

INDIA-JAPAN RELATIONS IN THE POST-COLD WAR PERIOD: A STUDY THROUGH NEOCLASSICAL REALIST FRAMEWORK

A Thesis Submitted to the University of Hyderabad in Partial Fulfilment of the Requirements for the Award of the Degree of

Doctor of Philosophy

In

Political Science

by

Gujjeti Anudeep

(17SPPH06)



Department of Political Science

School of Social Sciences

University of Hyderabad

Hyderabad, 500046

Telangana, India

JUNE 2024



**Department of Political Science
University of Hyderabad**

Declaration

I, **Gujjeti Anudeep** hereby declare that this thesis entitled “**India-Japan Relations in the Post-Cold War Period: A Study Through Neoclassical Realist Framework**” submitted by me under the guidance of **Dr S Shaji** is a bonafide research work which is also free from plagiarism. I also declare that it has not been submitted previously in part or in full to this University or any other University or Institution for the award of any degree or diploma.

I hereby agree that my thesis can be deposited in Shodhganga/INFLIBNET. A plagiarism report from the University Librarian is enclosed.

Date: 07/06/2024

Signature: 

Name: Gujjeti Anudeep

Regd. No: 17SPPH06



CERTIFICATE

This is to certify that the thesis entitled '**India-Japan Relations in the Post-Cold War Period: A Study Through Neoclassical Realist Framework**,' submitted by **Gujjeti Anudeep** bearing Registration No.: **17SPPH06**, in partial fulfilment of the requirements for the award of Doctor of Philosophy in Political Science, School of Social Science, is a bona fide work carried out by him under my supervision and guidance. This thesis is free from plagiarism and has not been previously submitted, in part or in full, to this University or any other University or institution for the award of any degree or diploma. Furthermore, the student has the following publications before the submission of the thesis for adjudication and has provided evidence for the same in the form of reprints in the relevant area of his research.

1. **Indo-Japanese Strategic Cooperation in the Indo-Pacific.** *Third Concept: An International Journal of Ideas*, 37(435), 7–10 (2023).

The student has presented research papers in the following conferences.

1. **Indo-Japan Cooperation in the Indo-Pacific Region: A Shift in India's Security Strategy** at the two-day National Conference on India and the World: Challenges and Opportunities organised by Aligarh Muslim University, February 27-28, 2023.
2. **Act East Policy through North East: Challenges and Prospects in New Era of India's Diplomacy** in a National Seminar on "Locating Northeast in India's Neighbourhood Policy: Problems and Prospects" organized by Department of Political Science North Lakhimpur College (Autonomous), under the aegis of ICSSR Delhi in collaboration with Centre for South East Asian Studies, Gauhati University, September 29-30, 2018.

Further, the student has passed the following courses towards fulfilment of coursework during his MPhil and obtained exemption certificate for the requirement for Ph.D.

Course No.	Course Title	Credits	Grade Awarded
PS701	Research Methodology (Qualitative)	4	B
PS702	Research Methodology (Quantitative)	4	B+
PS703	Individual Course	4	B

Date: 07-06-2024

Supervisor

Dr S Shaji

Head
Dept. of Political Science

Dean
School of Social Science

Acknowledgments

My PhD journey would not have been possible without the help extended to me by many. First and foremost, I would like to express my deepest gratitude to my supervisor, Dr S. Shaji, for his support, encouragement and guidance throughout my PhD journey. His feedback and profound knowledge have been invaluable in shaping my research and bringing this thesis to the light of the day. I am truly grateful for his encouragement in all these years. My research would not have progressed without his constant push. I am greatly indebted to him for all the help.

I like to thank Prof. Prithvi Ram Mudiam for guiding in the initial years of my PhD till his retirement. His insights on the subject and his feedback laid the foundation for my thesis. I would also like to extend my sincere thanks to the members of my advisory committee, Dr Aparna Devare and Dr Bhim Subba. Their expertise and valuable inputs have significantly contributed to the improvement of my research. I thank them for their time and effort in reviewing and providing feedback on my work. While doing my research and writing I interacted with several academicians, experts, bureaucrats and business personalities to whom I shall remain grateful for ever.

I am deeply indebted to my friends in the University for their support. Special thanks are due to Mahesh Edla, Parvathaalu, Saharika, Naveen Reddy, Suresh, Mahesh, Prabhakar, Muhsin, Subhash, Ravi Jadhav, Rakshit, Kiran Kumar for their encouragement, and the memorable moments we shared. I would like to acknowledge Chuchengfa Gogoi, Anurag, Nitin, Uday Raj Singh and Pallavi for their constant support and encouragement. I would also like to thank Ramya Chitrapu for her support throughout the writing process. Further I extend my gratitude to my cousins Naveen, Anusha and Sai Kumar for cheering me up constantly. My friends Arun, Charan, Yedukondalu and Anand were with me since my formative years, I extend my gratitude to them.

I thank my friends at Council for Social Development (CSD) for their constant encouragement. Special thanks to Pullanna, Raj Kumar, Dolma, Ajay, Sajid, Ramshi, and Deepthi for making my journey less painful. I also thank the Director of CSD Prof Sujit Kumar Mishra for motivating me throughout my PhD journey and providing me the support that was required. I would also extend my thanks to the staff of CSD for always keeping motivated

especially Sunder sir, Kumar sir, Vijay, Prasad sir, Lakshmi ma'am, Pratap, Das and Kalpana Kolli.

Special thanks to Dr. Soumya Vinayan, who was no less than a task master in my journey. She made my PhD process enjoyable. Her efforts in organising culinary delights added an extra layer of joy and fulfilment to my academic journey. Her academic rigour made me learn a lot especially in the field of academic writing. She kept on reminding about my PhD whenever I got deviated. I thank her for being my mentor.

My sincere gratitude also goes to my friend Dr Katari Akhil, who helped me throughout my writing process, from conception of the idea to submission. His insights on international relations and Indian politics helped me gain new perspectives. I am greatly indebted to him for all the support he extended.

Many thanks to my friend Blessy Mathew, a compassionate human being and a highly motivated academic companion who made the years of my PhD serene and welcoming. She stood as a pillar of support. Her constant encouragement all through my PhD journey was invaluable and I cannot thank her enough.

Additionally, I am grateful to the administrative and technical staff at the Department of Political Science, University of Hyderabad for their assistance and support throughout my course. I thank Prakash sir, Farzana Ma'am, and Rajeev - for their exceptional assistance in making administrative tasks such as doctoral committee meetings, academic inquiries, and other application filing works seamless.

Finally, a heartfelt thanks to my family for their unconditional love and support. To my parents, thank you, for believing in me and encouraging me to pursue my dreams. To my brother, Pradeep Gujjeti, whose patience, understanding, and unwavering support, has been a constant source of strength and motivation for me. Thank you for being my partner in crime. I dedicate this thesis to all three of them.

Gujjeti Anudeep

Contents

Abbreviations

Preface i-iv

Chapter 1 Theoretical Framework: Neoclassical Realist Framework 1-44

Chapter 2 India and Japan Relations: A Historical Overview 45-81

Chapter 3 Economic Engagement of India and Japan in the post-Cold War period 82-134

Chapter 4 India-Japan Security Partnership in the post-Cold War period 135-181

Chapter 5 The Role of State and Non-Traditional Security in India-Japan Relations 182-227

Conclusion 228-236

Bibliography

Annexure I

Annexure II

Abbreviations

ASCA	Acquisition and Cross-Servicing Agreement
AfDB	African Development Bank
ARF	ASEAN Regional Forum
AETI	Asia Energy Transition Initiative
AAGC	Asia-Africa Growth Corridor
AIIB	Asian Infrastructure Investment Bank
AMF	Asian Monetary Fund
ASEAN	Association of South East Asian Nations
BRI	Belt and Road Initiative
BRICS	Brazil, Russia, India, China and South Africa
BEE	Bureau of Energy Efficiency
CPEC	China-Pakistan Economic Corridor
CEP	Clean Energy Partnership
CDRI	Coalition for Disaster Resilient Infrastructure
CBDR-RC	Common But Differentiated Responsibilities and Respective Capabilities
CCRF	Compensation and Contingency Financing Facility
CFF	Compensatory Finance Facility
CEPA	Comprehensive Economic Partnership Agreement
CTBT	Comprehensive Test Ban Treaty
DMIC	Delhi-Mumbai Industrial Corridor
DPJ	Democratic Party of Japan
EAS	East Asia Summit
EPA	Economic Partnership Agreement
ESDM	Electronic Systems Design and Manufacturing
FMCT	Fissile Material Cut-Off Treaty
FOIP	Free and Open Indo-Pacific
GGP	Grant Assistance for Grassroots Projects
HADR	Humanitarian Assistance and Disaster Relief
IIL	Indian Independence League
IIT	Indian Institute of Technology
INA	Indian National Army
INCOIS	Indian National Centre for Ocean Information Services
ITEWC	Indian Tsunami Early Warning Centre
INDC	Intended Nationally Determined Contribution
IAEA	International Atomic Energy Agency
IISS	International Institute for Strategic Studies
ISA	International Solar Alliance
JBIC	Japan Bank of International cooperation
JCOAL	Japan Coal Energy Centre

JETRO	Japan External Trade Organisation
JFIR	Japan Forum on International Relations
JGSDF	Japan Ground Self-Defence Force
JIMEX	Japan India Maritime Exercise
JICA	Japan International Cooperation Agency
JINED	Japan International Nuclear Energy Development of Japan Co. Ltd.
JMSDF	Japan Maritime Self-Defence Force
JCG	Japanese Coastguard
JDA	Japanese Defence Agency
JPP	JICA Partnership Programme
JSG	Joint Study Group
LDP	Liberal Democratic Party
LTFP	Long-Term Fiscal Policy
MSDF	Maritime Self-Defence Forces
METI	Ministry of Economy, Trade and Industry
MOFA	Ministry of Foreign Affairs
MAHSR	Mumbai Ahmedabad High Speed Rail Project
NAPCC	National Action Plan for Climate Change
NDPG	National Defence Programme Guidelines
NCR	Neoclassical Realism
NEDO	New Energy and Industrial Technology Development Organisation
NSSP	Next Steps in Strategic Partnership
NTT	Nippon Telegraph & Telephone
NAM	Non-Aligned Movement
NPO	Non-Profit Organisation
NPT	Non-Proliferation Treaty
NTS	Non-Traditional Security
NATO	North Atlantic Treaty Organisation
NPR	Nuclear Posture Review
NSG	Nuclear Suppliers Group
ODA	Official Development Assistance
PCRA	Petroleum Conservation Research Association
Q-CHAMP	QUAD Climate Change Adaptation and Mitigation Package
QUAD	Quadrilateral Security Dialogue
RCEP	Regional Comprehensive Economic Partnership
RECAAP	Regional Cooperation Agreement on Combating Piracy and Armed Robbery against Ships in Asia
SFPT	San Francisco Peace Treaty
SLOC	Sea-Lines of Communication
SAGAR	Security and Growth for All in the Region
SDF	Self Defence force
SARS	Severe Acute Respiratory Syndrome
SATF	South Asia Task Force

SAARC	South Asian Association for Regional Cooperation
SDR	Special Drawing Rights
SCRI	Supply Chain Resilience Initiative
TICAD	Tokyo International Conference on African Development
TPP	Trans-Pacific Partnership
UNFCCC	United Nations Framework Convention on Climate Change
UNDP	United Nation Development Programme
UGV	Unmanned Ground Vehicle
WMD	Weapons of Mass Destruction
WTO	World Trade Organisation

Preface

The bilateral relations between India and Japan have traversed through multiple phases to reach the contemporary status which is officially called as ‘Special Strategic and Global Partnership’ while engaging with several systemic and domestic level developments. This has been examined and understood through the prism of several theoretical frameworks. In general, in international relations, several theoretical frameworks have been employed to analyse the relationship, among which most dominant being realist frameworks. Both the contending realist frameworks, classical and neorealist ones, studied the relationship through state centric analysis, by placing the international structure at the core of analysis. In doing so, these frameworks have shown limitations understand certain behaviour of nation-states at a given point of time while facing similar international structures. This necessitated the emergence of another set of analysis within the realist tradition at the unit level including domestic factors and their interactions between the States, which can be applied in studying bilateral relations. These theoretical concerns are addressed by Neoclassical Realist (NCR) framework of International Relations (IR). NCR, as a theoretical framework, adheres to the tenets of realism such as state centrality and the relative distribution of power in a structure but at the same time uses another level of analysis as well i.e., domestic/unit level including various domestic level factors such as the role of leadership, bureaucracy, domestic policies, business groups, state-mediated civil society interactions, ideologies and so on. This is undertaken to get a precise understanding of foreign policy decisions of various nations; and the same can be applied to examine the bilateral ties between India and Japan. It is in this context, the current study analyses India-Japan bilateral relations by employing NCR as a theoretical framework in the domains of economy, defence and Non-Traditional Security (NTS) since the end of the Cold War period i.e., 1991 to 2022, covering a span of three decades.

The current study tries to answer the questions such as; what are the specific characteristics and differences that NCR has with other variants of realism and its effectiveness in understanding bilateral relations?; What are the significant domestic/unit level factors which influenced the bilateral relations involving India and Japan?; How have the structural factors and domestic level factors interacted to further India-Japan bilateral relationship in the fields of economy, security and Non-Traditional Security (NTS)?

The objectives of the study, while answering these questions are, first to understand the characteristics of both classical and neorealist framework and point the limitations of these traditions. It also aims to bring out the characteristics of NCR which makes it distinct from earlier forms of realism to understand the bilateral relationship of India and Japan from the end of the Cold War. The second objective is to bring out the factors that influenced India-Japan relationship historically, till the end of the Cold War. These factors include both structural and domestic in nature, for example the World Wars, Cold War, people-to-people exchanges and so on. The third objective is to understand the economic partnership between India and Japan by identifying the domestic level factors which helped further the relationship after the end of the Cold War given the prevailing structural conditions. The fourth is to analyse the defence partnership between India and Japan from the end of the Cold War through interweaving domestic level factors spanning different phases. Finally, the study tries to understand the engagements between India and Japan in the field of NTS by retaining the state centrality and notions on the national interests within an evolving framework of human security. In doing so, the study tries to bring out various domestic factors which helps India and Japan navigate the ever-increasing threats posed by NTS.

In order to answer the aforementioned questions and meet the objectives, the study employs a multi-method approach combining both quantitative and qualitative methods to ensure a comprehensive understanding of the bilateral relationship. This includes personal interviews, historical analysis, content analysis, and the examination of secondary sources. Personal interviews are done using semi-structured questionnaire, with relevant stakeholders to allow for flexibility and gain nuanced insights into the decision-making process of both nations. This approach helps in getting deeper into specific areas of interest of the respondents. The interviewee/respondents include business leaders from industries who have significant engagements with India and Japan as well as academicians specialised in international relations especially those who focus on India and Japan bilateral relations and government officials. Additionally, civil society representatives, other stakeholders including think tank experts, policy analysts were interviewed for the study. For content analysis different government documents, archival material, speeches of prime ministers, bilateral agreements and treaties, Memorandum of Understandings (MoUs) and declarations are used.

Further, the study outlines a nuanced approach to studying the trade and historical relations between India and Japan. It uses multiple sources from the Ministry of Commerce

and Industry (India), the World Trade Organisation (WTO), and other organisations to collect and analyse trade data, focusing on trade volumes, balance of trade, and sector-specific statistics. Historical analysis is conducted using archival records, diplomatic correspondences, agreements, and official documents to understand the evolution of bilateral relations from pre- and post-independence periods. Such an analysis links historical events with contemporary developments to understand continuity and change. Theoretical frameworks are supported by books on International Relations Theories (IRT), India-Japan relations, regional geopolitics, peer-reviewed journals, and industry reports from India and Japan. Publications from think tanks like Observer Research Foundation (ORF), Brookings Institution, and Manohar Parrikar Institute for Defence Studies and Analyses (MP-IDSA) provide in-depth analyses. Additionally, media reports, conference proceedings, and online magazines are used to support the arguments in the study.

While addressing the research questions, the study is divided into five chapters, apart from a preface and a conclusion. The first chapter deals with the theoretical framework of NCR. The first section of the chapter brings out the characteristics of realism, neorealism and their suitability in analysing India and Japan relations. Further, it discusses the limitations of both the strands of realism and the need for an alternative model of realism such as NCR. Subsequently, the chapter proceeds to outline the characteristics of NCR as a theoretical framework to analyse India- Japan relations in the post-Cold War period in the domains of economy, defence and NTS (through state-centric analysis). The chapter then concludes by highlighting the suitability of NCR as a framework to analyse the relationship in multiple domains.

The second chapter historicises the bilateral relationship between India and Japan from the early period to the end of Cold War. It first explores the early contacts between India and Japan through trade, culture and people-to-people contacts. The chapter then proceeds to discuss the relationship during two World Wars and before the Indian Independence. In doing so, the chapter analyses both the structural and domestic factors that influenced the relationship during that phase. The next section of the chapter brings out the relationship after India's independence and during the Cold War period till 1990. This section analyses the Cold War mentality, domestic leadership and its effects on the bilateral relationship. Finally, the chapter concludes by discussing changes that took place at the end of Cold War and sets the context for the next chapter.

The third chapter of the study discusses the economic partnership between India and Japan from the end of Cold War i.e., 1990-91 to 2022, spanning three decades. The chapter is divided into three phases to get a nuanced understanding of the relationship. The first phase includes the period from 1990-91 to 1999-2000, called as pre-sanctions phase. The second phase covers the period from 2000-01 to 2009-10, the post-sanctions phase. The last phase begins from 2011, when India and Japan signed the Comprehensive Economic Partnership Agreement (CEPA) till 2022. In each of these phases, domestic and structural factors that affected the relationship are analysed to give an overview of the relationship.

The fourth chapter analyses the strategic relationship between India and Japan from the end of the Cold War i.e., 1990-91 to 2022. It first presents a background that led both nations to cooperate on the strategic front by bringing out the structural factors. Further, the chapter analyses the relationship in three phases. The first phase begins with the end of Cold War and continues till 2000, during which India conducted its nuclear tests and witnessed sanctions from Japan. The second phase analyses the relationship between 2000 and 2010. The final phase begins in 2011 and ends in 2022. In each phase, the chapter discusses the structural forces and domestic factors which affected the security partnership.

The final chapter delves on the emerging area of cooperation between India and Japan, i.e., NTS. This chapter brings out the state centrality of the relations while dealing with issues of NTS. It focuses on NTS/human security issues such as climate change, energy linkages (includes nuclear), and digital partnership between India and Japan. While engaging with these issues, the role of state-mediated civil society interactions, Non-Governmental Organisations (NGOs), government institutions are emphasised upon.

Finally, the study concludes through the discussion of core arguments by highlighting the interplay of systemic and domestic factors within India-Japan relationship in the domains of economy, security and NTS adhering to the NCR framework. It brings out the systemic factors in every domain of relations while highlighting the domestic factors which affected the relationship in each phase after the end of the Cold War.

Chapter - 1

Theoretical Framework: Neoclassical Realist Framework

Introduction

Foreign relations of each state are shaped by the demands and pressures from other states, actors, alliances, international organisations, and markets as well as its own level of economic, political, security and trade conditions. External pressure can sometimes lead to clear changes in a state's foreign policy. In other cases, the same pressure can incite domestic resistance to change, while domestic factors can also influence a state's foreign relations. India, lacking any external patronage, has developed its identity by emerging from its colonial past and navigating both systemic pressures and domestic politics according to the situation and time. Militarily, India has built a substantial national security infrastructure, comparable to certain advanced military powers, giving it a strategic advantage, especially among Global South states. Economically, India transitioned from a relatively closed economy with restrictive trade practices during the Cold War to one open to foreign investment and goods through economic reforms. These economic and military factors have driven India to shape a foreign policy influenced equally by both domestic and external factors.

On the other end, Japan possesses all the characteristics of a middle level power with its size, population, and a developed economy. Japan, in general practises a reactive foreign policy.¹ External pressure has had a significant impact on both Japan's foreign and domestic policies to the point where some analysts claim that domestic political developments of the country are more often a response to international pressure than to domestic level factors. The historical legacy of the Second World War, Japan's subsequent response to international criticism, and a fear of isolation due to dependence on overseas markets are the causes of this tendency. Japan's security apparatus is not well developed in accordance with its economy. At the global level, among the developed countries, Japan contributed the least, militarily, which

¹ In 1988, Kent Calder authored a study that explored the responsive nature of Japanese foreign policy, with a particular emphasis on economic matters. Later on, the reactive state thesis has been employed to examine Japan's overall foreign policy. The primary attributes of a reactive state are its inability to pursue significant foreign-policy initiatives despite possessing the capability and national motivations to do so. Instead, it reacts to external pressures for change, albeit inconsistently, without a systematic approach, and frequently without fully addressing the demands. For more, see Kent E. Calder, "Japanese Foreign Economic Policy Formation: Explaining the Reactive State," *World Politics* 40, no. 4 (July 1988): 517–41, accessed on January 12, 2020, <https://doi.org/10.2307/2010317>.

was evident through its budget and its contributions to overseas military engagements (for instance, only monetary participation during the Gulf war in 1991). This was mainly due to its sensitivities towards war and the nuclear experiences it had in the pre-Cold War period. Internally, it is constrained with its pacifist constitution, public perception and the unwillingness of the leadership to improve military/defence capabilities (which is changing in the recent times due to the constantly evolving security situation in the Indo-Pacific).

Considering the unique characteristics of the states under study, India and Japan, a nuanced analysis of their bilateral relations through Neoclassical Realism (NCR) is essential. This approach uses both systemic and domestic factors, such as leadership, business groups, institutions, and policies, to provide a comprehensive understanding. In this context, the current chapter brings out the characteristics of NCR as a theoretical framework to analyse the bilateral relations of India and Japan. The chapter is organised in the following fashion: the first section of the chapter discusses the theoretical underpinnings and different strands of realism, which includes neorealism and presents the view point of various scholars who postulated/used the prism of realism and neorealism, to understand India and Japan bilateral relations. The next section delves into the need for an alternative variant of realism and proceeds to understand the nature of NCR through a discussion on the evolution of the concept and its effectiveness in understanding the bilateral relations involving India and Japan.

It is to be noted that diverse frameworks have been utilised by scholars of International Relations (IR) to elucidate the intricacies of the global system. However, despite the abundance of frameworks, the incommensurability of international relations theories posed a significant hindrance.² Mainstream frameworks of IR have had difficulty providing a sufficient explanation for the dynamics of security architectures in diverse regions such as East Asia, South China Sea, South Asia and so on.³ Consequently, several frameworks have surfaced. The basic difference between them was the variations in the variable or unit of analysis against other preferred alternatives. In other words, some theorists support the analysis that is focused on internal or domestic elements while others focus on external variables, such as the international system. For instance, over a period of time, the balance of global power has had

² Colin Wight, "Incommensurability and Cross-Paradigm Communication in International Relations Theory: 'What's the Frequency Kenneth?'," *Millennium* 25, no. 2 (June 1, 1996): 291–319, accessed on March 11, 2021, <https://doi.org/10.1177/03058298960250020401>.

³ Victor D. Cha, *Alignment Despite Antagonism: The United States-Korea-Japan Security Triangle* (Stanford: Stanford University Press, 1999).

an impact on the relationship between India-Japan. Both nations adopted overtly normative notions about how the world ought to be in the early post-World War II years. During the Cold War years, while India maintained a non-aligned stance, the alliance system of the United States (US) placed Japan on the side of western bloc in the Cold War binaries. Since the end of the Cold War, India and Japan have significantly strengthened their relations, driven by the rise of Asia as a centre capable of exerting influence and power at both regional and global levels. On the one hand, Japan sought new alliances in Asia as a result of decreased American strategic focus on East Asia and changing regional security dynamics. These developments have resulted in the current strategic partnership with India. On the other hand, soon after the Cold War ended, India opened its economy and wanted to explore its eastern neighbours, both Southeast Asian and East Asian states, for investments, trade and the transfer of technology.

Geographically, both India and Japan are part of Asia-Pacific (recently characterised as the Indo-Pacific) security architecture, and they both share traits like democratic principles and basic human rights values. Japan has long been a significant economic force and is currently transitioning to a “normal” military power. At the formal level, it appears that India has no plans to become an allied partner with any of the leading major powers in the world, despite the fact that India itself is in a status transformation. In general, Indo-Japanese interactions were primarily of an economic character till recently. Nevertheless, the shifting dynamics in Asia, particularly the emergence of China, and the threat posed by North Korea (especially in the case of Japan), and relative decline of the US power projection in the region have forced Japan to rekindle stronger connections with India, including in the military sphere. Simultaneously, India has worked to forge closer ties with all the major countries across the world, including China. This enabled India to continue its rapid economic growth, that requires investments and resources. As a result, the Indo-Japanese relationship has evolved from being primarily economic to the one being multifarious in nature. To attain mutual benefits, both nations have identified similar goals in this regard. It is in this context, there is a need to analyse India-Japan relations historically, by throwing light on the substantial body of theoretical literature to facilitate a nuanced understanding of foreign policies of India and Japan. Thus, it is pertinent to understand the postulates of major theoretical frameworks like realism and neorealism and their application in analysing India and Japan bilateral relations. The following section deals with the tenets of realism and neorealism; followed by a rationale and the need for an alternative variant such as NCR.

Realism and its Characteristics

The Realist tradition, which has roots in the Greek philosophical traditions, has been the dominant theoretical framework since the end of the World War II. Then on, realism was not only challenged by competing frameworks but has also exhibited a polarising tendency.⁴ Nation-states, as realism asserts, is the central and primary actor in the domain of international relations. Though there are other entities such as various groups and individuals in the realm of international relations their power or control is confined or limited. Moreover, the state can be regarded as a cohesive entity. It is compelled to communicate and behave in a strong manner, especially during the periods of conflict, because of its national interests. Furthermore, it can be contended that decision-makers demonstrate rational behaviour, in the pursuit of national interests by following logical decision-making procedures. In a competitive environment, regardless of their political ideology, realism posits that, leaders recognise this fact as they strive to administer their countries' affairs in order to ensure survival.⁵ States operate within a system of anarchy, characterised by an absence of international authority or administration. Globally, there is no established system of authority which can issue guidelines in an event of emergency. Consequently, states might ultimately depend only on their own resources. Realism frequently faces criticism for its perceived extreme pessimism, as it posits the inevitability of the combative character inherent in the international affairs. Nevertheless, realists argue that leaders encounter perpetual limitations and limited prospects for collaboration. As a result, they have limited ability to evade the actuality of power politics. From a realist point of view, confronting the reality of one's situation is not indicative of pessimism, but rather of wisdom.⁶ The realist perspective on international relations emphasises the inherent limitations on the potential for peaceful transformation or any other form of change.

⁴ Glenn H. Snyder, "Mearsheimer's World-Offensive Realism and the Struggle for Security: A Review Essay," *International Security* 27, no. 1 (2002): 149–73.

⁵ Or Rosenboim, "Realism," in *The Globalization of World Politics: An Introduction to International Relations*, ed. Baylis John, Smith Steve, and Owens Patricia, 9th ed. (United Kingdom: Oxford University Press), 134, accessed April 27, 2023, <https://www.oxfordpoliticstrove.com/display/10.1093/hepl/9780192898142.001.0001/hepl-9780192898142-chapter-9>.

⁶ Antunes Sandrina and Camisão Isabel, "Introducing Realism in International Relations Theory," *E-International Relations* (blog), February 27, 2018, accessed on March 11, 2021, <https://www.e-ir.info/2018/02/27/introducing-realism-in-international-relations-theory/>.

Hans Morgenthau, the chief proponent of realism, endeavoured to formulate an all-encompassing international theory in the post-World War II era, arguing that politics, like society at large, is regulated by laws derived from inherent human nature. The scholar's primary focus was to elucidate the correlation between interests and morals in the realm of international politics.⁷ His writings extensively relied on the standpoint of renowned historical figures like Thucydides and Machiavelli. In contrast to idealists (liberalists) with a more optimistic outlook who anticipated the resolution of international problems through transparent negotiations characterised by liberal/progressive human values, Morgenthau proposed a strategy that prioritised power over moral considerations. Morality was characterised as a factor that ought to be circumvented in the process of policymaking. According to Morgenthau, all political actions are oriented towards the preservation, augmentation, or exhibition of power. It is believed that policies grounded in morality or idealism might result in vulnerability, perhaps leading to the downfall or subjugation of a state by a rival.⁸ Pursuing the national interest is considered "amoral" in this context, indicating that it is not influenced by moral considerations. To be precise, in an anarchic international system, the deployment of a state's national power is considered as conventional realism's fundamental concern. The focus of realist scholars is on the state's nature and its relationship to its society, as well as how power is distributed among its many units.

While realists like Morgenthau believed that capable leaders could maintain the balance of power, the realist framework has encountered mounting criticism for its inclination to provide retrospective explanations without possessing predictive capabilities.⁹ Another criticism against realism is that it lacks coherence when applied to the field of international politics. Instead, it encompasses a set of characteristics grounded in fundamental ideas. The prevailing concept in this context is that in a world without a central authority, sovereign countries place a high importance on safeguarding their own security. This phenomenon compels states to pursue power and resources, leading to the emergence of conflicts. Moreover,

⁷ B. S. Chimni, *International Law and World Order: A Critique of Contemporary Approaches*, 2nd ed. (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2017), 46, accessed on April 1, 2021, <https://doi.org/10.1017/9781107588196>.

⁸ Chimni, 48.

⁹ Brian Rathbun, "A Rose by Any Other Name: NCR as the Logical and Necessary Extension of Structural Realism," *Security Studies* 17, no. 2 (May 22, 2008): 295, accessed on March 12, 2021, <https://doi.org/10.1080/09636410802098917>.

it is widely acknowledged that relative improvements hold greater significance compared to absolute increase in power. Realism places significant emphasis on the geographical location of a state (geographic determinism), suggesting that the primary determinant of states' behaviour is balance of power. States strategically form alliances or engage in military build ups because of the perception that no other state possesses the reliability to independently safeguard the interests of another state. The only recourse for states is to "bandwagon" or yield to a more dominant power when states are unable to achieve balance. While a few scholars have created a typology of realism,¹⁰ by employing new vocabulary or adjectives, the theorists of international relations have tried to develop a new variety of realism. In other words, realism has thrived and has given rise to a number of fresh threads. The first of these is neorealism, or structural realism, which severed ties with traditional or classical realism and was established through Kenneth Waltz's major work "Theory of International Politics."¹¹ Since the publication of this scholarly work (1979), the notion of "systemic determinacy" has effectively taken control of the IR theoretical literature.¹² As a result, domestic-level variables have been typically ignored or given lesser explanatory role in this literature on IR theory.

Neorealism and its Characteristics

Since the publication of Waltz's ground breaking work of 1979, the intellectual tide changed significantly. Waltz combined realism with system level theory, whereas Robert Cox is credited with coining the term "neorealism" to demonstrate both its philosophical affinity with conventional realism and its distinctiveness.¹³ Waltz discovered a behavioural pattern where nation-states repeatedly pursue similar strategies to ensure their security. His 1979 work argues that rather than the internal traits of the states,¹⁴ it is the structure of the international system that forms the driving factor. To explain state behaviour as well as systemic results, neorealism uses relative distribution of power among states in a structure as its key variable.

¹⁰ Stephen G. Brooks, "Dueling Realisms," *International Organization* 51, no. 3 (1997): 445–77; Gideon Rose, "NCR and Theories of Foreign Policy," *World Politics* 51, no. 1 (October 1998): 144–72, accessed on June 5, 2019, <https://doi.org/10.1017/S0043887100007814>.

¹¹ Kenneth Neal Waltz, *Theory of International Politics* (Massachusetts: Addison-Wesley, 1979).

¹² Jennifer Sterling-Folker, "Realist Environment, Liberal Process, and Domestic-Level Variables," *International Studies Quarterly* 41, no. 1 (1997): 20.

¹³ Robert O. Keohane, ed., *Neorealism and Its Critics* (New York: Columbia University Press, 1986).

¹⁴ Waltz, *Theory of International Politics*, 23.

According to Waltz's neorealism, reasons made at the state or unit level of analysis are not significant to explain the fundamental shifts in international politics. Instead, justifications made at the systemic level are considered necessary.¹⁵ According to Waltz, the emergence of international structure is a result of the interaction between states, which subsequently imposes limitations on their actions while simultaneously driving them towards alternative course of action. This perspective is crucial for comprehending the behaviour of a state.¹⁶ In essence, neorealism holds the view that there exists a transformation of the state into interconnected blocs that engage in mutual interaction.

In addition, according to structural realism (neorealism), first, every state is subject to certain limitations because of the anarchic nature of world politics. In a world, where no one can be relied upon to protect them, states are left to fend for themselves. The framework, therefore, offers states some incentives assuming that they wish to survive. For states to achieve their objectives, they must first amass power. Second, given the stakes, domestic politics should not be permitted to influence choices. Waltz suggests that the system encourages functional similarity by assuming the "black-box" or "billiard ball" scenario.¹⁷ Third, domestic politics serve a purpose beyond merely translating systemic elements into policy; they also contribute to the diversity of foreign policy, the debate over its objectives, and the functional differences therein. This implies that states have a responsibility to safeguard social interests, even if it means going against local interests. The state, acting as a single entity, should safeguard the national interest of a nation, which extends beyond the mere aggregation of societal preferences.¹⁸ Moreover, given the significant consequences that errors can bring about, it is crucial for nations to meticulously assess and comprehend their surroundings in an unbiased manner.

The system offers rewards for reason, which is defined as having an unbiased awareness of the effects of anarchy. Neorealists argue that the anarchic structure of international politics encourages the state to operate in a unitary manner. Undoubtedly, Waltz's development of

¹⁵ Lucas G. Freire, "Is Neorealism a Deterministic Theory of International Relations?," *International Studies* 56, no. 1 (January 1, 2019): 60, accessed on April 11, 2020, <https://doi.org/10.1177/0020881718824760>.

¹⁶ Kenneth N. Waltz, "Structural Realism after the Cold War," *International Security* 25, no. 1 (2000): 5–41.

¹⁷ J. David Singer, "The Level-of-Analysis Problem in International Relations," *World Politics* 14, no. 1 (1961): 78, accessed on March 10, 2021, <https://doi.org/10.2307/2009557>.

¹⁸ Rathbun, "A Rose by Any Other Name," May 22, 2008, 296.

neorealism, which focused on systemic-level grand theory, had a profound impact on subsequent research in international relations. For a while, system level theories were the dominant frameworks of global politics. Numerous academics¹⁹ have expressed opposition to the separation of system or structure and state as a result of this predicament.

Furthermore, from the neorealist perspective, the state is the security referent, the one that is to be secured from the vagaries of an anarchic international system. In this context, the main thrust of neorealist thinking on security is to protect the physical safety of states from deliberate harm (often military) inflicted across national borders²⁰ and the main means for doing so was the military. Neorealism contends that nations must restrain from the pursuit of power through the balance of power mechanism in order to guarantee their survival.²¹ The means to advance this mechanism include deterrence, military force projections, strategic nuclear balancing, and collective security and military alliances. According to Schweller, states must achieve consensus through a competitive and decentralised political process.²² In a way neorealism gives more primacy to the traditional security of nation-state.

In this context, the realist method has faced significant criticism when applied to Japan. After the defeat in World War II, especially the immediate years following it, Japan underwent diplomatic immobility. The strategy adopted by Japan was perceived as a result of a logical assessment of national interests, sometimes referred to as the “strategic state” or “Yoshida Doctrine.”²³ Prime Minister of Japan, Yoshida Shigeru formulated the Yoshida doctrine based on the conviction that Japan had mismanaged its national resources in the past and required an

¹⁹ Fareed Zakaria, *From Wealth to Power: The Unusual Origins of America's World Role*, vol. 82 (Princeton University Press, 1998), accessed on March 11, 2021, <https://doi.org/10.2307/j.ctvzcz5bq>; Randall L. Schweller, “Unanswered Threats: A Neoclassical Realist Theory of Underbalancing,” *International Security* 29, no. 2 (October 1, 2004): 159–201, accessed on March 11, 2021, <https://doi.org/10.1162/0162288042879913>; William Curti Wohlforth, *The Elusive Balance: Power and Perceptions during the Cold War* (Ithaca: Cornell University Press, 1993).

²⁰ Abdullah Alhammedi, “The Neorealism and Neoliberalism behind International Relations during COVID-19,” *World Affairs* 185, no. 1 (March 2022): 150, accessed on June 12, 2022, <https://doi.org/10.1177/00438200211065128>.

²¹ Stephen M. Walt, “The Renaissance of Security Studies,” *International Studies Quarterly* 35, no. 2 (1991): 211–239, accessed on July 1, 2020, <https://doi.org/10.2307/2600471>.

²² Schweller, “The Progressiveness of Neoclassical Realism”; Colin Elman and Miriam Fendius Elman, eds., *Progress in International Relations Theory: Appraising the Field* (Cambridge, Mass: MIT Press, 2003)

²³ Thomas U. Berger, Mike Mochizuki, and Jitsuo Tsuchiyama, eds., *Japan in International Politics: The Foreign Policies of an Adaptive State* (Lynne Rienner Publishers, 2007).

alternative solution. Japan was given a preferential security arrangement, which was critically referred to as a “free ride,” because the US took the responsibility to provide military support and safeguard Japan from any potential aggression by the Soviet Union during the Cold War.²⁴ This afforded additional time to concentrate on the process of economic recuperation and expansion. Japan faced criticism for its perceived lack of strategic planning and its adoption of a flexible diplomatic approach. However, it is noteworthy that this particular strategy proved advantageous for Japan over a significant period of the Cold War era.

The degree to which, US foreign policy, a structural variable, determined Japanese foreign policy is debatable. For Kent Calder, a Japanese studies expert, Japan is a “reactive state”,²⁵ with its policy determined by the US. In the Japanese context, it is called *gaiatsu* (policy dictated through external pressure). Hirose Takako, a Japanese scholar, agrees and believes that the “Please US policy” had shaped “in terms of responses to the external environment, rather than a policy formulated on its own initiative.”²⁶ He categorised the foreign policy of Japan as “characterised by vagueness and indecisiveness” where “not much imagination or initiative can be observed.”²⁷ Additionally, Calder contended that there was no chance of a comprehensive Japanese strategy because of the intense internal strife and “bureaucratic rivalries” brought on by Japan’s political system’s fragmentation and pluralism.²⁸ Van Wolferen, a prominent scholar on Japanese studies, does not consider Japan as a sovereign state in the conventional sense of the phrase. He defined Japan an entity “with central organs of government which can both recognise what is good for the country and bear ultimate responsibility for national decision-making.”²⁹ Such a dependence, according to Van Wolferen, was mainly due Japan’s reliance on the US for its security.

²⁴ Berger, Mochizuki, and Tsuchiyama, 24.

²⁵ Kent E. Calder, “Japanese Foreign Economic Policy Formation: Explaining the Reactive State,” ed. Takashi Inoguchi et al., *World Politics* 40, no. 4 (1988): 518, accessed on February 18, 2023, <https://doi.org/10.2307/2010317>.

²⁶ Hirose Takako, “Japan in a Dilemma: The Search for a Horizontal Japan-South Asia Relationship,” in *Distant Asian Neighbours: Japan and South Asia* (New Delhi: Sterling, 1996), 34.

²⁷ Takako, 35.

²⁸ Calder, “Japanese Foreign Economic Policy Formation,” 1988, 518.

²⁹ Karel van Wolferen, “Japan in the Age of Uncertainty,” *New Left Review*, no. 1/200 (August 1, 1993): 15–40.

From an alternative perspective, Japanese policy consists of pragmatic and well-considered strategies. Jonathan Green examines the structural level factors, identifying Japanese foreign policy as “increasingly shaped by strategic considerations about the balance of power and influence in Northeast Asia, particularly vis-à-vis China.”³⁰ Japan’s relationship with East Asia has evolved from being primarily driven by economic factors to now encompassing a deliberate competition with China for geopolitical influence over the region. Jonathan Green, a Japanese studies scholar, argues that Japan’s adoption of a realistic approach in its regional role was influenced by international events rather than a deliberate need.³¹ Observers who recognise the importance of restraining China as a key aspect of Japanese policy have embraced Green’s analysis. Nevertheless, Japan’s progress is hindered by its conventional dependence on the US-Japan alliance and regional conventions. Christopher Hughes, another notable Japanese scholar, concurs with Green’s assertion that Japan’s alliance with the US has been bolstered due to China’s increasing military expenditure and the persistent belligerence of North Korea.³² This in turn leads to more dependence by Japan on the US.

Pyle and Samuels, noted experts on Japan’s foreign relations, assert that Japan is rational and becoming more aggressive rather than “irrational, passive or lacking in strategic thought.”³³ The evaluation made by Calder has been challenged by Samuels and Heginbotham, who contend that policymakers are neither characterised as “doves nor hawks,” but rather as pragmatists.³⁴ They assert that policymakers employ an efficient bureaucratic system adept at diplomacy to safeguard Japan’s national political and economic goals. Samuels and Heginbotham posit that Japan continues to persist in its dependence on the US for military equilibrium, while concurrently pursuing additional commercial prospects in the region, employing a “dual hedge” approach.³⁵ Over the past twenty years, there has been a growing controversy on whether Japan has achieved or should achieve a state of normalcy. The idea

³⁰ Michael Jonathan Green, *Japan’s Reluctant Realism* (New York: Palgrave Macmillan US, 2001), 5, accessed on March 11, 2021, <https://doi.org/10.1057/9780312299804>.

³¹ Green, 6.

³² Christopher W. Hughes, “Japan’s Doctoring of the Yoshida Doctrine,” *Asia Policy*, no. 4 (2007): 200.

³³ T.J. Pempel, “The Pendulum Swings toward a Rising Sun,” *Asia Policy* 4, no. 1 (2007): 191.

³⁴ Eric Heginbotham and Richard J. Samuels, “Japan’s Dual Hedge,” *Foreign Affairs* 81, no. 5 (2002): 113, accessed on January 10, 2020, <https://doi.org/10.2307/20033272>.

³⁵ Heginbotham and Samuels, 115.

was first articulated by Ichiro Ozawa, a prominent politician associated with the Democratic Party of Japan (DPJ), in 1993 in a publication entitled “Blueprint for a New Japan.”³⁶ He argued for an increased role for Japan to assume a position that is more congruent with its military and economic capacities. Japan has transitioned from its prior dual identity as an elite-guided mercantile state and democratic pacifist state towards a more military-realist position.³⁷ This shift is marked by the convergence of overlapping yet somewhat contradictory frameworks. By forming multilateral coalition of regional alliances, Japan has shifted from relying on the US for its military and economic capabilities. Pyle and Green consider that by taking on a significant role both at the region and world stage is a positive development not just to the Japan but also to the region as a whole.³⁸ As a result, Japan has begun to cooperate with other nations on the strategic front. For example, this can be observed in the Middle East strategy of Japan. During the Gulf War (1990-91), Japan provided economic assistance to countries which were involved in fighting instead of sending troops like any other nation. Due to this “cheque book” diplomacy Japan received criticism for not actively taking part in the war. Later on, after 9/11 attack on the US, Japan started changing its policy of not sending troops and actively participated in peace keeping operations.

With regard to Middle East strategy of Japan, Yukiko Miyagi, a Japanese scholar, contends that Japan’s alignment with the US policy following the events of 9/11 resulted in a prioritisation of political goals over economic stability, despite its significant dependence on oil from the region.³⁹ This development has been acknowledged by numerous researchers, who have characterised it as the transition towards a “normal country” or the emergence of “Creeping Realism, Transitional Realism, and Mercantile Realism.”⁴⁰ The terrorist attacks on the US in 2001 and accompanying “war on terror” served to accelerate this approach. Further,

³⁶ Yoichiro Sato, “Three Norms of Collective Defense and Japan’s Overseas Troop Dispatches,” in *Norms, Interests, and Power in Japanese Foreign Policy*, ed. Yoichiro Sato and Keiko Hirata (New York: Palgrave Macmillan US, 2008), 95, accessed on January 10, 2020, https://doi.org/10.1057/9780230615809_5.

³⁷ Sato, 97.

³⁸ Kenneth Pyle, *Japan Rising: The Resurgence of Japanese Power and Purpose*, Reprint edition (New York, NY: PublicAffairs, 2008).

³⁹ Yukiko Miyagi, *Japan’s Middle East Security Policy: Theory and Cases*, 1st ed. (London: Routledge, 2013), 30, accessed on March 11, 2021, <https://www.routledge.com/Japans-Middle-East-Security-Policy-Theory-and-Cases/Miyagi/p/book/9780415666725>.

⁴⁰ David C. Kang, “Getting Asia Wrong: The Need for New Analytical Frameworks,” *International Security* 27, no. 4 (2003): 70.

Hughes acknowledges efforts by Japan's elite to "maximise autonomy and the great skill and ingenuity with which these leaders have sought to maintain hedging options."⁴¹ Rose believes that economic and technological strength are now more significant than political or military power.⁴² Japan's engagement with the United Nations (UN) and its confidence in multilateral institutions also fall under this realm. The claim that Japan is utilising the UN to evolve as a great power and, eventually, acquire a permanent place on the Security Council is subscribed to by realists.

Neorealist analysts, during the course of the Cold War, predicted that Japan would shift from its passive position to a more assertive global role.⁴³ Realist principles dictate that in an international state of anarchy, governments must strive to maximise their influence within the limits of their economies.⁴⁴ Nevertheless, the activities undertaken by Japan was quite opposite to these standards. Japan, as a nation, is often recognised as a highly developed and contemporary society, being the fourth largest economy globally. Despite possessing greater degree of military capabilities globally, the allocation of funds towards defence has been limited due to the imposition of a ceiling at one percent of Japan's total income. Miyagi argued that Japan's diplomacy reflected an unbalanced power dynamic, where its economic capabilities are far advanced in comparison to its political status and military strength.⁴⁵ The primary focus of scholarly investigation was to examine this issue within the context of its foreign strategy. Many historians had embraced postulates of realism to elucidate the acts of India and Japan, assigning different levels of significance to the aforementioned assumptions.

The theoretical attempts to understand foreign policy of India was mostly refracted through the lens of liberalism from the period it became independent. This phase lasted until the end of Bandung conference in 1955, Suez Canal crisis in 1956, and the establishment of

⁴¹ Hughes, "Japan's Doctoring of the Yoshida Doctrine," 201.

⁴² Gideon Rose, "Neoclassical Realism and Theories of Foreign Policy," *World Politics* 51, no. 1 (October 1998): 144–172, accessed on January 23, 2021, <https://doi.org/10.1017/S0043887100007814>.

⁴³ Hiro Katsumata, "Norms, Interests, and Power in Japanese Foreign Policy," *International Relations of the Asia-Pacific* 10, no. 1 (January 1, 2010): 189–92, accessed on January 10, 2020, <https://doi.org/10.1093/irap/lcp004>.

⁴⁴ Harsh V. Pant, *Contemporary Debates in Indian Foreign and Security Policy* (New York: Palgrave Macmillan US, 2008), accessed on January 10, 2020, <https://doi.org/10.1057/9780230612952>.

⁴⁵ Yukiko Miyagi, *Japan's Middle East Security Policy: Theory and Cases*, 32.

non-alignment in 1961 by Nehru, Nasser and Tito. However, the US decision in 1954 to provide military aid to Pakistan for the growth of its armed forces represented the first explicit intervention by a superpower in subcontinental politics.⁴⁶ As previously mentioned, India was believed to be pursuing a liberal/idealism based foreign policy, emphasising a moral and idealistic character while rejecting balance of power tactics, embracing non-alignment and a peaceful coexistence policy.

The early period of Indian foreign policy which was most significantly attributed to the first Prime Minister of India, Jawaharlal Nehru, focused on the autonomy of India and non-alignment, as well as its readiness to actively collaborate in global multilateral arenas, such as achieving full nuclear disarmament.⁴⁷ The analysis pertaining to Nehru's position as an "idealist" or "moralist" in India had revealed specific facets of his ideology (as a practitioner of foreign policy) that demonstrated realism as well. One illustration of his realist ideas can be observed in his emphasis on non-alignment as a counter response to the West in international affairs, as well as his focus on the building of relatively credible national security infrastructure. Initially, India did not prioritise military capabilities,⁴⁸ however, due to border conflicts and the threat of nuclear proliferation, the country shifted its attention towards an overt realist policy that centred on national security concerns. Consequently, normative concerns began to appear less visible in India's foreign policy calculus.⁴⁹ The instances of realism in Indian foreign policy were frequently observed in several contexts, with a particular focus on the observed shifts in post-Cold War period. The conflicts against Pakistan and China, along with its distinctive nuclear policy (supported by the key developments in science and technology) facilitated the emergence of realism as an overarching framework. India consistently exhibited its "pragmatic stance" while addressing several political matters, leading to the embrace of a realist strategy,⁵⁰ as demonstrated by its military realism, multi-alignment, and power

⁴⁶ Dr. Mona Singh, "Indian Foreign Policy: From Idealism to Realism," *International Journal of Scientific Research* 3, no. 5 (June 1, 2012): 94, accessed on January 14, 2020, <https://doi.org/10.15373/22778179/MAY2014/29>.

⁴⁷ Purusottam Bhattacharya, "India's Foreign Policy In The Twenty-First Century: THE QUEST FOR MAJOR POWER STATUS," *World Affairs: The Journal of International Issues* 22, no. 3 (2018): 40.

⁴⁸ Debiel Tobias and Wulf Herbert, "More than a Rule Taker: The Indian Way of Multilateralism," in *Theorizing Indian Foreign Policy*, ed. Mischa Hansel, Raphaëlle Khan, and Mélissa Levailant, Rethinking Asia and International Relations (Routledge, 2017), 52.

⁴⁹ Dr. Mona Singh, "Indian Foreign Policy: From Idealism to Realism," 95.

⁵⁰ Jamie Gaskarth, *China, India and the Future of International Society* (Rowman & Littlefield International, Limited, 2015).

asymmetry with China. This can be understood by its policy towards balancing by way of acquiring nuclear capability beginning in 1974.

In the post-Cold War period, as a theoretical framework, classical realism began to face numerous challenges especially with ascendancy of non-state actors unleashed by the processes of globalisation.⁵¹ Earlier to this, the neorealist viewpoint had been employed by certain scholars to elucidate the impact of India on the foreign policies of neighbouring countries, including Bangladesh⁵² and Sri Lanka (Ceylon).⁵³ These debates have applied certain theories, especially the theory of “Balance of Power” propounded by Waltz. The examination of India-Japan relations has also been approached through the prism of balance of power and power capabilities.⁵⁴ India’s relationship with the major nations has also been analysed through neorealism.⁵⁵ Therefore, neorealism has been predominantly employed in the analysis of empirical cases. With non-state actors (like Multi-National Corporations - MNCs, Inter Governmental Organisations, violent actors and so on) gaining influence, and with the role of variables (traditional and non-traditional) becoming more prominent, neorealism’s state-centric and materialist perspective was no longer capable of describing current developments. This in a way has interrogated the credibility of neorealist framework.

A significant area of analysis has been on proving that relative capabilities are important and that India's efforts to establish control in the region are influenced by its superior material capabilities. Since the end of the Cold War, irrespective of a single political party or a coalition of multiple parties in power, the primary geo-economic framework guiding Indian foreign policy has been the promotion and strengthening of globalisation. The attempt to

⁵¹ William C. Wohlforth, “Realism and the End of the Cold War,” *International Security* 19, no. 3 (1994): 92, accessed on March 11, 2021, <https://doi.org/10.2307/2539080>.

⁵² V.K. Vinayaraj, “India as a Threat: Bangladeshi Perceptions,” *South Asian Survey* 16, no. 1 (March 1, 2009): 102, accessed on January 10, 2020, <https://doi.org/10.1177/097152310801600107>.

⁵³ Shakthi De Silva, “Balancing, Bandwagoning or Hedging? Independent Ceylon’s Reaction to Regional Hegemony,” *South Asian Survey* 22, no. 2 (September 1, 2015): 191, accessed on January 10, 2020, <https://doi.org/10.1177/0971523117753929>.

⁵⁴ Joshy M. Paul, “India and Japan: Reluctant Idealism to Practical Realism,” *South Asian Survey* 15, no. 1 (January 1, 2008): 100, accessed on February 1, 2020, <https://doi.org/10.1177/097152310801500107>.

⁵⁵ Rajesh Rajagopalan and Varun Sahni, “India and the Great Powers: Strategic Imperatives, Normative Necessities,” *South Asian Survey* 15, no. 1 (January 1, 2008): 5–32, accessed on February 1, 2020, <https://doi.org/10.1177/097152310801500102>.

develop, cement, and strengthen the strategic alliance between India and the US has been the key geopolitical tenet. This has, of course, been explained and supported in a number of ways.⁵⁶ For instance, it has been justified in terms of Indian national interest and placing it in an advantageous position to help grow into a significant world power.

Theoretical predictions concerning state behaviour cannot be true if the system is not determinative. Waltz remarked, “we cannot know what state X will do on Tuesday”⁵⁷ in his well-known remark, which implies that states are unpredictable and neorealism fails to explain their behaviour in an anarchic international structure. According to Rajesh M. Basrur, a prominent Indian political scientist:

*“the very sparseness and tightness of Waltz’s theory, which relegates everything but structure (viewed as anarchy and power distribution among states) to the realm of process and therefore beyond the pale of scientific theorising, leaves very little scope for explaining the vast majority of events that occur in international politics.”*⁵⁸

Neorealism is often criticised for being ahistorical, downplaying the importance of context (especially the decision making within a state), disregarding the agency of players, and neglecting fundamental aspects of international relations such as morality. These criticisms stem from its narrow focus and desire for simplicity.⁵⁹ Neorealism in India has been sufficiently acknowledged within the broader realist academic scholarship due to its emphasis on simplicity.

Nevertheless, this perception has caused many to believe that neorealism lacks relevance in the context of foreign policy, especially on aspects pertaining the linkages between domestic and the structural factors and that NCR should step in to address this gap. Taliaferro

⁵⁶ Achin Vanaik, “National Interest: A Flawed Notion: Indian Foreign Policy since 1991,” *Economic and Political Weekly* 41, no. 49 (2006): 5045–49.

⁵⁷ Waltz, *Theory of International Politics*, 121.

⁵⁸ Rajesh M. Basrur, “Theory for Strategy: Emerging India in a Changing World,” *South Asian Survey* 16, no. 1 (March 1, 2009): 10, accessed on February 1, 2020, <https://doi.org/10.1177/097152310801600102>.

⁵⁹ Nabarun Roy, “Realism in the Study of International Relations in India,” *ORF Issue Brief*, no. 253 (September 2018), accessed on February 12, 2020, https://www.orfonline.org/wp-content/uploads/2018/09/ORF_IssueBrief_253_Realism-IR.pdf.

argues that NCR encompasses realist theories of foreign policy, specifically focusing on the intersection of domestic politics and ideas, rather than solely relying on systemic level factors.⁶⁰ NCR completes the incomplete picture left by structural realism by utilising internal politics and ideologies as relevant variables. Neoclassical realists concur with Waltz in this regard, holding that any analysis should begin with the system.⁶¹ On this, they stick to their position. All proponents of NCR stress the value of structure. As has occasionally been suggested, NCR is more than merely an exacting and scientific version of classical realism. Since the sparing account of neorealism falls short, in order to explain international politics, neoclassical realists added domestic-level variables to achieve greater accuracy. Neoclassical realists do this by opening up the state's "black box"⁶² and interacting with each other and framing policies that suit their domestic interests.

According to Snyder, proponents of realism in IR have erred in their entire focus on states as the inseparable entities whose interests and power are to be evaluated.⁶³ This adjustment can be achieved by incorporating elements of Waltzian neorealism, which posits that the distribution of material power influences the behaviour of states. By incorporating domestic variables, one can gain insights into the reasons behind states' actions. The following section focuses on a recent surge in NCR research that originated in the early 1990s. It suggests that foreign policy acts are influenced by systemic pressures, which are then filtered by intervening domestic variables. Academic research conducted by scholars such as Jack Snyder, Fareed Zakaria, Randall Schweller, Aaron Friedberg, Thomas Christensen and William Wohlforth⁶⁴ demonstrated that the assessment and reaction of a state to changes in the external environment are shaped by its internal institutions and political circumstances.

⁶⁰ Jeffrey W. Taliaferro, "Security Seeking under Anarchy: Defensive Realism Revisited," *International Security* 25, no. 3 (2000): 128–161.

⁶¹ Randall L. Schweller, "The Progressiveness of NCR," in *Progress in International Relations Theory: Appraising the Field*, ed. Elman Colin and Elman Miriam Fendius (United States: The MIT Press, 2003), accessed on January 10, 2020, <https://direct.mit.edu/books/edited-volume/2500/chapter/66986/The-Progressiveness-of-Neoclassical-Realism>; Rose, "NCR and Theories of Foreign Policy"; Jeffrey W. Taliaferro, "State Building for Future Wars: NCR and the Resource-Extractive State," *Security Studies* 15, no. 3 (September 1, 2006): 464–95, accessed on January 10, 2020, <https://doi.org/10.1080/09636410601028370>.

⁶² John Baylis, Steve Smith, and Patricia Owens, eds., *The Globalization of World Politics: An Introduction to International Relations*, Ninth Edition, Ninth Edition (Oxford, New York: Oxford University Press, 2023).

⁶³ Snyder, "Mearsheimer's World-Offensive Realism and the Struggle for Security," 155.

⁶⁴ Rose, "Neoclassical Realism and Theories of Foreign Policy"; Schweller, "The Progressiveness of Neoclassical Realism," 320.

Complex domestic political processes function as conduits, facilitating the transmission, alteration, and reorientation of policy outcomes in reaction to external pressures, primarily alterations in relative power dynamics. Consequently, states often exhibit varying reactions to identical systemic pressures and opportunities, with their answers being primarily shaped by domestic factors rather than systemic ones.

Neoclassical Realism (NCR) and its Characteristics

NCR represents a significant advancement within the comprehensive research paradigm of realism while seeking to enhance Waltz's theory by clarifying the reasons and justifications for states' departure from the framework of "balance of power" propounded by neorealists.⁶⁵ It is imperative to integrate Waltz's ultra-parsimonious theory of neorealism with other concepts and ideas to produce conclusive predictions of decision making at the level of foreign policy.⁶⁶ Alternative assumptions propose that the structure imposes constraints on foreign policy actions, but does not exert complete control over them. However, it is the perceptions of decision-makers and the domestic state structure at the unit level bearing a significant impact in this context. NCR does not deviate much from the earlier realist scholars but instead adds different levels of analysis within the realist framework keeping the state as a primary player and unit of analysis while including domestic factors as another set of analysis.

Gideon Rose introduced the term "NCR" in a critical examination of four publications featured in the spring 1998 edition of the journal *World Politics*. In the paper, Rose argued that the four volumes, written by Randall Schweller, Thomas J. Christensen, William C. Wohlforth, and Fareed Zakaria, represented a unique collection of concepts about mid-path foreign strategy.⁶⁷ The concept of NCR aimed to combine Kenneth N. Waltz's structural realism, or neorealism, which emphasises the constraints placed on states by an anarchic global system, with the practical understanding of statecraft and the complex dynamics of society-state relationships derived from the classical realism of Arnold Wolfers, Hans Morgenthau, E. H. Carr and other influential scholars of the twentieth century. Rose identified a new branch

⁶⁵ Jason Davidson, *America's Allies and War: Kosovo, Afghanistan, and Iraq*, 1st ed (New York: Palgrave Macmillan, 2011).

⁶⁶ Juliet Kaarbo, "A Foreign Policy Analysis Perspective on the Domestic Politics Turn in IR Theory1," *International Studies Review* 17, no. 2 (June 1, 2015): 189–216, accessed on April 10, 2021, <https://doi.org/10.1111/misr.12213>.

⁶⁷ Rose, "Neoclassical Realism and Theories of Foreign Policy," 145.

within the realism movement that formed as a result of prior scholarly writings during the same decade. Rose suggested that their contributions should be classified as a distinct foreign policy school because they incorporated common intervening variables such as perceptions of leaders, state structure, relative power, and domestic incentives with a single independent variable, specifically the relative power within the international system.⁶⁸ Furthermore, it was found that these contributions were associated with a dependent variable, especially the process of making decisions on foreign policy. The strategy counters the tendency to excessively prioritise systemic aspects by integrating institutional and cultural influences.⁶⁹ Neoclassical realists claim to have a greater capacity to explain the variations in how and why states react to changes in the international system differently.

While not entirely rejecting the systemic explanations, an increasing number of researchers including Zakaria, Schweller and Wohlforth have emphasised the significance of mixing systemic and unit-level variables. Fareed Zakaria points out that “a good account of a nation’s foreign policy should include systemic, domestic, and other influences, specifying what aspects of the policy can be explained by what factors”.⁷⁰ Gideon Rose, in his review paper “NCR and Theories of Foreign Policy” published in 1998, referred to the writings of these researchers as “Neoclassical Realist” to demonstrate their intellectual affinity with classical realism.⁷¹ Rose argues that the power capabilities of individual states influence on foreign policy is not straightforward and can be complex. This is because systemic pressures need to be filtered via several factors at the individual level, such as the views of decision-makers and the structure of the state. He also argues that NCR updates and organises ideas obtained from traditional realist framework. Gustav Meibauer, an NCR proponent, criticises the implicit reliance of neorealism on the historically contingent but inadequately conceptualised transmission of systemic elements into state behaviour and contends that NCR is better adapted to utilising “history” in a systematic and general explanation,⁷² whereas

⁶⁸ Rose, 151.

⁶⁹ Ariel Ilan Roth, “A Bold Move Forward for NCR,” ed. Randall Schweller, *International Studies Review* 8, no. 3 (2006): 486–88.

⁷⁰ Fareed Zakaria, *From Wealth to Power: The Unusual Origins of America’s World Role*, vol. 82 (Princeton University Press, 1998), accessed on January 23, 2021, <https://doi.org/10.2307/j.ctvzcz5bq>.

⁷¹ Rose, “NCR and Theories of Foreign Policy,” 152.

⁷² Gustav Meibauer, “Neorealism, NCR and the Problem(s) of History,” *International Relations* 37, no. 2 (June 1, 2023): 348–69, accessed on November 10, 2023, <https://doi.org/10.1177/00471178211033943>.

Powell contends that the Neorealist-Neoliberal debate has failed to contribute as much as it could to International Relations Theory (IRT), and that these approaches have serious internal flaws and limitations that the debate has frequently obscured rather than clarified.⁷³ Neoclassical realists do not seek to develop a comprehensive theory of international politics. Instead, they want to understand the behaviour of a particular state in terms of its foreign policy. According to Baylis, the fundamental principle of NCR is that foreign policy is a complex interplay between domestic and international factors.⁷⁴ Domestic issues can influence a state's foreign policy even though national strength and the state's place in the international framework are the two main determinants.

Gideon Rose categorises NCR as a theory of foreign policy and contends that NCR, as an international political theory, is principally concerned with the results of units' interaction.⁷⁵ Additionally he states, "...theories of foreign policy are left to account for much of the daily functions of international relations."⁷⁶ NCR is employed in international relations not because it can explain a variety of occurrences, but rather because it excels in highlighting several levels of analysis and avoids the reductionist dogmatism that other theories experience. NCR argues that to analyse the foreign policies of states within the international system, it is crucial to consider the analytical merits⁷⁷ of both classical realists like Morgenthau, Wolfers, Kissinger and others at the unit-level as well as neorealists such as Waltz and Gilpin.

According to Firoozabadi and Ashkezari, "The History of the Peloponnesian War" of Thucydides is considered the first example of NCR,⁷⁸ and it outlines the cardinal principle that the dread that the Spartans felt as Athena's influence grew was the primary driver of the conflict. In fact, Thucydides outlined in his work the significance of both unit factors of Greek

⁷³ Robert Powell, "Anarchy in International Relations Theory: The Neorealist-Neoliberal Debate," *International Organization* 48, no. 2 (1994): 313–44.

⁷⁴ Baylis, Smith, and Owens, *The Globalization of World Politics*, 34.

⁷⁵ Rose, "Neoclassical Realism and Theories of Foreign Policy," 150.

⁷⁶ Rose, 151.

⁷⁷ Taliaferro, "Security Seeking under Anarchy," 130.

⁷⁸ Jalal Dehghani Firoozabadi and Mojtaba Zare Ashkezari, "Neo-Classical Realism in International Relations," *Asian Social Science* 12, no. 6 (May 20, 2016): 95, accessed on April 10, 2021, <https://doi.org/10.5539/ass.v12n6p95>.

city-states and systematic motives (losing balance of power) in understanding foreign policy.⁷⁹ The main focus of NCR is the analysis of how relative power affects foreign policy. NCR holds the view that understanding of systemic factors influence decision makers as the primary factor in foreign policy analysis. In NCR, the relative strength or competence of states in comparison to other states serves as the second intervening variable. For example, the Turkish response to Syrian mass migration since 2011 is better understood through NCR.⁸⁰ The Turkish state's response was mainly due to the interplay between domestic level and external factors. Turkey initially embraced a humanitarian strategy to address the arrival of Syrian refugees. The agreement among the policy makers on the humanitarian factors facilitated the takeover of the required resources from Turkish society to accommodate millions of Syrian migrants.⁸¹ Nevertheless, the increased external security threats and the deepening of the Syrian crisis and consequent perception of a protracted civil war affected domestic sentiments, which in turn made policymakers to gradually implement stricter policies to deal with the influx of Syrian migrants. It also helped in minimising potential conflicts and negative reactions in the domestic political sphere till 2018.⁸² In other words, even while examining the relative strength of various states and the perspectives of decision-makers, the neoclassical realists aim for systemic analysis. NCR, in a nutshell, is a theory that aims to better understand national foreign policies by combining elements of systemic and micro level factors.

Neoclassical realists, in contrast to neorealists, perceive that elements at the systemic levels are as essential as political attitudes and domestic structures of states. Neoclassical realists acknowledge anarchy as a significant component, but they also uphold the classical realist tenets (for instance, primacy of states, power competitions, balancing and so on). They have been dubbed “neoclassical” for this reason. NCR does not outrightly dismiss neorealist concepts, but instead seeks to adapt and refine them to provide a more comprehensive understanding of the foreign policy decisions made by national governments.⁸³ NCR places

⁷⁹ Firoozabadi and Ashkezari, 97.

⁸⁰ Zeynep ŞahiN Mencütek, N. Ela Gökalp Aras, and Bezen BalamiR Coşkun, “Turkey’s Response to Syrian Mass Migration: A Neoclassical Realist Analysis,” *Uluslararası İlişkiler / International Relations* 17, no. 68 (2020): 95.

⁸¹ ŞahiN Mencütek, Gökalp Aras, and BalamiR Coşkun, 95.

⁸² ŞahiN Mencütek, Gökalp Aras, and BalamiR Coşkun, 96.

⁸³ Norrin M. Ripsman, “NCR,” in *Oxford Research Encyclopedia of International Studies*, by Norrin M. Ripsman (Oxford University Press, 2011), accessed on April 10, 2021, <https://doi.org/10.1093/acrefore/9780190846626.013.36>.

significant emphasis on power and defines it primarily in terms of capacity, similar to the approach taken by neorealists but NCR in contrast to neorealists, emphasises the significance of both domestic structures of states as well as systemic level elements. Thus, multiple levels of analysis are equally significant given the anarchical structure of the international system.

For neoclassical realists, domestic factors function as a tie between the relative power i.e., an independent variable and the foreign policy which is a dependent variable. For instance, China's space programme has adhered to realist theories in the long run, despite potential obstacles by the intervening variables such as technological developments that hindered China's response to changes to space power in the short term.⁸⁴ Chinese pursuit of space security is based on a strategic culture of techno-nationalism, which shapes its thinking and actions in a realist manner that prioritises rivalry, conflict, and the balance of power. This realist perspective prioritises security threats and the necessity of counterbalancing potential adversaries.⁸⁵ At the same time, the significant influence and the thinking of the leadership of the People's Republic of China (PRC) is evident in their approach to international relations, including their stance on space-related matters. China's space programme is intrinsically linked to the PRC leadership's perspective on the global security situation.⁸⁶ The development of China's military space capabilities cannot be separated from the PRC leadership's belief in the necessity of safeguarding China against perceived international security threats, particularly those originating from the US. However, it asserts that China's emergence as a significant space force took several decades to materialise despite the PRC leadership's awareness of the significance of space for their security since the 1950s.⁸⁷ To a large extent, the limitations of China's technological and economic capabilities hindered China's ambitious space plans for a very long period of time. Therefore, factors such as technological capabilities, elite attitudes, governmental interests, or, internal group interests influence a state's foreign policy. Gideon Rose points out that theories of foreign policy aim to explain the goals that nations want to

⁸⁴ Kevin Pollpeter, "Neoclassical Realism as a Framework for Understanding China's Rise as a Space Power," in *The Oxford Handbook of Space Security*, ed. Saadia M. Pekkanen and P.J. Blount (Oxford University Press, 2024), 295, accessed on March 12, 2024, <https://doi.org/10.1093/oxfordhb/9780197582671.013.17>.

⁸⁵ Pollpeter, 299.

⁸⁶ Pollpeter, 300.

⁸⁷ Kevin Pollpeter, "Neoclassical Realism as a Framework for Understanding China's Rise as a Space Power," 293.

achieve in terms of timing of the decisions made by the national leadership.⁸⁸ NCR is primarily intended to address these issues because realists have mostly disregarded them.

As states are driven by the pursuit of security and control in a world marked by limited resources, neoclassical realists claim that politics is an unending contest among them, much like other branches of realism. Due to their belief in the significance of structure, neoclassical realists contend that anarchy is the primary source of disputes like the neorealists. In short, neoclassical realists start by assuming, as previously mentioned, that the choices made by states regarding their foreign policies are limited by the absence of a central authority, which means that the unrelated systemic factors determine a state's foreign policy. Essentially, the strength of a state directly influences the character of its foreign policy.⁸⁹ Unit level variables act as channels for systemic pressures and limitations, therefore; state resources and capabilities have a secondary impact on state behaviour.⁹⁰ The elements at the unit level that act as connecting factors in influencing foreign policy formation consist of attitudes of decision-makers and the state structure. This aspect is applicable for decisions shaping the bilateral relationships as well. In the case of Japan and South Korea, though both countries possessed similar political and economic set ups i.e., democratic polity, market economy, geographical proximity, along with similar external threats, they did not become allies. They remained as quasi-allies, though two have a shared third power ally - the US. The perceptions of Japan and Korea regarding the security commitment of their shared powerful ally, the US, have a direct impact on the extent of political-military cooperation between these two quasi-allied nations.⁹¹ The extent to which historical animosity impacts the nature of relations is determined by concerns about the potential abandonment by the US and the specific circumstances in which it occurs. The degree of patron commitment, i.e., the US commitment to the security of both nations and the perception of domestic leadership is an accurate indicator of alliance behaviour than the degree of external threat.⁹² In order to understand the connection between the distribution of relative

⁸⁸ Rose, "Neoclassical Realism and Theories of Foreign Policy," 160.

⁸⁹ Michiel Foulon, "Neoclassical Realism: Challengers and Bridging Identities," *International Studies Review* 17, no. 4 (December 1, 2015): 640, accessed on March 11, 2021, <https://doi.org/10.1111/misr.12255>.

⁹⁰ Foulon, "Neoclassical Realism: Challengers and Bridging Identities," 639.

⁹¹ Rose, "Neoclassical Realism and Theories of Foreign Policy," 160.

⁹² Victor D. Cha, "Abandonment, Entrapment, and Neoclassical Realism in Asia: The United States, Japan, and Korea," *International Studies Quarterly* 44, no. 2 (June 1, 2000): 261, accessed on April 10, 2021, <https://doi.org/10.1111/0020-8833.00158>.

power and a state's foreign policy, it is essential to take into account both the global and domestic contexts in which the policy is implemented.

NCR combines and expands on classical realists and neorealist interpretations by integrating classical realism's state-society interaction with neorealism's emphasis on power balance theory. On the one hand, according to Lobell,

*"Proponents of NCR draw upon the rigor and theoretical insights of the neorealism or structural realism of Kenneth N. Waltz, Robert Gilpin, and others without sacrificing the practical insights about foreign policy and the complexity of statecraft found in the classical realism of Hans J. Morgenthau, Henry Kissinger, Arnold Wolfers, and others."*⁹³

On the other hand, Rathbun sees NCR as a "logical extension and necessary part of advancing neorealism."⁹⁴ It might thus be classified as the extension to various strands of realism. In view of this discussion, the following section discusses various variables from the domestic settings of a State which influence foreign policy decision making.

The Role of Domestic Variables within Neoclassical Realism (NCR)

NCR diverges from neorealism by placing emphasis on factors at the unit level. Sterling-Folker argues that the notion that liberalism is more adaptive to domestic matters compared to realism is inaccurate.⁹⁵ In fact, the idea of NCR allows for nuanced consideration of the domestic factors as a potential causal influence. Zakaria further argues in favour of including "systemic, domestic, and other influences" into the analysis of "events, trends, and policies that are too specific to be adequately addressed by a grand theory of international politics."⁹⁶ Policy execution and response characteristics can be influenced by domestic politics.

⁹³ Steven E. Lobell et al., *NCR, the State, and Foreign Policy* (Cambridge University Press, 2009), 3–4.

⁹⁴ Brian Rathbun, "A Rose by Any Other Name: Neoclassical Realism as the Logical and Necessary Extension of Structural Realism," *Security Studies* 17, no. 2 (2008): 300.

⁹⁵ Sterling-Folker, "Realist Environment, Liberal Process, and Domestic-Level Variables," 15.

⁹⁶ Fareed Zakaria, "Realism and Domestic Politics: A Review Essay," *International Security* 17, no. 1 (1992): 177–98.

External or internal shocks can lead to a change in public opinion, unlike the relatively stable international system. An illustration can be seen in Japan's resurgence of anti-nuclearism following the Fukushima nuclear crisis of 2011 and in the Indian context it is the public response to the Russia and Ukraine conflict which started in 2022.⁹⁷ The research including the current one go into several unit-level characteristics examined by NCR, such as public opinion, leadership, corporate groupings, academics, and the nature of state policies. Dueck argues that domestic politics primarily focuses on the timing and methods rather than the question of "how" and "when."⁹⁸ Nevertheless, NCR diverges from the perspectives of innenpolitik and liberalism, which are commonly perceived as being "frequently oversimplified and imprecise."⁹⁹ One notable distinction is in the treatment of domestic variables as intervening rather than dominant factors. NCR acknowledges the pressure on governments to maintain their positions and therefore satisfy popular sentiment. According to Davidson, re-election of the national leadership is a necessary condition for achieving all other objectives.¹⁰⁰ In other words, conflicts about foreign policy can have political implications for the leadership/ political parties in power.

Moreover, NCR argues that the impact of public opinion on foreign policy is contingent upon the alignment of the opposition with the populace.¹⁰¹ When a problem emerges, the influence of public opinion takes precedence over other reasons. This holds particularly true in democratic nations, such as India and Japan, which are governed by democratic processes. Norms are undeniably crucial, however, their influence on policy is assessed in NCR according to the elites' interpretations and perception of them. When decision-makers are guided by structural realities, they are believed to have the ability to either limit or empower them. However, when the structure contradicts a domestic norm, elites are confronted with the choice of whether to disregard the norm or not. For instance, the deployment of Japanese troops in the UN Peacekeeping Operations missions during the early 1990s, as well as their recent

⁹⁷ Joaquin Matamis, "Mitigating Japan's Nuclear Dilemma," *Stimson Center* (blog), May 7, 2024, accessed on May 11, 2024, <https://www.stimson.org/2024/mitigating-japans-nuclear-dilemma/>.

⁹⁸ Sten Rynning, "Review of Lobell, Steven E.; Ripsman, Norrin M.; Taliaferro, Jeffrey W., Eds., *NCR, the State, and Foreign Policy*" (H-Diplo, H-Review, July 2009), accessed on April 10, 2021, <https://www.h-net.org/reviews/showrev.php?id=24339>.

⁹⁹ Rose, "NCR and Theories of Foreign Policy, 160."

¹⁰⁰ Jason W. Davidson, "From Harmony to Hard Times: A Neoclassical Realist Explanation of Transatlantic Burden-Sharing in Afghanistan and Iraq," *Aspen Institute Italia* 9 (2008).

¹⁰¹ Foulon, "Neoclassical Realism," 640.

involvement in Iraq and Afghanistan, exemplify a readiness to embrace a restricted role for the military as far as Japan is concerned and endorse the viewpoint of revisionists who contend that the norm of anti-militarism is becoming less significant.¹⁰² Most recently, the Japanese policy maker's decision to increase the defence budget, lifting restrictions on foreign sale of weapons developed in collaboration with foreign countries and acquiring strike capabilities can be cited as an example where elite perception mattered significantly in the decision making. However, the general Japanese population is resolute in their adoption of non-military means of pursuing foreign policy. Similarly, among the domestic level factors, an issue that requires special mention is the role played by the policy makers in foreign policy making.

Understanding the Role of Policy Makers in Neoclassical Realism (NCR)

NCR, like neorealism, believes that a state's relative material power capabilities primarily determine its foreign policy. It also contends that while foreign policy decisions are based on capabilities of a nation, they are translated by how that power is viewed by those who frame it i.e., decision makers (mostly policy makers). This is because decisions are determined by policy makers; such a human aspect is equally significant as the power capability of states.¹⁰³ Rose contends that the anarchic international system gives states with only unclear signals on how to respond because 'there is no immediate or perfect transmission belt linking to foreign policy behaviour.'¹⁰⁴ There is thus a lag between structural change and alterations in state behaviour. As a result, to translate systemic pressures into policy outputs, policy makers are supposed to use a 'filtering' method by taking into consideration their domestic interests.

Rajesh Basrur, has made significant contributions to the emerging literature through his scholarly work titled "Subcontinental Drift: Domestic Politics and India's Foreign Policy."¹⁰⁵ In his analysis, Basrur examines the concept of NCR, which incorporates domestic factors, such as policy makers, to elucidate the foreign and security policies of states.¹⁰⁶ Although

¹⁰² Hiromi Nagata Fujishige, Yuji Uesugi, and Tomoaki Honda, *Japan's Peacekeeping at a Crossroads: Taking a Robust Stance or Remaining Hesitant?*, Sustainable Development Goals Series (Cham: Springer International Publishing, 2022), accessed on March 11, 2023, <https://doi.org/10.1007/978-3-030-88509-0>.

¹⁰³ Basrur Rajesh, *Subcontinental Drift: Domestic Politics and India's Foreign Policy* (Hyderabad: Orient BlackSwan, 2023).

¹⁰⁴ Rose, "Neoclassical Realism and Theories of Foreign Policy," 152.

¹⁰⁵ Rajesh, *Subcontinental Drift: Domestic Politics and India's Foreign Policy*, 18.

¹⁰⁶ Rajesh, 20.

states share identical fundamental conditions, their reactions vary due to the influence of individuals with differing beliefs on policy decisions. NCR argues that the state is not a unified entity, necessitating internal deliberation until a consensus is reached through a decentralised and competitive political process.¹⁰⁷ One of the prime examples is the role played by the Indian Prime Minister P.V. Narasimha Rao during the Balance of Payments (BoP) crisis in the post-Cold War period in India. The world changed significantly with the disintegration of Soviet Union and the subsequent collapse of socialist bloc as well as the failure of planned economy. These sweeping developments prompted the national leaders to refashion the national policies, especially ones pertaining to economy and foreign relations. Though there were enough systemic stimuli, India needed a leader who could navigate through the domestic political crisis to deal with the economy. In this context, Prime Minister P.V. Narasimha Rao, deftly managed the internal domestic turmoil by successfully heading a minority government and skilfully opened up the economy and ended licence raj by bringing in industrial reforms.¹⁰⁸ In the foreign policy front, his policy on “Look East” formed the building blocks to shape the current state of relations with most of the Southeast and East Asian countries, especially with Japan. NCR can also account for infrequent policy changes where there is no structural shift caused by domestic events, such as ‘shifts in personnel, institutional power, or the popularity of particular ideas.’¹⁰⁹

One can infer the role played by several national leaders (when they were/are in the government) in navigating India-Japan relations from time to time. Such interventions and roles played by national leaders can be analysed through the prism of NCR. In this regard, the current study will specifically focus on the role played by Prime Minister Shinzo Abe who advocated an “Arc of Freedom and Prosperity” and Prime Ministers of India, Dr Manmohan Singh and Narendra Modi. From the standpoint of NCR, detecting the impacts on statesmen’s actions is

¹⁰⁷ Schweller, “Unanswered Threats,” 164.

¹⁰⁸ “Narasimha Rao Can Truly Be Called Father of Economic Reforms in India: Manmohan Singh,” *The Hindu*, July 24, 2020, sec. India, accessed on March 11, 2021, <https://www.thehindu.com/news/national/narasimha-rao-can-truly-be-called-father-of-economic-reforms-in-india-manmohan-singh/article32183365.ece>.

¹⁰⁹ Nicholas Kitchen, “Systemic Pressures and Domestic Ideas: A Neoclassical Realist Model of Grand Strategy Formation,” *Review of International Studies* 36, no. 1 (January 2010): 117–43, accessed on June 1, 2021, <https://doi.org/10.1017/S0260210509990532>.

difficult because political leaders representing political parties would take decisions in order to stay in power.¹¹⁰

Neoclassical Realism (NCR) and Balance of Power (BOP)

The assumption of international anarchy is the aspect in which NCR bears the closest resemblance to its neorealist counterpart. Schweller argues that although the term “balance of power” is commonly employed in the realm of international affairs, it continues to possess an inherent ambiguity.¹¹¹ He links this phenomenon to the conventional understanding that the equilibrium of power is regarded as an inherent principle, wherein the entirety of the foreign policy is conceptualised as a vast apparatus, a mechanism, or a clockwork that is established and maintained by observers.¹¹² NCR argues that the balance of power theory is flawed because of its implication of a “continuous mobilisation capacity.”¹¹³ Although states may possess the same resources, their ability to effectively utilise them is contingent upon several domestic circumstances.

NCR acknowledges the significance of international hierarchy, particularly in relation to the self-perception of nations and their adversaries. States are perceived as desiring to enhance their authority and standing within the system. Though the world was divided into opposing blocs of power, India with other third world countries, remained non-aligned even when they were aware that their material power was insignificant in relation to the big powers in the international structure. This was mainly due to the ideological stances of leadership of the countries of the Third World. With respect to India, it was the then Prime Minister Jawaharlal Nehru, who believed that not aligning with any bloc would serve Indian interests

¹¹⁰ Iyer Prithvi, “Understanding the Indian Public Opinion-Foreign Policy Relationship,” Observer Research Foundation, November 23, 2020, accessed on March 11, 2021, <https://www.orfonline.org/research/understanding-the-indian-public-opinion-foreign-policy-relationship>.

¹¹¹ Schweller, “Unanswered Threats,” 170.

¹¹² Schweller, 171.

¹¹³ Luíza Cerioli, “Neoclassical Realism, Global International Relations, and the Unheard Echoes of Realist Practices from the South,” *The British Journal of Politics and International Relations*, February 20, 2024, 13691481241230858, accessed on March 15, 2024, <https://doi.org/10.1177/13691481241230858>.

best during the Cold War.¹¹⁴ Here one can say that ideological orientations of the leadership can influence decision -making, especially on issues pertaining to alignments.

Interestingly, this trajectory continues even after the end of the Cold War. While the world was grappling with the after effects of COVID19, Russia-Ukraine conflict, the US-China rivalry over economic hegemony and Israel-Palestine conflict, India acted according to its best interests instead of band wagoning behind a leading power or taking sides. In this context, such a positive neutrality is a continuation of India's position of not aligning with any major power. Japan's status as the fourth-largest economy does not affect its strength but the difference in perception had the potential to impact the decision-making process. Regarding this, NCR shares similarities with classical realism's acknowledgement of competition for status as shown in the writings of Thucydides, Hobbes, Rousseau, and Machiavelli. Japan responded to the increase in China's relative power and the decrease in the US influence by building coalitions to balance China's emerging dominance in the region. This was done in order to safeguard their security and discourage aggression.¹¹⁵ The immediate threat to the survival of Japan in its neighbourhood has pushed its leadership to look for alternative avenues. The Japanese approach to India is different from its approach to other military powers as the initial bilateral interaction rested on the back of economy and constantly evolved into a strong strategic partnership.

Security and Neoclassical Realism (NCR)

The notion of security has undergone expansion in recent years, necessitating an examination of the extent to which realism has been able to accept and showcase this development.¹¹⁶ For decades, the concept of security has been understood from the perspective of realism, which is usually regarded as the dominant school within the IR discipline.

To attain common security, nations in the international system rely on traditional analysis of international relations and accordingly join forces. All other values are exposed in

¹¹⁴ B. R. Nanda, "Nehru and Non-Alignment," in *Jawaharlal Nehru: Rebel and Statesman*, ed. B. R. Nanda (Oxford University Press, 1998), 230, accessed on March 11, 2021, <https://doi.org/10.1093/acprof:oso/9780195645866.003.0012>.

¹¹⁵ Rose, "Neoclassical Realism and Theories of Foreign Policy," 166.

¹¹⁶ Krause and Williams, 235.

the traditional framework of global security without the capacity to secure survival. In such a context, governments believed that military strength was the only trustworthy way to ensure security.¹¹⁷ Most states therefore tried to build as much military might as their economies might allow in the hope that their own military might will make them secure. Even though a state appears to arm itself for defence, its neighbours view the military power as dangerous. This prompts other nations to arm themselves likewise. At the same time, the increase of armaments that is intended in each nation's foreign policy to promote a sense of power and a sense of security does not guarantee actual security.

The dynamics of security can be better understood through the lens of NCR which opens up multiple levels of analysis emanating out of the domestic sphere of a country. These multiple levels of influence on the strategic relationship between India and Japan can be clearly analysed with the help of NCR's postulate that unit-level variables serve as "conduits for systemic pressures and restrictions," while state capabilities have a secondary effect on state behaviour.¹¹⁸ By the early 2000s, the relationship between India and Japan started taking a U-turn owing mainly to Japan's understanding of the security environment of India and its obligation to protect its national interests. This normalisation was also made possible through domestic variables such as political leadership, especially with the beginning of the head-of-state visits from Japan, followed by India.

As discussed above, traditional security includes state centric security, this means that the state's territory must be secured from enemy attacks. It can also be viewed as deploying the military to protect against external threats. As humanity advances, frameworks alter. While the military components of security remain a significant concern in this sub-discipline, the notion of security has been consistently scrutinised, expanded, and advanced. David Mutimer and Derek Verbakel, experts in critical studies, assert that "when one challenges the object to which security refers, one must also question the characteristics and extent of security, and thus, the field of security studies."¹¹⁹ Individuals, societies, and countries are not and cannot

¹¹⁷ Riccardo Trobbiani, "How Should National Security and Human Security Relate to Each Other?," *E-International Relations* (blog), April 26, 2013, accessed on March 10, 2020, <https://www.e-ir.info/2013/04/26/how-should-national-security-and-human-security-relate-to-each-other/>.

¹¹⁸ Stephen Benedict Dyson, "Neoclassical Realism and Leader Psychology: A Theory of Foreign Policy," in *The Blair Identity: Leadership and Foreign Policy*, ed. Stephen Benedict Dyson (Manchester University Press, 2009), 16, accessed on March 11, 2021, <https://doi.org/10.7228/manchester/9780719079993.003.0002>.

¹¹⁹ Mutimer David and Derek Verbakel, "7. Critical Security Studies: A Schismatic History," in *Contemporary Security Studies* (Oxford University Press), 69, accessed March 21, 2023,

be exclusively preoccupied with safeguarding their land from military aggressions or expanding it solely to gain more security or economic benefits. Nation-states are also committed to protecting their environment, fundamental values, identities, and way of life. Depending on the approach taken, security can cover a broad spectrum of subjects, such as transnational criminal activities, poverty and development, international trade, human security, the connection between humans and the environment, terrorism, and energy security among other themes. Evidently, there is disagreement among individuals on the inclusion of all these issues within the scope of Security Studies. Amitav Acharya acknowledges that the prevailing perception of security continues to exclude non-military factors from the agenda of Security Studies.¹²⁰ Stephen Walt, for example, is clearly one among those who opposes such inclusion.¹²¹ His understanding is that attempts to broaden the idea of security to encompass non-military matters risks overextending the field to the point where it loses logical coherence. This would be detrimental because such growth might stymie efforts to address these policy challenges and specifically traditional military security concerns.

While competing nations have the potential to employ alternative forms of threats in order to undermine the territorial integrity and domestic political stability of one another, these dangers may encompass environmental, economic, and cultural aspects. Furthermore, it is imperative to consider the potential risks to territorial integrity and political stability that arise not just from other nation-states, but also from a range of non-state entities and even natural disasters. The concept of comprehensive security,¹²² thus, refers to a broader understanding encompassing a wider range of instruments and sources of threat. A more profound critique of security extends beyond the notion that security should solely encompass the state's welfare. From this standpoint, the classical conception of security inherently encompasses safeguarding and promoting the interests and well-being of the state. In contrast, the primary focus, or rather the rightful focus, should be on safeguarding and promoting the interests and well-being of the

<https://www.oxfordpoliticstrove.com/display/10.1093/hepl/9780198862192.001.0001/hepl-9780198862192-chapter-7>.

¹²⁰ Amitav Acharya, "The Third World and Security Studies," in *Security Studies: A Reader*, ed. Hughes Christopher and Yew Meng Lai (UK: Routledge, 2011), accessed on June 1, 2022, <https://www.taylorfrancis.com/chapters/edit/10.4324/9780203422144-8/third-world-security-studies-amitav-acharya>.

¹²¹ Walt, "The Renaissance of Security Studies," 214.

¹²² Kanti Bajpai, "The Idea of Human Security," *International Studies* 40, no. 3 (August 1, 2003): 205, accessed on July 12, 2022, <https://doi.org/10.1177/002088170304000301>.

individual citizen or individual being. The term “human security” refers to a conceptualisation of security that prioritises the protection and well-being of individuals above everything else.

The emergence of human security was influenced by the changing dynamics and risks that accompanied the dissolution of the bi-polar power structures.¹²³ During the Cold War, the concept of security, as understood within the framework of national security, was primarily the responsibility of the state through military defence. Peace, on the other hand, was defined as the absence of war. However, the conclusion of the bi-polar competition that characterised the Cold War era led to the emergence of influential transnational actors, such as private companies, international organisations, Non-Governmental Organisations (NGOs), and non-state entities.¹²⁴ This shift in the global landscape enabled these actors to play a significant role in international relations. The world has changed significantly since 1990s. Two superpowers dominated global politics, and their rivalry shaped the development of international relations. Suddenly, though, there was no communism, Soviet Union, or arms races, much of the world, including Moscow, was struck by the winds of change. It is in this context that the idea of human security first surfaced. In 1994, the United Nations Development Programme (UNDP) originally recommended human security as a “way to go from here”.¹²⁵ The objective of the Human Development Report was to broaden the traditional understanding of security beyond military aspects to include both “safeguarding against abrupt and detrimental disruptions in daily life” and “protection from persistent threats such as diseases, hunger, and oppression.”¹²⁶ Thus, the notion of human security encompassed food, political, economic, health, personal, environmental, and community security.

Human security has since gained considerable traction. Nations such as Canada and Japan have declared it as the cornerstone of their foreign policy.¹²⁷ To further the objectives

¹²³ Yaniv Roznai, “The Insecurity of Human Security,” *Wisconsin International Law Journal* 32, no. 1 (2014): 94–141.

¹²⁴ Shahrbanou Tadjbakhsh and Anuradha Chenoy, *Human Security: Concepts and Implications* (UK: Routledge, 2007), 3.

¹²⁵ Tadjbakhsh and Chenoy, 1.

¹²⁶ Jolly Richard and Basu Ray Deepayan, “The Human Security Framework and National Human Development Reports,” Human Development Report Office National Human Development Report Series (United Nations Development Programme), accessed May 23, 2023, <https://hdr.undp.org/system/files/documents/human-security.human-security>.

¹²⁷ Tadjbakhsh and Chenoy, *Human Security*, 4.

outlined in the concept, both have urged other nations to join them in international forums. As a result, numerous international conferences, networks, and commissions have been undertaken and initiated. Several studies that expand on the idea and use it in particular contexts have been published. Scholarly writers in order to contribute to empirical research, have joined the debate by constructing metrics and integrating human security into theories. The contemporary understanding of human security lacks a universally agreed-upon definition.¹²⁸ Various entities, including the European Union, Canadian and Japanese institutions, the UNDP, and academicians, have divergent interpretations of the concept. These interpretations span a spectrum, encompassing a restrictive definition focused solely on preventing violence, as well as a more expansive and inclusive perspective that advocates for the integration of development, human rights, and traditional security aspects. The recent evolution has resulted in a confluence of ideas, pronouncements, studies, assessments, and critiques, creating a complex landscape that can be challenging to navigate. Despite its clear assertion and the involvement of several institutions and experts, there is a lack of consensus over the definition of human security, as well as its conceptual framework and policy goal. Each advocate of the notion possesses their own distinct interpretation, hence supporting the perspective of critics who argue that the substance of human security is subjective and dependent on individual perception.¹²⁹ According to Bajpai, although there are similarities between the UNDP and Canadian-led middle powers' approaches to human security, the latter has set itself apart over time.¹³⁰ In Canada, personal security is synonymous with human security, i.e. security from a people-centred perspective.

While it is recognised that national security alone is insufficient to guarantee people's security, the importance of security between nations remains crucial for ensuring people's safety. The Canadian perspective on human security encompasses various issues, such as the income disparity between affluent and impoverished nations, internal conflicts and state collapse, transnational criminal activities, the proliferation of Weapons of Mass Destruction

¹²⁸ Mike Fell, "Is Human Security Our Main Concern in the 21st Century?," *Journal of Security Sector Management* 4, no. 3 (2006): 11.

¹²⁹ Brown Malcolm and Gehrman Richard, "Conflicting Perspectives," in *Human Security in World Affairs: Problems and Opportunities*, ed. Lautensach Alexander and Lautensach Sabina, 2nd ed. (BC campus, Canada: Victoria, BC, 2020), accessed on March 11, 2021, <https://opentextbc.ca/humansecurity/chapter/conflicting-perspectives/>.

¹³⁰ Bajpai, "The Idea of Human Security," 206.

(WMDs), religious and ethnic tensions, environmental deterioration, population growth, ethnic conflicts and migration, state oppression, child abuse, and economic stagnation.¹³¹ Broadly, human security includes energy security, security from dangers of climate change or natural disasters or manmade, health security (pandemics), economic security etc.

In the late 1980s, the Realist school of thought faced criticism for its exclusive focus on military aspects when conceptualising security. The objective was to expand the notion of security beyond the limited framework advocated by the realists, who viewed security solely in terms of achieving military might or responding to external aggression.¹³² Scholars like Barry Buzan argue that the concept of security is undergoing a transformation, with a growing emphasis on non-traditional and transnational security issues.¹³³ These include environmental degradation, the rise of non-state actors such as MNCs, and organised crime like drug trafficking. The Copenhagen School, led by Barry Buzan, Ole Waever, and Jaap de Wilde, offers the most substantial alternative to unidimensional security analysis.¹³⁴ The Copenhagen School, by means of its scholarly and pioneering research, approached the notion of security from a novel standpoint. Buzan had advocated for the expansion of the notion, highlighting the incorporation of additional dimensions such as sociological, political, economic, and ecological security. This perspective challenges the traditional understanding of security solely in military terms. In this particular tradition, Buzan also placed significant emphasis on the individual as an "irreducible base unit" within any security perspective.¹³⁵ The Copenhagen School argues that security threats can arise from various sources, including nations, regions, subnational groups, and individuals.¹³⁶ However, within the broader concept of security, the

¹³¹ Tadjbakhsh and Chenoy, *Human Security*, 20.

¹³² Mohd. Usman Bhatti, "Human Security Challenges in Borderlands: A Study of Borderlands Communities in Poonch District" (Unpublished Thesis, Hyderabad, University of Hyderabad, 2020).

¹³³ Barry Buzan, *People, States and Fear: An Agenda for International Security Studies in the Post-Cold War Era* (UK: Harvester Wheatsheaf, 1991).

¹³⁴ Luiza-Maria Filimon, "An Overview of the Copenhagen School's Approach to Security Studies: Constructing (in)Security through Performative Power," *The Romanian Journal for Baltic and Nordic Studies* 8, no. 2 (December 15, 2016): 50, accessed on March 1, 2020, https://doi.org/10.53604/rjbns.v8i2_4.

¹³⁵ Steve Smith, "The Contested Concept of Security," in *Critical Security Studies and World Politics*, ed. Ken Booth (Boulder: Lynne Rienner Publishers, 2005), 30, accessed on June 1, 2022, <https://doi.org/10.1515/9781685857356-004>.

¹³⁶ Barry Buzan, Ole Waever, and Jaap de Wilde, *Security: A New Framework for Analysis*, Nachdr. (Boulder, Colo.: Rienner, 1998), 5–8.

security of individuals holds significance, but is not the primary focus of security analysis in the context of international security. The state currently holds a central position within the international structure. It is widely acknowledged that the state bears the responsibility of creating a favourable environment for the development and progress of both its citizens and the state itself. Furthermore, the state possesses the authority to engage with and oversee various other states and “sub-states” within the international system, as well as address emerging global challenges. Within this particular context, it has been posited that Barry Buzan established the notion of “societal security”¹³⁷ as a means to comprehend the intricate nature of individual security, operating within the confines of the state, within the dynamic security landscape of the post-Cold War era.

The global security environment changed tremendously with the end of the Cold War. While interstate wars appeared to decline, internal conflicts threatened the lives and well-being of individuals and communities in many parts of the world. Globalisation and rapid urbanisation, along with their impacts, also brought forth new existential threats, from poverty to risks from environmental degradation, pandemics and migration. While some of these threats were not new, they were occurring at a scale and magnitude not seen before. Many of these threats were also transnational in nature and effects. When the mainstream IR and Security Studies theories, in particular neorealism, proved inadequate to the task of explaining and dealing with these emerging threats, there was the inevitable exercise of reconceptualising security.¹³⁸ Leading up to the end of the Cold War, NCR was gaining prominence in the study of IR and the focus of many studies seen later.

Approach of Neoclassical Realism (NCR) towards Non-Traditional Security (NTS) Issues

Due to the diverse range of perspectives and methodologies in the field of security, it is logical to expect a multitude of possible viewpoints and approaches in security studies. Multiple endeavours have been undertaken in this context to expand and intensify the field's scope beyond its traditional concentration on nations and military hostilities. These discussions over the nature, significance, and future of security studies have brought up vital theoretical

¹³⁷ Ole Wæver et al., *Identity, Migration and the New Security Agenda in Europe* (New York: Palgrave Macmillan, 1993).

¹³⁸ “Globalization: Threat or Opportunity? An IMF Issues Brief,” International Monetary Fund, April 2, 2000, accessed on April 1, 2020, <https://www.imf.org/external/np/exr/ib/2000/041200to.htm#V>.

and practical issues.¹³⁹ One of the main debates is to view security beyond its traditional realms and include non-traditional forms of security. In doing so, this study tries to bring in a correlation between the traditional and NTS.

The human security notion contests every one of the earlier realist tenets.¹⁴⁰ NCR as an approach does not diminish the importance of the traditional forms of security but adds another layer of security which strengthens the traditional form of security by taking into consideration the nuances of security in the domestic arena. These include human security aspects such as energy security, piracy, health, sanitation, literacy, civil-nuclear cooperation, food security, economic, etc.¹⁴¹ These non-traditional forms of security have for long entered into the lexicon of domestic security aspects in every nation state and have formed part of the core national security.

Every nation state conducts its foreign policy to maximise its interests but these interests are manifested through its domestic level concerns or are mediated through domestic or unit level variables such as leadership, ideology, civil society, business groups perceptions, bureaucracy etc, according to NCR.¹⁴² These aspects and actors consider human security as a prime motivator to formulate foreign policy and in doing so they intend to strengthen their traditional forms of security. It is in this context the last section of this study deals with non-traditional types of security which forms one of the central pillars in conducting foreign policy with any country. Though economy and defence form a central pillar of analysis in a bilateral relationship, adding another level of analysis which encapsulates the non-traditional forms of security as perceived by the unit-level variables such as leadership, bureaucracy, business entities, and civil society gives a comprehensive picture of foreign policy through the NCR framework.¹⁴³ This is done by analysing India and Japan's relations in non-traditional areas

¹³⁹ Roznai, "The Insecurity of Human Security." 100.

¹⁴⁰ Bajpai, "The Idea of Human Security," 2016.

¹⁴¹ Sylvia I. Karlsson-Vinkhuyzen and Nigel Jollands, "Human Security and Energy Security: A Sustainable Energy System as a Public Good," in *International Handbook of Energy Security*, ed. Hugh Dyer and Maria Julia Trombetta (Edward Elgar Publishing, 2013), accessed on April 1, 2021, <https://doi.org/10.4337/9781781007907.00036>.

¹⁴² Norrin M Ripsman, Jeffrey W Taliaferro, and Steven E Lobell, *Neoclassical Realist Theory of International Politics* (New York: Oxford University Press, 2016), 34, accessed on June 1, 2022, <https://doi.org/10.1093/acrefore/9780190846626.013.36>.

¹⁴³ Ripsman, Taliaferro, and Lobell, 34.

such as energy security, climate change, piracy, and the state's support to civil society organisations working in different human security areas. One of the unique aspects of India and Japan relations is that Japan as a state supports India's human security development through state-mediated aid and state mechanisms instead of involving non-state actors. This is unlike the western nations wherein most interventions in non-traditional areas come through non-state actors such as NGOs or international bodies. In other words, there is a state mediated intervention in the non-traditional areas of security to address a broad range of issues as far as Indo-Japanese ties are concerned. Though human security is integral to policy formulations, the state remains the main actor in achieving the goals set by human security proponents, particularly in the context of the bilateral relationship between India and Japan.

The Japanese government has shown considerable interest in the notion of human security, as it aims to take on a more prominent role in international affairs while maintaining its pacifist ethos.¹⁴⁴ Both the then Prime Ministers of Japan, Murayama Tomiichi (1994-1996) and Hashimoto Ryutaro (1996-1998), who represented different political ideologies in the political spectrum of Japan, expressed their endorsement of the concept. Prime Minister of Japan, Obuchi, in December 1998, formally presented the notion of human security as a vital component of the foreign policy of Japan. The purpose of this strategic shift was to strengthen global influence in politics while abiding by the regulations specified in the Constitution especially in Article 9.¹⁴⁵ Human security was passed down to subsequent administrations as a fundamental aspect of the foreign policy agenda of Japan. Prime Minister of Japan Yoshiro Mori, proposed the creation of an International Commission on Human Security at the UN Millennium Summit in 2000¹⁴⁶ and in August 2003, this element was officially incorporated

¹⁴⁴ Ramli Dollah et al., "Japan's Advocacy for Human Security in Global Politics: Case Study of Japan's Grant Assistance for Grass-Roots Human Security Projects (GGP) in the State of Sabah, Malaysia, 2000–2021," *East Asia* 40, no. 2 (June 1, 2023): 151–74, accessed on October 1, 2023, <https://doi.org/10.1007/s12140-023-09399-4>.

¹⁴⁵ Makoto Sato, "Human Security and Japanese Diplomacy: Debates on the Role of Human Security in Japanese Policy," in *Protecting Human Security in a Post 9/11 World: Critical and Global Insights*, ed. Giorgio Shani, Makoto Sato, and Mustapha Kamal Pasha (London: Palgrave Macmillan UK, 2007), 83–96, accessed on June 1, 2022, https://doi.org/10.1057/9780230592520_6; Akiko Fukushima and William T. Tow, "Human Security and Global Governance," in *Security Politics in the Asia-Pacific*, ed. William T. Tow, 1st ed. (Cambridge University Press, 2009), 167–87, accessed on June 1, 2022, <https://doi.org/10.1017/CBO9780511815126.010>.

¹⁴⁶ "Trends in Japan's ODA in a Rapidly Changing World," Ministry of Foreign Affairs of Japan, 2003, accessed on March 18, 2021, https://www.mofa.go.jp/policy/oda/white/2002/part1_2_4.html.

into the revised Official Development Assistance (ODA) charter.¹⁴⁷ In addition, the UN established the Human Security Trust Fund, which is acknowledged as the largest among the various trust funds under the UN's jurisdiction. It is important to mention that only Japanese firms were responsible for managing and administering this fund. The Ministry of Foreign Affairs, in the year 2000, integrated a grassroots human security programme into its aid portfolio. The distribution of this aid primarily occurs through foreign embassies, with a focus on supporting small-scale initiatives aimed at social development.

The concept of human security and providing assistance, proved to be highly beneficial for the policy makers of Japan as it provided a way to contribute to global security apparatus without needing to engage in politically sensitive activities such as constitutional interpretations or increasing military spending. The concerns that have been highlighted under the human security agenda can be effectively addressed through the implementation of existing ODA programmes.¹⁴⁸ The Japanese government has predominantly directed its aid efforts on the economic and social aspects of human security in Southeast Asia, with a particular emphasis on addressing poverty and economic crises. However, there has been a limited focus on applying the idea of human security to situations involving organised violence.¹⁴⁹ At the same time, the disbursement of ODA to developing countries is also driven by the interest of economic groups within Japan. The aid to developing countries in the field of infrastructural development indirectly helps the Japanese private sector to invest in those countries and expand markets.¹⁵⁰ The correlation between civil conflicts and human security also enables Japan to actively participate in the preservation of security in its traditional domains.

Similarly, the Japan International Cooperation Agency (JICA), the Japanese Government Agency, plays a significant role in the disbursement of aid and loans to a wide range of countries across the world, including India. JICA is widely recognised as the agency that

¹⁴⁷ David M. Potter, "Japan's Foreign Aid, Human Security, and Traditional Security," *Journal of Nanzan Academic Society Social Sciences* 8 (January 2015): 50.

¹⁴⁸ "Trends in Japan's ODA in a Rapidly Changing World."

¹⁴⁹ Yoshihide Soeya, "A 'Normal' Middle Power: Interpreting Changes in Japanese Security Policy in the 1990s and After," in *Japan as a "Normal Country"?: A Nation in Search of Its Place in the World*, ed. Soeya Yoshihide, Welch David A, and Tadokoro Masayaki (Buffalo: University of Toronto Press, 2011), 72–97.

¹⁵⁰ "Enhancing Cooperation between ODA and the Private Sector for Economic Development in Developing Countries," Keidanren, December 20, 1994, accessed on June 15, 2022, <https://www.keidanren.or.jp/english/policy/pol013.html#pro2>.

demonstrates the highest level of dedication to the interconnectedness of peace building, human security and development. The transition from violence to peace in fragile states or conflict-affected nations is evident in JICA's development initiatives. In 2001, the JICA released a comprehensive report consisting of four volumes. This report put out aid recommendations for peace-building efforts, with a focus on promoting human security. The guidelines were developed based on an extensive analysis of the practises employed by seventeen other donor organisations.¹⁵¹ Similarly, the Koizumi administration in Japan shifted the significance of human security from a prominent foreign policy pillar to a fundamental premise of ODA.¹⁵² However, it is worth noting that aid also started to be utilised as a means to address terrorism, a subject that encompasses both hard and soft security dimensions.

From the discussion from the preceding pages, one can infer that NCR gives the scope to incorporate human security concerns within its ambit, considering the state centrality in dealing with non-traditional forms of security. Issues such as energy security, climate change, disaster resilience, health and diseases were considered to be on the periphery of countries' national interests. However, in the 21st century, they started taking centre stage, and states are conducting their foreign policies by including human security in the set of core national interests. This change can be attributed to the understanding that no state can successfully deal with transnational issues such as climate change or health. COVID19 has blurred the lines between traditional and NTS threats.¹⁵³ Health epidemics were considered a domestic concern that has transcended sovereign boundaries and impacted developing and developed countries, no traditional means of protecting boundaries could restrict its debilitating effects. COVID19 did not just affect the health of people but also questioned the fundamental tenets of security by derailing countries' economies, gave rise to unemployment, and caused supply chain disruptions. It led to consequences similar to the effects of a traditional war between nations or

¹⁵¹ Pedro Amakasu Raposo Carvalho and David M. Potter, "Peacebuilding and the 'Human Securitization' of Japan's Foreign Aid," in *The Securitization of Foreign Aid*, ed. Stephen Brown and Jörn Grävingholt (London: Palgrave Macmillan UK, 2016), 89, accessed on June 1, 2022, https://doi.org/10.1007/978-1-137-56882-3_5.

¹⁵² Bert Edström, "Japan and Human Security: The Derailing of a Foreign Policy Vision" (Institute for Security and Development Policy, 2011), accessed on June 1, 2022, https://isd.dp.eu/content/uploads/publications/2011_edstrom_japan-and-human-security.pdf.

¹⁵³ Andrew K. Ringsmuth et al., "Lessons from COVID-19 for Managing Transboundary Climate Risks and Building Resilience," *Climate Risk Management* 35 (2022): 100395, accessed on March 21, 2023, <https://doi.org/10.1016/j.crm.2022.100395>.

more. Its impact was systemic, and at the same time, it affected citizens (individuals) of every country alike.

Controlling COVID19 was only possible through bilateral and multilateral arrangements¹⁵⁴ Similarly, in the scenario of climate change, natural disasters, energy security, etc. Japan and India are in a unique position. Japan is situated in a very fragile geographical area where tsunamis and earthquakes are very common. It witnesses natural calamities regularly. The Fukushima earthquake had resulted in a nuclear crisis, which became a bone of contention between Japan and China. Over a period of time, these security concerns have become the core of countries' national interest, but dealing with them requires domestic and systemic level interventions.¹⁵⁵ Domestic, because the leadership and bureaucratic perceptions of such threats help in formulating policies to deal with human security effectively, but considering the transnational nature of the threats, a bilateral and multilateral approach works more effectively than dealing with human security as a lone player. This is where NCR provides scope to understand the policies of nations which deal with human security. A combined effort by internal domestic players of a country and the system as a whole by keeping the state as a key player is what NCR strives to create and understand.

It is essential to note that all the aid from Japan passes through the state instead of taking the usual route of NGO to NGO like the western model. Even the NGOs in India get their aid from Japanese state through Grant Assistance for Grassroots Projects (GGP) to address issues like education, health and skill development.¹⁵⁶ This demonstrates that although civil society is engaged in the India-Japan relationship, the directives of the state play a crucial role. This is where NCR differs from other liberal frameworks or critical theories in International Relations. In the case of aid disbursement, it is the Japanese state which decides the areas or sectors where the aid is supposed to be utilised and this selection often varies from country to country. For instance, in most Southeast Asian nations the aid disbursed through ODA is utilised to improve the military capabilities of individual countries to address the power asymmetry with an ever

¹⁵⁴ Alhammedi, "The Neorealism and Neoliberalism behind International Relations during COVID-19," 150.

¹⁵⁵ Astri Suhrke, "Human Security and the Interests of States," *Security Dialogue* 30, no. 3 (September 1999): 265–76, accessed on May 11, 2019, <https://doi.org/10.1177/0967010699030003002>.

¹⁵⁶ "Guidelines For JAPAN's Grant Assistance for Grassroots Projects (GGP)," Embassy of Japan in India, September 2023, accessed on November 1, 2023, [https://www.in.emb-japan.go.jp/Japan-India-Relations/GGP/01_Guideline_\(Updated_September_2023\).pdf](https://www.in.emb-japan.go.jp/Japan-India-Relations/GGP/01_Guideline_(Updated_September_2023).pdf).

assertive China, whereas in India the areas where the majority of the aid is utilised are in the areas of education, capacity building, infrastructural connectivity, health and other related fields.¹⁵⁷ This proves that though, on a systemic level, Japan is a major aid disbursing state to individual countries, the interest of the Japanese state remains pivotal in deciding the areas where the aid can be utilised. Similar trends can be witnessed in the realm of climate change and energy security. Often these areas are considered to fall in the non-traditional security realm of foreign policy and where non-state actors play a major role but when we apply the lens of NCR to analyse the achievements in those areas it is evident that the State plays a crucial role advancing cooperation between states.¹⁵⁸ India and Japan consider climate change to be a major issue to tackle considering the increase in frequency of natural disasters both the nations are experiencing in the recent past. Japan, owing to its geographical location, is subjected to earthquakes and Tsunamis regularly and cause enormous damage to property and people, the Fukushima disaster is prime example. India also faces natural disasters ranging from flooding to tsunamis. One such area of cooperation between India and Japan is in identifying natural disasters and early warning systems. India formed the “Indian National Centre for Ocean Information Services (INCOIS)” in 1999 and through its India developed Indian Tsunami Early Warning Centre (ITEWC) in 2007 which actively collaborates with Japan to share expertise and knowledge.¹⁵⁹ Moreover, India and Japan actively engage in the Indian Initiative of Coalition for Disaster Resilient Infrastructure (CDRI) to develop infrastructure which withstands natural calamities and reduces the burden on states.

Moreover, for India, the ODA of Japan was mostly concentrated in education, sanitation, capacity building and energy. However, these aid programmes are not provided through NGOs but directly by the state. The civil society interactions were confined to the field of education and business entities as these sectors remain an area of mutual exchanges and require return on investments. The lack of civil society to civil society interactions can be attributed to various reasons which include socio-cultural reasons as well. Language forms a

¹⁵⁷ Momo Shioyama, “Japan’s Latest Chapter in Military Cooperation: Official Security Alliance (OSA),” Center for Strategic and International Studies, December 21, 2023, accessed on March 11, 2024, <https://www.csis.org/blogs/new-perspectives-asia/japans-latest-chapter-military-cooperation-official-security-alliance>.

¹⁵⁸ Sreeparna Banerjee and Pratinashree Basu, “Strengthening Partnerships to Counter Non-Traditional Security Threats In,” n.d., 18.

¹⁵⁹ “India Gets Tsunami-Ready,” UNDRR, September 6, 2016, accessed on March 11, 2021, <http://www.undrr.org/news/india-gets-tsunami-ready>.

significant barrier regarding interactions, despite historical ties in terms of religious and trade domains, etc. Irrespective of the challenges, India and Japan interacted through the medium of the state while collaborating in human security. In sum, India and Japan also prioritise civil society engagements and issues beyond traditional security concerns, such as climate change, energy security, education, sanitation, etc., in their partnership.¹⁶⁰

Furthermore, India and Japan are prominent actors in the CDRI which focusses on areas like climate change and disaster management. The Indian Cabinet in 2022 approved categorising the CDRI as an “International Organisation.”¹⁶¹ All these areas form part of the core security arrangements within any national government policies without which the survival of a state has become unimaginable. The State is an indisputable actor in dealing with these non-traditional security areas and NCR framework of state centric analysis and domestic level perceptions prove necessary in understanding the foreign policy determinants.

In short in the current study, NCR as a theoretical framework is used to analyse foreign policy. Its goal is to understand how international politics work by taking into account the fundamental features of the global system and the political environment in which nations interact. Neoclassical realists have noted there are many significant shortcomings inherent in the neorealist model. These include: states may not consistently interpret systemic stimuli accurately; leaders might not be able to consistently exhibit reasonable responses to systemic environment; and the international system frequently fails to provide unambiguous indications on potential risks and advantageous circumstances. Due to prevailing domestic political and economic conditions, governments may encounter challenges in effectively mobilising the resources required to meet the demands of the international system.¹⁶² NCR approach is a substantial advancement over prevailing frameworks in the field of international relations and

¹⁶⁰ Panda P. Jaganath, ed., *Scaling India-Japan Cooperation in Indo-Pacific and Beyond 2025: Corridors, Connectivity and Contours* (New Delhi: Institute for Defence Studies and Analyses, 2020).

¹⁶¹ “Cabinet Approves Categorization of the Coalition for Disaster Resilient Infrastructure (CDRI) as an ‘International Organization’ and Signing of the Headquarters Agreement (HQA) with CDRI for Granting It the Exemptions, Immunities and Privileges as Contemplated under the United Nations (Privileges & Immunities) Act, 1947,” Press Information Bureau, June 29, 2022, accessed on November 1, 2022, <https://pib.gov.in/pib.gov.in/Pressreleaseshare.aspx?PRID=1837893>.

¹⁶² Norrin M. Ripsman, “NCR” (Oxford University Press, December 2017), accessed on July 12, 2022, <https://doi.org/10.1093/acrefore/9780190846626.013.36>.

foreign policy, encompassing “Innenpolitik” methods as well.¹⁶³ Neoclassical realists, drawing from neorealism, argue that foreign policies of nation-states are primarily shaped by the constraints and opportunities presented by the international system when developing their foreign and security strategies. Nevertheless, the responses are also impacted by other elements at the unit or individual level, including the dynamics between the state and society, the specific attributes of their domestic political systems, the attitudes of their leaders, specific strategic culture and business groupings.

Concluding Remarks

Realism, which believes in the State as the primary and unitary actor that tries to maximise power in a state of anarchy, fails to explain how nation-states navigate the prevailing international structure where different nation-states have varying degree of resources and capabilities. Further, classical realism views decision makers as rational actors but provides limited power to individual and organisations to influence policy making. Neorealism, on the other hand, believes in an international structure and relative distribution of power in an anarchic world where an international government is absent. In such a scenario every state tries to improve their capabilities with respect to other states to ensure military, economic and territorial security. By completely neglecting the domestic units and their influence in foreign policy decision making, these types of models fail to explain why states behave differently to similar situations and at varying points in time.

NCR argue that the neorealist model exhibits several significant shortcomings, one of which is the occasional failure of states to accurately identify both systemic and domestic stimuli. The objective of employing NCR as a framework for analysing foreign policy is to comprehend the dynamics of international politics by taking into account the political context in which governments engage with one another at a global level and how the intervening domestic variables influence foreign policy making. According to neoclassical realists, the formulation of foreign and security policies by states is influenced not only by the opportunities and limitations presented by the international system, but also by unit-level factors such as the interplay between states and their societies, the characteristics of their domestic political regimes, strategic culture, and the perceptions of their leaders. For India and Japan bilateral

¹⁶³ Shahid Hameed, “Dissecting Neo-Classical Realism and Foreign Policy Behavior: An Analysis,” *Journal of Development and Social Sciences* 4, no. 3 (September 30, 2023), accessed on December 1, 2023, [https://doi.org/10.47205/jdss.2023\(4-III\)70](https://doi.org/10.47205/jdss.2023(4-III)70).

relations, NCR provides a comprehensive picture considering how much their domestic variables like leadership perception, industrial bodies, civil society, and national interests play a role in determining the foreign policy objectives of both states while conducting relations and navigating the international system as a whole. To accomplish this, it is necessary to bring in different levels of analysis, and this is done by employing unit-level variables which have a significant impact on foreign policy making.

By the early 1990s, the hitherto established bipolar international system ended with the collapse of the Soviet Union and the world became unipolar with the US emerging as the sole superpower. Both India and Japan were witnessing economic upheavals at the end of the Cold War. Domestic compulsions led both countries to improve their economic relations, but it was made possible by the change in the systemic environment as well. With the end of the Cold War, Japan stopped looking at India through the Cold War prism, i.e., Japan had no obligation to consider India non-aligned or tilted towards the Soviet Union. Being an ally of the US, Japan limited its interaction with India earlier, limited to providing aid and imports and exports in a few key areas. With the end of the Cold War, Japan came out of the dilemma and viewed India as a potential partner in the region. Moreover, domestic leadership played a prominent role. For example, the then Prime Minister of India, P.V. Narasimha Rao, while heading a minority government, steered India through the economic crisis and set the path for bilateral relationship on the foreign policy front by introducing the “Look East” policy. Both realism and neorealism frameworks fall short of fully comprehending this type of relationship. This form of conduct or relations can be understood when we employ NCR as a theoretical framework. Systemic factors, in this case, the end of Cold War provided a push factor to improve relations between both the states i.e., India and Japan. At the same time, at the domestic level unit, i.e., the economy of both the nations and their political leadership efforts, especially from the part of India helped to cement the economic and strategic partnership between both the states.

As NCR adheres to the principle that domestic level concerns influence foreign policy making in an international setting, it gives scope to different security concerns including both traditional and NTS threats. Threats such as natural disasters, energy security, climate change, human security, education and so on have ceased to be on the periphery of any nations foreign policy making and started affecting the states directly. Over time they have become multilateral issues where in one single issue, such as diseases, can affect multiple countries all at once and undermine the survival of the nations. In this sense, the line has blurred between traditional and

NTS. Japan started providing aid to many developing countries through its ODA programme to tackle these security concerns and also entered into bilateral agreements to tackle such threats together. With respect to India and Japan relations, India has been receiving Japanese assistance in many areas. This assistance was directly provided through state institutions, like the JICA, instead of disbursement through the NGO route. Thus, addressing NTS threats is in the national interests of both India and Japan. NCR posits state centrality while addressing systemic challenges that mediated through domestic actors. Both the nation's leadership actively engaged in both bilateral and multilateral forums to tackle these threats. In a nutshell, NCR has emerged as a significant framework to understand the foreign policy decision making of individual states and as well as their bilateral relationship with other nations.

Chapter-2

India and Japan Relations: A Historical Overview

Introduction

The relations between India and Japan passed through several phases, which include periods beginning with ancient Buddhist connections, modern cotton trade from Bombay, relations during Indian Independence movement and a more estranged relationship during the Cold War period. For instance, the early engagements were dominated by the culture wherein Buddhism played a prominent role in introducing India to Japan in a more comprehensive way. Later on, in the modern times, after the opening up of the economy of Japan during the Meiji period (starting 1868), cotton trade dominated the trade relationship when India was under British rule. It was during this period, in the absence of state-to-state relations, more people-to-people contacts were made. These contacts were intellectual, scholarly and political in nature. This phase, i.e., the period of Indian Independence movement, also served as a bedrock among the Indian political leadership to develop an understanding about Japan as an Asian power which had the potential to serve the purpose of building Pan-Asianism¹, though Japan as an imperial power colonised part of Asia. Post-independent India and Japan promoted the state-to-state relations which were characterised by a phase of camaraderie and a subsequent estranged relationship. Such a relationship was manifested due to both structural impediments (like Cold War binaries) and domestic interests (the conflicting nature of Indian economy from the Japanese economy). To be precise, in the Cold War period, the relationship composed of various characteristics ranging from cultural, people to people and state centric engagements while navigating structural impediments. Only after the end of the Cold War, the relationship started maturing in a comprehensive way giving equal importance to all the dimensions of a bilateral relationship.

In this context, the present chapter delves into historical summary of India's relations with Japan. The chapter will provide the background and show how past interactions influenced

¹ Pan-Asianism, often known as Asianism, is a concept, movement, and ideology that is founded on the belief in a shared cultural and ethnic identity among Asians. This statement presupposes the presence of mutual political and economic interests, as well as a shared future that requires the unification of Asian nations or individuals in order to achieve collective objectives. The concept of Asian commonality and unity, with political undertones, began in Japan around the late 19th century and it rapidly gained recognition across East Asia, as well as in other regions inside and outside of Asia. See, Torsten Weber, "Pan-Asianism," in *The Palgrave Encyclopedia of Imperialism and Anti-Imperialism*, ed. Immanuel Ness and Zak Cope (Cham: Springer International Publishing, 2020), 1, accessed on January 23, 2022, https://doi.org/10.1007/978-3-319-91206-6_259-1.

the current relations through a phase-wise evaluation of the relationship. It also analyses the various variables that have previously impacted India's relationship with Japan, demonstrating how structure (international) and domestic factors interact with each other, keeping in view the Neoclassical Realism (NCR) as the analytical framework. The chapter is divided into three sections wherein, the first section delves into the early contacts between India and Japan, tracing how the initial contacts took place and what drove the interactions. The second section discusses the relationship between both nations during the period of India's independence movement, coinciding with the two World Wars in which Japan played an active role. This section highlights how people-to-people contacts evolved, which includes intellectual exchanges, a fascination towards a rising Asian giant and its consequent damage of image due to Japan's aggression towards China and its involvement in the World War II. The perception of Indian National Congress (INC) leadership, during anti-colonial struggle, towards Japan is also briefly dealt with in this section. The following section discusses the relationship between both nations in the post-independence or post-war period. This section analyses the relationship during the post-Indian independence period, coinciding with the onset of Cold War bipolarity. In this context, the perception of different political dispensations of India towards Japan is brought out while discussing Japan's overall attitude towards India in the period. Finally, the chapter concludes by discussing the environment surrounding the end of Cold War and how the collapse of Soviet Union changed the perception of India and Japan towards each other to form a relationship that evolved into a "special strategic and global partnership."

Early Interactions between India and Japan

Archaeologists, such as Oga Katsuhiko and Sunil Gupta, traced early maritime connections between ancient India and Japan through archaeological evidences.² An artefactual indication of early trade over the Indian Ocean, for example, can be found in the distribution of Indo-Pacific beads. The glass microbeads can be traced back to a period spanning from the third century BC to the fourteenth century AD,³ with instances in places as widely apart as Japan and South Africa. The available evidences indicate that microbeads were first produced in the third or second century BC in the southern Indian town of Arikamedu (in modern-day

² Oga Katsuhiko and Sunil Gupta, "The Far East, Southeast and South Asia: Indo-Pacific Beads from Yayoi Tombs as Indicators of Early Maritime Exchange," *South Asian Studies* 16, no. 1 (January 2000): 73–88, accessed on February 19, 2021, <https://doi.org/10.1080/02666030.2000.9628581>.

³ Peter Francis, "Glass Beads in Asia Part Two. Indo-Pacific Beads," *Asian Perspectives* 29, no. 1 (1990): 1–23.

Puducherry), and over time, similar production centres sprang up throughout Southeast Asia and South Asia. Indo-Pacific beads were first found in the Yayoi period tombs in Japan (Yayoi ruled the regions in Japan between 300 BC and 250 AD).⁴ These tangible evidences indirectly point towards an early connection between the Indian subcontinent and Japan.

At the more tangible level, India's historical ties with Japan were established in the sixth century with the introduction of Buddhism through China. In the "Consecrating Ceremony" of the Buddha at Japan's Nara Todaiji Temple in 752 AD, Bodhisena, an Indian Buddhist scholar and a monk, served as the "Master of Ceremony."⁵ Buddhists promoted art and culture, gradually expanding the influence of the religion over the region, at the same time giving rise to other sects and cults, like *Tendai* and *Shingou*.⁶ There is a belief that the Japanese syllabary known as Kana is derived from the Sanskrit alphabets used in India. The impact was so significant and far reaching that even Hajime Nakamura⁷ asserts that Japanese culture owes a significant debt to Indian influence, as it has played a crucial role in shaping its present form.

In the early modern times or later medieval period, the official encounters between India and Japan occurred significantly around the late 16th century. Japan initiated political engagement with Portugal in colonial India. During the peak of anti-Christian movements in 1596, the Christians of Japan sought refuge in Goa.⁸ There, they formed a community of merchants and enslaved individuals who had been captured by Portuguese vessels. Leupp, a prominent Japanese historian, states that Japan previously had belief that Christianity was a religion originating from India and the Portuguese were native to India.⁹ During the eighteenth and nineteenth centuries, Indians worked as sailors on ships and sailed to Japan, commissioned by the British and the Portuguese. Prior to the outbreak of the World War I, textile producers

⁴ Katsuhiko and Gupta, "The Far East, Southeast and South Asia," 74.

⁵ John Carroll, "Bodhisena: The Indian Monk Who Opened Eyes in Nara | JAPAN Forward," Japan Forward, September 26, 2020, <https://japan-forward.com/bookmark-bodhisena-the-indian-monk-who-opened-eyes-in-nara/>.

⁶ Kalidas Nag, *Greater India* (Indian Society Bulletin No. 1, 1926), 33, accessed on February 20, 2021, <http://archive.org/details/greaterindia029157mbp>.

⁷ Hajime Nakamura, *Japan and Indian Asia: Their Cultural Relations in the Past and Present* (K. L. Mukhopadhyay, 1961), 1.

⁸ Nakamura, 1.

⁹ Jan Leuchtenberger, "Christians, Christianity, and Kakure Kirishitan in Japan (1549–1868)," in *The Tokugawa World*, ed. Leupp Gary P and De-min Tao (London: Routledge, 2021), 802.

and merchants from both India and China opened branches in Yokohama, Kobe, and subsequently in Osaka, prominent cities in Japan.¹⁰ It is evident that Japan's initial interactions with India have generally been driven by commercial interests.

In the 19th century, despite Japan's overall isolation from the rest of the world, there was a significant link between India and Japan. This connection was primarily driven by Japan's dependence on India as a source of raw cotton because of quickly growing spinning industry in Japan. Moreover, in the same period, India emerged as a market for Japanese finished products. It is to be noted that, as India was under the rule of British, the political and economic/trade relations between India and Japan were manifested either through British officials or through their agents present in India. Japan started to import substantial amounts of Indian cotton via Bombay in order to establish and sustain its textile sector during the 1890s.¹¹ In 1893, J.N. Tata, a noted Indian industrialist of that time, visited Japan to establish an office to trade with Japan, this was considered one of the significant partnerships in India-Japan bilateral relationship.¹² Trade links between Japan and India were established in 1894 with the opening of a Japanese consulate in Bombay and in the same year an Indo-Japanese Trade Convention was established, marking the initiation of regular maritime transportation between the two nations.¹³ The Japan-India Association, a first of its kind was established in 1903 under the leadership of Japanese Prime Minister Okuma in 1907, the office of Japanese Consulate General was also established in Calcutta. Throughout the Meiji era (1868-1912) India played a crucial role in supplying raw materials, such as cotton, to Japan¹⁴

¹⁰ Hiroshi Shimizu, "The Indian Merchants of Kobe and Japan's Trade Expansion into Southeast Asia before the Asian-Pacific War," *Japan Forum* 17, no. 1 (March 1, 2005): 27, accessed on March 23, 2022, <https://doi.org/10.1080/0955580052000337459>.

¹¹ Lentin Sifra, "Imperial Japan's Trade with Bombay," *Gateway House* (blog), March 20, 2019, accessed on March 23, 2022, <https://www.gatewayhouse.in/bombay-japan-trade/>.

¹² Arpita Mathur, "Setting the Stage: India and Japan in History," *INDIA-JAPAN RELATIONS* (S. Rajaratnam School of International Studies, 2012), <https://www.jstor.org/stable/resrep05895.3>.

¹³ T. R. Sareen, *India and Japan in Historical Perspective* (New Delhi: Life Span Publishers & Distributors, 1997), 9.

¹⁴ Sawaji Osamu, "A New Era of Japan-India Relations," *The Japan Journal*, September 10, 2008, accessed on March 23, 2022, http://www.japanjournal.jp/tjje/show_art.php?INDyear=07&INDmon=12&artid=ca3d183e4aa7b102c482f80af209c56a&page=2.

and continued the practice until Japan started acquiring cotton from other nations, including China.

India and Japan Relationship during India's Freedom Struggle

During the late 19th and early 20th century, British India experienced social and political turmoil, which led to a series of intellectual and scholarly interactions between India and Japan. Prominent individuals such as Sureshchandra Bandhopadhyay and Manmatha Nath Ghosh, distinguished scholar-activists, visited Japan with the aim of acquiring technical expertise and exploring potential economic prospects. Meanwhile, political figures such as Rash Bihari Bose, Subhash Chandra Bose, and Radha Binod Pal, travelled to Japan with political intentions, which helped foster a growing flow of ideas between the two countries.¹⁵ In addition to them, intellectuals like Rabindranath Tagore and Mukul Dey visited Japan with the intention of promoting cultural exchange and enhancing comprehension of Japanese aesthetics and traditions.

Nevertheless, it was not solely men who undertook these transforming voyages. Indian women often travelled overseas, influencing the cultural environment through their writings and experiences. Women from India made notable contributions to Japan, expanding the spirit of travel and cultural interchange. Shanta Devi, Abala Bose, Saroj Nalini Dutt, Hariprabha Takeda and other individuals embarked on a journey to Japan, enhancing the genre of travel literature with their distinct viewpoints and first-hand encounters.¹⁶ Exploring the extensive collection of travel writings from this era, revealed a wide range of personal stories and cultural interactions, shedding light on the interconnected past and lasting friendship between India and Japan.

The idea of 'Asianess' continued to develop as intellectuals like Swami Vivekananda travelled throughout the region. In 1893, Swami Vivekananda was deeply fascinated with Japanese nationalism when he visited Japan.¹⁷ He urged Indian students and intellectuals to

¹⁵ "India-Japan Relations," Ministry of External Affairs, Government of India, December 13, 2016, accessed on March 23, 2022, https://www.mea.gov.in/Portal/ForeignRelation/Japan_Relations_13_12_2016.pdf.

¹⁶ Jayati Gupta, *Travel Culture, Travel Writing and Bengali Women, 1870-1940* (New Delhi: Routledge India, 2020), 242.

¹⁷ Sanjaya Baru, "Vivekananda Went to Japan in 1893. He Was Fascinated by Its Army, Tunnels, Match Factories," ThePrint, August 10, 2023, accessed on December 23, 2023, <https://theprint.in/pageturner/excerpt/vivekananda-went-to-japan-in-1893-he-was-fascinated-by-its-army-tunnels-match-factories/1708352/>.

emulate the achievements of the Japanese by visiting Japan at least once in every year.¹⁸ An Oriental Youngman's Association was founded in Japan in 1900, which encouraged greater interaction among Asian students studying in Japan, including Indians.¹⁹ The Indian national movement against the British East India Company's colonialism peaked during this time. Many Indian students who were beginning to protest British colonialism were educated by the Association. The British expressed their displeasure with the detrimental impact of the Japanese²⁰ on them and implemented a regulation requiring Indian students travelling to Japan to present a certificate of identity endorsed by a reliable official.

During the late Meiji period, there was a significant rise in intellectual interactions between India and Japan, which was evident by the friendship of Okakura Tenshin and Rabindranath Tagore, an Indian Nobel Laureate. During his tour to India, Okakura, a distinguished art critic and historian, encouraged Rabindranath Tagore to visit Japan. In Okakura Tenshin's important work "The Ideals of the East (1904)," the opening statement expressed the concept that "Asia is a cohesive entity."²¹ His perception of Asia was influenced by the Buddhist perspective, which focused on the three prominent nations of India, China, and Japan.²² Asians were expected to be unified in their shared experience of being humiliated by colonial powers.

From the Indian side, Tagore held a deep admiration for Japan's ability to distinguish itself from the western world. However, he also considered that Japan could benefit from incorporating certain aspects of western civilisation in order to become the sole modernised state in Asia. Tagore urged Japan to showcase the magnificence of its principles, much like the majestic Mount Fuji emerging from the core of the country and reaching towards the boundless

¹⁸ "Alasinga - Letters of Swami Vivekananda," *Viveka Vani* (blog), August 14, 2011, accessed on February 23, 2022, <https://vivekavani.com/iii-alasinga-letters-swami-vivekananda/>.

¹⁹ Sultana Aleya Mousami, "India Foreign Policies and the Contemporary World" (Cooch Behar Panchanan Barma University, 2020), 3, accessed on April 10, 2022, [https://www.cbpbu.ac.in/userfiles/file/2020/STUDY_MAT/POL_SC/15-05-20/INDIA%20JAPAN%20RELATIONSHIP-converted%20\(1\).pdf](https://www.cbpbu.ac.in/userfiles/file/2020/STUDY_MAT/POL_SC/15-05-20/INDIA%20JAPAN%20RELATIONSHIP-converted%20(1).pdf).

²⁰ Sareen, *India and Japan in Historical Perspective*, 9.

²¹ Kakuzo Okakura and Sister Nivedita, *Ideals of the East: The Spirit of Japanese Art* (Mineola, NY: Dover Publications Inc., 2005).

²² Pekka Korhonen, "The Geography of Okakura Tenshin," *Japan Review*, no. 13 (2001): 110.

realm.²³ The impact of this idealised portrayal of a “oriental character” on India-Japan ties is subject to debate. However, Tagore exerted a profound influence on the Japanese populace, and his literary works were extensively disseminated in Japan. Okakura was more renowned internationally (including in India) than in his own country, as his ideas on ‘Asianism’ had limited backing domestically. It is worth mentioning that Tagore and Okakura had disagreements, particularly about the conduct of their nations.

Tagore voiced particular apprehension towards Japan, which he deemed to be inconsistent with the traditional ideals of Asia such as Japan’s increasing nationalism and its conduct towards China in the 1930s.²⁴ Although some scholars have periodically brought up this episode, the idea of Asian awareness did not materialise in the establishment of any political relationship, and its practical impact was little. However, the international system in place at the time did not make it easier for Japan and India to become more closely linked.

India’s interactions with Japan were primarily limited in scope, focusing on intellectual or economic aspects as discussed earlier. During the late nineteenth century, Japan’s modernisation efforts led to increased political engagement, which in turn inspired early advocates of Pan-Asianism.²⁵ The elites in Meiji ruling class closely monitored the unfolding volatile events in “British India” with apprehension. For many people, the Indian experience served as a prime example of the perils associated with western influence.²⁶ The Indian independence movement is believed to have developed and flourished with significant influence from neighbouring Asian countries that were also grappling with western domination. During Russia and Japanese war in 1904-1905, there was a growing movement in Japan to establish an Asian identity that included countries such as Persia, India, China, and Japan. Several Indian, Chinese, Vietnamese and Korean students travelled to Japan with the

²³ Tagore Rabindranath, *The Message of India to Japan: A Lecture* (New York: The McMillan Company, 1916), 29, accessed on March 23, 2022, https://issuu.com/dirkjan2/docs/rabindranath_tagore_-_the_message_of_india_to_japa.

²⁴ Giri Deshingkar, “The Construction of Asia in India,” *Asian Studies Review* 23, no. 2 (June 1999): 175, accessed on April 12, 2022, <https://doi.org/10.1080/10357829908713229>.

²⁵ Yukiko Sumi Barnett, “India in Asia: Ôkawa Shûmei’s Pan-Asian Thought and His Idea of India in Early Twentieth-Century Japan,” *Journal of the Oxford University History Society*, 2004, 3.

²⁶ Cees Heere, “‘The Englands of East and West’: Britain and Japan, Empire and Race, 1894–1904,” in *Empire Ascendant: The British World, Race, and the Rise of Japan, 1894-1914*, ed. Cees Heere (Oxford University Press, 2019), 15, accessed on April 12, 2022, <https://doi.org/10.1093/oso/9780198837398.003.0002>.

purpose of seeing the Japanese approach towards Europeans.²⁷ After winning the war against Russia in 1905, Japan was viewed as an example for fighting against colonialism, despite the fact that its own imperial rule was somewhat diminished. In India, there was a clear and outspoken respect for the Japanese achievement.

The Japanese reciprocated the Indian enthusiasm with a favourable response. The then Speaker of the Japanese House of Peers expressed that it was Japan's solemn obligation, as the foremost Asian nation, to extend assistance to India, a nation with a civilisation, and liberate it from the domination of Europe.²⁸ In 1903, a bilateral Indo-Japan Friendship Association was established.²⁹ A total of 54 Indian students went to Japan in 1906.³⁰ After Japan's triumph in the war against Russia, trade also significantly increased. The Japanese showed a distinct and sincere support for the Indian independence movement, which greatly unsettled the British. Indians had a strong connection with Japan, to the extent that even when they chose to adopt the swadeshi system of boycotting foreign goods, they made an exception for Japanese items and did not include them in the prohibited list.³¹ Indeed, an Indian journal called *Kesari*³² explicitly urged individuals to prioritise Japanese products over those supplied by other foreign countries. This shows the positive attitude of a section of Indian society towards Japan.

Apart from the intellectuals, a number of revolutionaries were drawn towards Japan. Tokyo became a hub for revolutionaries from all over the Asia including Indians who visited Tokyo to seek support from Japanese society to liberate their countries from British control after the Japanese victory over Russia in 1905.³³ The Indian revolutionaries organised anti-

²⁷ Pekka Korhonen, "Monopolizing Asia: The Politics of a Metaphor," *The Pacific Review* 10, no. 3 (January 1, 1997): 350, accessed on April 11, 2022, <https://doi.org/10.1080/09512749708719227>.

²⁸ Sareen, *India and Japan in Historical Perspective*, 15.

²⁹ "PM's Address at the Reception by Japan-India Association and Japan-India Parliamentary Friendship League," Prime Minister of India - Dr. Manmohan Singh, October 23, 2008, accessed on April 11, 2022, <https://archivepmo.nic.in/drmanmohansingh/speech-details.php?nodeid=714>.

³⁰ Birendra Prasad, *Indian Nationalism and Asia* (Delhi: B. R. Publishing Corporation, 1952), 45, accessed on April 11, 2022, <http://archive.org/details/dli.bengal.10689.12981>.

³¹ Prasad, 47.

³² Prasad, 46.

³³ Harald Fischer-Tiné, "Indian Nationalism and the 'World Forces': Transnational and Diasporic Dimensions of the Indian Freedom Movement on the Eve of the First World War," *Journal of Global History* 2, no. 3 (November 2007): 325–44, accessed on April 11, 2022, <https://doi.org/10.1017/S1740022807002318>.

British propaganda, highlighting the oppression faced by the Indian people at the hands of colonial power. The first known Indian revolutionaries who shifted his base to Tokyo for anti-British propaganda campaign was Mauve Barkatullah. He took an assignment of teaching Urdu at School of Foreign Language in Tokyo University in 1909.³⁴ He also used his time to campaign against the British by publishing various articles aimed at informing the Japanese people about the treatment meted out by colonial rulers to his fellow Indians.³⁵ Barkatullah was associated with Indian revolutionaries abroad, and was well acquainted with political propaganda against the British rule.

Rash Behari Bose, is another Indian freedom fighter, who arrived in Tokyo in 1915³⁶ with the intention of expanding Pan-Asianist ideology. In 1905, after victory of Japan over Russia, Rash Behari Bose viewed Japan as a model in the struggle against the colonialism. India largely welcomed the setback for “shattering the notion of European dominance over Asia and providing a powerful source of motivation for Indian nationalists striving to liberate their country from British colonial rule.”³⁷ Upon receiving the news of Japan’s victory over Russia, Nehru expressed his sense of pride in his Asian identity.³⁸ Subsequently, Japan’s position significantly improved. Following these events, Japan found the relationship with India to be appealing.³⁹ Rash Behari Bose, established links with a number of Japanese journalists and conveyed to them stories of Indian people suffering under the British rule in India. These stories frequently appeared in the Japanese press, and thus, a number of people in Japan felt sympathetic about India and offered their moral and political support to the cause of India’s freedom. While campaigning in Japan to gain support for India’s independence among the Japanese civil society, Rash Behari Bose pursued his goal of an armed rebellion in India by providing weapons to his Indian counterparts. He sent first consignment including some documents addressed to his comrades, to India using one of his associate Avanti Nath

³⁴ Nakajima Takeshi, *Bose of Nakamura: An Indian Revolutionary in Japan*, trans. Motwani Prem (New Delhi: Bibliophile South Asia, 2024), 70.

³⁵ Takeshi, 71.

³⁶ Takeshi, 21.

³⁷ Purnendra Jain and Mauree Todhunter, “India and Japan: Newly Tempering Relations” (Sterling, 1996), 90.

³⁸ Deshingkar, “The Construction of Asia in India,” June 1999, 176.

³⁹ Cemil Aydin, “Japan’s Pan-Asianism and the Legitimacy of Imperial World Order, 1931-1945,” *The Asia-Pacific Journal: Japan Focus*, March 3, 2008, accessed on April 11, 2022, <https://apjff.org/cemil-aydin/2695/article>.

Mukherjee.⁴⁰ But these documents and consignments were confiscated by the British authorities in Singapore.

Despite the individual support offered by a group of leaders, the Japanese government did not feel the need to give an official support to the cause of India's freedom as it was bound by an alliance with United Kingdom (UK). But after lapse of the third Anglo-Japanese alliance in 1921,⁴¹ the Japanese felt the need to utilise the Indian revolutionaries in their goal to drive the western powers out of the region. Japanese officers contacted various Indian organisations in Southeast Asian countries which were active in their efforts to bring an end to British rule in India.⁴² They were successful in contacting Independence League of India (also referred as Indian Independence League), consisting of Thailand-based Indians and of its prominent face, Giani Pritam Singh, an Indian revolutionary.

Later, a Memorandum of Understanding (MoU) between the Indian Independence League (IIL) headed by Pritam Singh and Col. Tamura was signed in 1941, and the IIL was given the task to weaken British Empire in Southeast Asia with the help of Indian nationalists based in the region. As per the MoU,⁴³ the main objective of the cooperation between India and Japan was to establish India and Japan as an independent, sovereign and equal nation. Notably, it was also agreed that the Japanese authorities would assist propaganda activities of the IIL by providing the broadcasting facilities in Tokyo, Bangkok and other occupied territories.⁴⁴ Moreover, they agreed to provide airplanes for distributing propaganda materials within the Japanese sphere of influence. This MoU between Japan and the lesser-known organisation IIL was an important landmark in the relationship of India and Japan.

When Japanese army was moving towards Singapore and Malaya, in December 1941, the dispersal of propaganda material prepared by IIL resulted in surrender of Indian soldiers to

⁴⁰ Takeshi, *Bose of Nakamura*, 51.

⁴¹ The third Anglo-Japanese alliance lapsed in 1921 and it was not renewed later. From 1902 to 1921, Japan has signed three alliances with England known as Anglo- Japanese Alliance.

⁴² Hugh Toye, "The First Indian National Army, 1941-42," *Journal of Southeast Asian Studies* 15, no. 2 (1984): 370.

⁴³ Memorandum of Understanding between Sardar Pritam Singh and Col. Tamura was signed on December 4, 1941

⁴⁴ Toye, "The First Indian National Army, 1941-42," 372.

Japanese army. The slogans included “Asia for the Asians”, “Keep out the white devils from the East, we have come out to liberate Asia from the clutches of the Anglo- Saxons, and No Asian is our Enemy.”⁴⁵ This propaganda material was prepared to attract the Indian origin soldiers fighting on behalf of the British Army. The abandonment of soldiers from the British Army made the Japanese task easier and, on many fronts, they started retreating. Mohan Singh, a British Indian officer, later became an important link between India and Japan, and a point of reference in the history of Indian freedom movement and Japan. The Japanese side tried to win support of Mohan Singh, to achieve its objectives by arguing that the war had given the Indians best opportunity to attain freedom.⁴⁶ In his conversations with Mohan Singh, Fujiwara, a Major in Japanese army, cited reasons for supporting India’s independence. First, Japan and India had a common enemy to fight to achieve their objective. The second reason was Japan’s historical relations with India which was motherland of Japan’s religion and culture, i.e., Buddhism. Third, geographical and ethnic ties in Asia involving India and Japan was another reason. Finally, the Japanese people’s resentment towards the British formed a crucial rationale to support India’s independence.⁴⁷ Consequently, Mohan Singh provided conditional backing to Fujiwara, and put forth a set of six proposals as a condition for his support.⁴⁸ The following were the conditions made by him: first, that the Japanese army would provide full support to this army. Second, the Indians would establish an Indian People’s Army, later known as the Indian National Army (INA). Third, the Indian army and the IIL would collaborate temporarily. Fourth, the Japanese would view Indian captives as allies and release those who wanted to join the Indian army. Fifth, the Japanese Army would acknowledge Mohan Singh as the leader of the Indian captives. and finally, the Indian army should be officially recognised as a friendly allied army by the Japanese army.⁴⁹ This showed that the Indian revolutionaries wanted to ally with Japan but on their own terms.

At the same time, the Indian National Congress (INC) played an important role in representing Indian nationalism throughout the history of interactions between the Indian

⁴⁵ Sareen, *India and Japan in Historical Perspective*, 62.

⁴⁶ Sareen, 63.

⁴⁷ Joyce Lebra-Chapman, *Jungle Alliance: Japan and the Indian National Army* (Singapore: D. Moore for Asia Pacific Press, 1971), 20.

⁴⁸ Lebra-Chapman, 24.

⁴⁹ Lebra-Chapman, 25.

nationalist movement and Japan. The Japanese and Russian War of 1904-05 was the first event in the East Asia to have a significant effect on the Indian nationalist movement.⁵⁰ The nationalist movement in India was transitioning at the time from its initial phase that took pride in India's history and moved towards a Pan-Asian movement. The younger members of the nationalist movement were inspired by the Japanese defeat of Russia, one of the most powerful militaries, which had caused England to fear for its Indian territories and accelerated the spread of nationalism. Indian revolutionaries responded to the division of Bengal in 1905 with vigour and speed because of the enthusiasm and confidence that Japan's victory had instilled in them.⁵¹ At this time, the INC published resolutions endorsing the launch of Swadhesi movement (a boycott of imported goods in favour of domestic ones) and for the first time calling for self-government inside the boundaries of the British Empire. When Lala Lajpat Rai, a prominent Congress figure, wrote about Japan, he said,

*“That the East must imbibe something of the aggressive spirit of the West and must also adopt and assimilate the intellectual achievements of the West if she wants to regain her self-respect, goes without saying . . . I want to establish that even at the present moment there is a fundamental unity between India, China, and Japan, and that the Western influences over these countries have not yet advanced sufficiently far to destroy that unity.”*⁵²

The foundation was laid for the growth of a Pan-Asian movement, led by the highly regarded Japanese leaders, but due to the declining of sentiment and India's preoccupation with internal issues like the partition of Bengal, the fight to have the oppressive press laws repealed, and the Home Rule agitation during World War II, the Pan-Asian movement was put on hold.⁵³ In the 1920s, some freedom movement activists such as Jawaharlal Nehru, advocated for collaboration between India and Asian countries to establish an “Asian federation” and

⁵⁰ Irving S. Friedman, “Indian Nationalism and the Far East,” *Pacific Affairs* 13, no. 1 (1940): 17, accessed on April 12, 2022, <https://doi.org/10.2307/2750768>.

⁵¹ Cemil Aydin, “A Global Anti-Western Moment? The Russo-Japanese War, Decolonization, and Asian Modernity,” in *Competing Visions of World Order: Global Moments and Movements, 1880s–1930s*, ed. Sebastian Conrad and Dominic Sachsenmaier (New York: Palgrave Macmillan US, 2007), 220, accessed on April 12, 2022, https://doi.org/10.1057/9780230604285_8.

⁵² Friedman, “Indian Nationalism and the Far East,” 18.

⁵³ Abul Kalam, *Japan and South Asia: Subsystematic Linkages and Developing Relationships* (Dhaka: University Press Limited, 1996), 129.

dismantle the central pillar of imperialism.⁵⁴ But, Japan had lost its respect in India as a result of its aggressive China policy during the World War II.

It was indicated in Pandit Motilal Nehru's presentation at the December 1928 Calcutta Congress, which he presided over, that the time had come for India "to no longer confine her activities within her own borders but should stretch out her hands of fellowship to other Asiatic nations."⁵⁵ It is notable that Mr. Satyamurthi, a leader of INC, felt compelled to explain this inclusion and that, for the first time, Japan was clearly listed as a country with whom contact should be formed. He claimed that many people agreed that Japan was "tainted with imperialism,"⁵⁶ but that the Japanese people were starting to realise that they needed to establish democracy and give up imperialism. Furthermore, he added, it must not be forgotten that Japan was one of the world's top powers and had dealt a devastating blow to Russia, an outpost of western imperialism, demonstrating to the rest of the world that Asia was capable of defeating Europe. Thus, Japan's pacific policy was progressively dispelling the mistrust and fear of Japan that existed in nationalist groups in India. This was most obviously shown in Japan's unwillingness to join the other powers in dispatching substantial reinforcements to Shanghai during the 1926-1927 difficulties.⁵⁷ According to Mr. Satyamurthi, a "Pan-Asiatic Federation" comprising all Asian states should be formed and popularised in India.⁵⁸ He refuted the claims that this was not practical and noted the volume of kind greetings that were sent to the Congress in support of his position.

By the year 1935, Japan resumed its expansionist agenda in China and was actively pursuing its autonomy plans for the five provinces of North China.⁵⁹ On the backdrop of such a development, the notion of a Pan-Asiatic Federation was practically dead, and instead grew a conviction that India's domestic concerns were part of the overarching global structure of

⁵⁴ Kalam, 130.

⁵⁵ Friedman, "Indian Nationalism and the Far East," 22.

⁵⁶ Friedman, 21.

⁵⁷ Harumi Goto-Shibata, *Japan and Britain in Shanghai, 1925-31* (London: Palgrave Macmillan UK, 1995), 45, accessed April 11, 2022, <https://doi.org/10.1057/9780230389830>.

⁵⁸ Prasad, *Indian Nationalism and Asia*, 45.

⁵⁹ "Japan-China Joint History Research Report," Modern and Contemporary History Vol.1 (Ministry for Foreign Affairs, Japan, March 2011), 117, accessed on April 12, 2022, <https://www.mofa.go.jp/mofaj/files/100512970.pdf>.

colonialism, aggression and the potential dissolution of international order.⁶⁰ The invasion of Manchuria not only cost Japan the respect and prestige it had gradually gained over the 1920s, but it also eliminated any positive undertone that the Indian nationalist movement had retained regarding Japan.

From the early 1930s, when the Sino-Japanese hostilities started, the nationalist movement in India supported the Chinese independence struggle. This stance was expressed in a variety of ways, including through statements made by notable members of the Congress, resolutions adopted by the Congress, support for the Chinese cause in the form of financial aid and the dispatch of an ambulance corps to China, adoption of an anti-Japanese stance, rejection of Japanese propaganda, and the trip undertaken by Jawaharlal Nehru in 1939 to Chongqing, a municipality in Southwest China.⁶¹ Furthermore, Nehru was not the only national leader to oppose Japan's invasion of China. Gandhi expressed his disapproval of the Japanese case as well, though not as frequently or forcefully as others.⁶² When responding to a letter from the well-known Japanese poet Yone Noguchi, India's venerable poet-philosopher Rabindranath Tagore said that "Japan was creating an image of Asia that could only be realised atop a tower made of skulls."⁶³ Tagore claimed that Noguchi's "Asia for Asia" doctrine was a political blackmail tactic that had all the characteristics of the "lesser Europe."⁶⁴ Tagore, rejected and said that it had nothing to do with the greater humanity that allowed people to see beyond the boundaries of political labels and divisions.⁶⁵ This shows that though there was admiration towards Japan, the Japanese expansionist tendencies negatively affected its perception especially among Indians.

⁶⁰ Friedman, "Indian Nationalism and the Far East," 23.

⁶¹ Vijay Gokhale, "A Historical Evaluation of China's India Policy: Lessons for India-China Relations" (Carnegie India, December 2022), 6, accessed on April 1, 2023, https://carnegieendowment.org/files/Gokhale_-_Chinas_India_Policy3.pdf.

⁶² Rashmi-Sudha Puri, "Gandhi and the Second World War," *The Indian Journal of Political Science* 38, no. 1 (1977): 30–53.

⁶³ Chaudhuri Devdan, "Do Indians Have Tagore's Identity of Being an Asian?," *The Punch Magazine*, September 30, 2020, accessed on April 1, 2023, <https://thepunchmagazine.com/the-byword/non-fiction/do-indians-have-tagore-amp-s-identity-of-being-an-asian>.

⁶⁴ Devdan.

⁶⁵ Devdan.

Trade between Indian and Japan declined significantly since 1923 when the Anglo-Japanese alliance dissolved as a result of pressure exerted by the United States (US).⁶⁶ A combination of structural incentives, bolstered by domestic support, consequently arose such as World War II. However, there was a lack of unanimity among the elite, and no national leader showed keen interest in taking forward the relations.

To create the Indian Independence League and INA, Indian expatriates assembled in Bangkok and Tokyo in 1942. Originally, the INA was made up only of British prisoners of war (PoWs) and expatriates from India. But in 1944, the great freedom fighter Subhash Chandra Bose succeeded in getting Japanese War Minister Tojo Hideki, who later became Japan's prime minister, to back the Indian independence cause.⁶⁷ Rash Bihari Bose, whose reputation had suffered as a result of accusations that he preferred Japan over India, was replaced as leader of the INA by Subhash Chandra Bose.⁶⁸ Japanese forces fought alongside the INA in Manipur, India, during the "U-Go Offensive." Nevertheless, the Japanese and INA forces suffered heavy losses in both the Battles of Kohima and Imphal, which ended in their defeat.⁶⁹ Nevertheless, there was widespread mutual support between Indian revolutionaries and Japan.

Japan's adoption of "Pan-Asian" philosophy had a different significance compared to that in India. While the Indian perspective focused on achieving independence from the British, The perspective of Japan was driven by imperialistic ambitions.⁷⁰ For leaders like Subhash Chandra Bose, Pan-Asianism served as a strategy rather than a goal in its own right. Although Subhash Chandra Bose acknowledged Japan's imperialism and even endorsed Japan's militarist expansionism⁷¹ there was a deep-seated suspicion regarding Japan's intentions to reassert itself in Asia after years of apathy towards nationalism. In the absence of positive

⁶⁶ Kenichi Ohno, *The History of Japanese Economic Development: Origins of Private Dynamism and Policy Competence*, 1st ed. (London: Routledge, 2017), 17, accessed on April 12, 2022, <https://doi.org/10.4324/9781315444048>.

⁶⁷ Ranjan Borra, "Subhas Chandra Bose, The Indian National Army, and The War of India's Liberation," *The Journal of Historical Review* 3, no. 4 (March 14, 2024): 407–39.

⁶⁸ Joyce Lebra, *The Indian National Army and Japan* (Singapore: Institute of Southeast Asian Studies, 2008), 109.

⁶⁹ Lebra, 110.

⁷⁰ Aydin, "Japan's Pan-Asianism and the Legitimacy of Imperial World Order, 1931-1945."

⁷¹ Rajaram Panda and Yoo Fukazawa, *India and Japan, in Search of Global Roles* (Delhi: Promilla & Company Publishers, 2007), 28.

structural conditions, the individual level affiliations were unable to elevate interactions to a higher degree.

An often-neglected element of interaction is the encounter of PoWs in 1940s belonging to Japan in India.⁷² Discussion with regard to PoWs in Japan is restricted due to the significant impact of the “Bushido Code of War,” which unequivocally forbids giving up.⁷³ Although the capture of soldiers belonging to Japan was rare, historical sources suggest that around three thousands of them were held in India throughout the war period.⁷⁴ T. S. Sareen, a renowned expert on the diplomatic ties between India and Japan, notes that PoWs of Japan from New Zealand formed associations after being sent back to Japan, but those who were detained in India were mostly neglected or forgotten.⁷⁵ An event that left a lasting impression on the Japanese was the opposing opinion expressed by Indian Justice – Mr. Radha Binod Pal, during the “International Military Tribunal for the Far East” in November 1948. While some Justices expressed their disapproval of the court’s decision, it was Pal’s “not guilty” conviction that had the most profound impact. His dissenting opinion was censored in both Britain and Japan until 1952. However, Justice Pal’s criticism was not rooted in endorsing Japan’s conduct or asserting the innocence of the defendants. He admitted Japan’s wartime brutality, specifically mentioning the Nanjing massacre⁷⁶ and emphasised that the horrific nature of the reported atrocities cannot be disputed.⁷⁷ His point of divergence was about the legality of the actions in terms of being subject to criminal charges. Pal disputed the existence of a plot to initiate war and objected to the retrospective adoption of the terms of “crimes against peace” and “crimes against humanity”.⁷⁸ Pal’s critique was specifically aimed at the Tribunal. Justice Pal perceived

⁷² Tilak Raj Sareen, *Japan and the Indian National Army* (Delhi: Agam Prakashan, 1986), 50.

⁷³ Bushido, is a code of behaviour of how men should act in their professional and personal spaces. It involves attitudes of a Samurai and his lifestyle.

⁷⁴ Tilak Raj Sareen, *Japanese Prisoners of War in India, 1942-46: Bushido and Barbed Wire* (Folkestone, Kent: Global Oriental, 2006), 20.

⁷⁵ Richard H. Minear, *Victors’ Justice: Tokyo War Crimes Trial* (Princeton, N.J: Princeton University Press, 1971), 120.

⁷⁶ The Nanjing Massacre, also known as the Rape of Nanjing, refers to the large-scale killing of Chinese people in Nanjing, the capital of the Republic of China, shortly after the Battle of Nanking during the Second Sino-Japanese War. The perpetrators of this atrocity were the Imperial Japanese Army.

⁷⁷ Aloysius Röling Bernard Victor and Rüter C. F., *The Tokyo Judgment: The International Military Tribunal for the Far East (I.M.T.F.E.), 29 April 1946-12 November 1948* (Amsterdam: APA-University Press Amsterdam, 1977), 981.

⁷⁸ Bernard Victor and C. F., 982.

the trial as primarily a political rather than a judicial matter, marked by a strong desire for retaliation and a concept of justice favouring the winners. He desired an interpretation of events based only on legal principles, both before and throughout the years of struggle. Pal maintained the conviction that western powers were accountable for the creation of the circumstances that precipitated Japan's wartime activities.⁷⁹ He regarded it as hypocritical that the authorities were not being held responsible for comparable offences. According to Ambassador Seth, a former Indian Ambassador to Japan, this interpretation strengthened the belief that as Gandhi aimed for a "fair and non-violent" triumph over Britain, Justice Pal desired a "fair and non-violent" verdict against Japan.⁸⁰ Justice Pal's stance against colonialism was undeniably impacted by his own beliefs, which were moulded by his direct encounters with British governance and his reverence for Gandhi.⁸¹ Justice Pal's instance forever etched in the minds of Japanese and contributed to the bilateral relationship proving that the people to people and individual level factors also influence any relationship.

Despite receiving some favourable reaction from the Indian media, Jawaharlal Nehru disapproved Justice Pal's statements in a message as

*"Unsubstantiated and broad statements, many of which I strongly disagreed with. We informally notified the relevant governments that India bear no responsibility for it. Pal's opinion was expressed in a personal capacity and does not reflect the stance of the Indian government. Regardless of whether Pal's words may be considered as the argument for Japan's innocence or as emblematic of Indian ideas."*⁸²

The nature of Justice Pal's remarks fostered the perception of a relationship between India and Japan. The event left a lasting impression on the psyche of Japanese individuals,

⁷⁹ Dawsey Jason, "Justice Radhabinod Pal and the Tokyo Tribunal," National World War II Museum, May 31, 2021, accessed on April 1, 2022, <https://www.nationalww2museum.org/war/articles/justice-radhabinod-pal-tokyo-war-crimes-trial>.

⁸⁰ Seth Aftab, "India and Japan," in *Indian Foreign Policy: Challenges and Opportunities*, ed. Atish Sinha and Madhup Mohta (New Delhi: Academic Foundation, 2007), 809–18.

⁸¹ Ashis Nandy, "The Other within: The Strange Case of Radhabinod Pal's Judgment on Culpability," *New Literary History* 23, no. 1 (1992): 53, accessed on April 1, 2022, <https://doi.org/10.2307/469157>.

⁸² A.G. Noorani, 'The Yasukuni "hero"', *Frontline, The Hindu*, Vol. 24, Issue 21, Oct 20-Nov 02, 2007, accessed on July 12, 2019, <http://www.hindu.com/fline/fl2421/stories/20071102503906000.html>.

particularly those who hold nationalist beliefs. The trial had a significant impact on the establishment of Japan's post-war identity, given the scarcity of knowledge accessible to the Japanese populace regarding the events of the war. Ultra-nationalists in Japan commended Justice Pal's statements, seeing them as implying that Japan's activities were in favour of Japan's "Great East Asia Co-Prosperity Sphere" and also "innocent".⁸³ The installation of a memorial honouring Justice Pal in 2005 at the Yasukuni Shrine complex demonstrated the deep respect for his convictions.

India and Japan Relations after India's Independence

The conclusion of the Second World War, in which Japan suffered a defeat, yielded divergent outcomes for India and Japan. While the former gained independence, the latter country was tried as a defeated nation in front of the international community.

Following their loss in the war in 1945, Japan came under the authority of the US-led Allied Forces, which were comprised of nations such as the UK and China. General Douglas MacArthur was in command of these forces. Japan's post-World War II foreign policy was founded on the principles of the Yoshida doctrine, named after the Japanese prime minister of that time, Shigeru Yoshida.⁸⁴ The Yoshida framework prioritised economic development while depending on the United States for security. The San Francisco Peace Treaty (SFPT), signed in 1951, marked the formal conclusion of the war and was the result of negotiations between the US-led Allied Powers and Japan during the Peace Conference. A total of 48 countries have signed the contentious document.⁸⁵ The treaty was rejected by countries such as Poland, former Soviet Union, and Czechoslovakia, while Yugoslavia, India, and Myanmar (formerly Burma) chose not to participate in the summit.

India was determined to include Japan in the comity of nations by normalising relations, aligning with the idealism and non-alignment principles of India's first Prime Minister, Jawaharlal Nehru. India was concerned that if Japan became vulnerable to a major power, it

⁸³ Jason, "Justice Radhabinod Pal and the Tokyo Tribunal."

⁸⁴ Sun-Ki Chai, "Entrenching the Yoshida Defense Doctrine: Three Techniques for Institutionalization," *International Organization* 51, no. 3 (1997): 395.

⁸⁵ "Progress Report by the Secretaries of State and Defense to the National Security Council," Historical Documents - Office of the Historian, September 25, 1951, accessed on April 1, 2022, <https://history.state.gov/historicaldocuments/frus1951v06p1/d16>.

would lead to friction and concern due to the Cold War competition.⁸⁶ India expressed strong opposition to two specific articles of the SFPT deal in 1951. First, India viewed the presence of Occupation forces as a constraint on Japan's sovereignty. Second, India supported the idea of returning the Bonin and Ryukyu islands to Japan.⁸⁷ Newly independent India rejected the pact outright due to its failure to provide Japan with the recognition and equal status it deserved among countries.⁸⁸ Nevertheless, it is explicitly mentioned that India would finalise an independent bilateral agreement with Japan. Subsequently, the SFPT successfully disarmed and established democracy in Japan.

Further developments during the era following the war stimulated favourable feelings within India. In continuation to Pal's individual effort, the Indian government extended an invitation to Japan, which was under occupation at the time, to participate as a separate nation in the Delhi Asian Games in 1951.⁸⁹ Moreover, India played a significant role in advocating for Japan's inclusion in the UN and in organising the inaugural Afro-Asian Conference in Bandung in 1955. The conference represented a pivotal moment in the concept of a contemporary Asia, but it was rather paradoxical that, given the subsequent trajectory of Asian integration, the conference did not devote much emphasis to economic connections.⁹⁰ Simultaneously, discussions were taken place to create a peace treaty that would be deemed to be acceptable. This led to the Indian people experiencing a remarkable sense of camaraderie.⁹¹ Excluding the territorial demands that made Japan's other post-war treaties more complex, the treaty with India was one of Japan's most straightforward. India's decision to renounce the

⁸⁶ Mathur, "Setting the Stage," 9.

⁸⁷ Hiroshi Sato, "India Japan Peace Treaty in Japan's Post-War Asian Diplomacy," *Minamijakenkyu* 2005, no. 17 (December 26, 2005): 14, accessed on April 1, 2022, <https://doi.org/10.11384/jjasas1989.2005.1>.

⁸⁸ Murthy, P. A. Narasimha, *India and Japan*, in J. D. B. Miller, *India, Japan, Australia: Partners in Asia?* Papers from a Conference at the Australian National University (Canberra: Australian National University Press, 1968), 42.

⁸⁹ Jain Purnendra, "Twin Peaks: Japan's Economic Aid to India in the 1950s and 2010s" (Shinjuku-ku: JICA Research Institute, February 2017), 13, accessed on April 1, 2022, https://www.jica.go.jp/Resource/jica-ri/ja/publication/workingpaper/175nbg000005413s-att/JICA-RI_WP_No.139.pdf.

⁹⁰ Camroux, David. 'Asia ... Whose Asia? A "Return to the Future" of a Sino-Indic Asian Community'. *The Pacific Review* 20, no. 4 (20 November 2007): 554. accessed on April 1, 2022, <https://doi.org/10.1080/09512740701672027>.

⁹¹ Sato, "India Japan Peace Treaty in Japan's Post-War Asian Diplomacy," 15.

claim to reparations and Japanese properties held by India in the peace treaty after the war played a significant role in fostering gratitude towards India.⁹²

Moreover, it was evident that Indian sentiments towards Japan were not as remarkably amicable as the Japanese have acknowledged. According to Hiroshi Sato, a Japanese researcher, India's decision to forgo the right to reparations was a product of careful consideration and was influenced by direct requests from Japan's Ministry of Foreign Affairs (MOFA).⁹³ On 28 April 1952, India and Japan formally established diplomatic relations, appointing K K Chettur as the first ambassador of India to Japan.⁹⁴ Japan's efforts to restore diplomatic relations with Southeast Asian countries were met with a favourable response from India and provided substantial aid. The Indian support came primarily from the understanding that the then international structure required the establishment of alliances in many geographical areas for a country to prosper.

Abul Kalam, a Japanese Studies scholar, stated that India supported post-war Japan with a keen interest by recognising the potential harm of humiliation and causing economic hardship to a population that is renowned for its hard work and self-respect.⁹⁵ India supported initiatives to assist Japan in its recovery and reintegrate Japan into the community of free nations.⁹⁶ India's actions were predominantly attributed to Jawaharlal Nehru. Nehru's favourable disposition towards Japan was shown in his reaction to the Japanese school children's appeal for an Indian elephant in 1947. He opposed the trial of Emperor Hirohito, considering it a needless "witch hunt" that would undoubtedly generate resentment among the Japanese population. Although facing internal criticism, Nehru prioritised Japanese support for India's political aspirations in Asia over commercial concerns.⁹⁷ Nehru's aspirations for a global government with India as a leading force in Asia failed, but the economic opportunities

⁹² Sato, 17.

⁹³ Sato, 18.

⁹⁴ The treaty was signed in on June 9 1952 in Tokyo and later ratified in Delhi on August 27

⁹⁵ Kalam, Abul. *Japan and South Asia: Subsystematic Linkages and Developing Relationships*. University Press Limited, 1996.

⁹⁶ Murthy, Narasimha, and P. A. (Poomagame Anantharamaiah). 'India and Japan : Dimensions of Their Relations : Historical and Political'. New Delhi: ABE Publishing House, 1986. accessed on April 1, 2022, <https://cir.nii.ac.jp/crid/1130000795243891200>.

⁹⁷ Sato, "India Japan Peace Treaty in Japan's Post-War Asian Diplomacy," 17.

continued to progress.⁹⁸ According to NCR, the most significant criterion is to take advantage of a favourable international structure and with the help of strong political will. Therefore, the influence of individual leaders, in this context that of Indian Prime Minister Jawaharlal Nehru in driving the policy, was clearly visible. However, progress was constrained due to the absence of an appropriate structural framework.

At the same time, economic links between India and Japan also began to develop. During the post-war years, there was a significant increase, or more accurately, a revival, in economic trade between India and Japan. In May 1948, India received a Japanese trade delegation.⁹⁹ India, in contrast to other Allied countries, viewed Japan's ultimate economic recovery in a favourable rather than a competitive light. Japan's first focus on re-establishing ties with Asia was centred in South Asia. In March 1952, before the peace deal was finalised, the President of Toshiba Corporation Mr. Taizo Ishizaka visited India.¹⁰⁰ India did not anticipate any potential risks related with the resurgence of the Japanese economy.

In the 1950s,¹⁰¹ India initiated the sale of unprocessed cotton to Japan and later on India became the primary provider of iron ore to Japan in 1960s.¹⁰² In 1950, India became the first beneficiary of foreign technological transfer initiative provided by Japan, as it commenced the production of electric wires within India. Japan was providing Yen developmental loans to India by the late 1950s.¹⁰³ Nevertheless, despite the enthusiasm, the improvement in relations between India and Japan was hindered by the influence of the Cold War. The deterioration in relations became apparent when Japan aligned itself with the US, while India opted for non-alignment but with a clear inclination towards the Soviet Union.

⁹⁸ Giri Deshingkar, "The Construction of Asia in India," *Asian Studies Review* 23, no. 2 (June 1999): 173–80, accessed on April 12, 2022, <https://doi.org/10.1080/10357829908713229>.

⁹⁹ Sato, "India Japan Peace Treaty in Japan's Post-War Asian Diplomacy," 18.

¹⁰⁰ Sato, 17.

¹⁰¹ Indian cotton had played an important role in Japan's industrialization in the late nineteenth and early twentieth centuries.

¹⁰² Sato, "India Japan Peace Treaty in Japan's Post-War Asian Diplomacy," 19.

¹⁰³ Takenori, Horimoto. 'Synchronizing Japan-India Relations - ProQuest'. *Japan Quarterly; Tokyo* 40, no. 1 (1 January 1993).

Despite numerous restrictions on iron ore exports imposed by various countries, India maintained its supply of this resource to Japan.¹⁰⁴ In the early decades of India's independence, India served as Japan's primary exporter and played a significant role in fuelling post-war growth in the iron and steel sector in Japan. While Japan had challenges in entering Southeast Asian markets due to resistance stemming from its wartime actions, India emerged as a favourable destination. In addition, Japan and India had relatively similar economic systems until the late 1950s, both functioning under a state system and having comparable standards of living. When Nobusuke Kishi became the Prime Minister of Japan, he selected India as his first official destination in 1957, indicating the importance he placed on the relationship between the two countries.¹⁰⁵

Nobusuke Kishi was drawn to Jawaharlal Nehru's global standing and aimed to show the US that Japan had partners in the region.¹⁰⁶ After Nehru's visit in 1958, the Foreign Minister of Japan created a distinct department known as the "Southwest Asia Division" inside the "Asian Affairs Bureau."¹⁰⁷ The central point of the discussion centred on economic linkages, namely concerning the incorporation of yen loans into India's five-year plan. In 1958, Dr. KB Lall, Commerce Secretary of India and his counterpart in Tokyo officially approved a currency-exchange agreement during Dr. Lall's visit to Japan. On 4 February, a bilateral "Agreement on Commerce Between Japan and India" was officially signed,¹⁰⁸ accompanied by a visit from the President of the Keidanren, a Japanese apex body of commerce and business, to India. The international framework significantly facilitated a few fruitful years, at least for a shorter duration, for diplomatic ties.

On the military front, after India gained independence, Nehru questioned Japan's ability to become a significant military force again in the near future due to the extensive damage

¹⁰⁴ "Japan-India Relations (Basic Data)," Ministry of Foreign Affairs of Japan, March 14, 2024, accessed on April 1, 2024, <https://www.mofa.go.jp/region/asia-paci/india/data.html>.

¹⁰⁵ "India-Japan Relations 2014" (Ministry of External Affairs, Government of India, July 2014), accessed on April 12, 2023, https://www.mea.gov.in/Portal/ForeignRelation/Japan_-_July_2014_.pdf.

¹⁰⁶ Kallol Bhattacharjee and Langa Mahesh, "Shinzo Abe Recalls Grandfather's Ties with Nehru," *The Hindu*, September 14, 2017, sec. India, accessed on April 12, 2022, <https://www.thehindu.com/news/national/abe-recalls-grandfathers-ties-with-nehru/article19685815.ece>.

¹⁰⁷ Purnendra C. Jain, "Japan's Relations with South Asia," *Asian Survey* 37, no. 4 (1997): 340–52, accessed on April 12, 2022, <https://doi.org/10.2307/2645652>.

¹⁰⁸ "Agreement on Commerce Between India and Japan [1958]," CommonLII, February 4, 1958, accessed on February 12, 2022, <http://www.commonlii.org/in/other/treaties/INTSer/1958/2.html>.

caused during the war, although not being officially at war with Japan.¹⁰⁹ He wanted an early peace deal with Japan due to its wide-ranging ramifications for the entire Asian region. Nehru, unlike leaders in neighbouring countries, had less apprehension about the revival of Japanese military strength. He advocated for Japan to be permitted to equip itself to a limited extent, with the expectation that the UN would provide assistance if needed.¹¹⁰ However, it is crucial to prevent Japan from increasing its military capabilities to a level that would cause alarm in China or the Soviet Union. Additionally, there was strong desire that Japan should not be used by the US as a military base to impose aggression on other countries. India, despite being involved in discussions about the SFPT with the US, Britain, and the Commonwealth countries, declined to sign the treaty when invited by the US.

The primary factors behind this decision were the US retention of authority over the Bonin (Ogasawara) and Ryukyu Nansei rather than transferring them to Japan, the presence of US soldiers in Japan, and the failure to transfer the Kurile islands and South Sakhalin to the Soviet Union and Taiwan to China.¹¹¹ Nehru held the belief that the deal did not bestow complete sovereignty upon Japan, and he considered an “Asian peace treaty” that excluded China and the Soviet Union to be of little importance. Nehru perceived the agreement as granting the US a distinct position, thereby positioning Japan as a substitute for the US in matters of international affairs.¹¹² Meanwhile, India opted to maintain strategic autonomy by adhering to a policy of non-alignment. Thus, India entered into a distinct peace treaty with Japan in 1952, which was negotiated on conditions of “equality”.¹¹³ Although this treaty was based on the SFPT, it has some unique characteristics. Initially, in response to the Japanese’s request, India decided to exempt Japan from paying any reparations for the damages caused during warfare, as the real harm inflicted by the Japanese in India was relatively insignificant.

Furthermore, both the nations mutually agreed to bestow upon each other the designation of “most favoured nation” in trade, in contrast to the SFPT when Japan was

¹⁰⁹ Gopal, Sarvepalli, *Jawaharlal Nehru, A Biography—Volume Two, 1947–1956*, (London Jonathan Cape, 1979), 135.

¹¹⁰ Sarvepalli, 136.

¹¹¹ Sarvepalli, 137.

¹¹² Gopal, Sarvepalli, *Jawaharlal Nehru, A Biography—Volume Two, 1947–1956*, (London Jonathan Cape, 1979), 139.

¹¹³ Sato, “India Japan Peace Treaty in Japan’s Post-War Asian Diplomacy,” 20.

compelled to unilaterally provide this status to the Allied nations.¹¹⁴ Several East Asian nations, along with Australia and New Zealand, harboured concerns about the economic resurgence of Japan, although India did not share those concerns. Indeed, Nehru was profoundly influenced by Japan's swift economic development in the first three decades preceding the war and sought to gain insights from their encounter.¹¹⁵ Jawaharlal Nehru found key lessons for India in Japan's rapid development through investment in social capital. In addition, Nehru held the belief that a financially thriving Japan would divert China's attention towards East Asia, especially considering that India's concerns about China were evident following the invasion of Tibet by China in 1950-1951.¹¹⁶ Significantly, Nehru had conveyed to a trade team from Japan that "India will, to the extent permitted by our economic and industrial development plans, provide maximum assistance in supplying raw materials to Japan."¹¹⁷ India's peace treaty with Japan marked Japan's initial and noteworthy peace agreement with an Asian nation subsequent to the signing of the SFPT. This event symbolised Japan's "reengagement with Asia" during the post-war era. Japan strategically utilised the treaty with India as a model for its discussions with Southeast Asian countries such as Burma (now Myanmar) and Indonesia.¹¹⁸ Japan's participation in the Afro-Asian forum, i.e., Bandung conference, one year prior to becoming a member of the UN, held greater significance. It aimed to showcase to its Asian neighbours that Japan possessed foreign policy objectives that were separate from those of the US, particularly in the Asian region.¹¹⁹ This was a deliberate move by Japan's strategic leaders to assert their country's independent foreign policy interests. Nehru held significant role as Prime Minister and Foreign Minister until his demise in 1964. Nehru's comparatively favourable perception of Japan was influenced by a "Pan-Asian" standpoint, which greatly influenced foreign policy of India towards Japan during this initial period.

¹¹⁴ Purnendra, "Twin Peaks: Japan's Economic Aid to India in the 1950s and 2010s," 10.

¹¹⁵ Nehru's letter to Indian Premiers, August 15, 1949, *SWJN*, 12, pp. 318, 323

¹¹⁶ Manjeet S. Pardesi, "India's China Policy," in *Engaging the World: Indian Foreign Policy since 1947*, ed. Sumit Ganguly (Oxford University Press, 2016), 170, accessed on January 14, 2022, <https://doi.org/10.1093/acprof:oso/9780199458325.003.0007>.

¹¹⁷ Pardesi, 172.

¹¹⁸ Sato, "India Japan Peace Treaty in Japan's Post-War Asian Diplomacy," 20.

¹¹⁹ Kristine Dennehy, "Overcoming Colonialism at Bandung, 1955," in Sven Saaler and J. Victor Koschmann, eds., *Pan-Asianism in Modern Japanese History: Colonialism, Regionalism and Borders* (London: Routledge, 2007).

The prevailing international realities of the bipolar world shaped the foreign policy objectives of India and Japan during Cold War. As Edwin, an analyst on Japanese foreign policy, has rightly pointed out that, “whatever the mechanism for formulating foreign policy, the chief determinants are inevitably the actual international realities and the national perception of these.”¹²⁰ Throughout the Cold War years India and Japan figured very little in each other’s foreign and diplomatic policies. Such mutual intransigence attributed to the fundamental divergences in the political ideologies of the two nations in the bipolar world which proved to be the main stumbling block in the development of a sustainable political relationship between them. The differences in the respective foreign policy objectives of the two states were further widened by the Cold War’s strategic divide.

Soon after its emergence as a free nation, India was confronted with the Cold War strategic and geo-political imperatives. The US and the Soviet Union became engaged in an intense ideological conflict and both were involved in a race to enlist on their respective camps as many countries as possible. In the given circumstances Jawaharlal Nehru, the principal architect of India’s foreign policy, believed that it was essential to stay away from the ideological conflict between the two power blocs so that India could focus on the more immediate requirement of national reconstruction.¹²¹ As the noted analyst, Sumit Ganguly¹²² has maintained, India’s non-aligned stance was in essence a foreign policy strategy to pursue its own interests free from external domination.

India Japan Relations during the Period of Cold War

India’s economic trajectory, after India’s independence, shifted towards a state-system influenced by socialism, while Japan’s alignment with the US became deeply rooted, causing the two nations to gradually move away from each other. India’s reluctance to engage in international trade greatly hindered economic connection, while political events worsened relations. Japan’s earlier promising relations shifted from being driven by ideology to pragmatism. The primary reason for Japan’s interest was that Southeast Asia and Northeast Asia were essentially inaccessible. As indicated by NCR, the importance of structure was

¹²⁰ Cited in Robert A. Scalapino, *The Foreign Policy of Modern Japan* (University of California Press, 1977).

¹²¹ Dilip Mohite, “Ideological Foundations of Nehru’s Nonalignment,” *The Indian Journal of Political Science* 53, no. 1 (1992): 24.

¹²² Sumit Ganguly, “India’s Foreign Policy Grows Up,” *World Policy Journal* 20, no. 4 (2003):1.

greater than normative considerations.¹²³ India's geopolitical and strategic compulsions largely conditioned its gradual tilt to the Soviet side. A strained relationship with the US, wars with Pakistan, the Chinese assault were some of the factors which propelled the Indian foreign policy elite to get close to the Soviet side. India reaped three crucial strategic benefits by forging a treaty with the Soviet Union (1971).¹²⁴ First, it paved the way for a highly favourable arms-transfer relationship for India. Over the years the Indian defence establishment received billions of dollars' worth of modern warplanes, tanks, and ships from the Soviet Union which enabled it to sustain a modern military. Second, India received the support of a veto-wielding power in the UN Security Council. Third, it was a balancing behaviour on the part of India because one of the reasons why New Delhi cultivated close ties with Moscow was its objective of balancing Pakistan's support from the US and China.¹²⁵ These factors made India maintain cordial relations with the Soviet Union.

During the Cold War era Japan pursued a foreign policy which was essentially pragmatic based on its national interests. In the post War period war-ravaged Japan had to face a monumental task of nation-building. Shattered by two atomic bombs dropped on Hiroshima and Nagasaki Japan was confronted a huge reconstruction work. Japan adopted a foreign policy strategy which had two major components. First, the Japanese leadership chose to seek security arrangements with the US and adopted a pacifist constitution. The foreign policy of Japan was framed on the basis of a unique war-renouncing constitution. Japan's anti-militarist stance was adopted during the tenure of Prime Minister Yoshida Shigeru.¹²⁶ The Yoshida Doctrine committed Japan to a security alliance with the US.¹²⁷

¹²³ Gustav Meibauer, "Neorealism, Neoclassical Realism and the Problem(s) of History," *International Relations* 37, no. 2 (June 1, 2023): 348–69, accessed on April 12, 2022, <https://doi.org/10.1177/00471178211033943>.

¹²⁴ The Treaty of Peace, Friendship and Cooperation between the Government of India and the Government of Soviet Socialist Republics, August 9, 1971, accessed on August 16, 2022, <http://www.mea.gov.in/treatiesagreement/1971/chap434.html>.

¹²⁵ Cohen Stephen P, "India Rising," Brookings, June 1, 2000, accessed on December 12, 2020, <https://www.brookings.edu/articles/india-rising/>.

¹²⁶ Hiro Katsumata, "Norms, Interests, and Power in Japanese Foreign Policy," *International Relations of the Asia-Pacific* 10, no. 1 (January 1, 2010): 189–92, accessed on December 12, 2020, <https://doi.org/10.1093/irap/lcp004>.

¹²⁷ Inoguchi, Takashi. *Japan's International Relations* (Boulder: Westview, 1991), 45.

Japan agreed to furnish the US with substantial military bases under the security treaty, in exchange for Washington's commitment to utilise these bases for the protection of the East Asia. It is important to highlight that, in contrast to the agreement among North Atlantic Treaty Organisation (NATO) countries, where members have committed to mutual defence, Japan was not obligated to assist the US in the event of an attack. According to the pact, Japan was only required to defend itself in methods that did not contradict Article 9 of the Constitution, which it had adopted under the US Occupation.¹²⁸ It has allowed for maintaining Self Defence Forces and embraced pacifism by renouncing war as a means.

During the 1950s, Japan primarily focused on providing compensation and re-establishing relationships with countries affected by war. India gradually became closely aligned with the Soviet Union, to the point that they were essentially allies, although not officially. Post-independence relations of India with the Soviet Union were characterised by ambivalence and uncertainty. The relationship between Nehru and Stalin was characterised by a lack of warmth, though improved to a stable one during Khrushchev's tenure (1953-64).¹²⁹ India's inclination towards the Soviet Union was attributed to their growing concern over the substantial military and economic assistance provided by the US to Pakistan. The 1960s widened the gap between India and Japan.

Significant domestic issues followed Nehru's death in 1964, and India's stance on the Vietnam War exacerbated the divide between Japan and India's foreign policy objectives.¹³⁰ President Johnson of the US responded indifferently to India's Balance of Payments (BoP) crisis in 1966 and declined to offer bilateral aid from the US.¹³¹ India's post-war worldview was primarily political in nature, but Japan, which had heavily politicised relations with the region in the past, preferred an economic strategy. The then Indian Prime Minister Lal Bahadur Shastri noted that despite India's great efforts, there was concern in India about Japan's

¹²⁸ Sayuri Umeda, "Japan: Article 9 of the Constitution" (Law Library of Congress, 2006), 5.

¹²⁹ Lubna Fatima Saeed, "Indo-Soviet Relations: A Study on Nehru's Diplomacy" (Aligarh, Aligarh Muslim University, 2003), 67, accessed on December 12, 2022, <https://core.ac.uk/download/pdf/144509445.pdf>.

¹³⁰ Zorawar Daulet Singh, *Power and Diplomacy: India's Foreign Policies During the Cold War* (New York: Oxford University Press, 2019), 230, accessed on December 12, 2022, <https://doi.org/10.1093/oso/9780199489640.001.0001>.

¹³¹ Arvind Virmani, "India's BOP Crisis and External Reform: Myths and Paradoxes" (Indian Council for Research on International Economic Relations, December 2001), 31.

steadfast commitment to the US, which was viewed as a mere subordinate.¹³² India believed that Japan was abandoning its earlier anti-imperialist stance. When the Indian military annexed the former Portuguese colony of Goa in 1961, India expected Japan to condemn the colonialism but Japan remained silent.¹³³ A year later, Japan remained neutral during the dispute over the border between China and India.¹³⁴ The relations declined during the next two decades, as the “limited friendship” of earlier years declined due to the prevailing international system.

In India’s wars with Pakistan and China in 1962 and 1965, respectively, Japan opted to maintain its neutral position. Additionally, there was a perception that Japan did not want to support India’s involvement in regional organisations such as the Association of South East Asian Nations (ASEAN)¹³⁵ in order to prevent India from depleting their few resources there were available. In reality, South Asia did not fit in Japan’s notion of the Asia or Asia Pacific until the late 1990s and was therefore considered a remote region. Beyond the Arakan Yoma (in Myanmar), as the Japanese often say, is the outside world, which aptly captures this perspective.¹³⁶ Although there were sporadic exchanges between Japan and India, their engagement was somewhat moderate. When visiting India in 1984, Yasuhiro Nakasone, the then Prime Minister of Japan, placed a strong emphasis on nuclear disarmament and economic interdependence.¹³⁷ Additionally, Japan was considered as a force for stability in an unstable continent like Asia, thus former Indian Prime Minister Indira Gandhi encouraged the Japanese Prime Minister Yasuhiro Nakasone to make sure Japan played a wider role than that of an economic power.¹³⁸ This demonstrates that despite their limited connections during the Cold

¹³² Kalam, *Japan and South Asia*, 117.

¹³³ KV Kesavan, ‘India-Japan Relations in the Changing Foreign Policy Perspectives’, in Panda and Ando, *India and Japan: Multi-Dimensional Perspectives*, 147.

¹³⁴ Nagao Dr. Satoru, “What Is Japan’s Role in the Indo-China Border Conflict?,” Society Of Security and Diplomatic Policy Studies, accessed May 27, 2021, <http://ssdpaki.la.coocan.jp/en/topics/6.html>.

¹³⁵ Prakash Nanda, *Rediscovering Asia: Evolution of India’s Look-East Policy* (New Delhi: Lancer Publishers & Distributors, 2003), 235.

¹³⁶ Takako Hirose, “Japanese Emerging Nationalism and Its New Asia Policy,” in V. R. Raghavan (Ed.), *Asian Security Dynamic: US, Japan and the Rising Powers* (New Delhi: Promilla & Co. Publishers, 2008), 65–66.

¹³⁷ Nanda, *Rediscovering Asia*, 235.

¹³⁸ Mathur, “Setting the Stage,” 12.

War, India and Japan made an effort to be included in each other's foreign policy decisions in order to strengthen their relationship.

The opposite political ideologies of India and Japan were brought to the fore during the Cold War period.¹³⁹ As India broke away from British colonial rule, Japan limited its policy till the end of the Cold War to the US. Japan followed an approach, which separated politics from economic matters by taking cautious advancements into prominent positions within multilateral financial and industrial organisations.¹⁴⁰ India chose a different path. India, after gaining independence, took up the political posture of defending the interests of recently established industries within India, shunning foreign trade, and standing up for the rights of newly independent countries. India missed out on Japan's early entry into Asia's investment and trade success because it was eager to keep outside influences out of its economy.¹⁴¹ Throughout the Cold War, domestic beliefs and perceptions kept India and Japan essentially "indifferent" to one another in addition to structural constraints.

Japanese elites' interest in India was strengthened for a brief period, notwithstanding the persistence of Cold War bipolarity. This was mainly due the possibility of increased trade which was a result of the economic reforms that India's then-prime minister, Rajiv Gandhi, had instituted in the late 1980s.¹⁴² Three formal and informal visits were made by Rajiv Gandhi to encourage greater Japanese involvement in India's industrial growth.¹⁴³ Rajiv Gandhi held a particular affinity towards Japan and declared a three-day mourning period in 1989 following the passing of Emperor of Japan, Showa. In Japan, this gesture was highly valued.¹⁴⁴ Japanese business delegations grew in size by the late 1980s in India. As efforts to combine the economic capabilities of India and Japan continued, Japan was able to make progress in the Indian markets. This led to doubling the trade between India and Japan and increase in the number of

¹³⁹ Murthy, *India and Japan: dimensions of their relations*, 344.

¹⁴⁰ Jain, *Distant Asian Neighbours: Japan and South Asia*, 10.

¹⁴¹ Purnendra, "Twin Peaks: Japan's Economic Aid to India in the 1950s and 2010s," 18.

¹⁴² Ahluwalia Montek Singh, "Rajiv Gandhi Opened the Doors for 1991 Reforms: Montek Singh Ahluwalia - The Week," *The Week*, May 30, 2021, accessed on April 12, 2021, <https://www.theweek.in/theweek/cover/2021/05/20/rajiv-gandhi-opened-the-doors-for-1991-reforms--montek-singh-ahl.html>.

¹⁴³ Jain, 11.

¹⁴⁴ President Venkataraman attended both the funeral of the Emperor Showa and the enthronement ceremony of the new Emperor

joint ventures in India in 1980s.¹⁴⁵ During his official visit to India in 1984, the then Prime Minister of Japan Yasuhiro Nakasone enhanced the number of credits in the form Yen given to the country. In 1985, both India and Japan decided to support technology transfers in the Information and communication technology/service sector and provided support for modernising India's textile and railway sectors.¹⁴⁶ Nonetheless, Japanese businesses were dissatisfied with India. Prominent companies like Sony, Toshiba, Honda, Nissan and Mitsubishi attempted to enter the Indian markets but quickly left due to significant losses accrued by the companies. Businesses believed the Suzuki success story could be replicated in India, but they encountered significant bureaucratic and infrastructural. Rajiv Gandhi's proposed reforms were met with subdued interest by Japanese companies due to the internal difficulties faced by them.¹⁴⁷ India encountered yet another financial crisis by the end of the Cold War.

Given the geostrategic framework and NCR's commitment to structural significance, the Soviet Union's 1980s¹⁴⁸ invasion in Afghanistan served as a reminder for Japanese officials regarding the strategic significance of India in the region.¹⁴⁹ But Japan did not do much to solidify political connections with India, even as the US tried to handle relations with Pakistan and India at the same time.¹⁵⁰ As NCR acknowledges, what mattered during that period was the opinion maintained by foreign policy experts of Japan towards India.¹⁵¹ The degree to which India aligned with the Soviet Union was debatable, but most of the Japanese bureaucrats believed that Japan should have maintained positive relations with India.

¹⁴⁵ *Direction of Trade Statistics Yearbook, 1988 Edition* (Washington, D.C.: International Monetary Fund, 1988), 534.

¹⁴⁶ Deborah L. Haber, "The Death of Hegemony: Why 'Pax Nipponica' Is Impossible," *Asian Survey* 30, no. 9 (1990): 900, accessed on December 12, 2021, <https://doi.org/10.2307/2644528>.

¹⁴⁷ Satu Limaye, "Japan and India after the Cold War," *Japan in a Dynamic Asia: Coping with the New Security Challenges*, 2006, 26.

¹⁴⁸ The conflict between the Soviet Union and Islamist mujahedeen resistance lasted a total of ten years, from December 24 1979 to February 15 1989

¹⁴⁹ This has been identified by Inoguchi as a milestone in Japan's recognition of India and the South Asian Region

¹⁵⁰ Nakasone visited India and Pakistan in the hope that Japan could represent the interests of developing countries at forums such as the G7 but little was achieved. The major objective of the visit turned out to be improving economic, rather than political links.

¹⁵¹ A Madhavan, "The Post-Cold War Equations," in *India-Japan: Towards a New Era*, ed. Kamalendra Kanwar (New Delhi: UBS Publishers' Distributors, 1992), 37.

India and Japan at the end of the Cold War

India and Japan were presented with an opportunity build stronger relationship with the end of the Cold War. The post-Cold War world order, thus emerged consisted of certain specific characteristics, such as ascendancy of globalisation, adoption of free market economies or liberalisation of economies, regionalisation of international relations and emergence of non-state actors.

In a manner, a situation like this gave both administrations the opportunity to create foreign policies independent of the limitations of the Cold War.¹⁵² For example, in 1991, India implemented the “Look East Policy”¹⁵³ and undertook a major economic restructuring through the implementation of Liberalisation, Privatisation, and Globalisation (LPG) programmes. This implies that decisions about foreign policy are influenced by structural factors as well as the domestic level factors. In addition, the theoretical framework of NCR states that although structure is important, it must be mediated via the perspectives of policymakers and take into consideration intervening domestic-level factors. The leadership of the then India’s Prime Minister, P.V. Narasimha Rao and Japanese Prime Ministers Kiichi Miyazawa, Morihiro Hosokawa, Tomiichi Murayama are cases in point. Their leadership assumed paramount significance in the context of economic and political crisis they faced in their respective countries. For instance, India entered into coalition politics and an economic transition to market economy while Japan too had its own share economic and political crisis,¹⁵⁴ where in for the first time the Liberal Democratic Party (LDP) of Japan lost power after staying in power for almost 38 years.

Against the backdrop of economic crisis, India adopted economic liberalisation that broadened and strengthened the influence of market forces. They encompass both microeconomic and macroeconomic dimensions of the economy. The ideological cohesion, that had defined the economic policies of India so far i.e., following relatively high degree of

¹⁵² Madhavan, 40.

¹⁵³ The Government of India, under the leadership of former Prime Minister Narasimha Rao, initiated the Look East Policy in 1991. The aim was to foster political, economic, and security collaboration with nations in South-east Asia. The primary goal was to enhance involvement in several domains with South-east Asian countries, as well as with nations in the Far East such as Japan, South Korea, and countries in the Pacific region like Australia.

¹⁵⁴ Madhavan, “The Post-Cold War Equations,” 40.

socialistic model of development, had given way to market led economy. Political stability in India, at the same time was also very crucial to implement the required economic policies. In the final years of the Cold War (1989-1991), India witnessed three political dispensations within a span of three years.

On the domestic economic front, a BoP crisis and an exchange rate collapse, which was accompanied by inflation and an unsustainable fiscal deficit, were the immediate causes for the adoption of liberalisation initiatives in India.¹⁵⁵ The foreign exchange reserves dwindled and exacerbated already existing problems. As a result, International Monetary Fund (IMF), financed structural adjustment initiatives and put pressure on the country to liberalise in order to receive aid. Apart from the broader systemic or worldwide factors, it is important to also take into account the liberalisation process and resulting globalisation at the regional and domestic levels. The international structure served as a framework that set criteria for individual players within the country to collaborate regionally and globally. In a way, the systemic or global level, incorporated a new framework that integrates decisions made at the local and national levels (the economic analysis on India-Japan relations from the stand point of NCR will be taken up in a separate chapter).

In the post-Cold War period, unlike in the Cold War period, several multilateral linkages began to emerge involving India and Japan. For instance, regionalism, both old and new variants assumed great significance in the multilateral linkages. Historically, the origins of old regionalism can be traced back to the profound impact of inter-war nationalism and World War II. A key instance of old variant of regionalism can be traced back to the discourse on ‘regional integration’ in Europe, with the establishment of the European Coal and Steel Community in 1952.¹⁵⁶ In the context of developing countries (Third World/Global South), regionalism as a strategy began to emerge in the backdrop of deepening decolonisation in Afro-Asian world in the post-World War II period. Non-Aligned Movement (NAM), G77, ASEAN are some of the examples representing such a trend. In fact, India was part of NAM and G77, established by a group of third world countries who experienced similar colonial past. It is also to be noted in the immediate neighbourhood India was active in forming the South Asian

¹⁵⁵ Deepak Nayyar, “Economic Liberalisation in India: Then and Now,” *Economic and Political Weekly* 52, no. 2 (2017): 41.

¹⁵⁶ “History of the European Union 1945-59,” European Union, January 2023, accessed on April 12, 2022, https://european-union.europa.eu/principles-countries-history/history-eu/1945-59_en.

Association for Regional Cooperation (SAARC) in 1985, a regional organisation representing all the South Asian countries.

On the other end, the dismantling of Cold War binaries marked the beginning of what is commonly known as ‘new regionalism’ on a worldwide level.¹⁵⁷ The term ‘new regionalism’, which decentres geography in most of the cases, encompasses several emerging trends and developments. These include a significant rise in the number of regional trade agreements, a shift towards a more externally focused and less protectionist form of regionalism. Furthermore, the emergence of anti-hegemonic regionalism driven by regional actors rather than superpowers became a common trend. Another development was the growth of a more diverse and inclusive form of regionalism that extends beyond trade and security cooperation with increasing influence of business and civil society actors. The formation of a grouping called Brazil, Russia, India, China and South Africa (BRICS) which was founded in 2009 is an example of the ‘new regionalism.’¹⁵⁸ On similar lines Quadrilateral Security Dialogue (QUAD) (focusing on traditional security issues), International Solar Alliance (ISA) and Coalition for Disaster Risk Resilience - CDRI (focussing on Non-Traditional Security issues) can be broadly included in emerging new regionalism frameworks. In a way, an essential aspect addressed throughout the new regionalism was the correlation between globalisation and regionalism.

In essence, in the realm of contemporary regionalism, more than geographical proximities issues such as economy, security, climate change, natural disasters, supply chain resilience started taking centre stage. In view of this trend, India and Japan began to collaborate on several multilateral fronts in the post-Cold War period. For instance, in the recent times, with the advent of Chinese aggressive overreach and its perceived threat in the Indo-Pacific region, new organisations have emerged. As discussed earlier, one of them where India and Japan actively collaborate through a multilateral dialogue is the QUAD, which comprises of the US, Japan, India and Australia. Though it is not a security organisation, its mandate allows the four countries to collaborate on range of issues such as technology, climate change, supply chains and so on. Others instances like CDRI, ISA, and Supply Chain Resilience Initiative (SCRI) are formed, which are discussed at length in the ensuing chapters. In a way, cooperation

¹⁵⁷ Björn Hettne and András Inotai, *The New Regionalism: Implications for Global Development and International Security*, Research for Action (Helsinki: UNU World Institute for Development Economics Research, 1994), 1.

¹⁵⁸ Andrew Heywood, *Key Concepts in Politics and International Relations*, Second edition (Palgrave Macmillan, 2015), 207.

in multilateral frameworks as well as minilaterals which advances the national interests of participating nations within the prevalent systemic order has become a norm in the post-Cold War period.

In sum, a closer look at the India-Japan relations provides how the international structure and the domestic factors together played a crucial role in advancing the relationship. According to NCR, though the international structure remains the corner stone of foreign policy analysis, it is the domestic level factors such as leadership, ideology, business groups, bureaucracy, civil society play an important role in decision making and furthering the bilateral relationships. Though the India-Japan relationship passed through critical phases in the 20th century, it is mostly the people to people contacts such as intellectuals, revolutionaries, leadership, and Buddhism (part of culture) played a prominent role in keeping the relationship intact even when ideology and structural forces created a rift. Most of these domestic level variables or factors are discussed in the subsequent chapters while dealing with specific themes such as economy, defence and non-conventional security within India-Japan bilateral relationship.

Concluding Remarks

India and Japan relations passed through several phases throughout its history. Beginning with ancient Indian trade connections including trade in cotton and cultural exchanges to include intellectual and scholarly exchanges in the modern times. The relationship evolved by surpassing the structural hindrances created by two World Wars and Cold War. The first phase included the relationship between India and Japan in the ancient times where trade in artefacts pointed to the earlier connections and Buddhist religious connection helped to pave a closer relationship by introducing India to Japan in a holistic manner.

The second phase of relationship followed the reopening of Japan in 1868 in the Meiji period and continued till Indian Independence i.e., till 1947. This phase witnessed an all-round development of the relationship. The relationship was formalised beginning with the trade of cotton from Bombay to Japan. This was followed by people to people contacts which ranged from scholarly and intellectual exchanges to providing support to Indian revolutionaries in South East Asian countries by Japan through liaison agencies headed by serving officials of the Japanese Imperial Army. The first three decades of the 20th century was driven by the personalities and the civil society interactions and many Indians started to look at Japan as their

role model mainly after the Russo-Japanese war in 1905 where Japan defeated Russia. Following this, ideas such as Pan-Asianism attracted Indians towards Japan in the early 20th century. However, the relationship between the two countries witnessed a dramatic turnaround owing to the expansionist tendencies of Japan. Indian leaders, such as Jawaharlal Nehru, condemned the attack of Japan on China. Similarly, the Indian intellectuals who were fascinated by the development and the culture of Japan began to perceive Japan with scepticism. This led to the estrangement in relationship. The period i.e., in the late 1930s and early 1940s India appeared prominently in Japanese foreign policy priorities because of its geo-strategic location. Japan considered that to create new order in Asia free from Anglo-American dominance, it is important to drive British out of India and to achieve this objective they established contacts with Indian revolutionaries. Structural factors such as World Wars, freedom struggles against colonialism in general around the globe dominated the phase. Japan's interest towards India was also partly developed due to these structural incentives but was navigated through domestic level factors. This phase, i.e., the period of two World Wars which coincided with Indian freedom struggle helped both nations to understand each other especially through people to people contacts and paved the way for establishing bilateral relationship after the Indian Independence.

The intellectual and religious interactions, however symbolically beneficial, have not resulted in a durable economic or political collaboration due to the lack of a conducive institutional framework. India's relations with Japan in the post-Indian independence period was dominated by initial camaraderie where India helped Japan to normalise its relations to join the comity of nations. India opposed the conditions set forth by US led Allied forces in SFPT and signed a separate agreement with Japan. It helped Japan by supplying iron ore which was used to rebuild Japan. India was not averse to Japan becoming an economic power and didn't consider it as posing any threat. This phase witnessed the leadership of Indian leaders such as Jawaharlal Nehru, the first Indian Prime Minister who actively strived to develop cordial relations with Japan. Japan was even invited to Delhi Asian games in 1951 and Bandung conference in 1955. But the relationship went into troubled waters with the advent of Cold War binaries and ideological differences. The systemic factors and at the same time the ideological differences played a key role in making the relationship stagnant. While Japan allied with the western bloc led by the US following a capitalist model of development, India opted a mixed economy following a general socialistic path and maintained close relationship with the Soviet

Union. Japan, by following pragmatism started developing bilateral relationship with Southeast Asian nations as they provided better economic opportunities than India.

In the post-Second World War period, the security alliance with the US was a hindrance, especially for the non-aligned countries such as India. Furthermore, the Cold War rivalry greatly influenced Japan's relations with India in the subsequent decades. India, representing the interests of the emerging Afro-Asian nations in international forums regarded Japan as a "client state" associated with the US. Due to the ideological disparity, the two nations maintained divergent perspectives on numerous local and international matters, creating barrier between them. Nevertheless, it is important to acknowledge that the leaders of Japan and India have selected certain domains in which they may establish the groundwork for continuous collaboration and partnership such as economy and international aid. The utilisation of trade and development aid emerged as significant means for promoting mutual cooperation.

As the NCR framework suggests, in reality, the interaction between India and Japan was a result of both structural and domestic factors. The structural issues such as British rule of India, Japan's imperial ambitions, two World Wars and Cold War caused India to maintain distance from Japan in forming a productive bilateral relationship for the most part of the 19th and 20th centuries. Additionally, domestic factors such as leaders from political, economic and cultural spheres provided the necessary interaction between India and Japan. Additionally, ideological differences during the Cold War, opposing economic systems and leadership perceptions posed hindrances in the later part of the 20th century. Similarly, the dismantling of Cold War binaries created a conducive environment for India and Japan to cooperate with each other in areas ranging from security to the management of Non-Traditional Security (NTS) threats. In fact, the domestic level factors including the role of leadership of both the countries along with the structural factors contributed to the recalibration of India-Japan bilateral ties in the post-Cold War period.

Against this backdrop, the following chapters of the current study focus on three important aspects of India and Japan relations i.e., economy, security and NTS issues. The relations involving India and Japan on economic issues forms the core of the upcoming chapter. The fourth chapter of the study discusses how India has effectively managed its conventional security concerns while engaging with Japan, and how their strategic relations have evolved in the post-Cold War era. The final chapter examines the state mediated civil society interactions

of India and Japan while bringing in the NTS factors, which are manifested through the agencies of the state.

Chapter 3

Economic Engagement of India and Japan in the post-Cold War period

Introduction

The end of the Cold War has not only prompted alterations on a global scale, but also exerted a substantial impact on regional and bilateral relationships.¹ India and Japan are two major states in Asia that are impacted by this particular transformation. As a result, their relationship experienced substantial transformation during the past thirty years. While Japan saw a significant change in its foreign policy, India has also made notable shifts in its policy through its “look east” approach and structural reforms. The period after the end of the Cold War in the India-Japan bilateral relations was dominated by the systemic and domestic level factors equally. For the purpose of the study, the post-Cold War economic relations between India and Japan are divided into three phases. The first phase is called post liberalisation phase i.e., 1991-2000. This phase also can be described as pre-sanctions phase, wherein after the test of nuclear weapons by India, Japan imposed severe sanctions on India. The second phase began from late 2000 and early 2001 (when the sanctions were lifted). This is the period when normalisation of relations started taking place, which lasted a decade where “strategic” and “global” relationship between both the nations is cemented. Third phase began in 2011 after the signing of the Comprehensive Economic Partnership Agreement (CEPA) between India and Japan. This phase witnessed deepening of economic relationship between both the nations. While discussing each phase, emphasis is given to both systemic and domestic intervening variables which drove the relationship forward. The first section of the chapter briefly discusses the context in which India and Japan began their economic engagement in the post-Cold War era by providing a picture of India and Japan’s economy at the end of cold war. This section also analyses how the world has transformed and opened up avenues for new opportunities at a systemic level. It is followed by the second section, where a detailed analysis of the three phases of economic engagement is provided by highlighting the nuances of systemic effects and domestic actors of both the nations which influenced the engagement such as business groups, leadership and policy changes. The chapter then concludes by providing an overview of the analysis.

¹ Purnendra Jain and Mauree Todhunter, “India and Japan: Newly Tempering Relations,” in *Distant Asian Neighbours : Japan and South Asia*, ed. Purnendra C. Jain (New Delhi: Sterling Publishers Pvt.Ltd, 1996), 90.

End of Cold War and the Systemic and Domestic Situation in India and Japan

The end of Cold War opened up multiple avenues for partnership for India and Japan with the Soviet Union disintegrating and the waves of economic liberalisation sweeping across the globe. This, however, did not translate into overhaul of India and Japan cooperation owing to both domestic and systemic factors. Both the countries were undergoing internal churning by the end of the Cold War especially in the economic realm. In this context, the following section brings out the domestic economic situation of both India, Japan and also provides a picture of the world after the cold war.

India's Economy by the End of the Cold-War

By the early 1990s, marked by a Balance of Payments (BoP) crisis, India faced a severe economic crisis, with the dwindling foreign exchange reserves, and the risk of default. The crisis was from not so desirable results from planning and an emphasis on import substitution (protectionism). Around 1979-1980, BoP issues got deepened due to slowed agricultural development, industrial bottlenecks, inadequate infrastructure, and a weak monsoon. Inflation surged from 3% in 1978-1979 to 22% in 1979-1980.² Rising import costs for fertilisers and petroleum widened the trade deficit, leading to unprecedented deficit financing and increased bank lending. India received Special Drawing Rights (SDR) 266 million from the International Monetary fund (IMF) under the Compensatory Finance Facility (CFF) during the 1981 programme to address temporary imbalances.³ Although IMF programmes between 1966 and 1981 helped manage high inflation and BoP issues, they had limited success in bringing economic reforms. The 1985-1986 Union Budget introduced the Long-Term Fiscal Policy (LTFP) to provide annual budgets with clear direction and coherence, aiming for rules-based economic policies and better coordination across trade, industrial, monetary, and fiscal policies.⁴ The LTFP emphasised poverty reduction and projected national government resources of 10.1% of Gross Domestic Product (GDP) for

² Ranjit Sau, "Making of a Payments Crisis: India 1991," *Economic and Political Weekly* 27, no. 33 (1992): 1741–45.

³ V. Srinivas, *India's Relations with The International Monetary Fund (IMF) 25 Years In Perspective 1991-2016* (Delhi: Indian Council of World Affairs, 2019), 55.

⁴ "Fiscal Policy and Government Budget" (India Budget), accessed May 1, 2022, https://www.indiabudget.gov.in/budget_archive/es1985-86/6%20Fiscal%20Policy%20and%20Government%20Budget.pdf.

the 7th plan period (1985-1990).⁵ However, the LTTP's goals were unmet due to droughts, rural hardship, and expenditure booms. Tax receipts fell short, and budgetary deficits remained high, leading to foreign reserves covering only three months of imports by 1990-1991.⁶ Despite a 5 percent growth rate, Indian economy faced structural rigidities and macroeconomic imbalances. The 1991 BoP crisis was triggered by internal issues and external factors like the Soviet Union's disintegration and the Gulf War's impact on oil prices.⁷ A comprehensive reform agenda supported by the IMF emerged from this crisis and was subsequently implemented.

Dr Manmohan Singh, the then finance minister of India requested an 18-month stand-by arrangement worth SDR 1656 million to the IMF's managing director on August 27, 1991.⁸ A memorandum of economic policies outlining the Indian government's economic plan for the years 1991-1992 and 1992-1993 was additionally provided. In relation to any remaining surplus in oil import costs or deficit in earnings from products and remittances in 1991, the government additionally requested a second acquisition through the Compensation and Contingency Financing Facility (CCRF). The Government had indicated its preparedness to participate in a comprehensive structural adjustment project, which will be financed through a contract under the Extended Fund Facility by IMF. The Government of India established several financial limits for the Reserve Bank of India (RBI) in 1991-1992.⁹ These included a limit on RBI's credit to the government, a limit on RBI's net domestic assets and net official international reserves, and a minimum requirement for the union government's overall borrowing.

The adoption of a set of rapid stabilisation measures in July 1991, which involved a depreciation of the exchange rate by 18.7 percent and a tightening of monetary policy through increased interest rates, aimed to enhance confidence and halt the temporary outflow

⁵ V Srinivas, "The Economic History of India: India and the International Monetary Fund 1944-2017" (Special Lecture, National Archives of India, New Delhi, July 21, 2017).

⁶ Sweta Chaman Saxena and Valerie Cerra, "What Caused the 1991 Currency Crisis in India?," *IMF Working Papers* 00, no. 157 (2000): 1, accessed on March 1, 2022, <https://doi.org/10.5089/9781451857481.001>.

⁷ R Krishnaswamy and K Kanagasabapathy, "The Balance of Payments Situation: 1991 and Now," *Economic and Political Weekly* 48, no. 33 (2013): 73-76.

⁸ V Srinivas, "Journey of India's Central Bank," Press Information Bureau, August 7, 2017, accessed on May 12, 2022, <https://pib.gov.in/newsite/printrelease.aspx?relid=169696>.

⁹ Srinivas, 20.

of capital as part of the adjustment strategy.¹⁰ As per the evaluation by the IMF, the passage of the 1991-1992 final budget marked the initiation of a comprehensive plan focused on two main strategies, first is fiscal consolidation and the second is taking up significant structural reforms to deviate from previous policies.¹¹ India committed to mobilising substantial funds to prevent a major economic disruption and keep imports at a minimum level. Furthermore, apart from the original stabilisation package, a specific measure was implemented to maintain reserves at a minimal operational level. This endeavour encompassed obtaining external loans backed by gold, acquiring funds from the IMF, and having the capability to efficiently distribute assistance from the Asian Development Bank, World Bank, and various bilateral contributors.

The IMF suggested that the programme's primary macroeconomic goals consist of improving the payment situation, raising gross international reserves by the conclusion of 1992-1993 financial year, attaining economic expansion of 3 to 3.5 percent in 1991-1992, followed by a gradual rebound in 1992-1993, and decreasing inflation to a maximum of 6 percent by that same period. The current account deficit was projected to be less than 2.5 percent of GDP¹² throughout the periods of 1991-1992 and 1992-1993. The structural benchmarks of the IMF programme encompassed trade liberalisation, industrial policy, public sector reforms, domestic pricing strategies, tax adjustments, financial sector reforms, and expenditure control.¹³ The crisis management measures implemented encompassed the utilisation of gold to generate foreign exchange resources, the relaxation of the policy regarding gold importation, the issuance of India development bonds and non-resident deposits, the liberalisation of import licencing, the relaxation of tariffs, the deregulation of the industrial sector, the revision of foreign investment policy, and substantial modifications to the exchange rate policy. The IMF programme of 1991-1992 played a crucial role in ensuring India's integration into the global economy across all dimensions.

¹⁰ V Srinivas, "Indian Economy: Critical Milestones during 70 Years," Press Information Bureau, August 9, 2017, accessed on April 1, 2022, <http://pib.gov.in/PressNoteDetails.aspx?NoteId=150142>.

¹¹ V. Srinivas, *India's Relations With The International Monetary Fund (IMF): 25 Years In Perspective 1991-2016* (VIJ Books, 2020).

¹² Srinivas, 32.

¹³ Mitu Sengupta, "From 'Hard Sell' To 'Soft Sell': The Imf, World Bank And Indian Liberalisation," *World Affairs: The Journal of International Issues* 14, no. 1 (2010): 112–36.

Japan's Economy by the End of Cold-War

In the early 1970s, Japan's rapid economic growth halted due to several factors, including technological advancements, depletion of rural labour for industry, and declining global competitiveness in heavy manufacturing sectors like shipbuilding and steel.¹⁴ The international trade atmosphere also shifted, with the US dollar devaluing against the Yen and the 1973–1974 oil embargo caused economic crisis due to Japan's dependence on West Asian oil.¹⁵ These events highlighted Japan's vulnerability in food and energy, pushing the country to seek ways to sustain its economy. In response, Japan integrated more into the global economy during the 1970s and 1980s, advocating for unrestricted trade and strived for energy independence through nuclear power. The economic instability of the 1970s fostered a defensive and patriotic attitude, leading to conflicts with foreign entities, especially the United States (US).¹⁶ Despite internal economic and political concerns, the ruling Liberal Democratic Party (LDP) managed to maintain control until the early 1990s.

During the 1980s, Japan's economy became one of the largest and most technologically advanced globally. By the mid-1980s, Japan was the leading provider of development aid and the top net creditor nation, with a significant trade surplus driven by exports like electronics and automobiles. Despite this, domestic consumption stagnated, with Japanese consumer spending lagging behind that of the US, Great Britain, and Germany. Factors like sluggish wage growth, high living costs, traditional saving habits, and long working hours limited domestic consumption, necessitating internal economic reforms.¹⁷ Rising trade surpluses led to hostility between Japan and its trading partners in Europe and the US. Critics argued that Japan promoted unrestricted trade while protecting its domestic market, a claim disputed by Japanese officials. In response, Japan liberalised and deregulated its financial markets, reduced manufacturing tariffs, and planned to shift the

¹⁴ Takatoshi Ito and Takeo Hoshi, *The Japanese Economy, Second Edition*, second edition (Cambridge, Massachusetts London, England: The MIT Press, 2020), 25.

¹⁵ Kazuhiko Yago, "Before the 'Locomotive' Runs: The Impact of the 1973–1974 Oil Shock on Japan and the International Financial System," *Financial History Review* 27, no. 3 (December 2020): 418–35, accessed on June 1, 2021, <https://doi.org/10.1017/S0968565020000177>.

¹⁶ Yago, "Before the 'Locomotive' Runs," 425.

¹⁷ Ito and Hoshi, *The Japanese Economy, Second Edition*, 14.

economy towards domestic demand for growth. By the late 1980s, formal trade barriers had largely been reduced, though cultural barriers remained.

The Japanese “bubble economy”¹⁸ of the 1980s, which came to be known as a time of easy credit and unrestrained speculation, led to the astronomical price levels of the equity and real estate markets in Japan, eventually burst. This caused a severe recession in 1992–1993, which was so severe that it delayed many of the earlier reform initiatives, severely undermined Japanese consumer confidence, and unavoidably increased trade tensions.¹⁹ Yet, Japan’s trade surplus in goods with the rest of the world kept growing. At the middle of the 1990s, the Yen quickly appreciated against the dollar as a result of those export surpluses. Contrary to the US predictions, the trade balance was only slightly impacted by this.²⁰ Simultaneously, the appreciating value of the Japanese currency enabled Japanese corporations and individuals to engage in substantial overseas investments, including in the acquisition of foreign assets, particularly real estate, at reduced prices.

Into the beginning of the twenty-first century, the Japanese economy persisted in a state of sluggishness, alternating between a recession and feeble growth. Despite being relatively low compared to other developed countries, unemployment experienced a substantial surge and surpassed 5 per cent in 2000, marking the first time since the conclusion of World War II.²¹ According to Robert Ward, Japan Chair, International Institute for Strategic Studies (IISS), “Japanese companies started going abroad after 1990s and this is when the government was less able to influence the businesses as well.”²² During the 1990s and early 2000s, several Prime Ministers actively supported substantial economic reforms, such as deregulation. The reforms proposed by Hashimoto Ryutarō during his tenure

¹⁸ The “bubble economy” of Japan in the 1980s, characterized by the combination of readily available credit and unrestrained speculation, led to a significant increase in prices in the Japanese equity and real estate markets. However, this unsustainable situation eventually collapsed.

¹⁹ Christopher Wood, *The Bubble Economy: Japan’s Extraordinary Speculative Boom of the ‘80s and the Dramatic Bust of the ‘90s* (Solstice Publishing, 2005), 15.

²⁰ Simon Bytheway, “The Japanese Economy Since World War II,” in *Oxford Research Encyclopedia of Asian History*, 2023, accessed on December 23, 2023, <https://doi.org/10.1093/acrefore/9780190277727.013.688>.

²¹ Kenichi Ohno, *The History of Japanese Economic Development: Origins of Private Dynamism and Policy Competence*, 1st ed. (London: Routledge, 2017), accessed on April 2, 2022, <https://doi.org/10.4324/9781315444048>.

²² Robert Ward (Japan Chair, International Institute for Strategic Studies, USA) in discussion with researcher on December 18, 2023.

as Prime Minister from 1996 to 1998, commonly referred to as the “Big Bang” reforms, were significant in the domains of governance, finances, social security, the economy, monetary system, and education.²³ Although Hashimoto’s successors were in favour of the initiatives, they faced opposition from several industries. The lack of success in implementing policy measures to stimulate economic growth caused dissatisfaction among several politicians, including Koizumi Junichiro, who assumed the position of Prime Minister in 2001.²⁴ Additional challenges to the economy encompassed a rapidly ageing population and expanding disparities in income. Japan realigned its economy to more effectively integrate it into the Asian economic bloc, while still maintaining the US as the foundation of its international relations.

From the above-mentioned discussion, one can discern the domestic situation of both the nations at the end of the Cold War, with both nations undergoing transformations economically. Ken Moriyasu, the diplomatic correspondent, Nikkei Asia notes that “India and Japan, were undergoing similar dilemmas by the end of the Cold War between the US and Soviet Union. Both the countries’ economies were undergoing a major churn and both India and Japan found themselves in a major security flux.”²⁵ As India started to liberalise its economy owing to the BoP crisis, Japan went into stagnation in the early 1990s when the “bubble economy” burst. India, additionally, witnessed coalition politics and the rule of minority governments for two decades starting from 1990. Furthermore, headed by Prime Minister P.V Narasimha Rao headed minority government had to deal with an impending economic crisis. This was an important juncture in the political history of independent India wherein the country witnessed “political risk” in the form of minority government in dealing with economy. According to Sanjaya Baru, Political Analyst and Media Advisor to the former Prime Minister Manmohan Singh, the political instability India witnessed during the late 1980s and early 1990s exacerbated the economic crisis.²⁶ Coalition politics, where different political groups with varied ideologies come together to form government when

²³ Toshiyuki Masujima, “Administrative Refrom in Japan” (Institute of Administrative Management, 2006).

²⁴ Bytheway, “The Japanese Economy Since World War II.”

²⁵ Ken Moriyasu (Diplomatic Correspondent, Nikkei Asia, USA) in discussion with the researcher on December 8, 2023.

²⁶ Sanjaya Baru, (Political Analyst and Media Advisor to Prime Minister Manmohan Singh) in discussion with the researcher on January 22, 2024.

there is no party with simple majority, had its influence on the policy reforms. This is especially evident in the case where the magnitude of the reforms required were to correct the course of Indian economy in 1990's which was affected due to the interests of different political parties that influence policy formulations. The instability of the coalition politics had adverse effects on the economy, wherein within two years (1989-1991) three different governments came to office (the governments led by Prime Ministers - V.P. Singh, Chandrashekar and P.V. Narasimha Rao).²⁷ At the same time, Japan was undergoing an internal strife within the LDP and in 1993 for the first time since 1955 a liberal coalition headed by Prime Minister Hosokawa Morihiro formed government in 1993 and this trend continued till 1996. In this way India and Japan were both undergoing economic transition as well as political transition by the end of the cold war.

Changing Nature of Economy in the New World Order in the post-Cold War Period

As a result of the end of the Cold War, a new world order emerged, which was a major turning point in world affairs. The bipolar international order, which was characterised by competition between the US and the Soviet Union, ended with the fall of the latter in 1991.²⁸ The end of the Cold War acted as a catalyst to establish a new international system based on cooperation and multilateralism. The rise of the US as the leading global power was one of the main characteristics of the new world order.²⁹ With its newly acquired influence, the US promoted free markets and democracy throughout the world. The World Trade Organisation (WTO), which aided in fostering free trade and economic expansion, was established in 1995 (as a successor organisation to the GATT) with significant backing from the US. The enhanced regionalism involving regional groupings like the African Union (AU), European Union (EU), and the Association of South East Asian Nations (ASEAN) was another significant aspect of the new world order. These groupings were crucial in advancing regional collaboration and economic integration, which supported peace and

²⁷ Deepak Nayyar, "1991: Economic Liberalization and Political Process," mint, October 13, 2016, accessed on May 11, 2023, <https://www.livemint.com/Opinion/l46jd4x7sEnYgxizMcnq3M/1991-economic-liberalization-and-political-process.html>.

²⁸ Robert D. Schulzinger, "The End of the Old World Order," ed. Raymond L. Garthoff, *Diplomatic History* 20, no. 4 (1996): 689–93.

²⁹ William C. Wohlforth, "Realism and the End of the Cold War," *International Security* 19, no. 3 (1994): 91–129, accessed on May 1, 2020, <https://doi.org/10.2307/2539080>.

stability.

The period following the Cold War witnessed the emergence of other security dangers, the spread of Weapons of Mass Destruction (WMDs), terrorism, and cyberattacks. These threats need a new security strategy that prioritised inter-state collaboration and coordination.³⁰ International politics underwent a huge sea change with the end of the Cold War, resulting in the formation of a new world order based on collaboration, multilateralism, and regional integration.

The end of the Cold War, led to a significant redistribution of political and economic power at the global level. Some of the major changes in which this redistribution occurred are, first, the emergence of the US as the sole superpower. With the collapse of the Soviet Union, the US emerged as the world's only superpower. This gave the US significant political power at the global level, allowing it to influence the policies of other countries. Second, the rise of China as an economic powerhouse. China's economic reforms in the 1980s and 1990s led to its emergence as a major economic power. Its growth has been so significant that it is now the world's second-largest economy, trailing only the US. Third is the establishment and expansion of the European Union (EU) and it expanded significantly in the years following the end of the Cold War, with several countries joining the bloc. This gave the EU greater economic and political power, particularly in Europe. Finally, with the disintegration of the Soviet Union, its influence on the global stage declined significantly to an extent that many of the former Soviet Republics became sovereign nations and implemented open market economies.³¹ Against these settings, after the end of cold war binaries, India and Japan began to engage economically with each other in a significant fashion. This was an outcome of the churning processes in the internal or domestic political, economic and security domains of these states. The following section brings out the first phase of economic relations between India and Japan from 1991 to 2000. i.e., the post liberalisation phase.

³⁰ David Held and Anthony McGrew, "The End of the Old Order? Globalization and the Prospects for World Order," *Review of International Studies* 24 (1998): 219–43.

³¹ K. D. Willis, "First World," in *International Encyclopedia of Human Geography*, ed. Rob Kitchin and Nigel Thrift (Oxford: Elsevier, 2009), 183–88, accessed on May 14, 2023, <https://doi.org/10.1016/B978-008044910-4.00097-3>.

Phase I: Post-Liberalisation Phase 1991-2000

This phase is also called as pre-sanctions phase, wherein after the test of nuclear weapons by India, Japan imposed severe sanctions on India economically and cut its Official Development Assistance (ODA). As discussed earlier, both nations entered into a difficult phase in their history with Japan's economy entering into a stagnation after decades of high growth and India liberalising its economy to resolve the BoP crisis. India and Japan's economic engagements can be divided into three different categories or we can say that the relation rests on three important components; one is the ODA, second is the Foreign Direct Investments (FDI) and the third is the trade of goods and services.³² These three components form the main thrust areas of the economic relationship between both the nations other than the aid provided by the Ministry of Foreign Affairs of Japan (MOFA) as part of its diplomacy. These components will be discussed under each phase in the light of the domestic and systemic factors that influenced the foreign policies of each country towards each other.

India and Japan Bilateral Trade: 1990-2000

India's economic policies and goals during this phase placed a significant emphasis on foreign trade. At a time, when India was facing BoP crisis, emphasis was placed on exports to meet a bigger share of India's foreign exchange demands, which were rising quickly as the new economic policies start to kick in. The trade between both the nations, which has been expanding before 1990s, was anticipated to grow much more as a result of India's trade liberalisation initiatives of the P.V Narasimha Rao government which lasted till 1996. Japan stood as the third-largest trading partner in the early 90s. Yet, it is important to point that commerce between India and Japan was still at a low position, and neither country has been successful in taking advantage of trade's potential or chances.³³ This was a period when both countries started familiarising with the economic systems of each other.

³² R.S. Yadav, "Changing India-Japan Relations in the Post-Cold War Era," *India Quarterly* 58, no. 2 (2002): 191–212.

³³ Badar Alam Iqbal, 'Indo-Japanese Relations in The 90s', *India Quarterly* 52, no. 1/2 (1996): 39–72.

Table 3.1: Volume of trade between India and Japan in the first half of 1990s (Values in INR crores)

Year	Volume of Trade in crores of rupees	Percentage growth (%)
1990-91	6,284	-
1991-92	7,446	18.5
1992-93	8,296	11.4
1993-94	10,231	23.3
1994-95	15,977	56.2

Source: Statistics of Japan Finance, 1995 (standardised into Indian rupee)

Trade between both the nations increased from the start of the 1990s, and such a trend continued during the time period under consideration. The most important aspect to observe is that although India's trade balance with Japan was negative in the 1980s, the trend started declining in the 90s. India's trade deficit was Rs.150 crores in the years 1980–1981 and Rs. 89 crores at the end of the 1980s.³⁴ Similarly, the entire value of trade between India and Japan at the start of the 1980s, in the years 1980–1981 stood at Rs. 1,347 crores, while it reached Rs. 5,546 crores in 1989–1990. As a result, it has seen a growth of over 4 times. The trade imbalance, however, with Japan was quite high, at Rs. 206 crores, in the first year of the 1990s.

According to data on Japanese exports to the world, there was nearly 38 percent growth in overall exports in the first half of the decade i.e., between 1990–1991 and 1991–1995 of Japan. While at the same time, India's total exports saw a noticeable increase of nearly 45 percent.³⁵ This indicates that India's export performance in the 1990s was far better than Japan's, which was distinctively a positive and a healthy trend. The efforts of both the governments and business communities from the both countries contributed significantly to the increase in trade volume.

³⁴ Madanmohan Ghosh, "Non-Tariff Barriers to Trade: Case Study of India Vis-A-Vis Ec, Japan and USA" (NIPFP Library, April 1994), accessed on October 16, 2021, https://www.nipfp.org.in/media/pdf/working_papers/WP_1994_143.pdf.

³⁵ Iqbal, "Indo-Japanese Economic Relations in the 90s," 42.

Table 3.2: Year on Year growth of exports and imports and trade balance between India and Japan from 1996 to 2001 (Values in USD Million)³⁶

Year	Exports	% growth	Imports	% growth	Total Trade	% growth	Trade balance
1996-1997	2,005.96	-	2,187.45	-	4,193.41	-	-181.49
1997-1998	1,892.07	(-5.68)	2,144.90	(-1.95)	4,036.97	-3.73%	-252.83
1998-1999	1,652.00	(-12.69)	2,465.72	14.96	4,117.72	2.00%	-813.72
1999-2000	1,685.37	2.02	2,535.80	2.84	4,221.17	2.51%	-850.43
2000-2001	1,794.48	6.74	1,842.19	(-27.35)	3,636.67	-13.85%	-47.71

Source: Extracted and compiled from Department of Commerce.

From 1996 onwards, there were fluctuations in the total trade volume between India and Japan. For example, according to table 3.2, which denotes growth of exports and imports and trade balance between India and Japan, in 1997-98, there was a negative trade growth of -3.73% between both the states. This can mainly be ascribed to the less volume of exports from India to Japan and at the same time there has been a decline in the imports compared to the previous year. Indian exports saw a further decline in the following year, the decline has been so significant that in the same year i.e., 1998-1999, the trade deficit of India with Japan rose to USD 813 million. There was a marginal increase in the imports and exports in 1999-2000 but the trade deficit between these two countries continued to increased. Whereas, in the final financial year during the period under consideration, the trade witnessed a significant drop in imports from Japan. As pointed in Table 3.2, the drop was so significant that for the first time the trade deficit between both the countries fell to USD 47 million, to put in perspective the previous year's trade deficit with Japan stood at USD 850 million. This was because Japanese imports fell almost 27 percent compared to the previous year. This can be attributed to the fluctuations of bilateral relations during the period of India's nuclear tests till the end of the decade.

The overall trade data of the 1990s point towards major developments or influential factors in the Indian and Japanese polity. The initial thrust in the increase in volume of mutual trade was attributed to the opening of Indian economy and also Japan's new found interest in dealing with India as the Cold War ended. After the conclusion of the Cold War, there was no longer a geopolitical or ideological barrier between the two countries, and their interests in

³⁶ Department of Commerce, Government of India, accessed on June 12, 2022, <https://tradestat.commerce.gov.in/>

preserving peace and stability in Asia were similar. India and Japan, therefore, resumed high-level communication to forge tight ties at the start of the 1990s.³⁷ This continued till Japan imposed sanctions on India following nuclear tests conducted by India.

³⁷ Yadav, "Changing India-Japan Relations in the Post-Cold War Era," 192.

Table 3.3: Indian exports to Japan: Commodity-wise 1996 to 2001 (values in USD Million)³⁸

Sl.no	Hs Code	Commodity	1996-97	Share (%)	1997-98	Share (%)	1998-99	Share (%)	1999-2000	Share (%)	2000-01	Share (%)
1	61	Articles of Apparel (knitted)	1,033.98	3.0893	1,022.56	2.9397	1,258.83	3.7895	1,588.17	4.313	1,786.87	4.01
2	62	Articles of Apparel	2,719.47	8.1251	2,855.38	8.2087	3,107.23	9.3539	3,117.39	8.6289	3,790.47	8.5064
3	42	Articles of Leather	787.72	2.3535	885.45	2.5455	878.28	2.6439	824.5	2.2391	1,016.22	2.2805
4	10	Cereals	1,104.07	3.2987	910.43	2.6173	1,495.30	4.5014	723.66	1.9653	743.67	1.6689
5	9	Coffee, Tea and Spices	860.56	2.5711	1,130.62	3.2503	1,124.64	3.3856	983.39	2.6706	857.56	1.9245
6	52	Cotton	2,826.20	8.444	2,627.10	7.5524	2,018.57	6.0766	2,183.27	5.9292	2,408.22	5.4044
7	85	Electrical machinery and equipment	858.71	2.564	882.27	2.5363	813.61	2.4493	866.63	2.3535	1,292.45	2.9004
8	3	Fish and crustaceans	1,115.86	3.339	1,198.15	3.4444	1,029.14	3.0981	1,163.91	3.1609	1,376.35	3.0887
9	72	Iron and Steel	865.71	2.58665	989.48	2.8446	662.18	1.9934	892.28	2.4232	1,132.65	2.5418
10	27	Mineral fuels, Mineral oils	516.43	1.543	394.52	1.1342	141.08	0.4247	90.87	0.2468	1,930.99	4.3334
11	71	Pearls, precious and semiprecious stones	4,771.71	14.2567	5,147.57	14.7982	5,954.14	17.9241	7,583.64	20.5951	7,427.49	16.6684
12	84	Nuclear reactors, boilers	1,047.64	3.1301	1,161.68	3.3396	964.96	2.9049	995	2.7021	1,428.24	3.2052
13	29	Organic chemicals	993.06	2.967	1,214.94	3.4927	1,141.67	3.4368	1,368.92	3.7176	1,729.72	3.8818
14	63	Other made-up textile articles	745.32	2.2268	841.19	2.4183	779.52	2.3466	907.53	2.4646	1,150.30	2.5814
15	23	Residues and waste from food	997.13	2.9792	943.46	2.7123	478.11	1.4393	389.02	1.0565	462.04	1.0369

Source: Compiled from Department of Commerce, Government of India.

<https://tradestat.commerce.gov.in/>

As can be seen in the above Table 3.3, the top items in Indian export basket to Japan mainly constituted agricultural products, precious and semi-precious stones, marine products,

³⁸ Department of Commerce, Government of India, accessed on June 12, 2022, <https://tradestat.commerce.gov.in/>

and textile products as opposed to manufactured goods that India imported. By the year 2000, goods such as engines, components of vehicles, hardware, iron and steel, machine tools, organic chemicals, precision instruments and specialised machines were the top imports from Japan.³⁹ This difference in the type of products traded points to the level of economic development between both the nations. Though India opened up its economy, it still focused on exporting agricultural products owing to the still developing manufacturing sector then.

Japan's Official Development Assistance (ODA) to India during 1991-2000

Japanese ODA is divided into three distinct classifications, including technical aid, grants and bilateral loans. Loans are provided to governments through detailed talks and negotiations. These loans must be paid back within a specified timeframe and have a set interest rate. Over the years, there has been a substantial enhancement in the quality and conditions of the loans. India receives a limited proportion of the funding in the form of unconditional grants. Technical assistance offered by Japan International Cooperation Agency (JICA) to India across various areas. Currently, the loans within the Official Development Assistance (ODA) are directly associated with certain projects. After the introduction of liberalisation measures in 1991, India received increased support from Japan, namely in the areas of transportation, environment, energy, irrigation, and gas. India's dedication to economic reforms after the liberalisation in 1991 served as an impetus for Japan to forge stronger relations with India. From 1991 to 2000, Japan emerged as the leading donor nation globally, with its donations experiencing a corresponding growth.⁴⁰ Japan also viewed this assistance as a way to promote its diplomatic goals.

During the 1980s, Japan frequently allocated its ODA to nations such as Pakistan, Egypt and Turkey due to their strategic closeness to very significant geopolitical regions. In 1992, Japan introduced the inaugural ODA Charter, which outlined the objectives of Japan's aid by placing particular focus on the importance of assisting with the development of

³⁹ Biswa Nath Bhattacharyay and Kakali Mukhopadhyay, "A Comprehensive Economic Partnership between India and Japan: Impact, Prospects and Challenges," *Journal of Asian Economics* 39 (August 2015): 94–107, accessed on March 14, 2021, <https://doi.org/10.1016/j.asieco.2015.06.006>.

⁴⁰ "The Track Record of Japan's ODA," Ministry of Foreign Affairs of Japan, accessed May 6, 2022, accessed October 1, 2022, accessed on March 14, 2023, <https://www.mofa.go.jp/files/000119315.pdf>.

infrastructure in less developed countries.⁴¹ However, the Charter also implemented certain criteria for the distribution of resources, such as a recipient country's level of military expenditure, position on arms regulation, and engagement in free trade and environmental issues.

Japan's ODA has exhibited significant growth since the late 1990s, which stands in stark contrast to the underwhelming outcomes in investment and trade. India is the primary beneficiary of Japanese ODA. Japan has increased its assistance to India since 1991, from Rs. 2,677 crores to Rs. 4,110 crores in 1997-98.⁴² While providing aid, political and strategic factors have been just as significant as financial ones. Almost 95 percent of the overall ODA has been provided as Yen loans, grants around four percent, and one percent as technical support.⁴³ Poverty alleviation, healthcare, natural disasters, rural development, population control, AIDS control initiatives, ports, irrigation, transportation, environmental protection, power etc. have been the main areas of Japan's aid to India.

Domestic Perceptions and Linkages through New Foreign Policy Initiatives

From 1951 to 1991, Japan's total overseas investment reached USD 386.5 billion, while India's portion was only USD 332 million, a miniscule amount in comparison.⁴⁴ This stood in stark contrast to the reception that Japan extended to other Asian countries such as Indonesia, Singapore, Malaysia, Philippines and Thailand. The closer economic contacts between Japan and the Association of Southeast Asian Nations (ASEAN) countries were driven by numerous factors. During the 1960s, Japan made significant attempts to create enduring economic relationships with these countries. The investment legislation in these nations proved highly appealing to Japanese corporations. Furthermore, the majority of Southeast Asian nations extensively benefited from Japan's ODA, effectively utilising it to create opportunities for Japanese Foreign Direct Investment (FDI). This effect was also evident in the case of China.

⁴¹ "Japan's Official Development Assistance Charter | Ministry of Foreign Affairs of Japan," Ministry of Foreign Affairs of Japan, June 30, 1992, accessed on March 14, 2021, <https://www.mofa.go.jp/policy/oda/summary/1999/ref1.html>.

⁴² Yadav, "Changing India-Japan Relations in the Post-Cold War Era," 195.

⁴³ "Outline of Japan's ODA to India," Ministry of Foreign Affairs of Japan, 2004, accessed on March 14, 2021, https://www.mofa.go.jp/region/asia-paci/india/pmv0504/oda_i.pdf.

⁴⁴ K V Kesavan, "Economic Liberalization in India and Japan's Wavering Response," *Ritsumeikan Annual Review of International Studies* 2 (2003): 134.

However, India, while being a significant beneficiary of economic assistance from Japan, did not manage to achieve such efficient coordination. Furthermore, Japan's investments in the ASEAN region had significant advancements subsequent to the Plaza Accord in 1985.⁴⁵ Prior to that, Japanese FDI was primarily intended for the domestic markets of the ASEAN. The increasing cost of labour in Japan and the significant appreciation of the Yen prompted Japanese investors to relocate a large portion of their manufacturing operations to the ASEAN area, where labour costs remained relatively low. The ASEAN countries were inclined to attract Japanese investors due to their own economic challenges stemming from the significant decline in domestic agricultural product prices. Consequently, there was a fundamental alignment of shared interests. Due to the increase in labour costs in these nations, Japanese FDI subsequently shifted towards Malaysia and China. Due to the diminishing comparative advantages of production costs, Japan started seeking alternative sources for its investment. It is important to highlight the increasing intra-regional investment within ASEAN, which exceeds Japan's total investment, while considering the points at hand. Moreover, the rise of China as a formidable economic force, particularly in industries such as electronics, communication, and consumer appliances, presented a significant threat to Japan. It became necessary for Japan to explore new options that have significant market potential and offer advantages such as cheap labour costs, among others. Given India's substantial market size, it was positioned to be able to attract Japanese investors.

An additional advantageous reason for an extended economic framework between India and Japan can be attributed to India's active pursuit of the "Look East Policy" since 1992.⁴⁶ It closely aligned with India's implementation of the economic liberalisation programme. Impressed by the robust economic growth of East Asian and ASEAN nations, India recognised the need to enhance its diplomatic ties with them. An immediate consequence of this policy was that in 1995, India achieved the status of a dialogue partner with ASEAN. India became a member of the ASEAN Regional Forum in 1996.⁴⁷ India's diplomatic ties with the ASEAN countries have significantly broadened throughout time, leading to the establishment of the

⁴⁵ Asian Development Bank, *Asia's Journey to Prosperity: Policy, Market, and Technology Over 50 Years* (Manila: Asian Development Bank, 2020), 296, accessed on May 1, 2022, <https://www.adb.org/publications/asias-journey-to-prosperity>.

⁴⁶ Lakhan Mehrotra, "India's Look East Policy: Its Origin and Development," *Indian Foreign Affairs Journal* 7, no. 1 (2012): 75–85.

⁴⁷ Ganganath Jha, "India's Dialogue Partnership with ASEAN," *India Quarterly* 64, no. 4 (2008): 1.

annual ASEAN Plus One summit session. The “Look East policy,” implemented by the former Indian Prime Minister P.V. Narasimha Rao, acted as a catalyst to forge better ties with Japan as well. As previously mentioned, the Indian economy was greatly affected by the Gulf War of 1990-91 and the dissolution of the Soviet Union.⁴⁸ This prompted India to explore other regions that showed potential for investment and trade. However, the South Asia region itself provided little opportunities for investment and trade. Conversely, world attention was increasingly directed towards East Asia as a significant hub of economic expansion. In the early stage of the “Look East policy”, India primarily prioritised ASEAN countries. However, it soon recognised that the ultimate objective of the policy would be better achieved by cultivating strong commercial relationships with Japan. P.V. Narasimha Rao in the month of June 1992, embarked on a trip to Japan as a deliberate move to enhance diplomatic relations with Eastern nations.⁴⁹ He and Kiichi Miyazawa, the Prime Minister of Japan, recognised the capacity of the evolving global order to strengthen their bilateral relations. They understood the need to collaborate in reorganising international relations in a way that enables effective resolution of global and regional issues within a more democratic international framework.

The Role of Political Leadership in Economic Decision Making

Japanese Prime Minister Toshiki Kaifu visited India during his trip to South Asia in May 1990. In order to strengthen ties with South Asian nations, Prime Minister Kaifu’s efforts resulted in the formation of a separate “South Asia Forum” within the Japanese Foreign Ministry.⁵⁰ Indian Prime Minister Narsimha Rao maintained the momentum established by Prime Minister Kaifu on his official trip to Japan in June 1992, commemorating the 40th anniversary of the two nations’ post-war diplomatic ties.⁵¹ He engaged in conversation with his Japanese counterpart, Miyazawa Kiichi, regarding an exceptional chance to incorporate several novel elements into collaboration. Both individuals shared the belief that India and Japan

⁴⁸ “The Economic Situation in 1990-91” (Ministry of Finance, 1992), accessed on March 14, 2021, https://www.indiabudget.gov.in/budget_archive/es1990-91/1%20The%20Economic%20Situation%20in%201990-91.pdf.

⁴⁹ Takenori Horimoto, “Japan-India Rapprochement and Its Future Issues,” *JIIA*, Japan’s Diplomacy Series, Japan Digital Library, 2012.

⁵⁰ Iqbal, “Indo-Japanese Economic Relations in the 90s,” 40.

⁵¹ Horimoto, “Japan-India Rapprochement and Its Future Issues,” 2.

should collaborate to reconstruct international relations in a way that allows for effective handling of global and regional issues within a more democratic international setting.

During this time, there was even debate on the necessity of a bilateral security dialogue between India and Japan, as both began to perceive their relations in a regional framework. Early in the 1990s, as India implemented significant economic reforms and launched a “Look East policy”, the stagflation that had been observed in the Indo-Japanese economic relationship for many years was also broken. In 1997, the highest level of FDI commitment reached USD 531.5 million, however, the actual quantity of money that entered the country was only about one-third of that figure.⁵² Toyota, Mitsubishi, Honda, Sony, Fujitsu, YKK, and Matsushita were prominent Japanese firms that established their presence in India. The prominent financial newspaper *Nihon Keizai Shimbun* was actively advocating for economic changes in both India and Japan, while Japanese airlines (JAL and ANA) were commencing direct flights to India.⁵³ The Japanese Ministry of International Trade and Industry (MITI) was actively involved in fostering connections, while the Keidanren had also initiated similar efforts. Japanese banks, insurance businesses, and securities firms were increasingly recognising the potential of the Indian market. High level interaction had resumed at the political level as well, with a MITI minister making his first visit ever in 1995 and a foreign minister making his first visit in ten years in 1997.⁵⁴ By this point, the Cold War’s mentality of viewing India as a country close to the Soviet Union, had been discarded. India’s participation in ASEAN fora gave Japan more opportunities to debate important political and security problems. Even the necessity for a bilateral security conversation between the two nations was discussed, and the visits of the navy chiefs in 1997-1998 set a new precedent. Supporting industries including academic contact, research and technology, and cross-cultural exchanges were also displaying signs of increased engagements.

As pointed out earlier the first half of the last decade of 20th century saw a continuous increase in the trade volume which coincides with the P.V. Narasimha Rao’s stable government until 1996 which was followed by unstable governments. From May 1996 to October 1999,

⁵² Horimoto, 3.

⁵³ S Jaishankar, “India - Japan Relations after Pokhran II,” *India-Seminar*, 2000, accessed on March 10, 2020, <https://www.india-seminar.com/2000/487/487%20jaishankar.htm>.

⁵⁴ Arpita Mathur, “Economic Linkages,” *India-Japan Relations* (S. Rajaratnam School of International Studies, 2012), 72, accessed on May 1, 2022, <https://www.jstor.org/stable/resrep05895.7>.

India witnessed change of four Prime Ministers and four governments, which proved a hindrance for India which was coming out of the BoP crisis and an experiment with the opening up of markets. This coincided with the test of nuclear weapons on 11th May 1998, wherein India conducted three underground tests and two more tests after two in the same place with a low yield to obtain “additional data for improved computer simulation of designs.” These tests led India to come under severe sanctions.⁵⁵ The sanctions regime was led by the US which was widely believed to be acting alone in its endeavour to penalise the nuclear violators, as had been the case with many other economic penalties. As a form of retaliation against India, 14 nations, including Japan, Germany, Australia, Canada, Denmark, and Sweden, discontinued their bilateral aid programmes. Yet, only the Japanese sanctions involved amounts that were appreciably large. Japan cancelled USD 30 million of the total grant money and USD 1.2 billion in the total development loans to India.

Nuclear Tests and its Impact on Economic Relations

Japan responded swiftly and severely to the Indian nuclear tests.⁵⁶ The Japanese government unveiled a set of “economic measures” in two distinct phases. The implemented measures included discontinuing yen loans for new projects, relocating the “India Development Forum” from Tokyo, conducting thorough evaluations of loans to India by international financial institutions, suspending grant aid for new projects (except for grassroots assistance, emergency, and humanitarian), and enforcing strict regulations on technology transfers.⁵⁷ Jeff Kingston, Professor of History and Asian Studies at Temple University, Japan notes that the “reaction of Japan towards India after India’s nuclear tests emanates from its historical sensitivities.”⁵⁸ Japan is more wary of India gaining nuclear capability due to the unstable and security threat that persisted in South Asia between India and Pakistan. It is

⁵⁵ Saha Premesha, “The 1998 Pokhran Nuclear Tests: Reactions and Responses from the Indo-Pacific,” orfonline, May 11, 2023, accessed on November 1, 2023, <https://www.orfonline.org/expert-speak/the-1998-pokhran-nuclear-tests>.

⁵⁶ Satu P. Limaye, “Tokyo’s Dynamic Diplomacy: Japan and the Subcontinent’s Nuclear Tests,” *Contemporary Southeast Asia* 22, no. 2 (2000): 322–39. accessed on May 1, 2022, <http://www.jstor.org/stable/25798495>.

⁵⁷ Limaye, 3.

⁵⁸ Jeff Kingston (Professor of History and Asian Studies at Temple University Japan) in discussion with researcher on December 3, 2023.

important to emphasise that, in contrast, only a fraction of China's grant financing by Japan was halted after its 1995 nuclear test.

In order to conduct talks, the then Japanese ambassador to India was temporarily called back, and the Prime Minister Hashimoto reaffirmed his commitment to persuading the G-8 to condemn India's nuclear tests. The Japanese government referred to these trials as an intolerable challenge to global society. The Diet, on the other hand, went farther and stated that the tests posed a threat to human survival by destroying the world. Following the "economic measures,"⁵⁹ Japan halted a number of official conversations, cutting off contact just when it was most required.

If one accepts Japan's sensibilities and moral attitude against nuclear weapons and testing, then one can see why the Japanese public, media, and civic organisations also reacted with shock and anger. It was noteworthy that the Japanese government did nothing to gauge popular outrage, but rather served to amp it up by completely ignoring India's national security concerns. Japanese policymaking has always included the public's response as a key component. Nevertheless, the Japanese government has been perceived as manipulating public opinion to advance its own agenda by selectively emphasising certain aspects of public sentiment, such as opposition to nuclear tests, while disregarding the significant concerns regarding the US nuclear umbrella and the P-5's failure to fulfil their disarmament responsibilities.⁶⁰ The fervent leadership of Japan in the international campaign against India's nuclear tests is epitomised by Prime Minister Hashimoto's position at the G-8 summit in Birmingham, UK. He emphasised the importance of rewarding countries that adhere to international community rules and punishing those that do not. Japan proactively formed a South Asia Task Force (SATF) to effectively coordinate efforts to exert pressure on India and Pakistan during the G-8 foreign ministers' meeting in London. Japan has subsequently emerged as one of the most dynamic participants in the SATF.⁶¹ These steps were unprecedented.

⁵⁹ Hisane Masaki, "Japan Ready to Lift Sanctions on India," *The Japan Times*, September 9, 2001, accessed on May 1, 2022, <https://www.japantimes.co.jp/news/2001/09/09/national/japan-ready-to-lift-sanctions-on-india/>.

⁶⁰ Jonathon Baron, Rebecca Davis Gibbons, and Stephen Herzog, "Japanese Public Opinion, Political Persuasion, and the Treaty on the Prohibition of Nuclear Weapons," *Journal for Peace and Nuclear Disarmament* 3, no. 2 (July 2, 2020): 299–309, accessed on June 1, 2022, <https://doi.org/10.1080/25751654.2020.1834961>.

⁶¹ Jaishankar, "India - Japan Relations after Pokhran II."

Japan, in partnership with Sweden, Costa Rica, Slovenia, and Costa Rica, first proposed United Nations (UN) Security Council Resolution 1172.⁶² This resolution strongly condemned the nuclear tests conducted by India and Pakistan and further demanded that India and Pakistan halt the advancement of ballistic missiles and unconditionally and expeditiously endorse the Comprehensive Test Ban Treaty (CTBT) and Non-Proliferation Treaty (NPT). Interestingly, the initial Japanese proposal was more assertive in its language and alluded to the need for a resolution that tackles the underlying causes of conflicts, such as the Kashmir issue, among other matters. Japan also implored the foreign ministers of the P-5 nations convening in Geneva to refrain from acknowledging India and Pakistan as states possessing nuclear weapons. The Tokyo Forum on Non-Proliferation and Disarmament was established by the Japanese government in response to India's nuclear testing. In its final report, which was made public on July 25, 1999, the Tokyo Forum urged the international community to keep pressuring Pakistan and India to comply with all the demands of UNSC Resolution 1172.⁶³ It argues against granting the two nations any additional privileges or recognition due to their nuclear testing, including special status under the NPT or legal recognition as nuclear weapon states. Its primary suggestions included the halting of proliferation in South Asia and the settlement of the Kashmir nuclear dispute. Several of these Japanese projects include Pakistan and India as equals, which disturbs the former because it is considered as a remnant from the Cold War balance of power approach to the subcontinent.

The Japanese strategy regarding India's nuclear programme appeared to be changing by the second half of 1999.⁶⁴ The initial G-8 Accord reached in June 1998 had already begun to weaken. India and China's relations had also clearly improved. So, the shared need for normalcy in the partnership started to make a stronger comeback. High level political connections were resumed, conversations that had been suspended were reinstated, and the Jammu and Kashmir problem was now seen as a misunderstanding. India's CTBT signing was also an important development that contributed to amenable relations with the Japanese. The

⁶² "Statement by Foreign Minister Keizo Obuchi on the Adoption as a U.N. Security Council Resolution of a Joint Proposal by Japan, Sweden and Other Countries against Nuclear Testing by India and Pakistan," Ministry of Foreign Affairs of Japan, June 7, 1998, accessed on May 1, 2022, <https://www.mofa.go.jp/announce/announce/1998/6/607f.html>.

⁶³ "Facing Nuclear Dangers: An Action Plan for the 21st Century," Ministry of Foreign Affairs of Japan, July 25, 1999, accessed on March 1, 2022, <https://www.mofa.go.jp/policy/un/disarmament/forum/tokyo9907/index.html>.

⁶⁴ Jaishankar, "India - Japan Relations after Pokhran II."

partnership had a cloud of sanctions hanging over it, from India's point of view though it was evident that neither state wanted to focus only on one aspect of their relationship. Their recent resolve to come to terms on a future-focused agenda revealed a shared desire to move past a trying time.


An in-depth analysis of Japan's response reveals that the domestic compulsions that the Hashimoto government (1996-1998) faced during that period. Primarily, the Hashimoto's governments popularity declined significantly due to its inefficient management of the economy during a lengthiest recession in the history of post-war. Severe challenges were faced by the banking system as numerous financial scandals were uncovered.⁶⁵ In addition, Hashimoto was confronted in July 1998 with a pivotal Upper House election, and his tenure as Prime Minister was contingent upon the results of the election. In order to enhance his public perception among voters, he had to utilise all the available resources at his disposal. In the midst of growing public criticism of ODA programme by Japan, Hashimoto had to demonstrate that government loans were being provided in strict adherence to the conditions specified in the 1992 ODA Charter.⁶⁶ Furthermore, he sought to portray himself as a staunch advocate of nuclear non-proliferation by actively engaging in key international forums.⁶⁷ Primarily, Japan was determined to uphold the existing worldwide nuclear framework and regarded India's actions as a cause of instability to that framework, since it may potentially inspire other nations to pursue nuclear weapon initiatives.

⁶⁵ Ko Mishima, "The Changing Relationship between Japan's LDP and the Bureaucracy: Hashimoto's Administrative Reform Effort and Its Politics," *Asian Survey* 38, no. 10 (1998): 968–85, accessed on March 14, 2021, <https://doi.org/10.2307/2645646>.

⁶⁶ Thomas F. Cargill, Magnus Blomstrom, and Sumner La Croix, "Japan's Economic and Financial Stagnation in the 1990s and Reluctance to Change," in *Institutional Change in Japan* (New York: Routledge, 2017), 136.

⁶⁷ Mishima, "The Changing Relationship between Japan's LDP and the Bureaucracy," 970.

Figure 3.1: Growth trends of India and Japan during 1991-2000⁶⁸



Source: Compiled from the World Bank

Phase II: Post sanctions phase 2001-2010

This phase which began with the turn of century coincides with the end of Japanese sanctions on India. The resumption or normalisation of relations had two important factors. On one hand was the realisation of India's security concerns by Japan and to tap the potential of India as a growing market and on the other to find an alternative to China. The first is obvious considering the lukewarm bilateral interaction that took place in the 1990s even when the economic bubble of Japan burst and India opening up its economy. The second factor refers to the systemic level factor that influenced Japan to tilt towards India as a balancer.

Thus, in the 1990s, China and Japan's relations began to shift. Although the Japanese economy entered a period of economic stagnation known as the "lost decade,"⁶⁹ the Chinese economy started to take off quickly. Japan continued to have significantly greater economic and technological capabilities than China, but China started to close the gap quickly. Despite domestic economic stagnation, China's rise offered new prospects for Japanese businesses.

⁶⁸ World Bank, Data Bank, accessed on June 12, 2022, <https://databank.worldbank.org/reports.aspx?source=2&series=NY.GDP.MKTP.KD.ZG&country=IND>

⁶⁹ The term "The Lost Decade" initially denoted a protracted period of sluggish to adverse economic expansion, enduring for nearly a decade, inside Japan's economy throughout the 1990s. The 1990s in Japan were characterized by a significant decline in economic performance, which has caused some experts to refer to this period as Japan's "lost decade."

Significant Japanese investments were made in its sizable neighbouring country due to the lucrative nature of conducting business there, as well as the belief that Japan's technological advantage would ensure its ongoing economic dominance and grant it the power to shape China's strategic trajectory.

By the late 1990s, Japan started expressing concerns about Beijing's increasing military modernisation and investment, as well as its strong position in territorial confrontations with neighbouring countries. A new impression of China as a security threat has arisen due to Chinese nuclear and missile tests, as well as military training conducted off the coast of Taiwan.⁷⁰ The Japanese Defence White Paper of 2000 stated that China's enhancement of its nuclear, naval, and air forces, together with the expansion of its maritime activities, required close observation. Japan began to notice over the following several years that "observation" and "scientific" naval vessels were entering its exclusive economic zone surrounding the contentious Senkaku islands more frequently.⁷¹ Following the Asian financial crisis of 1997-1998, Japan's concerns were validated by the change in regional sentiment towards China.⁷² Due to its conflicting territorial claims in the South China Sea and its previous backing of communist insurgency, China was perceived as a threat to its Southeast Asian neighbours in the early 1990's.

With the onset of the Asian financial crisis, perceptions started to shift as China defended its decision to hold its currency steady rather than devalue it, which would have worsened currency devaluations in Thailand and Indonesia. The philosophy of "win-win" ties was further articulated by Chinese officials, who emphasised that Southeast Asians could gain from their interactions with China just as much as China could gain from its relationships with them.⁷³ Invariably, China posed a serious security threat not just to its sovereignty but also to the global supply chain in an event of conflict. This realisation made Japan to look for other

⁷⁰ "The Rise of China and Its Effect on Taiwan, Japan, and South Korea: U.S. Policy Choices," CRS Report for Congress (Washington, D.C.: The Library of Congress, January 13, 2006).

⁷¹ Sanjana Joshi, "The Geopolitical Context of Changing Japan-India Relations," *UNISCI Discussion Papers*, no. 32 (2013): 117–36, accessed on 12 June 2022, https://doi.org/10.5209/rev_UNIS.2013.n32.44793.

⁷² Joshi Sanjay, "Prospects for Security Cooperation Between India and Japan," *Strategic Analysis* 25, no. 2 (May 2001), accessed on May 1, 2022, https://ciaotest.cc.columbia.edu/olj/sa/sa_may01jos01.html.

⁷³ Pei, Minxin and Swaine, Michael: "Simmering Fire in Asia: Averting Sino-Japanese Strategic Conflict" Carnegie Endowment, Policy Brief no. 44 (November 2005), accessed on May 1, 2022, <http://carnegieendowment.org/files/pb44.pei.FINAL.pdf>.

alternatives, especially a democratic nation, which plays by the rules of established order. Japan found India to be one of the nations with which it can develop significant economic partnership even though the relations were at historical low following the sanctions.

Robert Ward states the shift in relationship started from 2000 onwards with the visit of Prime Minister Mori to India.⁷⁴ During his visit to India in 2000, it was announced that India and Japan will establish a “Global Partnership” in the twenty-first century.⁷⁵ This term had previously been exclusively used by Japan to describe its relationship with the US. Japan initiated the inaugural bilateral security dialogue in July 2001, and subsequently decided to ease the economic restrictions it had imposed after India’s nuclear tests in 1998, in October of the same year. Subsequent Joint Statements and conversations have expanded and enhanced this relationship, emphasising its strategic nature. A Strategic and Global Partnership in 2006, between India and Japan, which aimed at strengthening regional peace and stability.⁷⁶ This partnership involves greater coordination on bilateral, regional, multilateral, and international issues at the political and diplomatic front, as well as stronger defence connections. The proposal recommended that the highest-ranking officials of the two nations convene yearly at summit meetings and that the strategic involvement be officially established through the foreign ministries.

⁷⁴ Robert Ward (Japan Chair, International Institute for Strategic Studies) in discussion with researcher on December 18, 2023.

⁷⁵ “Japan-India Joint Declaration,” Ministry of Foreign Affairs of Japan, December 10, 2001, accessed on 12 June 2022, <http://www.mofa.go.jp/region/asia-pac/india/joint0012.html>.

⁷⁶ “Joint Statement Towards India-Japan Strategic and Global Partnership,” Ministry of External Affairs, Government of India, December 15, 2006, accessed on 12 June 2022, <https://www.mea.gov.in/bilateral-documents.htm?dtl/6368/Joint+Statement+Towards+IndiaJapan+Strategic+and+Global+Partnership>.

India and Japan Bilateral Trade 2001-2010

Table 3.4: Year on Year exports and imports between India and Japan from 2001 to 2010
(Values in USD Million)⁷⁷

Sl. No	Year	Exports	Growth	Imports	Growth	Total Trade	% Growth	Trade balance
1	2001-2002	1,510.44	(-15.83)	2,146.44	16.52	3,656.88	0.56%	-636.00
2	2002-2003	1,864.03	23.41	1,836.33	(-14.45)	3,700.36	1.19%	27.70
3	2003-2004	1,709.29	(-8.30)	2,667.68	45.27	4,376.97	18.28%	-958.39
4	2004-2005	2,127.91	24.49	3,235.13	21.27	5,363.04	22.53%	-1,107.22
5	2005-2006	2,481.26	16.61	4,061.10	25.53	6,542.36	21.99%	-1,579.84
6	2006-2007	2,868.12	15.59	4,599.54	13.26	7,467.66	14.14%	-1,731.42
7	2007-2008	3,858.48	34.53	6,325.92	37.53	10,184.40	36.38%	-2,467.44
8	2008-2009	3,025.70	(-21.58)	7,886.27	24.67	10,911.97	7.14%	-4,860.57
9	2009-2010	3,629.54	19.96	6,734.18	(-14.61)	10,363.72	-5.02%	-3,104.64

Source: Extracted and compiled from Department of Commerce, Government of India, accessed on 12 June 2022, <https://tradedstat.commerce.gov.in/>.

Following the sanctions period, the mutual trade remained stagnant, wherein the overall trade growth witnessed only 0 to 1.2 percentage points, as can be seen in table 3.4, but the negative trade balance remained. The only financial year when the trade was in favour of India was in 2002-03, this can be attributed to the Severe Acute Respiratory Syndrome (SARS) outbreak in China and East Asia. This made exports from Japan to India fall to the tune of 14.45 percentage points compared to the previous year.⁷⁸ This was the first instance where an epidemic proved fatal to supply chains. Though it didn't last long. The following year saw almost 45 percent growth in the exports of Japan to India making an 18 percent overall growth in the trade volume. This took the trade deficit to almost USD 1000 million but it crossed the absolute mark of USD 1000 million in the financial year 2004-05. The exports and imports to and from Japan saw a steady upward trend in value but the year-on-year growth percentage fluctuated except for 2008-09 when Indian exports saw a 21.5 percent decline but still the overall growth saw a positive trend. It was only in 2009-10, for the first time over the years after lifting sanctions the overall growth declined compared to previous year's growth. In 2009-

⁷⁷ Department of Commerce, Government of India, accessed on 12 June 2022, <https://tradedstat.commerce.gov.in/>.

⁷⁸ Marcus Richard Keogh-Brown and Richard David Smith, "The Economic Impact of SARS: How Does the Reality Match the Predictions?," *Health Policy (Amsterdam, Netherlands)* 88, no. 1 (October 2008): 110–20, accessed on June 14, 2022, <https://doi.org/10.1016/j.healthpol.2008.03.003>.

10 the overall bilateral trade growth witnessed a 5 percent decline and trade balance to came down almost USD 1000 million. This was due to 14.6% decline in the imports from Japan compared to the previous years. The dramatic decline can be attributed to the 2007-08 financial crisis. The trade imbalance saw a steady growth in this decade except for in the financial year 2009-10 where the decline in bilateral trade volume was so profound that the trade deficit of India with respect to Japan saw a decline for the first time in 7 years.

Table 3.5: Commodity wise exports to Japan – Top fifteen products of exports during 2001-2010 (percentage share of total export)⁷⁹

Sl. No.	Hs Code	Commodity	2001-02	2002-03	2003-04	2004-05	2005-06	2006-07	2007-08	2008-09	2009-10	2010-11
1	61	Articles of apparel (knitted)	4.25	4.53	4.23	3.16	3.10	2.86	2.62	2.72	2.57	1.98
2	62	Articles of apparel (not knitted)	7.17	6.36	5.55	4.71	5.27	4.19	3.32	3.19	3.43	2.67
3	73	Articles of Iron or Steel	2.29	2.20	2.40	2.77	2.73	2.69	3.20	3.12	2.28	2.64
4	10	Cereals	2.21	3.04	2.37	2.40	1.58	1.34	2.26	1.81	1.67	1.34
5	52	Cotton	4.55	4.18	3.86	2.71	2.89	3.12	3.17	1.70	2.58	2.77
6	85	Electrical machinery and equipment	2.88	2.76	2.97	2.48	2.68	3.25	3.28	5.15	4.05	4.06
7	3	Fish and crustaceans	2.78	2.65	1.94	1.57	1.38	1.24	0.91	0.70	1.02	0.93
8	72	Iron and steel	2.14	3.63	4.06	5.05	3.70	4.43	4.02	4.07	2.53	2.86
9	27	Mineral fuels, mineral oils	4.98	5.14	5.85	8.55	11.51	14.92	17.83	5.35	16.24	17.11
10	71	Pearls, precious or semiprecious stones	16.75	17.25	16.86	17.28	15.38	12.73	12.15	15.36	16.34	17.49
11	84	Nuclear reactors and other appliances	3.58	3.26	3.93	3.96	4.06	4.03	4.17	4.31	4.02	3.64
12	26	Ores, slag and ash	1.24	1.99	2.05	4.48	4.32	3.87	4.29	2.94	3.72	2.10
13	29	Organic chemicals	3.67	3.99	4.42	4.33	4.71	4.54	4.40	4.03	4.17	3.61
14	30	Pharmaceutical products	2.41	2.66	2.54	2.47	2.37	2.52	2.55	2.74	2.90	2.67
15	87	Vehicles other than railway	1.98	2.13	2.73	2.95	3.19	2.98	2.75	3.24	3.45	3.73


Source: Compiled from Department of Commerce, Ministry of Commerce and Industry, Government of India, accessed on 12 June 2022, <https://commerce.gov.in/trade-statistics/>.

According to table 3.5, during this period i.e., between 2001 to 2010, minerals and mineral oils were the major export items from India to Japan. From 5 percent of overall exports to Japan at the beginning of the decade to taking a share of 17.11 percent, Mineral oils and fuels saw a significant growth. A close look reveals that it was Natural or Cultured Pearls, Precious or Semiprecious Stones which were exported in large quantities during the entire period. With a marginal increase from 16.8 percent in 2001-02 to 17.5 percent in 2010-11, pearls and stones remained the top export items in the export basket of India to Japan. Other

⁷⁹ Department of Commerce, Ministry of Commerce and Industry, Government of India, accessed on June 12, 2022, <https://commerce.gov.in/trade-statistics/>.

than these, iron and steel, cotton, clothing and apparel, organic products, pharmaceutical products, appliances of nuclear reactors, boilers and vehicles other than railways formed the top ten export items in the export basket of goods to Japan. The following figure represents the overall growth trends of India and Japan for the period of 2001-2010.

Figure 3.2: Growth trends of India and Japan during 2001-2010⁸⁰



Source: Compiled from the World Bank.

As figure 3.2 and table 3.4 represents, there is a clear correlation between the years got affected with the financial crisis of 2008 and the trade between both the nations. The years 2008-09 and 2009-10 saw the fall in trade growth, from 36.38 per cent in 2007-08 to -5.02 per cent in 2009-10 there was drastic fall. This was despite having a favourable domestic policy environment in India and Japan.

Foreign Direct Investment (FDI)

Japanese investments in India totalled USD 2.15 billion between 1991 and 2006, according to the Confederation of Indian Industry (CII), or just under 6% of all FDI that entered India during that time. Similarly, China received almost USD 23.7 billion FDI from Japan which nearly 17 times higher Japanese FDI than India.⁸¹ The very clear Japanese reluctance is a result of their unease with India as a host economy due to its dearth of fundamental

⁸⁰ World Bank, Data Bank, accessed on June 12, 2022,

<https://databank.worldbank.org/reports.aspx?source=2&series=NY.GDP.MKTP.KD.ZG&country=IND>

⁸¹ “Japanese Trade and Investment Statistics | Reports and Statistics - Japan External Trade Organization,” JETRO, 2024, accessed on April 30, 2024 <https://www.jetro.go.jp/en/reports/statistics.html>.

infrastructure, bureaucratic procedures and inefficiency, corruption, and general business climate. Hence, ensuring an improvement in India's overall business and investment climate is one of the important requirements. Certain important industries, like the automotive industry (27%) and the sectors of industrial machinery (7%), electrical equipment (11%), trading (7%), and services (14%), have seen a sizable amount of Japanese investment.⁸² The electrical equipment business, the chemicals industry and the transportation industry have all been engaged in technology transfer. In terms of FDI, Matsushita Electric Works Ltd., Maruti-Suzuki, Tata Teleservices-NTT Do Co Mo, and Anchor Electricals Pvt. Ltd. are three of the largest Japanese-Indian partnerships. The USD 5 billion partnership between Ranbaxy Laboratories Ltd. and Daiichi Sankyo Co. Ltd. (Japan) in the pharmaceutical industry is also important. These investments proved a favourable perception by the industry stakeholders in the both the nations.

Perception of Business Establishments

The hesitancy of Japanese businessmen to venture into India has been the subject of a number of insightful surveys. One of them is undoubtedly the fact that, aside from the Maruti-Suzuki, other investors belonging to Japan had less than favourable experiences in the country. For example, research on "Japan's FDI Experiences in India" claims that Toyota Kirloskar Motors tried to enter the Indian market, for the production of light commercial vehicles, but ran into problems and conflict with its cooperation with DCM, India. Other Japanese businesses, including Satake and Soyo, had similar bad experiences.⁸³ According to the survey, these Japanese businesses decided to avoid market of India even after the country's economy was liberalised. Subsequently, Ranbaxy has had issues with the US Food and Drug Administration since Daichii Sankyo took over the company.⁸⁴ Due to the failure of two of its products to receive the required government permission before entering the US market, the

⁸² "Japanese Trade and Investment Statistics | Reports and Statistics - Japan External Trade Organization."

⁸³ Choudhury Srabani Roy, "Japan's Foreign Direct Investment Experiences in India: Lessons Learnt from Firm Level Surveys - ICRIER" (ICRIER, December 2009), 25, accessed on May 1, 2022, <https://icrier.org/publications/japans-foreign-direct-investment-experiences-in-india-lessons-learnt-from-firm-level-surveys/>.

⁸⁴ Srabani Roy, "Japan's Foreign Direct Investment Experiences in India: Lessons Learnt from Firm Level Surveys - ICRIER."

company suffered losses and stock prices fell. This can be asserted to the insufficient preparation before to the contract's signature.

Most significantly, India categorically lacked the infrastructure that would serve as a magnet for investment. In crucial sectors such power, energy, water supply systems, road and rail networks, or warehousing, the infrastructure issues were pervasive and ingrained. Finally, Japanese investors also found the legal and regulatory framework, high tariffs, tax structure unfavourable, as well as the red tape and bottlenecks associated with the process. Tomio Isogai, Member, Kansai Japan India Cultural Society in Kobe, Japan states that “Japanese investors are wary about the bureaucratic hurdles they face in India especially red tape and corruption.”⁸⁵ According to a CII study, a typical power plant required 57 clearances at the State Government (including local government) and 43 Central Government clearances.⁸⁶ Moreover, there is corruption, a lack of openness in procedures, decision-making, and documentation, in contrast to other states that may not need as many clearances.⁸⁷ This, i.e., bureaucratic hurdles and corruption, proved to be a serious hurdle to the Japanese investors in India.

According to Japan External Trade Organisation's (JETRO) 2007 “Survey on International Operations of Japanese Firms,” the five major risk factors for doing business with any Asian countries are political instability, underdeveloped infrastructure, legal systems, underdeveloped supporting industries and concerns over local currency stability.⁸⁸ This holds true with respect to India as well. According to Japan Bank of International cooperation (JBIC)'s “Survey Report on Overseas Business Operations,” the most prevailing difficulties in doing business with India include shortage of infrastructure, difficulties in land ownership, complexity of land holdings, complicated government regulations and difficulties in fund

⁸⁵ Tomio Isogai, (Member, Kansai Japan India Cultural Society in Kobe, Japan) in discussion with researcher on December 28, 2023.

⁸⁶ Planning Commission, “Report of The Steering Group on Foreign Direct Investment” (New Delhi: Government of India, New Delhi, 2002), accessed on May 1, 2022, <http://14.139.60.153/handle/123456789/5804>.

⁸⁷ Sumit Ganguly, “India's Corruption Problem,” *Foreign Affairs*, August 20, 2011, accessed on February 1, 2021, <https://www.foreignaffairs.com/articles/india/2011-08-20/indias-corruption-problem>.

⁸⁸ Japan External Trade Organisation, “Survey on International Operations of Japanese Firms (FY2007),” March 26, 2008, accessed on February 1, 2022, https://www.jetro.go.jp/ext_images/en/reports/survey/pdf/jafirms2007.pdf.

raising.⁸⁹ This survey is done by Japanese Manufacturing Companies in order to bring out the prevailing perceptions.

China Factor and Certain Advantages for India

Despite the increased cultural and economic interactions between China and Japan in the 1990s, there remained a mutual distrust and hostility. In the 1990s, there was a significant and notable change in the relative power dynamics between China and Japan. The Chinese economy had a rapid rise whereas the Japanese economy entered a period of stagnation lasting for a decade. In just ten years, the divergence became significant enough to change the regional power dynamics and impact the relationship between China and Japan. Despite Japan's continued dominance in terms of economic and technological capabilities, China was rapidly closing the disparity between the two countries. This trend resulted in a modification of geostrategic calculations.⁹⁰ Japan's strategic value, formerly praised by Beijing as a paradigm of economic modernisation in the 1980s, experienced a significant drop in the late 1990s and in the first decade of twenty first century.⁹¹ Beijing's disregard and mishandling of its Japan policy, particularly evident in the growing number of conflicts in the past and territorial issues, had caused Japanese elites and the general public to become more wary of China's intentions and resentful of Beijing's aggressive approach towards Japan.

While prioritising domestic political concerns over the potential long-term advantages of maintaining strong relations with Japan, China did not pay attention to the strategic importance of Japan. Notably, the Chinese Communist Party (CCP) initiated a patriotic education campaign in the 1990s to strengthen its political legitimacy. This campaign primarily emphasised the traumatic and violent resistance against the Japanese invasion during World War II.⁹² The Chinese government's intention to demonise Japan through the patriotic education programme is a subject of debate. However, it is indisputable that the campaign

⁸⁹ Japan Bank for International Cooperation, "Survey Report on Overseas Business Operations by Japanese Manufacturing Companies: Result of the JBIC FY 2012 Survey," November 2012, accessed on February 1, 2022, <https://www.jbic.go.jp/en/information/press/press-2012/1207-6493.html>.

⁹⁰ Katherine G Burns, "China and Japan: Economic Partnership to Political Ends," *Stimson*, n.d., 27–58.

⁹¹ "The Rise of China and Its Effect on Taiwan, Japan, and South Korea: U.S. Policy Choices."

⁹² Benoit Hardy-Chartrand, "The Dangers of Nationalism in China and Japan," Centre for International Governance Innovation, September 26, 2014, accessed on May 5, 2022, <https://www.cigionline.org/articles/dangers-nationalism-china-and-japan/>.

significantly fuelled anti-Japanese nationalist feelings among the Chinese public, particularly among the younger generation in China. Upon reflection, the 1990s proved to be a period of stagnation for China in terms of reframing its relations with Japan.

Another element that has contributed to strained relations between China and Japan is the alteration of Japan's domestic political environment. The political influence of the pacifist movement has significantly diminished since the mid-1990s. The implementation of the new electoral system and campaign financing regulations has diminished the authority of party factions and enhanced the authority of the prime minister, particularly during legislative election campaigns.⁹³ The prime minister's power in making decisions on national security has been greatly strengthened by the implementation of several administrative reforms in 2001. In addition, during the 1990s, there was a noticeable shift towards conservative views among the general public in the country. This shift allowed prominent figures in national security, such as Shintaro Ishihara (the governor of Tokyo Prefecture) and Shinzo Abe to deliberately provoke and exploit the growing wave of populist nationalism.⁹⁴ As a result, they gained significant influence in matters related to foreign policy. Public opinion polls suggest a decrease in pacifist attitude and a rise in support for a more assertive national security policy. Nevertheless, a growing number of Japanese legislators support the amendment of the pacifist constitution. During the 1990s, the Japanese public became increasingly aware of the potential military danger from external sources, especially following North Korea's testing of long-range missiles in 1998.

The alterations in Japanese politics and public sentiment had a direct impact on Japan's approach towards China. In the late 1990s, the Mori faction gained prominence inside the Liberal Democratic Party (LDP), which was the political stronghold of Prime Minister Koizumi. With a few deviations, this faction predominantly supported a strong security policy and exhibited greater scepticism towards China compared to other factions within the LDP. Simultaneously, the power and impact of politicians with pro-China leanings and officials within the foreign ministry diminished. The individual events that triggered the swift decline of Sino-Japanese relations were mostly unrelated, but when considered together, they seem to have created a destructive cycle that is pushing China and Japan even further away and made

⁹³ Minxin Pei and Michael Swaine, "Simmering Fire in Asia: Averting Sino-Japanese Strategic Conflict" (Carnegie Endowment for International Peace, 2005), 2, accessed on May 1, 2022, <https://carnegieendowment.org/files/pb44.pei.FINAL.pdf>.

⁹⁴ Pei and Swaine, 3.

Japan to strengthen relations with India. In November 2004, when a Chinese submarine traversed Japanese national seas without emerging, it significantly deteriorated the relations between the two countries. Consequently, Japan implemented fresh National Defence Programme Guidelines (NDPG) in 2005, which explicitly acknowledged China as a security concern. The guidelines highlighted China's ongoing modernisation of its nuclear and missile capabilities, as well as its naval and air forces, along with its expanding maritime presence. China exerts significant influence over the security dynamics in this region.

Japanese concerns about an imbalanced and unequal reliance on China were realised on April 3, 2005, when enraged Chinese demonstrators in Chengdu, Sichuan Province vandalised the windows of a supermarket owned by a Japanese company. This act was a manifestation of their protest against pursuit of a permanent seat on the UN Security Council for Japan. An initially minuscule demonstration originating in central China escalated into a sequence of massive anti-Japanese protests.⁹⁵ The largest and longest-lasting public protests since those in Tiananmen Square in 1989 involved tens of thousands of participants in more than twenty major Chinese cities. Protesters smashed Japanese-made cars, defaced Japanese eateries and shops, and demanded boycotts of Japanese products in response to Japan's alleged lack of regret for atrocities committed during World War Two. Since then, Japan has closely observed the rise in frequency and amount of aggressiveness in the recurrent cycles of tensions over historical hostility and territorial disputes, as well as China's employment of economic pressure tools at these times, with great concern. This was also when Japan started to realise, according to Tomio Isogai, member of Kansai Japan cultural society, the rise of China as the manufacturer of the world. Japan did not want to lose the race and started to look west for markets as well as to invest.⁹⁶ The Japanese policy of keeping politics and economy separate, according to which relations between China and Japan were "politically cold and economically hot" began to be severely tested. Interestingly, this incident acted as a catalyst for the setting up of a Japan-India Joint Study Group (JSG), at the direction of Prime Ministers of India and Japan, established by June 2005 shortly after the anti-Japanese protests. The JSG was given the responsibility of thoroughly examining ways to improve economic ties between India and

⁹⁵ Pei and Swaine, 4.

⁹⁶ Tomio Isogai, (Member, Kansai Japan India Cultural Society in Kobe, Japan) in discussion with researcher on December 28, 2023.

Japan and submitting its report within a year. The JSG advised the two nations to begin talks for a Comprehensive Economic Partnership Agreement (CEPA) at the intergovernmental level.

The Prime Ministers of India and Japan accepted to immediately begin discussions for the signing of a bilateral “Economic Partnership Agreement (EPA)/ CEPA” in December 2006, with the goal of reaching a substantive conclusion as soon as feasible in about two years.⁹⁷ This was Japan’s first EPA with the Brazil, Russia, India, China and South Africa (BRICS) nations. An EPA attempts to “eliminate restrictions on foreign investment, develop rules controlling investment, harmonise intellectual property systems and competition policies, and cooperate in different sectors,” according to the MOFA, Japanese. Before the CEPA was ultimately completed in February 2011, there were fourteen rounds of negotiations held in India and Japan.⁹⁸ This came right after the financial crisis of 2008-09 and the increased hostilities with China.

Furthermore, a Chinese trawler captain hit two Japan Coast Guard boats in disputed waters on September 7, 2010.⁹⁹ The Chinese captain was detained and charged in Japan according to its domestic law. China’s retaliatory actions included the suspension of rare earth metal shipments to Japan, cancellation of bilateral meetings at the provincial and ministerial levels, and other punitive actions. Chinese tourists also mass-cancelled their vacations to Japan, and there were demonstrations in front of Japanese embassies and schools in China. Interestingly, the Joint Statement between India and Japan that year recognised the significance of rare earths and rare metals for future industries and agreed to investigate the possibility of bilateral cooperation. This should be read in the context of China suspending rare earth shipment to Japan as a way to exert pressure during the 2010 flare-up over the Senkaku islands. Japan was thus attempting to diversify its sources for rare earths, which are crucial for its high-tech electronics industry but were temporarily suspended by China. To this end, India and Japan inked a memorandum of understanding in 2012, allowing Japan to import rare-earth

⁹⁷ “Joint Statement Towards India-Japan Strategic and Global Partnership” (Ministry of External Affairs, Government of India, December 15, 2006), accessed on July 5, 2020, <https://www.mea.gov.in/bilateral-documents.htm?dtl/6368/Joint+Statement+Towards+India+Japan+Strategic+and+Global+Partnership>.

⁹⁸ “Q NO.4116 Economic Partnership with Japan,” Ministry of External Affairs, February 19, 2014, accessed on May 1, 2022, <https://www.mea.gov.in/Speeches-Statements.htm?dtl/22952/Q+NO4116+ECONOMIC+PARTNERSHIP+WITH+JAPAN>.

⁹⁹ Smith, Sheila A.: “A Sino-Japanese Clash in the East China Sea”, CFR Contingency Planning Memorandum, no. 18, accessed on November 1, 2023, <http://www.cfr.org/east-asia/sino-japanese-clash-east-china-sea/p30504>.

minerals from India. In view of the discussion on the deepening of India-Japan relations in the realm of economy, the role played by the leadership of both the countries need to be understood.

Role of Leadership in Economic Decision Making

In August 2000, Yoshiro Mori, the Prime Minister of Japan, had an official visit to India. He proactively redefined the limits of the collaborative partnership and emphasised that India and Japan, despite their significant roles in global politics, were constantly interconnected in their specific bilateral issues.¹⁰⁰ He called on both nations to establish a global partnership to address many issues, such as UN organisational restructuring, nuclear weapons reduction, safeguarding marine territories, combating terrorism, and collaborating on energy initiatives. He believed that India and Japan, under the framework of global partnership, could make significant contributions to resolving many regional and global concerns. When Prime Minister Yoshiro Mori proposed the concept of a global partnership, his true intention was to reinvent the bilateral connections in response to the swiftly changing geopolitical environment of Asia and the world. He emphasised the importance of establishing a strong and comprehensive basis for their relationship, which should demonstrate their shared economic and security interests, as well as their significant involvement in forging a new global and regional system.

It is important to thoroughly understand the conditions that motivated Mori to propose a global alliance with India. Following the conclusion of the Cold War, Japan, which had benefited diplomatically from the Cold War, required a significant amount of time to adapt to the emerging new geopolitical circumstances. In the 1990s, Japan was in a dilemma regarding President Bill Clinton's attempts to establish a relationship with China. Many Japanese authorities questioned the prudence of relying exclusively on their alliance with the US.

The level of uncertainty was further intensified during the currency economic crisis that occurred in Southeast Asia from 1997 to 1998. Amidst the crisis, the US rejected Japan's request to establish an "Asian Monetary Fund (AMF)" with a substantial capital of USD10 billion to provide assistance to nations impacted by the crisis. The US declined the plan due to its reluctance to confer Japan with a significant role in the region.¹⁰¹ It is crucial to note that

¹⁰⁰ Visit by Prime Minister Mori to South Asia, August 2000, accessed on May 1, 2022, <https://www.mofa.go.jp/region/asia-paci/pmv0008/summary.html>

¹⁰¹ Suk Hyun and James F Paradise, "Why Is There No Asian Monetary Fund?" (ADBI Working Paper 1061, Tokyo, 2019), accessed on March 03, 2022, <https://www.adb.org/sites/default/files/publication/546901/adbi-wp1061.pdf>.

Japan was aggressively promoting ASEAN+3, a new institutional structure designed to improve collaboration among Japan, ASEAN, South Korea and China during this period. These trends illustrate Japan's aspiration to broaden its diplomatic options beyond the framework of the Japan and the US alliance, indicating its discomfort. Prime Minister Mori's proposal for a global partnership between India and Japan was put up in order to fulfil Japan's desire to expand its influence in Asia and protect its own interests.¹⁰² The origin of this tendency can be attributed to the visit of Defence Minister of India, George Fernandes, to Japan in January 2000, with the purpose of initiating a fresh dialogue on defence matters.

The concept of global collaboration was revitalised by the leaders of both nations. The visit conducted by Junichiro Koizumi, the prime minister of Japan to India in 2005 was a significant event that initiated an ongoing practice of annual summit meetings between the Prime Ministers of both countries, which can take place in either nation. The joint declaration outlined an eight-point agenda that offered a fresh trajectory for the bilateral relations.¹⁰³ One of its aims was to establish a meticulously organised security framework discourse and collaboration between the two nations. Both countries reached a consensus to continue their collaboration on three different levels and work together to enhance the existing political and economic connections. At the regional level, their objective is to enhance peace and security in Asia by actively participating in regional collaboration, particularly in areas like marine security and achieving energy independence. On a worldwide scale, both nations collaborated in domains such as the UN restructuring, nuclear disarmament, counterterrorism, and environmental matters. In December 2006, the second summit occurred in Tokyo, where Prime Minister Manmohan Singh met with the recently appointed Japanese counterpart, Prime Minister of Japan, Shinzo Abe.¹⁰⁴ He was eager about establishing a robust bond with Abe, who, in return, had a strong inclination to cultivate deeper relations with India. Their joint declaration, titled “Towards India-Japan Strategic and Global Partnership,” outlines a comprehensive and detailed strategy for building a complex and interconnected system of bilateral relationships.

¹⁰² Panda Rajaram, “Changing Dynamics of India-Japan Relations: Future Trends,” in *India-Japan Dialogue: Challenges and Potential*, by Iwashita Akihiro (Sapporo: Slavic Research Center, Hokkaido University, 2011).

¹⁰³ “Japan-India Relations (Basic Data),” Ministry of Foreign Affairs of Japan, March 14, 2024, accessed on April 30, 2024, <https://www.mofa.go.jp/region/asia-paci/india/data.html>.

¹⁰⁴ “Joint Statement Towards India-Japan Strategic and Global Partnership,” December 15, 2006.

The December 2009 visit of Yukio Hatoyama, the newly elected Prime Minister of Japan, proved that the relationship between India and Japan extends beyond political party connections inside Japan. Hatoyama, who spearheaded a fresh government coalition dominated by the Democratic Party of Japan (DPJ), further strengthened this partnership.¹⁰⁵ Despite facing numerous economic and diplomatic challenges upon taking office, he has demonstrated a determined resolve to visit India before the end of the year in order to maintain the "continuity" of relations both the nations. It was considered unusual for a new prime minister to undertake an international tour during a hectic election campaign. The Japanese media praised Hatoyama for his clear determination to visit India. Recognising the change in the strategic and global alliance, he not only participated in the summit conference, but also swiftly executed a detailed action plan on security cooperation with India, as recommended by the previous administration led by the LDP.

Phase III: Economic relations after the signing of Comprehensive Economic Partnership Agreement - CEPA (2011-2022)

The commencement of this phase occurred immediately following the financial crisis of 2008 and subsequent to the endorsement of the CEPA between India and Japan. In 2011, the two nations signed the CEPA. It has had a substantial influence on the business connection between India and Japan. The bilateral trade between the two nations has surged from USD 10.4 billion in 2010, before to the introduction of the CEPA, to USD 17.6 billion in the fiscal year 2018-19.¹⁰⁶ This remarkable rise of over 69 percent has been achieved despite the agreement being employed to only a small degree. Despite this, Japan has maintained a favourable trade balance, leading to an increase in India's trade deficit with Japan after the CEPA. The imbalance has risen from USD 3.54 billion in 2010–11 to USD 7.91 billion in 2018–19.¹⁰⁷ Japan still has an advantage in terms of trade as its exports to India and growing year on year.

¹⁰⁵ Visit to India by H.E. Dr. Yukio Hatoyama, Prime Minister of Japan, December 2009, accessed on May 1, 2022, <https://www.mofa.go.jp/region/asia-paci/india/pmv0912/outline.html>.

¹⁰⁶ "India-Japan Partnership: Trade and Beyond," CNBCTV18, April 16, 2021, accessed on May 9, 2022, <https://www.cnbctv18.com/views/india-japan-partnership-trade-and-beyond-8957701.htm/>.

¹⁰⁷ "India-Japan Partnership."

India and Japan Bilateral Trade 2011-2022

To ascertain whether there was a change in the trading framework following the implementation of the CEPA, it is necessary to compare the composition of traded goods between the two countries during the periods of 2010–11 and 2018–19. In 2010-11, India's primary exports to Japan were by-products and waste from the food industry, mineral fuels and oils, and iron and steel. In 2018-19,¹⁰⁸ there was a significant increase in the proportion of organic chemicals and precious and semi-precious stones, although mineral fuels and oils remained the leading export commodities.

The top three Japanese products that India imported in 2010–11 remained unchanged in 2018–19. The products encompass iron and steel, boilers, nuclear reactors, electrical machinery, and mechanical appliances. In 2010-11, these three import groups accounted for around 55% of India's imports. However, by 2018-19, their share had decreased to 48%. The imports of copper and related items from Japan have experienced a substantial growth,¹⁰⁹ rising from 0.3 per cent in 2010-11 to 2.87 per cent in 2018-19.

¹⁰⁸ Nisha Taneja et al., "Post COVID-19 Prospects For India-Japan Economic Partnership," *Indian Council for Research on International Economic Relations (ICRIER)*, New Delhi, 2020, accessed May 9, 2022, https://icrier.org/pdf/Post_COVID-19_Prospect_for_India-Japan_Economic_Partnership.pdf.

¹⁰⁹ Taneja et al, 2.

Table 3.6: Commodity wise exports to Japan – Top products of exports during 2011-2022
(percentage share of total exports in each year)¹¹⁰

Sl. No.	Hs Code	Commodity	2010-11	2011-12	2012-13	2013-14	2014-15	2015-16	2016-17	2017-18	2018-19	2019-20	2020-21	2021-22
1	61	Articles of apparel (Knitted)	1.98	1.89	1.85	2.12	2.47	2.92	2.98	2.63	2.37	2.40	2.18	1.94
2	62	Articles of apparel (not knitted)	2.67	2.60	2.47	2.65	2.96	3.56	3.32	2.87	2.53	2.55	2.04	1.86
3	10	Cereals	1.34	2.05	3.21	3.36	3.08	2.39	2.18	2.69	2.47	2.13	3.46	3.05
4	52	Cotton	2.77	2.92	2.98	3.16	2.49	2.79	2.40	2.32	2.39	1.83	2.17	2.56
5	85	Electrical machinery and equipment	4.06	3.77	3.62	3.28	2.80	3.06	2.98	3.07	3.86	4.85	4.87	4.78
6	72	Iron and Steel	2.86	2.71	2.69	2.93	2.80	2.09	3.15	3.70	2.95	2.96	4.15	5.43
7	27	Mineral fuels, mineral oils	17.11	18.76	20.67	20.57	18.57	11.91	11.76	12.67	14.52	13.63	9.22	16.49
8	99	Miscellaneous goods	4.73	3.86	1.48	1.17	0.31	0.19	0.14	0.02	0.05	0.06	0.04	0.02
9	71	Precious or semiprecious stones	17.49	15.45	14.57	13.26	13.39	15.08	15.81	13.75	12.25	11.52	8.97	9.31
10	84	Nuclear reactors, boilers etc.	3.64	3.55	3.84	3.84	4.45	5.15	5.11	5.89	6.35	6.65	6.50	6.02
11	29	Organic chemicals	3.61	3.82	4.03	3.82	3.85	4.39	4.24	4.87	5.53	5.58	6.15	5.22
12	30	Pharmaceutical products	2.67	2.77	3.35	3.54	3.73	4.92	4.69	4.37	4.47	5.20	6.64	4.60
13	39	Plastic and articles thereof	1.60	1.73	1.71	1.79	1.64	2	1.92	2.09	2.43	2.21	2.35	2.15
14	87	Vehicles other than railway	3.73	3.57	4.06	4.11	4.66	5.47	5.42	5.69	5.48	5.33	4.67	4.48

Source: Compiled from Department of Commerce, Ministry of Commerce and Industry, Government of India, accessed on 12 June 2022, <https://commerce.gov.in/trade-statistics/>.

By categorising traded products into intermediate goods, raw materials, consumer goods and capital goods, we can obtain more insightful conclusions. While the shipment of unprocessed materials from India to Japan has experienced a 2% decline, the most significant loss has been observed in consumer goods, with their proportionate contribution decreasing by

¹¹⁰ Department of Commerce, Ministry of Commerce and Industry, Government of India, accessed on June 12, 2022, <https://commerce.gov.in/trade-statistics/>.

17.6% between 2010–11 and 2018–19. India's exports to Japan have seen a 13 per cent increase in the proportion of capital goods and a 6.6 per cent increase in the proportion of intermediate goods. Japan's exports to India mostly consist of capital and intermediate goods, which accounted for 87 per cent in 2010-11 and slightly rose to 89 per cent in 2018-19.¹¹¹ Moreover, market shares in the trading of goods have not significantly changed since the CEPA. In 2018-19, Japan accounted for 2.48 percent of India's imports while India accounted for 0.7 percent of Japan's imports. Lower tariff rates under the CEPA have helped Indian exports of pharmaceuticals, marine products, and clothing, but they still fall short of their potential.

The years from 2011-2022 witnessed an uneven trend in the bilateral trade volume. Both imports from Japan and exports to Japan fluctuated through-out the said period. According to Table 3.6, exports of goods saw major decline during 2014-15 to 2016-17. For the three consecutive financial years exports witnesses a decline of 20.96, 13.2 and 17.52 percent respectively. Whereas Japan's exports to India declined by 23.62 percent compared to its previous year in 2013-14, this brought down the trade balance between India and Japan to a low as USD 2,666 million. The same year overall trade volume of India and Japan witnessed 11.98 percent decline compared to the previous year. Again in 2019-2020, 2020-2021 India and Japan bilateral trade shrunk owing to the COVID19 pandemic. These were the only years when both the states' export to each other witnessed a decline compared to their previous years and the bilateral trade rebounded in the financial year 2021-22 with 33.97% increase of trade volume. The noteworthy fact here is that the CEPA, which was envisaged as a policy that would decrease the trade deficit with Japan, but did not meet the expectations.


¹¹¹ Kirtika Suneja, "Exporters Body Keen on Value Added Exports to Japan," *The Economic Times*, October 18, 2019, accessed on May 10, 2022, <https://economictimes.indiatimes.com/news/economy/foreign-trade/exporters-body-keen-on-value-added-exports-to-japan/articleshow/71655260.cms?from=mdr>.

Table 3.7: Year on Year exports and imports between India and Japan from 2011 to 2022
(Values in USD Million)¹¹²

Year	Exports	Growth	Imports	Growth	Total Trade	% Growth	Trade balance
2011-2012	6,328.54	24.48	11,999.43	39.01	18,327.97	33.55%	-5,670.89
2012-2013	6,100.06	(-3.61)	12,412.29	3.44	18,512.35	1.01%	-6,312.23
2013-2014	6,814.07	11.71	9,480.75	(-23.62)	16,294.82	-11.98%	-2,666.68
2014-2015	5,385.57	(-20.96)	10,131.36	6.86	15,516.93	-4.77%	-4,745.79
2015-2016	4,662.85	(-13.42)	9,850.22	(-2.77)	14,513.07	-6.47%	-5,187.37
2016-2017	3,845.73	(-17.52)	9,754.64	(-0.97)	13,600.37	-6.29%	-5,908.91
2017-2018	4,734.22	23.1	10,973.35	12.49	15,707.57	15.49%	-6,239.13
2018-2019	4,861.73	2.69	12,772.67	16.4	17,634.40	12.27%	-7,910.94
2019-2020	4,520.25	(-7.02)	12,434.67	(-2.65)	16,954.92	-3.85%	-7,914.42
2020-2021	4,434.59	(-1.90)	10,924.74	(-12.12)	15,359.33	-9.41%	-6,490.15
2021-2022	6,176.77	39.29	14,399.77	31.81	20,576.54	33.97%	-8,223.00
2022-2023	1,467.47 (April - June)		4,061.40 (April - June)				-2,593.93

Source: Extracted and compiled from Department of Commerce.

Figure 3.3: Growth trends of India and Japan between 2011-2021¹¹³



Source: Compiled from the World Bank

¹¹² Department of Commerce, Ministry of Commerce and Industry, Government of India, accessed on June 12, 2022, <https://tradedat.commerce.gov.in/>

¹¹³ World Bank, Data Bank, accessed on June 10, 2022 <https://databank.worldbank.org/reports.aspx?source=2&series=NY.GDP.MKTP.KD.ZG&country=IND>

Japan's FDI to India totalled USD 1.95 billion and USD 1.49 billion for the fiscal years 2020–21 and 2021–22, respectively. From 2000 to June 2022, India attracted a total of around USD 37.79 billion in FDI, with Japan being the fifth most significant source of FDI.¹¹⁴ Japanese FDI in India in recent years has mostly focused on general machinery, pharmaceuticals, electrical equipment, chemicals, financial and insurance services, construction, wholesale and retail, transportation and various services. According to Robert Ward, this is the period when the relationship moved from Japan providing ODA to providing private investments to the strategic arena.¹¹⁵ Strategic considerations within a changed security environment in East Asia has prompted Japan to diversify its investments and secure supply chains. Moreover, the role of leaders such as Prime Minister of India Narendra Modi and Japan's Prime Minister Shinzo Abe played key roles by providing stable governments.

Role of Political Leaders in Economic Decision Making

The idea that leadership of any state plays an important role in conducting foreign policy can be understood by looking at the policies of the Japanese Prime Minister Shinzo Abe. At the economic front, he wanted to get the country out of its stagnation and introduced a revolutionary policy which are roughly translated into Abenomics.¹¹⁶ In 2013, Prime Minister Shinzo Abe of Japan implemented Abenomics as a strategy to put an end to the nation's two-decade-long period of financial and economic stagnation.¹¹⁷ Prime Minister Abe introduced a "comprehensive economic strategy package" in an effort to revive the Japanese economy while also ensuring fiscal responsibility. The Government of Japan asserts that Abenomics has been built upon three key policy initiatives: a proactive monetary policy, an adaptable fiscal policy, and a growth plan centred around structural change.

According to the IMF, Abenomics has enhanced economic conditions and created the necessary conditions for structural reforms. However, at that time i.e., 2015, it had not yet

¹¹⁴ "India-Japan Bilateral Economic Relations," Embassy of India Tokyo, Japan, December 2023, accessed on January 12, 2024, https://www.indembassy-tokyo.gov.in/eoityo_pages/NjQw.

¹¹⁵ Robert Ward (Japan Chair, International Institute for Strategic Studies) in discussion with researcher on December 18, 2023.

¹¹⁶ "Abenomics: How Shinzo Abe Aimed to Revitalise Japan's Economy," *BBC News*, July 8, 2022, sec. Business, accessed on February 14, 2023, <https://www.bbc.com/news/business-62089543>.

¹¹⁷ Joshua K. Hausman and Johannes F. Wieland, "Overcoming the Lost Decades? Abenomics after Three Years," *Brookings Papers on Economic Activity*, 2015, 385–413.

achieved a definitive end to deflation.¹¹⁸ The report commended the remarkable pace at which the economy has expanded, surpassing its potential in the past five quarters. Additionally, it highlighted the significant decrease in unemployment, reaching low levels. As per the IMF, unemployment has plummeted to its lowest level in 25 years, while the job-to-applicant ratio has hit its highest point ever. The main reasons contributing to this turnaround are the increasing global demand and the government's short-term financial stimulus measures for alleviation.

The Japanese government asserts that Abenomics has achieved remarkable progress in steering the economy towards overcoming deflation and achieving a consistent recovery. The nominal GDP has achieved an unprecedented milestone, reaching a staggering 543 trillion Yen in 2017.¹¹⁹ With an increase of 2.5 million, there are now 65.2 million employed females, and the unemployment rate is 2.4%, which is the lowest it has been in 24 years.¹²⁰ Private non-residential investment reached a record high of JPY 86.2 trillion, corporate ordinary profit has reached all time high of JPY 81.0 trillion, and tax income has increased to JPY 59.1 trillion. Four goals have been set for this Abenomics strategy: (i) to increase productivity through a revolution in both productivity and human resource development; (ii) to capitalise on global opportunities (iii) to pursue regulatory reforms and (iv) to enhance the business climate to encourage FDI inward.¹²¹ By providing a stable leadership and renewed economic policy Abe played key role in taking forward the relationship.

This period witnessed high level exchanges between India and Japan. Emperor of Japan Akihito and Empress of Japan Michiko visited India for the first time in 2013. Later for the first time ever A Japanese Prime Minister, Shinzo Abe was invited as the Chief Guest for

¹¹⁸ Dennis P. Botman, "Abenomics: Lessons Learned from Two Decades of Conventional and Unconventional Monetary Policies," in *Can Abenomics Succeed? Overcoming the Legacy of Japan's Lost Decades*, ed. Dennis Botman, Danninger Stephan, and Schiff Jerald (Washington, D.C.: International Monetary Fund, 2015), accessed on May 20, 2022, <https://www.elibrary.imf.org/display/book/9781498324687/ch002.xml>.

¹¹⁹ "LDP-Komeito Ruling Coalition Makes Headway in Reviving Economy | Komei News (September 28, 2017)," Komeito, September 28, 2017, accessed on May 20, 2022, https://www.komei.or.jp/en/news/detail/20170928_26102.

¹²⁰ Mariko INOUE, Mariko NISHIKITANI, and Shinobu TSURUGANO, "Female Non-Regular Workers in Japan: Their Current Status and Health," *Industrial Health* 54, no. 6 (November 2016): 521–27, accessed on May 20, 2022, <https://doi.org/10.2486/indhealth.2016-0105>.

¹²¹ Patrick Hugh, "Japan's Abenomics: So Far So Good, But Will It Prevail?" (Center on Japanese Economy and Business, October 2014), accessed on January 1, 2021, <https://academiccommons.columbia.edu/doi/10.7916/D8GF132C/download>.

India's Republic Day parade in January 2014. Moreover, India witnessed a strong leadership under the Prime Minister Narendra Modi from 2014 onwards with a stable and decisive government. In August 2014, Prime Minister of India, for an annual summit, paid an official visit to Japan. This was Prime Minister Modi's first ever visit to a country outside its immediate neighbourhood. During this visit India and Japan upgraded their ties to "Special Strategic and Global Partnership."¹²² During this visit the Japanese Prime Minister earmarked a USD 35 billion investments to India. This investment was to double the number of Japanese companies in India over a period of five years and to invest in both public and private sectors and also agreed to establish a "India-Japan Investment Promotion Partnership". In February 2015, Prime Minister Narendra Modi, in accordance with his government's new policy called "India first" policy, tried to reach out to states like Japan in order to enhance its global role.¹²³ Prime Minister Modi, in order to achieve the goal economic transformation, started improving ties with all the major powers such as the US, Russia and China. The renewing of relations with the US helped India and Japan in turn to cooperate more closely in the decade. Developing closer strategic relations with Australia and US also translated into improved economic cooperation.

For the tenth annual summit, Prime Minister of Japan Shinzo Abe, visited India in December, 2015. During this visit, a "Japan-India Make in India Special Finance Facility" worth 1.3 trillion Yen was established and as a special gesture towards Japan, especially for the Japanese travellers, a "visa on arrival" scheme was announced, which covers the Japanese citizen travelling for business purpose as well from March 1, 2016.¹²⁴ Following this Prime Minister of India, Modi travelled to Japan for a eleventh annual summit where agreements were signed to cooperate in fields such as agriculture and food, outer space, skill transfer in manufacturing sector, science and technology, cultural exchange, marine, sports and earth and atmospheric science. In the following annual summit meeting held in 2017, Prime Minister of Japan, Shinzo Abe and Prime Minister of India, Narendra Modi participated in the ground

¹²² "Brief Note on India-Japan Bilateral Relations" (Ministry of External Affairs, Government of India, February 2020), accessed on June 1, 2022, https://www.mea.gov.in/Portal/ForeignRelation/India-Japan_Bilateral_Brief_feb_2020.pdf.

¹²³ Takenori Horimoto, "'Modi Diplomacy' and the Future of Japan-India Relations," *Nippon*, May 18, 2020, accessed on May 12, 2021, <https://www.nippon.com/en/in-depth/a06701/>.

¹²⁴ "India-Japan Relations" (Ministry of External Affairs, Government of India, November 2017), accessed on May 12, 2021, https://www.mea.gov.in/Portal/ForeignRelation/14_Japan_Nov_2017.pdf.

breaking ceremony of the “Mumbai Ahmedabad High Speed Rail Project (MAHSR)” and additional agreements on Japanese language training, civil aviation, disaster risk management were signed both the countries.¹²⁵ This suggest that India started nurturing relations so as to emerge as a credible force and Prime Narendra Modi placed increased weightage on economy to achieve it. Additionally, India-Japan Act forum was established in December 2017 under the umbrella of “Act East Policy” of India and Japan’s “Vision of a Free and Open Indo-Pacific.”¹²⁶ This was established to develop North East region of India and modernise its economy. Areas such as developmental infrastructure, connectivity, people to people contacts were given priority. In 2018, Prime Minister Modi, travelled to Japan for thirteenth annual summit meeting. Prime Minister Abe, as a Special gesture hosted a private dinner to Prime Minister Modi, at his ancestral home in Yamanashi. During the summit, Prime Ministers of both the nations outlined a vision for both the countries and Japan announced it joining of the “International Solar Alliance (ISA)”. Additionally, a currency swap agreement of USD 75 billion dollars was signed. During the visit, almost 15 Indian companies announced to invest in Japan and around USD 2.5 billion dollars of investments were announced by 57 Japanese companies.¹²⁷ Moreover, Prime Minister Abe and Prime Minister Narendra Modi met frequently at bilateral and multilateral for an improved political connection. Such as the meeting on the side-lines of G20 summit held in Osaka in June 2019, where both the leaders discussed wide range of issues of mutual interest like Japan’s assistance for the “Coalition on Disaster Resilience Infrastructure, and about infrastructure works in the North East region of India. They even met in Vladivostok, Russia in 2019 on the side-lines of Eastern Economic Forum, in Biarritz G7 summit, in Bangkok during ASEAN summit meeting in 2019.

Apart from the annual summit level meetings, there were regular ministerial visits between India and Japan at the senior official levels. Foreign secretary level and vice foreign Minister level dialogues including the 2+2 Foreign and Defence Ministerial level talk were started from 2019 onwards. The first 2+2 Foreign and Defence Ministerial meeting was held in June 29, 2019.¹²⁸ In 2019, President of India Ram Nath Kovind visited Japan to attend the

¹²⁵ “India-Japan Relations.”

¹²⁶ “India-Japan Bilateral Relations” (Ministry of External Affairs, Government of India, October 2023), accessed on November 12, 2023, https://www.mea.gov.in/Portal/ForeignRelation/Japan_-_Bilateral_Brief_MEA_Website_Oct_2023.pdf.

¹²⁷ “Brief Note on India-Japan Bilateral Relations.”

¹²⁸ “Brief Note on India-Japan Bilateral Relations.”

Enthronement Ceremony of Naruhito, the emperor of Japan. These meetings were regularly held to main the political connections between both nations and improve ties at a personal level. Utmost importance was given to the political relations, this can be understood with the conferring of India second highest civilian award, Padma Vibhushan, to Shinzo Abe in 2021.¹²⁹ After the resignation of Shinzo Abe as Prime Minister of Japan, Narendra Modi, maintained the same level of understanding with the successive Prime Ministers Yoshihide Suga (2020-21) and Fumio Kishida. After the COVID19 pandemic, the first summit level meeting i.e., the fourteenth summit, was held in March 2022 with Prime Minister of Japan Kishida's visit to India. During the visit, both issued a joint statement titled "Partnership for a Peaceful, Stable and Prosperous Post-COVID World" highlighting the cooperation in post-COVID between both the nations.¹³⁰ Both the leaders i.e., Prime Minister of India Narendra Modi and Japanese Prime Minister Kishida took note of the developments of the USD 35 billion investments pledged in 2014 and additionally Kishida announced JPY 5 trillion investment in both public and private sectors. This investment is to be utilised for projects of mutual interest in the five years following the agreement. Prime Minister Modi even met Kishida at the second Quadrilateral Security Dialogue (QUAD) leaders' summit which was held on May 24, 2022 in Tokyo. In 2023, Kishida visited India and held a meeting with his counterpart Prime Minister Modi. He even delivered a speech on "the Future of the Indo-Pacific: Japan's New Plan for A Free and Open India-Pacific". They both met on the side-lines of G7 summit meeting where India was invited. Moreover, both the leaders met again in 2023, September on the side-lines of G20 summit held in New Delhi.¹³¹ With these leadership level connections transcended the bilateral relationship into more comprehensive partnership by moving away from the yesteryear relationship which was mainly focused on receiving aid from Japan. Political connections and the will of leadership proved helpful to keep the relationship intact even during a pandemic. Additionally, business groups perceptions about India also played a significant part in this phase of relationship.

¹²⁹ "Padma Awards 2021 Announced," Press Information Bureau, January 25, 2021, accessed on June 1, 2022, <https://pib.gov.in/pib.gov.in/Pressreleaseshare.aspx?PRID=1692337>.

¹³⁰ "India-Japan Bilateral Relations" (Ministry of External Affairs, Government of India, March 2023), accessed on January 14, 2024, https://www.mea.gov.in/Portal/ForeignRelation/India-Japan_Bilateral_Relations_March_2023.pdf.

¹³¹ "India-Japan Bilateral Relations."

Perception of Business Establishments

Manufacturing enterprises made up half of the total number of Japanese companies registered in India as of June 2022, a total of 1439, declined from 1455 in 2020 according to a study by the Embassy of Japan in India and the JETRO. There are 4,790 business establishments for these Japanese enterprises in India.¹³² They consist of regional subsidiaries as well as liaison and branch offices in India. Parallel to this, there are more Indian businesses operating in Japan than ever before, the number has now surpassed 100. According to the “Foreign Trade Policy Statement 2015–20” published by the Indian Ministry of Food Processing Industries, the Japanese market has not experienced any increase in the product categories that are of importance to India. Additionally, Indian corporate entities are facing challenges in reaching the Japanese market.¹³³ The challenges faced by Indian firms in Japan can be attributed to linguistic hurdles, stringent product and service standards, costly market entry regulations, and insufficient commitment from Indian businesses.

According to a 2018 JETRO “Survey on Business Conditions of Japanese Companies in Asia and Oceania,”¹³⁴ the top five disadvantages of investment environment of India are underdeveloped infrastructure, complicated tax procedures, high increase in personnel costs, uncertain government policy management and administrative procedures. Shashank Patel notes that “the corruption in India at multiple levels are panicking their executives to follow Japanese work ethics in India. Japanese people are very concerned about the working style of theirs to implement in India but the laxity in Indian working style frustrated them heavily.”¹³⁵ These reasons remain constant in most of the surveys conducted by JETRO and JBIC. According to Survey Report on Overseas Business Operations by Japanese Manufacturing Companies by JBIC 2014, India stood first among all the countries among the five promising countries to do business. The respondents of these surveys are Japanese companies who conduct business with foreign nations. In the JBIC 2020 survey, India stood

¹³² “India-Japan Bilateral Economic Relations” (Embassy of India Tokyo, Japan), accessed May 10, 2022, accessed on November 1, 2023, https://www.indembassy-tokyo.gov.in/eoityo_pages/NjQw.

¹³³ “Foreign Policy Statement 2015-2020” (Ministry of Food Processing Industries), accessed February 10, 2022, accessed on November 1, 2023, <https://www.mofpi.gov.in/sites/default/files/2-ftpstatement2015.pdf>.

¹³⁴ Takashi Tsuchiya, “A Look into Ease of Doing Business for Japanese Companies in India,” *JETRO*, 2019, accessed on May 1, 2022, https://www.mof.go.jp/pri/international_exchange/kouryu/fy2019/icrier201903_01.pdf.

¹³⁵ Shashank Patel (Japanese Scholar) in an email conversation with researcher on December 12, 2022.

second among top five promising countries to do business. This was due to the severe lockdowns announced in the wake of COVID19 pandemic in the country.

Though attitude changed in the 2021 JBIC survey, India still stood in the second place among top five promising countries for Japanese companies to invest. While talking about the poor performance of the state of Telangana attracting Japanese investments, Jayesh Ranjan, Chief Secretary for Information Technology, Electronics & Communications (ITE&C) and Industries & Commerce Departments of Government of Telangana, mentioned that Japanese companies prefer familiarity with the geographies and governments.¹³⁶ If the companies had business established previously in any state, then the investors would prefer those areas instead of exploring different regions due to familiarity with policies and bureaucracy. That was the reason why Jayesh Ranjan notes that Tamil Nadu and Maharashtra have more Japanese investments. According to him, this trend is breaking up now and the Japanese companies are looking to diversify their options within India due to competitive industrial policy environment of different states. According to the survey conducted by the JBIC in 2022 on the overseas business operations of Japanese manufacturing companies, which focuses on the survey of Japanese companies overseas direct investment, India has reclaimed its position as the leading potential country, displacing China to second place after a three-year period. India has regained its position as perceived by a diverse spectrum of industries as the most promising country for the next three years.¹³⁷ Although there has been an increase in Japanese FDI in India in recent years, it still constitutes a very small portion when compared to the overall amount of FDI that Japan invests in other countries. In FY 2020-21 and FY 2021-22, the amount of Japanese FDI in India was USD 1.95 billion and USD 1.49 billion, respectively. From 2000 till September 2022, Japan has invested around USD 40.84 billion in India, making it the fifth largest source country for FDI.¹³⁸ This amount accounts for 6.24% of the total FDI received by India. FDI by Japan in India was mostly focused on sectors such as financial and insurance

¹³⁶ Jayesh Ranjan (Chief Secretary for Information Technology, Electronics & Communications (ITE&C) and Industries & Commerce, Departments of Government of Telangana,) in discussion with researcher on February 5, 2024.

¹³⁷ “FY2022 JBIC Survey (34th) Report on Overseas Business Operations by Japanese Manufacturing Companies | JBIC Japan Bank for International Cooperation,” Japan Bank for International Cooperation, December 16, 2022, accessed on June 1, 2023, <https://www.jbic.go.jp/en/information/press/press-2022/1216-017128.html>.

¹³⁸ “India-Japan Bilateral Economic Relations,” Embassy of India Tokyo, Japan, December 2023, accessed on January 10, 2024, https://www.indembassy-tokyo.gov.in/eoityo_pages/NjQw.

services, general machinery, transportation, construction, chemicals and pharmaceuticals, wholesale and retail, electrical equipment, and various other service industries.

Nevertheless, during this period, India and Japan witnessed the rise of more actors or organisations acting as mentors to provide guidance to improve the relationships. The Suzuki Innovation Centre was founded by Suzuki Motor Corporation, Japan (SMC) and Indian Institute of Technology (IIT), Hyderabad with the goal of “Creating Innovations for India and Japan.” The objective is to establish a platform that facilitates open innovation and fosters connections between innovators in many sectors, including Industries, Academia, and Startups, from both nations. Its overall Execution Head, Vipul Jindal, notes that such kind of platforms help scale up the idea from rural innovators and provide them resources such as investment and expertise.¹³⁹ They also act as a medium to conduct network events for the budding innovators and provide them exposure to the markets of Japan as well as India. Active government encouragement with the participation on JICA helped them to start such centres. Unlike western countries, Indian entrepreneurs have less familiarity with the Japanese culture, language and its business establishments. To bridge that barrier, centres like these increased the frequency of conducting workshops, cultural events, mutual exchange programmes. Asa Bhanu Technical Services Limited’s Chairman, Rama Bhadra, mentions that such events would help not only familiarise the Indian business enterprises to gain an understanding of the workings of Japanese business entities but also improve people to people contact by actively making the citizen participate in the cultural exchange programmes.¹⁴⁰ Japanese state institutions such as Japan Embassy, Japan Foundation, JICA provide extensive support to organise such events.

During the recent pandemic times, COVID19 as a systemic factor proved detrimental not just to the supply chains around the world, but also impacted the economic security of sovereign countries. The overconcentration of industrial bases in one part of world created hurdles in the phase of recovery. In order to prevent any potential future disruptions, a video conference was conducted on September 1, 2020, by Australia, India, and Japan to formally establish the Supply Chain Resilience Initiative (SCRI). This trilateral effort, led by economic

¹³⁹ Jindal, Vipul (Overall Execution Head, Suzuki Innovation Centre, Hyderabad) in discussion with researcher on November 15, 2022

¹⁴⁰ Bhadra, Rama (Chairman, Asa Bhanu Technical Services Limited, Hyderabad) in discussion with researcher on September 14, 2022

ministers, aims to ensure the resilience of supply chains in the Indo-Pacific region by promoting diversification.¹⁴¹ The Department for Promotion of Industry and Internal Trade (DPIIT), Government of India and the Ministry of Economy, Trade and Industry (METI) of Japan signed a Memorandum of Cooperation on November 16, 2021. The purpose of this memorandum is to collaborate on the India-Japan Industrial Competitiveness Partnership. The goal of this partnership is to enhance India's industrial competitiveness and strengthen the Special Strategic and Global Partnership between the two countries. As part of the agreement, Joint Working Groups (JWGs) have been established for textiles, logistics, and steel. On October 5, 2020, the JWG on Textiles had its first virtual meeting. On October 17, 2022, in Tokyo, the JWG on Logistics convened its fourth meeting. On October 14, 2022, the first India-Japan Steel Dialogue took place online.¹⁴² Both. Structural and domestic factors combinedly pushed India and Japan to diversify their area of cooperation and thereby improve economic relationship.

Concluding Remarks

India and Japan's relationship underwent significant changes post-Cold War, driven by economic needs and strategic realignments. Initially, Japan saw India as a new export market, while India viewed Japan as a crucial source of FDI. The end of Cold War binaries facilitated economic ties, bolstered by India's "Look East" policy under the leadership of P.V. Narasimha Rao, which attracted Japanese investments. However, India's nuclear tests in 1998 led to a downturn, with Japan imposing sanctions despite its recession, emphasising domestic pacifist principles over economic needs. This period highlighted the impact of domestic actors and structural factors on the bilateral relationship.

In the early 2000s, Japan lifted sanctions, recognising India's security concerns and economic potential, leading to renewed bilateral trade growth. Despite fluctuations, trade saw a positive trend until the 2008 financial crisis disrupted growth. The crisis, along with China's aggressive postures, prompted both nations to reassess their economic ties. Japan's policymakers acknowledged India's security issues, leading to stronger bilateral ties. Domestic leaders like Yoshiro Mori, Junichiro Koizumi, Atal Bihari Vajpayee, and Manmohan Singh and business groups played crucial roles in fostering this economic engagement, demonstrating the interplay of systemic and domestic factors. The 2008 financial crisis significantly impacted

¹⁴¹ "India - Japan Commercial Relations" (Embassy of India, Japan), accessed March 10, 2023, accessed on June 1, 2023, https://www.indembassy-tokyo.gov.in/eoityo_pages/NjA.

¹⁴² "India-Japan Bilateral Economic Relations."

both nations, leading to political changes and economic challenges. In Japan, the LDP's fall and the rise of the DPJ were due to economic deregulations and subsequent unemployment, while India faced corruption scandals under the Congress government in India. The CEPA was signed to enhance trade by reducing tariffs and opening markets. Stable leadership in both countries, with Prime Minister Shinzo Abe in Japan and Prime Minister Narendra Modi in India, drove economic partnership and strengthened bilateral relations, especially in the face of China's rise and supply chain issues from the COVID-19 pandemic.

Overall, the economic relationship between India and Japan has been shaped by both structural and domestic factors. Initially, structural conditions allowed for economic ties, but domestic factors like nuclear policy and public perception influenced the relationship. In later phases, policy adjustments, alongside business interests, leadership such as Yoshiro Mori, Junichiro Koizumi, Shinzo Abe, P.V. Narasimha Rao, Atal Bihari Vajpayee, Manmohan Singh and Narendra Modi reinforced bilateral ties, while external factors like China's rise and the 2008 financial crisis posed challenges. In recent years, stable leadership, strategic policies, and external pressures like the pandemic and China's economic influence have further solidified India-Japan economic relations.

Chapter 4

India-Japan Security Partnership in the post-Cold War period

Introduction

The existing literature on India's relations with Japan has predominantly concentrated on economic and nuclear aspects. Yet, most studies suggest that the main interest of India and Japan lies within the security domain. From the stand point of security, most contemporary studies on the bilateral relations between India and Japan are focused on the Japanese endeavour to include India in the regional initiatives to "contain" or at least "balance" China's growing dominance in the region. By taking into account unit-level influences/factors and systemic factors on India and Japan's security decisions, the current chapter delves into the rationale and background to the cooperation between India and Japan in the strategic front. In this context, the chapter is divided into three sections wherein the first section deals with the background to India and Japan relations in the post-Cold War period in the 1990s followed by a section focusing on the developments in the first decade of the new millennium i.e., 2000-2010, which is considered as the formative years in the India-Japan strategic partnership. The third section throws light on how the strategic collaboration materialised in the following decade i.e., 2011-2022. While dealing with the evolution of strategic relationship the discussion focuses on how the strategic collaboration is fostered with the intervention of domestic level factors such as leadership. Apart from domestic level factors, it also highlights major events and agreements which were signed between India and Japan through an analysis that brings out the nuances of systemic level influences on the relationship within the framework of Neoclassical Realism (NCR). Finally, the chapter concludes by drawing inferences on the emerging areas of cooperation in the strategic realm especially the evolution of Quadrilateral Security Dialogue (QUAD) and the Indo-Pacific as a new security construct.

Systemic needs had a crucial role in shaping policy decisions under the framework of realism. Neorealism elucidates the dynamics of international relations through the analysis of power distribution among the many components within the system.¹ In contrast, NCR emphasises the importance of domestic stakeholders in shaping policy objectives deviating

¹ Gustav Meibauer, "Neorealism, Neoclassical Realism and the Problem(s) of History," *International Relations* 37, no. 2 (June 1, 2023): 348–69, accessed on November 10, 2023, <https://doi.org/10.1177/00471178211033943>.

from strict tenets of structural realism.² The impression of a state's relative capabilities and how these capabilities affect a state remain significant while giving primacy to domestic variables which can fashion a policy. Such an approach blending structural and domestic realities shaping policy decisions forms the core of NCR. Structural elements are essential to understand the backdrop of India's interest in Japan though they do not fully describe the nature of decision-making in both nations. To enhance the understanding, the study utilised intervening factors from the domestic sphere. Key aspects in the security domain include the role of leadership, anti-nuclearism norm and increasing threat perceptions. Foreign policy decisions are influenced by material power but also by how that power is viewed by the policy makers who implement it.³ Human factors, technical advancements, perceptions of material resources, geographic position, and other factors are just as important as military capability.

In the years following the formalisation of their diplomatic ties in 1952 after signing a bilateral peace treaty, India and Japan had limited military contact due to the dynamics of Cold War.⁴ However, in the twenty-first century, personnel exchanges had become a common trend. Shared and aspirational concepts, such as Indo-Pacific, progressively became a reality and practical policies were framed. Japan's heightened defence and security ties with India were not entirely attributed to China. However, the chapter discusses how China has stepped up initiatives that have been ongoing since late 1990s and the early 2000s, when piracy occurrences in the Indian Ocean surrounding the Gulf countries prompted Japan's defence establishment to look for a more common approach to the problem of energy and maritime security.⁵ India's involvement would not have occurred as swiftly if not for the structural necessities imposed by the end of Cold War. At the same time, Japan re-evaluated its security strategy amid concerns over the declining of the commitment of United States (US) and India's rising prominence, along with systemic factors such as the end of the Cold War.

² Meibauer, 352.

³ Paul Kowert and Jeffrey Legro, "Norms, Identity, and Their Limits: A Theoretical Reprise," in *The Culture of National Security*, by Peter J. Katzenstein, (New York: Columbia University Press, 1996), 435,

⁴ K V Kesavan, "India and Japan: Changing Dimensions of Partnership in the Post-Cold War Period," Observer Research Foundation, March 6, 2010, <https://www.orfonline.org/research/india-and-japan-changing-dimensions-of-partnership-in-the-post-cold-war-period>.

⁵ Gaye Christoffersen, "China and Maritime Cooperation: Piracy in the Gulf of Aden" (Institute for Strategic, Political, Security and Economic Consultancy, December 1, 2009).

Ken Moriyasu,⁶ diplomatic correspondent at Nikkei Asia, opined that the realisation that the US cannot alone fend off China is making Japan to look for new partnerships to build its strength which includes India.

In fact, four significant systemic transformations affected the relations between India and Japan after the end of the Cold War. These transformations include, first; the dissolution of the bipolar structure of the Cold War and the renewed recognition of the strategic importance of the Indian Ocean. Second, the assertiveness of China in maritime affairs was another development while the growing concerns regarding energy security, particularly due to Gulf of Aden piracy activities constituted the third important transformation. Finally, the simultaneous increase in India's diplomatic and military influence, along with the strengthening of cooperation in the defence sector between Japan and the US emerged as a key trend which contributed to a major systemic transformation.⁷ Keeping this in view, the following section brings out the position of India and Japan at the end of the Cold War.

India-Japan at the End of the Cold War

Throughout the Cold War, the Asian regional order was structured by a system of alliances referred to as the “hub-and-spokes” system. This term metaphorically represents a wheel with the US positioned at the centre, connected to its regional allies (South Korea, Japan, Taiwan and other Southeast Asian nations) through bilateral agreements.⁸ Asia and Europe diverged in their approach to multilateral organisations. In Europe, there was a strong emphasis on fostering these institutions via a sense of community, and significant efforts were made to integrate West Germany into them. In contrast, the Asian region lacked a security community, with governments from the region lacking shared interests and making minimal efforts to build regional bodies.⁹ This was exacerbated by the histories of these nations owing to Japan's invasion of Chinese mainland and its occupation of Korean peninsula. The normalisation of

⁶ Ken Moriyasu, (Diplomatic Correspondent, Nikkei Asia, USA), in discussion with the researcher, December 8, 2023.

⁷ Kesavan, “India and Japan.”

⁸ G. John Ikenberry and Michael Mastanduno, “CONCLUSION;” in *International Relations Theory and the Asia-Pacific*, ed. G. John Ikenberry and Michael Mastanduno (Columbia University Press, 2003), 430, accessed on February 25, 2023, <http://www.jstor.org/stable/10.7312/iken12590.18>.

⁹ Ikenberry and Mastanduno, 190.

their ties was further hindered by Cold War complexities. Although Japan faced significant diplomatic hurdles in the Southeast Asian region, South Asia offered a more favourable and stable environment.¹⁰ South Asian countries did not perceive Japan's integration into the international community as a danger, as they did not first-hand experience the severity of Japan's military rule during World War II. The absence of any historical antagonism proved to be beneficial in strengthening the security relations between India and Japan.

The military divergence between India and Japan throughout the 20th century can largely be attributed to the framework of the Cold War.¹¹ After Japan embraced pacifism, as represented in its constitution in the post-war period, its military forces witnessed significant downsizing. Japan's security strategy was strongly connected with the interests of the US in Asia, which primarily aimed at handling the perceived threat presented by the former Soviet Union.¹² Japan mainly concentrated its efforts on the maritime sector, namely in the Western Pacific region and the Soviet Union's East Fleet based in Vladivostok. Japan dedicated its available resources to the advancement of sophisticated surveillance vessels in order to efficiently monitor and identify submarines in the Sea of Japan.¹³ Even though the Japan Maritime Self-Defence Force (JMSDF) had an understanding of the geopolitical importance of the Indian Ocean, their powers were limited.¹⁴ For India, the Cold War binaries proved significant in developing relations with Japan. By the end of the Cold War, the US, a close ally of Japan and Pakistan developed strong military connections with India. India, while being non-aligned, during the Cold War, had a close relationship with the former Soviet Union. Though India wanted to develop a close partnership with Japan, the prevailing conditions such as the Cold War, India's closed economy and its strong relations with the Soviet Union and so

¹⁰ Lalima Varma, "Japan's Policy towards South Asia : Shifting Paradigms" (Changing Perceptions of Japan in South Asia in the New Asian Era : The State of Japanese Studies in India and Other SAARC Countries, International Research Center for Japanese Studies, 2011), 231, accessed on February 26, 2023, <https://doi.org/10.15055/00001243>.

¹¹ Harsh V. Pant and Julie M. Super, "India's 'non-Alignment' Conundrum: A Twentieth-Century Policy in a Changing World," *International Affairs (Royal Institute of International Affairs 1944-)* 91, no. 4 (2015): 747–64.

¹² Christopher Hughes, *Japan's Re-Emergence as a "Normal" Military Power* (London: Routledge, 2013), 12.

¹³ Peter J. Katzenstein and Nobuo Okawara, "Japan, Asian-Pacific Security, and the Case for Analytical Eclecticism," *International Security* 26, no. 3 (2001): 153–85.

¹⁴ Katzenstein and Okawara, 160.

on, made the relationship stagnant. Japan, meanwhile a strong ally of the US, faced challenges even in developing close political ties with India for the same reasons.

After the end of the Cold War, the structural changes in the Asian security order provided India and Japan with increased strategic flexibility compared to the Cold War era. After the breakdown of the bipolar security structure in Asia, the US implemented force reorganisation. The closure of the US military post in Philippines in 1992 marked the end of America's largest overseas military base.¹⁵ The decrease in US troops impacted the strategic equilibrium in East Asia, prompting Japan to seek out allies with similar interests. One of the significant factors that influenced Japan to perceive India as a like-minded partner in the region is the growing proximity between the US and India.¹⁶ Jeff Kingston, a prominent historian notes that "during the 1990s, as the world moved away from a bipolar power structure, Japan steadily re-evaluated the strategic importance of the oceans located to the east."¹⁷ In this backdrop, the following section deals with India-Japan relations after the end Cold War period.

Post-Cold War period and India-Japan Strategic Relations

With the Gulf War of 1990-91 and the collapse of the Soviet Union, Indian economy was severely impacted, prompting India to seek for alternative regions with promising prospects for investment and trade. However, the South Asian region did not provide significant opportunities for investment and commerce.¹⁸ Conversely, world attention was increasingly directed towards East Asia as a significant hub of economic expansion. In the early stages of the "Look East" policy, India primarily directed its attention to the Association of South East Asian Nation (ASEAN) countries. However, it soon realised that the ultimate objective of the policy was to be most effectively achieved by forging strong commercial relationships with China, Korea, and Japan. In June 1992, P.V. Narasimha Rao, the then Indian

¹⁵ Sebastian Strangio, "Former US Bases in the Philippines Prompt Mixed Feelings," *The Diplomat*, September 17, 2020, accessed on June 12, 2021, <https://thediplomat.com/2020/09/former-us-bases-in-the-philippines-prompt-mixed-feelings/>.

¹⁶ Varma, 232.

¹⁷ Jeff Kingston, (Professor of History and Asian Studies at Temple University Japan), in discussion with researcher on December 3, 2023.

¹⁸ Muhammad Tariq Niaz, "Regional Integration in South Asia: Utopia or Reality?," *Margalla Papers* 26, no. I (June 30, 2022): 111.

Prime Minister, visited Japan as part of his efforts to strengthen ties with East Asian countries.¹⁹ Narasimha Rao, and Japanese Prime Minister, Kiichi Miyazawa, acknowledged the potential of the emerging global order to enhance their bilateral relations.²⁰ They emphasised the need to collaborate in reorganising international relations in a way that enables effective resolution of global and regional issues within a more democratic international framework. India's ties with Japan started expanding after the visit of Prime Minister P. V. Narasimha Rao to Japan in June 1992. Both countries formalised the commencement of annual talks and bilateral discussions were conducted at the Foreign Secretary level.²¹ Following this, most of the formal interaction between Indian and Japanese officials revolved around the nuclear question of India and Pakistan in South Asia. In January 1992, External Affairs Minister of India, Madhav Sinh Solanki paid a six-day visit to Japan. His talks with Mr. Michio Watanabe, Deputy Prime Minister and Foreign Minister, reiterated the "complicated position" of India while replying to the conditionality of receiving aid from Japan to India's adherence to Nuclear Non-Proliferation Treaty (NPT).²² While addressing a question related to NPT during his visit to Japan, Prime Minister Rao emphasised India's decision not to manufacture nuclear weapons.²³ Another series of high-level discussions occurred on April 1st and 2nd, 1993, in New Delhi.²⁴ The Indian delegation was headed by Foreign Secretary J.N. Dixit, while the Japanese side was led by Deputy Minister for Foreign Affairs Kunhiko Saito.

In the meeting, they mutually decided that the solution to the non-proliferation issue should not be limited to traditional convictions. They believed that new strategies and concepts should be considered and emphasised the necessity of a comprehensive plan that includes India, Pakistan, and China. They also stressed the importance of addressing the strategic

¹⁹ "India Japan Relations," Ministry of External Affairs, Government of India, July 2015, accessed on July 26, https://www.mea.gov.in/Portal/ForeignRelation/Japan_2015_07_23.pdf.

²⁰ "Annual Reports Prior to 1999: Annual Report 1993-94," Ministry of External Affairs, Government of India, 1993, accessed on July 26, 2023, <https://mealib.nic.in/?2522?000#East%20Asia>.

²¹ "Annual Reports Prior to 1999: Annual Report 1994-95," Ministry of External Affairs, Government of India, 1995, accessed on February 26, 2020, <https://mealib.nic.in/?2523?000>.

²² "JPRS Report: Proliferation Issues" (Foreign Broadcast Information Service, January 31, 1992), 4, accessed on February 20, 2021, <https://apps.dtic.mil/sti/tr/pdf/ADA333845.pdf>.

²³ Joshi Sanjay, "Prospects for Security Cooperation Between India and Japan," *Strategic Analysis* 25, no. 2 (May 2001): 2, accessed on March 26, 2023, https://ciaotest.cc.columbia.edu/olj/sa/sa_may01jos01.html.

²⁴ Sanjay, 3.

interests of the countries involved and ensuring their security. Most of the discussions regarding nuclear question was in relation to the aid being received from Japan as it wanted India to adhere to the NPT regime. However, India intended to diversify its relationship and wanted to go beyond the nuclear question. In 1994, India's "Look East" policy yielded positive results as it achieved the status of a full-fledged dialogue partner of ASEAN. India, after becoming a member of the ASEAN Regional Forum (ARF) in 1996,²⁵ actively engaged in its discussions and also as an active participant in the biennial ASEAN+1 meeting. Even though India looked east to enhance its economic engagement to Southeast Asian neighbours and also East Asian countries, its domestic security consideration led India to pursue its nuclear ambition and finally tested nuclear weapons in 1998. In retaliation Japan imposed sanctions on India and froze its developmental aid²⁶ and declared that it would cautiously examine the loans extended to India by international financial institutions.²⁷ This resulted in a significant setback to the early gains that India and Japan made in the bilateral relationship, particularly in initiating strategic dialogues.

Despite these setbacks, India's foreign policy experienced a profound shift after the end of the Cold War. This development liberated India from its Cold War-imposed constraints and encouraged it to broaden the basis of its foreign policy. As a result, India adopted a more favourable stance towards the US and actively engaged in efforts to build mutual understanding. The 1994 visit of Prime Minister P.V. Narasimha Rao to the US was a pivotal event in furthering that goal.²⁸ India successfully mitigated the contentious political and security concerns, despite significant disagreements on nuclear matters and the provision of military assistance to Pakistan by the US. India wanted to enhance collaborations in commerce,

²⁵ Sinha Amb (Retd) Dilip, "Distinguished Lectures Details: India's Look East Policy and the Northeast," Ministry of External Affairs, Government of India, April 25, 2016, accessed on February 01, 2022, <https://www.mea.gov.in/distinguished-lectures-detail.htm?505>.

²⁶ "Comment by Chief Cabinet Secretary Kanezo Muraoka on the Nuclear Tests Conducted by the Republic of India," Ministry of Foreign Affairs of Japan, May 12, 1998, accessed on February 01, 2022, <https://www.mofa.go.jp/announce/press/1998/5/512.html#1>.

²⁷ "MOFA: Comments by the Chief Cabinet Secretary on Measures in Response to the Second Nuclear Testing Conducted by India," Ministry of Foreign Affairs of Japan, May 14, 1998, accessed on February 07, 2023, <https://www.mofa.go.jp/announce/announce/1998/5/0312-09.html>.

²⁸ Bobb Dilip, "PM Narasimha Rao Meets President Bill Clinton, Talks Business, Plays down Kashmir," India Today, June 15, 1994, accessed on February 26, 2022, <https://www.indiatoday.in/magazine/cover-story/story/19940615-pm-narasimha-rao-meets-president-bill-clinton-talks-business-plays-down-kashmir-809248-1994-06-14>.

scientific, investment, and technological exchanges. The US became India's principal investment and trading partner. As the US started normalising its relations with India, Japan, being the closest ally of the US, steadily re-evaluated the strategic importance of the "eastern" seas as the world order moved away from bipolarity in the 1990s.²⁹ A few limited information exchanges and exchanges of goods and services started in the 1980s, and in 1995 two ships from the Maritime Self-Defence Forces (MSDF) visited India and two ships from the Indian Navy visited Japan.³⁰ However, Japan did not start looking explicitly to India for collaboration until numerous high-profile pirate hijackings of Japanese ships took place. Even while "piracy" in itself was not a structural condition, the problem (of piracy) helped to identify potential areas of engagements.

Piracy, a threat that almost all sea-faring states face, served as the initial impetus for India and Japan's defence cooperation.³¹ Armed pirate incidents increased in number, and Japan itself³² was the target of multiple hijackings. In 1999, India's potential contribution to addressing such a problem became clear. In October of 1999, after departing the Indonesian port of Kuala Tanjong, the vessel owned by Japanese "MV Alondra Rainbow," which was flying the Panamanian flag, went missing. Half of the ship's cargo of aluminium ingots, worth over \$14 million, was lost.³³ The Navy and the Coast Guard of India coordinated its operations to capture the ship and tether it to Mumbai in response to international requests to find the vessel. Later, the crew was saved in Thailand. Piracy cases, particularly in Southeast and Southwest Asia, increased dramatically at the start of the twenty-first century. In 2000, 65 percent of cases, or 469 cases overall, were in these locations, according to Ministry of Foreign

²⁹ Sinderpal Singh, "From 'Asia' to 'Asia-Pacific': Indian Political Elites and Changing Conceptions of India's Regional Spaces," ISAS Working Paper (Singapore: Institute of South Asian Studies, September 28, 2010), 2.

³⁰ Vijay Sakhuja, "Indo-Japanese Maritime Security Cooperation," *Strategic Analysis* 24, no. 1 (April 2000): 189, accessed on March 25, 2022, <https://doi.org/10.1080/09700160008455204>.

³¹ Baruah Pranamita, "Japan's Response to Sea Piracy | Manohar Parrikar Institute for Defence Studies and Analyses," Manohar Parrikar Institute for Defence Studies and Analyses, March 30, 2009, accessed on March 20, 2022, https://idsa.in/idsastrategiccomments/JapansResponsetoSeaPiracy_PBaruah_300309.

³² Baruah Pranamita, "Japan's Response to Sea Piracy | Manohar Parrikar Institute for Defence Studies and Analyses," Manohar Parrikar Institute for Defence Studies and Analyses, March 30, 2009, accessed on February 19, 2022, https://idsa.in/idsastrategiccomments/JapansResponsetoSeaPiracy_PBaruah_300309.

³³ John F. Bradford, "Japanese Anti-Piracy Initiatives in Southeast Asia: Policy Formulation and the Coastal State Responses," *Contemporary Southeast Asia* 26, no. 3 (2004): 487.

Affairs (MOFA), up from 188 instances in 1995 to 300 cases in 1999 and 469 cases in 2000.³⁴ Maritime security had become more important due to its connection to combatting piracy, ensuring the safety of Sea-Lines of Communication (SLOCs), and its close relationship with energy security.³⁵ The extensive coastlines of India, and Japan were crucial to their marine security and required protection. India and Japan both had inherent vulnerabilities and dependencies in the marine domain due to their geographical location. The strategic location of India in the Indian Ocean served as a crucial point along sea transport routes connecting Japan, Southeast Asian countries, and the Persian Gulf, making it a key guardian of these traffic flows.

The Indian authorities gained international acclaim for their actions for safeguarding ships against piracy because it was the first instance of its kind in the Indian Ocean region. This appreciation was echoed by Japan, which therefore started looking for methods to interact with its Indian counterparts. Prior to the 9/11 attacks and the global awareness of terrorism risks, the MSDF requested the MOFA of Japan to contact India to initiate discussions on sea-lane protection. They also extended an invitation to participate in “search and rescue” missions to the Indian Coast Guard.³⁶ Many scholars opined that US pressure following the Al Qaeda attacks led to Japan’s actions, but it was actually Japan’s concern for the security of sea routes that prompted Japan to form a tighter partnership with India.³⁷ When India’s Defence Minister Fernandes visited Japan in January 2001, a first of its kind after 48 years of relations, India and Japan had their first official exchange of views mainly due to anti-piracy collaboration.³⁸ India and Japan acknowledged their shared interests in maintaining maritime security.

Both India and Japan rely heavily on the maritime lanes. They are the “most vulnerable to any disruption of oil supplies from the Persian Gulf region,” according to Brahma Chellaney,

³⁴ “MOFA: Present State of the Piracy Problem and Japan’s Efforts,” Ministry of Foreign Affairs of Japan, December 2001, accessed on February 19, 2022, <https://www.mofa.go.jp/policy/piracy/problem0112.html>.

³⁵ Arpita Mathur, “Strategic and Political Relations,” INDIA-JAPAN RELATIONS (S. Rajaratnam School of International Studies, 2012), 51, accessed on December 26, 2022, <https://www.jstor.org/stable/resrep05895.6>.

³⁶ Sakhuja, “Indo-Japanese Maritime Security Cooperation,” 190.

³⁷ Sakhuja, 191.

³⁸ Joseph Josy, “Army Chief to Visit Japan, Singapore from Wednesday,” Rediff, August 21, 2001, accessed on March 10, 2023 <https://m.rediff.com/news/2001/aug/21jap.htm>.

a prominent geopolitical observer.³⁹ However, cooperation rather than competition was the way between both the nations. Both countries have utilised the piracy problem as a way to raise their military image as Asia's power dynamics have shifted from the continental to the maritime sphere.⁴⁰ For example, the Japanese Coastguard (JCG) had utilised the need to protect the Japanese archipelago as an excuse for requesting additional funding and policy influence. Richard Samuels, a Japanese security expert, suggests that augmenting the JCG budget was a secondary method of improving Japan's capabilities.⁴¹ Bill Emmott, another notable Japanese studies expert, stated that the 2001 law granting the JCG the authority to employ force in order to prevent maritime invasions was solely motivated by the threat of piracy or the fact that Japan is made up of a vast archipelago.⁴² Naval force was expected to be the main traditional method used by Asia's major countries to engage in conflict and demonstrate their power. Additionally, there was ongoing competition with China for the ownership of certain inaccessible islands such as Senkakus. According to Lai Hongyi, pirate activity is more of an annoyance to the world's maritime transportation infrastructure rather than a significant threat.⁴³ The presence of the navy, however, had attracted significant attention of policy makers in Japan and given some causes, allowing pro-naval activists to defend their financial claims. In addition to being its "strategic shield," the seas surrounding Japan demanded policymakers' attention in light of the other regional dangers.

The end of the Cold War was also advantageous for the relations between India and Japan, as certain shared issues and concerns that had been inactive for years started to become more apparent in the changing regional landscape. The relationship between the two countries improved significantly after 2000. India's significant economic growth, driven by liberalisation

³⁹ Brahma Chellaney and Takenori Horimoto, "Japan-India Links Critical for Asia-Pacific Peace and Stability," *Gaiko Forum* 7, no. 2 (September 2007).

⁴⁰ Evan Feigenbaum, "Continental and Maritime in US-India Relations," East Asia Forum, November 20, 2010, accessed on February 26, 2021, Joseph Josy, "Army Chief to Visit Japan, Singapore from Wednesday," Rediff, August 21, 2001, accessed on March 21, 2022, <https://m.rediff.com/news/2001/aug/21jap.htm..>

⁴¹ Richard J. Samuels, "'New Fighting Power!' Japan's Growing Maritime Capabilities and East Asian Security," *International Security* 32, no. 3 (2007): 84–112.

⁴² Bill Emmott, *Rivals: How the Power Struggle Between China, India and Japan Will Shape Our Next Decade* (London: Allen Lane, 2008), 20.

⁴³ Hongyi Lai, "Introduction: Understanding and Enhancing Energy and Maritime Security in Asia," in *Asian Energy Security: The Maritime Dimension*, ed. Hongyi Lai (New York: Palgrave Macmillan US, 2009), 1–25, accessed on March 10, 2022, https://doi.org/10.1057/9780230619609_1.

and economic reforms, led Japan to assess the impact of a financially strong India for the stability and security of Asia.⁴⁴ Japanese leaders believed that India strongly supported an open market economy because of the broad domestic backing and high annual growth rate following the liberalisation plan. They anticipated that the new economic direction would create many chances for foreign investment, which may foster deeper economic relations between the India and Japan. In this context, the following section discusses India-Japan strategic partnership in the second phase which begins in the early 21st century wherein both domestic and systemic factors played a crucial role in advancing the strategic partnership between both the nations.

Strategic Partnership in the 21st Century: The Role of Leadership

Early 21st century proved significant for India and Japan bilateral relationship considering the pause in relations due to nuclear tests by India in 1998 and the ensuing restrictions imposed by Japan on India. The relationship took a turn with the Japanese Prime Minister Yoshiro Mori's visit in August 2000, four months after the US president Bill Clinton travelled to India. Demonstrating foresight, within the ambit of India-Japan relationship, he proactively tried to redefine the parameters.⁴⁵ Mr. Mori emphasised that although India and Japan play significant role in global politics, they are inevitably entangled in their own specific bilateral issues. He urged both India and Japan to establish a global partnership that can tackle a broad range of concerns, including nuclear disarmament, UN structural reform, counterterrorism, maritime security, and energy cooperation.⁴⁶ Prime Minister Mori believed that India and Japan, within the framework of global partnership, could make significant contributions to resolving many global and regional concerns.

When Prime Minister Mori proposed the concept of a global partnership, his true intention was to reinvent the bilateral relationship in response to the swiftly changing geopolitical environment of Asia and the world.⁴⁷ He emphasised the importance of establishing a strong and comprehensive basis for their relationship, which demonstrated their

⁴⁴ K V Kesavan, "Economic Liberalization in India and Japan's Wavering Response," *Ritsumeikan Annual Review of International Studies* 2 (2003): 130.

⁴⁵ "Annual Report 2000-2001," Ministry of External Affairs, Government of India, April 1, 2001, 29, accessed on February 27, 2021, https://www.mea.gov.in/Uploads/PublicationDocs/163_Annual-Report-2000-2001.pdf.

⁴⁶ Kesavan, "India and Japan," 132.

⁴⁷ Annual Report 2000-2001, 20.

shared economic and security interests, as well as their significant collective influence in forging a new regional and global system. The inception of this trend was traced back to when India's Defence Minister George Fernandes visited Japan to commence a fresh defence discussion in January 2000.⁴⁸ After a series of talks with Japanese officials, he noted that "after fifty years of aloofness, India and Japan have decided on a security and defence related dialogue on a regular basis."⁴⁹ Such a shift in the perception towards India was attributed to the appreciation of India's security considerations in its neighbourhood, realisation of common security threats in securing the SLOCs and India's improving relationship with the US.

After Japanese Prime Minister Mori presented the idea of global partnership in August 2000, the relevance of the strategic aspect of bilateral interactions became increasingly highlighted. The inaugural bilateral security discussion occurred in Tokyo in July 2001, focusing on security and military strategy, the Asian security landscape, and nuclear non-proliferation.⁵⁰ The discussion was initiated as a recurring event on a yearly basis. Consequently, there was an increase in military collaboration between the two nations.

In February 2001, Japan participated in the "International Fleet Review" held at Mumbai, and subsequently, a squadron of the Maritime Self-Defence Force (MSDF) visited Chennai in May 2001.⁵¹ Later on, there were frequent reciprocal visits, including the ones made by military chiefs. Prime Minister Junichiro Koizumi of Japan and Prime Minister Atal Bihari Vajpayee of India expressed content with the heightened emphasis on security with the outcomes of the bilateral "Comprehensive Security Dialogue" and military-to-military engagements that occurred in July, 2001.⁵² Highlighting the importance of conducting regular discussions, they also established an additional channel to address counter-terrorism issues inside the bilateral security framework. In January 2003, Japanese Foreign Minister Yoriko

⁴⁸ Josy, "Army Chief to Visit Japan, Singapore from Wednesday."

⁴⁹ K V Kesavan, "Indo-Japanese Partnership: The Security Factor" (Observer Research Foundation, May 2009), 3, accessed on February 27, 2021, https://www.orfonline.org/wp-content/uploads/2009/05/IssueBrief_19.pdf.

⁵⁰ Sanjana Joshi, "The Geopolitical Context of Changing Japan-India Relations," *UNISCI Discussion Papers*, no. 32 (2013): 117–36, accessed on March 20, 2022, https://doi.org/10.5209/rev_UNIS.2013.n32.44793.

⁵¹ Panda Rajaram, "Changing Dynamics of India-Japan Relations: Future Trends," in *India-Japan Dialogue: Challenges and Potential*, by Iwashita Akihiro (Sapporo: Slavic Research Center, Hokkaido University, 2011), 3.

⁵² "Japan-India Joint Declaration," Ministry of Foreign Affairs of Japan, December 10, 2001, accessed on February 01, 2019, <http://www.mofa.go.jp/region/asia-pac/india/joint0012.html>.

Kawaguchi highlighted the increasing significance of security. She stressed the necessity for India and Japan to strengthen their relationship in security and defence.⁵³ The discussions held in May 2003 between the Director General of Japan's Defence Agency, Shigeru Ishiba, and the Defence Minister of India, George Fernandes, in New Delhi, advanced a determined effort to increase participation in security affairs.⁵⁴ The meeting between the key policy makers from both the countries marked Japan's initial foray towards establishing a fresh strategic cooperation with India, indicating a growing interest on Japan's part.

The concept of global collaboration gained renewed momentum from the heads of both nations. The visit by Prime Minister of Japan Junichiro Koizumi in 2005 to India initiated an annual procedure wherein the Prime Ministers of both nations would convene on a yearly basis in either country. With regard to Japan's initiative to open a high-level strategic dialogue with India the Prime Minister Koizumi's visit to India in 2005 was considered a significant moment. This is because for the first time the two states decided to "reinforce strategic focus" in the bilateral relations. The leadership of the two states declared to launch a high-level strategic dialogue in the eight-point plan. The joint declaration, on "Japan-India Partnership in a New Asian Era: Strategic Orientation of Japan-India Global Partnership", encompassed an eight-point agenda that charted a fresh trajectory for the bilateral relations.⁵⁵ An aim of the initiative was to establish a meticulously organised framework for security discourse and collaboration between the two nations. Both countries reached a consensus to continue their collaboration on three different levels. Both parties agreed to work together to enhance the existing political and economic connections on bilateral level. At the regional level, their objective was to enhance peace and security in Asia by actively participating in regional collaboration, particularly in the domains of maritime security and achieving energy independence.⁵⁶ On a global scale,

⁵³ Panda Rajaram, "Changing Dynamics of India-Japan Relations: Future Trends," in *India-Japan Dialogue: Challenges and Potential*, by Iwashita Akihiro (Sapporo: Slavic Research Center, Hokkaido University, 2011).

⁵⁴ "Embassy of Japan in India: Press Releases from the Embassy," Embassy of Japan in India, April 29, 2003, accessed on February 27, 2021, https://www.in.emb-japan.go.jp/Press_Releases_Embassy/PR05-03.html.

⁵⁵ "Joint Statement, India-Japan Partnership in a New Asian Era: Strategic Orientation of India-Japan Global Partnership," Ministry of External Affairs, Government of India, April 29, 2005, accessed on March 26, 2023, <https://www.mea.gov.in/bilateral-documents.htm?dtl/6627/joint>.

⁵⁶ "Japan-India Partnership in a New Asian Era: Strategic Orientation of Japan-India Global Partnership," Ministry of Foreign Affairs of Japan, April 29, 2005, accessed on March 27, 2023, <https://www.mofa.go.jp/region/asia-paci/india/partner0504.html#eight>.

both parties wanted to collaborate in domains such as United Nations (UN) restructuring, nuclear weapons reduction, counterterrorism, and environmental issues.

Furthermore, Prime Minister of Japan Shinzo Abe and Indian Prime Minister Manmohan Singh met during the second summit held in Japan in December 2006.⁵⁷ Prime Minister Manmohan Singh wanted to develop a strong connection with Prime Minister Abe, who, in turn, had a strong desire to foster stronger ties with India. According to Sanjaya Baru, political analyst and media advisor to the Prime Minister Manmohan Singh, it was the personal interest of the both the prime ministers to advance India-Japan bilateral relationship to next level.⁵⁸ Their collaborative declaration, titled “Towards India-Japan Strategic and Global Partnership,” outlined a comprehensive and thorough plan for establishing a complex and interconnected framework of bilateral relations.⁵⁹ In essence, it suggested the implementation of the measures such as organising yearly summit meetings between the highest-ranking officials of both nations, formalising strategic discussions at the foreign minister level and engaging in negotiations to reach a bilateral economic partnership agreement or comprehensive economic cooperation agreement.⁶⁰ Further, the declaration emphasised on creating a forum for business leaders to collaborate, in the field of science and technology. The declaration even encouraged promoting exchanges between individuals and collaborating in international organisations. The “Joint Statement Towards India-Japan Strategic and Global Partnership,” signed in Tokyo by the prime ministers of India and Japan in December 2006, represented the most extensive expression of their intention to establish a strong partnership in the 21st century.

Additionally, the Joint Statement emphasised the goal of elevating the bilateral relationship to the status of a strategic partnership.⁶¹ Paragraphs 10 to 12 of the Joint Statement addressed the topic of maritime security. This is the first instance where India had extensively discussed this issue in an official statement. Additionally, six paragraphs were dedicated to the

⁵⁷ “Message of H.E. Mr. Shinzo Abe, Prime Minister of Japan,” Embassy of Japan in India, 2007, accessed on December 12, 2023, https://www.in.emb-japan.go.jp/Friendship_Year2007/Friendship-Year-07/Page3.html.

⁵⁸ Sanjaya Baru, (Political Analyst and Media Advisor to Prime Minister Manmohan Singh) in discussion with the researcher on January 22, 2024.

⁵⁹ “Joint Statement Towards India-Japan Strategic and Global Partnership” (Ministry of External Affairs, Government of India, December 15, 2006), accessed on February 27, 2022, <https://www.mea.gov.in/bilateral-documents.htm?dtl/6368/Joint+Statement+Towards+IndiaJapan+Strategic+and+Global+Partnership>.

⁶⁰ “Joint Statement Towards India-Japan Strategic and Global Partnership.”

⁶¹ “Joint Statement Towards India-Japan Strategic and Global Partnership.”

areas of “Political, Defence, and Security Cooperation.”⁶² This indicated that the matters of defence and security cooperation were becoming increasingly important in the high-level discussions between the two nations.

Moreover, in March 2007, the first ministerial-level strategic dialogue took place when the Indian External Affairs Minister, Pranab Mukherjee, visited Japan.⁶³ India’s efforts to strengthen security collaboration with Japan were clearly demonstrated during this visit, marking a significant milestone in the ongoing development of bilateral defence relations. For the first time, the two governments, India and Japan, had mutually agreed to convene regular meetings between their Defence Ministers and engage in periodic defence policy discussion.⁶⁴ Furthermore, the Indian Defence Minister’s decision to visit Japan, followed by China and Singapore, during his tour of three nations, demonstrated the increasing significance of Japan in the strategic policy considerations of the Indian defence establishment. Ultimately, the visit represented a major advancement in the pursuit of strengthening the “strategic focus” in the bilateral relations, as the Defence Chiefs of India and Japan established the specific methods for implementing that objective. The primary modalities of cooperation included conducting goodwill exercises between the Indian Navy and the JMSDF. The joint statement by Pranab Mukherjee and Fukushima Nukaga, Japan’s Minister of State for Defence, emphasised the need to enhance conversation and collaboration in the areas of defence and security.⁶⁵ They also expressed a strong interest in addressing regional and global security concerns. These trends suggested that India and Japan were actively seeking to participate in bilateral security cooperation.

In August 2007, New Delhi, India hosted the third India-Japan Annual Summit, where Prime Minister of Japan Shinzo Abe presented a broader vision for Asia, focusing on

⁶² “Joint Statement Towards India-Japan Strategic and Global Partnership.”

⁶³ Raghav Nair, “India, Japan for Strategic Relations,” *The Economic Times*, March 22, 2007, accessed on September 23, 2023, <https://economictimes.indiatimes.com/news/politics-and-nation/india-japan-for-strategic-relations/articleshow/1791405.cms?from=mdr>.

⁶⁴ Ministry of External Affairs of India, Joint Statement, Visit of Mr. Pranab Mukherjee, Minister of Defence to Japan, May 25, 2006, accessed on June 3, 2022, <http://meaindia.nic.in/speech/2006/05/25js01.html>.

⁶⁵ “Joint Statement, Visit of Mr. Pranab Mukherjee, Minister of Defence to Japan,” Ministry of External Affairs, Government of India, May 25, 2006, accessed on June 3, 2022, <https://www.mea.gov.in/bilateral-documents.htm?dtl/6159/Joint+Statement+Visit+of+Mr+Pranab+Mukherjee+Minister+of+Defence+to+Japan>.

accelerating the pace of partnership.⁶⁶ Prime Minister Shinzo Abe delineated the precise responsibilities of both nations in upholding peace and security in the region. Prime Minister Abe proposed the establishment of a QUAD agreement among Japan, India, Australia and the US to enhance peace in Asia.⁶⁷ However, although after extensive discussion, the concept ultimately did not succeed due to Beijing's profound mistrust, since it believed the suggestion was antagonistic to China. Indeed, during the ASEAN Regional Forum (ARF) security policy meeting in May 2007, when the officials from the four countries convened to engage in preliminary discussions about the QUAD, China vehemently expressed its objection.⁶⁸ The initiative ultimately failed due to the lack of interest from India, the US, and Australia, particularly under the leadership of its Prime Minister of Australia Kevin Rudd. In Japan, Prime Minister Shinzo Abe's resignation was prompted by a sudden convergence of health and political factors. The subsequent Prime Minister of Japan Yasuo Fukuda, showed little interest in pursuing the matter.

Furthermore, India finalised the nuclear deal with the US in August 2007, marking a significant change in India's international reputation. India's position in the global nuclear industry was enhanced by securing the Nuclear Suppliers Group (NSG) exemption, even though it is not a party to the NPT.⁶⁹ India joined the group of countries known as the "nuclear club", which included nations like the United Kingdom (UK), China, and France.⁷⁰ India's prolonged economic growth over the decade had elevated its global status and significantly strengthened its ability to exert diplomatic influence. India preferred to collaborate in a cooperative manner to attain peace and stability in the region. Japan had a crucial role in influencing the developing security framework in the Asia-Pacific region, which is a significant

⁶⁶ "Joint Statement On the Roadmap for New Dimensions to the Strategic and Global Partnership between India and Japan," Ministry of External Affairs, Government of India, August 22, 2007, accessed on March 16, 2022, <https://www.mea.gov.in/bilateral-documents.htm?dtl/5885/Joint+Statement+On+the+Roadmap+for+N>.

⁶⁷ Miller Manjari Chatterjee, "India's Special Relationship With Abe Shinzo," *Council on Foreign Relations* (blog), July 14, 2022, accessed on April 27, 2023, <https://www.cfr.org/blog/indias-special-relationship-abe-shinzo>.

⁶⁸ Shishir Gupta, "QUAD to Reject the 2007 Chinese Veto on Its Foreign Policies," *Hindustan Times*, March 11, 2021, accessed on April, 27, 2023, <https://www.hindustantimes.com/india-news/quad-to-reject-the-2007-chinese-veto-on-its-foreign-policies-101615438862807.html>.

⁶⁹ Rajeswari Pillai Rajagopalan, "Indo-US Nuclear Deal: Implications for India and the Global N-Regime," IPCS Special Report (Institute of Peace and Conflict Studies, December 2008), 2.

⁷⁰ Kagan, Robert, *The Return of History and the End of Dreams*. London: Atlantic Books, 2008, 41.

factor in India's strategic approach towards Japan. Therefore, India aimed to enhance its security and economic connections with Japan in the region.

Consequently, Prime Minister of India Dr Manmohan Singh and his Japanese counterpart Prime Minister of Japan Taro Aso made a significant and ground-breaking move by signing the "Joint Declaration on Security Cooperation" on October 22, 2008.⁷¹ This pact is considered historic since Japan had established similar agreements with only Australia and the US till date. Consequently, the result was a direct consequence of the persistent endeavours undertaken by the highest-ranking officials from both nations over an extended duration.

The document on the collaboration includes nearly all of the promises and assurances made in many joint declarations and official meetings since 2001.⁷² The declaration emphasised the crucial requirement for bilateral policy coordination on issues pertaining to the region, as well as bilateral cooperation within multilateral forums in Asia such as the ARF, East Asia Summit (EAS) and Regional Cooperation Agreement on Combating Piracy and Armed Robbery against Ships in Asia (RECAAP).⁷³ The Declaration wanted to build upon the existing progress in defence relations and improve the framework to effectively influence the evolving security system. Under this framework, a detailed action plan was also devised to clearly outline the methods for implementing security cooperation.

A comprehensive framework for increased strategic collaboration between India and Japan was established with the Joint Declaration on Security Cooperation between India and Japan which was agreed during the summit conference in October 2008. The Action Plan in December 2009 addressed strategic and defence cooperation, including annual strategic discussions between the subcabinet or senior officials two plus two dialogue, foreign ministers, and bilateral naval exercises.⁷⁴ Between 2000 and 2008, visits to China grew to seven, while

⁷¹ "Joint Declaration on Security Cooperation between India and Japan," Ministry of External Affairs, Government of India, October 22, 2008, accessed on March 10, 2022, <https://www.mea.gov.in/bilateral-documents.htm?dtl/5408/joint+declaration+on+>.

⁷² "Joint Declaration on Security Cooperation between India and Japan," Ministry of External Affairs.

⁷³ "Joint Declaration on Security Cooperation between India and Japan," Ministry of External Affairs.

⁷⁴ "Action Plan to Advance Security Cooperation Based on the Joint Declaration on Security Cooperation between Japan and India," Ministry of External Affairs, Government of India, December 29, 2009, accessed on June 12, 2021, https://www.mea.gov.in/bilateral-documents.htm?dtl/5089/Action_Plan_to_advance_Security_Cooperation_based_on_the_Joint_Declaration_on_Security_Cooperation_between_Japan_and_India.

visits to India surged to twenty-five by Japanese officials. Twenty-two Indian officials visited Tokyo as part of a reciprocal exchange.⁷⁵ Official visits and rhetoric may not seem important on their own, but they convey a powerful message to the political and corporate sectors about the stability of connections. Prime Minister of Japan Yasuo Fukuda's brief tenure from 2007 to 2008 restricted his ability to impact the foreign policy. His focus on enhancing ties with China and putting aside the "Arc of Freedom and Prosperity" initiative suggested that India-Japan relations might have lost priority on Japan's agenda if he had not resigned abruptly in September 2008.⁷⁶ Despite internal Japanese concerns over its domestic politics, India-Japan relations had advanced significantly with the signing of the strategic agreement in October 2008.

The official visit by Yukio Hatoyama, the Japanese Prime Minister, in December 2009, to India demonstrated that the Indo-Japanese relationship went beyond domestic party divisions. Hatoyama represented a new government led by the Democratic Party of Japan (DPJ).⁷⁷ Soon after assuming office, Prime Minister Hatoyama, despite encountering numerous internal diplomatic and economic obstacles, demonstrated a strong desire to visit India in order to uphold the "continuity" of bilateral relations. It was atypical for a newly elected prime minister to leave for an overseas journey amidst a period of intense domestic activity. Prime Minister Hatoyama's visit to India was unanimously praised by the Japanese media. Recognising that the relationship with India had evolved into a new phase, he not only agreed to attend the summit meeting but also actively formulated a comprehensive action plan for security collaboration with India, expanding on the proposals made by the previous government under the leadership of the Liberal Democratic Party (LDP). In 2009, a plan was launched to enhance security cooperation by establishing yearly naval exercises that would take place alternatively in India and Japan.⁷⁸ Australia was the sole nation with whom Japan had signed

⁷⁵ Hayoun Ryou, "India-Japan Security Cooperation: Chinese Perceptions," Policy Brief (Institute of Peace and Conflict Studies, January 1, 2009), accessed December 02, 2022, https://www.ipcs.org/issue_briefs/issue_brief_pdf/7840897671B89-Ryou-IndJapan.pdf.

⁷⁶ Linus Hagström and Björn Jerdén, "Understanding Fluctuations in Sino-Japanese Relations: To Politicize or to De-Politicize the China Issue in the Japanese Diet," *Pacific Affairs* 83, no. 4 (2010): 725.

⁷⁷ "Japan Calling" (Embassy of Japan in India, December 2009), accessed on March 07, 2021, Linus Hagström and Björn Jerdén, "Understanding Fluctuations in Sino-Japanese Relations: To Politicize or to De-Politicize the China Issue in the Japanese Diet," *Pacific Affairs* 83, no. 4 (2010): 725.

⁷⁸ "Action Plan to Advance Security Cooperation Based on the Joint Declaration on Security Cooperation between Japan and India," Ministry of External Affairs, Government of India, December 29, 2009, accessed on May 07, 2020, <https://www.mea.gov.in/bilateral->

a similar declaration till then. This proved the importance attached by Japan to India on the strategic front.

Japan found itself in a security dilemma with several perspectives, but none had the power to impact governmental decisions. In Japan, there were various factions such as advocates for normalcy, globalists, revisionists, middle-power internationalists, realists, Asianists, new autonomists, and pacifists. This diversity of opinions had hindered the establishment of a consensus over Japan's future security policy.⁷⁹ The strictness and unwillingness to change within Japanese culture hindered the ability to reach agreement on a crucial problem regarding the country's security. Japan's political culture and institutional framework had a tendency to discourage a strong expression of military security goals, which hindered substantial policy shifts.⁸⁰ Despite debates on security policy, the India-Japan relationship became strong and was viewed positively in Japanese strategic analysis. Japan believed that forming a strategic partnership with India could be beneficial.

Japan's new security strategy reflected a more proactive role for the Self Defence force (SDF). It went beyond mere political rhetoric given that the role of the SDF was expanded from providing defence only to Japan to sharing the task of maintaining international security.⁸¹ In connection with the wars in Afghanistan and Iraq, the policy elite enacted special laws to enable SDF deployment to areas near combat zones. In 2004, Japan for the first time took the step of contributing its SDF in the multinational force formed under the UN Security Council resolution, following the handover of sovereignty in Iraq in June 2004. Here it needs to be mentioned that one of the reasons for Japan's security policy to assume a more assertive stance was due to the US reaction to Japan's role during the 1991 Gulf War. Japan's reluctance of a direct military involvement in the 1991 Gulf war and its "cheque book diplomacy" in the form

[documents.htm?dtl/5089/Action_Plan_to_advance_Security_Cooperation_based_on_the_Joint_Declaration_on_Security_Cooperation_between_Japan_and_India.](#)

⁷⁹ Richard J. Samuels, *Securing Japan: Tokyo's Grand Strategy and the Future of East Asia* (New York: Cornell University Press, 2008), 20.

⁸⁰ Katzenstein Peter J and Okawara Nobuo, "Japan's Security Policy: Political, Economic and Military Dimensions," in *Rethinking Japanese Security: Internal and External Dimensions*, by Peter J. Katzenstein, 1st edition (London; New York: Routledge, 2008), 60.

⁸¹ Since 1992 the Defence White Paper of Japan features a chapter on the international contributions of the Self Defence Forces.

of financial contribution in the Gulf War I, frustrated the US.⁸² It is perhaps the criticism which Japan faced during the Gulf War I from its closest ally, that propelled the Japanese Prime Minister Junichiro Koizumi to build consensus in the Diet over its historic decision to send the SDF to Iraq in 2004 which demonstrated the giant transition in the history of Japan's security policy since 1945 which received enormous press coverage. As discussed in the above section, domestic leadership played a significant role in enhancing the strategic partnership but it was not the sole determining factor. In this context, the following section examines with the role of defence forces of Japan.

The Role of Japan's Self Defence Forces (JSDF)

The changing domestic sentiments within Japan towards the normalisation of the JSDF since the early 1990s became more significant than the external forces. Consequently, there was an increasing endorsement for reinterpreting the constitution to ensure that the JSDF are unequivocally lawful according to Japanese legislation. As polls revealed that over 60 percent of the Japanese populace expressed support for revising the constitution,⁸³ marking the first instance since the end of World War II. The approval was attributed to the Japanese general commitment with the JSDF's involvement in global peacekeeping missions, as well as their perception of the JSDF's effectiveness in addressing regional threats. Their primary focus was on North Korea and its nuclear and ballistic missile programmes. The JSDF made significant investments in ballistic missile defence because of repeated missile testing by Korea which breached Japanese airspace.

The establishment of the Ministry of Defence (MoD) within Japanese government system in 2007 was a response to both internal and external pressures to standardise the JSDF. The MoD replaced the Japanese Defence Agency, which was first established in 1954.⁸⁴ The elevation of the defence department from agency to ministry level resulted in increased centralisation of power and influence over security policies. Debates arose concerning the

⁸² Purnendra Jain, *Japan's Subnational Governments in International Affairs*, 1st ed. (London: Routledge, 2006), 20, accessed on June 3, 2022, <https://doi.org/10.4324/9780203413906>.

⁸³ *Japan as a "Normal Country"? A Nation in Search of Its Place in the World* (University of Toronto Press, 2011), 20, accessed on May 12, 2023, <https://doi.org/10.3138/9781442694231>.

⁸⁴ "About Ministry," Japan Ministry of Defense, accessed March 8, 2023, accessed on May 12, 2023, <https://www.mod.go.jp/en/>.

removal of export restrictions on military equipment since the establishment of the MoD.⁸⁵ The main contention was that removing the export prohibition would afford Japanese arms manufacturers the opportunity to achieve economies of scale in weapons production. This enabled the Japanese military complex to sustain its competitiveness while also benefiting from technological transfers with other developed nations. The imposition of an export embargo significantly increased the expenses associated with indigenous weapons manufacture, thereby impeding the ability of those enterprises to engage in innovation due to their inability to establish business relationships with foreign defence firms.⁸⁶ Japanese enterprises were considered to have a significant disadvantage since they were unable to lower prices by exporting different versions of their products to other countries, unlike countries with well-established military industrial complexes such as the US.

As discussed above, one of the important indicators of the changing security perspective of the Japanese policy elite was the upgradation to the ministry level of the Japanese Defence Agency.⁸⁷ The upgradation came five decades after the Defence Agency and the Self-Defence Forces were established in 1954. On January 9, 2007 the Japanese defence establishment which for so long functioned in the name of the Japanese Defence Agency - JDA (*Boeicho*) was upgraded to a full ministry status. The official name was changed to Japanese Defence Ministry (*Boeisho*). In English language, the terms “agency” and “ministry” are sometimes used interchangeably, but in Japanese, the change in name involves replacing one ideograph, from “cho” to “sho,” which signified a notable transformation.⁸⁸ The change seemed minor, but in reality, it is significant. This is because the JDA acquiring a ministry status was symbolic of the unshackling of Japanese defence as pointed out by Keizo Nabeshima, a notable defence analyst.⁸⁹ It implied that the Director General of the erstwhile JDA, by acquiring the position of the defence minister, will have more say about his/her ministry’s budget than in the past given that the person became a cabinet minister.

⁸⁵ Shinya Oguma, “Japan’s Security Policy Making after Political Reforms: Centralization and Constraints since the First Abe Administration,” *Anzenhoshō Senryaku Kenkyū (Security & Strategy)* 3, no. 2 (March 2023): 70.

⁸⁶ Christopher W. Hughes, *Japan’s Remilitarization* (Oxon: Routledge, 2009), pp. 72–75

⁸⁷ Lies Elaine, “Japan’s Defence Agency Upgraded to Ministry,” Reuters, August 10, 2007, accessed on March 30, 2022, <https://www.reuters.com/article/idUST203640/>.

⁸⁸ Keizo Nabeshima, “Unshackling Japan’s defense,” *The Japan Times*, January 22, 2007.

⁸⁹ Keizo Nabeshima, “Unshackling Japan’s defense”.

In December 2006, the Chief Cabinet Secretary, Yasuhisa Shiozaki, hinted at the change and mentioned that it was necessary for the Defence Agency to be upgraded into a ministry, befitting the role of defending the country and contributing to world peace.⁹⁰ The Japanese policy elite's push for a defence ministry reflected its intent to improve its security. A subtle signal of Japan's intention to assume a more significant security role reflected the increasing aspiration of the Japanese ruling elite to modify the Constitution, which was imposed on them by the occupying US forces nearly six decades ago. A revision of the Constitution would enable Japan to increase its contribution to global security and play a role commensurate with its economic power, while sustaining its alliance partnership with the US. The Japanese Prime Minister Shinzo Abe's comment at a news conference in January 2007 is quite significant in this regard. Abe said that, "we must reconstruct a legal basis for security that befits the times."⁹¹ Prime Minister Abe's remarks were perceived as a signal for a partial revision of the government's constitutional interpretation. The debate for revision of the constitution seemed to have intensified during his tenure. Prime Minister Shinzo Abe's administration wanted to amend Article 9 of the Constitution, under which Japan renounced force as an instrument of national power. An urgency to amend the Constitution was evident from the fact that in April 2007 the Lower House of the Japanese Diet passed a bill on holding a national referendum required to revise the Constitution. However, carrying out actual constitutional amendment was a difficult task.⁹² A revision would constitutionally permit Japan to use military force to protect its interests. This security strategy of Japan towards incremental expansion of its security role signified a break from its traditional security posture. The emerging security strategy of Japan thus reflected breaking tradition.

Moreover, since the end of the Cold War, the US has been making a concerted effort to enhance its relations with India. For instance, within the Asian regional security framework, American leadership viewed India as a viable partner for the US. The US strategy of leveraging

⁹⁰ Lies Elaine, "Japan's Defence Agency Upgraded to Ministry," August 10, 2007, accessed on March 07, 2021, <https://www.reuters.com/article/idUST203640/>.

⁹¹ "1st Meeting of the Council on Reconstruction of a Legal Basis for Security (What's up around the Prime Minister)," The Prime Minister's Office of Japan, May 18, 2007, accessed on March 20, 2022, https://japan.kantei.go.jp/abepphoto/2007/05/18anpo_e.html.

⁹² "House passes referendum bill," The Asahi Shimbun, April 14, 2007, accessed on June 23, 2022, <http://www.asahi.com/english/Herald-asahi/TKY200704140103.html>.

India's influence in view of shifting security dynamics in Asia exemplified a realistic approach of balancing behaviour. In the early 1970s, the US acknowledged China as a significant force. In the new millennium, India was acknowledged as an emerging power of the 21st century, as demonstrated by the President of the US, Bush administration's efforts to involve India as a "Global Strategic Partner" of the US.⁹³ Former Japanese Prime Minister Yoshiro Mori noted that the US's efforts to strengthen relations with India played a key role in altering Japan's perspective of India. Japanese Prime Minister Mori believed that the relationship dynamics among India, the US, and Japan would play a vital role in maintaining regional stability in Asia. The US had established a strategic partnership with India under the Next Steps in Strategic Partnership (NSSP) programme.⁹⁴ Japan appeared to have followed the lead of its nearest ally in reaching out to India.

In April 2005, Japanese Prime Minister Junichiro Koizumi visited India and initiated the Japan-India Partnership in the new Asian era, with the goal of strengthening the strategic focus on the "global partnership" between India and Japan in response to the changing geopolitical landscape in Asia influenced by China's assertive rise.⁹⁵ Japan invited India, Australia, and New Zealand to become founder members in 2005 in the first East Asia Summit.⁹⁶ Japan prioritised the ASEAN+6 framework over the ASEAN+3 framework to counter China's increasing influence in the East Asia Summit. This was a result of the strategic convergences between India and Japan, which are discussed below.

Areas of Strategic Interest between India and Japan

The strategic interests of India and Japan seemed to converge on the issue of maritime security which figured very prominently in the security discussions between both the nations. Given that Japan is a maritime nation and is plagued by a lack of natural resources, its very

⁹³ "Engaging India as a Global Strategic Partner," U.S. Senate Republican Policy Committee, July 19, 2005, accessed on June 23, 2020, http://rpc.senate.gov/_files/July1905IndiaDF.pdf.

⁹⁴ Ahuja Lt Gen Anil, "Next Phase of India- US Strategic Partnership: Maximise Hope without Underestimating Challenges," Vivekananda International Foundation, June 19, 2023, accessed on September 12, 2023, <https://www.vifindia.org/article/2023/june/19/Next-Phase-of-India-US-Strategic-Partnership>.

⁹⁵ "Japan-India Partnership in a New Asian Era: Strategic Orientation of Japan-India Global Partnership," Ministry of Foreign Affairs of Japan, April 29, 2005, accessed on September 12, 2023, <https://www.mofa.go.jp/region/asia-paci/india/partner0504.html#eight>.

⁹⁶ Arpita Mathur, "Strategic and Political Relations," INDIA-JAPAN RELATIONS (S. Rajaratnam School of International Studies, 2012), 65, accessed on December 26, 2022, <https://www.jstor.org/stable/resrep05895.6>.

economic survival is overwhelmingly dependent on maritime links with regard to importing natural resources and raw materials as well as exporting its products. Among its imports, perhaps, the most important is the import of the energy resources given that energy constitutes the major pillar of the Japanese economy.

India and Japan are among the world's five largest energy consumers. India's oil consumption is primarily met by imports, which account for almost two-thirds of its overall consumption. On the other hand, Japan relies heavily on imports for all of its oil needs and holds the title of being the largest worldwide importer of liquefied natural gas (LNG), accounting for more than 40 percent of the world's total imports.⁹⁷ India and Japan's economies were highly reliant on the oil supply from the Persian Gulf. The reliance on imported energy resources entails securing the shipping lanes. Therefore, a core strategic interest of both India and Japan was securing the energy supply lanes in the Indian Ocean Region (IOR), where the stakes of India and Japan were indeed high. From India's perspective, the centrality of Indian Ocean to India's trade was emphasised by scholars from pre-independence times. In this regard, K.M. Pannikar, a prominent maritime historian emphasised the significance of Indian Ocean way back in the 1940s which is valid even in contemporary times. K.M. Pannikar argued:

*“while to other countries the Indian Ocean is only one of the important oceanic areas, to India it is a vital sea. Her lifelines are concentrated in that area, her freedom is dependent on the freedom of that water surface. No industrial development, no commercial growth, no stable political structure is possible for her unless her shores are protected.”*⁹⁸

India continued to prioritise the IOR in its security strategy in the 21st century, as evidenced by the publication of the Maritime Doctrine by the Indian Navy in 2004.⁹⁹ The Indian strategic elite regarded the Indian Ocean as its exclusive sphere of influence, as it is the only region and ocean named after a single state in the world. The 2004 Annual Report of the Indian Defence Ministry emphasised the strategic importance of the IOR. The report

⁹⁷ “Why Japan’s Power Sector Depends so Much on LNG,” *The Economic Times*, March 10, 2022, accessed on March 14, 2023, <https://economictimes.indiatimes.com/news/international/world-news/why-japans-power-sector-depends-so-much-on-lng/articleshow/90115357.cms?from=mdr>.

⁹⁸ K. M. Pannikar, *India and the IO*, (London: Allen and Unwin, 1945), p. 84.

⁹⁹ Bedi Rahul, “A New Doctrine for the Navy,” *Frontline*, July 15, 2004, accessed on December 15, 2023, <https://frontline.thehindu.com/the-nation/article30223434.eec>.

highlighted India's strategic location in relation to continental Asia and the Indian Ocean Region.¹⁰⁰ The strategic interests of India and Japan in the Indian Ocean were closely tied to the region's strategic location. The interaction of dominant nations in the Indian Ocean area and the increasing risks and difficulties there affected the shared strategic goals of India and Japan.¹⁰¹ The Indian Ocean is situated in a key location, with the Indian subcontinent to the north, East Africa to the west, Malaysia, Indonesia, and Australia to the east, and Antarctica to the south. In the post-Cold War era, the Indian Ocean is acknowledged as having strategic significance and is no longer considered unimportant for Third World nations.¹⁰² The ocean served as the location for crucial international SLOCs. The area encompasses significant strategic bottlenecks, including the Straits of Hormuz, the Straits of Malacca, the Lombok Strait, and the Sunda Strait. The strategic location has attracted regional and extra-regional powers of all sizes and types, including land and sea powers and the area was defined by increasing strategic rivalry between external forces and the coastal states.

For instance, following the collapse of the Soviet Union, the U.S. Navy emerged as the dominant naval force in the Indian Ocean, establishing extensive connections and exerting significant influence. Undoubtedly, the US holds unparalleled dominance as a major force in the Indian Ocean, possessing the capacity to exert naval influence throughout the area. The US had a clearly defined plan to actively pursue its policy of being superior or surpassing others in the region. In the new millennium, the US strategic focus has transitioned from traditional maritime control and sea denial to exerting influence on events that occur closer to land, as seen by its involvement in Afghanistan. During the war in Afghanistan, the U.S. missile strikes were executed, among others, by Fifth Fleet warships which demonstrated the ability of the US to exercise naval power against littoral states deep inland.

Moreover, the strategic landscape in the Indian Ocean region became increasingly unstable due to the emergence of many threats and challenges. These include acts such as sea piracy, the increase in narco-terrorism, disasters related to oil and the environment, the

¹⁰⁰ "Annual Report Year 2004 - 2005," 2005, accessed on March 07, 2020, <http://www.mod.gov.in/annual-report-year-2004-2005-0>.

¹⁰¹ Thomas F Lynch Lii and James J Przystup, "India-Japan Strategic Cooperation and Implications for U.S. Strategy in the Indo-Asia-Pacific Region," *Strategic Perspectives* (Washington, D.C: Institute for National Strategic Studies, March 2017), 8.

¹⁰² Li Li, "India's Security Concept and Its China Policy in the Post-Cold War Era," *The Chinese Journal of International Politics* 2, no. 2 (2008): 229–61.

connection between terrorism and crime, and pollution in the maritime environment among others. Certain unpopulated islands in the area have transformed into secure sanctuaries for terrorists and their activities. Besides, the proliferation of weapons of mass destruction was looming large in the region. Countering these threats and challenges entailed consistent cooperation between the states which had their mutual strategic interests at stake because of these menaces. According to Prof. Yoichiro Sato, a Japanese foreign policy expert,¹⁰³ India and Japan benefit mutually with their cooperation in the maritime domain in the Indian Ocean region especially to counter the growing threat emanating not only from China but also in facing new challenges like disaster management, piracy etc.

By 2009, approximately 60,000 ships passed through the Strait of Malacca, the Strait of Hormuz, the Lombok, and the Sunda Straits annually. Around 33% of global trade and 50% of the world's oil flowed through these maritime routes.¹⁰⁴ The traffic through the Malacca Strait into the South China Sea exceeded Suez Canal traffic by nearly three times and surpassed Panama Canal traffic by more than five times. The primary energy supply route in the Indian Ocean is the Strait of Malacca. The U.S. Energy Information Administration (EIA) had identified the Strait of Malacca as a crucial marine "choke point" in Asia due to its strategic significance.¹⁰⁵ The EIA reported that around 11 million barrels per day transit via the Strait of Malacca. This amount was expected to increase due to the projected three percent annual rise in oil consumption in developing Asian countries until 2025. China represented one-third of that estimated rise.¹⁰⁶ The EIA stated that a significant portion of the extra supply of oil would be sourced in from the West Asia and Africa, with a large portion of it expected to transit through the critical Strait of Malacca.

¹⁰³ Yoichiro Sato, (Dean, College of Asia Pacific Studies Dean, Graduate School of Asia Pacific Studies Ritsumeikan Asia-Pacific University Trustee of the Ritsumeikan Trust, Japan) in discussion with researcher on June 11, 2023.

¹⁰⁴ Gus Lubin, "A Brief Tour Of The 7 Oil Chokepoints That Are Crucial To The World Economy," Business Insider, accessed May 13, 2022, <https://www.businessinsider.com/oil-chokepoints-suez-canal-2011-1>.

¹⁰⁵ "World Oil Transit Chokepoints," U.S. Energy Information Administration (EIA), July 25, 2017, accessed May 13, 2022, https://www.eia.gov/international/analysis/special-topics/World_Oil_Transit_Chokepoints.

¹⁰⁶ Watkins Eric, "Facing The Terrorist Threat In The Malacca Strait," *Terrorism Monitor* 2, no. 9 (May 2004), accessed on March 07, 2020, <https://jamestown.org/program/facing-the-terrorist-threat-in-the-malacca-strait-2/>.

With regard to maritime security, Yoriko Kawaguchi, the then Japanese Foreign Minister during her visit to India in 2003, pointed out to the maritime security cooperation between the two states and stated that,

*“Cooperative maintenance of the security of maritime traffic in the sea-lanes that stretch across the Indian Ocean and the Strait of Malacca are among the security and defense issues which deserve our increased attention. Both countries share common interests and concerns regarding these issues.”*¹⁰⁷

In this regard, Japan’s keenness to enhance its security collaboration with India was apparent from the series of visits to India by the heads of the Japanese defence establishment. In 2006, during the months of February to April, all three Japanese service chiefs visited India. It is important to note that with the establishment of a security dialogue between India and Japan, had three tiers of defence cooperation: annual comprehensive security discussions, exchanges between the armed forces, and joint military exercises.¹⁰⁸ India and Japan collaborated on marine security through their coast guards. Both states advanced their bilateral military cooperation through mutual visits by military officials, naval goodwill cruises, and coordinated anti-piracy drills. Indian military officers and Japanese counterparts participated in each other’s training facilities to study different courses. The most notable advancement in the increasing security collaboration between the two nations is the transition from coastguard-to-coastguard exercises, as outlined in the May 2006 bilateral defence agreement, to a higher degree of naval cooperation.¹⁰⁹ This signified the level of comfort in developing strategic partnership between India and Japan. An important result of the first Ministerial-level strategic dialogue between India and Japan, which took place during the visit of the Indian External Affairs Minister Pranab Mukherjee to Japan on March 21, 2007, was the agreement for the navies of both countries to conduct their inaugural joint naval exercises in 2007.¹¹⁰ The Indian

¹⁰⁷ “Towards a Brighter Future: Advancing Our Global Partnership, Address by Yoriko Kawaguchi, Japanese Minister for Foreign Affairs, At the Federation of Indian Chambers of Commerce and Industry,” *The World and Japan*, January 8, 2003, accessed on March 07, 2020, <https://worldjpn.net/documents/texts/exdfam/20030108.S1E.html>.

¹⁰⁸ Rajaram Panda, “India-Japan Defence Partnership,” *Indian Foreign Affairs Journal* 7, no. 3 (2012): 311–20.

¹⁰⁹ “Joint Declaration on Security Cooperation between India and Japan.”

¹¹⁰ “India, Japan to Hold Joint Naval Exercises,” *The Times of India*, March 23, 2007, accessed on April 01, 2020, <https://timesofindia.indiatimes.com/world/rest-of-world/india-japan-to-hold-joint-naval-exercises/articleshow/1797419.cms>.

India's then External Affairs Minister Pranab Mukherjee's comments during the visit to Japan is worth mentioning. Pranab Mukherjee stated that each of them (India and Japan) had shown their ability to enhance maritime security. He emphasised that the key to sustained economic growth in Asia depends on both regional cooperation and ensuring the security of sea routes.¹¹¹ Mukherjee emphasised the importance of ensuring unrestricted movement of energy and trade between the Suez Canal and the Western Pacific to fulfil Asia's economic goals, as these routes provide 60 percent of the world's energy needs during that time. He even emphasised the need to improve collaboration between the navies of India and Japan to achieve marine security for energy supply and economic development, as reported by the foreign ministry.¹¹² The Indian External Affairs Minister's comments suggested that India was strategically interested in security cooperation with Japan. The common security concerns between India and Japan notably include, the spread of weapons of mass destruction (WMDs) in their joint pronouncements.¹¹³ India's history of non-proliferation had led Japan to collaborate with India in the field of non-proliferation. One significant agreement reached in high-level discussions between India and Japan is their decision to collaborate as partners to prevent the spread of WMDs. India and Japan even agreed to work together to enforce strict export controls.

Additionally, one of the security concerns for Japan is nuclear proliferation in the Korean Peninsula. Perhaps, one of the most volatile flash points in the Asia Pacific in the 21st century is the Korean Peninsula. Pyongyang's provocative acts had heightened Japan's security concerns. For instance, North Korea's missiles testing in the Sea of Japan in July 2006, was viewed by Japan as a serious problem from the standpoint of its national security.¹¹⁴ Two other developments, first, Pyongyang's declaration to hold nuclear tests on the plea of developing its deterrent against any US invasion and second, its actual nuclear test on 9th October 2006 sent shock waves in the regional security architecture and greatly complicated the security situation

¹¹¹ "India, Japan to Hold Joint Naval Exercises."

¹¹² David Scott, "India's 'Extended Neighborhood' Concept: Power Projection for a Rising Power," *India Review* 8, no. 2 (June 2009): 107–43.

¹¹³ Panda P. Jaganath, ed., *Scaling India-Japan Cooperation in Indo-Pacific and Beyond 2025: Corridors, Connectivity and Contours* (New Delhi: Institute for Defence Studies and Analyses, 2020).

¹¹⁴ Norimitsu Onishi and David E. Sanger, "Missiles Fired by North Korea; Tests Protested," *The New York Times*, July 5, 2006, sec. World, accessed on April, 07, 2020, <https://www.nytimes.com/2006/07/05/world/asia/05missile.html>.

in the region. Given this backdrop, the bilateral security partnership of both the countries entered into a more productive phase in the next decade.

Strategic Partnership from 2012-2022 between India and Japan

Even though the India-Japan partnership advanced to the point of agreeing to carry out joint military exercises, the relationship lost some of its momentum in the years from 2007 to 2014, a period marked by frequent changes in Prime Ministers of Japan. The successive Prime Ministers such as Yasuo Fukuda, Yukio Hatoyama, Naoto Kan, and Yoshihiko Noda showed less interest in improving relations with India compared to Prime Ministers Shinzo Abe and Taro Aso.¹¹⁵ Instead, they focused on repairing relations with China, but achieved limited results. A.K. Antony, the Defence Minister under the UPA regime, directed the Indian Navy to discontinue its involvement in collaborative exercises with the US and its allies in the Indian Ocean. India rejected Japan's proposals to utilise its base facilities in Djibouti for conducting anti-piracy operations.¹¹⁶ The inaugural Japan India Maritime Exercise (JIMEX) bilateral naval exercise took place in 2012, involving the participation of two Japanese vessels and an Indian frigate, destroyer, and corvette.¹¹⁷ In late 2013, Itsunori Onodera, Defence Minister of Japan visited India to propose the sale of the ShinMaywa US-2, which was an amphibious aircraft.¹¹⁸ Upon Shinzo Abe's return to power in December 2012, defence policies and strategies of Japan were more closely linked with his capabilities. Shinzo Abe even attended India's Republic Day celebrations in January 2014 as a Chief Guest.

¹¹⁵ Dhruva Jaishankar, "A Confluence of Two Strategies: The Japan-India Security Partnership in the Indo-Pacific," in *India and Japan: Assessing the Strategic Partnership*, ed. Rajesh Basrur and Sumitha Narayanan Kutty, Politics of South Asia (Singapore: Springer, 2018), 55, accessed on March 27, 2020, https://doi.org/10.1007/978-981-10-8309-9_3.

¹¹⁶ Chaudhuri Pramit Pal, "India and Japan A Nascent Strategic Bonding" (S. Rajaratnam School of International Studies, May 2015), 9, accessed on March 07, 2022, https://www.rsis.edu.sg/wp-content/uploads/2015/05/PR150514_India-and-Japan-A-Nascent-Strategic-Bonding.pdf.

¹¹⁷ "First Japan-India Maritime Exercise (JIMEX) in Indian Waters From 19-22 Dec," Press Information Bureau, December 17, 2013, accessed May 13, 2022, <https://pib.gov.in/newsite/PrintRelease.aspx?relid=101825>.

¹¹⁸ Mishra Vivek, "The Benefits for India of a US-2 Deal with Japan – The Diplomat," *The Diplomat*, October 24, 2013, accessed May 13, 2022, <https://thediplomat.com/2013/10/the-benefits-for-india-of-a-us-2-deal-with-japan/>.

In December 2013, Japan released a National Security Strategy, advocating for a defence force that was more adaptable and for easing of limitations on the sale of weapons.¹¹⁹ The Cabinet of Japan and the National Security Council granted approval to the National Defence Programme Guidelines, which aimed to outline strategies for enhancing Japan's defence capabilities and establishing the framework for the SDF.¹²⁰ In order to operationalise the strategy, a National Security Secretariat was created with the purpose of synchronising foreign and security strategies. As a result of implementing these measures, modifications were made to rules and laws pertaining to national security. In April 2014, the Abe government introduced new standards for the transfer of defence equipment and technology, following updated guidelines for defence cooperation between Japan and the US.¹²¹ The government led by Abe made a decision to revise Constitution of Japan to allow for collective self-defence. In September 2015, Japan's National Diet, the parliament, approved security measures that eased constraints on its capacity to participate in security operations abroad. Japan relied on India to safeguard its SLOCs, which were crucial for Japan's economic interests and energy stability. Japan recognised India as a crucial strategic partner in its endeavours to consolidate its status as a conventional military force and enhance its security impact in the Indo-Pacific region and beyond. At the same time, the alliance partnership between the US and Japan was crucial for maintaining regional security. However, there was a lack of partners (other than the US) that were both capable and willing to collaborate within the region. In contrast, India had superior maritime domain awareness capabilities compared to any ASEAN countries.

Subsequently, Prime Minister Narendra Modi undertook his first bilateral visit outside of South Asia to Japan in September 2014. The visit initiated the third phase of defence cooperation between India and Japan, during which they elevated their relationship to a "Special Strategic and Global Partnership."¹²² On the part of Japan it attempted to strengthen cooperation with India in the areas of defence and space, which are considered to be sensitive.

¹¹⁹ "National Security Strategy," Cabinet Secretariat, Government of Japan, December 17, 2013, accessed on January 07, 2022, <https://www.cas.go.jp/jp/siryoku/131217anzenhoshou/nss-e.pdf>.

¹²⁰ "National Security Strategy," Cabinet Secretariat, Government of Japan.

¹²¹ Heigo Sato, "Japan's Arms Export and Defense Production Policy," Japan Chair, Center for Strategic and International Studies, 2015

¹²² "Joint Statement on India and Japan Vision 2025: Special Strategic and Global Partnership Working Together for Peace and Prosperity of the Indo-Pacific Region and the World," Ministry of External Affairs, Government of India, December 12, 2015

India voiced its endorsement of Japan's endeavours to liberalise arms shipments and amend its legislation during Abe's visit to India the following year i.e., 2015.¹²³ Such a support played a crucial role in Japan's transformation into a more conventional military power.

In a way, the Japanese NSS of 2013 document supported a relationship with India which includes stronger military ties. It further stated that "Japan will strengthen bilateral relations on a broad range of areas, including maritime security, based on the bilateral strategic and global partnership."¹²⁴ The Japan-India security collaboration was still in its early stages when 2013 NSS was announced. Following the NSS guidelines, military cooperation took off once both Japanese Prime Minister Shinzo Abe and Indian Prime Minister Narendra Modi took office. Since then, there was steady growth in India and Japan's security cooperation. Similarly, the "Japan and India Vision 2025"¹²⁵ of 2015 outlined the commitment of the two nations to "a peaceful, open, equitable, stable, and rules based" Indo-Pacific as well as their aim to support high-quality infrastructure to improve connectivity in the area. Prime Minister Abe said, "a strong India is in the best interest of Japan, and a strong Japan is in the best interest of India."¹²⁶ According to Ken Moriyasu, diplomatic correspondent of Nikkei Asia, "Shinzo Abe followed an aggressive foreign policy vision as he had absolute control over bureaucracy and domestic politics."¹²⁷ Here, Prime Minister Shinzo Abe's political strength and his personal interest proved very significant while strengthening the strategic relationship between India and Japan.

¹²³ C. Raja Mohan and Rishika Chauhan, "India-Japan Strategic Partnership: Steady Advance amidst Enduring Constraints," in *Poised for Partnership: Deepening India-Japan Relations in the Asian Century*, ed. Rohan Mukherjee and Anthony Yazaki (Oxford University Press, 2016), 190, accessed on April 15, 2022, <https://doi.org/10.1093/acprof:oso/9780199466481.003.0007>.

¹²⁴ "National Security Strategy."

¹²⁵ "Japan and India Vision 2025 Special Strategic and Global Partnership," Ministry of Foreign Affairs of Japan, December 12, 2015, accessed on March 12, 2020, https://www.mofa.go.jp/s_sa/sw/in/page3e_000432.html.

¹²⁶ Abe Shinzo, "Two Democracies Meet at Sea: For a Better and Safer Asia" (Japan Institute of National Fundamentals, September 20, 2011), accessed on March 12, 2020, <https://en.jinf.jp/wp-content/uploads/2011/09/HP-E%E3%82%A4%E3%83%B3%E3%83%89%E6%BC%94%E8%AA%AC%E4%BC%9A%E5%A0%B4%E9%85%8D%E5%B8%83%E7%94%A8916.pdf>.

¹²⁷ Ken Moriyasu, (Diplomatic Correspondent, Nikkei Asia), in discussion with the researcher on December 8, 2023.

As an outcome of various military and strategic partnerships, Japan joined the US-India Malabar drills as a permanent participant in 2015.¹²⁸ Japan raised the quantity of defence attaches at its embassy in New Delhi, thereby establishing a representation of all three services and the Coast Guard as military attaches in India, thus becoming the sixth country to accomplish this.¹²⁹ India made the decision to permanently appoint a naval officer as its attaché at the Indian Embassy in Tokyo, rather than rotating the position among the three services. These decisions emphasised the significance of maritime cooperation in the defence collaboration of both the nations.

Furthermore, the 13th Annual Summit conference which was held in New Delhi in December 2015 was named as Vision 2025. In the summit, Prime Minister Shinzo Abe secured Prime Minister Narendra Modi's approval for Japan's policies regarding "Proactive Contribution to Peace" and "Legislation for Peace and Security."¹³⁰ The collaboration was also expected to establish comprehensive alignment in political, economic, and strategic objectives. The India-Japan partnership was strengthened at the Annual Summit meeting held in November 2016.¹³¹ It was evident through the efforts on the part of both the countries to synergise between "India's Act East Policy and Japan's Free and Open Indo-Pacific (FOIP)" plan. This was seen as an instance of harmonisation of their political, strategic and economic objectives. It was underscored that both India and Japan had a vital role in upholding peace and fostering progress in the Indo-Pacific region. The 2017 Annual Summit meeting which was held in India, focused on the theme of a Free, Open, and Prosperous Indo Pacific. There was a growing recognition that peace, security, and development were important factors in strengthening convergence and thereby a consensus was reached to advance the strategic goals.

¹²⁸ Franz-Stefan Gady, "Confirmed: Japan Will Permanently Join US-India Naval Exercises," *The Diplomat*, October 13, 2015, accessed on March 12, 2020, <https://thediplomat.com/2015/10/confirmed-japan-will-permanently-join-us-india-naval-exercises/>.

¹²⁹ "India-Japan Defence Ties Set to Grow Stronger," *The Economic Times*, July 11, 2018, accessed on May 07, 2021, <https://economictimes.indiatimes.com/news/defence/india-japan-defence-ties-set-to-grow-stronger/articleshow/48221899.cms?from=mdr>.

¹³⁰ "Japan and India Vision 2025 Special Strategic and Global Partnership."

¹³¹ "India-Japan Joint Statement during the Visit of Prime Minister to Japan," Ministry of External Affairs, Government of India, November 11, 2016, accessed on March 17, 2021, https://www.mea.gov.in/bilateral-documents.htm?dtl/27599/IndiaJapan_Joint_Statement_during_the_visit_of_Prime_Minister_to_Japan.

It is in this regard the 2017 Annual summit declaration gained prominence with the security cooperation between India and Japan. The term “role” used in the previous summit i.e., 2016, was upgraded to “central role” at 2017 summit. Through this change, India and Japan were expected to play a central role in safeguarding and strengthening a system that is based on rules. The collaboration which was embedded in 2016 Annual Summit declaration was transformed into the level of synchronisation in the declaration of 2017 Annual Summit. Both India and Japan tried to project a shared awareness of each other’s problems by using terms such as central role, convergence, alignment, consensus, and vow.¹³² India pledged to establish a de-facto balancing partnership with Japan but not in a complete alliance format. Hence, the burgeoning security cooperation between India and Japan had raised anticipations of a robust strategy to constrain China.

Subsequently, the October 2018 Summit resulted in the issuance of a Vision Statement by the governments of India and Japan. In the summit, proposals such as the “Acquisition and Cross Servicing Agreement and Implementing Agreements” with the navies were introduced.¹³³ In contrast to the Summit statements made in 2015, 2016, and 2017, the 2018 Summit exhibited a decline in several of the earlier promises. Labelling the 2018 Summit as a “Vision Statement” was in contradiction to the earlier established relationship since India and Japan had already defined their vision during the 2015 Summit. In Japan, during this period, the FOIP approach underwent revision and was transformed into the FOIP vision. The 2018 Summit statement failed to discuss the harmonisation or coordination between Act East policy and FOIP. The significance of maintaining a system which is governed by rules was reduced. There was a collective reduction of consensus and unity. The security relationship in 2018 was comparatively weaker than in 2015, 2016, and 2017. The examination of the India-Japan Summit statements revealed that the security relations between India and Japan experienced an upward trajectory from 2015 to 2017.¹³⁴ Nevertheless, there was a significant shift in 2018. The meeting between the leaders of China and Japan, President of China, Xi Jinping and Prime

¹³² “India-Japan Joint Statement during Visit of Prime Minister of Japan to India,” September 14, 2017, accessed on February 27, 2022, <https://www.mea.gov.in/bilateral-documents.htm?dtl/28946/IndiaJapan+Joint+Statement+during+visit+of+Prime+Minister+of+Japan+to+India+September+14+2017>.

¹³³ “2018 Japan-India Summit Meeting” (Ministry of Foreign Affairs of Japan, October 29, 2018), accessed on February 27, 2022, https://www.mofa.go.jp/s_sa/sw/in/page3_002603.html.

¹³⁴ “2018 Japan-India Summit Meeting”

Minister of Japan, Abe, took place on October 26, 2018, just two days prior to the conference between Prime Ministers Narendra Modi and Shinzo Abe. The joint statement between Xi and Abe did not contain any clear commitment of de-escalation. In June 2018, Prime Minister Narendra Modi, delivered a keynote address at the Shangri-la Dialogue, which was a noteworthy development. Two important concepts addressed in the speech by Modi were Indo-Pacific and the QUAD. It is pertinent to understand that India perceived the Indo-Pacific area as neither a strategy nor an exclusive coalition of members. This was understood as a refusal or dismissal of Japan's FOIP Strategy and the QUAD concept. Another trigger was related to sensitivity with regard to closer partnership between India and China. It was pointed out that India and China would achieve a more promising future for Asia and the world by collaborating with each other, relying on confidence, trust, and mutual respect for their respective interests.¹³⁵ India's increased engagement towards China led Japan and the US to become more vigilant and concerned. Nevertheless, after 2018, the security relationship between India and Japan was strengthened.

After the resignation of Prime Minister Shinzo Abe in 2020, there was a sense of dilemma in the policy circles regarding the continuity of his policies such as Indo-Pacific and QUAD. The subsequent Prime Ministers of Japan Yoshihide Suga and Fumio Kishida both belonging to LDP carried forward the foreign policies of Abe especially in the fields of security. After three online conversations, owing to COVID19, Prime Minister of Japan Suga and Prime Minister of India Narendra Modi met for the first time on 23 September 2021 in the US on the sidelines of the QUAD Leaders' Summit. During their meeting they committed to advance "India-Japan Special Strategic and Global Partnership" keeping in line with earlier policy commitments.¹³⁶ During the meeting they even reiterated their commitment to the newly launched "Supply Chain Resilience Initiative (SCRI)" between Japan, Australia and India. Due to the COVID19 pandemic Prime Minister Suga did not visit India.¹³⁷ In 2022, Prime Minister of Japan Fumio Kishida visited India for the 14th Annual Summit. During this summit both

¹³⁵ "India and Japan Growing Partnership and Opportunities for Cooperation" (CPPR Centre for Strategic studies, August 2019), accessed on February 02, 2023, <https://www.cppr.in/wp-content/uploads/2019/08/India-and-Japan-Growing-Partnership-and-Opportunities-for-Co-operation.pdf>.

¹³⁶ "Meeting on Japan-India Civil Nuclear Cooperation," Ministry of Foreign Affairs of Japan, February 21, 2020, accessed on March 12, 2021, https://www.mofa.go.jp/press/release/press4e_002521.html.

¹³⁷ "Meeting between PM and H.E. Mr. SUGA Yoshihide, PM of Japan," Prime Minister of India, September 24, 2021, accessed on March 12, 2022, https://www.pmindia.gov.in/en/news_updates/meeting-between-pm-and-h-e-mr-suga-yoshihide-pm-of-japan/.

Prime Ministers affirmed their commitment to a “peaceful, stable and prosperous world” and resolved to advance the “India-Japan Special Strategic and Global Partnership.”¹³⁸ During the meeting both the Prime Ministers reiterated their commitment to conduct a fighter exercise between the “Japan Air Self-Defence Force and the Indian Air Force.” Furthermore, they took note of the collaboration between India and Japan in “Unmanned Ground Vehicle (UGV) and Robotics” and wanted to further enlarge scope of areas to collaborate. Both the Prime Ministers welcomed the participation of Japan, for the first time in 2022, in the biennial naval exercises conducted by the Eastern Naval Command of India called MILAN.

Furthermore, the Prime Minister Kishida and Prime Minister Narendra Modi met each other in 2023 during a summit meeting in India¹³⁹. This was the year when both India and Japan chaired G20 and G7 respectively. During the summit Kishida extended invitation of Prime Minister Narendra Modi to take part in G7 summit held in Hiroshima, Japan. Both Kishida and Modi expressed their satisfaction with the growing defence exchanges that have taken place since the second “Japan-India Foreign Ministers’ and Defence Ministers’ Meeting (“2+2”)” held in September 2022. This includes the historic joint fighter exercise conducted by Japan and India in January of 2023 in Hyakuri airbase in Japan.¹⁴⁰ Subsequently, the two leaders met during the G7 summit held in Japan. During his visit Modi took part in QUAD summit and highlighted its importance in ensuring stability, prosperity and peace, in the Indo-Pacific region. Later on, the two leaders met again on the sidelines of the G20 summit held in India and maintained the necessary political connections to advance the bilateral strategic partnership. Moreover, during Kishida’s period Japan adopted three significant security documents and committed to increasing its defence spending to two percent of its Gross Domestic Product (GDP), marking a notable departure from its past stance.

¹³⁸ “India-Japan Summit Joint Statement Partnership for a Peaceful, Stable and Prosperous Post-COVID World,” Ministry of External Affairs, Government of India, March 19, 2022, accessed on March 12, 2023, <https://www.mea.gov.in/bilateral-documents.htm?dtl/34991/IndiaJapan+Summit+Joint+Statement+Partnership+for+a+Peaceful+Stable+and+Prosperous+PostCOVID+World>.

¹³⁹ “Japan-India Summit Meeting,” Ministry of Foreign Affairs of Japan, March 20, 2023, accessed on December 12, 2023, https://www.mofa.go.jp/s_sa/sw/in/page1e_000587.html.

¹⁴⁰ “Japan and India Hold First Joint Fighter Jet Exercise,” DW, January 16, 2023, accessed on December 12, 2023, <https://www.dw.com/en/japan-and-india-hold-first-joint-fighter-jet-exercise/a-64406635>.

During this phase i.e., 2012-2022 several significant agreements were signed, such as the 2015 “Agreements Concerning the Transfer of Defence Equipment and Technology”¹⁴¹ and Security Measures for the Protection of Classified Military Information”; the 2021 “Acquisition and Cross-Servicing Agreement (ACSA)”¹⁴²; the 2022 Memorandum of Cooperation in the Field of Cybersecurity.¹⁴³ Furthermore, in 2019, the 2+2 ministerial dialogue was established. Since 2017, the two nations also worked together to promote the QUAD partnership. In terms of military relations, the JMSDF began participating in joint exercises with the Indian Navy since 2012. Over time, the JMSDF transitioned from temporary involvement in earlier exercises to being a permanent participant in the U.S.-India Malabar exercise starting in 2015.¹⁴⁴ In 2018, the Japan Ground Self-Defence Force (JGSDF) and the Indian Army initiated their annual joint exercise, known as Dharma Guardian, with a specific focus on counterterrorism.¹⁴⁵ The earlier decade i.e., 2000 to 2010, witnessed institutionalisation of high level political visits with various levels of discussions and dialogues, formed as a base to the next decades strengthening of relationship. This phase was dominated by more action where military exercises, broadening of areas of cooperation with in strategic front, cooperation in multilateral fora where there were convergences in interests. In view of this discussion, the next section analyses the certain areas of common interests (areas of convergence) in the debates surrounding Indo-Pacific, a new security construct that India and Japan firmly believe in.

¹⁴¹ “Agreement Between the Government of Japan And The Government Of The Republic Of India Concerning The Transfer Of Defence Equipment And Technology” (Ministry of Foreign Affairs of Japan, December 12, 2015), accessed on March 07, 2022, <https://www.mofa.go.jp/files/000117470.pdf>.

¹⁴² “Agreement Between the Government of Japan And The Government Of The Republic Of India Concerning Reciprocal Provision Of Supplies And Services Between The Self-Defense Forces Of Japan And The Indian Armed Forces” (Ministry of Foreign Affairs of Japan, September 10, 2020), accessed on March 07, 2023, <https://www.mofa.go.jp/files/100091751.pdf>.

¹⁴³ “Memorandum of Cooperation in the Field of Cybersecurity between India and Japan” (Ministry of External Affairs, Government of India, March 19, 2022), accessed on July 07, 2023, <https://www.mea.gov.in/Portal/LegalTreatiesDoc/JP22B4109.pdf>.

¹⁴⁴ “Malabar Naval Exercises,” Press Information Bureau, February 8, 2021, accessed on February 12, 2023, <https://pib.gov.in/Pressreleaseshare.aspx?PRID=1696140>.

¹⁴⁵ “India-Japan Military Exercise Dharma Guardian-2018 Begins in Mizoram,” *The Indian Express* (blog), November 1, 2018, accessed on February 12, 2023, <https://indianexpress.com/article/india/india-japan-military-exercise-dharma-guardian-2018-begins-in-mizoram-5429954/>.

Convergences in the Indo-Pacific

Japan's Prime Minister Shinzo Abe discussed the strategic concept of the Indo-Pacific framework during his speech called "Confluence of the Two Seas" to the Parliament of India in August 2007, elevating the level of India-Japan bilateral relations. Prime Minister Abe based the ideology of this strategic framework on a book by Dara Shikoh, (author and a Prince during Mughal period) from 1655, and emulated Swami Vivekananda's idea that various powers come together, like numerous streams merging into the sea.¹⁴⁶ In 2007, Prime Minister Shinzo Abe highlighted the importance of stability for the development of a "broader Asia." The goal of the "arc of freedom and prosperity" was to establish an "open and transparent network" that facilitates the free flow of people, goods, capital, and information in the outer rim of the Eurasian continent.¹⁴⁷ This signified Japan's shift in foreign policy focus towards the Indian Ocean and India.

More than a decade later, the mutual effort to establish a coherent strategic framework for the Indo-Pacific region became evident. India's strategy for the IOR was defined by Prime Minister Narendra Modi's in March 2005, during his official trip to Mauritius, where he introduced the concept of "Security and Growth for All in the Region (SAGAR)."¹⁴⁸ The five pillars of SAGAR encompass the protection of India's interests and position, facilitating India's role in improving the region's maritime security capabilities, promoting security and peace through joint efforts and partnership in the maritime domain. At the same time, fostering the integrated and sustainable development of the IOR, including the Blue Economy, and emphasising that the countries within the region bear the responsibility for maintaining prosperity, stability, and peace. The policy promoted cooperation with external partners to accomplish these objectives. Prime Minister Modi defined the "Indo-Pacific region" as stretching "from the coastlines of Africa to the Americas."¹⁴⁹ India expressed its support for

¹⁴⁶ "Speech by H.E. Mr. Shinzo Abe, Prime Minister of Japan, at the Parliament of the Republic of India "Confluence of the Two Seas," Ministry of Foreign Affairs of Japan, August 22, 2007, accessed on April 07, 2022, <https://www.mofa.go.jp/region/asia-paci/pmv0708/speech-2.html>.

¹⁴⁷ "Speech by H.E. Mr. Shinzo Abe, Prime Minister of Japan, at the Parliament of the Republic of India "Confluence of the Two Seas."

¹⁴⁸ "Text of the PM's Remarks on the Commissioning of Coast Ship Barracuda," www.narendramodi.in, March 12, 2015, accessed on March 10, 2022, <https://www.narendramodi.in/text-of-the-pms-remarks-on-the-commissioning-of-coast-ship-barracuda-2954>.

¹⁴⁹ "Prime Minister's Keynote Address at Shangri La Dialogue," Ministry of External Affairs, Government of India, June 1, 2018, accessed on March 10, 2022, <https://www.mea.gov.in/Speeches-Statements.htm?dtl/29943/Prime+Ministers+Keynote+Address+at+Shangri+La+Dialogue+June+01+2018>.

establishing a region that is “free, open, and inclusive”, emphasising the significance of ASEAN in the Indo-Pacific. The achievement of this goal relied on ensuring fair access to shared areas in the Indo-Pacific region and maintaining a rules-based system to establish an open, equitable, and secure trading atmosphere. The Prime Minister Modi emphasised the crucial role of connectivity in the region and stated India’s stance that competitions should not escalate into hostilities.

The FOIP strategy of Japan, launched in 2017 as a novel foreign policy strategy, expanded upon Prime Minister Shinzo Abe’s 2007 plan and presented a holistic perspective of the global landscape. It is based on the concept of global cooperation which connects the continents of Africa and Asia, as well as the Pacific and Indian oceans, considering them as a unified concept. The policy objective was to “improve ‘connectivity’ between Asia and Africa through free and open Indo-Pacific and promote stability and prosperity of the region as a whole.”¹⁵⁰ In doing so, Japan wanted to increase its cooperation with African continent. Dr Satoru Nagao, a fellow at Hudson institute,¹⁵¹ points that Japan with its technology and resources is collaborating with India which has enormous material power in terms of human resource and potential manufacturing power to foster ties with African countries where China has an edge.

India and Japan formulated principles to implement their joint strategy for the Indo-Pacific region. The Annual Summit statement issued in September 2017 during Prime Minister Shinzo Abe’s visit to India included, among the other things, declaration “Towards a Free, Open and Prosperous Indo-Pacific.” In this context, Shashank Patel, a Japanese scholar, stated “the leadership of both countries played an active role in furious execution of decisions taken. India extended its foreign policy under Act East to far Pacific as well as Japan included IOR under the operational range of their idea of Indo-Pacific.”¹⁵² The principles included sovereignty and adherence to international law, resolution of conflicts via dialogue, sustainable development, and a trade and investment system that is characterised by freedom, unrestricted

¹⁵⁰ “Priority Policy for Development Cooperation FY 2017” (International Cooperation Bureau, MOFA, April 2017), accessed on March 10, 2022, <https://www.mofa.go.jp/files/000259285.pdf>.

¹⁵¹ Satoru Nagao (Fellow, non-resident at Hudson Institute, USA), in discussion with the researcher on May 3, 2023.

¹⁵² Shashank S. Patel, (Researcher, Department of East Asian Studies, University of Delhi), in discussion with the researcher on June 6, 2023.

freedom of navigation and overflight for all nations, fairness, and openness to everyone.¹⁵³ The “Vision Statement” issued subsequent to the October 2018 Summit reiterated the commitment of India and Japan to collaborate in realising a liberated and unobstructed Indo-Pacific region.¹⁵⁴ It emphasised the mutual initiatives undertaken by India and Japan in the Indo-Pacific region, particularly in Bangladesh, Sri Lanka, Myanmar, and Africa. This linked India’s “Act East Policy” with Japan’s “FOIP strategy.”¹⁵⁵ Japan’s regional order in the Indo-Pacific was formulated upon three strategic policies which include the FOIP initiative, the QUAD serving as the political and military foundation, the Regional Comprehensive Economic Partnership (RCEP) as the economic foundation, and the reinforcement of its navy.¹⁵⁶ The strategies sought to counteract China’s increasing dominance in the Indo-Pacific region by efforts such as the China-Pakistan Economic Corridor (CPEC), Belt and Road Initiative (BRI), the Asian Infrastructure Investment Bank (AIIB), and naval development aimed at establishing superiority in the Indo-Pacific region.¹⁵⁷

The importance of naval strength build-ups in achieving strategic objectives can be understood by looking at Japan’s approach. Japan was promoting the concept of the FOIP since the mid-2010s. Prime Minister Abe presented the initial idea during his keynote address in Kenya in August 2016 at the Tokyo International Conference on African Development (TICAD) VI.¹⁵⁸ The key to global security and prosperity resides in the dynamic linkage between two “free and open” oceans between two continents. It is crucial to emphasise that TICAD also prioritises the advancement of linkages. In its annual report, the MOFA of Japan

¹⁵³ India-Japan Joint Statement “Toward a Free, Open and Prosperous Indo-Pacific”, 14 September 2017, Gandhinagar. accessed on March 23, 2023, <https://www.mea.gov.in/bilateral-documents.htm?dtl/28946/IndiaJapan>.

¹⁵⁴ “India-Japan Vision Statement,” Ministry of External Affairs, Government of India, October 29, 2018, accessed on April 02, 2022, https://www.mea.gov.in/bilateral-documents.htm?dtl/30543/IndiaJapan_Vision_Statement.

¹⁵⁵ India-Japan Joint Statement “Toward a Free, Open and Prosperous Indo-Pacific”.

¹⁵⁶ Takenori Horimoto, “Indo-Pacific Order and Japan–India Relations in the Midst of COVID-19,” *Journal of Asian Economic Integration* 2, no. 2 (September 2020): 140–58, accessed on May 17, 2023, <https://doi.org/10.1177/2631684620940476>.

¹⁵⁷ Horimoto, 145.

¹⁵⁸ “Address by Prime Minister Shinzo Abe at the Opening Session of TICAD VI,” Ministry of Foreign Affairs of Japan, August 27, 2016, accessed on April 02, 2022, https://www.mofa.go.jp/afr/af2/page4e_000496.html.

characterised Abe's speech as the first implementation of FOIP, despite the presence of several similar words employed by scholars and experts in Japan and internationally by that time.

The basic concept of the FOIP according to the MOFA of Japan is as follows

*“Develop a free and open Indo-Pacific region as ‘international public goods’, through ensuring the rule-based international order, in a comprehensive, inclusive and transparent manner, attaching importance to ASEAN’s centrality and unity, to bring stability and prosperity for every country as well as secure peace and prosperity in the region as a whole. Japan will cooperate with any country that supports this idea.”*¹⁵⁹

The MOFA summarises FOIP as the “Promotion and establishment of the rule of law, freedom of navigation, free trade, Pursuit of economic prosperity, Commitment for peace and stability.”¹⁶⁰ Since the implementation of FOIP, there have been ongoing discussions regarding its effectiveness and its ability to gain the approval of other interested countries. The MOFA of Japan initially employed the FOIP strategy. Since mid-2018, the plan was replaced with FOIP vision. The term ‘strategy’ implied a focus on achieving harsh political objectives, leading the MOFA to maybe use the softer term, the FOIP vision.¹⁶¹ India and ASEAN countries may find such reforms favourable due to the emphasis placed on ASEAN centrality.

Quadrilateral Security Dialogue (QUAD)

One of the major strategic responses which India and Japan are involved in, along with like-minded states, to the emerging power architecture in Indo-Pacific region is QUAD. Against this setting, it is significant to consider the linkages between FOIP and the QUAD. FOIP, or Free and Open Indo-Pacific, represents a broad goal within the regional order of the Indo-Pacific. On the other hand, the QUAD is one of the means to ensure the achievement of FOIP. Yet, the QUAD is considered a loose grouping with no “teeth.”¹⁶² In 12 November 2017,

¹⁵⁹ “Free and Open Indo-Pacific,” Ministry of Foreign Affairs of Japan, April 24, 2023, accessed on March 07, 2023, https://www.mofa.go.jp/policy/page25e_000278.html.

¹⁶⁰ “Free and Open Indo-Pacific,” Ministry of Foreign Affairs of Japan.

¹⁶¹ Kei Koga, “Japan’s ‘Indo-Pacific’ Question: Countering China or Shaping a New Regional Order?,” *International Affairs* 96, no. 1 (January 1, 2020): 49–73, accessed on March 07, 2023, <https://doi.org/10.1093/ia/iiz241>.

¹⁶² Nagao, Satoru, (Fellow, non-resident, Hudson Institute, USA), in discussion with researcher May 3, 2023.

a press release titled “Australia-India-Japan-U.S. Consultations on the Indo-Pacific”, issued by the MOFA reported that “senior officials of diplomatic authorities in Japan, Australia, India, and the USA met in Manila, the Philippines on 12 November, and discussed measures to ensure a free and open international order based on the rule of law in the Indo-Pacific”, and noted that “the participants affirmed their commitment to continuing discussions and deepening cooperation based on shared values and principles.”¹⁶³ This conveyed the importance attached to QUAD grouping by all the member countries.

A subsequent quadrilateral conference held in June 2018.¹⁶⁴ The QUAD, consisting of four countries, was upgraded to a ministerial level of involvement from a secretary level during the UN General Assembly in New York held in September 2019. Through their negotiations, they made progress in achieving the realisation of the FOIP initiative.¹⁶⁵ It is pertinent to note that in all these discussions Japan was the main actor which led the discussions. India fully participated in all the processes. The US sought to play a more supportive role rather than taking the lead. Australia backed the QUAD process due its ties with Japan and the US. A fundamental challenge remained over the level of dedication to FOIP by the “America first” Trump administration. During President Barack Obama’s administration, the US was advocating for the Trans-Pacific Partnership (TPP) as a key component of its economic strategy in Asia, alongside a broader strategic approach known as the “rebalance to Asia.”¹⁶⁶ Trump withdrew the US from the TPP and gave less importance to the Asian rebalance policy.

During Trump’s first official Asian tour in November 2017, he accepted Japan’s FOIP initiative as a key component of his comprehensive Asia strategy. Before Trump’s arrival,

¹⁶³ “Australia-India-Japan-U.S. Consultations on the Indo-Pacific,” Ministry of Foreign Affairs of Japan, November 12, 2017, accessed on February 06, 2022, https://www.mofa.go.jp/press/release/press4e_001789.html.

¹⁶⁴ Takenori Horimoto, “Explaining India’s Foreign Policy: From Dream to Realization of Major Power,” *International Relations of the Asia-Pacific* 17, no. 3 (September 1, 2017): 463–96, accessed on March 07, 2022, <https://doi.org/10.1093/irap/lcx011>.

¹⁶⁵ Roy Shubajit, “Quad to Meet: Foreign Ministers of India, US, Japan and Australia | World News,” *The Indian Express*, September 23, 2019, accessed on May 23, 2023, <https://indianexpress.com/article/world/quad-to-meet-foreign-ministers-of-india-us-japan-and-australia-6019411/>.

¹⁶⁶ “Fact Sheet: Advancing the Rebalance to Asia and the Pacific,” *The Whitehouse President Barack Obama*, November 16, 2015, accessed on May 14, 2023, <https://obamawhitehouse.archives.gov/the-press-office/2015/11/16/fact-sheet-advancing-rebalance-asia-and-pacific>.

officials from the US administration were involved in discussions regarding the QUAD.¹⁶⁷ Secretary of State Rex Tillerson proposed on October 18, 2019, to enhance the trilateral collaboration among India Japan and the US to include Australia. Moreover, the National Security Advisor H. R. McMaster started employing the phrase ‘Indo-Pacific’ with increased frequency in the lead-up to President Trump’s tour of Asia. The National Security Strategy of the US, which was published by the White House in December 2017, explicitly expressed its caution towards Russia and China and its commitment to backing the QUAD. China’s objective was to outpace the US in the Indo-Pacific region and extend its state-controlled economic system. Additionally, China supported India’s ascent as a significant global power and a more robust strategic and defence partner. China also sought to strengthen collaboration with India, Japan and Australia through the quadrilateral partnership.¹⁶⁸ Sheila Smith, an American Japan specialist, underscored the importance of Japan and China for the US in a publication that was written before the Trump administration. She asserted that the foremost objective for US policymakers would be to forge a productive partnership with China while safeguarding the robust alliance with Japan.¹⁶⁹ In this way it was impossible to entirely attribute the policy change to the changing of the US government. The QUAD framework was likely the most appropriate diplomatic approach for the four countries in a region where China has expanded its influence.

China had regularly expressed its opposition to the QUAD since its establishment in 2007. Upon the initial proposal of the Australia-India-Japan-US partnership, China responded with a strong and unfavourable reaction. China view frameworks, whether they are quadrilateral or trilateral, as being intentionally created to surround it.¹⁷⁰ China cautioned against the QUAD by reiterating that it would essentially operates as an alliance similar to

¹⁶⁷ Horimoto Takenori, “The Free and Open Indo-Pacific Strategy: India’s Wary Response,” nippon.com, October 9, 2018, accessed on February 19, 2023, <https://www.nippon.com/en/currents/d00436/the-free-and-open-indo-pacific-strategy-india’s-wary-response.html>.

¹⁶⁸ “National Security Strategy of the United States of America,” National Archives, December 2017, accessed on March 07, 2023, <https://trumpwhitehouse.archives.gov/wp-content/uploads/2017/12/NSS-Final-12-18-2017-0905.pdf>.

¹⁶⁹ Sheila A. Smith, *Intimate Rivals: Japanese Domestic Politics and a Rising China* (Columbia University Press, 2015), accessed on March 07, 2023, <https://doi.org/10.7312/smit16788>.

¹⁷⁰ John W. Garver and Fei-Ling Wang, “China’s Anti-Encirclement Struggle,” *Asian Security* 6, no. 3 (September 30, 2010): 238–61, accessed on March 07, 2022, <https://doi.org/10.1080/14799855.2010.507412>.

NATO in Asia.¹⁷¹ China's critique and demonstrations against the 2007 QUAD and the QUAD 2017 has exhibited a fundamentally similar tone. D. Lian, a Chinese analyst, asserted that the purpose of the four-way conversations was to limit China's influence and warned that they would hinder regional progress.¹⁷² Another analyst, Zhao, asserted that the FOIP plan, which was designed with the intention of impeding the BRI and was bound to fail.¹⁷³ Deputy Director of the Chinese Foreign Ministry's Information Department, Geng Shuang, raised concern in a press conference on 13 November 2017.¹⁷⁴ He emphasised that multilateral projects should focus on promoting cooperation among countries involved rather than becoming exclusionary frameworks. China is likely to oppose the QUAD because it could hinder the region from achieving a Pax Sinica vision.

Since its inception QUAD has come a long way. QUAD witnessed significant growth and advancement in 2021, reaching the level of leaders at the inaugural QUAD Leaders' Summit held virtually on March 12, 2021.¹⁷⁵ The Prime Minister Narendra Modi joined his counterparts from Japan, Australia, and the USA to address regional and global challenges, focusing on the Indo-Pacific area. Leaders of the grouping announced the formation of three Working Groups which include Climate Change, Vaccine Partnership, and Critical & Emerging Technology. The QUAD implemented a proactive strategy to facilitate tangible collaboration. The QUAD had a significant turning point during the COVID-19 epidemic. India and China clashed in the Galwan Valley in 2020 and 2021, resulting in casualties on both sides. The incident was one of the major reasons which prompted India to align with the QUAD, resulting in the first face-to-face leaders' meeting in September 2021, hosted by U.S. President Joe Biden, after a virtual meeting six months prior.¹⁷⁶ The Leaders introduced three new

¹⁷¹ Minghao Zhao, "No Need to Overreact as Quad Ups Gear - Global Times," The Global Times, September 19, 2019, accessed on March 07, 2022, <https://www.globaltimes.cn/content/1165867.shtml>.

¹⁷² D Lian, "Four-Way Talks Meant to Contain China Miss Regional Development Demand," The Global Times, October 31, 2017, accessed on June 20, 2020, <http://www.globaltimes.cn/content/1072877.html>.

¹⁷³ Zhao, "No Need to Overreact as Quad Ups Gear - Global Times."

¹⁷⁴ D. Ba Alice et al., "The U.S. and China in Asia: Mitigating Tensions and Enhancing Cooperation" (Johns Hopkins SAIS, 2019), accessed on May 15, 2023, https://sais.jhu.edu/sites/default/files/The%20US%20and%20China%20in%20Asia_0.pdf.

¹⁷⁵ "First Quad Leaders' Virtual Summit," Ministry of External Affairs, Government of India, March 9, 2021, accessed on March 07, 2023, <https://www.mea.gov.in/press-releases.htm?dtl/33601/First+Quad+Leaders+Virtual+Summit>.

¹⁷⁶ "Fact Sheet: Quad Leaders' Summit," The White House, September 25, 2021, accessed on March 07, 2023, <https://www.whitehouse.gov/briefing-room/statements-releases/2021/09/24/fact-sheet-quad-leaders-summit/>.

Working Groups focusing on Infrastructure, Cyber and Space. 100 STEM grants, with 25 allocated to each QUAD country, have been announced for graduate and doctorate students from the QUAD countries to study at the US universities. The third QUAD Leaders' Summit took place virtually on 3 March 2022 to address the situation in Ukraine and its implications for the Indo-Pacific region. They also created a Quadrilateral Partnership on Humanitarian Assistance and Disaster Relief (HADR). Eventually, Japan hosted the fourth QUAD leaders' summit, the second one held in person, on 24 May 2022.¹⁷⁷ All the four leaders introduced the QUAD Satellite Data Portal to offer space-based data to regional countries for climate and disaster forecasting and sustainable use of marine resources. They also launched "QUAD Climate Change Adaptation and Mitigation Package (Q-CHAMP)" for practical collaboration on climate action, finance, and technology transfer to support countries in meeting their climate goals. Additionally, the QUAD Debt Management Resource Portal was established to tackle issues related to unsustainable debt financing. Lastly, the QUAD Partnership on HADR, led by India, aims to provide prompt and efficient aid in the Indo-Pacific region during future incidents. The fifth QUAD Leaders' Summit, the third held in person, took place in Hiroshima, Japan on May 20, 2023.¹⁷⁸ Aside from the Joint Statement, the QUAD Leaders' Vision Statement was also published. It detailed the Leaders' vision for a free, open, and inclusive Indo-Pacific region, emphasising the principles of sovereignty, territorial integrity, and peaceful conflict resolution. While talking about multilateral cooperation Prof. Rajesh Basrur opined that "in the bigger scheme of things, India and Japan can play a larger economic role in the Indo-Pacific while India and the US a larger military-strategic role; and all three a significant political role."¹⁷⁹ For instance, India and Japan together can coordinate economic assistance to Africa-India has the historical connections, Japan the money. India and the US can enhance the military resistance capabilities (vis-à-vis China) via training and equipment in the region (exercises, best practices, hardware). All three can build political solidarity and resistance to Beijing if the latter becomes more threatening.

¹⁷⁷ "Quad Joint Leaders' Statement," Ministry of Foreign Affairs of Japan, May 24, 2022, accessed on March 07, 2023, https://www.mofa.go.jp/fp/nsp/page1e_000401.html.

¹⁷⁸ "Quad Leaders' Joint Statement," The White House, May 20, 2023, accessed on October 07, 2023, <https://www.whitehouse.gov/briefing-room/statements-releases/2023/05/20/quad-leaders-joint-statement/>.

¹⁷⁹ Prof. Rajesh Basrur, (Professor of International Relations and Coordinator of the South Asia Programme at RSIS at Nanyang Technological University, Singapore.), in an email conversation with the researcher June 2023.

Concluding Remarks

India sought to engage with Japan as a key security partner through various means including declarations, dialogues, agreements, and defence exercises. The development of the security aspect of their relationship was gradual, contrasting with the more rapidly evolving economic ties. Following the culmination of the Cold War, both India and Japan aimed to diversify their security cooperation, particularly to safeguard their energy interests, given Japan's heavy reliance on gas imports. This led Japan to enlist India's assistance in addressing piracy in the decade after the Cold War.

Systemic factors prompted India and Japan towards strategic partnership, yet it was domestic factors enunciated by NCR, such as economic factors, leadership, anti-nuclear sentiment, and Japan's pacifist constitution that primarily shaped their relationship in the late 20th century. For instance, though the partnership slowly started to strengthen in the field of anti-piracy, India's nuclear tests strained the burgeoning security cooperation between India and Japan. However, the dynamics shifted quickly in response to emerging security challenges in their respective regions, especially concerning China, and the need to secure sea lanes of communication in the 21st century.

The initial decade of the 21st century marked a significant period of strategic engagement between India and Japan, serving as a transition phase in their bilateral strategic partnership. This era was characterised by increased leader-level dialogues, with both nations starting to see each other as crucial allies. The evolving systemic factors, particularly the rise of China as a potential challenge to the existing security order, further incentivised India and Japan to strengthen their ties. Additionally, the normalisation of India-US relations encouraged Japan to enhance its strategic presence in its relationship with India. The foundation for a deeper partnership was laid with Prime Minister Atal Bihari Vajpayee and Prime Minister Yoshiro Mori establishing a "Global Partnership" in 2000, which was further elevated to a "Strategic and Global Partnership" during Indian Prime Minister Dr Manmohan Singh's visit to Japan in 2006. The frequency of high-level visits between the two countries in this decade was nearly four times higher than in the previous years, underscoring the increased emphasis on their bilateral relations.

The 2000s laid the groundwork for more intensive dialogues and interactions, initiating the first India-Japan Two-Plus-Two Dialogue (involving the foreign and defence secretaries of

India and the deputy foreign minister and vice-defence minister of Japan) and the India-Japan Foreign Office Consultations. This period also saw the convening of four sessions of the “Joint Working Group on Counter-terrorism.” Prime Minister of India Manmohan Singh and Japanese Prime Minister Mori institutionalised summit level meetings during this period. From systemic factors fostering an environment conducive to strategic collaboration to domestic factors like leadership driving the partnership forward, the India-Japan security partnership underwent a comprehensive transformation during this decade. The ensuing decade i.e., 2010 to 2020 witnessed robust activities in the relationship.

India and Japan elevated their ties to a Special Strategic and Global Partnership, marking a significant advancement through the conclusion of various bilateral treaties and conducting numerous military exercises. This period was characterised by the rise of several systemic factors, including the conceptualisation of the Indo-Pacific region, the formation of the QUAD, the COVID-19 pandemic, threats to global supply chains, and the perceived emergence of China as a strategic threat, all of which spurred both nations to strengthen their strategic partnership with renewed enthusiasm. The leadership of Prime Ministers Narendra Modi of India and Shinzo Abe of Japan for most of the decade played a pivotal role in reinforcing this partnership. During this time, Japan adopted three significant security documents and committed to increasing its defence spending to two percent of its GDP, marking a notable departure from its past stance. Beyond systemic imperatives, domestic factors also served as a driving force behind the enhanced security cooperation between the two nations. For Japan, its post-war pacifist constitution, the political elite and ruling parties, bureaucratic dynamics, and public perceptions of security were key factors that either constrained or propelled the partnership forward. In India’s case, political leadership, the quest for technological advancements, the strategy to diversify security cooperation with other Asian nations due to shared concerns about China, and rising energy needs were crucial elements propelling the relationship forward.

To sum up, as the strategic partnership between India and Japan in the last three decades can be clearly understood through various systemic, domestic factors and issues (including the role of leadership), which in a way adhere to the postulates of NCR. As NCR points out the systemic factors, in the India-Japan strategic relationship, such as the end of Cold War, change in global order, rise of China, improving India-US ties, evolving Indo-Pacific construct, Pandemic and so on provided a conducive environment to strengthen their ties. But it was

through the domestic factors such as leadership perception, need for defence build-up, institutions, pacifist constitution and so on the decisions to tackle the systemic forces are mediated. In this case, i.e., India and Japan bilateral security relationship, the domestic influences which comprise the role played by key actors such as prime ministers, cabinet ministers and bureaucrats acted as a catalyst to drive the relationship forward in a systemic environment which was favouring the relationship.

Chapter 5

The Role of State and Non-Traditional Security in India-Japan Relations

Introduction

International Relations (IR) has traditionally focused on state-centric security issues, such as military power, territorial integrity, and national sovereignty. However, in recent years, the concept of security has expanded to include many issues that transcend state boundaries and challenge traditional security paradigms. These are a broad range of security concerns that are not directly related to military or territorial threats, but rather arise from a range of economic, social, environmental, and political factors. Examples of such risks include climate change, pandemics, terrorism, cyber-attacks, transnational crime, and energy security. As the world becomes increasingly interconnected and globalised, these issues are becoming more prominent in the international arena, and are increasingly recognised as critical challenges to global stability and prosperity. In this context, the first section of the chapter discusses the concept of security in international relations discipline, its various dimensions and how Neoclassical Realism (NCR) views security as a concept by bringing in the state centrality, national interest and domestic influences while dealing with issues of security which fall outside the traditional areas of security. The second section brings out various emerging security issues that affect the foreign policies of nation states, in this context India and Japan, and finally the third section of the chapter discusses different security issues surrounding India and Japan bilateral relations, which fall outside the domain of traditional security, and their mutual cooperation thereof.

The present chapter mainly focuses on state centric engagements on human security concerns through civil society interaction, climate change, which includes energy security and civil nuclear cooperation between India and Japan (convergence of interests linked with several domestic issues and factors). This chapter aims to highlight that despite regional geo-political ties, historical and territorial contexts and varying levels of development, there is potential for engagement between India and Japan. Specifically, it argues that their shared interests in environmental, energy security, and civil nuclear linkages can serve as a foundation for collaboration in both bilateral and multilateral fora. This perspective is analysed through the lens of neoclassical realist interpretations of international relations. While analysis is being made in the chapter on Non-Traditional Security (NTS) dimensions in India - Japan relations,

the centrality of state is focused as the study takes into consideration domestic and individual level factors.

The Concept of Security

Defining security has not been an easy academic endeavour. It conveys different meanings and has many referent objects ranging from an individual to state (national) and to that of the universal (international). It has meant different things to different people, in different places and different times over the course of human history. Many scholars have defined the term 'security', in various ways as a dynamic and diverse concept,¹ a controversial concept,² contested concept,³ most abused and misused concept,⁴ there can be no consensus as to its meaning. This is certainly true because the understanding of the concept is based on people's ideas, culture and perception of reality. Security is a common theme considered by almost every person in the developing and the developed world and is the core value of human life. The term security has no definite meaning and definition, since people view it differently. Ian Bellamy denotes security as, "a relative freedom from war, coupled with a relatively high expectation that defeat will not be a consequence of any war that should occur."⁵ According to Walter Lipmann, a noted American writer, a nation's security is determined by its ability to resist compromising its fundamental principles in order to prevent war, and its capability to uphold these principles via victory in a conflict if necessary.⁶ These are two examples as to how scholars receive the notion of security differently.

¹ Hitoshi Nasu, "The Expanded Conception of Security and International Law: Challenges to the Un Collective Security System," *Amsterdam Law Forum* 3, no. 3 (June 1, 2011): 16, accessed on February 2, 2023 <https://doi.org/10.37974/ALF.190>.

² Patricia Lasarte, "Framework Document: The Evolution of the Concept of Security (June 2011)" (Institute for Strategic Studies (IEEE: Instituto Español de Estudios Estratégicos), June 1, 2011), 1, accessed on February 4, 2022, https://www.ieee.es/en/contenido/noticias/2011/05/DIEEEM05_2011EvolucionConceptoSeguridad.html.

³ Barry Clarke, "Eccentrically Contested Concepts," *British Journal of Political Science* 9, no. 1 (January 1979): 123, accessed on January 24, 2022, <https://doi.org/10.1017/S0007123400001654>.

⁴ David A. Baldwin, "The Concept of Security," *Review of International Studies* 23, no. 1 (1997): 6.

⁵ Ian Bellamy, "Towards a Theory of International Security," *Political Studies* 29, no. 1 (March 1, 1981): 101, accessed on September 12, 2022, <https://doi.org/10.1111/j.1467-9248.1981.tb01276.x>.

⁶ Walter Lippmann, *U.S. Foreign Policy: Shield of the Republic*, First Edition (New York: Little, Brown and company, 1943), 51.

Similarly, Arnold Wolfer, an IR scholar, acknowledges that the concept of security is multifaceted and can have various interpretations. He discussed two aspects of security concepts: objective security, which refers to the lack of threats to acquired values, and subjective security, which refers to the absence of fear that these values may be challenged.⁷ Thus, he proposes a distinction between objective and subjective notions of security, where objective sense denotes, the real state of security for a given state, the subjective sense covers, how the state perceives its own security situation. Objective conception of security usually defines security in material terms and the subjective approach to security emphasises the importance of history and norms, of the psychologies of fear and perceptions within which threats are framed. Thus, the dual focus of security refers to absence of objective dangers and subjective fears.⁸ For Mohammad Ayoob, a distinguished political scientist, insecurity is characterised by vulnerabilities, both external and internal, that pose a danger or have the capacity to undermine or weaken the structure of a state, including its territorial boundaries, institutions, and governing systems.⁹ The protection of state's territory, which included military aggression, was highlighted as one of the main goals for the states in the aforementioned definitions. The term "security" has traditionally been employed in the theory and application of International Relations Studies (IRS), with a focus on themes of war, peace, balance of power and so on. Traditionalists, or supporters of the realist school of thought, view security as a state responsibility, a key aspect of a state's duty is to militarily protect its population from external attack.

Furthermore, neorealism posits that in order for states to guarantee their own survival, they must limit the unrestrained pursuit of power by employing the balance of power mechanism.¹⁰ The means to advance this mechanism include deterrence, military force projections, strategic nuclear balancing, collective security and military alliances. The nation-state and its national security were addressed under the traditional framework of security in the

⁷ Professor Arnold Wolfers, *Discord and Collaboration: Essays on International Politics* (Baltimore: The Johns Hopkins University Press, 1965), 145.

⁸ Hans Günter Brauch, "Concepts of Security Threats, Challenges, Vulnerabilities and Risks," in *Coping with Global Environmental Change, Disasters and Security: Threats, Challenges, Vulnerabilities and Risks*, ed. Hans Günter Brauch et al., Hexagon Series on Human and Environmental Security and Peace (Berlin, Heidelberg: Springer, 2011), 61–106, accessed on February 14, 2022, https://doi.org/10.1007/978-3-642-17776-7_2.

⁹ Mohammed Ayoob, *The Third World Security Predicament: State Making, Regional Conflict, and the International System* (Lynne Rienner Publishers, 1995), 200.

¹⁰ Stephen M. Walt, "The Renaissance of Security Studies," *International Studies Quarterly* 35, no. 2 (1991): 211–39, accessed on February 24, 2023, <https://doi.org/10.2307/2600471>.

past. In order to strengthen national power and capability and to eliminate threat which emanates from foreign invasion and aggression, security was necessarily seen as a notion that involved arming oneself with weapons and fighting skills. National interest was interpreted to mean interest in national security. Territorial integrity, sovereignty and political independence of the state are seen as the essential values by national security policy makers, and any danger to these values is seen as a threat to national security.¹¹ The desire for greater security sparked competition between states. The old approach to security restricted its application to just external security. External threats are typically of a military nature and take the form of invasion, aggression, and intrusion. This is a conventional interpretation of national security that was thoroughly established within the framework of realism for understanding international affairs.

The end of the Cold War posed a challenge to the neorealist worldview. The shift in power dynamics following the collapse of the Soviet Union prompted a re-evaluation of security objectives. The focus on nuclear threats between the United States (US) and the Soviet Union shifted to concerns about environmental deterioration and resource scarcity. The fundamental change in the international security landscape created the opportunity to alter the security discourse to allow for other security concerns to be given more attention in the security calculations of states and alternative paradigms emerged that shook the foundations upon which 'traditional' Security Studies were built. Since the end of the Cold War, non-military challenges to national security have increased. War is still a major concern for global security, but it is neither the sole hazard to life on earth, nor a guarantee of security. Furthermore, the culmination of the Cold War and the acceleration of globalisation have altered how different countries view national security.¹² As a result, NTS concerns are receiving their due place on the sides of traditional security concerns. To sum it up, it may be claimed that security is evolving by becoming more inclusive.

As discussed above, with the end of the Cold War, the global security environment changed tremendously. While interstate wars appeared to decline, internal conflicts threatened

¹¹ David A. Lake and Patrick M. Morgan, *Regional Orders: Building Security in a New World* (Pennsylvania: Penn State Press, 2010).

¹² Hans Günter Brauch et al., eds., *Globalization and Environmental Challenges: Reconceptualizing Security in the 21st Century*, vol. 3, Hexagon Series on Human and Environmental Security and Peace (Berlin, Heidelberg: Springer Berlin Heidelberg, 2008), 23, accessed on February 4, 2023, <https://doi.org/10.1007/978-3-540-75977-5>.

the lives and well-being of individuals and communities in many parts of the world. Urbanisation in the era of Globalisation and its effects also brought forth new existential threats, from poverty to risks from environmental degradation, pandemics and migration.¹³ Although such threats are not entirely new, they were occurring at a scale and magnitude never seen earlier. Many of these threats were also transnational in nature and effects. When mainstream IR and Security Studies theories, in particular neorealism, proved inadequate to the task of explaining and dealing with these emerging threats, especially how countries deal to mitigate them, there was the inevitable exercise to understand the intricacies of nation states perceive these threats.

In this regard, NCR provides a practical, balanced and policy-relevant construct which forms the base to understand the process of foreign policy making. Especially, while dealing with security threats which fall outside the realm of conventional understanding of security.¹⁴ Human security threats such as climate change, proliferation of nuclear technology, energy security and issues such as illiteracy, health, infrastructural deficiency and so on needs a level of leadership skills, public perception, and suitable policy environment. NCR aligns with the neorealist perspective that a state's foreign policy is primarily influenced by its "relative material power capabilities".¹⁵ However, it posits that foreign policy decisions, although influenced by material power, are also influenced by how the governing bodies, such as leadership and bureaucracies, of that power perceives it. Within a structure where human security forms a major security concern requires individual nation states to act individually and collectively at the same time to deal with such threats.

In other words, NTS issues in international relations, such as climate change, pandemics, and transnational terrorism, have profound impacts on the global structure due to their transboundary nature. Whereas, NCR, posits that the state plays a central role in navigating these complex threats within the international structure. However, this approach also emphasises the significant influence of domestic actors such as national interest,

¹³ Commonwealth Advisory Group, "A Future for Small States: Overcoming Vulnerabilities" (London: OECD Publishing, January 1, 1997), 16, accessed February 4, 2023, <https://doi.org/10.14217/9781848596078-en>.

¹⁴ Nicholas Kitchen, "Systemic Pressures and Domestic Ideas: A Neoclassical Realist Model of Grand Strategy Formation," *Review of International Studies* 36, no. 1 (January 2010): 118, accessed on February 6, 2023, <https://doi.org/10.1017/S0260210509990532>.

¹⁵ Ellis Mallett and Thomas Juneau, "A Neoclassical Realist Theory of Overbalancing," *Global Studies Quarterly* 3, no. 2 (April 1, 2023): 3, accessed on April 12, 2023, <https://doi.org/10.1093/isagsq/ksad023>.

leadership, civil society, and bureaucracy on foreign policy decisions. In addressing NTS threats, the perception and actions of these domestic players are crucial. Thus, while the state remains the primary actor in the international structure, the internal dynamics and varied interests within the state shape its responses to these global challenges, underscoring the nuanced interplay between domestic and international factors as articulated by NCR. In the context of India and Japan, the engagements in NTS areas takes place through state mediation. For instance, the Official Development Assistance (ODA) provided by Japan is used in areas of human security, such as education, health, infrastructure etc.

The Japanese government considers human security within the broader framework of NTS to include protection from aggression in wars as well as meeting the basic requirements of citizens. The Japanese government adopts a broader interpretation of the United Nation Development Programme (UNDP) concept of human security, emphasising the importance of protecting human security even in times of peace.¹⁶ Human security in India and Japan comprises several threats to human existence, daily life, and human dignity. These threats include human rights violations, environmental degradation, transnational organised crime, illegal substances, low levels of literacy, refugees, poverty, anti-personnel landmines, and infectious diseases. Japan and other Asian nations have adopted the UNDP's human security concept, which emphasises on a comprehensive approach to security.¹⁷ Japan's foreign policy places a high importance on addressing conflicts in Asia, as well as humanitarian issues such as illegal immigration, human trafficking, environmental challenges and poverty. The concept of human security remains a fundamental component in delineating both India and Japan's foreign policy, irrespective of changes in political regimes of both the states.¹⁸ It proves that irrespective of the political dispensation both states give priority to the aspects of human security in their policy formulations. In doing so both states gives primacy to state within the context of human security issues and NTS. This is because the cooperation in the areas of NTS between India and Japan takes place through state structure instead of leaving these issues to civil society completely. Within the context of NCR, the NTS issues can be of systemic nature

¹⁶ David Bosold and Sascha Werthes, "Human Security in Practice: Canadian and Japanese Experiences," *International Politics and Society* 1 (January 1, 2005): 90.

¹⁷ "Diplomatic Bluebook 2016 Japanese Diplomacy and International Situation in 2015" (Minister for Foreign Affairs, Japan, 2016), accessed on June 13, 2022, <https://www.mofa.go.jp/files/000177707.pdf>.

¹⁸ Yukio Takasu, "Japan and Networked Human Security," in *Routledge Handbook of Human Security*, ed. Mary Martin and Taylor Owen (London: Routledge, 2013), 342.

but responses to these threats come primarily from the state and through domestic interests which these states subscribe to. In this context, the following sections deal with various areas of cooperation between India and Japan in the realm of human security by bringing out various domestic actors who contributed to the relationship by keeping state at the centre.

The State and Civil Society in India-Japan Relations in the area of NTS.

The term civil society is often used ambiguously. At times, it refers to a society founded for individual rights and based on private property. Larry Diamond, a Japanese scholar, in his work on “rethinking civil society” enumerates different categories of civil society organisations.¹⁹ Most of them are general in nature but can be applied to India and Japan. These include organisations based on cultural groups, educational institutions, groups which work for the betterment of their members for example pensioners, veterans and so on, and even organisations which work for the betterment of the community by pooling in resources and investing in public goods such as infrastructure. In addition, there are organisations based on issues such as women rights, environmental groupings; those working towards the betterment of the society in a non-partisan way by creating awareness among public and organisations which advance intellectual or cultural activities; also called as the ideological groupings which includes think tanks, media groups, universities, publishing houses and artistic associations.²⁰ Japanese Non-Governmental Organisations (NGO) involved in enhancing Japanese ODA can be categorised into issue-based movements, developmental groups, and informational and educational groups.²¹ However, not all of these categories are applicable to Japanese NGOs in the context of India.

Throughout the period of accelerated economic growth (1960s to 1970s), Japanese civil society exhibited a predominantly cautious attitude. Japanese grassroots groups, particularly NGOs, had started to actively participate in political life in Japan since the 1980s, and more prominently in the early 1990s. Their involvement in foreign policy making, particularly with

¹⁹ Larry Diamond, “Rethinking Civil Society: Toward Democratic Consolidation,” *Journal of Democracy* 5, no. 3 (1994): 4–17.

²⁰ Diamond, 5.

²¹ Takafumi Miyake and Rie Koarai, “Japanese NGOs for Education: From Service Providers to Change Agents,” in *Japan’s International Cooperation in Education: History and Prospects*, ed. Nobuko Kayashima, Kazuo Kuroda, and Yuto Kitamura (Singapore: Springer Nature Singapore, 2022), 271–90, accessed on February 14, 2023, https://doi.org/10.1007/978-981-16-6815-9_12.

India, has been significant.²² Such an area of NTS aims to explore the correlation between grassroots activities and policy making, specifically in the context of development policy and overseas aid, which is a primary focus of Japanese state agencies and Indian state as well as civil society. Japanese NGOs have developed alongside the increase in Japanese ODA towards developing countries, such as India. NGOs began participating in ODA in the 1990s, with Japanese NGOs having the most frequent and close interactions with state officials in this field.²³ The Japanese ODA administration and the Japanese NGO community acknowledge two specific types of incorporated associations as NGOs: public interest corporations and designated non-profit activity associations. In accordance with Article 34 of the Uniform Civil Code of 1896 public interest corporations are a type of hybrid NGOs.²⁴ They are supervised by government agencies with jurisdiction in their specific area. Conversely, some of them operate independently from the government and participate in foreign aid at the local level. They are also part of NGO coordinating groups recognised by the Japanese government. Public interest businesses, like unincorporated entities, are eligible to receive government ODA subsidies and can participate in ODA implementation contracts.²⁵ These incorporated associations are commonly seen as privileged and exclusive organisations because of their financial status and close ties to the government. They are recognised as part of the NGO movement, unlike mass organisations represented by unincorporated associations classified as NGOs by the state, as well as other NGOs involved in grassroots foreign aid or influencing Japanese ODA with governmental action and through them state plays an active role in dealing issues with NTS.

As of March 2020, there are 51,269 specified non-profit corporations in Japan and around 7,718 public interest corporations and around 20,818 social welfare corporations.²⁶

²² Keiko Hirata, *Civil Society in Japan: The Growing Role of NGO's in Tokyo's Aid and Development Policy*, 1st edition (New York: Palgrave Macmillan, 2002).

²³ Reimann Kim, "Civil Society and Official Development Assistance: International Politics, Domestic Structures and the Emergence of International Development NGOs in Japan" (International Studies Association 41st Annual Convention, Los Angeles: Harvard University, 2000), accessed on July 12, 2022, <https://ciaotest.cc.columbia.edu/isa/rek01/>.

²⁴ "Legal Framework: Different Legal Status of Nonprofit Organizations in Japan," Japan NPO Center, 2020, accessed on February 2, 2023, <https://www.jnpoc.ne.jp/en/nonprofits-in-japan/legal-framework/>.

²⁵ "White Paper on Development Cooperation 2016 | Ministry of Foreign Affairs of Japan," Ministry of Foreign Affairs of Japan, 2016, accessed on June 2, 2022, https://www.mofa.go.jp/policy/oda/white/2016/html/honbun/b2/s2_3_3.html.

²⁶ Compiled by Japan Non-Profit Centre (JNPCC) from Cabinet Office NPO homepage, accessed on October 21, 2023, <https://www.jnpoc.ne.jp/en/nonprofits-in-japan/size-and-scope/>

Additionally, there are corporations like medical, religious and private school corporations. The role of Japanese NGOs is considered very significant in changing the nature of the ODA provided by Japan to developing countries. Over a period of time, Japan used its foreign aid to assist its domestic economic development by using aid as an instrument of the developmental state. Till late 1980s, there was little influence of Japanese NGOs in the functioning and allocation of ODA to developing countries. Japanese aid was primarily used to create market for Japanese products and aid projects were identified and allocated where Japan found potential for their economy and allotted aid projects to the Japanese firms accordingly.²⁷ The loan component within the Japanese aid was utilised to the benefit of Japanese firms as countries which are allowed to participate in the bidding process for projects from the less developed countries were technologically under developed and failed to win the projects.²⁸ With the advent of the globalisation and weakening of the developmental state, the idea of aid centred around Japan economic prospects was criticised and to meet the international norms which specified for grant elements within the aid programme for each country Japan started to diversify its aid component. This coincided with the broadening of the understanding of security within diplomatic circles. The concept of human security started featuring mostly in the Japanese security dialogue in the last decade of the 20th century.²⁹ Japan viewed areas such as health, climate, disaster resilience, education and so on as the priority areas in the developing countries. In order to provide this “soft aid” Japan started a grant programmes for NGOs within Japan in 1989 to implement small scale projects especially in the grassroots in the areas of human security and by mid 1990s Japan established, within the Ministry of Foreign Affairs (MOFA), a special division for NGOs and they were invited by the bureaucrats to take part in policy dialogues for the aid programme.³⁰ Reasons like the lack of understanding about the internal norms regarding the aid programmes on sustainable development, human security, human development and the and lack of personnel within the MOFA and Japan International Cooperation Agency (JICA) prompted the Japanese government to involve NGOs both in

²⁷ Jain Purnendra, “Japanese Foreign Aid: What’s in It for Japan? | East Asia Forum,” *East Asia Forum* (blog), July 21, 2016, accessed on June 12, 2022, <https://eastasiaforum.org/2016/07/21/japanese-foreign-aid-whats-in-it-for-japan/>.

²⁸ Hirata, 15.

²⁹ Satomi Ho, “Japan’s Human Security Policy: A Critical Review of Its Limits and Failures,” *Japanese Studies* 28, no. 1 (May 1, 2008): 105, accessed on June 2, 2022, <https://doi.org/10.1080/10371390801939120>.

³⁰ Hirata, 20.

Japan and other developing countries to implement aid projects in recipient countries. Within this context, Japan started Grant Assistance for Grassroots Projects (GGP) to help aid projects within the areas of human security in developing countries.

Grant Assistance for Grassroots Projects (GGP)

Numerous countries and locations worldwide have populations residing in challenging circumstances. People encounter multiple challenges in their daily lives, including restricted healthcare and education access, as well as inadequate clean drinking water. Providing direct support to NGOs and community-based groups is crucial in addressing the diverse needs of local communities at the grassroots level and addressing the human security issues. Moreover, providing support to local governments rather than national governments will more effectively address the genuine requirements of the population by making foreign policy making of a state resulting in an impact directly on the lives of citizens. The GGP programme was implemented by the Japanese MOFA in order to achieve this objective. The Government of Japan's ODA includes the GGP scheme. The Government of Japan has been providing financial aid through a system known as GGP since 1989.³¹ This scheme aims to support development projects that address the various fundamental human needs of individuals in over 100 countries, including India. The GGP represents a continuation of Japan's endeavour to bolster human security within the realm of global politics but keeping state at the centre. The GGP plan implemented by the Government of Japan has garnered a commendable global standing due to its provision of prompt assistance to development initiatives that directly contribute to the well-being of local communities at the grassroots level.³² The GGP, formerly referred to as the Small Scale Grant Assistance, was founded in 1989 with the objective of offering aid to NGOs and local authorities in developing countries that urgently need assistance from the Japanese government in addressing fundamental human needs and ensuring human security. The name was changed to GGP in 1995.³³ In Japan, it is generally known as "*Kusanone*." The word "Kusa" translates

³¹ "Evaluation of Japan's Grant Assistance for Grassroots Human Security Projects (GGP Scheme)" (Ministry of Foreign Affairs of Japan, 2005), accessed on June 14, 2022, <https://www.mofa.go.jp/policy/oda/evaluation/FY2005/text-pdf/gghsp.pdf>.

³² "Evaluation Study on The Grassroots Grant Programme Case Studies in Myanmar, Cambodia, Vietnam" (Ministry for Foreign Affairs, Japan, 2001), accessed on June 2, 2022, <https://www.mofa.go.jp/policy/oda/evaluation/FY2001/text-pdf/grassroot.pdf>.

³³ "Japanese Grant Assistance for Grass-Roots Human Security Project (GGP) 2023," Ministry of Foreign Affairs of Japan, accessed on February 24, 2023, https://www.my.emb-japan.go.jp/itpr_en/ggp2022.html.

to “grass” and “Ne” translates to “roots” in Japanese.³⁴ This assistance is provided in accordance with the agreement established between the Japanese Diplomatic Mission and the recipient organisation in the host country. While the aid is limited in scope, its purpose is to provide financial assistance to the local community that is experiencing significant adversity. The GGP gives priority to NGOs that implement grassroots initiatives, especially in qualified aid-receiving countries. This refers to educational institutions such as elementary and secondary schools, NGOs, multinational organisations, local governments, hospitals, and medical facilities that directly contribute to delivering assistance to impoverished nations. The GGP programme does not provide aid to governments and international groups for purposes such as conflict resolution and natural catastrophes.

The MOFA explicitly states that the GGP is not accessible to individuals or entities with the intention of making a profit. GGP’s main objective is to improve fundamental human needs, particularly by supporting grassroots organisations and humanitarian relief organisations.³⁵ Projects under the GGP systems include upgrading hospital equipment, building schools, constructing wells, providing vocational training, and organising seminars focused on poverty alleviation. The MOFA does not offer financial assistance for projects that do not benefit the target group i.e. the citizen of respective countries, such as research conducted by higher education institutions and capacity building by organisations; projects focused solely on commercial activities to create jobs for specific individuals or organisations; projects related to culture, literature, and sports that prioritise social and economic development; and projects with missionary, political, or military purposes.³⁶ MOFA emphasised that the maximum aid granted for each project is approximately JPY 10 million. Exceptions will be granted for improvement initiatives and project management, such as the development of infrastructure facilities. Certain initiatives require additional financial assistance in order to effectively tackle human security concerns, including trans-boundary challenges such as infectious diseases, environmental contamination, refugee populations, and

³⁴ “Grant Assistance for Grassroots Human Security Projects (GGP),” Ministry of Foreign Affairs of Japan, accessed February on 24, 2023, https://www.am.emb-japan.go.jp/itpr_en/b_000195.html.

³⁵ Ramli Dollah et al., “Japan’s Advocacy for Human Security in Global Politics: Case Study of Japan’s Grant Assistance for Grass-Roots Human Security Projects (GGP) in the State of Sabah, Malaysia, 2000–2021,” *East Asia* 40, no. 2 (June 1, 2023): 151–74, accessed on November 2, 2023, <https://doi.org/10.1007/s12140-023-09399-4>.

³⁶ “Japanese Grant Assistance for Grass-Roots Human Security Project (GGP) 2023.”

internal disputes within conflict-ridden areas. The GGP has received approval in 141 developing nations and has gained recognition for its ability to offer flexible and timely assistance to local development initiatives, thereby building a commendable standing.³⁷ The GGP plan provides financial assistance to non-profit organisations, including NGOs, medical institutions, and educational institutions, that meet the eligibility criteria outlined in the relevant legislation of the Government of India.

The Japanese government, through the GGP scheme, presently provides financial aid to non-profit organisations that are dedicated to promoting the well-being of marginalised and underprivileged segments of the population. The scheme primarily focuses on enhancing primary education and adult literacy, ensuring access to safe drinking water and sanitation, providing basic healthcare, reducing poverty, empowering women, promoting child welfare (including support for street children and the eradication of child labour), supporting persons with disabilities, and preserving the environment.³⁸ The aggregate count of projects receiving support in India is categorised into five regions, namely the Southern States, Karnataka State, Northern/North-Eastern States, Western States, and the Eastern States. The Embassy of Japan in New Delhi, as well as four Japanese consulates in Kolkata, Bengaluru, Chennai, and Mumbai, serve as the corresponding offices for GGP. Each office of the GGP is assigned a certain fund allocation and associated area to provide support for initiatives, which is determined at the State level.³⁹ Simultaneously, it should be noted that the GGP initiative does not offer scholarships, grants, or loans directly to people or organisations for the purpose of training, education, seminars, conferences, or research in Japan and India. By 2019, according to Mr. Mayasuki Taga, the Consulate General in Kolkata, 90 projects have been implemented in the Eastern India alone to help the underprivileged and disadvantaged communities at the grassroots level since 1992 within the areas of human security.⁴⁰ All of these projects are undertaken by the Japanese missions in India with the partnership of local

³⁷ Dollah et al., “Japan’s Advocacy for Human Security in Global Politics,” 155.

³⁸ “Grant Assistance for Grassroots Human Security Projects (GGP),” Ministry of Foreign Affairs of Japan, March 29, 2024, accessed on April 2, 2024, https://www.mu.emb-japan.go.jp/itpr_ja/11_000001_00288.html.

³⁹ “Frequently Asked Questions About GGP” (Ministry of Foreign Affairs of Japan, 2022), accessed on February 24, 2023, [https://www.in.emb-japan.go.jp/Japan-India-Relations/GGP/04_FAQ_\(Updated_October_2022\).pdf](https://www.in.emb-japan.go.jp/Japan-India-Relations/GGP/04_FAQ_(Updated_October_2022).pdf).

⁴⁰ Chakraborty Ajanta, “Japan Grant for Indian Tribal Students,” *The Times of India*, November 7, 2019, accessed on March 03, 2023, <https://timesofindia.indiatimes.com/education/news/japan-grant-for-indian-tribal-students/articleshow/71948322.cms>.

recipient organisations or NGO. Similarly, from 2009 to 2019 around 31 projects are funded by Japanese consulate in Mumbai in areas ranging from drinking water facilities, eradication of diseases, education to skill development.⁴¹ Additionally, the Consulate of Japan in Chennai funded around 25 grassroots projects under their jurisdiction from 2014 to 2022 within the domains of human security.⁴² For the period of 2019 to 2022, the Embassy of Japan in New Delhi funded 20 grassroots projects.⁴³ All the projects that are undertaken by the GGP scheme through Indian missions of Japan in India are state mediated and needs to be implemented by local level NGO or organisation. For instance, the project to provide drinking water supply system at Bellefonte community college in Meghalaya was funded by the Embassy of Japan in India, New Delhi but implemented by May Our Help Training Centre, an NGO in Meghalaya. Similarly, a project to construct school for children with special needs in Tamil Nadu was funded by Consulate General of Japan, Chennai but implemented by Ritham Charitable trust, an NGO based out of Rajapalyam which works to support mentally and physically challenged children. In this way Japan and India built their bilateral relationship within the area of human security by involving local communities but without losing the state centrality.⁴⁴ In the same way, Japan also began its JICA Partnership Programme to increase the role of civil society in cooperating and forwarding the bilateral relationship.

Japan International Cooperation Agency (JICA) Partnership Programme

The introduction of the JICA Partnership Programme (JPP) in 2002 was a response to the increasing significance of civil society in the realm of international cooperation. The programme facilitates the execution of projects devised by Japanese NGOs, local governments, and universities (“Partners in Japan”) with the aim of leveraging their collective knowledge

⁴¹ “Consulate General of Japan in Mumbai: Grant Assistance for Grassroots Projects,” Consulate - General of Japan in Mumbai, accessed on March 3, 2022, https://www.mumbai.in.emb-japan.go.jp/en/politics_eco/ggp.html.

⁴² “Grant Assistance for Grassroots Human Security Projects (GGP),” Consulate - General of Japan in Chennai, June 28, 2022, accessed on March 03, 2023, https://www.chennai.in.emb-japan.go.jp/itpr_en/b_000085.html.

⁴³ “Embassy of Japan in India: Grant Assistance for Grassroots Projects,” Embassy of Japan in India, 2022, accessed on February 04, 2023, <https://www.in.emb-japan.go.jp/Japan-India-Relations/GGP/ggp.html>.

⁴⁴ “Embassy of Japan in India: Grant Assistance for Grassroots Projects,” Embassy of Japan in India, 2022, accessed on June 2, 2023, <https://www.in.emb-japan.go.jp/Japan-India-Relations/GGP/ggp.html>.

and expertise in initiatives targeting developing nations.⁴⁵ The objective of JPP initiatives is to address the varied requirements of developing nations and enhance cooperation between communities in both developing nations and Japan. The JPP initiative was initiated in India in 2004. Since then, numerous projects have been executed in the domains of rural development, agriculture, health, women's empowerment, and tourism.⁴⁶ These initiatives aim to foster social and economic progress at the local level. JICA collaborates with Japanese partners to undertake JPPs aimed at empowering the community and people of India in conjunction with the Government of India (GOI). JPP has three important components in order to be considered for the scheme. First, it needs to be led by a Japanese organisation and fine-tuned to the local needs of the country, in this case it is India. Second, it must improve the standards of living of people and finally the project has to include Japanese citizens to participate in international cooperation by understanding the host country.⁴⁷ Unlike the GGP project a JPP project needs a Japanese organisation to actively take part in the project. As part of a JPP project on "Training for Capacity Development of Child Care Institutions to establish a Safety net for Vulnerable Children", a Japanese NGO called IMAGINUS partnered with an Indian NGO called Care of Needy Children Rightfully Nurtured (CONC'RN), conducted training for school teachers on life skill education and literacy. Similarly, the Implementation of Matricellular Protein (MCP) measurement in a Joint Project Proposal (JPP) named "Enhancing Treatment Outcomes for HIV/TB Co-infected Patients in Maharashtra" has been initiated by Junsei Educational Institution/Kibi International University and National AIDS Research Institute (NARI) in Pune, Maharashtra, since the year 2020. The utilisation of MCPs as indicators of severity in infectious diseases is anticipated to facilitate the assessment of HIV/TB severity, identification of adverse effects, and evaluation of treatment response, hence enhancing the management of patients co-infected with HIV/TB. The research intends to alleviate the physical load produced by adverse reactions of patients using NARI by sharing these strategies.⁴⁸ In similar way,

⁴⁵ "Japan's Official Development Assistance White Paper 2011: Japan's International Cooperation" (Ministry of Foreign Affairs, 2011), 147, accessed on June 2, 2022, https://www.mofa.go.jp/policy/oda/white/2011/pdfs/00_oda_wp_2011.pdf.

⁴⁶ "Operations and Activities in India FY 2022 - 2023" (JICA, 2023), 28, accessed on December 03, 2023, https://www.jica.go.jp/Resource/india/english/office/others/c8h0vm00004cesxi-att/brochure_27.pdf.

⁴⁷ "Operations and Activities in India."

⁴⁸ "Operations and Activities in India."

through a range of schemes, JICA assists the GOI in achieving its objectives and started NGO-JICA Japan Desk.

The main goal of the NGO-JICA Japan Desk is to promote the active participation of Japanese NGOs/academic institutes, Indian NGOs, and local governments in JICA's social development projects in India and at the same time assist Japanese NGOs in implementing the JICA Partnership Programme in India.⁴⁹ Furthermore, its objective is to provide extensive information about Indian NGOs and the current social development situation in India. The NGO-JICA Japan Desk provides assistance and advice on the standards and laws governing project implementation in India, with the aim of supporting Japanese NGOs. Furthermore, it provides support to Japanese NGOs who are interested in participating in the NGO schemes offered by the JICA in India. Additionally, it enables Japanese NGOs to implement the JICA JPP and other JICA NGO initiatives, as well as to carry out projects in India.⁵⁰ JICA seeks to enhance collaboration and partnership between Japanese citizens/organisations and Indian NGOs through consultations on matters pertaining to Indian NGOs and the organisation of seminars and workshops.

In order to provide information regarding the NGOs in India JICA developed a JICA India NGO Database.⁵¹ It classifies Indian NGOs based on the state of registration, operation state, sector wise and also provides information on whether an NGO worked with any Japanese organisation earlier and also whether an NGO collaborated with any State or Central government. Since its inception, according to the NGO database, there are 138 Indian NGOs which worked with different Japanese Organisations in ten sectors which include livelihood, disaster prevention, agriculture, environment, education, women empowerment, forestry, health, hygiene, water sanitation and rural development.⁵² In June 2020, JICA India initiated the establishment of the 'Sustainable Development Goals (SDGs) Business Co-Creation Lab -

⁴⁹ "JICA's Collaboration with NGOs | India | Countries & Regions | JICA," Japan International Cooperation Agency, 2023, accessed on December 03, 2023, https://www.jica.go.jp/Resource/india/english/office/about/ngodesk/ngodesk_01.html.

⁵⁰ "NGO-JICA Japan Desk," Japan International Cooperation Agency, March 2, 2023, accessed on December 03, 2023, <https://jicaindiango.in/updates/1>.

⁵¹ "JICA India NGO Database | India," Japan International Cooperation Agency, accessed on September 2, 2023, <https://www.jica.go.jp/Resource/india/english/office/others/ngo.html>.

⁵² "JICA India NGO Database | India."

Tsunagaru Lab” with the aim of fostering collaboration between Japanese corporations and Indian social businesses. The laboratory functions as a collaborative platform aimed at tackling social and developmental issues in various sectors, including healthcare, education, agriculture, waste management, and energy, among others. In addition, the collaboration between Japanese companies possessing distinctive technology and Indian social enterprises will facilitate their ability to target the final segment of the market, which has proven to be challenging thus far. This will result in the provision of products and services that are suitable for the Indian market, potentially leading to the development of a novel business model. As of December 2021, the Tsunagaru LAB has successfully enlisted more than 600 Indian enterprises and 80 Japanese companies as participants in its endeavours to disseminate information regarding Indian social entrepreneurs and facilitate business matchmaking.⁵³ During FY 2021, a total of nine webinars were conducted to showcase the initiatives undertaken by corporations to tackle social concerns in India, as well as to highlight successful corporate collaborations between Japan and India.

Additionally, campaign known as Achhi Aadat (AAC), Good Habit Campaign was initiated on National Cleanliness Day 2021 with the objective of enhancing public consciousness among a population of 10 crore individuals regarding the significance of adhering to proper hygienic practices in order to mitigate the transmission of Covid-19 and other contagious illnesses.⁵⁴ The campaign seeks to implement a straightforward and pragmatic strategy to address hygiene and sanitation concerns by advocating for handwashing, nail care, and other hygiene habits, including proper mask usage during the pandemic. In collaboration with numerous Japanese corporations, a range of hygiene goods, such as nail clippers, reusable masks, and a handwashing station known as “SATO Tap,” were disseminated throughout educational institutions and localities across 15 states and the National Capital Region of Delhi.⁵⁵ The campaign utilised a partnership with two Japanese characters, Kumamon and Hello Kitty, to promote COVID-19-related episodes of the popular Japanese manga “Cells at Work” and films. The aim was to disseminate messages about cleanliness and hygiene practices

⁵³ “SDGs Business Co-Creation Lab - Tsunagaru Lab - | India | Countries & Regions | JICA,” Japan International Cooperation Agency, 2022, accessed on April 5, 2023, <https://www.jica.go.jp/Resource/india/english/office/others/tsunagaru.html>.

⁵⁴ Sreeradha Basu, “JICA’s Achhi Aadat Campaign: Promoting Public Health and Sustainable Development in India,” *The Economic Times*, March 11, 2024, accessed on April 4, 2024, <https://economictimes.indiatimes.com/industry/services/consultancy/-audit/jicas-achhi-aadat-campaign-promoting-public-health-and-sustainable-development-in-india/articleshow/108398007.cms?from=mdr>.

⁵⁵ “Operations and Activities in India FY 2022 - 2023,” 14.

throughout the country.⁵⁶ The programme has effectively promoted cleanliness and healthy habits among children, who will persist in practicing “Achhi Aadat” as a lifelong habit to safeguard not only themselves but also their neighbours, including family and friends. Japanese corporations in India have undertaken various efforts that are also associated with India’s Atmanirbhar Swasth Bharat Yojana (PM-ASBY), a scheme aimed at enhancing the public healthcare system.

Another initiative; namely, Tokyo for India is a global student-led initiative supported by a team of more than 30 university students from Japan and India, extending to the USA, the UK, Spain, Australia, Singapore and so on. They have come together to launch an emergency fundraiser to support and enable critical COVID-relief services for marginalised communities in different parts of rural India.⁵⁷ Tokyo for India has launched the fundraiser as a call to action for all globally-minded citizens. Together with Non-Profit Organisation (NPO) Asia Initiatives, Tokyo for India distributed the funds raised to five local NGOs, undertaking COVID-relief activities for marginalised populations in different parts of rural India. Asia Initiatives is a registered NPO in both Japan and India which partnered with Indian NPO across 20 locations in India. The NGO’s Tokyo for India partnered with, are Gramin Mahila Vikas Sansthan (GMVS) in Rajasthan, which works on women in rural areas, received USD 6000. Samanat, an NGO which works for the forest communities received a budget of USD 4000, while Parmarth, an NGO which works for the betterment of the Scheduled Castes, Scheduled Tribes, migrants and women received a budget of USD 8000. The High Range Rural Development Society (HRDS), an NGO located in Tamil Nadu, Kerala and Gujarat, which works for tribal and rural communities, received a budget of USD 6000.⁵⁸ The cost of the project for each NGO was decided on the basis of the size and need of the NGO. All these NGOs concentrated on providing ration kits, vaccination facilitation, mobile health care units, medicine kits, warm up kits, sanitation kits and also conducting awareness campaigns related to COVID-19.

⁵⁶ “JICA and Hello Kitty Unite for Hygiene Advocacy with Hello Kitty: JICA’s Collaborative Drive for Hygiene Awareness in New Delhi | Where We Work - JICA,” Japan International Cooperation Agency, February 2, 2024, 14, accessed on April 5, 2024, https://www.jica.go.jp/english/overseas/india/information/press/2023/1530230_16802.html.

⁵⁷ “Support India as Globally Minded Citizens,” Tokyo for India, 2021, accessed on March 02, 2022, <https://www.tokyoforindia.org/>.

⁵⁸ “Support India as Globally Minded Citizens,” Tokyo for India, 2021.

Civil Society Involvements in the Multilateral context

The India-Japan collaboration extends beyond the bilateral agreement and encompasses the broader Asia-Pacific/Indo-Pacific area. The alliance recognised its potential to contribute significantly to the African continent.⁵⁹ During the annual conference of the African Development Bank (AfDB) in Ahmedabad in May 2017, the two nations made a substantial commitment of USD 200 billion towards the Asia-Africa Growth Corridor (AAGC) initiative.⁶⁰ The provision of assistance for this infrastructure endeavour across two continents is regarded as a connectivity initiative with a substantial budget. The AAGC is established under the framework of Trilateral Development Cooperation, wherein a northern donor provides technical and financial support to two or more southern countries (South-South).⁶¹ This project aims to establish a connection between South and Southeast Asia and Africa, with the objective of facilitating India and Japan in addressing their apprehensions regarding China's assertive outreach strategies. The project aims to provide advantages to Japan by capitalising on India's established robust connections with several African countries.

The aforementioned ties encompass civil society organisations such as Competition, Investment and Economic Regulation (CUTS), who possess substantial expertise in trilateral development and have established centres throughout Sub-Saharan Africa. Capacity building, technical assistance, and soft infrastructure development are crucial elements of AAGC.⁶² The project's ability to achieve its desired impact relies on the first-hand experience of civil societies in the regulatory regime, establishing strong working relationships with key decision-

⁵⁹ Ruchita Beri, "AAGC: Towards India-Japan Development Cooperation in Africa," RIS Discussion Papers (Research and Information System, 2017).

⁶⁰ Basu Titli, "Thinking Africa: India, Japan, and the Asia-Africa Growth Corridor," *The Diplomat*, June 3, 2017, accessed on December 03, 2023, <https://thediplomat.com/2017/06/thinking-africa-india-japan-and-the-asia-africa-growth-corridor/>.

⁶¹ Beri, "AAGC: Towards India-Japan Development Cooperation in Africa," 2.

⁶² "CII Report on India in Africa Report - Developing Trilateral Partnership" (Confederation of Indian Industry, 2019), accessed on December 03, 2023, <https://www.ciieximafricaconclave.com/Document/Reports/CII%20Report%20on%20India%20in%20Africa%20Report%20-%20Developing%20Trilateral%20Partnership.pdf>.

makers, and understanding their work style.⁶³ CUTSs services were utilised by the Japan Fair Trade Commission to organise a capacity building event for the African competition authorities, recognising that knowledge in developing countries is a suitable technology.

Climate Change

Only in the late 1980s did the Japanese become conscious of climate change as a political issue.⁶⁴ Just before the Conference on the Changing Atmosphere took place in Toronto in 1988, the G7 Summit was held there. The Toronto Summit covered political, economic, and the growing concerns over environmental deterioration around the world. One of the significant issues highlighted at the meeting was climate change. At that point, Japanese decision-makers realised that the issue of climate change was no longer solely one of science but rather one that was already high on the political agenda.⁶⁵ The government created a new “Council of Relevant Ministers on Global Environmental Conservation” in May 1989. Climate change was regarded as the most challenging of the several worldwide environmental challenges that the Council addressed. Japan was prepared to help with climate change mitigation, but it was of the view of setting specific goals for CO₂ emissions. At the Noordwijk Ministerial Conference in November 1989, Japan opposed the idea of establishing emission reduction objectives.⁶⁶ It claimed that establishing CO₂ emission targets was equivalent to limiting governments’ sovereign authority over the policy of energy. Japan’s main point of contention was its objection to the industrialised nations adopting a single emission reduction rate starting from a base year. It stressed how little energy is consumed in Japan on a per-capita or per-Gross Domestic Product (GDP) basis. Japanese populace had various reactions to Japan’s opposition to emission targets. Private Japanese companies were allegedly abusing marine resources and forests in the 1980s, and Japan came under fire for its actions. Increased media coverage helped

⁶³ Pradeep S. Mehta, “India-Japan Ties Will Get Closer If Civil Society Groups Are Involved,” *The Asian Age*, January 9, 2019, accessed on April 02, 2023, <https://www.asianage.com/opinion/oped/090119/india-japan-ties-will-get-closer-if-civil-society-groups-are-involved.html>.

⁶⁴ Yasuko Kawashima, “Japan and Climate Change: Responses and Explanations,” *Energy & Environment* 12, no. 2/3 (2001): 170.

⁶⁵ For example, climate change by anthropogenic greenhouse gases was a part of a discussion during a symposium of Kisho Gakkai (Japan Society of Meteorology) annual meeting in 1978.

⁶⁶ Kawashima, “Japan and Climate Change,” 171.

boost public awareness of environmental issues worldwide in Japan.⁶⁷ The Japanese government's answer at the Noordwijk meeting was criticised by several political figures in Japan as being excessively pessimistic.

In the year 1990, certain industrialised nations, including Germany and the United Kingdom (UK), initiated the establishment of their respective national emission targets, irrespective of the advancements made in international negotiations.⁶⁸ Japan, inspired by the actions of other nations, initiated measures to address global environmental concerns. The "Council of relevant Ministers" reached a consensus in June to establish an emission target for Japan. This led to the adoption of the "Action Programme to Arrest Global Warming" in October 1990.⁶⁹ CO₂ emissions were subject to a two-tier objective. The primary objective was to achieve a state of equilibrium in per capita CO₂ emissions from the year 2000 onwards, aiming to reach a level comparable to that of 1990. In order to accomplish the second aim of stabilising CO₂ emissions by 2000 and beyond at 1990 levels, it is necessary to enhance this target. However, this can only be done if innovative technology becomes available during the period of 1990-2000.⁷⁰ Regarding the CO₂ emission reduction, the Action Plan outlined the need to prioritise the preservation and advancement of forests in Japan, as well as to implement measures to conserve and enhance forests worldwide.⁷¹ The formulation of Japan's climate change policy can be elucidated by a multitude of domestic and international elements. The economic elements, sub-national players, political macrostructure and Japan's conception of its place in international society are among the notable factors. The initial two factors have remained consistent throughout the 1980s. Conversely, the latter two factors have exerted a

⁶⁷ Yuki Sampei and Midori Aoyagi-Usui, "Mass-Media Coverage, Its Influence on Public Awareness of Climate-Change Issues, and Implications for Japan's National Campaign to Reduce Greenhouse Gas Emissions," *Global Environmental Change*, Traditional Peoples and Climate Change, 19, no. 2 (May 1, 2009): 210, accessed on November 10, 2023, <https://doi.org/10.1016/j.gloenvcha.2008.10.005>.

⁶⁸ Germany announced 25% reduction of CO₂ emission from 1987 level by 2005, while the UK committed stabilization at 1990.

⁶⁹ Gunnar Fermann, "Japan's 1990 Climate Policy under Pressure," *Security Dialogue* 24, no. 3 (1993): 287–300.

⁷⁰ "Japan's Eighth National Communication and Fifth Biennial Report" (United Nations Framework Convention on Climate Change, December 2022), accessed on December 03, 2023, https://unfccc.int/sites/default/files/resource/NC8_BR5-JPN-E%20%281%29.pdf.

⁷¹ Yasuhiro Shimizu, "Japan's Policy on Global Warming," in *Global Climate Change: The Economic Costs of Mitigation and Adaptation*, ed. James C. White, William Wagner, and Carole N. Beal (Dordrecht: Springer Netherlands, 1991), 416, accessed on February 19, 2023, https://doi.org/10.1007/978-94-011-2914-5_25.

growing impact on decision-making processes of Japan. Although domestic level actors are increasingly acquiring the capacity to exert influence on decision-making processes, the prevailing determinant of Japan's stance on climate change continued to be the view within international society.

The major position of the Japan's government in decision making remained relatively stable from 1990 to 2000. Conversely, a significant shift occurred in the perception of subnational players over the decade. Every year, domestic players have acquired increased influence and expertise to effectively participate in decision-making processes of Japan regarding climate change. As a stakeholder in climate change policy generally, business is a significant sub-national player. Japanese business feels that it should strive to be ecologically responsible. However, before 1995, the industry had not given the matter of climate change adequate attention.⁷² Following Conference of Parties (COP) 1, the business community began to be apprehensive that the government may impose more rules because Japan was hosting COP3. Keidanren (Japan Federation of Economic Organisations) became active in urging private businesses and economic organisations to set voluntary emission targets in an effort to avoid such government interference.⁷³ On the other side, Keidanren is against legislation and other policies being introduced to minimise CO2 emission from the industrial sector in Japan. Keidanren started the "Voluntary Action Plan on the Environment" in 1997 and has been monitoring the industries' accomplishments ever since.⁷⁴ Its argument underlines that the majority of the emission rise since 1990 was witnessed in the transportation and residential sectors rather than in industry. It claims that Japanese business has cooperated with government efforts to address climate change and that the government of Japan should depend on the voluntary actions of the industries.

As public awareness of environmental issues grew in recent years, environmental NGOs in Japan gained power. Instead of focusing on climate change in the early 1990s, many

⁷² Takahiro Yamada, "Transforming the Dynamics of Climate Politics in Japan: Business' Response to Securitization," *Politics and Governance* 9, no. 4 (October 22, 2021): 67, accessed on November 10, 2023, <https://doi.org/10.17645/pag.v9i4.4427>.

⁷³ Yasuko Kameyama, "Evaluation and Future of the Kyoto Protocol: Japan's Perspective," *International Review for Environmental Strategies* 5, no. 1 (2004): 75.

⁷⁴ Komiyama Yasuji, "Japanese Industries' Voluntary Approaches: Outcomes Attained and Roles of the Government" (Director, Environmental Economy Office, June 2015), accessed on December 03, 2023, <https://iea.blob.core.windows.net/assets/imports/events/226/1.3Komiyama.pdf>.

of them were addressing regional environmental problems. NGO as a notion did not exist in Japan's conventional manner of formulating policy. Even when some of the NGOs began to take action against climate change, they struggled to win the support of the public. For the Japanese environmental NGOs, hosting the COP3 marked a sea change. Environmental organisations founded the *Kiko Foramu* (climate forum) umbrella organisation a year before the COP3.⁷⁵ Attending international conferences allowed them to learn about environmental NGO operations in other nations. In the awareness of common people, a comparable learning curve was also seen. Media coverage of climate change negotiations increased as COP3 drew closer. People understood the importance of environmental NGOs' work, the COP3, and climate change. The government began to pay attention to what the NGOs were saying.⁷⁶ Even after COP3, this trend is still going strong. Environmental NGOs increasingly hold workshops, publish newsletters, and do their own research on the potential for forests to reduce emissions or store carbon. Japanese NGOs are expanding their legitimacy by obtaining more clout.

The discussion about the usage of nuclear energy is another example of how willing the public is to engage in the decision-making process. Construction of new nuclear power stations is one of Japan's initiatives for reducing CO2 emissions. The administration argued at the time of COP3 that 20 new nuclear power facilities would be required to reach the 6 percent emission reduction goal.⁷⁷ However, public opposition to nuclear power intensified. The alleged impact of the Tokaimura radioactive manufacturing facility accident in September 1999 on public sentiment against nuclear power grew. In this way the response to Japan's climate change policies were multifaceted.

India's approach to climate change, on the other hand, took multiple considerations into account. The first is the country's high vulnerability to the impacts of climate change. India faces imminent effects of global warming such as irregular monsoons, flooding, rising sea levels, and higher heat stress. The poorest population groups of the country, which have the

⁷⁵ "A Brief History of the Environmental Movement in Japan (Part I) | JFS Japan for Sustainability," JFS Japan for Sustainability, July 21, 2009, accessed on December 10, 2023, https://www.japanfs.org/en/news/archives/news_id029180.html.

⁷⁶ "A Brief History of the Environmental Movement in Japan (Part I) | JFS Japan for Sustainability."

⁷⁷ Eric Shibuya, "The Kyoto Protocol from Formulation to Ratification: Japan's Role in International Climate Negotiations," in *Norms, Interests, and Power in Japanese Foreign Policy*, ed. Yoichiro Sato and Keiko Hirata (New York: Palgrave Macmillan US, 2008), 215, accessed on June 3, 2021, https://doi.org/10.1057/9780230615809_10.

least energy access, are the most vulnerable to these effects.⁷⁸ Climate change, therefore, is an urgent and compelling concern. The second factor influencing India's climate approach is the development imperative. India had roughly 400 million people, by 2012, with no access to electricity.⁷⁹ In terms of development indicators, in 2013, the country ranks at 135 of 187 on the UN's human development index and multidimensional poverty index.⁸⁰ This was marginally above countries in the least developed category. India, being one of the fastest growing economies, with a young population, its energy-related needs are significant and essential to its development. They include the ability to provide sufficient and quality energy for all, be energy secure, and limit local environmental concerns. Further, the energy sector is inextricably linked to, and the largest determinant of, the country's contribution to climate change: the energy sector is responsible for 77 per cent of India's greenhouse gas emissions by 2007.⁸¹ Any climate policy for India, thus, needed to take into consideration its energy strategy. Further, its mitigation and adaptation actions must be embedded within the overriding sustainable development objectives.

A third factor shaping India's approach to climate change is its engagement with the multilateral negotiations under the UN Framework Convention on Climate Change (UNFCCC). The per capita emissions picture looks very different, with India's projected per capita emissions in 2030 falling well below the 2011 world average.⁸² This emissions scenario does not allow for an easy answer to the climate problem. Traditionally, India, together with a majority of developing countries, insisted upon the principle of "Common But Differentiated

⁷⁸ Intergovernmental Panel on Climate Change, *Climate Change 2014: Impacts, Adaptation, and Vulnerability, Part B: Regional Aspects, Contribution of Working Group II on the Fifth Assessment Report of the Intergovernmental Panel on Climate Change*, (New York: Cambridge University Press, 2014), 1327–70.

⁷⁹ Kugelman Michael, "India's Nexus between Resources, Climate Change - and Stability," *NATO Review*, September 21, 2012.

⁸⁰ United Nations Development Programme, "Table 1: Human Development Index and Its Components", 2013, accessed on September 19, 2022, <http://hdr.undp.org/en/content/table-1-human-development-index-and-its-components>

⁸¹ "India: Greenhouse Gas Emissions 2007" (New Delhi: INCCA Indian Network for Climate Change Assessment, Ministry of Environment and Forests, Government of India, 2010), accessed on February 05, 2023, https://www.iitr.ac.in/wfw/web_ua_water_for_welfare/water/WRDM/MOEF_India_GHG_Emis_2010.pdf.

⁸² Navroz K Dubash et al., "Informing India's Energy and Climate Debate: Policy Lessons from Modelling Studies" (Centre for Policy Research, December 1981), accessed on February 19, 2023, https://pure.iiasa.ac.at/id/eprint/11644/1/Informing%20India's%20Energy%20and%20Climate%20Debate_CPR-IIASA.pdf.

Responsibilities and Respective Capabilities (CBDR-RC)”, which is enshrined in the UNFCCC.⁸³ The principle implies that any burden sharing for meeting the challenge of global climate change must take into account the historical responsibilities of industrialised countries for accumulated greenhouse gas emissions, which are the cause of anthropogenic climate change. While this principle was endorsed in the COP to the UNFCCC at Bali in 2007, a shift in narrative took place in subsequent negotiations away from a top-down approach premised on CBDR-RC with multilaterally negotiated targets and actions.⁸⁴ Japan and India took opposing stands on burden sharing in these negotiations.

Japan, along with other developed countries, stressed the ‘common’ rather than the ‘differentiated’ aspect of the CBDR principle, arguing that emerging economies like India were now significant emission sources and should therefore assume mitigation commitments of the same legal form, even if not stringency, as developed economies. It is for this reason that India and Japan find themselves on opposite sides of the fence at the multilateral level. India was also disappointed by Japan joining other developed countries in rendering the Kyoto Protocol inactive, especially since the protocol was associated with Japan and its commitment to the UNFCCC. The multilateral negotiating process under the UNFCCC has now evolved towards a pledge-and-review approach, whereby each country puts forward its domestically determined contribution towards global climate change action in the form of an Intended Nationally Determined Contribution (INDC). Considering these various changing factors, India’s INDC aimed to decrease its emissions intensity by 33.5 per cent from a 2005 baseline. It also intended to raise the proportion of electricity generated from non-fossil fuels to 40 per cent of the total capacity.⁸⁵ This will be achieved through technology transfer and low-cost financing. Additionally, India aims to create an extra carbon sink of 2.5 to 3 billion tonnes of CO₂ equivalent by enhancing forest cover according to the “India’s Intended Nationally Determined

⁸³ Navroz K. Dubash, “Safeguarding Development and Limiting Vulnerability: India’s Stakes in the Paris Agreement,” *WIREs Climate Change* 8, no. 2 (2017): 1–10, accessed on July 6, 2019, <https://doi.org/10.1002/wcc.444>.

⁸⁴ Sandeep Sengupta, “India’s Engagement in Global Climate Negotiations from Rio to Paris,” in *India in a Warming World: Integrating Climate Change and Development*, ed. Navroz K. Dubash (New Delhi: Oxford University Press, 2019), 114–41, accessed on December 12, 2020 <https://doi.org/10.1093/oso/9780199498734.003.0007>.

⁸⁵ Kwatra Sameer, “India Announces Climate Commitments - Putting India’s INDC in Perspective,” Natural Resources Defense Council, October 2, 2015, accessed on September 12, 2022, <https://www.nrdc.org/bio/sameer-kwatra/india-announces-climate-commitments-putting-indias-indc-perspective>.

Contribution: Working Towards Climate Justice” in 2015.⁸⁶ The above pledge builds on India’s National Action Plan for Climate Change (NAPCC), which was launched in 2008, ahead of the COP in Copenhagen. India’s NAPCC contains eight missions, of which the national solar mission is the most developed.⁸⁷ On the demand side, the government’s relatively successful mission on enhanced energy efficiency focuses on increased efficiency for industrial, commercial, and domestic sectors. The mission targets savings potentials of 23 million tonnes of oil equivalent, which corresponds to 98 million tonnes of CO₂ equivalent emissions.⁸⁸ An important component of the NAPCC is its focus on a co-benefits-based framework to inform domestic policy making. The framing keeps the focus on development as the basis for climate action, yet allows a linkage between India’s domestic priorities and its international engagement.

The solar mission aims to increase the stake of solar power in the energy basket by investing in and creating a favourable investment climate. National Democratic Alliance (NDA) has increased the solar energy target from the initial 20 GW to 100 GW by 2022 in 2015.⁸⁹ In spite of the detailed climate plan, however, many of the NAPCC missions are yet to see progress. The reasons for the slow progress can be traced to institutional failures and the lack of a consistent approach to guide efforts. Sound implementation of the NAPCC requires a institutional responses that support climate policy to be interwoven into existing policy-making plans and institutions. However, India does not have a formal role for an agency or individual to coordinate such a process. Furthermore, the limits of government capacity and governance styles also do not enable the driving of climate policy beyond fragmented efforts.⁹⁰ This growing domestic interest in clean energy and climate change efforts in India allows for

⁸⁶ “India’s Intended Nationally Determined Contribution: Working Towards Climate Justice,” UNFCCC, accessed on March 2, 2022, <https://www4.unfccc.int/sites/submissions/INDC/Published%20Documents/India/1/INDIA%20INDC%20TO%20UNFCCC.pdf>.

⁸⁷ “Climate Change Programme | Department of Science & Technology,” Department of Science and Technology, accessed on March 2, 2022, <https://dst.gov.in/climate-change-programme>.

⁸⁸ BEE, Perform, Achieve and Trade, 2012, accessed on September 21, 2022, <https://beenet.gov.in/>

⁸⁹ “Year- End Review 2022- Ministry of New and Renewable Energy,” Press Information Bureau, December 20, 2022, accessed March 02, 2023, <https://pib.gov.in/pib.gov.in/Pressreleaseshare.aspx?PRID=1885147>.

⁹⁰ N. Dubash and N. Joseph, “The Institutionalization of Climate Policy in India: Designing for Co-benefits and Prime Minister’s Council on Climate Change, National Action Plan on Climate Change”, Mainstreaming, Working paper, Centre for Policy Research, New Delhi, 2014.

significant opportunities for collaboration when approached strategically. India and Japan focus on advancing a clean energy agenda, it is possible to advance interests that simultaneously link energy and climate concerns, and enhance the bilateral relationship, which has thus far achieved limited outcomes. In addition, such cooperation would create a constructive dialogue on climate change that can help bridge the countries' differing positions at the UNFCCC. The untapped potential of the energy transition is significant if properly harnessed, it would provide access to new markets and the resulting economic growth, increase energy security which is a pressing need for both countries, and enable climate and socio-environmental benefits. The next section discusses opportunities for partnership for India and Japan within this context.

Energy cooperation between India and Japan was emphasised by the joint statement on the “Enhancement of Cooperation on Environmental Protection and Energy Security” in 2007.⁹¹ The recurring priorities under the dialogue are: energy security, environment and conservation, renewables, industrial and research cooperation, and the transfer of Japanese technologies to India. From the Japanese side, technical assistance is provided with support from the Japan External Trade Organisation (JETRO) and the Ministry of Economy, Trade and Industry (METI) and by Japan's New Energy and Industrial Technology Development Organisation (NEDO), Funding is provided by the Japan Bank for International Cooperation (JBIC) and the JICA.⁹² A multitude of organisations participate in the environmental cooperation between both the nations.

Focus areas under the dialogue are currently categorised by several working groups. To name a few, under ‘energy efficiency’, the major activities are capacity building and research and development (R&D) programmes.⁹³ Under ‘renewable energy’, projects include the Delhi–Mumbai Industrial Corridor (DMIC), which utilises Japanese technologies for solar power, smart urban transportation, and so on. Under ‘electricity and coal’, the Japan Coal Energy Centre (JCOAL) works towards improving the efficiency of equipment and facilities at Indian

⁹¹ “Joint Statement by the Republic of India and Japan on the Enhancement of Cooperation on Environmental Protection and Energy Security,” Archive PMO, August 22, 2007, accessed on March 02, 2022, <https://archivepmo.nic.in/drmanmohansingh/press-details.php?nodeid=624>.

⁹² “Joint Statement by the Republic of India and Japan on the Enhancement of Cooperation on Environmental Protection and Energy Security.”

⁹³ “Japan's Eighth National Communication and Fifth Biennial Report.”

sites and to introduce clean coal through supercritical and ultra-supercritical coal power generation.⁹⁴ While the architecture for cooperation is in place and some early initiatives are under way, the actual impact of the bilateral relationship under the energy dialogue has not been significant. The cooperation so far does not reflect a larger strategy of working towards the interests of both countries. It is worth taking a deeper look at the nature of the engagement to understand this, especially to bring in transformational changes in the energy economies of both the countries. Experience from the energy dialogue shows that while at the level of heads of state there is a positive commitment to cooperation, the enthusiasm and leadership does not filter down to implementing ministries and agencies. At an institutional level, there is no coordinating agency that oversees or can take forward the working group relationships. The objectives of the working groups require engagement from different ministries, yet the ministries operate in silos with respect to working group goals and seldom participate in the same discussions. The members of working groups themselves often have minimal engagement with ministry officials responsible for taking forth the groups' agendas. Lastly, there is no accountability with regard to fulfilling targets, and progress is therefore fitful and slow.

In the absence of follow-up implementation and careful monitoring by an empowered governmental mechanism, there could still be private sector opportunities to pursue. However, this has not been the experience so far. While Indian businesses see immense opportunities in the Japanese market, their efforts to avail these are largely unsuccessful. Prevailing explanations for this failure highlight the deep differences between the business cultures of the two countries.⁹⁵ While Indian businesses prefer contractual agreements with short-term gains, Japanese industry prefers to own business stakes in projects and rely on long-term relationships, an approach which is often perceived as too insular for Indian industry to penetrate. On the other hand, such a longer-term approach has allowed Japanese industry to be somewhat more successful in India than vice versa.⁹⁶ This was highlighted by Jayesh Ranjan,

⁹⁴ "Joint Statement on the Occasion of the 6th India-Japan Energy Dialogue between the Planning Commission of India and the Ministry of Economy, Trade and Industry of Japan," Ministry of External Affairs, Government of India, October 10, 2012.

⁹⁵ Shyam Saran and Radhika Khosla, "Energizing India-Japan Cooperation on Clean Energy and Climate Change," in *Poised for Partnership: Deepening India-Japan Relations in the Asian Century*, ed. Rohan Mukherjee and Anthony Yazaki (Oxford University Press, 2016), 127–50, accessed on December 15, 2021, <https://doi.org/10.1093/acprof:oso/9780199466481.003.0005>.

⁹⁶ "Joint Statement on the Occasion of the 7th India-Japan Energy Dialogue between the Planning Commission of India and the Ministry of Economy, Trade and Industry of Japan," September 12, 2013, accessed on March 02, 2022, <https://www.mea.gov.in/Speeches->

Special Chief Secretary for Information Technology, Electronics & Communications (ITE&C), Government of Telangana. He pointed out that Japanese Industries look for making connections for a longer duration to build trust and that's the reason why Japanese investors take a long time to enter into new regions to invest.⁹⁷ Importantly, the high cost of Japanese technology prevents its penetration into the Indian market at scale.

It is that in spite of the common energy priorities of the two countries, the scope of significant cooperation to mainstream clean energy remains untapped. Any serious bilateral collaboration must thus address the institutional shortcomings and cultural differences. Given the current India-Japan relationship where the two countries are increasingly looking to each other as partners, the political context is conducive to imparting a new thrust to clean energy cooperation.⁹⁸ The effort requires a clear identification of opportunities and agencies responsible for implementation, with a rethinking of the bilateral approach as one that prioritises the simultaneous objectives of sustainable economic growth, energy security, and addressing climate change. Clean energy cooperation itself should be seen as part of a larger strategic partnership that can evolve to other areas over time.

India and Japan have a long standing history of collaboration on energy efficiency. Beginning in 2006 under the energy dialogue, the countries collaborated on the development of India's Energy Conservation Act.⁹⁹ The act is the cornerstone of India's domestic strategy on energy efficiency in appliances, buildings, industry, and transportation. Cooperation currently entails workshops in partnership between the Energy Conservation Centre, Japan, Bureau of Energy Efficiency (BEE), Petroleum Conservation Research Association (PCRA), of India; capacity-building programmes for Indian state-designated agencies, small and medium enterprises, and energy managers and auditors; training of Indian trainers and technical assistance from METI; and cooperation on energy conservation in the textile industry.

Statements.htm?dtl/22192/Joint+Statement+on+the+occasion+of+the+7th+IndiaJapan+Energy+Dialogue+between+the+Planning+Commission+of+India+and+the+Ministry+of+Economy+Trade+and+Industry+of+Japan.

⁹⁷ Jayesh Ranjan (Special Chief Secretary for Information Technology, Electronics & Communications (ITE&C) and Industries & Commerce Departments of Government of Telangana), in conversation with the researcher on February 5, 2024.

⁹⁸ Saran and Khosla, "Energizing India-Japan Cooperation on Clean Energy and Climate Change," 140.

⁹⁹ "Japan-India Energy Dialogue," Simplified Digital Hands-on Information on Energy Efficiency in MSMEs, December 2006, accessed on July 2, 2022, http://sidhiee.beeindia.gov.in/ProjectComponent/Japan_India_Energy_Dialogue.

Demonstration projects on energy efficiency and smart community projects in the DMIC that utilise Japanese technologies are also under way. In the last few years, the countries have placed special emphasis on energy-intensive sectors and discussed technology transfers, financial support, and training programmes for Indian experts to exchange information with their Japanese counterparts.¹⁰⁰ Further, there are collaborations on energy-intensive industries such as steel and iron, pulp and paper, cement, petrochemicals, and power generation and distribution for formulating benchmarks, undertaking energy audits, and recommending energy efficiency measures. Transport, one of the fastest-growing energy-intensive sectors in the Indian context, is another area for collaboration.¹⁰¹ Japanese foreign direct investment (FDI) in India forms a 19 per cent share in automobiles, making opportunities for fuel-efficient automobile technology easier given existing Japanese market penetration.

Solar energy projections dominate India's renewable energy future. The Indian government launched the "Jawaharlal Nehru National Solar Mission" in January 2010 with the aim of making solar energy a progressively more significant component of the country's energy mix. The original target was to install 20 GW of grid-connected capacity and 200 MW of off-grid decentralised applications by 2022. In late 2014, the already ambitious target was raised to 100 GW of solar power by 2020.¹⁰² By 2015, the mission achieved an installed capacity of approximately 4,000 MW and as on 2024 January 31 the total installed renewable energy sources increased to 135116 MW which includes a 74306 MW of solar power.¹⁰³ The target is challenging considering that the Indian solar industry faces constraints on account of its limited domestic technological capacity and its substantial reliance on imported technology. Further, the enhanced target will require adequate financing. In both respects, Japan is a partner to India. Such collaboration is also in line with Japan's recalibrated post-Fukushima energy strategy to increase the share of renewables in its overall energy mix, as per its 2014 Strategic Energy

¹⁰⁰ "Joint Statement on the Occasion of the 7th India-Japan Energy Dialogue between the Planning Commission of India and the Ministry of Economy, Trade and Industry of Japan."

¹⁰¹ "FDI Synopsis on Country Japan" (Department for Promotion of Industry and Internal Trade, December 31, 2020), accessed on March 12, 2022, https://dpiit.gov.in/sites/default/files/Japan_v_2020.pdf.

¹⁰² Ministry of New and Renewable Energy, Annual Report 2013–14.

¹⁰³ "All India Installed Capacity (in MW) of Power Stations" (Central Electricity Authority, Ministry of Power, January 31, 2024), accessed on April, 2023, https://cea.nic.in/wp-content/uploads/installed/2024/01/IC_Jan_2024_allocation_wise-1.pdf.

Plan.¹⁰⁴ However, technological and space constraints can hinder growth in the Japanese solar market. India, like Japan, needs to reduce the space required per megawatt of solar power through technology applications (for example, nanotechnology). In order to reduce intermittency to achieve parity with the current grid, it is also necessary to advance battery storage technologies. This is a key joint R&D project between India and Japan. Japanese companies at the forefront of solar technologies could be a source for India's expanding solar market and assist in creating an Indian manufacturing base. The Indian government is promoting solar manufacturing parks, and Japanese companies are invited to set up wholly owned subsidiaries or joint ventures.

The two governments have already initiated technological cooperation on solar power as part of the bilateral relationship. A large-scale micro-grid solar photovoltaic demonstration project and smart community projects in the DMIC utilise Japanese technologies to develop next-generation energy infrastructure.¹⁰⁵ NEDO has also initiated a feasibility study for the greening of India's telecommunication towers using a photovoltaic system. Both countries intend to initiate a joint research programme towards energy access improvement in non-electrified areas and to establish appropriate investment environments for renewables. India and Japan have initiated a Clean Energy Partnership (CEP) with the aim of attaining sustainable economic growth and safeguarding energy security in the domain of electric vehicles.¹⁰⁶ The Ministry of External Affairs (MEA) stated that the collaboration will result in environmentally sustainable economic expansion through the enhancement of employment opportunities, innovation, and investments. India and Japan recognise the necessity of investigating many alternatives to guarantee a reliable and consistent energy supply in order to accomplish the objectives of sustainable economic expansion and mitigating climate change. Both parties hold the perspective that the attainment of a low-carbon economy does not adhere to a singular trajectory, but rather varies across nations. This alliance will establish a foundation for collaboration between two nations. India acknowledged the Asia Energy Transition Initiative

¹⁰⁴ "IRENA's Renewable Roadmap (REmap 2030): REmap Countries Renewable Energy Targets" (International Renewable Energy Agency, 2014), accessed on February 24, 2022, http://irena.org/remap/IRENA_REmap_RE_targets_table_2014.pdf.

¹⁰⁵ "All India Installed Capacity (in MW) of Power Stations."

¹⁰⁶ "India-Japan Clean Energy Partnership," Ministry of Economy Trade and Industry, Government of Japan, March 19, 2022, accessed on March 02, 2023, https://www.enecho.meti.go.jp/en/category/others/cep/20220319_e.pdf.

(AETI) implemented by Japan. India has set a more ambitious goal, which includes achieving net zero emissions by the year 2070.¹⁰⁷ Japan has similarly set a goal to attain carbon neutrality by the year 2050.¹⁰⁸ Both nations are strategically leveraging low-carbon rising industries and capitalising on emerging technology and business models in order to mitigate carbon emissions. Most recently Government of Japan along with its domestic institutions such as JICA, JBIC, NEDO signed a Memorandum of Cooperation with International Solar Alliance (ISA), headquartered in Haryana, India. The ISA was conceived as a coalition of “sunshine states”, a novel assemblage of countries abundant in solar resources situated between the tropics.¹⁰⁹ During the 21st COP at the UNFCCC in November 2015, the Government of India and the Government of France together initiated the ISA initiative. The involvement of India in the initiation and implementation of the ISA serves as a reflection of the interconnectedness between domestic interests and concerns, the expansion of domestic renewable energy objectives, and transnational, international, and regional goals. The ISA serves as a purposeful tool of Indian economic statecraft, effectively aligning its financial objectives, namely money and technology for clean energy transition, with the imperative of human security, namely energy security. The purpose of this cooperation is to build a cohesive and institutional framework aimed at fostering and advancing tangible international collaboration among the Government of Japan, NEDO, JICA JBIC, and ISA in the realm of renewable energy.¹¹⁰ It also includes cooperation in energy storage, energy saving, and energy efficiency technologies. Additionally, it aims to foster technological innovations in the solar energy industry and promote a clean tech ecosystem in the member countries of ISA.

¹⁰⁷ Singh Vaibhav Pratap and Saran Samir, “Net Zero by 2070: Financing India’s Biggest Infrastructure Buildup,” orfonline.org, February 23, 2024, accessed on March 2, 2024, <https://www.orfonline.org/expert-speak/net-zero-by-2070-financing-india-s-biggest-infrastructure-buildup>.

¹⁰⁸ Ben Dooley, Makiko Inoue, and Hikari Hida, “Japan’s New Leader Sets Ambitious Goal of Carbon Neutrality by 2050,” *The New York Times*, October 26, 2020, sec. Business, accessed on October 3, 2022, <https://www.nytimes.com/2020/10/26/business/japan-carbon-neutral.html>.

¹⁰⁹ “Signing of Memorandum of Cooperation with International Solar Alliance,” Japan International Cooperation Agency, May 21, 2022, accessed on December 17, 2023, https://www.jica.go.jp/Resource/india/english/office/topics/press220521_02.html.

¹¹⁰ “Signing of Memorandum of Cooperation with International Solar Alliance,” Ministry of Foreign Affairs of Japan, May 21, 2022, accessed on December 03, 2023, https://www.in.emb-japan.go.jp/itpr_en/11_000001_00643.html.

Similarly, Prime Minister of India Narendra Modi, inaugurated the Coalition for Disaster Resilient Infrastructure (CDRI) during the New York Climate Action Summit 2019.¹¹¹ The Coalition was established as a consequence of extensive consultations at the national, regional, and global levels, involving countries confronted with diverse difficulties arising from development, climate, and catastrophic risk factors. CDRI is an initiative launched by India that demonstrates India's increasing leadership in fostering an integrated and inclusive approach to disaster resilience and climate change. Infrastructure systems play a pivotal role in fostering sustainable development, facilitating economic progress, and promoting wealth. These systems encompass various components such as highways, power plants, communication lines, and housing.¹¹² Nevertheless, contemporary infrastructure projects frequently encounter severe weather phenomena, including intense precipitation, extensive inundations, and unprecedented heatwaves, necessitating a collaborative approach and proactive measures.

Despite the existence of well-established disaster management procedures and early warning systems in numerous nations, such as India, the economic ramifications resulting from infrastructure projects damage continue to be substantial. It poses an additional risk to progress and hinders the achievement of global objectives to establish fair and equitable infrastructure systems for individuals nation states and communities. Hence, the construction of robust and impervious infrastructure systems, as envisioned under the CDRI, has become of great importance. The Coalition earned the classification of a "International Organisation" in 2022, and its Secretariat is situated in New Delhi.¹¹³ The organisation entered into the Headquarters Agreement (HQA), which grants it autonomy and an international legal identity to facilitate the efficient and successful execution of its international operations. Japan became part of

¹¹¹ "Leadership Initiatives | Coalition for Disaster Resilient Infrastructure (CDRI)," Disaster Management Division, Ministry of Home Affairs, 2022, accessed on October 7, 2023, <https://ndmindia.mha.gov.in/leadership-initiatives>.

¹¹² "Coalition for Disaster Resilient Infrastructure (CDRI) 2022 Conference Proceedings," in *Sustainable and Resilient Infrastructure*, vol. 8 (Taylor & Francis, 2023), 1–143, accessed on March 03, 2023, <https://doi.org/10.1080/23789689.2023.2181552>.

¹¹³ "Cabinet Approves Categorization of the Coalition for Disaster Resilient Infrastructure (CDRI) as an 'International Organization' and Signing of the Headquarters Agreement (HQA) with CDRI for Granting It the Exemptions, Immunities and Privileges as Contemplated under the United Nations (Privileges & Immunities) Act, 1947," Press Information Bureau, June 29, 2022, accessed on January 6, 2023, <https://pib.gov.in/pib.gov.in/Pressreleashere.aspx?PRID=1837893>.

CDRI considering the risks posed by its geography with frequency of disasters.¹¹⁴ By being part of Japan and India wants to actively collaborate in creating disaster resilient infrastructure for the most vulnerable nations. India and Japan also multilaterally collaborate within the framework for Quadrilateral grouping comprising Australia, the US, India and Japan. In this regard, the Indian National Centre for Ocean Information Services (INCOIS) example (formed in 1999), wherein different states in Asia-Pacific region collaborating on data sharing especially on Tsunamis and earthquakes is quite noteworthy. India and Japan are part of such a novel collaborative framework which is of immense help to the common people in the region in managing the disasters emanating from marine system.

This presents significant opportunities to strengthen shared collaboration in the field of environmentally friendly and sustainable development. Significant strides have been made by India and Japan in the pursuit of establishing a secure, efficient, resilient, and sustainable energy system. The energy policies of both countries are driven by the ideals of energy security, efficiency, environmental sustainability, and the transition to clean energy, with a focus on safety. The participation in this relationship further enhance the existing efforts of both parties, which were initiated through the “Japan-India Energy Dialogue” in 2007. It will significantly broaden the scope of cooperation to mutually benefit both the parties. Furthermore, it will foster the development of inventive solutions and the establishment of robust and reliable supply networks between India and Japan as they advance in their own energy transition strategies.

India-Japan Engagements in the Civil Nuclear Arena.

The nuclear issue encompasses two facets: the need for the elimination of nuclear weapons and the increasing concern in the non-military utilisation of nuclear energy. In the case of Japan, they are involved in multiple multilateral alliances to address the issues of nuclear proliferation. For instance, the proponents of full disarmament include the economically developed nations that do not possess nuclear weapons, namely New Zealand, Australia, Japan, Canada and the majority of the developing countries. These countries have presented their arguments from an ideological perspective, placing significant emphasis on the

¹¹⁴ Sablok Avni, “Examining the Role of the Coalition for Disaster Resilient Infrastructure (CDRI),” Indian Council of World Affairs, September 14, 2023, accessed on October 03, 2023, https://www.icwa.in/show_content.php?lang=1&level=3&ls_id=9924&lid=6344.

inhumane nature of nuclear weapons.¹¹⁵ The individuals at the forefront of the contemporary nuclear disarmament movement primarily consist of the nations that possess nuclear weapons, with the US at the forefront. Their policy positions are shaped by the security landscape that has arisen in the aftermath of the Cold War. President Barack Obama's address in Prague in April 2009, which sought to establish a world devoid of nuclear weapons, holds great importance.¹¹⁶ In April 2010, the Nuclear Posture Review (NPR) of the US advanced the nuclear disarmament programme initiated by President Obama by announcing a decrease in the quantity and significance of nuclear weapons in safeguarding the national security of the US and its allies.¹¹⁷ The increasing global interest in nuclear energy, encompassing both developed and emerging nations, is primarily motivated by apprehensions regarding energy security and the phenomenon of global warming. However, the expansion of nuclear power generation is accompanied by potentially hazardous aspects such as safety concerns, nuclear proliferation, and nuclear security. The utilisation of nuclear power for military objectives inherently entails inherent hazards. Ensuring the mitigation of this danger necessitates the implementation of essential safety mechanisms, safeguards against proliferation, and robust security measures, popularly known as 3-Ss.¹¹⁸ The notion of 3-Ss was initially established through consensus among the G-8 nations and subsequently incorporated into the Declaration of the G8 Hokkaido Tokyo Summit which was held in 2008.

This section provides an analysis of the present state of civil nuclear collaboration between India and Japan, as well as the challenges associated with establishing such cooperation. An assessment is conducted to determine the potential consequences of the Fukushima event on Japan's nuclear prospects. The study's findings suggest that the Fukushima incident serves as a poignant reminder to nations globally to prioritise the implementation of robust safety measures in order to establish nuclear energy as a dependable

¹¹⁵ Endo Tetsuya, "Two Sides of the Same Coin: Nuclear Disarmament and the Peaceful Use of Nuclear Energy," *East Asia Forum* (blog), June 12, 2010, accessed on June, 2022, <https://eastasiaforum.org/2010/06/12/two-sides-of-the-same-coin-nuclear-disarmament-and-the-peaceful-use-of-nuclear-energy/>.

¹¹⁶ "Remarks By President Barack Obama In Prague As Delivered," Whitehouse.gov, April 5, 2009, accessed on February 10, 2021, <https://obamawhitehouse.archives.gov/the-press-office/remarks-president-barack-obama-prague-delivered>.

¹¹⁷ Tetsuya.

¹¹⁸ Dr Robert Finch, "3S Framework" (Sandia National Laboratories, 2012), accessed on February 12, 2023, <https://www.osti.gov/servlets/purl/1104765>.

and environmentally friendly energy source.¹¹⁹ However, it is important to note that both Japan and India cannot completely eliminate nuclear energy as a viable component of their energy security strategies. Japan, as the sole nation to have experienced a nuclear strike, exhibits a heightened sensitivity towards nuclear matters. Consequently, Japanese public sentiment strongly opposes the proliferation of nuclear weapons and any manifestation thereof.¹²⁰ Japan's stance on matters such as the Comprehensive Test Ban Treaty (CTBT) and Nuclear Non-Proliferation Treaty (NPT) has been characterised by a lack of adaptability. While Japan now comprehends India's stance and past utilisation of nuclear power for civilian applications, publicly acknowledging this altered perception could potentially convey an incorrect message to the global community regarding Japan's potential nuclear future. The bilateral relations between India and Japan worsened after India conducted nuclear tests at Pokhran in 1998. Japan halted all its economic assistance to the ongoing initiatives at that time. The action was perceived in India as an excessive response and a deficiency in comprehending India's imperatives.¹²¹ From 2001 onwards, there was a gradual improvement in political relations under the leadership of Junichiro Koizumi, Shinzo Abe, Yasuo Fukuda, and Taro Aso. The trend has persisted throughout the Hatoyama government and is being observed under Kan Naoto.

Differences do exist in the realm of potential collaboration in the important civil nuclear domain between India and Japan. Despite the occurrence of talks in multiple summit gatherings, a significant breakthrough has yet to be achieved.¹²² Yukio Hatoyama emphasised the significance of promptly implementing the CTBT during his visit to India in December 2009.¹²³ During a collaborative press encounter, the individual emphasised the worldwide trend

¹¹⁹ Willis Carley, "Ensuring the Safety of Nuclear Installations: Lessons Learned from the Fukushima Daiichi Accident," Text, International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA, March 3, 2021), accessed on May 12, 2022, <https://www.iaea.org/bulletin/ensuring-the-safety-of-nuclear-installations-lessons-learned-from-the-fukushima-daiichi-accident>.

¹²⁰ "Tokyo NGO Criticize Japan-India Nuclear Pact for Spreading Proliferation," *The Japan Times*, January 10, 2010, accessed on February 12, 2019, <http://search.japantimes.co.jp/print/nj20100701f4.html>.

¹²¹ Thakur Ramesh, "India's Relations with Japan: Post Pokhran-II | IPCS," Institute of Peace and Conflict Studies, January 12, 1999, accessed on May 30, 2021, https://www.ipcs.org/comm_select.php?articleNo=168.

¹²² "India Japan Relations," Ministry of External Affairs, Government of India, January 2013, accessed on March 02, 2021, https://www.mea.gov.in/Portal/ForeignRelation/Japan_Relations_-_Jan_2013.pdf.

¹²³ "Japan Hopes India Will Sign Nuclear Test Ban Treaty," *The Hindu*, December 29, 2009, sec. India, accessed on December 12, 2021, <https://www.thehindu.com/news/national/Japan-hopes-India-will-sign-nuclear-test-ban-treaty/article16855970.ece>.

towards the prompt implementation of the pact and anticipated that India would align itself with the US and China in promptly signing and ratifying it. The commitment of India to a unilateral and voluntary moratorium on nuclear explosive testing was reaffirmed by the then Prime Minister Dr. Manmohan Singh. Hatoyama mentioned the Fissile Material Cut-Off Treaty (FMCT) and expressed hope that India would join Japan in the negotiation process to speed up its conclusion. The FMCT plan seeks to enforce a ban on the ongoing production of uranium and plutonium specifically intended for use in weapons at that time. The two Prime Ministers urged for the immediate commencement of negotiations in the Conference on Disarmament and a swift conclusion of the FMCT accord.¹²⁴ Additionally, they expressed their endorsement for the enhancement of global collaboration in order to effectively tackle the complexities associated with nuclear terrorism and covert proliferation.¹²⁵ Hatoyama imposed a constraint on high-technology trade, requiring India to prioritise the expeditious completion of the FMCT. Japan anticipated that India would ensure that its high-tech imports are not redirected for weaponry or to other nations, acknowledging the significant magnitude of the situation in this domain.¹²⁶ Prime Minister Dr. Manmohan Singh restated India's enduring position on the CTBT would be contingent upon the ratification of the treaty by the US and China. According to him, if the US and China approve the CTBT, a new situation will arise. India has consistently maintained that the NPT is biased since its inception. In a notable shift from its previous position, Japan has developed an understanding and appreciation for the conditions that compelled India to pursue the acquisition of nuclear weapons in 1998. The Prime Minister Hatoyama in 2009 expressed gratitude for the elucidation provided by his Indian counterpart regarding the contextual factors that led to India's acquisition of nuclear weapons.

During the negotiations regarding the civilian nuclear agreement with the US, there were reports in 2006 indicating that Washington was applying pressure on India to consent to a forthcoming suspension of dual-use missile technology testing, which could potentially be employed for nuclear payload delivery, as well as a moratorium on conducting further atomic

¹²⁴ Rajaram Panda and Ch. Viyyanna Sastry, "India and Japan: Prospects for Civil Nuclear Cooperation," *Indian Foreign Affairs Journal* 6, no. 2 (2011): 202–16.

¹²⁵ "India Japan Relations."

¹²⁶ Jacob Jayant, "India Stands Firm to Japan's CTBT Push," *Hindustan Times*, December 30, 2009, accessed on October 02, 2021, <https://www.hindustantimes.com/delhi/india-stands-firm-to-japan-s-ctbt-push/story-EBtgbDXUdekcNoc5JNbCUL.html>.

bomb tests.¹²⁷ These actions were seen as a reciprocal arrangement for the civilian nuclear deal. India declined the request as a covert means of accessing the CTBT. Both the Japanese government and the public appear perplexed about the appropriate position Japan should adopt in relation to nuclear collaboration with India. Although there is no significant schism within the Liberal Democratic Party (LDP) or the Democratic Party of Japan (DPJ) that would pose a threat to party unity on this matter, it is important to acknowledge that the Hiroshima experience continued to influence the collective consciousness of the Japanese population and shaping their cognitive processes.¹²⁸ In light of the prevailing conditions, the DPJ engaged in the process of formulating a strategic direction that aligns with Japan's declared stance on nuclear disarmament, while concurrently promoting nuclear trade with India. Japan faced challenges in finding a compromise that would allow it to achieve both objectives, despite the support it has previously gained from its foreign policy community for establishing a strategic partnership.

Japan acknowledged India's strategic importance and the need to supply its energy demand, although it has not made a firm commitment. Japan widely acknowledges the potential of nuclear power to contribute to India's efforts in combating global warming. On June 28, 2010, the two nations engaged in their initial round of negotiations with the objective of finalising a bilateral agreement for civilian nuclear cooperation.¹²⁹ According to this agreement, Japan would engage in the exportation of its nuclear power production technology and associated equipment to India, with the condition that India would be prohibited from utilising these technologies for military purposes or transferring them to any other nation. The establishment of nuclear connections between Japan and India is actively advocated by the Japan Forum on International Relations (JFIR).¹³⁰ Japan acknowledges that India's primary obstacle in sustaining economic growth is to provide an adequate supply of energy, particularly

¹²⁷ Panda and Sastry, "India and Japan," 210.

¹²⁸ Tatsumi Yuki, "Political Influence on Japanese Nuclear and Security Policy Ms. Yuki Tatsumi Henry J. Stimson Center Dr. Robert Weiner Naval Postgraduate School FEBRUARY 2014 | REPORT NUMBER 2014-004 New Forces Face Large Obstacles," accessed on May 14, 2024, <https://apps.dtic.mil/sti/tr/pdf/ADA601871.pdf>.

¹²⁹ "India-Japan Civil Nuclear Agreement: Differing Perceptions," Observer Research Foundation, November 18, 2016, accessed on July 1, 2022, <https://www.orfonline.org/expert-speak/india-japan-civil-nuclear-agreement-perceptions>.

¹³⁰ "The 29th Policy Recommendations India's Leap Forward and Japan" (The Policy Council The Japan Forum on International relations, September 2007), accessed on March 12, 2019, https://www.jfir.or.jp/en/wp-content/themes/JFIR_2021_en/pr/pdf/29.pdf.

for power generation. Significantly, Japan possesses exceptional technology and knowledge in the generation and safety of nuclear power, positioning it as one of the leading nations globally. Consequently, the JFIR has called upon Japan to collaborate with India in these domains, recognising Japan's advantageous position.¹³¹ The distinct rationales for Japan's necessity to engage in collaboration with India, includes the political importance of such cooperation, India's imperative to address its energy resource deficiency, the escalating peril of global warming, the benefits derived from fostering cooperation in the realm of science and technology, and finally the involvement of Japanese corporations in the domain of nuclear power.¹³² The JFIR recommendation urges the Japanese government to collaborate with India on this matter, while also demonstrating proactive engagement in the worldwide effort to disarmament of nuclear weapons. Japan stands itself as a notable developer of nuclear power reactors due to its excellent technological capabilities. For instance, Toshiba, a major Japanese company, possesses more than 30 percent of the worldwide capacity for constructing civilian nuclear reactors. If Japan were to adopt a more lenient attitude and engage in cooperation with India, the aforementioned factor serves as a significant incentive for Japan to reassess its stance in the near future. The experience of Japan in Kazakhstan may serve as a suitable point of reference.¹³³ The aforementioned development is expected to significantly enhance the level of economic involvement of Japanese firms in Indian economic endeavours, so greatly stimulating the previously stagnant economic connections between the two nations.

The bilateral relations between India and Japan are not burdened by any historical baggage. The strategic nature of this partnership would be significantly enhanced if Japan were to demonstrate a greater degree of flexibility regarding the nuclear problem. In the context of strategic partnerships, such as the relationship between Japan and the US, it is imperative to maintain a spirit of flexibility. Flexibility in its strategic partnership with India regarding nuclear commerce, would serve as a significant indication of Japan's commitment to fostering a mutually beneficial and strategic partnership.¹³⁴ Prior to the Nuclear Suppliers Group (NSG)

¹³¹ Nagao Satoru, "Why Is India Important to Japan, the US, and Australia?," *The Japan Forum on International Relations* (blog), April 16, 2023, accessed on December 2, 2023, <https://www.jfir.or.jp/en/commentary/4186/>.

¹³² "The 29th Policy Recommendations India's Leap Forward and Japan."

¹³³ Kassenova Togzhan, "Kazakhstan's Nuclear Ambitions," *Bulletin of the Atomic Scientists* (blog), April 28, 2008, accessed on March 02, 2023, <https://thebulletin.org/2008/04/kazakhstans-nuclear-ambitions/>.

¹³⁴ Srabani Roy Choudhury, "India-Japan Relations: The Economic Advantage," *Indian Foreign Affairs Journal* 10, no. 3 (2015): 268–83.

ruling in India's favour, India consented to the International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA) conducting inspections on fourteen out of its total twenty-two reactors.¹³⁵ In order to engage in the nuclear agreement with the US, India consented to segregate its civil and military nuclear facilities and consented to subject its facilities to safeguards provided by the IAEA. India has made a firm commitment to maintain a moratorium on nuclear tests and has also decided to participate in negotiations regarding the FMCT. Pakistan's pursuit of a nuclear balance has led to a halt in negotiations on the FMCT. There are observers who argue that the decision to offer India an exemption from NSG strictures might be seen as a significant flaw, as it has resulted in a weakening of the non-proliferation framework. Furthermore, there is a contention that if Japan does not weaken its stance on India's commitment to no-testing, it might perhaps mitigate some of the negative impact on the NSG exemption.

The Japanese Cabinet approved a new ten-year economic strategy that involved encouraging the export of nuclear power producing facilities on June 18, 2010. The objective of the then Prime Minister of Japan Kan Naoto's "New Growth Strategy" was to revitalise the nation by fostering relationships with growing economies in Asia and facilitating the exportation of infrastructure, including nuclear technology, to the area through collaboration with governments and the commercial sector.¹³⁶ The trade strategy of the DPJ exhibits a gradual yet cautious approach towards the facilitation of exports and investments in emerging markets. India aligns seamlessly inside the framework established by Japan. The government's new "Industrial Structure Vision" policy was revealed by METI in June 2010.¹³⁷ Acknowledging the limited progress of Japanese companies in keeping pace with global leaders and market dynamics, the "Vision" initiative recognised four key shifts in both the government and commercial sectors. In June 2010, METI minister Masayuki Naoshima elucidated the "Vision" in a communication addressed to the Japanese populace.¹³⁸ According

¹³⁵ "IAEA Mission Finds Solid Regulatory Arrangements in India, Notes Areas for Improvement," Text, International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA, June 20, 2022), accessed on September 1, 2022, <https://www.iaea.org/newscenter/pressreleases/iaea-mission-finds-solid-regulatory-arrangements-in-india-notes-areas-for-improvement>.

¹³⁶ Toki Masako, "Japan's Dilemma: Nuclear Trade vs Nuclear Disarmament Advocacy," *Bulletin of the Atomic Scientists* (blog), November 3, 2010, accessed on March 02, 2022, <https://thebulletin.org/2010/11/japans-dilemma-nuclear-trade-vs-nuclear-disarmament-advocacy/>.

¹³⁷ "Japanese Fundamentals Drive Adoption of New Industrial Structure Vision" (Japan External Trade Organisation, October 2010), accessed on March 05, 2021, https://www.jetro.go.jp/ext_images/en/reports/survey/pdf/2010_07_other.pdf.

¹³⁸ Susan Carpenter, *Japan's Nuclear Crisis* (London: Palgrave Macmillan UK, 2012), accessed on October 3, 2021, <https://doi.org/10.1057/9780230363717>.

to his statement, it is imperative for Japan to develop and execute a strategic plan that enables it to achieve success on the international platform. This can be accomplished by surpassing the conventional limitations between the corporations, government and ministries, as well as national and local governments. The relevance of Japan's vision statement is seen in Masayuki Naoshima's choice to retain his post in the Kan Naoto's cabinet after Prime Minister Hatoyama's resignation. Notably, the presidents of Toshiba, Hitachi, and Mitsubishi Heavy Industries accompanied him during his visit to India in April 2010, as part of the initiative to promote India-Japan relationship.¹³⁹ During the visit, the two parties agreed to address their differences on nuclear issues and formed a Joint Working Group (JWG) to promote civil nuclear cooperation. During the fourth ministerial-level conference of the India-Japan Energy Dialogue, the establishment of a JWG was decided upon by Montek Singh Alhwalia, the Deputy Chairman of the Indian Planning Commission, and Naoshima.¹⁴⁰ International Nuclear Energy Development of Japan Co. Ltd. (JINED) was established on 22 October, 2010 by a consortium of thirteen Japanese corporations.¹⁴¹ JINED is based in Tokyo and focuses on proposing and supporting nuclear power plant projects in emerging countries. The primary objective of JINED is to provide comprehensive suggestions to nations embarking on the construction of their inaugural nuclear power facilities. President Ichiro Takekuro of JINED, representing Tokyo Electric Power Co., expressed his ambition to provide comprehensive solutions that encompass the extensive knowledge and expertise acquired by Japan over the past five decades in several domains, including advanced technology and fuel procurement.¹⁴² JINED has developed a behavioural code that revolves around three fundamental principles: one is ensuring the establishment of a safety culture that prioritises the assurance of the 3-Ss (safety, security, and safeguards) within the organisation. Second, it engages in proposing activities tailored to the specific requirements and desires of the respective country. Finally, acquiring and maintaining the trust of stakeholders and society at

¹³⁹ Rajaram Panda, "Prospects for India-Japan Civil Nuclear Cooperation," *India-US Insight* 2, no. 7 (2012): 3.

¹⁴⁰ "Joint Statement between the Ministry of Economy, Trade and Industry of Japan and the Planning Commission of India on the Occasion of the Fourth Meeting of the Japan-India Energy Dialogue," *The World and Japan*, April 30, 2010, accessed on May 02, 2023, <https://worldjpn.net/documents/texts/JPSA/20100430.D1E.html>.

¹⁴¹ "Announcement of Organizing Registration of 'International Nuclear Energy Development of Japan Co., Ltd.'" (JINED, October 22, 2010), accessed on October 5, 2021, <https://jined.co.jp/pdf/101022-e.pdf>.

¹⁴² "Establishment of 'International Nuclear Energy Development of Japan Co.," *Global Toshiba*, October 15, 2010, accessed on April 22, 2018, <https://www.global.toshiba/ww/news/corporate/2010/10/pr1501.html>.

large. Thus, after years that witnessed several rounds of discussions, India and Japan have inked a bilateral Civil Nuclear Cooperation Agreement on 11 November 2016, making it the first non-NPT country to do so.¹⁴³ The implementation of the civil nuclear agreement between the two nations has thus far been hindered due to India's non-compliance with Japan's '*Hikaku San Gensoku*' or the three non-nuclear principles.¹⁴⁴ The resolution enacted by the Japanese parliament establishes the principles that Japan is prohibited from possessing or manufacturing nuclear weapons, and is also prohibited from allowing their entry into Japanese territory. The deal enabled the export of nuclear technology to India by Japan and has the potential to strengthen bilateral strategic and economic partnership. From the current production of 8000 MW, India by 2047, is aiming to generate 1 lakh MW of nuclear power.¹⁴⁵ According to the "Synchronising Energy Transitions Towards Possible Net Zero for India: Affordable and Clean Energy for All" report released by Nuclear Power Corporation of India Ltd., India need to build alternative adequate infrastructure of nuclear power in order to transition from coal dependent energy without compromising on development.¹⁴⁶ This requires the participation of countries like Japan, who possess advanced technology in producing nuclear power by participating the supply chains of projects. Following the deal, two working group meetings were held in Mumbai in 2018 and the third meeting was held in Tokyo in 2020.¹⁴⁷ The Civil Nuclear Cooperation agreement facilitates exchange of information and scientific experts in the scientific field between the designated authorities from India and Japan. Additionally, the deal provides for provisions to exchange nuclear technology, material, and equipment to each other and also

¹⁴³ "India, Japan Ink Civil Nuclear Cooperation Agreement to Boost Energy Ties - ET EnergyWorld," ETEnergyworld, November 12, 2016, accessed on November 3, 2022, <http://energy.economictimes.indiatimes.com/news/power/india-japan-ink-civil-nuclear-cooperation-agreement-to-boost-energy-ties/55381760>.

¹⁴⁴ Yuki, "Political Influence on Japanese Nuclear and Security Policy Ms. Yuki Tatsumi Henry J. Stimson Center Dr. Robert Weiner Naval Postgraduate School FEBRUARY 2014 | REPORT NUMBER 2014-004 New Forces Face Large Obstacles."

¹⁴⁵ "India Eyes 100 GW Nuclear Power by 2047: AEC Chairman," *The Economic Times*, April 3, 2024, accessed on April 10, 2024, <https://economictimes.indiatimes.com/industry/energy/power/india-eyes-100-gw-nuclear-power-by-2047-aec-chairman/articleshow/109012593.cms?from=mdr>.

¹⁴⁶ "Synchronizing Energy Transitions toward Possible Net Zero for India: Affordable and Clean Energy for All" (Indian Institute of Management Ahmedabad, April 2024), accessed on April 20, 2024, https://psa.gov.in/CMS/web/sites/default/files/publication/ESN%20Report-2024_New-21032024.pdf.

¹⁴⁷ "Meeting on Japan-India Civil Nuclear Cooperation," Ministry of Foreign Affairs of Japan, February 21, 2020, accessed on June 2, 2022, https://www.mofa.go.jp/press/release/press4e_002521.html.

cooperate on aspects such as nuclear safety and security, nuclear fuel cycle, radiation in agriculture, healthcare, environmental protection, and industry.

India-Japan Digital Partnership

India and Japan have been cooperating in the sphere of Science and Technology as they strive to develop a comprehensive and strategic alliance. Japan's rich historical legacy and longstanding tradition of research and development dating back to the Meiji era, coupled with its renowned global status as a leader in innovation and technology, rendered it a perfect collaborator for India. The relationship was formally established after signing the Inter-Governmental Agreement in 1985.¹⁴⁸ Japan has become India's foremost ally in terms of technological and economic advancement. In 1993, India and Japan initiated a Cooperative Science Programme, engaging in collaborative studies spanning several sectors.¹⁴⁹ In 2006, a Memorandum of Understanding (MoU) was signed between the Japanese Science and Technology Agency and the India's Department of Science and Technology. This was followed by a Letter of Intent in 2015. The purpose of these agreements was to establish joint research laboratories that would focus on big data analysis, Internet of Things, and data science applications in the areas of climate change response and food security.¹⁵⁰ In the fiscal year 2020-21, this programme shifted its focus to technology pertaining to COVID-19 and the utilisation of artificial intelligence in mitigation.

India and Japan have expanded their technology collaboration to include a wide range of topics connected to the accomplishing of Sustainable Development Goals (SDGs).¹⁵¹ The areas encompassed are agriculture, health, water, energy, space exploration, environmental protection, earth and marine sciences, climate change, nuclear energy, life sciences, healthcare,

¹⁴⁸ "India-Japan Bilateral Relations" (Ministry of External Affairs, Government of India, October 2023), accessed on December 5, 2023, https://www.mea.gov.in/Portal/ForeignRelation/Japan_-_Bilateral_Brief_MEA_Website_Oct_2023.pdf.

¹⁴⁹ "India-Japan Relations" (Ministry of External Affairs, Government of India, December 2018), accessed on December 05, 2023, https://www.mea.gov.in/Portal/ForeignRelation/Bilateral_brief_India-Japan_december_2018.pdf.

¹⁵⁰ "S & T Cooperation," Indian Embassy Tokyo, accessed on February 24, 2023, https://www.indembassy-tokyo.gov.in/coityo_pages/NjI.

¹⁵¹ Basu Titli, "High Technology and India-Japan Strategic Cooperation," Australian Institute of International Affairs, February 3, 2021, accessed on September 3, 2023, <https://www.internationalaffairs.org.au/australianoutlook/high-technology-and-india-japan-strategic-cooperation/>.

and agriculture. The Digital Partnership was initiated in 2018 when former Prime Minister Shinzo Abe visited Delhi, resulting in an enhanced level of engagement between India and Japan.¹⁵² The coordination of the initiative is overseen through joint working group meetings between the Japanese Ministry of Economy, Trade and Industry (METI) and India's Ministry of Electronics and Information Technology (MeitY). This alliance encompasses five primary domains, each comprising a range of activities and projects: start-up initiative and corporate partnership, digital talent exchange, R&D cooperation, promotion of electronic systems design and manufacturing (ESDM), and strategic collaboration in the field of security.

The digital partnership is founded on common interests and values regarding a modern digital society. It emphasises the importance of collaboratively constructing digital infrastructure alongside social systems and industrial platforms to foster trust among stakeholders, enhance services, and achieve economic and social progress globally. India and Japan have strengthened their strategic alignment due to shared ideals and mutual concerns on China's increasing regional influence, particularly in the technology sector. Within the digital realm, these common principles manifest as digital independence, open access and cybersecurity.

In November 2020, India and Japan assessed their Science and Technology collaborations to look into new opportunities, particularly in the field of digital infrastructure.¹⁵³ In March 2023, Nippon Telegraph & Telephone (NTT) declared its intention to allocate a sum of USD 500 million annually for a duration of four years towards investments in India's renewable energy, data processing, and communications infrastructure. This is in addition to an approximate investment of USD 800 million that was previously made in Information and Communication Technology infrastructure.¹⁵⁴ India recognises Japan as a promising strategic ally for the advancement of artificial intelligence, as well as for the development of technological collaborations in the fields of space and military. Additionally, India places emphasis on the areas of 5G and fintech for the betterment of livelihoods of its citizen.

¹⁵² "India-Japan Commercial Relations" (Embassy of India, Japan), accessed March 10, 2023, https://www.indembassy-tokyo.gov.in/coityo_pages/NjA,.

¹⁵³ "S&T Cooperation," Embassy of India Tokyo, Japan, 2024, accessed on April 03, 2024, https://www.indembassy-tokyo.gov.in/coityo_pages/NjI,.

¹⁵⁴ Duggal Mahima, "India and Japan: Towards a Stronger, Comprehensive, and Global Digital Partnership," in *Building the India-Japan Partnership Strategic Compulsions and Indo-Pacific Imperatives*, ed. Panda P. Jaganath and Shikata Tatsuo (New Delhi: Pentagon Press, 2023), 75, accessed on January 3, 2024, <https://isdpr.eu/wp-content/uploads/2023/12/India-Japan-Relation-in-One-File.pdf>.

Concluding Remarks

Security as a concept has undergone test of time. From the traditional understanding of security through the lens of military might, territorial sovereignty, and national interest the concept has enlarged to encompass security issues which fall outside the realm of conventional security. It now includes a broad number of issues which normally skip the scrutiny of bilateral relations between any nations. There are wide range of areas where both the nations cooperate under the umbrella of NTS. In doing so, one of the important stakeholder i.e., civil society is involved within the state structure to be more inclusive. Under the NCR framework international relations are still conducted by state centrality, even while dealing with issues of NTS issues such as climate change, energy security, education, literacy and so on in India and Japan bilateral relations. Participation of civil society organisations in Japan revealed how Japanese civil society organisations became prominent in the decision making process of aid projects by Japan in developing countries. From being kept in the periphery of foreign policy to playing an important role, civil societies became an integral part in aid programmes by Japan. This in turn pushed the aid of Japan from implementing projects which brought economic dividends to Japanese domestic firms to providing aid in the areas of human security through state intervention.

Significant area of cooperation within the ambit the on NTS between India and Japan is the working of civil society organisations and NGO's. A pattern evolves when we closely look at the areas in which these civil society organisations function. These include, sanitation, agriculture, education, disaster management, women empowerment, and poverty reduction. All constitute the core areas of NTS. From the initial GPP in early 1990's to JICA's support to the local NGO's in India from 2002 provides a history of NTS cooperation between India and Japan. The unique model in this framework is that the grants provided by Japan to India via the route of civil society and NGO's in the field of NTS is through the state mediated mechanism. The grants are either directly routed through state in the form of aid from MOFA, Japan or through its constituted body JICA, making it important as it perfectly fits into the narrative of NCT wherein the symbiotic relationship between Japanese funding agencies and the domestic Indian civil society or NGO's in the field of NTS is also an influencing factor in the foreign policy decision making.

The other area of cooperation between India and Japan that is explored in the chapter is on climate change and clean energy. Primary objective of the Clean Energy Partnership is to

foster energy collaboration between Japan and India by implementing a comprehensive and feasible energy transition strategy that encompasses various energy sources and technologies. This approach is designed to safeguard energy security, achieve carbon neutrality, and stimulate economic growth. The Japan-India Energy Policy Dialogue broadens the scope of bilateral energy cooperation to encompass eleven additional areas, including clean energy. Furthermore, with the sharing of information between the governments, there are public-private workshops to deliberate on the initiatives of both nations, encompassing research and development as well as human resource development. India and Japan even collaborate on the multilateral front in the areas of clean energy and climate change. Japan's signing of MoU with ISA took the collaboration to multilateral front. By becoming a member of the grouping Japan intends to actively participate in energy efficiency projects, help with technological innovation and improve solar technologies to reduce the burden of fossil fuels. This was a result of domestic interests of reducing dependence on the traditional mode of energy production to serve regional and global interests of limiting the extent of climate change. Another important area where India and Japan actively collaborate is the grouping of CDRI where both nations are striving to provide disaster resilient infrastructure to vulnerable nations there by providing equitable development.

The implementation of a civil nuclear collaboration agreement between India and Japan commenced on July 20, 2016, subsequent to the exchange of diplomatic correspondence. Indian Prime Minister Narendra Modi and Japanese Prime Minister Shinzo Abe announced the deal at a joint press conference on 11 November, 2016, following six years of discussions. The agreement facilitates a bold enlargement of India's civilian nuclear power initiative by procuring materials and technologies from Japan. The objective of the agreement is to facilitate comprehensive collaboration in the advancement and utilisation of nuclear energy for non-military objectives. This agreement signifies the inaugural pact between Japan and India, a nation that has not officially approved the nuclear NPT. Despite not being a signatory of the NPT, India was granted a waiver by the Nuclear Suppliers Group in 2008, enabling it to engage in nuclear commerce for peaceful objectives. Furthermore, India and Japan, digital partnership is being taken forward in the backdrop of SDGs and in the areas of human security.

Overall, the discussion in the chapter brought out the collaboration of India and Japan in areas of human security. It clearly indicates the centrality of state by providing aid to local NGOs to implement grassroots projects which have a direct impact on the citizens. This helps

in taking forward the relationship while state forms a core pillar in driving relations in areas of human security such as civil nuclear cooperation, climate change and so on. As NCR argues, in an international structure, states participate and conduct relations as much as their domestic interests allow. In the realm of non-traditional security, within India-Japan bilateral relations, leadership, civil society, and national interests played a key role through the state.

Conclusion

Foreign policy making is a dynamic process influenced by several factors both at the systemic and domestic level. These factors assume paramount significance while studying bilateral relationship of any nation-state. The studies on foreign policy making of India and Japan is no exception to this trend. In this context, the study focused on India and Japan bilateral relationship from the end of the Cold War through the Neoclassical Realist (NCR) theoretical framework wherein both structural (systemic/international) and domestic factors are analysed to understand the foreign policy decision making of both the nation-states in the domains of economy, defence and Non-Traditional Security (NTS). For most of the 20th century, the field of International Relations (IR) was subjected by the analysis of foreign relations of nation-states through the realist frameworks, which includes both classical realism and its nearest variant - neorealism or structural realism. Both the strands were applied extensively in understanding foreign policies of nation-states, including bilateral ties, for instance India-Japan relations. However, both these strands of realism failed, partially due to their over emphasis on structural level factors, to adequately explain why India and Japan behave differently to the same event or a structure at any given point of time. In this context, Neoclassical realist framework which emerged as an alternative within broad realist school, that emphasises on both structural and domestic/unit level factors, can be employed to study India and Japan bilateral relations in the post-Cold War period.

The study posed certain research questions such as what are the specific characteristics and differences that NCR has with other variants of realism and its effectiveness in understanding bilateral relations? What are the significant domestic/unit level factors which influenced the bilateral relations involving India and Japan? How have the structural factors and domestic level factors interacted to further India-Japan bilateral relationship in the fields of economy, security and NTS. The objectives of the study, while answering these questions, were to first understand the characteristics of NCR which makes it different from earlier forms of realism such as classical realism and neorealism. Second, to bring out the factors that influenced India-Japan relationship historically, till the end of the Cold War. The third objective was to understand the economic partnership between both the nations by identifying the domestic level factors which helped further the relationship after the end of the Cold War. Fourth, the study made an attempt to analyse the defence partnership between India and Japan from the end of the Cold War through the interaction of structural and domestic players. Finally,

the study tried to understand the collaboration between both the nations in the field of NTS by retaining the state centrality within an evolving framework of human security in the prevailing structure.

The study employed a mix of both quantitative and qualitative methods. This includes personal interviews with relevant stakeholders to gain in-depth insights. Additionally, trade data from various governments and international institutions was used to analyse the trends in relationship. Primary data was sourced from published government reports, bilateral agreements, treaties and speeches of various leaders. An extensive review of secondary literature from books, journal articles and reports from various think tanks was used to reach the stated objectives of the study. The research questions are examined and discussed in five core chapters of the thesis.

The study began by explaining the characteristics of both classical realism and neorealism before delving into the concept of NCR. It further argued that both classical realism and neorealism gave primacy to state and the international structure by neglecting other factors (mostly, domestic level issues) which have the potential of influencing foreign policy decision making of any nation. But both these strands of realism, in a way, have certain inadequacies in explaining as to why various nation-states behave differently to the same event or a structure at any given point of time. This proved a major limitation for both these strands and the need for an alternative framework such as NCR, emerged.

The chapter (first chapter) further delved into how NCR is considered as a logical extension to the classical realism and neorealism due to its adherence to the core tenets of realism. The study argued that NCR was developed as a school of thought within the realist framework to address the limitations on structural realism. To be precise, NCR does not deviate from the state centrality, as propounded by the realist framework. In fact, NCR believes in “the relative distribution of power” among states in a structure but adds another level of analysis at the unit level mostly from the internal settings of a nation-state. For NCR, unit or domestic level factors provide strategic choices to states in any given structure as these factors have the ability to decide how states act in an environment of pressure created by an international structure/system. The study further argues that though the ambition of a nation-states’ foreign policy is determined by its relative power or position in the international system, in reality it is the domestic level factors such as leadership, public perception, business groups, prevailing

policy environment, civil society and national interests that translate the relative power into policy making. In a way, a new level of analysis i.e., unit/domestic level is added to the analysis of foreign policy making to understand the behaviour of countries that lead them to choose a particular kind of decision. To bring in such a nuanced understanding, the study used NCR as a theoretical framework to analyse India-Japan bilateral relations after the end of the Cold War in the domains of economy, security and in the areas of NTS.

Against the backdrop of the theoretical discussion, the study further delved into the discussion (in the second chapter) on the history of India and Japan relations and pointed out that the relations between both the nations have passed through several phases since earlier trade connections were made. From ancient trade routes, Buddhist cultural contacts, intellectual exchanges, cotton trade, war time contacts, Cold War to the present Special Strategic and Global partnership, the relationship has come so far. The study argues that, structurally, the first half of the twentieth century witnessed two World Wars while India remained a British Colony. The relationship between both the nations during this period was dominated by more people-to-people contacts. This was mainly due to the prevailing international structure where the Japan and British were on the opposite sides of the war.

Furthermore, the study, through this chapter, argued that there was a sense of admiration towards Japan among Indian intellectuals in the early years of 20th century mainly due to the perception that, as an Asian power Japan had emerged as a major power and defeated Russia in 1905. For instance, Indian politicians, including Jawaharlal Nehru, started embracing the concept of Pan-Asianism, championed by Japan. The study further state that the initial enthusiasm gave way to discontent with Japan after it indulged in expansionist policies within the East Asian region by attacking countries, including China. Indian intellectuals (activists/scholars) opposed the imperial tendencies of Japan and started to support China in their endeavours to free themselves from Japan. During the inter-war and war period Japan supported Indian revolutionaries such as Subash Chandra Bose, to create Indian National Army (INA) to fight against the British. This period, as the chapter points out, formed as a base to further the relationship in the coming years as the Indian politicians and intellectual utilised this period to develop an understanding about Japan and vice versa.

The chapter further explained the relationship after India's independence, wherein the relationship, witnessed a turnaround during which the Indian leadership welcomed Japan into

the comity of nations when it was under the United States (US) occupation forces. The study stressed that under the leadership of the first Prime Minister of India Jawaharlal Nehru, India opposed the harsh conditions imposed on Japan by occupation forces and entered into a separate treaty to establish diplomatic relations in 1952. Eventually, the relationship was affected by the structural forces with the beginning of Cold War and its binaries. To this effect, the study stressed how Japan, with a market led economic model allied with the US bloc and India, with its planned economy got close to the Soviet Union after signing a friendship treaty in 1971. This led Japan to limit its interactions with India in all the dimensions. Such a phase with limited interactions continued till the end of the Cold War. Only in the last decade of the Cold War India witnessed significant investments from Japan as it started viewing India as a potential market. Finally, the chapter concluded by arguing that in the entire twentieth century the international structure provided an environment to curtail as well as improve the bilateral relationship but it was mainly the domestic factors such as leadership, intellectual and revolutionary contacts, varying economic models which helped navigate the structure and build the relationship till the end of the Cold War.

The discussion in the third chapter of the study brought out the economic relationship between both the nations in three phases starting after the end of the Cold War. The chapter pointed out that the end of the Cold War (since 1990s) coincided with domestic economic and political crisis in both nations. Internally, India was undergoing through a Balance of Payments (BoP) crisis as its foreign reserves dwindled and was on the edge of bankruptcy. This was exacerbated through the political crisis where no majority and stable government was formed for over three years. Similarly, Japan was also reeling under the economic crisis as its “bubble economy” burst and was in search of markets to reconstruct its economy. During this period, Japan witnessed change in its political dispensation for the first time after thirty-eight years as a non-Liberal Democratic Party (LDP) formed government in 1993. Further, the study argues that, structurally, the Soviet Union was dismantled and the Cold War binaries that dominated the relationship during the Cold War came to an end. Japan came out of the Cold War baggage of viewing India through lens of bloc politics and on its part, India liberalised its economy and introduced new industrial policies allowing foreign investments into its economy. Through the analysis, the study showed how the domestic and structural changes paved the way for both the nations to collaborate in the post-Cold War years.

The study pointed out that, at the end of the Cold War, as Japan started looking for new markets India liberalised and opened its economy for foreign investment. At the same time, the world transformed from a bipolar to unipolar world order which in turn helped Japanese policy makers and leaders to view India separately from that of the US foreign policy considerations. Whereas, India understood the importance of East Asia, especially Japan and wanted to attract its investment and technology. In a way one could infer that there emerged a high degree of convergence of interest between India and Japan since 1990s. The study further argued that in the case of India and Japan it was the leadership and policy changes which brought in that change. Other than liberalising the economy, in order to attract investments, the P.V. Narasimha Rao led government introduced the “Look East” policy. Initially this policy concentrated on the Southeast Asian nations but eventually extended its ambit to include East Asian nations such as Japan. Additionally, high level leadership visits began to take forward the relationship and the amount of aid being provided started increasing. The study further pointed out how India’s nuclear tests, conducted in 1998 derailed the positive trajectory of the economic relations as Japan imposed sanctions on India followed by halting the Official Developmental Assistance (ODA).

In fact, Japan’s sensitivity on nuclear weapons, which the study considers as a domestic factor, is linked to the nuclear debates within Japan whose roots can be traced back to nuclear attacks on its mainland during World War II. Therefore, the reaction towards India, came not just from the government circles but also from its citizens, civil society and bureaucracy which shows the influence domestic level factors has on bilateral relationship. Following the lifting of sanctions (2000-01), the relationship was normalised with the help of leadership of both the nations. For instance, the chapter discussed how Prime Minister of Japan Yoshiro Mori’s visit to India in 2000 provided the momentum to the bilateral relationship. During this period i.e., 2000 to 2010 the relationship witnessed institutionalising of summit level meetings between India and Japan and high-level meetings at secretary level also began. In addition, business groups of the both the nations played an important role in furthering the bilateral economic relationship. Externally, during the same period, the aggressive rise of China as a major power, India improving its relationship with the US proved helpful in cementing the partnership. All these factors together led the trade to increase from USD 3,656 million in 2001-02 to US\$ 10,363 million in 2009-10. One can also infer that major structural hurdle in this phase came in the form of financial crisis of 2008. This resulted in negative growth rate in trade for the first

time in the decade in 2009-10. Though the domestic factors such as leadership, business group perception were in favour of the relationship the financial crisis proved detrimental to trade.

The discussion further moved into the phase which began in 2011, when both the nations signed a Comprehensive Economic Partnership Agreement (CEPA) to improve investments and trade. Internally India and Japan, in this phase i.e., 2011-22, according to this study, witnessed stable governments under the leadership of Prime Ministers Shinzo Abe and Narendra Modi respectively. Prime Minister Abe introduced economic policies, which includes monetary policy, structural reforms and fiscal stimulus together called “Abenomics” to jumpstart the Japanese economy which was reeling under stagnation for two decades. At the same time the National Democratic Alliance (NDA) government led by Prime Minister Narendra Modi through various policy initiatives such as “India first” policy, “Make in India” and “Aatma Nirbhar Bharat” tried to bring investments (including from Japan) to India. The study argued that both the leaders maintained sustained political relations by visiting each other throughout the decade to improve bilateral economic partnership. At the level of economic engagements, the domestic business groups of Japan viewed India as an ideal destination for its investments. Almost half of the industries established in India by Japan belonged to the automobile sector and regular surveys by Japanese business groups put India in top three position. As the study specifically pointed out, a survey conducted by Japan Bank of Industrial Cooperation in 2022, which suggests that India stood at first position as a leading potential country for investments beating China. This, as the study points out, proved that there are favourable domestic level factors which advance the relationship. The trade volume in this period increased from US\$ 18,327 million in 2011-12 to US\$ 20,576 million in 2021-2022. The rise of China remained a structural factor in fostering closer economic partnership while COVID19 derailed the overall trade.

Following the COVID19 impact, the years 2019-20 and 2020-21 witnessed negative growth rates. The financial years 2019-20 and 2020-21 witnessed -3.85 percent and -9.41 percent growth rates respectively. This development brought forth the dangers to supply chains during a structural shock and led India and Japan to multilaterally build supply chain resilience. The chapter concluded by stressing that, overall, the economic partnership after the end of the Cold War witnessed the influences of both structural factors such as global financial crisis, pandemic and domestic factor such as nuclear question in halting the positive economic trend. At the same time domestic level factors such as leadership, positive business group perception

and structural factors such as aggressive rise of China, improving relations between US and India, absence of Cold War binaries helped the economic partnership to improve in a sustainable way.

Having captured evolving economic relations, the study (through the discussion in the fourth chapter) examined the security/strategic partnership between India and Japan and pointed out that both the nation's strategic partnership followed a similar trajectory as their economic partnership. Following the end of the Cold War, the absence of a structural deterrent allowed both nations to seek closer ties. Japan, looking for strategic partners as the US shifted focus to West Asia, faced energy supply threats from piracy in the Indian Ocean. Progress was initially hindered by nuclear tests conducted by India, which Japan viewed as a threat to global stability, resulting in sanctions. However, recognising India's regional threat perceptions, Japan eventually lifted the sanctions. The establishment of the "Global Partnership between Japan and India" during Prime Minister Yoshiro Mori's 2000 visit, and subsequent annual summit meetings initiated in 2005 under Prime Minister Koizumi, laid the groundwork for elevating the partnership to a "Global and Strategic Partnership" in 2006. This period saw steady progress in defence cooperation through declarations, dialogues, agreements, and exercises, leading to the signing of the "Joint Declaration on Security Cooperation" in 2008, with significant contributions from leaders like Yoshiro Mori, Junichiro Koizumi, Shinzo Abe, Atal Bihari Vajpayee, and Manmohan Singh.

From 2010 to 2022, the strategic partnership strengthened further under the leadership of Prime Minister Narendra Modi and Shinzo Abe. Abe aimed to enhance defence capabilities of Japan, leading to the expansion of the partnership to a "Special Strategic and Global Partnership" in 2014. This period was marked by the aggressive rise of China, with India facing border attacks and Japan contending with sovereignty threats posed by China in the Senkaku Islands. The regional challenges prompted the evolution of the Indo-Pacific construct and the formation of the Quadrilateral Security Dialogue (QUAD) with Australia and the US, formalised through summit-level meetings. The "Japan and India Vision 2025" underscored the Indo-Pacific's importance in their bilateral partnership, committing to a "Free and Open Indo-Pacific." The partnership was further solidified through Foreign and Defence Ministerial Meetings (2+2), Coast Guard dialogues, and numerous agreements between the Japan's Self Defence Forces and Indian armed forces. Moreover, military exercises like Malabar exercises, Japan India Maritime Exercise (JIMEX) and Dharma Guardian took place during this phase.

Subsequent Japanese leaders, including Prime Ministers Suga and Kishida, maintained this momentum, with Kishida introducing a new National Security Strategy prioritising India. Finally, the chapter concludes by arguing that while the end of the Cold War initially provided a structural impetus to improve the strategic partnership, the nuclear issue acted as a domestic impediment. Eventually, the aggressive rise of China, regional threats, and the rise of the Indo-Pacific as a security and economic construct provided India and Japan with a favourable structural environment for defence ties. In this context, it was domestic leadership, bureaucracy, and institutions that consistently advanced the relationship by understanding each other's threat perceptions.

The final chapter, while exploring the emerging collaboration between India and Japan in NTS areas, focused on human security areas such as education, literacy, climate change, digital partnership and energy cooperation. Although these issues are non-traditional, the state remains central in addressing them at both bilateral and multilateral levels. Alongside the state, domestic factors like civil society, institutions, and Non-Governmental Organisations (NGOs) played significant roles. Given this complex nature, NCR provides an alternative framework for analysing NTS issues, emphasising the state's primary role.

Post-Cold War, human security threats beyond traditional sovereignty concerns necessitated closer international cooperation, argued the study. It further explains that the India-Japan partnership, as detailed in the study, allows state-provided aid to Indian NGOs working in human security areas, exemplified by programmes like the "Japan International Cooperation Agency (JICA) Partnership Programme (JPP)" and the "Grant Assistance for Grassroots Projects (GGP)." These initiatives have enabled Indian communities to benefit from Japanese funds and expertise, particularly during crises like the COVID-19 pandemic.

The chapter also examined energy security and climate change collaboration (for instance Coalition for Disaster Resilient Infrastructure – CDRI, International Solar Alliance - ISA and so on), highlighting the roles of Japanese civil society and business groups in influencing policy. Despite differing views on responsibilities, India and Japan have cooperated on energy efficiency technologies and disaster management. Japanese institutions such as Japan External Trade Organisation (JETRO), Ministry of Economy, Trade and Industry (METI), Japan Bank for International Cooperation (JBIC) and Japan's New Energy and Industrial Technology Development Organisation (NEDO) have actively partnered with Indian agencies

to support the energy transition. Furthermore, the study discussed the progress in civil nuclear cooperation and the digital partnership, emphasising human security areas like agriculture, health, and environmental protection. The chapter concludes by noting that in the areas of NTS, India and Japan have adhered to state centrality while allowing domestic actors to advance collaboration, reflecting a robust and multi-faceted partnership within the NCR framework.

From a Neoclassical Realist perspective, the India-Japan relationship can be understood as a dynamic interplay between systemic forces and domestic factors. Structurally, after the Cold War, the shift from a bipolar to a unipolar world order, the aggressive rise of China, global financial crises, improving India-US relations, the pandemic, and regional security threats created a conducive environment for collaboration at both bilateral and multilateral levels. However, it is the domestic factors such as strong leadership in both countries, mutual threat perceptions, the influence of business groups, bureaucratic actions, Japan's peace constitution, civil society engagement, and institutional mechanisms that have translated these structural factors into concrete policy outcomes. These domestic influences have been pivotal in advancing India-Japan relations across various dimensions including the economy, security/strategic, and NTS issues. Thus, while the international environment sets the stage, it is the internal dynamics within each country that drive the tangible progress in their bilateral relationship, especially in instances of relations involving India and Japan.

Bibliography

Books

- Ayoob, Mohammed. *The Third World Security Predicament: State Making, Regional Conflict, and the International System*. Lynne Rienner Publishers, 1995.
- Baylis, John, Steve Smith, and Patricia Owens, eds. *The Globalization of World Politics: An Introduction to International Relations*. Ninth Edition, Ninth Edition. Oxford, New York: Oxford University Press, 2023.
- Berger, Thomas U., Mike Mochizuki, and Jitsuo Tsuchiyama, eds. *Japan in International Politics: The Foreign Policies of an Adaptive State*. Lynne Rienner Publishers, 2007.
- Bernard Victor, Aloysius Röling, and Rüter C. F. *The Tokyo Judgment: The International Military Tribunal for the Far East (I.M.T.F.E.), 29 April 1946-12 November 1948*. Amsterdam: APA-University Press Amsterdam, 1977.
- Blanton, Shannon L., and Charles W. Kegley. *World Politics: Trend and Transformation*. 17th ed. Cengage Learning, 2020.
- Brauch, Hans Günter, Úrsula Oswald Spring, Czeslaw Mesjasz, John Grin, Pál Dunay, Navnita Chadha Behera, Béchir Chourou, Patricia Kameri-Mbote, and P. H. Liotta, eds. *Globalization and Environmental Challenges: Reconceptualizing Security in the 21st Century*. Vol. 3. Hexagon Series on Human and Environmental Security and Peace. Berlin, Heidelberg: Springer Berlin Heidelberg, 2008. <https://doi.org/10.1007/978-3-540-75977-5>.
- Buzan, Barry. *People, States and Fear: An Agenda for International Security Studies in the Post-Cold War Era*. UK: Harvester Wheatsheaf, 1991.
- Buzan, Barry, Ole Wæver, and Jaap de Wilde. *Security: A New Framework for Analysis*. Boulder, Colo.: Lynne Rienner Pub., 1998.
- Cantori, Louis J. compiler. *The International Politics of Regions / a Comparative Approach [by] Louis J. Cantori and Steven L. Spiegel*. Englewood Cliffs, N.J.: Prentice-Hall, 1970.
- Carr, Edward Hallett. *The Twenty Years' Crisis, 1919-1939: An Introduction to the Study of International Relations*. 450th ed. edition. Basingstoke, Hampshire: Harper Perennial, 1964.
- Cha, Victor D. *Alignment Despite Antagonism: The United States-Korea-Japan Security Triangle*. Stanford: Stanford University Press, 1999.
- Chimni, B. S. *International Law and World Order: A Critique of Contemporary Approaches*. 2nd ed. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2017. <https://doi.org/10.1017/9781107588196>.
- Davidson, Jason. *America's Allies and War: Kosovo, Afghanistan, and Iraq*. 1st ed. New York: Palgrave Macmillan, 2011.

Direction of Trade Statistics Yearbook, 1988 Edition. Washington, D.C.: International Monetary Fund, 1988.

Director, Information Services and <mailto:director.iti@anu.edu.au>. *India, Japan, Australia : Partners in Asia? Papers from a Conference at the Australian National University, September 1967*. Australian National University Press, 1968. <https://openresearch-repository.anu.edu.au/handle/1885/115129>.

Dower, John W. *Embracing Defeat: Japan in the Wake of World War II*. W.W. Norton & Company/New Press, 1999.

Elman, Colin, and Miriam Fendius Elman, eds. *Progress in International Relations Theory: Appraising the Field*. Cambridge, Mass: MIT Press, 2003.

Emmott, Bill. *Rivals: How the Power Struggle Between China, India and Japan Will Shape Our Next Decade*. London: Allen Lane, 2008.

Fallodon (Viscount), Edward Grey Grey of. *Twenty-Five Years, 1892-1916*. Frederick A. Stokes Company, 1925.

Fujishige, Hiromi Nagata, Yuji Uesugi, and Tomoaki Honda. *Japan's Peacekeeping at a Crossroads: Taking a Robust Stance or Remaining Hesitant?* Sustainable Development Goals Series. Cham: Springer International Publishing, 2022. <https://doi.org/10.1007/978-3-030-88509-0>.

Gaskarth, Jamie. *China, India and the Future of International Society*. Rowman & Littlefield International, Limited, 2015.

Goldstein, Judith, and Robert O. Keohane, eds. *Ideas and Foreign Policy*. New York: Cornell University Press, 1993.

Gopal, Sarvepalli. *Jawaharlal Nehru Vol.2 1947-1956*. Random House, 2014.

Goto-Shibata, Harumi. *Japan and Britain in Shanghai, 1925-31*. London: Palgrave Macmillan UK, 1995. <https://doi.org/10.1057/9780230389830>.

Green, Michael Jonathan. *Japan's Reluctant Realism*. New York: Palgrave Macmillan US, 2001. <https://doi.org/10.1057/9780312299804>.

Gupta, Jayati. *Travel Culture, Travel Writing and Bengali Women, 1870-1940*. New Delhi: Routledge India, 2020.

Hettne, Björn, and András Inotai. *The New Regionalism: Implications for Global Development and International Security*. Research for Action. Helsinki: UNU World Institute for Development Economics Research, 1994.

Hirata, Keiko. *Civil Society in Japan: The Growing Role of NGO's in Tokyo's Aid and Development Policy*. 1st edition. New York: Palgrave Macmillan, 2002.

Hobbes, Thomas. *Leviathan; Or, the Matter, Forme and Power of a Commonwealth, Ecclesiasticall and Civil*. Edited by Oakeshott Michael. 1st Collier Books Edition. New York: Collier Books, 1962.

- Hughes, Christopher. *Japan's Re-Emergence as a "Normal" Military Power*. London: Routledge, 2013. <https://doi.org/10.4324/9781315000831>.
- Inoguchi, Takashi. *Japan's International Relations*. A&C Black, 2013.
- International Relations Theory and the Asia-Pacific*. Columbia University Press, 2003. <https://www.jstor.org/stable/10.7312/iken12590>.
- Jaganath, Panda P., ed. *Scaling India-Japan Cooperation in Indo-Pacific and Beyond 2025: Corridors, Connectivity and Contours*. New Delhi: Institute for Defence Studies and Analyses, 2020.
- Jain, Purnendra. *Japan's Subnational Governments in International Affairs*. 1st ed. London: Routledge, 2006. <https://doi.org/10.4324/9780203413906>.
- Johansen, Robert C. *Where the Evidence Leads: A Realistic Strategy for Peace and Human Security*. Oxford University Press, 2021. <https://doi.org/10.1093/oso/9780197586648.001.0001>.
- Kalam, Abul. *Japan and South Asia: Subsystematic Linkages and Developing Relationships*. Dhaka: University Press Limited, 1996.
- Katzenstein (editor), Peter J., and Takashi Shiraishi (editor). *Beyond Japan: The Dynamics of East Asian Regionalism*. Cornell University Press, 2018. <http://gen.lib.rus.ec/book/index.php?md5=D84C6DCD7D69202892A489B1E4344BB3>.
- Kegley, Charles W., and Eugene R. Wittkopf. *World Politics: Trend and Transformation*. 6th ed. New York: St. Martin's Press, 1997.
- Keohane, Robert O., ed. *Neorealism and Its Critics*. New York: Columbia University Press, 1986.
- Lake, David A., and Patrick M. Morgan. *Regional Orders: Building Security in a New World*. Pennsylvania: Penn State Press, 2010.
- Lebra, Joyce. *The Indian National Army and Japan*. Singapore: Institute of Southeast Asian Studies, 2008.
- Lebra-Chapman, Joyce. *Jungle Alliance: Japan and the Indian National Army*. Singapore: D. Moore for Asia Pacific Press, 1971.
- Lippmann, Walter. *U.S. Foreign Policy: Shield of the Republic*. First Edition. New York: Little, Brown and company, 1943.
- Machiavelli, Niccolo. *The Prince and The Discourses*. New York: McGraw-Hill Education, 1950.
- Minear, Richard H. *Victors' Justice: Tokyo War Crimes Trial*. Princeton, N.J: Princeton University Press, 1971.
- Miyagi, Yukiko. *Japan's Middle East Security Policy: Theory and Cases*. 1st ed. London: Routledge, 2013. <https://www.routledge.com/Japans-Middle-East-Security-Policy-Theory-and-Cases/Miyagi/p/book/9780415666725>.
- Morgenthau, Hans J. *Politics among Nations: The Struggle for Power and Peace*. Brief ed. New York: McGraw-Hill, 1993. <http://catdir.loc.gov/catdir/toc/mh021/92003398.html>.

- Nag, Kalidas. *Greater India*. Indian Society Bulletin No. 1, 1926.
<http://archive.org/details/greaterindia029157mbp>.
- Nakamura, Hajime. *Japan and Indian Asia: Their Cultural Relations in the Past and Present*. K. L. Mukhopadhyay, 1961.
- Nanda, Prakash. *Rediscovering Asia: Evolution of India's Look-East Policy*. New Delhi: Lancer Publishers & Distributors, 2003.
- Narasimha Murthy, Poomagame Anantharamaiah. *India and Japan, Dimensions of Their Relations : Economic and Cultural*. New Delhi: Lancers Books, 1993.
<http://archive.org/details/indiajapandimens0000nara>.
- Ohno, Kenichi. *The History of Japanese Economic Development: Origins of Private Dynamism and Policy Competence*. 1st ed. London: Routledge, 2017. <https://doi.org/10.4324/9781315444048>.
- Okakura, Kakuzo, and Sister Nivedita. *Ideals of the East: The Spirit of Japanese Art*. Mineola, NY: Dover Publications Inc., 2005.
- Panda, Rajaram, and Yoo Fukazawa. *India and Japan, in Search of Global Roles*. Delhi: Promilla & Company Publishers, 2007.
- Pant, Harsh V. *Contemporary Debates in Indian Foreign and Security Policy*. New York: Palgrave Macmillan US, 2008. <https://doi.org/10.1057/9780230612952>.
- Prasad, Birendra. *Indian Nationalism and Asia*. Delhi: B. R. Publishing Corporation, 1952.
<http://archive.org/details/dli.bengal.10689.12981>.
- . *Indian Nationalism and Asia (1900-1947)*. B. R. PUBLISHING CORPORATION, DELHI, 1952. <http://archive.org/details/dli.bengal.10689.12981>.
- Pyle, Kenneth. *Japan Rising: The Resurgence of Japanese Power and Purpose*. Reprint edition. New York, NY: PublicAffairs, 2008.
- Rabindranath, Tagore. *The Message of India to Japan: A Lecture*. New York: The McMillan Company, 1916. https://issuu.com/dirkjan2/docs/rabindranath_tagore_-_the_message_of_india_to_japa.
- Rajesh, Basrur. *Subcontinental Drift: Domestic Politics and India's Foreign Policy*. Hyderabad: Orient BlackSwan, 2023. <https://www.orientblackswan.com/details?id=9789354425998>.
- Ripsman, Norrin M, Jeffrey W Taliaferro, and Steven E Lobell. *Neoclassical Realist Theory of International Politics*. New York: Oxford University Press, 2016.
<https://doi.org/10.1093/acrefore/9780190846626.013.36>.
- Samuels, Richard J. *Securing Japan: Tokyo's Grand Strategy and the Future of East Asia*. New York: Cornell University Press, 2008.
- Sareen, T. R. *India and Japan in Historical Perspective*. New Delhi: Life Span Publishers & Distributors, 1997.
- Sareen, Tilak Raj. *Japan and the Indian National Army*. Delhi: Agam Prakashan, 1986.

- . *Japanese Prisoners of War in India, 1942-46: Bushido and Barbed Wire*. Folkestone, Kent: Global Oriental, 2006.
- Scalapino, Robert A. *The Foreign Policy of Modern Japan*. University of California Press, 1977.
- Shahrbanou, Tadjbakhsh, and Chenoy Anuradha M. *Human Security: Concepts and Implications*. Abingdon, Oxon ; New York, NY: Routledge, 2007.
- Sheehan, Michael J. *International Security: An Analytical Survey*. Colorado: Lynne Rienner Publishers, 2005.
- Singh, Zorawar Dault. *Power and Diplomacy: India's Foreign Policies During the Cold War*. New York: Oxford University Press, 2019. <https://doi.org/10.1093/oso/9780199489640.001.0001>.
- Sinha, Atish, and Madhup Mohta. *Indian Foreign Policy: Challenges and Opportunities*. Academic Foundation, 2007.
- Smith, Sheila A. *Intimate Rivals: Japanese Domestic Politics and a Rising China*. Columbia University Press, 2015. <https://doi.org/10.7312/smit16788>.
- Srabani Roy, Choudhury, Thankachan Sahana, and Bakshi Parul, eds. *India-Japan Relations @70: Building Beyond the Bilateral*. New Delhi: KW Publishers, 2024. <http://kwpub.in/Home/product/9789391490065/india-japan-relations-@70-building-beyond-the-bilateral>.
- Tadjbakhsh, Shahrbanou, and Anuradha Chenoy. *Human Security: Concepts and Implications*. UK: Routledge, 2007.
- Takeshi, Nakajima. *Bose of Nakamura: An Indian Revolutionary in Japan*. Translated by Motwani Prem. New Delhi: Bibliophile South Asia, 2024.
- The Foreign Policy of Modern Japan*. 1st ed. California: University of California Press, 1977. <https://doi.org/10.2307/jj.13167873>.
- Thucydides. *History Of The Peloponnesian War: Revised Edition*. Translated by Rex Warner. Reprint edition. Harmondsworth, Eng., Baltimore: Penguin Classics, 1974.
- Waever, Ole, Barry Buzan, Morten Kelstrup, and Pierre Lemaitre. *Identity, Migration and the New Security Agenda in Europe*. New York: Palgrave Macmillan, 1993.
- Waltz, Kenneth Neal. *Theory of International Politics*. Massachusetts: Addison-Wesley, 1979.
- Wohlforth, William Curti. *The Elusive Balance: Power and Perceptions during the Cold War*. Ithaca: Cornell University Press, 1993.
- Wolfers, Professor Arnold. *Discord and Collaboration: Essays on International Politics*. Baltimore: The Johns Hopkins University Press, 1965.
- Zakaria, Fareed. *From Wealth to Power: The Unusual Origins of America's World Role*. Vol. 82. Princeton University Press, 1998. <https://doi.org/10.2307/j.ctvzc5bq>.

Chapters in Edited Books

- Acharya, Amitav. "The Third World and Security Studies." In *Security Studies: A Reader*, edited by Hughes Christopher and Yew Meng Lai. UK: Routledge, 2011.
<https://www.taylorfrancis.com/chapters/edit/10.4324/9780203422144-8/third-world-security-studies-amitav-acharya>.
- Aftab, Seth. "India and Japan." In *Indian Foreign Policy: Challenges and Opportunities*, edited by Atish Sinha and Madhup Mohta, 809–18. New Delhi: Academic Foundation, 2007.
- Aydin, Cemil. "A Global Anti-Western Moment? The Russo-Japanese War, Decolonization, and Asian Modernity." In *Competing Visions of World Order: Global Moments and Movements, 1880s–1930s*, edited by Sebastian Conrad and Dominic Sachsenmaier, 213–36. New York: Palgrave Macmillan US, 2007. https://doi.org/10.1057/9780230604285_8.
- Botman, Dennis P. "Abenomics: Lessons Learned from Two Decades of Conventional and Unconventional Monetary Policies." In *Can Abenomics Succeed? Overcoming the Legacy of Japan's Lost Decades*, edited by Dennis Botman, Danninger Stephan, and Schiff Jerald. Washington, D.C.: International Monetary Fund, 2015.
<https://www.elibrary.imf.org/display/book/9781498324687/ch002.xml>.
- Brauch, Hans Günter. "Concepts of Security Threats, Challenges, Vulnerabilities and Risks." In *Coping with Global Environmental Change, Disasters and Security: Threats, Challenges, Vulnerabilities and Risks*, edited by Hans Günter Brauch, Úrsula Oswald Spring, Czesław Mesjasz, John Grin, Patricia Kameri-Mbote, Béchir Chourou, Pál Dunay, and Jörn Birkmann, 61–106. Hexagon Series on Human and Environmental Security and Peace. Berlin, Heidelberg: Springer, 2011. https://doi.org/10.1007/978-3-642-17776-7_2.
- Bytheway, Simon. "The Japanese Economy Since World War II." In *Oxford Research Encyclopedia of Asian History*, 2023. <https://doi.org/10.1093/acrefore/9780190277727.013.688>.
- Carvalho, Pedro Amakasu Raposo, and David M. Potter. "Peacebuilding and the 'Human Securitization' of Japan's Foreign Aid." In *The Securitization of Foreign Aid*, edited by Stephen Brown and Jörn Grävingholt, 85–112. London: Palgrave Macmillan UK, 2016.
https://doi.org/10.1007/978-1-137-56882-3_5.
- Chimni, B. S. "The Classical Realist Approach to International Law: The World of Hans Morgenthau." In *International Law and World Order: A Critique of Contemporary Approaches*, 2nd ed., 38–103. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2017.
<https://doi.org/10.1017/9781107588196.004>.
- David, Mutimer, and Derek Verbakel. "7. Critical Security Studies: A Schismatic History." In *Contemporary Security Studies*, 90–110. Oxford University Press, 2023.
<https://www.oxfordpoliticstrove.com/display/10.1093/hepl/9780198862192.001.0001/hepl-9780198862192-chapter-7>.
- Dyson, Stephen Benedict. "Neoclassical Realism and Leader Psychology: A Theory of Foreign Policy." In *The Blair Identity: Leadership and Foreign Policy*, edited by Stephen Benedict

Dyson, 10–24. Manchester University Press, 2009.
<https://doi.org/10.7228/manchester/9780719079993.003.0002>.

Fukushima, Akiko, and William T. Tow. “Human Security and Global Governance.” In *Security Politics in the Asia-Pacific*, edited by William T. Tow, 1st ed., 167–87. Cambridge University Press, 2009. <https://doi.org/10.1017/CBO9780511815126.010>.

Heere, Cees. “‘The Englands of East and West’: Britain and Japan, Empire and Race, 1894–1904.” In *Empire Ascendant: The British World, Race, and the Rise of Japan, 1894-1914*, edited by Cees Heere, 8–45. Oxford University Press, 2019.
<https://doi.org/10.1093/oso/9780198837398.003.0002>.

Ikenberry, G. John, and Michael Mastanduno. “CONCLUSION:” In *International Relations Theory and the Asia-Pacific*, edited by G. John Ikenberry and Michael Mastanduno, 421–40. Columbia University Press, 2003. <http://www.jstor.org/stable/10.7312/iken12590.18>.

Jain, Purnendra. “Japan and South Asia: Between Cooperation and Confrontation.” In *Japanese Foreign Policy Today*, edited by Inoguchi Takashi and Purnendra Jain, 266–82. New York: Palgrave Macmillan US, 2000. https://doi.org/10.1007/978-1-349-62529-1_15.

Jain, Purnendra, and Mauree Todhunter. “India and Japan: Newly Tempering Relations.” In *Distant Asian Neighbours : Japan and South Asia*, edited by Purnendra C. Jain, 261. New Delhi: Sterling Publishers Pvt.Ltd, 1996.

Jaishankar, Dhruva. “A Confluence of Two Strategies: The Japan–India Security Partnership in the Indo-Pacific.” In *India and Japan: Assessing the Strategic Partnership*, edited by Rajesh Basrur and Sumitha Narayanan Kutty, 43–64. Politics of South Asia. Singapore: Springer, 2018.
https://doi.org/10.1007/978-981-10-8309-9_3.

Karlsson-Vinkhuyzen, Sylvia I., and Nigel Jollands. “Human Security and Energy Security: A Sustainable Energy System as a Public Good.” In *International Handbook of Energy Security*, edited by Hugh Dyer and Maria Julia Trombetta. Edward Elgar Publishing, 2013.
<https://doi.org/10.4337/9781781007907.00036>.

Kowert, Paul, and Jeffrey Legro. “Norms, Identity, and Their Limits: A Theoretical Reprise.” In *The Culture of National Security*, by Peter J. Katzenstein, 560, 0 ed. New York: Columbia University Press, 1996. <http://gen.lib.rus.ec/book/index.php?md5=22d915ec34516a309222d8317d90ac2c>.

Lai, Hongyi. “Introduction: Understanding and Enhancing Energy and Maritime Security in Asia.” In *Asian Energy Security: The Maritime Dimension*, edited by Hongyi Lai, 1–25. New York: Palgrave Macmillan US, 2009. https://doi.org/10.1057/9780230619609_1.

Leuchtenberger, Jan. “Christians, Christianity, and Kakure Kirishitan in Japan (1549–1868).” In *The Tokugawa World*, edited by Leupp Gary P and De-min Tao, 801–14. London: Routledge, 2021.

Madhavan, A. “The Post-Cold War Equations.” In *India-Japan: Towards a New Era*, edited by Kamalendra Kanwar. New Delhi: UBS Publishers’ Distributors, 1992.

Malcolm, Brown, and Gehrman Richard. “Conflicting Perspectives.” In *Human Security in World Affairs: Problems and Opportunities*, edited by Lautensach Alexander and Lautensach Sabina, 2nd ed. BCcampus, Canada: Victoria, BC, 2020.
<https://opentextbc.ca/humansecurity/chapter/conflicting-perspectives/>.

- Miyake, Takafumi, and Rie Koarai. "Japanese NGOs for Education: From Service Providers to Change Agents." In *Japan's International Cooperation in Education: History and Prospects*, edited by Nobuko Kayashima, Kazuo Kuroda, and Yuto Kitamura, 271–90. Singapore: Springer Nature Singapore, 2022. https://doi.org/10.1007/978-981-16-6815-9_12.
- Nanda, B. R. "Nehru and Non-Alignment." In *Jawaharlal Nehru: Rebel and Statesman*, edited by B. R. Nanda, 222–52. Oxford University Press, 1998. <https://doi.org/10.1093/acprof:oso/9780195645866.003.0012>.
- Pardesi, Manjeet S. "India's China Policy." In *Engaging the World: Indian Foreign Policy since 1947*, edited by Sumit Ganguly, 167–94. Oxford University Press, 2016. <https://doi.org/10.1093/acprof:oso/9780199458325.003.0007>.
- Peter J, Katzenstein, and Okawara Nobuo. "Japan's Security Policy: Political, Economic and Military Dimensions." In *Rethinking Japanese Security: Internal and External Dimensions*, by Peter J. Katzenstein, 1st edition. London ; New York: Routledge, 2008.
- Pollpeter, Kevin. "Neoclassical Realism as a Framework for Understanding China's Rise as a Space Power." In *The Oxford Handbook of Space Security*, edited by Saadia M. Pekkanen and P.J. Blount, 293–311. Oxford University Press, 2024. <https://doi.org/10.1093/oxfordhb/9780197582671.013.17>.
- Rajaram, Panda. "Changing Dynamics of India-Japan Relations: Future Trends." In *India-Japan Dialogue: Challenges and Potential*, by Iwashita Akihiro. Sapporo: Slavic Research Center, Hokkaido University, 2011.
- Rosenboim, Or. "Realism." In *The Globalization of World Politics: An Introduction to International Relations*, edited by Baylis John, Smith Steve, and Owens Patricia, 9th ed., 132–46. United Kingdom: Oxford University Press, 2023. <https://www.oxfordpoliticstrove.com/display/10.1093/hepl/9780192898142.001.0001/hepl-9780192898142-chapter-9>.
- Saran, Shyam, and Radhika Khosla. "Energizing India–Japan Cooperation on Clean Energy and Climate Change." In *Poised for Partnership: Deepening India-Japan Relations in the Asian Century*, edited by Rohan Mukherjee and Anthony Yazaki, 127–50. Oxford University Press, 2016. <https://doi.org/10.1093/acprof:oso/9780199466481.003.0005>.
- Sato, Makoto. "Human Security and Japanese Diplomacy: Debates on the Role of Human Security in Japanese Policy." In *Protecting Human Security in a Post 9/11 World: Critical and Global Insights*, edited by Giorgio Shani, Makoto Sato, and Mustapha Kamal Pasha, 83–96. London: Palgrave Macmillan UK, 2007. https://doi.org/10.1057/9780230592520_6.
- Sato, Yoichiro. "Three Norms of Collective Defense and Japan's Overseas Troop Dispatches." In *Norms, Interests, and Power in Japanese Foreign Policy*, edited by Yoichiro Sato and Keiko Hirata, 93–108. New York: Palgrave Macmillan US, 2008. https://doi.org/10.1057/9780230615809_5.
- Schweller, Randall L. "The Progressiveness of Neoclassical Realism." In *Progress in International Relations Theory: Appraising the Field*, edited by Elman Colin and Elman Miriam Fendius, 311–

48. United States: The MIT Press, 2003. <https://direct.mit.edu/books/edited-volume/2500/chapter/66986/The-Progressiveness-of-Neoclassical-Realism>.

Sengupta, Sandeep. "India's Engagement in Global Climate Negotiations from Rio to Paris." In *India in a Warming World: Integrating Climate Change and Development*, edited by Navroz K. Dubash, 114–41. New Delhi: Oxford University Press, 2019. <https://doi.org/10.1093/oso/9780199498734.003.0007>.

Shibuya, Eric. "The Kyoto Protocol from Formulation to Ratification: Japan's Role in International Climate Negotiations." In *Norms, Interests, and Power in Japanese Foreign Policy*, edited by Yoichiro Sato and Keiko Hirata, 211–31. New York: Palgrave Macmillan US, 2008. https://doi.org/10.1057/9780230615809_10.

Shimizu, Yasuhiro. "Japan's Policy on Global Warming." In *Global Climate Change: The Economic Costs of Mitigation and Adaptation*, edited by James C. White, William Wagner, and Carole N. Beal, 415–21. Dordrecht: Springer Netherlands, 1991. https://doi.org/10.1007/978-94-011-2914-5_25.

Singh, Zorawar Daulet. "Vietnam War and India, 1965–6." In *Power and Diplomacy: India's Foreign Policies During the Cold War*, edited by Zorawar Daulet Singh, 225–65. Oxford University Press, 2019. <https://doi.org/10.1093/oso/9780199489640.003.0007>.

Smith, Steve. "The Contested Concept of Security." In *Critical Security Studies and World Politics*, edited by Ken Booth, 27–62. Boulder: Lynne Rienner Publishers, 2005. <https://doi.org/10.1515/9781685857356-004>.

Soeya, Yoshihide. "A 'Normal' Middle Power: Interpreting Changes in Japanese Security Policy in the 1990s and After." In *Japan as a "Normal Country"? A Nation in Search of Its Place in the World*, edited by Soeya Yoshihide, Welch David A, and Tadokoro Masayaki, 72–97. Buffalo: University of Toronto Press, 2011.

Takako, Hirose. "Japan in a Dilemma: The Search for a Horizontal Japan-South Asia Relationship." In *Distant Asian Neighbours: Japan and South Asia*. New Delhi: Sterling, 1996.

Takasu, Yukio. "Japan and Networked Human Security." In *Routledge Handbook of Human Security*, edited by Mary Martin and Taylor Owen, 239–50. London: Routledge, 2013.

Tobias, Debiel, and Wulf Herbert. "More than a Rule Taker: The Indian Way of Multilateralism." In *Theorizing Indian Foreign Policy*, edited by Mischa Hansel, Raphaëlle Khan, and Mélissa Levaillant. Rethinking Asia and International Relations. Routledge, 2017.

Weber, Torsten. "Pan-Asianism." In *The Palgrave Encyclopedia of Imperialism and Anti-Imperialism*, edited by Immanuel Ness and Zak Cope, 1–11. Cham: Springer International Publishing, 2020. https://doi.org/10.1007/978-3-319-91206-6_259-1.

Willis, K. D. "First World." In *International Encyclopedia of Human Geography*, edited by Rob Kitchin and Nigel Thrift, 183–88. Oxford: Elsevier, 2009. <https://doi.org/10.1016/B978-008044910-4.00097-3>.

Journal Articles

- Alhammadi, Abdullah. "The Neorealism and Neoliberalism behind International Relations during COVID-19." *World Affairs* 185, no. 1 (March 2022): 147–75.
<https://doi.org/10.1177/00438200211065128>.
- Aydin, Cemil. "Japan's Pan-Asianism and the Legitimacy of Imperial World Order, 1931-1945." *The Asia-Pacific Journal: Japan Focus*, March 3, 2008. <https://apjif.org/cemil-aydin/2695/article>.
- Bajpai, Kanti. "The Idea of Human Security." *International Studies* 40, no. 3 (August 2003): 195–228. <https://doi.org/10.1177/002088170304000301>.
- Baldwin, David A. "The Concept of Security." *Review of International Studies* 23, no. 1 (1997): 5–26.
- Barnett, Yukiko Sumi. "India in Asia: Ôkawa Shûmei's Pan-Asian Thought and His Idea of India in Early Twentieth-Century Japan." *Journal of the Orford University History Society*, 2004, 23.
- Basrur, Rajesh M. "Theory for Strategy: Emerging India in a Changing World." *South Asian Survey* 16, no. 1 (March 1, 2009): 5–21. <https://doi.org/10.1177/097152310801600102>.
- Basrur, Rajesh, and Sumitha Narayanan Kutty. "Modi's India and Japan: Nested Strategic Partnerships." *International Politics (The Hague)* 59, no. 1 (2022): 67–89.
<https://doi.org/10.1057/s41311-021-00288-2>.
- Beckley, Michael. "The Power of Nations: Measuring What Matters." *International Security* 43, no. 2 (November 1, 2018): 7–44. https://doi.org/10.1162/isec_a_00328.
- Bellany, Ian. "Towards a Theory of International Security." *Political Studies* 29, no. 1 (March 1, 1981): 100–105. <https://doi.org/10.1111/j.1467-9248.1981.tb01276.x>.
- Bhattacharya, Purusottam. "India's Foreign Policy In The Twenty-First Century: THE QUEST FOR MAJOR POWER STATUS." *World Affairs: The Journal of International Issues* 22, no. 3 (2018): 38–59.
- Bhattacharyay, Biswa Nath, and Kakali Mukhopadhyay. "A Comprehensive Economic Partnership between India and Japan: Impact, Prospects and Challenges." *Journal of Asian Economics* 39 (August 2015): 94–107. <https://doi.org/10.1016/j.asieco.2015.06.006>.
- Borra, Ranjan. "Subhas Chandra Bose, The Indian National Army, and The War of India's Liberation." *The Journal of Historical Review* 3, no. 4 (March 14, 2024): 407–39.
- Bosold, David, and Sascha Werthes. "Human Security in Practice: Canadian and Japanese Experiences." *International Politics and Society* 1 (January 1, 2005): 84–101.
- Bradford, John F. "Japanese Anti-Piracy Initiatives in Southeast Asia: Policy Formulation and the Coastal State Responses." *Contemporary Southeast Asia* 26, no. 3 (2004): 480–505.
- Brooks, Stephen G. "Dueling Realisms." *International Organization* 51, no. 3 (1997): 445–77.

- Brunnée, Jutta, and Stephen J. Toope. "Canada and the Use of Force: Reclaiming Human Security." *International Journal* 59, no. 2 (2004): 247–60. <https://doi.org/10.2307/40203925>.
- Burns, Katherine G. "China and Japan: Economic Partnership to Political Ends." *Stimson*, n.d., 27–58.
- Calder, Kent E. "Japanese Foreign Economic Policy Formation: Explaining the Reactive State." Edited by Takashi Inoguchi, Yoichi Funabashi, Atsushi Kusano, Thomas McCraw, Kenneth B. Pyle, and Michele Schmiegelow. *World Politics* 40, no. 4 (1988): 517–41. <https://doi.org/10.2307/2010317>.
- Camroux, David. "Asia ... Whose Asia? A 'Return to the Future' of a Sino-Indic Asian Community." *The Pacific Review* 20, no. 4 (November 20, 2007): 551–75. <https://doi.org/10.1080/09512740701672027>.
- Cerlioli, Luíza. "Neoclassical Realism, Global International Relations, and the Unheard Echoes of Realist Practices from the South." *The British Journal of Politics and International Relations*, February 20, 2024, 13691481241230858. <https://doi.org/10.1177/13691481241230858>.
- Cha, Victor D. "Abandonment, Entrapment, and Neoclassical Realism in Asia: The United States, Japan, and Korea." *International Studies Quarterly* 44, no. 2 (June 1, 2000): 261–91. <https://doi.org/10.1111/0020-8833.00158>.
- Chai, Sun-Ki. "Entrenching the Yoshida Defense Doctrine: Three Techniques for Institutionalization." *International Organization* 51, no. 3 (1997): 389–412.
- Chellaney, Brahma, and Takenori Horimoto. "Japan-India Links Critical for Asia-Pacific Peace and Stability." *Gaiko Forum* 7, no. 2 (September 2007).
- Clarke, Barry. "Eccentrically Contested Concepts." *British Journal of Political Science* 9, no. 1 (January 1979): 122–26. <https://doi.org/10.1017/S0007123400001654>.
- Davidson, Jason W. "From Harmony to Hard Times: A Neoclassical Realist Explanation of Transatlantic Burden-Sharing in Afghanistan and Iraq." *Aspen Institute Italia* 9 (2008). <https://scholar.google.com/scholar?cluster=10245651612025838705&hl=en&oi=scholar>.
- De Silva, Shakthi. "Balancing, Bandwagoning or Hedging? Independent Ceylon's Reaction to Regional Hegemony." *South Asian Survey* 22, no. 2 (September 1, 2015): 189–209. <https://doi.org/10.1177/0971523117753929>.
- Degaut, Marcos. "WHAT IS SECURITY?" Translated by Marcos Degaut. *Revista Brasileira de Inteligência*, no. 9 (May 2015): 9–28. <https://doi.org/10.58960/rbi.2015.9.113>.
- Deshingkar, Giri. "The Construction of Asia in India." *Asian Studies Review* 23, no. 2 (June 1999): 173–80. <https://doi.org/10.1080/10357829908713229>.
- Diamond, Larry. "Rethinking Civil Society: Toward Democratic Consolidation." *Journal of Democracy* 5, no. 3 (1994): 4–17.
- "Documentation: Foreign Policy and National Security." *International Security* 1, no. 1 (1976): 182–91. <https://doi.org/10.2307/2538582>.
- Dollah, Ramli, Diana Peters, Wan Shawaluddin Wan Hassan, Marja Azlima Omar, Md Saffie Abdul Rahim, and Adi Jafar. "Japan's Advocacy for Human Security in Global Politics: Case Study of

Japan's Grant Assistance for Grass-Roots Human Security Projects (GGP) in the State of Sabah, Malaysia, 2000–2021." *East Asia* 40, no. 2 (June 1, 2023): 151–74.
<https://doi.org/10.1007/s12140-023-09399-4>.

Dubash, Navroz K. "Safeguarding Development and Limiting Vulnerability: India's Stakes in the Paris Agreement." *WIREs Climate Change* 8, no. 2 (2017): 1–10.
<https://doi.org/10.1002/wcc.444>.

Eric, Watkins. "Facing The Terrorist Threat In The Malacca Strait." *Terrorism Monitor* 2, no. 9 (May 2004). <https://jamestown.org/program/facing-the-terrorist-threat-in-the-malacca-strait-2/>.

Fell, Mike. "Is Human Security Our Main Concern in the 21st Century?" *Journal of Security Sector Management* 4, no. 3 (2006): 11.

Fermann, Gunnar. "Japan's 1990 Climate Policy under Pressure." *Security Dialogue* 24, no. 3 (1993): 287–300.

Filimon, Luiza-Maria. "An Overview of the Copenhagen School's Approach to Security Studies: Constructing (in)Security through Performative Power." *The Romanian Journal for Baltic and Nordic Studies* 8, no. 2 (December 15, 2016): 47–72. https://doi.org/10.53604/rjbns.v8i2_4.

Fischer-Tiné, Harald. "Indian Nationalism and the 'World Forces': Transnational and Diasporic Dimensions of the Indian Freedom Movement on the Eve of the First World War." *Journal of Global History* 2, no. 3 (November 2007): 325–44. <https://doi.org/10.1017/S1740022807002318>.

Foulon, Michiel. "Neoclassical Realism: Challengers and Bridging Identities." *International Studies Review* 17, no. 4 (December 1, 2015): 635–61. <https://doi.org/10.1111/misr.12255>.

Francis, Peter. "Glass Beads in Asia Part Two. Indo-Pacific Beads." *Asian Perspectives* 29, no. 1 (1990): 1–23.

Freire, Lucas G. "Is Neorealism a Deterministic Theory of International Relations?" *International Studies* 56, no. 1 (January 1, 2019): 58–67. <https://doi.org/10.1177/0020881718824760>.

Friedman, Irving S. "Indian Nationalism and the Far East." *Pacific Affairs* 13, no. 1 (1940): 17–29. <https://doi.org/10.2307/2750768>.

Ganguly, Sumit. "India's Foreign Policy Grows Up." *World Policy Journal* 20, no. 4 (2003): 41–47.

Garver, John W., and Fei-Ling Wang. "China's Anti-Encirclement Struggle." *Asian Security* 6, no. 3 (September 30, 2010): 238–61. <https://doi.org/10.1080/14799855.2010.507412>.

Gustafsson, Karl, Linus Hagström, and Ulv Hanssen. "Long Live Pacifism! Narrative Power and Japan's Pacifist Model." *Cambridge Review of International Affairs* 32, no. 4 (July 4, 2019): 502–20. <https://doi.org/10.1080/09557571.2019.1623174>.

Haber, Deborah L. "The Death of Hegemony: Why 'Pax Nipponica' Is Impossible." *Asian Survey* 30, no. 9 (1990): 892–907. <https://doi.org/10.2307/2644528>.

Hagström, Linus, and Björn Jerdén. "Understanding Fluctuations in Sino-Japanese Relations: To Politicize or to De-Politicize the China Issue in the Japanese Diet." *Pacific Affairs* 83, no. 4 (2010): 719–39.

- Hameed, Shahid. "Dissecting Neo-Classical Realism and Foreign Policy Behavior: An Analysis." *Journal of Development and Social Sciences* 4, no. 3 (September 30, 2023). [https://doi.org/10.47205/jdss.2023\(4-III\)70](https://doi.org/10.47205/jdss.2023(4-III)70).
- Heginbotham, Eric, and Richard J. Samuels. "Japan's Dual Hedge." *Foreign Affairs* 81, no. 5 (2002): 110–21. <https://doi.org/10.2307/20033272>.
- Ho, Satomi. "Japan's Human Security Policy: A Critical Review of Its Limits and Failures." *Japanese Studies* 28, no. 1 (May 1, 2008): 101–12. <https://doi.org/10.1080/10371390801939120>.
- Horimoto, Takenori. "Explaining India's Foreign Policy: From Dream to Realization of Major Power." *International Relations of the Asia-Pacific* 17, no. 3 (September 1, 2017): 463–96. <https://doi.org/10.1093/irap/lcx011>.
- . "Indo-Pacific Order and Japan–India Relations in the Midst of COVID-19." *Journal of Asian Economic Integration* 2, no. 2 (September 2020): 140–58. <https://doi.org/10.1177/2631684620940476>.
- Hoshiro, Hiroyuki. "Japan's Foreign Aid Policy: Has It Changed? Thirty Years of ODA Charters." *Social Science Japan Journal* 25, no. 2 (June 1, 2022): 297–330. <https://doi.org/10.1093/ssjj/jyac010>.
- Hughes, Christopher W. "Japan's Doctoring of the Yoshida Doctrine." *Asia Policy*, no. 4 (2007): 199–204.
- Inoue, Mariko, Mariko Nishikitani, and Shinobu Tsurugano. "Female Non-Regular Workers in Japan: Their Current Status and Health." *Industrial Health* 54, no. 6 (November 2016): 521–27. <https://doi.org/10.2486/indhealth.2016-0105>.
- Jain, Purnendra C. "A New Political Era in Japan: The 1993 Election." *Asian Survey* 33, no. 11 (1993): 1071–82. <https://doi.org/10.2307/2645000>.
- . "Japan's Relations with South Asia." *Asian Survey* 37, no. 4 (1997): 340–52. <https://doi.org/10.2307/2645652>.
- Joshi, Sanjana. "The Geopolitical Context of Changing Japan-India Relations." *UNISCI Discussion Papers*, no. 32 (2013): 117–36. https://doi.org/10.5209/rev_UNIS.2013.n32.44793.
- Kaarbo, Juliet. "A Foreign Policy Analysis Perspective on the Domestic Politics Turn in IR Theory1." *International Studies Review* 17, no. 2 (June 1, 2015): 189–216. <https://doi.org/10.1111/misr.12213>.
- Kameyama, Yasuko. "Evaluation and Future of the Kyoto Protocol: Japan's Perspective." *International Review for Environmental Strategies* 5, no. 1 (2004): 71–82.
- Kang, David C. "Getting Asia Wrong: The Need for New Analytical Frameworks." *International Security* 27, no. 4 (2003): 57–85.
- Katsuhiko, Oga, and Sunil Gupta. "The Far East, Southeast and South Asia: Indo-Pacific Beads from Yayoi Tombs as Indicators of Early Maritime Exchange." *South Asian Studies* 16, no. 1 (January 2000): 73–88. <https://doi.org/10.1080/02666030.2000.9628581>.

- Katsumata, Hiro. "Norms, Interests, and Power in Japanese Foreign Policy." *International Relations of the Asia-Pacific* 10, no. 1 (January 1, 2010): 189–92. <https://doi.org/10.1093/irap/lcp004>.
- Kawashima, Yasuko. "Japan and Climate Change: Responses and Explanations." *Energy & Environment* 12, no. 2/3 (2001): 167–79.
- Keogh-Brown, Marcus Richard, and Richard David Smith. "The Economic Impact of SARS: How Does the Reality Match the Predictions?" *Health Policy (Amsterdam, Netherlands)* 88, no. 1 (October 2008): 110–20. <https://doi.org/10.1016/j.healthpol.2008.03.003>.
- Kitchen, Nicholas. "Systemic Pressures and Domestic Ideas: A Neoclassical Realist Model of Grand Strategy Formation." *Review of International Studies* 36, no. 1 (January 2010): 117–43. <https://doi.org/10.1017/S0260210509990532>.
- Koga, Kei. "Japan's 'Indo-Pacific' Question: Countering China or Shaping a New Regional Order?" *International Affairs* 96, no. 1 (January 1, 2020): 49–73. <https://doi.org/10.1093/ia/iiz241>.
- Korhonen, Pekka. "Monopolizing Asia: The Politics of a Metaphor." *The Pacific Review* 10, no. 3 (January 1, 1997): 347–65. <https://doi.org/10.1080/09512749708719227>.
- . "The Geography of Okakura Tenshin." *Japan Review*, no. 13 (2001): 107–27.
- Krause, Keith, and Michael C. Williams. "Broadening the Agenda of Security Studies: Politics and Methods." *Mershon International Studies Review* 40, no. 2 (1996): 229–54. <https://doi.org/10.2307/222776>.
- Li, Li. "India's Security Concept and Its China Policy in the Post-Cold War Era." *The Chinese Journal of International Politics* 2, no. 2 (2008): 229–61.
- Limaye, Satu. "Japan and India after the Cold War." *Japan in a Dynamic Asia: Coping with the New Security Challenges*, 2006, 226.
- Limaye, Satu P. "Tokyo's Dynamic Diplomacy: Japan and the Subcontinent's Nuclear Tests." *Contemporary Southeast Asia* 22, no. 2 (2000): 322–39.
- Mallett, Ellis, and Thomas Juneau. "A Neoclassical Realist Theory of Overbalancing." *Global Studies Quarterly* 3, no. 2 (April 1, 2023). <https://doi.org/10.1093/isagsq/ksad023>.
- Meibauer, Gustav. "Neorealism, Neoclassical Realism and the Problem(s) of History." *International Relations* 37, no. 2 (June 2023): 348–69. <https://doi.org/10.1177/00471178211033943>.
- Milner, Helen. "The Assumption of Anarchy in International Relations Theory: A Critique." *Review of International Studies* 17, no. 1 (1991): 67–85.
- Mishima, Ko. "The Changing Relationship between Japan's LDP and the Bureaucracy: Hashimoto's Administrative Reform Effort and Its Politics." *Asian Survey* 38, no. 10 (1998): 968–85. <https://doi.org/10.2307/2645646>.
- Mishra, Pritimayee, and Kaikashna Begum. "From 'Look East to Act East': The Changing Dimension of India's Foreign Policy." *The Indian Journal of Political Science* 76, no. 3 (2015): 658–60.
- Mohite, Dilip. "Ideological Foundations of Nehru's Nonalignment." *The Indian Journal of Political Science* 53, no. 1 (1992): 24–38.

- Murthy, Narasimha, and P. A. (Poomagame Anantharamaiah). "India and Japan : Dimensions of Their Relations : Historical and Political." *New Delhi: ABE Publishing House*, 1986.
<https://cir.nii.ac.jp/crid/1130000795243891200>.
- Nandy, Ashis. "The Other within: The Strange Case of Radhabinod Pal's Judgment on Culpability." *New Literary History* 23, no. 1 (1992): 45. <https://doi.org/10.2307/469157>.
- Nasu, Hitoshi. "The Expanded Conception of Security and International Law: Challenges to the Un Collective Security System." *Amsterdam Law Forum* 3, no. 3 (June 1, 2011): 15.
<https://doi.org/10.37974/ALF.190>.
- Nayyar, Deepak. "Economic Liberalisation in India: Then and Now." *Economic and Political Weekly* 52, no. 2 (2017): 41–48.
- Niaz, Muhammad Tariq. "Regional Integration in South Asia: Utopia or Reality?" *Margalla Papers* 26, no. I (June 30, 2022): 108–20.
- Oguma, Shinya. "Japan's Security Policy Making after Political Reforms: Centralization and Constraints since the First Abe Administration." *Anzenhosho Senryaku Kenkyu (Security & Strategy)* 3, no. 2 (March 2023): 67–87.
- Ohta, Hiroshi, and Brendan F. D. Barrett. "Politics of Climate Change and Energy Policy in Japan: Is Green Transformation Likely?" *Earth System Governance* 17 (August 1, 2023): 100187.
<https://doi.org/10.1016/j.esg.2023.100187>.
- Omar, Eslam M. "Japan Balances Power Dynamics in Southeast Asia: An Analysis of Japan's Role in Crystalizing Asian Relations." *Open Journal of Political Science* 13, no. 2 (April 17, 2023): 180–204. <https://doi.org/10.4236/ojps.2023.132011>.
- Panda, Rajaram. "India-Japan Defence Partnership." *Indian Foreign Affairs Journal* 7, no. 3 (2012): 311–20.
- . "Prospects for India-Japan Civil Nuclear Cooperation." *India-US Insight* 2, no. 7 (2012): 1–9.
- Panda, Rajaram, and Ch. Viyyanna Sastry. "India and Japan: Prospects for Civil Nuclear Cooperation." *Indian Foreign Affairs Journal* 6, no. 2 (2011): 202–16.
- Pant, Harsh V., and Julie M. Super. "India's 'non-Alignment' Conundrum: A Twentieth-Century Policy in a Changing World." *International Affairs (Royal Institute of International Affairs 1944-)* 91, no. 4 (2015): 747–64.
- Paul, Joshy M. "India and Japan: Reluctant Idealism to Practical Realism." *South Asian Survey* 15, no. 1 (January 1, 2008): 99–119. <https://doi.org/10.1177/097152310801500107>.
- Pempel, T.J. "The Pendulum Swings toward a Rising Sun." *Asia Policy* 4, no. 1 (2007): 188–90.
- Potter, David M. "Japan's Foreign Aid, Human Security, and Traditional Security." *Journal of Nanzan Academic Society Social Sciences* 8 (January 2015): 45–60.
- Powell, Robert. "Anarchy in International Relations Theory: The Neorealist-Neoliberal Debate." *International Organization* 48, no. 2 (1994): 313–44.

- Prävălie, Remus. "Nuclear Weapons Tests and Environmental Consequences: A Global Perspective." *AMBIO* 43, no. 6 (October 2014): 729–44. <https://doi.org/10.1007/s13280-014-0491-1>.
- Puri, Rashmi-Sudha. "Gandhi and the Second World War." *The Indian Journal of Political Science* 38, no. 1 (1977): 30–53.
- Rajagopalan, Rajesh, and Varun Sahni. "India and the Great Powers: Strategic Imperatives, Normative Necessities." *South Asian Survey* 15, no. 1 (January 1, 2008): 5–32. <https://doi.org/10.1177/097152310801500102>.
- Rathbun, Brian. "A Rose by Any Other Name: Neoclassical Realism as the Logical and Necessary Extension of Structural Realism." *Security Studies* 17, no. 2 (May 22, 2008): 294–321. <https://doi.org/10.1080/09636410802098917>.
- Reed, Steven R., Ethan Scheiner, and Michael F. Thies. "The End of LDP Dominance and the Rise of Party-Oriented Politics in Japan." *The Journal of Japanese Studies* 38, no. 2 (2012): 353–76.
- Ringsmuth, Andrew K., Ilona M. Otto, Bart van den Hurk, Glada Lahn, Christopher P.O. Reyer, Timothy R. Carter, Piotr Magnuszewski, et al. "Lessons from COVID-19 for Managing Transboundary Climate Risks and Building Resilience." *Climate Risk Management* 35 (2022): 100395. <https://doi.org/10.1016/j.crm.2022.100395>.
- Rose, Gideon. "Neoclassical Realism and Theories of Foreign Policy." Edited by Michael E. Brown, Thomas J. Christensen, Randall L. Schweller, William Curti Wohlforth, and Fareed Zakaria. *World Politics* 51, no. 1 (1998): 144–72.
- Roth, Ariel Ilan. "A Bold Move Forward for Neoclassical Realism." Edited by Randall Schweller. *International Studies Review* 8, no. 3 (2006): 486–88.
- Roy, Nabarun. "Realism in the Study of International Relations in India." *ORF Issue Brief*, no. 253 (September 2018). https://www.orfonline.org/wp-content/uploads/2018/09/ORF_IssueBrief_253_Realism-IR.pdf.
- Roznai, Yaniv. "The Insecurity of Human Security." *Wisconsin International Law Journal* 32, no. 1 (2014): 94–141.
- ŞahiN Mencütek, Zeynep, N. Ela Gökalp Aras, and Bezen BalamiR Coşkun. "Turkey's Response to Syrian Mass Migration: A Neoclassical Realist Analysis." *Uluslararası İlişkiler / International Relations* 17, no. 68 (2020): 93–111.
- Sakhuja, Vijay. "Indo-Japanese Maritime Security Cooperation." *Strategic Analysis* 24, no. 1 (April 2000): 187–89. <https://doi.org/10.1080/09700160008455204>.
- Sampei, Yuki, and Midori Aoyagi-Usui. "Mass-Media Coverage, Its Influence on Public Awareness of Climate-Change Issues, and Implications for Japan's National Campaign to Reduce Greenhouse Gas Emissions." *Global Environmental Change, Traditional Peoples and Climate Change*, 19, no. 2 (May 1, 2009): 203–12. <https://doi.org/10.1016/j.gloenvcha.2008.10.005>.
- Samuels, Richard J. "'New Fighting Power!' Japan's Growing Maritime Capabilities and East Asian Security." *International Security* 32, no. 3 (2007): 84–112.

- Sanjay, Joshi. "Prospects for Security Cooperation Between India and Japan." *Strategic Analysis* 25, no. 2 (May 2001). https://ciaotest.cc.columbia.edu/olj/sa/sa_may01jos01.html.
- Sareen, Tilak Raj. "India and Japan in Historical Perspective." (*No Title*), March 12, 2024. <https://cir.nii.ac.jp/crid/1130000795633915008>.
- Sato, Hiroshi. "India Japan Peace Treaty in Japan's Post-War Asian Diplomacy." *Minamiajiakenkyu* 2005, no. 17 (December 26, 2005): 1–20. <https://doi.org/10.11384/jjasas1989.2005.1>.
- Schweller, Randall L. "Unanswered Threats: A Neoclassical Realist Theory of Underbalancing." *International Security* 29, no. 2 (October 1, 2004): 159–201. <https://doi.org/10.1162/0162288042879913>.
- Scott, David. "India's 'Extended Neighborhood' Concept: Power Projection for a Rising Power." *India Review* 8, no. 2 (June 2009): 107–43. <https://doi.org/10.1080/14736480902901038>.
- Sengupta, Mitu. "From 'Hard Sell' To 'Soft Sell': The Imf, World Bank And Indian Liberalisation." *World Affairs: The Journal of International Issues* 14, no. 1 (2010): 112–36.
- Sezai, ÖzçeliK. "The cold war re-visited: explaining and understanding of the end of the cold war in light of neo-realism." *Milletleraras* 49, no. 0 (2018): 1–20. https://doi.org/10.1501/Intrel_00000000315.
- Shimizu, Hiroshi. "The Indian Merchants of Kobe and Japan's Trade Expansion into Southeast Asia before the Asian-Pacific War." *Japan Forum* 17, no. 1 (March 1, 2005): 25–48. <https://doi.org/10.1080/0955580052000337459>.
- Singer, J. David. "The Level-of-Analysis Problem in International Relations." *World Politics* 14, no. 1 (1961): 77–92. <https://doi.org/10.2307/2009557>.
- Singh, Dr.Mona. "Indian Foreign Policy: From Idealism to Realism." *International Journal of Scientific Research* 3, no. 5 (June 1, 2012): 91–92. <https://doi.org/10.15373/22778179/MAY2014/29>.
- Snyder, Glenn H. "Alliance Theory: A Neorealist First Cut." *Journal of International Affairs* 44, no. 1 (1990): 103.
- . "Mearsheimer's World-Offensive Realism and the Struggle for Security: A Review Essay." *International Security* 27, no. 1 (2002): 149–73.
- . "The Security Dilemma in Alliance Politics." *World Politics* 36, no. 4 (July 1984): 461–95. <https://doi.org/10.2307/2010183>.
- Sterling-Folker, Jennifer. "Realist Environment, Liberal Process, and Domestic-Level Variables." *International Studies Quarterly* 41, no. 1 (1997): 1–25.
- Suhrke, Astri. "Human Security and the Interests of States." *Security Dialogue* 30, no. 3 (September 1999): 265–76. <https://doi.org/10.1177/0967010699030003002>.
- Tagore, Rabindranath. "The Message of India to Japan : A Lecture Delivered at the Imperial University of Tokyo." (*No Title*), March 7, 2024. <https://cir.nii.ac.jp/crid/1130000796809088896>.

- Takenori, Horimoto. "Synchronizing Japan-India Relations." *Japan Quarterly; Tokyo* 40, no. 1 (January 1, 1993).
- Taliaferro, Jeffrey W. "Security Seeking under Anarchy: Defensive Realism Revisited." *International Security* 25, no. 3 (2000): 128–61.
- . "State Building for Future Wars: Neoclassical Realism and the Resource-Extractive State." *Security Studies* 15, no. 3 (September 1, 2006): 464–95.
<https://doi.org/10.1080/09636410601028370>.
- Toye, Hugh. "The First Indian National Army, 1941-42." *Journal of Southeast Asian Studies* 15, no. 2 (1984): 365–81.
- Vanaik, Achin. "National Interest: A Flawed Notion: Indian Foreign Policy since 1991." *Economic and Political Weekly* 41, no. 49 (2006): 5045–49.
- Vinayaraj, V.K. "India as a Threat: Bangladeshi Perceptions." *South Asian Survey* 16, no. 1 (March 1, 2009): 101–18. <https://doi.org/10.1177/097152310801600107>.
- Walt, Stephen M. "The Renaissance of Security Studies." *International Studies Quarterly* 35, no. 2 (1991): 211–39. <https://doi.org/10.2307/2600471>.
- Waltz, Kenneth N. "Structural Realism after the Cold War." *International Security* 25, no. 1 (2000): 5–41.
- . "The Origins of War in Neorealist Theory." *The Journal of Interdisciplinary History* 18, no. 4 (1988): 615–28. <https://doi.org/10.2307/204817>.
- Wendt, Alexander. "Anarchy Is What States Make of It: The Social Construction of Power Politics." *International Organization* 46, no. 2 (1992): 391–425.
- Wight, Colin. "Incommensurability and Cross-Paradigm Communication in International Relations Theory: 'What's the Frequency Kenneth?'" *Millennium* 25, no. 2 (June 1, 1996): 291–319.
<https://doi.org/10.1177/03058298960250020401>.
- Wohlforth, William C. "Realism and the End of the Cold War." *International Security* 19, no. 3 (1994): 91–129. <https://doi.org/10.2307/2539080>.
- Wolferen, Karel van. "Japan in the Age of Uncertainty." *New Left Review*, no. I/200 (August 1, 1993): 15–40.
- Wolfers, Arnold. "'National Security' as an Ambiguous Symbol." *Political Science Quarterly* 67, no. 4 (1952): 481–502. <https://doi.org/10.2307/2145138>.
- Yamada, Takahiro. "Transforming the Dynamics of Climate Politics in Japan: Business' Response to Securitization." *Politics and Governance* 9, no. 4 (October 22, 2021): 65–78.
<https://doi.org/10.17645/pag.v9i4.4427>.

Documents and Reports

- “2016 India-Japan Joint Statement during the Visit of Prime Minister to Japan.” Ministry of External Affairs, Government of India, November 11, 2016. https://www.mea.gov.in/bilateral-documents.htm?dtl/27599/IndiaJapan_Joint_Statement_during_the_visit_of_Prime_Minister_to_Japan.
- “2018 Japan-India Summit Meeting.” Ministry of Foreign Affairs of Japan, October 29, 2018. https://www.mofa.go.jp/s_sa/sw/in/page3_002603.html.
- “A Future for Small States: Overcoming Vulnerabilities.” London: OECD Publishing, January 1, 1997. <https://doi.org/10.14217/9781848596078-en>.
- “Agreement Between the Government of Japan And The Government Of The Republic Of India Concerning Reciprocal Provision Of Supplies And Services Between The Self-Defense Forces Of Japan And The Indian Armed Forces.” Ministry of Foreign Affairs of Japan, September 10, 2020. <https://www.mofa.go.jp/files/100091751.pdf>.
- “Agreement Between the Government Of Japan And The Government Of The Republic Of India Concerning The Transfer Of Defence Equipment And Technology.” Ministry of Foreign Affairs of Japan, December 12, 2015. <https://www.mofa.go.jp/files/000117470.pdf>.
- Aleya Mousami, Sultana. “India Foreign Policies and the Contemporary World.” Cooch Behar Panchanan Barma University, 2020. [https://www.cbpbu.ac.in/userfiles/file/2020/STUDY_MAT/POL_SC/15-05-20/INDIA%20JAPAN%20RELATIONSHIP-converted%20\(1\).pdf](https://www.cbpbu.ac.in/userfiles/file/2020/STUDY_MAT/POL_SC/15-05-20/INDIA%20JAPAN%20RELATIONSHIP-converted%20(1).pdf).
- Alice, D. Ba, J. Bulman David, P. Freeman Carla, and Yongtao Gui. “The U.S. and China in Asia: Mitigating Tensions and Enhancing Cooperation.” Johns Hopkins SAIS, 2019. https://sais.jhu.edu/sites/default/files/The%20US%20and%20China%20in%20Asia_0.pdf.
- “All India Installed Capacity (in MW) of Power Stations.” Central Electricity Authority, Ministry of Power, January 31, 2024. https://cea.nic.in/wp-content/uploads/installed/2024/01/IC_Jan_2024_allocation_wise-1.pdf.
- “Annual Report Year 2004 - 2005.” Ministry of Defence, 2005. <http://www.mod.gov.in/annual-report-year-2004-2005-0>.
- Banerjee, Sreeparna, and Pratinashree Basu. “Strengthening Partnerships to Counter Non-Traditional Security Threats In.” Special Report. Observer Research Foundation, March 2022. <https://www.orfonline.org/public/uploads/posts/pdf/20230522162109.pdf>.
- Beri, Ruchita. “AAGC: Towards India-Japan Development Cooperation in Africa.” RIS Discussion Papers. Research and Information System, 2017.
- “Brief Note on India-Japan Bilateral Relations.” Ministry of External Affairs, Government of India, February 2020. https://www.mea.gov.in/Portal/ForeignRelation/India-Japan_Bilateral_Brief_feb_2020.pdf.

- “CII Report on India in Africa Report - Developing Trilateral Partnership.” Confederation of Indian Industry, 2019.
<https://www.cieximafricaconclave.com/Document/Reports/CII%20Report%20on%20India%20in%20Africa%20Report%20-%20Developing%20Trilateral%20Partnership.pdf>.
- “Diplomatic Bluebook 2016 Japanese Diplomacy and International Situation in 2015.” Minister for Foreign Affairs, Japan, 2016. <https://www.mofa.go.jp/files/000177707.pdf>.
- Dubash, Navroz K, Radhika Khosla, Narasimha D Rao, and K Rahul Sharma. “Informing India’s Energy and Climate Debate: Policy Lessons from Modelling Studies.” Centre for Policy Research, December 1981.
https://pure.iiasa.ac.at/id/eprint/11644/1/Informing%20India's%20Energy%20and%20Climate%20Debate_CPR-IIASA.pdf.
- Edström, Bert. “Japan and Human Security: The Derailing of a Foreign Policy Vision.” Institute for Security and Development Policy, 2011.
https://isd.eu/content/uploads/publications/2011_edstrom_japan-and-human-security.pdf.
- “Evaluation of Japan’s Grant Assistance for Grassroots Human Security Projects (GGP Scheme).” Ministry of Foreign Affairs of Japan, 2005.
<https://www.mofa.go.jp/policy/oda/evaluation/FY2005/text-pdf/gghsp.pdf>.
- “Evaluation Study on The Grassroots Grant Programme Case Studies in Myanmar, Cambodia, Vietnam.” Ministry for Foreign Affairs, Japan, 2001.
<https://www.mofa.go.jp/policy/oda/evaluation/FY2001/text-pdf/grassroot.pdf>.
- “FDI Synopsis on Country Japan.” Department for Promotion of Industry and Internal Trade, December 31, 2020. https://dpiit.gov.in/sites/default/files/Japan_v_2020.pdf.
- Finch, Dr Robert. “3S Framework.” Sandia National Laboratories, 2012.
<https://www.osti.gov/servlets/purl/1104765>.
- “Frequently Asked Questions About GGP.” Ministry of Foreign Affairs of Japan, 2022.
[https://www.in.emb-japan.go.jp/Japan-India-Relations/GGP/04_FAQ_\(Updated_October_2022\).pdf](https://www.in.emb-japan.go.jp/Japan-India-Relations/GGP/04_FAQ_(Updated_October_2022).pdf).
- Gokhale, Vijay. “A Historical Evaluation of China’s India Policy: Lessons for India-China Relations.” Carnegie India, December 2022. https://carnegieendowment.org/files/Gokhale_-_Chinas_India_Policy3.pdf.
- “Grant Assistance for Grassroots Human Security Projects (GGP).” Ministry of Foreign Affairs of Japan, June 28, 2022. https://www.chennai.in.emb-japan.go.jp/itpr_en/b_000085.html.
- Hugh, Patrick. “Japan’s Abenomics: So Far So Good, But Will It Prevail?” Center on Japanese Economy and Business, October 2014.
<https://academiccommons.columbia.edu/doi/10.7916/D8GF132C/download>.
- “Human Security Now.” Commission on Human Security, 2003.
<https://digitallibrary.un.org/record/503749/files/Humansecuritynow.pdf>.

- iii, Thomas F Lynch, and James J Przystup. "India-Japan Strategic Cooperation and Implications for U.S. Strategy in the Indo-Asia-Pacific Region." Strategic Perspectives. Washington, D.C: Institute for National Strategic Studies, March 2017.
- "India and Japan Growing Partnership and Opportunities for Cooperation." CPPR Centre for Strategic studies, August 2019. <https://www.cppr.in/wp-content/uploads/2019/08/India-and-Japan-Growing-Partnership-and-Opportunities-for-Co-operation.pdf>.
- "India: Greenhouse Gas Emissions 2007." New Delhi: INCCA Indian Network for Climate Change Assessment, Ministry of Environment and Forests, Government of India, 2010. https://www.iitr.ac.in/wfw/web_ua_water_for_welfare/water/WRDM/MOEF_India_GHG_Emis_2010.pdf.
- "India-Japan Bilateral Relations." Ministry of External Affairs, Government of India, March 2023. https://www.mea.gov.in/Portal/ForeignRelation/India-Japan_Bilateral_Relations_March_2023.pdf.
- "India-Japan Joint Statement during Visit of Prime Minister of Japan to India," September 14, 2017. <https://www.mea.gov.in/bilateral-documents.htm?dtl/28946/IndiaJapan+Joint+Statement+during+visit+of+Prime+Minister+of+Japan+to+India+September+14+2017>.
- "India-Japan Relations." Ministry of External Affairs, Government of India, November 2017. https://www.mea.gov.in/Portal/ForeignRelation/14_Japan_Nov_2017.pdf.
- "India-Japan Relations 2014." Ministry of External Affairs, Government of India, July 2014. https://www.mea.gov.in/Portal/ForeignRelation/Japan_-_July_2014_.pdf.
- "Indian Tsunami Early Warning Centre (ITEWC)." Incois, September 2018. https://incois.gov.in/documents/tsunami/PressNote_on_IOWave18%20from_INCOIS.pdf.
- "IRENA's Renewable Roadmap (REmap 2030): REmap Countries Renewable Energy Targets." International Renewable Energy Agency, 2014. http://irena.org/remap/IRENA_REmap_RE_targets_table_2014.pdf.
- "Japan Calling." Embassy of Japan in India, December 2009. https://www.in.emb-japan.go.jp/Japan-Calling/JAPAN_CALLING_DEC_09.pdf.
- "Japan-China Joint History Research Report." Modern and Contemporary History Vol.1. Ministry for Foreign Affairs, Japan, March 2011. <https://www.mofa.go.jp/mofaj/files/100512970.pdf>.
- "Japanese Fundamentals Drive Adoption of New Industrial Structure Vision." Japan External Trade Organization, October 2010. https://www.jetro.go.jp/ext_images/en/reports/survey/pdf/2010_07_other.pdf.
- "Japan-India Vision Statement." Ministry for Foreign Affairs, Japan, October 29, 2018. <https://www.mofa.go.jp/files/000413507.pdf>.
- "Japan's Eighth National Communication and Fifth Biennial Report." United Nations Framework Convention on Climate Change, December 2022. https://unfccc.int/sites/default/files/resource/NC8_BR5-JPN-E%20%281%29.pdf.

- “Japan’s Medium-Term Policy on Official Development Assistance.” Ministry for Foreign Affairs, Japan, February 4, 2005. <https://www.mofa.go.jp/policy/oda/mid-term/policy.pdf>.
- “Japan’s Official Development Assistance White Paper 2011: Japan’s International Cooperation.” Ministry of Foreign Affairs, 2011. https://www.mofa.go.jp/policy/oda/white/2011/pdfs/00_oda_wp_2011.pdf.
- “Joint Statement on India and Japan Vision 2025: Special Strategic and Global Partnership Working Together for Peace and Prosperity of the Indo-Pacific Region and the World(December 12, 2015).” Ministry of External Affairs, Government of India, December 12, 2015. https://www.mea.gov.in/bilateral-documents.htm?dtl/26176/Joint_Statement_on_India_and_Japan_Vision_2025_Special_Strategic_and_Global_Partnership_Working_Together_for_Peace_and_Prosperty_of_the_IndoPacific_R.
- “Joint Statement Towards India-Japan Strategic and Global Partnership.” Ministry of External Affairs, Government of India, December 15, 2006. <https://www.mea.gov.in/bilateral-documents.htm?dtl/6368/Joint+Statement+Towards+IndiaJapan+Strategic+and+Global+Partnership>.
- “JPRS Report: Proliferation Issues.” Foreign Broadcast Information Service, January 31, 1992. <https://apps.dtic.mil/sti/tr/pdf/ADA333845.pdf>.
- Kesavan, K V. “Indo-Japanese Partnership: The Security Factor.” Observer Research Foundation, May 2009. https://www.orfonline.org/wp-content/uploads/2009/05/IssueBrief_19.pdf.
- Lasarte, Patricia. “Framework Document: The Evolution of the Concept of Security (June 2011).” Institute for Strategic Studies (IEEE: Instituto Español de Estudios Estratégicos), June 1, 2011. https://www.ieee.es/en/contenido/noticias/2011/05/DIEEEM05_2011EvolucionConceptoSeguridad.html.
- Mathur, Arpita. “Setting the Stage: India and Japan in History.” INDIA-JAPAN RELATIONS. S. Rajaratnam School of International Studies, 2012. <https://www.jstor.org/stable/resrep05895.3>.
- . “Strategic and Political Relations.” India-Japan Relations. S. Rajaratnam School of International Studies, 2012. <https://www.jstor.org/stable/resrep05895.6>.
- “Memorandum of Cooperation in the Field of Cybersecurity between India and Japan.” Ministry of External Affairs, Government of India, March 19, 2022. <https://www.mea.gov.in/Portal/LegalTreatiesDoc/JP22B4109.pdf>.
- Modi, Shri Narendra. “17th Asia Security Summit: The IISS Shangri-La Dialogue.” International Institute for Strategic Studies, June 1, 2018. <https://www.iiss.org/globalassets/media-library---content--migration/images-delta/dialogues/sld/sld-2018/documents/narendra-modi-sld18.pdf>.
- Mohan, C Raja. “India’s Regional Security Cooperation: The Nehru Raj Legacy.” Institute of Southeast Asian Studies, March 7, 2013. https://www.isas.nus.edu.sg/wp-content/uploads/media/isas_papers/ISAS%20Working%20Paper%20168%20-%20Indias%20regional%20Security%20Cooperation.pdf.

- “Operations and Activities in India.” Japan International Cooperation Agency, 2023.
https://www.jica.go.jp/Resource/india/english/office/others/c8h0vm00004cesxi-att/brochure_27.pdf.
- “Operations and Activities in India FY 2022 - 2023.” JICA, 2023.
https://www.jica.go.jp/Resource/india/english/office/others/c8h0vm00004cesxi-att/brochure_27.pdf.
- Pei, Minxin, and Michael Swaine. “Simmering Fire in Asia: Averting Sino-Japanese Strategic Conflict.” Carnegie Endowment for International Peace, 2005.
<https://carnegieendowment.org/files/pb44.pei.FINAL.pdf>.
- Pramit Pal, Chaudhuri. “India and Japan A Nascent Strategic Bonding.” S. Rajaratnam School of International Studies, May 2015. https://www.rsis.edu.sg/wp-content/uploads/2015/05/PR150514_India-and-Japan-A-Nascent-Strategic-Bonding.pdf.
- “Priority Policy for Development Cooperation FY 2017.” International Cooperation Bureau, MOFA, April 2017. <https://www.mofa.go.jp/files/000259285.pdf>.
- Purnendra, Jain. “Twin Peaks: Japan’s Economic Aid to India in the 1950s and 2010s.” Shinjuku-ku: JICA Research Institute, February 2017. https://www.jica.go.jp/Resource/jica-ri/ja/publication/workingpaper/175nbg000005413s-att/JICA-RI_WP_No.139.pdf.
- Rajagopalan, Rajeswari Pillai. “Indo-US Nuclear Deal: Implications for India and the Global N-Regime.” IPCS Special Report. Institute of Peace and Conflict Studies, December 2008.
- Richard, Jolly, and Basu Ray Deepayan. “The Human Security Framework and National Human Development Reports.” Human Development Report Office National Human Development Report Series. United Nations Development Programme, May 23, 2024.
<https://hdr.undp.org/system/files/documents/human-security.human-security>.
- Ryou, Hayoun. “India-Japan Security Cooperation: Chinese Perceptions.” Policy Brief. Institute of Peace and Conflict Studies, January 1, 2009.
https://www.ipcs.org/issue_briefs/issue_brief_pdf/784089767IB89-Ryou-IndJapan.pdf.
- Shinzo, Abe. “Two Democracies Meet at Sea: For a Better and Safer Asia.” Japan Institute of National Fundamentals, September 20, 2011. <https://en.jinf.jp/wp-content/uploads/2011/09/HP-E%E3%82%A4%E3%83%B3%E3%83%89%E6%BC%94%E8%AA%AC%E4%BC%9A%E5%A0%B4%E9%85%8D%E5%B8%83%E7%94%A8916.pdf>.
- Singh, Sinderpal. “From ‘Asia’ to ‘Asia-Pacific’: Indian Political Elites and Changing Conceptions of India’s Regional Spaces.” ISAS Working Paper. Singapore: Institute of South Asian Studies, September 28, 2010.
- “Strengthening Partnerships to Counter Non-Traditional Security Threats in the Indo-Pacific,” May 23, 2024. <https://www.orfonline.org/research/strengthening-partnerships-to-counter-non-traditional-security-threats-in-the-indo-pacific>.
- “Synchronizing Energy Transitions toward Possible Net Zero for India: Affordable and Clean Energy for All.” Indian Institute of Management Ahmedabad, April 2024.
https://psa.gov.in/CMS/web/sites/default/files/publication/ESN%20Report-2024_New-21032024.pdf.

“The 29th Policy Recommendations India’s Leap Forward and Japan.” The Policy Council The Japan Forum on International relations, September 2007. https://www.jfir.or.jp/en/wp-content/themes/JFIR_2021_en/pr/pdf/29.pdf.

“The Economic Situation in 1990-91.” Ministry of Finance, 1992. https://www.indiabudget.gov.in/budget_archive/es1990-91/1%20The%20Economic%20Situation%20in%201990-91.pdf.

“The Rise of China and Its Effect on Taiwan, Japan, and South Korea: U.S. Policy Choices.” CRS Report for Congress. Washington, D.C.: The Library of Congress, January 13, 2006.

Umeda, Sayuri. “Japan: Article 9 of the Constitution.” Law Library of Congress, 2006.

Virmani, Arvind. “India’s BOP Crisis and External Reform: Myths and Paradoxes.” Indian Council for Research on International Economic Relations, December 2001.

Newspapers

Ajanta, Chakraborty. “Japan Grant for Indian Tribal Students.” *The Times of India*, November 7, 2019. <https://timesofindia.indiatimes.com/education/news/japan-grant-for-indian-tribal-students/articleshow/71948322.cms>.

Arun, Prakash. “East Meets East.” *The Indian Express*, October 27, 2018. <https://indianexpress.com/article/opinion/east-meets-east-5420476/>.

Basu, Sreeradha. “JICA’s Achhi Aadat Campaign: Promoting Public Health and Sustainable Development in India.” *The Economic Times*, March 11, 2024. <https://economictimes.indiatimes.com/industry/services/consultancy/-audit/jicas-achhi-aadat-campaign-promoting-public-health-and-sustainable-development-in-india/articleshow/108398007.cms?from=mdr>.

Bhattacharjee, Kallol, and Langa Mahesh. “Shinzo Abe Recalls Grandfather’s Ties with Nehru.” *The Hindu*, September 14, 2017, sec. India. <https://www.thehindu.com/news/national/abe-recalls-grandfathers-ties-with-nehru/article19685815.ece>.

Chaudhury, Dipanjan Roy, and Swati Mittal. “Indo-Japan Trade Increases to \$ 18 Bn in 2019: Exim Bank Study.” *The Economic Times*, October 13, 2021. <https://economictimes.indiatimes.com/news/economy/foreign-trade/indo-japan-trade-increases-to-18-bn-in-2019-exim-bank-study/articleshow/86983132.cms?from=mdr>.

Chellaney, Brahma. “Powering a Dynamic, Multipolar Asia.” *The Hindu*, December 29, 2009, sec. Lead. <https://www.thehindu.com/opinion/lead/Powering-a-dynamic-multipolar-Asia/article16856046.ece>.

Dooley, Ben, Makiko Inoue, and Hikari Hida. “Japan’s New Leader Sets Ambitious Goal of Carbon Neutrality by 2050.” *The New York Times*, October 26, 2020, sec. Business. <https://www.nytimes.com/2020/10/26/business/japan-carbon-neutral.html>.

- Gupta, Shishir. "QUAD to Reject the 2007 Chinese Veto on Its Foreign Policies." *Hindustan Times*, March 11, 2021. <https://www.hindustantimes.com/india-news/quad-to-reject-the-2007-chinese-veto-on-its-foreign-policies-101615438862807.html>.
- Nair, Raghav. "India, Japan for Strategic Relations." *The Economic Times*, March 22, 2007. <https://economictimes.indiatimes.com/news/politics-and-nation/india-japan-for-strategic-relations/articleshow/1791405.cms?from=mdr>.
- Onishi, Norimitsu, and David E. Sanger. "Missiles Fired by North Korea; Tests Protested." *The New York Times*, July 5, 2006, sec. World. <https://www.nytimes.com/2006/07/05/world/asia/05missile.html>.
- The Economic Times*. "India Eyes 100 GW Nuclear Power by 2047: AEC Chairman." April 3, 2024. <https://economictimes.indiatimes.com/industry/energy/power/india-eyes-100-gw-nuclear-power-by-2047-aec-chairman/articleshow/109012593.cms?from=mdr>.
- The Economic Times*. "India-Japan Defence Ties Set to Grow Stronger." July 11, 2018. <https://economictimes.indiatimes.com/news/defence/india-japan-defence-ties-set-to-grow-stronger/articleshow/48221899.cms?from=mdr>.
- The Economic Times*. "Why Japan's Power Sector Depends so Much on LNG." March 10, 2022. <https://economictimes.indiatimes.com/news/international/world-news/why-japans-power-sector-depends-so-much-on-lng/articleshow/90115357.cms?from=mdr>.
- The Hindu*. "Japan Hopes India Will Sign Nuclear Test Ban Treaty." December 29, 2009, sec. India. <https://www.thehindu.com/news/national/Japan-hopes-India-will-sign-nuclear-test-ban-treaty/article16855970.ece>.
- The Hindu*. "Narasimha Rao Can Truly Be Called Father of Economic Reforms in India: Manmohan Singh." July 24, 2020, sec. India. <https://www.thehindu.com/news/national/narasimha-rao-can-truly-be-called-father-of-economic-reforms-in-india-manmohan-singh/article32183365.ece>.
- The Japan Times*. "Tokyo NGO Criticize Japan-India Nuclear Pact for Spreading Proliferation." January 10, 2010. <http://search.japantimes.co.jp/print/nn20100701f4.html>.
- The Times of India*. "India, Japan to Hold Joint Naval Exercises." March 23, 2007. <https://timesofindia.indiatimes.com/world/rest-of-world/india-japan-to-hold-joint-naval-exercises/articleshow/1797419.cms>.
- William, Branigin. "U.S. Military Ends Role in Philippines." *Washington Post*, November 23, 1992. <https://www.washingtonpost.com/archive/politics/1992/11/24/us-military-ends-role-in-philippines/a1be8c14-0681-44ab-b869-a6ee439727b7/>.

Other Web Resources

Aida Mohamed, Yehia Salah El Din. "The Relationship between Human Security and National Security of the State Case Study: Egypt and Saudi Arabia." Unpublished Thesis, the American

University in Cairo], 2021.

https://fount.aucegypt.edu/cgi/viewcontent.cgi?article=3434&context=retro_etd.

Amb (Retd) Dilip, Sinha. “Distinguished Lectures Details: India’s Look East Policy and the Northeast.” Ministry of External Affairs, Government of India, April 25, 2016.

<https://www.mea.gov.in/distinguished-lectures-detail.htm?505>.

Archive PMO. “Joint Statement by the Republic of India and Japan on the Enhancement of Cooperation on Environmental Protection and Energy Security,” August 22, 2007.

<https://archivepmo.nic.in/drmanmohansingh/press-details.php?nodeid=624>.

Association for Diplomatic Studies and Training. “Beginning of a Beautiful Friendship: The 1951 Treaty of Peace with Japan – Association for Diplomatic Studies & Training,” May 27, 2021.

<https://adst.org/2016/10/japan-world-war-ii-peace-treaty-macarthur/>.

Baru, Sanjaya. “Vivekananda Went to Japan in 1893. He Was Fascinated by Its Army, Tunnels, Match Factories.” ThePrint, August 10, 2023. <https://theprint.in/pageturner/excerpt/vivekananda-went-to-japan-in-1893-he-was-fascinated-by-its-army-tunnels-match-factories/1708352/>.

Bhatti, Mohd. Usman. “Human Security Challenges in Borderlands: A Study of Borderlands Communities in Poonch District.” Unpublished Thesis, University of Hyderabad, 2020.

Britannica. “Japan - International Relations, Trade, Security,” May 24, 2023.

<https://www.britannica.com/place/Japan/International-relations>.

Cabinet Secretariat, Government of Japan. “National Security Strategy,” December 17, 2013.

<https://www.cas.go.jp/jp/siryuu/131217anzenhoshou/nss-e.pdf>.

Carley, Wilis. “Ensuring the Safety of Nuclear Installations: Lessons Learned from the Fukushima Daiichi Accident.” Text. International Atomic Energy Agency. IAEA, March 3, 2021.

<https://www.iaea.org/bulletin/ensuring-the-safety-of-nuclear-installations-lessons-learned-from-the-fukushima-daiichi-accident>.

Carroll, John. “[Bookmark] Bodhisena: The Indian Monk Who Opened Eyes in Nara | JAPAN Forward.” Japan Forward, September 26, 2020. <https://japan-forward.com/bookmark-bodhisena-the-indian-monk-who-opened-eyes-in-nara/>.

CNBCTV18. “India-Japan Partnership: Trade and Beyond,” April 16, 2021.

<https://www.cnbctv18.com/views/india-japan-partnership-trade-and-beyond-8957701.htm/>.

“Coalition for Disaster Resilient Infrastructure (CDRI) 2022 Conference Proceedings.” In *Sustainable and Resilient Infrastructure*, 8:1–143. Taylor & Francis, 2023.

<https://doi.org/10.1080/23789689.2023.2181552>.

CommonLII. “Agreement on Commerce Between India and Japan [1958],” February 4, 1958.

<http://www.commonlii.org/in/other/treaties/INTSer/1958/2.html>.

Consulate - General of Japan in Mumbai. “Consulate General of Japan in Mumbai : Grant Assistance for Grassroots Projects,” March 3, 2022. https://www.mumbai.in.emb-japan.go.jp/en/politics_eco/ggp.html.

Department of Science and Technology. “Climate Change Programme | Department Of Science & Technology,” March 2, 2022. <https://dst.gov.in/climate-change-programme>.

Devdan, Chaudhuri. “Do Indians Have Tagore’s Identity of Being an Asian?” The Punch Magazine, September 30, 2020. <https://thepunchmagazine.com/the-byword/non-fiction/do-indians-have-tagore-amp-rsquo-s-identity-of-being-an-asian>.

Dilip, Bobb. “PM Narasimha Rao Meets President Bill Clinton, Talks Business, Plays down Kashmir.” India Today, June 15, 1994. <https://www.indiatoday.in/magazine/cover-story/story/19940615-pm-narasimha-rao-meets-president-bill-clinton-talks-business-plays-down-kashmir-809248-1994-06-14>.

Disaster Management Division, Ministry of Home Affairs. “Leadership Initiatives | Coalition for Disaster Resilient Infrastructure (CDRI),” 2022. <https://ndmindia.mha.gov.in/leadership-initiatives>.

Dr. Satoru, Nagao. “What Is Japan’s Role in the Indo-China Border Conflict?” Society Of Security and Diplomatic Policy Studies, May 27, 2021. <http://ssdpaki.la.coocan.jp/en/topics/6.html>.

DW. “Japan and India Hold First Joint Fighter Jet Exercise,” January 16, 2023. <https://www.dw.com/en/japan-and-india-hold-first-joint-fighter-jet-exercise/a-64406635>.

Elaine, Lies. “Japan’s Defence Agency Upgraded to Ministry.” Reuters, August 10, 2007. <https://www.reuters.com/article/idUST203640/>.

Embassy of India Tokyo, Japan. “India - Japan Commercial Relations,” February 23, 2023. https://www.indembassy-tokyo.gov.in/eoityo_pages/NjA.

Embassy of India Tokyo, Japan. “India-Japan Bilateral Economic Relations,” December 2023. https://www.indembassy-tokyo.gov.in/eoityo_pages/NjQw.

Embassy of Japan in India. “Embassy of Japan in India: Grant Assistance for Grassroots Projects,” 2022. <https://www.in.emb-japan.go.jp/Japan-India-Relations/GGP/ggp.html>.

Embassy of Japan in India. “Embassy of Japan in India: Press Releases from the Embassy,” April 29, 2003. https://www.in.emb-japan.go.jp/Press_Releases_Embassy/PR05-03.html.

Embassy of Japan in India. “Guidelines For Japan’s Grant Assistance for Grassroots Projects (GGP),” September 2023. [https://www.in.emb-japan.go.jp/Japan-India-Relations/GGP/01_Guideline_\(Updated_September_2023\).pdf](https://www.in.emb-japan.go.jp/Japan-India-Relations/GGP/01_Guideline_(Updated_September_2023).pdf).

European Union. “History of the European Union 1945-59,” January 2023. https://european-union.europa.eu/principles-countries-history/history-eu/1945-59_en.

Feigenbaum, Evan. “Continental and Maritime in US-India Relations.” East Asia Forum, November 20, 2010. <https://eastasiaforum.org/2010/11/21/continental-and-maritime-in-us-india-relations/>.

Francisco P., Iturria, and Li Weirong. “Time to Act: Integrating Safety, Security and Safeguards in the Design of Innovative Reactors.” Text. International Atomic Energy Agency. IAEA, July 12, 2022. <https://www.iaea.org/newscenter/news/time-to-act-integrating-safety-security-and-safeguards-in-the-design-of-innovative-reactors>.

- Gady, Franz-Stefan. "Confirmed: Japan Will Permanently Join US-India Naval Exercises." The Diplomat, October 13, 2015. <https://thediplomat.com/2015/10/confirmed-japan-will-permanently-join-us-india-naval-exercises/>.
- Global Toshiba. "Establishment of "International Nuclear Energy Development of Japan Co.," October 15, 2010. <https://www.global.toshiba/ww/news/corporate/2010/10/pr1501.html>.
- Government of Canada. "Voices at Risk: Canada's Guidelines on Supporting Human Rights Defenders," January 2024. https://www.international.gc.ca/world-monde/issues_developpement-enjeux_developpement/human_rights-droits_homme/rights_defenders_guide_defenseurs_droits.aspx?lang=eng.
- Hardy-Chartrand, Benoit. "The Dangers of Nationalism in China and Japan." Centre for International Governance Innovation, September 26, 2014. <https://www.cigionline.org/articles/dangers-nationalism-china-and-japan/>.
- Historical Documents - Office of the Historian. "Progress Report by the Secretaries of State and Defense to the National Security Council," September 25, 1951. <https://history.state.gov/historicaldocuments/frus1951v06p1/d16>.
- Horimoto, Takenori. "'Modi Diplomacy' and the Future of Japan-India Relations." Nippon, May 18, 2020. <https://www.nippon.com/en/in-depth/a06701/>.
- Hyun, Suk, and James F Paradise. "Why Is There No Asian Monetary Fund?" ADBI Working Paper 1061. Tokyo, 2019. <https://www.adb.org/sites/default/files/publication/546901/adbi-wp1061.pdf>.
- ICWA. "Shinzo Abe's Legacy and India-Japan Relations - Indian Council of World Affairs (Government of India)," May 26, 2024. https://www.icwa.in/show_content.php?lang=1&level=3&ls_id=7828&lid=5212.
- Indian Embassy Tokyo. "S & T Cooperation," February 23, 2023. https://www.indembassy-tokyo.gov.in/eoityo_pages/NjI.
- Indian Tsunami Early Warning System. "Tsunami Early Warning System," 2020. <https://tsunami.incois.gov.in/TEWS/searlywarnings.jsp>.
- International Monetary Fund. "Globalization: Threat or Opportunity? An IMF Issues Brief," April 2, 2000. <https://www.imf.org/external/np/exr/ib/2000/041200to.htm#V>.
- James, McBride, and Beina Xu. "Abenomics and the Japanese Economy." Council on Foreign Relations, March 23, 2018. <https://www.cfr.org/backgrounder/abenomics-and-japanese-economy>.
- Japan Bank for International Cooperation. "FY2022 JBIC Survey (34th) Report on Overseas Business Operations by Japanese Manufacturing Companies | JBIC Japan Bank for International Cooperation," December 16, 2022. <https://www.jbic.go.jp/en/information/press/press-2022/1216-017128.html>.
- Japan International Cooperation Agency. "JICA and Hello Kitty Unite for Hygiene Advocacy with Hello Kitty: JICA's Collaborative Drive for Hygiene Awareness in New Delhi | Where We Work - JICA," February 2, 2024. https://www.jica.go.jp/english/overseas/india/information/press/2023/1530230_16802.html.

Japan International Cooperation Agency. "JICA India NGO Database | India," September 2, 2023. <https://www.jica.go.jp/Resource/india/english/office/others/ngo.html>.

Japan International Cooperation Agency. "JICA's Collaboration with NGOs | India | Countries & Regions | JICA," 2023. https://www.jica.go.jp/Resource/india/english/office/about/ngodesk/ngodesk_01.html.

Japan International Cooperation Agency. "NGO-JICA Japan Desk," March 2, 2023. <https://jicaindiango.in/updates/1>.

Japan International Cooperation Agency. "SDGs Business Co-Creation Lab - Tsunagaru Lab - | India | Countries & Regions | JICA," 2022. <https://www.jica.go.jp/Resource/india/english/office/others/tsunagaru.html>.

Japan International Cooperation Agency. "Signing of Memorandum of Cooperation with International Solar Alliance," May 21, 2022. https://www.jica.go.jp/Resource/india/english/office/topics/press220521_02.html.

Japan International Cooperation Agency. "What Is NGO-JICA Japan Desk? | JICA Zambia Office | About JICA | JICA," May 13, 2024. <https://www.jica.go.jp/Resource/zambia/english/office/about/ngodesk/what.html>.

Japan Ministry of Defense. "About Ministry," March 8, 2023. <https://www.mod.go.jp/en/>.

Japan NPO Center. "Legal Framework: Different Legal Status of Nonprofit Organizations in Japan," 2020. <https://www.jnpoc.ne.jp/en/nonprofits-in-japan/legal-framework/>.

Jason, Dawsey. "Justice Radhabinod Pal and the Tokyo Tribunal." National World War II Museum, May 31, 2021. <https://www.nationalww2museum.org/war/articles/justice-radhabinod-pal-tokyo-war-crimes-trial>.

Jayant, Jacob. "India Stands Firm to Japan's CTBT Push." Hindustan Times, December 30, 2009. <https://www.hindustantimes.com/delhi/india-stands-firm-to-japan-s-ctbt-push/story-EBtgbDXUdekcNoc5JNbCUL.html>.

JETRO. "Japanese Trade and Investment Statistics | Reports and Statistics - Japan External Trade Organization," 2024. <https://www.jetro.go.jp/en/reports/statistics.html>.

JFS Japan for Sustainability. "A Brief History of the Environmental Movement in Japan (Part I) | JFS Japan for Sustainability," July 21, 2009. https://www.japanfs.org/en/news/archives/news_id029180.html.

"Joint Statement on the Occasion of the 7th India-Japan Energy Dialogue between the Planning Commission of India and the Ministry of Economy, Trade and Industry of Japan," September 12, 2013. <https://www.mea.gov.in/Speeches-Statements.htm?dtl/22192/Joint+Statement+on+the+occasion+of+the+7th+IndiaJapan+Energy+Dialogue+between+the+Planning+Commission+of+India+and+the+Ministry+of+Economy+Trade+and+Industry+of+Japan>.

Josy, Joseph. "Army Chief to Visit Japan, Singapore from Wednesday." Rediff, August 21, 2001. <https://m.rediff.com/news/2001/aug/21jap.htm>.

- Keidanren. "Enhancing Cooperation between ODA and the Private Sector for Economic Development in Developing Countries," December 20, 1994.
<https://www.keidanren.or.jp/english/policy/pol013.html#pro2>.
- Kesavan, K V. "India and Japan: Changing Dimensions of Partnership in the Post-Cold War Period." Observer Research Foundation, March 6, 2010. <https://www.orfonline.org/research/india-and-japan-changing-dimensions-of-partnership-in-the-post-cold-war-period>.
- Kim, Reimann. "Civil Society and Official Development Assistance: International Politics, Domestic Structures and the Emergence of International Development NGOs in Japan." Los Angeles: Harvard University, 2000.
- Komeito. "LDP-Komeito Ruling Coalition Makes Headway in Reviving Economy | Komei News (September 28 , 2017)," September 28, 2017.
https://www.komei.or.jp/en/news/detail/20170928_26102.
- Lian, D. "Four-Way Talks Meant to Contain China Miss Regional Development Demand." The Global Times, October 31, 2017. <http://www.globaltimes.cn/content/1072877.html>.
- Lt Gen Anil, Ahuja. "Next Phase of India- US Strategic Partnership: Maximise Hope without Underestimating Challenges." Vivekananda International Foundation, June 19, 2023.
<https://www.vifindia.org/article/2023/june/19/Next-Phase-of-India-US-Strategic-Partnership>.
- Lubin, Gus. "A Brief Tour Of The 7 Oil Chokepoints That Are Crucial To The World Economy." Business Insider, May 13, 2022. <https://www.businessinsider.com/oil-chokepoints-suez-canal-2011-1>.
- Manjari Chatterjee, Miller. "India's Special Relationship With Abe Shinzo." *Council on Foreign Relations* (blog), July 14, 2022. <https://www.cfr.org/blog/indias-special-relationship-abe-shinzo>.
- Masako, Toki. "Japan's Dilemma: Nuclear Trade vs Nuclear Disarmament Advocacy." *Bulletin of the Atomic Scientists* (blog), November 3, 2010. <https://thebulletin.org/2010/11/japans-dilemma-nuclear-trade-vs-nuclear-disarmament-advocacy/>.
- Matamis, Joaquin. "Mitigating Japan's Nuclear Dilemma." *Stimson Center* (blog), May 7, 2024. <https://www.stimson.org/2024/mitigating-japans-nuclear-dilemma/>.
- Mehta, Pradeep S. "India-Japan Ties Will Get Closer If Civil Society Groups Are Involved." The Asian Age, January 9, 2019. <https://www.asianage.com/opinion/oped/090119/india-japan-ties-will-get-closer-if-civil-society-groups-are-involved.html>.
- Michael, Kugelman. "India's Nexus between Resources, Climate Change - and Stability." NATO Review, September 21, 2012. <https://www.nato.int/docu/review/articles/2012/09/21/indias-nexus-between-resources-climate-change-and-stability/index.html>.
- Ministry of Economy Trade and Industry, Government of Japan. "India-Japan Clean Energy Partnership," March 19, 2022.
https://www.enecho.meti.go.jp/en/category/others/cep/20220319_e.pdf.
- Ministry of External Affairs. "Q NO.4116 Economic Partnership with Japan," February 19, 2014.
<https://www.mea.gov.in/Speeches-Statements.htm?dtl/22952/Q+NO4116+ECONOMIC+PARTNERSHIP+WITH+JAPAN>.

Ministry of External Affairs, Government of India. "Action Plan to Advance Security Cooperation Based on the Joint Declaration on Security Cooperation between Japan and India," December 29, 2009. https://www.mea.gov.in/bilateral-documents.htm?dtl/5089/Action_Plan_to_advance_Security_Cooperation_based_on_the_Joint_Declaration_on_Security_Cooperation_between_Japan_and_India.

Ministry of External Affairs, Government of India. "Annual Report 2000-2001," April 1, 2001. https://www.mea.gov.in/Uploads/PublicationDocs/163_Annual-Report-2000-2001.pdf.

Ministry of External Affairs, Government of India. "Annual Reports Prior to 1999: Annual Report 1993-94," 1993. <https://mealib.nic.in/?2522?000#East%20Asia>.

Ministry of External Affairs, Government of India. "Annual Reports Prior to 1999: Annual Report 1994-95," 1995. <https://mealib.nic.in/?2523?000>.

Ministry of External Affairs, Government of India. "First Quad Leaders' Virtual Summit," March 9, 2021. <https://www.mea.gov.in/press-releases.htm?dtl/33601/First+Quad+Leaders+Virtual+Summit>.

Ministry of External Affairs, Government of India. "IISS Fullerton Lecture by Dr. S. Jaishankar, Foreign Secretary in Singapore," July 20, 2015. <https://www.mea.gov.in/Speeches-Statements.htm?dtl/25493/iiss+fullerton+lecture+by+dr+s+jaishankar+foreign+secretary+in+singapore>.

Ministry of External Affairs, Government of India. "India Japan Relations," January 2013. https://www.mea.gov.in/Portal/ForeignRelation/Japan_Relations_-_Jan_2013.pdf.

Ministry of External Affairs, Government of India. "India-Japan Joint Statement during the Visit of Prime Minister to Japan," November 11, 2016. https://www.mea.gov.in/bilateral-documents.htm?dtl/27599/IndiaJapan_Joint_Statement_during_the_visit_of_Prime_Minister_to_Japan.

Ministry of External Affairs, Government of India. "India-Japan Relations," December 13, 2016. https://www.mea.gov.in/Portal/ForeignRelation/Japan_Relations_13_12_2016.pdf.

Ministry of External Affairs, Government of India. "India-Japan Summit Joint Statement Partnership for a Peaceful, Stable and Prosperous Post-COVID World," March 19, 2022. <https://www.mea.gov.in/bilateral-documents.htm?dtl/34991/IndiaJapan+Summit+Joint+Statement+Partnership+for+a+Peaceful+Stable+and+Prosperous+PostCOVID+World>.

Ministry of External Affairs, Government of India. "India-Japan Vision Statement," October 29, 2018. https://www.mea.gov.in/bilateral-documents.htm?dtl/30543/IndiaJapan_Vision_Statement.

Ministry of External Affairs, Government of India. "Joint Declaration on Security Cooperation between India and Japan," October 22, 2008. <https://www.mea.gov.in/bilateral-documents.htm?dtl/5408/joint+declaration+on+>.

Ministry of External Affairs, Government of India. "Joint Statement, India-Japan Partnership in a New Asian Era: Strategic Orientation of India-Japan Global Partnership," April 29, 2005. <https://www.mea.gov.in/bilateral-documents.htm?dtl/6627/joint>.

Ministry of External Affairs, Government of India. “Joint Statement on the Occasion of the 6th India-Japan Energy Dialogue between the Planning Commission of India and the Ministry of Economy, Trade and Industry of Japan,” October 10, 2012. <https://www.mea.gov.in/bilateral-documents.htm?dtl/20657>.

Ministry of External Affairs, Government of India. “Joint Statement On the Roadmap for New Dimensions to the Strategic and Global Partnership between India and Japan,” August 22, 2007. <https://www.mea.gov.in/bilateral-documents.htm?dtl/5885/Joint+Statement+On+the+Roadmap+for+N>.

Ministry of External Affairs, Government of India. “Joint Statement Towards India-Japan Strategic and Global Partnership,” December 15, 2006. <https://www.mea.gov.in/bilateral-documents.htm?dtl/6368/Joint+Statement+Towards+IndiaJapan+Strategic+and+Global+Partnership>.

Ministry of External Affairs, Government of India. “Joint Statement, Visit of Mr. Pranab Mukherjee, Minister of Defence to Japan,” May 25, 2006. <https://www.mea.gov.in/bilateral-documents.htm?dtl/6159/Joint+Statement+Visit+of+Mr+Pranab+Mukherjee+Minister+of+Defence+to+Japan>.

Ministry of External Affairs, Government of India. “Prime Minister’s Keynote Address at Shangri La Dialogue,” June 1, 2018. <https://www.mea.gov.in/Speeches-Statements.htm?dtl/29943/Prime+Ministers+Keynote+Address+at+Shangri+La+Dialogue+June+01+2018>.

Ministry of External Affairs, Government of India. “Toward a Free, Open and Prosperous Indo-Pacific,” September 14, 2017. <https://www.mea.gov.in/bilateral-documents.htm?dtl/28946/IndiaJapan>.

Ministry of Foreign Affairs of Japan. “Address by Prime Minister Shinzo Abe at the Opening Session of TICAD VI,” August 27, 2016. https://www.mofa.go.jp/afr/af2/page4e_000496.html.

Ministry of Foreign Affairs of Japan. “Australia-India-Japan-U.S. Consultations on the Indo-Pacific,” November 12, 2017. https://www.mofa.go.jp/press/release/press4e_001789.html.

Ministry of Foreign Affairs of Japan. “Comment by Chief Cabinet Secretary Kanezo Muraoka on the Nuclear Tests Conducted by the Republic of India,” May 12, 1998. <https://www.mofa.go.jp/announce/press/1998/5/512.html#1>.

Ministry of Foreign Affairs of Japan. “Current State of Japan’s ODA,” 2004. <https://www.mofa.go.jp/policy/oda/white/2004/part2-2.pdf>.

Ministry of Foreign Affairs of Japan. “Free and Open Indo-Pacific,” April 24, 2023. https://www.mofa.go.jp/policy/page25e_000278.html.

Ministry of Foreign Affairs of Japan. “Grant Assistance For Grassroots Human Security Projects (GGP),” February 23, 2023. https://www.am.emb-japan.go.jp/itpr_en/b_000195.html.

Ministry of Foreign Affairs of Japan. “Inauguration of New JICA: A New Era of International Cooperation | Japan’s ODA White Paper 2008,” 2008. <https://www.mofa.go.jp/policy/oda/white/2008/html/ODA2008/html/box/bx03004.htm>.

Ministry of Foreign Affairs of Japan. “Japan - ASEAN Relations Overview,” April 2006. <https://www.mofa.go.jp/region/asia-paci/asean/relation/overview.html>.

Ministry of Foreign Affairs of Japan. “Japan and India Vision 2025 Special Strategic and Global Partnership,” December 12, 2015. https://www.mofa.go.jp/s_sa/sw/in/page3e_000432.html.

Ministry of Foreign Affairs of Japan. “Japanese Grant Assistance for Grass-Roots Human Security Project (GGP) 2023,” February 23, 2023. https://www.my.emb-japan.go.jp/itpr_en/ggp2022.html.

Ministry of Foreign Affairs of Japan. “Japan-India Joint Declaration,” December 10, 2001. <http://www.mofa.go.jp/region/asia-pac/india/joint0012.html>.

Ministry of Foreign Affairs of Japan. “Japan-India Partnership in a New Asian Era: Strategic Orientation of Japan-India Global Partnership,” April 29, 2005. <https://www.mofa.go.jp/region/asia-paci/india/partner0504.html#eight>.

Ministry of Foreign Affairs of Japan. “Japan-India Relations (Basic Data),” March 14, 2024. <https://www.mofa.go.jp/region/asia-paci/india/data.html>.

Ministry of Foreign Affairs of Japan. “Japan-India Summit Meeting,” March 20, 2023. https://www.mofa.go.jp/s_sa/sw/in/page1e_000587.html.

Ministry of Foreign Affairs of Japan. “Japan’s Official Development Assistance Charter | Ministry of Foreign Affairs of Japan,” June 30, 1992. <https://www.mofa.go.jp/policy/oda/summary/1999/ref1.html>.

Ministry of Foreign Affairs of Japan. “Meeting on Japan-India Civil Nuclear Cooperation,” February 21, 2020. https://www.mofa.go.jp/press/release/press4e_002521.html.

Ministry of Foreign Affairs of Japan. “MOFA: Comments by the Chief Cabinet Secretary on Measures in Response to the Second Nuclear Testing Conducted by India,” May 14, 1998. <https://www.mofa.go.jp/announce/announce/1998/5/0312-09.html>.

Ministry of Foreign Affairs of Japan. “MOFA: Policy Speech by Prime Minister Ryutaro Hashimoto to the 136th Session of the National Diet,” May 24, 2024. https://www.mofa.go.jp/region/n-america/us/security/alliance/ry_136.html.

Ministry of Foreign Affairs of Japan. “MOFA: Present State of the Piracy Problem and Japan’s Efforts,” December 2001. <https://www.mofa.go.jp/policy/piracy/problem0112.html>.

Ministry of Foreign Affairs of Japan. “Outline of Japan’s ODA to India,” 2004. https://www.mofa.go.jp/region/asia-paci/india/pmv0504/oda_i.pdf.

Ministry of Foreign Affairs of Japan. “Quad Joint Leaders’ Statement,” May 24, 2022. https://www.mofa.go.jp/fp/nsp/page1e_000401.html.

Ministry of Foreign Affairs of Japan. “Speech by H.E. Mr. Shinzo Abe, Prime Minister of Japan, at the Parliament of the Republic of India "Confluence of the Two Seas,” August 22, 2007. <https://www.mofa.go.jp/region/asia-paci/pmv0708/speech-2.html>.

Ministry of Foreign Affairs of Japan. “The Track Record of Japan’s ODA,” May 6, 2022. <https://www.mofa.go.jp/files/000119315.pdf>.

- Ministry of Foreign Affairs of Japan. "Trends in Japan's ODA in a Rapidly Changing World," 2003.
https://www.mofa.go.jp/policy/oda/white/2002/part1_2_4.html.
- Ministry of Foreign Affairs of Japan. "White Paper on Development Cooperation 2016 | Ministry of Foreign Affairs of Japan," 2016.
https://www.mofa.go.jp/policy/oda/white/2016/html/honbun/b2/s2_3_3.html.
- Miyagi, Taizo. "Looking Beyond Cold War History in Asia | Research." The Tokyo Foundation for Policy Research, September 30, 2008.
<https://www.tokyofoundation.org/research/detail.php?id=53>.
- Montek Singh, Ahluwalia. "Rajiv Gandhi Opened the Doors for 1991 Reforms: Montek Singh Ahluwalia - The Week." The Week, May 30, 2021.
<https://www.theweek.in/theweek/cover/2021/05/20/rajiv-gandhi-opened-the-doors-for-1991-reforms--montek-singh-ahl.html>.
- National Archives. "National Security Strategy of the United States of America," December 2017.
<https://trumpwhitehouse.archives.gov/wp-content/uploads/2017/12/NSS-Final-12-18-2017-0905.pdf>.
- Nayyar, Deepak. "1991: Economic Liberalization and Political Process." Mint, October 13, 2016.
<https://www.livemint.com/Opinion/146jd4x7sEnYgxizMcnq3M/1991-economic-liberalization-and-political-process.html>.
- Osamu, Sawaji. "A New Era of Japan-India Relations." The Japan Journal, September 10, 2008.
http://www.japanjournal.jp/tjje/show_art.php?INDyear=07&INDmon=12&artid=ca3d183e4aa7b102c482_f80af209c56a&page=2.
- Pranamita, Baruah. "Japan's Response to Sea Piracy." Manohar Parrikar Institute for Defence Studies and Analyses, March 30, 2009.
https://idsa.in/idsastrategiccomments/JapansResponsetoSeaPiracy_PBaruah_300309.
- Press Information Bureau. "Cabinet Approves Categorization of the Coalition for Disaster Resilient Infrastructure (CDRI) as an 'International Organization' and Signing of the Headquarters Agreement (HQA) with CDRI for Granting It the Exemptions, Immunities and Privileges as Contemplated under the United Nations (Privileges & Immunities) Act, 1947," June 29, 2022.
<https://pib.gov.in/pib.gov.in/Pressreleaseshare.aspx?PRID=1837893>.
- Press Information Bureau. "First Japan-India Maritime Exercise (JIMEX) in Indian Waters From 19-22 Dec," December 17, 2013. <https://pib.gov.in/newsite/PrintRelease.aspx?relid=101825>.
- Press Information Bureau. "Malabar Naval Exercises," February 8, 2021.
<https://pib.gov.in/Pressreleaseshare.aspx?PRID=1696140>.
- Press Information Bureau. "Padma Awards 2021 Announced," January 25, 2021.
<https://pib.gov.in/pib.gov.in/Pressreleaseshare.aspx?PRID=1692337>.
- Press Information Bureau. "Year- End Review 2022- Ministry of New and Renewable Energy," December 20, 2022. <https://pib.gov.in/pib.gov.in/Pressreleaseshare.aspx?PRID=1885147>.

- Prime Minister of India. "Meeting between PM and H.E. Mr. SUGA Yoshihide, PM of Japan," September 24, 2021. https://www.pmindia.gov.in/en/news_updates/meeting-between-pm-and-h-e-mr-suga-yoshihide-pm-of-japan/.
- Prime Minister of India - Dr. Manmohan Singh. "PM's Address at the Reception by Japan-India Association and Japan-India Parliamentary Friendship League," October 23, 2008. <https://archivepmo.nic.in/drmanmohansingh/speech-details.php?nodeid=714>.
- Prithvi, Iyer. "Understanding the Indian Public Opinion-Foreign Policy Relationship." Observer Research Foundation, November 23, 2020. <https://www.orfonline.org/research/understanding-the-indian-public-opinion-foreign-policy-relationship>.
- Purnendra, Jain. "Japanese Foreign Aid: What's in It for Japan? | East Asia Forum." *East Asia Forum* (blog), July 21, 2016. <https://eastasiaforum.org/2016/07/21/japanese-foreign-aid-whats-in-it-for-japan/>.
- Rahul, Bedi. "A New Doctrine for the Navy." *Frontline*, July 15, 2004. <https://frontline.thehindu.com/the-nation/article30223434.ece>.
- Ramesh, Thakur. "India's Relations with Japan: Post Pokhran-II | IPCS." Institute of Peace and Conflict Studies, January 12, 1999. https://www.ipcs.org/comm_select.php?articleNo=168.
- Renewable Energy World. "Data Analysis: Can Japan Exceed 10 Gigawatts of Solar Capacity Installation in 2014?," 2014.
- Saeed, Lubna Fatima. "Indo-Soviet Relations: A Study on Nehru's Diplomacy." Aligarh Muslim University, 2003. <https://core.ac.uk/download/pdf/144509445.pdf>.
- Sameer, Kwatra. "India Announces Climate Commitments - Putting India's INDC in Perspective." Natural Resources Defense Council, October 2, 2015. <https://www.nrdc.org/bio/sameer-kwatra/india-announces-climate-commitments-putting-indias-indc-perspective>.
- Sandrina, Antunes, and Camis o Isabel. "Introducing Realism in International Relations Theory." *E-International Relations* (blog), February 27, 2018. <https://www.e-ir.info/2018/02/27/introducing-realism-in-international-relations-theory/>.
- Satoru, Nagao. "Why Is India Important to Japan, the US, and Australia?" *The Japan Forum on International Relations* (blog), April 16, 2023. <https://www.jfir.or.jp/en/commentary/4186/>.
- Shioyama, Momo. "Japan's Latest Chapter in Military Cooperation: Official Security Alliance (OSA)." Center for Strategic and International Studies, December 21, 2023. <https://www.csis.org/blogs/new-perspectives-asia/japans-latest-chapter-military-cooperation-official-security-alliance>.
- Shubajit, Roy. "Quad to Meet: Foreign Ministers of India, US, Japan and Australia | World News." *The Indian Express*, September 23, 2019. <https://indianexpress.com/article/world/quad-to-meet-foreign-ministers-of-india-us-japan-and-australia-6019411/>.
- Sifra, Lentini. "Imperial Japan's Trade with Bombay." *Gateway House* (blog), March 20, 2019. <https://www.gatewayhouse.in/bombay-japan-trade/>.

- Simplified Digital Hands-on Information on Energy Efficiency in MSMEs. “Japan-India Energy Dialogue,” December 2006.
http://sidhjee.beeindia.gov.in/ProjectComponent/Japan_India_Energy_Dialogue.
- Srinivas, V. “Indian Economy: Critical Milestones during 70 Years.” Press Information Bureau, August 9, 2017. <http://pib.gov.in/PressNoteDetails.aspx?NoteId=150142>.
- . “Journey of India’s Central Bank.” Press Information Bureau, August 7, 2017.
<https://pib.gov.in/newsite/printrelease.aspx?relid=169696>.
- Stephen P, Cohen. “India Rising.” Brookings, June 1, 2000. <https://www.brookings.edu/articles/india-rising/>.
- Strangio, Sebastian. “Former US Bases in the Philippines Prompt Mixed Feelings.” The Diplomat, September 17, 2020. <https://thediplomat.com/2020/09/former-us-bases-in-the-philippines-prompt-mixed-feelings/>.
- Takenori, Horimoto. “The Free and Open Indo-Pacific Strategy: India’s Wary Response.” nippon.com, October 9, 2018. <https://www.nippon.com/en/currents/d00436/the-free-and-open-indo-pacific-strategy-india’s-wary-response.html>.
- Tetsuya, Endo. “Two Sides of the Same Coin: Nuclear Disarmament and the Peaceful Use of Nuclear Energy.” *East Asia Forum* (blog), June 12, 2010. <https://eastasiaforum.org/2010/06/12/two-sides-of-the-same-coin-nuclear-disarmament-and-the-peaceful-use-of-nuclear-energy/>.
- The Indian Express. “India-Japan Military Exercise Dharma Guardian-2018 Begins in Mizoram,” November 1, 2018. <https://indianexpress.com/article/india/india-japan-military-exercise-dharma-guardian-2018-begins-in-mizoram-5429954/>.
- The Prime Ministers Office of Japan. “1st Meeting of the Council on Reconstruction of a Legal Basis for Security (What’s up around the Prime Minister),” May 18, 2007.
https://japan.kantei.go.jp/abepphoto/2007/05/18anpo_e.html.
- The White House. “Fact Sheet: Quad Leaders’ Summit,” September 25, 2021.
<https://www.whitehouse.gov/briefing-room/statements-releases/2021/09/24/fact-sheet-quad-leaders-summit/>.
- The White House. “Quad Leaders’ Joint Statement,” May 20, 2023.
<https://www.whitehouse.gov/briefing-room/statements-releases/2023/05/20/quad-leaders-joint-statement/>.
- The Whitehouse President Barack Obama. “Fact Sheet: Advancing the Rebalance to Asia and the Pacific,” November 16, 2015. <https://obamawhitehouse.archives.gov/the-press-office/2015/11/16/fact-sheet-advancing-rebalance-asia-and-pacific>.
- The World and Japan. “Joint Statement between the Ministry of Economy, Trade and Industry of Japan and the Planning Commission of India on the Occasion of the Fourth Meeting of the Japan-India Energy Dialogue,” April 30, 2010.
<https://worldjpn.net/documents/texts/JPSA/20100430.D1E.html>.
- The World and Japan. “Towards a Brighter Future: Advancing Our Global Partnership, Address by Yoriko Kawaguchi, Japanese Minister for Foreign Affairs, At the Federation of Indian Chambers

of Commerce and Industry,” January 8, 2003.

<https://worldjpn.net/documents/texts/exdfam/20030108.S1E.html>.

Titli, Basu. “Thinking Africa: India, Japan, and the Asia-Africa Growth Corridor.” *The Diplomat*, June 3, 2017. <https://thediplomat.com/2017/06/thinking-africa-india-japan-and-the-asia-africa-growth-corridor/>.

Togzhan, Kassenova. “Kazakhstan’s Nuclear Ambitions.” *Bulletin of the Atomic Scientists* (blog), April 28, 2008. <https://thebulletin.org/2008/04/kazakhstans-nuclear-ambitions/>.

Tokyo for India. “Support India as Globally Minded Citizens,” 2021. <https://www.tokyoforindia.org/>.

Tripp, Emily. “Realism: The Domination of Security Studies.” *E-International Relations* (blog), June 14, 2013. <http://www.e-ir.info/2013/06/14/realism-the-domination-of-security-studies/>.

Trobbiani, Riccardo. “How Should National Security and Human Security Relate to Each Other?” *E-International Relations* (blog), April 26, 2013. <https://www.e-ir.info/2013/04/26/how-should-national-security-and-human-security-relate-to-each-other/>.

UNDRR. “India Gets Tsunami-Ready,” September 6, 2016. <http://www.undrr.org/news/india-gets-tsunami-ready>.

UNFCCC. “India’s Intended Nationally Determined Contribution: Working Towards Climate Justice,” March 2, 2022.

<https://www4.unfccc.int/sites/submissions/INDC/Published%20Documents/India/1/INDIA%20INDC%20TO%20UNFCCC.pdf>.

U.S. Energy Information Administration (EIA). “World Oil Transit Chokepoints,” July 25, 2017.

https://www.eia.gov/international/analysis/special-topics/World_Oil_Transit_Chokepoints.

Vaibhav Pratap, Singh, and Saran Samir. “Net Zero by 2070: Financing India’s Biggest Infrastructure Buildup.” *orfonline.org*, February 23, 2024. <https://www.orfonline.org/expert-speak/net-zero-by-2070-financing-india-s-biggest-infrastructure-buildup>.

Varma, Lalima. “Japan’s Policy towards South Asia : Shifting Paradigms,” 231–40. *International Research Center for Japanese Studies*, 2011. <https://doi.org/10.15055/00001243>.

Vivek, Mishra. “The Benefits for India of a US-2 Deal with Japan – The Diplomat.” *The Diplomat*, October 24, 2013. <https://thediplomat.com/2013/10/the-benefits-for-india-of-a-us-2-deal-with-japan/>.

Viveka Vani. “Alasinga - Letters of Swami Vivekananda,” August 14, 2011.

<https://vivekavani.com/iii-alasinga-letters-swami-vivekananda/>.

Whitehouse.gov. “Remarks By President Barack Obama In Prague As Delivered,” April 5, 2009.

<https://obamawhitehouse.archives.gov/the-press-office/remarks-president-barack-obama-prague-delivered>.

www.narendramodi.in. “Text of the PM’s Remarks on the Commissioning of Coast Ship Barracuda,” March 12, 2015. <https://www.narendramodi.in/text-of-the-pms-remarks-on-the-commissioning-of-coast-ship-barracuda-2954>.

Yasuji, Komiyama. "Japanese Industries' Voluntary Approaches: Outcomes Attained and Roles of the Government." Director, Environmental Economy Office, June 2015.

<https://iea.blob.core.windows.net/assets/imports/events/226/1.3Komiyama.pdf>.

Yuki, Tatsumi. "Political Influence on Japanese Nuclear and Security Policy," May 14, 2024.

<https://apps.dtic.mil/sti/tr/pdf/ADA601871.pdf>.

Zhao, Minghao. "No Need to Overreact as Quad Ups Gear - Global Times." The Global Times, September 19, 2019. <https://www.globaltimes.cn/content/1165867.shtml>.

Annexure - I

List of Key Interviews

Sl. no	Name	Designation
1	Mr. Vipul Jindal	Overall Execution Head, Suzuki Innovation Centre, Hyderabad, India.
2	Prof Rajesh Basrur	Professor of International Relations and Coordinator of the South Asia Programme at RSIS at Nanyang Technological University, Singapore.
3	Dr Arnab Dasgupta	Research Analyst, Manohar Parrikar Institute for Defence Studies and Analyses, New Delhi, India.
4	Prof Yoichiro Sato	Dean, College of Asia Pacific Studies Dean, Graduate School of Asia Pacific Studies Ritsumeikan Asia-Pacific University Trustee of the Ritsumeikan Trust, Japan.
5	Minako Kanemoto	Project Administrator, Suzuki Innovation Centre, Hyderabad, India.
6	Shashank S. Patel	Ph.D. Researcher, Department of East Asian Studies, University of Delhi, New Delhi, India.
7	Cdr Jayakrishnan	Retired Commander, Indian Navy Senior Fellow, Centre for Public Policy Research, India.
8	Misa Kitagawa	Innovation Strategist, Technology Research Park, IIT Hyderabad, Hyderabad, India.
9	Vamshi Krishna B M	Assistant Professor, Department of Asian Languages (Japanese), English and Foreign Languages University, India.
10	B Rama Badhra	Director, Asa Bhanu Technical Services Limited, Asa Bhanu Japan Centre, Hyderabad, India.
11	Rajiv Kumar	Deputy Director – International Department (Japan and South Korea), Confederation of Indian Industries, India.
12	Ken Moriyasu	Diplomatic Correspondent, Nikkei Asia, Washington, D.C., USA.
13	Dr Nabarun Roy	Assistant Professor, Department of International Relations, South Asian University, New Delhi, India.

14	Dr Satoru Nagao	Fellow (non-resident) at Hudson Institute, Washington, D.C., USA.
15	Jeffrey Kingston	Jeffrey Kingston, Professor at Temple University, Japan Campus in Tokyo, Japan.
16	Tomio Isogai	Member, Kansai Japan India Cultural Society in Kobe, Japan.
17	Robert Ward	International Institute for Strategic Studies Japan Chair, Director of Geo-economics and Strategy, Washington, D.C., USA.
18	Sanjaya Baru	Political Analyst and Media Advisor to the then Prime Minister Manmohan Singh, India.
19	Jayesh Ranjan	Special Chief Secretary for Information Technology, Electronics & Communications (ITE&C) and Industries & Commerce Departments of Government of Telangana, Hyderabad, India.

Annexure – II

General Questionnaire Administered to Academics, Policy Makers, Journalists, Business personnel and other key informants

Title of the study: India-Japan Relations in the Post-Cold War Period: A Study Through Neoclassical Realist Framework

Name of the Scholar: Gujjeti Anudeep

Reg. ID.: 17SPPH06

Supervisor: Dr S Shaji

- 1) What are the aspects that influence India and Japan relations the most? Is it Geoeconomics or Geopolitical?
- 2) Do India and Japan perceive a high level of convergence of interests in the contemporary period?
- 3) Is there any specific area of divergence of interests between India and Japan in contemporary times?
- 4) What are the prominent factors from the systemic and domestic levels that determine areas of convergence and divergence of interests in the bilateral relations involving India and Japan?
- 5) To what extent have structural forces determined the formulation of foreign policy of India and Japan with regard to security and economy?
- 6) Do you think, apart from structural incentives, unit level variables/domestic actors play an important role in shaping foreign policies of nations? Especially in the domains of economy, security and Non-Traditional Security (NTS) areas?
- 7) According to you who are the prominent domestic actors that influence Japan's foreign policy towards India especially in the realm of i) security (defence policy making) and ii) economy?

- 8) How have domestic actors such as leadership, business groups determined the foreign policy of Japan in general and especially towards Japan?
- 9) Do you think leadership of the two states has a role to play in advancing the relationship other than systemic factors? (this can include the role of individual leadership, stable governments, coalition governments etc.)
- 10) Do you specifically find the prime ministership of any leader or leaders as crucial in shaping India-Japan relations in the post-Cold War period?
- 11) Considering the weightage given to economic relations between both nations how significant are business entities/groups in shaping the relations and how do they play a significant role?
- 12) Considering Japan International Cooperation Agency's increasing role in helping India especially in the areas of Non-Traditional Security (NTS), how significant are the state mediated civil society interactions in shaping India and Japan relations?
- 13) How have domestic/unit-level factors interacted with structural factors in the foreign policy formulation of India and Japan?
- 14) What factors influenced Japan's strategy towards India in its quest for nuclear energy?
- 15) How do you perceive the role of history and constitutional settings of Japan in shaping Japanese nuclear perceptions towards India?
- 16) How does Neoclassical Realism offer insights into the foreign policy making of India and Japan with regard to each other?

Indo-Japanese Strategic Cooperation in the Indo-Pacific

Gujjeti Anudeep*

[Indo-Pacific, as a regional construct, in the domain of international relations, gained prominence in the recent past, so much so that every major power, including the United States of America (USA) and Japan, framed their respective strategies to deal with the region. The twin threats of an ever-increasing military posture of the People's Republic of China (PRC) and the nuclear threat posed by the Democratic People's Republic of Korea (DPRK) in the region have prompted Japan to revise its national security strategies. In this context, the paper aims to give a comprehensive account of India and Japan's strategic cooperation in the region amidst Japan's new national security strategy.]

The idea of the Indo-Pacific as a regional construct was initially conceived around 2006-07¹ to represent the amalgamation of the western Pacific Ocean and the Indian Ocean. To be more precise, it can be traced back to the Prime Minister of Japan, Shinzo Abe's speech, the "Confluence of Two Seas" in the parliament of India in August 2007² in which he remarked that the two seas, i.e., the Pacific and Indian Ocean are coming together to bring about freedom and prosperity.

This was necessitated due to the region's economic potential, especially in trade and energy, coupled with the fragile nature of security. Eventually, the "centre of gravity" shifted from the West to East Asia due to the growing economic might of the region, especially with the transition of the region into a global financial hub. Out of the total volume of trade carried out by sea, almost 60% volume of trade passes through the Indo-Pacific³. This alone signifies the importance attached to the region.

Japan became one of the first countries to officially use the term "Free and Open Indo-Pacific" in order to develop the Indo-Pacific into a region of rule of law, and free trade and to ensure freedom of navigation by creating a rules-based international order. In order to realise this vision, Japan proposed three pillars which include freedom of navigation, creating a sphere of economic prosperity, and a commitment to establish peace and security by building the capacity of maritime law enforcement, disaster relief, humanitarian assistance, etc.

Japan aims to realise this goal by maintaining strategic communication and cooperating with those countries which share similar principles for a "Free and Open Indo-Pacific".⁴ But the inflection point in terms of

developing the region into a larger construct for conducting relations among nations came with the use of the concept of Indo-Pacific by the United States of America (USA) in its "National Security Strategy" in 2017 followed by "National Defence Strategy" in 2018, 2019 report of Indo-Pacific Strategy and more recently the USA came out with its "Indo-Pacific Strategy Document" under President Biden administration.⁵

India also underlined its policy for the region at the Shangri-La Dialogue in 2018, wherein Prime Minister of India Narendra Modi outlined seven principles which include keeping the region "free, open and inclusive" by retaining the centrality of the Association of South East Asian Nations (ASEAN)".⁶ Further, many major powers of the world came out with their respective strategies for the Indo-Pacific which includes 2019 ASEAN's "Outlook on the Indo-Pacific", "Indo-Pacific Strategy of France" in 2019 updated in 2021, "EU strategy for Cooperation in the Indo-Pacific" by European Commission in September 2021.

Many countries even institutionalised these policy ideas. For example, the USA renamed its US Pacific Command into US Indo-Pacific Command and appointed an Indo-Pacific coordinator. Similarly, India created a new Indo-Pacific Division under the Ministry of External Affairs. All these points to how major powers of the world shifted their attention towards a region whose potential is yet to be tapped.

The Security Architecture of the Indo-Pacific Region

The prominence attached to the region is warranted because of two major reasons. One is the trade and energy potential, while the other is the fragile security situation of the region. Indo-Pacific security in general

* Ph.D. Scholar, Dept. of Pol. Sc., University of Hyderabad.



CELEBRATING INDIA'S G20 PRESIDENCY



National Conference

on

INDIA AND THE WORLD: CHALLENGES AND OPPORTUNITIES

27-28 February, 2023 (Hybrid Mode)


Certificate of Participation


This is certified that


Mr. Gujjeti Anudeep

Department of Political Science, University of Hyderabad

participated and presented a paper entitled "**Indo-Japan Cooperation in the Indo-Pacific Region: A Shift in India's Security Strategy**" in a Two-Day National Conference on "**India and the World: Challenges and Opportunities**" organised by the Department of Political Science, Aligarh Muslim University on February 27-28, 2023 at Aligarh, India-202002.


Prof. Mirza Asmer Beg
Dean & Co-Patron


Prof. Iqbalur Rehman
Convener & Head of Department


Dr. Md. Rahat Hasan
Organising Secretary



NORTH LAKHIMPUR COLLEGE (AUTONOMOUS)

Khelmati, Lakhimpur, Assam, 787031

Two Day National Level Seminar On

“LOCATING NORTHEAST IN INDIA’S NEIGHBOURHOOD POLICY: PROBLEMS AND PROSPECTS”

Organised by Department of Political Science, North Lakhimpur College (Autonomous)

Sponsored by ICSSR, New Delhi

In collaboration with Centre for South East Asian Studies, Gauhati University

Certificate of Participation

This is to certify that Prof./Dr./Mr./Mrs. **ANUDEEP GUTJETI**
of **UNIVERSITY OF HYDERABAD** has participated/presented paper titled
ACT EAST POLICY THROUGH NORTH EAST: CHALLENGES AND PROSPECTS IN NEW ERA
OF INDIA'S DIPLOMACY as a panelist


Dr. Chukhanga Gogoi
Convener
Seminar Organizing Committee


Dr. Birman Ch. Chetia
Principal
North Lakhimpur College
(Autonomous)


Prof. Nani Gopal Mahanta
Director,
Centre for South East Asian Studies,
Gauhati University

India-Japan Relations in the Post-Cold War Period: A Study Through Neoclassical Realist Framework

by Gujjeti Anudeep



Librarian
Indira Gandhi Memorial Library
UNIVERSITY OF HYDERABAD
Central University P.O.
HYDERABAD-500 046.

Submission date: 06-Jun-2024 12:43PM (UTC+0530)

Submission ID: 2396735709

File name: 17SPPH06_India-Japan_Relations_in_the_Post-Cold_War_Period...pdf (1.86M)

Word count: 77449

Character count: 430312

India-Japan Relations in the Post-Cold War Period: A Study Through Neoclassical Realist Framework

ORIGINALITY REPORT

6%	5%	3%	1%
SIMILARITY INDEX	INTERNET SOURCES	PUBLICATIONS	STUDENT PAPERS

PRIMARY SOURCES

1	wrap.warwick.ac.uk Internet Source	1%
2	www.orfonline.org Internet Source	<1%
3	www.rsis.edu.sg Internet Source	<1%
4	dokumen.pub Internet Source	<1%
5	icu.repo.nii.ac.jp Internet Source	<1%
6	fsi.mea.gov.in Internet Source	<1%
7	idsa.in Internet Source	<1%
8	"India and Japan", Springer Science and Business Media LLC, 2018 Publication	<1%

9	Internet Source	<1 %
10	ebin.pub Internet Source	<1 %
11	repozytorium.uw.edu.pl Internet Source	<1 %
12	Brummer, Klaus, Oppermann, Kai. "Foreign Policy Analysis", Foreign Policy Analysis, 2024 Publication	<1 %
13	acikbilim.yok.gov.tr Internet Source	<1 %
14	www.dhyeyaias.com Internet Source	<1 %
15	archive.org Internet Source	<1 %
16	"ASEAN and Regional Actors in the Indo-Pacific", Springer Science and Business Media LLC, 2023 Publication	<1 %
17	ficci.in Internet Source	<1 %
18	Perspectives in Business Culture, 2014. Publication	<1 %
19	www.researchgate.net Internet Source	<1 %

20	www.e-ir.info Internet Source	<1 %
21	Ghulam Mustafa, Aroon Sharma. "An Analysis of India's Revealed Comparative Advantage in Merchandise Trade with Australia", Global Economics Science, 2023 Publication	<1 %
22	Valentin Naumescu. "Great Powers' Foreign Policy", Brill, 2023 Publication	<1 %
23	library.oapen.org Internet Source	<1 %
24	en.wikipedia.org Internet Source	<1 %
25	Md. Muddassir Quamar, Sameena Hameed, P. R. Kumaraswamy. "Persian Gulf 2023", Springer Science and Business Media LLC, 2023 Publication	<1 %
26	www.indembassy-tokyo.gov.in Internet Source	<1 %
27	eprints.soas.ac.uk Internet Source	<1 %
28	src-h.slav.hokudai.ac.jp Internet Source	<1 %

29	"Annual Report on the Development of the Indian Ocean Region (2018)", Springer Science and Business Media LLC, 2019 Publication	<1 %
30	"Critical Readings on the Liberal Democratic Party in Japan", Brill, 2018 Publication	<1 %
31	Oga Katsuhiko, Sunil Gupta. "The Far East, Southeast and South Asia: Indo-Pacific Beads from Yayoi Tombs as Indicators of Early Maritime Exchange", South Asian Studies, 2000 Publication	<1 %
32	Amrita Jash. "China's Japan Policy: Learning from the Past", Springer Science and Business Media LLC, 2023 Publication	<1 %
33	Dickovick, J. Tyler, Eastwood, Jonathan, LeBlanc, Robin M.. "Comparative Politics", Comparative Politics, 2022 Publication	<1 %
34	Submitted to University of Malaya Student Paper	<1 %
35	docslib.org Internet Source	<1 %
36	Paul, J. M.. "India and Japan: Reluctant Idealism to Practical Realism", South Asian	<1 %

-
37	Madhuchanda Ghosh. "India and Japan's Growing Synergy: From a Political to a Strategic Focus", Asian Survey, 2008 Publication	<1 %
-
38	www.armscontrol.org Internet Source	<1 %
-
39	www.india-briefing.com Internet Source	<1 %
-
40	Zulfqar Khan, Zafar Khan. "India's Evolving Deterrent Force Posturing in South Asia", Springer Science and Business Media LLC, 2021 Publication	<1 %
-
41	Md.Saifullah Akon. "Chapter 6 Approaches and Challenges of Japan's Human Security Policy: An Evaluation", Springer Science and Business Media LLC, 2024 Publication	<1 %
-
42	vdoc.pub Internet Source	<1 %
-
43	India and China in the Emerging Dynamics of East Asia, 2015. Publication	<1 %
-
44	Submitted to Indian Institute of Foreign Trade Student Paper	<1 %

45	sol.du.ac.in Internet Source	<1 %
46	Sanjana Joshi. "Prospects for security cooperation between India and Japan", Strategic Analysis, 2001 Publication	<1 %
47	wuw.pl Internet Source	<1 %
48	Aletheia Kerygma B. Valenciano, Aries A. Arugay. "Chapter 160 Actors and Stakeholders in Non-traditional Security", Springer Science and Business Media LLC, 2023 Publication	<1 %
49	Submitted to Manipal University Student Paper	<1 %
50	ismenvis.nic.in Internet Source	<1 %
51	repository.dl.itc.u-tokyo.ac.jp Internet Source	<1 %
52	Bansidhar Pradhan. "Changing Dynamics of India's West Asia Policy", International Studies, 2016 Publication	<1 %
53	earp.in Internet Source	<1 %

54	en.asaninst.org Internet Source	<1 %
55	www.ssoar.info Internet Source	<1 %
56	lmsspada.kemdikbud.go.id Internet Source	<1 %
57	capsindia.org Internet Source	<1 %
58	Kazuhiko Togo. "Japan's Foreign Policy, 1945-2003", Brill, 2005 Publication	<1 %
59	Submitted to University of Stirling Student Paper	<1 %
60	www.kas.de Internet Source	<1 %
61	www.thecitizen.in Internet Source	<1 %
62	"India's Relations with Neighboring South and South East Asian Countries", Springer Science and Business Media LLC, 2023 Publication	<1 %
63	Submitted to University of Keele Student Paper	<1 %
64	dspace.cuni.cz Internet Source	<1 %

65	indiafoundation.in Internet Source	<1 %
66	wiredspace.wits.ac.za Internet Source	<1 %
67	www.willzuzak.ca Internet Source	<1 %
68	5dok.org Internet Source	<1 %
69	Ramli Dollah, Diana Peters, Wan Shawaluddin Wan Hassan, Marja Azlima Omar, Md Saffie Abdul Rahim, Adi Jafar. "Japan's Advocacy for Human Security in Global Politics: Case Study of Japan's Grant Assistance for Grass-Roots Human Security Projects (GGP) in the State of Sabah, Malaysia, 2000–2021", East Asia, 2023 Publication	<1 %
70	docplayer.net Internet Source	<1 %
71	documents.mx Internet Source	<1 %
72	economictimes.indiatimes.com Internet Source	<1 %
73	link.springer.com Internet Source	<1 %
74	scholars.hkbu.edu.hk Internet Source	

<1 %

75

unfccc.int

Internet Source

<1 %

76

www.cbpbu.ac.in

Internet Source

<1 %

77

www.ndu.edu

Internet Source

<1 %

78

G. V. C. Naidu. "Ballistic Missile Defence: Perspectives on India–Japan Cooperation", Strategic Analysis, 2007

Publication

<1 %

79

Submitted to Higher Education Commission Pakistan

Student Paper

<1 %

80

Keerthiraj, Takashi Sekiyama. "The Rise of China and Evolving Defense Cooperation between India and Japan", Social Sciences, 2023

Publication

<1 %

81

Tunchinmang Langel. "Transformation of Japan–India security relations: from imperial–colonial era to free and open Indo-Pacific", Journal of the Indian Ocean Region, 2022

Publication

<1 %

82

cigs.canon

Internet Source

<1 %

83

dspace.yildiz.edu.tr

Internet Source

<1 %

84

financedocbox.com

Internet Source

<1 %

85

ojs.indrastra.com

Internet Source

<1 %

86

search.wikileaks.org

Internet Source

<1 %

87

www.cppr.in

Internet Source

<1 %

88

www.eurasiantimes.com

Internet Source

<1 %

89

www.lowyinstitute.org

Internet Source

<1 %

90

www.nationmultimedia.com

Internet Source

<1 %

91

www.oilis.oecd.org

Internet Source

<1 %

92

"Asian Yearbook of International Law, Volume 4 (1994)", Brill, 1996

Publication

<1 %

93	"India's Foreign Policy and Economic Challenges", Springer Science and Business Media LLC, 2023 Publication	<1 %
94	James Manicom, Andrew O'Neil. "Sino-Japanese strategic relations: will rivalry lead to confrontation?", Australian Journal of International Affairs, 2009 Publication	<1 %
95	Submitted to Morgan Park High School Student Paper	<1 %
96	politicosse.in Internet Source	<1 %
97	researchrepository.wvu.edu Internet Source	<1 %
98	www.waseda-giari.jp Internet Source	<1 %
99	docs.pca-cpa.org Internet Source	<1 %
100	etheses.saurashtrauniversity.edu Internet Source	<1 %
101	foreignpolicy.org.tr Internet Source	<1 %
102	www.state.gov Internet Source	<1 %

103	Submitted to De Montfort University Student Paper	<1 %
104	India Studies in Business and Economics, 2015. Publication	<1 %
105	Submitted to International University of Japan Student Paper	<1 %
106	Michael Jonathan Green. "Japan's Reluctant Realism", Springer Science and Business Media LLC, 2001 Publication	<1 %
107	Purnendra Jain. "Japan-India Relations: Peaks and Troughs", The Round Table, 2010 Publication	<1 %
108	nci.org Internet Source	<1 %
109	www.coursehero.com Internet Source	<1 %

Exclude quotes On
Exclude bibliography On

Exclude matches < 14 words