

**IDENTITY, IDEOLOGY AND AMERICAN PRESIDENTIAL
RHETORIC IN THE POST-COLD WAR PERIOD (1989-2009)**

A Dissertation submitted to the University of Hyderabad in partial fulfilment of the
requirements for the award of the degree of

DOCTOR OF PHILOSOPHY IN POLITICAL SCIENCE

BY

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DECLARATION

I hereby declare that the research embodied in this dissertation entitled **“Identity, Ideology and American Presidential Rhetoric In The Post-Cold War Period (1989-2009)”** is an original bonafide research work carried out by me under the supervision of Dr. Aparna Devare, Department of Political Science, University of Hyderabad, in partial fulfilment of the requirement for the award of the degree of Doctor of Philosophy in Political Science.

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This is to certify that the dissertation entitled **“Identity, Ideology and American Presidential Rhetoric in the Post-Cold-War Period (1989-2009)”** submitted by **Ms. Areeba Ahsanat Moazzam**, bearing registration number **13SPPH02** as a part of the degree of Doctor of Philosophy in Political Science is a bonafide and original work carried out under my supervision and guidance.

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Further, the scholar has the following publications before submission of the thesis for adjudication and has produced evidence for the same in the form of acceptance letter or the reprint in the relevant area of her research in journals/edited books/magazines and modules for UGC/MANUU.

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Course Code	Name	Credits
PS701	Research Methodology I	4
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PS706	Advanced Theories in International Relations	4
PS712	Culture and International Relations	4
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ABSTRACT

That identity defines ideology has become a popular notion among IR and foreign policy scholars. However, this study (among a few recent studies by scholars like Karl Schonberg) finds that the reverse can also be used to understand IR realities. It is an ideology that shapes/constructs state identity, invariably and consistently, making the relationship between identity and ideology mutually reinforcing. What this thesis is interested in is how subscription to an ideology shapes/ constructs state identity which in turn affects the discursive foreign policy practices of that state's leader. Language in foreign policy then gives space to mechanisms which propel state action/perpetuate violence/war/interventions/sanctions which have tangible consequences.

The suppositions a state has about itself draws it to certain ideologies that later begin to shape national identity or the way a state perceives/presents itself both domestically and internationally. The rhetoric on self-identity in contrast to identity of adversaries (understood through *self* and *other*) then begins drawing from these coveted ideologies. Case in point is American foreign policy which tilts towards nationalism, democracy and liberalism (which had their roots in American Enlightenment). These are integral to overarching ideology of American Exceptionalism/Americanism, which has an overpowering impact on the presidential rhetoric, I argue. The foreign policy discursive practices which the presidential rhetoric employs presents the *self* as moral/civilised/ efficient/stable/democratic/liberal/fair/just/rational/good/ which is in direct contrast with the *adversary* who is represented/attributed/addressed as evil/irrational/immoral/inept/ uncivilised/illiberal/undemocratic/unjust/enemy in presidential rhetoric. This is done to sway public opinion and propel and justify state actions abroad including declaration of war/sanctions/intervention.

Through Discursive Practices Approach, American Presidential Rhetoric is analysed in the present work by using three analytical concepts: *presuppositions*, *predicates* and *subject-positioning* in the Middle East region in the Post-Cold war Period. American identity in presidential rhetoric especially during wars/conflicts/confrontations is constructed by employing core oppositions/*subject-positioning*. There is no *self* sans the *other* in such a narrative. The *predicates*/adjectives/qualities that America proclaims defines it are represented in direct contradiction/opposition to the enemy/adversary; it then gives it the impetus to declare sanctions/wars/interventions in states of Global South. How such rhetoric influences the foreign policy practices of George H. W. Bush (Sr.), William Clinton and George W. Bush (Jr.) forms the crux of the present work.

Keywords: American foreign policy, discursive practices, American presidential rhetoric, *presuppositions*, *predicates*, *subject-positioning*, identity, liberalism, nationalism, democracy, ideology, Post-Cold war period etc.

Dedicated to

My loving daughter,

Haniya Haidar

ACKNOWLEDGEMENTS

The journey is finally coming to an end and it feels surreal. Having spent almost a decade in the university campus I can feel the ties breaking and bonds snapping from every tree, special spots and open spaces that have cleared my head and joined me in my reflections. Writing this thesis has been a long journey where I have not just realised how miniscule my work is in the vast ocean of knowledge but also learnt about my strengths and weaknesses both as a person and as a scholar. I could not have written my thesis without the guidance, aid, advice and confidence of so many people in my life.

Firstly, I would like to begin by thanking my supervisor, Dr. Aparna Devare for the faith she showed in my research abilities. From the first time I spoke to her in my post-submission during my MA I knew I wanted to work under her guidance. The research methodology course during my M.Phil. validated my choice. Her prompt replies, her understanding, her support, her advice, and her confidence was the beacon that guided me. The doctoral committee consisting of Dr. Arvind Susarla and Dr. Shaji was the sounding board for my work. Their insightful questions and suggestions shaped my thesis, sometimes forcing me to rethink the premise of my work on so many levels.

The Department of Political Science has been a home away from home and I would like to thank the staff especially the office staff, Ms. Farzana and Mr. Prakash who were always helpful. The library staff at the Indira Gandhi Memorial Library, especially Mr. Adiseshaiah Panikkar deserves a special mention. This thesis would not have been submitted without the perseverance of Katari Akhilesh Kumar. His consistent support both morally and technically made it possible for me to submit it within a stipulated time period. Rija Asad Mirza, Mehboob Ali, Afrah S, Dr. Dev Bisnoi, Dr. Farah Naaz, Dr. Pratap Nayak and Dr. Usman Bhatti deserve a special thanks for urging me towards realising my goal.

I would like to thank my parents, (late) Prof. Mohd. Moazzam Ali and Salma Jahan Moazzam, my brother, Mohd. Farees Uddin Ali Moazzam, for believing in his “Dudess,” my maternal uncle, Mohd. Rashed Ali Hasan and last but not the least my sister, Zeba Tamkanat Moazzam whose innate confidence and help kept me going on. Secondly, my husband, Danish Haidar, for not just bearing with my long sojourns in Hyderabad but never letting me forget my goal and our charming daughter, Haniya Haidar, who deserves a special mention for her patience, abundant love and affection. She in all her innocence encouraged me to study while she ‘quietly’ wrote her own *little* PhD.

Lastly, I would like to thank the loved ones I lost in the last few years: Siraj Unissa Begum, Mohd. Yousuf Uddin, Mummy; May they rest in peace!

Hyderabad

Date:

AREEBA AHSANAT MOAZZAM

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CHAPTER ONE

Introduction

Introduction

Conventional constructivists examine how identity of a state in International Relations determines thought and action. Critical constructivism, conversely, focuses on the ‘foreign policy practices’ and also ‘political subjectivities’. The most recent research within critical constructivism focussing on political constructions of *self* and *other* (also studied as *us* and *them*) not only shape but are also shaped by these foreign policy practices. It is these foreign policy practices which are consistently impacting newer theories, concepts and methodologies.¹ The present study falls within this gamut of critical constructivism as it attempts to examine foreign policy practices in American foreign policy discourse, specifically in American presidential rhetoric. It also examines the relationship between power and knowledge: how power requires and produces knowledge and how knowledge in turn relies on and reinforces existing power relationships. In the present work methodology of discourse is employed, particularly, discursive practices of the president of the USA, to study the relationship between ‘power’ and ‘knowledge’ production.

The narrative that is predominant in American presidential rhetoric in the Post-Cold war era towards West Asia forms the crux of the study. I argue that the discourse where language plays a significant role makes certain foreign policy practises possible due to the power USA enjoys in the international structure. Because of its position it becomes possible to set a certain narrative in motion where the *self and its international other* are represented as opposites/binaries in a hierarchical relationship where the *self* enjoys a privileged and desirable

¹Vucetic, Srdjan, “Identity and Foreign Policy,” In *Oxford Research Encyclopaedia of Politics*, ed. William R. Thompson (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2017). DOI: [10.1093/acrefore/9780190228637.013.435](https://doi.org/10.1093/acrefore/9780190228637.013.435)

position while the *other* is found lacking/negation or sometimes even be the disruption to the identity of self. The differences between both are then highlighted, exaggerated and offered as justification to impose sanctions, interventions and declare wars in states of the Global South. Discourse then becomes powerful with tangible consequences as it perpetuates violent wars/interventions/sanctions making it inseparable from international realities and practical consequences. As has been argued by Roxanne Doty and Jennifer Milliken, certain predicates make it possible to justify USA's action in states like the Philippines and Japan respectively. I use Roxanne Doty's discursive practices approach to study the West Asian states/non-state actors. I also attempt to take it a step forward and theorise on USA's discursive practices by making the argument that American justification for interventions/imposing sanctions or declaring wars on Global South states is justified by setting into motion certain narratives and specific discursive practices.

The present study also aims to draw attention to the use of ideology in identity formation. Ideology constructs American identity through the president's foreign policy discursive practices, particularly via American presidential rhetoric. The foreign policy practices create American identity by projecting the *enemy/adversary/other* as core opposition to *self*; whereby, *them* in such a narrative occupy undesirable qualities/attributes and adjectives while the *self* is presented as having the positioning of such core-oppositions are described as *subject-positioning* under the *Discourse Practices Approach* which this study employs in examining American presidential rhetoric. The *subject-positioning* is dependent on *presupposition* i.e., textual mechanism which creates the background knowledge where certain things are accepted and taken for granted. It becomes visible in American Presidential rhetoric by use of *predicates/adjectives/qualities* that are ascribed to the *other* and *self* based on the *presuppositions* and *subject-positioning*.

While Roxanne L Doty and Jennifer Milliken have used these concepts to analyse American discourse towards Japan and the Philippines, I have used them to analyse American presidential rhetoric towards West Asia. Jennifer Milliken's study used the concept of *predicates* to analyse American discourse towards Japan.² Roxanne L Doty's study³ had applied the concepts of *presuppositions*, *predicates* and *subject-positioning* towards Filipinos in one presidential speech. In the present study, I have applied these concepts to trace the cumulative presidential rhetoric over two decades (1989-2009). It includes three presidencies (39th, 40th and 41st presidents of America): George H. W. Bush, William Clinton, and George W. Bush. Their rhetoric towards five Middle Eastern states of Iraq, Iran, Libya, Israel-Palestine and Afghanistan in the Post-Cold war era were examined/analysed. Though previously several studies have examined presidential rhetoric in general (in quantitative political science studies, political communication studies and presidential rhetoric studies), my study focuses on ideological tropes, in particular three ideologies: nationalism, liberalism and democracy which are distinct feature of American Exceptionalism. The findings suggest that these have been present in American discourse since American Enlightenment.⁴ The study found traces/presence of these ideologies since American Enlightenment in historical documents, pamphlets, newspaper articles and speeches of leaders/philosophers described as Founding

²Milliken, Jennifer, "The Study of Discourse in International Relations: A Critique of Research and Methods," *European Journal of International Relations* 5, no. 225 (1999): 7-8. DOI: [10.1177/1354066199005002003](https://doi.org/10.1177/1354066199005002003)

³Doty, Roxanne Lynn, "Foreign Policy as Social Construction: A Post-Positivist Analysis of U.S. Counterinsurgency Policy in the Philippines" *International Studies Quarterly*, 37, no. 3 (1993): 297-304.

⁴American Enlightenment was the philosophical and intellectual movement which eventually led to the American Revolution and subsequently American Independence. The principles adopted/promoted were highly influenced by the Enlightenment movement of Europe. It has been argued majorly by American establishment scholars that it was the practical application of the Enlightenment principles that rose in Europe in the 17-18th centuries. Some of the major thinkers are John Adams, Thomas Paine, Thomas Jefferson, Benjamin Franklin and others. Its thought included emphasis on the rule of law, economic liberty and religious tolerance. This has been dealt with in detail in Chapter Four. For further reading, refer to Henry F. May's *The Enlightenment in America* (DoubleDay,1796) and Henry Steele Commager's *The Empire of Reason: How Europe Imagined and America Realised the Enlightenment* (OUP, 1977). [Review: Ideas and the American Enlightenment on JSTOR](#)

Fathers. The study began with two hypotheses: that ideology constructs American identity; and that it also determines American presidential rhetoric in American Foreign Policy.

When I use the term ‘rhetoric,’ I refer to what John Callaghan et al classify as macro-level foreign policy in their three-tiered approach to study ideology and American foreign policy. These scholars in their book argue that ‘macro level’ is usually where the ‘hegemonic values’ and ‘beliefs’ of American ‘political culture’ are situated. They are ‘emotional,’ ‘repetitive’ and ‘simple.’ These ideas promote ‘liberal democracy,’ ‘civic nationalism,’ and ‘moral superiority.’ Another distinctive feature is that these hegemonic values persevere gradually over long period of time; they change very slowly. They are associated with notions of ‘American exceptionalism,’ ‘American greatness’ and ‘American idealism.’ It is ‘myths’ and ‘values’ which lie at the very core of American nationalism. They are central to president’s ‘inaugural addresses,’ ‘State of the Union’ address and also common place during ‘war’ and ‘international conflict’.⁵

Even though my work began much earlier, this recent book (that came out in 2019) contending that there is a link between ideology and American foreign policy, has bearing on my work. It substantiates my arguments that ideology heavily influences foreign policy of America. However, I take it further to demonstrate how ‘ideology’ impacts foreign policy discursive practices. I also draw attention to how these practices rely on ‘self’ and ‘other’ narrative and how it can be better understood within the power-knowledge production nexus.

⁵ Callaghan, John, Brendon O’Connor and Mark Phythian, *Ideologies of American Foreign Policy* (New York: Routledge, 2019).

Consequently, my thesis deals with not action but words where language plays a significant role.

The objective was to examine in detail presidential rhetoric to identify the terms/words/adjectives and qualities that the American president ascribes to *self* and *other* in his foreign policy discourse. After tracing these ideologies through American history, the study found that, especially in the Post-Cold war period, ideology constructs American identity at home. It also influences the kind of rhetoric an American president uses in his foreign policy discourse, especially towards its adversaries/*other*. After the 9/11 attacks it was also observed that American foreign policy became highly securitised, leading to extremely securitised presidential rhetoric. Recently, works on securitization theory/approach have also attempted to capture this phenomenon in academia including works of Clara Eroukhmanoff,⁶ Ole Wæver,⁷ Thierry Balzacq,⁸ Rens van Munster,⁹ Ralf Emmers,¹⁰ Matt McDonald,¹¹ Barry Buzan, Jaap

⁶Eroukhmanoff, Clara, "Securitisation Theory: An Introduction," in *International Relations Theory*, ed. Stephen McGlinchey, Rosie Walters & Christian Scheinpflug (Bristol: E-International Relations, 2017). [Securitisation Theory: An Introduction \(e-ir.info\)](#)

⁷Wæver, Ole, "Securitization and Desecuritization" in *On Security*, ed. Ronnie Lipschutz (New York: Columbia University Press, 1995), 46–86; Wæver, Ole, "The EU as a Security Actor: Reflections from a Pessimistic Constructivist on Postsovereign Security Orders," in *International Relations Theory and the Politics of European Integration*, ed. Morten Kelstrup and Michael C. Williams (London: Routledge, 2000), 250–294; Wæver, Ole, "The Theory Act: Responsibility and Exactitude as Seen from Securitization," *International Relations* 29, no.1 (2015): 121–127.

⁸Balzacq, Thierry, "Constructivism and Securitization Studies," in *The Routledge Handbook of Security Studies*, ed. Myriam Dunn Cavelty and Victor Mauer (New York: Routledge, 2010), 56–72.

⁹van Munster, Rens, "Securitization," in *obo* in *International Relations*, (June 2012). <https://www.oxfordbibliographies.com/view/document/obo-9780199743292/obo-9780199743292-0091.xml> (accessed 3 Aug. 2023). DOI: 10.1093/OBO/9780199743292-0091

¹⁰Emmers, Ralf, "Securitization," in *Contemporary Security Studies*, ed. Alan Collins (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2007), 109–125.

¹¹McDonald, Matt, "Securitization and the Construction of Security," *European Journal of International Relations* 14, no. 4 (2008): 563–587.

de Wilde,¹² Roxanna Sjöstedt,¹³ Michael C. Williams¹⁴ and Megan MacKenzie.¹⁵ American presidential rhetoric has also seen an increase in the process of elevating regular subjects from political issues into episodes of security, whereby use of extraordinary means is justified.¹⁶

American Presidential rhetoric has underlying persuasive tactics that any untoward action the said *enemy* takes would have catastrophic repercussions for the American state and American national interests. And how the problem has to be nipped in the bud before it escalates into something so huge that it topples the American state and security.¹⁷ The president also identifies the problems in the *enemy* land/state which revolve around ideology: non-liberal policies and non-democratic governance. He then goes on to ascribe qualities and adjectives to them in order to highlight their core opposition to *self*. The *self* is replete with desired *ideology*; it is at the apex of the hierarchy in the desired *ideology* i.e., democracy and liberal values and

¹²Buzan, Barry, Ole Wæver, and Jaap de Wilde, *Security: A New Framework for Analysis* (Boulder, CO: Lynne Rienner, 1998).

¹³Sjöstedt, Roxanna, "Securitization Theory and Foreign Policy Analysis," *Oxford Research Encyclopedia of Politics* 26 Apr, 2017; Accessed 3 Aug. 2023. <https://oxfordre.com/politics/view/10.1093/acrefore/9780190228637.001.0001/acrefore-9780190228637-e-479>.

¹⁴Williams, Michael C, "Words, Images, Enemies: Securitization and International Politics," *International Studies Quarterly* 47, no. 4 (2003): 511–531.

¹⁵MacKenzie, Megan, "Securitization and de-Securitization: Female Soldiers and the Reconstruction of Women in Post-Conflict Sierra Leone," in *Gender and International Security: Feminist Perspectives*, ed. Laura Sjoberg, (London: Routledge, 2010), 151–167.

¹⁶Securitisation theory depends heavily on showing linkages between "the rhetorical structure of decision makers when framing an issue" and attempts to "convince an audience to lift the issue above politics," which has been described as a speech act. Words then not just describe the reality but also constitute reality thereby triggering certain responses. Therefore, threats are also constructed through language. For illustration, the use of words like 'jungle' to any international situation brings to mind lawlessness and chaos. Convincing the audience to take up extraordinary measures requires exaggeration of urgency and level of threat so much so that the communication seems to point at a point of no return and also offer a possible solution which is more often than not in military terms. The decision maker then employs rhetorical structure about the nature of the threat to justify calling for military action. Eroukhmanoff, Clara, "Securitisation Theory: An Introduction," in *International Relations Theory*, ed. Stephen McGlinchey, Rosie Walters & Christian Scheinpflug (Bristol: E-International Relations, 2017). [Securitisation Theory: An Introduction \(e-ir.info\)](https://www.e-ir.info/2018/01/14/secritisation-theory-an-introduction/) <https://www.e-ir.info/2018/01/14/secritisation-theory-an-introduction/>

¹⁷For example, on January 11, 1991 Bush (Sr.) in his report to the Congress announced that the policies and actions of the Government of Libya continued to "pose an unusual and extraordinary threat to the national security and foreign policy of the United States." Refer Public Papers of George H. W. Bush, "Remarks Following Discussions With Prime Minister Yitzhak Shamir of Israel" (Jan. 11, 1991, Book I): 30. [Public Papers - George Bush Library and Museum \(tamu.edu\)](https://www.gpo.gov/publications/ppp/ppp.html)

principles. It is very rarely that the president uses the term *ideology* to describe itself. Majorly, *ideology* is something that the *enemy* state is suffering with. The *enemy* is not just lacking in said desired ideological derived policies but is in fact hindering its own population's aspirations. The enemy (in most cases belonging to the Global South), if left to its own devices, will escalate any situation into an international catastrophe. It is here that American nationalism is glorified and called upon to declare war/financial sanctions or freezing of the enemy's assets. In essence, ideology seeps into presidential rhetoric while constructing American identity.

1.1 Background of the Study

On January 12, 1991, Bush (Sr.) emphasised that the Persian Gulf Crisis demanded American attention just like other instances throughout history where America resolutely supported 'justice, freedom and human dignity.' America, he said, was not planning or seeking war but "if conflict is thrust upon us [Americans] we are ready and we are determined."¹⁸ When the Congress rendered its support to Bush, he declared that it was time Saddam Hussein realised that he was in confrontation with the "determination of the *American people*."¹⁹

On January 28, 1991, Bush declared that Iraq was not necessarily against America but against the world. He also stated that it was not a religious war but a fight between "good versus evil, right versus wrong and also human dignity and freedom versus tyranny and oppression." He went on to describe the war as a 'just war where good will prevail and in lieu with the first principle of just war, the support of a just and noble cause, America will seek Iraqi troops' withdrawal from Kuwait. He further confirmed that America was not seeking anything for

¹⁸Refer Public Papers of George H. W. Bush, "Remarks Following Discussions With Prime Minister Yitzhak Shamir of Israel" (Jan. 12, 1991, Book I): 31-36. [Public Papers - George Bush Library and Museum \(tamug.edu\)](https://www.tamug.edu/library/publications/public-papers-george-bush).

¹⁹Refer Public Papers of George H. W. Bush, "Remarks Following Discussions With Prime Minister Yitzhak Shamir of Israel" (Jan. 12, 1991, Book I). [Public Papers - George Bush Library and Museum \(tamug.edu\)](https://www.tamug.edu/library/publications/public-papers-george-bush).

themselves, (“we ask nothing in return”²⁰) not even destruction of Iraq. When exhaustive diplomacy fails, he stated, use of force is moral and the last resort.²¹ Expanding on American foreign policy that was based on respect of all nations and belief that justice of morality will triumph, he maintained that moral order must be the vision compelling America to wage a war against Iraq.²²

Bill Clinton’s rhetoric was not very different. The terrorist groups he argued, “share a hatred for democracy, a fanatical glorification of violence and a horrible distortion of their religion to justify the murder of innocents.”²³ He added the four reasons for which terrorists targeted America: the distinct leadership obligations they have in the whole world; their united front against terrorism; them being an open society in the world; and their advancement of peace, democracy, basic human values of tolerance and security.²⁴ The terrorists, he specified, target “the very spirit of our country and the spirit of freedom.”²⁵

On September 14, 1998, Clinton argued, that the US has “an absolutely inescapable obligation to lead” in a way that is in sync with the values of America and helps improve lives of people at home and abroad.²⁶ He avowed to use all tools at America’s disposal to fight terrorism from law enforcement to diplomacy to America’s military might.²⁷ He also declared

²⁰Refer Public Papers of George H. W. Bush, “Remarks Following Discussions With Prime Minister Yitzhak Shamir of Israel” (March 6, 1991, Book I): 222. [Public Papers - George Bush Library and Museum \(tamu.edu\)](https://www.tamu.edu/publications/George%20Bush%20Library%20and%20Museum/Pages/George-H.-W.-Bush-Public-Papers.aspx)

²¹Refer Public Papers of George H. W. Bush, “Remarks Following Discussions With Prime Minister Yitzhak Shamir of Israel” (Jan. 28, 1991, Book I). [Public Papers - George Bush Library and Museum \(tamu.edu\)](https://www.tamu.edu/publications/George%20Bush%20Library%20and%20Museum/Pages/George-H.-W.-Bush-Public-Papers.aspx)

²²Refer Public Papers of George H. W. Bush, “Remarks Following Discussions With Prime Minister Yitzhak Shamir of Israel” (Jan. 30, 1991, Book I): 81. [Public Papers - George Bush Library and Museum \(tamu.edu\)](https://www.tamu.edu/publications/George%20Bush%20Library%20and%20Museum/Pages/George-H.-W.-Bush-Public-Papers.aspx)

²³Refer Public Papers of William J. Clinton (Aug. 20, 1998, Book II): 1460. [From the U.S. Government Publishing Office www.gpo.gov] [Public Papers of the Presidents of the United States | GovInfo](https://www.gpo.gov/publications/presidents/presidents-of-the-united-states)

²⁴Refer Public Papers of William J. Clinton (Aug. 20, 1998, Book II): 1461. [From the U.S. Government Publishing Office www.gpo.gov] [Public Papers of the Presidents of the United States | GovInfo](https://www.gpo.gov/publications/presidents/presidents-of-the-united-states)

²⁵Refer Public Papers of William J. Clinton (Aug. 8, 1998, Book II): 1415. [From the U.S. Government Publishing Office www.gpo.gov] [Public Papers of the Presidents of the United States | GovInfo](https://www.gpo.gov/publications/presidents/presidents-of-the-united-states)

²⁶Refer Public Papers of William J. Clinton (Sept. 14, 1998, Book II): 1572. [From the U.S. Government Publishing Office www.gpo.gov] [Public Papers of the Presidents of the United States | GovInfo](https://www.gpo.gov/publications/presidents/presidents-of-the-united-states)

²⁷Refer Public Papers of William J. Clinton (Aug. 27, 1998, Book II): 1472. [From the U.S. Government Publishing Office www.gpo.gov] [Public Papers of the Presidents of the United States | GovInfo](https://www.gpo.gov/publications/presidents/presidents-of-the-united-states)

that America citizens will be protected against terrorists and will persist in their fight for peace, freedom and security.²⁸

On the morning of 9/11, George W. Bush, the then American President, equated Freedom with America when he declared in his address, “Freedom itself was attacked this morning by a faceless coward, and freedom will be defended.”²⁹ He went on to also label the attacks an *act of war*.³⁰ Then as days went by, he emphatically stressed on the Mission of the Nation which was based on American beliefs – the aim of establishing democratic peace that was based on dignity and rights of women and men. While mentioning these he debunks any desire of the American nation to dominate or further any yearning for the American empire.³¹ In his speeches, he also made references to coalescing the nation; his exact words being, “Our Nation must come together to unite.”³² He also emphasised that “This will be a monumental struggle of good versus evil but good will prevail,”³³ and “...the advance of freedom is the surest path to peace.”³⁴ Discussing American vision in the Middle East he argued, “It is “our vision” to spread freedom throughout the greater Middle East.”³⁵ And lastly, the assertion that effective diplomacy requires credible words and “no one can now doubt the word of

²⁸Refer Public Papers of William J. Clinton (Aug. 20, 1998, Book II): 1460. [From the U.S. Government Publishing Office www.gpo.gov] [Public Papers of the Presidents of the United States | GovInfo](http://www.gpo.gov/publications/presidents/pubs/pubs.htm)

²⁹George W. Bush Quotes. BrainyQuote.com, BrainyMedia Inc, 2022. https://www.brainyquote.com/quotes/george_w_bush_131044, accessed February 18, 2022.

³⁰Ibid

³¹ibid

³²ibid

³³Refer Public Papers of George W. Bush (Sept. 12, 2001, Book II): 1101. [From the U.S. Government Publishing Office www.gpo.gov] [Public Papers of the Presidents of the United States | GovInfo](http://www.gpo.gov/publications/presidents/pubs/pubs.htm)

³⁴Refer Public Papers of George W. Bush (Nov. 11, 2003, Book II): 1512. [From the U.S. Government Publishing Office www.gpo.gov] [Public Papers of the Presidents of the United States | GovInfo](http://www.gpo.gov/publications/presidents/pubs/pubs.htm)

³⁵Refer Public Papers of George W. Bush (Nov. 4, 2004, Book II): 2940. [From the U.S. Government Publishing Office www.gpo.gov] [Public Papers of the Presidents of the United States | GovInfo](http://www.gpo.gov/publications/presidents/pubs/pubs.htm)

America,”³⁶ seem to point towards a tectonic shift in the American foreign policy in the twenty-first century.

The following words and phrases piqued my interest while studying American presidential rhetoric under the first three presidents in the Post-Cold war epoch: America’s unique leadership responsibilities, America’s inescapable obligation to lead, American values, America beliefs, how America will lead world’s fight for freedom, the advancement of peace, democracy, basic human values of tolerance and security, how security, peace and freedom will be defended, and how America is an open society, how no one can “suspect the word of America” and how the ‘spirit of our country’ and the ‘spirit of freedom,’ was threatened.

It sounded strange, especially to a scholar’s ears, that a country could refer to itself as Freedom. ‘Freedom’ from being an ambiguous term in such a narrative assumes a purposeful and reassuring meaning. It is also active: from discursive practice, it goes on to become a kind of justification for international conflicts/wars/ interventions and sanctions on Global Southern states. Whilst my journey as a scholar made me aware that rhetoric invariably inclines towards exaggeration and spinning of tall-tales/ claims for the benefit of swaying public opinion, such claims nevertheless intrigued me: the presidential rhetoric, especially of an American president. I began with skimming through Bush’s (Sr.), Clinton’s and George Bush’s (Jr.) speeches in an attempt to find some patterns that could reflect light on themes that pervade the American presidential speeches. My supervisor and the doctoral Committee members nudged me towards examining how such rhetoric was similar or different from American presidents before him. And so began my research work where the context was defined (the Middle-East during the Post-Cold war era); texts procured (speeches of the American President in the public papers)

³⁶ibid

and Audience recognized (American public/Congress – though as a considerable player with substantial weight in the international arena, the audience by inference was the world at large).

When I first began working on this topic, I had not identified which aspects of presidential rhetoric or which Social Constructivist framework would prove highly conducive for this study. I began by reading the primary material: first the history of America and then the speeches of three Presidents after the Cold War ended. I read public papers of three American presidents from the National Archives. My initial questions were: is American identity dependent on ideology and does it impact the presidential rhetoric? I began by reading autobiographies, biographies, histories and newspaper articles to get a preliminary estimation of changes and similarities in presidential rhetoric in the Post-Cold war period. An astonishingly frequent avowal of America's 'greatness', its 'superiority' and its claims of adherence to the principles of liberty, democracy and freedom seem to be common among all three presidencies. The kind of language that is used to refer to the *other/enemy/adversary* seemed also to have overlaps. Also, the positioning of *self* with *other* to symbolise American identity as the good/moral/civilised/efficient/stable/rational in contrast to the identity of the *other* as immoral/uncivilised/inept/evil/irrational was also noteworthy. The region in which the U.S. majorly intervened in the immediate aftermath of the Cold War was West Asia (which America refers to as the Middle East). Hence, this study will focus on this region while analysing American presidential rhetoric. Also, as the study deals with American presidential rhetoric it is reasonable that the study uses the term that the American presidents employ in their rhetoric, i.e., Middle East.

The hunch I began working with was that American presidential rhetoric uses such distinction in positioning so as to establish its own identity vis-a-vis the *other* adverse entity. In order to signify its own stable and fixed identity, the process of *othering* is essential for the

United States. Like with any argument or communication, contrasts help indicate the difference and also organise/establish hierarchy. The United States of America in such rhetoric is then placed higher in this hierarchy with desirable characteristics which the *other* necessarily is lacking/wanting in. And it is with such rationale that these presidents then convince and justify to the American public the need to interfere/intervene/declare war or sanctions on the *other*/adversary. Identity of *self* and *other* is thus established. The next step in my research was to understand what informs the identity. Why do certain words/phrases reoccur in almost all American Presidential rhetoric? After some extensive reading and research, I was able to correlate such vocabulary to certain ideologies namely, nationalism, liberalism and democracy. Thus, was formulated my hypothesis that ideological foundations of American identity inform American presidential rhetoric.

An attempt was made to thoroughly examine the ideological foundations of American presidential rhetoric. The underlying ideological beliefs, embedded in the American system,³⁷ could be clearly marked under the rubric of the American enlightenment principles of liberalism, democracy and nationalism. An attempt was made to trace the same among crucial American historical documents, pamphlets and books including the *Federalist Papers*, *Declaration of Independence*, *Rights of Man*, *American Crisis*, *Common Sense*, and *Constitution of America*. It appeared as if the ideological underpinnings triggered the production of a *particular* set of meanings that coloured the American imagination, guided specific courses of action and influenced American presidential foreign policy rhetoric. These

³⁷Roxanne L. Doty argues, that the meaning and the context behind tropes are usually present within the agent's (in this case, America's) system. It also became clear to me that these tropes affect the foreign policy rhetoric. Doty, Roxanne Lynn, "Foreign Policy as Social Construction: A Post-Positivist Analysis of U.S. Counterinsurgency Policy in the Philippines" *International Studies Quarterly*, 37, no. 3 (1993): 297-304.

meanings restricted the imagination of the American people to a specific course of action and guided its foreign policy practices. I, following the logical trail, began to pay more attention to these ideological tropes of nationalism, liberalism and democracy. It was noteworthy that the tropes continued to be used even after the Cold War (when one of the oldest enemies/*other*/adversary, the USSR disintegrated) only to become more frequent and far more blatant under George W. Bush (Jr.).

1.1.1 Why should American Presidential Rhetoric be studied?

There are insufficient studies that reflect on the rhetoric of the president in ‘International Relations’ (IR) and ‘Foreign Policy Studies’ (FPS). Presidential rhetoric appears is grossly under-evaluated, understudied, under-researched and under-analysed in IR. Though there has been some scholarship which appeared during the Cold War in 1980’s like Philip Wander’s work³⁸ that focussed on ‘ceremonial nature,’ ‘function in domestic politics’ and its relations to facts or events. Regularly, American presidential rhetoric is analysed in journals that study speech/rhetoric³⁹/ political communication/cultural studies as part of political science discipline. They are also studied by humanities scholars to understand nature, effects and impact of the president’s rhetoric which aims to define social realities for its audience; the performative nature of president’s speeches; and what David Zarefsky calls, ‘rhetorical definition.’⁴⁰ For example, Michael J. Lee⁴¹ studied Bush (Jr.) rhetorical legacy which justified violence towards those ‘constructed as savages’ in war on terror based on

³⁸ Wander, Philip, “The Rhetoric of American Foreign Policy,” *Quarterly Journal of Speech* 70, no. 4 (1984): 339-361. <http://dx.doi.org/10.1080/00335638409383703>

³⁹ Hatzisavvidou, S., & Martin, J. Introduction to the special issue: Rhetorical approaches to contemporary political studies. *Politics*, 42, no. 2 (2022): 149-155. <https://doi.org/10.1177/02633957211050272>

⁴⁰ Zarefsky, David. “Presidential Rhetoric and the Power of Definition.” *Presidential Studies Quarterly* 34, no. 3 (2004): 607–19. <http://www.jstor.org/stable/27552615>.

⁴¹ Lee, Michael J., “Us, Them and the War on Terror: Reassessing George W. Bush’s Rhetorical Legacy,” *Communication and Critical/Cultural Studies* 14, no.1 (2016):3-30. <https://doi.org/10.1080/14791420.2016.1257817>

flawed framework of ‘presumed sameness’ not difference and complete failure of administration to ‘strategize’ keeping differences in mind and not sameness. It is also studied using computer technology/software⁴²/algorithm⁴³ to find trends, patterns, values and characteristics of various presidents in their speeches, stylistic elements that vary or overlap among these president’s rhetoric, etc.

How a state manifests its interests while maintaining relations with various states forms the crux of foreign policy studies. While foreign policies are closely studied and scrutinised, lesser attention is paid to the rhetoric of heads of states/ members of cabinet/administration of democratic states as source of foreign policy practices towards the adversary. Neither is the implications of such practices studied which invariably become an impetus to wage war or declare sanctions on international *other* in Global South countries. International relations especially under what Robert Cox famously describes as Critical Theories⁴⁴ (or post-positivists theories) have forced the spotlight on *ideational* forces shifting the focus from *material* forces. Traditional theories like Realism, Liberalism and Marxism focus on *material* forces namely, anarchical international structure, economy, economic structure, respectively. In these representations, the state, the individual and capitalism respectively form the major actors in International Relations. With the Critical theories, including Social Constructivism, the notion that *shared ideas* steer or drive change in International Relations became prominent. Also, the actor’s interests and identities are not fixed but rather, shared ideas govern them. Social context

⁴² Savoy, Jacques, “Analysis of the Style and the Rhetoric of the American Presidents Over Two Centuries” *Glottometrics* 38, (2017): 55-76.

⁴³ Dillet B, Speaking to algorithms? Rhetorical political analysis as technological analysis. *Politics*. 42, no. 2 (2020): 231–246.

⁴⁴ Cox, Robert W, “Social Forces, States and World Orders: Beyond International Relations Theory,” *Millennium* 10, no. 2 (June 1981): 126–55. <https://doi.org/10.1177/03058298810100020501>.

and process of social interactions constructs International Relations. In short, ideational forces precede material forces in International Relations.

Rhetoric of heads of states fall under the gamut of ideas and their prevalence in IR studies. Language and its undeniable role in foreign policy and foreign policy rhetoric has also found place in this transition. Rhetoric has bearing on foreign policy as the international community is affected by the words/language/phrases used. Words and phrases have some history attached to them or sometimes they are bursting with implications or often-times are also loaded with meaning that require greater attention by IR scholars. During the Cold War, the rhetoric of the president of the USSR had gripped the attention of certain scholars. Even in contemporary times, the rhetoric of the Chinese Premier remains a subject of interest among scholars.

By and large, American presidential rhetoric has far reaching consequences. American actions (and I argue words) are closely watched by the world for it has the capacity to cause ripples in world politics considering that America, as a state, occupies a substantial position of power (be it economic, political, soft and military.) In fact, it has been described as the ‘world's first *mega-power*’ by Robert Singh.⁴⁵ It became fashionable among American establishment scholars, during the Post-Cold war period, to describe the United States of America as the sole superpower. Speaking of an old aphorism, ‘when America sneezes, the rest of the world catches a cold’ (in lieu of ‘when France sneezes, the rest of Europe catches cold’), it carrying weight due to America’s technical and logistical superiority, in the sense of its premier military, economic and diplomatic force in the world. Anything its leader as the head of the state has to say does carry considerable weight in International Relations. Presidential rhetoric, therefore,

⁴⁵Singh, Robert, "Americanism," in *American Government and Politics: A Concise Introduction*, Endorsements for American Government and Politics (London: Sage Publications Ltd, 2003), 1-24. <https://dx.doi.org/10.4135/9781446215098.n1>.

becomes a subject of interest that is regrettably an understudied area of research in International Relations/ Foreign Policy studies.

Yet, it is not a completely unexplored area of research. Interestingly, studies show that American presidents' effect on public policy agenda is fleeting (waxed and waned) except in foreign policy (including defence).⁴⁶ Patrick Lee in his work concludes that both general and political rhetorical research by scholars like Cohen, Hill, Jacoby, Krebs & Jackson, and Ragsdale has found that presidents' rhetoric leaves a mark on prominent issues depending upon how they present those issues.⁴⁷ A set of "assumptions, ideals, beliefs, and conventions" forms a 'foreign policy vocabulary' that presidents 'draw upon' to "provide a broad vision of their foreign affairs." Such FP vocabulary influences the "national understanding of international relations," guides the American state in IR, gives guidelines to adhere to take specific actions, "educate the American public " about 'dangerous world' outside, "supply rhetorical support for policy decisions" and finally, to summarise both 'obstacle' and 'opportunities' for America interests in global politics.⁴⁸

Recent research has also dealt with analysing presidential speeches of the Republican Party especially after Donald Trump's presidency. One such thesis is by Patrick Lee who analyses four Republican president's rhetoric: Dwight David Eisenhower, Richard Milhous Nixon, George Walker Bush, and Donald John Trump. The common themes for these Republican presidents remain a 'firm friend,' a 'better world,' 'just peace,' a 'great enemy,'

⁴⁶Lee, Patrick, "The Words of War: A Content Analysis of Republican Presidential Speeches from Dwight D. Eisenhower, Richard M. Nixon, George W. Bush, and Donald J. Trump," *Electronic Theses and Dissertations*, Paper 3400 (2018):20. <https://dc.etsu.edu/etd/3400>

⁴⁷See Ibid. p.21.

⁴⁸ Edwards, Jason A, *Navigating the Post-Cold War World: President Clinton's Foreign Policy Rhetoric* (Plymouth: Lexington Books, 2008), xiv.

‘democracy,’ ‘terrorism’ and ‘communism.’⁴⁹ There have also been scholars, including Elvin T. Lim, that evaluate Presidents’ (who are aided by their speechwriters) rhetoric that has gone down from rousing speeches to repetitive robotic ‘talking points.’⁵⁰ Lim believes there was a steep decline in presidential communication with America’s public. He maintains, that the president was compelled to influence the opinion of the public more so since the presidential speeches were broadcast on television (giving the president access to people’s drawing rooms). This led to a “pathology of vacuous rhetoric and imagery where gesture and appearance matter more than accomplishment and fact.” He argues, that it was “deliberative choice and not a reflection of presidents’ intellectual limitations” to embrace ‘anti-intellectualism’ and ‘vague platitudes’ as a ‘public relations strategy.’⁵¹

Another work, *The Moral Rhetoric of American Presidents*, argues that even though Bush (Jr.) is credited with use of moral and religious rhetoric by ‘pundits,’ it is not the case. Colleen J. Shogan identifies nine case studies (of American presidents) throughout American history who have used similar rhetoric with “varying degrees of political success.” She argues such rhetoric is not reflective of personal character or America’s ‘civil religion’ but a ‘strategic tool’ used to advance ‘constitutional authority.’ Using quantitative methods, she attempts to show that political circumstances both encourage or discourage use of moral rhetoric including in Bush (Jr.) presidency where rhetoric instigated ‘several dilemmas of governance.’⁵²

⁴⁹Lee, Patrick, "The Words of War: A Content Analysis of Republican Presidential Speeches from Dwight D. Eisenhower, Richard M. Nixon, George W. Bush, and Donald J. Trump," *Electronic Theses and Dissertations*, Paper 3400 (2018):21. <https://dc.etsu.edu/etd/3400>

⁵⁰ One such work is *The Anti-Intellectual Presidency: The Decline of Presidential Rhetoric from George Washington to George W. Bush* by Elvin T. Lim, 2008.

⁵¹Lim, Elvin T., *The Anti-Intellectual Presidency: The Decline of Presidential Rhetoric from George Washington to George W. Bush* (London: Oxford University Press, 2008).

⁵² Shogan, Colleen J. *The Moral Rhetoric of American Presidents*. College Station: Texas A&M University Press, 2007. muse.jhu.edu/book/10997.

In sum, it is interesting to note that firstly, there are substantial works being done on presidential rhetoric in other disciplines; secondly, it is after Bush (Jr.) and Trump's presidencies that scholars' attention on presidential rhetoric within IR have increased; thirdly, though the Republican presidents' rhetoric is generally targeted in what Patrick Lee describes as "war going," as focus of studies in IR, the Democratic Presidents' rhetoric when examined also seem to lean towards the same common themes (as Colleen J. Shogan also finds) in their dealings with the Global South States. In order to fill this lacune in IR studies, the present work uses social constructivism and its theoretical concepts to study presidential rhetoric. In my study, I have endeavoured to find common tropes that pervade the presidential rhetoric of America, irrespective of their political party allegiances. The recurring tropes namely, *nationalist, liberal and democratic presuppositions, predicates and subject-positioning* that are identified remain consistent in almost all the presidents in American history varying only in degree. These are especially consistent in the first three presidencies in the Post-Cold war era: George Bush (Sr.), Bill Clinton and George Bush (Jr.).

1.1.2 Turbulent Times: Post-Cold War Period

After the Soviet Union imploded when Gorbachev introduced *Perestroika* and *Glasnost*, the Cold War, its discourse and presidential rhetoric dissipated. This period was celebrated by some American establishment scholars as a triumph of liberalism/ democracy over Communism. The discourse that developed during this period included debates on 'end of history', 'end of ideology' and a unipolar world. There was also a rise in social theory around culture and identity in the Post-Cold war IR theorising according to Yosef Lapid. Ideas once again saw a revival due to the incapacity of rational theories to 'predict' or 'explain' the outcomes of policies. These were collectively known as constructivism as per Karl Schonberg.

Jack Snyder suggests that such theories stress on ideologies, identities, persuasions and transnational networks and their role in understanding the world after 9/11.⁵³

There was also a development of the idea that in the 21st century the world was progressing towards a ‘Post American world,’ as Farid Zakaria describes it.⁵⁴ Though the arguments were compelling, the Post-American World is not how this period can be described because America not just waged wars on two independent states but also defied the United Nations in the process by employing its economic, military, political and logistic power.

Though these are inflated depictions of reality, it cannot be denied that after the implosion of America’s arch enemy, USSR, and dearth of some state/ group of states to fill the void, America witnessed itself as a sole leader of the world. Taylor McNeil reiterates arguments from Michael Beckley: there are multiple strengths that America has that its rivals lack. He is cognizant that America’s decline is a possibility for the reason that it has both corruption and political divisions domestically which can result in America losing its sole superpower status. Yet he strongly believes that America is most likely to thrive. He emphasises that the USA “is a mess, but China’s system is worse...The United States is a flawed democracy, but China is an oligarchy ruled by a dictator for life.”⁵⁵ America has “achieved the status of sole superpower” states Juliana Geran Pilon.⁵⁶

Such arguments led to suggestions that America was the sole superpower and the international system was most akin to a Unipolar system. Though this was far from reality, it garnered attention of IR scholars. And America, it can be argued, began taking unilateral

⁵³Karl K Schonberg, *Constructing 21st Century U.S. Foreign Policy: Identity, Ideology and America’s World Role in a New Era* (New York: Palgrave Macmillan, 2009), 3-4.

⁵⁴Zakaria, Fareed, *The Post-American World* (New York: W.W. Norton & Co., 2008).

⁵⁵McNeil, Taylor. “Why the United States of America is the Only Superpower,” *Tufts Now* (Nov.21, 2019). (accessed on February 23, 2022) <https://now.tufts.edu/articles/why-united-states-only-superpower>

⁵⁶Pilon, Juliana Geran, “American Exceptionalism: Implications for Strategic Communication” in *Israel Journal of Foreign Affairs* II, no. 3 (2008): 129. DOI: 10.1080/23739770.2008.11446337

decisions, sometimes going against the very institutions it helped establish to keep a check against aggressors in the international arena. Iraq War being the case in point when America invaded a sovereign state against UN directives.

It has been observed that even though the Cold War had ended, American troops continued to be stationed all around the globe.⁵⁷ In fact, scholars like Ivan Eland observe that, “the American empire grew larger after the Cold War ended.” Its military presence has increased and along with it the role of NATO has expanded. It has been given a new mission of being on the *offensive*, contrary to NATO’s charter which envisioned it as a defensive alliance. The alliance has been observed to send forces outside the treaty area (Western Europe) to stabilise the situation arising out of what has been described as “failed states.”⁵⁸ American FP began being aggressive in the immediate aftermath of the Cold War especially after September 11 attacks. And for convincing both the world at large and the American Public, it seemed almost like the American president used certain rhetoric revolving around ‘hate’/’fight against enemy’/ upholding ‘American ideals’ propelled by American nationalism. Such rhetoric on close inspection gave the impression that it was used by previous presidents too.

This ‘war of words’ has been a consistent phenomenon in presidential rhetoric especially during the Cold War, where American president portrayed America as the leader of the ‘free words’ and ‘defender of civilization’ as opposed to Soviet Union which was represented by the president as the ‘bastion of evil’ who could be opposed by use of ‘grand strategy of containment.’⁵⁹ Phillippe Le Prestre (as cited by Jason A Edwards) pointed out that

⁵⁷Eland, Ivan, *The Empire Has No clothes: U.S. Foreign Policy Exposed* (Oakland: The Independent Institute, 2008), 219.

⁵⁸See *ibid.* 16.

⁵⁹ Edwards, Jason A, *Navigating the Post-Cold War World: President Clinton’s Foreign Policy Rhetoric* (Plymouth: Lexington Books, 2008), xi.

in wake of Soviet union's implosion, American establishment pundits, leaders and also policy makers were struggling to replace containment as a strategy which until then offered a directive for American foreign policy. With a new era on its precipice, America foreign policy needed new direction. There was 'discord' over issues of definition of American 'role in the world,' need for a 'grand strategy' to substitute Cold War's 'containment' policy and justification for 'use of force' in global politics. Lastly, this also heralded a vacuum in rhetoric especially the presidential rhetoric in American foreign policy. A space opened up to 'invent' diverse 'foreign policy arguments' which would cater to the changing international 'environment' that took cognizance of 'changes,' 'challenges' and 'opportunities' of the new period.⁶⁰

What drew my attention most was why certain rhetoric in AFP was recurring? And if there are any observable patterns in American presidential rhetoric? This thesis is a modest attempt at analysing recurring patterns/tropes in rhetoric of the American presidents in order to fill a glaring gap in literature. But before we do that let us set the context of the study.

1.1.3 Setting the Context: Social Constructivism, Language and Presidential Rhetoric

International Relations Theory (IRT) in the late 20th century began being pulled in diverse directions. The traditional/classic theories like Liberalism, Realism and Marxism turned a perfunctory glance towards assumptions espoused by post-positivist theorists like imperfect knowledge, multiple realities, interpretations, subjective observations, prevalence of erroneous biases, and such. They single-mindedly continued cheering on the need to analyse International Relations using concepts like national interest, national power, economic interests, cooperation, hegemony, international institutions, and the like. Meanwhile the post-positivist theorists continued clamouring for the need to include qualitative data, interpretive

⁶⁰ Ibid. xii.

methods, role of language in construction of knowledge/ perception/ reality in understanding International Relations. It was in such a context where the discipline was being pulled in diverse directions that Social Constructivism emerged. It attempted to study assumptions and concepts of classic theories by employing methods of the post-positivist theories. They argued, that both interests and identities of states are socially constructed and influenced by the developments in interactions between various states. It opposed the view that happenings in the international structure including anarchy or relationships between states are pre-determined/given; rather, it argued, that the relations with other states are socially determined based on interactions, persuasions and communication.

Hence, under the first generation of constructivists like Alexander Wendt and Jeffrey Checkel there were attempts to synthesise constructivism and rationalism. They insisted that ideas, norms, beliefs and identities are socially constructed and not universal or *a priori*. Social Constructivism came to occupy the label, 'middle ground' theory: while Jeffrey Checkel opined that it lies between theories of postmodernism and rational choice, Theodore Hopf placed constructivism in-between critical theory and the mainstream theories. Steve Smith viewed constructivism as a link that connects reflectivist and rationalist theories. In short, Social Constructivism appeared keen on holding conversations with the other side, making it partly the reason for its success according to Stefano Guzzini (detailed assumptions and analyses including references can be found in Chapter 2).

Social Constructivists asserted that when the three dominant schools of thought in International Relations - Realism, Liberalism, and Marxism - were unable to explain the social reasons which ended the Cold War, its genesis occupied the vacuum in IR theory. They drew attention to the need to understand that it is societies and its peoples that constitute/construct one another based on both inner and outer nature of their material circumstances. In short, they

are products of each other's construction, observed Nicholas Onuf. States remain the primary unit of analysis for the constructivists. The behaviour and relationship of the states towards each other remain their primary focus. They believe similarity (identity, interests and preferences) and familiarity (shared history) breeds cooperation between states. They are cognizant that states have multiple identities based on multiple interests in global politics. The concept of power is understood as being both material and discursive. Social practices for them domestically constitute identity and at the same time, it also enables interests/identities and actions globally. A state's authority abroad is directly proportional to its desire to construct at home its national identity. In world politics, a state needs its *other* in order to validate its rule domestically.⁶¹

It is language, which constructs identities of both *self* and *other* in International Relations. Representations of identities and interests are done using language and hence its role cannot be ignored while analysing any foreign policy discourse. Presidential rhetoric is a scarcely researched area of study within foreign policy discourse. In this study, within Social Constructivism theory, three analytical concepts from Discursive Practices Approach are used to analyse the rhetoric employed by the president of USA namely, *Presuppositions*, *Predicates* and *Subject-Positioning* in the Post-Cold war period. It attempts to show how the Presidential speeches are part of the social norms that he tries to establish, as well as how the domestic needs are shaped through his words. It attempts to draw attention to how presidential rhetoric has historical roots; the kind of language that is used by the president has ideological influences and how his rhetoric (as the president of one of the most powerful states) shapes or influences public opinion at large. The sort of words/adjectives/predicates he employs while addressing

⁶¹Hopf, Ted, "The Promise of Constructivism in International Relations Theory," *International Security* 23, no. 1 (1998): 187-188.

<https://doi.org/10.2307/2539267>

and referring to the *other* in comparison to *self* has a bearing on foreign policy. The positioning of *self* versus the *other* helps establish state identity; both for its own citizens at home and for the states abroad. Both these *predicates* and *subject-positioning* are dependent upon the *presuppositions* which are ideological. The ideological *presuppositions* in American discourse have been present since its inception particularly in American Enlightenment. The three ideological *presuppositions* that this study is concerned with are Nationalism, Liberalism and Democracy and their influence on presidential rhetoric.

Presidential rhetoric has not always been constant. It went through a transition from rhetoric being shifted from the US Congress and other government bodies to the American public. And it has since began to be directed to the American Public that ‘dumbing down’ phenomena (as Elvin T. Lim calls it) began taking place in American presidential rhetoric. The advent of radio and television where the president began appearing in drawing rooms of anybody with access to them, set off what Elvin calls anti-intellectual presidencies. The rhetoric saw a sudden nose dive: the language/rhetoric from college level listener or reader fell as low as that of eighth grade level. These anti-intellectual addresses became simplistic and pandered to the emotional needs of the public. Lim insists that when presidential discourse becomes banal, democracy diminishes. “The cult of simplicity endorsed by presidents and speechwriters is anti-intellectualism with a demagogic smile; it is a justification of anti-intellectualism that has blinded us to the gradual rot of our public deliberative sphere”.⁶² One can’t help but agree with Bruce Miroff’s observation that Lim’s work would be more appropriately titled as the “degradation of presidential rhetoric.”⁶³

⁶²Lim, Elvin T., *The Anti-Intellectual Presidency: The Decline of Presidential Rhetoric from George Washington to George W. Bush* (London: Oxford University Press, 2008), 48.

⁶³Miroff, Bruce, review of *The Anti-Intellectual Presidency: The Decline of Presidential Rhetoric from George Washington to George W. Bush* by Elvin T. Lim, *Political Science Quarterly* 124, no. 1 (Spring 2009): 189–190. <https://doi.org/10.1002/j.1538-165X.2009.tb01854.x>

Joshua M. Scacco and Kevin Coe in their recent work, *Ubiquitous Presidency: Presidential Communication and Digital Democracy in Tumultuous Times* attempted to analyse presidential rhetoric's recent developments in the age of digital media: beginning with radio's use by Franklin Delano Roosevelt and television's use by John Fitzgerald to social media platform, *Twitter's* use by Donald John Trump. They argue, (as quoted by Lori Cox Han), there has been an existence of a *mythology* about the impact of presidential rhetoric on political and policy outcomes. In brief, the norm to study presidential political communication is about ubiquity.⁶⁴

Apart from the change in presidential rhetoric after the advent of electronic media and more recently, the digital media, it is also noteworthy that political scientists began taking interest in presidential rhetoric since the time of Ronald Reagan. Few of the earliest scholarship include Samuel Kernell (who made the observation about 'going public') and Jeffrey K Tulis⁶⁵ (who focussed on the 'rhetorical presidency'). Since then, there has only been an increase in research on presidential speeches/rhetoric, as observed by Miroff. Lim (as quoted by Bruce Miroff) identifies the problem of presidential rhetoric which is not rhetorical presidency *per se* but the anti-intellectual presidency. The quality has been dwindling and not the quantity in presidential rhetoric, according to Lim.⁶⁶

⁶⁴Han, Lori Cox., review of *The Ubiquitous Presidency: Presidential Communication and Digital Democracy in Tumultuous Times* by Joshua M. Scacco and Kevin Coe (New York: Oxford University Press, 2021), 248. *Perspectives on Politics* 20, no. 1 (2022): 334–35. doi:10.1017/S1537592721003431. [The Ubiquitous Presidency: Presidential Communication and Digital Democracy in Tumultuous Times. By Joshua M. Scacco and Kevin Coe. New York: Oxford University Press, 2021. 248p. \\$99.00 cloth, \\$27.95 paper. | Perspectives on Politics | Cambridge Core](https://doi.org/10.1017/S1537592721003431)

⁶⁵See Chapter Five for more details.

⁶⁶Bruce Miroff, review of *The Anti-Intellectual Presidency: The Decline of Presidential Rhetoric from George Washington to George W. Bush* by Elvin T. Lim, *Political Science Quarterly* 124, no. 1 (Spring 2009): 189-190. <https://doi.org/10.1002/j.1538-165X.2009.tb01854.x> [Anti-Intellectual Presidency: The Decline of Presidential Rhetoric from George Washington to George W. Bush by Elvin T. Lim | Political Science Quarterly | Oxford Academic \(oup.com\)](https://doi.org/10.1002/j.1538-165X.2009.tb01854.x)

The takeaway from this book remains above all that presidential rhetoric has seen a rise in platitudes, emotional bathos and partisan clichés. The ‘dumbed down verbiage’ in presidential rhetoric has seen an all-time high under Clinton and Bush (Jr.) observes Lim (as quoted by Bruce Miroff).⁶⁷ In short, there has been an upsurge in such rhetoric especially after the Cold War ended which makes it pertinent that American presidential rhetoric of this period be studied with a careful eye.

1.2 Overview of Literature

For far too long, national interests, and national security (with the focus on consequences/intentions/power/anarchy) in International Relations (IR) have captured the attention of scholars and commentators. Hard facts and ground realities stripped bare of ideas, values, ethics, morals, ideologies and such had been garnering the lion's share of attention from scholars. Such studies were dismissive of words, language, syntax, rhetoric and discourse for they believed they were just a front/ mask used by statesmen to hide/cloak their real intentions revolving majorly around national interests and national security in an anarchic world system. At the turn of the twenty-first century, changes began appearing in academia. The emerging critical theories like postmodernism, post-colonialism, post-structuralist, feminism, green theory etc., attempted to shift the focus away from national interests, national security, anarchy, national power etc., towards state identity, international structure, patriarchy, environment, and such. There were still others like social constructivism that offered alternative interpretations/explanations about the popular concepts like anarchy or national interests/security. They opened the doors to newer concepts like role of ideas, identity, ideology, historical social context/spatio-temporal influences, logic of appropriateness and

⁶⁷See *ibid*.

notions of friends and foes in understanding and explaining International Relations. The first two decades of the twenty-first century saw a steep rise in works that studied the impact of values, ethics, morals, ideas, and even ideologies on states' foreign policy in global politics. This movement began with some pioneering scholarship of the 1980's and 1990's including *Writing Security: United States Foreign Policy and the Politics of Identity* by David Campbell and *Social Theory of International Politics* by Alexander Wendt (that will be discussed in detail in the thesis). They were followed by works like *A Cultural Theory of International Relations* by Richard Ned Lebow, *Constructing 21st Century U.S. Foreign Policy: Identity, Ideology and America's World Role in a New Era* by Karl Schonberg, *American Foreign Relations: A New Diplomatic History* by Walter L. Hixson etc. in the last two decades that focused on culture, social relations, identity, ideology, in International Relations (IR) and also Foreign Policy studies.

Consequently, such shift in focus and subject matter of IR is what led Robert Cox to classify these post-positivist theories as *critical theories* in contrast to the traditional *positivist theories* like Realism, Liberalism and Marxism.⁶⁸ The present study falls within the ambit of these latter studies that attempt to reflect on those aspects of IR that have for far too long been dismissed/ignored/overlooked. Language and ideas' role in US foreign policy is the concern of this study. One of the theories that emphasises the need to examine the ideas' role in IR theory is social constructivism. Chapter Two deals extensively with social constructivism: its rise as an alternative to major theories of IR; its different versions; its major concerns while studying foreign policy; and major studies that have employed this theory in making sense of both

⁶⁸Cox, Robert W, "Social Forces, States and World Orders: Beyond International Relations Theory," *Millennium* 10, no. 2 (June 1981): 126–55.
<https://doi.org/10.1177/03058298810100020501>.

International Relations and Foreign Policy. Particularly, the study employs Roxanne L. Doty's social constructivist approach, *Discursive Practices Approach* which includes three concepts of *presuppositions*, *predicates* and *subject positioning*. I apply this framework to the study of American presidential rhetoric especially after the Cold War ended. As is argued by Doty, *presupposition* is the textual mechanism which creates the background knowledge where certain things are accepted and taken for granted; *predication* is the association of specific qualities to a certain populace/nationals/subjects by repeatedly referring to them with certain predicates, adverbs, adjectives, properties/qualities; lastly, *subject-positioning* is the relationship between the subject and the object where their identities are contrasted to create the identity of the subject through the dichotomy of *us* vs. *them* and where *other* is presented as an opposition to the *self*.⁶⁹

The present study begins with the assumption that certain ideas which are espoused by statesmen or policy makers help form perceptions for understanding International Relations. Specifically, this work argues, that certain ideologies guide the kind of language the US president employs; his rhetoric is loaded with nationalistic, historical, evangelical, ideological terms, phrases and innuendos that have roots in American history and experience. There is also a sort of ideological continuity that seems to pass from one American president to another irrespective of their political (party) affiliations. Certain recurring words/terms/phrases remain

⁶⁹Doty, Roxanne Lynn, "Foreign Policy as Social Construction: A Post-Positivist Analysis of U.S. Counterinsurgency Policy in the Philippines" *International Studies Quarterly*, 37, no. 3 (1993): 297-304.

common even if their intensity and usage may vary like crusade,⁷⁰ chosen land, God,⁷¹ liberty, freedom, democracy, peace, human rights etc. This study began with a hunch that American foreign policy has ideological moorings which seeps into American presidential rhetoric. Secondly, American foreign policy discursive practices of the president have inherent core oppositions that become aggressively pronounced during times of conflict/war/confrontation with *other/enemy/adversary*. The sort of adjectives/ *predicates* that are employed by the president to describe or refer to *self/America* and *other/enemy* are dependent on certain ideologies that have gained significance in American historical experience: liberalism, democracy and nationalism.

This study will examine the presidential rhetoric of the first three presidents of the 21st century namely, George Bush (Sr.), Bill Clinton and George Bush (Jr.). Previously, American diplomatic history and foreign policy approach has been studied through American foreign policy traditions of popular/prominent presidents of America. Different scholars have examined the influence of the president's perspective/values/ideas on foreign policy of America differently. As a way of illustration, one such significant work that concentrated on American foreign policy traditions remain *Special Providence: American Foreign Policy and How It*

⁷⁰One interesting work on America as a crusader state is Walter A McDougall's *Promised Land, Crusader State: The American Encounter with the World Since 1776* where he divided American history into two stages, Old Testament and New Testament. In the former stage, he deals with American history beginning from the American revolution up until 1890's wherein domestic matters (within) were the centre. In the latter stage, America began looking outward beginning from the Spanish-American War up to the present. In this stage, McDougall argues America has been taking huge risks, overextending its resources and paying a huge price while attempting to project American ideals and standards onto other states. Refer McDougall, Walter A., *Promised Land Crusader State : The American Encounter with the World Since 1776* (Boston: Houghton Mifflin, 1997). <https://archive.org/details/promisedlandcrus00mcdo>.

⁷¹Rhetoric on God/Religion and the influence of civil religion on American foreign policy was examined in detail by Walter MacDougall in *The Tragedy of U.S. Foreign Policy: How America's Civil Religion Betrayed the National Interest*. Though this analysis is crucial in examining American foreign policy especially in the first decade of 21st century under George W. Bush, the present study deals majorly with the impact of ideology on identity formation and presidential rhetoric. McDougall, Walter A. *The Tragedy of U.S. Foreign Policy: How America's Civil Religion Betrayed the National Interest* (Yale University Press, 2019). <https://doi.org/10.2307/j.ctvd1c8rh>.

Changed the World by Walter Russell Mead where he employed presidential names to identify certain American foreign policy traditions. He labels the political tradition of isolationism as Jeffersonian, nationalism as Jacksonian, realism as Hamiltonian, and liberal internationalism as Wilsonian in this prominent work. In *Conservative Internationalism: Armed Diplomacy under Jefferson, Polk, Truman and Reagan*, Henry R. Nau argues, that foreign policy traditions of America are formed by both intellectual ideas and events. The four main traditions he identifies are conservative internationalism, nationalism, liberal internationalism and realism. These traditions also have variations; for example, nationalism, in its lowest form, he argues, would be translated as isolationism, while imperialism, in its highest form, would be a variant of realism.⁷²

Significant contribution to foreign policy tradition remains, *US Foreign Policy in Context: National Ideology from the Founders to the Bush Doctrine*,⁷³ where Adam Quinn studies the ideological factors that drive foreign policy and impacts domestic and international national strategy. Another interesting and thorough book on American traditions was brought out by Sage publication, *American Foreign Policy Traditions* edited by Brendan O'Connor. It includes works/debates/arguments/ discussion on the theme from multiple perspectives including Americanism, anti-Americanism, manifest destiny,⁷⁴ imperialism and Messianism, exceptionalism, unilateralism, etc. But our aim in this work is not to just study the foreign policy traditions of American presidents but their rhetoric that is influenced by ideologies that had their birth in the American Enlightenment.

⁷²For more, refer Nau, Henry R., *Conservative Internationalism: Armed Diplomacy under Jefferson, Polk, Truman, and Reagan* (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 2015), 39. <https://doi.org/10.1515/9781400873722>

⁷³ Quinn, Adam. *US Foreign Policy in Context: National Ideology from the Founders to the Bush Doctrine* (1st ed.). London: Routledge, 2009. <https://doi.org/10.4324/9780203867679>

⁷⁴For a brief and succinct history and meaning of the term refer https://americanexperience.si.edu/wp-content/uploads/2014/08/Manifest-Destiny-and-U.S-Westward-Expansion_.pdf

Among the books that focus on American presidents in recent times, some crucial books remain, Joseph Nye's books on morals and presidential leadership and also William G. Howell's work on American presidency. In *Do Morals Matter?* Nye raises the question whether morals have a role to play in American president's decisions on foreign policy. He examines the president's decision making since World War II based on three ethical questions namely, their intentions, the means employed and consequences of those decisions. Regarding President Bush's foreign policy decision making, he concludes that even though his intentions were good, his means were not and thus, ethically wrong outcomes which included massive human suffering in the Iraq war were the result. Nye in his other book on presidential leadership⁷⁵ explores presidential foreign policy decisions, their effectiveness and ethics of choices at crucial phases in American history, primarily during the USA's ascent to world primacy in the 20th century. He believes the perceptions of American presidents about the world; the ethical choices and the effectiveness of major decisions have the potential to impart significant lessons for contemporary American presidents. William G. Howell, in his work, *The American Presidency: An Institutional Approach to Executive Politics* looks into the institutional sources of American presidential executive governance and power. He traces how the president's office was originally conceived in the American Constitution and its gradual progress including elections, its interactions with courts, media, public, bureaucracy and Congress and their impact on the president's office.

While the majority of the scholarship supports the notion that nation precedes the state, scholars of Historical Sociology argue that the state comes before the nation. And there is no better illustration this study argues, than the United States of America. Lida Bteddini argues,

⁷⁵Joseph S. Nye, Jr. *Presidential Leadership and the Creation of the American Era* (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 2013).

“nationalism is a construct of the state in pursuit of its legitimacy.... the power of nationalistic sentiments to secure a state’s identity is primarily rooted in the ability of that state to enforce and legitimise an ‘imagined political community’ that exists only insofar as it is a cultural artefact that is represented textually.” Conventional Literature assumes that behind state action, the nation is the force. Yet, it is clear that it is the other way round; she further argues, where “the identity of a ‘people’ provides the basis of legitimacy for ‘the state and its subsequent practices.’” This study argues, that American identity is defined by notions and perceptions of what it is to be American which in turn influences state practices including foreign policy practices.⁷⁶

David Campbell’s insightful arguments in his ground breaking work on American foreign policy and the politics of identity that America required the *other* in order to define and differentiate *self* from the *other* has far reaching implications for understanding American identity formation. Perception of danger and *difference* led to establishing the American identity. Foreign policy is contingent upon state identity which is assumed through interpretation of dangers posed by *others*. Identity is at the root of American foreign policy,⁷⁷ which is also something this thesis argues. Social constructivist theory analyses identity in International Relations as well. David Campbell, like Alexander Wendt observes, “in challenging traditional conceptions of theoretical foundations of International Relations, state identity can be better solidified and understood as being defined through human associations instead of material forces.”⁷⁸ Campbell’s work also attempts to analyse representation of fear in discourse which justifies national security measures. Fear of the *other* and the need to

⁷⁶Bteddini, Lida, review of *Writing Security: United States Foreign Policy and the Politics of Identity* by David Campbell, *Revue de la Securite Humaine, Sciences Po* 8, no.1 (January 2009):115. https://www.researchgate.net/publication/215570278_Writing_Security_United_States_Foreign_Policy_and_the_Politics_of_Identity

⁷⁷See *ibid.* 115.

⁷⁸See *ibid.* 115.

counter the *otherness* constitutes state identity. The security measures that a state employs are presented as beneficial for the state and its identity. He draws attention to how material practices of state identity are reinforced in foreign policy by the terminology, symbolism and ideology's role. In building state identity, the representation of *self* vs *other* is crucial which then influences foreign policy practices of the state.⁷⁹ Campbell's most significant contribution to America's development of foreign policy remains his argument that the creation of state identity is done through danger, fear and *otherness*.⁸⁰

When the work on this study began there was sparse literature on ideology's role in foreign policy of America barring few significant works including Michael Hunt's *Ideology and US Foreign Policy* (1986) and K. K. Schonberg's *Constructing 21st Century U.S. Foreign Policy: Identity, Ideology and America's World Role in a New Era* (2009). Since then, a few more crucial works like Walter L. Hixson's *American Foreign Relations: A New Diplomatic History* (2016), *Ideologies of the American Foreign Policy* by John Callaghan, Brendon O'Connor and Mark Phythian (2019) have also been published.

Hunt's book deals with ideology only in the introduction and conclusion chapter even though he makes a strong case in foreign policy for the role of both ideas and rhetoric. Hunt argues, that political rhetoric should not be accepted as it is presented. Any sceptic observation would point towards how public appeals which are staged are usually done with the intention 'to fool the gullible and mask true intentions' instead of being taken as blunt/subtle or refined articulations. It would be a mistake to treat rhetoric as a confession when in fact it is more of a 'form of persuasion.'⁸¹ What Hunt means is that public rhetoric is hypocritical, insincere and

⁷⁹See *ibid.* 116.

⁸⁰See *ibid.* 116.

⁸¹Callaghan, John, Brendon O'Connor and Mark Phythian, *Ideologies of American Foreign Policy* (New York: Routledge, 2019), 24.

for most part meaningless. Yet one cannot disregard the power of public rhetoric. It cannot be underestimated as a source of knowledge about foreign policy. It has the power to create an image, set a narrative and guide public opinion not just in domestic politics but also in the international structure. John Callaghan et al argue, that it is the kind of communication that is replete with mythology, symbols and even certain rules. Any effective public rhetoric must revolve around concerns and even values that are not just understood easily but also shared widely by its target audience. It is an ‘interpretive naiveté’ to take rhetoric as it is without listening to its recurrent values and themes.⁸²

The three ideas that Hunt identifies as essential in shaping foreign policy of USA are ‘greatness of America,’ ‘notion of racial superiority’ and America’s ‘view of revolutions.’⁸³ Richard Kerry identifies ‘Democratic Universalism’ (the notion that system of society and government of America is universally applicable), ‘American Exceptionalism’ (American development as a nation is distinct) and ‘Liberal philosophy’ of Locke, Mill and Jefferson among others. Stanley Hoffmann asserts Americanism being rooted in 18th and 19th century Liberalism and a sense of being the chosen champion which impacts American foreign policy goals. Henry R. Nau points at isolationism, liberal internationalism, and realism embedded in commonsense of American exceptionalism or separatism. Seymour Martin Lipset asserts that the American state is more classically liberal, populist and distrustful of government.⁸⁴ From among this, the present study incorporates three ideologies in its study of American presidential rhetoric, namely, Nationalism, Liberalism and Democracy. These impact and reinforce the American sense of self (American Identity) which is dependent on an International *Other*.

⁸²See ibid. 24.

⁸³See ibid. 24.

⁸⁴Schonberg, Karl K., *Constructing 21st Century U.S. Foreign Policy: Identity, Ideology and America’s World Role in a New Era* (New York: Palgrave Macmillan, 2009), 44-45.

Karl Schonberg,⁸⁵ argues, that sometimes, objective material power matters less than perception. Therefore, how America perceives the world witnessed a change in the aftermath of the 9/11 attacks. He recognises that ideational framework impacts how American leaders comprehend the world. It is national ideology and national identity which help determine both opportunity/threat and friend/foe in International Relations. He recognises that ideology emanates from identity and ideology shape identity.⁸⁶ American identity defines ideology where the narrative of ideology on meanings, consequences and causes are defined. And on which American foreign policy is based. Such ideological narratives are based on assertions about American identity and international *other*.⁸⁷ He stresses on the shared ideas in international politics; contends that international actors are socially and materially determined; identities and interests are malleable and intersubjective.

I argue that identity and ideology mutually reinforce each other and it is of interest to study how subscription to an ideology shapes/ constructs state identity which in turn affects the discursive practices in any foreign policy. Ideologies (that defines identity) keep reiterating themselves in speeches of public officials like the president, shaping national identity. My work aligns with Karl Schonberg's argument that it is ideology that affects perception of threat and opportunity.⁸⁸ My study understands that ideologies impact the identity of a state whilst also impacting the perceptions of identity, who or what constitutes *self* and *other/enemy*. And for studying ideology's role and influence on how American identity is shaped, a closer analysis must be made on how ideological *presuppositions* impact the presidential rhetoric so much so

⁸⁵See *ibid.* 44-45.

⁸⁶See *ibid.* 61.

⁸⁷See *ibid.* 1-3.

⁸⁸See *ibid.* 43.

that the *predicates* and *subject positioning* the American president employs are based on those ideologies that shaped American identity initially.

The focus of John Callaghan, Brendon O'Connor and Mark Phythian's book which came out in 2019 (henceforth referred as John Callaghan et al.) was to study the relation between foreign policy and ideology. Specifically, how ideologies of Anti-Colonialism, Anti-Communism, Neoconservatism, etc., impact US foreign policy under different presidencies. How American foreign policy was explained, projected and sustained under different presidencies was also the focus of the work. Specifically, it studies ideas and ideologies that impact the political language and plans for public policy which is done as justification of political arrangements that seem essential for realisation of certain objectives.⁸⁹ They also argue that it is the ideologies which facilitate comprehension by offering patterns or even explanatory frameworks through which meanings are obtained.

As recently as 2022, an edited volume titled, *Ideology in U.S. Foreign Relations: New Histories*⁹⁰ encapsulates some of the major arguments from my thesis namely, American exceptionalism, nationalism, democracy, etc. and also supplements it by studying various ideologies that have left a lasting impact on American foreign relation, namely, civilization, freedom, nationalism, free trade tradition, American exceptionalism, anti-slavery, unilateralism, internationalist ideology, just war, democracy, US immigration policy, neoconservatism, empire, technology/modernisation, science, etc. The book also emphasises the role of ideas and ideals (like freedom/civilization/democracy) that legitimise American military interventions abroad (including unleashing of 'catastrophic' actions in the Middle East

⁸⁹Callaghan, John, Brendon O'Connor and Mark Phythian, *Ideologies of American Foreign Policy* (New York: Routledge, 2019), 14.

⁹⁰ Nichols, Christopher McKnight, and David Milne, eds. *Ideology in U.S. Foreign Relations: New Histories*. Columbia University Press, 2022. <https://doi.org/10.7312/nich20180>.

by use of ‘racialised notions’ of ‘subjecthood’ and ‘civilization’ in Post-Cold war period) while enabling foreign leaders to use USA’s power to their advantage. They also take stock of the role of ‘ideology’ in American foreign policy in “ways seen and unseen.”

Walter L. Hixson’s *American Foreign Relations: A New Diplomatic History* incorporates not just strategic, economic but also cultural factors including race, gender and religion while analysing American foreign policy. He attempts to draw attention to how these factors shaped American actions in world affairs leading to the growth of the American empire. He argues, that it is culture that influences people’s perception and understanding and also response to history and contemporary foreign policy issues. Perceptions of core oppositions that are at the centre of *self*/identity (which this thesis will also deal with) like civilization and savagery, masculinity and weakness, heathenism and godliness influence both the course of history and diplomatic history. Manifest destiny is the widespread cultural conviction that America is an exceptional state which is destined to lead the world has also been a substantial influence on American foreign policy, he emphasises. But his work, by and large, is not post-positivist in nature, even though it employs cultural interpretation because it relies heavily on traditional explanatory themes like national interest, realism, soft power, idealism, economic and strategic motives.⁹¹

The term, *manifest destiny* has transformed over the years: from being used by Puritans or English protestants in 17th century to refer to *American exceptionalism* to being used by journalist John Louis O’Sullivan in 1845 to encourage Americans to take control over whole of the northern American continent that God had given them to spread and implement liberty and self-government. It was only in the 19th century that it began to acquire the meaning that

⁹¹See Hixson, Walter L., *American Foreign Relations: A New Diplomatic History*, preface, (New York: Routledge, 2016).

reflects expansionist tendencies. It increasingly became a term employed to argue that it was a God-given right to conquer and civilise/ convert to Christianity all the uncivilised/barbarian/ lands. This mentality was fuelled to forcefully/violently take over land from native Americans. Walter L. Hixson notes “The United States was a sovereign nation-state and as such had a right to settle in defined spaces, whereas Indians were viewed as primitive hunter-gatherers, children of the forest, warlike and uncivilised heathens, members of a ‘vanishing race.’”⁹² It also began to incorporate the idea of *Promised Land* (from the Bible where Israelites led by prophet Moses were promised a land by God) and Americans began seeing themselves and portraying themselves as the *chosen people* (much like the Israelites in the Bible). As Hixson observes, “The Americans viewed themselves as a nation chosen by Providence to expand republicanism and lead the world toward liberation from monarchy and aristocracy.”⁹³ Interestingly, Samuel Huntington labelled this an ideology, *Americanism*. For him, Americanism is a body of political ideas which can be referred to in a sense that he is sure can never be spoken about Britishism, Japaneseism, Germanism or even Frenchism for that matter, making it an ideology in its own right. And any rejection of the core of such a doctrine would be constituted as un-American. Which is why, such a nationality imbued by values and a political creed make the American nation essentially distinct or unique.⁹⁴

It gradually developed into Winthrop’s ‘a city upon a hill’ which meant that America is that land which the rest of the countries looked upon as a model state. This by the 20th century, when America shed its non-interventionist policy morphed into aggressive/imperial expansionism that politicians, statesmen, presidents and capitalists began using as justification

⁹²See *ibid.* Preface.

⁹³See *ibid.* Preface.

⁹⁴Callaghan, John, Brendon O’Connor and Mark Phythian, *Ideologies of American Foreign Policy* (New York: Routledge, 2019), 19.

for interference in other countries. The first of such expansionism were implemented in America's neighbourhood (Cuba, Mexico, and other South American countries) Later, the same justification was used in American foreign policy for intervening in Philippines, Vietnam, Middle East, Africa. Hence, there was a change in manifest destiny narrative: America from being a model state that others states would look up to/follow/emulate America began using force/violence/military to change/transform other states in its own image (biblical reference).

These studies without exception began by documenting that ideology's role in foreign policy and International Relations has not just been under-studied but also poorly understood in the American context. The aim of the present study is to examine the prevalence and impact of ideology on American presidential rhetoric. Ideologies, this study argues, much like the work by John Callaghan et al, facilitates comprehension by offering 'explanatory patterns or frameworks' that help in understanding the world that we inhabit. In a separate chapter, the meaning of ideology, how it impacts formation of perceptions in International Relations, and the need to study ideology's role in foreign policy is studied (Chapter Three).

Whilst aforementioned studies deal extensively with ideology, identity and American foreign policy, I argue, that the three ideologies (nationalism, liberalism and democracy) have their origin in American Enlightenment principles that have been codified by the Founding Fathers and crucial thinkers of that period in their writings and discourse. They have been carried forward by almost all the presidents since then varying only in form, degree and intensity in their rhetoric. An attempt will be made to trace the changes and continuities in presidential rhetoric of the first three presidents of 21st century in separate chapters.

1.3 Statement of the Problem

What remains under-researched and engrosses me is whether there are any patterns and themes that are prevalent in all American presidential rhetoric irrespective of their subscription of party ideology, Democratic or Republican in this case. And as I continued gathering and analysing more and more speeches a certain pattern stood out; as if the Rorschach inkblots cleared away leaving behind observable, identical and tangible themes in American presidential rhetoric towards the Middle East. Now what remained was to test my hypothesis that there are overarching tropes in American presidential rhetoric.

At first glance, it appeared as if contrary to popular American exertion it is typically the American *enemy* who operates under influence of ideologies (the state of *USSR* was guided by Communism; the non-state actor, *Terrorism* was guided by fundamentalism/radicalism). Violence in the 20th century germinated from attempts to socially engineer societies into ideological moulds, observe John Callaghan et al. They record that such thinking led to the spread of the notion that while the US was not guided by any ideology, USSR was. This led to association of ideology with distortion, deception and propaganda, “doctrinaire, dogmatic, closed, and inflicted on an unwilling populace.”⁹⁵ Yet, certain ideologies of democracy, liberalism, nationalism, neoconservatism, anti-colonialism, anti-communism and such channelled the recurring themes and patterns in American presidential rhetoric. This study argues, that liberalism, nationalism and democracy are a constant feature in American foreign policy discourse.

In order to understand the operation of nationalism in American foreign policy discourse, American exceptionalism has to be studied carefully. American nationalism at its core both subconsciously and consciously hold on to ideas of idealism, notions connected to

⁹⁵See Ibid 3-4.

greatness of America and also American exceptionalism according to Callaghan et al.⁹⁶ Though American exceptionalism as a concept has received sporadic mentions in research articles and books for some time now, organised empirical investigations about the same has seen a surge in academia. Juliana Geran Pilon describes American exceptionalism as an imprecise and wildly misunderstood term.⁹⁷ It has also been defined in simple terms as a “discourse that works to legitimate the United States' exceptions to domestic and international law in the minds of its citizens and foreign observers,” by David Hughes.⁹⁸ In his paper, Johannes Thimm examines the concept of American exceptionalism and its impact on US foreign policy behaviour. He also studies it as an independent variable and its impact on American public beliefs.⁹⁹ There has also been a renewed interest in American exceptionalism since Trump’s presidency. It has been described as *Americanism* by some scholars. Seymour Martin Lipset lays emphasis on Winston Churchill’s argument that being American involved ideological commitment and not birth, rejection of American values was un-American.¹⁰⁰ These and many such compelling arguments have been made in the recent past on the impact of Americanism/ American exceptionalism on American foreign policy that needs investigation.

⁹⁶See ibid 12.

⁹⁷Pilon, Juliana Geran, “American Exceptionalism: implications for Strategic Communication” in *Israel Journal of Foreign Affairs* II: 3 (2008): 129. DOI: 10.1080/23739770.2008.11446337

⁹⁸Hughes, David, “Unmaking an exception: A critical genealogy of US exceptionalism,” in *Review of International Studies*, 41, no. 3 (July 2015): 527. <https://doi.org/10.1017/S0260210514000229>

⁹⁹Thimm, Johannes, “American Exceptionalism—Conceptual Thoughts and Empirical Evidence,” *Internationale Politik* (2007) Available at http://www.jukkarannila.fi/docs/American_Exceptionalism_Thimm-American_exceptionalism.pdf (accessed on February 23, 2022).

¹⁰⁰Lipset, Seymour Martin, “American Exceptionalism: A Double Edged Sword” in *The Washington Post* (April 1, 2015):1. https://yale.learningu.org/download/2997dee3-f7c2-4158-be99-f722c5f992af/H1576_American%20Exceptionalism%20:%20A%20Double%20Edged%20Sword.pdf

Democracy as a goal was not part of the American constitution, argues Fareed Zakaria¹⁰¹ (America was described as a republic not a democracy). And yet it has been observed that its proliferation has become its preoccupation in foreign policy especially since Woodrow Wilson's 14-point program. Domestically, public schools were targeted to impose nationalising "reforms" based on "conviction that the struggle and growth of American democracy could not be conducted apart from the public schools," in 1930s and 1940s.¹⁰²

Multiple accounts of presidential speeches, it appeared, revolved around advocating democracy to both the Middle Eastern and Latin American states. Some scholars like Gideon Rose argue, that it is since the founding fathers onwards that Americans are concerned and judgmental about domestic order in other states.¹⁰³ It is since the American Revolution, argues Jennie Robinson, that democracy has been rooted in American traditions and culture but the mission to spread it/ export it is unrealistic policy¹⁰⁴ Democratic Peace Theory, as per certain historical evidence, postulates that democracies never go to war with each other.¹⁰⁵ And this has been used or cited while making attempts to invade and impose democracy in the Middle East, especially in Iraq, during the Bush presidency. Bush Junior's rhetoric revolved around what has been characterised as a "reckless ... crusade to promote democracy around the world." In Thomas Carothers words, "Certainly, President Bush has built a gleaming rhetorical edifice around democracy promotion through invocations of a universalist freedom agenda."¹⁰⁶ Similar

¹⁰¹Fareed Zakaria, "The Rise of Illiberal Democracy," *Foreign Affairs*, (November 1, 1997).

<https://www.foreignaffairs.com/world/rise-illiberal-democracy>.

¹⁰²Tanner, Daniel, *Crusade for Democracy: Progressive Education at the Crossroads* (Albany, New York: State University of New York Press, 1991), 133. (ISBN 0-7914-0544-3).

¹⁰³Rose, Gideon, Review of *Democracy Promotion and American Foreign Policy: A Review Essay*, by Thomas Carothers and Larry Diamond, *International Security* 25, no. 3 (2000): 186–203. <http://www.jstor.org/stable/2626710>.

¹⁰⁴Robinson, Jennie, *Foreign Policy of the United States* (Munich: GRIN Verlag, 2006), 1. <https://www.grin.com/document/135438>

¹⁰⁵See Ibid. 2.

¹⁰⁶Carothers, Thomas, "The Democracy Crusade Myth" *The National Interest*, no. 90 (2007): 8–12. <http://www.jstor.org/stable/42896042>. <https://carnegieendowment.org/files/CarothersNationalInterest.pdf>

rhetoric has been used by both Clinton and Bush (senior) which will be analysed later in the thesis.

1.4 Research Gap

Examining Presidential speeches/rhetoric in an attempt to identify ideological tropes remains a fascinating area of study. Such works fill the lacunae in foreign policy studies by providing qualitative techniques to identify and analyse trends/patterns in American foreign policy over a substantial period of time. The words that are employed, the phrases that are reiterated and fundamental issues that are emphasised during any president's term in office can elucidate how a state perceives not just the International *Other* (the Middle East, in this case) but also the *Self* (America, in this study). Language then becomes a significant area of study that has gained ascendancy in International Relations and so was employed in analysis. Public opinion is heavily influenced by rhetorical language; certain words act like symbols that trigger certain imagery in the mind of the public. In a specific context, the manner in which information is arranged, the words that are used and historical imagery that it evokes impacts public opinion. Scholars like Jacoby point out that the presenter of information has the capacity to alter the information to suit her interests. Vatz succinctly captures the essence of rhetoric; rhetoric is powerless without the meaning that the speaker assigns to it. Consequently, it is the speaker who chooses the meaning for the listener. He asserts that no theory on rhetoric can afford to neglect "linguistic depiction of the situation."¹⁰⁷ In short, this study is an attempt to understand the linkages between language/presidential rhetoric and ideology in foreign policy of USA. It also seeks to understand how ideology then builds American identity in International Relations.

¹⁰⁷ Ibid. 18.

1.5 Hypothesis

Peter Winch asserts that Explanation is sought only when there is a deficiency in understanding: the goal remains understanding¹⁰⁸ which is what has been a motivating force through-out this thesis.

For this I formulated the following hypothesis:

1. Ideology constructs American identity and
2. Ideology determines discursive foreign policy practices of American presidential rhetoric

1.6 Research Methodology

For the purpose of this study, the methodology used was content analysis. Both primary and secondary sources were used in analysing American presidential rhetoric. Principally, archival material from the United States's presidential public papers were used. These public papers which are published and compiled by the Office of the Federal Register, National Archives and Records Administration and issued by the Press Secretary's office were used for analysing and tracing linkages between the three ideologies identified, American identity and Presidential rhetoric. The Public Papers of American Presidents (Approx. 90,000 pages) were read in detail. Among the primary sources, the study also used memoirs, speeches and State Department Records (those which can be accessed online) of the Presidents. Almost all the memoirs of presidents are available that were used in the study.

In order to study the Post-Cold war presidential rhetoric towards the Middle East, speeches/statements of three presidents namely, George Bush (Sr.), Bill Clinton and Geroge

¹⁰⁸Winch, Peter, *The Idea of a Social Science and its Relation to Philosophy* (London: Routledge, 2012) p.X.

W. Bush (Jr.) was accessed online from the *American Congressional Library*. The selected speeches and statements deal with following states in West Asia i.e., Libya, Israel-Palestine, Iran, Iraq, Afghanistan and Egypt. Transcripts of the speeches of American presidents were read with a close eye to find themes that were recurring. Themes that were found common to all presidents were used to formulate the hypothesis. The keywords for identifying the common themes were enemy, evil, threat, democracy, human rights, reference to American ideals and exceptionalism. While discussing threats (both real and imagined) from the Middle East, the presidential rhetoric rarely shifted away from resuscitating the American state. Threat to the American state was projected in one too many scenarios as a threat to the world, its stability, its safety and largely incompatible with peace. Such arguments have been included in the presidential quotes.

The secondary sources that were used included scholarly articles and books by experts and scholars on American Foreign Policy, Defense Studies and also Journalists like Bob Woodward who captured American Foreign Policy in action as it was unfolding.

1.6.1 Conceptual Framework

The study attempted to understand and analyse concepts like *presupposition*, *predicate* and *subject-positioning*. Social constructivist concepts of *ideational* and *linguistic* construction of International Relations have also been studied. The role of *discourse* in foreign policy analysis was also dealt with. It was employed to analyse the presidential rhetoric of three presidents of the Post-Cold war period i.e., George Bush (Sr.), William Clinton and George W. Bush (Jr.). In the process, I inevitably ended up analysing in detail some more related concepts central to understanding American foreign policy namely, Identity, American Nationalism, American exceptionalism, Manifest Destiny, Ideology, Democracy, Liberalism., as is evident in multiple Presidents' rhetoric, has been described as the driving force behind the American

Constitution (and its makers). The zeal to spread them across the world appears to be their idealist dream since Woodrow Wilson who sent forces to Latin America in an effort to teach them to ‘elect good men,’¹⁰⁹ and also got involved in the first World War to fight ‘war to end all wars.’¹¹⁰ Some such assumptions of the benefits of liberty and democracy appear in rhetoric towards the Middle East as well. This has been analysed as well.

The study has also dealt with Bush's (Sr.) *New World Order*, Clinton's 21st century aims and Bush's (Jr.) *Bush Doctrine*, and the *War on Terror*. Bush's administration has been observed to be more blatant and aggressive¹¹¹, which went on to not just invent an “axis of evil” (irrespective of the fact that its members, Iran, Iraq and North Korea, were not only not allies but in some cases, enemies of each other) and also developed the *pre-emptive strike* doctrine to counter it.¹¹² In sum, these were also analysed.

1.7 Objectives

In this thesis, analysis of American presidential rhetoric of three Post-Cold war presidents are examined; the manner in which these American presidents discuss and describe American position in their dealing with the Middle Eastern countries is the focus of the study. Selection of presidents is temporal; both Democratic and Republican party presidents are part of the study. The objective of the study is to examine American Foreign Policy presidential rhetoric during the Post-Cold war period, majorly during two decades, i.e., from 1989-2009.

¹⁰⁹Eland, Ivan, *The Empire Has No clothes: U.S. Foreign Policy Exposed* (Oakland: The Independent Institute, 2008), 5.

¹¹⁰See Ibid. 8.

¹¹¹See *ibid.* 17.

¹¹²Refer *ibid.* 16.

The three administrations that were studied were George H.W. Bush, William Clinton and George W. Bush.

1.8 Scheme of Chapters

The study is divided into two sections namely the theory and American presidential rhetoric in the Post-Cold war period. The first three chapters (One, Two and Three) deal with the introduction, social constructivism and ideology's role in foreign policy studies respectively. The next section deals with the American presidential rhetoric in the first two decades of the Post-Cold war period, namely during the presidencies of George H. W. Bush (Sr.), William Clinton and George W. Bush (Jr.). The presidential rhetoric has extensive overtones of ideological presuppositions. Their rhetoric is replete with ideological *predicates* and *subject positioning* that require three chapters (Chapters Four, Five and Six). Finally, the conclusion (Chapter Seven) ties the thesis together by analysing the rhetoric in detail while making a case that there is a need to study the impact of ideology on American presidential rhetoric as it considerably influences the kind of rhetoric, they employ in their foreign policy discourse and International Relations.

In Chapter One, an attempt is made to introduce the research work. It deals with laying down the background of the study and setting a context for the need of such a study. It also states the hypothesis, objectives, conceptual framework of the study. Also, the scheme of chapters finds a place in it.

Chapter Two establishes the theory: Social Constructivism: its origins, types, major arguments, forms, generations, impact and role of discourse and language in social constructivism. It has a separate section on *Discourse Practice Approach* which uses three concepts in analysis: *Presuppositions*, *predicates* and *Subject-Positioning*. The chapter begins

with tracing the development of Social Constructivism in IR, beginning with its origin and moving on to defining the context when it gained popularity. Major arguments of the theory come next: social construction of reality and world around us; linkages between identity formation and national interest; *intersubjectivity* and foreign policy practices. In a concise manner, I also attempt to mention various types, variants and generations of Social Constructivism. The relationship between identity, ideology, language and rhetoric in discourse studies within social constructivism was also analysed. Lastly, three concepts: *presupposition*, *predication* and *subject positioning* were studied to examine social constructivist analysis of US foreign policy from works of Roxanne L. Doty and Jennifer Milliken.

Chapter Three deals with ideology's role in identity-formation within a socially constructed foreign policy. The chapter begins with ideology's role in foreign policy and moves onto making sense of foreign policy and ideology independently. What they comprise and mean is thoroughly examined, including features, definitions, dimensions and impact. It then moves on to deal with ideology's role specifically in American foreign policy including the political traditions. American exceptionalism, as an ideology, is also analysed in the last part of Chapter Three.

Chapter Four involves analysing the presidential rhetoric of George Bush (Sr.) and Bill Clinton through the three concepts of presuppositions, predicates and subject-positioning in Libya, Iraq, Israel, Palestine, Iran and Afghan Taliban. Chapter Four begins with George Bush (Sr.) settling in as the American president after the Soviet Union imploded ending the Cold War. This left a void in AFP; these were turbulent times with multiple possibilities but no clear-cut direction. The fast-globalising world and no enemy/*other* to justify its defence spending or military bases across the world left the American foreign policy with little direction. They had produced military, political, economic, defence and intelligence energies in their defence

against the Soviet Union. The Middle-East (fertile with its regional conflicts, autocratic leaders, rogue terrorists, geopolitical location, repository of crude oil and petroleum, and location of an American ally, Israel) was one such region that provided an excellent opportunity for America to not just spread its influence in the region and handhold state leaders/kings, but also put to use those defence, military and intelligence energies on which America was still spending millions of dollars.¹¹³ Bush envisioned a strong leadership role for America under the New World Order after collapse of USSR. The next president, Bill Clinton, stressed that there is a need for America to remain a pacific power and promote enlargement of NATO to combat WMDs, terrorism and the urgent requirement to spread democracy and peace in the region of Middle East, especially after the end of the Cold War. The presidential ideological rhetoric towards Middle Eastern states have been examined in this chapter in detail.

Chapter Five examines the ideological presidential rhetoric of George W. Bush (Jr.). The conceptual ideological framework i.e., *presuppositions, predicates and subject-positioning* in his speeches are extensively analysed. This is done in an attempt to understand his rhetoric towards the region of Middle East. It also examines his perception of the American role in the region of Middle East after the end of Cold War. George Bush's (Jr.) ideological rhetoric, at first glance gave the impression that it had a more *offensive* outlook. This was in reaction to the attack on the Twin Towers by the terrorists on September 11, 2001. While the region of Middle East had been of concern to America prior to these attacks because of its geo-political strategic locations and other reasons listed above including oil, natural resources, Israel and

¹¹³Works of Noam Chomsky and Indian scholar, Mohd Moazzam Ali, deal with the reasons for shift in attention to the Middle East region which have been discussed later in the thesis. Ali, Mohd. Moazzam, "U.S. Post-Cold War Search for Enemies: Muslim World is a Wrong Choice," *Azad Academy Journal* (Lucknow) June 2002.

Vulcans,¹¹⁴ 9/11 gave America a strong impetus to focus on the region. Continual repetition that 9/11 changed everything, in his rhetoric made it a cliché yet a truism.¹¹⁵

Bush (Jr.) wanted to take an *offensive* stance, called for *pre-emptive war* and revived the term *ideology* in presidential rhetoric, as a response to these attacks. He believed that the Middle-Eastern terrorists, (in a classic case of subject-positioning), were the opposite of the American values of liberty and freedom. He saw the terrorist agents harboured in the Middle Eastern region as the *other* or the *enemy* that America needed to vanquish. In his rhetoric, it becomes apparent that his declaration of war on terrorists was an ideological war; while America stood for everything that was normal/moral/good/just/open/liberal/peaceful, the *enemy* found in the Middle East was deviant/evil/barbaric/hateful/destructive. Bush (Jr.)'s interest in the Taliban was ignited from the belief that the Taliban provided safe haven to the mastermind, Osama bin Laden, who was responsible for the 9/11 attacks. So as to convince the media, American public, international community and the world at large, American President Bush (Jr.) used ideologically driven rhetoric as has been examined in Chapter Five and Six.

¹¹⁴James Mann's work, *The Rise of the Vulcans* (2004) remains one of the most comprehensive works on president Bush's war cabinet. Argentino Mendoza Chan in a review of the book captures the argument of Mann that the Vulcans were the new school in Foreign Policy that aimed at re-legitimizing the American military might (and how to use it) when they launched and supported the pre-emptive strike. He goes on to argue that the Vulcans are the bridge between the Cold War and the Post-Cold War where America was able to put to test the aspirations of the Vulcans in both Iraq and Afghanistan. Interestingly the term, "Vulcans" was used to make an analogy to Roman God, Vulcan and like Bush's foreign policy team (comprising of Donald Rumsfeld, Richard Cheney, Richard Armitage, Paul Wolfowitz, and Condoleezza Rice) had power, resistance and durability. These Vulcans were formed by cohorts in academia, private capital and government. This work underscores not just the role of Bush's cabinet but also their re-directing of American Foreign Policy towards War and resuscitating an active American military presence in the world that was witnessing a decline in active wars after the implosion of USSR (USA's enemy during the Cold War). See Mann, James, *Rise of The Vulcans: The History of Bush's War Cabinet* (New York: Penguin Books, 2004) and Chan, Argentino Mendoza, review of *The Rise of the Vulcans: The History of Bush's War Cabinet by James Mann* in *Voices of Mexico* (2004): 68. (accessed on February 23, 2022). <http://www.revistascisan.unam.mx/Voices/pdfs/6828.pdf>

¹¹⁵Karl K Schonberg, *Constructing 21st Century U.S. Foreign Policy: Identity, Ideology and America's World Role in a New Era* (New York: Palgrave Macmillan, 2009), 1.

Chapter Five deals with the changes in American Presidential Rhetoric under George W. Bush including rise in American presidential rhetoric on pre-emptive strike; revival and recurrence of the term *ideology* in American presidential rhetoric; Bush's (Jr.) rhetoric about the 9/11 attacks; Bush's (Jr.) rhetoric during American response to 9/11; Bush's (Jr.) rhetoric on the measures taken Post 9/11; and the need for increasing role of NATO. It, lastly, analyses the ideological presuppositions, predicates and subject-positioning in George W Bush's (Jr.) Rhetoric on the Middle East including states of Libya, Iraq, Iran, Israel, Palestine and Afghanistan.

Chapter Six deals with Bush rhetoric on War on Terror, the two stages in War on Terror including the transformation/re-making of the Middle East. It concentrates on presuppositions, predicates, and subject-positioning involving Nationalism, Liberalism and Democracy in Bush's (Jr.) Rhetoric.

Chapter Seven comprises the conclusion. It focuses on role of language in foreign policy discourse and practices that is integral to this study. It also summarises Milliken and Doty's work before moving on to trace both continuities and change in American presidential rhetoric in the Post-Cold war era under the three presidents, namely, George Bush (Sr.), Clinton and George Bush (Jr.).

Conclusion

In conclusion, this chapter argues for the need to study American presidential rhetoric in International Relations as it has the potential to shed light on foreign policy. It argues that the role of language is crucial and understanding American identity involves studying American ideologies as well. For understanding the impact of discursive foreign policy practices on American foreign policy, there is a rising need to study American presidential

rhetoric closely. How it can be done within social constructivist framework, along with objectives, methodology and background of the present study was also attempted in this chapter.

CHAPTER TWO

Social Construction of Foreign Policy

“Deeds done, acts taken, words spoken.”

Nicholas Onuf (1989:35)¹¹⁶

“Linguistic practices actively construct world(s).”

Roxanne Lynn Doty (1993: 297)¹¹⁷

Introduction

2.1 International Relations Theory and Social Constructivism

International Relations (IR) is a “heterogeneous collection of mini-disciplines” which is regarded as a ‘single academic discipline,’ argue Stephen Chan and Cerwyn Moore in the editor’s introduction.¹¹⁸ IR came into existence in 1918 (hardly a century old) making it one of the youngest disciplines. It remains primarily a theoretical discipline.¹¹⁹ Apart from the theoretical foundation of IR, there is also a lack of consensus on an agreed centre/nucleus in IR, which leads to ‘confusion’ and a “degree of intellectual insecurity.”¹²⁰ The mainstream theories, Realism (focuses on state power/national interest); Idealism (study of plural international system and institutions); Structuralism (impact of economic structure on politics);

¹¹⁶Onuf, Nicholas, *A World of Our Making: Rules and Rule in Social Theory and International Relations* (Columbia: University of South Carolina Press, 1989), 35.

¹¹⁷Doty, Roxanne Lynn, “Foreign Policy as Social Construction: A Post-Positivist Analysis of U.S. Counterinsurgency Policy in the Philippines,” *International Studies Quarterly* 37 no. 3 (1993): 297.

¹¹⁸Chan, Stephen and Cerwyn Moore, “Theory and Development of International relations as an Academic Discipline,” in *Theories of International relations*, ed. Stephen Chan and Cerwyn Moore, Vol I. (London: Sage, 2006), xix.

¹¹⁹See *ibid.* xxxii.

¹²⁰Hoffman, Mark, “Critical Theory and the Inter-Paradigm Debate,” in *Approaches to International Relations*, ed. Stephen Chan and Cerwyn Moore, Vol III. (London: Sage, 2009): 29.

and Critical Theory (which tries to capture reflexivity in international system) have dominated the field of study. Except Critical Theory, the others aim to identify a problem in IR and offer solutions to overcome them. The late 1980's saw a rise in what came to be known as Reflexive Theories/Interpretive Theories/Critical Theories. The Critical theorists argue, that there is an undeniable link between knowledge and interests.¹²¹ These theories have additionally been described as an “antidote to post-World War II realism.”¹²²

Robert Cox distinguishes between problem-solving and critical theories, where the former aims at solving problems within the theory while the latter reflects on the process of theorising in order to create an alternative world order.¹²³ Social constructivism falls in-between the former and latter category; it has been described as an in-between theory by some critics. It is that theory which attempts to bridge the gap between rational and reflexive theories.¹²⁴ Others have described it as a *middle ground* theory between rationalism and radical/reflectivist/relativist/interpretive approaches.¹²⁵ Jeffrey Checkel perceives ‘constructivism’ as the ‘middle ground’ between ‘rational choice theory’ and ‘postmodernism’; Ted Hopf locates it between ‘mainstream’ and ‘critical theory’; Emanuel Adler between ‘rationalist approaches’ and ‘interpretive approaches.’¹²⁶ It is Steve Smith who sees it as a bridge between rationalist and reflectivist theories. Constructivism appears keen on holding

¹²¹Hoffman, Mark, “Critical Theory and the Inter-Paradigm Debate,” in *Approaches to International Relations*, ed. Stephen Chan and Cerwyn Moore, Vol III. (London: Sage, 2009): 30.

¹²²See *ibid.* xxxi.

¹²³Hoffman, Mark, “Critical Theory and the Inter-Paradigm Debate,” in *Approaches to International Relations*, ed. Stephen Chan and Cerwyn Moore, Vol III. (London: Sage, 2009): 36.

¹²⁴Chan, Stephen and Cerwyn Moore, “Theory and Development of International relations as an Academic Discipline,” in *Theories of International relations*, ed. Stephen Chan and Cerwyn Moore, Vol I. (London: Sage, 2006), xxxii.

¹²⁵Zehfuss, Maja, *Constructivism in International Relations: The Politics of Reality* (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2002); Baylis, John, Steve Smith, and Patricia Owens, (eds.) *The Globalization of World Politics* (London: Oxford University Press, 2008).

¹²⁶Adler, E. “Seizing the Middle Ground: Constructivism in World Politics,” *European Journal of International Relations* 3, no. 3 (1997): 319–363. <https://doi.org/10.1177/1354066197003003003>

conversations with the other side. In fact, the first generation of constructivists like Alexander Wendt and Jeffrey Checkel attempted to synthesise constructivism and rationalism.¹²⁷ Stefano Guzzini credits this middle ground stance of constructivism as partly the reason for its success. He points out, that it has now come to be recognized as the ‘officially accredited contender’ to the ‘core of the discipline.’¹²⁸

Sheldon Wolin argued that IR need not discard its sub-fields or reformulate or restructure itself but to change not just ‘the way we look at the world’ but to ‘alter the world’ itself; it should not be a mere account of current affairs but offer ‘a critical analysis of quality and direction of life.’¹²⁹ My study is a humble attempt to offer an alternative way to access and analyse the chosen-context of American foreign policy in the Post-Cold war period. This is inherent also with the hope that it will lead to a better understanding of the domination of certain world orders rooted in hegemonic structures that are ensured through linguistic/rhetorical devices. This in turn would have the potential to offer an alternative normative basis of world order which is more just and equitable.

Robert Cox has a famous formulation that theory is ‘always for someone’ and ‘for something;’ it ‘serves some purpose’ and does not exist in ‘a vacuum.’¹³⁰ This posits the question: who does Social Constructivism belong to and for what purpose? It appears as though it attracts those scholars that recognize that there cannot be one version of reality that holds true. There also cannot be an understating of the world/history/knowledge/politics/reality based

¹²⁷Zehfuss, Maja, *Constructivism in International Relations: The Politics of Reality* (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2002), 5.

¹²⁸Zehfuss, Maja, *Constructivism in International Relations: The Politics of Reality* (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2002), 251-253.

¹²⁹Hoffman, Mark, “Critical Theory and the Inter-Paradigm Debate,” in *Approaches to International Relations*, ed. Stephen Chan and Cerwyn Moore, Vol III. (London: Sage, 2009): 44.

¹³⁰Cox, Robert W, “Social Forces, States and World Orders: Beyond International Relations Theory,” *Millennium* 10, no. 2 (June 1981): 126–55. <https://doi.org/10.1177/03058298810100020501>.

solely on material factors; there is an intertwining of the discursive with the material. While language/spoken word/texts remain integral as discursive factors; military, economic, financial, strategic, diplomatic agents among others are central to material factors. Social constructivists recognise the importance of both social and material worlds. Jeffrey Checkel argues, that the international ‘environment’ in which actors ‘take action’ are both ‘social’ and ‘material.’ The importance of material and normative structures are also emphasised by Christian Reus-Smit and Richard Price. In spite of the acknowledgment that discursive practices are integral to any understanding of IR, social constructivists much to the indignation of the critical theorists emphasise that states are the central actors in IR; their interests and identities do in fact shape International Relations.

The term, *Social Constructivism*, was introduced by Nichols Onuf in International Relations¹³¹ at the end of the Cold War. It then entered, even if partly, into the mainstream IR in the 1990’s.¹³² It gained popularity after Alexander Wendt, Friedrich Kratochwil, John Ruggie et al., began using it in their works. Social constructivism began being seen as a chief theoretical contender in IR scholarship which emphasises that moral norms and ethics matter in world politics.¹³³ It offers a ‘heterogamous research approach’ which ‘combines’ various ‘fields’ and ‘disciplines.’ It has itself been a ‘product’ of various disciplines including structural linguistics, postmodern political theory, critical theory, cultural and media studies, literary criticism among others. It tends to collaborate with approaches within and beyond political

¹³¹Several scholars identify Onuf as the first scholar to use the term Social Constructivism including Maja Zehfuss in her book, Zehfuss, Maja, *Constructivism in International Relations: The Politics of Reality* (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2002), 10.

¹³²Chan, Stephen and Cerwyn Moore (eds.) “Editor’s Introduction,” in *Approaches to International Relations*, ed. Stephen Chan and Cerwyn Moore Vol. I (London: Sage, 2009), xxx.

¹³³Price, Richard, “The Ethics of Constructivism,” in Christian Reus-Smit, and Duncan Snidal (eds), *The Oxford Handbook of International Relations* (2008; online edn, Oxford Academic, 2 Sept. 2009), <https://doi.org/10.1093/oxfordhb/9780199219322.003.0018>

science borrowing from those literatures that deal with political culture, socialisation, decision-making, experimental cognitive and social psychology.¹³⁴

Nicholas Onuf argues, the awkwardness of the term, *constitutivism* has pushed him towards using *constructivism* though they are synonymous for him. In simple terms, constructivism means that people and societies construct or constitute each other. They are both products of each other's construction. Human beings construct society and vice versa by using raw materials of both inner and outer nature of their material circumstances. He places a lot of emphasis on Ludwig Wittgenstein's influence on social constructivist understanding of reality. Wittgenstein's famous exposition that language is a vehicle for representing reality and our world is represented by us through our use of language seemingly is a lasting influence on social constructivism. Rules of language, he argues, govern people's social purposes. Hence, all rules in a socially constructed reality are related to practice.¹³⁵

Constructivism has been described by Emanuel Adler as a normative and epistemic interpretation of the material world, shaped by human action/interaction which in turn is shaped by the material world.¹³⁶ It is the sociological perspective on world politics that emphasises the importance of both 'material' and 'normative' structures; 'role of identity' in construction of 'interests and action'; 'mutual constitution' of 'agents' and 'structures.' It attempts to engage the 'mainstream' theories on issues of 'interpretation' and 'evidence'; 'generalisations,' 'alternative explanations,' 'variation' and 'comparability' in spite of linkages with critical theories that do not subscribe to these. It has the promise of contributing critical social insights

¹³⁴Hopf, Ted, "The Promise of Social Constructivism in International Relations Theory," *International Security*, 23, no.1 (1998): 188.

¹³⁵Onuf, Nicholas, *A World of Our Making: Rules and Rule in Social Theory and International Relations* (Columbia: University of South Carolina Press, 1989), 36-65.

¹³⁶Zehfuss, Maja, *Constructivism in International Relations: The Politics of Reality* (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2002), 7.

about the moral constitution of world politics according to Richard Price and Christian Reus-Smit.¹³⁷ It focuses on how the world/knowledge/history/global politics/is constructed by discourse.¹³⁸

Contextualization of constructivism is seen as being inspired by ‘reflexive modernity’ and ‘the end of the Cold War.’¹³⁹ Price and Smit offer three factors for the constructivist turn in IRT: firstly, the demand for ‘testable theories’ by neoliberals and neorealists when they were being criticised by critical theorists without offering alternative theories; secondly, the Cold war’s end; and thirdly, change in generation, wherein young scholars worked on ‘new formulations’/ ‘new conceptual frameworks’ and ‘theoretical perspectives.’¹⁴⁰

Constructivism explores three ‘core ontological propositions’ about ‘social life’ and ‘impact on aspects of world politics’: first, the significance of both ‘normative’ or ‘ideational’ structures and ‘material’ structures; second, that ‘identities constitute interests’ and ‘action’ and third, that ‘agents and structures’ are ‘mutually’ constituted. Meaning defines “how actors interpret their material environment.” Anthony Giddens states that social structures are ‘routinised’ physical and discursive practices that continue above broadened spatial and temporal horizons. Wendt argues, that structures of shared knowledge, in which material resources are embedded, give meaning to human action.¹⁴¹

¹³⁷Reus-Smit, Christian and Richard Price, “Dangerous Liaisons? Critical International Theory and Constructivism,” *European Journal of International Relations* 4, no., 3 (1998): 259-94.

¹³⁸Chan, Stephen and Cerwyn Moore (eds.) “Editor’s Introduction,” in *Approaches to International Relations*, ed. Stephen Chan and Cerwyn Moore Vol. I (London: Sage, 2009), xxxii.

¹³⁹Guzzini, Stefano. A Reconstruction of Constructivism in International Relations. *European Journal of International Relations* 6, no. 2 (2000): 147–182. <https://doi.org/10.1177/1354066100006002001>

¹⁴⁰Reus-Smit, Christian and Richard Price, “Dangerous Liaisons? Critical International Theory and Constructivism,” *European Journal of International Relations*. 4 no., 3 (1998): 263-265.

¹⁴¹Reus-Smit, Christian and Richard Price, “Dangerous Liaisons? Critical International Theory and Constructivism,” *European Journal of International Relations*. 4 no., 3 (1998): 265-266.

Social constructivism has received mixed reactions from scholars within IR: ranging from celebrated, dismissed, and even considered dangerous.¹⁴² Yet, it has been argued that as long as there is engagement with and about the theory, it remains significant in International Relations Theory (IRT). To quote Maja Zehfuss, “Constructivism as a phenomenon has become inescapable.”¹⁴³ It has become so popular that she notes that journals aimed at audiences outside academia refer to constructivism as one of the three standard ways to analyse international politics. She argues that its use by several scholars is not what makes it popular but rather how ‘different scholars’ and ‘not the same ones’ are debating it.¹⁴⁴

2.2 Post-Cold War Period and Social Constructivism

Social Constructivism claims that when the three dominant schools of thought in International Relations - Realism, Liberalism, and Marxism - were unable to explain the social situation that led to the end of the Cold War, its genesis came to occupy the vacuum in International Relations Theory.¹⁴⁵ The inadequacies of the grand/mainstream theories in International Relations (Realism, liberalism and Marxism including their offshoots, neo-realism, neo-liberalism and neo-Marxism) became evident as newer developments couldn’t find explanations and elucidations through these theories. In this background, the 1970s and 1980s saw a great debate between neorealism and neoliberalism which was called the Third Great Debate.¹⁴⁶ The product of such debates led to the inception of constructivism that challenged the traditional approaches to International Relations. Constructivist theory, it has

¹⁴²Zehfuss, Maja, *Constructivism in International Relations: The Politics of Reality* (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2002), 1.

¹⁴³See *ibid.* 2.

¹⁴⁴See *ibid.* 251.

¹⁴⁵ Barnett, Michael, “Social Constructivism,” in Baylis, John, Steve Smith, and Patricia Owens, (eds.) *The Globalization of World Politics* (London: Oxford University Press, 2008).

¹⁴⁶Bezerra, Valdir da Silva, “Constructivism Revisited: An Evaluation of Russian Foreign Policy and Moscow-Washington Relations,” *Revista Conjuntura Global* 8, no. 1 (2019): 16.

been argued, emerged onto the scene of international relations with the changing foreign policy of the USSR under President Gorbachev. It has been observed that it developed in the 1990s especially with the insightful works of Alexander Wendt, Nicholas Onuf, Friedrich Kratochwil to name a few.

It is the lack of trust and festering of insecurities between the USA and USSR that led to the Cold War in the post-Second World War period; the year 1989 saw the end of this decades long rivalry which took the world by surprise. Alexander Wendt argues, that the Cold War ended when both these states stopped viewing the other as an enemy. Once Gorbachev's foreign policy transformed in the late 1980's, it affected the identity of the Soviet Union. Wendt points out, (as Bezerra elucidates) that change in identity perception or redefinition takes place when a state has a reason to reconsider itself in new ways arising from economic, social or political changes (either international or domestic) that were rendering the old identity redundant or obsolete.¹⁴⁷ For Wendt international politics is not given; it is made as both 'identities' and 'interests' are 'constructed' and 'supported' by 'intersubjective practice'. The notion of *self* and environment is shaped and also shapes interactions. Independent of what we think about social reality, it is *out there* and Wendt attempts to explain it. But his perception of the world is something that is closer to Realist perception, observes Maja Zehfuss. With Kratochwil and Onuf, Zehfuss notes that there is a stark departure. It is they who 'challenge' the idea that 'international world is anarchic' and address the impact of language on construction of the social/international world¹⁴⁸

¹⁴⁷See *ibid.* 21.

¹⁴⁸Zehfuss, Maja, *Constructivism in International Relations: The Politics of Reality* (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2002), 12 and 246.

Social Constructivism argues, that both interests and identities of states are socially formed and influenced by the development in interactions between various states. It opposes the view that things are pre-determined/given; rather, it argues that national interests influence international positions of states and their relations with other states are socially determined based on interactions, persuasions and communication. As Bezerra puts it, while elucidating on Adler's point, agents socially construct international structures depending on the social coexistence between agents/states.¹⁴⁹ Before we dwell deeper into how constructivism views rhetoric and role of language in making of our material and social, it is pertinent we look closely at the major arguments of social constructivism.

2.3 Major Arguments of Social Constructivism

2.3.1 Social Construction of Reality/World

The construction of social reality has been of interest to sociologists of knowledge. Peter L. Berger and Thomas Luckmann argue, that "reality is socially constructed and that the sociology of knowledge must analyse the process in which this occurs."¹⁵⁰ They argue, that the sociology of knowledge will invariably be interested in the evaluation of reality that is socially constructed "concerned with the analysis of the social construction of reality."¹⁵¹ Adler also argues, that "the material world shapes human interaction and vice-versa."¹⁵²

¹⁴⁹Bezerra, Valdir da Silva, "Constructivism Revisited: An Evaluation of Russian Foreign Policy and Moscow-Washington Relations," *Revista Conjuntura Global* 8, no. 1 (2019): 17.

¹⁵⁰Berger, Peter L. and Thomas Luckmann, *The Social Construction of Reality: A Treatise in the Sociology of Knowledge* (London: Penguin Books, 1991), 13.

¹⁵¹Berger, Peter L. and Thomas Luckmann, *The Social Construction of Reality: A Treatise in the Sociology of Knowledge* (London: Penguin Books, 1991), 15.

¹⁵²Zehfuss, Maja, *Constructivism in International Relations: The Politics of Reality* (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2002), 251.

With a focus on a socially constructed world, constructivists argue, as Sarina Theys points out, that meanings are not fixed and that with the changing ideas and beliefs in world politics, there is a change in the relations these people (and their nations) will then hold with other people (and other nations).¹⁵³ Reality is always under construction and this can be used to influence and accommodate the changing ideas and norms of the world. For constructivists, “interpreting meaning and grasping the influence of changing practice” becomes more important.¹⁵⁴ Sarina Theys quotes the famous argument of Alexander Wendt to elaborate her point: North Korea having five nuclear weapons is perceived as more threatening to the US than the fifty nuclear weapons that the UK can possess.¹⁵⁵ This is due to the unique relationship that the US has built with the two nations; it is largely dependent on the history, norms, beliefs, and cultures that they share. These actors have the agency to change their relations: the social relationship can be changed from enmity to friendship by changing the beliefs and ideas held by both the states.¹⁵⁶

2.3.2 Interests are linked to Identities

How identities are understood by Social Constructivists is vastly different from how mainstream theories understand state identity. Identity reduces uncertainties and subsumes reputations – “States understand different states differently.” How the US understands the Middle East is vastly different from how it perceives Europe. Cooperation/ conflict is dependent on how states view their own and others identities and interests.¹⁵⁷ Reputations,

¹⁵³Theys, Sarina, “Introducing Constructivism in International Relations Theory,” *E-International Relations* (Feb. 23, 2018) accessed on: 3.9.2022, [Introducing Constructivism in International Relations Theory \(e-ir.info\)](https://e-ir.info/).

¹⁵⁴Zehfuss, Maja, *Constructivism in International Relations: The Politics of Reality* (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2002), 5.

¹⁵⁵Theys, Sarina, “Introducing Constructivism in International Relations Theory,” *E-International Relations* (Feb. 23, 2018) accessed on: 3.9.2022, [Introducing Constructivism in International Relations Theory \(e-ir.info\)](https://e-ir.info/).

¹⁵⁶See *ibid*.

¹⁵⁷Hopf, Ted, “The Promise of Social Constructivism in International Relations Theory,” *International Security* 23, no.1 (1998): 184-185.

integral to identity, outline any state's probable action towards other states. Not only do states understand each other differently, they also behave differently with each other based on their identity. Different 'patterns' of behaviour exist among groups of countries which have different 'identities' and 'interests.' Claims like similarity breeds cooperation (one of the popular ones being democracies do not go to war) are impossible to assert as no two states share similar 'nature,' 'motives,' 'interests,' 'attitudes,' 'action,' and 'role in political context'; identities offer more meaning than a mere label concludes Hopf.¹⁵⁸

Social Constructivism aims to 'uncover' characteristics of 'domestic society,' 'culture' and 'politics' that matter in 'state identity formation' and 'state action in global politics.' In order to do so they focus on social practices which constitute identity domestically and facilitate 'identity,' 'interests' and 'actions' internationally. It attempts to show how a state constructing its national identity is a prerequisite domestically in order to legitimise its identity abroad. Critical accounts may even set out by theorising on a state's requirement of the *Other* in global politics so as to 'justify' its rule domestically.¹⁵⁹

2.3.3 Not One Identity but Multiple

States need not necessarily perceive the other as a state but an 'ally,' 'friend,' 'enemy,' 'threat,' 'democracy,' or even a 'co-guarantor.' Social Constructivism attaches multiple identities to states/actors in global politics as opposed to single identity that mainstream theories offer. The social constructivist theorists base their claim for multiple identities on 'openness to local historical context'; empirically identities are 'generated' and 'reproduced' within a context. Multiple identities imply multiple interests and while power is both 'material' and 'discursive,' 'patterned behaviour' is perceived as the result of material and economic

¹⁵⁸See *ibid.* 187.

¹⁵⁹See *ibid.* 187-188.

power functioning with social practices, norms that are institutionalised, ideological structures and also ‘intersubjective webs of meaning’ spanning over a period of time.¹⁶⁰ These theorists also move beyond the typical binary characterization prevalent among mainstream theories of IR-democratic-non-democratic, North-South, West/non-West etc. by hypothesising differences among states. With such analysis Social Constructivism has the potential to give explanation on various “meaningful communities of identity throughout world politics.”¹⁶¹

Identities and interests of states have considerable influence on how they behave on the international scene: that is, small states are focused on their survival while larger states are focused on dominating in spheres of politics, economics and military so as to enhance their power. These identities of states are also constructed through shared history with other states; that is to say, through interaction with other actors, states can alter their foreign policies and international relations depending on their relationship with other states. Histories also influence the shaping of the interests and identities of states: for example, because of Germany’s Nazi history and the cruelties committed by Adolf Hitler, Germany’s political stance in the second half of the twentieth century has been that of pacifism rather than militarism despite its being a large and politically powerful state.¹⁶²

Identities of states are also dependent on the social norms that they exhibit; they have to behave in the manner appropriate to the identity that they have committed to follow. This is called the ‘logic of appropriateness’ where the states are expected to behave in a manner that has gained acceptance and popularity among other actors on the international scene. Some norms convert into expected behaviour that all political actors have to exhibit: for example,

¹⁶⁰See *ibid.* 191.

¹⁶¹See *ibid.* 187.

¹⁶²Theys, Sarina, “Introducing Constructivism in International Relations Theory,” *E-International Relations* (Feb. 23, 2018) accessed on: 3.9.2022, [Introducing Constructivism in International Relations Theory \(e-ir.info\)](https://e-ir.info/)

being supportive of climate change policies.¹⁶³ Another illustration could be support for human rights both internationally and domestically.

Social Constructivism proposes that there is a politics of identity on the international scene that often gets sidelined/ignored. It advances ways in which ‘nationalism,’ ‘ethnicity,’ ‘race,’ ‘gender,’ ‘religion’ and ‘sexuality’ are engaged in understanding international politics; these identities, their construction, ‘norms’ and ‘practices’ that go together with their ‘reproduction’ and ‘construction’. Identities, they reason, inform practices of states and also actions at home and abroad.¹⁶⁴ Critical constructivists attempt to offer explanations of ‘politics of identity’ around ‘dimensions of hierarchy,’ ‘subordination,’ ‘domination,’ ‘emancipation’ and ‘state-society struggle.’¹⁶⁵ They also lean towards balance of threat being a susceptible alternative to mainstream IR theories. Threat perception is crucial in social constructivists’ understating of identity.¹⁶⁶ Even threats, they perceive, are not a priori/given/primordial constant; they are socially constructed as the *Other* and theorised on.¹⁶⁷

Sarina Theys remarks that the distribution of wealth, geographical location and material power are not the only influencing factors in the shaping of international relations. But rather, the actions, communications and assessments of actors also shape reality. As reality is not fixed and can be changed, constructivists argue then, that actions and thoughts can change and construct the social reality of International Relations.¹⁶⁸

¹⁶³Theys, Sarina, “Introducing Constructivism in International Relations Theory,” *E-International Relations* (Feb. 23, 2018) accessed on: 3.9.2022, [Introducing Constructivism in International Relations Theory \(e-ir.info\)](https://www.e-ir.info/).

¹⁶⁴Hopf, Ted, “The Promise of Social Constructivism in International Relations Theory,” *International Security* 23, no.1 (1998): 186.

¹⁶⁵See *ibid.* 189.

¹⁶⁶See *ibid.* 180.

¹⁶⁷See *ibid.* 191.

¹⁶⁸Theys, Sarina, “Introducing Constructivism in International Relations Theory,” *E-International Relations* (Feb. 23, 2018) accessed on: 3.9.2022, [Introducing Constructivism in International Relations Theory \(e-ir.info\)](https://www.e-ir.info/).

Kessler Oliver and Brent Steele argue, that concepts like norms, discourses, speech acts, intersubjectivity etc. have come into focus in International Relations with the coming in of social constructivism. They argue that the ‘role of language,’ ‘meaning,’ ‘social facts’ and the ‘differences’ between ‘social’ and ‘natural’ have come into the spotlight with social constructivism. They also contend that it is with social constructivism that the link between International Relations and social theory has been established.¹⁶⁹

2.3.4 Intersubjectivity and Foreign Policy Practices

Social practice reproduces intersubjective meanings that constitute social structures and actors.¹⁷⁰ Richard Ashley, notes Hopf, offers a significant understanding on foreign policy practices: it “depends on the existence of intersubjective precedents and shared symbolic materials which impose interpretations upon events, silence alternative interpretations, structures practices (for instance imposing sanctions) and orchestrate collective making of history.”¹⁷¹ When we read presidential rhetoric as part of foreign policy practice, there is a subtle yet distinct practice of weaving a certain interpretation while silencing alternative interpretation about events in International Relations. For example, the insistence on presenting lack of democracy as the major cause of problems in the Middle East region while brushing foreign interferences under the carpet remains paramount. Another repeated illustration could be the presentation of tragic events of 9/11 as a war on humanity/democracy/liberalism/civilization etc., while simultaneously silencing or ignoring America actions/interventions/sanctions/ or even support of dictators/autocrats in the Middle East region. Such repeated narrow/one sided presidential rhetoric has also impacted/coloured

¹⁶⁹Kessler, Oliver and Brent Steele. “Introduction: Constructing IR: The Third Generation,” *European Review of International Studies* 3, no.3 (special issue, 2016): 7-8.

¹⁷⁰Hopf, Ted, “The Promise of Social Constructivism in International Relations Theory,” *International Security* 23, no.1 (1998): 175.

¹⁷¹See *ibid.* 176.

and orchestrated collective history making of the period. Hence, when Hopf concludes that states which have resources to use discursive power along with material – economic and military power, together help sustain institutions which reproduce formalised social practices, he is cognizant of the role of material and discursive resources/power in understating the complete picture/story as he terms it.¹⁷²

Unlike how Realists understand power, Constructivism understands power as ‘power to reproduce,’ ‘discipline’ and ‘police.’¹⁷³ Constructivism, R.B.J Walker observes, “surfaces diversity, difference and offers potential alternatives to current prevailing structures.”¹⁷⁴ Constructivism conceives as a “continual contest for control over power” that produces “meaning in a social group.”¹⁷⁵ Hence, for the purpose of this study following salient features of social constructivism are significant; assumption that the ‘process’ of identity ‘construction’ generates ‘state interests’, ‘power’ is ‘material’ and ‘discursive’, power of practice (especially foreign policy practice) are dependent on material and discourse, ‘actors’ and ‘structures mutually constitute’ one another.

2.4 Forms, Types, and Generations of Social Constructivism

2.4.1 Forms of Social Constructivism

After perusal of multiple works on social constructivism, it becomes seemingly clear that attempts are being made by scholars across academia to divide substantial works on social

¹⁷²Hopf, Ted, “The Promise of Social Constructivism in International Relations Theory,” *International Security* 23, no.1 (1998): 176.

¹⁷³See *ibid.* 176.

¹⁷⁴See *ibid.* 177.

¹⁷⁵See *ibid.* 177.

constructivism/their focus/their major scholarship/their forms into groups for clarity. This will be the focus of the following section, beginning with forms of social constructivism.

Though Richard Price and Reus-Smit identify two principal forms of modernist constructivism, systemic and holistic,¹⁷⁶ Maysam Behravesch points out, that foreign policy analysis (FPA) under constructivism has three forms: systemic, unit-level and holistic. *Systemic constructivists* are focused on state actors and what happens between them. They are not very focused on what is happening within these state actors i.e., their domestic policies influence their foreign policy and have an effect on the identities and interests of these state actors. Alexander Wendt is an influential writer of this form. In *unit-level* constructivism, focus is paid to domestic situations that largely influence state actors' national security approaches towards other state actors. This is influenced by writers like Peter Katzenstein.

The third form is *holistic* constructivism that accommodates both systemic and unit-level forms; it strives to understand the domestic interests and identities alongside understanding international state identities that these state actors attempt at creating. The state identities and their social identities on the international scene are both taken into account in this form. This is influenced by writings of John G. Ruggie and Friedrich Kratochwill.¹⁷⁷ For these scholars there is a single global social order which has two faces namely, the domestic and the international processes and structures. They focus on the state's and global social order's mutually constitutive relationship.¹⁷⁸

¹⁷⁶Reus-Smit, Christian and Richard Price, "Dangerous Liaisons? Critical International Theory and Constructivism," *European Journal of International Relations*. 4 no., 3 (1998): 267.

¹⁷⁷Behravesch, Maysam, "The Relevance of Constructivism to Foreign Policy Analysis" *E-International Relations* (July 17, 2011) accessed: 3.9.2022, [The Relevance of Constructivism to Foreign Policy Analysis \(e-ir.info\)](http://e-ir.info).

¹⁷⁸Reus-Smit, Christian and Richard Price, "Dangerous Liaisons? Critical International Theory and Constructivism," *European Journal of International Relations*. 4 no., 3 (1998): 267.

Behravesch further points out, that unit-level actors like the multinational corporations and non-governmental organisations have an influence on states and they exert pressure on them to adhere to the social norms of their domestic locations; they act as the moral force so that the social environment of the state is maintained on the international scene. Alongside this, he highlights that while conventional constructivists lean towards viewing language as a means of persuading states on a course that is akin to their domestic social norms, interpretative constructivists view language in terms of structured meaning and discourses that pave the way for particular foreign social actions by state actors.¹⁷⁹

2.4.2 Types of Social Constructivism

On similar lines, Sarina Theys argues, that there are two types of constructivists: ‘conventional constructivists’ and ‘critical constructivists.’ While conventional constructivists ‘ask’ the ‘*what questions*’ and explore the causal relations of social norms and state behaviour, critical constructivists focus on the language aspect of things and ask the ‘*how*’ *question*. They focus on reconstructing the identity of an actor so that they can figure out how language is used to construct social realities in a certain manner that has the ability to change social realities.¹⁸⁰

My work falls within the latter type of analysis, it uses critical constructivism’s assertions that identity of state is reconstructed through use of language (presidential rhetoric of American Presidents to be specific) which impacts construction and change of social reality.

2.4.2.1 Commonalities in the Two Variants of Social Constructivism

¹⁷⁹Behravesch, Maysam, “The Relevance of Constructivism to Foreign Policy Analysis” *E-International Relations* (July 17, 2011) accessed: 3.9.2022, [The Relevance of Constructivism to Foreign Policy Analysis \(e-ir.info\)](#).

¹⁸⁰Theys, Sarina, “Introducing Constructivism in International Relations Theory,” *E-International Relations* (Feb. 23, 2018) accessed on: 3.9.2022, [Introducing Constructivism in International Relations Theory \(e-ir.info\)](#)

Both conventional and critical constructivists in Yosef Lapid's characterization are in the same group; both are 'emergent,' 'constructed,' 'contested,' 'interactive,' 'process-like' unlike, fixed, natural, stable and unitary mainstream IR theories. Both aim to denaturalize the social world, discover/reveal institutions, practices, identities as products of human agency and of social construction. Data should be contextualised, situated and related within a social environment that gives it its meaning, power of practice and nexus between power and knowledge and reflexivity of *self* and society.¹⁸¹

2.4.2.2 Differences between the Two Variants of Social Constructivism

On the question of identity, conventional and critical constructivists disagree; while the former wishes to "discover identities, their reproductive social practices and how identities imply certain actions," the latter attempts to elaborate on how people are convinced of a single version of naturalised truth. They aim to "explode myths associated with identity formations." They also perceive some type of alienation that drives the need for identity. For Conventional constructivists, there is a necessity/need for difference/other that help construct/produce self-identity through practice (akin to ideas of Hegel, Tzvetan Todorov and Ashis Nandy). Critical constructivists, on the other hand, move beyond (influences by Nietzsche, Freud and Lacan) implying assimilation or oppression depending on perception of *self* or *other* as either equal or inferior. Power becomes crucial in critical constructivists analysis; unmasking these power relations in social exchanges drives their research.¹⁸²

Conventional constructivists reject homogenous universally valid generalisations about global politics that mainstream IRTs offer. They also are not in favour of critical

¹⁸¹Hopf, Ted, "The Promise of Social Constructivism in International Relations Theory," *International Security* 23, no.1 (1998): 178.

¹⁸²See *ibid.* 179-180.

constructivists' heterogeneous accounts of global politics that only study unique and differentiating patterns. They look for "communities of intersubjectivity in world politics" where "actors share" understanding of "themselves and others, yielding predictable and replicable patterns of action within a specific context."¹⁸³ It can be concluded that Social Constructivism, irrespective of the variant, aims at restoring 'a kind of partial order' and 'predictability to world politics' that "derives not from imposed homogeneity but appreciation of differences."

2.4.3 Three Generations of Social Constructivists

Oliver Kessler and Brent Steele argue, that there are three generations of social constructivists. The *first generation* has Onuf, Kratochwill, Duvall, Ruggie, Yosef Lapid etc. They were writing while the Cold War was still going on. They tried to move beyond the promise of rationalism and Enlightenment principles.¹⁸⁴

The *second generation* were focused on the notions of social norm and identity. By the time these writers were producing their work, the end of Cold War had already taken place, providing them with an opportunity to explore the events of the fall of the Berlin Wall and the collapse of the Soviet Union. Major writers of this generation include Michael Barnett, Jutta Weldes, Martha Finnemore, Audie Klotz, Ted Hopf, and Emanuel Adler.¹⁸⁵

The *third generation* of social constructivists emerged out of a generation that did not see the Cold War or the collapse of the Soviet Union; since the international scene of their times was vastly different from the preceding generations, their focus was drawn towards

¹⁸³Hopf, Ted, "The Promise of Social Constructivism in International Relations Theory," *International Security* 23, no.1 (1998): 191.

¹⁸⁴Kessler, Oliver and Brent Steele. "Introduction: Constructing IR: The Third Generation," *European Review of International Studies* 3, no.3 (special issue, 2016): 10.

¹⁸⁵See *ibid.* 10.

philosophical and theoretical problems. They provided a fresh perspective of the international politics they witnessed; they were engrossed with ‘meta-theory’ (a theory where the emphasis is on theory itself). Through Torsten Michel’s reading of meta-theory and IR, Oliver and Steele reproduce his ideas: “Meta-theory has so far failed to reflect on and recognise the central importance of the deep and intricate relation between the content of meta-theory and the forms in which it is practised.” They also state that Michel’s focus is on the ‘rhetoric of inquiry’ in meta-theory whereby it can be viewed from an “argumentative-persuasive” lens “whose content is deeply interwoven with forms of presentation on the one hand and normative commitments on the other.”¹⁸⁶

2.5 Social Constructivism: Discourse, Language and Rhetoric

An active and interesting area of study in IR, discourse studies have come to occupy the interests of post-modernists, post-structuralists, feminists and social constructivists. This has led to mixing and crossing-over among them and their analyses on discourse.¹⁸⁷ Common theoretical commitment of all discourse studies remains how textual and social processes connect and describe in specific contexts how we think and act in the contemporary world. They also focus on knowledge/power nexus. They aim to critically reevaluate foreign policy theory as practice. They also face a lot of backlashes from critics who criticise it as a bad science because of its lack of testable theories and empirical analyses. Three analytical theoretical claims among discourse studies are: *discourse as a system of signification*; discourse productivity and the play of practice. In the first type of discourse study, discourse as systems of signification, social constructivists claim that the material world does not convey any

¹⁸⁶Kessler, Oliver and Brent Steele. “Introduction: Constructing IR: The Third Generation,” *European Review of International Studies* 3, no.3 (special issue, 2016): 13.

¹⁸⁷Milliken, Jennifer, “The Study of Discourse in International Relations: A Critique of Research and Methods” in *Approaches to International Relations*, eds. Stephen Chan and Cerywn Moore (London: Sage, 2009), 50.

meaning; people construct meaning of things using signs, which are majorly linguistic. In a sign system, relationships between things exist in relation to other objects. Derrida's classification of binary oppositions (educated/ignorant, democratic/non-democratic, modern/traditional, Western/Third World to name a few) comes into play in such an understating wherein their relation of power is such that one element is privileged over the other.

In the second type, *discourse as productivity*, studies argue, that apart from providing a language for speaking, classifying and analysing phenomenon, discourse also makes comprehensible some manners of 'being' and 'acting' towards the world and equipping a certain "regime of truth." It also excludes any other "possible modes" of action and identity. It produces the world, "how it selectively constitutes some and not others as 'privileged storytellers...to whom narrative authority...is granted.'" In short, such discourse defines subjects that are authorised to speak and to act; it is seen as having the power to define/enable/silence/exclude by 'limiting' or 'restricting authorities' and also 'experts' to groupings (which are not open to others). This way it endorses a specific '*common sense*' while also causing 'other modes' of category to be judged as either 'meaningless' or 'impracticable' or 'inadequate' or even 'disqualified.' In international politics, the legitimacy for practices is that discourse produces as subjects an *audience/public* for 'authorised actors' along with some qualities and existence of 'common sense' of distinct phenomena. It thereby gives authority to public officials on how to 'act for them' and 'in their name' to 'aid' others or 'secure a state.'

In the third type, *the play of practice*, dominant or hegemonic discourses are studied. Their

structuring of meanings is seen as having a connection to applying practices and means of rendering them 'legitimate' and 'intelligible.'¹⁸⁸

Language, Fierke argues, is necessarily a part of any kind of analysis,¹⁸⁹ even though it has been marginalised in IR.¹⁹⁰ The question of how or why language is important in understanding IR is much more fruitful than whether language is important.¹⁹¹ There are two approaches to study language in IR: language as a mirror/picture that mirrors the logic of the world and language as making moves in a game. When language is studied as a movement in a game, the language user in that picture gains movement by becoming embedded in a context and is at the same time constrained by its rules. She also shapes the context and exercises choice in a particular space. There also emerges a possibility of multiple games instead of a single logic in the world, which is the case in language as a mirror approach.¹⁹²

For conventional constructivists language is not as important as ideas and norms¹⁹³ in IR which is a point of departure for the critical constructivists. My study leans towards the critical strand of constructivism where language, discourse and rhetoric are the focus of identity formation of states (especially the United States). IR has been witnessing a surge of interest in identity and identity formation, according to Iver Neumann.¹⁹⁴ Language has become a vital

¹⁸⁸Milliken, Jennifer, "The Study of Discourse in International Relations: A Critique of Research and Methods" in *Approaches to International Relations*, eds. Stephen Chan and Cerywn Moore (London: Sage, 2009), 53-61.

¹⁸⁹Fierke, K.M., "Links across the Abyss: Language and Logic in International Relations" in *Approaches to International Relations* Vol. III, eds. Stephen Chan and Cerwyn Moore (London: Sage, 2009), 96.

¹⁹⁰See *ibid.* 117.

¹⁹¹Fierke, K.M., "Links across the Abyss: Language and Logic in International Relations" in *Approaches to International Relations* Vol. III, eds. Stephen Chan and Cerwyn Moore (London: Sage, 2009), 94.

¹⁹²See *ibid.* 101.

¹⁹³See *ibid.* 94.

¹⁹⁴Neumann, Iver B., "Self and Other in International Relations" in *Approaches to International Relations* Vol. I, eds. Stephen Chan and Cerwyn Moore (London: Sage, 2009), 287.

marker of national identity. It has come to be an important bearer of national political identity.¹⁹⁵

Stanley Lim, citing Alexander Wendt, argues that IR is governed by ideas and identities and that it is through social construction that identities are formed. Rhetoric, then, influences the formation of such identities. Through the flexibility provided by interactions and time, change can be brought about that is not based on competition but dialogue. This approach by constructivists could inform the situation between the United States and China. The rhetoric employed by the US is anti-China, whereby an antagonistic relationship between the two countries is often constructed. It is by recognizing that the competition between the US and China is a socially produced construct that change can be brought about where realism's inevitable endgame of competition can be changed to cooperation. Lim argues, that constructivism demonstrates that identities are not absolute, unchallengeable, changeable but rather produced through social rhetoric, beliefs, interests, histories, and cultures of both the countries. The US rhetoric about China describes it as, especially in recent years, a rival, and a threat; such language and rhetoric adopted by the US has led to the formation of an image of China that fuels antagonistic relationships between the two countries. Similar analysis can be extended to the US relation with the Middle East. The aftermath of 9/11 and the subsequent War on Terror led the US government to employ a rhetoric of crusading war against the threat that is Islam.¹⁹⁶

Patrick Thaddeus Jackson and Ronald R. Krebs, in their text titled, "Twisting Tongues and Twisting Arms: The Power of Political Rhetoric" expand on their relevant theory of

¹⁹⁵See ibid 289.

¹⁹⁶Lim, Stanley, "Sticks and Stones: Realism, Constructivism, Rhetoric, and Great Power Competition," *Modern War Institute at West Point* (December 2021) accessed: 9.2.22. [Sticks and Stones: Realism, Constructivism, Rhetoric, and Great Power Competition - Modern War Institute \(usma.edu\)](https://www.usma.edu/sticks-and-stones-realism-constructivism-rhetoric-and-great-power-competition)

rhetorical coercion making note of two important factors involving the reach of rhetoric. They argue, that rhetoric constitutes the crux of politics.¹⁹⁷ Speakers cannot say whatever they like in the public arena: there are a set of commonplaces (or *topoi*) that the public is aware of and participates in; they are not pre-determined but rather are loosely shared notions by the public. In other words, rhetoric has to be embedded in already established discourses that are locally confined.¹⁹⁸ Only when the rhetoric used by a speaker is “*already* present in the rhetorical field” can the commonplaces be powerful (emphasis in original).¹⁹⁹ Only those arguments will find favour with the audience that are, what Jackson and Krebs call, socially sustainable commonplaces where the audience defines some of them as acceptable and others impermissible.²⁰⁰ The second important factor is context: the context in which the structure of discourses and commonplaces are produced is essential for the rhetoric to *work*. Therefore, rhetoric is limited in time and space.²⁰¹ Jackson and Krebs argue, that the Bush administration was overly occupied with the portrayal of the war with Iraq and not just the war itself; it was always called a war that would liberate Iraq rather than call it an invasion. This is a fine example of how rhetoric impacts politics.²⁰² In this thesis, I have attempted to retrace the chosen phrases and rhetorical terms that are used by the presidents in the Post-Cold war period in their foreign policy as having a local and contextual history: that is, the Presidential speeches before Bush have also participated in such rhetoric that was informed by ideologies of democracy, nationalism and liberal values.

¹⁹⁷ Jackson, Patrick Thaddeus and Ronald R. Krebs, “Twisting Tongues and Twisting Arms: The Power of Political Rhetoric,” *European Journal of International Relations* 13, no. 1 (2007): 42.

¹⁹⁸ See *ibid.* 45.

¹⁹⁹ See *ibid.* 46.

²⁰⁰ See *ibid.* 47.

²⁰¹ See *ibid.* 47.

²⁰² See *ibid.* 35.

The attempts by scholars to fortify the place of ideas, morals, ideology and ethics in foreign policy has led to a transformation among American foreign policy makers rhetoric. Leslie H. Gelb and Justine A. Rosenthal in their article, in *Foreign Affairs*, argued that morality, values, universal principles, ethics and such which were previously within exclusive domain of scholars and preachers have come to occupy space in the minds of American foreign policy community. A new vocabulary has come to dominate the rhetoric, whose various manifestations are employed to advocate regime change, humanitarian intervention or even to promote human rights and democracy. This change in rhetoric is traceable in both Democrats and Republicans' senior government officials, which is imbued with concepts "dismissed for almost 100 years as 'Wilsonian.'" ²⁰³ After the end of the Cold War and American emergence as the sole superpower, the authors argue, the exchanges between security and ethics became less visible and a moral foreign policy became "affordable."²⁰⁴ The change in rhetoric has not just been a 'postmodern' version of the 'white man's burden,' but has become "a constant force" if not a driving force, in "policy effectiveness abroad or political support at home."²⁰⁵ This change is best reflected in 'ethical rhetoric' permeating policymaking that led up to the Iraq war in 2003.²⁰⁶

2.6 Social Construction of American Foreign Policy

Ates argues, that any holistic understanding of American foreign policy would include both its international as well as its domestic policies; for IR theories coming from the US sees the US responding to the international scene and theories coming out of America see American

²⁰³Gelb, Leslie H and Justine A. Rosenthal, "The Rise of Ethics in Foreign Policy: Reaching a Values Consensus," *Foreign Affairs* (May-June 2003): 2.

²⁰⁴See *ibid.* 5.

²⁰⁵See *ibid.* 3.

²⁰⁶See *ibid.* 5.

action primarily as the result of its domestic political institutions and its political processes.²⁰⁷ Elaborating on the principles of constructivism and the US foreign policy, Ates argues, that by understanding the agents and structures as co-determined and co-constructed, constructivists argue, that “Not only does structure affect the agent’s decision, as in neorealism, but also the agent’s decisions may change the system.”²⁰⁸ He argues that constructivism is focused on identity and culture. It explains International Relations as being focused on social relations; power and interests of a nation are a product of their interactions with other agents.²⁰⁹ Constructivism, Ates argues, is attentive towards the social norms and perceptions. While discussing the Iraq War, he argues, that because Iraq is perceived as a threat to the US that invading it (as in, eliminate the threat) was the seemingly obvious choice for the US foreign policy. Israel is not treated the same way because the US does not consider it a threat despite its nuclear developments.²¹⁰

Roxanne Lynn Doty in her noteworthy article, *Foreign Policy as Social Construction*, states that ‘conventional approaches’ to foreign policy rarely question or enquire about the “how questions.” It is due to the fact that foreign policy analysis in general is involved with offering explanations on ‘why’ decisions were made that resulted in specific ‘courses of action.’ With what she terms as, “how possible” questions she attempts to examine how meanings are produced and also attached to various objects and subjects. They constitute a certain interpretative disposition which ‘create’ particular ‘possibilities’ and also ‘preclude others.’ The focus is not on ‘why’ certain outcomes were attained but ‘how’ both the subjects or objects and interpretive dispositions were ‘socially constructed’ in a way that certain

²⁰⁷Ates, Ahmet, "Understanding US Foreign Policy: A Theoretical Analysis," *Novus Orbis: Journal of Politics and International Relations* 4, no.1 (2022): 5.

²⁰⁸See *ibid.* 13.

²⁰⁹See *ibid.* 12.

²¹⁰See *ibid.* 14-15.

practices were made possible. The capacity of an 'agent' to envision a specific course of 'action' impacts the possibility of 'practices.' And for this to happen some background meanings, social actors and relations must already be present. And how possible questions are implicit with questions of power where power represents production of 'meanings,' 'subject identities,' their interrelationships along with array of 'imaginable conduct.' She employs the 'Discursive Practices Approach' that lays emphasis on the 'linguistic construction' of reality. In any foreign policy, policy makers work inside a 'discursive space' that enforces meanings on their world and creates reality. When discursive practices become 'a unit of analysis' in IR, the answers to 'how' certain reality is 'produced' and 'maintained' and how practices are made possible emerge. Speeches and press conferences also become a source of analysis as examining these statements can entail examining what was said within policymaking contexts as well as in society in general.²¹¹ What makes Discursive Practices Approach so interesting is that discourse it analyses is transparent and easily available. No academic digging is required, scholars don't have to look far to find them as they are on the surface. What makes this approach appealing is that it permits explanation on how despite such obviousness the construction of such practices are widely circulated and constitutive of *self* versus *other* making certain practices possible.

Doty intends to show how foreign policy practices constructed a significant aspect of IR, more precisely its hierarchical nature. Hierarchy is accepted by various IR Theories as a background condition in IR; realists see Great Powers having special privileges, neorealists see states sharing relations hierarchically, based on power, Marxists see capitalist relations of production result in a hierarchical world. Yet no attempt is made to denaturalise hierarchy, its

²¹¹Doty, Roxanne Lynn, "Foreign Policy as Social Construction: A Post-Positivist Analysis of U.S. Counterinsurgency Policy in the Philippines," *International Studies Quarterly* 37 no. 3 (1993): 297-304.

contents, the practices that produce them and practices they make possible. And which is what she attempts to do in her article. When foreign policy is conceptualised as social construction, foreign policy practices are placed in a larger context of constructing a certain kind of international order that consists of different kinds of international identities. The two aspects of analysis, how discourse constructs identities for subjects and position them vis-à-vis one another and what possibilities of practices emerge from such construction and positioning become central to her study about US intervention in the Philippines. She employs three concepts, *presupposition* (textual mechanisms that creates background knowledge which in turn creates a world where certain things are accepted and taken for granted as true); *predication* (involves linking of certain qualities to certain subjects through use of *predicates*/ adverbs/ adjectives/ quality/ property/ and attributes which create identity for subjects and what they are capable of doing) and *subject positioning* (the relationship between subjects and also between object and subject are established by predication and presupposition, like opposition/identity/similarity and complementarity) while deconstructing statements by US policy makers about the Filipinos.²¹²

Jennifer Milliken in her classification, discourse as systems of signification also deals with the notion of predication. She illustrates how Japan was repeatedly represented via emotional *predicates* of fear and desire, politically immature in contrast to the US who was a firm and courageous leader.²¹³ The core opposition of reason versus passion was employed which is quite similar to how the US represented the Filipino as child-like, emotional, greedy, cruel, inefficient, intellectually simple, dog-like follower, who does not reflect, and naturally

²¹²Doty, Roxanne Lynn, "Foreign Policy as Social Construction: A Post-Positivist Analysis of U.S. Counterinsurgency Policy in the Philippines," *International Studies Quarterly* 37 no. 3 (1993): 305-308.

²¹³Milliken, Jennifer, "The Study of Discourse in International Relations: A Critique of Research and Methods" in *Approaches to International Relations*, eds. Stephen Chan and Cerywn Moore (London: Sage, 2009), 58.

delights in pillage, destruction, bloodshed. Language is used to create a reality where the deviant (international deviants, problem-children are the group of countries classified as Third World) as opposed to the normal in Foucaultian sense is a threat to a modern and stable international order.²¹⁴ In short, the representation of the *other* (especially from the Global South) saw these states as objects at stake in the worldwide struggle between good and evil/ reason and passion, order and chaos, rational and emotional. These states then become what Doty labels, “show window” of democracy and “testing ground” for American leadership.²¹⁵

My study will employ ‘power as productive’ how-questions while analysing American foreign policy in the period after the Cold war. It will inquire into rhetorical practices of the US presidents that enable and empower certain foreign policy actors to act, to frame foreign policy as they do and wield the capacities they do. It aims at providing what Roxanne L. Doty describes as background meanings which are already present within the agent’s system (in this case, America). Background meaning is nothing but the historical developments within America²¹⁶ that impacted the shape its foreign policy has taken. These meanings restrict the imagination of agents to a specific course of action and guide its foreign policy practices. It also affects the foreign policy rhetoric (presidential rhetoric for the purpose of our study). My work focuses on the ideological presuppositions that are embedded in the American system. The meanings which colour the American imagination, guide specific courses of action and influence American presidential foreign policy rhetoric, I argue, is heavily influenced by American exceptionalism which developed during American enlightenment. It was a period

²¹⁴Doty, Roxanne Lynn, “Foreign Policy as Social Construction: A Post-Positivist Analysis of U.S. Counterinsurgency Policy in the Philippines,” *International Studies Quarterly* 37 no. 3 (1993): 317

²¹⁵ See *ibid.* 315.

²¹⁶ America or Americas indicate two continents, North America and South America, within which are many countries. In the rest of this chapter, America is a word used to indicate the United States of America only and not the rest of the countries and peoples on the two continents.

where ideologies of nationalism, liberalism and democracy gained significance and began percolating into American discourse. It pervaded into American presidential rhetoric which was not immune to it.

It will employ Doty's three discursive analytic concepts: presupposition, prediction and subject positioning while analysing presidential rhetoric in Post-Cold war period, specifically of Bush (sr.), Clinton, and Bush (Jr.). In order to do so I will make use of presidential speeches and press conferences as sources for analysing American foreign policy practices. Consequently, presuppositions embedded in American historical discourse (codified under American exceptionalism with insistence on equating American national identity with ideologies of liberalism and democracy) will be the focus. The kind of language used in the presidents' speeches i.e., the predicates used extensively in reference to *self* and *other* will also be focussed upon. Also, the subject positioning based on both, presupposition and predicates in typecasting/imaging of the *other* as an opposition to *self* will be integral to my study.

2.7 Conclusion

Social construction of foreign policy is a significant development in foreign policy studies. I have attempted to trace the development of social constructivism in IR, beginning with its origin and moving on to defining the context when it gained popularity. I discussed the major arguments of the theory: social construction of reality and world around us; linkages between identity formation and national interest; intersubjectivity and foreign policy practices. In a concise manner, I also attempted to mention various types, variants and generations of social constructivism. The relationship between identity, ideology, language and rhetoric in discourse studies within social constructivism was also analysed. Lastly, three concepts to

examine social constructivist analysis of US foreign policy were identified from works of Doty and Milliken: presupposition, predication and subject positioning.

I argue that while Ates' assessment is quite relevant, Presidential rhetoric needs special attention. The rhetoric employed by the POTUS is not just relevant through the domestic theories but also through a constructivist perspective; constructivists show how the Presidential speeches are part of the social norms that he tries to establish, as well as how the domestic needs are shaped through his words. Like with Bush (Jr.), he spoke the language of the domestic scene until 9/11 where again, he went back to the language of liberalism, spreading of liberal principles in the world and American exceptionalism. Therefore, this thesis will further Ates' arguments while also looking at rhetoric.

In the next chapter, an attempt will be made to study how ideology plays a role in identity formation especially in a socially constructed foreign policy. The concept of ideology is studied in detailed in relation to foreign policy, especially American foreign policy including political traditions, American exceptionalism and foreign policy practices.

CHAPTER THREE

Ideology in Identity Formation within Socially Constructed Foreign Policy

Introduction

China has been attempting to make popular what it calls, the *Chinese Dream*, an imitation (of what seems to be) of the American Dream to build international legitimacy. It consciously wants to project its rise in a positive manner to combat the western representation of the rising Chinese threat. It is looking to promote a less threatening picture of Chinese aspirations through ‘discourse power.’²¹⁷ But how far it has been successful is anybody’s guess. Yet, this is a fine example of projecting ideological driven aspirations through a language that is more acceptable. Chinese nationalist language has been known to be extreme, bellicose and fierce. In fact, as recently as 2021, Chinese President Xi Jinping, at CCP’s 100th anniversary celebrations declared, that China would never let anybody oppress or bully or subjugate it. If somebody even attempts it their heads will be bloodily bashed by 1.4 billion Chinese people against the Great Wall of Steel forged.²¹⁸ From ignoring discourse to attempting some form of ‘discourse power,’ China has come a long way and has yet to go a long way too. It still has to be seen if China is successful in changing its international perception with changes in its language. But what is noteworthy is that language/discourse is gaining prominence in

²¹⁷Jones, Hugo, “China’s Quest for Greater ‘Discourse Power’” *The Diplomat* (Nov. 24, 2021) accessed on 17-03-2023 at 8 AM <https://thediplomat.com/2021/11/chinas-quest-for-greater-discourse-power/>

²¹⁸Eves, Lewis, “Legitimacy and Nationalism: China’s Motivations and the Dangers of Assumptions” *E-international relations* (Jan. 13, 2022). In this article, Eves discusses how Chinese aspirations are not driven by the desire to counter the West but more by its domestic policies. He employs social constructivist analysis instead of the realist assumptions.
<https://www.e-ir.info/2022/01/13/legitimacy-and-nationalism-chinas-motivations-and-the-dangers-of-assumptions>

International Relations and that ideology impacts not just the identity of a state but also the language/discourse a state employs.

The major assumptions of social constructivism (discussed at length in the previous chapter) that are of interest to us are that international reality is socially constructed. Social worlds are linguistically constructed and it is language that actively constructs worlds. States have multiple identities and both identities and interests are also socially created. Norms play a significant role in behaviour of the state in international structure. Identities of states are dependent on these social norms which guide appropriate behaviour. States commit to certain identities and they behave according to the appropriate behaviour that identity demands. This 'logic of appropriateness' decides state behaviour in order to gain acceptance and popularity among other states. Some norms then get converted into expected behaviour that all states that share those similar norms begin to exhibit. For example, human rights or climate change. Identity informs practices and action of states at home and abroad. Threat perception is not given/constant and is capable of change with a change in circumstances. Threats to that identity are also socially constructed and balanced; who/what constitutes a threat is also driven by the identity of states.

In this thesis, I would like to argue that identities of states are dependent on ideologies that a state subscribes to; the kind of language/rhetoric that is used for describing the *self* or the threat/enemy/*other* is driven by ideology. Ideology is a big part of a state's identity. What/which ideology a state subscribes to defines it, its role, its behaviour, its relationships in the international structure. In this chapter, I will attempt to examine how foreign policy and ideology are studied in International Relations in contemporary times.

Ted Hopf, like it has been mentioned in the previous chapter, argues, that critical constructivists' search for *communities of intersubjectivity* in world politics, where state/actors share not just understanding of themselves but others. In this regard, I would like to examine ideology in identity formation especially on American presidential rhetoric which yields predictable and replicable patterns of action in American discourse. Consequently, we will attempt to trace how certain ideologies developed/were incorporated in America; how they took roots in domestic policies and gradually entrench into foreign policy. Our focus will remain *ideological presuppositions, predicates* and *subject-positioning* in American presidential rhetoric within foreign policy discourse which will become clear as the work progresses.

3.1 Ideology in Foreign Policy

It is undeniable that ideology performs a vital role in determining any states' foreign policy.²¹⁹ Ideology's role in foreign policy, especially in the great power intervention, has never been absent in scholarship but it has "returned with a vengeance in recent years," observes David Sylvan and Stephen Majeski.²²⁰ Its influence on foreign policy discourse/presidential rhetoric shall remain the focus of this study.

Foreign policy is rarely completely objective: neither is its formulation nor its implementation. Many ideational and material forces are at play that include but are not necessarily restricted to influence of culture, ideology, norms, constraints of the international system, economic, military and technological considerations, relations with other states, national power, etc. IR literature presently offers a clash between two schools of thought on

²¹⁹Sylvan, David and Stephen Majeski, "Ideology and Intervention," Paper prepared for presentation at the *49th Annual Convention of the International Studies Association*, San Francisco (March 26-29, 2008) <http://faculty.washington.edu/majeski/sylvan.majeski.isa08.pap.pdf> Accessed on July 6, 2016 at 1:49 PM.

²²⁰See *ibid*.

the dispute surrounding the origin of state strategic behaviour: they are, the materialists and the idealists. Amongst the mainstream IR scholars, arguments exist pertaining to the materialist mindset that espouses materialist thought in decision making within Foreign Policy. Thus, as argued by Hudson (1997) and Hopf (1998), ideational forces, largely, are ignored. Costel Calin quotes Ruggie (1998) thus: “the building blocks of international reality are ideational as well as material.”²²¹

A combination of a few/all of these forces leads to the formation of foreign policies/a state’s strategic behaviour. And American foreign policy is no exception. The case study this thesis is interested in, i.e., USA’s foreign policy in the Post-Cold war period, also involves a combination of the above-mentioned forces in its foreign policy.

3.2 Making Sense of Foreign Policy

States constitute the international system and it is their social interactions/relations that make the system anarchic. In International Relations, sovereignty is the key construct by which states are broadly organised. All states are viewed as equally sovereign²²² entities, meaning they are free to form/make and implement their independent domestic policy within and foreign policy without. Yet, it is very rare that states pursue completely independent foreign policies. The freedom of the states to follow independent foreign policy varies. For the realist theorists, it is dependent on their overall national power including their economic, political, social, military and technological powers. Macridis classifies these powers under the horizontal hierarchy of states. It is also dependent on the hierarchy of states vertically, he argues, which

²²¹See Calin, Costel, "Hawks versus Doves: The Influence of Political Ideology on the Foreign Policy Behavior of Democratic States," *PhD diss.*, University of Tennessee, 2010. http://trace.tennessee.edu/utk_graddiss/782 Accessed 15-07-2016 at 2:36 AM, 10-11.

²²²The crucial characteristic of the nation-state system is the insistence of every state to exist in sovereign equality. See Levi, Werner, "Ideology, Interests, and Foreign Policy," *International Studies Quarterly* 14, no. 1 (Mar., 1970). Stable URL: <http://www.jstor.org/stable/3013538> Accessed: 24-06-2016 13:54 UTC. p.1.

includes its geography, territory, demography, natural resources etc. As per the social constructivists' theorists, a state's behaviour in International Relations is constrained by international and shared norms, international laws, appropriate behaviour and shared values. Hence, to have the liberty to follow an independent foreign policy is still a novel experience; very few states have and can follow an independent foreign policy in International Relations.

For the realist theorists, the study of countries' foreign policies is at the core of International Relations scholarship.²²³ Foreign policy, in simple terms, is a combination of international goals and the strategy to achieve them. Levi Werner defines foreign policy as, "the government's definition of a state's international objectives combined with a plan for action to reach them. Foreign policy expresses the needs and wants of the state whose fulfilment the government conceives of as beneficial for the state."²²⁴ Consequently, national interests and ideology have also come to play a central role in the making of a foreign policy. Levi Werner captures it succinctly when he identifies foreign policy as a human product which is result of many homogenised factors which includes interests and ideology.²²⁵

A foreign policy gets recognition and is taken notice of in the international system only when a state announces its intention to implement it into action. Until a state decides its foreign policy and announces it, its needs and wants are of no concern to the larger international society because it remains that state's internal ambitions, dreams, internal affairs or even its ideals.²²⁶ And being ambitious, foreign policy statements are more often than not high-sounding, and are

²²³See Calin, Costel, "Hawks versus Doves: The Influence of Political Ideology on the Foreign Policy Behavior of Democratic States" *PhD diss.*, University of Tennessee, 2010. http://trace.tennessee.edu/utk_graddiss/782 Accessed 15-07-2016 at 2:36 AM, p.41.

²²⁴See Levi, Werner. "Ideology, Interests, and Foreign Policy." *International Studies Quarterly* 14, no. 1 (1970): 1–31. <https://doi.org/10.2307/3013538>. Accessed: 24-06-2016 13:54 UTC. p.3.

²²⁵See *ibid.* p.4.

²²⁶ See *ibid.* p.4.

couched with high ideals. They are declared to impress when they are announced to the world. Foreign policy, in general, is never published as a booklet. It becomes apparent in the presidents and his administration's chief members' speeches, addresses, reports, press conferences, exchanges with the media, auto-biographies, press releases and such. With change in the presidency, there is a change or modulation in the foreign policy. But it is also noteworthy that the change is usually in degree. This study argues that it is very rare for foreign policy to change drastically. Only in exceptional cases does foreign policy change; there is always a continuity. This study thus also attempts to scrutinise if and how much change and continuity there is in American presidential rhetoric in terms of ideological overtures in the Post-Cold war period.

Foreign policy, for the most part, is also a result of many forces and factors. For the constructivist scholars, foreign policy analysis is based on not just material or ideational forces. Both ideational and material forces are at play in the making of foreign policy. Isa Erbas argues that even though the material world exists independently, the states interact with each other through their foreign policy. It is through this process that the states socialise and these interactions give states their identity.²²⁷

Social constructivist comprehension of foreign policy analysis (FPA) can be understood in three significant ways, argues Maysam Behravesht: the role of actors and bureaucracies on foreign policy; the process of decision making; and the effect of the international system on foreign policy of states. The level of inquiry in FPA may vary from micro level (where the psychological and learning biases of individual policy makers impact the foreign policy) to macro level (conventional constructivist analyses that focus on social structural context and

²²⁷ Erbas, Isa, "Constructivist Approach in Foreign Policy and in International Relations," *Journal of Positive School Psychology* 6, no. 3 (2022): 5087).

role of social learning).²²⁸ For further discussion on social constructivist foreign policy analysis refer to Chapter Two. Having defined a foreign policy and its sources, the chapter will now focus on the linkages in foreign policy and ideology.

3.3 Ideology and Foreign Policy

Cursory attempts to study the link between foreign policy and ideology have been made throughout the history of International Relations. Most of these analyses ended with conclusions like ideology alone cannot be used to explain foreign policy impetus of states. They insisted that it was necessary to take into consideration the fact that no ideology alone guides foreign policy. Along with ideology, the state's national interests drive foreign policy. Wars cannot be fought in the international system either just to oppose a particular ideology or in support of an ideology. To capture a realist stance in Levi Werner's words succinctly, statesmen take actions not to get any ideology to operate but fulfil interests.²²⁹ Drawing attention to the changing FP between the US and the Soviet Union, Werner argues, that while in 1933, the US and the Soviet Union were allies against Japan, there was a shift during the Cold War period where the Soviet Union was now considered a threat to America's interests.²³⁰ Also, it is noteworthy that there is hardly any modern statesmen who has made a claim that he committed his state to demonstrate its trustworthiness or led his state into war to fight against any ideology.²³¹ Taking into account the aspect of ideology that promises realisation of salvations or proposed goals, it should be borne in mind that no statesman considers it his task to lead his people or the world to salvation.²³² Another significant observation that was made

²²⁸Behraves, Maysam, "The Relevance of Constructivism to Foreign Policy Analysis" *E-International Relations* (July 17, 2011) accessed: 3.9.2022, [The Relevance of Constructivism to Foreign Policy Analysis \(e-ir.info\)](https://doi.org/10.2307/3013538).

²²⁹See Levi, Werner. "Ideology, Interests, and Foreign Policy." *International Studies Quarterly* 14, no. 1 (1970): 1–31. <https://doi.org/10.2307/3013538>. Accessed: 24-06-2016 13:54 UTC. 7.

²³⁰ See *ibid.* 7.

²³¹ See *ibid.* 6.

²³² See *ibid.* 6.

through memoirs, memoranda, and interviews of statesmen was that in the designing of foreign policy, interests of the state are of first concern after which, if at all, ideology is taken into consideration.²³³

National interest was the centre through which any/all understanding of International Relations emerged. National interests were understood to play a prominent role in formulating and implementing a foreign policy. When a lot of literature was produced on this theme, it began to be taken as a well-documented fact. But with critical theories, this is slowly changing and this thesis is also one such attempt. What we are trying to establish, under social constructivist understanding of International Relations, is that subscription to any ideology percolates the identity of that state. It also then begins influencing the kind of language/discourse/rhetoric that is used by statesmen and policymakers of the state to describe international realities. There are not just multiple identities, there are also multiple realities/worlds which are socially constructed. It is language that constructs these realities.

Of late, not just material factors (as argued by the realists and neoliberal institutionalists) but even ideational factors (as argued by the liberals and constructivists) are recognized as having a primary role in determining state behaviour in the international system.²³⁴ They argue, that world politics is socially constructed, meaning the international system is what a state understands or comprehends it to be. If a state is powerful, materially and ideationally, and inherently believes in its superiority, it will concern itself with enhancing its national power by spreading its ideology and perceiving the world as an open field for reforming the other states in their image. One example of this would be the USA's aggressive

²³³ See *ibid.* 9-10.

²³⁴ See Calin, Costel, "Hawks versus Doves: The Influence of Political Ideology on the Foreign Policy Behavior of Democratic States" *PhD diss.*, University of Tennessee, 2010. http://trace.tennessee.edu/utk_graddiss/782 Accessed 15-07-2016 at 2:36 AM, 41-42.

drive to promote democracy and free-market capitalism. Conversely, if a state is small and weak, almost all the other states appear as threatening bullies or enemies out to crush it or change it or reform it in their image. The few options left with such states is to not get on the wrong side of a powerful state or be neutral during conflicts or become a close ally of a very powerful state to get aid in times of need and harness their protection in times of emergencies: financial, social, economic or military. Hence, among the two hundred odd states in the world, the shackles of a state's domestic political ideology, norms, ideas etc., are also compelling in formulating and pursuing/implementing their foreign policies.

This brings to the forefront the little recognized yet undeniable presence of many forms of ideologies, varying from political to economic²³⁵, ethical or moral or religious to regional. These ideologies also include non-Western ethnic ideologies or regional or local ideologies or even religious ideologies and national ideologies that influence foreign policy. But these are not the concerns of this study even though there is increasing scholarship on the same. It is ideologies and their influence on American foreign policy rhetoric that form the crux of this thesis.

In the international system, on an ideological scale, there are some states that explicitly profess allegiance to a political ideology and some that implicitly adhere to an ideology. They, however, do not use its concepts and categories in their foreign policy declarations. When a state professes allegiance to any political ideology, more often than not, their foreign policy is

²³⁵Nicholas Martini identifies economic ideology. He argues, Feldman (1988) focuses on three core beliefs that make up an economic ideology. These core beliefs consist of 1) equality of opportunity, 2) economic individualism, and 3) support for free enterprise. These three core beliefs are the basis of how an individual believes economic and business matters should be handled by the government. See Martini, Nicholas Fred, "The role of ideology in foreign policy attitude formation" *PhD (Doctor of Philosophy) thesis*, University of Iowa (2012), 11. [The role of ideology in foreign policy attitude formation - University of Iowa \(uiowa.edu\)](https://uiowa.edu/etd/6mz55796) DOI: 10.17077/etd.6mz55796

also affected by that ideology. Ideology is both inward and outward looking: ideologies have a political agenda which works within a state's domestic politics and, at the same time, one that guides a state in its foreign politics/policies. And ideology has political, social and economic aspects that come into play when any foreign policy is formulated (which will be dealt with in detail later in the chapter). Associations/relations with states sharing similar ideology increase. One such example is the former communist Soviet Union and its close allies which included states which were communist or were sympathetic towards communist ideology. The second result of adherence to any political ideology is the abhorrence/avoidance of its anti-thesis and devising ways/means to undermine the ideological *other*. A very good example of this is the United States of America's asphyxia of communist Soviet Union so much so that it was referred to as an Evil Empire during Reagan's presidency. The policy of containment²³⁶ and dominos theory²³⁷ are examples of such undermining and curbing the spread of the influence of communist Soviet Union. This correlation of *self* promotion and *other's* denunciation is part of the fall-out effect: the latter, an outcome of the former.

Apart from the states that profess their allegiance to a particular political ideology, there are some states that deny association with any political ideology because of the pejorative²³⁸ meaning attached to the word, *ideology*. These states do not explicitly use the word ideology to define their foreign policy decisions and accept the guiding role of any ideology in pursuing

²³⁶In 1940, U.S. diplomat George F. Kennan in his report submitted to US Defense Secretary, James Forrestal in 1947 used the word containment to curb the influence of the Soviet Union. It later went on to become a doctrine to describe the western states policy towards the Soviet Union.

²³⁷In 1954, US President Dwight D. Eisenhower articulated the domino theory whereby he believed that if not contained Communism would spread both in Southeast Asia and Central America. He strongly believed that if it is allowed to prevail in Vietnam, neighbouring states will fall to communism, right from SouthEast Asia to India. He feared his neighbour Mexico would also fall for it. His belief strengthened when North Vietnam turned communist.

²³⁸Though there are both negative and positive conceptions of political ideology, majorly the tilt is towards the former. Negative or pejorative meanings are attached to ideology implying that it is dogmatic, doctrinaire, extreme and simply false. See Heywood, Andrew, *Political Ideologies* (London: Macmillan, 1992), 2.

certain foreign policy decisions. An example of such a state is the USA that repudiates working of any ideology in their foreign policy even though ideologies have been strongly at play both in their domestic and foreign policies (which will be exclusively dealt with as the chapter progresses).

Comparing ideology to halitosis, James Carter brings to attention the attitude of American foreign policy stating that ideology is something that the other party has; that is to say, America does not have an ideological foreign policy and only the other countries it is engaging with seems to have it. This leaves American foreign policy makers defensive in their official position. “America, so the story goes, does not have an identifiable ideology. Its international role is, more often than not, thrust upon it, placing American policymakers in a defensive role.” He stresses that it appears as if under the banner of free men, who fight for freedom and trade liberalism, US foreign policy attempts to guide the world towards democracy, the ideal standard decided upon and the epitome of good governance. Carter calls this a shortcoming that needs to be addressed thoroughly which, according to him, is a dearth filled in through Michael Hunt’s work on ideology.²³⁹

This study also argues, that the American presidential rhetoric has, for most part, been a defensive one. The narrative has been on the defensive, where American involvement in international affairs is dependent on its attempt to ‘make the world safe’ for democracy/ freedom/ liberty. Though the American presidential rhetoric has revolved around ‘saving the world,’ ‘promoting peace,’ ‘advocating human rights,’ ‘spreading democracy,’ and such; it rarely overtly declares its allegiance to the ideologies of democracy, nationalism and liberalism

²³⁹See Carter, James, “War, Revolution,” (Spring 2000) <http://vi.uh.edu/pages/buzzmat/hunt.htm> accessed July 6, 2016 at 2:37 AM.

or even American Exceptionalism (and its values). Michael Hunt's work is an attempt to highlight the working of ideology in American foreign policy. He argues, that ideological constructs inspire, sustain and constrain a sense of historical place, a sense of the present and a moral compass to navigate a better future.²⁴⁰ He also argues, that public rhetoric is full of symbols, mythology and is a form of interaction that is guarded by definite rules; it is not just a tool, screen or even an ornament.²⁴¹ For public rhetoric to be efficient it must gain its appeal from values and concerns that are widely shared and easily absorbed by the audience.²⁴²

This study takes Hunt's argument further by contending that American foreign policy has been pursuing an ideology that revolves around promotion of liberal values, democratic processes and governance and is also dependent on a sense of 'exalted nationalism' which together come under the broad umbrella of American Exceptionalism for its cohesion. In American presidential rhetoric, justification for American involvement in international politics is given through the 'higher good' that America possesses and that needs to be promoted for lasting world peace. What is lost in this rhetoric is that such assumptions are part of the very definition of a liberal ideology. In short, there are strong linkages between foreign policy of America and ideology.

Then there are also states in the international system that take the view that ideology is futile. The impracticality of adherence to any ideology either implicitly or explicitly guided some of the states from Asia and Africa during the Cold War. These states were the one that professed the policy of non-alignment whereby they neither showed inclination towards Communism or Capitalism. "Ideology does not come into the picture at all," claimed Nehru.

²⁴⁰Hunt, Michael H., *Ideology and U.S Foreign Policy* (Yale University Press, 1987), 12. <http://www.jstor.org/stable/j.ctt5vk7c7>

²⁴¹See *ibid.* 15.

²⁴²See *ibid.* 15.

Sukarno branded pretences of an ideological conflict as a camouflage that helps keep the imperialist powers' dominance over the world.²⁴³

But foreign policies are not free from ideas, norms and ideology whether these states admit it or not. It can be safely indicated that foreign policy of any country contains ideological elements. No foreign policy is entirely free from ideological connotations. The ideological elements creep into the enunciation of national interests: from Imperialism to Fascism, Nazism to Socialism and Liberalism to Neo-Conservatism. It becomes apparent that there are both ideological elements and national interests that influence the foreign policies of states. From vocal or explicit declaration to implicit pronouncement, the ideological elements are invariably present. Interestingly, foreign policies have often been couched in ideological terms. Foreign policies provide worldviews, concepts and categories that are rooted in ideological frameworks. But this link between ideology and foreign policy has been under-explored in academia and lacks any unified approach in International Relations literature.²⁴⁴ One major reason is the denial by the Western states of any influence of ideology on their foreign policy. The Western states equated the guidance of a foreign policy by ideology with their counterpart or the *other*. For instance, it was Hitler's Germany and Mussolini's Italy that centred on the ideologies of Nazism and Fascism.

Even the (western) theories of International Relations Studies, like the Realists, deny/refuse to take into consideration motives/ideologies in study of foreign policy (even though the same are inescapable). These theories ascribe materialistic determinants of foreign policy:

²⁴³ideology is a, in his words, "disguise to involve the innocent on one side or the other as the imperialist powers try to preserve their domination over the world." For more, see Levi, Werner. "Ideology, Interests, and Foreign Policy." *International Studies Quarterly* 14, no. 1 (1970): 1–31. <https://doi.org/10.2307/3013538>. Accessed: 24-06-2016 13:54 UTC. 9.

²⁴⁴See Calin, Costel, "Hawks versus Doves: The Influence of Political Ideology on the Foreign Policy Behavior of Democratic States" *PhD diss.*, University of Tennessee, 2010. http://trace.tennessee.edu/utk_graddiss/782 Accessed 15-07-2016 at 2:36 AM, 7.

national power and economic relationships while refusing to recognize ideational determinants of foreign policy like identity, culture, norms and ideology. Realists dismiss the function of ideology in foreign policy making while others insist upon its importance, according to Calin.²⁴⁵

Most of such theories and studies led to an increase in arguments that it was the former Soviet Union's foreign policy which was guided by communist ideology. And this attitude led to very sparse literature being produced on the linkages between ideology and foreign policy, the bulk of which associates to end of the 18th and the beginning of the 19th centuries' revolutionary periods and for a second time during the Cold War.²⁴⁶ It is also very difficult to study the link, for (both) ideology (and national interests) is (are) partly rooted in psychology and hence, not by a long way 'separable' and exposed to 'examination' as factor(s) motivating behaviour of a state.²⁴⁷ But it is judicious to study this link as some scholars, including Levi Werner, are of the opinion that influence of ideology and interest on foreign policy making has the potential to diminish international conflict.

Even though the discussion so far has been about the link between ideology and foreign policy, not much has been said about what is ideology? What is its role? And what are its elements? These questions need to be answered before any more progress is made with the chapter. It would give clarity on this study's comprehension of these pertinent questions.

3.4 Understanding Ideology

²⁴⁵ To quote Costel Calin, in her own words, "...realists see international interactions as an expression of state capabilities and the distribution of these military capabilities more generally throughout the international system. They dismiss the role of ideology in foreign policymaking. Others, however, insist that political ideology does matter and helps explain variation in state foreign policy actions (Klingemann, Hofferbert, and Budge 1994, McCormick, Wittkopf, and Danna 1997, Therien 2002)." For more, see *ibid.* 7.

²⁴⁶ See Levi, Werner. "Ideology, Interests, and Foreign Policy." *International Studies Quarterly* 14, no. 1 (1970): 1. <https://doi.org/10.2307/3013538>. Accessed: 24-06-2016 13:54 UTC.

²⁴⁷ See *ibid.* 2.

Ideology as a concept is contentious. It has been multifariously defined and described. Michael H. Hunt calls it a ‘*slippery* subject,’²⁴⁸ because it is not ‘easy to grasp’ or comprehensible ‘in its entirety.’ Michael Howard argues that ideology in International Relations is not studied but ignored more so because the correct usage of the term is much broader than which is generally accepted. The cultural and political diversities of humankind are ignored largely in modern international systems as these ideologies are universalist in their suppositions. It is for this reason that foreign policies are a complex and challenging craft.²⁴⁹ Studies carried out within political psychology of International Relations are witnessing a rise of scholarship on how ideologies shape the world we experience (on the basis of which we act upon) and the vital role ideology plays in driving war and peace.²⁵⁰

Political ideology, according to John Callaghan et al. in their book, *Ideologies of the US Foreign Policy*, can be understood as a group of ideas, values, opinions and beliefs that have a repetitive pattern that is espoused by groups that fight for control over the political language and public policy.²⁵¹ They argue, that ideologies help in legitimising policies by connecting these policies with values and beliefs of the people that are approved by the people: for example, defending democracy, individual choice, equal opportunity, human rights etc.²⁵² Ideologies are therefore, effective as they adjust to change and are flexible while articulating, mobilising, arranging, interpreting and representing politics.²⁵³ They enforce a pattern and

²⁴⁸Field, James A., Review of *Novus Ordo Seclorum*, by Michael H. Hunt, *Diplomatic History* 13, no. 1 (1989): 114. <http://www.jstor.org/stable/24911841>.

²⁴⁹Howard, Michael. “Ideology and International Relations.” *Review of International Studies* 15, no. 1 (1989): 1–10. doi:10.1017/S026021050011304X. [Ideology and international relations | Review of International Studies | Cambridge Core](#)

²⁵⁰Gries, Peter Hays and Pak Chun Yam,, “Ideology and International Relations” *Current Opinion in Behavioral Sciences* 34 (2020): 135–141. [Ideology and International Relations — Research Explorer The University of Manchester](#)

²⁵¹Callaghan, John et al., *Ideologies of the US Foreign Policy* (New York: Routledge, 2019), 6.

²⁵²See *ibid.* 7.

²⁵³See *ibid.* 7.

some sort of structure or set up a narrative using catch-phrases and terms that enable the public to interpret and react to the policies employed by various political leaders. Therefore, ideologies are instruments of power and order the social world in a manner that creates a framework within which meaning and sense can be made. They sell certain ideas, beliefs, commitments and values. They link a large group of people and define the agendas they consume, help them prioritise ideas and policies that further the interests of certain groups within society. This is a particular kind of soft power.²⁵⁴

The ideological traditions of the West had their origins in the 18th century, during the French and American revolutions.²⁵⁵ It was in the early 19th century that political ideology emerged.²⁵⁶ The term itself was coined by Destutt de Tracy in 1797 during the French Revolution to refer to a new ‘science of ideas.’ Since then, it has acquired any number of attributes, meanings, characteristics and nature. While it is no longer considered only as a science of ideas, it is definitely seen as a system of ideas that help in comprehending the reality around us. Individuals have some abstract view of how the world works and how individuals and governments should act within this frame.²⁵⁷ In other words, it provides a world view. It acts as a pair of coloured lenses through which reality is viewed. Each coloured pair gives a different source/version for viewing/examining/making sense of the reality. While one may take into account economic inequalities, the other may consider racial superiority and so on. To elaborate, Michael Hunt’s definition of ideology is of significance: “an interrelated set of

²⁵⁴See *ibid.* 7-8.

²⁵⁵Heywood, Andrew, *Political Ideologies* (London: Macmillan,1992), xiii.

²⁵⁶See *ibid.* 2.

²⁵⁷See Martini, Nicholas Fred, "The role of ideology in foreign policy attitude formation" *PhD (Doctor of Philosophy) thesis*, University of Iowa (2012), 11. [The role of ideology in foreign policy attitude formation - University of Iowa \(uiowa.edu\)](https://uiowa.edu/etd/6mz55796) DOI: 10.17077/etd.6mz55796

convictions or assumptions that reduces the complexities of a particular slice of reality to easily comprehensible terms and suggests appropriate ways of dealing with that reality”²⁵⁸

But in spite of these different versions of reality, there are certain common features in almost all the ideologies that will be used to list the various definitions of ideology in this section. For example, it is noteworthy that whatever consideration an ideology takes as a starting point, it becomes the base of that ideology. Then, that base or foundation of the ideology directs the adherents of the ideology towards an ambitious and aspired target/goal to change that reality. It will also list out the course of action to be taken or followed for attaining that goal. In the case of the Nazi ideology, racial superiority of the Aryans was the base on which the extermination of Jews was called for, in order to cleanse the society. Consequently, it can be said that there are three aspects of any ideology: it gives ideas and concepts to explain the existing reality; it offers a critique of the existing ideology and it proposes a path forward in the future.²⁵⁹

3.4.1 Definitions and Features of Ideology

Ideologies have certain features, as discussed above, that are common in almost all ideologies. This study will list the definitions of ideology in a manner that will include its various features. Some of the features of ideology are: to provide *Worldview*; a system of *beliefs, normative values and symbols*; a source for *ordering, defining and evaluating political reality*; to establish *political identities*; to assign *meaning*; to propel social machinery into

²⁵⁸Sylvan, David and Stephen Majeski, “Ideology and Intervention,” Paper prepared for presentation at the 49th Annual Convention of the International Studies Association, San Francisco (March 26-29, 2008) <http://faculty.washington.edu/majeski/sylvan.majeski.isa08.pap.pdf> Accessed on July 6, 2016 at 1:49 PM.

²⁵⁹The idea about three aspects of ideology are based on a lecture by Prof. Mohd. Moazzam Ali in the Department of Political Science, University of Hyderabad during a Master of Arts class.

action for change; to provide/motivate *a course of action*; and to present *a goal* ('*what ought to be*') as opposition to the present scenario.

To begin with, an ideology gives a worldview on how to make sense of the reality/world around. Holsti defines ideology as "a set of lenses through which information concerning the physical and social environment is received." He further argues, that ideology familiarises the individual with his environment by defining and identifying its salient features. "In addition to organising perceptions into a meaningful guide for behaviour, the belief system has the function of the establishment of goals and the ordering of preferences."²⁶⁰ Ideology is conceived of as a set of normative values and moderately lasting belief. Levi Werner emphasises the role of belief in ideology stating that ideology must relate to principles, and other aspects of generalised realities. He also argues, that beliefs lack the certainty of knowledge.²⁶¹

Hamilton defines ideology on similar lines where he states that it is a system of beliefs and outlooks that are collectively held normative ideas that promote a particular pattern in social arrangements. It aims to promote and maintain a pattern of behaviour in social relationships.²⁶² They are in other words, sets of values and beliefs which are existing, ready, available in the minds of people.²⁶³ They also help to structure how the world is understood and explained.²⁶⁴ Ideologies are crucial resources for ordering, defining and evaluating political

²⁶⁰ As quoted in Martini, Nicholas Fred, "The role of ideology in foreign policy attitude formation" *PhD (Doctor of Philosophy) thesis*, University of Iowa (2012), 10-11. [The role of ideology in foreign policy attitude formation - University of Iowa \(uiowa.edu\)](https://doi.org/10.17077/etd.6mz55796) DOI: 10.17077/etd.6mz55796

²⁶¹ See Levi, Werner. "Ideology, Interests, and Foreign Policy." *International Studies Quarterly* 14, no. 1 (1970): 1–31. <https://doi.org/10.2307/3013538>. Accessed: 24-06-2016 13:54 UTC. 4.

²⁶² Sylvan, David and Stephen Majeski, "Ideology and Intervention," Paper prepared for presentation at the *49th Annual Convention of the International Studies Association*, San Francisco (March 26-29, 2008) <http://faculty.washington.edu/majeski/sylvan.majeski.isa08.pap.pdf> Accessed on July 6, 2016 at 1:49 PM.

²⁶³ See Levi, Werner. "Ideology, Interests, and Foreign Policy." *International Studies Quarterly* 14, no. 1 (1970): 6. <https://doi.org/10.2307/3013538>. Accessed: 24-06-2016 13:54 UTC.

²⁶⁴ Heywood, Andrew, *Political Ideologies* (London: Macmillan, 1992), 2.

reality and establishing political identities.²⁶⁵ But it should also be borne in mind that not every belief is part of an ideology.²⁶⁶

For social constructivists, it can be argued, ideology provides meaning and helps in identifying friends and foes in the international system. Objects/actors have meaning and people tend to *act* towards them.²⁶⁷ These meanings are formed by social norms, ideas, culture, beliefs and ideologies.

It is, Mullins argues, as quoted in Sylvan and Majeski, also a system of symbols that guides collective action through a logically coherent system of symbols for the transformation and regulation of society.²⁶⁸ It becomes the basis for political action like Seliger identifies in his definition of ideology.²⁶⁹ And this course of action demands a commitment to fulfil that goal as Jost et al. (2003, pg. 341) espoused. For them, ideology reflects the people's perception of the world they occupy including habits, customs, needs, and values in ways that satisfies these standards.²⁷⁰

²⁶⁵ See *ibid.* xiii.

²⁶⁶ See Levi, Werner. "Ideology, Interests, and Foreign Policy." *International Studies Quarterly* 14, no. 1 (1970): 4. <https://doi.org/10.2307/3013538>. Accessed: 24-06-2016 13:54 UTC.

²⁶⁷ "People act toward objects, including other actors, on the basis of the meaning that the objects have for them. States act differently toward enemies than they do toward friends because enemies are threatening and friends are not (Wendt 1992, 396-7)." For more, see Costel Calin's "Hawks versus Doves: The Influence of Political Ideology on the Foreign Policy Behavior of Democratic States" *PhD diss.*, University of Tennessee, 2010. http://trace.tennessee.edu/utk_graddiss/782 Accessed 15-07-2016 at 2:36 AM, p.10.

²⁶⁸ Mullins argues that ideology is "a logically coherent system of symbols which, within a more or less sophisticated conception of history, links the cognitive and evaluative perception of one's social condition – especially its prospects for the future – to a program of collective action for the maintenance, alteration or transformation of society." For more, see Sylvan, David and Stephen Majeski, "Ideology and Intervention," Paper prepared for presentation at the *49th Annual Convention of the International Studies Association*, San Francisco (March 26-29, 2008) .<http://faculty.washington.edu/majeski/sylvan.majeski.isa08.pap.pdf> Accessed on July 6, 2016 at 1:49 PM.

²⁶⁹ Seliger states that ideology corresponds to "...sets of ideas which provide basis for some kind of political action." For more, see *ibid* p.8.

²⁷⁰ See Martini, Nicholas Fred, "The role of ideology in foreign policy attitude formation" *PhD (Doctor of Philosophy) thesis*, University of Iowa (2012), 92. [The role of ideology in foreign policy attitude formation - University of Iowa \(uiowa.edu\)](http://uiowa.edu) DOI: 10.17077/etd.6mz55796

Ideologies also present situations/realities that ought to be or are desirable. Like Jost et al., as quoted in Nicholas Fred Martini, state, that ideologies present the world as it is through assertions about human nature, historical issues, current realities, and future probabilities. They envisage a world as it ought to be where acceptable ways of accomplishing social, political and economic ideals are satisfied.²⁷¹

3.4.2 Dimensions of Ideology

It has been argued that crucial ideological traditions formulate politics of the modern world.²⁷² And political ideologies are deeply rooted in modern cultures. They are not easy to handle and it is almost impossible to overcome its influence.²⁷³ Ideology is a product of a wide range of factors, including core values, individual traits, fundamental beliefs, and environmental factors.²⁷⁴

Throughout most of its history it has been criticised and its role and impact on both foreign and domestic policy have been under-emphasised. It has been a focus of criticism not just by the liberals but also by communists. Negative or pejorative meanings are attached to *ideology* implying that it is dogmatic, doctrinaire, extreme and simply false.²⁷⁵ The ultimate denunciation of ideology was when it became fashionable to bury ideology and declare its demise at the end of the Cold War. One such prominent argument was made in *The End of History and the Last Man* by Francis Fukuyama He argued, that human ideological evolution

²⁷¹See *ibid.* p.11.

²⁷²Heywood, Andrew, *Political Ideologies* (London: Macmillan,1992), xiii.

²⁷³ See *ibid.* p.2.

²⁷⁴See Martini, Nicholas Fred, "The role of ideology in foreign policy attitude formation" *PhD (Doctor of Philosophy) thesis*, University of Iowa (2012), 23. [The role of ideology in foreign policy attitude formation - University of Iowa \(uiowa.edu\)](https://uiowa.edu/etd/6mz55796) DOI: 10.17077/etd.6mz55796

²⁷⁵Ideology has been defined as the "opposite of truth, science, rationality, objectivity and philosophy. It signifies beliefs and doctrines which are either dogmas beyond reach of criticism or cloaks for individuals and group interests." Heywood, Andrew, *Political Ideologies* (London: Macmillan,1992), xiii.

had reached its end point, for Western liberal democracy was the final form of human government. He believed that “all the big questions had been settled” and that there was no more progress to be had in relation to institutions and principles. While discussing ideology, he argues, that there was no other ideology, with claims at universality, that could challenge liberal democracy in the world. He believed that the sovereignty of the people had been achieved.²⁷⁶ With this also came the lack of academic interest in ideology and scholarship on it dwindled. However, scholars like Andrew Heywood argue, that ideology has had a comeback just like history and politics.²⁷⁷ The interest in it has revived especially since Social Constructivism and other such similar theories and approaches have strenuously emphasised the role of ideas, ideology, norms and social fabric in foreign and domestic policy. It has also gained focus after scholars have attributed Wilsonianism and neo-conservatism as the basis for American Foreign Policy under George W. Bush (Jr.).

Ideological elements put some constraints on the choice of policy options. For example, under no circumstances can the American foreign policy be geared to promote socialism worldwide. Similarly, the former Soviet Union could never promote capitalism worldwide as a focus of foreign policy. Fascists and Nazis cannot promote democracy as a goal of foreign policy. In this sense, ideology can serve as a constraint. It can also help promote a set of foreign policy preferences at a given point of time. It also promotes a certain kind of language that is employed by policy makers for describing *self* and the *other* in the international system. It creates a certain identity of a state; the state comes to be identified based on their subscription to a certain ideology. The kind of discussion/rhetoric it pursues is dependent on that identity which is defined by an ideology.

²⁷⁶See *ibid.* 45.

²⁷⁷Heywood, Andrew, *Political Ideologies* (London: Macmillan,1992), xiii.

Ideology has always been subject to severe debates.²⁷⁸ It has been charged with notions like “Ideas and ideologies are simply ‘window dressing’ used to conceal the deeper realities of political life.”²⁷⁹ But whatever the charge against it, there have been ideologies that have worked/failed in the last century like Nazism, Fascism, Socialism and there are some that have thrived namely, democracy, neo-conservatism, religious fundamentalism and developmentalism.²⁸⁰

There are some studies that are being carried out on the role of ideology on the process of intervention in foreign policy. Two dimensions of ideology that play a role in the context of intervention are recognised by Martini as militant dimension (dealing with security) and cooperative dimension (dealing with humanitarian issues).²⁸¹

3.4.3 Role of Ideology in Foreign Policy

Political ideologies are generally accepted to provide social groups and/or societies with a set of unifying beliefs and values. They can succeed in binding together divergent groups and classes within a society. Werner argues, that there is a social purpose of an ideology which is to provide a reference for both individuals and groups. It allows their behaviour to be influenced and directed toward the final goal of making social existence possible. He believes that shared values and beliefs strengthen it by guiding the behaviours of the members of society. They also strengthen a ‘sense of community.’ Moreover, it is useful, he says, to arouse public support of a state's policies as ideology appeals to common values and beliefs in a society.²⁸² Some

²⁷⁸ See *ibid.* p.6.

²⁷⁹ See *ibid.* p.2.

²⁸⁰ See Easterly, William, “The Ideology of Development,” *Foreign Policy* <http://foreignpolicy.com/2009/10/13/the-ideology-of-development/> accessed on 6-7-2016 at 2:30 AM.

²⁸¹ See Martini, Nicholas Fred, "The role of ideology in foreign policy attitude formation" *PhD (Doctor of Philosophy) thesis*, University of Iowa (2012), 137. [The role of ideology in foreign policy attitude formation - University of Iowa \(uiowa.edu\)](http://uiowa.edu) DOI: 10.17077/etd.6mz55796

²⁸² See Levi, Werner. “Ideology, Interests, and Foreign Policy.” *International Studies Quarterly* 14, no. 1 (1970):

scholars have gone so far as to accord the purpose of maintaining society to ideology.²⁸³ And the function of an ideology, it has been argued, “is for a man to come to terms with his world and to serve as a guide for his behaviour.”²⁸⁴ Different political ideologies have an appeal to different sections/social classes of society. For example, Andrew Heywood argues, Liberalism has an appeal for the middle class, Conservatism with landed aristocracy and Socialism with the working class.

It is noteworthy that ideologies subordinate the national to the international and sometimes the international to the national. It depends on the ideology’s orientation: whether it is inward looking or outward looking. Not all ideologies are nationalistically driven. Some have an international agenda to be fulfilled and some ideologies have national objectives that hover over the international. For example, Fascism and Nationalism subordinate the international to the national society.²⁸⁵

3.5 Impact of Ideology on Foreign Policy

Trying to show the relationship between foreign policy (as an instrument) and ideology, which is both organisational and activity driven, Majeski in her thesis argues, that ideology provides two functions: that of simplification and reflection of power relations. By simplifying, she means there are only a few policy instruments available to any state which are typically employed in multiple times and places. She argues, that only the wealthy and powerful states are able to benefit from financially well-supported policy instruments. There are only a few states that can give loans for development, train other states’ militaries and covertly dissuade

20. <https://doi.org/10.2307/3013538>. Accessed: 24-06-2016 13:54 UTC.

²⁸³See *ibid.* 21.

²⁸⁴See *ibid.* 4.

²⁸⁵Refer *ibid.* 21.

coup d'état.²⁸⁶ In other words, there are hierarchical and interventionary connotations, whereby great powers intervene in the affairs of weaker states.

Also, governments have been observed to use ideology to justify their foreign policies; Martini argues, that governments presumably want to impress both their 'public' and 'world public opinion' about their morals and desire satisfaction for their basic beliefs. Slogans specifically like 'the free world' have the capacity to effectively arouse popular support from members of some states (Martini labels it membership of that world) for certain policies but they also uncover propagandistic purposes.

“‘To make the world safe for democracy’ may increase a people's willingness to go to war, but the seriousness of the intent becomes doubtful when the character of some partners in the enterprise is discovered. In each such case the facts clearly do not support any claim that such high-sounding objectives were the true motives of the allegedly implementing policies. There is a vast difference in the roles ideology plays for Sir Edward Grey's ‘on-lookers,’ who may take it seriously but are most indirectly influential on the making of policy; and for those who decide foreign policies who are using it to satisfy the ‘onlookers.’”²⁸⁷

Keeping in mind this role of ideology, some scholars, especially from the realists' school have argued that it is always national interests that guide foreign policy decisions, however strong the ideological pull. Jeremy Bentham asserts that ideologies serve to rationalise selfish interests and are nothing but “fig leaves of the mind.”²⁸⁸ For Levi Werner, ideology performs a minor role in determining the states' objectives or even a plan of action to promote

²⁸⁶Sylvan, David and Stephen Majeski, "Ideology and Intervention," Paper prepared for presentation at the 49th Annual Convention of the International Studies Association, San Francisco (March 26-29, 2008) <http://faculty.washington.edu/majeski/sylvan.majeski.isa08.pap.pdf> Accessed on July 6, 2016 at 1:49 PM.

²⁸⁷See Martini, Nicholas Fred, "The role of ideology in foreign policy attitude formation" *PhD (Doctor of Philosophy) thesis*, University of Iowa (2012), 28. [The role of ideology in foreign policy attitude formation - University of Iowa \(uiowa.edu\)](http://uiowa.edu/~philosophy/theses/martini_nicholas_fred.pdf) DOI: 10.17077/etd.6mz55796

²⁸⁸See Levi, Werner. "Ideology, Interests, and Foreign Policy." *International Studies Quarterly* 14, no. 1 (1970): 30. <https://doi.org/10.2307/3013538>. Accessed: 24-06-2016 13:54 UTC.

national interests; yet it starts to play a more significant role once the decision have already been made.²⁸⁹ He also goes on to make the argument that foreign policy's objectives and actions are chosen beforehand and only later are values including ideology called upon to justify those chosen objectives and actions. It is in order to influence public opinion in support of a policy that ideology gains significance; it is also used when psychological strategy or warfare is involved in the implementation of a states' policy.²⁹⁰ He also makes an interesting observation that statesmen publicly show coincidence between the nation's interests and the prescriptions of morality to explain or justify their foreign policies. Ideology is never meant to pursue morality; rather, morality comes into play for justifying a policy to the public. National interests are primary and ideologies along with morality are subordinate to them. And pursuing any ideological policy necessarily requires the national interests to also lie in the same direction. Any contradiction between the two leads to cancellation of that policy.

Morality is brought to the fore only as a tool to justify foreign policy; it helps navigate public opinion even when the governments are aware of their incompatibility and run counter to the ideologies prevalent in their countries.²⁹¹ Hence, it has often been argued, "Ideas and ideologies are therefore simply 'window dressing' used to conceal the deeper realities of political life."²⁹² Yet, there are also studies that give more weightage to ideology as an influential factor in foreign policy making. Nicholas Martini argues, that ideology has both a direct and indirect effect: direct effect relates to attitudes regarding foreign policy and policy preferences and indirect effect relates to other external motivations that influence attitudes.²⁹³

²⁸⁹See *ibid.* 5.

²⁹⁰See *ibid.* 7-8.

²⁹¹See *ibid.* 8.

²⁹²Heywood, Andrew, *Political Ideologies* (London: Macmillan, 1992), 2.

²⁹³See Martini, Nicholas Fred, "The role of ideology in foreign policy attitude formation" *PhD (Doctor of Philosophy) thesis*, University of Iowa (2012), 72. [The role of ideology in foreign policy attitude formation - University of Iowa \(uiowa.edu\)](https://uiowa.edu/etd/6mz55796) DOI: 10.17077/etd.6mz55796

It is also natural, he further argues, that individuals who are inherently different with different beliefs and experiences, require ideology to shape preferences.²⁹⁴ This view is supported by ‘motivated reasoning’ a theory that argues, that ideology influences the way in which new information is understood and deciphered towards external stimuli. In a nutshell, “it can act as a gatekeeper to new information.”²⁹⁵ There are also studies that suggest that foreign policy decision makers are consistently acting in a way that is in cognizance with their party manifestoes, political platforms and voters’ expectations.²⁹⁶

There is also a rise in scholars examining ideology’s role in foreign policy; one such work argues, that there is something called a *Foreign Policy Ideology*. Nicolas Martini defines a foreign policy ideology as a lens that helps an individual in understanding international events and how to tackle them.²⁹⁷ Alongside this, it has been emphasised by scholars like Richard S. Grossman, that foreign policy should be more ideological.²⁹⁸ Hence, to conclude with Hunt’s observation, ideologies are important as they outline the specific issues that policymakers deal with and the observant public comprehends those issues.²⁹⁹

²⁹⁴See *ibid.* p.83.

²⁹⁵Refer *ibid.* p. 72-72.

²⁹⁶See Calin, Costel, "Hawks versus Doves: The Influence of Political Ideology on the Foreign Policy Behavior of Democratic States" *PhD diss.*, University of Tennessee, 2010. http://trace.tennessee.edu/utk_graddiss/782 Accessed 15-07-2016 at 2:36 AM, iii.

²⁹⁷ Martini defines it “as an individual’s general theory of how the international environment works, and how governments should act within this international framework. A foreign policy ideology should provide an individual with a lens on how he or she should perceive international events. This ideology should also aid the individual in the formation of more specific policy prescriptions to address these events.” For more, see Martini, Nicholas Fred, "The role of ideology in foreign policy attitude formation" *PhD (Doctor of Philosophy) thesis*, University of Iowa (2012), 12. [The role of ideology in foreign policy attitude formation - University of Iowa \(uiowa.edu\)](http://uiowa.edu) DOI: 10.17077/etd.6mz55796

²⁹⁸ See Grossman, Richard S., “Why Foreign Policy must be more ideological than economic policy,” <http://blog.oup.com/2013/10/why-foreign-policy-must-be-more-ideological-than-economic-policy/> accessed 6-7-2016 at 2:18 AM.

²⁹⁹See Calin, Costel, "Hawks versus Doves: The Influence of Political Ideology on the Foreign Policy Behavior of Democratic States" *PhD diss.*, University of Tennessee, 2010. http://trace.tennessee.edu/utk_graddiss/782 Accessed 15-07-2016 at 2:36 AM, p. 1.

3.6 Ideology in American Foreign Policy

As the subject of study is American Foreign Policy and Ideology, it becomes pertinent that the study traces the role and remnants of various ideologies that had an impact on the American foreign policy since the United States' independence in 1775. Yet, as has been often argued, there is not much literature on ideologies having an impact on American Foreign Policy during that period. In fact, some scholars have argued that the US's history with regards to foreign policy has been ambiguous. Aside from particularly significant events like the Monroe Doctrine, expansion of the North American continent, Theodore Roosevelt's policies and the World War I, there is little of interest in American foreign policy till the World War II.³⁰⁰ In fact, Walter Russell Mead notes that the rise of the U.S. to the status of a world power was paved with little interest in foreign policy. So much so that the little interest it did demonstrate, it did not do well in it. He also highlights some assertions like that of Henry Kissinger's who believed that there was little place in American thinking for foreign policy apart from the Monroe Doctrine and the Spanish-American War.³⁰¹

During the pre-war period, some scholars are of the opinion that America concentrated on its domestic policy, ignoring the sphere of foreign policy so much so that they have categorised America's foreign policy as being almost non-existent. They refer to that period as the Isolationist period. And even when American interest in the foreign affairs did increase, it is noteworthy that American people, as has been observed, even in contemporary times have little or no interest in foreign affairs unless something goes amiss. Claiming that American citizens have little interest in their history until something goes wrong, Gries argues, that

³⁰⁰ Blatt, Dan, Book Review of *Special Providence* by Walter Russell Mead, *Futurecasts* 5, no. 9, (September, 2003) accessed on 1-1-2017 at 9.19 PM. [www.futurecasts.com](http://www.futurecasts.com/book%20review%205-7.htm)
<http://www.futurecasts.com/book%20review%205-7.htm>

³⁰¹ Callaghan, John et al., *Ideologies of the US Foreign Policy* (New York: Routledge, 2019), 4.

American people, for this reason, tolerate partisanship in foreign policy.³⁰² Hence, it should be noted that the American public and American state's approach to foreign policy have discrepancies. This is a potential area of further study that requires attention from academia.

As to what is ideology's role in American foreign policy, the book on US ideologies by John Callaghan et al. answers this question methodically. The focus of this book is to not just look at ideology's influence in the making of American foreign policy but also to look at the rhetoric produced by these ideologies in the keynote speeches, doctrines and conversations employed by various American presidencies.

3.6.1 Political Traditions (as Ideology) in American Foreign Policy

Apart from ideology there are also studies that focus on political traditions. The political traditions debates have come to occupy an integral part in ideology debates as ideas of former presidents have over the years manifested into a sort of ideology that is unique to American foreign policy. Glenn Hastedt comes close to recognizing them but is content in describing them as ideas in his book *American Foreign Policy: Past, Present, Future*. He states that ideas have an influence over policies even after they have lost their vigour and the people who espoused them are no longer present.³⁰³ He is in actuality describing the ideological bent of American foreign policy that has come to be defined as political traditions. Michael Hunt in his book, recognizes their role and captures their essence when he argues that American Foreign Policy has seen the guidance of established political ideologies and also the ideas of former presidents which eventually took the shape of American ideology that exclusively pertains to America and have become political traditions within the nation. A relevant

³⁰²See Gries, Peter Hays, *The Politics of American Foreign Policy: How Ideology Divides Liberals and Conservatives over Foreign Affairs* (California: Stanford Security Studies, 2015), xvi.

³⁰³See Hastedt, Glenn, *American Foreign Policy: Past, Present, Future* (New Jersey: Prentice Hall, 2000), 30.

illustration would be the work of Walter Russell Mead who identifies four political traditions that shaped American foreign policy which he named after four American Presidents: as Hamiltonian tradition which focused on protecting commerce, Jeffersonian tradition which espoused the maintenance of a democratic system, Jacksonian tradition which focused on both populist values and military strength, and Wilsonian tradition which advocated moral principles. He uses the title *Special Providence* for his book as it is famously recorded that Otto von Bismarck allegedly said that God has “special providence for fools, drunks, and the United States of America.”³⁰⁴ He opines that American foreign policy has been a messy yet healthy product of debate among these four schools of thought. For him the Hamiltonians combined mercantile concerns with military security believing that with trade comes peace and profit. Wilsonians have been interventionists who pursue not economic or strategic interests but democracy, morality and human rights; Jeffersonians attempt to restrain foreign interventions so that democracy and peace can be protected at home instead of seeking to establish liberty abroad and lastly, Jacksonians who oppose foreign interventions like Jeffersonians yet are ready to wage wars to protect American interests abroad.³⁰⁵

3.7 Ideology in American Identity Formation

Having summed up major works on ideology and foreign policy linkages, I will proceed to argue that apart from guiding/influencing foreign policy and /forming worldviews of publics, ideology also influences identity formation of a state. Even though social constructivism studies the influence of ideas, values and norms in International Relations, very meagre work

³⁰⁴ Mead, Walter Russell, *Special Providence: American Foreign Policy and How It Changed The World*, (Random House, 2001) ISBN 0375412301 accessed on 1-1-2017 at 7.22 PM. [Special Providence | Council on Foreign Relations \(cfr.org\)](http://www.cfr.org/Foreign-Relations/Special-Providence/p11977.html)

³⁰⁵ Jerald A. Combs, Review of *Special Providence: American Foreign Policy and How It Changed the World* by Walter Russell Mead, *Journal of American History* 89, no., 3 (December 2002): 1147. <https://doi.org/10.2307/3092502>

has been carried out on ideology. In this study, I put forward the notion that the state's consciousness is formed by not just subscription to certain ideologies but also repeated use of those assumptions while talking/writing about itself and *other*/enemy. Certain basic presuppositions about both *self* and *other* are shaped by ideologies. Those then have a tendency to become ingrained in the vocabulary that is used to describe not just itself but the threat/enemy of a state. An integral part of identity formation in International Relations is based on core oppositions: reason/passion, moral/immoral; chaos/order; good/bad (evil) to name a few which then percolates subject positioning of *self* with the *other*. Hence, a state's consciousness which decides *presuppositions*, *predicates* and *subject positioning* in a state identity is heavily dependent on ideology. This penetrates the international discourse when policymakers of that state use certain words/predicates and language/rhetoric while dealing with other states, friend/foe. Discourse on *self* is inherently linked to discourse on the *other*. And so, language (inspired and influenced by ideology) creates the international world(s) (for there are multiple worlds and multiple identities in social constructivist analysis).

In the present study, American identity is the focus. American identity has been previously studied by several scholars including Tocqueville who grappled with the centrality of the American Creed. If anyone followed the American creed, he could become an American citizen, argued Thomas Jefferson. The requirements of the Creed were accepting and abiding with equality, individualism, freedom, hard work among others. Taking into account the racial contradiction whereby American identity membership was denied on racial lines, Myrdal described it as the American Dilemma. Many scholars argue that there exist multiple competing

conceptions of American identity which includes not just civic or ethnic but also liberalism, republicanism and other ethnocultural forms of Americanism.³⁰⁶

3.7.1. American Exceptionalism as an Ideology

"America is the only nation in the world that is founded on a creed. That creed is set forth with dogmatic and even theological lucidity in the Declaration of Independence..."

G.K. Chesterton³⁰⁷

The American state's inherent belief in its distinct historical experience, unique values based on religion and European liberal philosophy and exemplary political system together have come to be described as American Exceptionalism. It is also described as *Americanism* by scholars like Samuel Huntington,³⁰⁸ Robert Singh,³⁰⁹ Stanley Hoffman and Seymour Martin Lipset. *Americanism*/American Exceptionalism has a long history: distinct features as a society relating to history, national credo, culture, political institutions, religious institutions, and identity³¹⁰ all coalesce to define *Americanism*. I argue, that it has assumed diverse meaning over period of time which has seen a gradual change from celebration of uniqueness and being exemplary domestically to using means and resources to transform other societies and states, internationally based on its distinct experience. Due to the assumption that America is in

³⁰⁶Bui, Phoebe. "Defining American National Identity: An Exploration into Measurement and Its Outcomes." *Nationalities Papers*, (2022) 1–19. doi:10.1017/nps.2021.79. [Defining American National Identity: An Exploration into Measurement and Its Outcomes | Nationalities Papers | Cambridge Core](https://doi.org/10.1017/nps.2021.79)

³⁰⁷Lipset, Seymour Martin. "American Exceptionalism: A Double-Edged Sword." *The Washington Post* April 1, 2015. <https://yale.learningu.org/download/2997dee3-f7c2-4158-be99-f722c5f992af/H1576-American%20Exceptionalism%20:%20A%20Double%20Edged%20Sword.pdf>

³⁰⁸ Callaghan, John, Brendon O'Connor and Mark Phythian, *Ideologies of American Foreign Policy* (New York: Routledge, 2019), 19.

³⁰⁹ Singh, Robert, "Americanism," in *American Government and Politics: A Concise Introduction*, Endorsements for American Government and Politics (London: Sage Publications Ltd, 2003), 1-24. <https://dx.doi.org/10.4135/9781446215098.n1>.

³¹⁰ Thimm Johannes, "American Exceptionalism-Conceptual Thoughts Empirical Evidence," Paper for the Conference of the Young Investigators Group International Politics of the DVPW 13 14 July Darmstadt. [Thimm-American exceptionalism \(jukkarannila.fi\)](https://www.thimm-johannes.de/jukkarannila.fi)

possession of both the knowledge and skill as a ‘superior’ model of governance, American foreign policy discourse and American public’s perception of America’s role in global politics is heavily influenced by American exceptionalism. Johannes Thimm argues, that in US foreign policy literature, in the earlier stages, American exceptionalism was used to refer to ‘unilateralism’ while it later began being used as a cause of foreign policy behaviour or explanation of foreign policy.³¹¹ It remains popular in American ‘collective memory’ by its ‘resurrection’ in presidential speeches according to Thimm, which aligns with what this thesis also argues. Lipset famously described exceptionalism as a ‘double-edged sword’ in the title of his book in 1996. In fact, he began his book with reference to the USA as a state that was born out of revolution and based on ideology, *Americanism*.³¹²

One of the early credits for equating America with exceptionality goes to Alexis de Tocqueville after he published his classic work, *Democracy in America*, (where he compared Great Britain, France and the USA) which he wrote after travelling extensively in America. He wrote of America as a New World while referring to its democratic order. Seymour Martin Lipset argued America’s exceptionality emerges from its origin as a state with a revolutionary beginning. His findings take him to the American Revolution while my findings suggest that it can be traced to American Enlightenment which was the period which came before even the birth of United States of America as a nation-state³¹³ and in fact inspired the American Revolution. The ideas that guided the revolution had their origins in the American Enlightenment period. This study finds that scholars, journalists, thinkers, philosophers and also who came to be known as ‘Founding Fathers’/prominent leaders of the American

³¹¹ Ibid.

³¹² Lipset, Seymour Martin. “American Exceptionalism: A Double-Edged Sword.” *The Washington Post* April 1, 2015. <https://yale.learningu.org/download/2997dee3-f7c2-4158-be99-f722c5f992af/H1576-American%20Exceptionalism%20:%20A%20Double%20Edged%20Sword.pdf>

³¹³ My findings are supported by Thimm’s work who also argue that it predates US as a nation-state.

Enlightenment period laid the foundation on which American Revolution was fought. The writings and speeches of this period appealed to the American public's imagination with rigorous emphasis on nationalism. In order to bring a sense of cohesion among people belonging to several nationalities majorly from Europe, values, religion, faith, liberal philosophy were constantly used in their discourse and writings. I argue that during this period, a sense of what Benedict Anderson refers to nationalism as 'imagined communities' was created in America. The general consensus remained that this brand of American Nationalism was different from any other state's nationalism because of one distinction: America was unique and so was its mission; to share its exceptional experience with the other states by becoming the exemplary 'the City upon a Hill.' The phrase which appears frequently in American political rhetoric is a biblical reference to Jesus' Sermon on the Mount. It generally is used to signify the need for America to become that 'beacon of hope' which would guide the rest of the states. This is what I characterise as the 'initial stage/meaning' of American Exceptionalism where the USA was to be an exemplary state that would inspire other states to emulate it. With passage of time and increasing power that the USA came to occupy especially during and after the World Wars, the meaning of the term, 'American Exceptionalism' modified to incorporate active participation of the USA in matters/ affairs of other states. It was further modified after the Cold War especially under Bush (Jr.) where militarily other states were invaded to establish 'democracy' as a system of governance as was the case in Iraq and Afghanistan. This can be characterised as the 'advanced stage/meaning' of American Exceptionalism. Though several other reasons were offered for these wars, a constant reference was made in presidential rhetoric to the need to impose democracy in the states of the Middle East. Hence, there was a change: from perception of being destined to become an 'exemplary state' to perception of being enabled and equipped to impose democracy and liberal principles, 'American exceptionalism' has a long history.

I want to argue that though American Exceptionalism began as a variant of American nationalism it has come to occupy a distinct place among ideologies that have an impact on both American identity and American foreign policy discursive practices, especially in American presidential rhetoric. Apart from providing a system of beliefs, values and political identity, *Americanism* also assigns meaning by ordering or classifying the world between states that are democratic/liberal and that are not; whereby it assigns political identities to both groups of states. It also propels the American state into ‘action’ for change by providing a ‘course of action’; the means America employs has changed but intent remains the same in American attempts to transform the world in its own image which is to say export liberal free market ideology, liberal political principles and democracy. Ever since the American Enlightenment, the Founding Fathers' works and words began percolating into prominent newspaper articles, which later were compiled and collected under the Federalist papers. They also pervaded pamphlets like *Common Sense* and the *Rights of Man* by Thomas Jefferson and *The American Crisis* by Thomas Paine. Together they became a source for writing some of the most prominent American historical documents including the ‘Declaration of Independence’ and the ‘Constitution of America.’ Almost all these documents including the pamphlets and the Federalist Papers made references to the ‘unique’ American experience. The belief that America is destined to, entitled to and even equipped to play a distinct and unique role on the international scene. It presents this as a desirable universal goal in its discourse, especially in the presidential rhetoric. The dimensions of ideology that were identified by this thesis in the first section of the chapter are all fulfilled by American Exceptionalism/*Americanism*.

Consequently, I argue, that American consciousness is built upon its history that has sometimes been defined as ‘unique.’ It is a state that chose to be free from monarchy, drawing ideas from European enlightenment. America had its own enlightenment that had heavy

influences from European enlightenment thinkers including John Locke. It saw the emergence of its own thinkers whose words (written and spoken) have had a lasting impact on American consciousness. They have been preserved/maintained as the Federalist Papers, the Constitution of America and Declaration of Independence. They were also glorified by their Founding Fathers in their speeches and documents. Some classical texts like *Common Sense* and other works of Thomas Paine have also influenced this consciousness. These ideas, I argue, were built on ideologies of democracy, liberalism and nationalism. Ideas about what constitutes America, what role America envisions for itself in International Relations, how American identity can be preserved have underpinnings of these three ideologies under American exceptionalism.

Hence, this thesis identifies three recurring ideologies within American exceptionalism which recur in presidential rhetoric namely, nationalism, democracy and liberalism which will be used to study the presidential rhetoric in the Post-Cold war period. The belief that America was created under unique circumstances and had the mission to transform the world guides American discursive practices in foreign policy.

I argue, that foreign policy discourse then becomes a means to justify American action abroad both to the American public and international public. Policy makers, especially American presidents, then use rhetoric to justify American action abroad. The kind of rhetoric they use is dependent on the three ideologies of liberalism, democracy and nationalism, which are part of American exceptionalism. Whilst promoting liberal values and democracy abroad, the American president uses words infused with nationalism creating a sort of exalted nationalism/nationalistic pride among the Americans. It appears as if America is doing good/helping developing and underdeveloped states in their quest to become ‘civilised’ or rise to the level of becoming a civilised democratic state or even becoming a responsible member of the

international community. Such statements and/or more such similar statements by American presidents are examined in detail in the upcoming chapters.

It has been observed that the American president uses specific words replete with core oppositions against the threat/enemy/*other* whether it is reason versus passion, good versus bad/evil, order/chaos, just/unjust, civilised/barbaric among others. His rhetoric is laced with *predicates* that show the enemy in poor light whilst shining a spotlight on American success at being the opposite of whatever is wrong with the enemy. In such a narrative, America, it appears, has what it takes to be a success; (the grit, knowledge and know-how) and during its interventions /counter-insurgencies/invasions is lending a helpful hand to the enemy/*other*.

This thesis tries to understand how American identity gets defined while dealing with the other/enemy. The kind of language that was used both written/spoken during its historical experiences, by founding fathers, in historical documents like Federalist Papers or even American literature that is produced during the American enlightenment. How that language elevated liberal values and democracy crouched in language of nationalist pride and how it still is prevalent in the rhetoric of the American president. The study will employ the three analytical concepts to understand ideological rhetoric: presuppositions, predicates and subject-positioning. While David Campbell focussed on the essential *other* to define the American *self*, what I will focus on is the language that is used while talking/writing of the *other*. In such rhetoric, the enemy/*other* is positioned in relation to the *self* more often than not in opposition to the *self*. The *other* is always placed at a disadvantage and is always the object that is placed in opposition to the subject/American *self*. The opposition is not something that marks a subtle difference between them. It is an essential core opposition where in the American *self* is good/moral/just/noble/civilised/rational/order while the other is bad/evil/immoral/unjust/uncivilised/chaotic and not just irrational but passionate which makes it necessary to eliminate

the enemy within such states. It's the same rhetoric when America defined Japan or Philippines or even Vietnam as the core opposition of American *self*. It does so while dealing with Middle Eastern states. We will focus on the American presidential rhetoric in the Middle East in the Post-Cold war period as America has been involved most in the region in the last three decades or so after the end of the Cold War.

3.8 Conclusion

This study aims to draw attention to the role of ideology in identity formation in foreign policy. Ideology, though not the guiding principle, is always lurking behind the national interests, giving the extra push to formulation of a foreign policy and also to be used as a justification of certain national interest-oriented actions in presidential rhetoric. Through this chapter this study has attempted to draw attention to ideology's strong impact on foreign policy. It has also attempted to bring together arguments in favour of and in opposition to the view that ideology guides foreign policy. It also tried to establish that not only does America foreign policy discursive practices get influenced by ideology but it also gives America a strong sense of identity. It also draws attention to how American exceptionalism has been generating American consciousness and guiding American foreign policy discursive practices especially in the presidential rhetoric based on ideologies of nationalism, liberalism and democracy. In the next chapter, we will look at the discursive practices under George H.W. Bush (Sr.) and Bill Clinton in the Post-Cold war period.

CHAPTER FOUR

Ideological Foreign Policy Discursive Practices Under George H. W. Bush (Sr.) and William Clinton (1989-2001)

Introduction

In the previous chapter we looked at ideology's role in American foreign policy discursive practices. When American exceptionalism began being used as a reason/justification for action abroad, it also started percolating into American presidential rhetoric. The American presidents in order to get the American public on their bandwagon, began to influence them through their ideologically-charged speeches. In his book, *The Anti-Intellectual Presidency*,³¹⁴ Elvin T. Lim argues, that until the advent of radio and especially television, the speeches and addresses of the Presidents were exclusively meant for the Congress. Once it began broadcasting on television, the president was in every American's living room. Therefore, there was a decline in the quality of American Presidential rhetoric: more simplistic and less substantive. This dumbing down phenomena of the Presidential addresses Lim assigns to technological developments among other factors. Dumbed down verbiage can be seen mostly in Bill Clinton and George W. Bush (Jr.) as opposed to their predecessors, he argued.³¹⁵ He also observed, that from college reading level, the rhetoric of presidents has been dumbed down to eighth grade reading level. He stresses that quality has been compromised in these speeches not quantity. He moves the focus from Samuel Kernell arguments and Jeffrey Tulis's

³¹⁴Lim, Elvin T., *The Anti-Intellectual Presidency: The Decline of Presidential Rhetoric from George Washington to George W. Bush* (London: Oxford University Press, 2008), 48.

³¹⁵Miroff, Bruce, review of *The Anti-Intellectual Presidency: The Decline of Presidential Rhetoric from George Washington to George W. Bush* by Elvin T. Lim, *Political Science Quarterly* 124, no. 1 (Spring 2009): 189–190. <https://doi.org/10.1002/j.1538-165X.2009.tb01854.x>

[Anti-Intellectual Presidency: The Decline of Presidential Rhetoric from George Washington to George W. Bush by Elvin T. Lim | Political Science Quarterly | Oxford Academic \(oup.com\)](https://doi.org/10.1002/j.1538-165X.2009.tb01854.x)

description that 20th century presidents were rhetorical presidencies by describing them as anti-intellectual presidencies. He states that there is a rise in platitudes, emotional bathos and partisan cliches which amounted to the decline of logos.³¹⁶ There are less arguments and more applause; less educating the public/audience and more of pandering to them. Such change in rhetoric has created a “pathology of vacuous rhetoric and imagery” where appearances matter more than fact.³¹⁷ Case in point, he hints at Bill Clinton whose rhetoric he describes as “glib but unmemorable probably because he was a smooth operating anti-intellectual rhetorician”³¹⁸

To elaborate, Rhetorical Presidency is a theory in political communications which describes government style and communication of American presidents in the 20th century. Presidential rhetoric went through a transition from rhetoric being directed from the US Congress and other government bodies to the American public (not just rhetoric but policies and ideas as well). In 1987, Jeffrey Tulis published a book, *The Rhetorical Presidency* which garnered a lot of attention for tracing the historical evolution of presidential rhetoric. It was during Roanld Reagan’s presidency that political scientists first became convinced that presidential speeches and public appearances of American presidents can become a significant subject for study and analysis.³¹⁹ Joshua M. Scacco and Kevin Coe attempted to analyse newer realities of presidential rhetoric in the digital media age in their work. From Franklin D. Roosevelt’s use of radio and John F Kennedy’s use of television to Donald Trump’s use of social media platform, Twitter, these scholars argue, there has been an existence of a

³¹⁶See Ibid. 189.

³¹⁷Lim, Elvin T., *The Anti-Intellectual Presidency: The Decline of Presidential Rhetoric from George Washington to George W. Bush* (London: Oxford University Press:, 2008).

³¹⁸Miroff, Bruce, review of *The Anti-Intellectual Presidency: The Decline of Presidential Rhetoric from George Washington to George W. Bush* by Elvin T. Lim, *Political Science Quarterly* 124, no. 1 (Spring 2009): 190. <https://doi.org/10.1002/j.1538-165X.2009.tb01854.x>

³¹⁹See ibid.

‘mythology’ about the impact of presidential rhetoric on political and policy outcomes. The norm to study Presidential political communication is about ubiquity, they argue.³²⁰

In this chapter we will look at the discursive practices including speeches, press conferences and addresses of the first two Presidents of America in the Post-Cold war period namely, George H.W. Bush and William Clinton. The chapter will also employ public papers including proclamations, press releases, remarks and press conference excerpts, major Presidential speeches and executive orders of the Presidents. The focus while perusing these speeches will be to identify the *subject-positioning* and *predicates* (influenced by *ideological presuppositions*) that are used while discussing the Middle East. For the sake of maintaining clarity, the speeches have been divided by states within West Asia (or the Middle East) namely, Libya, Afghanistan, Iraq, Iran, and Israel/Palestine. The kind of rhetoric used to describe these states and their actions in relation to America will be the focus of this chapter. The three *ideological presuppositions*, liberal, nationalism and democratic, will be the guiding force in identifying the *predicates* used by American Presidents towards these states in the Middle East.

We will begin first by contextualising the Post-Cold war period while also touching upon the history of this period in order to contextualise and provide the relevant background to the study. It will then move onto foreign policy of America during the Post-Cold war period. The chapter will then analyse the *presuppositions*, *predicates* and *subject-positions* used by Presidents, Bush (Sr.) and Clinton on Libya, Iraq, Iran, Afghanistan and Israel/Palestine. Each

³²⁰Han, Lori Cox., review of *The Ubiquitous Presidency: Presidential Communication and Digital Democracy in Tumultuous Times* by Joshua M. Scacco and Kevin Coe (New York: Oxford University Press, 2021), 248. *Perspectives on Politics* 20, no. 1 (2022): 334–35. doi:10.1017/S1537592721003431. [The Ubiquitous Presidency: Presidential Communication and Digital Democracy in Tumultuous Times. By Joshua M. Scacco and Kevin Coe. New York: Oxford University Press, 2021. 248p. \\$99.00 cloth, \\$27.95 paper. | Perspectives on Politics | Cambridge Core](#)

section will first capture the rhetoric which will then be followed by analysis that incorporates the ideological presuppositions, predicates and subject-positioning.

4.1 The Aftermath of Cold War

The political situation in the aftermath of the Cold War in the international system was volatile. The collapse of the Soviet Union seems to have left the Communist-inclined states tense and uneasy about their future in a world where Capitalism had seemingly endured the test of time. A struggle that had played out for more than half a century appeared to culminate in the implosion of the United States' contender, i.e., the Soviet Union leaving relations between several states strained and turbulent. America no longer faced the menace of hostile ideology or foreign military power.³²¹ The system seemed to pulsate with multiple possibilities; Robert Jervis argues₂ that the events of 1989 were unforeseen but the world was certainly entering a new phase and much of what the analysts anticipated for the coming decade was unpleasant.³²² There was a quest for a new American role in the world once the Soviet Union called off the Cold War, states Charles Krauthammer. He reiterated that unipolarity is the most striking feature of the Post-Cold war world.³²³ There was also rejoicing of American Capitalist victory in theses such as the 'End of History' and 'Clash of Civilizations.' Francis Fukuyama in his acclaimed book,³²⁴ argued that the triumph of Western liberal democracy might be the endpoint of mankind's sociocultural evolution and ultimate system of human government. The world, he argued, was gripped by not just the end of the Cold War but also the end of history with the

³²¹Thies, Wallace J, "Rethinking the New World Order" *Orbis* 38, no. 4 (1994): 621-634.

³²²Jervis, Robert, "The Future of World Politics: Will It Resemble the Past?" *International Security* 16, no. 3 (1991): 39–73. <https://doi.org/10.2307/2539088>.

³²³Krauthammer, Charles, "The Unipolar Moment," *Foreign Affairs* 70 (1990): 23. Also available in Krauthammer Charles, "The Unipolar Movement" in *Rethinking American Security: Beyond Cold War to New World Order*, eds. Allison Graham T. and Trevorton Gregory F. (New York: Norton, 1992).

³²⁴ Fukuyama, Francis, *The End of History and the Last Man*. (Harlow: Penguin Books, 2012).

universal appeal of Western liberal democracy proliferating as the highest form of human government.

The Clash of Civilizations and the Remaking of World Order (1996) attempted to guide American Foreign Policy by offering suggestions to policy makers: to exploit the differences among *other* civilizations. While at the same time, Samuel P. Huntington's argued that America should work towards improving itself to retain its leadership that the end of the Cold War had bestowed on the United States. Identifying around eight civilizations in the world, Huntington argued, that the "primary source of conflict" in the Post-Cold war period will be 'cultural' and 'religious' identities. The ideological conflicts of the Cold War would no longer be the defining source of conflict. His work identified Islamic and Sino (Chinese) Civilizations as the imminent threats to Western Civilization. And when America intervened in West Asia multiple times in the aftermath of the Cold War, many argued that Huntington's prediction of a clash of civilizations was being realised. Both these works were previously articles that garnered such conflicting views from across the world that the authors went on to convert and publish them as books, elaborating their ideas about the nature of world politics at the advent of the Post-Cold war period.

Responses from Europe, Canada³²⁵ and the rest of the world was different. Some like Janice Gross Stein, in her article in 1992 questioned the-then popular notion among American scholars that the world was by any means a unipolar world; she described it as 'the myth of Unipolarity'³²⁶ Christopher Layne in 1993 titled his article *The Unipolar Illusion* because he argued there was a scope for other great powers rising; America has not been able to impose a

³²⁵Barbara McDougall elaborates on Canadian options in McDougall, B, "Meeting the Challenge of the New World Order," *International Journal* 47, no.3 (1992): 463–478. <https://doi.org/10.1177/002070209204700302>

³²⁶Stein, J. G., "Living with Uncertainty: Canada and the Architecture of the New World Order," *International Journal* 47, no.3 (1992): 614–629. <https://doi.org/10.1177/002070209204700308>

‘universal monarchy’ on the international system even though by far it enjoys the utmost preeminent place in international politics.³²⁷

The Post-Cold war epoch is an interesting period in world history because the amount of debates and theories that were proposed and predicted were umpteen. And yet I wonder not for the first time that there is no better term that has been coined to define/summarise/describe/capture this period. It remains an era that has witnessed several defining changes in world politics but it has not yet achieved an identity that is bereft of the Cold War reference. It continues to be defined as the Post-Cold war period. Paul Wolfowitz,³²⁸ in his article published in the magazine, *National Interest* argued, that the present era, even now, has no better name than the Post-Cold war period. In other words, he was hinting that the era has no name yet. Discussing the Post-Cold war period, Condoleezza Rice reflected that the constant reference to the present period as ‘Post-Cold War period’ is proof that they do not know how to think beyond a confrontation between the US and the Soviet Union.³²⁹ Alternate names that were suggested included ‘Pax Americana’ which was rebuffed by Fareed Zakaria and others. The lone superpower, namely the United States of America, offering leadership in the international system was acceptable but defining an era with America’s name was deemed controversial and did not sit well with many around the world as it excluded other realities of international politics.

Clash of Civilizations (proposed and popularised by S. P. Huntington) was also seen as a lens for analysing the Post-Cold war period. The Western driven popular opinion (majorly American), immediately after the end of cold war, were abstractions like the ‘Lone Power,’

³²⁷Layne, Christopher, “The Unipolar Illusion: Why New Great Powers Will Rise,” *International Security* 17, no. 4 (1993): 5–51. <https://doi.org/10.2307/2539020>.

³²⁸Wolfowitz, Paul, "Remembering the Future," *The National Interest* no. 59 (Spring 2000): 35. [Remembering the Future \(jstor.org\)](#)

³²⁹ Condoleezza Rice, “Promoting the National Interest,” *Foreign Affairs* 79, no.1 (January/February 2000): 45.

‘Unipolar World,’ ‘American Hegemony,’ and the like. The conceptualising of the world into different civilizations posed in opposition to Western Civilization, became popular after Huntington proposed it. He argued, that the hallmark of Western civilization’s victory lay in its tenacious and overarching struggle to maintain a stable economy, human rights, democracy and political liberty, which were presented in opposition to the struggling civilizations. That these civilizations could benefit only from emulating the Western Civilization was evident in many writings during that time, even if couched in different terms than the civilization thesis.

Addressing the challenges, the United States was facing in its foreign policy reorientation in Post-Cold war conditions, David Campbell in his 1992 book, applied critical theory with focus on ‘culture’ and ‘identity’ to the study of International Relations. In his ground-breaking work, he emphasised on how “perceptions of danger and difference” help the United States in building its ‘identity.’ He extends this logic in analysis of American foreign policy. He claims that foreign policy establishes state identity by interpreting danger from *others*. Hence, a threat or danger from a contender leads to cohesion within a society/state where foreign policy is dependent on the presence of the *other*. While tracing the history of the *other* that has helped build American identity, he identifies the Soviet Union as the threat during the Cold war and predicts the terrorist of the Middle East region may be the potential danger in the Post-Cold war period.

4.2 Foreign Policy of America in the Post-Cold War Period

While many Western scholars were celebrating the rise of American hegemony, others were busy offering directions, aims and policy changes that focused on the emerging leader of the Post-Cold war international system, i.e., America. Certain themes, ideals and ideologies that were in favour of the Western world were being presented as foreign policy directives.

There were changes in tone, vocabulary, and terms used to define American foreign policy that resonated with expansion of western interests. The Realists and neorealists' outlook took a backseat among IR theories. Newer approaches that revolved around culture, identity, history, structure et al emerged in analysing world politics. There was no contending *other* and the responsibility of being the only major power defining international politics lay with the United States. And this new situation demanded a newer outlook. The George H W Bush administration was in power when the Soviet Union collapsed in 1991 and it tackled the void in the international system without the confrontational *other* by offering and promoting the 'New World Order.' He described the onset of a new era as a 'new American century.'³³⁰ The notion of 'New World Order' came out in various Presidential addresses, press conferences and press releases, proclamations and executive orders. An in-depth analysis of the New World Order will be made as the chapter progresses.

Globalisation gained prominence in the Post-Cold war period which was especially espoused by the Bill Clinton administration. Economics was this administration's major focus both in its domestic and foreign policy. In the Post-Cold war world, Bill Clinton asserted that American national security would require economic strength and leadership.³³¹ He stressed that American security in the 21st century demanded America to remain a 'pacific power' and America already was a 'pacific power.'³³² And to achieve this end, enlargement of NATO was

³³⁰Refer Public Papers of George H.W. Bush, "Remarks at a Meeting of the American Society of Association Executives" (Feb. 27, 1991): 187. [George Bush Library and Museum \(tamu.edu\)](http://www.tamu.edu/bush) [Public Papers of the Presidents of the United States | GovInfo](http://www.govinfo.gov)

³³¹Refer Public Papers of William J. Clinton, "The President's Radio Address" (Nov. 8, 1997, Book II): 1514. [From the U.S. Government Publishing Office www.gpo.gov] [Public Papers of the Presidents of the United States: William J. Clinton \(1997, Book II\) - The President's Radio Address \(govinfo.gov\)](http://www.govinfo.gov)

³³²Refer Public Papers of William J. Clinton (Nov 22, 1997, Book II): 1631. [From the U.S. Government Publishing Office www.gpo.gov] [Public Papers of the Presidents of the United States | GovInfo](http://www.govinfo.gov)

essential, he argued. Many scholars questioned the need for increasing budgets and expenditure on intelligence, NATO and military and military technology after the collapse of the USSR. They questioned the increasing relevance of such massive budgets in the absence of the *other/enemy/antagonist* to confront or fight. The American enemy was not clearly defined and it left little scope for any drastic increase in military spending. Yet, America continued to increase the budgets and expenditure.³³³

The logic forwarded by American presidents including Clinton and George W. Bush (Jr.) was the need for preparedness to confront terrorism, the rise of WMDs and the spread and maintenance of peace in the world. In 1994, the Clinton administration established Partnership for Peace (PFP) which had provided an improved mechanism to use in developing the interoperability with NATO that would be necessary for future NATO-led Allied/Partner missions.³³⁴ It was on March 14, 1998, in a letter to congressional leaders that Clinton appealed for the enlargement of North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO) arguing that it would benefit and consolidate America's security and stability that resulted from the end of the Cold War. The core mission of NATO would remain the collective defence of the territory of its neighbours and adding new members/new allies/new forces that would help share the security burden. It would help erase the dividing lines that came about during the Cold War and also help in building undivided democratic and peaceful Europe; this was the strategic goal of the USA.³³⁵ During the celebrations for the 50th anniversary of NATO, Bill Clinton described NATO's role in the 21st century. He talked of the link that binds 'North America' and 'Europe'

³³³Soros, George, "The Bubble of America Supremacy," *The Atlantic*, December 2003. [The Bubble of American Supremacy - The Atlantic](#) Scholars like Noam Chomsky and Moazzam Ali have also captured this in their writings.

³³⁴Refer Public Papers of William J. Clinton (Sept. 26, 2000, Book II): 1945. [From the U.S. Government Publishing Office www.gpo.gov] [Public Papers of the Presidents of the United States | GovInfo](#)

³³⁵Refer Public Papers of William J. Clinton (March 16, 1998, Book I): 377. [From the U.S. Government Publishing Office www.gpo.gov] [Public Papers of the Presidents of the United States | GovInfo](#)

in a “unique defence and security partnership”. He argued that the Alliance would be even stronger in enhancing its capacity to address conflicts beyond American borders. It would also protect citizens from terrorism, WMDs and help new members join it.³³⁶

Under nationalist presupposition, this study will identify and analyse statements on promotion of American nationalism in the presidential rhetoric. There is also the frequent fixation and preoccupation with maintaining and promoting peace and liberal values in the world. This study categorises this under liberal presuppositions. There is a constant reference to promotion of democracy in order to maintain world peace which is categorised under democratic presupposition.

Clinton, on his visit to India discussed his vision for the 21st century. On March 21, 2000 he declared that freedom and democracy were the strongest bases for peace and prosperity. These were ‘universal aspirations’ that were neither constrained by culture nor levels of economic development.³³⁷ I argue, that any rhetoric that promotes universality is suspect of ideological bearings. And American foreign policy is no exception. It is the recurrence of such Presidential statements that clarify this study’s basis that there is a continuity in ideological presuppositions: promotion of American nationalism, liberal values, peace and democracy. In the Post-Cold war period, Clinton clarified that American interests would be better served with “properly conceived and well-executed peace operations” and affirmed that peace operations could not be the centrepiece of U.S. foreign policy.³³⁸

³³⁶Refer Public Papers of William J. Clinton (April 24, 1999, Book I): 612-613.. [From the U.S. Government Publishing Office www.gpo.gov] [Public Papers of the Presidents of the United States](#) | [GovInfo](#)

³³⁷Refer Public Papers of William J. Clinton (March 21, 2000, Book I): 502. [From the U.S. Government Publishing Office www.gpo.gov] [Public Papers of the Presidents of the United States](#) | [GovInfo](#)

³³⁸Refer Public Papers of William J. Clinton (May 5, 1994, Book I): 853. [From the U.S. Government Publishing Office www.gpo.gov] [Public Papers of the Presidents of the United States](#) | [GovInfo](#)

Any discussion on peace is related to combating/fighting/struggling/confronting some *other* as has been discussed earlier. The *other*, after the demise of the Soviet Union, were the terrorist organisations and the terrorists that American people needed protection from and American interests and security were threatened by. Clinton's statements also fall within such reoccurring ideological foreign policy rhetoric. He argued that no campaign for peace can succeed without a determination to fight terrorism.³³⁹ On July 21, 1998, Bill Clinton identified twelve terrorist organisations that threatened the 'Middle-East peace process' and as per the executive order 'all property and interests' of these organisations were blocked.³⁴⁰ In the 21st century, he declared the American people's security would require the USA to fight terrorism all 'around the world' and at home.³⁴¹

Both the administrations appealed to the American people in their political discourse espousing the need to uphold the 'American Spirit' and the American 'ideals' and 'morals,' which is categorised under nationalist presuppositions. For instance, while discussing American greatness, Bill Clinton appealed to the people of America to draw on their strengths and spirit to renew their faith in the greatness and unlimited potential of their country.³⁴² Both the administrations claimed that 'national security,' 'national identity' and 'foreign policy' of the United States were under 'threat' during certain major events in the Middle East region. It is for the purpose of clarity that the study will focus on one major state at a time from the

³³⁹Refer Public Papers of William J. Clinton (Aug. 20, 1998, Book II): 1461. [From the U.S. Government Publishing Office www.gpo.gov] [Public Papers of the Presidents of the United States | GovInfo](#)

³⁴⁰Refer Public Papers of William J. Clinton (July 21, 1998, Book II): 1293. [From the U.S. Government Publishing Office www.gpo.gov] [Public Papers of the Presidents of the United States | GovInfo](#)

³⁴¹Refer Public Papers of William J. Clinton (May 27, 1995, Book I): 758. [From the U.S. Government Publishing Office www.gpo.gov] [Public Papers of the Presidents of the United States | GovInfo](#)

³⁴²Refer Public Papers of William J. Clinton (Oct. 29, 1994, Book II): 1904. [From the U.S. Government Publishing Office www.gpo.gov] [Public Papers of the Presidents of the United States | GovInfo](#)

Middle East while attempting to demonstrate the continuity in ideological presuppositions of nationalism, liberalism and democracy in the American presidential rhetoric.

4.3 American Presidential Ideological Discursive Foreign Policy Practices towards the Middle East

In the aftermath of the demise of the Soviet Union, the sphere of American influences increased around the world and the Middle East was no exception. The Bush (Sr.) administration's focus in the region revolved around the national emergency on Libya and the Persian Gulf Crisis. The federal papers of the president gave regular updates on these two events to the Congress, America people, international community and other government institutes and agencies through speeches, interviews, addresses and reports.

Similar was the case under the Clinton administration. The Bill Clinton administration concentrated on building the economy domestically and maintaining peace and promoting liberal ideas like human rights and democracy. It was committed to fighting against terrorism abroad. Specifically, in the Middle East, American focus during the Clinton presidency centred on four major events namely, the national emergency on Libya, national emergency on Iran, Israel-Palestine Peace talks and Iraq. The President also focused on terrorism in the Middle East and passed laws on counterterrorism that developed into a major concern of American foreign policy in the new century and had tremendous bearing on George Bush administration's foreign policy. There is a continuity and a pattern that developed in the Post-Cold war period concerning terrorism and policies on the Middle East which will be analysed as the thesis progresses. This section will attempt to establish that the American presidential rhetoric in the Post-Cold war period pertaining to the Middle East region was heavily laced with the three

ideological presuppositions: nationalism, liberalism and democracy. These, in turn, affected the *predicates* and *subject-positioning* used by these presidents in their rhetoric.

While declaring emergencies on states in the Middle East, America appealed to its citizen's support by repeatedly magnifying the threat these states posed to American 'security,' 'identity' and 'foreign policy.' During the Cold War, it was the policy of the United States and Soviet Union to get involved in any disturbances in the international system, in states' domestic and foreign politics in order to take control of the situation by influencing the states with their respective ideologies of Capitalism and Communism. Both the states of USA and USSR would be on alert and look out to claim newer states into their Bloc by manipulating and sometimes bullying states into taking sides after getting involved in domestic politics of states. The Middle East region was one such volatile region and after the demise of the Soviet Union, the United States continued to be involved in the region aggressively either through imposing sanctions or declaring wars on states in the region. In short, the end of the Cold War did not herald the end of interventions in the Middle East region. The region continued to hold appeal, among others reasons, due to its rich natural resources including oil, support of Israel (under the influence of Jewish Lobby on the US foreign policy), intention of establishing peace in the Middle East, and protecting American allies from unrest in the region.

As has been argued in the previous chapters, the United States did not declare wars without providing some rationale to its people and the international community at large. American nationalism was appealed to while declaring emergencies or interventions or wars by displaying the good that American involvement would bring to the situation. American liberal ideals, values and morals were being upheld while going to wars. And if not nationalism, then struggling for or against some ideals or ideologies was a prominent policy during the Post-Cold war period along with the promotion of liberal values and democracy that remained at the

core of American foreign policy. In this section, the chapter will identify some major events in the Middle Eastern States that America was involved in and through the Presidential statements will attempt to identify *ideological presuppositions*, *predicates* and *subject-positioning* in the American presidential rhetoric.

4.3.1 American Presidential Ideological Discursive Foreign Policy Practices towards Libya

4.3.1.1 George H. W. Bush's (Sr.) Rhetoric on Libya

It was during Ronald Reagan's administration that a national emergency was declared by the United States on Libya under the Executive Order No. 12543 on January 7, 1986. The Bush (Sr.) administration imposed economic sanctions on Libya. On January 11, 1991 Bush in his report to the Congress announced that the 'policies' and 'actions' of the Government of Libya continued to "pose an unusual and extraordinary threat to the national security and foreign policy of the United States," Thus, the sanctions will continue till deemed appropriate by his administration.³⁴³ On December 30, 1992, he asserted the same in his letter to the congressional leaders about Libya.³⁴⁴

The reports reflect the operation of nationalist presuppositions in the rhetoric of Bush(Sr.). While reporting to the Congress on Libya, Bush, in his discourses, emphasised that Libyan actions and policies are unacceptable³⁴⁵ as they pose a threat to the national security of

³⁴³Refer Public Papers of George H. W. Bush (Jan. 11, 1991, Book I): 30. [From the U.S. Government Publishing Office www.gpo.gov] [Public Papers of the Presidents of the United States | GovInfo](http://www.gpo.gov/publications/presidents/pubs/pubs.html)

³⁴⁴Refer Public Papers of George H. W. Bush (Dec. 30, 1992, Book II): 2219. [From the U.S. Government Publishing Office www.gpo.gov] [Public Papers of the Presidents of the United States | GovInfo](http://www.gpo.gov/publications/presidents/pubs/pubs.html)

³⁴⁵Two Libyan intelligence agents were charged by the U.S. and Scotland in 1991 for their involvement in the bombing of a flight in 1988 in Scotland. It was in January 1992, that the UN demanded from Libya the surrender of the suspects while cooperating with the investigations. They also asked the Libyan Government under Gaddafi to pay the victim's families compensation and stop any and all support of terrorism. When Libya refused to comply, the United Nations on March 31, 1992, imposed sanctions that limited freezing of assets and in 1993 there was also an embargo imposed. Libya under the leadership of Muammar Gaddafi fired on US aircrafts when

the United States. In other words, the interests of the United States were susceptible to threat in the Middle East region. It is noteworthy that such statements were intended to justify and gain credibility among the American people due to the operative word, national security. Any threat to the nation and its security required immediate attention and action by the American government and this was amply used in declaring national emergency and continuing the economic sanctions on Libya. The other operative adjectives used to describe the threat were ‘unusual’ and ‘extraordinary.’ They point towards the special nature of the national emergency as Libya had not declared a war on America or any of its neighbours which would have made it imperative for the United States to intervene as the most influential member of the international community.

4.3.1.2 Bill Clinton’s Rhetoric on Libya

The Bill Clinton administration renewed the national emergency on Libya on January 13, 1998 under which all trade with Libya was prohibited and all assets owned and controlled by the Libyan government were blocked. The “unusual and extraordinary threat to the national security and foreign policy of the United States” would continue, he declared until Libya demonstrates, by concrete actions, its ‘renunciation of terrorism’ and responds effectively to decisions of the Security Council concerning bombing of two flights, Pan Am 103 and UTA 772.³⁴⁶

they were carrying out naval exercises over Mediterranean international waters that Libya claimed as hers. The US planes shot down the attacking aircraft and in 1981, after this Gulf of Sidra incident, the United States not only advised all US citizens to leave from Libya but also invalidated passports for travelling to Libya. Over the years all import and export was prohibited between both the countries.

³⁴⁶Refer Public Papers of William J. Clinton (Jan. 13, 1998, Book I): 49-50. [From the U.S. Government Publishing Office www.gpo.gov] and (July 6, 1998, Book II): 1187. [Public Papers of the Presidents of the United States | GovInfo](http://www.gpo.gov/publications/pubs/pubs.html)

The threat from Libya for the United States continued to be unusual and extraordinary under the Clinton administration but what is noteworthy is that the use of the term, “terrorism” became significant for effectively continuing the sanctions on Libya. It was during the Clinton administration that the term ‘terrorists’ became the operative word for declaring sanctions and emergencies on states in the Global South, especially in the region of Middle East. David Campbell predicted that it would be the terrorists who would be the *other* the United States would confront or struggle against in the 21st century.³⁴⁷ And his analysis holds true with the War on Terror preoccupying America in the first decade of the 21st century under George W. Bush. It is these little nuances, this thesis argues, that slowly roll into significant foreign policy actions that need to be analysed under the American Presidential foreign policy rhetoric.

4.3.2 American Presidential Ideological Discursive Foreign Policy Practices during the First Iraq War and National Emergency and Sanctions on Iraq

4.3.2.1 George H. W. Bush’s (Sr.) Rhetoric on Iraq

The most significant event that the Bush (Sr.) administration was involved in in the Middle East was the Persian Gulf crisis or the First Iraq War. Iraq had been declared a threat and a national emergency was declared in the year 1990 on August 2, in ‘Executive Order 12722’ under the Bush administration.³⁴⁸ In his news conference on January 12, 1991, Bush (Sr.) emphasised that the Persian Gulf Crisis demanded American attention just like other instances throughout history where America resolutely supported ‘justice, freedom and human dignity.’ America, he said, was not planning or seeking war but “if conflict is thrust upon us

³⁴⁷See David Campbell, *Writing Security: United States Foreign Policy and the Politics of Identity* (Minneapolis: University of Minnesota Press, 1992).

³⁴⁸Refer Public Papers of George H. W. Bush (July 21, 1992, Book I): 1155. [From the U.S. Government Publishing Office www.gpo.gov] and Refer Public Papers of William J. Clinton (Aug. 13, 1998, Book II): 1446. [From the U.S. Government Publishing Office www.gpo.gov] [Public Papers of the Presidents of the United States | GovInfo](http://www.gpo.gov)

we are ready and we are determined.”³⁴⁹ When the Congress rendered its support to Bush, he declared that it was time Saddam Hussein realised that he was in confrontation with the ‘determination of the American people.’³⁵⁰ And war could end only with ‘full and unconditional compliance with UN Security Council Resolution 678.’

On January 28, 1991 Bush declared that Iraq was not against America but against the rest of the world. He also stated that it was not a religious war but a struggle between “good versus evil, right versus wrong and also human dignity and freedom versus tyranny and oppression.” He went on to describe the war as a ‘just war’ where good will prevail and in lieu with the first principle of ‘just war,’ the support of a ‘just’ and ‘noble’ cause, America will seek Iraqi troops’ withdrawal from Kuwait. He further confirmed that America was not seeking anything for themselves, (“we ask nothing in return”³⁵¹) not even destruction of Iraq. When exhaustive diplomacy fails, he stated, use of force is moral and the last resort.³⁵² Expanding on American foreign policy that was based on respect of all nations and belief that justice of morality will triumph, he maintained that moral order must be the vision compelling America to wage a war against Iraq.³⁵³

The sum of Bush’s (Sr.) statements resonate excessively with the statements of George W. Bush (Jr.) as will be elaborated in the next chapter. Arguments like force becomes moral and can be used when diplomacy fails and vision of moral order compels America to wage a

³⁴⁹Refer Public Papers of George H. W. Bush (Jan. 12, 1991, Book I): 31-36. . [From the U.S. Government Publishing Office www.gpo.gov] [Public Papers of the Presidents of the United States | GovInfo](http://www.gpo.gov)

³⁵⁰Refer Public Papers of George H. W. Bush (Jan. 12, 1991, Book I). [From the U.S. Government Publishing Office www.gpo.gov] [Public Papers of the Presidents of the United States | GovInfo](http://www.gpo.gov)

³⁵¹Refer Public Papers of George H. W. Bush (March 6, 1991, Book I): 222. [From the U.S. Government Publishing Office www.gpo.gov] [Public Papers of the Presidents of the United States | GovInfo](http://www.gpo.gov)

³⁵²Refer Public Papers of George H. W. Bush (Jan. 28, 1991, Book I). [From the U.S. Government Publishing Office www.gpo.gov] [Public Papers of the Presidents of the United States | GovInfo](http://www.gpo.gov)

³⁵³Refer Public Papers of George H. W. Bush (Jan. 30, 1991, Book I): 81. [From the U.S. Government Publishing Office www.gpo.gov] [Public Papers of the Presidents of the United States | GovInfo](http://www.gpo.gov)

war with Iraq are pregnant with *ideological presuppositions*. The American presidential rhetoric is heavily pervaded by the *subject-positioning*: distinction between good/right/freedom versus evil/wrong/oppression, where the good, noble, just, moral, and all things desirable and worthy of being emulated was represented by the United States and everything evil, tyrannical, and oppressive and in need of transformation/change was the *other* which in this instance was embodied by Iraq in the Middle East. The *predicates* used to describe *self* fell in the broad purview of all things positive and desirable (noble, good, moral, just, freedom, dignity), while the *predicates* used for the deviant *other*, in this case Iraq were negative and wanting (evil, oppressive, tyrannical).

Another significant aim of US foreign policy that was also presented as the reason for intervening/interfering in the Middle East in general (and Iraq, in this instance) was the claim that their efforts/attempts were to bring/herald and maintain peace. Discussing the maintenance of peace in the world as the ultimate aim of American foreign policy, Bush clarified that the goal of ‘real peace’ and ‘triumph of freedom’ was not just ‘absence of war’ but something that could be achieved by the means of “courage and character of the American people.”³⁵⁴ Such arguments are informed by the ideological presuppositions of nationalism and liberalism.

Discussing his intentions, Bush stated that the war with Iraq will herald peace out of which will emerge hope that will create a ‘New World Order.’ This was an attempt by Bush (Sr.) to create a new ‘rationale’ for American foreign policy after the end of USA-USSR confrontational war, which he argued was based on ‘human rights,’ ‘free trade’ and ‘democracy.’³⁵⁵ In Bush's own words, the prominent policy of his administration was the ‘New

³⁵⁴Refer Public Papers of George H. W. Bush (June 8, 1991, Book I): 627. [From the U.S. Government Publishing Office www.gpo.gov] [Public Papers of the Presidents of the United States | GovInfo](#)

³⁵⁵ Edwards, Jason A, *Navigating the Post-Cold War World: President Clinton's Foreign Policy Rhetoric* (Plymouth: Lexington Books, 2008), xii.

World Order,’ that has been observed was an attempt to give ‘moral leadership’ to the USA. There is no one document discussing the foreign policy directive of the New World Order;³⁵⁶ in various speeches, addresses, reports submitted to the Congress and press releases and interviews, he elucidated what the term means. Discussing the end of the Cold War, he stated that America has progressed in ‘ending the long era of conflict and war.’ The New World Order that had emerged out of it would be based on the ‘rule of law’ and not the ‘law of the jungle’ that would govern the ‘conduct of nations.’³⁵⁷

Quoting Churchill, this notion of world order, he added, would be based on the ‘principles of justice and fair play’ that would ‘protect the weak against the strong’ and where freedom and respect for human rights will be universally acceptable among all nations. Describing the win in the Gulf as the passing of the test in the New World Order, he stresses that this new Order will not be able to guarantee ‘an era of perpetual peace’ but ‘enduring peace’ will remain America’s mission. For him the freedoms and liberties of men as expounded by Thomas Jefferson and Franklin Roosevelt: the right to life, liberty and pursuit of happiness and the freedom of expression, worship, and freedom from want and fear had been guiding America. These were prompting and heralding the ‘New World Order,’ based on ‘respect for the individual’ and the ‘rule of law’ that were capable of leading the world towards lasting peace.³⁵⁸

³⁵⁶ Roy Joseph rightly points out that Bush’s ‘New World Order’ offered ‘moral leadership’ to USA, which were almost comparable to UN’s charter prescription. He was not able to define what the ‘phrase’ meant. See ³⁵⁶ Edwards, Jason A, *Navigating the Post-Cold War World: President Clinton’s Foreign Policy Rhetoric* (Plymouth: Lexington Books, 2008), xii.

³⁵⁷Refer Public Papers of George H. W. Bush (Jan. 16, 1991, Book I): 44. [From the U.S. Government Publishing Office www.gpo.gov] [Public Papers of the Presidents of the United States | GovInfo](#)

³⁵⁸Refer Public Papers of George H. W. Bush (Jan. 30, 1991, Book I): 81. [From the U.S. Government Publishing Office www.gpo.gov] [Public Papers of the Presidents of the United States | GovInfo](#)

And the *evil* that was challenging these cherished ideals and smothering the ‘hope for a better world’ was in the Middle East. It needed America to ensure ‘freedom to live in peace around the world’ by entering a ‘war’ against “the oldest enemy of the human spirit – evil that threatened world peace.”³⁵⁹ These words resonate with the Founding Fathers and writers of American Enlightenment (Jeferson, Paine, Hamilton, Jay among others) and their ideological presuppositions of nationalism and liberalism. This was discussed in Chapter Three. The sum of his discourse was charged with the spirit of fighting/struggling/confronting against evil/war that was represented by Iraq in this context. Such discourse was not dissimilar to his predecessors who focussed on ‘metaphor of war.’ It was ‘reminiscent’ of Cold war discourse and led to a ‘discursive incoherence,’ leading to what Timothy Cole defines, “a vision of politics that might transcend Cold War prescriptions.”³⁶⁰ Another aspect of his statements were inclined towards the need to promote democracy, human rights, peace, freedom, liberty, human dignity and such that reflect America’s fight/struggle for liberty.

Elaborating on the American intention of playing a leadership role in the Middle East, he argued that the Iraq War would bring not just credibility but will help restore reliability on America.³⁶¹ His inference is at the lost Vietnam War where America lost credibility and reliability in the international community. Having won the war, Bush declared in one of his interviews, that victory in the war has given the United States a ‘newfound’ and also ‘reestablished credibility’ in the world where use of force will not be necessary going forward.³⁶² But in the Gulf, he clarified America will have a military role in supporting the

³⁵⁹Refer Public Papers of George H. W. Bush (Jan. 30, 1991, Book I): 81. [From the U.S. Government Publishing Office www.gpo.gov] [Public Papers of the Presidents of the United States](http://www.gpo.gov) | [GovInfo](http://www.govinfo.gov)

³⁶⁰ Edwards, Jason A, *Navigating the Post-Cold War World: President Clinton’s Foreign Policy Rhetoric* (Plymouth: Lexington Books, 2008), xii.

³⁶¹Refer Public Papers of George H. W. Bush (Jan. 28, 1991, Book I): 72. [From the U.S. Government Publishing Office www.gpo.gov] [Public Papers of the Presidents of the United States](http://www.gpo.gov) | [GovInfo](http://www.govinfo.gov)

³⁶²Refer Public Papers of George H. W. Bush (March 1, 1991, Book I): 201. [From the U.S. Government Publishing Office www.gpo.gov] [Public Papers of the Presidents of the United States](http://www.gpo.gov) | [GovInfo](http://www.govinfo.gov)

stability of the region³⁶³ for America's 'vital national interests' are dependent on a 'stable' and 'secure Gulf.'³⁶⁴

Assuring the 'American people' that the Iraq war would not be another Vietnam, he claimed a definite win justifies war.³⁶⁵ He further assured the 'American people' that the war would be a success due to their support, for they were not only a 'land of the free' but a 'home of the brave.' And while celebrating the American win against the Iraqi regime he declared that Saddam Hussein made the grave error of "underestimating the determination of the American people and the daring of our troops." He went on to clarify after winning the war that the "spectre of Vietnam has been buried forever in the desert sands of the Arabian Peninsula."³⁶⁶ He also celebrated the joy of Americans by emphasising American 'noble and majestic' patriotism that "stems from their pride in the men and women that went" to war in the Peninsula.³⁶⁷ He declared that the victory was not just for the United States but for the United Nations, all mankind, the rule of law and what is right.³⁶⁸

It becomes evident from these statements that even in the immediate Post-Cold war period, American FP decisions employed ideological (nationalist/liberal/democratic) logic and justified involvement in Iraq through an exalted sense of nationalism and stress on American exceptionalism and American spirit that was guided by patriotism and American

³⁶³Refer Public Papers of George H. W. Bush (March 1, 1991, Book I): 205. [From the U.S. Government Publishing Office www.gpo.gov] [Public Papers of the Presidents of the United States | GovInfo](#)

³⁶⁴Refer Public Papers of George H. W. Bush (March 6, 1991, Book I): 220. [From the U.S. Government Publishing Office www.gpo.gov] [Public Papers of the Presidents of the United States | GovInfo](#)

³⁶⁵Refer Public Papers of George H. W. Bush (Jan. 28, 1991, Book I): 72. [From the U.S. Government Publishing Office www.gpo.gov] [Public Papers of the Presidents of the United States | GovInfo](#)

³⁶⁶Refer Public Papers of George H. W. Bush (March 4, 1991, Book I): 207. [From the U.S. Government Publishing Office www.gpo.gov] [Public Papers of the Presidents of the United States | GovInfo](#)

³⁶⁷Refer Public Papers of George H. W. Bush (March 1, 1991, Book I): 201. [From the U.S. Government Publishing Office www.gpo.gov] [Public Papers of the Presidents of the United States | GovInfo](#)

³⁶⁸Refer Public Papers of George H. W. Bush (Feb. 27, 1991, Book I): 187. [From the U.S. Government Publishing Office www.gpo.gov] [Public Papers of the Presidents of the United States | GovInfo](#)

Enlightenment principles. The ideology of nationalism was at its core when the American people's determination was appealed to in declaring war on Iraq. The foreign policy ideology of promotion of liberal values was also used as is evident from the employment of terms like upholding justice, freedom and human dignity in Iraq. The *predicates* used to define/describe American people were brave, free, determined, daring, with patriotism that was noble and majestic. Another distinctive feature of American presidential rhetoric remains universalism or claims of doing good/ best that would benefit not just America and its interests but the whole of mankind and the rule of law.

4.3.2.2 Bill Clinton's Rhetoric on Iraq

There was a continuity in this American presidential rhetoric during the Clinton administration. An attempt will be made to analyse Clinton's statements on Iraq that were heavily influenced by the ideological presuppositions of nationalism and promotion of liberal values including democracy, human rights and peace. "We have to keep America the world's strongest force for peace and freedom," Clinton declared at the 'onset of the 21st century.'³⁶⁹ The need to preserve freedom and peace abroad is reflected in this statement. And the insistence that it should be done by the American nation indicates not just nationalism but also perception of America as a world leader.

The reasons for continued American presence in the Middle East region were not given in a single document or report. But they were revealed in various speeches, reports, addresses and declarations. For instance, remarking on the American interest in the Gulf, on September 14, 1996, Clinton emphasised that America's vital interests in the Persian Gulf were 'constant and clear': to aid and also protect American 'friends' against aggression; to jointly work with

³⁶⁹Refer Public Papers of William J. Clinton (Dec. 19, 1998, Book II): 2199. [From the U.S. Government Publishing Office www.gpo.gov] [Public Papers of the Presidents of the United States](#) | [GovInfo](#)

other states to fight against terrorism; to maintain the unobstructed oil flow; and to develop ‘a comprehensive Middle-East peace.’ American interests will be threatened if any nation or group threatens the stability of the Gulf region, he warned.³⁷⁰

Clinton reported on Iraq in his public papers stressing on various developments, ranging from Iraq’s defiance of will of international community; Saddam Hussein’s atrocities on his own people including use of chemical weapons; Iraq’s declaration of Jihad on the United Nations; Iraq’s obstruction of work of international weapons inspectors; Iraq’s previous record of owning and having the capacity to use again the Weapons of Mass Destruction (WMDs); Iraq’s harbouring of terrorists; and the need to make Iraq a democracy for the stability of the Gulf. While reporting on these issues, the American presidential rhetoric was heavily influenced by ideological presuppositions of nationalism, democracy and promotion of liberal values which the chapter will elaborate on in the next section.

Following the Iraq War, Clinton regularly reported the progress on Iraq to the Congress through reports and addresses to the nation on the radio. In one such letter to the Congressional leaders, reporting on Iraq’s compliance with the UN Security Council Resolution dated February 3, 1998, Clinton reported that Iraq had announced its intention of expelling all U.S. personnel working in Iraq for the U.N. Special Commission (UNSCOM). It cited that the United Nations team was governed by “too many Anglo-Saxons.” The team was investigating, among other allegations, the use of human beings as subjects in biological and chemical warfare development. He recorded that the Iraqi government on January 17, 1998, declared Jihad (holy war) against UN sanctions and around a million citizens were called on to undergo military training to prepare for any consequences. He also emphasised the need to increase the

³⁷⁰Refer Public Papers of William J. Clinton (Sept. 13, 1996, Book II): 1566. [From the U.S. Government Publishing Office www.gpo.gov] [Public Papers of the Presidents of the United States](#) | [GovInfo](#)

number of aircraft participating in the ‘no-fly zones’ of the “Operation Northern Watch and Operation Southern Watch” as a response to violations by Iraq in the months of October and November 1997.³⁷¹ He asserted that the sanctions on Iraq will continue as it was obstructing the work of international weapons instructors and defying the will of the international community in November 1997. On February 4, 1998, Clinton declared that Saddam Hussein was denying the ‘will of the world’ and a “serious threat to international peace and security” because it had previously used WMDs and had the capacity to use them again.³⁷²

Among the reasons for imposing sanctions on Iraq, declared on December 1, 1997, Clinton recounted: Iraq’s invasion of Kuwait, use of ‘chemical weapons’ on ‘Iraqi people’ and ‘Iranian troops’ and threatening to use those weapons on ‘coalition forces’ and ‘innocent civilians’ in Saudi Arabia and Israel during the Gulf war.³⁷³ He listed around ten reasons on February 4, 1998 for not withdrawing UN sanctions on Iraq on account of Iraq’s failure to: eliminate WMD; recognize Kuwait; accept inviolability of ‘Iraq-Kuwait boundary’; release of ‘Kuwaiti and third country nationals’; compensate for ‘victims of Iraqi aggression’; agree for ‘long term’ monitoring of WMD capabilities; return ‘Kuwaiti assets stolen during Iraq’s illegal occupation of Kuwait’; renunciate terrorism; end Iraqi ‘repression of its own civilian population’; and facilitate access of ‘international relief organisations to all those in need in all parts of Iraq.’³⁷⁴

³⁷¹Refer Public Papers of William J. Clinton (Feb. 4, 1998, Book I): 163-164. [From the U.S. Government Publishing Office www.gpo.gov] [Public Papers of the Presidents of the United States | GovInfo](#)

³⁷²Refer Public Papers of William J. Clinton (Feb. 4, 1998, Book I): 166. [From the U.S. Government Publishing Office www.gpo.gov] [Public Papers of the Presidents of the United States | GovInfo](#)

³⁷³Refer Public Papers of William J. Clinton (Dec. 1, 1997, Book II): 1672. [From the U.S. Government Publishing Office www.gpo.gov] [Public Papers of the Presidents of the United States | GovInfo](#)

³⁷⁴Refer Public Papers of William J. Clinton, “Clinton’s Message to Congress Reporting on National Emergency with Respect to Iraq,” (Feb. 3, 1998, Book I): 169. [From the U.S. Government Publishing Office www.gpo.gov] [Public Papers of the Presidents of the United States | GovInfo](#)

The increasing number of reasons for continuation of sanctions on Iraq reflect to some extent America's intention of having a strong presence in the region with the aim of transforming not just Iraq but building a strong base within the Middle East. Iraq went on to become an illustration of American intentions for the Middle East in the 21st century under George W. Bush administration: transform into a democracy under the American guidance. The form of popular government and the process of transformation will be manoeuvred by the United States and its allies. Even though this transformation took place under the Bush (Jr.) administration, I argue, the seeds of change were sowed in the Post-Cold war period under the Bush (Sr.) and Clinton presidencies. Bill Clinton's foreign policy rhetoric 'invented' US foreign policy discourse around three tangible areas/issues; that have lasting effect on American Foreign Policy because his term in office came at a crucial transitional period in American history. Those three issues were firstly, defining American 'role' in global politics; secondly, his 'justifications for the use of force' and thirdly, his efforts at articulation of a 'grand strategy for a new era.'³⁷⁵

The stability in the Gulf region, Bill Clinton stated, was dependent on a democratic Iraq, that the government represented all the people of Iraq and was committed to the territorial integrity and unity of Iraq. He further added that Iraq could rejoin the community of "civilised nations only through democratic processes, respect for human rights, equal treatment of its people and adherence to basic norms of international behaviour."³⁷⁶

A year later, on October 27, 1994, Bill Clinton declared that the oil embargo and other sanctions will only be lifted when Iraq demonstrates its peaceful intentions in all issues, not

³⁷⁵ ³⁷⁵ Edwards, Jason A, *Navigating the Post-Cold War World: President Clinton's Foreign Policy Rhetoric* (Plymouth: Lexington Books, 2008), xiv.

³⁷⁶ Refer Public Papers of William J. Clinton (Sept. 24, 1993, Book II): 1588. [From the U.S. Government Publishing Office www.gpo.gov] [Public Papers of the Presidents of the United States](http://www.gpo.gov) | [GovInfo](http://www.govinfo.gov)

just its cooperation in the area of WMDs.³⁷⁷ And in order to ensure the beginning of Iraq's transition to democracy, Clinton on October 31, 1998, signed into law the 'Iraq Liberation Act of 1998' whereby he declared that America will offer new assistance to the opposing powers within Iraq to fight Saddam's regime and help realise a very different future for Iraq than "the bitter, current reality of internal repression and external aggression."³⁷⁸ It was assumed that by offering assistance to the opposition within Iraq the United States would be heralding the establishment of democracy in Iraq.

It is also noteworthy that Clinton's efforts of proliferating democracy were applauded by honouring him with W. Averell Harriman Democracy Award (NDI) on December 8, 1998, for advancing the cause of democracy and human rights for a sustained period of time. But these efforts by Clinton were not in isolation; they had a precedence in Bush's administration: in a press statement on free election in Kuwait, Bush's press secretary, Max Marlin Fitzwater, affirmed American commitment to support Kuwait in its "political and physical reconstruction" and Iraqi efforts in building a *democratic* future.³⁷⁹ Consequently, promotion of democracy and transforming the Middle East is a constant in American foreign policy especially in the Post-Cold war period which is reflected in the American presidential rhetoric. Both the presidents, Bush and Clinton, stress the need/aim/will of the United States in promoting liberal values including democracy and human rights in the region.

³⁷⁷Refer Public Papers of William J. Clinton (Oct. 27, 1994, Book II): 1889 and (March 7, 1996, Book I): 381. [From the U.S. Government Publishing Office www.gpo.gov] [Public Papers of the Presidents of the United States | GovInfo](http://www.gpo.gov/publications/pubs/pubs.htm)

³⁷⁸Refer Public Papers of William J. Clinton (Nov. 6, 1998, Book II): 1992. [From the U.S. Government Publishing Office www.gpo.gov] [Public Papers of the Presidents of the United States | GovInfo](http://www.gpo.gov/publications/pubs/pubs.htm)

³⁷⁹Refer Public Papers of George H. W. Bush (Oct. 7, 1992, Book II): 1772. [From the U.S. Government Publishing Office www.gpo.gov] [Public Papers of the Presidents of the United States | GovInfo](http://www.gpo.gov/publications/pubs/pubs.htm)

One of the most significant reasons for continued U.S. presence in the Middle East in the Post-Cold war period, Clinton argued, was to provide protection against a volatile Iraq. Clinton drew on the ideological presuppositions of promotion of liberal values, this thesis argues, when he declared that American presence in the region was essential for bringing good and providing security to the Middle East region. And in order to provide protection, the United States needed to fight/struggle against the unpredictable ruler of Iraq, Saddam Hussein. Citing Saddam Hussein's record of brutality and unreliability, Clinton argued that it was prudent to retain US (military)³⁸⁰ force's presence in the Middle-East to deter Iraq and respond rapidly in case of Iraqi aggression and threat against its neighbours.³⁸¹

While addressing the nation, on December 16, 1998, Clinton clarified that due to repeated violation of UN resolutions by Saddam Hussein and on the 'unanimous recommendation' of Clinton's 'national security team' (including the Vice-President, Secretary of Defence, the Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff, the Secretary of State and National Security Advisor) he had ordered a 'strong' and 'sustained' series of airstrikes against Iraq under 'Operation Desert Fox' which were designed to 'degrade' Iraq's capacity to 'develop' and 'deliver' WMD. It was also meant to degrade Saddam Hussein's capability to 'threaten' his neighbours.³⁸² He emphasised that America was never eager to use any force but when the need arises, he added, to act in America's 'vital' interests, it will readily do so.³⁸³ This is similar to Bush's (Sr.) arguments that when diplomacy fails, force becomes moral as the last resort.

³⁸⁰Refer Public Papers of William J. Clinton (Feb. 23, 1998, Book I): 268. [From the U.S. Government Publishing Office www.gpo.gov] [Public Papers of the Presidents of the United States | GovInfo](#)

³⁸¹Refer Public Papers of William J. Clinton (Feb. 4, 1998, Book I): 164. [From the U.S. Government Publishing Office www.gpo.gov] [Public Papers of the Presidents of the United States | GovInfo](#)

³⁸²Refer Public Papers of William J. Clinton (Dec. 16, 1998, Book II): 2183. [From the U.S. Government Publishing Office www.gpo.gov] [Public Papers of the Presidents of the United States | GovInfo](#)

³⁸³Refer Public Papers of William J. Clinton (Dec. 16, 1998, Book II): 2184. [From the U.S. Government Publishing Office www.gpo.gov] [Public Papers of the Presidents of the United States | GovInfo](#)

Under Clinton's leadership Iraq's nuclear weapons program and WMD program were effectively curbed. On September 24, 1993, he stated that 'U.N. Special Commission/International Atomic Energy Agency (UNSCOM/IAEA)' inspectors had 'effectively' terminated the 'Iraqi nuclear weapons program' and had also impaired Iraq's WMD programs.³⁸⁴ It was on June 6, 1994, that he expressed his fears that Saddam Hussein was committed to rebuilding his WMD capacity which required continued vigilance from the U.S.³⁸⁵ And on November 14 of 1994, Bill Clinton issued 'executive order 12938' to declare 'national emergency' on 'proliferation' of weapons of mass destruction.³⁸⁶ He stated that UNSCOM continued to find evidence that Iraq was hiding information on its past weapons program, providing 'safe haven' for known terrorists, repressing its own people and violating human rights.³⁸⁷ Towards the end of his presidency, on February 7, 1998, to be precise, he recorded that the UN inspectors in Iraq had found and destroyed '38000 chemical weapons', '100,000 gallons of agents' used in those weapons, '48 missiles,' '30 warheads' fitted for 'chemical and biological weapons' and a large plant for producing 'deadly biological agents on a massive scale.'³⁸⁸ What becomes noteworthy and needs reflection about the destruction of these weapons, in 1998, is that in less than five years Iraq was invaded on the pretext of possession of these very Weapons of Mass Destruction along with harbouring terrorists in 2003

³⁸⁴Refer Public Papers of William J. Clinton (Sept. 24, 1993, Book II): 1587. [From the U.S. Government Publishing Office www.gpo.gov] [Public Papers of the Presidents of the United States](#) | [GovInfo](#)

³⁸⁵Refer Public Papers of William J. Clinton (June 6, 1994, Book I): 1046. [From the U.S. Government Publishing Office www.gpo.gov] [Public Papers of the Presidents of the United States](#) | [GovInfo](#)

³⁸⁶Refer Public Papers of William J. Clinton (Nov. 12, 1997, Book II): 1542. [From the U.S. Government Publishing Office www.gpo.gov] [Public Papers of the Presidents of the United States](#) | [GovInfo](#)

³⁸⁷Refer Public Papers of William J. Clinton (March 7, 1996, Book I): 380. [From the U.S. Government Publishing Office www.gpo.gov] [Public Papers of the Presidents of the United States](#) | [GovInfo](#)

³⁸⁸Refer Public Papers of William J. Clinton (Feb. 7, 1998, Book I): 195. [From the U.S. Government Publishing Office www.gpo.gov] [Public Papers of the Presidents of the United States](#) | [GovInfo](#)

by George W. Bush administration. Unsurprisingly, no WMD's were found this time around given that Clinton records that they were already destroyed by the UN five years ago.

The last reason for continued American presence in the Middle East, in Clinton's own words, was ensuring peace in the Middle East. Among the seven challenges he set forth in January 1996, maintaining America's leadership for peace and freedom throughout the world remained vital.³⁸⁹ Elucidating the American dream as the strongest, he stressed that America can remain "the strongest force for peace [freedom, democracy and prosperity in the world³⁹⁰] the world has ever seen."³⁹¹ On April 27, 1998, he declared that the 21st century 'can' and 'must' be a century of 'democracy, prosperity, justice and peace.' "It must be a time to deepen freedom and raise up life in the Middle-East." He stated that all this was possible only when "we learn not only to respect but to honour our differences."³⁹²

In conclusion, it becomes apparent that the rhetoric under Clinton is charged with ideological presuppositions of Nationalism, Liberalism and Democracy. References to the American dream and American leadership in maintenance of peace and freedom throughout the world reflect nationalist ideological presuppositions. To describe America he uses predicates like the 'strongest force of peace,' 'prosperity,' 'freedom' and 'democracy' in the world. The language he used against the terrorists and Saddam Hussein in particular is nowhere akin to Bush (Sr.) or Bush (Jr.); yet the subject positioning is clear. The inherent argument that democratic and liberal values need to be implemented in the Middle East for American interests

³⁸⁹ Refer Public Papers of William J. Clinton (Jan. 27, 1996, Book I): 110. [From the U.S. Government Publishing Office www.gpo.gov] [Public Papers of the Presidents of the United States](http://www.gpo.gov) | [GovInfo](http://www.gpo.gov)

³⁹⁰ Refer Public Papers of William J. Clinton, "Radio Address" (Nov. 18, 1995, Book II): 1773. [From the U.S. Government Publishing Office www.gpo.gov] [Public Papers of the Presidents of the United States](http://www.gpo.gov) | [GovInfo](http://www.gpo.gov)

³⁹¹ Refer Public Papers of William J. Clinton (Dec. 30, 1995, Book II): 1935. [From the U.S. Government Publishing Office www.gpo.gov] [Public Papers of the Presidents of the United States](http://www.gpo.gov) | [GovInfo](http://www.gpo.gov)

³⁹² Refer Public Papers of William J. Clinton (April 27, 1998, Book I): 629. [From the U.S. Government Publishing Office www.gpo.gov] [Public Papers of the Presidents of the United States](http://www.gpo.gov) | [GovInfo](http://www.gpo.gov)

and his insistence on building a democratic future in Iraq because that would mean the stability of the Gulf region cannot be ignored.

He may not have described the leader or country with terms like evil/wrong/immoral/unjust/ but the sentiment that democracy has to be imposed in the region remains. The desire that it be done under American leadership for American presence brings ‘good,’ ‘peace’ and provides ‘security’ and ‘protection’ is also present. Arguments like ‘raising up life’ i.e., improving life conditions in the Middle East; need to ‘deepen’ freedom; coming century be based on ‘democracy,’ ‘justice,’ ‘peace’ and ‘prosperity’; the need to struggle against the *other* (here, unpredictable ruler, Saddam Hussein), deter the Iraqi aggression, unreliability and brutality, have an echo of a sense that America feels the need to ‘transform’ the world in its ‘image’. His insistence that Iraq can join, once again, the ‘community of civilised nations’ only by a ‘democratic process’ and adhering to norms of international behaviour also demonstrate that Iraq is no longer a civilised nation and needs to change according to American prescription and guidance. American leadership who will handhold Iraq in becoming a civilised state has the subject position of *them* versus *us*. And lastly, the universalism trope that was apparent in Bush’s (Sr.) rhetoric is evident in Clinton’s rhetoric as well. He argues, that Iraq is denying the ‘will of the world’ and ‘international community’ by causing a severe threat to ‘international peace’ and ‘security.’

4.3.3 American Presidential Ideological Discursive Foreign Policy Practices on Israel-Palestine Peace Talks

4.3.3.1 George H.W. Bush’s (Sr.) Rhetoric on Israel-Palestine

Bush (Sr.) declared America and Israel to be friends, strategic partners and allies in a meeting with Israeli Prime Minister Y Shamir in 1989. He also stressed that they shared mutual

interests, the binds of which went deep and broad. Both states were dedicated to maintaining and improving these relations. Bush (Sr.) argued that in lieu of other old enemies, ending conflicts to preserve interests of all concerned ‘around the world,’ states in the Middle East region should also do the same. The ‘Arab-Israeli’ conflict can be resolved and ‘peace’, ‘security’ and ‘political rights’ can be attained through ‘negotiations’ as nobody’s interests is being served under the present status quo. Together with Israel, the USA aims at developing approaches that enhance peace prospects. He categorically states that the USA ‘does not’ support an ‘independent’ Palestinian State and nor does it support Israeli ‘sovereignty’ or ‘permanent occupation’ of Gaza and West Bank. An ambitious yet realistic approach would include steps to reduce tensions, and political dialogue between Israel and Palestine. Israel is obliged to contribute to the process but the entire burden cannot be placed on it. Not just Palestine, but other states in the region along with ‘interested parties’ are expected to ‘demonstrate’ that they are ‘willing’ to attain peace as a reality. Israel must participate in ‘serious dialogue’ with Palestine to ‘address’ their political rights which are legitimate. He believed that elections could make a contribution to the ‘political process’ of ‘dialogue’ and ‘negotiation.’³⁹³ Even though the Prime Minister of Israel, Y Shamir declared America as the “leader of the Free World” and elaborated on liberal values and democracy as the binding force between both the states, Bush (Sr.) presidential rhetoric lacked references to such ideological arguments.

4.3.3.2 Bill Clinton’s Rhetoric on Israel-Palestine

Clinton made efforts to solve the Israel-Palestine issue during his tenure in office. But when his public papers are perused, most of his statements on the Middle East touched on

³⁹³Refer Public Papers of George H. W. Bush, “Remarks Following Discussions With Prime Minister Yitzhak Shamir of Israel” (April 6, 1989, Book I). [Public Papers - George Bush Library and Museum \(tamu.edu\)](https://www.tamu.edu/bush/publicpapers/)

terrorism. In fact, Clinton observed that the best way to safeguard the Middle East region from terrorism was a '*lasting peace*' between Israel and Palestine.³⁹⁴

He described the Israeli-Palestine conflict as one of the “greatest tragedies of our time” and one of the “hardest problems to solve.”³⁹⁵ At the same time, he was also aware that no conflicts were permanent; he argued that starting with the two great world wars between the ‘French’ and the ‘Germans’; the Cold War between ‘Americans’ and ‘Russians’; the ‘Irish Catholics’ and ‘Protestants’; the ‘Chinese’ and the ‘Japanese’; the ‘Black’ and ‘White South Africans’; the ‘Serbs,’ ‘Croats’ and the ‘Muslims’ in Bosnia – all have transformed from to cooperation from conflict and the vision of greater peace, prosperity and security should be the guiding force between Israel and Palestine.³⁹⁶ Urging the two states towards the common objective of “turning 1993 into the year of peace-making in the Middle-East,” he stated that both the countries would raise the relationship “to a new level of strategic partnership,” and will be partners in the pursuit of peace and security.³⁹⁷

On September 28, 1998, Clinton declared that the success of the agreement between Palestine and Israel was dependent upon “how badly they want it, how much we can work together, how much trust can be built and sustained, what kind of process for ensuring the agreement can be agreed upon by the two parties.”³⁹⁸ And towards the end of his presidency on July 1, 1999, to be precise, he declared that it was the people of the Middle-East who had

³⁹⁴Refer Public Papers of William J. Clinton (Oct. 17, 1998, Book II): 1820. [From the U.S. Government Publishing Office www.gpo.gov] [Public Papers of the Presidents of the United States | GovInfo](#)

³⁹⁵Refer Public Papers of William J. Clinton (Oct. 14, 2000, Book II): 2177. [From the U.S. Government Publishing Office www.gpo.gov] [Public Papers of the Presidents of the United States | GovInfo](#)

³⁹⁶Refer Public Papers of William J. Clinton (Dec. 14, 1998, Book II): 2178. [From the U.S. Government Publishing Office www.gpo.gov] [Public Papers of the Presidents of the United States | GovInfo](#)

³⁹⁷Refer Public Papers of William J. Clinton (March 15, 1993, Book I): 304. [From the U.S. Government Publishing Office www.gpo.gov] [Public Papers of the Presidents of the United States | GovInfo](#)

³⁹⁸Refer Public Papers of William J. Clinton (Sept. 28, 1998, Book II): 1698. [From the U.S. Government Publishing Office www.gpo.gov] [Public Papers of the Presidents of the United States | GovInfo](#)

to work out the terms of their reconciliation.³⁹⁹ In the article, ‘The Roots of Muslim Rage,’ Bernard Lewis argues, that the ‘best way to solve the Middle East problem’ was to let the states come up with the solution after reconciliation. Outside pressure from the West would only make matters worse.⁴⁰⁰ Clinton’s statements at the end of his tenure seem to reflect these very sentiments. He recognized the need for the Middle Eastern states to work together to sort out and solve their differences on their own without interference from the international community for lasting peace to ensue.

His efforts to reconcile Israel and Palestine were recognized and appreciated both at home and abroad. For instance, Arafat stated that it was through President Clinton that peace will prevail in the Middle-East.⁴⁰¹ But Clinton was aware of American limitations in promoting the peace process in the Middle-East.⁴⁰² On February 4, 1993, Clinton issued a statement declaring that America and Russia played a vital role in opening negotiations but have not been able to offer a ‘solution’ on the Middle-East. He acknowledged that only the ‘leaders’ of the said region can attain peace. In his administration such leaders will find a ‘*full partner*.’ And those who oppose the process will find ‘no tolerance.’⁴⁰³ Hence, he asserted that the US would

³⁹⁹Refer Public Papers of William J. Clinton (July 1, 1999, Book II): 1100. [From the U.S. Government Publishing Office www.gpo.gov] [Public Papers of the Presidents of the United States | GovInfo](#)

⁴⁰⁰Lewis, Bernard, “The Roots of Muslim Rage Lewis,” *The Atlantic* 266, no. 3, (Sep 1990): 60. ABI/INFORM Global [lewis_roots_of_muslim_rage.pdf \(pomona.edu\)](#)

⁴⁰¹Refer Public Papers of William J. Clinton (Dec. 14, 1998, Book II): 2173. [From the U.S. Government Publishing Office www.gpo.gov] [Public Papers of the Presidents of the United States | GovInfo](#)

⁴⁰²Refer Public Papers of William J. Clinton (Oct. 7, 1997, Book II): 1307. [From the U.S. Government Publishing Office www.gpo.gov] [Public Papers of the Presidents of the United States | GovInfo](#)

⁴⁰³Refer Public Papers of William J. Clinton (Feb. 4, 1993, Book I): 44. [From the U.S. Government Publishing Office www.gpo.gov] [Public Papers of the Presidents of the United States | GovInfo](#)

remain a mediator.⁴⁰⁴ He also stated that despite America's efforts only the parties involved, i.e., Israel and Palestine, can bridge their differences and put their people on a hopeful course.⁴⁰⁵

American relationship with Israel has been suspect and many commentators have commented on the special bond between both the states. Since Truman, it has been argued, who recognized the Israeli state within minutes of its inception all American Presidents have shown partial treatment of Israel. Among the many interpretations, the existence and functioning of a strong Israeli lobby has been recognized as a major reason for the shared bond between the states.⁴⁰⁶ It is interesting to note that Bill Clinton also mentioned that when he is in Israel or with the American Jewish groups, they try to get him to say things as a broker of the Middle East process that he said before he was the President and which he can no longer say.⁴⁰⁷

Bill Clinton observed that start with Harry Truman, almost 'nine' presidents of America have all been dedicated to Israel's security, freedom and peace in the Middle-East.⁴⁰⁸ On March 15, 1993, Bill Clinton discussed the special bond that America shares with Israel, identifying Israel's democracy, shared values, shared ideals, and common interests in a 'stable' and 'peaceful' Middle-East as the basis for their relationship.⁴⁰⁹ He also declared that a robust

⁴⁰⁴Refer Public Papers of William J. Clinton (March 15, 1993, Book I): 307. [From the U.S. Government Publishing Office www.gpo.gov] [Public Papers of the Presidents of the United States | GovInfo](#)

⁴⁰⁵Refer Public Papers of William J. Clinton (Oct. 17, 1998, Book II): 1820. [From the U.S. Government Publishing Office www.gpo.gov] [Public Papers of the Presidents of the United States | GovInfo](#)

⁴⁰⁶John Mearsheimer and Stephen Walt in their book show the strong relation these states share which does not always have positive impact on American interests abroad. See Mearsheimer, John J. and Stephen M. Walt, *The Israel Lobby and U.S. Foreign Policy* (New York: Farrar, Strauss and Giroux, 2007).

⁴⁰⁷Refer Public Papers of William J. Clinton (Sept. 28, 1998, Book II): 1698. [From the U.S. Government Publishing Office www.gpo.gov] [Public Papers of the Presidents of the United States | GovInfo](#)

⁴⁰⁸Refer Public Papers of William J. Clinton, "Remarks at Reception Celebrating 50th Anniversary of Israel," (April 27, 1998, Book I): 628. [From the U.S. Government Publishing Office www.gpo.gov] [Public Papers of the Presidents of the United States | GovInfo](#)

⁴⁰⁹Refer Public Papers of William J. Clinton (March 15, 1993, Book I): 303. [From the U.S. Government Publishing Office www.gpo.gov] [Public Papers of the Presidents of the United States | GovInfo](#)

American-Israeli relationship “must be the cornerstone on which to build a peaceful Middle-East.”⁴¹⁰ Such words reiterate social constructivist claim that shared values foster closer ties among states.

When it comes to his rhetoric, Clinton is very careful with his words and very few ideological statements appear in his rhetoric on Israeli-Palestinian conflict. The ideological presuppositions in Clinton’s rhetoric are majorly liberal values. He does not stress on either democratic or nationalist arguments while discussing Israeli-Palestinian issues. The *predicates* he used to describe America or the states in the Middle East are negligible. Only while discussing Israel's bond with America, does he indicate that the shared values (read liberal), shared ideals, democracy and common interests are what makes the bond special. Even subject positioning in his statements about Israeli-Palestinian are not significant.

4.3.4 American Presidential Ideological Discursive Foreign Policy Practices towards Iran and Afghan Taliban

4.3.4.1 George H. W. Bush’s (Sr.) Rhetoric on Iran and Afghan Taliban

Constituted by the situation in Iran, on November 14, 1979, by “Executive Order No. 12170,” the President of USA declared a ‘national emergency’ to deal with ‘the threat to the national security, foreign policy, and economy’ of the United States. It was continued till the end of George Bush (Sr.) presidency.as the relations between both the countries did return to normal and the crisis was not fully resolved. As there was no confrontation/conflict with the state of Iran, by and large there arose no need to employ rhetoric of *ideological presuppositions*, *predicates* or *subject position*.

⁴¹⁰Refer Public Papers of William J. Clinton (July 19, 1999, Book II): 1247. [From the U.S. Government Publishing Office www.gpo.gov] [Public Papers of the Presidents of the United States](#) | [GovInfo](#)

Bush celebrated and saluted the will and spirit of the Afghan people, when after 9 years, they were free from Soviet occupation. He also offered to support self-determination efforts of the Afghan people on Soviet withdrawal from Afghanistan.⁴¹¹ He called upon the ‘Afghan interim government’ to improve its efforts to form a stable government which is ‘responsive’ to the Afghan people’s needs.⁴¹² Similar to Iran, there was no struggle against Afghanistan during Bush’s (Sr.) term in office. And no sanctions were imposed on it. In fact, he supported their efforts of self-determination in words that did not insist on democracy or liberal values.

4.3.4.2 Bill Clinton’s Rhetoric on Iran and Afghan Taliban

National emergency was continued on Iran by the Bill Clinton administration on March 15 of 1995 under ‘Executive Order 12957’ as a reaction to the ‘actions and policies of the Iranian Government’ including “support for international terrorism, efforts to undermine the Middle East peace process and the acquisition of weapons of mass destruction and means to deliver them.” In 1998 on September 16, he, in his report to the Congress, stated his intention of continuing the national emergency as Iran has failed to alter on any count stated in the executive order of 1995. He observed that Iran represented a ‘threat’ to the ‘peace’ and ‘security’ of all the nations, especially to the “national security, foreign policy and economy of the United States.” As per the embargo imposed, no American national situated anywhere in the world could indulge in trade and investment activities with Iran.⁴¹³

⁴¹¹Refer Public Papers of George H. W. Bush, “Statement on the Soviet Withdrawal From Afghanistan” (Feb. 16, 1989, Book I). [From the U.S. Government Publishing Office www.gpo.gov] [Public Papers - George Bush Library and Museum \(tamu.edu\)](http://www.gpo.gov/publications/pubs/pubs.htm)

⁴¹²Refer Public Papers of George H. W. Bush, “Statement by Press Secretary Fitzwater on President Bush’s Meeting With Interim President Sigbhatullah Mokaddedi of Afghanistan,” (Nov. 27, 1989, Book II) [From the U.S. Government Publishing Office www.gpo.gov] [Public Papers - George Bush Library and Museum \(tamu.edu\)](http://www.gpo.gov/publications/pubs/pubs.htm)

⁴¹³Refer Public Papers of William J. Clinton (Sept. 16, 1998, Book II): 1598 and (March 13, 2000, Book I). [From the U.S. Government Publishing Office www.gpo.gov] [Public Papers of the Presidents of the United States | GovInfo](http://www.gpo.gov/publications/pubs/pubs.htm)

And on July 4, 1999, he declared a national emergency on the Afghan Taliban due to the “unusual and extraordinary threat to the national security and foreign policy of the US.” He stated that the ‘Taliban’ continued to offer ‘safe haven’ to Bin Laden permitting him and his Al-Qaeda organisation to function from ‘Taliban-controlled territory’ (spelling in original).⁴¹⁴ He cautioned that his ‘training camps’ ought to be closed; their ‘threats’ and ‘operational activity’ need to be ceased and he will be required to “answer for his crimes.” He also warned the Taliban that it will have to pay attention “to the will of the United Nations and end the threat of terrorism that emanates from Afghanistan.”⁴¹⁵

Though these national emergencies were not pressing issues under the Clinton administration, it helps record the continuity in Clinton’s rhetoric whereby not just Iraq but other states like Iran and Afghanistan were also under the American radar. The reasons mentioned for declaring emergency on Iran echoes with those that were used to declare emergency and sanctions on Iraq, Afghan Taliban and Libya. Terrorism was essentially a concept that was employed by the Clinton administration to declare and continue national emergencies on states like Iraq, Iran and Libya but it went on to become the major reason for invasion into other states only under George W. Bush’s (Jr.) administration.

The United States announced its commitment to fight against terror during Bill Clinton’s presidency. He described the terrorist activities as an “inhuman campaign of terror.”⁴¹⁶ On October 8, 1997, he signed into law the “Anti-terrorism and Effective Death Penalty Act” where he declared that US was committed to fight against “those who speak the

⁴¹⁴Refer Public Papers of William J. Clinton (July 4, 1999, Book II): 1134. [From the U.S. Government Publishing Office www.gpo.gov] [Public Papers of the Presidents of the United States | GovInfo](#)

⁴¹⁵Refer Public Papers of William J. Clinton (Nov. 15, 1999, Book II): 2098. [From the U.S. Government Publishing Office www.gpo.gov] [Public Papers of the Presidents of the United States | GovInfo](#)

⁴¹⁶Refer Public Papers of William J. Clinton (March 8, 1996, Book I): 395. [From the U.S. Government Publishing Office www.gpo.gov] [Public Papers of the Presidents of the United States | GovInfo](#)

language of terror.”⁴¹⁷ He further added that the future belonged to the peacemakers and not to the ‘terrorists’ and the ‘extremists’ who strive to do away with peace by ‘killing’ the innocent.⁴¹⁸ They live, he argued, for division and continuation of violence and hatred in the Middle-East.⁴¹⁹ And reaffirming America’s ‘commitment’ to peace, he emphasised that America will stand united against all the enemies of peace “whose real target is peace itself.”⁴²⁰

Bill Clinton asserted that terrorism was a global threat and no nation was immune to it and called on all nations to redouble their commitment to fight it.⁴²¹ Terrorism, he identified, “was one of the greatest dangers in the new global era.”⁴²² On August 24, 1998 he declared that it was not only ‘America’s fight’ but a ‘universal’ fight between those who aspire to ‘build a world of peace,’ partnership and prosperity and those who wish to “tear everything down through death and destruction.”⁴²³ He also differentiated between war and terrorism by stating that a war is planned and has limits whereas terrorism is unpredictable making war much easier than terrorism.⁴²⁴ The terrorist groups he argued, “share a hatred for democracy, a fanatical glorification of violence and a horrible distortion of their religion to justify the murder of innocents.”⁴²⁵ He added the four reasons that terrorists targeted America for: the “unique

⁴¹⁷Refer Public Papers of William J. Clinton (Oct. 8, 1997, Book II): 1322. [From the U.S. Government Publishing Office www.gpo.gov] [Public Papers of the Presidents of the United States | GovInfo](#)

⁴¹⁸Refer Public Papers of William J. Clinton (Oct. 29, 1994, Book II): 1903. [From the U.S. Government Publishing Office www.gpo.gov] [Public Papers of the Presidents of the United States | GovInfo](#)

⁴¹⁹Refer Public Papers of William J. Clinton (March 4, 1996, Book I): 359. [From the U.S. Government Publishing Office www.gpo.gov] [Public Papers of the Presidents of the United States | GovInfo](#)

⁴²⁰Refer Public Papers of William J. Clinton (Oct. 29, 1994, Book II): 1903. [From the U.S. Government Publishing Office www.gpo.gov] [Public Papers of the Presidents of the United States | GovInfo](#)

⁴²¹Refer Public Papers of William J. Clinton (Nov. 17, 1997, Book II): 1595. [From the U.S. Government Publishing Office www.gpo.gov] [Public Papers of the Presidents of the United States | GovInfo](#)

⁴²²Refer Public Papers of William J. Clinton (Aug. 20, 1998, Book II): 1460. [From the U.S. Government Publishing Office www.gpo.gov] [Public Papers of the Presidents of the United States | GovInfo](#)

⁴²³Refer Public Papers of William J. Clinton (Aug. 24, 1998, Book II): 1465. [From the U.S. Government Publishing Office www.gpo.gov] [Public Papers of the Presidents of the United States | GovInfo](#)

⁴²⁴Refer Public Papers of William J. Clinton (July 1, 1999, Book II): 1100. [From the U.S. Government Publishing Office www.gpo.gov] [Public Papers of the Presidents of the United States | GovInfo](#)

⁴²⁵Refer Public Papers of William J. Clinton (Aug. 20, 1998, Book II): 1460 [From the U.S. Government Publishing Office www.gpo.gov] [Public Papers of the Presidents of the United States | GovInfo](#)

leadership responsibilities” they have in the world; their united front against terrorism; their being the “most open society”⁴²⁶ on earth; and their advancement of peace, democracy, basic human values of tolerance and security. The terrorists, he specified, target “the very spirit of our country and the spirit of freedom.”⁴²⁷

On September 14, 1998, Clinton argued, that the US has an inescapable obligation to *lead* in a ‘way that is consistent with American values’ and helps improve lives of people at home and abroad.⁴²⁸ He avowed to use all tools at America’s disposal to fight terrorism from law enforcement to diplomacy to America’s military might.⁴²⁹ He also declared that America “will protect its citizens” against terrorists and “will continue to lead the world’s fight for peace, freedom and security.”⁴³⁰

Among the measures Clinton administration took to fight terrorists were apprehending them and ‘bringing them to justice’; ‘disrupting terrorist organisations’; ‘deepening counter terrorism cooperation’ with their ‘allies’ and ‘isolating nations that support terrorism’; ‘protecting computer networks’; ‘improving transportation security’; ‘combating the threat of nuclear, chemical and biological weapons’ and ‘giving law enforcement the best counter-terrorism tool available.’⁴³¹ On 20th August, 1998, Clinton ordered armed forces to strike at terrorist-related facilities (affiliated and funded majorly by Osama Bin Laden – the preeminent

⁴²⁶Refer Public Papers of William J. Clinton (Aug. 20, 1998, Book II): 1461. [From the U.S. Government Publishing Office www.gpo.gov] [Public Papers of the Presidents of the United States | GovInfo](#)

⁴²⁷Refer Public Papers of William J. Clinton (Aug. 8, 1998, Book II): 1415. [From the U.S. Government Publishing Office www.gpo.gov] [Public Papers of the Presidents of the United States | GovInfo](#)

⁴²⁸Refer Public Papers of William J. Clinton (Sept. 14, 1998, Book II): 1572. [From the U.S. Government Publishing Office www.gpo.gov] [Public Papers of the Presidents of the United States | GovInfo](#)

⁴²⁹Refer Public Papers of William J. Clinton (Aug. 27, 1998, Book II): 1472. [From the U.S. Government Publishing Office www.gpo.gov] [Public Papers of the Presidents of the United States | GovInfo](#)

⁴³⁰Refer Public Papers of William J. Clinton (Aug. 20, 1998, Book II): 1460. [From the U.S. Government Publishing Office www.gpo.gov] [Public Papers of the Presidents of the United States | GovInfo](#)

⁴³¹Refer Public Papers of William J. Clinton (Aug. 8, 1998, Book II): 1415. [From the U.S. Government Publishing Office www.gpo.gov] [Public Papers of the Presidents of the United States | GovInfo](#)

‘organiser’ and ‘financier of international terrorism in the world’) in Afghanistan and Sudan.⁴³² Referring to Bin Laden network as “the most dangerous non-state terrorist actor in the world today,”⁴³³ Clinton on August 20, 1998, identified Osama Bin Laden and his associates as responsible for disrupting the ‘Middle-East peace process’ and declared a ‘national emergency’ under ‘Executive Order 12947’ by which he blocked all property and interests of these terrorists as they pose danger to the US economy, foreign policy and national security.⁴³⁴

Hence, this thesis argues, that the War on Terror that defined American foreign policy in the first decade of the 21st century has its seeds sown during the Bush (Sr.) and the Clinton administrations. The focus on Iraq, its WMD program, use of terrorism as a pretext to declare national emergencies on states of Libya, Iraq, Iran and Afghanistan all have roots in the immediate Post-Cold war period. There was a change in approach in dealing with the non-democratic *other*; from persuading states to adopt democracy, the focus was shifted to thrusting *alien* democracy on reluctant states especially in the Middle East. There was a change in geographical focus of American foreign policy: from the northern hemisphere’s ideological *other*, the Soviet Union, the states of Middle East were elevated to the *other* which was for most part, among others, ascribed as an Israeli Lobby⁴³⁵ initiative. The American differences remained with Communist China and Russia (where their relationship dynamics were being transformed too, especially in regards to China in terms of strengthening of economic ties) but the prime focus was the remaking of the Middle East in its own image (read democracy).

⁴³²Refer Public Papers of William J. Clinton (Aug. 20, 1998, Book II): 1460. [From the U.S. Government Publishing Office www.gpo.gov] [Public Papers of the Presidents of the United States | GovInfo](http://www.gpo.gov)

⁴³³Refer Public Papers of William J. Clinton (Aug. 22, 1998, Book II): 1464. [From the U.S. Government Publishing Office www.gpo.gov] [Public Papers of the Presidents of the United States | GovInfo](http://www.gpo.gov)

⁴³⁴Refer Public Papers of William J. Clinton (Aug. 20, 1998, Book II): 1463. [From the U.S. Government Publishing Office www.gpo.gov] [Public Papers of the Presidents of the United States | GovInfo](http://www.gpo.gov)

⁴³⁵In their book, *The Israel Lobby and U.S. Foreign Policy*, John Mearsheimer and Stephen Walt focus on the Israeli lobby's grip on U.S. foreign policy and its negative effect on American interests and Israel as well. See Mearsheimer, John J. and Stephen M. Walt, *The Israel Lobby and U.S. Foreign Policy* (New York: Farrar, Strauss and Giroux, 2007).

Having perused the public papers it becomes apparent that there is an assumption in this rhetoric that democratic states dealt with confrontation by indulging in peace talks, diplomacy and sanctions. War was seen as the last resort and all energies were poured in avoiding any military confrontations. Not just any form of democracy was desirable but the American version of liberal free-market democracy was the most desirable. American guidance/leadership was best suited for establishing lasting peace in the Middle East remained the background for interventions, interferences and invasions in the region.

The American presidential rhetoric in the Post-Cold war period was infused with ideological presuppositions of democracy, nationalism and liberalism. Clinton, while discussing Iran and Afghanistan, uses rhetoric that revolved majorly around terrorism. His rhetoric has the universal narrative where the fight against terrorism is not just America's fight but a universal one. The reasons that Clinton identifies as to why terrorists target America (mentioned above), is replete with national pride. The predicate employed to refer to America is 'freedom' where he refers to the spirit of America as the spirit of freedom. Another predicate is that of a 'world leader' which America is and cannot escape; she is obligated to lead as it is consistent with her values. 'American leadership' improves lives of people both within America and abroad. As for the subject-positioning, Clinton objectifies the terrorists as those that want to tear everything down through death and destruction as opposed to those including America who want peace, prosperity and partnership.

4.4 Conclusion

To sum it up, George Bush (Sr.) was at the helm of power when the Soviet Union imploded, bringing decades long Cold War to an end. The Post-Cold war period was pregnant with multiple possibilities and was a turbulent time in a quickly globalising world; America's

role in international politics changed without an hostile ideology which consumed all its energies; military, political, diplomatic, economic, defence and intelligence. In the Middle East, states like Libya, Iran, Iraq, Afghanistan, Israel and Palestine drew American attention. This chapter analysed in detail how the two presidents, Bush (Sr.) and Clinton dealt with these states particularly in the use of their rhetoric which was embedded with *ideological presuppositions, predicates* and *subject-positioning* of liberalism, nationalism and democracy. Bush (Sr.) envisioned in the emerging period after the end of Cold War, devoid of ideological confrontation, an American ‘guidance and leadership’ in the form of a ‘New World Order.’ His rhetoric was replete with *predicates* and *subject-positioning* that were informed by ideologies. Clinton stressed the need for America to remain a ‘pacific power’ and ‘promote enlargement of NATO’ to combat WMDs, ‘terrorism’ and spread ‘democracy’ and ‘peace in the Middle East.’ Hence, it can be concluded that American presidential rhetoric in the Post-Cold war period for the most part reflected the *ideological presuppositions* of nationalism, liberalism and democracy.

CHAPTER FIVE

Ideological Foreign Policy Discursive Practices under George W. Bush (Jr.) (2001-2009) : Part I

“... our Nation has shown the world that though there is great evil, there is a greater good.”⁴³⁶

(George W. Bush: 2001)

“Democracies do not war; democracies yield the peace.”⁴³⁷

(George W. Bush: 2006)

Introduction

There was a continuity in terms of *ideological presuppositions, predicates* and *subject-positioning* in American Presidential rhetoric in the Post-Cold war period under George Bush (Jr.). Yet there was also a change, a more offensive turn on the advent of the 21st century, pertinently in the Middle East. It was in response to the terrorist attacks on the Twin Towers on September 11, 2001. Prior to these attacks, the USA had been involved in Middle Eastern politics because of its geo-political strategic locations and Soviet Union’s involvement in the region. The USA had been carrying on trade, forging new alliances in the Middle East, on one hand and also imposing sanctions on states that it felt stepped out of line, on the other hand; until the Twin towers collapsed, killing thousands. The attacks were unprecedented and once

⁴³⁶Refer Public Papers of George W. Bush (Dec. 20, 2001, Book II): 1534. [From the U.S. Government Publishing Office www.gpo.gov] [Public Papers of the Presidents of the United States](http://www.gpo.gov) | [GovInfo](http://www.gpo.gov)

⁴³⁷Refer Public Papers of George W. Bush (Feb. 23, 2006, Book I): 340 [From the U.S. Government Publishing Office www.gpo.gov] [Public Papers of the Presidents of the United States](http://www.gpo.gov) | [GovInfo](http://www.gpo.gov)

it was confirmed that they were carried out by terrorists hailing from the Middle Eastern region, American interest in the regions intensified. This occurred under the presidency of George W. Bush (Jr.) in 2001.

In this chapter, Bush (Jr.) presidential rhetoric will be analysed using the concepts of *ideological presuppositions*, *predicates* and *subject-positioning*. The three ideologies that will be the focus of this study will remain democracy, nationalism and liberalism. We shall begin the chapter by looking at the changes in American presidential rhetoric during the Bush (Jr.) presidency: the rhetoric became *offensive* (calling for *pre-emptive* wars); and there was a revival of the term *ideology* in American presidential rhetoric towards the Middle East. We will also look at the role Bush (Jr.) envisions in the Middle East even before the 9/11 attacks. The chapter then will move on to his rhetoric to describe 9/11 attacks and the rhetoric used while describing the measures taken after the attacks including establishing various centres like Foreign Terrorist Asset Tracking Centre, Terrorist Threat Integration Centre; Office of Homeland Security; Patriot Act and increasing Role of NATO. It will be followed by his rhetoric informed by *ideological presuppositions*, *predicates* and *subject-positioning* towards various states in the Middle East including Libya, Iran, Iraq, Israel-Palestine and Afghanistan.

5.1 George W. Bush and the Middle East

Bush declared on September 11, 2001 that America had learnt that the Middle East “directly threatens the security of the American people.” Recognizing the strong links America has with the Middle Eastern region, he argued, that “long before oil and gas were discovered in the region, it was a key source of trade and home to three of the world’s great religions.” The Middle East, he added, “remains a strategic crossroads for the world” and America has ties

of commerce, education and faith with the Middle East.⁴³⁸ Yet, the Middle East figured as a direct threat to the ‘security of the United States’ on September 11, 2001 and these incidents, Bush stated, will bring some ‘reality to the Middle-East.’⁴³⁹

Previously, the USA had declared national emergencies and sanctions on a number of states in the Middle East, as they posed a ‘threat to America’s security,’ ‘foreign policy’ and ‘national interests’ including Libya, Iraq, Iran, and Afghanistan. Most of these emergencies had been declared in the last three decades of the 20th century and most of the sanctions had been levied during the Clinton administration citing terrorism as the cause. It is in such an atmosphere that George W. Bush took charge as the 43rd President of the United States of America. During his campaign his focus was majorly inward looking; domestic politics formed the crux of his speeches including compassionate conservatism and education. Arguing that a ‘strong’ and ‘prosperous nation’ must be ‘compassionate,’ Bush declared that he will continue to promote the agenda of ‘compassionate conservatism.’⁴⁴⁰

In fact, he was at a primary school when he received a call about the September 11 attacks. His focus after the attack shifted to foreign policy and all his speeches, addresses, conferences and press-releases revolved majorly around the state of affairs in the Middle East and bringing ‘terrorists to justice.’ The measures he took and the policies that were adopted drew extensive attention from mainstream scholars in IR and Foreign Policy Studies. Unconventional studies turned their attention towards building a *Political Personality Profile* of George W Bush. These studies focus on comprehensive psychological representation of

⁴³⁸Refer Public Papers of George W. Bush (Aug. 28, 2007, Book II): 1118. [From the U.S. Government Publishing Office www.gpo.gov] [Public Papers of the Presidents of the United States](#) | [GovInfo](#)

⁴³⁹Refer Public Papers of George W. Bush (Sept. 26, 2001, Book II): 1168. [From the U.S. Government Publishing Office www.gpo.gov] [Public Papers of the Presidents of the United States](#) | [GovInfo](#)

⁴⁴⁰Refer Public Papers of George W. Bush (July 18, 2003, Book II): 897. [From the U.S. Government Publishing Office www.gpo.gov] [Public Papers of the Presidents of the United States](#) | [GovInfo](#)

political leaders; their life course that shaped their key attitudes and behaviour relevant to policy making. James Pfiffner has also attempted to capture the linkages between Bush's policies, politics and personality.⁴⁴¹ In short, life experiences and psychological forces that influence a leader's political behaviour were the focus.

Certain works focused on his cabinet: some studied the influence of neo-conservative ideology: the sway of Vulcans in James Mann's work⁴⁴²; while others studied the influence of the Israeli Lobby on American Foreign Policy⁴⁴³; others concentrated on what came to be termed as the 'Bush Dynasty.' One such work that offers detailed description and insights into the Bush family is *The Family: The Real Story of the Bush Dynasty* by the journalist, Kitty Kelley. Another work on the Bush dynasty entitled, *Family of Secrets: The Bush Dynasty, America's Invisible Government, and the Hidden History of the Last Fifty Years* is by Russ Baker. Yet, another interesting work that received a lot of publicity was *House of Bush, House of Saud: The Secret Relationship between the World's Two Most Powerful Dynasties* by Craig Unger. As for the words he used, the rhetoric and language influenced by religion, his cabinet, neo-conservatism etc., also attracted scholarly attention which is dealt with in Chapter Seven.

What this study majorly concentrates on is the ideological stimulus American foreign policy has in the American presidential rhetoric; nationalism, liberalism and democracy. The most pronounced declarations involving these ideologies in American presidential rhetoric have been under the Bush administration which will become evident as the chapter progresses. In the next section, we will look at changes that came about in American foreign policy after

⁴⁴¹Pfiffner, P. James, *George W. Bush: Policy, Politics, and Personality* (2003). Available at http://pfiffner.gmu.edu/files/pdfs/Book_Chapters/Bush%20Personality,%2004.pdf (accessed on February 23, 2022).

⁴⁴²Mann, James, *Rise of The Vulcans: The History of Bush's War Cabinet* (New York: Penguin Books, 2004).

⁴⁴³See Mearsheimer, John J. and Stephen M. Walt, *The Israel Lobby and U.S. Foreign Policy* (New York: Farrar, Strauss and Giroux, 2007).

9/11 including offensive attack on states (*pre-emptive* war); and revival/recurrence of the term ideology in presidential rhetoric.

5.1.1 George W. Bush's Perception of the American Role in the 'Middle East' in the 'Post-Cold War Period'

After taking oath of office, Bush early in his first term shared his vision of American foreign policy. He declared that in the period after the Cold war, the world was a dangerous place where the *them* were indeed present but were not clear. In a *us* versus *them* world, the *them* were no longer clear but “we know they are there.”⁴⁴⁴ Statements like these, which are ambiguous reflect lack of clarity about *them*, and also the direction of his foreign policy. It should be borne in mind that such a statement was made before the 9/11 attacks. It appears as if the president was groping in the dark in search of an enemy who had not yet revealed themselves. It reminds one of David Campbell's insightful arguments on perception of danger and difference that lead to establishment of American identity which is assumed by interpretation of dangers posed by *others*. Identity is at the root of American foreign policy,⁴⁴⁵ which is also something this thesis argues. Self-identity is given a semblance of cohesion by using *predicates* to define *self* in relation to the *other* as contradictory in values, ideologies, qualities, attributes and adjectives.

After a few months in office, Bush elaborated on the threats in the 21st century (before the 9/11 attacks); nuclear weapons, rogue states, terrorists and WMD. In the Post-Cold war period, Bush recognised that Russia was not an enemy anymore; it was, he declared, a

⁴⁴⁴Refer Public Papers of George W. Bush (March 29, 2001, Book I): 346. [From the U.S. Government Publishing Office www.gpo.gov] [Public Papers of the Presidents of the United States | GovInfo](http://www.gpo.gov/publications/papers/papers.html)

⁴⁴⁵Bteddini, Lida, Review of *Writing Security: United States Foreign Policy and the Politics of Identity* by David Campbell, *Revue de la Securite Humaine, Sciences Po*, 8, (Jan., 2009). [\[PDF\] Writing Security: United States Foreign Policy and the Politics of Identity \(researchgate.net\)](https://www.researchgate.net/publication/312111111)

democratic nation at peace with itself and its neighbours and an ally in NATO. In spite of the absence of Cold War politics and tensions, he believed it was still a ‘dangerous world’ that was ‘less certain’ and ‘less predictable’ because many more states ‘possessed nuclear weapons’ and others had ‘nuclear aspirations.’ There were some states which had ‘chemical and biological weapons’ and others had ‘developed ballistic missile technology’ that could allow them to ‘deliver weapons of mass destruction’ at ‘long distances’ and at ‘incredible speed.’

The major cause of concern for America was that the ‘list of such countries’ included some of the “world’s least responsible states.” And ‘unlike the Cold War’ where ‘thousands of ballistic missiles’ were with the Soviet Union, “today a small number of missiles in the hands of these states,” was a cause of major concern. These states were capable of using ‘terror,’ ‘blackmail’ and ‘weapons of mass destruction’ to ‘intimidate their neighbours,’ which could eventually be a threat to USA and other responsible nations. And these states would not allow them to help allies and friends in strategic parts of the world.

Arguing that Cold war deterrence was no longer valid, Bush stated that some tyrants like Saddam Hussein were ‘gripped by hatred’ of America, ‘their friends’ and ‘their values,’ ‘democracy,’ ‘freedom’ and ‘individual liberty.’ And in order to maintain peace, protect American citizens, American allies and friends, “a new policy”/ “broad strategy of active non-proliferation, counter proliferation and defences” was required, along with “new concepts of deterrence that rely on both offensive and defensive forces.”⁴⁴⁶

There was also a need to tackle the proliferation of the WMD, which was increasingly becoming a major threat in the new century. Bush argued, that in case the US moved in the

⁴⁴⁶Refer Public Papers of George W. Bush, “President Bush’s Remarks at National Defence University,” (May 1, 2001, Book I): 471-472. [From the U.S. Government Publishing Office www.gpo.gov] [Public Papers of the Presidents of the United States | GovInfo](#)

Middle East to protect an ally, rogue states possessing WMD could threaten the USA and its “forward-thinking foreign policy.”⁴⁴⁷ In short, WMD could be used to isolate America which was something that America had to avoid.⁴⁴⁸ He declared that freedom’s enemies in the Post-Cold war period were also ‘rogue nations,’ ‘terrorism’ and ‘missiles that threaten American forces, friends, allies, and homeland.’ In the Cold-War era, Bush observed peace was based on the capacity of the United States and Russia to blow each other up. But in the Post-Cold war period, where new threats were based on uncertainty, it was the capacity of someone who hated freedom, America, its allies, and Europe to blow them up.⁴⁴⁹

He pictured a significant role for America in the 21st century. He declared, “America has a window of opportunity to extend and secure our present peace by promoting a distinctly American internationalism.” He also added that America will work with its ‘allies and friends’ to be a ‘force for good and champion of freedom.’ It will also work for ‘free markets,’ ‘free trade,’ and ‘freedom from oppression’ for “free trade brings greater political and personal freedom” And in order for America to promote its values and peace a strong military was required to meet the emerging threats. The American strategy to confront the threats ranging from rogue nations, to terrorists of the 21st century, is to develop and deploy effective missile defences. He was very emphatic that with the end of the Cold War, America should transform its military by discarding cold-war relics and reducing nuclear forces. “A strong America is the world’s best hope for peace and freedom.”⁴⁵⁰

⁴⁴⁷Refer Public Papers of George W. Bush (Aug. 24, 2001, Book II): 1021. [From the U.S. Government Publishing Office www.gpo.gov] [Public Papers of the Presidents of the United States | GovInfo](#)

⁴⁴⁸Refer Public Papers of George W. Bush (Aug. 24, 2001, Book II): 1022. [From the U.S. Government Publishing Office www.gpo.gov] [Public Papers of the Presidents of the United States | GovInfo](#)

⁴⁴⁹Refer Public Papers of George W. Bush (June 13, 2001, Book I): 652. [From the U.S. Government Publishing Office www.gpo.gov] [Public Papers of the Presidents of the United States | GovInfo](#)

⁴⁵⁰ Refer Public Papers of George W. Bush (Feb. 27, 2001, Book I): 145. [From the U.S. Government Publishing Office www.gpo.gov] [Public Papers of the Presidents of the United States | GovInfo](#)

It is interesting to note that Bush (Jr.) rhetoric even before the 9/11 attacks was replete with themes of enemies in the Middle East, the WMD, missiles, rogue states, tyrants like Sadddam Hussein, terrorists, nuclear weapons in the wrong hands among others. Russia, it appeared, was no longer the enemy but a peaceful democracy and ally of NATO. *American identity* was defined in terms of *self* and *them* even before the 9/11 attacks where the enemy/*them* was not identified yet. The *predicates* Bush uses before the attacks to describe the American state was ‘freedom.’ He describes America as a ‘force for good’ and ‘champion of freedom.’ He also argued that peace can be maintained by promoting distinctly American internationalism. And a stronger American nation was ‘the best hope for peace and freedom in the world.’ The aim of the chapter is to focus on such ideologically charged rhetoric.

5.2. Changes in American Presidential Rhetoric under George W Bush

5.2.1 Rise in American Presidential Rhetoric on Pre-Emptive Strike

The American foreign policy in the 21st century changed exceedingly after the 9/11 attacks, making it “offensive” where Bush argued, the USA would not lie in wait to ‘react’ or ‘defend’ against attacks in the international system. America began targeting the ‘enemy’, taking the fight to them before they could plan/execute any attack on American soil. Bush declared that the “best defence against terror is a global offensive against terror.”⁴⁵¹

Bush argued, that the *pre-emptive strike* was the best way to secure America. Pre-emptive strike became the hallmark of his foreign policy. It means any military action taken against a state in anticipation of a perceived threat to defeat or repeal imminent invasion or offensive attack. He invaded Iraq in 2003 which he claimed was a pre-emptive war. And the justification he used in his rhetoric for the public and American allies was that Iraq had WMD

⁴⁵¹Refer Public Papers of George W. Bush (Oct. 8, 2001, Book II): 1203. [From the U.S. Government Publishing Office www.gpo.gov] [Public Papers of the Presidents of the United States](#) | [GovInfo](#)

and could not be trusted. He declared “we began the offense shortly after September the 11th,” to carry out a worldwide strategy to ‘bring the killers to justice’ before ‘they *hurt* America again.’⁴⁵² The strategy in the ‘war on terror’ that America adopted was based on being on the offence rather than defending against terrorist attacks. Describing this strategy, Bush stated that America has great faith “in the capacity of freedom to transform hateful societies to hopeful societies, to transform the conditions that create hate to the conditions that create hope.” And this confrontation, he described as “a fantastic period in American history.”⁴⁵³

He argued, that USA was adjusting to a ‘new’ type of war, fighting a ‘new’ enemy, the type which strikes and hides and knows no border. This *war* he declared was against ‘evil doers’ and those who harbour, finance and feed terrorists. The American objective was to “rout out and destroy global terrorism.” He clarified that the campaign was to do what is *right* and fight against *evil*, not the Muslim faith. With patience and determination, use of all their intelligence gathering capacity and all available diplomatic means, America also intended to use the help of a broad coalition of nations.⁴⁵⁴

In one of his addresses, Bush pointed out that even though America had known wars for the past 136 years on foreign soil,⁴⁵⁵ it had experienced attack only twice, once in 1941 and the other on September 11, 2001. And hence, the change from defensive foreign policy to an *offensive* foreign policy was relevant. This statement also resonates that in the long history of American interventions, wars and invasions, America sent troops to various sites of war in

⁴⁵²Refer Public Papers of George W. Bush (April 19, 2004, Book I): 605. [From the U.S. Government Publishing Office www.gpo.gov] [Public Papers of the Presidents of the United States | GovInfo](#)

⁴⁵³Refer Public Papers of George W. Bush (June 2, 2005, Book I): 933. [From the U.S. Government Publishing Office www.gpo.gov] [Public Papers of the Presidents of the United States | GovInfo](#)

⁴⁵⁴Refer Public Papers of George W. Bush (Sept. 27, 2001, Book II): 1171. [From the U.S. Government Publishing Office www.gpo.gov] [Public Papers of the Presidents of the United States | GovInfo](#)

⁴⁵⁵Refer Public Papers of George W. Bush (Sept. 20, 2001, Book II): 1140. [From the U.S. Government Publishing Office www.gpo.gov] [Public Papers of the Presidents of the United States | GovInfo](#)

different states and dealt with disruptions in international systems, never allowing the spoils of war to ruin American soil. It came to the rescue of “failing” states; aided states in transition to a democracy; promoted liberty and liberal values to oppressed states; protected “weaker” states being intimidated by stronger neighbours; deterred expansion of Nazism, Fascism and Communism to other states; all located beyond the two oceans, the Atlantic and the Pacific Ocean. Except for an attack by Japan on Pearl Harbour and the attack by a non-state *terrorist* actor on the World Trade Centre, (including Pentagon and Pennsylvania) wars since the American War of Independence in 1776 have never disrupted America. But all that changed with the 9/11 attacks; the illusion of protection offered by the two vast oceans shattered as they could no longer protect America and Bush argued, that the 9/11 attacks were proof of that.⁴⁵⁶ In the Post-Cold war period, it can be argued 9/11 attacks were crucial in comprehending the *offensive* change in American foreign policy.

5.2.2. Revival and Recurrence of the term *ideology* in American Presidential Rhetoric

Apart from the *offensive* change in American foreign policy, the term *ideology* began recurring excessively in the American rhetoric after the 9/11 attacks. With the demise of the Soviet Union, the term *ideology* became infrequent in American presidential rhetoric. Neither Bush (Sr) nor Clinton used it extensively in their rhetoric. Since the end of the Cold War, the use of the term *ideology* returned in American presidential rhetoric only after the 9/11 attacks. Reflecting on the similarities between the struggle against communism and the “modern totalitarian threat of radical Islam,” Bush observed that the followers of violent Islamic radicalism like the Communists are doomed to fail.⁴⁵⁷ The term *ideology* was also used in

⁴⁵⁶Refer Public Papers of George W. Bush (April 19, 2004, Book I): 606. [From the U.S. Government Publishing Office www.gpo.gov] [Public Papers of the Presidents of the United States | GovInfo](http://www.gpo.gov)

⁴⁵⁷Refer Public Papers of George W. Bush, “Foreword,” (Jan.-Jun 2007, Book I): vi. [From the U.S. Government Publishing Office www.gpo.gov] [Public Papers of the Presidents of the United States | GovInfo](http://www.gpo.gov)

reference to the terrorists; there were occasions when Bush contrasted the ideology of hate/evil and destruction of the terrorists with that of the American ideology of hope/ liberty and freedom. Bush described the ideology of the terrorists in the Middle East as ‘ideology of theocratic terror.’ He argued, that they use the language of religion behind which lies, ambitions for absolute political power.⁴⁵⁸ In one instance, he referred to the terrorists, as ‘ideological killers’⁴⁵⁹ who were afraid of democracy for they cannot survive in a democracy and open society.⁴⁶⁰ And the strategy to emerge victorious over ‘ideology of hate’ was ‘ideology of hope’ he stressed. “You can always defeat an ideology of hate with an ideology of hope,” he declared. And there’s nothing ‘more hopeful,’ he concluded, than a ‘system based upon human rights’ and ‘human dignity’ and “a system based upon the freedom for people to worship and speak their minds freely.”⁴⁶¹

Initially, in his speeches immediately after the 9/11 attacks, Bush made contradictory remarks on terrorists having an ideology. While in a statement made on September 19, 2001, he argued that terrorists have ‘a common ideology’ and ‘hate freedom and freedom loving people, particularly America.’⁴⁶² On September 25, 2001, he said that terrorists, “don’t represent an ideology” and neither are they a ‘legitimate political group of people.’ “They’re flat evil” and America as a nation will ‘hunt them down’ and ‘bring them to justice.’⁴⁶³ And it is by “remaining steadfast in freedom’s cause,” that we will ensure that a *future* American

⁴⁵⁸Refer Public Papers of George W. Bush (Nov. 6, 2003, Book II): 1471. [From the U.S. Government Publishing Office www.gpo.gov] [Public Papers of the Presidents of the United States | GovInfo](#)

⁴⁵⁹Refer Public Papers of George W. Bush (June 2, 2005, Book I): 933. [From the U.S. Government Publishing Office www.gpo.gov] [Public Papers of the Presidents of the United States | GovInfo](#)

⁴⁶⁰See *ibid*.

⁴⁶¹Refer Public Papers of George W. Bush (May 1, 2008, Book I): 614. [From the U.S. Government Publishing Office www.gpo.gov] [Public Papers of the Presidents of the United States | GovInfo](#)

⁴⁶²Refer Public Papers of George W. Bush (Sept. 19, 2001, Book II): 1131. [From the U.S. Government Publishing Office www.gpo.gov] [Public Papers of the Presidents of the United States | GovInfo](#)

⁴⁶³Refer Public Papers of George W. Bush (Sept. 25, 2001, Book II): 1161. [From the U.S. Government Publishing Office www.gpo.gov] [Public Papers of the Presidents of the United States | GovInfo](#)

President does not have to “dedicate a memorial to the millions killed by the radicals and extremists of the 21st century.”⁴⁶⁴

Before tracing Bush’s ideological rhetoric towards Middle Eastern states, we need to look at Bush’s (Jr.) rhetoric while describing both the events’ of 9/11 attacks and the measures and policies taken by America. These attacks remain a major event not just in international politics but also America's involvement in the Middle East, which is why the next section will describe and analyse presidential rhetoric about these attacks. The event of 9/11 transformed the American presidential rhetoric and American foreign policy in the Middle East. The *ideological presuppositions, predicates* and *subject-positioning* recurring in the American presidential rhetoric that forms the crux of the chapter can only be fully comprehended after analysing presidential rhetoric about the events of September 9, 2001.

5.3 Bush’s (Jr.) Rhetoric about the 9/11 Attacks

The September 11 attacks were coordinated terrorist attacks on New York’s Twin Towers of the World Trade Centre, Washington DC’s Pentagon and a federal building. These were suicide attacks, where four airplanes were hijacked by the terrorists and crashed into targeted government buildings. Two planes crashed into WTC, one into the Pentagon and one crashed into a field following a revolt from the passengers. Around 3000 people died in these attacks; the reason for America's Global War on terror is by and large ascribed to these attacks.

Following these attacks, the USA (CIA to be precise) identified AL-Qaeda as the terrorist organisation that was responsible for these attacks on America. Bin Laden, the leader of this organisation initially denied his or his organisations involvement in these attacks. It was

⁴⁶⁴Refer Public Papers of George W. Bush, “Foreword,” (Jan.-June, 2007, Book I): vi. [From the U.S. Government Publishing Office www.gpo.gov] [Public Papers of the Presidents of the United States](http://www.gpo.gov/publications/pubs/pubs_of_the_presidents_of_the_united_states) | [GovInfo](http://www.govinfo.gov)

later that he formally accepted responsibility. Bin Laden's reasoning for waging Jihad against America was “you attacked us and continue to attack us.”⁴⁶⁵ Al-Qaeda's motivations included ‘American support of Israel,’ the ‘presence of American troops in Saudi Arabia,’ and ‘sanctions on Iraq.’

Bush addressed the nation after the terrorist attacks where he declared that both the American ‘way of life,’ and American ‘freedom’ were “under attack in a series of deliberate and deadly terrorist attacks.” He also added that the attacks cannot touch the foundations of America and ‘dent the steel of American resolve.’ He argued, that USA was under fire as it is ‘the brightest beacon’ for ‘freedom’ and ‘opportunity in the world.’ Stressing that American military and financial institutions were powerful and prepared to protect Americans at home from evil, he declared that America will not easily be frightened into chaos.⁴⁶⁶

Defining the enemy immediately after the attacks, Bush identified them as the enemy that hides, who can’t stand freedom, who hates American values and what America stands for.⁴⁶⁷ What is noteworthy is that before any organisation or persons claimed responsibility for the 9/11 attacks or released any media citing reasons/justification for the attacks, Bush (Jr.) was able to describe their motivations/aims/preferences: what they stood for, what they were like and what they stood against, namely, American ideals, values and freedom.

Bush declared that ‘the American people’ desired not just to seek “revenge but to win a war against barbaric behaviour, people that hate freedom and hate what we stand for.” The Bush administration, he further added, was dedicated to winning the war.⁴⁶⁸ In an executive

⁴⁶⁵See Michael Scheuer, *Imperial Hubris: Why the West is Losing the War on Terror* (Washington D.C.: Brassey's INC, 2004): 131.

⁴⁶⁶Refer Public Papers of George W. Bush (Sept. 11, 2001, Book II): 1099. [From the U.S. Government Publishing Office www.gpo.gov] [Public Papers of the Presidents of the United States](http://www.gpo.gov) | [GovInfo](http://www.gpo.gov)

⁴⁶⁷Refer Public Papers of George W. Bush (Sept. 13, 2001, Book II): 1105. [From the U.S. Government Publishing Office www.gpo.gov] [Public Papers of the Presidents of the United States](http://www.gpo.gov) | [GovInfo](http://www.gpo.gov)

⁴⁶⁸Refer Public Papers of George W. Bush (Sept. 15, 2001, Book II): 1112. [From the U.S. Government Publishing

order of September 24, 2001, Bush identified ‘eleven terrorist’ organisations, ‘twelve individual terrorist leaders,’ ‘three charitable and humanitarian organisations’ and ‘one business entity’ that operate as ‘fronts for terrorists, financing and support.’⁴⁶⁹ As per this executive order, efforts were made by the USA to ‘form a coalition in the global war against terrorism.’

He declared that no distinction will be made between ‘terrorists who committed the acts’ and ‘those who harbour them.’ On September 11, 2001 he declared that America and its allies who desire peace and security in the world will stand united to win the ‘war against terrorism.’ He ended his address by urging the American people to ‘defend freedom, all that is good and just in the world.’⁴⁷⁰ On 12 September 2001, Bush stated that the terrorist attacks were not just ‘acts of terror’ but were ‘acts of war.’ He added that ‘freedom and democracy’ were ‘under attack.’⁴⁷¹ Ergo, it appears that Bush is equating America with freedom and democracy.

Bush’s speeches identified American values as the reason for Bin Laden targeting America. Yet, it has been often noted, that it was American ‘involvement in the Middle East’ that led to the 9/11 strikes. Michael Scheuer, (a former CIA Veteran) argues that none of Bin Laden’s motives revolve around “our freedom, liberty and democracy,” but has “everything to do with U.S. policies and actions in the Muslim world.” It is ‘cheap, easily accessible oil,’

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⁴⁶⁹Refer Public Papers of George W. Bush (Sept. 24, 20001, Book II): 1147. [From the U.S. Government Publishing Office www.gpo.gov | [Public Papers of the Presidents of the United States](#) | [GovInfo](#)

⁴⁷⁰Refer Public Papers of George W. Bush (Sept. 11, 2001, Book II): 1100. [From the U.S. Government Publishing Office www.gpo.gov | [Public Papers of the Presidents of the United States](#) | [GovInfo](#)

⁴⁷¹Refer Public Papers of George W. Bush (Sept. 12, 2001, Book II): 1100. [From the U.S. Government Publishing Office www.gpo.gov | [Public Papers of the Presidents of the United States](#) | [GovInfo](#)

which guides both ‘Washington’ and ‘the West’ to support the ‘Muslim tyrannies.’ This is what “Bin Laden and other Islamists seek to destroy.”⁴⁷²

He also observes that across the Islamic world, the United States of America is hated because of its specific “government policies and actions.” He also adds, ‘the hatred’ is ‘concrete,’ ‘material,’ and ‘will grow’ for the foreseeable future. “We are at war with an al Qaeda-led, worldwide Islamist insurgency because of and to defend those policies, and not, as President Bush mistakenly has said, ‘to defend freedom and all that is good and just in the world’.”⁴⁷³ Here it is noteworthy that though the language is liberal, the policies and their justification for them remain realist (focus on national interest). The reason for such intense perusal of national interests can be better understood within a social constructivist framework as socially constructed discourse on foreign policy. For illustration, ideological presuppositions of defending freedom, justice and peace are innately embedded within the foreign policy discourse as a prerequisite tangible variable.

Scheuer concludes in the book *Imperial Hubris* that if the status quo US policies on six issues remain the same, it will give Bin Laden ‘steady and invaluable aid’ instigating a worldwide defensive Jihad against the US.⁴⁷⁴ The six foreign policy goals the author refers to are firstly, to end Washington’s aid to Tel Aviv , eliminate the Jewish state and create ‘Islamic Palestinian State’; secondly, withdraw all American and ‘Western military forces’ from the ‘Arabian peninsula’ and ‘all Muslim territory’; thirdly, to terminate US engagement in Iraq and Afghanistan; fourthly, to stop supporting the ‘oppression of Muslims’ by other governments including the Chinese, Russian, and Indian governments; fifthly, restoration of ‘Muslim

⁴⁷²See Michael Scheuer, *Imperial Hubris: Why the West is Losing the War on Terror* (Washington D.C. : Brassey’s INC, 2004): xi.

⁴⁷³See *ibid.* 240-241.

⁴⁷⁴See *ibid.* 212.

control' over Islamic world's energy resources which would end 'impoverishment of Muslims' triggered by 'oil prices' that are set by 'Arab regimes' to 'placate the West'; lastly, to replace 'US-protected Muslim regimes' which do not govern according to Islam with regimes that govern by Islam.⁴⁷⁵ In short, he concludes that the war is being waged on America because of what America is doing in the Islamic world.⁴⁷⁶

Noam Chomsky called out American double standards when it came to playing the victim in the victim versus attacker narrative of history. He gives instances when America attacked other states in the world, causing destruction, violence, death and sufferings like in Sudan, Hawaii, Philippines, Middle East and Latin American states. He understands that it is a relatively new experience for America to be attacked by someone else. He also points that violence is never the answer.⁴⁷⁷

Bush's rhetoric immediately after the attacks are loaded with *ideological presuppositions* about America which gives it a sense of identity as the defender of freedom, democracy and peace. On some occasions, he has described America as freedom itself. The *predicates* freedom, democracy, good and just (including phrases like beacon of freedom and opportunity) were used to describe the United States of America. Quality of a leader or champion was also ascribed to America. The *predicates* used to describe the enemy, the terrorist (the enemy in American history and presidential rhetoric was traditionally a state but after 9/11, it became a non-state actor) were evil, people with barbaric behaviour and haters of freedom and American values. They also were the kind of cowards who attack and hide. *Nationalist presuppositions* hinting at American resolve and American values were also

⁴⁷⁵See *ibid.* 210.

⁴⁷⁶See *ibid.* 250.

⁴⁷⁷*Review of '9-11: Was There an Alternative?'* by Noam Chomsky, *Edubirdie* (Sept. 2022). Retrieved March 2, 2023, from <https://edubirdie.com/examples/review-of-noam-chomskys-9-11-was-there-an-alternative/>

present. The *subject positioning* in these arguments is glaring: the American good versus the enemy's evil; upholder of freedom versus hater of freedom; civilised America versus the uncivilised enemy to name a few contrasts inherent in Bush's rhetoric.

5.3.1 Bush's (Jr.) Rhetoric during American Response to 9/11

Immediately after the collapse of the Twin towers in 2001 on September 12, to be precise, Bush declared: "Terrorism against our Nation will not stand."⁴⁷⁸ What is noteworthy is the employment of the term, '*terrorism*,' to explain the attacks on America. The term '*terrorism*' previously was used to declare sanctions on various states especially in the Middle East region during Clinton's presidency. It was for the first time in American presidential rhetoric that terrorism was ascribed the status of an enemy that had actively attacked the United States of America.

On September 13, 2001 Bush declared that it was American responsibility to *history* to answer "these attacks and rid the world of evil." He added that though America was peaceful as a nation it became 'fierce when stirred to anger.' And even though the fight started on others' "timing and terms," it will "end in a way and at an hour of our choosing."⁴⁷⁹ These attacks, he stated, were not just against America; they were attacks 'on all civilised countries.' There were citizens from around 80 nations on the aeroplanes, making it a 'crime against humanity,' which condemned it.⁴⁸⁰ He further added that it was not only America's fight and America's freedom which was at risk; it was the 'world's fight' and the 'civilization's fight.'⁴⁸¹

⁴⁷⁸Refer Public Papers of George W. Bush (Sept. 11, 2001, Book II): 1098. [From the U.S. Government Publishing Office www.gpo.gov] [Public Papers of the Presidents of the United States | GovInfo](#)

⁴⁷⁹Refer Public Papers of George W. Bush (Sept. 13, 2001, Book II): 1108. [From the U.S. Government Publishing Office www.gpo.gov] [Public Papers of the Presidents of the United States | GovInfo](#)

⁴⁸⁰Refer Public Papers of George W. Bush (Oct. 20, 2001, Book II): 1273. [From the U.S. Government Publishing Office www.gpo.gov] [Public Papers of the Presidents of the United States | GovInfo](#)

⁴⁸¹Refer Public Papers of George W. Bush (Sept. 20, 2001, Book II): 1141-1142. [From the U.S. Government Publishing Office www.gpo.gov] [Public Papers of the Presidents of the United States | GovInfo](#)

The enemy i.e., the terrorists, Bush declared hated American ‘freedom of religion’, ‘freedom of speech,’ ‘freedom to vote’ and ‘assemble’ and ‘disagree with each other.’ They aspire to drive Christians and Jews out of Asia and Africa. They also want to drive Israel out of the Middle East. Bush described the ‘terrorists’ as the “heirs of all the murderous ideologies of the 20th century; Fascism, Nazism, and totalitarianism.” And the American strategy to ‘defeat the global terror network,’ he declared, would involve “every means of diplomacy, every tool of intelligence, every instrument of law enforcement, every financial influence, and every necessary weapon of war.”⁴⁸²

Among the many heads of states, Britain’s Tony Blair remained a staunch supporter of the War on Terror that America was waging in the Middle East. He also extended support in imposing sanctions on Iraq. In fact, as early as February 23, 2001 when America imposed sanctions on Saddam Hussein, Prime Minister Tony Blair stated that the “threat of Saddam Hussein is contained”: he was unable able to ‘develop any weapons of mass destruction.’⁴⁸³ In one of the joint addresses, Tony Blair described the struggle with terror as a concern of the ‘whole of the democratic, civilised and free world.’⁴⁸⁴ He argued, that such a struggle should unite people of all faiths, nations and democratic, and political persuasions. He also stated that ‘America, Britain and all their allies’ would ‘stand united’ in the war on terror to dismantle and eradicate the evil of mass terrorism from the world. He offered his country’s solidarity, support and sympathy for the American nation after the 9/11 attacks.⁴⁸⁵ The collaboration between

⁴⁸²Refer Public Papers of George W. Bush (Sept. 20, 2001, Book II): 1141-1142. [From the U.S. Government Publishing Office www.gpo.gov] [Public Papers of the Presidents of the United States](http://www.gpo.gov) | [GovInfo](http://www.gpo.gov)

⁴⁸³Refer Public Papers of George W. Bush (Feb. 23, 2001, Book I): 126. [From the U.S. Government Publishing Office www.gpo.gov] [Public Papers of the Presidents of the United States](http://www.gpo.gov) | [GovInfo](http://www.gpo.gov)

⁴⁸⁴Refer Public Papers of George W. Bush (Sept. 19, 2001, Book II): 1138. [From the U.S. Government Publishing Office www.gpo.gov] [Public Papers of the Presidents of the United States](http://www.gpo.gov) | [GovInfo](http://www.gpo.gov)

⁴⁸⁵Refer Public Papers of George W. Bush (Sept. 20, 2001, Book II): 1139. [From the U.S. Government Publishing Office www.gpo.gov] [Public Papers of the Presidents of the United States](http://www.gpo.gov) | [GovInfo](http://www.gpo.gov)

America and Britain came to be described as a *US-UK alliance* much like the *transatlantic alliance* which became popular after World War II when America and Europe began coordination on collective security or shared prosperity from both sides of the Atlantic Ocean.

Apart from Britain, many states of the world offered sympathy and help to the United States of America after the September 9 attacks including France that offered to provide leadership in responding to terror and safeguarding values of *civilisation*. In a joint statement with the President of France, Jacques Chirac, George W. Bush declared that the world was ready for their leadership in responding to terror and both America and France were ready to provide that leadership.⁴⁸⁶ President Chirac declared that in the conflict of ‘completely new nature’ attempting to destroy ‘human rights,’ ‘freedom’ and the ‘dignity of man,’ every attempt must be made “to protect and safeguard these values of civilization.”⁴⁸⁷ In short, not just America but states like France and Britain began using the *predicates* like *civilisation*, attack on *civilised, free, democratic* states in contrast to an emerging threat which became significant after the 9/11 attacks.

The use of the term ‘civilization’ and distinction between *civilised* and *uncivilised* has always been present in American presidential rhetoric (see Chapter 4). But it gained a new lease of life during Bush’s presidency when terrorist attacks began being read in light of S.P. Huntington’s thesis, *Clash of Civilizations*. Once Bush began using such terms, heads of states in Europe including France and Britain, also began using it extensively in their rhetoric on 9/11. In the Post-Cold war period when the ‘iron curtain’ of communism ended, the ‘velvet curtain’ of culture, as Huntington argued, would divide the world. The new conflict will be along

⁴⁸⁶Refer Public Papers of George W. Bush (Sept. 18, 2001, Book II): 1128. [From the U.S. Government Publishing Office www.gpo.gov] [Public Papers of the Presidents of the United States | GovInfo](#)

⁴⁸⁷Refer Public Papers of George W. Bush (Sept. 18, 2001, Book II): 1126. [From the U.S. Government Publishing Office www.gpo.gov] [Public Papers of the Presidents of the United States | GovInfo](#)

cultural and religious identities and fault lines. He recognized two major contenders to the Western civilizations: Islamic and Sino-Confucian civilizations. “Conflict along the fault line between Western and Islamic civilizations has been going on for 1,300 years,”⁴⁸⁸ he insisted in his article, ‘Clash of Civilizations?’ in *Foreign Affairs* in 1993. And when The Middle East was identified as home to the enemy terrorist (who attacked the US) many scholars/commentators began ascribing a prophetic undercurrent to Huntington’s work.

9/11 was viewed as the ‘plausible’ realisation of Huntington's thesis and “this idea (of a clash between Islamic and Western civilization) [has] lodged itself in the contemporary imagination, functioning as an increasingly influential idea in the media and political circles.”⁴⁸⁹ As Eric Neumayer and Thomas Plumper indicate, “events such as the terrorist attacks of 9/11, and the bombings in Bali, Madrid and London were interpreted by many as striking evidence for Huntington’s paradigm.”⁴⁹⁰ To quote Jens-uwe Wunderlich and Meera Warriar, “Others [scholars] see Huntington’s thesis as less of a description of an existing state of affairs and more as a means to form a basis for future policy prescriptions, leading to focus criticism that the thesis has the potential to be a self-fulfilling prophecy.”⁴⁹¹

In the first decade of the 21st century, it was also ‘revisited’ and used as an ‘explanation’ of the world politics, keeping in mind the War on Terror, which was declared by USA on the terrorists ‘across the globe.’ Many scholars, accepting Huntington’s argument that Islamic civilization will inevitably clash with the West, supported intervention in West Asian countries (considered home to many terrorist organisations) to weed out terrorists who posed a threat to

⁴⁸⁸Huntington, Samuel, “The Clash of Civilizations?” *Foreign Affairs* 72, no.3 (Summer 1993): 22-49. [Huntington: Class of Civilizations \(kenyon.edu\)](http://kenyon.edu)

⁴⁸⁹See Wunderlich, Jens-uwe and Meera Warriar, *A Dictionary of Globalization* (Routledge: London, 2010), 69.

⁴⁹⁰See Neumayer, Eric and Thomas Plumper, “International Terrorism and the Clash of Civilizations,” *British Journal of Political Science* 39, no.4 (2009): 2. The electronic copy available at: <http://ssrn.com/abstract=952208>

⁴⁹¹See Wunderlich, Jens-uwe and Meera Warriar, *A Dictionary of Globalization* (Routledge: London, 2010), 69.

Western interests. George Bush's statement, "This struggle has been called a clash of civilization. In truth, it is a struggle for civilization,"⁴⁹² was taken as a reference to Huntington's thesis which thrust the 'clash of civilizations thesis' once again into spotlight, making scholars and policy makers re-read it with a careful eye.

5.3.2 Bush's (Jr.) Rhetoric on the Measures taken Post 9/11

America declared that it will be pursuing a war on terror which will be "a larger campaign against anybody who hates freedom, anybody who can't stand what America and our allies and friends stand for."⁴⁹³ He stressed that "Our war is against terrorism – those who would conduct terrorist acts against the United States, those who sponsor them, those who harbor them, those who challenge freedom wherever it may exist."⁴⁹⁴ The terrorists threaten the national security of the US and Bush declared it was not only necessary but also 'appropriate' that America exercises "its right to defend itself" and "protect its citizens both at home and abroad" with the use of military force if needed. And thus, the resolution, the 'Authorization for Use of Force,' was signed in 2001 on September 18.⁴⁹⁵

On September 23, 2001, in a message to the Congress on "United States' Financial Sanctions Against Terrorists and Their Supporters," a national emergency was declared by Bush on both terrorism and foreign terrorists including the September 11 terrorist strikes at the World Trade Centre, Pentagon, and Pennsylvania in response to the 'unusual and extraordinary

⁴⁹²See Neumayer, Eric and Thomas Plumper, "International Terrorism and the Clash of Civilizations," *British Journal of Political Science* 39, no.4 (2009): 2. The electronic copy available at:<http://ssrn.com/abstract=952208>

⁴⁹³Refer Public Papers of George W. Bush (Sept. 25, 2001, Book II): 1161. [From the U.S. Government Publishing Office www.gpo.gov] [Public Papers of the Presidents of the United States | GovInfo](#)

⁴⁹⁴Refer Public Papers of George W. Bush (Sept. 24, 2001, Book II): 1150. [From the U.S. Government Publishing Office www.gpo.gov] [Public Papers of the Presidents of the United States | GovInfo](#)

⁴⁹⁵Refer Public Papers of George W. Bush (Sept. 18, 2001, Book II): 1124. [From the U.S. Government Publishing Office www.gpo.gov] [Public Papers of the Presidents of the United States | GovInfo](#)

threat posed to the national security, foreign policy, and economy of the United States.⁴⁹⁶ The USA government faced scrutiny as it tried to figure out what went wrong at the administrative level. Based on it, radical restructuring was initiated by the Bush administration including in its intelligence, military, and federal agency which coordinated homeland security,⁴⁹⁷ formed a Foreign Terrorist Asset Tracking Center and Terrorist Threat Integration Center. It was during this time that the controversial 2001 ‘USA PATRIOT Act (Uniting and Strengthening America by Providing Appropriate Tools Required to Intercept and Obstruct Terrorism)’ was also signed. While doing it he continued using the rhetoric which was laced with predicates which typecasted the enemy as evil/immoral and barbaric.

5.3.2.1 The Need for Increasing Role of NATO

At the inception of NATO, President Harry Truman declared: “By this treaty, we are not only seeking to establish freedom, freedom from aggression and from the use of force in the North Atlantic community, but we’re also actively striving to promote and preserve peace throughout the world.”⁴⁹⁸ And this has been its role, aiding its members and having an international presence. After the Cold War ended, it appeared like an irrelevant alliance but the Clinton administration promoted the need to increase its role and responsibilities according to the changing nature of international politics as has been discussed in the last chapter. In fact, the credit of “a bloodless end” of the Cold War and deterrence of Soviet Union, Bush accorded to the NATO Alliance.⁴⁹⁹

⁴⁹⁶Refer Public Papers of George W. Bush (Sept. 22, 2001, Book II): 1146. [From the U.S. Government Publishing Office www.gpo.gov] [Public Papers of the Presidents of the United States | GovInfo](http://www.gpo.gov/publications/papers/presidents/presidents.html)

⁴⁹⁷Snyder, Jack. “One World, Rival Theories.” *Foreign Policy*, no. 145 (2004): 52. <https://doi.org/10.2307/4152944>.

⁴⁹⁸Refer Public Papers of George W. Bush (Nov. 12, 2003, Book II): 1514. [From the U.S. Government Publishing Office www.gpo.gov] [Public Papers of the Presidents of the United States | GovInfo](http://www.gpo.gov/publications/papers/presidents/presidents.html)

⁴⁹⁹Refer Public Papers of George W. Bush (June 13, 2001, Book I): 649. [From the U.S. Government Publishing Office www.gpo.gov] [Public Papers of the Presidents of the United States | GovInfo](http://www.gpo.gov/publications/papers/presidents/presidents.html)

After the 9/11 attacks, NATO got a new lease of life; Bush declared that NATO will remain an “essential foundation of Transatlantic security” and “continue to adapt itself to meet new missions and challenges” by ‘strengthening its capabilities.’⁵⁰⁰ It was for the first time after the September 11 attacks that Article 5 of the NATO charter was invoked, which states that “an attack against one, is an attack against all” members of NATO. NATO’s ‘core mission’ was the defence of its ‘members’ against ‘any aggression.’ And in the aftermath of the Cold war, Bush stressed NATO has adapted to the new threats in the 21st century and also ‘proved’ its “worth” by “stopping ethnic cleansing in Bosnia” and “ousting armies of a tyrant in Kosovo.”⁵⁰¹ He described it as “most successful military alliance in history,”⁵⁰² which is not only an ‘instrument for freedom,’⁵⁰³ but will be a “cornerstone of world security in the 21st century.”⁵⁰⁴ Bush ascribed no record in history of a third world war to NATO and added that it has preserved the “stability of Europe and the transatlantic community” and also “kept peace in the world.”⁵⁰⁵ During the Bush administration seven members were given NATO membership⁵⁰⁶ which is indicative of recognition of NATO as an alliance that was going to stay actively involved in furthering American influenced interests in the 21st century.

⁵⁰⁰Refer Public Papers of George W. Bush (Feb. 23, 2001, Book I): 130. [From the U.S. Government Publishing Office www.gpo.gov] [Public Papers of the Presidents of the United States | GovInfo](#)

⁵⁰¹Refer Public Papers of George W. Bush (March 29, 2004, Book I): 478. [From the U.S. Government Publishing Office www.gpo.gov] [Public Papers of the Presidents of the United States | GovInfo](#)

⁵⁰²Refer Public Papers of George W. Bush (March 29, 2004, Book I): 475. [From the U.S. Government Publishing Office www.gpo.gov] [Public Papers of the Presidents of the United States | GovInfo](#)

⁵⁰³Refer Public Papers of George W. Bush (Nov. 14, 2003, Book II): 1539. [From the U.S. Government Publishing Office www.gpo.gov] [Public Papers of the Presidents of the United States | GovInfo](#)

⁵⁰⁴Refer Public Papers of George W. Bush (Nov. 20, 2003, Book II): 1588. [From the U.S. Government Publishing Office www.gpo.gov] [Public Papers of the Presidents of the United States | GovInfo](#)

⁵⁰⁵Refer Public Papers of George W. Bush (Feb. 13, 2001, Book I): 75. [From the U.S. Government Publishing Office www.gpo.gov] [Public Papers of the Presidents of the United States | GovInfo](#)

⁵⁰⁶Refer Public Papers of George W. Bush (March 29, 2004, Book I): 475. [From the U.S. Government Publishing Office www.gpo.gov] [Public Papers of the Presidents of the United States | GovInfo](#)

The new members of NATO were Bulgaria, Estonia, Latvia, Lithuania, Romania, Slovakia, and Slovenia.

Discussing the role of NATO in the War on Terror, Bush declared that it was extending support to the Middle Eastern states to ‘strengthen their ability’ to ‘fight terror’ and ‘provide common security.’ Increasing the role of NATO was necessary, he argued, to “support and increase the momentum of freedom in the greater Middle East.” The “commitment to freedom,” he argued, led America to victory during both the ‘Cold War’ and the ‘War on Terror.’ And the mission of NATO that history had set was to ‘advance freedom,’ ‘give hope’ and ‘support to all’ who seek to “lift the yoke of isolation and fear and oppression.”⁵⁰⁷

Now that we have examined George W Bush’s rhetoric on 9/11 attacks and measures taken, the background context for Bush’s rhetoric in the Middle East has been established. In the following section, an attempt will be made to identify *ideological presuppositions*, *predicates* and *subject positioning* in Bush’s presidential rhetoric on the Middle Eastern states.

5.4 Ideological Discursive Foreign Policy Practices in George W. Bush’s (Jr.) Rhetoric on the Middle East

Bush’s focus shifted to the Middle East after the September 11 attacks. In fact, Bush’s multiple interrelated foreign policy initiatives/principles of *pre-emptive strike* in Iraq; *Unilateralism* especially during the Iraq War, while withdrawing from ABM treaty and rejecting Kyoto Protocol; his War on Terror particularly as a reason/justification to invade Afghanistan and insistence on regime change progressed into what popularly became recognised as the *Bush Doctrine*. Reference to American ‘Unilateralism’ is not completely new in the period after the Cold war. Like David M. Malone and Yuen Foong Khong argue, in their book that, the foreign observers of American policies, witness “an unwelcome trend towards a

⁵⁰⁷Refer Public Papers of George W. Bush (March 30, 2004, Book I): 477. [From the U.S. Government Publishing Office www.gpo.gov] [Public Papers of the Presidents of the United States](#) | [GovInfo](#)

go-it-alone approach,” due to both Clinton and Bush (Jr.) administration’s policies, specifically Bush (Jr.)’s policy during the Iraq War.⁵⁰⁸

His presidency came to be defined by his involvement majorly in the Middle East: War on Taliban/Afghanistan; Iraq War; sanctions on Libya; sanctions on Iran; and Israel-Palestine Issue. The federal papers of the President gave regular updates on these events to the Congress, America people, international community and other government institutes and agencies through speeches, press conferences, interviews, addresses and reports which we will use to build Bush’s ideological rhetoric in the following section.

5.4.1 Presidential Ideological Discursive Foreign Policy Practices in Bush’s (Jr.) Rhetoric on Libya

Bush declared that due to the American interventions and actions in the Middle East, Libya has ‘gotten the message’ and renounced its Weapons of Mass Destruction programs.⁵⁰⁹ It was a nation that sponsored terror and was dangerous because it possessed WMD. But it made the decision to “disclose and disarm for the good of the world.” And around ‘50 tons of mustard gas’ was found in a farm in Turkey that Colonel Qadhafi willingly disclosed to make the world safer.⁵¹⁰ It was on December 19, 2003 that Colonel Muammar Al-Qadhafi decided to ‘disclose’ and ‘dismantle’ his country’s ‘weapons of mass destruction’ program. He also agreed ‘immediately’ and ‘unconditionally’ to give access to international organisation’s

⁵⁰⁸See Ikenberry, John, Review by *Unilateralism and U.S. Foreign Policy: International Perspectives* by David M. Malone and Yuen Foong Khong (eds.), *Foreign Affairs* (May/June 2003):147.

⁵⁰⁹Refer Public Papers of George W. Bush (March 20, 2004, Book I): 420. [From the U.S. Government Publishing Office www.gpo.gov] [Public Papers of the Presidents of the United States](http://www.gpo.gov) | [GovInfo](http://www.gpo.gov)

⁵¹⁰Refer Public Papers of George W. Bush (April 13, 2004, Book I): 567. [From the U.S. Government Publishing Office www.gpo.gov] [Public Papers of the Presidents of the United States](http://www.gpo.gov) | [GovInfo](http://www.gpo.gov)

inspectors to enter Libya. All these efforts, Bush argued, would make not just make America 'more secure' but the world 'more peaceful.'⁵¹¹

Bush's rhetoric on Libya has hardly any ideological underpinnings because the Bush administration's efforts for the initial four years were directed at Iraq and Afghanistan. The open enemy, terrorists and terrorist organisations preoccupied Bush. Bush made multiple threats against any state who harboured terrorists or pursued WMD programs repeatedly in his rhetoric. Libya for one fell in line with American demands in the Middle East. And for this reason, Bush appreciates Libyan efforts at making the world safe by disclosing and dismantling the WMD program in his rhetoric on Libya.

5.4.2 Presidential Ideological Discursive Foreign Policy Practices in Bush's (Jr.) Rhetoric during the Second Iraq War and National Emergency and Sanctions on Iraq

Even before the First Iraq War, national emergency and sanction had been declared on Iraq by the United States. George Bush (Sr.) declared war on Iraq when it invaded Kuwait and since then the American presidential rhetoric had ideological undercurrents towards Iraq. Under Clinton, reports of harbouring of terrorists, possession of WMD, torture of Iraqi citizens, need to transform Iraq to a democracy, regularly appeared, as has been discussed in the previous chapter. All these continued under the Bush (Jr.) administration. After America invaded Afghanistan and encouraged its democratic transition, it turned its attention towards Iraq under Bush (Jr.). With uncertain intelligence reports as the source, USA began eyeing Iraq, arguing for what seems to be the second phase of war on terror: transform Iraq to a democracy;

⁵¹¹Refer Public Papers of George W. Bush (Dec. 19, 2003, Book II): 1753. [From the U.S. Government Publishing Office www.gpo.gov] [Public Papers of the Presidents of the United States](#) | [GovInfo](#)

promote world peace; capture terrorists; end the WMD program; and make Iraq an exemplary state in American efforts to transform the Middle East.

Almost all of George W. Bush's addresses, press conferences and speeches after the alleged victory in Afghanistan were focussed on building arguments and presenting justifications for America to invade Iraq, for the second time, after a gap of twelve years. He went on to argue that the 'future course' of the Middle East was greatly dependent on the consequence of Iraq war for "Iraq is at the heart of the Middle East."⁵¹² Some of the arguments that were made were as follows: "Al Qaida is public enemy number one in Iraq" and the people of Iraq *ought* to identify the 'threat,' 'unite' against it, and "reconcile their differences";⁵¹³ A 'free Iraq' is vital for a 'peaceful world';⁵¹⁴ "Saddam Hussein's regime spent more than three decades oppressing Iraq's people, attacking Iraq's neighbors, and threatening the world's peace. The regime tortured at home, promoted terror abroad, and armed in secret;"⁵¹⁵ "Iraq is the place, in which the enemies of the civilized world are testing the will of the civilized world. We must not waver."⁵¹⁶

Bush further identified Saddam Hussein and 'his regime' as a 'threat to the American people' and freedom. He argued that by invading Iraq, America will help free the Iraqi people.⁵¹⁷ Bush offered four reasons that made Iraq a threat to America: they had a leader that hated America; they had attacked their neighbours; they had used weapons of mass destruction;

⁵¹²Refer Public Papers of George W. Bush (Aug. 28, 2007, Book II): 1119. [From the U.S. Government Publishing Office www.gpo.gov] [Public Papers of the Presidents of the United States | GovInfo](#)

⁵¹³Refer Public Papers of George W. Bush (May, 2007, Book I): 521. [From the U.S. Government Publishing Office www.gpo.gov] [Public Papers of the Presidents of the United States | GovInfo](#)

⁵¹⁴Refer Public Papers of George W. Bush (March 16, 2004, Book II): 394. [From the U.S. Government Publishing Office www.gpo.gov] [Public Papers of the Presidents of the United States | GovInfo](#)

⁵¹⁵Refer Public Papers of George W. Bush (July 22, 2003, Book II): 908. [From the U.S. Government Publishing Office www.gpo.gov] [Public Papers of the Presidents of the United States | GovInfo](#)

⁵¹⁶Refer Public Papers of George W. Bush (Jan.-June, 2004, Book I): vi. [From the U.S. Government Publishing Office www.gpo.gov] [Public Papers of the Presidents of the United States | GovInfo](#)

⁵¹⁷Refer Public Papers of George W. Bush (April 11, 2003, Book I): 334. [From the U.S. Government Publishing Office www.gpo.gov] [Public Papers of the Presidents of the United States | GovInfo](#)

and they had terrorist connections inside of Iraq.⁵¹⁸ And the American strategy in Iraq, which he offered had three objectives: “destroy the terrorists; enlist international support for a free Iraq; and quickly transfer authority to the Iraqi people.”⁵¹⁹

Iraq became a significant part of the war on terror, Bush argued, because it has terrorist ties; it trains and arms terrorists; and it is a country ‘with wealth.’ Bush added that the “new war against terror must not chase down” Al Qaida alone but also “deal with weapons of mass destruction.”⁵²⁰ And because intelligence reports suggested that Iraq possessed WMD, Iraq became “a part of the war on terror. It is not the war on terror; it is a theatre in the war on terror. And it’s essential we win this battle in the war on terror. By winning this battle, it will make other victories more certain in the war against the terrorists,”⁵²¹ he added.

Apart from the WMDs, he identified the growing presence of terrorists in Iraq: Al-Qaida-type *fighters* are moving in to oppose America as they “can’t stand the thought of a free society” in the Middle East. He also added that they ‘hated’ freedom and the thought of a democracy emerging in Iraq.⁵²² And “... victory in Iraq will bring something new in the Arab world – a functioning democracy that polices its territory, upholds the rule of law, respects fundamental human liberties, and answers to its people. A democratic Iraq will not be perfect” but it will be a country that will not serve as a ‘haven’ for terrorists but will fight terrorists instead of harbouring them, he stressed.⁵²³ These measures, he argued, ‘will make the Middle

⁵¹⁸ Refer Public Papers of George W. Bush (July 14, 2004, Book II): 1318. [From the U.S. Government Publishing Office www.gpo.gov] [Public Papers of the Presidents of the United States | GovInfo](#)

⁵¹⁹ Refer Public Papers of George W. Bush (Sept. 13, 2003, Book II): 1158. [From the U.S. Government Publishing Office www.gpo.gov] [Public Papers of the Presidents of the United States | GovInfo](#)

⁵²⁰ Refer Public Papers of George W. Bush (March 6, 2003, Book I): 246. [From the U.S. Government Publishing Office www.gpo.gov] [Public Papers of the Presidents of the United States | GovInfo](#)

⁵²¹ Refer Public Papers of George W. Bush (April 13, 2004, Book I): 567. [From the U.S. Government Publishing Office www.gpo.gov] [Public Papers of the Presidents of the United States | GovInfo](#)

⁵²² Refer Public Papers of George W. Bush (Aug. 22, 2003, Book II): 1051. [From the U.S. Government Publishing Office www.gpo.gov] [Public Papers of the Presidents of the United States | GovInfo](#)

⁵²³ Refer Public Papers of George W. Bush, “Foreword,” (Jan.-June, 2007, Book I): v. [From the U.S. Government Publishing Office www.gpo.gov] [Public Papers of the Presidents of the United States | GovInfo](#)

East a more peaceful place' which is 'important' to United States's security.⁵²⁴ Hence, 'creation' of a 'strong' and 'stable' Iraqi 'democracy' was central to the war against terror. And an 'advance of liberty' in the Middle East will help 'undermine the ideologies of terror and hatred.'⁵²⁵ In March 2003, Iraq was invaded by U.S. forces vowing to "destroy Iraqi weapons of mass destruction (WMD) and end the dictatorial rule of Saddam Hussein."⁵²⁶

The WMD intelligence reports "proved illusory and a violent insurgency arose," which resulted in the war losing public support. The Bush administration conceded that its *prewar* arguments about Saddam Hussein's Iraq seem to have been 'mistaken.' It was on May 1, 2003 that President Bush declared from the deck of the aircraft carrier 'USS Abraham Lincoln,' that in Iraq, the 'major combat operations' had ended. And in January 2004, a former U.S. weapons inspector, David Kay, told Congress that: "We were almost all wrong." And a 'presidential commission' concluded in March 2005 that 'not one bit' of "prewar intelligence on Iraqi weapons of mass destruction panned out."⁵²⁷ Interestingly, Seymour M. Hersh, in his article in *The New Yorker*, 'Selective Intelligence,' questioned the reliability and integrity of the intelligence sources of Donald Rumsfeld as early as May, 2003.⁵²⁸

After successfully ousting Saddam Hussein,⁵²⁹ the United States of America took measures to 'rebuild Iraq' and encouraged it to 'embrace democracy'. In order to ensure that

⁵²⁴Refer Public Papers of George W. Bush (Aug. 19, 2003, Book II): 1032. [From the U.S. Government Publishing Office www.gpo.gov] [Public Papers of the Presidents of the United States | GovInfo](http://www.gpo.gov)

⁵²⁵Refer Public Papers of George W. Bush (July 17, 2003, Book II): 884. [From the U.S. Government Publishing Office www.gpo.gov] [Public Papers of the Presidents of the United States | GovInfo](http://www.gpo.gov)

⁵²⁶The Iraq War timeline 2003-2011, *Council on Foreign Relations*, <https://www.cfr.org/timeline/iraq-war> was accessed on May 7, 2019 at 03:05 A.M.

⁵²⁷ See *ibid*.

⁵²⁸Seymour, Hersh M., "Selective Intelligence," *The New Yorker*, May 4, 2003. [Selective Intelligence | The New Yorker](http://www.newyorker.com)

⁵²⁹ Meanwhile, Saddam Hussein was captured on December 14, 2003 and hanged on December 30, 2006. Over 4,700 U.S. and allied troops and more than one hundred thousand Iraqi civilians were killed in the Iraq War. And while celebrating the alleged victory in Iraq as the strategic victory in the broader War on Terror, Bush stated

the process of ‘transition’ runs its course smoothly, NATO including the American troops stayed in Iraq to ensure the American approved version of democracy takes firm roots. Democratic elections were held in Iraq in 2005. Arguing for a longer presence of American troops in Iraq, Bush declared that the principle guiding his decision was “return on success.” He argued that the more ‘successful’ America was, the more ‘American troops’ would be able to ‘return home.’

Without American presence, Iraq could face ‘a humanitarian nightmare’ and democracy movements in the Middle East would be ‘violently reversed’ while Iran would ‘benefit’ from the ‘chaos’ and would be emboldened to ‘gain nuclear weapons’ and spread its dominance.⁵³⁰ A ‘free Iraq’ apart from being critical for United States’s security, Bush argued, will also ‘marginalise the extremists,’ ‘unleash the talent of its people’ and act as ‘an anchor of stability.’ A ‘free Iraq’ will also be an ‘example for people’ throughout the Middle East and be ‘America’s partner in the fight against terror’ that will make America ‘safer at home.’⁵³¹ He also invited other states to ‘help Iraq build a free country’ that will ensure making the world ‘more secure.’ Bush stressed that the ‘Iraqi people’ needed support as they take on ‘their own defence’ and moved ‘towards self-government.’⁵³²

Bush highlighted that \$87 billion was approved by the American Congress as supplemental spending support for American troops in both the states of Afghanistan and Iraq in order ‘to help those nations rebuild.’⁵³³ In Afghanistan and Iraq, he stressed, America has

that Iraq had become the place where the Arabs joined the Americans to drive Osama bin Laden and his ideology and his network (Al Qaeda) out.

⁵³⁰Refer Public Papers of George W. Bush (Sept. 13, 2007, Book II): 1197. [From the U.S. Government Publishing Office www.gpo.gov] [Public Papers of the Presidents of the United States | GovInfo](#)

⁵³¹Refer Public Papers of George W. Bush (Sept. 13, 2007, Book II): 1197. [From the U.S. Government Publishing Office www.gpo.gov] [Public Papers of the Presidents of the United States | GovInfo](#)

⁵³²Refer Public Papers of George W. Bush (Sept. 9, 2003, Book II): 1118. [From the U.S. Government Publishing Office www.gpo.gov] [Public Papers of the Presidents of the United States | GovInfo](#)

⁵³³Refer Public Papers of George W. Bush, “Foreword,” (July-December, 2003, Book II): vi. [From the U.S.

‘removed two of the world’s most brutal regimes’ and are helping them in establishing ‘functioning democracies’ that can “protect their own people and be allies in this global war on terror.”⁵³⁴

Self-congratulatory commendation is prevalent throughout Bush (Jr.) rhetoric regarding invasions in both Afghanistan and Iraq. But Michael Scheuer believes that just like in Mexico in 1846, there was ‘no pre-emptive’ war in Iraq. It was “avaricious, premeditated, unprovoked war against a foe who posed no immediate threat but whose defeat did offer economic advantages.”⁵³⁵ Yet several scholars question the USA war on Iraq as being anything more than a desire for access to Iraq’s oil reserves and preservation of American status as the paramount world power.⁵³⁶

Bush’s reason for shifting into the second phase of the War on Terror involved Iraq because he asserts that Iraq is ‘the heart of the Middle East.’ It is also a ‘threat’ to ‘world peace,’ ‘American security,’ ‘American people’ and ‘American freedom.’ Iraq “is the theatre in the War of Terror” because it has *wealth* and WMD and also it is not just ‘home’ to terrorists but also ‘trains’ and ‘arms’ them. Iraq ‘attacks’ its neighbours and most importantly, the Iraqi leader, Saddam Hussein ‘hated’ America. And lastly, Iraq is home to ‘enemies’ of the ‘civilised world,’ who are ‘testing’ the ‘will of the civilised world.’

The second phase required America to transform Iraq into a democracy: a functioning democracy which is capable of policing its ‘territory,’ ‘upholding the rule of law,’ respecting ‘fundamental human liberties,’ and is ‘answerable to its people.’ America’s role in Iraq was to

Government Publishing Office www.gpo.gov [Public Papers of the Presidents of the United States | GovInfo](http://www.gpo.gov/publications/pubs/pubs.htm)

⁵³⁴Refer Public Papers of George W. Bush (March 6, 2007, Book I): 239. [From the U.S. Government Publishing Office www.gpo.gov [Public Papers of the Presidents of the United States | GovInfo](http://www.gpo.gov/publications/pubs/pubs.htm)

⁵³⁵See Michael Scheuer, *Imperial Hubris: Why the West is Losing the War on Terror* (Washington D.C. : Brassey’s INC., 2004): xvii.

⁵³⁶Klare, Michael T., “For Oil and Empire? Rethinking war with Iraq,” *Current History* (2003) 102 (662): 129–135. <https://doi.org/10.1525/curh.2003.102.662.129>

‘promote world peace’ while capturing the terrorists. America also had to ensure that the WMD program was brought to a ‘forceful end.’ And on a larger role that America had in the region, Bush (Jr.) emphasised that Iraq was to become an ‘exemplary state’ (an example for others in the region) in transformation of the Middle East. America wanted to ‘transform’ the region of the Middle East, beginning in Iraq. American efforts to impose democracy in the region was essential for America as it would ‘secure’ and ‘safeguard American interests’ and ‘American people.’ But at the same time a regime change in Iraq would promote ‘stability’ for Iraq and help to ‘unleash Iraqi people’s talent’ and ‘marginalise the extremists.’ Such arguments within social constructivist framework can be contextualised as the president being heavily influenced in foreign policy discourse by the inner neoconservative cabinet⁵³⁷ (composed of Paul Wolfowitz, Condoleezza Rice and others).

The influence of neo-conservatives at one point had become quite popular with scholars. James Mann’s work describing Bush’s war cabinet as ‘Vulcans’ remains one of the most comprehensive works on his war cabinet.⁵³⁸ Argentino Mendoza Chan in a review of the book captures the argument of Mann that the ‘Vulcans’ were the new school in Foreign Policy that aimed at re-legitimizing the American military might (and how to use it) when they launched and supported the pre-emptive strike. He goes on to argue that the ‘Vulcans’ are the bridge between the Cold War and the Post-Cold War where America was able to put to test the aspirations of the ‘Vulcans’ in both Iraq and Afghanistan. Interestingly the term, ‘*Vulcans*’ was used to make an analogy to Roman God, *Vulcan* and like Bush’s foreign policy team (comprising of Donald Rumsfeld, Richard Cheney, Richard Armitage, Paul Wolfowitz, and

⁵³⁷Considerable articles and books have looked at the role and influence of neoconservative cabinet and neoconservative ideas on Bush’s foreign policy and foreign policy discourse that have been mentioned previously in the thesis.

⁵³⁸Mann, James, *Rise of The Vulcans: The History of Bush’s War Cabinet* (New York: Penguin Books, 2004).

Condoleezza Rice) had power, resistance and durability. These Vulcans were formed by cohorts in academia, private capital and government.⁵³⁹ This work underscores not just the role of Bush's cabinet but also their 're-directing' of American Foreign Policy towards 'War' and 'resuscitating' an active 'American military presence' in the world that was witnessing a decline in active wars after the implosion of USSR (USA's enemy during the Cold War).

The *ideological presuppositions* used in Iraq reflected the capacity of America at helping Iraq become 'a free society' and 'free country.' Advancement of 'liberty' was essential in order to undermine the ideologies of 'hatred' and 'terror.' There was also a need for 'democracy' to protect 'themselves' and 'their allies.' Bush argued that there was a continued presence of American troops in Iraq only because 'stability' can only be achieved under 'American guidance' and hand-holding. *Nationalist pride* is reflected in Bush's rhetoric at having the requisite skills, means and ability to bring democracy, peace, stability and American values to both Iraq and the Middle East. Bush's rhetoric for the enemy was directed majorly at Saddam Hussein and terrorists as the *enemy*. The *predicates* used to describe them were 'evil,' 'haters of freedom,' and 'free society'. The terrorists endorsed 'ideologies of hatred and terror.' Saddam Hussein 'hated' America. They were represented in opposition to the 'American good,' 'just,' 'free society,' 'open society' and 'freedom-loving public.' This *subject-positioning* becomes very clear in Bush's (Jr.) rhetoric.

5.4.3 Presidential Ideological Discursive Foreign Policy Practices in Bush's (Jr.) Rhetoric on Israel-Palestine Peace Talks

⁵³⁹Chan, Argentino Mendoza Review of *The Rise of the Vulcans: The History of Bush's War Cabinet* by James Mann, *Voices of Mexico* 68: 134-135.(accessed on February 23, 2022). <http://www.revistascisan.unam.mx/Voices/pdfs/6828.pdf>

The Israel-Palestine issue remains a significant part of American interest in seeking ‘peace’ in the Middle East. Like his predecessors, the American presidential rhetoric did not change considerably during the Bush administration. Bush in November 2007, attempted to facilitate peace talks between Israel and the Palestinian authority, at a conference in Annapolis, Maryland, by bringing together both the leaders on one platform and by encouraging the ‘expansion of freedom and peace in the Holy Land.’⁵⁴⁰ He declared that America will ‘not try to force a peace settlement in the Middle East’ but rather will ‘facilitate a peace settlement’ which will require “two willing parties to come to the table to enact a peace treaty that will last.”⁵⁴¹ And the population of both Israel and Palestine deserved the “same chance to live normal lives, free from fear, free from hatred and violence and free from harassment,” he added.⁵⁴² And it was in the interests of the Arab world to accept Israel as a partner in peace, not just for Israel and Palestine.⁵⁴³

Like all Presidents prior to Bush, he rendered support to the Israeli state. The American rhetoric on Israel under the Bush administration did not change notably. He, in his first National Security Council meeting, declared the ‘safety’ and ‘security of Israel’ as a top foreign policy priority of his administration. America, he added, will render support to Israel against ‘terrorism’ and ‘violence’ and in ‘seeking peace.’⁵⁴⁴ Bush declared that Israel “has got no better friend than the United States.” And with the ‘shared values’ that Israel shared with America, including democracy, he declared he had a “dream for peace for Israel,” and believed that the

⁵⁴⁰Refer Public Papers of George W. Bush, “Foreword,” (July-Dec., 2007, Book II): v-vi. [From the U.S. Government Publishing Office www.gpo.gov] [Public Papers of the Presidents of the United States | GovInfo](http://www.gpo.gov/publications/presidents/pubs/pubs.html)

⁵⁴¹Refer Public Papers of George W. Bush (March 29, 2001, Book I): 330. [From the U.S. Government Publishing Office www.gpo.gov] [Public Papers of the Presidents of the United States | GovInfo](http://www.gpo.gov/publications/presidents/pubs/pubs.html)

⁵⁴²Refer Public Papers of George W. Bush (July 29, 2003, Book II): 947. [From the U.S. Government Publishing Office www.gpo.gov] [Public Papers of the Presidents of the United States | GovInfo](http://www.gpo.gov/publications/presidents/pubs/pubs.html)

⁵⁴³Refer Public Papers of George W. Bush (Jan. 4, 2008, Book I): 5. [From the U.S. Government Publishing Office www.gpo.gov] [Public Papers of the Presidents of the United States | GovInfo](http://www.gpo.gov/publications/presidents/pubs/pubs.html)

⁵⁴⁴Refer Public Papers of George W. Bush (May 3, 2001, Book I): 487. [From the U.S. Government Publishing Office www.gpo.gov] [Public Papers of the Presidents of the United States | GovInfo](http://www.gpo.gov/publications/presidents/pubs/pubs.html)

“Israeli people want to have peace.”⁵⁴⁵ He emphasised that United States was “strongly committed to Israel’s security and well-being as a Jewish state.”⁵⁴⁶

And as for Palestine, Bush stated, America sought ‘justice,’ ‘dignity,’ a viable ‘independent’ and ‘democratic state’ for the people of Palestine, along with ‘security’ and ‘peace’ for Israel. “The Palestinian people deserve a peaceful government that truly serves their interests, and the Israeli people need a true partner in peace.” Bush argued that it is only through ‘democracy,’ ‘reform’ and the ‘rule of law’ that Israel and Palestine could co-exist in ‘peace’ and ‘security.’⁵⁴⁷ A ‘Palestinian State’ will ‘never be built’ on a ‘foundation of violence,’ he added. The ‘hopes of Palestinian state’ and the ‘security of Israel’ both depend on ‘an unrelenting campaign against terror,’ that has to be waged by ‘all parties in the region.’ He clarified that in the region of Middle East, ‘true peace’ had ‘deadly enemies,’ despite which the US will be a ‘consistent friend of every leader’ who actively ‘opposes violence’ by ‘working for peace.’⁵⁴⁸

The change that demarcated the American rhetoric under Bush was the argument that the terrorists were the “chief enemies of the Palestinian aspirations”⁵⁴⁹ and that they are the biggest impediment for the Palestinian state.⁵⁵⁰ Bush indicated that he was the ‘first’ American president to speak about the creation of a ‘Palestinian state.’ He gave three reasons for this: it will give ‘hope’ to the people; it will offer ‘peaceful’ avenues for people who seek ‘better

⁵⁴⁵Refer Public Papers of George W. Bush (Dec. 4, 2001, Book II): 1475. [From the U.S. Government Publishing Office www.gpo.gov] [Public Papers of the Presidents of the United States | GovInfo](#)

⁵⁴⁶Refer Public Papers of George W. Bush (April 14, 2004, Book I): 579. [From the U.S. Government Publishing Office www.gpo.gov] [Public Papers of the Presidents of the United States | GovInfo](#)

⁵⁴⁷ Refer Public Papers of George W. Bush (Dec. 1, 2004, Book II): 3032. [From the U.S. Government Publishing Office www.gpo.gov] [Public Papers of the Presidents of the United States | GovInf](#)

⁵⁴⁸Refer Public Papers of George W. Bush (Aug. 23, 2003, Book II): 1054. [From the U.S. Government Publishing Office www.gpo.gov] [Public Papers of the Presidents of the United States | GovInfo](#)

⁵⁴⁹Refer Public Papers of George W. Bush (July 17, 2003, Book II): 884. [From the U.S. Government Publishing Office www.gpo.gov] [Public Papers of the Presidents of the United States | GovInfo](#)

⁵⁵⁰Refer Public Papers of George W. Bush (July 21, 2003, Book II): 904. [From the U.S. Government Publishing Office www.gpo.gov] [Public Papers of the Presidents of the United States | GovInfo](#)

future’; and it will benefit Israel if Palestine develops in a ‘peaceful’ manner. He also added that if the Palestinian people wanted a future, they must assume the ‘responsibility of fighting terror.’⁵⁵¹

Ideological preferences lead America to support Israel in seeking peace and fighting terrorists, in Bush’s (Jr.) rhetoric. His remarks represent America as a friend of Israel and foe to the terrorists in the Arab world. America shares with Israel the ‘shared values’ of democracy and the desire for peace. American friendship will ‘ensure the security of Israel’ and the well-being of the Jewish state. Plans for Palestine, in Bush’s (Jr.) rhetoric, are to make it an independent and democratic state that would ensure ‘security’ and ‘peace’ for Israel. Democracy, reform and rule of law has the capacity to ensure Israel and Palestine security and peaceful co-existence. All this was possible only when both the states waged a war against terrorists who were enemies of peace. Bush identified terrorism as the major obstacle in realising the Palestinian dream for an independent state. America would be a consistent friend to any leader in the Middle East if they work for peace by opposing violence actively. American help and hand of friendship were conditional: help fight terrorists to maintain peace and security in the Middle East. As Bush elaborates this will help secure American interests in the region.

The *predicates* used to describe America fell within the larger scope of liberal values and love for democracy. American help and friendship were offered to the state of Israel keeping in view their shared values. *Subject positioning* of America and Israel as friends and

⁵⁵¹Refer Public Papers of George W. Bush (April 14, 2004, Book I): 575. [From the U.S. Government Publishing Office www.gpo.gov] [Public Papers of the Presidents of the United States](#) | [GovInfo](#)

sharers of similar values of democracy and peace in opposition to the terrorist who threatened creation of the Palestinian state are apparent.

5.4.4 Presidential Ideological Discursive Foreign Policy Practices in Bush's (Jr.) Rhetoric on Sanctions on Iran

The national emergency on Iran was declared on March 15, 1995 and Bush stated that the emergency will continue beyond March 15, 2001. The reasons for the continued emergency he argued were due to the persistent actions and policies of the Government of Iran in “its support for international terrorism, efforts to undermine Middle East peace and acquisitions of weapons of mass destruction and the means to deliver them.”⁵⁵² Iran has been a ‘source of trouble’ in the Middle East region, he argued, for it is the ‘world’s leading state sponsor of terrorism.’ He recorded that Iran supports *Hezbollah*, who was trying to ‘undermine the democratic Government of Lebanon.’ Iran also funds *Hamas* and *Palestinian Islamic Jihad*, two terrorist groups which ‘murder the innocent’ and ‘target Israel’ and ‘destabilise the Palestinian Territories.’ Iran was supplying arms to the Taliban in Afghanistan and there was a possibility that they could be used to ‘attack American and NATO troops,’ he added. Iran has also ‘arrested visiting American scholars’ who did not commit any crime and did not pose any threat to their regime. Iran’s ‘active pursuit of technology,’ he stated, could ‘lead to nuclear weapons threat’ and put an ‘already known unstable’ and ‘violent region’ under the ‘shadow of nuclear holocaust.’ Actions of Iran threaten the ‘security of nations everywhere,’ argued Bush, which is why America is ‘rallying friends and allies around the world’ to ‘isolate the regime’ and ‘impose economic sanctions’ in order to ‘confront the danger.’⁵⁵³ In July 2003,

⁵⁵²Refer Public Papers of George W. Bush (March 13, 2001, Book I): 234. [From the U.S. Government Publishing Office www.gpo.gov] [Public Papers of the Presidents of the United States](http://www.gpo.gov) | GovInfo

⁵⁵³Refer Public Papers of George W. Bush (Aug. 28, 2007, Book II): 1118-1119. [From the U.S. Government Publishing Office www.gpo.gov] [Public Papers of the Presidents of the United States](http://www.gpo.gov) | GovInfo

Bush recorded that Iran has admitted that they have Al Qaeda.⁵⁵⁴ Bush declared that it was in America's and Russia's 'national interest that Iran doesn't develop a nuclear weapon' at a joint press conference in Maryland with Vladimir Putin, who was then the President of Russia.⁵⁵⁵

In 2006, the Congress passed the 'Iran Freedom Support Act,' a legislation which codified the 'U.S. sanctions on Iran' while providing the 'administration with flexibility to tailor sanctions' on entities according to circumstances including the Iranian regime's development of nuclear weapons. It also facilitated American support to Iranian people's effort to build "a just, free, and peaceful society."⁵⁵⁶ Towards the end of his second term in 2008, on his trip to the Middle East, Bush declared that one of his reasons for visiting the Middle East was to make it 'abundantly clear' to the nations that America views Iran as a 'threat.' He declared that by 'isolating' Iran through international pressures, America will cause Iran to declare why Iran had a nuclear program.⁵⁵⁷ Iran's denial to share details of its nuclear program has been a motivating factor in Bush (Jr.) labelling Iran along with Iraq and North Korea as the 'axis of evil,' in 2002 at State of the Union address.

Bush's (Jr.) 'rhetoric for Iran' was quite similar to his 'rhetoric for Iraq' before declaring war on Iraq as part of phase two of War on Terror. Iran, he declared, was a 'supporter' of terrorists; was working to 'undermine peace' in the Middle East; had 'acquisition' and 'means' to deliver WMD. In fact, he called Iran the "source of trouble" in the Middle East as Iran was the 'world's leading state sponsor' of terrorism. Iran, Bush believed,

⁵⁵⁴Refer Public Papers of George W. Bush (July 30, 2003, Book II): 965. [From the U.S. Government Publishing Office www.gpo.gov] [Public Papers of the Presidents of the United States | GovInfo](#)

⁵⁵⁵Refer Public Papers of George W. Bush (Sept. 27, 2003, Book II): 1203. [From the U.S. Government Publishing Office www.gpo.gov] [Public Papers of the Presidents of the United States | GovInfo](#)

⁵⁵⁶Refer Public Papers of George W. Bush (Sept. 30, 2006, Book II): 1737. [From the U.S. Government Publishing Office www.gpo.gov] [Public Papers of the Presidents of the United States | GovInfo](#)

⁵⁵⁷Refer Public Papers of George W. Bush (Jan. 4, 2008, Book I): 3. [From the U.S. Government Publishing Office www.gpo.gov] [Public Papers of the Presidents of the United States | GovInfo](#)

was also funding terrorist organisations in Lebanon, Palestine and Taliban in Afghanistan which were capable of attacking US and NATO troops. Iran's 'pursuit of technology' had the capacity to turn 'nuclear' and the American assumption was that Iran could become a nuclear weapons threat. Iran's threat was 'universal;' it was 'threatening the security of all nations' of the world. Which is why America was making efforts to 'rally both friends and allies' to isolate Iran and impose economic sanctions. Iran was a 'threat' to America, declared Bush but he would support the 'Iranian people' in their quest for 'a just, free and peaceful society.' The *ideological presuppositions* were stark in his rhetoric; the Iranian Government and terrorists operating from Iran or using Iranian funds for operating in other states of the Middle East were the enemy. America was working towards ensuring 'peace' and securing 'stability in the Middle East.' The *subject positioning* of America/ allies/ friends against the Iranian government and terrorist was pronounced.

5.4.5 Presidential Ideological Discursive Foreign Policy Practices in Bush's (Jr.) Rhetoric on War on Taliban/ Afghanistan

Even prior to the 9/11 attacks, Bush, in a letter to the Congressional leaders, stated that the Taliban 'continues to allow the territory under its control' within Afghanistan 'to be used as the base of operations' for Osama bin Laden and Al Qaeda organisations. They 'threaten' and 'commit acts of violence' against America and Americans making Taliban 'an extraordinary threat to the national security and foreign policy interests of the United States.'⁵⁵⁸ In fact, it was during the Clinton administration that Osama bin Laden had been identified as a threat, as has been mentioned in the previous chapter. Bush referred to Al Qaeda as an

⁵⁵⁸Refer Public Papers of George W. Bush (June 30, 2001, Book I): 817. [From the U.S. Government Publishing Office www.gpo.gov] [Public Papers of the Presidents of the United States](#) | [GovInfo](#)

organisation that is based upon evil, hate and destruction,⁵⁵⁹ not good or peace.⁵⁶⁰ Its “goal is remaking the world and imposing its radical beliefs on people everywhere.” The terrorist’s directive, argued Bush (Jr.) ‘commands them to kill Christians, Jews and Americans’ making no distinction among’ military and civilians, including women and children.’⁵⁶¹

In the War on Terror, one of the doctrines to fight terror, Bush declared, was: “if you harbour a terrorist, you’re just as guilty as the terrorist” and in Afghanistan, he declared America has recognized “a cruel and oppressive regime that had turned a nation into training camps.”⁵⁶² Bush added that America will not only fight terrorists but also those who aid them. He stated that America’s message to the world is clear: “If you harbor terrorists, you are terrorists; if you train or arm a terrorist, you are a terrorist, if you feed a terrorist or fund a terrorist, you’re a terrorist and you will be held accountable by the United States and our friends.”⁵⁶³ On September 15, 2001, Bush identified Osama bin Laden as the prime suspect.⁵⁶⁴ On September 17, 2001, Bush declared that Osama bin Laden, his organisations and any nation or organisation that supported them in any form would be held accountable. He also alluded that he suspected the Taliban of providing safe haven to the ‘barbaric people’ who attacked America.⁵⁶⁵ On October 11, 2001, Bush announced that ‘\$40 million worth of assets of Taliban

⁵⁵⁹Refer Public Papers of George W. Bush (Sept. 28, 2001, Book II): 1174. [From the U.S. Government Publishing Office www.gpo.gov] [Public Papers of the Presidents of the United States | GovInfo](#)

⁵⁶⁰Refer Public Papers of George W. Bush (Sept. 26, 2001, Book II): 1166. [From the U.S. Government Publishing Office www.gpo.gov] [Public Papers of the Presidents of the United States | GovInfo](#)

⁵⁶¹Refer Public Papers of George W. Bush (Sept. 20, 2001, Book II): 1141. [From the U.S. Government Publishing Office www.gpo.gov]

⁵⁶²Refer Public Papers of George W. Bush (July 24, 2003, Book II): 914. [From the U.S. Government Publishing Office www.gpo.gov] [Public Papers of the Presidents of the United States | GovInfo](#)

⁵⁶³Refer Public Papers of George W. Bush (Nov. 21, 2001, Book II): 1440. [From the U.S. Government Publishing Office www.gpo.gov] [Public Papers of the Presidents of the United States | GovInfo](#)

⁵⁶⁴Refer Public Papers of George W. Bush (Sept. 15, 2001, Book II): 1112. [From the U.S. Government Publishing Office www.gpo.gov] [Public Papers of the Presidents of the United States | GovInfo](#)

⁵⁶⁵Refer Public Papers of George W. Bush (Sept. 17, 2001, Book II): 1119. [From the U.S. Government Publishing Office www.gpo.gov] [Public Papers of the Presidents of the United States | GovInfo](#)

and Al Qaeda’ were frozen ‘all around the world.’⁵⁶⁶ All these efforts were being made by the United States, Bush reasoned, since the “initial phase of the war on terrorism is against the Al Qaeda organisation.”⁵⁶⁷

Afghanistan became central to the war on terror for it was providing safe haven to Al Qaeda and its network. The Bush administration targeted it after intelligence reports narrowed it as the operations site and training ground of the terrorists. Taliban was given an ultimatum; either meet American demands or face the fate of the terrorists. And when the evidence pointed to Osama bin Laden operating from Afghanistan, who he described as an evil man,⁵⁶⁸ Bush demanded the following from Taliban: deliver to US authorities ‘all the leaders of Al Qaeda’; ‘release all foreign nationals’ including American citizens ‘unjustly imprisoned’; ‘protect foreign journalists’, ‘diplomats’ and ‘aid workers’; “close immediately and permanently every terrorist training camp in Afghanistan”; and give America “full access to terrorist training camps” so that it can ensure that they are not operative any more. He also included that these ‘demands’ were not open to negotiations and discussions. The Taliban is required to act immediately by handing over the terrorists to avoid sharing their fate. He declared that the American enemy was not just the radical network of terrorists but every government that supported them. Though the war on terror begins with Al Qaeda, he argued, it is not the end until “every terrorist group of global reach has been found, stopped, and defeated.”⁵⁶⁹

⁵⁶⁶Refer Public Papers of George W. Bush (Oct. 11, 2001, Book II): 1217. [From the U.S. Government Publishing Office www.gpo.gov] [Public Papers of the Presidents of the United States](http://www.gpo.gov) | [GovInfo](http://www.govinfo.gov)

⁵⁶⁷Refer Public Papers of George W. Bush (Sept. 26, 2001, Book II): 1168. [From the U.S. Government Publishing Office www.gpo.gov] [Public Papers of the Presidents of the United States](http://www.gpo.gov) | [GovInfo](http://www.govinfo.gov)

⁵⁶⁸Refer Public Papers of George W. Bush (Sept. 26, 2001, Book II): 1167. [From the U.S. Government Publishing Office www.gpo.gov] [Public Papers of the Presidents of the United States](http://www.gpo.gov) | [GovInfo](http://www.govinfo.gov)

⁵⁶⁹Refer Public Papers of George W. Bush (Sept. 20, 2001, Book II): 1141-1142. [From the U.S. Government Publishing Office www.gpo.gov] [Public Papers of the Presidents of the United States](http://www.gpo.gov) | [GovInfo](http://www.govinfo.gov)

Post winning the war, on May 23, 2005, Bush congratulated the first democratically elected leader in Afghanistan, Hamid Karzai, and declared that it was in American interest that Afghanistan be ‘free’ and will be ‘a key partner’ in the ‘global war on terror.’ He also declared that America will help Afghanistan build a ‘strong, lasting government’ and ‘civic institutions’ and “continue to support reconstruction, economic development, and investments that will help educate and build the skills of the Afghan people.”⁵⁷⁰ As democracy in Afghanistan is established on American behest and guidance, Bush (Jr.) is impressed with Afghanistan’s progress towards a “market economy and a full-fledged democracy.”⁵⁷¹ Michael Scheuer argues that it is ‘American hubris’ that what is identified and prompted as ‘nascent Afghan democracy’ is actually “a self-made illusion on life-support” because “it is a western-imposed regime that will be swept away if America and its allies stop propping it up with their bayonets.”⁵⁷² He seems to have made the right assessment because within a short span of time, Taliban has assumed power and control of Afghanistan. In almost two decades since US troops drove out Taliban from power, Taliban resumed control over Afghanistan in 2021. The civilian government fell to Taliban fighters in spite of well-funded and well-equipped security forces. The president, Ashraf Ghani fled the palace making it easy for Taliban to take control. Civilians also tried fleeing the country through any and all means. Earlier that year in July, the US troops withdrew from Afghanistan which seems to have prompted the return of the Taliban.

Bush’s rhetoric in Afghanistan which Bush (Jr.) describes as the initial phase of War on Terror is replete with ideological presuppositions of American nationalistic pride at targeting terrorists, Osama bin Laden, his organisation and ensuring democratic elections in

⁵⁷⁰Refer Public Papers of George W. Bush (May 23, 2005, Book I): 847. [From the U.S. Government Publishing Office www.gpo.gov] [Public Papers of the Presidents of the United States](http://www.gpo.gov) | [GovInfo](http://www.govinfo.gov)

⁵⁷¹Refer Public Papers of George W. Bush (May 23, 2005, Book I): 847. [From the U.S. Government Publishing Office www.gpo.gov] [Public Papers of the Presidents of the United States](http://www.gpo.gov) | [GovInfo](http://www.govinfo.gov)

⁵⁷²See Michael Scheuer, *Imperial Hubris: Why the West is Losing the War on Terror* (Washington D.C. : Brassey’s INC, 2004): xvi.

Afghanistan. His rhetoric towards Afghanistan identifies three enemies: Al-Qaeda (including its leader, Osama bin Laden), governments that support/harbour terrorists and Afghanistan who is providing safe haven to terrorists. The predicate used to describe Osama bin Laden was evil; Taliban was aiding *barbaric* people and Al-Qaeda was based on evil, hatred and destruction that wanted to remake the world to impose radical beliefs everywhere in the world. America, on the other hand, was good and peaceful and was under attack as Al Qaeda's directive was to kill Christians, Jews and Americans. And because Americans and America were threatened by them, they posed a danger to US 'national security and foreign policy interests' of America. The subject positioning was clear when he discussed the American resolve to not stop till all global terrorist groups were found, stopped and defeated as these organisations were accountable to America and its friends.

5.5 Conclusion

Even though American involvement in the Middle East was not restricted to Afghanistan (which was the initial War on Terror phase) and Iraq (second War on Terror phase), invasion of those states and attempt at implementation of democratic nation-building measures attracted (a lot of) debate and analyses. And some scholarship on the rhetoric Bush used during American involvement in the Middle East has been attempted in the last decade. But what the present study offers especially in this chapter is that when we study a President's rhetoric, certain *ideological presuppositions* (seeped in liberalism, democracy and nationalism) stand out; the *predicates* (quality/adjectives and such used to describe the enemy in the Middle East states as opposed to America itself) used in the rhetoric both fuel and makes apparent assumptions about America and its other/enemy. The *subject positioning* helps define American identity by contrasting the enemy as deviant/evil/barbaric/hater/destructive from the American normal/moral/good/just/open/liberal/peaceful.

This chapter began by analysing the changes in presidential rhetoric under Bush (Jr.) towards the Middle East: ‘pre-emptive’ and revival of term ‘ideology.’ It then moved on to the role Bush envisioned for America in the Middle East before 9/11 followed by description of rhetoric used to describe the event of 9/11 and the rhetoric used while disclosing the measures taken up after the 9/11 attacks including establishing centres like the Foreign Terrorist Asset Tracking Centre, Terrorist Threat Integration Centre; Office of Homeland Security; Patriot Act and increasing Role of NATO.

It then moved on to describe Bush’s rhetoric in each of the Middle Eastern states beginning from Libya, Iraq, Israel-Palestine, Iran and Afghanistan where he identified terrorists/ leaders of states/ leaders of terrorist organisations as the enemy that had to be fought to protect American interests and security in the Middle East. This chapter illustrated how the rhetoric employed towards the Middle East changed before and after the 9/11 attacks. It accounted, in detail, the changes that came about in the American presidential rhetoric under Bush (Jr.). The change in presidential rhetoric under Bush (Jr.) has been striking because of its aggressive language. The words he used to define both self and *other* have bordered on extremism. His words have superlatives attached for both description of American and the Middle East. What is more interesting is the continuity in aggressive rhetoric which only increased after the ‘9/11 attacks’: from first stage to the second stage of the war on terror. There have also been certain statements which are packed with liberal/democratic/ and nationalistic *predicates/ subject-positioning* which will be analysed in the next chapter.

CHAPTER SIX

Ideological Foreign Policy Discursive Practices under George W. Bush (Jr.) (2001-2009): Part II

“...when freedom and democracy take root in the Middle East, America and the world will be safer and more peaceful.”⁵⁷³

(George W. Bush: 2005)

"The world has a clear interest in the spread of democratic values, because stable and free nations do not breed ideologies of murder. They encourage the peaceful pursuit of a better life."⁵⁷⁴

(George W. Bush: 2003)

Introduction

For a comprehensive appreciation of presidential rhetoric in the Middle East during George W. Bush (Jr.) presidency, rhetoric towards states in the Middle East does not suffice. There is also a need to take into cognisance the rhetoric that was broadly used about the War on Terror that began in 2001 and continued up until August 2021 when American troops evacuated Afghanistan. Interestingly, it appears as if America left Afghanistan handing the power to the very same regime that they supposedly declared war on. They attempted to overthrow the Taliban because, as Bush declared, they provided safe haven to Osama bin Laden and his terrorist organisation. In order to convince the media, American public, international community and the world at large, American president Bush (Jr.) used ideologically driven

⁵⁷³ Refer Public Papers of George W. Bush (March 29, 2005, Book I): 524. [From the U.S. Government Publishing Office www.gpo.gov] [Public Papers of the Presidents of the United States | GovInfo](#)

⁵⁷⁴ Rice, Condoleezza, "Transforming the Middle East," *The Washington Post*, Aug. 7, (2003) [Transforming the Middle East - The Washington Post](#)

rhetoric which can be understood within the broad Social Constructivist framework. The concepts of *presupposition*, *predicates* and *subject-positioning* advance our understanding of Bush's rhetoric. It assists us in exploring what drives such rhetoric; what presuppositions America has about itself; how these presuppositions inform the predicates used to define *self* and *other/enemy* and how the *other* is positioned in contrast to the *self* while discussing the *other* in American presidential rhetoric in the Middle East.

The ideological influence on Bush's rhetoric towards several states in the Middle East were discussed in the previous chapter. An attempt will be made in the present chapter to analyse the War on Terror (its two phases, first in Afghanistan and second in Iraq) through presidential rhetoric. This chapter enhances understanding of American plans in the Middle East at the start of the 21st century that involves firstly, targeting the enemy and the terrorist organisations; and secondly, transformation of the region 'through the spread of liberal values of freedom and democracy.' The kind of rhetoric that was used has undertones of American nationalist pride which will also be included in this chapter.

6.1. War on Terror

In less than a decade in the aftermath of the Cold War, America was led into what Bush (Jr.) described as "the first war of the 21st century."⁵⁷⁵ Though interventions, sanctions and emergencies were declared by America on several states of the world in the span of years between the Cold War and the 'first war of the 21st century,' by both the administrations of Bush (Sr.) and Clinton, it appeared that America was not pursuing any specific *enemy/other*. This was the case during the Cold War when America was in conflict with Communist Soviet Union. In the period after the end of the Cold War, NATO's role was enhanced, intelligence

⁵⁷⁵Campbell, Duncan, "Bush talks of first war of 21st century," *The Guardian*, (Fri 14 Sep 2001). [Bush talks of first war of 21st century | World news | The Guardian](#)

services received more funding, and military spending increased, as has been discussed in the previous chapter. But all these policies appeared to lack a direction or purpose. In spite of the collapse of the USSR, the USA did not retract its coercive power from across the world but chose to embark on a purposeful search. The then-US Secretary of State Madeleine Albright in 1998, declared the USA as an indispensable nation which had the power of using force.⁵⁷⁶

It was the 9/11 attacks that came to be described as an event that changed the course of history. George Soros is of the opinion that it is not the event itself (which included the 3000 civilian casualties) but the way USA (under Bush (Jr.) leadership) responded to the event. It gave an opportunity to implement a radical foreign policy agenda whose underlying principles germinated years before the 9/11 attacks; in fact, as early as 1998 when subscribers of neoconservatism called for invasion of Iraq. The establishment of US supremacy in the Post-Cold war period which had not been used to its full potential under Clinton and Bush (Sr.) had the opportunity to assert its values, interests and views after the 9/11 attacks, argues Soros.⁵⁷⁷

The stages of the US supremacy, is captured by Chalmers Johnson who points out, that in the Post-Cold war period, USA was first described as *lone superpower*, then a *reluctant sheriff*, followed by being labelled as an *indispensable nation* and finally after the 9/11 attacks as a *New Rome*. American response to these attacks was radical militarism and secrecy, which is harmful for the American state, he argues. He hints at neoconservatives who enjoyed ever expanding control over administrative decisions. It was ensured, he argues, by infiltration of multiple branches of the American government by what he labels as professional warriors who target manipulation of the military budget and stress on secrecy. The title of his book, *The*

⁵⁷⁶Wertheim, Stephen, "The United States is No Longer Indispensable," *Foreign Policy*, (Sept. 8, 2021) [How 9/11 Changed U.S. Foreign Policy](#)

⁵⁷⁷Soros, George, "The Bubble of American Supremacy," *The Atlantic*, December 2003. <https://www.theatlantic.com/magazine/archive/2003/12/the-bubble-of-american-supremacy/302851>

Sorrows of Empire is thought provoking and apt as his central argument in the book is that America is being pushed into becoming an expanding empire of military bases which will only bring USA sorrow because it is pushing America into bankruptcy and propelling the end of globalisation.⁵⁷⁸

The War on Terror, it was observed, gave meaning and justification to the defence and intelligence budget (which swelled and doubled) after the Cold War ended.⁵⁷⁹ It also was used to execute an agenda of American supremacy by fostering fear that gripped the country,⁵⁸⁰ which was enhanced by the presidential rhetoric which continually exaggerated the threat, defined the enemy and shaped American identity. America was, once again, able to actively pursue a *threat* that needed to be brought to justice. At one-point Bush referred to the ‘War on Terror’ as a *revenge* of ‘the American people’ who wanted to ‘win the *first war* of the 21st century.’⁵⁸¹ He affirmed ‘the destruction of the *enemy*’ when he asserted: “Those who make war against the United States have chosen their own destruction.”⁵⁸² Such rhetoric Soros argues, only means that the war on terrorism cannot be won for the simple reason that it is a permanent war; terrorists will never disappear and this will always provide a pretext for pursuit of American supremacy which in turn will excite active resistance. The innocent victims as collateral damage in such a war will rise with greater resentment leading to a situation where the victims will turn into perpetrators.⁵⁸³

⁵⁷⁸Johnson, Chalmers, *The Sorrows of Empire: Militarism, Secrecy and the End of the Republic*, New York : Metropolitan Books, 2004.

⁵⁷⁹Feaver, Peter, “Did 9/11 Change the United States?: State power swelled—and not just the military,” *Foreign Policy*, (Sept. 8, 2021) [How 9/11 Changed U.S. Foreign Policy](https://www.foreignpolicy.com/story/2021/09/08/did-9-11-change-the-united-states/)

⁵⁸⁰Soros, George, “The Bubble of American Supremacy,” *The Atlantic*, December 2003.
<https://www.theatlantic.com/magazine/archive/2003/12/the-bubble-of-american-supremacy/302851>

⁵⁸¹Refer Public Papers of George W. Bush (Sept. 26, 2001, Book II): 1166. [From the U.S. Government Publishing Office www.gpo.gov] [Public Papers of the Presidents of the United States | GovInfo](https://www.gpo.gov/publications/presidents/pubs/pubs.htm)

⁵⁸²Refer Public Papers of George W. Bush (Sept. 15, 2001, Book II): 1113. [From the U.S. Government Publishing Office www.gpo.gov] [Public Papers of the Presidents of the United States | GovInfo](https://www.gpo.gov/publications/presidents/pubs/pubs.htm)

⁵⁸³Soros, George, “The Bubble of American Supremacy,” *The Atlantic*, December 2003.
<https://www.theatlantic.com/magazine/archive/2003/12/the-bubble-of-american-supremacy/302851>

After the win over Taliban in Afghanistan which was described as a ‘major combat’ by Donald Rumsfeld,⁵⁸⁴ Bush began referring to the War on Terror as having a two-fold aim of waging “war against terrorism and WMD in the hands of dictators.”⁵⁸⁵ Prior to it, the war on terror involved capturing and bringing the *enemy*/terrorists to justice. Bush declared: “... enemy hides in shadows and has no regard for human life,”⁵⁸⁶ while describing the terrorists. Bush also added that ‘the American people’ not only sought ‘revenge’ but wanted to ‘win a war against *barbaric behaviour*,’ against ‘people who hated freedom’ and what his country ‘stood for.’ The Bush administration will dedicate itself to winning that war, he avowed.⁵⁸⁷ In short, nation-building was not an integral part of American concern in 2001 when Bush declared that America was focused on justice, not ‘nation-building.’⁵⁸⁸

Later, the rhetoric undertook expansion of freedom as its primary aim around the world, beginning with the Middle East. He affirmed that the ‘long-term strategy’ of the Bush administration was to spread freedom around the world.⁵⁸⁹ He went further and announced a mission titled ‘Enduring Freedom’ which promised to protect the freedom of not only Americans but also the people everywhere in the world.⁵⁹⁰ The strategic vision of National Security Strategy (NSS), post-September 11, 2001 featured democracy promotion: “In pursuit

⁵⁸⁴On May 1, 2003, U.S. Secretary of Defense Donald Rumsfeld announced an end to *major combat* in Afghanistan. See Witte, G., "Afghanistan War," *Encyclopedia Britannica* (August 18, 2023).<https://www.britannica.com/event/Afghanistan-War>.

⁵⁸⁵Refer Public Papers of George W. Bush (March 16, 2003, Book I): 274. [From the U.S. Government Publishing Office www.gpo.gov] [Public Papers of the Presidents of the United States | GovInfo](#)

⁵⁸⁶Refer Public Papers of George W. Bush (Sept. 11, 2001, Book II): 1100. [From the U.S. Government Publishing Office www.gpo.gov] [Public Papers of the Presidents of the United States | GovInfo](#)

⁵⁸⁷Refer Public Papers of George W. Bush (Sept. 15, 2001, Book II): 1112. [From the U.S. Government Publishing Office www.gpo.gov] [Public Papers of the Presidents of the United States | GovInfo](#)

⁵⁸⁸Refer Public Papers of George W. Bush (Sept. 25, 2001, Book II): 1159. [From the U.S. Government Publishing Office www.gpo.gov] [Public Papers of the Presidents of the United States | GovInfo](#)

⁵⁸⁹Refer Public Papers of George W. Bush (April 21, 2004, Book I): 643. [From the U.S. Government Publishing Office www.gpo.gov] [Public Papers of the Presidents of the United States | GovInfo](#)

⁵⁹⁰Refer Public Papers of George W. Bush (Oct. 7, 2001, Book II): 1202. [From the U.S. Government Publishing Office www.gpo.gov] [Public Papers of the Presidents of the United States | GovInfo](#)

of our goals, our first imperative is to clarify what we stand for: the United States must defend liberty and justice because these principles are right and true for all people everywhere....”⁵⁹¹

Conducting elections and electing a democratic leader in the Middle Eastern states of Iraq and Afghanistan became central to prolonged American and NATO presence in the region. Democracy became essential in the War on Terror for it began to be promoted as the crucial American foreign policy goal in the expansion of ‘liberty and freedom in the Middle East.’ Democracy was acclaimed as the only viable solution in the Middle East (which seems to be based on the assumptions and formulations like democracies do not go to war which were a theme in Natan Sharansky’s book *The Case of Democracy*). These formulations greatly influenced Bush so much so that he claimed that in order to understand his ideas, that he described as his ‘political DNA,’ Natan Sharansky’s book, had to be read⁵⁹².

Bush stressed that the American strategy to fight the ‘terrorist enemy’ and defend America was: firstly, America will be on the *offensive* against the terrorist network; secondly, America will confront regimes harbouring, feeding and supporting the terrorists; thirdly, America will confront ‘outlaw regimes that pursue weapons of mass destruction,’ have ‘ties to terror,’ and ‘defy the world’; and fourthly, America will ‘promote freedom and democracy in the broader Middle East.’⁵⁹³ When each of these strategies are closely scrutinised, it becomes evident that the first strategy to be on the *offensive* directed America towards the Middle East where *terrorists* had to be captured and brought to justice; the second strategy to confront

⁵⁹¹See Dobriansky, Paula J. and Thomas Carothers, *Democracy Promotion: Explaining the Bush Administration’s Position, Foreign Affairs*, (May/June 2003):141.

⁵⁹²See <http://www.jewishagency.org/executive-members/natan-sharansky-0> . After reading the book, *The Case for Democracy: The Power of Freedom to Overcome Freedom and Terror* President George Bush was quoted saying: “If you want to understand my political DNA, read this book.” Accessed 17-07-2016 at 2 P.M.

⁵⁹³Refer Public Papers of George W. Bush (Oct. 29, 20004, Book II): 2816. [From the U.S. Government Publishing Office www.gpo.gov] [Public Papers of the Presidents of the United States](#) | [GovInfo](#)

regimes harbouring terrorists prompted America to deal with the Taliban in Afghanistan; the third strategy to confront regimes pursuing WMD drew American attention towards Iraq and lastly, the last strategy to ‘spread freedom and democracy in broader Middle East,’ proved to be the impetus for America to continue stationing its armies and urging NATO to train government leaders and armies to run their states under guidance from the *civilised* Western states. Bush’s statements concerning training of armies and leaders have been mentioned in the previous chapter. In short, it also became the reason for continued American presence and interest in the Middle East region. The assumed necessity to train and teach states to govern themselves and statements like “The war on terror is civilization’s fight” that was ‘not a clash of civilizations or a clash of religions’ but ‘instead a clash of political visions;⁵⁹⁴ brings to mind formulations like Rudyard Kipling's *White Man's Burden*.⁵⁹⁵

And it must be noted that in spite of his repeated claim that the war wasn't civilizational or religious, there were many scholars who studied the impact of Bush (Jr.) religion on the War on Terror. Bush’s religion drew a lot of attention, including Moutusi Paul Choudhury, Scott

⁵⁹⁴Refer Public Papers of George W. Bush (June 2, 2004, Book I): 976. [From the U.S. Government Publishing Office www.gpo.gov] [Public Papers of the Presidents of the United States](#) | [GovInfo](#)

⁵⁹⁵Rudyard Kipling's poem, “The White Man’s Burden” was originally written to celebrate British Queen Victoria's Diamond Jubilee in 1897. He later revised it to exhort America to conquer and rule the Philippines in 1899. He defines White Imperialism and Colonialism morally in the poem. For him conquests are not white race gaining wealth or power either individually or nationally. It is a burden on the White race to help civilise the non-white races. The White Man’s Burden had an impact on American Imperialism and till date remains a notorious racial justification for Western conquests. Greene, Clay, "The White Man's Burden," *LitCharts LLC*, January 23, 2019. Retrieved August 9, 2023. [The White Man's Burden Poem Summary and Analysis](#) | [LitCharts](#)

Kerney⁵⁹⁶, Walter Russell Mead,⁵⁹⁷ Lee Marsden,⁵⁹⁸ Alexander Kougentakis,⁵⁹⁹ E. Gentile,⁶⁰⁰ Paul Froese,⁶⁰¹ and Howard Fineman among many others.⁶⁰² Choudhury argues, that in the aftermath of 9/11, Bush offered solace and security to awestruck Americans through his religion and frequent references to God. He used religion to gloss over the aggressive expansion of American hegemony.⁶⁰³ Samuel P. Huntington's thesis, '*Clash of Civilizations*,' wound its way into the presidential rhetoric. As it has been mentioned previously in the chapter, Bush at one point clarified that the 'war on terror wasn't a clash of civilizations' but a 'civilization's fight.' Similarly, there have been works including works by Pippa Norris and Ronald Inglehart who have attempted to 'test' the 'Clash of Civilizations thesis' by pitching the said enemies, (identified by Huntington) i.e., Islam and West against each other.⁶⁰⁴

Assumption about the *oppression* and *helplessness* of the people of the Middle East region, it seemed, was integral to the need to rescue them and guide them towards freedom,

⁵⁹⁶Scott, Kerney, "Religion and U.S. Foreign Policy: Two Presidents and Two Perspectives" *Center for the Study of the Presidency and Congress* (2006-2007). Available at <http://cspc.nonprofitsoapbox.com/storage/documents/Vater/Scott.pdf> (accessed on February 23, 2022)

⁵⁹⁷Mead, Walter Russell, "God's Country?" *Foreign Affairs* 85, no. 5 (2006): 24–43.

⁵⁹⁸Marsden, Lee, "For God's Sake: Civil Religion and US Foreign Policy." *Revista Nures* no. 14, (Janeiro/Abril 2010) <http://www.pucsp.br/revistanures> Available at http://www.pucsp.br/revistanures/revista14/Nures14_Lee_Marsden.pdf (accessed on August 5, 2013).

⁵⁹⁹Kougentakis, Alexander, "How the Influence of Religion Makes the Foreign Policy of the Bush Administration Revolutionary, and How This Has Affected Our Relations with European Allies." *Scholarly Commons, Electronic Journal*, University of Pennsylvania (2007). Available at <http://repository.upenn.edu/curej/66/> (accessed on February 23, 2022).

⁶⁰⁰Gentile, E., *God's Democracy: American Religion after September 11* (Westport, CT: Praeger Publisher, 2008).

⁶⁰¹Froese, Paul, "Religion and American Politics from a Global Perspective" *Religions* (2014). Available at [http://file:///c:/Users/User/Downloads/religions-05-00648%20\(2\).pdf](http://file:///c:/Users/User/Downloads/religions-05-00648%20(2).pdf) (accessed on February 23, 2022).

⁶⁰²Fineman, Howard, "Bush and God" *Newsweek*, (March 10, 2003). Available at <http://www.prnewswire.com/news-releases/newsweek-cover-bush--god-74517272.html> (accessed on February 23, 2022).

⁶⁰³Choudhury, Moutusi Paul. "The Sacred and the Secular: Influence of Religion on George W. Bush's Foreign Policy." *Jadavpur Journal of International Relations* 19, no. 2 (December 2015): 159–83. <https://doi.org/10.1177/0973598416639413>.

⁶⁰⁴Norris, Pippa and Ronald Inglehart, "Islam and the West: Testing the 'Clash of Civilizations' Thesis" *Harvard Kennedy School*, 2002. Available at <http://www.hks.harvard.edu/fs/pnorris/Acrobat/Clash%20of%20Civilization.pdf> (accessed on February 5, 2022).

liberty and democracy in the American presidential rhetoric. In one instance, Bush declared that ‘the *removal* of Saddam Hussein’ was ‘an integral part of winning’ the ‘war against terror’ where ‘a free Iraq’ will eventually lead to Middle Eastern peace.⁶⁰⁵ And when American efforts were criticised for having the destabilising effect of democratic changes in the region, Bush counter-argued that the ‘stability in the Middle East was a mirage’ because ‘millions of people’ were “trapped in oppression and hopelessness.”⁶⁰⁶ In short, he believed that America was not causing the instability in the region by interfering in the domestic politics by urging states towards western approved/styled democracy because the stability in the region was a *mirage* or illusion. It appears as if Huntington’s recommendation of exploiting the differences and conflicts in the Islamic states⁶⁰⁷ and encouraging them towards incorporating democracy seems to have taken firm foundation in American foreign policy under the Bush administration. Whereas the more tolerant non-interfering western policy towards the Middle East as recommended by Bernard Lewis in his work, *The Roots of Muslim Rage*, seems to have taken a back-seat. Lewis warns against an equally historic or irrational reaction against the rival because Muslims must decide their issues amongst themselves.⁶⁰⁸

The chapter in the following sections will study in detail the presidential rhetoric on War on Terror (WoT) through concepts of presuppositions, predicates and subject-positioning. The *ideological presuppositions* of liberalism, nationalism and democracy which inform the *predicates* and *subject positioning* of America towards the Middle East will be attempted. ‘War on terror’ had two motives which were clarified in Bush’s statements, to defeat the *terror* and

⁶⁰⁵Refer Public Papers of George W. Bush (July 17, 2003, Book II): 886. [From the U.S. Government Publishing Office www.gpo.gov] [Public Papers of the Presidents of the United States | GovInfo](http://www.gpo.gov)

⁶⁰⁶Refer Public Papers of George W. Bush, “Foreword,” (July-Dec. 26, 2006, Book II): v. [From the U.S. Government Publishing Office www.gpo.gov] [Public Papers of the Presidents of the United States | GovInfo](http://www.gpo.gov)

⁶⁰⁷Huntington, Samuel P., “The Clash of Civilizations?” *Foreign Affairs* 72, no. 3 (1993):49. <https://doi.org/10.2307/20045621>.

⁶⁰⁸Lewis, Bernard, “The Roots of Muslim Rage Lewis,” *The Atlantic* 266, no. 3, (Sep 1990): 60. ABI/INFORM Global [lewis_roots_of_muslim_rage.pdf \(pomona.edu\)](http://www.pomona.edu/~lewis_roots_of_muslim_rage.pdf)

win over it by imposing democracy in the Middle East. He asserted that ‘democracy’ and ‘the rule of law’ “will always prevail over terror and against terror.” America ‘must defeat terror’ for it ‘cannot dialogue with them’ and “all we must do is defeat them.”⁶⁰⁹ He proclaimed: “Part of winning the war on terror is to spread freedom and democracy in the Middle East.”⁶¹⁰ These two motives developed slowly as the War on Terror progressed and for better comprehension, an attempt will be made to understand the two stages in War on Terror separately.

6.1.1 Two Stages in War on Terror

War on Terror was fought in two stages and America improvised on it as it moved forward in its struggle with terrorists. In the initial phase, George W. Bush declared America’s intention of being *offensive* whereby capturing the terrorists and bringing them to justice was ‘the primary aim of the war on terror.’ Bush declared that “wars are not won on the homefront alone” but that “wars are won by taking the fight to the enemy.”⁶¹¹ Therefore, America ventured in the Middle Eastern region, particularly in Taliban’s Afghanistan for security reasons.

In the second stage, America emphasised the need to ‘transform the Middle-East’ by both ‘establishing’ and ‘supporting’ democracy in the region in various states including Iraq and Afghanistan. ‘Part’ of the ‘War on Terror’ is to promote ‘freedom’ in the Middle East,⁶¹² Bush declared. It is indisputable that ‘democracy’ was an essential feature of Bush Doctrine, but the reason it was included in the Bush Doctrine was preparation and launching of the Iraq invasion, argues Maria Helena de Castro Santos and Ulysses Tavares Teixeira. The liberal

⁶⁰⁹Refer Public Papers of George W. Bush (June 12, 2001, Book I): 644. [From the U.S. Government Publishing Office www.gpo.gov] [Public Papers of the Presidents of the United States | GovInfo](#)

⁶¹⁰Refer Public Papers of George W. Bush (June 1, 2004, Book I): 959. [From the U.S. Government Publishing Office www.gpo.gov] [Public Papers of the Presidents of the United States | GovInfo](#)

⁶¹¹Refer Public Papers of George W. Bush (Nov. 21, 2001, Book II): 1441. [From the U.S. Government Publishing Office www.gpo.gov] [Public Papers of the Presidents of the United States | GovInfo](#)

⁶¹² Refer Public Papers of George W. Bush (Aug. 19, 2003, Book II): 1032. [From the U.S. Government Publishing Office www.gpo.gov] [Public Papers of the Presidents of the United States | GovInfo](#)

ideology's persistence in American foreign policy guides their argument that 'democracy,' 'security' and American 'interests' have been 'pillars' of US foreign policy since the Cold war ended. They emphasise that Bush innately believed that 'exporting' democracy will have 'positive effect' even if it meant 'use of force' in both Afghanistan and Iraq. They even come to the same conclusion (like this thesis have been arguing) that security was offered as justification for military intervention in these countries in initial years. It was only later that 'democratic concerns' took precedence over 'security reasons.' They identify absence of 'WMD' in Iraq as the reason for the shift in Bush (Jr.)'s narrative towards use of democracy as an "ultimate weapon to fight terrorism" in order to invade 'rouge states.'⁶¹³

And for better comprehension, the chapter will progress by dividing American rhetoric on war on terror into parts: first stage and second stage. While looking at Bush's statements on the War on Terror, in both the stages, emphasis will be laid on ideological foundations in his rhetoric: liberalism, nationalism and democracy.

6.1.1.1 First Stage

As was mentioned previously, the first stage involved capturing and bringing to justice the terrorists, terrorist organisations and states that harboured/funded terrorists or their organisations. On several occasions, Bush clarified that the war on terror was against people who conducted crimes against humanity, the terrorists and not against any one religion or followers of one faith, Muslims or Arabs.⁶¹⁴ Islam, he declared, was a peace-loving religion. America doesn't view the war on terror "as a war of religions in any way, shape, or form."⁶¹⁵

⁶¹³Santos, Maria Helena de Castro and Ulysses Tavares Teixeira, "The essential role of democracy in the Bush Doctrine: the invasions of Iraq and Afghanistan," *Revista Brasileira De Politica Internacional* 56, (2013): 131-156. DOI:10.1590/S0034-73292013000200008

⁶¹⁴This statement was repeated in so many words on September 18, 2001. Refer Public Papers of George W. Bush (Sept. 18, 2001, Book II): 1127. [From the U.S. Government Publishing Office www.gpo.gov] [Public Papers of the Presidents of the United States | GovInfo](#)

⁶¹⁵Refer Public Papers of George W. Bush (Sept. 19, 2001, Book II): 1136. [From the U.S. Government Publishing

President Bush's statements on terrorism revolved around differentiating between Islam and the terrorists, where Islam, he argued, represented peace and the terrorists, he added, represented evil and war.⁶¹⁶ Statements like these prompted/urged Mahmood Mamdani's most acclaimed book, that dealt with roots of terror in cold war (using good and bad Muslim as its title),⁶¹⁷ to argue that from a religious identity, Muslim became a racialized political identity. Repeated statements by Bush (Jr.) were made on what constitutes a good Muslim (one who is anxious about clearing names and consciousness of 'horrible crime' of 9/11 while also supporting *us* in the war against *them*) from being a bad Muslim. Hence inherent presupposition in these statements was that until proven good (through loyalty to nation and joining war against bad Muslims) all Muslims were bad.⁶¹⁸

Bush declared that not just the Taliban and Al Qaeda but anybody who harboured them were the targets of the war. He also emphasised that any nation which harboured the terrorists needed 'to *fear* the United States' and 'the rest of the *free world*.' Terrorism, he argued, had no borders and the terrorists would strike to bring fear in an attempt to change the *behaviour* of countries that love *liberty* and in the 'worldwide campaign' against terrorism, America would

Office www.gpo.gov [Public Papers of the Presidents of the United States | GovInfo](#)

⁶¹⁶Refer Public Papers of George W. Bush (Sept. 17, 2001, Book II): 1121. [From the U.S. Government Publishing Office www.gpo.gov [Public Papers of the Presidents of the United States | GovInfo](#)

⁶¹⁷Post 9/11 Mahmood Mamdani in his book, *Good Muslim, Bad Muslim: America, The Cold War and The Roots of Terror* argues that the link between terrorism and Islam received a lot of attention in the media, which resulted in, "culture talk." From a religious category, Islam became a political category, where instead of differentiating between terrorists and civilians the distinction was being made between a good muslim and a bad muslim. And the only way for exorcising the devil from Islam was a civil war between good and bad muslim in states like Palestine, Pakistan or Afghanistan. Cultural explanations, he states tend to avoid history and encounter issues between Islamic civilization and Western civilization. "Culture talk de-historizes the construction of political identities." Terrorism is modern construction, he stresses, not a premodern culture residue in modern politics. See Mamdani, Mahmood, "Good Muslim, Bad Muslim," *American Anthropologist* 104, no. 3 (September 2002). [Good Muslim, Bad Muslim: A Political Perspective on Culture and Terrorism \(wordpress.com\)](#)

⁶¹⁸ Koushik, Meghan, "Reimagining 'Good Muslim, Bad Muslim': Public Theologies of Citizenship and Belonging in the Republic of India " *Brown University Graduate Thesis*, (April, 2013): 5. [Microsoft Word - Thesis- Final.docx \(brown.edu\)](#)

not let them have their way.⁶¹⁹ Bush emphasised that the ‘victory against terrorism’ would not take place in a ‘single battle’ but in ‘a series of decisive actions’ against ‘the terrorist organisations and those who harbour and support them.’⁶²⁰ Bush declared that there is ‘no neutral ground in the fight’ between “civilization and terror, because there is no neutral ground between good and evil, freedom and slavery, and life and death.” The War on Terror was ‘not a figure of speech’; it was “an inescapable calling of our generation.” He added, “The terrorists are offended not just by our policies but by our existence as free nations. No concession will appease their hatred. No accommodation will satisfy their endless demands. Their ultimate ambitions are to control the peoples of the Middle East and to blackmail the rest of the world with weapons of mass terror.”⁶²¹ He also said: “The terrorists hate and target a free Iraq. They also hate and target every country that stands for democracy and tolerance and freedom in the world.”⁶²²

The presuppositions in Bush’s (Jr.) rhetoric in this first stage are replete with advancement of ideologies of liberalism and democracy. The predicates he used to describe self are tolerance, freedom and democracy. He emphasised that the terrorists represent evil and war; their hatred and endless demands can never be fulfilled; they will continue to strike fear to change countries that love liberty; and their aim is to ‘control the people’ of the Middle East and ‘blackmail the world’ with weapons of mass terror. The subject-positioning in his statements are stark: the ‘fight is between good and evil,’ ‘freedom and slavery,’ ‘life and

⁶¹⁹Refer Public Papers of George W. Bush (Sept. 19, 2001, Book II): 1129. [From the U.S. Government Publishing Office www.gpo.gov] [Public Papers of the Presidents of the United States | GovInfo](http://www.gpo.gov/publications/presidents/pubs/pubs.html)

⁶²⁰Refer Public Papers of George W. Bush (Sept. 15, 2001, Book II): 1113. [From the U.S. Government Publishing Office www.gpo.gov] [Public Papers of the Presidents of the United States | GovInfo](http://www.gpo.gov/publications/presidents/pubs/pubs.html)

⁶²¹Refer Public Papers of George W. Bush, “Bush Remarks on the Anniversary of Operation Iraqi Freedom,” (March 19, 2004, Book I): 411. [From the U.S. Government Publishing Office www.gpo.gov] [Public Papers of the Presidents of the United States | GovInfo](http://www.gpo.gov/publications/presidents/pubs/pubs.html)

⁶²²Refer Public Papers of George W. Bush (March 20, 2004, Book I): 415. [From the U.S. Government Publishing Office www.gpo.gov] [Public Papers of the Presidents of the United States | GovInfo](http://www.gpo.gov/publications/presidents/pubs/pubs.html)

death'; and 'civilization and terror' where *us* was good, freedom, life and civilization while the *other* was evil, slavery, death and terror.

6.1.1.2 Second Stage

Elaborating on 'America's strategy' for the War on Terror, Bush declared that 'every available tool' will be used to 'disrupt the terrorists and their organisations.' The war will be fought abroad to avoid it on American soil and on the ideological front America will continue to "spread the hope of freedom and reform across the broader Middle East." In short, transforming the Middle East was the key in winning the ideological struggle against the terrorists and the War on Terror. The reason offered for spreading democracy was that free nations, meaning democratic states neither support terrorists nor invade their neighbours. In short, the advancement of liberty was central to 'making the world more peaceful' and America 'more secure.'⁶²³

The transformation of the Middle East began with *freeing* Afghanistan and Iraq from terrorists and oppressive regimes that support proliferation and accession of WMD. It was in American interest to fight the War on Terror and establish democracies in Iraq and Afghanistan, Bush stated so as to ensure American security. He declared: "The establishment of a free Iraq is our fight. The success of a free Afghanistan is our fight. The war on terror is our fight. All of us are called to share the blessings of liberty and to be strong and steady in freedom's defense."⁶²⁴ A 'free Afghanistan' is in America's interest and US is 'more secure' because of 'the decision it took in Afghanistan,' Bush emphasised.⁶²⁵

⁶²³Refer Public Papers of George W. Bush, "Bush at the Address at US Naval Academy, Annapolis, Maryland," (May. 27, 2005, Book I): 886. [From the U.S. Government Publishing Office www.gpo.gov] [Public Papers of the Presidents of the United States | GovInfo](#)

⁶²⁴Refer Public Papers of George W. Bush (March 19, 2004, Book I): 413-414. [From the U.S. Government Publishing Office www.gpo.gov] [Public Papers of the Presidents of the United States | GovInfo](#)

⁶²⁵Refer Public Papers of George W. Bush (Sept. 22, 2004, Book II): 2161. [From the U.S. Government Publishing

The strategy to win the War on Terror was fourfold as was previously mentioned. It included use of “every available tool to dismantle, disrupt, and destroy terrorists” underground organisations. America promised to strike them before they could strike. Hence, ‘the best way to protect America,’ Bush opined, was ‘to stay on the offensive.’ Secondly, America would deny ‘terrorists places of sanctuary or support’ in order to avoid the emergence of terrorist-controlled states. Thirdly, America would use ‘all elements’ of its national power to ‘deny terrorists the chemical, biological, and nuclear weapons’ they sought. It would also strengthen international institutions to work against this global threat.⁶²⁶ Fourthly, America sought to deny ideological victories to the terrorists ‘by working for freedom and reform in the broader Middle East.’⁶²⁷

The two distinguishing aims among the two stages of the ‘War on Terror’ that emerged from analysing the presidential rhetoric were: being *offensive* in the first stage and *transforming/re-making* the Middle East in the second stage. A detailed analysis of *pre-emptive strike* had been made in the previous chapter that captured what Bush meant by pursuing an *offensive* foreign policy in the Middle East. The second most significant aspect of the War on Terror that was pursued in the second stage was *transforming/re-making* the Middle East that will be analysed in the following section. We will first attempt to comprehend what it means before analysing the presidential rhetoric on it.

6.2 Transformation/Re-making of Middle East

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⁶²⁶Refer Public Papers of George W. Bush (June 2, 2004, Book I): 977. [From the U.S. Government Publishing Office www.gpo.gov] [Public Papers of the Presidents of the United States](#) | [GovInfo](#)

⁶²⁷Refer Public Papers of George W. Bush (June 2, 2004, Book I): 978. [From the U.S. Government Publishing Office www.gpo.gov] [Public Papers of the Presidents of the United States](#) | [GovInfo](#)

The phrase, ‘transformation of the Middle East’ more often than not hints at solving Israel-Arab dispute or spread of democracy in the region. It gained currency during the Bush (Jr.) presidency though it had been in use for some time. Any dispute, discord, instability in the Middle East region, American presidential rhetoric deemed it as ‘a threat to American interests and security.’ The reason has been majorly understood in terms of national interests in the region including oil and natural resources, preservation of American status as paramount world power,⁶²⁸ the fate of Israel as a state, economic interests and geopolitical location. The Wilsonian dream of championing ‘the cause of democracy and freedom across the world’ has also drawn American interest in the Middle East region. Another substantial reason that draws American interest in the Middle East is the state of Israel which cannot be overlooked. John J. Mearsheimer and Stephen M. Walt in their book, contend that ‘American interest’ in the Middle East region is founded on America's intimate relation with Israel. The ‘Israeli Lobby’ propels American foreign policy in the region even though it is presented as ‘shared strategic interests’ or ‘compelling moral imperatives’ for America in the region.⁶²⁹

The phrase, *transformation/remaking* the Middle East was used by Stephen Walt in 2008 while discussing his realist position on the Middle East. He lists three options for dealing with the Middle East region: firstly, control the region through direct involvement by promoting regional transformation whereby America will ‘dictate the kinds of government’ the Middle Eastern states should have (which it can be argued was attempted by Bush (Jr.) administration); secondly, ‘withdraw’ from the region and let the region evolve on its own (a variation of this was also put forward by Bernard Lewis as has been mentioned before); and

⁶²⁸ Klare, Michael T., “For Oil and Empire? Rethinking war with Iraq,” *Current History* (2003) 102 (662): 129–135. <https://doi.org/10.1525/curh.2003.102.662.129>

⁶²⁹ Mearsheimer, John J. and Stephen M. Walt, *The Israel Lobby and US Foreign Policy* (New York: Farrar, Straus and Giroux, 2007).

thirdly, as the first two are not in American interests, the best option that America has is to encourage ‘balance of power’ in the region. He states that America declared war on Iraq in 2003 with an intent to ‘transform’ the region. He argues, that the Bush administration had hoped that with a victory in Iraq, the US could ‘dictate’ terms to other states, especially with those states that have differences with the US like Syria and Iran showcasing Iraq as an ‘example’ if any state ‘contradicts’ it or ‘disagrees’ with it.⁶³⁰

The war on Iraq, argues Raymond Hinnebusch, was also part of the ‘grand strategy’ of America for the 21st century. It included undertaking a ‘coercive assertion’ of ‘global hegemony’ based on use of the US's exceptional military capabilities to enforce ‘American will.’ The ‘Project for a New American Century’ influenced not just the Bush Doctrine but also the 2002 ‘National Security Strategy’ which came about in response to September 9, 2001 attacks. In the project, there was a call for a ‘full spectrum dominance;’ suggestion of dealing with any resistance with *preventive wars* and not just ‘containment;’ pursuing *unilateralism* with an *ad hoc coalition of the willing*; propagating the idea that states that were ‘not’ with the US were ‘against’ it; and that the US liberal model is the only ‘legitimate’ option for the Middle Eastern states. ‘Reshaping the Middle East’ was central for the success of this project, he observes. As for the Iraq war, he argues, ‘transformation’ of the Middle Eastern region to suit US interests was what motivated the US under Bush (Jr.) to go to war with Iraq. In fact, he records that the call to invade Iraq came before the 9/11 attacks as the hardliner in the Bush

⁶³⁰Barzegar, Kayhan, “Stephen M. Walt on the U.S., Iran, and the New Balance of Power in the Persian Gulf,” *Harvard Kennedy School Belfer Center for Science and International Affairs*, August 5, 2008. [Stephen M. Walt on the U.S., Iran, and the New Balance of Power in the Persian Gulf | Belfer Center for Science and International Affairs](#)

cabinet believed if American opponents were not to be emboldened then ‘retaliation’ was essential.⁶³¹

The phrase, ‘transforming the Middle East,’ was also used by Condoleezza Rice, the then National Security advisor, in *The Washington Post* in 2003 as the title of her article. She began by arguing that America in Europe after WWII worked towards a long-term transformation of Europe. She believes that when these two regions worked together, they succeeded in their commitment to the vision of prosperity and democracy. She is of the opinion that the same is possible and should be attempted by allies and friends in the Middle East or anyone who seeks progress towards democracy, tolerance, property and freedom. With the liberation of Iraq, there is an opportunity for advancing a ‘positive agenda’ in the Middle East that will ‘strengthen security’ not just in the Middle East but also across the world. She reiterated, America will work towards addressing the ‘freedom deficit’ in the region. Process will take a long time, will not be easy, and will require all aspects of American national power—diplomatic, economic, military and cultural. One such effort was the Middle East Partnership Initiative, launched by George Bush (Jr.) which aims towards building a better future through concrete projects.⁶³²

What she seems to neglect is that unlike Europe that has undergone periods of Enlightenment, Renaissance and Reformation, the Middle East has not. Both do not share the same historical context or experience. In Europe, democracy, freedom and nationalism were born. They were exported to America where they found a new lease of life in American history through the American Enlightenment (which was tailored to meet their requirements) as was

⁶³¹Hinnebusch, Raymond, “The US Invasion of Iraq: Explanations and Implications: Critique,” *Critical Middle Eastern Studies* 16, no.3, (Oct. 2007): 219-220. DOI: 10.1080/10669920701616443

⁶³²Rice, Condoleezza, “Transforming the Middle East,” *The Washington Post*, Aug. 7, (2003) [Transforming the Middle East - The Washington Post](#)

discussed in Chapter Three. Having made this observation it should also be borne in mind that democracy can still be a success where states did not inherently lean towards it depending on a state's history, political history, leadership and cultural underpinnings. Case in point is the Indian Union where democracy has been successful since its political liberation from the British Rule in 1947. But the fact also remains that democracy as a system needs conducive conditions and internal change not external imposition. This is something that even Condoleezza Rice hints at while describing the Arab scholars' analysis of the Middle East region: there is a political and economic freedom deficit in the region.⁶³³ Several scholars from the Middle East describe the Bush (Jr.) administration's policies and measures in the Middle East as 'ill-received,' 'imperialistic,' 'overbearing patronage,' 'insincere,' 'hypocritical' and 'self-defeating.' They declare it as the 'undoing' of the Middle East and argue, that American interference in the region has led to the creation of a political and social space that generated *radicalism*.⁶³⁴

In one of his interviews, Bush declared that the 'Middle-East' ranked among the top American 'foreign policy priorities.'⁶³⁵ On another occasion he emphasised that the region of Middle East was 'consuming' a lot of his administration's time as it is a very "important part of the world."⁶³⁶ The US Middle East policy was tilted towards 'peace,' he declared, and 'the best way' to fight terror was to 'achieve peace.'⁶³⁷ And in order to achieve peace, America, under Bush (Jr.), seems to have considered the need to 'confront' and 'dismantle regimes' in

⁶³³Rice, Condoleezza, "Transforming the Middle East," *The Washington Post*, Aug. 7, (2003) [Transforming the Middle East - The Washington Post](#)

⁶³⁴Shakdam, Catherine, "What Ever Happened to Bush's Greater Middle East Initiative?" *Mintpressnews*, (Nov.5, 2014). [What Ever Happened To Bush's Greater Middle East Initiative? \(mintpressnews.com\)](#)

⁶³⁵Refer Public Papers of George W. Bush (Aug. 8, 2001, Book II): 947. [From the U.S. Government Publishing Office [www.gpo.gov](#)] [Public Papers of the Presidents of the United States | GovInfo](#)

⁶³⁶Refer Public Papers of George W. Bush (June 14, 2001, Book I): 664. [From the U.S. Government Publishing Office [www.gpo.gov](#)] [Public Papers of the Presidents of the United States | GovInfo](#)

⁶³⁷Refer Public Papers of George W. Bush (April 14, 2004, Book I): 575. [From the U.S. Government Publishing Office [www.gpo.gov](#)] [Public Papers of the Presidents of the United States | GovInfo](#)

two states in the Middle East. These efforts also seem to include ‘nation-building’ and ‘self-governance,’ which according to Bush (Jr.) can be viewed as America’s ‘grandest endeavours’ since the Marshall Plan. Bush stated that both in Afghanistan and Iraq, America tackled violent and oppressive regimes that threatened the ‘peace’ and ‘cultivated ties to terror’ and was helping both the states ‘to restore their nation’ and ‘regain self-government.’⁶³⁸ In fact, Bush argued that investment America was making in the ‘future of Afghanistan and Iraq’ was the “greatest commitment since the Marshall Plan.” It reflected, he added, America’s ‘generous spirit,’ served the ‘national interests’ and ensured ‘American security.’ America appeared determined to lead the Middle East on the path of ‘progress’ and ‘peace’ by utilising all its power to ensure that freedom “finds a lasting home in Afghanistan and in Iraq.”⁶³⁹

Since 9/11, Bush observed that America has been able to oust two brutal regimes in Kabul and Baghdad that supported the terrorists and gave them safe haven. He observed that the launch of ‘lasting freedom’ in these two states was capable of inspiring reform throughout the Middle East to “rise up and claim their liberty.” What has been observed is that while Clinton had begun, declaring sanctions on various states in the Middle East for harbouring terrorists, Bush, it appears, invaded those states to be on the *offensive* and deal with the terrorists’ threat before they could attack the United States or disrupt ‘world peace.’ Bush argued, that both American security and “ensuring more peace in the world” guided the War on Terror and the need to ‘transform’ the broader Middle East was the key to achieving that end.⁶⁴⁰ In short, the ‘War on Terror,’ promotion of ‘world peace’ and preservation of ‘American

⁶³⁸Refer Public Papers of George W. Bush (July 17, 2003, Book II): 883. [From the U.S. Government Publishing Office www.gpo.gov] [Public Papers of the Presidents of the United States | GovInfo](#)

⁶³⁹Refer Public Papers of George W. Bush (Nov. 6, 2003, Book II): 1476. [From the U.S. Government Publishing Office www.gpo.gov] [Public Papers of the Presidents of the United States | GovInfo](#)

⁶⁴⁰Refer Public Papers of George W. Bush, “ President Bush at the Address at US Naval Academy, Annapolis, Maryland,” (May 27, 2005, Book I): 886. [From the U.S. Government Publishing Office www.gpo.gov] [Public Papers of the Presidents of the United States | GovInfo](#)

security’ seems to have provided the United States with the imperative to intervene in Middle Eastern politics.

America, Bush (Jr.) argued, has a ‘vital interest’ in ‘preventing chaos’ and ‘providing hope’ to the region of Middle East. And in order to prevail in the struggle against terrorists, Bush added, America must ‘defeat Al Qaeda,’ ‘counter Iran,’ ‘help the Afghan government,’ “work for peace in the Holy Land,” and ‘strengthen’ their military.⁶⁴¹ He argued, “... Al Qaeda has an interest in Iraq for a reason, and that interest is, they realise this is a front in the war on terror, and they fear the spread of freedom and democracy in places like the greater Middle East. They can’t stand the thought of free societies springing up in the Middle East because they understand a free society is against their very wishes.”⁶⁴² Terrorists, he argued, could try to kill the innocent, but they will not be able “to kill the desire for liberty” that “burns in the hearts of millions across the earth.” In the last century, he stressed, ‘the power of freedom’ had “defeated the ideologies of fascism and communism,” and it will defeat the “hateful ideologies of the terrorists in this century.”⁶⁴³

Discussing the ‘future of the Middle-East,’ Bush declared that the ‘future’ belonged to ‘freedom’ and not ‘terror.’⁶⁴⁴ He proclaimed, “If our country does not lead the cause of freedom, it will not be led.” He emphasised, “America at its best is also courageous.” It is ‘American courage,’ that has been clear in times of ‘depression and war,’ ‘defeating common dangers’ and defined American ‘common good.’ He asserted, “The enemies of liberty and our

⁶⁴¹Refer Public Papers of George W. Bush (Sept. 13, 2007, Book II): 1197. [From the U.S. Government Publishing Office www.gpo.gov] [Public Papers of the Presidents of the United States | GovInfo](http://www.gpo.gov)

⁶⁴²Refer Public Papers of George W. Bush (March 16, 2004, Book I): 393. [From the U.S. Government Publishing Office www.gpo.gov] [Public Papers of the Presidents of the United States | GovInfo](http://www.gpo.gov)

⁶⁴³Refer Public Papers of George W. Bush (May 23, 2007, Book I): 612. [From the U.S. Government Publishing Office www.gpo.gov] [Public Papers of the Presidents of the United States | GovInfo](http://www.gpo.gov)

⁶⁴⁴Refer Public Papers of George W. Bush, “Remarks on War on Terror in Arlington, Virginia,” (March 19, 2008, Book I): 394. [From the U.S. Government Publishing Office www.gpo.gov] [Public Papers of the Presidents of the United States | GovInfo](http://www.gpo.gov)

country should make no mistake: America remains engaged in the world, by history and by choice, shaping a balance of power that favors freedom.”⁶⁴⁵

Thus, Bush’s (Jr.) rhetoric revolved around the ‘American belief’ that it was the ‘flag bearer of freedom’ and without American leadership, ‘the cause of freedom’ in the Middle East region would falter. The present study argues, that it is statements like these that have presumptions that ideologies of liberalism and democracy are desirable and also that American presidential rhetoric resorts to nationalism. The belief that without ‘American’ intervention and leadership, freedom will be lost is packed with a sense of exalted nationalism. The need to promote the ‘cause of freedom,’ ‘democracy’ and ‘liberty’ fall under the ideology of promotion of liberal values. The prevalence of these ideologies in *presuppositions*, *predicates* and *subject positions* used in Bush’s (Jr.) rhetoric towards the Middle East is further analysed in separate sections.

6.3 Presuppositions, Predicates, Subject-Positioning involving Nationalism in Bush’s (Jr.) Rhetoric

On several occasions, President Bush’s discourse on the Middle East was bursting with statements exemplifying the sense of superiority of the American nation and various merits and commendable characteristics that make America a unique nation. “America is a nation built upon freedom,” its values and principles that make America unique, Bush argued in one of his addresses.⁶⁴⁶

His statements also reflected the assumptions that America was endowed with the responsibility of ‘securing world peace’ and fighting any threats that could develop into a cause

⁶⁴⁵Refer Public Papers of George W. Bush (Jan. 20, 2001, Book I): 2. [From the U.S. Government Publishing Office www.gpo.gov] [Public Papers of the Presidents of the United States | GovInfo](#)

⁶⁴⁶Refer Public Papers of George W. Bush (Sept. 25, 2001, Book II): 1162. [From the U.S. Government Publishing Office www.gpo.gov] [Public Papers of the Presidents of the United States | GovInfo](#)

for concern for the international community. In some instances, he celebrated the noble, good, and worthy work that America was involved in for the good of humanity. He contrasted the terrorist threat against the *civilised* states that were upholding the values of the civilization. It is statements like these that reflect a sense of exalted nationalism. The nationalistic tendency in the foreign policy discourse was excessively used to justify American involvement in the Middle East to both the world at large and the ‘American public’ at home. The study will now highlight such statements that were used to gain approval of the American public in declaring sanctions and emergencies on various states, waging wars and expanding democracy and liberty in the Middle East under the War on Terror.

Bush, in one of his addresses, declared that America was ‘determined,’ ‘strong,’ ‘tough’ and ‘compassionate.’ America, despite overcoming wars, attacks, recessions and corporate scandals, was still a ‘strong,’ ‘vibrant’ and ‘great nation’ because of their ‘ideals’ and ‘beliefs,’ especially in ‘human dignity’ and ‘promise of freedom.’ America was committed to a ‘world of peace’ and was ready to exercise ‘their strength’ to attain peace.⁶⁴⁷ The reason for Americans being ‘generous,’ ‘strong,’ ‘decent,’ and ‘compassionate’⁶⁴⁸ was because they held beliefs ‘beyond’ themselves.⁶⁴⁹ He reasoned that America was ‘never united’ by ‘blood,’ ‘birth’ or ‘soil’ but ‘by ideals’ that moved them ‘beyond’ their backgrounds, lifted them beyond their interests, and taught them what it meant ‘to be citizens.’⁶⁵⁰ He argued that Americans used ‘their strength’ to preserve ‘peace.’ They were an “optimistic country,” that was confident both in themselves and in ideals ‘bigger than’ themselves. Stressing on the work that America was

⁶⁴⁷Refer Public Papers of George W. Bush (Sept. 5, 2003, Book II): 1097. [From the U.S. Government Publishing Office www.gpo.gov] [Public Papers of the Presidents of the United States | GovInfo](http://www.gpo.gov)

⁶⁴⁸Refer Public Papers of George W. Bush (Jan. 20, 2001, Book I): 2. [From the U.S. Government Publishing Office www.gpo.gov] [Public Papers of the Presidents of the United States | GovInfo](http://www.gpo.gov)

⁶⁴⁹Refer Public Papers of George W. Bush (Jan. 20, 2001, Book I): 3. [From the U.S. Government Publishing Office www.gpo.gov] [Public Papers of the Presidents of the United States | GovInfo](http://www.gpo.gov)

⁶⁵⁰Refer Public Papers of George W. Bush , “Bush Inaugural Address,” (Jan. 20, 2001, Book I): 1. [From the U.S. Government Publishing Office www.gpo.gov] [Public Papers of the Presidents of the United States | GovInfo](http://www.gpo.gov)

involved in, he stated that abroad, the Americans strived ‘to lift’ all nations by ‘spreading freedom’ abroad and at home, they attempted to “lift up lives by spreading opportunity to every corner of America.”⁶⁵¹

The future, Bush argued, was dependent on ‘America’s leadership’ in the world. The ‘American nation,’ he added, was ‘strong’ and ‘confident’ in the cause of ‘freedom.’ One such instance, where America led the world was when America and its allies gave ‘ultimatums’ to the ‘terror regime’ in Afghanistan and Iraq. And when both the Taliban and Saddam Hussein chose defiance, it resulted in them losing power. He concluded that “America must confront threats before they fully materialize.”⁶⁵² He went on to mention the ‘threats of the 21st century’ that USA needed to deal with: terrorists testing ‘American will’ in Afghanistan and Iraq; regimes of North Korea and Iran challenging the peace. And he stressed that if America demonstrated any sign of weakness, and uncertainty in ‘this decade,’ to deal with these threats, the world will drift towards ‘tragedy’ and he vowed never to allow it.⁶⁵³

America has a ‘purpose,’ a ‘mission and a ‘war to win,’ Bush argued, and the world was ‘counting’ on America to advance ‘the cause of freedom and peace.’⁶⁵⁴ Bush declared that America would never forgo the ‘values’ that make the ‘American nation’ *great and unique*, the values that believe in ‘democracy,’ ‘rule of law’ and the ‘constitution.’⁶⁵⁵ Bush declared that the ‘survival of liberty’ in America depended majorly on the ‘success of liberty’ in other states,

⁶⁵¹Refer Public Papers of George W. Bush (July 18, 2003, Book II): 898. [From the U.S. Government Publishing Office www.gpo.gov] [Public Papers of the Presidents of the United States | GovInfo](#)

⁶⁵²Refer Public Papers of George W. Bush (April 19, 2004, Book I): 614. [From the U.S. Government Publishing Office www.gpo.gov] [Public Papers of the Presidents of the United States | GovInfo](#)

⁶⁵³Refer Public Papers of George W. Bush (April 19, 2004, Book I): 614. [From the U.S. Government Publishing Office www.gpo.gov] [Public Papers of the Presidents of the United States | GovInfo](#)

⁶⁵⁴Refer Public Papers of George W. Bush (May 3, 2004, Book I): 722. [From the U.S. Government Publishing Office www.gpo.gov] [Public Papers of the Presidents of the United States | GovInfo](#)

⁶⁵⁵Refer Public Papers of George W. Bush (Dec. 5, 2001, Book II): 1487. [From the U.S. Government Publishing Office www.gpo.gov] [Public Papers of the Presidents of the United States | GovInfo](#)

and the best hope for world peace was expansion of freedom. He asserted that he had marched America on a worthy goal: to support and seek the growth of democratic movements and institutions in every nation and culture, “with the ultimate goal of ending tyranny in our world.”⁶⁵⁶ He referred to this also as a global, democratic revolution.⁶⁵⁷

Bush argued, that a secure America was a place where American people realised the ‘American Dream.’ America will become secure only through the ‘focus’ and ‘strength’ of the ‘American people.’⁶⁵⁸ He declared: “America is a nation at peace but not a nation at rest.” The American purpose, he added, which was based on courage, can gather to greatness only when Americans work together, which is both their privilege and responsibility.⁶⁵⁹ He asserted: “No threat will prevent freedom-loving people from defending freedom.”⁶⁶⁰

On one occasion, Bush thanked Americans for their ‘strong will’ and reminded the Americans: they are the “greatest nation on the face of the earth and no terrorist will ever be able to decide our fate.”⁶⁶¹ And in order to defeat the enemy, “the will and determination of the American people” takes precedence, he admitted. The terrorist attack, he conceded, had strengthened the spirit of America and united the nation which realised that freedom was under

⁶⁵⁶ Refer Public Papers of George W. Bush (Jan.-June, 2005, Book II): v. [From the U.S. Government Publishing Office www.gpo.gov] [Public Papers of the Presidents of the United States](#) | [GovInfo](#)

⁶⁵⁷ Refer Public Papers of George W. Bush (April 12, 2005, Book I): 590. [From the U.S. Government Publishing Office www.gpo.gov] [Public Papers of the Presidents of the United States](#) | [GovInfo](#)

⁶⁵⁸ Refer Public Papers of George W. Bush (Sept. 12, 2003, Book II): 1156. [From the U.S. Government Publishing Office www.gpo.gov] [Public Papers of the Presidents of the United States](#) | [GovInfo](#)

⁶⁵⁹ Refer Public Papers of George W. Bush (Feb. 27, 2001, Book I): 146. [From the U.S. Government Publishing Office www.gpo.gov] [Public Papers of the Presidents of the United States](#) | [GovInfo](#)

⁶⁶⁰ Refer Public Papers of George W. Bush (Sept. 25, 2001, Book II): 1150. [From the U.S. Government Publishing Office www.gpo.gov] [Public Papers of the Presidents of the United States](#) | [GovInfo](#)

⁶⁶¹ Refer Public Papers of George W. Bush (Sept. 22, 2001, Book II): 1145. [From the U.S. Government Publishing Office www.gpo.gov] [Public Papers of the Presidents of the United States](#) | [GovInfo](#)

assault and that it would not rest till justice was done.⁶⁶² “A terrorist attack designed to tear us apart has instead bound us together as a nation,” he declared.⁶⁶³

American nationalism, it can be argued, was at its peak, when Bush, in his remarks, declared that America was ‘a leading light,’ ‘a guiding star’ and ‘the greatest nation’ on the face of the earth. He said this in reference to America’s role in the world which some believe was the cause of global turmoil, a mentality once called “blame America first.”⁶⁶⁴

The sense of exalted nationalism incorporated tendencies of the Cold War when American rhetoric began tapping into Ronald Regan's popular differentiation of the American *good* from that of the enemy who is *evil*. Bush began referring to the terrorists as *evil*, and *evil-doers* that resonated very much with Regan’s referring to the communist Soviet Union as an ‘evil empire.’ In one instance, Bush demanded of the ‘American people’ to make note of the extent of the evil advocated by the terrorists. He declared that Americans have “never seen this kind of evil before” and also reminded them that the “evildoers have never seen the American people in action before, either...”⁶⁶⁵

The use of terms like *evil* cropped in the American rhetoric as early as 15th September, 2001 when Bush declared: “Our Nation was horrified. But it’s not going to be terrorized. We’re a great nation. We’re a nation of resolve. We are a nation that can’t be cowed by evildoers.”⁶⁶⁶ And in less than a fortnight, he confirmed: “This is good versus evil.” The evil doers have no

⁶⁶²Refer Public Papers of George W. Bush (Sept. 25, 2001, Book II): 1162. [From the U.S. Government Publishing Office www.gpo.gov] [Public Papers of the Presidents of the United States | GovInfo](#)

⁶⁶³Refer Public Papers of George W. Bush (Sept. 15, 2001, Book II): 1113. [From the U.S. Government Publishing Office www.gpo.gov] [Public Papers of the Presidents of the United States | GovInfo](#)

⁶⁶⁴Refer Public Papers of George W. Bush (Feb. 8, 2008, Book I). [From the U.S. Government Publishing Office www.gpo.gov] [Public Papers of the Presidents of the United States | GovInfo](#)

⁶⁶⁵Refer Public Papers of George W. Bush (Sept. 17, 2001, Book II): 1117. [From the U.S. Government Publishing Office www.gpo.gov] [Public Papers of the Presidents of the United States | GovInfo](#)

⁶⁶⁶Refer Public Papers of George W. Bush (Sept. 15, 2001, Book II): 1114. [From the U.S. Government Publishing Office www.gpo.gov] [Public Papers of the Presidents of the United States | GovInfo](#)

‘justification’ for their acts; neither ‘religious justification’ nor ‘political justification.’ Their ‘only motivation,’ he pronounced, was ‘*evil*.’⁶⁶⁷

George Bush (Jr.) reminded Americans that the 21st century is riddled by an ideological struggle of good and evil. He declared that “it’s a struggle between those who believe in democracy and those who support tyranny.”⁶⁶⁸ Bush recognized the terrorist’s ideology as ‘dark and dismal’ which has no *hope* and the only way to “defeat that ideology is with an ideology of light.”⁶⁶⁹ Liberty should be ‘a guiding light’ of US foreign policy.⁶⁷⁰

The rhetoric used by Bush (Jr.) resonates with a superior sense of American nation and American exceptionalism. These statements create a sense of cohesion within America as it is a state that took birth when different languages, cultures, and nationalities began building life there away from European interference and imperialism. They also help shape American identity which, when positioned in contrast with the evil, barbaric, and uncivilised terrorists, propels the status of America as the good, noble, moral, civilised, free, open, and liberated state.

6.4 Presuppositions, Predicates, Subject-Positioning involving Liberalism and Democracy in Bush’s (Jr.) Rhetoric

Bush, argued that America’s ‘greatest security’ comes from the ‘advancement of human liberty,’ because ‘free nations’ don’t ‘support terror,’ don’t ‘attack’ their neighbours, don’t ‘develop’ weapons of ‘mass terror.’ “America also understands that unprecedented influence

⁶⁶⁷Refer Public Papers of George W. Bush (Sept. 25, 2001, Book II): 1159. [From the U.S. Government Publishing Office www.gpo.gov] [Public Papers of the Presidents of the United States | GovInfo](#)

⁶⁶⁸Refer Public Papers of George W. Bush (Oct. 3, 2006, Book II): 1760. [From the U.S. Government Publishing Office www.gpo.gov] [Public Papers of the Presidents of the United States | GovInfo](#)

⁶⁶⁹Refer Public Papers of George W. Bush (June 13, 2006, Book I): 1122. [From the U.S. Government Publishing Office www.gpo.gov] [Public Papers of the Presidents of the United States | GovInfo](#)

⁶⁷⁰Refer Public Papers of George W. Bush (Sept. 28, 2006, Book II): 1719. [From the U.S. Government Publishing Office www.gpo.gov] [Public Papers of the Presidents of the United States | GovInfo](#)

brings tremendous responsibilities” and as the President of the United States, Bush set certain goals including America’s commitment to ‘expanding the realm’ of peace and freedom for its ‘own security’ and for the ‘benefit’ of the world. “... freedom is the future of every single nation” and the rights of every person, he added.⁶⁷¹ The undersecretary of State, Paula Dobriansky, argued, that the ‘key foreign policy goal’ of the Bush administration was promotion of democracy which was also reflected in all of America’s international endeavours. What America sought, she added, was a “global society of nations” where freedom and democracy would reign.⁶⁷²

And the American ‘strategy’ to protect ‘American people’ at home, Bush stated, was to fight the terrorists in the Middle East to avoid facing them in the United States of America. American ‘long-term strategy’ in the Middle East was ‘advancing freedom and liberty’ as an “alternative” to ‘ideologies of hatred and repression’. America sought a Middle East of ‘secure democratic states’ that are ‘at peace’ with one another, participating in the ‘global markets’ and are ‘partners’ in the fight against terrorists. It also sought an Iran whose government is ‘accountable to its people’ instead of to the leaders who ‘promote terror’ and ‘pursue technology’ that could be used to ‘develop nuclear weapons’. America also sought to advance a ‘two-state solution’ for the population of Israel and Palestine so that they can live side by side in ‘peace and security’ and lastly, America sought justice, dignity and human rights for all the people of the Middle East.⁶⁷³

⁶⁷¹Refer Public Papers of George W. Bush (Aug. 11, 2003, Book II): 997. [From the U.S. Government Publishing Office www.gpo.gov] [Public Papers of the Presidents of the United States | GovInfo](#)

⁶⁷²See Dobriansky, Paula J. and Thomas Carothers, “Democracy Promotion: Explaining the Bush Administration’s Position,” *Foreign Affairs* (May/June 2003): 144.

⁶⁷³Refer Public Papers of George W. Bush (Aug. 28, 2007, Book II): 1119. [From the U.S. Government Publishing Office www.gpo.gov] [Public Papers of the Presidents of the United States | GovInfo](#)

And just as the defence of freedom in the 20th century had brought peace to Europe, he argued, the defence of freedom in the 21st century would also bring peace to the broader Middle East.⁶⁷⁴ America was pursuing a ‘forward strategy of freedom’ in the Middle East where it would consistently challenge the enemies of reform and confront the allies of terror.⁶⁷⁵ In the very *heart* of the Middle East, he appreciated the rise of democracy because of America’s efforts which led “to a freer world and a more secure America.”⁶⁷⁶ Bush emphasised that America was seeking to advance the cause of freedom in the Middle East because the security of the region as well as the security of America depend upon it. “... free nations are America’s best partners for peace and the only true anchors for stability,” he added. Bush asserted that America will “continue to support reformers, inside and outside governments, who are working to build the institutions of liberty.” He avowed that America will continue its confrontation of terrorist organisations and their sponsors until such time as a “democratic Israel and democratic Palestine” are peaceful neighbours in a secure Middle East.⁶⁷⁷

Recognizing that American isolation was not feasible and the need of the hour was active American involvement in the Middle East, Bush emphasised that America cannot seek comfort by “turning inwards” in the face of threat from abroad. It must reject “isolationism and its companion protectionism” in the 21st century, he argued, because the security and prosperity of America was dependent on the expansion of liberty abroad. He stated that if not for America, the cause of freedom would not be led.⁶⁷⁸ “Freedom is the best way to achieve peace in the long

⁶⁷⁴Refer Public Papers of George W. Bush (Jan.-June. 26, 2004, Book I): vi. [From the U.S. Government Publishing Office www.gpo.gov] [Public Papers of the Presidents of the United States | GovInfo](#)

⁶⁷⁵Refer Public Papers of George W. Bush (July-Dec., 2003, Book II): v. [From the U.S. Government Publishing Office www.gpo.gov] [Public Papers of the Presidents of the United States | GovInfo](#)

⁶⁷⁶Refer Public Papers of George W. Bush (March 20, 2004, Book I): 420. [From the U.S. Government Publishing Office www.gpo.gov] [Public Papers of the Presidents of the United States | GovInfo](#)

⁶⁷⁷Refer Public Papers of George W. Bush (Aug. 14, 2006, Book II): 1509-1510. [From the U.S. Government Publishing Office www.gpo.gov] [Public Papers of the Presidents of the United States | GovInfo](#)

⁶⁷⁸Refer Public Papers of George W. Bush (Jan. 15, 2009, Book I): 1579. [From the U.S. Government Publishing Office www.gpo.gov] [Public Papers of the Presidents of the United States | GovInfo](#)

run.”⁶⁷⁹ Bush believed that the 21st century will be liberty’s century. To quote him: “We’ll promote liberty abroad, protect our country, and build a better world beyond the war on terror.”⁶⁸⁰ “This nation is freedom’s home and freedom’s defender. We welcome this charge of history, and we are keeping it”⁶⁸¹ he clarified. Bush argued, that American history has taught: “freedom is not the possession of one race” or *one nation*, and that “this belief leads America into the world.”⁶⁸²

The advancement of human freedom, Bush argued, was the greatest achievement and great hope of every time which depended on the United States of America. He further added that America will lift “a dark threat of violence from our people and our future” without tiring, faltering and failing. He vowed as a president to “not relent in waging this struggle for freedom and security” of the American people.⁶⁸³ “We’re fighting for liberty and freedom, a way of life that is so essential for humankind, mankind to be able to realise their full potential.”⁶⁸⁴ Bush declared that it was a fight for freedom and “all the freedom loving people of the world.” Their mission, Bush argued, was to battle terrorism not just bin Laden and Al Qaida and join with freedom-loving people.⁶⁸⁵

“In every generation, the world has produced enemies of human freedom. They have attacked America because we are freedom’s home and defender. And the commitment of our

⁶⁷⁹ Refer Public Papers of George W. Bush (Feb. 23, 2006, Book I): 340. [From the U.S. Government Publishing Office www.gpo.gov] [Public Papers of the Presidents of the United States | GovInfo](#)

⁶⁸⁰ Refer Public Papers of George W. Bush (Oct. 6, 2004, Book II): 2379. [From the U.S. Government Publishing Office www.gpo.gov] [Public Papers of the Presidents of the United States | GovInfo](#)

⁶⁸¹ Refer Public Papers of George W. Bush (Oct. 15, 2003, Book II): 1309. [From the U.S. Government Publishing Office www.gpo.gov] [Public Papers of the Presidents of the United States | GovInfo](#)

⁶⁸² Refer Public Papers of George W. Bush, “Foreword,” (July-Dec. 2003, Book II): v. [From the U.S. Government Publishing Office www.gpo.gov] [Public Papers of the Presidents of the United States | GovInfo](#)

⁶⁸³ Refer Public Papers of George W. Bush (Sept. 20, 2001, Book II): 1144. [From the U.S. Government Publishing Office www.gpo.gov] [Public Papers of the Presidents of the United States | GovInfo](#)

⁶⁸⁴ Refer Public Papers of George W. Bush (Sept. 18, 2001, Book II): 1127-1128. [From the U.S. Government Publishing Office www.gpo.gov] [Public Papers of the Presidents of the United States | GovInfo](#)

⁶⁸⁵ Refer Public Papers of George W. Bush (Sept. 17, 2001, Book II): 1120. [From the U.S. Government Publishing Office www.gpo.gov] [Public Papers of the Presidents of the United States | GovInfo](#)

fathers is now the calling of our time,”⁶⁸⁶ he asserted. Bush vowed that if America was “determined and strong, this will not be an age of terror” but an ‘age of liberty’ across the globe.⁶⁸⁷ “Our foreign policy is based upon freedom and peace...,”⁶⁸⁸ he declared. Freedom is “part of our national soul”⁶⁸⁹ “... we’re marching to peace ... A free Iraq is going to help change the world. A free Afghanistan is changing the world. The world is becoming more peaceful,”⁶⁹⁰ he added in reference to American foreign policy in the Middle East.

“The credibility of the United States is incredibly important for keeping world peace and freedom.”⁶⁹¹ And when terrorists attacked America, Bush (Jr.) declared that it was freedom that was attacked, thereby making it seem as if America was synonymous with freedom. He declared on the morning of 9/11 attacks: “Freedom was attacked this morning by a faceless coward” and freedom will be defended.⁶⁹² And in order to defend freedom, there was a need for a strong military. Bush declared, in one of his addresses, that America needs to be militarily strong because, as a peaceful nation that rests upon freedom and democracy, the nation needs to promote peace.⁶⁹³ Though it seems paradoxical, it reflects the inherent underlying intention to use the American military in its mission of spreading freedom and democracy. In an address to the joint session of Congress, on February 27, 2001, Bush declared that America needed “a

⁶⁸⁶Refer Public Papers of George W. Bush (Sept. 14, 2001, Book II): 1109. [From the U.S. Government Publishing Office www.gpo.gov] [Public Papers of the Presidents of the United States](#) | [GovInfo](#)

⁶⁸⁷Refer Public Papers of George W. Bush (Sept. 20, 2001, Book II): 1144. [From the U.S. Government Publishing Office www.gpo.gov] [Public Papers of the Presidents of the United States](#) | [GovInfo](#)

⁶⁸⁸Refer Public Papers of George W. Bush (Sept. 26, 2000, Book II): 1945. [From the U.S. Government Publishing Office www.gpo.gov] [Public Papers of the Presidents of the United States](#) | [GovInfo](#)

⁶⁸⁹Refer Public Papers of George W. Bush (April 20, 2004, Book I): 619. [From the U.S. Government Publishing Office www.gpo.gov] [Public Papers of the Presidents of the United States](#) | [GovInfo](#)

⁶⁹⁰Refer Public Papers of George W. Bush (March 16, 2004, Book I): 395. [From the U.S. Government Publishing Office www.gpo.gov] [Public Papers of the Presidents of the United States](#) | [GovInfo](#)

⁶⁹¹Refer Public Papers of George W. Bush (April 13, 2004, Book I): 571. [From the U.S. Government Publishing Office www.gpo.gov] [Public Papers of the Presidents of the United States](#) | [GovInfo](#)

⁶⁹²Refer Public Papers of George W. Bush (Sept. 11, 2001, Book II): 1098. [From the U.S. Government Publishing Office www.gpo.gov] [Public Papers of the Presidents of the United States](#) | [GovInfo](#)

⁶⁹³Refer Public Papers of George W. Bush (Aug. 21, 2001, Book II): 1001. [From the U.S. Government Publishing Office www.gpo.gov] [Public Papers of the Presidents of the United States](#) | [GovInfo](#)

clear strategy to confront the threats of the 21st century.” He stated that these threats could range from “terrorists who threaten with bombs to tyrants in rogue nations intent upon developing weapons of mass destruction.” And in order to fight these threats, he requested that the defence budget be increased. American military strength, he argued, was the key to “preserving peace, protecting human dignity and extending human freedom.”⁶⁹⁴ Bush, in an interview, reflected upon the spirit of the US military force declaring that the US military was ready to defend freedom at all costs.⁶⁹⁵ Submitting the budget to Congress, Bush declared that he had set national defence as a priority in August 2001, even before the 9/11 attacks. He promised to build “major investments in research and development” so that America can continue its commitment to defend itself and its allies against ‘ballistic missile attacks’ and ‘weapons of mass destruction.’ These were owned by rogue nations who hated ‘American values,’ and everything America ‘stands for.’ Bush declared that America’s security against its enemies and the *dangerous* world was his first responsibility.⁶⁹⁶ Bush’s clarified American defence policy during the Swearing-In Ceremony of Donald H. Rumsfeld stating that there were three clear goals that they wished to pursue: to strengthen the bond of trust between the American people and those who wear the National uniform; to defend Americans and their allies against growing threats of missiles, information warfare, and the threat of biological, chemical and nuclear weapons; and to create the military of the future where America will take full advantage of revolutionary new technologies. Bush stated that the aim is to “promote peace by redefining the way wars will be fought.”⁶⁹⁷

⁶⁹⁴Refer Public Papers of George W. Bush, “Foreword,” (Jan.-June, 2001, Book I): v. [From the U.S. Government Publishing Office www.gpo.gov] [Public Papers of the Presidents of the United States | GovInfo](http://www.gpo.gov/publications/pubs/pubs.htm)

⁶⁹⁵Refer Public Papers of George W. Bush (Sept. 17, 2001, Book II): 1118. [From the U.S. Government Publishing Office www.gpo.gov] [Public Papers of the Presidents of the United States | GovInfo](http://www.gpo.gov/publications/pubs/pubs.htm)

⁶⁹⁶Refer Public Papers of George W. Bush (Aug. 29, 2001, Book II): 1049. [From the U.S. Government Publishing Office www.gpo.gov] [Public Papers of the Presidents of the United States | GovInfo](http://www.gpo.gov/publications/pubs/pubs.htm)

⁶⁹⁷Refer Public Papers of George W. Bush (Jan. 26, 2001, Book I): 22. [From the U.S. Government Publishing Office www.gpo.gov] [Public Papers of the Presidents of the United States | GovInfo](http://www.gpo.gov/publications/pubs/pubs.htm)

And when America had to deal with the terrorists' threat, he underlined the need to promote "an ideology based on hope and decency" which he described as the ideology of liberty.⁶⁹⁸ He declared that there was a growing need 'to promote' democracy and hope in the region of Middle-East because it has been proved through history that "free nations are peaceful nations and that democracies do not fight their neighbors" and it is through advancement of freedom and democracy 'for others' that American freedom will be more secure.⁶⁹⁹ Bush argued, that "it's an historic opportunity to spread democracy and hope as an alternative to hatred and terror ..."⁷⁰⁰ And part of advancing freedom was promoting open trade because both were integral parts of each other. Open trade across borders reflected political freedom within borders, he pointed out. Open trade is a moral imperative, not just an economic opportunity that creates jobs for the unemployed, he stressed. He stated that when America promotes 'open trade,' they are in fact promoting 'political freedom' because being open to commerce 'across borders' mean being open to democracy 'within their borders'; not 'immediately or smoothly' but in 'good time.' He added that the 'benefits of open trade' are calculated not just in dollars and cents but in 'human freedom,' 'human dignity,' 'human rights,' and 'human progress.'⁷⁰¹

Stephen M. Walt argues, that the first three presidents of this century, Bill Clinton (through his "National Security Strategy of Engagement and Enlargement"), Bush (Jr.) ("Freedom Agenda") and Barack Obama were convinced that 'liberal democracy' was the "only variable political formula for a globalising world" and hence pursued 'Wilsonian ideals' and designated promoting democracy 'a key element' of US foreign policy. Yet, they failed

⁶⁹⁸ Refer Public Papers of George W. Bush (March 28, 2008, Book I): 432. [From the U.S. Government Publishing Office www.gpo.gov] [Public Papers of the Presidents of the United States | GovInfo](#)

⁶⁹⁹ Refer Public Papers of George W. Bush (Nov. 19, 2005, Book II): 1744. [From the U.S. Government Publishing Office www.gpo.gov] [Public Papers of the Presidents of the United States | GovInfo](#)

⁷⁰⁰ Refer Public Papers of George W. Bush (April 19, 2004, Book I): 606. [From the U.S. Government Publishing Office www.gpo.gov] [Public Papers of the Presidents of the United States | GovInfo](#)

⁷⁰¹ Refer Public Papers of George W. Bush (May 7, 2001, Book I): 495. [From the U.S. Government Publishing Office www.gpo.gov] [Public Papers of the Presidents of the United States | GovInfo](#)

because firstly, for the success of any liberal democracy there is a need for an effective legal system, pluralism, and a certain level of income and education, not just a written constitution or elections. It is American hubris that they assume a ‘quick’ and ‘cheap’ “export of democracy” is possible by the US military. Secondly, forceful spread of democracy does not sit well with nationalism and local forms of identity and it most definitely leads to violent resistance. An enforced creation of democracy is a very vast social engineering project which could only lead to a ‘rapid meltdown,’ he adds. There is still hope for the spread of democracy without use of force, he adds, through use of ‘diplomacy’ and becoming an ‘exemplary democracy’ that could inspire other states to emulate it. He suggests America should work on itself by building a better America at home which has a better chance of spreading democracy abroad than using forceful means.⁷⁰² Jeremy Pressman in his article, ‘Power without Influence: The Bush Administration’s Foreign Policy Failure in the Middle East’ argues, that Bush (Jr.) administration failed in realms of counterterrorism, democracy promotion, unconventional proliferation as it depended greatly on ‘military force’ and ‘little on diplomacy’; it also overlooked ‘empiricism’ and well-established ‘policy contradictions.’ He concludes that having ‘material power’ does not necessarily transform into ‘international influence.’⁷⁰³

Thomas Carothers detects an ‘rhetorical overkill’ by administration officials of Bush administration when they portray *promotion* of democracy ignoring the reality that people across the globe are “capable of seeing that the United States has close, even intimate relations with many undemocratic regimes for the sake of American security and economic interests.”⁷⁰⁴ He also stresses that such a ‘relentless portrait’ weakens and not strengthens America’s

⁷⁰²Walt, Stephen M, “Why Is America So Bad at Promoting Democracy in Other Countries?” *Foreign Policy*, (April 25, 2016). [Why Is America So Bad at Promoting Democracy in Other Countries? – Foreign Policy](#)

⁷⁰³Pressman, Jeremy, “Power without Influence: The Bush Administration’s Foreign Policy Failure in the Middle East” *International Security* 33. no. 4 (Spring 2009).

⁷⁰⁴See Dobriansky, Paula J. and Thomas Carothers, “Democracy Promotion: Explaining the Bush Administration’s Position,” in *Foreign Affairs* (May/June 2003):141.

credibility. There are also other critiques of democracy promotion including among others, Fareed Zakaria who in his book, *The Future of Freedom*, differentiates between constitutional liberty and democracy.

Hence, the foreign policy ideologies of nationalism, democracy and promotion of liberal values were significantly apparent in the American rhetoric under the Bush administration. These ideologies, this study argues, have had their origins in American Enlightenment principles espoused by Founding Fathers and philosophers. Their articles in newspapers like the Federalist papers, pamphlets and books like *Common Sense* and *The Rights of Man* and speeches of freedom fighters, it can be argued formed the *presuppositions* on which are based contemporary presidential rhetoric that is replete with the need to pursue liberal, democratic and nationalistic ideologies in foreign policy and subsequently American foreign policy practices. The kind of language that was used by them gave rise to what is referred in contemporary times as American Exceptionalism. The arguments that history, God and the world has bestowed America with the responsibility to uphold and lead by example (initial liberal argument of ‘city on the hill’) then by force (extreme right wing argument to transport by force) towards higher goals/ideals/principles of democracy and liberalism seem to have an impact on foreign policy practices in presidential rhetoric.

These *presuppositions* had a new lease of life after the world wars when America began getting involved in wars/conflicts/interventions for the alleged cause of freedom, liberty and democracy. They also influenced the rhetoric during the Cold War where American *self* was represented as the opposite of the Communist threat/ideology/evil/enemy. The presence of an enemy/threat was also used as a justification/explanation for the increased spending on intelligence, military and defence during the Cold War and even after the end of the Cold War. by all three presidents. In the Post-Cold war period, Bush (Sr.), Clinton and Bush (Jr.)

emphasised the need to increase budgets and role for CIA, NATO, defence, military equipment and technology and intelligence departments. After Clinton recognised *terrorists* as cause of major concern, scholars like David Campbell emphasised that the new *enemy* America would deal with would be the *terrorists* and it proved almost predictive when George W. Bush declared the “first war of the 21st century” on the terrorists in the very ‘first year’ in office as president of American and also ‘first year’ of the new century. With a new *enemy* to fight, American budget spending and actions in the Middle East gained credibility as the American rhetoric revolved around the ‘common good.’ America was spreading freedom and democracy in an *unstable* Middle East region; by accepting the “responsibility that history had bestowed” on the ‘American nation’ without which the cause of freedom will not be led. It is these assumptions that make the foreign policy ideologies of nationalism, democracy and promotion of liberal values crucial in understanding the American presidential rhetoric in the Post-Cold war period.

In American presidential rhetoric, these ideologies recur/persist. They may not be successful in hiding/camouflaging real national interests that are strongly pursued by America for its interests in economy and security. In the Middle East, especially, American support of dictators and autocrats have not gone unnoticed. The realists/ neo-realist scholars highlight American national interests in the Middle East region. The efforts to re-make or transform the region, they argue, does not hide American desire to spread democracy in the region which would make it easier for America to further its geopolitical and economic interests uninterrupted.⁷⁰⁵ But it is equally significant that American presidents employ a certain rhetoric

⁷⁰⁵ Stephen M Walt, John Mearsheimer, Dobriansky Paula J. and Thomas Carothers, Jeremy Pressman, and all in their respective articles and works stress that American interests precede the need to spread democracy or liberal values in the Middle East for the sake of the region itself.

towards the Middle East region which is propelled by ideology that has roots in American enlightenment principles and that are replete with notions of American exceptionalism.

6.5 Conclusion

The ‘War on Terror’ defined the tenure of the 43rd U.S. President, George Bush’s (Jr.). This war, as this chapter highlights, was carried out in two stages: stage one focussed on finding the terrorists and bringing them to justice and stage two involved expansion of democracy and freedom in the Middle East. The American presidential rhetoric during both the stages was analysed. Transformation of the Middle Eastern region was also focussed upon. The chapter lastly, also elaborated and analysed the *presuppositions*, *predicates* and *subject-positioning* in Bush’s statements reflecting the ideologies of liberalism, democracy and nationalism.

CHAPTER SEVEN

Conclusion

Introduction

Social constructivism, Ahmet Ates argues, draws attention towards how ideas, social norms and perceptions of the USA determine its foreign policy.⁷⁰⁶ By way of illustration, North Korea is perceived as a threat by the US, whereas South Korea is not because the US does not consider it a threat. The USA has such perceptions in place because of its *presupposition* based on historical relationships with both the states. Depending on these perceptions the USA uses appropriate *predicates* to discuss or describe either state. Furthermore, perceptions about the *other* states reinforces foreign policy choices. It is interesting to note that apart from the foreign policy, perceptions and social norms also impact the language/ rhetoric that is used to describe the *other* state in foreign policy discourse. It is this premise that guides the present work: the rhetoric of heads of states and state leaders is heavily influenced by the perception about the *other* state. Social constructivists scholars emphasise that perception of states is not neutral, neither is it rational or identical for all. States are perceived as either friends or foe (and sometimes neutral) based on socio-temporal historical relations, shared values and shared ideals with them. In this study, I argue that perceptions about both the *self* and *other* are influenced also by ideology that a state subscribes to. The kind of language/rhetoric that is used about the *other* state and about one's own *self* i.e., the adjectives/predicates; suppositions based on historical relations and distinction/position made between states are guided by ideology.

⁷⁰⁶ Ates, Ahmet, "Understanding US Foreign Policy: A Theoretical Analysis," *Novus Orbis: Journal of Politics and International Relations* 4, no.1 (2022): 14-15.

And it is this language (including *predicates*, *presuppositions* and *subject-positioning*) which makes certain foreign policy practises possible in the international structure.

The linguistic construction of reality impacts the foreign policy practices of a state argues, Roxanne Lynn Doty. Social meanings are produced that are then attached to various subjects and objects. The interpretive disposition creates certain possibilities that preclude other possibilities. These interpretive dispositions are socially constructed based on previous relations, background meanings and social actors.⁷⁰⁷ Discourse as a system then acquires significance in the international structure. The *predicates*, used to describe any state in the discourse when used repeatedly paves a way for making particular foreign policy actions possible. Jennifer Milliken demonstrates how the Japanese and the Filipinos were repeatedly represented using emotional *predicates* of fear and desire in contrast to a firm and courageous leader, the USA. The *other*, in this case Japanese and Filipinos were represented as core opposition to reason i.e., passionate, child-like, greedy, cruel, emotional, inefficient, intellectually simple devoid of any sense of reflection and who takes pleasure in destruction, bloodshed and pillage. Consequently, language/rhetoric is used to create a reality where the international deviant *other* (including, problem-children who are the group of countries classified as Third World/Global South) in opposition to the ‘normal’ in the ‘Foucaultian’ sense is a ‘threat’ to a ‘modern’ and ‘stable’ international order.⁷⁰⁸

Identities of actors/agents/states are socially constructed in the international structure. They are not formed in a vacuum; neither are they constant nor are they pre-given or *a priori*. They are both flexible and have the capacity to change. One aspect of identity formation of a

⁷⁰⁷ Doty, Roxanne Lynn, “Foreign Policy as Social Construction: A Post-Positivist Analysis of U.S. Counterinsurgency Policy in the Philippines” *International Studies Quarterly*, 37, no. 3 (1993): 297-304.

⁷⁰⁸ See *ibid.* 317.

state in the international structure is the kind of discourse a state uses to describe itself. The kind of rhetoric that is used to refer to *self* especially in opposition to the *other* impacts the identity of a state. It is also dependent upon the kind of rhetoric other states (*read* higher up in the hierarchy of states in terms of economic/strategic/technological/power) use while describing or referring to a state in international events (including conferences, press releases, world forums and such) and literature (including academic work, biographies, auto-biographies and the like). The language/ rhetoric employed gives meaning to both the structure/agent and also at the same time constructs the world/reality. The hierarchy that exists in the international structure is socially constructed too. In such a scenario, certain foreign policy practices construct/maintain and reinforce identities. They make certain foreign policy actions/practices possible in the international structure which become possible/make sense only within a certain reality/system of discourse.

Foreign policy discursive practices were examined in this thesis. I closely examined the type of discourse U.S employs towards the Third World/Global South which makes certain courses of action/ foreign policy practice possible in these regions. American foreign policy makers, especially the American presidents' discourse towards Global Southern states is the focus of the study. American foreign policy discourse, especially the American presidential rhetoric is replete with recurring association of qualities of immaturity/irrationality/corruption/disorder with the Third World. Such a narrative makes space for America to assume an identity that is stable, mature, moral, and rational. It also gives America an opportunity to guide/construct/lead the 'problem children' (*read* the Third World states) in the international structure towards maturity/freedom/openness/ rationality which will make them worthy of becoming part of the international community. In the hierarchy that emerges from such American foreign policy discourse, the superior *self* then becomes the

guiding light/shepherd for the inferior/deviant/exotic stray sheep. Such discourse makes space for American intervention (humanitarian or otherwise)/invasion/ insurgency. American foreign policy discourse then, (especially the presidential rhetoric) is used or maybe abused to justify certain actions/torture/abuse/infringement on sovereignty of Third World states. For details on the history (beginning during the Cold War) and kind of torture that is employed by the USA, a substantial work remains Michael Otterman's book.⁷⁰⁹

In the present study, I have applied Roxanne Lynn Doty's *Discursive Practices Approach* to examine American presidential rhetoric in Third World states. Though others like Jennifer Milliken have also used the concept of *predicates*, I found that Doty's analysis is more wholesome and comprehensive as it has in place three analytical concepts. I have used the analytical concepts of *presuppositions*, *predications* and *subject-positioning*⁷¹⁰ to establish that

⁷⁰⁹ Otterman, Michael, *American Torture: From the Cold War to Abu Ghraib and Beyond* (Victoria: Melbourne University Press, 2007). *American Torture* explores not just the origins of American Torture, the detention regime but also traces how torture was kept legal, refined and spread. He identifies American Torture Regime which is a product of more than 60 years of research and development which is part of CIA manuals. Contrary to what the US government asserted later on the torture as represented in the Abu Ghraib photos are not representative of perverse actions of few soldiers. Many inhuman forms of torture including sensory deprivation, sexual humiliation and forced standing remained central means of torture in American detention as per Otterman in *American Torture*.

⁷¹⁰ The three analytical concepts that are integral to the Discursive Practices Approach are *presuppositions*, *predications* and *subject positioning*. Statements, especially political ones, are loaded with *presuppositions* or background knowledge that is taken to be true. The kind of language used reflects the inherent assumption about the subject object and the relation between them. Consequently, for Doty *presuppositions* is a textual mechanism that not just creates background knowledge but also creates a reality/world where certain things are given/recognised/understood/ taken for granted as true. For construction of the worlds/realities particular labels are attached to subjects through predication. Certain qualities/meanings are attached to subjects through use of predicates/adverbs/adjectives/qualities/attributes/properties that modify those subjects and how they are perceived. Such modifications and perceptions assign identity to the subjects and define what that subject can do and also what it is capable of doing. Hence, subjects and objects are produced *vis-a-vis* other subjects and objects. Predicates and presuppositions create/ construct not just the subject and objects but also the relationships that these subjects and objects share with each other. This becomes subject-positioning, whereby the relationships between the subject and objects/ and subjects can take the form of either opposition or similarity or identity and complementarity. The dominant terms are highlighted by contrasting them with subordinate terms that define the other/inferior/ deviant. See Doty, Roxanne Lynn, "Foreign Policy as Social Construction: A Post-Positivist Analysis of U.S. Counterinsurgency Policy in the Philippines" *International Studies Quarterly*, 37, no. 3 (1993): 311-316.

ideologies of liberalism, democracy and nationalism guide American presidential rhetoric. To gain insights and narrow down the variables under study, I focused on the Middle East region. The hypothesis of the study was that American identity formation is dependent on ideology and that American foreign policy discursive practices have inherent core ideological oppositions/positioning that impacts American presidential rhetoric. The findings of my study are discussed in detail in the following sections.

7.1 Linguistic Construction of International Realities

Language has the capacity to construct international realities. The discourse/rhetoric used by statesmen, heads of states and people in positions of power has the ability to create/construct realities in the international structure. This study attempts to draw attention to linguistic construction of reality whereby language, as Shapiro (as quoted in Doty) emphasises, generates subjects, objects and worlds.⁷¹¹ Language (simply, the words which are used), generate meanings, subjects, objects and intersubjective relations between states. In short, the world as we know it is shaped by the kind of language that is used to describe it or makes sense of it. But what/who decides which kind of language is used? The social construction of subjects/objects/ meanings/ intersubjective relations between states does. Certain *presuppositions* about what constitutes reality influence language. These *presuppositions* have a background; they are generated in shared history and shared values. By way of illustration, Bill Clinton discussed the special bond that America shares with Israel including democracy, shared values, shared

⁷¹¹ Shapiro, M in Doty, Roxanne Lynn, "Foreign Policy as Social Construction: A Post-Positivist Analysis of U.S. Counterinsurgency Policy in the Philippines" *International Studies Quarterly*, 37, no. 3 (1993): 302.

ideals and common interests for a stable and peaceful Middle East.⁷¹² No subject/object or meaning is *a priori*, already in place/ is fixed/ given in the international structure. Power, then in such a study lies not only in material capabilities but in the linguistic/discursive practices by which agents in the international system are constructed and are articulated within certain discourses.

Discourse, Roxanne Lynn Doty states, is a system of statements where each statement makes sense and produces interpretive possibilities in a way that makes it impossible to think beyond or outside that system. Discourse then provides discursive spaces (concepts, categories, models, metaphors and analogies) through which meanings are constructed. Policy makers, including the American president (for the purpose of this study) function within such a discursive space where meaning and realities are created in the international system.⁷¹³ States are the international subject which are constructed by discursive practices of those who speak about it, write about it and act on its behalf. The focus of this study, firstly, is American foreign policy discursive practices. My focus is on how it produces/creates/constructs and maintains a certain international reality. These practices also aid in maintaining a certain hierarchy making certain international practices possible. This is a reality where the American enemy is barbaric/uncivilised/evil who needs to be eliminated/reformed/taught to become a capable/worthy international actor/state. Secondly, American presidential rhetoric is the focus of the study, particularly how it has ideological underpinnings. For such a study, the *how possible* questions become pertinent to analyse how such practices become possible in the international structure.

⁷¹² Refer Public Papers of William J. Clinton (March 15, 1993): 303. [From the U.S. Government Publishing Office www.gpo.gov] [Public Papers of the Presidents of the United States | GovInfo](http://www.gpo.gov).

⁷¹³ Doty, Roxanne Lynn, "Foreign Policy as Social Construction: A Post-Positivist Analysis of U.S. Counterinsurgency Policy in the Philippines" *International Studies Quarterly*, 37, no. 3 (1993): 302-303.

7.1.1 *How Possible* versus *Why* Questions in Foreign Policy Studies

Foreign policy has traditionally been examined using the why question: why specific causes of action came about as a result of certain foreign policy decisions. Explanation of why particular outcomes were obtained remains the primary focus of such questions in foreign policy analysis. With the post-positivist analysis gaining prominence in International Relations theory, especially under social constructivism, the how-possible questions became popular. These questions examine how meanings are produced in the international system; how they are attached to various social subjects and objects creating interpretative dispositions that creates and precludes space for certain possibilities only. The questions that are asked are how the subjects/objects and interpretative dispositions in a context were socially constructed whereby only certain practices were made possible. For the sake of illustration, traditional foreign policy analysis would include questions like why did the US invade Iraq in 2003? To end the autocratic rule of a dictator or end the WMD program. Or why America takes such interest in the Middle East region? Traditional answers also would revolve around oil, natural resources, economic interests, geopolitical location, among others. Others would also point towards imperial motives or military might (including military-industrial complex) that propels American invasions.

Yet, the question remains: does the US invade any country that it has a grievance with, who opposes it or to which it is militarily superior? The *Discursive Practices Approach* that I have employed for analysing American foreign policy towards the Middle East in the Post-Cold war period focuses on discursive practices and what they do/ make certain practices possible. Discursive practices presuppose the ability of any agent in the international system to imagine a certain course of action based on particular kind of social actors/relationships or certain background meanings that are already in place. The *how-possible* questions attempt to

explain how these meanings/subjects/objects/interpretative dispositions came to be constructed.

The study of power remains significant in such an analysis but the understanding of power is not which realists/neo-realists offer. Power as productive becomes the focus: power that produces meanings, subjects, identities and decides the relations between states and creates space for only a range of imaginable conduct between the states. The questions inquire into practices that frame foreign policy as they do and enable social actors to act. The practices could include bureaucratic writings, language used in press conferences and speeches, official language used in government institutions etc. They all together fit into a sort of system of representation in a society. Every speech, every press conference, every document forward to the Congress, etc., in American presidential papers become a source of knowledge. All these are produced for a specific purpose and they become significant for the public who view it as a social reality. Discourse in IR then acquires the ability to perpetuate action, in some cases, even perpetuate violent wars/interventions/ sanctions which then become the practical consequence of employing such a discourse.

I have attempted to analyse the American president's rhetoric which included not just what was said and written within the broad foreign policy making process and for the general public but also what and how it was said. The kind of language employed by the president to describe the situation, reasons, measures, policies and future plans about the threat/enemy from the Middle Eastern states is the central focus of this study. Such a language it was found had ideological underpinnings. It emphasised the need to embrace 'liberal' values and 'democracy' for "acceptance into the international community." The kind of rhetoric used to describe itself was laced with nationalistic pride. The subject positioning of *self* in opposition to the *other* provided a stable, rational, mature, moral, just, and noble identity to America. The hierarchical

relations that were built on such a discourse relegated the Middle Eastern states to *objects* while America remained a *subject* in such an international reality.

What Doty argues about the Philippines is somewhere true for the Middle East region as well. Overt interventions could open space for questioning the success of the US effort to civilise a people and cultivate a democracy. It would also call into question the sovereignty and independence of Middle Eastern states. Hence, such a discourse worked to simultaneously construct identities and position the subjects vis-a-vis one another maintaining a hierarchy which necessarily does not coincide with military or economic hierarchies in the international system. If and when these hierarchies coincide certain implications follow which make certain foreign policy practices possible.

7.2 Identity Formation and American Discursive Foreign Policy Practices in the Middle East

Meanings and identities in the International system are dependent upon binary oppositions, in discursive practices approach according to Doty.⁷¹⁴ These binaries provide the logic or operative principle for constructing the structure of such a discourse. The logic/principle gives *meaning* to things while positioning them against others involving two core or guiding oppositions. These not only structure the discourse but also serve as a framework for thinking in terms of *self* and *other*. Though several such oppositions are subsumed under core oppositions (few that Doty identify and few that I have identified) in US foreign policy discourse most significant remain: *Reason versus Passion* where the *other* is characterised by prevalence of ‘passion’ and ‘emotion’ in contrast to ‘reason’ and ‘rationality’ of *self*. Another opposition which is prevalent in US foreign policy discourse is *order/chaos*

⁷¹⁴ Doty, Roxanne Lynn, “Foreign Policy as Social Construction: A Post-Positivist Analysis of U.S. Counterinsurgency Policy in the Philippines” *International Studies Quarterly*, 37, no. 3 (1993): 312.

where the geographical location of the *other* is in disorder which can be managed by America through policies that are consistent with American strategic and economic interests. Third opposition which is emphasised in Middle East is *civilised/barbaric*, where America, as a civilised state has the means, authority and might to transform the barbarians and teach them rules of governance. The fourth core opposition is *just/unjust* where USA is morally fair and right in their treatment of their citizens/ domestic governance which can be exported to the *other* states who use unfair means and methods to govern their population.

The fifth core opposition is good versus bad/evil within US foreign policy discourse. The Cold war witnessed extensive application of this opposition where the USSR was categorised as the evil *other*. Such oppositions constructed identities of both the US and USSR through opposition wherein America was typecast as the free world/moral/good subject in the international structure while USSR was typecast as communist/ totalitarian/evil. After the end of the Cold War, the Global South states (or states which are grouped under Third World) began being categorised as irrational/disorderly/chaotic/ corrupt/ inept along with being evil. So, the strategy from containment then became elimination. For instance, the Huk leaders were regarded as evil that had to be eliminated in the Philippines. The same can be extended to the state leaders/terrorists in the Middle East who were not just evil but irrational and needed to be eliminated. While the *other* are classified as such, the identity that emerges from such a discourse about the *self*, USA, is rational/ efficient/good/moral/honest. It is not that no good is seen within the *other*. Sometimes the 'good' people within *other* states are identified, constructed, guided and cultivated to become 'mature world citizens' (a term Doty employs). These people are supported/ and even financially and militarily aided by the USA to overthrow the bad/evil fractions in the said society. A significant illustration remains what Mahmood

Mamdani classified as Good Muslim and Bad Muslim in the Middle Eastern context especially after the 9/11 attacks.⁷¹⁵

Subject positioning in American foreign policy discourse thus has a hierarchical arrangement wherein the Third world states are characterised by chaos, disorder, corruption and general ineptitude whereas USA is characterised by morals, order, efficiency, honesty and rationality. In such a discourse, America becomes an ‘initiator of action,’ a ‘formulator of policy’, an ‘assessor of situations’, and a ‘definer of problems’. America has a tendency to universalise its perception of threats and problems. Because of its powerful position the discourse it employs in foreign policy has far reaching consequences. Presidential rhetoric plays a key role in defining the threat/enemy/other based on its perception (which in turn is based on *presuppositions*), describing the threat by use of *predicates*/adjectives/qualities and positioning the threat/enemy against itself through *subject-positioning*. It is note-worthy that juxtaposition with the enemy assigns America a higher position in the hierarchy. During the Cold War, the Third world states were categorised as a group of countries that were international deviants ‘the problem children’ that pose a threat to modern and stable international order. After WWII, America was able to use counterinsurgencies and development policies to know, understand and partially control these states. Such discourse then socially constructs subjects and objects leading to construction of North/South, First World/Third World, Core/Periphery hierarchy in the international structure. Power then lies with America/West in production of knowledge about the international structure. This makes one wonder perhaps, there is also space for emergence of a different/counter discourse in the international structure. A discourse where Third World states’ perspective/assessment of

⁷¹⁵See Mamdani, Mahmood, *Good Muslim, Bad Muslim: Islam, the USA and the Global War against Terror*, (Permanent Black: New Delhi, 2008).

international problems throw light on American foreign policy which appears to be propelled by an emotional, impassioned opposition and irrational fear of *other/exotic/foreign/communism* and such.

Consequently, American foreign policy discursive practices are significant factors in both the ‘production’ and ‘reproduction’ of self-identity. The creation of American identity is done by juxtaposing *self* against the *other/threat/enemy* (in my study the Middle Eastern States/heads of states/terrorists). This process helps the USA then acquire a firmly established, relatively fixed and stable identity. Such an identity, then, gives America licence to engage in certain practices in the Global South/Third World including the Middle East.

The qualities/attributes and other *predicates* used to describe the *other* become attached to the region and serve as a basis for constructing the identity of the Middle Eastern states. When we analyse discursive practices in the Middle East, what becomes apparent is that American presidential rhetoric was creating the subject/enemy/threat’s identity, whereby the enemy or threat was assuming the identity that was being assigned/created for it by the American president. President George H. W. Bush (Sr.) used predicates like good, justice, freedom, noble, just, moral, brave, determined, daring, majestic, human dignity to refer to *self* and evil, unjust, tyrannical, oppressive, etc. to refer to *other*. The *subject-positioning* he used was struggle between ‘good’ and ‘evil’; ‘right’ and ‘wrong’; ‘human dignity’ and ‘tyranny’; ‘freedom’ and ‘oppression’ where all qualities negative were used to describe the Middle Eastern states (for more details refer Chapter 5).

President Clinton used phrases like, “... to keep America the world’s strongest force for peace and freedom.” ‘Democracy,’ a crucial feature of American identity, was to be implemented in Iraq to maintain stability of the Gulf region according to Clinton. Clinton

declares that only through the democratic process could Iraq return to the community of civilized countries. It is crucial to follow and adhere to the norms of international behaviour. He also emphasised that American presence in the region was key for bringing *good* and will provide security to the regions in the Middle-East and the rest of the world. He employed *predicates* such as the ‘strongest’ forces of freedom, prosperity, democracy and peace while referring to the American *self*. In fact, he declared in 1998 that the twenty-first century ‘can and must’ be a century of ‘justice,’ ‘peace,’ ‘democracy,’ and ‘prosperity.’ He declared that America was committed to fight against those who speak the language of terror. The subject-positioning is also clear: the *other/enemy* was the terrorist who destroyed peace, divided and continued violence and hatred in the region. They also target peace itself as they are enemies of peace. They also target the very ‘spirit of America’ and the ‘spirit of freedom.’ They also hated democracy, fanatically glorified violence. Death and destruction were predicates used to refer to the *other*. America in contrast was representative of freedom, peace and justice (for detailed analysis, see Chapter 5).

President George W. Bush (Jr.) employed phrases like the ‘force for good’ and ‘champion of freedom’ to refer to America. His arguments revolved around the notion that a strong military is a prerequisite for promotion of American values and peace. An extreme version of such a statement included words like, “A strong America is the world’s best hope for peace and freedom.” He repeatedly emphasised that it wasn’t the US policies or actions in the Middle East which promoted terrorists to attack the USA but American values. In brief, ideological presupposition about *self* created an American Identity of defender of freedom, democracy and peace. One of the constant predicates in his rhetoric was freedom to identify America so much so that at times he used both America and freedom as synonymous. Other predicates included democracy, free, good, civilised, stability, just, hope, right, to define itself

while the other was described as evil, hateful, barbaric, instability, uncivilised, unjust, among others. The *subject-positioning* that was used included hate versus hope (transformation of hateful societies to hopeful societies/ ideology of hate versus ideology of hope); evil doers versus freedom; hate versus hope; evil versus liberty; civilization versus barbarism; free society/free country versus autocratic/dictatorial society/state.

He believed that the Middle-Eastern region stood contrary to American values such as freedom and liberty. This is a classic case of *subject-positioning*. He saw the terrorist agents harboured in the Middle Eastern region as the *other* or the *enemy* that America needed to vanquish. War on Terror in Bush's (Jr.) rhetoric seems to be ideological; while America stood for everything that was normal/moral/good/just/open/liberal/peaceful; the *enemy* found in the Middle East was deviant/evil/barbaric/hateful/destructive. These *predicates* were used to define the *self* in opposition to the *other*; this rhetoric was created to fuel the 'War on Terror' and his narrative revolved around keeping America safe. The War on Terror began in 2001 and continued up until August 2021 when American troops evacuated Afghanistan. Interestingly, it appears as if America left Afghanistan handing power to the very same regime that they supposedly declared war on.

Secondly, there was positioning of that subject/enemy/threat vis-a-vis American *self* that presented the subject in poor light as a deviant/abnormal/different/other while raising the same; for instance, the identity of America/self onto a higher more moral/ethical/favourable pedestal. Lastly, such construction of reality sets the stage for justification in advance of adverse policies that will be taken to overcome/overpower such menacing threats. Torture/inhuman conditions and treatment for the enemy is justified/ normalised by creating such a discourse.

Hence, language is never neutral in such a discourse/rhetoric; it becomes powerful and active. Language then has a constitutive role as it produces subjects and their relationships. It not only produces agents and their identities, impacts their relationships but also produces the international structure which is formed by continued interaction between these agents and the language they use in these interactions. Lastly, it also becomes means to perpetuate violence/wars/sanctions/interventions in global politics.

7.2.1 Ideological Tropes in Identity Formation/Construction

We have so far seen that language plays a significant role in construction of identity of both the '*self*' and the '*other*' in International Relations. One of the most substantial findings of this study is that there is a close relationship between the identity that is constructed through language and ideology that has moorings in the history of a state. The kind of ideology a state subscribes to or identifies with has linkages in its history and its evolution which guides its motives, interests, preferences, and identity. The link between ideology and identity have been extensively studied by various scholars as has been discussed in Chapter One. What this work has attempted to establish is that ideological preferences of a state seep into the foreign policy rhetoric/ discourse. The kind of language that is used to communicate with people at large, including its citizens, is influenced by the ideology that guides the domestic politics of that state. This can be studied under the analytical concept of *presuppositions* within the Discursive Practice Approach. These *presuppositions* impact the *predicates*/attributes/adjectives that are used while describing or referring to both the *self* and *other*. This becomes the second analytical concept while *subject-positioning* is the third concept used in analysing the language/presidential rhetoric of a state.

In order to establish the role of ideology on state identity, which has the capacity to influence the kind of language that is used, literature including speeches, press conferences, statements at international events and press releases of the president and his cabinet become a considerable source of data. In the present study, presidential rhetoric of the United States of America towards the Middle East was analysed with focus on the Post-Cold war period. The presidencies of George H.W. Bush (Sr.), William Clinton and George W. Bush (Jr.) were extensively studied and analysed. The findings are discussed in the simplest language at length in the following paragraphs.

American presidential rhetoric has ideological overtures. These have a bearing on American identity formation. The kind of language used in presidential rhetoric propels social construction of American identity. The kind of language that is used for the *other* is guided by perception of the other. It also influences the relationship it will share with the other. The words and phrases, in short, the rhetoric either makes the relationship antagonistic or amicable. The kind of language used to define the *other*, reflects on *self*, which is where identity formations come in. The kind of rhetoric America uses towards states and terrorists in the Middle East as opposition/ contrast help define American identity. Identities are not constant; they are capable of change and are challengeable. Case in point, in the aftermath of 9/11, American presidential rhetoric became antagonistic towards not just autocratic leaders, terrorists but also Muslims and radical Islam in the Middle East.

The ideological foundations of American presidential rhetoric were thoroughly examined in Chapter 4. In the Post-Cold war period, the underlying ideological beliefs, embedded in the American system, could be clearly marked under the rubric of the American enlightened principles of liberalism, democracy and nationalism. Ideological underpinnings triggered the production of a *particular* set of meanings that coloured the

American imagination, guided specific courses of action and influenced American presidential foreign policy rhetoric. These meanings restricted the imagination of the American people to a specific course of action and guided its foreign policy practices. I, following the logical trail, began to pay more attention to these ideological tropes of nationalism, liberalism and democracy. Soon, it was clear to me that there seems to have been a break in the rhetoric of presidents with the coming of the electronic age especially with the radio and television. This is elaborated upon by Elvin T. Lim who studied the rhetoric of the Presidents of America before and during the 20th century. He describes the rhetoric of presidents of the late 20th century (and onwards) as anti-intellectual. These anti-intellectual addresses pandered to the emotional needs of the public and were filled with bathos and partisan clichés. In short, the quality and not quantity of presidential rhetoric declined and became too simplistic and less substantive; more applause and less argument; more pandering to the public and less educating them; more appearances and less facts.⁷¹⁶ The tropes, I argue, began to be used more frequently and far more blatantly in the Post-Cold war period. Even Elvin T. Lim comes to the same conclusion that the dumbed down verbiage can be seen mostly in president Bill Clinton and president George W. Bush (Jr.) as opposed to their predecessors.⁷¹⁷ It is also noteworthy that the meaning and the context behind these tropes are present within the agent's (America's) system that goes on to affect the foreign policy rhetoric.

Ideological *presuppositions* this study was able to trace from the American Enlightenment period as is extrapolated upon in the fourth chapter. It is here that the

⁷¹⁶ Lim, Elvin T., *The Anti-Intellectual Presidency: The Decline of Presidential Rhetoric from George Washington to George W. Bush* (London: Oxford University Press, 2008).

⁷¹⁷ Bruce Miroff, review of *The Anti-Intellectual Presidency: The Decline of Presidential Rhetoric from George Washington to George W. Bush* by Elvin T. Lim, *Political Science Quarterly* 124, no. 1 (Spring 2009): 189-190. <https://doi.org/10.1002/j.1538-165X.2009.tb01854.x>

[Anti-Intellectual Presidency: The Decline of Presidential Rhetoric from George Washington to George W. Bush by Elvin T. Lim | Political Science Quarterly | Oxford Academic \(oup.com\)](https://doi.org/10.1002/j.1538-165X.2009.tb01854.x)

presuppositions of nationalism, liberalism and democracy are fleshed out from American history through a close inspection of major historical documents including Federalist papers, Declaration of Independence, and the Constitution of America and also crucial works by Thomas Paine and Thomas Jefferson from the American Age of Reason and American Enlightenment period. Under the *nationalist presupposition*, this study identified and analysed the statements on promotion of American nationalism in the presidential rhetoric. The frequent fixation and preoccupation with maintaining and promoting peace and liberal values in the world were categorised under *liberal presuppositions*. The constant reference to promotion of democracy in order to maintain world peace is categorised under *democratic presupposition*. The chapter also traced a brief history of the influence of the Enlightenment principles upon the American collective psyche.

In the Post-Cold war period, when George Bush (Sr.) settled as the President of the United States, the war with the Soviet Union had imploded bringing the Cold War to an end. This left a void in the turbulent times with multiple possibilities but no clear-cut direction. With the fast-globalising world and Bush's New World Order, avenues for American foreign policy opened with little direction. They had produced military, political, economic, defence and intelligence energies in their defence against the Soviet Union. They had also lost the Vietnam War and lost credibility. The Middle-East provided, with its regional conflicts, especially the Iraq War, an excellent opportunity for America to spread its influence in the region. This is probably why Bush referred to this opportunity for America as a means to gain both credibility and reliability. Bush (Sr.) envisioned in the "emerging Post-Cold War world," devoid of ideological confrontation, an American guidance and leadership in the shape of a 'New World Order.' Bush (Sr.) declared America's intention of playing a leadership role in the Middle East to gain and reestablish newfound credibility and restore reliability after the failure in Vietnam.

Bill Clinton also perceived America as a world leader. Clinton stressed that there is a need for America to remain a pacific power and promote enlargement of NATO to combat WMDs, terrorism, preserve unobstructed flow of oil and the urgent need to spread democracy and peace in the Middle East, especially at the end of the Cold War. He argued that American presence and leadership brings peace, freedom, democracy, prosperity, good, protection and security. Bill Clinton's rhetoric has been described as "glib but unmemorable probably because he was a smooth operating anti-intellectual rhetorician"⁷¹⁸ Clinton's response to terrorists was to isolate nations that support terrorists. Whereas Bush (Jr.) took it a step further when he declared that anyone who wasn't with the USA in fight for terrorism was against the US.

When Bush (Jr.) came to power, he spoke of an unknown enemy; it appeared he hadn't still identified the enemy in his rhetoric before 9/11 though he did make reference to the enemy. He described the enemy and its presence in ambiguous terms. He also described the world in Post-Cold war epoch as a 'dangerous' place (which was less certain and less predictable) because unlike the Cold War where US and USSR had the capacity to blow each other, in the present era newer threats existed and the enemies who hated freedom, Europe, America and its allies had the capacity to blow the world. He referred to rogue states, WMDs, missiles, tyrants, terrorists, nuclear weapons and such as enemies in the Middle East during his initial months in office. He is cognizant that this presents an opportunity for America to secure peace by promoting distinct American internationalism. The confrontation between hateful and hopeful societies he declared was a fantastic period in American history. He also highlighted why he was pursuing such a policy in one of his addresses: that America has experienced war on its own soil just twice, once in 1941 and in 2001. It did not take long for him to put a face to the enemy after the 9/11 attacks; it was the terrorist in the 'first phase' of 'War on Terror' in the

⁷¹⁸ See Ibid.190.

state of Afghanistan and later Saddam Hussein in the ‘Second phase’ of ‘War on Terror’ in Iraq. The rhetoric takes on a sharper turn with the presidency of George Bush (Jr.) who took on a more *offensive* outlook. He argued for an offensive war, where war was to be taken to the enemy as opposed to waiting for the enemy to attack the USA. He declared that the USA would no longer lie in wait to react or defend attacks in the international system. This was a direct response to the terrorist attacks on the Twin Towers on September 11, 2001. Bush’s words were not equivocal when he declared that the “best defence against terror” was a “global offensive against terror.” While the Middle East had been of concern to America prior to these attacks (because of its geo-political strategic locations, oil, other natural resources and other reasons as has been previously mentioned), 9/11 brought a stronger American focus onto the Middle East. Bush (Jr.) who wanted to take an *offensive* stance, called for *pre-emptive war* and revived the term *ideology* in presidential rhetoric.

The War on Terror took place in two phases, first in Afghanistan and next in Iraq. The rhetoric that was continuously perpetuated during this time has been elucidated upon in the last two chapters; a thorough reading of this rhetoric reveals that the point was not just to vanquish the enemy and its regressive, destructive, hostile tendencies (as was declared by Bush (Jr.) in his early rhetoric) but also to spread the liberal values of freedom and democracy. Interestingly, this was so integral that he even named both operations/wars around ‘freedom’ in Iraq and Afghanistan: Aghan War was titled, ‘Operation Enduring Freedom’ and Iraq War was termed, “Operation Iraqi Freedom.’

This kind of rhetoric has undertones of American nationalist pride which can also be clearly seen in these chapters. Bush (Jr.)’s interest in the Taliban was ignited from the belief that the Taliban provided ‘safe haven’ to Osama bin Laden, the ‘mastermind’ behind the September 11 attacks. In order to convince the media, American public, international

community and the world at large, American President Bush (Jr.) used ideologically driven rhetoric as has been explicated in chapters Five and Six. Rather than calling a war in Iraq an invasion for what it was, Bush presidential rhetoric used terms like liberation of Iraq which reflects the power of political rhetoric, which impacts politics. What is noteworthy is that war was declared on Iraq on pretext of presence of WMDs in Iraq when just five years ago, Clinton recorded in his address that UN has found and destroyed missiles, chemical and biological weapons. Yet, presidential rhetoric had the power to convince the international community that invasion of Iraq was essential to destroy the WMDs. Jackson and Krebs in their work argue, that the rhetoric in Post-Cold war became ethical and moral because it could afford to once there was no ideological other like the former USSR. Such rhetoric not just garnered effectiveness abroad and international support but also fetched political support at home.

7.3 Continuities and Changes in American Presidential Rhetoric in the Post-Cold War Epoch

There are some continuities and as well as changes in the presidential rhetoric in the period after the US-USSR rivalry ended. We will first look at the continuities followed by the changes. There is an overlap in William Clinton and Geroge H. W. Bush's (Sr.) rhetoric. Both Bush (Sr.) and Clinton appealed to the 'American people' in their political discourse the need to uphold the 'American Spirit' and the American 'ideals' and 'morals,' which has been categorised under *nationalist presuppositions*. Clinton goes a step further to appeal to American people to draw on their 'strength' and 'spirit' to renew faith in 'American greatness' and 'unlimited potential' of the American state. Bush (Sr.) referred to the 'courage' and 'character' of the 'American people' on several occasions including using words like 'land of the free' and 'home of the brave.' Both the administrations claimed that national security, national identity and foreign policy of the United States were under threat during certain major

events in the Middle East region. The statement that was repeatedly used in all three presidential rhetoric (Bush Sr, Clinton and Bush Jr.) was, “unusual and extraordinary threat to the national security and foreign policy of the United States.” Both the presidents refrained from using the word ideology in their rhetoric in foreign policy choices or action.

Interestingly, there is an overlap also in William Clinton and George Bush’s (Jr.) rhetoric. Both refer to the USA as an ‘open society’ as opposed to the *other* in the Middle East. Both these American president’s rhetoric towards the Middle East revolved around the need for preparedness to confront terrorism, the rise of WMDs and the spread and maintenance of peace in the world. Clinton (like Bush (Jr.)) also emphasised the ‘special’ relationship/alliance that binds Europe and America in a unique security and defence partnership. Clinton emphasised that NATO would protect against terrorists, WMD and increase new membership.

The overlap between all the three presidents, namely, Bush (Sr.), Clinton and Bush (Jr.) were their rhetoric being replete with what I call, ‘American selflessness’ in waging war against Iraq. To quote Bush (Sr.), “we ask nothing in return.” There is also the similarity in justification used for war in Iraq by both Bush (Sr.) and Bush (Jr.); both maintain principles of ‘justice’ and ‘morality’ compels America to wage war against Iraq. ‘Use of force’ is justified or a ‘moral force’ is presented as a last resort in battle of good and evil by both the presidents. Bush (Sr.) stressed that when diplomacy fails, ‘force’ becomes ‘moral’ as the last resort. Bush (Jr.) even signed the resolution, ‘Authorization for Use of Force’ on September 18, 2001. Bush (Sr.) declared that ‘enduring peace’ would be the American ‘mission.’ Bush (Jr.) made references to ‘enduring freedom.’ Clinton also used the same rhetoric before ordering airstrikes against Iraq under ‘Operation Desert Fox.’ He argued, that though America was not eager to use force generally it became vital to ‘use force’ when the need arises for American interests.

All three presidents use universalism⁷¹⁹ in their rhetoric: while Bush (Jr.) garners approval for attacking Iraq and Afghanistan under War on Terror by referring to the war as a ‘civilizational war’ and a war of ‘international community’ that insinuate towards universalism, Bush (Sr.) declared American win in the First Iraq War as victory of ‘United Nations,’ all ‘mankind,’ ‘rule of law’ and what is ‘right’ which also imply universalism. Interestingly, Clinton too refers to Iraq’s ‘defiance’ of the ‘will’ of the ‘international community,’ will of the ‘world;’ and Iraq being a threat to ‘international peace and security’ while imposing and continuing sanctions on Iraq. This seems to be a common theme among all three presidencies; universalizing American perceptions of problems, threats and enemies, irrespective of their party allegiances.

One of the most significant findings of the present study has been that whether the president belonged to the Republican party or the Democratic party there is a sort of continuity in the rhetoric towards the international *other* in this case the Middle East. The rhetoric used for justification/presenting threats/representing the enemy overlaps among the three presidents. It is interesting to note that the notion that presidency doesn’t matter; national security and interests are primary drivers of political actions of presidents (which is emphasised by realists and neo-realists) seems to be relevant/ applicable even for presidents’ rhetoric. Be it any presidency, ideological discursive practices seem to pervade presidential rhetoric. Irrespective of the party allegiance, similar rhetorical practices seem to run across these presidencies.

⁷¹⁹ ‘Democratic Universalism’ is a concept that has become popular in recent times. According to Richard Kerry, it is the notion that the American system of society and government is applicable universally. But what I mean here as ‘universalism’ is that American presidential rhetoric has a tendency to portray both its problems/predicaments/hinderances to its national security/national interest and also its conquest/triumph over adversaries, as obstruction or victory of whole of ‘mankind,’ ‘humanity,’ ‘international community,’ ‘world,’ ‘world order’ and several similar universal terms.

Having observed that it is also noteworthy that there are slight changes/variances in degree of aggressive rhetoric/discursive practices; the variation comes from the focus of the rhetoric, while two Republican presidents were using their rhetoric to declares wars and sanctions on countries of the Middle East, the Democratic president was declaring sanctions and destroying ‘chemical’ and ‘biological weapons of mass destruction’ in the period following the Cold war. Secondly, the variance seems also to comes from the party allegiances; the Democratic party presidents have been observed to use a restrained language in comparisons to the Republican presidents on issues not just in international politics but also domestically. Lastly, it also comes with what was discussed earlier, ‘personality’ of the president; his religion, his morality, his social and political circle, his education, family values, personal preferences, in short, his life journey and experiences.

Due to time constraints and practical considerations of conducting research I have restricted the present study to just three presidents in the aftermath of the Soviet-American Cold war but this framework has the potential to be used in analysing subsequent presidents. It can be used to study Barrack Obama’s rhetoric when he was implementing extensive drone attacks in the Middle East, under the US drone programme (during his presidency, he oversaw 563 strikes in comparison to Bush (Jr.)’s 57 drone attacks). President Trump’s and President’s Biden’s rhetoric has received increasing attention in recent times and the present framework has the potential to offer greater insights into their rhetoric towards China. While Trump’s rhetoric has been ideological driven towards China (along with ‘direct’ attack on China, its ‘government,’ ‘Communist Party’ and its ‘non-transparent’ behaviour, ‘violation of human rights’ and ‘international protocols’), Biden’s rhetoric revolves around ‘trade wars,’ ‘tech. competition’ and ‘mutual distrust’ and ‘mutual accusations.’ It can also be used to study Biden’s rhetoric towards Russia in the Ukraine-Russia war. Apart from being used to study just

American discursive practices, it can also be used to study other states/countries head of states/leaders' rhetorical practices, especially during conflicts/wars like ongoing Hamas-Israel War.

Conclusion

In consequence, foreign policy discursive practices employed in the United States of America's presidential rhetoric has the capacity to offer a fresh and diverse perspective on American foreign policy in the period after the decline of Cold War. The present analysis offers something novel; Foreign policy discursive practices employed in the United States of America's presidential rhetoric can be understood through the nexus of 'power' and 'knowledge' wherein the American president uses/abuses his privilege as leader of one of the most powerful states, as the 'story-teller' who represents/narrates the happenings in international politics for both domestic American public and international public. It also uncovers the tangible relation between discourse and consequences where discourse has the potential to be used to perpetuate violence in global politics. The study reinforces the linkages between ideology, identity and rhetoric to bring to light how American president uses certain words/specific language while referring to itself and the international enemy/*other* due to the impact of *presuppositions* on *predicates* and *subject-positioning* of the enemy/*other*. Lastly, it draws attention to influence of American Exceptionalism on the discursive foreign policy practices of American president.

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Understanding Ideology: Dimensions and Influences

Areeba Ahsanat Moazzam*

Abstract

Ideology is a key subject of inquiry for the scholars of political science, media studies, sociology, philosophy and other disciplines of Social Sciences. It is excessively used in interpretation, formulation and functioning of many states' political systems. Yet, the literature on the concept of ideology seems wanting in content and analyses. Ideology has been ascribed as something that the 'other' nations are afflicted with. It was a concept that was associated with Germany and Italy during the Second World War and USSR in the Cold War in the last century. And it was also the reason why ideology had acquired much literature during these tumultuous times. But ideology as a concept needs scrutiny which is the aim of this paper. The paper argues that no state in the international system functions without the influence of some significant ideology, whether it is United States of America or Uganda. It also argues that all nations in the international system utilize and operate on some sort of ideology. It also attempts to differentiate between political, economic and moral ideologies. The paper goes on to capture the various aspects, features and dimensions of the term ideology.

Keywords: Ideology, International System, States, Foreign Policy

Introduction

Ideology is a contentious subject of study. Michael H. Hunt has gone as far as to describe it, in his book, *Ideology and U.S. Foreign Policy* as a 'slippery' subject, for it is not easy to grasp or comprehend it in its entirety. It has been variously described and defined as well as celebrated and criticized. It has remained a subject of interest within the academia through the centuries with its share of highs and lows, sometimes taking the centre stage and sometimes shrouded in shadows. Yet it has always made its presence felt, making its appearance at intervals due to its staunch habit of resurfacing. One scholar goes as far as to claim that ideology like history and politics, "has a habit of coming back." It has received most attention during the French revolution and the Cold War with disdain shown amply also during the Second World War. During the upheaval of the French Revolution, the concept of 'ideology' had its genesis. Destutt de Tracy used the term ideology in 1797 to refer to a 'science of ideas.' But since then its meaning has undergone tremendous transformation mostly acquiring negative connotations. It received undeniable attention from the academic during three important landmarks in history: during Second World War, Cold War and post-Cold War. The Second World War was fought to terminate the widely spreading tentacles of influential ideologies: from Fascism in Italy to Nazism of Germany. These ideologies posed a threat to

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Transcending Dualism in Samuel P. Huntington's Clash of Civilizations Thesis: Some Critical Reflections

South Asian Survey
21(1&2) 64–76
© 2017 ICSAC
SAGE Publications
sagepub.in/home.nav
DOI: 10.1177/0971523115592490
<http://sas.sagepub.com>


Areeba Ahsanat Moazzam¹

Abstract

Glorification of 'self' (Western civilisation) at the expense of the 'other' (eight civilisations) was inherent in Huntington's *Clash of Civilizations* thesis. The 'other' civilisations identified—as the non-self and situated mostly in the Global South—were clubbed together as the Rest, irrespective of their pluralism. Building on Huntington's binaries—the West and the Rest—this article makes an attempt to reflect on similarities within the perceived differences. Even though his civilisations appear different, they are in many ways similar due to interactions, colonisation and globalisation. Their relationship has become complicated; Western civilisation cannot do without civilisations from the Global South. Hence, there can be no perpetual or fixed enemy nor can all relationships be suspended with the 'other' in a globalising world.

Keywords

Dualism, binaries, clash, civilisations, Samuel P. Huntington, self, other, West, Rest

Introduction

A unified West is a myth. Theories and theses that build arguments on such claims need to be read with a careful eye. Even though there are many such theories and theses that deal with the idea of a unified West, the question that needs pondering upon is what exactly the West is? Is it more than a mere compass direction?

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Identity Catapult in a Globalizing World: A Critique

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Abstract

Globalization suffers from a 'Dr. Jekyll and Mr. Hyde syndrome.' Its merits the West never ceases to stress while its demerits are not stressed enough. It is a ubiquitous process that is claimed to compress the world into a global village. For proponents of globalization, identities are merging in that hazy space provided by economic interdependence. Yet, identities are catapulting back with dynamic force. With the result there is a parallel development of globalization and identity assertion. For the pro-globalizers, identities blur and blend into a perfect fusion of 'one world – one identity,' citizen of the world. But what generally transpires is re - questioning of self-identity and renewed interest in one's culture, ethnicity, religion and almost anything that gives a sense of belonging and feeling of distinction. In short, amidst the 'common' factor of globalization, a 'unique' identity is sought, i.e., amidst the whirlpool of globalization, (the cultural, social, economic and political changes it imposes) identity is firmly clasped/ held on to for semblance of order and a relation to the familiar. Hence, instead of identity getting diffused in a globalizing world, it is tenaciously catapulting, rendering 'global citizenship' obscure. This paper argues that in global exchange of ideas, goods, technology etc. identities centred on ethnicity, religion, and such remain unchangeably local.

Keywords: Identity, Globalization, Self, Other

Introduction

Globalization cannot be evaded. As has been observed by a scholar, "no one can escape its influence." It is a ubiquitous "process" (Anthony Giddens and Ulrich Beck perceive it as a "process" due to the growing interconnectedness and interrelatedness of all aspects of society) that has become the looming reality for all states and people across the globe. Scholars like Raymond Williams have gone as far as to describe it as a "keyword" in academic research in contemporary times. Its significance is escalating so much that "globalization studies" as a discipline is being developed. Yet it is a controversial term. It has been understood and interpreted in many ways. It has been described as a "time space compressor" (David Harvey) and "crossing borders" (Kate Galbraith). It has been interpreted to lead to the formation of a "global village" (Marshall McLuhan); rise of global identity; citizenship of the world, etc. It has typically been defined as interchange of ideas, goods, technology, world views and some aspects of culture. Like many other concepts globalization also has its pros and cons that are emphasized by its supporters and opposers, which will be dealt with later in the paper.

Globalization, it has been argued, gained currency only in the post-Cold War period. Before that, even though intellectually and philosophically the concept had few propagators, it was not as frequently used, misused, abused or studied and interpreted (or even become central

Does 'Culture' Explain International Relations? A Critical Perspective

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Abstract

Culture it is argued influences values, world-view, and the structures of human relationships. To quote Hudson (1997 b, p.8), 'culture tells us what to want, to prefer, to desire, and thus to value.' Culture as an explanatory variable is gaining wider appeal among the International Relations scholars. It acquired plausibility especially in the post- Cold War period. The post- positivist critiques or Alternative theories (as Robert Cox dubs them) emphasize the role of "culture" in comprehending International Relations more strenuously in the last fifteen years. Culture has also become the focus of foreign policy scholars who try to grasp the cultural influences on the decisions of leaders of various states. With globalization's flexing arms compressing the world into a "global village" (as is often presented by its proponents), scholars increasingly attribute rise of a global culture, which renders enquiry and explanation revolving around "culture" necessary. Social Constructivism has reached its pinnacle with cultural explanation of international relations in Richard Ned Lebow's book, *A Cultural Theory of International Relations*. Interest in studying culture has also increased after works like *Clash of Civilizations* and *Soft Power* gained popularity. This makes us infer culture is a relevant field of inquiry in International Relations. The unanswered question is whether culture can explain or predict actions/decisions/policies of states in the international system. This paper will attempt to critically reflect on culture and its role or otherwise in international relations.

Keywords: culture, international relations, social constructivism, soft power, clash of civilizations

[Acknowledgements: The Author would like to dedicate this article to Danish Haidar.]

[This paper was presented at the 2nd National Conference on Politics & Governance, NCPG 2014 held at India International Centre Annexe, New Delhi on 3 August 2014]

Introduction

Culture as an explanatory variable escaped the scrutiny of International Relations (I.R.) scholars till almost the last decade of 20th century. I.R. scholars were preoccupied with power politics, peace, war, political Idealism, national interest, economic interdependence, security, conflict and cooperation, hegemony etc. since its inception in 1919. Their major concern was avoidance the re-occurrence of another catastrophic World War. Even the mainstream paradigms like Idealism, Realism and Marxism paid hardly any interest to the role of culture in understanding and explaining World Politics. A decade into the 21st century and many scholars including Yu Xintian, James Ferguson, Monika Mokre, Iver B.

Chapter 1

India's National Security Discourse: A Conceptual Introduction

Anshuman Behera and Areeba Ahsanat Moazzam

Introduction

Considering the porous scope of the discipline, the discourse of security is rather obscure in nature. Buzan's (1983, 1984) thesis attributes this obscurity to the polarized attempt made to engage with the security discourse. To Buzan, security has been obscured by the realists who focus on power and the idealists who dwell on peace. Arguably, the discourse of 'national security' is not free from such obscurity. However, despite this obscurity, thanks to the polarization between the pursuit of 'power' and 'peace', there seems to be some certainty in terms of stressing upon the state-centric security that has a dominance in the national security discourse. Engaging with the national security discourse, one would observe that it has gone through multiple changes in terms of widening its scope. The post-World War era witnessed the engagement of the national security discourse through the prism of foreign policy and national interest. The stress on the robust foreign policy frameworks for furthering national interests articulated national security interchangeably with the interests of respective nation-states. While, in a broader perspective, one might not have a convincing criticism on 'national interest as national security', the attempts made to see the national interests through a dominant 'economic interest' paradigm certainly narrows the scope. However, economic interests as national interests through the prism of 'welfare of people' convey a wider meaning to the discourse.

Talking of the national security discourse, one can observe three dominant narratives: state security, human security, and comprehensive security. The state-centric

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Chapter 3

Gandhian World Order: A Social Constructivist Perspective

Areeba Ahsanat Moazzam and Zeba Tamkanat Moazzam

Abstract

The study of International Relations (IR) has become a vortex that pulls ideas, approaches, methods and theories from most other social sciences. Scholars of IR attempt to understand the present world order from novel perspectives and prescribe alternatives. One such under-examined approach is the Gandhian World Order that needs revisiting especially in the fast-changing dynamics of IR. The question of morality and its centrality in politics is an integral focus of the social constructivist approach to international politics closest to Gandhian ideas and ideals. The values that a state upholds in IR based on which it decides friends and foes form the crux of this approach. Only, Gandhian notions of “politics with morality” appear relatively prescriptive yet they have great scope for analysis for social constructivists. Under the social constructivist purview, focus from “power”, and “national interest” shifts to values, morals and norms in international politics (Price, 2008: 317). Likewise, as noted in the article “Political Thoughts of Mahatma Gandhi: A Brief Outline”, on the site mkgandhi.org, Gandhi talks of “politics bereft of morality being a death trap as it kills the soul”, so he prescribes morality

5

Re-Reading the Indo-US Nuclear Deal

A Social Constructivist Perspective

Areeba Ahsanat Moazzam

The nuclear deal signed between India and US sparked many debates among the IR academia. To understand the deal, it needs to be contextualised in the first decade of the 21st Century. The US being one of the most powerful nation-state, declaring its intention of making India a global power is the 'idea' in the international political process that the US intends to carry forward, which can be seen as the 'role of idea' and 'impact of structure on actor' in the terminology used by social constructivists. With the logic employed by social constructivism, the nuclear deal between the US and India gained newer dimensions, which is what this paper intends to present.

The 123 Agreement, US–India civil nuclear agreement, or Indo-US nuclear deal, as it is popularly known as, was signed between the US and India in October 2008. The deal has a greater meaning for the international community. This chapter attempts to look at the deal from a social constructivist lens in order to highlight the implications it holds for both the involved nation-states and for the international community at large. The agreement was signed on 10 October 2008 by Indian External

Areeba Ahsanat Moazzam¹ | Zeba Tamkanat Moazzam²

Anarchy in International Relations

Conflicts arise among states/units due to the conditions of anarchy/structure. With no international government, there is always a scope for conflict and war to become inevitable. This assumption has been made by the major theories of IR. Liberalism assumes that in such a scenario, the only way for states to operate would be to have international institutions and tools like liberal democratization, liberal economic interdependence and liberal institutionalism that could mitigate and regulate anarchy's effect on state relations. Consequently, interdependence through Free Trade would act as a deterrent for a state to go to war with another state with whom it shares its economic interests with.

The Neoliberals argue that security of states should not be seen relatively; it could be cooperative and collective. They are in prescriptive of their analysis of states; absolute gains that should be the focus of states and not relative gains to other states. They assume that in an anarchic system, any increase in security of one state does not automatically reflect on the decrease in security of other state; states could in fact benefit from other state's increase in security when they have a relationship of interdependence.

Anarchy is distinctly perceived by the Realists: the states as the main players on the International Scene, have to operate in a self-help system; they are responsible for their own security; power politics can be explained by human nature. For their survival in absence of a central authority, they accumulate "power" (national power) and work towards their "national interests" in their drive for security. Their analysis of the anarchic international system is relative; the constant need to accumulate power leads to

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Hermeneutics

Areeba Ahsanat Moazzam

The theory of Hermeneutics at its core deals exclusively with interpretation, be it written, verbal or even non-verbal forms of communication. It had its birth in the interpretation of biblical texts and soon became popular in interpretation of philosophical texts as well. In contemporary times, it includes interpretation of various forms of knowledge but is not restricted to just interpretation in the traditional sense. It has become crucial in disciplines of Humanities and Social Sciences since hermeneutics or interpretation has come to be referred to as “the sort of understanding by which we integrate facts into a meaningful whole, the kind of practical operation that provides knowledge in the sense of deep familiarity with something.” (Zimmermann: 2015, 2) Method of interpretation is dependent on understanding and communication which forms the methodology of Hermeneutics.

In this unit we will attempt to understand what comprises hermeneutics as a theory and methodology. It will also give an insight into the origins and forms of hermeneutics. It will explore the two ways it is studied in while also taking into account its principal aims, assumptions, and major claims. A brief note on how hermeneutics is tied to both ethics and

Syria is the West's Civilisational Dilemma

Areeba Ahsanat Moazzam

The Syrian tragedy poses a dilemma to a Western coalition that has increasingly come to view its interaction with the Muslim world's troubles in terms of a confrontation between two civilisations.

Faced with a humanitarian crisis that has already claimed thousands of lives and turned thousands of others into refugees, the US-led coalition now faces the existential dilemma of deciding on whether to intervene on the side of rebels seeking to topple President Bashar Hafez al-Assad.

The dilemma is not new, but taking a decision on it is; in the light of the consequences of past decisions in and around the region, which have put the legitimacy of interventions by the US and its allies under scrutiny; from Iraq to Libya to Afghanistan.

Since the days of British colonial rule, the Middle East has been a critical staging

ground for outsiders, being strategically located, amidst an abundance of oil reserves. The Arab nations around the crucial Gulf area have been among the stable allies of the West. But new forces are emerging in the region, influenced by modern ideas and evangelical faith, both seen as threats to the region's leadership, mostly royal and loyal to the West.

The forces at play in the region range from the reasonably moderate to the fiercely traditional. Divisions between the Shias and the Sunnis, complicated by the pockets of Christians, who have lived in peace with Muslims for centuries, only enhances this complexity of the region, and inspires a scholarly view that some of the fiercest battles in the future may be fought here. In such a tense environment, the West has been forced into being cautious in deciding on interventions that in the past have triggered or worsened conflicts.



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Interaction Among Youth can Unite South Asia

The youth of South Asia has made substantial use of social media to connect with the world outside its borders. They have done this through interactive online games, international sporting events, movies, and music. Apart from these interests, intellectual interests have also found favour among the youth and have stirred their imagination.

By Areeba Ahsanat Moazzam



Galle Face Green, Sri Lanka which was the venue of 2022 youth protest.

Production of Womanhood in Historical Fiction: Politics of Gender Narrative

Zeba Tamkanat Moazzam and Areeba Ahsanat Moazzam

“She [woman] had to refashion her nature to emerge as a fit complement to the new man.”

– Susie Tharu and K. Lalita (*Women Writing in India*, 1991)

Introduction

In India, women have been marginalised in the historical narrative. The performance of gender and politics of narratives can be traced in the literature of the late nineteenth century, India. The politics of representation, production and narration of women's voice and characters have not escaped Urdu literature. Added to that, the Western readings of Muslim women of colonial India, encased in purdah, do them a double injustice – not only are they culturally placed outside the public milieu, but this seclusion also promises to strip them of freedom and much worse, of “human” rights. The term ‘human’ takes on an ambivalent presence when one realises, in Susie Tharu and K. Lalita's words in their seminal work *Women Writing in English: 600 BC to the Early Twentieth Century*, that “subsuming the female into the category of human was a political act” (16). They continue to argue, “With its universalist assumptions, literary criticisms systematically obscure questions relating to women as writers, women as readers, and the representation of women in literary texts” (16). While facing Western interpretation of their existence, Muslim women also had



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
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Millennium Journal of Humanities and Social Sciences

Journal homepage: <https://leappublish.uk/index.php/mjhss>

ISSN: 2709-393X (Online)
2709-3921 (Print)

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Your dedication and expertise have significantly enriched the quality and impact of our publications. Your invaluable insights, thoroughness in the review process, and meticulous attention to detail have played a pivotal role in upholding the high academic standards and integrity of our journal. Your timely and constructive feedback to authors has not only helped them enhance their research but also contributed to the advancement of knowledge in your field of expertise.

We look forward to your continued partnership in shaping the future of our journal.

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
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Identity, Ideology and American Presidential Rhetoric in the Post-Cold War Period (1989-2009)

by Areeba Ahsanat Moazzam



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