

REFOUNDING OF HOBBS'S POLITICAL PHILOSOPHY: A CRITICAL EXAMINATION

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by

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
CERTIFICATE

This is to certify that the thesis entitled **Refounding of Hobbes's Political Philosophy: A Critical Examination**, submitted to the Department of Philosophy, University of Hyderabad in fulfillment of the requirements for the award of the Degree of **Doctor of Philosophy** in **Philosophy** is a bona-fide work carried out by Mr. D. Balaganapathi under my supervision and guidance.

This work has not been submitted in any form to any other university or institute for the award of any degree.

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DECLARATION

I hereby declare that this dissertation entitled **Refounding of Hobbes's Political Philosophy: A Critical Examination** submitted for the award of the degree of **Doctor of Philosophy in Philosophy** to the University of Hyderabad embodies the result of bona-fide research work carried out by me under the supervision of Dr. A. Raghuramaraju. It has not been submitted either in part or in full for any other degree or diploma to this or any other university.


D. Balaganapathi

TO

BIT BROTHERS

Sri. D. SRI VENKATA SURYA BALA
SUBRAHMANYAM

AND

Chi. D. BALA JAYASANKAR

&

BIT WIFE

Mahalakshmi

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INTRODUCTION

Human knowledge has been classified into different disciplines. Each discipline restricts itself to a particular field of **study**, having a specific subject **matter**, discussing a particular set of **issues**, problems or concerns. At **least**, at **times**, all the disciplines are both autonomous as well as related to one another. A discipline is autonomous in the sense that it has a particular well-defined domain as its subject matter and it deals with a set of restricted and specified problems. **However**, the autonomy of the discipline does not rule out the **possibility** of any kind of relation with other disciplines. The relationship between **philosophy** and science is an interesting philosophical theme. The relationship between **philosophy** and science has at least two different contexts in the **history** of philosophy. In the classical **times**, science was construed as a part of philosophy. For **instance**, in **Aristotle**, science was based on philosophy. Aristotle placed science in the area of theoretical sciences and tried to explain it on the basis of philosophical speculation. **Thus**, in the classical times science was either founded on philosophy or at least it was a part of philosophy. **However**, this relation is inverted in the modern period where some philosophers have sought to found **philosophy** on science. **Science**, in the modern **period**, has shed its **dependency** on **philosophy** and has claimed its autonomy. It has even influenced the philosophical **thinking**, and in some philosophical schools, science has become the foundation of philosophy. Political **philosophy**, as a branch

of philosophy, is no exception to this influence of modern science. This is evident in the philosophies of the modern philosophers from Descartes through Hobbes to Logical positivists, who have contributed to this inversion.

In discussing the philosophical implications of the inversion of philosophy depending on science, it is interesting to note that scientific theories often contest their previous theories in substantiating their position. It is natural that a scientific theory could be rejected by a new one. For example, Copernicus' revolution and Einstein's 'Special Theory of Relativity' came into existence by contesting Ptolemy's theory and Newtonian mechanics, respectively. Unlike science, philosophical theories are criticised and interpreted, but never completely rejected. Popper (1959) rightly acknowledges this difference between philosophy and science.¹ In contrast, the rival social and political theories unlike their scientific counterparts exist simultaneously at different places, though they oppose each other radically. Co-existence of socialist political philosophy and liberal political philosophy in the present day world is the best available example for this. However, the case with scientific theories is not the same.² This difference between political philosophy and science results in complexities when one is dependent on the other, as it is the case

¹ It is a different matter that Popper sought to remove this distinction. He was committed to methodological monism, and suggested falsification as a common criterion to science and philosophy.

² I am not, here, concerned with the methodological discussions that are taking place in the recent times about continuity or discontinuity of the scientific theories.

with the modern period. The political philosophy of Hobbes serves as an interesting case in understanding the problems involved in basing political philosophy on science.

Though there is a continuous interest in the philosophy of Hobbes in the academic circles since 17th century there is a sudden increase in the amount of work that came up in the twentieth century. Preston King, in his introduction to Thomas Hobbes: Critical Assessments, observes that "What cannot be denied is that Hobbes's work has been paid more sustained, critical attention in the twentieth than in any preceding century..." (1993: vi). The sustained and critical attention that Hobbes commands from twentieth century scholars proves the relevance of his philosophy to our concerns, but it cannot explain the occasion for such an attention. My thesis gives an account of the reason for the sudden emergence of diverse interpretations of Hobbes that had cropped up in the twentieth century. This is the central argument of my thesis.

In this connection it is relevant to ask, how one would account for astonishingly diverse works on a particular thinker like Hobbes. Why did such a need, which amounted for the arrival of large number of works, arise? What caused such a curiosity in the twentieth century scholars? This curiosity is, further, strengthened by the fact that these are not works that particularly dealt with Hobbes's scholarship or mere studies of Hobbes's texts, rather, they are attempts to probe the monolith structure of Hobbes's philosophy and to provide alternative foundations. They seek to provide to Hobbes some connection that is lost. This is what makes one

wonder about the emergence of these works. Further, these works are major contribution in interpreting Hobbes. These works, while displaying diversity in interpreting Hobbes, nevertheless, converge on the same purpose. This converging point does give us a clue to proceed further. In order to proceed further we need to look at the reason for the emergence of the works. The reason, according to King, for the renewed interest in the twentieth century is because "He [Hobbes] was more analytical than Machiavelli, more concise than Bodin, more historical than Descartes, more 'modern' than any of them" (1993: \i). King argued that along with the specific skills of analyticity, consciousness, historicity, insightfulness and coherence Hobbes's modern attitude towards the subject made him command significant attention in the twentieth century by relating his philosophy to our times.

However, one must note here that though it is true that the skills of the author certainly attract the attention of the scholars and cause the production of the number of works on him, some times, besides these skills there can be other reasons also which may cause such an upsurge. If the skills of the author alone draw the attention of the scholars in producing works on him, then, if the author is skilled he must attract the attention of the scholars all the time, without any exception. From the words of King (above) we can understand that Hobbes did not attract the attention of the scholars all the time. Only the present century attracted the attention of the scholars more than the previous centuries. This implies that the greatness of the author alone cannot cause the production of diverse works on him. Now a relevant question that is to be asked is, what is the reason, if not the authors skills and

greatness **alone**, in the case of Hobbes, that caused the sudden increase in the works on Hobbes. **King** did not recognise the need to answer this question.

Going outside the framework of King the present thesis maintains **that**, to **appreciate** or evaluate the significance of these twentieth century attempts one **may** have to go outside Hobbes's scholarship or even look at the developments outside philosophy which might have necessitated these efforts. **However**, most of the interpreters have not discussed this aspect of the background to these interpretations earlier. This work argues that the **arrival** of the diverse interpretations cannot be answered only by looking at the developments within Hobbes's political **philosophy**. We have to go outside Hobbes's political philosophy to account for their arrival. Modern period in science started with the **discovery** of Newtonian and Galilean **theories**, which **were** accepted unquestionably until twentieth century. **However**, the emergence of Special **theory** of **Relativity** in the twentieth **century** by Einstein has caused a set back to the Newtonian and Galilean theories. These **developments**, though internal to **science**, have their own implications even outside science. Hobbes's political **philosophy** is one of the instances where the implications of the developments within science can be observed. Given the fact that Hobbes's political philosophy is based on Galileo's Resolutive-Compositive **method**,³ the sudden

³ The traditional interpreters of Hobbes generally accept that his political philosophy is founded on Galileo's '**Resolutive-Compositive**' method. Commenting on this Richard Tuck shows that both Richard Peters (**Hobbes**, 1956) and J.W.M. Watkins (**Hobbes's system of Ideas**, 1965) have demonstrated the impact of scientific

upsurge of the diverse interpretations in the twentieth century can be accounted by looking at the developments in the modern science.

Following the contestation of Galilean theories Einstein's Special theory of Relativity Hobbes's political philosophy hangs in the air without foundations. This work argues that it is in this context that the twentieth century interpretations can be accounted. Since it is difficult to discuss all the interpretations, I have taken a clue from C.B. Macpherson (1962: 9-12) who lists Leo Strauss (1936), A.E. Taylor (1938), J.H. Warrender (1957) and M. Oakeshott (1947) as the most influential intervention in Hobbes's political philosophy. These interpreters have put forward three important propositions to demonstrate the dependence of Hobbes's philosophy on scientific theories. They are, to quote Tuck, "First, that Hobbes's political theory was intimately connected with his general scientific philosophy. Second that his scientific method was the same as Galileo's, which was in turn a well established principle of scientific inquiry... namely the so called 'resolutive compositive method'. Third, that this was a method of empirical inquiry designed to elicit a moral or political science in the modern sense - something, which could be used to explain human social behavior. Few people [other than those in the second of the post Kantian traditions] would now disagree with the first of these propositions (1985: 218). This dependence has given scientific status to the political philosophy of Hobbes, making it more rigorous in methodology and helping him to construct a coherent system of philosophy, which is both rational and indubitable.

interpreters of Hobbes in the twentieth century. The present thesis confutes only to Leo Strauss, A.E. Taylor, J.H. Warrender and C.B. Macpherson's own interpretation (1962), while excluding M. Oakshott, who is not very relevant to the present endeavour. In this work, we elaborately discuss these alternative interpretations of Hobbes, which are discussed briefly by Macpherson.

Given this fundamental relation or dependency, Hobbes's political philosophy can become a good instance to understand the relationship between philosophy and science, especially the dependence of philosophy on science. Further, the complications in the inverted relationship between political philosophy and science provide a ground to bring these interpreters together. These twentieth century interpreters either implicitly or explicitly argue against the view that Hobbes's political philosophy is based on the method of natural sciences. Strauss is explicit in the rejection of science as the foundation of Hobbes's political philosophy. However, the interpretations of Taylor, Warrender and Macpherson implicitly reject the scientific foundations of Hobbes. The primary purpose of Taylor is to piece out a consistent theory of moral obligation from the philosophy of Hobbes. Warrender concentrates on constructing a coherent theory of obligation. For Macpherson, locating the possessive individualistic qualities in the seventeenth century philosophy of Hobbes is the primary intention.

Following this discussion on the relation between philosophy and science in the introduction, I will discuss, in chapter I, the impact of scientific intervention in Hobbes's political philosophy as an important instance. In this chapter, I will discuss

how Hobbes had used the scientific theories such as materialism, motion, geometric method and Galileo's Resolutive-Compositive method, as foundations in the course of the construction of his political philosophy by showing textual evidences.

The next four chapters discuss four various responses to the question about the predicament of Hobbes's political philosophy after its foundations i.e., Newtonian and Galilean theories were contested by Einstein's Special theory of Relativity. Chapter II discusses Strauss's rejection of scientific method as the basis of Hobbes's political philosophy. Strauss is explicit in his rejection, and considers 'self-observation' as the basis of Hobbes's philosophical construction. According to this view, the political philosophy of Hobbes is 'mistakenly attributed' in method and material, to natural sciences. Strauss, further, points out that the origin of the material for Hobbes was provided by the tradition through the influences of Scholastic humanism and Aristocracy, and not by the modern science. He, thus, minimizes the significance of science in the philosophy of Hobbes.

Taylor-Warrender thesis, as it is usually called, argues against the importance of scientific method in Hobbes's philosophy by establishing a discontinuity between theory of psychology and political philosophy. However, they differ regarding the basis on which Hobbes founded his philosophy. While it is 'moral imperative' which is the basis of Hobbes's political philosophy for Taylor, for Warrender it is 'moral obligation'. Taylor views it from a deontological point of view, whereas Warrender gives it a naturalistic stand. The arguments of these two philosophers shall be the subject matter of III and IV chapters, respectively.

Chapter V discusses **Macpherson's argument**, which minimises the importance of scientific method and views 'Possessive **individualism**' as the basis of Hobbes's political **philosophy**. Macpherson argues that Hobbes was able to construct his deductive system because he took it for granted that there existed a market model of **society**, which is of possessive nature. The basis **of the theory** of the political obligation of Hobbes, **therefore**, is possessive **individualism**, but not the scientific method.

In conclusion, the discussions in chapters II to V in establishing the independent status *of Hobbes's political philosophy* by providing alternative foundations will be, **further**, related to the sudden upsurge in the twentieth century literature on Hobbes. Since endorsing any one of the interpreters deviates the discussion from the main **concern**, the thesis concentrates on establishing the context of the upsurge. Though all the four interpreters that are discussed have their own major concerns in interpreting Hobbes, the thesis viewed them as responses to the developments in realm of the relationship between political **philosophy** and science. **In this way**, this work explicates the context of the recent revival in **Hobbes's** political philosophy.

My argument is not intended to undermine either Science or Political **Philosophy**, but to merely **clarify** the relation between the two. I shall not enquire into the truth or falsity of the relation. **Rather**, my questions are: what are the implications of scientific intervention to political philosophy? Does political **philosophy** lose its relevance **simply** because it tried to systematize itself with the

influence of science? Does it have to become a mere historical fact by losing its relevance? Does the political theory have to lose the relevance of its conclusions, just because it is based on a scientific theory?

CHAPTER I

SCIENTIFIC INTERVENTION IN HOBBS'S POLITICAL PHILOSOPHY

The relationship between political philosophy and science is one of the perennial problems in the history of philosophy. The perenniality of the problem lies in the fact that it has invoked and is still generating lot of debates in the philosophical circles. One of the interesting aspects of the relationship is the intervention of science into political philosophy. The intervention of natural sciences into political philosophy has marked a significant change in the history of political philosophy. This intervention has changed the outlook of the political philosophers, who started looking at the tradition with a skeptical attitude. The political philosophy of Hobbes is an interesting instance of the intervention of physical sciences into political philosophy. It is interesting because, as pointed out by Leo Strauss, "Hobbes was the first who felt the necessity of seeking, and succeeded in finding, a *nuova scienza* of man and state" (1936: 1). Macpherson reasserted the intervention of science when he said that Hobbes 'had truly caught the spirit of the new science that was transforming man's understanding of the natural world. This was the spirit of Galileo – bold hypothesis and closely reasoned deduction from it, to reach propositions that would match and explain the phenomena ...' (1968:10).

This chapter discusses the political **philosophy** of **Hobbes** as an instance in the relationship **between** philosophy and **science**, more specifically political philosophy and **modern** science.

Hobbes was the first modern political philosopher to use science as a foundation of a social **theory** (Habermas: 1977: 56, **61**). Dissatisfied with the traditional methods of **philosophizing**, which he thought had complicated the **problems**, instead of solving **them**, he criticized traditional philosophy for being 'a dream than a science'. He rejected the classical doctrines like Aristotle's physics and metaphysics. His rejection of classical doctrines does not imply that he did not **give** any value to the traditional way of knowledge. **In** the words of Strauss, Hobbes:

...**certainly** knew and valued the joys of knowledge no less than any other philosopher: but these joys are for him not the justification of philosophy: he finds its justification only in the benefit of man i.e., the safeguarding of man's life and the increase of human power (1936:34).

Traditional ways of **knowledge**, for Hobbes, cannot become the justification of **philosophy**, for the sole justification of philosophy lies in safeguarding the **life** of man and increasing the human power. The benefits of this kind were sought to be attained by using science to political philosophy. His interest in the developments in modern natural sciences made him base political philosophy on the scientific method.

Hobbes's system of science is a synthesis of three parts: Materialism or Physics. Psychology and Civil philosophy. These three correspond to the three basic structures of human existence: Body. Man and Civil society. According to C.B. Macpherson, Hobbes intended to start his philosophy with:

of Body, which would set out the first principles of motion: *of man*, which would consider man as one kind of body in motion and would explain his **sensations, desires**, and behavior as results of his internal motion and the impact on it of external motions; and *of the citizen*, which would show what these motions would necessarily lead to and how their result might be altered for the better by knowledge of these laws and by rational fore thought (1968:19).

In this way, Hobbes conceived the project of a **system** of philosophy in three **parts**, the first dealing with **body**, which is physics: the second with the man, his physiology and **psychology**, and third with the artificial body, i.e., civil society. He used the method that was used for physics by Galileo to **all** the three parts of **philosophy**, i.e., to **physics, psychology** and political philosophy.

Hobbes on Science

Before discussing the influence of science on Hobbes, let us **clarify** his notion of science. He equates science with philosophy and uses both words interchangeably. This equation is **clearly** evident in Leviathan when he says: "**Knowledge of the**

Consequences of one Affirmation to another... is called *science*.... And this is the knowledge required in a **Philosopher**." (1968:147) Further, he says, "The Registers of Science ... are commonly called *Books of Philosophy*." (1968:148) The reason for this equation is his **deep-rooted** conviction **that**, only the methods of science are infallible and can lead to sound conclusions. **Therefore**, **philosophy** should be scienticised. He was convinced that only practical efficacy of the scientific method can provide a solution in resolving the perennial problems of **philosophy**. Science or philosophy for him is not mere prudence rather it is an analyses of ratiocination that articulates the possibility of knowing the **whatness** of the things.

As it is stated above, Hobbes in **Leviathan** defines science as, "**Knowledge of the Consequence of one Affirmation to another**". (1968:147) According to this **definition**, science demonstrates the consequences of the affirmations. The affirmations have names as their elements and connections between these names to one another are called affirmations. Science proceeds from names to affirmations made by the relation of one to another till the knowledge of all the consequences of names pertaining to the subject in hand are reached. It begins with the imposition of **names**, which serves to remember the things named and function either as marks or signs. **Science**, in this **way**, for him, is also imposition of **names**, the analysis of meanings through definitions and construction of syllogism basing on ratiocination. **It** is often **described** as the process of unpacking of definition and the proper ordering of the names and terms. Consequences are the conclusions at which one arrives after examining the connections of affirmations to one another.

Hobbes makes a distinction between knowledge of facts and knowledge of **science**, and argues that the former is the thing of the **past**, which is irrevocable. But the later has a practical utility in the sense that once we know we have the knowledge we can demonstrate it and can also use it in the future course of **action**. **Knowledge** of facts deals with the dependence of one fact upon another. **If we have** the knowledge of this dependence then we know what causes produce what effect and what consequences **follow** from what affirmations. To quote Hobbes:

Science is the knowledge of **Consequences**, and dependence of one fact upon another: by **which**, out of that **we** can presently do, we **know how** to do something else **when we will**, or the **like**, another time: Because when we see how **any** thing comes **about**, upon what **causes**, and by what manner: when the like causes come into our **power**, we see how to make it produce the like effects (1968:115).

This definition of science or philosophy stresses the importance of not only the theoretical knowledge of the cause and the effect or affirmations and **consequences**, but also the practical aspect of the ability to produce the effects or consequences in similar situations. **In** addition, Hobbes points out that science is not just the knowledge of 'what **causes**', in 'what manner' produce 'what **effects**', but the **ability** to recognize that the same cause will produce the same effect. According to **him**, if we have scientific knowledge then we know what cause **will** produce what effect in what manner. **Further**, he explains science as, "...the knowledge of effects

based on true reasoning from other knowledge of causes or knowledge of causes based on true reasoning from knowledge of effects.” (**English Works of Thomas Hobbes**¹: 1839-45: 3) **Knowledge**, either of the causes from the effects or the effects from the **causes**, which is based on true reasoning is explained as science. Reason means nothing but **reckoning**, which is adding and subtracting of **consequences**, and is attained by industry or practice.

Science, defined in this way, for **him**, signify two things - one, that it is demonstrative in nature and two, that it is the knowledge of the relations between causes and effects. The causal nature of the scientific knowledge is based on the mechanistic explanation of **nature**, which stresses the importance of **experimentality**.²

The definition of **science**, as a demonstration of the relations between consequences and **affirmations**, include certain branches of **knowledge**, such as Civil Philosophy and Natural science and exclude Theology, Civil and Natural History.

¹ Hereafter **EW**.

² One important observation in this **regard**, pointed out by Douglas Jesseph, is that the traditional scholastic understanding of science is in no way different from Hobbes's definition when it comes to the fact that scientific understanding must be rooted in the knowledge of causes. **However**, the **Scholastic-Aristotelian philosophy** rejects the mechanical explanation of the natural phenomena which is accepted by Hobbes and bases itself on **non-mechanical** principles like substantial forms and final causes. (1996: 87)

Astrology **and teaching** about **God's** Worship. This exclusion is grounded on the tension between certainty and uncertainty of knowledge that these branches of learning impart. **However**, he does not deny the existence of non-scientific branches of **study**, **rather**, he drops these branches from the scientific status. Value to these **non-scientific** branches of **knowledge** is dropped only when they don't lead us from causal reasoning to true and certain conclusions. **However**, he states that sometimes even a **non-scientific** subject complements or aids science.

Science in Hobbes:

Hobbes, following modern **science**, sought to restore credibility to **philosophy**, which was lacking in all previous philosophical methods. More **specifically**, with the influence of his **contemporary** scientific **developments**, he applied **Materialism**, Law of **Motion**, Geometric method and 'resolutive-compositive method* or Analytic-Synthetic Method to his political philosophy. Let us **briefly** discuss these in the following.

Materialism:

Following materialistic conception of **reality**, he argues that matter is the **only** **reality** and it can be either matter or something produced out of matter. All the objects of nature are products of **matter**, and they exist as ultimate physical particles or as compounds of these ultimate particles. He rejects the existence of non-materialistic things such as spirit or soul. The seemingly non-physical entities such

as space and **time**, or thought or logical relations are the attributes of mind. Mind is a material **phenomena**, a complicated series of physical motions. To quote Hobbes:

...the *Universe*, that is, the whole masse of all things that are is Corporeall, that is to say, Body: ... and consequently **every** part of the *Universe*, is **Body**, and that which is not **Body**, is no pan of the Universe: And because Universe is All, that which is no part of it, is Nothing. <1968:689)

It follows from the above quote **that**, material **body** is the only existent reality. **Body** is something which has an independent existence from our thought and which is extended in some part of space.

All **sensations**, emotions and **feelings**, he **argued**, emerge from the human **body** as a result of the perception of external objects. **Thus**, human behavior is determined by the **material** objects that act from outside.

Law of motion:

Another significant aspect along with matter in the philosophy of Hobbes is motion. **Motion**, together with matter plays an important role in explicating a mechanistic model. He explains motion as the cause of all things that have a cause. He relates motion to all existent **things**, in other **words**, to all corporeal **things**, which have a cause. This leads him to the conclusion that only material things exist and they have motion as the cause of their movements. He also explains motion in terms

of place. He **says**, "**Motion** is change of place." < 1968:693) This definition explains motion as something that changes its place always. According to **him**, "life is nothing but the motion of limbs."³ He recognizes **eternality** of motion as something **natural**, when he says that:

When a body is once in **motion**, it **moveth**, (**unless** something else hinders it) eternally. (1968:88)

In this way, he states that since the motion is eternal it is also natural to material bodies. He accepted the **Law** of inertia of Galileo. Galileo while opposing the traditional conception of the **theory** of **motion**, which states that motion comes to the object because of some external **force**, argued that motion is natural to the objects and **all** objects stay in motion until something obstructs the movement. **If** something hinders a moving **body**, it will not stop the movement instantaneously, but in a period of time. **Hobbes's** explanation of *Sense*, *Imagination*, *Memory* and *Speech* include motion as the basis. For **instance**, while explaining the *Sense*, he **states**, the 'qualities called *Sensible* ' are nothing but "so many several motions of the matter' that in turn produce "divers **motions**, for motion produceth nothing but **motion**.' (1968: 86) He

³ Alexander **Rose**, a **contemporary** of Hobbes, has refuted the argument that life is the motion of limbs. He argued on the one hand that there is life even if there is no motion like in sleep or in hysterical paralysis. And on the **other hand**, there is motion without life "as in a wooden leg.' Thus, Rose concluded by saying that life is cause of the motion and not vice versa (in John Bowie: 1969, 65).

states that all **sensations**, emotions and feelings emerge from the human **body** as a **result** of perception of external objects. Human behavior is determined by outside material objects.

Further, **Hobbes** explains two kinds of motions: one, *vital motions*, which begins in generation and continues without interruption through out the whole **life**, such as blood **circulation**, **pulse**, **breathing**, etc. And two, *voluntary motions*, such as motions involved in **speaking**, moving etc.. as willed by the human minds. The first one is the basis of all physical life and the **second**, the basis of all social and civil life/

⁴ Hobbes made a radical shift in the assumptions of political philosophy. This shift is similar to that of Galileo's reversal of the formulation of **law** of uniform motion. Galileo reversed the earlier **view** of the **law** of **motion**, which states that an object at rest would stay the same unless something moves it: by assuming that an object in motion would stay in motion unless something stops it and its motion does not require the continual application of outside force. Hobbes instead of finding rights and obligation only in some outside **force**, which was the case before him, "assumed that they were entailed in the need of each human mechanism to maintain its **motion**." (Macpherson: 1962: 77) The revolution that he brought in moral and political philosophy, Macpherson **argued**, constituted in the assumption that "equal right was entailed in equal need for continued **motion**."

Matter and **motion**, formed the subject matter of the philosophy of **Hobbes**, to which he applied the methods of natural sciences in order to demonstrate his civil philosophy. This makes the influence of the methods of Newtonian and Galilean sciences on his works profound. They guided **him** to achieve **his** objective of making political philosophy a **science**, on the basis of rigorous methodology.

The contribution of mechanistic psychology to **Hobbes's** political philosophy is clearly evident in **Leviathan**. **Hobbesian** physics explains man in terms of material and **motion**, i.e., man as a material being acted upon by the world. Man is said to be governed by **appetites, passions, imaginations**, and emotions. The object of perception is **motion**, which enters to our minds through sensation. To quote Hobbes, "... **there** is no conception in a mans **mind**, which hath not at **first, totally**, or by **parts**, been begotten upon the organs of Sense. The rest are **derived** from that originall." (1968:85) The effects of matter in motion becomes **light, figure, color, sound, odor, savor**, heat, **cold, hardness**, softness in man. All the conceptions of man originate first through the sense organs. **Memory** and imagination come from the image of the object that brain retains after the object is removed from the sense. Hobbes calls these obscure motions as decaying sense and says that these are the **phantasms**, which make up our thinking material. When **language**, i.e., naming of the **objects**, is added to thinking the computation with the words becomes possible. This computation or **reckoning**, which is adding and subtracting of **names**, is called reason. All our thinking is subjected to sense and it is either rooted in science or experience. Thinking that is rooted in science is rational and thinking that is rooted in experience is out of sensations.

Few memories stimulated by new sensations produce harmful consequences and lead to the feeling of aversion. Few other memories, which are pleasant, produce a feeling of pleasure or desire. The pleasure and pain or aversion and desire emerge from the physical forces of attraction and repulsion and lead to a consecutive action.

Hobbesian account of motion of the mind extends beyond sensation and cognition to passions. Passions are understood as after effects of sense. When we see something, the thing imparts motion to the inner most part of the organ of sight, which is sensation and make the mind cognize the object. The motion and agitation of the brain, which we call conception, can be 'continued to heart, and there by called passion.' The heart controls circulation of the blood, which is the 'vital motion' in the body. When the motion derived from an act of sense encourages vital motion, man experiences pleasure at the sight, smell or taste of the object and increases his contact with the object so as to prolong or intensify the pleasure, which is passion.

Since life itself is but motion we can never be in tranquility. This implies that we can never be without desire or sense, which are consequences of simple forces of motion. Human life can never be without desire and fear. Desire is unending and fear is permanent. These two, desire and fear, are the natural conditions of life, which makes the life of man 'solitary, poor, nasty, brutish and short.' This, further, leads to the state of war, which is war of every one against every one. State of war forces people to think of avoiding fear of death and Hobbes's political philosophy is based on this self-interest.

Geometric method:

Hobbes's chance reading of the **geometry** of Euclid at the age of forty **literally** changed his **life** and introduced him to a mode of reasoning that he later sought to transfer to natural and civil philosophy. (Aubrey, 1950: 332) According to this **method**, the physical world is a mechanical system under which anything that happens is to be explained in terms of a preceding event. **Identifying** man with **matter**, he begins his explanation with the **law** of motion and goes on to build his **philosophy** on the basis of geometric method.

The importance of **geometry** is due to the fact that **geometry** studies the general **law** of motion. All human techniques and arts are special cases of human actions which in **turn**, are nothing but special cases of motions. Geometry is that part of **philosophy**, which studies the **effects**, figures and **properties**, resulting from the notion of moving bodies. Since all arts are special applications of **geometrical theorems**, studying the properties of these moving **bodies**, Hobbes **concludes**, that the geometrical method is the method of philosophy.

The two important features of **geometry** that he was attracted to **were**; one, **carefully analyzed**, defined and explicated **terms**, which form the beginning of the argument and make the conclusions '**indisputable**.' And two, the precision and exactitude of the **arguments**, which leaves no room for any doubt regarding the **validity** of the conclusions. This is the reason why **geometry** is regarded as 'the only

science that it hath pleased God hitherto to bestow on **mankind**." (Hobbes, 1968: 105)

Hobbes argues that once the true definitions of a system have been introduced then all its properties can be **easily** demonstrable by one who understands the relevant definitions. Based on this **assumption**, it is argued that civil **philosophy** is also **demonstrable**, because as man creates the **commonwealth**, its causes are **fully knowable** to **men**, and therefore there is room for a genuinely demonstrative science of **commonweahh**.

Resolutive-Composive method:

Although **geometry** can completely **satisfy** the **criteria** for genuine scientific **knowledge**, its application is left with a serious problem. The precision and exactitude of the geometric method is based on the simple self-evident propositions that are employed in the beginning of the deductive process. Simple **elementary** and clearly defined propositions that form the beginning of the geometric deduction **signify** the **validity** of the conclusions. That means geometric method starts from the simple **primary propositions, which** are themselves definitions and the principles *of* demonstration. **However**, the problem involved here is '**how** to arrive at such **primary** propositions in political **philosophy**?' **Now** the problem for Hobbes is - how to reach such basic **primary propositions**, which need no further explanation.

Commenting on **this**, Macpherson says:

To do this he needed a hypothesis more specific than the general one about **motion**, and he needed a method more inclusive than the deductive method **of geometry**. (1968: 25)

Since the application of **geometric** method to political philosophy is not **possible**, as it is not possible to reach the indubitable definitions in political philosophy Hobbes looked for a **new** method which can give the exactitude of the Geometry. This necessitated him to look for a **"two-part method, which would show how to reach such simple starting propositions**, as well as what to do when one had them. Hobbes found it in the method used by Galileo – the **'resolutive-compositive' method**" (Macpherson, 1968: 25-6)⁵. This method is also known as analytic synthetic

⁵ J.W.N. Watkins (1965) observes that in his social contract argument Hobbes is **implicitly** making a certain kind of use of the **'resolutive-compositive'** method expounded by the Pauduan scientists of his day such as **Harvey** and Galileo. This methodological doctrine of resolution and composition was developed in the sixteenth **century** by Italian philosophers known as the **'School of Padua'**, whose most famous exponent was Jacopo Zabarella (1532-89). Galileo was strongly influenced by this school. Some modern interpreters of Hobbes like Leo Strauss. Macpherson also argued that **Hobbes's** conception of analysis and synthesis is an inheritance from Galileo. Douglas Jesseph (1996: 95) argued **that**, though there is no

method. According to this **method**, the best way to understand a system or a process is to resolve it into its **components**, analyze these **components**, and then recompose or synthesize them via a **theory** that explains their interrelationships and interactions. Galileo applied this method and explained all the physical phenomena in terms of simple forces of motion. For him, resolution part is an exercise in imagination. This exercise assumes that the observable thing to be explained is a compound effect of some simple unobservable factors. Hobbes borrowed this method from Galileo to make his political philosophy scientific. This borrowing may raise a question about the **originality** of Hobbes's contribution to political philosophy. Douglas Jesseph argues that though Hobbes has no **originality** in distinguishing between analytic and synthetic methods from his previous **philosophers**, he adds slightly different twist by phrasing them in terms of causes and effects. To quote Jesseph:

In the Hobbesian scheme the difference between analysis and synthesis lies in the comparison between the order of reasoning and the order of cause and effect: to reason analytically is to proceed from effects to (possible) **causes**, where as the synthetic mode of reasoning follows the natural causal order and moves from causes to effects. (1996:92-3)

doubt that Galileo also employed the technique of analysis and **synthesis**, there no evidence of direct connection between Hobbes and Galileo.

Apart from the **originality** of order of reasoning and order of cause and **effect**, the application of the method is also an original contribution of **Hobbes** to political philosophy. According to Macpherson this application of the method is both 'difficult and simpler than the science of mechanics.' (1968:26) It is difficult because political philosophy is concerned with the motions of men in relation to each other and these motions are complex and difficult to understand than the motions of mere physical objects. And it is simpler because since men are the parts of the political **organization**, they can have direct knowledge of the motions within themselves. Hobbes describes his application of the **resolutive-compositive** method as:

...for as in a **watch**, or some such small **engine**, the **matter**, **figure**, and motion of the wheels cannot well be **known**, except it be taken in sunder and viewed in parts: so to make a more curious search into the rights of States and duties of **Subjects**, it is necessary. (I say, not to take them in **sunder**, but yet that) they be so **considered**, as if they were dissolved. (*i.e.*) that wee rightly understand what the quality *of* the human nature is. ... and **how** men must be agreed among **themselves**, that intend to **grow** up into a well-grounded State. (1983:32)

Hobbes sought to construct **coherent**, theoretical explanations from simple basic factors by applying the scientific technique of - **resolve**, idealize and **recompose** - to political philosophy. In accordance with Galileo **Hobbes's** application of **resolutive** part of the method is also an exercise in imagination. The process of

resolution takes us to the fundamental causes or the first principles from which all the phenomena of nature are **derived**. In this **connection**, it is important to note that the resolution or dissection involved here need not be taken as literal. Regarding the investigation of the basic principles of nature it is sufficient to perform a 'thought **experiment**' in which natural phenomena are resolved only in thought. Using this thought **experiment**, he derives motion and matter as the basic principles of all the natural **phenomena**, and individual as the basic part of the civil society. **Here**, it is **necessary** to quote Hobbes's own statement that stresses the need of the thought experiment:

Civil philosophy is **demonstrable**, because we make the commonwealth ourselves. But because of natural bodies we **know** not the **construction**, but seek it from the **effects**, there lies no demonstration of **what** the causes be we seek it from **effects**, there lies no demonstration of what the causes we seek for, but only of what they might be. (**EW**, VII. 184)

This explanation states that it is not the physical dissection that is involved in resolution but it is the resolution in thought. Hobbes with the help of motion and matter as the basic principles explains all natural phenomena and also the composition of civil **society**. He had in imagination reduced the motions of man to simple forces of **matter** and motion. These are self-evident to any reasonable inquirer. He also believed that his rational composition of these factors was so

logically correct that no honest inquirer could disprove their validity. Hobbes expresses this fact **clearly** in his introduction to **Leviathan**. He says:

Whosoever looketh into **himself**, and considered! what he **doth**, when he does *think, opine, reason, hope, feare, & C.* and upon what gourdns: he shall thereby read and **know**, what are the **thoughts**, and Passions of all other men. upon the like occasions .. **[and]** when I shall have set down my own reading **orderly**, and **perspicuously**, the pains left **another**, will be **onely** to **consider**, if he also find not the same in himself. For this kind of **Doctrine**, **admitteth** no other Demonstration. (1968: 82-3)

Hobbes, **thus**, felt that there is no need of showing the guesswork and logical trial and error by which he arrived at his postulates. That is the reason why he does not take his readers through the process of **resolution**, instead starts right away with the postulates and the compositive reasoning. It is for this **reason**, that some of his interpreters like C.B. **Macpherson** contended that his use of **resolutive-compositive** method is partial. Hobbes, to quote Macpherson, "...does not take us through the resolutive stage of his **reasoning**, but starts us straight away with the postulates and

the compositive reasoning." (1968: 29)⁶ However the application of the method is not **partial**, and reasons are given for omitting the resolute part in its application.

To sum up, the method that **Hobbes** used is 'resolute-compositive' method and he takes note of matter and motion but not **soul**, and studies matter according to scientific methods of his time. Using the resolute part of the **method**, he first refers to individuals as the basic parts of a **society**, and then refers to motion and matter as the basic elements of **every** physical set up. Following Galileo's law of **inertia**, which

⁶ Macpherson pointed out this partial use of scientific **theory** only to say **that**, as in most scientific theories the order in which it is presented is **different** from the order in which it was discovered. (1968: 30) According to Richard Peters, **Hobbes's** method did not in fact provide him new **truths**. It only helped him to systematize opinions that are as old as Thucydides, which is the earliest work produced by Hobbes, before he got introduced to the science. (1956: 46) However, Richard A. **Talaska**, contended this view and argued that '**Hobbes** also used his method to serve for **invention**.' (1988: 210) While criticizing Hobbes's use of science, Richard Tuck stated that, Hobbes 'offered a science: but when one takes a closer look would **find** that his science is of an extremely exiguous kind. By clearing **away** all that he thought **doubtful**, he was left with a bare *a priori* **materialism**, according to which the universe must consist of material objects causally interacting with one **another**, but the real character of these objects and their interactions is unknown **able**.' (1985:114>

regards motion as the basis to **everything**, he expounded a materialistic **philosophy**. The basic pillars of his philosophy are **'Matter'** and **'motion'**. Hobbes's materialism is a bridge between science and mechanics and its logic is as elegant and brittle as any to be found in political thinking. **In** using science as the foundation for his **philosophy**, he undoubtedly thought that he had discovered the key for unlocking the door to a true political **philosophy**, which would at the same time furnish an irrefutable foundation for political order. This can be seen as an attempt by him to transform political philosophy into science. By doing so he thought he could bridge the gap between speculation and practice. With the use of different scientific theories that were prevalent in his time, **Hobbes** became an important instance in the process of the transformation of political philosophy into science.

The above understanding of **Hobbes'** s political philosophy being based on scientific **method**, particularly "resolutive-compositive" method and its continuity from materialism to political **philosophy** through psychology can be named as a traditional interpretation. According to this interpretation Hobbes deduced the civil society from his theories of matter and motion **by** following deterministic psychology. The civil **society** is resolved into its basic **parts**, i.e., individuals and individuals are further deduced to their basic **elements**, matter and **motion**, by following a strict determinism. **In** this way, the traditional interpretation claims two aspects in Hobbes: 1. That Hobbes's **philosophy** is a unified **system**, or to use C.B. **Macpherson's** phrase 'monolithic structure' and. 2. That the basis of this structure is science.

However, this traditional interpretation of representing Hobbes's philosophy as a monolithic structure has been contested subsequently. The monolithic structure has been **probed**, attacked and broken up, as it is said by Macpherson, to 'rescue a substantial part of it from what were thought to be fatal weaknesses in other parts.' (1962: 9) According to Macpherson the first wedge to break the monolith was driven between Hobbes's **theory** of materialism and his political **philosophy**, which reached its culmination in Strauss's work **The Political Philosophy of Hobbes, Its Basis and Genesis** (1936). The second wedge between **empiricistic** psychology and political philosophy was driven by A.E. Taylor in his article "The Ethical Doctrine of Hobbes" (1938). Similar **view** with a few differences was expressed by Warrender in his work **The Political Philosophy of Thomas Hobbes: His Theory of Obligation** (1957). These interpretations of the modern period which opposed the traditional interpretation by probing and breaking the monolithic structure can be named as the modern interpretations of Hobbes.

Stuart **Brown Jr.**, while discussing these modern interpretations states that there are at least three reasons why these interpretations radically oppose the traditional interpretation. They are:

1. There are passages in Hobbes's **works**, which discusses obligation in terms of language that cannot be explained by the traditional interpretation. These passages assert that men are obliged *in fore interno* to keep covenants even in state of nature and **list** the duties of the sovereign to his subjects. **In contrast**, following traditional

interpretation we understand that obligation has its origin **only** in civil **society** made through a contract and the sovereign has absolute authority and has no duties towards his subjects. From **this**, one assumes that either Hobbes is 'systematically inconsistent' or that the traditional interpretation is 'some how mistaken and **in** need of substantial revision.' Since the first alternative does not lead us **anywhere**, the modern interpretations have chosen the second alternative.

2. Since the traditional interpretation assumes continuity between psychological egoism and political **philosophy**, if the psychological egoism is false then the political philosophy must also be either untenable or false. Hobbes's descriptive account of psychological egoism now seems incredibly crude and plainly false. Hence if we are to take him seriously we must **look** at the traditional interpretations with deep suspicion. This suspicion must start with the assumption that his ethical theory could turn out to be **logically** independent of his philosophy.

3. Even if Hobbes did not distinguish between his **theory** of empirical **psychology** and political **philosophy**, we should now distinguish between these two and determine whether Hobbes could in principle have done so without damaging his philosophy.
(1959:306)

For these reasons the modern interpretations of **Hobbes** given by Strauss, Taylor, **Warrender**, and **Macpherson** have taken a view that is **radically** opposed to the traditional interpretation. **In contrast**, they argued that science is not the basis of Hobbes's philosophy. **In** order to substantiate this argument they probed the monolithic structure projected by traditional interpretations and broke it. **They** claimed **discontinuity** in the philosophical system of **Hobbes**, between **materialism**, **psychology** and political philosophy. This led them to establish the independence of political philosophy. **Now** the interesting aspect to be studied is the occasion for the arrival of these modern interpretations. What is the reason that occasioned such an upsurge in the works on Hobbes? Is it the developments in Hobbesian studies that occasioned this upsurge or the developments in the field of the discipline political philosophy? The occasion of this upsurge cannot be understood only by looking at the developments within either Hobbesian studies or political **philosophy**. Though it is true that the attitude of the authors of Hobbesian studies has changed during the twentieth **century**, the studies themselves cannot occasion the upsurge. There must be some other happening that occasioned the upsurge. This occasion is the developments within the field of science.

As already **stated**, the twentieth **century** developments in **science**, especially Einstein's Special **theory** of **Relativity**, contested the earlier theories of science such as **theories** of **Newton** and Galileo. With the background of these developments the sudden upsurge in Hobbes's studies in the twentieth century can be understood with more clarity. These developments in science indirectly occasioned the upsurge in the Hobbesian studies. They have changed the outlook of the modern interpreters of

Hobbes and made the probe into Hobbesian monolith possible. Wittingly or unwittingly, the modern interpreters were influenced by the developments in science. The following chapters discuss the attempts of Leo Strauss, A.E. Taylor, Warrender and Macpherson in providing alternative interpretations of Hobbes.

In chapter II, Leo Strauss's interpretation of Hobbes's political philosophy is discussed. According to him, Hobbes's political philosophy is based on the method of 'self-observation'.

CHAPTER II

LEO STRAUSS: SELF-OBSERVATION

This chapter discusses Leo Strauss, who, according to Macpherson, along with others,¹ driven a wedge between natural science and political philosophy of Hobbes, making the latter independent of the former. This provides an alternative foundation and thus, rescues it from the problems internal to sciences.² The traditional view of Hobbes argues that there is a logical and philosophical continuity from the theory of physics to the civil philosophy through the theory of psychology. Strauss rejects the traditional interpretation by pointing out the inconsistencies that are involved in it and advocates a discontinuity between Hobbes's philosophical materialism and political theory.

¹ G.C. Roberston (1886) and John Laird (1934) are the other interpreters of Hobbes who belong to this wedge between political philosophy and natural science.

² Other interest of Strauss is to look at Hobbes as a 'key to the understanding' of the real character of modernity, and also as a founder of novel doctrines of 'political hedonism' and 'political atheism' which gave modernity its distinctive character. However, this aspect is not the main concern of the present discussion.

Strauss argues that Hobbes's political philosophy is independent of natural science in both method and material. The political philosophy of Hobbes, he **claims**, was mistakenly **attributed**, in method and **material**, to the natural science. According to this mistakenly attributed **view**, the method that Hobbes used was Galileo's 'resolutive-compositive' method and the material was provided by mechanistic psychology. However, criticizing this **view** Strauss argues that the political philosophy of Hobbes is actually based on **self-observation** for its method and moral psychology for its content. The moral psychology, in turn, is based on the fear of violent death.

To establish the independence of Hobbes's political philosophy from natural science,³ Strauss makes a distinction between 'form' or method and 'content' or material in Hobbes's political philosophy. Method is the approach based on which conclusions are **drawn** from the premises. It supports the **content**, like skeleton supports the flesh and Mood of the human body. It helps and systematizes the material in a specific order so as to **draw** conclusions. Material is the content or the flesh and

³ Watkins explains three factors responsible for encouraging 'Hobbes scholars' to think that civil philosophy is independent of science. To quote Watkins, "Firstly, they have tended to look for some linear connection between his philosophy and the premises of his civil philosophy. **Second**, they have tended to identify, Hobbes's 'philosophy' with his materialism. So that their question became; Does Hobbes's materialism entail the psychological premises of his civil **philosophy**? And to this the answer is **surely** NO. **Third**, they have tended to support that the third section of his philosophy came first and does not need the other two" (1965: 11).

blood of the theory. Material **is** that which is obvious in a given theory and method is the **one**, which is applied **underlyingly**. Strauss first proves the origin of material as **pre-scientific** rather **non-scientific**. The material is **pre-scientific** in the sense that it was developed even before **Hobbes** was introduced to science. It is **non-scientific** because it developed independent of the scientific influence. This is substantiated by bringing a distinction between naturalistic and anthropological aspects. Naturalistic aspect is the one that is developed as a part or annex of natural science. And the understanding of human nature developed by **self-observation** and experience is regarded as anthropological aspect. According to him, the anthropological **aspect**, and not the naturalistic **aspect**, that is based on natural **sciences**, which forms the base for the **Hobbesian** political philosophy. **Further**, the origin **of** the material of Hobbes has its basis in tradition and not in natural science.⁴ He substantiates this claim by elucidating the early influences of Aristotelianism and Scholastic humanism on Hobbes before he turned to **science**, where the importance of '**self-observation**' is emphasized over the method of natural sciences. The principle of **self-observation**, which '**is** discovered by the efforts of **self-knowledge** and **self-examination** of every one" is the basis for the origin of the **Hobbes's** political philosophy. **Strauss, thus**, argues that **self-observation** is the method and the fear of death is the basis *of* the political obligation of Hobbes. This led him to argue that not only material but even the method that Hobbes adopted for his political philosophy was **non-scientific**.

⁴ **However**, the traditional **material**, according to **Strauss**, was given an **entirely** **untraditional** meaning in **Hobbes's** work". (1936:4)

Let us discuss the arguments of Strauss in **detail**, first by taking his rejection of traditional **interpretation**, and then by looking at his projection of **self-observation** as the method and fear of death as the basis of Hobbes's political philosophy.

Method and Material:

According to **Strauss**, Hobbes was the first philosopher to answer coherently and exhaustively the two principle questions of political **philosophy**, namely, what is man's right life and what is the right ordering of society. Right life for him is commodious living without the fear of death. It is the life which **every** man desires. Right order of **society** is the order that should be there to make the life of people **commodious**, which for Hobbes is the maintenance of peace and protecting the life of the people in **society** by the sovereign **authority**. Hobbes's attempt to answer these questions has made him significant not only to the study of political philosophy but also to the **study** of philosophy as such. Though 'Hobbes marks an epoch* in the **history** of political **philosophy**, in answering these questions in a way that is different from the classical **times**, his **importance**, with regard to his political **philosophy**, is not accordingly acknowledged. The reason for this lack of proper **recognition**, according to **Strauss**, is the understanding that 'his achievement in political philosophy is made possible by the application of a new **method**,' the method of **Galileo**, i.e., 'resolutive-compositive' **method**.⁵ The application of this method seems to be the basis of

⁵ According to the 'resolutive-compositive' method, Strauss **explained**, I quote, "...the given political facts (the disputable justice or injustice of nay political **action**, or the

Hobbes's important political contents **like**, **priority** of the individual to the **state**, the conception of individual as **asocial**, the state as Leviathan. **It** appears as if these political contents are 'determined by' and 'implied **in**' the scientific **method**. But, Strauss **felt**, if the scientific method was considered as the decisive factor then the significance of **Hobbes's** political obligation would subside to the second order importance. To quote Strauss:

It would seem that the characteristic contents of Hobbes's political philosophy – the absolute priority of the individual to the **State**, the conceptions of the individual as asocial .. **and** finally of the State itself as Leviathan – is determined by and as it **were**, implied in the method. As this **method**, **however**, was applied only **subsequently**, only in imitation of Galileo's founding of the **new** physics, **Hobbes's achievement**, from this point of **view**, however great it may be, is nevertheless of the second order. (1936:2)

current conception of justice in **general**, or the state **itself**, which as the **primary** condition of justice is the political fact *par excellence*) are **analyzed**, reduced to their elements (the '**Individual will**'), and **then**, *concorso itinere*, starting from those **elements**, the necessity and **possibility** of a '**collective will**' is developed *evidentissima connexione*, by a completely lucid **deduction**, and what was at first an 'irrational' whole is '**rationalized**'" (1936:2).

The scientific method is of later addition to the political thinking of Hobbes and it is only an imitation of the Galileo's new physics. This scientific method has only secondary value in his philosophy. If it were given primary place then the very significance of Hobbes's political philosophy will remain unrecognized. Nevertheless, Strauss had no doubt that the assumptions of 'resolutive-compositive' method 'have become decisive for the development of the idea of the state', but he doubts whether this 'decisive question is unequivocally traced out in advance by the method'. This doubt remains worth considering because a method can lead us from the basic premises to the conclusion, but it cannot be the basis of the basic premise. As stated earlier, method is the approach one follows either to deduce or to generalize the conclusion of the material. It works as a basic underlying structure, which can be inferred from the underlying coherence of a theory. It takes us from the given premises to its implied conclusions. Nevertheless, it cannot become the content of a philosophy. Content is the material, which is readily given and after reading which one can infer the method employed. Hence, method cannot trace out the conclusion but it can only help the content to reach the conclusions systematically.

Hobbes's own works provide counter instances to the view that the method and material of his political philosophy is provided by natural sciences. The publication of *De Cive*, even before the publication of *De Corpora* and *De Homine* supports the conviction that political philosophy is independent of natural science.⁶ *De Cive*, the

⁶ Tom Sorell contends that though Hobbes's civil philosophy can be claimed to be a science, it cannot be claimed as on par with the natural sciences. He maintains that

third part of Hobbes's scheme of philosophy, which is about the 'body politic' was published in 1642. De Corpore, which is first in the scheme came into print in 1655 and is about 'the body' and De Homine is about 'the man' and was published in 1658. Levia than (1651), which was produced after De Cive, is said to be the final systematic presentation of his moral and political views.

Regarding the immediate and concrete basis of the material, Strauss argues that, the mechanistic psychology, deduces civil society from passions, which are produced by simple forces of motion called sensation. The mechanistic psychology follows rigorous determinism and argues that sensations, which are produced by the motions, determine all the actions of man. According to this mechanistic psychology

Hobbes "is not obliged to rest the scientific status of his civil philosophy on any content it shares with the natural sciences." Further, Sorell proclaims that Hobbes "need not trade as any overlap between a mechanistic physics and ethics, though he thinks such an overlap exists." Finally, Sorell asserts that civil philosophy is autonomous and independent of the natural sciences. (1996: 13)

⁷ Hobbes announces the reason for taking up the civil philosophy to publish first as, to quote, "...that my Country some few yeares before civill Warres did rage, was boyling hot with questions concerning the rights of Dominion, and the obedience due from Subjects, the true forerunners of an approaching War: And was the cause which ... ripend, and pluckt from me this third part. Therefore it happens that what was last in order, is yet came forth first in time" (1983: 35-6).

the characteristic contents of Hobbes's political philosophy, such as denial of altruism as natural, positing of man's rapacious nature and the state of war as the natural condition of the state-of-nature and the obedience of reason to the passions, are all determined by the scientific method. However, according to Strauss, the determinism of mechanistic psychology is not the necessary assumption for Hobbes, because his characteristic contents can also be maintained in the indeterminate assumptions. To quote Strauss:

Hobbes's characteristic theories – the denial that 'altruism' is natural, the theses of man's rapacious nature, of the war of every one against every one as the natural condition of mankind, of the essential impotence of reason – can also be maintained in the indeterminist assumptions. (1936: 3)

The important and necessary precedents of the civil society can be maintained without basing them on the scientific and deterministic assumptions of mechanistic psychology. Strauss maintains that the 'pessimistic' view of human nature in the state-of-nature was formed even before Hobbes was acquainted with the mechanistic psychology. Adoption of the pessimistic view of man as evil by nature which is the basis of the political philosophy of Hobbes, must have a non-scientific origin, which could be more immediate and concrete than science. The pessimistic view of man, to quote Strauss, "must therefore have an origin other than the method, and as a result his political philosophy must have a more immediate and concrete origin than the method." (1936: 3) The search for the more concrete and immediate origin of the

political philosophy of **Hobbes** lead Strauss to look for the origin of the material in **non-natural** and anthropological assumptions. Now let us discuss **Strauss**'s distinction between naturalistic and anthropological aspects of philosophy.

Naturalistic and Anthropological distinction:

Strauss makes a distinction between naturalistic and anthropological aspects in order to stress the point that the political philosophy of Hobbes is not 'a part or annexe of natural **science**', but is 'a **fully** independent branch of knowledge.' Strauss asserts that the anthropological aspect bears not only the method but also the material **of** Hobbes. This is substantiated by taking **Hobbes**'s explanation of human nature as it 'underlies his political philosophy in two most certain postulates'. The two postulates of human reason are natural appetite and natural reason.

Postulates of Human reason:

at Natural Appetite:

Strauss, while taking up the first postulate of human **reason**, i.e., 'natural **appetite**', argues that naturalistic or scientific explanation of human **nature**, which is mechanistic in **conception**, explains human appetite as 'having its roots in man's sensuousness, in his animal nature.' Man is exposed to varied impressions of **objects**, which produce desires and aversions '**like** that of all other animals.' This human appetite is something that is not different from animal **appetite**, except by the only

'fact that it has reason at its service'. It is on this reason man's most predatory, cunning and dangerous nature is based. To quote Hobbes, man is:

..not like animals hungry only with the hunger of the moment, but also with future hunger, and thus he is the most predatory, the most cunning, the strongest and most dangerous animal.
(1936:9)

This conception of cunning and predatory nature is deduced by the mechanistic explanation of the theory of motion. This nature is derived from man's appetite towards or away from the objects, which is produced by the impressions of the objects. These impressions are the simple forces of motion. In this way the conception of the predatory and cunning nature of man has mechanistic explanation as its method and general theory of motion as its matter. Strauss maintains that this view 'which seems to be specifically Hobbesian' has been contradicted by Hobbes himself. The anthropological conception of natural appetite contradicts the naturalistic mechanical explanation. The anthropological view emphatically argues that 'human appetite is infinite in itself and not as a result of the infinite number of external impressions.' which we get from the outside objects. It is this infinite nature of the appetite, which distinguishes human appetite from the animal appetite. Animal appetite is based only on external impression and therefore it is finite. But man can desire spontaneously and infinitely. Strauss says:

...if this is the case, then human appetite is essentially distinguished from animal appetite in that the latter is nothing but reaction to external impressions, and, therefore, the animal desires only finite objects as such, while man spontaneously desires infinitely. (1936: 9)

The human appetite forms its clearest expression in the proposition that 'man desires power and ever greater power, spontaneously and continuously'. Strauss makes a distinction between rational and irrational striving after power in Hobbes's explanation of human appetite. He argues that 'only the un-permissible, irrational, lustful striving after power is infinite.' This irrational striving after power has its roots in the pleasure that man takes into consideration of his power, which is vanity. Vanity is man's natural striving to over power other men and to get pleasure in making others recognise his superiority. The origin of man's natural appetite is in vanity but not in perception or sensation. This conception that man's irrational striving after power is rooted in vanity, is based, not on any scientific theory, but 'on insight into human nature' the method of which is self-observation and material is self-knowledge. Thus, only the anthropological view of human appetite, not the mechanistic one, corresponds to the intentions of Hobbes.

b> Natural reason:

Coming to the second postulate of human reason, which is 'natural reason'. Strauss explains that naturalistic understanding of this postulate reduces it to the

principle of self-preservation. According to this explanation, 'the postulate of life is the condition *sine qua non* for the satisfaction of any appetite' and therefore 'it is the primary good.' Interestingly, Strauss points out, Hobbes preferred the negative expression of 'avoiding death' to the positive expression of 'preserving life'. The reason being that the preservation of life is affirmed by reason, whereas the fear of death is affirmed by passion. As reason by itself is powerless, passion for fear of death compels man for the preservation of life. The feeling and fear of death is immediate, direct and infinite. Further, death is not only the primary evil, but also the supreme evil of man's life. It negates not only the primary good but therewith negates all goods. Strauss advocates that, it is not the naturalistic explanation of natural reason as self-preservation, which is rational and which gives the uncertain knowledge of death as the *summum malum* that is the basis of Hobbes's conception of human nature. Rather, the anthropological explanation of natural reason as an emotional and certain form of aversion of death that is the basis of Hobbes's civil philosophy.⁸ The fear of death is based on mutual fear, that every man feels the other as a potential murderer. This fear of violent death, is 'pre-rational in its origin' and rational in its effect. To quote Strauss:

⁸ However, John H. Blits who along with Strauss accepts that the fear of violent death is the most powerful force in human life which drives men towards establishment of civil society - argues that the fear is not the fear of other men, but 'a deeper more radical fear' - that is the 'indeterminate fear of the unknown.' It stems from the inherent limitation of man's natural cognition. (1989: 417-437)

Not the rational and therefore always uncertain knowledge that death is the greatest and supreme evil, but the fear of death, i.e., the emotional and inevitable, and therefore necessary and certain, aversion from death is the origin of law and the State. This fear is mutual fear, i.e., it is the fear each man has of every other man as his potential murderer. This fear of a violent death, pre-rational in its origin, but rational in its effect, and not the rational principle of self-preservation, is, according to Hobbes, the root of all right and therewith of all morality. (1936: 18)

This makes Hobbes deny the moral value of all virtues, which do not protect man against the danger of violent death. In other words, he rejects, all virtues, which do not proceed from the fear of violent death.

There is a close connection existing between the two postulates of human nature. The view that human appetite is infinite in itself leads man to be a restless power monger and this in turn makes the state of 'war of every one against every one', which forces him to recognize fear of violent death as the primary and greatest evil. The two postulates of human nature form the basis for the origin of sovereignty in Hobbes. It is not the naturalistic explanation of 'morally indifferent striving after power' and 'morally indifferent striving after self-preservation that is the basis of his political philosophy.' Rather it is the moral and humanist antithesis of unjust vanity and just fear of violent death, which is the basis. To quote Strauss:

The moral and humanist antithesis of fundamentally unjust vanity and fundamentally just fear of violent death is the basis of Hobbes's political philosophy. (1936: 27-8)

The distinction that Strauss made between naturalistic and anthropological explanation of the postulates of human nature proves two important points. One, that Hobbes's political philosophy is not based on the mechanistic explanation of natural sciences. And, two, that it is essentially moral and humanistic, based itself on the 'vanity-fear antithesis'.⁹ The vanity-fear antithesis is the essential content of Hobbes. For, him vanity is the root of all evil, and fear is the origin of justice, virtue and ultimately civilization.

Strauss opined that Hobbes's anthropological humanist moral attitude of his political philosophy is more original than the naturalistic motivation. This, he tries to prove by showing that the most important aspects of moral motivation in Hobbes was established even before he turned his attention to the natural science. Strauss refers to Aubrey who remarked that Hobbes 'was 40 years old before he looked on Geometry: which happened accidentally.' (1936: 150) Hobbes's original thoughts were developed even before he turned towards natural science and to quote Strauss, it is not that 'he was asleep up to the age of forty, so that he needed the 'discovery' of Euclid to awaken

⁹ Watkins, while endorsing the view that 'the role played by vanity and fear in Hobbes's system is indeed important', however, rejected the claim that it is the fundamental aspect in the philosophy of Hobbes. (1965:15)

him." < 1936: 24) To understand the development of the philosophical ideas Strauss looks at Hobbes's life before his introduction to science, and explicates the influences of tradition on his philosophy.

Traditional influences on Hobbes:

Strauss traced back the basis of Hobbes's material to the tradition. The origin of the material of Hobbes's political philosophy, 'had its basis in the descriptions, classifications, and explanations of the previous age.' This took Strauss's investigation to the 'sparse remnants of his [Hobbes's] youthful philosophy', which influenced him, before he turned towards natural science. The early influences on Hobbes are Scholastic humanism, Aristotelianism, and Aristocracy. Of these 'humanism was most decisive, because of which it is justifiable to call the 'first period of Hobbes's life (up to 1629) the humanist period.' (1936:31) Now let us proceed to the influence of Scholastic humanism on Hobbes.

Hobbes accepted Aristotle as the authority in his humanistic period. However, in the later periods Plato was regarded as the 'best of ancient philosophers.' While explaining the conception of State in **Elements**, Hobbes asserts that the aim of state is both peace and common benefit. This assertion, according to Strauss, runs similar to that of Aristotle's distinction between the reason of the genesis of the state (i.e., peace) and the reason of its being (i.e., common benefit). However, in the later presentations Hobbes leaves this distinction and attributes the necessity and possibility of the state to the fear of violent death

Strauss compares the **Rhetoric** of Aristotle with the Hobbesian **theories**, and concludes that **the** central chapters of **Hobbes's** political **anthropology**, in their style and content owe to the **Rhetoric**.¹⁰ Emphasizing the influence of **Rhetoric** on **Hobbes**, Strauss states:

It would be difficult to find another work whose influence on Hobbes's political philosophy can be compared with that of **Rhetoric**. (1936:35)

The use of **Rhetoric** is more in his later **period**, which made Strauss to infer that Hobbes while writing his later works studied Aristotle afresh and used it in his systematic expositions of later **period**. To quote Strauss:

Since Hobbes in his later writings uses passages from the **Rhetoric**, of which he had made no use in earlier **writings**, it follows that when composing all his systematic expositions of anthropology (**Elements** 1640, **Leviathan** 1651 and **De Homine** 165S) he studied Aristotle's **Rhetoric** afresh each time. (1936:41)

¹⁰ Strauss had in his mind the 8th and 9th chapters of the first part of **Elements**; and 10th chapter of **Leviathan** and 11th, 12th and 13th chapters of **De Homine**, which almost run parallel to the passages of the **Rhetoric**.

For instance. Strauss points out. Hobbes's earliest treatment of the theory of passions was because of **the** influence of Aristotle's **Rhetoric**. **In** other **words**, the 'use and appreciation of **Rhetoric**' can be traced in Hobbes's mature **period**. His interest in **Aristotle**, in the later **period**, shifted from physics and metaphysics to **morals**, politics and philosophy. Strauss interprets this shift as the replacement of theory by the primacy of practice. To quote Strauss:

Hobbes, even after natural science had become his favorite subject of **investigation**, acknowledged the precedence of practice over theory and of political philosophy over natural science. (1936:34)

This precedence of practice over theory shows the independence of political philosophy from natural science. A peculiar form of Hobbes's humanism is his interest in history. This is justified by the translation of **Thucydides**, which Strauss regards as the 'crown and **end**' of his humanist period. The translation of **Thucydides** made a **significant** impact on his political philosophy. Strauss points out that Hobbes's interest for history made him say **that**, 'the neglect of history **is** one of the most weighty reasons for the inadequacy and **uselessness** of Scholasticism.' (1936: 89) Though the scholasticism **contributed**, at least at the level of the origin of **material**, it was proved inadequate to provide answers to the philosophical problems put forth by Hobbes."

¹¹ To add to this **discussion**, Lubienski held **that**, "**Through** the influence of experimental **science**, the old **scholastic**, rationalistic philosophy gave place to a

Hobbes turned from philosophy to history because he saw that the norms that philosophy establishes find no way in their application. Also because traditional philosophy, failed to provide material to political philosophy. According to Strauss, Hobbes argued that the "reason why history becomes, if not the theme of philosophy, at least most important material for philosophy seems to be that the philosophical interest is shifting from physics and metaphysics to morals and politic" (1936:90). Another reason for turning from philosophy to history is the conviction that, reason is impotent, which adds to the enhanced interest in man. Impotency of reason here means the incapacity of reason to establish or justify norms. Hobbes after finding the alleged or real defect in traditional philosophy and a possibility of 'developing a theory of the application of the (traditional) norms' turned back again to philosophy. His formation of new political philosophy made 'history sinks back into its old philosophic-insignificance.' This shows that the predominantly modern aspect of the political philosophy of Hobbes is its 'principle of application.' Strauss asserts that the 'principle of application' conditions the form or the method of Hobbes and the moral attitude gives the peculiar substance to his philosophy. Rejection of the traditional norms led Hobbes to place morality on the basis of the passions, temperaments, intentions and motives of man and explain right order and best form of state on the basis of passions. In the words of Strauss, for Hobbes:

more empirical, critical way of thinking. Where as the first is based on dogmatic assertions, the new philosophy admitted nothing without proof and tried to gather direct data from the senses" (1930:177).

A thorough knowledge of the passions is the indispensable condition for the answering of the question as to the right ordering of social life, and particularly as to the best form of state. (1936:110)

Knowledge of passions is the necessary condition for understanding the best form of state. Hobbes's study of history and especially the translation of **Thucydides** made him uphold 'hereditary absolute monarchy' as the best form of the state. The view that monarchy is the best form of state is based both on human experience and also on the study of passions. His attitude regarding monarchy did not change throughout his life. To quote Strauss, "Hobbes was from the outset a decided upholder of the monarchy and a decided opponent of democracy, and he kept to this opinion throughout his whole life." (1936:59) But Hobbes's conception of traditional monarchy has taken a modern shape. He in his earlier presentations argues that 'monarchy is the only natural, i.e., original form of authority, the only form, which corresponds to nature's original order.' But in his later presentations he maintained that the "paternal authority and consequently patrimonial monarchy, is ..origin of all or majority of states." (1936:60) He regarded monarchy and patrimonial kingdom as identical.

The influence of Aristocracy on Hobbes can be traced to his acquaintance with the aristocratic families.¹¹ This acquaintance made him consider the aristocratic virtue as the highest virtue. Strauss quotes passages from the **Elements**, where Hobbes regards 'nobility as honorable,' and from **Levia** than where Hobbes states that, 'to be descended from conspicuous parents is honorable'. These quotations substantiate that 'Hobbes always held fast to his esteem of the aristocracy.' (1936:45) it is argued that the aristocratic virtues of honor and heroism (courage) were decisive in humanist phase of his life. i.e., before he thought of composing an independent and coherent study of political philosophy. However, in the course of his philosophical development departing farther from aristocracy he even sublimated and spiritualized it. According to Strauss:

In the course of his development Hobbes departed farther and farther from the recognition of aristocratic virtue. At the end of this process there is, however, not only the establishment of a peculiarly bourgeois morality, but at the same time aristocratic virtue itself becomes sublimated and spiritualized. (1936: 50)

However, the aristocratic virtues of tradition are given a different outlook in Hobbes. The theory of magnanimity, which is the well founded consciousness of one's

¹² According to Strauss, Hobbes "after taking his degree, he was for twenty years without a break tutor, and then Secretary, to William Cavendish, later the Second Earl of Devonshire and on a friendly footing with Cavendish family." (1936:31)

own superiority, is considered by Hobbes to be the source of all virtue. Aristotle discusses the theory of magnanimity in the traditional philosophy and this influenced Hobbes. But the theory of Hobbes differs from Aristotle in the sense that the latter regarded magnanimity to be an 'ornament of all virtues, among them is justice which is already in existence.' For Hobbes magnanimity is the origin of justice among other virtues. This change is characterized by the fact that, virtue is not a state but an intention. Hobbes's ideas, passed through a transformation starting from the application of aristocratic virtue in the beginning to a progressively more and more decided criticism of aristocratic virtue. For earlier Hobbes, all virtues were based on aristocratic virtues such as courage and honor. However, its status was reduced to war and then to barbaric epoch of state-of-nature. To quote Strauss:

Aristocratic virtue, which originally embraced all virtue, is later recognized as virtue only in war. Afterwards it becomes the virtue of the barbaric epoch, in which 'rapine was a trade of life': it is thus reduced to a virtue of the state of nature.
(1936:115)

In this way the influence of aristocracy on Hobbes was profound in earlier writings and in due course of time it subsided and afterwards it was reduced and was even criticized. This, Strauss held, proves both the influence of Aristocracy of tradition on Hobbes and also its difference with Hobbes's own conception of virtue.

In **Hobbes's** earliest presentations of political philosophy his conception of religion was 'relatively close to Anglican **Episcopalianism**'; it was close to '**Independetism**' in his later writings. Strauss argues that **Hobbes** in his earlier **writings** accepted at least the natural knowledge of God if not the revealed knowledge. But in the later **period** he excluded both natural theology and revealed theology from philosophy. The religion **should, at all times, 'serve** the state and it is to be esteemed or despised according to the services or disservices rendered to the state'. (1936: 74) He stated that religion should never come in conflict with the state and in fact it should be the one prescribed by the state. The golden mean between atheism and theism is to subordinate oneself to **religion**, which is prescribed by the state. In this way he posits an utilitarian value to religion.

The discussion so far proves the influence of tradition on the political philosophy of Hobbes. **Aristotelianism, Humanism, Aristocratism** of the tradition have influenced the thought of Hobbes in his early years. And this influence is displayed **by Strauss**, by analyzing the three principle formulation of the philosophy of Hobbes, i.e., **Elements, Leviathan, and De Homine**. Given the influence of tradition on Hobbes, let us account for those views in him which both implicitly and explicitly reject the tradition.

Strauss's answer to this is that 'traditional thesis and concepts take an entirely untraditional meaning in Hobbes's political **philosophy**.' In order to understand the true origin of the material of **Hobbes**, the influence of the 'classical as well as the Christian attitude' on his 'characteristic moral **attitude**', which determines his way of

thinking, should be properly grasped. The moral attitude, which underlies his political philosophy, is both pre-scientific and also at the same time specifically modern. It comes prior to the 'argument and presentation' of political philosophy. It also precedes his preoccupation with natural sciences. His political philosophy, thus, comes into being after the establishment of moral attitude as the basis. His philosophical development started even before the 'modern science was formed or established' and, the 'classical and theological tradition was already shaken.' This led him to ask the decisive question about man's right life and of the right ordering of society. According to Strauss:

This moment was decisive for the whole age to come: in it the foundation was laid, on which the modern development of political philosophy is wholly based, and it is the point from which every attempt at a thorough understanding of modern thought must start. This foundation has never again been visible as it was then. (1936:5)

This was the moment in which Hobbes philosophized his thinking: it is both anti-traditional and pre-scientific in its nature and method. It is anti-traditional because, though it is influenced by tradition, it also criticizes the tradition, and the concepts are given entirely modern meaning. It is pre-scientific because it developed even before the modern science was formed or established.

In order to understand how much Hobbes owes to natural science, Strauss attempts to show how far Hobbes could depart from Aristotle without breaking with his substance and without following scientific method. This is shown by pointing out the changes that Hobbes made in Aristotle's ideas. Though Aristotelianism has its impact on Hobbes it also got modified in his hands. It is true that he believed in the authority of the tradition in his humanist period. He departs from this Aristotelian tradition with regard to the application of method and in considering reason as impotent. Tradition taught him what man ought to be and now he is attempting to discover 'what man is?' and what forces really determine him.' The vanity-fear antithesis, which has its roots in Aristotle's analysis of passion, is regarded as the force that determines man and his actions. Vanity is regarded as the force that makes men blind and fear of violent death is which makes men see. The emphasis on vanity-fear antithesis makes him go beyond the traditional horizon. These differences of Hobbes with Aristotle, Strauss says, cannot possibly be explained by the influence of natural science. Hobbes did not doubt the fundamental assumption of the tradition that 'political philosophy in general is possible and necessary', but 'cast the tradition, as a whole, aside.' His understanding of natural science made him investigate for a new political philosophy. This investigation made him 'designate Plato as the best of the ancient philosophers' as against his earlier conviction that Aristotle is the philosopher *par excellence*. The reason for this designation is that to quote Strauss, "Plato is not only in fact, but also according to Hobbes's opinion, the originator of at least the demand for an exact and paradoxical political science." Hobbes owes his vanity-fear antithesis, which originates from reason-passion antithesis to Platonic antithesis of

truth and appearance. However, Hobbes's agreement with Plato is limited to Plato's criticism of Aristotle. Further, Hobbes's investigation for a purely rational political philosophy, which is based on the 'norm' to be set up by reason, takes him much beyond Plato. Hobbes's predominant interest in the applicability of the norm under all circumstances is the primary reason for his opposition to Plato, and his motive for turning to the scientific method. This made Strauss argue that the difference between Hobbes and tradition is in decisive points independent of the turn to mathematics and modern science. Now let us discuss the place of scientific method in Hobbes as illustrated by Strauss.

Discussion of the scientific method in Hobbes by Strauss:

It is true that one of the differences between Hobbes and the traditional philosophy is the adoption of modern sciences like Galilean and Euclidean methods. However, Strauss contends that "the difference between Hobbes and tradition is in decisive points independent of the turn to mathematics and modern science." (1936: 135) Further, if we take the basis of the goal of political philosophy, in general, which is the - necessity and the possibility of political philosophy - then it would be clear that the answer to this problem in Hobbes comes independent of the naturalistic and scientific explanations. What becomes prominent by the study of Geometry in Hobbes is not the idea of political science, with its possibility and necessity but the requirement of a necessary method for political philosophy. Hobbes knows that science and political philosophy are fundamentally different from each other in both method and material. And this knowledge is the basis of Strauss's conviction that

Hobbes's political philosophy is independent of natural science. (1936: 7) This conviction is based on Hobbes's own pronouncement of distinction between political philosophy and natural sciences. The important aspects of this distinction, according to Hobbes, are:

1. The evidence in political philosophy is different from the evidence in natural science.
2. The contents and the concepts are not remote from the average man, as are the subject and concepts of mathematics, which form the basis of natural science.
3. Political philosophy is harder study than natural science.
4. Man with his passions and his self-seeking attitude is the particular subject of political philosophy. Whereas the subject matter of the natural science is the natural phenomenon.

These important distinctions, which Hobbes himself made, support Strauss's view that political philosophy is independent of natural science. Strauss, further, argues that just as political philosophy has few limitations, in the same way science also has limitations. To quote Strauss, "...the fear of violent death, is the necessary condition not only of society but also science, just as life in common is hindered by passion, science is hindered by prejudice." (1936: 26)

The reason why political philosophy is not based on or is independent of natural science, for that matter any science, is that the first principles of political philosophy are provided by experience. Self-experience and self-knowledge, which is discovered by self-examination, provides the basis for political philosophy.

Strauss, further, maintains that the problem of the principle of applicability of Hobbes made him turn towards 'resolutive-compositive' method of Galileo. By using this method Hobbes first resolved the state into its component parts, i.e., man, and then by a lucid process of composition reconstituted the state. What attracted Hobbes in this method was its exact unconditional applicability to a given phenomenon. He wanted to achieve in politics what Galileo achieved in physics. However, the problem of applicability of the method is more for political philosophy than physics, because the natural body is the subject of physics, where as the subject matter of political philosophy is an artificial body, i.e., civil society. Strauss felt that the political philosophy could not be really accommodated within the scientific tradition, which rejected anthropomorphism. And therefore could 'contribute nothing to the understanding of things human, to the foundation of morals and politics.' Nevertheless, the application of the scientific method compressed the original political and moral insights and changed the concern of the political philosophy from the knowledge of civil society to the creation of the civil society.

The resolution and composition of the existing state presupposes that a better synthesis of the basic elements may produce a right order of the state. This presupposition turns the purpose of the political philosophy towards making it a

technique for the regulation of state from what the state ought to be. The use of 'resolutive-compositive' method in this way shifts the purpose of political philosophy to a technique of the regulation of the state. This shift eliminates the primary and fundamental question of political philosophy – which is the aim of the state. The price of the introduction of the 'resolutive-compositive' method into political philosophy renounces the primary and the fundamental question of the subject concerned. This makes Strauss to doubt the value of the application of the 'resolutive-compositive' method, not only from the point of view of political philosophy, but also from the 'point of view of Hobbes's presuppositions.'

Strauss, further, contends that the adoption of 'resolutive-compositive' method should have prevented Hobbes from asking the question regarding the standard of political philosophy. Nevertheless, the very fact that Hobbes did not, in fact, neglect the question, but only compressed the original insights of political philosophy proves the insignificance of 'resolutive-compositive' method to his political philosophy. There is no change in the essential content starting from his first work to the last work. To quote Strauss:

...there was no change in the *essential* content of the argument and aim of Hobbes's political philosophy, from the introduction

to his translation of **Thucydides** up to the latest work.
(1936:112)¹³

The essential content is same through out his life. But what has changed in his course of life is the method. Strauss states that originally Hobbes supports his essential content by **history**, later by the study of passions. What scientific method influenced in him is the method of reasoning and presentation.

in addition, in the process of proving the inadequacy of the 'resolutive-compositive' method, Strauss pointed out, that - according to this method the resolution of the state takes us back to the principles of human nature. These principles of human nature are 'limitless self-love' on the one hand, and the 'fear of violent death' on the other. If the application of the 'resolutive-compositive' method proves to be true then Hobbes should be able to deduce the origin of state from these two principles. But then, these two principles in themselves do not contain certain standard that is necessary to the question of the right state. The necessary standard is the characterization of the principle of human appetite and the principle of natural reason into the principle of right and wrong respectively. This standardization or characterization of good and bad or right and wrong order cannot be found in the

¹³ However, this has been taken by Watkins as a 'disheartening view* since the political content in **Thucydides** is 'meager'. This led him to ask 'who would care to read **Leviathan** if it consists of the meager political content presented in **Thucydides**.' (1965: 15)

application of the 'resolutive-compositive' method in any part of the process of its application. To quote Strauss:

The justification of the **standard**, which is the fundamental part of the political **philosophy**, is hidden by the **resolutive-compositive** method and even made unrecognizable. (1936: 154)

Strauss points out this as the reason for the failure of the interpreters of **Hobbes**, for they could not notice the principle of natural reason or the fear of violent death as the basis of his political philosophy.

Strauss, further, explains Hobbes's turn towards natural science on the basis of his interest in 'self-knowledge of man as he really is', which characterized him even in his humanist period. This explains the motive for **Hobbes**, which prompted him in viewing both the humanist thought and the natural science to be the same. This motive, further, lead him to the principle of **self-observation** which is the 'self-knowledge of man as he is'. This self-observation, Strauss advocates, is the method of **Hobbes's** political philosophy. The inclusion of right and wrong in the principles of human nature cannot be traced by the scientific method. But they can be traced by the method of **self-observation**, which is the method that **Hobbes** uses throughout his political philosophy. The standardization or the characterization of right and wrong, which can not be thought off in the state of **nature**, which have their **origin** only in the civil **society** can never be understood in the light of 'resolutive-compositive' method.

Nevertheless, if the self-observation is taken as the method, it becomes obvious to any 'rational inquirer' that the characterization of right and wrong is there in the very essence of the civilized person from whom the principles of human nature have been deduced.

Strauss argues that self-observation is the method that Hobbes applied for his political philosophy. He stresses the importance of self-observation, which is based on self-knowledge, over 'resolutive-compositive' method, by stating:

Political philosophy is independent of natural science because its principles are not borrowed from natural sciences ... but are provided by experience, by the experience which every one has of himself, or, to put it more accurately, - are discovered by the efforts of self-knowledge and the self-examination of every one. (1936:7)

In the above quotation, Strauss is arguing not only for the independence of the method, but also of the contents of Hobbes's political philosophy from the natural sciences. The principles of political philosophy were provided by experience and the method was self-observation. In other words, by self-observation one gets the knowledge of the principles of his own social existence. To quote Strauss:

Hobbes's political philosophy is really, as its originator claims, based on a knowledge of man which is deepened and corroborated by the self-knowledge and self-examination of the

individual, and not on a general scientific theory... it is not derived from natural science but is founded on first-hand experience of human life. (1936: 29)

As the above quote suggests, the basis of Hobbes's political philosophy is knowledge of man, which is deepened and confirmed by self-knowledge and self-examination. This first hand experience of his own life in particular and human life in general, lead him to base the political philosophy of self-observation. This basis saves Hobbes's political philosophy from becoming non-moral, because it stresses the significance of self-knowledge of man over the mechanical conception of psychology. A truly Hobbesian theory of state cannot be based on science, because it is based on experience of human life. And further, it can never, in spite of all the temptations of natural science, fall completely into the danger of going away from moral life and forget moral difference. The political philosophy of Hobbes, thus, for that very reason, has a moral basis. It is not derived from natural science but is founded on first hand experience of human life.

To conclude, Strauss argues that the attempt to work out political philosophy as a part or annex of natural science by means of scientific method is constantly questioned in Hobbes's work, because he was aware of the fundamental differences between the two disciplines in method and material. Strauss's conviction that political philosophy is essentially independent of natural science is based on the awareness of this independent nature of political philosophy from science. He proved this from two different perspectives. One, by showing the textual evidences in Hobbes's own works,

which advocated a distinction between method and material, and anthropological and naturalistic aspects. Two, by expounding the historical influences, which are drawn from tradition such as Scholastic humanism and Aristocracy etc. In order to prove the independent nature of political philosophy, he first brought a distinction between anthropological and naturalistic aspects of Hobbes, and argued that, the basis of Hobbes's philosophy is not in the naturalistic explanation of man, which comes with the background of natural sciences. Rather the basis is rooted in anthropological aspect, which is discovered by the method of self-observation. The material was provided by the tradition through the influences of scholastic humanism and aristocracy, which shaped his political philosophy, even before he got introduced to science. Thus, according to Strauss, the method of Hobbes's political philosophy is self-observation and material is provided by the moral psychology. Strauss states that, the important aspect in Hobbes's system that can be claimed as the basis or foundation is self-observation. As scientific method has only secondary position, the disturbances in the scientific discipline do not, surely, affect his political philosophy.

The next chapter discusses the arguments of A.E. Taylor who attempted to find basis of the political philosophy of Hobbes as moral imperative, rather than scientific method.

CHAPTER III

A. E. TAYLOR: MORAL IMPERATIVE

This chapter discusses the interpretation of A.E. **Taylor**, which rejects the traditional view of Hobbes that there is **continuity** amongst **materialism**, psychology and his political theory. Unlike **Strauss**, who advocates a break between Hobbes's materialism and civil philosophy, Taylor points out the independence of political philosophy **from** egoistic psychology. The importance of Taylor's interpretation lies in disengaging political philosophy **from** the materialistic psychology. The political philosophy of **Hobbes**, according to **Taylor**, should be read independent of the materialistic psychology. This implies that he is not only disengaging psychology but also natural science from political **philosophy**, since natural science forms the first part of Hobbes's system of **philosophy**, the second and third being psychology and civil philosophy respectively. Commenting on the **profundity** of Taylor's thesis Stuart **M. Brown Jr.** (1959) says that:

...the arguments and evidence adduced by Taylor in support of his thesis are so compelling that most of the recent work on Hobbes has been done on the presumption that Taylor's theses is true.... controversies about the interpretation of Hobbes's **theory** have been for the most part between scholars who

agree with each other in accepting Taylor's thesis and who disagree only as to what in detail Hobbes's non Prudential theory of obligation is (1959: 303-304).

Taylor's thesis as it is clear from the above quote changed the outlook of recent interpreters of Hobbes so much that they even centered their interpretations on this thesis.'

To demonstrate the independent existence of Hobbesian theory of obligation from the egoistic psychology, Taylor pieces out self-consistent ethical theory and highlights the imperative character of the moral laws. His plan in maintaining the imperative nature of moral law is two fold. One is to show the logically independent nature of the political philosophy from the theory of egoistic psychology, and another is to argue for the deontological character of the moral philosophy. However, the attempt to disengage the political philosophy from the theory of psychology consequently undermines the importance of natural sciences. Taylor, while disengaging the political philosophy from psychology, also rejects any continuity between the natural philosophy (that is, physics) and political philosophy.

Taylor attempts to expose the commonly seen 'false perspective' of the moral doctrine of Hobbes, which has seriously obscured: (i) the real affinities between Hobbes and Kant which are of deontological character: (ii) that sovereign has no

¹ Warrender, Oakeshott, and many others followed Taylor in this enterprise.

corresponding duties to his extensive rights; (iii) ethical theory has its moral imperativeness in laws of nature. The 'false perspective' attributed continuity between theory of psychology and moral obligation. Nevertheless, the reason for this false perspective is largely due to the fact that most of the ethical readings of Hobbes 'begin and end' with the rhetorical masterpiece *Leviathan*. Taylor, in order to correct the misunderstandings of the ethical philosophy refers almost entirely to *De Cive*, and substantiates his preference by pointing out that unlike *Leviathan* which was produced 'in the very culmination of what looked at the time to be a permanent revolution,' *De Cive* was produced 'before the issue of conflict could have been thought to be already decided by the sword.' Since *De Cive* is produced before the outbreak of civil war and before culmination of permanent revolution it should be taken more seriously to understand the moral philosophy of Hobbes. Taking only *Leviathan* into consideration has given rise to the false perspective. This has obscured the real affinities, listed above, of moral philosophy because *Leviathan* was produced after the conflict between the state and the individual has been decided by the sword and at the time of the culmination of the permanent revolution. Since this deciding factor has its impact on Hobbes's ethical thinking, it shifted his attention away from the deontological character. In moving away from *Leviathan* and towards *De Cive*, Taylor wants to correct the false perspective of Hobbes's ethical philosophy.

Taylor attempted to explicate the origin of the political philosophy of Hobbes in moral imperative nature of the law-of-nature (natural law) rather than self-interest based on egoistic psychology, by:

1. Arguing that the **deontological** character of the moral imperativeness is the basis of Hobbes's political **obligation**, which has its affinities with Kant.
2. Pointing out the prevalence of moral imperative even before the existence of civil **society**, i.e., in the state of **nature**, in the form of laws of nature and subjecting the sovereign also to the natural **law**.
3. **Finally**, arguing that the laws of nature are **obligatory** and they draw their **authority** as the commands of God.

The important aspects of Taylor's thesis shall be discussed by pointing out **how** he bases the political philosophy of Hobbes on moral imperative by disengaging it from the egoistic psychology.

Deontological character of Hobbes's Ethical philosophy

Taylor **attempts** to prove the deontological character of the ethical **theory** of Hobbes by disengaging it from the egoistic psychology. The **theory** of egoistic psychology provides self-interest as the basis of political obligation. It argues that every man 'ought to obey the political sovereign without asking any questions or making any difficulties'. The reason **being**, 'he stands personally to lose by doing anything **else**', in this way it advocates absolute submission of the individual to the **sovereign**, and bases this submission on **self-interest**. Every individual always desires some good for himself. The disobedience to the civil **law** causes **anarchy**, which does

not contribute any good to the individual. The miseries of the anarchy are to be prevented for his personal interest. And, therefore, in one's own interest every one should conform to the law. Moreover, if the individual thinks that the violation of law brings gain to him, then he is justified in doing so. However, according to Taylor, Hobbes adds that he would never stand to gain anything by violating a law, since it breaks the peace of the society, and causes recurrence of the state of 'war of everyman against everyman' (1938:137). Since it is in his own interest that the individual should not violate the law, Taylor rejects this self-interest as the basis of Hobbes's ethical theory and argues that it is because it is his duty that an individual acts according to law.

Further, Taylor deduces sense of duty from self-interest. He maintains that self-interest, 'if we try to understand it calmly', is the interest in doing one's duty. It is the duty of the person not to disobey the covenant once made, and this has its root in the self-interest. He argues:

... to say that this is to my interest is equivalent to saying that it is my duty: my duty, in fact, means my personal interest, calmly understood. (1938: 136)

Taylor, in this way, equates self-interest with duty. Further, according to him, the question why a person ought to be a good citizen and perform his duties, can be answered, from the Hobbesian point of view, as iniquity is explained as violating his pledge and refusal to perform the covenant that has been made. To quote Taylor, 'it

is, quite **explicitly**, that I **have**, expressly or **tacitly**, pledged my word to be one, and to violate my **word**, to refuse to 'perform my covenant as **made**, is *iniquity, malum in se*' (1938:137).

Since the violation of the given **word**, and refusal to perform the covenant **made**, is **iniquity**, a person is obliged to be a good citizen. In other words, disobedience of the given word is equal to the disobedience of the duty to which a person is pledged. Performing an act because it is **duty** is **deontology** and deontology as an ethical **theory** basically argues for the independence of moral act from its consequences. Etymologically, deontology means the science of duty. According to this **theory**, the seat of moral worth lies in the sense of duty. An action done from duty must wholly exclude the influence of inclination and with it **every** object of the will, so that nothing remains which can determine the will except objectively the law and **subjectively** pure respect for the practical law. Duty implies that we are under some kind of **obligation**, or a moral law. This deontology differs from Hobbesian egoistic psychology in the sense that it is based on duty whereas egoistic **psychology** bases itself on self-interest and fear of violent death. **Taylor**, in this way, brings the **deontological** character of the moral obligation by differentiating it from the egoistic psychology. This **argument**, which bases the moral philosophy of Hobbes on deontological character of moral **imperative**, makes him argue for a logical independence of ethical **doctrine** from egoistic psychology. To quote Taylor:

Hobbes's ethical doctrine proper, disengaged from an egoistic psychology with which it has no logically necessary connection, is a very strict deontology. (1938: 137)

Hobbes's ethical theory is independent and has no necessary connection with egoistic psychology. Instead, it is based on duty and hence it is a deontological theory. Having established the deontological character of the moral obligation of Hobbes, Taylor, further, points out both similarities and differences between Hobbes and Kant.

Affinities between Taylor and Kant:

Deontology, as stated above, is an ethical theory which basically argues for the independence of moral act from its consequences. And duty implies that we are under some kind of obligation or a moral law. According to Kant, as rational beings we are aware of this obligation as it comes to us in the form of an imperative. This awareness regards moral law as rational and also as imperative. Taylor also views the Hobbesian moral obligation as imperative and rational in nature. He finds the exposition of the deontological character of the moral law in the distinction between just act and just person, which was explicated in De Cive. According to Taylor, Hobbes, while making a distinction between a just act and a just person, argues that the just and unjust when attributed to persons signify one thing and when applied to actions signify another. A just act is one that is done in accord with right, and an unjust act is what is done with 'injury'. However, when applied to persons 'just and

unjust' are not similar to that of actions. Justice of an act lies in doing it 'in accord with right.' That is, an act should be backed by right in order to be just. But a man who acts in accord with right may not *eo ipso* a just man. A man can said to be just if he derives pleasure in doing justice and in studying how to act in accordance with righteousness. This implies that, one who neglects righteous dealing or thinks that actions are based on some present benefit are unjust. Hence a just man acts justly because law commands the act and if a man acts because of the fear of punishment he is said to be unjust. Taylor, to substantiate the deontological position of Hobbes, quotes from De Cive:

When the words are applied to persons, *to be just* signifies to be delighted in just dealing, to study how to do righteousness, or to endeavour in all things to do that which is just: and *to be unjust* is to neglect righteous dealing, or to think it is to be measured not according to my contract, but some present benefit.... That man is to be accounted just, who doth just things because the laws command it, unjust things only by reason of his iniquity: and he is properly said to be unjust, who doth righteousness for fear of the punishment annexed unto the law, and unrighteousness by reason of the iniquity of his mind. (1938: 137)

The above quotation signifies two important aspects that are the characteristic marks of the deontological theory. In the first part of the quotation, Hobbes seems to

reject the significance of any benefit in a just man's act. In this way, he is criticizing the teleological view, which argues that the significance of an act depends upon its consequences. A just person acts justly, for he gets delighted in doing so, and he is not motivated by any future consequence. The second part of the quotation signifies another important aspect of deontology which says, a just man acts not by the threat of punishment, but because the law commands him. Therefore, no external force or threat motivates or compels a just person to act justly, but it is purely the imperative nature of the law, which comes from within the nature of the person. Further, a man is said to be unjust, even if the act by itself is just and is done because of the fear of punishment. This shows that just or unjust behavior of man does not solely depend on his acts but also on his motives in doing so. The reason or motive, which compels man to act justly or unjustly, decides whether he is just or unjust. These two aspects of Hobbesian exposition of just act and just man, which are deontological in nature made Taylor show the similarity between Hobbes and Kant. Kant makes a distinction between an action done merely in accordance with law and an action done from law. This distinction is similar to the distinction made by Hobbes between just act and just person. Kant reduced all kinds of moral law to the 'good will'. In the same way, Hobbes reduces the law from which a virtuous man acts to a single law that 'a promise once duly fulfilled must be kept.' Another interesting similarity is Hobbes's anticipation of the attempt made by Kant 'to reduce all wrong willing to the irrational attempt to will both sides of contradiction at once.' (1938: 138) Hobbes argues that every breach of covenant is a contradiction. It is a contradiction in the sense that a person who covenanted to do something is agreed to do so in all the

future cases and when he violates it, he is willing to do and not to do at the same time, which is a plain contradiction. According to Taylor, Hobbes agrees with Kant, about the imperative nature of the moral law and regarding the moral law as the law of right reason.

Notwithstanding these similarities, there are few differences between the moral imperative of Hobbes and the categorical imperative of Kant. Firstly, Taylor says, 'Hobbes, for his own reasons, reduces all injury to the violation of an expressed or implied promise' (1938: 138), whereas it is not the case with Kant. Second, one is the principle of universalisability. Kant universalized the moral law in order to free it from contradiction. However, Hobbes never tried to universalize moral law on these lines.

To add to the argument of Taylor that the moral philosophy of Hobbes is independent of psychology, it is interesting to discuss the importance given to 'reason' in his discussions on psychology and political philosophy. Hobbes gives secondary importance to reason in his psychological explanation of man and regards reason as a slave to passions. However, when it comes to the discussion on laws of nature, he upholds their prominence by regarding them as the 'dictates of reason'. In other words, the significance of the law-of-nature is based on the assumption that they are dictated by reason. In this manner, Hobbes seems to elevate the significance of reason in political philosophy from psychology. This may also be helpful to us in understanding the moral philosophy of Hobbes, independent of his psychology. After understanding Taylor's explication of the imperative nature of moral laws on the

grounds of **deontology**, let us proceed to discuss the **ground** of moral **imperative** in the ethical theory of Hobbes.

Moral Imperativeness ID Natural Law:

Taylor rejects the traditional **view**, largely **drawn** from **Leviathan**, which states that Hobbes's moral obligation comes from the transference of the rights of the people. This transference of rights is a continuation of the **theory** of **psychology**, which tries to **show how** the sovereign and the civil **society** come into existence. This transference cannot explain the imperative character of the moral **laws**, because it only calls for the submission of the rights of the people to the sovereign b> establishing the civil society. Moral imperativeness is there even in the **state-of-nature** in the form of laws of **nature**, i.e., even before the existence of civil sovereign and society. Since transference of rights is continuation of psychology and moral obligation prevails prior to the existence of civil **society**, the psychological **theory** of Hobbes is independent of his moral obligation.

Taylor argues that moral imperative has its **basis**, not in the transference of rights or in the civil **society** in the form of the commands of the sovereign backed b> **penalties**, but in the laws of nature. According to him, the natural law, which is also a moral law, is imperative in nature. The moral philosophy of Hobbes has its origin in the exposition of the doctrine of laws of nature. **In other words**, it is in the exposition of laws of nature that Hobbes intends his moral **obligation**, but not in the explication of his psychology. **Taylor**, by highlighting the imperative character of the laws of

nature, which tends to be obscured by a hasty **reader**, tries to prove the origin of moral obligation in them. He warns us **that**, 'a hasty reader' of Hobbes may get obscured by the above fact and may be disposed to wrongly understand the **laws-of-nature** as 'mere propositions indicative about the means **which** are commonly found to be most conducive to a peaceful **existence**, and that their imperative character as **laws**, in the proper sense of the **word**, is entirely secondary' (1938: 139-40). The imperative character of a moral **law** arises only in the civil **society**, when the sovereign bestows them with the 'penal sanctions'.

Taylor observes that the **very** kind of explanation of laws of nature that Hobbes has given expresses that they are imperative in character. Hobbesian use of these laws of nature is always as **dictates**, but never as pieces of advice. To quote Taylor, "Hobbes always **describes** the items of the natural **law** as *dictamina*, or **dictates**, never as *consilia*, or pieces of advice.... which *forbids* certain actions' (1938: 140).

Even in their **formulation**, he uses imperative and quasi-imperative language. The **very** definitions that he gives in **De Cive** and **Leviathan**, to describe laws of nature show their imperative character. Taylor substantiates this by quoting the works of Hobbes:

... the **law-of-nature** is defined as 'the dictate of right reason, conversant about those things which are either to be done or omitted ... for the constant preservation of life and members.

as much as in us **lies**' (*De Cive*. II. I [EW. II. 161]). "A Law-of-nature (*Leviathan*. XIV. 84[EW. III. 116-117]) is a **Precept**, or generall **Rule**, found out by **Reason**, by which a man is forbidden to do, that which is destructive of his **life**, or **taketh** away the means of preserving the same: and to omit **that**, by which he thinketh it may be best **preserved**'. And (ibid. [*Leviathan*, 85: **EW III. 117**]) the '**Fundamentall Law-of-nature**' is that 'by which men are commanded to endeavour **Peace**.' (1938: 140)

The above definitions of laws of nature quoted from different works of Hobbes **show** that the imperative character is inseparably associated with laws of nature. For Taylor this is true even in the case of 'fundamental **law**' in the **state-of-nature**. According to him, even the creation of the civil **society**, is based on the moral imperative. The way civil society comes into existence is by unqualified submission of individual's personal rights to the sovereign. To quote Taylor:

It must be **remembered, however**, that this unqualified submission to the sovereign is regarded by Hobbes not as a mere counsel of **safety**, but as a strict moral **obligation**, and that the obligation is imported into it from the 'eternal' natural law that faith once given is to be kept. (1938: 143-4)

The unqualified submission of the individual to sovereign, for Hobbes, is not just for the sake of safety or to avoid death as egoistic psychology states, but it is for the sake of moral obligation of the natural law, which states that if we pledge once, we have to keep it under all circumstances. It is upon a covenant that the civil society depends, which is nothing but natural law that the covenants once made can never be violated.

Civil Law Vs Natural law:

In order to show the origin of moral obligation in natural law Taylor explicates a distinction that is found in Hobbes's description of civil law and natural law. According to him, Hobbesian use of these laws of nature is not simply as advises to persuade one's personal interest, but as moral laws. These moral laws, dictate duties. They are morally obligatory and imperative in character and so everybody should obey them. Hobbes's ethical theory, as Taylor infers from this, is a strict deontology. This deontological character is already, implicitly there in the state-of-nature. It becomes explicit in the civil society. Whether it is a civil society or a state-of-nature every individual has to play his part, and should be under the governance of some law or authority.

Hence, according to Taylor, laws of nature are moral laws and moral law will always be in the imperative form and it always dictates some duty. In this way, he insists that Hobbesian presentation of laws of nature must be viewed not as mere pieces of advice about the prudent pursuit of self-interest, but as moral laws, which

dictate duties. The imperative nature is inseparable from these laws of nature. This inseparable imperative nature proves the origin of obligation, not in the sovereign's orders backed by threats of penalties. Instead, it proves the continuance of moral obligation before the existence of the legislator and the civil society. Therefore, moral obligation to obey the natural law is independent of the civil sovereign. Taylor argues that the obligation to obey the sovereign is not created by the orders of the sovereign backed by the threat of penalties. Instead, the moral obligation derives its birth from the laws of nature, which has its existence even before the existence of the civil society, i.e., in the state-of-nature. He uses the distinction made by Hobbes between internal obligation or *in fore interno* and external obligation *in fore externo*, and argues that in the state-of-nature the moral law is obliged *in fore interno*, but not always *in fore externo*. (1938: 141)

Taylor held that Hobbes would have conveyed his meaning of the moral imperative in the state-of-nature more clearly, had he stressed that the fundamental law-of-nature, i.e., the natural law is a law of reciprocal obligation. What Taylor meant by this reciprocal obligation was that, every man tries to be peaceful 'with him who is willing also to be at peace with him.' In other words, 'that every man ought to endeavor peace *at tore* as he has hope of obtaining it'. The moral obligation in the state-of-nature is *in fore interno* and, therefore, is reciprocal because there is no external common power to act as a protector or a governor. Every man has to judge for himself whether other man's desire for peace with me is reciprocated on my part.

Taylor, further, argues that this reciprocity of the natural law has its fuller implication on another important distinction between civil law and natural law. Civil laws can only be violated by external actions and words, but the 'moral law is violated by an improper thought and purpose'. Moral law, which is *in fore interno*, is said to be broken not only when one acts contrary to it but also when one thinks contrary to it. In other words, even if the action done is according to the laws, but the purpose or intention is against the law, then the natural law is said to be broken.

Taylor maintains that natural law unlike civil law, in Hobbes, is 'immutable and eternal'. What the laws of nature command can never be unlawful and what they forbid can never be lawful. And 'pride, ingratitude, breach of contracts (i.e. injury), inhumanity' will never be lawful and the contrary can never be unlawful. In this way, Taylor advocates the precedence and significance of the natural law over the civil law.

Another important point that makes Taylor to argue for the imperativeness of the natural law in Hobbes is the existence of a lot many other obligations along with those ordained by the sovereign in the civil society. All the other obligations that a man in the civil society obliges, which are not commanded by sovereign, derive their obligatoriness from the natural law. The range of natural law, therefore, is broad and it even includes the obligatoriness of the civil sovereign's commands. The kind of importance that has been given to the practical importance of obedience to the sovereign is so great that it overshadows another equally predominant theme in Hobbes, namely, that 'we are under an 'eternal obligation' to practice an equity

which demands mercy, benevolence, gratitude, and to practice it because the law commands it." (1938: 142)

Taylor saves Hobbes from Cudworth² charge that Hobbes based moral obligation on the 'mere will' of the sovereign, by maintaining that 'all obligations, including the obligation to honor ray covenant by strict obedience to the sovereign, is thus derived by Hobbes from a natural law'. The sovereign uses his 'mere will' only to make a distinction between 'just and unjust'. The meaning of just, by definition, is that which civil law permits, and unjust is that which the civil law forbids. However, the sovereign does not make a more important and antecedent distinction between equity and inequity. To quote Taylor:

... the sovereign does nothing to create the obligation to keep a 'covenant': all that he really does is to decree that the performance of certain 'covenants' is illegal, and to prescribe the precise forms of declaration of our intentions, which his courts will regard as constituting a contract. So, we are told, he does not make adultery wrong: it was wrong antecedently by the 'natural law': he merely decides 'what copulations' are to be regarded as adulterous. (1938: 143)

² Cudworth is one of the early critics of Hobbes. He was referred by Taylor. (1938: 142)

This shows that the sovereign is **only** an interpreter of the law, and is not the **law** giver as such. Taylor argues that for Hobbes a good citizen has to simply obey the command of his sovereign even if the command given is iniquitous. Since the subject is covenanted to be loyal to the **sovereign**, he must obey and should not break the command of the natural **law** that 'covenants once made are to be **kept**'. By obeying the **sovereign**, the subject has done his duty. If the command is **iniquitous**, the **iniquity** applies to the sovereign who gave it and he is, according to Hobbes, answerable to the God. Taylor argues that if the subject disobeys the command believing that the command is **iniquitous**, then the iniquity of the disobedience would not fall on him, in this way, while attributing iniquity to the **sovereign**, he justifies the unqualified submission of the subjects to the sovereign. He argues that, Hobbes regards this unqualified submission 'not as a mere counsel of safety but as a strict deontology'. The obligation is imported into it by the natural law that 'faith once given is to be kept'. And this is antecedent to the creation of political obligation.

Sovereign as a part of Moral Imperative:

Taylor argues for the consistency of the deontology of Hobbes by pointing out the dependence of civil **society** on the covenant and making the obedience to the civil **law** as the **duty** on the part of the subjects. He, in order to substantiate his argument for the deontological character of Hobbes, introduces civil sovereign also into the jurisdiction of the natural law. **Taylor**, in this way, makes the moral obligation **obligatory** not only to the subjects but also to the sovereign. Civil **sovereign**, who is not subject to his own laws and who is authorized to command and

forbid at his discretion, is 'just as much under a rigid law of moral obligation as his subjects'. What the sovereign obliged is 'equity'. To quote Taylor, 'He is obliged to equity, the strict observance of the natural (or moral) law, which means, in effect, that he is bound to command and forbid always with a view to the good of the community' (1938: 144).

The sovereign is obliged to work for the good of the community that is to command his subjects in order to preserve the peace and commodious living. Taylor argues that Hobbesian sovereign has not only extensive rights, but also corresponding duties. They are: 1) not to restrain the 'harmless liberty' of the subjects by 'superfluous laws': 2) not to 'allow law to be stultified by the imposition of inadequate penalties' and, 3) 'not to poison its administration by conniving at the corruption of judges by bribes and presents'. (1938: 148) Violation of all these duties has been regarded as 'misconduct' on the part of the sovereign and Hobbes described it as *'iniquity' and sin*.

Now the problem for Taylor is, since Hobbes reduces all iniquity in the end to the breach of contract, and regards sovereign as no part to the contract, how could the misconduct of sovereign be termed as iniquity. According to Hobbes, the 'original contract' imposes no conditions on the sovereign's arbitrary exercise of the power to command or forbid, and hence the sovereign cannot said to be guilty of iniquity.

If **iniquity** and the breach of contract are the same then sovereign can never be said to have violated the contract since contract imposes no restrictions on **him**. In such a case Hobbes's description of the duties of the **sovereign**³ can never be substantiated. However, Taylor thinks that Hobbes's description of the duties of the sovereign does mean that sovereign is in **fact**, 'discharging a *debitum*'. From the Hobbesian point of **view** Taylor rules out the **possibility** of owing debt to oneself. Hobbes is careful to insist **that**, to quote Taylor:

... in ruling with a single eye to the public **good**, the sovereign is doing what he is *obliged* to do by the 'natural law'. (1938: 145)

In order to argue for the consistency of Hobbesian doctrine, Taylor makes the sovereign also a party to the contract. According to Hobbes, the sovereign is created by the transference of the rights in the state-of-nature by his future subjects. What the people transfer to sovereign is the right to prescribe at his discretion what they should do. And the purpose of this transference is to promote 'safety and commodious living'. **It** is true that the renunciation of rights by the people is done not between sovereign and the people but between people themselves. However, Taylor argues that completeness of the transaction depends on the acceptance of the transaction by the beneficiary. To quote Taylor:

³ Hobbes discussed the duties of the sovereign in **De Cive**, **XIII** concerning the duties of those who bear **Rule**, sections 15-17.

Hobbes is quite clear on the point that to make the transaction complete there must be an *acceptance* of the proposed transfer of rights by the beneficiary. 'In the conveyance of right, the will is requisite not only of him that *conveys*, but of him also that accepts it. If either be *wanting*, the right remains.' (1938: 147)

A transaction or a contract can never said to be complete unless the *beneficiary* also accepts the contract. And once the *beneficiary* accepts the transaction then he can be said to be a party to the transaction. The sovereign is a party in the formation of civil society. Taylor argues that this does not make the sovereign a party to the contract in the same way as the people are. It does not make the sovereign answerable to the subjects. But it brings a kind of obligation on the part of the sovereign to provide commodious living to all, which is the purpose of the contract. In this way, the sovereign is not a party to the contract in the sense as his subjects are. What Taylor tries to show by this discussion is that, "there really is a *bargain*, to which the sovereign is a party by his acceptance of the *sovereignty*, that the transferred rights shall be exclusively used in the ways which the sovereign honestly believes to further the end aimed at in the *transference*, and this is enough to explain why, even on the assumption that all 'iniquity' can be reduced to breach of contract ...the sovereign can be said to be capable of 'iniquity', to be bound by the natural law" (1938: 147).

It is by acceptance of **sovereignty** the sovereign has 'virtually contracted', not in the sense of submission of his rights, but to use rights transferred to him for the common **safety** and welfare of the people. **Taylor, however**, substantiates his position that moral imperative is the basis of moral obligation and it has its origin in the **laws of nature** to which even the sovereign is a subject with some prescribed duties. Since the sovereign also has duties to perform is substantiated by natural **law**, the author of the natural law must be other than the sovereign. This led Taylor to revoke the concept of God in Hobbes to understand the obligatoriness of natural law.

God as **the source** of Moral **Obligation**:

A **duty**, according to Hobbes, is 'following what is prescribed by the **law**' and a **law** is "the command of the person...whose precept contains in it **by** the reason of obedience". If the sovereign is said to have duties by following the prescribed law then whose command is this law? What person is **this**, 'whose commands are binding on princes because **they** are *fas* **commands**?' Taylor rules out the possibility of a 'natural person' being the source of the obligatoriness of the natural law since Hobbes never accepts the existence of any universal monarch on the earth. Even the **possibility** of a court of natural persons has also been denied since the existence of no such court is possible. In order to make the **theory** of Hobbes consistent, Taylor argues **that**, 'natural **law** is the command of **God**, and to be obeyed *because* it is God's command". (1938: 148) These natural **laws**, commanded by **God**, are theorems in the sense that they are discoverable by rational thinking. They are commands in the sense that **they** are commands laid by one will upon another will.

According to I ay **lor**, since "no man can be obliged **except** it be to another" (1938: 148), the natural **law** cannot be termed "natural iniquity" unless it is **regarded** as command and by following it as a duty. **It** can be recognized as law only as the command of God. Since Hobbes regards natural law to be *infore interno*, it cannot be regarded as command unless there is a formal intention on the part of the subject to obey the law. No one really fulfils the demands of **equity** unless they are regarded as the commands of God. Taylor **tries** to import the moral imperative into the natural **law by** regarding them as the commands of God.

Now the problem for Taylor is to show how the "theorems" of laws of nature are commands of God. There are different expositions in the works of Hobbes. **In the Elements of law**, Hobbes explained the 'theorems', as being obtaining their fuller character of being divine laws from their being laid down as commands in scriptures. **However**, this implies that only those people who accept the **authority** of that particular scripture can feel theorems as **laws**, whereas they remain as mere precepts for others. This exposition seems to be insufficient to maintain the consistency in the **deontological theory** of Hobbes because it does not include **all** and excludes few people such as atheists. **Taylor, therefore**, cites another **exposition**, from **De Cive**, where Hobbes maintained that God has a **two-fold kingdom** – *natural*, which is reigned by **reason**, and is **universal**, therefore common to all; and *prophetical*, which is positive and is not given to all men but to some peculiar people elected by Him. **Taylor, further**, adds that the right to **rule**, in the natural kingdom is founded on God's irresistible **power**, whereas in the prophetic world God's **sovereignty** over the 'elected' rests on a covenant. (1938: 149)

Taylor finds consistency in this exposition and maintains that, according to this version, natural law is a law for all men except atheists. He states that in order to maintain the deontological character of moral obligation it is necessary to bring consistency to the statements of Hobbes, which carry an atheistic tone. Hobbes's atheistic utterances were normally misunderstood to be 'insincere verbiage'. In fact, they insist only on the 'incomprehensibility of the divine nature and on the impossibility of our having a 'conception of God'. (149-150). When Hobbes stated that we can have no conception of God, according to Taylor, he is only ascribing to the 'universal scholastic doctrine that the *essentials* of God cannot be known'.

Taylor tries to bring consistency to the view of Hobbes regarding the existence of God by constructing a causal argument.² He brings the arguments of the universe as an aggregate of bodies and arguments of causation as nothing can be the cause of its own. These together prove that God exists as a cause of the universe.

² However, Taylor himself pointed out a certain kind of inconsistency between Hobbesian definition of cause and effect, which goes against this explanation. To quote Taylor, "There is, perhaps, a certain inconsistency between Hobbes's definition of cause and effect, for which it should follow that a cause is always temporally prior to its effect, and the doubt expressed in the *De Corpore* about the validity of the reasons given for a beginning of the world in time. But the utmost that this proves, I think, is only that Hobbes had not thought out the implications of the problem to the end. He has been laughed at for leaving the question undecided until it shall be authoritatively determined by the sovereign" (1938: 151).

since the universe cannot be the cause of its own. **However**, he overcomes the limitation **that**, whatever exists must be conceivable as body and God **is not conceivable**, by arguing that He is incomprehensible. According to Taylor, Hobbes **seems**:

... to accept at its face value the argument that the universe (= the aggregate of bodies) must have a **cause**, and **since**, on his own definition of **causation**, nothing can be *causa sui*, it follows at once (1) that the 'cause of the **universe**' is neither itself (the 'aggregate of bodies') nor any part of **itself**, and (2) **that**, if as Hobbes **held**, nothing can be conceived but **body**, this **cause**, though certainly known by the causal argument to **exist**, must be incomprehensible to us. The internal consistency of this doctrine seems to me to be the best proof that it was sincerely held. (1938: 150)

Taylor believes that, Hobbesian conviction that "natural law, as a command of God is produced not on the basis of the Scriptural **testimonies**, but by the '**unusual** depth of his own sense of moral obligation". Attributing few personal remarks to Hobbes like 'honest **man**, and 'a man of the sense of duty'. Taylor argues **that**, 'to such a man the thought that duty is a divine command is so natural that it is almost impossible not to form it'. (1938: 151) Taylor conceives the religion of Hobbes to be similar to that of Kant – as '**the** discharge of the duties of everyday morality with an accomplishing sense of their transcendent obligatoriness'. (1938: 152)

To conclude, Taylor argues that the moral and political philosophy of Hobbes rests on the moral imperative. The moral imperative has its basis in the natural law, and thus it is antecedent to the civil society. This view rejects two important possible interpretations of Hobbes: that is, that the moral philosophy of Hobbes is based on self-interest and the origin of civil society is in the transference of rights of the people. According to Taylor, ethical and political philosophy of Hobbes is based on moral imperative, whereas the origin of civil society has its basis in the convenient. The prevalence of moral imperative in the state-of-nature in the form of laws of nature exposes the deontological character of the ethical doctrine of Hobbes. Since there is no superior power or authority to control the people, the law-of-nature has been followed, at least *in fore interno*, as duty. Taylor attributes the source of authority to God. Thus, the thesis of Taylor attempts to show that the ethical doctrine of Hobbes is basically deontological. This implies that the ethical philosophy of Hobbes is logically independent of his egoistic psychology. Even if the psychology is rejected in *toto* Hobbesian theory of obligation does not lose its relevance, instead, will gain consistency.

CHAPTER IV

J. H. WARRENDER: MORAL OBLIGATION

In Warrender too we find an account, which bases Hobbes's political philosophy outside science. This chapter discusses his argument that the political philosophy of Hobbes is based on the theory of moral obligation, which has its basis, in turn, in the state-of-nature in the form of laws-of-nature. The laws-of-nature are essentially moral laws and prescribe duties towards society and are morally obligatory because they are commanded and willed by God. The sovereign does not create moral laws, and his only role is to interpret and render the preexisting moral laws fully operative. Therefore, Warrender argues, Hobbes's theory of obligation runs through the whole of his account of man, both apart from and within society and it is independent of the *fait* of the sovereign. Beginning with a brief note on the difference and similarities between Warrender and Taylor, this chapter proceeds to different types of obligation and the significance of moral obligation in Hobbes as stated by Warrender and discusses the three aspects of obligation and their pervadence in both state-of-nature and civil society. It concludes by pointing out how Warrender placed the philosophy of Hobbes outside science.

It is necessary to point out that the above argument of Warrender that moral obligation in Hobbes is independent of the sovereign authority though seems to be similar to that of Taylor, however, differs from the latter in significant ways. One of

the important points of difference between Warrender and Taylor is - the 'Kantian analogies' in Hobbes's doctrine. While Taylor drew similarities between Kant and Hobbes, Warrender rejects this and maintains that the obligatory character of natural law in Hobbes does not follow from its rational form but from their capacity as the commands of God. The rational nature of laws-of-nature guarantees, not their obligatoriness, but 'that they are knowable without special promulgation as commands of God.' (1957:337) Further, Warrender contends that Taylor's analysis of obligations in the state-of-nature in terms of reciprocity cannot be justified from Hobbes's text. Warrender criticizes Taylor for presenting Hobbesian treatment of the sovereignty only as sovereignty by institution and neglecting the sovereign's conquest and acquisition. Taylor correctly indicates that there are some passages reminiscent to Kant's moral theory. However, Warrender departs from Taylor in asserting that the Kantian elements (though present) have no continuing and significant part. And it was a rationalistic ethic that pervades and ties together the whole structure, relating both to man in the state-of-nature and in civil society. Warrender holds that for Hobbes the laws-of-nature are rational principles, and they are eternal and unchangeable even by God. Warrender regards Hobbes as essentially a natural law theorist or philosopher. Let us discuss Warrender to see how he argues that moral obligation is the basis of Hobbes's political philosophy.

Warrender makes an 'attempt to discover the logical structure of Hobbes's argument in one of his central aspects, namely, the theory of obligation' by piecing together his arguments as far as it could be done legitimately. (1957:2) The theory of obligation though forms only a part, has widespread implications in the philosophy

of Hobbes. A consistent formulation of theory of obligation is necessary to demonstrate 'why the citizen ought to obey the civil law' and to prove the survival of Hobbes's ethical and political philosophy. In order to provide consistent formulation of moral obligation he first examined two types of obligation. They are, physical obligation and moral obligation. Subsequently, he provided a framework within which the aspects of obligation, such as instruments of obligation, grounds of obligation and validating conditions of obligation are discussed. He argued that these aspects of obligation are same in both the state-of-nature and the civil society.

Let us discuss two types of obligation discussed by Warrender. Physical obligation is concerned with involuntary actions. It does not play any role in Hobbes' system for it 'involves the type of involuntary obedience that is given to the laws of natural science and is concerned with sheer physical constraint' and therefore it has marginal use in Hobbes. Moral obligation is concerned with the voluntary actions. It is the obligation to obey God in his natural kingdom, based upon fear of divine power, and it is the one which binds the citizen in the civil society. Warrender takes up the later one as the subject matter of his study.

According to Warrender the framework of the study to the discussion on moral obligation is (a) 'what the individual is obliged to do' which can be derived from the Hobbesian treatment of natural and civil law' and (b) 'what the individual cannot be obliged to do' which can be derived from Hobbes's 'logical analysis of what is implied in being obliged'. The first one gets exposed in the Hobbesian account of obligation and authority, i.e., in the description of civil law and finding

their **authority** in God. The second one gets exposed in the analysis of obligation and its **applicability** to human conditions. (1957: 13)

Within this framework the three aspects of obligation i.e., Ground of Obligation, Validating conditions of Obligation and Instruments of Obligation were discussed. Warrender defined the ground of obligation as that "condition or factor" from which the **obligatoriness** is derived (i.e., the source of obligation). The source of obligation, in Hobbes's philosophy, is God. Validating conditions are those, "which must be satisfied if a ground of obligation is to be operative" (such as sanity and morality). These conditions in their negative sense can also be called as "invalidating principles" since "they state the absence of some validating condition that by its absence renders inoperative some ground of obligation." (1957:14) The instruments of obligation are the standard means "whereby an obligation is incurred". The sole instruments of obligation are laws and covenants. "Obligations are imposed upon the individuals by laws and the covenant is an instrument whereby the individual takes obligation upon himself. (1957:28-9)

Satisfaction of these three aspects of obligation is **necessary** for any act of obligation. **Nevertheless**, what happens if one of the **conditions**, either the ground of obligation or the validating condition of obligation is absent. In order to clarify the confusion regarding the absence of any one of the conditions Warrender introduces a further distinction between *suspended obligation* and *prima-facie obligation*. He names that a *suspended obligation* in which the ground of obligation is present and one or more validation conditions **is** are missing. To quote Warrender, "When the ground of obligation is **present**, but one or more validating conditions pertinent to

that ground are *lacking*, this case may be described as a *suspended obligation*." (1957:26) *Prima-facie obligation* is that where the ground of obligation is present and the existence of validating conditions pertinent to the ground of obligation are not specified. He says, "Again, when the ground is *present*, but it is not specified whether the relevant validating conditions are satisfied or not this case will be called a *prima-facie obligation*." (1957:26) In the above two cases the ground of obligation is *present*, but the problem is with the presence or the specification of the validating conditions. However, if the ground of obligation itself is not there then such kind of *situation*, irrespective of the satisfaction of the validating conditions, is described as *moral vacuum*. To quote Warrender, "If, on the other hand, the grounds of obligation themselves are *lacking*, the situation may be described as a *moral vacuum*, whether the relevant validating conditions are satisfied or not." (1957:26)

The analysis of the grounds of *obligation*, i.e., the authority or source of *obligation*, provides answer to what the individual is obliged to do. What the individual cannot be obliged to do is answered in the discussion on validating conditions and the instruments of obligation. In the course of his argument, however, he first takes up the issue of what the individual cannot be obliged to do and second, what the individual is obliged to do. In other words, he first takes up the Instruments of Obligation and Validating conditions of Obligation and then proceeds to the Ground of Obligation.

Warrender acknowledges three kinds of possible expositions regarding the *theory* of obligation of Hobbes. Firstly, the very possibility of the exposition of the *theory* of obligation can be questioned by arguing that there is no such *theory* to be

found in any significant form. The very possibility of any normativity can be denied by arguing that Hobbes's theory of obligation is essentially a theory of how men do act and it does not discuss how men ought to act. Secondly, it can be argued that the institution of civil society brings with it a "generically new type of obligation", since the state-of-nature is a moral vacuum and moral obligations have their origin only in civil society. The third possibility is to argue for the prevalence of the theory of obligation in 'the whole of Hobbes's account of man, both apart from and within the civil society.' (1957: 7) Warrender accepts this third interpretation and expounds a consistent theory of obligation. He bases Hobbes's theory on a postulate which, as he himself puts it, 'the obligation of the citizen to obey the civil law is a type of obligation that is essential! independent of the *fact* of the Civil Sovereign'. (1957: 7) This postulate led him to the notion that the origin and validity of the theory of obligation lies above and independent of the purview of the civil society. Let us discuss obligation in the state-of-nature and see whether there is a single consistent theory of obligation running through the state-of-nature to the civil society.

Instruments of Obligation:

Hobbesian account of moral obligation starts with state-of-nature, which is an account of man outside and apart from the civil society. Two instruments of obligation, covenants and laws-of-nature, form the basis of obligation even in the state-of-nature, and proceed to the civil society. Let us first understand Hobbesian account of the covenant. Covenant has a specific technical meaning, it involves the individuals who promise or agree to do something for their benefit and continue to do it in the future. The covenant in this specific usage includes the mutual benefit of

the people who covenant and also the trust on the part of both the parties. To quote Warrender:

Covenants, which have a technical meaning in Hobbes's **writings**, arise when individuals make a promise to, or an agreement **with**, each **other**, when there is a consideration or matter of benefit involved for both **parties**, and where one or both parties are to perform in the future and are to be trusted in the meantime. (1957: 30)

Agreement between the two parties is the general condition of the covenants. In other **words**, the covenant arises because **of** the agreement between the parties. The **agreements**, which do not **satisfy** this technical **definition**, cannot be regarded as covenants in the Hobbesian sense. **If** the agreement between the parties is the basis for the covenant to come into existence then there must be some principles on which their agreement rests. There must be some principles that validate the covenants. These **principles**, according to Warrender are: (i) The covenant should not be against law, whether it be natural or civil. **In** the **state-of-nature** all covenants are valid except those that are against the **laws-of-nature**. (ii) **It** should not prescribe known **impossibilities**, which the party to the covenant cannot **perform**. (iii) **It** should not take away the right to self-preservation of the **individual**. (iv) **It** should not contradict the earlier **covenant**. (v) Both the parties to the covenant must accept to perform the **covenant**. (vi) The individual should know to whom he should oblige the covenant. That means no one should have obligations to persons unknown. These are the basic **principles**, which must be satisfied to call a covenant to be performed. (1957:31-4)

All these principles apply "alike to covenants in the State of Nature and to those in civil society." (1957:35)

Warrender argues that it is mistakenly thought that there are no obligations in the state-of-nature. Tracing the source of this mistake to Hobbes's own pronouncement that there are no valid covenants in the state-of-nature and man is not subject to the obligation before the establishment of the sovereign power. Warrender argues that the state-of-nature is, in fact, central to Hobbes's theory of obligation. It is central because all the obligations of Hobbes's political philosophy have their beginning in the state-of-nature. Though Hobbes did say that there are no covenants in the state-of-nature, he did not, however, say that there is no obligation to keep valid covenants. In other words, there are no covenants does not imply, as it is mistakenly thought, that there is no possibility of covenants. Conceding the possibilities of the absence of the valid covenants in the state-of-nature, however, does not rule out the possibility on the part of the individual to perform his part if there were any valid covenants. This possibility of obligations did not get actualized in the state-of-nature, because the validating conditions are not satisfied. As it is stated above, all obligations have to satisfy certain validating conditions, without which they cannot be considered as obligations. In the state-of-nature obligations such as covenants against the law and covenants not to defend oneself are valid. Except the covenants that are against the law and self-preservation, all the other covenants are valid in the state-of-nature. The ground of obligation (i.e., God) the instruments of obligation (covenants and laws) and the validating conditions (such as obligations should not go against the law and obligation should not prescribe known

impossibilities etc.) are prevalent even in the state-of-nature. But only few of them are operative. For instance, both parties to the covenant must accept and agree to perform the obligation and man can have no obligation to kill himself, are the validating conditions that are satisfied even in the state-of-nature. It is true that, there will be a fear of nonperformance of the covenant by others in the individual. However, this does not work in all situations. For instance, the fear of one party, of the nonperformance by another party to the contract, even though that party has already performed the covenant, cannot be justified. The just suspicion of one party of the covenant that the other party will not perform his share (which Warrender calls 'retrospective invalidating principle') would make the validity of the covenants insecure in the state-of-nature. One of the reasons, which justify the just fear of non-performance on the part of the parties to the covenant, is the fear that the subsequent conditions or events would invalidate the covenant. In addition, the appearance of such subsequent causes of fear are ever likely to arise in the state-of-nature, which is why there are few covenants that are not invalid. It is this just fear that is responsible for the different positions of covenants in the state-of-nature as compared with those in the civil society. In the civil society the fear that the other party to the covenant may not act accordingly cannot be regarded as the just fear. Because the sovereign will enforce lawfully the performance of the covenants and creates certain security on the parties to the covenant. But in the state-of-nature the absence of this enforcing mechanism makes the parties to the covenant insecure and gives way for invalidity of the covenants.

Warrender asks the question, if the sovereign is necessary for the existence of valid covenants, how can he be instituted by a covenant? This gives him scope to argue that the origin of obligation to obey the covenants is in the state-of-nature itself. He argues, to quote Warrender:

If Hobbes's theory is, that I am obliged by my covenant unless some subsequent cause of fear invalidates it, the function of the sovereign is not to make covenant valid that was previously invalid, but to prevent (by taking away subsequent causes of fear) what is already a valid covenant from becoming invalidated. (1957: 44)

Warrender stresses the point that in the state-of-nature man is obliged to fulfil the covenants he made but the required determinate conditions are inoperative. However, this won't leave the individual blameless, in fact, he has to answer to his conscience. In this way he brings conscience also into the discussion, since any act of performance or breaking of the covenant is a willful and volitional act of the individual. All the volitional acts are the acts of conscience. Even if the determinate conditions are inoperative covenants can be obliged because the individual has to answer his conscience. This provided Warrender a way to argue that the transition from the state-of-nature to civil society was made possible only because of the existence of the valid covenants. The sovereign in the civil society only makes the situation possible for the existence of covenants, but he does not provide an obligation to keep valid covenants. Further, Warrender adds, 'the difference

between the **state-of-nature** and the civil society is a difference of circumstance and not of moral principle' (1957:47).

After explaining that without the existence of covenants before the existence of civil **society** the transition from the state-of-nature to civil society is not possible. Warrender turns to the second set of instruments of **obligation**, i.e., **laws-of-nature**. Though both the covenant and law of nature are the instruments of **obligation**, covenants **draw** their obligation from the laws-of-nature. Covenanting is a special case of **obligation**, where as **laws-of-nature** is a general one.

Warrender argues that Hobbes's theory of political obligation should be derived from the natural law, which enjoys its own authority, and hence the political obligation is a moral obligation. This led him to interpret Hobbes as a 'genuine natural law theorist'. The **laws-of-nature** play a crucial and pivotal role in Hobbes's theory of obligation. Even in the state-of-nature these natural laws prompt the individuals to establish the sovereign. Their **importance**, though marginal in the civil society, nevertheless continues in the civil society. Warrender points out that **obligation**, as Hobbes understood it, is **essentially** same both within and outside civil society, and there are obligations in the state-of-nature and that no **new** kind of obligation is added with the formation of a state. The obligation to keep the **covenant** by which a sovereign is set up depends on, and is merely a special case *of* the obligation to obey the **laws-of-nature**.

The **laws-of-nature** are **obligatory** to man in both the **state-of-nature** and civil society. In order to **specify** the extent and manner of the fulfillment of obligations a

distinction has been brought **between** obligations *in fore interno* and *in fore externo*. Obligations *in fore interno* (i.e., obligations in the court of conscience) are not affected by the provision of sufficient security and oblige always. The obligations of *in fore externo* (i.e., obligations in the realm of external action) are contingent upon the security of the agent. According to obligations *in fore interno*, in the **state-of-nature**, there is a general obligation or duty to endeavor peace or preserve a readiness of mind or disposition to observe the **law**. The obligation to **obey the laws-of-nature** by man, for **Hobbes**, is not always *in fore interno*, since he may not have sufficient security against other men. Since the performance of law without security may put the individual into mortal **danger**, "sufficient security" acts as a validating condition for obligation *in fore interno*. Obligations *in fore interno* are all those obligations for which the individual conscience is **guide**, and for the **performance**, of which the man is responsible to **God**, who judges his intentions as **well** as his actions. This goes in contrast with the civil law, where specific performance of an act alone always satisfies the law, for the civil authority cannot adequately scrutinize the **thoughts**, but only external actions of men.

Further, the distinction between obligations *in fore interno* and *in fore externo* as obligation to *intend* peaceful actions and an obligation to *act* peacefully **comes**, not out of the best reading of Hobbes. The actual distinction between these two kinds of obligations is based on a distinction between two classes of actions. The obligation *in fore interno* comprises those **actions**, which ask men to be as peaceful as they **safely** can and look for favorable opportunities for peace. The obligations *in fore externo* comprises **specific** performance of law: where what the **law** prescribes

is carried out precisely in actions.' (1957: 67-8) For instance, the third law-of-nature, which states that man must keep covenants, can be used to understand the distinction carefully. According to Warrender:

An obligation *in fore externo*, under this law, would be satisfied only by a specific fulfillment of the agreements which the agent had made. In a dangerous situations, however, the corresponding obligation *in fore interno* may be satisfied by not performing the pledge or performing only the safe parts of it, or even by fighting, as all these may be consistent with endeavoring peace in some circumstances (1957: 68).

To bring the moral issue into the context the individual is required to satisfy himself by discharging his obligatoriness in good faith and right spirit. He is answerable only to God, "who will judge both his action and the intention which lies behind it, for God that seeth the thoughts of man, can lay it to his charge." (1957: 69) Obligation *in fore interno* applies solely to all obligations in the state-of-nature and has wider range of application even in the civil society. This wider range excludes the obligations done under civil law and includes situations where the civil law is silent and where civil law by its very nature cannot give prescriptions. Therefore, obligations *in fore interno* "are a class of obligations which includes all the obligations of men in the state-of-nature and those obligations upon the citizen which lie in a field where the civil law for some reason or another does not apply" (1957:72) This proves the fact that the concept of obligation *in fore interno* has a relevance for the whole of Hobbess doctrine and not merely for the state-of-nature.

Validating Conditions:

As the argument in Warrender's thesis aims to project, a consistent theory of obligatoriness, which runs from the state-of-nature to the civil society, the validating conditions of obligation in the state-of-nature is also the validating conditions of obligation in civil society. The validating conditions of natural law are: (i) Sufficient security, which states that, to be a law and obliged, a law "must operate in a context in which the validating condition of 'sufficient security' may be said to be fulfilled." (1957: 58) The state of general insecurity in the state-of-nature is because there is no law and no authority to impose obligations, which can be called as a condition where every man has 'a right to all things'. (ii) The law must be known or knowable to the person to be obliged. (1957:80) Children and madmen are exempted from this. (iii) The author of the law must be known or knowable. 'for no man is understood to be obliged, unless he knows to whom he is to perform the obligation'. (1957:81) The author of the law is God and along with children and madmen, atheists are also excluded from being obliged by the natural law. (iv) The law must be interpreted. This condition operates at a secondary level and useful to distinguish valid from invalid interpretation of law. The principle which governs the valid interpretations of natural law is, 'that where there is an external human authority (in other words, a sovereign), the interpretation given by that authority is law, and where there is no such authority, or where that authority is not or cannot be competent the law must be interpreted by the individual reason and conscience." (1957:86) (v) The person obliged must have a possible sufficient motive to obey the law. (1957:87) Obligation to the law must be motivated by the self-preservation of the individual. Since no man

can have a sufficient motive to end his life, obligations must be consistent with self-preservation. Warrender argues that this validating condition is partly logical and partly psychological. It is logical in so far as it can be extracted from Hobbes's concept of moral obligation. It is psychological in stating that no man can have a sufficient motive to kill himself. Warrender supports the main claim of the present thesis, the point that the motivation for self-preservation is a psychological one and not based on the natural science. Hobbes by introspective and observational evidences, rather than the first principles of motion extracts the motive of self-preservation. To quote Warrender:

... that no man can have a sufficient motive to kill himself, is a psychological principle and Hobbes appears to have regarded this as being based upon introspection or observational evidence, though he does occasionally suggest that it may also be deduced from his first principles of motion. Neglecting the latter possibility, the psychological principle is contingent. (1957:93)

The psychological principle that nobody will have sufficient motive to kill himself is the basis of moral obligation. This psychological principle is deduced from introspection or observational evidence but not from the laws of motion.

Warrender rejects the view that there is no obligation in the state-of-nature and argues instead that even in the state-of-nature the laws-of-nature are obligatory. However, the problem of 'sufficient security' i.e., bona-fide defense in terms of self-

preservation invalidates the obligation *in fore externo*. Nevertheless, even in the state-of-nature, which is state of war, there are few external actions which are specifically forbidden, they are drunkenness and cruelty or revenge. The excuse of self-preservation invalidates 'a great many obligations'. However, this does not mean that the state-of-nature is a state of total insecurity and so there are no obligations. Hobbes, according to Warrender, for instance, enumerates few external situations where suspicion of danger is not possible, such as, where one party to a valid covenant has already performed its part. Further, a just suspicion of a good faith of a party can arise only from some event subsequent to the agreement. These two define secure situations in the state-of-nature and no 'just fears' can be true as far as these situations are concerned. In general, therefore, the class of persons who are in an insecure situation and who sincerely think themselves to be insecure are exempted from the obligations to obey the law and remaining class of people are obliged to obey the law. This general principle is true to both the state-of-nature and the civil society. However, Warrender asserts that this general principle has been obscured because of Hobbes's apparent over emphasis on the problem of security as a significant aspect of the contrast between the civil society and the state-of-nature. There are few secure situations in the state-of-nature and also there are insecure situations in the civil society.

As law and covenant are the only necessary instruments from which the obligations are incurred it is obvious that the same conditions, which validate law and covenant, validate obligation. However, there are conditions other than the validating conditions of covenants and laws-of-nature, which qualify the validity of

obligations. They are the logical and psychological impossibilities. Logical impossibilities are the laws such as commanding a person to round a square or to bring a colorless red object etc. Psychological impossibilities are, for example commanding the agent to kill himself or asking him to **covenant**, which renounces the right to **self-preservation**. In this way, these validating conditions of obligation are tests for the logical and psychological **possibility** of obligations.

Warrender argues that the discussion of the account of obligation in the state-of-nature gives the outline of the **theory** of obligation in general. He states that the entire **theory** of obligation is given in the outline description of the **state-of-nature** and any further discussion on this **aspect**, which comes in civil **society**, is only a kind of explanation or the application of the **already** discussed one. That means the state-of-nature gives a full outline description of the **theory** of obligation and what remains for civil sovereign to do is either to give an explanation or to **show** a way *of* application to the affairs of man under various circumstances. **This, further**, implies that the state-of-nature is not a state of moral vacuum and if certain validating conditions are **satisfied**, then **law** will always bind man. Civil **society** is not the starting point of Hobbes's description of moral obligation. The civil sovereign prescribes neither the ground of obligation nor the validating conditions of obligation. **Rather**, the sovereign is only concerned with the making a framework under which the obligations could work. To quote:

The account of civil society is essentially an account of how these validating conditions **may** become satisfied. The civil **law prescribes** neither the ground of obligations nor the terms

under which they are valid in any particular case, but is concerned entirely with the satisfaction of conditions that he does not himself specify. (1957: 102)

The political sovereignty, for Hobbes, is always established by covenant. Whether it is sovereignty by institution or sovereignty by acquisition the power of the sovereign is absolute and it cannot be transferred to another. The sovereign cannot be accused by any of his subjects of injury. He cannot be punished by them. He is the judge in deciding what is necessary for peace and he is the sole legislator. Individuals are authorized to obey him without any resistance, except in the case of self-preservation. Though, he is not a party to the contract, he is still accountable to his own conscience and to God for his actions. The establishment of civil society does not affect either the ground of obligation or the validating conditions of obligation. Nevertheless, according to Warrender, its existence effects the obligations in the following ways.

1. Because of the provision of the 'sufficient security' the obligations, which are suspended due to lack of security, are converted into obligations.
2. Sovereign gives a determinate and public interpretation to the laws-of-nature to enlarge their applicability to the affairs of man.
3. Obligations are extended and particularized under a framework of obligations and interpreted as under the previous heads. In other words, they are extended by the political covenant to the other matter of affairs. (1957: 141)

In this sense, the function of the sovereign is not to create moral laws but to enforce and interpret them. Hobbes's main concern, in this respect, is the political authority and his main contention is that without proper political authority morality is frustrated, 'either through men's passions or their insecurity.' The provision of security protected by the sovereign authority effects not only the validity of the covenants but also the operation of the laws-of-nature in general. For these laws bind the individual *in fore interno* in the state-of-nature, with the establishment of the sovereign they work *in fore externo* also. The sovereign, in this way, provides conditions, which render operative obligations that are previously imperfectly effective and *suspended* in nature.

After the advent of the civil sovereign, laws-of-nature persist even in the civil society and play an essential role in the theory of obligation. In the civil society the laws-of-nature are not superseded by the civil law, however, what is altered is their manner of operation. In civil society the interpretation of sovereign works as a public code and determinates rules, which are to be enforced by public authority. From Hobbes's account of civil society, it appears as if civil law and the authentic interpretation of natural law encompass the whole theory of political obligation by sovereign. However, Warrender asserts that along with the civil law and the interpretation of natural law there are other obligations 'where these official enactments are not or cannot be applied.' (1957: 146) In such situations the individual subject is supposed to interpret the natural law for himself and for this he is accountable 'only to his own conscience and to God.'

Hobbes has given supremacy to the natural law over the civil law. The civil law, in this way, neither commands what the natural law forbids, nor can it forbid what is commanded by natural law. In the civil society, civil law replaces the natural law to the extent that a determinate rule is made in interpreting the natural law. However, where it is not replaced in this way, natural law prevails. As the broadest objective of the law is to seek peace, all laws can be regarded as natural in some sense or the other. Civil law is only one level at which the citizen obeys natural law and it is neither comprehensive nor self-justifying in itself.

The obligation to the moral law, i.e., either natural or civil law, is not unconditional. As already pointed out there are few validating conditions that are to be satisfied to make a law obliged. However, if the validating conditions are satisfied, the moral law would be then of universal application. If there is any discrepancy that is found between the obligations of the individual outside the society (i.e., in the state-of-nature) and those of the citizen, then it is understood entirely in terms of "presence or absence of the circumstantial factors." That is, what is altered in the civil society, when compared to the state-of-nature, is neither the ground of obligation nor the conditions of obligation, but circumstantial state of affairs.

The discussion so far expounds that the validating condition of both the instruments of obligation i.e., the covenants and the natural law, are same in both the state-of-nature and the civil society. This discussion, to recall the framework of the argument, explicates what the individual cannot be obliged to do. The applicability of the instruments of obligation to the conditions of man in both the state-of-nature

and the civil society, stress the existence of validating conditions, which state what an individual cannot do. Let us now proceed to Warrender's discussion on what the individual is obliged to do by turning our attention to the ground of obligation, which is the source or the authority of obligation.

Ground of Obligation:

Warrender asserts that the ground of obligation in Hobbes is God. The argument that Hobbes is an atheist is totally rejected. The question that 'why the laws-of-nature are obliged or why the covenants must be kept?' is answered by Warrender as "because these laws are the commands of God, who is entitled to obedience." Thus, the laws-of-nature in the state-of-nature can only properly be considered as laws as the commands of God and it is from this ground that they draw their obligatoriness. The authority of the law, in this way, is drawn from the authority of the author. The inoperativeness of the ground of obligation under few cases such as atheists, madmen and insecure persons is because the validating conditions of obligation are not always satisfied. Further, to quote Warrender:

...if the atheist knows God in the relevant sense, or the madmen were sane, or the 'insecure' men were 'secure', &C., the laws-of-nature would oblige these persons, and under one of these laws they would also be obliged to fulfil any valid covenants which they had made (1957: 100).

This shows that if the validating conditions such as 'law' and the author of the law must be **known** to the **agent** are satisfied then the ground of **obligation**, that is **God**, is obviously **known** and become operative.

Warrender makes a reasonable case for the ground of obligation by arguing that men ought to obey natural **law** because obedience is a means to attain highest **good**, which is their highest interest and natural law is the will of **God**, and ought to be obeyed for that reason (1957: 279). There is a sphere of **God**, which governs the individual by the use of **commands**, which are **laws-of-nature** that are knowable by the use of reason. These laws are supported by rewards and punishments which Warrender describes as "a sanction which may be summarized as the sanction of eternal salvation or the ultimate destruction" (1957: 295) **Thus**, the highest good of the individual posited by Warrender gives rise to an interesting problem to be **solved**, that is the case of an **atheist**, who doesn't believe in God. Warrender argues that the highest good here is not just an end that man may set for **himself**, rather it is a rational one, which could be preferred to the other **non-rational** evils. Since it is a rational principle and can be discovered by using the reason even the "atheist would choose this end if he reasoned to better **effect**."

Conclusion:

Understanding of **Warrender's** main claims of **Hobbes's** theory of obligation in terms of providing an alternative **non-scientific** foundation to the political philosophy of Hobbes is as follows. The ground of obligation is the factor or source from which obligatoriness is derived. According to Warrender, it is not the first

principle of natural science, but God. The source of obligation does not come from the deterministic principles of Hobbesian physics, rather it is derived from God. The laws are obligatory as the commands of God. In this way, Warrender denies the credit to natural science in Hobbes and attributes primary position to moral obligation based on the commands of God.

Again, the validating conditions of moral obligation are not the physical principles of natural science, rather they are the rational principles such as the law and its author must be known, to ensure that the law is obeyed. Without the knowledge 'what law is' and 'who authored the law', it is rationally impossible to obey it. In this way, Warrender gives rationalistic justification, not the naturalistic or scientific, for the validating conditions of moral obligation. Warrender, finally, concludes that the difference between the state-of-nature and the civil society is of 'circumstance' than of 'moral principle'.

Moreover, the very assertion of Warrender that physical obligation does not play any role in the philosophy of Hobbes shows that the role that is played by natural science in the political philosophy is limited. The reason for withholding the physical obligation from the sphere of discussion is that it involves involuntary obedience given to the laws of natural science. It implies that since the obedience that is demanded by the natural science is involuntary, natural science doesn't play any role. Thus, the main arguments of Warrender at least indirectly support the main claim of the thesis and help us to look at him as offering an alternative foundation to the political philosophy of Hobbes.

Thus, Warrender argues that Hobbes's political philosophy rests on the moral obligation. The moral obligation has its basis in the state-of-nature, which is central to the theory of obligation. This theory of obligation pervades in both state-of-nature and civil society. Though there are obligations in the state-of-nature since the validating conditions are sufficiently not satisfied, men proceed to the establishment of the civil society. In the civil society, the sovereign does not create moral obligation, but only interprets the already existing moral laws so as to make them applicable to the everyday instances. This implies that Hobbesian account of moral obligation is independent of the *fact* of the civil sovereign, and it proceeds from state-of-nature to civil society. Laws-of-nature in the state-of-nature are the main source of obligation, and therefore Hobbes is a natural law philosopher. Thus, Warrender disengages the Hobbes political philosophy from the natural science by providing a consistent theory of obligation and by disengaging the political obligation.

Chapter V discusses the argument of C.B. Macpherson, who works in finding another alternative foundation to Hobbes's political philosophy

CHAPTER V

C.B. MACPHERSON: POSSESSIVE INDIVIDUALISM

This chapter discusses C.B. Macpherson's claim that 'Possessive Individualism' is the foundation to the political philosophy of Hobbes. Macpherson presented an historical interpretation, which bases the philosophy of Hobbes on the possessive quality of a market society. This historical interpretation helps us to minimize the importance of scientific method in Hobbes's philosophy, by arguing for a gap between Hobbesian presentation of physiological nature of man (which is materialism) and man's necessary behavior towards each other (which is psychology). It is argued that the gap is filled by a certain kind of social assumptions. However, C.B. Macpherson's main aim is not to limit the significance of scientific method in the philosophy of Hobbes. He, while pointing out the difficulty of finding a firm theoretical basis for the liberal democratic state, inquires into the roots of liberal tradition for the solution. This inquiry led him to the seventeenth century individualism, which is the root of liberalism. Individualism is an outstanding characteristic of the whole liberal tradition. He identified the difficulty of modern democratic theory in its 'Possessive Quality'. The possessive qualities that are present in the seventeenth century political philosophies correspond to the actual conditions of a market society of that period. These possessive assumptions worked as strength to the liberal theory of seventeenth century, but became weakness to the nineteenth

century liberalism. The reason for this weakness, he identified, is the development of market society, which destroyed certain pre-requisites while deriving liberal theory from possessive assumptions. He argued that, though the prerequisites of the possessive assumptions have been destroyed by the development of modern market society, yet these assumptions could not be abandoned since they are closely confirmed to the society. The persistence of these possessive assumptions is responsible for the difficulties of the liberal democratic theory in our own time. According to him, individualism as a basic theoretical position starts from Hobbes. Hobbes's postulates were highly individualistic and he deduced political rights and obligation from the interest and will of dissociated individuals. The fact that individualism has its basic theoretical basis in Hobbes, led Macpherson to start his analysis of the difficulty of the 20th century liberal democratic society from Hobbes. The perennial fascination towards Hobbes's political philosophy has been proved by the fact that, it has been interpreted, re-interpreted and now a days even completely reconstructed. Hobbes has been interpreted as a constructor of a monolithic structure. This has been re-interpreted by breaking the monolith either to discredit or to rescue a substantial part of it from the fatal weakness of the other parts.

Let us begin by understanding what Macpherson means by possessive individualism and then proceed to discuss the analysis of state-of-nature to know where the social assumptions have entered into Hobbes's philosophy and how possessive market society fits to Hobbes's requirements.

Possessive individualism is a theory which states that every individual is both free and independent in having exclusive control over his capacities and is essentially the proprietor of his own person and capacities, owing nothing to the society in possessing the capacities. In other words, Possessive individualism talks about the possession of the individual, the possessions such as freedom and independence from the wills of other, in using which he has an exclusive control. Individuals have this exclusive control not only in owning them but also in using them. Let us look at the assumptions that are provided by Macpherson to understand possessive individualism.

1. What makes a man human is freedom from dependence on the wills of others.

2. Freedom from dependence on others means freedom from any relations with others except those relations which the individual enters voluntarily with a view to his own interest.

3. The individual is essentially the proprietor of his own person and capacities, for which he owes nothing to society.

4. Although the individual cannot alienate the whole of his propriety in his own person, he may alienate his capacity to labor.

5. Human society consists of a series of market relations.

6. Since the freedom from the will of others is what makes a man **human**, each individual's freedom can rightfully be limited only by such obligations and rules as are necessary to secure the same freedom for other.

7. Political society is a human contrivance for the protection of the individual's property in his person and **goods**, and (therefore) for the maintenance of orderly relations of exchange between individuals regarded as proprietors of themselves. (1962:263-4)

In the first **postulate**, **humanness** is defined as freedom from dependence on the **will** of others. **Humanness**, in this **definition**, is equated with freedom. Freedom is said to be the natural quality of man. This freedom though makes man independent of other's **will**, it also gives him scope to enter into relations with others **voluntarily** on his own **choice**, and for his benefit. **Further**, the individual's capacities are independent of **society**, which implies that he owes nothing to the society. He has an exclusive control over his capacities and these capacities cannot be alienated from him. But he can alienate his capacity to labor. This capacity to labor makes human society consisting of a series of market relations. Since by nature all individuals are free **equally**, their freedom is limited by obligations and rules that are necessary to secure freedom for **others**. In order to protect the individual's property in his **person**, and maintain orderly relations of exchange between them political society is **constituted**. These possessive individualistic **assumptions**, according to **Macpherson**, are in their fullest and clearest form in **Hobbes**.

Two possible questions may **arise** regarding the prevalence of these assumptions in **Hobbes's** philosophy. One is, where does the social assumptions come from. Two, what kind of society is consistent with these social assumptions. Macpherson answers the first question in his **re-examination** of the **state-of-nature**. The second question is discussed by offering three kinds of model **societies**, one of which was claimed to be consistent with the philosophy of Hobbes.

Let us now start with the first question and understand where possessive individualistic assumptions were introduced by Hobbes, by analyzing the description of the state-of-nature.

Unlike the previously discussed interpreters such as Leo Strauss, A.E. Taylor and Warrender, Macpherson accepts the assumption of traditional interpretation that there is continuity in the philosophy of Hobbes from physiological principles to political obligation. Hobbes deduced from his description of man as a self-moving mechanism (which is materialism) the necessary behavior of men towards each other (which is psychology) from which the need for a sovereign follows. Macpherson argues that the argument from physiological principles to the necessary behavior of **men**, which is described as state of war, is not a simple deduction. It was considered to be a simple deduction by the traditional interpreters because it is misunderstood by them. The reason for this misunderstanding is that the argument from the physiological principles to the social motion of man is usually taken to be culminating in the **state-of-nature**. Hobbesian description of man as a self-moving mechanism and psychological principles of **man**, contact each other and take their

fullest shape in the state-of-nature. ~~Nevertheless~~, he believes that ~~Hobbes~~ introduced possessive individualistic assumptions about the behavior of man along with his description of man in the ~~state-of-nature~~. Macpherson focuses his attention on the ~~state-of-nature~~ in order to understand where the assumptions got ~~introduced~~. His analysis of ~~state-of-nature~~ tries to bring out three important aspects into light: one, that the state-of-nature is about the social and not about the natural man; two, that the ~~state-of-nature~~ in any case is not the culminating point of the arguments ~~from~~ physiology to the behavior of men towards each ~~other~~; and ~~three~~, that Hobbes's theory of necessary relations of men ~~in~~ society requires the assumption of a certain ~~kind~~ of society.

According to ~~Macpherson~~, ~~Hobbesian~~ conception of the state-of-nature is not about the behavior of the natural man as opposed to the ~~civilized~~. It is the natural condition of mankind of the civilized ~~form~~, if we withdraw the law and the contract enforcement. To quote Macpherson:

The state of nature depicts the way in which men, being what they are, would ~~necessarily~~ behave if there were no authority to enforce law or contract (1962: 19).

~~Further~~, the physiological propositions about the state-of-nature do not contain all that is needed for the deduction of a civil ~~sovereign~~. Hobbes's statements about ~~sense, imagination, memory, reason~~, appetite and ~~aversion~~, which are physiological ~~principles~~, do not contain the necessary requirements for the deduction of the

necessity of the sovereign. These propositions describe the human being as a system of 'self-moving, self-guided matter in motion.' These propositions are about man as such, abstracted from society, as opposed to civilized man. They do not contain all that is needed for the deduction of the sovereign state. But if we take, physiological propositions, the statements about the behavior of men in the 'hypothetical absence of any society', such as statements about the necessary behavior of men towards each other, then they do contain the requirements for the deductions of the sovereign. This implies that the physiological propositions are, as the argument proceeds, not about man as a mechanical system as such, but they include some social assumptions about the behavior of men in a civilized society. According to Macpherson:

You can move from the universal struggle for power in society, or from the state of nature, to the necessity of the sovereign without further assumptions, but you cannot move from man as a mechanical system to the universal struggle for power, or to the state of nature, without further assumptions. (1962: 18)

The deduction of state of war situation from man as a self-moving mechanism is not possible without few assumptions about the behavior of man. Macpherson argued that these assumptions are about the relations prevailing between men in certain kind of society.

Further, Macpherson argues that the state-of-nature is a logical and not a historical hypothesis. However, it is not a logical hypothesis reached by setting aside

completely the historically acquired characteristics of men.' It is not about the historically primitive man, who is untouched by the civilized attitudes towards power. It is about the natural man as opposed to civilized man. What Hobbes deduces from the state-of-nature is the need of man to acknowledge the absolute sovereignty that is based on his understanding of the 'historically acquired nature of men in existing civil societies'. The inference that is drawn about the passions of man-in-the-state-of-nature is from the passions of existing men (his contemporary man), "passions shaped by civilized living." Hobbes deduced the behavior of man-in-the-state-of-nature from the behavior of man in the civilized societies by setting aside the law and contract enforcement. To quote Macpherson:

His state of nature is a statement of the behaviour to which men as they now are, men who live in civilized societies and have the desires of civilized men, would be led if all law and contract enforcement (i.e., even the present imperfect enforcement) were removed. To get the state of nature, Hobbes has set aside law, but not the socially acquired behaviour and desires of men. (1962: 22)

The fact that the statements about man in the state-of-nature are about the statements of the behavior of social and civilized man can be confirmed by looking at Hobbes's own descriptions of man. His exposition of the state-of-nature describes man as having a 'tendency to invade and destroy each other and lock his doors and

chest".¹ This description of man is a clear evidence that he is talking about the civilized human beings' **behaviour**, where there is no common superior power. It is assumed that Hobbesian conception of the behavior of men in the **state-of-nature**, is **non-social**, but **actually**, it is a **statement** about the behavior of the social and the civilized men. He reached this state-of-nature by successive degrees of abstraction from the civilized **society**. According to **Macpherson**, if we take men as they now are, remove the fear of unpleasant or fatal consequences of their actions to **themselves**, and their present natural proclivities would lead **directly** to the state of war. As the above quote **suggests**, the state-of-nature is 'a deduction from the appetites and other **faculties**, not of man as **such**, but of civilized **man**.' Hobbes primarily derives the nature of man from observation based on his **contemporary** society. He deduces the **state-of-nature**, which is of state of war, by temporarily setting aside the fear of a

¹ In **Leviathan** Hobbes says "it may seem strange to some men, that has not well weighed these things: that **Nature** should thus, [i.e. as in the state of nature) **dissociate**, and render men apt to **invade**, and **destroy** one another: and he may **therefore**, not trusting to his **inference**, made from the **Passions**, desire perhaps to have the same confirmed by **experience**. Let him therefore consider with himselfe, when taking a **journey**, he arms himselfe, and seeks to go well accompanied: when going to **sleep**, he locks his doores; when even in his bouse he locks his chests: and this when he **knowes** there bee done him: what opinion he has of his **fellow subjects**, when he rides armed: of his **fellow Citizens**, when he locks his dore: and of his **children**, and **servants**, when he locks his chests." (1968: 97)

sovereign. However, the absence of the sovereign heightens the **fear** of the other individuals being **omnipresent**.

Further, the kind of negative **description** that Hobbes gives about the **state-of-nature** as a state where there is 'no **industry**, no **culture**, no **arts**, no letters and no society.* proves that the **state-of-nature** is deduced from the civilized society with the historically acquired social behaviour. What the **man-in-the-state-of-nature** lacks is 'precisely all the goods of civilized living: **property**, **industry**, **commerce**, the **sciences**, **arts**, and **letters**, as well as security for his life.' (1962: 29)

Macpherson, in this way, regards the state-of-nature both as **logical**, as well as historical hypothesis. **It** is logical in so far as it is a link between physiological principles and the civil society. It is historical in so far as it is deduced from the historically acquired nature of man in existing civil societies. According to **him**, Hobbes's theory of 'necessary relations of men in **society**, as each striving for valuing and honoring of his power by **others**, requires the assumption of a possessive model society. The value of a man gets manifested by the honor that he gets from others. This value is both determined by and determines the other's opinion of his power. Individuals make their own estimates about the powers of others independently on their own by comparing themselves to others. This comparison leads to struggle for power. Hobbes developed the model of society which contains an incessant competitive struggle of man for power over others even before the exposition of the **state-of-nature**. The three principle causes of quarrel in the **state-of-nature**, such as **competition**, diffidence and **glory**, arise out of civilized man's desire to live **well**.

Only a civilized man can have the conception of these three principles and these three principles can be the causes of quarrel.

Moreover, the fact that Hobbes used the *resolutive-compositive* method is itself a surest proof for stating that his analysis of psychological principles is about the civilized man. His order of thought is from man in society back to man as a mechanical system of matter in motion, and only then forward again to man's necessary social behavior.' But leaving the first part of the method, he starts from the description of man as a mechanical system of matter in motion. The *resolutive* part, which he did not demonstrate, must have proceeded not merely by breaking the phenomenon down into its simplest elements, but doing this with a considerable amount of abstraction. The civilized nature of man might have been set aside in this process of abstraction. This may be the reason why he opens his philosophy by setting aside the civilized characteristics of man.

From the above discussion it follows that the behavior of men in the *state-of-nature* is deduced from both the physiological principles and the social assumptions. As it is stated above, the physiological explanation seems to be of the natural man. However, as the argument moves forward and enters the sphere of psychological principles, it turns out to be the analysis of the behavior of the civilized man. Macpherson argues that civilization was always there in the arguments of Hobbes. Macpherson quotes Hobbes, who says, "whosoever looketh into himself, and considereth what he doth, when does think, opine, reason, hope, t'care, &c and upon what grounds: he shall thereby read and know, what are the thoughts, and Passions of

all other men. upon the like occasions." presumes that the analysis is about the civilized man of his contemporary time. (Macpherson. 1962: 30) Let us see where did these civilized elements get into the argument in the process of compositive method.

These civilized assumptions are not there in the opening presentation of man as a self-moving and self-directing automated machine. It is when he starts the discussion of man's natural power that the inclusion of the social assumptions starts.² He defined the natural power of man as the 'eminence of his ability.' It consists of the excess of his personal capacities over those of other men. plus what he can acquire by that excess. Macpherson argues that a new postulate is implied in this, that is, 'every man's power is opposed by the power of others.' This postulate, for him, is not contained in the previous postulates, which describe man as a self-moving mechanism. From this, the argument goes on to the analysis of valuing and honoring, which fills out the picture of the relations of men in society. Since it is a relation between one man, who receives it and all the others, who give to him, it justifies the

² According to Macpherson "it is in chapters 10 and 11 that we find the main transition from man the machine by itself, to man the machine as a unit in a series of social relationships. And it is in these chapters that we shall expect to find such new postulates, stated or implied, as are needed for the deduction of state-of-nature...." (1962: 34) He argued that these two chapters (10 and 11), contain all but one of the essential propositions of the model society, and the last essential proposition was stated in the 13th chapter, which is the equality of men, from which the necessity of war of every man against every man is deduced.

relations of all the people in society. The definitions of power, along with his analysis of valuing and honoring explain the necessary behavior of men in society, as an endless struggle for power over others.

Hobbes deduces the opposition of power, which is an endless struggle for power over others, from the physiological principle that 'every man innately desires more power without limit.' According to Macpherson, unless there is an apparently universally competitive society, it is not possible to deduce the opposition of power from these physiological principles. Therefore, there is a need for assuming a model of society, where every man's natural powers are continually invaded by others, i.e., "a society in which each can continually seek to transfer to himself some of the powers of others." (1962: 46) This kind of violent behavior of men cannot be possible in any kind of society. However, Hobbes finds this to be the actual behavior of man in the state-of-nature. Macpherson resolves this contradiction in positing the violent behavior of men as the actual behavior, by postulating a model society, "which provides peaceful, non-violent ways by which every man can constantly seeks power over others without destroying the society." (1962: 46) He, after explaining that the arguments of Hobbes, which run from the physiological postulates to the state-of-nature, inquires into the details of the model of society that is consistent with the social assumptions.

In order to show the kind of model that fits to **Hobbes's thought**, Macpherson **constructed**³ three kinds of **models**, which he named **as**, 'Customary or Status society*', 'Simple market society' and 'Possessive market society*' respectively. He argues that the first two model societies do not fit to Hobbes's **requirements**. The model of customary or status society '**neither** permits nor requires the constant search for power by individuals over individuals to such extent that all individuals must seek more power in order to protect what delights they **have**', which is necessary for a model to be consistent with Hobbesian **model**. in the same way individuals in the simple market society 'who are content with their existing level of satisfactions are not pulled into competition for more power in order to protect the level they **have**', which is the exact requirement to deduce the state of war. **Therefore**, both the **models**. Macpherson **opined**, do not meet the requirements of Hobbes.

The possessive model society in which each man's capacity to labour is his own property and is **alienable**, and also is a market commodity** and in which all individuals be in continual competitive power relationship meets the requirements of

³ **However**, this construction of model **societies**. is not arbitrary or without proper **determination**. The principle that governed this construction **is**. **"To** construct the fewest possible models to which all known kinds of society could be assimilated and which would isolate their features in such a way as to permit comparisons with **Hobbes's model.**" (1962: 47)

Hobbes.⁴ In this model society, there is no authoritative allocation of work or rewards. There is only market in labor as well as in products. The main criterion of the possessive model society is that man's labour is a commodity, which is saleable. In other words, though a man's energy and skill are his own, yet they are regarded, not as integral parts of his personality, but as possessions. Regarding the use and disposal of this possession, man is free to hand it over to others for a price. As a society of this kind becomes a market of possessed social relations, Macpherson names it as possessive market society.

In possessive market society, there is no authoritative allocation of work and authoritative provision of rewards for work. However, there is authoritative definition and enforcement of contracts. Each individual's capacity to labour is his own property. Land and resources are also owned by individuals, which are alienable. All individuals seek rationally to maximize their utilities. Some individuals have more

⁴ The concept of possessive market society of Macpherson is neither a 'novel nor an arbitrary' construction. It is similar to the 'concepts of bourgeois or capitalist society' used by Marx, Weber, Sombart and others.' However, Macpherson argued, the possessive market society, also at certain aspects, differs from the bourgeois and capitalist society used by Marx, Weber etc. To quote Macpherson 'it differs from theirs chiefly in that it does not require any particular theory of the origin or development of such society. It is not concerned about the primacy or relative importance of various factors such as Marx's primary accumulation, Weber's rational capital accounting, or Sombart's spirit of enterprise." (1962: 48)

energy, skill, or possessions, than others and desire to have a higher level of utilities or power than they have. Man is seen as an absolute natural proprietor of his own capacities, owing nothing to the society. Man's essence is freedom to use his capacities in search of satisfaction. This freedom is limited properly only by some principle of utility or utilitarian natural law, which forbids harming others. Freedom, therefore, is restricted to, and comes to be identified with, domination over things, not domination over men. The clearest form of domination over things is the relation of ownership or possession. Freedom, therefore, is possession. Everyone is free, for everyone possesses at least his own capacities. Society is seen, not as a system of relations of domination and subordination between men and classes held together by reciprocal rights and duties, but as a group of free equal individuals related to each other through their possessions. In other words, the individuals are related to one another as owners of their capacities and of what they have produced and accumulated by the use of their capacities. This relation of exchange is seen as the fundamental relation of society. All possessions, including man's energies, are commodities; and the relationship between individuals is the possession of marketable commodities. Everybody has to continually offer commodities in the market, in competition with the other. Macpherson says that, "Competition in this market unlike that in the simple market in products is a means by which men who want more may convert more of the powers of others to their use than others convert of theirs." (1962: 55)

This process of transferring some of the powers of one man to another, which is an interesting aspect of the possessive market society, follows the Hobbesian

definition of power as 'man's present means to obtain future apparent **good**.' This implies that the powers of man includes not only his **energy**, skill and **labor**, but also his access to the means of production like **land**, material and **capital**, 'without which his capacity to labour cannot become active labour and so cannot produce any goods.* (1962: 56) There is a continuous transfer of power and 'its amount is not **fixed**, but fluctuates with the changes in the supply of labour and capital.

The possessive market society. Macpherson **argues**, requires a 'compulsive framework of law' to secure the life and property and to define and enforce contracts. **Also**, this model of society permits state **action**, but it does not require a state policy of *laissez-faire*. He accepts the possibility of minimum state action and states that there is authoritative definition and enforcement of contracts in this model society. This authoritative definition later inspired **men-in-the-state-of-nature** to get into a contract. This model permits individuals to convert the natural powers of the other individuals to their use. This converted power is their acquired power. Making the individual's labor as a commodity in the market makes this conversion possible and the society as continually competitive. **In** this way, Macpherson **says**, Hobbes's argument from the physiological nature of man to the necessary attempt of all men in society to seek ever more power over others requires the proposition that every man's power resists and hinders the powers of others. This **proposition**, even if supposedly deduced from a physiological postulate that all men innately desire limitless power over **others**, requires at least the further assumption of a model of society which permits continual peaceful invasion of each by each. And if the proposition is taken to be deduced from the physiological postulate that only some men innately want ever

more, it requires a model of society which not only permits continued invasion of each by each but also compels the moderate men to invade. The only model which satisfies these requirements is the possessive market society, which corresponds in essentials to modern competitive market societies. That Hobbes's explicit postulates, notably, that labour is a commodity, that some men want to increase their level of delight, and that some have more natural power than others, are essentially those of a possessive market society. That the model of society which Hobbes constructed in his analysis of power, valuing, and honouring and confirmed in his analysis of commutative and distributive justice, essentially corresponds to the possessive market society. Although Hobbes was not fully conscious of such correspondence, there is some evidence to suggest that he was aware of the peculiar suitability of his analysis to seventeenth-century society.

Macpherson maintains that even Hobbes's deduction of obligation is also based on this possessive individualism. As every individual in the market society seeks getting more power over others; there is a constant fear of violent death, which made their lives miserable and insecure. Yet, as Hobbes already postulated, men necessarily seek and desire commodious living. From this it follows that basing on protection of their own life and property, i.e., only for their personal interest they made a covenant with each other and transferred all their rights to a sovereign to protect themselves. It is this transfer of rights, which creates their obligation to the sovereign. Macpherson thought that it is equally necessary that their natural power also should be transferred in order to make the sovereign absolute to enforce the

restraint on the appetites. He, in this way, explains even the origin of sovereign power also as based upon the possessive market society.

The conception of obligation of Hobbes, Macpherson maintains, is moral and is deduced from the facts about human nature. This he expressed clearly in his statement that "Hobbes believes that he has deduced moral obligation from fact, ought from is." (1962: 71) Further, Hobbes "thought that his rational, albeit self-interested, obligation was as moral an obligation as could be found." (1962:73) Hobbesian postulate of equality of man, i.e., equality of ability and equality of expectation of satisfying their wants implies a moral equality. To quote Macpherson:

Hobbes takes it that an equality of fact sets up an equality of right: without bringing in any outside value judgment or moral premises. He does not prove that fact entails right, he simply assumes that it does because there is no reason why it should not. (1962: 75)

Hobbesian treatment of political obligation as moral obligation is derived from the transfer of rights, which are moral rights. According to Macpherson, morality enters Hobbes's thought in the early stages of his deduction of equality of right from the equality of ability and need. Hobbes argued that there is no need of bringing the right from outside the realm of fact but it is already there, that they were entailed in the need of each human mechanism to maintain its motion. He deduced right and obligation from the fact, by way of the postulate of equality. This postulate

of equality is a **characteristic** of the possessive market society and it pervades Hobbes's political philosophy. In fact Macpherson took up the postulate of equality as the main string in the possessive **individualism**, stated all the other features in order to substantiate it and showed Hobbesian philosophy as basing itself on the new foundation.

After explaining the possessive market model, Macpherson thought that it fits absolutely to Hobbes's requirements and in fact, Hobbes implicitly laid down this **model**, upon which he constructed the **state-of-nature**.

Hobbes, according to **Macpherson**, brought out the Galilean revolution in science. Galileo assumed that the object in motion does not require the continual application of outside force to stay in motion. In the same way Hobbes, instead of finding rights and obligations only in some outside **force**, (as it was the case before) assumed that they were entailed in the need of each human being to maintain its motion. In this way, Hobbes dispensed any moral postulate imposed from outside the individual.

Macpherson, while accepting the view that materialism is a necessary condition of the theory of political **obligation**,⁵ however, argues that materialism is

⁵ Macpherson states that "**Hobbes's** deduction of right and obligation from **fact**, by way of the postulate of **equality**, seems to have been made possible by his acceptance of the materialist assumptions which he took over from the new science of the seventeenth century. **In** this view, Hobbes's materialism was neither an afterthought

not the sufficient condition. For him, besides materialism market assumptions are needed to deduce political obligation. To quote Macpherson:

For besides the materialist assumption that men are self-moving systems of matter in motion, he needed the postulate that the motion of every individual is necessarily opposed to the motion of every other. This latter postulate was not contained in his mechanical materialism but was derived, as we have seen, from his market assumption. The postulate of opposed motion was what enabled him to treat all individuals as equally insecure, and hence as equally in need of a system of political obligation. (1962: 79)

Macpherson holds the view that political obligation is enabled by both market assumptions and materialistic assumptions. However, he thinks that 'we need not conjecture which is more important, or which came first in Hobbes's thinking.' Instead, it should be noticed that market assumptions are essential and 'only a society as fragmented as a market society can credibly be treated as a mechanical system of self-moving individuals.' It is the market assumptions that made Hobbesian attempt to transfer the mechanical postulates of the new science to the analysis of society possible.

nor a window-dressing but an essential part of his political theory. His materialism was a necessary condition of his theory of political obligation." (1962: 78-9)

Hobbesian attempt to transfer the mechanical postulates to the analysis of **society**, which was done by using **resolutive-compositive method**, leads to a logical difficulty. By following scientific analysis of man's nature, Hobbes **claimed**, he showed that men ought to acknowledge a steadier obligation to a sovereign. **If** this scientific analysis of the resolutive-compositive method is true and men by nature have to acknowledge the sovereign then the men **now** must oblige the sovereign without any hesitation. But the condition of man in his **contemporary** times was different. They did not in fact act in accordance with Hobbesian scientific analysis in obliging the sovereign without any hesitation. To quote Macpherson:

That is to say that men must act in a way they do not now act.
if they are to be consistent with their own nature. This seems to
be a flat contradiction. Yet it is what Hobbes gets by his
application of Galileo's **resolutive-compositive** method. (1962:
101)

However, he resolves this contradiction by stating that possessive individualism saves Hobbes from this contradiction. His theory is to persuade men by showing their actual nature to behave in a way that is different from the way they hitherto **behaved**. They need to be persuaded because they did not realize what is demanded of and permitted to in possessive market society. Macpherson **claims**, "if his theory is taken only as a theory of and for possessive market society he is saved in some measure from the reproach of being contradictory about men's capacities. More **accurately**, he is saved from that reproach if his theory is taken as a theory of and for

a possessive market society.... So understood, his theory is an attempt to persuade present men, by showing them their actual nature, to behave differently from the way in which men have hitherto behaved, and in which they are now still behaving simply for lack of realizing what is demanded of and permitted to men in possessive market society" (1962: 105).

Macpherson's main aim was to show the puzzle solving power of his Possessive Individual model. He attempts to solve long-standing dispute about Hobbes's political obligation with reference to his model. Macpherson boldly attacks the problem by claiming that Hobbes was able to construct a deductive argument from factual premises to moral conclusions because he took for granted a market model of society in which each man is equally liable to be invaded by others.

Further, coming to the main argument of the thesis, Macpherson also argued that the method and purpose of Hobbes's philosophy is non-scientific. While discussing the impossibility of deducing the behavior of man-in-the-state-of-nature from physiological postulates without social assumptions, Macpherson held that, if we accept that the above deduction is possible without social assumptions, and then it would not be in consonance with Hobbes's method or purpose. To quote Macpherson:

For his [Hobbes's] purpose was to persuade men that they needed to acknowledge a sovereign, and his method of doing so was 'only to put men in mind of what they know already, or

may know by their experience'. The whole success of his endeavour **necessarily** depended on **this**. (1962: 69-70)

Thus, Macpherson endorses the **view**, which is the main argument of the present **thesis**, that Hobbes's method is **non-scientific**. Rather it is to make people look into their own selves and understand what they are or to realize it through experience. In other words, Macpherson looks to be accepting the view that Hobbes's method is **self-observation**, though the basis is possessive individualism.

CONCLUSION

The present thesis specifically discussed the reason for the sudden emergence of vast literature on Hobbes in the modern period. The reason does not lie in Hobbes's scholarship or in the developments in political philosophy alone. In order to locate the reason one has to go outside Hobbes and even **outside** political philosophy and look for the developments in the realm of relationship between science and political philosophy. Hence, the broader objective of the thesis is to discuss the consequences of the developments in the relationship between political philosophy and science.

The relationship between philosophy and science is the fundamental concern of modern philosophy. These two disciplines are both autonomous as well as related to one another. That is, though each of them has a specific subject matter which discusses a specific set of issues and problems, yet the developments in one influence the other. For instance, the developments in science in the modern period have not only affected man's understanding of nature, but they also **influenced** humanistic sciences and political philosophy. The implications of this influence are the backdrop of this thesis. Hobbes's political philosophy is based on Newtonian and Galilean methods of the modern natural sciences. This dependence has posed a problem, namely the predicament of Hobbes's political philosophy when Einstein's

Special theory of Relativity contested its foundations, i.e., Newtonian and Galilean methods.

Beginning with a general introduction about the dependence and autonomy of the disciplines, the thesis discussed the relation between philosophy and science - in the classical as well as modern contexts. Further, the differences between the nature of the developments in science and philosophy were explained. The sudden emergence of Hobbesian literature in the twentieth century, the thesis argued, could be accounted by locating Hobbes as an instance in the relationship between political philosophy and science.

In chapter I, Hobbes as an instance of the relationship between political philosophy and science was discussed. Hobbes used the scientific methods such as the Resolutive-compositive method and the Law of Inertia in his philosophy. Subsequently, the recent developments in science, specifically, Einstein's theory of relativity, contested the Newtonian and Galilean theories. Consequently, the implications of these developments to the political philosophy of Hobbes, was discussed. **It** is maintained that even though the foundations of Hobbes were contested, still it does not lose its validity, as philosophical theories, unlike theories of science, are not rejected once and for all. At best, they can be criticized. In this context, the thesis discussed and elucidated the context of the alternative foundations provided to Hobbes's political philosophy in twentieth century. There were attempts in the twentieth century where alternative foundations to the political philosophy of Hobbes were sought. The thesis discussed the interpretations of Leo Strauss, A.E.

Taylor, J.H. **Warrender** and C.B. **Macpherson**. Chapters **II** to IV discussed each of these attempts at refounding the political philosophy of Hobbes outside natural sciences.

Chapter II discussed how Strauss's attempt to base Hobbes's political philosophy on self-observation, has disengaged natural science, consequently, making his political philosophy independent of science. Strauss made a distinction between '**form**' and '**content**' of the material of the political philosophy. He proved the origin of the material to be pre-scientific i.e., in the early influence of **Aristotelianism** and Scholasticism of Hobbes. These early influences emphasized the importance of self-observation 'which is discovered by the efforts of self-knowledge and self-examination of every **one**.' Thus, Strauss argued that not only the method but also the material of the political philosophy of Hobbes is rooted outside scientific theories.

Chapter III discussed Taylor's offering of moral imperative as the basis of the political philosophy of Hobbes. He showed the independent existence of the theory of obligation from the egoistic psychology. This chapter discussed Taylor's rejection of the traditional views on Hobbes. The views state that Hobbes's moral obligation comes from the transference of the rights of the people, and also argues for the existence of the imperativeness of moral laws, in the **state-of-nature**, in the form of laws of nature that precede the existence of civil society. It is shown that the ethical philosophy of Hobbes proper is logically independent of his egoistic psychology and hence even if the psychology is rejected in *toto*, Hobbesian theory of obligation does

not **lose** its relevance. Moreover, it gains **consistency**. Thus, he disengaged **egoistic** psychology, which is an extension of scientific theory from political philosophy, and further, based Hobbes on the moral imperative.

Chapter IV discussed **Warrender's** interpretation of Hobbes. It is argued that Warrender while piecing out a consistent theory of obligation, offered moral obligation as the basis of Hobbes's political philosophy. He attempted, 1) to explain what Hobbes meant by obligation and 2) to show that unless men were already obliged to obey the **laws-of-nature** (which reason teaches them as the commands of God), they could never by valid covenant bind themselves to obey a human ruler. He exposed the view that obligation, as Hobbes understood it, is essentially the same in both civil society and **State-of-nature**. Warrender based his arguments on three **premises**. i) The laws-of-nature persist through the state-of-nature into civil **society**. ii) They are essentially moral laws. Most of these prescribe duties towards society and are morally obligatory because they are commanded and willed by God. iii) The sovereign does not create the moral laws. His role is only to interpret and render fully operative **pre-existing** moral laws. The thesis argued that Warrender's attempt to establish the independence of political obligation is an attempt to view Hobbes's political philosophy independent of science.

C.B. Macpherson's presentation of the historical interpretation, which bases the philosophy of Hobbes on the possessive quality of market society, was **discussed** in chapter V. He argued that even before the use of **state-of-nature**, Hobbes **had** developed a theory of the necessary relations of **men** in society. This **theory requires**

the assumptions of a certain kind of model society, which he calls, possessive market society. This discussion has minimized the importance of scientific method in two respects. One, by highlighting the social postulates of a certain kind of a model society as the foundation of the philosophy of Hobbes. Two, by arguing for a gap between theories of materialism and psychology, which is filled by certain kind of social assumptions. He bridged the gap between materialism and psychology with social assumptions.

Now let us analyze these four modern attempts, which interpreted Hobbes's political philosophy independent of natural science. Here, it must be noted that these four attempts are neither contradictory nor complementary to each other. Each of these has their own standpoint and this work attempted to see an **underlying** connection among these four.

Though the immediate objective of each of these varies from the other, establishing the independence of political philosophy is the connecting link between them. This establishment of independent nature of Hobbes's political philosophy has two aspects; one, to disprove the argument that **science** is the basis of political philosophy and two, to argue for the independence of political philosophy. Among the four interpreters discussed in this work, only Strauss developed the argument considering both the aspects. His immediate objective is to reduce the importance of science in Hobbes. He not only rejected the view that Hobbes's political philosophy is based on scientific foundations, but also established the independent nature of political philosophy. He argued that the moral attitude that underlies Hobbes's

political philosophy is independent of the foundation of the modern science. His analysis of distinctions between form and content, naturalistic and anthropological aspects show the dissimilarities between science and political philosophy and independence of each other in Hobbes's philosophy. This argument of Strauss is an unconscious response to the developments in the realm of the relationship between political philosophy and science.

The arguments of Taylor, Warrender and Macpherson aimed at different **aspects** of Hobbes's philosophy. The purpose of Taylor's argument is to prove that political philosophy is disengaged from and has no logically necessary connection with egoistic psychology in Hobbes. This argument of Taylor disengages not only egoistic psychology but also science (which is the basis of egoistic psychology) from political philosophy. However, while arguing for the independence of political philosophy in Hobbes, Taylor is not conscious of the fact that he is responding to the developments outside political philosophy and he is contributing to wider issue of the impact of the twentieth century developments in science to political philosophy, which is the basic argument of the present thesis.

Warrender's interest in Hobbes is only with regard to the concept of Obligation. He attempted to discover logical structure of the theory of obligation. In making this attempt, he contributed to the main argument of the thesis that Hobbes's political philosophy is independent of the influence of science. It can be argued that this contribution of Warrender is an indirect response to the developments in the relation between political philosophy and science.

Macpherson's interest in Hobbes is rooted in his search for finding a **firm** theoretical basis for the modern liberal democratic State, which is grounded in the 17th century individualism. Since individualism as a basic theoretical position starts with Hobbes, Hobbes became the central figure in the discussion on Possessive Individualism. Though Macpherson is consciously attempting to view Hobbes as the initiator of Individualism in the 17th century, his attempt can be viewed as a contribution to the impact of developments in science on political philosophy. The attempt to highlight social postulates and bridging the gap between materialism and psychology with these assumptions minimizes the importance of science in Hobbes. This argument of Macpherson can be viewed as a response to the developments in the realm of relation between philosophy and science.

In this way, the immediate objective of none of the arguments of Taylor, Warrender and Macpherson is a conscious attempt to disengage political philosophy from science. However, their attempts can be viewed, as is the case with the present thesis, as indirect attempts at establishing the independence of political philosophy. Only Strauss is worried about the universal importance of Hobbes's political philosophy which remains unrecognized if the science is taken to be decisive. Though Taylor is compelling in his arguments and in adducing evidence in support of his thesis, his concern is only with regard to the moral imperativeness of theory of obligation of Hobbes. In the same way **Warrender's** consistent formulation is also directed towards theory of obligation of Hobbes. Macpherson's merit of argumentation is restricted to prove the existence of possessive individualistic

qualities even before the use of state of nature in Hobbes. However, Strauss is not bothered about **reframing** any one aspect of Hobbes's political philosophy such as Moral imperative, Obligation, Possessive Individualism as it is done by Taylor, Warrender and Macpherson respectively. He is interested in the universal recognition of the whole of the political philosophy of Hobbes.

The above discussion brings us to the conclusion that the attempts of Strauss, Taylor, Warrender and Macpherson either directly or indirectly established the independence of Hobbes's political philosophy from science. These interpreters form a part of the twentieth century literature on Hobbes. As the concern of the present thesis is to account for the sudden increase of Hobbes's literature in the twentieth century, these attempts have to be viewed from a broader perspective of the relationship between political philosophy and science. These twentieth century interpretations are not just alternative interpretations of Hobbes's political philosophy. Rather they are responses to the developments within the realm of the relation between political philosophy and science, of which they are not conscious. Both science and philosophy, being neither exclusive nor exhaustive fields of study get related to and influenced by each other.¹ As it is stated earlier, Hobbes was

¹ However, neither science nor philosophy should try to be completely against each other, nor should they follow each other blindly. Following Peter Winch, philosophy should not be anti-scientific; if it tries to be so it will succeed only in making itself look ridiculous. However, equally, for the same reasons, philosophy must be on its guard against the '**extra-scientific pretensions** of science' (1990:2).

influenced by the Galilean and Newtonian theories of science and used them in his philosophy. There were attempts during his time to view Hobbes as a value free scientist basing on his adoption of scientific theories. However, later in the twentieth century the discovery of Special theory of Relativity by Einstein contested the Galilean and Newtonian theories. These developments in science occasioned the emergence of sudden increase of Hobbesian literature in the twentieth century. These twentieth century interpretations are responses to the impact of the **developments** in the relationship between science and political philosophy. The fate of Hobbes's political philosophy when the foundations i.e., Newtonian and Galilean theories, were contested by Special theory of Relativity by Einstein, is the problem to which the twentieth century interpretations are the responses. These **interpreters** argued for the independence of Hobbes's political philosophy by offering alternative foundations.

From the above discussion, it follows that, it is possible **that** the developments in one discipline can have implications to the developments in other disciplines. Moreover, it is necessary to have open-mindedness to look outside a discipline to understand such implications. Only then it is possible to understand the non-linear responses like the developments in one discipline having implication on other disciplines. Nevertheless, they have to be careful in ascertaining the firmer grounds of what one is dependent on. **Alternatively**, even if it is not possible to have firmer grounds, one should know the weakness of one's own foundations, so that it would not become too much dependent or it would have an alternative to depend on.

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