

**GOVERNANCE REFORMS AND RESPONSE OF THE
BUREAUCRACY: A CASE STUDY OF KERALA**

**DOCTOR OF PHILOSOPHY
IN
POLITICAL SCIENCE
BY
SALMAN AK**



**DEPARTMENT OF POLITICAL SCIENCE
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HYDERABAD-500046
JUNE, 2022**

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A Dissertation submitted to the University of Hyderabad
in partial fulfillment of the requirement
for the award of the degree of

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DECLARATION

I hereby declare that the work embodied in this dissertation titled "*Governance Reforms and Response of the Bureaucracy: A Case Study of Kerala*" has been carried out under the supervision of Prof. E. Venkatesu, Department of Political Science, University of Hyderabad, and has not been submitted for any degree in part or in full to any other University or to this University.

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CERTIFICATE

This is to certify that the dissertation titled “*Governance Reforms and Response of the Bureaucracy: A Case Study of Kerala*” submitted by Mr. Salman AK in partial fulfillment of the requirements for the award of the Degree of Doctor of Philosophy in Political Science, is carried out by he under my supervision and guidance.

This dissertation has not been submitted either in part or in full to any other university or institution of learning for the award of any other degree.

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ABBREVIATIONS

AAP	Annual Action Plan
ACR	Annual Confidential Report
AIS	All India Service
ARC	Administrative Reforms Commission
CLAD	Center for Latin American Administration for Development
DEG	Digital Era Governance
DRDA	District Rural Development Agency
EDG	Essentially Digital Governance
ERC	Expenditure Reforms Commission
FRAC	Framework of Roles, Activities, and Competencies
GDP	Gross Domestic Product
IAS	Indian Administrative Service
ICT	Information and Communication Technology
IFS	Indian Foreign Service
iGOT	Integrated Government Online Training
IMF	International Monetary Fund
IPS	Indian Police Service
IT	Information Technology
MCTP	Mid-Career Training Program
MLA	Member of Legislative Assembly
MOU	Memorandum of Understanding
MP	Member of Parliament
NGO	Non-Governmental Organisation

NPA	New Public Administration
NPCSCB	National Programme for Civil Service Capacity Building
NPM	New Public Management
NPS	New Public Service
O&M	Organisation& Method
OBC	Other Backward Community
PRI	Pnchayati Raj Institutions
PSO	Public Sector Organisation
RTI	Right to Information
SC	Scheduled Caste
SPV	Special Purpose Vehicle
ST	Scheduled Tribe
UNDP	United Nations Development Programme
UNESCO	United Nations Educational, Scientific and Cultural Organization
UPSC	Union Public Service Commission
WTO	World Trade Organization

PREFACE

Socio political and even environmental changes necessitate administrative reforms in every country. The study analyses the evolution of bureaucratic mechanism of the country from the very roots and covers major administrative and bureaucratic models of various governments through the ancient, medieval and modern periods. The study discusses major administrative reform efforts which have occurred in the country since independence, majorly focusing on the Second ARC that were directed towards a responsive face of the bureaucracy. It is also an attempt to understand the organisational set up of the country and the reform efforts and changes made in the administration structure after the adaptation of New Public Management as a paradigm for administrative reforms. Of course, as a continuation to that challenge it looks at the possibilities of the latest paradigm “New Public governance” in the Indian context.

Such a study is relevant because the effectiveness of these reforms in bringing responsiveness in our bureaucracy is rarely studied from its field of action. A reform should only be effective when it has a mechanism to evaluate its impact in the field because the field may have many more surprises await the newly introduced mechanism which were unseen in the initial effort of reform. Therefore, it is significant to look at the various models of responsive bureaucracy and to see the reaction of actors in the field. As the field of public service delivery and policy implementation is a highly stratified, inter-organisational and contested space than before it is high time to bring in innovative tools and techniques to deal with emerging problems. There are a few such cases of innovative and responsive bureaucracy coming up from different parts of our country. These bureaucratic experiments have to be read along with the global and national governance reforms regimes without any doubt. This study takes up a move to study one of such case from the state of Kerala where a district collector takes up an initiative for collaborative governance.

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Introduction

Globalisation has affected every institution, ideology, and movement in the world. The government apparatuses were also shaken and renovated, with a great reliance on neoliberal values. There the world witnessed withdrawal of the state from previously governed areas and in most of those spaces corporate entrepreneurial forces took in charge. Role of the state shifted from 'doer' to that of 'enabler' in order to accommodate market in the governance process. All these neoliberal thoughts mostly favoured funding agencies such as IMF and WTO who have been acting as donors for developmental projects in third world countries. Their newly introduced 'structural adjustment programmes' facilitated by their resources with conditionalities and IT boom actually 'delegitimised' the role that state performed in the progress of these countries. And more importantly these countries become dependent on the global capital. In short, recently between state and society, government and citizen and state and non-state institution has developed new models of relationships and interactions. All these can be captured under the conception of 'governance'.

Emergence of the term governance as a buzzword has to be understood as an impact of all these or as neo liberal response to public administration independent of its 'purpose'. The ability of the government to develop, prepare and execute policies and perform functions is coming under the idea of governance. It is equal to goal oriented and development-oriented administration, which is bound to bring development in living standards of citizens. Governance also denotes a higher standard of organisational efficiency and effectiveness in service delivery and responsive and responsible to the recipients of services. It takes the 'structure' and 'process' of administration into account in its discussion. Governance helps us to understand how the power enters "policy spaces, processes and practices, and the formal and informal institutional arrangements which contribute to a matrix of governance" (Lieberthal, 1995). 'Public' is no more significant in administration and market has acquired the significance in governance. Thereby citizens became clients and bureaucrats turned to be 'rent-seekers'. This paradigm shift made traditional Weberian theory of administration inadequate to answer the challenges those are brought in front.

Until very recently bureaucracy has been understood as the main focus of governance. Although this centre of gravity shifted recently from the bureaucracy to other multiple agencies it cannot be said that its relevance is reduced in governance.

Bureaucracy as a system survived long turbulences and troubles because it became key actor for “maintenance, continuity and enhancement of both capitalist and socialist systems” (Farazmand, 2009). As recent developments in governance paradigm promote collaborative and joint up government system in which the public servant has to play an important role in complicated process of holding on varieties of actors for a particular goal. In fact, moving from conventional to innovative means moving away from a rigidly rule-bound and exploitative system and toward a more representative, responsive, and collaborative bureaucracy, which is what is anticipated in the sense of governance. However due to the increased role of new actors, a study of either governance or bureaucracy cannot be fulfilled with the classical state centred theories. At the very emergence of globalisation itself traditional bureaucratic models had lost their significance. The traditional model operated on a variety of assumptions on how to govern despite the fact that governing traditions are different in every country (Peters, 2010).

It is observed by the scholars that the impact of the paradigm shift in developing countries cannot be compared to that of Western countries as governance has to be analysed within the peculiar contexts of every country (Chakrabarty and Chand, 2012). In the case India, its governance model is deeply rooted in its colonial past as the post-colonial government kept many important administrative structures which included All India Civil Service. It was in the background of 1947 partition these administrative structures became significant to the governance of the country despite of its imperial roots. When this matter was brought for Constituent Assembly Debate members were not in a unanimous position about it. When some criticised it as against nationalist interests, some were concerned about the burden it caused to the fiscal capacity of the country and a few also expressed their anxiety over the loyalty and honesty of the officers. Even then by the strong insistence of Sardar Vallabhai Patel pointing to the necessity of their service to build the union of India, it was agreed to retain more or less with the same features (Chakrabarty and Chand, 2012).

Accepting the ‘steel frame’ of colonial bureaucracy constitutional framers did not leave its nature unaltered as they located it to function within the framework of democratic governance. In that way they wanted to involve public in the decision making process and that responsibility had left to the creative capacity of the bureaucrat similar to that of a politician. Hence retaining the same structure system is transformed

from its imperial nature to a different regime without much difficulty. The revolutionary part of this transformation is that the founders of the constitution abled it to adapt into democratic and socialist social environment to an extent. Thereby obviously the structure of bureaucracy had undergone radical changes. However, in 1990s this bureaucratic nature visibly responded to the forces of globalisation and neo liberalisation. Therefore, the country witnessed its bureaucracy challenging the planned economic development directed by the State, although in a guarded manner.

If we look at the recent changes in bureaucratic governance in India, those are majorly articulated by Administrative Reforms Commission in their Reports. It was Fifth Pay Commission, 1997, crossing the conventional boundaries of a Pay Commission, laid down an action plan for 'good governance' playing the role of an Administrative Reforms Commission. Along with suggestions of new Pay scales for civil servants, it also proposed recommendation with regard to the size, efficiency, ethos, motivation, training, recruitment and procedural operations. Measures to achieve these were well articulated in *Action Plan for Effective and Responsive Government* 1998. Again, this document also marks the initial response of the state to the global scenario created by neo liberalization, with respect to the changed role of bureaucracy. Another significant aspect of administrative reforms in India is that they seek alternatives to the Vertical Power structure given by Max Weber, like decentralization founded upon democratic values.

If we look at governance reforms, the principles of the Washington Consensus for developing countries have been adopted by the majority of governments. To achieve social, political, and economic growth in the country, changing circumstances necessitate governance reforms. The state appoints reform committees and commissions to bring in administrative changes. More than 600 attempts by the Central and State governments to improve India's administrative system were made until the creation of the Second Administrative Reforms Commission in 2005. The government of India established the Second Administrative Reforms Commission to review the functioning of the country's current administrative structure. In the light of liberalisation/ privatisation/ globalisation, the establishment of the Second Administrative Reforms Commission is a landmark decision for bringing about improvements in the functioning of India's public governance. India, the world's largest democracy, is facing obstacles in improving governance and is facing a governability

crisis. Since permanent bureaucracy plays such a significant role in the designing and execution of a policy, it is critical to investigate how it can become more functional in order to bring about improvements in society and governance keeping people's satisfaction at the focus.

According to Caiden (2009) governance reform is essential for bring changes in the society. Hence governance is an interdependent variable to Bureaucracy and governance reform. Governance reform can be a dependent variable or independent variable or both at the same time. There is no way that a reform just happens in its own as it is not an act of God. It has to be permeated by actors and implemented through an established governance system. Blacksburg Manifesto suggests that we should not guard the bureaucrats but train them, or inculcate with them values. Such that they make initiatives responsive to citizen need while considering both governance process and rights of minorities. While accepting this paradigm shift and changing role of bureaucracy towards the development of the society it should not be undermined the question of equality and social justice.

Background of the Research

Bureaucracy has been infamously known for its stagnant nature not only in India but everywhere. Studies from Europe and America states that there is visible signs of change in their civil service in last twenty years and were mostly by the initiatives of their political leaders (Peters, 2000). Moreover, it has also been widely noted that governments across the globe are on their moves towards people centred governance. The underlying motive of this shift in majority of the systems is to give priority to the interests of the customers, as citizens are turned to be 'customer' by the recent governance models (Garg, 2006).

There is no doubt that every government across the world are hugely influenced by their socio-economic political backgrounds. It designs their mechanisms of administration accordingly. That is the reason why governance is also to be understood as a process. In other words, there is a necessity of change in every governance mechanism according to the changing environment. But this change cannot be read with a universal scale. In the context of impact made by the globalisation on the governance it was observed that transformation as per the neoliberal values was not a task for western countries. But the case was different to the developing countries like India. Their governance has to be read along with their historical contexts. And due to the

same history of colonialism they also have an in-built nature of resisting the routes of western origin thoughts and values bringing up alternatives (Chakrabarty, 2012). These made any changes to the bureaucracy very difficult task although globalisation made occasion to bring in multiple transformation within the shortest time span. The inadequacy of 'anti-capitalist' development Plans in the country also paved the way to the impact of globalisation. Beyond that in this context many countries undermining the 'public' nature of bureaucracy, shifted their performances from 'process- oriented' to 'result – oriented' as advertised by 'New Public Management regime'. The hazard of the shift was that the administration would be ignorant of the ultimate consequences of their actions as their complete focus is diverted to achieve the maximum result.

To restore the dysfunctions caused by the NPM and NPA a recent model 'New Public Governance' is emerged in the field which is mostly based on the network theory. NPG's proposal is that there is no absolute monopoly of power residing with any government and it also advocates for cooperation among rest of the societal actors on an equal basis, such as other public organizations, companies, civil society and citizens. This can lead to achieve synergies among these forces in the society; can save the costs. It has to be understood that issues regarding the Policy matters are really complicated; hence various committed actors are required. Along with satisfying their individual interests, they can also help the public service to resolve specific issues with their extra capacity and knowledge.

Despite of various challenges including globalisation and emergence of new models of governance bureaucracy stayed back irreplaceable in every single public and private or non-profit organisations at local, national and global levels. Especially in the case of developing countries like India these 'events' acts more as giving new additional roles to the bureaucracy along with the conventional ones. It needs to address shifting dynamics of the globe with a well efficient leadership. But the important factor is that this change, whatsoever it may be, should able to ensure a responsive bureaucracy in action. Since the very first attempt of administrative reforms from the part of the state a 'responsive, accountable, transparent and people friendly administration' has been emphasised as a greater concern of the state.¹ The dissatisfaction and anxiety of the people, especially the vulnerable sections of society, in relation to the public service

¹ See *Action Plan for Effective and Responsive Government* 1998 which was published by Fifth Pay Commission of 1997.

delivery has also been expressed by the earlier reforms commissions time and again. It was marked that lack of empathy and enthusiasm is evident in the relationship of our bureaucracy and stakeholders.

Responsiveness is generally understood as a customer oriented value and that is closely connected with providing services to the customer in a manner appropriate to the values of customer. It is one of the main typologies of accountability as proposed by Jonathan G. S. Koppel while transparency, controllability, responsibility and liability are the remaining ones. Koppel interprets responsiveness in two ways. One is to focus on people's demand and the other way is to attend their needs. Being responsive to People's demands can be in different forms such as to find out their preferences through focus groups. On the other hand, when an organisation is oriented to needs it focuses on the organisational goals and if those goals are capable of achieving the needs of the people, they are responsive (Koppell, 2005).

To achieve the responsiveness there is a requirement of reforms which takes the bureaucrat closer to the customer that is citizen who is irritated by the arrogance of bureaucracy, and to put the citizen in the driver's seat (Osborne and Gaebler, 1992). As pointed out earlier irrespective of the different styles of reforms across the globe the ultimate consequences of these reforms in recent past have been to shift "the governing out of conventional and politically driven public sector and to empower a range of actors including- but not limited to- senior civil servants, lower-level public employees and members of civil society" (Osborne, 2010).

Whatsoever the effectiveness of these reforms in bringing responsiveness in our bureaucracy is rarely studied from its field of action. A reform should only be effective when it has a mechanism to evaluate its impact in the field because the field may have many more surprises await the newly introduced mechanism which were unseen in the initial effort of reform. Therefore, it is significant to look at the various models of responsive bureaucracy and to see the reaction of actors in the field. As the field of public service delivery and policy implementation is a highly stratified, inter-organisational and contested space than before it is high time to bring in innovative tools and techniques to deal with emerging problems. There a few such cases of innovative and responsive bureaucracy are coming up from different parts of our country. These bureaucratic experiments have to be read along with the global and

national governance reforms regimes without any doubt. This study takes up a move to study one of such case from the state of Kerala where a district collector takes up an initiative for collaborative governance. In that means researcher attempts to see whether the governance reforms measures of the state are truly informed of the paradigm shifts in the realm of public policy implementation and public service delivery. As this research tries to answer that question it also looks at how these governance reforms impacts in contributing a responsive bureaucracy in the country.

Research Questions: -

1. How the bureaucracy responds to the state measures of governance reforms in the context of paradigm shifts in governance and public administration?
2. What are the accelerating/decelerating factors/actors involved in conduct of a responsive bureaucracy in the field?

Objectives: -

1. To critically examine to what extent the paradigm shift in governance at global level is reflected in governance reforms of the Indian state.
2. To examine the bureaucratic response of governance reforms and impacts in the field level.
3. To find out and analyse various factors responsible and actors involved in the conduct of a responsive bureaucracy.

Methodology: -

The methodology of this study is both analytical and empirical. First four chapters are based on Analytical method which is undertaken by making use of both primary and secondary sources of Data.

The Primary sources include commission reports, policy documents and Autobiographies etc. The secondary sources of data include scholarly books, articles in journals, articles in newspapers and internet resources.

The sources of the study also include empirical Data collected from the field, which is Kerala with the use interviews with bureaucrats and survey of both bureaucrats and of the beneficiary people on the basis of structured questionnaire. Field study is

conducted with various public administrators of the state to understand their experiences from the field of administration.

Hypothesis: -

It is clearly evident from the general experience that there is a huge necessity of transformation in the Indian bureaucracy from the recruitment to the realm of public service delivery. The impartiality, commitment of the bureaucracy towards people's issue have been largely compromised by the bureaucracy. Breaking down the traditional hierarchical bureaucratic structure has become a trend followed by every country especially post liberalisation. Reducing the gap between the bureaucrat and the citizen can contribute to make the bureaucracy responsive. New models of governance appropriate to that have been developed locally and globally with regional and socio-political specificities. And some of these models could override the inadequacies of NPM without any doubt and they mark the emergence of a new paradigm 'New Public Governance'. There are experiments which comprise the features of NPG, successfully take place at local levels under the bureaucratic administration in India too.

However, the state response to these global governance paradigms and local bureaucratic movements has not able to make any efficient and effective outcomes so far. There are number of reform measures suggested and attempted to implement at various stages of bureaucratic administration. However, those were not able to ensure a responsive bureaucracy in the field. It is expected that if the state abled to work seriously on a collaborative and network governance so as to improvise the measures undertaken to reform the bureaucracy to responsive bureaucracy. This hypothesis is going to be tested in the coming chapters of this research.

Scope of the Study

As an emerging paradigm in governance, it is significant to look at the possibilities that NPG brings up for a responsive bureaucracy in terms of collaboration and innovation that are appropriate to the socio political and economic conditions of the country. Generally, the studies on bureaucracy miss the point that every public governance system has to be read within its 'environment' and without missing the social political and historical context. This is highly important especially for a country like India where bureaucracy has a heavy baggage of its colonial past. That is the possibility NPG ensures above NPM as New public governance drawing from open

natural systems theory, is concerned with the pressure exerting by institution and its environment. These institutional and environmental pressure enable/constrain the public service and policy implementation in every plural and pluralist state.

Review of Literature

Despite the fact that there are numerous works on bureaucracy in India, there are very works that study locally developed innovative systems or techniques of bureaucracy and their impact on development outcomes. Hence it is relevant to study the governance reforms and changing role of bureaucracy in Kerala especially by taking examples from initiatives taken by the Civil Servants. Some important literature can be reviewed to make an overview of the topic.

Trivedi and Rao contributed to understand the socio-economic background of the bureaucrats (Trivedi 1990). The study gives a light in to the elite character of higher civil services and their recruitment scheme. The findings reveal that a historical transformation has happened in the socio-economic background of the ICS recruits. However, individuals with background of urban and higher income who have better access in terms of region and education are dominated the IAS. Subramanian in his study social background of India's Administrators makes a similar observation. He noted that a large proportion of the recruits come from the middle class having urban background and very few hail from the rural areas. However, this overrepresentation of the small section of the country's population in administrative services is not confined to India but has been found in most of the developed and developing countries. Thus, he argues that it would be wrong to attribute administrative malfunction to an unrepresentative bureaucracy alone. The major flaw could be in the type of training that the young IAS recruits undergo after their selection. Their training should equip them to meet their administrative and public demands in a healthier way.

In the work 'The Civil service' Krishnan and Somanathan (2017) explained the changes of the civil service from Independence and effectiveness of the Bureaucracy in its functioning. They also try to analyse its impact on the other institutions and social changes on its effectiveness. The study analyses the effectiveness of the civil service by assessing the interrelation between the preservation of India's constitutional order (which include democracy, secularism, national unity and the rule of law) and the impartial implementation of the rule of law in day-to-day dealings with the citizens.

Another analysis made by checking the policies created by the elected governments and its effective implementation by the executives. It also deals with some values which is to be expected in the functioning of the governance such as neutrality, integrity, lack of corruption, willingness to change, social sensitivity, idealism, competence and flexibility.

Vaishnav and Khosla also examine the effectiveness of bureaucracy in their work “The Indian Administrative Service Meets Big Data”. The study analyses the impact of politics on bureaucracy and the influence of the officers in the development outcomes in areas such as poverty, health and education. The study says that the examination scores and education levels are highly predictive of future success for the civil servants. Another finding of the study is that officers with strong local collaboration are frequently connected to better delivery of public service. And the study says political interference ‘creates substantial inefficiency’ in the functioning of the bureaucracy. They argued that “the IAS of today is hampered by several concomitant issues: a decline in the quality of recruits, political interference, perverse incentives for career advancement, a lack of specialized expertise, and a perception of widespread corruption” (Vaishnav and Khosla, 2016).

Several examples are there for appointing committees and accepting its recommendations but no actions were taken. TR Raghunandan says about the constitution of a committee By Central government headed by V Ramachandran a former member of the Second ARC and former chief secretary of Kerala recommended that the panchayats are responsible to plan and execute programmes and projects for economic development and social justice and provided for transferring schemes in the relevant functional domains to them, the role and relevance of bodies lie DRDAs need to be reconfigured. The Central Government declared that it has accepted the report of the committee. But beyond that nothing happened. No orders were issued to restructure the DRDAs. The internal grapevine had it that a few officers dug in their heels and refused to move the file, even as the minister chafed and pressed for an early decision. The government changed and the matter was given a decent burial (Raghunandan, 2019). This is just an example for what is happening to the recommendations of the various reform commissions and committees. He also portrays the red tapism, recruitment system, technological innovations, ethical concerns, posting transfers and dysfunctionality in the civil service.

Mathur (1972) examined bureaucrats' attitudes toward their success as reform agents. Unlike the other studies listed so far, his samples were only Block development officers. The study concludes that these Block Development Officers play a significant role in shaping people's perceptions of effectiveness and confidence in government. These are very vital components of this total system. The issue with running an administration isn't so much a lack of skilled bureaucrats at the top as it is a lack of competent administrators at the base level. Attractive plans and programmes could be drawn up, but failure occurs when they are put into action.

Jain (2002) examined the relationship with bureaucracy and development on the basis of four structural attributes. The structural attributes include hierarchy, division of labour system of rule and impersonality. An important finding of this study is that a large proportion of the officials has a bureaucratic attitude, which apparently hinders the process of change and development. The study argued that the pace of development cannot be accelerated by a rigid adherence to the Weberian characteristics of bureaucracy, but at the same time a rapid programme of debureaucratization would also not be the solution. As an important actor in the process of governance bureaucracy called for a combination of the traditional and innovation through the entrepreneurial, collaborative and information technology oriented reforms. However, it continues its hierarchical traditional nature in the structure and process even today.

A review of the existing literature on bureaucracy in India tends to indicate that much more work needs to be done on bureaucratic functioning in the context of New Public Governance Reforms perspective. The post reforms period has coupled with more active governance for better administration. The paradigm shift in the public administration and its impacts and innovation in the bureaucracy are very significant to discuss in the context post second administrative Reforms commission. The new governance reform initiated by the central government has percolated down to the state level. It is important that most of the state governments also introduced the governance reform agendas through collaboration, co-operation, entrepreneurship and e-governance. In this context, the bureaucracy's capacity to formulate and implement policies in accordance with the New Public Governance reform initiatives should be analysed.

Chapters

The chapters in the study have arranged in the following order:

1. Governance Reforms and Bureaucracy: This chapter offers an in depth analysis of the developments in the field of administration and later in governance till date. There it discusses the consequences of each paradigm of public policy implementation and public service delivery in theoretical level. Going further the chapter argues why New public Governance as governance paradigm has more appropriate features for a country like India.

2. Institution of Bureaucracy: A Conceptual Framework: This part of the study discusses in detail various theories on bureaucracy from the classical theory of max Weber and so on.

3. Dilemmas in the Evolution of the Indian Bureaucracy: Understanding the past experiences of bureaucracy is highly significant to study reforms and their impacts on bureaucracy. Therefore, this chapter looks at the historical evolution of bureaucracy in India.

4. Initiatives for Governance Reforms of the Indian Bureaucracy: The chapter analyses the reforms suggested and measures thereby taken by the Indian state to make bureaucracy responsive. Here the chapter answers whether the state consider the governance reforms at global level seriously and how it is reflected in their response.

5. Governance Reforms and Response of the Bureaucracy: A Case Study of Kozhikode District in Kerala: This chapter looks at the field level experiences of bureaucrats in achieving a responsive bureaucracy from the study of Kerala. The particular focus goes to the case of ‘compassionate Kozhikode’ programme run by the civil Servant Prasanth during his tenure.

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Chapter I

Governance Reforms and Bureaucracy

The designing of public policy, their implementation and delivery of public services altogether is denoted as “Public policy implementation and Public service delivery”. As Stephen Osborne observes “Public Administration, New Public Management (NPM), New Public governance (NPG) are various policy implementation and public service delivery regimes within this overall field” (Osborne, 2010: 1). Among these while PA is the pre-eminent one until early 1980s, New Public Governance (NPG) is just an emerging regime very recently. As these three are considered as the prevalent paradigms in the field, there also has questions raised as to their eligibility to be called as paradigms at all. It has to be kept in mind that the elements of these regimes inevitably overlap and coexist as we can see many networked governance systems operates under hierarchical orders.

These paradigm shifts at global level has huge impact on the governance reforms that gets planned and implemented at local levels. Moreover, the experiences of local bureaucratic administration, complications and consequences of their procedures inform the paradigm shifts in return. This chapter discussing these paradigms NPA, NPM and NPG lays the ground to locate the bureaucratic administration in India and the changes that brought in for a responsive bureaucracy in the country.

Paradigm Shifts in Public Administration

Towards the end of 1960s there was academic foment which caused emergence of a distinctly public perspective of administration called as New public Administration. This ideology showed up at a time when there was a group of young American scholars who had strongly expressed their discontent against basic character of the discipline. In 1968 at the Minnowbrook Conference I, these scholars strongly voiced for New Public administration as they found its study and practice highly significant to fulfil the requirements of the post-industrial society that is emerging (Chakrabarty and Chand, 2012). This attempt was successful as many theorists and the practitioners began to think about it seriously so that the discipline becomes more socially relevant and responsible. There was a deep sense of dissatisfaction about the

current status of the discipline that irritatingly obsessed with efficiency and economy. Along with that the time of this conference was also significant as there were so many socio-political developments were happening in the background like ethnic conflicts across the America, campus clashes, Vietnam War etc., (Chakrabarty and Chand, 2012). All these together paved the way to the emergence of the New Public Administration in practice and theory. Therefore, undoubtedly the Minnowbrook Conference I has great role in bringing about public administration as discipline informed with relevance, values, social equity, and change. What is more relevant here to the purpose of this research is that it was the public interest that became the heart of every deliberation in the conference.

There were a few common key features visible in the field of practice and theory during NPA regime. There was the domination of the “rule of law” and they focused on administering based on fixed rules and regulations. Most importantly the bureaucracy had the central role in planning and implementing policies. Within the public institutions there was a visible split between “politics” and “administration”. Moreover, they showed “commitment to incremental budgeting” and there was hegemony of the professional in public service delivery (Hood, 1991). Exploring the political feature of public policy implementation and public service delivery was considered as its strength. It was also observed that PA took the nuances and complexities of public policy implementation and public service delivery (Osborne, 2010).

At the same time, it was also criticized that PA literatures were unwilling to unpack multiple external and internal influences upon the policy implementation. Rather PA considered policy implementation simply as a ‘black box’. Hence it failed to understand the complex sub processes of public policy implementation (Schofield, 2001). It failed to see differential influences from various sides in the management of the output of policy implementation process. More than that, these literatures featured public management and public managers as villains in the scene of policy implementation and service delivery, who subvert the intentions of policy to satisfy their personal interests.

New Public Management

The Minnowbrook Conference II, organized in 1988, is credited with giving rise to the new public management (NPM) approach to governance. This was also a result of transformations that happened in Western countries in late nations 1970s as the role of the State was that of a “major dispenser of social justice” and that had been widely criticised throughout the world (Chakrabarty and Chand, 2012). Popular dissatisfaction with the dull performance of the state in socio economic and political fields and transformations in the nature of governance in western nations resulted in the emergence of NPM. A series of multiple changes happened to the public sector management of western democratic nations in late 1980s and early 1990s.

The Public choice school has also a landmark role in the emergence of NPM as a new model of governance. The proponents of this school were sceptical about the efficiency of bureaucracy as an institution of public service delivery.² They criticised the operational behaviour of the bureaucracy. According to their theory which was based on administrative egoism bureaucrats are absolutely individualistic self-seekers (Das, 1998: 7). Hence for the welfare of the public it is highly necessary to regulate this self-seeking behaviour of the bureaucrat. For that matter they suggested to control bureaucrats with strict measures by executive and legislature, to bring more competition in the field of delivery of public services, to avoid wastage of resource, privatisation and contracting out should be practiced (Niskanen, 1971). In this manner public choice school was successful to point out new alternatives to deliver public services efficiently. While slashing out the capacity of the bureaucracy as an institution by bringing up people friendly alternatives it also brought up market as competing paradigm to challenge the hegemony of the state.

NPM is portrayed as a normative conceptualization of public administration with multiple interrelated elements such as “providing high-quality services that citizens value; increasing the autonomy of public managers; rewarding organizations and individuals on the basis of whether they meet demanding targets; making available human and technological resources that managers need to perform well; and, appreciative of the virtues of competition, maintaining an open-minded attitude about which public purposes should be performed by the private sector, rather than public

² Niskanen, Downs, and Tullock were main advocates of Public Choice School.

sector” (Chakrabarty and Chand, 2012). At the most extreme level of NPM, assuming when private-sector management approaches are used to public-sector service delivery, the efficiency and effectiveness of these services are naturally improved, it asserted such techniques over that of public administration (Thatcher, 1995).

The features of the NPM can be summarised as follows: a) it strongly proposes to revamp the organisation very thoroughly so as to make the organizational structure conducive to the leaders of the organization. This restructuring of the organisation means to simplify its procedures, to flatten the hierarchies within the organisation, and so on; b) Different from conventional methods of public sector, NPM conceptualises citizens as ‘active customers’; c) it asks for more autonomy for the managers of the public sector. It provides greater elbowroom to the persons in managerial leadership to be relaxed while dealing with personnel policy matters like contractual appointment, workplace bargaining, and so on; d) NPM has strict performance measurement techniques. That is the reason why it emphasises on inputs and output control and evaluation and keeps an eye on performance management and audit; e) it proposes to break down public bureaucracies into multiple agencies as basic units which will engage with each other on a user-pay basis. This way NPM believes to manage the cost; f) therefore the next feature is that it favours cost-cutting in public sector; g) it promotes techniques of quasi-markets and contracting out to make sure better handling of cash-strapped public sector; h) it focuses on decentralisation of governance. Therefore, it promotes all forms of organizational and spatial decentralization; i) within public service organisations, NPM focuses to promote entrepreneurial leadership.

Due to all these features, there was a trend among researchers of focusing upon public services and public service organisation as a distinctive field from public policy processes. The result was that in the field of practice, the management is evolved as a legitimized role and function of PSOs.

The problem with the NPM was that although it could take the nuances of the said ‘black box’ –public policy implementation- into account, it considered the process of public policy as a mere context to complete the essential task of public management (Osborne, 2010). Going beyond that it also challenged this public policy as being the ‘context’ for public management and this ‘context’ as unreasonably restricted by democratic principles (Meier, 1997). In increasingly growing plural and pluralist state the severely dangerous part of NPM was that it is “limited and one-dimensional in its

ability to capture and contribute to the management and governance of public services and of Public Service Organizations” (Rhodes, 1997).

To sum up the argument made so far, both NPA and NPM were inadequate in addressing and capturing the nuances in the complex realities of design, delivery and management of policy implementation and public service delivery of the twenty first century. This led scholars and the practitioners in the field to think about a framework with sophisticated understanding on public service delivery that operate beyond the dichotomy of management v. Administration. New Public Governance gets its relevance in this context. But before going directly to NPG a discussion on governance and public governance is necessary as the terms are not new.

Emergence of the Concept of Governance

The word governance is thought to have originated from the Greek term ‘kybernan’ that indicates pilot, steer, or lead and ‘Gubernare’ is its Latin translation. There is no doubt that ideas of government and governance in twenty first century are inextricably connected to it (Schneider and Hyner, 2006: 155). Governance as subject was not in the fore front to the realm of in the social sciences and humanities knowledge production in the 1950s and 1960s (ISI Web of Knowledge databases). The major part of research on governance was confined to the areas of urban governance and higher education with an assumption that local governments and universities hadn’t any hierarchical forms of control that much to speak about.

When measured by their effect, the influence of papers on this subject was low until the end of the mid-1970s. There was a drastic change to this situation after the publication of ‘Transaction Costs Economics: Governance of Contractual Relations’ by Oliver Williamson (1979) and there was also an increasing demand for law and economics in corporate governance.³ The years 1981-1985 saw a surge in the number of articles on corporate governance. The idea spread over the next five years, and by the 1990s, governance had become a buzzword. The number of papers written and the number of citations earned a tenfold rise in the 1990s (3773 papers and 70157 citations) (Levi-Faur, 2012: 5). The academic community's interest in governance grew even

³ Williamson's paper made a big impression. It was not only one of the most cited papers in the field of governance between 1997 and 1980, but it was also one of the most cited papers in the field overall.

further in the first decade of the second millennium. The number of papers on the subject rose to 18648, with 104,928 citations (Levi-Faur, 2012: 5).

Definitions of Governance

While different people have interpreted governance differently depending on context and viewpoint, though there is agreement on the broad elements of governance. Webster's Dictionary describes governance as "the act of governing or exercising power," although other meanings are more detailed. The following are some of the definitions:

Governance refers to “all processes of governing, whether undertaken by a government, market, or network, whether over a family, tribe, formal or informal organization, or territory, and whether through laws, norms, power or language. Governance differs from government in that it focuses less on the state and its institutions and more on social practices and activities” (Bevir, 2012: 1).

In another definition governance refers “to government, rule, or administration, both in politics and business, and it is almost always used in an evaluative, even a judgmental context, especially by the United Nations and its agencies”. Good Governance indicates “corporate or governmental administration that is not corrupt, technically competent, legally correct, efficient in its implementation and oriented towards the interests of its citizens, customers or employees” (Munshi 2004: 51).

In a definition considering Governance as a process describes it as: “i) the process by which governments are appointed, held accountable, monitored, and replaced; and (ii) the process by which governments are selected, held accountable, monitored, and replaced; (ii) Governments' ability to effectively manage resources and devise, enact, and execute sound policies and regulations; and (iii) Governments' respect for the structures that regulate economic and social relations between them” (Kaufmann et al., 2002).

It is also referred to as a collection of principles, policies, and structures that governs management of economic, political, and social relations of a society by means of interactions between the state, civil society, and the private sector. The term also indicates the manner in which society arranges itself in order to plan and carry out decisions, resulting in shared knowledge, consensus, and action. Every tool and

procedure that have been used by people and associations use for the purpose of communicating their opinions, of mediating disputes, and of exercising legal rights and responsibilities. Individuals, organisations, and businesses are all governed by laws, institutions, and procedures that “set limits and provide incentives” (UNDP, 2004: 2).

Bangladesh's Centre for Governance Studies (2006) describes governance as the mechanism by which societies or organizations make important decisions, decide who to include, and how to account for them. It also states that the current report's viewpoint on governance is that it is the mechanism by which the organizations entrusted with achieving growth carry out their responsibilities. This involves both the public sector and the state, as well as nongovernmental organizations, civil society organizations, and private businesses.

Governance is concerned with constitutional and electoral change on one basis. On a different level, it concerns the interface between government and people. In a more basic level, it applies to the legal and justice systems. Governance is the mechanism by which different stakeholders “express their interests, exercise their rights, and mediate their differences” (Debroy, 2004). It is distinct from government. As a consequence, governance change does not happen in a mysterious way without the involvement of all players involved in the process. Of course, there are several facets to this governance reform process. Instead of maintaining its conventional character, bureaucracy and administration, as the primary actors in this process, are required to innovate more.

Rhodes uses the term governance to define the shifting borders between the public, private, and voluntary sectors, as well as the changing position of the state. In his works it is used to describe how networks informal authority complements and replaces government's formal authority. From hierarchical or centralised government to governance in and through networks, the pattern and exercise of state has changed.

Three Schools of Governance Literature

As it is mentioned above the terms “governance” and “public governance” are not new in the field of public policy execution and public service delivery. These terms arrive to the current discussion here with a significant baggage of theoretical and ideological base. Governance literature is differentiated into three larger schools by critics, which consist of corporate governance, “good” governance, and public

governance (Osborne, 2010). Internal mechanisms and processes in order to direct and to hold accountable any organisation come under the category of corporate governance. The interaction between the policy makers, trustees of public organisations and the senior managers who has the responsibility to execute these policies in the field, has been the major concern of the corporate governance in public services.

International entities such as World Bank or IMF promote “normative models of social, political and administrative governance” with developmental agenda and this is covered under “good” governance (Leftwich 1993; Rhodes 1997). Without any failure this could place “a premium upon market-based approaches to the allocation and governance of public resources” (Osborne and Kaposvari, 1997).

For the purpose of this study, we focus on the third school among the literature which is public governance which can be further categorise into seven different streams:

- Socio-political governance: over all institutional relationships within the society come under this stream. It is argued that for understanding the planning and execution of public policy, these relationships and exchanges have to be analysed in their totality (Kooiman, 1999). This approach does not consider the government in pre-eminent position in the field of public policy. Hence the government has to depend on other actors in society to maintain its legitimacy and to ensure its impact in the field of public policy.
- Public policy governance: In order to create and govern the public policy process, how policy elites and networks interact is the major concern of this approach. Initial explorations on the policy communities and networks were of Hanf and Scharpf (1978). Building upon their work Marsh and Rhodes (1992), Börzel (1997) and Klijn and Koppenjan (2000) also have produced good explorations of the operation of policy communities and networks. A very recent piece of work by Peters (2008) explores “meta-governance” instruments “as a way by which to reassert political direction within multi-stakeholder policy networks”.
- Administrative governance: In order to substantiate effectiveness in applying Public Administration several repositioning are made to it for encompassing the intricacies of postmodern state and this concern comes under administrative governance. To illustrate, for Salamon (2002) governance is almost a euphemism for the overall process

of the implementation of public policy and delivery of public services, whilst Lynn et al. (2001) use it as a comprehensive phrase as it helps in their attempt to build a comprehensive theory of public policy implementation and public services delivery in a “hollow state” situations (Milward and Provan, 2003). To trigger it further, Frederickson (1999) argues that if governance along with the theory of “administrative conjunction” is applied, it would help “to reposition Public Administration as the continuing pre-eminent discipline for the realities of the modern world”.

- Contract governance: it is related to the internal mechanisms of the NPM, and specifically it deals with the governance of contractual relationships in the public service delivery. In this vein, Kettl has claimed that “public agencies in the modern contract state have become responsible for a (public service delivery) system over which they [have] little control” (Kettl 1993: 207; and Kettl, 2000).
- Network governance deals with “how self-organizing inter-organizational networks function both with and without government to provide public services” (Rhodes, 1997; see also Kickert, 1993). Focus of this approach is upon those networks that engaged in the implementation of public policy and delivery of public services contrary to public policy governance (Denters and Rose, 2005; Entwistle and Martin, 2005).

A quick rundown of these theoretical viewpoints has given here to indicate the contribution that these give in our understanding of public policy implementation and public service delivery. Hence it can be understood that governance has been present as an element in NPA and NPM regimes. From there public governance has adapted to become a regime in its own right within the realm of public policy implementation and public service delivery- that is NPG. Where the other regimes failed NPG tries to stand out in capturing the realities of this field and in dealing with the intricacies offered by the same in a plural and pluralist state of twenty first century.

New Public Governance

The emergence of New Public Governance has widely welcomed by the governments to achieve more active governance. It has promoted a joint up networked and collaborative governance with various institutions and associations, in addition to the aim of efficiency, economy, and effectiveness. The major shift has introduced by the New Public Governance while emphasizing the role of government in facilitating

for the cooperation among the players like market, state and civil society. Since then, many governments adopted governance principles as a base for their reform initiatives.

As in the case of other paradigm shifts the third Minnowbrook Conference played a role in the emergence of NPG too. In the Conference which was held in two parts at two sites two different but complementing perspectives on the difficulties faced by public administration in the globalizing world was presented. One of the perspectives governed the works of developing universal models of governance as the perspectives had roots in the complex texture of globalization. The other perspective at the same time was connected to necessity to develop context specific models taking influences from the wider global scenario again. The conference raised concerns on four specific areas of ‘discomfort’ which the scholars find critical in contemporary research of public administration. These concerns relate “to (a) the nature of public administration in the changed environment of a globalizing world, (b) the complexities of the market-oriented NPM, (c) the impact of interdisciplinary borrowing on the methodological core of the discipline, and (d) the growing importance of networked governance and collaborative public management in re-conceptualizing public administration in a rapidly changing socioeconomic and political milieu” (Chakrabarty and Chand, 2012: 28). These concerns definitely reflected in the evolution public governance as new paradigm in the public policy implementation and public service delivery.

As discussed already, New Public Governance is emerged with an objective to redeem the dysfunctions of other regimes. The New public governance as paradigm in public policy implementation and public service stands in its own right and is deeply rooted in institutional and network theory. Thus, the theory which proposes that state does not have absolute monopoly of power and it has to cooperate with the other forces in the society such as public groups, corporate companies, civil society and citizens. The development of this framework is greatly inspired by the works of Ouchi (1979), Powell (1990), Powell and DiMaggio (1991), and Nohria and Eccles (1992). NPG puts forward a plural state in which public service delivery is offered by multiple actors who are dependent on one another, and pluralist state which means a policy making system that is informed by multiple processes. Following the Open natural systems theory, NPG takes into account the pressures from institutions and external environment as that is a major factor in enabling and restricting the public service delivery within this plural

and pluralist state. Consequent to these two kinds of plurality, this governance regime concentrates on the inter-organizational relationships and the governance of processes with an emphasize on effectiveness and outcomes of services that depends upon the relationship of PSOs with their environment. The central resource allocation mechanism that is proposes by NPG is interorganizational network in which the question of accountability has to be negotiated at the levels of inter organizational and inter-personal within these networks (Osborne, 1997). Within these networks splits due to power inequalities are very common which needs to be reconciled successfully to ensure the effective functioning of the network.

Network Theory and Governance

NPG also can be understood as a response to the evolution of society to network. As Castells puts down it, Society can be understood as a network of multiple actors and government is one amongst them (Castells, 1996). The prior conception of the government above the society is no more valid as it situates in the middle of the network. When there is a complicated policy issue in the network, policy networks evoke different actors who are responsible within to cooperate with each other to resolve the problem. Moreover, for the realisation of the policy, Information, goals, and methods are shared across these actors, including the government. It was observed that there has been a transformation in the ways of state governing society and that is to say from a strong hierarchical leadership and a strict united states to a very divided and decentralised organisation (Rhodes, 2007: 1257).

“The predominant focus is on the increasing significance of governance through networks as an alternative to markets and hierarchy ... The state, it is argued, can no longer assume a monopoly of expertise or resources necessary to govern, and must look to a plurality or interdependent institutions drawn from the public, private and voluntary sectors” (Newman, 2004: 71).

Network Governance

It was argued by Frederickson (1999) that network governance theory “repositions” public administration to the frontline of political science as it deals with the issues of a fragmented and disarticulated state. Majorly there are four facets of network governance: Firstly, it gives a modernist practical account of how public sector was transformed irrespective of multiple factors and its time such as high rates of splits

caused by reforms in 1980s or the call for effective coordination in the field in 1990s. Secondly, it interprets or clarifies the changes that caused in government. According to its theory responsible governance with a vertical power structure are no more relevant. This theory got a different tale about the transition from hierarchical government to network-based governance. The change is explained as a result of functional differentiation and modernization. Thirdly, it gives strategic guidance to government officials about how to better direct networks and collaborate. Finally, it provides recommendations for democratic governance, including how networks and governance can be used to improve participation. For all these features this network governance literature is "the new orthodoxy" to many in the field of research (Marsh 2008: 738).

New Public Service Model

The New public service model is a technique of NPG that is based on the idea that the citizen, the civil society and the community should be at the center of all public service delivery. Controlling and directing the society is no longer the responsibility of the civil servants rather their role is to help people in formulating their needs and in serving their interests. NPS condemns the business like thinking of NPM and opposes considering citizens as customer. Under NPS citizens are not considered as the passive recipients of the services and policies that processed through a top-down mechanism.

The foundation of NPS is the theory of democracy of which active citizenship and social involvement are the key principles. NPS proposes as the citizens to pursue larger public interest transcending self-interest and civil servants to facilitate them to participate in seeking solutions for social issues. For that matter public managers have to develop skills that necessary to connect, mediate, and negotiate and to find solutions to problems going beyond the conventional skills of a bureaucrat in partnership with citizens.

Digital Era Governance (DEG)

Digitalization or Digital era governance (DEG) is a component added to NPG. Increased usage of technology and internet affects the relationship between government, citizens and civil society in an unexpected range as per the observation of Patrick Dunleavy and Helen Margetts who presented the idea in 2006. This impact is not only visible on technological level, but technological influence is also led to behavioral change, cognitive, organizational, political and cultural change. The internet

acted as medium for individuals to respond more quickly and effectively than government agencies in their interactions with government and other actors in the field of public policy implementation and public service delivery.

The impact of this digital transformation on organizations associated with the government are of two levels: First one is on personal level, it leads to a "do-it-yourself" administration in which citizen uses public services in the same way they use online banking. Citizens, on the other hand, co-create public services at a collective level, utilizing the government as a forum for innovative ideas to co-create policy. However, the challenge here is to make this a reality and for that matter it is vital for digital world of citizens and government to cohabit. To make this happens DEG and Essentially Digital Governance (EDGe) more advanced successor of DEG has arrived to the scene nowadays. But unfortunately, there is rare works on the impact of these on the role and function of civil servants.

Open Governance

The Open governance lays its ground building upon the advancements in the application of technology in government processes. ICT was taken into the current government system without any change in the structure and methods of functioning during the e-governance phase. However, in next level that means in phase of transformation (t-government) making government more efficient and effective, ICT and drivers transformed structures and processes. In response to the economic crisis of 2008 Lean government (l-government) was emerged. Its objective was to improve service delivery in a continuous manner avoiding 'waste' an 'inefficiency' in processes.

As governments focus their attention on long-term global concerns widely and the need of tackling those collaborating with non-public organizations has grown, the era of Open government (o-government) begins. To create public value, it adopted various means such as to open up government data and other digital assets, to open up (digital or digitally enabled) public services and to enable (digital) open interaction by all society actors in governmental operations.

This is an idea of government that goes beyond the conventional notions of government and explains the interactions and decision-making processes between

leaders, public institutions, and citizens. There are three main elements that constitute Open governance such as “rights, institutions and policies and tools”. It also holds onto “open structures, open organizations and open processes” and it includes “breaking down, or at least cooperation between, silos across different administrations, levels and locations, through pooling and sharing infrastructures, processes, data, assets, resources, content and tools”. From these characteristics the huge challenges technically, politically, legally, organizationally and in terms of working cultures involved in this system is very clear. And these factors also point to that this system is impossible to function without bureaucracy with creative ideas and programs in hand.

Meta Governance

The role of different actors in the functioning of network governance has been criticised in several respects. Since governments reconsider the mix of policy instruments, according to Pierre and Peters (2000), the transition to network governance could increase public influence over society. As a result, coercive and administrative instruments are becoming less important, while softer instruments are becoming more important. As a result, controlling the combinations of governing mechanisms available to it, such as markets and networks, and making use of indirect control instruments, the state has reclaimed its ability to rule rather than being hollowed out.

Meta governance refers to the state's position in ensuring governance coordination by negotiation, diplomacy, and other less formal means. Meta governance, like network governance, comes with a number of flavours (Rhodes, 2012: 37). Instead of actively delivering services by state bureaucracies or rowing, the state now steers associations, legislatures, and networks.

The state, on the other hand, will influence the other actors in governance in a number of ways. First, the state should establish the game's rules and regulations for other players and they are free to work in whatsoever manner they like but within the limits of the rules; therefore, these actors are not completely out of the shadow of the hierarchy. As a result, it will reshape economies, restructure policy industries, and amend the constitution. Second, the state will use various mechanisms to influence other actors. Third, the state can exert control by allocating resources such as money and power. Of course, such state-led government-steering policies have their limitations.

Interpretive Governance

Interpretive governance refers to a transition from old to new concepts, or from institutional mechanisms to definitions in motion. It illustrates evolving governance patterns by reflecting on how actors view their own views and practises. Agents whose values and behaviour are influenced by rituals and articulated in stories are the basis of daily activities.

Comparing NPM and NPG

Public-private partnerships (PPP) (Osborne, 2000; Hodge and Greve, 2005), cooperation (Ansell 2012), stakeholder engagement (Mc Laverly, 2002; Edelenbos and Klijn, 2006), and other forms of citizen participation (Lownes et al., 2001) are new ways of horizontal governance under experiment in the countries across the world. Various players are involved in the decision making and implementation processes at different levels with different capacities, according to the governance viewpoint. Around the same time, a various pattern in modern government is developing following the Current Public Management movement that started in the 1980s. A combination of private and non-profit actors has become the medium for governments to run programmes and enforce public policies. By way of management strategies states attempt to improve the quality and efficacy of delivery of service and execution of public policy. This move is clearly accompanied by patterns of agentification (Pollitt and Boukaert, 2000) and privatisation.

On the one hand, NPM and governance is considered as responses to society's increasing complexity and the classical welfare state's inability to cope with it. People, on the other hand, have formed a more critical attitude towards their government as a result of modern society's growing interdependencies. The strength of traditional types of relations such as family, faith, and community has diminished as individualization has increased. These concerns must be addressed while dealing with the increasing complexities in the process of making decision as a result of interdependence and increasingly assertive citizens and other stake holders on one side, and the call for more unified service delivery on the other side. NPM is attempting to adjust the actors, while NPG is attempting to organise the existing actors by looking within.

If we consider any of the major distinctions between governance reforms and management reforms that the public governance recognises that to carry the collective

interests as the vital role the state in the governing process. But the public management generally rejects the public sector's specificity in service development and instead seeks to follow models and roles of private sector management with an objective addressing issues of inefficiency and lack of responsiveness to beneficiaries of the service (Peters and Pierre, 2012: 189). In reality, it was a continuation of similar proponents' ideals, with a greater emphasis on teamwork and a networked government system.

Under NPG more importance has to be given to the process of governance than its end result which is opposite in the case of NPM. To operate NPG a mindset change is required not only of the civil servants but for the entire system of government. Unlike NPM, objectives, targets and evaluation and measurement indicators are not that easy to fix in advance as the process of collaboration is really complicated. In other words, all the actors have to be flexible enough so that, they will be able to adapt to modifications as the process progresses.

Until the emergence of NPG, civil servants have the sole responsibility of proposing and executing the policies under NPM. Now with NPG they need to share these responsibilities with the other actors in the field. As the classical civil servants were driven by their sense of duty, those under NPM are motivated by their personal interest. But intrinsic factors and public interests are the factors to motivate under NPG.

At the very foundation NPM considers public organisations as service providers and through control-based performance management mechanism it prevents the opportunistic attitude of its employees. NPG understands public organizations as a field of coproduction and service delivery and these organizations have to ensure that leadership and management on trust basis work for enhancing motivation of their employees. When the major issue that NPM wished to address is poor and costly services rendered by the public bureaucracies with autonomic status. Removing regulations, enhancing public-private competition and introducing performance incentives were considered as the solutions under NPM for these issues. NPG wanted to touch the problematic areas of public policy implementation and public service delivery which other previous models thought as unruly and wicked along with appalling state of fiscal restrictions. It proposes to resolve these concerns by collaborating Public-private entities through networks, partnerships and relational contracting. Civil Society organisations such as NGOs and corporate firms are

“Partners in negotiated co-creation of public solutions” under NPG (Torfing and Triantafillou, 2016).

Table 1.1 Differences in the Core Elements of NPM and NPG

Paradigm/key Elements	Public Administration	New Public Governance
Theoretical roots	Rational/public choice theory and management studies	Institutional and network theory
Nature of the state	Regulatory	Plural and Pluralist
Focus	The organization	The organization in its environment
Emphasis	Management of organizational resources and performance	Negotiation of values, meaning and relationships
Resource Allocation mechanism	The market and classical or neoclassical contracts	Networks and relational contracts
Nature of the service system	Open rational	Open closed
Value base	Efficacy of competition and the marketplace	Dispersed and contested

Source: (Osborne, 2010: 10)

Major Impacts of Governance Reform

The key role of government in a dynamic society must be to align its activities with those of multiple social actors. This indicates that by means of service delivery and other joint initiatives every group and communities such as civil society and charitable organisations all have to be part of the process. Here it is the duty of the government to prepare a long-term policy and to make sure that the governance process takes place in accordance with the democratic principles. According to Osborne and Gaebler (1992), governance is the business of government. How the public sector performs with respect to the delivery of public service delivery and how abled it to organise political and social action against common goals were the guiding criteria for its position (Peters and Pierre, 2012: 191). The new forms of state-society engagement necessitated the mobilisation of lower-level government employees and the contextualization of government's position in governance. The newly proposed position of the position by NPM necessitated major government reform.

In the course of the NPM reform movement, “disaggregation, autonomization, agencification, and marketization” replaced the old public administration characterized by hierarchy and Weberian bureaucratic techniques. Following the NPM, the state's administrative bodies were patched up, the tone interaction and operation among various actors like state, the private sector, and civil society was more integrated and capacity of the central government was improved. It is clear that one change is complementing another in every phase in which the trade-off between various institutional types has shifted. This resulted in making the organisational forms more complicated and hybrid.

Governance literature largely portrayed it as phenomenon of networks in which a key role is played by private actors (Skelcher et al., 2005). What these literatures are ignorant of is a governance approach which is highly state-centric and at the same time key roles are played by private networks (Peters and Pierre, 2003). Civil servants here should have abilities of networking and boundary-spanning which allow them to serve as brokers with a vertical and horizontal movement across organisational boundaries. In order to trump hierarchy civil servants from various policy fields were put together by means of Public – public networks (Hood Lodge, 2006: 92). To put it in other words

going beyond their hierarchical authority they also exercise role as facilitators, negotiators, and diplomats.

It is argued that rather than replacing the hierarchy of conventional welfare state, relationship models, networks as a coordination system complement this hierarchy (Bouckaert, 2010). A major issue with a process like this is that it leads to question the accountability relationships (Christensen and Lægreid, 2012: 259-261).

For the purpose of creating novel hybrid organisational types features of NPM and post NPM models were combined to the old public administration. Sustainability and the stability are the central elements of the classic Weberian bureaucratic model. However, in the context of a powerful modern state, these aspects have been replaced with neo-Weberian elements such as performance management and user involvement, responsiveness, and professional management (Pollitt and Bouckaert 2011) as well as new public governance initiatives. (Osborne 2010). It was stated that radical market-based reforms had a negative impact on governance. Many critics argue that market-based restructuring has weakened the public sector's role in democratic governance (Peters 2008; Suleiman 2003; Ventriss, 2000).

According to Mark Bevir, it can be discussed that there are three aspects of the new governance. The first is the emergence of new modes of policy development and execution, such as new public administration, marketization, and different forms of co-governance, which have co-existed with, if not replaced, centralised bureaucracies. The extension of public dialogue and intervention to include new social players is a second aspect of the new governance. It's likely that social networks would become more extensive and common. Many state actors make an effort to include new actors in policymaking. Both of these facets of the modern governance are well-known and widely debated. The third one does not occur often and it is about the emergence of the new forms of knowledge and expertise.

The leadership and management of a company is one of the reform targets. Public agencies represent political masters and their orders are transmitted through a quite solid vertical power mechanism, starting with the senior most civil servants and ending with service providers. NPM reform, on the other hand, aimed to eliminate operational obligations from the politicians and inject managerialist thought into the hardened public sector. Another type of organisational reform involves resource

reallocation and shrewd usage of the budget as a driving tool of the organisation (Caiden, 1998).

Opening up new avenues for societal actors was the impact of the intraorganizational mechanism in the field via recent management reform. It envisioned new position of the state in governance as to coordinate these multiple actors. Before the reform, although public bureaucracies were in constant contact with customers, most of those communications were via the public service and were performed in a supervised manner. The institution's new governance position necessitated the creation of systems and processes that assisted in the creation of new spots to interact with society. Such interactions were easily happened at the higher levels of the organisation. However, more day to day based interactions and exchanges were more frequently occurred at the lower levels the organizational structure.

Governance and Institutional Flexibility

The extent of the challenges raised by this reform differed dramatically across national contexts. Some countries quickly and comprehensively introduced public management reform, while others were more cautious, constrained, and slow to introduce NPM measures within their governing systems (Peters 2001; Pollitt and Bouckaert, 2004). In a similar way, a few of the governments were having ample experience consulting with their social partners, while in other situations, those experiences were more new. In addition, the current governance statement undoubtedly exaggerates the state's importance in society a few decades ago (Oslen, 2007). Governmental capacity has often been limited, to a greater or lesser degree, by factors connected to the economic status, social complexity, or social partner opposition.

Flexibility is required to make adjustments in public services delivery according to changing market trends and to accommodate changes in the organization's climate. However, it cannot be denied that despite of the vast transformations in the socio-political situations over the last century or so, little change has happened to the foundational structures of governments from those of the late nineteenth century.

One major reason raised to this is that flexibility is in opposition to the long-held principles of the public sector such as due process, procedural fairness, equal justice, and even the rule of law. Institutional stability is needed for these values to exist. Furthermore, clients of government agencies value some continuity in structure

of the bureaucracy because it decreases costs of transaction and confusion. The issue that reformers confronted at the time was to balance the benefits of institutional continuity with the benefits of greater institutional flexibility (Peters and Pierre, 2012: 197).

In the midst of calling for more flexibility in government, reformers must also understand the benefits of institutional stability. Increased government stability helps to ensure efficiency of the government system on long-term basis as well as the public sector to adapt to any changes in the climate and public policy. State-society relationships, on the other hand, benefit from continuity and institutionalisation, such that people know the government and are closer to its system and operating procedures (Peters, 2001).

Peters and Pierre (2012: 188) argues that significant transformations at the institutional level were made as part of the recent administrative reform and that is highly visible at the executive level. Achieving a flexible government in a new position in governance was a result of increasing the flexibility of governance and management and contextually specified rather than by making government itself flexible. To a large degree, the government's position in that governance is to ensure due process and legalism.

New Institutionalism and Governance

Before concluding the discussion on governance and stability of institutions it is significant to have a brief view of the theory of new institutionalism. Institutionalism is an approach with a central assumption that 'institutions matter'. Institutions are referred to as "persistent and connected sets of rules (formal and informal) that prescribe behavioural roles, constrain states, and shape expectations" (Keohane 1989: 3). New institutionalism is emerged as empirical methodological approach and it is distinctive with two significant aspects which make it relevant here to discuss: first one it encompasses formal and informal institutions alike. Second differentiation is a "concern with the beliefs, paradigms, codes, cultures and knowledge embedded within the institutions" (March and Olsen, 1989: 26).

Broader aspects of governance are therefore encompassed within a new institutionalist approach. Governance also puts forward an idea of governing beyond the formal state or government institutions. "In including the less formal arenas of

politics new institutionalism can be sensitive to the valuable findings of the ‘policy community’ and ‘policy network’ literature that has exposed the interconnectedness between formal state organizations and communities and networks of actors with an expertise and interest in a given policy area” (Peterson, 1995).

Conclusion

This detailed analysis of different paradigms in the public administration and governance does not make to claim that one particular regime has an upper hand over the other nor to celebrate the NPG as ‘the best way’. Beyond that it intends to emphasise the point that reforms which are necessarily made as per the demands of the society-with contextual specificities can contribute to the stable at the same efficient administration. More importantly the biggest challenge for the governments with initiatives to bring changes is lack of understanding about the change that the system has undergone. Therefore, to make any efforts to make bureaucracy efficient and responsive the state has to have an in depth understanding of the developments and experiments at the global as well as local level.

Moreover, new transformations strongly point to the need of a creative and innovative bureaucracy in the field of public policy implementation and public service delivery. Therefore, looking at theoretical and historical evolution of the bureaucracy in line with the developments in the field of governance will help to understand the change and to make appropriate measures of reform.

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Chapter II

Institution of Bureaucracy: A Conceptual Framework

Despite of the claims post globalisation era that bureaucracy has no more relevance in the public policy implementation and public service delivery, the previous chapter has shown that how the new governance regime with collaborative innovative initiatives requires a creative bureaucracy in the field. That means a new public governance regime can be highly productive according to the efficiency of the bureaucracy. Therefore, a complete negation of the bureaucracy within the public governance actually not practical as there is no organisation system capable of replacing it despite of its drawbacks. Having said this, this chapter looks into the various literatures conceptualising bureaucracy since nineteenth century and tries to understand how the theoretical framework of this institution has been evolved along the time. In that flow it also explains how and why it stayed back being significant to the public governance against the troubles and turbulences.

In the studies of bureaucracy, it has been discussed in two ways, firstly it is as a theoretical phenomenon, which is widely accepted in the academic discourses. The other one is as an institution of administration which takes a significant role in formulating the policy and in its implementation. The vital role of bureaucracy in administration is continuing for several millennia although bureaucracy, as a theoretical formation, has just got three centuries old. And this omnipresent form of organisation has been appreciated for its “qualities of precision, speed, unambiguity, continuity, efficiency, regularity, consistency, economy, reduction of friction and of material and personal costs, unity, strict subordination, and so on” (Chakrabarty and Chand, 2012).

The term bureaucracy was first coined by M. de Gournay, a French economist in 1764. He said that “We have an illness in France which bids fair to play havoc with us; this illness is called bureaumania”. The term ‘bureau’ denotes writing table in eighteenth century and it used for the work place of officials worked. The suffix was derived from a Greek term meant ‘rule’. Whatsoever the combination of both the terms contributed a term which has been proved powerful enough to penetrate and to get mired in other cultures (Albrow, 1970: 17). It quickly formed part of the worldwide political lexicon. In French it became *bureaucratie* and in German it was used as *Bureuakratia* and *Burocrazia* is the term in Italian. Going further terms like bureaucrat,

bureaucratic, bureaucratism, bureaucratist and bureaucratization all have derived as analogy of it.

The term bureaucracy as a word is accepted by the Dictionary of the French Academy in 1978 defining it as “Power, influence of the heads and staff of governmental bureaux”. In the same way 1813 edition of the German dictionary of foreign expressions provided a definition of bureaucracy as “the authority or power which various government departments and their branches arrogate to themselves over fellow citizens”. The term was referred in an Italian technical dictionary of 1828 as “Neo-logism, signifying the power of officials in public administration”. These meanings prove the acceptance and development of the term in to the multiple societies.

Various scholars have described bureaucracy in a number of different ways. In its most basic sense, it refers to a group of permanent government employees known as civil servants. A tool or a process developed for the effective and efficient execution of a specific goal or goals is referred to as bureaucracy. Bureaucracy is regarded as the epitome of rationality and effective goal-setting and service delivery. The second point of view observes bureaucracy primarily as a tool of power, capable of exerting control over people and various aspects of their lives, and of extending that power over time, either in the bureaucracy's own interests or in the interests of other masters. There are a wide variety of ideas has emerged under the heading of bureaucracy and a discussion around that follows below.

Pre-Weberian concepts of Bureaucracy

The existing literature on bureaucracy can be categorized in to four major parts which are bureaucracy, bureaucratization, debureaucratization and rebureaucratization. The Public administration literatures generally cite Max Weber as the first scholar who put forward a theory of bureaucracy. At the same time scholars like J.S Mill, GWF Hegel, and Karl Marx, Robert Michels and Gaetano Mosca etc. also had made serious discussions and they also have played a significant role setting a background in nineteenth century for the modern theories of bureaucracy. The historian Ramsay Muir's 1910 article, “Bureaucracy in England,” best described the English nineteenth-century theory of bureaucracy. Bureaucracy, for him, was described as "the exercise of power by professionalised administrators.”

J.S Mill

In his political theory written in 'Considerations on Representative Government' Mill has discussed the concept of bureaucracy giving it full significance. According to his argument comparing different types of government, bureaucracy was the only form of government with higher level of political skill and ability besides the representative government. This stands the same even if the bureaucracy went under the name of a monarchy or aristocracy or democracy. He used the term bureaucracy to imply the direct work of government and sometimes in his work bureaucrats were called as actual governors. He observed that "the work of government has been in the hands of governors by profession; which is the essence and meaning of bureaucracy. Such a government accumulates experience, acquires well-tryed and well-considered traditional maxims, and makes provision for appropriate practical knowledge in those who have the actual conduct of affairs" (Mill, 1861: 113). He found the permanent strength of public services in the bureaucracy and wanted to ensure the professionalism in bureaucratic functions by means of "tests for selecting the best officers, rules for promotion, appropriate provisions for order and convenient transactions of business, good record keeping, and proper measures for responsibility and accountability" (Mill, 1861: 11). On the other hand, he also expressed his concern about the drawbacks of the institution of bureaucracy as it dies of it's of routine. He states "they perish by the immutability of their maxims" (Mill, 1861: 115).

At the same time JS Mill in one of his previous works 'Principles of Political Economy' (1848) had a criticism of "concentrating in a dominant bureaucracy all the skill and experience in the management of large interests, and all the power of organized action, existing in the community". In his view this was "a main cause of the inferior capacity for political life which has hitherto characterized the over-governed countries of the continent" (Albrow, 1970: 22).

He developed further on these views in his work 'On Liberty' (Mill, 1861) singling out the dangers of bureaucracy such as misuse of authority and hampering human creativity. And these were his one of the most important reasons to object government interference even when it did not curtail liberty. He also argued that as the efficiency of the administrative machinery increases there would be a higher tendency for monopolization of the talent of that country. To get an admission in the bureaucracy

people have to submit all their ambitions and there would be no one qualified left outside to criticise its shortcomings. This makes both governors and governed the slaves under bureaucracy and that lead to impossibility of any reform. “Where everything is done through the bureaucracy, nothing to which the bureaucracy is really adverse can be done at all” Mill observed (Mill, 1892: 66).

From various experiences of bureaucracy, it is very clear that despite of mediocrity trained men have been showing an upper hand over a person with original genius unless there is a popular element in government. Examples of Chinese and Russian governments show us the consequences of a bureaucracy holding power. By this Mill did not mean that skilful administrators were not required to run the government. Rather he was trying to highlight the necessity of a skilled administration under the control of the representative bodies of all people. In his discussions of relationship between representative government and bureaucracy he placed bureaucracy as an institution with “experience, skill and knowledge” rather than viewing it within the frames of policy process.

Different from positivist view considering bureaucracy as a ‘value-free entity’ Mill took role of bureaucracy as ‘neutral entity’ in partisan politics. This did not mean to stay inert but to stand out with exceptional qualities like stability, skill, knowledge and experience with an objective of mediating democratic decision making process. Referring to this bureaucratic function in the process of democracy, he identified it with potential role in the state’s progress and development of the citizens. Through a multi-stakeholder approach, he attempted to bring in the democratic spirit in the governance process in which most educated, skilled and experienced citizens were involved irrespective of their status as elected members or officials. At this point it is undoubtedly clear that these thoughts of Mill have influenced in great ways the narratives of citizenship, community governance and civic participation today.

Hegel

Hegel has a major role in placing bureaucracy as a significant governing institution under the modern state. In the discussion on how to organise liberal state in his work ‘Philosophy of Right’ he provides great significance to the role of civil service. Hegel postulates a higher position and payment to the civil servants as “universal class” because he argues that they serve the universal interest through their activities and

operates as a link between the civil society and the state. More than that, he defines the idea of bureaucracy as 'will of the state' and understands it as a "transcendent entity, a mind above individual's minds" (Misra, 1977: 66). "The bureaucratic class stands above any partisan objectives in society and is dedicated to the general interest" (Naidu, 2005: 88). Hegel's vision of a modern bureaucracy has the following characteristics: "functional division of authority, principle of hierarchy, separation of office from its incumbent, merit based recruitment through competition, fixed remuneration and exercise of authority in compliance to common good" (Misra, 1977).

To ensure maximum simplification, speed of service delivery and efficiency, he believed that a bureaucracy with the above mentioned features was the most appropriate administrative institution in an egalitarian society. More interestingly, most of the public administration scholars rarely take the name of Hegel while discussing bureaucracy, there are a few scholars who argue that the above mentioned features of bureaucracy from Hegel has a close similarity to the characteristics of bureaucracy as described by Max Weber, the founder of classical theory of bureaucracy, in terms professionalism, fixed remuneration, centralisation etc. Therefore, these scholars argue that there is a partial scope to the fact that Weber derived his concept of bureaucracy with the help Hegel's theory. However, while Weber conceptualise his idea of bureaucracy based on technocracy and strict compliance to the rules Hegel's characteristics of bureaucracy is based on practical philosophy.

As in the case of Marx, Hegel was also not directly concerned about the bureaucracy as such, rather he reached to the conceptualisation it with the larger objective of challenging the essence of the state. In the chain of rational social order, the state comes at last after the family and the civil society. If the state has come to the scene, it is responsible to set the environment "for the unconscious and specifically focused actions to progressively become self-aware and public spirited". According to the view Hegel, the prince, the estates' deputies and the bureaucrats are all political actors and he describes the bureaucracy as "state formalism" of civil society and state power as a corporation.

Another important point with respect to this particular study, there can be found no traces of politics-administration dichotomy in the writings of Hegel. Rather he was more concerned with the conceptualisation of the crucial role played by the bureaucracy

in a modern constitutional state. As per the theory of Hegel “the task of the modern bureaucracy is to realise the political norms in concrete situations and to subsume the latter (political) under the universal norms” (Carl, 1992: 387).

Karl Marx

Bureaucracy was not a central theme for Marx. However, in his 1843 essay 'Critique of Hegel's Philosophy of Right,' he gave more than a passing remark to bureaucracy. His work is set in the background of capitalist society in which state apparatuses in general and bureaucracy in particular have not shown any tendency to uphold universal interests.

The Hegelian view of state and bureaucracy was not acceptable to Marx. He asserted that the state and civil society depends on each other absolutely. The state cannot transcend civil society and it does not represent the common interest but the specific interests of the dominant class in the society. Thus, under capitalism state was the handmade of the dominant capitalist class. This dominant class used bureaucracy as an instrument to exert its dominance over other social classes. According to this logic, what bureaucracy claimed as its interests were basically had close connection with the interests of the superior class and the state (Naidu, 2005: 89). Therefore, Marx saw bureaucracy as a powerful tool of the capitalist state and its administrative apparatus. For him, it originated from this close link between power-holding entities such as primarily the state and the social classes that were subordinated to it. In this, unlike Hegel who thought origin of the bureaucracy owes to the functional imperatives, Marx was of the view that it was the external pathological division in the bourgeois class society caused emergence of bureaucracy. He believed that bureaucracy constitutes a very specific closed social group within the state.

Both Hegel and Marx were elaborating two contrasting theories of power distribution that can be found in the great ideological systems. In the theory of Hegel, religious or secular metaphysical grounds were employed to justify the actions of those in the positions of power. Moreover, these persons in power position considered it as a mission to be accomplished for the sake of God or for society. Public officers as their servants shared that mission and acknowledged it as responsibility. On the other hand, theory from Marx, power was a result of a group's position in society's economic order. Officials were nothing more than government agents, instruments of the ruling class.

While the conceptualisation of Hegel on bureaucracy was that of an insightful institution with the capacity to fulfil the public interest, Marx viewed it as a repressive instrument at the hand of the state.

Marx challenged the position of the bureaucracy and held that it was not able to be the voice of the repressed masses and to face their problems. In his examination of the functional and hierarchical differentiation feature of bureaucracy he criticised that these features lead the functionaries of the institution to be incompetent. While discussing his observation on the incompetence of bureaucracy Bhattacharya summarises it as: “the superior does not know the specifics of the case, the subordinates does not know the general principles and none can appreciate the totality of the situation” (Bhattacharya, 2008: 95). It was also observed that Marx viewed that egoist interest of the state were determining its role. Therefore, rather than being an umpire in conciliating the struggles among the social classes it acted more like a partisan instrument in creating such struggles (Dwivedi and Jain, 1985).

In short, an analysis of observations made by Marx, it is very clear that rather than making theory for bureaucracy he was trying to look at it through a critical lens. And he expressed it as an instrument and agent of the state which is under the control of the dominant class in society. If we take his own words: “the general spirit of bureaucracy is secret, mystery, safeguarded inside by hierarchy and outside by its nature as a closed corporation”. It is worth an analysis by applying this perspective into the context of a top-down bureaucratic model: First of all, every incumbent in the institution is not able to access the knowledge and information in a same range. Marx had warned about a tendency of bureaucracy inherently to manoeuvre “knowledge into secrecy and competence into mystery”. Secondly, there is an obsession of the bureaucracy about which he had cautioned as “passive obedience, faith in authority, mechanisation of fixed and formal behaviour, fixed principles, attitudes and traditions” (Maheshwari, 2003: 277). This view of Marx should be utilised as a framework of analysis to determine the causes of dysfunctions in developing countries.

There are three major distinguished concepts of bureaucracy acquired a significant place as classical theories of bureaucracy in the twentieth-century. In these theories two different concepts that are incompatible with each other compete to substantiate their role in the modern bureaucratic model. One is bureaucracy as

contributing to administrative efficiency and the latter is bureaucracy as contributing to administrative inefficiency. This has to be understood as a continuation of the arguments made by the scholars in nineteenth century than taking it as incomprehensible vagary from the side of modern social science.

Mosca and Michels

As Gaetano Mosca published his classic work *Elementi di Scienza Politica* (translated as “The Ruling Class” in 1939) in 1895, he belongs to 19th century. He began it as critique of the conventional method of categorizing governments. Different from dominant class theory proposed by Marx who based it on economically dominant class, ‘politically dominant class’ was the foundation of the theory that put forward by Mosca. His view was that a rule by official can be referred to as bureaucracy.

In his work ‘Ruling Class’ published in 1939 Mosca made a differentiation of all governments dividing them into two named as feudal and bureaucratic. According to the explanation given to this division, feudal state was a political organisation of the ruling class with a simple structure. There, any member or same members of the ruling class would exercise executive functions of the state such as economic, judicial, administrative or military functions. Every member had personal and intimate control over a ruled class member (Mosca, 1939: 75). This was not the case in the bureaucratic state in which all these executive functions were not concentrated in bureaucracy. Rather there was strict separation of functions from one another and these were exclusive activities assigned to specific groups in the ruling class. Name of the bureaucratic state was given according to the specificities of these groups. For him bureaucracy was a group of officials receiving salary from the national treasury. Hence, he defined bureaucracy “as a political organisation with an extensive number of public services receiving their salaries from the government for the performance of their ‘public duties’ demanding a ‘greater specialisation of functions’, a far greater discipline in all grades of political, administrative and military services” (Mosca, 1939: 59)

Mosca did not believe that the ruling class should show a monolithic nature. Contrary to the concept of Marx, he believed that people of similar class status do not necessarily have to have identical interests. Instead, what he did was to make liberty of this class possible through the differentiation of the ruling class based on their functions. He also wrote about bureaucratic absolutism that means monopolization of

wealth and military power by a bureaucracy and he thought that such a government was “despotism in its worst form”. In his own words “we get a more powerful oligarchy, a more all-embracing ‘racket’, that one has ever been seen” (Albrow, 1970: 34). For him bureaucracy had to be controlled by representative bodies. In a way to reflect various interests and talents of a society in the ruling class the representative bodies were consisted of leaders from different social spheres and they have elected a voting mechanism.

Of course, with his stance of realistic political analysis, we cannot expect Mosca to be any more optimistic about the operation of the Parliament than his concerns for majority rule. He did not hesitate to state that a bureaucracy cannot be completely controlled by elected bodies. That is the reason why he turned to a second check and that was also a result of lessons learned from English experience. He advocated for group of honorary public servants to be culled from the rich as well as from "respectable, hard-working citizens who live in modest ease" in order to engage directly in administration.

Particularly, there were much more possible intricacies to his conception of bureaucracy. He did not provide a definition to bureaucracy, probably since it didn't seem to mean anything more complicated to him than a forum of public servants. Anything that comes in contact with such a forum, he called it ‘bureaucratic’ (Albrow, 1970: 35).

He cited specialisation and centralization as features of the "Bureaucratic State" in his writings. However, the employment of salaried officials in public services was the key feature of the bureaucracy. By means of his writings he was trying to make bureaucracy and democracy part of discussions among the scholars of social science. In that he succeeded to an extent presenting the term bureaucracy in a new background because he caught the term being a less serious concern in the arena of political argument. Later he worked on it and took it to the world of sociology which was still in its embryonic stage, as a major category. However, he couldn't go any further and the first scholar who took up the rest of the work was Robert Michels.

In the work ‘Political Parties’ (Michels, 1962) he discussed the concept of the bureaucracy in a ruling class of modern state. He was in complete agreement with Mosca while arguing that a modern state required bureaucracy to maintain the status of

the politically dominant classes as the insecure middle classes started to think that a state employment can ensure their security. At the same time, an analysis on why the bureaucracies grew does not necessarily have to limit to the state.

Based on his statistics of political parties in history, he could demonstrate that how the heads of large bodies with thousands of members needed to hire full-time paid officials. Importantly all requirements at different levels of the organisation were full filled by these employees who had become specialists in those fields. In return these heads of the organisation also needed various skills and educational qualification that enable them for the management of the hierarchy of officials. These trainings made them to be a professional leadership with a distinct cultural background and it also led to exclusion of general membership. Usually, the remuneration of the hierarchy of officials was paid from the party revenues. As a result, they avoided taking any actions that may jeopardise the number of the total membership. Consequently, bureaucratic organisation from being a means became an end. Michel's determinism may have contributed in him to show a little more attention to the idea of bureaucracy than Mosca had shown (Albrow, 1970: 37). There was no use in studying various types of oligarchy, if the paid official was an unavoidable characteristic of the modern organization and oligarchy was its inevitable conclusion. From this point, it was Max Weber who undertook a massive responsibility to extent the concept of bureaucracy from Mosca and Michels contributions in sociological to a non-sociological literature.

Max Weber's Theory of Bureaucracy

The Context

Wirtschaft and Gesellschaft, the two massive volumes of Weber published in 1921, are overflowing with references to bureaucracy. In these works, he gave the notion of forming a 'Verband' a lot of thought. Although 'organisation' is the most obvious translation, Weber's 'Verband' had a unique meaning for him (Weber et al., 1947: 150). It denoted a system of social interactions, the upkeep of which was the responsibility of specific individuals. Defining attribute to an organization was the presence of a leader and, in most cases, an administrative staff.

The idea that human behaviour was routinely orientated to a set of rules (*Ordnung*) was considered fundamental to sociological analysis by Weber. The concept of an organisation was founded on the existence of a distinct set of rules guiding

behaviour. It would be impossible to tell what was and wasn't organisational behaviour without them. Administrative order (*Verwaltungs ordnung*) was the term he used to refer the rules of an organization (Rheinstein, 1954: 330). In two ways the administrative staff (*Verwaltungs stab*) related to these rules. Primarily it was these rules regulated behaviour of the staff itself and secondarily the staff was responsible to see whether the rest of the membership abide by them (Weber et al., 1947: 146).

It was with the administrative order to determine who was to give commands to whom. There was an intimate link between administration and authority (*Herrschaft*). When all forms of authority and their functions were expressed in terms of administration, all type of administration involves authority in some way or the other, as it requires someone with vested power to command. This is called imperative co-ordination to which Weber attached a great deal of importance in his work. He gave equal importance to commands and rules as factors significant in structuring of social relationships.

Each member staff in the Weberian organization was responsible to give and receive orders. He distinguished power and authority in this context of evaluating the fundamental categories of organizational structure. A person could be said to be in a position of power if “within a social relationship, his own will could be enforced despite resistance”. But this is a ‘sociologically amorphous’ and broad concept according to Weber because he thought people could be said to have power in multiple ways. What he was seeking is a “a special instance of power” that is highly important to structure human groups and that particular power is authority. It comes to play if “a command of a definite content found obedience on the part of specific individuals” (Albrow, 1970: 39).

His attempt classify organisations was a natural consequence from the idea of legitimacy. He states that “the foundation of all authority, and hence of all compliance with orders, is a belief in prestige, which operates to the advantage of the ruler or rulers”. He identified multiple types of belief in the legitimacy of authority and those would be linked to various authority structures; therefore, multiple kinds of organizations. The beliefs he identified can be categorised into three as: firstly, the obedience to the orders can be justified as the individual giving the order had a divine or exceptional qualities which is known as ‘charismatic authority’. Secondly, in a

different situation obedience might be a result of respect to the old-established patterns of order that means 'traditional authority'. Thirdly, people would also think that an individual giving an order was empowered to do so by a code of law and that is legal-rational authority. This last category of authority had a logical character and modern organisations were described in this form of authority by Weber.

The Ideal Type of Bureaucracy

Weber saw rational bureaucracy as a key component in the modern world's rationalisation, and the most critical of all social processes. This process included, among other things, the specificity and explicitness in the values governing social organisation. He started by laying out principles on which legal authority was based, in line with his theory that a belief in legitimacy was fundamental in every system of authority. He put forward eight propositions about the structuring of legal authority organisations: (a) there should be a clear and sound management in arranging official activities; (b) there should be a division of responsibilities into functionally distinct domains with the necessary authority and sanctions; (c) there should be a hierarchical order in organising the officers with control and complaint rights allocated to each; (d) There might be legal and technical rules and regulations to govern the performance of work and for that matter skilled men are needed; (e) There should be distinction made between the finances of the organization and those of its staffs as private individuals; (f) The officeholder is not permitted to appropriate his position; (g) Since administration is focused on written records, the office (Bureau) appears to be the nucleus of the modern organisation; (h) Legal authority structures can take many forms, but a bureaucratic administrative staff is the purest example (Albrow, 1970: 43). The final proposition is important for comprehending Weber's conceptualisation of bureaucracy.

Moving forward Weber also proposed some defining features of the bureaucratic administrative staff as follows: 1) the staff members only have to perform impersonal duties of their offices. Otherwise, they are entitled to be personally free; 2) All the offices are organised on a clear hierarchical basis; 3) There must be a clear specification of the functions of each office; 4) the appointments of the officials are based on contract; 5) a professional qualification is necessary for the selection of the administrative staff; 6) There must be provision for salary paid in money and for

pension rights according to their grade in the hierarchy. The official is always free to resign from his position and under certain situations staffs may be terminated; 7) the major or exclusive occupation of the official is his administrative post. There is a career structure with possibility of promotion based on tenure of service or merit along with the superior evaluation; 9) neither the post nor the resources of the organisation cannot be appropriated by the official; 10) every official is controlled and disciplined by a unified system (Weber et al., 1947: 330).

Weber also envisioned enacting a legal code to seek the obedience from every member in the organization. According to him set of abstract rules that to be applied to specific cases is called law and it is the administration's job to guarantee that the interests of the organisation are within law's limits. Even the people who exercise authority also have to obey this legal code. And most importantly this obedience is due to the impersonal order that appointed him in the post but not to the person holding authority (Weber et al., 1947: 329).

The concept of rational bureaucracy by Max Weber has an enormous influence in the organisation and management theories. The principles of rational bureaucracy are formalization, instrumentalism, and rational- legal authority. Formalization “refers to the degree which rules, procedures, regulations and task assignments exist in written form”. Written documentation includes the procedures for action, decision making and communication. The term instrumentalism refers to the idea that understands the organization as an instrument or machines that is built with a specific purpose to achieve. The formal internal structure – “positions, procedures, rules, interaction patterns” are also considered as tools used for the service of this larger organizational mission. What makes bureaucracy a rational organisational instrument is the formal connection between the structures and functions of the organization and the aims or objectives of the organization. Bureaucracies, according to him, establish new elites. Through the efficient use of experience, elected officials were dominated by these new elite with their power.

To sum up the argument of the Weber that the most efficient way to obtain the obedience of members of the society is the principle of rational- legal authority. Different from the commanding authority that is either based on tradition or charisma, the legitimate authority is based on the formal status. He believed that this principle of

rational authority was able to constitute an ideal type because an evaluation of rational bureaucratic organisation is made possible with the usage this representation as a standard. However, the time demands to address the relationship between rational bureaucratic theory and the actual practices. Although Weber himself had pointed out this ideal type can be found nowhere in practice, his model has been criticised in terms of its applicability. The critiques were also concerned that its structure is so large, inactive and inefficient and it would result in much more complications in terms of rigidity of the structures, expenditure etc.

Criticism on Traditional Bureaucracy

Traditional theories of bureaucracy have been criticised for a variety of reasons, despite the fact that they have served as the foundation for many modern forms of organisations. In 1944 Von Mises castigated bureaucracy in a classic piece on the subject, with a statement that everybody started to feel and to accept that “bureaucracy is an evil”. But his conclusion was that bureaucracy can only be considered as mere symptom, but not the source of evil. The “new system of government” was the real villain because it curtailed personal freedom and entrusted the government with ever-increasing responsibilities (Farazmand, 2009: 143). Mises, like Reagan, speak of good and evil, with bureaucracy serving as a weapon for the evil doers.

Modern societies have now recognised bureaucracy as an essential component despite it is often regarded as a negative trait. And it is clear from the theories we have discussed above. Both underdeveloped and developed countries, according to Francis E Rourke (1984: 15), need the services of highly qualified bureaucrats. Working along with such trained bureaucrats can motivate political leaders through impartial guidance from trained staff when making decisions (Wilson, 1887). These well-trained bureaucrats often ensure consistency because they stay on the job for longer than elected officials. Although there are benefits to bureaucracy, there is still widespread fear of an independent bureaucracy. The apprehension stems from the basic question of whether it serves as the people’s “master” or “servant.”

While studying the dysfunctions of the existing institutions, Robert K Merton proposed to replace them with new alternatives. The “red tape” and other inefficiencies of bureaucracy are defined in his essay “Bureaucratic Structure and Personality” (Merton, 1952). According to Merton, the superiority of rational rules and their tight

hold over all actions, favour bureaucrat's behaviours that are stability and predictability, as Weber claimed. Moreover, it may also contribute to lessen flexibility and propensity to transform means into ends. These laws, rather than becoming a means to an end, become ends in and of themselves. Shortcomings in orientation involving trained incapacity obviously stem from systemic causes. (1) A well-functioning bureaucracy necessitates rigorous adherence to laws and consistency in responding. (2) That kind of adherence to the laws transforms them into absolutes; they are no longer considered in terms of a set of goals. (3) This obstructs fast transformation to special circumstances not anticipated by those who drafted the general rules. (4) As a result, the same factors that lead to productivity in general lead to inefficiency in particular situations. Community members who have not separated themselves from the norms' implications for them are rarely fully aware of their inadequacy. In time, these rules become symbolic rather than purely utilitarian (Merton, 1952).

Bureaucrats, Merton believed, were more inclined to protect their own vested interests than to behave in the best interests of the organisation in total. He also assumed that bureaucrats were proud of their work, as a result of which they were able to prevent alterations in their in routine. Merton further observed that bureaucrats prioritised formality over interpersonal relationships, and that they had been taught to disregard the unique circumstances of individual cases, making them seem “arrogant” and “haughty.”

Post-Weberian Concept of Bureaucracy

With the emergence of new nation-states in the twentieth century, bureaucracy exploded. The end of official colonialism, as well as the global expansion and rivalry of the two ideological regimes of capitalism and socialism, has fuelled the growth of bureaucracy. Both the welfare state in capitalist systems and the socialist state under socialism extended their spheres of roles beyond any given reach or domain, and both expanded a burgeoning bureaucracy. At the same time, citizens, lawmakers, corporate business leaders, and intellectuals escalated a campaign against bureaucracy, branding it undemocratic and unresponsive to people, a movement that started in the 1960s and accelerated with the election of Ronald Reagan and Margaret Thatcher in the United States and the United Kingdom, respectively.

After discussing a variety of competing conceptions of conventional bureaucracy, it is clear that the Weberian concept has spawned a slew of modern bureaucracy theories, which Martin Albrow divided into seven categories: “bureaucracy as rational organisation; bureaucracy as an organisational inefficiency; bureaucracy as a rule by officials; bureaucracy as public administration; bureaucracy as administration by officials; bureaucracy as the organisation; and bureaucracy as modern society” (Albrow, 1970: 87) .

Tullock

Tullock (1965) articulated that as the number of layers of control increases, the output comparing to the input will only slowly rise in a pyramidal system. A decline in efficiency has come from the gradual lack of control from the top down, and also the gradual loss of information from the bottom up. There are variety of methods were introduced to reduce these losses like the executive officer, a personnel structure, random checks, and calculation and evaluation of cost.

The relationship between efficiency and freedom is a little more complicated. Tullock refers to dysfunctional bureaucracies as “bureaucratic free enterprise” because they allow considerable independence. As the efficiency increases there will be necessary reduction in this dimension of discretion. An efficient organisation may allow considerable discretion in the selection of methods to serve the goals of the organization except in some cases in which cost of coordination of the means is higher. But it cannot allow the freedom of acts that do not serve the organisation. A government employee is likely to have more freedom on the job in comparison to an employee with a private entity. On the other hand, an intense meaning of freedom would emphasise the freedom to enter alternate contractual arrangements rather than the freedom to choose one's own contract. There is sufficient evidence that such contract freedom is essential for efficiency in societies.

Tullock eventually comes to the conclusion that a solution to the problems of bureaucracy is not possible, at least not inside the government. This view may be right; however, his arguments and evidences are insufficient. In a competitive market, many large private companies are very successful, adaptable, and innovative. As a result, it was because of the external ties rather than the internal structure of the governmental agencies he attributed productivity challenges to them. His call for a greater dependence

on local governments and to reduce the reach of government operations was a consequence his scepticism about addressing bureaucratic issues.

Niskanen

William Niskanen (1971) argues that bureaucrats are the cause of maximisation of budget. With an intention to increase the budget beyond the necessary levels, according to him, bureaucrats deploy their control over information and their skill to camouflage the real expenditure in producing the public services that they deliver. As far as bureaus monopolises information, he believed, legislature cannot be able to control the bureaus. This may lead to the inability of legislatures to make independent judgements on the budget and also increase the cost of government. The way he found to get out of this problem and to control the public bureaucracy is to set up a system similar to market allowing more than one bureau in the same area of service and that leads to competition among them in order to provide better services to more clients. By this way, threatening the weak performing organisation to be taken out of business, he aimed to reduce the costs. It is a suggestion by many governments creating numerous quasi- governmental organizations and relying more on performance measurement.

After the initial boom of bureaucracy at the beginning of twentieth century, in fact both the capitalism and socialism has led a global crusade against bureaucracy and welfare state regulatory structures that was funded and sponsored by trans world globalising corporate elites. In the name of transparency and public individuality, aiming at the profit they advocated eliminating welfare administrative structures and privatising every service that governments have been delivering for centuries. As a result, order and continuity of the bureaucracy and government have been troubled and challenges of instability and corruption persisted.

Bureaucracy and Post Reform Period

In the previous chapter it is discussed in detail how globalisation and associated waves like NPM impacted the public administration and a reaction to traditional bureaucratic values was an obvious consequence of it. In the same way NPM directly challenged principles of traditional bureaucracy (Hughes, 2003). Towards the end of twentieth century many countries had deeply and resolutely rooted and entrenched the post-bureaucratic model of public administration which reflected NPM reforms in response to the flaws of traditional bureaucracy. Post bureaucratic model is also

understood as a call for a larger range of service providers and a more market-oriented management style that has been made in response to monopolistic service delivery. (Heckscher and Donnellon, 1994).

Hood (1991) described the doctrinal components of New Public Management or Post-bureaucracy such as “Hands-on professional management, Explicit standards and measures of performance, Greater emphasis on output controls, Disaggregation of units in the public sector, Greater competition in the public sector, Private sector styles of management practice, and Greater discipline and parsimony in the use of resources”. These elements coexisted with four reform megatrends: (a) slowing down or reversal in the growth of government; (b) privatisation and quasi-privatization, (c) implementation of advanced technology in the development and delivery of public services, and (d) a global agenda in public sector reforms. Pollitt outlined the main characteristics of Post-bureaucracy as follows: “(1) a shift in the focus of management systems and efforts from inputs and processes to outputs and outcomes; (2) more measurement as evidenced by the increase in performance indicators and standards; (3) more specialized, lean, flat, and/or autonomous forms of organization rather than multipurpose hierarchical bureaucracies; (4) a shift from hierarchy to contracts or contract-like relationships; (5) wider use of market or market-like mechanisms for the delivery of public services; (6) a blurrier frontier between the public and the private sectors; and, (7) shifting values from universalism, equity, security, for example, towards efficiency and individualism” (Pollitt, 2001).

Hughes provided four grand themes in post-bureaucratic reforms as starting point of discussion “(1) management (i.e. results and managerial responsibility) is a higher order function than administration (i.e. following instructions); (2) economic principles (i.e. drawn from public choice theory, principal-agent theory, contracting, competition, and the theory of the firm) can assist public management; (3) modern management theory and practices (i.e. flexibility in staffing and organization) can assist public management; and (4) service delivery is important to citizens” (Hughes, 2006).

For regimes in the stage of transition in developing as well as developed countries, it was a critical task to create or recreate bureaucratic forms of governance (Peters, 2009, p. 11). As these democratic structures seek to institutionalise new modes of

government after decades of different forms of authoritarian rule, formal, legal forms of governance must be developed before any other styles of change can be considered.

The New Public Management and other contemporary governance models expect the existence of a shared culture that will direct behaviour of the public servants. That culture helps not to reduce transparency and control which is otherwise the consequences of pressing on managerial freedom in the contemporary public administration. Under the new models the role of public servants can be classified into four categories: manager, policymaker, negotiator, and democrat.

Ambiguous roles allow public servants to mix and match solutions to meet the demands of unique policy situations. The significant take away from this analysis is that unlike early theoretical models which presented governance as a simple and hierarchical operation, contemporary bureaucratic models deal with more complicated relationship between the public and private sectors and among a variety of public-sector organisations (Kooiman, 2003; Peters and Pierre, 2000). In order to deal with the underlying complexities of governance, flexibility must be supported with a strong dedication to the integrity of the policy making processes.

Approaches of Post Reform Bureaucracy

Entrepreneurial bureaucracy, IT-assisted bureaucracy, collaborative bureaucracy, and result-oriented bureaucracy are the four primary fields of post-reform bureaucracy theories. The following paragraphs discuss how they work.

Entrepreneurial Bureaucracy

Usually for services in the private sector, competition also appears in the form of contracting out in post-bureaucracy. It has so many complications at different level and necessitates contract drafting and tracking expertise. It's possible that a contractor will establish a monopoly in the future. Contracts are vulnerable to corruption because it can be offered to political benefactors. There are four proposed criteria adhering to which help to avoid corruption practices in post-bureaucracy: (1) competition should be promoted in the process of bidding; (2) the focus of the competition should be on performance quality and cost reduction; (3) a proper monitoring of contractors should be arranged, and (4) these activities should be performed by an agency that is relatively non-political (Osborne and Gaebler, 1992).

The fundamental features of entrepreneurial bureaucracy, according to Osborne and Gaebler (1992), are: “(a) recognising the importance of abandoning old and irrelevant programmes and methods; (b) taking timely and necessary action; (c) remaining creative and innovative; and (d) being business-oriented; (e) privatising where it makes sense and private operators can provide the same service far more effectively; (f) making room for new ventures and revenue-generating operations; (g) remaining customer-driven and adopting transparent performance metrics; (h) rewarding merit; and (i) welcoming changes and challenges”. In its broadest sense, entrepreneurial bureaucracy guarantees the continuous improvement of resource use.

The rivalry between public service providers is aided by entrepreneurial bureaucracy. It gives citizens more influence by passing bureaucratic authority to communities. In post-bureaucracy, efficiency of public agencies is calculated in terms of outputs generated rather than inputs spent. Every public institution in the post-bureaucracy era has a clear mission and objectives. People have a right to demand reliable service from entrepreneurial bureaucracies. The standards of post-bureaucracy are to predict and avoid problems rather than to propose solutions. The government is decentralised, and everyone is promoted to engage in the post-bureaucratic process. Entrepreneurial bureaucracy is strongly market-oriented, encouraging public, private, and voluntary sector participation. Instead of focusing only on delivering public service, it aims to address neighbourhood issues quickly. To form a post-bureaucratic government all these ideals have to be combined (McSweeney, 2006). And its advocates believe it has the ability to address many of the government’s big issues.

Entrepreneurial bureaucrats have little control over the general public in order to maintain their status. They also may not want to oppose reform when retaining their place of authority. Traditional bureaucrats, on the other hand, are focused on widening their sphere of influence over public resources. Regardless of their positions, they try to support and protect public initiatives and schemes. Contrary to that entrepreneurial bureaucracy sets up more efficient and reliable methods of managing public agencies and public service delivery systems.

Digitalization of Bureaucracy:

E-governance is the term for the digitalization of bureaucracy. E-governance, according to UNESCO, is the use of information and communication technology by the

public sector for improvement in delivery of information and service. It also involves the idea of citizen engagement in decision-making and in preparing the government to be more "accountable, open, and efficient". New leadership models, emerging methods planning and determining policy and spending, new means to access education, new practices of hearing people out, and emerging methods of organising and providing knowledge and services are all part of e-governance. E-governance is a larger terminology than e-government as it can transform how people interact with governments and each other. E-governance has the potential to introduce new citizenship principles, with respect to citizen requirements and obligations. Its mission is to involve, activate, and empower people. While e-government is restricted to the advancement of online services, it is a wider term that deals with the entire spectrum of government relationships and networks including the use and application of ICTs.

People and societies will practise self-governance thanks to post-bureaucracy. In a post-bureaucratic society, citizens, or the general public, are the beneficiaries of public services at the end of the day. They should be able to choose from a variety of competing and differentiated approaches to delivering any given public good. In the modern age, it is important to optimise the involvement of as many individuals and organisations as possible in the decision-making process and e-governance approach helps it in a great extent.

Collaborative or Joint up Government

Rather than hierarchical structures, formal and informal social networks are the determining character of a joint-up-government and that is presented by metaphoric relationship. The central organisational foundation of joint-up-government is complementary, harmonising, and matching strengths. The actors have independent relationships, and the organization's aims are reciprocal and mutually beneficial. In joint-up-government, that the means of organisation is partnerships, and the modes of organisation are rivalry and cooperation. Controlling and synchronisation systems are available in both horizontal and vertical configurations. In the other side, there is some wiggle room here. In it, the main elements of conflict resolution are confidence and reputation.

The concepts of NPM and e-governance underpin all aspects of network governance. Joint-up-government is emerged with the aims to promote efficient and

effective collaboration and interaction among many interconnected elements, to provide high-quality public services based on coordination, to give public officials more autonomy, to make human and technical capital available, to admire the values of competition and to keep an open mind regarding public functions that can be performed by non-governmental organisations. In a joint-up-government, a computer network connects ministries, provinces, municipalities, and administrative or executive government agencies at all levels. The popular tasks of e-government are faced by this form of government. Networks are formed by way of gathering every type of project teams, task forces, and other temporary teams into groups and take on the form of a specific network configuration. Organisational form of a particular is described as a network configuration. To accomplish the specific tasks of e-government intra governmental department consultations in formal and informal modes are frequently needed (Josser, Teo and Clegg, 2006). These discussions are often institutionalised in the form of a specific network configuration.

Result Oriented and Performance Based Bureaucracy

Osborne and Gaebler (1992) have suggested multiple aspects for a post-bureaucratic paradigm that is focused on results. First and foremost, what is calculated is carried out; defining performance metrics helps people to ask the relevant questions, redefining the issue, diagnosing it, and considering organisational objectives. Second, when the government lacks reliable data, public policies and policy formulations are heavily influenced by political factors. Third, no one can reward success if they can't see it. The business has improved productivity by rewarding good managers. Fourth, if anyone can't reward success, he or she is likely to reward failure. In practise, if a student fails, he or she may be eligible for financial assistance. When the crime rate rises, for example, the government or the public provide more incentives to the police. Fifth, if anyone cannot see success, he or she would not be able to benefit out of it. If anyone succeeds unexpectedly, that will be remembered as a valuable lesson. Sixth, if someone is unable to accept failure, he or she will be unable to fix it. Since no one tests the outcomes of these agencies' work, no one outside the bureaucracy can say whether they are worthwhile. Seventh, someone who can produce results can gain public support.

Promoting performance management in public enterprises has two main objectives: to leverage public resources effectively and to achieve higher public

performance objectives innovatively. It aims to improve the skill and accountability of public employees in order to achieve the team's objectives. This is a method of convincing government employees to satisfy the expectations of the organization in order to improve productivity and effectiveness. The following three broad assessment elements are used in public performance management: i) the output assessment is done according to the directives of government; ii) the performance assessment and management is related to the vision and mission of government; and iii) in order to accomplish total performance management, public agencies must examine performance measuring procedures, systems, preferences and strategies (Jamali, Khoury and Sahyoun, 2006). The basis of public performance management must be methods, objectives and values for public development. The central elements of public performance management are public performance assessment and its progression.

Criticism on Post Reform Bureaucracy

Since the mid-1990s, papers were presented on the shortcomings of administrative reforms in Latin America, with privatisation and the implementation of NPM as main features, at CLAD conferences⁴. As a result, many Latin American countries started to walk away from public management regimes either abandoning or making changes in NPM (Farazmand, 2009: 370). These countries were mainly concerned with justice, equity, and equality as well as transparency questions which were less significant to NPM. In reality, managerial flexibility and expenditure-cutting are primary concerns of NPM rather than justice, equity, openness, or accountability. Interestingly the irony of the events is that most of the failure of the wider privatisation and NPM reforms has been recorded from Latin American nations, a region that is heavily influenced and dependent on the globalising corporate powers of North America, notably the United States.

United Nations records and other international conference papers have reported similar evidence of NPM deficiencies and sweeping privatisation (for example, Argyriades, 2001). Other academics have cautioned about the significant shortcomings of sweeping privatisation, public-private partnerships, and NPM (for example, Wettenhall, 2001, 2003). Switzerland and the Netherlands document the latest accounts of failure of NPM (Noordhoek and Saner, 2005: 38). Local lawmakers (parliaments)

⁴ Latin American Conferences on Public Administration Reforms

in both countries have voted against the implementation of NPM in local government administration, citing a loss of democratic power, transparency, and fairness, as well as a lack of promised productivity as major concerns. Even in New Zealand, the birthplace of NPM, a newly elected government recently reversed the NPM's adoption, deciding to either abandon or change its application.

Post-reform bureaucratic reforms have tended to focus on shrinking the government. However, it is not proven that democratic pressure was the cause of it. The so-called tax revolts of the 1970s and 1980s had several limited political ramifications. But it was insignificant and only lasted a few days. But it is true that governments have developed in response to citizen demands. Post-bureaucratic reformers may be seen as acting in an undemocratic manner if they minimise government independent of popular opinion (Bolin and Harenstam, 2008). Instead, there was the neo-classical economics-derived theoretical claim, which led to widespread privatisation of public enterprises, mostly against public sentiment. In addition, the scope of government may be minimised by restricting the permissible spectrum of political and political activity to only those issues on which current doctrine provides for debate (Hughes, 2003). More transparency is needed, as is the enhancement of elected politicians' roles. It is also conceivable that, in some nations, it was the desire for a democratic society that worked as a motivation to the post-bureaucratic reforms.

Post-bureaucratic reforms have their own set of unintended results and side effects. Unwanted side effects necessitate the ability to adapt to new challenges. Furthermore, previous attempts at debureaucratization always result in increased demands for laws. Any move to give managers more freedom to control as a result risks limiting discretion. A proactive approach to the use of emerging technology to track the actions of subordinates has also emerged. The military's ability to use modern information technology to monitor and “access” soldiers in the “fog of war” from remote locations led to limit the military’s discretion “on the ground” and to increase expectations for transparency and fault management when things go not according to the ‘plan’ (Hendry, 2006).

There may be negative and positive consequences to this loss of discretion. It seems like post-bureaucracy is ignorant towards current discussions on good governance and the hazards that diverse public administration principles entail. The

defence of three main principles can be boiled down to the roles of the 'state' in public service provision which are (1) impartiality and fairness; (2) efficiency; (3) redundancy and resilience (Grey, 2007). Bureaucracy is required for the preservation of these indisputable goals such as fairness, impartiality, and integrity.

Traditional to Innovation Bureaucracy

Guy Peters (1994) divides the bulk of the theoretical literature on administrative restructuring and reorganisation into three categories: purposeful (top-down) models, environmental (bottom-up) models, and structural models. These models are useful for describing and comprehending the approaches and motivations of contemporary government changes and reorganisations. They also include conceptual structures for the study of modern government and public administration organisation and reorganisation.

It was a major criticism raised for the inefficient and ineffective response of bureaucracy towards the social issues that it follows traditional/ Weberian theory of bureaucracy. Traditional bureaucracy is identified with generalist preference over specialised one, focusing on the leadership position than the leadership function. New forms of bureaucratic organisation has been presented to address these issues with the 'traditional'. The conceptualisations of bureaucracy from pre-modern period till recent reforms in post-bureaucratic era has been presented as alternative theories for accommodating public interests by way of collaboration at multiple levels and innovation. It is true that there were attempts to flatten the vertically structured organisation with techniques of management and entrepreneurship etc. Hence with respect to the possibility of innovation and creativity in a bureaucratic organisation, it is a conclusion made by the literatures that classical theories of bureaucracy were devoid of creativity and innovation. Or it can also be said that these literatures rarely attempted to investigate, as a legitimate and fruitful field of scholarship, the possibility of creative and innovative work in bureaucracy (Styhre, 2007: 59). It was criticised that these conclusion against innovation in bureaucracy is made without any empirical evidence. However, it is argued that 'routinisation of practices' which is central to the bureaucracy kills any tendency of creativity within (Schumann, 1993: 111).

At the same time there are scholars of innovative bureaucracy who argue that the very essence of innovation can be made possible within the ideal type of

organisation as described by Max Weber. They argue that historically Weberian organisation is the beginning of almost all forms of innovative bureaucracy which they call as 'Weber II'. These new organisational forms emerge with the help of a charismatic network of stake holders rather than a single charismatic leadership (Kattel, 2019). Proponents of bureaucracy also argue that innovation and bureaucracy are not two opposite terms. Rather it can ensure "stability and discipline", the famous virtues of bureaucracy, and thereby helps innovation (Craig, 1995: 33).

Another way the bureaucracy has adapted to new management and governance positions is to adjust the way organisations work in order to involve social stakeholders. Government agencies and departments reached out to the public, asking for policy advice and feedback. Government agencies may use such networks to guarantee that society agreement on policies. For example, a substantial proportion of central government officials feel that guiding through networks is an efficient governance strategy, according to a poll of civil servants conducted by the Swedish Central Government Office. Moreover, those networks already have a considerable number of public servants active (Pierre, 1995:192).


Bureaucratisation and Dysfunctional Governance

Another particular domain in the literature on bureaucracy marked their serious concern is 'bureaucratisation'. The term can be understood as "the introduction of systematic administration and the growth of the number of purely administrative employees" (Albrow, 1970: 104). It was rightly observed that "the term 'bureaucratization' serves to designate these patterns of social change, which can be traced to the royal households of medieval Europe, to the eventual employment of university-trained jurists as administrators, to the civilian transformation of military controllers on the Continent, and to the civil-service reforms in England and the United States in the nineteenth century. These several changes were related to other social trends, especially the development of the universities, the money economy, the legal system, and representative institutions (Bendix, 1971: 133)".

Of course, the legal rational authority of the organization makes it more profitable than other types of human organisations. Despite this, it provides a plethora of possible organisational flaws or "bureaupathologies," leading to the most ineffective results (Caiden, 2009: 111). It can be shown in the given parabolic curve that rising

bureaucracy accelerates efficiency at first, then diminishing, and eventually reaches in to an actual decline.

Figure 2.1 A Parabolic Curve of Bureaucratization



Source: (Caiden, 2009: 112)

Studies show that when bureaucratic concepts like specialisation, hierarchy, laws, managerial direction, impersonality, and professionalisation are overused, they can become inefficient and unproductive. Institutions that are over bureaucratized are unpleasant to deal with and uncomfortable to work in. As a result, this parabolic curve depicts how the functional components of bureaucracy become dysfunctional when overused.

During the nineteenth century, as industrialising economies encountered increased efficiency as a result of bureaucratization, scholarly attention was focused on bureaucracy's functionality. The ideal form analysis from Weber may be read as a justification and incitement of bureaucratization, given its alienating effect on individuals and other problematic components. The dysfunctionalities of bureaucratization became increasingly obvious and gained more attention as it grew in the first half of the 20th century, leading bureaucracy to be under growing criticism. However, study on the dysfunctional bureaucracy only began in the second part of the twentieth century. More bureaucratization, according to these researches, might result in so many "bureaupathologies" that bureaucracy would become dysfunctional, efficiency would deteriorate, and production would be hindered. Hence these studies suggested that many organisations that are already over bureaucratized would benefit

from debureaucratization (Caiden, 2009: 111). As a result of these critics, policymakers must consider new methods of providing public services, such as collaborative and sensitive management experiments with debureaucratization to boost efficiency. Debureaucratization decreases the bureaucracy's distinctive characteristics, both in terms of autonomy and explicit rules and priorities, to the point that its tasks and activities are taken over by other groups or organisations.

Conclusion

As stated in the beginning, the chapter looked at the concept of bureaucracy as a discourse that arises and is constantly re-formulated, as well as a unique organisational form. A criticism to the reformulating concepts of bureaucracy is that they do not mirror empirical conditions in society as happens in the discursive production of concepts. The majority of the concepts analysed under this chapter are centred their arguments on the flaws of the bureaucracy although there is no doubt that there is no organisational structure with “prescriptive and descriptive certainty” yet emerged to replace it. Democratisation of the societies uprising the demand of people and their increased public involvement in the administrative matters is the major reason, along with the emergence of liberalisation ideals, for the constant re-formulations on the concept of bureaucracy. Along with that there is trend in the present society towards more fluid and fluxing ideologies. Modern period is characterised by constant change and is credited for liberation of human beings from conventional institutions and structures. Almost all post- bureaucratic organisational theories emphasise on point that the bureaucracy as such emphasises on the pre-modern virtues of “stability and fortification”. Although there are problems with such sweeping conclusions it cannot be denied that the apprehension of elite power and domination by a small group of technocrats seems to have continued over time. Today, generally there are unprecedented lows in the public perception of bureaucrats and bureaucracies, as incompetence and inefficiency are often linked with government departments.

Among the bureaucratic concepts discussed so far Post bureaucratic reforms under NPM is presented as the latest. As the background of this particular research is set in India, this management bureaucracy has been widely criticised as not appropriate for a pluralist as well as developing country like us. However, there are experimentations in the field of bureaucratic governance under the principles of ‘New Public Governance’

by means of collaborative and innovative efforts. A theoretical conceptualisation of this type of bureaucracy is still in the phase of emerging. The following chapters may contribute in that conceptualisation.

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Chapter III

Dilemmas in the Evolution of the Indian Bureaucracy

As discussed in the last chapter the major criticism received by most concepts of bureaucracy has been that these are not substantiated from the field of bureaucratic practices. A conceptualisation in the 'air' without looking at the field of practice and to other specificities does not provide any help in improving the organisation. Similarly, it is significant that every analysis of bureaucracy should look at the historical background of the region and the institution. It can say to us how the impact of globalisation and neo liberal values varies from one region to other, country from country and city to city. Especially for the purpose of this study which analyses the reforms in the Indian bureaucracy, it wouldn't be complete without looking at the evolution of the bureaucratic administration in the Indian Territory. This chapter is specifically concerned how the transformations from one system of bureaucracy to the other through time contributed to the efficiency of its services and what are the factors accelerated the change.

As an institution bureaucracy is one of the oldest form in the history of state and administration. Bureaucracy and administration have existed since the dawn of civilisation. Its origins can be traced back to antiquity. Bureaucracy has played a powerful role in the history of administration of great empires and civilizations such as Persian, Chinese and Roman. It can be described in three major phases which are ancient, colonial and modern. Before going into the Indian context, a brief of global historical perspective is given

History of Bureaucracy in a Global Perspective

Since the dawn of civilization, bureaucracy has been served as a central institution of administration. The origins of bureaucracy can be traced back over ten thousand years to ancient Susa, one of early Iran's oldest human towns. (Farazmand, 2009: 3). Records on early Iran and the Elamite Empire, which provided the world one of the two first prototype writing alphabets, the Elamite script, the other being the Sumerian alphabet, show presence of bureaucracy served as a large-scale organisation of public administration. Both ancient China and India left administrative legacies. However, despite the fact the former was more centralised and constrained latter was

more short-lived and local both lacked organisational cohesion, effectiveness, continuity and productivity.

While bureaucracies were vital in China, Egypt, and Rome for getting things done and aiding in political rule, the Persian bureaucracy later evolved and advanced to such a high degree that academics continue to study its aspects and learn from its amazing growth. Civilizations and governances have coexisted, advanced, and evolved, each supporting the others (Waldo, 1992). Bureaucracy can be seen developed through the other early civilizations, including the Egyptians and the Romans in a much later period. The early civilizations owe a great deal to the impressive role of bureaucracy as a tool of “power, public works implementation and the planning and execution of monumental works such as the Suez Canal in Egypt under the Persians, the Chinese Walls, and the pyramids of Egypt” (Frazmand, 2009: 3). Engineers, architects, planners, and administrators from the Persian Empire and Egypt are credited with variety of advancements in public administration. The previous bureaucracies were responsible for enormous accomplishments in massive public undertakings such as “underground irrigation systems, roads and communications, and legal systems in early Iran, legal codes, and mathematical and medical works in Egypt, and elsewhere” (Frazmand, 2009: 5). However, Persia and Rome, the two most powerful empires in ancient history, were aided in establishing large-scale administrative structures by the subsequent development of bureaucracy.

Thus, the origins of bureaucracy can be traced back to Persia, China, and Egypt in the ancient world, and much later to Rome. Even though other ancient world bureaucracies existed, it was the Persian bureaucracy's sophistication, structure, and efficient performance that made it world famous, earning it the title of “second to none in human history” (Olmstead, 1948). For the same reason the administrators from the Persian Empire were regarded as the most capable, “excellent administrators” and they were highly respected within the society and among the rulers. Cyrus the Great established Achaemenid Persia in 559 BC, and it was the most powerful and largest empire in the ancient world. Its 230 years dominance over the world was based on the principles of “tolerant governance, respect for local customs and values, Religious and political freedom, free education and freedom from slavery” with a centralization and

decentralisation organisational framework that provided for greatest flexibility in government administration (Farazmand ,2009: 3).⁵

Beside from countless inventions, advancements, and public monuments like Persepolis, Persia's one-mile-long ceremonial royal palace complex, the Persian bureaucracy has also provided the world with concepts of contemporary governance and administrative systems in both East and West, organisational theory, administrative ethics, and more. Furthermore, “chequebooks, stock market exchange concepts, individual and company taxes, fixed and variable property taxation, public finance and management, legal administration, enormous engineering and communicative expertise through the Postal Pony Express postal system, banking systems, and paved and unpaved royal roads that connected the vast empire from the Pacific Ocean to the Persian Gulf, as well as the Lydian Satrapy of Persia's Mediterranean city of Sardis” were also the contributions of these bureaucracies. The Chinese civil service, like the early Egyptian, Babylonian, and Assyrian bureaucracies, had some significant accomplishments and contributions, albeit none of that was ever as great as the Persian, and all three were absorbed by the Persian World State Empire in the sixth and fifth century BC.

The tremendous successes in big public works projects in 16th and 17th century Persia under the centralised Safavid Empire, as well as the Ottoman Empire into the 20th century until its collapse, were aided by bureaucracy. Although the British, German, Dutch, and Portuguese colonisers had well established an older version of colonial bureaucratic order in Asia, Latin America, and North America, in the mid-nineteenth century, modern bureaucracy began to form in Europe, first in Prussia and Germany, then in France and England, before spanning throughout the continent. In these countries, industrialization and centralization were once again followed by the creation of a necessary centralised bureaucracy.

In the service of Europe's absolutist monarchies, colonial bureaucracies were “stiff, rule-bound, exploitative, elitist, and repressive”. The oppressed sometimes organised mass revolts against these repressive regimes' brutal bureaucracies in order

⁵ After conquering Babylon and releasing all Babylonian slaves and prisoners, including over 45,000 Jews, Cyrus the Great announced the first Universal Human Rights Charter in Babylon on October 29, 537 B.C., making it the first time in history that slavery was abolished. See (Farazmand, 2009) for details.

to replace them with more humane and inclusive systems. Against the brutal and corrupt bureaucracy led by absolute Monarchy in France oppressed class along with the urban proletariat revolted which was recorded as the French Revolution, then the Paris Commune of 1871. Similarly, the revolutions of 1848 which began in France and spread to all major parts of Europe, and others are examples of this kind (Farazmand, 2009). Also, the eighteenth and nineteenth centuries witnessed number of revolts and revolutions in North America and Latin America along with the American independence movement. Until the 1950s in Asia and Africa persistent military-bureaucratic rule was present. Military continued to dominate in certain countries in the region despite the majority of the countries broke free from the weight of colonial repression.

Twentieth century witnessed more sophisticated face of modern bureaucracy in the western world. Everywhere, bureaucracy achieved its apex of power, competence, and institutional skills, resulting in a flurry of academic research on the role, nature, and functions of bureaucracy. Moreover, this was the century in which bureaucracy marked its significant role both in public governance and business administration and as a result, large-scale corporate organisations and multinational enterprises have risen around the world. Bureaucracy is responsible for a wide range of accomplishments in the public sector, including economic and cultural management, domestic and international governance, and much more. However, the institutional capacity and legitimacy of bureaucracy as an instrument of governance and administration had reduced by the late twentieth century due to the criticism from multiple corners. As a result, has bureaucracy vanished? Bureaucracy has sustained millennia of reform and will continue to do so. Its character and functions, however, have changed significantly as a response to the socio-political and economic transformations in the global level.

Bureaucracy in Ancient Indian Administration

Kautilya's *Arthashastra* contains the first detailed discussion of public administration in India. *Dharmasastra*, *Shukraniti*, and Thiruvalluvar's *Kural* were also useful for determining the responsiveness of the ancient politico-administrative system. The Indus Valley Civilization laid the foundations for a well-organized governmental organisation. Cities had a type of municipal government that was responsible for maintaining roads and drainage. A single type of building, a common system of weights

and measures, and a common script all point to a unified administrative structure in the region. It dealt with civic issues and made systemic arrangements for city residents (Sarkar, 2010: 5). In this Indus Valley setup, an unequal distribution of profit divided the people into two classes: urban dwellers and cultivators, who made up the majority of the population, and dwellers and cultivators, who made up the majority of the population. The ruling upper class in the Indus Valley ruled over the working class, using religion as a powerful tool to keep violence to a minimum. As a result, they were able to persuade the majority of the working population of the effectiveness of their administrative policies. From the early Harappan settlement on the site of a pre-Indus hamlet to the time of violent destruction, conservatism based on monopoly profits and religion would explain the Indus valley civilization's static nature (Kosambi, 1956: 65).

There were no advanced civilised states that could be compared to the Indus Valley civilization after it was overthrown and the majority of its territory was occupied by Aryans. Until the later Vedic era, there were no regular settlements in the Indus region, and those tribes that did settle there always fought each other for survival before scattering. The four varnas of the caste system, *Brahmana*, *Kshathriya*, *Vyshya*, and *Sudra*, were a major feature of this age, in which the rulers of the system, the *Kshathriyas*, exploited the lower castes *Vyshyas* and *Sudras* with the assistance of priests *Brahmanas*. During this period, the king or monarch held all of the authority and responsibility for the state's administration. There was a lot of development in the later Vedic period, which is known as the *Brahmana* period. Because the Vedic period in India archaeologically draws a complete blank and the Vedic texts available as resources do not mention much about the administrative system, the state organisation was stabilised and established, and a variety of offices were recorded, even if their exact functions are not always clear (Basham, 1975: 28). Kul, Gram, and Vish and Nation were the Rigvedic administrative units. During this period, monarchy was the established form of government, and office of the king was known as "primogenitor." In fact, they were required to take an oath to serve the people at the time of coronation (Sarkar, 2010: 5).

The rise of mighty kingdoms marked the post-Vedic period. As the socio-political situation evolved, it became necessary to increase the number of officers available to help the king in the day-to-day administration. The king used to seek advice from his Council of Ministers on how to run the government (Sarkar, 2010: 5). The

Council of Ministers was led by Mukhyamatya. As a continuation of the Vedic era, Sabha and Samiti existed in the post-vedic period. These were two powerful institutions tasked with putting a stop to the king's despotism. The king was in charge of the judicial administration, which was aided by other officials.

The Ramayana and Mahabharata are two Indian classics that belong to the epic period. The Ramayana era was characterised by monarchical government. The king was in charge of administration. Ministers and councillors used to advise him on matters of state and government. During the Mahabharata period, the state was known as 'Saptanghi,' and monarchy was the primary form of government. There used to be a council of ministers and officials in charge of administration.

Large empires began to crumble after the Battle of Kurukshetra, and several republican states known as 'Mahajanapadas' arose in their place. During the Buddha's reign, 'Mahajanapadas' served as administrative centres. Kasi, Kosala, Kuru, Anga, Avanti, and Gandhara are among the sixteen Mahajanapadas. The real power in republics was held by 'Sabhas,' which included both the common people and the elite. The king was the republic's head and was elected for a set period of time. He had to answer to the council, or the 'Sabha,' for his actions.

Under the leadership of Chandragupta Maurya and Ashoka, the administrative system reached its pinnacle during the Mauryan period. The government was structured in a hierarchical and centralised manner, which necessitated the hiring of a large number of people to ensure the efficiency and innovation of the job (Rathore, 1978: 3). There was a regular collection of taxes, smooth run of trade and commerce. Moreover, subjects were looked after and the military wing remained vigilant in the face of any external resentment or threat. Every province had its own officials in charge of dealing with local government administration. The economy of the Mauryan Empire was mostly focused on agricultural products and agriculture and livestock were the people's main occupations. Law and order maintenance, the protection of individuals and property, defence against violence and providing welfare services to the people, including measures to ensure the moral growth of individuals were all key tasks of the state at the period.

The role of the Amatya, who was just below the king, was another feature of Mauryan administration. In terms of rank, he was similar to the current Cabinet

Secretary. The Amatyas could only be nominated if they were competent, dependable, faithful, scholarly, and well-connected. They were incredibly intelligent, effective, and quick to make decisions. All ministers, Amatyas, and department heads are divided into eighteen *Tirthas*⁶ by Kautilya. They are as following:

1. Mantrin	- Minister/ Counsellor
2. Purohita	- Priest
3. Senapati	- Commander of the Army
4. Yuvaraja	- Prince
5. Dauvarika	- Chief of palace attendants
6. Antarvamsika	- Chief of king's guard
7. Prasastr	- Magistrate
8. Samahartr	- Collector-General
9. Samnidhatr	- Chief treasurer
10. Pradestr	- Commissioner
11. Nayak	- Town guard
12. Paur	- Chief of the town
13. Karmanta	- Superintend of mines
14. MantrinparishadAdhyaksha	- Chief of council of ministers
15. Dandpala	- Officer of the army department
16. Durgapala	- Guardian of the forts
17. Antapala	- Officer in charge boundaries
18. Ativahika	- Officer-in-charge forests

Source: (Arora and Goyal, 1996: 9)

There were four provinces in the empire, one of which was Pataliputra, the Mauryan Empire's capital city, which was both mythical and functional. As a result, the city's administration during the Mauryan dynasty required sensitivity. The city's municipal administration was overseen by six boards or departments. Each board had a total of five members. These boards were in charge of commercial matters such as industry, census, commerce, manufacturing and sales, collection of taxes and the welfare of foreigners in the city. The administration of the four provincial capitals⁷ was

⁶ *Tirthas* refers to the departments of the Mauryan administration (Arora and Goyal, 1996)

⁷ The names of the four provincial capitals, Tosali in the east, Ujjain in the west, Suvarnagiri in the south, and Taxila in the north, are also included in the Ashokan proclamations.

headed by Kumara, or royal prince and he also played the role of the representative of the King in the provinces. Mahamatyas and a council of ministers assisted the kumara in his efforts. The districts were assigned to officials known as Pradeshikas or Sthanikas. The Gramanis served as the village rulers. At the top of the administrative hierarchy, the Emperor and his Mantri parishad, or Council of Ministers, were placed. Despite being an absolute monarch with total authority, the king was accountable to his citizens. His Majesty's power was supreme as the head of the army as well as the chief justice of the territory. The Yuvaraja aided the emperor in decision-making and implementation.

Many of the Mauryan administrative system's customs are similar to those of modern-day India's administrative structure and procedure. In the Mauryan administration, for example, there were three classes of government officials: municipal officers, military officers, and village officers. There was a central office that housed all of the government's records and correspondence.

The Gupta kings who succeeded the Mauryan Dynasty built their administration on the institutions passed down from Mauryan rulers, with some modifications. The Guptas managed their vast empire in a systematic manner, both in the centre and in the provinces (Jayapalan, 2001: 19). The king was aided by a council of ministers during this time, which followed a monarchical form of government. The entire central administration was divided into departments, each of which was overseen by a different officer. For administrative purposes, the empire was divided into provinces, regions, and 'Vishyas.' The smallest administrative unit was known as 'Gram,' which was led by the 'Gramin' and assisted by the 'Gram Sabha'.

Bureaucracy and Administration during Medieval Period in India

Rajput rule is the beginning of mediaeval Indian administration. During the Rajput period, monarchy was the most common form of government. The state was divided into smaller units, with 'Prant' being the largest (Jayapalan, 2001: 20). It's worth noting that during this period, popular control over Gram Panchayats waned, and their importance waned as well. The main reason for this was that the Rajput administrative system was largely based on the Gupta administration, in which the role of the village Panchayat was relatively minor (Sarkar, 2010: 9). The old institutions had lost their value and were rapidly deteriorating and dying out.

Bureaucracy under Sultanate

After the Turkish invasion the Rajputs disappeared from the scene and the Sultanate administration came into force in the northern part of India. All dynasties of sultanate period basically followed military form of administration and the rulers were autocrats (Sarkar, 2010: 9). As the state's legal head and chief executive, as well as the highest court of appeal, the Sultan dominated the central government. A number of ministers assisted him. *Wazir*, *Ariz-i-Mamalik*, the *Diwan-i-Insha*, and the *Diwan-i-Risalat* were the four top ministries nominated by the slave dynasty sultans. After some time, the state nominated an extraordinary officer known as *Naib-ul-Mulk*, *Maliknaib*, or the regent. Two additional department heads, *Sadr-us-Sadur* and the *Diwan-i-Qaza*, were elevated to the role of central ministers after the sultanate was well established. After the Sultan, the commander of the royal army received his rank. The *Majilis-i-Am* or *Majilis-i-Khawat* was founded by the crown prince with the above ministers which acted as a council of advisors made up of the state's most trusted and highest officials (Jayapalan, 2001: 21).

The *Wazir* adapted as well, with *Vakil* as Prime Minister and the *Diwan-i-Wizarat* as his department. Along with his role as the financial department head he was also in control of the entire administrative setup for the most part. The ministry of defence which had the charge of army establishments was headed by the *Diwan-i-Arz*. He was in charge of the royal army's organisation and upkeep, as well as its disciplinary supervision. The royal court's correspondence and records department was known as *Diwan-i-Insha*, and it was overseen by a central minister known as *Dabir-i-Mamlik*, *Dabir-i-Khas*, or *Amir Munshi*. The fourth pillar of the imperial administration of the Sultanate was the *Diwan-i-Risalat*. Religious affairs under this rule were supervised by an official called as *Sadr-us-Sadur*. The *Diwan-i-Risalat* department was removed from the *Sadr*'s control and renamed *Diwan-i-Riyasat* during the reign of Alauddin Khalji. Its main job was to carry out the sultan's economic laws and keep a tight grip on the markets and prices. Other notable officials of the time included *Barid-i-Mamalik*, *Vakil-i-Dar*, *Amir-i-Barbak*, *Amir-i-Hajib*, *Amir-i-Majlis*, *Amir-i-Shikar* (Saran, 1978: 10).

Despite the fact that sultanate rule was completely centralised, with the entire administrative system revolving around the King, rulers used gentle forms of delegation even at the central bureaucracy, and villages at the time were characterised by self-rule

to some extent. The Sultanate's administration reflects some of the Muslim culture that was prevalent in Central Asia and Europe at the time. Following the sultanates, the Mughal administration adopted a reformed version of the sultanate's administrative structure.

Bureaucratic system of the ruler Shershah

Before delving into the specifics of Mughal administration, it's important to look at the administrative system in place during Shershah's reign. Shershah lived at the same time as Mughal emperors Humayun and Babur. He was a capable Afghan ruler who was well-known for being a good organiser and a capable military commander. During his reign, he established an effective bureaucracy and strictly adhered to the traditional sultanate administrative system. Shershah divided his empire into three provinces for administrative purposes, with each province divided into 47 divisions known as *Sarkars*. These provinces were divided into *Parganas*, which were smaller administrative units. In his revenue administration, Shershah abolished the system of landlords and middlemen. The modern Ryotwari settlement is compared to his income management. He settled the land revenue directly with the peasants after a thorough survey of the land and set the State demand at one-third of the gross produce, payable in cash or in kind. He told the revenue officers to be lenient when it came to assessments, but strict when it came to collection.

Mughal Administration and Bureaucracy

The administration was entirely taken over by Mughal emperors after Shershah's reign. The *Ain-i-Akbari* (the Emperor Akbar's institutes), The *Tuzuk-i-Jahangiri* (Memoirs of Jahangir), and *Munthakhab-ul-Twarikh* written by Abul Fazal, Khwaza Nizamuddin Ahmed, and Abdul Qadir Badaoni are the most important sources of information on Mughal administration. The administrative system in India under Mughal rule underwent many significant changes, particularly during the reigns of Akbar (1556-1605), Jahangir (1605-1627), and Shahjahan (1605-1627). (1627-1658). In terms of administrative ability, Akbar was the best of them. He possessed exceptional administrative skills, and the Mughal Empire was probably the most well-organized and prosperous empire in the world at the time (Arora, 1978: 5). The Perso-Arabic system served as the foundation for the Mughal administration. The king was required to rule in accordance with Islamic tradition and to follow the *Ulemas'* commands.

The Mughal administration's highly centralised nature was one of its most notable features. The Emperor was a complete autocrat who wielded all powers, including military, administrative, and judicial. He was the head of both the civil and military administrations, and he was in charge of appointing and dismissing all high-ranking officials. He delegated authority on occasion and kept a close eye on his servants' activities. The emperor was assisted by a few important officers known as *Wazir* and *Diwan*. There was no ordinary council of ministers for the Mughal Emperor. The *Wazir* or *Diwan* was the emperor's second-highest official, but the other officials were not regarded as his peers in any way. They were admitted to be his subordinates and deserved to be referred to as secretaries rather than ministers (Sarkar, 1920: 27). Mughal emperors regarded provincial governors as merely administrative officials. They were nominated by the emperor and were subject to his whims. Provincial administration existed in the Mughal administration for the sake of organisational efficiency. Each province's authority was split among three top officials: *Subhedar*, *Diwan*, and *Bakshi*, who were all self-governing and acted independently within their provinces.

The Mughal administration was military by nature, and every officer had to be enrolled in the army list in order to be approved as a government officer, a system known as the *Mansabdari* system. The Mughal system had a highly bureaucratic hierarchy of officials known as *Mansabdars* (Rathore, 1978: 7) who were given a specified number of people to serve in the military. Each of them was the commander of his troop's horsemen, which determined their status and pay. The top levels of this organisational hierarchy were occupied by administrative heads at headquarters known as *Diwan*, the chief revenue officer *Khalsa*, and a superintendent known as *Serishtadar*, while the Village *Patwaris* were at the bottom. The *Mansabs* commanded anywhere from ten to 5,000 troops in the early years of Akbar's reign. As a result, the highest *Mansabs* were raised from 10,000 to 12,000, but the number of *Mansabdars* was not corrected. Their numbers continued to rise from Akbar's reign to Aurangzeb's. During Akbar's reign, the total number of *Mansabdars* was 1803; however, by the end of Aurangzeb's reign, their number had increased dramatically to 14,449.

The services were recruited solely on the basis of merit (Rathore, 1978: 7). Men with talent or capacity from various parts of the Muslim world were drawn to the Mughal capital, where their abilities were encouraged and recognised by the Mughal

administrators by appointing them to appropriate administrative positions. *I'timad-ud-Dawlah* and *Chin Qilia Khan*, for example, rose to positions of power. Anyone who demonstrated a talent for military or civil service was eligible to join the Mughal army, and capable individuals were promoted as well.

The Mughal administration had several departments, such as the revenue department, which was responsible for revenue collection and administration. The *Diwan* or *Wazir* supervised and controlled this department. The *Khan-i-Sama* was in control of the imperial household department. The emperor's personal servants were all under his command. He was also in charge of the emperor's daily expenses, including food, supermarkets, and so on. *Mir Bakshi* was in charge of the military pay and accounts office. He was the central government's payment authority. He assisted the King in the *Mansabdars'* appointment. The *Qazi* was in charge of the law department. He was the chief judge in criminal cases tried under Muslim law, and he was responsible for the administration of the law of the land. The *Sadr* was in charge of the religious affairs department. He was the *Ulema's* spokesman and the guardian of Islamic law. The *Muhthasib* was the head of the department of public morals censorship. It looked into issues of morality and human behaviour, and those who engaged in anti-religious acts were punished. The artillery, led by *Mir Atish* or *Daroga-i-Topkhana*, and the department of intelligence and posts, headed by the *Dwaraka* and *DakChouki*, were the other two departments.

Mughal administration was a paper-based government, according to Arora and Goyal (1996: 22), due to the vast territory, slow modes of transportation and communications, and lack of political initiative among the rulers. As a result, there was an increase in official correspondence and the creation of enormous records. The Mughal administration was primarily focused on the law enforcement and tax collection. The government did not take any special measures to advance the common man's social or economic well-being. The Mughal government's agrarian administration was the most well-organized branch. Many significant reforms occurred in this region, and the peasants benefited greatly as a result of these changes.

Despite all of these reforms, the Mughal Empire remained a failure by the eighteenth century. The failure of Mughal administration was caused by a number of factors. The Mughal rulers attempted to establish a uniform administrative apparatus

throughout the empire, but they were unable to establish a nation state. While establishing administrative machinery based on Hindu, Mughal, and Persian elements, the Mughals did not demonstrate any organisational innovation. As a result, the central government's law and order system weakened, and they were unable to provide much resistance as the British conquerors invaded the empire's political and economic domains. The Mughal Empire was not safe in the hands of weak rulers due to the penetration of British colonial rule and political disunity in the country.

Indian Bureaucracy and Administration during Modern Period

With the arrival of the British, the modern Indian administration was born. As stated in the introduction, the structure of the Indian administration at present is largely a replica of the British administration that existed prior to independence. Structurally and functionally, it can be traced back to the British period especially in the aspects of “the secretariat system, All-India Services, recruitment, training, office processes, district administration, local administration, budgeting, auditing, centralising trends, police administration, revenue administration” (Srivastava, 2009). The British Crown granted a group of traders a monopoly over trade in the East on December 31, 1600, and they came to India for trade but found themselves in the role of rulers. As a result, it became necessary to create a type of administration that was suitable for their new task of governance, one that rotated around and focused solely on trade and business. The purpose of every administrative mechanism introduced by the British in India was not to benefit the citizens of this country, but to make it easier for Britain to accumulate wealth and gain economic and political power. The British era of two hundred years can be divided into two parts which the administration of the East India Company and the administration of India under the Crown 1858 to 1947.

Following the fall of the Mughal Empire, the East India Company gained control of a vast swath of the Indian subcontinent and wielded immense political clout. The East India Company operated under the British Queen's overall political control. However, The Crown was not in charge of the administration. The two governing bodies for the company's administration were the Board of Control and the Court of Directors. The members of the Court of Directors were nominated by the Company's

proprietors, while the members of the Board of Control were appointed by the British Parliament. These two bodies, which were largely independent, determined the Company's course of action in India.

The Regulating Act of 1773

“The British Parliament enacted a series of laws among which the Regulating Act of 1773 stood first to curb the company traders unrestrained commercial activities and to bring about some order in territories under company control” (Heitzman and Worden, 1995). The company's primary focus was on maximising profits rather than ensuring the welfare and well-being of its employees. As a result, the company's rule became brutal, driven by the need to obtain more resources from India. There were allegations about the Company's mismanagement, which prompted the company's rulers to try to reform its administration. The House of Commons established a secret committee to investigate the complaints' veracity. The committee's findings were extremely damaging to the company. The Regulating Act of 1773 was enacted as a result of this. It was the first formal articulation of British India, and the Company's dual government was abolished. This Act laid the groundwork for India's Constitution and was the first in a series of Acts that shaped the country's government structure (Dutt, 2006: 45).

The Regulating Act was passed by Lord North's government in 1773, it is also known as Lord North's Bill. As a result of this Act, the British government assumed some responsibility for ruling British India. The East India Company and the Government each nominated a Governor-General and Council under this legislation. The Bengal Governor Warren Hastings was appointed Governor General, with extensive civil and military authority over the Madras and Bombay Presidencies, as well as the administration of territorial acquisitions and revenues in Bengal, Bihar, and Orissa. He was aided by a four-member council appointed by the Crown. Even though it had to operate under the oversight, direction, and control of the Court of Directors in Britain, the council had supreme authority and decisions were made by a majority vote.

This Act, according to Bidyuth Chakrabarty, was a watershed moment in India's public administration (Chakrabarty and Chand, 2012: 388). For the first time, the British Parliament intervened in the affairs of India through this Act. The Act endorsed important administrative values and contributed to a socio-political climate that

eventually led to the adoption of more stringent legal provisions. It rejected the governor's model of individual-based administration. The council was also held accountable to the Crown. The Regulating Act was the first step toward centralization. The Governor General in Council became India's supreme ruler, and the governors of three presidencies were reduced to subordinate governments: Bengal, Madras, and Bombay. The Act also established a Supreme Court of Judicature in Calcutta to punish people who worked directly or indirectly for company. Because the governors of the presidencies remained administratively independent in their respective domains, the Act recommended unitary command by suggesting the Governor General in Council's supremacy. It was also a device for limited decentralisation because the governors of the presidencies remained administratively independent in their respective domains.

Simultaneously, the Bill for the Enactment of the 1773 Act was met with fierce opposition from various quarters. Edmund Burke saw the Bill as an unnecessary Parliamentary intervention that went against the spirit of the British nation's laws and Constitution. He slammed the bill as an affront to national rights, national faith, and national justice. The Directors of the East India Company were also concerned about the Bill's motivations. They immediately accused Lord North of attempting to overwhelm the Company and eventually transfer ownership to the Crown. The City of London also objected, claiming that the privileges enjoyed by the City of London are protected in the same way as those enjoyed by the East Indian Company. The Bill, named the Regulating Act of 1773, was eventually passed. It had been a lengthy legal document. It restructured the Company's constitution as it operated in London, as well as making significant changes to the Indian government.

According to Prof. Dodwell, "Regulating Act of 1773 was a medley of inconsistencies dictated by tyranny yet bearing throughout each line the mark of ignorance". One of the Act's biggest flaws was that the Governor General was overruled by his councillors, and he had no veto power in front of them. Some of the councillors were inept and unfit for the job, causing problems for the Governor General. The Act also had a flaw in terms of the Supreme Court's jurisdiction. Its relationship with the governor general and the council was unclear. Another significant flaw was the Governor General's lack of interest in presidencies. The presidencies of Madras and Bombay acted independently in the face of an emergency, waging wars and creating coalitions before notifying the Governor General in Council. Lack of efficient

machinery to study and scrutinise the reports submitted by the Governor General in Council in India was also a flaw (Shyam, 2002: 50).

The Declaratory Act, 1781, The Pitt's India Bill, 1784 and the Amendment Act of 1786 removed the flaws in the Regulating Act 1773. The Declaratory Act, 1781 demarcated the relations between the Supreme Court and the council. The Governor General was granted veto authority by the Act of 1784. The office of Governor General was given control of the presidencies. Lord Cornwallis accepted the governor-generalship of India on February 23, 1786. Before stepping down on August 13, 1793, he instituted a number of legal and institutional changes, including the 1793 Cornwallis Code (Britannica Encyclopaedia).

The Cornwallis Code was a set of laws passed by the East India Company in 1793 to upgrade their administration in India. The first and most important thing he had to deal with was preventing corruption. For this, he prohibited civil servants from accepting gifts, salaries, or bribes, among other things. The company's servants were corrupt, ineffective, and irresponsible individuals. Cornwallis realised that the company's servants' meagre wages allowed them to engage in a variety of private trades to supplement their profits. As a result, Cornwallis agreed to increase the pay of the company's servants (Priyadarsini, 2018). He passed laws prohibiting private trade. He also developed the policy of implementing seniority-based promotions. The districts were subdivided into smaller *thanas*, each with its own Inspector. In each district, a senior officer with the title of superintendent of police was assigned to supervise the Inspectors' work. He increased the pay for all police officers. As a result of separating the judiciary and the executive, he was able to provide equal justice to all people.

The Pitt's India Act of 1784

A Board of Control was constituted by the Pitt's India Act of 1784, which was made up of six Crown-appointed members. The Secretary of State for India, the Secretary of Finance, and four Privy Councillors of State for India served on the commission. All activities of the civil and military governments of the British territorial possessions in East India remained under the board's supervision, direction, and authority. The Court of Directors was charged with the commercial affairs of the company in India. There was a reduction in the number of members from four to three in the Council of the Governor-General, including the Commander-in-Chief. Pitt's India Act established a system that lasted until 1858. According to which he Indian

Government was bound to a dual control structure in which the Company may make suggestions that were subject to the Board's reviewing and directing authority..

The Pitt's Act was significant because it established the British Crown's superiority over the Company's controlled territories. Administration had evolved into a complex system involving those appointed by the King and held accountable to Parliament through various structural mechanisms. The British government wanted to establish a system of administration in India that was qualitatively different from anything that had come before. The act established a new policy toward the Indian princes, requiring the company to pursue a policy of non-interference in their affairs. To put it another way, the company was limited to the areas that it already controlled. The non-intervention policy was short-lived, and by the end of the eighteenth century, the British Empire in India had been converted into the British Empire of India, particularly with the arrival of Wellesley as Governor General (Chakrabarty and Chand, 2012: 390).

The arrival of Governor General Wellesley marked a watershed moment in India's civil service evolution (1798-1805). He founded Fort Willam College to train new recruits. The then Court of Directors disapproved Wellesley College in 1806 and paved the way for the establishment of East India College in Haileybury, England, to provide two years of training to recruits. The Company's patronage was terminated as a result of this act.

The Charter of 1833

The most important legislative intervention in Indian administration was the Charter Act of 1833. The British parliament passed the Act with an aim to regulate the East India Company in India. It was a rewrite of the Charter Act of 1813. It was enacted in response to pressure from the British merchant lobby on the British Parliament to take control of Indian administration because the East India Company was posing undue resistance to new businesses wishing to set up shop in India. The Company's monopoly in tea trade with India and general trade with China was terminated by the British Parliament, which continued to run Indian administration through the Company's Board of Control. New businesses can now set up shop in Indian territories and buy land. The procedural stumbling as well as the licensing system for new merchants was removed. 'The act established a strong centralised government for British India as a whole; such legislative centralisation ensured the country's legal uniformity. It was also supposed to ensure that Indians were treated fairly and equally

when applying for state jobs” (Dutt, 2006: 45). The Company's position was changed from commercial to administrative and political as a result of this Act. The merchandise titles were changed into bureaucratic titles with a hierarchy of first, second and third class civil servants. A new Presidency of Agra was created, and the Governor of Bengal was converted to the Governor General of India. The Governor General had direct control over the presidencies of Bombay, Madras, and Calcutta. The most notable feature was the Law Commission's Civil and Criminal Procedure Codes, which were prepared for the entire country under Macaulay's leadership.

This act was revised again in 1853, after a twenty-year gap. The East India Company's powers were significantly weakened as a result of this act. It effectively gave the Company the authority to rule the Indian territories on behalf of the Crown. The permission of the British Parliament, on the other hand, was made mandatory. The Parliament also made provisions for the Law Commission's rules, regulations, reports, and drafts to be examined. The Charter Act is also recalled as the final in a series of similar laws. Indian nationals were previously barred from serving in the Indian civil service.⁸ The Court of Directors used to make recommendations for civil servant appointments. With the passage of the Charter Act of 1853, this practise was abolished, and civil servants were selected through competitive examinations.

Macaulay Committee and the Modern Civil Service in India

According to the recommendations of Macaulay Committee, patronage-based system of the East India Company should be reformed with permanent civil service and recruitment to which should be based on merit and competitive admission tests. For that matter they established first modern civil service Commission in London in 1854. The Report observes, “Henceforth, an appointment to the civil service of the Company will not be a matter of favour but a matter of right. He who obtains such an appointment will owe it solely to his own abilities and industry”. According to it, for the Indian Civil Service, only the finest and brightest will suffice. The Committee went on to state in the Report, “it is undoubtedly desirable that the civil servants of the Company should have received the best, the most finished education that the native country affords”. The

⁸ Clause 87 of the Act stated that no one could be denied employment with the Company due to their caste, colour, creed, or place of birth.

Company's civil officials should have obtained a first degree in arts at Oxford or Cambridge, according to the Report.

Recruitment to the Indian Civil Service became entirely merit based after 1855 once the competitive examinations with that objective started to conduct however even these examinations were held at London and the syllabus of which was dominated by European classics. All of these made it a mountain task for Indian candidates who wish to join civil services. More than two-thirds of individuals who joined the ICS between 1855 and 1878 were university men with a liberal and complete education, according to the Civil Service Commissioners' report (Misra, 1977). As initially only Oxford and Cambridge qualified were sought for the ICS, it was undoubtedly an elite service. It later welcomed Indians, and the Indian Civil Service Examination was held for the first time in India in 1922.

The Government of India Act 1858

The Government of India Act of 1858 was significant in Indian history since it made the Company to hand over the power to the Crown. The Act stated that India would now be governed in Her Majesty's name, and the Governor General's title would be changed to Viceroy of India. It also provided for the Company's military and naval forces to be transferred to the Crown. The act also makes significant changes, such as the elimination of the Court of Directors and the Board of Control, the transfer of government, territories, and revenues from the authority and control of the Company to that of the Crown, and so on. As a member of the Cabinet, the Secretary of State was paid from revenues created in India. A legislative and permanent Under-Secretary aided him in his constitutional and administrative duties. The Council was constituted to help him and perform his duties most efficiently in the name of the India council. The Act of 1858 was similar to the previous acts in that it made no significant changes in colonial administration other than vesting the entire country's revenue in the Governor General and Council (Chakrabarty and Chand, 2012: 393). While this transfer of power took place there were 846 civil service posts under Civil Establishment of the Company (Greene, 2000: 90). After the transfer the new service is called as "Covenanted Civil Service of India". Such a name was due to a practice of signing a Covenant with the

Secretary of the state expressing his terms of service under the Crown.⁹ Those who were admitted to the service from India were coming under the uncovenanted service.

This agreement made the official to bound by a certain set of conditions and responsibilities “to serve as a member of the Civil Service of India in the Province known as XYZ during His Majesty's pleasure” (Greene, 2000: 92). These conditions involved a requirement his “genuine fidelity, obedience, keeping regular accounts, 'the preservation of chattels and realties', and 'not to divulge secrets’”. He was also barred from accepting corrupt gifts or making corrupt deals, as well as trading in violation of law or regulation and “to quit India without leaving and to satisfy all debts to His Majesty before departure”.

Lord Canning introduced the portfolio system in 1859. The government's work was split into several branches and assigned to various members of the Governor General's Council under this system. The Indian Council Act of 1861, which brought non-official members into the administration, was another significant Act in India's administrative history. It allowed the Governor General to include Indians in the legislative process. Furthermore, this act was critical in restoring legislative powers to the Bombay and Madras provincial governments.

The Indian Civil Service Act 1861

The Indian Civil Services Act of 1861 was a watershed moment in the history of bureaucracy because it reserved such positions for covenanted civil servants. The exam would be conducted in English in England, and it would be based on classical Greek and Latin knowledge. The maximum age allowed gradually decreased from 23 (1859) to 22 (1860), 21 (1866), and 19 (1878). Satendra Nath Tagore was the first Indian to be recruited into the Indian civil service. Lytton initiated the statutory Civil Services in 1878-79, which consisted of one-sixth covenanted posts to be filled by Indians of high families by appointments by local governments and approval by the secretary and Viceroy, however the scheme failed and was abolished. In this way the Act provided many privileges to the Indian candidates as in recruitment, promotion, termination, pension, payment of salaries, etc.

Lord Mayo took a noteworthy resolution in the direction of decentralisation from the centre to the provinces in 1870, which became known as the Mayo Resolution

⁹ “The practice of signing a covenant with one's employer dated back to Cornwallis's time, and from 1813 the title of an officer in the Covenanted Civil Service was reserved for graduates of the Company's training establishment, Haileybury College” (Kirk-Greene, 2000:88).

of 1870. Consequently new Municipal Bodies with clearly defined fields of activity and constitutions were created in various provinces for effective administration. The Ripon Resolution of 1882, which influenced the development of local government in India until 1947, was the next significant step in the field of local self-government.

Decentralisation and the growing involvement of Indians in administration fuelled the growth of strong nationalism feelings among the educated middle class in the late nineteenth century. When the Indian National Congress was established in 1885, moderates¹⁰ demanded that the facilities be Indianized. It was thought that an Indianized civil service would be more sensitive to Indian needs. This Indian bureaucracy would halt the flow of funds; large portion of India's riches was expatriated every year through the payment of European officers' salaries and pensions. This law was argued to be promoted as a counter-measure to prejudice. Moderates requested that civil service exams be held in both India and London. There was also a request for the age limit for taking such exams to be raised from 19 to 23 years.

Aitchison Committee on Public Services 1886

British citizens quickly replied by forming the Aitchison Committee on Public Services. In 1886, Lord Dufferin appointed Sir Charles Aitchison to head a "Public Service Commission" to look into the problems with India's civil service. The following statements were taken by the Commission: (i) The idea of a simultaneous test for covenanted service was shot down, and it was recommended that the statutory public service be abolished; (ii) It was also suggested that a provincial civil service be established, with members recruited separately in each province, either through promotion from lower ranks or through direct recruitment; (iii) It was also proposed that the words "covenanted" and "uncovenanted" be changed with "imperial" and "provincial," respectively. (iv) It also recommended that the minimum and maximum age limits for Indians taking open civil service exams be 19 and 23 years old, respectively. The covenanted civil service became known as the Civil Service of India after Aitchison's recommendations were adopted. The provincial service was named after the province in which it was located. Montagu Chelmsford Reforms, which came

¹⁰ From 1885 until 1905, the Congress was ruled by a group of members known as the moderates. They belonged to a class of people who were Indian in blood and skin colour but British in taste, morals, and intellect. They were the British state's most ardent supporters. They maintained that if India provided the Englishmen and their Parliament with a balanced and clear picture of her requirements, their demands would almost surely be met. They shared the British spirit of justice and fairness. India's connection to the West via England was viewed as a blessing rather than a curse.

into effect in 1919, declared that if a responsible government was to be formed in India, more Indians needed to be involved in public service.

A Royal Commission was appointed in 1907 to provide an administration that was responsive to India's changing realities in social, economic, and political spheres. Major concerns of the Commission were the following when recommending corrective measures: (a) the difficulties of governing a large subcontinent from a single capital, as well as the inevitable failure of statesmanship and administrative efficiency (b) the challenges of implementing uniform development schemes in socio-culturally diverse provinces; (c) fostering a feeling of accountability among those in charge of provincial and local government; and (d) bolstering colonial control by instilling strong administrative ideals in citizens (Chakrabarty and Chand, 2012: 396). In 1908, a bill was introduced based on the commission's recommendations, which became the 1909 Minto-Morley reforms.

In 1906, Lord Morley, the Secretary of State for India, declared that the British government intended to give Indians more power in the Legislative Council. The conservative Governor General of India collaborated with Minto on the Indian Councils Act, sometimes known as the Minto-Morley reforms. The main purpose of these changes was to maintain British authority in India while also providing Indians a voice in the legislative council (Maheswari 1984). But the Act made no provision for a certain majority in the Provincial Legislative Councils to pass a Bill. The Madras Legislative Council, for example, had a mix of officials and non-officials, with 21 officials and 25 non-officials. The Act also established a communal representation system for Muslims. Despite the fact that the Minto Morely reforms of 1909 failed to address the legitimate grievances of the ruled, various other Acts were passed to address the new situation.

With the establishment of the Islington Commission in 1912, Indianization of the Civil Service was once again brought to the fore. Although the Commission dismissed the concept of holding an ICS test in India and London at the same time, it did suggest that Indians hold 25% of the ICS positions. The Montagu-Chelmsford report revised this percentage to one-third in 1920, with the goal of reaching slightly under half by 1930.

Some reforms, such as the Government of India Act 1919, were initiated by colonial rulers to bring about changes in administration. It was passed by the United Kingdom's Parliament in order to increase Indian participation in all government departments and the steady growth of self-governing institutions in India. The Diarchy

of Provincial Governments Act dealt with the structure of provincial governments. The provincial subjects were split into Reserved and Transferred categories as a result of this. Members of the Governor's Executive Council were nominated by the Crown for a five-year fixed-pay term to administer the reserved subjects. They did not appear to be accountable to the Provincial Legislature. This category included all relevant topics such as the home, police, press, and finance, among others. The transferred subjects were entrusted to ministers who were to be nominated by the Governor from among the Provincial Council's elected members, and who were to serve during his pleasure. Medicine, health, education, and other departments that provided opportunities for local knowledge and social service were among the transferred subjects (Arora and Goyal, 1996: 34).

Lee Commission 1922

In 1922, the Lee Commission was established in response to the 1919 Act to prescribe the rate and method of superior service Indianization. By proposing the establishment of a Public Service Commission, this Commission made a major contribution. The decision was made in 1926 to carry out this recommendation. On October 1, 1926, the Federal Public Service Commission, consisting of a Chairman and four other members, was formed and began operations. Its key duties included recruiting and disciplinary consultation with the government. Its pre-independence position, on the other hand, was advisory. By 1939, Indian recruitment into the ICS had been increased to 40%, with a goal of 50:50 in the ICS makeup.

The colonial history has very clearly marked how the Indian Civil service was built in as an elite cocoon. Along with the location of the admissions tests conducted there were a restricted number of posts only called for which they thought “absolutely necessary to fill the supervising and controlling offices” of administration. To attend the mundane tasks of administration they appointed Indians in lower ranks as clerks in large numbers. However the complete responsibility and power lied at the hands of selected ICS officials.

The Government of India Act of 1935

The Government of India Act of 1935, which replaced Diarchy with Provincial Autonomy, was another constitutional development in India during British rule. The Act established a parliamentary style of government in which the executive is held accountable to the legislature within specified limits, paving the path for a federal

system in which the constituent provinces have independent legislative and executive powers. This had a significant impact on India's public administration, including the civil service. This Act also resulted in the division of subjects into three lists: union, state, and concurrent. Diarchy was abolished in the provinces, but it was reinstated in the capital. Both reserved and transferred subjects were eventually placed under the Governor General's control.

The Government of India Act 1935, followed by the Government of India Secretariat Committee (Wheeler Committee) 1936, investigated the issue of Secretariat delays and recommended that double noting be used to speed up work. Many upgrades in the operation of the government machinery, work procedures, and personnel were recommended by the Committee on Organization and Procedure (Maxwell Committee) in 1937. It was recommended that the secretary of the department report to the minister and that the secretary was the officer best qualified to advise the minister. In his classic report from 1945-46, Sir Richard Tottenham recommended that India's future public administration be development-oriented, and he proposed a number of measures to make the country's public administration a suitable instrument for the new duties. It covered departmental organisation, staffing issues, and the reorganisation of the entire secretariat system. It was suggested that different grades of secretarial officers be assigned separate responsibilities and that classifications for each grade be agreed upon.

Political unrest, economic discontent, scientific and technological advancements, and, most notably, World War II, all put immense strain on the administrative machinery, causing it to expand in size and scope. During the war, the Executive Council of Viceroy grew from six to fourteen members. At the Central and Provincial Secretariats, as well as district and sub-divisional offices, new departments were created. In order to accommodate specialised matters, new cadres were created (Maheswari, 1984: 23).

Several projects in the field of administration were introduced during British rule in India, all of which were based on three basic principles of British public administration: cabinet government, ministerial responsibility, and non-political public service. They also kept some of the main features of the Mughal administrative system, such as the centralising trend in administration and a rule of law system in place of the Mughal period's "rule of custom". British rulers implemented major reforms in the areas of law and order, education, and industrial expansion. These reforms have proven to be extremely beneficial in the political unification of India. The British administration in

India has been important and unique among the other administrative systems that have existed in India's territory since the Indus Civilisation. For the first time, this vast country was governed by a single authority. The British contributed a state structure with many ramifications and a similarly centralised administration. Overall these historical overview clearly shows that pressures from the social political spheres necessitated reforms in the bureaucracy and administration of the country though many features are still continuing.

Bureaucracy and Governance in the Post-Independence Period

The question of what kind of bureaucracy India should have was a major problem after independence; some critical issues needed to be addressed, such as the organisation of the bureaucracy and how they would be recruited. There was also the vexing question of what happened to the Indian officers in the former ICS. Notwithstanding their criticisms of the ICS, the post-independence leaders opted to maintain those Indian officers in the civilian bureaucracy who had service years left in the civilian bureaucracy constituted after August 15, 1947. Rather than being incorporated into the newly formed Indian Administrative Service (IAS) – the successor to the ICS – a large number of these officers were immediately recruited into the IFS (Indian Foreign Service), which was charged with implementing India's non-aligned foreign policy (Warsi, 2016:53).

The Indian political leaders opted to keep major elements of the British unified administrative system when developing a successor civil service. These include an open admission on the basis of academic accomplishments of the candidate; arrangements for extensive training; tenancy continuity; every higher rank positions at the federal, state, and local levels are reserved for civil servants; a regular graduated pay scale that includes pension and other perks and a promotion and transfer mechanism based mostly on seniority (Jain and Dwivedi 1989). The Indian civil services may be divided into three larger groups. “All India Services” are those whose members work for both the Union as well as the State Governments. The next category “Central Civil Services” refers to services whose members solely work for the Union Government. Aside from this, there is another set of services exclusively for the State Governments referred to as “State Civil Services”. The offices in the Union and State Governments are hierarchically divided into four groups, ranging from Group A to Group D.

According to Article 312 of the Constitution of India the Parliament has power to establish All India Services upon meeting a few conditions. Under this Article, the Indian Administrative and Police Services are recognised to be services formed by Parliament. The selection procedure for the IAS is outlined in Section 3 of the AIS Act, 1951, and there are rules and regulations for the same passed under the Act. The IPS and the IFS have similar clauses added in the Act. The AIS is created with major objectives such as “(a) sustaining national unity and integrity, as well as uniform administrative standards (b) neutrality and objectivity - non-political, secular and non-sectarian outlook (c) competence, efficiency and professionalism - at entry by attracting the best and brightest and throughout the career (d) integrity and e) idealism” (AIS Act, 1951).

They also decided that recruitment to be held, as before, through an open competitive examination conducted by an independent, autonomous legislative body. The Union Public Service Commission (UPSC) was to be based in Delhi, the nation's capital. The Union Public Service Commission (UPSC) was created according to the mandate of Article 315 of the Indian Constitution. A Chairman along with ten Members makes up the Commission. The terms and conditions according to which they serve the Commission are governed by The Union Public Service Commission (Members) Regulations, 1969. A Secretariat supports the Commission, which is led by a Secretary and includes two Additional Secretaries, a number of Joint Secretaries, Deputy Secretaries, and other support staff. The Constitution has entrusted the UPSC with certain responsibilities and roles as follows: Recruitment to Union services and posts is done through competitive examinations; recruitment to Central Government services and posts is done through interviews; Providing advice on the suitability of officers for promotion and transfer-on-deputy appointments; Providing advice to the government with respect to subjects related to recruitment practises for different services and positions; Disciplinary proceedings involving various civil services; and miscellaneous issues involving extraordinary pensions, reimbursement of legal costs, and so on. The Commission's main responsibility is to appoint people to work in the various Central Civil Services and Posts, as well as services that are shared by the Union and States such as All-India Services (UPSC official website).

Even after independence, the country faced a number of challenges, including the inclusion of disadvantaged groups, maintaining the stability and dignity of a diverse

society, establishing a democratic government structure, ensuring socio-economic growth, and dealing with the challenges that arose as a result of liberalisation, privatisation, and globalisation. With all of these problems, bureaucracy has taken on the purpose of trying appropriate solutions.

The bureaucratic pattern that finds in India is very similar to that of the one described by Max Weber. The idea of bureaucracy in Weber's mind is inextricably linked to democracy. Since bureaucracy is unimaginable in every denomination of human organisation for various reasons, Weber believed that a democracy could not function without it, as previously stated. According to his idea, different to a monarchy or a feudal state, officials in a democracy should uphold their freedom and neutrality as citizens of a free state. He claimed that officials cannot be considered as servants in the conventional sense as they are not subject to personal allegiance and granted authority and bound by law. They operate in a system that is governed by the constitution. The Weberian model's validity and viability were recognised by the framers of India's independent constitution. As a result, India's constitution has maintained the inherited framework while making necessary amendments over time.

Due to historical and social reasons, such amendments are required to govern and run political and administrative institutions. Since India is such a large country with such a wide range of sects, castes and creeds, languages and dialects, this heterogeneity at various levels cannot be effectively handled without a bureaucracy that keeps up with changing demands. The Indian bureaucracy is largely a legacy of colonialism not only with the structure of it, rather because of the officers' conduct, the conditions under which they serve, their attitude toward the citizens, and the mechanical manner in which they carry out their duties the legacy continues. For the same reason the general opinion about it has always been negative. "It is customary for a secretary or minister not to raise the telephone receiver," for example. The clerk is left to ponder pointless inquiries. These are various modes used to give the impression of dominance. The new mask of post-independence Saheb is worn by the Babu-oriented administration. It's difficult to tell what his overall performance would be in terms of social goals. However, he spends long hours on occasion in his work without providing much positive results. The picture of a civil servant in India is marred by unexalted thoughts and does not move beyond the known reality's ground line.

The backlog of performance has been growing due to the expansion of government functions in all realms, as well as electoral promises of the ruling parties. The character of a public servant is inscribed by the disparity between expectations and efficiency, between requirements and the adequacy of the administrative machinery (Verma, 1973: 58). In India, bureaucracy being one of the most significant political institutions both experts and common citizens criticize it very frequently. This is a democratic country where a large number of people living in poverty and relying heavily on welfare measures delivered through the bureaucracy. Therefore it has frequently been observed that the social and economic schemes are not distributed among all the people reasonably and equally. This was explained by a scholar that “the general perception is that a public servant does not work in the light of reason; nor does he work according to rule; nor does he work in accordance with the aspirations of the people; he wastes his time; his productivity is ungloriously petty; and it is also devoid of social intent. In certain instances, he lives above and above his emoluments. He is insolent and disconnected from the mainstream of existence due to the conventional prestige system. Given his wisdom and cunning, he is more often than not responsible for the failure and mismanagement of the institutions over which he preside” (Verma, 1973: 58).

When one considers the entire system in its larger political, social, and economic contexts of India, the growing criticism of bureaucracy is understandable. The Indian government, for example, is structured in a hierarchical manner. Subordination of officials is unavoidable in such a situation. They are directly controlled by the politician and their senior officials, which has an impact on their results. Despite commissions and committees for civil service reform, little progress has been made in this area.

Around seven decades after India's independence, when efforts to overhaul the Indian bureaucracy had already been launched, there had been a realisation that reforms had only partly addressed overarching demands. “During British rule, the main lines of the civil service were created. There have been no substantive changes since independence. Many people point to institutional inertia in the British system as a primary cause of poor results, especially in the achievement of plan objectives. Even lawmakers have shown their usual complacency when it comes to administrative institutions” (Verma, 1973: 23). Powers and responsibilities did not always coincide,

and authority in ministries and departments was over-centralized in some cases. The ministers were zealous in their desire to retain and maintain their influence. The coordination structures were inadequate. There was a strong trend toward using so many cross references. There were too many minor tasks burdened with the secretariat and it had grown cumbersome and overstaffed, resulting in occasional roles being blurred and administrative machinery choking.

From the time of Independence, the Union Government has established more than fifty Commissions and Committees to investigate what may roughly be described as administrative reforms. The First Administrative Reforms Commission, which was established in January 1966, was charged with looking at all areas of the following topics: “The machinery of the Government of India and its procedures of work; The machinery for planning at all levels which includes, Centre-State relationship; Financial administration; Personnel administration; Economic administration; Administration at the state level; District administration; Agricultural administration; and Problems of redress of citizens grievances”.

The structure and duties of bureaucracy have remained essentially same despite historical and political developments, as demonstrated by the first Administrative Reforms Commission (ARC). It was appointed by the Indian government to address organisational deficiencies: (a) proliferation of ministries and departments, (b) overlapping and diffused roles, and (c) a large number of officials and the methods and procedures were found to be unsuitable for both proper policy formulation and successful programme implementation. The following were the major organisational change recommendations made by the ARC: (a) job allocation in the secretariat and among executive agencies that is more reasonable, (b) improved arrangements for cooperation, (c) reduced administrative agencies and personnel, (d) a stronger top-down structure and the use of board-style management, (e) reduced levels of concern, (f) alignment with field agency secretariats, (g) and delegation of powers.

There are 537 major recommendations in the total 20 Reports Of first ARC. In November 1977, a report detailing the implementation status and possibilities was presented to Parliament based on feedback from several administrative Ministries. A number of the recommendations made by the First Administrative Reforms Commission such as, as the government's tasks became more diverse, there was a

demand for specialisation. Selection criteria for senior management positions in functional areas and outside functional areas have been established. It was proposed that a unified grading system based on credentials and the nature of activities and responsibilities be implemented. With respect to the recruitment, the ARC proposed holding a single competitive test for Class I services, with the age restriction raised to 26 years; lateral appointment into senior technical positions; Recruitment for Class II services will no longer be done directly; For the recruitment of clerical personnel, a basic objective type test to be administered; State government personnel to be recruited for certain Central Government positions.

The commission also made recommendations on recruitment agencies such that to introduce a new approach for the selection of members of the UPSC and the State Public Service Commission; to set up Recruitment Boards for selection of clerical staff; to formulate a national policy on Civil Service Training; To prepare an outline of detailed guidelines for promotion; and reforms to be made in disciplinary hearings and establishment of Civil Service Tribunals. There were also suggestions made by the Commission on overtime pay, voluntary retirement, exit mechanism, pension amounts, government holidays, project completion incentives and rewards, and creating work rules for various positions, all of which may be assessed by the Staff Inspection Unit. Several more Commissions and Committees were established over the years, in addition to the First Administrative Reforms Commission, including the Second ARC in 2005, to examine various aspects of Civil Services Reforms. Those will be discussed in relation to the next chapter.

Conclusion

The formal constitution of the bureaucracy that e in India through years through civilisations and dynasties contains fundamental components of Weber's rational or ideal type. If we read second chapter along with the findings of this chapter in all spheres of society, there is a disparity between the disrespect for bureaucracy and the great dependence on bureaucratic organisation patterns. On the one hand, bureaucracy is derided as essentially defective and corrupted, yet on the other, it is the most broadly implemented form of social organization.

After India's independence, the issue of reform has occupied the government's attention. Several efforts were made to change the administrative structure, but despite

the steps taken to correct the country's administrative flaws, the reform issue has become more complicated and challenging. State, business, and civil society co-operation and collaboration of systems and subsystems can be critically evaluated in the governance regime for the betterment of the country. The studies focused on the "what" element of the change, with an effort to address "who" and "how" the reform could be implemented. In the light of New Public Governance and Transparency issues, which is a call for a representative, responsive, and collaborative system of government, and the questions of reform for whom, reform by whom, and reform for whom are clear sign for the changing role of bureaucracy. A very elaborated discussion on these concerns are presented in the coming chapter while discussing the reform initiatives on Indian Civil Service in the Post-independence India.

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Chapter IV

Initiatives for Governance Reforms of the Indian Bureaucracy

As the previous chapter on historical perspective discussed, after independence, in 1947, India became a Sovereign Republic and adopted a Parliamentary Democracy. Securing economic development and social justice was considered as the most important aims of the State. The legacy received from the past British rule was not appropriate to what the people of India required. The reasons for this include that civil servants who have been raised and trained in the colonial administrative system were welded to the Weberian features such as hierarchical authority, power position and rigid rules and regulations. The administration had a major concern of the enforcement of law and order and collection of revenue. While this structure was totally unfit for the changed environment, it was also inappropriate to develop the state and achieve its administrative objectives. Thus, the Government of India initiated several changes in the administrative structure.

The prevailing administrative framework in India was inadequate at the structural as well as the functional levels to meet the challenges of changing socio-political situations of the country. Hence without any doubt, administrative reforms have been required whereby the structure would respond to systematic changes in the Indian polity following British withdrawal (Chakrabarty, 2012: 456). Reforms were necessary for the effective governance of the country. Before independence the British rulers introduced different kinds of reforms to structure their rule in India. Their aim was entirely different from the welfare of people and well-being of society. As indicated in the previous chapter since the British handed over the power there have been several efforts in the administrative organization, methods of working and procedures of the administration at Central and State governments to be free from the colonial hang over. This part of the research attempts to analyse the reforms suggested and measures thereby taken by the Indian state to make bureaucracy responsive to the particularities of the Indian population. While doing this analysis it tries to answer the major research question of this study that to what extent the global governance trends have been reflected in these reforms in India.

Reforming the public sector is never out of vogue. The public service delivery and who provides them are hot themes of debate on a daily basis. To begin with the analysis of administrative reforms, Maheswari classifies these reforms after independence into six major phases which are (a) First phase 1947-54 featured as grouping and probing time; (b) Second phase 1954-64 featured as Organisation and Method era; (c) Third phase as 1964-66 preparatory for further action; (d) the fourth phase featured as Administrative Reforms Commission era; (e) Fifth phase 1970-90 was the period of entry and dominance of new concepts and (f) The sixth phase 1990s onwards featured as administrative reform is key to the new policy of liberalization and free market economy (Maheshwari 2009: 70). In addition to that, a seventh phase since 2000 that can be named as Era of Governance also discussed in this chapter. Major reform initiatives and the commissions appointed in the post- independent period may be described as follows.

First Phase: Grouping and Probing

Soon after independence, India faced a number of problems on its administration. One major problem was the massive departure of the British and Muslim officers from India. In 1945 the Indian Civil Service (ICS) strength was 1064. The number had fallen to 932 just before August 1947 and to 422 when the country became independent. This caused shortage in the number of civil servants which created wide gaps in the governmental hierarchies. New government invested lot of its resources to solve these manpower imbalances. In order to bring changes, the Government of India appointed Secretariat Reorganisation Committee.

The Secretariat Reorganization Committee

In July 1947, a Six Member Committee was appointed under the leadership of Girija Shankar Bajpai. Major objectives of this commission were to investigate personnel shortages in the government, better use of existing labour and improved work techniques in the Central Secretariat. In its report published in August 1947, the Committee recommended the appointment of the Provincial Civil Service officers to the posts in the Central Secretariat, re-employment of suitable retired officers, and re-organizations of the method of work in the secretariat (Arora,1996: 575).

Table 4.1 Number Civil Servants and the Year

Posts	1945	1948
Secretaries	19	19
Additional Secretaries	6	5
Joint Secretaries	26	35
Deputy Secretaries	51	84
Under/Assistant Secretaries	103	191
Superintendents	215	283
Assistants	1771	2406
Clerks	2776	2569
Stenographers	434	515
Class IV staff	3028	3091

Source: (Maheswari, 2002: 73)

But this important advice could not be accepted by the government. It resulted to a rapid expansion of staff at all levels. This is elaborated in Table- I. It described the number of personnel in the central secretariat both before the partition of the country and after it.

The Secretariat Reorganisation Committee recommended:

We shall be failing in our duty if we do not add that until additional trained personnel become available, government will be well advised not to undertake new activities whose success depends upon the adequate provision of such personnel. (Maheshwari, 2002: 73)

The rapid expansion in government establishments led to increase in public expenditure of the Central Government. It was Rs.90.8 crore in 1945-46-which itself was unnaturally high, but it increased to Rs.144.5 crore in 1948-49 (Maheswari, 2002: 74). It is notable here that this increase in the expenditure was at a time when the administration was bifurcated between India and Pakistan. The rejection of major recommendations of Bajpai Commission in relation to the appointment of civil servants, re-employment of experienced retired senior officials and restructuring of work method, led to increase in the expenditure of the Government.

Economy Committee

The government established the Economy Committee in 1948 to examine the growth in the Central Government's public expenditure between 1938- 1939. This Committee had another objective to recommend various ways to promote economy in the administration through avoiding superfluous, inefficient, or lavish expenditure. The group was chaired by Kasturbai Lalbai, a famous businessman, and included representatives from the legislature, business, and the bureaucracy. They submitted their final report in 1949. The committee proposed that the Additional Secretary position be abolished in the government and that the Joint Secretary be in charge of a number of activities within the department. Moreover, it also suggested for setting up of Organisation & Method unit for improving administrative efficiency in all sectors of public administration in India.

Ayyangar Report

In 1949, N. Gopalaswamy Ayyangar, a civil servant, submitted a report on organizational and procedural changes. The "Report on Government Machinery Reorganization," advocated that central government departments be divided into four bureaus. They are: (1) Bureau of natural resources & agriculture (2) Bureau of industry and commerce (3) Bureau of transport and communications and (4) Bureau of labour and social services. In the Report, he highlighted the need for changes in the prevalent set-up of government because there was insufficient co-ordination in the framing of policies and plans. The other reason for recommending changes in the government machinery was inefficiency in the implementation of policies. However, the government turned down the core recommendations in the Report which was to group Ministries into Bureau.

This report was subjected to an analysis by another bureaucrat, R.A. Gopalaswami, who filed his one-man report on "The machinery of Government: Improvement of efficiency" in 1952. His Report supplemented the recommendations in the Ayyangar report. R.A.Gopalaswami's report is a most penetrating and thorough analysis of the machinery of central government. "It provides answers to vital questions like what changes were felt by the machinery of government and why; how its workload increased during this period; what setbacks the staffing system suffered; what reform

proposals were mooted; and finally, what precisely happened to the recommendations of the Ayyangar report” (Maheswari, 2002: 59).

Gorwala Report

In 1951, as a result of Planning Commission’s recommendation, A.D. Gorwala who was a retired civil servant produced two reports on public administration along with one another on the effective running of the state enterprises. He made a few significant recommendations in these Reports such that: 1) recruitment to all levels of public service should be performed in a way that excludes the possibility of patronage, and it must be applicable to the enrolment of temporary employees; 2) importance of proper methods and techniques for recruiting and training, as well as an efficient organisation and processes setup, in order to have appropriate individuals to serve the public posts. There was also a recommendation to introduce induction training, so that a civil servant is equipped with the essential knowledge and abilities to fulfil his or her tasks. The report also recommended the induction to be followed by training sessions at regular intervals in order to renew his or her knowledge about the field, to update him about the latest trends and developments and to keep his or her mind active, pliable, and open. The Committee suggested that a Director of Training be appointed to oversee all elements of training.

There is no doubt that training should aim at precision and certainty in the conduct of government businesses and to boost employee morale. However along with these aims training should inspire public servants to view their job in a greater perspective and to show perseverance with their educational developments. Training is necessary to prepare them to be efficient in their works and to take up greater responsibilities well as to adapt his views and tactics to changing situations. Gorwala's proposals to establish an O&M branch in the government were adopted by the Indian government.

Second Phase: Organisation and Method (O&M) Era

Organisation and Method had been familiar subject in administrative circles for some time. Due to the increase in the volume and range of the governmental activities the number of officials recruited was increased. This proliferation necessitates an O&M unit in every part of the government to improve the efficiency in administration. In continuation to earlier committees such as the Secretariat Reorganisation Committee

1947, the Economy Committee 1948, Ayyangar Report 1949, Gorwala Report 1951 had also recommended the immediate establishment of such a unit. Similarly in 1953 Appleby also insisted for the setting up of the Organisation and Method unit both at the centre and states.

Reports of Appleby

Paul H Appleby was an American expert on Public Administration and a Consultant with the Ford Foundation carried out the studies in India as the Government of India invited him. There are two major reports that he submitted on Indian administration. His first report “Public Administration in India: Report of a Survey” was submitted in 1953. In 1956, the second report “Reorganization of India’s Administrative System (With special Reference to Administration of Government’s Industrial and commercial Enterprises)” was published. The two reports of Appleby suggested radical reforms in the Indian administrative structure that was archaic, feudalistic, and inadequate to fulfil the primary goals of the nation with a long history of colonialism (Chakrabarty, 2012: 457). Among the recommendations of Appleby two were implemented with immediate effect. These were the recommendations to establish an Organisation & Method unit in the Central Government and for the establishment of the Institute of Public Administration.

Organisation and Method (O&M) Unit

The machinery for administrative improvement known as O&M division was established in the year of 1954. However, later in 1964 it was combined with the Department of Administrative Reforms. The O&M division was housed in the Cabinet Secretariat in order to be directly accountable to the Prime Minister. At the same time the Department of Administrative Reform was under the Ministry of Home Affairs. Its operations are much larger level and aims to enhance administration on a big scale by focusing on administrative changes in a broader sense rather than mere economic efficiency and regular office processes.

The Indian Institute of Public Administration

The Indian Institute of Public Administration was founded on March 29, 1954, as an autonomous organisation under the Registration of Societies Act and it was a result of the study conducted by Paul H. Appleby. The primary goal of this Institute

was to engage in academic activities that would improve the leadership skills and managerial capacities of government executives and other officials in public service organisations. It aims to promote the study of public administration, economics and political science with a focus on administration and government machinery. For that purpose, it organizes and facilitates study courses, workshops and expert talks. The institute publishes various journals, research papers and books such as “Indian Journal of Public Administration”, “Nagarlok”, “Lok Prashashan” and a Bibliographic Journal Documentation in Public Administration, monthly Newsletter, Research Reports, Books and monographs.

Asoka Chanda Report

Asoka Chanda submitted his report in 1954 to resolve the problems of major gaps in project execution and to devise ways to utilise large amount of money allotted to various projects in an efficient manner. The report was titled as “Notes on Changes Necessary in System of Budgetary and Financial Control and in Other Matters to Eliminate Delays in Execution of Projects”. It recommended for more delegation, the formation of all-India services, the adoption of an officer-oriented operating structure, and the formation of a common service split vertically into departments with a provision for specialised training in various fields of government activity. But the cabinet never reviewed the Asoka Chanda report.

Ramaswami Mudaliar Committee Report

In 1956, this particular “Report on Public Services (Qualifications for Recruitment)” recommended that a graduate degree from a university should be the minimum requirement for recruiting into the higher services. However, it also observed that a university degree is not required for secretarial and ministerial job. The age restriction for the highest executive and administrative positions should be fixed between 21 to 23 years old, according to the Committee.

Krishnamachari Report

The Planning Commission assigned the Krishnamachari committee in 1960 to research issues related to administrative officers at different levels in states and the problems that have arisen after establishing democratic institutions at the district and block levels with an instruction to make appropriate recommendation for the

improvement. In 1962 the findings of this study were submitted to the government and they mostly agreed with all of the recommendations in the report. Some of the significant recommendations were such that for expanding the IAS cadre to suit the requirements of economic and social growth and courses on rural development has to be added in the syllabus at the Lal Bahadur Sastri Academy of Administration at Mussoorie.

The Report examined state government recruiting to Class I and Class II positions and advised that recruitment be done on a yearly basis. State Civil Service officers, according to the study, should also get organised training comparable to that received by IAS officers. It also had recommendation for states to establish training institutions with the assistance of the National Academy of Administration. The latter segment of this report is dealing with one of the important institutions of developmental administration namely the Panchayati Raj Institution.

While analysing the second phase four features are prominent to note: firstly, the standing O & M was set-up and administrative reforms committees emerged as an important factor in Indian administrative system. Secondly, the integrity in civil services and in political life was seriously wearied out. Thirdly, in the context of economic development, business and government interacted in regulatory and promotional angles. Finally, Parliament showed its interest in questions of administrative reforms.

Third Phase: Preparation for Further Action

Efforts to prevent the corruption and the expansion of the Department of Administrative Reform were the two important developments in this phase. This short time preparation became successful one when the constitution of the Administrative Reform Commission was announced. Two commissions were appointed to look into measures for the prevention of corruption under the leadership of S.R. Das and Santhanam.

S.R. Das Commission

In June 1964, the Das Commission issued 288-page report and it was a report of examination of charges against Pratap Singh Kairon, a state-level political official. There were thirty-one charges of corruption and maladministration against him. Kairon

was found guilty on eight charges by the Commission, which ruled that he had exploited his power and position for his personal gain in some circumstances. He had also exploited his position of authority to assist his family members in acquiring and disposing of assets or businesses violating procedural rules and law of the land through his colleagues and subordinates. The verdict of the Commission was accepted by Pratab Singh Kairon with humility. And later he stated: “I publicly dissociate myself from all the activities of my sons; it is mainly for the doing of my sons that I have come to suffer” (Arora, 1990: 102). This report eloquently confirmed the popular impression about the existence of widespread corruption in the public life of the country.

Monteiro (1964: 1141) quotes from the Das Commission Report:

“The Commission has throughout this enquiry, constantly borne in mind the two cardinal principles which have made our laws and administration of justice noble and which bar the way to tyranny and arbitrary Government. These principles are: (1) That an individual must be presumed to be innocent until the contrary is proved beyond reasonable doubt by dependable evidence freely and publicly ascertained or by the irresistible probabilities of the case; and (2) that no individual shall be condemned on suspicion, however, strong. In arriving at its conclusions, the Commission has, therefore, demanded the high standard of proof which our laws enjoin before it has accepted any allegation, however emphatically asserted, as evidence on which it could safely rely and confidently act.”

Santhanam Committee

In 1960s the Indian administration was involved in a huge number of corruption cases at all levels. It is in this context that a “Committee on Prevention of Corruption” was appointed in 1962. It submitted its report in the year 1964. Santhanam the Committee had five members of Parliament and two senior officers. The committee looked into number of corruption cases and concluded that it was not limited to lower levels of government servants and that the number of instances involving gazetted personnel was dangerously high. The Report laid down “(a) a set of procedures to deal with articular complaints against Central and State Ministers; (b) a Code of Conduct

for Central and State Ministers; (c) a Code of Conduct for MPs and MLAs; and (d) a Code of Conduct for Political Parties” (Kalhan, 1997: 78).

Therefore, the Santhanam Committee recommended for setting up a Central Vigilance Commission with adequate powers to prevent corruption among public personnel, to maintain integrity in them and to ensure just and fair exercise of administrative powers vested in various organisations. The Report also proposed that the President, on the suggestion of the Prime Minister, appoint a National Panel, from which a three-person committee may investigate complaints against a Minister. Minimum one of the three members must have previously had or now occupy a prominent judicial position. “If a formal allegation is made by any ten members of Parliament in writing to the Prime Minister through the Speaker or the Chairman, the Prime Minister should consider himself obliged, by convention, to refer the allegations for immediate investigation by such a committee” (Kalhan, 1997: 78). The Central Government accepted this recommendation and Central Vigilance Commission was established in December 1963. In terms of property purchase, accepting gifts, and disclosing assets and liabilities, a similar code of conduct as in the case of elected officials was recommended by the Commission for public servants.

These two reports proved that more often than not, political and administrative corruption went hand in hand, being mutually reinforcing. Both committees repudiated the view that ministers, lawmakers, and political leaders were all clear of this disease at the political level and emphasised the politico-administrative nature of corruption in India.

Department of Administrative Reform

The Division of Operations and Maintenance was transformed into a full-fledged Department of Administrative Reform. Now it is a part of the Ministry of Personnel, Public Grievances & Pensions (Official Website, Dept. of Administrative Reform). The department promotes administrative reforms in government structures, policies, and processes. It examines the structure and practises of particular departments with the primary goal of eliminating corruption at various levels of the administrative hierarchy. The department also makes activities for formulation of policies and coordination of issues relating to redress of grievances. The department makes effort to

disseminate governance knowledge and best practices. It also prepares the ground for a comprehensive investigation of the entire administrative system in India.

Fourth Phase: The Era of the First Administrative Reforms Commission

The Government of India appointed a high power Administrative Reform Commission (ARC) in 1966 under the chairmanship of Morarji Desai. Later when he became Deputy Prime Minister, K.Hanumanthayya took over the Chairmanship. The First Administrative Reforms Commission was a watershed moment in India's post independent administrative reforms. The commission submitted 20 reports with 581 recommendations. The commission spent an amount of ten million rupees in a period of four years from 1966 to 1970. The following were the major areas for the considerations of the Commission: "i) the machinery of the government of India and its process of work; ii) the machinery of planning at all levels; iii) Centre State Relations; iv) financial administration; v) Personnel administration; vi) Economic administration; vii) Administration at the state levels; viii) Administration at the district levels; ix) Public sector undertakings; x) Redressal of citizen grievances; xi) Improvement of the quality of membership of the Public Service Commission; xii) Agricultural Administration".

Rationale behind the Recommendations

Along with providing recommendation in detail the first ARC Report also outlined its philosophy on domain expertise. Firstly, it finds its basic philosophy as to create a rational foundation for filling policy-making positions with people who have the necessary credentials and experience. This would entail making the best use of various Services for fulfilling secretariat tasks, as well as taking specific efforts to develop the required specialisations within the secretariat.

Selection of top management personnel from all relevant sources – generalist and specialist – was another reform the Commission planned to implement. For this aim, talent should be identified and fostered across all services, particularly among individuals who have not yet been recruited into the secretariat's top management positions. The Commission also aimed at providing exceptional employees with more possibilities to advance in the civil service based on their competence and performance.

The first ARC categorised senior civil service positions into two: (a) posts in the field, and (b) posts at headquarters. Field postings were assigned to members of the 'functional' services, which included not just various engineering services but also accounting and income tax. IAS was the only service that was not “functional” yet filled the majority of the senior jobs in the civil services, according to the Report of the Commission. Therefore, it was suggested that the IAS should be transformed into a functional service.

Major Recommendations in a Nutshell

A number of recommendations made by the First ARC are important here to discuss. It acknowledged the necessity for specialisation as the government's tasks had become more diverse. For senior management positions in functional areas and outside functional areas a selection criteria has been established. It was proposed that a Unified Grading system based on credentials and the nature of activities and responsibilities of the civil servants be implemented. A unified grading structure was recommended because posts with comparable qualifications, challenges, and responsibilities are graded together. The notion of “equal pay for equal work” was pushed to be acknowledged across the board, by both the federal and state governments, as well as local governing bodies. It believed that the concept of equal pay for equal work could not be achieved without a detailed assessment of the labour content of employment at all levels and the matching of pay scales to it. This uniform grading system was designed to overcome the disparity in salary between headquarters and field posts, as well as the diversity of pay scales for various groups. It is suggested that the following aspects be taken into account during grading:

- i) The grading system in services that offer for postings in the secretariat as well as at the field level should reflect the accountability for service across the country.
- ii) For services that only give field postings or secretariat posts but not both, the grades must be connected to the duties and responsibilities of these positions.
- iii) Members of the State civil service should have their grades reflect the fact that they are only obligated to work within the State and not outside.

- iv) Posts requiring more research should be given a higher grade, even if they have little or no administrative responsibilities.
- v) According to the Commission, the number of grades should be between 20 and 25.

Regarding the subject of recruitment the ARC recommendations were such that:

- i) For the Class I services, a single competitive examination to be held, with the age limit being raised to 26 years;
- ii) Senior-level technical positions can be attained through lateral entry;
- iii) The use of direct recruitment for Class II services to be phased out;
- iv) For the recruitment of clerical personnel, a basic objective type test to be administered;
- v) State government personnel will be recruited for Central Government positions in particular fields.

With respect to Recruitment Agencies there were a few recommendations in the Report such as

- i) A new appointment mechanism for the members of UPSC and State Public Service Commission has been proposed;
- ii) recruitment boards for clerical personnel be established.

Another significant recommendation in the Report was that to formulate a policy at national level on the Training for Civil Service. The First ARC underlined that training should equip government servants not only to do their current jobs, but also to take on more responsibilities and face new and challenging issues in the future. It suggested that the Department of Personnel to establish a Central Training Division. It also advised that the content of the National Academy of Administration's foundation courses be changed.

It also provided an outline of detailed guidelines for promotion of the civil servants. The Report also suggested recommendations for reforms in the field of disciplinary inquiry proceedings and the establishment of Civil Service Tribunals. It also recommended on subjects associated to “overtime allowances, voluntary retirement, exit mechanism, quantum of pension, government holidays, incentives and awards to be given on timely completion of projects, and establishing work norms for various posts that may be reviewed by the Staff Inspection Unit” (ARC Report).

The first ARC proposed a reform plan that would allow members of all services to advance to middle and senior management levels in the Central Secretariat based on their expertise and experience in their areas of specialisation. The ARC also listed the knowledge and specialisation necessary for filling positions in each of these categories

in general terms. Personnel for the eight areas of specialty were to be chosen through a competitive mid-career test. All Class I officers from the All-India and Central Services with eight to twelve years of experience in the functional areas would be considered for the same. The selection process will include a written test administered by the UPSC and an interview conducted by a committee consisting of the UPSC Chairman and two senior Secretaries of the Government of India.

The need of an efficient administrative structure was emphasised in the numerous Reports of the first ARC. Appropriate prizes, such as a rolling cup/shield, should be offered as incentives for meeting deadlines of specified tasks, according to some of the proposals to improve efficiency. Furthermore, cash prizes are to be offered for valuable proposals made for job simplification that resulted in cost savings and greater efficiency, as well as for creating work norms and evaluating staff strength based on studies conducted by Staff Inspection Units.

The Commission also advised that performance budgeting should be implemented by departments and organisations which are directly responsible for development programmes. The ARC also advocated the creation of two unique institutions: the LokPal, which would deal with complaints against administrative activities of Ministers and secretaries at the Centre, and the Lokayuktas, which would deal with similar allegations in States. According to Chakrabarty and Chand (2012: 460) the First ARC Report is probably the most exhaustive check list of steps to streamline the administration in the changed socio-political environment. The most significant recommendations happen to be the appointment of the *Lokpal* and the *Lokayukta* aside from the concept and practise of performance budgeting being introduced. In 1968, the Lokpal and Lokayukta Bill were introduced in the *Lok Sabha* but it could not be passed in the *Rajyasabha*.

This historical Report had proposed various modifications in the performance appraisal system like: a) Instead of “confidential report”, the phrase “performance record” should be used; b) The civil servant shall provide an account of the work he or she did during the year to his or her reporting officer at the conclusion of the assessment year, and this report should become part of the performance record. This account should be noted by the reporting officer when evaluating the public servant in service; c) grading can be given under any of the three categories in the performance report: “(i)

fit for promotion out of turn, (ii) fit for promotion, and (iii) not yet fit for promotion”. The “unfit for promotion” category should be eliminated; d) Only 5-10% of bureaucrats in any organisation engaged in similar duties and at the same level should be assigned the grade “fit for promotion out of turn”; e) The civil servant should not be informed of any negative remarks about him/her. When there are unfavourable remarks in the report, the reviewing officer should either affirm the statements or adequately alter them after having a discussion on the matter with the reporting officer, and if required, with the officer reported on.

The report advocated the establishment of a distinct Department of Personnel, which would be in charge of “a) formulating personnel policies for the Central and All-India Services, as well as inspecting and reviewing their execution; b) talent acquisition, senior management staff development, and the processing of senior-level appointments; c) manpower planning, training and career development, personnel administration research; d) discipline and welfare of employees and machinery to resolve their grievances; e) liaison with the Union Public Service Commission, State Governments and professional institutions; f) and filling middle-level jobs in the Central Secretariat”. It was particularly advised that the Department of Personnel not run any service cadres, and that administrative responsibility of various services be delegated to the respective ministries. There was another recommendation that at the Ministry of Home Affairs should handle the administration of the IAS, IPS, and Central Services.

The first ARC was not a big success although it contributed significantly towards the transformation of Indian administrative system. The causes of failure as observed by the scholars were due to some factors like the sudden death of Lal Bahadur Shastri who had appointed the commission. Indira Gandhi, the next Prime Minister, was preoccupied with her struggles for political survival and did not have time to consider administrative changes (Chakrabarty and Chand, 2012: 460). Also, the country was in the midst of a fight for Bangladesh's liberation, and then was thrown into chaos by a national emergency.

This is not to imply that the ARC has been an entirely wasted effort. Because as per the Annual Report of the Department of Personnel and Administrative Reforms for the year 1975 to 1976, there were 527 recommendations concerning the Central Government out of which parts 5 was concerned with the State Governments. Decisions

ave been taken in respect of 106 recommendations fully and 10 others partly which also include 5 recommendations concerning both the Central and State Governments.

Fifth Phase- Entry and Dominance of New Concepts of Reform

In the mid sixties, when the Indian private industry had recorded the phenomenal growth, a shift in the content of reform began, but the full impact of the new change was felt only around the beginning of the seventies. This was the phase of entry and dominance of new concepts of reform as increased emphasis began to be accorded to 'management' in public administration.

Kothari Committee 1976

The Committee was appointed for reforms in the field of recruitment policy and selection methods. The Chairman of this commission was DS Kothari and he submitted report in 1976. The committee believed that competitive examination to all services should be of equal importance to the nation and prescribed a single examination to be known as the civil services examination in place of the existing three categories of examination, one for the Indian Foreign Service and the Indian Administrative Service, another for the Central Services, and the third for the Indian Police Service. The committee recommended that the examination system be overhauled. They suggested a two-stage examination procedure, with a preliminary exam followed by a main exam.

A remarkable feature of the Kothari Committee was that it recommended for vernacular languages in place of English for writing the exam except in English and language papers. In December 1978, the Central Government accepted the scheme of examination as recommended by the Kothari Committee and thus, the competitive examination held by the Union Public Service Commission since 1979 marked an important departure from the pattern hitherto followed. This committee also recommended reforms to the civil service training programme.

Ashok Mehta Committee

In 1977, the Ashok Mehta Committee was formed to suggest ways to overcome the flaws of the Panjayati Raj system. The committee, which released its findings in August 1978, concluded that the system was unquestionably designed to promote

decentralisation of authority and citizen engagement in governance. They had realised the necessity to improve it as a mechanism for assisting rural development and promoting grass root level planning process. The committee anticipated such entities playing a bigger role in development in areas including agriculture, forestry, cottage industries, and welfare. Recognizing the importance of women's contributions in these areas, it advocated for more women to be represented in Panjayat Raj bodies in order to influence planning and execution (Baluchamy, 2004: 5).

Jha Committee

Under the leadership of L.K. Jha, the Economic Reforms Commission published a series of papers in 1981 advocating for the streamlining and modernisation of the economic administration system, opening the path for an advanced economic order. The Commission argued for a shift toward positive accountability, emphasising the significance of performance above compliance with rules and regulations. Annual Action Plans (AAP) for ministries and departments, as well as Memorandums of Understanding (MoU) with Public Sector Undertakings, established the notion of management by objectives. Similarly, an online monitoring of managerial performance in infrastructure sectors was initiated.

Sarkaria Commission

On June 9, 1983, the Government of India's Ministry of Home Affairs officially established the Sarkaria Commission. Its report was submitted in 1988. Union and states are the two important tiers of the Indian State. Certain operations of the federal created a few issues and disputes in the Union-states relationship. It led to tension in the government and made some risks to the unity and integrity of the country. Then Indira Gandhi government announced to appoint a commission under the chairmanship of R S Sarkaria who was a retired judge of the Supreme Court, to review all present settings for Union-State relations and the socio-economic and political developments. They were also required to make recommendations for changes taking into account the spirit of the Constitution and the needs of maintaining the unity as well as the integrity of India in the changed context (Arora, 1991: 75).

The report is divided into two sections. The major primary report is in the first section, while the memoranda from state governments and political parties are in the second. It examines matters that have a substantial impact on intergovernmental

relations in the administrative and legislative realms. With the basic approach of the report towards development of “co-operative federalism” the commission suggested the appointment of an Inter-Governmental Council as per Art.263. The paper also covers topics such as the duties of the Governor, emergency laws, and the deployment of the military forces in a state to assist preserve public order, among others. “Financial Relations, Economic and Social Planning, National Economic and Development Council, and other miscellaneous items such as agriculture, industry, mines and minerals, inter-state trade and commerce, inter-state river disputes, forests, food and civil supplies, mass media, and other miscellaneous items which are helpful to boost socio- economic development among states” also included in the report. Thus, Sarkaria Commission made several useful recommendations on the present arrangements between the Union and States in terms of authorities, functions, and duties in all domains, as well as proposed appropriate adjustments. appropriate changes. One such recommendation was concerning the establishment of an Inter-State Council which was carried out in 1990.

Singhvi Committee

The Congress Government set up a committee in June 1986 under the leadership of LM Singhvi. The Committee was appointed with a task of developing a concept paper for revitalising Panchayati Raj Institutions. The committee focussed on the issues in the local level like a lack of conceptual clarity, political will, research, evaluation, feedback and remedial actions. It also focussed on the financial problems of the Panchayati Raj Institutions. It was noticed that local self-government institutions were frequently found to be hesitant to use their taxing powers to collect revenue. Hence the in the Report, they recommended a system of mandatory and optional taxes. The PRIs may be granted the authority to charge taxes and fees with the stipulation that the state government will levy and collect on behalf of Panchayati Raj Institutions and transfer money to them based on the recommendations of the Finance Commission in each state for a set length of time. It further recommended that Union Government's Finance Commission, which is appointed as per the provisions of the Constitution, allot sufficient resources to Panchayati Raj Institutions for the implementation of different rural development and poverty reduction programmes, which would result in a major increase in their power and productivity. L.M.Singhvi Committee also recommended a constitutional status to the Panchayti Raj Institutions (Banerjee et al., 2004:70).

Satish Chandra Committee

The appointment of a committee to study the civil service examination system under the leadership of Satish Chandra was a watershed moment in India's administrative reform history. Their Mission was to examine and review the higher civil service selection system, which was implemented in 1979 in response to the 1974 Kothari Committee on Recruitment Policy and Selection Methods and to make recommendations for further improvement of the system. In 1989 the committee submitted its report and several of its significant recommendations have been effectively implemented. One of them was competitive examinations for all India and central services that came into existence in 1993. The major recommendations which were accepted and implemented are the introduction of a paper with essay questions in the civil service main examination for 200 marks and the maximum marks for the personality test was increased from 250 to 300 (Chakrabarty and Chand, 2012: 461). The committee also recommended giving more publicity to the civil service examination through the print and electronic media.

Sixth Phase- Post Liberalisation Era

The sixth phase of the reforms was enunciated by the 1990s in the outbreak of the economic crisis and adoption of the new policies such as globalisation, liberalisation and privatisation. A new concept was introduced known as the New Public Management (NPM). It gave importance to market oriented, competitive and transparent administration. The NPM was an attempt to achieve efficiency, economy and effectiveness towards administration and to restructure the administrative system. It also aims to achieve a result oriented decision making, decentralised management environment, responsible and responsive authority, accountability and transparency. New Public Management was in favour of utilising new technological advances and other suitable mechanisms to eliminate corruption. The role of the state, the size of the government, the role of private sector, production and delivery of goods and services became the focus of the administration during period. In this context, the Government of India appointed committees such as Expenditure Reforms Commission, fifth and sixth Pay Commissions, and second Administrative Reforms Commission.

Expenditure Reforms Commission (ERC)

The 1999-2000 Budget shows that high rate of growth in the non-developmental expenditure of government. It's becoming a major matter of concern. While presenting the budget the then Finance Minister observed that a solution for this problem is to begin the process of downsizing the Government. To carry out the process of downsizing in a systematic way the Government proposed an Expenditure Reforms Commission in 2000 headed by K.R. Geethakrishnan who had earlier functioned as the Finance Secretary in the Government of India. The Committee suggested a guideline for rationalising the tasks and operations of the Central Government.

Major recommendation by the Commission to rationalise the staff and cadres of different services are: By the 2004-2005 fiscal year, a 10% reduction in employee strength will be implemented. A Screening Committee will also develop an annual direct recruiting strategy for all cadres. For two years, there should be a complete bar on creating new positions. Staff who have been declared surplus should be moved to the Surplus Cell, which will be renamed as the Division of Retraining and Deployment and will pay their salaries, benefits, and other obligations. Surplus employees should be eligible for the Fifth Central Pay Commission's generous Voluntary Retirement Scheme, with the caveat that commutation entitlements will remain unchanged and the ex-gratia sum would be paid in monthly instalments over a five-year period. Staffs who do not join the Voluntary Retirement Scheme and are not redeployed within a year will be dismissed from the service (GOI ARC 13th Report, 2009: 67).

Pay Commissions

The Fifth and Sixth Pay Commissions made some valuable recommendations for implementing good governance in the country. Major proposals of the Fifth Central Pay Commission include government machinery optimization, government right-sizing, and work-force size regulation. The commission had also made some suggestions regarding organisational restructuring, reduction in the number of organisational employees by reducing number of ministries and departments, introducing officer oriented system in government, de-layering and level jumping, multi-skilling of the employees and so on.

The Sixth Central Pay Commission also made recommendations to rationalise the structure of the government with a motive to enhance the delivery mechanism in

order to ensure efficient service to the people. The major recommendations of the commission are reduction of layers in the governmental machinery, recovering pride in public services, delegating with accountability, ensuring the availability of the finest possible talent for government, performance-related incentive schemes and so on. The grades have been lowered from thirty-five to twenty, split throughout four separate running pay bands, one apex scale, and another grade for the office of Cabinet Secretary and similar positions.

Yoginder K. Alagh Committee

Professor Yoginder K. Alagh headed the Civil Services Examination Review Committee in 2001, which suggested fundamental modifications in the structure of the civil service examination system. It preferred candidates to be tested on a common subject rather than optional subjects.

The Alagh Committee analyzed successful candidates in examinations between the years of 1995 to 1999 and discovered that less than 20% of applicants were successful on their first try in the general category. Roughly the same was the percentage of successful applicants when they analysed the candidates who gave their second and third attempts (over 30% in both cases)) and it went up about 80% in the group of candidates who passed the test in their third attempt. The Analysis of the Committee on successful candidates from the category of OBC and SC/ST revealed that 80% got selection by the fifth attempt in the case former category and around 85% to 90% of the latter category got selected only in their sixth attempt. For general, OBC, and SC/ST candidates, the Committee suggested age limitations of 26, 29, and 31 years, respectively.

The nature of the Preliminary Examination had also been discussed by the Alagh Committee. It was proposed that the general studies paper be recast as a 'Civil Services Aptitude Test', with an emphasis on comprehension, logical reasoning, problem solving, and data analysis. It did not, however, completely concur with the perspective that optional papers do not provide a level playing field, as well as the reality that the success rate of diverse courses varies greatly. They also felt a need to test the academic knowledge of candidates in a detailed manner. Therefore, it was proposed that the optional paper be upgraded to the honours level of a standard

university. It also advocated giving the Preliminary Examination a 25% weightage in the overall scheme of civil service examination.

It was rightly observed by the Alagh Committee that candidates were choosing optional subjects based on 'scorability' of the subject rather than their own specialization in the same. As a result, 41% of applicants in the Civil Service Examination 1999 while opting the optional papers, rather than taking the subjects they had specialised from their universities, preferred both optional subjects different considering this 'scorability'. For the years 2000 through 2005, the percentages for such candidates were 40 percent, 36 percent, 44 percent, 46 percent, 41 percent, and 48 percent, respectively. As a solution to this the Alagh Committee proposed that optional subjects be replaced with three mandatory papers on: "(a) Sustainable Development and Social Justice; (b) Science and Technology in Society; and (c) Democratic Governance, Public Systems, and Human Rights" in the context of shortcomings in the current system.

Hota Committee Report

Domain assignment for civil servants was recommended by the Hota Committee on Civil Service Reforms in 2004 to promote skill acquisition, professional excellence, and career planning. Another recommendation made by the Committee was that Joint Secretaries, Additional Secretaries and Secretaries be selected and appointed through "domain assignment, competitive selection and matching of available skills with the job requirements".

Moreover, according to the Hota Committee recommendations amendments to be made in sections 13 (1) (d) and 19 of the Prevention of Corruption Act as well as section 197 of the Code of Criminal Procedure to safeguard innocent civil servants against false prosecution and harassment. It further suggested that a Code of Ethics for civil officials to be drafted, which would include the key values of integrity, merit, and quality in public service. The Hota Committee also recommended that services that were delivered by each department as well as procedures of grievance redressal and public performance evaluation should be defined and benchmarked. It was also suggested that a Model Code of Governance be developed, which would serve as a baseline for citizens to assess governance services available to them. It was also suggested that an annual State of Governance Report be published, which would evaluate the level of performance of each state, department, and ministry.

RVV Ayyar Committee

According to the Reprt of Aiyyar Committee, the abilities necessary for senior posts can only be given through a significantly lengthier mid-career programme than Phases III, IV, and V currently foresee. Hence it was recommended that it should be made mandatory for an IAS official to attend two long-term programmes during his or her tenure. The Committee drew a parallel with the military forces, which separates training for lower-level field commands from that for higher-level commands, and opts for a one-year extended in-service training programme for officers who are perceived to be on the fast track to posts at higher ranks.

As a benchmark, the present Foundation Course for Group 'A' Services, as per the review made by the Aiyyar Committee, has been used. Two years appears to be an adequate period for professional training programmes for the Group 'A' and All India Services. In a similar manner the length of the Foundation and Professional programmes for Groups "B", 'C," and "D" must be determined considering their employment requirements. This can be viewed as a starting point for proposals that can be tweaked as part of the process of actually designing programmes for each of these groups of bureaucratic officers.

The unfortunate fact is that content and course materials of most of the professional programmes are out dated and it is necessary to review these in order to meet current demands. The Aiyyar Committee has already completed this task for the IAS. Fresh perspectives on the Aiyyar Committee's suggestions are not being presented here because the Aiyyar Committee has had extensive discussions on wide range of issues. Any comprehensive assessment or review should be carried out only after a few years of implementing these recommendations. As a result, it is proposed that all Group 'A' Services take the Foundation Course, as recommended by the Aiyyar Committee.

There is a major flaw in the induction training for IAS officers; it is primarily concerned with the district and sub-divisional assignments that an IAS officer is likely to have in his or her early years of service. It does not adequately consider the need for officers to develop domain expertise and awareness of various government sectors, nor does it respond to the individual interests and academic qualifications of officers. There has been criticism regarding this training as it is out dated and exhibits an archaic attitude by failing to represent the nature of the job done in today's environment. The

Aiyar Committee has gone through the design and content of this programme in considerable detail.

Seventh Phase: Era of Governance

As we discussed earlier 2000 onwards the word governance became familiar in the academic discussions and in the policy documents. The major areas of discussions came as democratic governance, collaborative or network governance, decentralised governance, e-governance, public governance and good governance. Therefore, in addition to Maheswari's six phases of administrative reforms Governance has to be understood as an emerging era and hence can be called as a seventh Phase in the history of public administration reforms in India.

Second Administrative Reforms Commission

In a significant move aimed at revamping the public administration in the country, the Prime Minister, Manmohan Singh announced the appointment of a six-member Administrative Reforms Commission (ARC-II) in 2005 to "suggest measures to achieve a proactive, responsive, accountable, sustainable and efficient administration for the country at all levels of the government" (GOI, ARC 13th Report 2009). The Commission submitted fifteen reports in 2009. The defects of this commission are listed in Annexure-II. Dr. M. Veerappa Moily was the Chairman of this Commission until he resigned with effect from April 1st 2009 as he became the Member of Parliament and subsequently Union Cabinet Minister. Subsequently, V. Ramachandran was appointed as the Acting Chairman of this Commission. Other members of the commission were Dr. A. P. Mukharjee, Dr. A. H. Kalro, Dr. Jayaprakash Narayan, Smt. Vineeta Rai who was appointed as the Member Secretary. Jayaprakash Narayan resigned from the membership of the commission on September 1st 2007.

Refurbishing Personnel Administration

The terms of reference for the second ARC on refurbishing personnel administration were: (i) Analyse the policy and the procedures of recruiting, training, and placement, and make suggestions for any necessary modifications; (ii) Prepare a standard guideline for improving public servant performance and for its evaluation; (iii) Better cadre management strategies that focus on career advancement, motivation, and enhancement of productivity; (iv) Approaches for improving the skills and capabilities

of civil service officials and administrative cadres, as well as relevant capacity-building measures; and, (v) Linking of performance of Civil Servants. A close reading of the report on refurbishing personal administration indicates that several vital suggestions have been put forward by the Commission which would have wider ramifications in the governance of the country in the years to come. Need for a Civil Service Law, reframing the Government- civil servant relationship, reforming civil service recruiting procedures, reforming civil service recruiting procedures, reforming the placement method, and ensuring the security of tenure of civil officials are some of the significant suggestions. It strongly advocates for the performance management system for the civil servants. Therefore, it recommended releasing an Annual Performance Report by each department which should be made available to the public. It also puts forward the suggestion for Services Authority to review the public services and for Government to formulate the codes, aid and advise aspects concerning the public services.

Competency-based Training:

It was clear that the role of bureaucracy has become more complicated in the context of governance reforms. To face these challenges, they need specialised knowledge and technical skills. Normal college and university education does not meet these criteria for bureaucracy's changing role. As a result, there is a greater than ever need for civil servants to be trained. Training has now become a required component of modern personnel management. Almost everywhere in the world, including India, highly organised arrangements are in place to provide civil servants with effective and efficient training. The Twelfth Five-Year Plan (2012: 24-25) acknowledged the value of training, noting that “training for enabling the services to address the large variety of economic and management problems should be comprehensive and performed on a regular basis”.

The Second ARC and the National Training Policy of 2012 both firmly advocated for a competency based approach to human resource management across the board, including civil service capacity building. Knowledge, abilities, and attitudes or behavioural qualities make up competency. A classification of these competencies can be made into various core skills which a bureaucrat is required to have with various degrees of proficiency for multiple tasks at various levels. “Leadership, financial management, people management, information technology, project management, and

communication” are a few of the fundamental competencies. Another category of competencies pertains to technical or professional talents that are required for specialised tasks such as construction of roads, irrigation projects, and medical treatment, among others. Moving to a competency-based human resource management system, which guarantees that every function is handled by an individual with the requisite competency for that task, is critical for achieving transformative progress to the civil service.

Right to Information Act: Master Key to Good Governance

The Right to Information Act of 2005 marks a watershed moment in our governance paradigm, with far-reaching repercussions for all public entities. To the proper implementation of this law three fundamental transformations are necessary: from the current secrecy culture to a new culture of transparency; from personal dictatorship to power with accountability; and to participatory governance from unilateral decision-making. The effectiveness of this law depends greatly on the agencies established under it, early traditions and practises, subsequent transformations in laws and processes, and effective involvement of common people and government servants.

The Second ARC mainly focussed on two major areas: The first set of concerns addresses changes in other legal provisions and practises pertaining to state secrets, civil service conduct code and document classification. It argued that the Official Secrets Act of 1923 is out dated and inappropriate for modern requirements in its current form. The second category of matters under consideration includes the execution of the RTI Act, particularly “process engineering, record keeping, disclosures, access, and monitoring”. The Commission's suggestions for the second group of challenges are generally within the framework of current law.

The right to information is largely accepted as necessary but inadequate for an efficient government. On the other hand, through providing protection to whistle blower, decentralising power and merging the authority and accountability at every level accountability of the government can be promoted. Nonetheless, the Act offers a priceless chance to reimagine governing processes especially at the local level, where citizens' interaction is greatest. Now that the glamour of the fight for transparency has faded, the arduous task of system development must take precedence.

E Governance

The Eleventh Report of the Second ARC on e-Government, made contributions to India's transformation to a “transparent, responsive, citizen-friendly, and efficient governance”. The Commission has looked into several facets of India's e-Government reforms. The Commission believes that the focus should be on governance reforms in any e-Government programme, with the ICT's tools of technology re being utilised to enhance government processes fundamentally.

Today government faces challenges with respect to the E-Government and e-Governance since there is larger involvement of various stakeholders and processes and they necessitate a great deal of coordination, collaboration, as well as management and financial resources. In terms of employing ICT to improve government business, India has made a tremendous start. Several Indian states have been experimenting with e-governance solutions to improve information access. States have established Information Technology and Telecommunications departments. Departments of Information Technology and Communications lead and coordinate the deployment of programmes and projects in e-governance. It is one of the responsibilities of these departments to offer advice for government organisations to purchase hardware and software. IT&C Departments have made commendable progress in the development of e-governance applications such as FRIENDS in Kerala, Bhoomi in Karnataka, Gyandoot in Madhya Pradesh, Lokvani in Uttar Pradesh and e-Seva in Andhra Pradesh. These initiatives have become role models for other states in the country, and they have been copied.

The Second Administrative Reforms Commission observes that Indian experience of e-Governance includes a slew of pilot initiatives with varied degrees of success. However, the most of them are not scaled up or extensively reproduced. The Commission believes that learning from these experiences is critical, and that every pilot project must be completed to perfection. To achieve this, the focus must be on reforming government procedures, structures, and systems, rather than relying solely on technical solutions.

Finally, an e-Government initiative's success is determined by how effectively it has increased the involvement of the public in governmental operations via widespread ICT access. Because ICT could bring government and its services more

citizen friendly, promoting accountable, transparent, and responsive operations of the government and ensuring that government operates more efficiently at reduced costs. A healthy democracy and a good governance must have these as the bare minimum requirements.

Citizen Centric Administration

The essence of every functioning democracy is citizen centricity, which is intrinsically related to good governance. Good governance essentially entails fostering an atmosphere in which all citizens can reach their full potential. It also entails providing citizens with efficient and equitable governmental services. The Constitution of India lays the groundwork for promoting citizen-centered governance. It guarantees fundamental rights, which are the bedrock of our democracy, and establishes a set of Directive Principles to ensure the welfare of all citizens. India has established an intricate legal and institutional structure for ensuring good governance to its citizens, based on the values enshrined in the Constitution.

As a result, the Commission has looked into various approaches for making government more responsive to citizens. As a result, the concept of a citizens' charter as a tool for increasing efficiency and accountability has been thoroughly investigated. Processes and techniques for increasing citizen participation in government have also been proposed. To make government more accessible to citizens, the Commission has stressed process simplification, decentralisation, and delegation. The commission also recommended a number of changes to government departments' grievance redress systems. The significance of special institutional structures for the protection of vulnerable groups, such as national and state commissions, has also been analysed, with recommendations for how to improve their effectiveness.

Ethics in Governance

The Second Administrative Reforms Commission treated the “Report on Ethics in Governance” as the most significant one among those it was asked to prepare. For that the Commission was aware that enhanced transparency in governance would have a significant influence on the daily lives of the common people of India. When the suggestions in this study are adopted, government activity would be more efficient and accountable, because more public officials would labour for the greater good rather than for personal gain. Furthermore, a less corrupt system would result in a significantly

better rate of GDP growth, a complete economic improvement, and greater openness in governmental operations.

Local Self Governance

The terms of reference of the Second Administrative Reforms Commission (ARC) pertaining to Local Self Government were: (i) Upgrading the delivery of public utilities and citizen services by including more citizens and stakeholders in the process; Water, electricity, health and sanitation, education, and other services. (ii) Empowering the Panjayatiraj institutions in order to encourage participatory governance and networking; and, (iii) To support capacity-building and training measures to help local governments function better.

The National Training Policy Revised in 2012

“Training has acquired an added significance for building up required leadership and trust among civil servants to measure up to the standards of the public in the context of rapid technological changes as well as the economic, social, and political transformation taking place in the country” says the Indian government's National Training Policy, which covers civil servants' training demands. The Policy guidance have stressed the significance of training as "one of the most important and well-tested methods for improving efficiency and upgrading personnel's knowledge and skills". Vital and sharply oriented organisational motivation and morale, as manifested in attitudes and administrative culture, can be cultivated through successful training programmes. Specialised training programmes would be required in the background of sensitive response to changing socio-political issues along with modernism in thought and reconfiguration of the administrative structure. These programmes would ensure its dissemination within the administrative system.

In order to upgrade an employee's knowledge and skills and to enhance efficiency of his functions training is an established as well as effective method according to the remark made by the policy. It notes that the following should be the goals of training: a. Maintaining and improving professional expertise and skill that are necessary to improve performance at individual and organisational level; b. Increasing awareness of professional standards as well as the sensitization to the professional, economical, and political environment in which work is conducted; and c. establishing the required positive approach.

In accordance to the Training Policy, training programmes should underline during the course: (a) Responsiveness to the demands of citizens for their democratic needs and desires, and to the transformations at organisational and technical spheres; (b) Commitment: to democratic principles, the relationship principle, and participatory decision-making; c) Awareness of technological, economic, and societal issues and advancements; (d) Accountability: to ensure high performance in terms of competence as well as cost-effective methods of delivery.

According to the National Training Policy of 2012, the aim of training is to establish a competent, unbiased, and productive civil service which attend the requirements of citizens in a responsive manner. For that purpose, particular attention would be paid to the creation of proper ethics, job engagement, and empathy for disadvantaged groups like the differently abled, older people, SCs, STs, and others. It should be ensured through the competency system that every bureaucrat possesses the required expertise, skill and attitude for performing their duties effectively. The effectiveness of training can be determined by how well civil servants perform.

Kiran Aggarwal Committee Report

The committee was appointed in 2014 to assess the contents and duration of IAS officials' induction training. The recommendations of the Committee are divided into five categories. Firstly, it has advocated that the ideology that underpins Induction training should be revisited and made more competency-based. Second, it has established a case to reduce the duration of the training programme from two years to roughly one and a half years. Third, it has recommended some minor revisions to the Aiyar Committee's curriculum, in light of the revised UPSC General Studies syllabus and to better meet the Trainees' perceived requirements. The fourth set of proposals focuses on bringing the Academy's existing pedagogical approaches up to date with those used in top higher education institutions in order to promote more "adult" and "participant-centered" learning. The advantages of information technology can be utilised to facilitate this. Finally, various structural modifications have been recommended for the Ministry's consideration in order to allow improved training at the Academy.

Mission Karmayogi

Aiming at efficient service delivery to the public, through an organic integration of reforms in work culture, development of public institutions and usage of advanced technologies, Mission Karmayogi is designed to bring about transformative change in the civil service. It recommends forming a Human Resources Council chaired by the Prime Minister to approve and oversee capacity-building programs. It constituted a capacity building commission to guarantee that the capacity-building ecosystem is managed and regulated in a consistent and collaborative manner. Its purpose is to help the Prime Minister chaired Public Human Resource Council to approve Annual Capacity Building Plans, among other things. Its mission is to establish a wholly-owned SPV to own and run a platform for the online learning as well as to enable the market for world-class learning material.

A coordinating unit, led by the Cabinet Secretary, has also been established. The Central government launched the National Programme for Civil Service Capacity Building (NPCSCB) in recognition of the unique potential to achieve citizen-centricity with a competency-driven human resource management strategy that aspires to deploy the "right person" to the "right post". Building a Civil Service Competency Framework - FRAC (Framework of Roles, Activities, and Competencies) - which will contain the competency standards for each function is at the heart of the initiative. The details of the current competency levels will be indicated in learning record of the officials. After matching the two data, you can find the appropriate individual with the right skills for the right position. There is no doubt that this is a positive step in the direction of advancing the efficiency of civil servants, there are a few concerns remain especially with respect to the transparency of its implementation.

Over the decades, administrative reform committees have been plagued by a perceptible lack of enthusiasm in current civil service training programs. So far, linking punishments and incentives to the performance in training has been the approach suggested as a response to this particular concern. This was a recommendation made by the Yugandhar Committee in 2003, and the Mid-Career Training Program (MCTP), which was established in 2007 linking career advancement to the successful completion of training program. Similarly, the present reform attempts to connect training with career milestones and performance at department level through "continuous

performance analysis, data-driven goal-setting, and real-time monitoring", which includes the use of yearly scorecards and rankings.

Few concerns that to be taken care with respect to this reform: Firstly, while emphasizing on incentives and motivation is critical, earlier efforts to link training and performance have shown issues at the implementation stage. Civil servants should find time to schedule their attendance in training and get an approval for the same, particularly if it is held in a place other than their current assignment location. As the experience of MCTP has showed, systems that do not prioritize training can make attendance impossible. As a result, incentive-linked training eventually becomes a burden instead of a chance to learn. The iGOT platform's suggested digital environment and self-learning paradigm might assist to avoid these kinds of problems providing flexibility with respect to location and time. However, if the department does not prioritise appropriate time for online coursework and instead transfers it to frequently already overburdened employees, new form of the same problem may arise.

Secondly, the performance evaluation method has to be consistent, reliable, and transparent. Constant changes in the scoring technique, as observed in other projects to rank and drive competition in public program, generate ambiguous indications whether improvements in rankings represent greater performance or the re-weighting of score components. Incentive-linked training has the potential to become a cause of demotivation in the system if badly designed and implemented. As we have public service workforce that is large and diverse, obtaining right assessments is increasingly important and difficult.

To sum up the concerns in practice, linking the training to career advancement and performance requires meticulous planning, systemic responsibility, and a high level of transparency and trust. While a centralized design may provide coordination and standardization, a decentralized training and learning environment is required for a diversified public sector workforce. Although a proper training is an essential aspect of state capacity, it is unlikely to enhance the delivery of public service or be assimilated by organizations unless it is accompanied by a concerted effort to modify organizational norms and learning culture.

Civil Service Reform Components

Before concluding the chapter, a complete analysis of various efforts made by the state to reform Indian Civil service there are a few mandatory components that should be the foundations of any reforms of civil service. Reforms must consider the position of the civil service in today's governance demands, as well as the expectations it has engendered. The following should be the primary components of Civil Service Reform:

1. Structure and size of government

The government has expanded the number of ministries, departments, and officials since independence. Besides the financial implications, this type of increase has taxed implementation capacity and exacerbated coordination issues. Moreover, civil servants have to spend a larger portion of their time in clearing the concerns and confusions regarding their jurisdictional boundaries and rights and coordinating their operations across a growing number of agencies.

The key is to sustain a ministry's viability and integrity by retaining all closely linked operations in the context of priorities of a government under single administrative structure. It allows ministry officials to efficiently conduct business while also being held accountable for their performances.

2. Recruitment

The shifting tendencies in society and the economy ask for a greater emphasis in admissions examinations on technology expertise and topics such as human rights. In addition, the current pattern of examination places less emphasis on assessing managerial skill of the candidate. Our changing economy necessitates the hiring of professionals in a variety of fields. With rapid technological advancements and high levels of specialization in every industry, the government won't be able to afford employing generalists in positions that need specialised knowledge.

3. Capacity Building

Gaps in training facilities that are out of step with latest trends must be detected on a regular basis so that training may be offered straight at the induction level. Demotivating elements such as recurrent and arbitrary transfers, a terrible work

atmosphere, poor housing and health amenities, as well as specific factors impacting women in office and field employment, must all be addressed.

4. Performance and Promotion

The ACR format should be revised and updated, and more department-specific comments can be incorporated. Improvements to the consultative nature of the ACR process and the feedback managers offer to employees may also be improved without much trouble. Annual Confidential Reports will benefit greatly from the implementation of a Performance Appraisal Model.

Hong Kong Civil Services was reformed with a stipulation that civil servants were to be appointed on a permanent basis but that their continued employment would be subjected to periodic verification of performance metrics. This approach may also be used to India.

5. Professionalism and Modernity

A deliberate attempt should be made to encourage civil servants to develop professional skills through hands-on experience or research. Participation in training and study courses, as well as peer-reviewed published research, must be documented in the ACR. Civil servants should not be cynical about reforms; instead, they should ensure their active participation in them. To establish a pro-active, energetic, and responsible civil service, the feeling of change should emerge from inside the civil service.

6. Accountability

Though they are two distinct notions, transparency is a vital component of accountability. It is necessary for the public to be aware of the decisions made and actions taken by the civil servant in order to hold him accountable. This highlights the essential need for effective implementation of legislation such as the Right to Information Act and whistle-blower protection for citizens.

Conclusion

From this chapter of the research, it is clear that the Indian civil service reform movement is not short of ideas and recommendations. Countless committees and commissions have been established, with qualified public affairs specialists and

technocrats at the head, but very little progress has been made. The irony lies in the fact that every new Prime Minister has indicated their worry about the rigid system of bureaucracy and outmoded processes that are unable to meet aspirations of people and their developmental demands. Reform, on the other hand, has not followed.

In the end, India's civil service reform has not improved the efficiency or accountability of the civil service in any substantial way. It has not been effective in the eyes of the general public. If Maheshwari (1972: 55) is true, India's reform efforts have resulted to minor tweaks to the inherited system, over a quarter-century later, Das (1998: 213), an IAS official, has gone even farther to criticize the reform attempt, claiming that the correction slips were more like endorsement slips than correction slips. In order to transform the civil service system to welcome changes and reforms, the ideal combination of contemporary factors such as “structural adjustment, liberalization, technological imperatives, and grassroots pressures” can overcome bureaucratic skepticism and foster political will.

It's critical to acknowledge that the necessity of reform brings up further challenges. To meet the difficulties, the following would be necessary: “Political support and will; Management capacity to implement reforms; Nurturing support from civil servants themselves; ‘Safety nets’ must be in place for people adversely affected; Reforms must reflect the political and institutional environment of a country; Developing communication between all the stakeholders”. Government must involve more stakeholders in the field of civil service reforms, including civil servants and the general public. This is due to the fact that civil service reforms are critical in improving delivery of service in the country. By bringing reform debates into the open, the general public will be more interested in the process and will see themselves as essential stakeholders. This would definitely benefit for a responsive bureaucracy.

Trying to answer why the Indian Civil service shows reluctance to rapid changes following the international trends in governance, along with the challenges and difficulties it is also because of the persistence of colonial evils at the heart of the steel frame. It has been expressed that institutional reforms are impossible as long as colonial bureaucracy remains as it is scared of losing power through an administrative change. It has also been realized that Indian civil service is not yet ready to surrender its power, privileges and facilities to anything including a market economy. However there have

been efforts though at a minimal level from various corners of the country wherein individual civil servants proactively walked towards global trends in governance reforms. These individual cases cannot be left out while talking about a responsive bureaucracy especially to see how they strive being within the rigid institutional framework.

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Chapter V

Governance Reforms and Response of the Bureaucracy:

A Case Study of Kozhikode District in Kerala

The changing governments have made little conscious efforts to revamp the bureaucracy to meet the changing position in the context of governance reforms beyond setting up reform commissions and committees. The inclusion of disadvantaged groups, responsiveness to the people, and involvement of multiple actors are all objectives of governance reforms. This chapter is an attempt to explore the bureaucracy's field-based realities of responsiveness, and cooperation in Kerala. Kerala is one of the most important states in terms of social, economic, and cultural growth. Here the question to what extent administrative reforms impact the bureaucrats at work is answered from the field experiences of Kerala. To what extent policies of administrative reforms on responsiveness become practice is inquired specifically and various modalities chosen for that purpose is discussed in detail.

Responsive Bureaucracy

Modern bureaucracy as advocated by Max Weber is founded upon its legal – rational authority which determines the content and character of this organisation in its present scenario. One of the many characteristics of his ideal type of bureaucracy is an impersonal official whose task is to perform according to his technical training (Weber, 1969). This official's possible autocratic behaviour is limited by the formal legal norms for that matter. This is so because Weber thought that formalism can block any possible autocracy without much doing. Hence it can be inferred from this point of view of Weber that bureaucrats should act in an accountable manner while performing their function which he thought was part of very nature of the bureaucracy. We can call this accountability in its wider sense as responsiveness of bureaucracy. However, it is a hard reality there is a huge gap between the ideal bureaucratic organisation and its real-life practice because the most of basic principles upon which this institution is formed were not yet have been able to bring into life in their whole forms.

Actually, the human behaviour has a significant and larger role in the realisation of the activities of every organisation as we briefly discussed before. Even though the individual performing the functions of an organisation agrees with the objectives of the organisation, during his performance he would follow not only this organisational

objective but also his personal objectives too (Arora, 2007). This indicates the functional performance of a bureaucratic official not always follow an ideal route map as these behavioural factors also play a role there. Hence the question of accountability of bureaucrats cannot that easily be answered as did by Weber. In addition to that bureaucratic functioning is also influenced greatly by social settings due to its economic historical and political characteristics depending on its efficiency within the society. This gap in ideal type and bureaucratic practices is addressed as deviant bureaucracy that is comparatively more visible in developing countries than in the developed (Arora, 2007). One of the most visible characteristics of deviant bureaucracy in developing countries is personal dominance. This is present from selection process till the functioning of a bureaucrat in a developing country. Surprisingly it was pointed out that this dominance of public administrator over rule of the land is solely not a result of lack of such rules to control but sometimes it is the opposite of it that is the relative over regulation (Kulcsar, 1991). And interestingly it can be observed that the deviance from the ideal type actually helped to strengthen the bureaucratic system everywhere across the globe. If you look at it, while almost everything on earth is changing by time, it is the bureaucracies of governments which continue to be the same monopolistic, rigid, hierarchical and insensitive with rare variations here and there. It doesn't mean that the role of bureaucracy hasn't changed so as to demand more of a direct connection between administrators and citizens. At this point of time responsive bureaucracy is also significant to have as it ensures the political efficacy of citizens and encourages an active citizenry.

Concept of Responsive Bureaucracy

The definition of Bureaucracy responsiveness is given in Global Encyclopaedia of Public Administration, public policy and governance as it “refers to the extent that administrators can track public interests in a timely and accurate manner, providing the appropriate services accordingly”. Six variants of responsive bureaucracy were identified which are relevant in any contemporary democracy across the globe. They are as follows “dictated responsiveness to elected officials, constrained responsiveness to bureaucratic rules and norms, purposive responsiveness to professional goals, entrepreneurial responsiveness to customers of government, deliberative responsiveness to the public as partners or collaborators with administrators, and negotiated responsiveness to balancing potentially competing demands” (Bryer, 2007).

Scholars with a value perspective argue that professionals holding positions in public offices should deliver their duties in accordance with the values of “efficiency, representation, social equity, and individual rights” (Nalbandian, 1991). Another argument can be generally seen that public officials to be accountable to a collection of values such as public interest, law of the land, media, professional ethics, community values, circumstantial factors. This way it aims to reconcile possible conflicts between bureaucratic interests and democratic values. Ultimately bureaucratic responsiveness makes sure that administrative actions reflect the interest of the public. This is a concept which helps to understand “how to define, safeguard and advance public interest” (Farzamand, 2017).

Major Approaches to Achieve Bureaucratic Responsiveness

There are various perspectives among scholars regarding means of approaching Bureaucratic responsiveness. Mainly these differences are based on the questions of public interests should be defined and sought and the role of bureaucrats to bring in responsiveness in bureaucracy. The “citizen-get what- they-want” approach, the “dare-to-say-no” approach, and the “let’s-work-together” approach are the three major approaches hereby discussing. Among these first two approaches are two just opposites of a continuum.

1. **“Citizen-get what- they-want” Approach:** This citizen centered approach insists that bureaucrats should carry out all the needs and demands of citizens without any failure. It was pointed out by Schumaker that responsiveness is “the relationship between the manifest or explicitly articulated demands of a protest group and the corresponding actions of the political system which is the target of the protest-group demands” (Schumaker, 1975). In the same manner Rourke argues that a responsive system always fosters a harmony between the decisions made by the administrators and the priorities and demands of the community (Rourke, 1969: 3). Hence according to this approach of “citizen gets what they want” the changes that bring in the policy by the administrators as per the demands of the people can be considered as responsive.
2. **“Dare-to-Say-No” Approach:** Followers of this approach thinks that the best means for a responsive bureaucracy is to have administrators with professional skills and specialized knowledge in the field of administration. This approach considers the citizen’s demands as unrealistic and impractical. Hence a simple correspondence between the citizen demands and bureaucrats do not bring in a

responsive system. Rather what they propose is to have administrators who can find out using scientific methods and techniques the long-term valid interest of the public. Although this approach encourages the bureaucrats to reach out to the common people and to listen to their demands and to find out their interests, it asks them to remain flexible to an extent so as to mold citizen interests in certain cases if necessary. In totality this approach suggests that a policy would be acceptable even if the outcome is not an exact reflection of people's demands. Professional expertise and knowledge of the field make administrators eligible to make a policy with required changes to the people demands.

3. **“Let’s-Work-Together” Approach:** This approach tries to merge both the previous approaches together and believes that both the citizen demands and scientific expertise are crucial for a responsive bureaucracy. It is process based approach and it proposes that the quest of a responsive bureaucracy should be to have a deliberative and learning engagement between skillful administrators and all concerned stakeholders. According to this approach bureaucrats are not subordinates to the superior legislators and experts in the field who exercise their duties based on their scientific knowledge. Rather it demands them to be spokespersons of affected communities and to have a direct interaction with the common people. They should function as “facilitators, educators, and co-participants, rather than deference-demanding experts or independently responsible decision makers” (Adams, 1990). A responsive bureaucracy can only be built on the base of process featured by a two-way communication such as “public discussion, dialogue and deliberation”. Public deliberation means “debate and discussion aimed at producing reasonable, well-informed opinions in which participants are willing to revise preferences in light of discussion, new information, and claims made by fellow participants” (Chambers, 2003: 309).

In this way it creates a mutual understanding between the public administrators and common people. By means of a two-way communication public professionals realize the value of public expertise and encourage them to share their knowledge of the issue and solutions. This can create a bond between the administrators and citizens. Hence it was observed that a first step towards a responsive system is skillful listening because it demands the bureaucrats to be humble and look for diverse perspectives. “Dialogue marked by skilled listening creates a shared reality, a public or common space that

promotes responsiveness and a sense of mutual obligation or commitment” (Stivers, 1994). Moreover, communication process also provides chance to learn for citizens. By means of public dialogue and deliberation common people get opportunities to listen to other views which can sharpen their intellectual capacities and help to find alternatives which were not obvious from the previous proposals and discussions. Therefore, responsiveness is not an easy output that can be achieved by adhering to citizen preferences and professional qualifications. This approach understands it as a constant process which needs active involvement of both professionally qualified bureaucrats and vigilant and vibrant citizens. This approach is clearly summarized as follows: “Whereas traditionally government has responded to needs by saying, ‘yes, we can provide that service’ or ‘no, we can’t’ . . . public administrators should respond to the requests of citizens not just by saying yes or no, but by saying such things as ‘Let’s work together to figure out what we’re going to do, then make it happen’” (Denhardt, 2007: 84).

There are two perspectives possible in the case of responsiveness: that is bureaucrat’s perspective and beneficiary client’s /citizen’s perspective. This study employs a few sets of questions asked to bureaucrats to understand their perspective of responsiveness and a responsive bureaucracy. These general questions were asked to all sixty bureaucrats under study.

Associated Factors of Responsive Bureaucracy

There are number of collective factors that are associated with a responsive bureaucracy:

Organizational factors: The structure and rules of the organization within which a bureaucrat functions have a significant role in molding a responsive behavior of him/her. The level of centralization and formality hold by the organization impact its responsiveness to the peoples’ demands. For example, higher the centralized power and authority of the system there is a lesser chance for administrator responding to the public preferences in an appropriate manner. This was the reason why Alkadry observed that if we empower the employees at the bottom level, it will enhance their responsiveness to the society (Alkadry, 2003).

How we design administrative procedures is another significant concern among organizational factors. Because it was observed that administrator’s devotion to responsive management of citizen’s affairs is highly influenced by the reward structure and workload (Manring, 1994). A key factor here to keep in mind is that whether citizen

satisfaction is taken seriously while making rules. That is why the design of organizational rules becomes significant. If citizen complaints are processed with too much technicality, there is a lesser chance of them getting resolved.

Political Control: Elected officials as legitimate representatives of citizens have formal responsibility to collect, distinguish and follow up the needs and demands of the common people of the country. Hence it becomes their duty to provide a political guidance to the bureaucrats about the same. Political control also determines the bureaucratic responsiveness in the case of funding and other resources for a policy formulation and implementation. Because it is in the hands of political superiors how much resources bureaucracy gets for a project. A responsive administration needs financial and human resources to fulfill the public demands and elected officials are authorized to increase/reduce/cancel these resources according to their preferences. Even though political control is necessary for a responsive bureaucracy it is not sufficient for the same. There are cases of elected officials not interested to listen to people's demands. Hence it is not possible to think that citizens are represented exclusively by elected officials.


Policy Clients: Different pressure groups like policy clients can also make bureaucrats to be responsive to their demands. But the levels of pressure they can put on officials vary based on the socio-economic background of these groups. For the same reason there can be seen a variation in the responsiveness of the public administrators to these groups. Sometimes the amount of capital that they can invest with the political leaders also plays a role. It was observed in a study from US that people from higher income and white majoritarian neighborhood get comparatively faster response than the other (Jones, 1977). It is also noted that an organized opposition can influence the responsiveness of the bureaucrats to a great extent. Studies from the field experiences also show that interest and knowledge of citizens regarding the policy matters actually impact the decisions of administrators. It also results in healthy correspondence between the administrators and those citizens.

Intentions and values of Bureaucrats: Despite of all the above said factors, it is still with the bureaucrat to decide how to react to the people's demands and requests. It is called bureaucratic discretionary power. With this power of discretion, they can either enhance or diminish the strength of political control. Political control can be restricted by a skillful bureaucrat who can deal with political complexities of an issue. The case is not different about organizational structures as we can see bureaucratic offices with

same organizational structures and procedures give different outputs. The reason for such a variation lies with the mindset of the bureaucrat who runs that office. Values and intentions of a public administrator can actually make negotiations with the organizational and environmental factors that impact responsiveness of the institution. At the same time, how bureaucrats appreciate having values and ethics in their profession and how much willing they are to give effort to be responsive may also affect the responsiveness.

Task Difficulty: Another significant associated factor of responsiveness is task difficulty which means content, time and resources required for the demanded service determines the responsiveness of the bureaucrat to that particular task. A service which requires considerate number of resources may not get a very good response from the administration. Hence it was observed that demands from the disadvantaged sections of society are not well received by the bureaucrats because those may seem impossible to achieve with limited financial and political resources.

Figure 5.1 Factors Affecting Responsive Execution of a Policy



Source: Survey Data

Some of these factors came into light when during the survey with the civil servants in Kerala. It was asked to mention the elements which they find hindering or

damaging their responsiveness to the community demands at the time formulation or implementation of the policies.

According to the above figure pressure from various quarters such political superiors, corporate groups etc. and lack of financial resources are the major reasons affecting the smooth functioning of a responsive bureaucracy. Likewise, many have pointed how political parties' interference in affect the functioning and impede the execution of proposed policies. A few also find inadequate written rules making complication later in the way of implementation of policies.

Factors Leading to a Non-responsive Bureaucracy

If we consider the case of India in this regard, we are a country rely magnanimously on bureaucratic administrators for governance as we follow a parliamentary form of government. There are a few specific reasons we can find behind the abundance of authority and power left at the hands of the Indian bureaucracy which are exercised in an irresponsible manner. First one is that post-independence governments had to bring in numerous policies and programmes aiming the masses to ensure their economic development and social justice. This resulted in complicated governance operations which needed bureaucrats in higher responsible positions. And that led to the accumulation of formal power with the bureaucrats.

Table 5.1 Continuation of Colonial Legacy

Sl. No.	Continuation of Colonial Legacy	No of IAS Officers Responded	Percentage
1	Continuing	21	35.00%
2	Not continuing	30	50.00%
3	May be continuing	8	13.33%
4	Don't know	1	1.67%
Total		60	100.00%

Source: Survey Data

Moreover, these bureaucrats were also empowered with substantial discretionary powers as there were no sufficient rules and regulations to cover all the matters that arise during the operations of these policies. Secondly the elitist nature of Indian bureaucracy is also derived from its colonial legacy. Hence by nature it tends to

keep distance from masses and failed to fulfil the expectations and needs of them in time.

Almost half of the officers understudy agreed to an extent to the point that bureaucracy still follows the colonial legacy. However, the fifty percent of them were of the strong view that Indian bureaucracy does not continue the colonial legacy in any significant manner.

Another factor that led to the irresponsible bureaucracy is the ethical degeneration of our political leaders with whom bureaucratic members hold hand for their personal gains and vested interests. As the political leaders moved on to gain power at whatever cost in a very irresponsible manner it is sad to say that the bureaucracy which should act politically neutral began to twist rules in order to appease the vested interests of the political leaders. In other words, it can be said that political leaders or parties in reign had to get hold of the bureaucrats in offices to set and implement their agenda to remain in/remove the opposite from power or to accumulate profit with the power in hand. And officers were asked about this during the interview.

Majority of the officers expressed their concern about the interference of the political leaders within their administrative sphere and marked it as an often phenomenon. However, 20 officers have experienced this interference in rare occasions only.

It is highly important to have a fair and mutual responsive relationship between the political parties as they form the legislature of the state and the bureaucrats who constitute the executive section of the state. Only a fair and consistent relationship between these two provides good governance. However, in practice dealings in this relationship results in creating major inefficiencies of Indian Bureaucracy: firstly, as politicians are interested to micromanage the public administrators beyond their prescribed power, we are not always able to fill all the important bureaucratic positions in country with the most talented civil servant. Rather we may go for one who is submissive to personal and political interest of that particular elected official. Secondly, there is a lesser investment from the junior civil servants for skill acquisition as they started to believe in political loyalty in opposition to merit based professional advancements (Vaishnav and Khosla, 2016: 20).

Table 5.2 Interference of Political Leaders

Sl. No.	Interference of Political Leaders	No of IAS Officers Responded	Percentage
1	Often	28	46.67%
2	Very often	10	16.67%
3	Rarely	20	33.33%
4	Never	0	0.00%
5	No opinion	1	1.67%
6	Depends	1	1.67%
		60	100.00%

Source: Survey Data

Arora S.C has observed in his work that an important factor which made the bureaucrats irresponsible is the cumbersome procedure and complicated language of regulations and communication. Ignorance of masses about these matters worsened the situation (Arora, 2007). The very evident lack of professionalism in exercising powers and discharging duties also made people to show less respect towards this institution. Because people knew that a professional institution always tries to keep its internal qualities and standards. Above all of these it has been observed that the attitude of the civil servants to the common people is as of a ruling class but not a serving class. Above discussed factors have caused the bureaucratic administrators non responsive and authoritarians.

Political interference is deeply rooted in governance of our country and constantly baffles any attempts to eradicate diminishing standards of the bureaucracy. As per a survey conducted in 2010 among bureaucrats, only 24 percent bureaucrats believe that their appointments were solely merit based. Vishnav and Khosla (2016: 14) shares an experience of Ashok Khemka, an IAS officer who joined the Haryana cadre in 1991. As he exposed prevalent corruption in various state-government departments, he had been transferred 47 times in twenty-four years of his career. This is why sometimes bureaucrats are scared to be responsive to public interest over political interests.

As a result, politicians are only motivated to inspire bureaucrats when the advantages are internalised. As Saad and Benjamin suggested: “Politicians realize that large development programs offer them an important opportunity to earn favour with voters. Development program designs that help politicians claim credit will strengthen democratic accountability and improve service delivery” (Vaishnav and Khosla, 2016: 31)

Under Representation’s Impact on Responsiveness

Various studies from the field have shown that representative bureaucracy impact public administration in a positive manner. The major reason given for this finding is as it encourages inclusion in policy performance of every administration and decision makings would be less partial in comparison to a non-representative bureaucracy (Meier and Capers, 2014). The idea of the representative bureaucracy is that the composition of the bureaucracy at the socio-economic level should be similar to the society at a larger level as every social group of it has a spokesperson of its own in the bureaucracy to safeguard each of their interests (Jitha, 2007). As the Representative theory suggests increased representation in the administrative posts according to the population specificities of a country can bring in equity and inclusiveness in administration. In that way common people can identify themselves more with those in administrative positions which encourage them to cooperate in the administrative functions of bureaucrats. This obviously leads to enhanced acceptance and legitimacy of public institutions in society. Although initially this concept of representation came in relation to power sharing now a days it is more understood and analysed with its expanded versions of inclusiveness and responsiveness along with democratic governance and new public management (NPM) reform questions (Andrews et al., 2016).

Passive representation in its clear terms is not about doing something on behalf of people they represent. Moreover, it is about being responsive to the need of the people they represent. This does not mean that a representative bureaucracy is always responsive to those people who are represented and a non-representative bureaucracy may be more responsive to its citizens. It all depends on the structural mechanisms and procedures an administrative system follows to control and discipline the bureaucrats. These may result in socialisation and internalisation of service ethos and shape administrator’s mind to think/feel on behalf of the citizens. Having a system with

significant regard to representativeness and responsiveness is fundamental because it ensure active participation of various sections of society in the execution of administrative policies.

This concept is highly relevant in a country like India which has a diverse population. More importantly the civil servants are appointed in the key executive positions throughout the country. Therefore, it is important to have an ideal representation in its composition that is drawn from diverse social, geographical and career groups. Hence it can be expected that such a composition can ensure self-regulation and responsiveness. Another significance of representative bureaucracy in India is due to its relation to development administration. As a country that is involved in numerous programmes and schemes of socio-economic development in the post-independence period with huge investments under successive five years plans, a representative bureaucracy is a significant step to have to walk into the ultimate goal of these socio-economic projects and programmes.

The effectiveness of every administrative action of the officers in power can be determined to an extent by their skills, knowledge, behaviour, attitudes and values. Some of these can be inferred from the socio economic and educational backgrounds of these officers. There have been a number of studies made with respect to the socio-economic background of the higher bureaucracy in India which help to understand how representative is the country's bureaucracy is. Some of these studies point out that there is no connection between pattern of behaviour in their administrative capacities of a bureaucrat and his/her social and cultural origin. At the same time this theory has also been rebutted by a few scholars stating that every individual is influenced by the prevailing norms and values from their living surroundings (Jitha, 2007). They continue to state that this influence with no doubt is reflected in their course of actions. According to V. Subramaniam "the bureaucrats carry their class attitudes and prejudices into the official life and only when all classes or castes are properly represented in the bureaucracy, their different needs and interests find due attention" (Subramanyam, 1967).


It is repeatedly pointed out by most of the scholars regarding the accountability and responsiveness of the bureaucracy that rather than providing more extensions and inputs to make it accessible and responsive, there should be a restructuring of the inner dynamics of the very existing system. This is where question of representation within

the bureaucracy comes to the scene again. It is not sufficient to say that bureaucracy operates within the system of democracy which let everybody with diverse interests speak out but we need ears to listen to those interests as it is the demand of a responsive bureaucracy. This objective can easily be attained to a great extent if those diverse interests are reflected in the totality of the administrative processes. There are three points to be noted to support this argument and these are: 1. such a change in bureaucracy can advance economic political and social status of the concerned disadvantaged groups. 2. It can avoid suspicious and antagonistic behaviour such as “blacks will not serve the browns”. 3. It reduce the undemocratic and hierarchical way of treating disadvantaged sections of society and provide equal sensitivity and responsiveness to them in the matters concerned.

Excessive Bureaucratisation and Responsiveness

Bureaucratisation was increased in nineteenth century once the industrialised communities get to know the higher rate of productivity of bureaucratic administration. However, as bureaucratisation its dysfunctionalities become more and more visible in the twentieth century. As the researches more and more concentrated in the dysfunctional bureaucracy, it was suggested that going ahead on the path bureaucratisation may incite more bureaupathologies which will lead to diminish the productivity and damage the performance of the organisation. Hence to make up these drawbacks it was argued for debureaucratisation.

Figure 5.2 Over-bureaucratization Enhance Non-responsiveness?



Source: Survey Data

Caiden in his famous work argues that “Studies of selective allegedly over-bureaucratized organizations exhibiting bureaupathologies on an extensive scale (such as multi-national corporations, armed forces, prisons, legal systems, mail services welfare agencies) do suggest a J-curve effect. They also indicate how the functional elements of bureaucracy such as specialization, hierarchy, rules, managerial direction, impersonality, and professionalization, if overdone can turn dysfunctional and eventually unproductive. In combination the various dysfunctionalities not only alienate clients but also members/employees” (Caiden, 1991: 487).

Civil servants were asked during the field work whether excessive bureaucratisation as suggested by Caiden result in a dysfunctional and a non-responsive bureaucracy. While 14 officials agreed to it completely majority civil servants observed it as a partially true statement.

IT and Digital Media Effects on Responsive Bureaucracy

Since the beginning of twentieth century many countries across the globe started to shift their public services into electronic format including India. This shift is widely understood as to simplify the administrative procedure and thereby to boost the effectiveness and responsiveness of the administration. But such a general conclusion is not that simple to make as there are various other factors there to make this movement effective for administrative purposes like the technical literacy of citizens and public officials, expertise of the officials, availability of technical support team etc.

In Kerala cadre 51 out of 60 bureaucrats extensively make use of information technology and social media at different stages of their administrative process. Four of them responded that they are personally not well oriented about the technology.

Table 5.3 Utilisation of IT for Administrative Purpose

Sl. No.	Utilisation of IT for Administrative Purpose	No of IAS Officers Responded	Percentage
1	IT and social media oriented	51	80.00%
2	Not oriented	4	11.67%
3	To a certain extent	4	6.67%
4	No response	1	1.67%
Total		60	100.00%

Source: Survey Data

It was observed that if there is proper technical education provided with access these are really helpful for a responsive bureaucracy. As there is no direct interaction between the bureaucrat and citizen there is lesser chances of bribe. At the same time on one hand, it empowers many who were not able physically access the public services, participate in the formulation of policy as they were not aware of it. Another hand it also keeps a few behind as they are not technologically advanced due to financial capacity or lack of technical illiteracy.

Responsive Bureaucracy: A Kozhikode Model

An analysis of responsiveness of an organisation is incomplete without looking into the perspective of people at the receiving end of respective services. This research is particularly designed to see the case of citizens who are beneficiaries of a bureaucratic policy. For that purpose, Kozhikode district of Kerala state is selected and beneficiaries of ‘Compassionate Kozhikode’; a project that was executed in Kozhikode city are the respondents of this case study.

About Kozhikode

Kozhikode or Calicut is city with long recorded history and since time immemorial it attracted travellers with its hospitality and prosperity. Kozhikode is well known as ‘city of Spices’ since the Middle Ages due to its major role as a trading point of Eastern spices. It had trade relations with Jews, Arabs, Phoenicians, and Chinese and Arabs and Chinese merchants preferred Kozhikode port to all other ports in the region because of the freedom and security they enjoyed here. It was also the capital of Samoothiri’s (Zamorins) independent kingdom and later the capital of Malabar district under the British Rule. City’s first historical contact with Europe was when the Vasco-de-Gama set his foot on its shore at Kappadu. At present Kozhikode district consists of 2 revenue divisions, 4 taluks, 12 Block Panchayats, 70 panchayats and 118 villages with a total population of 30,86,293 (2011 Census).

Compassionate Kozhikode

It was in 2015 February, Prasanth Nair, a 2007 batch IAS officer took charge as Collector of Kozhikode. Since his first week in office, he created a social media page in the name of ‘Collector Kozhikode’ and extensively used it to interact with the people. It led to various projects that later he undertook with huge support from common people and made great impacts in the reformation and development at various levels. It all began when he posted a request to public to contribute various enlisted essentials (not cash) such as wheelchairs, mugs, plates, cots, nail cutters etc. for a mental health

asylum in the city. His post was a result of his visit to that institution and witnessing the poor conditions in which the inmates were living there. He thought that a request for fund to purchase those items from the government would take time and each second was precious as a living human being is there left inhumane conditions. Seeing the huge immediate positive response from the people of Kozhikode he initiated a web platform called 'compassionate Kozhikode'.

The Website provides institutions in need of help and services required in the respective institutions. It does not only invite goods and amenities but also invited people to perform various services such as maids for child care Centres, occupational therapists for mental health Centres, yoga trainers at old age homes etc. Citizens who are ready to volunteer or contribute services or goods can register providing their area of interest on this website and communicate his willingness to associate with any particular institution in the given space. It was younger generation mostly attracted to this platform and they were in leadership also. People belonging to different spheres of life such students, teachers, professionals, social activists, merchants, local fishing communities were actively participated in this project. The project was operated by community run initiatives who volunteer to tackle so many issues such as poor roads, pollution, crowded transportation, hunger etc. Some initiatives also aimed to assist and reform different institutions like libraries, children's homes, old age homes, and palliative care centres. Prasanth himself states in an interview that "The idea originated from the realisation that there are people in Kozhikode who are willing to give and there are many who really need help. We acted only as a facilitator. It is the culmination of several brainstorming sessions by a group of dedicated persons". The project never allowed accepting anything in the form of money to hinder corruption. By 2016 there were 1000 active volunteers in association with the 'compassionate Kozhikode'. It was these members handled and managed the project which had carried out works worth 25 million rupees within its first year of establishment.

Operation Sulaimani

Sulaimani is a special blend of tea with lime in it served in Malabar region of Kerala. Operation Sulaimani intends to serve food anyone at Kozhikode who would be denied the same due to his empty pocket without answering a series of questions. As per the project 25 'Sulaimani' Distribution centres in 14 zones of Kozhikode district were set up for anyone in need can access. These Centres provide coupons which can be exchanged for a good meal in any of the listed more than 100 hotels in the district.

That way anyone can have a meal with dignity and without being questioned. This project was planned and executed in association with the Kozhikode Hotel and Restaurants Association. Moreover, public whoever experienced the taste of Kozhikode also remembered to contribute towards this project in the donation boxes that were kept in these hotels. The collections from these boxes were consistently transferred to the account of KHRA and loss of any participating hotels were absorbed from this fund matching coupons collected from them.

Cleaning a Lake

In 2016 through his Facebook page the collector invited people to clean up 'Pisharikavu' lake in Koyilandi, 57,000 square metered water-body which was filled mud and waste. He offered delicious Malabar biriyani to those who participate in the action. 750 people turned up in response to his call and cleaned up the entire lake within one day. The biryani was prepared with the money from the Drought Prevention Fund of the District Administration. Joining the volunteers in action Prasanth said the media that success of every governmental policy is based on how much we can involve common people in it and how much excited you make them throughout the project. Cleaning up of the lake later inspired many other similar actions in the district with local people coming together to clean up the water bodies in the residential area.

Citizen's Perspective on Responsiveness

Having summarily explained the project that executed in Kozhikode district of Kerala by Prasanth IAS as a district administrator touching various fields of life, this particular section of the research attempts to answer a major question how citizen perceive this project with a responsiveness focus. To rate the responsiveness, it analyses their awareness regarding the project, source of information, citizen involvement, social groups involvement, limitations or difficulties they faced to obtain benefit from the programme, their satisfaction level, their awareness and access to complaint mechanism. For this purpose, with the help of a questionnaire 120 beneficiaries of various programmes under the 'compassionate Kozhikode' was interviewed.

Awareness is one of the most significant factors explaining responsiveness of bureaucracy. Awareness of a citizen regarding an administration in general and regarding a governmental programme in particular is a reason that influences him/her to approach that administration. It was observed that greater the awareness on a government, there are higher chances citizens to contact the government (Serra, 1995).

Table 5.4 People's Awareness about the Programme


Sl. No.	Awareness About the Programme	No of Beneficiaries Responded	Percentage
1	Aware	90	75.00%
2	not aware	20	16.67%
3	No response	10	8.33%
	Total	120	100.00%

Source: Survey Data

As per the survey for this study, 75% of beneficiaries responded that they were aware of the Project and the various programmes conducted by the district administration. Only 16% of the total respondents were not aware of the programme but received the benefits through different ways like accompanying other beneficiaries or with the help of other social activists' group etc.

Figure 5.3 Source of Information


Source: Survey Data



The above figure shows the major medium through which information are accessed regarding the Collector's project is social media networks such as Facebook, WhatsApp etc. Only 10% of the respondents obtained information regarding the programmes via public advertisements issued by the district administration. Second highest medium that made people aware of the programme is media reports which includes local newspapers, television and radio channel programmes. Moreover, Civil Society groups and political parties also have played a role in spreading awareness about the programme.

Citizen participation has a great role attributed by the public administration scholars in the democratic decision-making processes (Denhardt and Denhardt, 2000; Thomas, 1995). However, in reality citizen participation is rarely visible in the policy formulation and in execution stages. One of the major reasons for this is the reluctance of bureaucrat to involve citizens and mostly include them after everything is done. This attitude triggers the citizens and led them to express their frustration and distrust towards the government. Citizen involvement is an express indication of bureaucratic responsiveness (Saltzstein, 1992).


Figure 5.4 Citizen Involvement in Programmes



Source: Survey Data

The above figure points to the higher level of citizen involvement in the project that executed in the Kozhikode district by the district administrator. 70% of the beneficiaries agreed to the fact that there was large number of citizens present and actively joined in the planning and implementation of the project ‘compassionate Kozhikode’. They stated that actually it was a people’s project, district collector and team were just facilitator of the project. Beyond this survey observers evaluated that the major reason for the success of ‘compassionate Kozhikode’ is the space that Collector provided to the volunteers and participants in making decisions. Hence, they were able to adopt a leadership position and provide unique solutions to the difficulties they faced on their way to success. According to Prasanth IAS, “the responsibility for dissecting an issue and generating solutions had to be with the youth where they were bestowed with leadership roles and were required to tap their creativity in problem solving and ensuring consistency in execution” (UNDP, 2017:72). He believes that one of the most important aspects of fostering volunteer engagement is mutual trust.

Figure 5.5 Obstacles to Citizen Participation



Traditional literatures propose that bureaucrats respond to the external stakeholders such as powerful politicians, knowledgeable citizens, legal entities, corporates and professional organisations (Saltzstein, 1992). At the same time, it was also suggested that bureaucratic responsiveness to the stakeholders not always desirable and some sometimes may result in negative impacts on citizen participation and involvement.


Recently scholars have begun to consider citizen participation and community building as a bureaucratic value (Nalbandian, 1999). Bureaucrats in their new role as public managers do not become mere respondents to the pressure of external stakeholders but they are able to make judgments what are best for their community. In that process they are not only concerned about their career goals rather they act for the best interest of public.

For meaningful and authentic citizen participation it is the responsibility of the administrators to think about the practical requirements in terms of financial and other resources, institutional and structural capacity and about the potential hindrances that may arise. Previous studies have identified the institutional, organisational and material obstacles to citizen involvement (King and Stivers, 1998) and the present survey affirms it somehow. The Figure above represents citizen's view on the obstacles they face in their meaningful participation in the formulation and execution of administrative policies and programmes. The major challenge, according to beneficiary respondents, is the negative attitude of public officials towards the citizens' joining the process of

administrative programmes. It is often observed that public administrators are reluctant to share power, especially those in the street level which makes a negative impact in the citizens to share their interest and opinion regarding the programme or policy. Sometimes administrators promote and proactively work to enforce their own agendas which also result in withdrawal of public from the governance sphere.

Sometimes bureaucrats find deficiency of time and financial resources for an effective public involvement in the whole process. But the experience from Kozhikode is a real answer to this issue. ‘Compassionate Kozhikode’ experience clearly points out that people’s active participation can resolve financial difficulties as they could find huge resources in the form goods and services from the public itself without even waiting for a budget allocation from the concerned government. Hence by means of citizen participation, a kind of partnership can be built so as to address not only financial but other resources deficiencies. Most importantly the collector’s willingness to share his power actually brought up so many skilled citizens to the forefront. Thereby public officials hadn’t to spend so much time for the project, they just had to facilitate and direct the volunteers in the fields when it was necessary.

Figure 5.6 Role of Stakeholders



While understanding the bureaucratic responsiveness it has been often said that it is from the stake holder groups administrators mostly experience pressure. This is to ensure that bureaucrats act in the best interests of these groups. Sometimes among this constant push and pull from various stakeholders such as elected officials, politicians,

media groups, non-profit organisations, civil society groups, business entities public administrators often forget or undermine the best interest of the common citizens.

All the groups visibly promote the citizen interest with the aim of promoting the interest of that particular group. That means a particular group actively involved in a project indicates they have needs to fulfil in relation to that project. A particular group actively involved in a programme doesn't mean that they are successful in achieving their aims. Their successful highly depends upon the eminence of their position within that race which determined by their legitimacy and power (Yang, 2007). The legitimacy is based on how far their claims are appropriate within the constitutional framework. Hence if an illegitimate claim brought in even by a powerful stakeholder, the public administrator has the power to resist.

From the experience of 'compassionate Kozhikode' citizen beneficiaries observed that political groups were not that active in the whole project as they are everywhere else. This may be a result of intentional push back from the part of the team project towards political parties or leaders so as to avoid later controversies. Moreover, Collector's call was more for civil society groups and community level activists and clubs and these groups were highly visible in the running of the project. One of the main initiatives 'Operation Sulaimani' was completely under coordination of Hotel and Restaurants Association of Kozhikode whose efforts were highly appreciable to make it a huge success. Non-profit organisation keeps a 'networked relationship' with the elected members of legislature and bureaucrats (Van Slyke, 2003: 304). It was rightly observed that civic groups involvement helps citizen engagement with the governments because they not only assist government actions but also encourage them to seek citizen inputs. Therefore, it is understood that civil society groups have capacity to push for bureaucratic responsiveness. It is shown that media had significant part in the success of the project.

It was observed that another cause of grand success of the project lies in its key principle that neither the benefactors nor the beneficiaries being photographed or be given any kind publicity. This way the authorities and volunteers could ensure that only those stakeholders who put the needs of citizens ahead of their own exposure or self-promotion were considered, joined hands in initiatives under the project.

Collaborative Bureaucracy: Kozhikode Model

When we think about the idea of ‘bureaucracy’ or ‘bureaucrat’, image of authoritarian, privileged man neither responding to societal needs nor ready to interact with the common people is the prevalent one in our mind. Such an image is a result of preconditioning by the path that system of bureaucracy undertook till date. Terms like Cooperation or collaboration were not even closer to common man’s perspective of bureaucracy. But the bureaucracy in post globalisation era faced new challenges as we saw information boom which made all the decision-making processes cumbersome. Hence it required proper and effective knowledge management systems, as knowledge became highly specialized and distributed within short span, in order to process large volumes of data required for decision making. This scenario made previously restricted and rigid systems to think about cooperation and collaboration at different levels. Collaborative governance makes various stake holders come together in a public forum with state agencies aiming to interact with each other in the process of decision making (Ansell and Cash, 2007). Through ‘compassionate Kozhikode’ District administration under the leadership of Prasanth IAS attempted to bring into light this model of Collaborative bureaucracy in Kerala.

As the case before hand the idea of collaboration governance came up from many such local experiences all over the world. However generally it arose as a reaction to failures of previous administration due to excessive political interference, effortless and ineffective implementation of policies, high cost etc. Its emergence was also as a solution to the non-responsive bureaucratic system and adversarialism of multiple interest groups. All these factors along with the knowledge boom caused “turbulence” to policy makers and managers (Gray, 1989).

Although there are general theoretical accounts on collaborative governance, almost all literatures on the field are single case to case studies focusing on specific governance fields. In their initial attempt to derive theoretical claims about the genus of collaborative governance working on the previous case study literatures, Ansell defines collaborative governance as “A governing arrangement where one or more public agencies directly engage non-state stakeholders in a collective decision-making process that is formal, consensus-oriented, and deliberative and that aims to make or implement public policy or manage public programs or assets”. In the case of Indian

bureaucracy in collaboration literature, it has been argued that “collaboration literature has only peripherally examined the institutional substructures that underlie cooperative endeavors” (Ibrahim, 2004: 210).

Examining the constitutional framework for administrative structures and functioning of bureaucrats and the historical evolution of public administration in India, a paradox formed by the federal polity and democratic principles are clear on the surface. That means although there exists structural preconditioning for a collaborative bureaucratic functioning, administrative structures of these institutions make any collaborative attempts and citizen involvement impossibly tiresome excise (Jagannath, 2016). Even though since independence the role of district collector has evolved in so many ways and there are new actors and agencies emerged at the local panchayat levels, collector is the sole master coordinator at the district level as per the new mode of actions. District collector still holds the complete authority of coordination of development planning in a district. It is a bureaucratic norm that all programs should be organized without threatening the authority of the District Collector. Hence despite the presence and active involvement of local representatives or civil society group, District collector is the one who chairs or coordinates every district level committee. This was accurately marked in the Report on ‘State and District Administration’ as “many of them were not fully aware of how many committees they are required to preside over” (Kumar, 2011: 70). Interesting fact is that a District Collector is an authority appointed by the Central Government of India although he/ she is responsible to administer as in charge of every program at local and district level. However, there is no system in place to keep the Collector of the District Accountable to any programs or project he was in charge during his tenure. This was articulated as “diffused responsibility and confused accountability” of the Indian bureaucracy (Jagannath, 2016).

While discussing accountability, there are two indications came up from the field of ‘Compassionate Kozhikode’. First one is that it made things possible when people come together which was not easy to achieve as a single entity. As a negative side of collaboration, secondly, various departments at district administration find it as an opportunity to wash away from responsibility and shifted the blame of failure of one department over the other and finally it reached the basket of collective failure and collective responsibility.

The Indian bureaucracy undoubtedly operates within centralized, command and control framework of administration at all levels. At the same time being within this administrative structure they are asked to be collaborative beyond the departmental boundaries and with citizens and civil society groups. However, beyond this complicated status of the system collaboration is not an impossible task. If the District in charge, the Collector, understanding this mesh decides to concentrate on the collaborative initiative, he can activate it. This is how it happened in Kozhikode district of Kerala under 'Compassionate Kozhikode'. Collaborative bureaucracy becomes a difficult task for an administrator as he still has to navigate within the 'steel frame' of bureaucracy to make collaboration possible. There his role shifts from a ruler of the past to one who administer for the people. The important fact here to note that is a collaborative bureaucrat is a title that still suitable to only the one administrator who is willing to take the intentional efforts. The district administrators take caution not to damage the legitimacy and authority that the institution acquired historically. That is the reason why Collaborative bureaucracy has not yet become a common tag for the Indian bureaucracy.

It is pointed out that the diffused responsibility that the district level, state level bureaucrats experience is one of the key factors for them take collaborative initiatives. But as emphasized before "the policy entrepreneur in the positions of public authority" is an initiating factor (Jagannath, 2016: 438). Policy entrepreneur is a term that used to denote "senior bureaucrats who can shape, influence or even formulate policy because of their close proximity to external sources of power (i.e., politicians, donor organizations, or the legislature)". That means a charismatic leadership is necessary though not sufficient. The authority of 'compassionate Kozhikode' Prasanth IAS made it to that point and reports suggests it as one of the reasons for his successful experience of collaboration. People started to address him as 'collector Bro' with a friendly tone before he left the station.

Bureaucrats can use community participation in order to monitor and evaluate services. If they can use this as a proper governance mechanism, the question of responsibility and accountability would be eventually become this administrative systems' qualities. This is how collaboration helps to achieve responsiveness in bureaucrats of Indian state.

Conclusion

As a summary of this chapter, we can say that to address any problems associated with the Indian bureaucratic administration, firstly we have to deal with multiple paradoxes under which Indian bureaucracy operates. Indian bureaucracy is at the same time rational, open and political. Bureaucrats are supposed to work for a responsive bureaucracy by means of collaboration, cooperation and innovation while striving to maintain the stability. From the interactions with the bureaucrats and while engaging with their experiences in the field, we cannot on straightly say that they are against changes or adamant to maintain status quo. Also, it is not true if we say they are insensitive or incompetent. Rather they should be understood as individuals with fearless personalities working in a complicated and contradictory atmosphere. Because that particular atmosphere is founded upon a structure that is open, rational and political at the same time. They are in a constant strive to adapt, survive and to make sure the stability. The reason for that they understand organisational stability as individual stability.

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Conclusion

Even though bureaucracy is a common institution present around the world, there is no doubt that every bureaucratic system operates within unique socio cultural economic and historical contexts. All of these background factors somehow cause impact on their administrative traditions, key principles, objectives of civil service mission and state mechanisms. Likewise Indian bureaucracy closely connected to the past of this country in which various dynasties to British colonizers had played their role. Hence this background has played a huge role in moulding the Indian Bureaucracy what it is today. Also, there is no doubt that the people and those in power positions can't also be free from the burden of this past and it reflects in their perceptions on bureaucracy and its different modalities.

So far from this study it has been understood that bureaucratic organisations are less susceptible to external changes at the core when comparing to the number of reforms that were introduced to make bureaucracy compatible to the fast growing outer world. It was argued by Appleby Indian bureaucracy operates in line of diffused responsibility and strictness throughout the inter-governmental structures and gives its credit to the basic constitutional principle of federal polity (Appleby, 1953). This study examined in depth to what extent administrative reforms could make an impact to the bureaucracy to function efficient and responsive. And this analysis could not separate it from a consistent worry that rarely public administration scholars in India share that is this bureaucratic shift is possible in its full meaning as the reform Committee suggests as long as the rigid structure of the organisation remains with the bureaucracy. From the close interaction with the bureaucrats and active engagement with the implementation of their policy and programmes, it is not difficult to understand that the paradoxical organisational structure affects the flexible and cooperative nature of the bureaucrats.

The foundation of Indian Civil Service has been centralisation of authority and structured within a command and control framework since colonial times. It still maintains same structural characteristics even after independence and structurally determined to avoid uncertainties so as to ensure stability of the nation. Although Indian Civil Service functions like a 'steel frame' ensuring the stability of the nation making sure it remains as an indestructible union, in last 30 years it has to undertake changes to adapt new environments in the country. Including more people from rural, technical

education, socially economically backward communities, there has been attempts to make it 'less' elite.

However, it has been criticised that training of civil servants still provides traditional Weberian administrative orientation to the candidates even though they would be given opportunities to 'familiarise' with the terms like cooperation, collaboration and innovation later. This can be understood with an "open system perspective of organisational theory" as it points out this kind of training process as a means to maintain the equilibrium of the organisation. In other words, even though as per the demands of changing environment Bureaucracy selects representative group of candidates from the society, training them in Weberian Orthodoxy it ensures the structural stability of the institution. Hence it is to be understood that training is also works as an organisational tool to the Bureaucratic administration, giving it an opportunity to adjust any environmental variables that went beyond its control. In this way at one hand, it reflects by accommodating differences flexibility and on the other hand by ensuring a rational orientation of bureaucratic structures retains the certainty.

Recent reforms on bureaucracy proposed the administrators to engage citizens in the decision making process and considered it as an intrinsic value of public administration. From emergence local political parties, constitutional status of Panchayat raj institutions to liberalisation and administrative reforms are all factors contributed to make bureaucracy responsive and representative. Result of these was an expansion of organisational structures of bureaucracy in order to make space for requirements of decentralisation and governance while maintaining the rigidity and command –control nature of administration. This contradiction is present in the term collaborative bureaucracy also; it is an oxymoron because at the same time bureaucrats are asked to work for a collaborative responsive system while striving to ensure the stability and status quo.

'Revolutionary Reforms' in paper

During the period following independence, elected governments had to bail out their administrative machineries from different types of issues and threats because public administration was under great stress. The period between 1947 and 1954 was highly crucial for the Indian administrative system. The main issue confronted by the administrative machinery during this time was the shortage of officials due to the

division of nation into India and Pakistan. Therefore, governments of that time made several far reaching decisions putting India along a definite path of development and commissions were appointed to recommend solutions to overcome difficult situations. Although they brought developmental and promotional changes in the administration, the system lacked an organised, sustained concern for improvement and strengthening of administration. There was an absence of standing machinery in government which could address itself to the problems of administrative progress without any distractions. Consequently, Central Government created O & M unit to spread a simultaneous effort for efficiency over as wide an area as possible with a commendable quickness. The Government moved long forward by implementing recommendations of the commissions which generated confidence in the bureaucracy. The confidence and authority adhered to the administrative officials led them to corruption and abuse of power in some ways and that became a continuing nuisance for the Indian administrative system. S R Das Commission and Santhanam Committee brought a large number of suggestions to safeguard administrative institutions, starting from the local level, from this nuisance. The period in which Administrative Reforms Commission came into existence was a fruitful preparatory period, characterised by the assertion of parliamentary leadership in administrative reforms and the elevation of the O & M division to a full-fledged department of administrative reform. The initiatives of First ARC provided valuable lessons in administrative reforms to India which had many lessons to impart to developing countries, such as, timing of commission and sense of priorities in scheduling its activities. It could publish a huge amount of literature highlighting many problems for further study. It also generated a much wider public awareness on the various problems faced by administration as well as their possible solutions. Its interim report on setting up of the Lokpal and Lokayuktha created a great deal of interest in the country. From the initial phase of administrative reforms, recommendations for reform were numerous but their implementations were poor, tardy and uneven. Therefore, the basic structure of administration and attitudes and orientation of bureaucracy remained blithely unchanged. But, post ninety administrative reforms based on the philosophy of NPM are guided by the measures of economic liberalisation. Therefore, the Second ARC could do more and in a better way because its reports came after the nation went through a paradigm shift to business liberalism and globalism. Collaborative and network bureaucracy is a product of

thoughts of privatising certain tasks of bureaucracy. As most of the reforms reports and a general tendency points towards overhauling the total bureaucracy.

The government should consider implementing legislation to prohibit arbitrary staff transfers. One measure the current administration may take to improve the situation is to prioritise action on a set of draft laws that would limit politicians' capacity to transfer bureaucrats at will. The Public Services Bill (2007), the Civil Services Bill (2009), and the Civil Services Standards, Performance, and Accountability Bill (2010), all of which have been languishing, are among the pending bills. The sole noteworthy act of civil service reform in recent years has come from the judiciary, not from legislation; In 2013, the Supreme Court of India ordered both the national and state governments to create civil service boards to oversee “tenure, transfer, and posting” of all officers in the All India Services (Vishnav and Khosla, 2016: 24). Unfortunately, many of the states were not accepted the minimum tenure of two years for civil servants.

Dealing with the task of Reform

Reform is riddled with risks. Every act of reform may not necessarily bring the expected improvement to the system or not going to be worth the effort, if they are just changed for the sake of change. Surroundings, people and events change so quickly overwhelming them even before they have opportunity to affect life of the people. Successful reforms and reformers from the past can give insights from their experiences. These are reformers who achieved much of what they set out to do and through which public service was transformed in an irreversible manner.

As they guarantee in the election manifestos in return of massive support of the public everywhere in our country, there should be unwavering backing from elected politicians. Elected authorities must demonstrate their support for reform via word and deeds, and if they find it necessary, it is their responsibility to collect the public opinion behind it. When there is a suspicion that these leaders are just moving with the flow without any public support, and then also the reform becomes impossible.

Second, reform must be considered as an investment. Before starting the business of reform, it is necessary to conduct thorough study to determine whether it is going to be deceptive or irresponsible; there must be some minimal guarantee of a beneficial outcome. There should be an initial homework followed by frequent

monitoring to evaluate if everything works as planned and if any modifications are required.

Thirdly, as the Indian example demonstrates, reforms take time. At the same time the public, public leaders, reformers and public servants all express their impatience because everyone holding an office or a post have a very short time span in their hand. Hence, they seek for immediate results. If we realise the complications and intricacies involved in civil service reforms, we also would be aware of the fact that enough breathing space is a fancy idea within that sphere. Therefore, in order to maintain everyone involved on the right platform, there is a need of some instant result there have to be some quick results, however contrived. A progress report of actual progress in the field of reform needs to be presented showing the development made and persisted in a constant interval. Absence of sufficient time contributes to hazardous results in the sphere of reform.

Lastly, objections and grievances are going to be there irrespective of success or failure of any civil service reform. Nobody appears to be happy about the results. Some individuals will always think that the civil service is too huge, too expensive, too useless, too unproductive, too inefficient, and surely too ineffectual, and that public officials are parasitic, inept, impolite, overbearing, arrogant, malicious, and nasty.

Like Brunsson (2009) points out, reform is not always motivated by the desire to make particular changes, but can sometimes be purely symbolic: “Reform can be regarded as part of organizational stability rather than of organizational change. Reforms are often presented as dramatic one of changes, and they may sometimes lead to changes. But reform in itself is more often a standard repetitive activity. Reforms are routines rather than breaks in organizational life”. (Brunsson, 2009: 44)

NPG: Where Future Reforms to be Directed

What this research draws for the future of the Indian Public service is the multiple possibilities that New Public Governance has introduced in the field of governance, particularly in public service delivery. A large and diverse country like India should not miss this opportunity to take advantage of this new paradigm of public administration. Within NPG social actors and private players network would be responsible in diverse governance aspects wherein civil servants would only steer

instead of row the boat. These last two years of Covid-19 pandemic have shown us how civil society plays a critical role in saving lives. This role must be institutionalised part of the new public governance. This again brings us again to the point of necessary change that our bureaucracy is required in its character. This change demands a serious rethinking on hierarchical flexibility, generalist versus expert argument, as well as openness to innovations and reforms like lateral entrance and collaborating with a network of social actors.

Over the years, as in the beginning of this work mentioned public service and public servants have been denounced for multiple reasons that have been discussed in detail. This is best opportunity to replace these monotonous condemnations with practical based view of bureaucracy and New Public governance can bring that to us. The idea of bureaucracy has to be reformed and reappraised in an age like ours, where all kinds of fluid and fluxing social structures are extolled as proof of an approaching new global order, primarily rooted in a variety of technical innovation and related modes of communication.

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Annexure I

Questionnaire for the Study of Bureaucracy

Distributed Among the IAS officers, Kerala Cadre

- 1) Name:
- 2) Sex:
- 3) Age
 - i) Below 30 years
 - ii) Between 30 & 40
 - iii) Between 40 & 50
 - iv) 50 and above
- 4) Home state:
- 5) Mother tongue:
- 6) Religion:
- 7) Caste:
- 8) Educational Qualification
 - i) BA/B. Sc./ B.Com
 - ii) MA/M.Sc./ M.Com
 - iii) MBBS
 - iv) Engineering
 - v) Other Degree
- 9) University
- 10) Medium of Instruction
 - i) In School
 - ii) In College
- 11) Occupational Experience before joining IAS
 - i) Teaching
 - ii) Research
 - iii) Executive
 - iv) Fresh from College
 - v) Other job
- 12) Mention Date of joining Service:
- 13) Present Position (Designation):
 - i)
 - ii) Any Other

14) Parents Education

- | | |
|----------------------|-------------------------|
| i) Matriculation | iv) Professional Degree |
| ii) Degree | v) Any other |
| iii) Post Graduation | |

15) Parent's Occupation

- | | | |
|------------|---------------|---------------|
| i) Teacher | iii) Engineer | v) Executive |
| ii) Doctor | iv) Business | vi) Any Other |

16) How did you decide your career

- | | | |
|-------------|--------------|--------------|
| i) Self | iii) Friends | v) Relatives |
| ii) Parents | iv) Spouse | |

17) Why did you opt for this career

- | | | |
|---------------------|-------------------|-----------|
| i) Career prospects | ii) Social status | iv) Power |
| | iii) Service | v) Salary |

18) What is your opinion about the training which the IAS officers receive, both institutional and practical?

- | | |
|---------------|-------------------|
| i) Good | iii) Average |
| ii) Very good | iv) Below average |

19) Do you think there is room for improvement?

- | | |
|--------|--------|
| i) Yes | ii) No |
|--------|--------|

20) Do you think personal, ideological and political considerations influence the transfer of officials?

- | | |
|--------|----------------|
| i) Yes | iii) May be |
| ii) No | iv) Don't know |

21) Do you find society and culture conducive to efficient working of the administration?

- | |
|--------|
| i) Yes |
| ii) No |

22) Do you think bureaucracy has become innovative in functioning?

- | | |
|--------|--------|
| i) Yes | ii) No |
|--------|--------|

- 23) Do you think the character of colonial bureaucracy is still present in the administration?
- i) Yes
 - ii) No
 - iii) Maybe
 - iv) Don't know
- 24) Do you think the civil servants are the agents of social change?
- i) Yes
 - ii) No
 - iii) Maybe
 - iv) Cannot say
- 25) What is your role in the formulation of policies?
- i) Active
 - ii) Moderate
 - iii) No role
- 26) Is it true that the civil servants offer advice or suggestions in policy matters to suit the interest of the politicians?
- i) Yes
 - ii) No
- 27) Are you independent in taking decisions?
- i) Yes
 - ii) No
- 28) What are the major problems that you face while taking initiatives for innovative programmes, like e- governance, entrepreneurship, collaborative efforts etc,
- i) Lack of clear-cut rules
 - ii) Interference from politicians
 - iii) Interference from rural/urban rich
 - iv) Ignorance of the people
 - v) Lack of adequate finance
- 29) How far the innovative initiatives like e-governance, entrepreneurship, collaboration etc. really benefited to the people?
- i) Benefited
 - ii) Not benefited
 - iii) To a certain extent
 - iv) Don't know
- 30) Do you think that people are aware of the developmental programmes of the government?
- i) Yes
 - ii) No
- 31) If no what are the steps you take to make the people aware of the government programmes?
- i) Through education
 - ii) Through public contact

iii) Trough propaganda

32) What is the attitude of the people to your new role as a innovation bureaucracy?

- | | |
|------------------|------------------|
| i) Positive | iii) Indifferent |
| ii) Not positive | iv) Don't know |

33) Who according to you should decide the development priorities?

- | | |
|----------------|-----------------|
| i) Politicians | ii) Bureaucrats |
|----------------|-----------------|

34) At what level the developmental priorities should be decided?

- | | |
|-----------------|------------------|
| i) National | iv) Block level |
| ii) State level | v) Village level |
| iii) District | |
| vi) Rarely | |

35) How do IAS officers get along with the officers of the state cadre in their capacities both as superiors and subordinates?

- | | |
|--------------|-------------------|
| i) Excellent | iv) Poor |
| ii) Good | v) Unsatisfactory |
| iii) Fair | |

36) What do you think are the reasons for conflict with other officials?

- | | |
|---------------|-------------------------|
| i) Status | iii) Party affiliations |
| ii) Seniority | iv) Values |

37) Are you aware about the concept of New Public Management and Governance?

- | | |
|--------|--------|
| i) Yes | ii) No |
|--------|--------|

38) The concept of NPM is praiseworthy but in practice it is harnessed for purpose other than economy efficiency and effectiveness. Do you agree?

- | | |
|---------------------------------|----------------------|
| i) Strongly agree | iv) Disagree |
| ii) Agree | v) Strongly disagree |
| iii) Neither agree nor disagree | |

39) Performance appraisal Systems are fair and Objective

- | | | |
|-------------------|---------------------------------|----------------------|
| i) Strongly agree | iii) Neither agree nor disagree | iv) Disagree |
| ii) Agree | | v) Strongly disagree |

- 40) Civil servants are promoted well on their job
- | | | |
|-------------------|---------------------------------|----------------------|
| i) Strongly agree | iii) Neither agree nor disagree | iv) Disagree |
| ii) Agree | | v) Strongly disagree |
| vi) | | |
- 41) Civil Servants are well equipped to meet the requirements and challenges of their job
- | | |
|---------------------------------|----------------------|
| i) Strongly agree | iv) Disagree |
| ii) Agree | v) Strongly disagree |
| iii) Neither agree nor disagree | |
- 42) People often complain about the administrative inefficiency in government? how do you feel about this observation?
- | | |
|---------------------------------|----------------------|
| i) Strongly agree | iv) Disagree |
| ii) Agree | v) Strongly disagree |
| iii) Neither agree nor disagree | |
- 43) Do you think the public have confidence in you?
- | | |
|------------|----------------|
| i) Yes | iii) No |
| ii) May be | iv) Don't know |
- 44) What qualities are essential for a good official?
- | | |
|---------------|-----------------|
| i) Efficiency | iii) Commitment |
| ii) Knowledge | iv) All these |
- 45) Your commitment to
- | |
|-----------------|
| i) Constitution |
| ii) Government |
| iii) People |
| iv) Self |
- 46) Is there anything would you like to mention?

Annexure II

Questionnaire Distributed among the Beneficiaries of the Project

Compassionate Kozhikode

- 1) Name:
- 2) Address:
- 3) Taluk/Village:
- 4) Educational Qualifications:
 - i) Primary Education
 - ii) SSLC
 - iii) Pre-Degree
 - iv) Degree
 - v) Post Graduation
 - vi) Technical Education
- 5) Age:
- 6) Religion:
- 7) Caste:
- 8) How many members in your family:
 - i) Yes
 - ii) No
 - iii) If Yes How many members:
- 9) Annual Income of the family
- 10) Any members with regular source of income:
- 11) Whether you have own land:
 - i) Yes
 - ii) No
 - iii) If Yes What is area
- 12) What type of house you own?
 - i) Thatched
 - ii) Tiled
 - iii) Concretes
 - iv) No House
- 13) Do you aware about the welfare schemes promoted by the district collector office?
 - i) Yes
 - ii) No
- 14) The Programme from which you are benefitted from?

15) Who gave you Information regarding the programme?

- | | |
|------------------------------|-----------------------|
| i) District Collector office | iv) Hotel authorities |
| ii) Political parties | v) Others |
| iii) Social workers | |

16) What motivates you to join the programme?

- | | |
|-------------------------------|--------------------------|
| i) Financial constraints | iii) Political influence |
| ii) District collector office | iv) Other reasons |

17) What are obstacles do you think affect citizen participation in the government projects?

- | | |
|----------------------------------|-----------------------------------|
| i) Unawareness | iv) Lack of time |
| ii) Lack of finance | v) Negative attitude of officials |
| iii) Lack of structural facility | |

18) Whether this project was helpful for you?

- i) Yes
- ii) No
- iii) If not what are the reasons

19) Who are the persons suggested you proper directions to get the benefits?

- i) Collectorate officials
- ii) Hotel authorities
- iii) Others

20) Whether you have approached Higher officials like collector, sub collector, Asst. collector etc.?

- i) Yes
- ii) No
- iii) If Yes Whom?

21) In your opinion who are the appropriate officers for upliftment if poor and downtrodden?

- | | |
|---------------------|----------------------|
| i) Collector | iv) All of the above |
| ii) Politician | v) None Of the Above |
| iii) Social workers | |

22) How do you rate citizen's involvement in the project run by district administration?

- i) Higher participation iv) rarely

- ii) A few participate v) no participation

23) How do you rate different stakeholder's role in the conduct of the project?

Stakeholders	Very active	Active	Not active
1. Politicians			
2. Civil Society Groups			
3. Media			
4. Business groups			


24) In your opinion whether the developmental/ welfare activities have any negative impact?

- i) No
 ii) Yes
 iii) If yes whether the reasons are any of the following?
- a. Bureaucracy
 - b. Political Interference
 - c. Bureaucratic corruption
 - d. Non cooperation of the other groups
 - e. Other reasons

25) Do you have any suggestion for the progress of this program?

Annexure III Published Article

Salman AK



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Indian Bureaucracy: An Elite Cocoon

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ABSTRACT

Representative bureaucracy is a term that has been widely used in academia with multiple meanings in different contexts in history. This paper analyses the socio economic background of IAS officers in Kerala and how representative is the higher bureaucracy and inquire to what extent it is reflected in their administrative actions. It argues that the Bureaucracy continues to be a place for elite in India and this is main root cause of failure of Indian bureaucracy in multiple aspects. It remains inaccessible to women, religious minorities and to people from lower caste and rural background. The data for this study was collected by means of questionnaire served to the civil servants in Kerala.

Key words: Representation, Bureaucracy, Kerala, Civil service

Introduction

Representation is a hot topic in every democratic society across the world because not only who should represent whom is a question but how and to what extent the representation is allowed has also becomes a serious concern. In this context this paper analyses socio economic background of IAS officers in Kerala.

Theoretical Approaches to Representative Bureaucracy

Representative Bureaucracy is a term that has been widely discussed in streams of Public administration and management but still misunderstood by many due to its theoretical overtones. The meaning of the term has also been changed many times according to the interest and context of the scholar. Before going into the case study, it is important to understand some important approaches to representative bureaucracy. First among them is active and passive representation put forth by Frederic Mosher. He seemingly favours passive representation which is also known as sociological approach. It means that “concerns the sources of origin of

**Annexure IV
Presented Paper- I**



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CERTIFICATE OF PARTICIPATION

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
I, Philippe Zittoun, General Secretary of the International Public Policy
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Education(RTE) Act: A Study of Malabar Coastal Region."

Philippe Zittoun
General Secretary, IPPA

Annexure- V
Presented Paper-II



Governance Reforms and Response of the Bureaucracy

by Salman A K

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