

# U.S. Intervention in Sub-Saharan Africa since the Seventies: Case Studies of Angola and Ethiopia

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This is to certify that I, *Chirumamilla Srinivas*, have carried out the research embodied in the present thesis for the full period prescribed under Ph.D Ordinances of the University.

I declare to the best of my Knowledge that no part of this thesis was earlier submitted for the award of research degree of any University.


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*Every day, every moment should be an  
occasion for a new and completer  
consecration...*

*The mother*

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The U.S began to take active interest in the politics of Sub-Saharan Africa during the Sixties which coincided with the attainment of independent statehood by majority of African nations. However, in the Seventies, its involvement in the region deepened as a reaction to various liberation movements in the continent which the Americans saw as Soviet inspired and supported. The U.S, in pursuit of undermining the Soviet influence began to nurture pro-West leaders, ideologies, movements and regimes in Africa. Apart from the Cold War rivalries, the nature of American interventionary behaviour in Sub-Saharan Africa was more importantly influenced by U.S hegemonic decline in the international system during the Seventies and Eighties.

This study seeks to examine the correlation between the American hegemonic decline and its interventionary behaviour in Sub-Saharan Africa between 1975 and 1988. The year 1975 has been chosen as the starting point of this study primarily because the crisis that broke out in Angola in that year marked the beginning of a heightened and more intense superpower rivalry in Sub-Saharan Africa. The American clandestine intervention in supporting certain Angolan factions to tilt the balance of power in its favour prompted the Soviet Union to respond in kind by pouring military aid and bringing in Cuban troops for active combat for the first time in the region. This phenomenon was also re-enacted in Ethiopia during 1978 when Cuban forces were also flown to fight alongside the Ethiopian troops in the Ogaden war between Ethiopia and Somalia. The year 1988 represents the endpoint of this study as it marks the beginning of the end of the cold war in the third

world symbolised by an agreement between the two super powers to disengage themselves from conflicts in the third world. This manifested in the resolution of the problem of Namibian independence and the withdrawal of Cuban troops from Angola.

The chapterization of the study is as follows. The first chapter provides a theoretical and conceptual framework of the study of intervention. It also highlights the various liberal (Hedley Bull), neo-Marxist (Andre Gunder Frank, Immanuel Wallerstein) and third world (Mohammed Ayoob) perspectives on intervention. The second chapter focuses on the U.S hegemonic decline both in absolute and relative terms during the seventies and eighties, as viewed by scholars like Robert Gilpin, Robert Keohane, James Petras, Immanuel Wallerstein, Susan Strange, Stephen Gill. The third chapter seeks to define American military, strategic, economic and political interests in Sub-Saharan Africa. It also tries to establish a correlation between the changes in global economic cycles and its impact on intervention. In times of economic expansion, the imperial rivalries largely remained benign. Conversely, in times of economic contraction, these rivalries often resulted in a spiral of regional instability and external interventions. The fourth chapter appraises perceptions and policies of various U.S administrations starting from Kennedy's in the early sixties to the Reagan's in the eighties. The fifth and sixth chapters serve as case studies of Angola and Ethiopia respectively to illustrate U.S interventionary behaviour in Sub-Saharan Africa. The final chapter draws overall conclusions on American interventionist behaviour and its linkages to relative hegemonic decline of the U.S. during the period under study.



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**C. Srinivas**

## ABBREVIATIONS

AID	Agency for International Development
ANC	African National Congress
APC	armored personnel carriers
AWACS	airborne warning and control aircraft
GENICOM	Central Command
CIA	Central Intelligence Agency
FNLA	National Liberation Front of Angola
FMS	Foreign Military Sales
IMF	International Monetary fund
MAP	Military Assistance Program
MAAG	Military Assistance Advisory group
MPLA	Popular Movement for the Liberation of Angola
NATO	North Atlantic Treaty Organization
NFD	Northern Frontier District
OAU	Organization of African Unity
OECD	Organization for Economic Co-operation and Development
OPEC	Organization of Petroleum Exporting Countries
PMAC	Provisional Military Administrative Council
RDF	Rapid Deployment Force
SADF	South African Defence Force
SAP	Security Assistance Program

SAP	Structural Adjustment Program
SWAPO	South West African Peoples Organization
UNITA	National Union for the Total Independence of Angola
UPA	Union of Peoples of Angola
UPNA	Union of the People of Northern Angola

# Chapter-I Conceptualizing Intervention

# CHAPTER-I

"Intervention" has been an ubiquitous feature in the history of world politics and it has been a constantly changing phenomenon overtime. Interventionary behaviour can be seen dating back to as far as the Greek and Roman times, the city-states of Athens and Sparta incessantly intervened in each others's affairs as well as in lesser city-states having alliance with them. Imperial Rome at the height of its power occupied a position of such dominance in the world that it could intervene in the affairs of most of the lesser states with virtual impunity. Europe of the Sixteenth and Seventeenth centuries, right upto the Napoleonic and post-Napoleonic periods, which underwent tremendous religious and social upheavals, witnessed a number of interventions associated with the transition to a state system and territorial aggrandizement. Coming to the 20th century, intervention does not seem to be any less prevalent than in former times. The ideological competition and division between the capitalist and the communist world that marked the beginning of this century, which gradually escalated into cold war by the middle of this century provided a fertile ground for intervention by the super powers in the less developed world for proclaiming their respective supremacy. Along with the superpowers, many states with power at the regional levels also intervened on a regular basis in the internal affairs of lesser powers for their self- interest.

## **What is Intervention?**

Before making any attempt at defining this rather slippery concept "intervention" it would be sensible to note that it defies a universal definition since the context in which intervention takes place is not the same everywhere and also the widening of the field of activities which appear to be interventionary does not allow for any easy definition. Then what is this thing called intervention? Several writers have long been grappling with the problem of defining it. As Rosenau has remarked "the concept of intervention suffers from a lack of definitional clarity".<sup>1</sup> The ambiguity surrounding the term is borne out in statements made by the general public as well as people in the government without understanding what really constitutes intervention. Distinction has to be made between acts of intervention and other forms of international politics. We often hear in India about American intervention in subcontinent affairs when the Americans decide to sell F-16 fighter planes to Pakistan. Chinese see American intervention when the Americans make statements about human rights of the Tibetan People; Pakistan and other Islamic countries making statements about the Kashmiri peoples right to self-determination is seen as tantamount to intervention in domestic affairs. Similarly American protection of Iraqi Kurds in northern Iraq is considered by Iraqis as intervention against their territorial integrity and sovereignty; so in the widest sense anything can constitute intervention. Indeed even non-intervention is sometimes seen as constituting intervention as in the case of the Spanish civil war (1936-39) when Britain and France abstained from taking sides with the republican forces fighting Franco. Likewise, Palestinians see the American

failure to Protest against Israeli atrocities against them and Israeli invasion of Lebanon during 1982 as intervening on the side of the Israelis.<sup>2</sup>

So for the sake of clarity one has to distinguish between acts of intervention and other forms of international politics such as diplomacy etc. Some writers therefore, tried to offer a more rigorous definition: Howard Wriggins, for example proposes a continuum moving from influence, to involvement to intervention, and finally to clandestine intervention.<sup>3</sup> Although superficially an exacting categorization, this spectrum is not of great value. It fails to provide us with any clear demarcations. If we take only the example of intervention, we can see that ambiguity is rampant. We are told of activities not being "mutually acceptable", but we are not told to whom. In case of civil war, for example, intervention by an outside power may be at the request of the existing government. Conversely, recognition by an outside power of de facto control by an insurgent group of a portion of the state may be considered as intervention by the government which formerly claimed sovereign powers over the whole of the state. Tanzanian recognition of Biafra is a case in point. The Tanzanian response to the Nigerian Civil war invoked much protest from the central government of Nigeria.<sup>4</sup>

Richard Falk, another scholar writing on intervention distinguished between five types of intervention, unilateral, counter-intervention, collective intervention, regional intervention and universal.<sup>5</sup> The problem with this definition is that it is basically a description of the types of intervention without explaining the analytical content which will be valid across space and time. Oppenheim , defines intervention by reference to the



type of activity, i.e. acts which constitute "dictatorial interference".<sup>6</sup> But to say that only acts of dictatorial interference constitute interventions narrows the subject too much. There are a variety of forms of intervention of which some are explicitly coercive such as sending an army into a particular country to unleashing terrorists. Another kind of explicitly coercive intervention takes the form of economic coercion- trade and credit, sanctions, boycotts, embargoes. Explicit coercion can also be achieved through subsidies, aid to revolutionary groups or to opponents of a regime that one wants to unseat. Other kinds of intervention which can be called implicitly coercive is the age old practice of bribery; rewards to friends. One modern form of bribery is aid to shaky governments designed to make them both less shaky and more favourable to one's own side. The United states has practiced this, sometimes with virtuosity, sometimes with mixed results, for instance, American support to the Shah of Iran, during the 70's and to Pakistan during the 80's. But aiding shaky governments so that they do what one wants is also what the Soviet Union and the Cuba have done in places like Angola and Ethiopia. Another form of intervention which is implicitly coercive but not obviously dictatorial, is propaganda bombardment. This bewildering variety of techniques explains why one cannot delimit intervention by reference to the type of activity; the choice of the latter depends on the specific objective, on the circumstances of the intervening state's resources and on the kinds of policy instruments at its disposal.<sup>7</sup> S.N. Macfarlane defines "intervention as coercive military involvement in civil and regional conflict, involvement of which is intended to, or does, affect internal political outcomes".<sup>8</sup> This definition too is narrow in scope confining the interventionary activities to coercive military involvement neglecting various other forms of intervention. However, it takes cognizance of the important aspect

of this type of target, i.e., the internal political structure. According to Oran Young "Intervention refers to organized and systematic activities across recognized boundaries aimed at affecting the political authority structures of the target".<sup>9</sup> Though this definition captures the essence of what constitutes intervention, i.e., activities which affect the internal political authority structures of the target; it fails to explain what sort of systematic activities are carried out. It is just military? Economic? or Political?.

James Rosenau, pointing the lack of definitional clarity protests that "Ambiguous and contradictory formulations characterize the voluminous moral, legal and strategic writings on the subject, and as a result, intervention has come to be treated as synonymous with influence".<sup>10</sup> Rosenau's answer to this problem of definitional clarity is to advocate an operational definition whose characteristics are convention-breaking, temporary phenomenon and the authority - oriented nature of the behaviour.<sup>11</sup> However, Rosenau's definition is limiting in that, it takes into account only the traditional conception of intervention. He implies that it is a clear-cut action, having a definite beginning, middle and end. Yet if we accept a whole range of behaviour other than acts of military force, as constituting intervention then we run into problems. For example, formerly intervention amounted largely to the physical coercion of one state by another, and this could be identified easily by troops crossing border. However, this is no longer the case. Coercion is expressed in a variety of ways such as economic, political, psychological etc., and by actors other than the state. Interventionary behavior today, therefore, is less clearcut. The activities of Multinational Corporations, The International Monetary Fund (IMF), the World Bank etc. in the third world is neither convention-breaking nor authority-oriented.

Thus any effort at a black and white formulation of what constitutes intervention could be frustrating.

Since the concept of intervention is surrounded by so much contention, any amount of description of the type activities or defining it in 'operational terms' would not shed much light on the essential nature of intervention. Our efforts, therefore, have to be made in defining the concept in analytical terms. Rosenau has claimed that "... the essence of intervention reveals itself to be highly variable..."<sup>12</sup> Yet it is contended that the essence of a concept is constant within a given system. If the essence changes then the concept is not the same one. What may vary within a particular system is the operational definition, but the actual nature of the phenomenon is static.<sup>13</sup> Thomas and Thomas have suggested that: "the essence of intervention is the attempt to compel..."<sup>14</sup> This essential nature is expressed in some of the operational definitions, though within the context of a state-centric approach. Max Beloff, for example, describes intervention as "the attempt by one state to effect the internal structure and external behaviour of other states, through various degrees of coercion".<sup>15</sup> It is this element of coercion or compulsion that is understood to be the essence of intervention in world politics. Since a fundamental attribute of sovereign status is that a government is theoretically omnipotent within the territorial boundaries of any given state, any externally imposed attempts to limit that right and power which is not desired or welcomed by the incumbent government amounts to intervention.<sup>16</sup>

Moreover, it is acknowledged that such compulsion may originate in a variety of sources apart from states and it may be expressed in a variety of forms. With this conception of intervention in mind, we can now proceed with the task of identifying different traditions in international relations studies (I.R.S) to explain the phenomenon of intervention in world politics. Interventionary behaviour of states cannot be understood properly by looking at isolated events. Any analysis and explanation of intervention should look for the underlying causes which could be varied and complex. It is at this point perspectives, like Liberal-pluralist, Marxist, Neo-Marxist etc. become useful tools in understanding such behaviour. The main thrust of the Liberal-pluralist argument is that, the domestic structure of states reflect certain values, ideas, beliefs, attitudes, historical experiences etc. of a pluralist society expressed in competitive party politics, regular elections, free institutions, autonomous interest groups and so on. It follows that these pluralist values, influencing the domestic structure are carried through into foreign policy which justify intervention around the globe to safeguard world-community interests like defending 'freedom' against 'totalitarianism'. It is also understood that these Liberal-pluralist states acting in the interests of international community and world order undertake interventions against any states which become a threat to world order and world peace.

In contrast to the Liberal-pluralist perspective which gives primacy to politics, the neo-Marxist perspective gives primacy to economics factors. It emphasises the class nature of society and insists that foreign and domestic policies are indivisible. They do not vary according to the separate interests of formally independent institutions, but are determined by the dominant class interests of that society. Neo-Marxists argue that

intervention is mainly undertaken by capitalist countries of the west (metropole) in the third world (periphery) to structurally exploit the third world of its resources and markets creating an infrastructure of dependency; certain institutions, social classes, processes etc., with a vested interest in the international system, attain an increasingly privileged and hegemonic position in their countries. They are both junior partners of metropolitan interests and dominant elites in their own societies. Thus dependence on imperialism is not created by occasional acts of military intervention, but is a chronic condition', maintained by subtler mechanisms. Coercion is used only as the ultimate resort when the subtler mechanisms prove ineffective.

Now having spelt out the broad perspectives: Liberal-pluralist and Neo-Marxist in understanding intervention, the study highlights diverse approaches within each of these broad perspectives. One very significant approach in international relations theorising is the international society or Grotian approach which falls within the Liberal-pluralist perspective.

#### Hedley Bull and the International Society School

The international society school has its philosophical antecedents in the Grotian tradition which views international politics as taking place within an international society in which states are bound not only by rules of prudence or expediency but also by imperatives of morality and law.<sup>17</sup> The Grotian tradition has been distinguished from the Hobbesian or realist assumptions on the one hand, and the Kantian or universalist

assumptions on the other. For the realists, international politics is one of an enduring conflict between states which do not recognise any moral or legal rules. This is the world of 'might is right' and states are motivated solely by considerations of self interest. Kantians, on the other hand, view international relations not in terms of a society of states, but that of a community of humankind which exists potentially, even if it does not exist actually.<sup>18</sup> The goal of the Kantian is to overthrow the state system and replace it with a cosmopolitan world society

Hedley Bull viewed both the Hobbesian and the Kantian positions as extremes and posited the idea that states form an international society. In his formulation, international society exists "when a group of states, conscious of certain common interests and common values, form a society in the sense that they conceive themselves to be bound by a common set of rules in their relations with each other, and share in the workings of common institutions".<sup>19</sup>

The most basic claim of the international society school is that the idea of international society, that states have rights and duties is not just an idea of theorists of international relations, it is a concrete reality in the minds of those who think and act in the name of states. Bull also believed that states do more than pay lip service to the legal and moral rules of international society. He argued that conflict does not arise between national self-interest and the moral and legal obligations of the society of states, as long as states follow their long-term interests. In one of his essays on the British Commonwealth

of Nations he noted the incompatibility of theories of realpolitics with the reality of a group of states whose mutual relations were not inherently antagonistic, °

Hedley Bull's concern for international society stems from his quest for order in world politics. He defines the problematic in terms of the phenomenon of war and intervention and the conditions of peace and order. He is more concerned with the question of order. Similarly he offers no sustained analysis of the causes of war or intervention but seeks to explain the existence of order in anarchy.

In a world that lacked sufficient solidarity among humankind to agree upon principles of justice and human rights, Bull thought that pursuit of particular conceptions of justice would be subversive of order among states. This view is reflected in his 'pluralist' conception of international society in which the states are the principle bearers of rights and duties in international law, with individuals only having legal rights insofar as the state provides them. Individuals are objects and not subjects of international law because there is no agreement in the society of states on universal principles of human rights. For pluralists, states are capable of agreeing only for certain minimum purposes. The most crucial being reciprocal recognition of sovereignty, and its logical corollary, the norm of non- intervention.

Bull draws distinction between the pluralist position and the realist position to clear the misunderstanding that, his pluralist position is a disguised form of realpolitik.<sup>21</sup> Recognition by states of the existence of rights and duties among them separates the

pluralist conception of international society from a realist position which argues that states keep the rules of sovereignty and non- intervention only when it is in their national self-interest. Similarly Bull, distinguishes between the 'pluralist' and the 'solidarist' position within the international society school. The central premise of the 'solidarist' position is that, states comprising international society exhibit solidarity or potential solidarity with respect to the enforcement of the law. Unlike the Pluralist position, which confers rights and duties only to states, the solidarist position assumes that individuals are the ultimate members of international society and confers them rights and duties in international law. This position legitimizes collective humanitarian intervention in cases where there is a gross human rights abuse and regards the existence of an universal standard of justice and morality against which the actions of states (and individuals) may be judged.<sup>22</sup> Bull fears, that this position could be subversive to international order where states pursuing self-interests could intervene in other states using human rights as a pretext. Bull considered that where the solidarist position had been pursued in practice, it had undermined and not strengthened international order.

However, in his later writing, Bull exhibited considerable solidarist leanings. In the Hagey lectures given at the university of Waterloo in 1983, Bull came round to the view that in the second half of the twentieth century the question of justice concerns what is due not only to states and nations, but to all individuals in an imagined community of mankind.<sup>23</sup> Furthermore, if liberal states were to be true to their values and moral premises, "some degree of commitment to the cause of individual human rights on a



world scale must follow... what is ultimately important has to be reckoned in terms of the rights and interests of the individual persons of whom humanity is made up, not the rights and interests of the states into which these persons are now divided".<sup>24</sup> Bull took a clear moral position on the normative values of the society of states in the Hagey lectures and suggested that the society of states have to be judged in terms of what it contributes to individual justice, the implication being that if the society of states fail to ensure individual justice, this would place in jeopardy its normative value. Yet, it is not clear whether Bull was endorsing the idea of universal human rights, a position which seems to contradict his pluralist comments on the lack of universal agreement on human rights or whether he was suggesting a western notion of human rights on the basis of cultural preference. Nicholas J. Wheeler would like to interpret Bull as arguing that some cultural preferences are universalist in meaning and intention even if they do not have universal support.<sup>25</sup>

Bull, however is quite skeptical about any universal values that could be agreed upon by the society of states. He believed that, states do not have a common understanding on what constitute human rights. While some states accorded priority to civil and political rights, some believe that economic, social and cultural rights should be given priority. Bull worried that particular states, setting themselves as judges of what constituted individual justice, would be a menace to international order. This brings into sharp focus the question whether Bull prefers order or justice in international relations. Bull argues that while he is reluctant to give a 'commanding value' to order, for he would prefer a solution that accommodates demands for both order and justice, the absence of a

consensus as to what justice requires renders such accommodation unlikely. Accordingly, Bull adopts the position that prioritises order over justice on the grounds that in the absence of consensus as to the nature of desired change, 'the prospect is opened up that the consensus which does exist about order or minimum coexistence will be undone'.<sup>26</sup>

Bull, however writing in one of his latest edited books felt that, in the event of gross violation of human rights, any collective intervention with the consent of the great powers and the sanction of the U.N. is not as disruptive to order as unilateral intervention. Indeed, collective humanitarian intervention, reflecting the solidarity of states on basic values would, in the long term, reinforce international order by demonstrating the collective determination of international society to support its core moral principles.<sup>27</sup> Thus the whole of Hedley Bull's thesis centres round the goals which include the preservation of the system of sovereign states, maintaining their independence or external sovereignty and its corollary, the principle of non- intervention.

Now, we shall try to understand intervention in Neo-Marxist perspective and within this perspective the ideas of Andre Gunder Frank, Wallerstein, and the Dependency School.

### **Andre Gunder Frank and the Dependency School**

Dependency theory evolved in Latin America during the 1960's and later became one of the dominant schools in the neo-marxist tradition. Many scholars became interested in

the **area** resulting in diverse interpretations and development of conceptual frameworks to grapple with the phenomena of development and underdevelopment. The emergence of dependency theory was a reaction to the failure of modernisation theory and import substitution techniques suggested by the U.N Economic Commission for Latin America (ECLA) economists led by Raul Prebisch. They attacked the diffusionist explanation of modernists, which visualized gradual trickling down of the capitalist benefits from the imperial centres and the subsequent changes at the political institutional levels by incrementalism. The 'import substitution' which was suggested by the ECLA group paved the way for or rather involves capital intensive techniques, which results in low level of employment and low wages and increase in the marginalisation of the people. These two causes strongly acted on the Latin American scholars first and later other thinkers. They adopted a radical stance and took a skeptical view of the above mentioned formulas for development.

Their view of capitalism was quite radical but in no way an orthodox Marxist view. In fact they denounced the 'progressive role' and 'historic mission' of capitalism which found favour with Marx and others and also the modernists. To the extent capitalism replaces pre-capitalist modes of production it can be termed as progressive. Marx assigned this role to capitalism, which would transform the world, and thus only subsequent proletarianization of workers is possible which would pave way for revolution and socialism. Dependency writers did not find this logic convincing. Since revolutions which occurred in China, Cuba etc., which were essentially agrarian, prompted them to think that proletarianization is not an essential condition for revolution. In the process

these ideas motivated them to take a fresh look at the concept of development and under development. In doing so, Frank and others launched a frontal attack on capitalism and its effects on the third world.

### Basic Premises

- Capitalism while promoting development simultaneously generated underdevelopment in other areas and hence not progressive as believed earlier.
- That a structural and symbiotic relationship has evolved between the developed and underdeveloped countries over a period of time.
- Another premise which most of them appear to share is the systemic character of the world and the interconnectedness between the parts and the whole.

The aims and objectives of these theorists in general is to transform the existing system so as to repeat the performance of the developed nations. For this objective, the solutions prescribed vary from socialism to dependent capitalist growth. This however does not mean they offer ready-made alternatives. At best, they offer a description which might be called analysis of the working of capitalism and the process of under development it brings. The main focus is on the foreign penetration into the economies of the third world.

While ECLA economists criticized and modified bourgeois theories of development, A.G. Frank attempted to formulate a theory of under development within a marxist framework. He distinguished center and periphery (ECLA economists) by referring to metropole and satellite, which would mean the developed and underdeveloped areas.

Frank in his development of under development thesis points out that under development in the third world is not an original or traditional condition.<sup>28</sup> They may have been undeveloped but certainly not underdeveloped. Underdevelopment he argues, is a distinct consequence of the relationships between the now developed Metropolitan countries and the underdeveloped satellite countries

Frank also attacks the dualistic view of the societies as modern, feudal and backward, developed, underdeveloped and considers such dichotomies as false because the under development of backward areas is a product of the same historical process of capitalist development that shaped the development of the progressive areas.<sup>29</sup> Frank puts his thesis most emphatically when he argues that the most underdeveloped regions are those that in the past had had closest ties to the Metropole. They were greatest exporters of primary products and a major source for capital but were abandoned once business declined.<sup>30</sup>

Frank attempts to analyze capitalism on a world scale and defines capitalism as a system of monopolistic exchange, which acts to transfer surplus from subordinate areas to the imperial centres. He sets on to demonstrate with a wealth of factual and historical information that no part of Latin America is left untouched by these market relations.

Capitalist exploitation is carried through metropole satellite structure. The Metropolis exploits the satellite so that surplus is concentrated in the metropolis, which leaves the satellite impoverished. The satellite is deprived of potential investment funds, which results in the slowing down of growth. Satellite being reduced to a state of dependence is ruled by a local class which acts according to the wishes of the metropolis. This class is termed as lumpen bourgeoisie which acts only to bring about under development.

Frank explains the extraction of surplus and its channeling to metropolises through the chain of metropole satellite relations. These relations are found at the international, national and local levels, which operate on social, political and economic lines. It is these links which ensure the perpetuation of Metropole dominance over the satellites. The ruling classes in underdeveloped countries owe their position to their place in a 'chain' that runs from the countryside of the periphery to the imperialist metropolis, and thus have an interest in maintaining it.

Frank argues that development in the satellite is possible only when the links with the Metropole are weakened.<sup>31</sup> He gives the example of Brazil in Latin America which witnessed large scale industrialization between 1929 and 1950 when the Metropolitan centers were preoccupied in war in Europe and other areas of the world and their hold over the satellites was the least. Due to this situation of war and depression during this period, regional interests were able to assert themselves. But again he points out that this industrialization is mainly restricted to 'import substitution' of finished consumer goods which necessitated the importation of capital inputs. The foreign exchange to pay for this

was to come from the raw material exports. This phase of development, Frank maintains, came to a halt with the onset of Korean War, which resulted in a fall in the prices of raw materials. The new industrial bourgeoisie was compelled to turn back to encouraging export industries and to attract foreign capital to fill the gap; thus the metropolitan dominance was again reinforced.

The argument of development of underdevelopment in peripheral areas appears in various forms in his works. The remedy he visualizes is the delinking of the economy from the satellite metropole relations, which he thinks, can only be achieved through socialism.

Immanuel Wallerstein and World Systems School.

Immanuel Wallerstein has developed a theoretical system which is nearer to the ideas developed by dependency theorists like Frank, Samir Amin, Paul Sweezy, Paul Baran, Harry Magdoff, Arghiri Emmanuel, in contrast to the orthodox Marxist tradition. Wallerstein's world system school sees an integrated world capitalist system existing in the twentieth century, encompassing even the socialist countries. Market forces integrate all countries, primarily through trade but also through the flow of capital and labour, generating and reproducing three interdependent tiers, the rich industrial core where wage labour is predominant, the poor raw materials exporting periphery where a variety of 'labour control systems' coexist, and the semi-periphery intermediate between the two, which plays an essentially political role in holding the system together.<sup>32</sup>

The semi-periphery is not, however, the only stabilizing element in the system. Within each of the semi-peripheral states, as well as in those of the periphery, there are ruling classes that owe their position to their place in the chain that runs from the peripheral countryside to the central cities.<sup>33</sup> These ruling classes are not highly developed capitalist bourgeoisie, but rather a dependent bourgeoisie without an independent momentum of their own. However, Wallerstein, finds that national bourgeoisie of the semi-periphery under some conditions does play a radical and anti imperialist role.<sup>34</sup> .

Wallerstein, like Andre Gunder Frank sees a continuity in the systematic flow of economic surplus away from the periphery to the core in which the strong states of the core play the decisive role in using their political power to guarantee unequal exchange resulting in the specialization in raw materials and the relative under development of the periphery, with the rich getting richer and the poor poorer. He argues that capitalism both needs and produces strong states and that the cutting edge of capitalist accumulation is coercive practices such as war, subversion, diplomacy and military interventions. This idea of a strong state explains the need of the metropolitan business interests in safeguarding their interests in the periphery. Military power has long been and continues to be a primary instrument of imperialism in the less developed countries.<sup>36</sup> In the pre-World War II period the imperialist countries frequently used their militaries in direct support of their business interests. But in the post-world War II world with the rise in nationalist consciousness and the growing strength of both national liberation movements and the Socialist's countries that give assistance to them, Western imperialism has found it more difficult to use direct military intervention (especially in the post-Vietnam world).



As a result, military power has largely come to be exercised through surrogates. These surrogates, armed and advised by imperial powers were used to stage coups d'etats in support of their local ruling classes and the western economic interests when necessary to prevent social instability, economic collapse and the communist threat.

Thus the theories of Andre Gunder Frank, Wallerstein and broadly the dependency school represents a major advance in the Marxist theory of imperialism. In contrast to the early Marxist theory (except as developed by Rosa Luxemburg), dependency theory provides a comprehensive analysis of the impact of the capitalist penetration into the third world. This analysis is carried out within a theoretical structure that treats capitalist development and under development within a unified framework of mutual cause and effect. The view of metropolitan dominance and control over the economic, social, and political structures, of the satellite, while similar to the early Marxists is profoundly different in that such control is seen to prevent satellites from achieving successful capitalist development even after national liberation. Far from creating the conditions for successful development, capitalist penetration has created the conditions for capitalist under development. Indeed, such penetration creates conditions for successful development only in the metropolitan center. Dependency theory, thus, conforms more closely to the post-World War II experience in the third world. It has provided an analytic structure that has furthered our understanding of contemporary imperialism and the need for intervention wherever the interests of the imperial powers are threatened.

## **Mohammed Ayoob and Third World security problematique**

Unlike the liberal and Neo-Marxist scholars who basically viewed interventions as externally directed violating sovereignty and territorial integrity of a state, Mohammed Ayoob, a leading Third World scholar, tried to understand interventions as part of the 'Security problematique' of the third world states. He points out "that all of these contending schools of thought tend to define the concept of 'security' in external or outward-directed terms. That is, external to the commonly accepted unit of analysis in international relations: the state"<sup>37</sup>. He also notes that security issues that affect the western states whether capitalist or socialist differ significantly from the third world security issues in three important respects. Firstly, its external orientation; secondly, its strong linkage with systemic security, and finally, its binding ties with the security of the two major alliance blocs. He does not, however, argue that the characteristics mentioned above are totally absent in the third world. He only finds them to be so thoroughly diluted as to be hardly recognizable.

Mohammed Ayoob locates the problem of insecurity of the third world states as emanating mostly from within their borders rather than from outside.<sup>38</sup> He does not, however, rule out external threats but views them as augmenting the problems of insecurity that already exists within their state boundaries. For the most part third world problems such as political oppression, economic collapse, scarcity, over population,

ethnic rivalry, terrorism, crime and disease etc., are internal in nature. These problems are profoundly significant in the sense that they have already cost millions of lives and could have grave consequences if left untreated. The repression of human rights, ethnic and religious rivalry, economic breakdown and so on can create dangerous instability at the domestic level, which in turn, can exacerbate the tensions that could lead to violence, refugee crises and possibly, inter-state conflicts and superpower intervention.

Mohammed Ayoob argues that the security issues mentioned above are symptoms of a much deeper divergence in the respective experiences of western and third world states. These differences are related to two major variables: 1. The history of state formation in the third world as compared to its counterpart in the west and 2. The pattern of elite recruitment and regime establishment and maintenance in the third world as compared to the same process in the developed states.<sup>39</sup> He points out that, unlike western states which have attained the current position of 'unconditional legitimacy' after passing through various stages of social and political development and the attendant conflict and turmoil over a period of a few centuries, third world states were faced with the challenge of state formation in a time span of a few decades. This lack of adequate time to work out the various stages of development in the process of state formation has rendered the third world states weak in terms of institutional structures lacking in legitimacy.

Apart from the problems of state formation, Mohammed Ayoob notes that most regimes in the third world come to power by non-democratic means, often by *coup d'état* and try by all means to retain or perpetuate their regimes. They are far more interested in how to

protect their regimes rather than how to look after the security of their societies as a whole. Lacking political legitimacy these regimes resort to all kinds of repressive measures which fly in the face of all cherished ideals of the majority of the people. Often, these problems of political fragmentation, legitimacy crisis, narrow support bases of regimes etc. are compounded by the uneven economic development, disparities of income and wealth among various social groups leading to large scale turmoil.<sup>40</sup>

To deal with the violent reactions engendered by developmental and distributive failures, the ruling classes seek external military assistance. Thus internal security issues tend to take on international dimensions leading to superpower interventions.

Having discussed various perspectives on intervention, liberal, neo-marxist as well as the third world, we shall now try to understand different types of intervention.

### **Military Intervention**

The nature of international conflict has changed very dramatically over the last half century. The traditional goals for which states went to war have largely disappeared in contemporary times. In the period before World War II, states clashed over territorial, ethnic and religious issues, issues relating to dynastic succession etc. In the 19th century many wars were fought about the right of people to secure national independence (if they were ruled by another state), national unity (if they were scattered among several states),

or national preeminence.<sup>41</sup> Most of these goals are competitive and could only be achieved by war between one state and another.

Since 1945, military conflicts among developed states have largely come to an end. But conflicts between the western countries and the so-called developing countries or between developing countries themselves, is still a possibility. For the most part, members of the western world have intervened in developing countries for one of three reasons. The first occurred during the cold war and had to do with preventing the spread of Soviet sponsored communism. The American involvement in Vietnam and in many other locales provides examples. The second centered on the need to maintain stability in a country rich in important natural resources. Recurrent French and Belgium interventions in Zaire are illustrations. Finally, Western countries have moved to safeguard areas that they regard as strategically important, as the French and British sought to do in 1956 when they invaded Suez and the United states did when it deposed the Panamanian dictator Manuel Noriega during the Bush administration.

Among developing countries, conflicts have resulted for entirely different reasons. In general these countries have clashed over territorial ethnic and religious issues. But even among these countries external wars of the traditional kind have been rare. Though the process of de-colonization brought about a number of limited territorial disputes, they were restricted in scale being confined to particular frontier or territories in dispute at the time of de-colonization. Some examples are the low level Indonesian-Malaysian conflicts (1963-1966); Kenya versus the Somali Republic (1963-1967); The Rann of Cutch

incident between India and Pakistan (1967; the so called Soccer war between El Salvador and the Honduras (1969); Guyana and Surinam (1969); El Salvador and Honduras (1970); India and Pakistan over Kashmir (1972); Iran and Iraq (1974); Thailand and Cambodia (1975); Morocco and Algeria over Western Sahara (1975) and India and Pakistan over Kashmir (1975).<sup>42</sup>

For the most part the wars of the third world have overwhelmingly been civil wars concerning the internal political situation in particular states. Most wars in the modern world therefore begin at least as domestic conflicts between different political groups and ideological factions, that is, they occur between communist and noncommunist or atleast leftwing and right wing factions. Of this sort were all the most important wars of the era: the Chinese civil war; the Greek Civil War; the Korean War; the Wars in Guatemala (1954); Cuba (1956-59); The Dominican Republic (1965); Nicaragua (1961-79 and 1980); El Salvador (1980) and other Latin American Countries, the Wars in Angola, Mozambique, and others parts of Africa; The wars in Vietnam, Cambodia and Laos, and in Afghanistan in Asia to give only some of the more obvious examples.<sup>43</sup>

These civil wars do not occur exclusively within the domestic context. External powers, often the superpowers become involved, in these domestic conflicts to safeguard what they perceive to be their national interests, or challenge to their security, a loss of face or a defeat of its own ideological alliance. Often such intervention is essentially defensive in nature and undertaken to maintain the existing Status quo as when the Soviet Union intervened to prevent Hungary (1956), Czechoslovakia (1968) or Afghanistan (1979)

from falling under the control of a regime, which might threaten its interests; or when the U.S. intervened in Guatemala (1954). Cuba (1961) the Dominican Republic (1965) and Grenada (1983) to prevent the governments of those countries falling into, or remaining in, left wing hands.<sup>44</sup>

In other cases the same purpose has been fulfilled without direct intervention by the external power, through the provision of substantial military assistance to rebels seeking to unseat governments of opposing ideology as by the Soviet Union's allies in 1946-49 or by the U.S. in Nicaragua, Angola, Afghanistan etc.

In every case the object has been to ensure that a government of a particular persuasion held power in a particular state. There is every indication that it will remain the pattern of conflict for the foreseeable future. The essential change in such an international system is not that military power is no longer employed but as Bruce Russett and Harvey Starr point out that the use of non-conventional violence has become quite prevalent. While eighty percent of all international conflicts before World War II involved traditional state against state action, since that time eighty percent of all clashes have been of the non-conventional variety.<sup>45</sup> States in today's world are prone to resort to internal subversion state sponsored terrorism instead of direct military interventions. With internal subversion, assistance is funneled to those within the country who oppose an antagonistic government, as when the United States supported the UNITA rebels in Angola, Contras in Nicaragua etc. With state sponsored terrorism, a government creates or supports organisations that seek to wreak havoc against targets that it opposes, as with Arab

support for anti-Israeli terrorists groups, Iranian support for anti-American groups, in the Middle East and Libyan support for anti American groups in Europe and in the MiddleEast.<sup>46</sup>

Today military coercion is limited by other considerations, many of which relate to capabilities. First, would be targets are better able to defend themselves because of the international trade in arms. Second, many of today's opponents are not territorial actors, and therefore are not easily discovered and brought to battle. Third, many of the potentially explosive issues that exist are not easily handled with the use of military resources. Fourth, the use of force is somewhat less acceptable today than in the past, and aggressors are more likely to confront substantial international condemnation, perhaps even an armed coalition as in the Gulf war. Finally the needs of actors have become so extensive as a result of industrialization and interdependence that they simply cannot hope to fulfill them or even a reasonable proportion of them through military conquest. Rosecrance provides an excellent illustration of this last point.

"In the world economy of the 1990's, however, it would be much more difficult to conquer territories containing sufficient, oil, natural resources, and grain supplies to emancipate their holder from the restraints of the interdependent economic system. Such an aggressor would need the oil of Middle East, the resources of Southern Africa, and the grain and iron of Australia, Canada, and the American Middle West. Too much dependence and too little strength make that list unachievable".<sup>47</sup>



This quotation applies best to the west but among the smaller and poorer countries military means to secure either territory or resources is a worthwhile option. But generally speaking, external intervention in civil wars or inter-state wars using military means often end up as failures to achieve the desired goals since, what finally counts in the survival of a government or a particular regime is the policies it pursues towards its own population and the way that population perceives them.<sup>48</sup> Thus any state's attempt to use military force to coerce other states into doing what it wants is exceptionally difficult in contemporary world. These difficulties do not, however, mean that such effort will end.

### Covert Action

When states seek to support foreign friends or attack foreign enemies without revealing their own hands, usually by employing their intelligence agencies, we speak of 'covert action' or 'political warfare.' Typical methods used here in support of allies are the provision, as appropriate- of funds, advice, technical assistance, training and weapons. Where foreign enemies are concerned covert action includes black propaganda, sabotage, economic disruption, and even the controlling of mercenary armies and assassination of foreign political figures.<sup>49</sup> Such activity has been a distinguishing feature of the cold war. Covert action has sometimes paid substantial dividends for the states, which have employed it. American enthusiasm for the technique was fired by the effectiveness of the CIA's role in helping to prevent the feared victory of the communists in the Italian general election in 1948. In 1955, it played a similar role in the elections, which consolidated the power of Ngo Dinh Diem in South Vietnam. The CIA also contributed

to the downfall of nationalist leaders in Iran in 1953 (Dr. Mussadigh) and Guatemala in the following year (Jacob Arbenz), and of the Marxist leader of Chile, Dr. Salvador Allende, in 1973. In the Congo Crisis of 1965 the CIA was instrumental in General Joseph Mobutu emerge as president.<sup>50</sup>

If the CIA has had substantial successes in the field of covert action, especially in the 1950's it has also usually as a result of ignorance of local conditions or Political vacillation, or both had serious failures: among others, in the Ukraine, Eastern Europe and Albania in the 1940s and early 1950's, in Indonesia in 1958 when it tried to sponsor rebellion against president Sukarno, and most spectacularly in Cuba in 1961 an event referred to as 'The Bay of Pigs' after the chosen site for the landing of the small CIA trained exile army which was supposed, in some unspecified way, to be instrumental in the downfall of Fidel Castro. 'Operation Mongoose' failed to prevent Agostinho Neto's Marxist MPLA from emerging triumphant in the succession struggle, which followed the departure of the Portuguese from Angola in 1974-75.<sup>51</sup>

'Covert Action' is clearly the late twentieth century equivalent of gunboat diplomacy and has been adopted as a result of the moral disapprobation which came to be attached after the second world war both to 'imperialism and to the use of force in international relations. Provided it works and remains covert, there can be no possible practical objection to it. The main argument against 'covert action' in many cases is that if it is to be conducted on a scale sufficiently substantial to provide good chance of success and if it is used repeatedly, it will be impossible to conceal either its role or the source of its

direction. In other words, it will not be 'covert' at all and will thus attract the opprobrium, which it was designed to avoid. Lamenting America's excessive enthusiasm for covert action in the 1950's Roger Hilsman, who was appointed Director of the State Departments Bureau of Intelligence and Research by John F. Kennedy, remarks in his memoirs that 'where one action, considered in isolation, might seem worth the cost of slightly tarnishing our image abroad, the cumulative effort of several hundred blots was to blacken it entirely'. By the end of the Eisenhower administration, he continues, 'our reputation was such that we got credit for almost everything unpleasant that happened in many countries...'<sup>52</sup> Furthermore, if there is to be any chance at all of preserving secrecy, it is probably inevitable that the responsibility for covert action should be handed to those most expert in acting by stealth the agent of secret intelligence. But this risks compromising both the assets and the regulation of the intelligence gatherers among those in foreign countries whose trust they require. It was in substantial part of result of its covert operations that the CIA attracted such unfavorable media and congressional attention in the 1970's and suffered serious harm as a result. Not surprisingly, the size and status of the CIA's covert action branch were severely reduced after the mid 1970's though this was partly a result of the ending of the huge involvement in Vietnam. However, there will still be circumstances in which covert action will remain attractive, and may well be the only option available.

### **Economic Intervention**

In comparison to the military, which has played a major role in the use of force since antiquity, the use of economic resources for coercion is of relatively recent origin. Prior

to the first world war, few political leaders and international analysts believed that economic moves has the same kind of coercive potential as political and military actions. In a world where nations are increasingly interdependent and rely upon each other for resources and commodities, economic coercion becomes an extremely important foreign policy tool. States, which are resources poor invariably, have to depend on others states, which can provide them, creating dependency. This need for resources can be used as a successful leverage by the providing state for achieving political ends. It is the need for key raw materials by industrial powers that helps explain "weak" states as measured by military or economic capabilities, are able to influence the actions of the "strong". Economic resources are among the major capabilities that can be mobilized for political purposes.

Today, some developing countries possessing rare mineral or commodities often try to wield effective international influence. But these countries are also dependent on other developed countries for capital, machinery technological know how etc to develop their economies. They lack a variety of export products, and for these reasons are vulnerable to economic pressure from industrialized countries. When a country relies on the export of a few commodities to earn foreign exchange, any drop in the price of these exports can have disastrous effects on the economy. Such forms of dependence are not uncommon between developing and industrialized countries, and can be exploited for political purposes, provided that alternative markets are not available.

Degrees of dependence upon trade as a component of overall economic activity vary considerably among states and fluctuations in trading patterns could render them vulnerable. Smaller states having a high proportion of their total economic activity accounted for by export and imports are the most vulnerable and some of the examples are Cyprus, Malta, Iceland, etc. These states export most of their commodities to one state or group of states (Iceland sells a large proportion of its fish exports to the Soviet Union), they are potentially vulnerable to threats to break off that trade.

### **Techniques of Economic Intervention**

There are a number of techniques that states use to control the flow of goods, services, and resources between states.<sup>53</sup> These controls can be used either to punish or reward either to cut down or expand the amount of the goods being traded or to make that good more or less expensive. Tariffs are taxes levied on imported goods to raise revenue or to control the flow of foreign goods into a country. This control is usually related to the protection of the country's domestic industries. If tariffs are raised, then a particular imported item becomes more expensive to purchase and fewer will be sold, particularly in relation to similar domestically produced goods. Low tariffs will encourage trade; high tariff will discourage trade. Similarly, quotas control imports not through prices but through the amount of goods permitted to enter a country from a specific source for a specific time period. The United States, for example used to impose strict quotas on sugar from Cuba, the Dominican Republic and others sources. By shifting the quotas for different countries, some countries could be hurt and others helped. This is particularly

effective in dealing with countries that depend heavily on one crop that cannot be stored and thus has been sold relatively quickly.

States might also grant a special trade status, such as most favoured nation (MFN) status, as a form of influence. MFN is based on nondiscrimination in trade and means that any tariffs reductions granted to any country will also be extended to the trading partner given MFN. The United States has attempted to encourage Polish economic independence from the USSR by giving Poland MFN. In 1975, U.S. Senator Henry Jackson and others attempted an influence Soviet Policy on the emigration of its Jewish citizens through the manipulation of MFN. (The attempt failed, the Soviets, in fact, toughened their stance on emigration and refused an American treaty that guaranteed MFN status to the USSR on the condition that the Soviets allow more Jews to leave).

Other mechanisms exist for controlling trade. There are various sorts of loans and credits to stimulate buying by lowering prices, as well as monetary policy to make the goods of one state more or less expensive gives the devaluation or revaluation of the states currency. Additionally, there are devices that can be used strictly to punish others states. These include the boycott, by which states cease to buy the goods, resources or services of another state. Boycotts cut the target State off from its market, similarly, an embargo entails stopping the sales of economic items to another state. An embargo cuts off the target states supply of resources and products from the outside.

## Foreign Aid

Finally, there is the whole question of economic aid to other states. Foreign aid is a major 'carrot' or economic reward, technique. It involves the transfer of economic goods or services from the donor to the recipient. These might be any resource or commodity, money services or technical advice.<sup>54</sup> In the newly independent and economically developing countries, the needs for development capital (money and goods) and for the technical and technological skills to build a modern economy are particularly high. The issue of aid is therefore very useful in dealing with most of the states in the international system today. To give it or withhold it, to attempt to create dependencies through its use, and to attempt to substitute the aid from one state with that from another are all strategies for influence (or escape from that influence) employed today.<sup>55</sup>

Aid may take any number of forms.<sup>56</sup> It can be used for military assistance, economic development, or relief. Bilateral aid, which is provided by one state to another, is particularly liable to manipulation by the donor. The aid may come as outright grants, loans, sales or technical assistance. In the 1950's and the 1960's grants were the preferred form of aid. More recently technical assistance and loans have assumed a greater role. With bilateral aid, dependence relationship can be created. Bilateral aid has also been provided with "strings". 'Tied aid' means that the recipient is forced to buy or trade for goods it does not want or need to receive the aid that it does not desire.

Donors may still find foreign aid a useful instrument. The greater proportion of all-American economic assistance, for example, goes to two countries, Egypt and Israel. The assistance is provided for obvious political purposes. American aid to Egypt did displace Soviet influence. It was also useful for compensating the Egyptians for the loss of Arab economic aid as a result of Israeli- Egyptian peace treaty. Recipients, on the other hand, typically prefer multilateral aid assistance given through international organizations such as the I.M.F, World Bank, other UN agencies, or regional organizations such as the Inter American Development Bank or the Asian Development Bank etc. This aid is less subject to donor manipulation, although the U.S. does have a great deal of influence over I.M.F, World Bank lending decisions.<sup>57</sup> Third world recipients of aid have expressed their desire for much more aid but through multi lateral agencies, because aid, like any others scarce resource that is valued, may be used as a reward and punishment in the pursuit foreign influence.



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## Chapter-II Notions of Hegemony and U.S Power

## CHAPTER II

This chapter is primarily a continuation of our search of the interventionary behavior of dominant hegemonic powers over weak states. It focuses mainly on United States role in Africa during the seventies and eighties. Analysing U.S. role during this period is by no means an easy task, for, as a dominant power within the capitalist world United States was facing a serious crisis of credibility as a nation both on economic as well as foreign policy fronts. Addressing any foreign policy issue without the knowledge of the state of American economy during this period would seriously impair a holistic assessment of any given situation. In view of this, we can proceed to appraise the U.S. power with reference to the overall performance of its economy. Our understanding will be informed by a few important scholarly writings in this domain.

The United States power in the seventies and eighties has been perceived differently by different perspectives. For instance, scholars like Robert Gilpin who belongs to the realist tradition have seen American hegemony on the decline. Some Marxist scholars like James Petras and world system scholars like Wallerstein have also attested this prognosis of Gilpin. However, scholars like Stephen Gill working within the Gramscian tradition have visualised the ascent of American hegemony in the world capitalist economy despite momentary setbacks as witnessed during 1970s and 80s. Susan Strange, a liberal eclectic scholar is of the view that, although U.S. has relatively declined viv-a-vis Western Europe and Japan, it has sustained structural dominance over the international system.

In view of these varying assessments of American hegemony, the present chapter has been organised as follows. First, it would highlight the perspectives of Robert Gilpin, Robert Keohane, Immanuel Wallerstein, James Petras etc; that underline the U.S. hegemonic decline thesis followed by the perspectives of Susan Strange and Stephen Gill that provide a counterpoint to the notion of U.S. hegemonic decline.

### **Robert Gilpin and the American hegemonic decline thesis**

Robert Gilpin belongs to the realist tradition of scholars like E.H. Carr and Hans Morgenthau who understood inter-state relations as inherently conflictual. It is a Hobbesian state of nature where states are perpetually struggling to safeguard their existence in an anarchic world system i.e. lacking a higher authority to enforce norms of inter-state behaviour. For the Realists, the salient features of the international system are (1) the existence of sovereign nation-states who have no higher authority than themselves, (2) the fundamentally competitive nature of relations between nation states, although there is a possibility of cooperation in the pursuit of national interests, (3) the primary motivations of nation-states in such an anarchic system are the quest for power and material well-being (Security).

The economic variant of Realism is mercantilism, which emphasizes the interventionist role of the state in the economy. This involves national policy of self-sufficiency in terms of strategic commodities and minerals, which reduces dependence on other nations. If this is not possible, it should endeavour to obtain guaranteed access to crucial technologies



and commodities for domestic industry. This is the state sponsored economic development through international trade. Realism and mercantilism coincide in that strong national economies are necessary to support the military establishments required to protect national sovereignty.<sup>1</sup> Gilpin in trying to understand international political economy in his book *"The Political Economy of International Relations"* argues that "a hegemon is necessary to the existence of a liberal international economy. Whether such an economy is conceived as a collective good or a private good shared by a particular group of states, historical experience suggests that, in the absence of a dominant liberal power, international economic cooperation has been extremely difficult to attain or sustain and conflict has been the norm".<sup>2</sup>

Gilpin argues that, the hegemonic powers use their preponderance of economic and military capabilities to construct and maintain liberal regimes, regulating international trade and monetary affairs. The United States in the Post Second World War era erected an elaborate network of Political military and economic institutions and regimes such as the NATO and the Bretton woods agreement which led to the establishment of the International Monetary Fund (IMF), the World Bank etc., which integrated Western Europe, Japan and the non-communist third world into a liberal international economy which gave maximum scope for the expansion of economic forces, particularly those centered in the United States. All this was made possible by the predominant position it had in the world economy during the 1940s and 1950s. Most of the European nations and Japan relied mostly on the United States for rebuilding their war shattered economies. Large infusions of aid and exports of primary products and manufactured goods by the

U.S. put the West European economies back on their feet. At the same time, perception of a growing threat from the Soviet Union and their inability to defend themselves made them dependent on U.S. military protection. These entire factors formed a U.S led liberal international economy.

The United States was able to maintain economic integration and political coordination by its willingness to bear a disproportionately large share of costs.<sup>3</sup> The U.S did this by providing massive economic assistance, which averaged 1 - 3 per cent a year of U.S. Gross National Product (GNP) during 1950s. From 1945 to 1970, the U.S. provided in total more than \$134 billion in direct economic aid and defense support assistance, mostly in the form of grants, to 130 nations. The U.S. also took upon itself the risk of nuclear destruction vis-a-vis the Soviet Union. The military expenditures from the mid-1950s to the mid 1960s - that is, after the Korean war and before the build up for the Vietnam war - averaged nearly 9 per cent a year of U.S. GNP, while its European allies spent less than half as much of their G.N.P.s. Finally, the U.S fostered international economic integration by keeping its economy fairly open by reducing restrictions on import and exports compared to any other member of the system. The U.S. was the largest market on the planet during 1950s. Its GNP was about half of world GNP and the proportion was still more than a third in 1970; U.S. imports were nearly 16 per cent of total world import during 1950 and around 14 per cent during 1970. Thus, the U.S. by giving access to its market on favourable terms helped in a steady growth of world economy especially the West European and Japanese economics which witnessed high growth rates during 1950s and 1960s.<sup>4</sup>

Gilpin believes that "the U.S has been motivated more by enlightened self-interest and security objectives. The U.S has assumed leadership responsibilities because it has been in its economic, political and even ideological interest to do so or at least it has believed this to be the case. To secure long-term interests the U.S. has been willing to pay the short-term and additional costs of supporting the international economic and political system".<sup>5</sup>

However, by the 1970s American economic dominance began to wane. This was mainly due to some structural transformations that took place in global economy. Firstly, the Bretton Woods system as monetary institution broke down when president Nixon in August 1971 broke a commitment on the part of the USA to exchange gold for dollars at a fixed rate. This rupture, together with a move to floating exchange rates in 1973, led to a quick deregulation of international monetary affairs. Secondly, the U.S. lost control over the energy market when the OPEC steeply raised its oil prices in 1973. Thirdly, the emergence of new competitors such as Japan and the Southeast Asian threshold nations with spectacular growth rates began to eat into the international as well as domestic market share. This was also a period of transition from a dominant economy to an interdependent economy.

The American economy during 1970s and 80s witnessed dramatic decline in growth rate from around 3% annually in the post-war years to an incredible low of .8% in the 1970s.<sup>6</sup> Between 1953-1954 and 1979-1980, imports as a share of GNP more than doubled from

4.3% to 10.6%. Between 1980 to 1984, there was a further rise of imports from 11,4% to 15.3% America during this period was running a deficit trade balance with almost all the countries it was trading with. By 1985, the American trade deficit was \$150 billion and \$50 billion of that was with Japan. The surplus trade balance of \$20 billion it has with the Western Europe in 1980 also turned into a \$15 billion deficit by 1984. As trade deficits and economic unemployment rose, the U.S started exploiting its hegemonic position by pursuing protectionist policies leading to inflationary forces and global economic instability. In Conybeare's phrase, the U.S has become "a predatory hegemon"<sup>7</sup> In this context Gilpin believes that "the tendency toward breakdown or fragmentation of the system greatly increases with the relative decline of the hegemon."<sup>8</sup> He is also very pessimistic about the possibilities for rational co-operation amongst the major capitalist states and their ability to manage the world economy.<sup>9</sup> Thus Gilpin attempted to give a broad picture of the relative American economic decline which has also its impact on the overall hegemony it wields in the political and military domains.

#### Robert Keohane and after Hegemony

Robert Keohane, one of the originators of the transnationalism approach in his book *"After Hegemony"* published in 1984, essentially argued the decline of American hegemony since the mid 1960s. Keohane seems to believe the U.S will never be able to regain its hegemonic position in the near future and any cooperation that underlies interaction between states has to be a non-hegemonic cooperation. This is a crucial

argument in the sense that, it contradicts the Realist claim that great hegemonic powers are necessary for maintaining order in the system.

Keohane, however, knew that non-hegemonic cooperation is difficult since independent states tend to behave in a selfish manner than work towards a common good. But he also believed that, "Though there is persistence of discord, world politics is not a state of war and states do have complementary interests, which make certain forms of cooperation potentially beneficial".<sup>10</sup> The international regimes erected in the Post-world War-II phase such as the oil regime etc., gain salience during periods of hegemonic decline since they create a favourable climate for cooperation than would otherwise exist. Keohane argues that.... "the network of international regimes bequeathed to contemporary international political economy by American hegemony provides a valuable foundation for constructing post-hegemonic patterns of cooperation, which can be used by policy makers interested in achieving their objectives through multilateral action".<sup>11</sup>

### **Wallerstein and the crisis of the capitalist world economy**

Wallerstein's world system approach is an attempt to chart the course of capitalist development as a 'world system' since the sixteenth century. He argues that in the late Middle Ages in West Europe the crisis of feudalism led to the new system of capitalism by which the elite restored their ability to extract surplus value, "the new system consolidated itself in Europe (by about 1650) and went on from there to take over the

world, in the process eliminating all alternative modes of social organisation and establishing a single division of labour throughout the globe for the first time in human history".<sup>12</sup> The world system is a stratified, functionally interrelated global market containing three levels: the core, the semi-periphery and the periphery. As these three levels came under the influence of international trade and later colonialism, they began to specialise in certain economic activities - the core in capitalist agriculture and industry, the periphery in single crop agriculture or mining for export. The semi-periphery has a dualistic economy, exporting raw materials to the core as well as manufactured goods to the periphery. As specialization advanced, disparities developed in exchange relations between the core and the peripheral states resulting in an outflow of surplus from the periphery to the core. This outflow left the periphery in a weakened condition, retarding the state development there and ultimately leading periphery nations into economic and political dependence. "It is the operations of the world market forces which accentuate the differences, institutionalise them, and make them impossible to surmount over the long run."<sup>13</sup>

However, any given state has the possibility of shifting across the spatial hierarchy which is constant depending upon the type of economic activity that is being carried i.e. whether its activity resembles core - like or periphery like. But what makes a production process core-like or periphery - like is the degree to which it incorporates labour-value, is technologically driven and is highly profitable and all these characteristics shift overtime for any given product because of "product cycles". In such a situation no product can be seen as inherently core-like or periphery like but each has that characteristic for a given

time. Nevertheless, there are always some products, which are core-like, and others, which are periphery-like at any given, time.

Wallerstein argues that, although there is a possibility of upward and downward movement within the world system, a basic structure of extreme inequality persists. This is maintained by either 'formal' i.e. military power or 'informal' means as with the indirect application of market power. It is here, the centrality of class alliances between the transnational bourgeoisie of the core states and the comprador elements within the elite of the peripheral and semi-peripheral states come into focus in maintaining the core's economic dominance.

Apart from the premises of world system theory mentioned above Wallerstein in his recent article<sup>14</sup> undertook the task of surveying the major development in the world system since 1945 and also forecast the short term (upto 2000) and middle term future (2000 - 2050) of world capitalist economy. The study is also an attempt to understand the world economic cycles of expansion and contraction in terms of Kondratieff Cycles. Here Wallerstein takes the example of the U.S as a hegemonic power undergoing economic decline, which corresponds to the 'B' phase of the Kondratieff cycle. It can also be seen as a study to probe the linkage between the economic cycles and hegemonic positions.<sup>15</sup>

In the last two centuries i.e., from the beginning of industrialisation - economists have observed several statistical time series which have shown rising and declining movements

of world economy which could be interpreted as waves with a period of about 40 years.

In economic literature the Russian economist N.D.Kondratiev is generally credited with the discovery of the long waves and the cycles are named after him. The Kondratieff cycle consists of two phases - phase -A and phase - B. The phase-A is one of economic growth and expansion. This is also period of relative monopolies in few leading products for which the rate of profit is high.<sup>17</sup> The phase-B is marked by economic stagnation and loss of profits. The relative monopoly situation occurring in the A-Phase is eroded with the entry of a number of competitors in the world market. "The Kondratieff B-phase has also the general characteristics of relatively high world wide unemployment of wagedworkers; acute politicized competition among core-countries for the tighter world market; increased economic suffering in many sectors and (at least as important) a sense in many sectors that they are suffering by comparison with the previous A-period; increased world concentration of capital; geographical relocation of production processes; and a search for product innovations.<sup>18</sup>

Wallerstein argues that U.S. hegemony coincides with the A-phase of the Kondratieff cycle starting from 1945 to 1967. This was a period of unprecedented economic growth and productivity and the U.S became the unquestioned leader in the realms of military superiority, political leadership and cultural influence. But this growth phase-A proved to be shortlived and since 1967/73 the world-economy witnessed the onset of phase-B of the Kondratieff cycle. The period of economic stagnation starting from 1973 has also been a period of declining U.S hegemony. The erosion of American competitiveness in production and the catching up of its western allies and Japan seriously undermined



American political and economic leadership. Thus Wallerstein argues that Americans lost its hegemonic status during 70s and it is not likely to regain it in the near future.

James Petras : U.S. hegemony under Siege

James Petras belongs to the neo-Marxist tradition subscribing to the class analysis approach. He believes that the 'class analysis in world-historic perspective' is better equipped to deal with the issues of modern world. Petras argues "that the key units of analysis are the state (including the imperial state) and class relations - particularly the process of class formation and its impact on capital accumulation and regional and world markets".<sup>19</sup> He contends that, apart from the world market, the classes too have a role in shaping the dynamics of capital accumulation. The institutions, struggles and collective consciousness impact the world market conditions mediated by the state as much as they are affected by the world market. This mutual impact shapes the political choices in the modern world.

In his recent book *"U.S. Hegemony under Siege: Class, Politics and Development in Latin-America"* Petras contextualizes the decline of U.S. hegemony in a broad analysis of the shift in political and economic structures within the U.S and the centrality of violence as a consequence of these shifts.

The basic premises which help in understanding the hegemonic decline of the U.S according to Petras are the structural shifts that took place in the economic and political

spheres. The primacy of the productive capital, which ushered in an era of stupendous economic growth and prosperity until the 1960s was replaced by the finance capital. This involved less capital being invested in productive activities in relation to the financial transactions, which took on the nature of speculation on a worldwide scale. This growth in speculative financial activities has structurally transformed the domestic economy into one where, in the felicitous terms of Paul Sweezy and Harry Magdoff, 'making money' has become relatively much more important than 'making goods'. The productivity edge that the U.S. maintained until 1960s vis-a-vis the West European and Japanese economies began to decline with this structural shift. In 1950, the U.S.A. produced 40 % and western Europe/Japan less than 22 % of world's goods and services. By 1980, these figures were reversed to 23 per cent and 39 per cent respectively. Between 1960 and 1980, the U.S. share of world trade declined from 16 per cent to 11 per cent, with the worsening competitive position most marked in manufacturing (market share down from 26 per cent to 18 per cent).<sup>20</sup> These figures give a dramatic picture of the decline of U.S. economy, especially in the manufacturing sectors.

The structural shift in the economy is only matched in the realm of politics with the arrival of a new breed of politicians with a penchant for military adventurism (Ollie North); the ideologue and political gangster as the most influential policy maker on Latin American Affairs (Elliot Abrams); and others lumpen intellectuals inside or linked to the State (Jeane Kirkpatrick, Fred Ikle, Richard Perle, Patrick Buchanan, Vernon Walters and so on). Petras portrays these lumpen intellectuals as shaping U.S. foreign policy into a military doctrine devoid of any clear-cut economic interests. This change in foreign

policy behaviour is seen to compensate for the loss of hegemonic power in economic, diplomatic and political spheres. The U.S attitude towards the third world reflects the militarization of its foreign policy. Beginning in the late 70s and escalating into the 1980s, third world witnessed a spate of American interventions.<sup>21</sup> The military strategy in the third world was not directed merely at defending existing client regimes through the supply of repressive equipment but to overthrowing existing regimes through violent action directly with U.S. forces (Grenada, Libya, Panama) or through wars of attrition using surrogates (Nicaragua, Mozambique, Angola).<sup>22</sup> The militarist foreign policy has the backing of neo-conservative ideologues and the government bureaucracy, which cooperated and cohabited with the political modern world mercenaries, adventurers, death-squad hitmen, and narco-traffickers). The corporate groups acquiesced to this situation since they no longer had any economic states in these parts of the third world. The militarization of foreign policy instead of reversing the hegemonic decline exacerbated it.

Petras in focussing his attention on the role of the U.S. imperial state in the decline of its hegemonic position argues that the imbalance between the internal components of the imperial state i.e. between military/ideological on the one hand and economic on the others had serious consequences for its overall position in the capitalist world economy. This imbalance came about in the process of stemming the revolutionary upheavals across the third world in countries like Vietnam, Central America, Southern Africa, Middle East, South Asia etc. During this phase the military/ideological components were given precedence over the economic components. This is contrast to the

West European and Japanese economies which stressed more on the economic component during the 70s and 80s resulting in their competitiveness and steep economic growth during the time when the U.S. was waging wars in the third world and pursuing cold war with the Soviet Union. Petras also believed that hegemonic status of any state is not determined by the ties between the core and the periphery or conflict between the U.S. and the third world but by relations and competition between the major capitalist countries. The third world played the role only to the extent of displacing the dominance of one imperial power and facilitating competitiveness among capitalist powers.<sup>23</sup>

As the crisis of hegemony deepened in the 1970s, the U.S. in order to restore its lost power tried the strategy of detente. Detente was an attempt to reach agreement with the Soviet Union to accept the status quo regarding the spheres of influence and the arms race. It was also an attempt at cutting down the military expenditures and activities in order to restore the lost equilibrium between the imperial state and the capital.<sup>24</sup> The U.S. hope of restraining the Soviet Union through detente however was belied and the Soviet overtures toward revolutionary third world countries ironically escalated the military spending by the U.S. dashing all-American calculations. Failure of detente has once again brought disequilibrium between the ideological and military components and the economic components resulting in military adventurism during the Reagan's presidency in 1980s. Petras argues that, "the interaction between productive capital and the economic agencies of the state, are central to the creation of global hegemonic powers".<sup>25</sup> The rise and decline of U.S. Global hegemony between 1950 and the 1980s according to petras is

the subordination of the military-ideological to economic agencies of the imperial state and vice-versa.

### **Susan Strange and the structural strength of American hegemony**

Susan Strange is a liberal eclectic scholar who does not subscribe to the view that U.S. hegemony is on the decline. The central argument of her book *"States and Markets: An Introduction to International Political Economy"* is that, power exercised in a world system is of two kinds -relational power and structural power. Relational power according to strange "is the power of A to get to B to do something they would not otherwise do".<sup>26</sup> Structural power on the otherhand sets the framework within which A, B, and all the others act. It is the power of designing international regimes and norms that govern international economic relations.<sup>27</sup> The actors - whether states, individuals, corporations having structural power often need not exercise power directly over others because the frameworks for action tend to produce results favourable to them without a direct use of their relational power. Structural power, thus is generally more important than relational power.

Structural power according to Susan Strange is to be found in four separate distinguishable but related primary structures. They are the security structure i.e. the military-political component; production, finance and knowledge. Subordinate to these primary structures are a larger number of 'aspects of political economy that are in some sense structures'.<sup>28</sup> Susan Strange discusses four of these: transport, trade, energy and

welfare. This view of political economy differs from the Marxist or neo-Marxist view of structural power, which lays great stress on only one of her four structures i.e., the structure of production. Her image of structural model is a 'four-faceted triangular pyramid or tetrahedron'. Each touches the other three and is held in place by them. Each facet represents one of the four structures through which power is exercised on particular relationships. This structural model does not privilege any one structure against another like the Marxist models. Strange contends that "there is a sense in which each facet security, production, finance and knowledge plus beliefs is basis for the others. But to represent the others as resting permanently on any one more than on the others suggests that one is dominant. This is not necessarily or always so".<sup>29</sup>

Thus, states or any international actors possessing these structural attributes of threatening or preserving people's security; controlling the mode of production of goods and services; controlling the supply and distribution of credit and finally controlling of knowledge by the possessors in deciding the access to it or denying it, exercise hegemony in international politics.

Susan Strange in her book takes issue with some liberal and neo-Marxist scholars about the decline of American hegemony in the 70s and 80s. She doubts that U.S. power within the four primary structures had declined. What has changed is U.S. behaviour, which has become more unilateral and self-serving, disregarding both the interests of allies and the general interest of the system. In her words "the U.S. Government and the corporations dependent upon it have not in fact lost structural power in and over the system. They may

have changed their mind about how to use it, but they have not lost it. Nor taking the four structures of power together, are they likely to do so in the foreseeable future."<sup>30</sup> She argues that, counting only output or of manufactured goods is not a reliable indicator of U.S. decline. In a world dominated by service industries like banking, insurance data storage and retrieval the U.S. is quite strong and no economy in the world is a match for the U.S. As regards the decline in productivity growth vis-a-vis Japan and other European economies, Strange feels that, the U.S. had such a headstart that it can afford lower annual growth rates before other states catch up.<sup>31</sup>

Thus, Susan Strange is of the view that, U.S. hegemony is not on the decline and it still continues to wield structural power although, it appears to have declined in relative terms in certain sectors of the economy like manufacturing of goods, and trade vis-a-vis Japan and other West European economies.

### **Stephen Gill and the Structural dominance of U.S. Hegemony**

Stephen Gill is a Gramscian Marxist scholar who tried to understand the structural transformations that have taken place in the global politics since the 70s. The innovative approach employed in understanding the global structural transformation lies in his use of Gramscian concept of hegemony. This approach unlike the Orthodox Marxist view or the liberal view does not take the states as primary actors in global politics. Gill understood global politics in much more complex social and political formations. He believes that non-Gramscian Marxism or liberalism for that matter, lacked concepts to grasp how capitalism evolves and overcomes crises at historical junctures. In addition, the use of

Gramscian concept of 'international civil society' presents the possibility of going beyond the state and understanding more fully the meaning and significance of transnational social forces.<sup>32</sup>

Stephen Gills book, *"American hegemony and the Trilateral commission "* focuses on the U.S. and constructs an analysis of the changing structure of global political economy and the way in which the U.S. has attempted to define that structure for its own end. Gill is concerned with the question of U.S. hegemony and the role of the trilateral commission as an essential component of that hegemony. By focussing on the Gramscian concept of 'hegemony' Gill brings out an interesting analysis on the power of transnational capital. Within this extended theoretical frame he is able to analyse the nature and importance of the trilateral commission.

However, for the purpose of our study we do not intend to explore the hegemonic linkage between the transnational forces and the trilateral commission. We are concerned here with only the decline of U.S. hegemony, which Gill refutes vehemently in his book. Gill, like Susan Strange does not accept the view that the U.S. hegemony is on the decline.

He defines hegemony not in terms of the preponderance of economic and military capabilities of one state in the interstate system but employs it in a Weberian notion of power over domination. This can be either overt or covert and is usually associated with intentional action. "Where this concept of hegemony is linked to more structural forms of power it often rests upon material aggregates: The states with a disproportionately high



share of economic power, resources and military might exercise structural domination, in the same way as a monopolist dominates the market behaviour of smaller firms." The U.S. owing to its military and economic might in the international system has the capability to create framework of policies within which most other states are constrained to operate. However, this structural power of the U.S. is not as visible as other forms of relative power in areas like production, trade etc. Although the U.S. has relatively declined since the 1970s in terms of production and trade vis-a-vis European and Japanese economies, Gill argues that, the decline theorists were misled by the aggregate figures relating to manufacture and trade and failed to understand the qualitative transformations that were taking place within the American and Global Political economies. Citing Robert Cox, a Gramscian structuralist Gill suggests "that the era since the early 1970s has been non-hegemonic, or at the very least it is characterized by, in Gramscian terms, a crisis of hegemony. This crisis should not be confused with a crisis in US power as such. Rather, it is a crisis in social and political aspects of the world order system. A less consensual order appears to be emerging, unbalancing the relations between capital and labour between capital and state and between political and economic aspects in the system more generally."

Since the 1970s and 80s, the global political economy has been witnessing profound changes in terms of a shift from national forms of capital accumulation to one of transnationalisation. The transnationalisation of the world economy is one of the most significant events of the postwar period. The revolutionary development of technology in transportation and communication has made markets in different countries

interdependent to an even larger extent than previously. As a result, trade and financial flows between countries have become even more sensitive to changes in relative prices. Another new feature is the globalisation of entrepreneurship and technology and the emergence of the transnational corporation. This development also has been facilitated by technological progress in transportation and communication over large distances, which has made it possible to operate global organisations efficiently. The transnational activity as a revolutionary phenomenon in global political economy affected areas of economic production, trade and finance.<sup>35</sup>

Production of goods as a form of economic activity until the 60s and 70s was mainly a domestic activity. Manufacturers of products felt secure in knowing that the domestic economy could absorb their production. However, the rapid pace of technological change has shook manufacturers out of their complacency and competitive entrepreneurs began to supply the market with new products or make them with new materials or new processes. At the same time, product and process lifetimes have shortened, sometimes dramatically. The costs of investment in R&D and innovations also rose forcing manufactures to search for additional markets abroad to gain profits to amortize their investments in time to stay up with the competition when the next technological advance comes along. Another important shift in the realm of production along with the technological changes is the internationalization of production i.e. Production activity occurring at different locations in other countries other than their home.

The second important structural change that has undermined the earlier Post-World War II economic order is the liberalization of international finance, beginning perhaps with the innovation of Euro currency dealing and lending in the 1960s, and continuing unchecked with the measures of financial deregulation initiated by the United States in the mid 1970s and early 1980s. As barriers went down, the mobility of capital went up. The old difficulties of raising money for investment in offshore operations and moving it across the exchanges vanished. It was either unnecessary for the transnational corporations to find new funds, or they could do so locally.

The third significant contributing factor, which has often been overlooked, is the steady and cumulative lowering of the real costs of trans- border transport and communication. Without them, central strategic planning of far-flung affiliates would have been riskier and more difficult, and outsourcing of components for manufacture would have been hampered. Thus, the structural changes that have occurred in the areas of production, finance, communication, trade etc, has shaped the contemporary global political economy destroying or gradually undermining the form of postwar international economic order based on the Brettonwood system. The basic argument, however, lies in understanding this global integration process based on asymmetrical and unequal terms.

Here some observations of Fred Halliday on Hegemonic internationalism are pertinent.

"It remains a belief, often expressed in forth right terms in the international relations literature that international security and prosperity can only be maintained by hegemonic

activity of a more or less decorous kind by the leading states. For those who benefit from it, hegemonic internationalism is not, of course, incompatible with nationalism but is an extension of it."<sup>36</sup>

Hegemony exercised by the leading states such as the U.S. does not necessarily involve coercive tactics or outright intervention. Hegemony can also be exercised in many different ways, which might look cooperative and beneficial. One such example is the role of the Trilateral Commission (TC) which brings together the OECD countries, Japan and the U.S. on a platform to coordinate and integrate their economies who in turn set global economic agendas. The developing third world countries are constrained to operate within the parameter set by the hegemonic powers and the free trade agenda pursued by these powers. The slogan of free trade which is believed to be beneficial to all the countries is in fact not a free one since most of the developing countries cannot match the economic power of the developed world and the global economic interaction is carried out mostly on the terms of the hegemonic powers.

Thus, Stephen Gill, discounts arguments about the decline of U.S. hegemony and highlights the structural changes that have altered the landscape of the global political economy and also the essential hegemonic dominance of the U.S. in this new global economic order.

### Recession and Reaganomics

The Seventies and Eighties marked one of the severest economic crisis that engulfed most of the world economy. The crisis was sparked off by the oil price hikes imposed by the

OPEC (Organisation of Petroleum Exporting Countries) during 1973-74 resulting in a general slowdown in growth rates of almost all groups of countries ie. the western economies, the oil exporting countries and the non-oil exporting developing world. The growth in per capita output of industrial countries between 1973 and 1983 was 1.7 percent per annum, in contrast to 3.7 per cent in the former period and that of the oil exporting countries fell from 5.6 to 3.8 percent in the two periods. The non-oil developing countries per capita growth rates fell from 3.6 to 2.7 per cent in the two periods. In the Western hemisphere, the growth in per capita out put in 1973-82 was 2 per cent compared with 3.3 per cent in the previous decade. In the United States, the 1979-82 recession was the worst since the 1930s. The effects of the slowdown were particularly severe for less-developed and indebted nations especially in Latin America and Africa.<sup>37</sup>

However, the global recession during the 70s and 80s which was apparently sparked off by the oil price hikes is not the only single important reason that resulted in a global economic downturn. The tens of billions of petrodollars that were generated as a result of the oil prices hikes along with the Eurodollars<sup>38</sup> found their way into the vaults of the big commercial banks only to be recycled back in the form of loans to the developing countries.<sup>39</sup> The Developing Countries hungry for external financing for their developmental needs began attracting the 'easy money' that was made available to them by the private banks on low interest rates, resulting in an indiscriminate borrowing spree. The antecedent to this debt crisis of the 70s and the 80s is the shift in the pattern of third world financing from concessionaire financing consisting mainly of long term, low

interest, project related to non-confessional, private bank lending. One of the reasons, which prompted this switch, was the weakening of the Brettonwoods objectives. The essence of these objectives was to redress and expand the world capitalist system, which was badly shaken by the war and threatened by the spread of national liberation and other social movements in many parts of the world. The institution of the IMF (International Monetary Fund) and the World Bank helped the war-ravaged Europe and Japan in their economic reconstruction in the postwar phase. Soon after, the United States began to divert the resources of these institutions to the third world.

To understand U.S. interest in the third world we need to look at the changing world politics of the 50s and 60s.<sup>40</sup> The Soviet Union emerged as a major political force with its socialist vision in the third world. Soviet Union was challenging U.S. influence in the third world by helping national liberation struggles in Asia and Africa. The U.S. in order to contain the Soviet challenge in the third world was placed in an ambivalent Position whether to support national liberation struggles or to back its European allies who were still controlling colonial territories and in effect, kept U.S. Capital out of those territories and markets. Here the U.S was competing with its allies for the third world markets and raw materials.

Under these circumstances, the U.S. began using its economic strength by giving financial assistance to some of the third world countries, which were willing to toe their line. This financial assistance was primarily based on geopolitical and long term economic considerations than short term, cost-benefit calculations. And this is why most

of the financial flows to these countries at that time were in the form of either outright aid or concessionary, development related loans through multilateral institutions.

However, by the late 1960s and the early 1970s, most of the challenges from the Soviet Union became less threatening and the sociopolitical upheavals in the ex-colonies and less developed countries had also ebbed. In the case of Africa and some countries in Asia, the economic and cultural ties binding them to Europe proved to be more powerful than Soviet Union's ideological strength.<sup>41</sup> Most of the developing countries had by then adopted a capitalist path of development, which created favourable conditions for large European private banks to lend to the third world countries on a commercial basis. This move by the private banks was also reinforced by the favourable legislative conditions as OECD countries relaxed barriers that previously hampered commercial lending to developing countries. Thus, the shift from the concessionary financing to indiscriminate non-concessional private lending in the post-OPEC price hike created anarchy in the financial world leading to one of the most severe debt-crisis that shook the global economy during the 70s and 80s.

As mounting repayments on foreign debts aggravated balance of payment deficits, most third world governments turned to the IMF and World Bank for assistance. This gave an opportunity for these institutions to prescribe neoclassical strategies which involved government's non-intervention in the market, austerity measures and currency devaluation etc., which were part of a larger consensus among the OECD countries to tide over the debt crisis. Many third world governments followed these prescriptions and the

plight of these countries worsened and at the same time gave the affluent economies of the west a firm leverage over the economic destiny of these countries.<sup>42</sup>

## Reaganomics

The second oil price hike in 1979-80 proved to be the proverbial last straw on the camel's back when the price hikes sparked off inflation and the growth in world output stopped and the global economy slipped into recession. The policy response of the OECD countries to the 1979-80 oil price hikes was diametrically opposed to its response in 1973-74. Instead of maintaining expansionary monetary policy in order to maintain the level of growth, of income and world trade, these countries now resorted to tight monetary policy to control inflation. The new policy created a ripple effect in the opposite direction of the previous period: interest rates shot up, growth slowed down and recessionary cycle of 1980-82 set in, and the export earnings of deficit countries began to drop.

In the United States, the Reagan administration which came to power in 1980, focussed its attention on the recovery of the economy. By advocating supply side economics and tax cutting measures, the Reagan administration wanted to stimulate the economy so that it would once more grow as rapidly as it had during the 1950s and 1960s. Military spending was also vastly increased as a fiscal measure to spur growth.<sup>43</sup> These developments, in turn, led to widespread corporate restructuring which resulted in a large number of non-competitive sectors of the economy going out of business. The American



manufacturing capital shifted many of its assets towards high-profit sectors like energy reserves, financial services, real-estate, high-tech industries and defence.

According to Stephen Gill, "recessions had obvious short term purgative effects associated with a down swing in the business cycle. This promoted a general restructuring of capital labour relations. For example, during 1979-82 there were record number of bankruptcies, and the decline of older, less-competitive industries was accelerated. Thus, noteworthy links between different aspects of global restructuring in the late 1970s and early 1980s were discernible. In many ways the recession of the early 1980s can be seen as facilitating the material and ideological renovation of American hegemony".<sup>44</sup>

Reaganomics, thus paved the way for a new resurgence of American economic strength and the launching of a new international economic order characterized by global inter penetration of capital and the power of the transnational corporations. It also led to a global macroeconomic restructuring where mobile forms of capital dominated the global political economy.

Thus, the major theoretical approaches discussed in this chapter contains important insights towards achieving a more accurate understanding of the interface between politics and economics in international relations. As a continuation of this understanding, the next chapter deals with the American intervention in Africa during the 70s and 80s. It explores how the economic decline of the U.S. during the 70s coupled with the serious

setbacks on the foreign policy fronts such as the Vietnam, Angolan and Afghan crises shaped American attitude towards the third world in general and Africa in particular.

## Notes

1. Hans Morgenthau and Kenneth W. Thompson, *Politics among Nations: The Struggle for power and peace* (New Delhi: Kalayani Publishers), 5<sup>th</sup> Indian reprint 1985, pp. 127-140. Also see Robert Gilpin, *The Political Economy of International Relations* (Princeton, N.J: Princeton University Press, 1987), pp.31-34.
2. Robert Gilpin, Ibid, P. 88.
3. Theodore Geiger, *The Future of the International System: The United States and the World Political Economy* (Boston: Unwin Hyman, 1988) P. 15.
4. Ibid, P. 16.
5. Robert Gilpin, Op.cit, P.88.
6. Ibid, P. 344.
7. Ibid, P. 90.
8. Ibid, P. 91.
9. Ibid, PP. 151-165.
10. Robert Keohane, *After hegemony: Co-operation and discord in the world political economy* (Princeton: Princeton University Press), 1984, P. 244.
11. Ibid, P. 245.
12. Immanuel Wallerstein, "*Marx and under development*" in *Rethinking Marxism* ed. By R. Wolff and S. Resnick, (New York: Autonomedia), 1985, P. 389.
13. Immanuel Wallerstein, *The Capitalist world economy* (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press), 1979, P. 21.
14. Immanuel Wallerstein, "The Capitalist World - Economy: Middle run prospects", *Alternatives*, Vol. XIV, No. 3, July 1989, PP. 279-288.

15. See Appendix -Table.1 & Table.2.
16. See Nicole Bousquet's *"From Hegemony to Competition: Cycles of the core"* in Terence K. Hopkins and Immanuel Wallerstein ed., *Processes of the world system* (Beverly Hills, London: Sage Publications) 1980, P. 46-83. In this piece Bousquet sketches the Kondratieff cycles of roughly 30 years - 1896 to 1929 - A phase; 1929-1938-1945-B Phase; 1938-1945 to Circa 1970 - A Phase; 1970 - B Phase. Also see George Modelski, "Long Cycles in World Politics" (London: Macmillan Press) 1987, PP. 88-98. for a different perspective. Modelski argues that great wars and leading powers are linked to waves of major innovations, such as the age of discoveries or the industrial revolution, that have made the modern world what it is. Long cycles according to him try to show links between major wars and leadership which occur in repeated patterns and eventually link up to major trends of global development. Modelski finds that the U.S world power cycle is over by the mid - 70s.
17. Immanuel Wallerstein, "The Capitalist World - Economy: Middle run prospects", Op.cit, P. 279.
18. Ibid, P. 280.
19. James Petras and Morris Morley, *U.S Hegemony under Siege: Class, Politics and Development in Latin America* (London, New York: Verso), 1990, P. 43.
20. Ibid, P. 77.
21. See Waltrand Queiser Morales, "U.S intervention and the New World order: Lessons from cold war and post-cold war cases", *Third World Quarterly*, Vol. 15, No. 1, 1994, P. 77-101.
22. James Petras and Morris Morley, Op.cit, P. 47.

23. Ibid, P. 69.
24. Ibid, P. 71.
25. Ibid, P. 72, also see James Petras, Steve Vieux's; "Shrinking Democracy and Expanding Trade: New shape of the Imperial State", *Economic and Political Weekly*, Vol. XXXI, No. 30, July 27, 1996, P. 2016. In this postures of the U.S. Imperial state. He observes that the U.S is assuming more of an economic role and increasingly abandoning its cold war world wide military and ideological tasks in contrast to the 70s and 80s.
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27. Ibid, P. 25.
28. Ibid, P. 135.
29. Ibid, P. 31.
30. Ibid, P. 28.
31. Ibid, P. 240.
32. Stephen Gill, "Hegemony, Consensus and Trilateralism", *Review of International Studies*, Vol. 12, No. 3, July 1986, P. 217.
33. Stephen Gill, *American Hegemony and the Trilateral Commission* (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press), 1990, P. 63.
34. Stephen Gill, "Reflections on Global order and Socio historical Time", *Alternatives*, Vol.16 , No.3 ,Summer 1991, P. 278.
35. See Richard J. Barnet and Ronald E. Muller, *Global Reach: the power of the Multinational corporations* (NewYork: Simon & Schuster), 1974, PP. 26-44. Also see

Jagdish N. Bhagwati, 'Nation States in a an international framework: An Economists perspective', *Alternatives*, Vol. XIV, No. 2, PP. 233-238.

36. Fred Halliday, "Internationalism in International relations: Three concepts of Internationalism", *International Affairs*, Vol. 64, No. 2, Spring 1988, PP. 193-194.
37. The figures are quoted directly from Stephen Gill's American hegemony and the Trilateral commission, Op.cit, P. 101.
38. Euro dollars are the deposits held by the European banks denominated in the U.S dollar. All this started with the USSR and East European countries holding their dollar earnings in those banks. At the time of the cold war it made sense for the Soviet bloc to keep its money away from the U.S banking system and its government regulators. The Euromarkets expanded in the 1960's when the Johnson government attempted to impose restrictions on the growth of foreign lending by U.S banks, and took steps to control domestic interest rates. The intention of these changes was to keep U.S capital at home, but in practice they encouraged U.S companies to finance their overseas operations from U.S and non-U.S banks operating beyond the confines of U.S banking legislation. The most rapid growth of the Euromarket, however, was in the 1970's and early 1980's.
39. Stuart Corbridge, *Debt and Development* (Oxford U.K, and Cambridge USA: Blackwell), 1993, P. 29.
40. See Michael Clough, *Free at last? U.S policy toward Africa and the end of the cold war* (New York: Council on Foreign Relations Press), 1992, P. 5.
41. Ibid, P. 7.

42. See Kenna Owoh, "Fragmenting Healthcare: The world Bank prescription for Africa", *Alternatives*, Vol. 21, No. 2, April-June 1996, P. 213, for the effects of SAP's led by the IMF and world Bank in Africa. Also see Jeffrey Herbst's, *U.S Economic policy towards Africa* (NewYork: Council on Foreign Relations Press), 1992, P. 39-59.
43. Helga Haftendorn and Jakob Schissler ed. *The Regan Administration: A Reconstruction of American Strength?* (Berlin & NewYork: Walter de Gruyter), 1988, P. 53.
44. Stephen Gill's, "American hegemony and the Trilateral commission", *Op.cit*, P. 102.

## Chapter-III    Changing U.S interests in Africa: an Overview



## CHAPTER- III

In the course of this chapter we shall focus our attention on the U.S interests in Africa. After emerging as a superpower in the aftermath of World War II, the U.S ventured to play a dominating role in world politics. It was mostly preoccupied in Western Europe and Latin America. Afro-Asian States did not occupy a prominent place in its strategic calculations except for its role in Vietnam. The Sub-Saharan Africa in particular was treated with a measure of distance by the United States. This was partly because the European allies of the U.S had already entrenched interests during their colonial past in Africa and partly in geo-strategic terms; Asia and Europe had become more vulnerable to the cold war politics.

However, things started changing for Africa, when the 1974 coup in Portugal led to a hasty withdrawal of Portuguese colonial presence from Africa. The sudden development upset the regional status quo leading to a heightened Soviet interest in the region. Ever since Africa became a victim in the East-west conflict. Western inability or unwillingness to back cohesive and majoritarian nationalist movements in Southern Africa opened up opportunities for the Soviet Union to intervene and for African groups to draw Soviet military resources to their side in a complex struggle. Between 1975-90 the local political competition in Africa has provided opportunities for previously uninterested outside powers to intervene. These opportunities often have taken the form of appeals for assistance from local groups, which then strengthened the case for intervention of great powers for their own geo-strategic, economic and political reasons. These reasons have

often had little to do with the details of the specific African situation, and actions predicated on them often led to unforeseen and unintended consequences. This issue is discussed at a later stage.

Keeping in view the hegemonic decline of the U.S during the seventies, this chapter will focus on the U.S intervention in Africa. We shall also explore a connection between the decline of U.S hegemony and its foreign policy stance towards the continent. We shall begin this exercise by outlining the military, geo-strategic, economic and political factors that impinged on Afro-American ties and later analyse American interventionary behaviour during the different administrations towards the continent.

### **U.S Military and Strategic interests**

Africa during the 1950s experienced momentous historical and political changes when the nationalist ideas of self-determination and anti-imperialism caught the imagination of African elite. The nationalist struggles waged by these groups led to a number of countries gaining independence either in a peaceful transfer of power or in some cases, armed struggles over the next two decades. The withdrawal of the colonial powers created a sort of power vacuum, which both the super powers tried to fill. Historically, the formulation of super power policies in Africa has been dominated by objectives relating to their bipolar rivalry. The two Super powers have traditionally perceived that the process of change in Africa to be significant largely in terms of the effort either to 'contain or to roll back Soviets-sponsored communist revolutions' on the one hand, or as

a component of a global revolutionary process directed against imperialism on the other. As each side perceived the others' efforts to be directed not only at undermining its powers but also the destruction of its principles of political, economic and social organisation, they began searching for African allies, who could provide military positions which could be useful in threatening or containing the other.

Added to this, a number of newly independent African States with their artificially created boundaries, fragile political systems and vast resource potential soon slid into political chaos and economic stagnation. The resulting local instability in the form of ethnic and cultural strife, coup d 'etats and full-scale regional wars provided ample opportunities for the superpowers to derive strategic, economic and political advantages from such instability on the continent. The U.S military and strategic objectives in Africa were thus geared to exploit the African turmoil as much as they form part of a global strategy of Soviet containment. American military strategists viewed Soviet activity in Africa as an offensive move to attack western forces from bases in Africa to interdict the trade routes so as to sever western nations from their sources of oil and other strategic raw materials.<sup>1</sup> In order to counter Soviet moves in the region, the U.S. started looking for geographically well placed pro-western regimes with well-equipped land, sea and air bases and good communication systems. Thus the U.S. attention was chiefly concentrated on the North, South and East of the continent, the West being predominantly under the influence of France. The U.S. set about creating its strongholds, getting individual countries involved in "strategic co-operation" and ultimately building its own strategic

bases, all possessing a high degree of military readiness. Now let us consider American activities in these individual regions.

### **U.S. Strongholds in the North Africa**

The strategic interests of the U.S in North Africa are interrelated to the Soviet-American competition in this region, which is also known as the Maghrib. Morocco, Algeria, Tunisia and Libya which are the Maghrib states have important links with both Sub-Saharan Africa and the West Asia. The United States has had close relations with Morocco and Tunisia and important but not so close relations with Algeria and severely strained relations with Libya. The major American concern in the region was the Soviet backing of Libya a state, which in the eyes of Washington was responsible for destabilization in the region and also exporter of terrorism across the globe. Throughout the 1970s, successive administrations declined to improve relations with Libya for two reasons: (a) the Qaddafi regime's support of international terrorist activities and (b) its opposition to a negotiated solution of the Arab-Israeli Conflict.<sup>2</sup> The U.S in a bid to counter Soviet and Libyan postures in the region began strengthening its military ties with Morocco and Tunisia. The U.S selected five sites in Morocco for the construction of strategic air bases. Three of these became bases for the Strategic Air Command and were not phased out until 1963. An American naval communications facility at port Lyantey functioned until its termination by U.S. initiative in 1978. However, the termination of these operations did not stop U.S. from using Moroccan ports for U.S. naval vessel visits and transit rights to U.S. military aircraft.<sup>3</sup> Similarly, Tunisia helped

in maintaining stability along the coast of North Africa to protect the Southern flank of the North Atlantic Treaty Organisation (NATO) by providing access to its ports and naval bases.

Egypt, though not a part of the Maghrib, has been connected to the region by geography, history and culture as well as its strategic front on the Mediterranean. The reopening of the Suez Canal in 1979, which has been widened and deepened to allow the passage of huge supertankers has enhanced Egypt's maritime and strategic significance to the entire Western Bloc. The U.S has two air force bases in Egypt (at Cairo west and Qena) housing various types of planes including AWACs aircraft. A third U.S. military base at Ras Banas was also planned to be built by 1980 making Egypt a pivot in its Middle East and African military strategies.<sup>4</sup>

### The Horn of Africa

The Horn of Africa is the North East corner of Africa, composed of the states of Sudan, Djibouti, Ethiopia, Somalia, and parts of Kenya. It has had considerable strategic importance for the U.S, as it is relevant to both the security of the West Asia and to Africa. Physically, it is a key crossroad of air and sea routes. The Horn guards access to the Red Sea. It protects the South West approaches of Arabia and sits astride the waters of the Nile on the Southern flank of Egypt.<sup>5</sup> The geopolitical significance of the region lies in the fact that most of the oil that the industrial west needs passes through this region from the oil fields in West Asia and the Persian Gulf. According to some estimates,

Japan gets about 85 per cent of its oil requirements through this area, while more than 60 per cent of oil to Western Europe and the U.S also passes through this area.<sup>6</sup> The Horn of Africa thus became central to the strategic configurations of the super powers, which try to control the dynamics of the region.

American foreign policy towards the Horn during the cold war phase was dictated more by its policy of 'containment' or preemption of the Soviet Union and more specifically, to its support for Israel in the Middle East than any overriding interests in Africa.<sup>7</sup> The U.S felt that its presence was required in the region if

1. The economic security of the West was to be maintained
2. If stability and regional security were to be upheld in Middle East and the Horn of Africa
3. If a potential blockade of Western oil lanes by the Soviets was to be prevented, and,
4. If the Red Sea and Indian Ocean were to be kept open for Israeli and Israeli bound shipping.<sup>^</sup>

The Americans became wary of Soviet activism in Africa during the 1970s when the Soviets demonstrated their capabilities of airlifting and sealifting military personnel to Angola in 1976 and later in Ethiopia. It was also around this period that the long time ally of the U.S., the Shah of Iran, fell out of power in 1979 and the Afghan invasion by the Soviets took place in the same year making it necessary for the Americans to respond to

the Soviet challenges. In fact, while responding to the Soviet intervention in Afghanistan, the former U.S. President Jimmy Carter said in January 1980: "Any attempt by an outside force to gain control of the Persian Gulf region will be regarded as an assault on the vital interests of the United States. It will be repelled by use of any means necessary, including military force." The strong Soviet Naval presence in the Red sea and Indian Ocean region and its access to airfield in Asmara in Ethiopia and the dry-dock and bunkering facilities at Dahlak Island and port facilities at Aden in South Yemen<sup>10</sup> made it necessary for the U.S. to seek agreements with Egypt, Somalia, Kenya and Oman for access to naval and air facilities in exchange for economic and military aid. The U.S has access to two bases in Egypt one at Ras Banas and another a secret base having capabilities for C-5 transport and SL-7 fast sealift ship unloading facilities, tactical fighter squadrons or AWACS etc. In Somalia the U.S has agreements for the use of air facilities at Mogadishu and port facilities at Berbera. The Moi airport and the Kenya Naval base at Mombasa provide for the maintenance of American ships and allow liberty calls for crews. In Oman the Al khasab air base (located on Goat Island near the gulf of Hormuz), Masiran, Thumrait and Seeb air bases provide air cover for U.S. forces operating in the Gulf region. Apart from these bases on the East Coast of Africa, the Indian Ocean island of Diego Garcia which was taken from the U.K. in the mid 1960s on a long term lease by the U.S., is the sole base in the region which provides runways and support for patrol aircraft and is used as a prepositioning base and navy moorage.<sup>11</sup>

## Southern Africa

The U.S. strategic interests in Southern Africa revolved around South Africa, which was seen as a bulwark against communist aggression in the region.<sup>12</sup> The location of South Africa at the tip of the continent overlooking the Indian Ocean and South Atlantic adds to its geostrategic significance. The shipping traffic around Cape of Good Hope is one of the busiest in the world and an estimated 2,300 ships per month cross the waters of the Cape of which about 600 are the oil tankers.<sup>13</sup> This route supplies around 65 per cent of Western Europe's oil and 28 per cent of U.S. imported oil.<sup>14</sup> In addition, some 70 per cent of the strategic raw materials used by NATO are transported via the Cape route.<sup>15</sup> Thus, the strategic significance of South Africa to the U.S. can be seen as:

- It has been geopolitically important for the west to maintain control of the sea lanes around the Cape of Good Hope.
- South Africa was a bulwark against the Soviet/Cuban threat to Southern Africa.
- South Africa has been the dominant military power in Africa. It may even be a nuclear power. It has bases and facilities that potentially could be extremely useful to the U.S. and other Western countries if there was a major conventional war in the Middle East or Indian Ocean region. Moreover, South Africa seeks friendly relations with the U.S. and other Western countries. Therefore, it should be embraced as part of a global coalition of regionally dominant pro-western powers



- South Africa uniquely possesses key minerals that are increasingly critical to the economies of the industrial democracies. Assuring this continued access is thus seen as a central consideration in any policy formulation towards South Africa.<sup>16</sup>

In order to protect its interests in the region, the U.S. has been using the South African naval base of Simonstown. This base has been one of the main centers for naval communications, training centre for submariners and electronic intelligence centre (located at Silvermine near Simonstown) which processed data on surface and submarine movement in the area. The U.S. apart from using the bases on the eastern and southern side of the African continent has been using the Island of Diego Garcia which also provides runways for patrol aircraft and serves as a rear area base.

### **Rapid Deployment Force (R.D.F.)**

The Rapid Deployment Force is a specialised interventionary force to be used in SouthWest Asia, the Persian Gulf and the Horn of Africa. The force was organised in March 1980 as a strike force intended to protect America's vital interests in the region. The R.D.F., unlike the U.S. ground forces, which are too unwieldy to ensure prompt response, especially in local crises in "faraway places", is flexible in terms of its organisational structure, mobility, readiness and combat capability. It is a multiservice organisation comprising of the Army, the Air Force, the Navy and the Marine Corps, having its headquarters at MC Dill Air Force base in Florida.

The forces available to the R.D.F. for intervention abroad in times of crisis total nearly 300,000 men, including two airborne and one mechanised division from the Army; seven tactical fighter-wings and two strategic bomber squadrons from the Air Force; a Marine amphibious assault division with its own air support; three Navy aircraft carrier-led battle groups; and specialised counter-insurgency units like the Rangers and the Green Berets. While most of these troops are still based in the United States, a significant number are already stationed in the region itself. An aircraft carrier led battle group with 4,000 Navy personnel and 1,800 Marines is now permanently deployed in the Indian Ocean; more than 1,000 troops from the Central Command (CENTCOM) which is in charge of the R.D.F. have been stationed in the Sinai Peninsula as part of the multinational peace keeping force there since the withdrawal of Israeli troops in April 1982; and 1,800 of American Marines on board the U.S. naval force offshore led by two aircraft carriers and the battleship 'New Jersey'. In addition, the United States has stockpiled enough weapons ammunition, spare parts, food and fuel to supply a division sized intervention force at the U.S. base on Diego Garcia and on board 18 support ships in the Indian Ocean.<sup>18</sup> Thus the U.S. has had a strong military presence in the region to meet the challenges and threats posed by the Soviet Union and radical African States to safeguard its vital interests.

### Arms Assistance

Arms Assistance has been an important and flexible instrument in the overall military strategy employed by the U.S. Policy makers. It has been used to help friendly and allied states to acquire and maintain the capability to defend themselves and in the

process serve both specific U.S. national interests and the collective security of the free world against Communist aggression.<sup>19</sup> Arms assistance apart from fulfilling a military requirement of defence against the enemy has also political and economic implications. It was part of a larger effort to promote patron-client relationship in the third world during the cold war years. In the words of John Girling, American relationship with third world countries has resulted from the operation of 'push' and 'pull' factors, which he termed as a 'dual bind'.<sup>20</sup> The push factor was the compulsive ideology of intervention developed over the years in the face of Soviet threat and largely seen in zero-sum attitudes. This attitude calls for American action in the name of saving the 'free world' against possible Communist aggression. The pull factor is the appeal of beleaguered clients seeking the patron protection and support in the face of domestic instability.

American countermeasures to address the problem of Push-Pull factors thus takes two forms.<sup>21</sup> Pressure on its super power rival to desist; and attempts to prevent, or reduce, internal challenges to client regimes. The first measure, in the cold war decades was the purpose of containment policy where the balance of power strategy was employed in offsetting any possible Soviet gains in the third world. The notable example of such a policy was the Nixon-Kissinger Policy of Balancing off China against Russia and later day containment policy of Reagan. The second counter measure, intended to preserve the client regime also takes two forms, suppressive and reformist. The suppressive policy assists regimes to put down by force any substantial movement of opposition (we have seen its effects from Vietnam to Angola to El Salvador). The reformist policy on the

other hand seeks to improve the regime's image and performance to the extent that dissent movements either do not arise or are easily contained.

The U.S in trying to maintain patron-client relationship in the third world and especially in Africa began selling arms mostly to geo-strategically important countries like Morocco, Tunisia, Egypt in North Africa; Sudan, Somalia, Kenya in East Africa and Zaire, South Africa in Southern Africa. The U.S. apart from assisting formal client states has also been assisting some of the rebel movements like UNITA in Angola in the name of supporting 'freedom fighters'.

The economic dimension of arms assistance although overlooked by some scholars is of equal importance in understanding the dynamics of arms trade for the supplying country. The U.S during the 1950's and 60's exported relatively unsophisticated and second hand military equipment as a form of aid to allied and friendly nations, often with political conditions attached. However by 1970's the whole arms trade scenario changed, marking a shift from aid to trade. This trend started when Robert McNamara, Secretary of Defence in Kennedy administration began to emphasize selling arms instead of giving them away, as a means of improving the U.S. balance of trade. Despite McNamara's efforts to turn weapons into a "cash crop", it was not until Nixon came along that balance of U.S. arms export shifted decisively away from aid toward sales.<sup>22</sup> The main motivation for the trend was purely economic. The U.S needs arms export (a) to improve the balance of payment, (b) as a means of spreading the R&D costs and using the advantages of economies of scale, that is, lower unit prices and (c) to ensure employment in military industries.<sup>23</sup>

One another major reason for U.S arms exports is the increasing share of global arms trade with third world countries. As the arms industries of Western Europe were reconstructed, the European market for U.S. arms became smaller. Competition grew among the weapons exporters as more countries entered the arms business, so the need to create new export markets became important.<sup>24</sup>

Africa during the mid 1970s and 80s provided a huge market for both the Western and Communist suppliers of arms. The number of secessionist wars, civil wars, ethnic wars etc., throughout this period created a huge demand for arms. The U.S preoccupied with the fear that trends in Southern Africa and the Horn of Africa, if ignored or mishandled, would benefit the Soviet Union, began supplying geo-strategically important countries like Kenya, Somalia, Sudan etc., with arms and military equipment.<sup>25</sup> *Table 3.1* given in the next page shows the dramatic increase in U.S arms aid to African countries during this period.

### U.S Economic Interests in Africa

U.S. economic interests in Africa have been marginal compared to its interests in Asia and Latin America. The economic primitiveness and endemic poverty of most of Africa could not attract economic interest in the region. This was reflected in U.S aid, trade and investments towards Africa as a percentage of world shares. However, emphasis only on

**Table-3.1**

U.S. Security Assistance to Africa during FY 1955-FY 1992

*(In thousands of dollars)*

1955-1969	181,472	FY 1986	681,525
1970-1979	353,575	FY 1987	611,950
FY 1980	148,750	FY1988	213,235
FY 1981	189,399	FY 1989	165,305
FY1982	441,555	FY 1990	165,275
FY1983	567,910	FY 1991	92,100
FY1984	611,345	FY 1992	61,945
FY1985	603,130		

Note: Figures for 1955-1979 represent the total for MAP,FMS,FMS financing , and IMETP for this period. Figures for FY 1980-1992 are proposed amounts.

Source: Jeffrey A. Lefebvre, "Arms for the Horn: U.S. Security Policy in Ethiopia and Somalia 1953-1991", (Pittsburgh,Pa: University of Pittsburgh Press) 1991,p.27.

quantifiable economic variable like aid, trade and investments does not give an overall picture of U.S. interests in Africa. Rajen Harshe argues that "from the standpoint of a giant economy like the U.S such investments (private or public) or aid may appear marginal. That is why it would be necessary to study, in addition to the economic factors, the long term politico strategic and military dimensions for portraying an integral picture of the U.S led imperialism."<sup>26</sup> Thus it becomes necessary to understand the

complementarity of U.S. economic and politico-strategic interests in Africa in the broader context of U.S capitalist expansion worldwide.

U.S economic interaction with the African States has been channelised through trade, aid and investments. African raw materials constitute a substantial proportion of bilateral trade between the U.S. and individual African States. The U.S along with Western Europe and Japan covet the huge mineral resources of Africa for their industrial and defense use. These countries depend on Africa for more than 50% of their imports of bauxite, natural gas, phosphates, cobalt, uranium ore, alumina, chromium, manganese, etc.<sup>27</sup> The vast riches in minerals can be seen in *Table 3.2*

The high standard of living in the west, especially the U.S in order to be sustained over a long time badly needs most of the critical raw materials that the Sub-Saharan Africa has to offer. Although the U.S itself has large domestic deposit and stockpiles of many minerals, it does not produced sufficient quantities for domestic needs, may be to conserve for the future or it might be cheaper to buy raw materials than to mine them in their own country. The critical dependence on African minerals by the U.S has been underscored by the Santini Congressional report which pointed that "no issue facing America in the decades ahead poses the risks and dangers to the national economy and defense as presented by U.S dependence on foreign sources for strategic and critical minerals." <sup>28</sup>

The U.S depends on foreign sources for some of the critical minerals that are designated as essential to American national survival. Africa provided the following percentage of U.S. Non-fuel imports. Industrial diamonds (100 per cent), Uranium (38 per cent), manganese (44 per cent), antimony (40 per cent), platinum (39 per cent), and columbium

tantalum (21 per cent),<sup>29</sup> the key suppliers to the USA are: Angola, Namibia, South Africa and Zaire - industrial diamonds; South Africa, Namibia - Uranium; South Africa and Gabon - Manganese; South Africa -Antimony; South Africa - Platinum; Zaire - Cobalt; South Africa - Chromium; Nigeria Columbium. Apart from these critical minerals America imports major metals like copper from Zambia, Tin from Nigeria, lead from Morocco and Zinc from Zaire.<sup>30</sup>

[illegible]



Antimony	16, 800	22.3	South Africa
Fluorspar	357. 300	4.7	South Africa

*Source:* Bade Onimode, A Political Economy of the African Crisis', (London & New Jersey: Zed Books Ltd.) 1988, p. 4.

The oil and gas resources of Africa also have attracted the U.S. attention, although the African reserves are in no way comparable to the West Asian source. The U.S has been operating through its multinationals like Gulf, Mobil, Texaco, Ashland and standard oil of California in the Southern Swamps and offshore wells in Nigeria. In Libya companies like Mobil, Exxon and Occidental have been operating in the face of a hostile regime of Qaddafi pumping 6000,000 barrels of high quality, low sulphur oil to the U.S daily, providing 10 per cent of the fuel Americans consumed each year.

Algeria and Angola are another two countries having political and ideological differences with U.S but have a mutually beneficial economic interaction. After Saudi Arabia, Nigeria, and Libya, Socialist Algeria is the fourth major supplier of U.S. oil, reaching a record of 638,000 barrels per day in 1978, which amounted to 8 per cent of total U.S imports. Like wise in Angola, the U.S companies like Gulf oil, and Texaco which are operating even before it attained independence in 1975, continued to operate in the oil rich Cabinda province after the independence with Angola retaining a 55 per cent ownership while the Gulf oil having the remaining per cent as corporate stake.<sup>31</sup>

Thus, African mineral wealth attracted many U.S. transnational which were accorded special rights and privileges and allowed to set up their own companies for production that required unskilled, manual labour on a large scale. African countries which lacked expertise in production and marketing of minerals, in some cases, worked out partnership

deals with the transnational as a formula to maintain a reasonable balance between the development requirements of the African countries on the one hand and the minimum profitability necessary to attract the transnational on the other. *Table 3.3* shown below gives an idea of the number of U.S. MNCS operating in Africa and the type of mining activity they are engaged in.

The attractive opportunities and incentives the African economies provided and the super profits that the MNCS could earn set the stage for expansion of U.S investment and trade mostly in the mining and petroleum sector and to a lesser extent in manufacturing and plantations. The *Table 3.3* gives a general idea of how many MNCS are operating in the mining sector. However, U.S direct investment in entire of Africa according to latest figures quoted by Michael Clough in his book, accounts for only 2 per cent of the total investments in less developed countries.<sup>32</sup> This investment again is highly concentrated in very few countries such as South Africa and the oil producing countries like Nigeria, Cameroon, Angola and Gabon. The *Table 3.4* gives an idea of the relative unimportance of Africa as a destination for U.S investment vis-a-vis Latin America and Asia.

Although U.S. investments in Africa is very marginal, the level of multinational capital penetration and control (that is, the dependency it generates) is rather high. Similarly the returns on investments in terms of monopoly super profits, dividends, interest, transfer pricing and over invoicing is huge. In an authoritative study on the export of capital from Africa, Bade Onimode gives data on the annual earnings on direct private investment of

U.S. firms between 1960 and 1970. The *Table 3.5* gives the percentage of profits for the U.S. firms from Africa and a few select countries of the continent.

**Table 3.3**  
U. S Mineral Multinationals in Africa, 1977

Home country/Parent company	African subsidiaries	African "host" countries	Minerals	% share
USA:	Mobil (Nigeria) Ltd. Texaco (Nigeria) Ltd. Total (Nigeria) Ltd.	Nigeria Nigeria Nigeria	Oil Oil Oil	-
ALCAN	Alcan Aluminium of Nigeria Hulets Aluminium Co.	Nigeria South Africa	Aluminium Aluminium	72.8 24.0
Reynolds Aluminium	Volta Aluminium Co. (VALCO) Ghana Bauxite Co.	Ghana Ghana	Aluminium Bauxite	10.0 45.0
Kaiser Aluminium	VALCO BASCAL	Ghana Ghana	Aluminium Bauxite	90.0 80.0
Amax	Tsumeb Corp. O'Okiep Copper Roan Consolidated Mines	Namibia South Africa Zambia	Copper Copper Copper	29.6 17.3 20.4
Martin Marrietta	HALCO (Mining) Inc.	Guinea	Bauxite	20.0
Union Carbide	African Manganese Rhodesia Chrome Mines African Chrome Mines Tubatse Ferrochrome	Ghana Zimbabwe South Africa South Africa	Manganese Chrome Chrome Ferro-chrome	45.0 100 100 49.0
US Steel	COMILOG	Gabon	Manganese	44.0
Bethlehem Steel	Sierra Rutile LAMCO joint venture	Sierra Leone Liberia	Rutile Iron	85.0 35.0
Falconbridge Nickel	Oamites Mining Co. Kilembe Copper	Namibia Uganda	Copper & silver Copper	74.9 72.8
Phelps Dodge Kennecott	Tin & Associated Minerals Richards Bay Minerals	Nigeria South Africa	Columbium & iron titanium	49.0 39.0
Nord Resources	Nord Mining & Exploration	Namibia	Tin & wolfram	100
Foote Minerals	Rhodesian Vanadium Corp.	Zimbabwe	Vanadium	100
-				

Source: Bade Onimode, 'A Political Economy of the African Crisis' (London & New Jersey: Zed Books Ltd.) 1988, pp. 54-55.

**Table 3.4**  
U.S. Investment in Less Developed Countries (LDCs), 1988

	Investment - billion \$	% of total
World	421	100
Sub-saharan Africa	2	1
North Africa	4	1

Latin America	73	17
Asian LDCs	25	6

*Source:* Michael Clough, 'Free at last?: U. S Policy toward Africa and the end of the Cold war' (New York: Council on Foreign relations press) 1992, p. 19.

**Table 3.5**  
Annual Earnings on Direct Private Investment U.S. Firms (book value in \$ million)

	1960	1964	1967	1970
Total AH Areas	3,566	5,061	6,017	8,733
Africa, total*	33	380	453	845
% of profit	3%	21%	19%	24%
South Africa	50	87	128	141
% of profit	17%	20%	20%	17%
Libya	-	258	292	557
% of profit	-	68%	65%	55%
Liberia	-	18	16	28
% of profit	-	10%	9%	14%
Other Countries	-	-17	17	119
Middle East	734	813	1,004	1,176
% of profit	64%	61%	57%	71%

\* Excluding South Africa

*Source:* Bade Onimode, 'A Political Economy of the African Crisis'. (London & New Jersey: Zed books) 1988, p.71.

## U.S-Africa Trade

U.S. trade with Africa has always been marginal in terms of volume, value and the number of commodities traded. The reason for this is the small size of the African market and the monocultural commodity production of most of the African states. As Africa gradually got integrated into the global system during the 19th century, the very nature of this integration assigned it a dependent and peripheral role in the world economy. This Phenomenon led Africa to specialise in raw material exports minerals, metals and food

stuffs and consequently became an importer of manufactured goods from the west in the global division of labour.

Another important reason which hindered any diversification of economic activity of African states can be attributed to the colonial policies of the western powers which tied specific African economies firmly to the metropolitan centres, while discouraging any intra-African trade and also trade with external non- metropolitan colonial actors. This binding framework of trade relations between the metropolitan centre and the colony continued even after many of African States attained independence during the 1960s and 70s, making these States continue the old pattern of monocultural commodity production and exports.<sup>33</sup>

The lack of sectoral economic diversity and the one way trade i.e., between the erstwhile colonial powers and African states and vice versa was compounded by the cyclical upturns and downturns of capitalism during the 70s and 80s playing havoc with the economic fortunes of the mostly monocultural producers of Africa. A look at **Table 3.6** gives a general idea of the monocultural nature of most of the African producers.,

The economic travails of most of the African states which started during the mid seventies and lasted for a whole decade after was the direct consequence of the cyclical downturn of the global economy. As the global economy slowed down, the industrialised west turned inward and erected protectionist barriers. This situation resulted in a serious economic collapse in most of the African states, which witnessed declining terms of trade

because of the mostly monocultural and primary product exporting nature of these economies. A brief look at the trade figures for this period mentioned below gives us an insight into the economic tragedy that beset the African continent.

According to the latest International Monetary Fund (IMF) data given in the yearly publication of Africa South of the Sahara 1994,<sup>34</sup> in 1992 more than 50% of the sub-saharan Africa's exports went to the western industrialised countries. In the same year, Africa bought about 80% of its imports from these countries. The poor export performance and the range of problems dealt with above have resulted in larger deficits in most of these countries' current balance of payments accounts. The average current account deficit rose from about 4% of GDP in the 1970s to almost 8% of GDP in the 1980s. The current account deficit improved in 1990 by about \$2,500m. compared with 1989.

Price levels for the region's primary exports have been uneven. Prices for many agricultural commodities (including cotton and sugar) rose during the period 1986-90, but prices for many others (coffee, cocoa and tobacco) have remained steady or fallen. Except for some petroleum producers, the terms of trade for most African States continued to decline between 1970-81. They stabilised somewhat in the late 1980s, and by 1988 stood at about 60% of the 1970-73 level. Importantly, the poorest group of countries are the least able to withstand the side effects of a worsening terms of trade. According to the global coalition for Africa, revenues from Uganda's coffee exports fell by about 50% between 1985-90, despite a rise in volume terms.

**Table 3.6**  
Principal merchandise exports of sub-saharan Africa

1976-78 average				
	Value (millions of dollars)	Percentage share of Sub-Saharan African exports	Principal exporter	
			Country	Percentage share of exports from Sub-Saharan Africa
Fuels				
Petroleum	11520	43.5	Nigeria	95.5
Mineral and metals				
Copper	1589	6.0	Zambia	54.0
Iron ore	432	1.6	Liberia	67.9
Bauxite	188	0.7	Guinea	95.1
Phosphate rock	140	0.5	Togo	58.6
Manganese ore	120	0.5	Gabon	85.7
Zinc	79	0.3	Zaire	57.7
Tin	59	0.2	Nigeria	43.8
Lead	20	0.1	Namibia	63.9
Food and beverages				
Coffee	2838	10.7	Ivory Coast	22.5
Cocoa	1882	7.1	Ghana	34.5
Sugar	432	1.6	Mauritius	48.5
Tea	245	0.9	Kenya	57.7
Groundnuts	194	0.7	Sudan	52.1
Groundnut oil	177	0.7	Senegal	80.8
Beef	78	0.3	Botswana	43.4
Palmoil	58	0.8	Ivory Coast	71.4
Bananas	45	0.2	Ivory Coast	32.8
Maize	30	-		
Non-food				
Timber	680	2.6	Ivory Coast	47.4
Cotton	651	2.5	Sudan	46.0
Tobacco	290	1.1	Zimbabwe	47.8
Rubber	128	0.5	Liberia	47.5
Sisal	50	0.2	Tanzania	52.8
All other exports	4553	17.2		
Total exports of Sub-Saharan Africa	26458	100.0		

Source: Timothy M. Shaw, 'Towards a Political Economy for Africa: The Dialectics of Dependence', (London & Basingstoke: Mcmillan press) 1985, p. 62.

The purchasing power of the region's exports has fallen by 24% since 1985, due primarily to the decline in world petroleum prices. The steep decline in Africa's export revenues was due more to falls in volume than to relative prices. Between 1970-85 Africa's share of the world market for primary (non-petroleum) exports fell from 7% to 4% of the total.

The U.S. share in the overall volume of African exports and imports is very insignificant and mostly results from the oil imports from countries like Nigeria, South Africa, Angola etc. Exports from U.S. to Africa are also concentrated in countries like South Africa 46%, Nigeria 10% and Angola 3% and others constituting 41% of the share.<sup>35</sup> However, for most of the poor African countries the U.S. along with other European States comprises more than 80% of the exports and imports trade and any moves that cut off this trade could be crippling as was witnessed during the recession of the 1980s.

### African Debt

The African debt crisis of the 70s and 80s has its origins in the immediate aftermath of independence when most African states in the first flush of freedom began investing in extravagant projects like public buildings, modern hotels, airlines, military arsenal, huge industries and dams wholly unsuited to their economic conditions as symbols of national pride.<sup>36</sup> They borrowed heavily during this period from western countries and private banks that were at that time more than willing to give loans to these newly independent states. This spending spree continued into the 70s unmindful of their ability to repay. But the sudden oil price hikes in 1973 and 1979 and the subsequent recession that engulfed the western industrialised economies resulted in a crippling blow to most of the African economies whose export now no longer cover even a quarter of the debt repayments borrowed during the earlier decades. As the Western countries began cutting down on imports from the third world to protect their domestic economies, the third world economies which were primarily producers of raw materials and agricultural



products failed to get access to these western economies resulting in a total economic collapse and rising debt burden. African economies during these decades suffered the most and their debt burden grew five folds between 1970 and 1990.

According to the World Bank figures Sub Saharan Africa's foreign debt increased from \$6,000m. in 1970 to \$90,000m. in 1980 to \$290,000m in 1992. Total external debt as a percentage of total exports of goods and services increased from 96% of exports in 1980 to 362% in 1989. The region's debt represents only 20% of the developing world's total, and, although not large by Latin American standards, it is nevertheless 1.15 times greater than the region's G.D.P. and 3.7 times greater than the foreign exchange it annually earns from exports.<sup>37</sup>

The crisis of this magnitude coupled with internal problems including drought, rapid population growth, inappropriate government policies such as poor incentives to farmers, the maintenance of overvalued exchange rates has worsened the economic climate calling for a through reappraisal of the economic policies of these states. Here the African economic crisis cannot be seen in isolation from the broader global economic movements which all have been responsible for the mess that was created not only in Africa but also in other parts of the world. In Brioni, Yugoslavia, in May 1984, the Inter Action Council of Former Heads of Government declared that the debt problem was created jointly by all parties debtor countries, international banks, and creditor countries. Therefore, all have the responsibility to seek solutions that take into account the interests of debtors and

creditors alike and that maintain a stable orderly, and just world economic and financial system.

The wisdom for the west and the world at large now lie in understanding the mutual interests that are at stake and work towards a plausible solution. For most borrowing countries, the debt problem is an economic growth problem - one of acquiring enough foreign exchange to import the necessities to sustain economic growth while simultaneously paying debt service. The problem for the western creditors is one of maintaining the financial stability of their own domestic banking systems for which they are forced to create policies that would avoid solvency crisis in the debtor countries. This situation calls for restructuring of the old debt and giving of fresh loans to these debtor countries with certain conditionalities imposed.<sup>38</sup>

Most of the African countries reeling under the debt crisis found themselves in an unfavourable position of not being able to have any say in the matter of restructuring their economies. The only option left to them was to agree to the conditionalities imposed by the IMF and the World Bank for future consideration of loans and debt rescheduling. These conditionalities known also as the structural adjustment programmes contain measures to stimulate economies for export and and productivity. This includes currency devaluation; reduction of government expenditures, removal of subsidies and retrenchment of civil servants and public sector employees; and liberalisation of (internal) trade. As more and more African states began implementing these structural adjustment programmes, the role of the IMF and World Bank along with the G-7 nations

and especially the U.S. became central for the management and coordination of the debt crisis.

The structural adjustment programmes were a product of the neo-liberal development thinking that emerged during the 1980's in the U.S. as a reaction to the structural shifts that the global economy had undergone during the previous decade. The neo-liberal scholars and think tanks began attacking earlier developmental theories such as the dependency theory, which attributed underdevelopment in the third world countries to the structure of the world economy. Neo-liberals in contrast located the problems of development within the third world countries. According to these scholars, the widespread corruption, the misuse of funds and, most importantly, an overly large role of government in the economy (e.g. central planning, state ownership, welfare programmes) are the real culprits that impede economic development in these countries. The solution to these problems in their perception lies in reforming government, strengthening the role of the market and integrating these countries more fully into the world economy.

In the words of Kelly Lee the structural adjustment programmes imposed on most of the African and other third world countries were more or less accepted as 'fait accompli'. She takes a neo-Gramscian perspective and argues that "coercion does not adequately explain the extent to which such ideals have been adopted. It is argued that core interests have supported neo-liberalism not only for material gain but also because there has been a genuine belief that it will lead to development. For peripheral interests (LDCs as well as

the "emerging market economies" of Central and Eastern Europe), consent has been given with conviction that participation in the global market place will benefit them. The intellectual void left by the failure of dependency theory and centrally planned economies, as well as the rapid growth of NICS, has given further legitimacy to neo-liberalism. It is for these reasons that, by the mid 1990s, there are few economies in the world outside this emerging hegemonic order."<sup>39</sup>

Thus the U.S., the European countries and Japan form part of this neo-liberal hegemonic group along with the multilateral institutions IMF and the World Bank who set the agenda for the global economy. This far reaching power to re structure the world economy by these powers can be construed as a dangerous form of intervention affecting the livelihood of more than two thirds population of the globe. However, most third world countries have little resistance to fight the hegemonic domination of the U.S. and its allies and as a consequence the human and political costs of SAP in African continent is anything but laudable. The impact of SAPs became apparent during the mid eighties and the nineties. They have produced, among other things, inflation, poverty, inequalities, crime, institutional and infrastructural decay, informal sectors, and ecological deterioration.<sup>40</sup>

Despite the misery the African states were experiencing, the role of the U.S in providing aid or debt relief was minimal. Among the G-7 States, the U.S has been the least forthcoming. It was among the last to agree to debt cancellation, and it has opted for the least concessional approach to debt rescheduling under the Toronto menu approach (that

is, the lengthening of maturities to 25 years rather than a reduction in the stock of debt or concessional interest rates). The total African debt owed to the U.S. is comparatively small in comparison to the Latin American and Egyptian debt levels. African debt amounted to \$4.9 billion as of September 1990, or roughly 4 per cent of the total debt of these countries. Of the \$4.9 billion, \$1.8 billion is in Exim Bank Credits, \$1 billion, in foreign aid (development assistance and Economic Support Funds (ESF), \$1.6 billion in PL480 credits, and \$500 million in military aid. By far the largest single sub-saharan African debtor to the U.S is zaire, which owes a total of nearly \$1.5 billion; just over \$900 million of which is owed to the Exim bank. Sudan is the next largest debtor, owing \$745 million. Nigeria is third with a debt of \$648 million. Most of Sudan's debt is food aid and concessional economic assistance. Most of Nigeria's is owed to the Exim bank.<sup>41</sup>

According to Michael Clough, the U.S contribution to African aid has never been much compared to Europe and Japan. As a percentage share of donor's total aid contribution in 1989, the U.S. ranked at the bottom with 11% while France ranked at the top with 50%.<sup>42</sup> Although the U.S. bilateral aid to Africa is small in comparison to Europe and Japan, it did not in any way affect its influence in the region since most of the aid to Africa is also channelised through the multi lateral institutions like the IMF and the World Bank within which the U.S. exercises its power.

Thus in an overall analysis, Africa figures marginally in the economic interests of the U.S. and even if it does have some special interests like in South Africa, Nigeria, Angola etc., they are quite concentrated and does not speak for its general interests in the region.

### **Political Interests in Africa**

The U.S. Political interests in Africa since the 1970s have always been driven by its cold-war ideology of "containing communism." This overarching reoccupation in containing Soviet expansion in Africa since the seventies led to lopsided policy directions which blurred regional issues to be seen on their merit. In other words, the U.S. as well as the Soviet Union in their competition to win allies and strategic partners on the continent during the cold-war years pushed regional issues from the centre stage and brought their own ideological conflict to bear on most African issues. This East West ideological conflict stymied regional initiatives for political and economic development at a stage when the nascent independent states of Africa should have been mobilising their energies in nation building and economic self reliance. Most of these states were caught in an unnatural situation of choosing between either the Soviet Union and the U.S. as their ideological ally. This virtually split up the entire continent into 'radical' and 'moderate' states with the former aligned to the Soviet Union and the latter tilting towards the West on major foreign policy issues. But a small group of states remained non-aligned and pragmatic and took sides depending on the issues at state. These were also the states whose voices were usually decisive in determining the majority stand of the Organisation of African Union (OAU) on issues of foreign involvement. The so-called radical states were more or less committed Marxist-Leninist states which on issues

of foreign intervention, can be relied upon to take a strongly anti- western and usually and Chinese position. Those in this category included: Angola, Mozambique, Ethiopia, Guinea Bissau, Cape Verde, Sao Tome eprincipe and the Congo. The moderate states were usually pro western and anti Communist. Egypt, Sudan, Somalia, Cote D'Ivoire, Senegal, Togo, Malawi, Gabon, Morocco, Tunisia, Mauritius, the Central African Empire, Swazi land, Gambia, Zaire, Chad and the Comoros fall in the category. There is a small group of states within this category, which tend to support anti Soviet group on most issues but with some qualification. They were Kenya, Liberia, Upper Volta, Lesotho, Mauritania, Niger, Djibouti, Botswana, and Rwanda.

The last category of states which are non-aligned and mostly influential in the OAU are the idiosyncratic ones like Libya and Uganda and the pragmatic ones like Tanzania, Nigeria, Zambia, Algeria, Ghana, Cameroon and Guinea. The smaller ones who belong to this group are Seychelles, Burundi, Sierra Leone, and Mali.<sup>43</sup>

The super power rivalry which divided the whole continent along ideological lines distorted regional problems and further added to an already dismal scenario of the problems of nation building in Africa. The main sources of political instability and conflict in Africa have been (a) the absence of democratic forces, structures and institutions in most of the post-colonial independent states. This was exacerbated by the existence of widespread authoritarian rule (whether of monarchic, military dictatorship or single party authoritarian rule) and tendency on the part of rulers to resort to aggression, internal or external, to improve their political position, (b) another major

source of political instability is created by clashing ethnic identities in most states of Africa. This problem is no where more acute than in Africa where almost all states have multiple ethnic groups with divided loyalties. Another reason for this situation had been the direct consequence of African states being artificially carved out leaving many ethnic groups scattered across different political and territorial boundaries. The following table shows the ethnic composition of different states in Sub-Saharan Africa.

**Table 3.7**

ANGOLA [Angola has three major ethnic divisions apart from a few smaller ones. They are Ovimbundu 37%, Kambundu 25% and Bakongo 13%. ,
BENIN [Benin has 42 ethnic groups, the most important being Fon, Adja, Yoruba, Bariba. ,
Botswana [Botswana has 95% Batswana, about 4% Kalanga, Basarwa and Kgalagadi, whites constitute 1%;
Burkina [Burkina has more than 50 tribes, the principal tribe being Mossi. Their important groups are a Gurunsi, Senno, Lobi, Bobo, Mande and Fulani; ,
Burundi [Burundi has 85% Hutu (Bantu), 14% Tutsi(Hamitic), mostly Rwandans and Zairians;
Cameroon [Cameroon has over 200 tribes of widely differing background, 31% Cameroon Highlanders, 19% Equatorial Bantu, 11% Kirdi, 10% Fulani, 8% North Western Bantu, 7% Eastern Nigritic, 13% others; ,
Central African Republic [It has about 80 ethnic groups, the majority ,[of which have related ethnic and linguistic characteristics; 34% Baya, 27% Banda, 10% M'Baka; 6,500 Europeans of whom 3,600 are French; ,
Chad [Chad has some 200 distinct ethnic groups, most of whom are Muslims (Arabs, Tonbon, Fulbe, Kotoko, Hansa, Kanembon, Baguirmi, Bonlala and Mabar) in the North and Centre and Non Muslims (Sara, Ngambaye, Mbaye, Gonlaye, Mondang, Moussei, Massa) in the south; some 150,000 non indigenous, of whom 1,000 are french; ,
Djibouti [60% Somali (Issa); 35% Afar, 5% French, Arab, Ethiopian and Italian. ,
Egypt [Egypt has 90% Eastern Hamitic stock; 10% Greek, Italian, Syro-Lebanese; ,
Equatorial Guinea [Has indigenous population of Bioko, Primarily Bubi, some Fernandinos; Rio Muni, primarily Fang; less than 1,000 Europeans, mostly Spanish; ,
Ethiopia [has 40% Oromo, 32% Amhara and Tigrean, 9% Sidamo, 6% Shannella, 6% Somali, 4% Afar, 2% Gurage, 1% other;
Gabon [has about 40 Bantu tribes including four major tribal groupings (Fang, Eshira, Baka, Baka); ,
Gambia [99% African (42% Mandinka, 18% Fula, 16% Wolof, 10% Jola, 9% Serahuli, 4% others); 1% non Gambian;
Ghana [has 99.0% black African (major tribes 44% Akan, 15% Moshi Dagomba, 13% Ewe, 8% Ga), 0.2% European and other
Guinea [has 3 major ethnic groups Fulani, Malinke, Soninke, and 15 other smaller tribes;
Guinea Bissau [has about 99% African (30% Balanta, 20% Fula, 14% Manjaco, 13% Mandinga, 7% Papel); less than 1% European and mulatto;



irredentism) as in the case of Somalia, which makes claims on a portion of Ethiopian territory (the Ogaden) and possible claims over Djibouti and Kenya to unify ethnic Somalis. Another variety of ethnic nationalism can be seen in the form of separatist movement such as that which took place in Eritrea before it became independent and the on going guerrilla struggle for national liberation in Western Sahara. Anti Racist struggles are another distinct form of liberation struggles that convulsed Rhodesia, South Africa and Namibia where the Black majority fought the white minority supremacy to achieve independence.

Thus Africa provided ample opportunities for external interventions. The African states in order to bolster their respective security interests embarked on an arms race endangering regional stability and peace. The super powers in trying to further their ideological, political and strategic interests on the continent were more than willing to pump military hardware to warring states and groups creating regional flash points such as Ethiopia-Somalia war in the Horn; Angola-South Africa clashes in Southern Africa; Chadian Civil War, where moderate states backed by France and the U.S supported the Hissene Habre government while Libya backed by the Soviet Union supported Goukouni Oueddie etc.

According to Timothy Shaw, "it is in the regions where there is likely to be the greatest intersection of various internal and external interests that external associations tend to concentrate resulting in regional flash points."<sup>44</sup> He also argues that, super power intervention is in direct "correlation with the changes in global cycles-from economic

expansion to contraction, and from strategic detente to confrontation."<sup>43</sup> He elaborates that "in periods of economic expansion, inter imperial rivalries are benign: So although structural involvement is high, strategic intervention is low. Conversely, in times of economic contraction, such as the present period (i.e. the 1980's) when inter imperial rivalries are active, then the reverse is true."<sup>46</sup> African continent unfortunately got caught in this global economic cycle of contraction during the 1970s and 80s resulting in a spiral of regional instability and foreign interventions.

Yet another important source of instability in Africa stems from the disparity in the distribution of wealth and natural resources. African states during the 1960s benefited from the relatively high prices for then- export commodities in the international market. This was also a boom time for most of the western economies which imported African minerals, oil and agricultural products allowing African states a brief span of growth and development. This achievement was short lived as the global economy went into a recession during the 1970s and 80s. This global phenomenon severely affected African States which suddenly began witnessing negative growth rates during this period resulting in economic stagnation, widespread corruption, class antagonisms and a dramatic decline in welfare and living standards ecological destruction and refugee crisis. Yet again in the words of Timothy Shaw, 'African security issues are inseparable from political economy issues'. He argues that, "as most African states and leaders have come to confront shrinking economics so security issues have expanded even before the Present decade, beyond border disputes and non alignment, to include new internal

threats to incumbent regimes arising out of inter related IMF conditionalities and income declines."<sup>47</sup>

As the IMF /World Bank's structural adjustment programmes (SAPs) got underway, African people slowly began realising the negative effects of the SAPs. Unemployment at all levels rose sharply affecting income levels. As the income levels fell, private consumption such as the daily calorie intake per capita dropped, health care suffered due to cuts in budgetary allocations resulting in reduction in life expectancy, morbidity and infant mortality. Education levels also suffered due to less allocations.

According to Ernest Harsch, "a few have benefited from adjustment, while large numbers of people remain stuck in the most miserable conditions. In those countries where new economic opportunities have materialized, it has been primarily the better off layers of society that have reaped the gains. Even among rural populations, who are sometimes touted as the prime beneficiaries of adjustment, any gains appear to have gone disproportionately to the more prosperous commercial farmers, leaving those farming at near subsistence levels or with only small marketable surpluses even farther behind".<sup>48</sup>

As the income disparities grew along with rising unemployment and lack of livelihood for the majority in all the sectors of the economy i.e., the industrial, agricultural and the civil service, people began to revolt against their respective governments. Over the course of the decade, Egypt, Morocco, Tunisia, Nigeria, Senegal, Zambia, and other countries saw sporadic strikes and outbursts of street rioting, often in response to sudden

price increases caused by adjustment imposed currency devaluations or the reduction of subsidies on food and other basic necessities.<sup>49</sup>

Thus economic depression of the 80s and the subsequent SAPs, instead of alleviating African economic and political problems, actually aggravated the situation leading to large scale political instability on the continent in the form of political corruption, violence, abuse of human rights, refugee crisis, coup detats and depressing poverty, starvation deaths and health crisis. This political and economic instability in Africa can be seen reflected in the number of coup detats, insurrections, ethnic conflicts political strikes etc across the continent as given the table below:

**Table-3.8**

**African Conflicts 1990 -1995**

COUNTRY	YEAR	CAUSE ,
Algeria	1992	Co -ordinated anti - govt. activity.
Angola	1975- 91	SouthAfrican backed insurrection (UNITA)
Burundi	1993-94	Ethnic violence ,
Chad	1975-94	Part occupied by Libya
_Djibouti	1991- 94	Afar insurrection ,
Egypt	1992	Coordinated anti government activity
Eritrea	1994	Insurrection backed by Sudan
Gambia	1994	Coup and counter coup
Ghana	1994	Insurrection in Northern Region
Guinea	1994	Armed clashes with opposition forces
Kenya	1994	Ethnic Violence
Lesotho	1993-94	Fighting between rival army factions.
Liberia	1990	Civil war
Libya	1973- 94	Occupation of disputed territory in Chad
Mali	1992	Continued clashes with Tuaregs
Morocco	1976	War against Polisario Front of Western Sahara
Mozambique	1986-94	SouthAfrican backed insurrection

		(Renamo)
Rwanda	1990	Insurrection by Rwandan Patriotic Front (FPR)
Sierra Leone	1991	Insurrection backed by National Patriotic Front of Liberia (NPFL)
Somalia	1991	Ousting of Said Barre followed by civil war
South Africa	1990-94	Inkatha/ANC clashes
Sudan	1983	Separatist guerrillas in South
Togo	1994	Insurrection against president Eyadema
W.Sahara	1976	Occupied by Morocco and Mauritania

Sources: Third World Guide 93/94; Keesings Record of World Events.

This table was given in Susan Calvert and peter Calvert's, 'Politics and Society in the third world: An Introduction' (London & New York: Prentice Hall/Harvester Wheatsheaf) 1996, p.202.

The U.S. political interests on the continent thus are manifold considering all the factors mentioned above. Though, its main interests lie in areas where there is an intersection of external intervention and local instability such as Southern Africa and the Horn of Africa. Chester Crocker, in outlining U.S. objectives in Africa considered "Africa and Africans are largely oriented toward the west. Yet that orientation, that advantage cannot be taken for granted. Events of the last decade have proven only too clearly that the objectives we seek in Africa are increasingly threatened by political instability, external intervention, and declining economic performance. Soviet Cuban and Eastern bloc intervention in African Affairs, the presence of thousands of Cuban troops in Angola and Ethiopia, the presence of Libyan troops in Chad, and the massive transfer of arms by Eastern bloc nations all serve to undermine U.S. and Western interests in Africa and to thwart our and Africa's objectives".<sup>50</sup>

According to Chester Crocker, the U.S. objectives in Africa are:

- to promote peace and regional security and deny opportunities to those who seek contrary objectives.
- to support proven friends and be known as reliable partner in Africa as elsewhere.
- to maintain open market opportunities, access to key resources, and contribute to expanding African and American economics.
- to support negotiated solutions to the problems of Southern Africa.
- Seek to expand that group of nations whose development policies produce economic progress and which have flourishing democratic institutions.
- to help in meeting Africa's humanitarian needs and in fostering basic human liberties in keeping with both our principles and our interests.<sup>51</sup>

Having broadly understood U.S. interests in Africa now, it becomes imperative to focus our attention in the next chapter on policy making by different U.S. administrations from Richard Nixon to George Bush. This is largely to analyse the changing policy stances since the 1970s in the context of East West conflict as well as the rapidly changing regional dynamics. Keeping in mind the broad objectives mentioned above, we shall also analyse how the different U.S. administrations tried to fulfill these objectives in Africa.

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## Chapter-IV U.S Policy towards Africa from Johnson to Reagan

## CHAPTER - IV

The U. S. foreign policy towards Sub-Saharan Africa since the 1960's has been a track record of a series of misperceptions that proved to be a disaster for the next quarter of a century. The origins of this problem can be traced back to Kennedy (Jan20,1961-Nov22,1963) and Johnson's administrations (Nov22,1963-Jan20,1969) which viewed Sub-Saharan Africa from a broadly East-west angle without being sensitive to the regional dynamics. According to David A. Dickson, the U.S. policy towards this region suffered from two important misperceptions. "The first misperception has been a lack of understanding of the pace and nature of change in the area." The second misperception has been "a lack of understanding of the character of radical movements in the region."<sup>1</sup> The United States during the late 50s and early 60s believed that its European allies which were in control of African colonies would set the pace of independence movements in a manner which would give them influence over the colonies they would liberate. The U.S. expected that the liberated African colonies would be dependent in future on their erstwhile rulers and not be attracted to the communist Soviet Union.

However, most of these expectations were belied when African countries got their independence. The newly independent countries like Ghana, Guinea, Mali, Algeria, Egypt began to be attracted ideologically towards the Soviet Union. The Soviet Union, under the leadership of Nikita Krushchev, perceiving the significance of the events in Africa and elsewhere in Asia began to actively court the leaders of these independent countries with political flattery and economic and military aid.<sup>2</sup> Egypt was one of the important recipients of Soviet and East European arms aid during late 50s and early 60s.

An estimated value of 1.7 billion was shipped to Egypt. Military shipments to Sub-Saharan Africa, were relatively small- an estimated \$86.5 million, as compared to \$2.7 billion for the middle East and \$ 2.2 billion for south and south-east Asia. However, the impact of even this amount was far greater than this figure would imply. With small sums of \$ 10-15 million in arms aid, Moscow could gain important political mileage in Africa. It managed to place about 1,000 advisers in Ghana, some of whom were reportedly assigned important positions in Nkrumah's presidential guard. Similarly considerable Soviet military assistance and equipment was also seen in Guinea and Mali.<sup>3</sup> Soviet non-military aid to 'progressive' regimes was equally impressive. Between 1955 and 1966, Egypt received an estimated \$ 2.6 billion in economic assistance from the Soviet Union and Eastern Europe, including a \$ 100 million credit for the first stage of the Aswan dam- the most dramatic single undertaking in the Soviet foreign aid programme. Ben Bella's Algeria also received \$ 232 during these same years.<sup>4</sup>

As the Soviet Union began to make inroads into Africa, the U.S. was alarmed and started suspecting Soviet motives in Africa. The U. S. felt that communist successes in Africa would contribute to its momentum around the world. The most important agenda during this phase was to contain communism. According to David A. Dickson, "this was not done because of its minerals or its sea lanes. It was done because of Africa's role in the global battle with communism."<sup>5</sup>

However, the U. S. inordinate fear of a communist expansion was proved rather misplaced when the so-called 'progressive' leaders on whom the Soviet Union was

heavily banking were either ousted from their office or distanced themselves from Moscow. Ben Bella of Algeria was overthrown in June 1965; Modibo Keita of Mali was ousted in November 1968; Nkrumah was overthrown in a military coup in February 1966. The self-proclaimed Marxist, Sekou Toure, expelled the Soviet Ambassador for interference in internal Guinean politics and slowly distanced itself from Moscow. Similarly Egypt too had differences with Moscow during Anwar Sadat's regime and by 1972 the relationship had broken off. The Soviets found to their bitter experience that the so-called 'progressive' national democrats' were unreliable, expensive ungrateful and even at times dangerous allies. According to Morton Schwartz, "given this unhappy experience, Soviet interest in radical leftist regimes as such has sharply diminished. And, in fact, to the extent the Kremlin leaders are concerned about the third world, the political colours of a particular regime is now of little matter."<sup>6</sup>

But, the U. S. during this period which was mostly concerned about the communist inroads into Africa did not see deep enough to understand the character of the so-called radical movements which proved to be more nationalistic and pragmatic than merely imitating communist Soviet Union. This misperception largely accounted for the use of containment policy during the Kennedy Administration which seriously undermined regional initiatives for a better Africa that Kennedy promised when he came to office in Jan, 1961.



## **Kennedy and Johnson Administrations**

Africa gained prominence in the initial months of the Kennedy administration. Kennedy displayed an eagerness to meet with African leaders. According to former U. S. Ambassador of Guinea, William Attwood, president Kennedy possessed "an understanding of what the non-aligned nations wanted. . . . .and was able to make the leaders of these new nations feel that he was interested in them. . . . ." <sup>7</sup> The new administration's approach to these newly independent states at first seemed to be sympathetic to their neutral and non-aligned positions in the context of the cold war. It strongly proclaimed that the new nations of Africa could build their destinies unimpeded by conflict between powers outside of the continent. The Kennedy administration in a show of empathy and understanding was willing to work even with the radical governments of Guinea and Ghana.

Another significant approach towards Africa which was seen as quite radical was the administration's outspoken support for decolonization. The Kennedy administration in the initial phase showed a tendency to distance itself from the policies of its European allies. This can be illustrated by its treatment of Portugal. It responded negatively to Portugal's suppression of a rebellion in Angola in 1961. The U. S. backed a U. N resolution which advocated reforms in Angola, terminated commercial arms sales to Portugal, and reduced its military aid programme from \$ 25 million to \$ 3 million. <sup>8</sup> Thus the administration's early initiatives were epitomized in the slogan of assistant secretary

for African Affairs G. Mennen Williams "Africa for the Africans," a vision of a continent in which Africans would control their own political destiny.

But as the year 1961 wore on, the optimism that signaled a departure from the anti-communist policies of the earlier Eisenhower administration proved to be short lived. The African issues that were high on the American foreign policy agenda quickly lost their status. The administrations attentions shifted to the Soviet-American rivalry in Cuba and Southeast Asia. The only African issue that attracted the U. S. administration was the Congo. The U. S. which suspected communist intervention in the Congo, quickly began to reorganize its foreign policy in terms containing communism in Africa. In December 1961, Undersecretary of State George Ball stated in an address in Los Angeles that the over riding priority of U. S. policy was to restore order and discourage Soviet aggression in the Congo.<sup>9</sup> The fundamental thrust of U. S. foreign policy since the Congo crisis was to preclude communist gains both Soviet and Chinese on the African soil. The administration sought to establish military ties with the African states to counter any threats from outside. This policy thrust was embodied in a 1962 State Department document entitled, "Africa: Department of State Guidelines for policy and operations."<sup>10</sup>

Thus, the anti-communism of the Kennedy administration evolved into a distrust of radicalism in general. The administration's willingness to draw distinctions between Soviet controlled radical movements and independent movements largely faded away and any radical change on the continent was seen as damaging to American Security interests. The Kennedy administrations ever since the Congo crisis began to adopt a cautious

policy posture by adjusting its continental policy to the stances of its western European allies."<sup>11</sup> A 1962 State Department document observed that the U. S. role in Africa was to supplement European economic and military assistance. In additions, in a post-administration interview, G. Mermen Williams declared that the U. S. had repeatedly informed the Europeans that it supported a high European profile on the continent."<sup>12</sup>

The U. S. policy toward South Africa and Rhodesia which was critical at one juncture had to accommodate the sensitivities of the British which had a large stake in these two countries. Similarly the administrations tough policy line towards Portugal had to be toned down in the context of a changed environment of communist threat. The security interests related to U. S. access to the Azores which was under the Portuguese control and which served as a transit point for U. S. forces enroute to Europe, Africa and the Middle East determined the policy shift. Analysing Kennedy administration's foreign policy towards Africa, David A. Dickson concludes that "a seemingly bold policy, which gave African affairs a high profile, tolerated ideological diversity and blazed an independent path, was soon rejected. It was replaced by a policy which largely treated African affairs as a peripheral concern, promoted ideological rigidity, and adapted to western European sensitivities."<sup>13</sup> David A. Dickson goes on further to say that this administration contributed to the evolution of policy misperceptions which would develop further in subsequent years.

The Johnson administration which inherited the presidency on November 22, 1963 following John Kennedy's assassination continued with the policy line formulated during

the earlier administration which was staunchly anti-communist. Perceiving the threat posed by the Soviets and the Chinese on the African continent, the Johnson administration understood the need for economic aid as a tool for thwarting the communist advances. Johnson expressed this view when he stated "we must strengthen the ability of free nations everywhere to develop their independence...."<sup>14</sup> Assistant secretary Williams later repeated this theme in an address before the House of Representatives committee on Foreign Affairs. Williams observed that communism feeds on the frustration generated by poor conditions. Economic aid, he stressed, could mitigate such conditions.

This strong anti-communist approach by the administration was provided by a number of confidential reports on communist encroachments on the continent. A 1964 state Department Bureau of Intelligence and Research study, while discounting the possibility of a communist takeover of the continent in the near term, identified areas of opportunity for the communists. It warned that nationalist movements could be subverted, particularly in the Southern Africa region.<sup>16</sup> Viewing such a scenario, the Johnson administration understood the need for having close co-ordination with its European allies in Africa in checking the march of communism. Johnson's administration however was diverted from the African issues when war in Vietnam became the single most dominant issue for the administration to grapple with. The only African issues that caught high-level administration's attention even for a brief while were the Stanleyville airlift in November, 1964 and Rhodesia's unilateral declaration of independence in November, 1965. Most other issues were largely relegated to middle levels of the bureaucracy.

## **Nixon and Ford Administrations Africa Policy**

The continuing war in Vietnam and domestic public outcry at the loss of American lives became one of the main issues that the Nixon administration, which came to power in 1969, had to address. This was a tragic legacy inherited from the earlier administration. President Nixon and his national security adviser Henry Kissinger together formulated a strategy of withdrawal from the Vietnam war as a face-saving measure to pull U. S. troops out without appearing to be "weak" or "vacillating." This strategy was aired in a statement that Nixon made in Guam on July 25, 1969. This statement later came to be known as the Nixon doctrine which placed greater reliance on finding regional and local allies who could share the burden of containing communism. In the face of the political strategic and economic limitations of waging wars directly in many third world conflicts, the Nixon doctrine emphasized the need for exerting global U. S. military influence by recruiting key regional powers to serve as junior partners in a U. S. dominated anticommunist coalition. These regional and local allies would receive U. S. arms and training to combat communist insurgencies.

The implications of such a strategy for Africa was to find regional allies such as South Africa and other pro-western African States like Ethiopia during 60s and 70s and later Somalia, Kenya, Egypt, Nigeria etc. in containing communism. As the Nixon administration became embroiled in Vietnam and Cambodia between 1970 and 1973, when it was finally able to secure a military withdrawal, the apparent stability in South Africa was a welcome respite from having to think too closely about the nature of U. S.

policy response to the continued entrenchment of apartheid and racial segregation. The Nixon administration also viewed the whole of Southern African region as a potential bulwark against communist expansion.<sup>17</sup> The existence of a white ruled Rhodesia and the Portuguese rule in Angola gave a sense of stability to the region. Based on this understanding, the Nixon administration formulated its policy to the region in the important National Security Council Memorandum 39 in 1969 in which the favorite course of action was securing continued contact and dialogue with the pretoria government. The Memorandum was a result of a directive from Henry Kissinger, then adviser on National Security Affairs, to the NSC's Interdepartmental Group for Africa, drawn from mainly the State Department and the Department of Defense, chaired by David Newsom, the Assistant Secretary of State for African Affairs.<sup>18</sup> It listed six different options based on a detailed analysis of the U. S. interests involved in the region. The favoured option was option two which was based on the premise that "the whites are here to stay and the only way that constructive change can come is through them. There is no hope for the blacks to gain the political rights they seek through violence, which will only lead to chaos and increased opportunities for the communists."<sup>19</sup>

However, this prognosis proved to be short-lived when a group of young radical Portuguese colonels fed up with dictators and colonial wars staged a coup in Lisbon in April 1974 and precipitated the collapse of Portuguese colonial rule. This set the stage for a long drawn out civil war in Angola where rival factions sought to capture power with outside help. The U. S. which understood the dangers of a power vacuum in Angola, immediately began to provide covert aid to factions such as FNLA and UNITA whose

leadership was pro-west, to tilt the balance in its favour. But the Soviet Union which had ideological attraction for some of the third world countries fighting was also drawn into the conflict when the Marxist-Leninist MPLA faction sought help in its fight with the FNLA and UNITA.

It was during this time the Watergate Scandal broke out and Nixon had to resign from presidency. The new incumbent was Gerald Ford who took over the office of the president in August 1974. The new president became a prisoner of events both domestic as well as foreign over which he had little control. On the domestic front, he had to steer clear of the fallout of the Watergate Scandal as well as the fears of public opinion against another military misadventure such as the Vietnam war. He had also very little time to chart out a new direction to the administration before the presidential election in the year 1976. Henry Kissinger who continued as the National security adviser even in the Ford administration now had the onerous task of insuring Ford's political survival until 1976 elections as well as to re-establish his vision of America as the balance wheel in world diplomacy. In search of domestic success, international prestige, and the reassertion of American power, he focussed on a civil war in an obscure former Portuguese colony in Central Africa: Angola.<sup>20</sup>

As the administration began to show more attention on the Angolan crisis, Henry Kissinger in one of his first administration shake ups removed Assistant Secretary of state for African Affairs Donald Easum in January 1975 for being critical of America's reluctance to support black rule in Africa. In this place, Kissinger selected Nathaniel

Davis, a former Ambassador to Chile during whose tenure the government of Salvador Allende was overthrown in a coup. This was perhaps meant as a signal to Moscow that detente was not a license to expand in Africa. As the three liberation movements in Angola met at Alvor, Portugal on January 15, 1975 and agreed to form a coalition government and a united army in preparation for independence on November 11, Kissinger and the CIA felt that the Alvor agreement would collapse and suspected that Soviet backed MPLA would seize total power in Angola. To counter any such mishap, and to insure a pro-west Angola, the administration began to pump money and weapons to FNLA and UNITA.

Although Henry Kissinger and the CIA were strongly advocating covert intervention in Angola, Nathaniel Davis, and the state department were opposed to such a move. They argued that MPLA was militarily far superior to either of the other two groups and the United States could not bring FNLA on a equal footing without massive aid and perhaps direct intervention. Kissinger, however, brushing aside such criticism pushed ahead with his advocacy of covert intervention. Facing a November 11, 1975 deadline for Angolan independence, the agency rapidly mobilized a massive air and Sea supply system to rush weapons to Zaire and Zambia for later transport to Angola. As American weapons flowed to FNLA and UNITA, the civil war in Angola increasingly became a global issue. The MPLA at this stage appealed for outside help to counter U. S. moves. In September, Cuba responded by sending more weapons and military advisers to Angola. On October 14, 1975 the situation again escalated when South Africa launched a major attack on MPLA forces in Southern Angola. This action provoked the Cubans to directly intervene with



combat troops in response to South African intervention in the conflict. As the Cuban troops fought alongside with the MPLA, the FNLA and UNITA troops lost courage and had to retreat to bases in Zaire. The MPLA troops quickly occupied Luanda and declared themselves the government of the now independent people's Republic of Angola.

At this stage, another battle broke out in congress regarding the CIA's lack of candor in informing the scope of operations in the Angola conflict. This provoked some members of the congress in recommending the Foreign Relation's committee an amendment to cut off all overt aid to Angola. This motion later became known as the "Clark Amendment" after senator Clark who moved the amendment for curtailing CIA's covert activities in Angola. The "Clark amendment" became a direct challenge to Ford and Kissinger and they responded with an intense lobbying effort to defeat it. However, on December 19th, by a vote of 54-22, the Senate passed the amendment cutting off immediately all U. S. covert aid to Angola. Ford and Kissinger still hoped that the House would restore funding for Angola. Even this came to a naught when the House, on January 27 voted 323 - 99 to join the senate in ending aid to Angola. This was a bitter defeat for the Ford administration which eventually cost him the presidential election in 1976.

Thus the Ford Administration proved to be a failure both in terms of its lack of direction in foreign policy matters and in guaging the domestic support for the administration. Thomas J. Noer in a blunt appraisal of the administration felt that self-interests of president Ford and Kissinger played a great deal in the administration failure. "Ford wanted to be nominated and elected and Kissinger wanted to remain the architect of

American foreign policy. To get delegates and votes, Ford needed a foreign policy success. To stay in power, Kissinger needed to keep Ford in the White House."<sup>21</sup> He went on to add that "perhaps they confused international interests of the nation with their own political survival."<sup>22</sup>

## **Carter Administration**

After winning election in 1976, president Carter assumed office on an agenda that seemed far-reaching in its global outlook and moral tone. The administration in an unprecedented move broke the long tradition of foreign policy based on containment, realpolitik and anti-communism. The Carter administration felt that in a newly emerging world order of great complexity and inter-dependence, the "old politics" with its parochial interests, its one way dependencies, its hierarchical ordering and marked inequalities, its obsession with equilibrium and careful balancing of power, and its reliance on forcible methods,"<sup>23</sup> espoused and refined by strategies like Henry Kissinger, seemed irrelevant and outdated.

The Carter administration believed in a world order approach based on three very different underlying intellectual roots from previous cold war policies.:

- A strategy of adjustment and preventive diplomacy,
- A global complexity and interdependence approach to international relations, and
- The pursuit of human rights and global community.<sup>24</sup>

The first postulate symbolized the beginning of an end to the obsessive preoccupation with the Soviet Union. Another variant of this obsession was the irrational fear that any global change threatens international stability and statusquo. The Carter administration however, viewed change in a positive sense and emphasized the importance of a strategy of adjustment to the inevitability of change. The administration also emphasized the need to take preventive diplomacy approach. The idea was to resolve problems even before they became intractable. Focussing attention on regional problems, the Carter administration sought to resolve conflicts by addressing their fundamental causes, rather than seeing them in east-west terms and treating the symptoms by relying on containment and force.

The second postulate was a departure from Realpolitik thinking to one of Global complexity and interdependence. The Carter administration assumed that the cold war was over and American hegemony with it. In its stead was a multipolar world in which American power was limited and would have to be wielded selectively and often indirectly. The administration also saw the world's major problems as essentially economic in nature and too complex for simplistic military solutions. Viewing Soviet Union as a declining power and no longer a major source of global instability, they believed that the Soviet Union could be controlled through economic rewards of detente and active diplomacy.

As new actors such as Japan and European states became economically dominant during the seventies, the global hegemony of the United States came under attack. Another

development that eroded American hegemony was the collective strength of the third world states which began to bargain for their rightful share in world politics. The Carter administration quickly realized the changed character of international relations and began to reorient its policies to accommodate such changes. It realized that the U. S. could no longer command or control other states but can only lead. "However wealthy and powerful the U. S. may be-however capable the leadership," stated president Carter, "this power is increasingly only relative, the leadership increasingly is in need of being shared. No nation has a monopoly of vision, of creating, or of ideas. Bringing these from many nations is our common responsibility and our common challenge."<sup>25</sup>

The third postulate was the promotion of human rights and the quest for global community. For president Carter, human rights and democracy were the essence of what America represented. As Carter argued in his memoirs, "I was familiar with the widely accepted arguments that we had to choose between Idealism and realism, or between morality and the exertion of power, but I rejected those claims. To me, the demonstration of American Idealism was a practical and realistic approach to foreign affairs, and moral principles were the best foundation for the exertion of American power and influence."<sup>26</sup>

Carter believed that this moral drive in foreign policy would not only appeal to the liberals and conservatives at home who were frustrated by amorality of Kissinger's foreign policy actions; but also to the people throughout the world. But the administration's optimism in implementing the new approach proved to be short-lived as both the Soviet Union and the U. S. sharply differed over detente's applications to the

third world. American insistence on Soviet Union's respect for the statusquo vied with Soviet insistence on its continued right to support revolutionary national movements.<sup>27</sup> New Soviet involvement in South west Asia and North east Africa in what Brzezinski, (the national security adviser to the Carter administration) termed as an "arc of crisis" extending from Afghanistan to the horn of Africa, and a series of coups and countercoups in 1978 produced Marxist governments in Ethiopia, South Yemen and Afghanistan, all of which enjoyed Soviet support. This turn of events unsettled the Carter administration to the extents that it backtracked on the new approach and revived containment policy followed under, the Ford-Kissinger administration.

In Africa, the Carter administration in its first two years in office began improving its relations with African countries, attempting by direct dialogue to find peaceful solutions to the South African, Rhodesian and Namibian problem. The administration in order to shake off its image as a white racist, quasi-colonial power since the "Tar Baby Option"<sup>28</sup> of the early 1970's began advocating the cause of majority rule in South Africa, Rhodesia and Namibia. The administration officials like Andrew Young, the U. S. ambassador to the UN and, Cyrus Vance, the first secretary of state who mostly formulated Southern Africa policy cautioned the administration that Soviet's influence could be contained through an orderly, non-violent transfer of political power from the white-minority regimes to democratically elected governments.<sup>29</sup> They felt that such orderly transfer of power favoured the west, while escalating warfare by the liberation movements favoured the Soviets. The administration felt that pressuring South Africa could yield policy dividends and threatened to suspend intelligence links and terminate the tax credits of

U.S. corporations in the country. There were also threats to bring the U.S. military attache home, and cut back on Export-Import Bank loan guarantees. Similarly, the Carter administration took initiatives to resolve the Rhodesian and Namibian crises.

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In Zaire, the U. S. administration tried to detach itself from the Mobutu regime which was highly corrupt and a gross violator of human rights. With regard to Angola and Mozambique, the administration could not still reconcile to giving recognition to them because of Cuban presence in Angola and Soviet involvement in both these countries. However, efforts were made to use diplomatic means and economic mechanisms to encourage ties between Angola and Mozambique and the west. Administration officials openly acknowledged that Angola had been an asset in negotiations on African disputes including Namibia. The Carter administration entertained the hope that Angola was much more pragmatic in its relations with the Soviet Union and hence can be gradually wooed away from the Soviet Union in future.

Thus, the first two years of the Carter administration's approach toward Africa sounded positive and affirmative. However, events such as the conflicts of 1977 and 1978 in the shaba province of Zaire, between the Katangese and president Mobutu, and the war between Ethiopia and Somalia over the Ogaden region in 1977 abruptly ended the optimistic foreign policy of the administration. The regionalist approach to African Problems advocated by officials like Andrew Young and Cyrus Vance was soon replaced by a strident anti-communist and Globalist approach advocated mostly by National security adviser Brzezinski. The Iranian revolution and the hostage crisis of November

1979 followed by the invasion of Afghanistan by the Soviet military on December 27, 1979 shook the administration in reverting back to the policy of containment. Brezezinski stated that his fears of an aggressive and expansionist Soviet Union, now proved vindicated and feared the consequences of Soviet presence so much closer to the Persian gulf.

Brzezinski's fears were also acknowledged by president Carter's pronouncements in January, 1980 of the so-called Carter doctrine, vowing American military intervention, if necessary, to defend the Persian Gulf.<sup>30</sup> The doctrine was imparted credibility by the American naval buildup in the Near East; the completion of negotiations over bases in Somalia, Kenya, Oman and Egypt; and a call for a rapid deployment force to monitor and attend to crises in the region.

Thus, Carter who gave a wholly new foreign policy outlook in the first two years of administration, left office a disillusioned president caught in a web of reality. His neo-idealism proved irrelevant in a world still dominated by power politics.

#### Reagan and the Bush Administrations

At a time when America as a nation was undergoing crisis of identity as a superpower, Reagan came to power in 1980 on a platform that promised to arrest American military and economic decline. After the crises and humiliations of the 1970's, Reagan wanted to re-furbish the nation's self-image and restore its faith in America's "manifest destiny."

Michael Cox reflecting on the American decline during the 1970's commented that 'the unbounded hope' and 'muscular optimism' that existed during the Kennedy and the Johnson period evaporated over the next fifteen years leaving America a confused and 'a wounded nation'. By the time Reagan came to power in 1980, Cox saw that, "the American institutions were no longer revered, respect for authority had diminished, the military was held in contempt by many, business confidence had fallen dramatically and finally, the verities which had served the nation so well before seemed to be relics of a by-gone age."<sup>31</sup> Reagan skillfully exploited these anxieties during his election in 1980 and set an agenda for American economic and military revival.

The Reagan's administration's claim to reviving American leadership had three dimensions.

- To contain the adversary, the Soviet Union
- To reinvigorate the U.S economy and support for American interests and goals
- To command respect for American hegemony among the nations of the third world.

Reagan intrinsically believed that the Soviet Union was the 'evil empire' and the main culprit in destabilizing different regions of the world. From the Vietnam debacle in 1975 and the subsequent sweep of the communists over most of South-east Asia to the collapse of Ethiopia, Angola and Mozambique in Africa to the Afghan invasion and the coming to Power of the Sandinistas in Latin America, the Reagan administration directly attributed to the subversive goals of the Soviet Union. To counter the growing Soviet challenge the



administration saw the need for increased military spending which seemed to have badly neglected during the previous decade.

On the economic front, the Reagan administration in order to arrest economic slide used the theory of supply-side economics to cure inflation and stimulate growth. The administration believed that by employing supply side economics the administration could increase its overall revenues by cutting taxes. The removal of the heavy hand of government, it was said, would liberate the forces of enterprise and enthusiasm among workers and business owners alike to such a degree that there would be an unprecedented spurt of economic growth.<sup>32</sup>

Another important dimension of Reagan's foreign policy had been the avowed declaration of protecting the freedom of the people's of the third world states from Marxist-Leninist regimes aided and abetted by the Soviet Union. To Reagan, the ultimate expression in freedom did not involve moral appeals or diplomatic support- it meant supplying arms. In February, 1986, Reagan announced this determination to "enlarge the family of free nations," which came to be called the Reagan doctrine: "To those imprisoned in regimes held captive, to those beaten for daring to fight for freedom and democracy.... We say to you tonight you are not alone freedom fighters. America will support . . . with moral and material assistance your right not just to fight and die for freedom but to fight and win freedom-to win freedom in Afghanistan, in Angola, in Cambodia, and in Nicaragua."<sup>33</sup>

The regimes Reagan referred to were Marxist-Leninist and were in fact all faced with armed opposition movements. The U.S did become involved in these struggles, although its involvement proceeded indirectly and cautiously, without clear military commitments of a kind that could lead to a U.S-Soviet confrontation. The U.S sent arms to the Afghan rebels, primarily through Pakistan; U.S military aid reached the Angolan rebel movement UNITA; some aid went to the Kampuchean resistance; in Nicaragua, the U.S aided the Contra rebels against the Sadanista regime. Thus the Reagan administration's approach in regaining the lost respect for the U.S in the thirdworld reflected in the Reagan doctrine of arming virtually any movement, no matter how extreme or undemocratic as long as it was anti-communist.

In Africa, the Reagan administration's policies were largely determined by geo-political considerations as they were in other parts of the world. Throughout the 80s, the U.S officials were preoccupied with the fear that trends in South Africa and the Horn of Africa, if ignored or mishandled, would benefit the Soviet Union. Even those officials who favoured policies that were responsive to regional realities defended them in geo-political terms. Chester Crocker, the Assistant Secretary for African Affairs outlining U.S objectives in Africa commented that, "Events of the last decade have proven only too clearly that the objectives we seek in Africa are increasingly threatened by political instability, external intervention, and declining economic performance. Soviet-Cuban and Eastern bloc intervention in African affairs, the presence of thousands of Cuban troops in Angola and Ethiopia, the presence of Libyan troops in Chad, and the massive transfer of

arms by Eastern bloc nations all serve to undermine U.S and western interests in Africa and to thwart our and Africa's objectives."<sup>34</sup>

In order to address the problem of Soviet threat to the region, the Reagan administration began to increase military assistance to countries like Sudan, Kenya and Somalia in East Africa, all of which face toward the Indian Ocean and Persian Gulf, and thus are thought to be relevant for U.S strategic interests in those areas. In Southern Africa, the Reagan administration focussed its attention on the wide spread political instability in the region - Apartheid in South Africa, Civil war in Angola and Mozambique, and national liberation movement in Namibia. In a bid to thwart Soviet initiatives and to bring about political settlement to the ongoing conflicts in the region, the administration devised a policy popularly known as 'Constructive Engagement'. This policy sought to emphasize the value of a positive relationship with South Africa, claiming that this position offered greater opportunities to influence and change its racial policies. This policy also enabled the U.S to act as a mediator between South Africa and its Marxist neighbors, Mozambique and Angola. In Angola, both South Africa and the U.S who were supporting anti-government forces of UNITA made attempts to arrange a Cease-fire that would link Namibian independence to withdrawal of Cuban forces from Angola.<sup>35</sup> Thus the Reagan administration during its two tenures in office viewed most African crises from an East-West angle and laid great emphasis on the military and security aspects of U.S interests in Africa.

George Bush who succeeded Reagan in January, 1989 continued with the policies of the earlier administration in providing economic and military assistance to African allies until 1991 when, it became clear that all the old geopolitical reasons for U.S involvement in Africa had vanished. The Reagan-Gorbachev Moscow summit of 1988, signalled the end of cold war in Africa when the two leaders agreed to strive for a speedy accord in Southern Africa. This set the momentum for a gradual disengagement by both the super powers leaving Africa to its own fate. The Bush administration preoccupied with domestic economy and events in the Persian Gulf since 1991 began to put African issues on the backburner which proved costly for most African states still plagued by unresolved conflicts, political instability and economic chaos.<sup>36</sup>

Keeping in mind, the different interests and policy approaches of United States in Africa, the next two chapters will analyze U.S intervention in Angola and Ethiopia since 1975 in detail.

## Notes

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2. Morton Schwartz, 'The USSR and Leftist Regimes in less - developed countries', *Survey*, Vol. 19, No. 2, 1973, P. 212, for an excellent review of Soviet Third World relations also see Rajen Harshe, *Twentieth Century Imperialism: shifting contours and changing conceptions* (New Delhi, Sage Publications), 1997, pp. 192-241.
3. For these figures see Morton Schwartz, *Ibid*, P. 216-217.
4. *Ibid*, P. 217.
5. David A. Dickson, *United States Foreign Policy towards Sub-Saharan Africa* (NewYork, London: University Press of America), 1985, P. 14.
6. Morton Schwartz, *Op.cit*, P. 242.
7. Transcript of Interview with William Attwood, U.S. Ambassador to Guinea, Nairobi, Kenya, 8 November 1965, Oral History Collection, John F. Kennedy Presidential Library, Boston, P. 8, Quoted in David A. Dickson, *Op.cit*, P. 302.
8. John Stockwell, *In search of enemies: A CIA story* (NewYork: W. W. Norton and Co.) 1978, P. 51.
9. U.S. Department of State, Bureau of Public Affairs, Address by George Ball, "The Element in our Congo Policy", 19 Dec 1961, *Department of State Bulletin* 47, 8 January 1962, P. 420.
10. David A. Dickson, *Op.cit*, P. 303.

11. Ibid, P. 304.
12. G. Mermen Williams interview transcripts quoted in Ibid, P. 304.
13. Ibid, P. 305.
14. Johnson quoted in Ibid, P. 47.
15. Ibid, P. 47.
16. Ibid, P. 48.
17. See Mohamed A, El - Khawas and Barry Cohen ed., *The Kissinger study of Southern Africa: National Security Memorandum 39* (Connecticut: Lawrence Hill and Company), 1976, pp. 117 and also pp.135-136,138.
18. Ibid, pp. 21-22.
19. Ibid, P. 28.
20. Thomas J. Noer, 'International Credibility and Political Survival: the Ford Administration's Intervention in Angola', *Presidential Studies Quarterly*, Vol. XXII, No. 3,1993, P. 772.
21. Ibid, P. 783,
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23. Robert W. Tucker, *The purposes of American power: An essay on National Security* (New York: Praeger), 1981, PP. 16-17.
24. Jerel A. Rosati, "Jimmy Carter, a Man before his time? The emergence and collapse of the first post-cold war presidency", *Presidential Studies Quarterly*, Vol. XXII, No. 3,1993, P. 462.
25. Carter quoted in Ibid, P. 466.
26. Carter quoted in Ibid, P. 468.

27. See Walter Laquer, "Detente: Western and Soviet interpretations", *Survey*, Vol. 19, No. 3, 1973, PP. 74-87.
28. "Tar Baby Option" is the second option given in the NSSM39 which called for a partial relaxation of American measures against White racist regimes, together with increased aid for black Africa, especially South Africa's neighbours like Botswana, and diplomatic efforts to resolve tensions between the White governments and their neighbours. In damning the second option of partial relaxation, the State Department argued that, once adopted, the policy would prove sticky. The United States would be unable to abandon it if it did not work. Hence, the label given this option by its state opponents.
29. See the Statement by Philip C. Habib, under secretary for political affairs, "Southern Africa in the Global context", *Department of State Bulletin*, Vol. LXXVI, No. 1971, April 4, 1977, pp. 319-321.
30. See Samuel M. Makinda, "Conflict and the Super Powers in the Horn of Africa", *Third World Quarterly*, Vol. 4, No. 1, Jan 1982, P. 101.
31. Michael Cox, "Whatever happened to the second cold war? Soviet-American relations: 1980-1988", *Review of International Studies*, Vol. 16, 1990, P. 158.
32. John Agnew and Stuart Corbridge, *Mastering space: hegemony, territory and international political economy* (London & New York: Routledge), 1995, p. 122-123.
33. Facts on File, Feb 7, 1986, P. 77.
34. Chester Crocker's address before the African American Institute conference in Wichita, Kansas, on June 20, 1981, *Current Policy*, No. 289, P. 2.

35. See Michael Clough, 'Beyond Constructive Engagement', *Foreign Policy*, Winter, 1985-6, P. 5.
36. See Michael Clough, 'The United States and Africa: the policy of Cynical disengagement', *Current History*, Vol. 91, No. 565, May 1992, PP. 193-198.



## Chapter-V U.S intervention in Angola- a Critical appraisal

## CHAPTER V

The U.S involvement in Southern Africa and its intervention in Angola since 1975 is part of a long history of misperceptions and miscalculations that appear to have stemmed, at least to a great extent, from unrealistic notion that the Soviet Union was trying to orchestrate a 'total onslaught' on South Africa as part of a drive for world dominance. During the 1970's the steady Soviet military expansion and modernization particularly in areas of strategic nuclear weaponry and long-range force projection capabilities produced a substantial change in the global balance of power. The Soviet Union was also looking for ways to leap frog as well as weaken the U.S supported alliances that contained the spread of Soviet power. As the Soviet Unions influence and control, together with varying forms of Soviet military presence, spread to country after country, the U.S became alarmed since the Soviet Union's reach now extended to areas which were well outside the perimeter of containment.

The Soviet Unions involvement in supporting national liberation struggles in Southern Africa and its active assistance to left oriented fronts within Angola, Mozambique, Rhodesia including the ANC in South Africa was perceived as grave threat to U.S interests in the region. Moreover, U.S optimism in the early 70's of a continued presence of the Portuguese rule in Angola and Mozambique and the white regimes in South Africa and Rhodesia soon evaporated when a coup in Lisbon in 1974 precipitated the collapse of Portuguese colonial rule. This event led to a sudden withdrawal of the Portuguese from its African colonies leaving a power vacuum. The U.S wary of Soviet moves in the region

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began to covertly aid certain pro-western factions like the National Liberation Front of Angola(FNLA) and National Union for the Total Independence of Angola(UNITA) and thereby set the stage for a bloody civil war that continued to rage even into the nineties. Now, before we begin to analyze U.S intervention in Angola, it would not be out of place to discuss U.S interests in Southern Africa.

### **U.S Interests in Southern Africa**

U.S interests in Southern Africa are many and varied, though not vital.<sup>1</sup> These interests range from economic and political to strategic issues, which the U.S feared would be threatened in the event of a communist expansion in the region. U.S economic interests in sub-saharan Africa have been heavily concentrated in the Southern third of the continent. Nearly \$3 billion of direct investment, or about 60% of the Sub-Saharan total, is located there. Southern African trade totals over \$6 billion. This concentration of U.S interests reflects Southern Africa's tremendous mineral wealth and the relative sophistication of the area's economies especially those of South Africa and Zimbabwe. Southern Africa accounts for over 40% of Sub-Saharan GNP, 70% of its industrial and 60% of its mining output, 80% of the steel and 85% of the electricity consumed. The area contains immense deposits of many strategic minerals which are vital to industrial economies of the West, including: the platinum group (86% of the world reserves), Manganese (53%), Vanadium (64%), Chromium (95%), and Cobalt (52%) as well as a dominant share of world reserves and diamond output and internationally significant output of Coal, Uranium, Copper and other minerals.<sup>2</sup>

A more detailed and country wise breakup of resources ranks South Africa in the region as the most important U.S partner both in terms of Foreign direct investment (FDI) and trade. Figures quoted in NSSM39 showed that total U.S investment during 1968 and 1973 increased from \$692 million to \$1.2 billion, or by 73 percent in a five-year period. Similarly U.S exports to South Africa during the same period increased from \$450 million in 1968 to \$746 million in 1973, and imports from South Africa increased from \$250 million to \$ 377 million during the same period.<sup>3</sup> The net result was a very favourable balance of trade for the United States. Apart from the favourable balance of trade, the U.S also found the cheap African labour and the annual rate of return on direct American investment in South Africa which varied between 17 to 19 percent since 1968 very attractive, for investment.<sup>4</sup>

Another distinguishing feature of South African economy vis-a-vis other African economies has been that, while investments in other African economies have been in the extractive industries, more than 50% of American investment has been in the manufacturing sector while less than 10% is in mining.<sup>5</sup>

Apart from investments in the mining, manufacturing and service sectors, the U.S also had wide ranging scientific and military ties. During the Nixon administration, the U.S corporations were allowed to supply electrical navigational aids, communications equipment and computers for military purposes. For example, IBM supplied four computers to the South African Department of Defense, while ITT equipment and expert

knowledge have been applied to the regime's communications systems. General Electric, through its South African subsidiary, supplies about 95% of the diesel locomotives for South African railways. In addition, between 1967 and 1972, about \$10 million worth of herbicides were sold to Pretoria, and a General Motors plant was built in South Africa, specifically designed to allow for conversion to military production.<sup>6</sup> Another important area of U.S-South African Co-operation has been in the nuclear energy program and the maintenance of space tracking stations by National Aeronautical and Space Administration (NASA).<sup>7</sup>

Now, a brief look at the Table 5.1 gives a broad idea of the diversity of American corporate interests in South Africa which includes mining companies, manufacturing companies, service industries like banking, telecom etc as well as corporations interested in scientific-military co-operations.

**Table 5.1 Some of the U.S corporations operating in South Africa**

AAF International	Borg Warner	System
Abbott laboratories	Bristol Myers International	Columbus McKinnon
Addressograph Multigraph	Bucyms Erie	Control Date*
APIA	Caltex Petroleum*	CPC International
American Cynamid	Carborundum	Dames and Moore
American Express*	Cascade	Dart Industries
Arthur Anderson	J. I. Case	Donaldson
Applied Power	Caterpillar Tractors	Dow Chemicals
Automated Building Components	Celanese	Dresser Industries
Batten, Barton, Durstin and Osborn	Chase Manhattan*	Dubois International
Berkshire International	Cheeseborough-Ponds	Dunn and Bradstreet
Black Clawson	Chrysler*	Eastman Kodak*
Blue Bell	Citibank*	Echlin Manufacturing
Bprden	Coca Cola Export	Englehard Minerals and Chemicals
	Colgate-Palmolive	Envirotech
	Columbia Broadcasting	

ESSO Africa	Masonite	Revlon
J. A. Ewing and Mc	Max Factor	Rexnord
Donald	Measure	Richardson-Merrell
F & M Systems	Merck, Sharp and Dohme	Riggs Bank
Ferro	Geo. J. Meyer Mfg.	Robbins
Firestone Tire and	Miles Laboratories	A. H. Robins
Rubber*	Minnesota Mining and	Rockwell International*
Ford Motors*	Manufacturing	Helena Rubinstein
Gardner-Denver	Mobile Oil*	Schering Ploughs
Gates Rubber	Monsanto	Scholl
General Electric*	Nabisco	G. D. Searle
General Motors*	Nashua	Singer
Gillette	National Cash Register*	Tampax
Goodyear Tire and	National Chemearch	Timkin
Rubber*	National Standard	Titan
Heublein International	National Starch and	Trane
Honeywell International	Chemicals	Twentieth-Century Fox
International Business	Newmont Mining	Union Carbide*
Machines	A. C. Nielson International	Uniroyal International
International Flavors and	Norton	United States Steel
Fragrances	Otis Elevator*	Westinghouse Electrics
International Harvester	Pan American	
International Telegram and	Parke Davis	
Telephone*	Parker Hannifin	
Johnson and Johnson	Perkin-Elmer	
S. C. Johnson and Sons	Permatex	
Kellogg*	Pfizer International	
Kendall	Phillips Bros	
Kidder Peabody	Phillips Petroleum*	
McGraw-Hill	Pizza Inn	
Macmillan Publishing	Precision Valve	
M & T Chemicals	Performed Line Products	
Manufacturers Hanover	Ramsey Engineering	

\*Major US multinationals operating in South Africa.

*Source:* H.E. Newsum and Olayiwola Abegunrin, 'United States Foreign Policy towards Southern Africa: Andrew Young and Beyond'. (London: Macmillan Press Ltd) 1987, P. 97-98.

The U.S economic interests in the region also extended to Namibia and Portuguese Angola and Mozambique. The South African occupation of Namibia gave a foothold for U.S corporations to exploit the vast mineral wealth of Namibia. Some of the major

multinationals companies operating in Namibia are the consolidated Diamond mines of Southwest Africa, Rossing Uranium and Tsumeb corporation. These three transnational own something like 90% of the assets in base metals, Uranium and Diamond mining. They also account for nearly half of Namibia's gross domestic product and for more than three-quarters of its export.<sup>8</sup> Some of the other multinationals operating in Namibia in gross violation of a Dec 13, 1974, U.N General Assembly resolution 3295 (XXIX)<sup>9</sup> on the protection of Namibia's natural resources are given in Table 5.2.

**Table 5.2. Some of the U.S companies operating in Namibia by 1982**

Company	Date of arrival		
General Motors	1920s	Parker Pens	1954*
Ford Motors	1920s	General Electric	1956*
Farrell Lines	1925s	Quaker Oats	1956*
Chrysler	1930s	Coca Cola	1958
Caltex	1937	Chase Manhattan	1959*
Tsumeb Corporation	1947	Marine Diamond	1962*
American Motors	1947	Getty Oil	1963
Pan American	1947*	Standard Oil of California	1963
Goodyear	1947	Texaco	1963
Johnson and Johnson	1947*	Gulf Oil	1965
Eastman Kodak	1947	National Cash Register	n.a.
Colgate-Palmolive	1950	Minnesota Mining and Manufacturing	n.a.
Bethlehem Steel	1952	Phillips Petroleum	1972ab
IBM	1952	Mobil Oil	1976c
Uniroyal	1953*	Holiday Inns	1976
Star Kist Foods	1954		

*Source:* H.E. Newsum and Olayiwola Abegunrin, 'United States Foreign Policy Towards Southern Africa: Andrew Young and Beyond' (London: Macmillan Press Ltd) 1987, p.96.

Apart from economic interests in South Africa and Namibia, the U.S also had economic interests in the Portuguese held Angola and Mozambique. In 1966, the U.S company,



Gulf oil, found petroleum off the coast of Cabinda and was given a concession to exploit the province by the Portuguese. By the end of 1972, Gulf was contributing 13 percent of Angola's budget and 60 percent of military expenditure.<sup>10</sup> Some of other American companies which sought access to petroleum concessions in Angola were Ranger oil company of Cheyenne, Superior oil company of Houston, Carlsberg Resources Corporation (Los Angeles), the Milford Argosy corporation of North Portland, Esso Exploration, Incorporated of Houston, and Iberan petroleum limited of Stanford. In addition, Western Geophysical company, a subsidiary of Litton industries, was subcontracted by Angola to carry out part of its prospecting activities off shore in the Congo area. Further, Texaco continued its prospecting operations with ANGOL, PETRANGOL and TOTAL. It was also reported that ANGOL-PETRANGOL had negotiated with a group of foreign companies to increase off shore prospecting activities in the Cuanza area.<sup>11</sup>

In the area of mineral exploration, Portugal granted concessions in 1969 to three American firms-Diversa Incorporated, Diamond Distributors of New York and DIAMUL for diamond prospecting and exploration in Southeast Angola. The Rockefeller group represented by the Clark Canadian Exploration Company, holds one-third of the share capital of the Companhia dos Fosfatos de Angola (COFAN), which began Phosphate prospecting in Cabinda in 1969. In May, 1972, the Great Lakes Carbon Corporation of NewYork applied for a concession to prospect for and exploit copper deposits in Cuanza(North Districts). That same year, Argo Petroleum Corporation of LosAngeles received a concession covering five areas totalling 12,189 square kilometers. In 1973, the

Riverwood Corporation of Midland Texas was contracted by the Companhia dos Asfaltos de Angola for the exploitation of rock asphalt.<sup>12</sup>

In regard to Mozambique, Bethlehem steel and its consortium partners obtained an exclusive concession in 1972 for mineral prospecting between Djanguire to Changara in the Teta District. In the same year, the Export-Import Bank granted an investment loan of a little over a million dollars to the Banco comercial e industrial de laurencio Marques. Hunt international petroleum company and Mozambique Amoco oil company were other companies involved in oil prospecting and exploitation.<sup>13</sup> Thus Angola and Mozambique became increasingly integrated into the non-Portuguese western industrial structure, requiring western investment and technology.

Among the political interests, the U.S was mostly concerned by the racial repression of the black majority by the white minority regimes in the region. The U.S was aware that the racial question was a sensitive issue on the continent and also knew that close relationship with white minority regimes in the region would make the U.S suspect in the eyes of the Africans for tacitly approving racism. So, the U.S understood that its stand on the racial issue held the key to any future relations with African states. With rising black aspirations for freedom and the Soviet involvement in the region that stood to gain by challenging the region's statusquo; the situation became even more complicated for the U.S. The U.S was also worried that "adverse reaction to our policy in Southern Africa could make more difficult our relationships elsewhere in Africa on a variety of matters including U.S defense installations, over flight rights and the use of port facilities and

economic investment." The other political interests in the region were, the denial of political opportunities for the Soviet Union by working closely with moderate pro-western African states for resolving regional problems.

Thus, the U.S with its substantial economic and political interests in the region pursued a policy that emphasized close ties with the white regimes in South Africa, Rhodesia and the Portuguese colonies of Angola and Mozambique. But at the same time it did not lose sight of the fact that close ties with the white regimes would jeopardise future relations with other black states and also open up opportunities for communist in roads in the region. However, the strategic and economic interests prevailed over political interests during the 1960's and early 1970's because of the mistaken notion that the region was secure from internal as well as external political threats. The strong anti-communist posture of the white regimes in the region bolstered such a belief.

But the fall of Marcello Caetano government in Portugal in the spring of 1974 and the subsequent announcement by the military government in Lisbon of the withdrawal from its colonies in Africa dramatically altered the situation in the region.<sup>15</sup> The U.S suddenly woke up to the fact that the Portuguese withdrawal from Angola and Mozambique would create a power vacuum that could threaten its interests in the region. Fearing a possible communist threat in Angola, the U.S began to secretly aid certain pro-western factions like the FNLA to tilt the power balance in its favour. This move set the stage for a prolonged and bloody civil war that raged even into the 90's.

## **The Angolan Civil war and the U.S intervention**

The April 1974 coup in Portugal which led to the sudden withdrawal of the Portuguese from its African colonies marked the beginning of a long drawn out civil war in Angola. This dramatic decision to withdraw left Angola completely unprepared for independence. However, on Jan 15, 1975, the Alvor accord was signed for this purpose. It provided for a coalition government in which the three Angolan independence movements, Movimento popular de libertacao de Angola (MPLA), Frente-Nacional de liberatacao de Angoal (FNLA), and Uniao Nacional para a Independencial total de Angola (UNITA) were to participate.<sup>16</sup> This was to be a transitional government empowered to draft a constitution and to organize national elections in October 1975, after which, on November 11, Angola was to become independent. This plan for a peaceful, democratic route to independence had the blessing of the Organization of African Unity (OAU). But factional politics intervened. The question of who would rule Angola was settled not through the ballot box, but on the battle-field. Because of differences that were tribal and ideological in origin, the MPLA, FNLA and UNITA began to fight, and the intensity of the civil war grew steadily. To make matters worse foreign powers became involved in this factional war and independence struggle.

In accordance with its policy of supporting progressive forces within the national liberation movements, the Soviet Union identified the MPLA as its ally in Angola and its leader, Dr. Agostino Neto whose Marxist orientation and connections were well known. The support base for MPLA mostly consisted of sympathetic whites, mestizos, urban

groups such as workers and slum dwellers, and the Mbundu ethnic group. Given the diverse nature of the support base, Agostino Neto although paying tribute to the Marxist-leninist ideology, felt that such a political programme would need adaptation to suit the needs of Africa.<sup>17</sup> The MPLA with its marxist orientation began developing close relations with the Soviet Union since the time Agostino Neto attended the 23<sup>rd</sup> congress of the CPSU in 1966, 24<sup>th</sup> congress in 1971 and Moscow celebrations in 1967 marking the 50<sup>th</sup> anniversary of the Bolshevik revolution. Moreover, Neto was also a member of the presidium of the pro-Soviet world peace council. In 1971, Dr. Neto declared at the 24<sup>th</sup> congress of the CPSU that "our people, the fighters representing the vanguard of the anti-colonialist struggle in Angola, feel the friendship and support of the Soviet people. We regard the communist party of the Soviet Union as one of the main forces we rely upon in developing our liberation struggle".<sup>18</sup> The official Soviet position was that the MPLA was the only genuine liberation movement in Angola. Oleg Ignatyev, writing from Luanda in the fall of 1974, branded FNLA and UNITA as "Organizations which call themselves champions of national liberation but which were actually knocked together by anti-popular forces mainly for the purpose of fighting the country's real patriots united in the MPLA."<sup>19</sup> The Soviet leaders decided to strengthen the military power of the MPLA faction when the FNLA faction started receiving increased Chinese and American aid.<sup>20</sup>

FNLA led by Holden Roberto was another important faction having its base among the Congo people on both sides of the Angolan / Belgian Congo Border. FNLA, earlier known as the Union of the People of Northern Angola (UPNA) developed as a movement

in the 1950s. The Parochial nature of the movement did not allow it to gain much support among other ethnic groups leaving it mostly as a North Angolan faction. Roberto, after attending an All-African people's congress in Accra in 1958 realized that the 'Northern' limitation appeared to be an anachronism in modern Africa and induced his fellow leaders to drop the 'Northern' epithet and changed the name to the Union of the People's of Angola (UP A) and became its president.<sup>21</sup>

Since the 1950s both the MPLA and UPA intermittently clashed with the Portuguese authorities in Angola which made them to clamp down on these embryonic movements; and their leaders were either arrested like Agostino Neto or fled the country, like Mario de Andrade (MPLA party president), Viriato da Cruz, and Lucia Lara who all three took refuge first in Paris, then in Conakry, and finally in Leopoldville. The UPA too set up its base in the capital of the former Belgium Congo when that country became independent in 1960. From there Roberto was able to keep in touch with his Kongo supporters and established himself, in the eyes of the outside world, as the most significant figure in the Angolan nationalist movement.<sup>22</sup> However, in 1961 both the groups simultaneously launched military attacks on the Portuguese. The MPLA engineered an uprising in Luanda aimed at releasing political prisoners and the UPA operating over the Congo border into Northern Angola killing a number of Portuguese nationals.<sup>23</sup> But the attacks were quickly repulsed by the Portuguese and the leaders of both the factions had to retreat to their bases in the Congo. At no point in their struggle against the Portuguese, the leaders of both the MPLA and FNLA came together. Instead, their mutual hostility grew stronger because the leaders of each group were seeking power for themselves.

Soon after the attack, in 1962, Neto was released from prison and he fled to Congo where he succeeded de Andrade as President of MPLA. Intra-party feuds within the MLPA led to the expulsion of Da Cruz resulting in a split in the party. Shortly afterwards, Neto and his own followers were driven from the Congo and moved their head quarters to Brazzaville. During this period, the image of the MPLA sank very low in the estimation of outside observers. By contrast, Roberto kept a firm grip on his party, renamed it the National Front for the Liberation of Angola (FNLA) and set up a government in exile which was officially recognized by the organization of African unity in 1963.<sup>24</sup>

It was at this moment that a new faction emerged to fight the Portuguese. Jonas Savimbi, a prominent member of the FNLA who became thoroughly dissatisfied with Roberto's style of functioning left FNLA to form his own organization called UNITA, drawing supporters mainly from his ethnic Ovimbundu tribe.<sup>25</sup> In order to fight the Portuguese, Savimbi tried to enlist the support of the USSR, Czechoslovakia, Hungary, East Germany and China. But as his efforts failed he began sporadic guerilla warfare in Mexico province in 1966, claiming to be the only nationalist group to have base in Angola itself. Soon, Savimbi was able to convince China about UNITA credentials as the most effective anti-colonial movement in Angola and so won support from that quarter.<sup>26</sup>

However, the Portuguese revolution of 1974 had given a new sense of urgency to the Angolan nationalist movement. Each faction tried to build up arms supplies in preparation for an internal power struggle. In May 1974, Chinese advisers arrived in Zaire to train FNLA guerrilla and arms were sent in from August. Using Zaire as a

conduit, the U.S began secretly aiding the FNLA in July and January 1975, the National security council's. "Forty Committee" approved \$300,000 in aid to the FNLA. Altogether, from August through December 1975, about \$60 million worth of arms were sent to Angola.<sup>28</sup> In response to Chinese and American aid for FNLA, the Soviet Union began to supply arms directly and via the Congo to the MPLA faction from October 1974.<sup>29</sup> However, it did not totally neglect diplomatic channels for a solution to the civil war in Angola. But the U.S administration ignored all diplomatic overtures hoping to somehow manage a victory for the FNLA.<sup>30</sup> In January 1975, the Ford administration gave \$300,000 in covert aid to the FNLA. Wayne Smith, a former official in the U.S foreign service and a leading expert on Cuba, stated that Ford and Kissinger deliberately encouraged the FNLA to launch an attack on the MPLA in March 1975, and encouraged President Mobutu of Zaire to support the FNLA with his own regular troops.<sup>31</sup> The Soviet Union's response to this U.S backed offensive against the MPLA was to increase its shipment of arms to Neto. Cuba, meanwhile, following a meeting in May 1975 between Neto and Cuban comandante, Flavio Bravo in Brazzaville, agreed to assist the training of the MPLA recruits.<sup>32</sup>

By July 1975, the success of the MPLA seemed imminent and it was hoped that it would form the government by November 11, the date set for the independence of Angola. It was at this juncture that the U.S began intensifying its support and increased the supply of arms to the FNLA and UNITA. The Central Intelligence Agency (CIA) stations and bases in Southern Africa were responsible for co-ordinating the distribution of U.S war material. On 17 July 1975, the "40 committee" met and authorised \$14 million for further



paramilitary operations inside Angola.<sup>33</sup> On 19<sup>th</sup> July, the first U.S C14 flight carrying arms to Angola delivered its Cargo to the FNLA. Cargoes from CIA warehouses in Texas were assembled in South Carolina and delivered to Matadi, Zaire, on 12<sup>th</sup> September 1975 for collection by the FNLA.<sup>34</sup>

According to John Stockwell, head of the CIA's Angola Task Force, who published "In search of Enemies: A CIA story" believed that "from the outset we (the United States) were deeply involved in managing the war from Washington, from Kinshasa and from advance bases inside Angola....[the] intelligence effort was always subordinate to their [CIA officers] advisory activities. CIA communications officers trained FNLA and UNITA technicians at the Angolan advance bases. Kinshasa cables reported that CIA paramilitary officers were training UNITA forces in Silva Porto and the FNLA in Ambriz. . . . A retired Army Colonel was hired on contract and assigned full time to the FNLA command at Ambriz."<sup>35</sup> Another interesting twist in the Angolan imbroglio had been the presence of U.S and other western mercenaries fighting along side the FNLA and UNITA. Ward Churchill writing for 'Africa Today' investigated the links between some U.S Army veterans running mercenary recruiting rackets calling for enlistment in such operations as in Angola.<sup>36</sup>

The situation was further aggravated by a massive South African invasion into Southern Angola in October 1975 coinciding with an incursion of Zairean troops in the North. The U.S was not unaware of these developments favouring FNLA and UNITA, and their silence at this stage amounted to a tacit approval of the South African offensive.

By 3<sup>rd</sup> November 1975, South African troops had penetrated 700 Kilometers into Angola and were rapidly advancing towards the capital city. The conflict had now been transformed from a guerilla struggle for independence into a full scale war against a professional foreign invading army. Consequently the MPLA leadership sent out an urgent appeal to the Soviet Union for international solidarity. Cuba immediately responded with Soviet backing by air lifting Cuban combat troops to Angola to assist the MPLA in its struggle against foreign invaders.<sup>38</sup> This Cuban move was instrumental in turning back FNLA and its supporter, South Africa at the battle of Quifangondo.

The U.S wanted to respond to Cuba's intervention by increasing American assistance to the FNLA and to UNITA. By December 1975, however, the Cuban's military effectiveness made it clear that any increased assistance to FNLA and UNITA would not help them to capture power. Only large scale commitment of U.S troops or an unrestrained South African intervention with full U.S backing could have reversed the momentum which favoured the MPLA. But neither option was acceptable since the first threatened domestic tranquility and the second, diplomatic intrests.<sup>39</sup> Both alternatives nonetheless had their champions in the congress and within the executive branch. But a group of U.S senators led by Dick Clark, a democrat from Iowa and John Tunnery and Alan Cranston of California learned of the Cladestine operation and pressed for legislation that came to be known as the Clark Amendment which banned American aid to the fighting Angolan groups. As a result the South Africans began to pull out of Angola, charging the United States with defaulting on a promise to give them all

necessary support in their campaign to defeat the MPLA. The Chinese also had withdrawn from the fight in the later half of 1975, when it realized to its dismay that any affiliation with the racist South Africa would seriously damage its political image in Africa. As the South Africans and the Chinese withdrew, FNLA and UNITA resistance crumbled. By March 1976 the war for all practical purposes was over, and the MPLA was left in sole possession of power.<sup>40</sup>

Immediately after forming the government, the MPLA led Angola entered into a twenty-year treaty of friendship and co-operation with the Soviet Union on October 8, 1976. This in effect cemented the already existing ties between the MPLA and the Soviet Union. The newly formed government introduced a number of social and economic reforms in line with the Soviet conception of a Socialist-Oriented state. In order to enable the new government to succeed in the eyes of the third-world, the Soviet Union continued its support to Angola both from a military and economic angle. The U.S, thoroughly demoralized by the turn of events could no longer do anything to salvage its position in Angola. The Ford-Kissinger administration tied down by the Clark amendment that disallowed any further covert aid to the FNLA and UNITA helplessly watched as the MPLA gained power. To add to its dismay, its European allies also recognized the MPLA and the first to do so was France on 17<sup>th</sup> February 1976. However, the Ford-Kissinger administration refused to recognize the MPLA government and vetoed its membership application at the U.N. After President Ford's election defeat in early November, the administration withdrew its veto and Angola joined the U.N.

## **Carter administration and Angola**

After the Carter administration took office on 20 January 1977, the thrust of its policy making process for Africa was focussed on Rhodesia and Namibia rather than Angola. This was not due to the evolving situation in these two countries, nor was it due to congressional limitations on American involvement in Angola. It was because, in marked contrast to the Ford administration, President Carter was reconciled to the situation in Angola. In fact, during the 1976 Presidential campaign, Carter talking to 'Africa Report' argued.

"I think that the United States position in Angola should be one which admits that we missed the opportunity to be a positive and creative force for good in Angola . . . .we should also realize that the Russian and Cuban presence in Angola, while regrettable and counter productive of peace, need not constitute a threat to United States interests, nor does that presence mean the existence of a satellite on the continent."<sup>42</sup>

Such positive pronouncements signaled a departure from the cold war mindset that drove Africa Policy during the Nixon and Ford administrations. During the first ten months of the Carter administration, Andrew Young, the U.S ambassador to the U.S set the tone of its policy towards Africa and Angola. He advocated a policy that would moderately try to accommodate, at minimal cost to the western capitalist system, the African demands for majority rule in Southern Africa. He pressed the Carter administration to recognize the MPLA leadership in Angola. He argued that, regardless of their political belief in

Socialism or Marxism-Leninism, President Agostinho Neto of Angola was a man educated in western and Christian traditions. He also warned that, if the U.S refused to deal with him, there were young African nationalists in Southern Africa who were more radical and not educated in western Christian traditions. If any of these came to power, it would most likely mean instability and chaos for economic interests in Southern Africa.<sup>43</sup> He further argued that the Cuban troop presence in Angola was not a problem and moreover believed that the troops might play a positive role in helping the fledgling MPLA regime to defend Gulf oil's investments in Cabinda. Young's approach won support as a number of business people, academicians and government officials favoured diplomatic recognition of Angola at a State department conference on Angola in February 1978. Gulf oil corporation also favoured such an approach.<sup>44</sup>

However, events such as the conflicts of 1977 and 1978 in the Shaba province of Zaire, between Katangese and President Mobutu, and the war between Ethiopia and Somalia over the Ogaden region in 1977, where Cuban forces played a crucial role set the alarm bells ringing in the Carter administration.<sup>45</sup> These events brought back memories of Angolan debacle and an yet another challenge by the communists in Africa. This provided an opportunity for officials like Zbigniew Brzezinski, the President's National Security Advisor to mount a globalist challenge to the policy pursued by regionalists like Andrew Young, Richard Moose, Assistant Secretary of the State and Anthony Lake, Director of the State Department's policy planning committee.

Brzezinski's conception of African policy resembled that of Kissinger and was dominated by geo-political interests and Africa was seen as part of the overall power balance. The continuing presence of the Cuban forces in Angola and Ethiopia after the Ogaden war worried the administration and it felt that the communist expeditionary force was moving at will through Africa. This presented a serious challenge to President Carter. He was accused of being "soft on communism". Brzezinski seizing the opportunity presented by the turn of events in Africa began to push forward a tough line against Cuban presence in Angola and linked Angolan recognition to the withdrawal of the Cubans. Later, in 1977, the Soviet invasion of Afghanistan reinforced American fears of Soviet motives in Africa and once again U.S-Angolan relations were held hostage to issues which had no direct bearing on American interests in Angola. Thus, the initial optimism of possible co-operative relationship with Angola vanished as Carter's term approached its end in 1980.

### Reagan and Angola

During Reagan's administration Angola became central to the American strategy of containment in Southern Africa. In American perception Cuban involvement in Angola in 1975-76 represented a major failure for the United States as a global power. Moreover, the continuing presence of Cuban troops in Angola was seen as a glaring symbol and reminder of that failure. In contrast to the Carter administration which, however in consistently and unclearly, sought an accommodation with what it viewed as a fait

accompli in Angola, the Reagan administration apparently sought to "roll back" the Cuban and Soviet presence there.

Through the eight year Reagan era, U.S policy towards Southern Africa was shaped by Chester Crocker, the Assistant secretary of state for African Affairs. Crocker devised a policy of 'constructive engagement' that sought to bring about a negotiated settlement to the political problems in Southern Africa.<sup>46</sup> Crocker's strategy was based on the conviction that the United States could not force South Africa in dismantling apartheid and that constructive change could come only with their co-operation. He also believed that a solution to the vexed question of Namibian independence lies in addressing South African security concerns. Just as the South African government feared Cuban backed Angola, the Angolan government was perpetually afraid of South African destabilization moves in the region. South African support of UNITA rebels inside Angola was another major concern for Angola. Crocker realizing the complexity of the Southern African situation devised the strategy of 'constructive engagement' that linked Namibian independence to the withdrawal of Cuban forces from Angola. This was a skillfully crafted policy aimed at pressuring Angolan governments to negotiate with South Africa or else face reprisals from South African backed UNITA rebels.<sup>47</sup>

In one of its first moves, the Reagan administration in 1981, tried to force the withdrawal of Cuban troops from Angola and the inclusion of a pro-western element, UNITA, within<sup>a</sup> a new coalition government through a combination of economic blandishment and Political destabilization.<sup>48</sup> An official memorandum, attributed to Assistant secretary of

state, Chester Crocker, stated that the Soviet backed government of Angola would be told that Washington could help it economically but only after "the Cubans leave and only after an understanding is reached with Savimbi, leader of the UNITA faction."<sup>49</sup> The other options contemplated by the administration was to increase assistance to the UNITA rebels either directly, or through third parties and also encourage South Africa to step up their military activities inside Angola territory raising the cost of Cuban/Soviet involvement.

This strategy of threats concretely began taking shape as the administration requested the congress to lift the Clark amendment in April 1981 that prohibited U.S military assistance to Angolan political factions.<sup>50</sup> Although, the administration failed to get congressional approval at that time, it flirted with the idea of extending recognition to Jonas Savimbi's UNITA in order to force a political showdown in Angola.<sup>51</sup> In the meantime, South Africa, encouraged by America's tough policy towards Angola began to help Savimbi regroup his forces and gave them arms and equipment. The main purpose was to destabilize Angola in order to show that only with UNITA in government, there could be peace and order. The means to this end were acts of diversion, terrorism, armed raids, and provocations.<sup>52</sup>

In a raid in July 1980, UNITA guerrillas struck the major Atlantic port of Lobito and claimed the total destruction of the oil storage depot and harbour facilities.<sup>53</sup> In January 1984, UNITA forces attacked villages and towns in Huambo province resulting in the hospitalization of as many as 2,200 people.<sup>54</sup> In April 1984, Jonas Savimbi claimed



responsibility for bombing Cuban barracks in Huambo which claimed over 200 people.<sup>55</sup> In October 1984, the power transmission line supplying power to Luanda, the Angolan capital and the adjoining districts, was destroyed.<sup>56</sup> In March 1986, Andrada township where diamonds are mined was attacked and more than 150 foreign experts were abducted.<sup>57</sup> And these were just a few of the hundreds of hit and run attacks on civilian targets by UNITA. In May 1985, an ICRC (International Committee of the Red Cross) report accused UNITA of "attacks, reprisals, looting and mining of fields and paths". It also blamed this South African backed rebel organization for the large scale displacement of the Angolan people- 50,000 in Huambo and Benguela provinces; 75,000 in Bie and Huambo and 75,000 in Mexico, Huila and Cunene provinces.<sup>58</sup>

UNITA's major target apart from the civil ones, was the Benguela railway line. The land locked countries like Zaire and Zambia as well as Zimbabwe and Mozambique use the Benguela railway line to have access to sea port facilities in Angola. The destruction of this line would force these countries to rely on South African railways and ports. UNITA's war against the railways cost Angola millions of dollars to rebuild bridges and replace wrecked locomotives and rolling stock. These insurgency activities by UNITA have posed a big threat to Angola.<sup>59</sup>

Another source of threat for Angola came directly from South Africa which periodically has conducted raids into Southern Angola in search of what they call SWAPO guerrillas. The South African regime claimed it was making pre-emptive attacks on SWAPO bases

inside Angola, but in the process created massive destruction of bridges, railway lines and other economic installations including the uprooting of people in Southern Angola.

In one such raid on July 12, 1981, the South African forces had attacked a SWAPO base 90 miles inside Angola and killed 114 people.<sup>60</sup> Again, between 1<sup>st</sup> November and 20<sup>th</sup> November South Africa invaded 150 miles inside Angola.<sup>61</sup> It also crossed into Southern Angola on August 25, 1982; September 16, 1985; November 14, 1986; November 2, 1987 and January 15, 1988.<sup>62</sup> On each one of these cross-border raids, the South African forces claimed civilian lives as well as economic destruction. The South African intention in destabilizing Angola was to keep it in some form of turmoil with the object of showing the world that the MPLA rule does not work, unless there was some kind of accommodation with other rival groups in the country. The other intention could have been that, destabilization helps South Africa in diverting Angola's attention from supporting SWAPO reconstruction of its wrecked economy. Thus, Angola faced with the twin threats of UNITA subversion and South African raids was forced to move closer to the Soviet Union and Cuba for its survival.

However, since the beginning of the 1980's Angola, while maintaining close contacts with the Soviet Union and Cuba, has sought to expand its political and economic ties with the west in an effort to attract much needed investments and economic assistance, as well as to enlist western help for pressuring South Africa to abandon its policy of aggressive support for UNITA, and to achieve a speedy solution of the Namibian problem. The Soviet Union showed its displeasure at Angolan overtures to the west and during the visit

of Lucio Lara, the reputed leader of the MPLA party, to Moscow in January 1982, an unprecedented 10 year \$2 billion economic assistance was initiated.<sup>63</sup> The timing of this aid, only a few weeks after the first round of the U.S - Angolan talks, suggested that it was designed to demonstrate the Soviet Union's commitment to Angola and to strengthen the pro-Soviet elements within the MPLA. It was also aimed at undercutting any possible American aid that could be offered as part of a Namibian settlement package. Throughout 1982 there was an upsurge in high-level exchange between the Soviet Union and Angola. In the wake of Lara's talks in Moscow, Cuban foreign minister Isodoro Malmierca met with Angolan leaders in Luanda.<sup>64</sup> At the conclusion of this visit, on February 4, a joint communique was issued outlining the Cuban-Angolan stand on the presence of Cuban troops in Angola, including the conditions for their departure.<sup>65</sup> These conditions were, the withdrawal of South African forces from Angolan territory, cessation of Pretoria's aggressive activities against Angola, and implementation of U.N security council resolution 435 on Namibian independence.<sup>66</sup>

Two months later, Soviet deputy foreign minister Leonid Lichev visited Angola. His visit was followed by that of the East German foreign minister Oskar Fischer.<sup>67</sup> In November, Lucio Lara, and subsequently Angolan defence minister Pedro Tonho, travelled to Havana.<sup>68</sup> Despite all these consultations Angola continued to negotiate with the United States hoping for an early solution to the Namibian independence and normalization of relations between the U.S and Angola. Between 1982 and 1985, both Angola and the U.S had numerous bilateral discussions for addressing problem issues in Southern Africa. Table 5.3 gives an idea of these efforts.

**Table 5.3**

Bilateral meetings between the people's Republic of Angola and the United States during Regan administration.

Date	Place	Principals
July 21-24, 1982	Luanda	President dos Santos and Vernon Walters
August 17, 1982	Luanda	President dos Santos and Frank Wisner-USA
September 27, 1982	Luanda	Paulo Jorge-RPA and Frank Wisner- USA
Octobers, 1982	New York	Paulo Jorge-RPA and George Schultz-USA
January 26, 1983	Luanda	Paulo Jorge-RPA and Nicholas Platt-USA
March 16, 1983	Paris	A. Rodrigues-RPA and Frank Wisner-USA
April 13-14, 1983	Wash. D.C	A. Rodrigues-RPA and G. Bush, G.Shultz-USA
October 6, 1983	New York	Paulo Jorge-RPA and Chester Crocker-USA
January 20-22, 1984	Cape Verde	V.da Moura-RPA and Frank Wisner-USA
February 16-17, 1984	Lusaka	A. Rodrigues-RPA and Chester Crocker-USA
May 28, 1984	Lusaka	A. Rodrigues-RPA and Chester Crocker-USA
July 24-25, 1984	Cape Verde	A. Rodrigues-RPA
September 6-7, 1984	Luanda	A. Rodrigues-RPA and Chester Crocker-USA
September 28-29 1984	Luanda	A. Rodrigues-RPA and Frank Wisner-USA
October 15-16, 1984	Luanda	A. Rodrigues-RPA and Frank Wisner-USA
December 3-5, 1984	Luanda	A. Rodrigues-RPA and Frank Wisner-USA
January 29-30, 1984	Luanda	A. Rodrigues-RPA and Frank Wisner-USA
March 18, 1985	Cape Verde	A. Rodrigues-RPA and Chester Crocker-USA

Source: Genrald J. Bender, James S. Coleman and Richard L. Sklar ed., 'African crisis areas and U.S foreign policy' (Berkeley & Condon: University of California press) 1985, p.120.

However, the fragility of Angolan government's diplomatic manoeuvrings and its increased reliance on Soviet military and Cuban support was once again underscored by

the fact that the U.S could not restrain the South Africans from attacking Angola. South Africa's deep penetration into Angola to provide logistical assistance for UNITA's August 1983 attack against Cangamba, an MPLA-held town in Eastern Angola, greatly alarmed the MPLA leadership and confounded their previous assessments of how far South Africa would go in Angola.<sup>69</sup> This battle also marked a turning point since it prompted, the Angolan government to refocus its energies away from diplomacy to the battle field. On September 16, Havana domestic service reported president Dos Santo's statement that "more assistance would be requested from friendly countries if it became necessary to defend the country's sovereignty."<sup>70</sup> This comment was echoed by Angola's ambassador to Cuba during a press conference in Havana. To complement this military buildup in Angola, the Soviet Union employed a more aggressive diplomacy, apparently to impress upon South Africa the seriousness with which they viewed Angolan developments. In November, Soviet delegates to the U.N warned the South Africans directly to desist from their policies of destabilization in Southern Africa.<sup>71</sup> As South Africa continued its destabilization policies, the Soviet Union, Cuba and Angola held consultations on 11 January, 1984 in Moscow, where an understanding was reached to strengthen Angola's defence capability.

#### Lusaka Accord

In a dramatic turn of events in early 1984, the Angolans and South Africans gave a brief respite to their war efforts and shifted their concerns to a negotiated settlement of the region's problems. The result was the signing of an accord on February 16, 1984 at Lusaka, Zambia which called for the staged withdrawal of South African forces from

Southern Angola in exchange for Angola's commitment to prevent South West Peoples Organization (SWAPO) from entering the area. A joint monitoring commission was established to police the area of disengagement and to prevent infiltration of Northern Namibia by SWAPO guerrillas. The accord was significant in many respects because it had put a stop to fighting that was a decade old. Perhaps it was even more important for Soviet interests in the region because it was not made a party to the treaty. Angola signed "Lusaka Accord" without informing Moscow. However, Angola had every reason to sign the accord since it was in an extremely difficult position from mid-1983 onwards.<sup>72</sup> The Botha regime was determinedly asserting South Africa's role as a regional power, deploying the South African Defence Force (SADF) across its border to any point required by its perceived security interests in keeping SWAPO insurgents at bay. The ruling MPLA-labour party was in a state of internal disarray, its regime having lost much of its popular base because of relentless economic hardship and conditions of insecurity; the war has taken an enormous toll on the Angolan nation. President dos Santos calculated material losses at \$12 billion; the number of dead was said to be "incalculable"; over 500,000 have been crippled and 600,000 people or ten percent of the population displaced.<sup>73</sup> The country's economy was also in ruins as over half of the foreign-exchange earnings, primarily from oil, has had to be used for war-related payments. The Cuban forces alone are estimated to have cost Angola \$250 million a year apart from the huge sum of \$2,500 million owed to the Soviet Union by 1989 for its military sales.<sup>74</sup> It was against this somber background that the Angolan leaders signed the accord which they regarded as an absolute necessity. Even without informing either SWAPO or the Soviet Union.

Moscow's reaction to the accord was a grudging approval. On March 18, 1984 Soviet political commentator Alexander Bovin candidly laid out on Moscow television the factors that figured in the Angolan decision to sign an agreement with South Africa, nevertheless, he criticized the accord, calling it "naive" to think that Pretoria's destabilization efforts could be stopped by "treaties and agreements". He concluded by stating that the region's fundamental problems were all linked to the existence of the white minority government in Pretoria, implying that the armed struggle should be continued.

However, in April, the general situation in Angola once again deteriorated and the media reported a UNITA bomb attack near a military hostel in Huambo on April 18, 1984 that killed more than 200 people, including two Soviet and 37 Cuban army officers.<sup>76</sup> These incidents made Cuba decide to stay back in Angola. While a communique issued at the conclusion of Dos Santos visit to Havana in March 1984 seemed uncompromising on the continued Cuban presence, it may well have been designed to protect Havana's prestige rather than to impede a Namibian settlement. In fact, president Fidel Castro has sought to present Cuba as a constructive factor in the talks on Namibia and expressed Cuba's desire to participate in them.

The situation arising from the implementation of the Lusaka accord has thus brought mixed results for the Soviet Union. They saw little need to undermine the accord, since the cease-fire and South Africa's withdrawal from Southern Angola would diminish

some what the security threat to the MPLA-PT regime. If the cease fire holds, Luanda and the Cubans will be able to redirect their energies to combat UNITA. Although the Soviets probably had misgivings about leaving SWAPO in the lurch, preserving the regime in Luanda was their more important short-term policy.

But the cease-fire between South Africa and Angola could not hold for long as neither parties were willing to make any of the key concessions required to resolve the Namibian issue. In March 1985 as Crocker tried to bring both parties together for a compromise, South Africa established an "interim government" in Namibia aimed at undermining a compromise deal. Two months later, South Africa attempted to blow up the U.S-owned Gulf Oil installation in Cabinda. Thus four years of secret and gradual negotiations were derailed. At the same time, that South Africa was undercutting the talks, secret negotiations were taking place between Angola, Cuba and the Soviet Union, resulting in an escalation of military aid from Moscow. By the end of 1984 a \$2 billion military equipment and 7000 additional Cuban forces arrived in Angola.

In the summer of 1985, a major offensive by the MPLA against UNITA headquarters in Jamba continued as the negotiations were still underway with Washington and Pretoria.<sup>77</sup> This prompted the Reagan administration to press the congress for the repeal of the Clark Amendment, which finally got approval in July 1985. Subsequently Savimbi visited the U.S in January 1986 and was warmly received by the White House.<sup>78</sup> The administration soon informed the congress that it intended to supply military aid worth \$15 million to Savimbi's forces that included stinger missiles.



The U.S gesture towards UNITA became suspect in the eyes of the Angolan government and it accused the U.S of bad faith and immediately suspended talks. The relations worsened in March 1987 as the U.S announced that it was planning to hold joint manoeuvres with Zairian troops along the Angolan Zairian border. But the mounting internal pressures for peace and economic recovery once again brought Angola to the negotiating table. South Africa too, realizing the hopelessness of winning a war against Angola as long as the Cubans stayed there, resumed dialogue with the Angolan government through U.S mediation. In addition, a general change in international relations was taking place, largely due to the coming to power of Mikhail Gorbachev in the Soviet Union. Moscow's policy makers disillusioned by Soviet activism of the late 70s began to realize the price of regional confrontations that affected their domestic economy and also its relations with the U.S. As part of Gorbachev's "New Thinking" in foreign policy, Moscow de-emphasized its involvement in third world conflicts and sought to bring about a speedy end to Southern African crisis.<sup>80</sup>

Thus, on November 11, 1988, the U.S mediated talks had a breakthrough in Geneva and a time-table for the phased withdrawal of the Cuban troops was drawn with Cuba accepting a 27 month period. South Africa however did not readily give its consent and said it would consider the issue at the next Brazzaville conference where the four parties were to sign a protocol over the issue. The quadripartite Angolan peace talks held in Brazzaville in December 1988 also ran into difficulties over South Africa's insistence that the Cuban Pull out be "verified to the satisfaction of all parties". The move caught the American

mediators by surprise and evoked sharp criticism from Angola and Cuba. Angola made it clear that the verification of Cuban troops withdrawal was its own internal affair.<sup>81</sup> However, on 13 December, 1988 South Africa, Angola and Cuba signed the Brazzaville protocol which also stipulated the signing of a trilateral treaty in New York on December 22. It provided for Angola and Cuba to reach bilateral agreement, subject to security council's approval, on verification arrangements before the New York signing. The South African foreign minister Mr. Pik Botha, however, warned that entire South African peace process could collapse if all parties did not keep their word. The withdrawal was part of an agreement between Cuba and Angola but it was an important link in a chain of agreements signed between South Africa, Cuba and Angola during months of negotiations in 1988. Finally on December 22 the Namibian independence accord was signed in New York and a 10 nation U.N team to verify the Cuban troops withdrawal from Angola was also formed setting the stage for the implementation of U.N resolution 435.<sup>82</sup>

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## Chapter-VI U.S intervention in the Horn: Revisiting Ethiopia- Somalia dispute

## CHAPTER - VI

The American policy towards the countries in the Horn of Africa has its own set of complexities. Some of them could be spelt out in the following manner. Being a geopolitically strategic area on the Red sea, the U.S has consistently clamoured to build viable allies among the states within this region. The U.S search for allies was obviously accentuated in the context of the cold war because the Soviet Union was equally involved in finding its naval feet in the horn of Africa. Thus at one level the game of finding allies was also punctuated by the power rivalries between the U.S and the Soviet Union. Under the circumstances choosing an ally merely on ideological grounds was hardly a tenable proposition. If the notions of interventions are kept in mind it would be obvious that both the U.S and the U.S.S.R would be ready to deploy indirect and subtle rather than direct forms of intervention. Such indirect forms could be deployed to nurture covert ambitions in the overall Horn of Africa as well as towards the broader area of the Indian Ocean. Thus entertaining diplomatic ties, signing trade ties, acquiring bases, in connecting strategic regions in the overall global strategy were integral to the Horn of Africa. In the forthcoming pages, this chapter will try to unravel such complex and subtle forms of intervention on the part of the U.S to capture the overall understanding of the forms of intervention. Keeping this background in mind, we can proceed to present the sequence of this chapter by first outlining U.S strategic interests in the region.

## **Strategic Interests**

The Horn of Africa comprising of Ethiopia, Somalia, Djibouti, Sudan and parts of Kenya has been one of the most strategic and volatile regions in the world.<sup>1</sup> Devoid of natural resources, characterized by the presence of deserts along the coast and rugged mountains further inland, the Horn attracted very little economic attention to outsiders except for its strategic location. Sitting astride the route to the Mediterranean through Suez, the Gulf of Aden and the Persian Gulf it presides over international maritime traffic in the Red Sea which mostly consists of oil from the Middle East. The region's proximity to the Middle East oil fields makes it even more important in the context of super power rivalry in the area. J. Bowyer Bell , a strategic analyst has neatly summarized how the U.S national security establishment has viewed the Horn of Africa throughout the post-world war-II period: "The basic strategic importance of the Horn is not the presence of copper deposits, the fate of democracy or the future of the Ethiopian monarchy, it is simple geography."<sup>2</sup>

The strategic interests of the U.S in the Horn dates back to the II world war. The Roosevelt administration in an effort to bolster the beleaguered military forces of Great Britain against the Nazi German and Fascist Italy's forces operating in North Africa included Ethiopia in a military aid programme known as "Land-Lease" in March 1941. Ethiopia thus became an assembly point and distribution centre for this aid designed to strengthen Britain's defences hi Libya and Egypt against Germany's famed Afrika Corps.<sup>3</sup> The focal point of these Land-Lease efforts was Eritrea - a former Italian ruled

colony commanding a strategic location bordering the Red sea that had been liberated by British forces in 1941.

The U.S war department's efforts in Eritrea were two fold. First, in the aftermath of a secret meeting held in Washington on November 19, 1941, a Royal Air Force (RAF) support base was established at the Eritrean town of Gura. Codenamed "Project 19", the purpose of the base was to repair and return damaged RAF aircraft to the North Africa battle zone with minimal delay. The war department also refurbished the Eritrean port of Massawa to provide direct support for the British Mediterranean fleet, as well as to maintain naval salvage operation to raise over forty ships scuttled by the Italian navy.<sup>5</sup> By August 1942, less than one year after the war department's decision to establish a presence in Eritrea, 336 US military personnel were directing projects that employed nearly 16,000 workers, including 2,819 US civilians, 5, 611 Italians, and 7,384 Eritreans.<sup>6</sup>

The U.S interest in Eritrea was basically to acquire a radio communication centre at a former Italian installation known as Radio Marina located on the outskirts of the Eritrean town of Asmara. But the uncertain status of Eritrean territory under British control with competing claims both by Ethiopia and post-war Italy put on hold U.S moves to acquire the base. With Great Britain deciding to terminate its administration of Eritrea in 1948, the U.S realized the dangers of an independent Eritrea vulnerable to communist aggression. The other option of an Italian trusteeship supported by France and Soviet Union was also ruled out because of the fear that a victory for the Italian communist party in 1948 Italian national elections would also pave way for a communist Eritrea.<sup>7</sup> The U.S

meanwhile, had a secret understanding with Ethiopia in 1948 that traded U.S support for Ethiopian claims over Eritrea in return for unrestricted access to and use of Asmara communications centre later known as Kagnew station and other military bases and airfields in Ethiopia.<sup>8</sup> In 1953, soon after the U.N implemented its decision to unite Eritrea to Ethiopia in a federation, the U.S government and Haile Selassie signed a treaty which gave a twenty-five year lease on the Kagnew communications centre. The United States in return, agreed to train and equip three Ethiopian military divisions totalling 18,000 men.<sup>9</sup> The strategic significance of the Kagnew communications centre for the U.S was that, it was part of America's world-wide network of linkages that stretched from bases in Morocco to the Philippines. It was used to monitor Soviet activities during the cold war, to gather intelligence in Africa, and especially the Middle East and clearly played a vital role during both the Korean and Vietnam wars.<sup>10</sup>

The U.S strategic interests in the Horn were not just limited to the Kagnew station in Eritrea. The U.S was also interested in the Red Sea and its littoral states as an area with its own strategic and economic significance. The region also weighed in the minds of U.S strategists because of its - proximity to the Persian Gulf region which controls more than half of the world's proven oil reserves and supplies about 60 percent of Europe's oil and 90 percent of Japan's and a fast growing percentage of American oil consumption in the future.<sup>11</sup> The Red sea thus, has been:

- (a) The main artery for oil and trade between Europe and the East.
- (b) It serves as a major trade outlet for its Coastal states, especially Sudan, Ethiopia, Jordan and Israel.

(c) It has great fishing potential

(d) Along its coasts lie some of the key countries in the Arab, Islamic and African worlds, namely Egypt, Saudi Arabia and Ethiopia.

(e) It serves as the western arm of the Indian ocean and the Southern outlet for the Mediterranean sea.<sup>12</sup>

However, despite the strategic significance of the horn of Africa and the Red Sea region, the U.S during the 50s and 60s viewed the area with a measure of complacency, the British presence in the region and the lack of genuine Soviet interest in the Horn of Africa during this period reinforced America's casual attitude towards the region. This attitude became apparent when, the U.S turned down an offer made by Haile Selassie in December 1952 to join a Middle East defence organization tied to N.A.T.O., in which Ethiopia would help to form a 'Southern tier' which could act as a kind of safety valve for the Baghdad pact concept of the 'northern tier' as formulated by the U.S secretary of state, John Foster Dulles.<sup>13</sup> But Soviet activity in the Horn and in other parts of Africa since the mid 70s made the U.S to wakeup to the dangers of Soviet expansionism. In fact, Soviet Union first real success in the Horn of Africa was achieved in October 1963, when Somalia accepted its unconditional offer of \$30 million in military aid.<sup>14</sup> The Soviet Union essentially outbid the west by agreeing not only to assist the Somali airforce but also to expand the army from 4,000 to 20,000. The United States, along with its Italian and West German N.A.T.O allies, had only been willing to provide \$ 10 million worth of equipment and training for a 5000 - 6000 man army oriented primarily towards internal security, and had made the military package contingent upon Mogadishu not accepting

aid from any other source.<sup>15</sup> The Soviet-Somali arms agreement, therefore, ended the Western arms monopoly in the Horn of Africa, and effectively undermined the ability of the West to play the role of 'balancer' between Ethiopia and Somalia.

The Soviet Union since then began taking active interest in the Political developments of the Red sea region and looked for opportunities to establish friendly ties with states in the region. Between 1967-72 it maintained friendly ties with Egypt under Nasser and had access to substantial air facilities and naval base in Alexandria. Similarly from 1974 until 1977 the Soviet Union had a major naval facility at Berbera in Somalia at which ships were refuelled and arms stored. Since 1969 it has also been able to use facilities at Aden in South Yemen. Since 1977 some facilities have also been available in Ethiopian ports - at Assab and Massawa in Eritrea, and on the Dahlak Islands off the Eritrean Coast. These facilities provided Soviet Union in undertaking aerial reconnaissance, and since 1978 Russian planes often Ilyushin-38s, are believed to have been operating from Aden, monitoring U.S naval deployments in the Persian Gulf and the Indian Ocean areas. Moreover Soviet Intervention in Angola in 1975, Ethiopian intervention in 1978 followed by the fall of Shah of Iran and the Afghan invasion in 1979 set the alarm bells ringing in Washington about Soviet motives in the region.

The Americans perceived that the Soviet presence in the Horn and the Indian ocean region constituted a vital threat to its interests in the Middle East, especially the Persian Gulf. In order to counter Soviet presence in the region, the Americans began looking for allies who could provide military bases to checkmate Soviet moves.



Here, before we begin to analyze American objectives and policy towards Horn of Africa and the Red Sea region, it is important that we also understand Soviet strategic concerns in the region.

### **Soviet Strategic Concerns**

Soviet strategic interests in the Horn of Africa and the Red Sea form part of its overall interests in the Gulf and Indian Ocean region. Soviet interests in the Gulf area predates the discovery of oil there and oil remains but one of several interests that drew Moscow's attention southward. With a common border running from Turkey to Pakistan through Iraq, and Afghanistan on the South, the Soviet Union cannot be indifferent to any political developments in the region which might affect its national security. The overlapping of religions and ethnic minority Muslim population across borders can be a serious source of instability for the Soviet Union. With about 16 percent of the Soviet population being Muslim, i.e 43 million people out of the total of 262 million, and their relation to 100 million people living in the Turko-Iranian world of important nationalities such as the Azeria, the Turkmen, the Tajiks, the Kurds etc is quite unsettling to Moscow.<sup>17</sup>

Apart from this, the Soviet Union was also concerned about its Southern neighbour, Iran and its friendship with the U.S. Moscow felt threatened by the Iranian-U.S alliance and the possible use of Iran as a U.S base.<sup>18</sup> Although the Shah of Iran announced in

September 1962 that he would not allow any nation to base missile forces on his territory, the Soviets were apprehensive about the presence of U.S military personnel in Iran. During Iran's revolution the Soviets were quick to assert that foreign intervention in Iran would be perceived as a threat to the Soviet Union.<sup>19</sup>

In the Red Sea and the Indian Ocean the Soviet Union was mostly concerned about the possible deployment of N.A.T.O aircraft carriers with planes carrying nuclear weapons and submarines capable of launching rockets against its territory. During the early 1960s the emergence of Polaris A<sub>1</sub> and A<sub>2</sub> missile carrying submarines having a range of 1200 nautical miles and 1800 nautical miles seriously threatened the security of the Soviet Union. According to Geoffrey Jukes, the Indian Ocean entered the calculations of Soviet naval strategists in 1964, following the launching in 1963 of Polaris A<sub>3</sub> , with a range of 2,500 nautical miles. 'In making the necessary calculations', says Jukes 'they would have been bound to discover that the north-west corner of the Indian Ocean . . . . . an area of low interest for possessors of the Polaris A<sub>1</sub> and A<sub>2</sub> , becomes more attractive to the possessors of A<sub>3</sub> , because from there the A<sub>3</sub> exposed to attack all areas between the Western Soviet border and Eastern Siberia.'<sup>20</sup> With newer generations of submarines such as the Poseidon and the Trident, which have a much longer range, the whole of the Red Sea and the Indian Ocean has been turned into a potential basing site to launch nuclear attacks against the Soviet Union.<sup>21</sup>

Besides the strategic interests which are relevant in specific war time situations, it is the Peace time role that best explains the Soviet interests in the Red Sea and Indian Ocean

region. The Suez canal - Red Sea maritime route that connects the Indian Ocean provides Soviet Union with the shortest sea route open year-round between its European and the Far Eastern ports- something that does not apply to the Arctic route. The canal is therefore in some degree, to the USSR what the Panama canal is to the USA- a waterway for its own domestic economy.<sup>22</sup> This route is also vital because it has become possible for Soviet ships to reach the Indian Ocean through the Suez canal, a distance of around 4,800 Km as compared with a distance of 8,000 Km or more from Vladivostok and 18,500 Km from the Black Sea around the Coast of Africa: indeed, prior to the reopening of the Suez canal, the Red Sea was one of the furthest points on the globe for ships operating out of the Black Sea<sup>23</sup>

The Suez canal - Red Sea route is also considered as an alternative to the Trans-Siberian railway. In a contingency such as a conflict with the people's Republic of China, the Trans-Siberian railway might be either interrupted or insecure and hence the importance of this maritime route in connecting the farthest corners of Russia.<sup>24</sup>

Thus, given Soviet Union's interests in the Red Sea and Indian Ocean and its attempts at safeguarding these interests by deploying Soviet navy in the Indian Ocean and along the Red Sea Coast at bases in South Yemen and in Somalia until 1977 and later in Ethiopia, created apprehension in Washington about the real Soviet motives in the region.

The U.S in order to protect and promote its interests in the face of Soviet expansion in the region began to define certain objectives. These objectives have varied over time,

depending on the ranking of U.S interests at any given moment and perceptions regarding the main threats to those interests. However certain objectives can be identified that have been basic throughout the period from 1945 to the present. These include:

- \* Containing Soviet expansionism through collective security;
- \* Maintaining uninterrupted access to the region's oil resources;
- \* Preserving the independence and self-determination of regional states;
- \* Preventing the spread of communism and other radical social economic doctrines;
- \* Deterring intra- regional conflict, especially a new Arab-Israeli conflict;
- \* Enhancing US economic and commercial interests; and
- \* Avoiding war with the Soviet Union.<sup>25</sup>

But in the wake of Iranian revolution and the Soviet invasion of Afghanistan, the Americans were quite convinced that the Soviet Union had expansionist motives than just access to the waterways in the Red Sea and the Indian Ocean. After December 1979, the Persian Gulf came to be seen as a crucial area whose defence was essential to the very viability of the U.S position in Europe and the North east Asia. President Carter made this view official policy in this state of the Union address of January 1980, when he declared that "an attempt by an outside force to gain control of the Persian Gulf region will be regarded as an assault on the vital interests of the U.S" and the such action "will be repelled by any means necessary, including military force".

In trying to protect its interests in the Gulf, the U.S suddenly realized the acute problem of access to military bases and facilities in the region. Although, the U.S had been

developing the military base at Diego Garcia since the mid 70s, the Carter administration felt that Diego Garcia by itself was not adequate considering the distance it is from the strategic focal point - i.e. the straight of Hormuz in the Persian Gulf- in the event of a surprise Soviet attack. The U.S administration thus began to look for naval ports with adjacent air fields in friendly countries of the region to provide for logistic support facilities for American warships in the region. Infact, even before the Soviet invasion in Afghanistan, the United States had already despatched a defence team to the Persian Gulf and the Horn of Africa to negotiate for military facilities.

Carter's initiative succeeded and the U.S managed to engineer access to a network of facilities in the north west quadrant of the Indian Ocean to support its increased naval presence in the region. By August 1980, the U.S had secured air and naval facilities in Egypt, Sudan, Somalia, Kenya and Oman.<sup>27</sup>

Now, having discussed the strategic interests of the super-powers in the Red Sea, Indian Ocean and the Gulf, we can focus our attention in the next section on the regional issue of conflict in the Horn of Africa and the super power intervention. Here we shall discuss the question of how the divergent interests of the super powers and regional states combined to create an unstable situation in the region during the seventies and eighties.

## II

### **Background to the Conflict in the Horn:**

The conflict in the Horn of Africa is essentially rooted in its history and geography. Conflicting territorial claims, historical and ethnic differences, and political incompatibility existing between the regions have led to a seemingly never-ending situation of tension, violence and armed conflict between Ethiopia-Somalia over the contested Ogaden and the continuous struggle in Eritrea. According to Bereket Habte Selassie, "The crisis in the Horn, encompassing several armed conflicts, reflects two interrelated historical processes: 1) a continuing 'crisis of empire' within the borders of Ethiopia, a state created through military expansion and the subjugation of national groups in the area from the late nineteenth century onwards, and 2) the persistence of unresolved national and social questions and contradictions shaped by, and inherited from, the European colonial era in Ethiopia, Somalia and Kenya".<sup>28</sup> A similar view point is expressed by William Zartman, when he characterizes the Somalia- Ethiopian conflict as "a clash between nation and state, or between nation-state and multinational empire. On another level, it is the expression of a literally legendary hatred between two ethnic groups in the region, one of them in the midst of a historic *Volkerwanderung*. Thus, the conflict is a long and constant part of history, evolving through different forms. First it was a clash of tribes or traditional nations; then it became part of the process of imperial consolidation and religious war, soon compounded by the intrusion of foreign colonialism with its need to draw geographic boundaries. Then it burst out as part of the politics of newly independent and highly expectant states, complicated by cold war super Power support and most recently by revolution".<sup>29</sup>

One of the central issues of conflict in the horn has been Ethiopia's attempts at the consolidation of its empire. Throughout its history the imposition of a single centralized authority over the whole of Ethiopia has never been an easy matter because of the rugged nature of the topography, which has tended to divide the country into large number of isolated blocks of territory bounded by steep scarps and separated from each other by deep river gorges. Added to this geographical impediment is the very composition of Ethiopia's population which is highly varied consisting of diverse ethnic groups with different religions and cultural practices. Some of the largest groups are the Amhara, the main branch of the Abyssinian family and the traditional rulers of Ethiopia; The Galla or the Oromo, and the Tigrinya speakers, the smaller Abyssinian branch, occupying the province of Tigray in the north and the Eritrean highland. The other groups are the Somalias, the Sidama, and the Afars.<sup>30</sup>

Among these diverse people, the Amhara, Tigre and the Oromo have played the leading historic roles. The former two are Semitic in origin; speak related languages and live in central and northern highlands, and are mostly Coptic Christians. The Gallas, are a Hamitic people who were originally the inhabitants along the Somali Coast and moved into the highlands during the sixteenth and seventeenth centuries. Although they arrived as hostile forces, they were quickly assimilated into the local cultures and a substantial number of them converted to Christianity. Galla chiefs and Amhara nobles also intermarried.<sup>31</sup> However, the process of assimilation was never complete and the historical animosities continued, partly because many of the Gallas embraced Islam and also perhaps because their interests in land was seen to have been subordinated to

Christian aristocrats and soldiers who were beneficiaries of imperial patronage.<sup>32</sup> But unlike the Gallas, the pastoralist and nomadic tribesmen of the lowlands such as the Somali and Afars who are mainly Islamic, and distinct socio-culturally never intermixed with the highland peasantry and bore animosity towards the Christian rulers of Ethiopia.

The Ethiopian state before Emperor Menelik II (1889-1913) thus, consisted of several virtually autonomous provinces and smaller subdivisions ruled by powerful local chiefs. Ethiopia during the 17<sup>th</sup> and 18<sup>th</sup> centuries was only a small highland kingdom with its centre limited to the central Shoa, Gondar and Tigrayan highlands. The outlying lowlands, including most of the areas inhabited by the Gallas and Somalis today, were not integrated into or ruled by the Christian kingdom.<sup>33</sup> But the events during the second half of 19<sup>th</sup> century that witnessed intense rivalry among the imperialist European powers in the horn after the opening of the Suez Canal in 1869, provided opportunities for Menelik to use his astute diplomacy in acquiring enormous weapons from these rival powers. With this newly acquired military power, Menelik carried out a series of campaigns of conquest among the Oromo and Sidama in the south. But in the North, the Italians had laid claim to the land beyond the Mareb river and to a long stretch of the Red Sea Coast, including Massawa, where they established the colony of Eritrea. Intent on seizing the whole of the plateau, they invaded Abyssinia in 1896, but were heavily defeated by the Abyssinians led by Menelik in the battle of Adwa.<sup>34</sup>

With Italy defeated and France confined to the Djibouti enclave, Britain and Abyssinia went on to seize the remaining unclaimed territories of the region. Menelik sent



expeditions as far as the white Nile in the west, Lake Turkana in the South-west, and the land of the Boran in the South. Menelik obtained most of the territory he coveted, settling the boundaries of his empire roughly where they stand today.<sup>35</sup> In 1897, Menelik signed a treaty with Britain and France, who formally recognized his conquests and imperial territory. From then on he was acknowledged African partner in the era of European colonization. Indeed, his observers had earlier attended the Berlin conference in 1884-1885, which 'legalised' the colonial division of Africa.<sup>36</sup>

But the new multi-ethnic state of Ethiopia created largely by conquest, now faced the enormous task of consolidation of its power. The solution sought by Ethiopian kings and nobility had been the forceful imposition of the Amhara culture that included the use of Amharic language and the special status of the Ethiopian orthodox church. Anyone ambitious for a place in the state apparatus, and especially for national political power, must to some degree assimilate into this culture.<sup>37</sup> Ethiopian politics thus has been the domination of the political system by the representatives of the highland core particularly by the central province of Shoa which provided some 60-70 percent of high central government officials, the imperial family and the seat of government in Addis Ababa.<sup>38</sup> The exclusion of many aspiring elites from other ethnic groups however, brought great resentment within their ranks and ethnic animosities smouldered beneath the surface of much of Ethiopia. They gathered force as communication increased in the 1960s. The Oromo had always resented their subordination as a conquered people, and frequently rose in rebellion. The Tigreans, though historically are of the main components of Ethiopia, resented the Shoan ascendancy and found their language treated as badly as

those of all other non-Amhara speakers. From 1960 onwards, with the advent of an independent Republic of Somalia claiming to be the government of all Somalis, the Southeastern Ogaden region became increasingly insecure. The most serious threat of all to Ethiopian territory, however came from the Red Sea province of Eritrea, which had been under a succession of non-Ethiopian rulers until the Italians were driven out in 1941.<sup>39</sup> Thus consolidating the empire since the time of Menelik II has been a constant source of conflict in the region as separatist movements fought for their self-determination.

The other important source of conflict in the region has been the Somali irredentism. Ever since Somalia attained independence on 1<sup>st</sup> July 1960 with the amalgamation of British Somalia and (26 June 1960) and Italian Somaliland (1 July 1960), it has been struggling to unite all the Somali inhabited areas of the region, i.e., Ogaden in Ethiopia, Northern Frontier district of Kenya and the French territory of Afars and Issas, formerly known as French Somaliland and present day Djibouti. Somalia claims that the boundaries drawn up by the Italians, the British and the Ethiopians at various times during 19<sup>th</sup> and 20<sup>th</sup> centuries, were arrived at arbitrarily, without recourse to geography and ethnicity and therefore illegitimate. To stake its claim over the areas inhabited predominantly by Somalis, it advanced two justifications: (a) the right to self-determination in the sense of claiming independent statehood for a large ethnic group that possesses considerable cultural cohesion and is conscious of a common historical destiny; (b) that, the borders between Somalia and its neighbours, which were drawn by the

colonial powers are part of the colonial order that the new states should aim to overthrow.<sup>40</sup>

This Somali claim was viewed by Ethiopia and Kenya as more than merely threatening the loss of territory or population. They viewed the claim as a challenge to their very existence. Like most African states, Ethiopia and Kenya are multi-tribal and granting the right to self-determination or secession to any tribe or region would threaten the very integrity of these states and create a dangerous precedent. According to Saadia Touval, "the conflict is rooted in the incompatible self-images of the parties and concerns the core values. The self-image of Somali nationalism of the Somali tribes constituting a Somali nation entitled to form its own nation-state -cannot be realized without inflicting severe injury on both Ethiopia and Kenya. The viability of these two states is contingent upon the acceptance of the legitimacy of their present boundaries by all tribes presently incorporated within them. And conversely, as long as Ethiopia and Kenya continue to exist within their present boundaries, the Somali aspiration for national unity within a nation-state cannot be realized. Thus, the conflict arises out of the incompatibility of the most fundamental values of the parties concerned - the essence of their national .existence."<sup>41</sup>

The historical antecedents to the Somali border dispute is rooted in the various treaties entered into by the British, French and Italians with Ethiopia at various stages during the 19<sup>th</sup> century and early 20<sup>th</sup> century. The borders of present day Somalia kept changing according to the changing power equations of the colonial powers during this period In

1884 and 1886, the British made protection agreements with the clans along the coast and hinterland opposite Aden; the French did the same with the clans around Djibouti (1885) and the Italians also, with various Sultans on the Indian ocean coast (1889). The three powers then came to agreements with one another delimiting their respective spheres, the British and French in 1888, the British and Italians in 1894. The last two also reached agreement (1891) regarding the far south, where the Juba was to be the line between the British in East Africa and the Italians in Somaliland. Jubaland, to the South of the river was transferred to Italy by a treaty in 1924.<sup>42</sup>

But at the same time, the three powers also had to reckon with the growing strength of the Emperor of Ethiopia, who laid claim (1891) to the whole of the Horn of Africa. After his victory over the Italians at Adowa (1896), Italy and Britain made agreements with him (1897) drawing back substantially the line of their protectorates in the Haud and Ogaden respectively, and so in effect ceding territory inhabited by Somali tribes whom they had taken under protection.<sup>43</sup>

However, these boundary agreements agreed to by the colonial powers and Ethiopia left the Somalis unawares and life went on much as before and the Somali tribesmen used to grazing their cattle in the Ogaden region found no difference to their rights to graze even after the new boundaries have been established. But soon disputes erupted between the Ethiopians and the Italians over the location of their line in Ogaden (placed by their 1897 agreement irreconcilably, thanks to an erroneous map at 180 miles from the coast and at various specified points, and little clarified by their treaty of 1908).<sup>44</sup> Infact, at that point,

neither side had extended its control to the area. In the Haud, the British did not tell the tribesmen of their 1897 agreement with the Ethiopians; but as yet the Ethiopians troubled them little.

By the 1930's, the Ethiopians were making themselves felt in both the Haud and Ogaden. In the Haud, an Anglo-Ethiopian commission sought to demarcate the 1897 line, rousing the opposition of the tribesmen. In Ogaden, the Italians, who had meanwhile used some force to convert their protectorate into a direct-rule colony, were likewise advancing. The outcome was the Walwal incident (1934), the Italian conquest of Ethiopia (1935-36) and the joining of Ogaden to Italian Somaliland. Then followed the second world war, the brief Italian conquest of British Somaliland (1941) and, from the end of 1941, a situation in which, with the exception of French Somaliland, the British administered all the lands inhabited by the Somalis. After the war, in April 1946, the British proposed in the four-power commission set up to consider the matter (Britain, France, Soviet Union, United States) that the whole area currently under its administration should be unified into a Greater Somalia under British trusteeship. However, the three other opposed this solution and so did Ethiopia, to which Britain had restored full Sovereignty by a treaty of 31 Jan, 1942 following the ejection of the Italians. Accordingly, in 1948, the British returned Ogaden to Ethiopia; in 1950, the Italians began a ten-year trusteeship of Italian Somaliland; and in 1954, the British returned the Haud to Ethiopia.<sup>45</sup> Legally speaking, therefore, little had changed for the Somalis after the twenty-year upheaval, except that there was now a ten-year limit on the Italian presence.

Soon after Somalia gained independence in 1960, its relations with Ethiopia worsened. Ethiopia on its part conceded as before that the Ogaden border was in dispute and had stated its willingness in principle to embark on the necessary procedures for border demarcation in accordance with the 1897 and 1908 treaties; but it would not discuss the wider contention that the nineteenth-century treaties were wholly invalid and that the future of the Somalis in Ethiopia was an open question to be decided by self-determination.<sup>46</sup> Meanwhile Shifta<sup>47</sup> attacks began and a Somali liberation movement developed in Ogaden which Ethiopia accused Somalia of fomenting and which Somalia declared was a spontaneous local movement against Ethiopian oppression and restrictions on grazing rights.

In May 1963, the Organization of African Unity (OAU) was inaugurated at Addis Ababa, Somalia took the opportunity to stake its claims but this was received coldly. In August, Ethiopia carried out a large scale campaign in Ogaden in an effort to stamp out the liberation movement. In November, it alleged that Somali regular army units had entered Ethiopia, and in January 1964, Somalia counter-alleged that Ethiopian planes had bombed Somali villages. In February, serious border clashes broke out.<sup>48</sup>

Both sides called for an extraordinary meeting of the Council of Ministers of the OAU and this recommended a cease-fire and bilateral negotiations to be followed by a report to the organization. Negotiations began in Khartoum with the good offices of Sudan, and on 20 March an agreement was reached. There was to be a cease fire and a demilitarized

zone of 10-15 kilometers, to be supervised by a joint military commission drawn from both sides, and a cessation of hostile propaganda.<sup>49</sup>

Somalia wanted the negotiations to extend to the wider issue of the future of the Somalis in Ethiopia but Ethiopia would not agree to this interpretation of the OAU recommendation. Further talks were held in Cairo in July immediately before the OAU meeting but came to nothing. At the meeting, Ethiopia successfully promoted a resolution (with Somalia dissenting) in which the members "pledged themselves to respect the frontiers existing on their achievement of national independence".<sup>50</sup>

In Ogaden, over the next few years, incidents continued and Somalia continued to complain of restrictions on the grazing rights of the nomads and various forms of Ethiopian oppression. Ethiopia answered that it was merely taking the measures necessary to curb the Shiftas and Somalia's request to OAU (April 1965) for a fact finding commission made no progress. Thus, the Ogaden border dispute between Ethiopia and Somalia continued to be a constant source of conflict in the Horn of Africa drawing super power attention and eventually their intervention during the seventies and eighties.

Now, having broadly discussed the U.S strategic interests and the regional sources of conflict in the Horn, we can focus our attention on U.S intervention in the region during the Seventies and Eighties.

### III

Between 1953 and 1974, the year Emperor Haile Selassie was overthrown in a military coup, the U.S policy towards Ethiopia was mostly guided by geopolitical and strategic concerns. The U.S was primarily concerned about access to the Kagnew station in Eritrea an intelligence gathering installation which was only of its kind in that part of the world before the use of satellite technology. In order to have continued access to this station, the U.S was forced to cultivate good relations with Ethiopia. The U.S policy was also aimed at keeping Haile Selassie in power and keeping the region relatively stable and free of communism.<sup>51</sup> Ethiopia too, with its internal turmoil in Eritrea and external threats from Somali irredentism badly needed American help. Thus the strategic interests of the U.S coincided well with Haile Selassie's domestic and regional interests paving the way for long term friendship. The American use of bases in return for Arms to Ethiopia became a permanent feature in this relationship. Perhaps, in a sense this situation could also be seen as a complex interplay of patron-client relationship where, each actor tried to serve its own interests in the context of perceived cold war threats and regional instability.

The U.S, despite its keen interest in the Kagnew station in early 50s was cautious in its approach of developing friendly ties with Ethiopia. Lack of any immediate threat to Haile Selassie regime from neighboring states and the absence of Soviet interest in the region during this phase did not warrant any serious U.S commitments to Ethiopia. In fact, Haile Selassie's requests for military assistance program initially was rejected by U.S policy makers and a U.S Army mission led by Lt General Charles L. Bolte concluded in June 1951 that the creation of a military training program was both politically unadvisable and



militarily of little strategic benefit to the United States. This report reinforced an earlier assessment of the joint chiefs of staff that, scarce U.S military resources were much needed in places like Korea, Europe and elsewhere threatened by direct communist aggression.<sup>52</sup>

But Haile Selassie's persistent demands for military assistance in return for giving long-lease (25 years) of the Kagnew station finally bore fruit and resulted in the signing of two U.S - Ethiopian military agreements on May 22, 1953. The first consisted of a twenty - five year access agreement which assured the complete freedom of access to facilities on Ethiopian soil by surface, land and sea, as well as freedom of flight throughout the country. The second military agreement required the U.S to establish a Military Assistance Advisory Group (MAAG) Mission in Addis Ababa to oversee a \$5 million military assistance program that entailed the equipping and training of three Ethiopian divisions, of 6,000 men each.<sup>53</sup>

This agreement thus, marked the beginning of a long list of Ethiopian demands (and at a later stage Somali demands) for military assistance and American bargaining for the use of base facilities in the Horn. And Arms assistance became a policy instrument for U.S administrations in influencing regimes in the Horn.

The U.S in order to maintain its credibility as a friendly partner had to concede Ethiopian demands time and again for Military assistance. Between 1953 and 1977 Ethiopia received some \$279 million in U.S military aid and more than 3,500 Ethiopian military

personnel were trained in the United States.<sup>54</sup> This military assistance was, however, by no means automatically accepted by the U.S policy makers and at each point involved a lot of bureaucratic wrangling between the Pentagon and the State department about the wisdom of arming Ethiopia in the absence of any clear threats on the one hand and the bargaining leverage of the Selassie regime on the other. During the period 1957-60, the U.S granted approximately \$20.9 million in military aid towards a limited package of military equipment and training suitable for maintaining internal security. The aid was mainly to equip 28,000 soldiers of the Ethiopian Army (including 4000 support troops), the purchase of coastal patrol vessels for the navy and a survey to determine the needs of the Ethiopian Airforce.<sup>55</sup>

Haile Selassie, however, was not satisfied by the limited aid provided by the Americans and was basically looking for a more formal and expanded military commitment from the U.S. In the wake of Somali claims over Ogaden since the mid-fifties which posed serious threat to territorial integrity and the American decision in 1959 to support for the unification of the British and Italian Somali land territories in accordance with the wishes of the former European colonial powers, Ethiopia began to pressure the U.S for more military aid as a mark of friendship. It was at this point, the Soviet Union extended Ethiopia credits of about \$110 million and apparently also offered military aid in excess of what the Americans had been providing.<sup>56</sup> This move by the Soviet alerted the policy makers in the U.S to the possibility of Ethiopian alignment with the Soviet Union in the event of American neglect of Ethiopian military needs and the U.S, quickly decided in 1959 to supply Addis Ababa with a Squadron of F-86 Saber Jet-Fighters. Again in 1962,

the U.S, as a follow-up to a an August 1960 secret executive agreement agreed to train and equip a 40,000 man army. The American secretary of Defence, Robert McNamara and the Ethiopian Defence minster, Mengesha Merid, also signed a memorandum in which the Americans not only promised to continue supporting Ethiopian's airforce but also agreed to supply more T-28s, F-37s and F-86s.<sup>57</sup>

Besides regular Arms aid to Ethiopia, the test of American commitment to Ethiopia came by in two potential crisis situations during the early 1960s. The first test began on December 13, 1960, when Haile Selassie's imperial Bodyguard arrested the members of Royal family and senior leaders of the Ethiopian Army in an attempted Coup d' etat against the government while the emperor was on a tour to South America. As the coup leaders tried to establish control over Addis Ababa, they summoned U.S Ambassador Arthur L. Richards and asked him to contact Washington for a formal recognition of the new regime which called itself the people's Republic of Ethiopia.<sup>58</sup>

The initial reaction of the U.S embassy in Ethiopia to the unfolding crisis was to stay neutral. However, as the Haile Selassie loyalists began regrouping with superior force to thwart the Coup attempt, General Chester de Gavre, chief of the US MAAG Mission along with other embassy staff announced on December 15 that "the time had come" for U.S MAAG to meet its advisory obligations to the Ethiopian government as provided for in the U.S - Ethiopian military agreements.<sup>59</sup> During the next three days, the U.S gave tactical advice to the loyalists in the field apart from airlifting urgently needed medical supplies. The U.S military personnel also terrorized the rebels in control of the Imperial

palace by over flights that broke the sound barrier and created sonic booms.<sup>60</sup> This timely response from the U.S embassy was greatly appreciated by Haile Selassie on his return to Addis Ababa on 17 December.

The second test of commitment came during 1960 and 1964 border clashes with Somalia over Ogaden. Soon after Somalia became independent in June 1960, it started a nationalist propaganda over Radio Mogadishu and sounded the call to arms for the liberation of the Ogaden and other unredeemed Somali lands. According to Colin Legum, this propaganda was a clear 'incitement to violence and some of the songs aired were worded, 'I shall not feel well until we go to war to unite the Somali'.<sup>61</sup> The patriotic fervour among Somalis resulted in fierce border clashes in July 1960 between Somali fighters and the Ethiopian Army northeast of the Ogadeni city of Dire Dawa, claiming 800 Somali and 1000 Ethiopian casualties. Again in August, some 300 Somalis attacked and derailed a train travelling on the Djibouti-Addis Ababa railroad Ethiopia's economic life line to the outside world.<sup>62</sup>

After a brief lull in their activities, the Somali insurgents in Ogaden launched rebellion at Hodayo, a watering place north of warden on 16 June 1963.<sup>63</sup> About 300 insurgents infiltrated the area and planned a long guerrilla campaign to make the Ogaden ungovernable. During the next three months isolated clashes occurred throughout Ogaden. The rebels attacked outlying posts manned by few policemen who were armed with antique Enfield 303 rifles, and forced the government to abandon them, thereby yielding over large areas of the Ogaden. The guerrilla ranks also increased during this

time to around 3000 and with the help of Somali provided weapons began spreading rebellion in Bale and Sidamo provinces in Southern Ethiopia, as well as in the NFD in Kenya.<sup>64</sup> In response to this serious threat from the insurgents, Haile Selassie decided to put direct military pressure on Somalia - the chief instigator and source of insurgency. In mid-January 1964, the third division of the Ethiopian Army headed by General Aman Adorn launched air and ground attacks on Somali border posts and nearby towns. The Somali government retaliated Ethiopian attacks and during the first three months of 1964, heavy fighting took place at several border points particularly at Tug Wagale in the north, 65 km from Jijiga, and Ferfer and Dolo in the south. Ethiopia, with its superior airpower bombed many towns in Somalia including Hargeisa.<sup>65</sup>

The American response to these events was one of unequivocal support for Ethiopia. This was reflected in the U.S MAAG Mission's advisory role on deployment of Ethiopian forces and the employment of counterinsurgency tactics to counter Somali attack. The U.S support was also underscored by the State Departments Africa Bureau viewing Somali insurgency as illegitimate and applying pressure on Mogadishu to end its support for the insurgents.<sup>66</sup>

Thus U.S - Ethiopian security relations during the first decade moved on an even keel. The arrival of the Soviet Union in the Horn in 1963 with its military aid to Somalia and the continuing insurgency in Eritrea where the U.S had a greater stake in the 'Kagnew station' further enhanced U.S - Ethiopian security ties. This scenario gave Haile Selassie another opportunity to demand for newer and more sophisticated weapons, and in May

1964 as two giant parabolic antennas arrived for installation at Kagnew, Selassie forced a commitment from the U.S government for the delivery of F-5 jet fighters in exchange for access to the Kagnew station.<sup>67</sup>

This demand for F-5s like the earlier ones was not devoid of controversy. As Ambassador Korry advocated Ethiopian case by arguing that 'Ethiopia's geographic location alone warranted Washington's interest,<sup>68</sup> the State Department and the Pentagon were not convinced and preferred a go-slow approach. But Washington's attitude began to change during 1966 and was premised on two reasons:

1. The notion that the Soviets would not acquire bases in Somalia became suspect and the construction at the port of Berbera began in 1964 by the Soviets neared completion, suggesting the Moscow might strike a base deal with Mogadishu and
2. The idea that Moscow would not put any heavy armament into Somalia began to crumble in 1965-1966, as Moscow executed a rapid buildup of the Somali Air Force including delivery of six MiG-15s, twenty Yak Us, and twelve MiG-17s.<sup>69</sup>

Now with very little pretext for delaying Ethiopian request for F-5s the Johnson Administration to maintain its credibility quickly proceeded with the delivery of F-5 freedom fighter squadron during the second half of 1966 and completed the transaction in 1967. The F-5 episode was thus "a classic example of a weak client state manipulating the weakness and vulnerability of its arms patron."

## The Revolution of 1974 and the Fall of Haile Selassie

The Haile Selassie regime during the 1950s and 60s, in trying to consolidate power from the onslaughts of Eritrean and Somali insurgents failed to give priority to the much needed Social and Economic reforms to modernize Ethiopia. The constant attacks from internal and external forces distracted the regime to concentrate its energies in modernizing its army rather than changing the character of the semi-feudal social and economic structure of the Ethiopian state. Although Ethiopia began receiving increasing amounts of economic aid along with military aid from the United States, in the form of point four and AID-funded education, health and agricultural projects since the mid-fifties, in order to effect social change and economic development, the centralized decision making power of the regime which rested with the emperor and a few hand picked ministers and bureaucrats thwarted any reform process leaving intact the historical inequities which inevitably led to the revolution.

By 1974, the emperor's regime was rife with corruption, inefficiency and apparent disregard for the welfare of Ethiopian people. Indeed, during 1972 and 1973, a massive famine swept the north-central provinces of Welo and Tigray killing thousands, while the government denied any such disaster. The callous attitude of the regime provided an opportunity for the radicals to discredit Haile Selassie regime in the eyes of the world as they put up posters of the emperor feeding hunks of meat to his dogs, juxtaposed with another of starving peasants of Welo.<sup>71</sup> Thus a series of events culminated in the

overthrow of Haile Selassie. However the most immediate cause was the mutinies in the army during January and February of 1974, over the living conditions and pay. These mutinies were also joined by student revolts and taxi drivers in Addis Ababa as the government imposed a sudden and ill-timed price hike of gasoline creating economic chaos and social disorder.<sup>72</sup> These events prompted Haile Selassie to sack his Prime Minister of sixteen years, Aklilu Habte Wold and appoint Endalkatchew Makonnen as a new Prime Minister and agreed to draft a new constitution that makes the Prime Minister responsible to parliament and also implement a major land reform program.<sup>73</sup> These steps quieted unrest for a time before there were renewed attacks on the regime. Thus a series of events finally culminated in the overthrow of Haile Selassie on 12 September 1974 and a Provisional Military Administrative Council (PMAC) assumed power with General Aman as its Chairman.

PMAC, also known as the Dergue soon began to implement policies to destroy Ethiopia's feudal system and to establish Socialism. As early as December 1974, the new government declared that it sought to transform the country into a Socialist State with a one-party system, collective farms, and government control of all productive property. On April 21, 1976 PMAC announced a political program centered on the formal adoption of "Scientific Socialism". Since then, the Dergue has emphasized government control of the economy, centralized political control, nationalization of property, and the creation of a "new Ethiopia".<sup>74</sup>



For the U.S, the crisis in Ethiopia came at a time when the whole of U.S polity was seized of the Watergate scandal. This distracted most of the top officials from giving priority to third world crises, leaving the State Department to monitor events such as the Ethiopian revolution of 1974. The initial American reaction to the crisis was to step up arms supplies as a measure to strengthen the government and friendly elements in the military. The Americans felt reassured when the moderate elements within the Dergue initially assumed leadership under General Aman. In the early summer of 1974, Washington approved a new program of credits and cash sales that would allow Ethiopia to obtain about \$100 million in American military equipment during 1974-75.<sup>75</sup> As Gerald Ford assumed the Presidency in mid-August, the State Department urged that the supply of military hardware to Ethiopia be continued. In a memorandum sent to the National Security Council on 29 August for briefing the new President, the Department wrote:

"As long as there exists a distinct possibility that the present situation will result in a strengthened, more moderate state, and in a continuation of the traditional Ethiopian ties with the west, we should continue to carry out program of military aid and sales as agreed. Suspension of these shipments would only strengthen the hands of radical elements among the military and further frustrate the moderates, perhaps leading them to concur in more radical initiatives."<sup>76</sup>

The state department's memorandum also concluded that it was in the U.S interest to 'assist Ethiopia to remain an independent, cohesive, moderately inclined and responsible nation'.<sup>77</sup> Interestingly, the memorandum does not talk about the Kagnaw

communications centre in Asmara, which during all previous policy decisions provided good rationale for assistance to Ethiopia. In fact by 1970s the importance of Kagnew station began to diminish with the development of Satellite technology and perhaps also because of the development of the military base on the Indian Ocean Island of Diego Garcia.

The U.S optimism of a moderate leadership in Ethiopia however proved to be short lived as the radical elements within the Dergue began to push a hard line and clashed with the moderate views of General Aman. Being an Eritrean himself, General Aman tried to broker peace deal with the Eritrean groups fighting for self-determination. But his proposals met with stiff opposition from a group of radical elements within the Dergue who wanted to send additional forces to Eritrea and crush the rebellion. Similarly, General Aman's views on being lenient towards the top figures of the Haile Selassie regime too met with criticism. Unable to push forward his proposals in the face of stiff opposition from leaders like Mengistu and Atnafu Abate, General Aman resigned. This proved a fatal mistake and on the night of 22 November soldiers were sent to arrest General Aman. When he resisted, fire from anti-tank weapons was directed against the house and Aman was killed. The same night 57 other top figures of the earlier regime were summarily executed<sup>78</sup>.

These killings proved to be a turning point for the Ethiopian revolution which until then was bloodless. Aman's death heralded the beginning of a long reign of terror by which the Dergue struggled to create an authoritative state apparatus and establish its

legitimacy. The Dergue faced serious political challenge from groups within Ethiopia and groups on the periphery over its vision of the new social order. Radical left parties such as the Ethiopian people's revolutionary party, a self-styled Marxist group opposed to military rule conducted anti-Dergue activity in Addis Ababa itself. On the right, the conservative royalist Ethiopian Democratic union fought PMAC's rule.<sup>79</sup> On the periphery the Eritrean liberation groups, the Ogaden irredentists and the Oromo liberation movements seriously threatened the existence of the Ethiopian state and the Dergue under Mengistu. But the most serious challenge of all came from the Eritrean insurgency which after General Aman's death gained momentum and by early 1977 was in control of most of the rural areas and towns except Asmara and Massawa.<sup>80</sup>

Besieged on all sides with political challenges and insurgency by nationalist groups, the Dergue requested the U.S for a \$30 million emergency military aid consisting of small arms and ammunition. The U.S, although opposed to the Derg's human rights abuses finally approved only \$7 million worth of arms after some delay angering the PMAC, which interpreted the delay and small quantities offered as "an unambiguous sign that Washington was opposed to the revolution and was backing out of a long-term commitment to supply Ethiopia with arms".<sup>81</sup> In mid 1975, the U.S confronted a new problem regarding the transfer of two squadrons of F5-E fighter bombers to Ethiopia. The F5-E deal was actually part of an earlier promise by the U.S administration to modernize the Ethiopian Air Force. But in the changed context of the U.S-Ethiopian ties after the revolution the U.S State Department sought Congressional approval for the delivery of the aircraft when Ethiopia's turn on a Pentagon waiting list came up in October 1975. In

a confidential letter addressed to the speaker of the House and other Congressional leaders, the State Department however emphasized that provision of the F-5Es had become a matter of "great importance" to the Dergue and a "touchstone" of U.S-Ethiopian relations.<sup>82</sup> The U.S finally proceeded with the delivery of eight F-5Es which arrived in Addis Ababa on April 15, 1976. The U.S administration also agreed in early July 1976 to provide approximately \$175 - \$200 million worth of arms to Addis Ababa on a cash and credit basis. The proposed arms package was to include two squadrons of F-5E and a Squadron of F-5G jet-fighters, several dozen M-60 heavy tanks, three to six C-130 transports, an early warning radar system, a number of armored personnel carriers (APCs), and several thousand anti-tank weapons.<sup>83</sup>

The U.S willingness to extend such large amounts of military aid to Ethiopia even after the Derg's anti-western rhetoric and human rights abuse underlines its desperation to go to any extent to preserve the U.S-Ethiopian security relationship and counter balance Soviet influence in the Horn of Africa.<sup>84</sup> The victory of the MPLA (Popular Movement for the Liberation of Angola) in Angola and the final defeat of the South Vietnamese army in Spring 1975 also perhaps weighed in the minds of the U.S policy makers for approving such a large military package.

### **Realignment in the Horn**

But the continuing military operation in Eritrea and the reported "Peasant March" that was being planned by the Derg where a huge peasant militia was being recruited from the Center and South of Ethiopia to push out or kill recalcitrant Eritreans alarmed the U.S

administration that was still trying to keep the door open for a possible change in attitude by the Derg. As the Derg's policies became more violent and repressive, Henry Kissinger sent a strong message to Lieutenant-Colonel Mengistu who by now rose to being the first vice-chairman of the PMAC that, the U.S would not be able to supply any more weapons if "peasant march" was carried out and there were persistent reports of human rights abuses.<sup>83</sup>

This proved to be the last straw for the Ethiopians who were harbouring no great hopes in a continued U.S-Ethiopian security relationship. In fact many radical members of the PMAC felt embarrassed to be dealing with an imperial power. They were also sore over the fact that the U.S has drastically reduced MAP assistance and that they have to make cash purchases for weapons delivered by the U.S here after. The growing chasm between Ethiopia and the U.S further widened after Carter administration which came to power on a human rights agenda supported human rights legislation on Feb 24, 1977, that officially designated Ethiopia as a gross violation of human rights, and terminated all grant military aid after 1977.<sup>86</sup> This move by the Carter administration triggered a chain of events, which by May had led to the expulsion of all U.S military effectively ending two and half decades of political and military partnership in the Horn.

After severing ties with the U.S Mengistu flew to Moscow to build ties with the Soviet Union. During his stay in Moscow, he declared that the goal of the Ethiopian revolution was to 'lay a firm foundation for transition to Socialism and for the establishment of the people's Democratic Republic' in Ethiopia. Mengistu also managed to convince the

Soviet Union in providing a large arms deal worth \$350 million to \$450 million. Besides the arms deal, he also signed agreements on 'principles of friendly relations' and on economic, scientific and cultural co-operation.<sup>88</sup>

For the Soviet Union, Ethiopia's defection proved be a major gain in the region. Ethiopia's size and population along with its political clout in Africa always impressed Soviet Union. Moreover, like Somalia, Ethiopia also professed Marxism-Leninism making it more valuable in the eyes of the Kremlin.<sup>89</sup> But courting Ethiopia without angering Somalia where it had initially gamed foothold in the Horn became a big dilemma for the Soviet Union. In a effort to resolve this dilemma, tried to bring Ethiopia and Somalia together to accept the idea of a federation which would also include South Yemen all of which professed socialism. The question of Ogaden and Eritrea enjoying autonomous status within this federalism was also mooted and Fidel Castro acted as a mediator between Mengistu and Said Barre in this secretly held meeting in Aden in March 1977 "but the support common commitment to socialism of the two regimes proved inadequate to overcome their nationalist differences" and the idea of a federation was rejected by both sides.<sup>90</sup>

Soon afterwards, in July 1977, Somalia invaded Ogaden. Indeed two factors had precipitated this action. The first was that the Ethiopian government was facing a major challenge from the Eritreans in the North, and with the sudden cessation of U.S hardware would be in a relatively weak position until its forces were trained to use the new Soviet equipment. Secondly, the advent of the Carter administration had also seen a switch in

policy towards Mogadishu, with the decision that Somalia was one of the countries where the U.S could provide a successful peaceful challenge to Soviet influence.<sup>91</sup> Said Barre construing Carter's decision of 15, July to agree 'in principle' to help meet Somalia's 'defensive requirements' in co-operation with other countries<sup>92</sup> as a signal of encouragement to its irredentist claims launched a full-scale offensive in Ogaden on July 17, with a force of roughly 250 tanks, 12 mechanized brigades, and 30 fighter air craft and bombers. By mid November the Somali army was in control of most of the Ogaden territory and captured Jijinga a big tank base. The Somali army also moved towards Harar an ancient market town and the rail and industrial centre of Diredawa, Ethiopia's third largest city and also the main Ethiopian airbase in the region and a rear supply base for the army.<sup>94</sup> Meanwhile Mengistu alarmed at Somali successes in Ogaden, requested the Soviet Union and Cuba to intervene in order to check the Somali onslaught. Moscow responded to the request by quickly airlifting arms and equipment to a tune of \$1-\$1.5 billion, which was four or five times the value of all U.S military aid delivered to Ethiopia between 1953 and 1977.<sup>95</sup> Among the weapons delivered were T-54 and T-55 tanks, crated aircrafts, 122- millimeter artillery and undetermined missiles.<sup>96</sup> In addition to the war material, the air lift brought in a considerable number of Soviet-bloc and Cuban technicians to handle the equipment, as well as other military elements. Between November 1977 and early February 1978, an estimated number of 1000 Soviet advisers and between 10,000 and 11,000 Cubans arrived in Ethiopia.<sup>97</sup> This massive military aid and Cuban combat troop presence emboldened Mengistu to launch a counter offensive in late January 1978 that quickly overwhelmed the **out** numbered and internationally

isolated Somali troops within a matter of weeks, forcing them to flee across the border on March 9.

The U.S, during the war in Ogaden remained as a bystander unable to help the Somali army in any way. The Americans were aware that they had very little case against either Ethiopia or its new patrons the Soviet Union and Cuba who poured large quantities of weapons into Ethiopia since, it was Somalia that was the aggressor. Moreover, American reluctance to intervene on the side of Somalia at any stage during the war was also a policy matter, which the Carter administration always reiterated that U.S arms aid to Somalia can only be for defensive purposes and not for its irredentist goals in Ogaden.<sup>98</sup> The U.S position was perhaps meant to curb any Somali ambitions that would destabilize the entire Horn of Africa.

However, the Carter administration despite its criticism of Said Barre regime for its Ogaden misadventure was ambivalent regarding the future course of its bilateral relations. The bureaucratic wrangling within the administration added to its policy dithering. As the national security advisor Zbigniew Brzezinski worried over the Soviet-Cuban intervention as part of a Soviet "grand strategy" designed to exploit instability in Africa and elsewhere on the Soviet periphery - the so-called "arc of crisis", senior officials of the State Department like Secretary of State, Cyrus Vance and Richard Moose of the Africa Bureau opposed Brzezinski's idea of looking at the Ogaden issue from an East-West angle. They believed that Soviet Union's action in the Horn were not inspired by any "grand strategy" but stemmed from a desire to simply seize an opportunity to



exploit a local conflict. They also believed that the Soviet Union ultimately would fan in Ethiopia and be ousted as it had been from Sudan and Egypt, and more recently Somalia.<sup>99</sup> Thus the State Department officials argued for a combination of diplomacy, negotiation and restraint by the U.S in resolving the conflict in the Horn rather than rushing in to arm Somalia.

However, two crisis events in 1979 - the November 4, 1979 seizing of all diplomatic personnel stationed at the U.S Embassy in Tehran by the followers of Ayatollah Khomeini and the Soviet invasion of Afghanistan two months later, dramatically altered Washington's perceptions of the Indian Ocean region and Somalia's place therein. The Carter administration alarmed at these developments immediately tried to formulate a policy that would seek access to military facilities in Kenya, Oman and Somalia. This policy strategy aimed at developing contingency plans to defend the Persian Gulf at any cost. President Carter, in his state of the Union address announced that "any attempt by any outside force to gain control of the Persian Gulf region will be regarded as an assault on the vital interests of the United State of America and such an assault will be repelled by any means necessary, including military force".<sup>100</sup>

In December 1979, the Carter administration sent a delegation of the State and Defence Department officials to negotiate with Somalia for a 'base access agreement'. Somalia agreed to become part of U.S military contingency plans to defend the Persian Gulf but imposed conditions for giving access to the use of naval and air facilities at Berbera and Mogadishu. It bargained for a \$1 billion five year arms package that would include long-

range missiles and sophisticated air defense weapons. It even tried to get the U.S recognition for Somali claims to the Ogaden and military support for the liberation of the territory.<sup>101</sup> But the U.S agreed to provide only limited package of \$100 million for all the three countries - Oman, Kenya and Somalia, with which it tried to negotiate 'access agreements'. The Carter administration also tired of Somali bargaining at one point gave an ultimatum which brought Mogadishu to its senses about its dispensability if it tried to bargain any further. Finally, on August 22, 1980, it signed a ten-year base rights access security assistance agreement. The U.S on its part, agreed to provide \$65 million in credits and grants during U.S fiscal years 1980, 1981 and 1982 for the purchase of arms to Somalia and would undertake repairs and expansion of port facilities at Berbera.<sup>102</sup>

But even before the 'access agreement' got implemented, Somalia despite repeated American warnings to curb its activities in Ogaden was found, according to American intelligence reports, to be operating with regular Somali Army units during August 1980. This Somali act invited a strong Congressional disapproval and it balked at voting funds for weapons to be provided to Somalia. But in the end, the first instalment of U.S military assistance to Somalia (\$20 million) was simply conditioned upon the "verified assurance" that no regular Somali armed forces remained in Ogaden region. The State Department assurance in January 1981, finally cleared the decks for the implementation of US-Somali access agreement.<sup>103</sup> Thus, throughout the Carter's tenure, the U.S policy towards Somalia remained cautious and incremental despite its fear of a Soviet expansion in the region.

Reagan's coming to power in January 1981 on a platform that promised to revitalize American foreign policy and "roll back" communism did not alter U.S policy towards the Horn. This was in marked contrast to Reagan administration activist role in other parts of the world, especially Central America where it tried to support guerrilla insurgencies intent on overthrowing Marxist regimes in the third world. Somalia, despite its attractiveness as a geo-politically important country with anti-Soviet and anti-Ethiopian credentials could not however bring about any dramatic change in Reagan administration's policy to support it. Indeed, the level of military aid negotiated during Carter administration remained unchanged at \$20 million and even the Pentagon's promise to refurbish and expand the airfield and harbour facilities at Berbera did not take effect.<sup>104</sup>

However, the Somali-Ethiopian military clashes which broke out during July 1982, changed American policy towards Somalia. Although ever mistrustful of Somali claims of innocence, the military clash and the subsequent occupation of the Somali border towns of Balenbale and Goldogob by Ethiopian forces during July and August in retaliation for Somali raid on an Ethiopian army unit outside Shilabo, prompted the Reagan administration to airlift an emergency military aid of \$5.5 million. The aid consisted of rifles, small arms and ammunition, twenty-four armored personnel carriers (APCS) that were "married up" with TOW anti-tank weapons.<sup>105</sup>

For the Reagan administration which believed in active support of friendly regimes in distress due to Soviet destabilization moves, this crisis gave an opportunity to pour arms

into Somalia to counter balance Soviet military aid to Ethiopia. Infact, during Reagan's administration, Mogadishu became one of the largest beneficiaries of U.S security assistance programmes ever put together for a Sub-Sahara African state. Washington's initial two-year (FY 1980- FY 1981) \$45 million SAP commitment was dwarfed by the aid amounts promised to Somalia throughout the mid-1980's. Over the next seven years, the U.S committed almost \$500 million worth of military resources to Mogadishu - an amount that surpassed previous U.S assistance to Ethiopia during its twenty-five year partnership.

As Reagan administration began providing large scale assistance to regimes threatened by Soviet and Cuban forces, during the 80's, Gorbachev's accession to power in 1985 brought about a parallel and opposite trend of military de-escalation in the thirdworld. This approach was the result of "new thinking" in Moscow that viewed protracted regional conflicts in the third world as impediments to the emerging priority of improving East-West relations. Moscow leadership also recognised the economic costs of providing third-world regimes with mounting military assistance in pursuit of apparently unwinnable wars on the Soviet economy.<sup>107</sup>

This new Soviet approach towards resolving third world conflicts gained acceptance even by the Reagan administration. The initial moves towards such a co-operation between the Soviet Union and the U.S manifested in Moscow's willingness to send observers to the quadripartite meetings that took place during 1988 between Angola, Cuba, South Africa and the United States. Indeed, the Soviet observers acted as conduits of information

between Angolan, Cuban and U.S delegations by helping to fix the timing and agenda of meetings. This co-operation was also complemented by a series of high-level initiatives. The Reagan-Gorbachev summit in Washington in December 1987, for example, considered pursuing a mutual approach to regional conflicts, while a joint declaration in March 1988 singled out Southern Africa as one possible area of action.<sup>108</sup> As the Soviet-U.S initiative in Angola, Namibia bore fruit, there remained very little rationale for a continued rivalry in the Horn. At this point, the Bush administration which came to power in January 1989, realizing that old geo-political reasons for U.S involvement in Africa have vanished began to disengage gradually from Somalia. The said Barre regime which became brutal and corrupt during this period lost American sympathy and with the Congress no longer willing to provide assistance of any kind to persistent violators of human rights cut off funds to Somalia triggering off a bitter cycle of violence leading the disintegration of Somalia and the flight of Said Barre from the capital in January 1991.<sup>109</sup>

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2. J. Bowyer Bell, *The Horn ofAfrica: Strategic Magnet in the Seventies* (New York: Crane, Russak) 1973, P.8-9.
3. John R. Rasmuson, *A History ofKagnew station andAmerican Forces in Eritrea* (Arlington VA: US Army security Agency; Information Division, 1973), cited in Peter J. Schraeder, *U.S Foreign Policy towards Africa: Incrementalism, Crisis and Change* (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press; 1994) P.115.
4. Ibid; P. 115
5. Ibid; P.115
6. Harold G. Marcus, *Ethiopia, Great Britain and the United States, 1941-1974: The politics ofEmpire* (Berkeley: University of California Press, 1983) cited in Peter J. Schraeder, Ibid; P. 115.
7. Peter J. Schraeder, Ibid P. 118; Under the terms of the Italian peace treaty the United States, the Soviet Union, Britain, and France were to decide the fate of the former Italian colonies. The four could not agree with each other, and the decision was transferred to the U.N General Assembly, which finally voted on the issue in 1952 uniting Eritrea to Ethiopia in a federation.
8. Jerffery A. Lefebvre, 'Donor Dependency and American Anns Transfers to the Horn of Africa: The F-5 Legacy'. *The Journal ofModern African Studies*, Vol. 25, No. 3, 1987, P.471.

9. Marina Ottaway, *Soviet and American Influence in the Horn of Africa* (New York: Praeger) 1982, P.26-27.
10. Bereket Habte Selassie, 'The American Dilemma on the Horn' *The Journal of Modern African Studies*, Vol. 22, No. 2, 1984, P.260.
11. Mordechai Abir, 'Red Sea Politics' *Adelphi Papers*, No. 93, 1972, P.34.
12. See Hassan el-Badri, '*Local conflicts in the Red Sea and their Implications over the Last Two decades*' in Abdel Majid Farid ed., '*The Red Sea prospects for stability*.' (London: Groom Helm) 1984, P.66.
13. See John Spencer, *Ethiopia at Bay: A Personal Account of the Haile Selassie years* (Michigan: Algonac), 1984, PP.266-267.
14. Jeffrey A. Lefebvre, op.cit, P.476.
15. Ibid; P.476 and also see Steven David, 'Realignment in the Horn: The Soviet advantage', *International Security*, Fall 1979, P.72.
16. Fred Halliday, '*The USSR and the Red Sea: Moscow's Panama Canal*' in Abdel Majid Farid, ed., op.cit, P. 124.
17. Roberto Albioni, *The Red Sea Region: Local Actors and Super Powers* (London: Groom Helm) 1985, P.20.
18. Moscow's concern for threats emanating from Iran dates from the early years of the Soviet Republic. In 1920 Lenin supported the "Socialist Republic of Gilan" in northern Iran to undermine the British position in Iran and to limit British support to white Russian forces operating out of Iran. When a coup brought Reza Khan to power in Tehran in 1921, Moscow dropped its support for the Gilanis and signed a treaty with the new Iranian regime, Principally to undercut any pretext for a

- British presence in Tehran. Article 5 and 6 of the treaty gave Moscow the right to intervene in Iran should foreign powers seek to use Iranian territory as a base from which to threaten the Soviet Union. Although Iran has since declared the treaty void, the Soviets hold articles 5 and 6 valid action against Iran. See Alvin Z. Rubinstein, 'Soviet policy toward Turkey, Iran, and Afghanistan: The Dynamics of Influence', (New York: Praeger) 1982, PP.60-61.
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  22. Ibid,;p.125.
  23. Ibid;P.124.
  24. Roberto Albi\oni, op.cit, P.24.
  25. See Richard P. Cronin in Shirin Tahir Kheli ed., *U.S Strategic interests in South west Asia* (New York : Praeger Publishers) 1982, P.44; Also see NSDD-57, Sep17, 1982: U.S Policy Towards the Horn of Africa, p.200, published in Christopher Simpson ed., *National Security Directives of the Reagan and Bush Administrations: The Declassified History Of U.S. Political and Military Policy, 1981-1991*, (Boulder, San Francisco, Oxford: Westview Press, 1995).
  26. President Jimmy Carter, State of the Union address, Jan 23, 1980 (text in the New York Times, Jan 24, 1980, P. A12.



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- 29.1. William Zartman, *Ripe for Resolution: Conflict and Intervention in Africa* Council on Foreign Relations Book (New York; Oxford: Oxford University Press) 1985, P.72.
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32. Ibid; P. 13.
33. Bereket Habte Selassie, op.cit, P.254.
34. John Markakis, *National and class conflict in the Horn of Africa* (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press) 1987, P.28.
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36. Bereket Selassie, op.cit, P.254.
37. See Christopher Clapham, 'State, Society and Political Institutions in Revolutionary Ethiopia' in James Manor ed., 'Rethinking third world polities' (London & New York: Longman) 1991, P.243.

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39. Mesfin Araya, 'The Eritrean Question: An Alternative Explanation'<sup>1</sup> *The Journal of Modern African Studies*, Vol. 28, No.1, 1990, PP.79-100.
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43. Madan M. Sauldie, *Super powers in the Horn of Africa* (New Delhi: Sterling Publishers) 1987, P. 19-20.
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45. Marina Ottaway, op.cit, P. 19.
46. Madan M. Sauldie, op.cit, P.24.
47. Ethiopians described all the Somalis living in Ogaden as 'Shiftas' meaning bandits, while the Somali government considered them as nationalists fighting for their freedom.
48. See John Markakis, Op.cit, p. 180.
49. Madan M. Sauldie, op.cit, P.26.

50. See Ian Brownlie ed., *Basic Documents on African Affairs* (Oxford: Clarendon press) 1971, P. 360-361; also see Madan M. Sauldie, Ibid; P.24.
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62. Peter J. Schraeder, op.cit, P.126.
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81. Jeffrey A. Lefebvre, 'Arms for the Horn', Op.cit, P.150.
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83. Jeffrey A. Lefebvre, 'Arms for the Horn', Op.cit JM52.
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87. David A. Korn, Op.cit, P.28.
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# Conclusion

## CONCLUSION

The U.S intervention in Africa, as discussed in the preceding pages can be critically appraised with reference to a few important themes that have emerged from our study.. These themes can be broadly spelt out in the following manner. The first and the foremost theme that emerges in the study is the conceptual understanding of intervention in international relations theory as understood by liberal, neo-marxist and third world scholars. This also forms the background for our enquiry into the nature of U.S intervention in Africa. The second important theme that runs across the study like a thread pertains to the nature of U.S hegemony and its principal trajectories. To understand these trajectories the study also did some exploratory ground work by highlighting the findings of dominant schools of International relations studies. The third theme broadly can be identified as changing U.S - African relations where the U.S Policy vis-a-vis the overall African continent could be placed in perspective. Finally, certain significant generalizations which stem from the earlier themes are being tested under the case studies of Angola and Ethiopia. We propose to take up all these themes in the above stated order. First we shall critically appraise the concept of intervention as enquired in the study.

Intervention as a concept defies any easy and straightforward definition. Although it is a commonly used term in world politics, it is also by far the most misused term. It is, therefore, important that we look for conceptual clarity before using the term. In order to do this, it may be useful to first try and explain what constitutes intervention? Our effort



in the first chapter has been essentially to explore the various definitions of intervention before arriving at the essence of the phenomenon. Several scholars like Howard Wriggins, Richard Falk, Oppenheim, S.N. Macfarlane, James Rosenau, A. Thomas and A. Thomas, M.Beloff and others have defined intervention in world politics. But most of these definitions were either descriptive, classificatory or partial in meaning or restrictive in scope missing the essential character of the concept, that is the element of coercion used by an external actor (state or non-state) to affect the internal structure of the target state. In other words, we can state that, in a world order composed of nation - states with sovereign rights within their respective territorial boundaries, any externally imposed attempts to limit that right and power which is not desired or welcome by the incumbent government amounts to intervention.

Interventions take different forms which could be overt as well as covert. Military intervention is a direct and overt form of intervention. Covert interventions are clandestine and involve propaganda, sabotage, economic disruption and even controlling of mercenary armies and assassination of foreign political figures etc. During the cold war, covert intervention has been the most important instrument in foreign policy making. Compared to the military and covert forms of intervention, economic intervention is of a relatively recent origin. In a world where nations are increasingly interdependent and rely upon each other for resources and commodities, economic coercion becomes an extremely important tool and has the same kind of coercive potential as political and military actions. Finally, foreign aid is used as useful tool in dealing with most of the states in the international system today. To give aid or withhold

it, to attempt to create dependencies through its use, are all strategies for influence widely used today.

Having defined what is intervention and its various forms, the next important question that needs to be answered is, why intervention? Interventionary behavior of states cannot be understood properly by looking at isolated events. Any analysis and explanation of intervention has to look for the underlying causes which could be varied and complex. It is at this point, theoretical perspectives like liberal-pluralism advocated by Hedley Bull, neo-Marxist perspectives of Andre Gunder Frank and Wallerstein as well as critical third world perspectives advocated by scholars like Mohammed Ayoob give useful insights into the understanding of why states intervene.

Hedley Bull theorizes international relations in terms of society of states existing in an anarchical system. In his formulation international society exists, when a group of states, conscious of certain common interests and common values, form a society in the sense that they conceive themselves to be bound by a common set of rules in their relations with each other and share in the workings of common institutions. However, this arrangement is only of a limited kind and in his view, states are capable of agreeing only for certain minimum purposes. The most crucial being reciprocal recognition of sovereignty, and its logical corollary, the norm of non-intervention. Another aspect of his theorization concerns with the distinction between the pluralist and the solidarist positions within the international society school. The pluralist position confers rights and duties only to states in contrast to the solidarist position that **views** individuals as the

ultimate members of international society. This distinction is important in the context of the anarchical character of the international system that lacks any agreement on universal values and morality. Hedley Bull's whose main theoretical concern is the quest for order in international relations believed that 'the solidarist position' could be subversive to international order where states pursuing self-interests could intervene in other states using universal values as a pretext. He believed that where the solidarist position had been pursued in practice, it had undermined and not strengthened international order. Thus by implication Bull understands interventionary behaviour of states as a quest for order in a anarchical system informed by their selfish and narrow conceptions of universal values and morality.

The neo-Marxist perspectives of Andre Gunder Frank and Immanuel Wallerstein, in contrast to the liberal perspective, provides a comprehensive analysis of the impact of the capitalist penetration into the third world. The central concern of these two scholars was to find an explanation for the uneven development of different parts of the globe. They argued that the phenomenon of uneven development had to be understood as a structural feature of the global economy. This was better seen as arising from a relationship between development in the core of the world economy and underdevelopment in its periphery, with both being integral part of the same historical process. The degree of underdevelopment varied with the extent to which the periphery was rich in resources of value to the core powers. Thus the incorporation of most third world regions into the world economy forms part of the systematic underdevelopment geared to the demands of capital accumulation in the metropolitan countries. This argument was also extended to

the political and social structures of underdeveloped countries by Frank and Wallerstein. They insisted that 'Social relations of Production' in the periphery were primarily the result of the penetration of those regions by capitalism and not the product of 'backward' or traditional societies which either had missed or were still waiting for the vivifying forces of capital.

The outcome of this core-periphery relationship was a world wide division of labour in which local development was stunted by the need for expansion of metropolitan capital. Wallerstein also argued that capitalism in order to expand needed strong states to safeguard metropolitan business interests in the periphery. Originally, such needs were met through direct colonization, military intervention and forms of administrative rule. But of late, these forms of direct exploitation which became untenable in the post-World War II era began to be exercised through surrogates. Imperial interests were safeguarded through building up armed forces in the less-developed countries which are pro-west and could stage military coups in support of their local ruling classes and the western economic interests. Thus the neo-Marxist perspectives of Andre Gunder Frank and Immanuel Wallerstein represent a major advance in Marxist theory of imperialism. They have provided an analytical structure that has furthered our understanding of contemporary imperialism and the need for intervention by these powers wherever their interests are threatened.

While the liberal-pluralist perspective understood intervention largely in terms of maintaining order in an anarchical system of states and the Neo-Marxist perspective, in

terms of the need for the expansion of the capital and access to third-world resources and markets; Mohammed Ayoob, a leading third world scholar understood intervention in terms of the 'Security' problematique. Ayoob locates the problem of security/insecurity of third world states as emanating mostly from within their borders rather than from outside. External threats, in his view are important in that they exacerbate the already existing problems of the third world such as political oppression, economic collapse, scarcity, overpopulation, ethnic rivalry, terrorism, crime and disease etc which are all internal in nature.

Ayoob argues that the security issues mentioned above are symptoms of a much deeper divergence in the respective experiences of western and third world states with regard to the state formation and the pattern of elite recruitment and regime establishment and maintenance. Lacking adequate time to work out the various stages of development in the process of state formation, the third world states were rendered weak in terms of institutional structures and regimes that came to power by non-democratic means. This situation was compounded by developmental and distributive failures forcing the ruling classes to seek external military assistance to control internal failures. Thus internal security issues tended to take on international dimensions leading to superpower interventions.

Given the theoretical background to interventionary behavior of states, the next important theme that emerged as a running thread throughout the thesis has been the relative decline of U.S hegemony since the mid-60s and its consequences for world order. During the

post-second world war period the United States emerged as a predominant power in the international system.. Having largely escaped destruction during the war it was able to economically expand and grow to an extent that it dominated the world economy for the next twenty years. In the process, the U.S erected hegemonic order that consisted of an elaborate network of political, military and economic institutions and regimes such as the North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO) and the Bretton Woods agreement which led to the establishment of the International Monetary Fund (IMF), the World Bank etc. Most of the war shattered economies of Western Europe and Japan which depended on the U.S financial assistance and military protection for their revival soon became part of this liberal hegemonic order designed by the U.S. in fact, the U.S was able to maintain this hegemonic order of economic integration and political coordination by its willingness to bear a disproportionately large share of costs that averaged between 1-3 percent a year of U.S Gross National Product (GNP) during the 1950s. Ever since, the U.S tried to expand its hegemonic order globally by building vast network of allies in all regions of the world with interlocking interests designed essentially to promote its strategic security and economic prosperity.

However during the 70's and 80's several scholars like Robert Gilpin, Robert Keohane, James Petras, Wallerstein, Susan Strange, Stephen Gill and others began debating the decline of U.S hegemony. But they were unable to arrive at a consensus as to whether U.S hegemony has declined and if it has the consequences for world order and the functioning of the international economy. They mainly differed over the question, as to

what constituted hegemony. Any argument which wants to use the term hegemony has therefore to begin by trying to chart a course across this difficult conceptual terrain.

The starting point of this exercise, therefore, has to be the neo-realist literature which makes up the vast bulk of the work done on hegemony. Robert Gilpin who belongs to this school understood 'hegemony' in terms of the preponderance of economic and military capabilities. He argues that the U.S during the 50's and 60's used these capabilities to construct and maintain liberal regimes, regulating international trade and monetary affairs. However, by the early 70's this hegemonic dominance began to decline mainly due to some structural transformations that took place in the global economy like the breakdown of the Bretton Woods systems, losing control over the energy market when the OPEC raised its oil prices in 1973 and the emergence of new competitors such as Japan and the European economies that began to eat into its international as well as domestic market share. These changes transformed the U.S economy from a dominant economy into an interdependent economy.

The fall out of these structural changes has been that the U.S began to exploit its hegemonic position by pursuing protectionist policies leading to inflationary forces and global economic instability. Although, the U.S continued to be the dominant economic and military power, its relative decline profoundly affected the role that it could play in the international economy and its relations with other economies. Critical problems of the world economy in the areas of trade, money and debt were left unresolved. As its power declined, American policies became more self-centered and increased the conflicts, political and economic, between the U.S and other countries.

Robert Keohane, who belongs to the transnationalist school and whose main theoretical concern has been the post-U.S hegemonic co-operation between states in maintaining liberal regimes developed during the previous decades, agrees with Gilpin's thesis on the decline of U.S hegemony since the mid-sixties. He understood hegemony as a 'preponderance of material resources'. For him, the elements of hegemonic power, as they relate to the world political economy, consisted of control over raw materials, markets and capital as well as competitive advantages in the production of highly valued goods involving the use of complex or new technologies. These material resources, then, provided the means by which the hegemon could both make and enforce the rules for the world political economy. Power is thus conceived in traditional resource terms and hegemony is deployed as force.

World systems theorists like Wallerstein, although operating from a different theoretical perspective to that of the neo-realists, agree with them in offering a definition of hegemony as primarily economic in origin. Wallerstein, however, adds that hegemony is gained and lost in a particular sequence of preponderance (production, commerce, finance) and that it only exists when advantage is simultaneously held in all the three spheres of economic activity.

In understanding U.S hegemonic decline, Wallerstein uses the Kondratieff cycles model of world economic expansion and contraction. The Kondratieff cycle consists of two phases - phase-A and Phase-B. Phase-A is one of economic growth and expansion while



Phase-B is marked by economic stagnation and loss of profits. Wallerstein argues that U.S hegemony coincided with the A-Phase of the Kondratieff cycle starting from 1945-1967, while the B-Phase since then marked the onset of its decline seriously undermining its political and economic leadership.

Another neo-Marxist scholar who wrote about the decline of American hegemony is James Petras. He believes in the class analysis approach in world-historic perspective. According to Petras, the interaction between the productive capital and the economic agencies of the state are central to the creation of global hegemonic powers. Analysing U.S hegemonic decline, Petras argues that, the productive capital which ushered in an era of stupendous economic growth and prosperity until the 1960s was replaced by the finance capital. This involved less capital being invested in productive activities in relation to the financial transactions, which took on the nature of speculation on a world wide scale. This structural shift in the economy was also matched by changes in the realm of politics with the arrival of a new breed of politicians with a penchant for military adventurism like Ollie North; the ideological and political gangsters as the most influential policy makers like Elliot Abrams and other lumpen intellectuals inside or linked to the state (Jeane Kirkpatrick, Fred Ikle, Richard Perle, Patrick Buchanan, Vernon Walters etc). Petras portrayed these lumpen intellectuals as shaping U.S foreign policy into a military doctrine devoid of any clear-cut economic interests. This militarization of foreign policy instead of reversing the hegemonic decline exacerbated it.

In contrast to the above mentioned perspectives that argued the decline of U.S hegemony, scholars like Susan Strange and Stephen Gill offer a different perspective which does not believe in the loss of U.S hegemony. Susan Strange for her part, widened the range of the debate by deploying the concept of structural power to argue that the combined power which the U.S continued to obtain from its position in the security, production, financial and knowledge structures of the global political economy still enabled it to act as a hegemon. However, she concedes the fact that there has been a relative decline of power in certain sectors of the economy like manufacturing of goods and trade vis-a-vis Japan and other West European economies.

Similarly, Stephen Gill, a Gramscian-Marxist Scholar concurs with Susan Strange's view that U.S structural power is quite intact and argues that the decline theorists were misled by the aggregate figures relating to manufacture and trade and failed to understand the qualitative transformations that were taking place within the American and global political economies. He argued that, since the 1970's and 80's, the global political economy has been witnessing profound changes in terms of a shift from national forms of capital accumulation to one of transnationalization, financial deregulation and trans-border transport and communication. These changes radically altered the landscape of the global political economy without affecting U.S hegemonic dominance.

To broadly summarize the debates and their relevance for the study, the relative decline of U.S hegemony meant that the U.S government no longer had the power to set the terms of its relations with other countries unilaterally. U.S options were more limited and

the U.S as a world power was no longer able to force its will unrestrainedly on other nations through instant and direct military intervention, as it had been able to do in literally hundreds of instances up through the 1965 Dominican Republic intervention and the Vietnam war itself. This situation gave rise to a new imperialist tactic, neo-imperialism; the practice of extending control or domination over nations by means and actions of other client nations. Another aspect of this decline has been a stepped up cold-war anti-Soviet policies that increasingly employed military measures and military solutions to situations that it defined as "threatening U.S interests".

The third theme that emerges in the study and is relevant for understanding U.S intervention is the U.S-African ties in the context of Cold War. In Africa, the withdrawal of the colonial powers in the 50s and 60s created a sort of power vacuum which both the superpowers tried to fill. The United States and the Soviet Union saw Africa as a vast geographical space not yet committed to any particular path to modernity. Another attraction of the continent was its vast natural economic resources. They believed that hegemonic success would lie in their relative abilities to recruit candidates for their respective models of political economy from the ranks of these newly independent states. As each side perceived the other's efforts to be directed not only at undermining its power but also the destruction of its principles of political, economic and social organization, they began searching for allies, who would show unambiguous commitment to their respective policies and enlarge their spheres of influence. This ideological competition stymied regional initiatives and states following their own development or foreign policy goals were looked at with suspicion and branded as unreliable partners.

Moreover, during the cold war most local issues such as ethnic conflicts, boundary disputes and socio-economic problems were invariably tied to the larger global context resulting in escalation of tensions and possible superpower intervention. But this was a particularly American approach which saw Moscow's hand in every third world unrest. The U.S. refuses to accept that most third world conflicts have far less to do with Soviet interference than with indigenous social, economic and political structures. If the capitalist world loses third world states to some form of socialism, then it is far more likely to be as a result of a failure to understand the salience of indigenous developments than of the artful maneuvering of the Soviet Union. This misreading of the nature and source of conflicts in the third world reflected in foreign policy making of almost all the U.S. administrations from Truman to Reagan except, perhaps that of Carter's.

The United States, in order to counter Soviet expansion in Africa, and secure access to its vast economic resources developed a policy of 'Patron-Client' relationship. This involved rewarding states that followed its leadership with access to the American market, foreign aid, military assistance etc. Tremendous economic and particularly military aid were poured into these states to guarantee their ability to carry out American interests that were no longer politically feasible for the U.S. to implement directly. This relationship also included possible American direct intervention in case the client regime is threatened by external forces. Some of the examples of such patron-client relationship in Africa are South Africa and Zaire in Southern Africa, Ethiopia until 1977 and Somalia in the Horn and Egypt in North Africa etc. But states which are attracted to the socialist path of development and allied to the Soviet Union drew American wrath and suffered American

sponsored proxy-wars and internal subversion. Since the Angolan civil war in 1975-76, U.S covert intervention in support of UNITA rebels to destabilize the MPLA government in Angola and its military aid to Ethiopia till 1977 and later to Somalia in response to local crises reflected America's global dimensions of security and its interventionary behaviour.

The case studies of Angola and Ethiopia discussed in the thesis were instructive in unveiling the substance of U.S policy in Africa. At a broad level there have been certain obvious similarities between the two cases. To begin with, both these countries have been strategically significant. While Angola has a crucial link with the South Atlantic, Ethiopia is connected with the Red Sea. Angola gives access to the conventional cape route whereas Ethiopia gives access to the Mediterranean through the Suez Canal. Since both these countries are located amidst two principal waterways their significance to U.S policy could hardly be underestimated.

Second, Angola has had enormous mineral resources including diamonds and oil for U.S transnational companies to exploit. Proximity of Angola to Namibia and South Africa, the minerally wealthy countries by themselves, have enhanced Angola's importance. Unlike Angola, Ethiopia was not as minerally wealthy but owing to its location on the Horn of Africa, it had the capacity to safeguard oil interests of western countries. For West Asian states which had bolstered the energy security of America's European allies found in Horn of Africa an international trade waterway. Hence the entire Horn of Africa was integral to America's Middle Eastern policy strategy.

Third, in the context of the Cold War the U.S was proving its might over the Soviet Union by getting an edge over the latter in all the strategic areas of Africa. Thus while the Soviet Union was trying to find a foothold in Southern Africa and the Horn of Africa, the U.S was ever concerned about wiping out Soviet presence in these areas.

Fourth, one of the ways to counter the Soviet Union was by establishing or propping up pro-west regimes or movements. For instance, Emperor Haile Selassie's regime in Ethiopia was propped up by the U.S between 1954-1974. Similarly UNTTA and FNLA were also indirectly supported by the U.S through arms. As against this, the Soviet Union consistently backed pro-Soviet regimes of Mengistu's Ethiopia and Said Barre's Somalia before 1977 and the MPLA.

In spite of these broad similarities mentioned above, the specificities of Angola and Ethiopia differed and hence, the U.S intervention took divergent forms in these two states. This can be elucidated as follows:

Africa as a continent faced serious problems of nation- building soon after the European colonizers withdrew from the continent leaving most of their colonies independent by the early 1960s. The newly independent colonies were characterized by the attainment of internationally recognized sovereign status along with the requisite political institutions that serve as the usual symbols of state. However, these were fragile entities unviable socio-economically and politically having great internal divisions. The new rulers **who** set out on the task of nation building had to first reorient their political energies towards

the consolidation of power within their states. This involved wide use of force to defend themselves and their regimes from competing dissident groups vying for a share in state power.

During this early phase of nation-building external actors became involved in supporting either the regime or its opponents for their economic or political/strategic gains. External actors seeking to exploit this environment at minimum risk to their positions were also caught in protracted struggles as internal adversaries found in them competing and willing providers of arms and other assistance leading to further turmoil. Although this is a broad pattern of conflicts in Africa, individual cases differ widely depending upon factors such as historical animosities, ethnic cleavages, poverty, unresolved border disputes, external meddling etc.

In the case of Angola, the anti-colonial guerrillas struggling against the Portuguese experienced divisions among their ranks from the early days of resistance. Typically, the divisions were primarily ethnic loyalties with ideological divisions emerging as secondary features. These divisions among the guerrilla groups also contributed to the post independence civil wars. The major guerrilla movements were the MPLA, the FNLA and UNITA. The MPLA under the leadership of Agostino Neto had a decidedly Marxist, urban, Mestizo and intellectual base, with Mbundu of the north as the major ethnic component. The FNLA led by Holden Roberto was another important faction having its base among the Kongo people on both sides of the Angolan/Belgian Congo border. The third faction was UNITA led by Jonas Savimbi, a former member of the FNLA who

formed his own organization drawing supporters mainly from his ethnic Ovimbundu tribe.

The April 1974 coup in Portugal which led to the dramatic withdrawal of the Portuguese from its African colonies marked the beginning of a long drawn out civil war in Angola. This sudden decision of Portugal to withdraw left Angola completely unprepared for independence. Each faction tried to build up arms supplies in preparation for an internal power struggle. In the meantime the U.S fearing a power vacuum in the region and the possible communist threat to Angola began to secretly aid pro-western factions like the FNLA and UNITA. Using Zaire as a conduit, the U.S transferred arms to these factions worth about \$60 million by December 1975.

The Angolan situation was further aggravated by the South African invasion into Southern Angola in October 1975 in support of the FNLA and UNITA. This South African move prompted the MPLA leadership to send urgent appeals to the Soviet Union for help. Sensing American and South African moves to tilt the power balance in Angola, the Soviet Union quickly responded by airlifting Cuban combat troops into Angola. This Soviet move decidedly tilted the power balance in Angola resulting in the victory of the MPLA.

The United States realizing that any increased assistance to the FNLA and UNITA would not help them capture power except through large scale commitment of U.S troops or an unrestrained South African intervention with full U.S backing, quietly withdrew from the



civil war. This was followed by the passing of the Clark Amendment which banned American aid to the fighting Angolan groups. Ever since, the U.S pursued a policy of 'constructive engagement' aimed at the withdrawal of Cuban troops from Angola which stayed back to defend the MPLA regime and the inclusion of UNTTA, within a new coalition government through a combination of economic blandishments, political destabilization and covert arms assistance to the rebels. Thus American intervention in Angola has been a case of covert intervention aimed at undermining the Marxist-oriented government of the MPLA.

Unlike the Angolan case the Ethiopian conflict is a long and constant part of history of Horn of Africa evolving through different forms. First it was a clash of tribes or traditional nations; then it became part of the process of imperial consolidation and religious war, soon compounded by the intrusion of foreign colonialism with its need to draw geographic boundaries. Then it burst out as part of the politics of newly independent and highly expectant states, complicated by the Cold War rivalries which made superpower to support opposing groups and most recently by revolution.

One of the central issues of conflict in the horn has been Ethiopia's attempts at the consolidation of its empire. Throughout its history the imposition of a single centralized authority over the whole of Ethiopia has never been an easy matter because of the rugged nature of the topography, which has tended to divide the country into large number of isolated blocks of territory. Added to this geographical impediment is the very composition of Ethiopia's population which is highly varied consisting of diverse ethnic

groups with different religions and cultural practices. Some of the largest groups are the Amhara, the main branch of the Abyssinian family and the traditional rulers of Ethiopia; the Galla or the Oromo, and the Tigrinya speakers, the smaller Abyssinian branch, occupying the province of Tigray in the north and the Eritrean highland. The other groups are the Somalias, the Sidama, the Afars etc.

Among these diverse people, the Amhara, Tigre and the Oromo have played the leading historic roles. The former two are Semitic in origin; speak related languages and live in central and northern highlands, and are mostly Coptic Christians. The Gallas, are a Hamitic people who were originally the inhabitants along the Somali coast and moved into the highlands during the sixteenth and seventeenth centuries. Although they arrived as a hostile force, they were quickly assimilated into the local cultures and a substantial number of them converted to Christianity. However, the process of assimilation was never complete and the historical animosities continued, partly because many of the Gallas embraced Islam and also perhaps because their interests in land was seen to have been subordinated to Christian aristocrats and soldiers who were beneficiaries of imperial patronage. But unlike the Gallas, the pastoralist and nomadic tribesmen of the lowlands such as the Somali and Afars are mainly Islamic, and socio-culturally distinct. They never intermixed with the highland peasantry and bore animosity towards the Christian rulers of Ethiopia.

The Ethiopian state before Emperor Menelik II (1889-1913) thus, consisted of several virtually autonomous provinces and smaller subdivisions ruled by powerful local chiefs.

Ethiopia during the 17<sup>th</sup> and 18<sup>th</sup> centuries was only a small highland kingdom with its centre limited to the central Shoan, Gondarin and Tigrayan highlands. The outlying lowlands, including most of the areas inhabited by the Gallas and Somalis today, were not integrated into or ruled by the Christian kingdom. But the events during the second half of 19<sup>th</sup> century that witnessed intense rivalry among the imperialist European powers in the horn after the opening of the Suez Canal in 1869, provided opportunities for Menelik to use his astute diplomacy to acquire enormous weapons from these rival powers. With this newly acquired military power, Menelik carried out a series of campaigns of conquest among the Oromo and Sidama in the south extending the frontiers of his kingdom.

But the new multi-ethnic state of Ethiopia created largely by conquest, now faced the enormous task of consolidation of its power. The solution sought by Ethiopian kings and nobility had been the forceful imposition of the Amhara culture that included the use of Amharic language and the special status of the Ethiopian Orthodox Church. This was resented by other ethnic groups and ethnic animosities smouldered beneath the surface of much of Ethiopia. The Oromo had always resented their subordination as a conquered people, and frequently rose in rebellion. The Tigreans, though historically of the main component of Ethiopia, resented the Shoan ascendancy and found their language treated as badly as those of all other non-Amhara speakers. From 1960 onwards, with the advent of an independent Republic of Somalia claiming to be the government of all Somalis, the Southeastern Ogaden region became increasingly insecure. The most serious threat of all to Ethiopian territory, however, came from the Red Sea province of Eritrea, which had

been under a succession of non-Ethiopian rulers until the Italians were driven out in 1941. Thus consolidating the empire since the time of Menelik II has been a constant source of conflict in the region as separatist movements fought for their self-determination.

The other important source of conflict in the region has been the Somali irredentism. Ever since Somalia attained independence on 1<sup>st</sup> My 1960 with the amalgamation of British Somalia (26 June 1960) and Italian Somaliland (1 July 1960), it has been struggling to unite all the Somali inhabited areas of the region, i.e., Oganden in Ethiopia, Northern Frontier district of Kenya and the French territory of Afars and Issas, formerly known as French Somaliland and present day Djibouti. Somalia claims that the boundaries drawn up by the Italians, the British and the Ethiopians at various times during 19<sup>th</sup> and 20<sup>th</sup> centuries, were arrived at arbitrarily, without recourse to geography and ethnicity and therefore illegitimate.

This Somali claim was viewed by Ethiopia and Kenya as more than merely threatening the loss of territory or population. They viewed the claim as a challenge to their very existence. Like most African states, Ethiopia and Kenya are multi-tribal and granting the right to self-determination or secession to any tribe or region would threaten the very integrity of these states and create a dangerous precedent. The viability of these two states is contingent upon the acceptance of the legitimacy of their present boundaries by all tribes presently incorporated within them. And conversely, as long as Ethiopia and Kenya continue to exist within their present boundaries, the Somali aspiration for national unity within a nation-state cannot be realized. Thus, the conflict arises out of the

incompatibility of the most fundamental values of the parties concerned - the essence of their national existence.

Emperor Haile Selassie in order to consolidate Ethiopian empire in the face of domestic and external threats sought American help in the form of arms aid. The United States guided by its geo-strategic interests in the region obliged Ethiopian demands in return for its access to the intelligence gathering base at Kagnaw in Eritrea. Thus the strategic interests of the U.S coincided well with Haile Selassie's domestic and regional interests paving the way for long term friendship. And arms assistance became a policy instrument for the U.S administrations in influencing Haile Selassie regime in the Horn. Between 1953 and 1977 Ethiopia received some \$279 million in U.S military aid and more than 3,500 Ethiopian military personnel were trained in the United States.

But the Ethiopian revolution of 1974 that led to the overthrow of Haile Selassie , and coming to power of a provisional Military Administrative Council (PMAC) wedded to "Scientific Socialism" however changed the regional dynamics resulting in a shift of alliances. While the Soviet Union that was earlier supporting Somalia in its fight against Ethiopia ditched Somalia and embraced Ethiopia, the United States became an ally of Somalia. However, this reversal of alliances did not change the existing patterns of Patron-Client relationship and arms assistance for base access continued to be the main component of U.S policy in the Horn. To counter Soviet military aid to Ethiopia, the U.S poured large quantities of weapons into Somalia. In fact, during the Reagan administration, Somalia became one of the largest recipients of U.S security assistance

programmes ever put together for a Sub-Saharan African State. Washington's initial two-year (FY 1980-FY 1981) \$45 million SAP commitment was dwarfed by the aid amounts promised to Somalia throughout the mid-1980s. Over the next seven years, the U.S committed almost \$500 million worth of military resources to Mogadishu-an amount that surpassed previous U.S assistance to Ethiopia during its twenty-five year partnership. Thus, the U.S intervention in the Horn was a case of overt arms aid to regional client states aimed at securing its strategic interests during the Cold War. To conclude, U.S intervention in Africa during the period under review can be analyzed with reference to the dynamic concept of intervention as also the notions of hegemony deployed to appraise changing U.S role in the international system. The hegemonic power, ascending or declining carried an inbuilt capability to intervene in different parts of the world. U.S interventions in Africa were part and parcel of this global historical process. Indeed, the range, depth, magnitude and impact of such interventions varied according to place and time. In the process overt as well as covert interventions on the part of the U.S warranted scholarly attention. Angola and Ethiopia merely represented two intensive cases to illustrate the point.

# Appendix

## APPENDIX

Table-1

### Wallerstein's Cycles of Hegemony

Hegemony	World War securing hegemony	Period of dominance	Decline
Dutch	Thirty Years War, 1618-48	1620-50	1650-72
British	Napoleonic Wars, 1792-1815	1815-73	1873-96
American	World Wars I&II, 1914-1945	1945-67	1967-

Source: Wallerstein, I. (1984) *The Politics of the World-Economy*, Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, pp.41-2.

Table-2

### Modelski's Long Cycles of World Leadership

Cycle	Global war	Preponderance	Decline
1495-1580	1494-1516	Portugal, 1516-40	1540-80
1580-1688	1580-1609	Netherlands, 1609-40	1640-88
1688-1792	1688-1713	Britain, 1714-40	1740-92
1792-1914	1792-1815	Britain, 1815-50	1850-1914
1914-	1914-45	United States, 1945-73	1973-

Source: Modelski, G. (1987) *Long Cycles in World politics*, Seattle WA: University of Washington Press, pp.40,42,44,102,131,147.




**Table-3 U.S Arms Transfers to Ethiopia, FY1953-FY 1977***(in thousands of dollars)*

	MAP	IMETP	EMETP <i>Students</i>	ESF	FMS <i>Financing</i>	FMS Cash
1953-1969	123,444	15,878	2,793	—	—	717
FY 1970	9,307	1,181	154	—		6
FY 1971	10,497	1,261	140	—	-	
FY 1972	9,420	1,208	160	—	—	10
FY 1973	8,687	670	158			—
FY 1974	9,885	797	148	—	11,000	6,272
FY 1975	10,892	738	129	—	25,000	17,301
FY 1976	2,805	775	184			110,596
FY 1977	838	199	46	—	—	6
Security	assistance	program	Terminated		—	
1953-77	185,774	22,707	3,912	—	36,000	134,907

**Table-4 U.S. Arms Transfers to Somalia, FY 1980-FY 1992***(In thousands of dollars)*

	MAP	IMETP	IMETP <i>Students</i>	ESF	FMS <i>Financing</i>	FMS Cash
FY 1980				5,000	20,000	
FY 1981	—	380	21		20,000	41,104
FY 1982	15,000	440	26	20,000	10,000	45,394
FY 1983	15,000	601	32	21,000	10,000	8,653
FY 1984	32,000	993	47	35,000		24,252
FY 1985	33,000	1,132	72	30,000	—	32,000
FY 1986	19,140	1,106	57	22,011	—	20,264
FY 1987	7,500	707	16	17,125	—	18,511
FY 1988	5,500	989	56	25,000	—	4,998
FY 1989		900	42	23,250	—	10,000
FY 1990	—			—	—	
FY 1991	—	—	—	—	—	
FY 1992	—	300	16	—	—	—

Source for table-3 & 4: Jeffrey A. Lefebvre, "Arms for the Horn: U.S. Security Policy in Ethiopia and Somalia 1953-1991" (Pittsburgh, University of Pittsburgh) 1991,p-280.




G. H. 11/1981 L.B.


THE HORN OF AFRICA




THE HORN OF AFRICA



THE SOMALI PENINSULA



NOTE: Kagnaw base is near Asmara  
ERITREA



THE RED SEA AND THE PERSIAN GULF

# Angola/Namibia Accords

WHITE HOUSE STATEMENT,  
DEC. 13, 1988<sup>1</sup>

The signing of the protocol of Brazzaville this morning by the Governments of South Africa, Cuba, and Angola opens the way to peace and stability in southwestern Africa. This development fulfills President Reagan's policy determination made early in this Administration to seek the removal of all foreign troops from Angola, the implementation of UN [Security Council] Resolution 435 for the independence of Namibia, and support for the UNITA [National Union for the Total Independence of Angola] freedom fighters in Angola. It was the combination of the U.S. steadfast support for these objectives and skillful mediation over a period of 8 years that made this breakthrough for peace possible. The American mediating team, the participating governments, and President Sassou-Nguesso of the Congo are to be congratulated for their role in this extraordinary achievement. We hope that this major diplomatic milestone in southern Africa will be followed by renewed efforts to settle the internal conflict in Angola through a process of national reconciliation and peaceful negotiation among Angolans.

ASSISTANT SECRETARY  
CROCKER'S REMARKS,  
DEC. 13, 1988<sup>2</sup>

Today's ceremony—the signing of the Brazzaville protocol by Angola, Cuba, and South Africa—is the culmination of many months of hard work by distinguished representatives of three sovereign governments which, faced by a stark choice of peace or war, chose to work for peace. With the signature of this protocol, the path is now clear for early signature of a tripartite agreement that will bring an end to the international conflict in southwestern Africa. This event signifies the end of a sad chapter in Africa's modern history and the beginning of a new chapter. Speaking for my government, we have high hopes that this will be a chapter that witnesses reduced internal and international strife, greater opportunity

for the building of just and prosperous societies, and strengthened prospects for international cooperation in support of African development and stability.

On behalf of the delegation of the United States, which has had the honor to serve as mediator in these negotiations, and on behalf of the delegations of the three governments here present today, I would like to express our deepest gratitude to you, Mr. President [Denis Sassou-Nguesso]. As the leader of the People's Republic of the Congo, we salute your own contributions to this historic peace process in southern Africa. I recall that in April 1987 it was your invitation, while chairman of the Organization of African Unity, to meet in Brazzaville that served as a catalyst to restore and reinvigorate contact and dialogue between my government and the Government of the People's Republic of Angola. Today is the fifth occasion since that meeting nearly 2 years ago that we have assembled in Brazzaville in our joint search for peace in the region. Your hospitality, Mr. President, and the cooperation and assistance of the Government of the People's Republic of the Congo have been a vital part of this process. You have encouraged us and supported us, and we are most grateful.

It is also appropriate today to salute the determination and professionalism of the delegations from Angola, Cuba, and South Africa that over the past 8 months have met in London, Cairo, Geneva, New York, and here in Brazzaville. The process has been long, painstaking, and often frustrating for everyone concerned. Without the extraordinary dedication and skill of the principal negotiators, we would not have been able to achieve this settlement. I would also like to pay tribute to two parties who have not been present officially at the negotiating table but whose cooperation and assistance have been crucial throughout the course of these negotiations.

As mediator, we have developed a pattern of close, practical, and effective cooperation with our Soviet counterparts. Despite some differences in perspective and different roles in the negotiating process, the United States and

the U.S.S.R. have been able to work cooperatively to move the process forward. It has been a case study of superpower effort to support the resolution of regional conflicts. So, I would like to salute the hard work and professional dedication of the Soviet officials who have been involved in this intensive effort over the past months.

The United Nations has the responsibility to implement UN Security Council Resolution 435/78 and to oversee the transition to Namibian independence, as well as to verify the withdrawal of Cuban troops from Angola. These are complex undertakings and are essential for the successful implementation of the agreements the parties are entering into. We have been fortunate to have had the benefit of the advice, support, and counsel of a real statesman, UN Secretary General Javier Perez de Cuellar, and of another distinguished international civil servant, Under Secretary General Martti Ahtisaari, and his colleagues from the United Nations, through the negotiations.

In conclusion, I would like to say a word about my own country and its role in the search for a peaceful solution in Africa. As this protracted negotiation means a successful conclusion, it is worth noting the ingredients that have made success possible. First, our role has been welcomed by our partners in Africa and by our friends and allies around the world. My country does not have blueprints for the solution of every problem or a mandate to play such a role. But we are prepared to involve ourselves in the search for constructive solutions when such a role is welcomed and appropriate. Second, we have been realistic. We have recognized that lasting solutions can only be based on the concrete historical realities of a given situation. Just as man cannot eat slogans, neither can statesmen solve problems with rhetorical clichés and abstract formulas. Third, we have tried to chart a clear course and stick to it. This is an approach that may sometimes fall short of shifting fashions or popular hopes for instant results. But over time this is the approach that gives confidence and predictability to key decisionmakers. It is the approach that works.



## PROTOCOL OF BRAZZAVILLE, DEC. 13, 1988

negotiations representing the Governments of the People's Republic of Angola, the Republic of Cuba, and the Republic of South Africa.

Meeting in Brazzaville with the mediation of the Government of the United States of America.

Expressing their deep appreciation to the President of the People's Republic of the Congo, Colonel Denis Sassou-Nguesso, for his indispensable contribution to the use of peace in Southwestern Africa and for the hospitality extended to the delegates by the Government of the People's Republic of the Congo.

Confirming their commitment to act in accordance with the Principles for a Peace Settlement in Southwestern Africa, initiated at New York on 13 July 1988 and approved by their respective Governments on 20 July 1988, each of which is indispensable to a comprehensive settlement; with understandings reached at Geneva on 5 August 1988 that are not superseded by a document; and with the agreement reached at Geneva on 15 November 1988 for redeployment to the North and the total withdrawal of Cuban troops from Angola.

Urging the international community to provide economic and financial support for implementation of all aspects of this settlement.

Agree as follows:

1. The parties agree to recommend to the Secretary General of the United Nations that 1 April 1989 be established as the date for implementation of UNSCR 78.

2. The parties agree to meet on 22 December 1988 in New York for signature of the tripartite agreement and for signature of Angola and Cuba of their bilateral agreement. By the date of signature, Angola and Cuba shall have reached agreement with the Secretary General of the United Nations on verification arrangements to be approved by the Security Council.

3. The parties agree to exchange the ratifications of war upon signature of the tripartite agreement.

4. The parties agree to establish a Joint Commission in accordance with the annex attached to this protocol.

### Annex on the Joint Commission

With the objective of facilitating the resolution of any dispute regarding the interpretation or implementation of the tripartite agreement, the parties hereby establish a Joint Commission, which shall carry out its work upon signature of the tripartite agreement.

2. The Joint Commission shall serve as a forum for discussion and resolution of issues regarding the interpretation and implementation of the tripartite agreement, and for such other purposes as the parties in the future may mutually agree.

3. The parties invite the United States of America and the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics to participate as observers in the work of the Commission.

Furthermore, the parties agree that, upon the independence of Namibia, the Namibian Government should be included as a full member of the Joint Commission. To that end, the parties will extend a formal invitation to the Namibian Government to join the Joint Commission on the date of Namibian independence.

4. The Joint Commission shall be constituted within thirty days of the signing of the tripartite agreement. The Joint Commission shall establish its own regulations and rules of procedure for regular meetings and for special meetings which may be requested by any party.

5. The decision by a party to discuss or seek the resolution of an issue in the Joint Commission shall not prejudice the right of that party to raise the issue, as it deems appropriate, before the Security Council of the United Nations or to pursue such other means of dispute resolution as are available under international law.

6. The Joint Commission shall in no way function as a substitute for UNTAG (including the monitoring role of UNTAG outside Namibia) or for the UN entity performing verification in Angola.

## SECRETARY'S STATEMENT, DEC. 22, 1988<sup>1</sup>

This is a moment for celebration of achievement and dedication to a better future in southern Africa.

But it is a moment as well of the immense tragedy of yesterday's airline disaster (in Scotland). Here we remember the UN Commissioner for Namibia, Mr. Bernt Carlson. Bernt Carlson was a tireless champion of Namibia's independence. His memory will be honored by all who wish Namibia well. We grieve for him and for all those who lost their lives and extend profound sympathy to their relatives and friends. Please join me in a silent moment of grief and prayer.

Mr. Secretary General: Your Excellencies the Foreign Ministers of the People's Republic of Angola, the Republic of Cuba, and the Republic of

South Africa: distinguished guests: We meet here today for the signing of two major agreements—a bilateral agreement between the People's Republic of Angola and the Republic of Cuba and a tripartite accord among the People's Republic of Angola, the Republic of Cuba, and the Republic of South Africa.

The first order of business this morning is the signing of the trilateral agreement, and I now invite His Excellency the Foreign Minister of the People's Republic of Angola, Afonso Van Dunem, His Excellency the Foreign Minister of Cuba, Isidoro Octavio Mamierca, and His Excellency the Foreign Minister of the Republic of South Africa, R.F. Botha, to sign their trilateral agreement. [The parties sign the agreement.]

Mr. Secretary General, on behalf of the United States, as mediator of these now-concluded negotiations, and on behalf of the parties themselves—Angola, Cuba, and South Africa—I am honored to present to the community of nations—through you—the agreement just signed by these ministers.

This is an occasion for both celebration and sober reflection. We have just witnessed the signing of an unprecedented agreement that will bring long-awaited peace to southwestern Africa and independence to Namibia. It is appropriate that we do so at the headquarters of the United Nations, where 10 years ago, the Security Council adopted Resolution 435. Today we are privileged to participate in the culmination of a decade of effort to implement the UN plan to assist Namibia in taking its rightful place in the family of nations.

The regional settlement concluded here today represents a momentous turning point in the history of southern Africa.

With the independence of Namibia, Africa's last colonial question will have been resolved. As the guns fall silent across the borders of southwestern Africa, the world will look to the nations of that vast region to turn to resolution of their pressing internal problems through peaceful means. We are especially mindful of the heavy responsibility assumed by the parties to the tripartite agreement and by the international community to see that the commitments undertaken today are fully and faithfully implemented. Nothing else will adequately respond to the aspirations of all the peoples of southwestern Africa for a new era of peace and prosperity.



UN Secretary General Javier Perez de Cuellar (seated, center) presided at the signing ceremony of the Angola/Namibia accords at UN headquarters. On the left is South African Foreign Minister Botha and on the right is Secretary Shultz.

I salute the negotiators of the agreement. In an age of mass media and public diplomacy, we are sometimes told that the ancient arts of negotiation—communication, compromise, and, above all, patience—are no longer relevant. You have proven otherwise. Each of your governments empowered you to negotiate and supported you with bold and timely decisions for peace. Your triumph has vindicated their faith in you and will give heart to others who still struggle to resolve conflicts around the world. You have reminded us all that, even in the complex world of modern diplomacy, individuals do make a difference.

We welcome the presence today of Deputy Foreign Minister Adamishin and department head Vasev as representatives of the Soviet Union. It is fitting that they be here because the Soviet Union has played an important and constructive role in the peace process in southwestern Africa. The parties themselves made the sovereign decision for peace, but, in doing so, they have been encouraged and strongly supported by both the United States and the Soviet Union. Though our roles have been different, our close cooperation has made an effective contribution to the achievement of this agreement. Let us hope that we can both draw from our experience in this process as we continue our regional dialogue aimed at peaceful resolution of other pressing regional conflicts.

Now that the parties have signed their trilateral agreement, the United Nations will undertake in earnest the

formidable task of implementing Security Council Resolution 435. This will be a complex undertaking requiring considerable expenditure of resources in an era of tight budgets for member governments and the United Nations itself. I reaffirm today that the United States will do its share. We look to other member states to join us in this great endeavor.

The United Nations can be justly proud of its leading role in the implementation of this regional settlement. The UN Transition Assistance Group (UNTAG) will have the challenging task of ensuring free and fair elections leading to independence in Namibia. The United Nations has also been requested by the Governments of the People's Republic of Angola and the Republic of Cuba to verify the departure of Cuban troops from Angola. The Secretary General, his Special Representative for Namibia, Marti Ahtisaari, and their team enjoy the full confidence of the parties and the member states. I am confident that they will perform magnificently, further enhancing the prestige of the United Nations.

At this season, millions of people around the world consider in a special way the meaning of peace on Earth and look forward with hope to a new year. The governments and individuals gathered together in this place have truly given the world a special gift. They have given us all a fresh and very welcome demonstration of the human capacity to put aside the tools of war in favor of the instruments of peace.

## PRESIDENT'S STATEMENT, DEC. 22, 1988<sup>1</sup>

I am pleased to announce that Secretary of State Shultz represented the United States at a very important ceremony today in New York, in which formal agreements were signed aimed at bringing peace to southwestern Africa. The Foreign Ministers of South Africa, Angola, and Cuba signed accords leading to the staged and complete withdrawal of Cuban military forces from Angola and for implementation of UN Security Council Resolution 435 leading to independence for Namibia. The United States mediated negotiations leading to these historic agreements.

The agreements signed today are the result of intense negotiations which have taken place over several years. They promise to end the cycle of violence which has plagued the Namibian Angolan border area for more than 14 years, inflicting untold human misery and property damage. We are pleased that Namibia is to gain its long overdue independence, after being occupied by South African forces for more than 70 years.

Regarding the Cuban military in Angola, the United States long has contended that the presence of Cuban combat forces was a destabilizing element in the region. We are gratified that they will be departing the African Continent. When completed in 1991, the total withdrawal of Cuban forces from Angola will end one of the major regional problems that have troubled U.S.-Soviet relations in recent years.

The United States, as mediator in the negotiations, is pleased to have assisted the parties to find a peaceful formula to reconcile differences and looks forward to working with other members of the joint commission formed to monitor implementation of the agreements.

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**TRIPARTITE AGREEMENT,  
DEC. 22, 1988**

AGREEMENT AMONG  
THE PEOPLE'S REPUBLIC OF ANGOLA,  
THE REPUBLIC OF CUBA,  
AND  
THE REPUBLIC OF SOUTH AFRICA

The governments of the People's Republic of Angola, the Republic of Cuba, and the Republic of South Africa, hereinafter designated as "the Parties,"

Taking into account the "Principles for a Peaceful Settlement in Southwestern Africa," approved by the Parties on 20 July 1988, and the subsequent negotiations with respect to the implementation of these Principles, each of which is indispensable for a comprehensive settlement,

Considering the acceptance by the Parties of the implementation of United Nations Security Council Resolution 435 (1978), adopted on 29 September 1978, hereinafter designated as "UNSCR 435/78,"

Considering the conclusion of the bilateral agreement between the People's Republic of Angola and the Republic of Cuba providing for the redeployment toward the North and the staged and total withdrawal of Cuban troops from the territory of the People's Republic of Angola,

Recognizing the role of the United Nations Security Council in implementing UNSCR 435/78 and in supporting the implementation of the present agreement,

Affirming the sovereignty, sovereign equality, and independence of all states of southwestern Africa,

Affirming the principle of non-interference in the internal affairs of states,

Affirming the principle of abstention from the threat or use of force against the territorial integrity or political independence of states,

Reaffirming the right of the peoples of the southwestern region of Africa to self-determination, independence, and equality of rights, and of the states of southwestern Africa to peace, development, and social progress,

Urging African and international cooperation for the settlement of the problems of the development of the southwestern region of Africa,

Expressing their appreciation for the mediating role of the Government of the United States of America,

Desiring to contribute to the establishment of peace and security in southwestern Africa,

Agree to the provisions set forth below.

(1) The Parties shall immediately request the Secretary-General of the United Nations to seek authority from the Security Council to commence implementation of UNSCR 435/78 on 1 April 1989.

(2) All military forces of the Republic of South Africa shall depart Namibia in accordance with UNSCR 435/78.

(3) Consistent with the provisions of UNSCR 435/78, the Republic of South Africa and People's Republic of Angola shall cooperate with the Secretary-General to ensure the independence of Namibia through free and fair elections and shall abstain from any action that could prevent the execution of UNSCR 435/78. The Parties shall respect the territorial integrity and inviolability of borders of Namibia and shall ensure that their territories are not used by any state, organization, or person in connection with acts of war, aggression, or violence against the territorial integrity or inviolability of borders of Namibia or any other action which could prevent the execution of UNSCR 435/78.

(4) The People's Republic of Angola and the Republic of Cuba shall implement the bilateral agreement, signed on the date of signature of this agreement, providing for the redeployment toward the North and the staged and total withdrawal of Cuban troops from the territory of the People's Republic of Angola, and the arrangements made with the Security Council of the United Nations for the on-site verification of that withdrawal.

(5) Consistent with their obligations under the Charter of the United Nations, the Parties shall refrain from the threat or use of force, and shall ensure that their respective territories are not used by any state, organization, or person in connection with any acts of war, aggression, or violence, against the territorial integrity, inviolability of borders, or independence of any state of southwestern Africa.

(6) The Parties shall respect the principle of non-interference in the internal affairs of the states of southwestern Africa.

(7) The Parties shall comply in good faith with all obligations undertaken in this agreement and shall resolve through negotiation and in a spirit of cooperation any disputes with respect to the interpretation or implementation thereof.

(8) This agreement shall enter into force upon signature.

Signed at New York in triplicate in the Portuguese, Spanish and English languages, each language being equally authentic, this 22nd day of December 1988.

FOR THE PEOPLE'S REPUBLIC  
OF ANGOLA

AFONSO VAN DUNEM

FOR THE REPUBLIC OF CUBA

ISIDORO OCTAVIO MALMERCA

FOR THE REPUBLIC OF  
SOUTH AFRICA

ROELOF F. BOTHA

**BILATERAL AGREEMENT,  
DEC. 22, 1988**

AGREEMENT BETWEEN THE  
GOVERNMENTS OF THE PEOPLE'S  
REPUBLIC OF ANGOLA AND THE REPUBLIC  
OF CUBA FOR THE TERMINATION OF THE  
INTERNATIONALIST MISSION OF THE  
CUBAN MILITARY CONTINGENT

The Government of the People's Republic of Angola and the Republic of Cuba, hereinafter designated as the Parties,

Considering,





That the implementation of Resolution 435 of the Security Council of the United Nations for the independence of Namibia shall commence on the 1st of April,

That the question of the independence of Namibia and the safeguarding of the sovereignty, independence and territorial integrity of the People's Republic of Angola are closely interrelated with each other and with peace and security in the region of southwestern Africa,

That on the date of signature of this agreement a tripartite agreement among the Governments of the People's Republic of Angola, the Republic of Cuba and the Republic of South Africa shall be signed, containing the essential elements for the achievement of peace in the region of southwestern Africa,

That acceptance of and strict compliance with the foregoing will bring to an end the reasons which compelled the Government of the People's Republic of Angola to request, in the legitimate exercise of its rights under Article 51 of the United Na-

## Cuban Troop Withdrawal Schedule: First Year



Names and boundary representation are not necessarily authoritative.

0225 12-88 STAFF 001

under charter, the deployment to Angolan territory of a Cuban internationalist military contingent to guarantee, in cooperation with the FAPLA (the Angolan government army), its territorial integrity and sovereignty in view of the invasion and occupation of part of its territory.

Notwithstanding the agreements signed by the Government of the People's Republic of Angola and the Republic of Cuba on 4 February 1984 and 19 March 1984, the platform of the Government of the People's Republic of Angola approved in November 1984, and the agreement of Brazzaville signed by the Government of the People's Republic of Angola, the Republic of Cuba and the Republic of South Africa on December 13, 1984.

Taking into account, That conditions now exist which make possible the repatriation of the Cuban military contingent currently in Angolan territory and the successful accomplishment of their internationalist mission,

The parties agree as follows:

#### Article 1

To commence the redeployment by stages to the 15th and 18th parallels and the total withdrawal to Cuba of the 50,000 men who constitute the Cuban troops contingent stationed in the People's Republic of Angola, in accordance with the pace and time-frame established in the attached calendar, which is an integral part of this agreement. The total withdrawal shall be completed by the 1st of July, 1991.

#### Article 2

The Governments of the People's Republic of Angola and the Republic of Cuba reserve the right to modify or alter their obligations deriving from Article 1 of this Agreement in the event that flagrant violations of the Tripartite Agreement are verified.

#### Article 3

The Parties, through the Secretary General of the United Nations Organization, hereby request that the Security Council verify the redeployment and phased and

total withdrawal of Cuban troops from the territory of the People's Republic of Angola, and to this end shall agree on a matching protocol.

#### Article 4

This agreement shall enter into force upon signature of the tripartite agreement among the People's Republic of Angola, the Republic of Cuba, and the Republic of South Africa.

Signed on 22 December 1988, at the Headquarters of the United Nations Organization, in two copies, in the Portuguese and Spanish languages, each being equally authentic.

FOR THE PEOPLE'S  
REPUBLIC OF ANGOLA

AFONSO VAN DUSEN

FOR THE REPUBLIC OF CUBA

ISIDORO OCTAVIO MALMERCA

### Schedule of Events

#### Transition to Namibian Independence

April 1989 - UN Facilitator implemented  
July - South African troops down to 1,500 men  
November - Elections in Namibia, remaining South African troops depart



#### Events During Cuban Troop Withdrawal

April - Cuban troops arrive in Angola  
August - UN Security Council Resolution 435 adopted  
November - UN Security Council Resolution 435 implemented  
December - Cuban troops begin withdrawal

## Annex on Troop Withdrawal Schedule

### CALENDAR

In compliance with Article 1 of the agreement between the Government of the Republic of Cuba and the Government of the People's Republic of Angola for the termination of the mission of the Cuban internationalist military contingent stationed in Angolan territory, the parties establish the following calendar for the withdrawal:

#### Time Frames

Prior to the first of April, 1989

(date of the beginning  
of implementation  
of Resolution 435)

3,000 men

Total duration of the calendar

Starting from the  
1st of April, 1989

27 months

Redeployment to the north:

to the 15th parallel

by 1 August 1989

to the 13th parallel

by 31 Oct. 1989

Total men to be withdrawn:

by 1 November 1989 25,000 men (50%)

by 1 April 1990 33,000 (66%)

by 1 October 1990 38,000 (76%); 12,000

men remaining

by July 1991

50,000 (100%)

Taking as its base a Cuban force of 50,000 men.

<sup>1</sup>Text from Weekly Compilation of Presidential Documents of Dec. 19, 1988.

<sup>2</sup>Chester A. Crocker is Assistant Secretary for African Affairs.

<sup>3</sup>Press release 260 of Dec. 28 and USUN press release 181.

<sup>4</sup>Text from Weekly Compilation of Presidential Documents of Dec. 26.



## The United States and Angola, 1974-88: A Chronology

*The following chronology was prepared by Nina D. Howland of the Policy Studies Division, Office of the Historian, Bureau of Public Affairs.*

**April 1974.** A military coup in Portugal brought to power a new government dedicated to granting independence to Portugal's colonies. In Angola, however, the decolonization process was complicated by the existence of three competing nationalist movements engaged in combat: the National Front for the Liberation of Angola (FNLA), the Popular Movement for the Liberation of Angola (MPLA), and the National Union for the Total Independence of Angola (UNITA). The FNLA had close ties to Zaire; the MPLA was supported by Cuba and the Soviet Union; and UNITA was receiving some assistance from China. Publicly the United States, which had been advocating independence for Portugal's colonies since 1961, expressed no preference among these contenders.

**January 15, 1975.** The leaders of the three rival nationalist movements— Holden Roberto of FNLA, Agostinho Neto of MPLA, and Jonas Savimbi of

UNITA—signed the Alvor accord in Alvor, Portugal. They agreed to tripartite participation in a transitional coalition government headed by a Portuguese high commissioner, who was to be assisted by a presidential council with the chairmanship rotating among the three leaders. It was also agreed that Angola was to become fully independent from Portugal on November 11, 1975. On January 31, a transitional government was installed in Luanda, Angola, but the truce soon broke down, and the three factions renewed their internecine warfare.

**June 11, 1975.** FNLA leader Roberto publicly accused the Soviet Union of supplying the MPLA with tanks, heavy artillery, and guided missiles.

**July 1975.** Amid continuing violence in Angola, the public position of the U.S. Government was that the three factions should resolve their differences through negotiations. South Africa—unhappy at the prospect of an unfriendly, communist-dominated Angola on the Namibian border—began to supply arms to the FNLA and UNITA.



August 1, 1975. UNITA formally declared war on the MPLA.

August 6-8, 1975. The transitional government in Luanda collapsed as UNITA and the FNLA, which had formed a weak alliance, withdrew their ministers in the midst of full-scale civil war. At this point, the MPLA had succeeded in securing control over 12 of Angola's 16 provinces.

August 29, 1975. Portugal formally annulled the Alvor accord and dissolved the transitional government after appointing a new high commissioner.

September 23, 1975. Secretary of State Kissinger declared that events in Angola had taken a "distressing turn" and that the United States was "most alarmed at the interference of extracontinental powers," i.e., the Soviet Union and Cuba.

October 23, 1975. South Africa sent a heavily armed unit of the South African Army, including black Africans who had served in the Portuguese colonial army and white Portuguese Angolans, into Angola to aid the FNLA-UNITA alliance. The force began a major thrust north toward Luanda. The entry of South African forces into Angola was followed by a massive increase in Soviet arms shipments to the MPLA. South Africa subsequently claimed that its intervention had been intended to prevent the communists from gaining a foothold in Angola.

November 5, 1975. Cuba, which had been sending military advisers and personnel to aid the MPLA since March 1975, began direct participation in combat. By mid-November, Western intelligence sources estimated that 2,000 Cuban troops were fighting in Angola; by February 1976, the number had increased to an estimated 14,000.

November 11, 1975. On Independence Day, the existence of two Angolan republics was declared—the MPLA announced the establishment of the People's Republic of Angola with its capital at Luanda, while the FNLA and UNITA called their divided territories the People's Democratic Republic of Angola with its capital at Huambo in southern Angola. (At this point, the MPLA occupied a strip of Angolan territory from Luanda eastward to the

Zairian border, as well as the enclave of Cabinda; the FNLA controlled the northwest; and UNITA held the entire southern sector of the country.)

Secretary Kissinger said that the United States would not recognize the MPLA, which had managed to seize Luanda "through a very substantial inflow of communist arms" and that it favored negotiations to attempt to create "a transitional government that would permit the popular will to be consulted."

December 4, 1975. After consultations between President Ford and Soviet Ambassador Anatoliy Dobrynin, the Soviet Union halted its airlift to Angola.

December 19, 1975. The Senate voted 54 to 22 to approve the Tunney amendment to the FY 1976 Defense Department appropriations bill (H.R. 9861) prohibiting the use of any funds in the bill "for any activities involving Angola."

December 20, 1975. President Ford strongly criticized the Senate action because it would tie U.S. hands in Angola and warned that Cuba had already sent 4,000-6,000 combat troops.

December 25, 1975. The Soviet Union resumed its airlift to Angola.

January 4, 1976. President Ford said that the Soviet Union's large-scale military involvement in Angola was "inconsistent with detente."

January 27, 1976. Despite last minute appeals from President Ford and Secretary Kissinger, the House of Representatives, voted 323 to 99 to adopt the Tunney amendment. The President said that the vote would result in "serious harm to the interests of the United States." On February 9, he signed into law the FY 1976 Defense Department appropriations bill containing the Tunney amendment.

February 11, 1976. The Organization of African Unity (OAU) recognized the Luanda (MPLA) government and accepted it into membership. On February 14, UNITA leader Savimbi announced that his forces had moved into the bush and would henceforth carry on the struggle against the MPLA through guerrilla warfare. On February 22, Por-

tugal recognized the MPLA government in Luanda. By the end of February, the MPLA had established its control of Angola.

March 31, 1976. Following South African raids against South West Africa People's Organization (SWAPO) bases in Angola, the United States, the United Kingdom, France, Italy, and Japan abstained on UN Security Council Resolution 387 condemning South African aggression against Angola and calling upon South Africa to pay compensation for the damage it had inflicted upon that country. The United States had sought unsuccessfully during the debate to obtain a resolution condemning all foreign involvement in Angola. SWAPO, the most active Namibian liberation movement, had been conducting intermittent guerrilla warfare against South Africa's occupation of Namibia from bases in Angola since the 1960s and had greatly expanded its guerrilla activity after Portuguese forces left Angola.

May 1, 1976. Secretary Kissinger said that the United States would be willing to normalize relations with Angola if the 15,000 Cuban troops in that country were withdrawn.

June 30, 1976. President Ford signed into law the International Security Assistance and Arms Export Control Act of 1976. The act contained an amendment sponsored by Senator Dick Clark of Iowa, which reaffirmed the Tunney amendment's ban on U.S. military and other forms of assistance to any group or persons in Angola.

November 22, 1976. The United States abstained on a UN Security Council resolution recommending that the General Assembly admit Angola to membership in the United Nations. (It had vetoed a similar resolution on June 23.) On December 1, the General Assembly admitted Angola by a vote of 116 to 0, with one abstention (the United States).

February 16, 1977. President Carter declared that his Administration "would like to move toward the re-establishment of normal relationships" with Angola but that the "Cuban mercenaries" in that country presented a problem. He said that the removal of Cuban troops from Angola would be "a step toward full normalization."

May 4, 1978. South African air and ground forces launched a major attack on SWAPO bases in Angola—their first direct action since 1976. On May 6, the UN Security Council unanimously adopted Resolution 428, which condemned South Africa for its attack and for using Namibia as a springboard, and demanded its withdrawal from Angola and the end of its illegal occupation of Namibia.

May 25, 1978. President Carter told a news conference that while he did not intend to seek modification of the Clark amendment, he had asked the Secretary of State to review the various legislative restrictions on U.S. foreign aid programs in light of the need "to preserve Presidential capacity to act in the national interests at a time of rapidly changing circumstances." He also said that the United States had "no intention of getting involved in the conflict in Angola."

June 20, 1978. Secretary of State Vance declared that increased U.S. consultations with the Angolan Government could improve the prospects for reconciliation between Angola and Zaire, as well as for achieving a peaceful settlement in Namibia. (Katangan rebels from Angola had invaded the Shaba Province of Zaire on May 11.)

June 26, 1978. President Carter told a news conference that his Administration had no current plans to "normalize" the U.S. relationship with Angola but there had been U.S. negotiations or consultations directly with Angolan officials ever since he came into office and that U.S. Deputy Ambassador to the United Nations Donald F. McHenry's current visit to Angola was "part of a series of consultations." In response to a question, the President also told reporters that he had "no knowledge" of a reported CIA plan to send weapons through a third country to the rebels in Angola. He declared that no "responsible person" in his Administration would have violated the Clark amendment and that he had no intention of sending weapons to Angola either directly or indirectly.

July 21, 1978. Angolan President Neto said that his government had "no reservations" about establishing diplomatic ties but that the United States would have to "take us as we are." On

July 22, the Department of State said that the United States was pleased with Neto's offer but concerned about the Cuban presence in Angola and declared that diplomatic relations could not be established so long as there existed the "problem of internal reconciliation among the various factions in Angola."

March 26, 1979. The United States, the United Kingdom, and France abstained on UN Security Council Resolution 447 condemning South Africa for its attacks against Angola and for its use of Namibia as a springboard for those attacks, demanding that it cease such attacks immediately. It requested that UN member states extend all necessary assistance to the Angolans and all other front-line states to strengthen their defense capacities. The U.S. abstention was based on opposition to the resolution's call for assistance to strengthen the defense capacities of the front-line states. On November 2, 1979, and June 27, 1980, the United States, the United Kingdom, and France again abstained on Security Council resolutions which repeated the major points of Resolution 447.

April 18, 1979. Assistant Secretary of State for African Affairs Richard M. Moose stated that although the United States had not recognized the Luanda government, it had found it possible to work constructively with the Angolans on "regional security problems." He also said that Angola would have "a crucial role" to play in any Namibia settlement.

December 16, 1980. President Carter signed into law the FY 1981 foreign aid appropriations bill which contained an amendment—proposed by Senator Paul Tsongas of Massachusetts on June 17 and modified by the conference committee on November 19—revising the 1976 Clark amendment. The new amendment prohibited U.S. aid to any faction for military or paramilitary operations in Angola unless: (1) the President determined that such aid should be furnished "in the national security interests of the United States;" (2) the President submitted this determination to Congress along with a description of the aid recommended and the identity of its proposed recipients; and (3) Congress enacted a joint resolution approving the furnishing of such aid.

March 19, 1981. The Reagan Administration formally requested that Congress repeal the Clark amendment on the grounds that it involved "an unnecessary restriction" on the powers of the President.

April 17, 1981. Assistant Secretary of State for African Affairs Chester A. Crocker arrived in Angola. Crocker, who was on a 2-week, 12-nation tour of southern Africa aimed at reviving stalled efforts to achieve negotiated independence for Namibia, told the Angolan Government that progress on Namibia was related to the withdrawal of Cuban troops from Angola—the first public linkage of the two issues.

May 19, 1981. The House Foreign Affairs Committee recommended (19-5) that Congress not repeal the Clark amendment and stated that repeal would play into the hands of the Soviet and Cubans by increasing Angola's reliance on the Cubans for security needs. The foreign aid appropriations bill retaining the Clark amendment had been signed into law on December 29.

August 29, 1981. Assistant Secretary Crocker stated that the U.S. Government recognized the "intimate relationship between the conflicts in Namibia and Angola" and was convinced that "a satisfactory outcome can only be based on parallel movement in both arenas."

August 31, 1981. The United States vetoed a UN Security Council resolution supported by the other 13 Council members, which strongly condemned South Africa for its "unprovoked and persistent armed invasion" of Angola and for using Namibia as a springboard for such invasions. The U.S. representative explained that the United States had voted against the resolution because it placed "all the blame on South Africa for the escalation of the violence."

December 8, 1981. UNITA leader Savimbi, on a private visit to Washington, met with Secretary of State Haig after a series of talks with other senior U.S. officials. The Secretary told Savimbi that the United States wished to see all foreign forces leave Angola and Savimbi declared his commitment to a political solution to the civil war in Angola.

December 17, 1981. The United States cast the only vote against UN General Assembly Resolution 36/172 C adopted by a vote of 136 to 1, with 8 abstentions, which condemned South Africa's "unprovoked acts of aggression" against Angola and other independent African states, urged the Security Council to adopt effective measures (i.e., sanctions) against South Africa under Chapter VII of the UN Charter, and demanded that South Africa pay full compensation for the damages caused by its aggression.

January 15-16, 1982. Assistant Secretary Crocker met with Angolan Foreign Minister Paulo Jorge in Paris to discuss a recent "Western Five" proposal to achieve Namibian independence. On March 4, the two met again in Paris for further talks. (The "Western Five"—Canada, France, West Germany, the United Kingdom, and the United States—had been attempting to negotiate a Namibian settlement since April 1977.)

June 17, 1982. South African Prime Minister Pieter W. Botha declared that no agreement on Namibian independence was possible until Cuban troops were removed from Angola. On July 25, Angola rejected the proposed linkage between South African withdrawal from Namibia and Cuban withdrawal from Angola.

December 20, 1982. UN General Assembly Resolution 37/233-B was adopted by a vote of 129 to 0, with 17 abstentions (including the United States). The resolution reaffirmed Security Council Resolutions 385 and 435 as the only basis for a Namibian settlement and rejected U.S. and South African attempts to establish linkage between Namibian independence and "extraneous issues" such as the withdrawal of Cuban forces from Angola.

January 26, 1983. The United States and Angola began a new round of talks on Namibia.

February 16, 1983. A *de facto* cease-fire between South Africa and Angola went into effect while negotiations proceeded between the two countries. The Department of State welcomed this as "a constructive step toward a more comprehensive regional peace."

April 13-14, 1983. Angolan Interior Minister Manuel Alexandre Rodrigues met with top U.S. officials, including Secretary of State Shultz and Vice President Bush, in Washington to discuss Namibia and the presence of Cuban troops in Angola.

August 29, 1983. Following his return from a working visit to South Africa, Namibia, and Angola, UN Secretary General Javier Perez de Cuellar reported to the Security Council that South Africa's insistence on the removal of Cuban troops from Angola made it impossible to implement Resolution 435—the UN plan for the independence of Namibia.

October 28, 1983. The United States abstained on UN Security Council Resolution 539 which rejected South Africa's insistence on linking Namibian independence to withdrawal of Cuban troops from Angola.

December 6, 1983-January 8, 1984. South African forces launched a major offensive against SWAPO guerrilla bases, attacking targets more than 150 miles inside Angola.

December 15, 1983. South African Foreign Minister Rieff F. (Pik) Botha sent a letter to UN Secretary General Perez de Cuellar saying that South Africa was prepared to begin a disengagement of its troops from southern Angola for a month beginning January 31, 1984, in order to advance the possibility of a Namibian settlement. He said the offer was made "on the understanding that the Angolan Government... would not exploit the situation." The Department of State welcomed the Foreign Minister's offer. On December 30, President Dos Santos sent a letter to the Secretary General accepting the possibility of a truce between Angola and South Africa.

December 20, 1983. The United States abstained on UN Security Council Resolution 545 condemning South Africa's continued occupation of parts of southern Angola which "endangered international peace and security" and demanding its immediate and unconditional withdrawal. On January 6, 1984, the United States abstained on a similar resolution repeating the condemnation.

February 16, 1984. A U.S. delegation headed by Assistant Secretary Crocker met with delegations from

Angola and South Africa in Lusaka, Zambia, where the three delegations reached agreement on the disengagement of Angolan and South African forces in southern Angola (the Lusaka accord). At the request of South Africa and Angola, it was agreed that a small number of U.S. representatives would participate in the activities of the joint South African/Angolan commission established to monitor the disengagement process.

October 31-November 1, 1984. Assistant Secretary Crocker met with Foreign Minister Botha in Cape Verde to discuss Namibian independence and disengagement in southern Angola. At the request of the Angolan Government, Assistant Secretary Crocker transmitted an Angolan proposal containing specific suggestions for the withdrawal of South African troops from Angola, implementation of Resolution 435, a cease-fire between South Africa and SWAPO, withdrawal of Cuban troops once implementation was in progress, and an international agreement guaranteeing Namibia's independence and Angola's security and territorial integrity. Angola submitted this proposal to the United Nations on November 17. Crocker later called this "an important step forward" because Angola had accepted the principle that Namibian independence could only take place in the context of the withdrawal of Cuban troops from Angola.

March 18 and 21, 1985. Assistant Secretary Crocker presented to the Angolan and South African Governments a new U.S. compromise proposal for a Namibian settlement which included provisions drawn from the positions of both sides. On April 18, however, the South African Government announced its intention to unilaterally establish an interim administration in Namibia. The U.S. Government stated that it would not recognize the transfer of power to any such government.

May 21-29, 1985. Following Angolan interception of a South African commando team about to sabotage an oil installation partially owned by Gulf Oil Corporation, South Africa admitted that it had mounted "covert military reconnaissance forays" into northern Angola but denied giving orders to commit sabotage. The Department of State spokesman indicated that the United States took the "strongest exception" to the presence of South African armed units inside Angola and



was "deeply concerned" about the safety of U.S. citizens and property overseas.

**June 14, 1985.** The United States recalled Ambassador Herman Nickel to protest South Africa's June 14 attack on Botswana and its attempted sabotage of Angola's oil facilities in Cabinda on May 21.

**June 20, 1985.** The United States voted for UN Security Council Resolution 567 condemning South Africa's recent aggression against Angola and its use of Namibia as a springboard for its attacks and demanding its unconditional withdrawal from Angolan territory.

**July 10, 1985.** The House of Representatives voted 225 to 185 to repeal the 1976 Clark amendment. The Senate had voted 63 to 34 to repeal the ban on June 11. On August 8, President Reagan signed the repeal into law as Section 811 of the International Security and Development Cooperation Act of 1985.

**July 13, 1985.** The Angolan Government announced that it was suspending all diplomatic contacts with the United States in protest against the congressional vote repealing the Clark amendment. The Department of State said that the United States had no plans to aid the UNITA rebels or to relax its diplomatic efforts concerning Angola.

**September 20, 1985.** The United States voted for UN Security Council Resolution 571 condemning South Africa's September 16 incursion into Angolan territory and announcing the appointment of a UN Commission of Inquiry to investigate the damage in Angola resulting from this invasion. It abstained, however, on paragraph 5 which called on member states to strengthen the defense capabilities of the front-line states. On October 7, the United States voted for a similar resolution which repeated the condemnation.

**November 22, 1985.** President Reagan said in an interview that he favored covert aid to UNITA in preference to the overt economic and military assistance being advocated by some Members of Congress.

**November 27-28, 1985.** A U.S. delegation headed by Assistant Secretary Crocker met with Angolan representatives in Lusaka, Zambia, to discuss a regional settlement between South Africa and Angola leading to the withdrawal of Cuban troops from Angola and implementation of UN Security Council Resolution 435.

**December 6, 1985.** The UN Security Council unanimously adopted Resolution 577 strongly condemning South Africa for its aggression against Angola. In a separate paragraph, on which the United States abstained, UN member states were requested to extend all necessary assistance to Angola "to strengthen its defense capacity."

**January 8-9, 1986.** A U.S. delegation, headed by Assistant Secretary Crocker, met with President Dos Santos and senior officials in Luanda for further negotiations on implementing Resolution 435. On January 12-14, Assistant Secretary Crocker met with senior officials in South Africa to discuss a regional settlement.

**January 30, 1986.** UNITA leader Savimbi, who was on a private visit to Washington January 29-February 6, met with President Reagan at the White House. Afterward, an Administration official said that Savimbi told the President his goal was "a peaceful national reconciliation in Angola."

**February 13, 1986.** The United States and the United Kingdom abstained on UN Security Council Resolution 581 condemning South Africa for threatening aggression against the front-line states and asking UN members to "expand urgently all forms of assistance" to those states.

**February 18, 1986.** Assistant Secretary Crocker told the Senate Foreign Relations Committee that the decision had been made to provide covert military aid to UNITA in order to prevent the Angolan Government from achieving a "military solution." Crocker stressed, however, that the United States remained committed to a diplomatic solution to the Angolan conflict. The Angolan Government subsequently stated that the U.S. decision amounted to "a declaration of war."

**March 4, 1986.** The South African Government announced that it would implement the UN plan for the inde-

pendence of Namibia (Resolution 435) beginning on August 1, 1986, but made it clear that implementation depended upon the withdrawal of Cuban troops from Angola. The U.S. Government welcomed the announcement as "a significant and positive step." On March 8 the Angolan Government rejected the South African proposal.

**March 6, 1986.** Assistant Secretary Crocker met in Geneva with Vladilen M. Vasev, the Soviet Foreign Ministry official in charge of southern African affairs, to discuss a settlement of the regional problems in southern Africa.

**March 13-14, 1986.** Foreign Minister Botha met with U.S. Deputy Assistant Secretary of State for African Affairs Frank Wisner in Cape Town to discuss a regional settlement.

**March 18, 1986.** Angolan President Dos Santos sent a letter to Secretary General Perez de Cuellar urging him to take full responsibility for negotiations regarding Namibian independence and peace in southern Africa. Dos Santos wrote that the "deliberate and systematic support" of the United States for South Africa and its increasing military support for UNITA had "jeopardized its credibility as a mediator."

**March 25, 1986.** Department of State spokesman Charles Redman said that "American companies operating in Angola should be fully aware of the fact they run" and that the U.S. Government had asked these companies to consider U.S. interests, as well as their own, in making business decisions relating to Angola. He said that U.S. economic policy toward Angola was "to deny, pending an achievement of a negotiated settlement, all U.S. exports to Angola with a military use and to not support...Angola's ability to earn foreign currency and thus fund its war against UNITA."

**June 18, 1986.** The United States and the United Kingdom vetoed a UN Security Council resolution which condemned South African aggression against Angola, called for mandatory economic sanctions against South Africa, and asked UN members to provide military assistance to the Angolan Government.



**August 11, 1986.** A South African force crossed the Namibian border and attacked a Soviet-supported air base 130 miles inside Angola. The State Department declared that the United States could not condone any South African raid into Angola.

**August 18, 1986.** President Dos Santos declared that he would welcome a meeting with President Reagan, invited him to Angola, and expressed the wish that the two countries might establish diplomatic relations. On September 17, Angolan Foreign Minister Afonso Van Dunem called for a top-level meeting between U.S. and Angolan officials as a prelude to the establishment of diplomatic ties.

**September 17, 1986.** By a vote of 280 to 186, the House of Representatives rejected an amendment to the FY 1987 intelligence authorization bill that would have barred any further covert aid to UNITA unless it was first publicly debated and approved by both Houses of Congress.

**April 7, 1987.** After Assistant Secretary Crocker met with an Angolan delegation in Brazzaville, Congo, the two sides agreed to resume the U.S.-Angolan negotiations aimed at reaching a regional settlement of the Angola-Namibia conflict which had been broken off by Angola in protest against the February 1986 U.S. decision to send aid to UNITA.

**July 14-15, 1987.** Assistant Secretary Crocker met with Angolan officials in Luanda to discuss a timetable for the withdrawal of Cuban troops from Angola and independence for Namibia. After returning to Washington, however, he said that the talks had been "a waste of time."

**September 7-8, 1987.** Assistant Secretary Crocker visited Luanda for talks regarding Angola's August 5 proposal for accelerated implementation of UN Security Council Resolution 435 on Namibia and the establishment of lasting peace in southern Africa. The Department of State said Assistant Secretary Crocker hoped to "clarify certain ambiguities" in the proposal regarding the withdrawal of Cuban troops.

**October 30, 1987.** The United States abstained on a draft Security Council resolution calling for rapid im-

plementation of Resolution 435. U.S. representative Herbert Okun indicated that implementation could not be achieved without addressing the security concerns of both Angola and South Africa. South Africa said that the only remaining obstacle to implementation was the presence of Soviet and Cuban military personnel in Angola.

**November 12, 1987.** South Africa admitted that its troops had recently intervened in southern Angola to assist UNITA and clashed with Soviet and Cuban forces. Defense Minister Gen. Magnus Malan said that if South Africa had not intervened, UNITA would have been defeated, leading to eventual communist domination of southern Africa. UNITA leader Savimbi later said that U.S.-supplied weaponry had been decisive in warding off the offensive.

**November 25, 1987.** The UN Security Council adopted a resolution condemning South Africa's aggression in southern Angola. U.S. Ambassador Vernon Walters stated that the United States had voted for the resolution but declared that this did not address many important issues. He said that the fates of Namibia and Angola were "inextricably linked" and that the U.S. Government was seeking a settlement removing all foreign forces from the region.

**December 23, 1987.** The UN Security Council adopted a resolution condemning South Africa for its delay in pulling out of Angola. Foreign Minister Botha rejected the UN demand for a complete withdrawal, although he declared that a gradual South Africa Defense Force pullback was underway.

**January 28-29, 1988.** A new round of negotiations between a U.S. delegation headed by Assistant Secretary Crocker and Angolan representatives took place in Luanda. On February 1, the Department of State announced that Angola and Cuba had jointly agreed to a total withdrawal of Cuban troops in Angola as part of a still-unresolved overall southern Africa peace settlement.

**March 1, 1988.** Defense Minister Malan announced that South Africa was willing to make a direct deal with the Soviet Union to withdraw from Angola if the Soviet Government committed itself to a neutral government in that

country. On March 10, the Soviet Foreign Ministry rejected Malan's offer.

**March 14, 1988.** Assistant Secretary Crocker met with Foreign Minister Botha in Geneva to discuss Angola. The meeting came a day after Angola announced that it had presented the United States with a specific timetable for the total withdrawal of Cuban troops, if both the United States and South Africa ended their support of UNITA. After the meeting, Botha complained that the Angolan plan lacked specific "numbers, figures, and time schedules."

**May 3-4, 1988.** The first round of quadripartite talks on the Angola-Namibia conflict was held among the United States, South Africa, Angola, and Cuba in London. On May 13, followup talks between South Africa and Angola took place in Brazzaville, Congo.

**June 1, 1988.** During the Moscow summit, the United States and the Soviet Union announced their support for a September 29, 1988, target date for reaching agreement on the withdrawal of all foreign troops from Angola and the independence of Namibia.

**July 20, 1988.** South Africa, Angola, and Cuba announced ratification of an agreement on principles, which called for "the staged and total withdrawal of Cuban troops" from Angola and stated that Resolution 435 was "indispensable to a comprehensive settlement." The agreement evolved during a series of quadripartite talks, beginning in London May 3-4 and continuing in Cairo June 24-25 and in New York July 11-13. Assistant Secretary Crocker, who had served as a mediator, called the agreement "a set of guidelines" but warned that "hard bargaining" lay ahead.

**August 2-5, 1988.** A new round of Namibia-Angola peace talks chaired by Assistant Secretary Crocker took place in Geneva.

**August 8, 1988.** The parties to the Geneva talks issued a joint communique announcing an immediate cease-fire and stating that they had agreed to recommend to the United Nations implementation of Resolution 435 beginning on November 1, with Namibian elections to be held 7 months later. South Africa

would begin to withdraw its troops from southern Angola on August 10 and complete withdrawal by September 1. Angola and Cuba agreed to subscribe to an accord including a timetable for "the staged and total withdrawal of Cuban troops from Angola" to be negotiated by September 1.

**August 9, 1988.** Assistant Secretary Crocker said that "the cooperation of the Soviet Union" had been an important factor in making the Geneva agreement possible and that Soviet officials had met with U.S. representatives before and after the negotiating sessions. He also said that two unresolved questions could still hamper and postpone a final settlement: the schedule for withdrawal of Cuban troops from Angola and the refusal of the Angolan Government to talk to UNITA. In addition, Crocker declared that the United States would not end weapons shipments to UNITA until the Soviet Union ended its deliveries of military supplies to the Angolan Government, commenting that "we are not going to unilaterally disengage."

**August 11, 1988.** The Soviet Union urged the Angolan Government to "start a dialogue" with UNITA and warned that in the absence of such negotiations, the quadripartite agreement reached in Geneva would be "placed in jeopardy."

**August 13, 1988.** Following the House of Representatives' vote for a new sanctions bill ending all U.S. investment and banning almost all trade with South Africa, Foreign Minister Botha warned that the new sanctions would present problems for implementation of the Namibia-Angola peace plan.

**August 15-16, 1988.** As a followup to the Geneva agreement, military experts from Angola, Cuba, and South Africa met at Ruacana on the Angola-Namibia border to establish a Joint Military Monitoring Commission (which would include Namibian representatives) to guarantee the cessation of hostilities and to smooth the way for implementation of Resolution 435.

**August 24-26, 1988.** During a fifth round of quadripartite talks in Brazzaville, the United States worked with the parties to narrow differences on a timetable for total withdrawal of Cuban

troops from Angola. Following the talks, President Dos Santos stated that he would not be pressured into a power-sharing agreement with UNITA.

**August 30, 1988.** The final contingent of South African troops withdrew from southern Angola into Namibia—2 days before the September 1 deadline set by the Geneva ceasefire agreement. South African officials announced that SWAPO had agreed to stay 120 miles north of the Namibian border and to begin observing a ceasefire.

**September 2, 1988.** The Department of State said that Cuba had sent substantial amounts of military aid to Angola in recent weeks but denied reports that Cuba had recently increased its troop strength to 60,000.

**September 3, 1988.** UNITA leader Savimbi told a press conference that he had decided to disassociate UNITA from the quadripartite peace talks and warned that those talks were bound to fail if they continued to exclude UNITA. He said that UNITA would not abandon the areas under its control along the Angolan-Namibian border. Savimbi stated that the U.S. Government and people fully supported UNITA.

**September 7-8, 1988.** Following the sixth round of quadripartite talks in Brazzaville, the four delegations issued a joint communique reconfirming their commitment to the November 1 target date for implementing Resolution 435. The communique noted that the agreements reached in Geneva in August had been implemented: South African forces had withdrawn from Angola before the September 1 deadline and the Joint Military Monitoring Commission was functioning satisfactorily. It indicated that the Cuban and Angolan Governments would reach agreement on a timetable for the withdrawal of Cuban troops from Angola within the framework of the general negotiations.

**September 22-23, 1988.** UN Secretary General Perez de Cuellar met in South Africa with high-ranking South African officials and Namibian political leaders to discuss remaining obstacles to Namibian independence—including the question of who would pay the estimated \$700 million needed to put the independence plan into effect. After-

ward, the Secretary General told a joint press conference that he had assured President Botha that the United Nations would act impartially once implementation of Resolution 435 began. Botha said that he had approved plans to send a UN technical team to Namibia to prepare the way for the UN Transitional Assistance Group (UNTAG) which was to oversee Namibia's transition to independence.

**September 24, 1988.** Following talks with Secretary General Perez de Cuellar in Luanda, Angolan President Dos Santos said that he had reaffirmed the Angolan Government's willingness to offer its full cooperation with the UN mission in Namibia.

SWAPO announced that it had rejected a proposal by the Namibian provisional government calling for a national reconciliation conference of all Namibian parties in preparation for the implementation of Resolution 435.

**September 26-29, 1988.** The seventh round of quadripartite peace talks in Brazzaville adjourned without reaching agreement on a timetable, but the negotiators expressed "their firm intention to solve the remaining problems after consultation with their respective governments." They also reaffirmed their earlier commitment to the November 1 target date for implementing Resolution 435.

**October 6, 1988.** Angolan President Dos Santos said that his government was prepared to talk to UNITA once agreement on such issues as the presence of South African troops and Namibian independence was reached and that he would "not exclude" granting cabinet posts in a government of reconciliation to UNITA members—with the exception of Dr. Savimbi, whom he described as "a special case."

**October 7-9, 1988.** Assistant Secretary Crocker presided over informal talks among high-ranking Angolan, Cuban, and South African officials attending the 43d UN General Assembly. U.S. officials said the purpose of the talks was to discuss new proposals aimed at settling differences regarding the timetable for Cuban troop withdrawal and implementation of Resolution 435 before the next round of formal negotiations in Brazzaville.

October 17, 1988. UNITA leader Savimbi told the press that he had "no intention" of moving his bases and supply dumps into northern Angola and that he would "not give up the infrastructure it has taken us 13 years to develop and move north to an uncertain future." Savimbi asserted that he was confident that UNITA could hold its own militarily against Angolan and Cuban forces but also said that there was no question of asking South Africa for assistance even if those forces broke through UNITA's lines.

November 15, 1988. After a 5-day round of quadripartite peace talks chaired by Assistant Secretary Crocker in Geneva, the South African, Angolan, and Cuban delegations announced that they had reached agreement in principle on a framework for the phased withdrawal of Cuban troops from Angola and U.N.-supervised elections in Namibia which was to be submitted to their governments for approval. If all three governments accepted the proposal, Crocker was to arrange a final round of quadripartite talks in Brazzaville to achieve and sign a formal agreement. U.S. officials said they expected that an agreement would provide a major impetus to the beginning of talks between the Angolan Government and UNITA.

November 18, 1988. The Cuban and Angolan Governments announced that they would accept the U.S.-mediated plan for the phased withdrawal of Cuban troops from Angola reached in Geneva on November 15.

November 19, 1988. UNITA leader Savimbi told a press conference that his forces had reached a tacit cease-fire agreement with Cuban forces in Angola and would not harass the departing Cuban troops as they withdrew. Savimbi also said that UNITA would continue its civil war against Angolan Government troops until all the Cubans were gone and national reconciliation with the government had been achieved.

November 22, 1988. Saying that "the hard nut that had to be cracked has been cracked," Foreign Minister Botha announced that the South African Government had advised the

United States of its acceptance of the U.S.-mediated agreement in principle reached in Geneva on November 15. Botha warned, however, that verification and monitoring of the Cuban withdrawal would be crucial to the peace process and noted that the parties still had to work out verification procedures. He also stressed that there could be no lasting peace in the region until there was national reconciliation inside Angola. Botha said, however, that UNITA leader Savimbi had told him that South African acceptance of the November 15 agreement would contribute to peace and stability in the region so long as the Cuban withdrawal from Angola was properly monitored. Department of State spokesman Redman welcomed the South African announcement and said that officials from the four countries would meet soon in Brazzaville to work out the final details of what would be "a complex interlocking set" of agreements.

December 1-3, 1988. The 10th round of quadripartite peace talks, which had been expected to conclude with the signing of a protocol outlining the terms of the agreement reached in Geneva on November 15, ended prematurely when the South African delegation abruptly left Brazzaville on December 3. Saying that his delegation needed to return to consult President Botha, Foreign Minister Botha declared

that South Africa could not sign a document that was "not specific" regarding verification of Cuban troop withdrawal. He added, however, that he still expected a protocol to be signed during December—once the last few issues were resolved.

December 13, 1988. In Brazzaville, South Africa, Angola, and Cuba signed an agreement (the Brazzaville protocol) committing themselves to the phased withdrawal of 50,000 Cuban troops from Angola over 27 months and the independence of Namibia by November 1, 1989. The signatories agreed to recommend to the UN Secretary General that April 1, 1989, be established as the date for implementation of Resolution 435 and to meet in New York on December 22 for signature of a formal tripartite treaty and a bilateral Angolan-Cuban agreement governing Cuban withdrawal. By that date, Angola and Cuba were to have reached agreement with the UN Secretary General on verification of the withdrawal. The parties to the Brazzaville protocol also agreed to establish a joint commission (which would include U.S. and Soviet observers) to serve as a forum for discussion and resolution of issues regarding the interpretation and implementation of the tripartite agreement.

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## Antarctic Mineral Resource Convention Signed

### DEPARTMENT STATEMENT, DEC. 2, 1988<sup>1</sup>

The United States signed the convention on the regulation of Antarctic mineral resource activities on November 30. The convention was signed in Wellington, New Zealand, by the U.S. Ambassador to New Zealand, Paul M. Cleveland.


The agreement was concluded following 6 years of negotiation among the parties to the Antarctic Treaty. It is an important environmental and resource management treaty which establishes the legal obligations and institutional mechanisms necessary for considering and regulating commercial mineral resource activities in

the Antarctic, should interest in them emerge in the future.

The convention is designed to protect the environment of Antarctica and create a stable and predictable framework for dealing with possible mineral resource activities there, including provision of security of investment for any permitted activities. It represents an important contribution to the Antarctic Treaty system which has maintained Antarctica as a zone of peace, free of military activity and reserved for peaceful international cooperation, for the past three decades.

<sup>1</sup>Read to news correspondents by Department deputy spokesman Phyllis Oakley. ■





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