GRAMMAR AND ONTOLOGY: AN APRIORISTIC WORLD-VIEW

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CERTIFICATE

This is to certify that the thesis entitled **"Grammar and Ontology: An Aprioristic World-view"** submitted by Mr.Sareef E.K. for the degree of Doctor of Philosophy to the Department of Philosophy, School of Humanities, University of Hyderabad, has been done under my supervision and embodies the result of *bona fide* research work. This work or a part thereof has not been submitted for any other degree or diploma to any University or Institution.

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This is to certify that I, **E. K. SAREEF** have carried out the research embodied in the present thesis entitled "**Grammar and Ontology: An Aprioristic World-view**" for the full period prescribed under the Ph.D. ordinances of the University.

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CONTENTS

INTRODUCTION

The shift in the focus of the Western Philosophy to the analysis of language and related concepts of meaning, truth and reference looks at first sight slightly perplexing, since the concerns over the structure of language, meaning and what makes words and sentences true or false are all entirely new interests hitherto unknown to the practices and concerns of the traditional philosophy. But this perplexity gets evaporated when one dwells well on and plunge deep into the new way of doing philosophy and when one understands that the underlying aims of the practitioners of the new philosophy are one and the same with those of the traditional philosophers. The main concern of describing the structure of the world or reality we experience remains the core issue in the contemporary philosophy as in the traditional philosophy.

At the outset of the new trend of philosophical analysis of language, there were some notions involved, namely that structural features of the language are identical with the structural features of the world, that meaning and truth of the linguistic expressions depend upon the way those expressions relate to the world of experience, and that the newly developed formal logic could provide efficient tools to conduct proper analysis of the language. Logic of language, i.e., grammar facilitates the understanding of the world or reality, because of the representational nature of language. The question of 'what there is' or ontology is addressed and solved by the

grammar of the language, since linguistic categories are the categories of understanding. In other words, logic presupposes the a priori or logical categories of understanding which are primarily concerned with the necessary structure or logical form of the world or reality. The question in connection with the philosophical analysis of language by making use of the techniques of logic is: can there be an aprioristic or logical understanding of the nature of reality or 'what there is'?

Since language is the medium of representation of our thoughts about the world philosophers got divided among themselves, over the nature of language and as to whether it is a befitting medium. While one group believed, in the construction of an ideal language to represent the structure of the world of experience, others were optimistic in arriving at the result by analysing ordinary language. While the presupposition that logical structure of the ideal language constructed is identical with the structure of the world gave impetus to the ideal language philosophers, ordinary language philosophers believed in analysing the functioning of the ordinary language vis-a-vis the world of experience, for our experience of the world gets crystallised into different linguistic expressions. Inspite of the difference of approach, they too agree that language has a logical structure which is the rock bottom of the multifarious linguistic phenomena.

In the first chapter the nature of grammar and ontology in the philosophical systems of Frege, Russell and Carnap has been taken into consideration. All the three philosophers believed that understanding of the structure of the reality or the world is achieved through the construction of an ideal language which

would capture the structural features of the reality. Frege attempted to relate logic to reality by way of discovering an aprioristic structure of language whereas Russell proposed 'logical atomism,' based on sense-data, in which complex expressions are knocked down by logical analysis to get ultimate simples or atoms. While these simples are the ground on which complex expressions are built it exactly matches with the complex nature of the world. Carnap was to derive a conceptual scheme which represents or reflects the strucutre of our world of experience. To him, answers to the questions related to the existence of the outside world could be framed only within the structure and devices provided within the linguistic framework. In short, these philosophers arrive at an idea, in their respective philosophies, that though the concepts of ideal language implicate the categories of the world of experience; ultimately, they are given apriori and so are logical in their nature.

The second chapter takes into account ordinary language philosophy of Quine, Wittgenstein and Strawson. Wittgenstein replaces the representational conception of language developed in the *Tractatus* by the use of theory of meaning and the theory of language-games. He advocates a new way of accounting for our experience and understanding of the world which is essentially metaphysical in nature. Quine by his theory of language makes a similar move and advocates a behaviourist theory of meaning, but is committed to the idea that ontological specifications of a belief system are possible by using the logical method. Strawson, on the other hand, firmly believes that the ontology of particulars in a spatio-temporal world can be determined

through an analysis of ordinary language. In his view, subject-predicate logic is enough to understand the basic categories of our language and, hence, of the world. This is not achieved by any empirical investigation, but by the conceptualisation of the logical structure of our natural language.

The third chapter describes how the logical categories thus derived by different philosophers are the ground on which apprehensions of the nature of meaning and truth could be achieved. Grammatical or logical categories presuppose ontological categories. These ontological categories, in turn, provide the basis for semantics. Hence semantical considerations of langauge directly pave the way for deriving the structural feature of the language. This is possible by presupposing ontological categories, sine semantics is ultimately about the world. In effect semantics is poised in between the structure of the language and the reality. Therefore, if we could derive the linguistic categories by semantics we are simultaneously deriving the ontological categories. It amounts to saying that the structure of language thus derived is the structure of the world.

Chapter four is an attempt to show that the realist-antirealist debate on the nature of truth and meaning in the contemporary philosophical arena has resulted in their respective conceptions on the semantical structure of the language. While the realist characterisation of language and the consequent world-view takes truth as a central notion to tackle the questions of meaning and language, the antirealists are not ready to accord such a perennial role to the notion of truth and, consequently, develop a theory of meaning based on the

notion of verification. The realist theory of the truth-conditions of language, which draws heavily from Tarski's semantic theory of truth, and the verificationist theory of meaning based on the intutionistic logic are the grounds for their respective conceptions of language and the world.

In the final chapter an attempt is made to derive the apriori or logical character of the metaphysics arising out of the semantic and grammatical considerations. Metaphysics of realism envisages an independently existing recalcitrant world which our language tries to describe or represent aptly with its structural features. This independently existing world constitutes or characterises our conceptual system. Realism affirms the truth that conceptual system, language and the world are invariably related to account for our experience. Anti-realism opposes the view of an independently existing world totally outside our experience of it, because we are not equipped to know such a world beyond our recognitional capacities. Inspite of that, there is no denial of the fact that our conceptual system and linguistic practices are related to or functions vis-a-vis a world of experience. In our language the world of experience manifests, and the organisation of those experiences into language is done by logical grammar. Thus, organisation of our experience into language by making use of logical grammar ultimately amounts to that our world as we experience is the one fashioned by the language and its logical grammar.

Chapter I

GRAMMAR OF FORMAL LANGUAGE

This chapter considers the nature of grammar and ontology in the philosophy of Frege, Carnap and Russell. It has three divisions: the first investigates the Fregean logical grammar, the second, the Carnapian formal grammar and the final one, Russell's attempt to construct an ideal langauge of logical atomism. It shows how in their respective philosophies grammar reveals the structure of reality.

1. FREGE'S PHILOSOPHICAL LOGIC

Frege was not a philosopher specific, but his enduring enthusiasm over mathematics and logic eventually paved way for a new conception of philosophical logic, which in turn became a corner stone in the new way of philosophizing. If we ask what is his greatest contriibution to the philosophy, the answer definitely refers to his work in philosophical logic. For example, the introduction of the quantifier for expressing generality caused the sharp break between modern logic and traditional logic.

It looks so amazing that a philosopher severely restricted in scope, being confined to philosophical logic and philosophy of mathematics, has been placed as the trend-setter in contemporary philosophy. What made him place himself as the father of analytic philosophy is the invincible stress he has given on logic to answer the basic questions of philosophy; indeed, it was nothing but logic that was everything for him. Dummett characteristically pointed out this fact as "from the time of Descartes until very recently the first question of philosophy was what we can know and how we can justify our claim to this knowledge, and the fundamental philosophical problem was how far scepticism can be refuted and how far it must be admitted. Frege was the first philosopher after Descartes totally to reject this perspective, and in this he looked beyond Descartes to Aristotle and the scholastics. For Frege, as for them, logic was the beginning of philosophy, if we do not get logic right, we shall get nothing else right."[1]

Frege wanted to devise a logical system, in which proofs are completely formalised. The appeal to intuition can be avoided in asserting the correctness of the proofs, if proofs were to be formalised. As a consequence of his attempt to provide a logical system in order to account mathematics led him to look into the structural features of langauge. He used the same canon of logic to reveal the structure of langauge. The assumption is based on his conviction that, as in the case of mathematics, langauge has an underlying structure which can be made explicit logically. He felt that the subtler and elaborate

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[1] Dummett, "Gottlob Frege," in *Encyclopedia of Philosophy*, ed. by Paul Edwards, Macmillan Publishing Co., Inc. and the Free Press, Vol.III, p.225.

theories of scholastic logicians had failed to give a coherent account of a fundamental feature of language--the expression of generality. Actually his attempt to develop a quantifier-variable notation determined his orientation towards the philosophy of language.

Frege's construal of formal logic and hence the philosophical logic, which determined his philosophical conception, would be essential in our endeavour to look into the nature of contemporary philosophical language.

Frege's Construal of Logic:

As a mathematician Frege's principal motive and purpose had been to provide a secure and rigorous formulation for the proofs of arithmetics. Realization of this goal needed a new and improved logical notation. His thesis is that arithmetic can be founded in logic. But in order to do that logic should be equipped well, therefore his relentless effort in devising a rigorous logic. The system of logic he developed consists of special notations such as the notion of 'assertible content,' 'negation', 'conditional proposition,' the 'universal quantifier and identity', for expressing certain basic logical ideas.

In traditional logic a predicate is understood as something that ascribes a certain property to a subject. However, what we mean by a 'subject' can be better understood if we think of it on the analogy of what in mathematics is called the 'argument' of the function. Thus the combination of a 'function' and its 'argument', when treated in this broadened logical sense, can now be thought of as having a truth-value. Frege showed how, in carrying out the analysis of internal logical structure of a

the notion of quantities and the variables they bind in order to, thereby, express the concept of generality.

As pointed out earlier, Frege's creative contributions to logic have a range of application that extend beyond his original interest in upholding the logical thesis. In understanding the formal structure of propositions--their logical interconnections among themselves, together with an analysis of their internal parts and components, Frege made use of the logic which he developed. It is a logic that can be employed regardless of the subject matter to which it is applied. The general rules and forms of logic can be used to express the structural features of the discourse, whatever be the subject matter. The logical notations are being used to extract the logical form of the discourse and to guide one in achieving precision of thought.

In clarifying the use of logical symbolism for expressing interrelations among propositions and the internal structural components of the proposition, Frege found necessary to work out his philosophy. This consisted in developing a theory of meaning, philosophy of language, and system of philosophical logic.

Frege lays dowm three basic pricniples of philosophy of logic in his work *The Foundations of Arithmetics* he writes:

> In the enquiry that follows, I have kept three fundamental priciples: always to separate sharply the psychological from the logical, the subjective from the objective;
>
> Never to ask for meaning of a word in isolation, but only in the context of a proposition: never to lose sight of the

distinction between concept and object!"[2]

As far as concerned the first fundamental principle Frege strongly opposed psychologism, the view that deals with certain subjective, inner process of the mind. Frege was a realist in the technical sense of the terms, who believed in the objective existence of concepts, notation and objects. He maintained that an understanding of the nature of meaning requires that we be able to examine certain objective features to be found in the use of langauge. Thus for Frege concepts are special types of objective entities; concepts-words are lingusitic expressions that report these concepts. In the same way objects are entities in the world designated by special linguistic expressions called 'proper names', whereas concepts-words refer to concepts, relation expressions to relations. He studied how various types of linguistic expressions might contribute to a logically perspicuous use of langauge in sentences and logical connections of such sentences with one another. It is in this context of language--use not in the domain of psychological processes--that Frege would carry out his investigations into the nature of language.

The second principle quoted above is of fundamental importance which tells us that the basic unit of langauge use is the sentence. The fundamental move in the use of language is that one constructs and uses sentences to say something. The understanding of individual words can be successfully achieved when we see them as contributing to the formation and use of sentences. For Frege the major use of sentences is that in which

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[2] Frege, *The Foundations of Arithmetic*, trans. by J.AL. Austin, Basil Blackwell, Oxford, 1950, p.x.

we use it to make an *assertion* to say something that is either true or false. Hence the understanding of the meaning of words is to be found in the link they have to our being able to specify ultimately the truth or falsity of sentence of which they are constituents. The meaning of words is bound up with the way in which they contribute to and help to determine the truth-conditions of the sentence in which they figure. Another way of making this point is to say that Frege's approach to a philosophy of language was a semantical one. The question he was principally concerned with is what distinctions of logical type need to be made among linguistic expressions in a logically purified language, where we wish to use that language to convey the truth and avoid falsity. In a broad sense semantics is precisely that aspect of the study of language that concerns itself with matters of reference and truth. It studies the semantic roles of various types of expression in the formation and use of sentences of varying degrees of complexity. It evaluates their contribution to the determination of the truth or falsitfy of the sentence of which these expressions are constituent parts.

Concept and Object:

A central theme in Frege's philosophy is the importance for logic of taking the sentence as a whole as the basic item to be analyzed. It is the thought conveyed by a whole sentence of which, when asserted, we can ask whether it is true or false and so having possible cognitive signifcance. Frege writes "I call a thought something for which the question of truth arises. The thought is the sense of the sentence without wishing to say as

well that the sense of every sentence is a thought. The thought in itself immaterial, cloth itself in the material garment of a sentence and thereby becomes comprehensible to us. We say a sentence expresses a thought."[3] The task of logic, in starting with whole sentences, is to examine the types of component out of which a sentence is constructed. It is important to see the underlying logical role of these items and not to be misled by superficial grammatical similarities or dissimilarities. The disentangling of these logical components was accomplished by Frege in a path-breaking way.

As contrasted with superficial grammatical distinction between subject and predicate that underlay much of traditional logic, Frege distinguished between the linguistic expressions of concept-words and proper names. To accomplish this he showed the great importance of making a useful comparison between the idea of a mathematical function and its argument on the one hand, and the logical idea of a concept in application to an object on the other hand. In the light of this distinction he was able to point the way for using the important idea of quantifiers in expressing generality where this is found in certain types of sentences.

Another underlying theme in Frege's analysis has to do with the notion of assertion. A sentence can be, need not be, asserted. The sense of the sentence as a whole Frege calls a thought (a proposition). We can understand the thought expressed by the sentence without asserting it. Insofar as the sentence is understood as expressing a thought, it has an assertible

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[3] Frege, 'The Thought, A Logical Inquiry,' in *Philosophical Logic* ed. by Strawson. P.F., Oxford University Press, 1967, p.20.

content, it would make sense to ask whether it is either true or false. To assert this sentence is to use it to make an actual truth-claim: one is prepared to claim that the sentence is true. And to assert this sentence is to use the sentence with an assortoric force.

With the background of how we are to think of the relations of 'function', 'argument,' and 'value' in a mathematical context, Frege proceeds to exploit these distinctions for general logical or philosophical purposes. He shows how we can apply these distinctions to deal with not only expressions having to do with number, but also how parallel distinctions among 'function,' 'argument,' and 'value' can be made in the logical analysis of language-use in which are to be found descriptions or assertible sentences having to do with various types of subject matter.

Consider the sentence 'Socrates is a philosopher.' Frege suggests that the sentence can be considered, for logical purpose, as made up of a functional part and an argument part. One way of analysing the sentence is to consider the expression '---- is a philosopher,' where we have to put in place of the name 'Socrates' a blank while retaining the rest of the sentence. Having done this we can treat the entire expression '---- is a philosoher' as a function. Frege calls this kind of function a concept. The expression 'is a philosoher' stands for a concept. When we plug in the name of 'Socrates' in the argument place of this linguistic expression we obtain a complete sentence. For this complete linguistic expression we can now ask whether it is true or false. Truth and Falsify are the possible truth-values, for the sentence as a whole. For the

sentence 'Socrates is a philosoher' we obtain a truth-value 'True'. Similarly for the complete sentence 'Plato is a philosopher,' 'Aristotle is a philosopher;' where 'Plato' and 'Aristotle' are the expressions in the argument-places for the same function obtain the truth-value truth. However, when we put in the numerical '4' or 'The Eiffel Tower' we obtain sentences whose truth-value is 'the False'.

The expression '---- is a philosopher' is the incomplete or unsaturated part of a sentence which, when supplemented by the name or other designation for an object, yields a complete sentence whose truth-value can be determined. This unsaturated part Frege calls a concept-word. According to him, in order for the entire sentence to be capable of determination as true or false, the concept-word it contains must be given a clear and determinate meaning, and the expression used as an argument-sign must designate some object, some individual entity.

A concept-word is a linguistic expression, it stands for a concept; it serves as a predicate. However, a concept is, for Frege, is something objective, not itself part of langauge. At the same time concept is not someone's idea, a mental occurance or psychological event. That same object has a certain property --falls under a certain concept-- either is or is not the case, objectively. To say 'Socrates is a philosopher' is to say something about Socrates--that he has the property of being a philosopher or falls under the concept 'philosopher'. The apprehension of a concept is a psychological matter. However, the concept apprehended and the relations it bears to objects or other concepts is not a matter for psychological investigation.

A concept-word is the predicative part of a sentence. As a

predicate, a concept-word is to be understood in a logical rather than a psychological sense. It belongs to the use of the language as analyzed and reconstituted to show its basic logical components. A concept word needs to be distinguished from those expressions such as proper names that designate individual objects. A concept-word or predicative expression is incomplete or unsaturated, whereas the expression designating an object is complete or saturated. It follows from this that the name of an object could never serve, as such and by itself, as the predicative part of a sentence.

Consider the sentence 'The morning star is a planet.' Follwoing Frege, we can say the expression 'the morning star' names an object, where as the expression 'is a planet' is predicative and conveys a concept. Whenever we have a situation of this sort--where a sentence attaches a predicate expression to the name of an individual object--we can say the object falls under the concept. 'The object falls under a concept' is Frege's way of expressing what is traditionally described by saying 'an individual has a property' or 'the universal is exemplified in the individual.' What is meant by the use of this phrase 'to fall under a concept' is that it holds for the relation between an individual object and a concept. It is only of concepts that we can say that some individual object falls under that concept.

Sense-Reference Distinction and Assertion

Frege makes some striking additions to his philosophy of logic which mainly help to keep the overall coherence of the system. Among them the celebrated distinction, sense and reference, stands out. He insisted that two proper names may

have different senses but the same meaning (reference). The same object is the bearer of both names, although the criterion for identifying an object as the bearer of the one name differs from that for identifying it as the bearer of the other. Frege held that this is applicable not only in the case of complex proper names but also true of proper names which are logically simple. The possibility to understand how an identity statement may be true and also informative is given by acknowledging that names with the same meaning may have different senses. The sense-reference distinction helped Frege to clarify the notion of 'concept'; he used 'concept' to apply not to the sense of a predicate but to the entity which the predicate means.

The existence of anything that is meant by an incomplete expression such as a predicate did not bother Frege, since whether such entities really are there in reality is a misconceived one. The notion of a concept is to be understood in such a way that the existence of concepts which are the meanings of predicates, as the existence of objects, which are the meanings of proper names. But the real problem lies in understanding the role played by meanings in the determination of the truth-value of sentences. If we go according to his formulations, this wholly depends upon the sense of proper names and predicates. Given this, knowing the criterion for identifying any given object as the meaning of that name is to know the sense of a proper name; to know the sense of a predicate is to know the criterion for deciding whether it is true of an arbitrary object. It amounts to finding the object which the name meant and then deciding whether or not the predicate true of it determines the truth-value of a simple

subject-predicate sentence.

Frege's thesis that names have meaning only in the context of sentences appears to go against this result. The thesis surely entails that the sense of a name may be given by means of a value for determining the truth-conditions of a sentence containing it than via identification of an object as the meaning of the name.

The meaning of a complex name depends only on the meaning, not on the sense, of its constituent parts, and the truth-value of a sentence only on the meaning, not on the sense, of the words of it. Frege brushed aside the problem posed by many counter examples to this principle by saying that in such contexts the words do not have their ordinary meanings but mean what are ordinarily their senses. Despite the apparent inconsistencies and shortcomings, Frege's whole point in insisting that names have sense as well as meaning was just that the sense of a name could not consist merely in its meaning the object which it does mean; there must also be some particular way in which we recognize the object as the meaning.

The second addition to his philosophical logic is the theory of force carried by an utterance. In our linguistic practice we try to give an account of the sense of our words which depend upon, or are derived from, the truth-conditions of the sentences we utter. If that is so then we need give an account of the connection between the truth-conditions of a sentence and what we effect by uttering that sentence. Frege thinks that an act of assertion not only constitutes an utterance of a sentence with determinate truth conditions which the hearer understands, but also we express that the uttered

sentence is true. This activity of asserting that the thought we are expressing is true is *sui generis*, it is not a further determination of truth-conditions of the sentence which will remain unchanged irrespective of whether we assert or not. This aspect can be made use of in giving a definition, in asking question regarding the sentence or the assertion. One feature of assertion, is 'force' of an utterance, which needs to be understood if communication is to be possible. Frege deployed some special signs for this element. These signs may be attached only to complete sentences, there being no room for assertion sign within a subordinate clause, since such a clause serves to determine only partially the truth-conditions of the whole sentence.

These two supplementations are completely in conformity with the main doctrines concerning logic and language. The identification of a sentence's truth-value with its meaning rules out the possibility of the construal that the meaning of a sentence be considered as the thought which the sentence expresses, for the meaning of the whole cannot alter so long as the meanings of its parts remain constant, whereas the thought expressed can alter. But Frege gave no direct argument for ascribing a meaning to a sentence. Sentences are evidently complete expressions and hence truth-values are objects. Consequently sentences become a kind of complex proper name.

2. CARNAP, FORMAL LANGAUGE AND ONTOLOGY

As a formal langauge philosopher, Carnaps' views on the

concept of langauge and its philosophical consequences have to be considered. Carnap believes in the construction of a formal langauge which would comprehend the essential characterisation and nature of the world. His attempt to put forth the semantical theories and the concern over the formal syntax of language together provides the ground for the construction of an empiricist account of the world.

What makes him different from other empiricist philosophers or logical positivists is his theoretical construction of a formal language in order to accommodate and scientifically justify both the physical things and events and abstract entities, which are essential in a scientific theoretical construction of our experience of the world.

External and Internal Questions:

Carnap argues for a fundamental distinction concerning the questions about the existence or reality of entities, and the question regarding the linguistic framework in which the questions about the reality or existence of entities can be raised. The questions regarding the linguistic framework are external whereas the questions are internal in relation to the questions about the linguistic framework. Accordingly, linguistic framework provides the ground for the distinction and makes possible to answer the questions about the reality of entities. Carnap writes, "If someone wishes to speak in his language about a new kind of entities, he has to introduce a system of new ways of speaking, subject to new rules: we shall call this procedure the construction of a linguistic framework for the new entities in question. And now we must distinguish

two kinds of questions of existence: first, questions of the existence of certain entities of the new kind within the framework; we call them internal questions; and second, question concerning the existence or reality of the system of entities as a whole, called external questions. Internal questions and possible answers to them are formulated with the help of the new forms of expressions. The answers may be found either by purely logical methods or by empirical methods, depending upon whether the framework is a logical or a factual one."[4]

Internal questions are cognitive, since the questions and possible answers can be formulated by making use of forms of expressions which are introduced to incorporate the proposed entities into the system. Whereas in the case of external questions, it is totally non-cognitive because of its nature itself. The possibility of finding out expressions as possible answers to the external questions are without avail because of the nature of the question, since the question is about the existence or reality of the system of entities as a whole. In order to understand Carnap's this idea, notion of linguistic framework must be taken into consideration in some detail.

Linguistic Framework:

It would be better to know the functioning of everyday langauge with its ontology of the spatio-temporally ordered things and events in order to understand what is Carnap's idea of linguistic framework. According to Carnap, we have accepted

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[4] Carnap, "Empiricism, Semantics, and Ontology." in *New Readings in Philosophical Analysis*, ed. by Feigl, H., Sellars, W. and Lehrer, K., Appleton--Century--Crofts, New York, 1972, p.586.

the thing language with its framework. He says "once we accepted the thing language with its framework for things, we can raise and answer internal questions, e.g., 'Is there a white sheet of paper on my desk?', 'Did King Arthur actually live?', 'Are unicorns and centaurs real or merely imaginary?' and like. These questions are to be answered by empirical investigations. Results of observation are evaluated according to certain rules as confirming or disconfirming evidence for possible answers."[5]

The introduction of a linguistic framework is essential, accordingly, to raise the questions and to find out possible answers. For him, this means a set of rules which will coordinate forms of expressions in a language. As we practice in everyday life, prior to asking the questions regarding the existence or reality of the thing world, we have accepted a thing-langauge. Therefore, spatio-temporally ordered things and events constitute the subject-matter of the thing language. Since we accepted this thing-langauge the questions and answers regarding the reality of the thing--world can be raised and answered meaningfully and cognitively. Hence, answers are supposed to be found out by empirical investigations since the questions are about the factual world. Moreover, questions regarding the reality of physical objects and events are within the framework; therefore they can be considered as internal questions. Carnap says "the concept of reality occurring in these internal questions is an empirical, scientific, non-metaphysical concept. To recognise something as a real thing or event means to succeed in incorporating it into the system of things at a particular space-time position so that it fits

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[5] "Empiricism, Semantics, and Ontology." p.586.

together with the other things recognized as real according to the rules of the framework.[6]

Once we raise the question about the reality of the thing world itself, the question amounts to be as external question because this question meaningfully cannot apply to the system itself and the question is framed in a wrong way. "To be real in the scientific sense means to be an element of the system; hence this concept cannot be applied to this system itself."[7] And Carnap construes this external question as the practical question, rather than theoretical question, concerning the structure of our language. The question is about the choice whether to accept or not the use of the forms of expressions in the framework in questions.

The acceptance of the thing language, according to Carnap, must be construed as the acceptance of the thing world. But that does not include or must not be interpreted as the acceptance of a belief in the reality of the thing world. "To accept the thing world means nothing more than to accept a certain forms of langauge, in other words, to accept the rules for framing statements and for testing, accepting or rejecting them."[8] Therefore, the acceptance of a thing would does not amount to the acceptance of a belief since there is no such statements or assertions. Because it is not a theoretical question. It is an external question, hence, question regarding practical choice of the framework. Moreover, this question and statements about the reality of the world cannot be formulated in the thing langauge.

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[6] "Empiricism, Semantics and, Ontology." p.586.

[7] Ibid., p.586.

[8] Ibid., p.587.

As in the case of the thing language, Carnap constructs the introduction of new forms of expression into the langauge in order to incorporate abstract entities like numbers, properties, classes, propositions etc. The introduction of new forms of expression in accordance to the new sets of rules provides the linguistic framework in which we can cognitively raise the questions about the existence of the new entities and find possible answers to them. The way we answer or find out the answers depends upon the nature of the framework. For example in the case of numbers the nature of the framework and the questions and answers are logical.

Semantics and The Linguistic Framework

In the semantical meaning analysis Carnap makes use of the idea of linguistic framework. Linguistic expressions are said to designate or refer to certain extra-linguistic entities. In the case of thorough going empiricism, protagonist are reluctant to admit any kind of abstract entities as designatum. There will not be any objection as long as physical things and events are taken as designate. But when they take into account the nature of abstract entities, they express serious doubts. Carnap argues, "they reject the belief, which they regard as implicitly presupposed by those semantical statements, that to each expression of the types in question (adjectives like "red", numerals like "five" etc.) there is a particular real entity to which the expression stands in relation of designation. This belief is rejected as incompatible with the basic principles of empiricism or of scientific thinking."[9]

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[9] "Empiricism, Semantics, and Ontology." p.592.

Carnap stands for the acceptance of the abstract entities as possible designate because once we accept the linguistic framework for a certain kind of entities, then we are bound to admit the entities as possible designate. In other words, the questions concerning the abstract entities as possible designate turns out to be the questions concerning the acceptability of the linguistic framework. For e.g., the statements 'Five designates a number' is a statement which presupposes that our langauge contains the forms of expressions which we introduced as framework for numbers. Here framework for numbers means introduction of numerical variables and the general term 'number.' Hence statement turns out as an analytic statement.

It is clear that within the linguistic framework we are able to assert meaningfully, since the forms of expressions, which are found in accordance with the set rules, provide the tool or necessary ground for the verification of the statement. In the case of statements or propositions concerning the physical things and events, the accepted framework for the thing would provide verification method by an empirical investigation, whereas in the case of abstract entities the method of verification is logical and depends upon the rules set by the framework. The set of rules, to which the linguistic expressions belong, are said to determine the answers to the questions raised about the reality of abstract entities. Carnap writes "Thus the question of the admissibility of entities of a certain type, or of abstract entities in general as designata is reduced to the question of acceptability of linguistic framework for those entities. Both the nominalistic critics, ... and the skeptics, ... treat the question of existence as a theoretical

question? They are, of course, not the internal question, the affirmative answer to this question is analytic and trivial and too obvious for doubts or denial, as we have seen. Their doubts refer rather to the system of entities itself; hence they mean external questions."[10]

Ontological Commitments

It seems, Carnap's world of entities is broad enough to accommodate the things and events of our daily experience and the abstract entities which are essential for the langauge of science. One may express doubts over whether his world of entities is over populated. But he set forth rules for the verification of the entities in question. These rules are the essential characteristics of the language. Language, in his case formal language, contains the semantical and syntactical rules, though these are developed in course of adoption of a language in order to account for the world of experience. Therefore adoption of a language essentially entails the linguistic framework which determines the content and validity of the proposition or statements. Within his framework only the question regarding the entities, which are mentioned or expressed in a proposition, can be positively or negatively answered.

How is it possible to understand a proposition meaningfully? The understanding of a proposition depends upon the understanding of the meaning of the constituent words of the proposition. In order to understand the meaning of words, those words have to show, point out, indicate or designate. What do

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[10] "Empiricism, Semantics, and Ontology." p.593.

they point to or designate? We can possibly, within Carnap's system, answer that what they designate, or point out, are the things and events presented to us in our experience. From this shall we construe that an external world of things and events exist independently? To speak of the existence of the external world would be to make a distinction between what is in our consciousness and what is outside of it.

When we raise the question of existence, or rather the ontological commitments of a theory, Carnap suggests to take into account quantificational nature of language. In a general statement which contains quantification variables stand for the entities which are values of the variables. Therefore, the ontological commitment of a theory depends upon the variable which ranges over a domain of entities. In other words, Carnap admits Quine's view that 'to be is to be the value of a variable.'

Carnap rejects the view that only those entities which are given immediately in our experience are to be considered as real or existent. If that is the case it is impossible to admit any abstract entities. According to him the constructs out of the data of sense experience are also eligible to be considered as real. Otherwise construction of abstract entities in the langauge of science would be impossible to justify.

3. LOGICAL ATOMISM OF RUSSELL

Russell labelled his philosophical perspective as logical atomism. If someone keen on finding a tightly knit system of principles and doctrines in Russell's thought definitely bound to get disappointed. Not only his contributions range over a

wide spectrum but also frequently the ideas or theories he presented with regards to some or other areas of thought get readjusted or reformulated, or sometime end up in total rejection with the replacement new thought. One reason might be that his philosohical carrier span over such a long time; consequently had to respond to the new developments. Another reason, it seems, could be that he did not believe in dogmatic assertiion, rather felt happy with continuous interaction and reflection so that a more refined perspective will emerge. In spite of all these, there is an overall unity which can be shown by making explicit the underlying themes of his philosophical perspective.

When we take into account all his philosophical thought and try to locate the overall scheme, we can see that the whole endeavour was devoted to two principal themes, i.e., ontology and theory of knowledge. The search for 'what there is' constitutes Russell's idea of ontology with the perceived end result of what should be taken to be basic or fundamental type of reality. A theory of knowledge constitutes the attempt for a critical examination of the way to justify our claims to know the truth about something or other. According to Russell these two departments, i.e., 'what there is' and 'the justification of what we believe to be true' are closely inter-twined to the effect that a proper understanding of the one is not possible without taking into account the other. Ontology requires a theory of knowledge and the theory of knowledge has as one of its ultimate purpose to sanction an ontology.

Another area in which Russell devoted himself is the theory of meaning; but the concern over developing a meaning theory was

not for its own sake, rather he perceived that a well developed theory of meaning will act as a link between theory of knowledge and ontology. Problem of meaning should be considered within the wider concern of langauge and its functioning vis-a-vis a world or reality. For Russell the analysis of the nature of meaning is part of the wider concern of formulating a theory of truth and, therefore, also with what is real. He thought that consideration of the nature of meaning finally lead us to the role and nature of language as the carrier of meanings.

Analysis of language by making use of modern logic is not just a convenient tool in understanding the link between ontology and theory of knowledge but is an important one and the only possible method available. Hence modern logic assumes perennial role in the philosophical analysis of language. This made Russell say that logic in one sense is the essence of philosophy. Logic gives us the criteria by which we can confront and evaluate the everyday use of langauge.

Russell's logical atomism adheres to a procedural principle called 'Ockham's Razor' which states that plurality is not be posited without necessity. The idea in adhering to 'Ockam's Razor' is that in performing any logical analysis, i.e., in treating the meaning of any complex symbol, as well as in determining what is real and what is true one should persist in trying to find what there are by identifying the meanings genuine constituents or components out of which they are composed.

Russell's logical atomism is a complex doctrine concerning the nature of language, of knowledge and the world. He makes explicit what is meant by 'logical atomism'; "the reason that I

call my doctrine logical atomism is because the atoms that I wish to arrive at is the sort of last residue in analysis are logical atoms and not physical atoms. Some of them will be what I call 'particulars'--such things as little patches of colours or sounds, momentary things--and some of them will be predicates or relations and so on. The point is that the atom I wish to arrive at is the atom of logical analysis, not the atom of physical analysis.[11]

Facts and Propositions

The logical atomism assumes that we can get down in theory, if not in practice, to ultimate simple, out of which the world is built, and that those simples have a kind of reality not belonging to anything else. Simples are infinite in numbers, includes particulars, qualities and relations. All those simples have in their various ways some kind of reality that does not belong to anything else. Russell says that despite these simples the only sort of objects we come across in the world is facts, and facts are the sort of things that are asserted or denied in the proposition, and are not properly entities at all in the same sense in which their constituents are. This is evident from the fact that we cannot name any fact except that we can deny or assert. Though we cannot name them, it is true that we cannot know the world unless we know the facts that make up the truths of the world. Knowing of facts is entirely different from knowing simples.

Facts are not particular existing things, such as Socrates,

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[11] Russell, "The Philosophy of Logical Atomism," in *Logic and Knowledge*, ed. R.C. Marsh, London: Routledge, 1956, p.179.

Russell a fact is a sort of thing that is expressed by a whole sentence. "We express a fact, for example, when we say that a certain thing has a property, or that it has a relation to another thing; but the thing which has the property or the relation is not what I call a 'fact'."[12]

Facts belong to the objective world, they are not created or depend on our thought or belief. For Russell, there is a outer world of which we aim at knowing and this outer world, of course, comprised of particulars. But the world outside is not completely described by particulars; for that we have to take into account the facts which are sort of things that we express by sentences. Statements which express facts are not intendned to express the condition of our mind, rather it reflects the facts of the outside world. Those sentences or statements are either true or false. When we speak or express truly it is that objective fact which makes what we say true and it is the same objective facts that makes it is false we speak falsely.

Russell's atomism does not envisage only one kind of facts. There are different kinds of facts, there are particular facts, for instance, 'this is white' and general fact which epxress sentence like 'All men are mortal.' Our world of experience are not fully derivable by only particulars facts, Compounded with these facts, there is a distinction between positive and negative facts.

Russell does not support the dualism of true and false facts. Facts are neither true nor false. The quality of truth and falsehood is ascribed only to statements or propositions. For the purpose of logic it is natural to concentrate upon the

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[12] "The Philosophy of Logical Atomism." p.183.

proposition as the thing which is going to be typical vehicle on the duality of truth and falsehood. A proposition is a sentence asserting something. "A proposition is just a symbol. It is a complex symbol in the sense that it has parts which are also symbols: a symbol may be defined as a complex when it has parts that are symbols. In a sentence containing several words, the words are each symbols, and the sentence comprising them is therefore a complex symbol in that sense.[13]

A belief or statement has duality of truth and falsehood which the fact does not have. Any statement involves a proposition and a proposition is not a name for fact. For each fact there are two propositions, one true and one false, and there is nothing in the nature of the symbol to show which is true one and which is false one.

There are two types of relations between a proposition and a fact; one is being true to the fact and other is being false to the fact. But both these relations are essentially logical in nature which subsist between the two. Whereas in the case of name only one relation is possible. It just names some particular or object. If a name does not have a relation with a particular, then it ceases to exist. This is not the case with a proposition, even if it is false the proposition does not ceases to exist.

Propositions express facts and are capable of being true or false. A proposition is a complex symbol expressed by several words. One uniqueness of the proposition is that the meaning of it is the product or combined effect of its constituent words whose meaning are simple. We can grasp the meaning of a

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[13] "The Philosohy of Logical Atomism." p.185.

proposition, which we never encountered before, if we know the meaning of its constituent words. In contrast to this, component words get their meaning only by directly representing what they denote or refer. Therefore, analysis is only possible in regard to what is complex, and it always depends, in the last analysis, upon direct acquaintance with the objects which are meanings of certain symbols. If we know the vocabulary, grammar and syntax of langauge, then we can understand any proposition in a language.

To understand a proposition is to understand the components of the proposition which are symbols. Components of the facts, which makes a proposition true or false, are the meanings of the symbols which we must understand in order to understand the proposition. This directly shows that the complexity of propositions is the direct consequences of the complexity of facts. This complexity of facts or world is a genuine one and therefore one ought to start from the complexity of the world and arrive at the complexity of the proposition.

The simplest imaginable facts are those which consists in the possession of a quality by some particular thing. Again, we have facts which have relation between two facts, triadic facts, tetradic facts and so on. There are infinite hierarchy of facts available. But the whole hierarchy constitutes atomic facts and they are the simplest sort of facts. The proposition expressing them are called atomic proposition. All atomic propositions assert relations in varying orders and contains a 'term' which Russell define as 'particular'. The definition of particular is something purely logical in nature. An atomic fact, therefore, must contain a term or particular and a quality or relation with

respect to that particular. This relation of quality is called a 'predicate' of the atomic propositions. The other words that occur in the atomic propositions may be called the subject of the proposition which is the counterpart of particular in atomic facts.

According to Russell the only kind of word that is theoretically capable of standing for a particular is a proper name. He says that "it is true that if you try to think how you are to talk about particulars, you will see that you cannot ever talk about a particular except by means of a proper name. You cannot use general words except by way of description. Atomic proposition is one which does mention actual particulars, not merely describe them but actually name them, and you can only name them by means of names. Therefore, every other parts of speech except proper names is obviously quite incapable of standing for a particular."[14]

What pass for names in language were originally intended to fulfil this function of standing for particulars. But Russell argues that those are just abbreviations for descriptions. What really merit to be a name according to him, is a name, which is the narrow logical sense of a word, whose meaning is a paricular, only be applied to a particular with which the speaker is acquainted. Therefore, in the proper strict logical sense, the only words that one use as names are the words like 'this' or 'that' with which one is acquainted at the moment.

While formulatiing his ideas of what is a theory of meaning Russell's main concern was with questions of specifying the kind of criteria needed to establish the meaning of some terms in the

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[14] "The Philosohy of Logical Atomism." p.200.

nonformal vocabulary of a sentence or proposition. Russell agrees with Frege and others that in exploring logic of language we draw a broad distinction between those expressions which are purported to refer individual objects and the terms that general. In consistent with this distinction Russell in his formulation of a theory of meaning introduces the distinction between knowledge by acquaintance and knowledge by description. It is assumed that the formal or syntactical questions have been satisfactorily dealt with in the logical symbolism set forth in *Principla Mathematica*.

Russell's work in logic, especially the theory of description and the theory of types, has important connection with the logical atomism. One can look up on this as fitting out the details of his philosophical atomism.

Chapter II

GRAMMAR OF NATURAL LANGUAGE

This chapter seeks to study the nature of grammar and reality in the context of the natural language philosophy. Of its three divisions, the first studies the concept of grammar in Quine's philosophy; the second studies Wittgenstein's idea of grammar and the last deals with Strawson's idea of grammar and descriptive metaphysics.

1. QUINE AND ONTOLOGICAL RELATIVITY

Quine stands for a philosophical view which has a general empiricist and pragmatist orientation. As in the case of Frege and Russell, Quine is more concerned with logic, and, as a consequence, its metaphysical implications. Again, as against over populated world of the realist with abstract entities of all sorts, Quine maintains a nominalist world-view in which a taste for 'a desert landscape' is prominent. Hence there is an attempt to describe the world by positing minimial entities, which could be discerned in his formulation of quantificational devices to determine one's ontology.

His taste for 'a desert landscape' does not allow him for a universe of superfluous entities, both physical as well as abstract. He attempts to describe the world of objects or individuals which are allowed to be or posited through quantification. His considerations of logic imply a language through which our ontological constructions of the world are established. Accordingly, in language the conceptualization of our experience of the world takes place. Quine advocates a naturalistic view of language; he rejects the characterization that the construction of an ideal language, by making use of logical tools, would be appropriate to account for the world of experience, since the structure of such a language and the world matches very well, or has an identical nature. Instead, he maintains that ordinary language is capable of doing the job very well. Moreover, as an essential sequence of the above notion the assumption of postulating meanings as entities and its referential aspect have also been questioned. He construes meanings as the behavioural aspects of the language which can be discerned in appropriate stimulus-response conditions.

Quine's Conception of Language

There is a close interconnection, in Quine's thought, between his views on the nature of language and his conception of the enterprises of ontology and behaviourism. Quine's approach to language is that of an empiricist and behaviourist. Being a philosopher, Quine endeavours to give an account of the world or what there is'. But this is possible only through an account of our conceptual scheme, or rather by an account of the

language, because the terms used to give an account of the world have to be embedded with the very ontology we seek, Quine is deeply aware of the diversity of conceptual systems, and according to him, we cannot get outside the use of some conceptual system or other. We cannot divest ourselves of the grid or filter of conceptual system in order to determine what the world is like independently and absolutely. Out of this deep awareness his conception of the intimate connection of thought and language is derived.

Quine argues that a thorough empirical study of the language learning could help us to understand the nature of reality. This empirical study comprises behavioural and publicly observable responses of the individual under verbal and non-verbal stimulations. Hence, in the course of learning a language, this behavioural and publicly observable responses to the given situations, either verbal or non-verbal stimulus, gets transformed and channelled into specific speech dispositions. This course of learning constitutes the basis for the claim of one's mastery over a language, inspite of the complications and stages involved in the 'ontogenesis of reference.' This emphasis over the empirical orientation for a study of a language does not give an ample ground to the claim of having got access to the 'things-in-themselves', since our claim of access is filtered through or coloured by the distinctive characteristic of one or another set of linguistic tools.

Quine is highly critical of the procedure of equating language and the world in a one-to-one correspondence fashion in which each term designates or refers something as meaning. He

characterises this copy theory of meaning by making use of the metaphor 'the myth of the museum'. In a museum the exhibits are labelled, correspondingly in the language words provide the labels of the 'meanings' as exhibits. Hence, words are labels for meaning exhibits. This conception projects meanings as some kind of entities, either propositional, or platonic or mental; consequence is the being of a universe of ontological excesses. "Uncritical semantics is the myth of museum in which exhibits are meanings and the words are labels. To switch language is to change the labels."[1]

Quine takes the criticism of the myth of the museum further stating that a naturalist objection to this conception is not merely on the idea that it takes of meanings as menteal entities, though it is one among them. Even if it is conceded that meanings are not mental entities but are Platonic ideas or even the denoted concrete objects, the objections persist because the very ideas of 'determinateness' of meaning beyond the dispositions to overt behaviour is not acceptable. Semantics should be free from 'mentalism'. Therefore, in a naturalist-behaviourist point of view of language, what we have to foresake along with the myth of the museum is the assurance of determinacy. The words and sentences in a language, according to the copy theory of language, have definite and determinate meaning. This determinateness cannot be sustained in a behaviourist-naturalist view of language, since meanings are nothing but the property of behaviour.

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[1] Quine, *Ontological Relativity and Other Essays*, Columbia Univ. Press, New York & London, 1969, p.27.

Quine rejects any argument in favour of meaning as proposition or information, or content, [2] since an empirical scrutiny of sentences does not allow us beyond the consideration of meaning as essentially as 'the property of behavior.' Moreover, Quine rejects the idea of finding out the truth and meaning of a sentence in isolation. Instead he considers the totality of sentences or statements in a language in which it is possible to ask the meaning of a sentence. Let us have a short look at Quine's holistic picture of language moulded in empiricist-behaviourist pattern.

The totality, Quine believes, of our so called knowledge or beliefs is constituted or embedded in the statements or sentences and to consider the meaning and truth of a singular sentence would amount to be insufficient to ascertain its validity. Because all those statements are part and parcel of an interconnected web of statements. He uses the metaphor of a 'field force' or 'a man-made fabric' to characterize the totality of our belief statements. Accordingly, periphery belief statements are in direct touch with our experience, and these statements in turn are logically connected with the 'interior' ones which in turn with others. Hence the truth-values of periphery belief statements condition the truth values of the statements of the whole system.

On the face of a recalcitrant experience in the periphery, the network or web of belief statements or system of knowledge has to readjust and re-evaluate in a fashion so that the

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[2] Quine, *Philosophy of Logic*, Prentice-Hall, Inc., Englewood Cliffs, New Jersey, USA., 1970, Chapter I.

statements at the centre, which are so remote from occasion statements, too get adjusted in tune with them. See how Quine describes this process. "A conflict with experience at this periphery occasions readjustments in the interior of the field. Truth values have to be redistributed over some of our statements. Reevaluation of some statements entails reevaluation of others, because of their logical interconnections--the logical laws in turn imply certain further statements of the system, certain further elements of the field. Having reevaluated one statement, we must reevaluate some others, which may be statements logically connected with the first or may be statements of logical connections themselves. But the total field so undetermined by its boundary conditions, experience, that there is much latitude of choice as to what statements to reevaluate in the light of any single contrary experience. No particular experiences are linked with any particular statement in the interior of the field, except indirectly through considerations of equilibrium affecting the field as a whole."[3] In this view it would be meaningless to ask for the meaning and truth of individual statements independently as conceived by the copy theory of language.

Meaning, Reference and Linguistic Relativity

Quine's objection does not simply end with this, but goes further to show that there is an indeterminacy of meaning in the case of these statements or sentences which are at the

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[3] Quine, "Two Dogmas of Empiricism," in *New Readings in Philosophical Analysis*, ed. by Feigl and Sellars, p.92.

periphery. This indeterminateness of meaning could be discerned, he further argues, in the objects of reference or denotation in experience. This we will consider later.

Let us consider how Quine arrived at the theory of indeterminacy of meaning, which has a direct bearing on his empiricist-behaviourist conception of language. As we already pointed out in the beginning of this section, for Quine language is a holistic network of belief statements; a social art which demands a thorough empirical study of the contents and situations in which one's language skill gets moulded. In order to do this, Quine prefers a drastically different method in which he portraits how one can translate words or sentences from a hitherto unknown language of an unknown community to English. He insists on a 'radical translation' rather than a linguist's approximation for the convenience of communication. He considers an hypothetical situation in which our linguist encounters a native of hitherto unknown language in which both happen to see a rabbit. Our native's verbal dispositions to the stimulus of the rabbit amount to the linguistic expression 'Gavagai'. In the usual situations the linguist easily may translate "Gavagai" as "Rabbit" into English. But from a philosophical point of view, the translation of "gavagai" as "rabbit" is not exact for our linguist, who with radical translation in mind is not pretty sure whether the native's dispositional utterence is an assent to the linguistic expression "rabbit" or to "undetached rabbit part" or to "rabbit stage." Quine, upon this consideration, brings out the difficulties involved in determining this aspect of translation and affirms that, any attempted way leaves a

trace of indeterminacy, which is deep rooted in translation.

"Thus consider specifically the problem of deciding between "rabbit" and "undetached rabbit part" as translation of "gavagai". No word of native language is known, except that we have settled that on some working hypothesis as to what native's words or gestures to construe as assent and dissent in response to our pointings and querings. Now the trouble is that whenever we point to different parts of the rabbit, even sometime screening the rest of the rabbit, we are pointing also each time to the rabbit. When we indicate the whole rabbit with a sweeping gesture, we are still pointing to a multitude of rabbit parts. And not that we do not have even a native analogue of our plural ending to exploit, in asking "Gavagai?". It seems clear that no even tentative decision between "rabbit" and "undetached rabbit part" is to be sought at this level."[4]

For Quine meaning is basically concerned with human behaviour to the occasional sentences. Beyond, that the construction of meaning as mental entities is totally unacceptable. The meaning being derived out of the dispositions to the stimuli, it does not acquire, as we have seen in the translation of "gavagai" to "rabbit," determinacy. The argument Quine put forward is that even in the most carefully controlled conditions of providing certain particular publicly given stimuli, it will not be the case that different linguistic responses in the face of those stimulations can be discovered to match each other completely in meaning. It is possible that

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[4] *Ontological Relativity*, p.32.

there is always a certain element of indeterminateness which would be impossible to detect, in the attempt to go from one linguistic response to another, in the face of same stimuli.

Thus Quine formulated that even if we devise and use various techniques in order to reduce or avoid the indeterminacy, there is an unavoidable indeterminacy, in some degree, that will not be eliminated altogether. Especially when we go from one language to another there will not be complete match that could be brought out by a single manual of translation. This indeterminacy of translation, Quine argues, has much philosophical consequence. Indeterminacy of translation intrudes into our conceptual system and, hence, we face conceptual relativity. Quine's thesis of conceptual relativity or linguistic relativity finds its extension in the form of ontological relativity, into which we will come later. Before that we have to look into how the residual indeterminacy of meaning affects.

Quine extends his thesis of indeterminacy of meaning to reference, for conditions in which meanings become indeterminate have bearing over references in radical translations. Quine says, "the indeterminacy of translation now confronting us, however, cuts across extension and intensions alike. The terms "rabbit", "undetached rabbit part" and "rabbit stage" differ not only in meaning; they are true of different things. Reference itself proves behaviorally inscrutable".[5]

In the ordinary use of our language the notion of extension

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[5] *Ontological Relativity*, p.35.

has been clear enough, there is no mystery over it; terms of our language have the same extensions when true of the same things. This is because we consider the apparatus of individuation as given and fixed. But when we are concerned with radical translation, the indeterminacy of the apparatus of individuation itself becomes the resting ground for the indeterminacy among "rabbit" and "rabbit stages"; then the inscrutability of reference.

Quine makes use of the words "green" and "alpha" in order to show the inscrutability of reference. There is an ambiguity, he argues, in the uses of these two words. We use these words as general concrete terms, when we say the grass is green, or some inscription begins with an alpha, and sometimes as abstract singular terms when we say green is a colour or alpha is a letter. Quine ascribes this ambiguity to the fact that there is nothing in ostension to distinguish these two uses. While teaching both the concrete general terms and abstract singular terms the pointing would be done on the same, yet the objects of reference are different under the two uses of words. Quine says "the inscrutability of reference runs deep, and it persists in a subtle form even if we accept identity and the rest of the apparatus of individuation as fixed and settled; even, indeed, if we forsake radical translation and think only of English."[6]

This inscrutability of reference, Quine remarks, is not only existent in radical translations from an unknown, language to a known one, but can be discerned even within ones own

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[6] *Ontological Relativity*, p.41.

language. While we learn language, in our childhood, we do it in a homophomic translation, we systematically construe our neighbour's apparent references. We reconcile and readjust our translation to the tune of our neighbours verbal behaviour so that we would be able to compensate for the switch of ontology. In effect, it would be impossible to unearth the inscrutability of reference at home. But, for Quine, this inscrutability of reference is not the inscrutability of fact, since there is no fact of the matter.

Quine draws his linguistic relativity thesis out of this predicament accrued in the considerations of inscrutability of reference and the reluctance to admit the facts of matter. Once we proceed with the conventional sense of terms and their references, we would land up in an absurd position in which there will not be any difference on any terms, interlinguistic or intralinguistic, objective or subjective, between referring to rabbit and rabbit parts or stage. This would be absurd, Quine argues, for it has the implication that attempts to discuss any difference between rabbit and each of its parts or stages are of no avail.

This 'quandary' can be solved by consideration of how in our mother tongue things work. The argument is that we have, in our language, a frame of reference, i.e., a network of terms, predicates, and auxiliary devices. Quine says, we have the apparatus, "... in our language with all its predicates and auxiliary devices. This vocabulary includes "rabbit," "rabbit parts," "rabbit stage," "formula," "number," "ox," "cattle"; also two-place predicates of identity and difference, and other

logical particulars. In these terms we can say in many words that this is a formula and that a number, this a rabbit and that rabbit part, this and that the same rabbit and this and that different parts. This network of terms and predicates and auxiliary devices is our frame of reference or coordinate systems. Relative to it we can and do talk meaningfully and distinctively of rabbits, and parts, numbers and formulas."[7] In terms of this 'frame of reference' in a language we are able to specify meanings and referents. Therefore, there is no question of absolute specification of meanings and referents; hence linguistic or conceptual relativity.

Quine on 'What there is'

Quine thinks that this linguistic or conceptual relativity has ontological consequences, since objects of a theory have to be determined in terms of the language. Quine devices some tools to determine one's ontology. Therefore it is essential to consider what he has to say over 'what there is'.

Ontology or 'what there is' occupies a central place in Quine's philosophy. He discusses what should be the ontological commitment of a theory in his celebrated paper 'On What there is'. He criticises the existing philosophical views such as the one which wants to acknowledge beings of non-existent entities named in the fiction or myth; which posits entities based on the distinctions between actual and possible; and which makes use of fundamental contrast between particulars and universals. Quine,

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[7] *Ontological Relativity*, p.48.

dissatisfied with these theories, vehemently opposes them and shows the faulty grounds and misleading considerations on which those theories are based.

Against the above said philosophical view Quine raises, mainly, two objections; lack of the clear and distinct criterion of identification and the fallacy of equating meaning and naming. The concept of identity could not be applied to the unactualized possibles as the example of the possible fat man and possible bald man shows.[8] When we use singular terms, it has been construed that there should be an entity to be designated or referred to. This fallacy could easily be solved by using, Quine argues, Russell's theory of descriptions. The technique of analysis employed in that theory showed how one can transform a sentence containing a singular term into a sentence in which, without loss of meaning, that singular term is no more present; what remains are quantified variables, predicate expressions and relevant constants. Since singular terms are no longer present, necessity of positing an entity correspondingly does not arise. Quine writes, "when a statement of being or non being is analyzed by Russell's theory of descriptions, it ceases to contain any expressions which even purports to name the alleged entity whose being is in question, so that the meaningfulness of the statements no longer can be thought to presuppose that there be such entity."[9]

In the fundamental distinction of particulars and

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[8] Quine, 'On What There Is' in *New Readings in Philosophical Analysis*, p.546.

[9] "On What There Is." p.548.

universals, Quine stands firm against positing universals as entities, for abstract nouns never ontologically commit us, since it can be replaced by a predicate expression. Of course there are red houses, roses, sunsets but nothing in common as 'red'. Quine says the words "red houses," "roses," "sunset" are all about sundry individual entities which are houses, roses, sunsets, but there is no entity which can be named as "redness."[10]

Thus how can we determine ontology of a theory, or in what way is it possible to determine the ontological commitment of a theory? For the answer, Quine resorts to, like Frege and Russell, the great resources and power of modern logic, especially of predicate calculus which uses the method of quantification, i.e., the bound variables to express forms of generality.

In order to determine the ontological commitments embedded in a discourse, Quine adopts Russell's method, i.e., rewrite the relevant statement by making use of the tools of the predicate logic, to disclose the underlying structure of the statement. Quantifiers, bound variables, predicate expressions and logical constants are the expressions involved in the process. Accordingly in a re-written statement only quantified bound variables determine the ontology since the bound variables range over a domain of objects as values. "To be assumed as an entity is, purely and simply, to be reckoned as the value of a variable.... The variables of quantification, 'something,'

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[10] "On What There Is', p.550.

'nothing,' 'everything,' range over our whole ontology, whatever it may be; and we are convicted of a particular ontological presupposition if, and only if, the alleged presupposition has to be reckoned among the entities over which our variables range in order to render one of our affirmations true"[11]

A first-order quantified proposition is one in which the bound variables range over individual objects. Therefore, once the different expressions or elements of first-order quantification takes its position in a sentence, the ontology committed by it can be determined. Among different expressions, in such a re-written sentence, the bound variables stand out because among other expressions only bound variables range over a domain of objects. Other expressions do not designate any objects, therefore not bindable by quantification. For Quine predicate expression stands only for schematic letter, do not refer to any entities.[12] Hence bound variables range over individual objects. These individual objects constitute the possible values of the bound variable. These objects, as making up the domain of possible values over which the quantified variables range, may be of any type one chooses to distinguish in one's ontology.

For Quine the difference among ontologies have to do with what kind of objects should be considered as values of variables. As said earlier, the predicate expressions and other logical constants, except bound variables, are not quantified

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[11] "On What There Is." p.551.

[12] See "Ontology and Ideology," in *New Readings in Philosophical Analysis*.

since they do not range over any domain of objects. So it is clear that in a first order predicate calculus, when all expressions assume their proper place, only variables stand to present us the ontology of the expression. They are to be found in a range of values allowed and governed by the bound variables. Thus Quine's famous dictum 'to be is to be the value of a variable' gives us the essential nature of the quantification by which we determine the ontological commitment of a given discourse.

Ontological Relativity

Quine's idea of linguistic relativity provides grounds to deny absolute specifications of ontology of a theory. The question whether the terms in our language really refer to the 'referents' of the terms makes sense only with ingeniously permuted denotations. On the other hand it is meaningless to ask the question of reference absolutely, it can be asked meaningfully only relative to some background language. This makes it essential that any attempt to fix the ontology of a given theory needs a background language. Then the question of reference for the background language itself will be in need of another background language and so on ad infinitum. Does this process involve an infinite regress? Quine argues that somehow somewhere we have to end this regress. His suggestion is that we find this ultimate 'resting place' in our mothertongue. "In practice of course we end this regress of coordinate system by something like pointing. And in practice we end the regress of background languages, in discussion of reference, by acquiescing

in our mothertongue and taking its words at face value."[13]

As we have seen in the previous section, the answer to the question what would be the objects of a theory lies in his dictum 'to be is to be the value of a variable.' While keeping it in mind, what has he to say about the objects of a theory in the light of the thesis of ontological relativity? Quine draws a comparison by bringing in the idea of a coordinate system in which position and velocity occupy the end points of physical explanation. But what of velocity and position itself? There is no absolute velocity and position, it is relative to a coordinate system.

In the same way, the objects of a theory do not make sense in absolute terms but in how the theory of objects is interpretable in a background language. Quine writes, "... it makes no sense to say what the objects of a theory are, beyond saying how to interpret or reinterpret that theory in another. Suppose we are working within a theory and thus treating of its objects. We do so by using the variables of the theory, whose values those objects are, though there be no ultimate sense in which that universe have been specified. In the language of the theory there are predicates by which it distinguishes as portions of this universe from other portions and these predicates differ from one another purely in the roles they play in the laws of the theory. Within this background theory we can show some subordinate theory, whose universe is some portion of the background universe, can by a reinterpretation be reduced to

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[13] *Ontological Relativity*, p.49.

another subordinate theory whose universe is some lesser portion. Such talk of subordinate theories and their ontologies are meaningful, but relative to the background theory with its own primitively adopted and ultimately inscrutable ontology.[14]

Quine finds indeterminacy of meaning out of the thorough-going empiricist-behaviourist study of language. This idea takes him to the inscrutability of reference and, finally, to the linguistic or conceptual relativity thesis. Result is that our conceptual system or linguistic practice depends on another background language, since there are no facts of matter to 'scrute'. Does he advocate a kind of 'semantic nihilism,'[15] for meaning and reference are so indeterminate and inscrutable? Or shall we assume that our conceptual apparatus or linguistic tools are not sufficient enough to know what it is, or the very nature of our language is such that ontology becomes elusive to human understanding?

2. LOGICAL GRAMMAR IN WITTGENSTEIN'S PHILOSOPHY

Wittgenstein, both early and later, attempted to reveal the structure of reality by the logical analysis of language. It is obvious that early Wittgenstein was trying to construct a logico-metaphysical system which will reflect the nature of

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[14] *Ontological Relativity*. pp. 50-51.

[15] Hans-Johann Ghock, "The Indispensibility of Translation in Quine and Davidson," *The Philosophical Quarterly*, vol.43, 1993.

reality. The structure of the ideal language revealed by making use of the truth-functional logic is expected to reflect the structure of reality, for the concepts or categories derived by such an analysis are the categories of reality. In other words, the revealed structure of the language conforms to the structure of reality.

Though the characterization of the later Wittgenstein in this line would not be available easily and may be against the general spirit of his endeavour, what ultimately underlies in the philosophical ideas about the nature of our experience or understanding, which is essentially related to our linguistic habits, is an attempt to account for the nature of reality. Sketching of the nature of our understanding in turn portray our conceptual scheme which correlate itself, on the one hand, with our linguistic concepts and, on the other hand, with the categories of the world. Then the question is whether linguistic concepts conform to the structure of the reality or reality conforms to the concept of our understanding. Irrespective of the difference of opinions regarding the question one can argue that though the later Wittgenstein never directly considered this question, his later philosophical perspective provides ground, indirectly, to a conception in which the nature of reality has been accounted for.

Tractatus: A Logico-metaphysical System

The *Tractatus* is basically a logico-metaphysical treatise which aims at the construction of an ideal language by making use of truth-functional logic. What matters for us in this

project is the fact that it seeks to unearth the structure of the world. This structure could be manifested in the language. Since our ordinary language does not reflect the reality properly we have to construct an ideal language which aptly portrays all the structural features of the world.

According to the *Tractatus* the world consists of facts or states of affairs. "The world is the totality of facts, not of things" (*TLP* 1.1). These facts or states of affairs are constituted of objects "A states of affairs is a combination of objects" (*TLP* 2.01). And these objects are in a determinate relation which makes up the structure of facts. The ultimate substance of the world are objects, but what we comprehend is facts. "Objects make up the substance of the world" (*TLP* 2.021). What constitutes our experience of the world is the totality of facts. "The totality of existing states of affairs is the world" (*TLP* 2.04).

Thus *Tractatus* presents a picture of the world composed of compound facts and, when they are analysed finally, we arrive at simple or elementary facts. This simple or elementary fact is a concatenation of objects, since facts are constituted of objects. These objects are simple and unanalyzable, and therefore, become the basic stuff or substance of the world. These objects are in a determinate relation so that a fact is possible.

Wittgenstein argues that we picture facts to ourselves, therefore a picture is a model of fact or reality. In a picture elements are in a determinate relation. Hence a picture is a fact. Further, these pictures of facts constitute our thought,

and the totality of our thought is the totality of the world. "A logical picture of fact is a thought" (*TLP* 3). "The totality of true thoughts is a picture of the world" (*TLP* 3.01). Again, our thoughts are nothing but propositions. "A thought is a proposition with sense" (*TLP* 4). "The totality of proposition is language" (*TLP* 4.001). "A propostion is a picture of reality" (*TLP* 4.01).

For Wittgenstein, then, what we comprehend or experience is the picture of the world which is constituted of facts. This picture represents our thought and language. As in the case of facts, our language is constituted of propositions which picture facts of the world. These propositions are complex or compound and when the analysis of these complex propositions is carried out what we finally reach are simple or elementary propositions. This elementary propositions represent, simple or elementary facts of the world. "The simplest kind of propositions, an elementary propositions, asserts the existence of a state of affair" (*TLP* 4.21). This elementary proposition consists of names which is counterpart of object in an elementary fact. Like objects, names are also unanalyzable and simple, and are the basic units of the language. The truth or falsity of an elementary proposition depends upon the existence or non-existence of a corresponding simple fact and determination of the truth or falsity of compound propositions is done truth-functionally. "A proposition is a truth function of elementary proposition" (*TLP* 5).

Thus Tractarian ideas on the nature of the world and language, provide a picture that langauge reflects or represents

the world. There is an isomorphic relation between langauge and the world. Can we construe that the actual structure of the world gets reflected or unrepresented in our language or the structural features of the language derived out of the logical consideration are transplanted on to the world? Possibly the latter, since the *Tractatus* is not a result of an elaborate empirical survey of the world. Therefore, what determines the nature of reality or world is the notion of the capability of arriving at the structure of the world through language, since what we experience of the world is to be formulated in our language. One aspect which should be noticed is that the *Tractatus* presents a rigid notion that propositions of natural science only qualify to be meaningful propositions because those propositions are capable of being true or false. Hence all other propositions disqualify to be meaningful and sensible.

Language and Reality in *The Philosophical Investigations*

There are varied opinions whether there is a clear cut distinction between Wittgenstein's early and later philosophical writings or there is a continuation and extentions of the theories put forth in the *Tractatus* in his later works. If we look through a particular perspective, which, it seems, more or less reflects the general spirit and intentions of the philosopher, a complete rejection of the Tractatarian view lays ground for the latter philosophical developments. The very idea of 'picture theory' as the cornerstone of the Tractarian system has been severely criticised because of its shortcomings and narrow conception. Along with it his idea of meaningfulness of

proposition and conception of truth have been criticised. This could be the reason for the rigour and conviction of the early part of the *Investigation's* criticism and reconsideration of the Tractarian views. Does it really pave way or give ground for the argument to the effect of saying that the later philosophy is totally disjoined from the earlier? Can't it be possible to argue that it is an attempt to have a comprehensive scheme to accomodate our varied experiences of the world?

It has been widely accepted or agreed, in philosophical circle, that to discern a pattern or system of philosophy in the later Wittgenstein's work, especially in the *Philosophical Investigations*, would be difficult. Some of the critics went to the extent of saying that what matters in his later work is the method rather than the system. These varied opinions have their bearing on the style and context of the work since what he did is in a sense a complete, repudiation of the Tractarian view of language and the world, which is essentially of an 'Augustinian picture of the essence of langauge'. In the place of a demolished one what is discerned is nothing but remarks on various subjects questioning the very possibility of philosophizing.

In spite of this, his treatment or ideas over various subjects like theory of meaning, language-game thesis, thesis concerning status of grammatical propositions, family resemblance theory, and nature of philosophy provides, subtly, some clues about what they all meant for him. It would be impossible and unjustifiable for any philosopher to have his ideas hanging in the air. Moreover, that would be negation of

the basic spirit of what philosophy is meant for. What emerges out of his considerations and remarks over different subjects, it seems, is an urge to account for the nature of our understanding, i.e., how language functions vis-a-vis the nature of reality. "There is a metaphysical orientation as the rationale of his appeal to the use of language; certain position or stand regarding the nature of thought and reality and of the relation between them."[16] This, of course, does not suggest that he has been engaged in a system-building exercise, he rather suggests, indirectly, what all his endeavour is about.

His appeal for a use theory of meaning lays ground or becomes the substratum from which emerges either directly or indirectly all other philosophical thought. This appeal for use theory of meanig and langauge is invariably related to the repudiation of Augustine's, picture of the essence of language. The meanings of words, the meanings of our discourse about things, are not determined by the nature of the things the words stand for, the nature of things we talk about. The determination of meaning rather takes the other way round, i.e., the nature of things our words are for, the nature of things we talk about are determined by the use of those words in a language with regard to them, by what it makes sense to say about them, by their grammar. "Grammar tells what kind of object anything is."[17]

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[16] See Herbert Schwyzer, "Thought and Reality: The Metaphysics of Kant and Wittgenstein" in *Ludwig Wittgenstein: Critical Assessments*, ed. S. Shankar, Croom Helm, London, 1986, (vol.II), p.150..

[17] *Philosophical Investigations*, trans. by G.E.M. Anscombe, Basil Blackwell, Oxford, 1953, p. 373.

Logical grammar, for Wittgenstein, becomes an explanatory tool in his conception of meaning and truth of an expression. Does it mean that his new theory repudiates completely logical necessity presented in the *Tractatus*? Instead, it seems, he could find that the *Tractatus* explanation of logical truth was simply insufficient to account for various expressions which serve as a necessary truth. And thus he wanted to supplement his earlier conceptions with a subtle account of logical grammar of necessary truths. The philosopher's interest, according to the *Investigations*, in the grammar is merely not for the sake of getting our language clear in its use, but rather to solve the puzzling philosophical questions through the clarifications of language. Hence the criticism that Wittgenstein confines philosophical activity to the realm of the grammarian does not stand in itself.

Resolving philosophical questions through the appeal to the multifarious use of langauge and its logical grammar can be construed as Wittgenstein's main interest in his later works. Well-formed sentences formed as per the conventions of ordinary langauge are perfectly grammatical, but are sources of philosophical problems. This problem is of much interest for philosophers than grammarians, hence requires a philosophical treatment or therapy rather than a grammatical clarification. Ordinarily a straightforward examination of the rules of grammar never reveals anything, since those expressions are not ill-formed, rather formed according to the rules. While for a grammarian the matter ends there, for a philosopher these expressions are the source of profound metaphysical, ontological

or epistemological questions. Accordingly, philosophers attempt to reason out why these expressions are sources of metaphysical, ontological, or epistemological theories and how those theories transgress the limits of the logical grammar.

Wittgenstein suggests that all these philosophical puzzles arise out of our failure to understand that these expressions are the rules of grammar, and do not indicate or refer anything beyond that. We construe these expressions as the ordinary empirical propositions which are used as norms of representations to fix the concepts. Therefore, we have to make a demarcation between those grammatical sentences and the empirical sentences. Treating the grammatical propositions as empirical propositions only leads us to all metaphysical and skeptical muddles which have so far bewildered philosophy. In case of regarding such grammatical well formed expressions in such a line, it becomes a cause to raise questions regarding the source of our knowledge of the truths of such experiences, or what would the ground for the certainty of those truths. These questions are the grounds for the justification to transcend the bounds of sense. Wittgenstein regards these questions as irrelevant since solutions to such philosophical dilemmas do not lie in the transcendence of bounds of sense and in any transcendental theory of truth and meaning. Rather, he suggests, answers to those questions lie in the elucidations of the logical grammar of the expressions involved. When these expressions get identified for what they are, we will be in a position to resolve those problems.

In the case of the so called metaphysical propostions, we

will then see that the supposedly metaphysical truths turn out to be merely shadows of grammar. For "like everything metaphysical, the harmony between thought and reality is to be found in the grammar of the language."[18] Therefore, what ultimately helps us dispel the shadow cast by grammar is disclosing the linguistic conventions which underpin such metaphysical sentences. We find ourselves in a position to say that those questions regarding the metaphysical truths of such expressions are merely nonsensical and the search beyond the bounds of our sense is all the more meaningless. As a consequence, all problems of unresolvable skeptical dilemmas arising out of those expressions cease when we recognize that all that we are dealing with are the rules of grammar. According to Wittgenstein, the rules of grammar are autonomous and are not in need of justification. It is prior to truth and determines what make sense but themselves cannot be true or false. There is hence no need to justify grammar by reference to reality because any reference to reality pre-supposes grammatical rules. "Grammar is not accountable to any reality. It is grammatical rules that determines meaning and so they themselves are not answerable to any meaning and to that extent are arbitrary."[19]

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[18] *Philosophical Grammar*, ed. by Rush Rhees, trans. by A.Kenny, Basil Blackwell, 1974, p. 112.

[19] Ibid., p. 184.

Language-Games as the Link between Language and Reality

The idea of representational relation between language and reality is one instructive way of looking at Wittgenstein's development beyond the *Tractatus*. The *Investigations* give us the opportunity to have the insight of the need of analyzing the representational nature of language and reality. As earlier perceived, the nature of relation between them is not a sort of natural relation. It is not a dogmatic prescription, as the earlier philosophers of language conceived, that is just based on observing or looking at the expression of the langauge and of world of which they speak of. Neither the nature of relation can be discerned by looking into nor read off from the mental content of language-users.[20] If God had looked into our minds, he would not have been able to see those whom we are speaking of.[21] The *Investigations* suggests that representational relationships between language and reality have their mode of existence in certain rule governed human activities which Wittgenstein calls language-games. The creation and sustenance of the relationship between language and reality is in-built in the language-games which are our forms of life.

Thus, the idea of language-game is crucial in understanding not only various remarks and arguments such as private language argument, remarks on mathematics, nature of philosophy, but also

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[20] See Jaako Hintikka, "Language-games in *Ludwig Wittgenstein: Critical Assessments*, ed. by S. Shankar. (vol. II), p. 89.

[21] Ibid., p.217.

to get at an overall picture of what he said and what is he striving to arrive at or establish. It seems, the idea of language-game does not refute or reject in essence his earlier theory of pictorial relationship as establishing link between elementary proposition and reality, rather what it does is depriving of the primacy of the pictorial or isomorphic theory of relationship. Moreover, the determination of truth of propositions is construed earlier as truth-functional. But it is true of the compound propositions of which truth can be established truth-functionally by taking into account the truth of constituent propositions or elementary propositions. Thus, the question is how could we account for or establish the truth of elementary proposition itself? Wittgenstein takes the help of language-game to solve this predicament while preserving a limited role to the idea of pictorial relationship and truth-functionality of propositions.

When the complex structure underlying these relationships is uncovered by the language-game idea, the logic of isomorphism will not be the fundamental link between language and reality any longer. There will be something more of fundamental than the pictorial relation, since logic of picturing will not be able to take care itself. It needs something more to explain the multifarious use of linguistic expressions, which could be given by language-game only.

Thus the thesis of autonomy of meaning, language-game and logical grammar are crucial in Wittgenstein's ideas and are connected to each other to provide an over all philosophical perspective to account for the nature of language and reality.

Language-game is played according to the rules of grammar which constitute the explanation of meaning of the expressions used in the game. Therefore, autonomy of meaning rests in the rejection of the idea that rules of grammar are dependent on the reality. The nature of reality, empirical or transcendental, does not help us in determining the rules of our language. Neither the structure of reality determines that a proposition or sentence is true or false. We play language-games according to the rules of grammar which determine the meaning. What are the bounds of sense of an expression are determined by the rules of grammar. Hence, while playing various language-games, according to the rules, what we conceive is a perspective of the nature of reality which is transplanted onto the reality. In effect, the nature of reality conforms to the nature of language, and reality has a determinate structure in accordance with the linguistic conventions embedded in our forms of representations.

In the history of philosophy Kant made a 'Copernican Revolution.' There is an argument that what the later Wittgenstein was accomplishing is nothing but a second Copernican Revolution in Philosophy.[22] In analytic philosophical tradition philosophers firmly believed that the structure of reality gets reflected or represented in the structure of the language. Therefore, the attempts were to arrive at the logical structure of language which essentially is the structure of reality. But in contrast to this, the later Wittgenstein argues

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[22] See Herbert Schwyzer, "Thought and Reality: The Metaphysics of Kant and Wittgenstein," in *Ludwig Wittgenstein: Critical Assessments*, Vol. II, ed. by S.Shankar.

that what determines the structure of reality is the multifarious use of our language. Our language is not the picture of reality, rather we play 'language-games' by using the linguistic conventions. Therefore, the essence of language is not the essence of reality, but a rule-governed activity. The backbone of the language is the rules of grammar.

Hence, the essence of language-game is the rules of grammar. Reality conforms to the language game played. Then there are questions of what is the nature of this logical grammar? Wittgenstein's answer is that logical grammar is nothing but the essence of language-game itself, it is inbuilt in the language. Is this argument a cogent one? Kant, while tracing categories of understanding and forms of intuition in order to account for our experience of the world, considered for this 'game' as given, a-priori, hence transcendental in nature. But for Wittgenstein ultimate ground or bedrock is language-game itself.

3. STRAWSON: ONTOLOGY OF PARTICULARS AND DESCRIPTIVE METAPHYSICS

Concept of Language

Strawson's philosophical approach characterises the concern for ordinary language and its structure through which the

essential structure of the world manifests itself. As a corollary to his approach, he rejects the idea of the construction of a formal language in order to account for the world of reality. Instead, he strongly holds that the traditional subject-predicate logic is sufficiently rich enough to assert the truth and the structure of the world, which are embedded in the ordinary language.

Strawson's approach, consequently, accomodate ordinary sentences as the basic units of language; and in our language we use sentences to assert or to talk about various 'particulars' which are constituents of the world of experience. "One of the main purpose for which we use language is the purpose of stating facts about things and persons and events."[23]

Strawson draws certain distinctions both in the case of sentence and an expression; in the case of a sentence he distinguishes 'a sentence,' 'a use of a sentence,' and 'an utterance of a sentence.' Parallel to this, the discernible distinctions of an expression are 'an expressions,' 'a use of an expression' and 'an utterance of an expresssion.'

Out of these distinctions Strawson draws some significant philosophical consequences. For Strawson a sentence means any specific sentence which has been used in various times. For e.g., 'The King of France is wise' has been uttered at various times starting from successive French monarchs till now in which France is not a monarchy. Therefore utterances of 'this sentence' are significant or meaningful at various occasions and

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[23] Strawson, 'On Referring,' in *Logico-Linguistic Papers*, Methuen, London, 1977, p.17.

thus one and the same sentence uttered in various times has been intended by 'a sentence.'

Straswon argues that, however, though a sentence can be uttered in various times, there is an obvious difference between different occasions of the use of a sentence. For instance, a sentence 'The King of France is wise' can be uttered either in the reign of Louis XIV and Louis XV. But, obviously, when it is uttered in the reign of Louis XIV the sentence amounts to be a true assertion, where as in the latter case a false assertion. In this case the same sentence has been used but it yields different results. Therefore the talk of a sentence being true or false cannot be possible, but it is possible of being used to make true or false assertion.[24] That is what is meant by the use of a sentence. The same sentence can be uttered by two men simultaneously in the reign of Louis XIV to make two different utterances of the same sentence in spite of the same use of the sentence. This is what is meant by an utterance of a sentence.

Strawson makes more or less analogous, though not identical, distinction in the case of 'an expression' also. As in the case of a sentence, an expression does not mention or refer to anything specific but the expression is used to mention or refer to a particular person or thing in case of using the sentence. Accordingly the mentioning or referring is not something that an expression does but it is something someone can use an expression to do. Hence mentioning or referring to, is characteristic of the use of an expression.

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[24] "On Referring." pp.6-7.

Out of the above said distinctions Strawson derives some philosophical consequences. For him meaning is a function of a sentence or an expression, and mentioning and referring and truth or falsity, are the functions of the use of the sentence or expression. Strawson writes, "To give the meaning of an expression is to give general directions for its use to refer or mention particular objects or persons; to give meaning of a sentence is to give general directions for its use in making true or false assertions. It is not to talk about any particular occasion of the use of the sentence or expression. The meaning of an expression cannot be identified with the object it is used, on a particular occasion, to refer to. The meaning of a sentence cannot be identified with the assertion it is used, on a particular occasion, to make. For to talk about the meaning of an expression or sentence is not to talk about its use in a particular occasion, but about the rules, habits, conventions governing its correct use, on all occasions to refer or to assert."[25] It is clear that the signficance of a sentence does not depend upon what has been asserted on a particular occasion, rather it depends on whether such language habits, rules or conventions exist or not in order to use sentences logically to talk about something.

As pointed out earlier, a sentence consists of an expression which uniquely refers to something and an ascribing part which attributes or describes about that something, i.e., a particular referred or mentioned by an expression. Strawson

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[25] "On Referring." p.9.

lays stress on the necessity of drawing this distinction because both referring and describing involve different linguistic conventions or rules: rules for referring and rules for attributing or ascribing.

Idea of subject-predicate Grammar

Strawson wants to find out the rationale behind the traditional subject-predicate distinction in our discourse and finds out how it could be possible to describe the world of expreience which is inscribed in the language. According to the traditional view, there is an asymmetrical relation between subject and predicate in respect to particular and universals. Therefore, if we are able to establish the cogency of the subject-predicate distinction that would amount to saying that the resting ground for the distinction is the existence of particulars and universals, or the world consist of particulars about which we talk in sentences in our language.

In the complex activity of asserting a proposition, two complementary functions are involved. While making this distinction of complementary function we are making a distinction of things that are done in making a statement. These two complementary functions have been characterised by philosophers as subject and predicate which is essentially a linguistic distinction, and that of object and concept as a non-linguistic distinction. Strawson's attempt is to find out the rationale behind this distinction.

Grammatical distinction

The distinction between subject and predicate, and the non-linguistic distinction of particulars and universals are considered, traditionally, as naturally exclusive. According to Frege a proper name can be a subject but never be a predicative expression, though it can be part of it. Geach says that a name of an object can be used as logical subject but cannot be used as logical predicate without a radical change of the sense. Strawson does not find much ground in this explanation to sustain the distinction.

The subject expressions and predicate expressions are used to make an assertion by attaching suitable expressions among the either sort. In this we can discern a common feature, that an expression serves to introduce a term into the remark; in the case of a subject the expression introduces a particular whereas a predicative expression introduces a quality. Strawson argues that the style of introduction of terms into remarks is different between subject expression and predicate expression. Though both of them are introduced alike, they are introduced differently; one is used to refer to and the other to predicate. The term 'referred to' introduced is a substantial expression whereas the term 'predicated to' is introduced in an expression containing a verb in an indicative mood. But in the case of predicative expression introduced, the introduction is distinctive and important in style, i.e., the assertive or propositional style. The use of the indicative form of a verb characteristically involves the introduction of a term in such

a way as to show what is introduced into a proposition. The use of the substantial form, on the other hand, has no such implications."[26] Therefore, on the one hand, the overtly grammatical style of distinction, i.e., substantial and verb-like introduction of terms and, on the other hand, the rationale behind the style of introduction, i.e., assertive or propositional style of introduction of the predicative expression can be taken, though not adequate, as grounds for the subject-predicate distinction.

Strawson finds a supportive element in Quine's quantification of proposition. Accordingly, singular terms and predicate expressions constitute the elements of a proposition in which singular terms stands for quantification. Only singular terms have access to position appropriate to quantified variables while predicative expressions do not.

Category Criterion:

A proposition is the result of the capability of a term of being assertively tied to some other terms so as to yield a significant result. These assertive links between terms are not be construed as ordinary relation, but as non-relational ties. Among universal terms which are supposed to have different non-relational ties, Strawson draws a distinction between universals which apply or collect particulars. These distinctions amount to be two kinds of non-relational ties which bind particulars and universals. This is the distinction between sortal and

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[26] Strawson, *Individuals*, Methuen, London, 1957, p.151.

characterizing universals and, hence, between sortal tie and characterizing tie.

The different kinds of non-relational ties, according to Strawson, give ground for setting up another criterion for the subject-predicate distinction. In a proper sense of 'is an instance of,' in the case of sortal tie and 'is characterized by,' in the case of characterizing tie, it amounts to ruling that universals can be predicated of particulars, but not predicated of universals. Strawson argues that on analogous ground, we can assume different non-relational ties in which universals collecting other universal in a way analogous to the ways universals collecting particulars. But we cannot assume or think of particulars collecting universals or other particulars in a way analogues to these. In this way we can develop a sense of 'to predicate' for which it is true that universals can both be simply predicated and have things predicated of them. But particulars can never be simply predicated, though they can have things predicated of them and can be part of what is predicated.

A theoretical explanation can be given about the association or affinity between grammatical and category criterion. This explanation could be made from the conditions of introducing particular and universal term into proposition. Strawson says the term introduction essentially involves the idea of identification. While introducing a term into a proposition the speaker and hearer should be able to identify the reference. In the case of a particular, a deep consideration of essential conditions shows that both the speaker and hearer should have a knowledge of the empirical fact which suffices to

identify that particular; whereas knowing what a universal meant does not entail knowing any empirical fact. It just entail knowing the language.

Introduction of a particular term essentially involves knowing some distinguishing empirical fact about what it introduces. But introduction of a universal term does not involve this. Therefore, in a sense, an expression of particular has a kind of completeness or self-sufficiency, which the universal expression lacks. The propositional style or assertive style of predicate expression, while introducing its term, shows an incompleteness. This feature of predicate expression, which we have seen in the grammatical criterion, perfectly coincides with the incompleteness of universals in its style of introduction. "A subject expression is one which, in a sense, prevents a fact in its own right is to that extent complete. A predicate expression is one which in no sense presents a fact in its own right and is to that extent complete. We find that this new criterion harmonizes admirably with the grammatical criterion."[27] Not only the new criterion harmonizes with the grammatical criterion but also with category criterion. The particular introducing expression can never be incomplete, according to the new criterion, consequently it never can be a predicate expression.

Introduction of a particular presupposes knowledge of a fact which may introduce another particular. This particular introduced in the second stage may, in turn, presupposes another

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[27] *Individuals*. pp.187-88.

proposition of fact. Obviously it is leading into a regress. But Strawson contends that the proposition thus presupposed does not necessarily introduce another particular because in the ultimate analysis those presupposed propositions rest on facts which do not contain individual particulars, but universals. Thus, a class of facts exist which supply a basis for the introduction of particular upon which introductions of all others directly or indirectly rest.

The class of facts presupposed thus yield propositions containing universals. But these universal are neither sortal nor characterizing universals. These universals, Strawson calls, are feature-universals or feature-concepts and statements which express those facts are feature-placing statements. These feature-placing statements do not introduce particulars in to our discourse, but they provide basis for the introduction. Introduction of a certain kinds of particulars presuppose facts which feature-placing statements state. Therefore the existence of such facts is the condition for being proposition into which particulars are introduced.

This transition, according to Strawson, from feature-placing statments to propositions into which particulars have been introduced involves a conceptual complication. This involves adoption of a criterion of distinctness, criterion of reidentification of particulars as well as the use of characterizing universals which can be tied to a particular. In this process of evolving a conceptual scheme, from presupposed facts to the particular introducing proposition, basic particu-lars, in the point of view of identificatiion, have an important place.

Ontology of Particulars

Our ontology of the world comprises objective particulars. These particulars and events are the subject of common discourse. These particulars and their inclusion in our discourse characterises our conceptual scheme. In our talk usually we make some identifying reference. When a speaker mentions or refers to a particular in his talk he is identifyingly making a reference, he knows what or which particular he is talking about. In the same way the hearer may or may not identify the referred to particular. But success of the discourse depends on the identification of the particulars by both speaker and hearer. Identification of some kinds of particular depends upon the identification of some other kinds, in a general way, and thus gives us the way for the enquiry into our conceptual scheme.

How can we say that a hearer identifies a particular being referred to by the speaker? When the hearer successfully locates the particular being referred to in his general frame of the world, he can be said, partially, to have identified the particular referred. But as a necessary condition, the hearer sensibly discriminates the particular being referred to by the speaker by knowing that it is that particular. This identification, which the hearer is able to do is by directly locating the particular. This is, Strawson says, the case of demonstrative identification of particulars.

But in the case of non-demonstrative identification we resort to identifying description with a certain reference which

the speaker and hearer use by knowing that they are referring to the same particular. But its adequacy is doubtful. This can be solved, Strawson argues, by showing that in the case of non-demonstrative identification, though it is not possible to locate directly, the description of non-demonstrative particulars depends somehow on some demonstrative particulars which appear in the description. "Though particular in question cannot itself be demonstratively identified, it may be identified by description which relates it uniquely to another particular which can be demonstratively identified."[28] All identifying description of particulars may include, ultimately, a demonstrative element.

The identification of particulars in this way gives us a general unified framework of knowledge of particulars, since in both demonstrative and non-demonstrative particulars the identification is directly related to the location of the referred to particular in a spatio-temporal framework. This condition of a spatio-temporal framework, in which we locate and identify particulars and ourselves, is a necessary condition for the kind of knowledge of the world of experience we ordinarily have, says Strawson: "We may agree, thus, that, we build up our single picture of the world, of particulars and events... This we do quite rationally, confident in a certain community of experience. Yet it is a single picture which we build, a unified structure, in which we ourselves have a place, and in which every element is thought of as directly or indirectly related to

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[28] *Individuals*. p.21

every other; and the framework of the structure, the common unifying system of relations is spatio-temporal."[29]

Re-identification of particulars is important, Strawson argues, because in a unified spatio-temporal system the inability of continuous observational identification of particular necessitates re-identification. "There is no doubt that we have the idea of a single spatio-temporal system of material things; the idea of every material thing at any time being spatially related, in various ways at various times, to every other at every time. There is no doubt that this is our conceptual scheme... a condition of our having this conceptual scheme is the unquestioning acceptance of particular identity in at least some cases of non-continuous observation."[30] The re-identification of particular is related to the re-identification of places. But re-identification of place is possible only in relation to things. In turn the identity of material things requires the existence of time as well as being continuous in time and space.

The particular-identification ultimately rests on the possibility of locating the particular thing in a single unified spatio-temporal system. These particulars identified in a single unified spatio-temporal system constitute our conceptual scheme. Among the particulars identified physical things or material bodies possess some special characteristics, from the point of view of particular-identification, which enable them to be

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[29] *Individuals*. pp.28-29.

[30] Ibdi., p.35.

'basic' among particulars. This class of basic particulars enables us to make identifying references to particulars of other class. Whereas to make identifying references to the particulars of this class we do not depend upon other class of particulars, since material bodies possess enough 'diversity, richness, stability and endurance.'[31] This independent status from the point of view of identification enables them to be basic to our conceptual scheme. In fact conceptual scheme is not something extraneous to the particular we speak of. What constitutes our conceptual scheme or framework is this class of basic particulars and persons.

Ontological absolutism and the transcendental argument

Strawson portrays structural features of our ordinary langauge in which rules and conventions govern the use of sentences; and such a language consists of subject-predicate sentences. What qualifies to be subject of a sentence cannot be treated as predicate except as a part of predicate expression and vice-versa. This picture of the langauge on which, ultimately, we depend for the subject-predicate distinction, on the presupposed facts, over which subject expressions rests, takes us to the question what would qualify to be the subject.

This enquiry into the ontology presents a picture of the world constituted or comprised of particulars as the subejcts and their properties as predicates in our language. Among particulars material bodies including persons qualify to be basic particulars. These particulars being spatio-temporally

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[31] *Individuals*, p.39.

located constitute the structure of the world and; in turn, our conceptual scheme.

Strawson does not support the assumption that things and objects offer nothing to our experience but fleeting sense impressions, feelings and images and, hence, rational justification should be given to the ordinary picture of ours which contains continuously and independently existing things and events. "The central problem of classical empiricism was set by the assumption that experience really offers us nothing but separate and fleeting sense-impressions, images and feelings; the problem was to show, on this exiguous basis, we could supply a rational justification of our ordinary picture of the world as containing continuously and independently existing and interacting materials things and persons."[32]

Instead of starting with this 'exiguous basis,' i.e., what we have in our experience Strawson confers absolute and independent existence on material bodies and persons. Further, not only particulars exist independently but these spatio-temporally located particulars constitute our conceptual scheme, the very basis of experience by which only we can construct our picture of the ordinary world.

This conceptual structure or scheme represents the most general and fundamental features of exprerience and an investigation into the limits and ideas which form the framework of all our thought about the world of experience could be considered, Strawson maintains, a legitimate enquiry of

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[32] *Bounds of Sense*, Methuen, London, 1966, p.18.

philosophy. He names it as the 'descriptive' metaphysics and characterises it as the study of the most general and fundamental features of the world, and its method is taken as non-empirical, or a priori, not because, like transcendent metaphysics, it claims to be concerned with a realm of objects of inaccessible to experience, but because it is concerned with the conceptual structure which is presupposed in all empirical enquiries."[33] And his *Individuals* is an attempt to that effect and calls it a descriptive metaphysics because it is 'content to describe the actual structure of our thought about the world.'[34]

The sceptic's doubt about the legitimacy of the external world of experience can be met by adopting a kind of naturalism in which the framework or scaffolding is given and are beyond doubts. This framework, for Strawsonian, is a natural one, unlike Carnap's (for him it is a practical choice), is an absolute one and 'only connects'[35] elements of the conceptual system.

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[33] *Bounds of Sense*, p.18.

[34] *Individuals* p.9.

[35] *Skepticism and Naturalism*, Methuen, London, 1985, p.23.

LOGICAL GRAMMAR AND THE REALITY

The notion that the language which we make use of to account for our world of experience by and large represents the structure of the world was the thrust of the linguistic analysis. In the beginning of the analytical tradition there were questions regarding the feasibility of this project as far as it concerned the ordinary language, with which we usually describe our daily experience. The construction of an ideal language was proposed in order to avoid vagaries and pitfalls of ordinary language. This can be discerned in Wittgensteins statements: "That is to say, where ordinary language disguises logical structure, where it allows the formation of pseudopropositions, where it uses one item in an infinity of different meanings, we must replace it by a symbolism which gives a clear picture of the logical structure, excludes pseudopropositions, and uses its terms unambiguously."[1]

At the very outset of analytic philosophy, it was clear that newly rich logic will take a place of importance in the logical analysis of language, or better to say that new

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[1] Wittgenstein: "Some Remarks on Logical Form," *Proceedings of the Aristotilian Society*, Supp.rd. 9 (1924).

developments in logic prompted philosophers to venture out for a new philosophical perspective on language.

The early phase of the analytic method was largely characterised by the applications of new rich logic and opinions among philosophers weighed heavily on the construction of an ideal language, instead of considering ordinary language, since the vagueness of the ordinary language was beyond, they thought, corrections.

"We find logical forms which have very little similarity with the norms of ordinary language. We meet with the forms of space and time with the whole manifold of spatial and temporal objects, as colurs, sounds etc., etc., with their gradations, continuous transition, and combination in various prepositions, all of which we cannot seize by our ordinary means of expression."[2]

Philosophers, like Frege, Russell and early Wittgenstein settled with the logical analysis and construction of an ideal language, which would have clarity and precision of mathematics. Where as philosophers like the later Wittgenstein, Quine, Strawson and all took a drastically different stand that since we describe our world of experience in the ordinary language, the proper understanding of the functioning of ordinary language vis-a-vis the world of experience would be an appropriate way of philosophising.

In the earlier chapters I undertook the task of presenting briefly each philosophers, of both formal or ideal and ordinary language, the main concern being the relation between logic.

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[2] "Some Remarks on Logical Form." p.33.

language and reality. In spite of the differences in their views about the proper role of philosophy, and also about language and its structure, and semantics, I would like to elaborate and show that there are some steady undercurrents on which they agree, namely on th nature of logical grammar and its locus standi in mapping or representing the structural features of reality. In the case of formal language philosophy the link between the logical grammar discerned by analysis of language and that of the structure of the reality is obviously demonstratable in nature, while the mapping of linguistic structure onto the reality in ordinary language philosophy depends on how we reconstruct the nature of the grammar of ordinary language.

In the ideal language philosophy the isomorphic relations between the structure of langauge and reality gave an impetus to the idea that the concepts or categories of reality conform to the structure of the language. Hence, the structural features of language could be read onto the structural features of reality. This amounts to be a position that was ushered into Philosophy by Kant's Copernican Revolution. Anyway, even though the ordinary language philosophers were apparently against deriving an isomorphic relation between language and reality, their attempt amounts to accounting for our world of experience via language, because our experience is channelled into our thought, and thought, in turn, is invariably related to our linguistic habits. Language and thought are insperably related. Therefore, even analysis of ordinary language leads to the logical structure which is invariably the structure of the world of experience. In this chapter I will attempt to show how in both

formal and ordinary language philosophy, the structure of grammar reveals the structure of the world.

2. LOGICAL GRAMMAR AND THE IDEAL LANGAUGE

Early Wittgenstein was responsible for the celebrated lingustic turn. It is true that many of the essential ideas of the linguistic turn were provided or embedded in Frege's writings. The ideas or insights, of Frege such as philosophical problems are pseudo problems arising out of the imperfection of natural language, such problems can be solved by constructing an ideal language, and the construction of ideal language can be based on technical notions of logic, had far reaching consequences in the philosophical development thereafter. Logical notions such as logical function, quantification, functional calculus, the sense-reference distinction, grammatical or logical form, played a cardinal role in the philosophical analysis of language.

The *Tractatus* is a logico-metaphysical system, in the sense that ideal language is constructed by making use of the logical tools which are supposed to be isomorphic with reality, since the structural features of such a language are of the same nature as those of reality. Inspite of this the *Tractatus* laid emphasis on a clear cut demarcation between what can be said and what cannot be said in language. Accordingly, what can be said includes only propositions of natural sciences. Because the idea of truth-functionality of propositions permits only propositions of natural sciences as meaningful. Hence the question of truth

or falsity arises only with regard to those propostions, whereas, in the case of all other propositions, including the metaphysical, the truth or falsity of the proposition cannot be settled down. Logic does not permit us to discuss any underlying structure or form so that they cannot be validated truth-functionally. Hence, these statements are, according to the Tractarian Wittgenstein, construed as 'What cannot be said' and meaningless. The *Tractatus* conception of truth and meaning are inter-related. What makes sense and meaningful of a proposition is its correspondence with an objective fact or state of affairs. One to one correspondence of a simple or atomic proposition with that of atomic fact is the key notion by which we determine the truth of a proposition and, hence, its meaning. Any complex propositions are supposed to be combinations of atomic propositions whose truth and meaning are sought to be the truth-functionality of its component propositions.

In this *Tractatus* picture the metaphysical propositions, stand to lose because neither they have logical form of the sort discernible in the propositions of natural science to determine its truth, nor have any meaning like the propositions of natural sciences. This logical analysis of the structure of language invariably projects a picture that the *Tractatus* is a anti-metaphysical treatise in which no room has been provided for any sort of metaphysics.

In spite of this picture of the *Tractatus* the body of philosophical perspective presented in it can be seen as a doctrine of logico-metaphysical nature. The structure of ideal language constructed out of the logical considerations is of

essentially a logical kind. This logical construct is supposed to be derived out of, or embedded in, the experience about the world. Since the language we make use of is invariably related to our experience of the world. In other words, the structure of language thus derived is the structure of the world. Since such a structure of language is the logical construct, we map the structure onto the world of experience. Hence the emerged structural features of the world could be seen as the extension of the idea or conception of ideal language. This is nothing but to say that the Tractarian analysis of language and, consequently, of the world is logico-metaphysical in nature.

Post-Tractarian Wittgenstein nurtured a plan to construct a phenomenological language in which appropriately we grasp or present our world of experience. Thus he writes:

> Our ordinary language, which of all possible notation is the one which pervades all our life, holds our mind rigidly in one position, as it were, and in this position sometimes it feels cramped, having a desire for other position as well. Thus we sometimes wish for a notation which stresses a difference more strongly makes it more obvious than ordinary language does, or one which in a particular case uses was more closely similar forms of expressions than our ordinary language. Our mental cramp is loosened when we are shown the notation which fullfil these needs. These needs can be of the greatest variety.[3]

The shift in Wittgenstein's approach is closely related to a thought that phenomenology is grammar, that is to say, that the phenomenological investigations is no more than, or comes to the

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[3] Wittgenstein, *The Blue and Brown Books*, Basic Blackwell, Oxford, 1984, p.59.

same as our investigations of what it makes sense to say.

2.GRAMMAR AND WHAT IT MAKES SENSE TO SAY

Wittgenstein took the responsibility of explaining what he means by the phenomenology in the investigation of possibilities by appealing to the idea that phenomenology is concerned with what makes sense to say. He states, "... but the essence of language is a picture of the essence of the world and philosophy, as guardian of grammar, can in fact grasp the essence of the world, only not in the propositions of the language, rather in rules for this langauge which exclude nonsensical combinations of signs."[4] The reason that the phenomenological investigation, i.e., to the possibilities of phenomena, had seemed so important was that it provided Wittgenstein with means to determine what could be sensibly said, and thus what the rules of syntax of the 'Begriffsschift' should permit. Now he comes to recognize that the phenomenological investigations into what it makes sense to say about phenomena are the same as the grammatical investigations of the words used to describe immediate experience.

As what it makes sense to say assumes importance in the grammatical investigation, the notion of the construction of a notation becomes redundant. Therefore, the important task is to get clear about what it makes sense to say in our familiar language. As a consequence of this the understanding of the nature of grammar replaces the construction of a

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[4] Wittgenstein, *Philosophical Remarks*, trans. Raymond Hargreaves and Roger White, 1975, p.85.

phenomenological language for a proper understanding of the framework of language with respect to reality.

3. ARBITRARINESS OF GRAMMAR

The change of mind from the idea of phenomenological investigation to the grammatical investigation implies Wittgenstein's understanding of the nature of grammar. The identification of phenomenology with grammar presupposes that phenomenology is concerned to describe the norms, standards, or rules of the methods of representation one employs. But, in course of time, this conception of phenomenology has been replaced by concern of grammar and its nature as, he writes in the opening of *Philosophical Remarks*, the investigation of the rules of usages of our language, the knowledge of these rules and their perspicuous representation, come to same thing, that is, achieves the same as what one often wants/aims to achieve through the conception of a 'phenomenological language.'

Wittgenstein considers these rules of grammar as conventional and arbitrary because these grammatical rules or conventions cannot be justified by appeal to the supposed fact that they enable us to represent reality correctly. He writes:

> If I could describe the point of grammatical conventions by saying they are made necessary by certain properties of colour (say), then that would make the convention superflous, since in that case I would be able to say precisely that which the conventions exclude my saying. Conversely, if the conventions are necessary, i.e., if certain combinations of words had to be excluded as nonsensical, then for that very reason I cannot cite a

> property of colours that makes the convention necessary, since it would then be conceivable that the colours should not have the property, and I could only express that by violating the convention.[5]

Grammatical rules do not have propositional nature because any proposition presupposes grammatical rules, in that sense, are prior to experience. On the questions of the justifiability of grammatical rules as propositions Wittgenstein states that,

> I do not call a rule of representations a convention if it can be justified in propositions; propositions describing what is represented and showing that the representation is adequate. Grammatical conventions cannot be justified by describing what is represented. Any such description already presupposess the grammatical rules. That is to say, if anything is to count as non-sense in the grammar which is to be justified, then it cannot at the same time pass for sense in the grammar of the proposition that justify it.[6]

When he argues for the conventionality and arbitrariness of grammatical rules, the idea is not a total independence from what it is represented. The grammatical rules are essential to the description of our experience and constitute the meaning but not the reason to have meaning. It becomes clear when he says that "grammar is not to keep as such reality. Grammatical rules determine meaning (constitute it) and are therefore not responsible to any meaning and are to that extent arbitrary."[7] The relation between grammatical rules and what has been

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[5] *Philosophical Remarks*, p.53.

[6] *Philosophical Remarks*, p.55.

[7] *Philosophical Grammar*, p.184.

represented in proposition, and to what extent they are independent have beeen made clear by Wittgenstein in the following passage:

> Rules of grammar are in the same sense arbitrary and in the same sense not arbitrary as the choice of a unit of measurement. But that can only mean that they are independent of the length of that which is measured. And that the choice of one unit is not 'true' and that of the other 'false' as the statement of the length true or false which is of course only a remark on the grammar of the words 'unit of length.'[8]

From these arguments it is clear that Wittgenstein considers rules of grammar as arbitrary and, hence, autonomous. This recognition has the force to ask the question regarding what it makes sense to say about immediate experience, viz., the grammatical investigation of the language used to describe experience. In one interpretation it has been characterised as requiring the inspection of experience, or the phenomenon itself. The claim that grammar is arbitrary amounts to the recognition, for example, that a statement like 'This is no such thing as reddish-green' is not true because there is no grammatical convention regarding it in our language.

On Hintika's reading of Wittgenstein, he had thought that phenomenological language would perfectly mirror the structure of reality. A proposition of phenomenological language is transparent through which immediate experience can be examined. The grammar of phenomenological language is far from arbitrary, rather it is determined by the essential nature of immediate

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[8] *Philosohical Grammar*, p. 185.

experience. It was only after the realization of the impossibility of a phenomenological language that Wittgenstein embraced the idea of the arbitrariness of grammar. Indeed, in this view, Wittgenstein's recognition of the impossibility of a phenomenelogical language just was tantamount to the recognition that there could be no language the grammar of which was determined by the nature of reality.

But Hintikka's interpretation has been questioned. It was not the impossibility of a phenomenological language that convinced Wittgenstein of the arbitrariness of grammar. It is the other way around. His investigations deeper into the functioning of the language with respect to reality led him to the idea of arbitrariness of grammar, hence the impossibility of a phenomenological language. Long before his notion of arbitrariness of grammar Wittgenstein had the idea that in fact phenomenological investigations and grammatical investigations of language are one and the same. This led him, finally, to realise that the appropriate philosophical task ought not to be that of developing a notation that is structurally isomorphic with reality, but rather to be that of understanding what it makes sense to say about experience. Since what it makes sense to say about experience is independent of what experience is like--since any description of what experience is like begs the question of what it makes sense to say about experience--there is no need for phenomenology, nor for a new phenomenological notation.[9]

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[9] Robert Noe, "Wittgenstein, Phenomenology, what it makes sense to say," *Philosophy and Phenomenological Research*, vol. LIV, No.1, 1994.

Irrespective of differences in interpretation, what strikes more is the role grammatical investigation plays in articulating or describing our immediate experience of the reality. Any understanding of the nature of experience and, therefore, reality demands or presupposes the grammar. The organization of our experience has necessarily been related to the rules of grammar.

The transition from the *Tractatus* with its 'right' method of philosophy to the *Philosophical Investigation* with its denial of a single right method and its insistence of many methods was due to profound changes in Wittgenstein's thinking, many of them were rejection of Fregean elements in his early philosophy. He rejected the truth-functional conception of propositions, Frege's idea of logical form as something hidden beneath the grammatical surface of sentences together with the associated idea of revealing the logical form by logical analysis, Frege's construction of sense of a proposition as the objective representation of reality, and the ideal language construction as a calculus with fixed rules.

It could be seen that most of the ideas Wittgenstein developed in the *Tractatus* are to be abandoned as a consequence of the deep changes in his philosophical perspective. In spite of all these changes two important ideas have their place in his new philosophy. The thesis that metaphysics is sheer nonsense, because it transcends the limits of language, could find out a place, and the notion that what can be said are the propositions of natural sciences or rather the propostiions of natural history.

Tractatus provided a framework in which metaphysics is seen as nonsense, but as a consequence of abandoning the *Tractatus*, the thesis had to be reformulated in a new framework. Tractarian notion of 'meaning,' 'limits of language' and 'transcendance' are all given up in order to accommodate different notions concerning language and reality. Language is conceived as if it is a game--ike activity in which participants use signs in accordance with rules, analogous to rules of chess and other social practices. These activities by making use of rules are part of our social life and, therefore, is a social art which can generally be called as 'forms of life'. In contrast to the *Tractatus* conception, meaning is not something to be sought beneath the surface grammar of signs; finding logical structure out of the sentence by analysis became irrelavant. Meanings are out there, in the very activity itself, in the use of signs. What constitute meaning of a sentence is its use.

Mastery of a language is nothing but the proper understanding and use of words in multifarious ways appropriate to the situation; to Fregean calculus as determining meaning gets replaced in the new theory. This amounts to saying that everyday use or functioning of the language sets its limits. Transcending the limit is now a matter of departing from ordinary use in ways that outstrip our practice and thereby go beyond the possibilities for meaningful application contained in the rules. This construal of language and meaning still excludes metaphysical sentences as piece of plain nonsense and the work of philosophy is still to prevent "bumps that the understanding has got by running its head up against the limits of language."

From the perspective of the *Philosophical Investigations* the *Tractatus* itself transcends the limits of language, because it employs Frege's and Russell's theoretical conception of meaning and language and much of the metaphysics goes with it. While the Tractatus curved out a space for those sentences which are meaningful, the *The Philosophical Investigations* had to go for a much larger space so that it can accommodate all legitimate human linguistic activities than mere 'natural science' granted in the *Tractatus*. This change could be brought out by extending the notion of meaningfulness from propositions of natural science to the whole spectrum of 'natural history.'

> What we are supplying are remarks on the natural history of human beings; we are not contributing curiosities however, but observations which no one has doubted, but which have escaped remarks only because they are always before our eyes.[10]

According to the *Tractatus* the essence of language is the general form of propositions which constitutes the meaning. Meaning is hidden in the language as the logical form. Logical form is the sense of the proposition. Logical form is lying beneath sentences and disguised by the grammatical clothing. In order to unearth the hidden logical form it is necesary to penetrate beneath words to the meanings they disguise. Thus the *Tractatus* deeply commits itself to a logical theory that posits the hidden meaning and form, and this very logical theory cannot be considered a part of natural science, but a piece of metaphysics.

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[10] *Philosophical Investigations*, 119.

The role of logical theory in philosophy is thus seen, in some significant respect, as that of the theory in science. It takes us to places that observation cannot reach and provides us with the understanding essential to solving problems. But in the *Philosophical Investigations*, it seems, the above conception of a logical theory, does not have any place. The theories present us a picture which keep us away from seeing, according to the *Investigations*, how the things really are. Therefore, what the *Philosophical Investigations*, advocates is that the aim of philosophy should be to arrive at a proper method which enables us to see what the actual natural history of human beings is. Thus Wittgenstein writes:

> Philosophy simply puts everything before us, and neither explains nor deduces anything. Since everything lies open to view there is nothing to explain. For what is hidden, for example, is of no interest to us.[11]

This envisages a picture in which any sort of logical theory is ruled out; discerning a logical structure of language which correctly portrays the structure of reality by making use of logical notions becomes superfluous. If that was the case, the *Philosophical Investigations* committing itself to logical theory is of a remote possibility and against the spirit of the endeavour. But according to the *Investigations* what constitute the meaning of words are its multifarious uses in different contexts of social activities and, hence, in the language games in general. And this very language game is played according to

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[11] *Philosophical Investigations*, 133.

the grammaticall rules which are conventions in language. Even though those rules are conventional and arbitrary in nature they constitute the rock bottom of the activity of language-games, hence become the foundation of the language. There are questions regarding whether these grammatical rules are apriori or not, whether universal or specific to each language and the ground for its justification; thus grammatical rules indirectly acquire the functions of all those meant by a logical theory.

As we have seen, that as the *Tractatus* gave recognition only to those propositions of natural science as meaningful, and all others, including metaphysical propositions as nonsensical and meaningless, the Fregean and Russellian elements in it with regard to proposition, logic and, generally, language made it a metaphysical treatise. Nevertheless, the logical positivists took the *Tractatus* 'naturalistic' view that what can be said is the proposition of natural science literally and attempted to construct a philosophical perspective shaped according to the logico-linguistic thesis of Wittgenstein's thought. As a consequence of the adoption of these ideas, they opposed the philosopher's claim that there are things outside the causal nexus which are beyond the reach of the empirical methods of natural science. Their strict criterion of what can be said naturally led them to question the legitimacy of the claim that our logical, mathematical and metaphysical knowledge is about non-natural objects and that acquistion of such knowledge fully rests on the faculty of intuition.

The metaphysical doctrine is that significant truths divide exhaustively into those expressing relations of ideas and

expressions of matters or empirical facts. But in his later philsophy Wittgenstein transcends all these constraints and embraces a comprehensive and holistic philosophy. Any non-natural entities and non-natural knowledge are supposed to be abandoned according to the newly formulated critical philosophy which has a new conception of language and reality in order to keep closer to the revelation of the natural history.

4. QUINE'S NATURALISM WITH ONTOLOGICAL COMMITMENT

Quine is one who got disappointed himself of the overwhelming accommodation of non-natural entities as intensions within the logico-linguistic framework of ideal language of Frege and early Wittgenstein. He thought that the reason and the breeding ground for this lies in the analytic-synthetic distinction and the rejection of such a divide will provide an impetus to have a fulfledged naturalism which keeps pace with modern scientific development. And to that effect it was necessary for him to separate theory of meaning from the theory of reference.

> Once the theory of meaning is sharply separated from the theory of reference, it is a short step to recognizing as the business of theory of meaning simply the synonymy of expressions, the meaningfulness of expression, and the analyticity or entailment of statements; meanings themselves as obscure intermediate entities may well be abandoned. This is the step that Frege did not take... there is great difficulty in tying this well-knit group of concepts down to terms that we really understand. The theory of meaning, even with the elimination of the mysterious

> meant entities, strikes me as in a comparable state of theology.[12]

Quine's rejection of non-natural entities and logical knowledge was accomplished by constructing his own variety of naturalism supplemented with a conception of the structure of knowledge. This variety of naturalism, Quine believes, accounts better for the certainty of logic and mathematics. In contrast to Wittgenstein's conception of philosophy as a therapy, Quine treats philosophy as a naturalised epistemology, as natural science reflecting on itself. For Quine, a metaphysical principle is not ipso facto nonsense; it may be either a scientifically efficacious myth like the posits of physical objects or a scientifically impotent myth like that of Homer's Gods.

Quine's behaviouristic theory of meaning is well stretched to encompass all departments of human experience and knowledge. And in such a theory analyticity does not hold good to provide breathing space for non-natural entities, and, consequently, the thesis of necessary truths becomes superfluous. The tenor of Quine's naturalism could be discerend from the following passage:

> .... we see all of science--physics, biology, economics, mathematics, logic and the rest--as a single sprawling system, loosely connected in some portions but disconnected nowhere. Parts of it--logic, mathematics, game theory, theoretical parts of physics--are farther from the observational or experimental edge than other parts. But the overall system, with

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[12] Quine, 'Semantics and Abstract Objects' in *Proceedings of the American Academy of Arts and Science*, p.45.

> all its parts derives its aggregate empirical content from that edge; and theoritical parts are good only as they contribute in their varying degrees of indirectness to the systematizing of that context.
>
> In principle, therefore, I see no higher or more austere necessity than natural necessity; and in natural necessity, or our attribution of it, I see only Hume's regulations, culminating here and there in what passes for an explanatory trait or the promise of it.[13]

Quine conceives all knowledge as a composite whole and continuous with the paradigmatic natural sciences of physics, chemistry and biology. Since other disciplines like logic and mathematics have a certain degree of centrality, they occupy a central position in our overall belief system. Unlike non-naturalist philosophers, who argue that the centrality of such disciplines are derived from the non-natural objects which are outside our causal nexus and are known in a different way the greater degree of certainty, Quine argues, which logic and mathematics enjoy is because of their being more central in our belief system and drawing their strength from other disciplines which are in the periphery. The revision of logical or mathematical statements disturbs the system as a whole far more than the revision of statements of natural sciences, which lie close to its observational or experimental edge. The greater support that the former statements give to and receive from other statements--in virtue of their central position in the system--accounts for their greater certainty.

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[13] Quine, "Necessary Truth," in *The Ways of Paradox and Other Essays*, Harvard University Press, 1966, p.45.

Once we concede the intensionalist semantics, Quine believed, which mainly stems from Frege's ideas on logic and language, then acceptance of mysterious, non-natural objects is taken for granted. While fashioning his own naturalism, which is in consonance with the contemporary science, Quine found the intensionalist semantical doctrines as incorrigible hurdles, especially Carnap's articulation of positivism with Fregean ideas. Fregean views on logic and language survived a great part in Carnap's philosophical doctrines.

Carnap's empiricism was based on the Fregean logic which was wedded to the analytic-synthetic distinction. What Quine targeted was this analytic-synthetic divide which found its optimum use in Carnap's empiricism. Therefore it became necessary for Quine to expose the meaninglessness of the distinction in order to deny of the possibilities of positing non-natural entities in the pretext of analyticity. The Fregean senses and propositions have to find a way out in the absence of that distinction.

Once it is done, then what is left are the entities or objects of natural science or, rather, natural history. As we have seen, the whole belief system encompasses all objects, both entities of natural sciences like physics, chemistry, biology--entities positioned away from the centre of belief system and conditioned by experimental or observational data--and of those entities of abstract science like logic and mathematics, which are at the centre of our belief system. Given this picture, what should be the field of enquiry of a philosopher is what lies open to public view. Unlike Wittgenstein, Quine does not have an

aversion towards theories, though he concedes the limitation in the desirability of objective and behaviourist constraints on such theories. However, there is no meaning independent of languages; meaningfulness is relative to a language system and its cultural matrix. Hence there is no place for a conception of absolute necessity in Quine's system and so he eschews hope of truth "given and for all; and independently of any future experience."[14]

Quine demolished the myth of analytic-synthetic distinction in his celebrated paper 'Two Dogmas of Empiricism' and paved way for an unhindered conception of naturalism. He held that the sort of naturalism envisaged should be characterised in which all truths are contingent, all objects are natural objects and all knowledge is acquired on the basis of the empirical methods of the natural sciences. All branches of science form an epistemologically seamless web of belief about an ontologically unified world. Any bifurcation of the ontological realm by intensionalist theory of meaning is not accepted. Hence, non-naturalist characterization of language and logic as a kind of knowledge depending on a faculty of intuition over and above sense perception is ruled out.

Quine held that the unit of meaning and truth is to be considered within the conceptual framework as a whole. What entities one then takes to exist are those entities whose postulation yields the simplest and most comprehensive framework. Whether mental entities exist, then, becomes a question about whether such entities need be postulated and not

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[14] *Philosophical Investigation*, p. 92.

a question about whether they are found in experience. If one then asks about what conceptual framework determines the entities to be postulated, the answer is the framework suitable for the accommodation of science, logic and mathematics.

To accomplish this the standard epistemology is to be rejected and fresh and more down to earth approach is to be adopted. This involves accepting the deliverance of modern science. Taking science for granted, the question to be addressed is how did we achieve scientific knowledge? Because language is fundamental to the acquisition of such knowledge, the question of reference assumes fundamental with regard to any language, and the task finally reduces to an enquiry into the 'roots of reference.'

Since acquisition of knowledge is invariably related to learning language and its reference, and so what ontological commitments one has to have and how this ontology related to the language becomes very significant. When we take into account the ontological commitments, we are speaking nothing but about objects. Quine writes,

> we are prone to talk and think of objects. Physical objects are obvious illustrations when the illustrative mood is on us, but there are also all the abstract objects, or so these purported to be: the states and qualities, numbers, attributes, classes. We persist in breaking reality down somehow into multiplicity of identifiable and descriminable objects, to be referred by singular and gneral terms.[15]

Speaking of objects has to be understood as one's

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[15] Quine, 'Speaking of Objects,' in *Ontological Relativity and Other essays*, p. 1.

ontological commitments through the acquisition of language. A language is learned by conditioning; the teacher conditions the child to respond thus-and-so in the appropriate situations. A crucial step in the psychogenetic development from learning simple terms to learning science is the attainment of objective reference, which Quine regards as occuring when the learner has mastered predication by way of quantification. The referential apparatus of natural language is less tidy than logic, where it is effected by the quantifiers and variables they bind.

But, according to Quine, the objective referene is inaccessible to observation, so that the grounds on which the belief of objects are justified become very problematic. The acquisition of knowledge, hence, heavily depends upon our ability to get rid of these constraints on observation conditions. How do we do that? Quine says,

> Grant that knowledge of the appropriate stimulatory conditions of a sentence does not settle how to construe the sentence in terms of existence of objects. Still it does tend to settle what is to be taken into account an empirical evidence for or against the truth of the sentence. If we thus go on to assign the sentence some import in point of existence of objects by arbitrary projection in the case of the heathen language or as a matter of course in the case of our own, there upon what has already been counted as empirical evidence for or against the truth of the sentence comes to account as empirical evidence for or against the existence of the objects.[16]

This nature of the stimulus condition of knowledge acquisition and, consequently, its indeterminatness of the objects we speak in a sentence render the idea that objects we

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[16] "Speaking of Objects," p. 11.

speak are of the nature of posits. However, for Quine, ontology is a matter of speaking of objects. Accordingly, ontologies may be identified and the differences among them recognized, by what kinds of objects they posit or countenance. Sophisticated language of quantification helps us to make clear which ontological commitments are involved in a stretch of discourse.

The question of general ontological commitments has to do with the semantics of the language. For this purpose the use of quantifiers will serve equally well to indicate the domain of objects over which the quantifiers range. On the other hand, the use of some of the quantifiers or some array of them to translate the logical structure of a specific sentence has to do with the truth-condition for that specific sentence.

5. CARNAP'S CRITICISM OF ONTOLOGY

Quine attempted to restore legitimacy and meaningfulness of this branch of enquiry, i.e., ontology. At the outset of analytic philosophy there was a strong philosophical conviction to treat any ontological questions as illegitimate, since they are framed in a wrong way and there is no mechanism by which we can settle the question, and hence, the whole enterprise is meaningless. This strong objection could find more rigorous and refined form in Carnap's articulation of semantic structure of language and conceptual framework in which we meaningfully describe our experience.

The enterprise of ontology is unwarranted and meaningless within Carnap's formulation of epistemology in particular and

human knowledge in general. According to Carnap, philosophers engage in dispute over the status of abstract objects like numbers, class, propositions etc., without recognizing a very important distinction within which only any sensible solution to those disputes are possible. The distinction he proposes is that one between the question regarding external nature or internal nature of the question and by making such distinction one is in a position to find out possible answers to the question regarding existence. In sofar as the external questions are concerned, they do not have any cognitive validity, hence are pseudo questions, and possibly we cannot find any answers to those questions. Whereas in the case of 'internal questions' we are in a position to find out answers because those questions have cognitive validity. To determine which questions have cognitive validity and which do not have wholly depends upon the 'linguistic framework'. Carnap writes:

> Are these properties, classes, numbers, propositions? In order to understand more closely the nature of these and related problems it is above all necessary to recognize a fundamental distinction between two kinds of questions concerning the existence or reality of entities. If someone wishes to speak in his language about a new kind of entities, he has to introduce a system of new way of speaking, subject to new rules, we shall call this process the construction of framework for the new entities in question. Now we must distinguish two kinds of questions of existence; first, questions of existence of certain entities of the new kind within the framework; we call them internal questions; and second, question concerning the existence or reality of the framework itself, called external questions. Internal questions and possible answers to them are formulated with the help of the new form of expressions. The answers may be found

> either by purely logical methods or by empirical methods, depending upon the framework is a logical or factual one. An external question is of a problematic character which is in need of closer examination.[17]

The introduction of framework assumes, according to Carnap, importance in answering the ontolgical question. From the above paragraph it is clear that ontological questions are about the framework, and are, therefore, external. The qeustions regarding the framework are of such nature that a linguistic or semantic enquriy is not possible into those expressions and, therefore, they are pseudo-questions. There are no scientific, logical or mathematical procedures available to settle those questions. Therefore, Carnap concludes, ontological questions about reality or existence are 'external' and should be treated differently from science.

Quine has a large area of agreement with Carnap as well as an area of disagreement. The adoption of linguistic or conceptual scheme or framework is very relevant and important to Quine too and 'stepping outside' the use of a linguistic framework to answer 'What there is' is to be rejected. Both agree upon the pragmatic or practical considerations of choosing a language among other available languages, which would be effected by its economy, simplicity etc. But Quine rejects the idea of a sharp distinction between science and ontology because both require the use of some language or other and what holds true for one holds equally for other. According to him,

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[17] Carnap, 'Empiricism, Semantics, and Ontology," in *New Readings in Analytic Philosophy*, p. 586.

any enquiry must make use of some language, hence, whatever be the result, it is relative to the resources of that language. The question of cognitive status and related constraints or conditions that crop up in ontolgoical enquiry are equally applicable to all branches of enquiry. Therefore, Quine affirms, all enquiries depend upon one or other linguistic framework and its resources. The constraints or possible limitations on the determination of ontology of a theory or discourse, and the possible revisions or modifications of ontology are all the consequence of the relative nature of the enquiry. The division of science and ontolgoy gets blurred. In fact Quine stands for a different sort of distinction in which ontology is concerned with broad categories of expression whereas science is pre-occupied with expressions of a sub-class. Totally independent and absolute enquiry of any sort is out of question. One's ontology comprises objects posited or approximated within the linguistic framework.

6. 'WHAT THERE IS' AND THE ESSENCE OF LOGICAL GRAMMAR

It is clear from the above discussion that ideal language philosopher's attempts were to arrive at the structure of the world of experience through the logical analysis of language. This presupposes that language has a definite structural pattern. This logical structure of language is construed as identical with the structure of the world. Therefore, logical grammar discerned in the analysis of language represents the structure of the world, or, rather, what we experience about the world are those things and events given in or represented in the

logic of language. Language is thus the only medium in which we conceive the world. Consequently logical grammar of the language represents the essence of our world of experience. It presupposes one-to-one representational relation between the structure of language and that of reality.

Whereas, the ordinary language philosophes could not find much meaning in constructing logical notations; they were interested in studying the functioning of ordinary language vis-a-vis the world of experience. They thought that our experience of the world gets crystalized into different linguistic expression. These linguistic expressions represent the content of our experience of the world. But they too agree that our language has a logical grammar. Irrespective of the question regarding conventionality of logical grammar, this stays at the rock bottom of the 'social practice' i.e,. language. Hence, in our language the world of experience manifests, and organization of those experience into language is done by logical grammar. Thus, organization of our experience into language by making use of logical grammar ultimately amounts to that, our world as we experience it, is the one fashioned by the language and its logical grammar.

Chapter IV

THE SEMANTICAL STRUCTURES: TRUTH, MEANING AND THE WORLD

This chapter explores the semantic structures of language in order to explain how the structures of truth and meaning reveal the strucutre of the world. Both the truth-conditional semantics and the non-truth conditional ones do underline the fact that the understanding of meaning and truth is an understanding of the world as well.

1. MEANING AND TRUTH

Major approaches to the question of meaning in the contemporary scene are divided over the truth-conditional theory of meaning and its realist metaphysics on the one hand, and an antirealist alternative to that on the other. Whether meaning can be accounted for in terms of truth-conditions, where truth is understood in an objective realist sense, or in an alternative conception, based on 'verifications,' is required to serve as the key concept in the theory of meaning.

Philosophers, starting from Frege, Wittgenstein, Carnap,

Quine, Davidson and others believed that the meaning of a sentence can be given by stating the conditions under which it is true.

Frege asserted that names have both references and senses. And likewise, sentences, as complex names, have as their references either the True or the False. The thought or sense of a sentence is determined by the conditions under which the sentence designates the True.

In the *Tractatus* Wittgenstein also gave expression to the more or less same idea--'To know the meaning of a sentence is to know what is the case if it is true'[1]--, and, in the same vein Carnap later articulated that 'to know the meaning of a sentence is to know in which of the possible cases it would be true and in which not.'[2]

This basic idea finds a prominent place in Davidson's formulation of theories regarding language and truth-conditional theory of meaning. Davidson believes that by the investigation of language one thereby investigates the world. He says, 'in making manifest large features of our language, we make manifest the large features of the world.'[3] Therefore, according to him, 'what we must attend to in language, if we want to bring into relief general features of the world, is what is in general for a sentence in the language to be true.'[4]

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[1] *Tractatus Logico-Philosophicus*, 4.024.

[2] Carnap, *Meaning and Necessity*, Chicago, 1956, p.10.

[3] Davidson, D. "The Method of Truth in Metaphysics" in *Inquiries into Truth and Interpretation*, Clarendon Press, Oxford, 1984, p.199.

[4] Ibid., p.201.

Davidson draws inspiration from the works of Frege, Quine and Tarski. Frege did not formulate any general truth theory for natural language, rather he thought that natural language is defective and recalcitrant. In spite of this, Frege thought that his account could be applied to the natural language. Frege gave expression to the ideas of how the truth of a sentence is determined by the semantic constituents of the sentence, and to the construction of an improved language for which he derived a notation. Because of the artificiality of certain ideas, like treating sentence as name, and the pessimism inherent in his view about natural language, Frege's work cannot be applied, Davidson thought, directly to the investigations of meaning of natural language.

Quine has a holistic approach to the problems of language understanding. This holism furnishes the much needed empirical foundations of the theory. Unlike Quine, Davidson wants to draw metaphysical conclusions from a theory of truth and, consequently, an holistic approach to the language and truth would be handy. "If metaphysical conclusions are to be drawn from theory of truth in what I propose, the approach to the language must be holistic."[5]

As a matter of fact, Quine does not see much in holistic approach to language so that we will be able to draw some metaphysical conclusions. Rather it is Davidson's convenience taking this approach to language, since it goes very well with his assumption that investigating language amounts to investigating the world. Quine has it that he developed his

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[5] "The Method of Truth in Metaphysics," p.203.

logic and much of his metaphysics is attached to his logic? Anyway what we are looking at is the realist conception of truth and its metaphysics, in which Davidson's perspective occupies an important position and how other philosophical thinking of more or less the same stream contributes to the overall realist perspective.

As far as truth is concerned, Davidson draws much, to construct his own theory of truth, from Tarski's work on truth. The Tarskian theory consists in an enumeration of semantic properties of the items in a finite vocabulary, together with a recursive characterisation of the infinity of sentences which can be generated from that vocabulary. This characterisation turns on the subtle and powerful concept of satisfaction which relates both sentences and non-sentential expressions to objects in the world. But Tarski did not foresee much application of his theory for natural language. Contrary to this, Davidson's purpose of using Tarski's truth-theory is that, he thinks, it allows the truth-theory for a language to do what is centrally required, viz., to reveal and articulate structures in the language, which are just what is required to draw results on meaning and metaphysics.

2. THE SEMANTIC THEORY OF TRUTH

Tarski's semantic theory of truth made such a wide impact in contemporary analytic philosophy, especially on the proponents of truth-conditional theory of meanig who drew heavily from it. Though Tarski did not find much relevance of his theory in formulating semantics for a natural language, it

has it that a truth-conditional semantics could be developed to account for the natural language. His aim was minimal, i.e., to find a satisfactory definition of truth. He set mainly two criteria for a satisfactory definition, i.e., it should be 'materially adequate and formally correct'.[6] His attempted definition of truth has a 'precise expression' of the intuition intrinsic to the Aristotelian conception of truth.

Tarski's proposal of a definition of truth took shape from a solution advanced to solve a form of the Liar paradox. The crux of the solution proceeds from a distinction between what is said in a sentence of a language and what is said about this sentence in a 'metalanguage'. The metalanguage sentence is of higher order than the other which it takes as its object language. The paradox arises, Tarski argues, from the self-reference of the sentence, and the sentence belongs to a 'semantically closed' language, i.e., a language containing not only its expected stock of expressions, but the names of these expressions, and semantic terms like 'true' applicable to its sentences. Above all there is a tacit assumption that all sentences which determine the use of 'true' can be asserted in that language.[7] Therefore, inorder to avoid self reference Tarski drew the distinction between object language and metalanguage, and held that ascription of truth or falsity to sentences are metalinguistic. Truth in this way is construed as a predicate of metalanguage applicable to sentences of its object language.

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[6] Tarski, "The Semantic Conception of Truth" in Feigl, A. and Sellars, W. in *New Readings in Philosophical Analysis*, Appleton-Century-Crofts, 1972, p.52.

[7] Ibid., p.59.

Tarski's purpose was to provide a definition of the expression 'true sentence' for a given language in the metalanguage M of L such that it will entail all sentences of M of the form 'S is a true sentence of L if and only if P'; where 'S' is the name or structural description of a sentence in L and 'P' is the translation of that sentence into M.[8] Since M may include L as part of itself, such sentences of L are their own translations into M. The requirement that the definition entails sentences of this form constitutes a criterion of material adequacy for any satisfactory definition of truth, and it is called 'convention (T)'.

Convention (T), being a criterion for material adequacy, has it that an acceptable definition of truth should have as consequence all instances of the schema--

(T) S is true in L if and only if P.

Tarski's example of the schema is: 'snow is white' is true (in English) if snow is white. 'Snow is white' on the left-hand-side is the name of the sentence on the right-hand-side. Convention (T) is not a defnition of truth, but a materially adequate criterion such that all its instances must be entailed by any definition of truth which is materially adequate.

A proper definition of truth needs something more along with the material adequacy conditions--proof of formal correctness in respect of both the structure of the language in which truth is defined and the concept employed in the definition. Definitions of truth are given in an L's metalanguage M, and this is why is included in or translated

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[8] "The Semantic Conception of Truth," p.60.

into M. Because all equivalences of the form (T) must be implied by a definition of truth owing to the adequacy condition; not only must M contain L or translations into itself of all L sentences, but also the equipments to refer to L-sentences. Added to it, Tarski required that metalanguage sentence and object-language sentence should be 'formally specifiable'; we must be able to specify the well formed formulae of L in order to define truth in L, since these are the items which predicate 'true-in L' qualifies. Tarski ruled out the possibility of truth definition for natural language because none of them is formally specifiable.

'Concept of Satisfaction' plays an important part in the actual definition of truth. This is a relation between objects and expressions called sentential functions. These expressions are sentential functions rather than sentences because they contain free variables making gaps into which suitable expressions or terms have to be substituted so that we will get proper sentences. The notion of 'recursive procedure' is involved in the definition of sentential function. Thus, a sentence can be defined as a sentential function which does not contain any free variables. The concept of satisfaction can be explained, say, that a given object satisfies a given function if the function can be turned into a sentence by replacing the free variable occuring in it by the name of the given object.

For example, the actual stuff 'snow' satisfies the sentential function 'X in white' because 'snow is white' is true. But here we use 'true' in defining the satisfaction. Since our aim is to define 'true' another account should be given of

satisfaction which does not involve 'true'. This can be done, Tarski says, recursively by first indicating which objects satisfy the simplest sentential functions, and then by stating under what conditions given objects satisfy compound functions constructed out of these simple functions. The notion of satisfaction thus defined automatically takes care of sentential functions without any free variable, i.e., sentences. In the ultimate consideration, Tarski says, only two possible cases are there for a sentence, either it should satisfy by all objects or by no objects. In the first case sentence is true and in the second it is false.

3. DAVIDSON'S REALIST APPROACH TO TRUTH AND MEANING

An adequate theory of meaning, according to Davidson, must be able to satisfy some conditions and once these conditions are laid down, a theory of truth is the result which inturn satisfies all requirements for a theory of meaning. Davidson insists that an adequate theory of meaning should make it clear how the meanings of sentences in a language depend upon the meanings of their constituent words. Learning of language presupposes that sentence meaning is the function of word-meaning. A speaker or a language user has a capacity to construct and comprehend infinite number of sentences which have never been encountered before. Therefore, a theory should be able to explain how user of a specific language L is in a position to produce infinite number of sentences by making use of finite stock of words, and the rules governing their combination to produce sentences.

Hence, an adequate theory of meaning must satisfy the conditions: (a) it must enable us to give the meaning for each sentence of natural language L we are studying[9], (b) it must show how the sentences are semantically compounded from the finite stock of words by means of L's rules for combining those words[10], (c) it must show that the demonstration of how sentences of L mean is based on the same stock of concepts as L's sentences themselves,[11] and (d) it must be empirically testable.[12]

According to the form Davidson puts, an adequate theory of meaning would like to be

(1) S means M

where 'S' is a description of some sentence which specifies its structure, and 'M' is an expression which denotes that sentence's meaning. But appeal to the notion of sentence's meaning is ambiguous in nature and, hence, unhelpful. Therefore, a reformulated theory (1) would be

(2) S means that P

where 'P' is the sentence described by 'S'. But 'means that' is obviously no less problematic and, hence, another reformulation is needed. The idea in the second formulation is that 'P' is a sentence which means the same as the sentence described by 'S', but since the appeal to meaning is obscure, a more perspicuous

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[9] Davidson, "Truth and Meaning" in *Inquiries into Truth and Interpretation*, p.17.

[10] "On Saying that", *Inquiries into Truth and Interpretation*, p.93.

[11] "Semantics for Natural Language," *Inquiries into Truth and Interpretation*, p.55.

[12] "Truth and Meaning," p.24.

surrogate needs to be found. Davidson sees that an arbitrary predicate T can be a replacement to 'means that' to the effect that 'is T iff' does much better job than 'means that'.

If 'S' is a structure specific description and 'P' is the sentence itself, the reformulated theory involving the predicate T is

(3) S is T iff P

This formulation is a Tarskian style of formulation and what satisfies the arbitrary predicate T is the materially adequate truth predicate. This outcome is so positive to a theory of meaning which Davidson envisages because, for him, what a theory of meaning should provide is just a definition for such a truth predicate. This boils down to the fact that the meaning of a sentence is to be given by stating its truth-conditions.

Davidson's truth-theoretical approach resembles very much with Tarski's semantic theory of truth. In spite of this, Davidson is interested only in a species of truth theory which entails a statement of conditions under which every sentence of language is true. Thus Davidson's demand is for a truth theory which entails infinite number of biconditional statements of the form

(4) S is true iff P.

In this formulation the arbitrary predicate 'T' has vanished in favour of 'true' and, hence, we get an explicit formulation of the truth-conditions.

It seems that Davidson's proposal that 'is true iff' is an alternative meaning of 'means that', But in reality it exceeds

more than that. There are lots of difficulties involved in considering that 'is true iff' and 'means that' are not synonymous. Moreover, 'is true iff' is contextually truth-functional, but that is not the case with 'means that'.

Davidson's whole endeavour is to give a more tractable theory of meaning via a theory of truth as against the conventional theories. Hence, the demand that 'means that' is synonymous with 'is true iff'. What Davidson really wants is the elimination of 'means that' altogether and to treat the question extentionally so that we would have a tractable theory of truth rather than an obscure theory of meaning. Therefore, the question of meaning could be settled, according to him, via the consideration of truth and truth-condition under which a sentence is true.

Davidson's this idea of treating the theory of meaning has its background in Quine's separation of semantic notion into two, i.e., theory of reference and theory of meaning. Accordingly, theory of referene basically entails the considerations involving notions like 'designates', 'satisfy' and 'is true'; where as the second involves the notions of synonymy and analyticity. In other words, semantics has got two parts, i.e., extensional theories and intensional theories. Quine believed and proceeded in such a way that extensional theories are philosophically more promising.

Now let us see how Davidson makes use of these ideas of Quine in developing his theory. He writes:

> The theory will have done its work if it provides, for every sentence 'S' in the language under study, a matching sentence

> (to replace 'P') that, in some way yet to be made clear, gives the meaning of 'S'. One obvious candidate for the matching sentence is just 'S' itself, if the object language is contained in the meta language: otherwise a translation of 'S' in the metalanguage. As a final bold step, let us try treating the position occupied by 'P' extensionally; to implement this to sweep away the obscure 'means that', provide the sentence that replaces P with a proper sentential connective and supply the description that replaces 'S' with its own predicate. The plausible result is (T) S is T iff P.[13]

It is crucial to Davidson's programme of developing a theory of meaning that it treats the position occupied by 'P' extensionally. Accordingly he thinks that leaving 'means' and looking at truth as a solution to semantical problems are handy in solving a number of issues hitherto related to the talk of meaning. This goes in accordance with Quine's perception of the matter. Also it is a bold attempt in solving a number of semantic concepts which Quine considered obscure and problematic.

Davidson envisages that the formulated theory which has 'is T' as truth predicate, and a theory of meaning should place constraints on the predicate 'is T' such that the theory will entail all (T)-sentences. (T)-sentences are biconditionals in which 'S' is a standard structural description of 'P'. Davidson's this formulation of a theory of meaning is precisely in accordance with Tarski's proposed criterion of adequacy for any formal truth definition. The predicate 'is T' and the truth predicate are co-extensive. All true sentences will be entailed

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[13] Davidson, Truth and Meaning, p.23.

by the application of 'is T'.

Accordingly, a theory of meaning must demonstrate how the truth conditions for sentences are determined by the semantical features of the constituents of those sentences together with the semantic significance of their structure. Davidson demonstrates it by arguing that we have to sweep away intentionality in total and have to make the whole context extensional. Therefore, a theory of meaning should provide pairings between sentences of the object language with sentenes of meta-language. As argued by Davidson, once we sweep away intensionality and treat the whole affair extensionally, it amounts to that we adopt truth-functionality, obviously, in the biconditional form since the aim is to arrive at equivalence of meaning between S and P.

4. SOME DIFFICULTIES INVOLVED IN DAVIDSON'S PROPOSAL

Davidson envisages a theory of meaning in which the truth-conditions determine the semantic structure of the sentences for language. Here, as we have seen, one side of the biconditional stands for the sentene 'S' of which the meaning should be given by metalanguage sentence 'P'. This idea invariably relates to the notion of translation or interpretation which Tarski successfully employed in defining the truth predicate. In Tarski's construal it is a condition on 'S is true iff p' that 'P' be a translation of 'S'.

Davidson tried to employ this notion of translation or interpretation so that his theory of meaning, fashioned in Tarski's truth definition, would be applicable to the whole

spectrum of natural languages. Accordingly, we have to interpret that a sentence 'P' of metalanguage has the meaning possessed by the sentence uttered by someone and described by 'S'. This interpretation that depends upon Tarskian condition is met by some such sentence as 'Snow is white is true iff snow is white'. The idea, according to Davidson, is that one discovers the meaning of a speaker's utterance by invoking a notion of what the speaker holds true; meaning is discovered by holding the speaker's belief constant.

Davidson's this idea of employing interpretation to construct a theory of meaning goes awry because though it is true that his notion holds well with Tarski's attempt in defining truth predicate, it cannot be used in constructing a theory of meaning. Davidson's formulation gives the idea that translation or interpretation is part and parcel of a theory of meaning. While the perceived aim of a theory of meaning is to find way how an object language sentence is true and acquires its meaning, the interpretation or translation is supposed to be the consequence of such a theory, not an integral part of it. Therefore it appears to be a mistake that Tarski's truth predicate does the work we require of a theory of meaning.

Tarski was very much sceptical about the application of his formal truth theory to natural languages. He felt that semantic closedness, which leads into paradoxes, and the amorphous state of natural language are the main hindrances in grafting his truth definition onto natural language. But Davidson claims that this can be done with his modified versions of truth theory and, as generally perceived, his theory does not aim to reform the

natural language but to describe it. The application of his theory made progress, he claims, in solving, for example, the problem of indexicality. Any way, all these claims depend on settling the basic questions whether truth could be considered central to a theory of meaning.

5. IS TRUTH CENTRAL TO A THEORY OF MEANAING?

The whole project, for Davidson, of constructing a theory of meaning depends upon the notion of truth. His formulation, as we have seen, is a modified version of Tarski's truth definition in order to suit the natural language. In making truth a central concept in formulating a theory of meaning we acquire, according to him, a theory which is empirically testable.

This truth-conditions approach has it that any selected sentence is true given what the theory avers to be truth-conditions really are. A typical case might involve deciding whether the sentence "Snow is white" is true if and only if "snow is white". Here what essentially is involved in the decision procedure is the ability to recognise as true the T-sentences entailed by the theory. For the simplest cases it is no harder to test the 'empirical adequacy' of the theory "than it is for a competent speaker of English to decide whether sentences like "snow is white" is true if and only if snow is white" are true"[14] And this procedure is simple and straightforward as the homophonic cases concerned and ultimately the ability to recognize rests on speakers "linguistic

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[14] Davidson, "Semantics for Natural Languages," in *Inquiries into Truth and Interpretation*, p.62.

intuitions'. In homophonic cases the testing of theory involves determining whether object-language and metalanguage of the either side of the biconditional has the same truth value. But when it comes to the cases in which object and metalanguage differ, Davidson takes the help of the method of radical translation. He writes:

> We will notice under which conditions the alien speaker assents to or dissents from, a variety of his sentences. The relevant conditions will be what we take to be the truth-conditions of his sentences. We will have to assume that in simple or obvious cases most of his assents are true, and his dissents from false, sentences--an inevitable assumption since the alternative is unintelligible.[15]

It seems that an empirically testable theory is well grounded on the appeal to assent and dissent pattern, and there is a strong relation between the truth and the notion of assent and dissent. This could not be argued as the ground for forging link between truth and a theory of meaning.

This claim of Davidson's is acceptable only if he had fashioned his theory fully in accordance with the Tarskian definition. Tarski's formulations shows how truth-conditions of sentences depend upon their parts, and this entails not only the sentence is true but also that every sentence of given form is true. This means to say that Tarski's theory entails generalisation based on the sentence structure, and therefore, entitles to be plausible candidate for a theory of logical form. Of course, Davidson maintained that a theory of truth should

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[15] "Semantics for Natural Languages," p.62.

give an account of logical truth, equivalence, entailment for the object language. Davidson holds that the theory should entail not only the given sentences are true but also under any significant change in their logical parts, they remain true. He states, "It is hard to imagine how a theory of meaning could fail to read a logic into its object language to this degree; and to the extent that it does, our intuitions of logical form, equivalence, and entailment may be called upon in constructing and testing the theory."[16] Therefore, the testability of the theory goes with this; it has been said that at the bottom the testability is nothing but its dependence upon speaker's assent to or dissent from the sentence uttered. This is to say that speaker's intuitions become the sole test for the theory.

Other compelling reason for thinking that the Tarskian truth-definition will do the required trick in constructing a theory of meaning is that the Tarskian theory shows with precision how the truth-conditions of sentences are determined by the truth-conditions of their constituent items. Hence, the talk of truth gets substituted by the talk of meaning. Therefore, meaning of sentences should somehow be explained as the function of the meanings of their constituents. Considerable success can be achieved by doing this, since the Tarskian devices equip us to deal with potentially infinite number of sentences in the language.

6. DUMMETT'S CRITICISM OF THE TRUTH-CONDITIONS THEORY OF MEANING

Dummett says any theory which has it that the meaning of

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[16] Davidson, "Truth and Meaning", p.33.

sentences is to be specified in terms of truth-conditions is equivalent to realism concerning the subject of that class of sentences. Realism, he says, is the thesis that the world is determinately constituted, that is, has its character independently of any knowledge or experience of it, so that sentences about the world are either determinately true or false in virtue of the way things are in the world, whether or not we can come to know those sentences to be true or false. On a realist thesis, truth conditions of sentences in a given class of sentences may transcend our capacity to recognize whether or not they obtain. Consequently, realism with respect to a class of sentences may be characterised that, irrespective of what the truth-values of these sentences have, the principle of bivalence holds for that class. This principle states that every sentence in a given class of sentences determinately possesses either one or other of the truth-values, i.e., 'true' and 'false'.

This transcendent notion of truth, as realists conceive, could not do well in our attempt in constructing a theory of meaning for a language. Why because our capacity to recognize truth or falsity is limited and so much of the sentences in our language are beyond our recognisational capacity, therefore will have to be left unaccounted. This is not acceptable. Moreover, the transcendent notion of truth will not do, Dummett argues, because our demand is that a theory of meaning should tell us what speakers of a language know when they understand their language. Again, if truth-conditions determine the sense of the sentences then the theory should be able to tell how that knowledge of truth-condition equip the speaker to know every

aspects of the use of sentences. Dummett says that the realist thesis of truth-condition fails to account for the connection between the knowledge and its use.

The anti-realist demands that a theory of meaning must tell us what speakes of a language know in knowing what sentences of that language mean and also must show how that language enable the speaker to use. In short, the question is, how are truth-conditions, if truth is taken as the basic concept of a theory of meaning, related to the actual language use. This demand is all the more important to any theory of meaning since an acceptable theory of meaning has to meet mainly two requirements; that the theory must tell us what counts as a speaker's manifestation of his knowledge of the meaning of sentences, and what its speakers know in knowing their language must not only be publicly observable but also acquirable in the public context. Because language is considered to be a tool of communication, sense must be public. Dummett's objection to a realist theory of meaning based on the truth-conditions becomes more discernible here, since the notion of transcendence of truth does not conform to this basic demand for any acceptable theory of meaning.

If knowledge of truth-condition is held to consist in an ability to know when a given sentence is true or false, i.e., to recognise whether or not the sentences' truth condition obtain, then the connection between knowledge and use is unproblematic, for we have a practical capacity connecting the condition of sense for sentences and the use to which those sentences can be put. Because being able to recognize whether or not truth-

conditions obtain constitutes a practical mastery of a procedure for settling what truth-value a sentence has, understanding a sentence comes down to having this recognisional capacity. This grasp of the sense of sentence determines and is determined by the uses to which the sentences can be put. Hence connection between knowledge and use is manifest. However, if truth-value is construed as a recognition--transcendent property of sentences, as realists do, then what account is to be given of what it is to know the truth-conditions of sentences whose truth values we are not able to establish? It is impossible to associate grasp of transcendent truth-condition with the possession of an ability to recognise what their truth-values are, precisely because their truth-conditions are transcendent. For such sentences, then, we have no way of saying how knowledge of truth-condition can be manifested. If we cannot say this, then the theory does not show how sense and use connect--how sense and use determine each other. Therefore, Dummett concludes, any theory of meaning based on the transcendent concept is useless.

This does not mean that the notion of truth is totally irrelevant. Truth is to be thought, Dummett says, of as a product of the verification procedure we employ in exercising our capacity to establish truth-value.

7. TRUTH-CONDITION AND USE

Philosophical questions about meaning, Dummett holds, are best interpreted as questions about understanding: a dictum about what the meaning of an expression consists in must be

construed as a thesis about what is to know its meaning.[17] Accordingly, if truth is taken to be the key concept, then a truth-condition theory is to be construed as one which states that to know the meaning of a sentence is to know the condition for it to be true. But what is to know the truth condition of a sentence?

Whatever is knowing the truth-conditions of a sentence, it has to depend upon an understanding of the words constituting the sentence and the significance of their arrangement. Problem, therefore is: what is it that a speaker knows when he knows a language, and what, in particular, does he thereby know about any given sentence of the language? Answer to this will constitute a theoretical representation of a practical ability, viz., the ability to speak the language. That theoretical representation will consist in a set of deductively connected propositions, and will be an explicit setting-out of the speaker's linguistic knowledge. Of course, the speaker will not himself have explicit knowledge of these propositions, but it is enough to attribute implicit knowledge of these propositions to anyone who has mastery of a given practice. Therefore the theory of meaning must specify not merely what is it that the speaker must know, but what counts as a manifestation of that knowledge, for if the theory does not do this, it would fail to be an account of the practical ability it is supposed to be a theory of.

According to Dummett, any theory of meaning, which takes

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[17] Dummett, 'What is a Theory of Meaning? (11)' in *Essays in Semantics*, ed. by Evans G. and McDowell, J. Clarendon Press, Oxford, 1975.

the notion of truth as basic, consists of (a) a theory of reference couched within a theory of sense and (b) a theory of force giving us an account of different linguistic acts which can be performed by utterances of the language's sentences. Part (a) which Dummett calls 'theory of reference' will be a theory of truth consisting of inductive specification of the truth-conditions for sentences of the language. While some of the theorms of the theory of reference or truth state the truth-conditions of sentences, its axioms will assign reference to those individual words. The surrounding theory of sense specifies what a speaker knows in knowing the theory of reference, by correlating the speaker's practical linguistic abilities to certain propositions of the theory. This characterisation of a theory of meaning shows that knowledge of truth-conditions is not alone that a speaker has to know; but it is also that a speaker has to know specifically, in connection with any given sentence, because the rest of what he has to know is general in nature, viz., a set of general principles which enables him to derive any aspect of a sentence's use from its truth-conditions. This is how things stand with any theory of meaning which postulates that there is a single feature of a sentence, its truth-condition, such that awareness of it amounts to a grasp of the sentence's meaning.

At this point Dummett raises the important question 'Whether the concept of truth is the right choice for the central notion of a theory of meaning... or whether we need to employ some other notion in this role.'[18] In his view, as long as

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[18] "What is a Theory of Meaning?" p.76.

the notion of truth is taken for granted it serves as the right notion for a theory of meaning but all problems will crop up when we cease to take truth for granted and when we subject it for investigation, the intuitive sense of its aptness vanishes.[19]

When does the notion of truth enter in the process of mastering a language, or what sort of analysis should be given to the notion of truth? The argument that we can stipulatively introduce, while mastering a language, the notion of truth does not hold why because that assumption presupposes possession of a large fragment of the language already. The notion forwarded by Davidson and other realists states that language learning consists in the learning what it is to a sentence of the language to be true. This is to say that we must be able to state what it is to know that a sentence is true without having any prior knowledge of the sentence. If we depend on the prior understanding to know what it is to sentence of the language to be true, then the theory, we have to say, would be a circular one.[20] In the ordinary way of mastering a language we depend on other words to explain the meaning of a sentence. This verbal method of giving meaning of a sentence by stating under what conditions the sentence is true is apt to describe the state only after we acquired a particular level of language learning. But this will not do its job when it comes to the lower or primitive level of language learning. Since a theory of meaning should take into account the basic or primitive language acquisition, a theory based on the idea that meaning of a

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[19] "What is a Theory of Meaning?", p.78.

[20] Ibid., p.78.

sentence can be given by specifying its meaning in other words, would be circular.

It does not mean that the language learning consists in the specification of meaning of sentences by only verbal methods. In contrast a large chunk of language we learn by specifying the truth-conditions under which sentences are true. The truth-conditions of sentences are satisfied by stating what constitutes the speaker's recognition capacity of the fact. But there are 'decidables,' accoding to Dummett, where what constitutes the speaker's recogniton capacity could be decided both in practice and principle. The difficulty at issue is that "natural language is full of sentences which are not effectively decidable, ones for which there exists no effective procedure for determining whether or not their truth conditions are fulfilled."[21] The point Dummett raises is not whether we might discover some effective procedure for such undecidable, but rather that 'we cannot equate a capacity to recognise the satisfaction or non-satisfaction of the conditions for the sentence to be true with a knowledge of what condition is' because, "by hypothesis, either the condition is one which may obtain in some cases in which we are capable of recognizing the fact, or it is one which may fail to obtain in some cases in which we are incapable of recognizing that fact, or both: hence a knowledge of what it is for that condition to hold or not hold, while it may demand an ability to recognize one or the other state of affairs whenever we are in a position to do so, cannot be exhaustively explained in terms of that ability. In

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[21] "What is a Theory of Meaning?", p.81.

fact, whenever the conditions for truth of a sentence is one that we have no way of bringing ourselves to recognize as obtaining whenever it obtains, it seems plain that there is no content to an ascription of implicit knowledge of what that condition is, since there is no practical ability by means of which such knowledge may be manifested."[22]

According to Dummett the theory of sense, which is the 'shell' and the theory of truth, which at the 'core', are the two components of a theory of meaning; and any theory has to satisfactorily explain how these two relate to each other in the language learning process. What a speaker learns, in learning a language, is a practice. Acknowledgement of whether a sentence is true or false is part of that practice and what the speaker knows should manifest in the practice. 'But knowing the conditions which has to obtain for a sentence to be true is not anything which speaker does, nor something of which anything that he does is the direct manifestation.'[23] Though in some cases we are able to ascribe knowledge of truth-conditions to speaker in some other cases we cannot and consequently fail to attain a genuinely explanatory account of speaker's mastery of language.[24] This is the crucial point at which, according to Dummett, the transcendent notion of truth, hence realism, fails.

8. DUMMETT'S ANTI-REALIST ALTERNATIVE

All difficulties, in constructing a theory of meaning, have

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[22] "What is a Theory of Meaning?" pp. 81-82.

[23] Ibid., pp.82-83.

[24] Ibid., p.82.

to be ascribed, according to Dummett, to the realistic interpretation of sentences in our language. In a realistic fashion we assume that all statements, made by use of those sentences, are determinately either true or false, independently of whether we can know them to be so. Dummett thinks that this assumption of bivalence, with respect to the statements, is true so far as we take into account only 'decidable' statements. That is not so when we apply this notion of bivalence to 'undecidable' statements, and, therefore, we find ourselves 'unable to equate an ability to recognise when a statement has been established as true or false with a knowledge of its truth-conditions.'[25] There are cases in which speaker's knowledge of a sentence's truth conditions can be represented as explicit knowledge. But if that is not the case, we do not know how to explain what constitutes speaker's implicit knowledge of a sentence's truth-condition because mere actual usage of that sentence alone does not exhaustively explain what that knowledge is.

The solution Dummett proposes is to abandon the bivalent theory of truth and proposes to construct an alternative semantics for those sentences which is not based on the truth-conditions. If we do not do this we are bound to attribute to ourselves a grasp of concept of truth which transcends any knowledge we might manifest in our actual use of language.

Dummett sees a prototype of such a theory of meaning, which does not take the notion of objectively determined truth as its central concept, in intuitionist account of meaning of

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[25] "What is a Theory of Meaning?", p.101.

mathematical statements. He envisages the possibility of adopting the basic idea of intuitionist account of meaning of mathematical statements into the realm of semantics for the natural language. The crux of the intuitionist account is that an understanding of mathematical statements does not rest on our having to know, what has to be the case for those statements to be true. Rather, it rest on having an ability to recognise, with respect to any mathematical constructin, whether or not it constitutes proof of a given statement. Hence, what we look for in an assertion of mathematical statements is not whether it is true or not, but whether there is proof of a given statement of it or we can devise a proof of it. At the same time, understanding of a mathematical expression consists in knowing how it contributes to determining what counts as a proof of any statments. In other words, the grasp of any mathematical statements is fully manifestable in a mastery of the use of mathematical language; hence, grasp and use are directly connected or related.

Understanding a statement does not consist in being able to find a proof, but in recognising a proof, and the negation of statement is not in finding but in the recognition of a proof of the negation. Intelligibility of statements does not guarantee a decision procedure.

Dummett's project is one of developing a generalisation of intuitionist account of meaning of mathematical statements to the non-mathematical cases, i.e., our language with some changes in idioms. Verification replaces the proof in the new formulation. Therefore, an intuitionist theory, "genearlises

readily to the non-mathematical case. Proof is the sole means which exists in mathematics for establishig a statement as true: the required general notion is, therefore, that of a verification. On this account, our understanding of a statement consists in a capacity to recognise whatever is counted as verifying it, i.e., as conclusively establishing it as true. It is not necessary that we should have any means of deciding the truth or falsity of statements, only that we be capable of recognizing when its truth has been established."[26] What is the advantage of this formulation over the truth-condition theory if meaning and its realist interpretation of sentences as either true or false? Dummett argues:

> The advantage of this conception is that the conditions for a statement's being verified, unlike the condition for its truth under the assumption of bivalence, is one which we must be credited with the capacity for effectively recognizing when it obtains; hence there is no difficulty in stating what an implicit knowledge of such a condition consists in--once again, it is directly displayed by our linguistic practice.[27]

If we take this theory of meaning as an alternative, then we must take into account the 'interlocking or articulated character' of language as emphasised by Quine.[28] Dummett places his verificationist theory of meaning in contrast to the holistic picture of language presented by Quine. He, like Quine, offers an essentially verificationist account of language

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[26] "What is a Theory of Meaning?" pp.110-111.

[27] Ibid., p.111.

[28] Ibid., p.111.

without committing the logical positivist error of supporting that the verification of every sentence could be represented as the mere occurrence of a sequence of sense-experience.[29] This idea is relevant to only a restricted class of statements, which are, in Quine's picture, situated in the periphery. But method of verification with respect to non-peripheral sentences is different, for any non-peripheral sentence, our grasp of its meaning will take the form, not of a capacity to recognize which have sense-experiences to verify or falsify it, but of an apprehension of its inferential connection with other sentences linked to it in the articulated structure formed by the sentences of the language.[30]

There are problems related to the verificationist theory of meaning. This theory is conceived on the intuitionistic meaning of mathematical statements model, and therefore, differences between mathematics and language should be remarked. Understanding a mathematical statement does not involve both an ability to recognize a proof of it and ability to recognise a refutation of it, since there is available, within the theory, a uniform way of explaining negation. But when we apply this model onto the language we should have provision or means to recognize both verification and falsification. Nevertheless, Dummett says, "all will remain within the spirit of verificationist theory of meaning, so long as the meaning of each sentence is given by specifying what is it to be taken as conclusively establishing a statement made by means of it, and

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[29] "What is a Theory of Meaning?", p.111.

[30] Ibid., p.111.

what as conclusively falsifying such statements, and so long as this is done systematically in terms of conditions which speaker is capable of recognizing.[31]

Dummett's this anti-realist account of a theory of meaning does not obliterate the notion of truth altogether. In fact he admits that concept of truth has its role in a verificationist theory of meaning. The notion of truth has its place that we require it to give an account of deductive inferences, which we recognize as valid just in case it is truth-preserving.[32] But it is far from easy to explain exactly what account should be given of the notion of truth in terms of a verificationist theory of meaning. It is clear that, in terms of our capacity to recognize statements as true, rather than truth-condition which transcends our capacities, the notion of truth could be explained within verificationist framework of a theory of meaning.

9. SOME DIFFICULTIES WITH THE ANTI-REALIST THEORY OF MEANING

Main proponents of an anti-realist alternative, like Dummett and Wright, are in agreement with its stringent critics that though a theory of meaning has been forwarded as an alternative to the truth-condition theory, it lacks details and specificities. All the implifications of antirealism have not been derived, so whether it is a global theory or not has not been sufficiently established.

The difficulties involved in a truth-based theory of meaning are of difficulties of principle. Although we know what

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[31] "What is a Theory of Meaning?" p.114.

[32] Ibid., p.115.

the theory looks like, we do not know whether it can be made to work. Anti-realists think that it does not work. Though they agree that much work has to be done to their theory, in which truth is not a central concept, to meet all challenges, Dummett argues that 'on our present exceedingly in perfect comprehension of these matters, reflection should make us admit that a verificationist theory of meaning is a better bet than a thoroughgoing realist one.'[33]

One of the trenchant objections to Dummett's anti-realism was offered by MacGinn who made best out of the occasion provided by Dummemtt himself when he expressed doubts over the possibility of inclusive or global anti-realism. Dummett wrote that "a number of reasons for doubting whether global anti-realism is coherent, for instance, behaviourism is one species of anti realism, namely the rejection of realism concerning mental states and process; phenomenalism is another species, namely the rejection of realism concerning physical objects and processes; it immediately makes us to wonder whether it is possible to consistently maintain an anti-realist position simultaneously in both regards."[34]

MacGinn's attempt is to show the inconsistencies involved, and to assert that a realist stand would be better with respect to both species of anti-realism. Let statements about ineterial objects and statements about mental events be called 'M-statements' and 'P-statements' respectively. According to him, antirealism about M-and P-statements is the view that such

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[33] "What is a Theory of Meaning?" p.137.

[34] Dummett, *Truth and Other Enigmas*, Duckwork, 1978, pp.367-8.

statements possess whatever truth-value they possess 'in virtue of the truth-value of statements drawn from certain other classes of statements not trivially different from the given.'[35] When we apply anti-realist yardstick, then M-statements can be characterised as phenomenalism, and P-statements would be behaviourism. Therefore, we can discern that a reductionist thesis is applied on both M-statements and P-statements. Accordingly M-statements are true or false, when we adopt a reductionist thesis, with respect to the truth-value of statements about experiences (E-statements), and the truth-values of P-statements, likewise, depends upon the truth-values of statements about behaviour (B-statements).

These E-and B-statements are the 'basal statements' according to MacGinn, for M-and P-statements respectively, and therefore are those statements which are 'barely true'.[36] MacGinn proceeds further from here with the argument that phenomenalism and behaviourism cannot be affirmed jointly because they, "offer competing proposals as to what statements comprise the basal truths: Phenomenalism takes E-statements, a sub class of P-statements, as basic, while behaviourism takes B-statements, a sub class of M-statements, as basic. The result is that, where one reductive thesis represents a statement as not itself requiring the application of a reductive operation, the other insists that such a reduction be performed. Since a statement that is basal for one antirealism is derivative for the other,

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[35] MacGinn, "An Apriori Argument for Realism" in *Journal of Philosophy*, vol. LXXVI, No.3, (1979), p.113.

[36] Ibid., p.118.

it is plain that a vicious regress is generated by the conjunction of the two doctrines."[37]

MacGinn rejects the plausibility of antirealism in relation to either statements conjoined with a realist attitude, because of the fundamental 'independence thesis' of realism. Since realism consists in the view that there can be recognition--transcendent facts, it is possible to obtain M-facts without there being any experiences of their obtaining, i.e., it is not necessary for the truth of M-statements that some E-statements should be true. Moreover, since no E-statements entail the truth of M-statement, it cannot be considered as sufficient condition for the truth of M-statements that some corresponding E-statements are true. The same line of argument is possible in the case of B-statements. Hence, the realist thesis that M-facts are not reducible to E-facts and P-facts are not reducible to B-facts gives sufficient reasons to say that anti realism regarding either species conjoined with realism does not work in the expected way.

Antirealist defence of this criticism mainly centred around the fact that in order to be antirealist it is not necessary to hold any variety of reductionism, and, hence, the question regarding apparent vicious regress does not arise. Dummett even goes further by stating that, though often it took the form of reductionism, it is not necessary to adopt a reductionist thesis to uphold one's realistic interpretation of whether a given class of statements should be accepted or not.

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[37] "An Apriori Argument for Realism," pp.118-119.

Chapter V

THE APRIORI (LOGICAL) STRUCTURE OF METAPHYSICS

Both realism and antirealism present competing metaphysics or world-view emanating from the respective characterisation of the nature of meaning and truth. As we have seen, though realism is based on truth-condition semantics the accruing world-views out of it do not have uniformity across the board. It resulted in different species of realism like epistemological realism, semantic realism and metaphysical realism. Epistemological realist claims that specified class of postulated entities really do exist independently of our knowledge of them. In this sense we are almost all realists about prime numbers and bacteria, but not about dragons and tachyons. In their articulation neither any particular conception of truth is involved nor any commitment to what the existence of the supposed entities would have consisted in.

Semantic realism is basically anti-reductionist, anti-verificationist, and anti-instrumentalist in nature. Semantic realist believes that there is a body of facts concerning the structure of the world, and that our endavour is to discover this structure to formulate theories and provide evidence which will justify the belief that those theories provide a true description of that aspect of reality. Therefore, facts are to

be discovered by us and do not depend upon our methodology.

Metaphysical realist goes a little further to claim what it is for such irreducible theoretical claims to be true, specially that the concept of truth involves a primitive non-epistemic idea which Tarski-style disquotation scheme is not entirely able to capture. Hence a cognition-transcendent concept of truth motivates our standards of justification and our verification procedure.

In spite of the fact that different species of realism diverge considerably in their conception of truth and meaning and, consequently, their metaphysics, the core area or tenets of realism as traditionally conceived apply to all species. An independently existing recalcitrant world of which our language tries to describe or represent aptly with its structural features, an outside world or reality which constitutes or characterises our conceptual system, stands out in the realist picture. It affirms the truth that conceptual system, language and the world are invariably related to account for our experience.

Contrary to this, anti-realists have developed, as we have seen, their formulations of the concept of meaning and truth based on the notion of verification. Though anti-realists have articulated fully their semantics, it is yet to be seen properly what metaphysical consequences emerges out of it, or it subscribe itself, as a consequence of the meaning formulation, to any traditional metaphysics.

In this chapter an attempt is being made to derive the afinity character of the metaphysics arising out of the semantic and grammatical considerations.

1. METAPHYSICAL CONSEQUENCES OF ANTI-REALISM

If we accept a concept of sense in terms of verification, McDowell points out, then such conception 'would require a novel, antirealist conception: if truth is not independent of our discovery of it, we must picture the world as our own creation or, at least, as springing up in response to our investigations. So verificationist objections to a truth-condition conceptions of sense would have far-reaching metaphysical impliciations.'[1] Dummett also accept this that conception of sense in terms of verification has serious metaphysical consequences. He writes, 'the whole point of my approach ... has been to show that the theory of meaning underlies metaphysics.'[2] Anti-realism has metaphysical implications as much as the realism has. Are the realist and anti-realist metaphysics competing with each other so as to provide a better perspective to map our world of experience? To see this is to see what metaphysics they offer. Realism put its metaphysics in a straightforward way as we can see this in its picture of the world. Platt's says, 'realism embodies a picture of our language reaching out to, connecting with, the external world in ways, that are (at least) beyond our present practical comprehension. It embodies a picture of an independently existing, somewhat recalcitrant world describable by our language in ways that transcend (at least) our present capacities to determine whether those descriptions are true or

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[1] McDowell, 'Truth-Values, Bivalence, and Verification,' in *Truth and Meaning*, ed. Evans and McDowell, Oxford University Press, Oxford, 1976, p.48.

[2] Dummett, *Truth and Other Enigmas*, p.xi

not. It embodies a picture of our language, and our understanding, grappling with a stubbornly elusive reality. Perhaps, with efforts, we can improve our capacities to understand that world, to know that our characterisations of it are true. If we succeed in doing so, we do not bring that world into being, we merely discover what was there all along. But that reality will always exeed our capacities. We can struggle to achieve approximately true beliefs about that reality, approximately true beliefs about entities and their characteristics which, independently of us, make up that reality. But we have to rest with the approximate belief, and ultimately resign ourselves to (non-complacent) ignorance: for the world, austerely characterised by our language, will always outrun our recognitional capacities.'[3]

In this realist conceptions it seems there is no reasonable way of explaining what someone believes about the world, except credit him with a realist conception of world and language in which the claims that objects existing independently of one's talk or experience assumes cardinal role. This 'independence' is the ground on which language acquires sense it does have. But when we consider carefully the intricate relation between language and the world, and, consequently, the way by which we could possess or establish that relation, then the realist picture falls short and creates a considerable gap in our understanding. Antirealism challenges the realist picture and tries to construct an alternative conception to the effect that no gap is created in our understanding of world and language.

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[3] Platts, *Ways of Meaning*, Routledge & Kegan Paul Ltd., London, 1979, pp.237-8.

2. FROM ANTIREALISM TO RELATIVISM

It is generally perceived that cognitive relativism is the consequence of the antirealist stand with respect to truth and meaning, and cultural relativism, as distinct from cognitive relativism, does not follow from it. To put it the other way, while cognitive relativism is a distant consequence of anti-realism cultural relativism is not.

The cognitive relativism concerns the infrastructure, the level of basic beliefs about the world, such as that there are perception--independent, reidentifiable and individually descriminable objects or events, occupying space and time. What underlies the cultural relativist approach is the presupposition of the existence of an alien culture that is different from ours. Therefore, our ability to recognize another culture, or a historical phase in our own culture, with respect to its differences means that we must have enough in common between our culture and alien culture to allow us that access. This aspect is properly made use of by Davidson to claim that conceptual scheme is a language or set of intertranslatable languages. The conceptual schemes are intertranslatable like the languages in which they are embedded.[4]

To accept Davidson's thinking is suicidal to the proponents of philosophical relativism since it runs contrary to the basic ideas of relativism, and hence, to the very idea of access itself. According to them the appearance of accessibility is misleading, because what we have done is, far from gaining entry

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[4] See Davidson, "On the Very Idea of a Conceptual Scheme," in *Inquiries into Truth and Interpretation*, Clarendon Press, Oxford 1984.

to the alien scheme, merely re-interprets it in a systematic way into the terms of our own scheme and this is the best we can ever hope for because translation is not possible above a certain indeterminate level. By pointing out the impossibility of translation, relativists do not dogmatically assert the empirically false thesis that no language would be rendered into another. Rather they stand for a philosophical thesis that establishing synonymy relations is not possible beyond the level of stimulus-meanings of sentences. This is what Quine tried to establish with extensive articulation of the pattern of a native speaker's assent and dissent to the stimulus. This method directly points to the possibility of assimilating an alien language terms into our own, but with some reservations that we can never be quite sure which of the alternative translations of these terms exhaustively capture its sense, for its stimulus-conditions undermine what precise construction is to be placed upon it. Thus the word 'gavagai' in the native speaker's language might mean 'rabbit' or 'temporal slices of rabbithood' in English language. This ultimately leaves us with the impossibility of the elimination of the indeterminacy involved in the translation[5] and hence the access to the supposed common conceptual scheme.

The idea of a conceptual scheme as a language or set of intertranslatable languages need to be supported by making a distinction between theoretical and observational terms. This distinction that we are in a position to maintain between theoretical and observational terms gives what the thesis of theory-ladenness has to say about meaning and ontology. Denial

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[5] See Quine, *Word and Object*, Chapter 2

of this distinction is the crux of the theis of theory-ladenness. Positivist's debate on whether there can be an observational language or some form of theory-neutral description of experience resulted in the idea that there can be no such thing, precisely because the notion of observationality is itself theoretical, forming part of a theory of reductive analysis. The attempt to find whether there can be a neutral observational language into which different theoretical languages can be transltated for comparison, or certain sets of theoretical statements can be reduced to observational statements is of no avail, since the distinction required to licence such translations rest upon the possibility of there being formal criteria of synonymy by means of which the translation can be effected. Precisely this possibility has been questioned by the antirealists of the present. Quine holds that there can be no such formal criteria of synonymy because any such criteria would be constructible only by reference to our knowledge of what things in the world the terms in question apply to, and therefore, cannot be independent of our theories about the world.[6] In short, the distinction rests upon the concept of synonymy which, in turn, is dependent on the theories, hence appeal to it vitiates the reductive enterprise.

That the meaning of an expression in some natural language can be stated in some other natural language depends on the notion of synonymy. If it is denied then failure of translation amounts to radical relativisim because conceptual scheme is the language.

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[6] Quine, *Word and Object*, Chapter 3. This has been discussed extensively in Chapter 3.

These relativist considerations may appear to be the natural corollary of antirealism, since the antirealists assert that the sense of a term is fixed by its conditions of assertions. Hence, any changes in assertability conditions will have implication on the sense of the terms. Added to this is Quine's argument that we can never have a determinate grasp of conditions for assertion of an expression other than our own. Of course, we can grasp an expression of other language but indeterminately. If these arguments are true, then each language will have its own conceptual scheme and speakers are locked permanently in their conceptual scheme. Apparently these considerations show that relativism is true at its face value and it quite naturally follows from antirealist theory of meaning.

But the following considerations cast doubt on the construal that relativisim is the corollary of antirealist theory of meaning and truth. Indeterminacy involved in the process of translation of expression from one language into another is the backbone of the relativist constructions that one is sealed-off from an alien language or conceptual scheme. The very 'understanding' or 'recognition of the existence of an alien conceptual scheme or langauge is backed by some sort of access to the same. This access is provided by a wide background of mutual comprehensibility and wide range of shared beliefs and assumption. In order to recognise differences as differences, whatever they may be, there must exist a common platform. This platform should necessarily not be a theory-neutral observational language, but something beyond language, say, some undifferential experience. The undifferentiated experience in

the course of time get approximated into conceptual scheme or onto the language. This runs against relativism and the idea that these very many sealed-off conceptual schemes and languages without acess into each other. We can envisage that there is indeterminacy both in the translation from one language into another and within one's own language. But that should not give the room for the thesis of very many languages or conceptual scheme without any access into each other.

In short, a language is a conceptual scheme. If we recognize the language as a language, we must be able to recognise the presence of a certain range of beliefs underlying the speakers' employment of their language. The question what these beliefs are is very important, and then what features or elements of the language they reveal constitues what enables us to recognise the language as a language.

Language organises or systematises the world over which our experience ranges, i.e., language is the medium in which our experiences get crystallised. This language i.e., conceptual scheme presents a pluralistic ontology since the features or deivices of the language makes it possible. To capture ontology onto the language, it should contain or develop its devices, both individuative and predicative. These devices for concepts of individuals and concepts of properties are important as much for our own language as for an alien tongue. Co-extensivity of predicates between one's language and the alien language fulfils the criterion of languagehood. The criterion of languagehood is that if anything is a language it contains devices for individuation and for ascribing properties to the individuals individuated. These devices can be recognised as such in a way

exactly parallel to our understanding of the logical features of our language. This co-extensivity of devices in our own language and the alien language is the ground on which the possibility of translation rests.

On the face of it this possibility of translation between two languages rules out any acceptance of radical relativism. In Quine's characterisation meaning of certain range of sentences, i.e., observation sentences which are situated at the periphery of the web of language can be grasped by pure ostension. He cites mass terms as good examples which we learn ostensively. For e.g., the meaning of the term 'water' can be learned ostensively by conditioning or induction. But this way of learning the meanings, according to Quine, restricted to those sentences or terms which lie at the periphery of the web of language. But there are serious hurdles in learning this way as far as other sentences and terms are concerned. Terms of divided reference cannot be mastered without mastering the principles of individuation govering them. In the case of the term 'rabbit' learning ostensively is not possible, for fixing reference, especially in connection with the radical translation of 'gavagai' in the native langauge. We are not able to decide that 'gavagai' picks out what among rabbit, undetached rabbit parts or temporal slices of rabbit. Hence, appeal to reference in grasping the meaning of 'gavagai' does not yield any result and the indeterminacy gets involved in our attempt to understand the meaning of 'gavagai'. However, it leaves infact the 'stimulus meaning'. This is the only thing that enables us to get translation manual started.

This result is not satisfactory, for all that the stimulus

conditions for 'gavagai' tell us is that 'gavagai' is assertable when current stimulation includes a rabbit and that the native speakers never dissent when 'gavagai' is uttered in their presence. Assertability conditions demand more than this. In case we broaden our perceptual field, 'gavagai' might mean, something like 'creature which yields white meat.' This ascription will include chicken also. Therefore what we need for a correct specification of the assertability condition is for the condition denial, i.e., something to be 'not gavagai'. The denial depends upon the learning of certain negative options by a speaker. By this what a translater is left with is dissent to 'gavagai' where one gavagai left off and another began. Thus, the interpretation of any sort, if to get started, must have the required knowledge of the reference of the relevant terms, the reference of a term being just the object which use of the term picks out or individuates.

This gives us the idea that for translation to be possible accross the languages references must be perspicuous; added to this is that there are simple predicates and the intersection of the extension of such predicates between languages is determinable. If referential scrutability is established, then enumeration of objects satisfying a predicate allows correct application of the predicate in both the languages under study. This paired expansion will have semantic features like pretheoretical grasp of language synonymy. This will guarantee that relations of this sort are obtainable between different languages in a more determinate way than Quine's framework allows. Note that what these arguments are upto is not an argument of interlanguage synonymy in which a complete

intersubstitutivity of terms is available in sentential contexts.

Statement synonymy in the positivist view consists in the fact that because the meaning of a statment is its method of verification, any two statements with identical empirical conditions of confirmation or disconfirmation are synonymous. This implies that for each statement there should be a unique range of sensory events which verify or falsify the statements in question. If this is to be said about statements those truth-conditions determine meaning, there are meaning determinations based purely on the sentential features as in the case of analytic sentences. Quine finds it highly objectionable and adopts a holistic view. Rather, it seems, what was objectionable to him is the analytic-synthetic distinction and the reductionist thesis. Stimulus meanings of observation statements, construed as the ordered pairs of assents and dissents, stands with an added advantage in the total scheme of statements. Hence the class of observation statements across the language qualify for a determinate translations.

The notion of statement-synonymy depends upon the fact that translator is in a position to avail the determinacy of reference and predicate extension. Understanding a sentence in both the languages invokes extra information of terms which warrant their use in the perceptual context. As noted early this is related to the option left out by the dissent or denial. But the 'option-closure' only provides the idea that use of the terms is inappropriate. Though the unique range of sensory evidences is available for the confirmation or disconfirmation of a sentence in the assertability-condition what the speaker

has to know is the circumstances under which the use is warranted.

In short, the devices of language make possible the determination of reference and predicate extension. This in turn provides the ground for translation across languages. This is possible only when language is equipped with the conceptual scheme. The relativist idea that each language is sealed-off from others and, therefore, the impossibility of a common conceptual scheme, is in contrast with the above arguments. Hence, antirealist thesis that assertability or verification conditions constitute the meaning of an expression does not provide ample ground for a realativist consequence.

3. IDEALISM AS A CONSEQUENCE OF ANTIREALISM

Anti-realist thesis of meaning and truth, some argue, assumes an idealistic nature when its world-view, is fully brought out. Idealism holds the notion that the world is in some sense dependent on being known or conceived by subjects of experience. The idea of world's existing independently of any thought of it is unintelligible. In contemporary philosophy of language, the sort of idealism takes its shape mainly from the epistemological consideration, especially from empiricist epistemology. Given the idealist construal that what can be known about the world rests on a foundation of empirical experience or in some way arises primarily from empirical experience, then what can be known is subjected to the conditions of empirical experience. Contrary to this, the realists argue that without involving essential reference to experience it is possible to know what the world is like or

constituted of. In other words, we can arrive at conclusions through epistemological considerations by transcending experience.

If the idealist thesis that reference to the empirical conditions governing the concepts we habitually employ and apply is inescapable, an antirealist attitude to language is inescapable too; for anti-realism is the thesis that sense of our discourse is determined by the empirical conditions of its acquisition and use. A minimally conceived idea of idealism, that the conception of the world's existing independently of any experience of it is unintelligible, appears to quite naturally follow from antirealism, for the antirealist attitude to language takes empirical epistemology seriously in determining what there is. In spite of these discernable consequence of relating idealism with anti-realist attitude to language, most varieties of idealism are strong theses which purport to establish the falsity of the view that there is an experience--independent world. Idealism makes it clear that a world is a collection of ideas or is a seamless and eternal whole ('absolute'). These strong theses should be kept away from our considerations while attempting an antirealist construal vis-a-vis idealism since the talk of the world makes essential references to experience.

Any conception of the world cannot get rid of the idea that empirical experience is in some sense centrally important. Justified beliefs about contingent matters could not be ascribed to epistemic capacities of rational agents without experience. This constraint compounds with the fact that our ordinary thought or talk is realist and unless we equip ourselves with an

operable distinction between what is objective and what is subjective in experience, there would not be any means to make sense of the concept of experience.

Kant's articulations of transcendental idealism, which he considered as a thesis equivalent to empirical realism, help in construing, it seems, antirealism as a specimen of idealism. Note that "transcendental" here differs from "transcendent" in talk of 'transcendent truth conditions', the former concerns what is 'within' the limits of experience, the latter concerns what is 'outside' them. Since the notion of experience in transcendental idealism of Kant sets limits to what the understanding can do, the connection with antirealism becomes obvious, for having a proof or verification procedure sets limits to what can be said, and acquiring and manifesting of language must be explained in terms of the constraints imposed by the methods available to us.

According to Kant, phenonema is transcendentally ideal but empirically real, hence the ordinary distinction between appearance and reality is a genuine one but should be drawn within experience itself. This being the case, his transcendental idealism is not concerned with the familiar traditional epistemology which is concerned with the relation between perceptual experience and its objects. In traditional epistemology since empirical self-awareness is immediate the existence of objects has to be inferred from the immediate subjective data of consciousness. By contrast to this, Kant's transcendental idealism constitutes an empirical realism because of our experience of outer objects which are independent of our objective consciousness. This means that experience of objects

which exist independently of any particular acts of awarness of this is a necessary condition of having experience.[7]

Strawson's argument for the existence of other minds, i.e., persons goes very well with the claim that objects of experience exist independently of any acts of awareness of them. He argues that in order to doubt the existence of other minds the skeptic employs the concept of other minds itself, which can be done if he distinguishes between 'my state of consciousness' and 'other's states of consciousness' which in turn demands existence of others, for identification of conscious states can be effected by reference to particulars of special kinds, i.e., persons. One can talk of my experience only if one can talk of other experiences. This is possible only if there are criteria for distinguishing between persons. Since one does talk significantly about one's own experience, then bodily behaviour constitutes adequate grounds for ascription of states of consciousness to others. Strawson's aim here is to show what are the necessary conditions of a given conceptual scheme for the identification of particulars, including persons, in a spatio-temporal world. In a similar line the construal of object existing independently and articulate the basis of our understanding can be made available.[8] If we think of the world as a coherent spatio-temporal system of material things, then it is a condition of having this conceputal scheme that we unquestioningly accept the continued unperceived existence of at least some of these things. To deny this is to accept that we

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[7] See Strawsons's *The Bounds of Sense*, Methuen, London, 1966, Chapter 2.

[8] Strawson, *Individuals*, pp.35-6.

never reidentify objects and, therefore, effectively committing ourselves to the notion that each new stretch of observations or experience ranges over discrete and independent spatio-temporal systems. Hence, being completely different spatio-temporal systems, identity of a material item in one system with an item in other never arises. If that is the case, in such systems the continued existence of material things unperceived does not make sense. In other words, skepticism arises only when two systems are not independent. Precisely this is the condition for a unified system that there should be satisfiable criteria for the identity of at least some material items in one syb-system with some items in the other. Therefore, unperceived continuous existence of objects cannot be doubted.[9]

Now, we have and employ the concept of perception-independent particular or objects. This argument does not establish continued existence of objects independently of any experience. Rather it is a condition of the experience that we are committed to believing objects continue to exist unperceived. To ask whether there are objects independently of experience is misguided. If it is a necessary condition of the coherence of our conceptual scheme that we must believe that there are perceptions--independent objects and if there is only one conceptual scheme, then the perception-independent existence of objects is a condition of experience in general. It seems that the contemporary realist wants to go beyond this and attempts to derive a result that objects exist absolutely independently of any experience. Talk of entities for whose existence nothing whatever could count as evidence, for its

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[9] *Individuals,*

being completely independent of experience, cannot make any sense. In this picture the contemporary realist approximates the characterisation as 'transcendental realist', in the Kantian sense, whereas antirealists are apt to be labelled as 'empirical realist'.

The question about what there is independently of any talk or experience is strictly unintelligible. The point is not that there is no world existing independently of experience, but that there is no intelligible way in which one can talk of a world lying beyond or outside experience. This is all and only the world as it is experienced or experiencable and nothing can count as sensible outside the limits which the conditions of discourse impose. From an antirealist point of view, realism is premissed on strictly unintelligible commitment to the existence of our experience-transcendent reality. But a denial of realist claims about such a reality is equally unintelligible. If the constraint that ordinary talk or thought is realist is to be taken into account, and the realistic idea of language-learning requires publicly available conditions, then pervasive realism of our every day conceptural scheme is to be accounted for.

The point of view that the world is independent of particular acts of awareness of it, or independent of the relation in which individual perceivers stand to it, has to be reconciled and accommodated within our conceptual scheme in a sensible way. It seems Wittgenstein's idea of 'grammatical proposition' would be helpful in tackling proposition like 'objects exist unperceived'. Grammatical proposition is one which it makes no sense to doubt and therefore, in an important way, there is no sense in asserting or claiming to know. Since

grammatical proposition has its own role in our belief system and overall picture of what our experience is all about, the best way to characterise grammatical proposition is to say that they constitute the presupposition of our thinking or talking and, hence, to doubt the presupposition is not only false but also unintelligible. It amounts to saying that belief in the existence of objects is a necessary condition of our thought and talk. If we put it in a realist perspective, it is tantamount to say that those beliefs are necessary to our conceptual scheme; we are bound to be epistemological realists, if our thought and talk is to be coherent. While we say that we are bound to be realists, we are not rejecting the antirealist claim, that the objects are nonetheless, internal to our conceptual system. Here lies the importance of such a belief of the existence of objects vis-a-vis both realist and anti-realist epistemology and its world-view; it amounts to saying that anti-realism in a Kantian sense, is an empirical realism.

4. IS TRUTH WELL LOST?

Anti-realist theory of meaning, as we noted earlier, envisages that the notion of truth is eliminable, if not completely, in the epistemological consideration of understanding and meaning. Inspite of this Dummett conceded the importance of the concept of truth in our understanding of deductive inference and, therefore, of the concept of indirect conclusive proof.[10] If we take seriously Frege's thought regarding a proposition that the sense of the sentence consists

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[10] See Dummett, "Meaning and Truth," in *The Seas of Language*, Clarendon Press, Oxford, 1993.

in the grasping the condition for its truth and in order to assert an utterance the notion of force should be taken into account, then a concept of truth is required to keep a statement being true and someone's having grounds for taking it to be true. Dummett considers that a sense-force distinction is vital if we are to be able to give a systematic account of language, hence a concept of truth is required to understand utterances. The adherence to the verification principle forces anti-realist to conclude that truth is a matter of decision and strongly reject the realist idea of truth which transcends our cognitive beliefs. The principle of bivalance and the notion that truth is independent of human cognition are those classical realist tenets to which antirealist raises strong objection. The intuitionistic logic of antirealists holds a system of semantics and truth is placed within the limits of the semantics. But this verificationist dimension of truth described by Dummett[11] specifies that truth is immenent to our conceptual scheme as the transcendent notion of truth supported by the realist does not justify our cognitive practices. This verificationist notion of truth makes Dummett hold that the meaning of a statement is not constituted by the truth-conditions, rather by its assertion-conditions.

But if we uphold the anti-realist thesis that truth and cognition of truth are one and same, then truth will be the product cognitive consensus and hence this deny will that truth is a substantial concept in our conceptual system. This result is not acceptable because "the antirealist idea that truth is

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[11] See Dummett, *What Is a Theory of Menaing?* in *Mind and Language*, ed. S. Guttenplan, Clarendon Press, Oxford, 1975.

constructed rather than discovered does not hold good because it denies the fact that we do not manufacture truth whenever we apply it to the sentences we make. Semantically speaking, truth is a value granted to sentences only when there is a determinate way that sentence is related to the world. Since the world does not come into being the moment the sentence is made, it is evident that truth and reality are both independent of our cognition."[12] If that is the case, the verificationist notion that truth is man-made and dependent on our cognitive practices falls short of our requirement. In contrast to the anti-realist approach to truth, metaphysical realist maintains that the concept of truth involves a primitive non-epistemic idea. Metaphysical realism stands in opposition to various constructivist theories of truth according to which the surplus meaning in truth is identified with some notion of verifiability. Again, the redundancy theory of truth denies the existence of surplus meaning and contentds that Tarski's scheme is quite sufficient to capture the concept. Truth is held to be a genuine property of certain propositions, a property we desire our beliefs to possess.

Metaphysical realist's concepts of truth and truth conditions are unacceptable and obscure, even in their application to what we take to be decidable statements. Not only do they not give an account of what it is to know when a sentence would be true but also we have no right to assume that such knowledge would be maintained in a certain form of linguistic behaviour. Knowledge of truth accounts for all the

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[12] Pradhan, R.C. "Truth and Transcendence," *Viswa-Bharathi Journal of Philosophy*, vol. XXXI (1995), pp.72-3.

linguistic expressions or behaviour. Since the essential feature of the realist concept of truth is that it is a primitive notion and not to be explained in terms of verification it poses difficulties in answering the questions like in what does our knolwedge of truth-conditions consist, and how does such knowledge produce linguistic skill? In Dummett's argument the idea that truth is a primitive non-epistemic notion is confounded with the idea that the truth may exist beyond our capacity to recognize it. But we need to separate the latter idea from the metaphysical realist idea of truth as a primitive non-epistemic notion because if we go with metaphysical realist prescription truth cannot be made comprehensible, there being no account of that in which a grasp of it or evidence of grasp is found.[13] However, semantic realism like Tarski's provides truth-conditions of sentences which can be related to our linguistic practices.

In fact, semantic realism with its truth-conditional theory of meaning is compatible with a verification theory of understaniding.[14] A verificationist theory of understanding yields a modest commitment to realism about the world--a commitment to an ontology of objective, mind-independent objects and their properties. The assertability condition belie the commitment of the speakers to independent objects. Added to this, anti-realists argue that the language learning and understanding is explained solely in terms of justification conditions. Semantic realism has no trouble with these

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[13] See, Paul Horwich, "Three Forms of Realism," in *Synthese*, vol.51, 1982.

[14] See Shalkowski, A. Scott. 'Semantic Realism,' *Review of Metaphysics*, Vol. 48, March 1995.

statements. Realists agree that to understand a statement is to know under what circumstances that statment is warrantedly assertable, but disagree that meaning of a statement is exhaustively given by such circumstances. Instead the semantic realist finds reason to posit truth-conditions as the meaning of statements.

Semantic realists argue that mere assertability conditions are not sufficient to determine the meaning; we need to posit truth-condition with attention on justification--conditions so that we learn that property possession is not solely a function of current evidence. By understanding the nature of objective property possession, one understands that the state of objects is distinct from the evidential conditions required for justified assertion. With this distinction of knowledge of the distinctness of truth conditions and assertability conditions, semantic realist is warranted in claiming that the background theory to which use points is indeed a bivalent theory.The verificationists agree that this theory invovles the objectivity of certain features of the world. In spite of the trouble of deciding whether the background theory is bivalent or not, a semantic theory has to take into account the actual linguistic practice, so that semantic realism could embed the verificationist theory of linguistic understanding.

Putnam's internal realism is also critical about the realist idea of truth which entails that truth is independent of our cognition and, therefore, of our conceptual scheme. He stands for realism with a human face, i.e., truth and reality have to be characterised within our conceptual scheme. Our beliefs, knowledge and truth can be accounted for within human

conceptual system. Internal realism rules out metaphysical realist thesis that truth is a fixed and transcendental category and world consists of some fixed totality of man-independent objects. The ideal that all sciences and knowledge is a search for the independently existing truth provide thus to a complete description of the world is anathema to the internal realist. Instead of the realist concept of cognition-transcendent truth and reality the internal realist puts forward an idea of truth which "is some sort of (idealised) rational acceptability--some sort of ideal coherence of our beliefs with each other and with our experiences as those experiences themselves represented in our belief-system--and not correspondence with mind independent or discourse independent "states of affairs."[15]

Internal realism holds that epistemological and semantic notions are conceptually inseparable. But beliefs are not true simply because they are rationally warranted or rationally acceptable. No analytic or logical conclusions guarantee that the results of our best empirical methods will be true. Putnam does not agree with this realist argument and says that the realist or at least the hard-core metaphysical realist--wishes it be the case that truth and rational acceptability should be independent notions, while infact they are not.

Putnam's argument runs like this: suppose that truth and rational acceptability are independent notion, then it is conceivable that even an ideal theory could be false. Moreover, it is conceivable that such a theory could be false in the world having countably but not finitely many objects. But such an

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[15] Putnam, *Reason, Truth, History*, Cambridge University Press, Cambridge, 1981, pp. 49-50.

ideal theory must be consistent. Since it is consistent it has a denumerable model. Therefore, there is an interpretation of the language of the theory such that the domain of interpretation is the set of actual objects, and the theory is true under interpretation. Therefore the ideal theory is true, the supposition is contradicted, and truth and rational acceptability are not independent notions.

It seems that internal realist articulation of truth and rational acceptability places the concept of truth and, consequently, reality within human conceptual scheme or conceptual history but tends to reject the notion that truth is the product of consensus. "Rational acceptability" thesis does not in toto reject realism, since it does not reject the concepts of truth and reality. The rational evaluation of beliefs necessarily presupposes that there is a reality which should get represented in our beleif system. Putnam writes, "To look for any one uniform link between word or thought and object of word or thought is to look for the occult; but to see our evolving and expanding notion of reference as just a proliferating family is to miss the essence of the relation between language and reality. The essence of the relation is that language and thought do asymptomatically correspond to reality, to some extent at least."[16] This correspondence with reality assumes that eventhough truth is within our conceptual history and practice, those conceptual history, practice or human interest need to be appraised rationally. This appraisal is done against the background of that 'corresponds with

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[16] Putnam, "Language and Reality," in *Mind Language and Reality*. Cambridge University Press, Cambridge, 1975, p.290.

reality'. In the evaluation a standard or criterion is to be adopted with truth as the background concept. This standard is not a product of consensus but something substantial which helps us to evaluate our belief system, hence it transcends the relativist idea of truth being internal to the point of view of the people.

CONCLUSION

In philosophical analysis of language it is presumed that grammar ensuing out of such an exercise has representational nature. Since language functions vis-a-vis a world of experience, grammar captures the essential characteristic features of the reality. If language is the medium in which we express or articulate our thoughts and experiences, then grammatical structure of language and our conceptual scheme are invariably related. This relation between language and our conceptual scheme supports the thesis that grammatical structure is the structure of the reality, for our thoughts and experiences are the thoughts and experiences about the world.

The grammar discerned in the analysis of langauge delineate a world-view or metaphysics, since the essence of the language, i.e., grammar is the essence of the world. This metaphysics underlying in the linguistic analysis is essentially aprioristic or logical in nature, for those metaphysical conclusions are drawn within or derived from the logical grammar of language.

Irrespective of the differences of opinion as to whether there is an independently and continuously existing world with or without our experience of it, the existence of the world of experience or reality is beyond doubt. This world or reality is the 'bed rock' of all our experiences and justifies our truth claims in the semantics of language.

Ideal language philosopher's logical analysis presupposes that language has a definite structural pattern. This logical structure of language is construed as identical with the structure of the world. Therefore, logical grammar discerned in the analysis of langauge represents the structure of the world, or rather, what we experience about the world are those things and events given in or represented in the logic of language. Language is the only medium in which we conceive the world. Consequently, the logical grammar of language represents the essence of our world of experience. It presupposes one-to-one representational relation between the structure of language and that of reality.

Whereas ordinary language philosophers, since they were interested in studying the functioning of ordinary langauge vis-a-vis the world of experience, our experiences of world get crystallised into the different linguistic expressions. These linguistic expressions represent the content of our experience of the world. They too agree that language has a logical grammar and the ensuing ontology is posited by language and its logical grammar. In our language the world of experience manifests, and organisation of those experiences into language is done by logical grammar.

In all species of realism based on the truth-conditions semantics an independently and continuously existing world of experience is affirmed, for truth is a substantial concept which validates our linguistic practice. Though realists assert a world existing independently of our experience of it, our knowledge of it is limited to the cognitive capabilities. Our language with its logical structure approximates the world we experience within the limits of the cognitive activities and promises to capture fully the elusive reality once our own

cognitive apparatus is fully developed.

Antirealism does not question the claim about the existence of the world, and about the language as the medium in which the world is described, but it questions the claim of its existence independently of our experience of it. The notion of verification allows us only the claim that our understanding of the world is limited to, or dependent on, our cognitive practices; cognition-transcendant existence of the reality is ruled out. Truth as a primitive non-epistemic concept does not have any relevance in our linguistic practice. In their perspective truth is internal to our conceptual system. Our conceptual system and therefore language represent the world of experience. Beyond that we are not entitled to talk or claim anything. This metaphysics is the consequence of the internalism regarding meaning, truth and the reality.

Both realism and antirealism concede that our knowledge or understanding of the experience is determined by or couched in the semantical or logical structure of language. The metaphysics delineating the structure of the world is 'internal' or 'imminent' to the conceptual scheme and the linguistic practices. 'Rational acceptability' thesis of internal realism does not reject the concepts of truth and reality and therefore holds that our linguistic practices and conceptual scheme are bound to support a metaphysics which is aprioristic or logical in nature, hence, internal. The world we experience is the one fashioned by the langauge and its logical grammar. Therefore an aprioristic or logical world-view emanating from the philosophical analysis of language, can be construed as 'immanent' or 'internal' metaphysics.

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