above mentioned two types of the warfare, insurgencies in these days also have the capacity to wage a fully fledged conventional modern warfare. An insurgency movement also can be prone to propaganda warfare.

Any form of warfare used by an insurgency has to have a particular strategy to make the movement win against the state. So far as the strategies of insurgencies are concerned some of the important strategies are discussed in this chapter. One of the very important strategies adopted by the insurgent groups is the Leninist Strategy. Insurgencies adopting the Leninist strategy concentrate their activities in the urban areas which have political and economic powers. Importance is given to small but highly disciplined and organized groups to fight the state.

Leninist insurgents give importance to conspiratorial organization combined with active support from selected social groups. Secondly, there are insurgent groups which believe in the Maoist strategy. As the name suggests these strategies were advocated by Mao during the Cultural Revolution in China. The insurgent groups which follow the Maoist strategies believe in three main elements. They are: popular support, organization and the environment. As Mao advocated, these insurgent groups follow three stages of warfare: terrorism, guerilla warfare and the mobile conventional warfare. Thirdly, an alternative to Maoist strategy, Cuban strategy is also followed by many insurgencies. This strategic frame work was advocated by Che Guevara. Though the strategies given by him sounds almost like the Maoist strategies, yet he differed from him from in a fundamental aspect. Unlike the Maoist strategy, the Cuban strategy advocates that, an insurgency need not to wait until all the conditions are favorable for it: the insurgency can create them⁷. Ideas of Cuban strategy vis-à-vis, guerrilla warfare, country side as the basic area of the armed fighting are almost the same as the Maoist strategy advocated. Fourthly, urban strategy, followed by an insurgent group, situates the activism initially in the cities. So far as the strategy of the urban insurgency is concerned, they like to “turn political crisis into armed conflict by performing violent actions that will force those in power to transform the political situation of the country into a military situation. And that will alienate the masses who from then on will revolt against the army and the police and thus blame them for this state of things⁸”. Organizationally, these insurgents rely on small cells with a linkman and puts stress on organization, propaganda and terrorism as their techniques.

⁷ . For details see Che Guevara, *Guerrilla Warfare*, (Vintage Books, New York, 1961), p. 1.

⁸ . For details see Carlos Marghella, “On Principles and Strategic Questions” as cited in Bard E. O’Neill’s, *Insurgency: A Frame work of Analysis*, No-4, p. 33

We may now turn to various armed movements in South Asian region. The question that may be asked here is whether all the armed movements in this region fall under the insurgency category. Because South Asia as a region has been experiencing several armed conflicts against various governments particularly in post colonial period in particular. In the process of dealing with some of the major armed conflicts, we have attempted to find out whether, all of them are similar in nature or they have their own peculiarities depending on the specificities of the environment and the area.

In the following chapter we propose to study the historical background of the Communist movement in Nepal in general and the emergence of the Maoist insurgency in particular. In the process of dealing with the historical background of the Maoist insurgency, this chapter also discusses the causes of the emergence of the Maoists in Nepal. The communist movement in Nepal was inspired by the Communist Party of India. For the first time the communist movement in Nepal emerged when there was a strike by the workers at the Biratnagar Jute mill in 1947. The man who led the strike was Man Mohan Adhikari. Man Mohan Adhikari at that time was a member of the Communist Party of India. Another man, who was an active member of Nepali Congress, left the party and determined to start a communist movement in Nepal, was Puspa Lal Shrestha. For the first time he translated the Communist Manifesto into Nepali language in April 1949. To some this was the time when the communist party of Nepal was established. This translated version of the Communist Manifesto was made public in 15th September 1949. Since there is posit of information on the origin of the CPN, different views are expressed by different people.

The party's slogan at its founding convention was, 'civil liberties for all the classes'⁹. The communist groups were active as part of the Mukti Sena (Liberation Army). Through its leaflets distributed to the people in 1949 it was declared that, "Nepal should establish a 'new democracy' as in China- if necessary through armed struggle- so as to create a People's Republic"¹⁰. During the period of the emergence of the communists in Nepal (1947-49), Nepal was ruled by the Ranas¹¹. There was a discontent among the people against the Rana regime. In 1950-51 a "revolution" was started against the Ranas led by the Nepali Congress. The Ranas were dethroned and a democracy of sorts set up was introduced in the sense Nepal had an elected Prime Minister although the Monarch continued. However, the Communists of Nepal were not very clear about their role during the 1950 revolution. The CPN was very critical about the Nepali Congress, since the Nepali Congress had its association with the disgruntled section of the Ranas. The Communist party of Nepal (CPN) was also very critical about the outcome of the 1951 revolution. In its First Convention, the CPN's stand was that the 1951 revolution had no political significance, since it was not a total revolution. Subsequently, the CPN committed itself to strive for an all party conference, an interim government and elected constituent Assembly. It failed to influence for the above causes because of the lack of organizational base. From its first congress in the year 1951, till 1960 the CPN witnessed a number of disagreements and intra-party conflicts. These conflicts and disagreements came to become formal for the first time when the CPN got divided on the issue of supporting the king on his action of banning the political parties and introducing a new constitution. By the year 1962, the CPN was divided more on the

⁹ . For details of the founding convention of the CPN and the discussions see Anand Swaroop Verma, *Maoist Movement in Nepal*, (Samkalin Teesari Dunia Publication, New Delhi, 2001), P.21.

¹⁰ . As cited in Karki Arjun and Seddon David (ed), *The Peoples; War in Nepal: Left Perspective*, (Adroit Publishers, Delhi, 2003), P.6

¹¹ . The 'Ranas' used to be the Prime Ministers of the 'Shah' Kings in Nepal prior to 1848. In 1848 the Prime Minister Jung Bahadur Rana took over power from the Shah King through a massacre which was known as *Kot Massacre*. The Ranas ruled Nepal from 1848 to 1950 on the hereditary basis.

ideological lines. One group supporting the Soviet line led by Rayamajhi and the other consisting of leaders like Pushpa Lal, Man Mohan Adhikari and Tulsi Amatya comprised a pro-China faction.

The new constitution that was introduced by the king Mahendra established what was known as the Panchayat regime¹². During the Panchayat regime there was a crisis in the CPN leadership and most of the party cadres were either in jail and or hiding in India. Though all of them were- by and large- affiliated to the CPN, but their activities had hardly co-ordinated, since there was no central command structure. A number of cadres like Man Mohan Adhikari and Shambhu Ram Shrestha wanted to co-ordinate the divisions and to have a central committee. They were released in 1968 from the jail as they agreed to assist and support the king without reservation. In 1971 both Nirmal Lama and Mohan Bikram Singh were also released and a 'central nucleus' was formed to unify party apparatus. The aim was to bring the various strands of the communist movement under one party umbrella¹³. The central nucleus also tried to include the Puspa Lal party into it. But Puspa Lal wanted others to join his party and remained strong on working with the Nepali congress against the Panchayat Regime.

One of the major successes and the landmarks of the CPN after the first decade of the panchayat rule was the *Jhapa uprising*. For the first time in the history of Nepal a group

¹² . Panchayat Democracy was introduced in 1962 by King Mahendra in Nepal by dismissing the Constitution of 1959. According to the Panchayat democracy all the political parties were banned. This was otherwise known as partyless panchayat democracy. According to the legislation of 1962, Panchayat Democracy would have four tier structure: village panchayat, district panchayat, zonal panchayat and national panchayat. The Panchayat Democracy continued from 1962 to 1990. This period is otherwise known as Panchayat Era/Regime. For details of Panchayat Democracy see Bhuwan Lal Joshi and Leo E. Rose, *Democratic Innovations in Nepal*, (University of California Press, Berkeley and Los Angeles, 1966), pp. 395-442

¹³ . See Deepak Thapa and Bandita Sijapati, *Kingdom under Siege*, (Zed Books, London, 2004), P.25.

influenced by the Indian Naxalites and the ideas of Mao raised an armed struggle against the local establishment and the local land lords. Though it was crushed brutally, this uprising led the path towards establishing the CPN (ML). An underground convention was held and the All Nepal Communist Co-ordination committee Marxist Leninist (ML) was formed in 1975. Over next few years other localized movements also joined the committee and finally communist party of Nepal (Marxist Leninist) was established on 26th December 1978. The ML rejected the simple application of imported dogma and recognized the need to analyze and understand the objective conditions of Nepal. It also emphasized that, a distinctive revolutionary Nepali road to socialism would be based on an understanding of economic and social conditions in Nepal¹⁴. CPN (ML) was involved with a process of incorporating the smaller groups within it and by the time of 1990 people's movement, it had become the largest communist organization in the country having networks in 50 districts¹⁵.

Interestingly, one finds that the communist movement in Nepal had as many as twenty different factions of the communist party. Ironically, some of them had few members, but their ideological and strategic moorings did not show wide divergence. The communists, irrespective of their ideological and strategic moorings do not show wide divergence. The communists maintained National level prominence because of continued support from the peasants' and workers' organizations. The country's poverty and deprivation offered a fertile ground for the communist ideal. The split in CPN went on widening because of personality clashes between leaders and factors like parochialism and regionalism¹⁶.

¹⁴. As mentioned in Arjun Karki and David Seddon, No.9, P.11.

¹⁵. See Deepak Thapa, No.10, P.26.

¹⁶. As mentioned in Lokraj Baral, *Oppositional Politics in Nepal*, (Abhinava Publication, Delhi, 1971), P. 83.

Various factions of the CPN were brought together by CPN (ML) in 1989 to join with the Nepali congress and to bring an end to the Panchayat regime. As early as 1990, seven communist parties made an alliance and came to be known as the United Left front (ULF). However, two factions of the CPN named Mashal and Masal did not join the ULF. They instead launched their own anti-panchayat agitation with other smaller left parties under the banner of United National People's Movement (UNPM). But the UNPM also soon fell apart. A new alliance between the CPN (Fourth Congress) and Masal and the CPN (Unity Centre) was formed. The Unity Center was later joined by a splinter group from Masal headed by Baburam Bhattarai. The political branch of the Unity center which contested in the General election after the 1990 revolution emerged as the third largest party. In 1994 there was a split in the Unity Center and a faction led by Pusgpa Kmal Dahal (Prachand) advocated an armed struggle. In March 1995, the Unity centre (Prachanda faction) renamed itself as the Communist party of Nepal (Maoist) and formally adopted the doctrine of armed struggle. On 4th February 1996, Baburam Bhattarai presented the Nepali Congress led government with a forty point demands. The letter contained an ultimatum that the government should initiate positive steps towards the fulfillment of its demands by 17th of the same month or else they would be forced to resort to an armed struggle against the state.

The Maoists of Nepal struck on 13th of February 1996 before the expiry of their deadline. Since the emergence of the Maoists in Nepal till the year 2005, there had been loss of life and property. The political instability caused by the Maoist could dethrone the centuries old monarchy. The outside observers of Nepal believe that the reason for the emergence of the Maoists in Nepal attribute the political instability in Nepal. The Nepali government itself thought

that it was a law and order problem. This chapter seeks to understand the emergence of the Maoists in Nepal taking into consideration of factors like Social, political and economic.

One of the major demands which the Maoists of Nepal included in their forty point demand was the question of the social disparities in Nepal and the economic inequality. The social structure in Nepal is highly hierarchical. The castes like the Bahuns (Brahmins) and the Chetris (Kshatriyas) dominate the social structure where the tribals like the *Tharus*, *limbus*, *Magars* and the Indian origin *yadavs* living in the terai region of Nepal are considered as the second class citizens of Nepal. For centuries Nepali as a language has been imposed as a national and official language on the above mentioned tribals and non-Nepali speaking populations. But for centuries Nepal has been a state dominated by the Hindu rulers. The Buddhists and the other sections of the religious belief did not have much of a say in the affairs of the state. Hence the centuries old domination by the Hindus caused the oppressed ethnicities and other religions to support the Maoist insurgency.

Secondly, the social hierarchy replicates the economic uneven distribution in Nepal. Since the military and the civil servants are based at the Kathmandu valley development programmes were Kathmandu centered. In addition to this, the western regions of Nepal are among the poorest regions in Nepal. While the *terai* region is suitable for agriculture there is a little scope for agriculture in the western and the mid western regions of Nepal. As mentioned earlier, there is a concentration of wealth and the political power in Kathmandu valley. Hence, it created an economic divide between the rural and the urban areas. The economic divide does not necessarily limit itself to the village, town or geographical regions. Rather it goes to the urban

development pockets. These rich poor socio-economic disparities in Nepal promoted the emergence of the Maoist insurgency in Nepal.

The fourth chapter is an attempt to deal with the ideological dimensions of the Maoists in Nepal. In the process of analyzing the ideological stand of the Maoists in Nepal it deals with the ideas advocated by Lenin on 'Revolution' and Mao on 'People's war'. Maoist Insurgency, as the name suggests, claimed to follow the ideas of Mao to the most in their struggle against the state of Nepal. They also claimed to have followed Lenin's ideas on revolution to a great extent. In the course of the Maoist insurgency the Maoists also developed some of the 'revolutionary' ideas keeping in mind the specificities of Nepal. This is what they call as 'Prachanda Path'- Prachanda ways. Since the Maoists of Nepal claim that the political-economy of Nepal was the theoretical background of their revolution, this chapter also deals with the political economy of Nepal as addressed by the Maoists.

The Maoists of Nepal claimed to have followed the ideas of Lenin in relation to revolution against the state apparatus. According to them to compare the political situation of Russia during the period of 1871-1905 and the political situation of Nepal during 1990s one would find many similarities. Like Russia was ruled by a Czar and there were no democratic institutions Nepal was ruled by a king. Although there were some similarities yet there were some differences in the case of Nepal. For example the parliament elected by the people was in the place. But the Nepali king enjoyed absolute power. One can say that the parliament and other democratic institutions were for the namesake. The Maoists of Nepal had the similar kind of stand against the political parties like Nepali Congress and CPN (UML) the way Lenin criticized

the social democrats of Russia. For the Maoists of Nepal political parties mentioned above believed in political conspiracy with the political elite of Nepal led by the king. So far as the violent struggle was concerned, the Maoists of Nepal were of the opinion that the liberation of the proletariat was not possible in a peaceful means in Nepal. Initially the Maoists of Nepal tried to influence the king and the other political elite in Nepal to accept certain demands from the peasants and workers peacefully. They did not succeed in their efforts. The Maoists tried to join the political mainstream by contesting the elections held in 1994 general election. But they failed to get the recognition as a political party. They were not only not recognized a political party but the government tried to suppress the demands of the Maoists. This prompted an armed insurgency which the Maoists claimed was in tune with the Lenin's idea for the revolution.

The Maoists of Nepal were influenced by the doctrines of Mao besides Lenin. This is confirmed by the fact that, thirteen years of insurgency the Maoists made use of strategy and tactics given by Mao for a revolutionary war. Maoists of Nepal believed that the ideas of Mao are extremely suitable for Nepal. In the Maoist literature of Nepal, it has been constantly and consistently maintained that, Nepal is an agrarian society where the mode of production was overwhelmingly feudal. A majority of the Nepalese population was dependent on agriculture. There existed small scale business and other source of income other than agriculture. Given the situation the Nepali Maoists characterized Nepal as a semi-feudal country. Mao's revolution through a people's war was directed against Japanese colonialism, comprador bureaucratic system, feudal lords and the reactionary classes of China. Similarly, the Maoist of Nepal claimed to fight against the Indian colonialism, reactionary class/ elite led by the monarch, supporters of the comprador bureaucratic class like Nepali Congress and against the revisionists and reformist

communists of Nepal like Communist Party of Nepal (United Marxist-Leninist). Nepali history experienced once colonization by the British during the Rana regime. British withdrawal from India in 1947 ultimately put an end to its colonization over Nepal. Since then Nepal has not been colonized by any country ever. But according to the Maoist leadership, though Nepal was no longer a colonized country they regard Indian Influences over Nepal as colonization. As examples, the Maoists mentioned, 1950 Treaty of Peace and Friendship, various water projects dominated by India, India's big brotherly attitude interfering in internal affairs of Nepal. The Indian manipulation in these aspects is characterized by the Nepali Maoists as India's Colonization over Nepal. In addition there exists a great social, historical and cultural similarity between India and Nepal which according to the Maoists India uses them for its advantage. For example India characterizes Nepali King as the re-incarnation of Vishnu-the god. They regard Nepal as the only Hindu kingdom in the world. They want the Nepalese to believe in this logic and obey the monarch or show deference to him. Thus, according to Maoist, a semi feudal and semi-colonial country like Nepal, with agrarian societies dominated by the rural society, exploited by both colonial power like India and the feudal power is suitable to apply and follow Mao's doctrine of people's war against these.

In addition to the adoption of the doctrines of Mao and Lenin, the Maoists of Nepal also developed a set of ideas to fight against the Monarchy and to bring about socialism in Nepal. The new set of ideas developed by the Maoists in Nepal in the course of their movement was known as the 'Prachanda Path'¹⁷. According to the Maoist literature these ideas were developed keeping in mind the specificities of Nepal. However, this set of ideas- Prachanda Path- is an

¹⁷ . For details on Prachanda Path see Com. Kiran, "Philosophical Concept of Prachanda Path", in *Problems and Prospects of Revolution in Nepal*, (Janadisha Publication, Nepal, 2004), pp. 37-57.

amalgamation of the Chinese model of protracted People's War and Russian model of urban insurrection. The aim of the PP was to use the people's war in order to expand the Maoist base in rural areas and to use this as a platform from which to invoke a mass uprising at the urban areas in order to overthrow the existing government in Nepal at that time.¹⁸ According to the Maoists the Prachanda Path passed through three different phases in the course of the Maoist insurgency in Nepal. The first phase was political and military line of Nepalese revolution that was adopted in the Third expanded meeting of CPN (Maoist), held in 1995. The second phase was the ideological synthesis of the rich experiences of five years (1996-2001) of Great People's war that took place in the historical Second National conference of CPN (Maoist) in 2001. And the third phase was the process of development following the second national conference of 2001. While the Maoist insurgency adopted PP as one of its main ideological basis for the 'revolution' at the same time the Maoists of Nepal also followed the doctrines of Mao to the maximum extent. Mao, in the course of the Cultural Revolution, advocated some strategies and tactics for a revolution. The strategies advocated by Mao are: Strategic defensive Phase, Strategic equilibrium phase and Strategic offensive phase. The Maoist insurgency carried out their military operations in accordance with the above mentioned strategic phases.

Apart from the above mentioned ideological affiliations of the Maoists of Nepal, this chapter also deals with the theory vis-à-vis, political-economy of Nepal that rationalizes the Maoist insurgency in Nepal. These theoretical ideas are developed by the Maoist leader, Baburam Bhattarai. Baburam in his book *"Politico-Economic Rationale of People's War in Nepal"* deals with the aspects like Indian imperialism, expansionist policy of India, and the

¹⁸ . As mentioned in Sudheer Sharma, "The Maoist Movement; An Evolutionary Perspective", in Michael Hutt (ed), *Himalayan People's War*, (Hurst and Company, London, 2004), p. 53.

various reasons that led to the poverty of Nepal since 1950s. By doing so he gives a theoretical basis for a 'revolution' of Maoist kind in Nepal.

The fifth chapter of the dissertation deals with the responses from India and China towards the Maoist Insurgency in Nepal. Ever since the emergence of the Maoist Insurgency in Nepal, there had been questions regarding the role of these above mentioned states in relation to the Maoists in Nepal. Because both India and China have their strategic and security interests in Nepal. Disturbances in any form in Nepal are in a way create concerns for both India and China. Both India and China's paramount concern in Nepal is related to security and stability. For, China, Nepal is just below Tibet, a geographical continuity of China. Moreover, Nepal has a considerably substantial number of Buddhist populations, having historical cultural ties with the Buddhists in Tibet. Nepal's close relation with India worries China. A porous boundary, people to people contact, centuries old cultural, social and historical ties between India and Nepal also makes China concern over Nepal. China's take over on Tibet has made Nepal more vulnerable for India of its security interest. So any disturbances in Nepal would have spillover impacts on both the countries. So far as the Maoists insurgency in Nepal is concerned, the state of Nepal became even more vulnerable to both the countries, India and China. Throughout the Maoist insurgency in Nepal, one would find that, the Maoists perceived china as a source of ideological support, where as India was perceived as band wagoning the imperialist forces. The Maoists borrowed the idea of 'people war' on the basis of Maoist ideology and claimed their tactics had been similar to those used by the Chinese communist party fifty-five years ago. The communist movement in Nepal in general and the Maoist insurgency in particular were influenced by the communist movement in India. Various insurgency movements in India, especially left armed

struggles in different states of India, in a way boosted and had links with the Maoists in Nepal. Unlike China, India has been suffering from similar kind of insurgency movements for years. So, another similar kind of insurgency at neighborhood with linkages with insurgency groups in India is definitely a matter of concern for India. It is important to mention that, Nepal is a buffer state for both India and China. With the emergence of the Maoist in Nepal, the strategic and security interests of both the countries had been affected to a great extent. The presence of super power like US and UK, in the name of fighting against the global terrorism has definitely become matter of great worry for India and China.

So far as the responses from India towards the Maoists in Nepal is concerned, this chapter divides them into three parts. The first part deals with, the response of the Indian government in relation to the Maoists in Nepal and their links with the similar kind of groups in different states in India. As it has been mentioned earlier the communist movement of Nepal was influenced to great extent by the communist movement in India. Similarly the Maoists in Nepal had been influenced by the groups like PWG, MCC and other Maoist groups in India. The formation of the CCOMPOSA, led by Maoists of Nepal developed a suspicion in the minds of the Indian authorities regarding the growing relation between the Maoists of Nepal and the similar kind of groups in India. CCOMPOSA- Co-ordination Committee of Maoist Parties and Organizations of South Asia- was believed to be formed with a combination of nine violence espousing reds of South Asia in West Bengal in July 2001. The aim of the formation of the very committee was to “declare their principled unity and conscious determination to hoist the Red Flag of Marxism-Leninism-Maoism and Communism in all its splendor from the silver summits of the Himalayas

and throughout the region”¹⁹. The Maoists of Nepal with the likeminded groups planned to have a compact revolutionary zone (CRZ) from Hyderabad to Kathmandu taking Chhattisgarh, Madhya Pradesh, Bihar and Jharkhand into their area of influence with the help of other rebel outfits.²⁰ However, the growing relation between the Maoists of Nepal and the similar kind of groups in India was a major cause of concern for the Indian administration.

Second aspect of the India’s response towards the Maoists in Nepal has been a reaction to the presence of the international forces in the land of Nepal in the name of fighting against global terrorism. It is important to note that, since 1996 to the year 2001, the responses from India towards the Maoists of Nepal remained to be very casual. The Maoist problem was viewed as a law and order problem of Nepal. But after the incident of 9/11, there was the presence of the United States in the land of Nepal in the name of fighting against global terrorism. Not only the U.S., but there were other western powers like U.K., Belgium, France, etc who made their presence felt for India. Various aids and military helps by different countries were matter of concern for India. Hence since 2001 onwards, India took the matter of the Maoists in Nepal as a matter of grave concern. The third aspect of the India’s response in this regard-as dealt with in this chapter- is various measures by India government to crackdown on the Maoists link with the similar kind of groups in India, shift in policy with the change in government in India and the India’s response to various allegations from the government of Nepal.

¹⁹. For details see Sudheer Sharma, “Deep Red in the Heart Land”, *Himal*, Vol.15, No.1, January 2002, P.34.

²⁰. For details see Shyam Shrestha, “India’s Possible Role in the Future Peace Process of Nepal”, in Shiva K. Dhungana’s, *The Maoist Insurgency and Nepal- India Relations*, (ed), (Friends for Peace Publication, Kathmandu, 2006), P.176

So far as China's response to the Maoist insurgency of Nepal is concerned, it seems to be a general perception that, China might support the Maoist of Nepal, since they claimed to have followed the ideology of Mao-Tse-Tung, China was the first country to distance itself from the Maoists of Nepal. China never, throughout the insurgency movement, recognized the Maoists of Nepal as the 'Maoist'. Rather the official version of China made it clear that, the Maoist of Nepal never followed the ideology of comrade Mao, and by claiming themselves as Maoist they give a bad name to great comrade Mao-Tse-Tung. Though the Maoist had tried to have support from China, they remained unsuccessful. because, in view of the amicable relations between Beijing and Kathmandu, the recognized status of the Maoists as anti-government rebels prevented it from mastering support and solidarity from China despite an ostensibly shared ideology and declared values²¹. However, china maintained a safe distance from the Maoists of Nepal. In fact the Government of China was very clear and firm against the Maoists of Nepal. The factors that led the China government to make its stand against the Maoists are: first, China was very much aware of the fact that US was involved in the affairs of the Nepali Government to fight against the Maoists. It was also aware of the fact that, both India and US were working together to help Nepal against the Maoists. In addition to that, recognition of India's special relationship with Nepal by US's Assistant Secretary of state was a matter of concern for China. Secondly, China never wanted the Maoists of Nepal to have any success over the government of Nepal. Because the influence of the Maoists, especially in the bordering areas of Tibet, may give rise to the similar kind of groups in Tibet as well. The other factor which made the Chinese authorities not

²¹. For details see Chen Qiaoyan, "Tibet railway planned to extend up to the China-Nepal border", International Herald Leader, Sept. 5, 2006, as mentioned in Zhang Li's conflict Management and Nation Building in Nepal: China's perspective and interest calculus, at, www.cscnepal.org.np/pdf/zhang_Li.pdf, accessed on 15th December 2008.

support the Maoists of Nepal was the fear that the use of sophisticated weapons by the Maoists of Nepal may find their way to Tibet.

Throughout the Maoist insurgency in Nepal the Chinese government was very much clear in its stand against the Maoists. The Chinese government never branded the Maoists of Nepal as ‘terrorists’ like India. When the official version of the Chinese government was against the Maoists, there are reports saying that the Maoists of Nepal got some help in terms of arms and ammunitions from China. There were also reports which stated that the Maoists of Nepal got support from the Pro-Maoist Civil societies of China. This chapter also deals with the various supports the Chinese government extended to Nepali government to fight against the Maoists.

Methodology

This study is largely analytical and historical. But it has the empirical content as well. Apart from the secondary sources much of the information, especially regarding the Maoist Insurgency in Nepal has been gathered by a field trip to Nepal. During the trip to Nepal the researcher interviewed a number of activists involved in the movement. A number of intellectuals who have experienced and witnessed the Maoist insurgency, mostly the Nepalis, were interviewed by the researcher.

The study gathered information through both primary and secondary sources. Primary sources include government documents, CPN (Maoist) manifesto, bulletins, publications, proceedings of the international conferences and seminars, etc. The secondary sources used in

this dissertation are the books, articles and the internet sources. The books and the articles have been collected from different libraries of India and Nepal.



CHAPTER TWO

Insurgency Movements in South Asia: A Theoretical Overview

Internal political conflicts have become a pre-dominant feature in many heterogeneous nation states in the post-cold war era. These internal political conflicts also take the shape of movements and are generally oppose to a prevailing regime or a government. Political violence in whatever the form can start, basically, under the following pre-conditions; First, over the issue of Legitimacy of a government or a regime. Second, where a consensus on the morality of the political community obtains, there may be grounds for violent internal conflict. Thirdly, in spite of a legitimate regime, sometimes, a specific person in power is rejected and this leads to violent internal conflict. Fourthly, violent internal conflict can be started by the non-ruling groups in an effort to change existing policies that, they believe; have prevented them from to acquiring their fair share of the collective political and economic sphere.

Among the internal political violent conflicts, ‘insurgency’ has been dominant, throughout the world in general and third world countries in particular. It is not uncommon to find the scholars using the word ‘insurgency’ interchangeably, with the words like revolution, guerilla warfare, terrorism, protracted struggle, naxalism, civil war, coup d’état, etc. Because there lies good deal of conceptual confusion on the above mentioned issues. Similarly, the term ‘insurgency’ also invites some of the fundamental questions like- what is an insurgency and how and why does it start? One of the most important factors that lead to the emergence of an insurgency is the legitimization crisis. When a particular regime or government’s legitimacy in parts or whole becomes suspect

for a group there is a possibility that may lead to an insurgency. Legitimacy of a regime can be challenged on various grounds.

‘Legitimacy’ literally means ‘to declare lawful’. Therefore, it confers on an order or command, an authoritative or binding character. Thus, legitimacy transforms power in to authority. Political scientists treat legitimacy as a moral or rational principle, the ground on which governments may demand obedience from the citizens. In a political, sociological term, legitimacy is a willingness to comply with a system of rule regardless of how it is achieved. A regime’s legitimacy is rooted in a number of factors, including the sentiments of the population about the performance capacity (i.e. effectiveness) of government institutions¹ and the nature of governmental authority². Four principal sources of legitimacy crisis, according to Lucian Pye, create problem for a government or a regime. They are: first, breakdown of governmental, institutions that occurs because of conflicting or inadequate bases of claiming authority in society. Secondly, ‘excessive’ and ‘uninstitutionalised composition for power’ can create a crisis of legitimacy. Thirdly, faulty ideological justification and faulty predictions of future development bring out legitimacy problems. And fourthly, wrong political orientation or socialization of people lacking in normative political culture can be the basic cause of a legitimacy crisis³. Thus legitimacy crisis of a regime or a government is one of the major factors that give rise to an insurgency.

¹. For details see Lucian W. Pye, *The legitimacy Crisis*, in Leonard Binder et.al. *Crises and Sequences in Political Development*, (Princeton University Press, New Jersey, 1974), pp. 135-58

². Ibid. P. 136

³. Ibid, p. 135-58.

Besides legitimacy crisis, there are other factors responsible for the emergence of an insurgency. The first could be the appearance of a systematic crisis in the political system. The second could be the occurrence of series of precipitants or accelerators. The third could be the emergence of counter elites. And the fourth could be the formulation of an insurrectionist ideology.

Insurgency, whether in a democratic, democratizing or non-democratic policy, is generally caused by systematic crisis confronting a social system. If we take Huntington's argument (though he has argued this in the context of revolution) an insurgency, "is most likely to occur in societies which have experienced some social and economic development and where the process of political modernization and political development have lagged behind the process of social and economic change"⁴. In this situation, insurgency is the product of the break down in the interplay between political institutions and social forces, particularly when new social groups and new elites are blocked from participating in politics and government⁵. In this context, an insurgency is caused by the interrelationship between the class interests and the structures of the state. In addition to this, the state apparatus cracks and a political crisis start when the reforms required to meet the needs are prevented or resisted by the economically dominant classes. Secondly, in some countries occurrence of series of precipitants or accelerators takes the form in different forms. They are political repression that alienates powerful groups in society, factional struggles within ruling elite; the rise of new social classes and the refusal of established elites to share their power; a significant economic crisis or the

⁴ . For details see Samuel Huntington, *Political Order in Changing Societies*, (Yale University Press, New Haven, 1968) P. 265.

⁵ . Ibid, p. 274.

lack of political institutionalization behind economic and social change. Thirdly, the emergence of counter elites is also an important factor to organise and manage the insurgency. This way an effective insurrectionist counter elite is needed to mobilize the disaffected sector of the population against the existing government. However, this precondition is not an automatic process. For this kind of insurgency, the most important precondition is the emergence of the right kind of insurrectionist leader, the adoption of effective strategy and tactics, and a favorable combination of circumstances. Fourthly, formulation of an insurrectionist ideology is also an important factor for the rise of an insurgency. This new counter ideology must appeal to crucial sectors of the disaffected and potentially disaffected population. In addition to this the new ideology must take into confidence particularly those who are willing to lead such a struggle to become an effective counter force to the regime it is challenging.

Conceptualizing Insurgency

Conceptualizing the term ‘insurgency’ is a difficult task. Because the very term, most of the times, is intertwined and often confused with other terms, like subversion, coup d’état, terrorism, guerrilla warfare, revolution, civil war etc. The understanding of the term insurgency was first attempted in US in 1960s. They thought that, an insurgency is a political and social discrimination, exploitation and injustice consequence of a country. Hence giving no specific importance to the word as a separate facet of war making or as a separate strategic thought. However, an English translation of the Latin word ‘insurgere’, occurred in 1765 with the gradual usage of the term, it came to be commonly recognized as having to do with, ‘internal political revolution’ perpetrated by a certain group publicly

acknowledged as being ‘nonbelligerent’⁶. A number of scholars in the subsequent period gave different definition for it. In 1965, Jack C. Plano defined insurgency as a “revolt against an established government not reaching the properties of a full-scale revolution. Under international law an insurgency is a rebellion not recognized as a belligerency or civil war”⁷. Roger Scruton defined insurgency as a term “used in international law that describes an uprising against a constituted government that falls short of revolution, rebellion or civil war”⁸.

However, continuous refinement and redefinition of the term could not separate the term from the terms like guerrilla war, rebellion, civil war, or revolution. Wherever it was tried to be studied independent, ultimately all these terms merged with each other. The first ever study to deal with insurgency as a separate concept was attempted by David Galula. In his book *Counterinsurgency Warfare* he defined insurgency as,

“.... an insurgency is a protracted struggle conducted methodically, step by step, in order to attain specific intermediate objectives, leading finally to overthrow of the existing order (China, 1927-49; Greece, 1945-50; Indochina, 1945-54; Malaya, 1948-60; Algeria, 1954-62). To be sure, it can no more be predicted than a revolution; in fact, its beginnings are so vague that to determine exactly when an insurgency starts is a difficult legal, political and historical problem.... An insurgency is usually slow to develop and is not an

⁶ . For details see Donald W. Hamilton, *The Art of Insurgency*, (Prager, Westport(London), 1998), p. 14

⁷ . See Jack. C. Plano, et.al, *Political Science Dictionary*, as cited in Ibid,

⁸ ..See Roger Scruton, *A Dictionary of Political Thought*, (Harper and Row Publishers, New York), P. 226.

accident, for in an insurgency leaders appear and then the masses are made to move”⁹.

Though Galula tried to deal with insurgency independently, but he ended up with somehow with the concept of ‘revolution’. His very statement, “insurgency cannot more be predicted than a revolution”, makes it clear. Further, on the one hand he defined insurgency as a vague movement, since the emergence cannot be predicted, and on the other he said, insurgency starts slowly. It shows lack of clarity in the definition. However, his definition, towards the end stated as a planned movement against the government. His definition remains unclear as he does not distinguish between insurgency and other terms like revolution, rebellion, civil war, and guerrilla war.

In the year 1967, Julian Pagets in his book “*Counter-Insurgency Operations*” defined insurgency as “a kind of armed rebellion against a government. Here the rebels have the support or acquiescence of a substantial section of the populace; the method they adopt to achieve their aim to overthrow the government may include guerrilla warfare, but insurgents may equally well resort to civil disobedience, sabotage or terrorist tactics”¹⁰. This definition by Paget, also does not clearly mention the nature of warfare the insurgents adopt, though he tells them in an abstract sense. The definition by Bard E O’Neill, states an insurgency as “a struggle between a non-ruling group and the ruling authorities in which the former consciously employs political resources, (organizational

⁹ . See David Galula, *Counter-Insurgency Warfare: Theory and Practice*, as cited in Donald W. Hamilton’s, No-1, P. 15.

¹⁰ . For details see Julian Pagets, *Counter-Insurgency Operations: Techniques of Guerrilla Warfare*, (Walker and Company, New York, 1967), pp. 14-15.

skills, propaganda and/ or demonstrations) and instruments of violence to establish legitimacy for some aspects of the political system it considers illegitimate”¹¹. In this definition the major focus has been given to the concepts like legitimacy, violent means of struggle and engagement of political resources during the movement. Insurgency, according to Paul Wilkinson, “is a relatively value-neutral concept denoting a rebellion or rising against any government in power or the civil authorities”¹². By giving this definition, Wilkinson also stressed on the point that, although the idea of rising against the government may appear to imply a large popular movement, in reality many insurgencies have involved very small numbers of rebels¹³. Donald W. Hamilton, in his book defined insurgency as a, “political-military conflict waged against a specific faction(s), implementing irregular military actions in support of a unified political outcome, short of revolution and civil war”¹⁴. Talking about the methods and forms of warfare used in an insurgency, he said, “while regular military forces may be employed, irregular operations rooted in political subversion, selective terrorism, and guerrilla operations play an integral, if not primary role in the outcome. Political subversion, selective terrorism and guerrilla operations are then tactics that, when combined, may or may not represent an insurgency”¹⁵. Further, on the objectives of an insurgent movement he said, “The objective of insurgency is to force political social upheaval, in an organized

¹¹ . For details see Bard E. O’Neill. *Insurgency: A Framework for Analysis* in Bard E. O’Neill, William R. Heaton and Donald J. Alberts (ed), *Insurgency in the Modern World*,(West view Press, Colorado, 1980), p.

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¹² . See Paul Wilkinson, *Terrorism versus Democracy*, (Frank Cass Publishers, London, 2001), p. 2.

¹³ . Ibid.

¹⁴ . See Donald W. Hamilton, No-6, p. 21

¹⁵ . Ibid.

fashion, for the express purpose of validating a cause, and therefore justifying its violent means”¹⁶.

Hamilton’s definition clearly distinguishes between the insurgency, civil war and revolution. The methods used by the insurgents are also clearly mentioned. But when it comes to the objectives of the insurgent movements, he sounds to be very abstract. Because the objectives of insurgent movements are not only to create political-social upheavals, but for a complete change in the system/regime/government or a separate statehood. The methods used by the insurgents do not remain static (only political subversion, selective terrorism, guerrilla warfare) but keep changing depending upon the environment, political system of a country and on the strength and stage of an insurgent movement.

Like Hamilton’s all the definitions discussed above have tried to address insurgency as an independent concept. But most of the definitions addressed the concept keeping in mind how a counter- insurgency operation to be carried out against it. It is interesting to note that most of the definitions given by the Americans had pragmatic interest¹⁷. In the cold war period most of the insurgent movements operated against the foreign power’s control over a particular country. But in the post-cold war period, insurgent movements were largely intra-country affairs. Violent movements against a particular government/regime or for a demand of a separate statehood, equal status for an ethnic/religious section of the society, have been predominant objectives of the

¹⁶ . Ibid.

¹⁷ . Studying ‘insurgency’ was first initiated by the Military Department of the United States of America. Thus all the above mentioned thinkers addressed and defined the insurgency keeping in mind how the US forces would fight against them.

insurgent movements. The methods and forms of warfare have changed according to the demands and physical, political and social environments of a country. So taking into consideration all these matters, the term 'insurgency' needs to be defined as a separate and independent concept.

There are certain common elements, among the definitions, discussed above. One of the most striking commonality among these definitions is the use of violent means in an insurgent movement. Second commonality is the use of guerrilla warfare and the third being, challenging the authority of a government or regime. Thus, taking these commonalities into consideration and keeping in mind the nature of insurgencies in post-cold war period, insurgency can be defined as a consciously planned violent movement by an anti-establishment group against a government or regime, which it considers as illegitimate, or the movement starts up with a demand for a total change in the system, emancipation of a particular ethnic/religious section or else for a separate statehood. The objective of the very movement is clear from the very beginning. The methods and forms of warfare keep on changing according to the feasibility of the movement. Insurgencies, these days no longer remain to be low scale wars. Because with the process of development of technology and information, availability and accessibility to modern, sophisticated weapons have become easier than before. Large scale poverty and sense of ethnicity feeling have provided the insurgent leadership to draw popular support in both active and passive ways. So the insurgent groups are popular and have their means to wage a war against the state, where/whenever needed. An insurgent movement can be secessionist, nationalist, ethno-nationalist, reformist or conservative in nature. Most of

the insurgent movements are mobilized through an ideology. Thus to substitute the term with the terms like revolution, rebellion, civil war, would be inappropriate.

Distinguishing Insurgency

Since the insurgency as a term been substituted with other terms it is necessary to differentiate them between insurgency. When terms like **Coup'De' tat**, putsch or plot are occasionally used interchangeably with insurgency, terms like guerrilla warfare, civil war, revolution and terrorism are frequently used. To start with, the basic difference between a coup d'état, putsch or plot and insurgency is that the masses participate in the case of an insurgency. Whereas, the preparation and time taken in a coup or putsch remains a secret among a few. For example, coup, like a palace revolution the plotters strike at the last lightning act to seize power at the highest level by depriving, overpowering or eliminating those in authority¹⁸. Basically coups take place in an authoritarian regime or by one elite group against other in power. Since insurgency is larger in size, involves masses with it and follows certain ideology and forms of warfare, would no way can be substituted with coup d'état.

'Revolution' has been used interchangeably with insurgency more than any other term. The politics of substituting 'revolution' with insurgency is that, people who are insurgents or sympathizers of an insurgent movement have a negative notion towards the term 'insurgency'. The activities of an insurgency would prefer to be called as a revolutionary rather than an insurgent. In this regard, Khimlal Devkote (a Maoist leader of Nepal and member of Interim Legislature/parliament Nepal) said that, the Maoists of

¹⁸ . For details see LT. Col. V.K. Anad, *Insurgency and Counter Insurgency: A Study of Modern Guerrilla Warfare*, (Deep and Deep Publications, New Delhi, 1981), pp. 19-21.

Nepal should not be called as insurgents but as revolutionaries, since they fought for a cause and brought drastic change in Nepal”¹⁹. However, Devkote’s views do not carry sufficient justification for the same. There are some fundamental differences between insurgency and revolution.

Paradoxically, revolution as an English word entered into dictionary in about 1600, meaning ‘restoration of the old order’. But the modern revolution in its crude form means a sudden fundamental change in any field; social-economic-political. Accordingly, in a political sphere, a sudden change in the government/regime or authority can be called as a revolution. So a political revolution can cause the “sudden overthrow of the established authority aimed at fundamental changes in social order”²⁰. Though not entirely unexpected, the outburst in a revolution starts without any clear direction and involves unorganized participation of masses. One cannot undermine the deeper causes of all revolutions. The point here is a revolution does not start planned. But the conditions that cause a revolution can be felt. It is equally difficult to foresee and predetermine its timing of eruption and changes of success. Because the revolutionary environment may continue indefinitely without any stirrings at all. Violence, which plays a pre-dominant role in an insurgency, cannot be an inescapable element of revolution. For example, the ‘Glorious revolution’ in England was carried out without a single drop of bloodshed.

Coming to the concept in the latter half of twentieth and twenty first century, ‘Leftist Revolution’ has been predominant. The ‘Marxist-Leninist-Maoist

¹⁹ . Interview by the researcher with Khimlal Devkote, on 17th February 2008.

²⁰ . See W.F. Wertheim, *Evolution and Revolution*, Penguin, London, 1874, P. 127.

revolutionaries' have set up parameters to be evaluated as a revolution. For the Marxist all the nationalist revolutions against the foreign powers should not be called as complete revolution, since they were fought by the bourgeois and the reactionaries. These days, according to the Marxist-Leninist-Maoist 'A New Democratic Revolution' to be fought in order to fight against, imperialism, capitalism and feudalism in one go. The proponents of this kind of revolutions like, Lenin, Mao, Giap, Che-Guevera and Derhy consider revolution on the above mentioned lines. the Marxist-Leninist-Maoist of South Asian region in particular and others in general would include any insurgent movement against a non-communist authority as a revolutionary war²¹. To put the conceptualization framework of a revolution, one can say, revolution is a sudden phenomena aiming not necessarily a total change in the government/regime, though the factors/causes leading to a revolution may be long pending. Taking the earlier given definition of an insurgency, to substitute the terms, revolution and insurgency would be in appropriate.

Another term, which has been frequently used as a substitute to the term insurgency, is 'terrorism'. To define the term 'terrorism' is a difficult and controversial task. If somebody goes by the literal meaning of the term, use of terror by a group may be called as terrorism. Accordingly, use of terror method is never confined to a non-ruling group. Historically, states/regime/governments have conducted terror on a far more massive and lethal scale than the groups. They have employed terror as a weapon of tyranny and repression and as an instrument of war²². The politics, as Wilkinson rightly mentioned, is a state's use of terror is not referred to as terror, while sub-state terror is

²¹ . AS mentioned by George K. Tanham, *Communist Revolutionary warfare*, as cited in LT. Col. V.K. Anand, No-17, p.26.

²² . See Paul Wilkinson, No-12, p. 19.

referred to as terrorism²³. In the similar way, most of the time insurgency is substituted with terrorism because of a tendency by some practitioners in the discipline to politicize the term. They carry out the politics by condemning insurgents by labeling their actions as ‘terrorism’ and the actors as terrorist in order to delegitimize their political struggle and any genuine grievances they may express. But in spite of the wide use of both the terms interchangeably, still both the terms remain to be different.

To give an exact definition of terrorism is a difficult task that has eluded definition till date. But we can make some substantial difference between insurgency and terrorism by analyzing the operative methods and forms of both. To start with the military strategies of both, one would find while the strategies involved in an insurgency are more or less open; in the case of terrorism they remain to be secretive. An insurgency, as mentioned earlier, aims at more or less conventional order of battle. Most of the time the insurgents confront the state armed forces. The organization of an insurgency is large, supported by masses of the people. And an insurgency gets involved in both rural and urban method of warfare. The goal and objective of an insurgency remains to be either change in government or a separate statehood. But in the case of terrorism, the terrorist groups are highly secretive about their infrastructure. Mainly, the infrastructure/organization of a terrorist group is broken into small, compartmentalized cells. At the same time, these small cells carry out their activities as anonymously as possible. The terrorist do not go to engage in a direct combat against the state armed forces. According to Walter Laqueur, this is due to the fact that terrorists invariably are badly defeated in clashes with regular forces. So it is ‘less risky’ for them to “direct their

²³ . Ibid.

operation against the civilian population....”²⁴. Focusing on the aims and objectives of a terrorist military strategy, Walter Laquer says, unlike insurgency, terrorism is a “strategy of provocation, rather than aiming to defeat government forces in battle or seizing political power. It is therefore, intended to cause political, social and economic disruption in the threatened society not its takeover”²⁵.

Whatever may be the military strategy of a terrorist group, the term terrorism has become a much talked political term especially in international arena. Particularly after the 9/11 incident, number of definitions have come out to understand terrorism. One such definition is given by Paul R. Pillar. According to him, “terrorism is a pre-meditated, politically motivated violence perpetrated against non-combatants by sub-national groups or clandestine agents usually intended to influence an audience”²⁶. Responding to this definition, S.D. Muni was right to mention that, all the key components of this definition (pre-meditated, politically-motivated, non-combatants, sub-national groups or clandestine agents) are prone to subjective interpretation²⁷. As it has already been mentioned, as the above definition suggests, having biases against the non-state actors only responsible for terrorism will be too hard to endorse. The US endorsed interpretation of terrorism, need not to be applied to all sorts of violent movements. Because, US’s policy of fighting against the ‘global terrorism’ was more or less directed against ‘Islamic Terrorism’. Moreover, to understand, terrorism as a violent action against the innocent civilians also does not give a logical argument. Because if at all this interpretation has to be taken, the

²⁴ . For details see Walter Laquer, *The Age of Terrorism*, Brown and Company, Boston, 1987, p.76.

²⁵ . Ibid, pp-72-74.

²⁶ . As mentioned by Paul R. Pillar, *Terrorism and US Foreign Policy*, as cited in S. D. Muni (ed), *Responding to Terrorism in South Asia*, Manohar Publications, New Delhi, 2006, p. 13.

²⁷ . For details see S. D. Muni, Ibid, P. 13.

post 9/11 US also employed organized and planned terrorism in the name of global strategic restructuring. At the same time, it is also hard to distinguish between global/universal terrorism and local/domestic terrorism. As the definitions of both kind of terrorism go, the one which involves the citizens of more than one country is called as universal/global terrorism. Whereas a local/domestic terrorism is confined within the border of one country, sometimes within a particular locality in the country²⁸. In reality, however, it is hard to find a significant terrorist group which remains purely domestic. Because, any significant terrorist group actively seeks help in terms of political support, weapon, financial assistance or/and sanctuary beyond its border.

Coming to the South Asian countries like, India, Nepal, Srilanka, Pakistan, Bangladesh and Bhutan, one would find, (as declared by the respective governments and called by most of the scholars) many terrorist groups. Groups like Communist Party of Nepal (Maoist) in Nepal, Liberation of Tamil Tigers Elam (LTTE) in Sri Lanka, ULFA, NSCN, Communist Party of India (Maoist) in India, Jehadist in Pakistan, are often branded as terrorist groups, not only by the government authorities, but also by the scholars. Prof S.D. Muni divides the South Asian groups into two types. Under the first type, there is Jehadi Terrorism as a source of terrorism. Secondly, there are other types of terrorism like the Naxalites and Insurgencies in India's north-east, the Maoist in Nepal, the LTTE in Sri Lanka, etc.²⁹. There lies a great deal of confusion among the scholars to distinguish between insurgency and terrorism.

²⁸ . See Paul Wilkinson, No-12, p. 19.

²⁹ . See S.D. Muni, No-25, p.14.

It is not surprising that the insurgents also apply terror caused by both the insurgent groups and the terrorist groups may turn to be same. But still there are differences between the two. The insurgent groups, through their guerrilla warfare may sound secretive like the terrorist, but in actual they are not. Because through guerrilla warfare, an insurgent group develops itself to fight a conventional war. Unlike a terrorist group all the branches of its organization act synonymous according to the order of the central order. Whereas the small and compartmentalized cells of a terrorist group fight anonymously. Seizing of power or complete change in a political system is not necessarily an objective of a terrorist group, whereas it remains the main objective of an insurgency.

Like terms like terrorism, revolution, 'civil war' is also used as a substitute to insurgency. A civil war splits resources and even territory divided for a further contest of power through conventional process over the entire country³⁰. However, all the insurgent groups may develop their strength to a capacity which may cause a civil war in a country. The insurgents can become parallel power force only when there is a weak army, weak government or the insurgent group having extra-ordinary ammunition and people's support. The Maoist insurgency in Nepal could grow to a level where it was parallel to the Royal Nepalese Army because, they had similar sophisticated weapon and the mass support with them. Civil war also can develop between the traditionalists and radicals, revolutionaries and counter-revolutionaries legal authorities and groups, community and region. So a civil war cannot be substituted as an insurgency, because an insurgency can

³⁰ . As mentioned by David Galula, *Counter-insurgency Warfare*, as cited in LT. Col. V. K. Anand, No-17, p. 23.

only reach a civil war situation when it has power almost equal to that of a government/regime.

Types of Insurgency

As there are different causes for the emergence of an insurgency, there are also different motives and goals of each insurgent movement. The nature of every insurgent movement may not be the same. Thus, depending upon the ultimate goals of the insurgents and relating to the political aspects of them, there could be six types of insurgent movements³¹. First, the Secessionist insurgents. Insurgents under this category reject the existing political community and prefer to withdraw from it. And they want to constitute a new autonomous political community. Secondly, the Revolutionary. They seek for a radical change in a social structure within a existing political community. The third types of insurgents are the Restorational in nature. These insurgents seek to displace the regime, the values and structures they champion are identified with a recent political order. In this case the values are ascriptive and elitist while the structures are oligarchic ones that have little or no provisions for mass participation in politics. Fourth type of insurgents is reactionary insurgents. Although, the insurgents under this type seek to change the regime by reconstituting a past political order, their repristination relates to an idealized, golden age of the distant past in which religious values and authoritarian structures were predominant. Fifthly, there are conservative insurgents who seek to maintain the existing regime in the face of pressures on the authorities to change it. Finally, there are reformist insurgents. These insurgents attempt to obtain more political, social and economic benefits without necessarily rejecting the political community,

³¹ . For details of the *Types of insurgent movements* see Bard E O'Neill, No-11, pp. 8-9.

regime or authorities. They are primarily concerned with policies that are considered discriminatory.

In addition to the above mentioned six types of insurgencies, ethno-nationalist insurgent groups remain to be dominant in present scenario. Despite the Marxist pre-occupation with socio-economic class as the prime referent for the analysis of social conflict, it is ethnic identity which has provided a far more durable and powerful influence on human behavior. And moreover, despite all the powerful forces of globalization and talk of a new global 'mass culture', the reality is that the ethnic distinctiveness remains as an important factor for insurgency kind of conflict³². The factors like discrimination against the ethnic groups, arbitrary fixing of boundaries without taking into the consideration of the homogeneity of the ethnic or tribal groups, rise of charismatic ethnic leaders have encouraged insurgencies throughout the world. These Ethno-Nationalist ethnic insurgent mostly fight either against a state or regime in order to reestablish their ethnic identity or sometimes behave like the secessionists to withdraw from a state and establish their own state. Insurgent groups like Nationalist Socialist Council of Nagalim (NSCN) in India, Magar Liberation Front in Nepal, United Liberation Front of Asam (ULFA) in India, Liberation Front of Tamil Tigers Ealem (LTTE) are some of the examples of this kind.

Insurgency and Forms of Warfare

Violence, irrespective of the types of the insurgency, remains to be the constant and main component of an insurgency. Armed struggle, waged through an insurgency, against the

³² . See Paul Wilkinson, No-12, pp. 8-9.

regime or the state are of different types. When we talk about the types of warfare the insurgents employ to reach their goal, two types of warfare come to the picture. They are (1) Guerrilla warfare and (2) Terrorist warfare.

Guerrilla Warfare:

Guerrilla warfare by the insurgent groups can be analyzed as an irregular combatant force employing tactics such as surprise violent action and elusiveness. And these tactics may be supported entirely from resources within the operational areas or in varying degree by external sources. Most guerilla warfare is rural in the sense that it is carried out by a rural-based rebel movement intent on causing the collapse of central government.

However, guerrilla warfare is not a self-sufficient method of warfare for achieving victory. At the same time most of the insurgent movement have moved through a guerrilla warfare phase and have finally developed into a conventional warfare phase. In guerrilla warfare the insurgents target the government's armed forces, police, or their support units and in some cases, key economic targets. In most cases, the insurgents in this warfare do not target the unarmed civilians. While most of the guerrilla warfare is rural, yet sometimes the guerrillas do attack the urban area as one of their tactics, in a deliberate effort to prove the authorities into a counter insurgent overreaction, thereby inducing an effect on domestic and international opinion favorable to the guerrillas³³. Though the guerrilla warfare proved to be effective in many cases, still it has been used as an auxiliary method for the large scale insurgents.

³³ . Ibid. p. 11.

Terrorist Warfare: Unlike the terminology for guerrilla warfare, the definition of the term terrorism is highly controversial. This is not due to any conceptual issues or problems associated with the term as such. But because of a tendency by some to politicize the term, condemning insurgents by labeling their actions as ‘terrorism’ and the actors as ‘terrorist’ in order to delegitimize their political struggle and any genuine grievances they may express. However, terrorism as a form of insurgent warfare is directed against unarmed civilians rather than enemy military units or economic assets. Through this kind of warfare the insurgents are involved in the use of systematic, arbitrary, and amoral violence. Terrorism as a form of warfare of the insurgents, is a ‘strategy of provocation’ rather than aiming to defeat government forces or seizing political power³⁴. It is therefore intended to cause ‘political, social and economic disruption’ in the threatened society, not its takeover.

In addition to the definitional distinction between guerrilla warfare and terrorism warfare, the two forms of warfare are also distinguished by their military strategy. Guerrilla follows a more or less conventional order of battle, rules of engagement, tactics, operations, logistics, training and military objectives, namely, the eventual defeat of government forces on the rural and urban battlefield. In fact, as rightly mentioned by Bard E.O.’Neill, it is the ultimate goal of guerrilla armies eventually to “make a transition into conventional warfare... to achieve success”³⁵. Thus there is little mystery concerning the identity or development of guerrilla forces, although guerrilla troops attempt to blend in with local villagers between battles. On the other hand, terrorism as a form of violence

³⁴ . For details see Walter Laquer, *The Age of Terrorism*, No-23.

³⁵ . For details see Bard E. O’Neill, *Insurgency and Terrorism: Inside Modern Revolutionary Warfare*, (Brassey’s Publications, Washington, DC, 1990), P. 26.

is secretive about its organizational structure. It is broken into small compartmentalized cells. Furthermore, while terrorist group might attack members of police forces, it is generally willing to engage units of armed in direct combat, terrorism can be viewed as a weapon of the weak. Compared to the terrorist cells, the guerrilla units are larger.

In spite of these basic differences, there are certain similarities between both types of warfare. In the first place, the guerrilla armies occasionally engage in acts of terrorism. In addition to this both types of warfare hope that, their violent actions will lead to an intensification of repressive political and legal counter measures by the government, in order to alienate the population from the regime, thus resulting in greater support for the insurgents. Moreover, while both types of insurgencies operate outside the democratic political system's legal and constitutional boundaries, they generally use as surrogates, legal political fronts to agitate for their cause. This political agitation is intended to generate legitimacy and popular support for their movement, generally by espousing certain grievances and goals.

Apart from guerrilla and terrorism as major forms of warfare, conventional warfare and sabotage are also used by the insurgents as their forms of warfare. Whether an insurgent group would move into the conventional war depends on the nature of the insurgency i.e. auxiliary or independent. In the case of an auxiliary insurgent movement, the insurgents do not have to defeat the army. Rather a regular army will be charged with that mission. But an independent insurgent group has its strategic aims and must rely largely on its own capabilities in order to success. Hence, it has pre-conceived that insurgencies are low intensity conflict and mostly avoid following the conventional

warfare. But some insurgent groups have the man power and sophisticated weapons to enable them to resort to full-scale conventional warfare.

Sabotage, on the other hand, as a form of warfare, used in both low intensity conflict and full scale conventional war. Unlike the other forms of warfare discussed above, it does not aim at loss of life or target any particular individual. Rather, it aims at deliberate destruction, disruption or damage of equipment, power supplies, communications and other facilities, sabotage being an extremely low-cost, potentially high-yield means of inflicting damage on an enemy, has been frequently used as a form of warfare by the modern insurgents.

Strategies of Insurgencies

Strategies in an insurgency are skillfully planned to carry out the movement against the enemy state. To have a clear cut 'strategy' in warfare is not a recent phenomenon. Rather, scholars like Sun Tzu mentioned about strategies in way back in 300 B.C. However, revolutionary leaders, during 20th century have given importance on 'strategy' to wage violent movement against the enemy state, which is supposed to be more powerful than the insurgents. After the successful of the movements guided by left ideologies in Russia, China and some parts of Latin America by the leaders like Lenin, Mao and Che, most of the given by them. Besides, the strategies given by the above mentioned leaders, there are some insurgent movements who follow their own strategies. Taking into consideration of the usage of the strategies followed by the insurgent movements, they can be divided on the following heads. They are:

The Leninist Strategy: Since Lenin advocated an urban insurrection, the insurgents believe in Leninist strategy, concentrate their activities in urban centers which have political and economic power. These insurgents believe that a disciplined, organized small conspiratorial group must have obtained support from major discontent the groups like military and working class. The Leninist insurgents assume that, since the government is alienated from its population, hence it will capitulate when confronted by low-levels terrorism, subversions, government offices and other state institutions³⁶. Leninist insurgents give importance to conspiratorial organization combined with active support from selected social groups. However, the regimes and authorities, having substantial legitimacy and effective control over army and police, the Leninist strategy does not appear promising.

The Maoist Strategy: Mao, during the great Cultural Revolution in China, talked about the insurgents strategies in a most elaborative way than any other reader. To look into the strategic ideas by Mao one would find them as highly sequential. Three main elements, the Maoist insurgents give importance are: popular support, organization and the environment. In addition to that, as Mao advocated, these insurgents follow three stages of warfare: terrorism, guerrilla warfare, and mobile-conventional warfare.

To start with, the Maoist insurgents go for creating cellular network around which the guerrilla builds political propaganda groups. These groups try to win popular support and trains teams of terrorist to engage in selective intimidation of recalcitrant individuals³⁷. Once these cellular networks are organized, the insurgent, go for the

³⁶ . See Bard E. O'Neill, 'Insurgency: A Framework for Analysis', No-11, p.27.

³⁷ . Ibid. p. 28.

recruitment of local leaders. Local leaders, once in the organization, will go forth and attempt to detach people from the government. At the initial phase of warfare the Maoist insurgents prefer to wage the terror methods, where the insurgent organization and the terrain are not suitable or sufficient for guerrilla warfare. However, guerrilla warfare is the second stage in the Maoist scheme. Earlier to this stage, the insurgents fight by armed government control is weak. One of the major tasks through the guerrilla warfare is to secure base area. Deceiving the government, large-scale guerrilla warfare attacks are the main tactical moves by the insurgents during this stage to purpose for the mobile-conventional war. The final stage, the Maoist insurgents follow, is civil war. The objective at this point is displacement of regime and authority. Civil war is a situation where virtually there are two arm forces fighting against each other, the insurgent forces and the state army. However, for the Maoist insurgents, external support has an ambiguous place in their strategic framework. As Mao prescribed there strategic phases for, what he called, protracted war, each Maoist insurgent group more or less follow them. They are: a period of strategic defense and retreat. Secondly, a long period of stalemate, during which the insurgents would build up their forces. And thirdly, a strategic counter offensive phase, where the people's army would attack the enemies and would achieve victory. Mao's ideas on the strategies have been widely accepted and practiced by many insurgent groups, particularly in countries like India, Nepal, Burma and Bangladesh.

The Cuban Strategy: When Mao's ideas on strategy are widely accepted, an alternative and different strategic idea was given by Che Guevara. Che Guevara, a much publicized figure in the insurgent folklore, prescribed a different strategy for the insurgents. This is

otherwise known as the Cuban model. Che, in his book *Guerrilla Warfare*, commented on three fundamental lessons for conducting insurgency. They are: (1) popular forces can win a war against the army. (2) It is not necessary to wait until all the conditions for making revolution exist; the insurrection can create them. (3) In underdeveloped America the countryside is the basic area for armed fighting³⁸.

From the above ideas, ideas number first and third sound more or less similar to Mao. The way emphasized on the Mass, Guevara spoke of popularity. Mao's idea of surrounding on the cities from the rural areas concides with that of Che's idea of starting the revolution from the country side of America. In spite of some similarities with Mao's idea, the Cuban model by Che differed fundamentally in certain aspects. Contradicting Mao's idea to wait for the precondition, Che believed, thirty to fifty men, were adequate to start an army rebellion in Latin American countries, given "their conditions of favorable terrain of operations, hanger of land, repeated attacks upon justice, etc"³⁹. One of the major characteristics of Cuban model was that, it gave primary emphasis on guerrilla over the party. To, Guevara, the guerrilla forces was a political embryo from which the party could arise. To put it in another way, in the Cuban model military priorities takes precedence over politics. Accordingly, the insurgents, who follow the Cuban strategy believe in the guerrilla warfare and give importance on the military activism to politics.

Urban Strategy: As the name suggests, urban insurgents situate their conflict area, at the initial phase, in the cities. Because they assume that the increased size and socio-

³⁸ . For details see Che Guevara, *Guerrilla Warfare*, (Vintage Books, New York, 1961), p. 1.

³⁹ . Ibid, p. 112.

economic differentiation of urban centres make them especially vulnerable to terrorism and sabotage. Similar to the Maoist and Cuban strategy, urban strategy also believes in popular support and erosion of the enemy's will to resist. So far as the strategy of the urban insurgent is concerned, they like to "turn political crisis into armed conflict by performing violent actions that will force those in power to transform the political situation of the country into a military situation. And that will alienate the masses who, from them on will revolt against the army and the police and thus blame them for this state of things"⁴⁰. Organizationally, these insurgents rely on small cells with a link man and give stress on organization, propaganda and terrorism as their techniques.

The success and the effect of the urban strategy do not seem clear. Because Marghella, the foremost proponent of this theory, himself acknowledged the function of the urban insurgent strategy is to tie down the government forces in the cities. And this would permit the emergence and survival of the guerrilla warfare, "which is destined to play the decisive role in the revolutionary war"⁴¹. This statement of Marghella takes urban insurgents to get the popular support takes them back to the rural areas.

From the above mentioned strategies, it has become clear that, popular support and the guerrilla warfare and the use of terror are common to each category. On the question of an organization, when the Leninist, Maoist and Urban give stress on, the Cubans give stress on the military actions, party has been made a sub-servant to the guerrillas. Irrespective of the difference, one point, every strategy agrees on the use of force against

⁴⁰ . As mentioned by Carlos Marghella, "On Principles and Strategic Questions" as cited in Bard E. O'Neill's, 'Insurgency: A Frame work of Analysis', No-11, p. 33.

⁴¹ .As mentioned by Carlos Marghella, "Mini-Manual of the Urban Guerrillas", as cited in Bard E. O'Neill's, 'Insurgency: A Frame work of Analysis', No-11, p. 34.

the enemy state to displace it. Insurgencies, irrespective of whatever strategy and method of warfare they follow, always aim at victory of the movement. They use these strategies and methods in order to maximize the effectiveness of their political techniques and violence. At the same time along with the strategies and methods of warfare, there are certain other variables which have major impacts on the outcome of the insurgencies. Taking into considerations of the studies on different insurgent movements, Bard E. O'Neill has divided these variables into six categories. They are:

First, the *popular support* plays an important role in every insurgent movement. Starting from the leaders like Mao to the leaders of Maoists in Nepal, Prachanda has given stress on the popular support/mass. Giving stress on the mass Mao said, "The richest source of power to wage war lies in the masses of the people"⁴². Popular support can be active or passive in nature. The active supporters do participate actively in waging a war against the state where as the passive supporters only follow the insurgency cause and add the strength of the insurgents as they oppose the regime or the government the insurgents fighting against. There are different means applied by different insurgent groups to draw the support of the people. Leaders like Mao and Lenin had charisma along with the ideological superiority over any other contemporary leaders. At the same time Lenin's ideas on imperialism also got support from the third world countries. Some insurgent groups use terror methods to force the people to support them. On the other hand, insurgents also get support through the counter-terrorism measures of the government. By showing their potency through demonstrations, the insurgents also get

⁴² . For details see *Selected Military Writings of Mao-Tse-Tung*, (Foreign language Press, Peking, 1963), p. 260.

popular support. However popular support not only makes an insurgency successful but also it proves the government or regime in power as illegitimate.

Second major factor that enables the insurgents fight against a superior army is their organization. As it has been discussed earlier, Lenin had given too much stress on disciplined and a cohesive organization to wage a war against the enemy state. Mao also gave stress on an organization for his protracted war. For Mao, the organization is superior to the guerrillas in 'people's war'. Prachanda, the Maoist leader from Nepal, while taking on the importance of an organization, where, there is no democracy, or structure is based on 'hierarchy' can lead towards destruction. Hence in an insurgency, an organization, properly disciplined, extremely cohesive and democratized would lead the movement to victory.

Thirdly, *cohesion*, among the insurgents' decides the outcome of the insurgency. Most of the insurgent movements have leaders with ranks. At the same time they have also organizations starting from local level to the central level. Hence, unity among the ranks and different organizations are needed for a smooth functioning of the insurgency. Integrated strategy and discipline also needed for the positive outcome of the insurgency. Though, lack of unity always does not lead to the failure but it may seriously cause the ideological division among the insurgents. For example, separation of col. karuna from LTTE cost heavily to the LTTE leadership in Srilanka. Factors like, recruiting the insurgents of same ideological affection, democratic format of the organization, integrated strategy, would help maintain cohesiveness in an insurgent organization.

The fourth major variable that helps an insurgency is the external support. There are instances of USSR and China's several insurgent groups. When we talk about the external support to an insurgent group we talk about moral, political, material or sanctuary. When an insurgent movement gets external moral support, hardly the donor country is involved into it. In this case support remains to be public acknowledgement or/and at best recognition of the donor government that the movement is just and admirable. The political support helps the insurgent movement in a great deal. It not only gives open recognition to a movement but also may encourage other countries to render support to that insurgency in some or all aspects. Material external support is one of the best kinds of support an insurgent group gets. Material assistance in terms of weapons, ammunitions, financial, training etc. helps the insurgent to grow the movement larger in size and intensity. Most of the time insurgent groups get this kind of support not only from the external government, but also from the similar kind of insurgent group of neighboring countries. for example, insurgent groups of India like ULFA, BODO, NSCN, get support from similar minded groups of Pakistan, Bangladesh, Burma, etc. similarly, when an external country provides sanctuary to an insurgent group that becomes, can easily organize, plan and execute their operation and better. For example, insurgent groups like ULFA and NSCN are given sanctuaries in countries like Bangladesh and Burma. The Maoist of Nepal was allegedly given sanctuary in India. Thus, external support to an insurgent group gives positive outcome for the movement.

Fifthly, environment is a major variable to access an insurgency, environment, here, means, the terrain, climate, the road and communication network, ethnicity, religion, culture, size of the country and quantity and distribution of the country. This also takes

the political system of that country into consideration. Countries with stable political system, and where the government or the regime has effective control over the army and state machineries, may not be suitable for the insurgencies. Similarly, countries, well connected by road, good transportation system, and good communication are of less suitable for the insurgencies. Physical environment, like rugged terrain, vast mountain, jungles, swamps, forests is usually favorable for the insurgents. Because not only this kind of environment suits the guerrillas but also obstructs the government troops to carry out their operations. Rugged Mountain ranges in western Nepal, forest areas in the north-east of India have provided suitable environment for the insurgents in Nepal and India respectively. Countries, where majority of the population live in the rural areas are suitable for the insurgents. But the countries where, the population is small and concentrated, it is easier for the government to control the people and sever their links with the insurgents. Similarly, the ethnic groups, hence a positive factor for them.

Sixth variable to assess an insurgency is the role of the government. Most of the time success of the insurgency is not determined by how the insurgents operate, but how the government responds it. The insurgents apply various methods like terrorism, guerrilla warfare, and organizational activities to put the government in trouble. At the same time the insurgents also draw people's support from the counter insurgency measures of the government. So how effectively the government deals with different techniques by the insurgent also matters for the success of the insurgent movement. for example, during the 'Sija' campaign by the Maoists in 1995, the government of Nepal launched 'Operation Romeo' to suppress it. But it was counterproductive for the government of Nepal. The Maoist of Nepal was benefitted from this operation as the

common people supported the Maoists' cause against the repressive state action. Besides, these effective developmental policies of the government would make people have trust in the government countries like Nepal and India, where one of the major demands of the insurgent groups is the issue of land distribution. The alleged claim of the land acquisition in few hands, and uneven distribution of land holding claims more people's support for them. In these cases effective land reform policies and other developmental policies relating to agriculture would definitely be negative signal for the insurgents.

Insurgency Movements in South Asia

South Asia as a region has been prone to violent political conflicts, in the post colonialization era. These violent political conflicts in various forms have existed in almost every movement, religious extremism or terrorism, each country in South Asia experiences them in one form or the other. Religious extremism in countries like Pakistan, Bangladesh and India or the 'Jehadist Terrorism' by the Islamic forces is predominant during the recent period. Apart from the religious extremism, there are a number of ethno-nationalist insurgent movements in almost every country in this region. The ULFA, NSCN, MNF, NDFB of India, LTTE of Srilanka, Tharu Liberation Front, Magar Liberation Front of Nepal, Chittagong Hill Tracts (CHT) of Bangladesh, Balochi Tigers movement of Pakistan are some of the examples. When a religious violent movement/extremism in South Asia is carried out it has been, (consciously or subconsciously) branded as a terrorism. So 'terrorism' apart, the insurgencies in South Asia have always been colored with ethno-nationalist colour. Because every political state of South Asia is ethnically diverse and heterogeneous. For example in a religiously homogeneous state like Pakistan, there are four major ethnic groups. The Punjabis, the

Pasthuns (pathans), the Sindhis and the Baluchis. In addition to them the Urdu speaking Mohajirs who migrated from India also maintain a separate identity. Thus, forming a fifth ethno-linguistic group. Bangladesh, which looks like the most homogeneous in terms of ethnicity, but even so, there is an important minority of tribal people in the Chittagong Hill Tracts. Similarly, relatively small countries like Nepal, is being ethnically more divided than any other country in the world. Sri Lanka has been facing its ethno-religious-linguistic problem in terms of LTTE ever since it became independent. India has been host to more than a hundred ethnic groups. Thus, a region with diverse ethnic-religious-linguistic groups is certainly entitled to experience insurgencies on these grounds.

Apart from the ethno-religious and nationalist insurgent movements, there are a number of insurgent movements on the basis of socio-economic and political development in a particular country. These movements are mostly mobilized or motivated by the Marxist-Leninist-Maoist ideology and call themselves as the Maoists. Though, there used to be a group similar to the Maoist, who used to be known as the Naxalites in India. The Maoist communist centre of Bihar, People's War group (PWG) in Andhra Pradesh, Maoists in Orissa, Chhattisgarh, Maoist of Nepal are some of the examples of this kind of insurgent Groups. At the same time except the above mentioned Maoist insurgents, almost all other insurgent groups emerged with an aim of secession from the state or from some authority. There are some insurgent movements, like the Naxalism in the West Bengal of India which neither aimed for secession nor complete change in the political system but some fundamental change in the political system.

However, the dissertation, as the title suggests, aims at a detailed study on the Maoist insurgency movement in Nepal. This will be dealt with the following chapters. In this chapter, since it attempts to conceptualize the term ‘insurgency’ into South Asian content, some of the most unified state in south Asia. The source of political conflict in Bangladesh is not an insurgency but a conflict between religious supremacy and secular Bengali identity. Ever since a military coup that overthrow the Awami League government of Sheikh Mujib Rehman., the major struggle has been between more secular Bengali socio-cultural identity and religious identity based on Islam for Bangladesh⁴³. Thus, since study deals with insurgency aspect, Bangladesh is excluded in this chapter. Pakistan is different from any other South Asian country when it comes to the insurgency problems. In Pakistan, political violent conflicts are directed on a strong a religious ground, political changes, most of the time, take place through a military coup or a rebellion rather than through an insurgency. Outside actors (religious leaders) play important role than the insiders. Thus, Pakistan is not discussed in this study. So when the case of Nepal will be discussed holistically the followings of this chapter would discuss the insurgencies in Sri Lanka and India briefly.

Insurgencies in India:

Soon after the independence of India, it was threatened by a number of insurgent movements from its north-eastern part. These insurgent movements were secessionist in nature and threatened by mainly two states i.e. Nagaland and Mizoram.

⁴³ . See Deepa M. Ollapally, *The politics of Extremism in south Asia*, (Cambridge University Press, New Delhi, 2009), p. 180.

In Mizoram, the Mizoram National Front (MNF) was organized under the leadership of Laldenga demanding independence of Mizoram from India. It was clearly evident from the fact that, on 30th October 1965, laldenga addressed a memorandum to Prime Minister Lalbahadur Shastri, demanding independence for Mizoram and expressed his willingness to fight for it⁴⁴. The MNF through the Mizo National Army (MNA) raised the insurgency to such a level that, on 1st March 1966, it declared the independence of Mizoram and overran and took control of the entire territory of Mizoram.

To analyze the Mizo- insurgency against, one would find, it was one of the better organized and properly planned insurgencies of India. Started on a demand to be separate from Assam province, it addressed various causes of under development and especially the case of the famine that occurred in 1959. However, to put the variable, discussed earlier, responsible for the success of an insurgency, one would find the ineffective government response and policy that was responsible for this insurgency. The first ineffective policy of the government of India was not to address the famine problem effectively. Secondly, the then chief minister of Assam, Chaliha released Laldenga when he was arrested by the Assam police, on an allegation of his visit to East Pakistan. The other variables that helped the MNF to raise the insurgency successfully, was the external support in terms of arms, ammunitions, money and sanctuary from East Pakistan and China⁴⁵. The third factor suited the MNF was the physical environment of Mizoram. And the fourth factor was the popular support Laldenga gained through relief distribution

⁴⁴ . As mentioned by Vijendra Singh Jafa, "Insurgencies in North-East India", in S.D. Muni(ed), *Responding to Terrorism In South Asia*, No-25, P.84.

⁴⁵ . For details see, *ibid*, pp. 82, 95, 97.

during the famine in 1958. However, this insurgency movement was put to an end by a counter- insurgency operation by the government of India.

Apart from the factors important for an insurgency movement, other elements which were necessary were also present in this case. This was a politically planned insurgency directed against the government of India for separation of the Mizo population on the basis of its ethnicity and underdevelopment. The method of warfare used in this case was mostly guerrilla warfare. Thus, Mizo insurgency can be called as an ethno-secessionist insurgent movement.

Insurgency in Nagaland erupted in the year 1955 with high intensity. The insurgents had a demand and objective of a separate Naga state out India authority. Initially in pre-independence period there were three groups who demanded a separate Naga-hill state from India. One group favoured immediate severance of all ties with India and independence of Nagaland. The second group advocated continuance of governmental relations with India till the Nagas were in a position to take up the reign of self government. And the third group wanted Nagaland to be a mandatory state under the British government for a given period⁴⁶. However, in the year 1947, the Nagas under the banner of Naga National Council (NNC) went through various talks with Indian National Congress leaders including Mahatma Gandhi for a separate state of Nagaland. The same was also continued with Prime Minister Nehru in the initial years of post-independence. But dejected with the talks and negotiations, NNC joined an-anti government group in Burma (Eastern Naga Revolutionary Council) under the leadership of council adopted violent means to demand for a separate state for the Nagas. In the year 1956, a parallel

⁴⁶ . H. Horam, *Naga Polity*, (B.R. Publishing House, Delhi, 1975), p. 17.

government was formed by the Naga insurgents called 'Naga Federal Government'. Phizo, the chairman of FGN was successful in having connection with Pakistan and some other western countries like United Kingdom to systematically wage the insurgency against Indian authority over Nagaland.

Starting from the year 1955 to 1975 the intensity of the violent in Nagaland was very high. In the year 1975, initiatives by the church leaders brought 'Peace Mission' proposal for the Nagaland problem. The Naga insurgents and the Government of India representatives met at Shillong on 11th November 1975. According to 'Shillong Accord' the Naga Federal Government agreed to recognize the Indian constitution. It also agreed to solve the Naga problem within the framework of the Indian constitution and thereby surrender of men and weapons would have taken place⁴⁷.

However, the 'Shillong Accord' gave a setback to the insurgency waged by NNC and Eastern Naga Revolutionary Council. At the same time it also gave to another faction of group leading to the formation of a 'Maoist' group. A new militant faction called National Socialist Council of Nagaland (NSCN) was formed under the leadership of Thuingaleng Muivah. It set its head quarters in the Burmese jungle territory adjacent to Nagaland. The NSCN led by T. Muivah came out with an attempt to Maoism giving an ideology back-up to Naga insurgency. The demands and activities of NSCN are vast. It uses all the available resources of modern world which are in their disposal. Beyond the demand for a separate state for Nagaland, the NSCN also proposes for a greater Nagaland taking the areas dominated by Nagas in Manipur and other adjunct districts.

⁴⁷ . For details see Longjam Randeep Singh, *National Security problem in India: A Case Study of the Insurgency Problem in Nagaland and Manipur*, (APH Publishing Corporation, New Delhi, 2000), p. 83.

To analyze the insurgencies by various Naga groups, one cannot say, those are ethnic by nature. Because, the sub-ethnic identities, these days, play a crucial role among the Nagas. The divided NSCN, (NSCN-IM), NSCN-K) and the Naga National Council and other factional groups do not see themselves as Nagas⁴⁸. Hostilities and killings between different groups have become common factor in Nagaland these days. The initial movement by Phizo can be called as an insurgency, because the objectives and the demand for a separate state were very clear. The groups like NSCN (IM) and NSCN (K) can be termed as militant outfits. NSCN (IM), as mentioned by Vijendra Singh Jafa, is engaged more into money making than to a political commitment, for which it emerged. According to him, NSCN (IM) imposes a 'house tax' on every dwelling unit and 'professional tax', on every government employee⁴⁹. Militant groups like this cannot be termed as an insurgent group.

United Liberation Front of Assam (ULFA) is another group which started as an insurgent group in Assam. ULFA is the military wing of the all Assam Student union (AASU). AASU emerged in Assam against the illegal migration of Bangladeshis into Assam. It will be important to note that, during 1950s and 1960s, it was one of the tacit encouragements of the congress government to allow illegal immigrants of Muslims from East-Pakistan to create vote bank. Against these illegal immigrants, AASU was formed and started an agitation in 1979. The main objective of the agitation was to delete the name of the illegal immigrants from the voter list. However, AASU was divided into two parts. One was the Assam Gana Parisad (AGP), the political wing and the ULFA as its

⁴⁸ . See Patricia Mukhim, 'North-East Scan', *Dialogue*, Vol. 6, No.4, April-June-2005, P.15.

⁴⁹ . See Vijendra Singh Jafa, No-43, p.94.

military wing. AGP established ULFA because, it perceived the congress might appropriate power illegally in the 1983 election. However, the immediate objective of ULFA was to fight against the Bangladeshi Muslim immigrants and to preserve the socio-cultural ethos of the Assamese. The ULFA grew to its maximum strength during the tenure of AGP government from 1983-1986. But within a period of five years from 1986, in 1991, ULFA ceased to be an insurgent group. it turned to be like any other military outfit existing for its own purpose or to help some political parties. In 1991, the congress party, which banned ULFA in 1990, bribed ULFA to help it winning the election. And it is clear from the fact that with ULFA's help only, the congress led by Hiteswar Saikia returned to power in 1991. Moreover, ULFA has its sanctuary in Bangladesh these days. Ironically, it emerged against the Bangladesh refugees and killed many of them. So militant groups like ULFA cannot be called as insurgents.

There are numbers of insurgency movements waged against the political system and authority of India under the communist movements of India. One of them was the Telengana struggle. Initially, the movement started with simple demands against eviction and oppressive feudal extortions. Subsequently, it was also directed against the police and the Nizam's military. Among the various demands this armed struggle put one of them was for the communist ideology, it waged armed struggle throughout the Telengana region of Andhra Pradesh. Though the movement was called off in October 1951, it was one of the first struggles of this kind to become responsible to force the government to introduce land reforms.

Another type of insurgency problem, India has been facing for a long time is from the groups who call themselves as the Maoists. Influenced by the ideas of Mao, Marx and Lenin these groups carry out guerrilla type of war against the governments of different states of India. Presently, these groups are widespread covering nine states and 76 districts of India. The states where these groups are active are, Andhra Pradesh, Bihar, Jharkhand, Orissa, Chhattisgarh, Maharashtra, Uttar Pradesh Madhya Pradesh and West Bengal. The most influential among the groups in these states are the Communist Party Marxist Leninist-People's War Group of Andhra Pradesh and the Maoist Communist Centre (MCC-1) in Bihar. These two groups along with the other similar kind of groups are trying to extend their influence and operation in the newer areas like Tamilnadu, Karnataka and Kerala. The influence and the operation of these groups have extended to such an extent that, they have become a serious challenge for both the central and state governments. According to the Annual report of the Ministry of Home Affairs (2004-2005), Government of India, the Maoists have an assessed strength of 9,300 hardcore underground cadres holding around 6,500 regular weapons besides a large number of unlicensed country-made arms⁵⁰.

Initially these groups operated separately under different names. In the year 2004 both the MCC and the PWG came under a single banner and created the Communist party of India (Maoist). The creation of the CPI (Maoist) is intended to set in motion a process to "pursue unity measures with all the genuine Maoists in the country", with the objective of overthrowing the imperialist, the comprador bureaucratic bourgeoisie and the

⁵⁰ . See 'Naxalism Persists', *Dialogue*, Vol. 6, No. 4, April-June-2005, P. 15

big land lords⁵¹. These Maoists' ultimate aim for which they have waged an armed struggle is to capture political (state) power and to herald, what they called, a new democratic revolution and not for land or wages or *man-samman*. The Maoist ideology and strategy finds fertile ground in the administrative and political vacuum that extends over vast areas of the country. In these areas the state is systematically and chronically failing to provide the public goods and services that is obliged-including the security of life and property, criminal justice and opportunities for social and economic growth⁵². The Maoist groups give decisions on various cases in the areas where they have their control through what they call *jan Adalat* (people's court). Talking about the methods of the warfare these groups follow are mostly guerrilla warfare. These groups mainly target the government officials like the police and the officers they think to be corrupt and against the welfare of the people. However, there are instances where these groups are also involved in the activities of money making and working for some of the political parties of India. Imposing taxes on the business persons and taking money, 'professional tax' from the government servants is also some of the activities these groups are involved in these days. To analyze the Maoists of India one would find, these groups can be called as insurgents. Because these groups fight for the cause of the land distribution, change in the political system and the seizure of power. The Maoists of India from the very beginning are against the constitutional democracy. At the same time their involvement with the activities like money making, helping the political parties winning elections certainly brands them more a military outfit than an insurgency.

⁵¹ . For details see "The Communist party of India (Maoist)-Born in India", People's March, Vol. 5, No. 11-12, December-2004. Accessed from, <http://www.peoplesmarch.com/archives/2004/nov-dec2k4/Born%20in%20india.htm>.

⁵² . See Ajai Sahani, "India's Maoist Insurrection: Advancing in Waves", *Dialogue*, Vol. 6, No. 4, April-June-2005, p. 54

At the end to see the insurgent movements in India one would find except the Mizo insurgency, all other insurgencies have deviated from their stand in the course of time. Initially, the Naga insurgency by NNC was determined to separate Nagaland from India. The basis for the demand was the ethnic and political solidarity of the Naga population. But the emergence of the sub-ethnic identity among the Nagas and the division of the NSCN in to two groups and the intra Naga fighting have left the movement by the NSCNs nowhere close to the insurgency. The activities and the operative methods these groups are adopting have forced the scholars to brand them as the terrorists. Similarly the ULFA has ceased to be an insurgent movement way back in 1991 when it helped the congress party to win the election. Thus, Indian insurgent movements start with an objective and in the course of their development there are deviations and detachments from the said objectives. One of the important variables that help all these movements to start and sustain in India is the ineffective administration and the inefficiency in dealing with the insurgents.

Insurgency in Sri Lanka: The LTTE

Insurgency in Sri Lanka by the Tamil section of the Sri Lankan population began in the full force in mid-1983. The insurgency in Sri Lanka by the Tamils has been carried out by the Liberation Tigers of Tamil Eelam (LTTE). There have been various measures by different Sri Lankan Governments to resolve it have not been successful either militarily or peacefully.

Although the insurgency by the LTTE broke out in 1983, its root causes accompanying tensions and riots began much earlier. To understand the root cause of the insurgency in Sri Lanka, one would find it lies in the strong centralized government which the country inherited from its previous British colonial ruler. The Tamils, both the Sri Lankan and the Indian, as a minority, became disenchanted when they discovered that their representatives had little power in the newly independent state. More specifically, the insurgency has been caused by the conflicting political aspirations over the future of the country's Northern Province between the separatists, largely Hindu Tamil minority and the ruling Sinhalese Buddhist majority. Although the conflict between the two communities is rooted in the long history, it intensified in the early 1980s. Demands by the Tamils for a separate state called 'Tamil Eelam' (Tamil Nation) was raised in the country's northern province with Jaffna as its capital. To the Tamils, political independence is perceived as a permanent solution to their status as an ethnically and religiously distinct community that had become second class citizens in a predominantly Sinhalese society. As an example of such second class stature, the Tamils have felt disenfranchised by the emphasis by the Sinhalese as the country's only official language⁵³. Although, it was not explicitly demanded, the Tamil insurgents preferred that the Tamils who were dispersed throughout the country's Sinhalese-dominated regions "regroup in areas of Tamil majority as a means of long-term survival"⁵⁴.

⁵³ . See David Little, *Sri Lanka: The invention of Enmity*, (United States Institute of Peace, Washington, DC, 1994), pp. 68-74.

⁵⁴ . See S.J. Tambian, *Sri Lanka: Ethnic Fratricide and the Dismantling of Democracy*, (Chicago University Press, Chicago, 1986), p. 12.

Inter- communal clashes in the violent form between the Tamils and the Sinhalese started in the 1970s followed by the full-scale armed insurgency by the Tamils in the mid-1983. The insurgency movement by the LTTE has been using both the guerrilla and the modern conventional warfare against the Sri Lankan government forces. Within the Five years of its emergence the LTTE became one of the strongest and widely known insurgent movements in South Asia in particular and throughout the world in general. The LTTE could gain the popular support from the Tamil section and rise to the level where it could challenge the Sri Lankan government in all the ways possible. Insurgent movement by the LTTE by the time of 1990s came to such a position where it divided the country virtually in to two parts, two armies and two governments. In this case one can say this is the example of an insurgent movement coming to the level of a civil war. The Tamil insurgency by the LTTE can be called as a secessionist type of insurgency. The factors which helped the LTTE growing successively are the popular support from the Sri Lankan Tamil population, physical environment of the northern province of Sri Lanka and the lack of the Sri Lankan government to deal with the Tamil problem and dealing with the LTTE in its initial stage. And lastly the most important factor that helped the LTTE was the moral, physical, financial help and the sanctuary by some sections of Tamils in India.

After discussing the insurgent movements in some of the South Asian countries, it emerges that, most of the insurgent movements are secessionist in nature. There are also the insurgencies based on the ethnic identity like the ones in the north east of India. Insurgencies mobilized by the left ideologies demand some fundamental changes in socio-politico-economic system. With this in mind they attempt at the seizure of power.

South Asia, as mentioned earlier, has been a region of many insurgent movements in the post-colonial period. Some of these movements do not conform to the definitional specificities alluded to by the Western scholars.



CHAPTER THREE

Maoists in Nepal: Historical Background

Introduction

A study of political history of Nepal reveals a history of autocratic rule. Nepal as a state was organised by Prithiv Narayan Shah of Shah Dynasty in 1764. The rulers of the Shah dynasty remained in power till 1848. They were dethroned by the Ranas (Ranas were the ministers in the Shah dynasty) in the same year through a massacre. The Ranas continued to remain in power for more than a century. They were dethroned by a democratic movement in 1950. Once isolated itself from rest of the world, the state of Nepal was open to the new political ideas like democracy. Domination of the monarch in the state politics, vested interests of the political parties, since 1950 till date, has made the very democratic form of government a failure in Nepal. A long history of deprivation, discrimination, torture and poverty has paved way for many struggle and armed rebellion against the existing power structure. The most important and powerful armed struggle against the existing power structure of Nepal is the Maoist Insurgency.

The Maoist insurgency in Nepal was not the first organized protest against the autocratic rule of Nepal. Before the emergence of Maoists, Nepal had already witnessed many uprisings and revolts against the autocratic Rana oligarchy. During the Rana regime the public protest could not come to the fore for a long time. One of the earliest uprisings against the Rana regime (against Jung Bahadur Rana) was led by the Gurungs of Lamjung and Gorkha. The leader of the uprising was imprisoned and the uprising was suppressed brutally. The leader, named Sukadev Gurung, was accused of trying to be the

king of the Buddhists. He died in the prison in 1875¹. In 1876, Lakhan Thapa Magar led a revolt against the Rana from the central hill region of Gorkha. The revolt mobilized hundreds of people and spoke against the regime how it had failed to provide justice to the poor. The leaders of this revolt were executed and hanged to death in their native Gorkha land and the supporters were either put behind the bar or exiled². Subba Krishna Lal (Krishna Lal Adhikari), an employee in Munsilhana (office of the foreign affairs) wrote a book titled Makaiko kheti (Corn Farming) in 1907³. This book was a satire on life under the Ranas and urged socio-economic reforms and the introduction of new mechanisms in the cultivation of maize.

During early parts of twentieth century the south of Nepal was greatly influenced by the Indian Independence movement. During that period the Gurkha soldiers who fought for the British in the First World War got exposed to the new thoughts of democracy and were greatly influenced by those ideas. Various groups used the Indian soil and operated from there against the Ranas in 1921. The Gorkha League was organized under the leadership of Thakur Chandan Singh in Dehradun. Literature like Gorkha Sansar and Tarun Gorkha were published against the Ranas. Initially, Nepali Students' Association was established in Banaras and in 1945, Himachal Students Association was organized from Calcutta. In 1931, a group of Nepalese youth established a group called Prachanda Gorkha. This group planned to bomb all the senior Rana rulers to uproot them and to establish the system of elected parliament and a constitutional

¹ For details see Karki Arjun and Seddon David (ed), *The Peoples; War in Nepal: Left Perspective*, (Adroit Publishers, Delhi, 2003), P.4.

² Ibid.

³ For details see Bhim Rawal, *The Communist Movement in Nepal: Origin and Development*, (Achham – Kathamandu Contact Forum, CPN (UML), Kathamandu, 2007), p.16.

monarchy⁴. They were arrested before they could undertake their plan. Shortly after this on June 2, 1936, Nepal praja parishad and Mahabir School were established. Under the umbrella of Prajaparishad, a 'Revolutionary Committee' and the Nepali Nagarik Adhikar Samiti (Nepalese Civil Rights Committee) were also established in the same year⁵. This party aimed at democracy and constitutional monarchy. In 1940 the party distributed leaflets against the Ranas, and in the same year, those who were involved in the party were arrested and given stringent punishment.

The fight against the Ranas did not come to an end hereafter. In 1941, Akhil Nepal Barga-Mahasabha (All Nepal class Assembly) was established underground. A committee was formed for armed revolution and for the first time this Assembly gave slogan 'Long live Republic of Nepal'. It is interesting to know that this group had contact with the Bolsheviks⁶. About the success of this group the literature tells the same story of other groups earlier to this.

The above discussed struggle against the Rana autocracy could not achieve their goal to remove the Ranas because of various reasons. First and the foremost was the ruthless suppression of these revolts by the Ranas. Secondly, most of the groups were limited to a particular area and the ideas against the Ranas could not reach many as a uniting factor. Thirdly, the isolationist approach of the Ranas had kept the Nepalese away from the political development of elsewhere in the world. There were instances when the Ranas

⁴ See Ibid. Pp. 17-18.

⁵ Ibid.

⁶ As mentioned by Prem R. Uppreti, "Nepal: A Small Nation in the Vortex of International Conflict", (Kathamandu, Pugo M), 1984, P.47, as cited in Bhim Rawal, No. 3, P.19.

appointed a person named Birendra Nath Ghosh to monitor the activities of the Nepalese students studying in Calcutta. He was also directed to seize all radios during the period of world war signifying the then social conflict and consciousness⁷. The failure stories of different anti- Rana group did not lead to a dead end to the same.

Communist party of Nepal: origin and evolution

The communist movement in Nepal emerged when there was a strike by the workers at Biratnagar Jute mill in 1947. The man who led the workers was Man Mohan Adhikari. Man Mohan Adhikari at that time was a member of communist party of India. Pushpa Lal Shrestha, a member of the Nepali congress at that time, left the party and determined to start a communist movement in Nepal. For the first time he translated the Communist Manifesto into Nepali language in April 1949. This translated version of the Communist Manifesto was made public in 15th of September 1949. To others this was the time when the communist party of Nepal was established. So there is a bit of confusion regarding the date of the establishment of the CPN. The other founding member of the CPN were, Nara Bahadur Karmachary, Niranjana Govinda Vaidhya, Narayan Bilash Joshi and Man Mohan Adhikari.

The party's slogan at its initial conventions was, 'civil liberties for all the classes',⁸. From the very beginning idea of armed struggle was very clear. The communist groups were active as part of the Mukti Sena (Liberation Army). Through its

⁷. See Pramod Shamsher Rana, "Rana Nepal: An Insider View", Kathamandu: Nirs, R.Rana, 1978. Pp. 97-100 and 243-94 (as cited in Bhim Rawal, No. 3, P.17).

⁸ For details see Anand Swaroop Verma, *Maoist Movement in Nepal*, (Samkalin Teesari Dunia Publication, New Delhi, 2001), P.21.

leaflets distributed to the people in 1949 it was declared that, “Nepal should establish a ‘new democracy’ as in China- if necessary through armed struggle- so as to create a People’s Republic”⁹.

Though the CPN was not very clear about its role during the 1950 revolution against the Rana oligarchy, it was very critical about the Nepali Congress- the major political party that time. It viewed Nepali Congress representing the elite class, since it has association with the Ranas. The CPN was also critical about the success of the 1950-51 revolution. In its first convention in 1951, the CPN viewed that, the 1950-51 revolution having no political significance, since it was not a total revolution. In its first convention, the CPN committed itself to strive for an all party conference, an interim government and elected constituent Assembly. It failed to influence for the above causes because of the lack of organizational base.

First Congress of CPN:

The first congress of the CPN was organized in 1954 to stabilize the party. The congress elected Man Mohan Adhikari as the party’s General Secretary. Two members of the party named Tulsi Lal Amatya and D.P. Adhikari were suspended from the party, accused of creating grouping in side the party and allowing feudal forces into the party respectively¹⁰. However, they were allowed to the party a year after.

⁹ . See Arjun Karki and David Seddon, No.1, P.6.

¹⁰ . See Bhim Rawal, No.3, P.43.

In order to consolidate the gains of 1951 people's movement, the congress adopted a strategy of continuous mass mobilization. The congress raised the slogan for constituent Assembly as its main political agenda and demanded for the democratic rights for the citizens. The Delhi settlement of 1951 was strongly opposed. It highlighted the sovereignty of the parliament and a head of the state without any special privileges. There by it indicated support for a constitutional monarchy¹¹. It also adopted the resolution for upholding continuous struggle against the feudalist rule and stressed upon distribution of additional land and means of production to the landless peasants.

Second Congress:

The communist party of Nepal organized its second congress in 1957. This was the congress which experienced, for the first time, differences of opinions and disagreement on leadership and various other issues. Keshar Jung Rajamajhi was elected as the General Secretary of the party. The second congress, rejected the first congress's demand for a constituent Assembly, and soughted for what Rajamajhi called 'fair democracy'. Disagreements aroused over the issues like 'Constituent Assembly' and parliamentary democracy proposed by Puspa Lal Shrestha, Republic by Sambhu Nath Shrestha and a constitutional monarchy" advocated by Rajamajhi¹². Once the disagreement began it was a never ending process, throughout the communist movement of Nepal, polarized into two blocs during the second congress. One group favouring co-operation with other democratic process and the other was an adventurist and fighting policy¹³. However, the

¹¹. Ibid. P.44.

¹². Ibid. P.51.

¹³ Anirudha Gupta, *Politics in Nepal, 1950-60, Kalinga*, New Delhi, 1993, P.204 as cited in, Deepak Thapa and Bandita Sijapati, *Kingdom under Siege*, Zed Books, London, 2004, P.22.

somber performance of CPN in 1959 General election enhanced a section of party members believing in radical approach.

The Panchayat Era and Split in CPN

The year of 1960, there occurred a total political gap. This gap affected the CPN more than any other political party. The parliament was dissolved by king Mahendra and all political parties were banned. Two years later in 1962, the king promulgated a New Constitution with provisions for a party less electoral system. A New sort of democracy was established, what king Mahendra called it as a 'Party less Panchayat Democracy'.

The communist got split on the question of support to king's take over. It was during this time CPN's General Secretary issued a statement from Moscow declaring the King's action as a 'progressive step'. But in Kathmandu, on behalf of the Polit Bureau, Puspa Lal issued a circular demanding the end of the military terror and calling a conference of all parties. During this time the communists divided into two lines, pro-Soviet faction led by Rajamajhi and pro-China faction consisted of Pushpa Lal, Man Mohan Adhikari and Tulsi Lal Amatya. Prof S.D Muni rightly observes that:

The faction of the communist party that sided with the palace got support and encouragement, since the king wanted to use the communists for countering the Nepali congress, and all other

democracy forces opposing his direct rule, which was subsequently protected under his direct rule¹⁴.

The Darbhanga Plenum:

Amidst this political chaos the Darbhanga plenum (central committee) meeting was held in 1961. From this convention there emerged three different political lines. They were: (a) constitutional monarchy and guided democracy supported by Rajamajhi, (b) a joint mass movement along with Nepali congress against the dissolution of the parliament and monarchy advocated by Pushpa Lal Shrestha and (c) an election to constituent assembly suggested by Mohan Bikram Singh¹⁵. From Darbhanga plenum three major resolutions came out: First, to convene the party congress within nine months to sort out party's internal contradictions for political purposes. Second, to divide the country into five zones, each under the charge of a polit bureau member and. Third, to remove Rajmajhi from the post of General Secretary to be replaced by a three member secretariat.

The Third Congress:

Third congress of CPN was held in April 1962. Tulsi Lal Amatya was appointed as the new General Secretary. This congress also elected a National Council, which posed a resolution that the panchayat system was sustaining a 'military dictatorship' and that the exploitative feudal system was destined to collapse¹⁶. But it was objected by Puspa Lal

¹⁴. See S.D.Muni, *Maoist Insurgency in Nepal: The Challenges and Responses*, (Rupa-co-Publication, New Delhi, 2003), P.02.

¹⁵. Mohan Bikram Singh was elected to the central committee of the communist party of Nepal during second congress in 1957. He had ideas of radical left movement in Nepal.

¹⁶. See Deepak Thapa and Bandita Sijapati, *Kingdom under Siege* (Zed Books, London, 2004), P.29.

Shrestha, who adopted a more extreme position. However, the congress, this time extended its support for a powerful and sovereign parliament (implying either a republic or a constitutional monarchy). From this point onwards, CPN began to experience significant divisions. One of the reasons was different orientations towards popular struggle and revolution within Nepal. The second reason was the Sino-Soviet split and its international repercussions¹⁷.

Thus, after the third congress resulted in a split in the communist party, the member at different levels declared them independent. Due to the failure of the 1962 congress Puspa Lal and his supporters organized a separate convention in 1968. In this convention Puspa Lal formed a separate party and he was elected as its General Secretary. Looking back to the history of the communist movement in Nepal one can always find that the Royal takeover in 1960 divided the communists into two major blocs, those who criticized the king's position and those who supported it¹⁸.

In the panchayat regime, CPN's leadership and most of the party cadres were either in jail or in India. Though all of them were- by and large- affiliated to the CPN, but their activities had hardly co-ordinated, since there was no central command structure. A number of cadres like Man Mohan Adhikari and Shambhu Ram Shrestha wanted to co-ordinate the divisions and to have a central committee. They were released in 1968 from the jail as they agreed to assist and support the king without reservation. In 1971 both Nirmal Lama and Mohan Bikram Singh were also released and a 'central nucleus' was

¹⁷ See Arjun Karki and David Seddon, No.1, P.10.

¹⁸ For details see Narayan Khadka, "Factionalism among Communists in Nepal", *Pacific Affairs*, Vol.68, No.1, April, 1995, P.58.

formed to unify party apparatus. The aim was to bring the various strands of the communist move met under one party umbrella¹⁹. The central nucleus also tried to include the Puspa Lal party into it. But Puspa Lal wanted others to join his party and remained strong on working with the Nepali congress against the Panchayat Regime.

The Jhapa Uprising:

Jhapa uprising in 1971, made the first attempt of armed struggle against the state. Following the footsteps of Indian Naxalites and teachings of Mao, organized an armed uprising, killing the local feudals in the Jhapa district of Nepal. The uprising started from Jymirgadi village in Jhapa on 16th May 1971. Soon it attracted many young political activists across the country. The Jhapa uprising was able to wipe out some eight of the local feudal during armed action. It was brutally crushed by a police action. Looking back to the Jhapa uprising one can always put a question what led to the armed uprising in Jhapa. First, Jhapa is situated just across the border river of Mechi from Naxalbari, in West Bengal. The formation of CPI (Marxist-Leninist) in 1969, which was influenced by Mao's ideas of armed struggle and reports from Beijing about encouraging would-be revolutions through various press, influenced the youth and the leaders of the CPN to carry an armed struggle out. The CPI (ML) not only inspired the CPN cadres but it also assisted with two activists to the Nepali side.²⁰. Though the Jhapa uprising failed in fostering a communist movement, but its leaders succeeded in building the largest communist organization in the country, CPN, (Unified Marxist-Leninist).

¹⁹ . Anirudha Gupta, 1993, (as cited in Deepak Thapa and Bandita Sijapati , No.16, P.25).

²⁰ . See Deepak Thapa, No.16, P.26.

The failure of Jhapa uprising led the steps towards establishing the CPN (ML). An underground convention was held and the All Nepal Communist Co-ordination committee Marxist Leninist (ML) was formed in 1975. Over next few years other localized movements also joined the committee and finally communist party of Nepal (Marxist Leninist) established on 26th December 1978. The ML rejected the simple application of imported dogma and recognized the need to analyse and understand the objective conditions of Nepal. It also emphasized that, a distinctive revolutionary Nepali road to socialism would be based on an understanding of economic and social conditions in Nepal²¹. CPN (ML) was involved with a process of incorporating the smaller groups within it and by the time of 1990 people's movement, it had become the largest communist organization in the country having network in 50 districts²².

Interestingly, one finds that the communist movement in Nepal had as many as twenty different factions of the communist party. Ironically, some of them in fact have very few members, but their ideological and strategic moorings do not show wide divergence. The communists, irrespective of their ideological and strategic moorings do not show wide divergence. The communists maintained National level prominence because of continued support from the peasants' and workers' organizations. The country's poverty and deprivation offered a fertile ground for the communist ideal. The split in CPN went on widening because of personality clash between, leaders, parochialism and regionalism²³.

²¹. See Arjun Karki and David Seddon, No.1, P.11.

²². See Deepak Thapa, No.16, P.27.

²³. As mentioned in Lokraj Baral, *Oppositional Politics in Nepal*, (Abhinava Publication, Delhi, 1971), P. 83.

Fourth Congress:

The fourth congress of CPN was held in September 1974 under the leadership of Mohan Bikram Singh and Nirmal Lama. The congress agreed on a strategy to launch a people's movement to be converted into an armed revolution depending on an opportunity. This group again broke into two factions. Death of Chairman Mao and the overthrow of the 'Gang of Four' in China had its severe repercussion on the ideological lines of the fourth congress. While Nirmal Lama favoured the new Chinese leadership, Mohan Bikram Singh was stick to the orthodox Maoism and 'Cultural Revolution'. However, the formal relationship of Mohan Lal and Mohan Bikram Singh came to end in 1983-84 when Nirmal Lama continued with the name of Fourth Congress. Accompanied by some his friends (Mohan Vaidya) Mohan Bikram Singh formed a new party called Communist Party of Nepal (Masal). In 1984, Masal became one of the founding members of Revolutionary Internationalist movement (RIM), the world wide grouping of Maoist parties.

Referendum and the Communists in Nepal:

Reacting to a nationwide movement from 6th April to 23rd May 1979 against the panchayat Regime, king Birendra declared a 'National Referendum' on 24th May 1979. Various factions of communists in Nepal reacted differently to the referendum. The CPN (M-L) declared a boycott saying "the declaration was a deception aimed at suppressing the genuine public opinion and people's revolution and thus lengthening the rule of decadent reactionary regime deceiving the people and the revolutionaries after its failure

in the policy of violence to suppressing the people's revolution"²⁴. However, in the later stage in 1980 the ML decided to support the Referendum with five pre-conditions to be fulfilled by the king. Since the pre-conditions were not fulfilled, the ML stuck to its position with no restriction on voting against the panchayat system. Unlike the CPN (M-L), though the Fourth Congress, initially, announced an active boycott, but in February 1980 it changed its stand to participate in the referendum without any pre-condition²⁵. Not only the above mentioned groups, but some other communist groups also had difference of opinion over referendum. This showed the instability and ambiguity among the communists in Nepal.

People's Movement in 1990 and the Communists

Shortly after the referendum, the Nepali congress launched a civil disobedience (Satyagraha) to protest against the panchayat regime. At the same time various communist parties also initiated a 'fill the jails' campaign. Series of bombing in June 1986, in Pokhara and Kathamandu by Nepali Jana badi Morcha (People's Front) added intensity to both the campaigns. During the same time various communist parties were engaged in mobilizing against the panchayat system.

In 1989 CPN (Ma-Le) decided to call upon all 11 factions of Communist Party of Nepal and the Nepali Congress to unite and bring an end to the panchayat system. In early 1990 seven communist parties made an alliance and came to be known as United Left Front. The United Left Front joined with Nepali Congress and organized a

²⁴ . See The CPM (M-L), *Barga Sangharsa*, Vol.6, No.11, (1981), P.31, as cited in Bhim Rawal No.3, P.147.

²⁵ . See The CPN, "our main differences and causes of split in the party", Central office, 1984, P.62, as cited in Bhim Rawal No.3, P.148.

movement for the restoration of Multi-Party-Democracy and to bring about the end to the partyless panchayat Democracy. The movement, National People's Movement (Jana Andolan), succeeded when in April 1990 the panchayat system effectively came to an end. Though the present day Maoists did not join the United Left Front, elect they were the ones who initiated and supported the movement underground.

The two groups Mashal²⁶ and the Revolutionary party were committed worker's party wanted to stick to the 'People's War'. These three parties were united under the banner of Samyukta Rastriya Jana Andolan (United National People's Movement – UNPM) and joined in the street protest in April 1990. However, the UNPM did not formally participate in National People's Movement.

During the National People's Movement, the Maoists were clearly and assertively demanding for the abolition of monarchy and the declaration of Nepal as a Republic. However, they were not satisfied with the compromise on a multi-party democratic system under constitutional Monarchy that ended the people's movement against the party less panchayat system in May 1990²⁷. They maintained their stand on the demand for a constituent Assembly to draft a constitution. But they were forced to accept the 1990 compromise as a 'first step' for the abolition of monarchy and establishment of

²⁶ . During the 1990 People's Movement for the restoration of democracy, the Communist movement in Nepal strengthened and reunited. An extremist faction of the CPN emerged during this period. This was known as 'mashal' who meant 'torch'. This faction of the CPN was led by Pushpa Kamal Dahal and Mohan Vaidya. The Mashal group soon fell apart and a different group emerged out of it. It was known as CPN (Masal) led by Baburam Bhattarai and Mohan Vikram Singh.

²⁷ . See S.D.Muni, No.14, P.4.

democracy in Nepal. Even the Left Front, that was with the Nepali congress, found itself in a distinct minority in the interim government, formed after the movement.

In pursuance with these above mentioned demands the United National People's Movement rejected the new constitution, promulgated at the beginning of November. Initially the UNPM was not inclined to take part in the General Election, declared to be held on May 1991. In November 1990 the Communist Party of Nepal (Unity centre- Ekta Kendra) was established with Pushpa Kamal Dahal (Prachanda) as General Secretary. The CPN (United Centre) rejected the newly promulgated constitution declaring it as inadequate for a genuine democracy²⁸. In January 1991, the Unity Center changed its agenda and formed United People's Front of Nepal (UPFN) with an objective to fight in the election if necessary. Different factions of the Maoists came together under the banner of Unity Center. They were CPN (Mashal) under Prachanda, the CPN (Fourth Congress) under Nirmal Lal, the proletariat workers' organization under Ruplal Bishwakarma and the Splinter group of the CPN (Mashal) led by Baburam Bhattarai.

In the meantime, two major communist parties- the CPN (Marxist), the remnants of Pushpa Lal's original party (United Marxist-Leninist) in 1991. The CPN (UML) took part in the first General Election and established itself as one of the major political parties securing 69 seats as compared to 110 seats succeed by Nepali Congress. But the CPN (Unity Center) as United People's Front of Nepal (UPFN) with Baburam Bhattarai as coordinator was only 9 seats. Of those nine seats, the UPFN won four in the western

²⁸ . See Arjun Karki and David Seddon, No.14, P.15

region, two in Kathmandu, two in the Terai and one in the central region²⁹. As a political force, CPN (Unity Center) was weakened by splits, even within the first few months of its existence.

Formation of CPN (Maoist):

During the 1991 election, the CPN, Unity Center organized its first congress in December. In this congress it is decided to adopt 'Marxism-Leninism-Maoism' as the 'ideological direction' of the party and the path of 'protracted people's war' through the initiation of open struggle in the rural areas the classic Chinese model. The congress opposed the idea of 'mass uprising' line proposed by Nirmala Lama, as the appropriate revolutionary strategy for Nepal. The new parliamentary politics was dismissed by the Unity Center declaring it as incapable of progressive change.

The faction in the unity center became stronger during the mid-term election in 1994. One group was headed by Nirmala Lama and Nirajan Govind Vidya and another by Pushpa Kamal Dahal (Prachanda) and Baburam Bhattarai. It was the latter group that represented the Maoist Insurgency in Nepal. Interestingly, the group led by Nirmal Lama got recognition as a political party by the Election Commission. So it clearly shows that the UPFN under Prachanda and Baburam Bhattarai had been marginalised. So there was no way out but to boycott the mid-term election and used the opportunity to criticize the parliamentary democratic system and prepared cadres to bring 'radical change' through the armed struggle.

²⁹ . For details see Election commission, (Election for the House of Representatives 1991), Kathamandu, 1991.

The situation was all set for the people's war. In March 1995, at the Third Plenum of central committee, it foreswore elections and changed its name to the communist party of Nepal (Maoist). It decided the strategy and tactics of Nepal of the People's war in the country keeping in mind the specificities of Nepal. In their plan for historical initiation of the people's war adopted by the CPN (Maoist) central committee in September 1995, the Maoists stated that:

on the occasion of the formulation of the plan for the initiation of the process that will unfold as a protected people's war, based on the strategy for encircling the city from the country side according to the specificities of our country, the party once again reiterates its eternal commitment to the theory of people's war developed by Mao as the universal and invincible theory of war³⁰.

The people's war in Nepal aimed at creating a New Democratic state by overthrowing the monarchy; and marching towards communism passing the socialism through a continuous series of cultural revolution under the dictatorship of the proletariat and thus making it as integral part of the world proletarian revolution.

So what the CPN (Maoist) aimed in the political scenario of Nepal is to overthrow the monarchy. All the communist parties were well aware of the fact that, the possibility of establishing a pure democratic system is very hard without overthrowing the monarchy. Monarchy, during this time, had been associated in the social tradition of

³⁰ As cited by Arjun Karki and David Seddon, (Arjun Karki's "The Politics of Poverty and Movement from bellow in Nepal", Ph.D. thesis, University of East Angila, School of Development Studies, U.K., 2001, P.174), No.1, P.18.

Nepalese society. It used to derive power and authority not only from the feudal elements who support it but also from all economic classes. Keeping in mind the above mentioned position of the Nepalese society, the CPN (Maoist) started the path of complete revolution by first starting with an opposition to the feudal structure of the society.

The People's war

Once the CPN (Maoist) was formed it was never silent. In the areas of their influence and dominance like, Rolpa, Rukum, Jajarkot and Salyan, they started attacking land lords and government functionaries. The voters and political activists, who had taken part in the election process, were also targeted by the Maoist. During the period 1994-1995, the Maoists, led by Baburam Bhattarai started a campaign called 'sija campaign' in the areas of Rukum and Rolpa. The intention of the campaign was to propagate Maoist ideology through focused training-action programs. And again it intended to rouse the masses and heighten political consciousness. The Maoist also had continuous fighting between the UPFN (Nirmala Lama Group), Nepali congress workers and UML workers.

The unleashing violence by the Maoists was retaliated to by severe police action under a military operation code named 'Romeo', launched in November 1995. The ruthlessness of this operation Romeo became a notorious subject of discussion at the time and some have seen it as a crucial precipitating factor behind the Maoists' eventual commitment to the launching of a people's war³¹. Reacting to the ruthlessness of the operation Baburam Bhattarai, in a news-paper interview stated that:

³¹ . See Arjun Karki and David Seddon, No.1, P.20

Under this armed police operation around 1,500 policemen including a special trained commando force sent from Kathmandu have been deployed to let loose reign of terror against the poor peasants of that rugged mountain district (Rolpa) in western Nepal. So far about 1,000 people have been arrested, of whom about 300 are kept in police custody or sent to jail under fictitious charges while the rest have been released on bail after severe torture³².

The Human Rights year book for 1995 reported that,

The government initiated... suppressive operations to a degree of state terror. Especially the workers of UPFN were brutally suppressed, under the direct readership of ruling party workers of the locality, police searched, tortured and arrested without arrest warrants, in 11 villages of the districts. Nearly 6,000 locals had left villages due to the police operation one hundred and thirty two people were arrested without serving any warrants. The arrested included elderly people above 75 years old. All the detained were subjected to torture³³.

This was the situation when on 4th February 1996, Baburam Bhattarai, chairman of CPN (Maoist) presented the Nepali-congress-led coalition government of Sher Bahadur Deuba with a list of 40 demands related to 'nationalism, democracy and

³² . See Bertil Linter, "Nepal struggles to cope with diehard Maoist violence", *Jane's intelligence Review*, Vol.11, No.6, June, 1999, P.43.

³³ . For details see Deepak Thapa, in Kanak Mani Dixit and Rama Chandra Shastri, (ed), *State of Nepal*, Himel Publication, Lalit pur, 2002), "Maobadi of Nepal", P. 85.

livelihood'. These demands were not much different from the points outlined in the 1991 election manifesto. Baburam Bhattarai's letter contained an ultimatum that the government would initiate positive steps towards fulfilling those demands by 17th February 1996 or else they would be forced to resort to an armed struggle against the existing state. But, while the prime minister Sher Bahadur Deuba was on a visit to India, the CPN (Maoist) struck on 13th February 1996, before the expiry of deadline.

February 13 marks a historic and decisive victory for the revolutionary Marxist-Leninist-Maoist line over the various brands of revisionisms and neo-revisionisms plaguing the Nepalese communist movement for long and in that sense the supreme sacrifice made by the heroic martyrs in this phase of the revolution deserves permanent place in the annals of proletarian revolution³⁴

The initiation of people's war was due to the necessity of prevalent conditions in Nepalese society. Its agenda rested upon yearlong preparations of the Maoist revolutionaries. The new historic initiation of the people's war gave a fatal blow to the revisionist and reformist past of the communist parties, which was marked by the achievement on both forms an organization and also the struggle. By introducing a new era of democratic revolution in Nepal, it forced on all spheres of the society, economic, political, social and cultural. The CPN (Maoist) gave the organizational call of 'the right to rebel'. Therefore, the CPN (Maoist) party led the masses all over Nepal, to rebel

³⁴ . For details see 'The first day of people's war in Nepal', *Revolutionary worker*, 870, August 25, 1996, Pp.2-3.

against the reactionary state, the ruling feudal and bureaucratic class to smash the existing order and build a people's new democratic state.

Factors leading to the Maoist insurgency

In 1993, Stephen Nlikesell could make a sense of the forthcoming Maoist insurgency in Nepal. He noted:

The London staff of the International Emergency Committee to defend the life of Abimael Guzman, the imprisoned leader of the Shining Path guerrillas of Peru, has been astounded by the volume of mail received from Nepal in support of him. From nowhere in the world has such large number of letters been sent by so many members of a national legislature, to say nothing of common citizens³⁵. Perhaps, this support from a world away springs from ignorance of less than complementary picture portrayed by the international press and western analysis of the Sendero Luminoso (the party's name in Spanish). Or does not derive from a naïve romance of the Nepal's intellectuals with the revolutionary traditions? Or could the affinity for comrade Gonzalo's ideology have deeper underpinning, based on similarity of certain under lying characteristics of Himalaya society with those of the Andean hinterland of Peru? If this were the case, could we then expect tendencies similarly violent to emerge in Nepal?

Taking the above mentioned prediction and the political instability in Nepal, one can find that the Maoist problem in Nepal is not a sudden phenomenon. At the same time to say the Maoist insurgency in Nepal is a law and order problem will land

³⁵. See Njikesell, Stephen, "The paradoxical support of Nepal's left for comrade Gonzalo, Himal, Mar/April, 1993, cited in Deepak Thapa, No.16, P.54.

upon more fallacious situation. The kind of support the Maoists got during the Sija Campaign in 1995 and during the initiation of the people's war in 1996 shows the insurgency is deeply rooted in various problems of Nepal. Not only the political but the socio-economic and the external factors of the state of Nepal, contribute a lot to the Maoist insurgency in Nepal.

Social Factors

The social structure of Nepal is highly hierarchical in nature. While the Bahuns (Brahmins), Chetris and Newars dominate the social hierarchy, the ethnic communities like Limbus, Tharus, Magars and Gurungs are treated as the second-class citizens. One of the most important aspect of the domination of the power elites like the Chetris and the Brahmins is to achieve certain measure of cultural uniformity in Nepal by unifying different tribes under the label of Hinduism. This too is a result of the process of sanskritization³⁶. The hierarchy mentioned above has been a practice since the initial rule of the Shaha Dynasty and successfully taken over by the Ranas. Since the time of the Ranas, the Bahuns, Chetris and the Newars have been socially, politically and economically dominant.

In the course of history of Nepal, Hindu religion has tried to dominate the other religion and beliefs. Society has been organized on the basis of a hierarchical caste system whose distinctive feature was exclusiveness based on ritual status with reference

³⁶. For details see B.L.Joshi and Leo Rose, *Democratic Innovation in Nepal*, (California University Press, Berkeley, 1996), Pp. 11-12.

to marriage and diet³⁷. The Mulki Ain (Law of Land) 1854 had five hierarchies to accommodate the tribal natives between pure and impure castes.

Hierarchy	Category	Social Group
A	Wearer of holy cord	Parbate bahun/chetri, Newar Brahmin, Indian Brahmin, Newar Hindu
B	Non-enslave Alcohol drinkers	Magar, Gurung (associated with Gorkhali Army) sunuwar (Hinduised), Newar (Budhist)
C	En-slavable Alcohol drinkers	Bhote (Buddhist), Chepang/Kumal/Haya (ethnic minorities), Tharu (Tarai Ethnic), Gatri (Progeny of freed slaves)
D	Impure but touchable	Lower class Newar, Muslim, Christian
E	Impure and untouchable	Parhate artisan castes, Newar scavenger castes
Source: Harka Gurung, “Social Exclusion and Maoist Insurgency”, no. 37, P.2.		

From the table it is clear that the Mulki Ain of 1854 clearly granted supremacy to the politically, socially and economically dominant hilly higher castes. The Mulki Ain of 1854 had an ending impact on the constitution of Nepal even after the collapse of the Rana regime and when Nepal entered into a ‘so called’ democracy.

³⁷. For details see Harka Gurung, “Social Exclusion and Maoist Insurgency”, paper presented at National Dialogue Conference on ICO Convention, Kathamandu, 19-20 Jan. 2005, P.2.

In 1962, Nepal was defined in the constitution of king Mahendra as ‘an independent, indivisible and sovereign Monarch’s Hindu state’. Commenting on in favour of Hinduism in Nepal Richard Burghart writes, “Like good Hindus, the Nepalese know the higher truth that all is one. Furthermore, they put this truth into practice. It is because the Nepalese are really Hindus and that there is no ugly communalism in Nepal”³⁸. The statement like this one is quite ironical. First of all it is very difficult to define what he means by ‘good Hindu’ and his conception of all the Nepalese are Hindus is a mistake. Fifty percent of Nepali population are ‘janajatis’ (tribals) and twenty percent are Buddhists. Though the Hindu ruling classes would claim that the janajatis (tribals) are sudras, tribals (many of whom are animists and nature worshipers) reject the Hindu label³⁹.

The movement of 1990 for the restoration of democracy raised some hope among the Nepalese for a society free of discriminations. The constitution of 1990 jeopardised the hopes and aspirations of the people when once again it declared Nepal as a Hindu state. Though the constitution of 1990, in some cases, talks about social equality, it has more contradictions. Article 11.3 of the 1990 constitution states ‘The Right to Equality’. In this article it is stated that “the state shall not discriminate the citizens on the basis of religion, colour, sex, caste, ethnicity or conviction or any of these”. It shows a secular character of the constitution. But the Right to Equality is contradicted by the Right to Religion. In the Article 19.1 of the constitution it is stated that “Each individual will have

³⁸. See Richard Burghat, “The Political Culture of Panchayat Democracy” in Michael Hutt’s *Nepal in Nineties*, (Oxford University Press, Delhi, 1994), Pp.1-13.

³⁹. See K.P.M.Basheer, ‘The US presence in Nepal: A threat to India’, *The Hindu*, Hyderabad, Nov.30, 2003.

the right to follow and practice one's ancient (*sanatan*) religion by maintaining the dignity of prevailing tradition". So the article clearly indicates inequality towards sections of the society. Not only socially but culturally also the 1990 constitutions included some discriminations. With special reference to the usage of language. It was in this constitution, 'Nepali' as the 'national' language got recognition. Where as other languages were treated as the 'language of nationalities'. Use of languages like Maithali, Newari and other local languages were not allowed in the local administration. So the above examples clearly show the state of Nepal always practiced a policy of exclusion of the tribal and ethnicity minorities giving importance to the Hindu higher caste hierarchies and 'Nepali' as the language of the country.

Along with the social and cultural discrimination, discrimination on the basis of region is also a social history of Nepal. Historically, both the Shah Kings and the Ranas used to give land grants to the above mentioned three groups. The military and civil officials always preferred to establish themselves in the Kathamandu valley. So these officials, in the course of time, supported a mode of government who allowed them to remain in Kathamandu. As a result, Kathamandu became the geographical center where surpluses appropriated from other regions were realised⁴⁰. At the same time except the three dominant castes other ethnic groups or dalits never had any say in the state apparatus. This has always led to a polarization and which has contributed to the civil servants to operate from Kathamandu. Any development programme in Nepal has always been Kathamandu oriented, and the welfare among the worst affected and in the remote areas is completely sidelined.

⁴⁰ . See Deepak Thapa and Bandita Sijapat, No. 16, P.74.

Under this back drop the communists in general and the Maoists in particular, have constantly advocated the minority rights. Demands for the minority right goes back to the Fourth Congress, which emphasized the need for 'effective action' to develop the language, culture and society of oppressed and backward groups⁴¹. It was no co-incidence that the minorities of Nepal swayed away by the Maoists ideas.

From the very beginning the Maoist party (then Unity Center) began mobilizing oppressed ethnicities and dalits and adopted the twin agenda of secular state and linguistic and ethnic equality. The UPFN manifesto for the 1991 election was full of such sentiments. During the initiation of the people's war in the drafts the Maoists declared that:

to maintain the hegemony of one religion (i.e. Hinduism), language (i.e. Nepali) and Nationality (Khas), this state has for centuries exercised discrimination, exploitation and oppression against other religion, language and nationalities and has conspired to fragment the forces of national unity that is vital for proper development and security of the country⁴²

As already has been discussed it was co-incidence that the oppressed ethnic communists, nationalities and dalits swayed by the Maoists ideas. Rather, because of the centuries old exploitation, discrimination and oppression forced the minorities to believe

⁴¹ . See CPN (Mashal) 2059 BS, P.69 as cited in Deepak Thapa and Bandita Sijapati, No. 16, P.78.

⁴² . See *The Worker*. No. 16, 1996.

in the Maoists as a hope which could bring an end to the disparities. These were the reasons why the Maoists had a strong hold in the western areas of Nepal.

The western region of Nepal is the poorest and the most underdeveloped, and is also inhabited by tribal and backward social groups who have felt exploited and discriminated against at the hands of the upper castes⁴³. Giving a clear background about the political and economic situation in western Nepal, a Maoist comrade says,

The western region, economically and socially, has a feudalist character. Growth of capitalism is very little and slow. There are many social contradictions and the main problem is feudalism. Economically and socially, feudalism has dominated in this area in forms of exploitation. The main contradiction is between the people and the usurers. The usurers are also social, political and religious leaders in the society⁴⁴.

Economic Factors:

The economic factors are no less responsible for the growth of Maoist in Nepal. The state of Nepal is the poorest in the whole world and stands 142nd on the UNDP's Human Development index. Comparing the economic status of Nepal, with its Asian counter parts. Only Laos, Bangladesh and Afghanistan are worse off. The economic factors that led to the growth of the Maoists in Nepal can be divided into three major sections like,

⁴³. See S.D.Muni , No.14, P.10.

⁴⁴ . See Lio, Onesto, "Reports from the people's war in Nepal" in Deepak Thapa's *Understanding Maoist Movement in Nepal*, (Chautari Books Series, Kathamandu, 2003), P.151.

first, economic disparities among the regions. This includes the difference between the cities and the rural areas, urban and localities, economic difference between the centre and periphery. Secondly, acute underdevelopment. This includes failure of various development projects since 1950s, acute poverty low per capita income and low growth rate. Thirdly, concentration of land holding in few hands and lacuna in the distribution of national resources.

Taking the second criteria of Nepal's economy first, it can be found that, the political instability through out the history of Nepal has caused sorry and unbearable economic conditions in Nepal. The social hierarchy, mentioned earlier, has caused polarization of position and a way, the wealth of the country in few hands. In that case corruption of public wealth becoming institutionalized was a permanent feature of the panchayat regime that lasted from 1960s to 1990. Feudalism, a major mode of production, became unbearable for almost all lower strata people in Nepal since it paved way for the elites and businessmen to accumulate wealth to most of their capacities. Though some of the development projects were taken by the government, but it failed to satisfy the popular expectation. The unbearable and sorry economic condition of Nepal witnessed sporadic unrest and protest among the people in inner Tarai and elsewhere in the country. But the political impotence of the less privileged groups could hardly do anything about it⁴⁵. The economic inefficiency of the panchayat regime invited criticism

⁴⁵ . See Deepak Thapa and Bandita Sijapati, No. 16, P.56.

against it. Saying the economic crisis could be resolved only if the political system was reformed and multi party politics reinstated⁴⁶.

The regime change could not survive itself from repeating the same story but in course of time the new political system experienced even worse kind of economic crisis. The new government's promise to bring down the prices by 35 percent worked reverse. Rather during the tenure of Krishna Prasad Bhattarai it was up to 30 percent. Though fiscal year 1993-1994 saw a good economic growth, yet another political instability in 1995 changed the whole situation. It so happened that the economic condition of the people during 1990s became worse than the panchayat era. Because during 1990s when there was a democratic government the politicians and the elites misutilised the freedom and openness of the polity into an open house of nepotism, bribery and corruption. This was not the only cause of the economic crisis in Nepal. Many foreign donors who came to Nepal for any sort of development project were often trapped by the elites. The development project initially aimed at development of the rural people and eradication of poverty, either to be a failure or became successful document wise. Usually the donors never consulted the rural people about the programme that might serve their purpose, and secondly most of the time the foreign donors applied their methods and ideas to run a project which proved to be misfit for Nepalese condition. These were the reasons why, in spite of many development been implemented, there were hardly any changes in the economic standard of the people.

⁴⁶. As mentioned by David Seddon, "Democracy and Development in Nepal" in Michael Hutt (ed), *Nepal in the Nineties*, (Oxford University Press, New Delhi, 2001), Pp.135-36.

Secondly, the social hierarchy replicates the economic uneven distribution in Nepal. Since the military and the civil servants are based at the Kathmandu valley any development programme are always been Kathmandu oriented. Hence, it created an economic dualism between the rural and the urban areas. This economic dualism does not necessarily limit itself to the village, town, or geographical regions rather it goes to the development pockets. This economic dualism of Nepal can be interpreted putting up the argument of center and periphery idea of the Neo-Marxism.

The Neo-Marxist analysis says inequality is the main feature of the centre-periphery concept where the centre appropriates the surplus from the periphery for its own benefit and maintains domination over the periphery. Looking into the history of economic crisis of Nepal, one can find that Kathmandu, centre for economic and political power, appropriated and distributed the surplus generated by the peripheral areas. Regions like Tarai and Hills outside the valley are considered as the periphery. Neither the representation of the periphery is considered nor gets the surplus distributed in these areas.

The center and periphery argument, in the case of Nepal, is put by the Maoists in a different platform. The Maoists not only take the internal aspect of the argument but also take India as the centre and Nepal as its periphery. According to the Maoists since India is a geographical compulsion for Nepal, India always tries to dominate the economy of Nepal in a large extent. The unrestricted market in Nepal to sell the Indian products, appropriation of Nepalese primary products and labour and domination of *Marwaris* in

Nepalese market are some of the features of India's domination over the economy of Nepal⁴⁷.

Thirdly, Nepal's economy is largely based on agriculture. The limited arable land holding is concentrated in few hands. The feudalistic nature of Nepalese agriculture has not only caused accumulation of agriculture in few hands but also created a gap between landlords and the farmers in the rural areas. So the acute poverty, regional disparities, rampant corruption, favoritism and nepotism, failure of development projects in meeting the needs of rural people, concentration of land in few hands are the reasons why the Maoist could easily go to the mass and share the difficulties. The Maoists were the first who brought a proposed solution to this and that could touch the sentiment of the oppressed and economically deprived ones. It was for the first time the people found some force fighting for their cause. So the economic crisis in Nepal helped to a great extent for the growth of the Maoists.

Political Factors:

Political factor is the most important factor that led to the Maoist insurgency in Nepal. Along with the socio- economic disparities, constant political instability, and inefficiency of the political system and the high handedness of the Monarch have always been causes for various protests and unrest among the Nepalese citizens against the political system. The political factors that contribute the Maoist insurgency in Nepal can be divided into followings.

⁴⁷ See Baburam Bhattarai, "Politico-economic Rationale of People's war", in *Problems and Prospects of Revolution in Nepal*, (Janadisha Publication, 2004), Pp.58-88.

Constant political instability has been one of the major cause, which has led the Maoist to think of an alternative system against caused when the very system loses its legitimacy over the people. Legitimacy of a state over its citizens is nothing but to have the authority to enjoy the obligation of its citizens. According to S.M. Lipset legitimacy of a system involves, the capacity of the system to engender and maintain the belief that the existing political institutions are the most appropriate ones for the society. Furthermore, he says, the extent to which contemporary democratic political systems are legitimate depends in large measure upon the ways in which the key issues which have historically divided the society have been resolved⁴⁸. To put the political systems of Nepal into this definitional framework one would find that, not a single was appropriate for the Nepalese society. Instead of resolving the issues those divided the society, they were, time and again highlighted and used. So, the political legitimacy, always in crisis, in Nepal was questioned by the Maoists and thought of an alternative legitimate political system through armed struggle.

Lack of political representation from the lower strata was another cause of the Maoist insurgency. Not only socially and economically, but politically also, the rights and voices of the lower strata people of Nepal had been suppressed through out the political history of Nepal. The age old practice of sidelining the ethnic communities, Dalits and other under privileged ones were also sidelined and neglected even after the democratic constitution of 1990 was drafted. It was quite evident from the fact that, the Election Commission did not recognise political parties of nationalities. So the lukewarm response of the state to the claims of nationalities and ethnicities has further crystalised

⁴⁸ . For details see S.M.Lipset, *Political Man*, (Anchor Books, New York, 1963), P.64.

ethnic issues and provided opportunities for ethnic mobilization⁴⁹. The constitution of 1990, proved to be incompetent, in resolving the ethnic and nationality issues, was demanded to be redrafted or reformulated. But the state machinery failed to accommodate them. Though various political parties raised voice in favour of the ethnic communities and the nationalities, the ethnic communities found it comfortable under the banner of the Maoists. Because unlike other political parties, the Maoists's stand for the ethnicities and nationalities appeared to be more forceful, clear and resolute.

Inefficiency and lack of far-sightness of major political parties in general and Nepali Congress in particular led to the growth of Maoist insurgency in Nepal. In the post 1990 revolution for restoration of democracy, the political parties remained hesitant to take up the issues against the monarch or in favour of the unprivileged ones. They were in fear that any stand in favour of the ethnic communities or neglected nationalities may tilt the power balance in favour of the radical forces or non-parliamentary forces. And this gave a space to the Maoists to utilize. On the other hand, Nepali Congress, in power, took repressive measures any action against the government or the system. Citing the repressive measure of the Nepali Congress against the communists and other hesitations. The Human Rights Year Book 1992 says:

political workers, employees and teachers have been the victims of arrests and torture because of political revenge...speeches, processions and mass meeting had been prohibited in that area (Rolpa). There are many incidents that political parties with support from the ruling power

⁴⁹. For details see Chaitanya Subba, "The ethnic dimension of the Maoist conflict", in Lok Raj Baral (ed), *Facets of Maoist Insurgency*, (Adroit Publishers, New Delhi, 2006), P.42.

had taken political revenge in this district. Local elections were held in a one-sided manner in this district... and candidates of other political parties (non-Nepali Congress) were not allowed to file their nomination⁵⁰.

Nepali Congress as a political party in power proved to be pro-Monarchy throughout the political history of Nepal. Some section of the Nepali Congress belonged to the elite class of Nepal having some relationship with the ex-Ranas of Nepal. In the course of time NC failed seriously to address some of the important issues like ethnicity, identity, development and the distribution system. And this widened the scope for the Maoists to address various issues as mentioned above. Not only the NC, but the Communist parties like the UML also equally responsible for the growth of the Maoists in Nepal. The CPN (UML) joined the mainstream politics in order to make a check and balance for both the monarch and the NC. But it turned to be reverse once it entered into the politics. The UML only tried to adjust itself into the existing political scenario for its own benefit. Lack of consensus between the political parties also helped the Monarch to exercise some extra constitutional and extra- legal power over the political parties. Frequent change of government, constant political instability and the over exercise of power by the Monarch are some of the major political factors that gave rise to the Maoists of Nepal.

⁵⁰ . For details see NSEC, Human Rights Year Book, 1992, Pp.224-225.

CHAPTER FOUR

Maoist Insurgency in Nepal: Ideological and Strategic Dimensions

Maoist insurgency in Nepal emerged in February 16th 1996 as a protest against issues such as autocratic nature of the monarch, oppressed nationalism, social disparities and political economy of the state of Nepal. Starting from the year 1996 until 2006 (when the Maoist joined the Seven Party Alliance (SPA), the Maoist went through different phases of what they called the 'People's war' (PW). And they gradually succeeded in establishing a parallel government/authority in Nepal. The violent struggle that started in 1996 claimed many lives and destruction of property and caused not only political instability but brought the social lives of the Nepalese to jeopardy. More than a decade of the insurgency saw the Maoists extending their organization almost nationwide. The military branch of the Maoists, i.e. the People's Liberation Army (PLA) grew from strength to strength reaching the impressive numbers of ten thousand cadres. Thus, taking into account of such a strong position of the Maoist of Nepal, through the PW, the Maoists have emerged as a political force to be distinctly reckoned with, thereby causing a visible shift at the political spectrum of the nation.

When an insurgency movement of Maoist in Nepal had such an achievement and success in waging a PW, it is believed to have an ideological affiliation. The whole movement must be guided by an ideology or set of ideologies. Since issues concerning ideology are involved a brief statement on term ideology is on order. A notable definition is that of Hamilton who defined ideology as "an ideology is a system of collectively held and reputedly factual ideas and beliefs and attitudes advocating a particular pattern of

social relationships and arrangements, and/or aimed at justifying a particular pattern of conduct, which it proponents seek to promote, realize, pursue or maintain”¹. Definition given by Richard C. Snyder and H. Hubert Wilson states “an ideology is a cluster of ideas about life , which originates in most cases as consciously advocated or dogmatically asserted social, political slogans or usage and preachment gradually become the characteristic beliefs or the dogmas of a particular group, party or nationality.”² According to Dictionary of Politics, any comprehensive and mutually consistent set of ideas by which a social group makes sense of the world may be referred to as ideology.³

From the above mentioned definitions it can be said that, ideology, being the sum total of ideas, warrants a fixed direction through which proclaimed ideas related to politics, economy, culture, religion and other facets of society are constantly and consistently pursued. So far as the ideological affiliation of the Maoist insurgency of Nepal is concerned, it has borrowed from Marxism. It has also been deeply inspired by the ideology of Lenin and Mao. Marxism through the elements like ‘Dialectical Materialism’, ‘Class struggle’, ‘Materialistic Interpretation of History’ and so on constituted the core of the Marxian thought. This classical heritage of Marxism was modified by Lenin and gave a concrete shape in Russian Society. Lenin organized a Communist party on basis of ‘democratic centralism’ and brought an alliance between the

¹ . See Malcolm B. Hamilton, “The Elements of the Concept of Ideology, Political Studies, as cited in, *Global Encyclopedia of Political Science*, (Global Vision Publishing House, New Delhi, 2006), Vol.3, P.773,.

² . See Richard C. Snyder and H. Hubert Wilson, *Roots of Political Behaviour*, (American Book Company, New York, 1949), p.511.

³ . See Iain McLean and Alister Mcmillan, *Oxford Concise Dictionary of Politics*, Second Edition, (New York, 2003), p. 256.

peasants and workers to incite mass insurrections. Since it was successful in Russia which was a less industrialized society, Lenin defined 'imperialism as the highest stage of capitalism'. Thus, Lenin's ideas of revolution⁴ refined Marxism with new ideas like imperialism, Democratic centralism, and peasant-worker's alliance as his main ideas that constitute 'Leninism'. When the ideas of Marx and Lenin were suited to the industrial societies of Europe, the ideas given by Mao during 'The Great Proletariat Cultural Revolution' were suited to the third world countries because the theoretical premises were based on Peasantry. The political ideas like, People's New Democracy, protracted Guerilla war, permanent Revolution, and Great proletariat Cultural Revolution, were Mao's important contribution towards the revolution in third world countries. Most of the time it is felt that, the Nepali Maoists have gone more after Mao than Karl Max and Lenin. Because the Nepali Maoists claim that the basic tenets of Maoism, mentioned above, are applicable to Nepal unequivocally for carrying out a communist revolution. Looking into the whole period of Maoist Insurgency in Nepal, one would find, the Maoist of Nepal have applied both Mao's idea of protracted war and Lenin's idea of armed insurrection. Hence before discussing the ideology of the Maoist of Nepal, it is necessary to discuss the ideas of Lenin on Revolution and Mao's ideas on protracted war and permanent revolution.

Lenin's ideas for a violent revolution came first during the period between the years 1897-1905, when there were political disturbances in Russia. Absence of parliamentary institution was not existent during that period. Under the back drop of this

⁴ . For Lenin's ideas on revolution and how to prepare for the revolution see Lenin, V. I., *What is to be done*, (Progress Publishers, Moscow, 1973).

political disturbances Lenin talked about a violent revolution in order to bring an end to the bourgeoisie in Russia. By advocating a violent revolution, Lenin not only broke down from Marx and Engels's ideas of revolution but also criticized the Social Democrats of Russia seriously. Criticizing the methods of political struggle by the Social Democrats Lenin wrote,

To the Narodovoitsi, (theoreticians of the group of Narodnaya volya led by P.L. Lavrov) the term political struggle is synonymous with the term political conspiracy... The Social Democrats, however, are not guilty of such a narrow outlook; they do not believe in conspiracies; they think that the period of conspiracies has long passed away, that to reduce political struggle to conspiracy means, on the one hand, immensely restricting its scope, and on the other hand, choosing the most unsuitable methods of struggle⁵.

Hence, for Lenin, any struggle without a violent one, during that period of Russia, by the Social Democrats, was nothing but falling into the trap of political conspiracy of the bourgeoisie. Lenin had a fundamental breakdown with the ideas of Karl Marx and Engels on destruction of bourgeois state apparatus after the proletariat had seized power. For Lenin, the liberation of the oppressed class was impossible not only without a violent revolution but also without the destruction of the apparatus of state power which was created by the ruling class. Here a violent revolution was given primary importance to destroy the state apparatus caused by the ruling class. Contradicting Marx's views, where

⁵ . For details see Lenin, *Collected Works*, vol-4, (Foreign Languages Publishing House, Moscow, 1960), p.276.

he talked about destroying of the bourgeois state apparatus after the proletariat had seized power, Lenin viewed that, Marx had excluded Britain from this kind of pre-condition. Lenin said, Marx's assumption of Britain as a democratic country, therefore a peaceful capture of power was therefore possible, was misleading. In contrary, Lenin's argument was, the Britain of 1817 was not without its military and bureaucracy nor had the Britain of 1917, fundamentally departed from democratic values and traditions.⁶ So Lenin always maintained his stand asserting that the bourgeoisie could not be overthrown without the use of violence especially in the context of Russia which at no time had a fully democratic system.

While speaking about the violent aspect of his revolution, Lenin made it a point that, this violence was not directed against the mass. Lenin gave primary importance on action over propaganda and building of a party at the first place. The party, that Lenin proposed, would be used in two spheres to use the violent methods. One, the existence of a 'central body', directing the operations and second, strong local revolutionary organizations. Speaking on why revolutionary seizure of power for working class, Lenin, in a criticism to the editors of 'The Economist' news paper said,

The working class would, of course, prefer to take power peacefully... but to renounce the revolutionary seizure of power would be madness on the part of the Proletariat... It is very probable- even most probable- that the bourgeoisie will not make peaceful concessions to the proletariat and at the decisive moment will resort to violence for the

⁶. See Rustam Singh, "Violence in the Leninist Revolution", *Economic and Political Weekly*, Vol.25, no. 52, December 1990, p. 2844.

defense of its privileges. In that case no other-way will be left to the proletariat for the achievement of its own aim but that of revolution⁷.

The Maoists of Nepal claimed to have followed the ideas of Lenin in relation to revolution against the state apparatus. According to them to compare the political situation of Russia during the period of 1871-1905 and the political situation of Nepal during 1990s, one would find many similarities. Like Russia was ruled by a Czar and there were no democratic institutions, Nepal was ruled by a King. Although there were some similarities between Russia and Nepal in this context yet there were some differences in the case of Nepal. For example, the parliament elected by the people was in the place but the Nepali king enjoyed absolute political power. One can say that the parliament and other democratic institutions were there for the namesake. The Maoists of Nepal had the similar kind of stand against the political parties like Nepali Congress and Communist Party of Nepal (United Marxist-Leninist), the way Lenin criticized the Social Democrats of Russia. For the Maoists of Nepal, political parties like Nepali Congress, believed in political conspiracy with the political elite of Nepal led by the Monarch. CPN (UML) was viewed as a revisionist and reformist with no exact goal to achieve for the peasants and working class. So far as, violent struggle was concerned, the Maoists of Nepal were of the opinion that, the liberation of the proletariat was not possible in a peaceful means in Nepal. Initially the Maoist of Nepal tried to influence the king and the political elite of Nepal on certain demands from the peasants and workers peacefully. They did not succeed in their efforts. Maoists of Nepal also tried to join the political mainstream by contesting the elections held in 1991. But they failed to get recognition as

⁷ . For details see Lenin, *Collected Works*, Vol. 4, (Foreign Languages Publishing House, Moscow, 1960), P.276.

a political party in 1994 when the elections were held. The Maoists were not only not given the recognition of a political party but the government tried to suppress the demands of the Maoists. This prompted an armed insurgency, which the Maoists claimed was in the tune with the Lenin's idea of revolution.

There are mainly two aspects of protracted war and concept of New Democracy advocated by Mao. First, Mao advocated and practiced a unique strategy of protracted revolution in an economically backward country beset by foreign imperialism relying on rural base areas and a peasant Red Army. Secondly, his attempt to promote a 'Chinese road to Socialism'. Once political power had been achieved after 1949⁸ Mao on his way to establish a Chinese road to Socialism in a peasantry based rural society of China had a break down from the Soviet modes of Socialism propagated by Lenin. Mao criticized the Moscow trained communist rivals of China as dogmatic and by referring to the 'Sinification of Marxism' he asserted his ideological as well as military and political leadership. In a way Mao wanted to keep the Chinese Communist Party independent from Moscow. As the communist forces of the rural hinterland of China poised to take over the Guomindang-held cities in the civil war of the late 1940s, Chinese communist leaders also hailed the Maoist strategy of protracted rural revolution as a model for the colonized regions of Asia and Africa, thus implying that the Soviet Union should not be regarded as the as only source of guidance for the world communist movements.⁹

⁸ . See H.P. Chattopadhyaya, S.K. Saran, (ed), *Global Encyclopedia of Political Science*, Vol.4, (Global Vision Publishing House, New Delhi, 2006), P.1041.

⁹ . *ibid*.

In relation to the role of the Communist Party of China in response to meet the Japanese colonization and economic blockade imposed on his Yunan base area by the Guomindang, Mao emphasized self reliance, which implied local economic initiative. He also emphasized on the need to mobilize the entire population in a genuine 'people's war'. While talking about the people's war Mao was very much dependent on the mass. The doctrine of Mao's people's war called for an agrarian revolution led and dominated by a Chinese –type Communist Party. In this war / revolution, the peasantry provide the 'the main force', comprising the bulk of the troops and serving as a principal source of supplies, security and intelligence. So this kind of revolution was no longer a Marxian Proletarian revolution: rather it was a communist-led peasant insurrection¹⁰. While talking about the people's war Mao advocated four basic elements for the success of it. First, the organization of a Lenin's party; by a Lenin's Party the Communist mean a highly organized, indoctrinated and disciplined party of revolutionaries who demand leading role in the revolution. Secondly, people's war needs mass support and a united front. Mass support is meant to come primarily from the poorer peasants who are to be won over by promises and material incentives. The doctrine also calls for winning over or at least neutralizing other important but smaller classes or groups, whose support is to be sought through united fronts and appeals tailored to each groups. Thirdly, for the victory of the people's war, it needs an army. The army is organized by the party (Communist Party). It must be loyal to the party, willing to fight its countrymen in a civil war, and professionally capable of ultimately winning for the party. And the last element needed for the people's war is the creation of rural revolutionary base areas or strategic bases of operation. The bases should be sufficiently self-supporting to maintain the local

¹⁰. See Ralph L. Powell, *Maoist Military Doctrines*, Asian Survey, vol. 8, no- 4, April. 1968, p. 250.

population and to support the party and the party army.¹¹ However, Mao's main objective through people's war is the seizure and maintenance of political power. Apart from the four basic elements of a people's war, Mao, continued to stress the political mobilization and indoctrination of the people as a basis for military mobilization. Mao gave great stress on human will. Mao de-emphasized the role of space-the utilization of a vast area-which originally played a major role in his doctrine. Because Mao mentioned that victorious guerilla wars can be fought in small countries which do not have the vast terrain of China. While mentioning about the 'people's war' Mao mentioned a protracted war, through which the people's war would be brought as victorious. One of the major contributions of Mao vis-à-vis people's war was he advocated three distinct stages of protracted war. He developed the idea of the three different stages of protracted war during the early years of Sino-Japanese war. According to Mao, the conflict would be with a period of strategic defense and retreat. Secondly the protracted war follows a long period of stalemate, during which the people's war army would build up its forces. Thirdly, a strategic counter offensive stage, where the people's army would attack the enemies and would achieve victory.

Mao also advocated some strategies and tactics for a protracted war. Mentioning the tactics of a protracted war Mao said, "The enemy advances, we retreat. The enemy halts, we harass. The enemy tires, we attack. The enemy retreats, we pursue"¹². So far as Mao's ideas on the tactics of the protracted war were concerned, they stressed on deception, ruses and ambushes. Commenting on Mao's idea on the above mentioned

¹¹ . *ibid.* P. 249.

¹² . This slogan is mentioned in Ralph L. Powell, No. 9, Pp. 251-52.

tactics Ralph. L. Powell says, “there is nothing essentially new in any of this tactics: but they do constitute sound guerilla and insurrectionary techniques. Their adoption by dissident elements in developing nations to overthrow established governments presents real challenges”¹³. Many a times it has been considered that, the type of war Mao advocated consisted of solely of guerrilla warfare. His doctrine also calls for conventional mobile war, even positional war, depending on the stage or the phase of the conflict.

The Maoists of Nepal were influenced by the doctrines of Mao besides Lenin. This is confirmed by the fact that, for thirteen years the insurgency in which the Maoists were involved made use of the strategy and tactics given by Mao for revolutionary war. The Maoists of Nepal believed that, the Maoists ideas were extremely suitable for Nepal in the Maoist literatures of Nepal, it has been constantly and consistently maintained that, Nepal is an agrarian society where the mode of production is overwhelmingly feudal. A majority of the Nepalese population were dependent on agriculture. There existed small scale business and source of income other than agriculture. Given the situation the Nepali Maoists characterized Nepal as a semi feudal country. Mao’s revolution through a people’s war was directed against Japanese colonialism, comprador bureaucratic system, feudal lords and the reactionary classes of China. Similarly, the Maoist of Nepal claimed to fight against the Indian colonialism, reactionary class/ elite led by the monarch, supporters of the comprador bureaucratic class like Nepali Congress and against the revisionists and reformist communists of Nepal like Communist Party of Nepal (United Marxist-Leninist). Nepali history experienced colonization by the British during the Rana regime. British withdrawal from India in 1947 ultimately put an end to its colonization

¹³. See *ibid.* p-252.

over Nepal. Since then Nepal has not been colonized by any country ever, physically. But according to the Maoist leadership, though Nepal was no longer a colonized country they regard Indian influence as colonization. As examples the Maoists mentioned, 1950 Treaty of Peace and Friendship, various water projects dominated by India, India's big brotherly attitude in interfering internal affairs of Nepal. The Indian manipulation on these aspects is characterized by the Maoists as colonization by India. In addition there exists a great social, cultural and historical similarity between India and Nepal which according to the Maoists of Nepal India uses them for its advantage. For example India characterizes Nepali monarch as the incarnation of Vishnu- the god. They regard Nepal as the only Hindu kingdom in the world. They want the Nepalese to believe in this logic and obey the monarch and show deference to him. Thus, according to Maoist, a semi feudal and semi-colonial country like Nepal, with agrarian societies dominated by the rural society, exploited by both colonial power like India and the feudal power is suitable to apply and follow Mao's doctrine of class struggle against these.

Maoist of Nepal and Ideological Stands

The interaction of Maoist insurgency by the CPN (Maoist) in Nepal as an armed struggle emerged as a challenge to not only the political forces like monarchy and the political parties like Nepali Congress but also as a criticism towards the other communist movements and parties of Nepal prevailing at that point and time. The Maoist leadership, defending the struggle by CPN (Maoist) as the most genuine for the cause of the Nepalese, viewed that, the foundation of the communist movement had inadequate revolutionary maturity in applying the universal truths of Marxism in the historic

particularity of Nepalese society. At the same time CPN (Maoist) alleged that, instead of advancing towards in fulfilling its revolutionary goals, the initial communist movement in Nepal, badly sank into the swamp of reformism and legalism. As a consequence of it, according to the Maoist, for a long time Marxism, was so vulgarized and distorted by the reformists that it was degenerated into petty bourgeois reformism in general¹⁴. In a way comrade Prachanda, throughout his writings on 'people's war' in Nepal, has been a critique of the reformists and reformist ideas. Giving importance to Marxism and Maoism as the highest summit of science of revolution he said:

In today's world, nobody can be a revolutionary Marxist if he separates the highest summit of science of the revolution attained by the proletariat or underestimates universal character of Maoism. Generally, in the history of communist movement, the reformism has been always running its reformist business by rejecting the supremacy of development of revolutionary ideology. The reformism has been attempting to cover its anti-revolutionary essence by opposing Marxism at the time of Marx, supporting Marxism but opposing Leninism at the time of Lenin, and supporting Marxism-Leninism but opposing Maoism in today's world. All those who talk of so-called Mao-Thought but do not accept the contributions of Mao as a new, third and higher stage of development fall under the reformist camp¹⁵.

¹⁴ . For details see Com. Prachanda, "The Problem of Ideological Deviation in the Nepalese People's Revolution", in *Problems and Prospects of Revolution in Nepal*, (Janadisha Publications, Nepal, 2004), P.14.

¹⁵ . Ibid.

Thus, according to the Maoist leadership in Nepal, Mao's doctrine on class struggle is higher and third stage of revolutionary development of Marxism. While adopting Mao's thought as universal principle, the Maoist of Nepal, thought, that a revolutionary movement cannot be developed unless petty-bourgeois reformism is completely divorced on the basis of proletarian revolutionary principle. In a state like Nepal, petty bourgeois class plays a challenging role in the way of the proletarian revolution. And this class, to the Maoist, is one of the classes of ideological deviation in a revolutionary party. Justifying the above argument, Prachanda said:

Petty-bourgeois class has no scope virtually because it lies between to naturally contending classes, proletariat and bourgeois. Its life is pushing it down every day, on the one hand, but it is haunted by a dream to be a capitalist, on the other one part of it is already transformed into proletariat economically, but its consciousness is to be a capitalist at any cost. Therefore, this section of the petty bourgeois class is, by nature, frustrated, resentful and impatient. Another section is making some earnings in life and how and views a possibility in the horizon to upgrade itself into a bourgeois class. This section naturally does not want the statuesque disturbed. This conservative, unstable and vacillation life condition and nature of the petty-bourgeois class are the reason of ideological deviation and disorder¹⁶.

Prachanda also viewed that the petty bourgeois class in Nepal is a major historical source of rightist reformism in Nepal. Communist movement in Nepal was

¹⁶. Ibid. P.16.

deeply influenced by the communist movement in India. so, the Maoist of Nepal see the communist movement in Nepal prior to their movement as, the way Indian communists have adopted parliamentarism, same way the communists in Nepal, except the Maoist have also easily accepted parliamentarism. And also the impact of Hindu fundamentalist culture has been a causing factor for reformism. Thus, the initial ideological stand of the Maoist of Nepal was, accepting Marxism-Leninism and Maoism as the universal principle of revolution. By doing so the Maoists tried to wipe out the reformist ideas prevailing and sponsored in Nepal. Reformism defines Marxism in such distorted way that there all other things are accepted but the revolution is opposed. In the 'Marxism' of reformist, quantity is never transformed into quality, there is only quantity. So, according to the Maoist of Nepal, Communist Party of Nepal (United-Marxist Leninist) is the proper example of reformists.

As the Marxism says, the dialectics of history is such, that in the development of every process, another contradictory aspect emerges inevitably. Existence of positive element in the negative and vice-versa is a universal law of contradiction independent of the will of human being. Accordingly, as the Maoist claimed, against the treacherous old reformist Marxists, a Marxist-Leninist-Maoist party has inevitably emerged with in the communist movement in Nepal amidst the struggle against the old leaders and renegades of the party and revolution. Another important ideological aspect of the Maoist in Nepal was, it adopted the doctrine of Mao-Tse-Tung not as a 'thought' but as an 'ism'. Because, as the Maoist supremo of Nepal claimed, the terminology of 'Mao-Tse-Tung Thought' has been used on the one hand, by the reformists in the sense of a hypothesis according to

the actual weightage of the world ‘thought’, and on the other, by the communist revolutionaries in the sense of a universal principle. In this context, Prachanda viewed, to continue with the usage of misleading terminology ‘thought’ despite having the scientific terminology of ‘ism’ with the weightage of expressing a universal principle is nothing but to provide loophole for Right revisionism. Hence, according to Prachanda, it is essential for communist revolutionaries who have already been grasping Mao-Tse-Tung’s thought as today’s Marxism- Leninism to use the terminology ‘Maoism’ readily and firmly.¹⁷ However, an ‘ism’ takes shape when a thought develops to guide a revolution of a global scale. Thus, acceptance of Mao’s ideas as an ‘ism’ by the Maoist in Nepal was to accept it as a universal principle for revolution and Maoism as today’s Marxism and Leninism.

Maoist Insurgency and Adoption of ‘Prachanda Path’

‘Prachanda Path’ (PP) was adopted by the Maoist of Nepal in the year 2001 in order to overthrow the Monarchy and the reactionaries in Nepal. PP, as the name suggests, was advocated by Maoist leader, Prachanda, to fight the people’s war keeping in mind the specificities of Nepal. In fact Prachanda’s revised version of set of ideas on people’s war was an amalgamation of the Chinese model of protracted people’s war and Russian model of urban insurrection. The aim of the PP was to use the people’s war in order to expand the Maoist base in rural areas and to use this as a platform from which to invoke a mass uprising at the urban areas in order to overthrow the existing government in Nepal

¹⁷ . For details see Com. Prachanda, “On Maoism”, in *Problems and prospects of Revolution in Nepal*, (Janadisha Publications, Nepal, 2004), p. 08.

at that time.¹⁸ On the eve of the adoption of the PP, in the Second National Conference of the Maoist, it declared, “The party in this conference has taken up PP as an inseparable dialectical unity between international content and national expression, universality and particularity, whole and part, general and particular, and has comprehended that, this synthesis of experiences of Nepalese revolution would serve world proletarian revolution and proletarian internationalism”¹⁹. On the process of development of PP and its phases, Com. Prachanda declared that, “This synthesis of experiences, according to the theory of knowledge of dialectical materialism, has been acquired from the process of practice , knowledge, again practice and again knowledge. MLM (Marxism- Leninism-Maoism) has taught us that, this cycle goes on moving up to infinity”²⁰. PP, according to the Maoist was advancing in its third phase during the year 2004-2005. The first phase was political and military line of Nepalese revolution that was adopted in the Third expanded meeting of CPN (Maoist), held in 1995. The second phase was the ideological synthesis of the rich experiences of five years (1996-2001) of Great People’s war that took place in the historical Second National conference of CPN (Maoist) in 2001. And the third phase was the process of development following the second national conference of 2001.

One of the important aspects of PP was that, it synthesized Marxism-Leninism-Maoism keeping in mind the specificities of Nepal. Once Prachanda path was adopted in the second national conference in 2001, Prachanda prescribed some twelve synthesized revolutionary ideas of people’s war which would be suitable for Nepal. first, emphasis in

¹⁸ . See Sudheer Sharma, “The Maoist Movement; An Evolutionary Perspective”, in Michael Hutt (ed), *Himalayan People’s War*, (Hurst and Company, London, 2004), p. 53.

¹⁹ . For details see Com. Kiran, ‘Philosophical Concept of Prachanda Path’, in *Problems and Prospects of Revolution in Nepal*, No-16, p. 38.

²⁰ . See Com. Prachanda, “The Great Leap Forward: An inevitable Need of History”, as cited in, *ibid*.

building correct line on basis of the concept of ‘correctness of the political line decides everything’ and through that to educate, organize and make millions of masses agitate. Secondly, accepting MLM as a guiding ideology and being firm in the starting point of ‘masses are the creators of history’ to be prepared for back and forth and right and left. Thirdly, to launch the historical initiation of people’s war with its own originality and country wide shock and in a rebellion-like way. Fourthly, to centralize rebellion on the question of political power from the very beginning. Fifthly, to centralize main attacks upon feudal, comprador and bureaucratic bourgeois class as the enemy class and its guardian, the imperialism. Sixthly, to centralize and handle all the things with the understanding that main form of organization is army and main form of struggle is war. Seventhly, considering local power and the question of base area as the fundamental question, to continue in regular practice of mass agitation and central political intervention. Eighthly, to place ideology and man in principal position and weapon in secondary position and handle them correctly in a dialectical way. Ninthly, acceptance of inevitable role of use of force in history and use of mass line for the capture of state power through revolutionary violence, and under which emphasis upon building an armed sea of masses by developing people’s militia from millions of people. Tenth, to achieve technical superiority of low tech over high tech through quantity to quality, human bravery and people’s initiative. Eleventh, to apply offense and defence and centralization and decentralization scientifically. Twelfth, correct application of total war through ideology, courage and war of masses²¹. Another important aspect of the PP was that, it accepted mass line in its ideological, political and military sphere. According to

²¹ .These ideas of Prachanda have been cited from Com. Prachanda’s writing, “People’s War in the 21st century and Prachanda Path”, in *Problems and Prospects of Revolution in Nepal*, Janadisha Publication, Nepal, 2004, P.165.

PP, the mass line is based upon the understanding of organizing aspirations of oppressed nations, indigenous, lower class and downtrodden people and women, developing people's war with the goal of making masses politically powerful. Through mass line as Prachanda path suggests, revisionism has been strongly opposed. Putting stress on the above mentioned mass line Prachanda declared:

By grasping the famous Marxist-Leninist-Maoist principle of 'masses are the creators of history', the party is developing overall mass line according to the particular situation of Nepal. By synthesizing the historical process of rebellion of the masses, the party has been emphasizing upon the question of organizing aspirations of people's revolt. Without a goal of seizing people's power through people's war, to talk of mass mobilization and mass line is revisionism²².

From the above discussion, it may be deduced that, like Mao's stress on mass line and political parties than weapons, in a people's war, Prachanda also followed the same to a great extent in his ideas of people's war. Like Mao's idea of a party to carry out the protracted war in a people's war, Prachanda path also gave stress on a party that would bring victory for the people. The way Mao advocated two-line struggle in training the revolutionary party, Prachanda path also followed the same. Prachanda emphasized on the question of identifying correctly the contradiction, on the basis of materialist dialectics, inside the party and going on resolving them. Starting from Mao's General Cultural Revolution to the Prachanda path, two-line struggle inside a communist party, has been considered as protracted in accordance with the protracted nature of class

²². Com. Prachanda, No.19, Pp.71-72.

struggle in the society. In fact, Prachanda viewed that, the two-line struggle inside the party, was a synthesis of MLM. And this two-line struggle was a process, that would not appear and disappear in time, but it was that existed constantly. Two line struggle, according to Prachanda, when it is not developed and expressed in its higher form, then it is within the limit of non-antagonistic struggle and resolved through the method of criticism, self-criticism and disciplinary action. But when, it develops and appears in higher form then that is expressed in antagonistic way, which is resolved through a qualitative method²³.

Prachanda path prescribed some ideas on tactics of the Maoist revolution in Nepal. PP while mentioning about the tactics of Nepalese revolution, gave primary importance to the matter of 'balance' between political and military offensive. It also talked about the balance between local and central intervention, balance between people's war and mass movement, balance between main and secondary force, balance between centralization and decentralization, and balance between struggle and two line struggles. Adding to these, Prachanda path also talked about political slogan, people's government, new people's power, handling of different contradictions with tactical importance.

Prachanda path also claimed to have developed a theory of development of democracy in the twenty first century. According to Prachanda path, this theory is based upon the question of development of democracy in party, army and people's power. In this way it presented a concept that guaranteed to democratize and to revolutionize the party, army and power continuously and ensure the right of rebellion. Democracy through

²³. See *The Maoist*, February 1999, P.22.

a revolution, to Prachanda path, were to go on proletarianising the communist party and ensuring the right to initiate another communist party by rebelling against the earlier one if it went wrong. For this Prachanda path proposed to participate one section of the party in power and involve the other in people's service. Discouragement of use of force in two-line struggle, making the army to reach people, ensuring allied classes to take part in power are given importance in the theory. Prachanda path criticized the formal kind of democracy and parliamentarism and declared:

Here the question we have raised does not have any relation with treachery of those revisionists and liquidationists of different colors of the world, who by opposing people's democratic dictatorship or dictatorship of the proletariat have been entrapped into formal democracy of bourgeoisie. Here our question is centered in the objective of developing state power as an institution that can organize the continuous flow of revolution. The real democratic dictatorship of the proletarian dictatorship can ultimately be consolidated in the process of wide and lively democratization of the seizure of power. There can be no other meaning of democratic centralism, a great scientific theory, than this. Why the parties, which succeeded to seize power by correctly exercising democratic centralism before capturing it, turned last to be victims of formal democracy and bureaucratic centralism? The logic that revisionism had been dominant inside the party does not answer it fully. The weakness of this or that form that

came into effect in the application of dialectical materialism also are responsible for it²⁴.

In a way the idea of democracy in twenty-first century by Prachanda was an amalgamation of Marx's idea of dictatorship of the proletariat, Lenin's democratic centralism and Mao's concept of let's hundred flower blossom.

Prachanda path not only prescribed ideas for the people's war in Nepal, but also it spoke about world revolution by the proletariat in general and unified strategy of the South Asian countries against Indian expansionism and Indian imperialism. Concept of imperialism was taken both positive and negative was by Prachanda. Talking on the present day imperialism and its impact, Prachanda said, it has positive aspects, since imperialism has guaranteed the acceleration of the people's consciousness to move from world of necessities to that of freedom. At the same time imperialism with globalization has made the whole world to a small rural unit so that, an event in any place would have its good or bad impact over the world. Production and distribution of arms through imperialism has been indirectly playing a role for the technical preparation for the people's war on a world scale. And imperialism by intensifying the class struggle, principally the contradiction between imperialism and the oppressed countries and people to the maximum, has been preparing a revolutionary objective situation for eighty percent of the people of the world.

²⁴ . For details see Com. Prachanda, "Present Situation and our Task" in Com. Kiran, No. 18, P.56.

On the negative side of imperialism in the present days, Prachanda mentioned, it has only an evil intention to grab profit. For this reason the imperialist forces use and misuse the resources of the poorer countries and extract profit out of it. Against imperialism, according to Prachanda, an objective base for preparation of world people's war and establishment of communism has to be developed in the midst of globalization. To the Maoists of Nepal, Prachanda's ideas on imperialism, have widely understood new particularities of economy of the era of imperialism and inaugurated proletarian revolution.

While focusing on the proletarian revolutions in the context of South Asian countries Prachanda made expansionism of India responsible for their failures. According to him, since Indian ruling class of monopoly bourgeoisie and their agents are there in every country, it is inevitable for the communist revolutionaries of the South Asian countries to develop a unified strategy as a common responsibility against them. Here Prachanda proposes the necessity of turning this region into a new soviet federation of the twenty first century.

Prachanda path as mentioned above is considered by the Maoist of Nepal are the indigenous achievement of the people's war in Nepal. But to analyze the ideas and theories given by Prachanda through Prachanda path, one would find, it is a fusion of the Lenin's idea of general urban insurrections and the Mao's idea of revolution of the protracted war in the country side to encircle the cities. Moreover, the idea of democracy in the twenty first century in Prachanda path does not really provides any real space for

democracy. Baburam Bhattarai (Com. Laldhwaj) in an interview answered some of the questions on the Prachanda path, its originality, its applicability and differences between Com. Prachanda and Laldhwaj on various issues. According to Baburam, Prachanda path is a result of collective thinking of the vanguard of the Nepalese working class. On the universality of Prachanda path, he said that, Prachanda path has not yet attained a universal character. Moreover, to him it would be wrong to call it as a 'path'-way. It has already been mentioned how Prachanda path said about to maintain a balance between centralization and decentralization, in two line struggle in a party. But it was on the question of centralization of army, party and the state, there were differences between Prachanda and Baburam. Focusing on the above said differences, Baburam said in the interview that, the CPN (Maoist) in a resolution in 2003, categorically mentioned, the party, army and the state would not be centralized in one person. But contrary to this resolution, in the central committee, army and the state in a single individual. Hence, the differences²⁵.

Not only Baburam who made the intra-party conflicts and the drawbacks of CPN (Maoist) but also Prachanda himself admitted of indiscipline in the party and of not providing proper ideological and political training to the new recruiters²⁶. Thus Prachanda path as a theoretical development lacks originality. Rather it is a modification of Marxism, Leninism and Maoism. And when it comes to applicability inside the CPN (Maoist) there are many loopholes found.

²⁵ . For details see the interview with Baburam Bhattarai by Ajit Baral, in R.K. Viswakarma's (ed) *People's War in Nepal*, Manak Publications, New Delhi, 2006, Pp.217-221.

²⁶ . See Com.Prachanda's interview by Prateek Pradhan and Narayan Wagle, Ibid, Pp.222-31.

Maoist Insurgency in Nepal and Political Economy of Nepal

While Prachanda path focused on the ideas and theories of the people's war in Nepal, Baburam Bhattarai in his, writing, *Politico-Economic Rationale of People's War in Nepal* gave an ideological background to the political-economic of the state of Nepal, which has been responsible for the people's war in Nepal. Nepal is the second poorest country in the world in terms of physical and cultural developments, with 71% of its total population fall below absolute poverty level. And 10% of the total population of Nepal possesses 46.5% of national income. 60% of its total population is illiterate and more than 90% of the population live in the rural areas with 10% Of the total population engaged with full employment and 60% are either under employed or disguised employed. Foreign debts constitute more than 60% of the GDP. It was under this background, according to Baburam Bhattarai, a people's war and a New Democratic Revolution was initiated with the proclaimed aim of establishing a New Democratic Socio- Economic system and a state by overthrowing the old ones. In addition to establish the New Democratic Socio-Economic system, the people's war was also directed against 'the reactionary state' which had been promising to solve the above mentioned problems through various plans for last fifty years.

According to Baburam, in a state like Nepal, " since the development of the productive force is faster and the development of production relations takes place at much slower pace, at some stage of development of society, the production relations block the development of the productive forces and this leads to retardation and distortions in society. Under such a situation it becomes necessary to smash the old

production relations and to develop new production relations in their place”²⁷. For this Baburam prefers a ‘revolutionary path’ to that of a ‘reformist’. Because reformist path will only remain so long as there is possibility of developing productive forces within the old production relations where as the revolutionary path would smash the old production relations where as the revolutionary path would smash the old production relations and bring about a new productive system.

Besides the inner contradictions with in itself of a society (between productive force and production relations) the interference of external forces also plays decisive factor in development in that society. Here, Baburam mentions about the influence of imperialism upon the poorer countries. In present world order, imperialism, according to Baburam, affects the countries worse where the social formations are primitive and backward. Especially in societies which are on the eve of transition from feudalism to capitalism, the alignment with imperialism distorts the internal production relations by promoting the growth of comprador and bureaucratic capitalism instead of industrial capitalism²⁸. So in a state like Nepal Baburam proposes to smash the relationship with external imperialism while bringing progressive transformation in the internal production relations through revolutionary means. So the external influence by Indian supremacy, and the reformist attitude of Nepalese upper class in the name of development which are otherwise known as semi-colonial and semi-feudal nature of the state of Nepal to be abolished through a people’s war.

²⁷ . See Baburam Bhattarai, “Politico-Economic Rationale of People’s War in Nepal” in *Problems and Prospects of Revolution in Nepal*, (Janadisha Publication, Nepal, 2004), P. 59.

²⁸ . Ibid.

In his writing Baburam discusses how India's expansionist oppression has deteriorated the economy and political life of Nepal and how it has been one of the causes of people's war. In defense of his argument he says, Nepal has slid down from the 13th position of the poorest country in 1970s to the second position in present days. India has been accused as the principal country responsible for economic deterioration in Nepal. Accordingly, India's expansionist policy started from the period of the British in general and after the sign of Treaty of Sagauli in 1816 in particular. It was the British-India that oppressed Nepal till 1950 and after that India oppressed Nepal through the Treaty of Peace and Friendship of 1950. The Maoist leader claims, once Nepal was tied to Indian imperialism after 1950s through trade, finance and other means, the process of under development, distortion and dependency became all the more intense.

Expansionism, according to Baburam, "is the process of exploiting and oppressing the smaller and the weaker economy by a stronger economy, which has not developed to the level of imperialism but derives its strength from the backing of external imperialist forces and its own state. Similarly, because its hegemony cannot be maintained on purely capitalist competition the expansionist power uses extra-economic coercions (e.g. military, political, cultural etc.) to maintain its economic areas of influence or the market"²⁹. Accordingly, India has been alleged of using its cultural, religious and geographical advantages over Nepal as part of its expansionist policy.

Nepal, according to Baburam, prior to the Sagauli treaty (which made Nepal a semi-colony) was self-sufficient in its basic industrial production. Nepal was self-

²⁹ .Ibid, Pp.61-62.

sufficient in producing cotton fabrics, copper and brass utensils, domestic instruments, military armaments, sugar and food grains. But with the penetration of factory made goods from India and concomitant decline of Nepalese industries, Nepal was made dependant on India. The process of expansion by British- India that started in 1816 was again intensified by Nepal- British-India trade agreement of 1923 and again by the Treaty of peace and Friendship of 1950. In a way the above mentioned treaties between India and Nepal have made Nepal as a common market of India. More than this, the open boundary between India and Nepal gives scope to many informal and illegal trade and transactions. So the size of trade India have with Nepal given by the official statistics is much higher than this.

Another important aspect of Indian expansionism is employment of Nepalese youths in mercenary services and other sectors as cheap labour. In this way the semi-feudal agriculture of Nepal becomes ever dependant on India. This process of exploitation of labour and temporary and 'relay' (i.e. taking the father's place by his son) migration that started after the Sagauli Treaty has had a disastrous effect on the historical development of the industrial proletariat and indigenous capitalism in Nepal³⁰.

Finally, uninterrupted semi-colonial relation with Indian expansionism is alleged to have negative and destructive effect on the class relation and socio-economic structure. Thus, it was one of the most important objectives of the Maoist of Nepal to break the chain of semi-colonialism.

³⁰. Ibid, P.64.

Another aspect of Nepal's political economy, that, the people's war would fight against was 'semi-feudal Relation and Retardation in agriculture'. Nepal basically is an agrarian economy, where 81% of the labour force of the country is engaged in agriculture. This indicates, there are, very traditional methods of agricultural production in Nepal, 99% of the total investment in Nepalese agriculture is made in land, human and animal labour and primitive equipments. On the top of it, as the data suggests up to the year 1991/92 only 13% of the total cultivated land had permanent irrigation facility. this is important to mention here that, the lack of irrigation facility was not due to the shortage of water but due to the failure of successive governments in doing so, lack of irrigation facilities, use of traditional methods and some other reasons have made Nepal to export food grains from countries like India and falling into its trap.

There are many factors, that responsible for the retardation in agriculture. First, inequitable land ownership and; land distribution. According to the statistics, 65% of the poor peasants possess only 10% of the land, 25% of the middle peasants possess 25% of the land and 10% of the rich peasants possess 65% of the land. So this way the land ownership also determines the social status in the society. And ultimately this determines social class. And ultimately this determines social class relationship and finally social relations of production. Accordingly, the principal mode of surplus extraction in Nepal agriculture is semi-feudal relation and the same relation plays the principal role in the underdevelopment and retrogradation of the Nepalese agriculture³¹. In addition to this issues like bonded labour, entrance of the imperialist capital through feudal lords into agricultural sector, migration to India, unemployment and under employment are

³¹. Ibid, P.68.

important causes of backward agricultural production in Nepal. Different regimes and different government have taken various measures for the development of the agriculture in Nepal. Important measures in this regard, like 'land reform' in 1950-60, 'green revolution', 'small farmer development programme' in 1970s, were introduced in Nepali agricultural sector. But as Maoists say, without destroying the old feudal structure.

Thus, one of the major ideological commitment and rationale of people's war is to smash the reactionary production relations and to develop productive forces in agriculture. Decline of industry and expansion of comprador and bureaucratic capital in Nepal, is another aspect of Nepal's political economy. Baburam, by criticizing the imperialism says, "after the rise of world imperialism, the merchant capital and usury or financial capital of the third world's feudal and semi-feudal societies have turned themselves into comprador and bureaucratic capital as against of imperialist capital. their expansion plays doubly negative roles in the oppressed nations, through, one the one hand blocking the development of free industrial capitalism and on the other hand, by transferring third world's capital to world imperialist centers as super profit in trade and as interests³². In this line, factory made goods from India was the major cause for decline of traditional industry in Nepal. Other aspects like free trade between India and Nepal, joint venture by 'Nepalese comprador class and Indian *Marwaris*, impact of liberalization have affected the industrial growth in Nepal. At the same time it has given birth to comprador and bureaucratic capitalist class in Nepal. Thus, the people's war by the CPN (Maoist) aimed at destroying the comprador and bureaucratic capital and paving the path of self-reliant development by breaking way with dependency.

³². Ibid, Pp. 71-72.

Another aspect of Baburam's work is to solve the problem of oppressed regions and nationalities by giving regional and national autonomy. As it has been mentioned earlier in this chapter, 81% of Nepal's total population live in rural areas (see page no. 27). And most of the time these people, are ones from whom the surplus has been extracted by the people living in the urban areas like Kathmandu, etc. these oppressed regions of Nepal are primarily the regions inhabited by the indigenous people. And these people have been reduced to most backward kind of people due to internal feudal exploitation and the external semi-colonial oppression. The regional oppression of Mongol dominated eastern, central and the western hilly regions or the Austro-Dravid dominated Inner Terai and Terai region are manifested in the form of national oppression. Apart from the above mentioned examples, there are many oppressed regions and nationalities in Nepal, which are to be solved through a people's war.

The foregoing account provides the rationale of the people's war by the CPN (Moist) in Nepal. These are used as ideological backwards by the Maoists of Nepal in their struggle against the reactionary state and semi-feudalism and semi-colonialism and world imperialism.

Strategic Dimension of Maoist Insurgency in Nepal

One of the most important and vital objectives of people's war, as advocated by Mao, is the seizure and maintenance of political power. In a people's war the role of right kind of strategies and tactics, play important role. Because through strategy, tactics, techniques only an originally inferior force can expand and ultimately can defeat larger and better

equipped military forces it would fight against. Originally, Mao followed guerrilla warfare, to fight against the Japanese colonial army. Guerrilla which literally means 'small war' was originally used to define the resistance activities of armed Spanish civilians who hurried the French occupation army during the peninsular war of 1808-1814³³. But the usage of this term in English language describes all non regular military like combat that has accompanied partisan activities in civil wars, revolutionary wars and popular resistance to foreign invasion and occupation. A guerrilla force is usually viewed as an irregular tactical adjunct or supporting arm of the professional army. However, Mao's struggle through people's war was initiated by a guerrilla warfare tactic later as the people's war developed and progresses to the later stages it advocated a full-fledged conventional warfare against the enemy forces.

For the success of the people's war, Mao prescribed some strategies and tactics, when we talk about a strategy and tactics, it can be viewed as, a tactic serves strategy. A strategy is permanent and fixed when a tactic is a working policy. Tactics, however, are highly flexible and are prone to change as politics change its course. But, an ideologically formed tactic has no room for deviation from the proclaimed purpose of its strategy. According to Mao, as it has been mentioned earlier in this chapter, the people's war passes through three strategic phases for its success. First, strategic defensive, in which the people's army would defend themselves and retreat. Secondly, a long period of strategic stalemate or balance in which the people's army would build up its forces and thirdly, a strategic offensive stage, when the people's army would attack the enemy and cause victory for the people's war. Like any other Maoist movement elsewhere in the

³³. H.P.Chattopadhyaya and S.K. Sarkar (ed), *Global Encyclopedia of Political Science*, Vol.3, (Global Vision Publishing House, New Delhi, P.729).

world the Maoist of Nepal also followed the above mentioned three strategic stages in Nepal. It is important to mention that most of the communist movements, that went through the stages mentioned, could only successfully passed through the first two stages, i.e. strategic defense and strategic balance. Peru's shining path can be cited as an example in this regard³⁴.

Strategic defensive Phase and Maoist Insurgency in Nepal

In a strategic defensive phase, the people fight against the enemy, the 'reactionary state' under the leadership of a revolutionary party. Seizure of weapon from the security force by the 'grievance guerrillas' formation of a people's Liberation Army (PLA) and creation of a base area are the primary objectives of this strategic phase. And the base area that is created would be the centre of the revolution and people's political power. Looking into the strategic defensive phase of the Maoist insurgency in Nepal, one would find, informally, the Maoist entered into this phase even one year before the initiation of armed struggle. Through, what was known as 'Sija Campaign', the CPN (Maoist) undertook a yearlong campaign to seek the support of the peasants residing in the western districts. The Maoist insurgency in Nepal formally entered into the strategic phase when in its Third Plenum, the CPN (Moist) adopted the three-phased Maoist path for the armed struggle. In this plenum, the Maoist of Nepal also adopted broad policies to initiate armed struggle the theories into practice.

Strategic defensive of Maoist people's war in Nepal also involved several tactical stages. They were final preparation of initiation of people's war, development of guerrilla

³⁴. Thomas Marx, Nihar, P.921.

zones and development of base areas, beginning in 1996 and continuing up to 2001. Started by a small group, equipped with locally made and available weapons, the people's war in Nepal was initiated in seven target areas from three different regions of the country. according to the report of 'The Worker', a CPN (Moist) mouth piece, on 13th February 1996, one police outpost each in Rolpa and Rukum in the western hills, an Agricultural Development Bank and Manakamane distillery in Gorkha distinct in the central hills, a police outpost in Sindhuli and the house of a feudal usurer in Kavre in the eastern hills and the factory of Pepsi cola in Kathmandu valley were attacked by armed squads accompanied by mass supporters at several places³⁵. As the Maoist claimed, the selection of the seven targets, to disperse the government forces in one hand and attack on Pepsi-cola Company was to mobilize the people against the imperialist forces.

Once the people's war was on through the attacks, the next step was the propaganda actions- distribution of leaflets and posters, strikes all over the country, within three weeks of the initiation of the armed struggle, some 5,000 anti-state action took place in about 65 districts (out of 75 districts) across the country. Of that, about 85% of the action was related to propaganda, 12 percent to sabotage and 3% to guerrilla actions. the intensity of these actions were higher in districts like, Rolpa, Rukum, Jajarkot, and Sallyan districts of western hills; the Sindhuli, Kavre and Sindhupulchok districts in the Terai regions of the eastern hills and Gorkha district in the central hills.

³⁵. Details of the report has been taken from, Nihar Nayak, "The Maoist Movement in Nepal and its Tactical Digressions: A Study of Strategic Revolutionary Phases and Future Implication", *Strategic Analysis*, Vol.31, No.6, November 2007, P.922.

Mao, while advocating about the strategic defensive phase gave stress on to lay a solid foundation in the central districts of a country. By closely following this, the Maoist of Nepal, raised guerrilla zones, forces and militia and parallel government unities in the mid-west districts of Nepal, which are far from the reach of Kathmandu. By January 2001, the Maoist had declared temporary base areas in Rakum district. By the year 2000 the Maoist could run parallel government in almost all 75 districts of Nepal barring Kathmandu city and some of the district head quarters. Jan Adalats (people's court) were established to maintain law and order in the areas of their strong hold. As a part of making people aware of the people's war, they ordered implementation of an indoctrination programme in schools within the areas under their control.

Five years of strategic defensive phase, the Maoist were busy mobilizing people's support, building base areas and monitoring information on the political, military and financial position of the Royal Nepalese Army (RNA). Moreover, the inhospitable terrain, poor governance, poverty facilitated the Maoists to consolidate their position. The tactics of negotiation by the Maoist, at times, helped them of delay in any action against them.

Tactical lines used by the Maoist in this strategic phase were to create rift between the elected government and the monarch, recruitment of youth, women, and Dalits into the armed struggle, formulation of a number tactics of urban insurrections and more importantly going for the ceasefire in July 2001.

Till the first ceasefire between the government and the Maoist in July 2001, the Maoist problem used to be treated as a law and order problem of the country. On 22nd July 2001, when a police post was attacked and more than 70 police personnel were taken as hostage, the prime minister Sher Bahadur Deuba declared a ceasefire on 23rd July 2001. The Maoist leadership, without wasting anytime joined the ceasefire. Three rounds of talks and negotiations between the Maoist and the government, on 30th August, 14th September and 13th November 2001, came to an end without any result or conscious. Once the ceasefire was a failure, a state of emergency was declared on the country on 26th November 2001.

However, to analyze the ceasefire from the Maoist point of view, it was actually a tactical line of the Maoist for a short time. The covert agenda of the party during ceasefire was to get ready to take on the army to enter into a strategic equilibrium from the defensive³⁶. The party organized the People's Liberation Army (PLA) during the ceasefire. The URPCN was also formed. The CPN (M) expanded their organization to a great extend.

One of the changes in this phase in the strategic plan of the Maoist was the acceptance of Prachanda Path on February 2001. According to this 'path', the party accepted to follow the policy of 'urban insurrection' while continuing the build up in the rural areas and working to surround the towns³⁷. This proposal was accepted by the party because, it was felt that more focus on the rural areas would hardly create any pressure on

³⁶ .Abi Narayan Chamlagi, *Maoist Insurgency: An Ideological Diagnosis*, in Lok Raj Baral (ed), *Nepal Facets of Maoist Insurgency*, (Adroit Publishers, New Delhi, 2006), P. 21.

³⁷ . For details see 'Nepal Maoists: Their arms, Structure and Strategy', Crisis Group Asia Report, 104, October 27, 2005, p. 23

Kathmandu. Maoists' tactics on focusing on the urban areas like Kathmandu, building pressure on government created opportunity for the Maoist to seek the support of the petty bourgeoisie, political parties and civil society groups.

Strategic Equilibrium Phase

Strategic equilibrium phase in Maoist theory is a period where there is a balance of power between the people's army and the state army. In this phase, the development of people's power and the decomposition of the enemy's power reach a position where the enemy is not able to defeat the revolutionaries and the revolutionaries are not yet able to overthrow the reactionary state power. The balance of power between the state and the revolutionaries should not be understood on the basis of purely military strength of two sides. Rather it is to be understood on the basis of a qualitative situation between the revolutionary army and the mass in one side and the reactionary state on the other³⁸. The emergence and existence of two states, two armies and two ideologies in the process of development of the People's war has been the most basic condition for the emergence of a state of strategic equilibrium³⁹.

The CPN (M) entered into the phase of strategic equilibrium, as it declared, in August 2001. And this became even clearer after the break down of the peace talk and the ceasefire between the Maoist and the government of Nepal in November 2001. For the first time, after the failure of the peace talk and once the Maoist attacked the government officials immediately after that, it was seen two parallel armies and two political systems operating in Nepal.

³⁸ . See F.O., *The People's War in Nepal: Taking the Strategic Offensive*, in R. K. Viswakarma, N-24, PP. 147-148.

³⁹ . *ibid*, P. 148

A number of tactics were followed by the Maoists during this phase. Simultaneous attacks on several targets and to bring other revolutionary forces close to them were tactical move by the Maoists. These were done to put the state forces in confusion. The tactics helped the Maoists in the formation of base areas and the declaration of regional autonomous government. By 2004, the Maoist had declared eight autonomous people's governments⁴⁰. Tactics like negotiations, ceasefire, international mediation, restoration of democracy and human rights were applied to regroup the cadres, move armed cadres from the western region to eastern region and consolidate in new regions. More than this, by these tactical moves, the Maoist wanted to divert the attention of the international community. because the Maoists were fully aware of the fact that, qualitative development of the people's war to higher stages would provoke a stronger offensive from the state with the support of external forces like U.S. and India⁴¹. And these were reasons why Nepal, during the period 2001-2004 witnessed a number of ceasefire and peace talk offers both from the government and Maoist side. However, reacting to the criticism on the negotiation offer from the Maoist side, Prachanda argued that the 'enormous pressure on the state establishment both at the military level (through people's war) and at the political level (from masses) made the "possibility of negotiation" much stronger, "especially during the stage of strategic equilibrium"⁴²

Mao, while mentioning about the strategic equilibrium phase observed that, this phase should not go for a long period of time. Otherwise the enemy was likely to

⁴⁰ . See Nihar Nayak, N-34, P. 926

⁴¹ . *ibid.*

⁴² . See A World to Win, 'Building Peace in Nepal', in R. K. Viswakarma, N-24, P. 99.

strengthen itself putting the revolutionary force on defensive⁴³. Accordingly, the central committee of the Maoist party hurriedly made an objective study of the situation and on 3rd August 2004 declared the attainment of the strategic equilibrium stage and prepared itself to enter into the strategic offensive phase.

Strategic Offensive Phase

One of the major factors of strategic offensive phase is the destruction and near-collapse of the old state and the process of superseding of new-Revolutionary state over the old state. According to Mao, it is the final and the most important phase and strategy of the people's war. The people's army is supposed to attack and initiate mass offensive acts against the reactionary state with its overall power and capacity. Use of quality weapons, adoption of urban and tunnel warfare, mobile warfare, instead of guerrilla warfare, necessities of a large army and reserves of ammunitions are some of the most important aspects, prescribed by Mao for the success of this phase.

In August, 2004, the plenum of the central committee of the Maoists decided to advocate the strategic offensive. Declaring on the initiation of the strategic offensive phase, the plenum said, “.... to delay entering the strategic offensive is to commit rightist errors, such as self-preservationism, and would through the over-all people's power into perplexity and recoil”⁴⁴. Since in this phase both qualitative and quantitative changes are to take place the reactionary state may take help from the imperialist forces to make it a failure. Accordingly, the plenum confirmed that, “backed by imperialism, India was very

⁴³ . See Tetsuya Kataoka, “Resistance and revolution in China: The Communist and the Second United Front”, as cited in Nihar Nayak, N-34, P. 926

⁴⁴ F.O., No.41, P.150.

much likely to intervene in Nepal. So Indian expansionism was determined as externally a main barricade for the creation of credible environment to find a forward-going political solution through peaceful negotiations”⁴⁵. However, the plenum’s decision on India as the main barricade rather than monarch at the state of the offensive became the cause of inner party struggle as the minority group led by Baburam had serious opposition to it. To him, monarchy continued to be remaining the main enemy in the offensive phase.

However, since strategic offensive phase was the most important phase of the people’s war, the Maoist of Nepal were expected to follow mobile or maneuver warfare, urban uprising, positional warfare and mass mobilization to create a new revolutionary. The western divisional commander of the Nepalese Maoist, Diwakar said, the Maoists even decided that ‘a number of planned battles must be fought, and only at the end will we reach an insurrection’⁴⁶. But, the Maoist in Nepal got stuck for a longtime in this phase because of the lack of logistics and battle technique, weapons, poor presence in urban areas and other resources. This might be the reason, Com. Prachanda said in the Maoist document that, “comrade Mao developed the basic principle of the Strategic offensive as well as its meaning, importance and definition within the protected people’s war. In spite of the same theoretical premises developed by Mao, in the context of today’s twenty first century, it is not possible to use them mechanically”⁴⁷. After the CPN (M) adopted the “Development of Democracy in the Twenty –First century” at the

⁴⁵ Press statement of the Maoists issued on 30th August 2004, as cited in, Abi Narayan Chamlagi, No.35, P.23.

⁴⁶ . For details see Strategy and tactics of armed struggle in Nepal, third plenum of the Central committee of CPN- (v) in March 1995, at www.cpnm.org/worker/issue3/documnet.htm (accessed February 13, 2008).

⁴⁷ . F.O., N-41, p.157.

second national party conference, it drew the conclusion that in every stage of development. Such as from the strategic defensive to strategic equilibrium and to strategic offensive, while there is certainly a qualitative change, still in the present national and international context of the balance of power, the strategic offensive should not be understood as a stage immediately aimed at insurrection. The situation of armed insurrection can be understood as a process of development through sub-stages, such as initiation, continuation and development of the war and the national and international situation⁴⁸.

As it has been mentioned earlier that the Maoists were stuck at the initial stage of the strategic offensive phase for a longtime, commenting of that, the Maoist leadership viewed that the correct understanding of this situation died in objective understanding of the conditions. They even advocated returning even to the strategic defensive phase from the offensive phase if necessary and to reunite and re-organise the struggle against revisionist camp.

Disagreement on adopting the Prachanda path as an universal principle by a group inside the Maoist party led by Baburam, indiscipline inside the party, failure in taking up the strategic offensive phase, deviation from some of the principles advocated by Mao are some of the draw backs that showed the Maoists in Nepal to be ideologically poor and immature in their understanding of the correct path to follow.

⁴⁸. See Ibid- pp-157-158.

CHAPTER FIVE

Maoist Insurgency in Nepal: Response from India and China

The Maoist insurgency in Nepal (1996-2005) and its devastating effect on the security situation as well as politico-socio and economic life got Nepal into sharper international focus. The escalation of violence and growing instances of human Rights violation attracted the attention of the international community in general and the immediate neighbors in particular. The risk of the foreign intervention and the intensity of the insurgency alarmed its neighbors. This chapter seeks to focus on responses from India and China towards the developments in Nepal vis-à-vis Maoist Insurgency.

As discussed earlier, Nepal has been traditionally a buffer zone between two Asian giant neighbors, India and China. For both the countries, Nepal is an important country because of its geo-strategic location. Both India and China's paramount concern in Nepal is related to security and stability. For, China, Nepal is just below Tibet which is Achilles Hill of China. Besides Nepal has a substantial number of Buddhists which has historical and cultural ties with the Buddhists in Tibet. Nepal's close relations with India are also matter of concern for China. A porous boundary, people to people contact, centuries old cultural, social and historical ties between India and Nepal are areas of interest for India. Development of close relation between China and Nepal is a matter of concern for India. China's help to Nepal in building roads and other infrastructures facilities may have the potentials to pave the way of Nepal getting sucked into Chinese

orbit as Tibet before. As both the countries are competing regional powers in Asia, they are not only protecting their interests in Nepal but also are seeking to enhance their sphere of influence to the extent possible. Having said that their interests in Nepal are economic and politico-strategic in nature. In addition both India and China are averse to the involvement of big powers outside of Asia in Nepal.

Throughout the Maoist insurgency in Nepal, one would find that the Maoists perceived China as a source of ideological support, whereas India was regarded as a repository of the imperialist forces. The Maoists of Nepal claimed to have borrowed the idea of the 'people's war' from the Cultural Revolution of China. On the other hand, the communist movement in Nepal in general and the Maoist insurgency in particular was influenced by the Communist movement of India. India has been suffering from a number of insurgency problems for years. There are reports suggesting the links between the Maoists of Nepal and some ultra left groups in India which are regarded as a matter of concern for India.

Maoist Insurgency in Nepal: Response from India

India's response to the Maoist insurgency in Nepal is of great interest for both of Nepal and India. For Nepal, India is the closest neighbor and the largest supplier of arms and ammunitions to the Nepali security forces. Secondly, the Maoists of Nepal used Indian soil as a safe heaven. Thirdly, the growing links between the Maoists of Nepal and the similar kind of groups in India created suspicion among the ruling elites of Nepal towards India. So far as the interest of India in relation to the Maoist insurgency in Nepal is

concerned, it can be divided into four categories. First, the anti-India stands of the Maoists in Nepal. India's size and international clout causes apprehension in all the six smaller states with which India shares its boundary. India is a hotly debated neighbor among all the smaller neighbors in the sub-continent. The smaller countries are hyper sensitive about India and turn hostile to India on slightest protest. In Nepal India-bashing have always been an emblem of nationalism and the show of one's love for the mother land¹. As Prof. S.D.Muni rightly observes, "any problem that arises between two close neighbors like India and Nepal, or any other smaller South Asian country, is usually explained away in terms of India's bigness and it's over bearing and brotherly behavior. Indo-Nepal relations are obviously unequal relations"². The Maoists were not above or beyond the aforesaid argument. Since their emergence India bashing or creating a sentiment among the Nepalese against India had been one of the important weapon for the Maoists to mobilize the mass. Time and again the Maoist went on branding the role of India in Nepal as colonialist, expansionist, and made India responsible for whatever under development Nepal had. The Maoists opposed the 1950 Treaty of peace and friendship and the Mahakali River Treaty of 1960. The Maoist leader, Baburam Bhattarai, in his literature had given a critical analysis of India's role in the underdevelopment of Nepal in various sectors like Industries, Labour, Tourism, and Water and so on. To him India has been used as a medium through which the world imperialism entered into Nepal. To quote him:

¹ . See Nishal Nath Panday, *Nepal's Maoist Movement and implications for India and China*, (Manohar Publication, New Delhi, 2005), P.121.

² . See S.D.Muni, *India and Nepal: A Changing Relationship*, Konark Publishers, New Delhi, 1996, P.1.

This way world imperialism enters Nepal by riding over Indian horse. this combined intrusion and oppression of imperialism and expansionism has not only stunted the development of Nepal's national industries but it has also created a situation where previously self-reliant industries are now beginning to get liquidated one after another³.

He went on blaming India taking into account of the overall underdevelopment in Nepal.

To him:

in this over all context there is no doubt that 180 years of uninterrupted semi-colonial relation with India expansionism has had very negative and destructive effect on the development of internal class relations and socio-economic structures and in essence in the development of national capitalism in Nepal. That is why it is one of the most important objectives of Maoist people's war to break the chains of semi colonialism and to usher in a new type of national capitalism (or New Democracy) by mobilizing people of all ranks and classes suffering under all forms of semi-colonial exploitation and oppression⁴.

The anti-Indian stand of the Maoists is even clearer in their 40 points demands to the Nepali government before the emergence of the movement. A substantial portion of the 40 points demand of the Maoists covers the domination of India in Nepal in various fields ranging from nationalism to development, and from sociology to the politics of

³ . For details see Baburam Bhattarai, *Politico-Economic Rationale of People's War in Nepal*, (Janadisha Publications, Nepal April, 2004), P.63.

⁴ Ibid, P.64-65.

Nepal. So the emergence of Maoist insurgency in Nepal, its growth in scale and size and its anti-India stand had been really a challenge and a concern for India's age-old interest in Nepal.

Secondly, the 1700 k.M. long open border between Nepal and India had become even more a matter of concern for India with the growth of Maoist insurgency in Nepal. The open border and socio-cultural similarity of the people on either side of the border made quite easy movement to acquire arms and ammunitions and other necessary materials from India market. The free movement of the Nepalese Maoists in the Indian Territory and their organizational activities and political co-ordination with Indian rebel communist groups and north-east insurgents were certainly matter of concern for India. Besides, the open border also facilitated the increased incidents of illegal transaction on small arms and light weapons, provided sanctuaries of the Maoists and other criminal actors for treatment, hideouts and encouraged kidnapping for ransom, human trafficking, drug trafficking, cross border robbery, smuggling of forest resources and de-stabilizing the local labour market⁵. While talking to a Maoist, it was revealed that, the Maoists also procured arms and similar kind of help for free movements into India territory from the local police personnel of India⁶. As claimed from the Indian side, mostly by the Right wing political parties like BJP, since there was a link with the Maoists in Nepal and the terrorist elements from Pakistan and ISI, the open border between India and Nepal is

⁵. For details see Shiva K. Dhungna, "The Maoist Insurgency and Nepal-India Relations; The Issue in Contention", in *The Maoist Insurgency and Nepal-India Relations*, Shiva K. Dhungana, (ed), (Friends For Peace Publications, Series 010, Kathmandu, March 2006), P.7.

⁶. Interview conducted by the researcher with Dinanath Sharma, chief whip, Maoist parliament committee, secretariat member Maoist on 17-02-08.

certainly a matter of concern for both India and Nepal in relation to the Maoist insurgency in Nepal.

The third important factor which concerned India to respond to the Maoists in Nepal was the connection and links of the Maoists link with the similar kind of groups in India. As it has been mentioned earlier, the Maoist insurgency movement certainly influenced by the self extremist movements in India. Not only the Maoists but the first ever armed communist uprising, known as Jhapa Movement, in 1971 also inspired by the Naxalite movement of West Bengal. With the increasing instances of linkages between the Maoists of Nepal and similar kind of groups in India, in the course of the insurgency, the Indian government became certainly concerned. After the years of ignoring the Maoist of Nepal, India suddenly became concerned about the spread of this violent band so close to the Hindi heartland of Uttar Pradesh and Bihar. By the year 2002, the Maoist of Nepal ranked third in the Indian Home Minister's assessment. In the year 2001, India's intelligence Bureau Chief K.P.Sing, was reported to have said that, "there is a threat to relations between India and Nepal being entangled in the new ties emerging among the leftist insurgent groups"⁷. The above mentioned threat even more intensified with the formation of the CCOMPOSA (Co-ordination Committee of Maoist Parties and Organizations). This committee was believed to be emerged out of a meeting of comrades from nine Maoist parties, organized in some place in West Bengal. Among the nine Maoist parties, there were four Indian groups in this alliance- the Communist party of India- Marxist Leninist (People's War) of Andhra Pradesh, Maoist Communist Centre

⁷ As cited in Sudheer Sharma, "Deep red in the heartland", *Himal*, Vol.15, No.1, January 2002, P.35.

(MCC) of Bihar, Revolutionary Communist Centre of India (MLM) and the Revolutionary Communist Centre of India (Maoist). In the course of time the Maoists of Nepal in co-ordination with the left extremist groups of India proposed to establish a 'Compact Revolutionary Zone (CRZ). This was proposed to stretch from Kathmandu-Nepal to Hyderabad- India, what the Maoist used to call it from Pashupati to Tirupati. So the intensity, size and the scale of the Maoist insurgency in Nepal, in reverse became role model and sort of source of inspiration for the similar kind of groups in India. Hence, it was well understood by India, that the success or the failure of the Maoists in Nepal would definitely affect the similar kind of groups in India, which India has been fighting against for years.

The fourth important factor which prompted India responding to the Maoist insurgency in Nepal was the security and strategic interest of India- since the time of British India the state of Nepal has been strategic and security interest for India. After independence Nepal became even more vulnerable and important for India. One of the major threats that India got was the Chinese occupation of Tibet in 1950. This very act of China not only affected the balance of power in the Himalayas but gravely exposed the entire region. India was all aware of the fact that, Nepal would not be in a position to withstand in case there was a military or ideological pressure from China⁸. Because that time Nepal was going under a fundamental political change. With the Maoists tilting towards China ideologically and having India-bashing sentiment, once again, India could realize a repeated threat from Nepal. Throughout the insurgency movement, the Maoists of Nepal

⁸. For details see Sardar Patel's letter to Jawaharlal Neheru, 7th Nov. 1930. See, Indian Constitutional Documents, (Munshi papers, Vol.1, Bombay, 1967): 178.

never had a statement against China. Where as one of the main factors of the insurgency was against, what they called, India domination. Moreover, along with this, the presence of external forces like U.S., U.K., France, and Norway and on the top, the United Nations certainly was a matter of concern for India. India would not like the presence of external forces like U.S. in Nepal. This did not only harm the strategic interest of India but also the power equation in the sub-continent. While interviewing with a Nepali intellectual, it was revealed that, some of the U.N Delegates who came to India from Nepal for tourism purpose, happened to visit one of the banned armed outfits of Tarai region of Nepal⁹. This was not liked by India, because it exposed that India was harbouring the banned organizations of Nepal in its territory. And it created a rift in the bilateral relation of both countries. So involvement of forces like U.S., U.K. and U.N. and security threat perception from Chinese side in relation to Maoist insurgency was matter of concern for India.

India's Response to Different Regimes in Nepal

Nepal, as a state, has been going through a continuous political change since its exposure to the external world in general and precisely since 1951 in particular. 1951 was the year when the centuries old Rana autocracy was overthrown and a democratic form of government was established in Nepal. Ever since that it has been witnessed that in all its political changes in Nepal, India had played an important and decisive role in establishing and overthrowing a particular regime or the other. The rationale behind dealing with India's role in previous political change in Nepal is very important to answer the question whether India played a role in favour either of the Maoist or of the Government.

⁹.Interview with Nischal Nath Pandey, Professor, Tribhuban University, Kathmandu, Nepal on 11-02-2008.

Addressing India's role in previous political change would focus and highlights India's domination or highhanded-role in determining them.

Before stepping into a democratic framework, the Rana Regime enjoyed the confidence of the British India. By giving ransom amounts, permitting Gorkha soldiers to be recruited into the British army. The Ranas could take the British into their confidence and never had a threat to their regime from the British- India side. After the Independence of India the Ranas failed to get similar kind of support from Nehru Government. The Ranas were in fact weakened by various factors. Already there had started an armed democratic revolution against the Ranas in Nepal. India feared the Revolutionary democratic change in Nepal could jeopardize its own security. Addressing to the Indian parliament Prime Minister Nehru declared that, "India cannot risk her own security by anything going wrong in Nepal which permits either that barrier (Himalayas) to be crossed or otherwise weakens our frontier"¹⁰. Consequently, a compromise was made for a democratic set up in Nepal known as the Delhi Agreement in 1951 with the mediation of India. Three parties involved in this compromise apart from India were the king Mahendra, Popular Nepali Congress representation and the Rana prime minister. Ironically, it was alleged by Nepali Congress leader B.P.Koirala that, the three parties involved in the deal were neither properly consulted by India, nor given a chance to sit

¹⁰ See Nehru's statement in Avtar S Bhasin's, *Documents on Nepal's Relations with India and China*, 1949-66, (Academic Books Limited, Bombay, 1970), P.25.

together and discuss the matter. He further stated that all communications took place through Prime Minister Nehru, who never spoke about the terms concretely¹¹.

Another political change in which India played an indirect but very important role was the Royal coup of 1960 by king Mahendra. The Royal coup sustained for a period of 30 years in spite of regular sharp criticism. One of the interpretation and version of the Indian stand on the Royal coup was that, though India officially criticized it, but it was during this phase, Indian aid to Nepal had surprisingly increased. Taking the second Five Year Plan (1962-65) of Nepal as a base, the amount of Indian aid had been increased more than five times in the third and fourth Five Year Plans and ten times in the sixth Five Year Plan¹². The Panchayat Democratic phase of Nepal under the Monarchy seemed to going against India's idea of democracy. The question arises; if India wanted it could have toppled the panchayat Regime at its beginning, but why India continued to have passive support to it for almost thirty years.

There can be various versions on the afore asked question. One of the most important factors which made India support the Monarch might be the strained relationship of the Nepali Congress led Government against India in general and between B.P.Koirala and Nehru in particular. For example during a debate in Indian parliament, Prime Minister Nehru declared that, ".... any aggression against Bhutan and Nepal would

¹¹. For details see Statements of B.P. Koirala, cited in Shyam Shresta's "India's possible role in the future peace process in Nepal", in Shiva K Dhungana (ed), No. 5, P.165.

¹². See Shyam Shresta, "India's possible role in the future peace process in Nepal", No. 5, P.169.

be regarded aggression against India”¹³. This statement of Nehru was immediately reacted by B.P.Koirala. He stated, “I take Mr. Nehru’s statement as an expression of friendship that in case of aggression against Nepal, India would send help, if such help is ever sought. It could never be taken as suggesting unilateral action”¹⁴. Before this incident happened, there already started anti-Indian bogey by the Nepali Congress led Government. As early as 1956, there was a demand for the end of special relationship and beginning of ‘equal relationship’. The role of Indian members in the ‘constitutive Mechanism’ in Nepal was opposed by the then prime minister Tanka Prasad Acharya and he also demanded the Indian Military Mission (IMM) in Nepal. In fact Tanka Prasad Acharya was successful in winding up the former. Circumstances like these created discontent between India towards the democratic forces in Nepal.

Another interpretation in this regard is that king Mahendra, after the Royal Coup, established a close and cordial relation with China and later with Pakistan. He successfully used the China card to extract concession and recognition to the regime. The changing security concerns with Indo-Sino differences and the war 1962, led India to reassess its policy towards Nepal. In the change of stand, India approved of Nepal’s panchayat system¹⁵. So looking into the panchayat Regime of Nepal one would find, one of the major factor of survival of panchayat regime had been continuous Indian backing.

¹³. For details see Jawaharlal Nehru, *Lok Sabha Debate*, Second Series, Vol. xxxv, No.10, 1959, P.2211.

¹⁴. See Asian Recorder, Vol.51, 19-25, December, 1959, as cited in Shyam Shrestha, , No. 5, P.168.

¹⁵. For details see Padmaja Murthy, “India and Nepal: Security and Economic Dimensions”, Accessed from the website http://www.ciaonet.org/olj/sa/sa_99mup01.html on 26th February, 2009.

Once again India played a crucial role in toppling the panchayat regime and bringing about and supporting the movements for restoration of democracy in Nepal in 1991. Various factors, which went against the interest of India, compelled India to support the 1991 movement for the restoration of democracy. The first important factor which compelled India going against the Panchayat regime was the proposal for 'zone of peace' (ZOP). The proposal of ZOP was propounded by king Birendra in 1976. The idea behind the very proposal was directed towards relative political independence vis-à-vis India. It was an attempt by king Birendra to dilute mutual security convergence of two countries¹⁶. The proposal of ZOP was thought out as one of the ways to come out from the Indian security umbrella and to change the existing security perceptions¹⁷. The Indian government, from the very beginning, made its stand clear and remained defiant. It never approved the proposal though the proposal was recognized more than hundred countries including U.S., former USSR and China. So the proposal of ZOP, once again, boosted the strained relationship between Nepal and India.

Secondly, following the proposal of ZOP, what culminated the irritation of India towards the panchayat regime was, when Nepal imported arms and ammunitions from China in 1988 without the consultation with India. Nepal's import of arms from China included anti-air craft guns and medium range SSM AND AK-49 assault rifles. The import of arms and ammunitions from China was a complete dilution of the spirit of 1950 Treaty.

¹⁶ Ibid. P.

¹⁷ Shyam Shrestha, No. 12, P.171.

Thirdly, in the 1980s Nepal tried to decrease trade and aid independence on India. Till that time India continued to be the largest donor and aid provider to Nepal. On an understanding of Treaty of trade and transit, Nepal always wanted to deal with it as two separate treaties. One was on trade and the other was on transit. While transit was of permanent importance, trade interests changed from time to time¹⁸. It should be mentioned here that, the Janata Party Government in India attempted to develop a close relationship and it agreed to the afore mentioned two separate treaties on trade and transit in 1978. An agreement to control un-authorised trade was also concluded. From Nepal side, it responded, not quite friendly, by imposing restriction on the movement of Indians in northern border areas of Nepal. A tariff of 55 percent was imposed on Indian goods entering Nepal. Nepal also regularized the restriction on citizenship and introduced a work permit system requirement for Indians. This act of Nepal adversely affected the interests of people of Indian origin in Nepal.

So it was Indian side to respond when the 1978 treaties on trade and transit rights expired. The Rajiv Gandhi Government responded using its economic leverage over Nepal. This time India insisted that the entire scope of India Nepal relations be reviewed and redefined. India also insisted on negotiating a single unified treaty in addition to an agreement on un-authorised trade¹⁹. In March 23 1989, India closed the trade and transit points except two border entry points. This had immediate effect on Nepal's economy. On the other hand in 1989-90, India's policy towards the political parties in general and the Nepali Congress in particular changed dramatically and it wanted to establish rapport

¹⁸. See Padmaja Murthy: No. 15, P.

¹⁹. See Priyanka Singh, "India-Nepal Relations: Rickety Road Map", *World Focus*, Vol.27, No.5, May 2006, P.25.

with the Nepali Congress after weighing the pros and cons of the multi-party Democracy in Nepal. The Indian decision-makers took the view that in a multi-party democracy, lobbies could be created for or against certain policies with in turn, would help restrain a government²⁰. So the panchayat regime was weakened by, more than anything else, was the Indian trade embargo imposed on Nepal in 1989²¹.

So from the above discussion it has been clear that, India's role played to a great extent in all the political change that Nepal experienced. Moreover, it can be said that the deterioration of Indo-Nepal relation affected the political change in Nepal. Keeping in mind the above back-drop, it is important to explore, what role India played, what way India responded to the Maoist insurgency of Nepal.

India's Response

So far India's response to the Maoist insurgency in Nepal concerned, it is observed that, India did not take the Maoists seriously till 2001. From the emergence of the Maoists in 1996 till the year 2001, India's response remained casual. India treated the Maoist insurgency in Nepal as a law and order problem of Nepal. And the government of India absolved itself of any responsibility in restraining and containing the activities of the Maoists along the Indo-Nepal border²². India's passive response towards the Maoists insurgency in Nepal can be termed, as Shyam Shrestha observed:

It is probable that Indian government, as its Nepalese counterpart did not and could not foresee that an insurgency started by a small group of

²⁰. See Lok Raj Baral, *Nepal: problems of Governance*, (Konark Publishers, New Delhi, 1993), P.69.

²¹. For details see Willian Raeper and Martin Hoftun, *Spring Awakening: An account of the 1990 Revolution in Nepal*, (Penguin Books India, New Delhi, 1992), P.20.

²². See S.D.Muni, *Maoist Insurgency in Nepal*, (Rupa Co., New Delhi, 2003), P.58.

revolutionaries with crude-home-made guns and Khukaries in four hill districts would expand so dramatically and become security threat for both of the countries in such a short period of time. It cannot also be ruled out that India could have been waiting as a passive spectator for an opportune moment in the form of a severe political crisis in Nepal in order to 'fish in trouble water'²³.

The above mentioned interpretation of Shyam Shrestha, especially the second probable strategy of India, might be correct, but for five years, 1996 to 2001, India's look, but let it go on', policy got severe criticism from K.V.Rajan, India's former ambassador to Nepal. K.V. Rajan, very critically suggested India that:

India, too, must accept its share of responsibility- it has been a passive spectator for far too long, despite the obvious danger it poses to its own security. There is no excuse for the fact that despite frequent communications from the Nepalese side, Maoist leaders for the past few years have been moving freely across the border, holding meeting with senior Nepalese politicians on Indian soil, without Indian agencies apparently knowing about it²⁴.

In the year 2001, all of sudden, India for the first time responded to the Maoist insurgency in Nepal branding them as 'terrorist' outfit. It is ironic to notice that, the country, which was very casual in responding to the Maoists in Nepal, is the first country

²³. For details see Shyam Shrestha, "India's Possible Role in the Future Peace Process of Nepal", in Shiva K. Dhungana's, *The Maoist Insurgency and Nepal- India Relations*, (ed), (Friends for Peace Publication, Kathmandu, 2006), P.177.

²⁴. See K.V.Rajan, as cited in Shyam Shrestha, No-23, Pp. 176-177.

to brand them as the terrorists. This response from India came immediately after the break down of talks between the Maoists and the Nepalese government in November 2001. More than anything, what worried India the most was the presence of the international forces like the U.S. and U.K. on the Nepalese soil in the name of fighting against the 'Global Terrorism'. Apart from this, once the peace talk between the Maoist and the Nepalese government failed, the Maoist insurgency became more intensified, which caused definitely worry for India. The factors behind the response of India towards the Maoists in Nepal can be classified under the following three heads.

1. The formation of CCOMPOSA and suspicious growing relation with Maoists of Nepal and similar kind of groups of Nepal.
2. The direct involvement of international forces like U.S.
3. The change of Government in India.

Formation of CCOMPOSA and India's Growing Concern

'Co-ordination committee of Maoist parties and organizations of south Asia' (CCOMPOSA) was formed with a combination of nine violence espousing reds of south Asia in West Bengal on July 2001. Initiated by the Maoists of Nepal, CCOMPOSA had four Indian groups in this alliance. They were the communist party of India – Marxist Leninist (people's war) of Andhra Pradesh, Maoist communist centre of Bihar, the Revolutionary Communist Centre of India (Maoist) and the Revolutionary Communist Centre of India (MLM). The other members of this alliance were Bangladesher Samyabadi Dal (M-L), Purbo Bangla Sarbahara Party (MPK) of Bangladesh, and Ceylon Communist party (Maoist) from Sri Lanka. The vision of this alliance was to stretch the

revolutionary ‘success’ achieved in Nepal across larger party of South Asia²⁵. This proposed ‘Compact Revolutionary Zone’ was to stretch from Hyderabad of India to Kathmandu of Nepal. Highlighting on the motive and aims of formation of CCOMPOSA, Maoist leader of Nepal Baburam Bhattarai said:

CCOMPOSA has been lunched to unify and co-ordinate the revolutionary process in the region. As South Asia is developing into one of the most potent volcanic centers of revolution in the twenty-first century, this initiative of the CCOMPOSA has been very timely and significant. We are all strengthening and expanding CCOMPOSA which is destined to play a historical role in the South Asia region²⁶.

In the 2001 July meeting of the CCOMPOSA said that, “we declare our principled unity and conscious determination to hoist the Red Flag of Marxism-Leninism-Maoism and Communism in its entire splendor from the silver summits of the Himalayas and throughout the region”²⁷.

Before the emergence of the above mentioned ‘Compact Revolutionary Zone’ through CCOMPOSA, there were intelligence reports in India regarding the same. Indian media like Times of India and Frontline came out of the news that, the people’s war group was planning to create Compact Revolutionary Zone (CRZ) from Hyderabad to Kathmandu, taking Chhattisgarh, Madhya Pradesh, Bihar and Jharkhand into its area of

²⁵. See Sudheer Sharma, “Deep Red in the Heart Land”, *Himal*, Vol.15, No.1, January 2002, P.34.

²⁶. For details see Baburam Bhattarai, Interview with Nepali Times, Kathmandu, 13-19 July 2001, P.5.

²⁷. As mentioned in Sudheer Sharma, No.25, P.34.

influence with the help of other rebels out fits²⁸. This report came in early July 2001. This claim was initially rejected by both the Indian administration and by the Maoist leadership of Nepal. Once CCOMPOSA was formally launched all of sudden it became a serious matter of concern for India. Because if one looks back in the early 1970s, it was the Naxalites in India who inspired the communist movement in South Asia in general and the Nepal's communist in particular. But by 2001 the situation was well reversed. The achievements and the success that the Maoists in Nepal achieved in six years of time fighting against a whole nation state inspired not only the likeminded groups in India but the movements across the South Asia region.

Looking into the India's reaction to the formation of CRZ and CCOMPOSA in relation to the Maoist insurgency in Nepal, the very first question arises, what made India concerned regarding the same? Once the CCOMPOSA was launched, a survey was conducted by the Home Ministry of Government of India. The Home Ministry came out of its Annual Report (MOHA 2002-2003) which stated that, country wide Naxalites violence has increased by about 13.8 percent since September 2001. The report also mentioned that in 2003, there were 546 incidents of Naxalites violence and 509 were killed in them. The MOHA also recorded that, group-wise activities of the 'left wing extremist groups' in the country revealed an increase in the violent activities of all the major groups in India as compared to the previous year²⁹.

Keeping in mind the above mentioned reports of the Home Ministry, the Indian administration became very sensitive towards the Maoists of Nepal. From a policy of

²⁸. Shyam Shrestha, P. 176.

²⁹. For details see Ministry of Home Affairs Report, 2002-2003.

indifference towards the Maoist in Nepal the India Government became all the more serious. One of the reasons may be, as discussed earlier, the CPN-Maoist, with all its achievements and success had been a motivating and unifying factor for many similar kind of groups in India. In India groups like PWG, and MCC were not only united in action, but also trying to unify their party organizations into one. Indian intelligence could feel that the PWG and the MCC merge under a new identity: the 'All India Maoist Communist Centre' (AIMCC) and would acquire a more militant 'avatar' in India³⁰. The threat perception for India was that, if both these organizations succeeded in doing so, a CRZ would be created linking Andhra Pradesh, Orissa, Chhatisgarh, Jharkhand, Bihar and all the frontier territories of Nepal- the Terai. This threat perception was clearly stated in the annual report of MOHA OF India 2002-2003:

the restructuring of relation between Naxalites outfits, extensive militarization, particularly by the Communist Party of India Marxist Leninist- people's war (CPML-PW), formation of new organizational structure for military as well as organizational tasks by CPML-PW, possibilities of co-operation between Naxalites outfits and other terrorist organizations in India and abroad are all matter of concern. Efforts were made by left-wing. Extremist outfits towards actualization of the Compact Revolutionary Zone (CRZ) envisaged by the MCC, CPML-PW and the CPN-Maoist of Nepal for linking up the

³⁰ Nihar Nayak, "Left-wing Extremism: Synchronized on Slough", *South Asia Intelligence Review*, Vol. 2, No.28, January 2004, P.1.

strongholds of CPML-PW in Telengana and with those of the CPN-Maoist in Nepal³¹.

All these threat perception and fear for India turned into a reality with the formation of the CCOMPOSA and with the growing linkages with the Maoists of Nepal and similar kinds of groups in India. Looking at the growing relation between the Maoists of Nepal and similar outfits in India, the Indian ambassador to Nepal Shyam Sharan urged the Maoist to “cut of their links with the terrorist entities in India like the PWG and MCC”³². Hence the Maoist insurgency in Nepal had become a serious matter of concern for India in relation to its relation to the groups in India.

Maoist in Nepal and Connection with Indian Groups

Before the Maoists of Nepal declared the People’s War, they consulted with the PWG of India in selecting regions within Nepal that would be most conducive for launching their struggle. In this regard, in 1995, people’s war strategists from India conducted two surveys and recommended mid hills of mid-western Nepal. The People’s War Group also helped training the first few batches of the Nepali guerillas³³. At the initial stage of the Maoist insurgency it used to appear that, the Maoists in Nepal were taking a leaf from the book written by the PWG and MCC. Moreover, the Maoists of Nepal used to use either their own shelter in India or depended on PWG’s shelter. Initially, it was the PWG and other Maoist groups in India supported the Maoist comrades of Nepal. For example, as early as 13 September 1998, India’s struggling Forum for People’s Resistance organized

³¹ Ministry of Home Affairs, GOI, Annual Report, 2002/03, P.3:6.

³². For details see The Kathmandu Post, August 14, 2003.

³³. For details see Sudheer Sharma, No.25, P.38.

a meeting in Calcutta and called on all Maoists in the two countries to join hands in supports of the struggle in Nepal. Another group called the Solidarity Forum to support the people's war in Nepal even organized a rally and public meeting in New Delhi on 13th February 1999, to mark the third anniversary of the insurgency in Nepal³⁴. So from the above mentioned facts it is clear that the Maoist groups of India particularly the PWG and the MCC inspired and helped the Maoist insurgency in Nepal in terms of ideologically strategically and military wise.

Communist movement in India during 1970s was a motivating factor for the communist movement in Nepal. But by the year 2000, the situation was well reversed. The communist movement under the leadership of the Maoist in Nepal became an inspiring and motivating factor not only for the communist groups in India but also the communist groups in whole of South Asian Region. The connection between the Communist Party of Nepal (Maoist) and the groups in India, both ideologically and strategically, grew which ultimately led to the formation of a Compact Revolutionary Zone under the alliance of CCMPOSA. Though the connection between the communist groups of two countries was nothing new or first of its kind but this time it was more of a threat perception towards India both internally and externally. Once the Maoists had their strong holds in Nepal the connection became more solid with the Indian groups. Exchange of ideology, joint military exercises, arm deals and exchanges of ideas became even more frequent. As early as May 2000, before the formation of CCMPOSA, one of the India's magazines 'Frontline' reported that "the growing co-ordination between the extremist groups in Nepal and India have resulted in simultaneous attacks in both

³⁴ . See Ibid. P.36.

countries. When Nepali Maoists struck in Dailekh, on April 7, 2000 killing 47 people, the Indian Maoists of MCC also killed 14 people in Hajaribagh district of Jharkhand on April 14 2000³⁵. Followed by this report, Indian news paper reported that, “the Nepali government had made an official request to the Indian government that, the activities of Nepali Maoists in Indian territory be checked, claiming that they were being trained in Bihar by members of People’s War Group (PWG) and Maoist Communist Centre (MCC)³⁶. Till that time India Government used to be in a denial mode claiming its territory was not being used by the Nepali Maoists.

There had been many reports and interpretation regarding the Maoists of Nepal’s link with various insurgent groups in India. In 2001, a Nepali government commission on peace prospects with the Maoists, headed by the then Prime Minister Sher Bahadur Deuba concluded that the Nepal’s rebels have ties with the Northern Bihar Liberation Front and the United Liberation Front of Assam³⁷. This report became even clearer when it came to the public that the ULFA was a member in South Asian People’s Journalist Association (SAPJA)³⁸. Not only there were evidence on Maoists’ link with the insurgent groups in the North-East region of India, but there were also reports which claimed the Maoists of Nepal also had links with the terrorist groups of Kashmir. In an interview in *Spotlight*, it was reported that, Bamdev Chhetri, a Maoist leader of Nepal, had visited Jammu in September 2002 to establish contact with Kashmir militant groups for

³⁵. See *The Frontline*, issue May, 2000.

³⁶. See The Times of India, Delhi, April 16, 2001.

³⁷. See Sudheer Sharma, No.25, P.35.

³⁸. On November 2001, the journalists of South Asia, sympathetic to the rebels, who call themselves ‘pro people’ scribes announced the founding of the South Asia people’s Journalist Association (SAPJA). The ULFA had their delegate in this named Ajit Kumar Bhuyan, editor of the Assamiya Daily ‘Aji’.

procuring arms for the CPN (Maoist)³⁹. Apart from that, the Indian Intelligence sources, quoted in Hindustan, an Indian daily news paper, reported that, the Maoists of Nepal were believed to have obtained a large amount of sophisticated weapons equivalent to Rs. 55 million from India's people's war group⁴⁰. According to the news report of the Himalayan times, which had been denied by the Defense Ministry of Nepal, the Maoists of Nepal had set up an improvised helipad in the thick jungles of Bihar and are using choppers to transport weapons and cadres. Again, very similar to this, the news report, quoting the intelligence wing of the Bihar police, said that, the Maoist insurgents had set up training camps in the jungles of East and West Champaran districts and were regrouping with help from their Indian counter parts⁴¹.

So the Maoists of Nepal and its connection with India groups starting from Kashmir to the north-eastern region of India was certainly a serious issue of concern for the Indian administration. With the growing connection with these groups, there came out different version of threat perception and security issue concerns for India. Scholars of different orientation could sense a potential threat to Indian in relation to the Maoists connection with the north-eastern insurgent groups; Prakash A. Raj made a statement that,

As the Maoists in Nepal were collaborating with some separatist movements such as the Khumbuwan Liberation Front in the far eastern hills, the possibility of involvement of separatist movements in the

³⁹. See *The Kathmandu Post*, 17th July, 2002, P.1.

⁴⁰. See *The Hindustan*, Lucknow, February 27, 2002, P.08.

⁴¹. See Himalayan Times as mentioned in Nischalnath Pandey's *nepal's Maoist Movement and Implications for India and China*, (Manohar Publications, New Delhi, 2005), P.135.

northeast with that of Maoist would endanger Indian security, especially in the sensitive 'chicken's neck' area near Siliguri in India where a narrow strip of Indian territory links (the) northeast with the rest of India⁴².

Moreover, the Maoists' activities in the Terai region were also matter of serious concern for India. Nepal's Terai is the bordering areas to the Indian Territory. An open border, connection of Nepal's Maoist and similar groups in India, illegal arms and ammunition supply through the border certainly made Indian Administration more concern regarding the Indo-Nepal border. This was not only about the Maoist insurgency, but the Indian administration could realize that, the Maoist affected Terai region and its spillover effect on the bordering areas of Indian territory, might cause the total Indo-Gangetic plain seriously disturbed. And the Indian Administration was well aware of the fact that, the disturbed Terai region and its connection with the Indian Territory was more close to the Indian capital than any other insurgent or uprising movements in India. Analyzing this Problem Pushkar Gautam rightly mentioned that, "even if the Nepalese security forces were able to drive the Maoists out of the hills of Nepal, the guerrillas would simply head off to their hideous in India. What this also meant was that Nepal's security concern would span the Indian plains, where both the problem and solution may be hiding"⁴³.

More than the concerns for the Maoists of Nepal, the growing connection of the insurgent groups across South Asia was in fact a matter of concern. Not exactly the

⁴². See Prakash A. Raj, "Maoist Insurgency and India", *The Kathmandu Post*, 9th April, 2002, P.4.

⁴³. Pushkar Gautam, "Borderline War: Nepal's Maoist War could Spill over into India", *The Nepali Times*, 1-7 March, 2002, P.3.

insurgent groups, many a time the terrorist groups were also connected to these insurgent groups. As rightly mentioned regarding the insurgent groups and terrorist groups connection in South Asia:

In the terrorists of the North-East establish some kind of link with Afghanistan and the Golden Triangle and Mekong Valley and the state of Molucca in the east and the LTTE further south, terrorism will pose a great threat. As most Afghan warlords are now fighting in Jammu and Kashmir, one cannot rule out the possibility of their expanding links with insurgents in western Nepal⁴⁴.

This mentioned statement, though was a serious threat perception for the whole of South Asia, but its relation to the security threat towards India cannot be undermined. Apart from the above mentioned Maoist connection with the similar kind of groups in India, what also made India worried with the Maoists in Nepal was its connection with the 'Gorkhas' and the Nepalese Diaspora in India. Gorkhas have been a major part of the Indian army since the time of Maharaja Ranjit Singh, when he recruited them in the Sikh army some two hundred years back. They also served the British India. And now the Indian army has six regiments consisting of 60,000 Nepalese Gorkhas serving. Along with them there are 1, 15,000 Gorkhas dependent on the military pension branch at the Indian Embassy in Kathmandu. At the same time it would be interesting to note that these Gorkha soldiers and the Maoists in Nepal are more or less from the same clans; and the possibility of these soldiers and the Maoist insurgents. Gen. Padmanabhan told a

⁴⁴. For details see Dhrub Kumar, "Regional Initiatives Against Terrorism Required", Interview with Spotlight, 21 September 2001, Pp22-3, as mentioned in Nischalnath Pandey's, No.1, P.134.

gathering of ex-Indian Gorkha soldiers in Pokhara that, they should always be loyal to Nepal and should not help the Maoist insurgents in any way⁴⁵. This statement of Gen. Padmanabhan clearly mentions that the Government of India and the Indian army particularly could sense that, there was a link and connection of the Gorkha, retired soldiers and the Maoists. Speculations from many fields and areas were made claiming, the British and Indian ex-Gorkha-soldiers were training the Maoist insurgents with their skills and experience in jungle war fare. The speculations came to be proved true when Indian Government stopped the pension privileges of retired Gorkha soldier of 2/11 Gorkha Rifles, Jagat Bahadur Sunwar and Lance Naik Ratna Bashadur Gurung on the ground that they were assisting the Maoist insurgents. Retired General Ashok K. Mehta speaking out at an interaction programme at the united Service Institution of India on 16 September 2002 mentioned that several such cases of retired Gorkha soldiers helping the Maoists had been reported⁴⁶.

Coming to the aspect of the Nepalese Diaspora in India and its connection with the Maoist Insurgency in Nepal, it added up to the concerns for India. The Nepalese Diaspora in India comes up to roughly 8 million. This population of 8 million is well spread over states like Uttarakhand, Uttar Pradesh and West Bengal to Sikkim, Assam, and Meghalaya. In places like Darjeeling in West Bengal, Sikkim, Uttarakhand and Meghalaya throughout India one would find the Nepalese employed in various formal and informal sectors, starting from security guards, rickshaw pullers to the waiters and workers in the hotels and restaurants. With the emergence of the Maoists in Nepal and

⁴⁵. See as cited in Nischalnath Pandey, No.1. P. 137.

⁴⁶. See for details Ibid. P137.

their appeal towards the downtrodden and the poor of Nepal had created a sense of positive notion among the Nepalese working in India. From the very beginning the Maoist went on addressing the mass inside Nepal over the issues like unemployment, poverty, social justice. And this created a hope and made a sense among the Nepalese population inside India, especially the working class that the Maoist could bring about a positive change in Nepal and that could bring down all the problems mentioned above. The Maoists very successfully could win the trust of the Nepalese in India. these people inside India went on organizing rallies in different places in India time to time and mobilized not only the Nepalese but also tried to draw the support of the public in India in favour of the Maoist insurgency. rallies, meetings, and other activities in support of the Maoist insurgency in Nepal in Indian land was not definitely a good symbol. What made India much worried about this situation was that, these activities were also supported by some of the leftwing groups, of India, intellectuals, civil societies and the mass. In one hand India has been fighting against similar kind of its own problem and on the other hand this added up to that.

The Maoists in their propaganda highlighted the issue of Nepali Nationalism. Whenever in Nepal, one talk about nationalism, it has to go through an anti- Indian notion. The Maoists were no exception to that. Back in India there are instances where the Nepali dominated places like Darjeeling and Sikkim demand for some special privileges and status. The demand for a separate Gorkha state by the Gorkha National Liberation Front (GNLF) led by Subhash Ghising can be cited as an example. The idea of a Greater Nepal formation which includes the places in India, that have the substantial

Nepalese population, certainly created a pan-Nepali Nationalism. And this, in a way, created an anti India sentiment among these people. The Maoists, since their emergence, had been anti- India, throughout their insurgent movement. The idea of Nepali-Nationalism and Nepali identity was well capitalized by the Maoists. Based on this, there were reports that claimed the Maoist insurgents had been instigating the Nepalese in Darjeeling and surrounding areas to assert their right to self-determination. According to Prof. Nischanth Pandey, this activity of the Maoists inside the territory of India might be the case of West Bengal chief minister Buddhadev Bhattacharya's anger and the subsequent hard-line attitude against the Maoists⁴⁷. In this connection, the then Prime Minister of Nepal Sher Bahadur Deuba called on the chief minister of West Bengal. As an outcome of this meeting Abhijit Mazumdar, General Secretary CPI (ML) Darjeeling district, was arrested on a suspicion that he was the key contact point of Nepalese Maoist leaders. In spite of all the efforts of the Government of India to wipe out the Maoists and cut all the links of Maoists in India, still India continued to be in serious dilemma. On the one hand however, aids and privileges are given to the Nepalese in India. The Nepalese in India continued to treat India as a second home. As rightly mentioned by Prof. Pandey, the Nepali Indians for several generations have still maintained their contacts in Nepal; they are, in spite of everything, disconnected with their status and employment in Indian cities, making them an un appreciative and ungrateful Diaspora that neither returns to their own country, nor integrates happily with the adopted country⁴⁸. The areas like Darjeeling and Sikkim are very closely situated to India's most sensitive North-Eastern region, where India has been fighting against various insurgent groups. This was a very

⁴⁷ Ibid. P.140.

⁴⁸ Ibid. P.140-141.

concerned issue in relation to the Maoist connection with the Nepali Diaspora in India. India realized that any anti-India movement by these groups and their connection with the Maoists of Nepal and which are very close to the North-eastern areas would go against not only the internal security but the external security of the country as well.

Presence of International Forces and Displeasure for India

Though the Maoist insurgency in Nepal drew the attention of India more than any other country, it also drew the attention of other countries especially the United States of America and the United Kingdom. The United States of America reacted to the Maoist insurgency more than any other country. Once two of the America's places were attacked in 9/11 by the 'terrorist group' America made it a point to fight against, what they call, 'Global Terrorism'. In the name of fighting the global terrorism, US declared the Maoists as terrorist and made its presence in Nepali soil. Visit of US state secretary, Collin Powell, the first ever visit of any high level statesman to Nepal, in 2002, was in fact a point which made India realized its interest on Nepal. The presence of America followed by other western countries and their reaction towards the Maoist insurgency was not only a matter of concern for the Maoists, but for India as well. The geo-strategic position of Nepal, as mentioned earlier, makes Nepal a very important country in the South Asia region. The presence of US in Nepal would implicitly mean that, it wants to keep its eyes vigilant on two of the Asia's major powers, India and China. For US there could not be a better situation and a better country other than Nepal.

With the presence of these above mentioned countries in Nepal, the displeasure of India towards Nepal grew. What made India to take up the Maoist issues more seriously than before was that the state of Nepal continued to get help in terms of military assistance from the countries like U S, UK, and Belgium. According to the 1950 Treaty of Peace and Friendship, Nepal was supposed to import arms and ammunitions from India or through the mediation of India. Now that Nepal was getting military assistance from the above mentioned countries India felt a breach to the 1950 treaty. This was not for the first time Nepal got the military assistance from the foreign countries other than India. In 1989, when Nepal imported arms from China against India's consent, India reacted strongly. Comparing to the military assistance Nepal was getting in the name of combating the Maoist from the western countries, the Chinese export of arms to Nepal was very nominal both in quantity and quality. But this time India was not in a position to take a hard line approach what it did in 1989. Because there were the involvement of the major powers like US and UK. India could only realize that it was high time to react to the Maoists more seriously to engage itself in the internal affairs of Nepal and to win the trust of the ruling elites. Reacting to this issue, former Indian Ambassador to Nepal commented that, "India was left in a weak position to question the need or assert itself under the 1950 Treaty"⁴⁹. On a very similar note, Yuv Raj Gihimire, commented that, "the increasing military assistance from the US and the UK has provided some

⁴⁹. For details see K.V.Rajan, *Recent US/UK Activities in Nepal*, (Observers Research Foundation, New Delhi, 2003).

maneuverability to Nepal in its foreign policy and has diluted the issue of importing arms from third countries without Indian knowledge or consent”⁵⁰.

As mentioned above, US state secretary of state visited Nepal in January 2002. Once after this visit a number of military aid and help was granted to Nepal by US. To look back in the history of US Nepal relation prior to this visit, one would find there was no military office in the US Embassy in Nepal. Since the visit of Collin Powell, a military training and assistance programme was been seen by a defense advisors of USA. In the year 2003, throughout, there were up to 25 American military trainers periodically present in Nepal as part of exercise ‘Balance Nail’⁵¹. According to one of the statements given by the US Ambassador to Nepal James F Moriarty, in the three year’s period from 2002- 2004, US had given US \$24 million military aid to Nepal and increased the amount up to US \$ 40 million in the year 2004⁵². Similarly the United Kingdom was not lagging behind in the race for providing military help to Nepal. It was only with the initiative of the British government, an international conference was held in London in June 2002 to understand and look at the Maoist problem in Nepal. Apart from that, the UK also provided Rs 780 million as military aid in the year 2002-2003. A special envoy was also appointed by the British government in Nepal in order to co-ordinate the military relations between the US, UK and India.

⁵⁰. For details see Interview with Yuv Raj Ghimre, as mentioned in, Rajan Bhattarai, *Geopolitics of Nepal and International Responses to Conflict Transformation*, (FFP Publication, Series 006, Kathmandu, January 2005).

⁵¹. Ashok K. Meheta, “Maoist Insurgency in Nepal: Implications for India”, *Bharat Rakshak Monitor*, Vol. 6, No.4, Jan-Feb 2004.

⁵². *The Kathmandu Post Daily*, 11 Sept. 2004 as cited in Shyam Shrestha, No.12, P.182.

While all these activities were going on in the immediate and one of the most important neighborhoods of India. India seemed quite helpless during that time. Because it was neither possible for India to stop the flow of arms aid and help from the countries like US and UK nor feasible for India to take an action against Nepal in a similar manner of 1989. But certainly India was successful in not allowing the passage of the consignment of 5,500 machine guns from Belgium in 2002, for some days, until Nepal was ready to buy INSAS rifles from India. For India the US-UK block was too powerful to react. With its helplessness, Indian External Affairs Minister Mr Natwar Singh came out a statement that, “India is determined to work closely with the US to take the partnership forward in all areas”⁵³. Adding to the statement of Natwar Singh, US Ambassador to Nepal mentioned on 10th September 2002 that, “the US government is working together with Indian government to fight against the Maoist in Nepal”⁵⁴.

Though both the countries, India and US, came to an understanding on fighting against the Maoist, India simply could not undermine the fear and potential strategic threat with the presence of the US in Nepal. All of sudden the government was all set for a competition, in providing military assistance to Nepal. To prove itself as a friendly neighbor, India provided Rs 3.2 billion military aid between 2002-2004. Along with that, it also provided 13,000 INSAS rifles, 6 helicopters, 2 gunships and many more military tracks. In a way this move of Indian government, helping the Nepal Government, against the Maoist, was a kind of forced and desperate foreign policy towards Nepal. The presence of the US and other western countries in Nepal left India in such a situation that,

⁵³. As cited in Shyam Shrestha, Ibid. P.183.

⁵⁴. *The Nepal Samachar-Patra Daily*, 11 Sept. 2004, cited in Shyam Shrestha, No.12, P.183.

if Colin Powell went to the military head quarters of Nepal and discussed defense related policy matters; the Indian external Affairs Minister also demanded the same and did the same. If the US Ambassador or the UK army chief went inside the Nepalese military barracks around the country to observe and know the security position, the Indian counterpart followed the suit. In fact, India was paying for the tear of negligence and indifference towards the Maoist insurgency in Nepal.

As mentioned above, India was in a position, with the presence of the western countries, of mutual understanding with these countries. In the mean time India was fully aware of the fact that, the presence of countries like US and UK was not a very desirable development in India's own long-term interests. Reacting to the gradual spread and consolidation of the American and British military and political presence, India's Foreign Secretary Kanwal Sibal made a statement at the French Institute of International Relations in Paris on 17 December 2002 that, "Western countries should also be careful about extending excessive military assistance to Nepal in order to avoid increase in the lethality of internal conflict and leakage of arms to the Maoists"⁵⁵. India's displeasure on the issue of western countries intervention in the internal affairs of Nepal became more evident, when it refused to join multilateral committees to monitor developmental, political and security issues in Nepal. By inspecting the arms cargos from America and Belgium India wanted to make sure that they did not pose any long-term threat to India's internal stability and security by these arms falling eventually into the wrong hands. All these reactions of India towards the countries involved in Nepal, mentioned above, makes it clear that India was very much concerned about its own strategy security and interest in

⁵⁵ The Indian Express, New Delhi, 3 January 2003.

Nepal. In a way involvement of third countries made India respond, unlike the earlier situation, to the Maoist insurgency in Nepal.

Initiatives by India to Crackdown the Maoist in Nepal

Considering the threat assessment and the fear factor, caused by the Maoist insurgency in Nepal, due to the reasons mentioned earlier, India's first reaction towards the same was anti-Maoist. There could be different reasons, why the government of India choosed to act against the Maoist insurgency and to take a pro-monarch stand at the initial stage. First important cause could be, India has been fighting against a number of similar kinds of groups in different parts of its own territory. As mentioned earlier, there were links and exchange of ideas and arms between the groups from India and the Maoist in Nepal. Any initiative by India to help the Maoists in Nepal would lead to the success for the Maoists in India. Because the state of Nepal was in no way would be successful fighting against the Maoist if at all there was external help and support towards the Maoist. And the success of Maoist in Nepal would definitely boost up the similar minded groups of India, which would definitely go against the internal security interest of India. Secondly, India, during the period from 2001-2004 was being ruled by a National Democratic Alliance (NDA) Government led by the Bharatiya Janata Party (BJP). BJP is known to be a pro-Hindu political party. Nepal used to be the only Hindu state in the world ruled by a king who used to be considered as an incarnation of lord Vishnu. So it was obvious for the NDA Government of India to support the Monarch on the ideological ground. Thirdly, the countries like the US, UK, Belgium and some other came out openly by providing military and other assistance to the Government of Nepal to crack down the Maoists. If

India wished to help the Maoist, it would have invited the criticism not only from the above mentioned countries but internationally also.

One of the first initiatives India had taken to crack down the Maoists of Nepal was that, it promised military assistance to Nepal in 2001, which started reaching Nepal in subsequent years. As a step towards to monitor and stop the connection of Nepali as well as the Indian Maoists, the Government of India asked nine states (Andhra Pradesh, Bihar, Chhattisgarh, Orissa, Jharkhand, Madhya Pradesh, West Bengal, Uttarakhand, and Sikkim) to raise special task forces to crack down on Maoist groups, especially those operating along the open border. The proposed police forces were directed to concentrate on severing all links between Indian and Nepali Maoist groups⁵⁶. In addition to this, GOI also came to an agreement with Nepali Government to set up Border Management Committees (BMC) headed by District Magistrates (India) and CDOS (Nepal). The BMC would also include security personnel, custom officials and development related officers. GOI also tried to disrupt the linkages of Maoists with the Nepalese speaking people in India. Nepalese dominated settlements in border areas have been brought under strict surveillance by the Indian security forces. All these initiatives of India were undertaken keeping in mind the internal security interest of India.

Secondly, to crackdown the Maoist in Nepal, the GOI followed a policy to strengthen the Royal Nepalese Army (RNA). India's multilaterals support to the RNA increased since 2001. In this regard, India also proposed to construct a military training

⁵⁶ As reported by Joseph Nathan, Indian Special Force to Crakedown on Maoist on Border, The Himalaya Times, Kathmandu, 12 June 2001, P.1.

school at Saijhandi area in Rupandehi district of Nepal for the RNA⁵⁷. This initiative of GOI was one of the massive assistance fully funded as part of its efforts to help strengthen the RNA to fight against the Maoists. In addition to this, India also provided counter insurgency trainings to Nepal police by its special contingent called 'Grey Hounds' in Andhra Pradesh. It is interesting to note that, for the first time since 1970, Indian military teams had been located inside Nepal to train the RNA to train both counter insurgency and jungle warfare tactics.

While GOI was taking up all initiatives to crack down the Maoists of Nepal and to cut the links between the Indian and Nepali Maoists, the GOI also got severe criticism and request letters from Nepal alleging, the Maoists of Nepal had been operating from the Indian soil and had their safe hideouts in India. In reaction to this allegation, the next step of India was to arrest the Maoists of Nepal in the Indian Territory. Important leaders of the Maoists like, Matrika Yadav and Suresh Ale Magar were arrested by the Indian police in Lucknow to prove a point that, India was no longer a safe haven for the Maoist. In this action of India, the UP police arrested two sister in laws named Savitri alias Kalpana and Manisala Rawat of Dang district along with two others from a nursing home in Bareilly⁵⁸. The most important arrest, made by Indian police was the arrest of C.P. Gajural alias com. Gaurav from Chennai airport on 19th August 2003 when he was trying to go to Frankfurt on a fake British passport. This act of India was, in fact a definite attempt to prove Government of Nepal wrong that Indian Territory was a safe haven for the Maoist.

⁵⁷ The Himalaya Times, December 23, 2004.

⁵⁸ The Kathmandu Post, 23 July, 2002, P.1

Reacting to the arrest of one of its top leaders the Maoists of Nepal requested the GOI to release C. P. Gajurel. In his letter to GOI, CPN (M) chairman Prachanda wrote:

Indian security forces have taken comrade Chandra Prasad Gajural (com. Gaurav), a polit bureau member of the central committee of our glorious party..., in custody on August 20 from Chennai airport. Comrade Gajurel was heading towards Europe clandestinely according to our party decision for the propagation of our party policy and programme. In the context of ongoing peace negotiation between our party and old state of Nepal, to which the GOI has extended its support, we urge the GOI to release com. Gajurel immediately, without making the technical question of going to Europe clandestinely as an unnecessarily serious matter. His release will not only confirm the GOI's willingness to bring peace in Nepal but will also provide new dimension to our diplomatic relation....⁵⁹

What was against the interest of India was that, the arrest of the above mentioned Maoist leader, also could not satisfy the Government of Nepal, when the same again alleged that, com. C.P.Gajurel was operating from the Indian soil. To support this allegation the GOI of India also faced hesitations, back home, demanding the release of the leader. According to the news reports nine organizations staged an impressive mass rally in Chennai asking for his release. A committee to defend his life has also been formed in the South Indian state. Similarly, a 'committee in Defense of Com. Gaurav',

⁵⁹. For details see Press statement by Com. Prachanda, CPN (Maoist), to GOI on 23 August 2003.

was reported to have been formed by intellectuals and human rights activists including Prof. Manoranjan Mohanty, Anand Swarup Verma and others in New Delhi.

Along with the arrest of Maoists of Nepal in Indian territory, the Indian Government also banned the Maoist Front Organization, Akhil Bharatiya Nepali Ekta Samaj (ABNES) under the Prevention of Terrorist Act (POTA), 2002 for indulging in anti-Indian activities and for its involvement with the Indian extreme left organizations⁶⁰. Analyzing the arrest of some thirteen central leaders of Maoists, a Nepali scholar said that, more than India's motive to disrupt the relationship between CPN-Maoist and Indian insurgents and north-eastern insurgents. However, the much wider speculation claimed that, the detention of Maoist top leaders could be used a trump card by India to bargain for its national interest. Subsequently, government of India was also trying to appease the Nepalese Government and to dispel the complaint that India was nurturing the Maoists in India⁶¹.

India was, in fact, successful in appeasing the Nepalese government. In 2004 it got the permission to establish the second consulate General office in Birjung in 2004. Birjung is situated in the heart of Terai, bordering India and in only 6 hours journey from Kathmandu. Hence, it serious security concerns through which GOI could easily augment its activities, movement and grip on Nepalese Terai in diplomatic garbs⁶². Secondly, Indian Government was also allowed to open its pension camp in Butwal, another important centre of the western Terai.

⁶⁰. See Nischalnath Pandey, No.12, P.125.

⁶¹. See Shyam Shrestha, No.12, P.193.

⁶². Ibid.

One would find a bitter kind of bilateral relation between India and Nepal grew due to the Maoist insurgency in Nepal. As said earlier that, the Government of Nepal was very constant in its approach towards India alleging that, the Maoists of Nepal were operating from Indian soil in spite of all India's initiative to crackdown the Maoist. In certain cases the Government of Nepal seemed to be right. When the GOI had all its initiatives against the Maoist, the Maoist were gaining support from Indian intellectuals, civil societies and moreover from the left wing parties of India. Not only had the government of Nepal, the intellectuals of Kathmandu also alleged India as 'tacitly aiding the Maoist terrorists'. They also claimed that, though India banned some Maoist front organizations in India and handed over some leaders to Nepal, still some senior leaders were still at large in India. to support this kind of allegation it was reported that, in 2002, some prominent leaders of the left parties of Nepal, including the leader of the opposition Madhav Kumar Nepal and the then CPN (ML) General Secretary Bam Dev Gautam met the Maoist leaders in Siliguri in West Bengal. Prior to this meeting, C.P. Mainali of the CPN (ml) also met the top two leaders of the CPN (Maoist) in Siliguri⁶³. Under this light, American Ambassador A. Peter Burleigh, ex-officer- US mission in Kathmandu mentioned candidly in a talk programme in New York on June 2002, "During my recent visit to Nepal, I met a person who had met Baburam Bhattarai at a house in New Delhi. If that person can meet him, I am sure the Government of India can do the same. For that reason, India has a major role to play in resolving the Maoist problem in Nepal"⁶⁴. The hardening policy of India towards the Maoists in Nepal was viewed differently by several

⁶³. See Nischalnath Pandey, No. 1, P.127.

⁶⁴. See Akhilesh Upadhyaya, "Indian Policy Towards Maoist not Clear: Former US Envoy", Kantipur, 10 June 2002, P.1, as cited in Nischalnath Pandey, *ibid*.

power structures in Nepal. When the government of Nepal called it as a double dealing of India, on the other hand, it was widely suspected that Indian government might use the arrested leaders as a trump card for bargaining their vital interest. The Maoist leader also alleged that Indian government was making their arrested leaders as a bargain chip for valuable natural resources⁶⁵.

Hence, India was in such a situation where it was alleged by the Maoist as pro-monarch and by the elite and ruling class of Nepal that India was not doing enough to bring down the Maoists. So India was in a situation of 'do and be damned, do not do and be damned'. In this situation India was in a dilemma whether to keep its national interest as first priority or a healthy bilateral relation or the both. India also showed its displeasure towards the government of Nepal regarding some of its activities towards the Maoists. India has been an important and dominant neighbor that determined the politics inside Nepal. With the intervention of the western powers, and their involvement in the affairs of Nepal the GOI somehow felt annoyed by the Government of Nepal. India had been consistent in its policy of not favoring third party involvement in the peace process between the Maoist and the Government of Nepal. India kept on insisting on the point that, the Maoist conflict was an internal matter and the Nepalese themselves should solve it. Even the consensus was being built among the political parties of Nepal and the insurgents, about the possible involvement of the United Nations in the peace process had been rendered ineffectual because of India's opposition, India's displeasure also came to be seen when prime minister Lokendra Bahadur Chand's government and the Maoists declared a ceasefire on January 29, 2003 without the consultation of India. The then

⁶⁵. See Shyam Shrestha, No. 12, P.180.

foreign secretary Mr Kanwal Sibal raised the issue at a track-11 meeting where he said, “India was not taken into confidence and that there was no consultation from the Nepalese side on vital issues affecting bilateral relations between the two countries”. He further showed India’s dissatisfaction stating, what India is expected to do in relation to the Nepalese Maoists: stop monitoring their movements across the border and stop giving military support to the Nepalese government since ceasefire and talks have been announced⁶⁶. What was indicated by this reaction by India was a change of stand and in a way it seemed India was trying to favour a third-party involvement in solving the Maoist problem in Nepal. For the first time on the changing stand of India’s policy on third party involvement, India’s Ambassador to Nepal Shyam Sharan said on October 18 2003 that, “India is ready to help solve the Maoist problem”⁶⁷. India’s displeasure on the matter could be viewed when it refused to join the multilateral committees with other donor countries to monitor developmental, political and security issues in Nepal later in the year. To look at India’s response towards the Maoist insurgency in Nepal, in this context, one would find that India went for a shift in the policy, when it felt its national interests was at a difficult situation.

Changing Face of India’s Response towards the Maoist in Nepal

Throughout the Maoist Insurgency in Nepal, India kept on changing its policy and response under different circumstances. The change of stand and policy towards the Maoist came broadly under three circumstances. First, the intervention of the foreign

⁶⁶. Kanwal Sibal, *The Hindu*, New Delhi, 17 February 2003.

⁶⁷. As cited in “Political Economic and Social Development in Nepal in the year 2003”, Annual Report, Federich Ebert Stiftung, Kathmandu.

powers other than India into the internal affairs of Nepal. Secondly, change of government in India. Thirdly, keeping in mind the national interest of India.

To analyse the response of India towards the Maoist in Nepal, one would find that, India never maintained a neutral position. From 1996, when the Maoist insurgency emerged, till 2001, India had an indifferent attitude towards the same. India maintained a position stating, that was an internal problem of the state of Nepal and both the Maoist and the Government of Nepal should resolve it. Once countries like the US had its presence in Nepal in name of fighting against the 'Global Terrorism', for the first time India responded in a very clear manner. It is interesting to note that, India was the first country to declare the Maoist as terrorist in 2001 even before the Government of Nepal. Number of statements and initiatives in relation to the Maoist of Nepal followed in the subsequent years. Supporting the Royal Nepalese army against the Maoist, its displeasure towards the Nepali government in most of the cases, simply were reactions to the foreign countries' activities in Nepal.

Secondly, India's declaration of Maoist as terrorist came from the Government led by the NDA. It is quite understandable that NDA used to be led by BJP, which is considered to be 'pro-Hindu' political party. Since Nepal was a Hindu state ruled by a Hindu king supporting a Hindu king was quite natural. In this context, a 'pro-Hindutva' Journal, Panchajanya, declared Maoist as anti-Hindu and by extension pro-Pakistani and pro-ISI. By alleging that, the journal's propaganda organ wanted to state that, the growth of the Maoist movement in Nepal was largely aided by Pakistani money and policy and

that consequently they were threat to India's security⁶⁸. So the 'Hindu' factor made India to take an anti-Maoist stand from 2001 to 2004 under the NDA government in India. Once the UPA government led by the congress party came to power, India's response was rather balanced. It always tried to maintain its as usual policy towards Nepal and the Maoist, what it called the 'Twin Pillar Policy'. By Twin Pillar Policy India meant constitutional monarchy and a malty-party democracy. This time India choosed to have a middle stand; some scholars also claim that India under the UPA was more tilted towards the Maoist. Because the left parties of India in UPA government kept on pressurizing the government, one hand India was providing military assistance to the Nepali government on the other hand, it showed its interest to mediate between the Maoist and the government of Nepal. And in the later stage said there was no military solution of the insurgency. This, in fact, shows the contradictory approach of the government of India. In this regard, the then ambassador to Nepal tried to clarify this position of India in an interview by saying, "India's own experience in dealing with insurgency clearly indicates that military solution is neither practical nor even possible. The armed forces can only help create a space within which political process can be activated for a negotiated solution. We believe the same applies to the current situation in Nepal"⁶⁹. Two months later, very contrary to this statement, the Prime Minister of India came out with a statement saying, "Indian government is committed to provide all possible military and non-military assistance to Nepal in addressing the difficult challenges that in presently

⁶⁸ . For details see Yubraj Ghimre, "Nepal's Agony", *Seminar*, 517, September 2004, P.49.

⁶⁹ . See Syam Saran's interview in Spot Light Weekly, 16 July 2004.

faces”⁷⁰. Hence this contradictory approach was not only criticized by Nepal government and the Maoist it also severely criticized by the intellectuals, civil societies and the opposition political parties back in India.

Like other initiatives of India towards the Maoist in Nepal, the ‘Twin Pillar Policy’ was also not very effective in dealing with the Maoist. By the spirit of the policy, that talks constitutional monarchy and multi party democracy, India tried to unite the parliamentary political parties with the monarchy. By doing India aimed that when both these power structure unite, they could face the challenge by the Maoist. Otherwise the Maoist insurgency would be strengthened. In fact that was what going on during that point of time. But the problem came from this approach of India was that, it did not tally with the historical ground reality of Nepal. to review the modern history of Nepal one would find that, every time the political parties tried to establish a democratic set up with an agreement of the monarchy the parliamentary democracy had been demolished by the monarchy, first in 1953, then in 1960, than on 2002 and recent past in February 2005. So it clearly showed that the historical ground reality of Nepal is quite different from what India was propounding. Moreover, there used to be a serious inherent conflict, what Prof. S.D.Muni observed, between the interests of multi-party democracy based on the concept of popular sovereignty and kings political aspirations and self-perceived divine role rule⁷¹. On the other hand India failed to make a proper understanding of the Maoist insurgency of Nepal. Most cases India termed them as security threat on the grounds

⁷⁰. This was stated by Prime Minister Monmohan Singh of India during an official luncheon when Nepalese Prime Minister Sher Bahadur Deuba visited India (September 8-12, 2004) as quoted in Nation Weekly September 19 2004.

⁷¹. See S.D.Muni, No.22, P.61.

mentioned earlier. Some of the demands of the Maoists like abrogation of some of the important bilateral treaties like the Treaty of 1950, and the Mahakali Treaty of 1996, which projected India as an exploitative and hegemonic neighbor of Nepal was seen by India as going against its national interest. In this contest India should keep in mind that a peace and stable Nepal can best satisfy the interest of India. The way India was never clear on its stand whether to take king's side or the Maoist side or the political parties left India in a tricky position.

Finally, the Maoist insurgency got two types of responses from the state of India. When the government of India was anti-Maoist in its policy, the civil society, the intellectuals supported the Maoists to a great extent. The long open border between the two countries, in spite of all the measures by two countries to stop the links of Indian and Nepali Maoist turned to be failure. Throughout their insurgency movement, the Maoist used India as a free and safe transit point.

Maoist Insurgency in Nepal: Response from China

As the name of the insurgency movement in Nepal suggested, Maoist, it was claimed that the insurgency movement in Nepal started following the thoughts and ideas of Chinese leader Com. Mao-Tse-Tung. Ideologically, it makes a sense that, China would be supportive to the Maoists of Nepal, since the Maoist of Nepal claimed to have launched the people's war on the basis of Mao's ideology. They also claimed that they followed the tactics and strategies followed by comrade Mao. Following this kind of analogy, a common perception would be that, China would support the Maoist insurgency in Nepal.

But, it is interesting to note that, throughout the Maoist insurgency in Nepal, one would find, China has distanced itself from the Maoist and always it supported the Government of Nepal. There were many speculations and interpretations why China did not, supported the Maoist of Nepal even though they followed, as mentioned above, the ideology of Mao. To answer this question, it is necessary to analysis China's Nepal policy and China's interest in Nepal.

Throughout the years, China has maintained its stand very clear, that Nepal is a friendly neighbor. China's relation with Nepal should be based, according to China, on the five principles of peaceful co-existence. Three determinates, through which China has maintained a friendly relation with Nepal are: first, the policy of non-interference into the affairs of Nepal, secondly, the Chinese Government firmly pursue the principle that a country is equal with others no matter how big or small into is. In a way China consistently supports Nepal in its effort to safeguard sovereignty, independence and territorial integrity. And thirdly, over the past 50 years, as a matter of sincerity, China has provided financial and technical assistance more than 30 projects in Nepal. China has always stood by the Nepali government, even in the bad time of 1989 when there was an economic blockade imposed by India over Nepal. Having said the above, there arises a question, why the state of China treats Nepal so sincerely, when China's overall South Asia Policy tells a different story altogether. What makes China to go by the Government of Nepal whenever there is a crisis in Nepal rather than it goes against the anti-government forces in Nepal?

China's Interest in Nepal

So far as China's interest in Nepal is concerned, apart from any other issues, the Tibet issue remains to be the main interest concern for China in Nepal. For China what worries the most is that despite of all its efforts of over fifty years, Tibet still remains its soft underbelly, and a sustained conflict in Nepal, which adjoins the most poverty-stricken area of its Tibet Autonomous region, can well be used by anti- Chinese activist⁷². To be more specific, China's main concern in Nepal remains to be the hostile activities of the free Tibet movement which includes the presence of representative of the exiled Dalai Lama and reception center for Tibetans secretly crossing the border to join other exiles in India.

China does not want some of the incidents to repeat, where the Nepalese soil was used for anti- China activities. One of such incident was the 'Khampa Armed struggle' in the early 1970s. To the surprise of both the intelligence of China and Nepal, two of Nepal's air fields, Syuchatar and Rasua were used by CIA to supply arms and other logistic helps to the 'Four River and Six Mountain protection Army' of the Khampas. What was more worrisome for China, according to the report given by Eric S. Margolis:

The CIA organized regular air drops of weapons and supplies to bands of Khampas warriors fighting Chinese occupation in eastern Tibet. India by then finally aroused to the Chinese threat joined the effort, directing its foreign intelligence agency, the RAW to co-operate with the CIA in supporting Tibetan residence efforts. This was one of only a few known instances when the normally adversarial CIA and RAW worked together. It was even a rare example of co-operation, albeit

⁷² Nischal Nath Pandey, No.1, Pp. 150-51.

chilly and very limited, between the RAW and Pakistani intelligence; the latter was aiding the US in the effort to supply Tibetan rebels. Bases for Tibetan guerrillas were established in the Indian protectorate of Sikkim and in Nepal, which was equally concerned by the looming Chinese threat⁷³.

Another incident, that made China worried, was the flight of the 17th Karmapa Lama via Nepalese territory. Nepalese and Chinese intelligence, once again failed to get the information, and the Nepalese soil was so significantly exploited for the escape. All the above mentioned episodes prove that, there is international interest in Tibet, which remains to be one of weakest points of China. To add up to the worries of China, this disturbed area of China, Tibet, has the border with Nepalese districts of Sindhupaschowk, Dolakha and Rasua and Dolpa. Dolpa, a hub of the Maoist of Nepal, has 90 percent dwellers of Tibetan-Mongolian clan. With Maoist wishing to divide Nepal in lingual subdivisions would further disturb the Chinese. So the Maoist insurgency spreading day by day was a matter of concern for China. Because the Maoist effect in Tibet could not be ruled out if Nepal was not able to control the situation.

Apart from Tibet, there are some more areas that make China's interest on Nepal in this regard. For China, from a strategic point of view, Nepal is a buffer zone to avoid direct confrontation against India. This also makes China interested in protecting the territorial integrity of Nepal to maintain its buffer status. In this context, the International Bureau Chief of the Communist party of China assured Nepal that, "any foreign

⁷³. For details see Eric S. Margolis, *War at the top of the World*, (New Delhi, Roli Books, 1999), P.90.

conspiracy to disintegrate Nepal will be appropriately dealt with China”⁷⁴. In relation to Tibet, China feels Nepal as a geographical and cultural buffer between Tibet and Tibetans living in India. As strategically the state of Nepal is important for two Asian super powers, India and China, similarly Nepal is also important from the energy point of view for the two energy seeking nations. Like India, China also has its own interest in accessing the energy resources of China. As observed by a Nepali scholar, the future co-operation between Nepal and China could be, in terms of, construction of a bypass from Brahma-Putra through the Arun River which can permanently solve the water dispute in this region⁷⁵.

To sum up the Chinese interest of friendly relationship with Nepal one would find the following three common areas. First, a friendly Nepal would help secure the Chinese Tibet interest. In this regard the Nepalese government, irrespective of the regimes has protected the Chinese national interest over Tibet. It is sense making that while criticizing India’s hidden agenda of playing the Tibet card, Beijing extends its generous appreciation of Kathmandu’s effort to curb the Tibetan political agitation in Nepalese districts bordering Tibet. Secondly, as mentioned above, many times, the Nepalese soil has been used not only by the Tibetans but also some other powers for anti China activities. So the armed struggle by the Khampas supported by the CIA and RAW made China understand the relevance of Nepal for its border security. And moreover, the presence of US in Nepal, these days, is basically designed to encircle China. Hence China has to have a friendly relation with Nepal in order to make its border with Nepal secure. Thirdly, a

⁷⁴. The Telegraph Nepal, Nov. 5, 2008.

⁷⁵. Hiranyalas Shrestha, “Water Resources in Nepal- China Relation”, *The Telegraph Nepal*, May 7, 2008.

friendly Nepal provides China with an opening overland pass into the South Asian sub-continent where India has for long dominated. This connection promises to expand China's leverage in the Greater Himalayas and further the sub-continent as a whole. Among visible gains is booming economic interaction with this vast area. Which encouraging echoes inside Nepal, Beijing considers to extend its Tibet Railway to the Sino-Nepalese border in the near future and project it to be part of a vital passage into South Asian hinter lands⁷⁶.

Sino-Nepal Relation: A Historical Account

When, China has the above mentioned interest of its relation with Nepal, Nepal has more than one reason to have a friendly relationship with Nepal. The state of Nepal, sandwiched between two giant neighbors, has had to work out its destiny between these two. So far as Nepal's relation with China is concerned, many times, it has developed under the light of an anti-Indian sentiment of the Nepali regimes.

As India is considered as a dominating neighbor inside Nepal, geographically and otherwise also, Nepal continues to depend on India than any other country especially than China. So, in course of time, a sense of over dependency on India made the Nepalese rulers feel insecure about India. So in the late 1950s for the first time Nepal, under the kingship of king Mahendra tried to lessen Nepal's dependence on India. In the later stage after hip, his son king Birendra, also slowly tried to improve relations with China which

⁷⁶ Chen Qiaoyan, "Tibet railway planned to extend up to the China-Nepal border", International Herald Leader, Sept. 5, 2006, as mentioned in Zhang Li's conflict Management and Nation Building in Nepal: China's perspective and interest calculus, at, www.cscnepal.org.np/pdf/zhang_Li.pdf, accessed on 15th December 2008.

was very much welcomed by the later. In fact, more than lessening the dependence on India it was a bargaining tactics by the Nepali rulers, so that, the state of Nepal could make the most of its national interest from both the countries. Annexation of Tibet, war against India in 1962 made China feel the importance of Nepal during that time. So this co-incidence of Chinese and Nepali interests was epitomized by Mao-Zedong's comments to a Nepali delegation in August 1964 when work on the first modern road linking Nepal with China was just under way. Mao said to the Nepali delegation that, "once these roads are open, India may be a bit more respectful towards you"⁷⁷.

So far as the Sino-Nepal relation is concerned, it grew steadily closer during the regime of King Birendra in Nepal. And during this time Nepal, became one of the major recipients of Chinese assistance. Between 1956 and 1989, China provided Nepal with grant assistance for 42 projects, 36 of which were completed by the latter year. Since 1981 Chinese firms also had bid for various contracts projects. By the late 1989 Chinese firms had signed 85 contracts. Worth US Dollar 137 million for work in Nepal, five Chinese companies' maintained offices in Kathmandu and more than 1000 Chinese workers and experts were working in Nepal. When from China's point of view assistance towards Nepal was based on mutual understanding and respect, New Delhi viewed this as attempts of King Birendra to dissolve the special relationship between India and Nepal. When there was developing a feeling of distrust between India and Nepal, China became even closer by supporting the proposal of Nepal to declare Nepal as a 'Zone of Peace' in

⁷⁷ Meeting between Mao-Zedong and Nepali delegation on 29th August 1964, in Mao Zedong Sixiang Wansui (long live Mao-Zedong thought), August 1969, P.673, as mentioned in, John W. Garver, "China-India Rivalry in Nepal: The Clash over Chinese Arms Sales", *Asian Survey*, Vol.31, No.10, October 1991, P.957.

1975. With the support of China Nepal could push the proposal in various international forums.

The close and friendly relation between China and Nepal grew even stronger in the subsequent years to such an extent that, ultimately Nepal had to face the worst kind of economic crisis it had ever experienced. There were many reasons of the economic blocked imposed by India over Nepal which caused economic crisis, but the most important reason was the purchase of arms from China by Nepal in 1988. According to a treaty, Nepal has to purchase arms only from India or with the consultation of India, if India fails to deliver the required demands of Nepal. As alleged by Nepalese government, since India government could not meet the demands of Nepal in 1972, 1976 and 1980, king Birendra of Nepal reportedly ordered to purchase arms from China in 1988. And finally Nepal purchased arms from China; certainly the purchase of arms from China by Nepal was a matter of concern for India. As a respond to the “unfriendly behavior” of Nepal India imposed an economic blocked on Nepal in 1989. Perhaps this was the only time when China could not support fully fledged to Nepal in a crisis. According to diplomatic sources in Beijing, China quietly advised Kathmandu in late 1988 not to expect China to provide an alternative to Nepal’s economic connection with India, saying that the difficulties of transportation between Nepal and China and the serious financial constraints China then faced ruled out such a possibility⁷⁸. By April 1989 an agreement with China and Nepal for supply of fuel and food had been signed. And Chinese tankers and other trucks began to deliver supplies to Kathmandu by early May. Again in

⁷⁸ John W. Garver, opcit, P.959.

November 1989, China extended a support in terms of US dollar 13.6 million grants to Nepal for the construction of new projects.

In this context, there arises a question, why China did not come for a direct confrontation with India against the economic blocked against India. The rapid deterioration of China's relations with the western democracies in 1989 would have dissuaded Beijing from running the risk of confrontation with India at that point. One of the Beijing's diplomatic responses to the decline of its ties with the west was to push an improvement of relations with the third world of which India was an important part⁷⁹. Though China was not confronted with India directly, but it came out of a criticism against this act of India. In October 1989, vice premier Wu Xueqian in New Delhi said that, "China sincerely hopes that the South Asian countries will handle their mutual relations in accordance with the Five principles of peaceful co-existence and strengthen their co-operation in a spirit of equality and mutual benefit"⁸⁰. China did not stop there. Li Peng in his official visit to Kathmandu assured Nepal that, China would offer moral support and support in other fields according to its own strength. He went on to say that "It has always been China's steadfast policy to develop good neighborly and friendly relations with every country in South Asia. No matter what happens in the international situation China will always support Nepal and other South Asian countries in their efforts to safeguard independence and sovereignty"⁸¹.

⁷⁹ Ibid. P.965.

⁸⁰ FBIS, DR/CHI, 16 October, 1989, P.7, as mentioned in John W. Garver, No.75, P.966.

⁸¹ FBIS, DR/CHI, 20,21, November, 1989, Pp. 12, 20-21. As cited in John W. Garver, Ibid. P. 968.

Besides the above and assistance to the Nepalese government, the question arises why despite of all its help and assistance to Nepal, China never tried to establish a democratic form of government. The answer was China was well aware of the fact that, any democratic government in Nepal would be closer to the democratic countries like India, US and the UK. That would make China sideline and ignored by the elected government of Nepal. It was also proved that the elected government in Nepal often lost their control over the Tibetan refugees in Nepal. Hence China found democracy in Nepal as a threat to its oppressive rule in Tibet. Secondly, in return of the help extended to Nepal, China was successful in making the kings of Nepal suppress the Tibetan refugees. For instance, king Mahendra suppressed the voices of Tibetan refugees in Nepal, and stopped any political activities of them against China in 1960s. Later on, king Birendra also eliminated the Khampa rebels fighting against the Chinese rule in Tibet in 1970s. Thirdly, not only the king but the ruling elites of Kathmandu also reciprocated in having a pro- China stand. The ruling elite could realize, India, as supportive of pro-democratic forces, was a threat to the autocratic regime of Nepal. On the other hand, close links with communist China was less threatening to Nepal's autocratic monarchy.

China's Response to Maoists of Nepal

So far as China's response to the Maoist insurgency of Nepal is concerned, it seems to be a commonsensical perception that, China might support the Maoist of Nepal, since they claimed to have followed the ideology of Mao-Tse-Tung. China was the first country to distance itself from the Maoists of Nepal. China never, throughout the insurgency movement, recognized the Maoists of Nepal as the 'Maoist'. Rather the official version

of China made it clear that, the Maoist of Nepal never followed the ideology of comrade Mao, and by claiming themselves as Maoist they give a bad name to great comrade Mao-Tse-Tung. Though the Maoist had tried to have support from China, they remained unsuccessful. because, in view of the amicable relations between Beijing and Kathmandu, the recognized status of the Maoists as anti-government rebels prevented it from mastering support and solidarity from China despite an ostensibly shared ideology and declared values⁸². One hand China distanced itself from the Maoists of Nepal and on the other hand, it had been very careful in branding the Maoists of Nepal. Unlike India, China never called them as terrorists. Rather China very customarily branded them as anti-government militias or groups. So it is clear from the above discussion that the initial response of the Chinese government towards the Maoist insurgency in Nepal was very casual. It maintained its stand that, this was an internal problem of Nepal and since China believed in the policy of non-interference, it would rather suggest the government of Nepal to deal with the situation.

Unlike the initial response, China was very firm and clear in its stand against the Maoists of Nepal. There were many factors why China very firm and clear against the Maoist of Nepal. First, the involvement of the USA into the affairs of Nepal was an alarm for China. The instances of both India and the US working together to help Nepal, recalled the happening of Khampa armed struggled against it. Secondly, the recognition of India's special relationship with Nepal by US's Assistant Secretary of state Rocca was a matter of concern for China. Thirdly, with all these developments happening in Nepal

⁸² Zhang Li, No. 76, P.5.

by US and India, China tried to make it sure that the Chinese influence over Nepal did not go to the vain.

In regard of Sino-Nepal relation to curb down the Maoist of Nepal, king Gyanendra visited China in July 2002. During his visit, for the first time, Chinese president Jiang Zemin made it quite clear that Beijing supported the king and the Nepalese government to crack down on the anti-government militants and condemned the violence-smacking terror of all kinds. He also showed his belief saying that, the king and the administration would be competent to maintain peace, stability and development in this Himalayan Kingdom⁸³. At the same time, the spokes person of China's foreign ministry stated that, the Chinese government as well as any Chinese agencies/organizations had developed no connection with the Nepalese anti-government militants called the Maoists, despite their naming themselves after the late Chinese Charismatic leader Mao-Zedong. According to him, China's genuine desire was to see a scenario governed by peace, order and development within the neighbor⁸⁴. However, in this meeting the Chinese spokesperson did not mention what kind of help and assistance China would provide to crackdown the Maoists of Nepal. Just two months before Gyanendra's visit to China, the former Chinese ambassador to Nepal, Wu Congyong made a comprehensive statement on China's policy against the Maoists. He said, "The insurgency had created unprecedented difficulties, especially the declaration of the state of emergency in November 2001 due to the deteriorating security situation. China is

⁸³ Ibid. P.2.

⁸⁴ Nepali Maoist Threatens China's Security, at <http://www.southch.com/news/international/gjkd/200208131041.htm>, accessed on 15th December 2008.

much concerned about this, and has given a timely response and firm support to His Majesty's Government to quell the insurgency from the very beginning"⁸⁵.

With its commitment to Nepal, China continued to extend its help to Nepal to crackdown the Maoist. The Chinese assistance included military hardware, financial support and other logistic helps. In 2004, Nepalese army chief, General Pyar Jung Thapa visited China. There he signed an agreement with the Chinese counterpart on undertaking security co-operation. During that visit China promised to deliver military hardware and logistic support and to exchange intelligence⁸⁶. What was more interesting in regard to Chinese assistance to Nepal against the Maoist was that, even after the king dissolved the parliament and took over the power, China also supplied 18 truckloads of arms to Nepal irrespective of international pressure on the Nepalese king. By supplying lethal weapons to Nepal, China not only demonstrated its disregard for suppression of democracy, civil liberties and human rights, but also disrespected the international pressure on the Nepalese king to establish democracy. In this regard, as a gesture of support of king's takeover of power, Chinese president Hu Jintao met king Gyanendra in Jakarta (The Asian-African Summit 2005), voicing China's recognition of Kathmandu's effort to stabilize the situation⁸⁷. In one hand China kept on assisting the monarch to fight against the Maoist, on the other hand China stucked to the point that, the Maoist problem, as an internal affair should be solved by Nepal itself. China always tried to escape from direct involvement in the affairs of Nepal in relation to Maoist insurgency. In this regard,

⁸⁵ The Kathmandu Post, May 11 2002.

⁸⁶ Eva Cheng, "Nepal: Beijing Pledges to help suppress Maoist rebels", *Green left weekly*, July 14, 2004.

⁸⁷ HuJintao Meets king Gyanendra, "<<http://news.xinhuanet.com/misc/2005-04/23/content-2866488.htm>, accessed on 15th December 2008.

answering a question, whether the international criticism against the king's behavior in 2005 was interference into the internal affairs of Nepal, he said,


“Different parties made comments on the latest development in Nepal, expressing their views and opinions. That's what we have also noticed. But as a close neighbor of Nepal or South Asian countries, we believe the current peace, stability and development are of great significance. We sincerely hope the Nepalese people can develop their country with national reconciliation and social stability. In essence these matters should be decided by the Nepalese people themselves. What we can do is to sincerely wish them social stability, economic development, national reconciliation and steady progress of their nation”⁸⁸.

This shows China's Nepal policy vis-à-vis Maoist insurgency contrary to its action. At the same time there arises a question why China did not supported the Maoist rather it supported the monarch. First, so far as China's support to the Nepalese monarch is concerned, one would find, China has two reasons to support the monarch. First, it has a fear, as mentioned earlier, if the democratic forces come to the power, they may be tilted towards India and other democratic countries. Second, the Nepalese monarchs have reciprocates with China in many cases, especially, in not allowing the Tibetan refugees in Nepal to have any activism against China.

Coming to China's anti Maoist stand, there was more than one reason. First, as widely, recognized, Beijing has for long abandoned the practice of exporting revolution

⁸⁸ As cited in B. Raman, India and China: As seen by Maoists-part-ii, *South Asia Analysis Group*, Paper No. 1250, 12.02.05.

towards developing Afro-Asian nations and there is no rationale and no sign to revive this code of conduct as far as its own national interests are concerned. Thus, China's declining to evolve ties with the Maoists seems not so much being averse to its ideology, and populist approach as the necessity of pragmatic diplomacy. Secondly, China would definitely not want the Maoist insurgency spreading especially in the bordering areas of Tibet. Otherwise, there would be a chance of the insurgency spreading into Tibet along with the Nepalese in search of safety and livelihood. Thirdly, with the insurgency spreading day by day, and the use of modern weapon both the insurgents and the Royal Nepalese Army, China was worried, if they sneak into Tibet and instigate a Khampa movement kind of situation. Hence these were some of the reasons why China had an anti-Maoist stand.



Conclusion

This study brings out that the term insurgency is not amenable to an easy generalization. Its causes, ultimate goals, strategies, tactics and achievements all add new dimensions to the term. It is possible to argue that there are various kinds of insurgencies. While it is difficult to give an exact definition that encompasses all the nuances of the term insurgency, the present study tries to define insurgency as a consciously planned violent movement by a non-ruling section against the government/regime which it considers as illegitimate. An insurgency might aim at a total change in the system or the emancipation of a particular ethnic/religious group. A separate statehood may also be aimed at. The term insurgency differs from other related terms like subversion, coup d'état, terrorism, guerrilla war, revolution, civil war, etc. However, the term insurgency is prone to be used loosely and sometimes interchangeably with other terms we have mentioned. There are number of attributes of an insurgency. The important attributes of an insurgency are: an insurgency is consciously planned and it political in nature. Violence contributes another important attribute of the term insurgency. The forms of warfare employed in an insurgency keeps changing according to the time and situation. An insurgency can be secessionist, nationalist, ethno-nationalist, reformist or conservative in nature.

However, a working definition of insurgency can be worked out for the purpose of an academic study. We have attempted one such definition as outlined above, that also encompasses many details, given in chapter second. Chapter second also has attempted to provide the theoretical overview of the insurgency movements. The difficulties of conceptualizing insurgency have been highlighted in the very chapter. And for the

purpose of our study we regarded the attempt of Bard E. O'Neill as notable. As has been pointed out in chapter two, O'Neill regarded insurgency as any struggle between a ruling authorities and non-ruling group in which the latter consciously employs political resources (organizational skills, propaganda and/or demonstrations) and the instruments of violence to establish legitimacy for some aspects of the political system it considers illegitimate.

An attempt has also been made to distinguish insurgency from other terms like subversion, coup d'état, terrorism, guerrilla war, revolution, civil war, etc. We have also discussed the types of insurgency and the forms of warfare which includes guerrilla warfare, terrorist warfare, etc (page no. 17-22). The strategies of insurgencies are also highlighted. And they include Leninist strategy, the Cuban strategy, the Urban Strategy, etc (Page no. 22-29). Insurgencies may get external support which sometimes can make all the differences (page no. 29). The environment, geographical settings included can be an important variable in determining the fate of an insurgency (page no.-30). We have also examined broadly the nature of insurgency movements in South Asia including India, Sri Lanka and of course Nepal.

In chapter three, we have attempted to study the application of these aspects of insurgency with regard to Nepal. To make the study systematic, we have taken a bird's eye view of the historical background of the evolution of the Maoist insurgency movement in Nepal. The origin and evolution of the Communist party, its role in the Panchayat era, The Darbhanga Plenum and various congresses held are examined. The Jhapa Uprising, the National referendum of May 24th 1979, the People's Movement in 1990- and the role of the Communist Party, the formation of the CPN (Maoist) are also

highlighted. The factors leading to the emergence of the Maoists include social factors, economic factors, political factors are all studied. The social structure of Nepal is highly hierarchical. While the Bahuns, Chetris and the Newars dominate the social hierarchy, the ethnic groups are treated as second class citizens. The Indian origin Nepalese are also treated as second class citizens in Nepal. Social discrimination and exploitation on the basis of caste and gender in Nepal has been a factor responsible to get support of the mass to the Maoists in Nepal (page no. 21-26). The social discrimination and exploitation replicates in the economic sphere of Nepali society. Accumulation of land holding in few hands in an agrarian economy like Nepal has been an important factor for the economic disparities. In addition to this Kathmandu centric development plans have been the factors for unequal distribution and economic exploitation which are responsible for the emergence of the Maoists (page no.27-30). Constant political instability, inefficiency of the political system and the highhandedness of the king in the political affairs of the country and lack of consensus among the political parties are the political factors responsible for the emergence of the Maoists in Nepal (page no. 30-33).

Chapter four of this study highlights the ideological dimension/inspirations of the Maoist group in Nepal. The interesting point to be noted is that, when the Nepali insurgents characterize themselves Maoists as Maoists take their inspiration of the Maoist thought, the Chinese Communist Party and the leadership strongly denies that Nepali insurgency movement is Maoist in nature. We have also analyzed the reasons for this. As terrorism made its appearance in international political environment the Chinese became wary of being labeled as sponsors/supporters of terrorism. Being deeply involved in the economic development of China they preferred peace, order and stability. And hence

their aversion towards struggles disorder, chaos, etc. We have provided evidence to the effect that they had covert understanding with the king of Nepal whom the Chinese leadership supported. China's sensitivity over question on Tibet was also a contributory factor. Tibetan refugees who crossed over to Nepal and their proneness to hesitate alarmed Beijing. And hence the withdrawal of ideological and other forms of support to the Maoist Insurgency. China wanted to delegitimize ideologically or otherwise the insurgency movement in Nepal.

A central focus of chapter, inter alia, explores the dimensions of Prachanda Path (PP). Prachanda path was adopted by the Maoists of Nepal in the year 2001. It was advocated by the Maoists' leader Prachanda to fight the people's war keeping in mind the specificities of Nepal. Prachanda Path is an amalgamation of the Chinese model of protracted people's war and Russian model of urban insurrection. The aim of PP was to use the people's war in order to expand the Maoists base in rural areas and to use this as a platform from which to invoke a mass uprising at the urban areas in order to overthrow the existing government in Nepal at that time. Various tactics, strategies and how to fight against the Indian expansionism advocated by PP are also studied in this chapter (page no.15-24). However, the PP does not really give any clear cut idea on the issues like democracy and people's war. On the question of the originality and applicability of the PP there had been differences among the Maoists themselves. Baburam Bhattarai discarded the scope of the PP on the question of universal applicability. He even rejected the very claim to call PP as a path-way. Though the Maoists of Nepal claim to have followed the PP but there were always differences between Baburam Bhattarai and Prachanda over the issues like centralization of the army, organization and the state.

While Baburam was in favor of the decentralization of the party, army and the state Prachanda stressed on the command of a single individual over these issues. The intra-party conflicts, indiscipline inside the party and lack on ideological indoctrination of the cadres are some of the drawbacks of the Maoists of Nepal. PP as a theoretical development lacks originality. Rather it is an amalgamation of Marxism, Leninism and Maoism.

The strategic phases the Maoists of Nepal passed through (Strategic Defensive Phase, Strategic Offensive Phase and Strategic Equilibrium Phase) are also discussed in this chapter (page no.-30-32). In the process of discussing the strategic phases the Maoists of Nepal have passed through one would find the Maoists of Nepal failed to go through the Strategic Offensive phase completely. This shows lack of understanding of political environment of Nepal at that time and lack of cohesion in the party itself.

While the insurgency in Nepal was rising both India and China were alarmed. Their response and actual policies are subjects of study of Chapter four. It brings out that, India's response towards the Maoists of Nepal was characterized by many factors. One of the major factors that determine the response of India was the links between the Maoists of Nepal and the like minded ultra left groups in India. Secondly, the presence of the United States in Nepal was a determining factor for India to respond to the Maoists in Nepal. Thirdly, formation of the forums like CCOMPOSA was an alarming factor for India. The study brings out that, India's response to the Maoists of Nepal remained contradictory throughout. From the emergence of the Maoists in Nepal till the year 2001 India remained to be indifferent towards the Maoist problem in Nepal. During this period the official version of India to the Maoists of Nepal remained to be a law and order

problem and an internal affair of Nepal. But Ironically, India was the first country to brand the Maoists of Nepal as terrorists. Since 2001 India's response to the Maoists of Nepal had been self contradictory in nature. India was not clear whether to support the king or the political parties. It is important to mention here that India has been suffering from the similar kind of internal violence for years. A proper understanding of the Maoists in Nepal would have been a help to understand the similar problems back home. In a way one can always say India failed in dealing with the Maoists of Nepal as well as the king and the political parties. One hand India was determined to crack down the Maoists along with the King of Nepal, on the other hand India was used as a safe haven for the Maoists of Nepal for their activities. The links between the Maoists of Nepal and the like minded groups in India were never fully understood and hence not properly handled. It made India reliable to be interpreted playing a dual role in dealing with the Maoists. We have given evidence to the effect as to how exactly the Maoists of Nepal procured arms and other logistic help from India. India's 'twin pillar policy' towards Nepal in which India supported both constitutional monarchy and an elected government was in many ways a fallacious policy. Regime based policy changes are also studied in this chapter (page no-41-45). It is notable that, China, unlike India, was very clear on its response to the Maoists of Nepal. It had never supported the Maoists nor called them, as India called, as terrorists. China supported the king of Nepal because of its own strategic and security interests. The Nepali king always reciprocated Chinese gestures by not allowing the Tibetan refugees to agitate against China on the Nepalese soil. One of the major reasons why China was against the Maoists of Nepal was that it feared the intensity of the Maoist insurgency movement sneaking into the Tibetan soil. The USA's presence

in Nepal and its anti-Maoist stand and India's joint venture with the USA against the Maoists may have contributed to China taking an anti-Maoists stand. It is important to mention here that in the year 2005 when the king of Nepal was not supported by the international community for dismissing the fundamental rights of the Nepalese, it was China which supported the king and supplied arms to crackdown on the Maoists.

This study has also taken note of the manner in which the Nepali government dealt with the insurgency. Once Nepal was all set for a democratic election after the 1990 revolution for the restoration of democracy, there was scope for every citizen to take part in the electoral process. But we have mentioned earlier that, some groups were not recognized as political parties and were not permitted to contest in the elections. This directly went against the democratic nature of the electoral process in Nepal during that period. The suppressive measures by the government of Nepal against the Maoists from the very beginning could be a cause to make the bad situation worse. The Maoists of Nepal launched a campaign to propagate the Maoist ideas in the areas of Rukum and Rolpa in the year 1994-1995. In this campaign as the Human Rights report of Nepal states (Page no-18-19), there were no involvement of violence in it. But the government of Nepal launched a violent operation named 'operation Romeo' against the Maoists. In this operation as the Human Rights report suggests, the Maoists were brutally suppressed and nearly six thousand people left the villages. Hence the local people's support towards the Maoists. Use of counter violence against the Maoists ultimately resulted in the loss of legitimacy in the eyes of the people. Throughout the Maoist insurgency in Nepal, the government of Nepal never saw the Maoists beyond a law and order problem. One of the

major drawbacks of the political situation of Nepal during that period was that there was lack of consensus among the political parties. The king of Nepal took advantages of the situation and displayed highhandedness. In one hand the political parties of Nepal were losing their credibility in the eyes of the citizens and on the other hand the king used all suppressive measures to crack down the Maoists. There had been many peace talks and ceasefire between the state force and the Maoists of Nepal. But lack of consensus among the political parties and the king made the things easier for the Maoists. There are instances where the soldiers of the RNA joined the Maoists of Nepal. The government failed to realize that the RNA had never a history of fighting against any foreign power or similar kind of war by the Maoists. So for the RNA it was near impossible to crack down the Maoists. The king's involvement in dealing with the Maoists forced him to be indifferent towards the development works in the rural Nepal. This helped the Maoists to win over the mass through propaganda.

In this comprehensive study we have examined Maoist insurgency in Nepal in all its major dimensions. It represents an account which is both historical and analytical. We hope that this study contributes to a better understanding to insurgency movement in Nepal.

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Appendix- One

40 Point Demand

(This charter of demands was submitted by the Maoists to the Prime Minister of Nepal on 4 February 1996)

4 February, 1996

Honourable Prime Minister
Prime Minister's Office,
Singha Darbar, Kathmandu

Sub: Memorandum

Sir,

It has been six years since the autocratic monarchical partyless Panchayat system was ended by the 1990 People's Movement and a constitutional monarchical multiparty parliamentary system established. During this period state control has been exercised by a tripartite interim government, a single-party government of the Nepali Congress, a minority government of UML and a present Nepali Congress-RPP-Sadbhavana coalition. That, instead of making progress, The situation of the country and the people is going downhill is evident from the fact that Nepal has slid to being the second poorest country in the world; people living below the absolute poverty line has gone up to 71 per cent; the number of unemployed has reached more than 10 per cent while the number of people who are semi-employed or in disguised employment has crossed 60 per cent; the country is on the verge of bankruptcy due to rising foreign loans and deficit trade; economic and cultural encroachment within the country by foreign, and especially Indian, expansionists is increasing by the day; the gap between the rich and the poor and between towns and villages is growing wider. On (lie other hand, parliamentary parties that have formed the government by various means have shown that they are more interested in remaining in power with the blessings of foreign imperialist and expansionist masters than in the welfare of the country and the people. This is clear from their blindly adopting so-called privatization and liberalization to fulfill the interests of all imperialists and from the recent 'national consensus' reached in handing over the rights over Nepal's water resources to Indian expansionists. Since 6 April, 1992, the United People's Front has been involved in various struggles to fulfill relevant demands related to nationalism, democracy and livelihood, either by itself or with others. But rather than fulfill those demands, the governments formed at different times have violently suppressed the agitators and taken the lives of hundreds; the most recent example of this is the armed

police operation in Rolpa a few months back. In this context, we would like to once again present to the current coalition government demands related to nationalism, democracy and livelihood, which have been raised in the past and many of which have become relevant in the present context.

Our demands

Concerning nationality

1. All discriminatory treaties, including the 1950 Nepal-India Treaty, should be abrogated.
2. The so-called Integrated Mahakali Treaty concluded on 29 January, 1996 should be repealed immediately, as it is designed to conceal the disastrous Tanakpur Treaty and allows Indian imperialist monopoly over Nepal's water resources.
3. The open border between Nepal and India should be regulated, controlled and systematized. All vehicles with Indian license plates should be banned from Nepal.
4. The Gurkha/Gorkha Recruitment Centres should be closed. Nepali citizens should be provided dignified employment in the country.
5. Nepali workers should be given priority in different sectors. A 'work permit' system should be strictly implemented if foreign workers are required in the country.
6. The domination of foreign capital in Nepali industries, business and finance should be stopped.
7. An appropriate customs policy should be devised and implemented so that economic development helps the nation become self-reliant.
8. The invasion of imperialist and colonial culture should be banned. Vulgar Hindi films, videos and magazines should be immediately outlawed.
9. The invasion of colonial and imperial elements in the name of NGOs and INGOs should be stopped.

Concerning people's democracy

10. A new constitution should be drafted by representatives elected for the establishment of a people's democratic system.
11. All special privileges of the king and the royal family should be abolished.
12. The army, the police and the bureaucracy should be completely under people's control.
13. All repressive acts, including the Security Act, should be repealed.
14. Everyone arrested extra-judicially for political reasons or revenge in Rukum, Rolpa, Jajarkot, Gorkha, Kabhrc, Sindhupalchowk, Sindhuli, Dhanusa, Ramechhap, and so on, should be immediately released. All false cases should be immediately withdrawn.

15. The operation of armed police, repression and state-sponsored terror should be immediately stopped.
16. The whereabouts of citizens who disappeared in police custody at different times, namely Dilip Chaudhary, Bhuwan Thapa Magar, Prabhakar Subedi and others, should be investigated and those responsible brought to justice. The families of victims should be duly compensated.
17. All those killed during the People's Movement should be declared martyrs. The families of the martyrs and those injured and deformed should be duly compensated, and the murderers brought to justice.
18. Nepal should be declared a secular nation.
19. Patriarchal exploitation and discrimination against women should be stopped. Daughters should be allowed access to paternal property.
20. All racial exploitation and suppression should be stopped. Where ethnic communities are in the majority, they should be allowed to form their own autonomous governments.
21. Discrimination against downtrodden and backward people should be stopped. The system of untouchability should be eliminated.
22. All languages and dialects should be given equal opportunities to prosper. The right to education in the mother tongue up to higher levels should be guaranteed.
23. The right to expression and freedom of press and publication should be guaranteed. The government mass media should be completely autonomous.
24. Academic and professional freedom of scholars, writers, artists and cultural workers should be guaranteed.
25. Regional discrimination between the hills and the tarai should be eliminated. Backward areas should be given regional autonomy. Rural and urban areas should be treated at par.
26. Local bodies should be empowered and appropriately equipped.

Concerning livelihood

27. Land should belong to 'tenants'. Land under the control of the feudal system should be confiscated and distributed to the landless and the homeless.
28. The property of middlemen and comprador capitalists should be confiscated and nationalised. Capital lying unproductive should be invested to promote industrialisation.
29. Employment should be guaranteed for all. Until such time as employment can be arranged, an unemployment allowance should be provided.
30. A minimum wage for workers in industries, agriculture and so on should be fixed and strictly implemented.
31. The homeless should be rehabilitated. No one should be 'relocated' until alternative infrastructure is guaranteed.
32. Poor farmers should be exempt from loan repayments. Loans taken by small farmers from the Agricultural Development Bank should be written off. Appropriate provisions should be made to provide loans for small farmers.

33. Fertiliser and seeds should be easily available and at a cheap rate. Farmers should be provided with appropriate prices and markets for their produce.
34. People in flood and drought-affected areas should be provided with appropriate relief materials.
35. Free and scientific health services and education should be available to all. The commercialisation of education should be stopped.
36. Inflation should be checked. Wages should be increased proportionate to inflation. Essential goods should be cheaply and easily available to everyone.
37. Drinking water, roads and electricity should be provided to all villagers.
38. Domestic and cottage industries should be protected and promoted.
39. Corruption, smuggling, black marketing, bribery, and the practices of middlemen and so on should be eliminated.
40. Orphans, the disabled, the elderly and children should be duly honoured and protected.

We would like to request the present coalition government to immediately initiate steps to fulfill these demands which are inextricably linked with the Nepali nation and the life of the people. If there are no positive indications towards this from the government by 17 February, 1996, we would like to inform you that we will be forced to adopt the path of armed struggle against the existing state power.

Thank you.

Dr Baburam Bhattarai
Chairman
Central Committee, United People's Front, Nepal

Source: Deepak Thapa, ed., *Understanding the Maoist Movement of Nepal*, Kathmandu, Martin Chautari, 2003, pp. 391, First published in Dr Baburam Bhattarai, *Barta ra tatkalin rajnaitik nikasko prashna*, Kathmandu: Publication Department, Special Central Command, CPN (Maoist), Fagun 2059 BS.

Appendix- Two

Strategy and Tactics of Armed Struggle in Nepal

(Document adopted by the Third Plenum of the Central Committee of Communist Party of Nepal (Maoist) in March 1995)

HISTORICAL BACKGROUND

When analysing Nepal's history from historical materialistic perspective, it can be easily inferred that the Nepalese people have been struggling against the complexities of natural forces and various man-made problems for their own survival & development. Modern Nepal was evolved through the struggle between and intermingling of, on the one hand; simple, innocent people struggling to live peacefully in steep slopes with their natural economic system and tribal culture, and at the other, the Hindus who had periodically intruded into this country from the south specially about 1000 years back with their superior technology of production and art of war after they were defeated by Muslims. In this historical process the rise of princes & chieftains and the struggle that kept pursuing between them has forced the people to be trained in violent struggle, which has been proved by the history. The Nepalese people who had acquired military & fighting prowess in the course of their historical development were able to fight bravely against the Britishers in the south & the Chinese in the north who were well equipped with modern knowledge, technique & weapons, during the later period. In the battles fought for their own sovereignty the children, old men, women, youths have demonstrated unprecedented sacrifices, bravery & cleverness on the basis of arms & equipments made in their own country. This had frightened & terrorised even large imperialist armies and their commanders and established the Nepalese (Gorkhali) people as one of the greatest fighters of the world. Even today any independent Nepalese would feel proud when they remember the fighting prowess, bravery and sacrifice of the Nepalese people in the past history. It is a matter of no lesser pride that even Karl Marx, the proponent of communist

ideology & the leader of the world proletariat, too, had appreciated the sacrifice, bravery and skill shown by the Nepalese people in those wars.

However from the point of view of the leadership, even yesterday & today the foreign imperialism and its running dog, the domestic reactionary ruling class, have conspiratorially turned the brave Nepalese into mercenary soldiers. For us it is necessary to pass this historical legacy to the people through the struggle and encourage them to take their fate in their own hands.

Here, even after the development of the centralised Nepalese state, the Nepalese people have been fighting & opposing in their own way against the atrocities let loose by the ruling classes, specially the Ranas and the Shahas. Notable among these are many clashes within the different ruling classes and the rebellion of Lakhan Thapa against the Ranas. Under the background of the growing people's consciousness & rebellion worldwide around the period of Second World War, the Nepalese people too began to fight violently against the oppression perpetuated by the ruling classes. In this process, the Communist Party took birth in Nepal and Nepal entered into a stage of New Democratic revolution against feudalism & imperialism. The people from different parts of the country rose to fight with arms against the Indian expansionist ruling classes, their stooge the Nepal Congress, and the feudal king, who had conspired to crush the people's movement through the Delhi accord. In this connection the armed rebellion that took place in Bhairahawa area is notable. Even after that the people continued to be involved in small or big struggles breaking the reactionary law & administration. Armed conflicts against the local feudal tyrants in different places started taking place.

Among this kind of armed rebellion against feudalism & expansionism, armed rebellion that took place under the leadership of Bhim Datta Pant in Western part of Nepal is historically important. In the year 1952-53 itself the way Bhim Datta Pant made hundreds of armed squads, the way he was able to annihilate corrupt government officials, the way he was able to capture grains from the government granaries & other essentials and distribute amongst the poor and famine-stricken peasants, the way he was able to attack

the feudal tyrants one after the other, it was of no less importance. The very fact that it was beyond the capacity of Nepalese government to quell this rebellion itself proves clearly how popular & powerful it was. Thousands of Indian troops were called inside to quell this rebellion and the leader was killed in a most gruesome & inhuman manner. It was from that period onwards itself the present ruling class had shown its anti-national, capitulationist and fascist nature.

During this period peasants in league with the Communist Party start fighting against feudal exploitations in different districts of the country. Amongst them the peasant rebellion developed in Bara, Parsa and specially in Rautahat has special importance. Thousands of peasants defied the law and administration to destroy the bond papers of local feudal tyrants, to break their granaries, to start cultural movement to snub the pride of the feudals, thus spearheading the violent struggles. The peasants nearly captured local political power, leading to the panic flights by feudal landlords. However, it is a matter of sad concern that the then leadership of the Communist Party instead of analysing the peasant class war & armed rebellion that were taking place in different parts of Nepal and without exploring the potentiality of waging a guerrilla war, condemned them as extremism, and went to surrender before the king. It tried to limit itself into legal, peaceful struggle and to work within the parliamentary system. This was a historical betrayal in the direction of revisionism that would have a long - term impact in the Nepalese communist movement.

Even after that the people's rebellion went ahead. Peasant's rebellions of different kinds continued. In this period, peasant's long struggle against the feudals in Khaniyavas of Dhading and that of Dang are worth mentioning, illegal struggles of small & big nature continued against signing of Gandak treaty by the so called elected Nepali Congress government in the year 1959 and against the bootlickers of Indian expansionists. Incidences of violent struggles in different places against the Royal coup of 1960 and against the partyless Panchayat system were also seen. In this period leftist youths and students movement continued despite imprisonment, repression and terror unleashed on them.

The armed struggle of 1972-73 in Jhapa in line with the protracted people's war waged in rebellion against right revisionism prevalent in the Communist movement is the most note-worthy struggle. That rebellion certainly represents the revolutionary trend and the spirit. Those who have been martyred in the process of consciously establishing New Democratic republic are immortal martyrs. Although there were deep shortcomings in the leadership in terms of petty-bourgeois mechanistic and 'leftist' adventurist tendencies, it was however an important far-reaching rebellion against the autocratic feudal rule of the king and against the rightist reformist tendencies that had entrenched deeply into the Nepalese Communist Movement. In the armed struggle to pursue New Democratic revolution, the martyrs of Jhapa rebellion will remain in the forefront.

Around this time, the intense struggles pursued against the feudals and exploiters in the Eastern Terai consisting of Sarlahi, Mahottari, Siraha, Dhanusha and Sindhuli have established a new record in the history of peasant movement. In this process, too, hundreds of thousands of farmers under the leadership of the Party were involved in the class struggle resulting into a kind of power vacuum in the villages. It can be clearly seen that there was a possibility of initiating the process of guerrilla war from the foundation of peasant's struggle of that period. However, because of reformist line and the petty bourgeois pretensions of the party, the peasants became helpless under the onslaught of reactionary military operation. During that time many brave sons of Nepalese revolutionary movement got martyred.

Amidst this, in Chitawan, the peasants struggle including the Jugedi struggle took place. Even in that rebellion many peasant youths got martyred. The historic student's movement of 1979 took the form of people's movement throughout the country. In this process development of countrywide violent peasant struggle took place. This brought the waves of big peasant struggle in the Eastern Terai districts mentioned above and others including Chitawan, Dang and Bardiya. Different sections of people including peasants got involved in the countrywide struggle against the Panchayat and the monarchy by defying the reactionary law & administration. The king was forced to concede an alternative choice against the so-called choiceless Panchayat because of the strength of

violent struggle of people's power. Although behind it there was an inherent conspiracy plotted by the king & the monarchical forces. Even after that the trend of people's struggle forged ahead by becoming stronger day after day for the sake of nationalism, democracy and the livelihood of the people.

The historical people's movement of 1990 became the central expression of all these movements. Here along with the countless violent conflicts in all over Nepal including the capital city, the movement began to forge ahead to end the monarchical system. In this historical struggle, hundreds of brave sons & daughters of Nepal had to lose their lives. However the domestic and foreign reactionaries including the rightist reformists in order to get limited reforms went ahead to compromise with the king against the (high) level & the spirit of the movement and succeeded in their conspiracy to derail the movement. It is clear that the end of the partyless Panchayat and the establishment of multiparty system under the leadership of the king is also the result of people's violent struggle.

Even after the establishment of multiparty system, lakhs of people are still in the process of struggle for the nationality, democracy and the livelihood of the people. In this period we have also clearly seen in the course of the general legal movements under our leadership that people are willing to extend them full help and support with great enthusiasm when there are direct attacks against the reactionary state and there are violent clashes. Within a short period of the establishment of multiparty system hundreds of Nepalese have lost their lives for the sake of liberation & their rights, in which an important leader of our Party from Dhanusha and other cadres throughout the country also fall in.

The conscious peasant class struggle developed in the western hilly districts, particularly in Rolpa & Rukum, represents the high level of anti feudal & anti-imperialist revolutionary struggle. Despite severe reactionary repression and terror the movement not only remains sustained, but also it is going ahead as a resistance movement with the qualitative leap. That struggle has given birth to some new substances in the Nepalese

Communist movement which have inspired us to be more serious about the business of armed struggle.

From the above historical review it can be concluded that:

1. The reactionary propaganda that the Nepalese people are peace-loving and that they don't like violence is absolutely false. It is an incontrovertible fact that-the Nepalese people have been waging violent struggle for their rights since the historical times.
2. Till today whatever general reforms have been achieved by the Nepalese people, behind them there was the force of violent and illegal struggle of the people.
3. The Nepalese people are very conscious & sensitive about the question of nationalism and that they feel proud to lay down their lives while fighting rather than submit to the pressures of the foreigners.
4. From the year 1951 onwards till today, mainly the Nepalese peasants and other sections of the people have been joining in countless number of violent & armed conflicts against the reactionary state and the anti-establishment feeling among Nepalese people has been very strong.
5. The Nepalese people are the great warriors in the world who are known for their ability to bear the severe material and bodily hardships while fighting.
6. The domestic & foreign reactionaries including the revisionist elements have been time & again ditching & conspiring against the fighting tendency of the Nepalese people. Today the greatest responsibility has fallen upon the revolutionaries to initiate armed struggle methodically and consciously against feudalism & imperialism and to complete the New Democratic revolution by representing that great historical legacy.

Source:

http://www.satp.org/satporgtp/countries/nepal/document/papers/strategy_and_tactics.htm, accessed on 02.12.2009

Appendix-Three

Major incidents of violence in Nepal: 1999-2005: A Calendar of Major Events

2005

August 27: Seven persons travelling in a passenger bus from Kathmandu to Dang were killed and three others sustained injuries in an explosion at Surai Naka section on the Mahendra highway at the border of Kapilvastu and Dang districts.

August 26: Five SF personnel were killed and two others were injured in an IED explosion at Khairanpur in the western district of Kapilavastu.

August 22: Four police personnel are killed and four others sustained injuries when their vehicle struck a landmine at Manigram in the Rupandehi district.

August 7: Approximately 50 troops are killed during a Maoist attack on a RNA base at Pili in the Kalikot district.

July 22: At least seven RNA personnel are killed in an ambush laid by the Maoists on a security patrol team near Goltakuri Rajkot in the Dang district.

June 25: At least 12 soldiers are killed during a Maoist attack on an army patrol team at Khandaha in the Arghakhanchi district.

June 24: At least eight Royal Nepalese Army personnel and one police personnel are killed by the Maoists at Pandhare in the Bhojpur district.

June 19: At least five soldiers are killed during a Maoist attack on various Government offices and security forces' bases at Diktel, headquarters of the Khotang district.

June 14: Maoists kill seven family members of a police personnel, including three women and a one-year old child, at Attariya in the Kailali district.

June 10: Six soldiers and two civilians are killed during a Maoist attack on a passenger bus near Narke river in the Mangaltar area of Kavre district.

June 6: At least 36 civilians and three soldiers are killed and 72 persons sustain injuries in a landmine blast triggered by the Maoists at Mudhekhola in the Chitwan district.

Maoists kill seven security force personnel and injure at least 12 others during an attack on a patrol team at Masuriya jungle in Kailali district.

May 6: Maoists kill Nepal's top Hindu leader Narayan Prasad Pokhrel, chairman of the World Hindu Federation (Nepal chapter), at Dudharachha village in the Rupandehi district.

April 23: Five children are killed and three others sustain injuries during a bomb explosion allegedly triggered by the insurgents at Pakhapani in the Rolpa district.

April 16: Maoists kill ten civilians, including a child, at Baragdawa in the Somni area of Nawalparasi district.

April 9: Insurgents attack the District Police Office, an Army battalion, district prison and also burn some Government offices at Charikot, headquarters of the Dolakha district, and freed some 30 prisoners from the prison.

March 6: A group of Maoists kill five civilians, allegedly members of an 'anti-Maoist retaliation group', at Kudarmatewa village in the Kapilavastu district.

March 4: Insurgents set ablaze and destroy 11 Government buildings, including those of the police, district administration and the general post office at Sandhikharka, headquarters of the Arghakhanchi district.

February 27: At least 10 soldiers are killed and an equal number sustain injuries during separate Maoist attacks in the Bara and Solukhumbu districts.

January 26: Five troops are killed and eight people sustain injuries in a Maoist ambush at Bhyaple along the Baglung-Pokhara highway in Parbat district.

January 19: At least 23 security force personnel are reported to have died at Barbote in the eastern district of Ilam.

January 2: Five police personnel are killed and six others sustain injuries during a Maoist attack on an Army patrol team at Bangaon along the Mahendra highway in the far-western district of Kanchanpur.

January 1: At least 12 soldiers are killed during a clash with the Maoist insurgents at Malbase on the Koshi Highway in Dhankuta district.

2004

December 22: Five soldiers, five civilians and eight Maoists are killed and several others sustain injuries when a group of insurgents attacked an army patrol at Karnali-Chisapani in the Bardiya district.

December 15: At least 21 Royal Nepalese Army (RNA) personnel are killed at Sisnekhola in the Sidwara VDC area of Arghakhanchi district.

December 4: Six security force personnel are killed and three others sustain injuries when Maoist insurgents attacked an army patrol near Surai Naka along the Mahendra highway in the western district of Kapilavastu.

November 21: At least 10 soldiers are killed at Khimdi in the Pandaun VDC area of Kailali district.

November 17: Eight Armed Police Force personnel are killed, a dozen others are injured and over two dozen were reported to be missing after Maoist insurgents detonate landmines at Khari Khola along the Mahendra highway in Banke district.

August 26, 2004: A group of 50 armed Maoist insurgents shot dead a former Chairman of Dhanusha District Development Committee and Rashtriya Prajatantra Party (Nationalist) leader, Badri Bahadur Karki, in the Bharatpur area.

August 2, 2004: Maoist insurgents have reportedly killed the former Mayor of Guleriya Municipality, Rajendra Shrivastav, in Bardiya district

July 5: Twelve police personnel and a civilian are killed in a land mine ambush laid by the Maoist insurgents at Bindhyabasini village in Parsa district.

June 14: At least 22 security force personnel are killed and 16 others sustained injuries in a landmine explosion by the Maoist insurgents at Khairikhola in the Banke district.

May 9: During a Maoist attack on a passenger bus, eight security force personnel and seven civilians are killed at Mainapokhari in the Dolakha district.

April 4: At least nine police personnel are killed during a Maoist attack on the Yadhusha police post in Danusha district.

March 20 - 21: In a Maoist attack on the District Jail, Office of the Chief District Officer and Army Camps at Beni Bazaar in the Myagdi district, at least 51 security force personnel, including 33 Royal Nepalese Army (RNA) personnel, and 20 civilians are killed.

March 3: Maoists insurgents, numbering around approximately 1500 to 2000, attack Nepal Telecommunication Towers and kill 32 security force personnel in Bhojpur district.

January 15: Maoist insurgents kill the Mayor of Birgunj and member of the Rastriya Prajatantra Party (RPP), Gopal Giri, at Bahuaari in the Birgunj district.

2003

December 17: Maoist insurgents kill 11 soldiers in separate land mine blasts in the Kapilavastu and Bardiya districts.

November 15: Four security force personnel, including Brigadier General Sagar Bahadur Pandey, are killed and nine others sustain injuries in an ambush by the Maoist insurgents at Bhainse in Makwanpur.

November 5: Maoist insurgents detonate a bomb outside the Crown Prince's palace (Nirmal Niwas) in the capital Kathmandu. However, no fatalities are reported.

November 2: At least ten security force personnel are killed and six others injured in an ambush by Maoist insurgents at Simara.

October 28: Seven security force personnel and two civilians are killed during a Maoist attack on the Sishuwa Police Post at Danda Nak in Kaski district.

September 12: Maoists kill six civilians in the capital Kathmandu.

September 8: Eight civilians are killed and 12 others sustain injuries in bomb explosions at six places in the capital Kathmandu.

January 26: Armed Police Force chief Krishna Mohan Shrestha, his wife and bodyguard are killed in an attack by Maoist insurgents in Kathmandu.

January 23: Two police personnel are killed and 20 more injured in an ambush laid by Maoists in Girighat, Surkhet district.

January 3: Maoist insurgents kill five security force personnel at Gawar, 350km west of Kathmandu.

2002

December 18: Insurgents attack a police post in Koilabas, Indo-Nepal border, Dang district, and kill six police personnel injure two more.

November 14: Intense clashes occur between security forces and Maoists in Jumla and Gorkha. Insurgents, numbering several hundreds, attack Jumla airport and two police establishments and other government offices killing Jumla Chief District Officer Damodar Pant and two civilians Also, 33 policemen and four soldiers are killed in the clashes in Jumla, while the insurgents lose at least 55 cadres.23 police personnel are killed during clashes in Gorkha.

Insurgents kill former Member of Parliament Chakra Bahadur Chaudhary of the Communist Party of Nepal—United-Marxist-Leninist (CPN-UML), at his residence in Dhangadhi.

October 27: Insurgents attack the Rumjatar airport, Okhaldhunga district. The chief of the security forces stationed there, a Captain in the Army, and two more troops are killed.

September 28: Maoists attack the Phaplu airport tower causing a damage of NR 2 million.

September 13: Nine police personnel, traveling in a jeep, are killed in an ambush laid by Maoist insurgents near the Mahendra Highway, Siraha district.

September 12: Insurgents set-off an explosion and destroy the residence of Minister of State for Local Development Duryodhan Singh Chandhary at Padsari, Rupandehi district.

September 11: Insurgents attack and damage the residence of former Minister of State Bhakta Bahadur Rokaya at Mahat in Jumla, and separately set-off explosions at the home of former Minister Netra Bikram Thapa.

September 10: Maoist insurgents blast the residence of Hom Nath Dahal, spokesperson of the Nepali Congress faction headed by Prime Minister Sher Bahadur Deuba, in Okhaldungha.

September 8: 49 police personnel are killed and 21 more injured in an attack by a group of an estimated 1,100 Maoist insurgents in Sindhuli district at the Bhimad police post.

A group of an estimated 3,000 insurgents, in the Argakhachi district headquarters town of Sandhikharka, kill 68 SF personnel and raze to the ground all government offices in the town.

July 5: Ten persons are injured in a bomb explosion at the headquarters of Prime Minister Sher Bahadur Deuba's faction of the Nepali Congress party in New Baneswore area, Kathmandu.

February 17: 48 Royal Nepal Army troops and 49 police personnel are killed by Maoists in Mangalsen (Achim district) clashes.

2001

December 27: Maoists set off an explosion and damage the residence of Assistant Law Minister Nagendra Kumar Raya in Phulparasai village, Sarlahi district.

December 23: Insurgents destroy the private residence of Cabinet Minister Chiranjivi Wagle in Chitwan district.

December 19: The house of Water Resources Minister Narayan Sharma Poudel, in Chitwan district, is set ablaze by Maoists.

November 23: Maoist insurgents break the ongoing truce by attacking the Army barracks in Ghorai, Dang district, killing 14 soldiers and injuring 30 others. Separately, the insurgents attack the airport in Surkhet and blow up a private-owned helicopter, besides damaging two more helicopters stationed at the airport.

July 7: Insurgents set off explosions near the private residence of Prime Minister Girija Prasad Koirala at Biratnagar. However, no one is killed or injured in the incident.

April 1: At least 300 Maoists attack a hilltop police post in Rukum district and kill 31 police personnel, besides injuring 11 and abducting 23 more.

February 3: Maoist insurgents ambush the convoy of Chief Justice Keshav Prasad Upadhyay, who narrowly escapes the attack, in Chhyasatti, Surkhet, 500km west of the capital Kathmandu. Six others, including a judicial officer, are killed in the attack.

2000

September 24: 1,000 Maoist insurgents attack and demolish the district administration headquarters and a branch of the Nepal Rashtriya Bank in Dunai, Dolpo district.

June 8: 1,600 Maoist insurgents surround a police post manned by 53 personnel in Jajarkot district and attack with mortars and bombs. Nine police personnel, seven civilians and 21 insurgents are killed in the incident.


February 7: Maoists waylay a bus in Dolakha district carrying Polish tourists and rob them of approximately US\$ 5,000 in cash. This is the first major incident by Maoists targeting foreign visitors.

1999

April 19: Maoist insurgents explode bombs at the office of the Election Commission and of Gorkhapatra, the largest circulated Nepali newspaper, in Kathmandu.

March 5: Communist Party of Nepal—Unified-Marxist-Leninist (CPN–UML) leader Yadu Gautam is assassinated by Maoist insurgents.

Source: <http://www.satp.org/satporgtp/countries/nepal/database/majorincidents.htm>, accessed on 02.12.2009



MAP OF NEPAL
ADMINISTRATIVE DIVISION
75 Districts, 14 Zones, 5 Regions

International Boundry
Regional Boundry
Zonal Boundry
District Boundry

KTM - Kathmandu
B - Bhaktapur

INDIA

Maoists' Stronghold (Initial Period)

KTM - Kathmandu
B - Bhaktapur

I N D I A

Maoists' Stronghold (Initial Period)

75 Districts

C H I N A

District Boundry

B - Bhaktapur

INDIA

By 2005 the Maoists had spread over all districts of Nepal

The areas where the Maoists were comparatively less active.

