

Foundationalism and Coherentism in Epistemology: A Critical Study

A Thesis Submitted to the University of Hyderabad

in Partial Fulfillment of the Requirements for the Award of the Degree of

Doctor of Philosophy

**In
Philosophy**

By

NARENDRA PRASAD BEHERA

Reg. No.11HPPH04

Dr. B. Ananda Sagar

Assistant Professor

(Supervisor)



Department of Philosophy

School of Humanities

University of Hyderabad

Hyderabad, India- 500046

December -2022



DECLARATION

I, Narendra Prasad Behera, hereby declare that this thesis titled **“Foundationalism and Coherentism in Epistemology: A Critical Study”** submitted under the guidance and supervision of Dr. B. Ananda Sagar is my bonafide research work and is free from plagiarism. I also declare that it has not been submitted in full or in part to this university or any other university or institution for the award of any degree or diploma. I hereby agree that my thesis can be deposited in Shodhganga/INFLIBNET.

A report on plagiarism statistics from the University Librarian is enclosed.

Date: 31/12/2022

Place: Hyderabad

Signature of the Student

Name: Narendra Prasad Behera

Reg. No. 11HPPH04

Research Supervisor

(Dr. B. Ananda Sagar)



CERTIFICATE

This is to certify that the Thesis entitled “**Foundationalism and Coherentism in Epistemology: A Critical Study**” submitted by Narendra Prasad Behera bearing registration number **11HPPH04** in partial fulfillment of the requirements for the Award of Doctor of Philosophy in the School of Humanities is a bonafide work carried out by him under my supervision and guidance.

This Thesis is free from plagiarism and has not been submitted previously in part or in full to this or any other university or institution for award of any degree or diploma.

The student has **three presentations** and **one publication** for the minimum requirement of the Ph.D. thesis submission.

I. PRESENTATIONS

1. Narendra Prasad Behera. “Descartes Theory of knowledge” the paper presented in the 89th session of the Indian philosophical congress seminar held on 5th to 8th January 2015 at the Adikavi Nanaya University, Rajahmundry, Andhra Pradesh, India.
2. Narendra Prasad Behera. “Nagarjuna Account of Foundationalism and Coherentism” the paper presented in the two-day UGC Sponsored Global seminar on *Understanding the Contemporaneity of Acharya Nagarjuna’s Philosophy in the Global Context* held in the Centre for Mahayana Buddhist Studies, Acharya Nagarjuna University, on 28th and 30th January, 2015, at Guntur, Andhra Pradesh, India.
3. Narendra Prasad Behera. “Foundationalism Versus Feminist Epistemology” the paper presented in the one day National Seminar on *New trends and approaches in Indian History*, at PG Department of History, on 16th March, 2022 at Berhampur University, Berhampur, Odisha, India.

II. PUBLICATIONS.

1. Narendra Prasad Behera. "Descartes Foundationalism" *International Research Journal of Humanities and Interdisciplinary Studies (IRJHIS)* 3, Issue 4, (April, 2022). ISSN:2582-8568, DOI link: <https://doi-ds.org/doi/10.24018/2582-8568/IRJHIS2204029>

Further, the student has passed the following courses towards fulfillment of coursework requirement for Ph.D.

S.No.	Course Code	Name of the Course	Credit	Pass/Fail
PH.D-I Semester				
1.	PH-801	Topics in Metaphysics	4	PASS
2.	PH-802	Topics in Epistemology	4	PASS
PH.D-II Semester				
3.	PH-851	Topics in Ethics	4	PASS
4.	PH-852	Thesis Related Study	4	PASS

Research Supervisor
(Dr. B. Ananda Sagar)

Head of the Department
(Prof. C. A. Tomy)

Dean of the School
(Prof. V. Krishna)

**Dedicated to All who supported me directly and
indirectly to complete this work**

ACKNOWLEDGEMENT

Without expressing our heartfelt gratitude to the people, departments, institutions, and financial supporters who play a key role in completing our work/project as well as in honing our skills in various fields, finishing the program is morally vicious. Therefore, it is our duty to express our sincere gratitude.

First of all, I would like to express my sincere gratitude to my supervisor Dr. B. Ananda Sagar. His wholehearted encouragement whenever I am in low times and valuable and timely suggestions regarding my chosen problem, throughout M. Phil and PhD life.

I would like to express my sincere gratitude to Prof. R.C. Pradhan and Jhanshi Ma'am their wholehearted encouragement and moral support and correction of thesis during my difficult situations. Their valuable and timely suggestions regarding throughout my PhD carrier.

I would like to express my sincere gratitude to my brother Dr. Harendra K. Behera, Bhabi and family members for their wholehearted encouragement and continues moral support during my difficult situations. Their valuable and timely suggestions regarding throughout my PhD carrier.

And also, I thank to my doctoral committee members, Professor Prajit. K. Basu and Prof. A. Raghuramaraju, Prof. Laxmi Narayan Lenka's Dr. Kavita Chauhan, they helped me in every Doctoral Committee meeting to go in the right direction. In particular, Basu's and Lenka's guidelines honed my thought process regarding my thesis problem.

I would like to thank head department of Philosophy Professor C. A. Tomy, and other other faculty member Dr. Abhijeet Joshi, Dr. Venusa Tinyi, Dr. Shinod N. K. for their help and support during my thesis work.

Also, my special thanks to Bikram, Srikanta and Liza for their suggestion and continuous support and financial help.

Also, my special thanks to Dr. R. L. Behera and Dr. Shimi C. M. for their suggestion and continuous support to me and giving the shape of my thesis.

Also, my special thanks to Dr. Ranjan K. Nayak and Dr. Dibakar Sahoo, Dr. Priyabrata Sahoo, their continues suggestion and logistic support during my critical situations.

Also, my special thanks to Dr. R. Swain and G. C. Rout and Dr. Jyotirmaya Behera suggestion and timely support me to complete this work.

Also, my special thanks to my senior brothers in HCU and my friends in VNC for their suggestion and timely support me to complete this work.

It is not possible to complete my thesis without the help of the office staff of our department who have not only done their duty but many times helped me beyond the call of their duty, my sincere thanks to them.

Also, my sincere thanks to the university library (IGML) and the people who showed a kind nature towards me whenever I use to go there.

This acknowledgement page never fulfilled if I would not acknowledge my co-scholars and friend senior's role in my research life. Some of the scholars' help in various fields I should not forget. In particular Iswar Bhai, Roshon bhai, Raj, Dllip, Rafique, Priya ranjan, Bapina Bhai, Deepak, Jaganath, Pragya madam, Priti madam, Dillip Sir, Joby, Kailash, Biranchi, Ramesh, Anjaneyulu, Subhash bhai, Rekha, Selina, Abhaya, helped me to improve my skills in different areas and also their role is unforgettable in balancing my life. My lovely thanks to all of them.

Last but not least, my wholehearted thanks to UGC for providing RGNF fellowship, which gave me great financial support to finish my thesis without any obstacles.


Narendra Prasad Behera

TABLE OF CONTENT

CONTENT	Pg. No.
INTRODUCTION	1-14
CHAPTER-1: HISTORICAL BACKGROUND OF FOUNDATIONALISM AND COHERENTISM	15-38
1.0. Introduction	15
1.1.0. Plato's Theory of Knowledge	16-24
1.2.0. Aristotle's Theory of Knowledge	24-27
1.3.0. Descartes' Theory of Knowledge	27-28
1.4.0. Locke's Theory of Knowledge	28-29
1.4.1. Different Types of Knowledge	29-31
1.5.0. Kant's Theory of Knowledge	31-34
1.6.0. Foundationalism and Coherentism	34-37
1.7.0. Conclusion	37-38
CHAPTER-2: FOUNDATIONALISM IN EPISTEMOLOGY	39-65
2.0. Introduction	39
2.1.0. Foundationalism: An Outlook	39-42
2.2.0. Foundationalism on Epistemology	42-46
2.3.0. Foundationalism and its Classifications	46
2.3.1. Rationalist Foundationalism	46
2.3.2. Empiricist Foundationalism	46-47
2.3.3. Kantian Foundationalism	47
2.3.4. Internalist Foundationalism	47
2.3.5. Externalist Foundationalism	47-48
2.3.6. Classical Foundationalism	48-49
2.3.7. Moderate Foundationalism	49-50
2.3.8. Iterative Foundationalism and Simple foundationalism	50
2.3.9. Strong Foundationalism	50-56
2.3.10. Weak Foundationalism	56-58
2.3.11. Minimal Foundationalism	58-59
2.4.0. Chisholm's Foundationalism	59-61

2.4.1. The Presenting of Oneself	61-62
2.4.2. Self-Presentation and Certainty	62-63
2.4.3. Chisholm's empirical foundation	63-64
2.5.0. Concluding Remarks	64-65
CHAPTER-3: COHERENTISM IN EPISTEMOLOGY	66-85
3.0. Introduction	66
3.1.0. Coherentism: A outlook	67-73
3.2.0. The Coherence Structure	73
3.3.0. Verities of Coherentism	73-74
3.4.0 Coherentism and its Classifications	74
3.4.1. Explanatory Coherentism	74-75
3.4.2. Reliability coherentism	75-76
3.4.3. Internalist Coherentism	76
3.5.0. BonJour's Foundationalism	76-78
3.5.1. BonJour's criticism to Foundationalism	78-79
3.6.0. BounJour's Coherentism	79-81
3.7.0 Objections Against Coherentism	81
3.7.1. The Circularity Argument	81-82
3.7.2. Difficulties Defining Coherence	82
3.7.3. The Input and Isolation Objection	82-83
3.7.4. Alternative Systems Objection	83-84
3.8.0. Concluding remarks	84

CHAPTER-4: FOUNDATIONALISM AND COHERENTISM DEBATE IN EPISTEMOLOGY	85-105
4.0. Introduction	85-86
4.1.0 Foundationalism and Coherentism dichotomy	86-87
4.2.0. The Foundationalism and Coherentism Debate	87-91
4.3.0. Classical and Moderate: Foundationalism Vs Coherentism	92
4.3.1. Classical: Foundationalism Vs Coherentism	92-93
4.3.2. Moderate: Foundationalism and Coherentism	93-94

4.4.0. Weak Versus Strong Justification	94-95
4.5.0. Internalist and Externalist	95-99
4.6.0. Internalist Coherentism vs Externalist foundationalism	99-101
4.7.0. Reliabilism is alternative to internalism and externalism:	101-105
4.8.0. Conclusion	105

CHAPTER-5: TOWARDS RECONCILIATORY APPROACHES OF FOUNDATIONALISM AND COHERENTISM 106-142

5.0. Introduction	106
5.1.0. Susan Haack's Point of View	106-108
5.1.1. Empirical Justification for Foundherentism	108-110
5.1.2. The Sanction of Foundherentism	110-116
5.2.0. Earl Conee's Points of View	116-118
5.3.0. David Miller's Point of View	118-124
5.4.0. Assessments of the three Reconciliatory Approaches	124-125
5.5.0. Appraisal of Haack and Conee	125-128
5.6.0. Appraisal of Haack and Miller	128-134
5.7.0. Appraisal of Conee and Miller	134-136
5.1.9. Alternative path toward reconciliatory approach	136-142
5.1.10. Conclusion	142

CONCLUSION 143-152

BIBLIOGRAPHY

Paper Presentations

Publications

Similarity Index Report

INTRODUCTION

I.1. Introduction

Knowledge is considered more than true belief. Suppose an agent believes something about knowledge claims on the basis of evidence. But that evidence is happening right by, luckily, guess. He has a true belief but does not consider knowledge. Knowledge is something more than that which we accidentally have true belief as knowledge. Now a question may be raised what is this something called more that we all need to turn true belief into knowledge? We can point out that knowledge is something that the beliefs must be justified. The central problem in epistemology is how do we understand the word “know” or “how do we know that we know”? And “how do we know that p?” these are the fundamental question in epistemology regarding the justification of beliefs and knowledge. in order to answer the fundamental questions in epistemology, we have to be clear about the structure of knowledge and epistemic justification. A belief is justified. It must be epistemically acceptable to embrace it. Otherwise, there is the possibility of denying or rejecting the justification of belief.

It has been recognized and considered that in the history of philosophy, the theory epistemic justification is an essential condition for knowledge claims. The classical definition of knowledge, according to Plato knowledge is “justified true belief,” has been accepted largely. It is a universal agreement that knowledge is “justified true belief”. Since, in the 20th century, second half of the in 1963, Edmund Gettier, in his paper “Is Justified True Belief Knowledge?”¹ Showed that the meaning of knowledge earlier, which is universally accepted or largely accepted knowledge, is “justified true belief” is correct. Everyone is stuck with the definition of knowing what makes them astonished about the definition of knowledge. Gettier presented two counter-examples to show that justified true belief is not sufficient for knowledge claims. The existing meaning of knowledge, knowledge is ‘justified true belief,’ loses its standard. The general concern about Gettier’s counter-example has been accepted, and the search for the possibility of the fourth condition can be added analysis of knowledge claims that S knows that p. The requirement of knowledge we needed to search for the fourth condition of knowledge which is known as the Gettier Problem in philosophy. When the counter-example was introduced, most of the epistemologists thought and were convinced that there was a simple solution to this problem. There are simple conditions that were noticed that held the Gettier counter-examples. But new counter-examples also developed almost immediately. Day

¹ Gettier, Edmund. “Is Justified True Belief Knowledge?” *Analysis*, 23, no. 6, 1963, PP. 121-123.

by day, the difficult counter-examples were increasing then the fourth condition became more complicated.

Therefore, we are remaining with the usual analysis of knowledge, which is considered the usual meaning of knowledge. However, the standard analysis of knowledge is discussed symbolically in different ways to provide a better conception of knowledge. The epistemic justificatory conditions play a crucial role in the analysis of knowledge. The theory of epistemic justification of a belief may be rejected as a way of constructing the defense of knowledge claims because its opponent of this theory produces evidence in its favor. The basic character of justification of a belief is to provide reasonable straight refereeing of the connection between our objective point and our subjective area.

Justification varies in degrees; the higher degree of justification of beliefs is the adequate ground for justifying a belief. It is the evidence that justifies a belief properly. It is not always possible that we can provide adequate justification for a belief. There are mediate justification and immediate justification. Immediate justifications are more reliable than mediate justification. Mediate justifications are based on our inferential process of justifications and immediate justification based on self-evident. Mediate justifications are based on inductive and inferential processes. Sometimes, the justification of a belief is probable in nature, but it can be fallible. Therefore, we are not seeking knowledge as probable in nature. We should find out the adequate ground for justification of belief for knowledge claims. Even if we seek adequacy of justification, we fall into the probable nature of knowledge. So, we need more adequacy for the belief to be justified. If the belief is justified properly or adequately, the possibility of knowledge claims is higher. The justifications of a belief always depend on some other beliefs except self-evidently justified belief. The foundationalist believed that the justification of beliefs is independent. Its justification does not hinge on any other justification.

Epistemology, or the theory of knowledge, is a central point of philosophy. It deals with the human knowledge system in our life. It is concerned with beliefs, truth, and justification, which are the three conditions of knowledge. Among these three conditions, epistemologists are more interested in justification.² Therefore, justification becomes the central point in epistemology. There are different theories of justification in epistemology. All theories of justifications have their own identities in epistemology. The theories I have taken into account are foundationalism

² Noah, Lemos. *An Introduction to the Theory of Knowledge*, Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2007, PP1-21.

and coherentism. These theories are the essential theories in epistemology that have been debated from the Greek period to the present. Foundationalism and coherentism are the most debated concepts in epistemology regarding the structure and justification of knowledge. A question can be asked how can we justify our beliefs? How do we know things around us? These theories attempt to answer these questions. The foundationalists may respond by saying that there are basic beliefs that justify other non-basic beliefs. The justification of basic belief does not depend on other beliefs. Foundationalism holds that fundamental beliefs provide support to non-basic beliefs. At the same time, coherentism says that beliefs must be justified by the coherence among the beliefs. The beliefs are interdependent, having mutual relations among them within a system of beliefs.³

Throughout the history of philosophy, philosophers have endeavored to develop a method for providing a clear justification for their beliefs and possibility of knowledge. Noah Lemos in his analysis of knowledge provides adequate reason for the foundationalism and the coherentism as theories of justification in epistemology. Both the theories of knowledge explain the origins of our beliefs in vastly different ways. Foundationalists claim that all of our beliefs can be broken down which are nonfoundational until a fundamental belief remains. This foundational belief is mainly independent and not resultant from any other beliefs. Coherentists believe that a belief is justifiable if it is consistent and connect with among the beliefs. The foundationalist based on 'basic belief' is as foundational beliefs in the foundationalist "theory of justification". But coherentism, on the other way, would defend their belief that the cup is on the pot by appealing to other beliefs that are consistent and cohere with each other. The remaining beliefs coffee in the cup is hot, the coffee is made recently, it indicates that the coffee is hot. I saw the steam of coffee is rising from the coffee cup. All the above beliefs are not foundational as foundationalist prefer, but all the beliefs are mutually linked and produced adequate justification. The beliefs that coffee in my cup is hot. My beliefs about 'the coffee in the cup is hot' here the coherentists have stronger evidence for their claim, specifically in this case. I believe that foundational beliefs are justified according to their way. But I am not fully satisfied with that all of the beliefs in this world can be categorized in this manner.

Nonetheless, I believe in many of our beliefs need to support by a network of other beliefs. I am aware that my coffee is hot for several reasons, including the fact that I can feel its warmth. I don't believe I must pause it down into individual experiences when numerous other indicators

³ Fumerton, Richard. *Foundationalism* (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2022).

might more readily support my position. There are so many hints and opinions about me that support my belief that I don't have to attempt to deduce anything. Coherentism and foundationalism are opposing methods for determining whether a particular belief is justified. This analysis is known as justification in general philosophy, which is completely distinct from the biblical concept of justification about redemption. The topic of philosophical justification is whether a person has an acceptable level of confidence in a certain belief. Foundationalism is characterized by a more objective but also more abstract perspective. Coherentism is more realistic, but it has logical flaws. In general, philosophical discussions of knowledge, or epistemology, can be divided into three distinct concepts: a statement may be true or false, a person may accept or reject that statement, and an opinion may be reasonable or unreasonable. These are truth, belief, and justification, in that order. These are completely distinct: a person can believe something true for irrational reasons, or (according to some perspectives) he can believe something false for rational reasons. Different conceptions of justification include coherentism and foundationalism. Rather than directly addressing what is true or false, these views seek to define what makes a belief justified: when is it reasonable to assume that a certain belief is true? This distinction is particularly important because there is a coherentism and their theory of truth that not the same as coherentism in terms of justification. When comparing foundationalism and coherentism, we must keep in mind that these are not discussions of what is true but rather different perspectives on what makes a belief justifiable or reasonable to hold. Foundationalism can be represented by a tree, a pyramid, or a wall made of bricks. A belief must be supported by another belief, which must also be justified, and so on, until the ultimate basis, the foundation is reached. According to foundationalism, all justifiable beliefs are ultimately based on certain other beliefs that cannot be derived from or verified by other beliefs. These axioms are fundamental and essential. To have any knowledge, they "must be believed." Foundationalism demands that for a belief to be adequately justified, it must be traced back to one or more of these fundamental maxims. Before we can comprehend complete or universal truth, we must first define truth. The dictionary defines truth as "conformity to fact or actuality; a statement demonstrated to be or accepted as true." Some would argue that there is no objective reality; only perceptions and opinions exist. Others may say that there must be eternal truth or reality.

I.2 Foundationalism

Foundationalism is a view or a theory of justification in epistemology. According to this theory, a belief can be justified only through the foundational belief. This theory holds that there is a basic or foundational belief and that belief justified other nonbasic or nonfoundational beliefs. The basic belief is noninferential and non-basic beliefs are inferential in nature. For example, suppose there are series of beliefs like B1, B2, B3, and B4...Bn. Foundationalist claimed that in the series of beliefs B1 must have justified by B2, B2 must have justified by B3 and B3 must be justified by the B4 accordingly. Foundationalist claimed that the series should not be continued. The series is terminated by the basic or foundational belief. That means there is a foundational or basic belief that justified the beliefs which are nonfoundational in that series and the series terminates.

There are different levels of justifying our beliefs according to foundationalism. Some foundationalist are classical they claim that our justification of beliefs based on our internal factors. That means our inter factors are responsible for justifying a belief. Descartes in his “The Meditation on First Philosophy” search for clarity and certainty in philosophy by applying his methodology called “method of doubt”. There he found clear and distinct proposition “I think, therefore I am, or I think therefore, I exist.” by applying his method of doubt. That is “indubitable truth” in Descartes critical search operation in philosophy and that is the foundation of knowledge. On that foundational structure we can built up our knowledge, which would be clear and distinct knowledge according to Descartes. ⁴

The classical foundationalist claimed that their justification of beliefs is very strong because their justification is self-evident. When I say “I have a headache” I have the reason or evidence for that belief. So, the reason is self-evident in nature. Later on, strong classical strong foundationalists have been criticised severely by the rival coherentism. According to strong foundationalist their justification of belief is based on indubitable, infallible and incorrigible. Which is not acceptable by rival of foundationalism and certain versions of foundationalism allows basic beliefs can fallible.

⁴ Cottingham, J. and Williams, B. (trans.) *Rene Descartes Meditation on First Philosophy*, Cambridge University Press, London, 1986.

Moderate foundationalists are more advanced than classical foundationalists; they hold the basic tenants of foundationalism that there is a basic or foundational belief and that belief justified other nonbasic or nonfoundational beliefs. According to Robert Audi, the modest foundationalist allows the empirical beliefs to be justified through our adequate experience. For Audi, “foundationalism can acknowledge role for coherence in relation to justification.”⁵ Here Audi allows the significance role of coherence in justifications of foundational belief. The role of moderate foundationalism in coherence is to remove incoherence in justification of belief for knowledge claims. Moderate foundationalism is divergence to coherentism with account of strong foundationalism. According to them, the most minimal sense of role coherence can be allowed by foundationalism without affect the own theory of justification. Moderate foundationalism is mainly focus on the structure of knowledge and justified beliefs. Audi point out that

“if one has any knowledge or justified belief, then one has some direct knowledge or directly justified belief, and any other knowledge or justified belief one has is traceable to those foundations. A belief direct and foundational at one time may be indirect and non-foundational at another; it may gain or lose justification; it may have any kind of content; and some foundational beliefs may be false or unjustified or both.”⁶

So, Audi trying to seek more adequate justification for the beliefs and avoid the dogmatic justification moderate versions of foundationalism allows different levels of foundational beliefs for the diverse persons for their justification of beliefs under different situation. Weak foundationalist says to justify a belief, we need evidence; the evidence is either strong or weak. If the justification of a belief is weak, then it leads to weak foundationalism. Strong justification is based on the internal state of our beliefs, whereas weak justification is based on the external state of our beliefs. Weak foundationalism allows for the justification of beliefs in an inductive way, though not in the scientific sense of induction. Rockmore points out that the weak version of foundationalism and the strong version of foundationalism are sourcing only in theory but are not successful in practice. Weak version of foundationalism is a kind of foundational theory since this maintains that certain fundamental ideas have some level of noninferential epistemic validity, albeit a negligible one. However, weak foundationalism varies significantly from earlier, more orthodox iterations. In instance, the weak foundationalist solution to the regress

⁵ Audi, R. (2011) P. 233.

⁶ Audi, R. (2011) p. 135.

problem, which is typically not explained all that well, must be very different from the moderate foundationalist one. The weak foundationalist is unable to assert, as does the moderate foundationalist, that when fundamental beliefs are attained, the regress of justifications simply comes to a stop. For Bonjour the justification of belief by weak foundationalist are acceptable because justification is not adequate. Both basic and nonbasic beliefs of weak foundationalist is appealing to the concept of coherence.⁷

Minimal foundationalism is a version of foundationalism in epistemology. Minimal foundationalism is a little different from other versions of foundationalism. It tries to revise foundationalism. According to this view, beliefs are justified in a minimal sense. It makes two claims such as 1) there is no special status for the basic beliefs 2) there are no bars for foundationalism being about the external objects. Holding the two principle minimal foundationalism says that there is a difference between the beliefs in the superstructure and the beliefs which are foundational. It is not concerned with the contents of the belief, but it is concerned with how beliefs receive their justification.

I.3. Coherentism

According to coherentism, justified beliefs are those that have “good enough” support from other beliefs, and it is unnecessary to verify the chain of support until it stops, if it ever does. In simple way coherentism is views or a theory in epistemology which claims that a belief can be justified in a coherent system. In that system the beliefs inter connected to each other for their justification. They denied the possibility of foundational or basic beliefs and claimed that foundational beliefs are unjustified and not certain. Coherentism requires that a belief be connected to a subjectively sufficient number of supporting beliefs for it to be adequately justified. Foundationalism is primarily supported by the strength of logic. Basic mathematical theories, such as “a number is equal to itself,” demonstrate the existence of foundational truths. This assertion cannot be deduced from other ideas, nor can it be refuted without destroying logic and mathematics. By establishing a direct connection between truth and belief, foundationalism enables the strongest possible ties between the two. Additionally, it prevents the problem of an argument being used to support itself. Additionally, foundationalism is abstract. It may be logically possible to trace

⁷ Bonjour, L. The Structure of Empirical Knowledge. Cambridge: Harvard University Press, 1985, PP. 28-29

all facts and ideas back to fundamental maxims, but doing so is impractical and almost never done in practice. Practicality is coherentism's primary advantage.

The majority of people are incapable of tracing a belief all the way back to its fundamental axioms, even if they desire to make such a discovery. It is also true that, in some instances, the chain of justification becomes murky: not every step of the process is simple and straightforward. Even if they believe there ought to be an objective conclusion to their reasoning, the majority of people in the real-world approach justify it through a practical form of coherentism. Coherence can easily alter into relativism, which poses a threat. Since what constitutes a “good enough” connection is highly subjective, it can even lead to solipsism. We observed that powerful and intuitively compelling regress arguments are the primary motivation for foundationalism and coherentism. Coherentism claimed that regress can be terminated through the beliefs once connected to each other and justified in a holistic way. “Each belief is evaluated in the same way, by considering the effect its presence has on the coherence of the whole.”

And coherence is attached to belief systems, not their individuals. So far, so wonderful. However, we must understand the nature of this coherence property. Consider the characteristic of coherence itself. The coherence theory of justification and the coherence theory of truth is frequently associated with one another.⁸ According to the coherentist, there are no fundamental beliefs. The explanatory function is the justification for all beliefs. But there are two varieties of explanatory roles. “Some beliefs are justified by what they explain, while others are justified by being explained.” So, for instance, my belief in the existence of physical objects is justified due to their explanatory power and the descriptive coherence it carries to my entire body of opinions. If I did not have faith in the existence of physical objects, I would be epistemically careless because I would be rejecting the most consistent alternative belief system available.

Deprived of my trust in physical objects, I would be compelled to clarify things in a manner that is less coherent. This is, of course, debatable. Berkeley, for instance, would argue that there is a superior descriptive hypothesis, namely that God is the source of observable phenomena. He could confront that this hypothesis gives even greater descriptive rationality to our worldview beliefs and that it has none of the disadvantages of postulating material objects. But he was in error. Consequently, my belief about the existence of physical objects in this world is supported

⁸ Jonathan, Dancy. *Introduction to Contemporary Epistemology* (Hoboken: Wiley-Blackwell, 1991), pp. 110 -127.

by the inductive function. My belief about that “there is a table in front of me” is same way, supported by its sense experience which is explanatory. However, beliefs of one’s own experience is such that my belief that I now seem to perceive a rectangular brown patch, cannot be explained. Despite the fact that it continues to be justified by its explanatory function, its function is distinct. It is explained rather than being an explainer. Providing an explanation for a proposition and demonstrating how it follows from the rest of our beliefs is one way of removing doubt about it. Perhaps the majority of our beliefs are defensible because they both explain and are explained. In fact, contrary to foundationalism, the adequate justifications for our beliefs are those that are both explained and explicated. Explained unexplained, such as statements about how I am being seemed to, and unexplained are both epistemically contentious. This description conveys the notion that the justification of a belief cannot be determined in isolation from a system of beliefs. The system of beliefs that determines justification, according to Lehrer, must be one in which we explain as much as possible and leave as few questions as possible. A system with the highest level of explanatory coherence justifies the beliefs it contains.⁹

This account of coherence, however, also increase some new issues. Possibly the most significant issue is the question of what the explanation is. To a lesser extent we can explain this concept without appealing to the epistemic concepts we are attempting to account for. The circularity is unacceptable. (It would be meaningless to say, for instance, that one explanation is superior to another because, based on what we know, the first explanation is more likely to be accurate than the second explanation. We need not construct and defend a non-epistemic conception of explanation. The coherence theory's explanatory form has additional flaws that render it unappealing. According to the coherence theory, a thought is justified to the extent that the belief set it belongs to is coherent. This instantly implies that every member of a set of beliefs is justifiable to the same extent as every other member. This seems unconvincing: add a wacky belief to any coherent belief system. The coherence of the resulting sum will be lower than that of the system before the addition of the bizarre belief. According to the coherence theory, one system has larger informative coherence than another if it leaves fewer things undetermined to explain better than the other system of coherence. Ironically, a system may meet this condition by requiring less explanation. To lessen what is unexplained, one may deny the veracity of explanation-required statements.

⁹ Russell, Bertrand. *The Problems of Philosophy*, London: Oxford University Press, 1911, pp. 70-72.

Therefore, one can increment the informative coherence of one's belief system not only by increase statements that explain but also by removing statements that need to be explained. This sounds incorrect. It would be in conflict with the spontaneous necessity that our epistemic duty to believe truths is at least as crucial as our epistemic obligation not to believe untruth, as well as with our demand that a belief set is more consistent when it is more comprehensive. Secondly, the explanatory coherence theory is plagued by a problem that plagues all coherence theories, regardless of whether they are theories of truth or justification. Two belief systems with maximum explanatory coherence but incompatible with each other appear entirely possible. If incoherent belief systems can have peak informative coherence, then incoherent proposition may be fully evidence by the virtue of their membership in such systems. Thus, it appears that no relationship between statements is sufficient to guarantee full justification; an additional element must be added. Coherentists may not be able to resolve the issue by appealing to characteristics such as simplicity or conservatism. Needing simplicity exasperate the problem of augmentative coherence by removing explanations. To need conservatism, as Quine and his followers do, jeopardize to ensnare us in the original belief system, precluding radical conceptual change. Consequently, explanatory relationships are insufficient to select a unique set of fully justified beliefs. There would be some other factor that determines the necessity of explanation. Even coherent explanations are not sufficient. Considered to have at least the pursuing advantages over competing for foundationalist accounts, the coherentist account of justification has been held to be superior to foundationalist accounts. In the first place, it is intended to give us a sense that not only our opinion but also our principles of illation can be justified.¹⁰

I.4. Foundationalism and Coherentism

The foundationalists appear incompetent of defending these principles. What would justify, for instance, our inference of material-object statements from sense-datum statements? Or, what would justify my inductive logical thinking from how I appear to the external world? Unless the foundationalist can give a priori justification for these principles, all she can say is that we happen to accept them. The coherentist, on the other hand, is purportedly able to assert that we acquire the principles we do because they give to the whole coherence of our belief system. Belief systems that consider inductive inferences accomplish a higher level of instructive coherence than those that do not. This point, however, reintroduces the very idea of justification that the

¹⁰ Erik Olsson, *The Epistemology of Keith Lehrer* (Basingstoke: Springer, 2012), pp. 95-99

coherentist is attempting to outpouring, so I believe that any apparent advantage to the coherentist is illusory. If the coherentist is unable to escape this non-holistic conception of justification, he or she faces the regress contestation once more. Second, coherentism, as Dancy notes, starts to direct our attraction away from the individual's attempt to build his own epistemology and towards the notion that cognition is a social process, something that can be divided and which can grow through sharing. Coherentism is more possible to be able to justify our certainty on other people's testimony as a means of acquiring knowledge, for example. Whereas the classical foundationalist must be concerned with any method of getting beliefs that is not 100 percent dependable, the coherentist can have any such method so long as it gives significantly to the coherence of the full.¹¹

According to coherentism, the significance of holistic coherentism rather than atomistic is the source of these two benefits. Semantical theory asserts that each sentence has its own way meaning, which it sustains regardless of its participation in different theories. This theory has obvious similarities to empiricism. The empiricist view is that every sentence has a distinct empirical content due to its connections to perceptual experience. Since this empirical content is inextricably bound to the sentence, its meaning cannot be altered by the fact that it may appear as a component of radically different theories. In contrast, semantic holism is the belief that the meanings of sentences are interdependent, such that the meaning of one sentence depends on the meanings of other sentences and can be altered by a change elsewhere.” According to this view, a sentence's meaning is at least partially determined by the theoretical context of use in which it is placed.¹²

Foundationalism and coherentism are centrally debated in epistemology for the structure of justification of knowledge. Both theories of justifications respond to the epistemic regress problem in epistemology. According to foundationalism, epistemic regress can be overcome if we take the fundamental beliefs as the foundation for the justifications of non-basic beliefs. In contrast, coherentism disagrees with the foundationalism claims regarding the structure of knowledge and justification of beliefs. Coherentism denied, there is possibility of foundational

¹¹ Bertrand Russell, *Philosophical Essays* (London: Psychology Press, 1994), pp. 90-94

¹² Jonathan, Dancy. *Introduction to Contemporary Epistemology*, pp. 94-96.

beliefs at all. All beliefs are justified within a coherent system. They mutually support each other for justifications of beliefs are discussed.

The purpose of the thesis is to reconcile foundationalism and coherentism in epistemology. For that, I have done a historical survey on foundationalism and coherentism in epistemology. In that survey, chapter one discusses the historical background of foundationalism and coherentism in epistemology. The first part of chapter one discusses foundationalism's historical background. In this discussion, I have raised the question of definitions of foundationalism, motivations of foundationalism, and different versions of foundationalism. I also discussed the Greek philosophical thoughts of Plato and Aristotle, the rationalist Descartes and the empiricist Locke highlighting their foundationalist position in epistemology.

I.5. Main problem and Issues

The main concern of this project is critically thinking over the foundationalism and coherentism epistemology. The foundationalist theory of structure of justification and coherentist theory of structure of justification and knowledge is matter of critical discussion. How do this theory of justification and knowledge succeed concerning to the regress problem in epistemology.

1. To survey how do different thinkers from ancient period to present day tried to solve issues in epistemology with the help of the two significant methods of foundationalism and Coherentism.
2. To understand how does different type of foundationalism and their methods of approach to the problems in epistemology?
3. Examine how does the method of Coherentism and its role in solving the issues in epistemology?
4. Why does foundationalist reject Coherentists' method in solving issues in epistemology, and similarly, how Coherentists see drawbacks in Foundationalists' method of approach in solving issues in epistemology.?
5. What are the various possibilities to reconcile both Foundationalism and Coherentism in solving the significant problems in epistemology.

I.6. Methodology and its limitations

This thesis, mainly analysed the epistemological and conceptual analysis of foundationalism and coherentism theory of knowledge and justifications. The main focus of this thesis is to find out the different versions of foundationalist and coherentist theory of justifications. Along with that it critically examines the foundationalist and coherentist theory of justification in epistemology. Basically, this thesis taking Chisholm's foundationalist theory and BonJour's coherence theory of knowledge for the discussion. It also raised some criticism and objections against this theory. However, this thesis attempted towards the reconciliatory approaches of foundationalism and coherentism. This approach of justification is kind of hybrid doctrine of justification of foundationalist and coherentist epistemology.

I.7. The General Structure of Thesis

At the end of Chapter One, I discussed Kant's theory of knowledge. Kant, in his "Critique of Pure Reason," critically discusses the theory of knowledge. In that discussion, I show how Kant's theory of knowledge was built as a foundationalist position in epistemology. His reconciliation of rationalism and empiricism motivated me to reconcile foundationalism and coherentism in epistemology. The Chapter One ended with looking for more understanding of foundationalism. In Chapter One, I discuss the Coherentism theory of knowledge. This is a historical survey of coherentism in epistemology. In this part, I have discussed the definition and meaning of coherentism. I also discussed what are the problems and issues in coherentism. The main problem that motivated coherentism is foundationalism theory and the regress problem in epistemology. The core issue in coherentism is the justification of beliefs. For the coherentist, beliefs can be justified within a system in which the beliefs are dependent on each other. They mutually support each other for their justification. At the end of this part, I have taken Bradley's account of coherence. In Bradley's version of coherentism, coherentism is defended with the help of the coherence theory of truth.

In Chapter Two, I will look into foundationalism in a general way. I will start from the beginning; what is foundationalism? Its importance, problems, and existence in epistemology. I also discuss some of the arguments for foundationalism and identify different versions of foundationalism in the various foundationalist movements. I will look at the issues and problems addressed by foundationalism. I will present different versions of foundationalism to bring out the problems and some implications. In different variances of foundationalism, I take

the rationalist and the empiricist versions of foundationalism. Among the rationalist and empiricist versions, I discuss Descartes's and Locke's foundational positions in epistemology.

The chapter basically focuses on rationalist and empiricist versions of foundationalism, and furthermore, it explains internalist and externalist versions of foundationalism in epistemology. The chapter ends with a discussion of Kant's foundationalism, where I try to show the possibility that rationalist and empiricist foundationalism can be reconciled. It gives space to rising anti-foundationalist arguments in epistemology. The first chapter ends by raising some fundamental issues in different versions of foundationalism. Chapter Three looks into coherentism in epistemology. It is primarily concerned with the definition, nature significance, and varieties of coherentism. In the varieties of coherentism, I have critically analyzed the holistic and non-holistic holistic coherentism in epistemology. Mainly the chapter focuses on Bonjour's Coherentist positions in epistemology. In Bonjour's analysis of coherentism, he defends the empirical coherentist position in epistemology. Some of the objections are raised against foundationalism. This chapter also discusses different types of coherentism. At the end of this chapter, I discuss the objections against coherentism.

Chapter Four is about the discussion between foundationalism and coherentism. In the overall discussion, I am taking justification as the central issue of foundationalism and coherentism. I am trying to examine the theory of justifications, which is better for knowledge claims. I also try to find out the distinction between internalist foundationalism and externalist coherentism to bring out a better justificatory approach in epistemology. I discussed externalists foundationalism to understand the primary empirical justification in epistemology. There are some objections raised against internalist foundationalists in this chapter.

In the final chapter is an attempt towards reconcile foundationalism and coherentism in epistemology with the help of some case studies. This is also finding the various possibilities to reconcile both Foundationalism and Coherentism in solving the significant problems in epistemology. The aim is to that bring the two theories together and make justification more reliable and adequate. For this reason, I have been motivated by the works of Roderick Chisholm, Susan Haack and Earl Conne, C. David Miller's argument for the reconciliatory approaches in epistemology. Mostly, I have discussed the arguments of Earl Conne and Susan Haack to reconcile foundationalism and coherentism in epistemology. This is a hybrid approach of theory of justification in foundationalist and coherentist epistemology.

CHAPTER-1

HISTORICAL BACKGROUND OF FOUNDATIONALISM AND COHERENTISM

1.0. Introduction

This chapter discusses the historical background of foundationalism and coherentism. It has been categorised into different parts. But two parts are important in this discussion. The first chapter highlights the historical background of foundationalism, and the second part focuses on the historical background of coherentism. Both foundationalism and coherentism have some issues in epistemology regarding the justification of beliefs and knowledge. They have the epistemic regress problem, even though they tried to solve the epistemic regress problem in epistemology. The foundationalist and coherentist applied their own methodology to solve and overcome the epistemic regress problem. Whether they have succeeded or not is a matter of discussion here.

The first part of this chapter discusses the definition and the main developments of foundationalism and coherentism in epistemology. Furthermore, this chapter discussed the different versions and current scenarios of foundationalism and coherentism. In the different versions, classical as well as non-classical foundationalism are the core concepts of the study. In reference to coherentism, there are two versions, which are the 'liner version of coherentism' and the 'holistic version of coherentism'. Additionally, regarding the historical background of foundationalism, the classical foundationalist position in epistemology is the stressing argument like, say, foundationalism from Aristotle to Immanuel Kant. From their point of view, epistemological positions of Foundationalism and Coherentism are essential in this chapter. Following this, various problems of foundationalism in the 20th-century philosophers have been discussed.

In the second part of this chapter, one of the historical backgrounds, Definitions, and significance of coherentism is discussed. Subsequently, the 'coherentist on epistemic regress problem' and the different versions of coherentism have been discussed. Throughout these discussions, the development of the coherentist position in epistemology has been addressed. Among the classical coherentist thinkers, F. H. Bradley and others look into their epistemological progress in the domain of coherentism as noteworthy. How do they justify their beliefs by claiming their knowledge in the empirical world? It is the major question addressed here.

1.1.0. Plato's Theory of Knowledge

To understand Plato's epistemology, we must have to focus on his theory of ideas. His theory includes both epistemology and metaphysics. It is based upon his dialogue '*Theaetetus*.' Plato's dialogue is a conversation between his teacher Socrates and the Sophists. The conversation constitutes nature, sources, and limitations of knowledge. Plato, in his *Theaetetus*, has given three definitions of knowledge; "Knowledge is perception, Knowledge is true belief, and Knowledge is justified true beliefs with an account".¹³ *Theaetetus* tries to show that if a person has claimed that he has the knowledge, he must satisfy these three definitions of knowledge. But Socrates didn't agree with him regarding the definition of knowledge that he had provided. Plato, in his dialogue, showed which referring to mastering these definitions of knowledge that have been rejected. Plato rejected the definitions of knowledge through the counter-example. Does he ask if we know what knowledge is? We must know what not knowledge is. These are the basic things we have to know in the arena of the definition of knowledge. According to Socrates, knowledge is gained through concepts. Hence Socrates sticks to his definition of knowledge, wherein knowledge is through the concepts. Plato was inspired by his teacher Socrates who holds that knowledge is through concepts. He also accepted the view of his teacher's definition of knowledge. It is about the search for of theory knowledge. What evidence do we have, and how do we know? What information do we have? The underlying question of knowledge is addressed by epistemology. Knowledge, according to the traditional definition, is justified by true beliefs. We know that we believe, but beliefs are not knowledge. Knowledge is not belief, but it is a special kind of belief that justifies beliefs. Plato is rigorously and systematically concerned with ethical, political, metaphysical, and epistemological issues. But he was not happy with the definition of knowledge that was claimed by Protagoras and Sophists. He is trying to find out the limitations, problems, and definitions of knowledge. Plato, in his dialogues, examines and analyses definitions of knowledge, though the notion of knowledge has been analyzed by different philosophers. For him, the definition of knowledge is not complete. Sophists define knowledge as perception. Plato refutes Protagoras's, and Sophists claims that man is the major of all things and perception is knowledge.

Theaetetus's definition of knowledge is limited to certain aspects, which is not accepted by all philosophers because sometimes we may miss sensation, illusion, or hallucination of the objects, but we do not have the right knowledge. In that case, we are hallucinating or miss

¹³ See complete Plato's "*Theaetetus*"

sensing the objects in the world. So, according to the definition of knowledge by Sophists, our knowledge about the external world is limited to sensation only. Plato's dialogue, *Theaetetus*, brings a new dimension to epistemology. At the beginning of his dialogue, he raised the question of what knowledge is. The common-sense answer to the question is this knowledge comes through the senses. For Plato, the sensation is a lower level of knowledge. Therefore, Plato is not interested in common sense knowledge of the world. Thus, he rejected the Sophist conception of knowledge. He is interested in a higher level of knowledge of the world. Though Plato's theory of knowledge has not been systematically discussed in the dialogues, still his definition of knowledge is building a foundation in epistemology. In this discussion on 'Plato's theory of knowledge,' I have shown how it supports foundationalism in epistemology. It will focus on Plato's epistemological discussion, where he discussed the theory of knowledge in four ways. Plato's definition of knowledge has been discussed with *Theaetetus*. The three definitions of knowledge were given by *Theaetetus*, but Plato rejected some of the definitions of knowledge. These are as follows: In the beginning, the Sophists were convinced that knowledge is possible through sense perceptions. Protagoras claimed that human beings are important factor of all the thing in this world. The Sophists definition about knowing does not satisfy Socrates. Socrates objects that if knowledge is perceptions, no man can be wiser than another, for I am the best judge of my own sense-perception.¹⁴ According to Socrates, knowledge is possible only through a concept. His inquiry about knowledge would find out the ethical value-based definition of knowledge.

Knowledge must have a value that all people should accept as the definition of knowledge. For Socrates, knowledge is a virtue, and ignorance is a vice. Plato accepted his teacher's views and rejected sophists definitions of knowledge. He tries to give his own concepts of knowledge. Plato found that there are certain limitations to Sophists' definition of knowledge; he rejected the definition of knowledge which was given by sophists, like say, as knowledge is perception. He took it negatively as "what knowledge and truth are not" His ideas here are that the definition of knowledge is negative, to find out a clear and positive way of arriving at the definition of knowledge. Protagoras and Sophists claimed that "knowledge is perception." If this is the case, the definition of knowledge seems that what appears to each person is true for them. But this is not always happening because what appears to me sometimes, they are really not. It could be false to judge our future events. Suppose someone thinks he will become a

¹⁴Copleston, F. C. A History of Philosophy, Vol. I, New York: Doubleday, 1993, P.144.

politician in the future, but in fact, he will become a teacher. Here's what appears to a person now it is very difficult to predict future events.

Secondly, the same object will appear larger from near and smaller when it goes far from us. That seems a contradiction of the perception. Same time same objects look light to someone and heavy to another. Furthermore, the same object will appear white in a particular light and green in the other light, and it has no color in the dark. How is it possible if perception is knowledge, then it should be similar for all? If we say man and animal are percipient beings, even though the animal is in the lowest sense, then we must accept that as percipient beings, man and animal have no difference in terms of sense organs. They are measures of all things.¹⁵ One more counterexample has been given that the perception of the child is not the same as the perception of the teacher. If the perception of a child and the perception of a teacher are the same things, then there is no difference between child perception and teacher perceptions. Similarly, we may say that a perception of a mental disorder person and a perception of a healthy person is the same if knowledge is perception. But it is not the case that the perception of a mental disorder person and the perception of a healthy person is the same. So, it contradicts to say that the perception of mental disorder and the perception of a healthy human is the same. Then, Protagoras and Sophists are not right to say that perception is knowledge.¹⁶

If perception is knowledge, there is no distinction between truth and falsity, and there is also no distinction between the sick man and the healthy man regarding the perception of the same objects. For a sick man who perceives the thing, it is sour. But in the case of a healthy man, he can perceive things clearly. Since there is no hurdle to perceiving things, he easily recognizes the objects. According to Protagoras and Sophists, the definition of knowledge is perception; if that is the case, there is no variance between a healthy man and a sick person. A child's perspective against an adult's perspective, how could they separate? For them, the perception of children and the perception of an adult is the same, as we know that the perception of a kid and the perception of an adult individual are not the same because the kid is less logical than the adult person. Even if they perceive the same objects, they don't have the same perception of the same objects in the world. So, it seems that perception is not giving the right knowledge. If we hold that, perception is knowledge and memory is not knowledge; then there would be a problem. Suppose a person sees something and closes his eye. He remembers that thing that he saw then; he may not have knowledge about that thing. Additionally, suppose a person sees an

¹⁵Stace, W. T., *A Critical History of Greek Philosophy*, New Delhi: Macmillan, 1982, pp. 177-78.

¹⁶ Stace, W. T., pp. 178-79.

object with the left eye and closes his right eye. Then that person who knows the left eye knows only one eye and does not know about the other eye. In that case, the person who knows at the same time does not know.

Plato rejected *Theaetetus*'s second definition of knowledge. According to Plato, if true belief is knowledge, how will we define false beliefs? What is the status of false belief and true belief? For Plato, belief may be true, but it is not knowledge. It is the right opinion or belief. Stace points out that to hold knowledge, one must have not only known a thing is so but also why it is so.¹⁷ Plato's claim is that, even we have true beliefs by luckily, we cannot claim that we have knowledge because knowledge requires a good reason. Thus, knowledge must be grounded in reason. Beliefs either true or false belief and the opinions might be right or in case wrong but knowledge is always true.¹⁸ According to Socrates, a belief might be true without involving the man who holds the belief in knowledge. Consider a guy charged with a crime for which he is not genuinely responsible, despite the fact that the evidence presented against him is substantial. If an attorney representing an innocent guy was able to persuade the jury to return a not-guilty verdict, the result would be accurate. However, it is possible that it is founded on persuasion rather than information. As a result, the correct judgment could just be true believers, and true belief is not the same as knowledge.

The third, definition of this theory is that knowledge is justified by true belief with an account of justification. But this way of defining will not be sufficient. The counter-example of the juryman showed the definition of knowledge that could not be right. The definition remains undesirable. In *Theaetetus*' second definition of knowledge, Plato found that *Theaetetus* did not know what false judgment is, which is a problem with the third definition of knowledge. Secondly, *Theaetetus* adds logos in his third definition of knowledge; Plato says that, if we grant adding logos to lead the definition of knowledge, there are three possibilities to define the meaning of logos. Let's discuss the three possible meanings of logos which lead to the definition of knowledge that follows: Expression of thought in speech, enumeration of elementary parts, and the statement of distinguishing mark. From above, the three possible definitions of knowledge first account says that if we take everyone's account for the definition of knowledge, it will differ from person to person. They are true from their own perspective. It is their opinion that is true. The second probable interpretation of the logos is that to account for anything is to list all its components. For example, suppose someone asked where the

¹⁷Stace, 1982, P. 181.

¹⁸Ibid, p. 182.

university of Hyderabad is. You give him some names of the departments, schools, administrative buildings, library, etc. It would be giving an explanation of things to identify rightly and wrongly certain elements in a different context; these indications are visible in Plato.

Lastly, the meaning of logos is defined as a distinguishing mark. For example, the sun in the sky is bright that moves on the earth. Here, again the definition of knowledge is “true judgment with an account,” which takes no distinguishing mark. The second example, if someone tells you Socrates is a man who has the correct judgment of other things, is to say that he is a man. He has an ear, nose, eyes, mouth, etc. Hence, here the account does not distinguish Socrates from other men. If he would not have in mind who is Socrates, he did not distinguish from other men. Therefore, adding logos was meaningless because logos were already a part of the 'true judgment'. Hence, logos are not guaranteed for itself to have knowledge. It could not give a satisfactory definition of knowledge. It's just begging the question of what knowledge is or what the knowledge could be. The third definition of knowledge is true judgment with logos could not prove satisfactory answer three meanings of the term logos. In this way, the dialogue comes to an end inconclusively.

The theory of knowledge is an inquiry about the truth of knowledge, sources of knowledge, validity, and invalidity of knowledge and it also examines conditions, limitations and its possibility. This thesis is a critical inquiry into methods, techniques and meaning of knowledge. Plato's techniques and methods regarding the theory of knowledge are different from the other philosophers. He applies different types of knowledge in different disciplines. He has discussed four types of knowledge of inquiry in his theory of knowledge. Plato, in his dialogue, presented those different types of knowledge for different disciplines, whereas he mainly focused on four types of knowledge such as Conjectural knowledge, Practical or sensuous knowledge, Hypothetical knowledge, and Rational Knowledge. Plato rightly points out that conjectural knowledge is the lowest type of knowledge. This type of knowledge, in fact, is not knowledge at all. It is mere appearance. It is based on illusions, hallucinations, and dreams. In Indian Philosophy, Nyaya's popular example of this kind of knowledge is of a snake taken as a rope and the examples of the son of a barren woman and hare's horn are this type of knowledge. Conjectural knowledge has always fallen into errors and deals with illusionary experiences and

ideas of people. This knowledge can be compared with Sankara's *Pratibhasika Satta*, the lower level of reality.¹⁹

Once we know that in Sankara's Vedanta, *Pratibhasika* knowledge is the lowest kind of knowledge, and it can be compared to Plato's Conjectural knowledge. As similar as we may compare Plato's practical knowledge with Sankara's *Vyavaharika Satta*. Practical knowledge is the knowledge about the external world through our sense experience. It is called practical knowledge because we perceive things directly by our sense organs. This type of knowledge is our awareness of the common sense found in the objects in the world. G.E Moore, a famed ethical philosopher, points out that common sense is fundamental for knowledge about the external world; for him things are outside us in the world. We sense things through our sense organs. There are different philosophical thoughts; they have their own opinion about the "knowledge of the external world." Every philosophical tradition has its own mechanism to articulate knowledge of the exterior world. As Immanuel Kant points out, Plato's epistemology, man's knowledge is a result of the synthesis between precept and concepts.²⁰ As Protagoras and sophists point out, knowledge is perception, Plato is not happy with the claims of Protagoras and Sophists's knowledge about the external world. Plato claims that Protagoras and Sophists have given their opinion, but it is not knowledge per se. Though Protagoras and Sophists justified that knowledge is gained through sense perceptions, Plato points out that, sometimes, our sense perception can go wrong. Therefore, this could not be knowledge - claims. For example, when we perceive an object near to us, it looks bigger in size than the same object; when we perceive it from the far distance, it looks small in size. So, there is no certainty in knowledge claims in practical levels of knowledge. My perception is about a piece of paper that shows the objects existing outside me. It also proves that the existence of the perceptual mechanism in my mind.

Hypothetical knowledge is not the final knowledge, but hypothetical knowledge is knowledge of the numbers and forms as found in different branches of mathematics. This knowledge is through inductive generalization and logical deductions. R N. Sharma points out that "in hypothetical we arrive at certain conclusions through the process of inductive generalizations and logical deductions"²¹ The truth of the generalization and deduction is hypothetically

¹⁹ Sharma, R. N., *Plato: An Interdisciplinary Perspective*, New Delhi: Atlantic, 1991, p. 34.

²⁰ Sharma, R. N., *Plato: An Interdisciplinary Perspective*, New Delhi: Atlantic, 1991, p. 34.

²¹ Sharma, R. N., p. 37.

dependent upon the validity of sensory knowledge. In the case of mathematics, the basic deduction has been taken as axioms, which is self-evident in nature. They do not derive from any sense of experience, but they derive as it is. Hypothetical knowledge in between practical knowledge and rational knowledge, and it mediates the relation between sense objects in the world.

In Plato's epistemology, rational knowledge is the highest form of knowledge. This kind of knowledge gives us knowledge of forms, concepts or ideas. How do we achieve knowledge of form or ideas? It can be achieved through a dialectical process unrestricted by sense perception. This type of knowledge is not the knowledge of the subject to sensory knowledge. It is not the knowledge of things or any particular things, but it is knowledge of universal. This type of knowledge consists of Plato's theory of ideas, which will discuss in detail. Plato's theory of ideas are being unchanged and eternal; it is alone constituted reality. It is the essence of the world, whereas the material world is characterized by keeping on changing, sometimes perceptual to precepts and from time to time.²² The transcendent world of Ideas or Forms is above the world of sense perceptions. The transcendent world is more real than the world which we perceive day today. The transcendent world is ontologically real, but in the case of the sensible world that depends upon the reality of the transcendent world. The reality of the sensible world is an image of the transcendent world. Plato believes that the ontological reality of the transcendent world constitutes of Ideas or Forms or Concepts. So, Plato's philosophical theory is known as conceptual realism.²³

Plato in this analogy of cave theory, attempts to show the people who are untrained in the theory of form, who are the prisoner in the cave. They are chained to a wall in such a way not to turn their heads. Suppose a fire is burning behind them; they cannot see the fire, they only see the wall of the cave and the shadow of the fire. The prisoners who are in the cave are unable to understand the shadows. They do not see reality, only hear the echoes and see the reflection of the real objects in the world behind them, which is appearing. This analogy summarizes Plato's ideas and philosophical thoughts. The main focus of this analogy is that the beliefs we have are mostly available to our senses only through the reflection of the actual world. The actual world can be intellectually grasped. This is similar with his "theory of forms." It is higher than the world of thoughts and above the world of the wisdom.

²²Habib, M. A., *A History of Literary Criticism: from Plato to the Present*, USA: Blackwell, 2005, P. 21.

²³ Sharma, R. N., p. 44.

The above analogy demonstrates how certainly we can perceive appearance for reality. Wherever we spotted the inmates in the cave, shadows easily reflected. As a result, Plato attempted to demonstrate that knowledge of about the external world really a mirror of our inner thoughts. As a result, he established that everything we perceive on Earth is an imitation of the genuine thing. The inmates may have knowledge of the book by looking at its shadow, but they do not assert that I am referring to a thing. In this case, actual objects are required in order to enable conceptions. Plato's conceptions are abstract and not like tangible objects. It is abstract and it is our thought. Plato concluded that suppose prisoners once came from the cave and see the real thing in the world; road, sunlight and people passing on the road; he found the reality in the world and the images of people passing it along. From this he tried to draw the attention of the people to the perception of objects to be imaginary.

The seeming reality of the shadow outside the cave is the conceptual recognition that is the image that is being carried out, not the real, but variously motivated people carried them. Plato in his '*Meno*' suggested that knowledge is recollection. According to him, the soul is the main source to recollect knowledge of virtue which is the person already has. Plato's theory of recollection claims that, whatever we know the day-today, in our life, we do not really know anything new. Whatever we know the day-toady in our life we just remember what is known to us previously. As we know that our soul is immortal, when our soul is embodied, we forget our past, what we knew in the past, when we came to the sensible world. Once we come to the sensible world, we will sense objects by contacting it, which reminds us the form of the objects. Plato was influenced by Pythagorean mathematical concepts to explain the nature and structure of the world. For Pythagoras number is fundamental stuff in the world. Though, Plato emphasized on the Idea of mathematics, holding the Idea of a number of Pythagoras. Plato's concept of mathematics was formulated as the study of astronomy because it is necessary to comprehend the divinity of the world's government and, as a result, it is a necessary fulfillment of appealing. He has mainly focused on mathematics, astronomy, and geometry in his mathematical knowledge. His account of empirical knowledge is characterized systematically. However, that knowledge appears to reflect the orientation of mathematical knowledge. He also applies mathematical knowledge in the physical sciences, for example, in Physics. Norman points out that "the idea of mathematical formulation, physical theory is already evident in the account of the geometrical structure of mathematical elements and the explanation of the transformation of one element into another in terms of geometrical structure."²⁴ The idea of

²⁴Gulley, N., *Plato's Theory of Knowledge*, London: Rutledge, 1962, pp. 169-170.

mathematics explains the world's structure. Therefore, he used Pythagorean ideas of 'limit and unlimited' to discuss the mathematical purpose and he also tries to discuss the mathematical indeterminate or indefinitely, given the structure of the mathematical and geometrical shape in the world.²⁵

Furthermore, he tries to analyze the idea of mathematical knowledge. Here God is a divine and supreme living being in the world, whereas the immortal soul of man and the cosmic soul is the superstructure in the world. "This allows the possibility of the assimilation of rational activity of the individual human soul to that of the cosmic soul."²⁶ The individual should apply reason to attain mathematical study and astronomy study. The knowledge about astronomy constitutes the highest value of human beings in the world. So, the law of arithmetic, geometry and astronomy must be studied by human beings in the world. Why should all human beings study arithmetic, geometry and astronomy? Plato argues for the study of mathematics is necessary to understand natural phenomena. "In particular, the notion that the sun, moon, and other planets are irregular and wandering in their course must be eradicated."²⁷ He emphasized astronomy because the study of astronomy teaches us that the regular movement of the heavenly body is an account of training in mathematics. Plato agrees with the Pythagorean theory of numbers; the reason is that science, which is concerned with numbers, is considered the highest value is astronomy. Therefore, Plato considers that knowledge is numbers. He emphasizes that "the theory of propositions as the key to the understanding of the connection with the study of numbers with geometry and the science of astronomy."²⁸ This way, Plato's ideas were implemented in his mathematical knowledge to unify the science of the universe. Astronomy, which constitutes the mathematical interpretation of the world, it can apply to all, which is in the world.²⁹

1.2.0. Aristotle's Theory of Knowledge

Aristotle was much concerned about nature, scope, limitation as well as what is the constituent of knowledge. The definition of knowledge is a hot debate in epistemology as in the discussion of Plato's *Theaetetus*. In discussion, Plato's *Theaetetus* definition of knowledge has come to an end as knowledge is 'justified true beliefs. Some philosophers are agreed with the definition and some are not. Because, for them, justified true beliefs do not constitute the definition of

²⁵ Gulley, N., Plato's Theory of Knowledge, London: Rutledge, 1962, p. 170.

²⁶ Gulley, N., Plato's Theory of Knowledge, London: Rutledge, 1962, p. 170.

²⁷ Gulley, N. 1962, p. 171

²⁸ Ibid, p. 172

²⁹ Gulley, N. 1962, p. 170

knowledge or knowledge. For Plato knowledge is recollection, whereas for Aristotle, knowledge is possible only through the scientific way.

The foundation of Aristotle's conception of knowledge is his great conviction in logic and science. He devised the philosophy of thinking based on his confidence in logic and science. To avoid the risk of error, he advocated the reasoning method. The mind is told by reason to determine the reality or deceit of a statement. This implies that the intellect must be sufficiently rational to ensure that the belief is true. According to Aristotle, the reason is the ultimate foundation for perfect knowledge, which can be attained through causes. Aristotle in his posterior analytics, claimed that all our knowledge about the external world is through our existing knowledge. The things which we know are either true or false. One must believe either true or false as both cannot be at the same time. Secondly, we must know the things that they are. We will know both first and second or we can say both are significant to have knowledge. Aristotle's prior analytics presented syllogistic knowledge and posterior analytics presented his theory of scientific knowledge. On the nature of knowledge, Aristotle says it is two kinds (i) knowledge of facts and knowledge of the meaning of the words. The first one is related to the knowledge of logic, what he called excluded middle, and the second one is called by the knowledge of that triangle, which means so and so on. In the beginning, I mention Aristotle's knowledge of two kinds: knowledge about the facts and knowledge about the word of meaning. Knowledge about the factual world is gained by way of the reason is gained from pre-existing knowledge.

Aristotle believes that knowledge is possible only through valid reason and that reason must be logical, intellectual, and adequate. This is ultimately to confirm the reality of knowledge. He also believes such reasons are the foundation for knowledge. For him, perfect knowledge is possible through causes. He discussed in his syllogism; the reason is the only way in which a structure of two statements follows from each other and the conclusion is drawn from that premise. Even though Aristotle differs from Plato's theory of knowledge, according to him, our sense experience demonstrates that particular substances exist and are built of the substance and the particular does not produce any idea. Moreover, Aristotle opposed Plato's theory of ideas. According to him, the theory of knowledge is based on experiential evidence to oppose Plato's theory of ideas. He believes that there must be particular. Those particulars are referring to the sense of the world, and even particulars are a combination of matter and form. Matter and form are intermediate elements of particulars. Aristotle raised many questions against his master Plato and his theory of ideas. But Aristotle in his doctrine of knowledge agrees far more

than disagrees. His central point of knowledge is stated in proposition and statement with simple subject and predicate form. He also has the contingent notion of knowledge that is based on inductive inference from particular observations. According to Aristotle, perfect certainty can be attained through syllogistic demonstration of his conclusion if it is deductively valid from the true premise.

The premise where we deduce the conclusion, how could we know that those premises are true? If the first premise is true because of premise second, and the second premise is correct because of the third premise, and so on. Then it is suggested that there is a regression. That regression is either circular, infinite or ends in a first premise. It is not known by some deduction; it is the higher premise. Aristotle calls this higher premise as a foundational premise, which is a basic truth. Hence, we can conclude that there is knowledge by demonstration and there is knowledge of basic truth is possible. He comes to the inference that knowledge exists as the object of the “universal form” or essence inherent in the particular primal component. Aristotle acknowledged that Plato’s theory of knowledge is correct and that truth must be justified in a way that demonstrates the proposition’s logical truth. When you see things in detail or as they develop over time, the goal of your knowledge cannot be specific; it must be universal. For understanding, when we say that I know Baula is the name of cow. I came to know by my sense that the specific substance called cow is Baula. Theoretical knowledge is the knowledge of metaphysics, physics, psychology and biology. In his metaphysics, he discussed scientific axioms of beings, categories, form and matter, universals, substances, and cause. In his physics, he has discussed infinite, space and time and changed its relation to actuality and potentiality. In his biology, he has discussed the biological essence of animals. Aristotle’s practical knowledge is based on ethics, politics, and economics, while, Productive knowledge is knowledge of the productivity and creativity of a person. It is also knowledge of rhetoric and art. Here Aristotle’s first principle means origins, beginnings, and foundational in nature. What is the need for Aristotle’s first principles in his inquiry into nature? This principle is to show the direction to know things clearly is better known unconditionally.

The link between knowledge and the first principle is the first basis for knowing the things in the world. “Actually, existing things are first principles because they explain other things, and our knowledge of the world requires us to know the explanatory relation in it.”³⁰ For example, when we say ‘dog,’ we have to explain why dogs are as they are and behave as they do. To

³⁰Irwin, T., *Aristotle’s First Principles*, Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1988, p. 4,

explain the dog, we need to know what is the basic foundation is; once we find them, we have found the first principle of dogs. And what we know about a dog is scientifically prior and foundational in nature is the propositional principle about atoms. But Aristotle was not seeking that principle that is different from the scientific explanation of the first principles. According to Aristotle, the first principle is not propositional what they are referred to; then, the non-propositional things are not related to our beliefs. They are not first principles. When we understand the beliefs of propositional first principles, we may see how they correspond to relevant non-propositional principles. We may grasp the other ideas in specific ways after we understand the first principle. But belief does not make a belief connect into first principles. He describes it as the first principle because, in order to characterize the relationship between facts independent of our ideas, we require adequate beliefs in the right connections.³¹

Later, Aristotle discussed three kinds of knowledge: theoretical knowledge, practical knowledge, and product knowledge. This division of knowledge gives a clearer understanding of his theory of knowledge.

1.3.0. Descartes' Theory of Knowledge

Descartes is the chief proponent of the foundationalism structure of knowledge. What Descartes basically says in his meditation on the first philosophy? One day Descartes sat in his house, and he decided to do his thought experiments. He says I want to figure out what I really know. I am growing up as an adult and accepting the beliefs, but I am not sure which one is true and which one is false. So, I am going to do a thought experiment and try to find out certainty. The thought experiment is as he basically says, let's propose there is an evil demon, and the evil demon is exhausting all his power and like aiming at me and employed on my senses. I can't trust my senses. If I see this board let's just propose evil demon is making it so that board does not exist. Descartes said no evil demon makes me think that the table is unreal, the chair is unreal, and fire is unreal, and this is called exterior world skepticism. Attempting to escape exterior world skepticism is similar.

He is trying to figure out what he truly understands about the world, and he has come up with the basic premise that the truth is that I am discerning, and hence I exist. As a result, I believe I exist. What does this imply? Even if the monster is attempting to deceive me, I am drowning in my thoughts about it. Everything revolves around my head. Someone must exist if someone

³¹Irwin, T., pp. 3- 4

is drowning. It's known as *Cogito*. There is a problem, and you are unaware of it. Your other beliefs do not appear to be based on that. It may be a foundation, yet you exist. But what about other possibilities, as Descartes suggests? Descartes proposes, that God exists and he goes, God exists, he is the Supreme Being, and he would not manipulate me in the way that everything I see has to be true because otherwise, God would be manipulating me that does in nature.

Descartes is happy now, and he knows all the tables and other things exist. This is referred to as rationalist foundationalism. Descartes has notions about the mental content of something that truly exists, and everything else follows from there. The table, the chair, and this knowledge structure all exist for rationalist reason or certain beliefs, that is called foundationalism.³²

1.4.0. Locke's Theory of Knowledge

John Locke, in his "*An Essay Concerning Human Understanding*," deals with many things concerning knowledge of human understanding. This essay is concerned with the certainty of knowing, how human beings acquire the clarity of knowledge and what are the limitations of knowledge. He says that there is a degree of certainty of knowledge, and there is also a limitation of knowledge. Locke says, "Knowledge is the perception of the agreement or disagreement of two ideas. Knowledge then seems to me to be nothing but the perception of the connection of an agreement or disagreement and repugnancy of any of our ideas."³³ Locke, who is a radical empiricist, followed by Descartes, Descartes's knowledge is possible through innate ideas. But in the case of Locke, there were no innate ideas; he refuted them. For him, our mind is "tabula rasa" or blank slate when we are born. We know only through experience. He points out that we have two types of experience: sensation and reflection. Sensation is an ordinary experience of the external world, whereas reflection is about the experience in our mind. It is an internal experience; it makes our mental process conscious of engaging in it. Once we sense something, it reflects our mind; the mind experiences it and thinks, believes, doubting reasoning about it. Locke in the beginning of his Book IV chapter I, says knowledge is favored with ideas only and reason. Knowledge is a sensation about agreement and disagreement between two ideas. For example, White is not black. Here, we will see that 'the idea of white' is not agree with 'the idea of black'. Whereas the 'idea of triangle' there are

³²Cottingham, J., and Williams, B., (trans.) *Rene Descartes Meditation on First Philosophy*, London: Cambridge University Press, 1986, pp. 12-24

³³ Locke, John. *An Essay Concerning Human Understanding*, Hazleton: The Pennsylvania State University, 1990, p. 515.

three of a triangle is equal to a right angle.³⁴ These are the necessary agreements and cannot be separated from each other. Again, this agreement and disagreement can be discussed in four ways. To understand the agreement and disagreement of ideas, we need to understand the four sorts of agreements and disagreements, which Locke accepts. These are as follows:

(i) “Identity or diversity, (ii) Relation, (iii) Co-existence or necessary connection, and (iv) Real existence.”³⁵ Let's discuss all the agreements and disagreements of ideas one by one.

Locke says knowledge about identity is the first action of the mind to perceive ideas. It is necessary and absolute knowledge. We do not apply our reason, thought, and imagination at all. For example, $A=A$, A is not B . Here, the mind perceives the ideas clearly and infallibly. There is agreement and disagreement of ideas within itself. The second agreement or disagreement of ideas is the relation. The relation is nothing but the mind perceives ideas. It is the relationship between any two ideas. For example, eight is greater than seven. When we say 8, is greater than 7, there is a relation of smaller and greater. This is abstract relation between two ideas. This idea clearly perceives by the mind. This is the third point of agreement or disagreement. In substance, it is coexistence or nonexistence in the same subjects. We can perceive the notions of specific objects through this agreement. Consider the metal gold. The colour yellowness, hardness, and weight are all associated with gold. This complicates our concept.³⁶

“If I know that ice is cold this is because I perceive that my idea of cold always accompanies my idea of ice.”³⁷ The fourth agreements and disagreements of ideas are real existence. There is a real existence agreeing with any ideas. The idea of God is real existence. That all knowledge we have we can know concerning these four agreements or disagreements of our ideas.³⁸

1.4.1 Different Types of Knowledge

After discussing the different types of agreement or disagreement between ideas, which represent knowledge, Locke carries forward the discussion of the idea of degrees of knowledge. The idea of the degree of knowledge shows the way the different objects are known. He has

³⁴Locke, John, *An Essay Concerning Human Understanding*, Hazleton: The Pennsylvania State University, 1999, p. 515

³⁵Locke, John. *An Essay Concerning Human Understanding*, Hazleton: The Pennsylvania State University, 1999, p. 515

³⁶Locke, J., P.517.

³⁷<http://www.iep.utm.edu/locke/#SH2e>

³⁸Locke, J., pp. 517-18

discussed three degrees of knowledge, namely, sensitive, demonstrative and intuitive. All three types of knowledge are based on ideas.

(i)Intuitive knowledge.

(ii)Demonstrative knowledge.

(iii)Sensitive knowledge.

Intuitive knowledge is knowledge that is called the highest type of knowledge. According to Locke, this type of knowledge is gained directly and immediately. I know intuitively, A is not B. Locke points out referring to intuitive knowledge: “If we will reflect on our own ways of thinking, we will find that sometimes the mind perceives the agreement or disagreement of two ideas immediately by themselves, without the intervention of any other: and this I think we may call intuitive knowledge.”³⁹ In the view of Locke's intuitive knowledge, no mediator is required. It is direct knowledge of mental ideas. For example, ‘White is not black.’ and ‘circle is not a triangle’. Such types of ideas of truth the mind perceives by intuition. This type of knowledge is attained by the mind without the help of any other ideas. This is the purest and certain knowledge humans are capable of. ⁴⁰ Intuitive knowledge is the maximum kind of knowledge as it is perfect and certain. This is the foundation of knowledge according to Locke's epistemology.⁴¹

According to Locke, demonstrative knowledge is knowing where the mind perceives agreement and disagreement directly through the series of intermediary ideas. For example, we know that 9 is greater than 7, and 7 is greater than 5. Therefore, we demonstratively know that 9, is greater than 5. This demonstrative knowledge is not directly perceived by our mind. It is attained by a deductive process. In this example, we have the demonstrative knowledge which is certain. We do not know directly, but we need to demonstrate to have clear knowledge. For example, in mathematics, demonstrations need intuitive knowledge to demonstrate. Otherwise, sometimes the demonstration may go wrong.⁴² According to Locke, sensitive knowledge is the third kind of knowledge. In this knowledge, the mind makes the connection between our ideas and the things in the world. Locke holds that our understanding of the external world is certain

³⁹ Locke, John. *An Essay Concerning Human Understanding*, Hazleton: The Pennsylvania State University, 1990, p. 520.

⁴⁰ Ibid, p. 521

⁴¹ Locke, J., p. 521

⁴²Locke, J., pp.521-25

when we perceive anything, such as a table or chair etc. Our sensations are caused by the objects outside us.

Sensitive knowledge is the knowledge that is based on our sensory ideas. He also claims that there are differences in sensing objects and remembering perceived objects. Sensing the object is a phenomenal experience, and remembering the experience of the phenomenal object corresponds with the objects in the outside world. For example, I know there is a table in the classroom. I perceived it. This knowledge is the lower level of knowledge.⁴³

1.5.0. Kant's Theory of Knowledge

Immanuel Kant's "*Critiques of Pure Reason*" is a text on epistemology. Kant's philosophy challenges rationalists and empiricists on the possibility of human knowledge. He does not simply adopt the rationalist and empiricist view of knowledge, but he found a fundamental disagreement between the two schools of thought. For rationalists, the ideas we possess are not derived through our experience, whereas for empiricists, the ideas we possess are derived from sense experiences. But in the case of Kant, both rationalist's and empiricist's views are important to define the possibility of knowledge. Knowledge begins with experience but does not end in experience and the reason is the one source of knowledge.⁴⁴

Kant, in his theory of knowledge, explained that "concepts without intuition are empty, intuitions without concepts are blind." It means that knowledge is a mixture of opinions and intuitions (precepts and concepts). There must be an interconnection between sensibility and understanding to have knowledge. When we think about knowledge, we can think with concepts. However, my thinking involves something which is given to me by intuition. When we think we don't know immediately, sometimes we think marvellously but without any content and we may not claim that we know. The senses don't think but understanding does. According to Kant, both sensibility and understanding must cooperate to produce knowledge.⁴⁵ When we try to understand the information offered by our senses, we use certain types of thought, whether consciously or unconsciously. Kant not only brought together rationalist and empiricist ideas on the possibility of knowledge but also demonstrated the limitations of rationalist and empiricist theories of knowledge.

⁴³Locke, J., pp.527-28

⁴⁴ Dicker, Georges., *Kant's Theory of knowledge: An Analytical Introduction*, Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2004, p. 3

⁴⁵Marina, W. A., *Kant's Theory of Knowledge: Exploring the Relation between Sensibility and Understanding*, pp. 9-11

Kant's transcended account of knowledge is objective in nature. He rejects the pure rationalist account of knowledge; however, he also rejects the pure empiricist account of knowledge. For both the rationalist and the empiricist, our mind goes to the objects in the world; then, we have the ideas of objects, and we get knowledge about that objects. Kant points out that our mind can have concepts that are a priori and can give a priori knowledge about objects. He writes:

“if one removes from our experiences everything that belongs to the senses, there still remain certain original concepts and the judgments generated from them, which must have arisen entirely a priori, independently of experience, because they make one able to say more about the objects that appear to the senses than mere experience would teach, or at least make one believe that one can say this, and make assertions contain true universality and strict necessity, the likes of which merely empirical cognition can never afford.”⁴⁶

If the mind depends on objects to have the knowledge, then we can have no universal and necessary knowledge about objects. Therefore, Kant wanted to change the situation like Copernicus in astronomy, like say. Before Copernicus, people were thinking that the sun moved around the earth and earth was the centre of the universe. But Copernicus shows that the sun is the center and the earth is moving around the sun. Likewise, Kant shows that the mind does not depend on the objects on the other hand mind is the centre and objects are dependent on the mind. Furthermore, he claimed that the mind has the ability to know the objects. “Reason must approach nature not as a pupil but as a judge.”⁴⁷ So, the mind is the central mechanism to having knowledge of objects.

Kant distinguishes between the phenomenal world and the noumenal world. According to him, the phenomena world is the appearances to us, which constitute the experiences, whereas noumena are unknowable to us. It is a 'thing-in-itself'; it constitutes reality. According to Kant, all our synthetic a priori judgments are truths of the phenomenal world and not the noumenal world. Kant's noumena are independent of our experience; we are not acquainted with the noumena world. There are things in the phenomenal world that are independent of our experience, but we apply categories to know these objects. The knowledge of the object is

⁴⁶Guyer, P. & Wood, A. W. (trans. & ed.) *Immanuel Kant: Critique of Pure Reason*, Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1998, p. 128.

⁴⁷Masih, Y., p. 333.

universal and necessary. But the noumena or thing-in-itself is unknown to us. We cannot apply the categories to the noumena.

Kant has distinguished between synthetic and analytic judgments and also synthetic a priori and a posteriori judgment. Generally, it seems that analytic propositions are similar to a priori judgments and synthetic propositions are similar to posterior judgments. Analytic propositions are independent of our experience, and synthetic propositions are not independent of our experience. When we negate analytic propositions, it is self-contradictory and does not give any new information about the subjects. For example, “all bachelors are unmarried men.” The meaning of the word ‘bachelors’ is the same as the meaning of the word ‘unmarried men.’ But in the case of synthetic propositions, their negations are not self-contradictory; it gives new information about the objects. For example, all students are intelligent. According to Kant, “synthetic a priori judgments” are conceivable in the fields of mathematics, physics, and geometry. It is synthetic a priori because it is both autonomous of our experience and a priori and at the same time it is synthetic because the subject does not contain the predicate. Such knowledge is possible in the field of mathematics:

For example, $6+5=11$

Six plus five is eleven; it is necessarily true. It is universally accepted. It is an a priori proposition. Kant shows that this is also a synthetic proposition, 11 is not contained in the subject ‘6+5.’ Thus, for Kant, synthetic a priori judgments are possible in mathematics.⁴⁸ Kant also claims that the possibility of synthetic a priori judgment in the field of science specially mathematics, geometry and physics. For example, the three angles in a triangle are 180 degrees. The concept of “the three angles of a triangle” and the concept of “180 degrees” are not the same. Hence, for Kant, geometrical propositions are analytic and synthetic.⁴⁹

Again, Kant would say that artificial, a priori judgment is possible in the field of physics. For example, “Every event has a cause” is a synthetic a priori judgment. It is synthetic because the predicate ‘cause’ is different from the subject ‘event.’ Cause means the necessary connection between two events, but event means any succession of two or more happenings. Thus, the subject ‘every event’ does not contain the predicate ‘cause.’ This synthetic a priori proposition is independent of our sense experience. Causality is necessary for organizing and ordering factual knowledge properly. The law of causality is universally and necessarily true. Hence,

⁴⁸*Critique of Pure Reason*, p. 144.

⁴⁹*Critique of Pure Reason*, p. 145.

the judgment of synthetic a priori is possible in the field of in physics, metaphysics, geometrical science. which constitute the foundation of our knowledge of the world.⁵⁰

1.6.0. Foundationalism and Coherentism

Foundationalism is a view in epistemology which demands knowledge that relies on a secure foundation. According to Rene Descartes, a person who works on anything can be doubted and can be questioned. In his left concepts derivable conclusion, he opines, “I think; therefore, I am.” Once someone has a firm foundation, he can safely build my knowledge about the external world. That knowledge would trust holding because it is based upon a firm foundation. The root word for foundationalism is the foundation. The position in Foundationalism is basically like the bedrock, the things in which everything else has relied upon, nothing else that can be sustained without it. So, for example, there is a building that relies upon a foundation. If the house has secure foundations, then the building is secure or strong. That is one of the positional structures of knowledge. That we need to begin with a certain belief and a particular mental capacity, such as intellect experience and from there, all other opinions relied upon.

A process in which an endless number of things are correctly related is known as an infinite regress. One of the reasons why humans need a foundation of knowledge to stop the infinite regress is that it is one of the most important things they can do. Is this form of argument infinitely regressive? Basically, it allows you to have faith while it is raining outside. Every time you hold such view, you must justify them in terms of other beliefs. What makes you think it's raining outside? Because I have perceived it, or, someone told me. I examine the weather. Whatever the case may be, the notion is that whatever you have a belief, you must justify it. If you say that because of this and that I believe this. But the concerns are, if you claim it's because of the weather, or someone informed me it's raining outside, you are relying on your sense experience. It is called endless regress because you must justify your beliefs. Infinite regress indicates that it continues without even stopping. What the foundationalists advocated was that there must be a point at which we simply stop. Let's say you go from belief one to belief two, and you remark, I have a belief one because of belief two and you claim that these are particular beliefs. That is a really good belief that serves the foundations, such as something really known or something really serves, the infinite regress will come to an end. You do not need to continue because this supports your initial belief.

⁵⁰ *Critique of Pure Reason*, p. 145

There are different versions of foundationalism in epistemology. Some of foundationalists claim the internalist version of foundationalism and others are claimed the externalist version of foundationalism; apart from that, some other versions of foundationalism also essential such as classical foundationalism and the moderate version of foundationalism. There are also some philosophers who divided foundationalism as rationalist foundationalism and empiricist foundationalism. All these versions of foundationalism have been discussed in detail in the next chapters.

Coherentism in epistemology has been discussed for a long time. A coherentist epistemological theory such as the truth of coherence and the epistemological theory of coherentism are the most challenging in epistemology. The importance of truth in coherence theory is different from doctrine of coherentist knowledge. But the truth is one of the prominent conditions for knowledge. There are different ways coherentism has been expanded to include a concept of truth and a concept of justification. For example, Laurence Bonjour defended Coherentism in his “Structure of Empirical Knowledge.” John Rawls discussed the coherence theory in ethics and recently, Coherentism has been developing in artificial intelligence and laws.

In this part, I will discuss the historical background of coherentism. I start with F.H. Bradley, who was the first philosopher and who built coherentism in epistemology. After that, I moved toward the other coherentist philosophers to define coherentism. Secondly, I will discuss how coherentism has developed in epistemology. Coherentists epistemological position clearly states knowledge constitutes a coherent system. The coherentists have objected to the foundationalist theory of the assembly of knowledge and justification. Some philosophers also divided Coherentism into different kinds. For example, Jaap Hage discussed three types of coherentism such as epistemic coherentism, constructive coherentism, and integrated coherentism.⁵¹ Coherentism is a view in epistemology. According to this view, beliefs can be justified in a coherent system. All beliefs are mutually supported by each other for their justification. It means that there are no basic foundational propositions. What coherentism means is that a belief is true only in relation to the networks of beliefs in a coherent system. If a belief is a coherence with the belief system, then that is a justified belief. But there is no foundational proposition independent of the system. According to coherentism, the main rival of coherentist epistemology is foundationalism. The meaning of coherentism is that beliefs cohere with each other in a system for justification. They are not separated from each other for

⁵¹Hage, J. “Three kinds of Coherentism” in *Coherence: Insights from Philosophy, Jurisprudence and Artificial Intelligence*, Araszkiewicz, M. and Savelka, J., (ed.), New York: Springer, 2013, P. 2.

their justification. In short, Coherentism is an alternative to foundationalism, which holds that there are basic beliefs that are independent of a system and are not interconnected to each other for their justification. “A coherence theory holds that the justification of a belief derives from the coherence—that is, the mutual support of an agent’s beliefs.”⁵² According to Coherentism, every belief is epistemically dependent on other beliefs, nevertheless, it also rejects the existence of epistemically fundamental beliefs. There are many issues in Coherentism, for example, the issues related to regress problems, and issues related to the coherence theory of truth, issues related to justifications or knowledge, source of knowledge, limitations of knowledge and many more issues in Coherentism. Coherentists and foundationalists confront regress problems which are the most significant issues in epistemology. Coherentists believed that foundationalism reply to issues in regress is not proper, for them there is no basic belief at all. Even though, Coherentism does not agree with foundationalist's way of replying to the regress problem. Coherentism says, there is no 'basic or foundational beliefs' in response to the regress problem. Therefore, foundationalism cannot offer a proper argument to terminate the regress problem.

Coherentism is historically the greatest critic and alternative to Foundationalism. The contrary between Coherentism and Foundationalism is with regard to the regress problem in epistemology. The regress problem is the central problem for Coherentism and Foundationalism. The second problem of Coherentism is its structural problem and the justificatory problem. Coherentism is not satisfied with the foundationalist theory of the assembly of knowledge and justification. The foundationalist claimed that the regress problem in epistemology can be overcome if we have basic beliefs. Through the basic belief, we justify other beliefs which are non-basic. The basic beliefs can terminate the regress in epistemology. This is the best way to respond to regress problems in epistemology. But for Coherentism, this is not the case since they claim that there is no basic belief. According to Coherentists, the regress problem can be avoided without any basic beliefs. In a coherent system, the beliefs mutually support each other, and this theory terminates the regress problem in epistemology.

Coherentist epistemology holds that the system of beliefs should be taken as a whole or a single unit. A belief can be justified within the system as a whole. “A holist about justification believes that only a whole set of propositions (beliefs, or sentences, etc.), taken as a unit, can properly be said to process or fails to process the properties of being justified. An individual proposition

⁵²Crumley II, J. S., *An Introduction to Epistemology*, Canada: Broadview Press, 2009, p. 133.

can properly be called justified (or unjustified) only in a trivial and parasitic sense: it is justified if and only if the set of which it is a member is justified.”⁵³ Epistemic holism started from Quine’s critique of empiricism in his article “*Two Dogmas of Empiricism*.” He found that belief can be justified in a system of beliefs connected to each other.⁵⁴ According to the non-holistic coherence theory of justification, there are justified beliefs that can be justified with the help of other beliefs. The holistic theory of justification is different from the non-holistic theory of justification. An Individual belief, according to coherentist epistemology, is the primary bearer of the qualities of evidence. F. H. Bradley, the British idealist philosopher, was a champion of Coherentism. He defends coherentism as a theory of truth. Robert Stern has rightly pointed out that coherentism is not an account of justification or knowledge but a criterion or test for truth.⁵⁵ Though Bradley is not a defender of the coherence theory of knowledge or justification, he is the eye-opener of Coherentism. Bradley has defined coherentism as a test of truth. He opposes the correspondence theory of truth. He has shown that the truth of a proposition cannot be decided by correspondence with facts but by coherence with other propositions. Bradley has argued that the truth of a judgment essentially coheres with experience as a whole, and he shows that there is a degree of coherence and also degrees of truth.⁵⁶ According to Bradley, a proposition or group of beliefs is positively related to the members of a coherent set under the coherence theory of truth. A belief’s truth can only be determined by its consistency with other beliefs. The idealism-derived theory of coherence frequently forward to the concept that truth has grades. A proposition is correct if it is consistent with other beliefs.⁵⁷ Here Bradley gives more significance to “the coherence theory of truth” to explain the nature of reality. He makes a difference between appearance and reality.

1.7.0. Conclusion

This chapter focused historical advocated foundationalism and coherentism in epistemology. In this survey, the nature of foundationalism and coherentism has been discussed. Both foundationalism and coherentism theories are rivals to each other for the justifications of beliefs and knowledge claims. Though they differ from each other, they have their own mechanism for justification of beliefs and knowledge. Foundationalism sticks with the foundational or basic beliefs which justify the other beliefs. But coherentism sticks with the justification of

⁵³ Kirkham, Richard L. *Theories of truth: A critical introduction*, Cambridge: The MIT Press, 1995, p. 220.

⁵⁴ Kirkham, Richard L., p. 220.

⁵⁵<https://plato.stanford.edu/entries/bradley>

⁵⁶Ferreira, Phillip, *Bradley and the Structure of Knowledge*, Albany, New York Press, 1999, p. 123.

⁵⁷<http://plato.stanford.edu/entries/truth-coherence/>

beliefs within a coherent system. This survey only touches upon the main issues involved in the foundationalism and coherentism debate in epistemology. The finds that foundationalism and coherentism theory their positions in epistemology from Greek period to till contemporary period. The subsequent chapters will discuss the foundationalism and coherentism in detail.

CHAPTER-2

FOUNDATIONALISM IN EPISTEMOLOGY

2.0. Introduction

Foundationalism is a theory of knowledge that is mainly concerned with nature, structure and epistemic justification in epistemology. It is also concerned with the nature of belief and its justifications. Foundationalists say that “every justified belief is ultimately justified by basic beliefs”. Though, if you are able to show that the basic beliefs are skeptic-proof, and you can make all the rest of the belief’s skeptic-proof as well. For foundationalist thinkers, knowledge is like a building, at the bottom is the foundation, the basic beliefs, then built another belief, the beliefs that straight justified others and built on, then the further beliefs and so on. There are different types of foundationalism in philosophy, for example, mathematical foundationalism, metaphysical foundationalism, ethical foundationalism, logical foundationalism, epistemological foundationalism etc. But this thesis is mainly concerned with foundationalism in epistemology or epistemological foundationalism. There are also different traditions in epistemological foundationalism; some foundationalists are rationalists and some foundationalists are empiricists. There are also different versions of foundationalism, mainly, internalist versions and externalist versions of foundationalism, strong versions of foundationalism and moderate versions of foundationalism. According to the rationalist versions of foundationalism, the foundationalists relied on intuitions and deduction, but in the case of the empiricist versions of foundationalism, they basically relied on the induction and observation of justified beliefs.

2.1.0. Foundationalism: An Outlook

Simon Blackburn defines 'foundationalism' as “the view in epistemology that knowledge must be regarded as a structure rose upon the secure, certain foundation.”⁵⁸ Foundationalism is a theory in epistemology that has secured certain foundations on which the structure of knowledge is built. The whole idea of foundationalism explains how knowledge is possible. It raises the question: how do we know? What are the methods or processes of knowing things? To respond to these questions, we need to provide some reasonable answers to the knowledge claims. For example, one of my friends tells me that Hari is a thief in our college; I may not believe that claim without any strong support. I might be offended by such an accusation and

⁵⁸ Blackburn, S. *The Oxford Dictionary of Philosophy*, New York: Oxford University Press, 2008, p. 139.

may try to find out the reason for such an accusation. I may ask the accuser how you know it. We should not accept the answer that he, Ramesh heard it and so on. This is hearsay; we cannot accept it as a reasonable answer. Besides, this leads to an infinite regress. From the above example, it can be shown that the traditional motivation of foundationalism was formulated as a regress argument. Aristotle in his 'Posterior Analytic' formulates it thus:

“...the premises of demonstrated knowledge must be primary; I mean that they must be the ‘appropriate’ basic truths, for I identify primary premises and basic truth. A ‘basic truth’ in a demonstration is an immediate proposition. An immediate is one which has no other proposition to it.”⁵⁹

Here, Aristotle in his ‘Posterior Analytic’ talks about foundational knowledge and basic truths in a demonstration. According to Jonathan Dancy and Ernest Sosa, “Foundationalism is a view concerning the structure of the system of justified belief possessed by a given individual. Such a system is divided into ‘foundation’ and ‘super structure’, therefore, related that beliefs in the latter depend on the former for their justification but not vice versa.”⁶⁰ Noah Lemos defines foundationalism holding basic belief is foundational. The basic belief is possible if it must be justified. The basic belief is non-inferentially justified or immediately justified. He finds out that justified basic beliefs are of two types such as Beliefs about logical or mathematical truths and beliefs about our own psychological situations.⁶¹ Chisholm points out that foundationalism is an account of knowledge that can explain the epistemic status of empirical beliefs. It functions in three ways.

- 1) If the object of a belief is self-presenting, then that belief is called a basic nervousness.
- 2) Some beliefs might have a kind of prima facie possibility. If a belief is not disconfirmed by my total evident propositions, then that proposition is probable for me.
- 3) A belief may have its epistemic significance if it logically agrees with the other things one believes.⁶²

Mitthias Steup, defines foundationalism on the basis of the availability of basic beliefs. For him "(i) Many of our beliefs are basic, (ii) Every justified inferential belief ultimately receives

⁵⁹ Aristotle, (trns.) by Mure, G. R. G., *Posterior Analytics*, 2014, P. 6.

⁶⁰ Dancy, J. and Sosa E., (ed.), *A Companion to Epistemology*, Oxford: Blackwell, 1992, P. 144.

⁶¹ Lemos, N., *An Introduction to the Theory of Knowledge*, Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2007, p. 45.

⁶² Chisholm, R. M., *Theory of Knowledge*, third edition, Englewood Cliffs, New Jersey: Prentice-Hall, 1989, p. 85.

its justification from one or more basic beliefs.”⁶³ We can understand Steup's definition of foundationalism is a theory about the structure of the belief system in epistemology. According to Paul K. Moser, foundationalism is a theory that responds to the regress problem. According to this theory, there are two tiers of justification, no inferential or foundational and inferential or no foundational.⁶⁴ John Pollock defines foundationalism on the basis of theory of knowledge which is foundational. The doctrine of knowledge according to Pollock is based on doxastic theories and non-doxastic theories. Foundationalism is a part of doxastic theories; According to this theory, basic beliefs are privileged in epistemic status. They are self-justified. This is the position of foundationalism in Pollock philosophy.⁶⁵ He further clarifies foundationalism in terms of knowledge, which consists in accepting some beliefs as basic. According to him, “the foundation’s theories of knowledge have foundations. These foundations consist of a set of epistemologically basic propositions which are supposed to provide the basis upon which we know or are justified in believing other propositions. It is supposed that we, in some sense, have direct knowledge of epistemologically basic propositions. Belief in such propositions is reputed to be incorrigible, or self-justifying, or directly evident, etc. It is further supposed that our justification for believing other propositions must derive ultimately from our justified belief in epistemologically basic propositions.”⁶⁶ Thus, for Pollock, the basic beliefs are incorrigible and self-evident; the belief consists of the foundation of knowledge. Following Pollock Robert Audi also explains foundationalism in terms of basic beliefs. According to Richard Feldman foundationalism can be defined as: “there are justified basic beliefs, and they are the foundation upon which all our other justified beliefs rest.”⁶⁷ For Feldman, the basic beliefs must be self-justified so that other beliefs depend on them for their justification.

From the above discussion, the various definitions of foundationalism hold that there are foundational beliefs or basic beliefs through which we justify other beliefs. Foundationalist different version is based on the nature of basic belief.

In this chapter, I would like to focus on foundationalism in detail and I also discuss how foundationalism adequately addresses the infinite regress problem in epistemology. According to this theory, some beliefs are basic, foundational or non-inferential and some beliefs are non-

⁶³ Steup, M. *An Introduction to Contemporary Epistemology*, New Jersey: Prentice-Hall, 1998, P. 92.

⁶⁴ Moser, Paul K. & Mulder, Dwayne H., and Trout, J. D., *The Theory of Knowledge: A Thematic introduction*, Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1998, P. 86.

⁶⁵ Pollock, John L. *Contemporary Theories of Knowledge*, London: Hutchinson, 1987, P. 27.

⁶⁶ Pollock John L., “A Plethora of Epistemological Theories”, in G. S. Pappas (ed.), *Justification and Knowledge*, Holland: D. Riedel, 1979, p. 93

⁶⁷ Feldman, R., *Epistemology*, Upper Saddle River, New Jersey: Prentice-Hall, 2003, P. 51.

basic non-foundational or inferential. Now there may be a question as if what is basic belief and what is non-basic belief. According to foundationalism, some beliefs which are foundational can be justified on the basis of sense experience, reason or intuition etc. Nevertheless, basic beliefs are self-evident and self-justified. In another way, basic beliefs are non-inferential and nature-oriented. They need not require any support of other beliefs but they support other beliefs for their justification. Such kind of beliefs provides the foundation for other beliefs on which the structure of knowledge can properly be built. For example, “I have a pain in chest”, “I have a headache”, “ $2+2=4$ ” etc. Such beliefs are basic beliefs. According to foundationalism, non-basic beliefs are inferential in nature. They are justified through basic beliefs. For example, “there is a book on the table.” This belief is a non-basic belief because we have other basic beliefs on which it depends.

2.2.0. Foundationalism on Epistemology

Foundationalists' views are contemporaneous in epistemology; it is an indispensable concept in epistemology. In the classical period, Plato and Aristotle can be considered as the pioneer of foundationalism in epistemology. Plato, in his theory of ideas, claims that ideas are real they exist as unchanging and timeless objects. According to him, ideas exist in the third world, which is beyond our sense perceptions. For Plato, ideas are real; they are upheld in another realm beyond the perceptual objects. This is nothing but Plato's foundationalist position. Though he does not give a clear epistemological account of foundationalism, he has defined the clause ‘what knowledge is.’ Furthermore, there is much evidence for considering Plato's theory of ideas as a form of foundationalism. For him, Ideas are universal, perfect, original, and permanent. This gives a certain foundation for all worldly objects. We can say that Plato's 'theory of ideas' lays down a foundational position in epistemology. According to Plato, 'ideas' are real and absolute and they exist beyond the perceptible world. Aristotle is a foundationalist philosopher. His account of foundationalism follows from his consideration of demonstrative knowledge. Aristotle's demonstrative knowledge is based on the syllogism and logical truth. The premise of syllogism contains the primitive immediate by known propositions from which other propositions follow. The conclusion is derived by syllogistic reasoning from the premises.

“Aristotle's treatment of knowledge in the ‘Posterior Analytic’ is generally supposed to be linked with the formalization of geometry. The idea of knowledge grounded in pellucid principle inspired by geometry often returns in the history of philosophy; it became quite strong

in our own modern period of philosophy. The Cartesian project, for example, might seem to be rather Platonic in its search for the certain principal form which could be spun out all else, as if a universal mathematical understanding of the world were possible. Given the continuing fascination of the foundationalist project, particularly in its geometrical version, it may be quite useful to the period in which our fundamental conceptions of knowledge were formulated”⁶⁸

There are many things that are important for foundationalism, but one of the most significant ideas for foundationalism is the regress problem, which implies the basic beliefs and the structure of justification. Additionally, the epistemic regress confrontation is highly implemented by foundationalism, which gives adequate justification for stopping the regress problem. To find out the solution for the regress problem in epistemology is a great success for foundationalism is the vitality in epistemology. For Foundationalist, the theory of justification regarding the regress problem is the adequate reply to skeptics who denies the possibility of knowledge. There are many problems in epistemology; among them, two are more noteworthy. They are regress problems and Gettier problems; these are popular as well. But I will discuss here only one problem: regress problems in epistemology. The problem of regress argument or epistemic regress problem has been recognized in epistemology since the ancient period. In the Greek period, Aristotle took the regress problem seriously, but he has not given a proper explanation or justification to solve the regress problems.

To solve the epistemic regress problem, many epistemologists have given different views. Nevertheless, still the regress problem in epistemology is alive. To know details about epistemic regress problems, let's discuss what regress problems are and how we will resolve them. The regress problem in epistemology we can understand in general as the reasoning process to which there is no end. In another way, we can say that it is an infinite regress. It is a circularity of justified beliefs in which there is no end. In a sense, there is no justification at all in the series. We can better understand the epistemic regress problem through an example, like say, Suppose S believes that P, 'the belief' S believing P, there must be some reason for S to believe that P. Maybe the reason is Q, for S believes that P. Again, someone may be asked there must be a reason for P believing in Q. Furthermore, the reason is R, for P believing that Q. This reasoning process will continue to find out the satisfactory answer to the epistemic regress problem. If the reasoning process continues, then there is an infinite regress.

⁶⁸ Rockmore, T., and Singer, B. J. (ed.) *Anti foundationalism Old and New*, in “Foundationalism in Plato?” by Polansky, R., Philadelphia: Temple University Press, 1992, PP. 41-42.

There are four possible ways to address the regress problems in epistemology. According to Noah Lemos, four possible answers sought out for the regress problem, “(i) the series will terminate in a belief that is not justified, (ii) the series will not end but contains an infinite number of subsidiary of beliefs, (iii) the series is circular, and (iv) the justification series ends in a justified basic belief.”⁶⁹ There may be different theories to solve the regress problem but the most important theories in epistemology to solve the regress problems are foundationalism and coherentism. Let’s discuss the foundationalist view in epistemology. There may be many arguments for foundationalism but I would like to discuss a few of them. The most central confrontation of foundationalism is the 'regress argument' and the non-inferential or basic beliefs argument. The basic beliefs argument is the general argument for foundationalism.

As I have discussed the four options to answer the regress arguments problem earlier, this shows that foundationalism and coherentism seem to be able to stop the regress problems in epistemology. I will take all four options; among the four options first two options would not work to solve the regression problems at all. The last two options, the third option, are circular, which is related to the Coherentist view of justification. But the last option, which is supported by foundationalism, is the better option to show the regress problems. Let’s see and discuss all options; then we can understand which options are better for showing the regress problems. In the regress arguments, there can be four possibilities to get rid of the regress problems, but foundationalism claims that out of the four possibilities, the three possibilities would not work to stop the regress problem. Among the four possibilities, foundationalism, the last one, is the only way to solve the regress problem precisely. That means, according to foundationalism, there are basic beliefs or foundational beliefs which must justify the other non-basic beliefs to stop the regress problem.

Let's discuss all options; then we can know which option is better for stopping the regression problem. In other words, which option is better to justify the beliefs? The first option says that there are no possibilities of justification. That means the skeptics claim that there is no justification at all. So, the series of justifying processes would not be raised at all, for the skeptics' belief remains unjustified. For example, suppose there is a series of beliefs $B_1 \leftarrow B_2 \leftarrow B_3 \leftarrow B_4$. In this case, belief B_1 is justified by belief B_2 , belief B_2 is justified by belief B_3 , and belief B_3 is justified by belief B_4 , whereas B_4 is remaining unjustified in this series. B_4 is an unjustified belief. It is impossible that a belief that is unjustified can justify other

⁶⁹ Lemos, Noah. *An Introduction to the Theory of Knowledge*, Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2007, P. 47.

propositions. To justify other propositions, that belief required to evident first. For example, suppose the police believed that John is a thief. On the basis of beliefs, (a) John's fingerprint is found at the place where things were stolen, and (b) the objects which were stolen also are found in John's room. But in this case, if the police did not justify the belief (a) and (b) and the police believed (a) and (b) as mere guesses, then, the police could not be justified in have confidence in that John is a thief. ⁷⁰

In the case of option (ii) the series of beliefs goes on infinitely, there is no end; it is a continuous process. For example, $B_1 \leftarrow B_2 \leftarrow B_3 \leftarrow B_4 \dots$ the series will continue and we can't imagine the series; it constitutes of an infinite number of beliefs. It is beyond imagination. It is impossible that our beliefs can get support in an infinite series. So, the second option fails to justify the series of beliefs and to explain the regress problem.

In the case of option (iii) it says that there is circularity in justifying the beliefs. Furthermore, we can say that there is circularity in the series of beliefs which means that the justified beliefs come back again to the series which was justified previously in the series. For example, a series of beliefs like $B_1 \leftarrow B_2 \leftarrow B_3 \leftarrow B_1$ is circular. Referring to this series of beliefs Noah Lemos points out that the proponents of the regress confrontation would say that it is unbearable for a belief to deliberate justification on itself. But in order to B_1 to be reinforced by the spherical evidential chain, it would have to confer explanation itself. However, this is impossible say the least. ⁷¹ Suppose Rama believed that (1.) John is honest on the basis of other beliefs (2) Smith is honest and (3) Smith swears that John is truthful, and he trusts that (2) Smith is truthful on the basis of his belief that (d) John swears that Smith is honest and (1), John is honest. Given this belief analysis, the justification of believing (1) is based, at least in part, in his beliefs that (1), so it seems that he is not justified in trusting that (1)

In this case of option (4), it seems that it is a better option to solve the regression problems. Out of the four options, foundationalism is supposed to be the last option. According to foundationalism, there are the basic beliefs that justify the other non-basic beliefs in the series. The basic beliefs are foundational to non-basic beliefs. Though foundationalists solved the regress problems, foundationalism still remains controversial in epistemology. There are also

⁷⁰ Lemos, Noah. *An Introduction to the theory of Knowledge*, Cambridge University Press, Cambridge, 2007, P. 48.

⁷¹Lemos, 2007, P. 49.

lots of criticisms of foundationalism and its theories of the regress problem. Henceforth, the main rival to foundationalism is coherentism.

2.3.0. Foundationalism and its Classifications

Foundationalism has been classified into different types. Some of the important versions are highlighted here as follows.

2.3.1. Rationalist Foundationalism

It is a hard-core thesis, the major exponent of rationalist foundationalism is Rene Descartes, and for him, there are foundational beliefs that are self-justified and self-evident. They constitute the basis for other beliefs, which are non-basic beliefs. Let us discuss Descartes's foundationalism. Descartes is a rationalist philosopher, according to whom there is certainty in knowledge received through reason. He rejected the initial or provisional doubt about knowledge of the world. In the beginning, he doubted everything. This is called his method of doubt. Through this method, he formulated some arguments like the dream argument, the evil demon argument, and cogito ergo sum argument. The intention behind these arguments is to find out the indubitable truth which is never doubted, and which brings certainty to knowledge. Applying these arguments Descartes, reached a conclusion that, "I think; therefore, I am or I think; therefore, I exist".⁷² In other words, I can say that I doubt it. Therefore, I am. That means to doubt something, there must be a doubter, or to think something, there must be a thinker; without that, doubting or thinking would not be possible. That is, self or I must have existed. That need not be doubted. That is indubitable.

2.3.2 Empiricist Foundationalism

The empiricist version of foundationalism shows that the basis of knowledge is constituted by the immediately given, that is, sense data. According to John Locke, the sensation of primary qualities is the foundation of knowledge. For example, the sensation of solidity, which is a primary quality of the objects, contributes to the empirical basis of knowledge. The sensation of the primary qualities is basic in Locke's epistemology. On the basis of their primary qualities, the system of knowledge can be built.⁷³ Barbara Tuchanska points out that the basic element of the empiricist version of the foundationalist theory of knowledge is truth. Truth is

⁷² Rene Descartes Meditation on First Philosophy, PP. 12-17

⁷³ Locke, J. 1999, PP,611-19.

very much certain because it causes rather than the argument given to them. According to him, the fundamental elements of knowledge are to be given.⁷⁴

2.3.3. Kantian Foundationalism

Kant in his “*Critique of Pure Reason*” critically analyses reason and experience. Rationalists and empiricists claimed that reason and experience recognized the source of knowledge. For Kant, neither reason nor experience alone is the source of knowledge. Therefore, he critically analyzed reason and experience in his theory of knowledge. His critical analysis of reason and experience brings a transcendentalist approach to knowledge. That is the foundation of knowledge for Kant; his foundationalism is known as transcendental foundationalism. This version of foundationalism is different from other versions of foundationalism. This type of foundationalism is to solve the question of how we have built the cognitive relation between subject and object possible. The knowledge of synthetic a priori judgment is possible. According to Kant “synthetic a priori judgments are possible in our knowledge of the world”. This is the foundationalist position of Kant’s philosophy.⁷⁵

2.3.4. Internalist Foundationalism

Foundationalism holds that we can have knowledge about external which recognized our perceptions. The experience or sensation of the external world can be justified only through self-justifying beliefs, which are empirically basic beliefs. The internalist version of foundationalism holds that our beliefs are justified through our internal mental states. Our internal states have direct access to the cognitive processes in our mind, which include our beliefs. This suggests that our mental state justified the beliefs. Descartes is one of the internalist foundationalists. The opponent of the internalist version of foundationalism is an externalist version of foundationalism. The externalist states objected to the internalist view by viewing the external world it is important role of justification of our beliefs.⁷⁶

2.3.5. Externalist Foundationalism

The externalist version of foundationalism opposes the view that our beliefs are defensible internally. According to the externalist version of foundationalist, the cognitive processes of

⁷⁴ Tuchanska, Barbara “Is a Non-Foundationalist Epistemology Possible?”, 1999, Barbara Tuchanska: Is a Non-Foundationalist Epistemology Possible? (umcs.lublin.pl)

⁷⁵ Habl Jan, “Problem of Epistemological Foundationalism,” *Paideia: Philosophical E-Journal of Charles University*, Vol. 8, no. 04 (2011) P. 7

⁷⁶ Pollock, J. L., P.21-22.

our beliefs should be reliable. The externalists hold that; beliefs must be justified in a reliable process. The reliability of the cognitive process cannot be assessed a priori or by the internal states. The internal mental states are not sufficient enough to ensure the reliability of the cognitive processes. The external world must be brought into the picture for this.

2.3.6. Classical Foundationalism

Classical foundationalism is also known as strong foundationalism. According to this foundationalist, it accepts the all-basic principle of foundationalism, that is, there are justified basic opinions, and all non-basic beliefs depend on basic justified beliefs for their explanation.

Classical Foundationalism generally holds;

- (i) There are some justified foundational beliefs or basic beliefs,
- (ii) The foundational or basic beliefs support other justified beliefs. In other words, we can say that all inferentially justified beliefs depend on their justification of justified basic beliefs. Keeping the general account in mind, classical foundationalism goes towards providing justification of our belief in terms of foundational beliefs. According to classical foundationalism, there are important ways to make basic beliefs stronger for the justification of other beliefs. Classical foundationalism makes important claims regarding the basic beliefs that are infallible, incorrigible, and indubitable in nature.

The two entitlements of classical foundationalism are (i) the basic beliefs must be infallible, and (ii) the justification of the beliefs can be transferred from one belief to another belief through a deductive process. The infallibility of beliefs requires deduction, logical necessity, and mathematical truth, which is impossible of error; it is very much clear that some of our beliefs can be encountered it. Some of our perceptual beliefs, let say, there is a bottle on the table. I can take this as true, but it is not foolproof. Descartes, in his meditations, reasoned that perceptual; beliefs were not dependable in nature. It could be possible that we are deceived by a powerful evil demon. So, our perceptual beliefs are not infallible in nature. Our memory beliefs are also not infallible in nature. For example, I remember that I was in the classroom yesterday. But this belief is not infallible because this belief can be mistaken or false. It is possible that, according to Descartes, meditation is an evil demon or a powerful machine that controls my mind or I am just as absent-minded or have forgotten it. It seems that neither perceptual belief nor memory beliefs are infallible and give us knowledge. According to Descartes, there is the possibility of infallible knowledge. That the proposition I exist is the

only proposition that is foolproof for me. It is impossible to be erroneous in trusting I exist. I think this is also a proposition, which is impossible to be mistaken. It is infallible, which is foundational. Some classical foundationalist accepts that infallible simple logical and mathematical proposition are true. It is reasonable to think that beliefs of one own mental state and beliefs about necessary logical as well as mathematical propositions are infallible in nature. For example, I am in pain, I have a headache, and two plus two equals four etc. These beliefs are immediately justified beliefs.⁷⁷

2.3.7. Moderate Foundationalism

Moderate foundationalism is a type of foundationalism; it is an accepted basic principle of foundationalism. It is an alternative to classical foundationalism. According to modest foundationalism, the epistemologists have accepted two significant claims of the foundationalism, namely, (1) there are some justified basic beliefs and (2) justified basic beliefs support to all non-basic justified beliefs. We can, therefore, say that all non-basic beliefs depend on basic beliefs for their justification. In relation to classical foundationalism, modest foundationalism is a more flexible and relaxed view regarding the nature of basic belief. It also links between non basic beliefs basic beliefs which will be justified. Lemos points out that “modest foundationalism does not insist that justified basic beliefs must be infallible. Moreover, modest foundationalism does not hold that the only way of justification to be transmitted to non-basic beliefs is through deduction. Modest foundationalism allows, for example, that non-basic beliefs can be justified through various kinds of inductive reasoning, such as enumerative induction and inference to the best explanation.”⁷⁸ This means that modest foundationalist does not need the basic beliefs to be dependable, incorrigible and indubitable.

It is a more advanced version of foundationalism; they added non-inferential perceptual beliefs and memory beliefs can be accepted as justified basic beliefs. Modest foundationalist allows the inductive approach of beliefs to be justified as basic beliefs. Many philosophers viewed moderate foundationalism as more rational than classical foundationalism. Classical foundationalism restricted ordinary beliefs such as perceptual beliefs and memory beliefs are not justified. But moderate foundationalism avoids such kind of problems by taking off one’s non-inferential and unbeaten perceptual and reminiscence beliefs are nearly justified, that justification of beliefs for moderate foundationalists through the various forms of inductive

⁷⁷ Lemos, 2007, PP. 50-52

⁷⁸, Lemos, Noah. An introduction to the Theory of knowledge, Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2007, p. 55.

method/ process.⁷⁹ Robert Audi, Alvin Plantinga, and Some foundationalists maintained a “modest or moderate” version of foundationalism. According to them, the moderate or modest version of foundationalism allows the non-inferential “our perceptual beliefs are not infallible.”⁸⁰ For example, 'I perceive red an apple' that could turn out to be false unless I have solid evidence to produce.⁸¹ For foundationalism, there is a need to allow, as a basic, the empirical beliefs which are corrigible in nature. Therefore, they allow the empirical corrigible beliefs to justify their beliefs within the belief system.

2.3.8. Iterative Foundationalism and Simple foundationalism

Alston is the source of the foundationalism terms simple and iterative. According to his definition of simple foundationalism, there exist p's such that every epistemic subject, S, is instantly justified in holding that p. According to the definition of iterative foundationalism, for each epistemic subject S, there exist p's such that S is instantly justified in thinking that p and S is immediately justified in believing that he is immediately justified in believing that p. The main difference between iterative foundationalism and simple foundationalism, according to Alston, is that iterative foundationalism asserts that the foundations themselves can be known immediately without the need for additional propositions. Simple foundationalism merely asserts that there are immediately justified foundations. The higher-level notion that fundamental ideas automatically justify themselves is not the goal of simple foundationalism. The straightforward foundationalist account only goes so far as to suggest that it could be conceivable to uncover sufficient justifications for the higherlevel conviction that someone is right away justified in holding a foundational belief. Because of an epistemic principle¹⁶ that outlines the requirements for such justification, Alston leaves open the possibility that a fundamental belief may be promptly justified. The believer does not need to hold any additional valid beliefs in addition to these ones. However, in order for this technique to be effective, the epistemic principle must be true and the fundamental belief must in some way be covered by it.

2.3.9. Strong Foundationalism

Among the justification of the beliefs, there are strong justifications, and there are also weak justifications. Strong foundationalism is based on strong justifications, while Strong

⁷⁹ Lemos, Noah. PP. 55-56.

⁸⁰ O'Brien, Dan. *An Introduction to the Theory of Knowledge*. Cambridge: Polity Press, 2017, P. 80.

⁸¹ O'Brien, Dan. 2017, p. 80.

justification is based on our internal states of beliefs. The internal states of beliefs are stronger than the external justification of beliefs.

A Challenge to Strong Foundationalism, then a defense of it. I will contend that his case is most weakened when he employs the explanatory inference method to explain strong foundationalism. This approach is frequently used to explain moderately well-known external phenomena, such as those in science and other fields, and it forces the speaker to abandon his reliance solely on epistemic internalism, or the reliance on internally known knowledge such as “I have a headache”, which is the foundation of strong foundationalism. His argument is further complicated by this explanatory inference, leaving us unsure of any other potential opponents to his claim that there is a real universe filled with mind-independent things and how we may rule out those rivals.

As there are two factions that dispute, it is crucial to establish foundationalism before we begin. McGrew will be supporting Strong Foundationalism, which holds that a belief must be unaffected by mistake, rebuttal, or doubt in order to be considered fundamental. It frequently relies on the notion that an agent may obtain some knowledge through internal processes, including introspection. However, a moderate foundationalist perspective allows for things like memory, the past, other minds, the outside world, and God; it does not take the concept of justified empirical ideas being fundamental as seriously. Due to its fluid flexibility in accepting beliefs, the moderate foundationalist view has the advantage that many more things can be said to be ‘known’, whereas its disadvantage is that because its beliefs are inferred from a background and depend on outside sources, they are at best only speculative. Strong foundationalism has the virtue of being trustworthy, irredeemable, and indisputable, but it also has the drawback of having a predetermined narrowness of accepted views. A major issue in strong foundationalism is the limited number of things one can fully ‘know’. For instance, you may be aware of your existence, but you will never be able to tell for sure if the piece of paper in front of you is real. Descartes, a strong foundationalist, was correct, according to McGrew, that certainties serve as the cornerstones of empirical knowledge. However, in an effort to resurrect strong foundationalism, he chooses to pose the following three questions: Are these solid foundations required, readily available, and adequate to support commonplace empirical knowledge? These are the issues McGrew himself choose to focus on in order to turn strong

foundationalism into an approachable way to support ideas in daily life, and they are crucial to his case.⁸²

A fundamental conviction, such “I am being appeared to redly,” is uncertain. Whether a belief is legitimate may always be questioned. Any foundationalist who has a basic belief must respond to this query. McGrew contends that a moderate foundationalist may find it more difficult to explain their stance when confronted with this issue than a strong foundationalist, but I shall contend later that even McGrew is unable to maintain his position. Strong Foundationalists distinguish between fundamental and non-basic ideas. According to McGrew, strong foundationalists rely on fundamental beliefs, or views that cannot be derived from other beliefs that support them. This is why internalists those who only depend on readily available internal knowledge such that gained via introspection are frequently Strong Foundationalists.

On the other hand, moderate foundationalists think that some fundamental ideas are likely but not completely certain. According to McGrew, the likelihood that these beliefs exist alone proves that they are not fundamental. If beliefs are not fundamental, we must go farther in the past until we arrive at a fundamental belief, and if beliefs are fundamental, they cannot be likely. They must be unquestionably proven to be true, such as the uncontested fact that “I exist.” According to McGrew, solid foundations are required if we are to have justified inferred beliefs and he will not accept the notion of memory or weak sense perception as fundamental beliefs. As a Strong Foundationalist, McGrew firmly thinks that internal information, such as knowledge received via introspection, is a belief that is entirely justified. It is crucial to note this because he will eventually drop it from his argument, thereby rejecting Strong Foundationalism or, more precisely, redefining Moderate Foundationalism as Strong Foundationalism, which exposes his argument’s fatal error.

In order to demonstrate that strong foundationalist ideas are legitimate, he continues, “Is there any factual knowledge...that we simply cannot be mistaken about it?” He argues for strong foundationalism in his paper. As was previously said, strong foundationalism stresses the existence of firm beliefs. All of our empirical knowledge is founded on these sure convictions. In order to demonstrate that strong foundationalism is a useful framework for forming views about, he seeks to identify some factual facts about which we cannot be mistaken. Of course, the question at hand is whether or not these foundations actually exist. At this point, McGrew

⁸² Moriarty, Michael. *Rene Descartes Meditations on First Philosophy With Selections from the Objections and Replies*, Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2008, PP. 24

makes what seems to be the ideal analogy: if you think you have a headache, you are right and your thought is supported. Strong foundationalism is a useful theory for generating ideas because, as he demonstrates with this comparison, there is a type of empirical knowledge that we cannot be mistaken about. It is crucial to his case since it is practically uncontestable. You would be aware that you are not alright even if there was a technique to analyse and measure your present pain sensors and it said you were fine. You have a splitting headache, and it won't go away no matter who tries to convince you differently, how much proof is shown to refute this claim, or how much you want to think that you are not experiencing this irksome migraine. Because you are now feeling a headache, you may be positive that you do. This also falls under the category of internal knowledge. Strong Foundationalists only trust information they can easily access themselves, or what is known as internal knowledge, whereas Moderate Foundationalists are more likely to trust information they have accessed from outside sources, such as expert opinions or scientific data, in addition to sensory perception.⁸³

McGrew is performing great with his defence so far. The pain illustration is undoubtedly a persuasive case for internal knowledge and strong foundationalism. However, some critics will remain unimpressed. After all, the universe of mind-independent objects or things that may be known externally is a far cry from these first-person experiencing claims, this inside knowledge. It is conceivable to assert, "I appear to see something red," and have your suspicions confirmed. However, expressing that is quite different from saying, here is an apple. McGrew acknowledges this, adding that for strong foundationalists, this perplexing discrepancy between appearance and reality is quite the problem. His reasoning starts to falter at this point. McGrew now has the duty to offer a method of reasoning from that first-person foundation, that internal knowledge, to the existence of mind-independent reality, the outward information, keeping in mind that a strong foundationalist approach demands first-person foundations that are internally known. He makes an incredibly dubious recommendation known as explanatory inference, or inference to the best explanation. In many different professions, this kind of reasoning is prevalent. It would be simplest to state that this kind of thinking is one that is most frequently seen in the study of science. A theory is developed. Data are used. Whichever hypothesis appears to provide the evidence with the clearest and most reliable explanation is accepted as truth. Explanatory inference involves a reliance on external data from moderate foundationalism rather than internal data from strong foundationalism, which is an issue when used with strong foundationalism. The fact that there are so many

⁸³ Duke, Kendra. "Defense of Strong Foundationalism", 2016

diverse hypotheses that need outside data to establish whether or not they are justified beliefs is another issue with employing explanatory inference in a strong foundationalist sense. I, for instance, have a headache. Strong foundationalism completely justifies and accepts this internal conviction. However, it would not be entirely justified if I said that if I banged my head, I would undoubtedly get a headache. Of course, if I did hit my head and a headache followed, I may think that the headache was a direct result of the head impact, but that may not always be the case. It all depends on the word might not in that phrase. It only makes my belief more likely. I may not have eaten that day, I may have forgotten to drink my coffee, causing caffeine withdrawal symptoms, or a tumour in my brain may have coincidentally been pushing on a nerve when I struck my head. There are several potential causes for my headache. While it is true that no one could convince me that having a headache is not a reasonable belief, it is also true that in order to support my belief about the precise cause of my pain, I would need to examine several sources of outside information, something a strong foundationalist cannot accept. For this, McGrew has a justification. He explains that strong foundationalism does not hold to the idea that all views are unassailable, but rather that correlating and mutually reinforcing external evidence helps to support our beliefs. I'm not sure how this differs from moderate foundationalism, with the exception of McGrew's insistence. As mentioned in the footnote of his third paragraph, he also states, "I find the case for epistemic internalism wholly convincing," which, coming from a strong foundationalist, he should. However, if this is the case, he should not need to bother with external evidence to support his internal beliefs. A strong foundationalist should never make the claim that if all the external evidence supports a concept, then I do indeed hold a hamburger. If McGrew finds epistemic internalism completely compelling, he should not be need to rely on external data since it is unreliable.

Even though the remainder of McGrew's argument is already much in doubt, we will nonetheless describe it in order to more clearly demonstrate how this theory of explanatory inference fails to support strong foundationalism. McGrew's second proposition is that, assuming that all external evidence, which is assumed to be true but is not acceptable to be employed by strong foundationalists, verifies an internal belief, it is true as long as there are no competing hypotheses. If Descartes, the founder of Strong Foundationalism, hadn't previously refuted this claim by invoking the evil demon, this case would be much simpler to accept. Descartes spoke extensively about the possibility of an evil demon, who could alter our perceptions of virtually everything in order to lead us astray and lead us to believe that we inhabit a physical domain. To be fair, strong foundationalism suggests that we cannot rule out

the possibility of an evil demon. The concept that we live in a real world of mind-independent things is simpler, more believable, and a better-confirmed explanation than the idea of an evil demon, according to McGrew's case against it. I contend that it is not, and I contend that even if the evil demon were to vanish from existence, a number of other competitors might take his place. I can't really demonstrate that I am not a computer programme or a character in a book. I am unable to rationally acknowledge the existence of minds similar to mine or the fact that my memories are unique. How does McGrew interpret these conundrums? He advises us to choose the most straightforward explanation that explains the majority of the evidence and remains constant under pressure. It would make more sense to assert that a god created this universe, whether or not it is physical, if we were to rule out competitor theories using the criterion of whatever was the simplest explanation, which has all the evidence explained and does not continually alter under pressure. In fact, this explanation is so straightforward that even young infants can grasp it. Furthermore, we could readily refute the claim that God doesn't exist when questioned about anything. Given that the concept has persisted for thousands of years, it definitely has the ability to bear pressure of all intensities. It explains all evidence, regardless of how perplexing it may be. Additionally, we may assert that we know that god exists based on introspection. This would arguably carry more weight than the concept of sensory experience, which is an external and dubious hypothesis, given how seriously Strong Foundationalists value the idea of internal evidence. Given that Strong Foundationalists claim that both the existence of god and our ability to see the world via our five senses are only probable theories, this poses a little dilemma. It appears that McGrew's standards for eliminating competitors are very arbitrary. Observe: McGrew claims that there is a real world with mind-independent objects is the simplest theory, explaining away all the data, and withstanding all pressure, while I might argue that a god or an evil demon exists, which seems a simple theory, which explains all the data, and can withstand pressure. However, the idea that god exists is a more Strong Foundationalist idea, based off an internal reflection, and even determined by the father of Strong F. Descartes came to the conclusion that God must exist after coming to the conclusion that he existed. Descartes would never have been caught dead using the Moderate Foundationalist principle of depending on one's sensory experiences until he had thoroughly examined every pre-determined opinion that he had ever had, but McGrew does. This leads me to the conclusion that it appears hard to defend strong foundationalism

without accepting moderate foundationalism in some way, at least according to McGrew's method.⁸⁴

2.3.10. Weak Foundationalism

To justify a belief, we need evidence; the evidence is either strong or weak. If the justification of a belief is weak, then it leads to weak foundationalism. Strong justification is based on the internal state of our beliefs, whereas weak justification is based on the external state of our beliefs. Weak foundationalism allows for the justification of beliefs in an inductive way, though not in the scientific sense of induction. Rockmore points out that the weak version of foundationalism and the strong version of foundationalism are sourcing only in theory but are not successful in practice.⁸⁵

All forms of empirical foundationalism share the central tenet that certain factual views have some epistemic justification which is noninferential and that justification does not come under the perceptual beliefs in the way. That would be required the beliefs have to prior justification. The precise level of non-inferential epistemic justification that these fundamental beliefs are believed to hold can be used to differentiate between different varieties of foundationalism, albeit this distinction is not ultimately the most illuminating. There are three primary perspectives on this. I shall refer to this understanding of the foundationalist solution to the regress problem as foundationalism which is moderate. According to certain foundationalism which is moderate, the belief which is noninferential explanation that underlies fundamental beliefs is enough to meet the knowledge's adequate justification requirement on its own. Therefore, according to this perspective, a fundamental belief is perfectly admissible as the basis for the justification of additional empirical beliefs since, if true, it constitutes an instance of knowledge.

Such fundamental beliefs are ideally suited for a foundational function due to their total justificatory independence from other empirical beliefs. Weaker foundationalism one type of foundational theory since it maintains that certain fundamental ideas have some level of noninferential epistemic validity, albeit a negligible one. However, weak foundationalism varies significantly from earlier, more orthodox iterations. In instance, epistemically weak foundational theorist solution toward the regress issue, it would not describe all that well, must be very different from the moderate foundationalist one. The weak foundationalist is unable to

⁸⁴ Duke, Kendra. "Defense of Strong Foundationalism", 2016

⁸⁵ Tom Rockmore, P. 48

assert, as does the moderate foundationalist, that when fundamental beliefs are attained, the regress of justifications simply comes to a stop. Because they are insufficiently justified on their own, the fundamental beliefs of the weak foundationalist cannot serve as the presumptions that justify everything else. The feeble foundationalist response to this issue is an effort to strengthen the justification of both fundamental and nonfundamental ideas by using the idea of coherence. Roughly speaking, it is claimed that if a sufficiently large, sufficiently coherent system can be constructed, containing a reasonably high proportion of one's initially credible basic beliefs as well as nonbasic beliefs.

Finally, it is generally accepted that weak foundationalism is more defensible than moderate foundationalism since it makes a weaker case for the underlying ideas. For Bonjour weak foundationalism is "the weak foundationalist's basic beliefs are not adequately justified on their own to serve as justifying premises for everything else. The weak foundationalist solution to this problem is to attempt to augment the justification of both basic and nonbasic beliefs by appealing to the concept of coherence"⁸⁶ Weak foundationalism has their own style of justifications of beliefs for the knowledge claim.

Bonjour (1985) makes reference to a term that I will employ as the foundation for the dubious foundationalist assertion. Generally speaking, the argument is that fundamental beliefs do not fully satisfy the reasoning criteria to support non-basic views. Weak foundationalism justifies fundamental ideas by acknowledging the potential of their imperfection. This 'weak' justificatory state refers to a conviction that was originally believable. An initially credible belief's purpose is to support other beliefs, especially other 'initially credible' beliefs, in their justification. Infallibility is therefore not a need for fundamental beliefs. Weak foundationalism relies on coherence, which is related to coherence theories of epistemic justification, to guarantee the consistency of beliefs. Coherentism essentially contends that views need to be made up of a comprehensive collection of beliefs, each of which is mutually consistent and supporting. Since there must be a foundational set of beliefs that are true and justified in order to have knowledge, coherentism does not appear to be exempt from foundationalism.

However, knowledge that ends in a *reductio* can still be seen as being conceivable since our common notion of knowledge implies that it must conclude with something, which we describe to as fundamental. The fact that I have hands and am holding a pen is similar to our

⁸⁶ Bonjour, L. 1985, p. 28.

commonsense perceptions of the world. However, coherentism's appeal to a coherent set of ideas is its major positive feature. But how does the weak foundationalism that is described here stand up to foundationalism's detractors?

2.3.11. Minimal Foundationalism

Minimal foundationalism is a version of foundationalism in epistemology. Minimal foundationalism is a little different from other versions of foundationalism. It tries to revise foundationalism. According to this view, beliefs are justified in a minimal sense. It makes two claims such as 1) there is no special status for the basic beliefs 2) there are no bars for foundationalism being about the external objects. Holding the two principle minimal foundationalism says that there is a difference between the beliefs in the superstructure and the beliefs which are foundational. It is not concerned with the contents of the belief, but it is concerned with how beliefs receive their justification.⁸⁷

Let me give an example then we can understand how minimal foundationalism works; suppose my friend and I are staying together and doing a job at a different company in Hyderabad. When I come back home, I see my friend's coat in the closet; I see a bag of groceries in the kitchen, I smell coffee and hear footsteps upstairs. I got surprised that normally she comes after me. From these beliefs; about the coat, the groceries and the smell of coffee and the footsteps upstairs, it infers that she has come back home before me.⁸⁸ Minimal foundationalism would say that these beliefs are justified by our sense perceptions; there is no inferential relation among these beliefs. These beliefs are all basic beliefs. Furthermore, these basic beliefs are foundational beliefs. From these beliefs, I infer about my friend.⁸⁹ She came home early. She went for groceries shopping. She made coffee. She is upstairs.⁹⁰ Among the above beliefs, there are two sets of beliefs. The second set of belief woe their justification to the first set of beliefs. To get certainty of my beliefs of mine (that no one is staying in my home except my friend), this is a non-basic belief and it is a member of the superstructure. Now there may be a question as if what makes the beliefs get privileged in the first set but in the case of the second, it is not. The answer may be like this, the members of the first set get justified nondoxastically and the members of the second set get justified doxastically that is by the other beliefs.⁹¹

⁸⁷ Steup, Matthias. *An Introduction to Contemporary Epistemology*, New Jersey: Prentice-Hall, P. 108.

⁸⁸ Steup, M., 1998, P. 108.

⁸⁹ Ibid. PP., 108-109.

⁹⁰ Steup, M., 1998, p. 109

⁹¹, Ibid, P. 109

Classical foundationalism and modest foundationalism are less vulnerable to criticism. For minimal foundationalism, epistemic privilege is not the necessary condition for fundamental beliefs. Minimal foundationalism makes the beliefs easy to basic. So, it seems that minimal foundationalism makes the justification of the basic beliefs very easy. If a belief is justified by reason, perception, introspection, or memory and also does not obtain its justification from any other beliefs, then it is basic. In this analysis, the basic beliefs are not a selected few but are rather a large part of a person's doxastic system.⁹²

2.4.0. Chisholm's Foundationalism

In his investigation into epistemology, Roderick Chisholm attempted to support the foundationalism viewpoint. According to him, knowledge has certain foundations upon which we may base the rest of our views. This viewpoint holds that knowledge is a multi-stage building structure of knowledge. However, each of these phases has its own set of precepts.⁹³

He claimed in epistemology that each thesis that a person is justified in believing receives at least some of its support from fundamental premises, which are themselves justified but not by anything else. Insofar as they relate to the person's "self-presenting" states, contingent propositions are fundamental. According to Chisholm, there are states that are such that when a person is in them and thinks they are in them, their belief is fully supported. Intentional states and the sense experience are the two categories of self-presenting states.⁹⁴

A positive assertion will be considered fundamental if comprehending the sufficient to establish its veracity and justification. These statements include "2+3=5" and "if Jones is ill and Smith is away, then Jones is ill" according to Chisholm. The terms "the concepts of certainty, being evident, being beyond reasonable doubt, being acceptable and so on."⁹⁵ were defined by him.

According to Chisholm, non-foundationalist views are predicated on foundationalist beliefs since they are "directly evident." Non-fundamental knowledge is indirectly evident) not definite, whereas direct evident beliefs are those in which certain statements just turn out to be untrue.⁹⁶

⁹², *ibid*, p. 109

⁹³ Weldu, Amanuel. "Foundationalism and Roderick Chisholm", 2014, p. 1.

⁹⁴See Chisholm's "Self-Presenting"

⁹⁵ <https://plato.stanford.edu/entries/chisholm/#EpiEpiTerPriFou>

⁹⁶ Shirley, Edward S. "A Flaw in Chisholm's Foundationalism" in *Philosophical Studies*, 38, no. 2, 1980, PP. 155-160

Finding a path from the beliefs or propositions that form the basis and are in some ways unquestionable, or in Chisholm's language, "self-presenting," to the beliefs or propositions that comprise the rest of our knowledge is the difficulty in a foundationalist approach.

"P is self-presenting = Df Every property that P entails includes the property of thinking"⁹⁷ As an alternative to internalistic epistemology, the structure of empirical knowledge according to Chisholm is shown.

Chisholm employs particularism, a commonsense strategy developed G. E. Moore, which starts by making a preliminary suggestion. Chisholm responds to Socrates' inquiry, "What is the difference between knowledge and accurate opinion?" by analysing epistemic justification. According to him, justification is an early connection founded on the epistemic objectives and ethical principles of believing known as epistemic preferability. To clarify the degree necessary for knowing, Chisholm provides words of epistemic evaluation connected with distinct levels of justified belief. The epistemology championed by Chisholm, initially put out by René Descartes, is foundationalism. In support of it, Chisholm offers a novel justification for why sense-data propositions basic truths about one's mental/phenomenal experiences serve as the basis for empirical knowledge.

According to Chisholm, sense-data statements about how objects seem are self-presenting, definite, and plainly obvious under certain circumstances the basis of empirical knowledge.

In order to clarify how required facts are also fundamental, Chisholm defines a priori knowledge. This definition clarifies Kant's assertions on the status of Chisholm's epistemic principles and sheds light on his statements regarding synthetic a priori propositions.

We find some problem when we account about the justification of ideas about the outside world (non-foundational premises) from assertions about the contents of one's mind, which has confounded philosophers since John Locke, is finally resolved by Chisholm (foundational propositions). To wrap off his explanation of justification, Chisholm suggests epistemic principles that clarify the functions of vision, memory, and coherence (confirmation and concurrence).

Descartes argued that the basis of empirical knowledge must be certainties, or ideas about which one cannot be wrong. His basis consisted of ideas that not even an all-knowing, all-powerful, wicked genius could trick him about. It incorporated psychological assertions about

⁹⁷ Ibid, p. 19.

himself in addition to logical or necessary facts. These statements include I exist, I doubt, I deny, I deny, I imagine, etc. Most crucially, “I have sensory impressions of.” Perhaps the most important propositions on which all empirical knowledge is based are those of the final category, i.e., those regarding one’s psychological or phenomenological states that describe the sensory facts directly.

2.4.1 The Presenting of Oneself

A subject that has several qualities may be considered to experience all of them as being suggested by what psychological or “Cartesian” theory has to say about them. A few examples are feeling depressed, seeing a golden mountain, imagining oneself to be intelligent, and the odd phrase is appeared redly to. Another example is feeling melancholy. The distinguishing feature of a self-presenting property is that every trait it includes must be one that, if a person possesses it and also thinks about whether he has it, he would ipso facto ascribe it to himself. Thus, rather than defining these traits in terms of certainty, we will instead develop a material epistemic principle that connects these properties to certainty.⁹⁸

The self-presenting may be distinguished from “the self-presented.” A property that presents itself may not be taken into consideration by the owner, in which case it will not offer itself to that owner. However, if the owner acknowledges his possession of it, he will accept this reality and the asset is considered to be self-presented. What is psychological implies whatever is self-presenting. That is to say, there is a psychological quality that is necessary such that if one has the psychological property, one inevitably possesses the self-presenting attribute. And everything that presents itself has psychological elements. In other words, any self-presenting feature must be such that, if one imagines it, one imagines some psychological attribute.⁹⁹

I would reply that Descartes’ definition of thinking is that it is self-presenting. When he says,

“By the word thought I understand all that of which we are conscious as operating in us. And that is why not alone understanding, willing, imagining, but also feeling are here the same as thought... If I mean to talk only of my sensation, or my consciously seeming to see or to walk, . . . my assertion now refers only to my mind, which alone is concerned with my feeling or thinking that I see and I walk.”¹⁰⁰

⁹⁸ Chisholm R. *The Foundations of Knowing*, Minneapolis: University of Minnesota Press, 1982, p. 10

⁹⁹ Ibid, PP. 10-12.

¹⁰⁰ Principles of Philosophy, Part 1, Principle 9, in E. S. Haldane and G. R. T. Ross, eds., *Philosophical Works of Descartes* (Cambridge: The University Press, 1931), p. 222.

All of the qualities Descartes mentions here are ones that, if a person has them and ponders whether he possesses them, he would ascribe to himself. According to our concept, several non-psychological qualities also manifest themselves. The ability to be either a stone or to take anything into consideration is an example. But the psychological feature of contemplating something entails and implies this attribute. There are methods of being appeared to and ways of perceiving all that are such that being presented to in certain ways is self-presenting, which may not be evident from the paragraph from Descartes. Accordingly, there is something we can refer to as a method of being seen to that is such that if you are presented to in that way and if you think of yourself as having been appeared to in that way, then you will assign to yourself the quality of having been appeared to in that way.

Therefore, any self-presenting trait is one that, if you think you have it while you have it, then you will think you have it. Now let's observe that thinking and believing are self-presenting. If you feel depressed and think that you are depressed, you will assign depression to yourself. You will believe that you are sad if you think about being sad and then think about thinking about thinking about being sad. And if you think that you are sad and that you are thinking that you are sad, then you will think that you are thinking that you are sad.

Here, there is no regress. We are not arguing that if you think about how sad you are, you'll believe that you are thinking about how sad you are. Furthermore, we do not imply that if you think you are depressed, you will continue to think you are depressed. Because we may think and believe without thinking about how we think and believe. It is possible to read our concept of the self-presenting as meaning that its existence is "indubitable." This interpretation is accurate if "doubt" is understood to mean deliberate non-belief. We made the assumption that if you have a self-presenting property and you think of yourself as having one, you would believe that you do, and if you believe that you do, you cannot simultaneously question that you do. But it's important to separate this kind of indubitability from the epistemological notion of certainty.

2.4.2 Self-Presentation and Certainty

I didn't use proof or certainty to define self-presenting qualities. However, the individual who has such traits is also aware of their existence. Furthermore, if we consider certainty to be the greatest level of epistemic justification, we may state that an individual's "self-presenting" features constitute an object of certainty for that individual. In fact, with regard to such evidence and confidence, we may claim the following "material epistemic principle".

If the quality of being “F is self-presenting,” then it is definite for every x that he is F if x has the quality of being F and if x believes he possesses that quality. There is a self-presenting property for every self-presenting property. As a result, we may state that it is guaranteed for any x that he has certain feature, if x possesses the quality of being sad and if x questions whether he is sad. It will be clear for you that you are contemplating whether you are sad if considering also involves self-presentation and you consider whether you are considering whether you are sad. Our concept shows how positive epistemic status is supervenient on a collection of non-epistemic facts. Which some have referred to as the supervenient nature of epistemic justification.

One may say that the evidence provided by our self-presenting features constitutes that which is directly obvious, or more specifically, that which is directly evident a posteriori. When we possess these qualities, our direct attributions of them become immediately clear. The same is true for the attribution of the characteristics implied by self-presentation. Anything inferred or included by such attributions is plainly visible, as well. Because of these and other undesirable characteristics, it may be said that not believing in ghosts might make having them obvious to oneself. By our definition, these characteristics won't be self-presenting, but they can be implied by one that is, like the characteristic of believing in ghosts or not. (The latter trait may manifest itself even to persons who have no sense of ghosts. The theory of evidence depends on this result.) We do not, however, imply that such features are self-presented when we state that they are.¹⁰¹

2.4.3 Chisholm's empirical foundation

The externalism viewpoints in epistemology seem to be supported in this discussion of Chisholm epistemology. His externalist theory of knowing justification is dependent on a variety of individuals outside characteristics. The theory promotes to individual actions cannot justify just with describing what is important to them personally.

Chisholm said that internalism is not an alternative to externalism but rather an alternative to externalism as a philosophy. He claims that individuals who support internalism are unable to speak the truth. He also appears to think that internalists build their arguments on certain

¹⁰¹ Compare William P. Alston, Two Types of Foundationalism, *Journal of Philosophy*, 73 (1976), 165-85, esp. 170; and Ernest Sosa, "The Foundations of Foundationalism," *Nous*, 15 (1981).

considerations that "do not consider" the outside forces that influence how knowledge is justified.

I believe that using the example of a guy who believes that there is a sheep in his property would best illustrate Chisholm's point of view. On this instance, a guy thinks that a white sheep is in his property since he can make one out in the distance. However, the animal he really sees is a white dog. Despite this, the same individual is unaware that a white sheep is dozing off on another area of the complex. The presence of a white sheep inside the enclosure serves as a "internal justification" in the person's eyes. Based on the evidence that a sheep is present within the complex, he is correct that such an animal exists. He is mistaken because his environmental variables caused him to assume that the white dog was a sheep, even though he just sees a dog and not the sheep.

According to Chisholm, internalist philosophers would agree that the man is entitled to assert that a white sheep exists in his property based on what he observes. The dog may approach the guy and he will then understand there are no sheep in the complex, therefore this is not a good foundation for the argument. This shows that the internalist method of reasoning is flawed or dependent on non-externalist factors.

Chisholm's point is that internalist can say that the person is justified the belief that "there is a white sheep" in his complex based on what he perceives. However, this is the not a strong root for making his argument. Because the dog could be move closer to the person, after that he will realized that there is not sheep in the compound. This is indicating that the internalist way from justification is wrong and rest on reflections that are not externalist. Here Chisholm's position can be considered as empirical or externalist foundationalist. For that he allows the internal factor towards the empirical sense which is based on our evidence.

2.5.0. Concluding Remarks

The different approaches to justifications for knowledge claims by the different types and versions foundationalism give the new approaches of think foundationalist theory of justification in epistemology. I have raised the issues, like, say, the unlike kinds of foundationalism in this chapter. The robust foundationalists demand too much for the justification of beliefs, which cannot be easily fulfilled. The weak version of foundationalism is more feasible because it allows for inductive reasoning to justify the beliefs. Therefore, it is always possible to defend weak foundationalism against the attack of coherentism in

epistemology. Chapter two ended with compromising foundationalism. Basically, modest version of foundationalism that differs from the classical version of foundationalism. It allows foundational beliefs can be fallible. This version of foundationalism compromises a minimal sense of justificatory approach compares to classical foundationalist approaches.

CHAPTER-3

COHERENTISM IN EPISTEMOLOGY

3.0. Introduction

Coherentism is short of the sovereignty among British optimists at the opening of the early 20th century. It is advocated early by H. H. Joachim (1906), F.H. Bradley (1914), B. Bosanquet (1911; 1920), and Brand Blanshard (1939). The development of a distinctive variety of coherentism in philosophy is possible after spending time at Oxford University with F.H. Bradley. Before that, coherentism was outshined by the growth of the “Vienna Circle” and its philosophical inquiry. Till that period, coherentism has been unconvincingly held. It is only in a handful of philosophers. Later, the most significant philosophers and modern thinkers like Laurence BonJour (1985), Keith Lehrer (1974; 2000), Jonathan L. Kvanvig, and other coherentist philosophers formally discovered coherentism in epistemology.

This chapter is critically examining coherentism theory and architected explanation and knowledge. Main aim is to determine whether the coherentist theory of knowledge and reason is an alternative way to terminating the epistemic regress problem in epistemology. This thesis also discusses how the coherentism theory of information and justification is an alternative to the foundationalist theory of epistemology and justification. I focus on BonJour's coherentist position in epistemology and some criticism against BonJour's coherentism in epistemology. This chapter has been divided into two sections. In Section-I, I will discuss what coherentism is and its theory of knowledge in general. Section-II will discuss the different versions of coherentism and their epistemological framework, with special reference to Laurence BonJour coherentism in epistemology. At last, I will discuss some of the arguments for coherentism and the arguments raised against coherentism in epistemology. Coherentism holds that the explanation of a belief is derived from its coherence with other beliefs. Coherence theorists deny the possibility of any beliefs which are epistemically self-determining of other thoughts. Hence, they reject that there are epistemically basic opinions which is accepted by foundationalism. ¹⁰²

¹⁰² BonJour, L. *The Structure of Empirical Knowledge*. Cambridge: Harvard University Press, 1985, PP. 87-89.

3.1.0. Coherentism: A outlook

Coherentism is a model of epistemic explanation. According to this view, the structure of explanation or information is based on the belief system that is completely justified within the coherence system. The justification of beliefs or knowledge claims shows that the beliefs are mutually supported by each other within the system. All justified beliefs are acceptable under their relations to other beliefs. A is justified in trusting that B if and only if A's beliefs that B fits with A's systems of beliefs C. There are no such beliefs that are non-inferential or basic. According to Elke Brendel, "Coherence is a relation between an accepted belief and an acceptance system of an epistemic subject: P coheres with such an acceptance system if and only if all skeptical objections to P can be met."¹⁰³

Brand Blanshard defines coherentism in terms of coherent knowledge; according to him, "fully coherent knowledge would be knowledge in which every judgment entailed, and was entailed by the rest of the system".¹⁰⁴ Here Blanshard embraces the solidier version of the coherence theory. That version is fundamentally metaphysical, which is concerned with the nature of truth and knowledge. True judgment must be entailed by others.¹⁰⁵ Furthermore, Brand Blanshard pointed out that "for Bradley and Bosanquet, the reason was the presence in the experience of something described variously as a "nisus towards wholeness", "the spirit of totality", and 'logistability'. The terms were somewhat forbidding, but there was nothing mysterious in their meaning. Wholeness meant two things: completeness and interdependence of parts."¹⁰⁶

F. H. Bradley, the British idealist philosopher, was a champion of coherentism. He defends coherentism as a theory of truth. Robert Stern has rightly pointed out that coherentism is not an account of justification or knowledge but a criterion or test for truth.¹⁰⁷ Though Bradley is not a defender of the coherence theory of knowledge or explanation, he is the eye-opener of coherentism. Bradley has defined coherentism as a test of truth. He opposes the communication theory of reality. He has shown that the truth of a proposition cannot be decided by correspondence with facts but by coherence with other propositions. Bradley has argued that

¹⁰³ Brendel, Elke. "Coherence Theory of Knowledge: A Gradational Account", *Erkenntnis*, Vol. 50, No-2/3, 1999, p. 300.

¹⁰⁴ Blanshard, B. *The Nature of Thought*, Vol. 2, New York: The Macmillan Company, 1940 p. 264

¹⁰⁵ Cohen, Jonathan L. "The Coherence Theory of Truth", in *Philosophical Studies*, Vol.34, no 4, 1978, p. 353.

¹⁰⁶ Brand, Blanshard. *Reason and Analysis* (London: Routledge, 1962), p. 90

¹⁰⁷<https://plato.stanford.edu/entries/bradley>

the truth of a judgment essentially coheres with experience as a whole, and he shows that there are the degree of coherence and also degrees of truth.¹⁰⁸

According to Bradley, a proposition or group of beliefs is positively related to the members of a comprehensible set under the coherence theory of truth. A belief's certainty can only be determined by its consistency with other beliefs. The idealism-derived theory of coherence frequently it has degree of justification. The proposition is correct if it is consistent with other beliefs.¹⁰⁹ Here Bradley gives more significance to "the coherence theory of truth" to explain the nature of reality. He makes a difference between appearance and reality.

There are many philosophical views that have been seen regarding coherence theories coherence like the coherence doctrine about certainty. But this thesis focuses on the coherence theory of epistemic explanation and the coherence theory of knowledge. The term "coherence" has been used in different senses by different philosophers. There is no suitable definition has been found in the history of epistemology. The system of coherence is a completely interrelated/interconnected system. There is no proposition to be found out of arbitrariness; each proposition would require the other proposition to be taken jointly. The coherence theory of knowledge and truth is also advocated by other thinkers from different domains, like the Church fathers to Leibnitz, Hegel, and beyond. Classical account of the definition of knowledge, knowledge is justified accurate belief with an account is correct that maintaining justified true belief is necessary for knowledge. Here, we identify that there are two kinds of "coherence theory of knowledge" namely virtue of integrating the coherence theory of justification and other is justification and truth incorporating the coherence theory of knowledge. This type of coherentist view seeking by the positivist philosophers Neurath and Carnap by the defense of the coherence theory of knowledge and reality.

Laurance BonJour is one of the champions of contemporary epistemology. Basically, he was a defender of the coherence theory of empirical knowledge. He points out that "coherence is a matter of how well a body of beliefs "hangs together" how well its component beliefs fit together, agree or dovetail with each other, so as to produce an organized, tightly structured system of beliefs, rather than either a helter-skelter collection or a set of conflicting subsystems. It is reasonably clear that this 'hanging together' depends on the various sorts of inferential, evidential, and explanatory relations which obtain among the various members of a system of beliefs, and especially on the more holistic and systematic of these"¹¹⁰

¹⁰⁸Ferreira, Phillip. *Bradley and the Structure of Knowledge*, Albany, New York Press, 1999, p. 123.

¹⁰⁹<http://plato.stanford.edu/entries/truth-coherence/>

¹¹⁰ BonJour, L. *The Structure of Empirical Knowledge*, Cambridge: Harvard University Press, 1988, p. 93

Nicholas Rescher defines coherentism as: “a coherentist epistemology thus views the extraction of knowledge from the plausible data by means of an analysis of best-fit considerations. Its approach is fundamentally holistic in judging the acceptability of every purported item of information by its capacity to contribute toward a well-ordered, systemic whole”.¹¹¹

According to Ernest Sosa coherentism, he means that it is a view “according to which the ultimate sources of justification for any belief lie in relations among that belief and other beliefs of the subject: explanatory relations, perhaps, or relations of probability or logic”.¹¹²

According to Kith Lehrer, coherentism is that which holds the coherence theory of information. According to this view, he points out, “S knows that P if and only if S accepts that P, S is personally justified in accepting that P, and S's personal justification for accepting that P is undefeated or irrefutable by the error of S. This account reduces to the theory that S knows that P if and only if S's personal justification for accepting that p is undefeated or irrefutable by errors of S. Personal justification is a relation of coherence between a target acceptance and an evaluation system of a subject that enables the subject to meet objections to the target acceptance.”¹¹³

According to Peter Murphy, “coherentism is a theory of epistemic justification it implies that for a belief to be justified it must belong to a coherent system of beliefs. For a system of beliefs to be coherent, the beliefs that make up that system must “cohere” with one another. Typically, this coherence is taken to involve three components: logical consistency, explanatory relations, and various inductive (non-explanatory) relations.”¹¹⁴

The main idea of Coherentsim consists of the denial of foundational or basic beliefs. Each belief must have justified by the virtue according their common support or coherence relations. The coherentist rejects the foundational conception of justification of beliefs.

¹¹¹ Rescher, N. *Epistemology: An Introduction to the Theory of Knowledge*, Albany: State University of New York, Press, 2003, p. 132.

¹¹² Sosa, E. *Knowledge in Perspective: Selected essays in Epistemology*, Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1991, P. 184

¹¹³ Olsson, Erik J. (ed.), *The Epistemology of Keith Lehrer*, in "Coherence, Circularity, and Consistency: Lehrer Replies", Dordrecht: Kluwer Academic Publishers, by Lehrer, K. 2003, p. 310.

¹¹⁴ Murphy, P. “Coherentism”, *Internet Encyclopedia of Philosophy*, 2006.

According to them, beliefs constitute a spider's web and the beliefs stand up like a web, mutually supporting each other.¹¹⁵

The thesis of coherentism is framed in the view of the rejection to the rival foundational doctrine. Coherentist idea is that all information not justified beliefs rely merely special status of non-inferential justification and acceptable belief. With this basic thoughtful of coherentism, we move to the next section, where we explore the significance of coherentism.

Epistemological coherentism is known as “Coherentism.” It is distinguished from other theories. Coherentism is a theory of explanation but not a theory of reality. The truth of coherence doctrine states the propositions are right it adheres with the set of belief proposals. This doctrine of certainty has been largely neglected by epistemologists. Let us take the propositions. Such as, I am a rational being who adheres with I am in the cupboard, I am moving without clothes, and I eat grass. It adheres with this set of intentions. Modern Coherentists stay away from this theory of truth. Joachim said truth is “essential conceivability or systematic coherence.”¹¹⁶ But such theories are no more forwarded the epistemologists.

Coherentism in epistemology is contrasted with coherentism as a theory of truth, which has been dropped within the realm of semantics and the philosophy of language. Coherentism in epistemology has arisen historically in disagreement with foundationalist epistemology. According to this view, the structure of knowledge is such that necessarily all knowledge rests on a base of mutual support or coherence relation. Coherentism also arises theoretically in response to the degenerate argument. According to the coherentist, we have a ground for a belief, the ground that needs justification and a regress is thus beginning. The options are open to avoiding a skeptical problem that there is no arbitrary ending point concerning grounds and no infinite justification process. But there can be a circle in some sense which generates coherence support or networking chain for each.

The significant feature of coherentism is doctrine of doxastic, which states all beliefs have the equal epistemic value. That is, they mutually support each other. If we have a reason for equating one of the beliefs we accepted those evidence equating each proposition. The second significant feature of coherentism is that it is concerned with epistemic regress problems. The coherentist claims that the regress problem can be terminated if the belief is justified by other beliefs in

¹¹⁵ Anonymous, *S. Foundationalism Versus Tribal Epistemology*, 2015, pp. 52-53

¹¹⁶ Joachim, H. H. *The Nature of Truth: An Essay*, Oxford: The Clarendon Press, 1906, p.68

coherence or in mutual relation in a system. Coherentism throw-outs the foundationalist's assumption that explanation is direct. The coherentists have denied authenticity of regress claims. The regress confrontation has to supposition the evidence for the belief. It took the other form of belief: B2 is justified B1, while B1 justifies B. the justification of coherentism is a coherent or holistic way. Here the coherentist claims that B does not justify a part of same illative chain of perceptive process.

Other valuable thought of coherentism is we see the difference between objective and subjective styles of reasoning. It has defined coherence in terms of good explanations. In this view, the hypotheses are justified by the proper explanation of the things and the things are justified in the view of our theories. A crucial task for coherentist theory is to state the conditions under which the explanations occur. An altered unbiased account of coherence relation has been existing by Laurance BonJour. According to him, there are five features of coherence such as:

- “1) logical consistency,
- 2) the extent to which the system in question is probabilistically consistent,
- 3) the extent to which inferential connections exist between beliefs, both in terms of the number of such connections and their strength,
- 4) the inverse of the degree to which the system is divided into unrelated, unconnected subsystems of belief, and
- 5) the inverse of the degree to which the system of belief contains unexplained anomalies.”¹¹⁷

The features are necessary for the version of unbiased coherence, but by themselves, they are not enough. We need consideration of these factors to know how to provide a calculation to the total system of coherence. Coherentism claims rational way justification of beliefs are possible. Foundationalism, according to coherentism, looks for basic or foundational beliefs for the justification of other beliefs. But coherentism usually assumes the evidence is purely act of the association between system of beliefs. So coherentism charged foundationalism claims to there can be no basic beliefs to support the entire belief system.

Coherence usually takes a subjective approach to the belief that it must be coherent, claiming that the system in which coherence is demarcated is a human belief system. Coherence may be defined in terms of a society's common knowledge system in social variants of coherentism.

¹¹⁷ BonJour, L. 1985, PP. 93-100

The issues are coherentism is the nature of coherence among the beliefs. It is very much clear that coherentism is basically the property of beliefs in a coherent system. The founder of the coherence systems says that each and every belief is related to each other or mutual support among the beliefs. All beliefs have logical relation and logical consistency. The beliefs which are logically inconsistent with each other than that could not be truly justified by the knowledge. But in the same way, opponents of these doctrines sometimes suggest that a mere consistent belief system is not enough for a serious degree of coherence. Some of them which are independent of each other and have no coherent contact among the beliefs in a set, and they could not be in conflict with each other. These are not coherent at all, and they might be providing the real justification for those beliefs. For example, consider beliefs like the grass are green, today is Friday, and the belief that Sachin Tendulkar is a good cricketer. These sets of beliefs are consistent but have no contact with each other.¹¹⁸

According to coherentism, a belief does not signify knowledge that lies outside a system of theories. It needs to fit into a system for its justification. That fitting pattern must be in an appropriate way. That means coherence or mutual support is one of the fundamental features of coherentism. Another nature of coherence is reasonable steadiness. The beliefs which are in a system must have some logical consistency of coherence. That is, beliefs must support each other in a consistent system. And it is the nature of mutual support which gives us insight into the nature of coherence. A set of beliefs is said to be coherent if they are sensibly unswerving.

Many theorists have argued that logical consistency is an essential but insufficient condition of coherence, but as we will see, Lehrer has unrestrained even this. A more robust definition of coherence insists on the deductive connection of beliefs. This type of connection is found in geometry or logic. Indeed, accepting a geometrical system's postulates and theorems would result in a cohesive set of beliefs. Each belief in this system is inextricably linked to another. This turns out to be a very powerful sense of coherence. However, any belief derived through induction would not be counted as cohering with other beliefs in this logical paradigm. As a result, most coherentists regard logical relationships among beliefs as one possible way to link

¹¹⁸ Bonjour, L. *Epistemology: Classic problems and contemporary responses*, Lanham: Rowman & Littlefield, 2010, p. 87

ideas, but coherence should not imply that this is the only option.¹¹⁹ Deductive relationships among beliefs are not the only factor of a coherent system of beliefs.

3.2.0. The Coherence Structure

All beliefs are evident to justification only being inferentially connected among the beliefs with broader framework of spider web asserted by Bonjour. Fundamentally, a belief's justification comes from the coherence of the belief system as a whole, not from a single belief. Take into account the following as an example.

Let's a, b, and c stand in for a group or set of beliefs called B, that affirm proposition Z.

1. Proposition Z is justified if and only if set B is coherent reason.
2. If set B is coherent reason, then all beliefs within in a system is justified.
3. The set B is logical coherent, so justified.
4. As a result, set B justifies the proposition Z.

Set B gets related to the proposition Z. Set and proposition are connected in a special way as a result of this association.

Any way the beliefs in the set B are arranged, they will all logically need a justification. As a result, we have a coherent set of beliefs that are all mutually supporting of proposition and consist of linearly related beliefs. Therefore, proposition is supported. Let's say that new information leads to the development of beliefs that support proposition, in which case those beliefs must be consistent with set. This permits the belief system's coherence to be maintained. Furthermore, a set of beliefs that are supported by evidence can be used to support other sets of beliefs, or perhaps two or more evidence-based sets can be used to support yet another set, and so on.

3.3.0. Verities of Coherentism

There are different varieties of coherentism in epistemology. All the versions of coherentism hold the basic idea of coherentism, that there are mutual relations/supports among the beliefs in a system for their justification. But we will see there are serious difficulties in establishing circular chains. Let's try to formulate a more acceptable version of coherentism so that we can

¹¹⁹ Crumley II, J. S. *An Introduction to Epistemology*, P. 137-38

defend coherentism. The chief idea underlying coherentism is that the explanation of a belief rest on its rationality with other opinions one holds. The units of coherence must be large enough to contain all our beliefs. They are linear and holistic types of coherentism. Some coherentists believe that all beliefs in a system are *prima facie* justified. According to this theory of justification, beliefs can be automatically justified within a coherent system. These are the views of the linear version of coherentism in epistemology. Some of the philosophers called it local coherentism. This idea would not be recognized by the exponent of the rounded view. Global coherentists can be argued that the circular view can explain how beliefs mutually support each other within a holistic system. This view is called holistic coherentism. In their view, the spherical opinion. But it can be shown that beliefs form an in which each belief is inseparable from the rest. On the circular view, there is such a line linking the beliefs in a web. Thus, these kinds of problems we can be encountered regarding the circular epistemic chains must be resolved if the view is to be sustained in epistemology.¹²⁰

3.4.0. Coherentism and its Classifications

Coherentism has been classified in different ways; some of the important types of coherentism are as follows:

3.4.1 Explanatory Coherentism

Some of the eminent coherentists claimed that “coherence with explanation is produced explanatory coherentism”. Sellar, Quine, Harman and Kith Lehrer, and other philosophers have been exposed such theory. Kith Lehrer explanatory theory has been explained focused here. According to Lehrer, explanatory coherentism is a theory of coherentism in which a belief can be justified through an explanatory function. In that explanatory functions, beliefs are Justified within a system. Lehrer points out:

“S is completely justified in believing that p if and only if the belief that p coheres with other beliefs belonging to a system of beliefs of kind k.”¹²¹

One of the ingredients in coherence theory is steadiness. If a belief is rationally not consistent with other beliefs, then it flops to adhere with them. But for Lehrer, steadiness is not enough to have the kind of consistency we require explanation. To have more understanding of these

¹²⁰ Audi, Robert. *Belief, Justification, and Knowledge: An Introduction to Epistemology*, California: Wadsworth, 1988, P. 88.

¹²¹ Lehrer, Kith. *Knowledge*, Oxford: Clarendon Press, 1974, p. 162.

types of coherence, we trace the concept of explanation in a better way. When we cohere a belief to the system, a belief must full fill the role of explanatory coherence.¹²²

The inference is the best explanation for example of explanatory coherentism. A belief is taken as a primary belief for the justification of which we apply to other beliefs. For example, the belief is that an object is yellow. As a result, we have faith in that 1) we have a visual experience: the object appears to be yellow and 2) Assuming that the object is true, we can explain why we have the experience. Explanatory coherentism firmly believes that the real yellowness of the object is a superior explanation in this case.

The goal of descriptive coherentism is to help us comprehend where explanation comes from. The aim is to explain the source of a belief. However, explanatory coherentism would be circular and so uninformative if we move from one belief to another in a circle.¹²³

3.4.2 Reliability coherentism

Reliability coherentism emphasizes the construction between the belief and the source of its reality. the reliability of a beliefs can be taken as truth. The reliability of the source depends on factors like the presence of a reliable experience. But it may lead to a circularity problem.

Descriptive coherentism and trustworthiness coherentism each have their own circuitousness problem, as we have shown, because they are both doxastic coherentism. Both have a problem because they expect each knowledge to be have equipped with intellectual power to detect the circularity in their belief system.

BonJour defines consistency as the property of a full system of beliefs, which includes the five characteristics or symptoms of coherence listed below.

- 1) A belief system is only coherent if it is logically consistent.
- (2) The degree of probabilistic consistency determines how coherent a set of beliefs is.
- (3) The presence of illative linkages between a system's component beliefs increases its coherence.
- (4) A system of beliefs coherence is reduced to the degree that it is fragmented into subsystems of beliefs that are largely disconnected from one another.

¹²² Lehrer, PP. 63-64

¹²³ Moser, P.K. *Empirical Justification*, PP. 73-84

(5) a belief system is reduced the expectation of belief existence which unsolved irregularities with system's sieved criteria.¹²⁴

Thus, the definition of coherentism by BonJour takes us back to the idea of a system of beliefs that are consistent with one another and are also connected by inferential links. It is ultimately the consistent system that counts in coherentism.

3.4.3 Internalist Coherentism

According to internalism, a belief's explanation must be cognizable by the believer who understands why his or her beliefs are strong. Internalism appeals to the system which provides justifications for one's beliefs. 1. The believer must have appropriate meta-belief for the degree of coherence system of beliefs. Thus, internalism appeals to the inner strength of a system. BonJour attempts to address this issue by proposing the Doxastic Presumption. This is a presupposition that a person's understanding of her system of beliefs, which includes metabeliefs, is always roughly true. The problem is that the presumption makes justification conditional: certain beliefs can be justified if, but only if, we accept the presumption that our metabeliefs are approximately correct.

Laurence BonJour concludes with a description of coherentist observation and also introspection of beliefs. He claims that there are natural views that are not inferentially reached out but are yet justified by the reference to other beliefs. These beliefs are formed and imposed on us in an involuntary and coercive manner. They are psychologically fundamental, or fundamental in their genesis, even if they are not fundamental in any rational sense. On these arguments, BonJour presents a completely internalistic and coherentist explanation of how observational and introspective views are justified.

3.5.0 BonJour's Foundationalism

A theory of knowledge aims to explain what knowledge is and what it means for a belief to be justified. Though it is not a need for all views, justification is often expected of beliefs that are held to be true. In order to demonstrate not just the amount and type of our cognitive hold on the world, but also our right to that grasp. To explain how far we are rational in considering the world to be the way it seems to us, an epistemological explanation is utilised.¹²⁵ This thesis will discuss "the structure of epistemic justification for empirical knowledge" and what can

¹²⁴ BonJour, L. *The Structure of Empirical Knowledge* (Cambridge: Harvard University Press, 1985).

¹²⁵ Dancy, J. 1988, p. 1.

and cannot be justified in a specific structural schema. A knowledge structure is required to prevent an infinite regress in the justification of views since such a regress would render our beliefs ultimately unjustifiable. In other words, a sufficient theory of knowing cannot demand that a belief be supported by another belief that has to be supported and that in turn needs to be supported again and again, indefinitely. The prevalent epistemological view for at least the last four centuries was that human knowledge ultimately rests on a foundation of fundamental beliefs, the justification of which is often rooted in our 'given' sensory experiences. This is the foundationalist interpretation of the way knowledge is organised. Any defence of a belief must either make use of fundamental or underlying assumptions or explicitly reference relevant experiences. Furthermore, such foundationalism has historically been an internalist theory of epistemic justification, according to which the justification of a belief must be available to the believer.

However, in the past forty years, foundationalist epistemology has come under growing criticism as being unsustainable; the appeal to fundamental beliefs may fail to stop the epistemic regress, and the concept of a 'given' may not even be coherent in and of itself.¹²⁶ Coherentism, a theory that holds that the structure of knowledge is such that views deemed to constitute knowledge are justified by their link to other beliefs, producing a coherent system, has largely supplanted foundationalism. Coherentists disagree with the idea that all views are justified by a set of underlying assumptions, much like a construction. Instead, they propose a system that is built like a raft, with the justified beliefs supporting one another.¹²⁷

Recent attempts have been made to reinstate classic internalist foundationalism as a workable theory of the structure of knowledge, despite coherentism replacing it as the preeminent internalist viewpoint 20th century half period crossed. The critical evaluation of Laurence Bonjour's present foundationalist agenda, a well-known epistemologist who was formerly a loud opponent of foundationalism, will be the main objective of this thesis. In his most recent work, "The Dialectic of Foundationalism and Coherentism," Bonjour makes the case for a re-evaluation of foundationalism. And coherentism.¹²⁸

¹²⁶ Sellars, 1963 and Bonjour, 1985.

¹²⁷ Sosa, 1980

¹²⁸ Bonjour, L. 1999a, PP. 117-118

According to Bonjour, an internalist foundationalism gives the right understanding of epistemic justification. I would contend that an internalist foundationalism falls short of offering an acceptable strong justification for presuming any belief to be true with relation to a reality that is independent of the mind, given the premise of the correspondence theory of truth. In order to support this claim, I shall first define Bonjour's concepts of foundationalism, internalist justification, and truth as correspondence. Through a challenge for metajustification, the essence of fundamental beliefs will be examined. I demonstrate that Bonjour's three premises are mutually exclusive after considering whether foundationalism may serve as a sound basis for epistemic inference to the outside physical world. The first section of the thesis aims to do this. In the second section of my thesis, I will demonstrate that any two of these three ideas plus the opposite of the third are compatible, both to underline that only this particular trio is incompatible and to offer workable future approaches that are unaffected by this critique.

Finally, I recommend the mixture that, in my opinion, has the greatest potential. Although Bonjour's foundationalism is being specifically considered, it may be seen as a model. Any hypothesis that upholds all three of these tenets is subject to the argument meant to show their incompatibility.

3.5.1. Bonjour's criticism to Foundationalism

The criticisms of foundationalist programs frequently revolve around the concept of elementary beliefs. The opponents want to know if there are any fundamental beliefs. There are two ways to ask this question. First, are there any indubitable justifications for strong foundationalism? Are there infallibly justifiable beliefs when it comes to strong foundationalism? The idea of infallible basic beliefs is that they are subject to doubt because all beliefs find to cohere with other beliefs. The idea of epistemic independence is inferential.¹²⁹

Bonjour is very much motivated by "the coherence theory of empirical knowledge", that is, empirical knowledge. Basically, the challenge of the regress problem in epistemology made him think more critically about the explanation of beliefs. The foundationalist theory of explanation concerning regressing the problem is a failure. The foundationalist has been left due to the problem, which is found that self-justify beliefs are the critically basic beliefs that can be served as the foundation for foundationalism. Traditionally self-justifying beliefs are

¹²⁹ Crumley II, J. S., PP. 119-20

taken as infallible, incorrigible, and indubitable, which can be sense-data or empirical given.¹³⁰ Bonjour claims that there is a problem with givenness. He argued that when we immediately apprehend the object, it is a cognitive state, and it is more rudimentary than the belief and entails the assertion that-p. Therefore, it is not clear that-p which is apprehension about that proposition, does not require justification. If the anticipation of facts propositions p, then, that apprehension required another apprehension to justify the state of matters that-p. otherwise, original state of affair does not justify. Bonjour's point is that the requirement for justification does not end with the foundation.¹³¹

3.6.0. BounJour's Coherentism

Bonjour coherentism is the failure of foundationalism regarding the structure of justification of pragmatic beliefs in the epistemological framework. His coherentism theory of knowledge is stronger when the foundationalist fails to justify the adequate reason to terminate the epistemic regress. The foundationalist justification for epistemic problem regress in epistemology is problematic. That is the foundationalist theory of justification which terminates the regress is not acceptable by coherentists. They rejected the foundationalist approach of justification through which the regress can be terminated. Coherentists introduced their own methodology to handle the epistemic regress. They claim that the other possibility does not work to terminate the epistemic regress because the justification is less clear. The only possible solution to remove the regress is the "coherence theory of justification." The question may be raised how coherence theory establishes the prima facie solution to the epistemic degenerate problem. To answer this question, the coherentist may be responded that the justification of beliefs moves in a circle way or any other way. But it seems very inadequate to defeat foundationalism. Each and every step of the regress issues in justification disagreement, and its propositions need to justify earlier they might deliberate explanation with the inference.

The purpose of BonJour's coherentism is to highlight his coherentist position and the limitations of foundationalism, and also there are some of the criticisms raised against foundationalism. His aim is to give coherentism a proper shape in epistemology. Laurence Bonjour criticized foundationalism and defended coherentism in his analysis of

¹³⁰ Jones, Jan-Erik. Bonjour on Coherentism: A Critical Analysis of "The Coherence Theory of Empirical Knowledge" PP. 1-10

¹³¹ Laurence Bonjour, "The coherence theory of empirical knowledge," *Philosophical Studies* 30, no. 5 (1976), pp. 281-312, doi:10.1007/bf00357928.

foundationalism and coherentism in the construction of empirical knowledge. His critique of foundationalism and coherentism lays the groundwork for an epistemic account of empirical knowledge. He is a reliable supporter of coherentism.

Bonjour is the one who is thoroughly going foundationalism in his philosophical examination of coherentism. He examined different versions of foundationalism and found out the loop of foundationalism, then criticized the foundationalism in his “The Structure of Empirical knowledge.” He found the traditional or internalist account of epistemic justification of foundationalist theory weakness into foundationalism theory of justification. Subsequently, he attempts to characterize an alternate philosophy of epistemic justification, which is called the coherence theory of epistemic explanation. Where he presented and developed the arguments for coherentism and elaborated in the analytic manner of this theory. In this regrades he started from the beginning of general ideas of coherentism, that is, each and all beliefs are connected to other beliefs in a coherent system. The justification of that belief can be attributed to the coherent system as a whole and not to a particular basic or foundational belief. However, this initial general characterization is insufficient and so Bonjour must now proceed with a more elaborate characterization of his theory and address the difficulties that arise along the way. The history of philosophy has not given epistemic coherentism much credit. First, one defends a statement by quoting another remark when it is contested. The idea that the structure of epistemic justification relates to the structure of responding to problems in a certain environment arises from this feature of how to respond to challenges in specific situations. This inherent propensity is demonstrated by Socrates’ continual search for specific justifications or Descartes’ technique of scepticism. Both look for the foundation of reason in some unanswerable claims whose epistemic worth is independent of any specific viewpoint. This pragmatic aspect of the action of justifying belief can easily be extended to the condition of having justified beliefs. The validity of epistemic coherentism is obscured by this natural quest for reason’s right foundation. Further, BonJour points out that linear conception inferential justification fails under the regress problem. His holistic approach to the coherence theory of justification solves the epistemic revert problem. The system of belief is a large set of coherent beliefs that are related to each other in inference.¹³²

BonJour’s account explains how individual beliefs are justified. When an individual belief is part of a sufficiently extensive system of coherent beliefs held by the person, it is justified. The

¹³² Bonjour, L. 1985, PP.93-99.

coherentist justification has two levels of application. The first is the global level, where the entire system is justified by its coherence. Second, there is the local level, where we decide whether individual beliefs are justified on the basis of their membership in a coherent system. When a belief adheres with the rest of the system's beliefs, it becomes an associate of that system.

For the foundationalist, justification comes from other people's beliefs, as well as from inferential relationships. The foundationalist assumes that there is a basic belief from which follows the justification of other beliefs. However, in order to overcome the regress problem, the foundationalist had to stipulate the existence of fundamental beliefs. Coherentism has a different approach to justification. Individual beliefs are only given justification if they are members of the system, or if they cohere with the whole system.¹³³

3.7.0. Objections Against Coherentism

The objections I have in cognizance are that coherentism made some mistakes regarding its structure of justification and knowledge. Some of the objections raised against coherentism. The mere fact that a set of opinions is coherent is not sufficient reason to believe they are true. Therefore, coherentism is objectionably conservative and inappropriately privileges one's actual beliefs. And that coherentism flops to recognize the significance of experience adequately. I shall address each criticism in turn and argue that there are some problems and misunderstands coherentism in epistemology. There are many objections raised against coherentism. Broadly the important objections are deriving from nature coherence, as a holistic view, these are objections follows.

3.7.1 The Circularity Argument

Perhaps the major criticism of the coherence theory is that the theory is dedicated to validating spherical reasoning. Suppose p justified q, q justified r Assume I proclaim that I trust it will rain tomorrow. You inquire why I have this opinion. I reply: "I suppose it will rain tomorrow since it will rain tomorrow". It appears evident that I have not, therefore, developed a conceivable acceptable argument for my view. Nor is the issue evidently better if I make the circle broader and more intricate. If I claim that my belief that P1 is vindicated because it is reinforced by P2, which I also believe; that P2 is justified because it is supported by P3; and that P3 is justified because it is supported by P. Thus, it is a circular reasoning. It appears that

¹³³ Bonjour, L., *The Structure of Empirical Knowledge*, PP.87-106

the coherence theory of explanation commits the circularity problem. Peter Kline claims that “this form of coherentism, what I will call the “warrant-transfer” variety, holds that some proposition, p, transfers its warrant to another proposition which can, in turn, pass it to another proposition. Eventually, the warrant is transferred back to p. This view endorses circular reasoning.”¹³⁴

On occasion, a contrast is made between linear coherentism, which expressly promotes spherical perceptive. On the other hand, holistic coherentism purportedly avoids such thinking. According to the holistic coherentist, explanation smears first not to individual views but to an entire system of beliefs. This argument can be regarded as asking the question because the assumption that spherical reasoning is undesirable is too near to a straightforward rejection of the coherentist’s primary point. The coherentist cannot, however, avoid erroneously assuming that foundationalism is devoted to unquestionable, unchangeable grounds. The force of intuition by adopting a viewpoint that is in direct opposition to it. Nearly everyone, even the coherentist, in all likelihood, shares the feeling that there is roughly wrong with humble, plain situations of spherical reasoning. The coherentist consequently has the duty to elucidate why an exercise in spherical reasoning should become satisfactory just by way of the size of the circle.¹³⁵

3.7.2 Difficulties Defining Coherence

What does it mean that a trust system is coherent? The lowliest type of consistency one could assume the coherentist to admit is that of plain logical consistency a coherent belief system should not oppose itself. The greatest form of coherence one could expect the coherentist to acknowledge is that of reciprocal implication a belief system is coherent to the degree that every belief in it is necessitated by the rest of the system. Regrettably, it appears that even the smallest concept of rationality is too powerful for the goals of coherentists, as it is conceivable to be defensible in trusting an unpredictable collection of propositions.

3.7.3 The Input and Isolation Objection

Coherence as a relationship between beliefs gives rise to the input or isolation issue. According to BonJour, coherence is the sole function which is not external relationships in between the parts to a system justification of belief. It has not bearing any exterior relationships. As a result, coherence is a primary basis for pragmatic justification. Coherence theory implies that; a

¹³⁴ Klein, Peter. “Is Infitism the Solution to the Regress Problem?”

¹³⁵ 17 Chisholm R. 1982, pages. 20-46 and Audi 1993, pp. 307, 310.

system of pragmatic belief could sufficiently justify. They represent empirical knowledge, despite being completely disconnected from the world it pretends to describe. The definition of coherence implies that in some coherent system, beliefs must be received input from the outside of the world.¹³⁶

The familiar argument against coherence theories as a group has been raised frequently. Conferring justification of coherence doctrine is eventually it is a question of connections among the beliefs any one has faith in and nonentity about to do with the way the world is. Moser points out, “we should reject his coherence theory due to the isolation objection, the objection that coherentism cuts empirical justification off from the empirical world.”¹³⁷ That means there is no connection between beliefs and the world. But our goal in acquiring information is to discover how the world functions. Therefore, coherence theories are insufficient for the justification of beliefs acquiring knowledge.

Isolation problem is a disagreement arises in coherence justifications due to demand more precise explanation. How the coherence theories are meant to isolate explanation from the environment.

As per theory of doxastic application of beliefs in certain way one can know the belief casually related to the state of that domain. So, there is a need for some type of logical association. However, it is not at all obvious how it may be accomplished. Shrewdness appears to refer merely to the connections between beliefs. Notably, basics theories and coherence theories are not differing regarding the link with opinions about the outside reality. The way relation among beliefs with world may impact all belief with referring to coherentism and foundationalism through a causal relationship. The main difference between foundations and coherence theories is which ideas are the environment’s causal offspring. Theory of foundation assume epistemically they are rich view. The theory accepted more common factual things without epistemic privileges. As seen the isolation conformation gives neither justification nor choosing foundational justification over coherent justification of beliefs.¹³⁸

3.7.4. Alternative Systems Objection

The most common argument for coherentism is that alternative system. It has a problematic relationship with the truth. We have no reason to suppose that a good piece of fiction is true

¹³⁶ See (Kvanvig and Riggs 1992; Kvanvig 1995a, b, 2008)

¹³⁷ Moser Paul K., *Empirical Justification*, Dordrecht: D. Reidel Publishing, 1985, p. 84.

¹³⁸ John L. Pollock and Joseph Cruz, *Contemporary Theories of Knowledge*, Lanham: Rowman & Littlefield, 1999, PP. 74-75

because it is extremely coherent. The objection to alternate systems highlights the possibility of numerous incompatible sets of opinions that one has good motive to believe. Coherence, according to this objection, is an interior relation between a group of propositions. Given that there are an endless number of unsuited coherent systems, a subject has justification for believing an infinite number of incompatible sets of propositions. They have a compact reason to trust a coherent set of propositions. Coherentism is erroneous, according to this view, because epistemic justification requires more than interior coherence. Ernest Sosa offers a critique of the internalist position. Sosa himself is compassionate to coherentist concepts, giving coherence a significant role in reflective knowing. He does, however, believe that coherence is insufficient for acceptable epistemic justification. He clarifies coherentism appears to be erroneous. Each of us believes a set of propositions at any given time, some consciously or overtly, others subconsciously or covertly. Many of these will be about the follower as an individual, and many more will be near the time of belief as the current time.¹³⁹

3.8.0. Concluding remarks

This chapter has shown that despite the realities of challenges and problems faced by the coherentism theory of knowledge, the door is opened for recent coherentists who carry forward coherentism in epistemology. Once we have grasped coherentism, we discovered that it's unable to account for the relation between the system of beliefs and the world. It ignores the idea of truth altogether and the truth of beliefs. Coherentism does not fulfill these needs. However, coherentism has shown how our beliefs, true or false, must fit into a coherent system. Coherentists have much yet to be explained and explored. The problem raised against coherentism could handle the situation and was abandoned in favor of more compromising approaches. Chapter three ended with facing some problems and challenges in epistemology. The criticism raised against coherence theory for solving the regress problem which remains unsolved. There are different versions of foundationalism their justificatory approaches differ among them. The linear version of coherentism compromised justification comparative to the holistic version of coherentism allows belief to be acceptable in a loose sense compared to the holistic version.

¹³⁹ Sosa, E. (1991, P. 202)

CHAPTER-4

FOUNDATIONALISM AND COHERENTISM DEBATE IN EPISTEMOLOGY

4.0. Introduction

The debate between foundationalism and coherentism is a long-standing debate in epistemology. This chapter is an attempt to examine coherentism and foundationalism critical controversy in theory of knowledge. The study traced the similarities and dissimilarities between two vital doctrines of epistemology. The quality approach to theorizing about justification begins with responses to the regress argument in epistemology. When we are justified in taking some memory attitude toward the given claim, we are often so justified by grounding that mindset on some other attitude. For example, we might base our trust that Obama secured the election in 2008 on our belief that the New York Times published this result and it is a trustworthy origin of information about such informations. In order for this supporting belief to give an adequate basis for the braced belief. However, it would not itself be baseless, casual, or unjustified belief. Once such a requirement arises, a regress problem threatens. It appears that a belief cannot support another belief in the way it is required for justification unless the supporting belief is justified. If its justification needs support from some further attitude, a regress problem arises.

Secondly, the study delineates the theory of justification from the perspectives of foundationalism and coherentism. The standard metatheory regarding justification concentrates on two primary responses to this regress argument. As per the fundamental criteria of the doctrine, foundationalism denies the method of justification of coherentism. It is such that the criteria of foundationalism are nothing but the adequacy of basic belief and basic belief is the backbone for the formulation of knowledge of this doctrine. In contrast, the method of justification for the formulation of knowledge in coherentism accumulates or collect a piece of evidence and makes them beliefs to fulfill the adequacy nature of belief. The perspectives of the former doctrine and the later one of the theories of knowledge are dogmatic in nature. Because both doctrines discuss their theory of knowledge in such a way that it is not wrong to claim that they completely depend on their own certain dogmas. As a result, there is disagreement and divergence between the theories of knowledge. But both perspectives are equally important and epistemologically appropriate for the sake of knowledge formation in their own position.

A foundationalist response aims to find legitimate restraining points for the regress, and coherentists combat the urge for such legitimate refraining points. However, coherentists, are not the only theorists who makes an effort to resist foundationalist stopping points. Skeptics endorse the conclusion that no beliefs are ever explained, whether by being based on other beliefs or in terms of foundationalist stopping points. They insist that the regress cannot be stopped but that the regress is not vicious and hence doesn't stop beliefs from being justified. A further option is that refraining points are needed but can be arbitrary.

4.1.0. Foundationalism and Coherentism dichotomy

The two divergent doctrines of knowledge in modern western epistemology are very highlighted and vibrated due to their adequate evidence to justify the claim of belief for the formulation of knowledge. But in a recent development, theses of knowledge discuss or argue regarding the epistemic enterprise of it dynamically. It means, the justification of belief in epistemic enterprise entertains with multiple processes and implies the principle of justification in multifarious ways. Hence, it is too difficult to maintain the orthodox approach of justification of belief for the formulation of knowledge. The orthodox approach of justification of belief for the formulation of knowledge in foundationalism is not stable and sustainable. "X is a justified basic belief =df X is justified but is not justified on the basis of any other beliefs". It entails that not all justified beliefs are mediately justified, so there are suddenly justified beliefs. Hence, this type of approach has to be modified and introduced as well as established several forms of foundationalism in this era. But in a broader sense, there are two types of foundationalism such as classical and modest.

Epistemological foundationalism is based on these two sets of assumptions. The first group, which deals with knowledge, says that a body of belief structure, such as yours, me or mine, is foundational and non-foundational) knowledge is wholly dependent on foundational knowledge. However, the foundationalist theories may differ as to the connection between the two sets of beliefs. A strong foundationalist theory of justification, for example, would hold that concomitantly justified beliefs derive all of their justification from foundational beliefs; a modest theory, on the other hand, might hold only that the non-foundational belief will not be justified without the foundational beliefs. They might accept factors like the coherence of beliefs which may contribute to justification.

Coherentists' main principle is that a belief's justification comes from its coherence of other beliefs. A person's entire collection of beliefs can be considered coherent though the said

coherence could be a subject of degree hanging on how clearly the beliefs are related in a system. Coherentism opposes the foundationalist urge for the foundation of knowledge by showing that there is no way we can identify such a foundation within a system of beliefs. If the viewpoint is to be maintained, the concerns expressed regarding circular epistemic chains can be handled within the coherence system. Coherentism does not support the circularity of a system.¹⁴⁰

4.2.0. The Foundationalism and Coherentism Debate

The foundationalism versus coherentism disputes have been recognised of the theory of knowledge. Both the doctrine discuss is about and who is winning. I will thus only make a few remarks on it while identifying three issues where coherentism and foundationalism differ. That difference part would be crucial in future, to the discussion of foundational theory and coherence doctrine. The standard of anti-coherence arguments are founded on erroneous conceptions of coherentism. The existence of non-inferential justification that is not dependent on support from other beliefs is the first point of contention between the foundationalist and the coherentist. The foundationalist responds “yes”, frequently asserting that sensory experience is the cornerstone of non-inferential argument. Coherentist circular justification where beliefs are backed for justification of beliefs in that set according to them. Namely, the justification is non-inferential. Coherentist argued there could not be any kind of bare reasoning possible. If we have given situations, the belief b1 can guide by evidence it could be inferred. The belief b1 should only be evident if b2 was a certain belief, that belief justified prior with adequate reason logic relation to b1. The belief b3 was justified with strong relation with b2 would allow b2 to be justified. and so forth. Either this would come to an unfounded belief bn, go full circle to b1, or go on forever. B1 would not be appropriate in any scenario.

Therefore, if there were no non-inferential reason, there would be none at all. Of course, there is a reason behind this. Hence, there is no foundational inputs for the justification of beliefs. Foundationalist in referring to regress issues could solve the issues in epistemology somehow manage to solve and justified our empirical beliefs. Their methodology for solving the regress issues in epistemology through non foundational belief. To say that there is non-inferential

¹⁴⁰ Audi, R. *Belief, Justification, and Knowledge: An Introduction to Epistemology*, California: Wadsworth, 1988, PP. 87-88.

reason, however, would be to misinterpret the assertion. The assertion is not that a belief may be justified if it cannot be derived from other beliefs.

Coherentist denied noninferential epistemic sense of justification, more precisely they claimed justification of belief in which subject is not responsible for doxastic argument that view is logically (inductive or deductive) acceptable. As a result the subject does not have doxastic justification to justify a belief. The justification of a belief would be affecting in providing the existence of noninferential evidence. Rather than a reliable justified belief. Which cannot be experience from the other input beliefs. The second point of connection between the coherentist theory and foundationalist doctrine are nature of empirical justification. On the other way foundationalism asserts that empirical justification is to part by part unidirectional. It switches between the components of the belief system, which is what distinguishes it as part-to-part. Due to b2's prior justification and its favourable inferential relationship to b1, b2 is able to justify b1 inferentially. Because b3 is already justified and has a strong inferential relationship to b2, b2 is therefore inferentially justified by b3 as a result. As a result, b1 is justified by b2, which is justified by b3, and so on.

It only goes in one direction, making it uni-directional. Since b2 comes before b1, it justifies b1 but does not get justification in return. Since b3 comes before b2, it justifies b2 but does not get justification in return. On the different way, the coherentist asserts of the empirical evidence is that universal to particular rather than particular belief to particular belief. Just as the foundationalist assumes, b2 has a solid inferential relationship to belief b1. Just like as foundationalist predicts, belief b3 must have a strong inferential relationship to belief b2 once more. However, E (the belief system) justifies b1 rather than b2, and b2 is justified by E rather than b3 (the belief system). There is justification transfer, but it shifts from the whole to the portion rather than from belief to belief (i.e., from one to the other). Justification for inferential belief is a linear sense of justification foundationalist claimed but the global for coherentists, which is main distinction. I want to emphasise that talking about a belief system being justified might easily be substituted by talking about a belief system providing justification. Inferential justification is a purpose of having a suitable inferential part of the correct sort of system, according to coherentism the global-to-part notion. It proceeds in the following manner. The foundational theorist advances the regress issue argument and implicitly implies the inferential evidence is one to one and moving in a single direction. (very naturally). The doctrine of coherentist concurs the argument of second half, which states about the regress issues were to be conclude without justified belief called bn, or circularity backing to belief b1, otherwise it

will move infinitely. So that b1 could not be justified belief. Additionally, he sticks to the third point, is a valid reason. But he finds the final section to be completely enigmatic. He wonders how it is possible for a belief to be not inferentially warranted. To avoid the regress from ever commencing, he rejects the first component and switches from one to one and moving single direction idea of the illative reasoning in to global-to-local commencement. Third and last point of contention between the foundationalist and the coherentist concerns the basis for inferential justification. According to the foundationalist, every justified belief of inferential relation ultimately derive justification from the noninferential justified beliefs. To put it another way,

The foundational belief, which is justified without getting support from any other beliefs. Whereas inferential justified beliefs rely on the privilege class. That beliefs are inferential evident belief.in construct coherentism emphasis coherence or some part of coherence. According to coherentist doctrine the belief justifies which is inferential domain its justification from in return derive its nature of coherence. Significant parentheses include “at least in part” and “at least part of,” which cater to coherentists who need reasoning that goes well beyond coherence. Think about the idea of a belief in a system is justified iff it is consistence and every belief in that system is a result of trustworthy belief well forming process. Inferential justification is described as somewhat founded in dependability, but it is also described as coherence which is merely grounded beliefs, making it a coherent kind of belief. This is like to be correct outcome because the opinion that rejects the three central tenets of foundationalism that non inferential justification cannot be accepted. The inferential justification of belief connected to each other. The justification of inferential relation is only partially beached in coherence is completely opposite to foundationalism three main tenets. Considering the mixture perspective that was outlined in foundationalism and coherentism. It claims that justification necessitates the existence of a cause, and also the belief may assist as such details. Which puts towards odds with foundational theorist claims that non-observable justification exists. Given the theory that asserts justification of inferential beliefs globally connected. it is at odds with foundationalism in terms of how it functions.

Third, it contradicts foundationalism by referring to coherence and dependability rather than non-inferential justification (the belief which justified are justified without reference to justifications), which it is what underlies inferential justification. Therefore, it is coherentist in the most obvious sense. It rejects foundationalism and heavily relies on coherence. The fact that this is only a taxonomic issue, however, means that it has no significant theoretical ramifications. It doesn't matter which way you look at it, the view remains the equal: non

foundational views are there whose holistic justification is inferential. Whose justification of inferential belief is partially beached in coherence, and their justification of inferential beliefs which is ground in the things except coherentism. In order to better understand how the coherentist thinks about inferential justification, I need halt before continuing to highlight two very distinct views about Bonjour's explanation of holistic and non-linear, justification. Here, it seems that express and also support to above-described global-to local view about justification of inferential belief.

A single empirical belief can be justified, either a minor group about certain belief, inside the framework of overall justification of cognitive system (more or less) occupied for approved, is typically all that is at stake in an epistemic debate on a given occasion; this justification is known as the Linear level. However, it is also conceivable, at least in theory, to bring up the topic of the system's overall justification, or what is known as the global level of justification. In the end, I would argue that the question about of the belief occurs at last, the global closer is crucial for determination of empirical justification generally for the kind of coherence theory that will be articulated here and, in fact, for any complete, nonskeptical epistemology.¹⁴¹

And he seems to be saying that a belief system's justification depends on whether it is consistent here or not. According to the proposed coherence theory, the relationship between the many particular beliefs is rightly to be viewed as one of mutual or reciprocal support rather than one of linear dependency. As a result, there is no basis for a real regress because there is no way to have solid relation epistemic belief with belief system's participants. Instead, the beliefs that make up such a coherent system should all be sufficiently related to one another to allow each justification of beliefs related to others. According to movement of local justification of argument based on which belief (or set of beliefs) has actually been contested on that specific occasion. The justification of a specific empirical belief ultimately depends not on other specific beliefs as the linear conception of justification would have it, but rather on the overall system and its theory of coherence, as per to the coherence doctrine, which would argue that the outward circularity of the beliefs is not a vicious one the reason it does not circular truly.¹⁴²

¹⁴¹ Bonjour, L. 1985, PP. 90-91

¹⁴² Bonjour, L. 1985, PP. 91-92

But in this case, he seems to be saying something completely different: This idea holds that a specific empirical conviction would require four unique primary processes or stages of argument to be completely explicit:

- (1) The ability to draw conclusions about that specific certainty from other specific certainties and from other relationships between specific practical opinions.
- (2) Empirical beliefs chore within a system.
- (3) The defence of the entire framework of the experiential convictions.
- (4) The belief justification system of the specific in question based on its affiliation with the belief. In the theory of coherence, the empirical proof that contains that each of these processes is dependent through the actions that came before it.¹⁴³

Choosing the proper reading is not my current focus; instead, I want to emphasise how significantly different the second reading's interpretation of the passage is from the coherentist's interpretation. By advocating the whole-to-part model of inferentially way justifying belief, the coherentists are not implying that Subject must believe this worldview is supported by evidence. Additionally, he is not implying that Subject must believe his system of beliefs is logical. Instead, the coherentism theory (type at least whoever asserts the coherence theory is the only factor which matter for the justification) contends the fact that which is mere Subject's system of belief is coherent and also sufficient for its justification of beliefs. The mere fact about the Subject's system of belief is sufficiently justified for Subject's beliefs to be inferentially justified. The issue between foundationalism and coherentism essentially concerns justification of system of beliefs. Foundationalist claimed structure of justification of beliefs is a pyramid structure. The noninferential justification of beliefs are part to part and moving in a single direction. That inferential justification is based on non-inferential doctrine of justification. The coherentist, who completely rejects the views of foundationalism there is existence of non-inferential justification. The coherentist rejection of non-inferential doctrine of foundationalism and accepting inferential justification of beliefs system is that inference is global-to-part inference is founded in coherence doctrine.

¹⁴³ BonJour, L. 1985, p. 92.

4.3.0. Classical and Moderate: Foundationalism Vs Coherentism

The controversy between foundationalism and coherentism in epistemology has been recognized in philosophy. The main controversy of foundationalism and coherentism regarding their justification of beliefs. Here highlights some of the controversy between foundationalism and coherentism in epistemology.

4.3.1. Classical: Foundationalism Vs Coherentism

Two types of foundationalism have evolved to address the key epistemological concerns regarding the nature of the underlying knowledge and the relationship between those underlying information and the beliefs that are built atop them: Classical and Moderate. According to the ideology known as classical foundationalism these ideas should be promoted:

1. S has a number of fundamental, empirically supported beliefs.
2. S holds a few legitimated non-standard empirical beliefs.
3. Every branch leading to a fundamental empirical belief in an evidence tree supports any of S's non-basic empirical beliefs.
4. The core ideas are unquestionable.

This immediately raises the question of whether it's important to have certain foundations. Are such solid foundations even possible? Are these solid foundations sufficient to provide a framework on which we may base our empirical knowledge, even if they are required and feasible? It would appear that in order to convince the sceptic, we need solid premises, independent of other ideas. How do you know may be a persistent objection from the sceptic. The sceptic will challenge us if we use evidence from other claims, asking how we can be sure they are true. One possibility is to hypothesise the existence of some form of epistemic principle that links the premises to the conclusions I draw therefrom. The issue with fundamental beliefs is that they must somehow include the principle into their formation. Any epistemic standard that is independent of how a purportedly fundamental belief is developed must thus be justified. The sceptic might then ask more pointed questions, such as What validates the epistemic principle? The epistemic tenet would read something like this: Any belief that is developed in a way X is a justified belief. Although the principle need not be understood by the person, it must still be valid. The epistemic principle also has to explain why

the fundamental belief is to be justified the absence of the inferential backing and cannot be arbitrary.

4.3.2. Moderate: Foundationalism and Coherentism

According to moderate foundationalism, the fundamental ideas just need to be first plausible not necessarily true. The following are aspects of the moderate foundationalist viewpoint:

1. S has a number of fundamental (non-inferentially supported) empirical beliefs.
2. S holds a few legitimated non-standard empirical beliefs.
3. Every branch of an evidence tree that leads to a basic empirical belief for any of S's non-basic empirical beliefs.
4. S is not quite certain in some of his fundamental empirical views.

What else supports the fundamental ideas for justification if they are not clear, is the challenge that a moderate foundationalist theory encounters. Admitting that there are supporting beliefs at play may seem difficult, but if we do, the supporting beliefs will no longer be fundamental, and we will be forced to start our search for the supporting beliefs justifications from scratch. Because the foundations are uncertain, the sceptic would view moderate foundationalism as unlikely to withstand the strong sceptical examination. Differences regarding the nature of the foundations of knowledge are only one aspect of the disparities between classic and moderate foundationalism. Transmission, or how to get from the foundations to the additional ideas or propositions we hold, is another contentious question. Unlike the moderate foundationalist, who can also utilise non-deductive inference methods, the classical foundationalist restricts transmission to deduction alone. The problem of epistemic regress is a challenging one, and both the classical and moderate factions within foundationalism make an effort to offer a solution.

The fallibilist foundationalism presented by Audi is a variant of the moderate foundationalist solution to epistemic regress. The structure of S's body of justified beliefs is at t, fundamental, for any S and any time, t, according to this stance. The justification of S's foundational beliefs is at least typically rebuttable, the inferential transmission of justification need not be deductive, and non-foundationally justified beliefs need not derive all of their justification from foundational beliefs; rather, they only require sufficient justification to ensure that they would

still be upheld (if other factors were equal) if any other justification they may have (possibly from coherence) were eliminated.

Audi's foundationalism is fallible for a number of reasons. Fundamental assumptions may out to be both untrue and unreasonable. Only inductively and hence fallibly may the basic beliefs be used to justify the superstructure beliefs. This may have the effect of making the core beliefs true while the superstructure beliefs are incorrect. Despite holding to its core principles, Audi's moderate foundationalism provides room for error or a lack of reason. According to him, foundationalism does not require that a person's sources of knowledge be impenetrable. It is possible for our perceptions to change, and we might stop knowing something not because it is untrue, but because we are no longer able to believe it to be true. According to Audi, the epistemic regress issue is resolved by his theory. It neither makes knowledge impossible to acquire, as the sceptic would contend, nor does it make it too simple to have. The theory also appears to be in line with common sense in that it stipulates that non-inferentially justified beliefs are those that, upon thought, we believe individuals are justified in believing based on information from their senses or intuition. As an illustration, consider the fact that when someone claims they can see the rain from a window that isn't blocked, we don't typically question them why they think it is raining. Additionally, Audi contends that a moderate foundationalism promotes cognitive diversity. People differ from one another in their non-inferentially held views because various people have different experiences and everyone's experiences might change over time. We may be able to explain odd events by using the best explanation since inductive inference is a component of the moderate foundationalist theory. Modest foundationalism has the drawback of perhaps making knowledge too accessible. What further justification is there for the foundations if they do not need to be certain? Additionally, if the transition from the fundamental beliefs to the non-fundamental beliefs is made through methods other than deduction, the risk of mistake increases significantly. There is a disagreement about how far foundationalist justification should go in addition to the classical vs moderate dispute. Examining this problem is the following task.

4.4.0. Weak Versus Strong Justification

Strong foundationalism holds that core beliefs must be logically infallible and supported to the views to which is could fallible or mistaken in nature to qualify as knowledge. By protecting and reinforce the quality or standing of an infallible belief, it is likely necessary to establish a standard for what defines infallibility, such as evidence that is not subject to inspection or

maybe considered improbable. The foundationalist who upholds a rigid standard of infallible beliefs may pave the way for severe skepticism the assertion that we cannot know anything so long as any infallible belief is shown to be untrue, at which point the entire system of beliefs is destroyed. Strong foundationalism is therefore impossible to maintain. Simply put, the existence of flawless beliefs makes it impossible to construct an epistemic justification; in fact, it would defeat the very point of doing so. While weak foundationalism does not place as much emphasis on fundamental ideas that are logically flawless, it does allow for the possibility that fundamental beliefs may have just a poor degree of epistemic validity on their own. Finding an ultimate justified belief that serves as the cornerstone for all other beliefs is, in fact, the goal of arriving at fundamental beliefs. However, a weak foundationalism allows for faulty fundamental principles. It would be necessary to deal with faulty beliefs in order to maintain their justificatory position as fundamental beliefs. One hypothesis is that they would require coherence to improve their justificatory status, creating a framework of basic beliefs that are coherent yet flawed. However, why coherence?

4.5.0. Internalist and Externalist

Many philosophers believe that accepting classical foundationalism always leads to skepticism because of the absence of the foundation of knowledge. That is why many current epistemologists opt for more modest foundationalism that will make responding to skeptics arguments much easier. Both Jim Pryor's dogmatism and Michael Huemer's phenomenal conservatism are much more “permissive” in that they allow for broad and inclusive foundations of knowledge.¹⁴⁴ Huemer positions himself as a refinement of Chisholm's (1980) conservative viewpoint, characterized aptly as “epistemic conservatism” and, more aptly, “doxastic conservatism.” According to this view, a belief is foundational if it is accepted as self-evident. This point of view does not imply that simply believing something makes it reasonable because your belief may appear to be self-evident without being so. If you have solid reasons to doubt the belief P or believe that your belief is reckless or untrustworthy, your belief is defeated and not justified. To put it another way, doxastic conservatism says that if S believes that P, then S has reason to believe that P even if defeaters exist. With regard to internalist and externalist debate in epistemology, “internalism holds that all of the conditions that confer justification are internal to the subject’s mind or: supervene on the subject’s mental states.

¹⁴⁴ Huemer, M. “The Problem of Memory Knowledge”, Huemer, M. (ed.) and Audi, R. (intro.), *Epistemology: Contemporary Readings*, London: Routledge, 2002, PP. 114-115.

Externalism holds that atleast some of the condictions that confer justification are external to the subject's mind or: fail to supervene the subject's mental states."

Epistemic conservatism faces problems of defeaters of self-evidence. One of the better counterexamples is when one has a belief about something for which there is no evidence. S learns to believe, despite the lack of evidence for or against the belief, that a given beach contains an even number of grains of sand landed out of sight landed tails up. S has no proof to refute the belief, and he is no longer conscious that he formed the trust without proof or in an untrustworthy manner. The effect of doxastic conservatism is that self-evidence of primary belief is taken as rational and epistemologically justified.

Descartes believes that basic belief is the foundational belief which is the non-inferential state of justifications. This is the internalist foundationalist's position in epistemology. In contrast, externalist foundationalist believes that basic belief has an empirical foundation that is based on the external inputs of our beliefs.¹⁴⁵ In any case, most internalist foundationalists prefer a theory in which a non-believing state justifies non-inferential belief. The justifying state, according to phenomenal conservatism, is a "seeming" or "appearance": if it appears to S that P, S has some justification for trusting that P is in the absence of defeaters. Their "seeming" or "appearance" includes many introspective and perceptual data. Many individuals use the term "dogmatism" to denote the same point of view, or a point of view limited to a single domain, most commonly perception: if S perceives that P, then S has some cause to believe that P in the not-attendance of defeaters. Pryor, however, uses the term "dogmatism" to characterize the show that justification can be both sudden and direct. In contrast, supporters of the principle of phenomenal conservatism believe that some states provide immediate but feeble justification. It is also possible to believe that other territory provides sudden but defeasible justification. All that states could be other than perceptual. In any case, they hold on to the idea that phenomenal states could justify belief.

Phenomenal conservatism is facing more "permissive" than traditional foundationalism, entering for more extensive basic reasoning. For instance, I trust there is a cat on my leg, that I ate prawn for dinner last to last night, that I am thirsty and pondering drinking a glass of water, that pleasure is best, and that $3 + 2 = 5$. At first glance, it assume that I accept those things because all are true: there is a cat on my leg, I ate fish last to last night. In the non-

¹⁴⁵ Cottingham, J. (trans.) and Williams, B. (intro.) *Rene Descartes Meditation on First Philosophy*, Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1996, P. 18

attendance of defeaters, I am cleared out in accepting these things on the basis of these seeming's, as long as they give an appropriate origin of justification.

What exactly are these appearances or seemings? Typically, examples are used to explain the difference between seeming's and beliefs. Even though the lines appear to be uneven in certain aspects, after we grasp the Müller Lyer illusion, we no longer feel they are. The seeming's and appearances are not always false, though sometimes they are. Huemer and others contend that appearances are unrelated to dispositions, inclinations, or drives to believe. Huemer makes three primary arguments for this. First, you can have a persistent feeling or appearance like one line seems larger than another or that a stick dipped in water is bent, but be assured that it would be an illusion. Second, given the absence of a comparable appearance of P, it is possible to accept as true that P because, for example, you truly need it to be correct. Third, presences can afford non-trivial elucidations for what we think or are inclined to believe. Thus, it has been shown that perceptual appearance does not always add to the justification of the belief though sometimes they do.¹⁴⁶

Richard Fumerton in his discussion of internalism and externalism disagreements in epistemology pointed out that “traditional attempts to understand non-inferential justification were internalist in nature. But what is this internalism or externalism all about? The answer to that question is, unfortunately, more than a bit complicated. As is often the case in philosophy, technical terminology creeps into the discussion without a really clear understanding of what the terms mean. Furthermore, as the terms are used by different philosophers, their meaning evolves. By now, there are a number of different important controversies associated with the internalism or externalism debate. The debates are about the nature of justification, not just non-inferential justification. But because we will be interested in understanding various views about the nature of non-inferential justification in the context of the internalism or externalism controversy, it would be helpful to begin by defining that controversy as clearly as we can.”¹⁴⁷

The internalist/externalist debates about how to conceptualise justification have assumed prominence in modern epistemology. There are a number of quite distinct internalist/externalist conflicts as a result of the opposing definitions of internalism (and externalism) used by various philosophers (or by the same philosophers at various periods). It is crucial to have a basic explanation of the pertinent technical language in order to accurately define these disagreements. Internalization of the State The internal states of the subject are one important

¹⁴⁶ Huemer, M., PP. 3-10

¹⁴⁷ Fumerton, R. p. 54

way internalism is defined. According to this viewpoint, the internal condition of the believer at a given time determines the reason for a belief a person has at that time. According to this perspective, the internalist holds that having a justifiable belief in P, consists in S's being in some internal state. In contrast, external-state externalism might be defined as the belief that justification has something to do with external states. If internal-state internalism is dedicated to understanding justification in terms of the internal features of the subject.

In addition to making sense of the term 'internalism' internal-state internalism also seems particularly well-suited to explain the inspiration behind a now-famous thought experiment. When we think about the evil-demon case it looks at two scenarios. In the first, unknown to us, our cognitive processes, those involved in perception, memory, and inference, are made unreliable by the deeds of a strong demon or wicked expert. In the second scenario, a strong demon has no impact on the same cognitive processes; instead, our processes function consistently and as they should in our surroundings. According to this theory, the background beliefs are the same in both circumstances, and the sensory perceptions are virtually identical.

The internalist of the internal state holds that the subjects' views in both situations should also have the same justificatory significance. If both subjects are in the same internal state and one agent is justified, then the other agent must also be justified by definition. But according to external-state externalism, two agents might be in the same internal state but one of them is justified and the other isn't because of the different external states. The definition of mentalism by Conee and Feldman includes paradigm presentations of this sort of viewpoint: If any two people have precisely the same mental makeup, then they have exactly the same justifications, i.e., the same views are justified for them to the same amount, the author writes. Any developed theory of internal-state internalism would involve an understanding of precisely what an internal (as opposed to external) state is meant to be because this method of dividing the internalism/externalism dispute hinges on what counts as an internal state. It may seem unexpected that there are so many diverse viewpoints that might end up being classified as internalist variants. One would be concerned, for example, about the type of internalism that might develop in light of particular perceptions. The actual things in this world are the things of consciousness in realistic experience, for example, according to the direct realist. Would the internal-state internalist thus seek to include external things as a component of one's internal states? If the proponent of internal-state internalism has a preference for externalism with regard to mental content, this might lead to still another issue. Once more, it would appear that combining the two viewpoints would provide a rather odd notion of what constitutes an

internal. Adopting a kind of externalism about mental content and its ramifications for the kind of internal-state internalism that would arise are much more concerning. Although internalist by definition, a stance like this seems to contradict the difference being made. These ideas appear to highlight the necessity for the internal-state internalist to describe internal states extremely carefully (and non-dogmatically) in order to avoid bringing in too much. The fact that the internal-state internalist must be careful about what she allows into her internalism and at the same time not reject too much simply serves to complicate matters further, of course. For instance, it would appear problematic if internal-state internalism were to be restricted to non-relational mental characteristics and the price of making this difference was the absence of justifiable views about essential facts.

The internal-state internalist must also analyse which internal states lead to justification. This is a prerequisite. Even if it is assumed that internal states are the sole factor that matters for determining whether or not a claim is justified, work still has to be done to explain why some internal states lead to justification while others do not. What, for instance, about a subject's internal conditions confers justification in a situation of veridical perception? It is important to note that even if these two criteria for the internal-state internalist are satisfied, one may question whether this method of defining the distinction between externalism and internalism truly gets to the core of the matter.

4.8.0. Internalist coherentism vs Externalist foundationalism

The externalist version of justification or simple foundationalism has to face a kind of regress problem, the problem of circularity etc., while the internalist version of foundationalism or iterative foundationalism faces the problem from metaphysical speculation because here, the justification is evaluative properties. Evaluative properties depend on more fundamental properties. It is object-level justification.

We saw that classical foundationalists are associated with the internalist version of foundationalism. They very much must stick with the strong versions of foundationalism. They believe that basic beliefs or foundational beliefs are infallible, indubitable, and incorrigible. That account of justification is non-inferential in nature. With the advent of externalist epistemologies in the last thirty or forty years, the epistemic landscape has shifted radically. In epistemology, the debate between internalists and externalists is complex.

There are at least two common interpretations of the debate. It is commonly assumed that there is a debate about whether epistemic characteristics can be linked to the “internal” states of

believers. Justification is analyzed in terms of or solely based on what occurs within the mind. This view may be called “internal state “internalism”. It follows from this that no two people can be alike internally or psychologically so they have different justifications for the same ideas. As opposed to this being an externalist (a non-mentalist) is asserting that one’s reasoning is founded primarily on facts or events outside the mind. Others believe the discussion should focus on whether specific forms of access are essential for justification. To be justified in trusting that P, the “access internalist” holds that there must be anything relevant to the veracity or Justification of P within one’s perspective or awareness. While some entree internalists seem to assume that all that affects justification must be available, this is a view not widely accepted. Any access is not required for justification, according to the access externalist. The access externalist does not have to reject that something pertinent to the truth of P is at least occasionally accessible to the topic who has Justification for P. Nonetheless, the genuine externalists argue that access is not always obligatory for justification.¹⁴⁸

There is a debate as to whether access internalism or access externalism is more essential than the other. One could argue that admittance to internalism is more fundamental, believing that one can only have access to mental condition and internal facts about them and so thoroughly embracing mentalism. Alternatively, the mentalist argument could be viewed as more fundamental, stating that one has some minimal entree to major mental truths and hence accepts some form of entree to internalism. Some mentalists claim that we do not have access to all of the mental states or personality traits that influence justification. In any case, internalism does allow some access or other to the internal mental condition for justification of the beliefs. Internalizations of access differ depending on the type of “access” essential (real belief, justified belief, consociate, etc.) and what justification must be available. As a result, there are strong and weak types of access internalism. Almost all externalists believe that without being aware of any form of evidential link between belief and experience, there can be no justification for belief. This relation cannot be the deductive character.

Externalists, foundationalism, on the other hand, typically allow for a basic belief in the nonattendance of any appearance or appearing. In their explanations of epistemic justification, several epistemologists have mixed certain minimal internal requirements with externalist ones. While externalists advocate ideas that are diametrically opposite to classical foundationalist beliefs, the structure of justification and knowledge is arises from foundationalist

¹⁴⁸ Fumerton, R., *Epistemology*, Malden: Blackwell, 2006, PP. 75-76

account doctrine. We could start by looking at Alvin Goldman's reliabilism, which is maintained by the most notable of the externalists. Justified beliefs are those that are consistently formed. Beliefs that are reliably created are the result of a trustworthy process, and trustworthy processes produce trustworthy beliefs (or would typically be true if enough of them were produced). Justified views are valuable since they are almost always correct. Thus, Goldman allows to externalism within the foundationalist position.¹⁴⁹ With regard to the basic structure of justification of belief for the formulation of knowledge in coherentism, it is not stable and sustainable. It means every justified belief is mediately justified, so there are no immediately justified beliefs. The fundamental principle of coherentism is to justify a belief for the formulation of knowledge to satisfy the coherence model of the set of beliefs in a system of knowledge. Let's have an example, an agent's entire collection of the beliefs can be considered coherent though the said coherence could be a matter of degree liable on how clearly the beliefs are related in a system. Coherentism opposes the foundationalist urge for the foundation of knowledge by showing that there is no way we can identify such a foundation within a system of beliefs. Foundationalism and coherentism contradict to each other due to their divergent structure of justification.¹⁵⁰

4.7.0. Reliabilism is alternative to internalism and externalism:

Goldman first distinguished among two types of justified beliefs: those that are the outcome of belief-independent processes and those that are the consequence of belief-dependent processes. The former are procedures that use different cues than beliefs as their input. The latter refers to beliefs formed as a result of the procedure using at least some other beliefs as their input. The reliability of a belief depends on the reliability of the process in which a belief has been formed. And we may live in a world where such external-world beliefs are generally valid or would typically be true if plenty of them were produced. Through a reliable process, such convictions will be supported by reliable belief-independent mechanisms. This is reliability's "base clause," a basic or non-inferential justification principle: a belief can be justified if is a part of justification process of trustworthy person's independent belief procedure.

Reliability also adds a condition that the subject has no defeaters, that is, no compelling reason or justification to believe that the belief is false, undependable, or dishonest. These fundamental beliefs can then be used as input for trustworthy belief-dependent procedures to build even

¹⁴⁹ Fumerton, R., 2006, PP. 76-82

¹⁵⁰ Audi, R. 1988, PP. 87-88

more justified beliefs. If the output beliefs are normally or would be true, a belief-dependent process is “conditionally” trustworthy. The belief output process provisionally dependable to the belief dependent forming process which is justified if the input belief is reliable can be justified. This is a “recursive clause” of reliability justification. If a belief which is justification of temporarily trustworthy belief dependent method the input beliefs are justified, then the output confidence is justified. Goldman’s reliabilism is a form of foundationalism because there is an inferential link between the participation of belief and production of beliefs. Due to adopting a sort of justified belief that is not justified by the presence of other justified beliefs, the reliability avoids epistemic regress. Any undefeated conviction that emerges through a trustworthy belief-independent method is justified. The justification does not include any additional beliefs. As a result, such beliefs are fundamental.¹⁵¹

By exploring one of the most popular varieties of externalism, reliabilism, we have shown how an externalist account of justified belief might be used to illustrate a foundationalist structure. Other kinds of externalism, on the other hand, are also a form of foundationalism or, at the very least, present a justification account that distinguishes between inferential and non-inferential justification of belief and indirect and direct evidence for knowledge. Let’s take a simple kind of foundational doctrine for justification and knowledge, it holds that the proposition is true if it is trusts or reliable by cause that is the fact what is believed is true. It is possible to distinguish between underlying the process of chain which leads to desired belief. That belief includes the middle beliefs but this beliefs processing does not work according. This helps us to define the foundational beliefs.

Many people are attracted to externalist varieties of foundationalism because they appear to provide for a much larger basic ground of justified ideas. It makes no difference whether or not the beliefs are reliable justified. If nature has cooperated sufficiently to ensure the emergence of cognitive organisms which respond to their surroundings mostly with correct beliefs, then we may have access to a vast reserve of foundational information from which we might inferentially justify assumptions. Most of the externalist doctrine non-inferentially justified the belief, there is not prior restrictions on which basis one can stop being non-inferentially evident. Any proposition could have been thought as a result of a steadfast belief-forming process. Many epistemologists also argue that apologists must be truth-conducive and that the prerequisite of dependability (or some other external criterion) makes the linking to the truth

¹⁵¹ Fumerton, R., 2006, PP. 80-81

clear. On the other hand, the non-classical internalist foundationalist notions like phenomenal conservatism impend to break the relationship between justification and truth or probability because it is possible that what appears to be true is mostly false. However, these opposed to externalist epistemology question the externalist's ability to broaden the underlying basis of knowledge or justified belief. One of the most well-known counter-arguments to externalism is that the externalist's core belief criteria are insufficient for justification. In any case, for reliability, a belief can be justified the consequence in a reliable belief independently procedure where the subject would not have any defeaters for the belief.¹⁵²

According to Goldman (1986), it is logical to suppose that the subject of belief has defeated what he believes. Many people, including some reliabilists, believe that eliminating the defeaters is as simple as further specifying or altering the scenarios. Some accept a moderate kind of internalism, requiring just that the subject has an experience or accessible mental state that is, in reality, a reliable means to reach at beliefs, even if the subject does not have access to the experience's consistency.¹⁵³

There are many cases where the belief formation is not reliable, yet these are exceptional cases. One intuitive diagnosis is that there is no evidentiary or inferential relationship between output beliefs and input beliefs or that the process of producing output beliefs is neither evidentiary nor inferential. The challenge for a reliabilist who does not want to declare that such views are justified or impose internalist limits is to afford a well account of inferential processes. For good inference, the account cannot rely on consciousness of or access to a logical or probabilistic connection between believed premises in order to sustain its externalism.¹⁵⁴ It is commonly assumed that there is a debate about whether epistemic characteristics can be linked to the internal states of believers. Justification is analyzed in terms of or solely based on what occurs within the mind. It is called "internal state internalism". It follows from this that no two people can be alike internally or psychologically yet have different justifications for the same ideas. In one sense, being an externalist is asserting that one's reasoning is founded primarily on facts or events outside the mind. Others believe the discussion should focus on whether specific forms of access are essential for the justification. To justify a belief in certain way

¹⁵²Fumerton, R.,2006, PP. 82-83

¹⁵³ Alston, P. 1989.

¹⁵⁴ Alston, W., "Foundationalism", in Dancy, Jonathan & Sosa, Ernest (ed.). *A Companion To Epistemology*, pp. 144-45

believing that proposition P the ‘access internalist,’ holds (roughly) that there must be anything relevant to the reality or Justification of P within or at least available to one's standpoint or mindfulness. Any access is not required for justification, according to the ‘access externalist.’ The access externalist does not have to refute that something relevant to the truth of P is at least occasionally manageable to the subject who has Justification for P; nonetheless, externalists, in general, argue that access is not always obligatory for justification. Some people support both sorts of “internalism”, even if they believe one is more fundamental. For example, one could argue that access to internalism is more fundamental, believing that one can only have access to mental states and internal facts about them, and so embracing mental state as a result. Alternatively, the mentalist argument could be viewed as more fundamental, stating that one has some minimal access to major mental truths and hence accepts some form of access to internalism.

Externalists, on the other hand, typically allow for a basic trust in the absence of any attendance or appearing. In their explanations of epistemic justification, several epistemologists have mixed certain small internal requirements with externalist ones (Alston 1989 and Steup 2004.) While externalists advocate ideas that are diametrically opposite to classical foundationalist beliefs, the structure of justification and knowledge. That is the emerging field of theory called foundationalism. As we have discussed Goldman's reliability theory which maintained the most notable externalist. According to reliabilism, justified beliefs are those that are consistently formed. Beliefs that are reliably created are the result of a trustworthy process, and trustworthy processes produce trustworthy beliefs or would usually be true if enough of them were produced. Justified views are valuable since they are almost always correct.

By exploring one of important varieties of externalist theory, reliability theory, we have shown how an externalist account of justified belief might be used to illustrate a foundationalist structure. Other kinds of externalism, on the other hand, are either implicitly or explicitly dedicated to foundationalism or, at the very least, present a justification account that distinguishes between non-inferential and inferential justification, direct and indirect knowledge. As one might expect, the most significant difference between Huemer's phenomenal liberalism and Pryor's dogmatism is the air of inflexibility that Pryor grips in his viewpoint. Many epistemologists argue that phenomenalism has a role to play in the economy of justification. Perhaps sensations are representational states, and Huemer and other phenomenal conservatives term one form of representational state an appearing or seeming. In any form of phenomenal, states do matter though in belief-formation. However, one can argue that fear is a representational or propositional state; it does not appear that I have a *prima facie*

reason to believe in ghosts simply because I am terrified of them. Since believing is a representational state, it claims not to be justified by any perceptual appearance.

However, Huemer and Pryor will argue that the representational states they offer as justifiers are simply distinct in this aspect, owing to their unique phenomenal strength. Though they cannot assure that the world is as presented, they can provide justification that other representational states cannot.

4.8.0. Conclusion

In this chapter, we sought to provide a quick summary of foundationalism and coherentism. The confrontation for foundationalism is easy. If we have reasonable information and justified beliefs, about our internal or external thought. The of both the doctrine regarding structure, justification and knowledge claims. The foundation, the structure of knowledge and justification of foundationalism and coherentism is opposite to each other still they have built their position in epistemology. which must be based on other reasonable opinions, and so on. But, in the end, this justification process must lead to notions that are self-justified or self-evident and do not require justification. Some beliefs, according to foundationalists, must be directly or immediately justified rather than deduced from different beliefs.

Both theorists claimed non-inferentially justified beliefs defensible propositions are basic information to all and that basic beliefs justified other beliefs must be justified by light of them.

We examined many types of foundationalism to arrive at this conclusion. We also discussed the main purpose of coherentism. Any system of beliefs must have logical coherence in order to be acknowledged as correct; otherwise, we would be lost in insignificance. Coherentism established that a belief system is more coherent the more firmly it is bound. It emphasized the need for logical steadiness in the explanation of knowledge. We examined many types of coherentism to arrive at this conclusion. Finally, the importance of foundationalism and coherentism was discussed. This chapter mainly emphasized the debating points of foundationalism and coherentism regarding how beliefs are justified in any system of belief.

CHAPTER-5

TOWARDS RECONCILIATORY APPROACHES OF FOUNDATIONALISM AND COHERENTISM

5.0. Introduction

This chapter aims to explore the reconciliation method to examine the transaction and transformation of the theories of foundationalism and coherentism in the study of epistemology. It also tries to find the various possibilities to reconcile both foundationalism and coherentism in solving the significant issues and problems in epistemology. Implementing a reconciliatory approach in the epistemic enterprise, more specifically in radical foundationalism and radical coherentism. It is necessary to eliminate the negative aspects of their methods of judgment. It is necessary to explore the preservation and protection of these doctrines of knowledge. Otherwise, there is the problem of justification in both doctrines, which causes the deterioration of the doctrines. In general, every extreme case of observation or justification is causally problematic in nature because there is no further development and continuity, it entails that the stability and sustainability of these theories are problematic and questionable. Similarly, here in the case of radical foundationalism and radical coherentism, both doctrines function extremely in their epistemic enterprise. So, the study is attempted to examine both doctrines, and it tries to determine a moderate version of these theories, and the version is based on a reconciliatory approach. Here, we have used three vital reconciliatory approaches foundherentism which is introduced by Susan Haack, Foundational Coherentism by Earl Conee; and Coherent-foundation by C. David Miller. Apart from this case some other case has been taken to consider towards reconciliatory approaches of foundationalism and coherentism in epistemology.

5.1.0 Susan Haack's Point of View

Haack claims that there is a need for a new track to tackle the tension between foundationalism and coherentism. He argues that in the structure of the justification of both kinds of knowledge systems, there is a problem because their structure of justification is restricted to their own theory, and one contradicts to other. Both are exclusive in nature, so there is no possibility of further development and implication of their knowledge systems. But, as per the principle of epistemic enterprise, there is a need for inclusive nature of their structure of justification, and then there is the possibility of the growth or development of the knowledge systems. In general, as per the principle of epistemic enterprise, knowledge is always progressive in nature. In this

context, Haak has introduced a new theory called foundherentism; according to this theory, there is a need for a relation between foundationalism and coherentism for their development and sustainability. Hence, there is the necessity of some extra factors so, called experience; it is the intervention of our experiences and contribution of experience to empirical justification. He asserts that it is a dual-aspect theory rather than one that is solely causal or entirely logical in nature. It has evaluative and causal components. It is gradational in essence. A is more or less justified in thinking that p depends upon, for instance, even though A is justified in believing that p if and only if he will present a novel approach to the project of endorsement, one that is neither purely a priori nor purely empirical in nature. But modest naturalistic, permitting the related to empirical considerations about human beings and their cognitive capacities, limits as well as considerations of a rational, deductive nature.

Here, he heavily uses the analogy of a crossword puzzle, which, he would argue, more accurately captures the underlying structure of relationships of evidence support than the method of a mathematical demonstration that is so deeply ingrained in the foundationalist tradition. If he is correct, this comparison clarifies how reciprocal support among beliefs is feasible without leading to vicious circularity. It does, however, also hint at a potential problem with the structure of knowledge. I am forced to drive up and back while weaving and interlacing the interconnected filaments of my argument. Because he is unable to continue in a straightforward, linear manner. The structure of empirical knowledge is the topic under consideration by foundationalism and coherentism.

In order to address the issues of justification, both theories are helpful. The underlying “structure of the epistemic justification” of factual or empirical beliefs. For which foundationalism and coherentism give theories, is the framework in which we decide whether a belief is justified or not. The dispute’s topic can be taken in a number of ways, but this is faraway which is the most typical and obvious. Sosa was able to better explain the contrasts between foundationalism and coherentism with the use of the metaphors of the “pyramid and the raft”. According to foundationalism, every bit of knowledge is structured in a pyramid, with the base sustaining the superstructure by comparing knowledge to a raft that floats without any anchors or links, the coherentist substitutes a different metaphor for the pyramid. The floating rafts need to be repaired so that we may stand on some of them while replacing or fixing others. The raft cannot be disassembled in its entirety at once. However, Sosa discovers that there is some connection between coherentist theory and foundationalism. Both foundationalism and coherentism which try out to be variations of a strong foundationalism he refers to as formal

foundationalism and which is comparable to substantive foundationalism. He notes that “we have found a surprising kinship between coherentism and substantive foundationalism, both of which turn out to be varieties of a deeper foundationalism.”¹⁵⁵ The idea that nonepistemic situations are often affected by epistemic conditions is known as formal foundationalism. Sosa suggests two approaches to doing this: coherentism and substantive foundationalism. This suggests that the pyramid and raft are dedicated to formal foundationalism, as are foundationalism and coherentism. When we identify parts of both the pyramid and the raft inside the same justification theory, the road to reconciliation is made clear. The way for reconciliation is open when we find elements of the pyramid and raft within the same theory of justification.

5.1.1. Empirical Justification for Foundherentism

Although the other dichotomies will also be examined, the major argument will be that an intermediate theory of justified belief is more tenable than either foundationalism or coherentism, the two traditionally opposed theories of justified belief. My term for it is “foundherentism”. According to “foundationalist theories of empirical justification”; an empirical belief can only be supported by evidence. It is one of two types: either a derivative belief that is directly or indirectly supported by the basis of a basic belief or a foundational belief that is itself supported by the agent’s experience. According to coherentist theories of empirical justification, a belief can only be supported by evidence, if it is part of a coherent system of beliefs. In summary, foundationalism stresses a difference between fundamental and derived ideas and a largely moving understanding of empirical support. Whereas coherentism maintains that views can only be justified by supporting one another. The advantage of foundationalism and its justification is that it recognizes a subject’s experience of what does he see, hear, etc. It is relevant to how justification of his beliefs about the external world are. However, it also ignores the pervasive interdependence among an agent’s beliefs and calls for an advantaged class of fundamental beliefs that can support the rest of our justified beliefs. Coherentist’s take advantage is that it realises this persistent link and does not demand the separation of fundamental ideas from derived beliefs. It has also the disadvantage of not allowing the subject’s experience to play any part. The issues with coherentism are, of course, well-known among foundationalists. They question how one could have a basis for thinking

¹⁵⁵ Sosa, E. “Raft and Pyramid: Coherence versus Foundations in the Theory of Knowledge”, in *Midwest Studies in Philosophy*, Vol. 5, no. 3, 1980.

there is a dog in the yard if one's senses those of sight, hearing, smell, etc. had no bearing on the situation. Furthermore, it is not the coherentist's dialog of the mutual support of beliefs just an understatement for what is actually a 'vicious circle' in which what would justify the belief that A is the belief that B. What supposedly justifies the belief that B is the belief that C... and what supposedly justifies the belief that C is the belief that A? Naturally, the coherentists are just as conscious as foundationalists of the issues with their position. What sense does it make to assume that someone may have a legitimate belief that there is a dog in the field. They query, apart from the situation of the rest of his dog-related beliefs? In addition, why should we think that any views could be supported by experience alone while also being justified by it?

In the end, foundationalists are unable to agree among themselves as to whether the fundamental beliefs are about subjective experiences, such as "it now seems to me that I see what looks like a dog," or are about observable physical things, such as "there is a dog," or "I have appeared too brownly." A subject's experience couldn't possibly explain such purportedly fundamental ideas since only beliefs, not events, may stay in logical connections to other assertions. They have become more similar as the two schools of thought have progressed, and each side has attempted to get over obstacles the other believes to be insurmountable. Strong foundationalism demands that fundamental views are completely supported by the individual's experience, whereas "pure foundationalism" demands that derivative beliefs are only get some support by foundational beliefs, whether directly or indirectly. However, 'impure foundationalism', while needing all derivative beliefs to get some push back from foundational beliefs. It enables mutual backing among the derived beliefs to rise their level of justification. Only those basic beliefs are required to be justified by experience under weak foundationalism. Coherentism that adheres to an unwavering egalitarian stance maintains that only overall coherence counts and that any viewpoint in a coherent collection is equally justifiable. However, tempered, inequitarian varieties of coherentism offer a subject's views regarding his current experience a distinguishing beginning position or provide beliefs that are impulsive rather than inferential in nature a particular standing. These modified versions of coherentism and foundationalism skew toward the correct direction in a manner.¹⁵⁶

C. I. Lewis his shifting from a "pure foundationalism" to "impure foundationalism" and then, momentarily, to a form of "proto-foundherentism". On the foundationalist side when faced with pressures similar to those foundationalist identifies and on the coherentist side, get under

¹⁵⁶ This is characterised from, Alston's in J. Dancy and E. Sosa (ed.), *Companion to Epistemology* (Oxford: Blackwell, 1992), PP. 144-145 and Sosa's paper in "The Raft and the Pyramid,"

pressure from precisely the kind of difficulty has been identified.¹⁵⁷ Bonjour tries to confirm experiential input by introducing an “Observation Requirement” that, however, is unclear; on one explanation, it is genuinely can say that coherentist does not allow the relevance of experience. On the other hand, it allows the significance of experience, but is not genuinely coherentist. Without giving up its uniqueness, none of the historically opposing explanations can be satisfactorily reconciled.

The obvious conclusion is that there is a need to a fresh approach to allow the importance of our experience. The empirical justification of the belief without assuming any privileged status of foundational beliefs. That requires the relations among the theories to provide some input in certain way. Other way, the “foundherentist theory of knowledge”, despite the fact that those still committed to the old separation will undoubtedly continue to resist it.

5.1.2. The Sanction of Foundherentism

The challenge has been defining our standards for well and inferior evidence for knowledge claims. Haack, in her discussion of foundherentism theory tried to combine both the theories in a certain restricted manner. Instead, I see these values as being basically based on how well a trust is attached in experience and how strongly it is intertwined into a descriptive mesh of opinions. These standards are essentially based on how well a belief is entrenched in human nature, in the memory abilities and confines of all normal human beings. It will undoubtedly be argued that the evidentiary standards of other eras, civilizations, groups, or scientific paradigms are drastically different. The problem, in my opinion, is that people mistake the perspectival nature of evidentiary quality assessments for a fundamental difference in standards of better and worse evidence.


I believe that this apparent diversity is at the very least an exaggeration and quite probably a delusion. People with drastically different underlying views might be anticipated to judge the degree of justification in very different ways since assessments of the quality of the proof are perspectival. It doesn't always shadow that there are no accepted standards of proof. Instead of making precise judgments about the relevance, supportability, etc., of one piece of evidence over another, we should consider the limitations of experiential anchoring and explanatory integration, in which case we will likely discover convergence rather than divergence. Once more, the context of the crossword comparison makes the concept clearer to understand. Let's

¹⁵⁷ Haack, Susan. *Evidence and Inquiry: Towards Reconstruction in Epistemology*, Oxford: Blackwell, 1993, PP. 10-33.

say that while working on the identical crossword puzzle, you and I filled in several lengthy centre entries in different ways. Let's say that you and I are both members of an appointing team. You believe that the way this applicant writes his makes him untrustworthy; I disagree and mock your "proof" since I believe graphology is nonsense: We differ on the relevant evidence because of divergent baseline assumptions. But with regard to the premise that the candidate is trustworthy, we are both attempting to evaluate the strength, independence, and thoroughness of the evidence. However, even if I am mistaken and there are genuinely drastically different criteria for the admissibility of evidence, this does not necessarily mean that there are no objective signs of truth. Inconsistency the standards does have in it and of itself, suggest relativism in standards.¹⁵⁸

Therefore, this epistemic vacillator who concluded that because explanation criteria differ from society to society, where it is not objectively true values of good and shoddier proof had both broken a non-cogitation and relied on a questionable premise. We can only argue that individuals who have given up on the idea of truth and, as a result, have become victims of epistemic relativism exhibit wholly factitious despair in this essay.¹⁵⁹ What is needed is the idea of necessity of the truth in the following is that a announcement is right merely, in different cases the things turn out to be as it claims. Then these are the only clues we could have of how things are. This is what I think and what you presumably believe as well. As one might anticipate, the epistemological portion of my crossword, where the admissions are actually about acrostics, fits together perfectly with other portions. However, how can I respond to who are aware of Descartes futile attempt to demonstrate that. "What I plainly and vividly observe is real", who are sure to assume that I must be talking in circles? The strong-minded doubters won't be swayed, but they will never be persuaded and the remained part of it, might observe that foundherentism allows to avoid any different contrast that, when you will excuse this joke, has plagued current Epistemology, moreover a desperate fascination will be inflated scepticism. I think that foundherentism offers a more accurate portrayal of our epistemic state, one that is firmly fallibilist and, without losing objectivity, acknowledges some of how difficult and perplexing evidence may be. The following is in the table,

¹⁵⁸ Haack, Susan. "Reflections on relativism: From momentous tautology to seductive contradiction." *Philosophical Perspectives*, 10 (1996): 297-315.



The “coherence theory of epistemic justification” holds that the epistemic permit or authority of empirical speeches derives entirely from rationality and not at all from any sort of “foundation”. Despite the fact that there are many different philosophical perspectives that have been referred to as “coherence theories”, including theories of fact and of connotation. This is what Lewis seems to have had in mind when he wrote his famous essay. Lewis’s strict interpretation of foundationalism is now widely discredited. In light of this, Bonjour has debated “the coherence theory of empirical knowledge” (hereafter CTEK). Despite having evident similarities to various historical perspectives, the CTEK should not be associated with any one of them. Instead, it is meant to be a perfect reconstruction of a very simple coherence theory that shuns all forms of foundationalism.

A relatively new philosophical movement known as “weak foundationalism” amounts to an intriguing fusion of the CTEK and a foundation theory of knowledge. According to this perspective, certain empirical beliefs contain a thin layer of non-inferential epistemic support. This initial degree of justification must be supplemented by a further plea to consistency before knowledge is attained. As previously understood, these beliefs are not basic beliefs because their degree of non-inferential warrant is insufficient on its own to satisfy the satisfactory justification condition of knowledge or to be suitable them as appropriate vindicating premises for other opinions. Therefore, the answer to the regress problem is seemingly though it is rarely explicitly stated that the regress moves in a circle at the end, as in the CTEK, but that the justification for the coherent system of beliefs that emerges comes from both coherence and the non-inferential justification of some of its constituent beliefs. Weak foundationalism has been refined by Scheffler and, to a considerably greater extent, by Rescher. Russell and Goodman first proposed it. The primary driving force for foundational beliefs, as well as the majority of their persuasive backing, has been the regress problem. The majority of philosophers have believed that some kind of foundationalism must be genuine because the CTEK was evidently unable to offer an effective answer to the issue. They have missed significant issues that are related to the foundations stance as a whole as well as to specific forms of it due to this argument by elimination.¹⁶⁰

¹⁶⁰ Bonjour, Laurence. “The coherence theory of empirical knowledge.” *Philosophical Studies* 30, no. 5 (1976), 281-312. doi:10.1007/bf00357928.

However, the CTEK now views the relationship between the many particular beliefs as one of joint or reciprocal support rather than one of linear dependency at this global level. There is no basis for a real regress since there is no decisive relation of epistemic significance among the participants in such a system. Each of the constituent beliefs may be defensible in terms of the others since they are all so closely connected; whose belief is being questioned in a given situation will determine which way the justification argument really swings. Because the defense of certain beliefs ultimately rests not on other specific beliefs, as in the linear model of justification, but rather on the total system and its coherence, the seeming circle of justification is not vicious. Therefore, there would be four unique phases in the argument used to completely justify a given viewpoint, as follows:

1. The degree to which that particular credence may be inferred from other specific views and the extent to which specific beliefs can be inferred from one another.
3. The justification of the entire system of opinions. 2. The overall system of beliefs' coherence.
4. The argument that the precise belief in question is justified since it is part of the system.

Each of these processes is dependent upon the ones that come before it, according to the CTEK. The major cause of the linear understanding of explanation and, thus, of the regression problem will be the disregard with stages of 2 and 3, which obviously relate to the perceptive of mind. This is an impolite error. Phases 1 and 4 can be fatally confused with one another since they both require the same inferential links between specific ideas. This leaves out the two intermediate steps that explicitly refer to the system. Since it depends on the inferential relations that exist between the justification belief and other beliefs in the system, only the third transition, from step 3 to step 4, is reasonably free of problems. In fact, it is this conversion that occurs when an illative justification is presented in a normal setting. However, the other two transitions are quite troublesome, and the problems they bring up are essential to comprehending and evaluating the CTEK.

Weak foundationalism asserts that certain fundamental ideas have some level of non-inferential epistemic validity, albeit a negligible one. However, weak foundationalism varies significantly from earlier, more orthodox iterations. For instance, the weak foundationalist solution to the regress problem, which is typically not explained all that well, must be very different from the moderate foundationalist one. The weak foundationalist is unable to assert, as does the moderate foundationalist, that when fundamental beliefs are attained, the regress of justifications simply comes to a stop. Because they are insufficiently justified on their own, the

fundamental beliefs of the weak foundationalist cannot serve as the presumptions that justify everything else. The feeble foundationalist response to this issue is an effort to strengthen the justification of both fundamental and nonfundamental ideas by using the idea of coherence.

If weak foundationalism is seen in this way, it may be seen as a form of hybrid between moderate foundationalism and the coherence theories discussed previously, and it is frequently believed to have the best aspects of both while having the worst aspects of neither. The first of the common demurrals to the coherence theory stated earlier does seem to have an adequate response from the weak foundationalist: the choice between two similarly coherent systems is made by defining which system contains a greater amount of these fundamental beliefs. While it is less apparent how the other two coherence theory concerns, particularly the second, should be addressed, the weak foundationalist appears to at least have a lot more room for maneuver. Finally, it is generally accepted that weak foundationalism is more defensible than moderate foundationalism since it makes a weaker case for the underlying ideas.

According to Davidson, coherence is a test of truth. There is a clear association between coherence and epistemology because we have reason to assume that many of our ideas cohere with many others, which implies that many of our beliefs are genuine. The fundamental requirements for knowing to appear to be met when the beliefs are true. A coherence theory of truth could be defended without a coherence theory of information, potentially on the grounds that the bearer of a coherent set of views might not have a good reason to think his beliefs are coherent. Although it is unlikely, it is possible that someone, despite having correct views and solid justifications for them, may not understand how important reason is to believe. Such a person is best described as possessing information that he is unaware of since he believes himself to be a skeptic. All beliefs are defensible in this sense: they have a presupposition that they are true and are backed by a large number of other views. Because even while each of a follower's beliefs is, in some manner, defensible to him, not all of them may be sufficiently or appropriately justified to qualify as knowledge. By demonstrating why, it is not possible for all of our opinions to be untruthful at the same time, the universal assumption in favor of the reality of belief serves to save us from a common kind of skepticism. This leaves the task of defining the criteria of knowing largely unaffected. I have not focused on the standards of evidentiary

support (if any exist), but rather on demonstrating that every supporting information for a belief must originate from the same body of knowledge to which it belongs.¹⁶¹

5.2.0. Earl Conee's Points of View

Foundational coherentism is a hypothesis that Earl Conee developed. In his work "The Basic Nature of Epistemic Justification," he recently addressed the problem of reconciliation in the background of this theory. He contends that a satisfactory solution may be found to the conflict between the competing theses of foundationalism and coherentism. He maintains that the fundamental tenet of coherentism, that coherence among beliefs underwrites to justification without necessitating independently justified views, is still very much tenable. The finest foundations for foundationalism are provided by sensory experience, which opens up our cognitive access to the outside world. Since the two theses are diametrically opposite to one another, the settlement seems to be challenging. In the discussion, each side criticized the other. Conee offers a theory that, in his words, "outlines the subsequent inclusive vision" and overcomes "apparent barriers to reconciliation across viewpoints."

When it comes to coherent systems, Conee questions how it is possible to have a sufficient number of observational beliefs when experience, at least mostly, does not suit the system. He claimed that observable beliefs were incorporated into the system through experience. The claim that coherent views are justified loses credibility when sufficient experiences are missing. There is some truth to the coherentist argument that core ideas are not necessary. That coherent system of justified beliefs may arise without any external support in the form of common beliefs is a fair foundation for this denial. A person does not need to include his experiences in order to form judgments about them in order to establish a cohesive system of justified beliefs. The claim that a coherent system of beliefs is justified, however, is invalid even if the aberrant, experienced beliefs do not support the system. Assume a guy has a coherent set of beliefs, including the conviction that he is not hallucinating or otherwise being misled and that he exclusively sees black-and-white objects lighted by white light. Assume that individual has experienced seeing blue visually. His system's perceptual presumptions are invalid, given the situation. His belief that everything he sees is either black or white is refuted by the sight of

¹⁶¹ BonJour, Laurence. *The Structure of Empirical Knowledge*. Cambridge: Harvard University Press, 1985.

blue. Belief coherence is insufficient to sustain such perspectives in the face of an uncooperative reality.

It has been questioned whether foundationalism gives pure sensory experience any epistemic weight. It is now conceivable that there is no unreachable causal limit on what may be accepted based on experience. The primary foundationalist assertion, nevertheless, that experience provides a reasonable limit is unaffected by this. In other words, the types of concepts that may be justified are limited by the nature of experience. However, our non-propositional experiences limit our presumptions about the outside world. The system of empirical beliefs is built on the basis of our sensory perceptions of the world. Conee makes no significant assertions on the possibility of using sensory experiences as premises in inductive or deductive logical relationships to support any worldview.

According to him, experience may support ideas about the outside world through epistemic care relationships other than inferential and inductive validity. Experience has placed a justificatory constraint that calls for an explanation. This does not, however, call into question the validity of the relationship. If a belief has experience support yet is inconsistent, it might be challenging to argue that it is justified. As a result, justified beliefs do not arise in illogical or coherent combinations when foundationalists describe significant experiences as the basis for justification. Even first-person remarkable beliefs are unlikely to be justified in the absenteeism of complete coherence. Such ideas are only supported by phenomenally satisfying experiences, which require at least a minimally cohesive system. He asserts: Both experience and coherent belief require an explanation. It is pointless to think that these two partnerships are unhealthy. A form of coherence that occurs both between system beliefs and a system of beliefs and constrictive experiences may be the only fundamental epistemic support connection. If so, the best theory of justification would incorporate the essential elements of foundationalism and coherentism, contending that a belief is only epistemically defensible when it is a component of a coherence system that accords with the person's experiences. Conee claims that the disagreement between coherentists and foundationalists is caused by the challenge of incorporating experience into the doxastic framework. But he doesn't see any insurmountable obstacle to uniting foundationalism with coherentism. The ensuing theory is referred to by Conee as "foundational coherentism." When it is stated that justified opinions must be a part of a coherent system of beliefs, it integrates coherentist principles. However,

when it is stated that the coherent system of beliefs coheres with experience, it transcends coherentism and embraces foundationalism.¹⁶²

5.3.0. C. David Miller's Point of View

Foundationalism contends that all subsequent knowledge and reasoning are based on a small number of fundamental beliefs. The coherentist position, on the other hand, asserts that this is impossible since all beliefs can only be justified in relation to other beliefs. Miller contends that in order to avoid common flaws, a convincing compromise between the theories must be made by integrating their individual strengths. Each contending theory has advantages over the others as well as disadvantages. Thus, he has presented a critical idea known as a coherent basis. Regarding this theory, Miller contends that coherence and foundation are complimentary and additional to one another since both are built on a particular belief system, beliefs have varying degrees of epistemic authority, and this is supported by a variety of factors. Therefore, either foundationalism or coherentism must be built on certain ideas that have a specific foundation in order for there to be no problems with the knowledge system.

The foundationalist believes that it does (and must); these ideas constitute the “basis” of all others, as Miller has sensitively argued. According to the coherentist, justification is “ultimately inferential” since beliefs can only have epistemic authority if they can be backed up by reasons. In the past, the coherence hypothesis sounded less logical. As every believer must be supported by at least one other, it is first committed to a circle of justifications or, maybe even worse, an infinite regress. The idea, according to detractors, fails to “tie down” information and “blocks off” views from the outside world. Third, the idea of coherence has proven to be difficult. It has either been clarified using the idea of entailment, which makes it too restrictive, or it seems to signify consistency at times, which is plainly too permissive. Due to these issues, it is simple to mock the idea, leaving foundations unopposed. I'll make the case that coherence can be made to seem more credible than this, particularly if experience-based beliefs are allowed for and if the concept of coherence is made to seem pretty obvious. However, circularity presents a more challenging issue and eventually, in my opinion, renders the theory invalid. Let's try to first explain the disagreement between the hypotheses.¹⁶³

¹⁶² Conee, Earl. “The Nature of Epistemic Justification” Conee, Earl, and Richard Feldman. *Evidentialism: Essays in epistemology*. Clarendon Press, 2004.

¹⁶³ Miller, C. David, “A Coherent Foundation.” *IU South Bend Undergraduate Research Journal* vol. 4, 2001, PP. 67-70.

The idea that all knowledge and all opinions are built on a basis is known as foundationalism. According to Matthias Steup, foundationalism is composed of the following elements: In contrast to nonbasic beliefs, which create up a belief system's superstructure, basic beliefs provide the base of a belief system. Second, each superstructure-related belief is ultimately dependent on one or more foundation-related beliefs for its validity. Beyond this flimsy description, the waterways of comprehension soon get murky since foundationalism has many different iterations. Starting with the idea of fundamental belief. Basic beliefs must possess the following three qualities:

First of all, they are non-inferential, not inferred from other beliefs.

Second, they serve as the justifiers for nonbasic beliefs, which justifies them in their own right.

Finally, they are justified nondoxastically, which means that their justification comes from inside their own ideas alone. This third quality involves observation, reflection, and remembering within a person's worldview. With the qualities of fundamental principles established, we are now ready to move on to a fundamental definition shared by all foundationalism:

Many of our views are fundamental; each valid inference is ultimately justified by one or more fundamental beliefs.

With this theoretical framework for belief systems in place, a keen spectator can easily identify foundationalism's fatal flaw: if many of our beliefs are, in accordance with this theory, fundamental, then how can “foundationalists maintain that there are beliefs that are justified without receiving their justification from other beliefs”? When attempting to answer this question, at least two challenges must be overcome. While the second addresses the regress argument directly, the first addresses the possible issue of an endless regress. One can have a belief B1 that is justified, which solves the problem of an endless regress very easily and succinctly. If B1 is not fundamental, then it must, in turn, base its rationale on B2. If B2 is not fundamental, it must then base its defense on B3. Either this retreat comes to an end someday, or it goes on forever. Nevertheless, nothing can be justified by an endless chain of justifications. The regress must thus end in a fundamental belief given our presumption that B1 is true. Steup calls fundamental beliefs “regress terminators.”

The second issue is trickier since it raises doubts about the veracity of fundamental beliefs in and of themselves. To show that an infinite regress is impossibly impossible, foundationalists rely on B1 being justified. Skeptics could challenge this premise by posing the question of how we ever learn to rationalize such a fundamental conviction. To put it another way, the instant we define a basic belief, such as “regress terminator”, we have just broken the idea represented in that belief and returned to the circularity merry-go-round. We'll talk about this again shortly. The brief answer to the regress argument put forth by the skeptics is, “If there are justified beliefs, then there must be basic beliefs.” This response is credible because it is unbearable to believe that there are no justifiable opinions.¹⁶⁴

When compared to foundationalists, coherentists “argue that it is impossible for a belief to be fundamental on the grounds that what supports a belief must always be one or more other beliefs,” Coherentists “must somehow make sense of the concept of circular justification: of beliefs validating each other without there being any basis in which the process of justification can be anchored,” according to the foundationalists, who then instantly turn them into targets for their guns.

There could be a solution to the issue that this allegedly circular thought process poses, though. According to Steup, in order to provide coherentism a fair hearing, we must swap out the linear conceptual framework that gives birth to the regress problem for an all-encompassing notion of justification. None of the beliefs in the system, according to Miller, are “epistemically antecedent to the others” but rather stand “in relations of mutual support.” What this amounts to is a system with absolute internal consistency, where each component derives its justification from being a member and being properly situated within the whole system. The construction of such a system is shown to consist of three hypothesized elements: entailment relations, logical consistency, and explanatory relations.

Miller discovers that there are various issues with the coherentist perceptual paradigm, but two, in particular, are significant: The first comes from the coherentists' claim that justification for a belief must come from inside the existing network of opinions rather than from outside sources. This practically guarantees that an internalist must adopt a coherentist viewpoint. The challenge here is deciding what to do with new knowledge when it becomes accessible (from

¹⁶⁴ Miller, C. David, “A Coherent Foundation.” *IU South Bend Undergraduate Research Journal* vol. 4, 2001, pp. 67-70.

outside sources) to the believer. All internal beliefs have an external origin, with the possible exception of introspective views. Internalization can only happen over time and via interaction with the outside environment. While some of it happens randomly, much of it comes from background experience. Most people would disagree that the only acceptable type of belief is introspection. Thus, if someone is engaging with their environment, internalism is a weak foundation upon which to develop a strong theory of justification. Coherentism may result in a situation where a person's internal consistency of their personal perceptual framework is flawless.

This might ultimately cause that person to believe they are fully justified in all of their ideas when, in fact, they may be entirely out of touch with reality. The isolation objection refers to this. Regarding the role that time plays in the formation of beliefs, the coherentist approach also has another significant flaw. How does the coherentist, for instance, handle cognitively spontaneous observations or perceptual beliefs, which “just strike the observer in an involuntary, coercive, non-inferential fashion, rather than as a product of any form of inference or other discursive processes, whether explicit or implicit?” It becomes clear that justification occurs over time in a coherentist perceptual framework when Steup’s three putative components of coherence (logical consistency, entailment relations, and explanatory relations) are taken into consideration. This makes it challenging to handle fleeting justification situations, such as intuitions and irrational, impulsive convictions, in an appropriate manner. Therefore, the fundamental issue is as follows: foundationalists claim that coherentism is ineffective because it ruins into the self-justifying tail-chasing indirectness, while coherentists claim that the foundationalists reliance on basic beliefs also fails because basic opinions themselves must be defined in nonbasic language, eventually sketch them into a similar circularity problem.

Similarities to coherentism may be seen here. Beliefs do not develop in a vacuum. This is supported by our daily experiences. The challenge for a foundationalist is how to handle fundamental beliefs since foundationalism considers them as detachable independent variables and robs them of their contextual meaning in the process. I would request that the foundationalist give up this dearly held idea (no pun intended). Here's why: Take a look at a child’s growth. When my son was born, all that he was capable of doing was basic things like sucking, peeing himself, and wailing. I am not sure what his very first impression was while still in this existence. But I do remember that when he was born, he peered into my eyes. Let’s refer to this as his initial impression for the purposes of discussion. It appears that he didn't

personally associate much with the such notion. In fact, over the course of the next few weeks, he and I exchanged hundreds of glances without showing any sign that he remembered me. Although, if I know the foundationalist logic, each time he turned to look at me, he received a perceptual intake of data, leading to the formation of a fundamental belief. I won't go into great detail on child development psychology; instead, I'll just state that my kid "came into living" over time. Instead, he gradually "turned on". When enough causal linkages were established, he arose from the field of capability, which fits well with the Eastern model. He has not really emerged. Were all that. I believe that in our cores, every one of us has a set of fundamental ideas that serve as the foundation for our views and future evolution.

I am unable to describe what a cohesive foundation is, but I would hazard a guess that it comprises (but is not limited to) forms, colors, and sensory impressions, along with all the context-sensitive connections that take place between them. They have a comparable foundation thanks to these exchanges, from which they create the meanings that we humans infer. For instance, the common perception of "red" is meaningless until it is contrasted to other perceptions of both similar and different kinds. It doesn't appear like "red" has any worth until it is experienced in context, though. "Is and Is not generate each other," to use Taoist terminology. Numerous foundationalism-related issues disappear if we accept a cogent foundation. A set of fundamental ideas called the cohesive foundation acts as the regress terminators that are so important to the foundationalist viewpoint. The key distinction in this theoretical framework is that fundamental beliefs no longer experience the problems that occur when regress exterminators are viewed as detachable independent variables. The linear circularity argument is sidestepped by this approach. There is some circularity, but it is internal and limited to the essential concepts that lie at the foundation of the system. Because of this, every time a regress begins in the superstructure, it ends when it hits the cohesive basis.¹⁶⁵

Any component(s) of the coherent foundation structure that is suitable for the task of ending the specific regress arise to carry out their function, but they do so with the contextual support of the full collection of fundamental beliefs. The terminating loci, which in a sense lose their "identity," retreat into the field of coherent beliefs once the regress has been properly stopped. After that, they return to their more general mission of laying a solid foundation for the

¹⁶⁵ Miller, C. David, "A Coherent Foundation." IU South Bend Undergraduate Research Journal vol. 4, 2001, PP. 67-70.

superimposed superstructure of nonbasic ideas. Take a minute to review the differences between notion development and belief justification, then consider how these two aspects of a belief system fit into the cohesive foundation paradigm. A consistent underlying structure was previously demonstrated using the example of my son's early growth. Undoubtedly, this idea might be applied to explain how conceptions are created. The role of belief justification in the situation, however, might not be entirely evident. We must distinguish between a belief's ability to be justified and the process of justifying a belief. Even if one hasn't done anything to validate a belief, it might nonetheless have the attribute of being fully supported. Additionally, "it is feasible for you to have no notion how to defend a certain view even while that belief is, in fact, valid."¹⁶⁶ This is significant. Think about the sources of evidence for justification that are generally accepted: perception, reflection, reason, memory, and trustworthy authority.

Only perception, i.e., facts we get from external sources, does not need a higher grade of mental activity than the other four. It is also the earliest type of knowledge that we as humans have ever encountered, as was already said. Our primary source of belief development throughout our lives is perceptual evidence. Introspection, reason, memory, and trustworthy authority are the additional sources that will act as backup agents. I'm not saying they are any less significant. They are the ones who give the strainers through which perceptual evidence is sorted and processed, although we do have a usually larger degree of resistor over them. According to our model of concept development in early life and the contrast between perceptual evidence and the other four agents of evidence, it would appear that the activity of justification does not take place at the coherent foundation level. Instead, justification at this level arises as a characteristic of the cohesive foundation based on how the basic pieces of evidence fit together to build a whole system. To put it another way, at the level of the coherent foundation, justification is a property that results from the causal connections in the foundational matrix. On the other hand, justification as a function takes place at the superstructure level, which is not fundamental. Thinking about takes place at this level. To sift fresh packets of perceptual facts and shape them into the schema that sits atop each person's cohesive basis, introspection, reason, memory, and trustworthy authority work in concert.

The foundationalists' superstructure model is made up of nonbasic ideas that interact in innovative ways; as a result, each person has a distinct personality. There is a continuum: the more we move inside, the more plausible the coherentist model is, and the more we move

¹⁶⁶ Steup, 1998, p. 10

outward, the more suitable the foundationalist model becomes. A newborn, a grade-school kid, and an adult are distinguished from one another by how sophisticated this process is. The potential of life “turns on” for the person as they develop and mature. According to the quantity of evidence gathered, the number of beliefs developed, and the extent to which active justification of those beliefs happens, various prospects are then realized. Giving the foundationalists a logical framework, they are now free to erect any superstructure of nonbasic ideas they so want. Coherentists may also unwind because they can uphold the circle-of-beliefs thesis in the epistemic core, which is where it truly matters, but they are no longer vulnerable to challenges that surface at higher levels. The virtual necessity for an internalist perspective, for example, no longer applies. Coherentism’s issues with the isolationist objection also disappear by permitting extremism. The “time objection” is handled at the coherent foundation level, release the higher levels of awareness to deal with things like guesses and irrational, spontaneous opinions in a context-appropriate way.

Additionally, by permitting for a foundationalist-style superstructure, the issue with memory impulsiveness appears to be determined (perceived emergency situations). In these circumstances, it is plausible that different grades of supervenience may also be at work at the superstructure level, reliant, for instance, on the perceived level of risk in an emergency. One reacts in a high-danger scenario almost intuitively, spending little to no time considering how justified one’s actions are. The luxury of at least passing reference to the “library” of prior experiences down at the cohesive foundation level may be available in a circumstance where the level of danger is lower. In an effort to determine what is the most suitably justified response, this enables a comparison of the current event with earlier time-objection experiences. I firmly think that by choosing a cogent foundation theory, we may avoid the main issues that arise when proponents adhere dogmatically to their own theories and end up painting themselves into an epistemological corner. We may actualize a far more pragmatic approach to epistemic justification and encounter the dynamic each theory aspires to utilize by making a few concessions and getting East and West to shake hands.

5.4.0. Assessments of the three Reconciliatory Approaches

Here, we have deduced certain outcomes from the above important appraisals of eminent thinkers who have argued that there is a need for a reunion of foundationalism and coherentism in order to establish a kind of knowledge theory that will be stable and sustainable. Otherwise, there is the possibility of self-exclusion of the theory of knowledge as foundationalism and

coherentism as well. Therefore, eminent epistemologists like Susan Haack, Earl Conee, and C. David Miller have critically emphasized the method of reconciliation. They have argued that this is the alternative way to preserve, protect, and develop the theory of knowledge as foundationalism and coherentism as well. The main motto of this method of reconciliation is to wed both theories and establish an important theory that defends both theories of knowledge. So, they have suggested several ways to establish that on the basis of their appraisals. Let's check their appraisal as follows.

5.5.0. Appraisal of Haack and Conee

The hierarchy between foundationalism and coherentism in epistemology is not a new issue. It is historically well-rooted. The issue is limited to the justification of belief and adequacy of evidence. But the standardization of knowledge theory, like foundation and coherentism, is based on the standard form of justification and adequacy of evidence. Here, in the appraisal, it has examined whether the justification of belief and adequacy of evidence is restricted to the realm of human rationality (mechanism of mind) or corresponds to the fact (experience of the world). Whether is there an intervention between foundation and coherentism or not? Determining the fundamental sources of these knowledge theories is emphasized, but for the further development and flourishing of the theories, it lacks justification and adequacy of evidence due to the conservative nature of their epistemic enterprise.

With regard to this issue, Haack has argued that there is a necessity for reconciliation between foundationalism and coherentism in order to eliminate the conservative attitude of adequate evidence and belief systems. He argues that the spatiotemporal factors affect the knowledge system due to the nature of human beings and their cognitive capacity in the beliefs that are rooted. It is to notice how the standard of evidence and beliefs of man varies from time to time and from place to place. So, it is also carrying the load of cultures and communities. So, it is quite problematic, which resulted in evidential inadequacy and belief misleads to the system of knowledge. Here, the quality of evidence and background of belief must have to check for the progress of knowledge through the interaction of various doctrines of knowledge. If it is impossible, then it lacks explanatory integration and maintains isolation, resulting in some sort of partial knowledge and ignorance.

Therefore, Haack has found an important way in between foundationalism and coherentism to eliminate partial knowledge and ignorance, which is called foundherentism. According to this theory, knowledge is sharable, sustainable, and stable through integral integration; otherwise,

the origin of ignorance and illusion in the mechanical aspect of the system of knowledge is possible. Hence, the reconciliation between foundationalism and coherentism is necessary. There is a hierarchy between basic beliefs and derived beliefs in the epistemic frame of foundationalism. It is not a dependence-type argument. Epistemic dependence relation among beliefs is essential, and foundherentism is neither foundationalism nor coherentism, rather the hybrid version of both, which is based on epistemic dependence relation among beliefs. But there are several issues pointed out by Bonjour. He claims that in the epistemic frame of Haack's foundherentism, both foundationalism and coherentism lack certain essential attributes, and they became weaker in their epistemic activities. But, Bonjour has emphasized on foundationalism and stated that in the epistemic frame of Haack, foundationalism became so weaker. But, Bonjour did not examine whether there is any problem in coherentism or not. Similarly, in the epistemic frame of Conee, coherentism is also problematic due to the reliance of the foundational attitude of evidence.

Therefore, those epistemic relativists who drew the conclusion that there cannot be objectively true standards of well and shoddier suggestion because assessments of justification differ from community to community had committed a non sequitur and relied on a suspect premise. I can only remark that individuals who have given up on the idea of truth and have instead turned to epistemic relativism seem to be in a completely factitious despair. What will be essential of the idea of objectivity in the following is that a belief or report is necessary simply in different cases turn out to be as it claims. If we assume that humans are imperfect, limited, and inquisitive beings who exist in a universe that is mostly self-governing of different things that trust about it, but in which there are types, rules, and uniformities, and if we assume that our senses are a basis of evidence about the things and events in the world, though by no means an infallible source, and that introspection is a basis, even in any means of dependable source, This is the only clue we can have of how things are, assuming, since I think and you may be do, that we don't any other sources of knowledge about ourselves and the universe. Because the "supposing" sentences are empirical in nature, the last paragraph was far from an a priori confirmation of foundherentism.

Our criteria for evidence quality include assumptions about human cognitive abilities and limits. Therefore, the veracity of those standards' truth-indicativeness rests on the accuracy of those empirical presumptions. However, that last paragraph was also very different from the references to psychology or memory science that some extreme epistemological naturalists than me propose to rely on. This is because the assumptions made in my "supposing" clauses,

while empirical, are so broad in scope for more logical than systematic in nature. Those presumptions could undoubtedly will made in any imaginable systematic research, but they are fine matched to the cognitive sciences has to be say around the apparatuses of awareness and self-examination, as well as it will be more and less relevant, as well as how the evolution theory advises what the apparatus proves that how we arise here. The epistemological section of my crossword, where the items are actually about crosswords, interlocks perfectly with other sections, as one might anticipate. But what could I respond to people who are aware of Descartes' futile attempt to demonstrate that "what I plainly and obviously observe is accurate," who are sure to assume that I must be talking in circles?

After pointing out that I haven't provided a ratification confront where a premiss is shown to be the same as the conclusion or an confrontation that uses a particular mode of inference to conclude that the particular approach of interpretation is valid, to take the idea of Peirce's arguments, by there "the person will who reads, I believed that it is well founded in logic, to error joint care for a spiteful circle of perceptive, and what I will say to frightened Evil Demon readers who will undoubtedly argue that I haven't completely dismissed the notion that our senses aren't even a source of knowledge about the outside world? Explaining that then there will be indication of truth of evil demon would be conceivable for us since, ex hypothesis, his schemes would be completely undetected, except that my argument if any truth indication is fit for the idea of foundherentist that is conditional. I could eliminate the precursor and reach an unconditional inference by assuming a meaning of reality along with peircean lines, i.e., this position that could withstand the most rigorous logical analysis and all available experiential evidence, but I choose the more careful and pragmatist approach. Strong-minded doubters won't be convinced because they are never convinced. The remained of you might also sign that foundherentism allows you to avoid added opposition that, if you will what the quip, has plagued current epistemology, moreover a desperate fascination through inflated skepticism or a desperate doctrine.

It has been questioned whether foundationalism gives pure sensory experience any epistemic weight. It is now conceivable that there is no unreachable causal limit on what may be accepted based on experience. The primary foundationalist assertion, nevertheless, that experience provides a reasonable limit is unaffected by this. In other words, the types of concepts that may be justified are limited by the nature of experience. However, our non-propositional

experiences limit our presumptions about the outside world. The system of empirical beliefs is built on the basis of our sensory perceptions of the world. Conee makes no significant assertions on the possibility of using sensory experiences as premises in inductive or deductive logical relationships to support any worldview.

According to him, experience may support ideas about the outside world through epistemic support relationships other than inferential and inductive validity. Experience has placed a justificatory constraint that calls for an explanation. This does not, however, call into question the validity of the relationship. If a belief has experience support yet is inconsistent, it might be challenging to argue that it is justified. As a result, justified beliefs do not arise in illogical or coherent combinations when foundationalists describe significant experiences as the basis for justification. Even first-person phenomenal politics are unlikely to be justified in the absence of complete coherence. Such ideas are only supported by phenomenally satisfying experiences, which require at least a minimally cohesive system. He asserts that experience and coherent belief both call for an explanation.

It is pointless to think that these two partnerships are unhealthy. A form of coherence that occurs both between system opinions and a system of opinions and constrictive experiences may be the only fundamental epistemic support connection. If so, the best theory of justification would incorporate the essential elements of foundationalism and coherentism, contending that a trust is only epistemically defensible when it is a component of a coherence system that accords with the person's experiences. Conee claims that the disagreement between coherentists and foundationalists is caused by the challenge of incorporating experience into the doxastic framework. But he doesn't see any insurmountable obstacle to uniting foundationalism with coherentism. The ensuing theory is referred to by Conee as "foundational coherentism." When it is stated that justified beliefs must be a part of a coherent system of beliefs, it integrates coherentist principles. However, when it is stated that the coherent system of beliefs coheres with experience, it transcends coherentism and embraces foundationalism.¹⁶⁷

5.6.0. Appraisal of Haack and Miller

According to Haack, neither foundationalism nor coherentism on its own can provide a complete explanation of knowing. Due to their self-description and inherent or self-justifying manner of description of the explanation of fundamental belief, both accounts lack various

¹⁶⁷ Earl Conee and Richard Feldman, *Evidentialism: Essays in Epistemology* (Oxford: Clarendon Press, 2004), xx.

types of knowledge criteria. They set their own border restrictions. Naturally, however, unless foundationalism and coherentism are the only alternatives, no extreme conclusion arises about the veracity of the idea of justification, much alone regarding the validity of epistemology. However, as I will explain, they do not, and as I will also claim, there is a middle theory that can get over the issues the well-known rivals have. As a result, my initial steps “towards reconstruction in epistemology” shall start with the well-known arguments between foundationalism and coherentism. I should start by clarifying that I am unable to deliver either a falling swoop or a thorough sweep in order to avoid creating unwarranted expectations. The first would call for extremely accurate descriptions of foundationalism and coherentism as well as knock-down, drag-out defenses of both opposing theories, neither of which I am in a place to proposal. The latter would need a thorough analysis of every foundationalist and coherentist variation, which, once more, is beyond my capabilities (and your tolerance). What I propose is a conciliation, a mixture of the two idealistic but impractical approaches.

However, it is important to state upfront that my argument concerns the two theories of empirical justification, foundationalism, and coherentism. It is not currently in the contention that coherentism or foundationalism of the empirical variety may both be valid accounts of a priori justification and justification based on evidence, respectively. The argument is that foundationalism and coherentism do not deplete the possibilities when seen as theories of empirical justification; there is logical room in between. The basic premise of the argument is that foundationalism demands one-directionality, but coherentism does not, and thus foundationalism does not require that justification be solely a function of interactions among ideas. (Things are not quite symmetrical since foundationalism only permits nonbelief input; this asymmetry has no bearing on the matter.) Therefore, a theory that accepts input from non-believers cannot be coherentist, and a theory that does not demand one-directionality cannot be foundationalist. A theory like the one I support, which accepts the relevance of experience to justification but does not call for a class of privileged beliefs supported only by experience and not by other beliefs, is neither coherentist nor foundationalist but rather lies somewhere in the middle of the two long-standing rivals.

The approximate definition of foundherentism is as follows: and: A subject’s experience is pertinent to the justification of his pragmatic beliefs, but there need not be a advantaged class of practical beliefs justified completely by the care of experience, independent of the care of other beliefs; Justification is not purely one-directional but includes persistent relations of joint support. This is simply a first approximation that is very close to being accurate; further effort

must be made to iron out the specifics and increase its accuracy. The favoured explicandum, in short, will be “A is more justified in being certain of that p depends on,” as it is clear from even this very basic characterization that the account will be personal rather than detached because the subject's experience will be taken into consideration and that it will be seen that opinions are justified partially by experience and partially by other beliefs. Naturally, contextualism is a more well-known third option and is not the only “third alternative” theory of justification that has been proposed. The defining property of contextualist theories is that they define justification in terms of adherence to some epistemic community standards. Once contextualist accounts go beyond this very general thesis, it is not uncommon for them to have a two-level, one-directional structure important of foundationalism. However, there is a very significant difference: a contextualist may posit “basic” beliefs by which all vindicated beliefs must be supported, but these will be understood not as beliefs justified otherwise than by the care of other beliefs but as beliefs which, in the relevant epistemic community, do not require justification by other beliefs. The idea that contextualists are more interested in explaining how “A can justify his belief that p (to the members of C)” than “A is justified in believing that p” or, less kindly, that they have confused the two is one way in which this perception of contextualism not really addressing the same question as the conventionally rival theories is sometimes stated. In my opinion, the diagnosis of misperception of explananda is not without merit, and there is, in fact something about contextualism that sets it apart from foundationalism, coherentism, and foundherentism: it proceeds in a manner that supports the thesis that epistemic standards are not conventional but rather subjective. And because of this, contextualism is subtly anti-epistemological and would call into question the aim of ratification. This is the first indication of why it has been assumed, incorrectly in my opinion of course, that the entire epistemological project is threatened if neither foundationalism nor coherentism would do. The fact that contextualism has dramatic repercussions does not prove that it is incorrect. Although I believe it to be incorrect, I won't go into much depth about it right now. Since the current chapter's primary goal is to establish a case for foundherentism, it is important to stress that foundherentism, rather than contextualism, offers the best chance of providing a solution to the problems I will identify with foundationalism and coherentism.

In order to demonstrate how foundationalism and coherentism are opposed to each other and toward the middle ground of foundherentism, the method will be to explore the most important arguments in the discussion. The majority, though not all, of the reasons under consideration, are relatively well-known; yet, I will need to engage in some logical reconstruction in order to

strengthen these well-known arguments. Even in their rationally reconstructed forms, the arguments being considered are rarely watertight, so I can only assert to create a *prima facie* case. It would also be less than honest to hide the fact that sometimes it depends on the situation whether a challenge faced by one style of the theory that is viewed as insurmountable by supporters of the other style is more appropriately regarded as a conclusive objection or as a difficult but surmountable challenge. Consideration of the infinite regress argument, which is frequently cited as evidence that foundationalism in some form must be embraced, serves as the starting point of my meta-argument. It is intolerable for a belief to be defensible by being reinforced by a further belief, that further belief being supported by a further belief, and so on, because the first belief would not be justified unless this regress of reasons for a belief originates to an end. According to foundationalism, there must be fundamental beliefs that are justified in other ways than by the care of other beliefs and which serve as the eventual justification. In the foundationalist perspective, basic beliefs are necessary since an endless regress of reasoning is impossible.

A person could not be said to be defensible in a belief if the line of reasoning leading to it never came to a conclusion. Therefore, let's assume this is true. The argument is still debatable as it is since it relies on the presumption that a belief's justifications follow a path that either leads to a fundamental belief or doesn't terminate at all, and these are obviously not the only possibilities. The chain of reasoning may finish with the belief that is not justified, or it may end with the belief that it started with, with the initial belief being reinforced by subsequent beliefs that it, in turn, supports. Of course, the foundationalist would see these alternatives as no more appealing than an endless loop. Since an infinite regress is simply one of many possibilities it holds to be unacceptable, a stronger version of the confrontation may be formed, however, it no longer seems right to refer to it as the "infinite regress argument." The more tolerable alternatives argument is what I'll refer to as this reconstruction. This is how it would go: Consider A's hypothesis that *p*. Is he correct in his assumption that *p*? Let's say that because of his confidence in *q*, he thinks that *p*. If he is not also justified in thinking that *q*, he cannot believe that *p*. Consider the scenario where he bases his belief in *q* on his belief in *r*. Unless he is defensible in thinking that *r*, he cannot be justified in trusting that *q*, and as a result, cannot be justified in trusting that *p*. Let's say that because of his conviction in *s*, he thinks that *r*.

If not, he is not justified in trusting that *r*, and as a result, he is also not justified in thinking that *q*, and as a result, he is also not justified in having faith in that *p*. Now, either (1) this sequence continues indefinitely, (2) it ends with the belief that is not justified, (3) it repeats itself, (4) it

comes to a close with the belief that is justified, but not support to any other beliefs, or (5) it goes round in circles. H (1), A is not entitled to believe that p if the list of causes never comes to an end. A is not justified in thinking that p if (2) the line of reasoning leads to a view that is not supported by the evidence. A is not defensible in have faith in that p if (3) the chain is circular, with the acceptance that p is dependent on the certainty that q, the belief that q depends on the certainty that r... and the belief that z depends on the opinion that p. However, according to H(4), A is vindicated in holding the belief that p if the chain terminates with the belief that is vindicated but not by the care of any more beliefs. Therefore, since (4) is exactly what foundationalism asserts, only if foundationalism is true can anybody ever have a belief that is justified. The one palatable and uncritical alternative is foundationalism. This argument is still unresolved, while possibly no longer being as evident.

Miller asserts that justification as a function takes place at a nonbasic level. Giving the foundationalists a logical framework, they are now free to erect any superstructure of nonbasic ideas they so want. Coherentists may also unwind because they can uphold the circle-of-beliefs thesis in the epistemic core, which is where it truly matters, but they are no longer vulnerable to challenges that surface at higher levels. The virtual necessity for an internalist perspective, for example, no longer applies. Coherentism's issues with the isolationist objection also disappear when externalism is taken into account. In these circumstances, it is plausible that different grades of supervenience may also be at work at the superstructure level, liable, for instance, on the perceived level of risk in an emergency. One reacts in a high-danger scenario almost intuitively, spending little to no time considering how justified one's actions are. The luxury of at least passing reference to the "library" of prior experiences down at the cohesive foundation level may be available in a circumstance where the level of danger is lower. In an effort to determine what is the most suitably vindicated response, this enables a contrast of the current event with earlier time-objection experiences. The basis of justification or knowledge does not ultimately rely on non-inferential information or justified belief, according to the coherentism structure of justification or knowledge. Because any such purported origin of justification would need to be understood by the person in question in a belief-like state before it would play any justificatory role, coherentists insist that there is no way to plea to something outside of one's system of beliefs for justification. At that point, the belief would be the immediate source of justification rather than the external item. According to Strong Coherentism, Necessity Coherentism, Sufficiency Coherentism, and Doxastic Coherentism, every justified belief derives its justification from other beliefs in its epistemic locale. The

crucial one is Dependence Coherentism, and we also have Explanatory Coherentism and Reliability Coherentism.

Both reliability coherentism and explanatory coherentism have unique circularity issues. Given that both represent doxastic coherentism. Both struggle with the additional problem that they place too many intellectual demands on common people who are unlikely to possess the necessary underlying beliefs for justification. Dependence coherentism, which maintains that explanation want not take the shape of beliefs, can resolve this. It might take the shape of thoughtful and memory proof that supports a subject's ideas about explanatory coherence or dependability. Dependence coherentism provides for the possibility that a credence is justified purely by appropriate perceptual experiences and memory content rather than by getting any of its justification from other beliefs. This is known as the compromise stance. The issue with dependability and explanatory coherentism is therefore resolved by dependence coherentism. The coherence theory of justification is only as credible as the coherentist response to the foundationalism defense. The regression defense is rejected by coherentism. The disparity between subjective and objective methods is another important concept that has to be taken into consideration. Explanatory coherentism, which describes coherence in terms of what creates for a nice explanation, is the most well-known objective approach.

According to coherentism, it is always appropriate to inquire as to the rationale for every assertion. Coherentism questions foundationalism's claim that there is a predetermined point at which one should cease seeking justification and that, thus, certain views are not subject to justification. According to coherentism, justification is often just a result of a link between beliefs. He holds that a set of claims A is coherent if it consists of at least two claims that tend to support one another while remaining logically independent. A claim E tends to corroborate another claim H. According to Chisholm, if E gives someone a reason to believe H even if E is the only pertinent evidence, they have access to. According to Chisholm, the fact that E tends to follow H means that h has some assumption in its favor if E is visible for S and everything that is evident for S is involved by E. Chisholm's concept of coherence, therefore, entails that each assertion in a coherent collection receives some epistemic support from the combination of the remaining propositions. In situations where the statements that make up the coherent set have some justification independent of coherence, Chisholm does permit the function of coherence to be crucial in terms of epistemology. In essence, Chisholm thinks that without some sort of coherence principle, comprehensive empirical knowledge is not feasible.

Additionally, those foundationalists who questioned how fundamental and derived ideas could sustain one another run the risk of succumbing to coherentism. Coherentists who questioned why some beliefs, such as experiential ones, should be given greater weight than others were also slipping into foundationalism. Haack contends that neither foundherentism nor coherentism exhausts the field and that a middle position is more tenable than either in terms of incorporating the value of experience in support of empirical ideas. Coherentism does not, but experiential foundationalism does. At the same time, widespread mutual dependency may be supported without having a special group of fundamental beliefs. As a result, Haack suggests a novel theory of epistemic justification that is foundedherentist rather than foundational or coherentist. It is a synthesis of foundationalism and coherentism that permits both the contribution of experience to empirical justification as well as extensive mutual endorsement among beliefs.¹⁶⁸

5.7.0 Appraisal of Conee and Miller

The following condition should be compared with non-foundationalism:

Weak foundationalism does not automatically imply Coherence Justification. In fact, it is well known in probability theory that when two pieces of evidence are joined, the support for one conclusion may decrease or even change into disconfirmation. However, Weak Foundationalism does entail Coherence Justification in the framework of Conditional Independence.¹⁶⁹

A successful theory of knowing should include externalist and internalist elements in order to avoid the drawbacks of a pure externalist explanation and resolve the Gettier dilemma. Internalism should ensure that the epistemic subject has cognitive access to the justifications for her beliefs. Additionally, the externalist element should ensure that her view is not justified by any fabrications. Keith, an illustration of such an internalist-externalist explanation of knowledge, is Lehrer's coherence theory of knowledge as undefeated justification. However, Lehrer's account has unexpected consequences. Therefore, it is asserted a suitable idea of systematic coherence must also be the foundation of theory of coherence of knowledge.¹⁷⁰

¹⁶⁸ Haack, Susan. *Evidence and Inquiry: A Pragmatist Reconstruction of Epistemology* (2009), xx.

¹⁶⁹ ¹⁶⁹ Ernest Sosa, "The Raft and the Pyramid," *Midwest Studies in Philosophy*, 5 (1980): xx, doi:10.1111/j.1475-4975.1980.tb00394. x.

¹⁷⁰ Richard Feldman, "Lehrer's Coherence Theory of Knowledge," *The Current State of the Coherence Theory*, 1989, xx, doi:10.1007/978-94-009-2360-7_6.

Dancy questions if weak coherentism was a type of foundationalism and whether it is a comprehensive explanation of justification in his Coherence Theory of Justification. The notion that experiences always lead to certain beliefs may have a variety of exceptions. As Earl Conee has suggested, there is likely a lot more contingent causal relationship between our experiences and how we construct our beliefs. The point is that we can always think of a method that our experiences may have been hindered from leading to particular views, possibly due to our own simple inattention to those same events.¹⁷¹

Coherentism and foundationalism, as well as externalism and internalism, are ideally united, according to Conee's complete unification approach of the epistemic enterprise. The optimum way to merge the two combined viewpoints, referred to as "foundational coherentism" and "external internalism," must be determined. The structural characteristic of the relationship between a belief and its justification is the focus of foundational coherentism. It states that a justified belief must be part of a coherent set of beliefs that make sense in light of the available evidence. The viewpoint taken by justifying variables within or outside of the mind is called external internalism. In spite of the fact that the individual does not have cognitive access to the epistemic facts about what accomplishes the justifying and how it works, it is asserted that a person who has a justified belief must have justifying evidence in their mental existence. Three reasonable statements regarding interrelationships serve as the foundation for the optimum combination of these two viewpoints. The first assertion allows for externalism by stating that the existence of a suitable coherence does not entail that the person is able to become aware of it or aware of its capability for justification. A cohering system of beliefs and experience foundations always include some part of supporting evidence, according to the second claim, which allows for fundamental coherentism. The third claim admits to internalism that we may identify through introspection those mental states within us that in reality serve as a defence for each of our justified beliefs. The first claim guarantees that the epistemic facts that particular evidence provides justification and the epistemic facts about how the justification is provided by the evidence can be inaccessible by reflection. The second and third statements suggest that a justifying coherence occurs between such systems and experiences, as well as inside end systems of belief, precisely when the individual has reflective access to

¹⁷¹ Earl Conee, "Isolation and Beyond," *Philosophical Topics* 23, no. 1 (1995): xx, doi:10.5840/philtopics199523118

what is in reality, justifying evidence for the system's beliefs. Thus, it is plausible to include both internal externalism and foundational coherentism in a single theory.¹⁷²

5.5.0. Alternative path toward reconciliatory approach:

i. Transfer of Justification

It is a justified transfer. These related epistemic ideas explanation One of the most crucial and challenging challenges of the theory of knowledge is the transfer of evidence and the transfer to probability. Furthermore, it is a subject that has received a fair amount less attention in recent work. Here, we shall focus on two categories of relational epistemic concepts: those that are applied and those that are seldom logical. The relationships between “e tend to make h obvious” and “e tends to make h likely” serve as examples of logical notions. “e makes h obvious for a specific topic S” and “e makes h plausible for S” serve as examples of the applicable notions. The transmission of evidence comes first. One form of requirement is an epistemic requirement. There are also the standards of etiquette, or what Thomas Hobbes dubbed “Small Morals,” or good manners. There are also aesthetic standards. It can be socially appropriate to refrain from interrupting the host if he is speaking. But if you perceive that the home is on fire, this condition is nullified or superseded. Additionally, if the painter uses one type of color here, aesthetic considerations may dictate that he uses a different type of color elsewhere. However, if he quickly paints an exit sign so that the visitors can leave, these criteria are ignored. Similarly to this, non-epistemic factors may take precedence over epistemic needs. Take into account a patient who has been transported to the emergency room. He is required to get himself well enough to carry out specific duties, and he is aware that he will only do so if he has faith in the skill of the attending physician. But the evidence he possesses shows that the doctor was incompetent. In such a situation, the patient could be ethically obligated to prefer thinking that his doctor is competent to doubt it. So, what defines an epistemic demand as a different entity?

Our “internalistic” theory of knowledge has the effect that whenever someone is subject to an epistemic need, that requirement is imposed by the conscious state that person is currently experiencing. Although only the former is imposed by one's conscious state, this does not mean that epistemic requirements are separate from other kinds of requirements. Because our beliefs

¹⁷² Earl Conee and Richard Feldman, *Evidentialism: Essays in Epistemology* (Oxford: Clarendon Press, 2004), PP. 37-41.

which make up our conscious state can likewise impose moral obligations. Unlike an ethical need, an epistemic requirement may be imposed by a portion of a person's conscious state that does not involve a belief that does so. For instance, I can confidently state that the person I am currently observing walking is the same as the person I just observed walking. This indicates that I have to choose to accept that proposition over refusing it. Additionally, a portion of my conscious state that does not include any beliefs with content that imposes this condition is the one that is imposing it. Therefore, this is the distinctive quality of an epistemic demand and, consequently, the distinctive quality of an epistemic justification. Moral responsibility stands out because it is a necessity that any other obligation cannot override. So, an epistemological demand might turn into a moral obligation.¹⁷³

ii. Compromise coherentism

An alternative belief system is called compromise coherentism. It concerns the network of beliefs that is tailored toward the agent's normative elements. It has to do with how beliefs change over time in networks of different actors. The work on belief dynamics, on the other hand, that explicitly tackles descriptive concerns of what may be anticipated from networks of agents with a specific structure has nearly always dealt with what is conceived of as a single belief across the network. To make the case that the network's views can occasionally encompass both very agreeable and strongly disagreeable viewpoints. It gauges the significance of what we name coherence aggregate coherence: The total of highly agreeing and strongly disagreeing beliefs, as we call it, determines the normative quality of belief. A belief set's maximal level of absolute incoherence is called aggregate coherence. Because absolute incoherence is not significant in this context, aggregate coherence is significant. As a general model for coherence, the compromise mode of coherence is maybe more tenable, and aggregate coherence will dominate most of the work that follows.

The goal is to add a straightforward mechanism that reflects some very genuine moral urge toward conceptual consistency in an epistemic activity, notwithstanding the formality and abstraction of the model. It operates on cognitive disagreement, which describes the mental strain caused by conflicting ideas and the attempts made to reduce or avoid that stress. Cognitive disagreement is a key element of coherence. In reality, people decide to change their ideas in a way that would maintain consistency when faced with new information that conflicts with a previously held opinion. New empirical data might serve as input, but it could also

¹⁷³ Chisholm, *Theory of Knowledge*, PP. 85 -87.

reflect the epistemic enterprise that our networks attempt to model: engagement with others who share an agent's beliefs can enhance that conviction, whereas interaction with those who hold different ideas can erode that belief. It is also known as cumulative coherence, and it doesn't have a bad quality that renders the body of knowledge irrelevant.¹⁷⁴ We can use Haack's idea of foundherentism, which claims that some forms of coherentism are compromised. It is sometimes referred to as epistemic coherentism, which examines how we know about an independently existing reality (ontological realism). It also goes under the name of constructive coherentism, which employs a yardstick to ascertain what the facts are in a certain field. A type of ontological idealism is present here. The coherence test is often only applied to a portion of the positions (beliefs, etc.) that a person adopts, according to both epistemic and constructive coherentism. The concept and requirements for coherence are often kept separate from the process of making a position set coherent, much as logic and requirements for belief modification are. By including everything in the coherence-creating process, integrated coherentism differentiates. If and only if it meets the criteria listed in the set of positions itself, a set of positions is integrated coherent. It makes the case that integrated coherentism best adheres to the principles of coherentism.¹⁷⁵

iii. Compromise foundationalism.

After the reconciliation of foundationalism and coherentism, both became weaker in their system of justification because they compromised in their extremist approach to observation. So, they mutually related and constructed the theory of knowledge, which is stable and sustainable in a certain sense. With regard to compromise foundationalism, we have several important arguments, such as by Haack, Miller, Plantinga and Buddhist Epistemology.

Haack argues in his reconciliatory approach that when both extremist approaches are mutually related to each other, they limit their curiosity in the conservative attitude of observation. So, Haack claims that both have to be weaker in their epistemic enterprise and compromised in the epistemic exercise. This approach functions as a safeguard of both epistemic notions. In this context, Miller also argues that foundationalism is causally connected to coherentism, it is due to the compromising mode of belief in evidential relation they use to make the doctrine justify. Basically, Miller claims that in the causal chain of the evidence for proving certain cases, we

¹⁷⁴ Patrick Grim et al., "Coherence and Correspondence in the Network Dynamics of Belief Studies," 14, no. 2 (2016): xx, doi:10.1017/epi. 2016, p. 7.

¹⁷⁵ Jaap Hage, "Three Kinds of Coherentism," *Coherence: Insights from Philosophy, Jurisprudence and Artificial Intelligence*, 2013, xx, doi:10.1007/978-94-007-6110-0_1.

need mutual relations among the evidence. The pieces of evidence function in a liberal mode in their own epistemic frame as well as each other. So, Miller and Haack agreed in their construction of the approach but were slightly different in their perspective.

Moreover, Plantinga argues in favor of compromised foundationalism on the basis of the ethnic-religious point of view. Plantinga defines foundationalism as a principled distinction between those beliefs that are fundamental and those that are deduced from the fundamental beliefs. Thus, there is an asymmetrical relationship between a person's fundamental views at one moment and their non-fundamental beliefs at that same time. p , therefore q and r cannot support p . p supports q and r . And if S is the collection of fundamental beliefs, then S supports every reasonable belief. According to foundationalism, a proposition can only be justified as being believed if it is either "properly fundamental" or appropriately connected to a proposition (or propositions) that are properly basic.¹⁷⁶

A logical noetic system, in the foundationalist's view, will have a basis, a collection of beliefs that are not established on the basis of others; some of these beliefs will be fundamental. It goes without saying that nonbasic beliefs will be accepted based on other beliefs, which may then be accepted based on yet other beliefs, and so on, until the foundations are reached. Therefore, any nonbasic belief in a logical noetic system is finally accepted on the basis of fundamental beliefs. Such foundationalism should not be thought of in a too severe way. While the superstructure is (obviously) constructed by inference from such foundations, the basis may not be made up of just one or even a few assertions but rather a collection of premises. Furthermore, it would be incorrect to think of the relationships between the non-foundational propositions in a linear sense. Non-foundational assertions may have meaningful relationships with one another. Superstructural assertions, for instance, may explain other superstructural propositions.

The fact that I think I hear a wood pigeon crooning, a non-foundational belief, is at least partially explained and supported by the idea that I think I see a wood pigeon, itself a non-foundational idea. But if I am defensible in believing what I see and hear, it is because of the way in which these data are related to a fundamental set of assumptions. As of yet, our primary understanding of foundationalism has been as a form of belief system where certain ideas serve as the cornerstone upon which other beliefs are created. Strong foundationalism is the belief that a proposition is appropriately fundamental, suitably among the foundations of a person's

¹⁷⁶ Paul, Helm. *Faith with Reason* (New York: Oxford University Press, 2000), PP. 23-24.

noetic system, if and only if that proposition is either self-obvious to that person or (less demandingly) evident to that person's senses. Any reasonable person would have to be acting irrationally to reject a notion in order for it to be considered very basic. Therefore, the superstructure of belief must be based on ideas that are clear and distinct in mind or that are obvious to the senses, according to one widely accepted form of strong foundationalism.¹⁷⁷

Let's take a quick look at Plantinga's criticism of strong foundationalism. Plantinga criticizes this perspective in two ways. In opposition to Descartes and Locke, he contends that if strong foundationalism is correct, a wide range of human ideas, for instance, views about other individuals than myself and about times other than the present, are ruled out as illogical. For more information, see Strong Foundationalism. I think, for instance, that I had lunch this afternoon. This statement is fundamental to my noetic system; hence I do not base my belief in it on any other statements. Even while this statement is not self-evident nor obvious to the senses, nor unreformable for me, I am completely logical in taking it in this way. This argument makes two points. One is that it is a truth that many of the propositions we hold to be true and are justified in holding do not depend on other, simpler ones in order to be logically credible. In this case, Plantinga is acting in a manner that is characteristic of the kind of particularist epistemologist that Roderick Chisholm has described. He cites specific instances of belief, highlighting their characteristics and essentially asserting, "If anything is a case of rational belief, this is." Therefore, no theory or standard of what constitutes a rational belief that brings the rationality of such views into doubt cannot be upheld. The second argument is that these claims should be taken seriously even when they defy sensory verification.

To put it another way, epistemic justification is not required for strong foundationalism. As far as I can tell, Plantinga does not provide support for this viewpoint; instead, he appeals to our customary practices. He does not claim that we cannot justify our commonplace ideas, merely that we are not required to. We hold some ideas that we consider to be paradigmatically reasonable rather than first having a theory and then accepting those beliefs that it supports. Second, and more importantly, Plantinga contends that such foundationalism is internally incoherent. It does not meet the requirements it sets down for the validity of any belief, in other words. According to this, a proposition is only genuinely fundamental for a person if it is obvious to that person's senses or is self-evident to that person. Strong foundationalism is what we may choose, but there is nothing alluring about it. However, as we pointed out, Plantinga

¹⁷⁷ Helm. *Faith with Reason*, PP. 25 -26.

does not reject foundationalism in all of its forms since he rejected strong foundationalism. He believes that our noetic structures do indeed possess a foundationalist quality. However, if strong foundationalism is not necessary or cannot be demanded for the reasons above, then other foundationalism is most definitely acceptable even if they are not required. Theistic foundationalism is one of these other interpretations, according to Plantinga. According to Plantinga, even if a person has no supporting evidence, he is well within his epistemic rights to hold the belief that (let's say) God created the world. His noetic framework may have as one of its pillars the conviction that God exists and that he or she created the world.

On the basis of a phenomenological point of view, Buddhist epistemology has argued for compromised foundationalism.¹⁷⁸ A form of epistemic foundationalism is pursued by Buddhist philosophers of the Dignga-Dharmakrti school. The Buddhist epistemological tradition also uses a set of interconnected issues from the phenomenology of perception to ground epistemology in the phenomenology of cognition, though in a modified way. These issues have recently informed efforts within the Western philosophical tradition to overcome the Cartesian legacy.¹⁷⁹

The DigngaDharmakrti tradition's Buddhist thinkers are seen to have a foundationalist aim. This presumption is founded on the necessity of treating at least some sensations as inherently ascertained. In contrast to Buddhist foundationalism, which should naturally be the focus of any critique, epistemological foundationalism is primarily concerned with the justification of knowledge. Buddhists are preoccupied with defining what constitutes knowledge and what does not, which guarantees clear access to the established epistemology. Traditional epistemology, however, involves insurmountable contradictions. Although the topic of epistemic foundations is only explicitly discussed in the commentarial literature on Dharmakrti, if we understand epistemic foundationalism to be the idea that all knowledge is rooted in intrinsically ascertained cognitions, then the key developers of the Buddhist epistemological scheme, Dignga and Dharmakrti, do appear to be pursuing a foundationalist agenda. However, Dharmakrti simply defines the topic in terms of their practical efficiency, whereas Dignga does not address the problem of the intrinsic ascertainment of cognitions. According to Devendrabuddhi, an early commentator on Dharmakrti, who makes a distinction

¹⁷⁸ Christian, Coseru. *Perceiving Reality: Consciousness, Intentionality, and Cognition in Buddhist Philosophy*, Oxford University Press, 35, no. 4, 2015, PP. 191-93

¹⁷⁹ Christian, Coseru. "Buddhist 'Foundationalism' and the Phenomenology of Perception," *Philosophy East and West*, 59, no. 4 (2009), PP. 409-439: xx, doi:10.1353/pew.0.0078.

between intrinsic and extrinsic ascertainment (vatah and parata prmnaya), perceptions are seldom genuinely ascertained unless they are connected to the achievement of a human aim. The need that the sources of mistake be absent for perception to be intrinsically determined is added by Skyabuddhi (another early interpretation of Dharmakrti's theory). Dharmottara is the first to provide a more nuanced explanation of the distinction between intrinsic and extrinsic modes of ascertainment in the context of perceptual cognitions. He states that “trained perception” (ahhysavat pratyaka) and the perception associated with the accomplishment of a purpose may be intrinsically ascertained but not a perception in which the connection with an object is uncertain. To give an example, I may grasp an entity by apprehending its general characteristics, which may be intrinsically determined; for instance, I may grasp an entity as having branches and leaves, which is to say, I perceive an entity that is “treelike,” but its specific characteristics, such as whether it is a Dhava (anogeissus latifolia) or a Pala (hutea frondosa) tree, are extrinsically determined.¹⁸⁰

5.6.0. Conclusion

The possibility towards reconciliatory approaches cannot be denied in theory of knowledge. But the in case of foundationalism and coherentism compromised their theory somewhere else. “Susan Haack foundherentism theory of empirical justification” is an attempted towards reconciliatory approach of foundationalism and coherentism. Haack approached towards reconciliatory could not be success full one. She defended her theory called foundherentism. She showed a new direction towards her theory.

The reconciliation of foundationalism and coherentism is one kind of hybrid of our theory of justifications. This hybridization of the justification of these theories does not harm epistemology. This reconciliation of foundationalism and coherentism gives more space to the theory of justification. The reconciliation theory of justifications can be used in the situation based and also in general. When both theories of foundationalism and coherentism fail to justify a particular belief at that time, we can bring in the hybrid them and justify the particular belief. It gives or adds more value to the theory of justification for knowledge.

This chapter has explored how this reconciliation between foundationalism and coherentism has been made possible by philosophers like Haack and Conne. This hybrid theory, called foundherentism, is an ideal theory of justification of beliefs.

¹⁸⁰ Coseru, *Perceiving Reality: Consciousness, Intentionality, and Cognition in Buddhist Philosophy*, PP. 193 - 196.

CONCLUSION

As we know man is the only creature in this world always seeking to know. To know something in this world we have to follow certain mechanism of knowing the things. Yes, we have to obey the methods and conditions of knowledge. There are three conditions of knowledge as we have discussed in the thesis. Justification is important condition of knowledge. as we seen the epistemologist give more important to justification for knowledge claims. The thesis which surveys of foundationalism and coherentism positions in epistemology form Greek period to contemporary age. It found there were huge difference among the periods finding the positions of foundationalism and coherentism in epistemology. Their justificatory approach towards the beliefs made difference among the theories of justification for knowledge claims.

Today there is a cat on the roof of the building; there was one yesterday; there was also one the day before yesterday; there was also one the day before that, and indeed there is a cat on the roof virtually every day. The set of all other statements can be regarded to confirm each of the five propositions thus constructed.¹⁸¹ As a result, we presume that each of these five propositions has some presumption in favor of S based on current perception and particular memories. Using Chisholm's principle, we can resolve that each of these statements for S is beyond a reasonable doubt. Consequently, if we anticipate that S believes without a uncertainty that there is a cat on the roof of that building, we can conclude that it is obvious to S that there was a cat on the roof and that, thus, S is aware of this. And this sounds strikingly similar to what C. I. Lewis had said before him. Chisholm's reasoning is epistemic rather than pragmatic because his principles permit a claim with a particular degree of a warrant to earn further warrants by being backed by other claims with a similar degree of warrant. It also eliminates skepticism. This also affirms foundationalism along with coherentism in the resulting theory of Justification. It would be noted that Chisholm was referring to coherence principles rather than coherence theories. It's a question of nomenclature.

A theory is a collection of statements that also includes principles. Chisholm brings the coherence principle to strengthen his foundationalist inclination. This issue is moot because Chisholm's inclination toward coherence principles demonstrates that he agrees with the coherentist in terms of epistemic Justification of factual beliefs. There was two point of epistemic Justification, one basic and the other secondary. That is not to argue that there is no core belief or that some of our ideas are not supported by evidence. Thus, the core beliefs are

¹⁸¹ Foley, R., "Chisholm and Coherence," in *Philosophical Studies*, Vol. 38, No. 1, 1980, PP. 54-62

true of any system of beliefs. The inferential relationship among the beliefs will decide their warrant-increasing property. The degree of coherence among assertions contributes to whatever epistemic basis a notion has at the outset. However, basic Justification must come from the fundamental ideas. It is possible therefore to achieve a compromise between foundationalism and coherentism. Bonjour refers to this type of attenuated foundationalism or sublimated coherentism as “weak foundationalism.” That’s something we have already mentioned. Certain beliefs have some non-inferential epistemic justification. A further appeal to coherence will be added to this. The competing ideas meet at this moment. In epistemology, foundherentism is a theory of Justification that mixes the two contestant theories, foundationalism and coherentism, facing an infinite regress problem. Foundherentism is formulated and defended by Susan Haack in “Evidence and Inquiry: Towards Reconstruction in epistemology.” Foundationalism holds that basic belief is foundational support to non-basic beliefs. Coherentism grips that beliefs reciprocally assist each other when they belong to the same coherent notion set as these theories we cultivated.

Susan Haack’s most compelling claims in her book, “Evidence and Inquiry: Towards Reconstruction in Epistemology,” about reconstruction in epistemology. The reconstruction entails overcoming the traditional divide between foundationalist and coherentist justification systems. This is accomplished by presenting a new position that incorporates the best aspects of both traditional viewpoints while excluding the flaws. Haack refers to her viewpoint as foundherentism. In Haack’s book, three basic aims are pursued. The first and most critical step is to present foundherentism as a novel theory. The second is to demonstrate the benefits and superiority of foundherentism by a captious evaluation of rival epistemological theories such as foundationalism and coherentism. The third goal is to argue epistemological research and theory against a number of anti-epistemological viewpoints.¹⁸²

Haack proposes a new theory of epistemic Justification which is not a foundational or coherentist, but rather foundedherentist. It is a hybrid of foundationalism and coherentism that allows for widespread shared assist among beliefs as well as the input of experience to empirical Justification. On other hands, it could be a dual-aspect theory that allowed for the contribution of both empirical considerations of human cognitive capacities and limitations as well as logical deductive considerations. With this goal in mind, Haack examines foundationalism-coherentism and lets us explain how it pushes one toward foundherentism

¹⁸² Haack, S., *Evidence and Inquiry: Towards Reconstruction in Epistemology*, Oxford: Blackwell, 1993, PP. 1-4

which is the middle ground. Her philosophical approach differs from others because it uses rational reconstruction to transform common arguments into their most powerful forms. Haack classifies foundationalism into the following: strong or weak, pure or impure. Thus these being a few types. (1) Strong Pure Foundationalism, (2) Weak Pure Foundationalism (3) Strong impure Foundationalism, (4) Weak impure Foundationalism etc. Coherentism is about divided into uncompromising and moderate coherentism.

According to Haack, foundationalism necessitates one-directionality, whereas coherentism does not; coherentism necessitates justification to be purely a question of social relations among beliefs, whereas foundationalism does not. A coherentist theory that admits non-inferential beliefs cannot be foundationalist; this is not a one directional and it will not call as foundationalist. Haack seeks to develop a theory that allows for the relevance of experience in Justification but does not need any privileged beliefs to be justified solely by experience with no assist from other beliefs. It is neither foundationalist nor coherentist but sits in the middle of the two classic rivals. Haack presents an approximation of the theory she supports as follows: Although a subject's experience is related to the Justification of his empirical beliefs, there is no need for an advantaged class of empirical beliefs to be justified. There is experience independent of the support of other beliefs. A justification is not solely one-directional but indulges permeative mutual support relations.

Thus, Haack demands that experiences have a big role in justifications of belief. She does not demand a privileged class of beliefs for Justification. She goes for abandoning the one-direction character of foundational Justification. She also backs up the decision that if one-directionality is diminished in a believable way, the result is a form of foundherentism. She uses an example to illustrate these closely linked points. Assume a man has had the experience of watching a dog in front of him. Although this experience without doubt provides him some justification for believing that a dog is present, she claims that his Justification could be higher if he also accepted that his eyes were functioning normally, that he was not under the influence of post-hypnotic suggestion, that there were no life-like toy dogs in the area, and so on. Thus, she argues that even if a belief is caused by sense-experience there must be other beliefs output. The most fundamental flaw in coherentism, according to Haack, is that it attempts to make Justification purely dependent on relationships between beliefs. C. I. Lewis makes the point when he objects that the coherentist's claim is as ridiculous as proposing that two drunken sailors would help each other by leaning back-to-back when neither was upright on anything. Haack believes that only experience can offer the necessary foundation, the final empirical

proof, on which a system of reciprocally supportive empirical beliefs must finally rest. So, neither foundationalism nor coherentism will suffice. As a result, neither foundationalism nor coherentism is a viable option.

Haack's own theory incorporates some aspects of both in a limited and careful fashion but denies much else. This is a fresh and outstanding third alternative, not a synthesis. Haack uses an elaborated case study of C. I. Lewis as an example of foundationalism and Donald Davidson and Laurence Bonjour as representatives of coherentism to attack both.¹⁸³ Haack claimed both coherentist and foundationalist failed to justify beliefs regress claims. The account for empirical Justification beliefs adequately. Haack, on the other hand, is not a skeptic when it comes to the Justification of our empirical convictions. She proposes a third theory, foundherentism, to bridge the gap between foundationalism and coherentism. She argued against the contrast among coherentism and foundationalism in epistemological framework.

Foundherentism takes into account the merits of coherentism and foundationalism while trying to prevent their lose points. Haack's technique poses a number of challenges for coherentist theorist and foundationalist theorist and claims the only way to answer them and advance towards Haack' theory. Although coherentist and foundationalist are seeking to accept the challenges whereas being foundationalists or coherentists. Two theorist coherentist and foundationalist change their justificatory approach where they find lack of rational. Both ideas would become types of "proto-foundherentism" as a result of the changes. These proto-foundherentist ideas overcome the difficulties in the foundationalist and coherentist theories.¹⁸⁴ Coherentist doctrine states that "a certainty is acceptable if and only if it be in the right place to a cohesive collection of opinions."¹⁸⁵ as Haack puts it. The Justification of any belief, according to coherentists, is based logical reasoning links belief with other parts. Coherentist theory of knowledge reduces justificatory criteria to an assersive exercise.

The history of one casual belief of coherentism essentially unrelated to coherentist. according to Haack, is due to its exclusively evaluative nature. This is "too much to ask" of the agent, according to Haack, coherentist project of justification fails If total consistency is required for Justification, no one would have justified beliefs because no one can completely perused justification of beliefs. The problem comes since two inconsistent statements can be used to infer anything and anything. Agents would be justified in thinking anything based on what they

¹⁸³ Cain, Jonathan L. "Moral Foundationalism", in *The University of Mississippi*, 5, 2013, PP.27-28

¹⁸⁴ Ibid, p. 28

¹⁸⁵ Ibid, P. 28

may validly deduce from their justified beliefs. Thus, coherentism fails to provide Justification for the beliefs. It relies too much on consistency and other logical relations. Complete consistency is unlikely to be required for Justification.

According to Haack, it appears strange to believe that an oppositeness theorist subsequent to the person's beliefs could invalidate other misrelated propositions. Even if a justified belief is always entwined with a mix web different belief of other. It appears that all almost all of agent's beliefs are penitent to justification of every belief of an agent. Haack realised that consistency is not enough for justifying a belief. For Haack, "consistent fairy story objection" ¹⁸⁶ the standard of uniformity of an agent's views alone cannot be sufficient to be create any degree of justification of agent's beliefs. Even though the agent achieves perfect consistency, the agent is not entitled to believe simply on the basis of that consistency. The problem is that even a set of beliefs that are totally coherent might be disconnected from reality. Adding more quasi-logical characteristics to the mix (e.g., completeness, instructive, and coherence, etc.) does not help the situation, according to Haack. These are evaluative features, which do not guarantee that an agent is attached to the environment through sensory input. Haack's main problem with coherentism is revealed by the concordant fairy story objection. The issue is that logical or quasi-logical characteristics by themselves won't guarantee that our beliefs correspond the world. They cannot account for the intrinsic justification importance types of the not belief input on their own. Coherentist doctrine, in particular, could not enable causal information from the world to play a straight role in the Justification of our world ideas.¹⁸⁷

Second, because p is more to a great extent weighted than q, S might say that she is justified in believing that q. here p is heavily integrated than q. and p.

.To say p is more integrated than q is that p is more significant dependent on p than q. If a view is supported by more evidence, it is justified to a greater extent than it would otherwise be. To say that p is weighted is to say that its inherent nature provides it with a higher level of Justification than other beliefs.¹⁸⁸ Thus the inegalitarian coherentist gives more weight to the empirically justified belief. Some empirically acquired beliefs are more justifiable than others. According to an empiricist version of weighted coherentism, an agent's beliefs about her

¹⁸⁶ Haack, PP.34-42

¹⁸⁷ Ibid. PP. 52-56

¹⁸⁸ Haack, PP. 52-55

receptive states are justified due to their empirical nature. Because of this observation requirement, Bonjour's coherentist theory could be weighed.

Bonjour distinguishes between non-inferential belief origins (which are cognitively spontaneous) and non-inferential belief justifications. He contends that a cognitively natural belief can only be justified if an argument can be developed that demonstrates the reliability of that specific type of cognitively natural belief.¹⁸⁹ However, this does not imply that agents must have experiential input; rather, it allows experiential input into the agent's belief set if the agent is suitably placed in the world. The Observation Requirement's goal is to make it essential for agents to have prior experience in order to be justified. The doxastic interpretation and the experientialist interpretation of the observation requirement are presented by Haack. According to her, the observation requirement, according to the doxastic view, needs that the individual feel that he has cognitively natural beliefs and that these beliefs are generally dependable. It is necessary for the subject to have cognitively natural beliefs and to believe that cognitively intuitive beliefs are mostly reliable, according to the experientialist interpretation.¹⁹⁰

The doxastic interpretation, according to Haack, is failed. Because it does not assure experience input. Haack believes that the experientialist explanation has a chance of succeeding but if it could. It reduces Bonjour's system of not coherentism reason it rejects the evidence is solely doxastically and calculating.¹⁹¹ The experiential beliefs must have a greater initial evidentiary or justificative position than the not empirical, according to coherentism. The possible cause for failure, according to coherentism, the genesis of a proposition is essentially inappropriate to its justification. Because egalitarian variants of coherentism do not address the fundamental problem raised by the "consistent fairy story objection," they do not provide a satisfactory empirical justificatory account. We saw the foundationalist doctrine necessitates two types of beliefs: basic and non-basic beliefs, with Justification flowing one way from basic to non-basic views. There is no basis for non-basic ideas that are not rooted in ultimate fundamental beliefs. This concept of foundationalism is broad enough to encompass a wide range of basic theories (in addition to the infallibilist and fallibilist theories that we have already discussed). Haack distinguishes between different types of foundationalist theories and offers issues for each of them, much as she does with coherentism.¹⁹² Haack differentiates between

¹⁸⁹ Ibid., PP.56-60

¹⁹⁰ Haack, PP. 57-59

¹⁹¹ Haack, S. p. 59

¹⁹² Cain, Jonathan L., "Moral Foundationalism" in *The University of Southern Mississippi*, 5: 2013, pp. 32-33

empirical and non-empirical foundationalism. Haack's definition of empirical is a little too broad. "One must grant a coherentist, or for that matter a foundationalist of the non-experientialist stripe, the possibility of changing the conventional definition of empirical so as to detach concerning how things are in the world from depending on experience."¹⁹³ To put it another way, factual evidence easily necessitates some type the agent's beliefs ensure the relevance of belief accurately reflect reality. Experiential input is the most common kind of no belief input.

According to Haack, factual views can be foundational in three ways: empirically, extrinsically, and organically. "Experientialist foundationalists" argue that a person's sensory and introspective experiences justify (but not infer) basic foundational beliefs. Fundamental beliefs are justified, according to extrinsic foundationalists, "because of a causal or law-like relationship between the subject's belief and the condition of affairs that makes it true." Fundamental beliefs are justified by their self-justifying content, according to intrinsic foundationalism.¹⁹⁴ Haack goes on to say that there are strong and weak foundationalist ideas. All the basic belief are completely justified on the basis of their own, according to strong experiential, extrinsic, and intrinsic foundationalists.

According to weaker foundationalism, argued only beliefs are basic which partially justified without any help of additional fundamentalpropositions. Haack draws a distinction between pure and impure foundational theories. Not basic views should draw all their evidence from foundational proposition, according to pure foundationalists. In other words, Justification is always passed from fundamental beliefs to not basic propositions (weak or strong). "Infallible belief" provides all of the reasoning for non-foundational beliefs. Not pure foundationalism, on the other hand, permit for reciprocal support between non-basic beliefs while maintaining that non-basic beliefs should be deduced from foundational beliefs. Inferential beliefs must acquire at least some of their Justification from noninferential or basic beliefs. According to the impure foundationalist, their grade of evidence should be reinforced by their interactions with other inferential views. Not basic views, even though for not pure foundationalism, could not be justified to the any degree unless they were deduced from fundamental beliefs.¹⁹⁵

In fact, Haack believes all the forms of "empirical foundationalism" are flawed. Basic, self-justifying foundationalism flops in the similar reason coherentism failed. It failed to account

¹⁹³ Ibid., P. 33

¹⁹⁴ Cain, Jonathan L., PP. 33-34.

¹⁹⁵ Ibid, PP.34-35

for rolling of experience must show our justification of experiential views. In a reiterate, Haack believes we can only justify our opinions about the world if we have some input from it. (Self-evidence is thus ruled out as a sufficient criterion for perceptual justification of belief.) Unlike the “intrinsic foundationalist,” the extrinsic foundationalist tries to interpretation for the perception that some kind of non-belief involvement is intrinsically relevant to the empirical Justification. Extrinsic foundationalism, on the other hand, fails, according to Haack, since it contradicts the idea that “what justifies a belief should be something that the subject is aware of.”¹⁹⁶ We are leftward with foundationalism that is experientialist. The “swings and roundabouts argument” is Haack’s first argument against this belief. The argument notes that foundationalism necessitates secure and rich core beliefs. Independent of belief support to other beliefs, the more solid a belief is, the more justified it is. The larger the core concept’s superstructure can support, the richer it is. The content of a very secure belief is unlikely to support a huge enough superstructure. It is not only possible to have beliefs that support the entire superstructure. Hence foundationalism goes wrong in demanding strong content-rich basic beliefs. The weaker foundation and not pure foundational is kind of empirical foundationalism continue to exist.

According to Susan, the weaker or minimal doctrine of foundationalism is correct in insisting that the views (such as empirical beliefs) are partially correct but not entirely justified. Experiential beliefs, on the other hand, are skilled of being strengthened by non-basic beliefs. In view of this, foundationalism is in favor of foundherentism can be abandoned. In that case, the amount of mutual input is allowed. Haack believes that the impure foundationalist has no strong reason to reject justification to travel down from all the way noninferential justification beliefs to inferential justification of beliefs. “Foundherentism” is a view that every belief can be partially justified through mutual relation. The other aspect of it is that it is based on foundationalism. It is the notion that we require experiencing input to justify our inferential proposition. For Haack, foundherentism doctrine differs other theories such coherentism and the foundationalism since the coherentism theory could not be tolerate not belief effort, and foundationalist theory cannot give up one-directionality. Foundherentism tried to combine the finest features of the coherentism and foundationalism in a single umbrella theory. This is recognized that “the centrality of experience to justification, but does not need any class of privileged beliefs justified solely by experience with no support from other beliefs”¹⁹⁷

¹⁹⁶ Cain, Jonathan L., P. 35

¹⁹⁷ Cain, Jonathan L., “Moral Foundationalism” in *The University of Southern Mississippi*, 5: 2013, P. 36-37

I have started this work by presenting a survey of the main problems in foundationalism and coherentism in epistemology. In that survey, I found Plato's epistemological project on the definition of knowledge and analysis of knowledge as the foundationalist position in epistemology. After Plato, Aristotle built a foundationalist structure in epistemology and metaphysics. Aristotle demonstrated his foundationalist principles in his "Posterior Analytics." Later, modern thinkers like Descartes, Locke, and Kant built foundationalist positions in epistemology. Descartes, in his "Meditations on the First Philosophy," searched for truth through the method of doubt and finally found the indubitable truths as the foundations of knowledge. For Locke, intuitive knowledge is the foundation, while for Kant, the a priori principles and categories constitute the foundations of knowledge. The coherentist also has a strong position in epistemology. Bradley's analysis of the coherence theory of truth and knowledge is an essential foundation of the coherence theory of truth and knowledge. Later on, other coherentists developed this coherentist position in epistemology. Further, I have shown how various versions of foundationalism developed in epistemology.

According to doctrine of classical foundationalism, basic belief is there in the sense of incorrigible, infallible, and indubitable, belief whereas the minimal version of foundationalist allows for Justification of corrigible basic belief. Coherentist does not accept the foundationalist non-inferential or foundational beliefs to justify other beliefs which are non-foundational. They claim core among beliefs can be justified or mutually support each other. There is no way for foundational beliefs. Foundationalism came forward to defend the idea that there are fundamental beliefs that justifies other non-basic beliefs. Both theories criticize each other to establish their own position in epistemology. Both theories of Justification are accurate or correct in their own way. The idea of reconciliation between foundationalism and coherentism is an important and necessary idea in order to protect and preserve the idea of foundationalism and coherentism, which is predetermined of it. It is formulated and articulated by Susan Haack as known as foundherentism. According to the theory of foundherentism, knowledge is formulated neither just by satisfying the structure of foundationalism nor just by satisfying the structure of coherentism. Rather, it is demanded or required certain relation between both the satisfactory structure of their knowledge system and the method of amalgamation of both of the structures of knowledge rather than the method of compartmentalization. To make Justification more reliable, vital, and adequate, the foundationalist and coherentist theories of Justification need to reconcile their approaches. The

best reply to the skeptics is a reconciliation of foundationalism and coherentism in epistemology, in which the merits of both theories are taken into account.

The reconciliation of foundationalism and coherentism is one kind of hybrid theory of Justification. This hybridization of the Justification of these theories does not harm epistemology. This reconciliation of foundationalism and coherentism gives more strength to the theory of Justification. When both foundationalism, with the idea of basic belief, and coherentism, with the idea of a coherent system of belief, meet, there opens up a new way of justifying beliefs with the help of other beliefs within a coherent system. Foundationalism without coherentism is inadequate and vice versa as the theory of Justification of empirical knowledge.

Bibliography

- Abraham, William J., and Frederick D. Aquino. *The Oxford Handbook of the Epistemology of Theology*. New York: Oxford University Press, 2017.
- Anonymous, S., *Foundationalism versus Tribal Epistemology*, North-East Hill University: Shodhganga, 2005.
- Alston, William P. "An internalist externalism." *Synthese*, 74, no. 3 (1988), 265-283. doi:10.1007/bf00869630.
- Araszkiewicz, Michal, and Jaromír Savelka. *Coherence: Insights from Philosophy, Jurisprudence and Artificial Intelligence*. Basingstoke: Springer, 2013.
- Audi, R., *Belief, Justification, and Knowledge: An Introduction to Epistemology*, Belmont: Wadsworth Publishing Company, 1988.
- Audi, R., "Foundationalism, Coherentism, and Epistemological Dogmatism, Philosophical Perspectives", *Blackwell*, Vol. 2, 1988, pp. 407-442.
- Audi, Robert. *Epistemology: A Contemporary Introduction to the Theory of Knowledge*. London: Routledge, 2010.
- Audi, Robert, and John A O'Brien Professor of Philosophy Robert Audi. *The Structure of Justification*. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1993.
- Ayer, A. J., *The Problem of Knowledge*, England: Penguin Books, 1957.
- Benson, Hugh H., *A Companion to Plato*, Malden: Blackwell, 2006.
- Bergmann, M., "What's NOT Wrong with Foundationalism", in *Philosophy and phenomenological Research*, Vol. LXVIII, no. 1, 2004.
- Bernecker, Sven, and Duncan Pritchard, (ed.) *The Routledge companion to epistemology*, London: Routledge, 2011.
- Bernecker, Sven, *Reading Epistemology Selected Text wit Interactive Commentary*, Malden: Blackwell, 2006.

- Barnes, Gordon. "Resurrecting Old-Fashioned Foundationalism." *Philosophical Books* 44, no. 1 (2003), 53-62. doi:10.1111/1468-0149.00281.
- Barnes, Jonathan. *Aristotle: A Very Short Introduction*. Oxford: Oxford Paperbacks, 2000.
- Bender, J. *The Current State of the Coherence Theory: Critical Essays on the Epistemic Theories of Keith Lehrer and Laurence BonJour, with Replies*. London: Kluwer Academic Publishers, 1989.
- Bender, John W. "Coherence, Justification, and Knowledge: The Current Debate." *The Current State of the Coherence Theory*, 1989, 1-14. doi:10.1007/978-94-009-2360-7_1.
- Berker, Selim. "Coherentism via Graphs." *Philosophical Issues* 25, no. 1 (2015), 322-352. doi:10.1111/phils.12052.
- Bernecker, Sven. "Prospects for Epistemic Compatibilism." *Philosophical Studies* 130, no. 1 (2006), 81-104. doi:10.1007/s11098-005-3235-z.
- Berteau, Stefano. "Coherentism and Foundationalism in the Practical Domain." *Jurisprudence* 7, no. 2 (2016), 365-375. doi:10.1080/20403313.2016.1188499.
- Blackburn, Simon, *The Oxford Dictionary of philosophy*, New York: Oxford University Press, 2005.
- Blanshard, Brand., *The Nature of Thought*, Vol. 2, New York: The Macmillan Company, 1940.
- Blanshard, Brand. *Reason and Analysis*. London: Routledge, 1962.
- Blanshard, Brand. *The Nature of Thought*. London: Psychology Press, 2002.
- Bogdan, R. *Keith Lehrer*. Oxfordshire: Taylor & Francis, 1981.
- BonJour, Laurence. *Epistemology: Classic Problems and Contemporary Responses*. Lanham: Rowman & Littlefield, 2010.

- Bonjour, Laurence. *In Defense of Pure Reason: A Rationalist Account of A Priori Justification*. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1998.
- Bonjour, Laurence. *The Structure of Empirical Knowledge*. Cambridge: Harvard University Press, 1985.
- Bonjour, Laurence. "Can Empirical Knowledge have a Foundation?" *American Philosophical Quarterly* 15, no. 1 (1978), 1-13. doi:10.4324/9781003061038-33.
- Bonjour, Laurence. "Foundationalism and the External World." *Nous* 33, no. 13, 1999, PP. 229-249. doi:10.1111/0029-4624.33.s13.11.
- Bonjour, Laurence. "The coherence theory of empirical knowledge." *Philosophical Studies* 30, no. 5 (1976), 281-312. doi:10.1007/bf00357928.
- Bonjour, Laurence, and Ernest Sosa. *Epistemic Justification: Internalism vs. Externalism, Foundations vs. Virtues*. New York: Wiley-Blackwell, 2003.
- Bradley, F. H. *Appearance and Reality: A Metaphysical Essay*. London: George Allen & Unwin Ltd., 1916.
- Bradley, F. H. *Appearance and Reality (1893)*. by: F. H. Bradley: *Appearance and Reality: A Metaphysical Essay*. 2017.
- Brendel, Elke, Coherence Theory of Knowledge: A Gradational Account, *Erkenntnis*, Vol. 50, No-2/3, 1999.
- Brendel, Elke. "Coherence Theory of Knowledge: A Gradational Account" in *Erkenntnis*, 50, 1999, pp. 293-307.
- Cain, Jonathan L., "Moral Foundationalism." 2013.
- Casullo, Albert. *A priori justification*, Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2003.
- Chisholm, Roderick. M., *Theory of Knowledge*, (third edition), Englewood Cliffs New Jersey: Prentice-Hall, 1989.
- Chisholm, R. M., *The Foundations of Knowing*, Minneapolis: The University of Minnesota Press, 1982.

- Cohen, Jonathan L., “The Coherence Theory of Truth”, in *Philosophical Studies*, Vol.34, no. 4, 1978, PP. 351-360.
- Christian Coseru. “Buddhist ‘Foundationalism’ and the Phenomenology of Perception.” *Philosophy East and West* 59, no. 4 (2009), 409-439. doi:10.1353/pew.0.0078.
- Cling, Andrew D. “Foundationalism and Permanence in Descartes’ Epistemology.” *The Southern Journal of Philosophy* 23, no. 2 (1985), 145-156. doi:10.1111/j.2041-6962.1985.tb00385.x.
- Conee, Earl. “Isolation and Beyond.” *Philosophical Topics* 23, no. 1 (1995), 129-146. doi:10.5840/philtopics199523118.
- Conee, Earl, and Richard Feldman. *Evidentialism: Essays in Epistemology*. Oxford: Clarendon Press, 2007.
- Cornford, F. M., *Plato’s Theory of Knowledge*, New York: The Liberal Arts Press, 1957.
- Cornman, James W. “A Foundational Theory with Explanatory Coherence.” *Skepticism, Justification, and Explanation*, 1980, 157-195. doi:10.1007/978-94-009-8958-0_7.
- Cornman, James W. “Foundational Versus Nonfoundational Theories of Justification.” *Skepticism, Justification, and Explanation*, 1980, 127-156. doi:10.1007/978-94-009-8958-0_6.
- Cortens, Andrew. “Foundationalism and the Regress Argument.” *Disputatio* 1, no. 11-12 (2002), 22-36a. doi:10.2478/disp-2002-0002.
- Coseru, Christian. *Perceiving Reality: Consciousness, Intentionality, and Cognition in Buddhist Philosophy*. New York: Oxford University Press, 2015.
- Cottingham, J., (trans) and Williams, B., (intro.) *Rene Descartes Meditation on First Philosophy*, Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1996.

- Cottingham, J., and Williams, B., (trans.) *Rene Descartes Meditation on First Philosophy*, Cambridge University Press, London, 1986.
- Crumley II, J. S., *An Introduction to Epistemology*, Toronto: Broadview Press, 2009
- Dancy, Jonathan. *Introduction to Contemporary Epistemology* Oxford: Basil Blackwell, 1985.
- Dancy, Jonathan, Ernest Sosa, and Matthias Steup. *A Companion to Epistemology*. Malden: Wiley-Blackwell, 2010.
- DePaul, Michael R. *Resurrecting Old-fashioned Foundationalism*. Lanham: Rowman & Littlefield, 2001.
- Descartes, Rene, and Stanley Tweyman. *Meditations on First Philosophy*. Academic Resources Corp, 2002.
- DeVries, Willem A., Timm Triplett, and Wilfrid Sellars. *Knowledge, Mind, and the Given: Reading Wilfrid Sellars's "Empiricism and the Philosophy of Mind," Including the Complete Text of Sellars's Essay*. Hackett Publishing, 2000.
- Dicke, Georges. *Kant's Theory of Knowledge: An Analytical Introduction*, Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2004.
- Dodd, Dylan, and Elia Zardini. *Scepticism and Perceptual Justification*. New York: Oxford University Press, 2014.
- Duke, Kendra. "Defense of Strong Foundationalism", 2016
- Erickson, Millard J., "Foundationalism Dead or Alive?" in *Southern Baptist Journal of Philosophy*, Vol. 05, no-2, 2001, PP. 20-32.
- Evans, J. G. D., *Aristotle Concepts of Dialectic*, Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1977.
- Feldman, Richard. *Epistemology*. London: Pearson, 2003.

- Feldman, Richard. "Lehrer's Coherence Theory of Knowledge." *The Current State of the Coherence Theory*, 1989, 69-76. doi:10.1007/978-94-009-2360-7_6.
- Ferreira, Phillip. *Bradley and the Structure of Knowledge*. Albany: State University of New York Press, 1999.
- Firth, Roderick. "Coherence, Certainty, and Epistemic Priority." *The Journal of Philosophy* 61, no. 19 (1964), 545. doi:10.2307/2022933.
- Foley, Richard. *The Theory of Epistemic Rationality*. Cambridge: Harvard University Press, 1987.
- Foley, Richard. "Chisholm and coherence." *Philosophical Studies* 38, no. 1 (1980), 53-63. doi:10.1007/bf00354525.
- Fumerton, Richard. *Epistemology*, Malden: Blackwell, 2006.
- Fumerton, Richard. *Foundationalism*. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2022.
- Fumerton, Richard. "Foundationalism and Non-Foundationalism." *Encyclopedia of Educational Philosophy and Theory*, 2020, 1-6. doi:10.1007/978-981-287-532-7_688-1.
- Gendler, Tamar Szabó, and John Hawthorne, (ed.), *Oxford Studies in Epistemology Volume 3*, Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2010.
- Goldberg, Sanford. "A Reliabilist Foundationalist Coherentism." *Erkenntnis* 77, no. 2, 2011, 187-196. doi:10.1007/s10670-011-9347-2.
- Greco, J. and Sosa, E., (ed.) *The Blackwell Guide to "Epistemology"*, Malden: Blackwell, 1999.
- Grim, Patrick, Andrew Modell, Nicholas Breslin, Jasmine Mcnenny, Irina Mondescu, Kyle Finnegan, Robert Olsen, Chanyu An, and Alexander Fedder. "Coherence and Correspondence in the Network Dynamics of belief Suites." *Episteme* 14, no. 2 (2016), 233-253. doi:10.1017/epi.2016.7.

- Gulley, Norman. *Plato's Theory of Knowledge*. London: Methuen, 1962.
- Guyer, Paul and Allen W. Wood, (trans.) *Immanuel Kant: Critique of Pure Reason*, Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1998.
- Haack, S., *Evidence and Inquiry: Towards Reconstruction in Epistemology*, Oxford: Blackwell, 1993.
- Haack, Susan. *Evidence and Inquiry: A Pragmatist Reconstruction of Epistemology*. 2009.
- Habl, Jan, "Problem of Epistemological Foundationalism", *Paideia: Philosophical Journal of Charles University*, Vol. Viii, 2011.
- Hage, Jaap. "Three Kinds of Coherentism." *Coherence: Insights from Philosophy, Jurisprudence and Artificial Intelligence*, 2013, 1-32. doi:10.1007/978-94-007-6110-0_1.
- Hamlyn, D. W. *The Theory of Knowledge*. London: Palgrave Macmillan, 1970.
- Hansson, Sven O. "The False Dichotomy between Coherentism and Foundationalism." *Journal of Philosophy* 104, no. 6 (2007), 290-300. doi:10.5840/jphil2007104620.
- Harman, Gilbert. *Reasoning, Meaning, and Mind*. OUP Oxford, 1999.
- Hebert, Ryan Michael. "The Pyrrhonian problematic and generality in Arguments concerning the Structure of Justification." Master's thesis, Washington State University, 2011.
- Helm, Paul. *Faith with Reason*. New York: Oxford University Press, 2000.
- Herzberg, Frederik. "The dialectics of infinitism and coherentism: inferential justification versus holism and coherence." *Synthese* 191, no. 4 (2013), 701-723. doi:10.1007/s11229-013-0273-5.
- Hill, T. H., *Contemporary theories of knowledge*, New York: The Ronald Press, 1961.

- Hobson, Kenneth. "Foundational beliefs and the structure of justification." *Synthese* 164, no. 1 (2007), 117-139. doi:10.1007/s11229-007-9219-0.
- Howard-Snyder, Daniel. "Lehrer's Case Against Foundationalism." *Erkenntnis* 60, no. 1 2004, PP. 51-73. doi:10.1023/b: erke.00000005151.18261.6e.
- Howard-Snyder, Daniel, and E.J. Coffman. "Three Arguments Against Foundationalism: Arbitrariness, Epistemic Regress, and Existential Support." in *Canadian Journal of Philosophy*, 36, no. 4, 2006, 535-564. doi:10.1353/cjp.2007.0003.
- Huemer, M., (ed.), Audi, R., (intro.), *Epistemology: A Contemporary Readings*, London: Routledge, 2002.
- Ifeyinwa, Emenike M. "Problem of Foundationalism as a Theory of Epistemic Justification. *IOSR Journal of Humanities and Social Science* 19, no. 8 (2014), 102-105. doi:10.9790/0837-1981102105.
- Jackman, Henry. "Foundationalism, Coherentism and Rule-Following Scepticism." *International Journal of Philosophical Studies* 11, no. 1 (2003), 25-41. doi:10.1080/0967255032000050420.
- Jan, Hahl. "Problem of Epistemological Foundationalism." *Paideia: Philosophical E-Journal of Charles University* 8, no. 04 (2011), 1-12.
- Joachim, Harold, H., *The Nature of Truth: An Essay*, Oxford: The Clarendon Press, 1906.
- Kekes, John. "An argument against foundationalism." *Philosophia* 12, no. 3-4 (1983), 273-281. doi:10.1007/bf02380907. Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2004.
- Kirkham, Richard L., *Theories of Truth: A Critical Introduction*, Cambridge, The MIT Press, 2001.
- Klein, Peter D. "What IS Wrong with Foundationalism is that it Cannot Solve the Epistemic Regress Problem." *Philosophy and Phenomenological Research* 68, no. 1 (2004), 166-171. doi:10.1111/j.1933-1592.2004.tb00332.x.

- Kusch, Martin. *Knowledge by Agreement: The Programme of Communitarian Epistemology*. Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2002.
- Kornblith, Hilary, “Beyond Foundationalism and the Coherence Theory”, in *Journal of Philosophy*, Vol. 77, no. 10, 1980, pp. 597-612.
- Kornblith, Hilary., (ed.) *Epistemology: Internalism and Externalism*, Malden: Blackwell, 2001.
- Kvanvig Jonathan L., (ed.) *Warrant in Contemporary Epistemology: Essays in Honor of Plantinga’s Theory of Knowledge*, Lanham: Rowman & Littlefield Publishers, 1996.
- L. Cain, Joathan. “Moral Foundherentism.” PhD diss., The University of Southern Mississippi, 2013.
- Lehrer, Keith. *Metamind*. Oxford University Press on Demand, 1990.
- Lemos, Noah. *An Introduction to the Theory of Knowledge*. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2007.
- Lewis, Clarence I. *Mind and the World-order: Outline of a Theory of Knowledge*. North Chelmsford: Courier Corporation, 1956.
- Locke, John. *An Essay Concerning Human Understanding*. Hazleton: The Pennsylvania State University, 1999.
- Lycan, William G. *Judgement and Justification*. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press Archive, 1988.
- Masih, Y. *A Critical History of Western Philosophy: Greek, Medieval and Modern*, Delhi: Motilal Banarsidass, 1999.
- Martin, James A. “Is Foundationalism Indefinable?” in *Metaphilosophy*, 19, no. 2, (1988), 128-142, doi:10.1111/j.1467-9973.1988.tb00708.x
- Matthews, G., *Plato’s Epistemology and Related Logical Problems*, London: Humanities Press, 1972.

- McGrew, Timothy J. *The Foundations of Knowledge*. Lanham: Rowman & Littlefield, 1995.
- McGrew, Timothy, and Lydia McGrew. *Internalism and Epistemology: The Architecture of Reason*. London: Routledge, 2007.
- Miller, C. David, "A Coherent Foundation." *IU South Bend Undergraduate Research Journal* vol. 4, 2001, PP. 67-70.
- Moore, G.E., *Some Main Problem of Philosophy*, (ed.) Lewis H. D., London: George Allen & Unwin, 1953.
- Moriarty, Michael. *Rene Descartes Meditations on First Philosophy With Selections from the Objections and Replies*, Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2008.
- Morton, A., *A Guide through the Theory of knowledge*, Oxford: Blackwell, 1997.
- Moser, P.K. *Empirical Justification*. Basingstoke: Springer, 1985.
- Moser, P. K., and Nat, A. V., *Human knowledge, Classical and Contemporary Approaches*, New York: Oxford University Press, 1987.
- Moser P.K., (ed.) *The Oxford Handbook of Epistemology*, Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2002.
- Neta, R., (ed.) *Current Controversies in Epistemology*, New York: Routledge, 2014.
- O'Brien, Dan. *An Introduction to the Theory of Knowledge*. John Wiley & Sons, 2016.
- Okoye, CA. "Evaluation of Descartes' Rational Foundationalism." *UJAH: Unizik Journal of Arts and Humanities*, 12, no. 1, 2011, PP. 34-54, doi:10.4314/ujah.v12i1.2.
- Olsson, Erik. *The Epistemology of Keith Lehrer*. Dordrecht: Kluwer Academic Publishers, 2003.
- Pappas, G. S., (ed.), *Justification and Knowledge: New Studies in Epistemology*, Holland: D. Reidel publishing, 1979.
- Phillips, D. Z. *Faith After Foundationalism*. Routledge:1988.

- Pritchard Duncan. "Some Recent Work in Epistemology," *The Philosophical Quarterly* 54, no. 217 (2004): 604-613 doi:10.1111/j.0031-8094.2004.00377. x.
- Plantinga, A, *Warrant and Proper Function*, New York: Oxford University Press, 1993.
- Plantinga, Alvin. *Warrant: The Current Debate*. New York: Oxford University Press, 1993.
- Pollock J. L., "A Plethora of Epistemological Theories", in G. S. Pappas (ed.), *Justification and Knowledge*, Holland: D. Riedel, 1979.
- Pollock, J. L., *Contemporary Theories of Knowledge*, London: Hutchinson, 1987.
- Pollock, John L., and Joseph Cruz. *Contemporary Theories of Knowledge*. Lanham: Rowman & Littlefield, 1999.
- Porter, Steven L. *Restoring the Foundations of Epistemic Justification: A Direct Realist and Conceptualist Theory of Foundationalism*. Lanham: Lexington Books, 2006.
- Rauser, Randal. "Moderate Epistemological Foundationalism." *Theology in Search of Foundations*, 2009, 224-254. doi:10.1093/acprof:oso/9780199214600.003.0010.
- Rawls, John, and Professor J. Rawls. *A Theory of Justice*. Cambridge: Belknap Press, 1999.
- Rescher, Nicholas. *Epistemology: An Introduction to the Theory of Knowledge*. Albany: State University of New York Press, 2003.
- Rockmore, Tom. *On Foundationalism: A Strategy for Metaphysical Realism*. Lanham: Rowman & Littlefield, 2004.
- Rockmore, Tom, and Singer, B. J. (ed.) *Anti foundationalism Old and New*, in "Foundationalism in Plato?" by Polansky, R., Philadelphia: Temple University Press, 1992.
- Russell, Bertrand. *Philosophical Essays*. London: Psychology Press, 1994.

- Russell, Bertrand, *The Problems of Philosophy*, London, Oxford University Press, 1911.
- Russell, Bertrand. "Locke's Theory of Knowledge" *A History of Western Philosophy*, London: George Allen & Unwin, 1961.
- Sharma, R. N., *Plato an Inter-disciplinary Perspective*, New Delhi: Atlantic Publishers & Distributors. 1991.
- Scheidegger, Martin. *Modest Foundationalism Vs. Classical Foundationalism and Coherentism*. Grin Publishing, 2017.
- Shirley, Edward S. "A flaw in Chisholm's foundationalism." *Philosophical Studies*, 38, no. 2 (1980), 155-160. doi:10.1007/bf00374331.
- Short, T. L. "Was Peirce a Weak Foundationalist?" *Indiana University Press* 36, no. 4 (2000), 503-28. <http://www.jstor.org/stable/40320812>.
- Smithies, Declan. "Can Foundationalism Solve the Regress Problem?" *Current Controversies in Epistemology*, 2014, 73-94. doi:10.4324/9780203123522-5.
- Sosa, Ernest. *Knowledge in Perspective: Selected Essays in Epistemology*. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1991.
- Sosa, Ernest. "The Raft and the Pyramid." *Midwest Studies in Philosophy* 5 (1980), 3-25. doi:10.1111/j.1475-4975.1980.tb00394.x.
- Sosa, Ernest. Jaekwon Kim, Jeremy Fantl, and Matthew McGrath. *Epistemology: An Anthology*. Oxford: Blackwell, 2008.
- Steup, Matthias. *An Introduction to Contemporary Epistemology*. New Jersey: Prentice-Hall, 1998.
- Steup, M. and Sosa E., (ed.) *Contemporary Debates in Epistemology*, Malden: Blackwell, 2005
- Stiffler, Eric. "A definition of Foundationalism." *Metaphilosophy* 15, no. 1 (1984), 16-25. doi:10.1111/j.1467-9973.1984.tb00131.x.

- Swain, Marshall. "BonJour's Coherence Theory of Justification." *The Current State of the Coherence Theory*, 1989, 115-124. doi:10.1007/978-94-009-2360-7_10.
- T. Poston. *Reason and Explanation: A Defense of Explanatory Coherentism*. Basingstoke: Springer, 2014.
- Tamar Szabo Gendler and John Hawthorne, *Oxford Studies in Epistemology*, Vol. I, Oxford: Clarendon Press, 2005.
- Thagard, Paul. *Coherence in Thought and Action*. Cambridge: MIT Press, 2002.
- Thagard, Paul. *Mind: Introduction to Cognitive Science*. Bradford Book, 2005.
- Timmons, M., "Foundationalism and the Structure of Ethical Justification", in *The Journals of University of Chicago Press*, Vol. 97, no. 3, 1987, PP. 595-609.
- Tramel, Peter. "Haack's foundherentism is a foundationalism", *Synthese*, 160, no 2, 2008, 215-228, Doi:10.1007/s11229-006-9108-y.
- Triplett, Timm. "Chisholm's foundationalism", *Philosophical Studies* 38, no. 2 1980, 141-153. doi:10.1007/bf00374330.
- Triplett Timm. "Recent Work on Foundationalism," *American Philosophical Quarterly* 27, no. 2, 1990, 93-116.
- Tuchanska, Barbara. "Is a Non-Foundationalist Epistemology Possible?" Accessed , 1999. <https://hektor.umcs.lublin.pl/~zlimn/school/2/frames/courses/bt.htm>.
- Weldu, Amanuel. "Foundationalism and Roderick Chisholm", 2014, PP. 1-7.
- Westphal, Kenneth R., *Hegel's Epistemology: A Philosophical Introduction to the Phenomenology of Spirit*, Indianapolis: Hackett Publishing Company, 2003.
- Woozley, Anthony D. *Theory of Knowledge: An Introduction*. 1949.
- Zeglen, Urszula M. *Donald Davidson: Truth, Meaning and Knowledge*. London: Routledge, 1999.

Internet Sources

<https://academyofideas.com/2015/11/introduction-to-aristotle-knowledge-and-the-four-causes/>

<http://www.iep.utm.edu/aristotl/>

<http://www.plato.stanford.edu/entries/aristotle/>

<http://www.plato.stanford.edu/entries/descartes-epistemology>

<http://plato.stanford.edu/entries/leibniz/#Epi>

<http://www.sparknotes.com/philosophy>

<http://www.iep.utm.edu/theatetu/>

<http://plato.stanford.edu/entries/plato-theaetetus>

<http://plato.stanford.edu/entries/locke/#LimHumUnd>

<http://www.iep.utm.edu/locke/>

<https://plato.stanford.edu/entries/bradley>

<https://www.oxfordbibliographies.com/view/document/obo-9780195396577/obo-9780195396577-0020.xml>

<http://www.iep.utm.edu/aristotl/>

<http://www.plato.stanford.edu/entries/aristotle/>

<http://www.plato.stanford.edu/entries/descartes-epistemology>

<http://plato.stanford.edu/entries/leibniz/#Epi>

<http://www.sparknotes.com/philosophy>

<https://plato.stanford.edu/entries/bradley>

<https://www.oxfordbibliographies.com/view/document/obo-9780195396577/obo-9780195396577-0020.xml>

<https://shodhganga.inflibnet.ac.in>, 2015

<https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=98YItB4sFQU>

<https://www.cambridge.org/core/books/abs/an-introduction-to-the-theory-of-knowledge/coherence-theory-of-justification/fc53f5cb1fec8df6858d0fdb7c92f63c>

<https://plato.stanford.edu/entries/chisholm/#EpiIEpiTerPriFou>



INTERNATIONAL RESEARCH JOURNAL OF HUMANITIES AND INTERDISCIPLINARY STUDIES

(Peer-reviewed, Refereed, Indexed & Open Access Journal)

DOI : 03.2021-11278686

ISSN : 2582-8568

IMPACT FACTOR : 5.828 (SJIF 2022)

DESCARTES FOUNDATIONALISM

Narendra Prasad Behera

Research Scholar

Department of Philosophy,

University of Hyderabad,

Hyderabad (Telangana, India)

E-mail: npbehera@gmail.com

DOI No. **03.2021-11278686**

DOI Link :: <https://doi-ds.org/doilink/04.2022-99188538/IRJHIS2204029>

Abstract:

Rene Descartes' foundationalist theory of knowledge is the most challenging issue in epistemology. His foundationalist's theory of knowledge is building a strong foundation in epistemology. This paper is an inquiry about Descartes' foundationalist's theory of knowledge and challenging scepticism who denied knowledge is not possible. Try to find out whether Descartes' foundationalist theory of knowledge is possible? If possible how did Descartes justify his foundationalist's theory of knowledge to counter scepticism?

Keywords: Rene Descartes, method of doubt, Foundationalism, knowledge, Certainty.

1. INTRODUCTION:

Epistemology is the core area of philosophy. A central concern of epistemology or theory of knowledge is the justification of beliefs. A question may be raised how do we justify our beliefs? How do we know the things around us? What are the methods of knowing the things? These are the basic questions raised in epistemology. This paper will concern Descartes epistemological and methodological inquiry about the nature of knowledge and justification. To counter the scepticism that denied knowledge is not possible, Descartes' started his epistemological inquiry from very beginning. From his methodological inquiry he found 'I' which is foundational and cannot be doubted even if we apply sceptical arguments. This paper discussed Rene Descartes foundationalism theory of knowledge. Let's discuss Descartes epistemological project, how did he construct the foundationalist position in epistemology.

2. Descartes Doubts:

Descartes is a rationalist philosopher for him reason is the source of knowledge. As a rationalist philosopher, he sought clarity and certainty in knowledge. He saw that there is no clarity

and certainty in philosophy though it has been studied philosophy best of mind for long time. For that reason he was worried about certainty in philosophy. To bring out the certainty in philosophy, he thought I need to start philosophy from beginning. Therefore, he introduces a method that is called 'method of doubt'. The method of doubt is a tool to find out certainty in philosophy. Descartes in his first meditation says, whatever I have been accepting as true from my childhood that can be highly doubtful in nature. Therefore, he pointed out that "from time to time I have found that the senses deceive, it is prudent never to trust completely those who have deceive us even once".

Descartes here found that our day-to-day experience is not certain about our knowledge. So he doubted our all sense experience, because it is not providing clear picture of knowledge about the world to us. He introduced methodological inquiry to get certainty philosophy in genera and epistemology in particular. His most important arguments are dream argument; evil demon argument and cogito ergo sum argument. These three arguments are the basis for the achieve certainty in philosophy. According to his dream argument he shows that it is very difficult to separate between awaking state and dreaming state. That means he found that if I say I am holding a paper in my hand I cannot mislead it. But at the same time we need to think that we can dream there is a paper in our hand. So our sensation do not give us adequate knowledge. When he tries to doubt the mathematical propositions like $2+2=4$ he felt that it is very difficult to doubt mathematical propositions. So he fails to doubt mathematical propositions. He thought that God who made me think like that therefore, I am unable to doubt the mathematical propositions. Later he realized that God who is supremely good would not allow me to deceive. Descartes points out that "God would not allow me to be deceived in this way, since he is said to be supremely good."

According to his evil demon argument Descartes realized, that it is possible evil demon can deceive me any time. So it is the evil demon that deceived me. He says "that not God, who supremely good and source of truth, but rather some malicious demon of the utmost power and cunning has employed all his energies in order to deceive me." Descartes introduced cogito argument, according to him 'my thinking' is presupposes everything that is "I think therefore, I exist or I think, therefore, I am." Here Descartes identifies my thinking is a conscious being. I cannot be doubted even if we apply dream argument and evil demon argument. There must be doubter to doubt something. That doubter must exist. That is the foundational philosophy for Descartes, which is indubitable.

3. Descartes's Foundationalism:

Descartes foundationalism theory says that, there are some basic beliefs that beliefs justified the other non basic beliefs. In other words there are foundational beliefs, which supported to non-foundational beliefs. That non-foundational belief depends on the foundational beliefs and foundational beliefs do not depend on any other any beliefs for their justifications.

The Cartesian foundationalism is a very popular theory of foundationalism. This view holds that there is need for the deconstruction of epistemic superstructures, that is, every epistemic claim should be broken down until one gets to a solid base upon which one can build other forms of epistemic beliefs. What one can call Descartes basic belief is his claim of '*cogito ergo sum*', "I think therefore I am" while other beliefs which are derived inferentially from it are the non-basic beliefs. Descartes conceives beliefs as a superstructure with the basic beliefs serving as the foundation, while non-basic beliefs represent the structure itself. Descartes holds that those propositions which are directly evident for a person S have to do in some way with S's mental states- his thoughts, beliefs, feelings, perpetual experiences and others. The Cartesian foundationalists hold that basic propositions report private psychological state.

Descartes foundationalism consists of basic beliefs that somehow provide the support to everything else, which we may be claimed to know. Our knowledge is built upon the Descartes foundational theory of knowledge. Descartes foundationalist theory of knowledge especially discussed in his meditation of first philosophy, have been regarded as foundational in nature.

Descartes foundationalism is about foundational knowledge claims. Descartes in his method of doubt discussed that there was no clear and certain foundation of knowledge. Though the best of mind has been studied philosophy for long time. To build a indubitable foundation he searched for the strong method which he build the foundation of knowledge.

Descartes cogito argument, shows that there is a certain and clear foundation in epistemology. That foundation cannot be doubted. His argument is like this to doubt something there must be a doubter, without doubter nothing can be doubted. To think some things there must be a thinker without thinker thinking could not be possible. That thinker must exist. Therefore, he said "I think, therefore I am or I think therefore, I exist". That is the foundational claim in Descartes epistemology. Descartes cogito is something that whose truth is clearly and distinctly perceived. Once we are clear and certain about our cogito we can have truth about the other proposition clearly and distinctly. From this observation we derive clarity and a distinctness rule that is what is perceived clearly and distinctly must be true.

In relation to inferential knowledge or sensory experience our beliefs justified through foundational elements which is certain and indubitable. By the application of clarity and distinctness epistemic principle we will be able to justify basic beliefs and transfer the justification basic to non-basic beliefs. The main concern clarity and distinctness principle is self-evident internal. It is not external which needs further justification. It is due to the basic nature of clarity and distinctness rule and its secure source of Cogito, which provides a doable solution to the infinite regress problem.

After that Descartes proved the existence of God and world. But I would not discuss detail his theory of knowledge here.

4. Conclusion:

In this paper I have seen that Descartes Foudationalist theory of knowledge is built a solid foundation in epistemology. His discovery of foundation is certain and indubitable. His foundation of knowledge is bringing the certainty in philosophy. Though his Foudationalist theory of knowledge is built a strong foundation for knowledge, but there is some criticism to Descartes Foudationalist theory of knowledge. The main opponent to the Foudationalist theory of knowledge is Coherentism theory of knowledge but I would not discuss that part in this paper.

REFERENCE:

1. Cottingham, John. and Williams, Bernard. (trans.), (1986) *Rene Descartes Meditation of First Philosophy*, Cambridge: Oxford University Press.
2. Cottingham, John, (ed.), (1992), *The Cambridge Companion to Descartes*, Cambridge, University Press
3. Cottingham, John, Stoothoff, Robert and Murdoch, Dugald, (trans.), (1985.), *The philosophical Writings of Descartes*, Vol-II, Cambridge. Cambridge University press,
4. Masih, Y., (1993), *A Critical History of Western Philosophy*, Delhi, Motilal Banarsidass,





Indian Philosophical Congress

89th Session: 5th - 8th January 2015

ADIKAVI NANNAYA UNIVERSITY

Rajah Rajah Narendra Nagar, Rajahmundry-533296

Email: localsecretary89ipc@gmail.com, Tel: 0883-2472618, Fax: 0883-2472618.



Chief Patron

Prof P George Victor
Vice Chancellor

Patron

Prof EN Dhananjaya Rao
Registrar

Organizing Committee

Dr G Gavarraju
Development Officer

Prof S Teki
Principal, UCAC

Prof Y Srinivasa Rao
Principal, UCST

Dr K Subba Rao
Principal, UCED

Prof P Suresh Varma
Dean, CDC

Prof K S Ramesh
Dean, Academic Affairs

Dr P Venkatesawara Rao
Dean, Student Affairs

Mrs. KNookaRatnam
University Engineer

Dr N Uday Bhaskar
Warden, Boys Hostel

Dr D Kalyani
Warden, Girls Hostel

Mr A Satyanarayana
Physical Director

Dr N Kiran Chandra
NSS Program Coordinator

Mr M Pratap Reddy
Estate Officer

Local Secretary, IPC
DrK Purushotham Paul
Cell: 9848222756.

Participation Certificate

Dr. Mr. Narendra Prasad Behera

of... University of Hyderabad

... .. has participated in the 89th Session of
Indian Philosophical Congress, held during 5-8 January
2015 at Adikavi Nannaya University, Rajahmundry, A.P.

The title of the paper presented is

... .. Descartes Theory of Knowledge

Dr. K P Paul
Local Secretary
89th Session, IPC

Prof. S Panneerselvam
General Secretary
Indian Philosophical Congress



UGC SPONSORED GLOBAL SEMINAR ON
**Understanding the Contemporaneity of
Acharya Nagarjuna's Philosophy in the Global Context**

28th - 30th JANUARY, 2015



Centre for Mahayana Buddhist Studies

ACHARYA NAGARJUNA UNIVERSITY, Nagarjuna Nagar, Guntur - 522 510. A.P. India

CERTIFICATE

This is to certify that ~~Prof./Dr.~~ / Mr. / Ms. Narendra Prasad Behara (Research Scholar)
of University of Hyderabad, Hyderabad.
has participated / chaired a session / presented a paper titled Nagarjuna's Account of -
Foundationalism and Coherentism. in the Global Seminar.

Dr. L. Udaya Kumar
Director, Global Seminar-2015

NATIONAL SEMINAR

"NEW TRENDS AND APPROACHES IN INDIAN HISTORY"

P.G. DEPARTMENT OF HISTORY

BERHAMPUR UNIVERSITY

Certificate



This is to certify that


Mr. Nanendra Prasad Behera


has participated / chaired a session / presented a paper titled


Foundationalism Versus Feminist Epistemology.

in the "National Seminar" on topic "New Trends and Approaches in Indian History"

conducted by P.G. Department of History, Berhampur University on 16.03.2022


Dr. R. K. Bhuyan
Seminar Convener


Dr. Sadananda Nayak
Seminar Secretary


Dr. Sankarsan Malik
Organising Secretary

Foundationalism and Coherentism in Epistemology: A Critical Study

by Narendra Prasad Behera


Submission date: 31-Dec-2022 02:24PM (UTC+0530)

Submission ID: 1987606610

File name: THESIS_31-12-22_3.docx (230.87K)

Word count: 60772

Character count: 332896



Foundationalism and Coherentism in Epistemology: A Critical Study

ORIGINALITY REPORT

9%

SIMILARITY INDEX

7%

INTERNET SOURCES

5%

PUBLICATIONS

3%

STUDENT PAPERS

PRIMARY SOURCES

1

[idoc.pub](#)

Internet Source

1%

2

[epdf.pub](#)

Internet Source

1%

3

[aquila.usm.edu](#)

Internet Source

1%

4

[preterhuman.net](#)

Internet Source

1%

5

"A Companion to Epistemology", Wiley, 2010

Publication

<1%

6

[mural.maynoothuniversity.ie](#)

Internet Source

<1%

7

[philpapers.org](#)

Internet Source

<1%

8

[www.egyankosh.ac.in](#)

Internet Source

<1%

9

[homepages.wmich.edu](#)

Internet Source

<1%

Similarity Screening Done @ IGM Library

Sub ID: 1987606610

Sub date: 31-12-2022

Librarian / DL / AL
IGM Library (UOH)

10	Laurence Bonjour. "The coherence theory of empirical knowledge", Philosophical Studies, 1976 Publication	<1 %
11	iep.utm.edu Internet Source	<1 %
12	vdoc.pub Internet Source	<1 %
13	shawnslayton.com Internet Source	<1 %
14	The Epistemology of Keith Lehrer, 2003. Publication	<1 %
15	www.takhliqat.com Internet Source	<1 %
16	mospace.umsystem.edu Internet Source	<1 %
17	Submitted to University of Edinburgh Student Paper	<1 %
18	Paul K. Moser. "Empirical Justification", Springer Science and Business Media LLC, 1986 Publication	<1 %
19	doczz.net Internet Source	<1 %

20	Birte Schelling. "Knowledge - Genetic Foundations and Epistemic Coherence", Walter de Gruyter GmbH, 2011 Publication	<1 %
21	documents.mx Internet Source	<1 %
22	"The Current State of the Coherence Theory", Springer Nature, 1989 Publication	<1 %
23	"Justification and Knowledge", Springer Science and Business Media LLC, 1979 Publication	<1 %
24	Roderick M. Chisholm. "SELF-PRESENTATION AND THE PSYCHOLOGICAL", Grazer Philosophische studien, 1984 Publication	<1 %
25	academiaanalitica.files.wordpress.com Internet Source	<1 %
26	Ted Poston. "Reason and Explanation", Springer Science and Business Media LLC, 2014 Publication	<1 %
27	archive.org Internet Source	<1 %
28	mattersthought.blogspot.com Internet Source	<1 %

29	answers.winsingal.com Internet Source	<1 %
30	Submitted to University of Melbourne Student Paper	<1 %
31	www.scribd.com Internet Source	<1 %
32	Submitted to University of Florida Student Paper	<1 %
33	hdl.handle.net Internet Source	<1 %
34	Submitted to University of Hyderabad, Hyderabad Student Paper	<1 %
35	stathought.blogspot.com Internet Source	<1 %
36	Goldman, Alvin I.. "Epistemology", Oxford University Press Publication	<1 %
37	Submitted to University of Kent at Canterbury Student Paper	<1 %
38	www.unc.edu Internet Source	<1 %
39	"The Palgrave Handbook of German Idealism", Springer Science and Business Media LLC, 2014	<1 %

40

antilogicalism.com

Internet Source

<1 %

41

John L. Pollock. "Knowledge and Justification",
Walter de Gruyter GmbH, 2015

Publication

<1 %

42

Submitted to Broward Community College

Student Paper

<1 %

43

eprints.nottingham.ac.uk

Internet Source

<1 %

44

Locke, John, and J. A. St. John. "Book IV.", The
works of John Locke Volume 2 Philosophical
works, 1854.

Publication

<1 %

45

UDEFI, Amaechi. "An Analysis of Some
Contemporary Alternatives to Traditional
Epistemology", Uludağ Üniversitesi, 2009.

Publication

<1 %

46

peitho.amu.edu.pl

Internet Source

<1 %

47

bidiwif.dfaduke.com

Internet Source

<1 %

48

www.dcvxuanloc.net

Internet Source

<1 %

49	Submitted to American Public University System Student Paper	<1 %
50	Submitted to University of Alabama Student Paper	<1 %
51	Submitted to University of Western Ontario Student Paper	<1 %
52	core.ac.uk Internet Source	<1 %
53	Submitted to Grand Canyon University Student Paper	<1 %
54	Submitted to New Mexico State University Student Paper	<1 %
55	Submitted to The University of Manchester Student Paper	<1 %
56	en.wikipedia.org Internet Source	<1 %
57	Submitted to National University of Ireland, Maynooth Student Paper	<1 %
58	Submitted to University of Cape Town Student Paper	<1 %
59	Submitted to University of Sheffield Student Paper	<1 %

60	kupdf.net Internet Source	<1 %
61	Submitted to Heythrop College Student Paper	<1 %
62	perpus.filsafat.ugm.ac.id Internet Source	<1 %
63	Submitted to Bridgepoint Education Student Paper	<1 %
64	Submitted to Colorado Technical University Online Student Paper	<1 %
65	James W. Cornman. "Skepticism, Justification, and Explanation", Springer Science and Business Media LLC, 1980 Publication	<1 %
66	Submitted to University of South Africa Student Paper	<1 %
67	dokumen.pub Internet Source	<1 %
68	Golan Moshe Lahat. "The Political Implications of Kant's Theory of Knowledge", Springer Science and Business Media LLC, 2013 Publication	<1 %
69	tedposton.org Internet Source	<1 %

70 Submitted to American University in Cairo <1 %
Student Paper

71 Dretske, Fred I.. "Reasons, Knowledge, and <1 %
Probability", Philosophy of Science, 1971.
Publication

72 L. Jonathan Cohen. "The coherence theory of <1 %
truth", Philosophical Studies, 1978
Publication

73 Submitted to University of Houston System <1 %
Student Paper

74 www.cram.com <1 %
Internet Source

Exclude quotes On

Exclude matches < 14 words

Exclude bibliography On