

SOME MAIN PROBLEMS OF WITTGENSTEIN'S LATER PHILOSOPHY

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DECLARATION

I hereby declare that the thesis entitled
"Some Main Problems of Wittgenstein's Later
Philosophy" submitted by me for the degree
of Doctor of Philosophy, in the School of
Humanities has not been submitted to any
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PREFACE

In this dissertation I am concerned with the reaction of later Wittgenstein to certain issues in philosophy.

The original source of these issues may not be philosophy itself; their original home may be science, literature, art or daily life, for Wittgenstein was not a philosopher in the conventional sense of the term. His interest in science, mathematics, fiction, poetry, music, etc., is well-known and he draws inspiration and analogies from all these areas.

However, one may question what has been done in this dissertation, for one may question the very distinction between early and later Wittgenstein. The reason being simply that what Wittgenstein said in his later work has some kind of continuity with his earlier work. One may feel that the ideas which Wittgenstein expressed in the later part of his life were already there in the Germinal form in his earlier work. But the issue whether there were two distinct phases of Wittgenstein's thought or whether there was only one thought, could be a subject of an independent research work and is beyond the scope of this dissertation.

Here I follow the convention prevalent among a section of Wittgensteinian scholars who distinguish the later Wittgenstein from the earlier one. And there are considerable reasons for the acceptance of this convention. Even if some thought is present in its Germinal form in Wittgenstein's earlier work, it is to be articulated and expressed, we are interested in its articula-

tion, in its expression. This articulation and expression take place only in the later thought of Wittgenstein. Even if we grant that there is an unexpressed continuity of thought, such continuity alone is not sufficient, for we have instances and instances of Wittgenstein's thought which show a complete departure from his earlier thought.

There is no latent or open continuity in them. Consider his reactions to ethics, aesthetics and religion.

In the Tractatus Wittgenstein threw all these disciplines into the realm of ^{the}transcendental, but later he thinks that aesthetics is a very stimulating subject, even more stimulating than the conceptual questions of science. Similarly, early Wittgenstein wanted to remain silent (even though he talked) over the issues of religion. In the Tractatus Wittgenstein thought that how things are in the world is a matter of complete indifference to what is Higher. But later Wittgenstein does not hesitate in expressing his views on religion, as if what is Higher could have an attitude of indifference to the world but the world should not behave in the same manner. Similarly, early Wittgenstein was not interested in psychology; he considered psychology to be one of the sciences, and as a philosopher he thought he should not have any special interest in it. He was practising therapeutic positivist, and one of the ways in which he used to treat a philosophical problem (an illness, a disease) was to show that the problem in question was really a psychological one, and therefore not having any philo-

sophical significance. Philosophical worries and anxieties were converted by him into psychological worries and anxieties and then given up because philosophers should have their own worries and anxieties and not worries belonging to others. However, the same Wittgenstein, in the later stages of his life, finds psychological problems to be very interesting philosophically he discusses psychological issues with the same zeal with which he discusses philosophical issues. He is interested not only in the philosophical analysis of psychological concepts, but Freud too has attracted his attention.

Similarly Wittgenstein has second thoughts about logic of language and science, the two highly favoured disciplines of his earlier days. Logic of language is no more what it used to be in the Notebooks and the Tractatus, for his conception language has later changed. The change in his conception of language led him to change his conception of logic of language. Further he found it not possible to retain the same relationship between language and reality which he maintained in his earlier days. The kind of issues which attracted him later are quite different from the kind of issues which attracted him earlier. While with early Wittgenstein one gets the impression that language and reality are inseparable, as language is a mirror image of reality, with later Wittgenstein one gets the impression that language has obtained a separation from reality even though it may have failed to get a complete divorce from it. And it is natural that when language is separated from reality it develops its own complexities, and

problems. As far as later Wittgenstein is concerned the Gothic structure of science, and its grandeur, is considerably lost. He now finds science as mixed up with superstition. Thus in doing philosophy the later Wittgenstein has tried to untie the knots of our thought, and is certainly not whistling (Ramsey's expression) or talking nonsense (his own earlier view).

The later turn, or the later change, in Wittgenstein's thought becomes visible at the time he started developing the view that our language is a game. And there is not one language game, but a variety of language games. There is no such thing as the language game, exhibiting the essence of all language games. This turn in Wittgenstein's thought is most significant for this is the turn which has converted a Socrates into a Gorgias.

There is no doubt in my mind that if the views of the later Wittgenstein on philosophy or on science or on any other academic discipline are accepted then there can be no objective criteria of rationality. The demand for objective criteria of rationality exhibits essentialism which later Wittgenstein rejects. What is required is that the views in question are accepted. I am persuaded to accept them. I am charmed by the reasoning (persuasion) and this charm is similar to the one I have when I am charmed by the dancing steps of a dancer or the rhythm of a piece of music. If Wittgenstein was a sophist he was the Noblest and the greatest sophist the world has produced. Wealth and power never attracted him as they attracted Plato and his followers. Philosophy and only

philosophy, was his attraction. And he practised and preached, a novel method of doing philosophy.

After his death the philosophical world has shown renewed interest in his work. Strawson describes him as "the first philosopher of the age." He undoubtedly shared the fate of a great man; such a man is generally praised after his death.

Concerning the plan of this thesis I have imposed some restrictions on my writing. The first chapter is devoted to study the transition from, the Tractatus to Wittgenstein's later writing. The second is concerned with language game which is responsible for Wittgenstein's jumping out of the Tractarian cave. The third chapter deals with the advent of new rhetoric in Wittgenstein. The fourth chapter deals with Wittgenstein's philosophical psychology. The fifth discusses the contribution of Wittgenstein to philosophy of science.

Originally I thought of including Freudian psychology, religion and aesthetics too in this dissertation. Later I discovered it would be too ambitious a plan, and therefore, I decided to postpone writing on these issues for some future occasion. However something on both these issues has been written in the first chapter. The first chapter allows such writing because of its introductory nature.

C O N T E N T S

Preface	i
1. From Cave to Light	1
2. Language - Game	53
3. Rhetoric	85
4. Philosophical Psychology	127
5. Philosophy of Science	183
Bibliography	216

Chapter - I

FROM CAVE TO LIGHT

What men consider reasonable or unreasonable alters. At certain periods men find reasonable what at other periods they find unreasonable and vice-versa.

On Certainty

Revolution in Philosophy : Early Wittgenstein : It has been said that the Tractatus brought about a revolution in philosophy. What kind of revolution was brought about? Who was responsible for bringing about this revolution? Wittgenstein. He was a living legend. Barely three decades have passed since his death, yet I feel I am working on a Philosopher of great antiquity perhaps because he has received as much attention as any great philosopher of the past. As early as November 15, 1914, Wittgenstein remarked, "Don't worry about what you have already written. Just keep beginning to think afresh as if nothing at all happened yet."¹

True to this remark Wittgenstein kept on writing and sometimes really did not worry about what he wrote the day before, so he left behind him highly stimulating yet controversial views. He did not hesitate in considering some view as reasonable which at some other time he had considered to be unreasonable. So one need not read the writings of others to either praise or condemn his views for he was his own critic. He was not the kind of philosopher who would defend a given view simply because it happened

1. Notebooks p. 30 (6)

to be his own. He knew he was not incorrigible. The publication of the *Tractatus* in 1921 was considered to be a landmark in the history of philosophy and was so highly celebrated that some people thought that philosophy was born in 1921. This is an extreme view to which Russell reacted in the following manner "Those who really think philosophy began in 1921, or at any rate not long before, fail to see that current philosophical problems have not arisen all of a sudden and out of nothing."² The extreme view that philosophy was born in 1921 did not come about without reason. It was perhaps an exaggeration of the impact of the totally novel spirit and technique of doing philosophy introduced by Wittgenstein. Philosophy did not emerge "all of a sudden and out of nothing" but what went on before 1921 was according to Wittgenstein, something like alchemy. Just as alchemy gave birth to chemistry (a science) so also, the earlier writings gave birth to philosophy. Even Russell cannot deny the new way of philosophising introduced by Wittgenstein. The Wittgensteinian and post-Wittgensteinian philosophy is quite unlike what was done in the pre-Wittgensteinian days. In his Blue Book Wittgenstein comments about his own kind of philosophising, "Every particular notation stresses some particular point of view. If, e.g. we call our investigations "philosophy", this title, on the one hand seems appropriate, on the other hand it certainly has misled people. (One might say that the subject we are dealing with is one of the heirs of the subject which used to be called "philosophy")"³ Wittgensteinian philosophy is a class apart and

2. Wisdom of the West, London, 1959, p.5. *Bertrand Russell*

3. Blue and Brown Books p. 28.

cannot be compared with the works of his contemporaries or predecessors. What has been done by Wittgenstein has no historical analogue. This however does not mean that there were no similarities between his thoughts and say the thoughts of Plato, Aristotle, Hume, etc.

About his own way of philosophising, Wittgenstein never admits that it "happened all of a sudden and out of nothing". If he meant this he would not have considered his Tractatus as "dealing with problems of philosophy."⁴ Moreover further remarks of the preface would have been impossible to make. He says "I do not wish to judge how far my efforts coincide with those of other philosophers. Indeed what I have written here makes no claim to novelty in detail the reason why I give no sources is that it is a matter of indifference to me whether the thoughts that I have had have been anticipated by someone else."⁵ It is seen that Wittgenstein himself makes no claim to novelty of thought, though his Tractatus has been declared to be an extremely novel experiment in philosophical thinking. He is quite conscious that his thoughts might have been "anticipated by others." However he made no attempt to see whether his views were anticipated by any other great philosopher of the past. Neither was Wittgenstein a historian of philosophy nor was the history of philosophy important to him. What was of importance to him was the solution of philosophical problems. He was aware that others too have offered various solutions. Wittgenstein's mind was philosophically sensitive and receptive to philosophical

4. Tractatus Logico Philosophicus, Preface, p. 3.

5. Ibid.

influences. About the influence of others on him Wittgenstein admits in the Tractatus that "I am indebted to Frege's great works and to the writings of my friend Mr. Bertrand Russell for much of the stimulation of my thoughts."⁶ Frege's influence on Wittgenstein was profound and it continued till the end of his life. Frege's influence is present even in the repudiation of the Tractatus and Frege in the later part of his life. Even in Zettel, Wittgenstein states, "The style of my sentences is extraordinarily strongly influenced by Frege. And if I wanted to, I could see it."⁷ Wittgenstein seems to accept the influence of Fregeⁱⁿ an innocent and child-like manner. According to Dummett, Frege influenced Wittgenstein more than Russell. Dummett says, "The Tractatus pays profound homage to Frege, homage that is pointedly more intense than that paid to Russell, and is crammed with reference to his doctrines; indeed, the book is virtually unintelligible without an understanding of its Fregean background."⁸ However, what I feel is that the conceptual apparatus of Frege and the atomistic hypothesis of Russell, were partly, if not wholly responsible for the production of the Tractatus. But this does not decrease the superiority of Wittgenstein or his work in any way. For the Tractatus remains a landmark in the history of philosophy. According to Dummett Wittgenstein gave a specific formulation to the task of philosophy. He says "It is to Wittgenstein that we owe the formulation of the thesis that 'all philosophy is critique of language'. Frege never formulated a programme for philosophy as a whole, nor claimed to be

6. Ibid.

7. Zettel, 712.

8. Frege, Duckworth, London, 1973, p. 662.

more than a logician and a philosopher of mathematics."⁹ Dummett further accepts, "It is probably due to Wittgenstein that Frege is read by philosophers to-day."¹⁰ Frege will live so long as the Tractarian Wittgenstein lives.

The view that philosophy is a critique of language, helps to purge philosophy of its Cartesian element, from its epistemological bias. Wittgenstein gave a new turn to philosophy, a new direction to its flow. Though later he discovered that it was not the right kind of turn. Although when he wrote the Tractatus he sincerely believed that "the truth of the thoughts" he expressed is "unassailable and definitive" and he has produced the final solution of the problems."¹¹ What was the new turn that Wittgenstein gave to philosophy with the publication of his Tractatus ? It is true not only of Descartes, but also true of his adversaries the empiricists, that they reduced philosophy to epistemology. Dummett too points out, "For Descartes, the question 'What do we know ?' was not just the starting point of philosophical enquiry, but the central question of all philosophy." For the "empiricists ... epistemology was prior to other branches of philosophy because it indicated the only possible route to the analysis of ideas."¹² The empiricists differ from Descartes because they have changed the central question of philosophy from " 'What do we know' to 'How do we know' ".¹³ Frege wanted to liberate philosophy from the Cartesian - empiricistic hold. As Dummett further

9. Dummett, p. 683.

10. Ibid., p. 662.

11. Tractatus Preface p. 5.

12. Dummett, p. 676.

13. Ibid.

remarks, "It was Frege who first perceived both the irrelevance of genetic questions and the inadequacy of the empiricistic conception of ideas."¹⁴ Wittgenstein carried Frege's thought to its logical end. To quote Dummet again "The first philosopher fully to adopt Frege's perspective was Wittgenstein : the difference between him and Russell is brought out sharply if we compare the Tractatus with The Philosophy of Logical Atomism; Many of the same doctrines are argued for in the two books, but in Russell's work they take on an epistemological guise which is lacking in the Tractatus. The Tractatus is a pure essay in the theory of meaning, from which every trace of epistemological or psychological consideration has been purged as ^ethoroughly as the house is purged of leaven before the passover."¹⁵ It is because of Wittgenstein's constant attack on Frege for his psychologism that Wittgenstein succeeded where Frege failed.

It seems that for Wittgenstein anti-psychologism is connected with the anti-metaphysical. The removal of one will result in the removal of the other. If language is purged of its psychologism it would also be purged of its metaphysical bias. At that time the Vienna Circle philosophers were also in search of a theory of meaning which would purge philosophy of its metaphysical element and would give a dignified status to science. The metaphysicians of their time were Hegelians, who gave no importance to science, perhaps because they had no technical knowledge of science, and considered knowledge of science to be of no philosophical consequence. Not finding what they needed with the Hegelians, the Vienna Circle philosophers looked for

14. Ibid.

15. Ibid., p. 679.

other avenues and finally found that the Tractatus fulfilled their need, for the theory of meaning propounded in that work is not only free from the psychological considerations, but it also prohibits metaphysics as an independent academic pursuit, and considers philosophy to be a method rather than a body of propositions, "Philosophy aims at the logical clarification of thoughts"..... "Philosophy does not result in 'Philosophical propositions, but rather in the clarification of propositions.'"¹⁶ Thus Wittgenstein's Tractatus became the Bible of the circle. The major slogan of the Circle, "The meaning of a proposition is the method of its verification" was rightly or wrongly taken to be a variant of the picture theory of meaning. Of course the followers of Wittgenstein did not relish the idea that Wittgenstein should be treated as the God-father of Logical Positivism or that the Tractatus be treated like the Bible or the Communist Manifesto. Again, Dummett brings out the situation very clearly. He does not share the view of the followers of Wittgenstein. He gives his objective opinion when he says, "Admirers of Wittgenstein have complained that the positivists misinterpreted the Tractatus as a positivistic manifesto, and it may well be true that there is very little positivism actually in the Tractatus; but the complaint is unjustified all the same, because the book directly lends itself to this use. For the positivist, the sense of a sentence consists in the method of its verification, and verification is conceived of as direct confrontation with sense-data; verification on this view, is pure observation, into which linguistic operations (save the comparison with the actual sentence to be verified) do not enter."¹⁷

16. Tractatus, 4.112.

17. Dummett p. 636.

So viewed objectively Wittgenstein did encourage the positivistic movement and the positivists did make an attempt to study and understand the Tractatus, and its theory of meaning. However, when the positivists started making sense out of Wittgenstein's "essay in the picture theory of meaning", he had already started preparing his notes for writing another essay in the theory of meaning, "Meaning as use".

When one analyses the question about the originality of the Tractatus one notes that there is a sense in which the Tractatus is highly original, and also a sense in which nothing contained in it is original. In this book one can discern the thoughts of such great philosophers as Frege, Russell, Hume, Descartes, Schopenhauer; even Plato and Aristotle if one wishes. But it goes beyond all of them, not only singly, but also jointly. For none of them has the credit of achieving singly what Wittgenstein has achieved, and that too in just about twenty thousand words. While introducing the Tractatus Max Black points out, "Within a span of some twenty thousand words there are comments on the nature of the universe and the essence of language, important contributions to the foundations of logic and mathematics, penetrating criticism of the work of Frege and Russell, the outlines of a theory of probability, revolutionary ideas about philosophy of science, ethics, religion, and mysticism."¹⁸ The list given by Max Black is incomplete. What is striking is not just the long list of topics covered in these twenty thousand words but also the fact that these words have been articulated in a fairly

 18. A Companion to Wittgenstein's 'Tractatus' Cornell University Press, 1961 p. 1.

short time. Wittgenstein himself never claimed any originality except the originality of his style, method or approach. The philosophical problems which challenged Aristotle and Wittgenstein might have been the same, but Wittgenstein's solution of the problem is not Aristotelian. Wittgenstein reaffirms faith in the kind of originality he has in his later writing Culture and Value. He says, "I believe that my originality (if that is the right word) is an originality belonging to the soil rather than to the seed. (Perhaps I have no seed of my own). Sow a seed in my soil it will grow differently than it would if in any other soil."¹⁹

Wittgenstein's soil however does not allow a seed to grow for a long time. Before it sprouts so much as to take the form of a tree Wittgenstein pulls it out, and again prepares the soil for sowing a new seed. He says, "Each morning you have to break through the dead rubble afresh so as to reach the living warm seed."²⁰ But he should have added that the 'living warm seed' of to-day will become the dead rubble of tomorrow. There is no chance for this warm seed to grow and mature into a living tree. In his Notebooks (Earliest Wittgenstein) he advised us to go "on thinking afresh as if nothing at all happened yet." And now in the days of Culture and Value (Latest Wittgenstein) he advises us to 'break through the dead rubble each morning'. This certainly exhibits a continuity of thought in the two Wittgensteins. The later Wittgenstein approves of what was said by the early Wittgenstein, "Each morning think afresh", "Each morning break through the dead rubble". What was said in the past

19. Culture and Value, p. 36.

20. Ibid., p. 2.

is dead and gone. It is no use remembering it, for there can be no freshness in what is dead and gone. One has to bring out new fresh living thoughts from the dead rubble of the past. A philosopher who continues to stick to the dead issues is no philosopher.

While writing on the "Evolution of Frege's thought" for his book on Frege, Dummett quotes from William Black, "The man who never alters his opinion is like standing water, and breeds reptiles of the mind."²¹ I do not know much about Frege, but whatever little I know about Wittgenstein leads me to say that Wittgenstein's mind was not of the kind to allow the breeding of reptiles. Although attempts have been made to find unity in Wittgenstein's thought, it is doubtful whether one would succeed in finding the kind of unity in Wittgenstein's thought as Dummett finds in Frege's thought. In fact it goes against the very spirit of Wittgensteinian thought to search for unity. The whole idea of search for unity is misleading. It is wrong to argue that I have only one body and therefore I have only one mind and therefore I have only one thought, or different thoughts having oneness in them. Just as the mind of man is unlike his body and cannot be compared or deduced from the body similarly about thoughts. I can have^a thought today which is wholly unlike the thought I had yesterday. My thought today may contradict my earlier thought or exclude my earlier thought. But it just makes no sense to say that today my body is wholly unlike my body yesterday, or contradicts the body I had yesterday^ω excludes it in any sense of the term.

What is the revolution in philosophy which the Tractatus has

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21. Dummett, p. 628.

brought about ? The revolution consists in purging philosophy of its epistemological and psychological ingredients. The Tractatus is a revolt against the Cartesian empiricistic philosophy. Philosophers should direct their attention to the logic of language, and not to the epistemological or psychological questions.

Counter-Revolution in Philosophy : Later Wittgenstein. Every revolution is followed by a counter-revolution however short-lived the counter-revolution may be. The reactionary forces do not like the revolutionary changes. The counter offensive is launched with the intention of bringing back the old state, i.e., the state which existed prior to the revolution. Later Wittgenstein launches a counter-offensive against early Wittgenstein and in a sense also against Frege who inspired the revolution of the Tractatus. Perhaps Wittgenstein did not like the idea of his views being attacked by others. So, when he realised that his position was open to attack he started the attack himself. Wittgenstein thus excelled in both construction and destruction. Attack on his views from without would be superficial and Wittgenstein disliked superficiality, so he began the attack from within. He sought dignity even in rejection. Other philosophers may not give a fair treatment to his Tractatus. Dignified rejection lies in first understanding the views and then rejecting them and not in just superficial rejection. Therefore Wittgenstein himself became the leader of the counter-offensive. After all, who can know the strategy of the enemy camp better than the enemy himself. The seed of the Tractatus is no more warm and living, it is part of the dead rubble, therefore it is better to clear it out, Fresh seed is to be sown. In order to understand Wittgenstein's counter-revoluti-

nary offensive, I would like to point out that the Tractarian definition of epistemology or Theory of Knowledge is in terms of "Philosophy of Psychology."²¹ The revolution that was brought about by the Tractatus in Philosophy, as discussed earlier, was in terms of purging philosophy of its epistemological and psychological ingredients. The counter-revolution consists in . . . converting the whole of philosophy into philosophical psychology or making philosophical psychology as the major theme of philosophy. All the work of later Wittgenstein, whether it be the Blue and Brown Books or Zettel, are full of philosophical psychology even if we exclude the two volumes recently published on the Philosophy of Psychology. Later Wittgenstein has shattered Frege's dream by bringing epistemology back as the centre of focus. The Cartesian-empiricistic trend in philosophy has been revived. The questions such as 'what do we know?' and 'how do we know?' have again become the central questions of philosophy. It seems as if later Wittgenstein is concerned only with the solution of psychological muddles and logical rigour according to Russell is at zero level. There is no scope for doubt that the later work of Wittgenstein exhibits a counter-revolution for it has brought philosophy back to its original state. The tractarian ideal of purging philosophy of its epistemological and psychological ingredients is not respected any more. Now it is not suprising that Wittgenstein finds Freudian psychology interesting. From the Tractarian point of view this is Wittgenstein's degradation to the lowest nadir because he has started discussing empirical issues.

In his counter-offensive later Wittgenstein attacks not only early Wittgenstein but also Frege's views on meaning, or rather,

 21. Tractatus , 4.1121.

the attack on Frege is one of the ways in which he is attacking his own earlier view. The theory of meaning proposed in the Tractatus according to later Wittgenstein is grounded in the false picture of language. It is this false picture which has led him to talk about the logic of our language" ²³ or to think that 'all philosophy is a 'critique of language'." ²⁴ Thus in his Blue Book Wittgenstein attacks Frege and lays a foundation for the new theory of meaning 'meaning as use'. If the earlier theory of meaning helped the Logical Positivists, the later theory helped the Ordinary Language Analysis Movement in Philosophy. Making explicit Frege's view of meaning Wittgenstein remarks, "Frege ridiculed the formalist conception of mathematics by saying that the formalists confused the unimportant thing, the sign, with the important, the meaning ...Frege's idea could be expressed thus : the propositions of mathematics, if they were just complexes of dashes, would be dead and utterly uninteresting , whereas they obviously have a kind of life. And the same of course, could be said of any proposition : Without a sense, or without the thought, a proposition would be an utterly dead and trivial thing." ²⁵ Wittgenstein makes explicit the reason which might have led Frege to to his dualism of 'sign' and 'sense', to his postulation of 'thought' as distinct from the psychical arts on the one hand and the physical universe on the other. But Wittgenstein thinks that one need not postulate the 'realm of sense' as distinct from the 'realm of sign' in order to search for the meaning of a sign. Arguing against Frege he says, "If we had to name anything which is the life of the sign, we should have to say that it was its use." ²⁶ Making explicit his

23. Tractatus, 4.003.

24. Ibid., 4.0031.

25. Blue and Brown Books, p. 4.

26. Ibid., p. 4.

position he says further, "The sign (the sentence) gets its significance from the system of signs, from the language to which it belongs. Roughly: understanding a sentence means understanding a language."²⁷

Wittgenstein is drawing our attention to the 'macro aspect of language' rather than to its "micro aspect". In his Tractatus he attempted to draw attention to the micro aspect for then he was of the opinion that a proposition "is understood by anyone who understands its constituents."²⁸ And if a proposition "has no sense, that can only be because we failed to give a meaning to some of its constituents."²⁹ Thus the basic unit of meaning or sense is a constituent of a proposition. If a 'word' is the constituent of a proposition, and if the proposition is identical with a 'sentence', then we can say that the meaning or sense of a sentence depends on the meaning or sense of the words occurring in it. The journey is towards the micro-aspect of a sentence. This journey according to later Wittgenstein is futile, is ill-directed. The idea of making such a journey arises by interpreting the expression 'sense of a sign' on the pattern of 'brother of \neq Mary'. A sign is different from its sense as Mary is different from her brother. Instead of searching for the use of a sign, i.e., how the sign is used in a language both Wittgenstein and Frege were searching for what the sign stands, for the sense of a sign. As he says "The mistake we are liable to make could be expressed thus; We are looking for the use of a sign, but we look for it as though it were an object co-existing with the sign. (One of the reasons for this mistake is again that we are looking for a "thing corresponding to a substantive.")³⁰ If the use of a sign

27. Ibid., p. 5.

28. Tractatus 4.024.

29. Ibid., 5.4733.

30. Blue & Brown Books. p.5.
Tractatus, 4.002.

is not something independent of the sign, then Frege's postulation of 'thought' involves the same kind of mistake as Wittgenstein's search for the 'simples'. The use of a sign does not presuppose a second reality co-existing with the sign. There is no need to consider the micro-aspect of a sentence. A sentence itself becomes the basic unit of meaning and meaning of a sentence depends on its use in a given context, and not on the fact that its constituents words stand for independent simples.

Those who deny the view that there are two Wittgenstein's the earlier and later, the revolutionary and the counter-revolutionary would argue that the Tractatus itself presents a revolt against the view that in order to understand the sense of a sentence one must understand the sense of its constituents. In his Tractatus itself Wittgenstein revolts against commitment to logical atomism. For he said, "Man possesses the ability to construct languages capable of expressing every sense, without having any idea how each word has meaning or what its meaning is - just as people speak without knowing how the individual sounds are produced."³¹ This implies that a proposition can be constructed without knowing the meaning of 'names' occurring in it. But how would it be to not know the meaning of names? The analogy of words with sounds misleads only if one is already captive of a certain picture about language. One may not know how the sounds are produced, yet as a matter of fact one produces them. Does Wittgenstein mean to say that one may use a sign but one may not know what its meaning is? But if one does not know what its meaning is, then how has one succeeded in using ^{it} at all. In understanding Wittgenstein's view one may find difficulties if one has

³¹ Tractatus, 4.002.

already fallen prey to the picture that the use of a sign depends on its having a meaning. Unless the sign has a meaning, there is no question of its being used. So I must first know the meaning of a sign in order to use it. But if the use of a sign is its meaning, or confers a meaning on it, then the sign can very well be used if one does not know the meaning of a sign in advance in order to use it. Meaning is use. The use of the sign is not consequent upon its meaning .

Consider now the view presented in the Tractatus that all philosophy is a critique of language or that its function is to make explicit the logic of our language. When Wittgenstein presented this view he certainly did not mean to say that philosophy is concerned with logics (plural) of languages (again plural). Though he had difficulties with his conception of language, the conception was, all the same, that of a straight forward simple language. At that time he did not feel that the difference between two languages could be the sort of difference which exists between two objects of a totally different kind, say, triangle and a tiger. That is why, he was led to think of the logic of language, as something which is the essence of language. It was because he pictured a simple language that he could think of its essence. According to him philosophical nonsense arose because philosophers fail to understand the logic of our language. As he says, "Most of the propositions and questions of philosophers arise from our failure to understand the logic of our language³²." But even if we succeed in understanding the logic of our language, we cannot express our understanding in words, therefore all philosophy spoken or written is nonsensical. If this is the real situation then

 32- Tractatus. 4.003.

Wittgenstein should not blame philosophers for their failure to understand the logic of our language, for their success too would not have been of much use. As a matter of fact the word 'success' has also lost its meaning whether you understand or fail to understand, in both cases you cannot express yourself. This led Wittgenstein to the doctrine of maintaining silence, if the dignity of philosophy is to be maintained. This revolutionary consequence follows from the simplistic view of language. For he considered language to be a 'totality of propositions.'³³ And he thought that "a proposition is a model of reality as we imagine it."³⁴ This implies that the former can be considered as reality in miniature; it exhibits the structure of reality; it is its "logical picture."³⁵ But all this implies that neither logic nor philosophy can be expressed in words. As Russell points out in his introduction to the Tractatus that a "proposition. . . .has in common with the fact a certain structure"... "but the structure cannot itself be put into words, since it is a structure of words as well as of the facts to which they refer Everything, therefore, which is involved in the very idea of the expressiveness of language must remain incapable of being expressed in language". . . . "This inexpressible contains, according to Mr. Wittgenstein, the whole of logic and philosophy."³⁶ Wittgenstein is quite consistent in his views. For he treated his own philosophical work in exactly the same way in which he treated the philosophical work of others. About his Tractatus too he said, "My propositions serve as elucidations in the following way : anyone who understands

33. Ibid., 4.001

34. Ibid., 4.01

35. Ibid., 4.03

36. Ibid., xx - xi

me eventually recognises them as nonsensical."³⁷ The propositions of Tractatus too belong to the realm of the unspeakable; for they are attempts at saying what cannot be said. It is doubtful whether Frege ever imagined giving such a treatment to the issue of the logic of language.

Wittgenstein's conception of language in Tractatus, as it has been pointed out earlier, was that of a simple descriptive language, a language in which we name things, and then we talk about them. Language was a totality of propositions, and propositions had truth value. This simplistic view of language was given the refinement of logic and philosophy was made to appear as if it was something unique. But the Wittgenstein of Investigations is disillusioned about such a simplistic view of language. Reacting to Frege's view of assertions Wittgenstein remarks, "But how many kinds of sentences are there? Say assertion, question and command? There are countless kinds."³⁸ He concludes, "It is interesting to compare the multiplicity of the tools in language and the ways they are used, the multiplicity of kinds of word and sentence, with what logicians have said about the structure of language (including the author of the Tractatus Logico-Philosophicus)."³⁹ What Wittgenstein means is that the logic of assertions cannot be the same as the logic of questions and commands. When one talks about the structure of language one has already presupposed that there is only one kind of language or that there is only one language game. In his Tractatus he said that "Every language is a part of the human organism and is no less complicated

37. Ibid., 6.54

38. Investigations, 23

39. Ibid.

than it." ⁴⁰ From this he inferred that "It is not humanly possible to gather immediately from it what the logic of language is."⁴¹ But the complication to which he is referring in the Tractatus is not the same as the one referred to in the Investigations. In the former work the varieties of logic are missing; logic, like language, is of only one kind, and this too remains hidden behind the grammatical form. Praising Russell, Wittgenstein says, "It was Russell who performed the service of showing that the apparent logical form of proposition need not be its real one."⁴² So what was complicated in the Tractatus was the conception of language as a totality of propositions. The Tractarian Wittgenstein did not and could not think in terms of those languages or language-games which do not express propositions, say, the languages of commands, questions, etc. The real complications of language were not even touched upon in the Tractatus. And he realises his mistake when he says in the Investigations, "We see that what we call "sentence" and "language" has not the formal unity that I ^dimagined, but is the family of structures more or less related to one another. But what becomes of logic now? Its rigour seems to be giving way here."⁴³ There is no one given structure of language, there are structures and structures. So also there cannot be any such thing as the logic of language, there are logics and logics, for there are languages and languages.

An allied issue is the issue of a "logically perfect language" or "ideal language". The fundamental confusions of philosophy could

40. Tractatus., 4.002.

41. Ibid.

42. Ibid., 3.323

43: Investigations, 108.

be removed, thought Wittgenstein in his Tractatus, if we used "a sign-language that is governed by logical grammar - by logical syntax. (The conceptual notation of Frege and Russell is such a language.)"⁴⁴ This is a clear indication of Wittgenstein's preference for a logically perfect language as against the language of our everyday use. This preference is exhibited by his remark, "In everyday language it very frequently happens that some word has different modes of signification - and so belonging to different symbols - or that two words that have different modes of signification are employed in propositions in what is superficially the same way."⁴⁵ He cites the case of 'is' and 'green' in this connection. In this as in other respects Wittgenstein shares the view of Frege in rejecting ordinary language. Concerning Frege's view Dummett points out that Frege "started from the assumption that natural language is a defective instrument, and that what the logician needs is not a theory of the working of natural language but the theory of the working of an improved language which could ideally replace it."⁴⁶

Though he protested time and again, early Wittgenstein did not have the favourable attitude towards ordinary language which later Wittgenstein had. Earlier he thought that our language is full of confusions, and therefore, it requires reformations. But now the picture is very different. In his Investigations he says, "When I talk about language(words, sentences, etc.,) I must speak the language of everyday. Is this language somehow too coarse and material for what we want to say ? Then how is another one to be constructed ?

44. Tractatus, 3.325

45. Ibid., 3.323.

46. Frege, Dummett, p. 585.

And how strange that we should be able to do anything at all with the one we have."⁴⁷ These are his current thoughts. In his earlier days he did not think that our everyday language is too coarse and material and that in communication it would lead to ambiguity and vagueness. It did not occur to him then that inspite of the vagueness and ambiguity of certain expressions of our ordinary language, it does succeed in performing its role. Moreover any other language, that has to be constructed, has to take the help of ordinary language, so why blame ordinary language. Wittgenstein's transition from the logically perfect language to the language of everyday use is his transition from one way of philosophising to another way of philosophising.

Lifting the Ban from Philosophy: Early Wittgenstein imposed a ban on philosophy, i.e., to the expression of philosophy. Philosophy for early Wittgenstein, as we have already seen, is the "Critique of language." This was supposed to be the revolutionary concept of philosophy which he obtained from Frege. This was the concept that was used to purge philosophy of its epistemological and psychological ingredients. However, Wittgenstein saw to it (his originality) that no critique of language could ever be written. For the writing of such a critique presupposes knowledge of the logic of language. Unless a philosopher knows the logic of his language he cannot write a critique of it. But the logic of language cannot be expressed in language. Hence philosophy too cannot be expressed in language. So the revolutionary concept of philosophy implies that the philosopher must remain silent. It he is not concerned with any other kind

47. Investigations, 120

of questions, other than the questions of philosophy, then there is no option left for the philosopher but to keep silent. As Wittgenstein points out in his Notebooks "It is one of the chief skills of the philosopher not to occupy himself with questions which do not concern him."⁴⁸ The last line of the Tractatus is also a last warning to philosophers. "What we cannot speak about we must pass over in silence."⁴⁹ Thus, Wittgenstein puts a ban on philosophy and also warns the philosophers not to lift it. However, not only has Wittgenstein himself spoken so much of philosophy, he has also prescribed some tasks to be done by philosophers, i.e., some problems to be solved by philosophers, and some questions to be answered by philosophers. Perhaps these tasks, these problems and these questions are of secondary importance. Wittgenstein might have thought that philosophers should not be allowed to sit silently and do nothing. They should be provided with some task, some job. If they do not have their own specific doctrines to pursue or own programme to execute, they can at least help others in executing their programmes, in pursuing their doctrines. What then was the job of philosophers ? Wittgenstein prescribes, "Philosophy sets limits to the much disputed sphere of natural science."⁵⁰ So philosophers do have something to do, they can offer their services to the scientists. But what would happen to philosophy once the boundaries of natural science are demarcated ? Why should we assume that the natural sciences would continue having their boundary-disputes so as to provide some job to the philosopher ? While referring to the remarks on philosophy from 4.1-4 which we are considering in this context Max Black

48. Notebooks, p. 44 (12).

49. Tractatus, 7

50. Ibid., 4.113.

says, "It is noteworthy that in this part Wittgenstein allows philosophy a positive function."⁵¹ But what is really noteworthy in this part is that Wittgenstein has provided philosophy only a secondary function. A philosopher has been given a parasitic existence; he has been given second class citizenship of the academic world. His existence depends on the existence of science. He does not have a language of his own, so he has been debarred from touching reality. (How would you feel if you have no land and no language?) A philosopher is prohibited even from giving uninteresting descriptions of reality. Only a scientist possesses the right of describing reality, of doing whatever he feels like doing with reality; he can describe or distort it; he can synthesise it or break it into parts. What is the role of a philosopher while the scientist is doing all kinds of things to reality ? Perhaps he is the mute observer of what the scientist is doing. Wittgenstein has reserved both language and reality for science; the status of philosophy has been completely degraded. The status of science is decided first. Then on the basis of this important decision, Wittgenstein decides the status of philosophy. Since science has doctrines to pursue, therefore there should be no doctrines in philosophy. "Philosophy is not a body of doctrines."⁵² Since science is the totality of propositions, therefore, "Philosophy does not result in philosophical propositions."⁵³ Science is the paradigm of academic virtue, the status of philosophy is to be decided in terms of science. "Philosophy is not one of the natural sciences."⁵⁴ says Wittgenstein. Who can object to it, except perhaps a philosopher.

 51. A Companion to Wittgenstein's, 'Tractatus', p. 185.

52. Tractatus, 4.112

53. Ibid.

54. Ibid., 4.111

But the philosopher has already been silenced by Wittgenstein. Read and see the difference, 'Science is not a branch of philosophy. Philosophy is so and so, therefore, science cannot be so and so.' Wittgenstein goes on deriving the nature of philosophy from his prior decision about the nature of science. "(The word 'philosophy' must mean something whose place is above or below the natural sciences, not beside them."⁵⁵ The nature of philosophy which emerges as a result of the decision about the nature of science is that philosophy is an activity. And this activity is directed towards the welfare of science. Philosophy is at the service of science. On a superficial reading, the following remark may give some hope, "Without philosophy thoughts are as it were, cloudy and indistinct."⁵⁶ But this remark really deprives philosophy from having even confused and unclear thoughts. For a thought is nothing but an unarticulated position. Whatever can be thought, whatever can be said, and whatever can be articulated belongs to science. Philosophy is that which cannot be thought, cannot be said, and which cannot be articulated. When Wittgenstein says about philosophy that "it must set limits to what can be thought."⁵⁷ "to what can be said,"⁵⁸ etc., he simply means that it must "set limits to the sphere of science". The job of a philosopher is to sharpen the boundary of science. Philosophy will "signify what cannot be said by presenting clearly what can be said."⁵⁹ So the philosopher has been thrown back-stage; his only job is to see that an actress/actor produces a presentable impression on the stage.

55. Ibid.

56. Ibid., 4.114

57. Ibid., 4.114

58. Ibid., 4.115

59. Ibid.

He has merely to see that the body of science has proper make-up that it is presentable on stage.

Philosophers would perhaps prefer later Wittgenstein's counter-revolutionary concept of philosophy to his Tractarian revolutionary concept. What are we to do with a revolutionary concept if it does not allow philosophers to express their enchantment or puzzlement with philosophy. Later Wittgenstein lifts the ban from philosophy, and in lifting this ban he has also seen that philosophy does not play second fiddle to science; it has to look after its own problems, its own difficulties. It would not be wrong to say that later Wittgenstein brought philosophy to light by liberating it from the dark Tractarian cave. He reinstated philosophy to its former glory, glory which was suspended by early Wittgenstein.

The question what is Wittgenstein's later conception of philosophy has never been answered by the followers of Wittgenstein in satisfactory terms. The reason is that one hopes to get as clear and precise an answer to this question as one would have obtained while referring to the Tractatus. Later Wittgenstein must tell in a nutshell what his conception of philosophy is as early Wittgenstein told in a nutshell that "all philosophy is critique of language." But later Wittgenstein provides no such nutshell response. This is so, firstly because Wittgenstein now realises that the concept of philosophy is not one of those concepts which has sharp boundaries. Secondly, he is unable to reduce all philosophy to the kind of philosophy he has been doing in his later days. He did not feel shy of such reduction in the Tratatus. There is no doubt that he is doing some kind of philosophy, but all philosophy is not of one kind. And while super-

ficially it may appear that he is doing one kind of philosophy, as a matter of fact he may be doing so many different kinds of things under one name 'philosophy'. If 'philosophy' does not refer to a sharp concept, then it is possible that it refers to a 'family of concepts', having one and the same name 'philosophy'. On one occasion Wittgenstein is doing one kind of philosophy, and on another occasion he is doing another kind of philosophy. The only way in which it is possible to know something about Wittgenstein's later conception of philosophy is to make a general survey of his remarks on philosophy. But his remarks on philosophy are so numerous that one can write a whole dissertation by just analysing them. However, I have selected a few which appeared to be quite interesting and striking.

While referring to Wittgenstein's conception of philosophy Rush Rhees points out, "philosophy was a method of investigation, for Wittgenstein, but his conception of the method was changing."⁶⁰ Perhaps he was not doing the same kind of philosophy on different occasions, so he could not use the same method. In his Tractatus he thought that telling philosophers that they talk nonsense would be "the only strictly correct method of doing philosophy."⁶¹ But later Wittgenstein's attitude to philosophy has changed. He now thinks "There is not a philosophical method, though there are indeed methods, like different therapies."⁶² He is now quite open on the question of method. A philosopher's condition sometimes is the condition of a sick man, therefore the method of therapy in this context occurs to Wittgenstein. "The philosopher's treatment of a question is like the treatment of an illness."⁶³ If philosophy is sickness or disease

60. Blue and Brown Books, preface, vi.

61. Tractatus, 6.53

62. Investigations. 133.

63. Ibid., 255.

(in one of its uses), we cannot blame a philosopher if he does not have it. What is required is a cure, to find a therapy for the illness. For philosophy is not only a disease it is also an attempt to cure the disease. Philosophy brings puzzlement and frustration, but it is also an attempt to remove puzzlement and frustration. "What is your aim in philosophy ? - To show the fly the way out of the fly-bottle."⁶⁴ The philosopher, as Wittgenstein describes in his Notes on "Private Language" and "Sense-data", "flutters and flutters in the fly-glass, strikes against the walls, flutters further. How can he be brought to rest."⁶⁵ The only way seems to be that he be shown the way to go out of the fly-bottle. The method of showing such a way however is not simple. It is as complicated as the complication of a philosophical problem. This becomes clear from what he says in the Philosophical Remarks, "Philosophy unties the knots in our thinking, which we have tangled up in an absurd way; but to do that, it must make movements which are just as complicated as the knots. Although the result of philosophy is simple, its methods for arriving there cannot be so."⁶⁶

Though we may not succeed in obtaining a very clear picture of the positive aspect of philosophical method, its negative aspects are quite clear. As has been pointed out earlier that later Wittgenstein does not allow philosophy to play second fiddle to science, and therefore the method of philosophy is not akin to the scientific or empirical method. As he says in the Investigations, "It was true to say that our considerations could not be scientific ones. It was

64. Ibid. 309

65. Private Language Argument,

ed. O.R. Jones, p. 256. 66. Philosophical Remarks, 2

not of any possible interest to us to find out empirically 'that, contrary to our preconceived ideas, it is possible to think such-and-such.'⁶⁷ In his Blue Book he condemns those philosophers who consider science as the paradigm of philosophical pursuit. (Perhaps Russell is one of them.) He says, "Philosophers constantly see the method of science before their eyes, and are irresistibly tempted to ask and answer questions in the way science does. This tendency is the real source of metaphysics, and leads the philosopher into complete darkness."⁶⁸

Later Wittgenstein's refusal to mix philosophy with science led him to deny that philosophy has anything to do with explanations. As he says, "It can never be our job to reduce anything to anything, or to explain anything. Philosophy really is 'purely descriptive'."⁶⁹ The same ideal occurs in the Investigations, "Philosophy simply puts everything before us, and neither explains nor deduces anything. Since everything lies open to view there is nothing to explain."⁷⁰ And in a more forceful way he says, "We must do away with all explanation, and description alone must take its place."⁷¹ What he means by description is that philosophy does not "interfere with the actual use of language". . . . "It leaves everything as it is."⁷²

At times Wittgenstein exhibits the hangover of Tractatus even in his later writing. Consider his remark, "If one tries to advance theses in philosophy, it would never be possible to debate them, because everyone would agree to them." In his Tractatus he rejected the possibility of a 'philosophical doctrine', now he is rejecting the possibility of a 'philosophical thesis'. There is no doubt that

67. Philosophical Investigations, 109. 68. Blue & Brown Books, p.18.

69. Ibid. 70. Investigations, 126. 71. Ibid., 109.

72. Ibid., 124. 73. Ibid., 128.

the style of rejecting philosophical theses is novel. Why advance theses if they cannot be debated? Wittgenstein's acceptance of the possibility of philosophical propositions in his Philosophical Remarks, is also similar, he says "Philosophy is constantly gathering a store of propositions without worrying about their truth or falsity; only in the cases of logic and mathematics does it have to do exclusively with the 'true' propositions."⁷⁴ Why to gather those propositions about which you do not raise the question of truth and falsity? Are you not increasing the stock of useless propositions? The enterprise of gathering such a system of propositions is certainly not praiseworthy. Finally consider, "The results of philosophy are the uncovering of one or another piece of plain nonsense and of bumps that the understanding has got by running its head up against the limits of language."⁷⁵ The expressions such as 'piece of plain nonsense' and 'limits of language' remind us of Tractatus. Of course there is nothing wrong in later Wittgenstein's supporting the views of earlier Wittgenstein. One of the ways in which philosophy could be done was how it was done in the Tractatus. What was wrong on the part of the author of Tractatus was simply to think that this was the only way of doing philosophy; or, that all philosophy is reducible to the way philosophy is done in the Tractatus.

Language remains the major source of anxiety to both the Wittgenstein's, so also to the two schools of thought which were inspired by him - Logical Positivism and Ordinary Language Analysis movement. Of course the manner in which language worried earlier Wittgenstein

74. Cf. 60.

75. Philosophical Investigations, 119. What Wittgenstein means is that philosophy goes beyond the limits of language.

is different from the manner in which it worried later Wittgenstein. Language has become an obsession with later Wittgenstein, perhaps because he is fully concerned with philosophy now. And philosophy for him has its birth, life and end in language. He has started suffering from "language-neurosis". He exhibits his neurotic behaviour when he says, "Philosophical problems arise when language goes on holiday."⁷⁶ What is it for language to go on holiday? When it relaxes when it relaxes its grammatical rules. But then it is not functioning as language. As Wittgenstein remarks more clearly on the issue, "The confusions which occupy us arise when language is like an engine idling, not when it is doing work."⁷⁷ An idling engine is no engine; one cannot know how the engine works when it is idling. And finally on this issue, "Philosophy is a battle against the bewitchment of our intelligence by means of language."⁷⁸ These fascinating remarks exhibit Wittgenstein's deep-rooted concern with language, a philosopher's concern with language.

A few days before his death Wittgenstein said about the fashion in which he pursued philosophy. "I do philosophy now like an old woman who is always mislaying something and having to look for it again; Now her spectacles, now her cap."⁷⁹ But this has been the fashion in which he has been doing philosophy throughout his later days. And it is impossible to convert an old woman into a young girl. A philosopher would always go on mislaying something or the other, and would continue searching for it. To stop mislaying things would be to stop the search, and to stop the search would be to stop

76. Ibid., 38

77. Ibid., 132.

78. Ibid., 109.

79. On Certainty, 532.

doing philosophy.

Wittgenstein's later conception of philosophy succeeds in answering satisfactorily certain questions raised recently against philosophy. It has been pointed out that there has been no progress in philosophy. From the days of Aristotle (for whom the present-day scientists have high regards) to the present day there has been tremendous progress in science. This progress is missing in philosophy. We have not reached the heights of Plato. And the fact that we have not reached the heights show that we have made no progress. Wittgenstein shows that it is silly to ask the question of progress in philosophy. As he reacts, "Philosophy hasn't made any progress ? - If somebody scratches the spot where he has an itch, do we have to see some progress? Isn't it genuine scratching otherwise, or genuine itching ? And can't this reaction to an irritation continue in the same way for a long time before a cure for the itching is discovered."⁸⁰ If philosophy is an itch then the right sort of question concerning philosophy would be, when faced with a problem, whether it is a genuine philosophical problem (a genuine itch). So also it would be right to ask whether an appropriate method for the solution of the problem has been discovered (scratching the exact spot where the itching occurs). The fact that we are seriously attending to our itching exhibits our honesty. What can we do about it if the Platonic itch continues. There is absolutely no necessity for us to give any tragic significance to the fact that we have made no progress in philosophy. For we are not scientists, and we know that we have no ambition to become scientists. Whether we are good or bad we are philoso-

 80. Culture and Value, pp. 86-7.

Religion, according to the Notebooks and the Tractatus, belongs to the realm of the 'mystical', the realm of the inexpressible. But one should be very careful in describing the mystical as inexpressible. For not only is religion inexpressible but logic and philosophy too are inexpressible. But it would be quite wrong to think that Wittgenstein's mystical is extended to logic and philosophy. There is nothing mystical about them. The mystical ranges over the valuational activities only; the activities like religion, ethics and aesthetics. Wittgensteinian scholars distinguish the inexpressible that is mystical from the inexpressible that is not mystical. For example, logic cannot be said, therefore, it is inexpressible, but logic can be shown, therefore, it is not mystical. Mystical is that which can neither be said nor shown. As Max Black points out that "any effort to express the mystical, whether by saying or by showing, must result in absurdity."⁸¹ This implies that it would be wrong to equate the 'mystical' with the 'inexpressible'. In his Introduction to the Tractatus Russell wrongly equates them. (Incidentally, Wittgenstein did not appreciate Russell's Introduction). As Russell says, "Mr. Wittgenstein's attitude towards the mystical . . . grows out of his doctrine in pure logic This inexpressible contains, according to Mr. Wittgenstein, the whole of logic and philosophy."⁸² Yes, logic and philosophy are not expressible, but they can be shown. But there is no such thing as showing of religion unless one uses 'showing' for an actual demonstration of how one lives a religious form of life. Religion neither succeeds nor fails to picture reality in language; it is concerned

81. A Companion to Wittgenstein's 'Tractatus', p. 374.

82. Tractatus, xx-xxi.

with what transcends both language and reality.

Wittgenstein however manages to say so many interesting things about religion in the Tractatus itself. Later Wittgenstein breaks his silence for the second time and not for the first time. The first time silence over religion was broken in the Tractatus itself. Tractatus provides the structure of Wittgenstein's own concept of religion. The central issue of religion is the issue of God and his relationship to the world. The issue of human life and human destiny depends on the issue of God. But Wittgenstein's remarks on God and the world may disturb the Orthodox. He says, "How things are in the world is a matter of complete indifference to what is higher. God does not reveal himself in the world."⁸³ This remark is quite unorthodox. If God is indifferent to the world, then all our prayers become useless, the concept of 'Grace' also becomes useless. There is no special favour in special circumstances. Religion would become deterministic. One should never go wrong. If God does not reveal himself in the world then it becomes senseless to talk about incarnation or re-incarnation etc. Wittgenstein's view clearly goes against any theory of incarnation, therefore, also, against any theory^e re-incarnation. Unless incarnation is accepted talk of re-incarnation makes no sense. And if incarnation is accepted then there is no logical obstacle to re-incarnation. If God is allowed to visit this planet once, how can we prohibit his visit for the second time, how can we prohibit this repeated visits. The rejection of the theory of re-incarnation implies the rejection of the theory of incarnation. If the Saviour comes once, we just cannot

83. Ibid., 6.432.

Prohibit the Saviour from coming again and again, perhaps that is why Wittgenstein does not allow God's entry into this world even once. He introduces a kind of logical and not merely a physical prohibition. Suppose we consider God as the creator of the universe. Then it is logically ruled out that God appears in the world. For he can appear in the world only in the mode of created being. But if he is a created being then he is not a genuine creator.

No less interesting is the further remark of Wittgenstein. "Death is not an event in life, we do not live to experience death."⁸⁴ This remark again goes against all those religions, including Christianity, that preach the doctrine of the temporal immortality of the soul. The doctrine of resurrection clearly implies that 'death' is an event in one's life; it is an event that occurs prior to the event of one's resurrection. Birth, death and resurrection are all events in one's life; one lives "through one's death". This implies that 'death' is not strictly an end of life, but then death has lost its sense. How different an ordinary concept becomes when given a religious significance. The concept of death is an ordinary concept handled in a special way.

Wittgenstein again expresses quite an unorthodox view on the nature of survival. Survival of one's death should not be interpreted in terms of 'surviving for ever.' For even if one survives for ever one survives in time. If one has failed to jump out of time then all the miseries of one's temporal existence continue. Existence in space and time has its own riddles to solve. These riddles will not be solved if one is given an extension of one's

84. Ibid., 6.4311.

life in space and time. It is only by jumping out of space and time that the riddles connected with space and time can be solved. Thus the religious interpreters of 'eternity' are on a wrong track who interpret this concept in terms of 'never ending temporal duration'. As Wittgenstein says, "Is some riddle solved by my surviving for ever? Is not this eternal life ^{itself} as much of a riddle as our present life? The solution of the riddle of life in space and time lies outside space and time."⁸⁵ One's living for ever is not qualitatively different from one's living for a short time.

Interesting implications may be seen in Wittgenstein's transition from Tractatus to the view expressed in his "Lectures on Religious Belief". In one of these lectures he imagines a situation where people give linguistic expression to the religious . . . "They have sentences, and there are also religious statements."⁸⁶ Though linguistic expression to religious beliefs has been given, they have been kept apart from the scientific beliefs. Referring to the religious statements he further says, "These statements would not just differ in respect to what they are about. Entirely different connections would make them into religious beliefs."⁸⁷ What is the nature of the object of a religious belief, i.e., how can it be distinguished from the object of a scientific belief? And what connections does a religious belief have which are missing in the case of a scientific belief? Consider first the question of 'object'. Compare two statements, a religious and a scientific statement. We are going to have resurrection one day' with 'We are going to have rainfall one day'. The latter statement refers to

85. Ibid., 6.4312.

86. Lectures on Religious Belief.

87. Ibid.

an event of history, spatio-temporal history, of the world. In this sense the former is not a statement of history. In spite of the historical idiom, the statement cannot be treated as historical or empirical proposition. If resurrection is an event of history it will lose its religious significance. As Wittgenstein says, "Suppose for instance, we knew people who foresaw the future; make forecasts for years and years ahead; and they described some sort of a Judgment Day. Queerly enough, even if there were such a thing, and even if it were more convincing than I have described, belief in this happening wouldn't be at all a religious belief."⁸⁸ It would not be a religious belief for the simple reason that the evidence given for it suits only a scientific prediction. And religion is not science, so also religious statements are not scientific predictions. If the Day of Judgment is a scientific forecast, then why should I worry. As Wittgenstein says further, "Suppose that I would have to forego all pleasures because of such a forecast. If I do so and so, some one will put me in fires in a thousand years, etc. I wouldn't budge. The best scientific evidence is just nothing."⁸⁹ The religious beliefs are given the garb of history but are not historical. But a Christian may find it paradoxical that his religion is not based on historical truth. According to Wittgenstein there is no paradox in it. As he says, "Christianity is not based on a historical truth: rather it offers us a (historical) narrative and says now believe! But not believe this narrative with the belief appropriate to a historical narrative, rather, believe, through thick and thin, which you do only as the result of a life. Here you have a narrative,

88. Ibid., p. 56.

89. Ibid.

don't take the same attitude to it as you take to other historical narratives! Make a quite different place in your life for it. - There is nothing paradoxical about that!"⁹⁰ Don't be misled by the historical garb.

A religious belief has peculiar connections in the sense that it is shown by a religious believer "not by reasoning or by appeal to ordinary ground for belief, but rather by regulating for all in his life."⁹¹ Therefore, we use different words for a religious belief; words such as " 'dogma', 'faith'."⁹²

The game which we play with words in religion is very different from the game which we play with these words in science. Though the words may be the same they do not have the same significance. As Wittgenstein says, in religion "we don't talk about hypothesis, or about high probability. Nor about knowing. In a religious discourse we use such expressions as : "I believe that so and so will happen", and use them differently to the way in which we use them in science."⁹³ This leads Wittgenstein to the concept of religion which shows that religion exhibits an "alternative mode of rationality". Needless to point out that much has been written recently on this issue. When we find religious people arguing we may think that "they reason wrongly" or that "they don't reason at all" or that "It is an entirely different kind of reasoning."⁹⁴ If we make scientific reasoning as the paradigm of reasoning, then religious reasoning is no kind reasoning. Why don't you say that it is a di-

90. Culture And Value, p.32.

91. Lectures on Religious Belief, p. 54.

93. Ibid.

92. Ibid., p. 57.

94. Ibid., p. 58.

fferent kind of reasoning. Why don't you accept that religion is an alternative mode of rationality ? In religion we play a different kind of game with language than that which we play in science, not that we play no kind of game with religious language.

Wittgenstein of course does not mean that the language of religion is marked by any system of precise rules. He is well aware that the rules of the game which are proper to the game of science have sometimes been used in the game of religion. This of course does not mean that the game of science is played with clear and precise rules. If the anarchy of rules is sometimes glimpsed in religion, it is also glimpsed in science. We use language appropriate to one area also in the area which is not appropriate to it. Sometimes we wish to say something but the language which we use is not proper for the expression of this wish. Perhaps religion suffers most in this respect. Consider Wittgenstein's later reflections on the issue of immortality. "Philosophers who say "after death a timeless state will begin", or "at death a timeless state begins", and do not notice that they have used the words "after" and "at" and "begins" in a temporal sense, and that temporality is embedded in their grammar."⁹⁵ How wrong it is to talk about "timelessness" through a language which has all the corruptions of "time". But Wittgenstein himself is not free from this corruption. Consider his reputed Tractatus remark, "If we take eternity to mean not infinite temporal duration but timelessness, then eternal life belongs to them who live in the present."⁹⁶ What is "present" doing here?

95. Culture And Value, p. 22.

96. Tractatus, 6.4311

Is not "timelessness" being corrupted by "time"? Be it the issue of our eternal existence, be it the issue of death, be it the issue of the existence of God, it does not lead us to a sound doctrine which may be free from difficulties. And the root of these difficulties is language. It is this realisation which led Wittgenstein to say: "I believe that one of the things Christianity says is that the sound doctrines are all useless. That you have to change your life. (Or the direction of your life.)"⁹⁷ What is important in a religion is not the body of doctrine it is not like a scientific doctrine; the former is used for shaping one's life, for giving sense and direction to it.

It would be interesting to consider Wittgenstein's attitude to religion, whether it has changed from his Tractatus days to the days of his Lectures On Religion. Superficially there appears to have occurred a change. Earlier he denied giving linguistic expression to religion. For language is restricted to the world, and the fundamental concepts of religion like God, survival and creation etc., lead you beyond the world. What lies beyond the world cannot be articulated in language. Later Wittgenstein allows linguistic articulation to religious beliefs, but at the same time also maintains that this articulation leads to all kinds of confusions and difficulties. A religious belief may be confused with a scientific belief because of its linguistic similarities with the latter. Language also hides the real function of a religious doctrine. Instead of shaping one's life on the pattern of Christ, one starts arguing about the exact place and time on which Christ was born, as if a religious believer is no better than a common historian.

 97. Culture And Value, p. 53.

Wittgenstein, as is well known, was a religious person. He considered that "religion, is as it were, the calm bottom of the sea at its deepest point, which remains calm however high the waves on the surface may be."⁹⁸ But this calmness of religion demands silence. What is the use of shouting which may sink the ship. All his talk about religion is a kind of justification of his earlier mystical attitude to religion. Wittgenstein hardly accepted any of the Christian doctrines. But he also rejected none, for all of them he saw lead to the shaping of one's life, all of them give sense and direction to one's life on the earth.

Art And Aesthetics : Aesthetics, like religion, is another area which attracted Wittgenstein's attention as much as the conceptual questions of logic and mathematics. Talking about his attitude to aesthetics as late as 1949, Wittgenstein remarked, "I may find scientific questions interesting, but they never really grip me. Only conceptual and aesthetic questions do that. At bottom I am indifferent to the solution of scientific problems, but not the other sort."⁹⁹ Perhaps by 'conceptual questions' he means the questions of mathematics and logic. Wittgenstein's earlier attitude to aesthetics was the same as his earlier attitude to religion; the former too like the latter belongs to the realm of the mystical. And the amount of attention Wittgenstein paid to aesthetic in his Tractatus is nothing when compared to the amount of attention he paid to religion and ethics. Aesthetic is perhaps more mystical than even ethics, for in order to understand the nature of an aesthetic object, one may feel, one is also required to understand the

98. Ibid.

99. Ibid., p. 79.

nature of an ethical object (if there is any such thing). One is required to see how what is beautiful is connected with what is good. For it is in connection with ethics that Wittgenstein makes his only reference to aesthetics. As he says, "It is clear that ethics cannot be put into words. Ethics is transcendental. (Ethics and aesthetics are one and the same.)"¹⁰⁰ Even in his Notebooks Wittgenstein says very few things about aesthetics. However, what little has been said there makes us aware of Wittgenstein's earlier views on aesthetics, and it also makes us aware of the connection between ethics and aesthetics. He says in his Notebooks, "The work of art is the object seen sub specie aeternitatis."¹⁰¹ What he means is further explained "The usual way of looking at things sees objects as it were from the midst of them, the view sub specie aeternitatis from outside. In such a way that they have the whole world as background."¹⁰² This "viewing from the outside" is the connection between aesthetics and ethics. Both see objects from the outside, keeping the world as mere background. As Wittgenstein says, "the good life is the world seen sub specie aeternitatis. This is the connection between art and ethics."¹⁰³ Neither ethics nor aesthetics can be expressed, for both are connected with the view "from the outside", both are transcendental. Therefore, any attempt to talk about ethical or aesthetical matters would result in nonsense. Calling ethics or aesthetics as nonsense however is not to reject them as garbage. What is rejected is only their linguistic expression. This becomes clear from Wittgenstein's conclusive remarks on Ethics which he made a decade after the publication of Tractatus. He says, "My whole

100. Tractatus, 6.421.

101. Notebooks, p. 83 (6).

102. Ibid., 83 (7-8).

103. Ibid., p. 83 (6).

tendency and I believe the tendency of all men who ever tried to write or talk Ethics or Religion was to run against the boundaries of language. . . Ethics so far as it springs from the desire to say something about the ultimate meaning of life, the absolute good, the absolute valuable, can be no science. What it says does not add to our knowledge in any sense. But it is a document of a tendency in the human mind which I personally cannot help respecting deeply and I would not for my life ridicule it.¹⁰⁴ So 'nonsense' is a technical term in the context of Wittgensteinian philosophy it is not a term of abuse.

Wittgenstein's later views on art and aesthetics are no less unconventional. Though now he allows expression of art in words (it is no more an affair of the mystical), what he says about it does not support any contemporary school or system of aesthetics. His views even now do ^{not} fit into any given pigeon-hole. But before we proceed with his later views it would be better to clarify a minor issue. Earlier, Wittgenstein prohibited the expression of aesthetics in language, therefore, also he prohibited any kind of philosophical analysis of such a language. He thought that the language of art is impossible but he did not thereby think that the expression of art is impossible. For he said that "Art is a kind of expression."¹⁰⁵ "Good art is complete expression."¹⁰⁶ A painter expresses himself into his painting, a musician in his songs, a dancer in his dancing and a poet in his poetry. This kind of expression has not been prohibited by Wittgenstein. Wittgenstein was certainly not a Plato who suggested that art be banished from the

104. The Philosophical Review, 1965.

105. Notebooks, p. 83 (4).

106. Ibid., p. 83 (5).

state. What he suggested to be banished was merely the philosophers' talk about art and the subject matter of this talk - the language of aesthetics. He perhaps did not allow calling a poem good or a face beautiful, though would have no objection to the writing of good poems or having beautiful faces around him. So Wittgenstein's earlier view of art did no injury to artists, it injured only philosophers, art-critics and a host of other people who have no artistic talent but go on talking about art. The attack was clearly directed on the language of art rather than on art as such. Perhaps he thought that the linguistic expression of art leads to the same paradoxical situation to which the linguistic expression of religion lead. We have to see in what respect later Wittgenstein has taken a departure from his earlier position.

As soon as one opens his Lectures on Aesthetics, one would feel that Wittgenstein is opposing those philosophers who have reduced aesthetics to the analysis of aesthetical words. These philosophers detach certain words from the natural context of their use, and concentrate their attention on them. Whatever amount of concentration, whatever amount of gazing of these words, is done, the result can never be satisfactory. For once the words have been detached from their natural habitation, they lose their real significance. Therefore, Wittgenstein persuades philosophers to draw their attention to the aesthetic situations. As he says, "Language is a characteristic part of a large group of activities - talking, writing, travelling on a bus, meeting a man etc. We are concentrating, not on the words 'good' or 'beautiful', which are entirely uncharacteristic, generally just subject and predicate ('This is beautiful),

but on the occasions on which they are said.¹⁰⁷ This is a clear revolt against the reduction of aesthetics to the analysis of certain words. For further clarification the note of Rush Rhees is also significant. Rush Rhees writes, "When we build houses, we talk and write. When I take a bus, I say to the conductor: 'Threepenny'. We are concentrating not just on the word or the sentence in which it is used - which is highly uncharacteristic - but on the occasion on which it is said: the framework in which...the actual aesthetic judgement is practically nothing at all."¹⁰⁸ What is worth noting is the fact that the later Wittgenstein allows linguistic expression to aesthetics, but does not allow these linguistic expression to play any significant role. He made them very minor aspect in the situation. What is important is the aesthetic situation, and in that situation the occurrence of an aesthetic judgement is uncharacteristic. This shows that Wittgenstein has made very minor adjustment to his former attitude to aesthetics. Pressed from all sides he allowed the expression of aesthetic language, then allowed that language play only a subsidiary role.

The reason why those philosophers who describe themselves as analysts (There is a wide range from Moore to Stevenson) do not concentrate on the situations is that they suffer from Platonism, they suffer from the essentialistic tendencies. They would object to Wittgenstein's reference to the aesthetic situation. What is important to them is not a given aesthetic situation, but what is common to different aesthetic situations. They would argue against

107. Lectures and Conversations on Aesthetics, p. 2.

108. Ibid., Note of Rush Rhees on page-2.

Wittgenstein that though the occasions and situations differ, there is something which is common to them, something which is identical in them. It is this common element which is the object of aesthetics, with which aesthetics is concerned. When such a judgement as 'This is beautiful' is made, it is made after comparing this situation with other situations. Beauty is what is common to different situations, therefore we are not dealing with a mere word 'beauty'. Aesthetics is concerned with beauty, as ethics is concerned with goodness, therefore derivatively it is concerned with the word 'beauty' as ethics is concerned with the word 'good'. The linguistic analysis of aesthetical words presupposes a non-linguistic reality. And this reality can be obtained only by neglecting the differences. A situation becomes secondary once it is compared with other situations. Once the aesthetical object is discovered in them, the object which is designated by the word 'beauty' too becomes secondary. In his Blue Book Wittgenstein explicates such a view: "Beauty is an ingredient of all beautiful things as alcohol is of beer and wine, and that we therefore could have pure beauty, unadulterated by anything that is beautiful."¹⁰⁹ So what is important is this pure beauty, expressed by the judgement 'This is beautiful', and not the situation as such which was the occasion for making this judgement. A fundamental aesthetic judgement cannot be something minor in aesthetics. Wittgenstein is wrong in converting what is fundamental to aesthetics into what has a very minor role to play in aesthetics. His approach is wrong, for he concentrates on the particulars without concentrating on the universal features. He condemns philosophers for their "contemptuous attitude towards the particular case"¹¹⁰, and he him-

109. Blue and Brown Books, p.17. 110. Ibid., p. 18.

self exhibits a contemptuous attitude towards the universals. Granted that it is a vice to have a contemptuous attitude towards the particular cases. But it is also not a virtue to neglect the universal features of the particular cases, in case there happen to be such features. Of course the situation is different if there are no universal features.

But is it true that the differences do not matter? In aesthetics the differences do matter. As Wittgenstein remarks, "Perhaps I shall not even feel like comparing the beauty of expression in a pair of eyes with the beauty in the shape of a nose."¹¹¹ Not only is the nose different from the eyes, even the beauty of a nose is different from the beauty of eyes. Criticising further the search for a common aesthetic object-beauty - in different aesthetic situations Wittgenstein points out, "If I say A has beautiful eyes someone may ask me: what do you find beautiful about his eyes, and perhaps I shall reply : the almond shape, long eye-lashes, delicate lids. What do these eyes have in common with a gothic church, that I find beautiful too? Should I say they make a similar impression on me? What if I were to say that in both cases my hand feels tempted to draw them."¹¹² If 'similarity of impression' is allowed then 'temptation to draw them' should also be allowed.

The word 'beauty' is an extremely complicated word, and these complications arise because of the situations. One situation is so different from the other situation. There is no simple analysis of 'beauty'. A simple analysis is possible only by detaching the word 'beauty' from the actual contexts in which it is used. As Witt-

111. Culture And Value, 24.

112. Ibid.

Wittgenstein points out, "the main mistake made by philosophers of the present generation, including Moore, I would say that it is that when language is looked at, what is looked at is a form of words and not the use of the form of words."¹¹³ Once the 'use of words' is taken into consideration, contexts and situations would emerge.

On a superficial glance one may think that Wittgenstein's own view of aesthetics supports some kind of naturalism, subjectivism and emotivism. He opposes only objective aesthetics, the kind of aesthetics inspired by Moore's analysis of ethical terms. Consider his remarks, "If you ask yourself how a child learns 'beautiful', 'fine', etc., you find he learns them roughly as interjections. ('Beautiful' is an odd word to talk about because it's hardly ever used) A child generally applied a word like 'good' first to food. The word is taught as a substitute for a facial expression or a gesture."¹¹⁴ More direct is the further remark, "Would it matter if instead of saying 'This is lovely', I just said 'Ah' and smiled, or just rubbed my stomach?"¹¹⁵ This kind of remark can be made only by an emotivist. But Wittgenstein is no emotivist. This becomes clear from his remark, "We use the phrase 'A man is musical' not so as to call a man musical if he says 'Ah' when a piece of music is played, any more than we call a dog musical if it wags its tail when music is played."¹¹⁶

What Wittgenstein means is that the schools of aesthetics are formed by clinging to one feature of the situation by overlooking the other features. Different schools take up different features. For example, the emotivists cling to the primitive level. At the primitive level the words such as 'good'

113. Lectures On Aesthetics, p. 2.

114. Ibid.

115. Ibid., p. 3.

116. Ibid.

and 'beautiful' are taught and read as interjections. But this does not mean that we continue at the primitive level. As Wittgenstein says, "As far as these primitive languages go, problems about what these words are about, what their real subject is, (which is called 'beautiful' or 'good' -R) don't come up at all."¹¹⁷ It is impossible to keep aesthetics restricted to the primitive level. One may even question whether there is any aesthetics at this level. However, it would be another extreme to say that 'good' and 'beautiful' refer to some kind of Moore's non-natural properties or Plato's essences. Both extremes, the positivistic and the emotivistic, are to be rejected.

Those who cling to the linguistic analysis of aesthetics, whether the followers of the objectivistic tradition, have just failed to see that the aesthetic taste of a person develops. (An objectivist closes his eyes to the primitive stages.) As Wittgenstein says, "In what we call the ARTS a person who has judgement develops."¹¹⁸ If the issue of the development of taste is omitted, so would the issue of the cultural background of this taste be omitted. Wittgenstein gives more importance to the connection between the language of aesthetics and the culture of a people. As he says, "What belongs to a language game is a whole culture. In describing musical taste you have to describe whether children give concerts, whether women do or whether men only give them, etc., etc.,"¹¹⁹ This idea has been expressed also in his Culture and Value. As he says, "I believe that if one is to enjoy a writer one has to like the culture he belongs to as well. If one finds it indifferent or distasteful, one's admiration cools off."¹²⁰

¹¹⁷. Ibid., p.3. Within brackets occurs the note of Rush Rhees symbolised by 'R'. ¹¹⁸. Ibid., p.6. ¹¹⁹. Ibid., p.8.

¹²⁰. Culture And Value, p. 85.

Finally, I would again like to discuss Wittgenstein's attempts to subordinate the role of aesthetic words and judgements in aesthetic situations. Not the words and judgements but it is the aesthetic reaction which is important. And an aesthetic reaction may or may not involve language; and the language involved may not be the same which philosophers call aesthetic. According to Wittgenstein "the most important thing in connection with aesthetics is what may be called aesthetic reactions, e.g., discontent, disgust, discomfort."¹²¹ He has cited the cases of negative aesthetic reactions. To justify his view he points out "suppose our children draw windows and when they draw them in the wrong way we punish them. Or when someone builds a certain house we refuse to live in it or run away."¹²² In punishing the child or running away from the house I am doing an action, and not saying 'this is bad' etc. He treats the positive aesthetic reaction in the same fashion. "What are expressions of liking something ? Is it only what we say or interjections we use or faces we make ? Obviously not. It is, often, how often I read something or how often I wear a suit. Perhaps I won't even say: 'It's fine.' but wear it often and look at it."¹²³ The expression of aesthetic reactions is possible without the use of aesthetic language without the use of such words as 'beautiful', 'fine' etc. It is not words but the actions which sometimes matter.

Wittgenstein in his later years observed that it is "strange that whole epochs can't free themselves from the grip of certain concepts -the concept of 'beautiful' and 'beauty' for instance."¹²⁴

121. Lectures on Aesthetics, p. 13.

122. Ibid.

123. Ibid., p. 12.

124. Culture And Value,
p. 79

He has been struggling throughout his life to get freedom from the conceptual bewitchment, from essentialism. I do not know whether he succeeded or failed in his attempt in other areas, but in aesthetics he failed. Wittgenstein is exhibiting his failure when he says, "What is pretty cannot be beautiful."¹²⁵ What prohibits a pretty thing to be beautiful? Why cannot it be beautiful? One explanation could be that what is pretty is a concrete object, occupying space-time position, whereas 'beauty' is something abstract, it is a concept. This would be the fashion in which a Plato could argue. He would deny the identity of what is pretty with what is beautiful. The other explanation could be like that of Kant. A pretty thing arouses only our passion and emotions, but fails to give aesthetic delight (Let us accept that there is such a thing as 'aesthetic delight'). Beauty is an object of aesthetic delight and not of emotions and passions. Whether Wittgenstein's position is justified in terms of Plato or in terms of Kant, the justification goes against the spirit of later Wittgenstein. Is it possible that Wittgenstein could never liberate himself from the conceptual bewitchment of beauty? Or did he wish to be liberated from, as Freud would analyze, some beautiful person who might have bewitched him at one time? The best way is to philosophise the whole affair.

Early Wittgenstein: A Stage set for Later Wittgenstein : It would be interesting to consider the implications of Wittgenstein's remark, "Perhaps what is inexpressible (what I find mysterious and am not able to express) is the background against which whatever I could express has its meaning."¹²⁶ The inexpressible forms the background

125. Ibid., p. 42.

126. Ibid., p. 16.

of the expressible. Expressible is impossible without the inexpressible - Early Wittgenstein forms the background of later Wittgenstein. Tractatus is the setting up of the stage for work like Investigations to follow. Early Wittgenstein is only setting up the stage; later Wittgenstein is acting on the stage. The stage, though mute, must be suitable for the actor who speaks and acts. If one is not acquainted with Early Wittgenstein one cannot understand the Later Wittgenstein. If this is what is meant by unity in Wittgenstein thought then there is certainly unity in Wittgenstein's thought. Wittgenstein himself suggested in his Preface to the Investigations that his later thought could be seen "in the right light only by contrast with and against the background" of his earlier work."¹²⁷ I have tried to carry out the wish of Wittgenstein. Of course I am quite aware of my limitations.

127. Cf. p.x.

Chapter - 2

Language-Game

Like everything metaphysical the harmony
between thought and reality is to be found in
the grammar of the language.

Zettel

Names and Propositions; : Objects and their Configurations : Suppose following Dummett, Tractatus is decribed as an essay in the theory of meaning. Being an essay in the theory of meaning it can also be supposed that it has something to do with both language and reality. However, the theory of meaning which is presented in the Tractatus is certainly not directly concerned with 'words'. 'sentences' and the 'discourse' in which the words and sentences may occur. While making explicit the nature of meaning Wittgenstein refers to 'names' and 'propositions', and he is using neither 'name' nor 'proposition' as the kinds of things which are parts of language or which make language possible as 'words' and 'sentences' are part of language and make language possible. So also while talking about reality he is not talking about his 'objects' and 'configurations' in the sense in which we talk about tables and chairs and their arrangement in the drawing room. His objects are not tables and chairs and his reality is not the reality with which we are concerned in daily life. Then what kind of reality is the reality with which early Wittgenstein is concerned? And what kind of language is the language with which early Wittgenstein is concerned. Early Wittgenstein is concerned not with reality but with the essence of reality. So also he is concerned not with language but with the essence of

language. But why should he be concerned with the essence either of reality or of language? Perhaps any philosopher would desire that he says something which is of a permanent and enduring nature. But what he says would be of lasting value only when what he says is something about the essential and not the accidental features. Not only did Plato think like this, all great philosophers thought like this, and Wittgenstein was undoubtedly a great philosopher. When Wittgenstein draws his attention to the gross material objects like tables and chairs he rejects them, for all of them are perishable and changing, they cannot exhibit the essence of reality. The objects which exhibit the essence of reality, must be unchanging and substantial, for these "objects make up the substance of the world."¹²⁸ Though he does not argue on paper he might have thought that the changing objects like tables and chairs presuppose the existence of some unchanging objects, the objects which do not perish. As a philosopher he is concerned with these unchanging, substantial and unalterable objects. So even if no such object is locatable by sight or touch, these objects must be postulated. Concerning these postulated objects he says, "There must be objects, if the world is to have an unalterable form."¹²⁹ "Objects are what is unalterable and subsistent."¹³⁰ The language is not very different from Plato's in support of his universals. The final conclusive remark reads, "Objects, the unalterable, and the subsistent are one and the same."¹³¹ All these remarks exhibit that Wittgenstein is interested in the essence of language, 'names' are the essence of

128. Tractatus, 2.021.

129. Ibid., 2.026.

130. Ibid., 2.0271.

131. Ibid., 2.027.

language. In this sense of 'name' neither 'Tom' nor 'table' is a name. Though 'table' refers to something which is general, and, therefore, has wider application than 'Tom', neither 'table' nor 'Tom' represent objects of reality, in the sense in which objects are essences. "In a proposition a name is the representative of an object."¹³² The necessity for 'names' is clear. It follows from the rigid dualism of language and reality. "Object can only be named. Signs are their representatives. I can only speak about them. I cannot put them into words. Propositions can only say how they are, not what they are."¹³³ The essence of reality is qualitatively different from the essence of language, in the sense that an object itself cannot occur as a constituent in a proposition. What occurs in a proposition is only its representative, a name. The relationship between a name and an object is, therefore, very close. The relationship is that of meaning. "A name means an object. The object is its meaning."¹³⁴ The harmony between language and reality occurs because of the fact that language has meaning. But the fact that Wittgensteinian names have meaning, does not throw light on the fact that such words as 'table' and 'Tom' of our ordinary language have meaning, for they are not names and they are not representatives of objects in the sentences in which they are used. Wittgensteinian theory of meaning has so far failed in showing how the words of our ordinary language have meaning. Essence of language should not be confused with language.

The discussion of the theory of meaning associated with the 'meaning of propositions', the so called 'picture theory of meaning',

132. Ibid., 3.22.

133. Ibid., 3.221.

134. Ibid., 3.203.

is supposed to be the most attractive feature of early Wittgenstein. At one time to know anything about Wittgenstein's philosophy was to know something about his picture theory of meaning. So many dissertations, books and articles were published throughout the world. The craze was similar to the craze which occurred at a later stage, the craze about "the private language argument". Philosophy has its own craze and fashions. If you are not acquainted with the craze or fashion of the time, then you are outdated; you are not worth respecting as a philosopher unless you are capable of starting a craze or a fashion yourself. Thus, you were supposed to know something about the picture theory of meaning at one time, as you were supposed to know about the private language argument at the later stage of the development of Wittgenstein's thought. The responsibility for spreading the craze about the Tractarian theory of meaning goes partly to the logical positivists. Logical positivism is out of fashion these days, so also is the picture theory of meaning out of fashion these days. To write on the picture theory of meaning these days is to do some sort of an archaeological investigation. I would like to avoid this archaeological investigation. However, in order to know about our present civilization one is required to have some idea of the civilizations of the past on the ruins of which our own civilization is built. It is possible that the civilizations of the past ^{may} have left their spirit behind them. It is possible that the Tractatus may have left its imprint on Wittgenstein's later thought.

To see what the picture theory of meaning is, or how it attracted Wittgenstein, one is required to see Wittgenstein's conception

of the essence of reality. Concerning the essence of reality we have already seen that Wittgenstein was led to postulate 'objects' in order to exhibit the essential nature of reality. An object is that which does not change, which is substantial, so the essence of reality is that which does not change, which remains permanent. But at the second stage of his thought on the issue, Wittgenstein develops a desire to introduce change at the essential stage itself. The desire is not unusual. We begin with changes in order to reject them, and we arrive at permanence. But once we arrive at permanence. We develop a desire to accommodate changes rather than reject them. The same thing happened to Wittgenstein. If somehow alteration and change is introduced at the level of the 'objects' themselves, then this change will be as much an essential aspect of reality as is its permanence. What is objectionable is that the changes be introduced at a different level from the level of permanence. It would be unconvincing to say that the objects of the type 'A' are permanent and the objects of the type 'B' are changing. To be convincing both permanence and change are to be explained in terms of the same type of objects. What is substantial and unalterable must be identical with what is contingent and what alters. Wittgenstein succeeds in introducing alteration and change at the level of objects themselves, hence for him change is as (much an) essential aspect of reality as its permanence. In introducing change he is not going beyond essence. Objects do not change, "their configuration is what is changing and unstable."¹³⁵ And it is this change, the change of configuration, that produces states of affairs. As he says, "The configuration of objects produces states of affairs."¹³⁶

135. Ibid., 2.0271.

136. Ibid., 2.0272.

How change is essentially connected with permanence becomes further clear when Wittgenstein says "If things can occur in states of affairs this possibility ¹³⁷ must be in them from the beginning." Thus the birth of permanence and the birth of change do not occur on two different dates. From the very beginning ¹³⁷ what is substantial is also what changes. This becomes further clear from the remark "There is no object that we can imagine excluded from the possibility of combining with others."¹³⁸ If an object is allowed to exist independently of existing in any configuration, then its substantiality would have been of a very different sort. It would have been quite difficult to call it substantial. Thus, by introducing objects Wittgenstein succeeds in securing permanence as one of the essential features of reality. By introducing configuration he succeeds in securing change as the other feature of reality. But in doing this he has created problems for all of us, who have also something to do with reality, and are not bothered about the essential features of reality. In telling us how his objects succeed in forming configurations Wittgenstein is not telling us anything about how Toms and Marys, kings and cabbages, form configurations, how the objects of our everyday life behave with one another. Wittgenstein's essence of reality has started behaving like an independent reality, not very unlike Plato's.

Let us now consider the essence of language which we left at the stage of introducing 'names'. Wittgenstein trains names to ape objects. The training is so perfect that sometimes one may even confuse names with objects, one may confuse the essence of language

137. Ibid., 2.0121.

138. Ibid.

with the essence of reality. "The simple signs employed in propositions are called names."¹³⁹ And names too have their own configurations by aping objects. Their configurations are called 'propositions'. A proposition is the configurations of names as a state of affairs is the configuration of objects. And there is no independent identity of a name as there is no independent identity of an object. A simple sign is worthless without combining with other signs. The essence of language is certainly a true copy of the essence of reality. As Wittgenstein says, "The configuration of objects in a situation corresponds to the configuration of simple signs in the propositional sign."¹⁴⁰ It is because of this correspondence that the 'proposition' or 'the configuration of names' happens to be a picture of the state of affairs or configuration of objects. For "in a picture the elements of the picture are the representatives of the objects."¹⁴¹ Names are the representatives of the objects. As a matter of fact whether we say reality pictures language or language pictures reality we say the same thing. For, as we have already seen in the preceding chapter that according to the Tractarian Wittgenstein "knowing subject" is an illusion, so also the knowing states are illusory. Tractatus is a fight against psychologism; it is a fight against the introduction of mental states in the explanation of meaning. Referring to his picture theory Wittgenstein says "we picture facts to ourselves."¹⁴² But this remark should not be taken seriously; for the Tractarian Wittgenstein can give no sense to "we" and "ourselves". What should be said is 'There are pictures and those that are pictured'. Pictured and pictures, reality and language, nothing more can be said. How can it be wrong

139. Ibid., 3.202.

140. Ibid., 3.21.

141. Ibid., 2.131.

142. Ibid., 2.1.

if one says, 'states of affairs are the pictures of propositions? A proposition is some kind of original, of which a state of affairs is a picture. How can it be wrong if one says 'objects in reality represent names'? Why shouldn't the essence of reality be considered as picturing the essence of language. It is not ontology, but epistemology, that is prior; it is not reality but language that is prior.

It can hardly be doubted that Wittgenstein's treatment given to 'names' and 'propositions' cannot be given to the 'words' and 'sentences' or our ordinary language. Perhaps this has led Russell to say in his Introduction to the Tractatus that Wittgenstein is "concerned with the conditions which would have to be fulfilled by a logically perfect language."¹⁴³ Some leading philosophers, including Ramsey, objected to Russell's remark.¹⁴⁴ But if what Wittgenstein says about his names and propositions is not applicable to the ordinary language, then his talking about the 'essence of language, is as good as talking about an 'ideal language'. Of course while proposing the theory of meaning Wittgenstein presupposed that what he says about the essence of language holds also for the language of our daily use. Rather it is to know the real nature of the language of our daily use that he was driven to uncover its hidden structure. The essence, he presupposed, was hidden from us. The logical structure of language is hidden behind its grammatical structure. This is also true of reality. It is not any special variety of reality but our everyday reality which is the concern of Tractatus. The reality is also covered. The essence of reality is perhaps hidden behind its phenomenal presentation. Wittgenstein's concern, one would argue, is everyday language. It is as if he is talking about

143. Ibid., ix.

144. Cf. Mind, Vol. 32, October 1923.

the essence of everyday language.

But the dissolution of the distinction between the 'essence of language' and 'ordinary language' would lead to more confusions. These confusions do not arise once Wittgenstein's views are given Russell's interpretation, i.e., Wittgenstein's whole talk about the 'essence of language' is a talk about an 'ideal language'. How confusions arise can be seen from the two remarks of Wittgenstein: "What constitutes a propositional sign is that in it its elements (the words) stand in a determinate relation to one another."¹⁴⁵ A proposition is not a blend of words."¹⁴⁶ In these cases 'words' have been considered as the constituents of a proposition. So a proposition is not any kind of mysterious entity beyond the fold of language. It is a linguistic entity of some kind which allows words as its constituents. But what kind of role can a word play in a proposition. If the word in question follows the dictates of the 'essence of language', then it must be a name; it must be a representative of an object. Suppose the word in question is 'table', then it is the name of the object table. But it is impossible to consider a table as an object, for a table is both contingent and complex, whereas the Tractarian objects are simple and substantial. But then the word 'table' is also not a name. And if not a name, then it cannot occur in a proposition. Further, what about the 'proposition' which is supposed to have words as its constituents. Unfortunately the words of our language do not satisfy the condition of being 'names', hence no sentence, in which words occur in our language, could express a proposition. The truth is clear. If we apply Witt-

145. Tractatus., 3.14.

146. Ibid., 3.141.

Wittgenstein's idea about the 'essence of language' to the sentences of our ordinary language, we shall gain nothing but confusions. The reason is simple. Wittgenstein has converted something which is abstract into what is concrete, a mistake similar to that of Plato. Plato postulated the realm of essence as distinguished from the realm of particulars, and then used the language reserved (suitable) for particulars to explain the nature of his essences. The result was only confusion. In his Tractatus itself Wittgenstein realised his mistake. For his well known idea that "the logic of language cannot be expressed in language" shows that he realised his mistake. The difficulty is not that one has to go beyond language in order to understand the essence of language. The reason is that what is abstract, what is essential, is not concrete, is not what can be separated, demarcated and described. The solution is not that one goes beyond language. If we fail to understand the essence of language while using language, then there is no chance for us ever to understand the essence of language. Once I have transcended language, then I have nothing to do with language; language simply does not exist for me.

Referring to his Tractarian mistake of treating essence as something which is concrete rather than abstract he points out in his Investigations, "It is prior to all experiences, must run through all experience' no empirical cloudiness or uncertainty can be allowed to affect it - it must rather be of the purest crystal. But this crystal does not appear as an abstraction; but as something concrete indeed, as the most concrete, as it were the hardest thing there is."¹⁴⁷ The invention of 'names' and 'propositions', and then talking

147. Investigations, 97.

about the meaning of propositions, and the status of names, etc., is giving a concrete birth to the essence of language. It did not occur to Wittgenstein in the Tractatus, at least in the beginning, that no concrete birth can be given to essence, for essence is abstract. The so called picture theory of meaning, on which volumes have been written, should not have begun. What is the way in which his Tractatus view concerning essence may be saved? The only way in which it can be saved is to convert his whole talk about the essence of language into a talk about an "ideal language". But then it would not be Wittgenstein's view; it would be a view similar to the view expressed by Frege and Russell.

Words and Sentences: Cogs and cogwheels: The picture theory of meaning was responsible for bringing, what was described in the first chapter as, a revolution in philosophy. What created the situation for a counter-revolution in philosophy was Wittgenstein's disillusionment with the picture theory of meaning. He started feeling that what one requires is not a 'theory of meaning' but a 'theory of use'. Consider his remark from the Investigations, "One cannot guess how a word functions. One has to look at its use and learn from it."¹⁴⁸ Function of a word can only be known by looking at its use. There is no such looking at with respect to the meaning of a word. For 'meaning' refers to an extremely mysterious kind of entity; sometimes it is traced in the mind, sometimes outside, and the search never stops. So also is the case of the word 'sense'. 'Sense' leads us to all sorts of directions, yet we fail to glimpse it. Therefore, in the case of 'sense' too Wittgenstein suggests, "Look at the sentences as an instrument, and at its sense as its

148. Investigations, 340.

employment."¹⁴⁹ There will be no difficulty in looking at the sentence, or its employment, but there will be all kinds of difficulties in looking at the sense of a sentence, if this sense is not identical with its employment. The words, 'meaning' and 'sense' create all kinds of problems by creating all kinds of imagery. It is one imagery created by these words that led Wittgenstein to his picture theory of meaning. It is better for the health of philosophy to abolish 'meaning' and to introduce in its place 'use'. Thus, strictly speaking 'The theory of use' is a 'theory of meaning', though it may look like the latter. Perhaps because it looks like the latter (a matter of 'family resemblance') that the followers of Wittgenstein, so also his opponents, started using the expression 'use theory of meaning', which is a highly misleading expression. The expression is misleading, for it allows the ghost of meaning to continue. And the ghost of meaning seems to be more dangerous than meaning itself. For if 'the theory of use' is considered as a 'theory of meaning', then it will have not only its own difficulties, it will also harbour all those difficulties which are connected with the theory of meaning. Of course it does not matter much, for a counter-revolution accommodates some of the confusions of the revolutionary stage. There would hardly be any doubt that Wittgenstein continued his counter-revolutionary activities with the weapon of 'the theory of use'. The counter-revolution perhaps started in 1929 with the pages which are entitled in English as "Philosophical Remarks", and came to its full swing with the Blue and Brown Books.

The revolution in philosophy, as we have already seen, made, epistemology a secondary business. Tractatus realised this revolution

 149. Ibid., 421.

nary ideal by forcing language to serve ontology by picturing reality, by creating the models of reality. Thus, the consideration of reality is prior to any other consideration. The counter-revolution brings back epistemology to focus. Reality starts backing out, and language starts emerging as an independent entity. As we have already said language takes a separation from reality even if it has not taken a complete divorce from it. The Tractatus theory of meaning is worthless without the mirroring of reality by language. The language of Tractatus allows the essence of reality to penetrate into it. But later Wittgenstein takes interest in language, not to study reality, but simply to study how language works. He does not allow his language to be corrupted by reality; he does not intend to divide his attention in two different directions^{the direction} of reality and the direction of language. Only one direction, the direction of language is his interest. It is said that early Wittgenstein gave a linguistic turn to philosophy. But the linguistic turn to philosophy, in its real sense, was given not by early Wittgenstein but by later Wittgenstein. For Tractatus is more ontological than linguistic. But with later Wittgenstein emerges interest in knowing how 'words' and 'sentences' work in language, how the grammar of language dupes us into all kinds of confusions.

One may however be shocked to see that the later Wittgenstein does not propose 'the theory of use' as a complete replacement for the 'theory of meaning'. He does not consider the possibility of a strict definition of 'meaning' in terms of 'use'. This becomes clear from his remark, "For a large class of cases - though not for all - in which we employ the word 'meaning' it can be defined

thus: the meaning of a word is its 'use' in the language."¹⁵⁰ Why has Wittgenstein put the rider "For a large class of cases." This rider exhibits that Wittgenstein rejects essentialism or universalism. Even his own definition of meaning in terms of use is not applicable to all the cases of meaning, which simply means that he refuses to give a universal definition of meaning. The fact that his own definition of meaning in terms of use is limited, is not a point of inferiority but a point of superiority of his definition over those definitions which claim universality. As he points out in the Blue Book, "The idea that in order to get clear about the meaning of a general term one had to find out the common element in all its applications has shackled philosophical investigation; for it has not only led to no result, but also made the philosopher dismiss as irrelevant the concrete case, which alone could have helped him to understand the usage of the general term. When Socrates asks the question, "What is knowledge?" he does not even regard it as a preliminary answer to enumerate cases of knowledge."¹⁵¹ Thus, Wittgenstein revolts against Plato, and so also against his own Tractarian essentialism. The definition of 'meaning' in terms of 'use' given by him, is not to replace the former by the latter, but only to help understand the nature of the former. The aim of the study of use is ultimately to clarify the nature of meaning. Therefore, one is required to be very careful in interpreting such remarks of Wittgenstein as "We are inclined to forget that it is the particular use of a word only which gives the word its meaning".. "The use of the word in practice is its meaning."¹⁵² The use of

150. Investigations, 43.

151. Blue Book, pp. 19-20.

152. Ibid., n. 69.

'only' in the former remark and that of 'is' in the latter remark should not mislead you into thinking that Wittgenstein accepts an exact identity of 'meaning' with 'use'. The slogan 'Do not ask for meaning, ask for use' should not be misunderstood.

Let us consider the use theory in some detail. It would be better to consider the implications of a remark from the Philosophical Remarks, the work which exhibits Wittgenstein's coming out of the Tractarian cave. "If we say 'A word only has meaning in the context of a proposition; then that means that it's only in a proposition that it functions as a word, and this is no more something that can be said than that an armchair only serves its purpose when it is in space. Or perhaps better : that a cogwheel only functions as such when engaged with other cogs."¹⁵³ It is not for the first time that Wittgenstein has expressed and thought about the sentence 'A word only has meaning in the context of a proposition.' What has happened is only that there is a change in his vision. Now he is looking at this sentence in a quite different fashion than how he looked at it earlier. A change of aspect, to use Wittgenstein's own idiom, has occurred. He saw earlier a rabbit, and now he is seeing the same figure as a duck. This is clearly "dawning of a new aspect."¹⁵⁴ The rabbit disappears, and the duck takes hold of his thought. Now he is not looking at this sentence in the same fashion in which he looked at it in the Notebooks and the Tractatus. In his earlier work if he looked at a 'word' the picture of its being a 'name' used to occur to his mind. Then he thought that "one name is representative of one thing, another of another thing."¹⁵⁵ This

153. Philosophical Remarks, 12.

tions, The discussion of duck-rabbit, or seeing as, is instructive in many ways, pp.194-209.

154. Philosophical Investigations, or seeing as, is instructive in many ways, pp.194-209.

155. Notebooks, p. 26 (10)

consequently led him to think that "all words are names", and occur in a proposition as names. The imagery was further extended. No name could occur in isolation from other names. This simply means that something is a name only in a configuration of names, i.e., in a proposition. Just as a word brought certain pictures to Wittgenstein's mind, the proposition too brought certain pictures to his mind. A proposition, as we have already pointed out, was not a configuration of 'words', it was a configuration of 'names', or that the words in it occurred as names. The image which emerged to his mind in connection with a proposition was very curious. He thought that "In a proposition a world is as it were put together experimentally."¹⁵⁶ The three dimensional world was put into two dimensional writing. As he thought about the proposition that in it "we can portray all logical properties of situations in a two-dimensional script."¹⁵⁷

Later Wittgenstein does not have that conception of proposition which he accepted in his earlier work. Now the proposition has come down to the level of a sentence; there is no mystery surrounding its existence. A proposition is a cogwheel. To use the idiom of Tractatus, a proposition is a configuration of cogs. And a word is nothing but a cog. And unless the cogs form a configuration, no cogwheel has come into existence, therefore, no cogwheel has moved. But the value of cog lies only in a cogwheel; it moves only in a cogwheel. We do not ask the question 'what is the meaning of a cog'? What we ask is 'what function does a cog have?' 'what use does it have?' If the condition of a word in a sentence is not very different from the condition of a cog in a cogwheel, then we should

156. Ibid., p. 7 (3)

157. Ibid., p. 7 (7).

not raise the question about the meaning of a word, what we should ask is: how is the word used in a proposition (sentence)? And Wittgenstein is so definitive about his view that he does not find it informative to say that the meaning of a word depends on its function in a proposition. It is as unfortunate as saying that an armchair serves its purpose only when it is in space. Where else could an armchair serve its purpose? So also, where else could a word have its purpose?

The analogy of words with cogs, and propositions with cogwheels has its limitations. This analogy could be misleading too. There is no doubt that it succeeds in drawing our attention to the use aspect of words. But then it could be as misleading as is the reference to meaning aspect of words. One fundamental objection against the 'meaning theory' is that one is led to assimilate all kinds of words to one and the same kind. Since all words have meanings, therefore, all of them are of one and the same kind; they are all meaningful words. Since the words are of the same kind, therefore, all of them mean in the same fashion. If the word 'Tom' means in the sense that it is a name, then the word 'table' also means in the sense that it is a name. All words are names, therefore, all of them represent external objects in the sentences in which they are used. And consequently, all those sentences in which they are used are also like one another, and, therefore, all of them are guided by the same set of logical rules i.e. by the same kind of logic. There is no distinction between the logic of the sentence 'close the door' and the logic of the sentence 'this tree is green' because of the fact that the former is as much a sentence as is

the latter. If all words are like cogs and all sentences of one kind. Being cogs all words are used in the same fashion, all of them move in the same fashion. So also there is no logical difference between the cogwheels (sentences.) "The name is not a picture of the thing named."¹⁵⁸ Only a proposition is a picture. No cog can move in isolation, only when a word is in the company of other words that it moves. The analogy of words with cogs, and the sentences with cogwheels is clearly misleading. The explanation of words and sentences in terms of cogs and cogwheels is not very superior to their explanation in terms of the meaning theory.

Perhaps the use - theory is presented in a more convincing way by comparing language with a tool-box. Explaining the use - theory Wittgenstein remarks , "Think of the tools in a tool-box: There is a hammer, pliers, a saw, a screw-driver, a rule, a gluepot, glue nails and screws. - The functions of words are as diverse as the functions of these objects. (And in both cases there are similarities)."¹⁵⁹ The diversity of words does not emerge with the analogy of cogs, but it certainly emerges with the analogy of tools. In its function 'Tom' is quite unlike 'table', in the same way in which a hammer is quite unlike a glue-pot. Of course the words of language appear as uniform as cogs in the cogwheels. And this uniformity has misled philosophers. As Wittgenstein points out, "What confuses us is the uniform appearance of words when we hear them spoken or meet them in script or print. For their application is not presented to us so clearly. Especially when we are doing philosophy."¹⁶⁰

Because of the uniform appearance, the diversity of the uses is

158. Notebooks, p. 8(8).

159. Investigations, 11.

160. Ibid.

hidden. But as the tools are used in a variety of ways, the words too are used in a variety of ways. Consequently, the sentences in which words are used would also differ from each other in their logical character. Wittgenstein's immediately succeeding remark clarifies the issue in even clearer terms. He points out by comparing language with the cabin of a locomotive, "It is like looking into the cabin of a locomotive. We see handles all looking more or less alike. (Naturally, since they are all supposed to be handled.) But one is the handle of a crank which can be moved continuously (it regulates the opening of a valve); another is the handle of a switch, which has only two effective positions, it is either off or on; a third is the handle of a brake-lever, the harder one pulls on it, the harder it brakes; a fourth, the handle of a pump; it has an effect only so long as it is moved to and fro."¹⁶¹ The fact that all words look alike, does not mean that all of them have the same function. Consider the three analogies, the analogy of words with cogs, with the tools and with handles in a locomotive cabin. The analogy with cogs fails because words have diverse functions whereas cogs have only one function. The analogy with tools in a tool box also does not succeed much, for the words look alike but the tools do not. The analogy with handles is most appropriate. Words are like handles, looking alike. And like handles they have diverse functions.

If every word of our language has some function some use, then the word 'meaning' too should have some sort of function or use. What is the function of this word? Does this word have a well-defined

161. Ibid., 12.

use, regular boundaries ? According to Wittgenstein, "Meaning" is one of the words of which one may say that they have odd jobs in our language. It is these words which cause most philosophical troubles.¹⁶² Wittgenstein tries to justify his analysis of meaning again by bringing an analogy, "Imagine some institution" most of its members have certain regular functions, which can easily be described, say, in the statutes of the institution. There are, on the other hand, some members who are employed for odd jobs, which nevertheless may be extremely important - What causes most trouble in philosophy is that we are tempted to describe the use of important 'odd-job' words as though they were words with regular functions.¹⁶³ The fact that the word 'meaning' performs odd jobs itself implies that no attempt should be made to determine its uses. In drawing our attention to the use aspect of a word, Wittgenstein has made an attempt to remove the temptation to deal with meaning. But then 'meaning' too has its function, its use!! We cannot do away with it.

Language however has not only the complexity that it has words and sentences, and therefore requires their logical character to be exposed, it is used in very diverse situations. The context of science is different from the context of, say, religion, ethics etc. This diversity cannot be satisfactorily dealt with by any of the analogies we have discussed so far. It is this diversity which attracted the attention of Wittgenstein to games.

Analogy and Lack of Analogy : Wittgenstein's discussion of games in the Investigations is connected with his discussion of

162. Blue Book, pp. 43-4

163. Ibid., p. 44.

names in the Brown Book. It is not only analogy but also the lack of analogy which works in calling a word a 'name' consider his remarks from the Brown Book, "Our use of expressions like "names of numbers", "names of colours", "names of materials", "names of nations" may spring from two different sources. One is that we might imagine the functions of proper names, numerals, words for colours, etc., to be much more alike than they actually are. If we do so we are tempted to think that the function of every word is more or less like the function of a proper name of a person, or such generic names as "tables", "chairs", "doors", etc. The second source is this, that if we see how fundamentally different the functions of such words as "table" "chairs", etc., are from those of proper names, and how different from either the functions of, say, the names of colours, we see no reason why we shouldn't speak of names of numbers or names of directions either, not by way of saying some such thing as "numbers and directions are just different froms of objects", but rather by way of stressing the analogy which lies in the lack of analogy between the functions of the words "chair" and "Jack" on the one hand, and "east" and "Jack" on the other: hand."¹⁶⁴ There is nothing paradoxical about an analogy which exhibits the lack of analogy. We provide the same name to two different individuals, because of the fact they they resemble each other. But we also provide the same name to them in spite of the fact that they do not resemble each other, or positively differ from each other.

Now consider Wittgenstein's remarks on 'games'. He says, "Consider for example the proceedings that we call "games". I mean board
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164. Blue and Brown Books, 6, p. 82.

games, card-games, Olympic games, and so on,. What is common to them all ? Don't say: "There must be something common, or they would not be called 'games'" but look and see whether there is anything common to all. For if you look at them you will not see something that is common to all, but similarities, relationship, and a whole series of them at that. To repeat: don't think, but look! Look for example at board-games with their multifarious relationships. Now pass to card-games; here you find many correspondences with the first group, but many common features drop out, and others, appear. And we can go through the many, many other groups of games in the same way; can see how similarities crop up and disappear."¹⁶⁵ In the immediately succeeding remark Wittgenstein informs us about his conclusion, "I can think of no better expression to characterize these similarities than "family resemblances"; for the various resemblances between the members of a family : build, features, colour of eyes, gait, temperament, etc. etc. overlap and criss-cross in the same way. - And I shall say : 'games' form a family."¹⁶⁶

The concept of 'family resemblance', as used by Wittgenstein, has a restricted sense, it requires further explication. For the concept of 'family' with which we operate is not strictly 'genetic', so it would be a pure coincidence that a husband and a wife may have y resembling feature in common: colour of eyes build, gait, temperament etc. There is no 'genetic necessity' in operation. And even if we take the cases of genetic necessity (whatever that term means) it is not necessary that a brother may have any of his features in common with a sister. The resemblance may not occur

165. Investigations, 66.

166. Ibid., 67.

because of mutation. Mutation sometimes brings out drastic changes. The notion of 'family' which is accepted by us refuses its description, not only in terms of a common essence, but also in terms of resemblances. A family is found on genetic, religious and political (social) grounds, and not on the ground of seeing whether the nose of a girl is similar to the nose of a boy or that the two girls from a family have the same gait. A group of people belong to a family for various reasons. And it is certainly not one of those reasons that they are fair-complexioned, though it may be true that they are fair-complexioned. So also it is not one of those reasons that the colour of their eyes is the same, though as a matter of fact they may have the same colour of eyes. If the Platonic essence for membership in a family is rejected, so would the Wittgensteinian resemblances be rejected. Two people are members of a family by marriage. Two other people belong to that family because they are the offspring of the same parents. And the fifth one is an adopted child, so is neither an offspring of the same parents nor came to join the family by marriage. The notion of 'family membership' is quite complicated, more complicated than it seems to Wittgenstein. Wittgenstein is right in thinking that 'games form a family', but they do not always form a family on the bases given by Wittgenstein. Their bases are sometimes very different from those given by Wittgenstein. The features of a family which have attracted Wittgenstein's attention are not persuasive features even for supporting his view. The features to which we have referred give better support to his view. For example, board-games may be considered as brothers and sisters (sometimes half-brothers and half-sisters). Sometimes a hus-

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band differs from his wife as cricket differs from chess. In the case of a family we find analogy and also a lack of analogy in operation. What Wittgenstein says in the case of 'names' quoted above seems to hold in the context of 'games' too, but he does not stress this. He avoids stressing this similarity perhaps because he does not want to stress the lack of analogy. What is further misleading about his remark on 'family resemblance' is as if 'resemblances' play a special kind of role in the case of a family. 'Family resemblance' is a paradigm, and resemblances in other context are to be judged in terms of resemblances occurring in a family. But the resemblances in a family which caught his eyes are in no way superior to the resemblances that occur in the context of a drawing-room a dining-hall or a class-room. Wittgenstein is simply following the tradition of those philosophers of the past who reject identity or essence and opt for resemblances. Only he intends to reject essences in his own original way.

Wittgenstein intends to exhibit that what is called essence, what binds different individuals together, is itself the product of resemblances. The description of games in terms of a family is meant for justifying his view expressed throughout his later period. Consider his remark from the Brown Book, "What ties the ship to the wharf is a rope, and the rope consists of fibres, but it does not get its strength from any fibre which runs through it from one end to the other, but from the fact that there is a vast number of fibres over-lapping."¹⁶⁷ Though the rope is one, it is not constituted out of one fibre, but out of many, and there is no one fibre which gives the rope its strength. What is essence, what is -----
 167. Blue and Brown Books, 17, p. 87.

universal, is nothing but that which is constituted out of the threads of resemblances. And no resembling feature can be specially favoured, because none of them is specially favoured. If it is specially favoured then it would function as an essence, and Wittgenstein rejects essences. Consider now the case of a family. Suppose a husband differs from his wife (lack of analogy), they stand on two different poles agreeing neither in temperament nor complexion nor in their physiology. But the features of the father are visited by the sons and daughters. The father however is sweet-tempered, and the daughter is ill-tempered. Mother may be ill-tempered, and the son sweet-tempered. So the resemblances and differences mark different members in different ways. There is no common essence running through the family yet they are members of the same family. It is one and the same rope which binds the members of the family, but the rope is constituted out of different fibers. Wittgenstein's idea could be expressed in a less misleading fashion by saying that there is no hidden common bond in a family, because some members of the family have the bond of marriage, other, blood relationship, and still others, the social custom has brought them together (custom of adoption). "Games form a family", in the sense that the set of rules which govern one game may be of a totally different kind from the set of rules governing the other game. Someone is a member of a family, not by birth but by marriage. And there may be newness about a game as there is newness about a newly married couple.

Now consider Wittgenstein's exhortation "don't think, but look". "Don't think" simply means "don't think that there must be something common to different instances", not that you should give up thinking. Look and see whether there is anything common. If you look and see,

you will not find anything common, you will simply find similarities overlapping with each other. But Wittgenstein's exhortation may perhaps bring proper results in the cases of games, but quite improper results in the cases of families. Just by looking and seeing you cannot know that two different persons belong to the same family. Even if all the features of one person resemble with the features of the other person, these persons may belong to different families. We do not see any common essence in them in order to say that they belong to the same family. But so also we do not decide that they belong to the same family because their noses and chins resemble. We have to go beyond 'looking and seeing' if we have desire to know whether the persons getting down from the car belong to the same family. Thus, to say that "games form a family" does not necessarily mean that you know what the games are just by 'looking and seeing them'. You may require information about the game in question, the information which may be as relevant as are the birth and marriage certificates in the case of a person's family linkage.

The above discussion however is not meant for showing that 'games do not form a family'. Games certainly do form a family. What was attempted was simply to reinforce Wittgenstein's view by referring to an aspect of 'family' which was not taken by Wittgenstein into consideration. There are diverse grounds for membership in a family. Individual games in the family of games also exhibit a similar diversity.

Now I would like to discuss some further implications of Wittgenstein's view on games. In the immediately succeeding remark Witt-

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Wittgenstein says, "kinds of number form a family."¹⁶⁸ And the fact that he talks about numbers that they form a family shows that he is simply talking about the concept of game that it forms a family for a number is not an activity but a concept. To say about a concept that it forms a family means that the 'particular instances' which fall under the concept exhibit the character of 'family members'. Whether what Wittgenstein says about the concepts of 'game' and 'number' also holds for all possible concepts, is a question which we should not discuss. If Wittgenstein's job is to oppose essentialism, then he would not like to apply his analysis to all possible concepts he would like it to be restricted to "a large class of concepts". We have already seen how he treats 'meaning', 'meaning' is 'use' for a large class of cases, though not for all.

In saying about the concept of game that it forms a family what is further meant is that it is not a closed concept. Its doors are open for new membership. The family-planning measures are restricted, so also the mortality rate is controlled. Neither the birth of new members in a family can be prohibited nor the death of old members can be stopped. This is how family, the concept of family, survives. Old games die and the new games take their birth. This is a crucial analogy between games and family. Olympic games played now are not the same as played before the birth of Christ. Games, like music, seem to depend on culture. New cultures evolve new games. And in some cases the distinction between wars and games disappears, or, what may start as a game may end in a war. As Wittgenstein reacts, "What still counts as a game and what no longer does? Can you give the boundary? No."¹⁶⁹ But this implies that the concept

168. Investigations, 67.

169. Ibid., 68.

'game' is ^a blurred concept. But this leads to difficulties. Keeping Frege in his mind Wittgenstein raises the question "Is a blurred concept a concept at all?"¹⁷⁰ For Frege the notion of a blurred concept would appear as some kind of contradiction. A concept is by definition clear and precise. If a blurred concept is not a concept, then one solution to satisfy ^f [^] philosopher like Frege is that we invent a new name for the blurred concept. We retain the name 'concept' for those that are rigid and precise concepts, and introduce a new name 'compets' for those that are blurred ones. This is similar to John Wisdom's procedure for inventing new demonstrative expressions. As Wisdom says, "Owing to the paucity in language of words like 'this' and 'that' we must now invent new ones - 'thet', 'thot' and 'thit'."¹⁷¹ Like Wisdom's new demonstratives we introduce a new name 'compets' for those concepts that are blurred, for which boundaries cannot be drawn. However, Wittgenstein would reject such a move. For such a move presupposes that there really is a class of well defined concepts, concepts that have rigid boundaries. But if an ill-defined concept is the only concept which suits a particular situation, then the ill-defined concept is the most well-defined concept for that situation. If I want the picture of a cloudy weather, the camera would certainly be cheating me if it produces the picture of a clear weather. If I want darkness to be depicted, then the showing of sunshine would not satisfy me. It is only the blurred concept which is the most suitable concept on certain occasions. As Wittgenstein explains by referring to a situation. "Is it senseless to say 'stand roughly there'? Suppose I were

170. Ibid., 71

171. Essays on Wittgenstein's Tractatus, eds. Copi & Beard, p. 53.

standing with someone in a city square and said that. As I say it I do not draw any kind of boundary, but perhaps point with my hand -as if I were indicating a particular spot. And this is just how one might explain to someone what a game is."¹⁷² If what is required is only the reference to the spot where you are supposed to stand, it is not required for me to give you exact spatio-temporal co-ordinates. Not because I do not carry with me all the time scales and measuring rods so I fail, but that I am not required to carry any such procedure; this is not the situation for any such procedure.

The denial of essence does not necessarily mean that Wittgenstein denies that there is anything common to two different games. What is denied is simply that what is common to two different games is something abstract, a Platonic concept. What is common to them is a feature which could be indicated and pointed out. Again, this may not be common to other sets of games, they may have their own sets of features in common. Explaining his position Wittgenstein raises the question., "Could you tell me what is common between a light red and dark red."¹⁷³ Instead of answering this question directly he refers to another situation where one actually refers to what is common. "I show you two pictures of different landscapes. In both pictures, amongst many other objects, there is the picture of a bush, and it is exactly alike in both."¹⁷⁴ But the bush is something that is concrete, it is what is 'exactly alike' in two pictures. So what is common is what is exactly alike. What is exactly alike is certainly not what is identical. For what is identical is supposed to be numerically the same, but the bush in two pictures

172. Investigations, 71.

173. Blue and Brown Books, 2, p. 130.

174. Ibid.

is not numerically the same. The bush in one picture is numerically different from the bush in the other picture, yet these different bushes are 'exactly alike', and it is they that represent what is common to two different pictures. The same is true about what is common to two different colours or to two different games. In referring to what is common you are not referring to any hidden or unknown and unknowable essence. Wittgenstein does not reject the raising of the question 'what is common to two different particulars,' he simply rejects the Platonists' answer to it.

Since games do not have any essence, they form a family, no such definition of game is possible which may lead you to understand about all games : what they are and how they are played. If you do not know what 'game' means, what is done with it (or about it) the best way is to show you a few games. Once you are shown a few games you will be in a position to imagine their variations. As Wittgenstein reacts, "How should we explain to someone what a game is? I imagine that we should describe games to him, and we might add : "This and similar things are called 'games'". And do we know any more about it ourselves ? Is it only the people whom we cannot tell exactly what a game is ? But this is not ignorance. We do not know the boundaries because none have been drawn."¹⁷⁵ In actual showing of games, in letting others see how they are played, one may think that you are ignorant of the definition of game, you are not aware of how the concept of game operates. But this is not ignorance, for no definition of game has been given (unless it is a limited definition , and none could be given. The concept of game, - - - - -

175. Investigations, 69.

as we have already seen, cannot be bounded. To introduce boundaries to introduce a universal definition, to games, would be to stop the birth of new games. It is not the new games which will stop having birth, it is your definition which will be rejected. The concept of game is not an 'armchair concept'.

Words and Chessmen : As has been pointed out earlier Wittgenstein attempted to divert the attention of philosophers from the issues concerning the meaning of words to the issues concerning their use. He attempted to reduce meaning to use. It is this issue that led him to compare words with cogs and sentences with cog-wheels. But this analogy failed to exhibit the multiplicity of uses to which words are open. The comparison of language with toolbox also failed because the visual appearance of a hammer is very different from the visual appearance of glue, but the visual appearance of 'cut' is not very unlike the visual appearance of 'but', and they also sound the same if spoken. The comparison of words with handles in the cabin of a locomotive engine is quite fitting. There are long handles and there are short handles 'caressing' is a long handle, 'put' is not. But the function of 'care sing' is very different from the function of 'put'; long handle is used for a very different function from the function of a short handle. But the analogy of handles is not very helpful. Granted that words are like handles, one would like to react - 'so what ? It is the search for a comprehensive analogy that led Wittgenstein to games. The study of games, Wittgenstein discovered, can lead to the solution of a host of philosophical problems. He thought that "the question 'what is a word' is completely analogous with the question 'what is a chessman?'¹⁷⁶

Language is completely analogous with chess (game). This completeness does not occur in connection with a cogwheel or a toolbox. It is because Wittgenstein does not find any incompleteness in the analogy of language with game that he was led to coin the expression 'language-game'. This expression may mean two things. 1) using a language resembles playing a game. 2) Using a language is identical with playing a game. Wittgenstein uses the expression 'language-game' in both the senses: he often slips from one sense to another as if it is of consequence whether one considers language as a game or something resembling a game. Consider his remark from the Blue Book where Wittgenstein refers to five different systems of communication while introducing the expression 'language-game'. He says "Systems of communication as for instance 1), 2), 3), 4), 5) we shall call "language we call games. Children are taught their native language by means of such games, and here they even have the entertaining character of games."¹⁷⁷ The expression "more or less akin" does not identify a language with a game, it only brings the former very close to the latter. But he thinks that while teaching language to children, it is used as a game, having even the character of entertainment. In the Investigations he adds, "Think of much of the use of words in games like ring-a-ring-a-roses."¹⁷⁸ There is a tendency in Wittgenstein to assimilate language to game; language is literally, and not only metaphorically, a game. It is a species of game. We play chess, in the same fashion we speak and write language. The role of words in language is completely analogous with the role of chessmen in chess.

177. Blue and Brown Books, 5, p.81. 178. Investigations, 7.

Chapter III Rhetoric

How much we are doing is changing the style
of thinking and how much I'm doing is chang-
ing the style of thinking and how much I'm doing
is persuading people to change their style
of thinking.

Lectures and Conversations on Aesthetics.

Rejection of essentialism leads to the acceptance of rhetoric. Once essences are rejected one does not require any special method, any dialectic, exclusively for doing philosophy. Philosophy is no more the affair of the transcendent. In this chapter I would like to discuss those features of Wittgenstein's thought which would have been appreciated by Aristotle and the sophists. One may feel that perhaps Wittgenstein at the later stage was a committed rhetorician. The presentation of a theory or doctrine, whether it is scientific or philosophical, exhibits its rhetorical character if its acceptance depends on persuasion. There are certain devices of persuasion, such as the choice of words, and the mode in which one argues. It is not the theory but its presentation that is more important, or that the theory is accepted because of its presentation. The words of the theory are so chosen that the hearer is charmed by the imagery which they create. Similarly the argument for the theory is given not solely because it is logical but because it is an argument which persuades. The persuasive power of Wittgenstein's own work depends on the choice of words, his use of aphorisms, metaphors etc. Later Wittgenstein was not only himself a rhetorician, he also believed that the acceptance of a scientific theory so also that of a

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philosophical view ultimately depends on persuasion.¹⁷⁹ And there is no doubt that people can be persuaded by a speech or by a piece of writing only when the words are chosen with care, and the arguments too are convincing. Logic is of no importance if it fails to produce conviction. Logic can even be sacrificed for the sake of conviction. No theory or doctrine would have survived if it did not have an inbuilt persuasive mechanism. Wittgenstein's later work reminds us of Plato, Aristotle and the sophists. It may of course be just a coincidence that his views have some similarities with the Greek thinkers. However, it would be worthwhile to discuss the views of Wittgenstein in the light of what Plato and Aristotle have already said on this subject. What is happening now in philosophy in the West, has its source in the thoughts of Plato and Aristotle. So we are not unnecessarily introducing the Greek scene. Rather the Greek scene may help us to understand the present scene better.

Plato's Rejection of Rhetoric :

Gorgias calls rhetoric "the ability to persuade with speeches."¹⁸⁰ This characterisation can as well be extended to writing. For persuasion occurs not only in speaking but also in writing. 'Persuasive writing' is like 'persuasive speaking.' Rhetoric is identified with oratory in Greek thought. Sophists converted oratory into a professional art; they also considered rhetoric as the only proper method

179. This interpretation is well supported by Wittgenstein's Lectures and Conversations on Aesthetics, Psychology and Religious belief, ed, C. Barrett, Oxford, 1966.

180. Gorgias, 452 E, Trans. W.P.Lamb, Harvard, Loeb library, p. 279.

of doing philosophy. But Plato is not ready to grant the status of art to rhetoric. And the simple reason for his refusal to give this concession is that there is no special subject matter of rhetoric, consider the dialogue between Socrates and Gorgias:¹⁸¹

Soc...tell me with what particular thing rhetoric is concerned: as, for example, weaving is concerned with the manufacture of clothes, is it not ?

Gorg. Yes

Soc.And music likewise, with the making of tunes. The answer of Gorgias that "rhetoric is concerned with speech" does not satisfy Socrates. For it is not only rhetoric but other arts too that are concerned with speeches. Therefore, Socrates retorts, "then why, pray, do you not give the name "rhetorical" to those other arts, when they are concerned with speeches."¹⁸² Speech simply cannot distinguish rhetoric from other arts. Again, "the ability to persuade with speech" is also exhibited by other arts. "Rhetoric", says Socrates, "is not the only producer of persuasion".¹⁸³ What Plato is trying to show is that not only that rhetoric does not have any special subject matter of its own, even 'the method of persuasion' does not distinguish it from other arts. This means, according to Plato not that it is a special kind of art, but that it is not any kind of art whatsoever. For every art has its own subject matter, rhetoric has none. Every art has its own method, rhetoric has none. From this Plato concludes that rhetoric is not an art but a habitude a producer of "gratification and pleasure".¹⁸⁴ Rhetoric is like cookery and flattery which are no arts. Referring to rhetoric says

181. Ibid., 449 D, p. 267.

182. Ibid., 450, B, p. 271.

183. Ibid., 454 A, p. 283

184. Ibid., 462 C, p. 311.

Socrates, "It seems to me . . . to be a pursuit that is not a matter of art, but showing a shrewd, gallant spirit which has natural bent for clever dealing with mankind, and I sum up its substance in the name flattery. This practice as I view it, has many branches, and one of them is cookery : which appears indeed to be an art, but my account of it, is not an art but a habitude or knack. I call rhetoric another branch of it, as also personal adornment and sophistry."¹⁸⁵ The denial that there is any subject matter of rhetoric also implies that rhetoric is not concerned with truth, "For the orator and his rhetoric, there is no need to know the truth of the actual matter, but one merely needs to have discovered some device of persuasion."¹⁸⁶ So what is important is not the discovery of truth but the discovery of a device of persuasion. But then points out Socrates to Phaedrus, "He who knows not the truth, pursues opinions, will, it seems, attain an art of speech which is ridiculous, and not an art at all."¹⁸⁷ Rhetoric, therefore, "is not an art, but a craft devoid of art."¹⁸⁸

One may be moved by a speech in the same way in which one may be moved by a poem. Plato brings rhetoric closer to poetry particularly the poetry of the tragic kind. For such a poetry is also meant for "producing pleasure and gratification."¹⁸⁹ He says further, "If we strip any kind of poetry of melody, its rhythm and its metre, we get mere speeches as the residue."¹

185. Ibid., 463 B, p. 313.

186. Ibid., 459 C, p. 301.

187. Phaedrus, trans. H.N. Fowler, Harvard, Loeb Lib. 262 C, p. 523.

188. Ibid., 200 E, p. 517.

189. Gorgias, 502 C, p. 451.

190. Ibid., 502 C, p. 451.

So poetry is rhetoric if poetry is devoid of its melody, rhythm and metre. Or, rhetoric is nothing but poetry devoid of its melody, rhythm and metre. For neither the poets nor the rhetoricians are concerned with truth. Poets, like artists in general, imitate nature in order to please you, And rhetoricians beautify their speeches with metaphors and similies etc., to cater to your taste. Therefore, neither poetry nor rhetoric deserve to be paid any serious attention. Rather, these are the kind of manifestations of the human soul which deserve to be curbed.

In his Phaedrus Plato has proposed that rhetoric could be treated as art if it satisfied certain conditions. While proposing these conditions he says, "If you are naturally rhetorical, you will become a notable orator, when to your natural endowment you have added knowledge."¹⁹¹ A rhetorician should not restrict himself only to the realm of belief and opinion. He should have knowledge, for it is only by having knowledge that truth will be revealed by his speeches. If what he says expresses truth and knowledge then he will be more convincing, more persuasive. Plato remarks further "All great arts demand discussion and high speculation about nature; for this loftiness of mind and effectiveness in all directions seem somehow to come from such pursuit."¹⁹² Rhetoric could be a great art if it has the backing of 'discussion and speculation'. Plato compares "the real art of rhetoric" with the "art of healing". The method of the art of healing is much the same as that of rhetoric. "In both cases you must analyse a nature,

191. Phaedrus, 263 D, p. 547.

192. Ibid., 269 E, p. 547.

in one ^{that} that of the body and in the other hand of the soul."193 Why is the study of the soul a necessary condition for persuasion has been pointed out by Socrates when he says, "Since it is the function of speech to lead souls by persuasion, he who is to be a rhetorician must know the various forms of soul."194 But if we analyse the conditions prescribed by Plato, it seems that rhetoric can never satisfy them. Because once it satisfies them it would become dialectic; it would no more remain rhetoric. Consider the condition of 'discussion'. Oratory is not discussion, it does not proceed by way of posing questions and obtaining answers. The question-answer method is dialectic. Again, the subject of ones rhetorical performance may not at all require 'high speculation'. Not all subjects are in need of high speculation unless they are subjects of dialectic. It is only dialectic which is restricted to the areas of high speculation. So also the condition of knowledge, in Plato's sense of knowledge, is a necessary condition of dialectic not rhetoric. The latter may be concerned with the day to day affairs of the world, the affairs which may not go beyond belief or probable opinion even if one wished to do so. Lastly, consider Plato's condition that in order to persuade others you must know their souls. Yes, one has to know their souls if "knowing their souls" simply means "knowing them". But lurking behind is Plato's suggestion that one must know the transcendental nature of the self. And this is certainly not required for an orator. Neither a judge in the law-court (and not only the criminal) nor a man of the market-place acts and lives according to a belief

193. Ibid., 270 B, p. 547.

194. Ibid., 271 D, p. 553.

Gorgias and the Phaedrus that rhetoric does not have a special subject matter of its own. Aristotle finds dialectic in the same situation. Like rhetoric, dialectic too does not have any special subject matter of its own. "For both have to do with matters that are in a manner within the cognisance of all men and not confined to any special science."¹⁹⁷ If there is no 'special science' for rhetoric so also there is no 'special science' for dialectic.

Just after settling the issue of the subject matter of rhetoric Aristotle reflects on Plato's worry whether rhetoric could be an art. Since rhetoric, like dialectic, reduces "matters to a system"¹⁹⁸ both are arts according to Aristotle. We are well acquainted these days with the distinction between 'deductive' and 'inductive' arguments and proofs. We owe our present acquaintance with this distinction to Aristotle. According to him it is the function of dialectic to systematise these arguments and proof. His Topica is devoted to them. Rhetoric on the other hand is concerned with 'enthymemes' and 'examples'. But Aristotle seems to have dissolved the distinction between dialectic and rhetoric when he says, "I call an enthymeme a rhetorical syllogism, and an example rhetorical induction."¹⁹⁹ What perhaps Aristotle meant was that an orator may use, during his speech, an argument of the 'demonstrative kind', so also he may use an argument of the 'non-demonstrative kind'. He chooses the arguments as the situation demands. But this implies that dialectic has a superior status to rhetoric. Aristotle does not hesitate in accepting the superior-

197. Ibid., footnote to the expression "counterpart" in 1354 a, p.3.

198. Ibid., 1354 a, p. 3.

199. Ibid., 1356 b, p. 19.

rity of dialectic over rhetoric. He does not mind going to the extent of accepting that "rhetoric is . . . an offshoot of dialectic."²⁰⁰ But saying that it is an offshoot of dialectic does not degrade the status of rhetoric, for it is not an unacceptable offshoot. The unacceptable offshoot of dialectic is sophistry. As Aristotle says, "In Dialectic it is the moral purpose that makes the sophist, the dialectician being one whose arguments rest, not on moral purpose but on the faculty."²⁰¹ The footnote on this remark makes Aristotle's position quite clear. "The essence of sophistry consists in moral purpose, the deliberate use of fallacious arguments. In Dialectic, the dialectician has the power or faculty of making use of them when he pleases; when he does so he is called a sophist."²⁰² Thus, no body can be a sophist if he is not a dialectician. Sophistry is closer to dialectic than to rhetoric. A sophist is a degenerate dialectician. Plato attempted to identify rhetoric with sophistry, Aristotle sends it back to dialectic. In his "On Sophistical Refutations", Aristotle does not deny that the sophists are equipped with an art or a method, what he denies is that they do not "teach their art" to their students. There is a sense in which one learns nothing from the sophists. Referring to the sophists Aristotle remarks, "The training given by the paid professors of contentious arguments was like the treatment of the matter by Gorgias. For they used to hand out speeches to be learned by heart, some rhetorical others in the form of question and answer, each side supposing that their arguments on either side generally fall among them. And therefore

 200. Ibid., 1356 b, p. 19. 201. Ibid., footnote to 1356 b, p. 14.

202. Ibid., 1356 b, p. 19.

the teaching they gave their pupils was ready but rough . For they used to suppose that they trained people by imparting to them not the art but its products, as though any one professing that he would impart a form of knowledge to obviate any pain in the feet, were then not teach a man the art of shoe-making or the sources whence he can acquire anything of the kind, but were to present with several kinds of shoes of all sorts; for he has helped him to meet his need, but has not imparted an art to him.²⁰³ Aristotle's remarks give a very different picture of the sophists. They were no doubt "paid professors of contentious arguments, "but the art of sophistry which they used was not an independent kind of art, different from both dialectic and rhetoric. Rather, they used rhetoric when it suited their purpose. So also they used dialectic when it suited their purpose. Some of the speeches which they handed over to their pupils were 'rhetorical' and others 'dialectical', in the form of 'question and answer'. They supposed that they trained their pupils by imparting to them "not art but its products." So they trained their pupils neither in the art of rhetoric nor in the art of dialectic, they were simply interested in "selling the products of these two great arts." They were undoubtedly great, for they know both these arts, but they were dishonest about their art, But rhetoric cannot be blamed simply because it was a handy weapon with the sophists, for they misused dialectic too. If Plato does not give up dialectic because of its misuse by the sophists, why should he persuade others to give up rhetoric because of its misuse by the sophists. It is not only rhetoric which allows itself to be misused, dialectic is also

 203. On Sophistical Refutations 183-164, Ed.by Richard Mckeon,
 Random House, 1941.

in the same situation. For "Rhetoric and dialectic alone of all the arts prove opposites; for both are equally concerned with them."²⁰⁴

The question arises what is the need of introducing rhetoric. When it is just a pair or a copy or a counterpart of dialectic, then it loses its independent significance. Why not manage everything with dialectic alone? The need for rhetoric arises because on occasions the dose of dialectic will kill the patient rather than curing him. The patient on occasions requires a milder dose; rhetoric is a milder dose. As Aristotle points out, "in dealing with certain persons, even if we possessed the most accurate scientific knowledge, we should not find it easy to persuade them by the employment of such knowledge. For scientific discourse is concerned with instruction, but in the case of such persons instruction is impossible."²⁰⁵ This implies that on occasions it is not the "Knowledge of syllogism" which will persuade people, but methods other than the syllogistic which will work. Aristotle refers to different kinds of situations where rhetoric is the only method which will work, the situation of law-courts, the situation of political assembly or public gathering.

The most important question concerning rhetoric is the question concerning the discovery of the means of persuasion. As Aristotle points out, "It belongs to Rhetoric to discover the real and apparent means of persuasion, just as it belongs to Dialectic to discover the real and apparent syllogism."²⁰⁶ Plato already pointed out, though for different reasons, that what an orator

204. Rhetoric, 1355 a, p.13

205. Ibid., 1355 a, p.11.

206. Ibid., 1355 b, p. 13.

requires is "some device of persuasion."²⁰⁷ Plato used the expression "device" in a derogatory sense; Aristotle takes it up in a serious sense. Aristotle takes up the issue of device (means) of persuasion so seriously that he defines the discipline of rhetoric in terms of the discovery of these means. As he says, "Rhetoric then may be defined as the faculty of discovering the possible means of persuasion in reference to any subject whatsoever."²⁰⁸ Aristotle puts a heavy responsibility on rhetoric by making it a very superior kind of art. Each of the other arts is "able to instruct and persuade in its own special subject; thus medicine deals with health and sickness, geometry with the properties of magnitude....But Rhetoric, so to say, appears to be able to discover the means of persuasion in reference to any given subject."²⁰⁹ Therefore, Aristotle devotes the whole of the first book of Rhetoric to the discovery of the means of persuasion, to the discovery of the rhetoric proofs. And the first book itself introduces the problems of the second book. We have already seen how Plato in his Phaedrus considers it essential for the real rhetorician to inquire into the nature of the human soul. Unless one knows the nature of the human souls, it is impossible to persuade the human beings. This condition has been converted by Aristotle into the condition of an inquiry into the nature of human psychology. A speaker can persuade his hearer only if he knows the mental make up of the hearer. In order to persuade others one must know the psychological behaviour of others. So also one must know the moral character of others. The second book deals

207. Phaedrus, 262 c.

208. Rhetoric, 1355 b, p. 15.

209. Ibid., 1355 b, p. 15.

with the moral and psychological nature of human beings. Rhetorical proofs depend on such knowledge. But it is the third book which is partly, if not wholly, responsible for the survival of Aristotle's Rhetoric. For it deals with the delivery or style of speech. We have not only to consider rhetorical proofs, and human nature in persuading human beings, but also how ^{we} do it i.e. to say how we use language in persuasion. It is the fashion of the day to refer to Aristotle's Rhetoric when we discuss issues of linguistics or literary criticism.

Aristotle and Wittgenstein :²¹⁰

It is very interesting to find some similarities between the views of Wittgenstein and those of Aristotle as expressed in the first book of Rhetoric. Wittgenstein's distinction between 'symptoms' and 'criteria', as expressed in his Blue Book, has made a significant impact on the philosophical thought of this century. This is not one of those distinctions which has been introduced in philosophy for its own sake; it has led to the solution of some philosophical problems. For example, the connection between 'the behaviour of other people' and 'their experiences' has remained a source of anxiety to philosophers. The distinction between 'symptoms' and 'criteria' has succeeded in suppressing, if not completely removing, this anxiety. The behaviour of other people is not just a symptom of their experiences, it constitutes, as Strawson would say, a criterion of "logically adequate kind."²¹¹

210. Some of the material of this section is based on my paper

"Aristotle And Wittgenstein : Signs, Symptoms and Criteria"
read at the Waltair session of the Indian Philosophical
Congress, 1983-84.

211. Individuals, London, 1959, p.110.

The distinction between 'symptoms' and 'criteria' was already known to Aristotle. Of course Aristotle did not see those implications of this distinction which have been drawn by the philosophers of this century. But how could Aristotle have seen them? For the philosophical worries connected with 'solipsism', 'other minds' etc., were not Aristotle's worries, therefore, we cannot expect Aristotle to have reflected on them. New problems generate new implications. And it can hardly be doubted that our age has introduced new approaches to philosophical problems, if not altogether new philosophical problems.

While reflecting on the nature of enthymeme (rhetorical syllogism) Aristotle makes a distinction between 'probable signs' and 'necessary signs'. He was led to make this distinction for the reason that "few of the propositions of the rhetorical syllogism are necessary, for most of the things which we judge and examine can be other than they are."²¹² From this it follows "that the materials from which enthymemes are derived will be sometimes necessary, but for the most part only generally true."²¹³ Aristotle thinks that "the probability and signs" would exhaust the material in question."²¹⁴ And concerning signs he says, "some are related as the particular to the universal, others as the universal to the particular. Necessary signs are called tekmeria; those which are not necessary have no distinguishing name. I call those necessary signs from which a logical syllogism can be constructed, wherefore such a sign is called tekmerion; for when people think

212. Rhetoric, 1357 a, p. 25.

213. Ibid.

214. Ibid.

that their arguments are irrefutable, they think that they are bringing forward a tekmerion, something as it were proved and concluded."²¹⁵ The distinguishing name for those which are not necessary signs is 'probable signs', according to Aristotle. When Aristotle takes up the examples of 'necessary signs' and 'probable signs' what he says is very close to what was later said by Wittgenstein on 'criteria' and 'symptoms'. Consider Aristotle's remark, "...if one were to say that it is a sign that a man is ill, because he has a fever, or that a woman has had a child because she has milk, this is a necessary sign. This alone among signs is a tekmerion; for only in this case, if the fact is true, is the argument irrefutable. Other signs are related as the universal to the particular, for instance, if one were to say that it is a sign that this man has a fever, because he breathes hard; but even if the fact be true, this argument also can be refuted, for it is possible for a man to breathe hard without having a fever. We have now explained the meaning of probable, sign, and necessary sign, and the difference between them."²¹⁶

Aristotle clearly maintains that the connection between 'fever' and 'breathing hard' is different from the connection between 'fever' and 'illness'. The latter is a necessary or defining connection but the former is not. Now consider Wittgenstein's remarks from the Blue Book : "To the question "how do you know that so-and-so is the case ?", we sometimes answer by giving 'criteria' and sometimes by giving 'symptoms'. If medical science calls angina an inflammation caused by a particular bacillus, and

 215. Ibid., 1357 b, p. 27. 216. Ibid., 1357 b, pp. 27-29.

we ask in a particular case "why do you say this man has got angina?" then the answer "I have found the bacillus so-and-so in his blood" gives us the criterion, or what we may call the defining criterion of angina. If on the other hand the answer was, "His throat is inflamed", this might give us a symptom of angina. I call "symptom" a phenomenon of which experience has taught us that it coincides, in some way or other, with the phenomenon which is our defining criterion. Then to say "A man has angina if this bacillus is found in him" is a tautology or it is a loose way of stating the definition of "angina". But to say, "A man has angina whenever he has an inflamed throat" is to make a hypothesis."²¹⁷

If we apply Wittgenstein's idiom to Aristotle's cases then we can say that someone's having a fever is a criterion for my saying that he is ill. Similarly, if a woman has milk, then there is a criterion for my saying that she has had a child. But if someone 'breathes hard' then there is only a symptom for my saying that he has a fever. And if we apply Aristotle's idiom to the cases cited by Wittgenstein we can say that the 'bacillus so-and-so' is a necessary sign for having angina. But the case is different with the 'inflammation of throat'. For this happens to be only a probable sign for someone's having angina.

Associated with his distinction between symptoms and criteria Wittgenstein makes a distinction between hypotheses and tautologies. When we refer to the phenomenon which is a symptom, we express only a hypothesis which could possibly be false. But concerning the phenomenon which is a criterion what one expresses is a tauto-

217. The Blue and Brown Books, Basil Blackwell, Oxford, 1969, pp.24-

logy. Aristotle too makes a similar distinction. Referring to the 'probable sign' Aristotle also says "...that which is probable is that which generally happens ...that which is concerned with things that may be other than they are."²¹⁸ And when Aristotle says about his 'necessary sign' that it is a *tekmerion* he clearly means what would have been meant by saying that it is a tautology or a definition. For concerning his use of 'tekmerion', as we have already seen, Aristotle says, "...when people think that their arguments are irrefutable, they think that they are bringing forward a tekmerion, something as it were proved and concluded."²¹⁹ Wittgenstein's concept of a tautology clearly satisfies Aristotle's notion of a tekmerion. For a hypothesis can never have conclusive proof or evidence. Thus Aristotle's distinction between 'necessary' and 'probable' signs clearly coincides with Wittgenstein's distinction between 'criterion' and 'symptoms'.

What has really led Wittgenstein to have views similar to Aristotle's ? Not only did they belong to different ages, they were also brought up in different philosophical climate. The cultural tradition which produced Wittgenstein was different from the one which produced Aristotle. But were they really so different from each other, that they had no point of contact with each other? Was their philosophical climate so different that it did not allow them to have any similarity of thought? Wittgenstein's distinction between 'symptoms' and 'criteria' is the outcome of his observation of the phenomenon of experience, how does one ascribe experiences

 218. Rhetoric., 1357 a, p. 27. 219. Ibid., 1357 b, p. 27.

to others. The right conclusion concerning one's own mind or the mind of others cannot be arrived at by a transcendental method. For arriving at a right conclusion one is required to see how language actually works in concrete situations where experiences are ascribed to oneself or to others. Just before taking up the issue of the ascription of experiences Wittgenstein has been quarrelling with essentialism, quarrelling with those philosophers who have a "craving for generality" and exhibit a "contemptuous attitude towards the particular case."²²⁰ It is not by having a contemptuous attitude towards the particular cases, not by just knowing their identities, but by observing their individuality, by observing their differences, that one can arrive at the right philosophical conclusion. There is no essential method, there is no general principle, which can lead us to the solution of all philosophical problems. The problem of other minds is no exception. How do I ascribe experiences to others? On the basis of their physical behaviour. Sometimes I may go wrong, but this does not mean that their behaviour is only a 'symptom' of their experiences. Their behaviour is a criterion, "a logically adequate criterion" as Strawson says in his Wittgenstenian tone. Is there a better way of knowing the mind of others than with the help of their behaviour. Then why blame behaviour? Why take it only as a symptom?

Rhetoric is the context in which on the one hand Aristotle rejects Plato's Dialectic as of no use (Dialectic is Plato's unique method of arriving at all philosophical solutions), and on the

 220. The Blue And Brown Book, p. 18. It is interesting to read the three pages 17,18 and 19 for his attack on essentialism.

other hand he concentrates on the individual cases. Not all people can be persuaded in one and the same fashion, so also there is no single principle, the principle, of persuasion. There are principles, and principles to be chosen as the need arises. The multiplicity of principles depends on the multiplicity of occasions. It is in the context of his search for the 'rhetorical proofs' (not a single proof) that Aristotle comes to hit at the nature of 'signs' and discovers that signs are of two different varieties the necessary signs and those which are contingent. The mental make up of Aristotle is the same as that of Wittgenstein. Both exhibit a contempt for essentialism, and a respect for the particular cases. For Aristotle, Plato is the target. For Wittgenstein, he himself is the target, for Tractatus too draws an essentialistic picture of the universe. Since Rhetoric is not a science of any kind, it has no subject matter of its own, this is one area where differences of opinion will naturally emerge. Each individual case is to be studied on its own ground, and not by assimilating it to others. It is no surprise that Wittgenstein's views are similar to Aristotle's.

The similarities between the views of later Wittgenstein and Aristotle can be observed not only in the context of the Rhetoric, but also in other contexts. Consider Aristotle's introductory remarks from the De Anima and compare them with Wittgenstein's attack on the philosopher's "craving for generality" as expressed in the Blue Book. Aristotle says, "To attain any assured knowledge about the soul is one of the most difficult things in the world. As the forms of question which here presents itself, viz. the question 'What is it'? recurs in other fields, it might be supposed that there was some single method of inquiry applicable to

all objects whose essential nature we are endeavouring to ascertain (as there is for derived properties the single method of demonstration); in that case what we should have to seek for would be this unique method. But if there is no such single and general method for solving the question of essence, our task becomes still more difficult: in the case of each different subject we shall have to determine the appropriate process of investigation. If to this there be a clear answer, e.g., that the process of demonstration or division, or some other known method, difficulties and hesitations still beset us - with what facts shall we begin the inquiry? For the facts which form the starting-point in different subjects must be different, as e.g., in the case of numbers and surfaces.²²¹ Since the same question 'What is it?' can be raised on different occasions and situations one may be led to think that there is a single method of enquiry to be instituted for all those occasions and situations. But this is an allurement which we must avoid. The allurement is of course provided by our language, provided by the question 'What is it ?' However, not all subjects which we discuss on different occasions are like 'derived properties' which require only one method, 'the method of demonstration'. The subjects such as 'numbers' and 'surfaces' are so very diverse, therefore it would be a mistake to institute a single method of inquiry for them. Diverse subjects presuppose diverse methods of inquiry. Like Wittgenstein, Aristotle clearly proposes that 'in the case of each different subject we shall have to determine

221. De Anima, ed. Richard Mc Keon, Random House, 1941, 402 a, p. 535.

the appropriate process of investigation'. The issue of method bewilders Aristotle, but resorting to a single method of inquiry for all kinds of subjects, whether the subject requires the attention of syllogism or the attention of one's eyes and hands, does not solve the problem. Wittgenstein can be seen as the fulfilment of Aristotle's dream of a philosopher.

Aristotle and Metaphor :

Before we come back to Wittgenstein, it would not only be interesting but also of some consequence to discuss the treatment of metaphor by Aristotle. Metaphor is a common ingredient in both, poetry and rhetoric, and therefore, Aristotle discusses it in the context of both. If one studies Plato's views on rhetoric and poetry and compares them with Aristotle's views, then one may feel that Aristotle stands to Plato in the same kind of relationship in which Kant stands to Hume. Kant obtains the structure of his philosophy from Hume, yet the main target of Kant's philosophy is Hume. Aristotle too derives his views on rhetoric and poetry from Plato, yet the main target of Aristotle is Plato. Therefore, in order to know Aristotle's views we have to go back to Plato.

Concerning Plato's views we have to be careful that though Plato rejects both rhetoric and poetry, his reasons for rejecting them are not the same. Rhetoric is no art, but poetry is an art. Rhetoric is rejected, because it is not an art but a form of flattery. Poetry is rejected, because it is an art, and all art is third removed from reality. So the deficiency with rhetoric

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is not that it failed in acquiring the status of art. For even if it had succeeded in having this status, it would have possibly been rejected by Plato. In his Gorgias and Phaedrus, Plato argues against rhetoric in an exceedingly misleading fashion. It appears as if he rejects rhetoric because it failed to qualify itself as an art, as if Plato would have accepted rhetoric if it had passed the test of being an art. Has Plato accepted poetry, though poetry is an art? Perhaps Plato rejects rhetoric simply because it masquerades as dialectic. Similarly poetry is rejected not because it is third removed from reality or is merely an imitation of nature, but because it masquerades as metaphysics. Poetry is above history, as Aristotle has later shown, and is, therefore nearer the conceptual realm, if not an aspect of this realm. If rhetoric tries to dethrone dialectic, poetry tries to dethrone metaphysics. It is to save dialectic that Plato rejects rhetoric. And it is to save metaphysics that Plato rejects poetry. If rhetoric and poetry are allowed then instead of philosophers, the sophists and the poets will be the kings. For rhetoric is a kind of poetry and poetry is a kind of rhetoric. The most degenerate form of the ideal state would be the state governed by the sophists and the poets. It would not be a state but chaos. Like a Messiah Plato wanted to save the ideal state from chaos.

• Plato has not expressed his views on metaphor in any explicit form as Aristotle has done. There is no Socratic Dialogue on Metaphor as Aristotle has a book on metaphor, though all Socratic dialogues use metaphors. It is the use of metaphors that heightens

the poetic quality of these Dialogues. In his Poetics Aristotle considers Socratic Dialogues as poetry."²²² Plato's metaphors are partly, if not wholly, responsible for this remark. So instead of writing on metaphors Plato demonstrates their nature by using them. From his Dialogues we can very well infer the views of Plato on metaphor. However, one has to be careful. Though Plato does not have any disrespect for metaphors if one uses them in philosophy he disrespects them if they are used in rhetoric or poetry, perhaps because he disrespects these disciplines. But it is only in the context of his views on rhetoric that we have Plato's reaction, however indirect, to metaphor. Therefore, we have again to divert our attention to Gorgias, for it is this Dialogue that Plato refers to metaphor. We would avoid Phaedrus though it is equally important.

The most popular interpretation of Plato's views on metaphor is that metaphors have a kind of cosmetic and ornamental value. Cosmetic and ornamental, not in any aesthetic sense but in a derogatory sense. Plato brings out this derogatory sense when he attacks rhetoric by comparing it with a beautiful but cruel lady, who is interested only in herself. She "cares nothing for what is the best, but dangles what is most pleasant for the moment as a bait for folly, and deceived it into thinking that she is of the highest value."²²³ But the beauty which she has is the result of artificial creation. As Plato exposes her beauty when he says, "...self-adornment personates gymnastic: with its rascally, deceitful ignoble, and illiberal nature it deceives men by forms and colours, polish and dress, so as to make them, in the effort of assuming an extraneous beauty, neglect the native sort that comes through

 222. Poetics, 1447b, Basic Works of Aristotle, ed, Richard McKeon
 Random House.

223. Gorgias, 464 c-d.

gymnastic." ²²⁴ Thus Plato makes the distinction between 'natural beauty' and 'artificial beauty'. Natural beauty is produced by gymnastic., artificial beauty by forms and colours, polish and dress, i.e., by cosmetics, ornamentation and dressing in artistic fashion. Man are being decieved by the artificially created beauty. Metaphors provide colours, polish and dress to rhetoric, i.e. they provide an artificial frame of beauty to it. But what would provide natural beauty to it ? Gymnastic. Rhetoric should persuade, not with its cosmetic, ornamentation and dressing, but with its natural beauty which it has acquired by the help of gymnastic. What is the analogue of gymnastic in this context? Are not knowledge and truth such analogues? Are not knowledge and truth the gymnastic of rhetoric ? If one speaks with knowledge and truth, then one will have better persuasive power than one who simply wants to cheat people with his coloured and ornamentally dressed speeches. Is Plato right ? Certainly not. Too much occupation with gymnastic can produce an athelete but not necessarily a beautiful person. (Don't say an athelete is a beautiful person by definition, for this would produce beauty by definition). The whole trouble with Plato is that he thinks that forms and colours, polish and dress are meant for producing only "extraneous beauty", for they have been added to the body, one has not taken one's birth with them. Unfortunately dress is not a part of one's body, so also lipstick a part of one's lips or ear-rings a part of one's ears, yet their use on the body certianly enhances its beauty. Of course, they

224. Ibid., 465 b.

have a principle of their use, and it is by breaking these principles that 'artificiality' is created, that instead of beauty being produced monstrosity is produced. All art, as Aristotle would say, is the realisation of nature's ideal. The art of wearing dress and ornamentation or powdering one's face or painting one's eyebrows or lips is completing what nature has left incomplete. Cosmetics, ornaments and dresses are the materials with which the nature's ideal, the production of a beautiful form, is realised. Dress is not to hide one's body but to exhibit it in the presentable fashion,. So also cosmetics and ornaments are not meant for converting something into something else, but only to highlight the achievements of nature. No doubt all art is imitative as Plato said, but imitation is what distinguishes men from animals according to Aristotle. In using art man is only realising the ideal put forth by nature. Plato does not go to the depth of the concept of art or imitation, and therefore rejects it as artificial, deceitful and ignoble.

Aristotle liberates metaphors from Plato's verbal attack on them (The attack is only verbal, otherwise Plato would have refrained himself from using metaphors). Aristotle gives immense importance to metaphors, though himself not a master of metaphor like Plato. Aristotle thinks that metaphors do not occur to every one; for they "cannot be learnt from anyone else."²²⁵ So only a few are gifted with the faculty of generating metaphors, for metaphors cannot be generated as one generates a mathematical equation or a grammatically correct sentence by learning from

 225. Poetics, 1459 a.

others. Plato might have learnt the essentials of his philosophy from Socrates but to present that philosophy in the garb of metaphors was his own effort. Socratic philosophy survives because a metaphor as vivid as the metaphor of "the prisoners in the cave" survives. One is persuaded to accept Socratic philosophy because one is seduced by the metaphor of the cave.

In his Poetics Aristotle defines metaphor in the following words, "Metaphor consists in giving the thing a name that belongs to something else."²²⁶ In his Rhetoric he includes 'simile' too in the definition of metaphor, for there is very little difference between them. Distinguishing the two he points out "When the poet says of Achilles, 'he rushed on like a lion', it is a simile; if he says, 'a lion, he rushed on,' it is a metaphor."²²⁷ Aristotle further suggests that "similes must be used like metaphors."²²⁸ for both of them serve the same purpose. An 'analogy' is also a variant form. It would be an analogy if one said 'What Achilles is in the city that a lion is in the forest' It is because of this that Aristotle succeeds in deriving some of his metaphors from analogy. In our ordinary uses we seem to be more Aristotelian when we do not take much care about the uses of metaphors, similes and analogies and use one of them in the place of the other. In the context in which Aristotle discusses the various forms of metaphors, he refers to Plato's use of metaphors. "Plato in the Republic compares those who strip the dead to cures, which bite stones."²²⁹ "He also says... the poets' verses resemble those who are in the bloom of youth but lack beauty."²²⁹ Plato's attack

226. Poetics., 1457 b.

227. Rhetoric., 1406 b.

228. Ibid.

229. Rhetoric., 1406 b.

on metaphor is only a wacry.

It is in the context of the delivery of speech that Aristotle finds an occasion for telling us about the nature of metaphor in some detail. What kind of style should speech acquire that it would have better persuasive power ? The ordinary/usual style must be rejected. As Aristotle says, "Departure from the ordinary makes it appear more dignified. In this respect men feel the same in regard to style as in regard to foreigners and fellow citizens. Therefore we should give our language a "foreign air", for men admire what is remote."²³⁰ We admire foreigners and neglect our own citizens, therefore, 'foreignness' and 'remoteness' must be projected in our language in order to be admired. But in order to introduce 'foreignness' we should not sacrifice naturalness or acquire artificiality, "for that which is natural persuades, but the artificial does not."²³¹ What Aristotle means is that in order to persuade our fellow beings we are: not to invent new words. We are to use the same words which they use, only these words are to be manipulated in such a fashion that they may find their use surprising. As he makes his point again, "proper and appropriate words and metaphors are alone to be used in the style of prose."²³² Aristotle slowly develops the theme to introduce 'metaphors' as the most important element for improving the style. As he declares, "It is metaphor above all that gives perspicuity, pleasure, and a foreign air."²³³ It gives pleasure not only to those who hear it, but also to the inventor. And metaphors are introduced in prose,

230. Ibid., 1404 b.

232. Ibid.

231. Ibid.

233. Ibid.

not to introduce any poetic quality as many scholars believe. For Aristotle is a purist. He does not want to mix up poetry with prose. He allows rhythm to prose but not metre. He favours the dissolution of simile into metaphor so far as prose is concerned. For "there is something poetical about it."²³⁴

Aristotle, as might have become clear from the discussion we had of him in this chapter, allows rhetoric, allows also the use of metaphors in rhetoric. It is not dialectic or any kind of demonstrative method which is suitable for certain situations. Rhetoric is the only method left for those situations. Every situation calls for its own method.

Wittgenstein and the Metaphor of Language-game :

Late~~r~~ Wittgenstein, the Wittgenstein of Investigations, is a master of metaphor, is a master of the use of metaphor in philosophy. We are not wrong in considering him a genius. This is further proved by the fact that Wittgenstein invents metaphors in order to exhibit the nature of philosophy; its problems, its puzzlement, and the solutions and dissolutions of these problems and puzzlements. If Aristotle is right then Wittgenstein is certainly a genius, for a metaphor, as we have already seen, is something "which cannot be learnt from anyone else."²³⁵ Wittgenstein enjoys the invention of his metaphors. As he himself says, "A good simile refreshes the intellect."²³⁶ And a simile, as we have already seen, is a metaphor with its poetic qualities. Metaphors are what Wittgenstein enjoys producing while doing philosophy. Metaphor is the medium of his philosophising.

234. Ibid., 1406 b. 235. Ibid., 1405 a.

236. Culture and Value, p. 1.

Wittgenstein's first daring step, taken in his Investigations is the introduction of the metaphor of Language-game. The step is daring, for language is so very different from a game. But then it would not be a metaphor if the word 'game' is not very different from 'language'. Unless the name 'game' belongs to something else, attaching it to 'language' would not convert 'language-game' into a metaphor. This is what we have already learnt from Aristotle. In the last chapter we have already seen the consequence of treating language as a game. There we have talked about 'language game', as if what this expression means is not something metaphorical, this expression has a literal sense. So many theories and doctrines were dethroned just by assuming that there is a species of game which is called by the name 'language-game'. When we are using language we are playing a game. Among the philosophers the social scientists and the linguists, the best known game since the publication of Investigations is the 'language-game'. If we take such games as football, chess etc., we may be surprised to see that much more has recently been written on language-game by the philosophers and the social scientists than on all the other games combined together. And the most mysterious situation about 'language-game' is that it requires neither captains nor skippers. It can be managed even without referees, for there are no victories and defeats in this game. The people who play this game are indiffereent to the situation of having honours and rewards; they are indifferent even to whether this game deserves to be brought to the notice of the public. We know who is the best player of chess or tennis in the world, but we do not know

who is the best player of language-game in the world. Neither the radio nor the television has shown any interest in exhibiting the proceedings of the game, called, language-game.

Post-Wittgensteinian philosophers have developed a habit of talking about language-game, not in the sense that language is like a game, but in the sense that language is itself a game. But our language is neither like an indoor-game, such as chess, nor an out-door game, such as football. Wittgenstein has certainly succeeded in hypnotising us. (The success of a philosopher, so also that of a scientist, if later Wittgenstein is right, depends on his hypnotic (persuasive) powers.) Because of the hypnotic influence we just omit seeing dissimilarities between a game and a language. And however far-fetched the similarity may be we are attracted towards it. A person in love fails to find anything wrong with his/her love. So also we fail to find anything wrong with the metaphor of language-game. It is not a metaphor for us at all; it exhibits the real character of our language - Language is nothing but a game of course unlike other games.

Wittgenstein certainly could not have meant that language is literally one of the numerous games. He could not have meant that we play cards after breakfast, chess after lunch, foot ball in the evening, and language-game at some other time. There is no beginning, middle and end of the language game; for language-game is not a species of game which may have a beginning, a middle and an end. Language-game is not a member of the family of games; the name 'language-game' is a misnomer. But it is not a misnomer

if it is a metaphor, for a metaphor arises only by misnaming.

Is language-game a meta-game, a kind of para-game, which goes on when other games are being played. Now I am playing chess. The game is nearing its end. I make a move and say, 'I move the king; and move it to a new place. My opponent has been watching me, watching for my move. As soon as I make the move, my opponent declares 'Now you have lost the game, 'and shows me how I have lost it. And as a reaction I utter the form of words 'Oh, yes, I have lost it." But in uttering these words have I lost two games, 'the chess game' and 'the language-game of chess'. Is it the case that while playing chess I was also having a language-competition with my opponent ? For a conversation was also going on while we were playing. Does this conversation show that we were debating on some issue? Have I also, therefore, lost in the debate ? My opponent has undoubtedly defeated me in the chess-game. Has he also defeated me in 'the language-game of chess' if there be any such thing ?

There is no doubt that when we were playing chess we were also using language. We were talking, we were informing each other about our moves. I used the words 'I', 'move', 'the', and 'king', and I used these words according to the grammatical rules. So also my opponent used his words 'you', 'have', 'lost', 'the' and 'game', and he too has used the words according to the grammatical rules. Neither he nor I attempted to break the grammatical rules, for conversation between us would have been impossible if we had not observed the grammatical rules. So we were playing the language-

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game of chess all along when we were playing the chess game
 We were as a matter of fact following two different sets of
 rules, the set of rules which governs the movement of words and
 the set of rules which governs the movement of chess pieces.
 Words of our language too are like chess pieces, the only difference
 is that they are not made of wood.

As Wittgenstein remarks, "The question 'what is a word really?
 is analogous to 'what is a piece in chess?'"²³⁷

Pieces in the game of chess are moved according to the rules
 of the chess game. Words in language are moved according to the
 rules of language. In the absence of rules neither is it possible
 to play the game of chess nor is it possible to operate with lan-
 guage. If language is a game, then we were certainly playing the
 language-game when we were playing chess, for we were not silent,
 we discussed our moves in words. Though we were playing the chess-
 game, we were also moving the pieces of language, unfortunately
 without any solid board, perhaps in the air around us. Isn't it
 the situation for me to have been playing two games at the same
 time? But then have I lost in both the games, the chess game and
 the language game of chess? But while playing chess the environment
 was not that of a debate. We were not appearing in any, such thing
 as an elocutionary competition, so there is no question of my
 being defeated in the language-game, if at all we were supposed
 to be playing such a game. I have lost only in one game, i.e.,
 in the chess game. Doesn't it mean that the other game which I
 have also been playing, the language-game of chess has ended

 237. Investigations, 108.

Language is really treated like a game, and speakers use words as cautiously as they use chess pieces on the chess board. But while participating in a debate, I am not participating in any other kind of game except the language-game. In a debate situation our language is used quite differently from how it is used while playing chess or football. It is only in the former sense that language could be said to be a game. But such uses of language are rare.

The language-game of chess is a metaphor. And it is because it is a metaphor that one is unable to win in this game. Not that there is no winning in this game, or that the concept of winning is not applicable to this game. The truth is that this is no game, therefore, there is no question of our winning it. One can win or lose only in the context of a game. But in denying that there is any such thing as the language-game of chess, it is not denied that we use language in the course of a chess game or that the rules of chess cannot be verbally articulated or be recorded in a book. The use of language in the situation of game is not denied, what is denied is simply that language itself be considered as a game.

Talking about language-game reminds me of Wittgenstein's remark on the nature of 'gifts'. "Why can't my right hand give my left hand money ? - My right hand can put it into my left hand. My right hand can write a deed of gift and my left hand a receipt. But the further practical consequences would not be those of a gift. When the left hand has taken money from the right, then

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we shall ask : "Well, and what of it." ²³⁹ Following Wittgenstein, compare 'gifts' with 'games'. Extending the use of 'game' to 'language' is like extending the use of 'gift' i.e., one's right hand giving a gift to one's left hand. 'Words' of language may be seen as pieces of wood moved on the chess board, therefore, in using them I am playing a game similar to chess. But the further consequences of the use of words in language would not be those of their use in a game. 'Language-game' is an extremely charming metaphor. Its metaphorical nature remains hidden because of Wittgenstein's hypnotic concept of 'family resemblance'. We come back again and again, hypnotised into thinking that language may really be a game, though different in nature from all such games as chess, football, cards etc. Games form a family, having diverse kinds of members, one member wholly different from the other. Not only seeing the agreement between language and games attracts us to assimilate language to games, even seeing the differences between language and games leads us to consider that language is a game. As Wittgenstein says, "The language games are rather set up as objects of comparison which are meant to throw light on the facts of our language by way not only of similarities, but also of dissimilarities."²⁴⁰ So even if there is a dissimilarity between language and games, this, does not show that language is not a game. For one game may be dissimilar to the other, language may be a game of a dissimilar kind from other games. The concept of 'family resemblance' is so seducing that we are unable to see that language could not be a member of the family of games.

239. Investigations , 268.

240. Ibid., 130.

Perhaps Wittgenstein was himself seduced into thinking that language-game is not a metaphor, that it is the name of a species of game, that in using language we are playing a game. There is no doubt that Wittgenstein at times has been quite clear that the expression 'language-game' is a metaphor. The example of a game is brought only as an analogy to clear the working of language. As referring to a game situation and comparing that situation with language Wittgenstein raises the question "Doesn't the analogy between language and game throw light here?"²⁴¹ So attention has been drawn towards a game only to exhibit the nature of language. But once the attention has been drawn towards games, it has never been withdrawn from them. Language has come to be dissolved into games. If not the whole, the most important features of Wittgenstein's later philosophy are the result of the observation that language is a game. If Wittgenstein had considered language-game as a mere metaphor, perhaps he would not have drawn some of those conclusions. Drawing conclusions from metaphor has its limitations. But the fact that Wittgenstein continued drawing all those conclusions which he could have possibly drawn from considering language as a game, shows that he was serious in considering language as a game. While referring to the process of naming objects, learning language by repeating words etc., Wittgenstein introduces the metaphor of language-game by saying. "I will call these games "language-games."²⁴² This gives the impression that certain group of activities were game-activities, only the name 'game' was missing for them. The linguistic activities are game activities, only Wittgenstein has baptised them with the name 'language-game'. This

241. Ibid., 83.

242. Ibid., 7.

is like we were playing football all the time, but we had no name for it, so the name 'football' is given to it. Wittgenstein has not brought into existence a new game, what he has brought into existence is only a 'new name' for the game which we have been playing all the time. Wittgenstein has certainly been seduced by his analogy, simile or metaphor, whatever you call it. Wittgenstein himself has brought out the nature of this seduction. He says, 'A simile that has been absorbed into the forms of our language produces a false appearance, and this disquiets us. "But this isn't how it is" we say, "Yet this is how it has to be."²⁴³

Similes, metaphors and analogies are introduced in our language in their true nature. We go on using them. A time comes when they are 'dead'; they become part of our everyday language. In Aristotle's idiom, they have lost their 'foreign air'. We do not give them any special treatment; we treat them like our neighbours without any enthusiasm. The same thing has happened to the metaphor of Language-game. It has become a part of our philosophical heritage, it is no more foreign to us. We treat it like our neighbour and a fellow citizen. We hardly realise that its original home is in a foreign land. We have written books and articles, we have drawn conclusions, by considering language as a game. If someone says now, that it is really not a game, what are we to do ? Give up all those consequences which we have drawn by considering that language is a game ? Give up all what we have done so far? No. A better alternative is to give no hearing to one who says that language is not a game, "language has to be a game." This is the

243. Ibid., 112.

the most rational choice at this hour. It is only with this choice that we can save our work from the fate of futility.

By saying that language-game is only a metaphor it is not meant that it is not a significant metaphor or that it has not served the purpose for which it has been introduced or invented. It is also not for the first time in the history of philosophy that a philosopher has used metaphors in order to preach his doctrines, in order to make them acceptable to the people who lack philosophical vigour. If we ^edeprive Plato of his metaphors, there would hardly remain anything in Plato which is convincing, which is worth accepting. To do philosophy well, one has to metaphorise well. And it can hardly be doubted that Wittgenstein has metaphorised well. Perhaps Plato was another exception whose metaphors continue to seduce us even now.

Wittgenstein's New Rhetoric :

Wittgenstein is wholly unlike both Plato and Aristotle in so far as the fact that he has not written any book or article on rhetoric. However from what he has written in the later stages of his life it can easily be inferred that like Aristotle he favoured rhetoric. There is a sense in which one can even say that he favoured rhetoric in the spirit of a sophist. Of course if he was a sophist he was an honest sophist. Neither money, which disreputed the sophists, nor power, which ^{attracted} Plato attracted him. Plato, as we have already seen, despised rhetoric, because, according to him, it lacked the conditions of knowledge and truth. The sophists, and Aristotle, on the other hand, considered rhetoric

as one of the most appropriate tools for pursuing truth and knowledge. They were trying to curb the tendency of satisfying the concepts of truth and knowledge. Different occasions and situations deserve different kind of treatment. Sophists had no fixed method, fixed way, of dealing with all situations. To conceive that the method is fixed is to assimilate all situations to one and the same kind of situation. This is impossible. The method of persuasion would depend on the situation. Only that method is to be devised which suits the situation. If some method is demonstrative it does not mean that it is fit for all situations. Sophists rejected Plato's respect for a single method. Even Aristotle has not given a fair account of his academic competitors, the sophists. In his Rhetoric Aristotle finds a sophist to be a 'misplaced dialectician' Sophistry is fallacious use of syllogism, or using dialectic in a wrong way. The account of sophistry given in the Rhetoric is simply an attempt to bring the sophists closer to Plato, and keeping them away from his own position. But his own position on the question of method is closer to the sophists than to Plato. As we have already seen in his "On Sophistical Refutations" Aristotle accepts that some of the speeches of the sophists were "rhetorical, others in the form of question and answer."²⁴⁴ Sophists did not use rhetoric by excluding the non-rhetoric form of persuasion. It is the occasion which would decide what kind of speech to be composed, and what method of composition to be adopted. But this was also Aristotle's own position. Sophists were no less responsible for the development of Aristotle's thought on Method

 244. On Sophistical Refutations, 183.

than Plato. Wittgenstein's attitude to the method is the same as that of Aristotle and the sophists. What counts is persuasion? Only that method which works is to be adopted in a given situation.

One remark of Later Wittgenstein would be sufficient to show what he thinks of what he is doing, so also what he thinks of what his other academic colleagues are doing. Referring to what is going on in science and philosophy, i.e., to what he himself is doing and what others are doing, he says, "How much we are doing is changing the style of thinking and how much I'm doing is persuading people to change their style of thinking."²⁴⁵ This remark clearly exhibits Wittgenstein's rhetoric, a new rhetoric, different from the one condemned by Plato and the one supported by Aristotle. Of course Wittgenstein's rhetoric has its hereditary links with Plato and Aristotle, but it is novel. The concept of 'persuasion' has been given a new dimension of meaning, the dimension which is certainly missing in Plato, and it is doubtful whether it is present in Aristotle.

'Persuasion' for Wittgenstein does not mean what is meant for Plato. For Wittgenstein does not hesitate in equating 'persuasion' with 'propaganda'. As he says, "I am in a sense making propaganda for one style of thinking as opposed to another."²⁴⁶ This means that a doctrine or a thesis, be it philosophical or scientific needs to be accepted. I am persuading people to accept it; I am making a propaganda for its acceptance. Those who have at any time accepted any doctrine or thesis have accepted it because of the propaganda behind it, because of the persuasion behind

245. Lectures and Conversations on Aesthetics, 40.

246. Ibid., 37.

it. Now I am presenting my own doctrine. The first condition in presenting my own doctrine is that I am charmed by it. I would have never come to this doctrine if I had not been charmed by it. Now I have to charm others. How would I charm them? So long as the charm with the old doctrine continues, they would not receive my doctrine. So I have to dispel their charm with the other doctrine. Concerning the other doctrine, Wittgenstein says, 'I can put it in a way in which it will lose its charm.'²⁴⁷ Thus, one aspect of Wittgenstein's concept of persuasion is that I have to interpret the doctrine of the other person in such a fashion that it loses its charm. Unless it loses its charm people would not give it up. So one aspect of Wittgenstein's concept of 'persuasion' is 'brain washing'. Unless I wash and clean the brain of others with the doctrines which they have already acquired, there is no chance of my success with them. So what is important is not that my doctrine is truer than the doctrine presented by my competitor, but my doctrine has more persuasive power.

Wittgenstein's view of rhetoric is certainly different from Plato's. Plato thinks that rhetoric is a kind of flattery, it is catering to the taste of others. The implication is that I am not helping them to grow, I am simply providing them with spicy food which would ultimately ruin their health. Wittgenstein's rhetoric does not preach that I have to make adjustments to the taste of others. It is rather an attempt to persuade them to make themselves adjusted to my taste. I have not prepared dishes for their taste. I have prepared dishes which are of my taste. And

 247. Ibid., 39.

now I am making others change their taste. Unless they change their taste, they cannot enjoy the dishes prepared by me. So I am persuading them to change their taste to cultivate a new taste, to cultivate a taste for my dishes. In doing all this I am certainly not lowering their taste but brightening it up. So also I am not lowering myself, for I am not strictly catering to their taste, I am catering to mine. As Wittgenstein says clearly "A present-day teacher of philosophy doesn't select food for his pupil with the aim of flattering his taste, but with the aim of changing it."²⁴⁸ Thus what is required is to change the taste of others.

Is there any doubt now that Wittgenstein is an advocate of a new rhetoric ? I would like to take up this issue for further discussion when I shall be dealing with Wittgenstein's concept of science. It is his new rhetoric which is behind his later conception of science.

248. Culture And Value, p. 17.

Chapter - 4

Philosophical Psychology

There is a kind of general disease of thought which always looks for (and finds) what would be called a mental state from which all our acts spring as from a reservoir.

The Brown Book

The expression 'Philosophical Psychology' is a misnomer. It is not an expression of the kind 'Freudian Psychology' or 'child psychology' etc. We are certainly not going to discuss Wittgenstein's views on a branch of psychology. What we are concerned with is a branch of philosophy, traditionally known as epistemology. Our conclusions may not only differ from those at which psychologists arrive, we may even contradict the conclusions of the psychologists. For we do not use the method of psychology; we do not make appeal to experiments and experiences in order to solve our difficulties. "Psychology according to Wittgenstein, "is no more closely related to philosophy than any other natural science."²⁴⁹ We are dealing with certain concepts which, at least superficially, appear to be psychological. We are only making explicit the philosophical implications of these concepts. We are talking about the theory of knowledge, not talking about any theory of psychology. While discussing about the nature of this kind of theory Wittgenstein remarked, "Theory of knowledge is philosophy of psychology."²⁵⁰ So in this chapter we shall be

249. Tractatus, 4.1121

250. Ibid.

concerned with issues that are quite unlike the issues discussed by Freud. (The switch from Freudian psychology to philosophical psychology is qualitative) What we are going to do in this chapter is no kind of psychology.

The subject matter of philosophical psychology is quite vast, and Wittgenstein's own contribution to it is considerable. As a matter of fact the image of later Wittgenstein emerges with his work in philosophical psychology. He has given a new turn to this subject. If one compares Wittgenstein's treatment with the treatment given to this subject by the traditional philosophers one would detect novelty^t in Wittgenstein's treatment. One would feel that for the first time that philosophical treatment has been given to the issues of psychology. Concerning the treatment of philosophical problems by the traditional philosophers Ryle points out, "From the time of Locke to Bradley philosophers had debated their issues as if they were psychological issues . . . if they asked themselves as they seldom did ask, what they were investigating, they tended to say that they were investigating the workings of the mind, just as physical scientists investigate the workings of bodies. The sorts of 'Mental Science' that they talked were sometimes positivistic, sometimes idealistic, according, roughly, as they were more impressed by chemistry than by theology or vice versa."²⁵¹ In this chapter we shall see how different Wittgenstein is even when he is discussing the psychological issues. Traditional philosophers converted philosophy into a kind of "mental science", converted it into a branch

251. "Ludwig Wittgenstein", Essays on Wittgenstein's Tractatus, ed. Copi and Beard, Kegan Paul, London, 1966, p. 2.

of psychology. Wittgenstein has shown that psychology is as removed from philosophy as any other natural science. Philosophers are not mental scientists even when they are discussing the issues of mental science. Though the discussion of philosophers may have an 'empirical air about it' (to use Wisdom's expression) but it is not about empirical facts.

'A believes that p' : I would like first to consider Wittgenstein's reference to the disease of thought which always looks for and finds a mental state. Not only in his later work, in his earlier work Tractatus too Wittgenstein makes a vigorous attempt to cure himself of this disease. His earlier attempt at fighting this disease is best exhibited by his analysis of the psychological propositions of the form 'A believes that p'. 'A has the thought_p' etc. Not only do these propositions introduce mental states, they go against Wittgenstein's thesis of extensionality. Suppose I believe that it is raining outside. Then the fact that it is not raining outside does not mean that at this moment I do not happen to believe that it is raining outside. So the proposition 'I believe that it is raining outside' is true even when one of its constituents 'it is raining outside' is false. This goes against the extensionality thesis. What has created a problem is the psychological state of belief. Once this state has been posited it does not seem to care for the weather outside. What ever the weather outside the psychological state occurs, and the proposition in which it occurs remains true solely because of this state. In this respect the proposition 'I believe it is raining

outside' does not behave very differently from such a tautology as 'Either it is raining or it is not'. This tautology remains true whatever the condition of the weather outside, whether it is raining or it is not raining. Our belief-proposition also remains true, whatever the condition of the weather outside. In order to know the truth of the tautology you have not to look outside, you have not to go beyond the sentence, you have simply to look into the sentence, you have simply to look into the sentence, you have simply to look into the words 'either-or'. The rules governing the use of 'either - or' decide the truth of the tautology, in the case of our belief-proposition as well you have not to look outside, you have simply to look into the sentence, you have to look into the operation of the word 'believe'. Rather you have to look into yourself and see whether your psychical state of belief is operative. So the belief-proposition in question is like the report of a sensation. (On the one hand it behaves like a tautology, and on the other, like the report of pain. In order to know the truth of, if there is any such thing as knowing the truth of. 'I have a pain', you have not to look outside, you have to look into yourself if looking into yourself makes sense. The occurrence of a belief-state is like the occurrence of pain-state, and not a report of the weather outside. It is because it is not a report of the weather outside, that whatever the weather condition outside, the report remains true. The only way in which perhaps it could be false is that I could be lying. I have no pain yet I lie 'I have a pain'. So also I do not believe that it is raining outside yet I say that it is raining outside. A state of belief is like a state of pain,

a psychical state. Is having a belief like having a pain ? Is belief a kind of sensation, that I am led to report about it when it occurs? Could there be violent beliefs as there are violent pains ?

The thesis of eextensionality has been rejected in terms of such a proposition as 'I believe that p'. only by producing curious analyses of this proposition. This proposition is certainly not a tautology, for this proposition certainly asks you to look outside, it is a report of the weather outside. So also it is not a proposition expressing one's sensation, for there is no such thing as a sensation of belief. And even if there was a sensation of belief, this sensation is as irrelevant to the situation as is my sneezing when I am reporting about the condition of the weather outside. If I sneeze while telling you that it is raining outside you would not take my statement be a description of my sneeze, you would not say that I am simply saying something about my sneezing. So also if there is a sensation of belief occuring while I am telling you about the condition of the weather outside, I am not telling you anything about this sensation. I am not directing your attention towards my sensation. I am telling you only about the condition of the weather outside. 'I believe it is raining outside' is neither a tautology nor a sensation report, it is a proposition which has been used to describe the condition of the weather outside, and hence, like any other proposition it is a description of reality.

Wittgenstein is quite aware of the misleading nature of the psychological propositions, they seem to go against his extensionality thesis. As he says, "At first sight it looks as if it were possible
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for one proposition to occur in another in a different way. Particularly with certain forms of proposition in psychology, such as 'A believes that p is the case' and 'A has the thought p' etc. For if these are considered superficially, it looks as if the proposition p stood in some kind of relation to an object. A. (And in modern theory of knowledge (Russell, Moore etc.) these propositions have actually been construed in this way.²⁵² How to save the thesis of extensionality? Its safety depends on the elimination of the pseudo-psychical state, on the dissolution of fictitious sensations Wittgenstein finds a solution. He says, "It is clear, however, that 'A believes that p', 'A has the thought p', and 'A says p' are of the form '"p" says p'; and this does not involve a correlation of a fact with an object, but rather the correlation of facts by means of their objects." He has provided his own analysis and rejects the analysis of the psychological propositions given by Russell and Moore. For these philosophers have analysed the propositions in question in terms of a relation subsisting between a person and what he believes, thinks, says etc., (fact, proposition). But Wittgenstein eliminates both the psychological states (beliefs, thought etc.) and the subject (A) of these states. It is because the physical states are redundant that the subject of these states is also redundant. For in the immediately succeeding section Wittgenstein remarks "This shows too that there is no such thing as the soul -the subject etc. -as is conceived in the superficial psychology of the present day."²⁵⁴ If there are no physical states, there is no necessity for postulating a soul or a subject for these states. Psychologists do not hesitate in postulating a realm of

252. Tractatus, 5.541. 253. Ibid., 5.5421.,
 254. Ibid., 5.5421.

psychological states, different from, and independent of, the physical realm. And once these states are postulated, the bearer of these states is also postulated. But if there are no psychological states, there is no necessity of a bearer of these states.

What does Wittgenstein mean when he says that the proposition 'A believes that p' is of the form "p" says p'? This is the form of any significant proposition, and not only of 'A believes that p'. Any significant proposition means (says) a fact. In his analysis "p" stands for a proposition and p for a fact. But propositions for Wittgenstein are themselves fact. "A propositional sign is a fact."²⁵⁵ Thus, names in the proposition "p" must be correlated with the objects in the fact p. This is what Wittgenstein means when he refers to the "correlation of facts by means of their objects". "It is raining outside" says (Means) that it is raining outside'. But what is the expression 'A believes' doing here? If the fact meant (said) is that it is raining outside, then 'A believes' is superfluous. "Being believed" is not a part of the proposition believed. Wittgenstein has given the same treatment to the act of belief which he has given to Frege's act of assertion. The psychical states of believing, thinking, asserting etc., are as distant from the proposition^{as} are the physiological states of sneezing, yawning etc., which may also accompany the proposition in question. The conditions which make the expression of a proposition possible are not any kind of constituents of the proposition. If not the only, this is an important purpose of Wittgenstein's analysis.

255. Ibid.

Let us consider Wittgenstein's treatment of Frege's sign of assertion to see whether his treatment of the signs for believing, thinking, saying etc., is different from his treatment of the sign of assertion. Against Frege's move Wittgenstein remarked in his Tractatus "Frege's 'judgement-stroke' '⌈' is logically quite meaningless....'⌈' is no more a component part of a proposition than is, for instance, the propositions' number."²⁵⁶ His later position remains the same as his earlier position. As he remarks in the Investigations "Frege's idea that every assertion contains an assumption, which is the thing that is asserted, really rests on the possibility found in our ordinary language of writing every statement in the form "It is asserted that such-and-such is the case" - But "that such-and-such is the case" is not a sentence in our language - so far it is not a move in the language-game. And if I write, not "it is asserted thatbut "It is asserted : such-and-such is the case", the words "It is asserted" simply become superfluous."²⁵⁷ Though Wittgenstein does not say, he means a similar thing concerning the signs for believing, thinking, saying etc. "It is believed : such-and-such is the case". "It is thought : such-and-such is the case." "It is said : such-and-such is the case." The expression 'It is believed', 'it is thought' and 'It is said' are superfluous in the same way in which 'It is asserted' is superfluous. Dummett accepts that "Frege could never quite rid himself of the idea that assertion is the expression of a mental attitude."²⁵⁸ In attacking the linguistic sign of assertion Wittgenstein is attacking the mental attitude.

 256. Ibid., 4.442.

257. Investigations, 22.

258. Frege, p. 312.

Most of the known interpreters of Wittgenstein's remark 5.542 have missed the point of Wittgenstein's analysis of the signs for believing, thinking, 'saying etc., They seem to have missed that Wittgenstein treats these signs in the same fashion in which he treats Frege's sign of assertion, all these signs stand for mental states. 'A believes' is no more a constituent of the proposition believed than 'A asserts' is a constituent of the proposition asserted. What proposition is coordinated with reality is not 'I believe that it is raining outside' but the proposition 'It is raining outside'. A pseudo-proposition is rejected. When Wittgenstein analyses 'A believes that p' in terms of '"p" says p' he is referring to the redundancy of the expression 'A believes'. But philosophers were never satisfied with Wittgenstein's analysis, they thought that the remark 5.542 is obscure. In the very Introduction to the Tractatus Russell remarks "What Mr. Wittgenstein says here is said so shortly that its point is not likely to be clear."²⁵⁹ Referring to Wittgenstein's remark Ramsey says in his review of the Tractatus "As to the relation between a proposition and a thought Mr. Wittgenstein is rather obscure."²⁶⁰ And after his failure to give a satisfactory explanation of Wittgenstein's remark Urmson in his Philosophical Analysis expresses his dejection "We cannot go further now into this problem of 'intensional functions'. We must be content to see it as a running sore for the upholders of the view that language has the logical skeleton of a truth-functional logic."²⁶¹ And more recently the dedicated Wittgensteinian Hacker remarks, "The

259. Tractatus, p. xix. 260. Essays on Wittgenstein's Tractatus, p. 13.

261. Philosophical Analysis, Oxford, 1960, p. 73.

obscure relation between the mind and the un-coordinated terms of the judgement in Russell's theory is here replaced with the (hardly less obscure) method of projection correlating elements of thought or utterance with objects."²⁶² What has led philosophers to think that Wittgenstein's remark is obscure ? Perhaps they try to read those features in Wittgenstein's remark which this remark has been articulated to reject.

I would like to discuss Hacker's interpretation of Wittgenstein's remark. Wittgenstein's remark according to Hacker does not reject the psychological states, it retains them. While reflecting on Wittgenstein's analysis of 'A believes p' Hacker concludes, "The person A is not an object but a complex array of psychical objects....From the logical point of view the only important points to establish are that 'A believes p' is appearance notwithstanding - extensional and that it has the same logical multiplicity as p. It thus emerges that Wittgenstein was willing to adopt a neo-Humean analysis of the empirical self. There is no empirical soul-substance thinking thoughts, there are only thoughts. The self of psychology is a manifold, a series of experiences, a bundle of perceptions in perpetual flux."²⁶³ This is a purely Humean account of Wittgenstein's analysis. The source of Hacker's account are two. First is Wittgenstein's immediately succeeding remark that a "composite soul would no longer be a soul."²⁶⁴ The second is Wittgenstein's letter to Russell, dated 19 August, 1919 which has been reprinted in the Notebooks. Quoting Wittgenstein's letter Hacker writes, "But a Gedanke is a tatsache:

262. Insight And Illusion, p. 61. 263. Insight And Illusion, Hacker, p. 62.

264. Tractatus, 5.5421.

What are its constituents and components, and what is their relation to those of the pictured ~~fact~~ ^{fact}? I don't know what the constituent of a thought are but I know that it must have such constituents which correspond to the words of a language...(A gedanke consists) of psychical constituents that have the same sort of relation to reality as words. What these constituents are I don't know (NB, pp. 129-30)."²⁶⁵ It is by taking both the sources together that Hacker's picture emerges. In his notes dictated to G.E. Moore in Norway Wittgenstein does say "It is just as impossible that I should be a simple as that "p" should be."²⁶⁶

Consider the status of a 'composite soul'. If maintaining that there is no soul means the same thing as maintaining that the soul is not simple, then there is no doubt that Wittgenstein maintained that the soul is not simple. What kind of simplicity does it lack? Perhaps it lacks the simplicity of entering into a thought (proposition, fact) as one of its objects (constituents). The soul is not simple means that the soul is not an object in Wittgenstein's sense of 'object'. This is what Hacker also means when he says with approval that "The person A is not an object". But if the soul is composite, it would no longer be a soul according to Wittgenstein. Why? Wittgenstein is using the expression 'composite' in a technical sense, the sense in which he denies his objects to be composite. "Objects make up the substance of the world. That is why they cannot be composite."²⁶⁷ If they are composite, then they are not unalterable and unchanging. So if the soul is composite, whatever be the objects which compose it, it would be non-substantial, alterable, changing

265. Insight & Illusion, Hacker pp. 61-2.

266. Notebooks, p. 119.

267. Tractatus, 2.023.

etc. Perhaps Wittgenstein accepts the standard definition of soul that the soul is substantial, unalterable, unchanging etc. So as a matter of fact Wittgenstein rejects both the proposals, the proposal that the soul is simple and the proposal that it is composite. If it is simple it would be a constituent of a thought (fact or proposition) which is absurd. If it is composite it would be changing, altering etc., like any configuration of objects. So it would not be worth its name as soul.

Hacker thinks that Wittgenstein does not reject the view that the soul is composite. For this view simply means that a person "is a complex array of psychical objects", Hacker feels that Wittgenstein has simply adopted the neo-Humean view in rejecting the soul-substance and accepting that a person is a bundle of perceptions. But Hacker's interpretation of Wittgenstein's view in terms of Hume's cannot be accepted. If a person is not an object, then in Wittgenstein's sense of 'objects' a person's pain and pleasure, his experiences of hot and cold are also not objects. If pain, pleasure, hot and cold were objects, then they should have been substantial unchanging and unalterable; what changes is only a configuration. But according to Hume pain and pleasure, hot and cold, occurring in one configuration (stretch of perception or observation) cannot be the same as pain and pleasure, hot and cold occurring in another configuration. Hume denied that the constituents of one perception are identical with the constituents of another perception. Then how could Hume's pain, pleasure, hot and cold be Wittgenstein's objects? A person is not an object, so also a person is not a complex

array of psychical objects, in Wittgenstein's sense of an object. Instead of clarifying Wittgenstein's view, such an attempt as the one made by Hacker would lead to more confusions about Wittgenstein's view. For 'I believe that p' could mirror the structure of 'p' only by eliminating the psychical constituent 'I believe'. As Wittgenstein says in his Investigations, perhaps while reflecting on his Tractatus analysis, "The expression 'I believe that this is the case' is used like the assertion 'this is the case.'²⁶⁸ In a similar way he says, again, "The statement 'I believe it's going to rain' has a meaning like, that is to say a use like, 'It's going to rain'".²⁶⁹ Wittgenstein is conscious of the intensional analysis of belief-statements. As he remarks, "The language-game of reporting can be given such a turn that a report is not meant to inform the hearer about its subject matter but about the person making the report."²⁷⁰ The intensional-analysis is such a turn.

Experiences Without the Subject : No less difficult is the section 5.631 of the Tractatus, for it allows divergent interpretations. Consider the first remark of the section, "There is no such thing as the subject that thinks or entertains ideas."²⁷¹ At a superficial glance this remark would appear Humean. For Hume denied that there is any subject that thinks or entertains ideas. And Hume reached this conclusion after his failure to have an encounter with the subject. Hume's argument may be described as the non-encounterability of the subject. But non-encounterability of the subject, in the context of Hume, has two essentially connected aspects. Hume fails

 268. Investigations, x. 269. Ibid. 270. Ibid.

271. Tractatus, 5.631.

to have an encounter with the subject, but in the process he succeeds in having encounters with experiences. In a situation in which one is expected to have an encounter with the subject, one has only to encounter experiences. As Hume says in his treatise, "When I enter most intimately into what I call myself, I always stumble on some particular perception or other, of heat or cold, light or shade, love or hatred, pain or pleasure."²⁷² But it is an open question whether Wittgenstein denied the subject of experiences without denying the experiences of that subject. It is not clear whether he retained experiences and only denied the subject of those experiences as Hume did. It is possible that he denied both, the subject of experiences and so also the experiences of the subject. Consider his immediately succeeding remark of the section, "If I wrote a book called The world as I found it, I should have to include a report on my body, and should have to say which parts were subordinate to my will, and which were not etc., this being a method of isolating the subject, or rather of showing that in an important sense there is no subject, for it alone could not be mentioned in the book."²⁷³ If one reads this remark, even without reading it carefully, one would find that Wittgenstein has reported only on two items, my body and my will. No other item has been mentioned. Of course, Wittgenstein's world is open to other kinds of objects than the two mentioned by him. But whether 'experiences' would be allowed in that world is not clear. May be not only the subject of experiences is withdrawn, the experiences of the subject are also withdrawn from the world. Obviously my will, which is mentioned in the book, is not an experience. As Wittgenstein says in his Notebooks "The act

272. Treatise of Human Nature, ed, L.A. Selby-Bigge, Oxford, p.252.

273. Tractatus, 5.631.

of will is not an experience."²⁷⁴ Immediately preceding remark in the Notebooks is even more helpful. Wittgenstein says, "All experience is world and does not need the subject."²⁷⁵ So the need for the subject of experience is denied because there is no independent status of experiences. If all experience is world, then the world is not required to have an independent item called 'experience'. An experience is not a third independent item occurring in the world two other independent items being my body and my will. It is possible that Wittgenstein considers the Cartesian subject of experiences as illusory because he considers the Cartesian (Humean) experiences as illusory. As on Wittgenstein's analysis of 'A believes that p' so also on Wittgenstein's elimination of the subject of experiences Hacker's views are misleading. His own Humean prejudices seem to have been working on his mind while he is interpreting Wittgenstein consider Hacker's comment on the section 5.631. "Wittgenstein's first point is that there is no such thing as the thinking , representing subject: ...The argument supporting this contention is the standard Humean argument of the non-encounterability of the self in experience."²⁷⁶ Compare 'someone has constantly been deluding me in my dreams' with 'someone has constantly been deluding me in my life.' Have I lost anything if I have lost someone only in my dreams. But I certainly suffer a great loss if I have lost someone in my real life. One's failure to find the subject when one is day-dreaming, imagining, introspecting etc., must be distinguished from one's failure to find the subject in the world. Wittgenstein is heading for a qualitatively different kind of tragedy from that

274. Notebooks, p. 89.

275. Ibid.

276. Insight and Illusion Hacker, p. 59.

with which Hume suffered..Wittgenstein is certainly not using the Humean argument of the non-encounterability of the self. Though Hume fails to find the subject, he does succeed in finding its substitutes, the substitutes being the experiences of love and hatred, pleasure and pain etc. For Wittgenstein there is no subject, but so also are there no substitutes, or, if you wish, the substitutes are such objects as tables and chairs, not very likeable ^usubstitutes.

Strawson is quite cautious in not being misled by Wittgenstein's denial of the subject in the Tractatus. The fact that the subject is denied does not mean that one accepts the no-subject theory of experiences. No-subject theory of experiences is possible only when one believes in the existence of experiences. Had Wittgenstein rejected the subject without rejecting its experiences, then it would have certainly been possible to level the charge of the no-subject theorist on him. While charging Wittgenstein for holding the no-subject views on experiences Strawson refers to "Wittgenstien's Lectures in ,1930-35", later published by Moore in the Mind, Vol. LXIV. This was the period of the composition of what is now known as the Blue Book. And this was also the time when Wittgenstein comes out of his Tractarian Cave. What is the no-subject theory of experiences which Wittgenstein developed in his lectures of 1930-35, and which was later attacked by Strawson in his Individuals. Let us consider this theory briefly so as to see whether or not we can find its roots in the Tractatus.

Referring to Moore's articles in Mind Vol. LXIV Strawson comments on Wittgenstein's no-subject theory of experiences, "He is reported

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to have held that the use of 'I' was utterly different in the case of 'I have a tooth ache'...from its use in the case of 'I've got a bad tooth'...He thought...that in one of them 'I' was replaceable by 'this body'...But he also said that in the other use (the use exemplified by 'I have a toothache' as opposed to 'I have a bad tooth'), the 'I' does not denote a possessor, and that no Ego is involved in thinking or in having toothache, and referred with apparent approval to Litchenberg's dictum that instead of saying 'I think' we (or Descartes) ought to say 'There is a thought.'²⁷⁷

The view of Wittgenstein, as stated by Strawson above, refers to two uses of 'I'. In his Blue Book Wittgenstein calls these uses as 'the use as subject' and 'the use as object'.²⁷⁸ Wittgenstein does not deny the use of 'I' as object, he simply denies the use of 'I' as subject. But what gives flavour to his view is not the fact that he denies the use of 'I' as subject, for in his Tractatus too he expressed a similar view. The flavour comes from the fact that Wittgenstein now allows the thoughts and ideas to occur in the world, not only independently of the subject but also independently of other objects of the world. He does not suggest the reduction of ideas and thoughts to the world. Thus, his view now is not very different from the view of Hume so far as his treatment of 'I' as subject is concerned. Therefore the rejection of 'I' as subject now is quite unlike its rejection in the Tractatus. So also the present use of 'I' as object was just missing in both the works, Tractatus and Notebooks. What he now calls as the legitimate and genuine use of 'I' (i.e., its use as object) was no kind of use

277. Individuals, London, 1959, p. 95 footnote.

278. Blue Book, second edition, 1969, p. 66.

in his earlier work. In his earlier work he did not allow the reduction of 'I' to 'my body'. It would be quite misleading to say that Wittgenstein rejected the use of 'I' as subject in his earlier work and continued to reject it even in his later work. For the use of 'I' which has been rejected in the 'Lectures of 1930-35' is contrasted with the use of 'I' as object. No such contrast was appealed to in his earlier work.

The contrast to which Strawson is referring in his Individuals, is a different kind of contrast from that to which Wittgenstein was attracted in his earlier work. The earlier contrast was the contrast in which the use of 'I' as subject was contrasted with the use of 'I' as metaphysical. The Cartesian self was distinguished from the metaphysical self, rather than from the physical self. Therefore, what is interesting in the context of his earlier thought is how Wittgenstein arrived at the contrast between the Cartesian subject and the metaphysical subject.

To understand his earlier view I would like to refer to two remarks from the Notebooks. First remark has already been quoted earlier in this section. This remark is "All experience is world and does not need the subject."²⁷⁹ And the second remark is "Physiological life is of course not 'life'. And neither is psychological life. Life is the world."²⁸⁰ These I consider the key remarks for understanding Wittgenstein's earlier view, for understanding the contrast between the Cartesian subject and the metaphysical subject. These remarks clearly show that Wittgenstein gives no importance to the 'experiential' or 'psychological' life. Life is the world. But then the question of the bearer of the psychological does not

279. Notebooks, p. 89.

280. Ibid., p. 77.

arise. There is no Cartesian soul or that the Cartesian soul is illusory, for there is nothing significant existing for such a soul to be the bearer of. Instead of asking the question "Who is the bearer of the psychological?" we should have asked the question "Who is the bearer of the world?". And the proper answer is not "The Cartesian soul is the bearer of the psychological". The proper answer is "The metaphysical soul is the bearer of the world". For the bearer of the world could not be in the world. If it is in the world, then it is impossible for it to be its bearer. Therefore, Wittgenstein is led to say in the Tractatus "The subject does not belong to the world : rather, it is a metaphysical limit."²⁸¹ It would not be the subject if it is not metaphysical. Wittgenstein raises the question "Where in the world is a metaphysical subject to be found."²⁸² The subject would simply not be metaphysical if it is found in the world. Could a bearer of psychological state be a constituent of that state ? It could not be, it must lie outside the psychological state. On a similar pattern the bearer of the world could not be a constituent of the world, could not be an object existing in the world. It is to elucidate this point that Wittgenstein brings the analogy of the eye and the visual field. The eye is not a part of the visual field. "You do not see the eye."²⁸³ The subject is not a part of the world. You do not see the subject.

Now consider the nature of the 'will' which is one of the items mentioned in the Book entitled The world as I found it. Will is not an experience hence the willing subject cannot be an experiencing or a thinking subject. Rather Wittgenstein introduces the willing

281. Tractatus, 5.632. 282. Ibid., 5.633. 283. Tractatus, 5.633.

subject in such a fashion that it gives the impression as if the willing subject replaces the thinking subject. As he says, "Thinking subject is surely mere illusion. But the willing subject exists."²⁸⁴ But what kind of existence is the existence of the willing subject? Willing subject is the same as the metaphysical subject, a limit of the world and not a part of it. Wittgenstein does not intend to introduce the willing subject in the place vacated by the thinking subject, ~~which would be a part of the world rather than its limit~~. For if it occupies the place vacated by the Cartesian subject, it would be part of the world rather than its limit. For the hypothetical Cartesian subject, being the bearer of the psychological, should be a part of the world. Whether the willing subject could or could not be a part of the world cannot be decided by introspection or day-dreaming, the kind of activity in which Hume got himself involved. Wittgenstein uses a kind of deductive reasoning. As he says, "The willing subject exists." "If the will did not exist, neither would there be the centre of the world, which we call the I."²⁸⁵ The I to which Wittgenstein refers in this remark is neither the 'I' as subject nor the 'I' as object of the Blue Book. For the Blue Book 'I' in neither of its two senses is the centre of the world.

The necessity for postulating a willing subject arises also because of ethics. For "Good and evil enter only through the subject."²⁸⁶ But the willing subject is transcendental, so ethics also becomes transcendental. And Wittgenstein is led to accept the view "Ethics does not treat of the world. Ethics must be a condition

284. Notebooks, p. 80.

285. Ibid.

286. Ibid., 79.

of the world like logic."²⁸⁷ And being a condition of the world it is an essential character of the I. As Wittgenstein says, "What is good and evil is essentially the I, not the world."²⁸⁸ And concerning this I he says, "The I, the I is what is deeply mysterious."²⁸⁹ However, inspite of its mysterious character Wittgenstein is sure that this "'I" is not an object."²⁹⁰ Though I "confront every object but not the I."²⁹¹ And concerning this I Wittgenstein said in a conclusive tone, "So there really is a way in which there can and must be mention of I in a non-psychological sense in philosophy."²⁹² Philosopher's concern is not the psychological sense of 'I'.

The above discussion shows that the usual interpretations of the remark 5.631 of the Tractatus must be rejected. For it is not the psychological I but the non-psychological I which Wittgenstein attempted to isolate, about which he said that it cannot be mentioned in the book entitled The world as I found it. What Wittgenstein fails to encounter in the world is not the Cartesian or the Humean subject, but the willing subject, the meta-physical limit; the subject about which he said that it is not a part of the world but a presupposition of its existence. Thus, to view the Tractarian Wittgenstein as a neo-Humean is obviously wrong. He was not searching for the 'thinking subject', therefore, he did not fail in his search. What he was searching for in the world is a willing subject, and he failed. Hacker is quite right when he points out that "Schopenhauer's distinction between the illusory

287. Ibid., 77.

288. Ibid., 80.

289. Ibid., 2.

290. Ibid.

291. Ibid.

292. Ibid.

Cartesian self and the transcendental self was adopted by Wittgenstein."²⁹³

The relation between the transcendental subject and the world can best be understood by the example of the imaginary landscape to which Wittgenstein refers in his Investigations. "I think of a picture of a landscape, an imaginary landscape with a house in it. - Someone asks "whose house is that ?" - The answer, by the way, might be "It belongs to the farmer who is sitting on the bench in front of it." But then he cannot for example enter his house."²⁹⁴ The transcendental subject is like the farmer sitting on the bench in front of the house. The house is the world. And just as the pictured farmer cannot enter into the pictured house, inspite of the fact that he is its owner, so also the transcendental subject cannot enter into the world inspite of the fact that it owns it. The fact that the subject is transcendental does not mean that it is without any limitation. It has all kinds of limitations. "I cannot bend the happenings of the world to my will" I am completely powerless."²⁹⁵ In such a situation it is natural for Wittgenstein to develop the attitude of renunciation. "I can only make myself independent of the world - and so in a certain sense master it - by renouncing any influence on happenings."²⁹⁶

Human Soul, Human Body and Human Being : After 1930 Wittgen-

293. Insight and Illusion Hacker, p. 66.

294. Investigations, 398.

295. Notebooks, p. 73.

296. Ibid.

stein passes through a great philosophical turbulence. And this turbulence continued till the end of his life. He started questioning his earlier views. Transcendental subject seems to have lost its hold on his thought, and we do not hear anymore of the metaphysical subject or the subject that used to be the presupposition of the world's existence. Attack on the Cartesian subject for some years became his obsession. He devised very persuasive arguments against it. The Cartesian subject is undoubtedly to be rejected, but it has to be rejected with due respect. For it is not Descartes who invented the myth of the psychological self; Descartes' role was only the recording of this myth. Therefore it is a serious issue how the simple and honest people, and not only the philosophers, were misled by their language to arrive at the myth of the psychological self. Again the human bodies seem to have obtained a greater significance in Wittgenstein's later life. Perhaps because as we grow in our age we take more interest in our bodies than at the earlier stages. Our bodies become the centre of aesthetic, religious and moral values. They are certainly not such centres at the earlier stages. And early Wittgenstein was after all a child-prodigy; he completely ignored the history of philosophy. In his Notebooks Wittgenstein says, "The human body ...is a part of the world among others, among beasts, plants, stones etc., etc."²⁹⁷ No special attention was paid to the human body inspite of the fact that Wittgenstein was aware of the fact that the human will successfully operates only on the human body. I can will to lift my arm but not to lift the building which I

297. Notebooks, p. 82.

own. Only my body is subject to my will, yet bodies were not given any significance. But now Wittgenstein has a very different concept of the human body. "The human body has become now "The best picture of the human soul."²⁹⁸ Wittgenstein has now come down from his transcendental height to the mundane level. What attracts him now are the human soul and the human body; for none of them is beyond reach; both have the name 'human' attached to them. Even at the time at which Wittgenstein talked so much about the transcendental self, the transcendental self was a "deep mystery."²⁹⁹ to him. While talking about it he said, 'I am conscious of the complete unclarity of all these sentences.'³⁰⁰ Yet this mystery continued haunting him. It is only in the later phase of his philosophy that he gives up the mysterious universe. Now he is occupied with the "body", something concrete, a part of the physical world, not its metaphysical limit. The body becomes a 'genuine subject' and the 'metaphysical subject' has given way, as we shall see, to a new distinction between 'the psychological subject' and 'the bodily subject'. In his Tractatus Wittgenstein said, "The philosophical self is not the human being, not the human body, or the human soul, with which psychology deals, but rather the metaphysical subject, the limit of the world - not a part of it."³⁰¹ But now the philosophical self is the same with which psychology is concerned. He is now interested in human being, human soul and the human body. They were rejected earlier because they were parts of the world. They are accepted now exactly because of the same reason.

 298. Investigations, ll. iv. 299. Notebooks, p. 80.

300. Ibid., 79. 301. Tractatus, 5.641.

What was earlier a philosophical crime is now a philosophical achievement. The focus of philosophical interest has changed. Of course Wittgenstein does not suggest that we have to accept the verdict of the psychologists. We remain philosophers.

Before we proceed further it would be interesting to compare the views of Wittgenstein with the views of Aristotle. By saying that the human body is the best picture of the human soul Wittgenstein's views on the relation between the human soul and the human body comes very close to the view of Aristotle. Aristotle revolts against the Pythagorean-Platonic conception of the soul. Pythagorean-Platonic view allows a soul to enter into any kind of body. The soul which is associated with the body of a man in this life may be associated with the body of a dog or a plant in other lives. For Plato bodies can be distinguished into kinds, but no such distinction of kinds, exists for souls. But Aristotle finds it absurd to think that the human soul may enter into the body of a dog or a plant. The human soul is restricted only to the human body; for it requires the form of the human body and this form is lacking in other animals and vegetables. As Aristotle says, "Most theories about the soul involve the following absurdity: they all join the soul to a body, or place it in a body, without adding any specification of the reason of their union, or of the bodily conditions required for it...they do not try to determine anything about the body which is to contain it, as it were possible as in the Pythagorean myths, that any soul could be clothed upon any body - an absurd view, for each body seems to have a form

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and shape of its own. It is absurd to say that the art of carpentry could embody itself in flutes; each art must use its tools, each soul its body."³⁰² Not all dresses fit all kinds of beings. The dress which fits a human being is unfit for a dog or a plant. If the human body is the dress of the human soul, then it is impossible for the body of a dog or a tree to accommodate the human soul. The human soul is restricted to the human body. Wittgenstein's metaphor of 'the body as the best picture of the soul' can easily be substituted for Aristotle's metaphor of 'the body as the dress of the soul'. The fact that the human body is the best picture of the human soul shows that no other kind of body would picture the human soul so well. This also shows that one way, if not the only way, to understand the nature of the human soul is to understand the nature of the human body. (The dress of a man shows whether he is a rogue or a gentleman). Both Aristotle and later Wittgenstein reject the a priori understanding of the human soul, the kind of understanding which Pythagoras and Plato exhibited. Human bodies give us glimpses of the human soul. Without there being human bodies there is no question of our having glimpses of human souls. Of course this glimpse of the human soul is not any kind of inference. It is not the case that 'I have inferred the existence of a 'soul' by 'observing the human body'. If I have to depend on 'inference' then I could have had no glimpse of the human soul. For the requirements of inference are not satisfied in this case.

302. "On The Souls", Basic Works of Aristotle, ed. Richard McKeon, Random House, p. 546.

Wittgenstein at times does not distinguish the concept of 'human body' from the concept of 'human being'. In his Remarks On The Philosophy of Psychology the human soul has been pictured by the human being. As he says, "The human being is the best picture of the human soul."³⁰³ This indifferent attitude to the distinction between the concept of a human being and the concept of a human body shows that Wittgenstein in his later work gives much importance to the concept of a human body, that this concept is equated with the concept of a human being.

Had Aristotle anticipated the further consequences of Wittgenstein's later thought he would have certainly imposed more restrictions on Plato's view of souls. Not only would it have been impossible for Plato to allow the entry of human soul into the body of a dog or a plant, but that it would have been impossible for Plato to allow plants to have any kind of souls, and in the case of animals having souls would have been quite complicated. For Wittgenstein's concept of soul, in his later writing, is the concept of a thinking experiencing subject. In his earlier writing he sacrificed this concept for the concept of a 'willing subject', and therefore, he failed to find it either in the world or outside it. It is in the search for the human soul in the world that Wittgenstein's attention is diverted towards the human body. If human body could also function as the thinking experiencing subject or else in some way could lead us to such a subject then it is possible for us to have discovered the human souls. The search for a soul is the search for a thinking experiencing subject.

Only those things (to use 'things' vaguely) have souls to which it is possible for us to ascribe 'thoughts' and 'experiences'. Prohibiting the ascription of thoughts and experiences to a thing is prohibiting that it is (has) soul. This becomes clear from Wittgenstein's raising the question whether a stone has a soul. "In what sense will the stone have the pains...In what sense will they be ascribed to a stone ? And can he say of the stone that it has a soul and that is what has the pain? What has a soul, or pain, to do with a stone?"³⁰⁴ Thus, one of the ways in which an object could be conceived of as having a soul is that experience are ascribed to it. The soul is the subject of experiences. So the issue whether something has a soul depends on the issue whether experiences could be ascribed to it.

But what leads us to say that something has experiences? We ascribe experiences to a thing by observing its behaviour. As in his Investigations Wittgenstein reacts about this view "But doesn't what you say come to this : that there is no pain, for example, without pain-behaviour."³⁰⁵ In this context Wittgenstein has no intention of reducing 'pain' to its 'bodily expression' But the fact that pain cannot be reduced to its bodily expression, does not mean that it could exist independently of all its connections with the bodily behaviour. It simply makes no sense to talk about 'pain' without using 'behavioural criteria'. Pain is supposed to be an inner process. "An inner process," as Wittgenstein points out "is in need of outward criteria."³⁰⁶ On the basis of all this Wittgenstein is led to say "Only of a living human being and what

304. Investigations, 283.

305. Investigations, 281.

306. Ibid., 580.

resembles (behave like) a living human being can one say : it has sensations; it sees; is blind; hears; is deaf; is conscious or unconscious."³⁰⁷ We ascribe experiences to living human beings. And this we are able to do by observing their bodily behaviour. If they did not behave in the way they do behave, we would have failed to ascribe experiences to them. This implies that the living human beings are according to Wittgenstein the thinking experiencing subjects; they are the souls to which experiences are ascribed. In this Tractatus Wittgenstein did not give any importance to human souls, human beings and human bodies. They were supposed to be the kind of things with "which psychology deals."³⁰⁸ But now he does not restrict himself only to human souls, he goes to an even lower level. All those living beings are the subjects for the ascription of experiences that behave like the living human beings. Wittgenstein clearly makes 'human behaviour' as the paradigm for the ascription of experiences. A living being which is different from the human being could be a thinking experiencing subject, could be a soul, if its bodily behaviour resembles the bodily behaviour of the human being. So the human body is not only the paradigm for the ascription of experiences, it is also a paradigm for saying that something has a soul. As Wittgenstein says, "If one considers the behaviour of a living thing one sees its soul."³⁰⁹ Consider the variety of living beings to which Wittgenstein succeeds in ascribing experiences. "Look at a wriggling fly...pain seems able to get a foothold here."³¹⁰ A

307. Ibid., 281.

308. Tractatus, 5.641.

309. Investigations, 357. 310. Ibid., 284.

'wriggling fly' does not seem to very unlike a 'crying man'. It is because we say of a man who is crying that he is in pain, that we also say of a wriggling fly that it is in pain. Wittgenstein further says, "One can imagine an animal angry, frightened, unhappy startled." ³¹¹ One can imagine the psychical experiences in connection with an animal because of the fact that the behaviour of an animal resembles the behaviour of man. But if it is possible for us to ascribe experiences to animals, it is also possible for us to say that they have souls. Can experiences be ascribed to plants? Can we say of tomatoes and cabbages that they have souls ? Why not? Wittgenstein does not hesitate in allowing vegetative life to have thoughts and experiences, to have souls. As he says, "When you see trees swaying about they are talking to one another." Everything has a soul", you compare the branches with arms." ³¹² Like Plato, Wittgenstein seems to have permitted everything living to have soul, to have thoughts and experiences. He seems to have accepted the Aristotelian restriction that the human soul is restricted only to the human body. Perhaps animals have their own variety of souls, so also the vegetable world its own.

Wittgenstein's view, however, is not as simple as that of Plato or Aristotle. What his one hand gives to the animals and plants, the other hand takes away from them, and the result is that they remain animals and plants, qualitatively different from men and women. At first step we can see Wittgenstein assimilating vegetables to ^{the} ordinary material objects. As he reacts, "But doesn't

 311. Ibid, part ii, i, p. 174.

312 Lectures On Aesthetics, ed. Cyril Barret, pp. 2-3.

one say that a man has consciousness, and that a tree or a stone does not ?"³¹³ This implies that trees are not unlike stones. Upto this stage we have the picture that only human beings and animals have souls. But why do we deprive the material objects and vegetables to have consciousness ? Does the behaviour of a stone or a plant fail to resemble the behaviour of a man ? It does. Wittgenstein refers to a chair to see whether experiences could be ascribed to it. Where do the experiences occur if they occur to a chair. "In one of its parts ? Or outside its body."³¹⁴ This kind of questioning is justified, for "we want to know how the chair is supposed to be like a human being, whether, for instances, the head is at the top of the back and so on."³¹⁵ So also if a rose is allowed to be conscious, we would like to see how does its body resemble the human body. Suppose it is said, "A rose has no teeth". Is it like the raising of the question "A new born babe has no teeth"? Wittgenstein comments "One has no notion in advance where to look for teeth in a rose."³¹⁶ So the question of ascribing experiences to a rose does not arise. Thus, Wittgenstein has restricted Plato's souls to the animal kingdom, for men too are a species of animals (of course men suffer from the self-deception that they have something of the divine in them. Perhaps animals do not have any such suffering.)

What follows may be taken as the next step of Wittgenstein. He himself introduces difficulties for considering animals as the thinking experiencing subjects. Consider his reaction to

313. Investigation, 418.

314. Ibid., 361.

315. Ibid.

316. Ibid., part 11, xi, 221-222

the use of the expression 'think'. Wittgenstein remarks "We learn to say it perhaps only of human beings ? We learn to assert or deny it of them . The question "Do fishes think?" does not exist among our application of language, it is not used."³¹⁷ Similar is the remark, "We don't say of a table and chair that they think; neither do we say this of a plant, a fish, and hardly of a dog; only of human beings. And not even of all human beings."³¹⁸ If we have been taught to assert or deny 'thinking' to human beings, then we cannot extend its application to fishes, dogs and flies. As in his Investigations Wittgenstein remarks, "If a concept refers to a character of human handwriting, it has no application to beings that do not write."³¹⁹ The concept of thinking refers to a human being, therefore it has no application to those objects that are not human beings. Fishes, dogs and flies are not human beings. The concept of thinking is tied to language; or, rather 'Our concept of thinking is tied to our language. 'Fishes, dogs and flies do not use our language; hence we do not know what would it be for these animals to use our language. As Wittgenstein says, "If a lion could talk, we could not understand him."³²⁰ Therefore, we just do not know, hence, do not say, what it is for an animal to think.

Wittgenstein has introduced for us a paradoxical situation concerning his views. On the one hand he has led us to think that not only animals have souls even trees have souls. On the other hand he means to say that only human beings have souls, because in a legitimate sense we ascribe experiences only to

317. Philosophy of Psychology, 201. 318. Ibid., 192.

319. Investigations, part 11, i,p.174.

320. Ibid., Part 11, xi, 223.

human beings. One solution could be that Wittgenstein deprived the animals and plants only from having reason, from having thoughts. He allows them to have sensations. So his view is not very different from the view of Aristotle. Animals and plants too have souls, for they are experiencing subjects, not thinking subjects. This solution prohibits the entry of human soul into the body of a dog or a fly. But when Wittgenstein denies 'thinking to animals and trees his denial also covers the having of 'sensations' by the animals and plants. For our concept of sensation, like our concept of thinking, involves a linguistic structure. If we cannot ask the question "Do fishes think ?" We can also not ask the question "Do fishes feel?". How to reconcile Wittgenstein's denial that animals are thinking experiencing subjects and his assertion that they are such subjects? The solution seems to be that when he denies thoughts and experiences to animals he denies them only in the secondary sense. In the primary sense thoughts and experiences can be ascribed only to human beings. It is only in the secondary derivative sense that animals have thoughts and experiences. But this solution would keep Wittgenstein away not only from Plato but also from Aristotle. Our ascription of experiences to animals would not be very different from our ascription of experiences to dolls and pots. So also ascription of souls to animals is in no better situation. Only human beings have experiences, and it is only in connection with human beings that we can say that they have souls. It is only in a secondary sense that we talk about a dog or a tree that it talks and feels sensations, that it possesses a soul.

Two Uses of 'I' : It has been pointed out earlier in this chapter, that Wittgenstein makes a distinction between the use of 'I' as subject and its use as object. The period when he was charmed by this distinction can be described as the Blue Book period, it spreads over the years 1930-35. In the preceeding section we have seen that the concept of a human being is not complete if only the human body is mentioned, we must also take note of human experiences. Now the question arises whether experiences can be ascribed to the body, whether the body can function as the thinking experiencing subject. Suppose my hand is injured. Do I say that my hand feels pain. Though I have no qualms in saying that my hand is injured, I have qualms in saying that my hand feels pain. We do not say of our hands and heads that they feel pain. For it is I who feels pain in this hand or head. As Wittgenstein raises the question, "Isn't it absurd to say of ~~a~~body that it has pain?"³²¹ Wherein lies the absurdity ? Wittgenstein reacts, "What makes it plausible to say that it is not the body ? - Well, something like this, if someone has pain in his hand, then the hand does not say so (unless it writes it) and one does not comfort the hand, but the sufferer."³²² Wittgenstein does not equate the 'sufferer' with the 'hand'. The sufferer, the thinking experiencing subject, is not the body. Bodies could be injured or wounded, so they are the subjects of such injuries and wounds. But they cannot be the subjects of pains and pleasures. We must introduce a different subject for experiences in case we reject bodies as their subjects. All

321. Investigations, 286.

322. Ibid.

this has led Wittgenstein to differentiate between the two uses of 'I'. As he says "There are two different cases in the use of the word 'I' (or, 'my') which I might call "the use as object" and the "use as subject". Example of the first kind of use are these : "My arm is broken". "I have grown six inches", "I have a bump on my forehead", "The wind blows my hair about". Examples of the second kind are : "I see so-and-so", "I hear so-and-so", "I try to lift my arm", "I think it will rain", "I have toothache."³²³ In the case of 'I' as object 'I' refers to the body, but it is certainly not the body that is being referred to when 'I' is used as subject.

In his Individuals Strawson has attacked Wittgenstein for his distinction between the two uses of 'I'. For Wittgenstein intends to show that the use of 'I' as subject is illegitimate, it is not required. The legitimate use of 'I' is made only when it is used as object, when it is used to stand for the body. This conclusion according to Strawson makes Wittgenstein a no-subject theorist, a theorist who believes that there is no thinking experiencing subject, that thoughts and experiences could manage their affairs by themselves. While explaining Wittgenstein's view Strawson remarks, "He thought that there were two uses of 'I', and that in one of them 'I' was replaceable by 'this body'...But he also said that in the other use (the use exemplified by 'I' have a toothache' as opposed to 'I have a bad tooth') the 'I' does not denote a possessor, and that no Ego is involved in thinking or in having toothache; and referred with apparent approval to Lichtenberg's dictum that, instead of saying 'I think',

 323. Blue and Brown Books, pp. 66-7.

we (or Descartes) ought to say 'There is a thought.'³²⁴ Wittgenstein is clearly a no-subject theorist. For he retains thought without retaining the thinking subject. His position is different from the position of Hume, for he retains the body. But his position is also different from the position of Descartes, for he rejects the thinking experiencing subject.

Before we go further into the details of Wittgenstein's rejection of the Cartesian subject some minor clarification concerning Strawson's characterisation of his view is essential. Strawson says, "We may notice...a possible connection between the no-owner ship doctrine and the Cartesian position. The latter is, straight forwardly enough, a dualism of two subjects, or two types of subjects . The former could, a little paradoxically, be called a dualism too : a dualism of one subject - the body - and one non-subject. We might surmise that the second dualism, paradoxically so called, arises out of the first dualism, non-paradoxically so called; in other words, that if we try to think of that to which one's states of consciousness are ascribed as something utterly different from that to which certain corporeal characteristics are ascribed, then indeed it becomes difficult to see why states of consciousness should be ascribed to, thought of as belonging to, anything at all."³²⁵ I do not know whether Strawson has given a criticism of Wittgenstein's view or an accurate representation of his view. I simply do not find anything critical in it, except perhaps a critical tone. For Strawson accepts that if we try to think of that to which experiences

324. Individuals, 95 (footnote)

325. Individuals, p. 98.

are ascribed as something utterly different from that to which certain corporeal characteristics are ascribed then it becomes difficult to see why states of consciousness are ascribed to anything at all. This means that if we start with the Cartesian dualism of two subjects then we must end with the Wittgensteinian no-subject position (of there being no subject for experiences.) And this is what Wittgenstein wanted to show. No-subject doctrine is a natural heir of Cartesian dualism, therefore Cartesian dualism must be rejected. The kind of no-ownership view which Wittgenstein has proposed is straight forwardly dualistic. There is no paradoxicality or roundaboutness about it, for Wittgenstein was certainly not pleading for the neo-Humean analysis of experiences. If there is no reduction of experiences to physical states then the view is undoubtedly dualistic. But the consequence of dualism is solipsism. In rejecting the 'I' of the solipsist Wittgenstein is rejecting both Cartesian dualism and solipsism as ordinarily understood. Strawson does not recognise the service rendered by the no-ownership theorist. Strawson finds Descartes mistaken, and the no-ownership theorist doubly mistaken. For the no-ownership theorist as depicted by Strawson carries all the difficulties of the Cartesian dualism plus a few more. But Wittgenstein is certainly not pleading for Descartes. He is simply showing that Descartes is mistaken, that from his assumption solipsism follows and from solipsism follows the rejection of the thinking experiencing subject. So Cartesian dualism involves its own death. The no-ownership theory is a concrete rejection of both, Descartes and Hume, by mirroring the features of both.

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Wittgenstein's distinction between the use of 'I' as subject and its use as object should be studied along with his introductory remarks on this distinction. What leads him to make this distinction, and what purpose does this distinction serve. Wittgenstein says, just before proposing this distinction, "When I said, from my heart, that only I see, I was also inclined to say that by 'I' I didn't really mean L.W....I could almost say that by 'I' I mean something which just now inhabits L.W., something which the others can't see. (I meant my mind, but could only point to it via mybody.)"³²⁶ It is evident from these remarks that there is a clear connection between solipsism and dualism. Solipsism helps dualism and dualism helps solipsism; they survive on each others mutual assistance. Unless the thinking experiencing subject is totally different from the body, though hidden in the body, dualism does not get started. And thinking experiencing subject could be independent of the body only in the condition when its sole function is to stand as the subject for the ascription of experiences. As Wittgenstein points out, "in the cases in which 'I' is used as subject we don't use it because we recognise a particular person by his bodily characteristics; and this creates the illusion that we use this word to refer to something bodiless, which, however, has its seat in our body. In fact this seems to be the real ego, the one of which it was said, "Cogito, ergo sum"."³²⁷ Whether such an ego is illusory or not would be seen later. Suppose it is not illusory, then is there any way for it to push aside the body? Is there any way for this

326. Blue and Brown Books, 66.

327. Ibid., 69.

ego to peep through the body ? But without pushing aside the body, how could this ego, how could this subject, have the glimpse of other egos, other subjects? So there is only one ego, one thinking experiencing subject. Only I am real, I am the only thinking experiencing subject. Neither this type of solipsism is coherent nor this type of dualism is coherent. Both solipsism and dualism are internally incoherent. To be a clear and coherent solipsist one must reject the myth of thinking experiencing subject. One must show that the pure ego is a myth. So Wittgenstein makes an attempt to present himself as a coherent and consistent solipsist. His kind of solipsism is solipsism without the myth of the thinking experiencing subject.

According to the notes dictated to Alice Ambrose and Margaret Macdonald, Wittgenstein remarked, "(Getting into the solipsistic mood means not using the word "I" in describing a personal experience) (Acceptance of such a change is tempting) because the description of a sensation does not contain a reference to either a person or a sense organ."³²⁸ So Wittgenstein's solipsistic mood is very different from the solipsistic mood of an ordinary solipsist. We must distinguish Wittgenstein's solipsism from ordinary solipsism. When an ordinary solipsist gets into his mood he starts prefacing his experiential reports with "I", for he thinks that all experiences are his experiences. In the solipsistic notation of an ordinary solipsist the use of "I", "my" and "mine" become supremely important; nothing is to be spoken without prefacing one's speech with one of these expressions. Wittgenstein is aware that using one or any of these expressions

328. Wittgenstein's Lectures, Blackwell, 1979, p. 22.

is self-defeating; for their use presupposes the use of "you", "she", "his" etc. if all experiences are declared as mine then no experience can be declared as mine. Hence the solipsist would be preaching an incoherent doctrine if he uses such expressions as "I", "My" and "mine". They should be removed from the description of experiences. Ordinary solipsism gives way to Wittgensteinian solipsism, incoherent solipsism gives way to coherent solipsism.

It is to bring coherence to the solipsistic doctrine that Wittgenstein becomes a no-subject theorist, first a qualified no-subject theorist then a fulfilled no-subject theorist. At times Wittgenstein simply denies "I" as the subject of experiences without denying Smith or Jones as the subject of experiences. When he is denying only "I" as the subject of experiences he is a qualified no-subject theorist. Let us consider the remarks which show that Wittgenstein is a qualified no-subject theorist. Again let us take the notes of Alice Ambrose. "The function x has toothache" has various values, Smith, Jones etc., But not I. I is in a class by itself. The word "I" does not refer to a possession in sentences about having an experience, unlike its use in "I have a cigar."³²⁹ I can possess a cigar but not a toothache. The question arises what prohibits me from possessing a toothache but not a cigar? And we have to answer this question keeping in view that it is only I who have been refused to possess a toothache, no such refusal for Smith and Jones, for they are values of the function "x has toothache". Though I can possess only a cigar, Smith can possess both a cigar and a toothache. The easiest interpretation which would occur to an interpreter

329. Ibid., p. 21.

is that something is wrong with the sense of possession or ownership in the case of experiences like toothaches and headaches. Wittgenstein is using 'possession' and 'ownership' in a sense that I am deprived of possessing and owning experiences. In the case of experiences the possession and ownership is necessary; it makes no sense to say that an experience is unowned or unpossessed or that it is being transferred to another person. But the concept of 'necessary ownership' or 'necessary possession' is illegitimate, hence it is impossible for me to possess or own an experience. Referring to Wittgenstein's views on this issue Hacker points out, "It makes no sense to speak of an owner, because it makes no sense to speak of an owned pain. A matchbox can have an owner, because it can lack one. It makes sense to speak of ownership only when it makes sense to speak of none."³³⁰ But this simply could not be the exclusive reason for denying I to own experiences. For in this sense even Smith should not own experiences. The sense of ownership of toothache remains the same whether "toothache" occurs in the sentence "Smith has toothache" (uttered by Smith) and "I have toothache" (uttered by Smith). Since Wittgenstein allows Smith but not "I" as the value of the function "x has toothache", there is a deeper reason for denying experiences to be owned by me.

It is interesting to read the immediately succeeding remarks of Wittgenstein as Alice Ambrose reproduces them. These remarks also show that Wittgenstein is a qualified no-subject theorist. "We could have a language from which "I" is omitted from sentences

330. Insight And Illusion, p. 189.

describing a personal experience. (instead of saying "I think" or "I have an ache" and might say "It thinks" like "It rains"), and in place of "I have an ache", "There is an ache". Under certain circumstances one might be strongly tempted to do away with the simple use of "I".³³¹ The temptation is restricted to doing away with the simple use of "I" (the use of "I" as subject). This temptation is not extended to doing away with Smith and Jones etc. Wittgenstein does not suggest the use of "it" in the place of Smith. There is nothing wrong with "Smith has toothache", for "I" is in a class by itself. In doing away with "I" Wittgenstein is removing the monopoly of ego. As he says. "The statement 'Only I have real toothache', either has a commonsense meaning, or, if it is grammatical proposition, it is meant to be a statement of a rule. The solipsist wishes to say, 'I should like to put, instead of the notation 'I have real toothache' 'there is toothache'." What the solipsist wants is not the notation in which the ego has monopoly, but one in which the ego vanishes.³³² So Wittgenstein is opposing the concentration of ego in one person. And he considers 'I' as the representative of the ego in the language-game. Perhaps Smith does not represent ego in our language, therefore Wittgenstein does not have any objections to retaining Smith.

So far as solipsism is concerned there seems to be some incoherence in retaining Smith and doing away with 'I'. What would be the use of the name Smith for a solipsist? Are there

331. Alice Ambrose, p. 21.

332. Ibid., p. 22.

any Jones, Hicks and Toms, so that Smith maybe distinguished from them ? If in the solipsistic notation 'I' is a useless piece so would Smith be a useless piece. Qualified no-subject doctrine must give place to an unqualified no-subject doctrine. Wittgenstein perhaps is aware of this, therefore, he suggests the use of "There is real toothache" instead of "Smith (the solipsist) has toothache."³³³ "We could adopt the following way of representing matters; if I, L.W., have toothache then that is expressed by means of the proposition 'There is toothache.'³³⁴ So like 'I' Smith too is not the value of the function 'X has toothache'. Wittgenstein was certainly wrong in thinking that 'I' is in a class by itself. So far as solipsism is concerned, Smith belongs to the same class as 'I'. It is to eliminate the subject of experiences that in his Investigations Wittgenstein was led to think that it is a contingent fact that experiences are ascribed to a person, they could very well have been ascribed to physical objects like plants and stones. As he says, "Let us imagine the following : the surfaces of the things around us (stones, plants etc.) have patches and regions which produce pain in our skin when we touch them...In this case we should speak of pain-patches on the leaf of a particular plant just as at present we speak of red-patches."³³⁵

Lastly on this issue I would like to draw attention to some remarks of Wittgenstein which remind us of the metaphysical subject. Wittgenstein says, "Does a person enter into the description

333. Ibid., p. 22.

334. Philosophical Remarks, 58.

335. Philosophical Investigations, 312.

of the visual sensation ? If we describe the visual field, no person necessarily comes into it...The same applies to the description of an auditory sensation...The audible phenomenon is in a auditory space, and the subject who hears has nothing to do with the physical body. Similarly, we can talk of a toothache.. Pains have a space to move in, as to do auditory experiences and visual data."³³⁶ In the Tractatus he said that the willing subject is not a part of the world. Now the experiencing subject is not a part of experience. There is some kind of helplessness in allowing the subject to occur as a constituent of an experience It is like the painted farmer who is sitting in front of his painted house, who owns the house but cannot enter it. Nothing corresponds to the use of 'I' as subject in experiences, so it is redundant. But 'I' as object must be retained. As Wittgenstein says in his Philosophical Remarks, " "I" clearly refers to my body, for I am in this room."³³⁷ The consequence of distinguishing 'I' as subject from 'I' as object is doing away with the former sense of 'I'. Thus, in order to save solipsism from its incoherence Wittgenstein has produced a highly controversial doctrine, no less controversial than the doctrines of Descartes and Hume.

Identifying Persons and their Experiences : On the one hand Wittgenstein has succeeded in generating a spirit of admiration for his views, on the other he is also responsible for generating more heat; of course not an unusual situation for a great philosopher. In this section I have chosen Strawson's reactions to Wittgenstein views. Strawson is one of those critics of Wittgenstein

 336. Alice Ambrose, 22-3. 337. Philosophical Remarks, 58.

whose writing has perhaps been much influenced by Wittgenstein. If one reads such critics of Wittgenstein as Chomsky and Katz one would feel that these critics have an extremely superficial study of Wittgenstein. Of course philosophy for the linguists is a side affair, and therefore one should not expect much from them. But if one reads carefully then one may feel that Strawson's Individuals is a good ladder for understanding some of the issues of Wittgenstein's philosophical psychology. Strawson has a rare insight into Wittgenstein's thought. Because of this one may even feel that Strawson's position on nature of persons, their identification and identity is the logical culmination of Wittgenstein's position. Strawson has taken those steps which Wittgenstein has only suggested but not taken.

At times the kind of difficulties which Strawson raises against Wittgenstein's view could easily be raised against Strawson's own views. At other times Strawson's views appear to be the modified version of Wittgenstein's own views. Sometimes Strawson disagrees with Wittgenstein simply because he is looking at Descartes in a fashion quite different from that in which Wittgenstein is looking at Descartes.

Strawson, as we have already seen in the preceding section, finds Descartes views as straightforward dualistic, dualism of two independent subjects, quite distinct from each other. Rather, the dualism which is presupposed by Wittgenstein's no-subject theory is not straightforward. For it is "a dualism of one subject the body - and one non-subject."³³⁸ The expression "non-subject" is not a special kind of subject, therefore no request has been

 338. Individuals, p. 98.

made to search for a subject corresponding to the expression "non-subject". This characterisation which Strawson uses for Wittgenstein's view is precisely the characterisation which Wittgenstein uses for the view of Descartes. To Wittgenstein Cartesian dualism appears quite paradoxical. It is a dualism of two subjects "Mr. Body and Mr. Nobody". Wittgenstein feels that the Cartesian subject "Mr. Nobody" is a myth. How could such a myth as the myth of "Mr. Nobody" arise? It is interesting to know about the generation of such myths. On the genesis of the myth "Mr. Nobody" Wittgenstein reflects, "Imagine a language-game in which, instead of "I found nobody in the room", one said "I found Mr. Nobody in the room". Imagine the philosophical problems which would arise out of such a convention. Some philosophers brought up in this language would probably feel that they didn't like the similarity of the expressions "Mr. Nobody" and Mr. Smith".³³⁹ It is in the context of distinguishing "I have pain" from "He has pain" that Wittgenstein brings the analogy of "Mr. Nobody". The use of "I" in "I have pain" is like the use of "Mr. Nobody". And the use of "he" in "he has pain" is like the use of "Mr. Smith". As Wittgenstein points out concerning the distinction between 'I' and 'he'. "The difference between the propositions "I have pain" and "he has pain" is not like that of "L.W. has pain" and "Smith has pain". Rather it corresponds to the difference between meaning and saying that someone moans."³⁴⁰ Saying that 'I have pain' is nothing but moaning. The fact that the word 'I' has occurred in this sentence 'I have pain' does not mean

339. Blue and Brown Books, p. 69.

340. Ibid., p. 68.

that this word is the name of, or refers to, a person. So also the word 'pain' is not necessarily a name or a description. As Wittgenstein remarks "Words are connected with the primitive, the natural, expressions of the sensation and used in their place. "The verbal expression of pain replaces crying and does not describe it."³⁴¹ If 'pain' has not been used as the name of a sensation, if its use is only as an expression of a sensation, then neither pain nor anything else has been described by the use of this word. Therefore, the expression 'having pain' also denotes no sort of possession. But if 'pain' has lost its descriptive function in the sentence "I have pain", the word 'I' too has lost its referring and naming function. I cannot be merely referring to something if I am not in a position to say something about it. If in saying 'I have pain' I am not ascribing a sensation to a person then I have also failed in referring to that person: the word 'I' in such a situation has become a non-starter. The word 'I' in such a situation is performing the role of "Mr. Nobody", it is not performing the role of "Mr. Smith", hence it is better to translate the sentence in terms of the sentence "There is pain".

It is possible that Descartes was not aware of the above difficulties. Perhaps he was not cautious that in distinguishing the subject of experiences from the body, he was not distinguishing any subject from the body, that no subject existed which correspond^{ed}_A to the verbal expression of the subject as the body

341. Philosophical Investigations, 410.

correspond^{ed}_a to the verbal expression of the subject for the ascription of physical states. Descartes invented the hidden "ego" to stand for the non-subject, to convert the non-subject into a subject. Since the ego is hidden its existence cannot be disproved.

Strawson would oppose Wittgenstein's distinction between 'I have pain' and 'he has pain'. According to him these sentences are not only grammatically similar but also logically similar... As he says, "'In pain' means the same whether one says 'I am in pain' or 'he is in pain'. The dictionaries do not give two sets of meaning for every expression which describes a state of consciousness : a first person meaning and a second-and-third person meaning."³⁴² There is no doubt that we do not find in the dictionaries two sets of meanings for 'in pain', for the reason that the dictionaries are not concerned with the phrase-meanings and sentence meanings; they are concerned with the word-meaning. 'In pain' is a phrase and not a word, it can occur as a part of a sentence in a different sense than that in which a word occurs as a part of a sentence. So far as the dictionaries are concerned the expression 'in pain' has neither one set of meaning nor two sets of meanings. Since the dictionaries are concerned with the word-meanings one may find the meanings of both the words in it, 'in' and 'pain' separately. Once the meanings of these words are secured from the dictionaries, one may use them in framing phrases and sentences; 'in pain' is one of such phrases. And the fact that a word is given its meaning in the dictionaries

342. Individuals, p. 95.

does not mean that its uses are also given in the dictionaries. It is neither tragic nor comic that philosophers go beyond the dictionaries; for anyone who uses phrases and sentences goes beyond the dictionary-meanings. Moreover Philosophical problems cannot be solved by making an appeal to dictionaries. Saying that a word is "the description of.." "The name of ..." etc. etc., is doing philosophy, is doing something which goes beyond the dictionaries. Granted that there are occasions on which the word 'pain' is used in those sentences that are descriptive, how does it imply that there are no occasions on which the word 'pain' is used in those sentences (or putative sentences) which express one's experiences. What Wittgenstein maintains is that the word 'pain' has a manifold role in language; a role which is descriptive, but also a role which is expressive. Wittgenstein is drawing attention to the complexities of human language.

If the statement 'I have pain' is a description of ^a person's experience, as Strawson suggests, then it is possible to be mistaken about its truth. Two kinds of mistakes are possible with respect to this statement. One is concerning the experience game-designated by 'pain' and the other is concerning the subject designated by 'I'. What would it be to be mistaken about one's experience? And what would it be to be mistaken about oneself? These questions are not absurd, for they are connected with the question concerning the identification of persons and their experiences. I must have criteria for identifying experiences; so also I must have criteria for identifying persons. Strawson

too does not deny the issue of identifying experiences. So also he does not deny that there is such an issue as the issue of identifying persons. As he says, "A twinge of toothache or a private impression of red cannot in general be identified in our common language except as twinge which such and such an identified person suffered."³⁴³ But if an experience depends for its identification on a person, then it should be possible to identify the person in question. As he says further, "It would be necessary, in order for the experience-description to be given currency, that someone or other, who gave it currency, should also have been able to give an independent identification of the sufferer of the experience."³⁴⁴

Granted that persons and their experiences are the items to be identified. But then it is a precondition of identification that sometimes I misidentify those items which at other times I succeeded in identifying. Success in a game goes along with failure. If there is no possibility of my ever losing a game then it is also not possible for me to have won the game. Victory presupposes a possible defeat. Identification presupposes misidentification. Further, talking about the identification of pains and visual experiences provides to them some kind of independent status. Pains and visual experiences have to be assimilated to wallets, shoes and jackets, for we have the same sort of concern about both the group of objects. In his Philosophical Remarks Wittgenstein did not hesitate in treating toothache on

343. Ibid., p. 41.

344. Ibid.

par with a wallet. Referring to the identification of other's toothache Wittgenstein remarked: "But what does 'he' mean and what does 'have toothache' mean? Is this a relation toothache once had to me and now has to him? So in that case I would also be conscious of toothache now and of his having it now, just as I can now see a wallet in his hand that I saw earlier in mine."³⁴⁵

Treating a toothache exactly in the same fashion as a wallet is the consequence of Wittgenstein's distinguishability criteria for two toothaches. As he remarks, "How are toothaches to be distinguished from one another? By intensity and similar characteristics, and by location."³⁴⁶ If a toothache is to be identified

in terms of its intensity, location etc., then it is not absurd to say that the toothache which ^I_A have is the same as the toothache which you have (had). Wittgenstein goes a step further in assimilating toothaches to wallets. If it is logically ruled out for me to own his wallet, then it is also logically ruled out for me to own any wallet, including mine. The expression 'ownership' means that it is transferable from him to me and from me to him.

It is in this spirit that he remarked in the Blue Book, "If we exclude the phrase 'I have his toothache' from language, we thereby also exclude 'I have (or feel) my toothache.'"³⁴⁷ It is clear

why toothaches are to be treated like wallets. If they are not so treated then there is no question of identifying them, i.e. for saying that they are mine. Pains and visual experiences must be given the same treatment as shoes, jackets and wallets. A

345. Philosophical Remarks, 62.

346. Ibid., 61.

347. Blue Books, p. 55.

pair of shoes and a jacket fit my body does not mean that they could not have fitted to the body of some other person. It is a contingent fact that I own a given pair of shoes and a given jacket; they could have very well have been owned by some other person. Similarly, it is a contingent fact that I own a given toothache and a given visual experience, they could have been owned by some other person.

The assimilation of toothaches and visual experiences to shoes, jackets and wallets has its own difficulties, and Wittgenstein is quite aware of them. On occasion I have been searching for my jacket, it got mixed up with the jackets of other people. Ultimately I succeeded in searching it out. I succeeded in identifying it, in recognising it as my own. I separated it from the jackets of other people. Similarly, on occasions my shoes got mixed up with the shoes of other people. I have been searching for them. I try my feet in this pair of shoes and that pair of shoes. Ultimately, I succeeded in identifying my shoes. Have my experiences ever behaved in this fashion? Have my visual experiences and toothaches ever got mixed up with the visual experiences and toothaches of other people? Did I ever have the same sort of confusion about my private sensations which I had about my shoes and jackets? Wittgenstein connects the issue of 'misidentifying experiences' with the issue of 'misidentification of persons'. So also he compares 'misidentifying experiences' with 'misidentifying bodily states'. Concerning the misidentification of bodily states he says, "It is possible that, say in an accident, I should feel a pain in my arm, see a broken
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arm at my side, and think that it is mine, when it really is my neighbour's. And I could looking into a mirror, mistake the bump on his forehead for one on mine."³⁴⁸ So someone else's arm or the bump on his forehead could easily be confused as mine. Therefore, it makes sense to say that I identify my arm or the bump on my forehead. But toothache and visual experiences do not behave in the same fashion. As he says, "There is no question of recognising a person when I say I have toothache. To ask "Are you sure that it's you who have pains?" would be nonsensical"... "It is as impossible that in making the statement 'I have a toothache' I should have mistaken another person for myself, as it is to moan with pain by mistake, having mistaken someone else for me."³⁴⁹ Misidentifying a toothache is impossible, because such misidentification presupposes misidentification of a person. And it makes no sense to say that I confused myself with someone else. To talk about identifying my arm makes sense. For saying that an arm is mine means that it is not someone else's. But it could have been someone else's And it is because it could have been someone else's that it makes sense to say that I identify or recognise that it is mine. The same analysis however does not hold good for my toothache. Could it have been someone else's? Does it make sense to say that I misidentify my toothache? Do I say 'As a matter of fact this toothache is someone else's, only I confused it as mine'. Then how could I say that it is mine? I do not fail, so also I do not succeed in identifying a toothache as mine. No such difficulty exists for the toothache

348. Ibid., p. 67.

349. Ibid.

The fact that the identification of a toothache is postponed till the identification of the person who owns it, is simply postponing the difficulties. For the person in question has to be identified independently of identifying this toothache. Such a kind of identification is essential in order to avoid vicious circularity. If the identification of a toothache depends on the identification of a person, then the person's identification,

350. Individuals, p. 97. 351. Philosophical Remarks, 61.

to avoid vicious circularity, should not depend on the identification of his toothache. Would the identification of the person in question be conducted in terms of his body - my body in the case of 'I have toothache'? But what is 'My body' doing here? Isn't it the body in which I feel my toothache? So my body itself demands its identification prior to identifying a person. And if my body too is identified in terms of my experiences, then neither the services of my experiences nor the services of my body can be utilised while conducting identification of person (in this case 'myself'). How is a person identified independently of identifying his body and his experiences, is a mystery. If a toothache is identified as my toothache, whatever be the means, methods or ways of doing so, we must allow the possibility that it could possibly be someone else's. We must allow the possibility of defeat otherwise we cannot be victorious. We must allow misidentification in order to have identification. But once the possibility of misidentification is accommodated in the game of identification, then the experiences would not be owned in the sense of "logically non-transferable kind". I am not convinced that Strawson has provided a satisfactory solution to Wittgenstein's worries concerning either the identification of experiences or the identification of those who happen to own experiences.

Strawson has of course succeeded in showing, inspite of his failure on specific issues, that our philosophical worries concerning mind and body would continue if we do not in some way jump out of the Cartesian circle. Most of the Wittgensteinian

worries were the outcome of the Cartesian circle. Wittgenstein failed to jump out of the circle. Strawson has certainly succeeded in jumping out of the circle. The inspection of 'I am tall' and 'I see a spider on the ceiling' have not led Strawson to make a distinction between the two senses of 'I' but to discover that there is only one sense of 'I' though two different uses of the word. It is one and the same entity that is involved in having two different kind of predicates. Similar thought is present in Wittgenstein but he did not develop it. Consider Wittgenstein's remark, "Pain-behaviour can point to a painful place - but the subject of pain is the person who gave it expression."³⁵² The person who is the subject of pain is also the subject of bodily-states, otherwise it would be impossible for him to give physical expression to his pain. The remarks such as the present one are found in Wittgenstein's later work. Only Wittgenstein did not develop this line of thinking. Perhaps he had no wish to jump out of the Cartesian circle. Whatever may be said against Descartes his thinking is extremely bewitching. Much of what Wittgenstein says on the issues of philosophical psychology is a reaction to Cartesian thinking.

352. Investigations, 302.

Chapter V

Philosophy of Science

One could say "every view has its charm, "but that would be false. The correct thing to say is that every view is significant for one who sees it as significant.

Remarks on Frazer's Golden Bough.

Early Wittgenstein : Early Wittgenstein's thoughts have been restricted to science, even if his thoughts were philosophical early Wittgenstein cannot express his philosophical thoughts. He cannot express those thoughts because he has laid a ban on philosophy, a ban on the expression of philosophy. It is not as if philosophy could have been given expression if Wittgenstein had not laid this restriction but that early Wittgenstein finds the expression of philosophy to be inherently impossible. Impossible because it is like the logic of language which cannot be expressed in language. But the unexpressed is more important to Wittgenstein than the expressible for he says about his Tractatus : "My work consists of two parts : the one presented here plus all that I have not written. And it is precisely this second part that is the important one."³⁵² For early Wittgenstein we have unimportant things that can be expressed (science) and important things that cannot be expressed (philosophy). But by maintaining silence one does not wish them

352. Letter to Ludwig Ficker, quoted in The Fly and the Fly-Bottle p. 41.

out of existence perhaps, they exist silently without making much noise (like the scientists). The existence of the inexpressible is given credence by his view that what cannot be said, can be shown.

Why do we say or show anything? Saying and showing is concerned with something or someone other than oneself, i.e., it is used mainly for communication with others. If there were no other persons there would not be any need to communicate with others. However, now that there are people present besides ourselves we do communicate with them and explain to them whatever we want to. But what is the vehicle of communication?

According to Wittgenstein, "with propositions we make ourselves understood also "It belongs to the essence of a proposition that it should be able to communicate a new sense to us."³⁵³ Syntactical rules of a language or picture cannot be stated in the language or picture itself, they are shown or exhibited through the picture but not stated in the same medium as Wittgenstein points out "A picture cannot however depict its pictorial form: it displays it"³⁵⁴ In the Tractatus the unsayable is connected with the mystical and so cannot be said. In the Notebooks Wittgenstein further remarks. "In order that you should have a language which can express or say everything that can be said, this language must have certain properties; and when this is the case,

353. Tractatus 4.027.

354. Ibid., 2.172.

that it has them: can no longer be said in that language or any language."³⁵⁵ Also emphasising the connection between a proposition i.e. what is stated and reality or the world he says "every real proposition shows something, besides what it says, about the Universe : for, if it has no sense, it can't be used; and if it has a sense, it mirrors some logical property of the Universe."³⁵⁶ Perhaps this is the reason why he says that "the totality of true thoughts is a picture of the world"³⁵⁷ It has also led him towards his correct Tractarian method of doing philosophy. He states "The correct method in philosophy would really be the following : to say nothing except what can be said, i.e. propositions of natural science- i.e. something that has nothing to do with philosophy - and whenever someone else wanted to say something metaphysical, to demonstrate to him that he had failed to give meaning to certain signs in his propositions."³⁵⁸ Here we see that Wittgenstein has banned expression of philosophy and expression is reserved only for the sciences because the sciences deal with the concrete verifiable things of the universe and not with anything metaphysical. When Wittgenstein recommends "What we cannot speak about we must pass over in silence"³⁵⁹ He maintains silence over those subjects only e.g. metaphysics which were thrown into flames even by Hume.

Yet even as early as the Tractatus Wittgenstein has given

355. Notebooks 1914-1916 p. 108.

356. Ibid.

357. Tractatus 3.01.

358. Ibid., 6.53.

359. Ibid., 7.

a paradigmatic explanation of science. He calls his world picture signifying laws of nature as "a priori insights about the forms in which the propositions of science can be cast."³⁶⁰ These insights though useful in giving a unified description of the world need not remain fixed. One may have a choice between alternate modes of description of the world. Wittgenstein explains, "Let us imagine a white surface with irregular black spots on it. We then say that whatever kind of picture these make, I can always approximate as closely as I wish to the description of it by covering the surface with a sufficiently fine square mesh, and then saying of every square whether it is black or white. In this way I shall have imposed a unified form on the description of the surface. The form is optional, since I could have achieved the same result using a net with a triangular or hexagonal mesh... The different nets correspond to different systems of describing the world."³⁶¹ This remark of early Wittgenstein seems to be in tune with the later remarks of Wittgenstein on World - Pictures and exhibits a continuity between the two Wittgensteins the earlier and the later, at least in some aspects.

Even though Wittgenstein gives much importance to science all along the Tractatus he exhibits his dissatisfaction with science when he makes the observation that "We feel that even when all possible scientific questions have been answered the problems of life remain completely untouched."³⁶² Since my work is primarily related to Later Wittgenstein I wish to devote greater length to it and therefore now concentrate my attention to-

360. Ibid., 6.34.

361. Ibid., 6.341.

362. Ibid., 6.341.

wards his later work.

Later Wittgenstein : It has already been mentioned in Chapter 1 that language game is a source of anxiety to both the Wittgensteins, so also to the two schools of thought that he inspired, i.e. Logical Analysis and Ordinary Language Analysis Movement. However there are further aspects which one has to consider when reading Wittgenstein's views on language-games. When Wittgenstein discusses the various language games in the Philosophical Investigations he is discussing them not merely as different languages but as different language games which includes the language-game of science. . When he makes a comparison between languages (2), (8) and our everyday language he suggests that we should not consider language (2) or (8) to be incomplete languages because they consist of orders only when compared to our everyday language. His questioning whether our language was complete before the symbolism of chemistry was added points to the fact that when he is referring to a language it includes scientific language and also that no language is incomplete. For according to Wittgenstein, 'to imagine a language means to imagine a form of life.'³⁶³ Augustine's example is used as an illustration of a particular picture of the essence of human language i.e., Every word has a meaning.

In the Philosophical Investigations Wittgenstein refers to the "ostensive teaching of words." - I say that it will form an important part of the training".³⁶⁴ In the case of learning

363. Philosophical Investigations, p. 364. Ibid. 6.

a scientific language ostensive teaching can refer to experiments and training of scientists in a particular research tradition. For scientists have their own meanings associated to particular words and concepts. Further he states that "This ostensive teaching of words can be said to establish an association between a word and a thing....But if the ostensive teaching has this effect, am I to say that it effects an understanding of the word?"³⁶⁵

Wittgenstein agrees that "with different training the same ostensive teaching of these words would have effected a quite different understanding."³⁶⁶ The same thing is called by Kuhn by the name of different research traditions formed by the esoteric training received by the scientists. Kuhn has specified this only in the case of language games of science whereas Wittgenstein thinks this is true of all language games.

The views of later Wittgenstein especially in his On Certainty³⁶⁷ have a striking resemblance to the views of Kuhn as expressed in his Structure of Scientific Revolutions.³⁶⁸ Historical curiosity led me to write on Wittgenstein's anticipation of Kuhn's thoughts. My curiosity was aroused by some remarks Professor von Wright made in his book on Wittgenstein.³⁶⁹ Though von Wright does not go into the details, he has hinted at the similarity between Wittgenstein and Kuhn. I have tried to add

details to von Wright's analysis. My discussion is purely expository.

365. Ibid. 366. Ibid. 367. Trans. by G.E.M. Anscombe and G.H. von Wright, Basil Blackwell, 1977.

368. International Encyclopedia of Unified Sciences, The University of Chicago, 1962.

369. Wittgenstein, Basil Blackwell, Oxford, 1982.

tory. I shall use the short symbolic expression SSR for Structure of Scientific Revolutions and OC for On Certainty.

The key concept in Kuhn's SSR is the notion of a paradigm. To the notion of a paradigm corresponds Wittgenstein's notion of 'world-picture' as mentioned in OC. (The idea of the 'language-game' is the precursor of the idea of the 'world-picture'. Referring to this correspondence von Wright remarks, "Wittgenstein's investigations into the role of the concept of a world-picture have, I think interesting applications to the sociology of knowledge."³⁷⁰ The work on the sociology of knowledge to which he then refers is Kuhn's SSR. He finds Kuhn's paradigm to be a "good illustration for Wittgenstein's idea about the role of world-picture."³⁷¹ But von Wright does not take further steps, rather he deviates to the issue of the distinction between "the natural science and the sciences of man."³⁷² Therefore I would like to continue the steps suggested by von Wright but not actually taken by him.

Kuhn has not clearly defined what a paradigm means. In fact, Margaret Masterman has pointed out 22 different ways in which Kuhn uses the expression 'paradigm'.³⁷³ But this is not a serious objection. Though Kuhn has failed in defining a paradigm he has certainly succeeded in showing what a paradigm does. It does so many different things. He gives a justification for his failure in defining a paradigm by referring to the concept of 'family

370. Ibid., p.80. 371. Ibid., pp.180-181. 372. Ibid., p. 81.

373. Cf. "The Nature of Paradigm", Criticism and the Growth of Scientific Knowledge, Eds, Imre Lakatos and Alan Musgrave, Cambridge, 1970.

resemblance' held by Wittgenstein, i.e., giving instances of games, chairs, etc., rather than defining game, chair etc. Kuhn refers to Wittgenstein, saying, "For Wittgenstein, in short, games and chairs, and leaves are natural families, each constituted by a network of overlapping and crisscross resemblances. The existence of such a network sufficiently accounts for our success in identifying the corresponding object or activity."³⁷⁴

Thus, through the Wittgensteinian escape-route Kuhn avoids the definition of a paradigm. Instead of defining a paradigm he gives its concrete cases. And one case cannot be substituted for the other as chess cannot be played in the place of football. This becomes further evident from his introductory remark on his use of paradigm. "The concept of paradigm will often substitute for a variety of familiar notions."³⁷⁵

Kuhn wonders about the priority of concrete scientific achievements, over concepts, laws and theories. He asks, "Why is the concrete scientific achievement prior to the various concepts, laws, theories and points of view that can be abstracted from it?"³⁷⁶ According to Wittgenstein too it is the "concrete cases, which alone could have helped him to understand the usage of the general term."³⁷⁷ Here may I suggest 'paradigm' to be a general term just as 'game' or 'leaf' is a general term, and that it can be got hold of only by observing concrete particular instances. Kuhn follows Wittgenstein in drawing our attention from the general to the particular cases and so both Wittgenstein and Kuhn are anti-essentialists and therefore anti-platonists.

374. SSR. p.45.

375. Ibid., p.11.

376. Ibid.

377. The Blue & Brown Books, Basil Blackwell, Oxford, 1978 p. 19.

According to Kuhn "the study of paradigms....is what mainly prepared the student for membership in the particular scientific community....his subsequent practice will seldom evoke overt disagreement over fundamentals."³⁷⁸ Similarly Wittgenstein points out "When Moore says he knows such and such, he is really enumerating a lot of empirical propositions, that is, which have a peculiar logical role in the system of our empirical propositions."³⁷⁹ The 'propositions' of Wittgenstein which have a peculiar logical role in our system of empirical propositions are no different from the propositions that form the core of a paradigm, e.g., "whatever may happen in the future, - we know that upto now it has behaved thus in innumerable instances. This fact is fused into the foundations of our language game."³⁸⁰

Reflecting further on the nature of the core Kuhn remarks, "Men whose research is based on shared paradigms are committed to the same rules and standards for scientific practice. That commitment and the apparent consensus it produces are prerequisites for normal science, i.e., for the genesis and continuation of a particular scientific tradition."³⁸¹ But this commitment to rules does not mean that I can interpret these rules successfully or even make a list of them. As he remarks, "Lack of a standard interpretation or an agreed reduction to rules will not prevent a paradigm from guiding research."³⁸² According to his research

378. SSR p. 15.

379. OC. 130.

380. Ibid., 558.

381. SSR, p. 11.

382. Ibid., p. 44

is "aided by but does not depend upon the formulation of rules and assumptions."³⁸³ He goes to the extent of saying, "Indeed, the existence of a paradigm need not even imply that any full set of rules exists."³⁸⁴

The corresponding view held by Wittgenstein about his world-picture is as follows : "The propositions describing world-pictureare like rules of a game; and the game can be learnt purely practically, without learning any explicit rules."³⁸⁵ He further adds, "I do not explicitly learn the propositions that stand fast for me. I can discover them subsequently like the axis around which a body rotates."³⁸⁶ Wittgenstein even blames rules. He says, "Our rules leave loopholes open, and the practice has to speak for itself."³⁸⁷ Thus like Kuhn Wittgenstein accepts commitment to rules, yet this commitment does not mean that first I must learn these rules.

Corresponding to Kuhn's idea of fixed core and fluid periphery Wittgenstein states - -"It might be imagined that some propositions, of the form of empirical propositions, were hardened and functioned as channels for such empirical propositions as were not hardened but fluid."³⁸⁸ In a more picturesque way he further states, "the bank of that river consists partly of hard rock, subject to no alteration or only an imperceptible one, partly of sand, which, now in one place now in another gets washed away or deposited."³⁸⁹ In a non-picturesque way he refers to the system of beliefs formed by a child, "in that system some things stand unshakeably fast and some are more or less liable

383. Ibid.

384. Ibid., p. 11 385. OC p. 95. 386. Ibid., 152.

387. Ibid. 139.

388. OC 96.

389. Ibid., 99

to shift. What stands fast does so, not because it is intrinsically obvious or convincing; it is rather held fast by what lies around it."³⁹⁰ Elaborating on the idea of the core and periphery Wittgenstein further states, "I have arrived at the rock bottom of my convictions. And one might almost say that these foundation-walls are carried by the whole house."³⁹¹

But can there be any justification for having the propositions which we do have as the core? It seems that no justification can be given. Wittgenstein raises the question, "Does my telephone call to New York strengthen my conviction that the earth exists?"³⁹² He reacts to this question, "Much seems to be fixed, and it is removed from the traffic. It is so to speak shunted on to an unused siding."³⁹³ This shunting to an unused siding does not make it useless, rather Wittgenstein means that such facts do not require justification at every stage. In fact for Kuhn such questions do not arise at all because of the nature of paradigm initiation which is "a dogmatic initiation in a pre-established tradition that the student is not equipped to evaluate."³⁹⁴ This is an echo of Wittgenstein's view, "Now it gives our way of looking at things and our researches, their form. Perhaps it was once disputed. But perhaps, for unthinkable ages, it has belonged to the scaffolding of our thoughts."³⁹⁵

390. Ibid., 144.

391. Ibid., 248.

392. Ibid., 144.

393. Ibid. 394. "Essential Tension: Tradition and Revolution in Scientific Research." Scientific Creativity: Its Recognition and Development, Ed. Taylor & Barron, p. 345.

395. OC 136.

The world-picture of OC has its genesis in the language-game of The Blue and Brown Books.³⁹⁶ Concerning "language-games" Wittgenstein remarks in the Blue Book, "children are taught their native language by means of such games....we are not however, regarding the language games which we describe as incomplete parts of a language, but as languages complete in themselves, as complete systems of human communication."³⁹⁷ Here the requirement of language games to be complete in themselves has its analogue in Kuhn's requirement of paradigms to be complete in themselves and of paradigm initiation, i.e., of children being taught these paradigms.

In his OC too Wittgenstein often substitutes language-game for world-picture. Consider his remark, "You must bear in mind that the language game is so to say something unpredictable. I mean it is not based on grounds. It is not reasonable (or unreasonable.) It is there - - like our life."³⁹⁸ Like Kuhn's paradigm Wittgenstein's language-game or world-picture is not questioned. Its acceptance is neither rational nor irrational.

Even though the acceptance of a world-picture is neither rational nor irrational, the acceptance of one world-picture does not hold us captive forever. We do change our world view and adopt others.

Concerning the change of paradigms Kuhn points out, "When
- - - - -

396. Basil Blackwell, 1978. Further referred as BB.

397. BB p. 81.

398. Ibid., 559.

paradigms change the world itself changes with them."³⁹⁹ There is a sense in which a new paradigm brings with it a new world. As Kuhn points out, "paradigm changes do cause scientists to see the world of their research engagement differently..... after a revolution scientists are responding to a different world."⁴⁰⁰ But these scientists are not aware of the changes. As he clarifies, "If perceptual switches accompany paradigm changes. We may not expect scientists to attest to these changes directly. Looking at the moon, the convert to copernicanism does not say, "I used to see a planet, but now I see a satellite"...the scientist with a new paradigm sees differently from the way he had seen before."⁴⁰¹

Wittgenstein exhibits a similar view when he remarks, "I do not say that Moore could not convert a king to his view, but it would be a conversion of a special kind; the king would be brought to look at the world in a different way."⁴⁰² The switch from one world-picture to the other is a kind of conversion; it is looking at the world in a different way. The same idea is expressed when Wittgenstein says, "Further experiments cannot give the lie to our earlier ones, at most they may change our whole way of looking at things."⁴⁰³ But this change, this switch is not easy so long as a given world-picture has a grip over me - "What could induce me to believe the opposite ?....nothing in my picture of the world speaks in favour of the opposite."⁴⁰⁴ If I believe the opposite I must give up my present world-picture.

399. SSR p.111.

400. Ibid.

401. Ibid. p. 115.

402. OC 92.

403. Ibid. 93. 404. Ibid. 93.

Wittgenstein's remarks concerning "the conversion of natives" and "the conversion of king" and his further remark concerning the conversion "of a child to believe in God"⁴⁰⁵ have their echo in Khun. Khun considers conversion to a new paradigm as if it is a conversion to a new religion. Kuhn explains the switch from one paradigm to the other in terms of 'conversion', because the switch "must occur all at once."⁴⁰⁶ First he makes an attempt to explain this sudden change in terms of 'gestalt switch' and 'duck rabbit switch'. Later he refers to paradigm shift in terms equivalent to political and religious conversion. Talking of the decision made about paradigm conversion he states, "a decision of that kind can only be made on faith."⁴⁰⁷ Thus the switch from one paradigm to the other is based on faith, like the conversion from one religion to the other.

Kuhn's idea of two paradigms being incommensurable has an analogue in Wittgenstein, when he remarks "When children play at trains their game is connected up with their knowledge of trains. It would nevertheless be possible for children of a tribe unacquainted with trains to learn this game from others, and play it without knowing that it was copied from anything. One might say that the game did not make the same sense to them as to us."⁴⁰⁸ This remark is similar to Hanson's example of Kepler and Tycho Brahe standing on a hill watching the sun. "Kepler regarded the sun as fixed, it was the earth that moved. But Tycho

405. Ibid., 92.

406. SSR p.156.

407. Ibid. p.158.

408. Philosophical Investigations, Basil Blackwell, Oxford 1976, 282, further referred as P.I.

followed Ptolemy and Aristotle in this much at least; the earth was fixed and all other celestial bodies moved around it."⁴⁰⁹
 This raises the question whether "Kepler and Tycho see the same thing in the east at dawn?"⁴¹⁰

Kepler and Tycho Brahe in a sense see the same event but in a sense they see different things because they belong to different paradigms, and the sunrise is only one event in the string of events. According to Wittgenstein's world-picture "What I hold fast to is not one proposition but a nest of propositions."⁴¹¹
 "Our talk gets its meaning from the ⁶ret of our proceedings."⁴¹²

So whether Kepler and Tycho see the same thing will be known if the conclusions that follow from their data are the same, and obviously their conclusions are not the same.

Sometimes one may use terminology that belongs to different world-pictures or paradigms as will be evident from the history of any one scientific word like 'force' or 'atom'. Wittgenstein too considers the use of 'time' in two different paradigms. He says about the use of terms like "'five o'clock", "an hour", "a long time", "a short time" etc., in one case in connection with a clock, in the other independent of one."⁴¹³ He goes on to say that "We have now two uses of these terms, and no reason to say that one of them is less real and pure than the other."⁴¹⁴

409. Patterns of Discovery, N.R. Hanson, Cambridge Univ. Press 1958, p. 5.

410. Ibid.

411. OC 225.

412. Ibid., 229.

413. BB. p. 106 game 53.

414. Ibid.

When a person is within one paradigm or world-picture he is in the grip of, as Kuhn would put "strong network of commitments conceptual, theoretical, instrumental, and methodological."⁴¹⁵

These then are the circumstances under which a person must learn particular concepts of a paradigm. In fact, particular concepts within a paradigm make sense only because of the surrounding network of commitments. In Wittgenstein's words "we patiently examine how this sentence is to be applied. What things look like round about it"⁴¹⁶

Talking of the priority of theories or world-picture Wittgenstein states "a language-game does not have its origin in consideration. Consideration is part of a language game. And that is why a concept is in its element within the language-game."⁴¹⁷ He further states. "My judgements themselves characterise the way I judge, characterise the nature of judgement."⁴¹⁸ i.e., the acceptance of a particular world-picture characterises the way I make all further judgements. Wittgenstein adds — "Our knowledge forms an enormous system. And only within this system has a particular bit the value we give it."⁴¹⁹ He means to say that only within the vast knowledge that has been accepted, and systematised by our world-picture can individual problems find a place and be able to seek solutions. Kuhn expresses similar views in his statement — "What a man sees depends both upon what he looks at and also upon what his previous visual experience has taught him to see. In the absence of such training there can

415. SSR . p. 42.

416. Zettel 272.

417. Ibid., 391.

418. OC. 149.

419. OC 410

only be, in William James's phrase, a bloomin' buzzin' confusion."⁴¹⁹

For Kuhn the life of a science is divided into normal science and revolutionary science. Wittgenstein too makes such a distinction when he says, "It is only in normal cases that the use of a word is clearly prescribed, we know, are in no doubt, what to say in this or that case. The more abnormal the case, the more doubtful it becomes what we are to say. And if things were quite different from what they actually are ...if rule became exception and exception rule; or if both became phenomena of roughly equal frequency - -this would make our normal language-games lose their point."⁴²⁰ Thus normal scientific tradition will be shattered and revolutionary science will set in, i.e., a state of crisis will emerge.

Kuhn also considers separately how progress is made in these two stages, the stage of normal science and that of revolutionary science, which occur repeatedly in the growth and development of any mature science. I shall discuss progress in normal science first - - Kuhn points out "the reception of a common paradigm has freed the scientific community from the need constantly to re-examine its first principles...Inevitably, that does increase both the effectiveness and the efficiency with which the group as a whole solves new problems."⁴²¹ The solution of new problems surely means progress. But much importance is given to the scientific community. The scientific community plays a pivotal role

419b SSR p. 113.

420. PI 142.

421. SSR pp. 163-164.

to evaluate progress within a paradigm as well as during revolutionary science when it helps in the choice of a new paradigm. "There are losses as well as gains in scientific revolutions, and scientists tend to be peculiarly blind to the former."⁴²²

Wittgenstein's 'mistake' in a language game is similar to Kuhn's 'anomaly' within a paradigm. Emergence of anomaly has a place only in a paradigm. As Wittgenstein remarks "There is a difference between mistake for which as it were, a place is prepared in the game, and a complete irregularity that happens as an exception."⁴²³ In a similar tone Kuhn states "Anomaly appears only against background provided by the paradigm."⁴²⁴

How an anomaly leads to paradigm change is explained by Kuhn in the following words, "Anomaly appears only against the background provided by the paradigm. The more precise and far-reaching the paradigm is, the more sensitive an indicator it provides of anomaly and hence of an occasion for paradigm change."⁴²⁵ If we study closely the following remark of Wittgenstein it says a similar thing. "It would strike me as ridiculous to want to doubt the existence of Napoleon, but if someone doubted the existence of the earth 150 years ago, perhaps I should be more willing to listen, for now he is doubting our whole system of evidence. It does not strike me as if this system is more certain than a certainty with it."⁴²⁶ Doubting the existence of Napoleon

is not the rejection of the system of evidence. But doubting

422. Ibid., p. 167.

423. OC 647.

424. SSR p. 65.

425. Ibid.

426. OC 185.

the existence of the earth before 150 years leads to the rejection of our whole system of evidence, our world-picture. In order to accomodate the view that the earth did not exist before 150 years we must give up our present paradigm or world-view.

Regarding testing Wittgenstein raises some fundamental questions. He says, "An empirical proposition can be tested (we say). But how ? and through what ? What counts as its test? ---But is this an adequate test?"⁴²⁷ Wittgenstein further questions, "what is to be tested by what?"⁴²⁸ he has then bracketted the next important question" (who decides what stands fast).⁴²⁹ Kuhn has answered this bracketted question of Wittgenstein by adopting a sociological approach.⁴³⁰ According to Kuhn it is the scientific community which determines the paradigm by a common consensus and then it is this paradigm, i.e., a particular paradigm that decides 'what stands fast?' and hence also 'what is to be tested by what?' Wittgenstein too exhibits his sociological approach in the following remark, "So you are saying that human agreement decides what is true and what is false?"---It is what human beings say that is true and false, and they agree in the language they use."⁴³¹

Even within a paradigm testing can take place only, of one item at a time, one cannot doubt the whole paradigm within which something is being tested, we have to take something for granted i.e., we take the paradigm for granted. It is only within the

427. Ibid., 109-110.

428. Ibid., 125.

429. Ibid.

430. Cf. SSR p. 65.

431. PI 241.

context of a paradigm that testing can take place. As Wittgenstein too points out, "Does anyone ever test whether this table remains in existence when no one is paying attention to it? We check the story of Napoleon, but not whether all the reports about him are based on sense-deception, forgery and the like. For whenever we test anything, we are already presupposing something that is not tested. Now am I to say that the experiment which perhaps I make in order to test the truth of a proposition presupposes the truth of the proposition that the apparatus I believe I see is really there (and the like)?"⁴³² Obviously there are some things which are taken for granted, when one statement is tested it is tested on the basis of others. Even for Kuhn the statements which form the core of the paradigm are not doubted once the paradigm has been accepted.

Talking of reasoning and the tendency of clinging to the core Wittgenstein states, "If someone doubted whether the earth had existed a hundred years ago, I should not understand, for this reason : I would not know what such a person would still allow to be counted as evidence and what not."⁴³³ Because "only the accustomed context allows what is meant to come through clearly."⁴³⁴ Obviously one is not accustomed to doubt 'whether the earth had existed a hundred years ago' because in our world picture such statements are not doubted but taken for granted. as Wittgenstein elucidates - - - "so far I have no system at all within which this doubt may exist."⁴³⁵ "If someone said that

432. OC 163. 433. Ibid., 231. 434. Ibid., 237. .
 435. Ibid., 247.

he doubted the existence of his hands, kept looking at them from all sides, tried to make sure it wasn't 'all done by mirrors' etc., we should not be sure whether we ought to call that doubting. We might describe his way of behaving as like the behaviour of doubt, but, his game would not be ours."⁴³⁶ Because "The reasonable man does not have certain doubts."⁴³⁷ In fact, Wittgenstein says, "- - I cannot depart from this judgement without toppling all other judgements with it."⁴³⁸ If I wish to topple one such judgement "then in that case the foundation of all judging would be taken away from me."⁴³⁹ That is to say a paradigm or world-picture allows some doubts but doubting the foundations of a paradigm or a world-picture will only lead to its toppling. Even "to make a mistake" according to Wittgenstein "a man must already judge in conformity with mankind."⁴⁴⁰

It is not easy to give up the core and Wittgenstein states the difficulty to relent the hold on the core thus, "we shall stick to this opinion, unless our whole way of seeing nature changes. "How do you know that?" —I believe it."⁴⁴¹ Wittgenstein further states "But it isn't just that I believe in this way..... but that every reasonable person does. At the foundation of well founded belief lies belief that is not founded."⁴⁴² This however does not mean that it is, ill grounded.

Wittgenstein remarks, "Here I have arrived at the foundation of all my beliefs." This position I will hold." But isn't that

436. Ibid., 225. 437. Ibid., 220. 438. Ibid., 419

439. Ibid., 614. 440. Ibid., 156. 441. Ibid., 291.

442. Ibid., 252.

precisely, only because I am completely convinced of it? - what is 'being completely convinced like?'⁴⁴³ Wittgenstein attempts to answer this question with recourse to repeatedly confirmed experience, as seen in the following remarks. What is the belief that all human beings have parents based on? On experience But then is that really a proof? Isn't this an hypothesis, which, as I believe, is again completely confirmed? Mustn't we say at every turn. "I believe this with certainty?"⁴⁴⁴

Wittgenstein states the important role that persuasion plays in the acceptance of a particular world-picture or paradigm - "I can imagine a man who had grown up in quite special circumstances and been taught that the earth came into being 50 years ago, and therefore believed this. We might instruct him : the earth has long ...etc. - - We should be trying to give him our picture of the world. This would happen through a kind of persuasion."⁴⁴⁵ Kuhn too states similar views - - "Debates over theory-choice cannot be cast in a form that fully resembles logical or mathematical proof...that debate is about premises and its recourse is to persuasion as a prelude to the possibility of proof."⁴⁴⁶ He states more strongly that "to persuade someone is, I take it, to convince him that one's own view is superior and ought therefore, supplant his own. That much is occasionally achieved without recourse to anything like translation."⁴⁴⁷ The

same idea is expressed in Wittgenstein's remark "I wanted to

443. Ibid., 246. 444. Ibid., 240-242. 445. Ibid., 262

446. SSR p. 199. 447. Ibid., p. 156.

put that picture before him, and his acceptance of the picture consists in his now being inclined to regard a given case differently : that is to compare it with this rather than that set of pictures. I have changed his way of looking at things.⁴⁴⁸

In science it is not always reason but persuasion which has its role. Referring to the aesthetic appeal of theories Kuhn remarks, "By the time their full aesthetic appeal can be developed most of the community has been persuaded by other means."⁴⁴⁹ Referring to the element of persuasion Wittgenstein says, "I would 'combat' the other man, but wouldn't I give him reasons? Certainly : but how far do they go ? At the end of reasons comes persuasion. (Think what happens when missionaries convert natives.)"⁴⁵⁰ Of course Wittgenstein, as is obvious from this remark treats persuasion differently from Kuhn. Persuasion becomes an instrument when reasons fail. But no such distinction is maintained by Kuhn.

Wittgenstein's remarks concerning "the conversion of natives" and the "conversion of kings" and his further remark concerning the conversion " of a child to believe in God"⁴⁵¹ have their echo in Kuhn. Kuhn considers conversion to a new paradigm as if it is conversion to a new religion, Kuhn explains the switch from one paradigm to another in terms of 'conversion', because the switch must occur all at once."⁴⁵² First he makes an attempt to explain this sudden change in terms of 'gestalt switch' and

448. PI 144

449. SSR p. 156.

450. OC 612.

451. Ibid., 107. 452. SSR p. 156.

'duck rabbit switch'. Later he refers to paradigm shift in terms equivalent to political and religious conversion. Talking of the decision made about paradigm conversion he states "a decision of that kind can only be made on faith."⁴⁵³ Thus the switch from one paradigm to the other is based on faith, like the conversion from one religion to the other.

I note^{not} without some surprise that not only Wittgenstein but Kuhn too refers to different world-pictures or paradigms as different language games or different language communities. Kuhn states, "What the participants in a communication breakdown can do is recognise each other as members of different language communities and then become translators."⁴⁵⁴ He further states - "If they can sufficiently refrain from explaining anomalous behaviour as the consequence of mere error or madness, they may in time become predictors of each other's behaviour."⁴⁵⁵ However, there is a slight difference here in Kuhn's and Wittgenstein's view. Kuhn wants to refrain himself from calling a person belonging to another paradigm, mad and hopes that in time the two paradigms though disagreeable may be able to predict the behaviour of each other.

Wittgenstein on the other hand does not fear to declare the persons belonging to the other paradigm or world-picture (whom he was unable to persuade) as fool and heretic. Wittgenstein

453. Ibid., p. 158.

454. Ibid., p. 202.

455. Ibid.

states: "Where two principles really do meet which cannot be reconciled with one another, then each man declares the other a fool and heretic."⁴⁵⁶ He also considers the misunderstanding between two such paradigms to be total and there is no chance of one predicting the behaviour of the other because predictions can be made only after understanding the other person but refusing to accept it. But Wittgenstein is not only refusing to accept the other person's world-picture, he is refusing (genuinely) to understand his world-picture.

In introducing the possibility of translation Kuhn has sacrificed incommensurability. Unless I go beyond my own paradigm there is no question of understanding a thing belonging to another paradigm.

Peter Winch agrees with Wittgenstein and so does Taylor concerning the plurality of standards of rationality -- "The discourse in which matters are articulated in different societies can be very different....The standards are different, because they belong to incommensurable activities."⁴⁵⁷ However, both Winch and Taylor use this fact to arrive at incommensurable conclusions. Winch arrives at the conclusion that the plurality of rationality rules out judgements of superiority, whereas Taylor uses the plurality of rationality as the 'door to such judgements'.

Talking of scientific revolutions Kuhn states that they are "those non-cumulative development episodes in which an older

456. OC 611.

457. 'Rationality' p. 105

Rationality and Relativism, Basil Blackwell 1982
ed. Hollis & Lukes.

paradigm is replaced in whole or in part by an incompatible new one." ⁴⁵⁸ This idea of paradigm change (in part or whole) has an analogue in Wittgenstein where Wittgenstein likens a world picture to be "part of a kind of mythology." ⁴⁵⁹ And concerning this kind of mythology he says that "the mythology may change back into a state of flux, the river-bed of thoughts may shift. But I distinguish between the movement of the waters on the river-bed and the shift of the bed itself; though there is not a sharp division of the one from the other." ⁴⁶⁰ Here Wittgenstein.. has made a distinction between paradigm articulation or paradigm refinement and paradigm shift.

The aspect of paradigm articulation has been highlighted by Khun when he talks about paradigms in terms such as, "like an accepted judicial decision in the common law it is an object for further articulation and specification under new or more stringent conditions." ⁴⁶¹ Corresponding to this is Wittgenstein's remark: "Our empirical propositions do not all have the same status, since one can lay down such a proposition and turn it from an empirical proposition into a norm of description." ⁴⁶² He further remarks, "It might be imagined that some propositions were hardened and functioned as channels for such empirical propositions as were not hardened but fluid; and that this relation altered with time, in that fluid propositions hardened, and hard one's became fluid." ⁴⁶³ The above idea is similar to Kuhn's where

458. SSR p. 92. 459. OC 95. 460. Ibid., 97.

461. SSR p. 23. 462. OC 167. 463. OC 96.

he says, "The assimilation of a previously anomalous visual field has reacted upon and changed the field itself."⁴⁶⁴ However, for Wittgenstein, "the bank of that river consists partly of hard rock subject to no alteration or only an imperceptible one, partly of sand, which now in one place now in another gets washed away, or deposited."⁴⁶⁵

For Wittgenstein, "knowledge is in the end based on acknowledgement."⁴⁶⁶ He further states, "not only I know, or believe, all that but the others do too. Or rather I believe that they know, that all that is in fact so."⁴⁶⁷ This acknowledgement affirms that sociology of knowledge is the base of epistemology. Wittgenstein reiterates his position quite clearly in the following remarks where he is talking of rationality with respect to certainty. Wittgenstein regards this certainty not as something akin to hastiness or superficiality, but as a form of life."⁴⁶⁸ "I want to conceive it as something animal."⁴⁶⁹ "But doesn't it come out here that knowledge is related to a decision?"⁴⁷⁰ This decision once made need not remain fixed for all time and nor is it based on any objective criteria for, "what men consider reasonable or unreasonable alters. At certain periods men find reasonable what at other periods they found unreasonable. And vice versa."⁴⁷¹

Acceptance of a paradigm and so also its change depends on community. As Kuhn says, "Like the choice between competing

464. SSR p. 112. 465. OC 99. 466. Ibid 378

467. Ibid., 289. 468. Ibid., 358. 469. Ibid., 359.

470. Ibid., 362. 471. Ibid., 336.

political institutions, that between competing paradigms proves to be a choice between incompatible modes of community life."⁴⁷² This point is further emphasised, "As in political revolutions, so in paradigm choice -there is no standard higher than the assent of the relevant community."⁴⁷³ Similarly for Wittgenstein "we are quite sure of it' does not mean just that every single person is certain of it, but that we belong to a community which is bound together by science and education."⁴⁷⁴ "We are satisfied that the earth is round."⁴⁷⁵ Thus, Wittgenstein highlights the role of 'scientific community' and 'scientific education' in the acceptance of a world-picture.

Kuhn clearly maintains a similar position as Wittgenstein's view: stated above when he says, "there are no other professional communities in which individual creative work is so exclusively addressed to and evaluated by other members of the profession"⁴⁷⁶ Concerning education he says, "The effects of insulation from the larger society are greatly intensified by another characteristic of the professional scientific community, the nature of its educational initiation."⁴⁷⁷

During a paradigm conversion the minority that does not convert to the new paradigm is ignored and is left out of the mainstream. As Kuhn says, "There are always some men who cling

472. SSR p. 94. 473. Ibid. 474. OC 298.

475. Ibid., 299. 476. SSR p. 164. 477. SSR p. 164.

Each concept is restricted to a language-game. Consider Wittgenstein's remark, "A tribe has two concepts, akin to our 'pain'. One is applied where there is visible damage - - the other is used for stomach-ache - - "But then do they really not notice the similarity ? The question is " Is the similarity important to them ? And need it be so ? And why should their concept 'pain' not split ours up?"⁴⁸³ "But", reacts Wittgenstein "his concept just is fundamentally different from oursBut in that case it surely is as if his word could not designate the same as ours. Or only part of that. But of course it must look like that, if his concept is different."⁴⁸⁴

Mixing up two incommensurable activities feels Taylor, will only lead to confusion. He says, "The very attempt to identify separate activities here, two different goals, would have to be based on a confusion. The difference between the two...is not that they have made different selections or combinations out of the same catalogue of activities, but that their very catalogues are different and what is more incommensurable."⁴⁸⁵ By his reference to different catalogues Taylor is referring to different paradigms because 'selections or combinations' out of the same paradigm will not give rise to confusion. Confusion arises only when items from one paradigm are placed in another and an attempt is made to understand them in another paradigm. This is not possible because the meaning of each concept within

482. SSR. p. 199.

483. Z 380.

484. Ibid., 381.

a paradigm is based on the surrounding network of commitments.

Kuhn's answer to the possibility of inter-theoretic discourse is also negative though the negativeness is softened by his acceptance of the thesis of translatability. For Wittgenstein on the other hand this question as well as others like it, seek an answer with finality, as if to say once they are answered nothing else matters and he is against such seeking, such finality, because for him, "In philosophising we may not terminate a disease of thought. It must run its natural course."⁴⁸⁶

But how is the scientific community, which generally answers such questions, formed? A person who is initiated into a paradigm does not start questioning it. As Kuhn says, "his subsequent practice will seldom evoke overt disagreement over fundamentals."⁴⁸⁷

Again, the "process of learning by finger exercise or by doing continues throughout the process of professional initiation."⁴⁸⁸

Similarly Wittgenstein states, "The child learns by believing the adult. Doubt comes after belief."⁴⁸⁹ Unless one is initiated

into a paradigm the question of revolting against the paradigm does not arise. How does paradigm initiation take place? Kuhn reacts " 'normal science' means research firmly based upon (one or more past scientific achievements) achievements that some particular scientific community acknowledges for a time as supplying the foundation for its further practice. Today such achievements are recounted - - by science text-books elementary and advanced."⁴⁹⁰ The initiation into the community thus takes place

485. 'Rationality' Charles Taylor p. 98.

486. Z 382.

487. SSR p. 11. 488. Ibid., p. 47.

489. OC 160.

490. SSR p. 10.

with the help of text-books. Text-books and teachers help in the process of initiation.

Wittgenstein states his views on the text-book tradition thus, "In general I take as true what is found in text-books, of geography for example, why? I say : All these facts have been confirmed a hundred times over. But how do I know that ? What is my evidence for it ? I have a world-picture."⁴⁹¹ Why should I accept what is written in the text-books ? I accept it, because I have a world-picture and text-books are part of that world-picture.

"The child", says Wittgenstein, "learns to react, in such-and-such a way : and in reacting it doesn't so far know anything. Knowing only begins at a later level."⁴⁹² That is to say, the initiation is so smooth and begins so early that the realisation of being in a particular scientific tradition comes much later.

I began writing this section out of historical curiosity and would like to end it with Kuhn's view on the relationship between history and science. Commenting on Whitehead's views Kuhn remarks, "Whitehead caught the unhistorical spirit of the scientific community when he wrote. "A science that hesitates to forget its founders is lost." Yet he was not quite right, for the sciences, like other professional enterprises do need their heroes and do preserve their names. Fortunately instead

491. OC 162.

492. Ibid., 538.

of forgetting these heroes, scientists have been able to forget or revise their works."⁴⁹³ Kuhn has not revised Wittgenstein's work, but he has also not forgotten it. Though a sheer coincidence the structure of his SSR does coincide with some aspects of Wittgenstein's OC.

493. SSR pp. 138-139.

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