David Hume's Treatment of Personal Identity: A Critical Analysis

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By

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I, C Anjaneyulu, hereby declare that this thesis titled **"David Hume's Treatment of Personal Identity: A Critical Analysis"** submitted under the guidance and supervision of Dr. B. Ananda Sagar is my bonafide research work and is free from plagiarism. I also declare that it has not been submitted in full or in part to this university or any other university or institution for the award of any degree or diploma. I hereby agree that my thesis can be deposited in Shodhganga/INFLIBNET.

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Dedicated To All My Teachers Who Made Me To Walk Towards

The LIGHT

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INTRODUCTION

I.1. Introduction

Among the many living creatures, I think, we, human beings, are the only creature who curiously investigates the nature of things around us. Not only this but also, we are very curious about enquiring the nature of our own existence and our relation with the other things in this world. With the curious investigations from the time immemorial, we come to know we can think and also, we can think about our thinking nature—the nature of self-consciousness—which is a peculiar quality of human beings. This peculiar quality naturally makes us to think of past, present and future interests. In short, as human beings, we understand our peculiar nature of thinking ability is not merely limited to the present but also we understand we can think about the past and the future. Besides this, from the time immemorial, naturally, we have been chased by different, interesting and difficult questions to which getting a certain answer is more difficult. Most of the questions are closely related to our own existence. A rough list of the questions is as follows: Why is this existence occurring? What were we before this existence? Why does it cease at one point of time? What will happen after cessation of this existence? Though it is not easy to get accurate answers to these kinds of questions, there are many speculative answers. A general answer to these questions is that this existence is created by a power called God and after cessation of this existence we are judged for our deeds and get rewards or punishment. These kinds of speculative stories might slightly differ from time to time and slightly differ in western and in the eastern world. However, a common speculative story is that we are judged for our deeds. And, according to our deeds in this life we will get heavenly or netherworld life after cessation of the present life. For instance, Plato in his dialogue "*The Phaedo*" expressed through Socrates' voice that a philosopher welcomes death without fear in his/her heart. The reason for him, because of the liberation of the soul philosophers will get a great afterlife.[1] We can see a strong belief in Christian doctrines is that after the death of a human being God judges people's actions and sends them either heaven or hell according to their good and evil actions. Damned souls are tortured in the lake of fire forever, and good people who engage

[1] According to Plato, a human being is a combination of the soul and body. It leaves the body during the time of death. Some future waits for it according to good and wicked actions. Further, he claims that people who practice philosophy in the right way never fear death rather they welcome death. People who have desires of body, wealth, and honor and so on their death is resentful. Even though people who bravely face death but that braveness is illogical because it comes through fear and cowardice. But it is not the case with a philosopher. Plato holds that a philosopher after his/her life will get good friends and masters. See for more information, Plato, "The Phaedo: A Dialogue on Immortality of the Soul," in *The Works of Plato,* Vol. IV, translated by Floyer Sydenham and Thomas Taylor, with a new introduction by James A. Coulter (New York: AMS Press, 1979), 245-342.

with good actions are subjects to God's love.[2] The story is not much different in Indian theology and other doctrines, for instance, *Bhagavad-gītā* and Buddhism. Based on the good and evil actions in this life, people will get rebirth. Birth and rebirth cycle will continue up to the point they are attached to their deeds.[3] We can say that all these sorts of speculations are the result of a serious inquiry about the questions mentioned above. More specifically, to say, in terms of Udo Thiel, these are the outcomes of two essential and related features of human subjectivity. Firstly, our ability to be aware of self (self-consciousness) with concerning present and even past and future actions and their consequences. Secondly, our ability of thinking ourselves as identical through time (personal identity) whenever we talk about our responsibility to our past deeds.[4] From the time of ancient to till the date, we can see there are various and disputable arguments in the history of philosophy regarding the notion of self-consciousness and the notion of personal identity. Among these two, the question of personal identity is more interesting at the same time, more difficult to get an adequate solution.

I.2.0. The Concept of Personal Identity and Its Importance

Generally, the notion of personal identity deals with questions such as what constitutes me as the same person at two different times. Or, on what fundamental ground, I am assuming I am the same person now and the first day of my birth? Or, on what basis, we are thinking we are responsible for our actions which were done in the past? Or, on what basis, we are assuming we will be the same persons after fifty years later? Our life insurance policies and our present decisions for tomorrow are a few live/local examples for our assumptions regarding the future. In short, what is the principal requirement to say a person X is the same person

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[2] T. Talbott, "Heaven and Hell in Christian Thought," *The Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy* (Fall 2017 Edition), http://plato.stanford.edu › entries › heaven-hell.

[3] In *Bhagavad-gītā*, we can see clear textual evidence, in Chapter 2, verse 22, relating to how the same soul takes a new birth. The meaning of the verse is as follows: The same soul changes (gives up) its body and takes new birth repeatedly when the respective body does not function appropriately. It is just like, in our day to day life, we change our dresses when they are torn. Elsewhere, the text also says that this rebirth cycle is based on the action of the present life. To say, if a person made his/her consciousness like that of a cat or dog, for example, he/she is sure to change to the respective animals' body. In this way, the individual soul changes from one body to another. A person's present body and present actions are the background of his/her next life (see Chapter 15, verses 8 and 9). See for more information, A. C. Bhaktivedanta Swami Prabhupada, *Bhagavad-gītā as it is,* (Mumbai: The Bhakti Vedanta Book Trust, 1986), 94-96 and 639-641.

Even we can see the concept of rebirth in Buddhist philosophy but it gives a different picture of the notion of rebirth. First of all, Buddhists promote no-self theory. Therefore, for them, the soul is not the criterion of rebirth. Rather, their concept of rebirth is based on karma theory, not based on cosmic rewards and punishment. A person's actions are the main cause of his/her rebirth. At the same time, the person is not the same person who was in the past. C T Lin, "On the naturalization of karma and rebirth," in *International Journal of Dharma Studies* 3, no: 6(2015) (Springer Link, 09 June 2015). internationaljournaldharmastudies.springeropen.com › articles

[4] Udo Thiel, *The Early Modern Subject: Self-consciousness and Personal Identity from Descartes to Hume,* (New York: Oxford University Press, 2011), 1.

through time? We observe changes in our body—for instance, sometimes fat and sometimes lean. Also, we observe clear variations in our moods, passions, and character. Despite all the observable facts, we think we are the same persons through time. Why? What principles make us justify our belief about it? A brief historical account of the terms involved in the phrase "personal identity" could give us a picture about the problem of personal identity and its importance.[5]

I.2.1. The concept of Identity

The concept of identity, in general, is the concept that discusses the constitutive principle of things' sameness over time. In short, it tells us what constitutes the identity of things through time. Also, this concept is a basis for the problem of personal identity. As Theil said, before the 17th century the concept of identity is generally discussed with the concept of individuation which was widely discussed by the philosophers as well as theologists. We can see the basic difference between the both concepts is that the concept of individuation principally discusses the principle that differentiates an object from the other same kind of objects whereas the concept of identity discusses the required principle/condition for an individual's identity through time despite the fact of observable changes.[6] Therefore, we can say these two concepts are closely related. In particular, these concepts are generally discussed with relating theological as well as moral subjects. However, as Thiel shows, a shift had taken place in the 17th and 18th centuries. The shift is that instead of investigating rigorously the problem of individuation, philosophers became more engaged with the issue of identity.[7] Before the 17th century, we can observe, issues were mainly discussed about individuality of things. If we look at Aquinas' work, for instance, we can observe how he has given importance to the concept of individuality of things.[8] From the time period of Locke, many philosophers focused on the concept of identity rather than the concept of individuality. We can say Locke is a prominent figure in order to bring this shift. Additionally, as Thiel showed, Locke is also a prominent figure to bring another shift regarding the concept of

[5] Udo Thiel tries to provide a clear and in-depth picture of the historical account—from Plato to the 18th century—of these concepts, namely, individuation, identity, person, and personal identity. See for more information, Thiel, *The Early Modern Subject*, 18-30.
[6] Ibid., 18.
[7] Ibid.
[8] For Aquinas, a man is an individual. Man's individuality is based not on the mere matter and form but on the *"this"* particular matter and form. For instance, Socrates is an individual because of his particular qualities which are different from other individuals, for instance, Plato. See for more information, Thomas Aquinas, "MAN" in *An Aquinas Reader: Selections from the Writings of THOMAS AQUINAS,* edited with an Introduction Mary T. Clark (New York: Image Books, 1972), 201-225.

identity, namely, the shift from ontological to epistemological and subjective treatment.[9] Consequently, the shift took place in the case of personal identity. Locke's this shift relating to the concept of identity provides a slot for more arguments since it is significantly related to the person who is the prime subject to religion as well as morality. However, arguments from both sides, ontological and subjective, regarding this concept have the equal importance in the history of philosophy. The detailed discussions we shall see in the main chapters.

I.2.2. The Concept of Person

Historically, like the concept of identity, the concept person also occupied a significant place in the subject of philosophy. There are various disputes regarding the concept of the person. Answers to the questions that what it is to be a person or what are the constituted principles that make a thing as a person are always debatable. An etymological meaning and some of the definitions of the term tell us the significance of this notion of person. The term person is derived from a Latin word "persona" which means nothing but a "mask", a "false face". It was used in dramas to communicate the role/voice of an actor to the audience.[10] We can get a brief picture of the historical development of the term person from Adolf Trendelenburg's observations. According to his observations, the term persona is explained as "*per se ona"* which means "fullness in or of itself." Also, it had been used differently in different places and different ages, and in different contexts. For example, Roman law used the term person as a human being who is the bearer of legal and moral issues. Some statements in the Biblical text tell us it was considered as the appearance of the whole human body. In some other statements, it was considered as the term having relation with rewards and punishments. And, Stoics used the term in an ethical sense. Stoics' chief concern is to develop harmony and consistent character in life.[11]

Also, we can get a brief and clear picture of the historical development of the term person from Thomas Aquinas's views. Not only this but also we can see a proper definition

[9] Theil, *The Early Modern Subject*, 25.
[10] "Origin and meaning of person" in Online Etymology Dictionary, www.etymonline.com › word › person
[11] See for more information, Adolf Trendelenburg, "A Contribution to The History of The Word Person," in *The Monist,* 20, no. 3 (JULY, 1910): 336-363, http://www.jstore.org/stable/27900263. According to Trendelenburg, Luther's translation of the Bible gives several meanings to the term person. Luther's translation of the story that "They drowned them all to the number of two hundred persons" tells that the term person includes men and women. And in another case that "Zacchaeus had climbed a mulberry tree in his desire to see Jesus," the term person refers to the "outer appearance" of the whole body (ibid., 341). Also, Trendelenburg while showing the following statement that "Of a truth I perceive that God is no respecter of persons: But in every nation, he that eth him, and worketh righteousness is accepted with him" gives how the term related with moral subjects within the domain of religion (ibid., p.342). We can see like these sorts of explanations with different evidence in the history that how the term person was used differently in Trendelenburg's paper.

of the term given by him. According to him, the term person takes a significant transformation from the drama stage to real life. Though the term person (persona: mask) in initial stages is used to refer "famous men" who were represented in dramas through different characters, later in the religious world the meaning and usage of the term "persona" were widened. A kind of practice or custom was developed in the religious world. So, the term person was used to refer to "personages of rank." Therefore, he says, on the basis of this reason some theologians define the person as a substance that is distinguished by dignity.[12] To say briefly, the term's meaning and usage was transformed from the drama stage to human beings' conducts in real life. It was considered in the "ecclesiastical" world that the character of dignity would be developed by rational nature. Therefore, Aquinas says, theologians define "every individual with rational nature" as a person. Aquinas's definition is not much different from this sort of definition. He says we give a special name, person, to individual beings having a rational nature just as we give a special name, "hypostasis", to the subject in which all the accidents (qualities) inhere.[13] So to say, in the 13th century, the quality of the "rational nature" of an individual is the principal criterion which helps to give the answer to the question of what it is to be a person. However, in Aquinas' view, individuality of human beings is neither matter (body) alone nor form (soul) alone and also not the mere composition of the two. Rather, it is based on the particularity of the individual. That means, for Aquinas, "*this* self, *this* body, and *these* bones" which belongs to a particular man makes an individuality of an individual.[14] Therefore, he would say, the identity of an individual through time is based on the particularity of that individual. As Thiel said, Thomists, who follow Thomas Aquinas's ideas, think this idea of individuality meets the Christian Doctrines' requirements that the same body and soul are required for the resurrection and individual immortality.[15]

Francisco Suarez's explanation of the concept of person is also remarkable. According to Theil's observation, like Aquinas, Suarez also gives a similar sort of definition. Additionally, Suarez tries to bring an important difference between a "true" person and a "fictional" person. For Suarez, the individual human being is a true person whereas a "body politic with a moral unity" is a fictional person. However, Suarez holds both are subject to the law. Moreover, Suarez thinks since the soul is the primary principle of individuation, the

[12] Clark, *An Aquinas Reader,* 225.
[13] Ibid., 222-223.
[14] Ibid., 224.
[15] Thiel, *The Early Modern Subject,* 25.

same soul is the criteria for the identity of an individual despite the changes in the body.[16] We can understand an important point from this distinction that a fictional person is subject to the law of the phenomenal world whereas a true person is subject to the law of God. However, though, before 17th century, this concept was looked at through different lenses by different philosophers including Descartes, a few commonalities we can observe: firstly, the concept of person and its identity was discussed from the ontological viewpoint; secondly, the rational nature of an individual is the core principle; finally, it was treated not incompatible with theological doctrines. In the 17th century, John Locke's epistemologist treatment of this concept along with the concept of identity in general brings a new and radical shift which provides more scope to discuss this concept from both perspectives, ontological and epistemological. After Locke, this concept was discussed in new dimensions, in particular, in the hands of David Hume. As Thiel said, since this concept is related to issues such as life after death, punishments and rewards for human actions by God's judgments, the immortality of soul and resurrection of the body and so on, it occupies the most important place in the history of philosophy.

By considering the importance of this problem, this thesis critically studies the concept of personal identity, in particular, one of the prominent 18th-century philosophers' treatments of this problem, namely, David Hume.

I.3. Rousing Reasons

A few reasons motivated me to dive into this problem and particularly to focus on David Hume's arguments. Firstly, I was told by religious scriptures, parents, few teachers, and movies that we are not just a material body. We are the union of the soul and material body. After the death of this life, the soul would be judged and get rebirth based on its actions in the past life. The same soul takes birth after birth while uniting with different bodies. This birth cycle never stops until and unless the soul gets liberation from the attachments of its actions in the present life. Secondly, on the other hand, I was taught that there is nothing called a soul. It is one of our creations. However, the concept of soul and its related concepts, for instance, the identity of it, created zeal in my mind. Thirdly, more importantly, as I have mentioned above, the interest in the study of the problem of personal identity is still alive even today and it is considering one of the central concepts in philosophy. Finally, the main reason for focusing on Hume's treatment of this problem is his ground-breaking and

[16] Thiel, *The Early Modern Subject*, 29-30.

disputable arguments which are still alive even today with new forces. The arguments create more enthusiasm to take a deep dive into his account of mind. Therefore, having a special significance to the problem of personal identity in the history of philosophy and Hume's treatment of it, I would like to examine this problem in this thesis.

I.4. The Aim and Questions

The main aim of this thesis is a critical analysis of Hume's views on the concept of personal identity and how his explicit denial of this concept helps us to understand the "science of man" appropriately. Mainly, this thesis tries to deal with the following questions:

1) How the concept of personal identity was treated before the time period of David Hume.
2) How does Hume's noteworthy remarks/criticisms—with the help of his fundamental principles such as association principles, copy principles, separability principle and so on—on simplicity and individuality and the identity of the external objects as well as the soul/self/person help us to understand the concept of personal identity without any underlying persisting metaphysical substance through time?
3) How does Hume's "true idea of the human mind" that is a system of causally related perceptions would resolve the problem of personal identity without any support of simple and individual persisting self? What is the role of memory and imagination to get the idea of the simple and persisting self?
4) Why does Hume think personal identity needs to be explained with regards to passions or self-concern? What is the role of passions in generating the idea or impression of the self whenever certain passions are generated in us? How does Hume explain the relationship between passions and the faculty of imagination and their significant role in our concern with past and future pains and pleasures?
5) Why does Hume think about second thought regarding the issue of personal identity in the "*Appendix*"? What are the solid reasons for Hume's dissatisfaction regarding his own treatment of the concept? And, what are the solutions, which are not possible within his philosophical system, he had suggested overcoming the problem?
6) How do various criticisms, interpretations, and suggestions, from Thomas Reid to the present-day philosophical world, project Hume's treatment of the self in different books of *Treatise* and his second thought in the "*Appendix*"?

I.5. Methodology and Limitations

Mainly, this thesis followed the conceptual analysis method. The major source of this thesis is David Hume's *A Treatise of Human Nature* (hereafter, *Treatise*). Along with this, this thesis also focused, according to the need, on *Enquiries Concerning Human Understanding* (hereafter, *Enquiries*) and other Hume's prominent works, for instance, *Dialogue Concerning Natural Religion*. While analyzing different concepts—such as impressions, ideas, abstract ideas, external objects, immateriality, the causal relation between thought and motion, and passions and so forth—this thesis tries to examine the main concept personal identity since Hume uses those concepts as the background concepts. The criticisms examined in this thesis are objection based not thinker based. However, this thesis focused on prominent figures'—such as Reid, Merian, Smith, Penelhum, Pitson, Pike, Giles, Lecaldano, McIntyre, Galen Strawson, Don Garrett and so on—criticisms, responses, and suggestions. This thesis has a limitation that it moves around only Hume's treatment of the issue and its related problems, objections, responses, and suggestions.

I.6. The General Development of the Thesis

This thesis is developed in the following pattern. The first chapter deals with the pre-Humean concept of personal identity. Principally, it deals with how the question of personal identity, in the history of philosophy, had developed as a significant problem. In order to do that this chapter majorly focused on four prominent philosophers' accounts of personal identity, namely, John Locke, Leibniz, Joseph Butler, and Thomas Reid. Along with them, simultaneously, this chapter also briefly considered Rene Descartes, Berkeley, Samuel Clarke and Anthony Collins's accounts regarding the problem. To say briefly, this chapter precisely tells us how the question of personal identity was treated between the timeline of Descartes and before and contemporary to David Hume. The reason to start with Descartes is that Descartes is the person who systematically, with his tool method of doubt, tries to prove the man is the union of two different and distinct substances, namely, mind (soul) and body. According to him, since the body is an extended and changeable substance over time and mind is a simple and unchangeable substance, it is the mind that constitutes the identity of a person through time. Therefore, in his view, the soul gives numerical identity to the man even though various changes take place through time. Like his predecessors, Descartes treats the problem of personal identity with respect to an ontological viewpoint. By contrast, John Locke, who brings a radical shift, argued that the criterion of identity, in general, depends on what sort of thing it is. Therefore, for him, the identity criteria of an atom, a parcel of matter,

an electronic item, a tree, an animal, a man, and a person are different. To speak, according to the definition of the term, identity criteria would change. Therefore, Locke holds the term person as a "forensick" term—related to legal and moral issues—its identity depends on having the same consciousness (memory) over time but not based on the same soul or same material body. If a person has no consciousness regarding his/her past actions, Locke stresses that he/she is not the same person. Unlike Descartes, Locke treats the problem of personal identity with respect to a subjective viewpoint. However, on the one hand, this sort of treatment brings remarkable and radical changes in the history of philosophy. On the other hand, this treatment was criticized by many thinkers. Leibniz, Butler, and Reid severely criticized Locke's account of personal identity. They reject Locke's account while admitting the importance of memory's role which helps us to know we are the same person through time. Leibniz argues that the identity related to legal and moral issues is considered as "apparent" identity. The soul, which is simple and individual, gives the "real" identity through time. Reid's polished and fascinating analogy—army officer analogy—has been considering as a prominent counter-argument to Locke's account in the history of philosophy. Though they partially agreed with Locke, three of them with the same tone insisted that the mind gives identity to the person through time. The detailed picture of the various arguments regarding the issue of personal identity we will see in the first chapter.

The second chapter, particularly, deals with David Hume's fundamental tenets which he discussed in his book *Treatise*—the book which was considered as a dead-born. The principal reason to engage with these tenets is that Hume tries to bring the concept of personal identity into a new realm on the ground of these significant presupposing tenets. In other words, these tenets involved both explicitly and implicitly in his ground-breaking account of mind as well as its identity through time. Therefore, an elaborative look is needed to get a clear picture of Hume's treatment of this issue. This chapter starts with Hume's taxonomy of perceptions which are considered as building blocks of his philosophy. Perceptions, for him, are two sorts, namely, impressions and ideas. The difference between impressions and ideas is their peculiar nature of appearance. Impressions appear lively on the soul whereas ideas are faint images. And then again, he divided impressions into two kinds, namely, impressions of sensation (primary impressions), and impressions of reflections (secondary impressions). According to Hume, causes of secondary impressions are ideas of the primary impressions whereas causes of primary impressions are "unknown". Here, his reason for saying unknown is that as a moral philosopher he cannot explain it. It is the job of a natural philosopher (an

anatomist). Hume divided ideas into two, namely, memory ideas and imagination ideas. The difference between these two kinds is the degree of liveliness. It is the faculty of imagination that plays a significant role in Hume's philosophy. It can divide our complex ideas—for instance, the idea of an apple which has a particular shape, size, color, taste, smell—into simple. Also, it can create new complex ideas by uniting different simple ideas. For instance, a single horn and ten-handed human being is an example of complex ideas. The faculty of imagination makes us understand the relation between ideas by association principles, namely, resemblance, contiguity in space and time, and causation. And also, it makes us understand how we could separate complex ideas into simple in our thought or imagination by separability principle. In Hume's view, by this significant principle, one can find the origin of ideas. He conceives, if we could not find a simple impression of any term by using the separability principle then that is an abstract idea. Also, the faculty of imagination creates fictitious ideas when we are confused. We can say without the faculty of imagination; Hume's philosophy is nothing. Also, this chapter discusses one of the most important relations among the seven relations, namely, the identity relation. It mainly explores Hume's views on how we could form a belief about an external object's identity through time. In other words, what reasons tend us to attribute identity to external objects even though we have only successive perceptions. By using association principles, Hume tries to solve this problem. Next, this chapter examines Hume's examination of the concept of the immateriality of the soul and his arguments against the views of both materialism and immaterialism. Hume's arguments are as follows: neither we get an impression of the immateriality of the soul nor we get an impression of the inherence of all perceptions in it. And finally, we shall see Hume's arguments that how bodily motion can change our thought consequently our actions vice versa. All the above-mentioned tenets are more significant because with these presuppositions Hume—thinks that treating issues related to the mind is easier than issues related to the external world—entered into the discussions of personal identity.

The third chapter revolves around the main issue of this thesis, that is, the concept of personal identity. This chapter mainly goes through three major sections. Firstly, it discusses Hume's arguments regarding personal identity which he had presented in the section "*Of personal identity*" in book one of *Treatise*. In this section, we shall see how Hume tried to prove his predecessors' account that we are always conscious of the simple and individual self and its identity through time is a mistaken account. The reason for Hume to reject their

account is that we never find any impression of the self that is simple, individual and continued through our course of life. Rather, we perceive only changeable perceptions. We never catch ourselves without perceptions such as pain, pleasure, hot, cold, anger, pride, love and so forth. Therefore, he concludes, the self is nothing but successive perceptions having certain connections among them. His analogy of theatre and republic are the two well-known analogies that explain his account of the mind and its identity. For him, the steps involved in our attribution of identity through time are same for our ideas of the objects in the world and our mind. Interestingly, Hume had divided this concept into two parts: "personal identity as it regards imagination" and "personal identity as it regards passions". We shall see his explanations regarding the first part with the help of association principles, in particular, resemblance and causation. And, we shall also see the faculty of memory's contribution in finding resemblance and causation relations among the ideas, consequently, its role in discovering personal identity through time. Secondly, we shall see Hume's arguments regarding our self-concern which he had discussed the in-depth way in the second and third books of *Treatise*. Having some limitations, this thesis majorly focused on the arguments which were presented in the second book and partially focused on the third book. In this section, we shall see Hume's discussions regarding the second part of the concept of personal identity. We shall see how Hume tried to relate two parts while giving a hint that passions and the faculty of imagination work together to get the strong idea of identity through time. In other words, we shall see his explanations of their mutual role in our concern with past and future pains and pleasures. For him, passions—in particular, pride and humility—play a significant role in getting the idea of the self as well as its relation with past and future by assisting the imagination. The principle of sympathy is also an important principle, which remarkably works to get the ideas of others' impressions and consequently the idea of our own self when we are praised or humiliated. Finally, the third section looks at Hume's severe dissatisfaction—which he had expressed in the "*Appendix*" to the first book of *Treatise*—regarding his own treatment of the issue and his reasons for the dissatisfaction. It also examines his suggestions.

Hume leaves a great scope to his readers and scholars while expressing dissatisfaction regarding his own treatment. From the time of Hume to till today, in the history of philosophy, we can see different kinds of objections, different kinds of counter-arguments to those objections, and different kinds of suggestions to overcome Hume's labyrinth. We can also see some interpretations which strongly argue there is no problem in Hume's account.

Therefore, the fourth chapter deals with critical analysis of Hume's treatment of personal identity. This chapter critically examines different objections raised by commentators and various responses to those objections. Additionally, this chapter also scrutinizes some interpretations of Hume's treatment which tried to present Hume's philosophy regarding this concept from a different perspective. For instance, some of them try to argue Hume naturalized the self as well as moral subjects while explaining it in terms of passions and character. The detailed discussions we shall see in the main chapter.

Finally, we shall see some concluding remarks from the four chapters of the thesis.

CHAPTER-1

PRE-HUMEAN CONCEPT OF PERSONAL IDENTITY

1.0. Introduction

This chapter deals with the historical background of the concept of personal identity before David Hume's attempt. The principal reason for giving a picture of the historical background of this concept is that Hume, while responding to this problem, had started his section "*Of personal identity*" with the following lines:

> There are some philosophers who imagine we are every moment intimately conscious of what we call our self; that we feel its existence and its continuance in existence; and are certain, beyond the evidence of a demonstration, both of its perfect identity and simplicity.[17]

This excerpt is making the point very clear that Hume had focused on his predecessors' explanation of the self who, in fact, promoted the self as simple and continued over time. Generally, one can see his critiques on rationalist philosophers such as Rene Descartes and others who support the idea of self as an immaterial substance and continue the same over time. We shall see Hume's critics when we approach his attempt. Before dealing with Hume's account, it is important to know how the notion of person and personal identity was treated in the history of philosophy by his predecessors.

Therefore, the main objective of this chapter is to study the historical background of this problem. In order to do that, first I would like to focus on Descartes' a few important paragraphs which I think are very relevant to this problem. Next, I would like to focus on John Locke's account of the person and personal identity. And further, I would like to focus on difficulties raised by philosophers such as Leibniz, Berkeley, Joseph Butler and Thomas Reid and simultaneously their account of personal identity.

This is evident that in the history of philosophy one could not see the problem of personal identity as such before Locke's time. Before Locke, one could see only the problems such as the mind and body dualism, soul's immateriality and immortality, survival after death and so on. It is Locke who insists on the significance of this problem and presented a systematic account in his book called *An Essay Concerning Human Understanding,* in particular, in the long and complicated chapter 27 of Book 2 entitled "*Of Identity and*

[17] David Hume, *A Treatise of Human Nature*, ed. L.A. Selby-Bigge and P. H. Nidditch, 2nd edition (Oxford: Clarendon Press, 1978), 251.

Diversity". However, it is appropriate to inquire about the factors which help Locke to develop the theory of personal identity before going to engage with his treatment of personal identity.

1.1. Descartes and His Notion of Mind

Descartes (1596-1650) in his few passages clearly maintains that man is a combination of two substances: metaphysical substance (soul or mind); and material substance (body). For him, metaphysical substance gives the answer to the questions such as who I am or what I am. He writes: "I am a thinking thing…my essence consists solely in the fact that I am a thinking thing…I have a clear and distinct idea of myself in as much as I am only a thinking thing and unextended thing…it is certain that I […my soul by which I am what I am], is entirely and absolutely distinct from my body and can exist without it."[18] According to Descartes, it is very clear that metaphysical substance, soul, is a thinking substance and it is not an extended thing and moreover it can exist without the body. And also, in one another paragraph, he says: "Nature also teaches me by these sensations of pain, hunger, thirst etc., that I am not only lodged as a pilot in a vessel but that I am very closely united to it, so to speak, intermingled with it that I seem to compose with it one whole."[19] Here, he seems to maintain that even though mind and body are two different substances but the two are very closely united unlike a pilot in the ship. The reason is, he holds, a mere thinking thing cannot feel the pain and pleasure even though it can understand what is pain and pleasure. Therefore, he seems to insist on the importance of the body to feel these impressions. However, in the following excerpt, Descartes tries to give a clear picture of how the mind is different from the body. He says,

> There is a great difference between mind and body, inasmuch as body is by nature divisible, and the mind is entirely indivisible. For…when I consider the mind…I am only a thinking thing, I cannot distinguish in myself any parts, but apprehends myself to be clearly one and entire; and although the whole mind seems to be united to the whole body, yet if a foot…is separated from my body, I am aware that nothing has been taken away from my mind. And the faculties of willing, feeling…cannot be…its parts, for it is one and the same mind which employs itself in willing and feeling and understanding…it is sufficient to teach me that the mind or soul of a man is entirely different from the body.[20]

[18] Rene Descartes, *The Philosophical Works of Descartes*, ed. and trans. G.R.T Ross & E.S. Haldane, Vol. 1. (New York: Cambridge University press, 1911), 190.
[19] Descartes, *The Philosophical Works*, 192.
[20] Ibid., 196.

Descartes's argument is clear in the above excerpt that the mind and body are two different substances. Moreover, the body is divisible and the mind is not divisible. In his view, though some parts would separate from our body, our mind can be aware that the separation is only from the body, not from the mind. Thus, one can clearly understand a point from Descartes's argument that even though the body undergoes many changes, "one and the same mind" will continue over time. In addition to that, he seems to think, faculties of the mind are not parts of the mind but the mind itself employs in the willing, feeling and understanding etc. And also, he holds that the soul is immortal on the basis of its indivisibility. Besides this, another important claim Descartes has made in his philosophical letters. He writes: "I believe that the soul is always thinking for the same reason as I believe that the light is always shining, even though there are not always eyes looking at it."[21]

From all the arguments we have seen in the above paragraphs, we can clearly understand a few points. Firstly, for Descartes, a man is an interaction of two different substances, namely, mind and body. Interaction among these is not like a pilot in a ship but they are very closely united. Secondly, metaphysical substance (mind or soul) is a thinking substance and it always thinks. Moreover, it is indivisible, unextended and immortal. One and the "same mind" continue over time without any changes. Thirdly, material substance (body) is not a thinking substance. It is divisible, extended and continuously changing thing. Consequently, it is mortal. And finally, we could assume that the metaphysical substance gives the identity to a person over time even though Descartes did not mention explicitly what a person is. But, for him, it is clear that the soul is the only thing that continues without changing.

1.2.0. John Locke on Personal Identity

John Locke (1632-1704), as an empiricist philosopher, sees difficulties in the Cartesian dualism of substances. Even though he does not completely reject the ideas of soul and body, he seems to maintain his skepticism regarding the possibility of true knowledge of substances—both immaterial and material. He writes, "the substance of the spirit is unknown to us; and so is the substance of Body, equally unknown to us."[22] The reason for him is that we have "clear and distinct" ideas of two essential qualities of the body as well as spirit. In the case of the body, we have a "clear" and "distinct" idea of its "solid coherent parts and impulse"; and in the case of spirit, we have "clear" and "distinct" ideas of its "thinking and a

[21] Rene Descartes, *Descartes Philosophical Letters,* ed. and trans. Anthony Kenny (New York: Oxford University press, Basil Blackwell publisher, 1970), 125.
[22] John Locke, *An Essay Concerning Human Understanding,* ed. Pauline Phemister (New York: Oxford University Press, 1975), 192-193.

power of Action." Therefore, he holds, there is no more reason to reject or doubt the existence of these two substances even though the explanation of them is not so easy. And then again, he says, "we have as much reason to be satisfied with our Notion of immaterial Spirit, as with our Notion of Body, and the existence of the one, as well as the other."[23] Since thinking and solidity are simple ideas in us, our reason is satisfied with the existence of both. But, Locke argues further, when the human mind would go beyond these simple ideas and stabs to find the true nature of substances then it falls into the darkness. Therefore, he insists, we have no true knowledge of substance and its true nature. Rather, we have only simple ideas of them which we have received from "Sensation or Reflection."

With such kind of skeptical doubts, Locke does not positively admit Descartes' distinction between two substances even though he admits the mental and bodily properties, namely, thinking and solidity respectively. And also, Locke had tried to show explicitly the possibilities to deny the possibility of having true knowledge of immateriality as well as the immortality of the substance or soul. Locke had offered possibilities to show the difficulty in Descartes' claim that thinking is the property or quality of the soul. One possibility he expressed is that "It being, in respect of our notions, not much more remote from our comprehension to conceive that God can, if he pleases, superadd to Matter a Faculty of Thinking, than that he should superadd to it another Substance with a faculty of Thinking."[24] The crux of this argument is that since we do not know certainly "wherein Thinking consists", there is nothing contradictory in thinking that matter can think. This hypothesis would tempt us to think Locke as a strong materialist. Locke also sees another difficulty in Descartes' claim that "soul always thinks." Locke offers counterexamples to show Descartes' claim might not be true. The example is that when we are in sleep we get many dreams but after wake up from sleep, we forget many of those. And also, when we are in deep sleep we have no thoughts at all. Therefore, he concludes "it being hard to conceive, that anything should think, and not be conscious of it. If the Soul doth think in a sleeping Man, without being conscious of it, I ask, whether, during such thinking, it has any Pleasure or Pain, or be capable of Happiness or Misery?"[25] And also, he thinks, saying the soul in a man always thinks and is not conscious of its perceptions is nothing but saying that the man is not the same person but two persons.

[23]Locke, *An Essay*, 193.
[24]Ibid., 345.
[25] Ibid., 58.

Briefly, three points we can make clear from Locke's arguments. Firstly, the claim that the knowledge of indivisibility of soul and its immortality is self-evident is subject to doubt since we do not know the true nature of substances. Secondly, we cannot deny the possibility of the matter might think just as we cannot deny the possibility that the indivisible soul can think. And thirdly, the proposition that the soul always thinks would lead to the identity problem.

If Locke's suggestion that matter could think is acceptable then it is a great threat to well established religious doctrine and particularly to the doctrine of the immortality of the soul since the concept of the immortality of the soul is related to the concepts of morality and religion. But, Locke seems to be aware of this. He says "All the great Ends of Morality and Religion are well enough secured."[26] Because on the Judgment Day God "makes us capable there to receive the Retribution he has designed to Men according to their doings in this Life."[27] Even though Locke seems to admit the concept of Last Judgment, he observes immaterial and immortal substantial identity would not help us to determine the limits of moral responsibility. Moreover, he thought, it would lead to the identity problems. With these presuppositions, Locke had introduced the novel concept, that is, the concept of personal identity.

In chapter 27 "*Of Identity and Diversity*", Locke introduced this problem with various thought experiments that say explicitly the soul's identity cannot constitute the identity or sameness of a person over time.

Before going to the discussion of personal identity, it is essential to know the views of Locke on the notion of identity, which is known as a general account of identity, and also his principle of individuation. And finally, we shall see his account of the person and personal identity.

1.2.1. The Notion of Identity

Locke says that we can form the ideas of "identity" and "diversity" on the basis of comparing a being with itself at different times and places. His response to the question wherein consists of identity is that: "when we demand whether anything be the same or no, it refers always to something that existed such a time in such a place, which it was certain, at that instant, was

[26] Locke, *An Essay*, 346.
[27] Ibid.

the same with itself, and no other."[28] In other words, a thing is the same with itself in a particular time and space, not others. The reasons for him to say this is that firstly, it is impossible to think beyond that a thing has only one beginning for its existence in the same instant and same place. And secondly, it is impossible to think of two things having one beginning at the same place and in the same instance. We can think, these conditions would work as necessary and sufficient conditions for the notion of identity. In short, a thing is considered the same if and only if it has one beginning of existence and also it must be the same with itself.

1.2.2. Three Sorts of Substances

After giving the basic conditions which would satisfy the notion of identity, Locke had classified substances into three, namely, "God, Finite intelligences, and Bodies", and tried to apply the notion of identity to them. Regarding God's identity, Locke says, it is unquestionable since God's nature is unalterable and his existence is without beginning and he can exist everywhere. In short, God's existence is without having any relation with time and place. And regarding finite intelligences, Locke says that they have a "determinate time and place of beginning to exist, the relation to that time and place will always determinate to each of them its Identity, as long as it exists."[29] And, regarding the third sort of substances, namely, bodies, he applied the same conditions. However, in Locke's view, since these three substances are not the same kind, we can conceive the possibility of the existence of the three substances in the same place. So to speak, for Locke, individuality and identity of the same kind of objects is determined by objects' relationship with determinate time and place.

1.2.3. The Principle of Individuation and Its Identity

Interestingly, Locke gives different identity rules for different kinds of substances which give inspiration to his successors, in particular, David Hume. To say clearly, his treatment of the identity of an atom and the identity of a parcel of matter and the identity of an organism is different which deals with his "principle of individuation." According to Locke, an atom is a continued body without any changes and its existence in a determined place and time makes it the same individual with itself in any instant of its existence as long as its existence continues. And in the case of a parcel of matter, for instance, a lump of clay, he states that it is same with itself, even though particles would jumble in a random manner in the parcel of matter. Except in the case of new particles added to, or subtracted from the parcel of matter, it

[28] Locke, *An Essay*, 204.
[29] Ibid.

is always the same with itself in any instant or any place. But Locke gives a new criterion for the sameness of organisms, for instance, any living body. In other words, the identity criterion of the organism is different from the identity criterion of the matter. Locke had described the identity of plants, animals and men with the help of the same principle. The principle is that the identity of an organism consists in "the same continued Life communicated to different particles of Matter, as they happen successively to be united to that [organized] living Body."[30] Therefore, it is clear for Locke that the identity of an organism such as plants, animals and men cannot depend just on the mass of the body. Rather, it depends on the principle of the same continued life of the same organized body even though continuous changes occurred in that living body through time. For example, a tree continues to be the same individual tree as long as it continues with the same life even though that life would be joined to new particles of matter indispensably united to the living plant. Therefore, Locke says "an oak growing from a Plant to a great Tree, and then lopped, is still the same Oak."[31] And then again, Locke insists that this identity principle can also be applicable to the other finite substances, for instance, human beings.

1.2.4. The Idea of Same Man

At the same time, Locke explicitly says, the identity of different living bodies such as a beast and a man would depend on their shape and body rather than soul and its rationality. While saying this, Locke seems to be trying to devalue the importance of the theories of transmigration of the soul as well as the miscarriage of the soul in the cases of identity of a man. Former theory gives the picture that the soul of a man transmigrates into another man in different ages, and the latter tells the story that the soul of a man would migrate into a beast or any other living creature. However, Locke says that "yet I think nobody, could he be sure that the Soul of Heliogabalus [man] were in one of his Hogs [dog], would yet say that Hog were a Man or Heliogabalus."[32] Locke's main point here is that the term "Man" refers to a particular kind of appearance. Therefore, in his view, the sameness of a man is not grounded on the sameness of the soul or rational capacity alone but on a particular kind of form. That is to say, the sameness of a man is based on having particular qualities, for instance, shape. To strengthen this, Locke says an interesting point, that is, we call a man a man even though he is an irrational being. At the same time, he says, we call a bird a bird even though the bird is an intelligent rational being.

[30] Locke, *An Essay*, 208.
[31] Ibid., 206.
[32] Ibid., 207.

1.2.5. Identity is Based on What the Word Stands For

In order to give a clear picture of the notion of identity, Locke asserts that the "Unity of Substance" could not help us to understand all sorts of identity. Rather, he insists "we must consider what Idea the word it is applied to stands for: It being one thing to be the same *Substance*, another the same *Man*, and a third the same *Person*."[33] The essence of this argument is that meaning of the each term is to differ from other terms. Therefore, the identity criterion would also different. For instance, the term man does not stand for the same concept of a mass (parcel) of matter. Similarly, the term person does not stand for the same concept as an immaterial substance. While giving importance to the terms and their definitions, Locke tries to introduce and solve the problem of personal identity which does not depend on the spiritual substance.

1.2.6. The Concept of Person

In order to give the identity criterion for the person, firstly, Locke tries to define the term person which is the most influential definition. His definition is as follows: a person is "a thinking intelligent Being, that has reason and reflection, and can consider itself as itself, the same thinking thing in different times and places; which it does only by that consciousness, which is inseparable in thinking, and, as it seems to me, essential to it."[34]

From this definition, Locke seems to give some conditions that must be followed to say a thing is a person. The following list gives the brief picture of the conditions: firstly, it should be intelligent thinking thing; secondly, it has the ability of reason and reflection; thirdly, it must be a self-awareness being; fourthly, it continues as the same thinking thing in different places and time; and finally, he finished this definition with the capacity of consciousness which is necessary to all the above conditions.

With this definition, Locke also seems to emphasize how we can understand the person differently from the immaterial substance (soul) as well as the material substance with one common life (man).

1.2.7. Unity of Consciousness Alone Constitutes Personal Identity

After giving a long and clear definition of person, Locke tries to give an answer to the significant question as to what constitutes personal identity or wherein personal identity consists. We have seen in the above paragraph, Locke insists the importance of

[33] Locke, *An Essay*, 207.
[34] Ibid., 208.

consciousness, which accompanies thinking, as an essential condition. It explicitly implies his project that consciousness is the criterion for the notion of personal identity. Locke says that when we do actions such as seeing, hearing, smelling, tasting, feeling, and willing and so on we come to know these all actions belong to our present sensations and perceptions by the immediate reflection of our actions. Consequently, he says, by this everyone calls himself/herself as self. Moreover, this consciousness which always accompanies thinking can also distinguish himself/herself from all other thinking things. However, he says, at this moment one could not consider whether the same self is continued or not. In other words, for Locke, this reflection helps us to be aware of our own actions and also helps us to differentiate ourselves from other thinking things but it would not give the idea of the sameness. According to Locke, the idea of sameness of a person/rational being/self consists in the sameness of consciousness. Locke writes,

> In this alone consists *Personal Identity*, i.e. the sameness of a rational Being: And as far as this consciousness can be extended backwards to any past Action or Thought, so far reaches the Identity of that Person; it is the same self now it was then; and this by the same self with this present one that now reflects on it, that that Action was done.[35]

Furthermore, Locke tries to insist on the importance of the sameness of consciousness, irrespective of the role of any sort of substance, in the sameness of person with an analogy. The analogy as follows:

> By distant of time, or change of Substance, no more two persons, than a Man to be two Men by wearing other Clothes to Day than he did Yesterday, with a long or short sleep between: the same consciousness uniting those distant actions into the same *person*, whatever Substances contributed to their Production.[36]

From these two significant excerpts, one could understand Locke's idea of personal identity as follows: the present consciousness of past actions or thoughts constitutes the same person at any different instances. It does not matter whether the same immaterial substance (soul) would be continuing or not, and also the same material substance (body) is continuing or not. In addition, it also does not matter whether these actions belong to one hour before, or yesterday, or twenty years back, or past life, so to speak.

In order to prove this, Locke gives different sorts of puzzle cases that, in fact, give strength to his account of personal identity. For instance, one of Locke's famous analogues

[35] Locke, *An Essay*, 208.
[36] Ibid., 209.

cases is that if the soul of a prince would carry with it the memories of the prince's past actions and thoughts and enter into a Cobbler's body and behave like the prince, everyone sees his actions are the same as the prince. And, they would say he is the same person as the prince. Nevertheless, no one says the Cobbler is the same man as the prince.[37] In short, Locke's chief argument is that if there is no consciousness of actions, no matter whether these actions belong to the same substance or different substances, they should not be considered as one and the same person but different. It seems very clear from Locke's claim that the "consciousness alone" constitutes personal identity that means, consciousness would work as required principle for a person's identity over time.

1.2.8. Person is a "Forensick" Term

We have seen that Locke explicitly upholds personal identity does not consist in the sameness of soul but in the identity of consciousness. Since he considers the person as "Forensick" term, he seems to give more importance to the notion of sameness of consciousness which can alone make a person responsible for his/her own actions. Locke says "it is a Forensick Term, appropriating Actions and their Merits, and so belongs only to intelligent Agents capable of Law, and Happiness and Misery."[38] It is clear for Locke that a person is morally accountable for his/her actions such as happiness and misery and so on. Therefore, he thinks that in order to do that consciousness could help a person to go beyond his present existence. It could bring together all the past actions of the present self. If, Locke argues further, it could not bring all the past actions of the present self, those past actions would not be considered as the deeds of the present self or person. Additionally, he thought that rewarding or punishing the present self for those actions which cannot be memorized is meaningless. Rather, it is nothing but a creation of misery in the mind of the present person. Locke gives a supportive argument to his claim while asking a question, that is, "For supposing a MAN [punished] now for what he had done in another Life, whereof he could be made to have no consciousness at all, what differences is there between that Punishment and being created miserable?"[39] An example might give us a clear picture that punishing a sober man for his actions in sleep, or punishing a person in this life for his deeds in his/her past life is meaningless for the reason that there is no unity of consciousness at all, according to Locke.

[37] Locke, *An Essay*, 213.
[38] Ibid., 218.
[39] Ibid., 218-219.

So far we have discussed how Locke treats the problem of personal identity. Even though Locke's account of personal identity, which is based on the notion of consciousness, seems quite satisfactory but it shaken the strong theistic views which strongly believe immateriality of the soul and its necessity for morality as well as religion. Jane L. McIntyre seems to have rightly pointed out that Locke's account involved three contentious claims. Firstly, it is by unity of consciousness a person's identity is determined. Secondly, both immaterial and material substances are not considerable as necessary or sufficient conditions for the existence of the same consciousness. And finally, the self is not necessarily an immaterial substance.[40]

However, Locke's novel theory of personal identity gives a huge scope in the history of philosophy to present new and thought-provoking arguments by various philosophers. As usual, a group of people tried to defend Locke's central thesis and others severely criticized this idea. Leibniz is a philosopher who had partially agreed with Locke and at the same time criticized Locke's different hypothesis that will be examined in further sections. And, Joseph Butler and Thomas Reid are the other philosophers who severely criticized Locke's account with their original reasons that also will be examined in this chapter.

1.3.0. Leibniz on Personal Identity

Gottfried Wilhelm (von) Leibniz (1646-1716) was a rationalist philosopher who had criticized Locke's many assumptions, for instance, assumptions regarding the problem of personal identity. In his book called *New Essays on Human Understanding* especially in chapter 27 "*what identity and diversity is*", Leibniz had critically responded on the notion of identity and the problem of personal identity. Like Descartes, he had insisted on the significance of the underlying metaphysical substance and its necessity for the identity of a person over time which is, in fact, neglected by John Locke. And at the same time, he seems to admit explicitly Locke's view that the importance of consciousness or memory for the moral identity of a person. We shall see clearly in the following sections how Leibniz had presented his thoughts against Locke's assumptions regarding this particular problem and also where he had appreciated Locke's views.

[40] Jane L. McIntyre, "Hume and the Problem of Personal Identity," in *Cambridge Companion to David Hume*, ed. David Norton and Jaqueline Taylor (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2008), 179.

1.3.1. Internal Principle of Distinction

Primarily, Leibniz focused on Locke's account of identity which is explicitly based on the concepts of time and space. Already we have seen that Locke had given more importance to time and place in order to find out whether a thing is the same or different. And, it is also clear for him that a thing cannot have two beginnings at a time in different places and two things cannot have one beginning in the same place at one instant. Contrary to this position, Leibniz emphasizes the importance of substances which he called as "monads." Leibniz's substance theory says that monads are simple substances. They have no parts, therefore, divisibility is not possible. Thus, they have no characteristics of extension and figure. Therefore, he says: "These monads are the true atoms of nature…the elements of things."[41] And then again, he says that these monads have unique qualities. That is, they are distinguishable. To put it in another way, two monads are never impeccably alike in nature. On the grounds of this, Leibniz tried to reject Locke's assumptions concerning the idea of identity which is primarily based on time and place. According to Leibniz's view, there must at all times be "an internal principle of distinction"[42] among the substances in addition to the variance of time and place. This principle explicitly shows that despite the fact that there are many things that belong to the same kind and have similar kind of qualities, none of them are ever exactly alike. And then again, even though we distinguish things on the basis of time and place, things which are the same kind are distinguishable themselves from others. Contrary to Locke's view, Leibniz seems to be devaluing the importance of time and place which, in his view, does not constitute the core of identity and diversity though identity and diversity of things are always accompanied by time and place. Therefore, he concludes that "by means of things that we must distinguish one time or place from another, rather than vice versa."[43] Additionally, he insists, times and places are not substances or complete realities.

1.3.2. Identity of an Atom

On the basis of rejecting the importance of the notions of time and space, Leibniz rejects Locke's concept of atoms and his principle of individuation. The reason he says that according to Locke atoms are very tiny particles that we cannot be able to divide more. Moreover, these atoms are perfectly unalterable and incapable of internal change. Leibniz argues, in this case, we can distinguish atoms only on the basis of their particular size and

[41] G.W. Leibniz, *G.W. Leibniz's Monadology: An Edition for Students*, ed. Nicholas Rescher (Pittsburgh: Pittsburgh University Press, 1961), 17.
[42] G.W. Leibniz, *New Essays on Human Understanding,* ed. and trans. Peter Remnant, and Jonathan Bennett, (England: Cambridge University Press, 1981), 230.
[43] Leibniz, *New Essays*, 230.

shape. But, it is also true that when we reach the very minute level of any physical object we would get the same sized and shaped atoms. That means they are themselves indistinguishable. We can identify them only by giving a name to them like atom 'A' and atom 'B'. Therefore, he holds, if this is the case then Locke's principle of individuation would disappear since they are all the same kind.

In contrast, Leibniz's proposal is that each body changes all the time. Therefore, every substance differs itself from other substances. In other words, no two things are perfectly alike. Therefore, he claims, their identity depends on themselves rather than time and place.

1.3.3. Identity of a Single Plant

Next, Leibniz focused on Locke's view on the identity of a plant. We have seen in Locke's case that the identity of a plant over time is based on the principle of having such an organization of parts in one body and partaking in one common life irrespective of changes in that plant's entire life. Responding to this supposition, Leibniz says "organization and configuration alone" would not make an object remain the same without "an enduring principle of life". In Leibniz's view this principle is nothing but a "monad".[44] It seems that the notion of common life is the same for both Locke and Leibniz in the case of organic bodies. The only difference we can observe in both views: for Locke, a tree is a substance which has an organization among the parts of that substance with a principle of common life; and for Leibniz, it is an aggregation of substances.

However, in Leibniz's view, a thing is numerically the same because it contains one enduring principle of life which he calls monad. In addition to that, one another significant point he mentions is that "organic bodies" continue their identity only in appearance but in a strict sense they are not numerically the same. To strengthen this claim, Leibniz gives a river and Theseus's ship examples to show how a "real identity" is different from an "apparent identity". The analogy is as follows: "It is rather like a river whose water is continuously changing or like Theseus's ship which the Athenians constantly repairing."[45] We could clearly understand Leibniz's view from the given analogy that without one enduring principle of life the identity of a plant is not real but apparent. Moreover, he strongly opines that only monads give us real and "genuine" unity or identity of things. More clearly, he says: "As for substances which possess in themselves a genuine, real, substantial unity, and which are capable of actions which can properly be called 'vital'; and as for substantial beings…a

[44] Leibniz, *New Essays*, 232.
[45] Ibid., 232.

certain indivisible spirit animates them: one can rightly say that they can remain perfectly 'the same individual' in virtue of this soul or spirit which makes the I in substances which think."[46] The gist of the paragraph is that, for Leibniz, substantial beings can remain numerically the same individual because an "indivisible" soul or spirit stimulates them. Thus, in the case of a plant, or a brute, Leibniz seems to give a general conclusion. That is, if they have spirits or souls their identity is "strictly genuine", even though continuous changes occur in their organic bodies. If they do not have souls, their identity is only "apparent". Besides this, in an immediate paragraph he writes "if no reference is made to the soul, there will not be the same life, nor a vital unity, either."[47] Therefore, it seems pretty clear according to him that the spirit or soul is the essential thing for the same life. If there is no reference to the spirit or soul, their identity is not real but apparent. He holds that this principle can also be applicable to men.

1.3.4. The Same Man Over Time

The whole problem of personal identity came into existence because Locke sees a problem that if the same immaterial substance would transmigrate from one body to another, there would be a logical possibility to consider different people, who existed at different time periods, as the same man. For instance, Seth, Ishmael, Socrates and Augustine would be considered as the same individual if they have survived with the same immaterial substance. Similarly, if the same immaterial substance would miscarriage from men to the bodies of brutes, for instance, Heliogabalus (man) into a Hog (dog), then the Hog is to be the same man as Heliogabalus. But, Locke argues, no one says the Hog is the same man as Heliogabalus or Seth is the same man as Socrates. From these suppositions, he insists, the identity of a man would not consist in the same immaterial substance rather it consists in the fitly organized body with one common life. Additionally, it depends on so and so the shape of the body which differentiates one creature from another. Leibniz's response to Locke's arguments and assumptions seems very simple.

First of all, he tries to reject the theories of transmigration and miscarriages of the soul. Remarkably, he sees two points in Locke's assumptions, namely, a question about the thing and a question about the name (signification of words). In the former case, he says "as regards the thing, a single individual substance can retain its identity only by preservation of

[46] Leibniz, *New Essays*, 232.
[47] Ibid., 233.

the same soul."[48] Already we have seen that Leibniz strongly emphasizes that the soul or spirit gives the real identity of a substance irrespective of the continuous flux in the body. His main assertion is that the soul cannot abandon its body and pass into another body. Rather, he says "Even in death it always retains an organic body, part of its former one, although what it retains is always subject to wasting away insensibly and restoring itself, and even at a given time to undergoing a great change."[49] Furthermore, he says "instead of transmigration of the soul there is reshaping, infolding, unfolding, and flowing in the soul's body."[50] Even though he did not give any clarity how a soul could reshape and unfold, one point is clear that, for him, any single individual thing can retain its identity only by continuation of the same soul. And in the latter case, he stresses that if any such kind of transmigration or miscarriage of the soul would occur, "the question whether they ought to be called the same man is merely a question of a name."[51] For instance, we call the same substance with different names such as egg, caterpillar, pupa and butterfly. In such cases, he thought our arguments moved around the notion of naming which does not give any solution to the problem.

And responding to Locke's assumption that rationality alone cannot make a man but a particular shape is needed, Leibniz's argument is as follows. First of all, he admits the fact that there are irrational dull men but he emphasizes that "the inner being of the rational soul would remain despite the suspending of the exercise of reason."[52] The underlying message of this claim is clear, that is, the rational soul is essential to human beings rather than a particular shape, in Leibniz's view. He gives an orang-outang[53] example to strengthen his argument. That is, though an animal would have similar external features like a man, it is not considered as a man since it is lacking the faculty of reason. At the same time, Leibniz seems to accept Locke's definition of a man while accepting Locke's assumption that the possibility of the existence of a rational parrot/animal of some other species than a man. He admits the fact that if one would like to differentiate a man from a rational animal then a particular sort of shape is essential. However, in an immediate line, he emphasized that "Spirit would also

[48] Leibniz, *New Essays*, 233.
[49] Ibid.
[50] Ibid.
[51] Ibid., 234.
[52] Ibid.
[53] "Orang-outang" is a monkey which is very similar to a man in external features. Leibniz presented this example in his New *Essays* (see for more information, ibid., 234).

be men."[54] We can understand with this claim that Leibniz strongly insists only the rational soul preserves the identity of a man.

1.3.5. Person and Its Identity

After responding to Locke' account of the same man, Leibniz observes the main argument of Locke that the identity of substance over time would be possible but if there is no proper connection of consciousness among the different persons and their actions, there would not be enough evidence to say that that was a single person. For instance, there might be the same soul passing from man 'A' to man 'B', and 'C' at different time periods. According to Locke, if there is no memory connection between A, B, and C, then it would be a great trouble to morality since we cannot be able to say A, B and C are one and the same. While responding to this argument, first of all, Leibniz explicitly admits Locke's definition of the person. He writes,

> I also hold this opinion that consciousness or the sense of I proves moral or personal identity. And that is how I distinguish the incessancy of a beast's soul from the immortality of the soul of man: both of them preserve real, physical identity; but it is constant with the rules of divine providence that in man's case the soul should also retain a moral identity which is apparent to us ourselves, so as to constitute the same person, which is therefore sensitive to punishments and rewards.[55]

From this excerpt, we can understand a few points: first, Leibniz admits in some extent Locke's notion of consciousness or the sense of "I" and its importance to prove a person's identity or moral identity; second, like Locke, he considers the concept of person from a moral point of view; third, this awareness of "I" makes the differentiation between a beast's soul and a man's soul which he considers it as immortal; fourth, in both cases, a beast and a man, the soul preserves or determines their "real physical identity". But, in the case of men, according to the order of things ("rules of divine providence") the soul should also hold a moral identity which he has named it as "apparent identity". To say, for him, this is an essential character for punishments and rewards. To put it in short, Leibniz makes two kinds of identity, that is, first, "real physical identity" which gives the sameness of a man over time; and the second, "apparent identity" which is related to moral concerns or moral identity.

However, even though Leibniz admits Locke's definition of person and the importance of consciousness, he openly criticizes Locke's view that the preservation of personal identity in the absence of "real identity". Perhaps, he says, Locke's assumption could be possible in

[54] Leibniz, *New Essays*, 235.
[55] Ibid, 236.

the presence of God's absolute power. But, it could not be possible according to the order of things. Also, he says "an identity which is apparent to the person concerned … presupposes a real identity obtaining through each immediate [temporal] transition accompanied by reflection, or by the sense of I."[56] It is clear from this quote that, for Leibniz, without the existence of real physical identity apparent or moral identity which is concerned to a person is not possible. And at the same time, he stresses, the sense of "I" can give the knowledge of this. Additionally, Leibniz explicitly denies Locke's controversial hypothesis that matter could think if God pleases. He denies Locke's view on the ground of order of things. He says "I hold that that state of affairs is not possible at least not naturally."[57]

Another notable point is that Leibniz tries to show how consciousness is not necessary for considering an individual being the same person even though he/she is no longer conscious of their past deeds. He argues: "I would not wish to deny, either, that personal identity and even the self persist in us, and that I am that I who was in the cradle, merely on the grounds that I can no longer remember anything that I did at that time."[58] This passage seems to include two important concepts: first, with regard to the person; and the second, with regards to the self. With regard to the person, Leibniz's view is that merely on the basis of faculty of memory we could not deny the fact that an individual at two different instances as the same. In other words, he thought, it is absurd to think an individual "A" who is in the present state and the individual who was in the cradle as an infant baby as not the same person. And, another notable point he stresses is that the bond of consciousness between two immediate actions is sufficient to discover one's own moral identity without any help. Even though gaps of memory would occur, by the cause of illness or any other particular reason, while recollecting our actions but the testimony of others could help us to remember things back. According to him, it is adequate to punish for our wrong actions which we had done during the intervals of memory. Further, he adds, even if a person would forget the whole preceding states of his/her life such as name, reading and writing skills and so on, he/she could learn from others about his/her life, and about during his/her preceding states which he/she had done. All these things he/she can do without considering himself/herself as two persons. Therefore, Leibniz argues, "this is enough to maintain the moral identity which makes the same person."[59] Here, Leibniz is openly bringing the importance of the third

[56] Leibniz, *New Essays*, 236.
[57] Ibid.
[58] Ibid.
[59] Ibid., 237.

person's role in moral evaluations. However, though he admits the fact that testimonial knowledge may not be always trustable, he says "sometimes we can morally certain of the truth on the credit of other's report."[60] Leibniz thinks that even though the error may occur in justifying the credits of third person's report but the error could not occur in the time of Last Judgment because he says that "in relation to God, whose social bond with us is the cardinal point of morality, error cannot occur."[61]

And the second, with regard to the self, Leibniz emphasizes that the self is distinguished from the appearance of self as well as from consciousness. Already we have seen his emphasis on the importance of soul or spirit which gives the real identity of substantial beings. He maintains this view and says the self "makes real physical identity, and the appearance of self, when accompanied by truth, adds to it personal identity."[62] Here, he seems to be arguing that the self appears to us in the form of thoughts, feelings and actions etc. When these actions and feelings are "accompanied by truth" with the help of consciousness then that adds personal identity to the self.

Few more points he tries to make clear about the notion of self. Firstly, he states "an immaterial being or spirit cannot be stripped of all perception of its past existence."[63] While insisting this point, Leibniz seems to deny Locke's claim that persons may be different when the same immaterial substance can be stripped of its past existence. Here, Leibniz's argument is that an immaterial being or self recollects impressions of every action which has happened in the past. Not only this but also it has "presentiments" of every action that will happen to it. But, in his view, these "presentiments" are very minute to be distinguishable. On the ground of this, he concludes, "It is this continuity and interconnection of perceptions which makes someone really the same individual, but our awareness [*apperception*]—i.e., when we are aware of past states of mind—proves moral identity as well, and makes the real identity appear."[64] Here, he seems to insist on a point that there is an interconnection among our past and present perceptions. This connection makes an individual really the same individual. One could find this interconnection among our mental states by awareness which, in fact, proves moral identity. And secondly, Leibniz insists that "souls are not indifferent to any parcel of matter … they inherently express those portions with which they are and must be united in an

[60] Leibniz, *New Essays*, 237.
[61] Ibid.
[62] Ibid.
[63] Ibid., 239.
[64] Ibid.

orderly way."[65] For Leibniz, since souls are "united in an orderly way" they are not independent of the body and they must be responsible for each and every action of it. Therefore, on the grounds of these assumptions, he concludes "not a parcel of matter, which passes to one body to another, nor the appearance of self what we call 'I' but it is the soul"[66] makes the same human individual over time.

While stressing the importance of the soul, Leibniz rejects all Locke's puzzle cases such as different persons in one living body, and having the same immaterial substance but different persons so and so. His answer to Locke's all such kind of hypothesis is that they might be logically possible but "not in conformity with the natural order."[67]

However, a few interesting counter-arguments he has given against Locke's puzzle cases that help us to know the clear picture of Leibniz's view. Firstly, in the cases of drunker and sleepwalker, Leibniz's response is noteworthy. He says "we punish drunkards because they could stay sober and may even retain some memory of the punishment while they are drunk."[68] And further, he says drunkenness is a voluntary action but sleepwalking is not. Thus, he holds, punishing drunkards is not the same as punishing a sleepwalker. In the case of a sleepwalker, he suggests, we need to provide remedy rather than punishment. In both cases, unlike Locke, Leibniz explicitly considers them as the same person rather than two. Secondly, Leibniz's response to Locke's other puzzle cases, namely, that distinct "incommunicable consciousnesses" act in the same body in a different time, and the "same consciousness" act by intervals in two different bodies, is as follows. If God allows this exchange of awareness, he would also have to exchange the physical appearances of the individual which were presented to others.[69] Here, his argument is that if there is no transformation of sensible appearance along with consciousness, the individual himself/herself would fall into conflict with his/her own consciousness by others who say about changes in his/her appearances. In fact, Leibniz insists, it would be a true disturbance in moral order. Therefore, he denies this sort of divorce between sensible and insensible. He gives one analogy which counters Locke's notion of consciousness and its role in constituting personal identity. Leibniz's analogy as follows:

[65] Leibniz, *New Essays*, 240.
[66] Ibid., 241.
[67] Ibid., 245.
[68] Ibid., 243.
[69] Ibid., 245.

> In another region of universe or at some other time there may be a sphere in no way sensibly different from this sphere of earth on which we live, and inhabited by men each of whom differs sensibly in no way from his counterpart among us. Thus, at one time there will be more than a hundred million pairs of similar persons, i.e. pairs of persons with the same appearances and states of consciousness. God could transfer the minds, by themselves or with their bodies, from one sphere to another without their being aware of it.[70]

In this case, Leibniz questions, how defenders of consciousness would say whether they are two persons or one and the same since those pairs of people on the two spheres are insensible of their transformation of mind as well as body. And also, they are insensible of their outer relationships of space and time. His argument is pretty clear that if consciousness alone distinguishes persons irrespective of real identity, which appears to other people, then what reasons stop us from saying these two persons on the two distant but qualitatively same spheres are one and the same person. Thus, he emphasizes, the claim consciousness alone constitutes the same person over time is deniable. Finally, at the end of his dialogue, Leibniz concludes that a rational soul is a basis of "real physical identity" and it can never go against either with moral identity or memory. He continues, even though they cannot always indicate a person's physical identity, the moral identity or identity based on the memory never runs against physical identity and never totally divorced from it.

So far we have discussed Leibniz's responses to Locke's account of personal identity and his own account of this concept. As Noonan says, Leibniz seems to be opposing Locke's account only with regard to the necessity of substantial identity. But in other issues, his thought process seems to be very close to Locke's views. Like Locke, Leibniz sees person as a moral being. Moreover, he also seems to appreciate the role of consciousness as a matter, at least to some extent, in the case of personal identity.[71] Along with these observations, a few more interesting points we can see in his treatment. Those are, he explicitly says, Locke's all puzzle cases might be logically possible but not according to the rules of nature. And, unlike Locke, he considers testimonial knowledge of others can also help to reward or punish a person if that person would lose his/her consciousness. However, Leibniz's acceptance of the logical possibility of Locke's all assumptions would tempt one to think he does not, in fact, succeed to provide any substantial arguments to defend his proposal that substantial identity constitutes personal identity.

[70] Leibniz, *New Essays*, 245.
[71] Harald Noonan, *Personal Identity* (London: Routledge, 1986), 57.

After Leibniz, Joseph Butler and Thomas Reid are the notable philosophers who explicitly defend the claim that the soul's identity constitutes personal identity. And both of them denied Locke's claim that the sameness of consciousness is the necessary and sufficient condition for constituting a person's identity over time. We shall see their arguments against Locke as well as their standpoint about the concept of personal identity.

1.4.0. Joseph Butler on Personal Identity

Joseph Butler (1692-1752) was one among the many critiques of Locke's account of personal identity. We can see his views on personal identity in his first dissertation which was added to his chief work *The Analogy of Religion*. In his dissertation "*Of Personal Identity*", he majorly discussed the importance of the notion of person and its identity. Primarily, he observed difficulties in Locke's and Lockeans' account which gives more priority to consciousness and its role rather than substantial identity. Finally, he tries to give a simple and intuitive kind of view on personal identity. We shall see in the following paragraphs how Butler rejects Locke's memory theory and at the same time, we shall also see how he tries to defend his account of personal identity which is grounded on the identity of the simple and individual substance.

1.4.1. Personal Identity is Indefinable

In the opening lines, Butler writes: "when it is asked wherein personal identity consists, the answer should be the same, as if it were asked wherein consists similitude, or equality."[72] Here, he seems to have an opinion that defining personal identity cannot be possible just as we cannot be able to define words such as "similarity or equality" and so on. Despite the fact that, Butler says, to say we cannot define personal identity is not to say that we are not aware of it. He had tried to explain how it could be possible. He says, even though we cannot be able to define the words—similarity or equality—but our mind comes to know what they are exactly by observing or comparing n-number of instances. For instance, from Butler's examples, by comparing two triangles our mind can come to know the idea of similarity, and by observing twice two and four the idea of equality would arise.[73]

Similarly, he says, upon the comparison of our own existence at two different instances "there as immediately arises to the mind the idea of personal identity."[74] Here, his argument

[72] Joseph Butler, *The Analogy of Religion: Natural and Revealed to the Constitution and Course of Nature*, ed. Crooks, G.R. (New York: Harper &Brothers Publishers, Franklin Square, 1860), 323.
[73] Butler, *The Analogy*, 323.
[74] Ibid.

is that when we compare two triangles we not only get the idea of similarity but also it shows us that two triangles are similar. In the same manner, the comparisons among states of consciousness not merely give us the idea of personal identity but also show the identity of persons in different moments. Additionally, he writes, "by reflecting upon that which is myself now, and that which was myself twenty years ago, I discern they are not two, but one and the same self."[75] Therefore, Butler thinks, our reflection upon any two instances in our life gives us enough evidence to consider us as the same person.

1.4.2. Consciousness Presupposes Thinking Substance

Though Butler admits consciousness or memory of what we did in the past determines our personal identity but he explicitly rejects Locke's account that consciousness or memory constitutes personal identity, or it is a necessary condition to our being the same person over time.[76] The main objection of Butler to Locke is how memory could be possible without a person. He argues "one should really think it self-evident, that consciousness of personal identity presupposes, and therefore cannot constitute, personal identity; any more than knowledge, in any other case, can constitute truth, which it presupposes."[77] Here, Like Leibniz, Butler also raised a similar point. He said that it is "self-evident" that the consciousness presupposes something. Thus, he argues, consciousness cannot constitute personal identity. His main argument is that if person is the source of consciousness, how consciousness could constitute personal identity. Butler's this circularity objection is one of the famous objections to Locke's account of personal identity. Therefore, Butler considers Locke's account as a "wonderful mistake". It is a mistake because, he says, Locke considers consciousness (memory) is not separable from the idea of person or intelligent being. Thus, it might lead Locke to conclude that consciousness makes personal identity.[78]

Contrary to Locke's view, Butler argues, "though present consciousness of what we at present do and feel is necessary to our being the persons we now are; yet present consciousness of past actions or feelings is not necessary to our being the same persons who performed those actions, or had those feelings."[79] Butler's this quote is making the point clear that the present consciousness of my present actions and feelings, for instance, I am walking and I am feeling cold, is necessary to being the person what I am now is. However, Butler

[75] Butler, *The Analogy*, 323.
[76] Ibid., 323-324.
[77] Ibid., 324.
[78] Ibid.
[79] Ibid.

argues, the present consciousness, or remembering, of our past actions and feelings is not necessary criterion to being the same person who did those actions and had those feelings, since they are already facts. In short, for him, the consciousness of past actions only helps us as evidence but it would not necessarily constitute the sameness of the person. Therefore, Butler says, personal identity is always secured by the identity of the substance (soul) rather than just remembering deeds that we did in the past. Moreover, he says, to say consciousness (memory) can provide evidence of our own self or person is not to say it makes personal identity. Therefore, he sees Locke's claim that memory makes personal identity as a erroneous idea.

1.4.3. Loose and Strict Sense of the Word "Same"

Further, Butler explicitly critiques Locke's usage of the word "same" for different subjects. His main argument is that applying the word "same" to a plant for identifying over time is entirely different from applying the word "same" to a person. According to his view, since the plant and the person both are completely different subjects, in both cases, the way of using the word "same" should be in different senses.[80] The following example shows how Butler had used the word "same" in various senses. According to his example, "when a man swears to the same tree, as having stood fifty years in the same place, he means only the same as to all the purposes of property and uses of common life, and not that the tree has been all that time the same in the strict philosophical sense of the word."[81] From this quote, we can comprehend Butler's view like this: in the case of a plant, for instance, mango plant, we cannot say the plant that we are seeing now is the same mango plant which had stood in the same place some years ago. Because, he argues, we cannot know exactly whether at least one particle of the present mango plant is identical with any one particle of the mango plant which we had seen. Consequently, Butler stresses that if the plants at two instances would not share at least one common particle of substance then the plants cannot be considered the same plant "in the proper philosophical sense of the word same."[82] Therefore, in his view, even though no part of their substance and no one of their properties is the same, saying the two plants are one and the same is nothing but a contradiction since "the same property cannot be transferred from one substance to another."[83]

[80] Butler,*The Analogy*, 324.
[81] Ibid.
[82] Ibid.
[83] Ibid.

Therefore, in the case of Locke's claim that the identity or sameness of a plant consists in a systematic organization among the particles with one common life irrespective of changing particles, Butler says in a "loose and popular sense" we can say the plant is identical with itself over time. But, he stresses, in a "strict and philosophical manner" we cannot say even a man, any being and any mode of a being are identical with themselves over time if there is no continuation of the same substance.[84] Therefore, he concludes, "sameness is used in this latter sense, when applied to persons. The identity of these, therefore, cannot subsist with diversity of substances."[85]

Thus, Butler seems to understand the philosophical sense of identity as can be applicable to only persons since they have a substantial identity. And, in the cases of other beings he seems to maintain skepticism since, for him, we don't know whether they have the same substance or not.

1.4.4. Same Substance with Successive Consciousnesses

Having the view that we can only apply a strict sense of identity to persons, Butler tries to show an inconsistency in Locke's definition of person and personal identity and the question whether the same substance is the same person. Butler says "he [Locke] defines Person, *a thinking intelligent being, &c.,* and personal identity, *the sameness of a rational Being*."[86] From this definition, Butler suggests, there is no need of an answer to the question whether the same rational being is the same substance or not since the terms "Being" and "Substance" refer to the same idea.[87] On the ground of this, Butler tries to discard the idea of "same person" and "same substance" as different.

Accordingly, he rejects Locke's idea of the "sameness of consciousness". Contrary to this idea, he says "that the consciousness of our own existence, in youth and in old age, or in any two joint successive moments, is not the same individual action, i.e. not the same consciousness, but different successive consciousnesses."[88] To strengthen this claim, Butler says that a person has the capacity of knowing an object as the same at different times. For instance, if a person perceives (experienced) an object 'A' at different times, his/her

[84] Butler, *The Analogy*, 325.
[85] Ibid.
[86] Ibid.
[87] Ibid.
[88] Ibid.

perceptions (experiences) of that object 'A' in any two different moments may be different but the perceived object is one and same, that is 'A'.

Similarly, he states, even though the "successive consciousnesses" are not the same, since they are transient, but they are the "consciousnesses" of the same object, or the same person. Therefore, he concludes, "The person, of whose existence the consciousness is felt now, and was felt an hour or a year ago, is discerned to be, not two persons, but one and the same person."[89] It is very clear from this that unlike Locke, Butler conceives sameness of consciousness is impossible. Thus, he thought, considering two persons on the grounds of consciousness is ridiculous.

1.4.5. Counter Arguments to the Lockeans

Butler not only critiques Locke's notion of same consciousness and its necessity but also, he criticizes the people, for instance, Anthony Collins, who take this notion forward and say that the personality is not a permanent thing but it is a transient thing, moreover, a person cannot continue more than a moment. Therefore, they hold, not substance but the consciousness alone constitutes the identity of a person over time.[90] In contrast, Butler argues,

> It is a fallacy upon ourselves, to charge our present selves with anything we did, or to imagine our present selves interested in anything which befell us yesterday; or that our present self will be interested in what will befall us to-morrow: since our present self is not, in reality, the same with the self of yesterday, but another like self or person coming in its room, and mistaken for it; to which another self will succeed to-morrow.[91]

From this quote we can comprehend Butler's main worry that if a person in two successive moments is not the same, it will pose a threat to moral actions, that means, we cannot blame or praise our present selves for our past actions. To that extent, his worry is that if today's person and tomorrow's person are not considered the same then no one shows interest in any action of the next moment. And furthermore, he raised a point that if people, like Collins, allowed that a person cannot continue more than a moment but consciousness alone make personal identity then the concept is a "fictitious" idea,[92] since, he argues, if persons would not be the same at any two successive moments, how could consciousness at any two successive moments be the same?

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[89] Butler, *The Analogy*, 325.
[90] Ibid., 326.
[91] Ibid.
[92] Ibid.

1.4.6. Butler's Three Points on Personal Identity

After rejecting Locke and Lockeans' account of personal identity, Butler adds three points which emphasize the importance of the idea that substantial identity constitutes the sameness of a person rather than consciousness. Those are: firstly, he argues, the notion which supports the view that consciousness alone constitutes the identity of a person is very contradictory to our "certain conviction".[93] According to him, this conviction is "necessary and every moment rises within us"[94] whenever we reflect upon our present thoughts, upon our past actions, and look forward upon future results for our present actions. And furthermore, all our thoughts about the immediate future or future of our present life are "entirely born down by our natural sense of things."[95] In short, we can say that we do all actions with some expectations. And then, he argues that it is not possible for a person to alter his/her conduct regarding health and other affairs if he/she is suspicious about his/her own continuity over time.[96] Therefore, Butler insists, our strong belief is enough to say we are the same over time.

In the second point, Butler emphasizes that the notion of person or self is not a mere idea or an abstract notion or quality of something. Rather, it is a "being" that is capable of having "life and action, of happiness and misery."[97] Additionally, he had stressed, all beings continue to be the same throughout the course of their existence. Therefore, he says, all actions (sufferings, enjoyments) of a person in the past are as real as all actions of the person in the present. All these "successive actions" belong to the "same living being" and all these actions are "prior to all consideration of its remembering or forgetting."[98] They are prior because, he says, they are facts in one's life. Therefore, consciousness of those actions cannot bring any change in those facts. Further, he added that "suppose this being endued with limited powers of knowledge and memory"[99], even in such conditions also there is no more difficulty for a person to have the power of knowing himself as the same person who was in the past even though he can remember some actions and forget others. According to Butler, forgetting some past actions in our life at some instant is not great trouble for considering a person as the same over time.

[93] Butler, *The Analogy*, 327.
[94] Ibid.
[95] Ibid.
[96] Ibid.
[97] Ibid.
[98] Ibid.
[99] Ibid.

In the third point, Butler tries to prove that consciousness itself helps us to know the substance remains the same over time. He says: "Every person is conscious, that he is now the same person or self he was as far back as his remembrance reaches."[100] The reason is, he says, whenever a person reflects upon a past action of his/her life, then the person is certain about two things: first, he/she is certain about the person who did that action, namely himself/herself; and the second, he/she is certain that the actions were already done at some point of time. This whole confirmation of the actions which were done and who did it only arises from the consciousness of the person.[101] Therefore, he says "this he, person, or self, must either be a substance, or the property of some substance."[102] In this quote, we can see two points: first, the person is the same substance; the second, the person is the property of a substance. In the case of former, Butler argues that if the person is a substance then knowing by consciousness that he/she is the same person is to say nothing but he/she is the same substance. In the case of the latter, if the person is the property of a substance then still knowing by consciousness that he/she is the same property gives a certain proof that his/her substance remains the same since, for Butler, "the same property cannot be transferred from one substance to another."[103]

With these remarkable points, Butler denies Locke's account of personal identity. In the next section, we shall see another important philosopher's criticisms of Locke's account.

1.5.0. Thomas Reid on Personal Identity

Thomas Reid (1710-1796), a Scottish philosopher, who is in the line of critical thinking towards Locke's account. In his work *Essays on Intellectual Powers of Man,* Reid explicitly expressed his views on personal identity. Even though his line of thought on this matter is pretty similar to Butler's view that consciousness is not the necessary criteria to constitute sameness of a person over time, his approach against Locke's account is noteworthy. He expressed Butler's sentiments in one of his chapters "*Strictures on Locke's Account of Our Personal Identity"*. His expression is as follows: "Bishop Butler…with whose sentiments I perfectly agree."[104] With that expression, one can understand Reid's view easily. Like Butler, Reid's critique is majorly on Locke's definition of person and his account of consciousness. We shall see his arguments against Locke's doctrine on this matter in the following sections.

[100] Butler, *The Analogy,* 328.
[101] Ibid.
[102] Ibid.
[103]Ibid.
[104] Thomas Reid, *Essays on the Intellectual Powers of Man,* ed. James Walker (Cambridge: Published by John Bartlett, 1852), 234.

We shall also see while rejecting Locke's account of personal identity, how Reid strongly supports the notion of the soul which is indivisible and continued to exist through time.

1.5.1. Absurdity in Locke's Definition of Identity and Identity of Person

Primarily, Reid tries to show an absurdity in Locke's view. In order to do that, Reid focused on two points. Firstly, he focused on Locke's account of identity. According to Locke, Reid says, if a being continues to exist then it is the same being, but two different beings which have different beginnings or different endings of their existence cannot possibly be the same beings. Secondly, he examines Locke's definition of person. According to Locke, Reid says, "a person to be an intelligent being, endowed with reason and with consciousness, which last he thinks inseparable from thought."[105] From these two points, Reid tries to show Locke's doctrine of personal identity as a "manifest contradiction". In addition, Reid says,

> From this definition of a person, it must necessarily follow, that, while the intelligent being continues to exist and to be intelligent, it must be the same person. To say that the intelligent being is the person, and yet that the person ceases to exist while the intelligent being continues, or that the person continues while the intelligent being ceases to exist, is to my apprehension a manifest contradiction.[106]

Here, what Reid arguing is that saying an intelligent being is a person and at the same time the person would continue even in the absence of an intelligent being, or that the intelligent being would continue even in the absence of the person is completely absurd. It is absurd because, he critiques, Locke's definition of person is not following his account of identity and its conditions. And further, he says, everyone thinks that Locke's definition of a person should rightly determine the nature of personal identity. Contrary to this, Locke endorsed a version that the identity of a person consists in "consciousness alone". In Locke's this idea, Reid sees two strange consequences.

1.5.2. Two Strange Consequences

Reid argues, one of the consequences if we admit Locke's doctrine is that memory has the "magical power" of producing its object despite the fact that the object has already existed prior to the memory produced it.[107] Relating to this point, Reid gives one example of how memory plays an important role in Locke's view. Reid says, according to Locke it is very clear and also not impossible, if consciousness transfers from one being to another "*then two*

[105] Reid, *Intellectual Powers of Man*, 234.
[106] Ibid.
[107] Ibid., 237.

or twenty intelligent beings may be the same person"[108] or, if a being loses the consciousness of its past actions then "*one intelligent being may be two or twenty different persons.*"[109] To put it in other words, from these examples, Reid noticed that consciousness constitutes the sameness of a person. Like Butler, Reid also admits that our "remembrance", or in Locke's expression, consciousness of our past deeds would help as the "evidence" to identify us now with that person who did those actions. But, that does not mean memory (evidence) gives/constitutes the identity of a person. If we think in Lockean perspective, he argues, it is nothing but attributing "magical powers" to the memory to produce its object which already existed before memory produced it. He argues that this way of thinking is absurd. Therefore, following Leibniz and Butler's line of thought, Reid thought that consciousness presupposes the person. And thus, explicitly he rejects Locke's idea that consciousness is a necessary criterion for sameness of person.

And the second absurd consequence in Locke's account, Reid noticed, is that a person may and may not be the person at the same time on the basis of the person's particular deed. To this, Reid gives a brave officer example which is a well-known counterexample to Locke's doctrine. That is:

> Suppose a brave officer to have been flogged when a boy at school for robbing an orchard, to have taken a standard from the enemy in his first campaign, and to have been made a general in advanced life; suppose, also, which must be admitted to be possible, that, when he took the standard, he was conscious of his having been flogged at school, and that, when made a general, he was conscious of his taking the standard, but had absolutely lost the consciousness of his flogging.[110]

In this example, he is clearly saying the point that one can easily understand on the account of Locke that the schoolboy and the brave officer are the same person and also the brave officer and the general is one and the same person but the schoolboy and the general is not one and the same person. The reason, for Locke, is that the brave officer is conscious of his childhood incident and the general is conscious of his braveness, but the general has no consciousness of his flogging. Contrary to this, Reid's point is that "if there be any truth in logic, that the general is the same person with him who was flogged at school."[111] Because, in Reid's view, it is true that identity is transitive. Identity is transitive means, for instance, if 'X' is equal to 'Y' and 'Y' is equal to 'Z' then 'X' is equal to 'Z'. According to the principle of transitivity,

[108] Reid, *Intellectual Powers of Man*, 235.
[109] Ibid.
[110] Ibid.
[111] Ibid., 236.

the general and the schoolboy are one and the same person. Reid's principal critique is that Locke's view is not following this simple logic. Therefore, he emphasizes, Locke's account of personal identity is absurd.

One important point we need to know here is that, before Reid, Berkeley gives a similar kind of objection to Locke. Berkeley's argument is as follows: if we divide a person's life according to the space and time into three parts and parts marked by the letters A, B, and C. In the first part of his/her life, the person has some ideas and is conscious of those ideas. During the second part, he/she retains half of his/her old ideas and forgets the other half. In place of these forgotten ideas, he/she acquires new ideas. Therefore, to speak, in B his/her ideas are a mixture of half old and half new. In the same manner, in part three of his/her life, the person loses the remaining ideas which he/she acquired in A and gets a new set of ideas. Now he/she has ideas of B and ideas of C. If the sameness of person is based on consciousness, the person in A and in B is the same person since he/she has the consciousness of the common set of ideas. Similarly, the person in B and in C is the same person since he/she has the consciousness of the common set of ideas. But, Berkeley argues, according to the principle of transitivity if the person in A and person in B is the same person and person in B and person in C is the same person then the person in A and the person in C should also be the same person. Berkeley argues, since Locke's claim is not following this transitivity principle therefore personal identity does not consist in consciousness.[112]

From the similar kind of thought experiment given by both Reid and Berkeley, we can understand one point that both philosophers thought explicitly Locke's account violating the transitive principle. Therefore, they thought Locke's theory which is based on memory criteria is not so sound. However, it is evident that Reid's brave officer objection is one of the famous critiques to Locke's account.

Along with these remarkable consequences, Reid has tried to show us how Locke's account of personal identity was mistaken with the four notable observations from Locke's doctrine.

[112] Goerge Berkeley, "The Minute Philosopher: The Seventh Dialogue," in *The Works of George Berkeley: Bishop of Cloyne* (London: Thomas Tegg and Son, 73, Cheapside, 1837), 229. books.google.co.in › books

1.5.3. Reid's Four Observations in Locke's Doctrine

His first observation is that the terms consciousness and memory are used by Locke as if they are the same. He says, in common discourse a person can say he/she is conscious of what he/she did in the past. That means, he/she distinctly remembers that event or action. But, Reid stresses, in a philosophical sense it is not acceptable since they are different faculties of the mind. Therefore, they are distinguishable.[113] The reason Reid says "that the first is an immediate knowledge of the present, the second is an immediate knowledge of the past."[114] So to speak, in his view, the former gives the knowledge of what I am now; and latter gives the knowledge of what I did yesterday or ten years back. Therefore, he considers both are different faculties of the mind.

And the second observation is that Locke's doctrine not only confused the notion of consciousness with the notion of memory but also personal identity with evidence which we have of our personal identity.[115] Reid's argument is as follows: "my remembrance that I did such a thing is the evidence I have that I am the identical person who did it…. But to say that my remembrance that I did such a thing, or my consciousness, makes me the person who did it, is, in my apprehension, an absurdity."[116] With an analogy, Reid tries to strengthen this argument.[117] The analogy says this: suppose a person lost his/her horse at time t_1 and after some days he/she found a horse which is the same kind at time t_2. To claim the horse at time t_2 is very identical with the horse at time t_1, the person has with him/her only the properties of his/her horse as the evidences which are very similar. Reid argues that if the person infers the identity of that horse on the grounds of merely similar properties then it is ridiculous. It is ridiculous because except for similar properties (evidences) we don't know exactly the horse at t_1 is identical with the horse at t_2. Correspondingly, he says, it is also ridiculous that inferring personal identity from the mere evidences since evidences could not produce its objects.

In the third observation, Reid asks "is it not strange that the sameness or identity of a person should consist in a thing which is continually changing, and is not any two minutes the same?"[118] Like Butler, Reid also holds our operations of the mind, such as consciousness, memory and so on, change every minute. Moreover, he says the notion of identity can be

[113] Reid, *Intellectual Powers of Man,* 236.
[114] Ibid.
[115] Ibid., 237.
[116] Ibid.
[117] Ibid.
[118] Ibid., 238.

applicable to things which have continued existence. Since consciousness is momentary, the notion of identity cannot be applicable to it. Therefore, he argues, "if personal identity consisted in consciousness, it would certainly follow, that no man is the same person any two moments of his life; and as the right and justice of reward and punishment are founded on personal identity, no man could be responsible for his actions."[119] And then again, like Butler, Reid also tries to show the problems regarding morality in Locke's account.

And the fourth point is that, like Butler, Reid also thought that Locke's usage of the term identity or sameness in his doctrine of personal identity is "unintelligible". He says when someone says that "pain and pleasure" and "consciousness and memory" are the same in all men, or same in one man at different times, this sameness can only mean "sameness of kind" but not sameness in a perfect sense. For instance, he gives an analogy that "the pain of one man can be the same individual pain with that of another man is no less impossible, than that one man should be another man: the pain felt by me yesterday can no more be the pain I fell to-day."[120] With this pain analogy, Reid seems to insist on a point that even though our mental operations seem to us the same but it is similar or same kind but not perfectly identical. Consequently, he stresses, the idea that the sameness of consciousness is an absurd notion. And one more point Reid raised against Locke's idea of sameness of consciousness. That is, in deep sleep our consciousness ceases to exist. Therefore, he argues, if we follow Locke's assumption that the same thing cannot have two beginnings of existence, it implies that the present consciousness of mine is different from consciousness before my sleep. Accordingly, if consciousness makes personal identity then the person must cease to exist before deep sleep.[121] Keeping these Reid's objections to Locke's account in mind, we shall see in the next section how Reid develops the concept of personal identity.

1.5.4. Reid's Account of Personal Identity

Though we have seen Reid's account of personal identity implicitly while critiquing Locke's account, here we have some of his claims and an analogy which gives us a very clear picture of his account of personal identity. Primarily, Reid opines that even though it is more difficult to establish the meaning of "personality", the general account of it is that "all mankind place their personality in *something that cannot be divided, or consists of parts*. A part of a person

[119] Reid, *Intellectual Powers of Man*, 238.
[120] Ibid., 239.
[121] Ibid.

is a manifest absurdity."[122] Like Descartes, Reid gives an interesting analogy to defend this claim. The analogy is as follows: "When a man loses his estate, his health, his strength, he is still the same person, and has lost nothing of his personality. If he has a leg or an arm cut off, he is the same person he was before. The amputated member is no part of his person."[123] The gist of this quote is clear that Reid is openly insisting the claim that the concept of person consists of no parts. Moreover, he suggests that the person is something like Leibniz's *monad* which is indivisible and continued existence.[124] Therefore, in Reid's view, a person's identity implies the continuous existence of the indivisible thing of which everyone calls themselves. Besides this, he holds, this self is something that thinks, acts, and feels but these actions are not continuous but a "successive existences". Also, this self is permanent and it has the same relation to all succeeding thoughts, actions, and feelings.

When Reid comes to the notion of identity of self, he says our distinctly remembering of our actions could help as the evidence. Regarding this, Reid writes: "I remember that twenty years ago I conversed with such a person; I remember several things that passed in that conversion: my memory testifies, not only that this was done, but that it was done by me who now remember it. If it was done by me, I must have existed at that time, and continued to exist from that time to the present."[125] Here Reid seems to understand that as far as we distinctly remembered our deeds in the past our identity would continue from that time to the present time. This claim seems very similar to Locke's claim on consciousness and its role in the identity of the person over time. But, for Reid, even though these remembered events would give strong evidence of our being the identical person but there are other events which we do not remember, for instance, our early infant stages. Therefore, thinking remembering alone constitutes our identity is absurd.

Like Butler, Reid also seems to have the same opinion in the cases of one's own identity and the identity of other persons or any other objects. In the case of the former, he holds, no one can doubt his/her own identity since it is a "natural conviction" which comes from his/her reason. He/she never doubts his/her own identity as far as he/she distinctly remembered. Therefore, he says, identity in the case of the first-person account is a "perfect identity".[126] In the case of the latter, either it may be the identity of a third person or identity

[122] Reid, *Intellectual Powers of Man,* 230.
[123] Ibid.
[124] Ibid.
[125] Ibid., 231.
[126] Ibid.

of any object, identity is not perfect. Rather, he says, only on the grounds of similarity and other circumstances we are apt to think they are identical. According to Reid, this is only for our convenience of speech we call they are identical.[127]

From the last two major sections, we got a clear picture of Butler's and Reid's criticism of Locke's account as well as their similar line of thought of this account. Primarily, both philosophers try to reject Locke's memory criteria for the identity of a person. And both accepted questioning first-person identity is absurd because it is self-evident. In the cases of other persons' identity and any other objects' identity, the identity is "imperfect" or "loose sense" of identity. And also, both thought that if we admit Locke's view, no one can be responsible for their own actions since our consciousness is momentary.

1.6. Conclusion

In this chapter, we have discussed the historical background of the concept of personal identity, in particular before David Hume who takes this subject as a serious philosophical problem. In order to do that, we have started section one with Rene Descartes' mind-body dualism since he was the person who clearly explored the idea that body is an extended thing and mind/soul is an unextended and thinking thing. Moreover, he explicitly says the soul, which is self-evident, is immaterial and immortal. Therefore, unlike the body, the soul has no parts and it continues the same over time. If we would ask the question that what constitutes the identity of a person over time to Descartes, he would answer without any second thought the soul constitutes personal identity.

In section two, we have discussed John Locke's arguments who, in fact, introduced the problem of personal identity. Locke sees problems in the claims such as the idea of the soul is self-evident and it always thinks. He says we have only the ideas of properties/attributes of body and soul such as extension and thinking respectively. But we have no true knowledge of the body as well as the mind. And, Locke's arguments against the claim that the "soul always thinks" is that in deep sleep we have no consciousness of anything. In his view, if the soul always thinks and is not conscious of any action or of pain and pleasure then it leads to the identity problem. Therefore, he gives a theory that neither material substance nor immaterial substance constitutes the identity of a person over time. Rather, consciousness alone constitutes it. And also, he says we are the same person as far as our consciousness extends backward. If there is no sameness of consciousness of any action then that person at that

[127] Reid, *Intellectual Powers of Man,* 233.

particular point of time is not the same as the person at the present time. Principally, to speak, he considers the person as a forensic term. Therefore, he insists, one should not punish or reward if he has no consciousness of actions. On these fundamental grounds, Locke develops this new theory of personal identity. Nonetheless, one point is clear that Locke's acceptance of the concept of the Last Judgment seems to tempt us to think he admits the importance of immateriality and immortality of the soul. However, it is evident that Locke's theory which is explicitly neglecting the importance of substantial identity in the problem of personal identity has been creating a greater scope for more debates in the philosophical domain.

In the last three sections, we have seen Leibniz, Butler and Reid's arguments against Locke's account of personal identity. A common argument we can see in three of them is that they strongly defend the metaphysical substantial identity for the personal identity.

First, Leibniz seems to us he appreciates Locke's account of the person and the role of consciousness. Like Locke, he considers the person as a forensic term. Even though he admits some of Locke's claims but he strongly emphasizes the importance of immaterial substance and its identity. For him, this metaphysical substance gives the real identity of a person and consciousness gives the moral identity of a person. And also, he tries to show that consciousness is not necessary criteria for the identity of a person over time since consciousness presupposes real identity. And also, he insists on the importance of third-person account as a testimonial knowledge for punishing or rewarding a person even though he has no consciousness of his actions in the past.

And finally, unlike Leibniz, Butler and Reid explicitly critique Locke's account of personal identity. They try to show Locke's definition itself is a mistaken one. For them, we cannot define personal identity. Rather, they emphasize, our intuition is enough to believe we are the same person over time. And also, they consider consciousness helps as evidence but it cannot constitute the person since consciousness presupposes something which is indivisible and permanent. We have seen Butler's circularity objection and Reid's brave officer objection which seem very strong counter-arguments to Locke's position. And also, both reject the very idea that the sameness of consciousness. Rather, they thought that consciousness is momentary therefore it cannot constitute. In particular, Butler says if consciousness constitutes a person then the identity of the person is a "fictitious" idea. Also, we have seen Reid's critiques on Locke's usage of the term consciousness instead of memory. Besides this, both rejected Locke's identity theory and they said identity in the case

of a first-person account is a perfect and strict sense of identity. But, in the cases of other persons' identity or any other objects' identity, identity is imperfect. With these kinds of arguments, both Butler and Reid tried to reject Locke's treatment of personal identity and simultaneously, they strongly defend the necessity of the substantial identity which constitutes the sameness of a person over time.

After many arguments take place on the concept of personal identity, David Hume, a British empiricist philosopher, tries to give his own novel solution to this concept which is more controversial than Locke's treatment. Hume seems to argue that the concept of person and the concept of identity are fictitious notions. Moreover, he seems to give a definition of the self which is nothing but a "bundle of perceptions". Before going to examine Hume's treatment of this particular philosophical problem, it is more appropriate to look into his basic assumptions on different concepts such as perception, memory, and the association of ideas, relations, abstract ideas, our belief systems on the external world and also other significant and relevant issues because Hume had developed his ideas regarding the problem of personal identity on the ground of these significant concepts. Therefore, we can take this study as the main objective of the next chapter.

CHAPTER-2

THE FUNDAMENTAL TENETS OF DAVID HUME'S TREATMENT OF PERSONAL IDENTITY

2.0. Introduction

In the last chapter, we have seen four notable philosophers' views on personal identity. In this chapter, I would like to focus mainly on David Hume's philosophical assumptions on different notions which led him to give a unique kind of account of personal identity. The concept of personal identity he had discussed in section 6, part 4, of Book 1 of *Treatise*. If we want to understand his treatment of this concept, we must have to understand his philosophical assumptions related to different concepts which he had explored in the preceding sections to the section "*Of Personal Identity*". Majorly this chapter goes through four sections. Section one deals with Hume's taxonomy of perception. And the second section focuses on Hume's views on the ideas of memory and imagination. In the third section, we shall see Hume's views on various relations and the significant roles of them. And in the final section, we shall discuss Hume's ideas regarding the substance of the soul, and the causal relationship between the motion of the body and thought.

Before going to deeply engage with his arguments, it is better to know why Hume had started *Treatise* since this knowledge gives us a clear picture of his project. The following paragraph gives a brief idea about the project.

David Hume (1711-1775) was a British philosopher, who is a successor of empiricist philosophers, namely, John Locke and Berkeley. As an empiricist philosopher, he believes empiricism is the prominent source to gain knowledge. Even though he continues the legacy of Locke's and Berkeley's fundamental idea that perception is the primary source of our knowledge, he rejects many of their theories. The prime concern of Hume's philosophy is that before going to know the nature of the world which includes mathematics, natural philosophy, and natural religion, we should have to understand the "science of man" or the true nature of human mind since, according to him, all these sciences, in some measure, would depend on the nature of human mind. Therefore, Hume emphasizes this point and says "the science of man is the only solid foundation for the other sciences."[128] In order to explore the "science of man", he adopts Francis Bacon's experimental methodology which is

[128] Hume, *Treatise*, "*Introduction,*" xx.

principally grounded on observation and experience. About the reason to choose this method, he says "the only solid foundation we can give to this science [science of man] itself must be laid on experience and observation."[129] So to speak, the whole project of his philosophy is to discard the metaphysical speculations which are not founded on "fact and observation". Don Garrett's comment on Hume seems to be noteworthy. He comments, "Hume's many individual arguments that are among the most groundbreaking and controversial, yet quite often also among the most misunderstood, in the history of philosophy.[130] This comment is making the point clear how Hume is important in philosophy. However, we shall see, in detail, Hume's philosophy and its role in the following sections.

2.1.0. Theory of Perception

In section one, part 1, "*Of the Origin of our Ideas"*, Hume had classified perceptions[131] of the human mind into two kinds: impressions; and ideas.

2.1.1. Impressions of Perception

He classified perceptions as the impressions and ideas on the following principal reason. The reason he said that at first impressions enter into the mind with a higher degree of "force and liveliness." So to speak, with this feature of "force and liveliness", they enter into our consciousness. And moreover, he said that all our sensations, emotions and passions come under the family of impressions since "they make their first appearance in the soul."[132] In addition, Hume had classified impressions into two kinds: impressions of sensation (original impressions); and impressions of reflection (secondary impressions). In his view, the first kind "arises in the soul originally from unknown causes"[133] when an impression strikes upon the senses. Hume's reason for using the phrase "unknown causes" is that first kind impressions enter into the soul without any prior perceptions. And besides, he argues they depend on "natural" and "physical causes". Hume says that explaining reasons for those "unknown causes" does not come under his subject. An anatomist or a natural philosopher can deal with this subject more precisely than a moral philosopher.[134] Despite the fact that he

[129] Hume, *Treatise, "Introduction*," xx.
[130] Don Garrett, *Hume,* (New York: Routledge Publisher, 2015), 1.
[131] Don Garret's explanation helps us to know how Hume is different from his predecessors such as Descartes, Locke, Berkeley, regarding the term "perception". He said that like his predecessors Hume admits all our mental operations are performed on the basis of certain "entities". These certain entities are treated by Hume's predecessors as "ideas" but Hume uses the term "perception" for this purpose and he limited the term idea to the "subset of perception" (Garrett, *Hume,* 2015, 36).
[132] Hume, *Treatise,* 1.
[133] Ibid., 7.
[134] Ibid., 8 and 276.

is not able to give reasons for the unknown causes, Hume keeps impressions such as cold, heat, thirst, hunger, pleasure and pain in the family of the first kind since, for him, they are conveyed through our sensory organs.

And, concerning the second kind, Hume explains impressions of reflection are caused by our impressions of sensation. Even though he did not explain proper causes of the first kind, he had well explained how impressions of reflections arise in the mind. According to his explanation, first, an impression enters into mental life. And then, it turns into an idea. Whenever the mind remembers this idea it turns again into a new impression.[135] For instance, when a painful event strikes upon the mind, that impression turns into an idea of pain. And whenever our mind remembers that idea of pain, it turns again into a new impression, the impression of fear. A question generally arises as to why he considers the second kind as impressions, in spite of the fact they are derived from ideas. Hume's answer seems reasonable that even though they are derived from ideas but they have quite equal degree of liveliness as original impressions. Furthermore, he said that not only secondary impressions have an equal degree of liveliness but also they are again copied from memory and imagination and produce new ideas.[136] The role of memory and imagination we shall see in further sections. Like in the case of the first kind, Hume keeps impressions such as beauty, love, hatred, grief, joy, pride, humility and so on in the family of secondary impressions.

2.1.2. Ideas of Perception

Next, on the subject of ideas of perception, Hume said that when impressions enter into the mind with a great degree of liveliness they again make their appearance in the mind as ideas. Already we have noticed the basic disparity between impressions and ideas that the degree of "force and liveliness". It implies that ideas have the feature of a lesser degree of liveliness. Therefore, he says, ideas are "faint images" of impressions. Moreover, he draws a difference between these two sorts of perceptions in terms of "the difference betwixt feeling and thinking."[137] For instance, our feeling about the hotness or coldness one minute before and our thinking about the hotness or coldness are different. Here, the difference is clear that our feeling is a more lively impression whereas our thinking is a faint image of that impression.

Before discussing other related issues of perceptions, we must have to make one point clear, that is, Hume had used different terms such as "liveliness", "force", "solidity",

[135] Hume, *Treatise*, 8.
[136] Ibid.
[137] Ibid., 2.

"vivacity", "steadiness", and "firmness" to show how the impressions are different from ideas. Not only to show the difference between these two kinds but also, in particular, to show the difference between impressions and memory-ideas, and our beliefs and memory-ideas, however, that we shall see in the following paragraphs how he has differentiated them. At present, we should have to make clear a point why Hume uses different terms to differentiate those concepts. In other words, whether he had used these all terms as interchangeable or any other particular reason he had in his mind?

Norman Kemp Smith opined that Hume might have used these terms to show a sensible feature which differs only in "degree", and which will not allow any further investigation. And moreover, he said that Hume takes these terms in their "metaphorical", not in their "literal sense".[138]

Besides this, Don Garrett also gives the same opinion. That is, Hume uses these various terms interchangeably to capture a particular immediately experienced future of perceptions. To avoid confusion, Garrett uses Hume's equally common term "liveliness" as the primary term for this immediately experienced feature of some perceptions.[139]

Considering these opinions into account, we can understand the point that Hume might have used these various terms interchangeably.

However, Hume does not make this "liveliness" the necessary feature of an impression in all the cases. He said some exceptions would reverse the case. He presents two such cases. Firstly, he says "in sleep, in fever, in madness, or in any violent emotions of soul, our ideas may approach to our impressions."[140] Secondly, he says "it sometimes happens, that our impressions are so faint and low, that we cannot distinguish from our ideas."[141]

Janet Broughton raised an objection relating to the first case. He writes:

> Hume's classification of dreams as ideas causes trouble…. It appears he should classify dreams as impressions…since our dreams I seem to be receptive in having many of my dreams…and a nightmare, say, can provoke behavior (for example, a

[138] N. Kemp Smith, *The Philosophy of David Hume: A Critical Study of its Origins and Central Doctrines*, with a new introduction by Don Garrett (New York: Palgrave Macmillan, 2005), 233.
[139]Don Garrett, *Hume,* (New York: Routledge Publisher, 2015), 38-39.
[140]Hume, *Treatise*, 2.
[141] Ibid.

> scream) and feelings (for example, terror). What seems to prevent Hume from classifying dreams as impressions is the fact that our dreams are not sensations.[142]

Though Janet Broughton's objection seems to be reasonable that our dreams also can provoke our behavior and feelings but Hume's reasons seem to be more reasonable concerning dreams as ideas that they are not sensations. In short, they are not immediate objects of consciousness rather they are in some way copies of sensations. On the basis of this assertion, we can consider dreams as mere ideas.

We have seen Hume's two distinct kinds of perception, impressions and ideas, and their difference from each other on the ground of peculiar features of force and liveliness. Next, we shall see how he draws the relationship between these two kinds of perceptions.

2.1.3. The relation between Impressions and Ideas

Hume observes two kinds of relations between impressions and ideas: resemblance and causal relation.

Firstly, according to Hume, in the first appearance of objects to our senses we find a great resemblance relation between impressions and ideas. He continues, except the difference in a high degree of "force and vivacity", they are very similar in every other aspect such as shape, size, colour and so forth. In spite of the fact that they in general resemble, Hume states that in all cases they are not exact copies of each other. To strengthen this statement, he divided perceptions further into simple and complex perceptions.[143] According to him, this distinction also "extends itself both to our impression and ideas."[144] As per this distinction, simple perceptions cannot be distinguishable and separable further, whereas the complex perceptions are separable into parts or simple perceptions. Concerning the complex perceptions, he argues many of our complex ideas never have corresponding impressions, for instance, imagining the city "*New Jerusalem"* with the golden pavement.[145] But it is resolvable into simple perceptions on which this complex idea is developed. In this case, according to him, we cannot see any relation of resemblance between this particular complex

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[142] Janet Broughton. "Impressions and Ideas" in *The Blackwell Guide to Hume's Treatise,* ed. Traiger, Saul (UK: Blackwell Publishing Ltd., 2006), 45-46.

[143] Don Garrett had rightly pointed out how Hume's usage of the terms simple and complex differ from Locke's usage since Locke also differentiate simple and complex ideas in similar terms. He says, in Locke's case the idea of the 'colour' of an apple and the idea of 'existence', are simple but for Hume these are complex ideas since the perception of the colour of the whole apple must itself be composed of individual perceptions of the colour of spatial parts of the apple. In the case of extension also, for Hume, it consists of spatial parts (see for more information, Garrett, *Hume,* 2015, 41).

[144] Hume, *Treatise,* 2.

[145] Ibid., 3.

idea and the related simple impressions. And similarly, he argues we cannot find many of our complex impressions as exactly copied in ideas, for instance, a complex impression of a city. The reason for him is the lack of memory power. Therefore, Hume emphasizes that in particular cases we could not find any resemblance relation between impressions and ideas. Nevertheless, concerning the simple perceptions, he says, "every simple impression is attended with a correspondent idea, and every simple idea with correspondent impression."[146] The best example Hume gives for this claim is that the idea of red and the impression of red only differ in degree but not in nature.

And secondly, he states there is a causal relation between impressions and ideas. He writes, "I consider the order of their *first appearance*; and find by constant experience, that the simple impressions always take the precedence of their correspondent ideas, but never appear in the contrary order."[147] He tries to prove it with the following standard empirical example. The example says that forming an idea of the taste of a particular fruit, a pine-apple, without having any impression of the actual taste of it is impossible. On the basis of premises that all our impressions are prior to their corresponding ideas and without having the impression of anything we could not get any idea, he concludes impressions cause our corresponding ideas.

From these two relations between impressions and ideas, Hume propounds a significant and first principle, that is, "all our simple ideas in their first appearance are derived from simple impressions, which are correspondent to them, and which they exactly represent."[148] He strongly considers this copy, or resemblance principle[149] helps us to derive the origin of our ideas. Additionally, he seems to have thought that with this principle one could challenge the metaphysical speculations such as innate ideas, the necessity of causation, the substance of matter and soul, and the question of personal identity and so on.

So far we have seen Hume's distinction of perception into impressions and ideas, and further complex and simple. For him, they are distinguishable on the ground of force and vivacity but they maintain resemblance and causal relation. And finally, his copy principle which gives, I think, more empirical evidence to his conceptual empiricism.

[146] Hume, *Treatise,* 4.
[147] Ibid., 5.
[148] Ibid., 4
[149] But the fact Hume admits that the copy principle is not necessarily applicable in cases like "blue shade". However, he considers it as a "particular and singular" case where we could not see the impression of a particular shade of blue as prior to the idea of that particular shade of blue. In this particular case, Hume says, the faculty of imagination can predict the missing colour shade (see for reference *Treatise,* 6).

In the next section, we shall see Hume's treatment of two significant faculties and their role in making ideas and forming belief systems in human beings. Those are memory and imagination.

2.2.0. Ideas of the Two Faculties: Memory and Imagination

Regarding the distinction between ideas of memory and imagination, Hume has explicitly discussed in section 3, part 1, "*Of ideas of memory and imagination*", and also in section 5, part 3, "*Of impressions of the senses and memory*". For more clarification, we need to look at these two sections separately how Hume does differentiate these two faculties.

Firstly, in the section "*Of ideas of memory and imagination*", Hume said that once an impression, a mountain, enters into the mind it appears as an idea, the idea of a mountain. This idea may appear in two different ways: either it appears with "a considerable degree of its first vivacity…or…entirely loses that vivacity."[150] According to him, the former is caused by the faculty of memory, and the latter is caused by the faculty of imagination. He draws the degree of vivacity as the primary or sensible difference between these two kinds of ideas. And then again, he differentiates these two kinds of ideas using the phrase "forcible manner". Relating this, his view is as follows: when we recall our past actions, my visiting of Hyderabad city, memory-ideas enter into the mind with a "forcible manner" as its first impression. And additionally, these ideas are "steady and uniform" over time. Contrary to this, ideas of the imagination are so "faint" and not "steady". [151] For example, my idea of Hyderabad as a small village with a number of huts and a small number of populations is so faint and not steady since I never had any impression. So to speak, in Hume's view, imagination ideas are "perfect ideas".

And another difference Hume makes between these two kinds of ideas that "order and form". In his view, memory produces ideas without any change in the "order" and "form" of original impressions whereas imagination changes ideas as it pleases. Hume's given example for this claim is that the same text as a work of history or as a fiction produces different kinds of effects. A historical text which is based on the facts strictly follows the order and form of the events whereas the fiction does not. In addition, he argues if a historian would not follow

[150] Hume, *Treatise*, 8.
[151] Ibid., 9.

this "order and form" then we think there is a fault in the faculty of memory whereas in the case of fiction it is not the case.[152]

So far our observation makes the point clear that according to Hume "vivacity" and "order and form" are two important criterions to differentiate ideas of memory and imagination. But interestingly, he seems to change his opinion in section 5, "*Of the impressions of the senses and memory*". Hume's view regarding the peculiar differentiation between the two faculties is as follows:

> Though it be a peculiar property of the memory to preserve the original order and position of its ideas, while the imagination transposes and changes them, as it pleases; it being impossible to recall the past impressions, in order to compare them with our present ideas, and see whether their arrangement be exactly similar or not. Since therefore the memory is known neither by the order of its complex ideas, nor the nature of *simple* ones; it follows that the difference betwixt it and imagination lies in its superior force and vivacity.[153]

The gist of this quote is that, in Hume's view, we cannot differentiate between these two faculties on the ground of simple ideas. The principal reason is that both faculties take their simple ideas from their corresponding impressions. Therefore, they cannot go beyond these impressions. But, for him, somewhat we can differentiate these two on the basis of complex ideas and their arrangement since memory preserves the "order" whereas imagination does not. Yet, he stresses that this is not sufficient to know one from the other because it is not possible to recall past ideas and their exact arrangement. Here, he seems to realize that not always the principle of "order and form" is possible in the case of memorizing ideas. However, he seems to give more credit to the principle of superior "force and vivacity". This is why he might emphasize the point that it alone can differentiate these two faculties.

In spite of the fact, he describes some exceptional cases[154] where this notion of vivacity would be reversed. One case he had described is that sometimes our mind is confused between ideas of these two faculties when the ideas of memory become very "weak and feeble" because of the long gap. As Hume explains it, this lack of vivacity leads us to confuse whether those ideas are produced by memory or imagination. Consequently, this causes our mind to think of an idea of memory as an idea of imagination. And, another case he had given is that sometimes "an idea of imagination may acquire such a force and vivacity as to pass an

[152] Hume, *Treatise*, 9.
[153] Ibid., 85.
[154] Ibid., 86.

idea of the memory, and counterfeit its effects on the belief and judgment."[155] However, in this case, Hume tries to give clarification, which seems acceptable, that the feature of "force and vivacity" is not caused by its original impressions but by the repetition of liar's lies, for instance. Thus, for him, these exceptional cases are not taken into account since our judgment concerning these ideas is mistaken. By proper reasoning, we come to know the facts.

According to Hume, the principle of vivacity not only distinguishes memory-ideas from imagination-ideas but also our beliefs[156] from memory-ideas and imagination-ideas. Don Garrett seems to have rightly pointed out Hume's differentiation between memory-ideas and beliefs, that is, memory-ideas lack the quite high degree of liveliness possessed by impressions and belief-ideas lack the high degree of liveliness possessed by memories.[157]And, our beliefs are different from imagination-ideas by their force and liveliness.

Next, while describing the faculty of memory and its role, Hume tries to give a clear picture of the faculty of imagination. We have noticed the feature of "force and vivacity" is the principal difference between these two faculties. Unlike memory, he said that the faculty of imagination has the freedom to transfer and change its ideas as it pleases. In short, it can reproduce and reorder our ideas. And moreover, as indicated by him, this faculty of imagination can separate our complex ideas into simple ideas. For instance, the complex idea of an apple can be separated into simple ideas such as taste, smell, colour and so on. Or, it might combine different ideas into complex ideas which were before unknown combinations. For instance, ideas such as wings and horses can be formed as a complex idea, for instance, a unicorn. This might be the reason why Hume considers the faculty of imagination as "a kind of magical faculty in the soul."[158]

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[155] Hume, *Treatise,* 86

[156] In this particular case, Hume defines belief as "To believe is in this case to feel an immediate impression of the senses, or a repetition of that impression in the memory" (Ibid., 86).

[157] Garrett, *Hume*, 42-43.

[158] Hume, *Treatise,* 24. In a footnote, Hume gives the hint of how he has used the term "imagination" and of how it plays different roles in his philosophy. His explanation is as follows: "When I oppose the imagination to the memory, I mean the faculty, by which we form our fainter ideas. When I oppose it to reason, I mean the same faculty, excluding only our demonstrative and probable reasoning. When I oppose it to neither, 'tis indifferent whether it be taken in the larger or more limited sense, or at least the context will sufficiently explain the meaning" (See the footnote in *Treatise,* 117). It is clear from this note that Hume uses the term imagination in two senses. One way of using it is that in a "larger" sense in which demonstrative and probable reasoning include and another way of using it is that in a "limited" sense in which both sorts of reasons exclude. So, we can understand the point that inferring something from two distinct ideas, an association among different ideas and impressions, and feign some underlying substances are all functions of the faculty of the imagination.

According to this nature of "liberty" of the imagination, Hume propounds three important principles: The first principle is the "separability" principle. Concerning this principle, Hume says "whatever objects are different are distinguishable, and whatever objects are distinguishable are separable by the thought and imagination."[159] Moreover, he insists that all our complex perceptions are separable into simple perceptions at least in imagination. The second principle is "conceivability" principle. Regarding this principle, he says if we conceive "clear" and "distinct" idea of something in the imagination, we can assume the possibility of its real existence.[160] Hume uses these principle to argue against the assumption, that is, the inherence of qualities in the substratum, and also to advocate a very controversial claim that our mind is a "bundle of perceptions" that we shall see clearly in further sections.

And the third principle is that the principle of association of ideas[161] which is, in fact, we can consider the heart of Hume's philosophy. According to Hume, though the faculty of imagination has the freedom to "transpose" ideas as it pleases, whatever operation happens in the mind that would not occur randomly. But, he says, there is a "bond of union among them, some associating quality by which one idea naturally introduces another."[162] Further, he argues if there is no "associating quality" among our simple ideas it is not possible for the same simple ideas to fall constantly into complex ones. For example, our simple idea of fire naturally joins with the ideas of light and of heat together in the imagination. Moreover, he emphasizes it is not only the case when we are conscious of our ideas but also in the cases of our dreams "that the imagination ran not altogether at adventures, but that there was still a connection upheld among the different ideas, which succeeded each other."[163]

In both *Treatise* and in section 3 of *Enquiries*, Hume clearly and briefly emphasizes the importance of associating principles or relations among our ideas which he calls as a "principle of connexion". This principle of connection or association quality among the ideas Hume describes as a "kind of attraction" or "gentle force" which had an equal effect on all

[159] Hume, *Treatise*, 18.
[160] Ibid., 19-20 and 233.
[161] Garrett explains how Hume differs from John Locke in using the theory of association ideas. For Locke, this theory says our mind's tendency to associate certain ideas under certain situations in order to explain cognitive errors and instances of irrationality. But for Hume, association relation naturally takes place among the objects of the associated ideas. (Garrett, *Hume*, 50). We can see Hume's explanations clearly in both *Treatise* as well as *Enquiries.*
[162] Hume, *Treatise*, 10.
[163] David Hume, *Enquiries Concerning Human Understanding and Concerning the Principles of Morals,* ed. Selby-Bigge and P. H. Nidditch (Oxford: Clarendon Press, 1975), 23.

manhood. Like the force of gravity in the natural world, he considers this principle shows its effects in various forms in the mental world.

But Hume's response to the question as to what are the causes of this association among ideas is quite interesting. That is, his response is as follows: "Its effects are every where conspicuous; but as to its causes, they are mostly unknown", therefore, they must be determined into "*original* qualities of human nature".[164] Like in the case of sense impressions, Hume holds the causes of the association are "unknown". And therefore, he considers these qualities as are original qualities of human nature. Moreover, he says "a farther examination [would] lead…into obscure and uncertain speculations."[165] This point is clearly saying our mind's capacity is limited. If we go beyond that limitation, our investigation leads to absurd speculations.

However, Hume proposed three association principles on which one idea naturally introduced another idea. Those three principles are "resemblance", "contiguity" and "cause and effect". In Hume's view, these qualities among the ideas lead us to join two ideas together and facilitate the work of our imagination to move from one idea to another. He gives simple examples to illustrate how these principles cause an idea to introduce naturally another idea. The examples are: "A picture naturally leads our thoughts to the original [resemblance]: the mention of one apartment in a building naturally introduces an enquiry or discourse concerning the others [contiguity]: and if we think of a wound, we can scarcely forbear reflecting on the pain which follows it [causation]."[166] Hume conceives these relations as "natural relations" since these principles cause an idea to introduce naturally another idea in the imagination.

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[164] Hume, *Treatise,* 13. The terms "original" and "natural" occupy a prominent place in Hume's philosophy. Hume thinks if we understand the original qualities of human nature, we can resolve many problems relating to human life. For Hume, original qualities are qualities that the causes of those qualities are inexplicable. That means our human capacities cannot go beyond these qualities. These are the "simplest and fewest causes" on which all human phenomena would depend. And, these qualities are "universal" for all human beings. If anything related to the human being could be explained by reference to original qualities then that could be considered as natural. That might be the reason why Hume considered natural association among the ideas by the three association principles as "original qualities of human nature." However, we can see a fruitful discussion regarding these two terms in Miriam McCormick's paper titled "Hume on Natural Belief and Original Principles". McCormick has tried to provide a clear picture of what qualities Hume considered as original qualities and what beliefs are considered as natural beliefs which cannot be eradicate. Miriam McCormick, "Hume on Natural Belief and Original Principles," *Hume Studies*, XIX, no. 1 (April, 1993) 103-116, http://doi.org/10.1353/hms.2011.0463.

[165] Ibid., 13.

[166] Hume, *Enquiries,* 24.

But in particular circumstances, he says, an association of two ideas in the imagination is possible in an arbitrary way. Such kinds of relations among ideas he calls "philosophical relations". Hume draws a line between these two kinds of relations that former are "sense" relations in which one can see a connecting principle between ideas whereas the latter is "comparative" relations without any connecting principle.[167] Regarding this, Don Garrett seems to have rightly interpreted natural relations as "narrower sense" and philosophical relations as "broader sense" relations on the basis of their specific nature.[168] We shall see these two kinds of relations more clearly in the next section.

2.3.0. Of Relations: Resemblance, Contiguity, Cause and Effect, and Identity

Already we have seen that Hume classifies three species under the heading of natural relations: resemblance, contiguity, cause and effect. And under the heading of philosophical relations, he categorizes seven species[169]: resemblance, identity, relations of space and time, quantity or number, degrees of quality, contrary and causation. He uses the relations resemblance, contiguity, and causation as natural as well as philosophical sense since, according to him, the faculty of imagination has two faces: it can naturally introduce one idea/impression to another; and also, it can introduce one idea by comparing with another idea/impression. Hume's intention regarding these relations seems very clear that if we understand appropriately the relations among our ideas then that would help us to understand the "science of man".

Among all the relations, natural as well as philosophical, I would like to focus only on four important relations that play a substantial role in Hume's treatment of different issues, in particular, continued existence of objects in the external world, of the substance of the soul, and of the personal identity. Those relations are resemblance, contiguity, cause and effect, and finally the relation of identity.

2.3.1. Resemblance, Contiguity, and Cause and Effect

Firstly, concerning the relation of resemblance already we have noticed that Hume considers it as a "natural" as well as a "philosophical" relation. According to him, it works in two ways. The first way, he described, "our imagination runs easily from one idea to any other that

[167] Hume, *Treatise*, 13-14.
[168] Garrett, *Hume*, 51-52.
[169] These seven species he again categorized into two species: relations of ideas and matters of fact. According to Hume, the former entirely depends on the ideas which we compare together and the latter may be changed without any change in the ideas. On the ground of this, Hume says relations of ideas provides a basis for certainty and knowledge whereas, matters of fact provides a basis for mere probability (*Treatise*, 69-70).

resembles it" in our thinking.[170] In this case, our mind forms stronger associations between particular ideas which very closely resemble. For example, whenever a picture of our absent friend presents to the senses our mind naturally introduces the idea of him. And the second way, our mind also compares any two or more ideas which resemble a certain way. For instance, the same picture may introduce the ideas of various resembled persons, or different shapes related to that picture's shape, or other same-colored objects and so forth. In the case of the former, for him, the resemblance between two objects is based on the copy principle whereas in the case of latter it may not be the case. This is why Hume says "there is some degree of resemblance we could see in any two objects." [171] Another specific nature of this principle is that it enlivens the related ideas of the objects. So that, whenever we happen to see a picture of our friend, we get ideas related to him with "new force and vigour". Thus, he argues, if there is no resemblance between the picture and our idea of that person, our mind would not carry our thoughts towards that person. The reason for him is that "Sensible objects have always a greater influence on the fancy than any other; this influence they readily convey to those ideas to which they are related, and which they resemble."[172]

Moreover, this principle plays a significant role in generating abstract ideas in us. For Hume, "all general ideas are nothing but particular ones, *annexed to a certain term*, which gives them a more extensive signification."[173] Whenever we observe a resemblance among the things, we apply a general term to those things without more concern about their differences. In fact, though this general term is associated with a particular idea, it gets more significance and serves as the abstract idea because it renew the custom to call up all the related ideas to that particular thing. In Hume's view, in general, we apply certain terms such as man, space, time, extension, beauty, virtues, and simplicity and so on to corresponding particular ideas when they have the quality of resemblance.

Not only in the case of abstract ideas but also the principle of resemblance plays an extensive role in Hume's philosophy, in particular, in the case of attributing identity to the objects that we shall see in the future sections.

And secondly, like resemblance, Hume had considered the principle of contiguity as both "natural" as well as "philosophical". For Hume, like the principle of resemblance, this

[170] Hume, *Treatise*, 11.
[171] Ibid., 13.
[172] Hume, *Enquires*, 52.
[173] Hume, *Treatise*, 17.

relation also gives force and vivacity to our ideas. Thus, he says "It is certain that distance diminishes the force of every idea…upon our approach to any object…it operates upon the mind with an influence, which imitates an immediate impression."[174] So to speak, closer distance gives more force to the ideas than the ideas of distance objects. In addition, he says, naturally our thinking of any idea readily transposes the mind to whatever is related to that idea, either the spatial or the temporal. For example, the idea of President Trump naturally gives the idea of America and the idea of Gandhi naturally gives the time period of freedom struggle in India.

Regarding the relation of contiguity, Hume presents two cases: first, our reflection of an actual presence or an immediate impression of an object would give a "superior vivacity" to related ideas of that impression. For example, my present impression of my laptop gives a superior vivacity to the idea about where I bought it. And the second, he says, our reflection of any idea would also produce ideas related to that idea. For example, my reflection on the idea of my home may produce ideas related to the idea of my home such as my neighbors' houses, people who are living in that place, and existed trees and so on. Here, Hume seems to want to deduce a conclusion from these two cases is that in the latter case ideas which are produced by our reflection of particular ideas are not much livelier than the former case since in the latter case both are ideas. To strengthen this claim Hume gives an example: "When I am a few miles from home, whatever relates to it touches me more nearly than when I am two hundred leagues distance."[175]

And thirdly, like the principles of resemblance and contiguity, Hume considers the relation of cause and effect as natural as well as philosophical. But, according to him, among the three relations, the relation of causation is the most "extensive" since, he says, it "produces a stronger connexion in the fancy, and makes one idea more readily recall another." [176]

Regarding Hume's principle of causation, Don Garrett's opinion seems noteworthy. He says that Hume strongly believes that our "everyday understanding of the world…is primarily an understanding of the causes operative in it."[177] So we can assume that the proper understanding of Hume's explanations regarding the principle of causation would help to

[174] Hume, *Enquiries,* 52.
[175]Ibid. 52.
[176]Hume, *Treatise*, 11.
[177] Garrett, *Hume*, 172.

understand the reasons behind our many beliefs, in particular, our beliefs regarding the external objects' existence and their identity as well as the existence of the self and its continuity through time and relating other issues. In the following paragraphs, we shall see Hume's arguments relating to the principle of causation.

First of all, the following examples, namely, "when we think of the son we are apt to carry our attention to the father"[178] and "if we think of a wound we can scarcely forbear reflecting on the pain which follows it"[179] tell us a point that how an idea immediately recalls another idea in the imagination if they have a causal relation. So to speak, in the given examples, our thinking of the "son" and the "wound" would cause the mind to think vividly about the idea of the "father" and the "pain" respectively. In these cases, the process occurs naturally. The role of causation is not only limited to mere ideas but also infers the absent instances from the present facts. In other words, the mind can infer unobserved instances from the observed instances. These inferring unobserved instances are, in fact, beyond our sense as well as memory. This is why Hume says causal inference "assures us of any real existence and matters of fact, beyond the present testimony of our senses, or the records of our memory."[180] The following example might give us a clear picture. Our mind can infer our friend's existence somewhere in abroad while receiving a phone call from him or our mind can infer somebody's existence by observing electric light or fire in the forest. In these two instances, our mind has a strong belief about their existence even though all the inferences are beyond our senses and memory. In Hume's view, this sort of inference is possible neither by the senses nor by the memory. Not only senses and memory but also, he says "the knowledge of this relation is not…attained by reasonings a *priori*". But, he explains, it "arises entirely from experience, when we find that any particular objects are constantly conjoined with each other."[181] Regarding this observation, Abraham S. Roth's point is noteworthy that as this causal relation is not attainable by reasoning it doesn't mean the inference is unreasonable and unjustified but it means only that the faculty of reason does not help us in this causal inference.[182] However, Hume argues that from our experience we merely find three circumstances: contiguity in space and time, the temporal priority of cause, and constant conjunction. But, interestingly, Hume, in the section "*of Immateriality of the soul",* had

[178] Hume, *Treatise*, "*Abstract*", 662.
[179] Hume, *Enquiries,* 25.
[180] Ibid., 26.
[181] Ibid., 27.
[182] Abraham, S. Roth. "Causation", in *The Blackwell Guide to Hume's Treatise,* ed. Saul Traiger (UK: Blackwell Publishing Ltd., 2006), 107.

defamed the importance of contiguity in space that we shall see in the final section of this chapter. However, according to his view, we cannot observe anything farther than these three conditions in our every experiment/experience. But, from a number of resembled instances, our mind infers similar effects from similar causes. Hume says these "reasonings from experience are founded on the supposition that the course of nature will continue uniformly the same."[183] And then again, he insists, this supposing "conformity" between observed facts to usual unobserved facts is determined by "custom" or "habit" alone. Consequently, he says, this principle of "custom" causes the "determination of the mind" to go beyond the senses and memory and therefore tends to think as if there is a necessary connection between the two events. Not only this but also, Hume insists, this propensity of the mind by custom gives vivacity to our ideas to form a strong belief regarding matters of fact. It is evident that Hume's problem of induction is a great challenge to the sciences which is, in fact, primarily based on his causal theory. In the book *Enquiries,* we get a clear picture of Hume's explanation, which is significant, regarding our belief in the real existences. He says that our belief regarding real existences is resulting from the sense (or memory) object and the "customary conjunction" between the object and some other related idea to that object. He upholds this belief is an "unavoidable" result when we are situated in such circumstances. In other words, in his view, this result is a "species of natural instincts". It is just like, he says, the unavoidable feeling of our passion of love when we get some benefits or hatred when we were injured by someone. This might be the reason why, Hume insists, "no reasoning or process of the thought and understanding is able either to produce or to prevent."[184] From Hume's this explanation, we can clearly conceive the point is that this sort of inference is the outcome of the "original qualities" of human nature therefore common to all human beings.

Already we have noticed Hume's view that he has insisted the principle of cause and effect is more extensive than the other two principles. To strengthen this claim, Hume tries to show how the principles of resemblance and contiguity are not sufficient to form our beliefs when something is presented to the senses or memory even though these two principles undoubtedly enliven the ideas. His supportive argument for this claim is that unless we believe someone/something exists somewhere, our mind cannot be able to produce correlative ideas of that particular object which presents to our senses or memory. For instance, he says, "contiguity to home can never excite our ideas of home, unless we *believe*

[183] Hume, *Treatise*, "*Abstract*", 561-562.
[184] Hume, *Enquiries*, 46.

that it really exists."[185] Rather, he insists, it is only the principle of cause and effect that can produce our beliefs since the belief of the correlative ideas is always presupposed. This inference is merely based on customary conjunction not by reason. In other words, the belief about something's existence arises from like causes with the smooth passage of thought and vivacity of the correlative ideas. Moreover, he argues, this process is an essential nature of all human creatures. However, Hume seems to show the limitations of human mind while stating "nature has...implanted in us an instinct, which carries forward the thought in a correspondent course to that which she has established among external objects; though we are ignorant of that powers and forces, on which this regular course and succession of objects totally depends."[186] With this explanation, Hume seems to insisted, implicitly and explicitly, that our idea of "necessary connection" among the two objects is a mere speculation.

So far we have discussed the nature of three associating principles: resemblance, contiguity and cause and effect. Though he seems to consider these three principles are important, from his explanations the point is very clear is that he gives more significance to the principle of causation. However, we shall see in following sections and in third chapter the significant role of these principles in different sorts of our beliefs.

In the following sub-section, we shall see Hume's treatment of the relation of identity and its role in forming a belief in the continued and independent existence of the objects.

2.3.2. The Notion of Identity and the Belief in the Continued and Independent Existence of External Objects

Among the seven philosophical relations, Hume sees a great difficulty in the relation of identity. In section 2, part 4 of *Treatise*, he opines that "[it is] certain that there is no question in philosophy more abstruse than that concerning identity, and the nature of the uniting principle, which constitutes a person."[187] We shall see Hume's treatment of the person in the third chapter. In this section, particularly, we shall discuss Hume's assumptions regarding the notion of identity, and the mind's operations in forming a strong belief in the continued and distinct existents.

In the section "*Of relations*", Hume explicitly and very briefly explains his views about this relation. He says: "The relation I here consider as [applied] in its strictest sense to

[185]Hume, *Enquiries*, 54.
[186] Ibid., 55.
[187]Hume, *Treatise*, 189.

constant and unchangeable objects…. Of all relations the most universal is that of identity, being common to every being, whose existence has any duration."[188] While using the phrase "strictest sense" Hume seems to make his view clear that the notion of identity is only applicable to objects which are "unchangeable" and having "duration". According to Hume, if we could not observe these qualities, saying an object is the same over time is not the right way of reasoning. In short, the idea of identity is applicable to only "individually the same" things. To say more briefly, for Hume, identity means numerical identity. Thus, we can understand identity is opposed to resembling things. Besides this, in Hume's view, saying a thing is same with itself at any particular time is meaningless. For instance, saying 'A' is same with itself at time t_1 is meaningless. So to speak, identity must be in between any two time points. This is why he seems to use the term "duration" which is one of the significant conditions.

The noteworthy point is that since the idea of identity is related to the idea of existents, Hume had discussed overtly the notion of identity in the section "*Of skepticism with regard to the senses*". In this section, Hume argues explicitly asking the question like "*whether there be any body or not*"[189] is meaningless. It is meaningless because, he says, even a skeptic "cannot defend his reason by reason"[190] about denying the belief in the existence of objects. And moreover, according to him, we have only perceptions, for instance, the perception of my hand. Therefore, we cannot be able to prove/disprove whether there is any external world or not. Since asking the proof of an external body or object is meaningless, he suggests it is better to inquire "*What causes induce us to believe in the existence of body?*"[191]

In order to attempt this main question, Hume emphasizes the necessity of analyzing two other related questions: firstly, why we attribute a continued existence to external objects; secondly, why we take for granted the objects' existence is distinct from perceptions of our mind?[192]

Hume's project seems to be clear in these two questions. He believes that a proper investigation gives a clear idea regarding the notion of identity as well as operations that occur in the mind relating to the external objects. Moreover, he expects, the study resolves

[188] Hume, *Treatise*, 14.
[189] Ibid., 187.
[190] Ibid.
[191] Ibid., 187. While stressing this point, Hume seems to make himself as a non-skeptic regarding the existence of objects in the world. And moreover, he seems to think that these beliefs are natural beliefs on which we form different other beliefs.
[192] Ibid.,188.

the metaphysical problems such as our ascription of perfect identity to external objects in spite of the fact that they do not appear continuously to our senses, and our supposition that they are distinct from the mind and perceptions and so forth.

Regarding the first question, Hume said that two peculiar features, namely, "constancy" and "coherence", of our sense-impressions tend us to presume the continued existence of the objects. Donald L. M. Baxter tries to make a point clear that though Hume talks about these features as if the features of external existents but, for Hume, they are "primary" features of sense-perceptions. More precisely, they are features of impressions in sequences.[193]

However, Hume explains, "constancy" is a peculiar quality of a series of sense perceptions where each member of the series closely resembles the earlier perception. In his view, this feature is applicable to all our sense-impressions "whose objects are supposed to have an external existence."[194] Hume said that objects such as mountains, houses, and trees and so forth repeat themselves in the "same order" without any change even after a considerable gap in our observation. So to speak, in Hume's view, these perceptions are not merely resembled with respect to some properties but they are also resembled even with respect to positional properties, for instance, space. Thus, he thinks, the principle of constancy is always a factor to assume objects in the external world as continued existences without any change. In spite of the fact, he observes some exceptional cases where the principle of constancy is not necessarily applicable.

The exceptional cases are as follows: in our day to day observations, we observe some bodies often change their positions after a break in our series of perceptions. In that particular situation, he says, it is difficult to know whether the same object is continuing or not. Hume gives an example to illustrate the point clearly that we may not find the fire in the same situation after a long interval of our observation.[195] In this fire instance, he is arguing, we could not see the principle of constancy, like in the case of the mountain, after a considerable temporal gap in our series of perceptions. In other words, we could not see the fire in the same uniform manner. Despite the fact, we suppose that fire as the same continuing object even after considerable changes take place. Hume's reason for this is that we are habituated

[193] Donald. L.M. Baxter, "Identity, Continued Existence, and the External World," in *The Blackwell Guide to Hume's Treatise*, ed. Saul Traiger (UK: Blackwell Publishing Ltd., 2006), 119.
[194] Hume, *Treatise.*, 195.
[195] Ibid.

in other occasions to see a similar kind of alternation produced in a like time[196] irrespective of our presence or absence in the place. With this principle of custom, we observe "coherence" and "regularity" in our series of interrupted and changed perceptions. Coherence, as Hume explains it, is another peculiar feature of a series of perceptions but this series contains alternation. But, our mind comprehends it as a causal series. Therefore, like constancy, he considers the principle of coherence is also another cause to our belief in objects' continued existence.

However, Hume argues, in cases like fire examples we could not see "perfect constancy" among our series of interrupted perceptions though there is coherence. He says, in such kind of cases, our assumption of the continued existence of objects is not the result of "direct and natural effect of the constant repetition and connexion but must arise from the co-operation of some other principles."[197] With a galley analogy, Hume explains how we could suppose an object as a continued existing object on the basis of the principle of coherence. The analogy is: "that the imagination, when set into any train of thinking, is apt to continue, even when its object fails it, like a galley put in the motion by the oars, carries on its course without any new impulse."[198] Here, Hume is trying to say that our objects have a certain nature of "coherence" when they appear to the senses. If once we suppose they are continued existents then we could see this coherence as more "uniform" in nature. When our mind is in a disposition of observing regularity among the objects, it naturally gives the opinion of the continued existence of objects even though they are not present to our senses. Terence Penelhum argues that Hume's this view seems question-begging since we attribute continued existence to our impressions on the ground of coherence but this coherence is more uniform on the ground of our supposition of the continued existence.[199] It might not be the case because Hume explained how custom plays a role in this particular cognitive process. However, regarding the principle of coherence Hume says this principle alone is "too weak" to have the opinion of the continued existence of objects since lack of constancy.[200] In terms of Penelhum, Hume seems to put more weight on the principle of "constancy" which becomes the key principle in his "genetic account".[201]

[196] Hume, *Treatise*, 195.
[197] Ibid., 198.
[198] Ibid.
[199] Terence Penelhum, *Hume* (London: The Macmillan Press Ltd., 1975), 68.
[200] Hume, *Treatise*, 198.
[201] Penelhum, *Hume*, 69.

Therefore, it is clear according to Hume that the peculiar quality of constancy of our impressions induces us to suppose our series of interrupted perceptions as the same continued individuals. Furthermore, he argues, not only do we conceive of those objects as continued existents but also, we form a strong belief regarding their continued existence and their perfect identity.

Hume had explained this whole system from supposing the continuing existence of something to form a strong belief of that object in four stages. His arguments run in the following way:

In the first stage, Hume explains exactly what the idea of identity is. He considers the general account of identity[202], which says an object is something that preserves its sameness through time and it is the same object at any two different times, is an absurd notion. Contrary to this, he says the idea of identity is a "fiction". His arguments go like this: On the one hand, Hume says, we have a series of interrupted but closely resembled perceptions regarding any single object, for instance, a laptop. He considers them as different perceptions. Further, he argues, if we take any one particular perception from that series at any one particular moment of time, that particular perception only gives the idea of "unity" rather than the idea of identity. The reason according to Hume, a particular object is same with itself at any particular moment of time. Therefore, he concludes "*an object is the same with itself*…really [should] mean nothing."[203] On the other hand, according to him, our different perceptions in that series also do not suggest the idea of identity though they closely resemble. Rather, it merely gives the idea of the "number" of those objects "whose existences are entirely distinct and independent."[204]

From these two assumptions, Hume says, one may conclude the idea of identity is to be placed in something that is neither "unity" nor "multiplicity". But, he argues, it is evident that we have only two ideas regarding an object that is either "unity" or "multiplicity". Since there is no medium between these two ideas to get the idea of identity, Hume suggests the difficulty concerning the idea of identity can only be resolved by the idea of "time" or "duration".[205] For him, the idea of the time we get when we think of "successive"

[202] We have discussed in the first chapter of this thesis the general account of identity which was given by John Locke (see for more information, 6-7).
[203]Hume, *Treatise*, 200.
[204] Ibid.
[205]Boxter says "When Hume uses the word "time" he is not speaking of a dimension in which objects are located. That is why he uses "time" and "duration" interchangeably. He just means to refer to what temporal

perceptions. His explanation is quite interesting, that is, how the idea of duration and the idea of unity together give the idea of identity. His explanation as follows:

> When we apply its idea to any unchangeable object, [it is] only a fiction of the imagination, by which the unchangeable object is [supposed] to participate of the changes of co-existent objects, and in a particular of that our perceptions. This fiction of the imagination almost universally takes place; and [it is] by means of it, that a single object, [placed] before us, and [surveyed] for any time without our discovering in it any interruption or variation, is able to give us a notion of identity.[206]

In this quote, Hume is arguing that the very idea of identity is "fiction". It is fiction because an unchangeable object would not give any idea of time. Whereas successive perceptions only give the idea of time but they are not unchangeable. In spite of the fact, we are ascribing a perfect identity to the object. According to Hume, this is happening when we apply the idea of time to an unchangeable object. In that peculiar situation, our mind surveys unchangeable objects and changing perceptions—co-existing objects—together. This confused psychological operation leads our mind to suppose the unchanging object is participating in the changes of the changing perceptions. As a result, Hume says, our mind imagines the unchanging object has a genuine duration without finding any interruption and variation in it. Therefore, he concludes, the idea of identity is nothing but the fiction produced by the imagination.

An example might make clear this point that while seeing my laptop I also observe many other perceptions surrounding my laptop, such as books, bottles, tables, watch on the wall, etc., as well as I also think of many other ideas, for instance, my other laptop at my home. Here, our mind supposes that this unchanging perception of the laptop is participating in the changes of co-existing objects without finding any interruption and variation. For Hume, this is only a "fiction" rather than perfect identity since we are using mere successive impressions/ideas to represent one single or unchanging object, namely, my laptop. Therefore, Hume concludes, the idea of identity we are not deriving from our one single object. Rather, he says: "The principle of individuation is nothing but the *invariableness* and *uninterruptedness* of any object, [through] a [supposed] variation of time, by which the mind can trace it in the different periods of its existence, without any break of the view, and without being [obliged] to form the idea of multiplicity or number."[207] Though this definition

successions have in common." Donald L. M. Boxter "Identity, Continued Existence, and the External World," in The Blackwell Guide to Hume's Treatise, ed. Saul Traiger (USA: Blackwell Publishing Ltd., 2006), 122.
[206] Hume, *Treatise*, 200-201.
[207] Ibid., 201.

seems to be the general account of identity, Hume's emphasis on two essential characteristics, "invariableness" and "uninterruptedness", makes his account unique. Regarding these two conditions, Boxter opined that though whether Hume's view is right or not about the essentiality of these two conditions is a debated issue, why he would take these two conditions as essential is easy to understand. Regarding variation, he says, since the quality of variation implies a "non-relational quality", finding a strict sense of identity on the ground of it seems a contradiction. And regarding interruption, since it indicates "temporal separation", having the idea of identity on the ground of interruption is also a contradiction.[208]

In the second stage, Hume explains why close resemblance of interrupted impressions induces us to ascribe a perfect identity to them.

Hume argues even though we find only the feature of constancy in our series of perceptions of an object, we are ascribing perfect identity to objects. Reasons according to him are as follows: this nature of constancy among the series of perceptions cannot produce any alternation to them though there is an interruption. To say, the same objects return upon our mind as its first appearance; our mind observes this feature of constancy in our resembling perceptions "in a thousand instances, and naturally connects together our ideas of these interrupted perceptions by the strongest relation, and conveys the mind with an easy transition from one to other."[209] Therefore, this smooth passage, from one to another by the number of resembled instances, induces our mind to ascribe a perfect identity to our interrupted perceptions. Moreover, Hume argues our mind's action in the case of interrupted but resembled perceptions and in the case of invariant and uninterrupted perceptions is the same. Since our mind's function in these two cases is the same, our mind mistakes resemblance for identity. Therefore, he concludes, this is "very natural for us to mistake one for another."[210]

In the third stage, Hume explicates how this mistaken ascription of perfect identity turns towards the propensity of our mind.

Hume argues, even though we mistakenly ascribe a perfect identity to the interrupted perceptions, but at the same time, our mind conceives the fact that this interruption among the

[208]Boxter, "Identity, Continued Existence, and the External World," 120.
[209]Hume, *Treatise*, 204.
[210] Ibid.

perceptions is contrary to the idea of identity. Reason is, according to him, reflection towards these interrupted perceptions shows us our past perception was annihilated and present perception is a newly created one. It implies the idea that these perceptions are different from each other though they are resembled in nature. On the one hand, our mind mistakenly uses resemblance for identity and on the other hand, our reflection sees the contradiction. As he says, our mind feels "uneasy" in that confused psychological situation and therefore it seeks relief from the uneasiness. To overcome this difficulty, he argues "we disguise, as much as possible, the interruption, or rather remove entirely, by supposing that these interrupted perceptions are connected by a real existence, of which we are insensible."[211] According to Hume, all mankind, even philosophers[212] also, have this opinion that our "intimate" perceptions are real existences and continued uninterrupted beings. Therefore, he argues, neither our absence causes their annihilation, nor our presence brings them back into existence. Even though we are unable to see and feel an unperceived object, our mind thinks that that object still exists.

Hume's explanation seems quite reasonable concerning how we could come to have an opinion that our perceptions exist even in our absence, and also how we could convince our resembled perceptions are not newly created.

In order to do that, first, he defines mind. He says our "*mind*, is nothing but a heap or collection of different perceptions, united together by certain relations" and it is "endowed with a perfect simplicity and identity."[213] And then Hume explains the psychological reasons behind our opinion of how the objects exist even in our absence. He says,

> External objects are seen, and felt, and become present to the mind; that is, they acquire such a relation to a connected heap of perceptions, as to influence them very considerably in augmenting their number by present reflexions and passions, and in storing the memory with ideas. The same [continued] and uninterrupted Being may, therefore, be sometimes present to the mind, and sometimes absent from it, without any real or essential change in the Being itself.[214]

[211] Hume, *Treatise,* 199.
[212]According to Hume, unlike a lay man who considers objects and his perceptions both are one and the same, philosophers face a struggle between two kinds of results given by two faculties. On the one hand, the faculty of reason says our perceptions are interrupted. On the other hand, the faculty of imagination induces our mind to form a belief of continued existence of objects. To overcome this situation, they contrive a new set of hypotheses which satisfies both faculties. The hypothesis is "the philosophical one of the double existence of perceptions and objects" (*Treatise*, 215).
[213]Hume, *Treatise*, 207.
[214] Ibid.

From the above two significant quotes, a few points are very clear. According to Hume, the mind is a "collection" of perceptions. They unified together by certain causal relations. And, falsely we attribute perfect "simplicity" and "identity" to the mind. Hume's treatment of the mind we will see precisely in the third chapter. However, concerning the expression that the mind is a collection of different perceptions, Hume argues, according to the separability principle, every perception in that collection is distinguishable as well as separable from other related perceptions. It suggests that that perception may exist separately. Consequently, he says, our mind sees no absurdity in separating any particular perception from the mind. It naturally induces us to think even in our absence that particular object could exist.

On the ground of this assumption, Hume argues whenever an object appears to senses we can naturally think of that object as both a perception as well as an object. As a perception, it is considered as a part of the heap which constitutes our mind. For instance, seeing an object, laptop, may cause us to think of various related ideas such as a feeling of wonder, a recall of similar kinds of objects and so on. When we shut our eyes or turn our head, it is considered as a separate existent which may not be the part of that collection of perceptions. Until and unless we look back towards that object, our mind considers it as the separate existing being without being part of our mind. When we look back towards that object, it can come back and join in the collection of perceptions without any changes in its appearance. Thus, he said that this whole operation of the mind naturally induces us to think our perceptions are not newly created.

After all, Hume concludes: "An interrupted appearance to the senses implies not necessarily an interruption in the existence. The supposition of the [continued] existence of sensible objects or perceptions involves no contradiction. We may easily indulge our inclination to that supposition."[215] In this quote, Hume is asserting that since the mind sees no contradiction in our interrupted but resembled perceptions, the propensity of our mind unites these perceptions with a fiction of real continued existence.

And in the final stage, Hume explains how the whole system acquires force and vivacity and turns into a strong belief.

According to Hume, a belief is nothing but an idea having the nature of vivacity like an impression. In general, an idea acquires vivacity from its correspondent impression since

[215]Hume, *Treatise*, 208.

impressions are the vivacious perceptions of the mind. Therefore, every idea that is connected to an impression gets some degree of vivacity through having a causal relation. Consequently, this relation causes our mind to transpose perceptions smoothly from one to the other with a considerable degree of vivacity of the first perception. Moreover, this relation gives a propensity to that smooth passage. This propensity induces our mind to believe an idea when we have experienced a related lively impression.

In the present context, concerning the belief in the existing bodies, Hume emphasizes the role of memory. As he said, our faculty of memory provides a number of instances of qualitatively resembling perceptions that return upon our mind after considerable breaks. This nature of the close resemblance of our interrupted perceptions gives us propensity. This propensity of our mind induces us to consider these perceptions as one and the same. And also, this propensity of the mind connects them by a real and continued existence to overcome the conflict between two kinds of ideas, namely, interrupted perceptions and ascribing perfect identity to those interrupted perceptions. Therefore, he argues, since this "propensity arises from some lively impressions of the memory, it bestows a vivacity on that fiction; or in other words, makes us believe the [continued] existence of body."[216]

So far we have seen Hume's views on the identity of the objects in the external world. Though his views seem somewhat similar to Butler and Reid's views that we cannot say objects in the external world are perfectly one and the same objects over time, his way of scrutinizing the notion of identity as fiction is unique. Regarding Hume's treatment of the notion of identity, there are remarkable criticisms that we shall see in the fourth chapter of this thesis. However, while rejecting the view of skeptics on the external world, he seems not to have any interest in denying the existence of objects in the world though he accepts that proving their existence is beyond our limit. Besides this, while insisting on the point that though philosophers' reason could say we have only perceptions that are interrupted and not identical, he tries to show they, like a common human being, are convinced by the faculty of imagination which plays a key role to tend them to believe external objects as real existents and continued existents. For Hume, the belief in the existence of the external world is a natural belief.

After giving his philosophical views regarding the external objects' existence and their identity, Hume tries to engage with the most controversial issue regarding the immateriality

[216]Hume, *Treatise*, 209.

of the substance of the mind. Hume considers this as the most significant concept before going to engage with the notion of personal identity. Penelhem's comment is remarkable how significant this section on personal identity is. He says this section is "less interesting but important … with less subtlety, but almost as much effect … lambast the pretensions of a priori psychology."[217] Therefore, considering the importance of this concept, we shall discuss Hume's treatment of the immateriality of the soul in the next section.

2.4.0. Hume on the Substance of the Mind or Soul

Hume said that, like in the case of external objects, there are many difficulties and contradictions involved in every assumption relating to the internal perceptions and the nature of the mind. Despite the difficulties, he says, the intellectual world has developed various theories of the mind, which, indeed, involved more contradictions.[218] Hume thinks that to understand the "true idea of the human mind", there is a requirement to investigate the intelligibility of those arguments concerning this subject.

Hume gives a very brief idea about substance in section 6, part 1, "*Of modes and substances*". He said that we have "no impression of" substance either from "sensation" or from "reflection". Therefore, he says the idea of substance "is nothing but a collection of simple ideas, that are united by the imagination, and have a particular name assigned them."[219] To say, in Hume's view, the idea of substance is an abstract idea. However, in section 5, part 4, "*Of the immateriality of the soul*", Hume had explicitly and elaborately discussed this issue. Majorly, Hume tries to examine two opposite versions, materialist and immaterialist, and their curious reasons concerning three issues: firstly, the substance of the mind; secondly, the local conjunction of perceptions; and finally, causal relations between material and mental events.

2.4.1. No Idea of Substance and of Inhension

First, on the one hand, Hume observes immaterialists' arguments who argue all our perceptions inhere in an immaterial substance; on the other hand, he observes materialists' arguments who say all our perceptions inhere in a material substance.

[217] Penelhum, *Hume*, 75-76.
[218] Hume, *Treatise*, 232.
[219] Ibid., 22.

Before engaging seriously into those disputes, Hume insists on the need of asking a question to those philosophers that "*what they mean by substance and inhension*?"[220]

In order to do that, first, Hume sees the possibilities of the notion of substance. We have already discussed in section 3 of this chapter, according to Hume, proving whether there is an external body or not is implausible since we have only perceptions of the body. But in the case of the soul or mind, he says it faced more difficulties than external bodies. He argues, according to the "copy principle" our ideas are derived from correspondent impressions. If we have an idea of our mind, we must also have a corresponding impression of it. But we have no such kind of impression which resembles the idea of soul or mind.

And, he challenges philosophers who "pretend" they have an idea of the substance of the mind, for instance, Cartesians. He asks "Is it an impression of sensation or of reflection? Is it pleasant, or painful, or indifferent? Does it attend us all times, or does it only returns at intervals…and what causes is it produc'd?"[221] The principal question of Hume for them is that if we have only impressions and those impressions are not the substance of the mind then from where this idea could be derived? Additionally, he tries to examine the definition of the substance given by the philosophers that "*something which may exist by itself.*"[222] Hume argues that this definition is not sufficient to prove the distinction between substance and qualities, in particular, our mind and its perceptions. He tries to give reasons from his two familiar principles. According to the conceivability principle, he says "whatever is clearly conceived may exist; and whatever is clearly conceived, after any manner, may exist after the same manner."[223] And according to the separability principle, he says "everything, which is different, is distinguishable, and everything which is distinguishable, is separable by the imagination."[224] From these two principles, Hume concludes since all our perceptions are different, they are "distinguishable" and "separable" in the imagination. Thus, they may be conceivable as separately existing objects. In that case, all our perceptions are substances. It implies that they no need to have any support for their existence. Therefore, Hume argues this is "a sufficient reason for abandoning utterly that dispute concerning the materiality and immateriality of the soul, and makes me absolutely condemn even the question itself."[225] We can understand the point that on the ground of his observation, Hume condemns the disputes

[220]Hume, *Treatise*, 232.
[221]Ibid., 233.
[222] Ibid.
[223]Ibid.
[224] Ibid.
[225] Ibid., 234.

relating to the materiality and immateriality of mind. Moreover, he says we have no "perfect idea" of any substance.

And next concerning the notion of inherence, Hume maintains the very idea of inherence says something is needed to support our perceptions' existence. Hume argues that since we have no "true idea" of substance, the question of whether our perceptions inhere in a material or an immaterial substance is impossible to answer.

2.4.2. Local Conjunction of Perceptions

Even though he has a strong opinion concerning the idea of substance, he tries to show the unintelligibility in the arguments given by the immaterialists as well as materialists. Firstly, he observes immaterialists' arguments which support the idea of the immateriality of the soul. According to Hume, immaterialists' view is as follows: all extended objects, for instance, the brain, consist of parts and whatever consists of parts is divisible at least in the imagination. It implies that conjoining a divisible thing with an indivisible thing is impossible. For instance, assuming a thought conjoins with material parts is absurd. If the conjunction takes place, they ask, where do these indivisible objects exist? Whether they exist in the left or right side of this extended body? Or, do they exist in one particular part or in every part? Consequently, they argue, if they exist in one particular part of the object then that particular part must be indivisible, or if they exist in every part then that indivisible object would also be divisible and separable. Thus, in their view, both cases are absurd. The reason for them is we cannot imagine any of our thoughts or passions in a geometrical shape. Therefore, they conclude, since thought and extension both are incompatible notions, the two notions would never join in one subject.

Next, Hume also criticizes materialists' arguments. According to Hume, materialists' arguments are as follows: an external object, a table, appears to us through an impression. All the qualities of the object such as "extension", "figure", and "motion" and so forth are the qualities of the perception. From these qualities, the most noticeable quality is "extension". It is evident that the very idea of the extension is copied from the impression of that particular object. It implies, the idea of extension must perfectly agree with the impression. Therefore, they argue, to say it is agreed with the impression is nothing but the idea of extension is itself extended. Like an immaterialist, a materialist asks how an immaterialist can conjoin the immaterial substance, soul, with an extended perception since it is impossible to conjoin something that lacks extension with something that has the extension. And then again, like

immaterialists, a materialist asks the same questions such as on which side of the extended perception the simple or indivisible substance would locate? Whether it is located in a particular part or in the whole?

After the observation of tempting arguments of the two sides, Hume says those arguments "affects not the question concerning the *substance* of the soul, but only that concerning its *local conjunction* with matter; and therefore it may not be improper to consider in general what objects are, or are not susceptible of a local conjunction."[226]

Therefore, before going to engage with the question concerning the substance of mind, Hume suggests that an inquiry concerning the problem of "local conjunction" would help us to find out what sort of perceptions are or are not subject to the idea of the local conjunction.

In order to do that, first, Hume holds a claim that the very idea of the "space and extension" derives only from our vision and touch. Therefore, he argues, these two sense-impressions only can convey all the colored and tangible objects of which parts are arranged in a certain manner towards one another. Except these two impressions, he argues, no other perceptions can be either increased or lessened. In other words, according to him, we cannot be able to increase or lessen the perceptions such as smell, taste, sound[227], desires, and pain and so on in the way we do in the case of extension. More clearly, He says,

> Whatever marks the place of its existence either must be extended, or must be a mathematical point, without parts or composition. What is extended must have a particular figure, as a squire, round, triangular…. Neither ought a desire, [though] indivisible, to be [considered] as a mathematical point. For in that case [this would] be possible, by the addition of others to make two, three, four desires, and these [disposed] and situated in such a manner, as to have a determinate length, breadth and thickness; which is evidently absurd.[228]

Hume's argument in this quote is that except the perceptions that are related to the "sight" and "tangible", other perceptions are nowhere in space since they are not extended like geometrical figures. If they are in space, we can derive the idea of extension from those indivisible perceptions, for instance, desire. Therefore, Hume propounds a maxim that "*an object may exist, and yet be no where*…this is not only possible, but that the greatest part of

[226]Hume, *Treatise*, 235.
[227] According to Hume, even though the impression of sound seems to convey the idea of distance and contiguity of the objects when different kinds of sounds would strike upon our ear, it just considers as other impressions such as taste and smell rather than sight and touch. The reason behind it, he says, is that by the principle of custom and reflection we estimate the distance between object and us (see for more information, *Treatise*, 235).
[228]Ibid., 235.

beings do and must exist after this manner."[229] For Hume, they exist but nowhere in space. In short, they would not conjoin in someplace with the matter. However, he says, even though they are not conjoined with the matter, they may possibly exist since whatever we conceive is possible according to the conceivability principles. With an example, Hume tries to strengthen his maxim. He says, if we consider two fruits, a fig and an olive, are located at the two ends of a table, we could separate them only by their different relishes that sweetness and bitterness. Generally, he said, we suppose these qualities lie within the visible bodies since we conceive these bodies are separated from each other by the whole distance of the table. Contrary to this, Hume argues this supposition is merely an illusion since we would not get any impression of it. Therefore, he concludes, assuming qualities like taste conjoined with visible bodies is unintelligible.

However, Hume argues, even though these extended objects, fruits, are not capable of conjoining spatially with their qualities, yet they are susceptible to other relations such as the relation of causation and contiguity in time. So to speak, he seems to want to say spatial contiguity is not a matter. As Hume explains it, these relations between the "colored and tangible" fruit and the qualities of smell and taste must have an effect on our mind. With this effect, the appearance of the one instantaneously gives the thoughts of the other. For instance, the appearance of the fig gives us the idea of sweetness. And moreover, he says, our mind is not stopped there. The mind observes a new kind of relation among the existing and nowhere existing objects/perceptions. The new relation is that conjunction in place. Further, he explains it, whenever we see the relation of causation and contiguity in time between two kinds of objects "we have a strong propensity to add some new relation to them, in order to complete the union."[230] This is the way, he said, we conjoined the non-existent perceptions with spatial objects. But, Hume argues, when our faculty of reason reflects on this confused notion, it reveals to us this union in place is not comprehensible. He says if we ask ourselves the question "the taste, which we conceive to be [contained] in the circumference of the body, is in every part of it or in one only, we … perceive the impossibility of ever giving satisfactory answer."[231] This argument seems quite sound as we cannot be able to say the quality of taste exists in only one part of the fruit or every part of the fruit since our experience proves every part of the fruit has the same taste. On the other hand, if we say the quality of taste exists in every part then we can suppose this quality of taste is figured and an

[229] Hume, *Treatise*, 235.
[230] Ibid., 237.
[231] Ibid., 238.

extended object which is utterly absurd. In this particular situation, Hume says, our mind is influenced by two contrary principles: inclination and reason. As we have seen, inclination forms the union in place between two kinds of objects and the faculty of reason shows us that union is unintelligible. And then again, in this particular conflict situation, Hume argues, our reason succeeds over propensity and it presents us only the following choices[232]:

1) Some objects, for instance, taste, "exist without any place"
2) They are "figured" and "extended"
3) They are wholly in the whole of an object and whole in every part of the object.

But, according to Hume, since our suppositions of the last two choices are absurd, the first option that some objects exist without any place gives accuracy.

After giving sufficient reasons for the accuracy of the maxim, Hume declares both immaterialists', as well as materialists' arguments concerning the problem of local conjunction, are "unintelligible". Therefore, he writes: "'Tis impossible to give any answer to these questions, but will both be absurd in itself, and will account for the union of our indivisible perceptions with an extended substance."[233]

After all, Hume tries to examine the question relating to the substance of the soul. Already we have noticed, for him, the question of whether it is material or immaterial is utterly unintelligible. But for more conceptual clarity, Hume observed Spinoza's doctrine of the immateriality of the substance. And he pointed out that the hypotheses are given by the doctrine of the immateriality of the soul and the hypotheses are given by Spinoza regarding the simple and indivisibility of the substance seem very similar. Hume says, Spinoza holds all the material objects such as sun, moon, and trees and so on are the modifications of, or inhere in, the one simple and indivisible subject. And on the other hand, he continues, theologians hold all our impressions and ideas such as sun, moon, trees and so forth are inhere in one simple and uncompounded substance, namely, the soul. Hume argues both systems have the same fault. Since both doctrines follow the same arguments for the immateriality of substance, Hume argues that the same criticisms[234], which are applicable to Spinoza's doctrine, are also applicable to the theory of the immateriality of the soul. His criticisms run in the following way: Firstly, according to Hume, if the soul is simple and indivisible, how could our extended perceptions be considered as modifications of the soul. If that is the case,

[232] Hume, *Treatise,* 239.
[233] Ibid., 240.
[234] Hume has mentioned in a footnote that these criticisms are taken from Bayle's Dictionary, in the article of "Spinoza" (see, *Treatise,* 243).

the soul would also be an extended thing. In such cases, as he put it, we have two possibilities: either the simple and indivisible soul must be expanded to admit of extended perceptions; or, our extended perceptions are reduced to simple and indivisible to admit of indivisibility of the soul. But, in his view, both cases are absurd because our ideas of objects and objects are in every respect the same. In other words, we cannot differentiate the idea of the shape of a table and the shape of the table. Therefore, he concludes, such a kind of supposition is "incomprehensible". And secondly, if soul or substratum gives support to all things then how the same substance can be at a time modified into the round and square figures, which are contrary and incompatible. Therefore, Hume concludes, the answer is no more satisfactory.

Therefore, on the ground of these assumptions, Hume rejects the intelligibility of the immateriality of the soul. And further, Hume tries to inquire about the causal relation between material and mental states since, he observes, there are some arguments that how could causal relation be possible between matter and thought where the former is extended and the latter is nowhere objects. This we shall see in the next sub-section.

2.4.3. Causal Relations among Material and Mental States

Even though Hume thinks the ideas regarding the immateriality or materiality of the substance and the inherence of perceptions in it are unintelligible, he thinks inquiry about the problem concerning the cause and effect relation between the matter and thought is "intelligible". Therefore, he suggests, we must inquire into this problem separately from the question concerning the substance of the mind.

At first, Hume tries to observe the established argument which was raised by scholastics. They hold, according to Hume, matter, and motion could not produce any thought/mental state since it could produce only a variation in the position and situation of the body. If we divide matter—which has a certain figure and shape—into parts, those parts of the body give us only a figure and some shape but not cause any thought other than this. And also, we cannot find in moving objects beyond any other thing than a change of relation. Moreover, it is strange to think motion in the body should also be a passion/emotion. Therefore, they conclude, it is ridiculous to suppose matter which is extended can produce any thought which is nowhere in space.

Hume argues that this scholastic view is easily refutable. Moreover, he says, the question whether the matter could cause our thought or not can be resolvable by our reflection on the

relation of causes and effects. Already it is observed, his theory of causation says we cannot be able to sense any necessary relation or connection between causes and effects. Whatever knowledge we could get regarding the causation is only through our experience of constant conjunction. Therefore, he thinks, experience can give us knowledge regarding the causal relation between matter and thought. Regarding this, Hume says,

> Now as all objects, which are not contrary, are susceptible of a constant conjunction, and as no real objects are contrary; I have inferred from these principles, that to consider the matter a *priori*, anything may produce anything, and that we shall never discover a reason, why any object may or may not be the cause of any other, however great, or however little the resemblance may be betwixt them.[235]

The principal argument in this quote is that all the objects which are not opposing may stand in the relation of constant conjunction. And there is no contrary relation between the real objects. Therefore, Hume takes this matter "a priori" and concludes among those objects anything may cause anything. In other words, since the matter and thought are not contrary objects therefore they can stand in the relation of constant conjunction. With this conclusion, he seems to insist a point that there is no reason to think contiguity in space is a necessary condition for this constant conjunction, in particular, in the case of our inquiry of the relation between matter (body) and thought (mental states). That may be the reason why he emphasizes the notable point that even though it looks as if there is no manner of relation between motion and thought but "the case is same with all other causes and effects."[236] To strengthen this claim, he says that by experience everyone can perceive the fact that various dispositions of one's own body change his/her mental states.[237] Additionally, he says this relation of the disposition of the body and change in the mental states would not be necessarily governed by the unification of the soul and body. Therefore, he insists, we must have to separate this issue from the substance of the mind. Hume writes:

> We find by comparing their ideas, that the thought and motion are different from each other, and by experience, that they are constantly united; which being all the circumstances, that enter into the idea of cause and effect, when applied to the operations of matter, we may certainly conclude, that motion may be, and actually is, the cause of thought and perception.[238]

[235]Hume, *Treatise*, 247.
[236]Ibid.
[237] Ibid., 248.
[238] Ibid.

It is clear from this quote that though both objects—thought and motion—appear entirely different, by experience we get the knowledge about their reciprocal relation. That is why he says anything may cause anything.

So far we have discussed three significant issues. Firstly, for Hume, the question concerning the substance of the mind is unintelligible since we have no perfect idea of the materiality or immateriality of the soul. Secondly, we have also no certain knowledge about whether perceptions inhere in the material substance or immaterial substance. Relatively, he makes the conclusion that all our perceptions are not locally conjoined since some of our perceptions are extended and others are not in space. And finally, in Hume's view, though it appears there is no relation between matter and thought, they enter into the idea of causation. To inquire about this, he opines, we need not be dependable on the substantiality of the soul.

2.5. Conclusion

So far we have discussed some fundamental principles and the significant doctrines which are based on those principles. The upshot of this chapter is as follows. We can conceive that Hume's taxonomy of the perceptions (entities) of the mind into impressions and ideas is fundamental in his entire project of the "science of man". In particular, his copy principle, which is derived from the causal and resemblance relation between the simple ideas and impressions, would help to understand the way he breaks the grounds of many established concepts such as abstract ideas, the "necessary connection" between cause and effect, and the immateriality of the substance and so on. Moreover, Hume's novel theory of the association of ideas—resemblance, contiguity, causation which are the products of imagination—tells us how ideas smoothly introduce other ideas if they have any one of the mentioned relations between them. Hume seems to rightly name it the "principle of connection" because if we understood these principles, we could understand clearly the way our mind functions regarding different concepts. As we have seen, among the three principles, Hume gives more importance to causation. Causation is the principle which plays a crucial role in forming our beliefs. For him, since the observation of constant conjunction between events, we form strong beliefs regarding real existences. And moreover, we form a strong belief regarding the objects' continued existence through time. Hume's explanation regarding the confusion between two stages that occurs in our mind is interesting. On the one hand, reflection says all objects are mere successive perceptions. On the other hand, our mind forms the belief they are one and the same. To overcome the unbearable tension between these two sides, the faculty of imagination tends our mind to attribute perfect identity to objects. Hume's point

seems remarkable when he says philosophers are not exceptional; they ought to think like a common man regarding the existence of the objects and their continuity over time. Moreover, his view regarding the immateriality of the substance and the inherence of the perceptions in it is also noteworthy. For Hume, both philosophers and the common man have the same line of opinion. Regarding the substantiality of the soul or mind, Hume's investigation seems more significant. Because, Hume had not only questioned the intelligibility of the immateriality of the soul but also he had questioned the intelligibility of the materiality of the substance while showing some perceptions are spatial and some other perceptions are nowhere but exist. On the ground of this, he suggests we have to investigate the causal relation between matter and thought without much focusing on the substantiality of the soul and the inherence of the perceptions in it. His phrase that "anything may produce anything" is also noteworthy because he tries to show how the disposition of the bodily changes can cause thought process and vice versa.

So to speak, all these fundamental concepts are important because Hume, with these presuppositions, had tried to solve the more difficult problem among the many philosophical problems, namely, the problem of personal identity. How Hume has treated this problem is the main objective of the next chapter.

CHAPTER-3

HUME ON PERSONAL IDENTITY

3.0. Introduction

In the preceding chapter, we have discussed Hume's theory of perception and principles that he has derived from the theory. And also, we had discussed two significant faculties and their role in the theory of perception, namely, memory and imagination. And further, we have seen his explanations regarding our belief in attributing perfect identity to external objects despite the fact that we have merely interrupted perceptions. And finally, we have seen his critical observations and conclusions regarding the notion of the immateriality of the substance (mind), besides this, we also discussed his arguments regarding the causal relation between motion and thought.

In this chapter, we shall mainly focus on Hume's treatment of the problem of personal identity. It will go through three sections: the first section shall examine Hume's account of personal identity with regarding thought or imagination; the second section will discuss personal identity regarding with passions; and the final section will focus Hume's second thought, or dissatisfaction, or reconsideration, of his account of personal identity in the "*Appendix*".

3.1.0. Hume's Treatment of Personal Identity in the Section "O*f personal identity*"

In the very beginning of the section "O*f personal identity*", Hume had noted that "some philosophers"[239] explicitly hold we are not merely aware of ourselves every instant and feel its existence as well as continuity of its existence but also we are "certain beyond the evidence of demonstration both of its perfect identity and simplicity."[240] In other words, those philosophers think that the soul has the peculiar nature of simplicity and perfect identity. In Hume's view, this peculiar nature of the soul beyond the evidence of demonstration is unintelligible. We shall see Hume's arguments in the following section.

3.1.1. No Simple and Continuing Impression of the Self

Contrary to the claim that the self is an entity that is "simple" and continues over time, Hume argues if their argument is intelligible we can derive the "simple" idea of the self directly

[239] Even though Hume did not mention the names of those philosophers explicitly, Hume's usage of the phrase "some philosophers" seems to be referring to the philosophers such as Descartes, Leibniz, Samuel Clarke, Butler and so forth. The reason we can understand that those philosophers had tried to defend the claim of perfect identity and simplicity of the soul that we had seen clearly in the first chapter of this thesis.
[240] Hume, *Treatise*, 251.

from our sense-impression since all "real ideas" are derived in that manner only, for instance, the idea of the taste. Therefore, he asserts, there is no such simple idea of the self. And besides the quality of simplicity, we are also supposing that the person or soul must continue without any change throughout the whole course of our life. If that is so, Hume argues, the impression which gives the idea of the soul must continue without any change throughout life. But, he says, there is no such kind of impression which continues over time since all our impressions such as pain, pleasure, grief, joy, beauty and so forth change every moment. In other words, we can say they disappear the very next moment. Therefore, he concludes, the idea of the enduring self cannot be derived from any one of the impressions. It implies that there is no such kind of idea of continuing self.

From the above two conclusions, Hume insists that there is no idea of "simple" and "perfect identity" of the self. With the deduced conclusions, Hume seems to discard the traditional philosophical understanding of the self. Corliss Gayda Swain interprets Hume's this view as a "negative" view of the self.[241]

3.1.2. Hume's Intimate Entry into the Self

After rejecting the common philosophical understanding of the self, Hume says,

> When I enter most intimately into what I call *myself*, I always stumble one particular perception, or other, of heat or cold, light or shade, love or hatred, pain or pleasure. I never catch *myself* at any time without a perception, and never can observe anything but perception. When my perceptions are [removed] for any time, as by sound sleep; so long am I insensible of *myself*, and may truly be said not to exist. And where all my perceptions are [removed] by death, and [could] I neither think, nor feel, nor see, nor love, nor hate after the dissolution of my body, I should be entirely annihilated, nor do I conceive what is farther requisite to make me a perfect non-entity.[242]

Hume's project seems very clear in this quote. For him, we never find the self that is explained by the philosophers when we intimately introspect into ourselves. Rather, he says, we can observe only perceptions such as pain, pleasure, passions, heat, cold and so forth. But, these perceptions are rapidly changing perceptions. No single perception continues over a period of time. Besides, he argues, even in deep sleep we are completely insensible of ourselves since we never observe any kind of perception.

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[241] Corliss G. Swain, "Personal Identity and the Skeptical System of Philosophy," in *The Blackwell Guide to Hume's Treatise,* ed. Saul Traiger, (USA: Blackwell Publishing Ltd., 2006), 133-150.
[242]Hume, *Treatise*, 252.

On the ground of this reasoning, Hume tries to give his novel theory of mind. According to Hume, the mind or self is nothing but "a bundle or collection of different perceptions, which succeed each other with an inconceivable rapidity, and are in a perpetual flux and movement."[243] In addition, he holds, our "successive" experiences are inconstant in our sight as well as in thought. Therefore, he states, there is nothing called as a simple and individual entity which ties our perceptions at one time and also at different times. To put it in short, for him, there is "properly no simplicity" and "identity" of the mind.[244]

An interesting point is that at first instance Hume's worry seems, as Donald C. Ainslie expressed, not about the real unity of the bundle of perceptions, rather our tendency to form a strong belief about the simplicity and identity of the self when it is under observation.[245] But, later in the "*Appendix*", we could see a different picture.

However, we can see in the section "*Of personal identity*", Hume's explanations that what reasons tend us to attribute identity to the successive perceptions, and incline us to suppose the self continues invariably and uninterruptedly during the course of life despite the fact they are mere successive perceptions. In order to get the complete picture of the concept of personal identity, Hume seems to think a limited explanation is not sufficient. Therefore, he tries to deal with this problem in two different accounts. He writes: "personal identity as it regards our thought or imagination, and personal identity as it regards our passions or the concern we take in ourselves."[246] However, in book 1 of the *Treatise*, Hume had limited his explanations only to the first part.

Regarding Hume's this distinction, Jane L. McIntyre's observations would help us to understand why Hume had distinguished this subject into two parts. According to McIntyre's view, this distinction discloses the way in which Hume had re-conceptualized the problem. She says that the first part explains our propensity to suppose perfect identity as well as the simplicity of the person during the course of life. And the second part focuses not on our belief in the ascription of identity but on our concern for ourselves.[247]

[243]Hume, *Treatise*, 252.
[244] Ibid., 253
[245] Donald C. Ainslie, "Hume on Personal Identity," in *Blackwell Companion to Philosophy: A Companion to Hume*, ed. Elizabeth S. Radcliffe, (USA: Blackwell Publishing Ltd., 2008), 140-156.
[246]Hume, *Treatise*, 253.
[247] Jane. L. McIntyre, "Hume", 186-187.

3.1.3. Personal Identity as it Regards Imagination

This section mainly discusses two points, namely, our inclination to suppose the perfect identity of the person during the course of life, and our propensity to attribute simplicity to the self at any given point of time.

Before dealing with the first part of the problem of personal identity, Hume briefly summarizes[248] how we substitute resemblance for identity, and also gives different instances to strengthen his claim since he thinks the same mental mechanism is applicable to both external objects and the person too.

According to his argument, on the one hand, we have the distinct notion of "identity" which says an object remains constant and continuous through supposed variation of time[249]. And on the other hand, we have the notion of "diversity" that says objects in succession are connected together by a close relation of resemblance. With this close relation, he explains, the faculty of imagination infers causal link among the resembled perceptions and tends our mind to mistakenly think of those successive and related objects as one continued object. And moreover, on the one hand, this nature of resemblance gives us a great propensity to think as if they are constant and uninterrupted. But on the other hand, the faculty of reason or reflection says those successive related objects are interrupted. Hume argues these two kinds of methods of thinking give us contradictory notions. In this confusing situation, he says, our faculty of imagination invents "some new and unintelligible principle", namely, "substance" or "soul" or "self" to connect the successive objects together besides their relation.

Hume explains with different kinds of examples[250] to show how our mind attributes perfect identity to objects or bodies despite the fact that we never perceive this kind of perception in reality. The following excerpts give a brief summary of different examples.

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[248] Hume gives a short summary of the notions of identity and diversity and our ascription of perfect identity to external objects in the section '*Of personal identity'*. Hume's clear explanations regarding this subject we can see in the section "*Of scepticism with regarding to the senses"* (*See, Treatise,* 187-218). However, we have discussed his views regarding this subject in the second chapter of this thesis.

[249] Udo Thiel seems to have rightly pointed out the importance of the "supposed variation of time" in Hume's philosophy to have the idea of perfect identity of any object including the self (see for more information, Thiel, *The Early Modern Subject,* 389-390). It is clear for Hume that we get the idea of time with the perceivable succession of the variable objects. In other words, invariability of objects would not give us the idea of time. In the section "*Of the ideas of space and time"*, Hume had elaborately discussed how we get these ideas even though we have no impressions of them. In particular, Hume explained how we get the idea of time while giving the analogy of clock (see for more information, *Treatise,* 65).

[250] Hume, *Treatise,* 256-258. Before Hume, Locke used more or less similar examples in the chapter "*Identity and Diversity*" to explain the notion of identity. The difference between Locke and Hume is that Locke

Firstly, Hume starts with a mass of matter, for instance, a table. According to his view, the parts of the table are "contiguous and connected". And, for him, the table is continued over time as the same unless and until new parts are added to the table or removed from the table. Despite the fact that some "inconsiderable" parts are added to the table, we still consider the table as the same continued object. Strictly speaking, Hume argues, the object is not the same object since even a small change can destroy the very notion of perfect identity. However, he says, we are attributing perfect identity to the object because we observed a very close resemblance among the successive perceptions of the object. As we have seen in the above excerpt, our imagination smoothly transposes one idea to another—irrespective of any considerable change—and facilitates our mind to believe it as the same continued object with this particular feature of resemblance.

Secondly, Hume said that even though we observe regular changes in some objects, for instance, a ship or a watch, we attribute perfect identity to those objects. Contrary to the fact that we observe major and regular changes, we consider it as the same ship. Hume's reason for this assumption is that whenever we see a "common end" or "purpose" in such variations, the faculty of imagination easily transposes our thought from one situation of the body to another and tends us to believe it as the same continuing object.

Thirdly, Hume explains our view in the cases of "animals and vegetables". In these cases, for him, we add an extra ingredient to the principle of "common end". That is, "sympathy". In fact, Hume did not clearly explain how sympathy could play a role in the cases of animals and plants. He might think the notion of common life generates sympathy in us and tends to attribute identity. However, Hume had discussed the importance of the notion of sympathy in Book 2 and 3 that we shall discuss in further sections. Nevertheless, he says in the cases of animals and plants we suppose a "reciprocal relation of cause and effect in all their actions and operations."[251] In short, parts in vegetables or animals mutually depend and connect with each other. Thus, they undergo a total change in a very few years with a strong relationship among the parts. This is why, he said, we believe a small plant becomes a big tree and a baby becomes a man without any change in their identity.

Along with the above-noted examples, Hume also explained the way our ascription of perfect identity to an interrupted sound, a newly constructed church in the place of the ruined

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considers our attribution of identity to objects in the world is true whereas Hume assumes our ascription of identity is a fictitious idea on the ground of different principles.

[251]Hume, *Treatise*, 257.

church, and a river—which is by nature "changeable" and "inconsistent"—with the same mental mechanism.

We can summarize Hume's core argument regarding our ascription of identity to external objects in the following way: according to his argument, our mind uses the same mental mechanism in attributing identity to all the objects which we have experienced in our day to day life whether the change is considerable or inconsiderable. The psychological mechanism is that though we have only successive perceptions of the objects, our faculty of imagination tends us to believe they are continuing objects by observing a close resemblance relation among those perceptions.

In fact, Hume's view regarding the identity of external objects seems very similar to Butler and Reid except for the way of his explanation. Already we had discussed Butler and Reid's views in the first chapter of this thesis regarding our ascription of identity. According to their view, our attribution of identity to the objects in the world is not in the strict sense of identity but we can say they are the same in "loose" or "imperfect" sense. Like them, Hume also considers the identity that we attribute to objects in the world is not in a "strictest sense" of identity rather it is merely a "fictitious" identity.

However, unlike Butler and Reid, Hume says "the same method of reasoning must be" applicable in the case of mind or self. [252] Therefore, he concludes, the identity that we attribute to the mind also merely a "fictitious" idea. Like in the cases of plants and animals, the faculty of imagination plays a significant role in our ascription of identity to the mind. In particular, Hume insists, this relation of identity depends upon some of the three association principles, namely, resemblance, contiguity, and cause and effect. But, among these three principles, Hume gives more importance to resemblance and causation. He thinks these two principles play a significant role in attributing perfect identity to the successive and interrupted perceptions. Regarding the relation of contiguity, he says, it "has little, or no influence in the present case."[253]

It is a fact that Hume did not explicitly give any reason why the contiguity relation is not important in the case of our belief in personal identity, like the other two relations. Regarding this issue, A.E. Pitson's explanation may give clarification to us. According to Pitson, two reasons might cause Hume to neglect this relation in the case of personal identity. Firstly, he

[252]Hume, *Treatise*, 259.
[253] Ibid., 260.

says, the succession of perceptions which constitutes the mind is not constant but interrupted. That means, in deep sleep, we won't find any such kind of perception. More clearly, he says, "the successive bundles-of-perceptions-at-a-time which constitutes the mind or self over time need not be temporally contiguous to each other."[254] Secondly, he says, this relation among the succession of perceptions generally "fails to be preserved in memory". Despite this fact, it would not stop us from attributing identity to these perceptions. Having these two reasons in mind, he says, Hume might have thought the relation of contiguity has no influence, like the relations of resemblance and causation.[255]

However, though Hume seems to insist on the importance of the association principles, he explicitly admits the significant role of the faculty of memory in finding the relation of resemblance and causation among our perceptions. And consequently, he admits its role in discovering the personal identity. Regarding the role of memory, Hume's explanation is as follows. Our present perceptions, which we memorized, of any past events closely resemble those perceptions. Thus, he says "in this particular, then, the memory not only discovers the identity but also contributes to its production."[256] It seems to be very clear that, like Locke, Hume also admits the role of memory in the constitution of our belief that we are the same person at any two different points of time. Additionally, Hume also insists on memory's substantial role in generating the idea of causation. He said that our mind is a "system" of different perceptions. Those perceptions would produce other perceptions. For instance, an impression of a tree gives an idea of the tree and that idea may produce an impression of pleasure or pain and consequently passions and then again that particular secondary impression may produce another idea when we remember it. The substantial point in Hume's argument is that whenever we introspect we observe a causal link among those perceptions. In order to find this causal link among the perceptions, the faculty of memory works as a basic principle. Briefly to speak, in his view, we acquired the idea of causation from the faculty of memory. In this way, he holds, the faculty of memory contributes her role in the production of the idea of the enduring self.

Though Hume seems to give more importance to the faculty of the memory at first glance, he tries to show the limitations of this faculty. He argues that justifying the claim that

[254] A.E. Pitson, *Hume's Philosophy of The Self* (London: Routledge, 2002), 38.
[255] Ibid.
[256] Hume, *Treatise*, 261.

memory alone as a standard principle in identifying a person across time seems mistaken. He gives an example to support his argument:

> Who can tell me, for instance, what were his thoughts and actions on the first of *January* 1715, the *11* of *March* 1719, and the third of *August* 1733? Or will he affirm, because he has entirely forgot the incidents of these days, that the present self is not the same person with the self of that time; and by that means overturn all the most [established] notions of personal identity?[257]

The implicit point in this quote is very clear. According to Hume, it is impossible for the human mind to memorize each and every thought and action that occurred in our life. Therefore, assuming a person at any two different periods is not the same person merely on the basis of the person's loss of memory of particular incidents is nothing but a mistaken thought. Therefore, he concludes, memory alone cannot constitute personal identity rather it merely causes new perceptions that resemble past perceptions. Despite this fact, Hume holds that if we have no memory then we have no notion of causation. But, he argues, once we get the idea of causation from memory, our faculty of imagination can extend the same chain of causes and consequently gives the identity of our persons beyond the limits of memory. As a result, he says, we consider all forgotten incidents to have a causal connection with other perceptions.[258]

Regarding the faculty of memory and its role in the case of personal identity, Hume's view seems to be clear. Though Hume, unlike Leibniz, seems to admit with Locke's position[259] that the metaphysical substance (soul) would not help to solve the problems involved in the concept of personal identity but he, like Leibniz, explicitly disagrees with Locke's memory criterion (continuity of consciousness) and its role in the explanation of personal identity. The reason for Hume is that this criterion is empirically not proved. However, unlike Locke and Leibniz who admits the reality of identity of the person across time in different methods, Hume explicitly holds the perfect identity that we attribute to the mind is "fictitious" which is beyond the limits of memory but the product of the faculty of the imagination.

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[257] Hume, *Treatise*, 262.
[258] Ibid., 261-262.
[259] We have seen in the first chapter of this thesis that, for Locke, if there is no continuity of consciousness we should not consider a person as the same even though the same soul might be continued from an individual to another individual, for instance, Socrates to Russell. And also, we have seen Leibniz's counter arguments to Locke's memory criteria. According to Leibniz, it is evident that we have no clear memories of many stages in our life. Therefore, to say a person is not the same on the grounds of memory loss is nothing but absurd. He further says, even in the cases of memory loss, we can take a third person account which is sufficient to admit the actions, which we have forgotten, belong to us without considering us as two different persons.

In the concluding part regarding the notion of identity of the mind, Hume argues that all the "subtle questions" and disputes regarding personal identity would be considered as "grammatical" instead of "philosophical difficulties". The reason according to Hume is that even though our ascription of identity would depend on the relations of ideas and easy transition from one to other, these relations and the easiness of the passage may wane by "insensible degrees". Besides this, he says, we have no standard principles which resolve disputes concerning the time "when they acquire or lose a title to the name of identity."[260] Therefore, he concludes, "All the disputes concerning the identity of connected objects are merely verbal, except so far as the relation of parts gives rise to some fiction or imaginary principle of union."[261] What Hume's point here is that all disputes regarding this concept are not merely verbal disputes but our faculty of imagination by the association principles—resemblance and causation—tends us to believe some principle of union ties all the successive perceptions and makes us to attribute identity across time. Regarding Hume's explanation of verbal disputes, James Giles gives noteworthy arguments that we shall see in the fourth chapter of this thesis.

3.1.3.1. Attributing Simplicity to the Mind

After explaining the way our attribution of identity to the person across time, Hume tries to explicate how we attribute "simplicity" to the mind at a given time. Like in the case of identity, he explains, the same principles—resemblance, and causation—play an essential role in our attribution of simplicity to the mind. Hume says,

> An object, whose different co-existent parts are bound together by a close relation, operates upon the imagination after much the same manner as one perfectly simple and indivisible, and requires not a much greater stretch of thought in order to its conception. From this similarity of operation we attribute a simplicity to it, and feign a principle of union as the support of this simplicity, and the center of all the different parts and qualities of the object.[262]

Regarding the notion of simplicity, Hume's argument is that observation of a close relation among the successive perceptions operates upon our faculty of imagination and causes us to imagine a fictitious "principle of union" which supports the simplicity of the mind and "center of all the different parts and qualities" at any given time. Hume's view regarding the simplicity of the mind makes the point clear that the Cartesian view which holds substance or mind is a simple and individual entity that is the center of all the qualities or the experiences

[260] Hume, *Treatise*, 262.
[261] Ibid.
[262] Ibid., 263

is an absurd notion. And moreover, he tries to reject the skeptical claim of Locke that a substratum—something which we do not know—ties all the qualities of the object. For Hume, this principle of union is merely the product of the faculty of imagination.

The upshot of our discussion so far is as follows: according to Hume's argument, we never experience any simple and enduring impression of the self. Therefore, our ascriptions of these qualities to the self are mere fictitious ideas. Despite the fact, we attribute these qualities to the mind because when we introspect we observe all the perceptions of the mind are causally related which is in Hume's view true idea of the self. Since in our experience we find a causal relation among the perceptions, our faculty of imagination generates these fictitious ideas. Unless and until we do not feign a "principle of union", all our disputes regarding the personal identity are mere verbal disputes. On the ground of this thought, he insists, we form the belief that our self or person continues across time without any changes even though we never experience such an impression of the self. In short, according to Hume, our attribution of simplicity and identity to the person is a tendency or propensity of the mind.

In the next section, we shall discuss Hume's account of personal identity with relating to the passions or self-concern.

3.2.0. Personal Identity as it Regards Passions or Self-Concern

Fascinatingly, in the section "*Of personal identity*", Hume compares the notion of self with the notion of "republic" or "commonwealth". According to his argument, even though members of the republic and their positions may change regularly which are clearly noticeable, we consider that republic as the same. The reason he says is that the members in the republic have a reciprocal relation.[263]

Like the notion of a republic, Hume argues that even though a person's perceptions and his character and beliefs may change but they are associated with the relations of resemblance and causation. On the ground of this association, we form a belief that a person's identity will continue over time without any loss. In the formation of this belief, Hume says, our passions play a significant role. According to his view, our passions assist with the faculty of imagination to "corroborate" the belief about our ascription of identity to the person through time. In addition, he said that the assistance between the two faculties explains how our

[263] Hume, *Treatise*, 261.

distant perceptions impact each other and also explains how the present self relates to our past and future pains or pleasures.[264] With this claim, we can understand the important point that, as Asa Carlson suggested, we should not suppose the personal identity with relating to the imagination and with regard to the passions constitutes two separate persons.[265] The reason already we have noticed in Hume's argument is that the two faculties assist together and generate this idea.

Before scrutinizing Hume's arguments regarding how our "distant perceptions influence each other" and how our present concern relates to our past and future perceptions, it is essential to us to know briefly what he had explained about passions.

3.2.1. Hume's Account of Passions

Already we have noticed Hume's classification of impressions into impressions of sensations (primary impressions) and impressions of reflections (secondary impressions). And the main difference he makes between these two kinds is that the secondary impressions occur as the outcome of the attendance of other perceptions in the mind, namely, pleasure or pain.[266] On the basis of this, he considers passions as secondary impressions.

Hume further makes an interesting classification within the domain of passions: direct passions and indirect passions.[267] According to him, direct passions arise immediately from any painful or pleasant impressions. He says that mental states such as "desire, aversion, grief, joy, hope, fear, despair and security"[268] are direct passions since they derive immediately from the pain or pleasant impressions. Regarding the indirect passions, he says they "proceed from the same principles, but by the conjunction of the other qualities."[269] Here, in Hume's view, the "same principles" mean the pain or pleasant impressions[270] that

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[264] Hume, *Treatise,* 261.

[265] Asa Carlson, "There is Just One Idea of Self in Hume's *Treatise,*" *Hume Studies* 35, no. 1, 2, (2009): 174-184, muse.jhu.edu/article/403836.

[266] Hume classified secondary impressions into two general kinds, namely, "calm" impressions and "violent" impressions. The first kind, for Hume, is the "sense of beauty and deformity in action, composition, and external objects." And the second kind is related to different sorts of passions. The principal difference between these two kinds is that "the passions are more violent than the emotions [sentiments] arising from beauty and deformity." (See for the more information, *Treatise,* 276).

[267]Hume, *Treatise,* 276 and 438.

[268] Ibid., 277

[269] Ibid., 276 and 438-439.

[270]Hume seems to think the impressions of pain and pleasure are the most fundamental to generate all the secondary impressions as well as ideas from those secondary impressions. Though he said all the passions are generated by the pleasure and pain but he had given a clear picture by an analogy that the pleasure we get from having a good wine and the pleasure that we get from listening to a harmonious music and the pleasure that we get from observing the moral qualities in us or in others are not the same but the different species of the abstract term pleasure (see for more information, *Treatise,* 472).

give the "good and evil" feelings. This might be the reason why he strongly argues the removal of these impressions of pain and pleasure is nothing but the removal of all the secondary impressions.[271] And, the "other qualities" mean a set of associative principles namely, resemblance and causation. We shall see in the following excerpts how these associative principles could work. However, he says mental states such as "pride, humility, ambition, vanity, love, hatred, envy, pity, malice, generosity, with their dependants"[272] are indirect passions.

In Hume's view, among the several indirect passions, only the passions "pride" and "humility" play a decisive role to get the idea or impression of one's own self. On the other hand, the passions "love" and "hatred" help to know our relation to another person. However, in our present context, it is sufficient to know the role of pride and humility.

3.2.1.1. Two Indirect Passions: Pride and Humility

According to Hume, the impressions of pride and humility are "simple" and "uniform".[273] Therefore, they are not definable. However, he suggests that only one thing we can do, that is, the description of these passions. That means, how these passions relate to the notion of self. In order to do that, Hume first tries to find out the "object" and the "cause" of these passions.

Firstly, regarding the object of these passions, Hume said that though the passions pride (a pleasurable impression) and humility (a painful impression) are directly contrary passions, the "object"[274] of these passions is the same, that is, self. He defines the self as "a succession of related ideas and impressions, of which we have an intimate memory and

[271] Hume, *Treatise*, 438
[272] Ibid., 276-277.
[273] Ibid., 277.
[274]Regarding Hume's usage of the term "object" to refer to the self, Norman Kemp Smith argued that "we should have expected him rather to say their "subject"""". The reason for him is that generally we think the subject refers to the self. But Hume uses the term "subject" as the cause of the passions (See for more information, N.K. Smith, p.180). Regarding this Smith's view, Robert S. Henderson opined that, in fact, Hume is very clear regarding the usage of the term "object" because our evaluations regarding passions relate to objects not subjects. Therefore, he says, in Hume's view, the object of the passions is self. Further, Henderson says, "Hume's choice of terminology is perhaps more compelling in the discussion of love and hatred in which the object of evaluation is different from the one who is experiencing the passion. Robert S. Henderson, "David Hume on Personal Identity and Indirect Passions," *Hume Studies* XVI, no.1 (April 1990): 35, http: //doi.org/10.1353/hms.2011.0425.
We will get an in depth information about Hume's usage of the term "object" in Marjorie Grene paper titled "The Objects of Hume's Treatise". Grene says that Hume uses the term "object" in the book *Treatise* in three varieties: "objects" as "target of attention", as "identified with perceptions", and as non-mental/external objects. Self is the intentional object of my impression of pride/humility and causality is the intentional object of our impression of necessary connection. Marjorie Grene, "The Objects of Hume's *Treatise*," *Hume Studies* XX, no.2 (November 1994): 163-177, muse.jhu.edu/article/382703.

consciousness."[275] At the first glance, this definition seems very similar to that of his predecessors who argue we are always intimately conscious of ourselves but Hume seems to maintain the same definition which he had given in the section "*Of personal identity*". Regarding this "intimate memory and consciousness" of the self, there are remarkable objections to Hume that we shall examine in the fourth chapter of this thesis. However, in his view, this self is the object of the two contrary passions. His reasons why these particular passions always have the self as their object are as follows. According to him, it is a "natural instinct" in human beings since whenever these passions arise in the mind these passions always direct towards the self. And further, it is also an "original quality" of the human mind since whenever these passions arise they excite peculiar sensations in the soul, namely, the sensation of pleasure and of pain. Therefore, Hume concludes, "upon the removal of the pleasure and pain, there is in reality no pride nor humility."[276] Hume considers these are the two "established" properties of these passions.

And secondly, regarding the causes of pride and humility, Hume asserts that the object could not function as the cause of these two passions since the same object cannot be the cause of two contrary passions at a time. Instead, he explains, the causes of our pride and humility are different "subjects" and their "qualities". These subjects and qualities, he considers, are two "supposed" properties of the cause. According to Hume's argument, generally, the quality which inheres in any subject produces either pleasure or pain. These pleasures or pains are independent of the passions of pride and humility. And then again, every cause of these passions produces a separate pleasure or pain. That differentiation we shall see with an example in the following lines. However, for Hume, even though we have a number of subjects which cause the passions, he sets all the subjects (causes) into three sorts: our mind; our body; and all other relative things to us.[277] In other words, for Hume, our mental qualities such as good reasoning capacity, good sense, courage, justice and so forth may cause our pride and opposite qualities may cause our humility. And, our body and its qualities such as beauty, strength, height and so forth may cause our pride and opposite qualities, for instance, deformity, cause humility. And also, the relative subjects such as our country, children, family, houses, and even our pets and so forth may cause either pride or humility in us.

[275]Hume, *Treatise*, 277.
[276]Ibid., 286.
[277]Ibid., 279.

A common point we can observe from the above three varieties of subjects is that the subject is having either very close, or at least some, relation with the object (self). Hume argues, in the case of having such relations only we can feel either pride or humility. Furthermore, he argues, if the subject is not related to the object in any manner then the subject may give us either pleasure or pain but not cause pride or humility in us. Therefore, in Hume's view, we can say having a relationship with self is a "necessary condition" to generate either pride or humility. Also, it is a noticeable point that having a relationship with self is itself not "sufficient" but the quality of the subject is another important condition to excite these passions since the quality of the subject naturally causes us to feel either pleasure or pain independent of the passions.[278]

For example, if a lady makes her pet cat beautiful in a peculiar manner, the beauty of that cat causes in her not only pleasure but also pride which produces pleasure again. Here, according to Hume's view, the object is herself and the subject is her pet cat and the quality is the beauty of the cat. Suppose, that particular cat does not belong to her then the quality of beauty of the cat may cause in her mere pleasure but not pride. If beauty is replaced with deformity then it causes in her humility. In this example, the latter case is telling that the pleasure or pain is independent of pride and humility and the former case is telling that the pleasure or pain is caused by the passion of pride or humility. Therefore, for Hume, the quality and having a relationship are two required conditions in generating the passions.

Just before, we have seen that the causes of the passions are a vast variety. Hume insists that the causes of the passions are "natural" as the object but not "original". His reasons are as follows. It is natural because this is the nature of human beings that if they have special qualities such as power, resources, personal merits and so forth then those advantages cause in them pride. On the ground of this, Hume claims, even in a stranger's case, we can know nearly what will add to or lessen his passions. On the other hand, it is not original because many of the causes of pride and humility are the effect of art, industry, caprice and good fortune of the men. Therefore, he argues, this is absurd to imagine that each of these was originally or innately connected with the passions.[279]

[278] Hume, *Treatise*, 285-286. In fact, the terms necessary and sufficient conditions are used by John P. Wright. He had used those terms while interpreting Hume's intentions in the above-mentioned case. See for more information, John P. Wright, *Hume's A Treatise of Human Nature: An Introduction* (New York: Cambridge University Press, 2009), 195-196.
[279] Hume, *Treatise*, 281.

However, Hume argues that though there are varieties of causes which excite the passions but there is some common principle on which different causes could depend and generate the passions. Hume writes "we have [established] two truths…*that [it is] from natural principles this variety of causes excites pride and humility, and [it is] not by a different principle each different cause is adapted to its passion.*"[280] And then again Hume says that observing the "certain properties of human nature"[281] would help us to get the common principles. In his view, these principles could help us to the proper understanding of every operation of the imagination and passions.

According to Hume, the first property of human nature is the "association of ideas". We had already discussed in the second chapter of this thesis the significant role of these principles in Hume's philosophy. To say briefly, he had proposed three associating principles, namely, resemblance, contiguity, and causation, which naturally associate ideas even though our ideas are in constant flux. In other words, by the faculty of imagination these changeable ideas smoothly "pass from one object to what is resembling, contiguous to, or produced by it."[282] Hume considers these three principles as the governing rules. Interestingly, along with the principle of association of ideas, he introduces a new principle, that is, the "association of impressions".[283] For him, this is the second property of human nature. But remarkably, in the case of impressions, he proposed only one principle instead of three, namely, the association of resemblance. He argues that this principle naturally connects all the resembling impressions. So to speak, when two impressions are similar, our faculty of imagination can smoothly transpose one impression to the other resembled impression. Hume's reason for this is that, like in the case of the ideas, changeableness is essential to human nature in the case of impressions (passions) also. To strengthen his assumption, he writes,

> All resembling impressions are connected together…. Grief and disappointment give rise to anger, anger to envy, envy to malice, and malice to grief again, till the whole circle be completed. In like manner, our temper, when elevated with joy, naturally

[280]Hume, *Treatise*, 282.
[281] Ibid., 283.
[282] Ibid.
[283]Ibid. Indeed, Hume does not discuss the principle of "association of impressions" in his Enquiry. However, the importance of this principle could not be deniable since what Hume had explained regarding the impressions and their smooth transpose from one impression to another if they belong to a resemblance category is empirically intelligible.

> throws itself into love, generosity, pity, courage, pride and the other resembling affections.[284]

The crux of this quote is as follows. All the pleasant impressions can associate with pleasant impressions, and painful impressions can associate with only painful impressions by the nature of their resemblance. In other words, the association among resembled impressions smoothly occurs. Therefore, we can say our impression of grief leads to anger and our impression of joy leads to love or generosity.

Though Hume makes a remarkable difference between the two kinds of associations—the ideas are associated by three principles, namely, resemblance, contiguity, and causation, and the impressions are associated only by the principle of resemblance—but a point he makes very clear that the two kinds of associations do not function separately. He says "they very much assist and forward each other, and that the transition is more easily made where they both concur in the same object."[285] Hume had named this mutual assistance among the ideas and impressions as "double association" and he considers this as the third property of human nature. How does Hume explain the role of this double association principle in the origin of the passions of pride and humility is one of the main remarkable points that we shall see in further sections.

If we summed up our discussion so far in this subsection we can notice three points: firstly, two "established properties" of the passions of pride and humility, namely, their objects and their sensations. Secondly, two "supposed properties" of the causes which excite these passions, namely, the subjects and their qualities. And finally, a common principle among the causes, that is, the "double association" between the ideas and impressions which makes the transition smooth from one to the other.

Taking into consideration these three points, Hume tries to explain the mechanism of these passions' origin. According to his argument, when the cause (a beautiful house) is related to the object (self), the idea of the cause immediately gives rise to the idea of the subject's relationship with the object (my house). Here, in Hume's view, since the two ideas

[284] Hume, *Treatise*, 283.

[285] Ibid., 284. Hume had explained how the transition is possible in a smooth manner between two different faculties. He writes: "those two faculties of the mind, the imagination and passions, assist each other in their operation, when their propensities are similar, and when they act upon the same object. The mind has always a propensity to pass from a passion to any other related to it; and this propensity is forwarded when the object of one passion is related to that of another. The two impulses concur with each other, and render the whole transition more smooth and easy" (see for more information, *Treatise*, 339).

are causally related, one idea smoothly introduced another idea. And further, since having a causal relation between object and subject, the sensation of pleasure which is excited by the cause separately can smoothly introduce the sensation of the pleasurable passion (pride). In this example, we can clearly see the causal relation between the two ideas and resemblance relation between the two impressions. Therefore, he writes "from this double relation of ideas and impressions, the passion is derived."[286]

In addition, Hume said that the mechanism is almost the same in the case of humility.[287] His argument says that since the passions of pride and humility have the same object, to understand how humility is generated in us we need to change only impressions without making any changes in ideas. He explains it with the same example of a beautiful house.[288] If the beauty of the house that still belongs to ourselves would change into deformity then the house excites humility in us. Here, the pleasure of pride which is caused by the beauty of the house transforms into the pain of humility which is caused by the deformity of the house. In this whole transformation mechanism from pride to humility, we could find the two ideas—the house, and my house—before and after as the same but the impressions are different. However, for Hume, even in the case of the transition from pride to humility the same principle of double relation works.

3.2.2. Self-Concern and Intimate Idea of Ourself

In the previous section, we have discussed Hume's explanations of how the principle of double relation works in the production of pride and humility in us. In this section, we shall see Hume's arguments regarding how these passions naturally introduce the "idea or impression of the self".

According to Hume, it is by "nature" the "organs of the human mind", when they are fitted in a certain temperament, produce a peculiar passion to which we named as pride, for instance. To this passion, nature assigns "a certain idea" that we call as the self. Hume insists that whenever these passions arise in us the idea of the self generates in us. It never fails.[289] Hume compares this with the disposition of the body organs and their results in particular circumstances. For instance, he says, whenever we feel hunger we desire to eat something.

[286]Hume, *Treatise,* 286.
[287] According to Hume, the double association principle is not only the same for the two passions of pride and humility but also it is the same for the passions of love and hatredness which are generated in us when we have a relationship with others.
[288]Hume, *Treatise*, 289.
[289]Ibid., 287.

That means nothing but whenever our mind gets the sensation of hunger, it naturally makes us think about food. So to speak, food is always an object of hunger. Like that, Hume says, whenever the passion of pride or humility is generated in us, the idea of the self naturally generates which need not any further proof.[290] In addition, he says, since it is the nature of the human mind, it never fails to introduce the idea of the self. The other way round, we can understand that if the organs of the mind are not disposed of in a particular order then the possession of the particular passion is never possible. Furthermore, he argues it is very natural that the passion "always turns our view to ourselves, and makes us think of our own qualities and circumstances."[291] This "idea, or impression of ourselves is always intimately present with us"[292] whenever these passions arise in the mind, according to him.

With this kind of explanation, Hume seems to stress the point that human nature is fixed in generating passions when the organs of the mind are disposed of. That means, when the subjects are related to the object, naturally the double association principle works on the mind and causes to generate the passions and consequently the idea of the self.

Already we have discussed the point according to Hume that the mental qualities such as vice and virtue[293]; and the bodily qualities such as beauty and deformity; and qualities which lies outside of the mind and body[294] but still related to the self, such as houses, properties, riches, family, pet animals, country and so forth works as the "primary" causes to produce pride or humility in us. In all the cases, as we have noticed, the principle of double association plays a pivotal role and produces these passions which immediately turn our view to ourselves. In his view, this view to ourselves can make us think about our characters and personal merits and so on. The whole explanation implies that the passion of pride or humility and the notion of self are inseparable. This might be the reason why Hume writes "when self enters not into the consideration, there is no room either for pride or humility."[295]

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[290]Hume, *Treatise*, 287.
[291] Ibid.
[292] Ibid., 373.
[293] Hume considers the qualities of virtue and vice are "the most obvious causes of these passions" among the different causes. Compared to other causes, passions that would generate in us are more intensive by these particular causes of virtue and vice. For example, though a beautiful house and a virtuous quality of generosity produce in us the passion of pride but the pride that is generated by the quality of generosity is degree level higher. The reason for him is that these qualities are related to our moral actions and its consequences. In our character building these qualities are decisive (see for the more information, *Treatise*, 294-298). Moreover, regarding these mental qualities, Hume had discussed elaborately in the third Book of *Treatise*.
[294]Hume insisted a point that since body and mind are considered as part of ourselves, the qualities of the mind and the body are "natural and more immediate" causes of pride and humility (see, *Treatise*, 298 and 303).
[295]Hume, *Treatise*, 277.

Further, Hume said that not only the aforementioned qualities can cause the passions but there is also a secondary cause which plays the same role in the production of the passions of pride and humility consequently the idea of the self. The secondary cause is the "love of fame". In other words, pride or humility is excited in us when somebody praises or blames our good or bad qualities or actions. For Hume, praise and blame are nothing but pleasurable and painful impressions respectively. These impressions of praise and blame generally we take from other persons. Before knowing how these impressions of praise and blame works in generating the passions of pride and humility respectively, we must have to know Hume's explanations regarding how we can take other minds' sentiments into account.

According to Hume, it is by the remarkable nature of "sympathy" we take other persons' opinions and affections into account. Sympathy, for him, is a natural propensity of human beings. He writes "No quality of human nature is more remarkable, both in itself and in its consequences, than that propensity we have to sympathize with others."[296] So to speak, in his view, by this natural propensity, a person sympathizes with others' sentiments and passions. Though Hume did not say this causal mechanism of sympathy would give the solution to the problem of other minds, we can understand that it is a reasonable solution to form a belief of the existence of other minds. However, Hume argues that we receive other persons' impressions (passions) while conversation with them or observation of their external signs. Therefore, we could be able to experience other's passions such as hatred, love, courage, sadness and so forth.

Hume explains the mechanism of how others' impressions convert into our own impressions. According to his explanation, when we observe any impression—either painful or pleasurable impression—of others' by external signs our mind takes a copy of that impression. Sympathy enlivens that particular idea and converts it into an impression. Here, in order to transfer liveliness, we need some kind of association between the two ideas, namely, the idea of ourselves and the idea of other-self. He writes "In sympathy there is an evident conversion of an idea into an impression. This conversion arises from the relation of objects to our self."[297] In this conversion, Hume said that the relations among perceptions play a crucial role by conveying the vivacity from one to the other. Among the three relations, Hume emphasizes, the resemblance relation is the principal cause of our natural propensity to sympathize with others' sentiments and passions. In general, he says, we find a

[296] Hume, *Treatise*, 316.
[297] Ibid., 320.

great resemblance among bodily as well as mental qualities despite the fact that we find remarkable differences. Accordingly, he writes, "this resemblance must very much contribute to make us enter into the sentiments of others and embrace them with facility and pleasure."[298] And, this general resemblance is amplified by other similarities such as "manner", "character", "country", and "language" and so on. Hence, he says, it is very natural that a humble person always tries to make friendship with another person who has the same nature. And, a person generally makes friendship with the same country, or religious, or language people. That means, the greater resemblance causes greater sympathy. Also, he assumes, along with the resemblance the relations of contiguity and causal relations are also significant relations. In the case of contiguity, the other person's passions can show a greater effect on us if they are spatially near to us. If the case is not so, it is difficult to communicate with them. Consequently, the transition is also difficult. And in the case of the causal relation, he argues, if the other person has a causal relation with us, for instance, blood relation, we concern their passions as our own, but the degree is not the same in the case of others who are not relatives. Here, the main argument of Hume is that if the relation is strong between ourselves and others then by the force of imagination we sympathize with others' sentiments more effectively. Therefore, he writes "All these relations, when united together, convey the impression or consciousness of our own person to the idea of the sentiments or passions of others, and makes us conceive them in the strongest and most lively manner."[299] In this way, our faculty of imagination transfers the vivacity to our ideas of others' sentiments and makes them appear in a lively manner to us.

In Hume's view, this causal mechanism of sympathy not only helps us to know the sentiment of others but also it plays a significant role to know how the present self would communicate with future self's pains and pleasures and consequent passions that we shall see in future sections.

However, now we can come to our main point how the impressions of praise and blame could cause us to generate the passions of pride and humility in us and consequently to get an intimate impression or idea of ourself. According to Hume's argument, these feelings which are delivered by others have the same influence as primary causes in generating indirect passions of pride or humility and consequently the idea of ourself. His explanation is as follows. We look toward ourself or concern ourselves when others praise admirable qualities

[298]Hume, *Treatise*, 318.
[299] Ibid.

of us such as intellectual powers, properties, long and great history of family, beauty, virtue, and kindness and so on. Also, the case is the same when others blame the qualities of us such as poor judgments, poverty, deformity, vice, criminal background of family and so forth. Hume argues even in this way of consideration of ourselves, the same principle—the double association of ideas and impression—works as in the case of primary causes which we have seen in the foregoing excerpts. Additionally, he says when a person is praised; the person first receives "a separate pleasure, and afterwards a pride or self-satisfaction." So to speak, the smooth transition between two impressions (sensation of pleasure and the sensation of the pleasurable passion) and two ideas (the idea of praise and the idea of its relation to the self) cause us to direct towards ourselves. So to speak, in the process of self-concern, praise and blame also work as crucial ingredients.

If we summarize our discussion the following points we could see: according to Hume, from the impressions of pleasure and pain, or good and evil, we experience the passions either direct or indirect. These impressions of pleasure and pain, in general, we get from the qualities of the mind, or body, or from our own actions, or from actions of others towards us. Consequently, these impressions cause in us respective passions. From the list of indirect passions, only pride and humility make us think about ourselves immediately. And, the passions of love and hatred make us think about other persons. However, we cannot go beyond ourselves since all these passions (either direct or indirect) and the causes of the passions are related to the self. Therefore, for him, we are always intimately conscious of our own self at any given point of time whenever the passions of pride or humility arise in us. In this whole mechanism, according to Hume, the double association principle plays a significant role. In this way, Hume thinks, we are concerned with ourselves at any given point of time. Importantly, that self is not independent of the passions of pride and humility.

Now the main question is how these indirect passions, which make us to be concerned with ourselves, play a role in connecting present self with past as well as with future pains and pleasures. In fact, these past and future selves do not really exist at the present time, according to Hume. In other words, even though there is no idea or impression of persisting substance which is simple and numerically the same across the time, how we, at present moment, consider actions done in the past are related to us and why we are motivated to do actions now to get future pleasures and to avoid future pains which are not at all exist in reality. In short, why we think or believe our present, past and future selves all are one and the same. Hume's arguments related to this question we shall discuss in two different

sections[300]: our concern with the past; and our concern with future perceptions and actions. The following section mainly focuses on why we form a belief that our present self and the past selves are one and the same.

3.2.3. Self-Concern with One's Own Past

In Hume's view, on the one hand, we get pain or pleasure and consequently the passions from our own mental qualities, thoughts, and actions. And, on the other hand, we get the impressions and consequent passions from others' views about our character and actions. So to speak, from both ways, one could get pleasure or pain and consequently the indirect passions of pride or humility since in both cases the subjects are closely related to the object (self). And then again, for Hume, whenever these indirect passions arise in us we turn naturally our awareness to ourselves immediately.

Now the main question here is how our present passions and actions are affected by past pains and pleasures and consequent passions.

According to Hume, we have a nature of frequent self "survey" of our different perceptions. Moreover, the faculty of imagination can easily go from the present situation of the self to a very remote past.[301] In both cases, getting impressions of pain and pleasure and consequent passions from our own actions and qualities, and also from others' views about our character and actions, Hume insists that our repeated self "survey" or "reflection" works significantly. That means nothing but we can conceive our present passions and actions have a causal relationship with the past.

Already we had discussed enough of Hume's arguments, which he had argued in the section "*Of personal identity*", regarding different faculties and principles' role in our ascription of perfect identity to the person in the first section of this chapter.

Firstly, according to Hume, in the whole process of our present reflection on past actions and their consequent results at that point of time and the production of the passions related to those actions at present time, the faculty of memory plays a significant role. The faculty of memory recollects our past perceptions which include pains, pleasures, passions and actions and so on. For Hume, our present recollected perceptions are in fact new perceptions but

[300] In fact, Hume did not explicitly and orderly discuss our concern with past as well as future but in different places in the *Treatise* he had discussed how we concern with past and with future pains and pleasures and consequent passions. I take inspiration from Jane. L. McIntyre to discuss this issue in two different sub-sections (see for more information, McIntyre, "Hume," 191-195).
[301] Hume, *Treatise*, 427-428.

closely resemble the past. It means they are not the same. However, in Hume's view, though memory recollects ideas, it cannot give us the idea of sameness or identity.

Secondly, for Hume, it is not the faculty of memory but it is the faculty of imagination that works significantly in believing our memorized perceptions belong to us and they can affect our present passions and actions. Already we have seen Hume's assertion that our faculty of imagination by its nature can go easily from the present self to any remote past. Therefore, according to him, our imagination can smoothly transpose from one idea to another if they have any one of the relations, namely, resemblance, contiguity, and causation. In other words, our imagination can easily associate our present perceptions with past perceptions on the basis of the relations among them. Therefore, Hume seems to hold, with these association principles our faculty of imagination tends us to consider or form a belief that we are the same persons despite the fact that we never experience the same substance across the time.

If we go into a little deeper, Hume emphasizes the importance of the principle of causation which links all our distant perceptions either past or future, irrespective of changes in a person's character and dispositions. Besides this, he holds, with the nature of mutual assistance between two faculties of the mind, namely, imagination and passions, our mind has a propensity to pass smoothly from one idea to another as well as one passion to any other related passion.[302]

Therefore, according to Hume, we can understand the point that with the smooth association of ideas and impressions, a past action that is having a relation with the present self will affect the person with pride or humility and consequent other passions. An example might make it clear. For instance, whenever I looked at dragon-flies, I remember my harmful actions towards them. And, whenever I remember those vicious actions I feel guilty. That bad quality of me generates a painful impression as well as a painful passion in me, namely, humility. Therefore, my present thought of past vicious action and the present pain and consequent passion all are causally related. And these causally related perceptions may generate a motivation in me to love all the living beings as well as other beings in Nature.

In this case, McIntyre's interpretation seems to be noteworthy. That is, our present passions either pride or humility is the outcome of "two circumstances": firstly, the past

[302] Hume, *Treatise*, 339.

action either harming or loving is related to me; the action of loving or harming is of a kind that naturally generates feelings of either pleasure or pain.[303]

What we have seen in the above example is regarding our reflections on our own qualities, actions, and consequent passions. But, in Hume's view, as we have seen, the secondary causes— "love of fame"—also shows the same influence on the mind in generating the pains and pleasures and consequent passions. If somebody would praise or blame our status, character, and name,[304] that naturally causes in us pleasures or pains and consequent passions and then consequently makes us to concern ourselves. For Hume, we generally receive these impressions from the opinions and sentiments of others by the natural propensity of sympathy. And then again, these opinions and sentiments of others regarding our character or status or name would cause in us to strengthen or weaken our self-esteem. This whole mechanism is nothing but our repeated survey or reflection on those opinions and sentiments. An example might give us clarity on this assumption. Suppose, if someone would praise my peculiar qualities or family history, my mind recollects all related ideas and impressions and actions which I have done in the past. And it works as a source to generate pride and to strengthen my self-esteem. Contrarily, if someone blames, it would generate painful impressions and consequent passions. In short, pleasing opinions generate pleasure and pride and displeasing opinions generate painful impressions and humility.

Regarding Hume's this view, McIntyre opines that these qualities such as status, name, and character are "cumulative" and refer to a person's past. Therefore, concerning with these qualities is a more public aspect of concern with one's past.[305]

Therefore, in Hume's view, a person concerns with his/her own past since he/she finds a causal link among the ideas and impressions of the past and present. Whenever a person reflects or self-surveys of ideas or impressions of his/her own powers, riches, character, reputation, beauty and deformity, virtuous and vicious actions and so forth, the double association between ideas and impressions naturally generates the passions either of pride or humility. And thereby makes him/her to think more effectively about the present self's relation with the past. Hume tries to explain how the causal link significantly works in humans' life. According to him,

[303] Jane L. McIntyre, "Personal Identity and the Passions," *Journal of the History of Philosophy* 27, no.4 (October 1989): 545-557, https://doi.org/10.1353/hph.1989.0092.
[304]Hume, *Treatise*, 316.
[305] McIntyre, "Personal Identity," 545-557.

> Not only any limited portion of life a man's actions have a dependence on each other, but also during the whole period of his duration from the cradle to the grave; nor is it possible to strike off one link, however minute, in this regular chain without affecting the whole series of events which follow.[306]

This excerpt clearly is showing Hume's view that the causal link among the ideas provides a strong propensity to form a belief that the present self that is generated by the passions is the same self which was generated in the past. However, in Hume's view, one could not avoid this propensity which is caused by the causal link.

3.2.4. Self-Concern with One's Future Actions

In the above section, we discussed how a person concerns his/her past. In this subsection, we shall discuss Hume's explanations as to on what grounds we concern with the future self or how we could form a belief that our present self is identical to the future self.

As McIntyre opines, we could not see clearly Hume's discussion in Book 1, section 6, "*Of personal identity*" on the relationship of the self with the future but in book 2 he is not "silent" regarding our concern with future in accounting for the passions and will.[307] However, we have already noticed a remarkable point in the section "*Of personal identity*". That is, Hume insists that the mutual assistance between passions and imagination can help in conceiving our self-concern with our past or future pains or pleasures.[308]

Hume's explanations in Book 2, part 3 of *Treatise*, namely, "*Of the Will and Direct Passions*" show us how one could concern with his/her future self. According to his argument, like in the case of our concern with the past, passions, in particular, direct passions, play a significant role in surveying about our future self. He holds, direct passions such as "desire and aversion", "hope and fear"[309] and so on play a decisive role since they commonly refer to our present thoughts and expectations about the future. Furthermore, he explains, these passions along with "volition"[310] immediately arise from the feelings of good or evil. And, it is by an "original instinct" that our mind has a tendency to combine itself with the good and to evade the evil even though they are conceived merely in the idea and considered

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[306] David Hume, *An Enquiry Concerning Human understanding: A Critical Edition*, ed. Tom L. Beauchamp (New York: Oxford University Press Inc., 2006), 19, https://books.google.co.in> books.
[307] McIntyre, "Personal Identity," 545-557.
[308] Hume, *Treatise*, 261.
[309] According to Hume, desire and aversion arise from good and evil respectively. And, hope and fear arise in us when the good or evil are merely probable and "uncertain". Therefore, Hume considers these passions fear and hope as complex passions (see for more information, *Treatise*, 438-448).
[310] For Hume, will or volition means nothing but "*the internal impression we feel and are conscious of, when knowingly give rise to any new motion of our body, or new perception of our mind.*" (See *Treatise*, 399).

as to exist in any future period of time.[311] For Hume, by this "original instinct", human beings "will" to act on the ground of future interests and intentions, or are motivated by the view of future rewards and punishments. Therefore, he writes "all human laws are founded on rewards and punishments…these motives have an influence on the mind, and both produce the good and prevent the evil actions."[312]

And, like in the case of our concern with the past, Hume seems to reject not merely the role of simple and individual underlying substance which was encouraged by his predecessors but also he tries to promote the importance of the principle of causation in our present concerning with future self's thoughts and actions.

In order to devalue the importance of metaphysical substance and its role in the future rewards and punishments, and to show the importance of causal relation between our motives and actions, Hume had given the following arguments. He argues that our regular experience and observation of a constant "union" between our motives and actions, as in any natural operations, causes us to infer the future pains or pleasures consequently the passions of joy or grief from our present motives and interests. The reason for him is that our past or present joys or grieves would generate from our virtuous or vicious actions that follow from our motives, characters, and situations.[313] Therefore, as McIntyre interprets, in thinking of ourselves in the future, we naturally think of the actions and consequent passions from our present motives without the need of any underlying metaphysical substance.[314] Therefore we can understand clearly the point that on the ground of these kinds of assumptions Hume might assume that the present self is not necessarily the same with the future self in the strict sense since the ideas of the future self and its perceptions are mere faint ideas. And, as Pitson interprets, our acknowledgment of interests of desires towards future pleasures, and of aversion towards future pains would cause in us to think about this strict identification.[315] However, Hume tries to explain the mechanism how our present passions can be influenced by our thoughts which are related to the future and also mere ideas.

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[311] Hume, *Treatise*, 438.
[312] Ibid., 410.
[313] Ibid., 400-407. Hume while saying "moral evidence is nothing but a conclusion concerning the actions of men, deriv'd from the consideration of their motives, temper, and situation", he seems to insisting a point that since we find in our observation and experience a causal conjunction among our motives and actions and their results, therefore, we can able to infer future joys and grieves from our present motives.
[314] Jane L. McIntyre, "Personal Identity," 545-557.
[315] A.E. Pitson, *Hume's Philosophy of the Self* (London: Routledge, 2002), 128.

3.2.4.1. The Role of Mutual Assistance between Imagination and Passions in Our Concern with Future Self

In the sections "*Of the influence of the imagination on the passions*" and "*Of contiguity, and distance in space and time*", Hume has tried to explain how the faculty of imagination and the ideas of distance in time and space would work to connect our present self with the future self.

Firstly, regarding the relation between the faculty of imagination and passions, Hume's arguments are as follows. He insists that whatever causes influence the imagination, would also influence the passions. In addition, he writes "wherever our ideas of good or evil acquire a new vivacity, the passions become more violent, and keep pace with the imagination in all its variations."[316] Furthermore, he says, any pleasure which gives a "particular" and "determinate" idea influences more on the imagination and adds additional force to the temptation of the person. In this mechanism, the faculty of memory assists the imagination in giving additional force to its conceptions. Our recent memory of any pleasure or pain operates on the "will" with more effective than any distant past. Therefore, he writes "The image of the past pleasure being strong and violent, bestows these qualities on the idea of the future pleasure, which is connected with it by the relation of resemblance."[317] What Hume is saying here is that our recent image of pleasure or pain which is strong and violent functions on the "will" with more effectiveness. And, ideas of the future pleasures or pains which are connected to that image by the relation of resemblance get more force and liveliness. In this way, Hume stresses, the faculty of imagination influences the intensity of future passions. An example he gives is that a pleasure which is suitable to our way of life excites in us more desires than which would not be suitable or not resembled.[318] Moreover, he argues that "vivacity is a requisite circumstance in exciting all our passions, the calm as well as the violent"[319] as in the case of generating a belief. In this statement, Hume's intention seems very clear that the faculty of imagination while transforming vivacity to the ideas of future pains or pleasures could increase the intensity of the passions.

And secondly, Hume tries to explain the influence of the contiguous objects on the imagination and consequently on the will and passions. According to him, objects which are contiguous in space and time appear with more vivacity than the objects remote to us.

[316]Hume, *Treatise*, 424.
[317] Ibid., 426.
[318] Ibid.
[319] Ibid., 427.

Therefore, he seems to think, this factor shows a considerable effect on the imagination as well as on the will and passions. Further, he argues that since ourself is always intimately present to us, all related or contiguous objects to us would appear in a lively manner. On the other hand, ideas of the objects which are remote to us become fainter. He explains the mechanism of how distant objects could appear weaker. According to his argument, the faculty of imagination can never forget the present existent of the self in a particular space and time. Even though imagination may turn its attention to remote objects, it frequently reflects on the present self's situations by reflecting on the present passions and senses. In other words, it always proceeds from the present self to the conception of any remote object either past or future but it frequently reflects on the present self and its passions. He says,

> When we reflect…on any object distant from ourselves, we are [obliged] not only to reach it at first by passing [through] all the intermediate space betwixt ourselves and the object, but also to renew our progress every moment; being every moment [recalled] to the consideration of ourselves and our present situation. It is easily [conceived], that this interruption must weaken the idea by breaking the action of the mind, and hindering the conception from being so intense and [continued], as when we reflect on a nearer object.[320]

Therefore, Hume concludes, in this way, all objects nearer to ourselves acquire the quality of vivacity and show a considerable effect on the imagination and consequently have a "proportionable effect" on the "will" and passions. To strengthen this, he gives some common life examples that men are more concerned about the object which is very contiguous than remote. For instance, he says "Talk to a man of his condition thirty years hence, and he will not regard you. Speak of what is happen to-morrow, and he will lend you attention."[321] The core point in Hume's view is that our concern with the near future or past is more effective than remote since, as he explains, the general tendency of the imagination frequently reflects on the present condition of the self.

Besides this, interestingly Hume argues, even though if both, past and future, have the same distance from the present, the effect shown on the imagination by the past object is inferior to future objects. It means nothing but, in Hume's view, our ideas of the future are livelier than the ideas of the past. His reasons are as follows: firstly, if we take the "will" into account, no action of us can change the past. Therefore, our present thoughts regarding the past cannot influence the "will" regarding the past. But, our thoughts regarding future actions and their results show more influence on the "will". Secondly, with respect to the passions, he

[320]Hume, *Treatise*, 428.
[321] Ibid., 428-429.

argues, the thought of the future pleasures or pains could show more effect on the passions than the past.

Additionally, Hume argues, since we have a "peculiarity in our method of thinking" that "we always follow the succession of time in placing our ideas"[322], the faculty of imagination faces difficulty in the progression of backward thought from the present when the object is in the past. But when object in the future, it can conceive objects in a vivid manner. That is why, he say, a slight degree of distance in the past shows a greater influence in interrupting and fading the concept than the future concepts. This method of thinking shows a greater "influence on the will and passions."[323]

And already we have noticed that according to Hume the imagination could survey the past and future from the present self. In his view, even in the case of our past and future selves would have equal distance from the present, the faculty of imagination easily passes from present to future than present to the past and makes to conceive our future thoughts more lively than the past by its peculiar property of method of thinking. In addition, Hume says,

> We conceive the future as flowing every moment nearer us, and the past as retiring. An equal distance, therefore, in the past and in the future, has not the same effect on the imagination; and that because we consider the one as continually encreasing, and the other as continually diminishing. The fancy anticipates the course of things, and surveys the objects in that condition, to which it tends, as well as in that, which is regarded as the present.[324]

In this quote, Hume presents his view very clearly. In his view, human beings are more aware of future concerns. Their present motives and actions would depend on future pains and pleasures. In other words, in order to avoid punishments and to get rewards, they modify their motives and interests and consequently do actions. It is nothing but, inferring future results on the ground of constant conjunctions between similar actions and consequences.

A point is very clear from our discussion so far that our present self is more influenced when objects (ideas) are very nearer either in the past or future by the force of imagination. But interestingly, Hume said that our present self and its passions are equally impacted by the remote future pains or pleasures which are in fact not vivid in perceptions. It seems to us a contradiction. But, Hume explains it in the following way: the faculty of imagination tends to

[322] Hume, *Treatise*, 430.
[323] Ibid., 431.
[324] Ibid., 432.

pass from lesser to the greater and from remote to contiguous, whereas passions could smoothly pass from more contiguous to remote and from stronger to fainter. His example for the former statement is that our idea of servant naturally makes us to think of his master. And the mentioning of the provinces of any empire easily conveys our thought to the seat of the empire. But in both cases, Hume argues, the fancy could not return with the same facility since it is a natural tendency of the imagination. And, his example for the latter statement is that the passion of love or hatred passes from father to the entire family and even to the server but not necessarily true in the case of reverse. He says "the love or hatred of any inferior not readily causes any passion to the superior though that is the natural propensity of the imagination: While the love or hatred of a superior causes a passion to the inferior, contrary to its propensity"[325]

At very first glance, Hume's above explanations and his examples regarding the imagination and passions seem very contradictory since we have seen, on the one hand, he said that the faculty of imagination influences on the passions in all its variations, and on the other hand, he gives arguments that show the imagination has a limitation when ideas are remote whereas passions can go easily from contiguous to remote.

However, Hume's clarification would remove the tension. According to Hume, when the ideas belong to objects (province and king), the imagination can easily move from the idea of the province to the idea of a king. Whereas, in the case of ideas related to the emotions (love and hatred), passions can go from the present condition to very remote ideas. Regarding this particular case, Hume's argument is that the faculty of imagination is "overpowered" by the "stronger principle", namely, the principle of "association of impressions".[326] That means, the association between impressions is more effective than the association among ideas. Already we have noticed, for him, this kind of association is possible only among the impressions by the nature of their resemblance. Therefore, Hume says "where any two passions place the mind in the same or in similar disposition, it very naturally passes from the one to the other."[327] In addition, he said, since the passions are more "powerful principle" than the imagination, they pass smoothly without any difficulty from the idea of the stronger to the idea of the fainter. Also, when two ideas are related together, similar kinds of passions, either

[325] Hume, *Treatise*, 343.
[326]Ibid.
[327] Ibid.

pleasurable or painful, produce. Hume's illustration may give strength to this claim. He writes:

> The idea of the servant conveys our thought most readily to the master; but the hatred or love of the master produces with facility anger or good-will to the servant. The strongest passion in this case takes the precedence; and the addition of the weaker making no considerable change on the disposition, the passage is by that means [rendered] more easy and natural betwixt them.[328]

Therefore, though at the first look it seems both imagination and passions work contradictory, but the additional principle of association of impressions clearly shows how the faculty of imagination would influence the passions when our concern is related to the future ideas of pain or pleasures and consequent passions. In our present concern with future self, the role of sympathy is also significant that we shall see in the next subsection.

3.2.4.2. The Role of Sympathy in Our Concern with Future Self

However, even though those future ideas of pain or pleasure and consequent passions which do not really exist, we "anticipate" those pains and pleasures as ours. And always our "will" motivates us to do actions to get those pleasures and try to avoid those pains and consequent passions. According to Hume, in anticipating future pleasures and pains and consequent passions, the principle of sympathy works significantly.

We have already discussed the notion of sympathy and its functioning. However, a very brief discussion would help in our present context. According to Hume, the principle of sympathy is a natural propensity of human nature. It helps us to receive others' feelings and passions by observing the external signs or by communicating with them. It converts ideas, which we receive from others, into impressions by the force of imagination. In other words, sympathy enlivens the ideas that we received from others. Since we have the resemblance between ourselves and others, ideas received from others' emotions are enlivened by transferring the vivacity of our own impressions, or passions; consequently, those lively ideas converted into impressions. And then again, this conversion makes us to conceive the existence of other-selves and their emotions in the strongest and most lively manner. Also, we have seen that if the person is closely related to us in any one of three relations, resemblance, contiguity, and causal, then the result is more effective.

Moreover, Hume thinks it is certain that the principle of sympathy is not limited only to the present moment but also it can make us extend to the future which is in fact uncertain. He

[328]Hume, *Treatise*, 345.

said that it is very common for us to anticipate the pains and pleasure of others, which are not really in existence, by communicating others' present conditions. We foresee those pains and pleasures by the "force" of imagination. He argues, visioning the future situations of any person, "we may enter into it with so vivid a conception as to make it our own concern; by that means be sensible of pain and pleasure"[329] despite the fact those possible future conditions of the person neither belongs to ourselves nor at present moment have real existence.

In addition, Hume argues that our extension of sympathy to the future is aided by some of the situations in the present. Therefore, in his view, we can say the present circumstances can work as a necessary condition to anticipate future possibilities. The reason for him is that the present conditions of a person influence all the ideas which are related to that condition. Consequently, it gives us a lively notion of all conditions of that person no matter whether it is related to "past, present, or future; possible, probable or certain."[330] Therefore, he says, "By means of this lively notion I am interested in them; take part with them; and feel a sympathetic motion in my breast, conformable to whatever I imagine in his."[331]

For instance, if we see a strange person who is going to be attacked by some animal, immediately we try to help him/her. It is because we sympathize with his/her sorrows. In this case, as Wright interprets, even though we are not able to observe his future pains by communicating with him, we are conscious of the causes which are involved in the present conditions of the stranger. By the awareness of those involved causes, we anticipate the person's future pains and concern ourselves in the person's future welfare.[332] In other words, when we see a stranger's bad condition in the present circumstances, our faculty of imagination associates all related ideas to the idea of his/her condition and anticipates his/her upcoming pains and concerns in his/her future welfare. In this case, Hume stresses, this antecedent awareness of causal connection is "sufficient" to us to sympathize with someone's future even though we are not able to communicate directly with the present.

Indeed, according to Hume, the principle of sympathy turns our view to external objects (other persons), in particular, which are contiguous and resemble and also causally related to us. And also in all our discussions, Hume seems to explain only the point how we can

[329] Hume, *Treatise*, 386.
[330] Ibid.
[331] Ibid.
[332] Wright, *Hume*, 212.

sympathize with someone's future welfare but nowhere has he seemed to mention that this is the way we can interest in our future welfare by the principle of sympathy.

However, for Hume, the faculty of imagination can easily go from the present situation of ourselves to any remote past or future ideas that we have seen earlier. This implies nothing but by the force of imagination we could anticipate our future perceptions on the basis of our present conditions. Hume might think that we could sympathize more with our own future welfare. If we take Pitson's remarkable suggestion into account that if we consider our own future selves as any other person, it would not seem much effect on Hume's notion of sympathy which principally takes a reference to "other person".[333] In this way, we can apply Hume's causal mechanism of sympathy in order to anticipate our future pains and pleasures on the grounds of our present conditions, namely, motives, interests and actions just like our concern regarding other person's welfare. For instance, if a person is motivated to do one action then his faculty of imagination predicts all possible, positive as well as negative, results on the basis of his past observations and experiences. Then, ideas of the future pains or pleasures and their consequent passions convert into impressions by getting vivacity from his past experiences. By this liveliness of future ideas, as Hume explains it, one could "interest" and "take part" in future pains and pleasures and consequent passions even though all his predictions are uncertain. Therefore, as he said, we are always motivated to do actions to get pleasure and to avoid pain.

And, even though Hume does not explain directly the role of sympathy in our concern with our own future welfare, it seems the role of sympathy is decisive. Moreover, as he said, if we diminish the liveliness of the present conditions then we diminish all the related ideas and consequently destroy the "future prospect".

So to speak, according to Hume, as the result of conceiving a causal connection between our present interests and ideas related to the future self, we imagine our present self is the same with the future self despite the fact that we never experience any underlying simple and continued substance.

The upshot of the section is as follows: firstly, when the indirect passions of pride and humility arise in us the idea or impression of the self naturally generates in us without the need of any further proof. Also, others' praising and blaming also significantly causes to

[333] A.E. Pitson, *Hume*, 130.

generate these passions and consequently the idea of the self. In this particular case, as Hume put it, the mechanism of sympathy's role is decisive. And secondly, in Hume's view, we concern with our past because our repeated self-survey finds causal connections among our present pains and pleasures and related passions. And thirdly, our direct passions—for instance, hope and fear—together with "will" and interests we concern with our future which is, in fact, uncertain. In this major scheme, for Hume, the faculty of imagination together with passions plays a key role. This faculty by its nature can easily move from the present to the past and present to the future. Additionally, even though it brings us from the present to the past and the future, our ideas regarding nearer to the present self would show more effect on the imagination than remote ideas. So to speak, for Hume, contiguity also plays a significant role to influence on the imagination, passion, and will. Moreover, though there is an equal distance between past and future from the present, ideas which belong to the future show more effect on the imagination than the past since we consider that the future is coming very nearer to us and the past is retiring. Regarding our concern with the future, as Pitson suggests, the causal mechanism of sympathy converts ideas related to our future welfare into impressions by enlivening those ideas. This liveliness of ideas helps us to anticipate future pains and pleasures, and therefore, tends us to concern ourselves with the future welfare of our own person. In short, according to Hume's argument, our mind finds a causal relation among our present and past perceptions and also present and future perceptions. Therefore, he thinks, we feign that our past, present and future selves are one and the same over time without experiencing any underlying metaphysical substance which is simple and individual.

3.3.0. Hume's Strict Review of Personal Identity and His Dissatisfaction on His Own Account

We have discussed in the first section of this chapter Hume's account of personal identity. His account of personal identity says self or person is not a simple and individual entity. Rather, he asserts, it is a "bundle of perceptions" and its identity is a fictitious idea. In spite of this fact, in his view, we attribute "simplicity" and "identity" to the self by the principles of resemblance and causation, in particular. In the second section, we have seen Hume's explanations as to how imagination, passions, and sympathy play a role in connecting past and future self with the present self. It seems to us Hume gives a complete picture of the self.

But, interestingly, Hume in the "*Appendix*" to Book 1, which has published[334] together with Book 3 of the *Treatise* in November 1740, seems to be expressing his dissatisfaction with his own account of personal identity. In this section, our main objective is to know the reasons that make him disappointed. In the "*Appendix*", Hume expressed,

> I had [entertained] some hopes, that however deficient our theory of the intellectual world might be, it [would] be free from those contradictions, and absurdities, which seem to attend every explication, that human reason can give of the material world. But upon a more strict review of the section concerning *personal identity*, I find myself [involved] in such a labyrinth, that, I must confess, I neither know how to correct my former opinions, nor how to render them consistent.[335]

In fact, these hopes Hume had entertained in the section "*Of the immateriality of the soul*". In that section, he had mentioned with confidence that even though we would expect more difficulties and contradictions in every theory concerning the soul as in the theories related to "material world", but, he hopes, his account of soul or self is not confused with any such contradictions.[336] Accordingly, he tries to solve the problems related to the self and its identity in the immediate next section "*Of personal identity*" that we had discussed in this chapter. However, he opines that his "strict review" of that section makes him admit inconsistency between his proposed arguments.

In order to show his "labyrinth" in his account, once again he proposes those arguments which make him deny "the strict and proper identity and simplicity of a self or thinking being."[337]

Firstly, he argues, whenever we talk of the terms such as "self" or "substance", we must have an idea adjoined to those terms. But according to the "copy principle" that all ideas are derived from the corresponding impressions, we never find any impression of the self which is simple and individual. Therefore, he concludes, we have no ideas of them.[338]

And then again, he argues, according to the "separability principle", all our perceptions are "distinct" and "separable" by thought. Therefore, he concludes, they can exist separately without any contradiction.

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[334] The chronological information regarding the publication of Hume's "*Appendix"* to the first Book, we can see in Wayne Waxman's Article. Wayne Waxman, "Hume's Quandary Concerning Personal Identity," *Hume Studies* 18, no. 2 (November, 1992): 233-254. And also, see, Thiel's work *The Early Modern Subject*, 398.
[335] Hume, *Treatise*, 633.
[336]Ibid., 232.
[337]Ibid.,, 633.
[338] Ibid.

From the above two claims, Hume expresses his satisfaction while stating that since we have no idea of the simple and individual self, we can say it is not an absurd proposition that our perceptions can exist separately "without any common *simple* substance or subject of inhension."[339]

And further, Hume argues, when we reflect on ourselves we never perceive any such kind of self except perceptions. Therefore, he declares, the self is nothing but the composition of these perceptions which we have reflected. To strengthen this, he gives examples[340]: firstly, suppose if we have only one perception, thirst, we perceive nothing more than that perception. And, even adding more perceptions, a glass of water, also cannot give such an idea. And secondly, the annihilation of the mind (self), by death, is nothing but the annihilation of the perceptions of "love and hatred, pain and pleasure, thought and sensation" and, on the other hand, the extinction of these perceptions means nothing but there is no self because both are not separable, according to Hume.

On the basis of these assumptions, Hume proposes a principle in relation to the mind that "*we have no notion of it, distinct from the particular perceptions*"[341] In other words, imagining self without perceptions is not possible in our experience.

Therefore, Hume thinks he has "sufficient evidence" to reject the claim that the self is a simple and continued entity and to defend his claim that self is nothing but successive perceptions. In the section "*Of personal identity*", we have seen his explanations how these "loosened" perceptions are connected together and generate the idea of the self as well as makes us to attribute a "real simplicity and identity" to the self. According to his view, these "loosened" perceptions are tied by the association principles of resemblance and causation.

Firstly, as we have seen, he explains these principles' role in our attribution of identity to the external objects. Even though they are not invariable and uninterrupted in our experience, we form a belief that they are one and the same across the time. The reason for our belief is only because those distinct existences are related by the relations of resemblance and causation. This relation or connection determines our mind mistakenly to ascribe perfect identity to the objects.

[339] Hume, *Treatise*, 634.
[340] Ibid., 634-635.
[341] Ibid., 634.

And secondly, the same mechanism he had used to describe our tendency to ascribe the belief that the continuity of the person or soul across the time. This is the reason why he had strongly insisted "the same person may vary his character and disposition, as well as his impressions and ideas, without losing his identity."[342] And moreover, he uses the same principles to explicate our tendency to attribute "simplicity" to the self.

However, Hume finds his account is "very defective" when he has reviewed. It is defective because, according to him, if perceptions of the mind are "distinct existences" then they can form a complete thing only by connecting together. But, he finds, our human understanding is unable to perceive or discover any "real connection" among those distinct perceptions. Rather, we can only "feel a connection". Therefore, he writes "It follows…that the thought alone finds personal identity, when reflecting on the train of past perceptions, that compose a mind, the ideas of them are felt to be connected together, and naturally introduce each other."[343] In short, in his view, when we reflect on the past successive perceptions we felt they are connected, consequently, that feeling determines our thought to attribute identity to the person. Therefore, he says, it implies that "thought alone finds personal identity".[344]

Hume notes a point that many philosophers[345] inclined to think that our consciousness gives the idea of personal identity. For them, consciousness means a reflected thought or perception. Therefore, Hume considers that that assumption gives support to his account. However, he says, when he tries to explicate the connecting principles among the "successive perceptions in our thought or consciousness"[346] his "hopes vanish". At the same time, he says, he cannot discover any satisfactory theory regarding the notion of personal identity.

However, in the end, Hume tries to make clear what exactly the problem he has found in his strict review. He says, "there are two principles, which I cannot render consistent; nor is it in my power to renounce either of them, viz, *that all our distinct perceptions are distinct existences, and that the mind never perceives any real connexion among distinct*

[342] Hume, *Treatise*, 261.
[343] Ibid., 635.
[344] Ibid.
[345] As usual, though Hume did not mention any particular philosopher's name, we can understand his intentions in this particular argument to whom he is referring. Among the many of his predecessors, John Locke had proposed this view, which we have already seen in the first chapter of this thesis.
[346]Hume, *Treatise*, 636.

existences."[347] Hume seems to think these two principles are inconsistent and at the same time renunciation of any one of these is not in his power.

To overcome this difficulty, he sees only two options: either our perceptions are not distinct existences but inhere in something simple and individual entity which hypothesis was defended by theologians and his predecessors; or even though our perceptions are distinct but our mind perceives a real connection among them. But, regarding these both options, he seems to maintain a skeptical attitude and admits that this problem is hard to understand. However, he says, this is not an "insuperable" difficulty. He writes "Others, perhaps, or myself, upon more mature reflections, may discover some hypothesis, that will reconcile those contradictions."[348]

3.4. Conclusion

In the first two sections of this chapter whatever Hume's arguments we had found regarding personal identity gives us a hope that Hume succeeded in explaining the notion of self and its related notions. But, his review of his own account finally keeps only two options in front of us. If we admit the first one, Hume's entire *Treatise* seems a bundle of mistakes. If we admit the second one, as Hume said, our human mind has a limitation to finding the real connection among the perceptions. However, Hume's suggestion that more "mature reflections" may give a fine hypothesis to settle the problem would give us a further hope to engage more with the problem of personal identity.

A critical examination of different criticisms of Hume's treatment of personal identity and various suggestions to his problem which he had explored in the "*Appendix*" is the main objective of the next chapter.

[347] Hume, *Treatise*, 636.
[348] Ibid.

CHAPTER-4

A CRITICAL ANALYSIS OF HUME'S TREATMENT OF PERSONAL IDENTITY

4.0. Introduction

In the last chapter, we have discussed Hume's treatment of personal identity in two accounts: personal identity as it concerns our imagination; and personal identity as it concerns passions or self-awareness. And also, in the last section of that chapter, we have discussed Hume's dissatisfaction with his own account or we can say it is a self-criticism of his own account. Hume says, if perceptions are "distinct existences" then they form a whole only by a connection among them. But no such "real connections" are discoverable. What we discover is only a "felt" connection or "determination of thought." Therefore, he says, two claims "*that all our distinct perceptions are distinct existences, and that the mind never perceives any real connection among distinct existences*" seem to be inconsistent. To overcome this inconsistency, Hume supposes two hypotheses. Those are, either we might admit the existence of a substantial self where these distinct perceptions inhere or we might perceive a real connection among them. However, Hume confesses it is too hard.[349]

Hume's dissatisfaction has inspired and has been inspiring many thinkers. On the one hand, most of the commentators, for example, Don Garrett and Jane L. McIntyre, have expressed that the two principles, which cause Hume's confession, are not inconsistent. Rather, they are important to many of the fundamental arguments of Book 1.[350] In addition, they opined that Hume did not clearly say what his problem was. There are some commentators like Galen Strawson who say Hume is not unclear regarding his claims. On the other hand, some other, for example, Eugenio Lecaldano, opine that in the "*Appendix*" Hume is suggesting to the reader. The suggestion is that to understand the nature of self the account of personal identity which is described in Book 1 is not enough, one must have to follow the self in Book 2 and Book 3.[351]

This sort of unclarity in the "*Appendix*" leaves a good scope for many thinkers. On the one side, many thinkers raised objections to Hume's account and tried to establish Hume's account is a mistaken one. On the other side, some others try to defend Hume's theory and try

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[349]Hume, *Treatise*, 636.

[350] Don Garrett, *Cognition and Commitment in Hume's Philosophy* (New York: Oxford University press, 1997), 167.

[351] Eugenio Lecaldano, "The Passions, Character, and the Self in Hume," *Hume Studies XXVIII, no. 2 (November, 2002): 175-194.*

to show most of the criticisms are raised because of misinterpretations or misunderstanding of the text. Moreover, they try to defend Hume's views while showing the consistency in Hume's arguments. Among these sets, some interpreters try to defend Hume's account in a limited sense and some others try to give an actual picture of Hume's account. In this Chapter, we shall examine the various objections to Hume's treatment of personal identity and various responses to those objections.

The following section will examine one of the significant objections and a relative objection to Hume's treatment of personal identity.

4.1. Objection: a) How is it Possible a Perception/Observation/Association without the Existence of a Perceiver/Observer/Associator

b) No Clarity in Hume's Usage of Personal Pronouns/Proper Names

Nathan Brett seems to opine rightly regarding the chief problem that is involved in the problem of personal identity. He says "The chief difficulty in giving any account of personal identity is that of avoiding circularity, for it is hard to remove the assumption of the mind's identity from" the Humean sort of analysis of the mind.[352]According to Brett's view, whenever someone tries to give the account of mind without presupposing something like a soul, generally, these sorts of "circularity" problems would arise.

Some philosophers have mainly raised this objection to Hume's account. They try to show this would be the main reason for Hume's confession. Besides this, they try to insist unless and until we would not admit the existence of the substantial self, it is difficult to escape from the circularity problem.

Firstly, Thomas Reid's[353], a common-sense thinker, objections are remarkable. According to Reid, Hume's skeptical attack on the existence of the substantial self and its identity would not give any plausible solution to this problem. And moreover, he thought, Hume's account of the mind leads us nowhere but more skeptical about one's own existence. Reid's opinion in his introduction to the *Inquiry* is as follows:

[352] Nathan Brett, "Substance and Mental Identity in Hume's Treatise," *The Philosophical Quarterly* (1950-) 22, no. 87 (April 1972): 121. https://www.jstor.org/stable/2217539.

[353] We have discussed Thomas Reid's remarkable critics on Locke's account of personal identity in the first chapter of this thesis. Reid's main objection to Locke's memory theory is that how is it possible to think about memory without presupposing an underlying substantial principle. He also claimed Locke's theory creates problems with moral evaluations.

> It seems to be a peculiar strain of humour in this author, to set out in his introduction, by promising with a grave face, no less than a complete system of the sciences, upon a foundation entirely new, to wit, that of human nature; when the intention of the whole work is to shew, that there is neither human nature nor science in the world. It may perhaps be unreasonable to complain of this conduct in an author, who neither believes his own existence, nor that of his own reader.[354]

In Reid's view, Hume had promised in the introduction to the *Treatise* to give a complete picture of human nature or "science of man". But, Reid says, if we look at the intention of the whole work, we could not find his aim was fulfilled. In short, we could not find any kind of human nature in his text. Therefore, Reid opines, it is "unreasonable" to criticize this kind of behavior of Hume who does not believe in his own existence. Despite this fact, Reid explicitly expressed his remarkable view on Hume's account of mind. His arguments are as follows:

> Mr. Hume...conceives it to be a vulgar error, that besides the thoughts we are conscious of, there is a mind which is the subject of those thoughts. If the mind be anything else than impressions and ideas, it must be a word without a meaning. The mind, therefore according to this philosopher, is a word which signifies a bundle of perceptions…. But who is the I that has this memory and consciousness of a succession of ideas and impressions? Why, it is nothing but that succession itself.... I would wish to be further instructed, whether the impressions remember and are conscious of the ideas, or the ideas remember and are conscious of the impressions, or if both remember and are conscious of both? And whether the ideas remember those that come after them, as well as those that were before them? ... If these things can be ascribed to a succession of ideas and impressions, in a consistency with common sense, I should be very glad to know what is nonsense.[355]

The gist of Reid's principal critique to Hume is that if Hume thinks the mind is nothing but mere impressions and ideas then the mind is nothing but just a "word", which indicates a collection of successive perceptions. If that is the case, Reid asks, "who is the I?" Thinking an impression or idea could memorize or be conscious of other perceptions, and also, thinking successive perceptions can eat, drink, feel happy and sad without any substantial principle is not commonsensical.[356] In addition, he argues we are taught by nature to believe that "thought requires a thinker, reason a reasoner, and love a lover."[357] On the ground of these, Reid argues, Hume's way of thinking that it is a "vulgar error" if somebody would

[354] Thomas Reid, *The Works of Thomas Reid, D.D.: Now Fully Collected With Selections From His Unpublished Letters,* ed. Dugald Stewart (London: Longman, 1846) 102, https://books.google.co.in › books.
[355] Thomas Reid, *The Works*, 444.
[356] Ibid.
[357] Regarding the proof of substantial principle Reid admits his confession. He said if any man would demand the proof of this principle, he can give none. The reason is for him, we cannot get any empirical evidence for the substantial principle. Thomas Reid, *The Works*, 108.

think commonsensically we are conscious of mind and it is the subject of all thoughts is a mistaken notion.

Elsewhere Reid raised another objection, that is, Hume's theory of mind undermines the importance of morality and responsibility. He writes: "If one set of ideas makes a covenant, another breaks it, and a third is punished for it, there is reason to think that justice is no natural virtue in this system."[358]

It is very clear from Reid's arguments that having the belief that all our thoughts belong to a substantial principle and that we are the same person over time is taught by nature. In his view, we call this substantial principle as a self, which is simple and individual. Also, this belief is an irresistible belief. Since it is taught by nature, for him, assuming thinking self is nothing but a succession of perceptions is absurd. Also, it is a great threat to moral evaluations.

And secondly, like Reid, Jean Bernard Merian (1723-1807), a Swiss philosopher, in his paper called "On the phenomenalism of David Hume" expressed a set of skeptical doubts regarding Hume's treatment of personal identity. In that paper, Merian argues that since Hume did not understand the notion of self properly, he himself raised skeptical doubts about his own account in his second thought. John Christan Laursen and Richard H. Popkin's opinion might be right that scholars who worked on Hume's theory of personal identity might be inspired and benefited from Merian's this essay in two ways: either rely on it or to show Merian's work is the result of a misunderstanding of Hume.[359] Therefore, examining Merian's arguments would help us to understand whether Hume's account is a mistaken theory or not.

Primarily, Merian asked Hume a straight question that is, if a perception[360] neither exists nor can exist without being perceived then before whom it would appear or by whom is it perceived? If that is the case, he argues, there are only three possibilities that satisfy these questions: 1) either a perception can perceive itself. 2) Or, a perception can be perceived by another perception. 3) Or, a perception is perceived by something which is not a

[358] Thomas Reid, *The Works*, 109.
[359] John Christian Laursen, Richard H. Popkin, and Peter Briscoe, "Hume in the Prussian Academy: Jean Bernard Mérian's "On the Phenomenalism of David Hume"," *Hume Studies* 23, no. 1 (April 1997): 158, http://doi.org/10.1353/hms.2011.0156.
[360] In his paper, Merian used the word "phenomena" instead of Hume's actual term "perception". To avoid confusion, I am using the word "perception" instead of the word "phenomena".

perception.[361] Among the three suppositions, he rejects the possibility of the first two hypotheses because assuming sounds, for instance, would hear themselves or appear to themselves is a strange thing. The case is the same if someone assumes smell or colours would hear sounds. In continuation, he argues, according to Hume the mind is a collection of perceptions and they coexist or succeed without any "connection" or "mutual influence". In short, they are independent existences. This view, he says, is clearly implying that neither a perception in the bundle can perceive another perception, nor a collection or bundle of perceptions can perceive another collection. Moreover, neither these collections can perceive a separate perception, nor a separate perception can perceive these collections.

While rejecting the possibility of the first two assumptions, Merian insists that the third supposition only would remain. That is, in his view, a "substratum", or a "being" or a "subject" which is not a perception but affected by the perceptions. And, all the perceptions would come to appear themselves in it or before it. But, Merian says, Hume explicitly rejected this assumption and considered it as a fiction. If that is the case, he asks "what position should one take?"[362]

Secondly, to give his support to the existence of the soul and its enduring nature without any changes, Merian argues that when we perceive a perception—a beautiful scene, for instance—we say it appears to us but we never say it appears to itself. Moreover, we could say clearly that the perception is not *We*. When that perception disappears, only the perceiver—*We* or *I*—would remain. Later we may remember it in our memory. Besides this, images related to that scene may be formed in the imagination and different abstract ideas could be generated from those perceptions. Merian continues, we are very clear that all these perceptions such as sense perceptions, memory perceptions, perceptions in the imagination are not *We*. Merian asks an interesting question, that is, if Hume thinks in our intimate entry we observe only perceptions, not an observer then "what would an observation without an observer be?"[363] In his view, assuming an observation without an observer is similar to the assumption that a thought could generate without a thinker. On the ground of these arguments, he asks, what is this *We*? "Would it not seem necessary to be something constant, a solid ground, a permanent canvas where all these varieties would be painted and displayed;

[361]John Christian Laursen, Richard H. Popkin, and Peter Briscoe, "Hume in the Prussian Academy," 181.
[362] Ibid., 182.
[363]Ibid., 189.

and furthermore, something capable of grouping, separating, and diversifying them?"[364] According to Merian's argument, perception cannot do all these activities such as thinking, memorizing, imagining and so on. And, thinking a perception could do all these activities is unintelligible. This is possible only to a "stable", a "permanent" thing which is rejected by Hume.

Thirdly, Merian argues, if there exist only perceptions then we must be considered that we are nothing but a mere perception and nothing more. But, if we are each perception that we perceive then our existence would be only "momentary". From instance to instance it would be no longer *We* but another *We*. If that is the case, Merian asks again the same question, that is, what then *We*? He writes "I no longer know where to find myself, nor even where to look for myself."[365] And then again, if that is the case, we could not find any "necessary connection" between the past existence and present existence. Moreover, if we are just a collection or bundle of perceptions "by chance", it is difficult to find our place among the collection of perceptions that coexist. Two hypotheses he had put on the table: either we will be each of these perceptions separately at the same time, or we will be all of these perceptions together. According to Merian's view, in the first supposition, we are nothing but each perception which is very difficult to understand since the very assumption says each perception is *We*. In the second supposition, if we consider or admit ourselves as the whole of perceptions then it would need a "new relationship", "a union" in which the same *We* dominate them all. But as usual, he emphasizes, the very idea was rejected by Hume. In continuation, Merian argues that it is a fact that from the collection or bundle of perceptions some would remain and some would disappear very next moment and some new perceptions enter. In this situation, he asks "what do I become?" In his view, assuming the *I or We* that would divide and partly go with the perceptions that disappeared and partly stay with the perceptions that remain is absurd. He opines, if we assume the *I or We* would divide in that way, it is a great "labyrinth".[366]

In supposition, Merian argues, if this *I* or *We* is merely a perception then this perception would be more constant than others and accompanies other perceptions during their successions. He says, if we take this into account, the *I* or *We* perception is a permanent thing which continues over time and awakes after a deep sleep in which it seems to expire. This *We*

[364] John Christian Laursen, Richard H. Popkin, and Peter Briscoe, "Hume in the Prussian Academy," 186.
[365] Ibid.
[366]Ibid., 187.

perception "recalls past perceptions, witnesses the present, and bring itself up to date."[367] Additionally, he emphasizes, even in cases like "loss of mind" also, it does not completely disappear. Rather, it may return and reinstall itself which would give assurance for a "certain identity", or a "basis of continuity".

If this supposition is right, Merian's question is that whether this *I* or *We* perception does perceive other perceptions or not? On the one hand, he emphasizes, if it does not perceive other perceptions then it is clear there is no chance for a least communication among the perceptions. In other words, perceptions coexist with each other but they don't know each other. On the other hand, if the *I* or *We* perception could perceive other perceptions then they have an effect on it. Contrary to both suppositions, Merian argues, Hume gives his account of mind, which says the mind is not one perception among the collection and also our assumption that the self has the nature of perfect identity and simplicity is a "fictitious" notion. If that is so, he argues, how does this fictitious being "produce itself? And who perceives it? Being itself, according to you, a new phenomenon, there must be a new fictitious or mentally conceived subject to support it, and for that one another; and when it will finish?"[368] He opines that Hume's assumptions simply lead to nothing but infinite regress.

At the end of his discussion, Merian raised a final objection to Hume "What is the meaning in your mind and your mouth of these personal pronouns which you cannot prevent yourself from continually using, and without which you would not know how either to think or express your thoughts *me, I, we*, etc.?" and further "You consider yourself then a person. And by what right do you assume this personality, phenomenon or bundle of phenomenon that you are?"[369] Merian's argument in this quote is that Hume did not give any clear picture while using those personal pronouns whether they are referring to a single perception or a bundle of perceptions.

On the grounds of the above-mentioned arguments, Merian concludes that whatever language might be the case that does not matter. The fact is that one cannot separate oneself from these forms of thinking, speaking and acting. In short, these forms of thought are not avoidable. The reason for him is that they are deeply rooted in "some principle" that constitutes oneself. Our use of language is evidently revealing "a common origin, something

[367] John Christian Laursen, Richard H. Popkin, and Peter Briscoe, "Hume in the Prussian Academy," 187.
[368] Ibid.,189.
[369]Ibid., 190.

essential or a constitutive principle of what we call the human mind, a primitive form where this mind is… molded, which is inseparable from it, and from which it would not know how to deviate in the simplest development of its faculties."[370] Like Reid, Merian also seems to be insisting on the necessity of the existence of a metaphysical substance, which works as a link among the perceptions.

The upshot of Merian's arguments is this. Mere perceptions or collection of perceptions could not observe, think, reason, judge, imagine and feel themselves. There must be a stable and permanent substance that can do all these things. Hume's rejection of this "constitutive principle" would lead us nowhere but to confusion. We would not find any necessary connection between our past existence and present existence if we follow Hume's theory of mind. Also, in his view, Hume's intention is not clear while using personal pronouns whether they are indicating a perception or a bundle of perceptions.

Not only Reid and Merian but also there are many commentators who raised similar kinds of objections to Hume's different claims which are related to this account. A quick and brief look would give us a picture of how serious this problem is.

Firstly, MacNabb's objection is a considerable one. Like Reid and Merian, MacNabb also raised a similar objection that how could a perception in the bundle be aware of itself as a member. He says "what is it for a perception to be aware of itself as a member of that relational unity of perceptions we call a mind? I do not know the answer to this question."[371]

Secondly, J. A. Passmore's objection is also noticeable. We have seen, in Hume's view, that our mind confuses succession with identity. And, with sufficient reason, one can recognize that that is nothing but confusion. Despite this fact, the mind's propensity causes us to imagine a fictitious substance that we called mind or self or person. On this particular Hume's claim, Passmore's objection is as follows: he says Hume's intention is not clear. How it could be possible to confuse succession with identity and then to realize that succession has been jumbled with identity without the existence of something which is at first confused and then realized by the reflection that it was misled by the succession of perceptions.[372]

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[370] John Christian Laursen, Richard H. Popkin, and Peter Briscoe, "Hume in the Prussian Academy," 190.
[371] D.G.C.MacNabb, *David Hume: His Theory of Knowledge and Morality (*London: Routledge, 1951), 152.
[372]J. A. Passmore, *Hume's Intentions* (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1952), 82-83, books.google.com › Philosophy › History & Surveys › Modern.

Nelson Pike says, Hume uses expressions such as "looks within", "discover", "observe", "remember", "unites", "feign" and so on in many places in the section "*Of personal identity*". These sorts of expressions might be a reason for many commentators to think Hume's "theory is inconsistent with a certain line of thinking".[373] Moreover, he says, Hume's these sorts of expressions confuse us and tend us to believe as if there is the necessity of something beyond the perceptions because mere series of perceptions or a perception could not do all these things.[374]

So far our discussion tells a few points. Firstly, according to the commentators' arguments, Hume had reduced self or mind to mere perceptions and denied the existence of the self beyond perceptions. If that is so, they argue, Hume's theory of mind is false because thinking a series of perceptions, or a perception, could be conscious or memorize or feign or feel happiness and sadness or have a belief system about various perceptions is absurd. In short, all these actions cannot be possible without the presupposition of something. Secondly, it seems not clear what is exactly in Hume's mind while using proper names or personal pronouns such as "I", "my mind", "myself" "me", "we" and so on. They seem to have no proper reference given in the bundle account of the mind. Whether those nouns are referring to a single perception or a collection of perceptions together is not so clear. Thirdly, if self is a momentary thing then it is a great threat to moral evaluations.

At the first glance, there is a good scope to think Hume's theory of the succession of perceptions must presuppose the existence of the self which is simple and diachronically same over the time while observing all the above-mentioned curious arguments. As the commentators opine, Hume's usage of some expressions and personal pronouns leads us to think there must be something simple and individual beyond the perceptions.

Is Hume's theory of the self or mind a mistaken and confused account? Or, are the so far objections or interpretations mere misunderstanding of Hume's theory?

Interestingly, there are some thinkers who try to defend Hume's account from the different objections which we have seen in the above paragraphs. They argue that Hume's account has been misunderstood and misinterpreted. To get a clearer picture, the objections that we have discussed in the above excerpts we can reduce into two. Firstly, how could it be

[373]Nelson Pike, "Hume's Bundle Theory of the Self: A Limited Defense," *American Philosophical Quarterly,* Vol.4, No.2 (April 1967): 159, http://www.jstore.org/stable/20009239
[374] Pike, "Hume's Bundle Theory," 159.

possible for observation or association without an observer or associator? And secondly, what is Hume's intention to use personal pronouns such as *I, We, my mind* and so on?

In the following sub-section, we shall examine some of the responses to the second objection.

4.1.1. Responses to the Objections for Using Personal Pronouns/Proper Names in Hume's Account of Mind

Regarding the second objection, there are some defensive arguments. Those arguments try to give a picture to us that using personal pronouns is not a considerable objection to Hume. Nelson Pike and Galen Strawson and James Giles' defensive arguments are noteworthy for this objection that we shall see in the following passages.

Firstly, Nelson Pike's arguments are as follows. He thinks using personal pronouns is not a threat to Hume's account of the mind. He argues that when Hume speaks of some statements, for instance, "I see a chair", those statements are sometimes supposed (by some people) that the whole purpose of Hume's concept of the self is to recognize the object referred by the pronoun "I" in those statements. Contrary to this opinion, Pike argues that this is not an adequate explanation of Hume's account of the self. According to Pike, Hume tries to develop his theory of mind as an analysis of the mind. Therefore, for him, Hume had nothing to say straightly about the meaning of the pronoun "I". In addition, he argues, it is very clear that those sorts of sentences would say something about the mind. That is, they explain what is going on in our mind at the present moment. Moreover, Pike argues, these "I" statements could be reducible to the statements which are presently going on in the mind. In other words, one can say the statement "I see a chair" as the statement that the "visual perception" of the chair is going on in "my mind" at this moment of time. Further, Pike insists, Hume's usage of phrases like "my mind" designates nothing but a collection of perceptions and their qualities and the relations among them.[375]

Secondly, Galen Strawson gives a slightly different version. Like Pike, Strawson argues that using personal pronouns would not be a great trouble to Hume. He says it is easy to know what Hume's intention is. He explains, there is nothing wrong with using terms like "our" to interpret "a whole human being" for the practical purpose. This reading only suggests a "persisting human being". It doesn't presuppose any continuing "inner subject".

[375] Pike, "Hume's Bundle Theory," 162.

Further, Strawson tries to explain the role of phrases like "our successive experiences" in Hume's philosophy. He argues that since Hume deals with the concept of personal identity with an empirical eye, he employs the successive perceptions in that particular framework. In such cases, while "saying" that what the phrases like "our" consecutive perceptions could do, one can explain things more precisely. That means, he says, these sorts of phrases are used to describe how things appear to the subject—a short-lived subject—of any given experience. This subject itself has a sense that it is a continuing thing and "has and has had many successive experiences."[376] To speak, for example, a subject S_1, having an experience at time T_1, has the belief that it is a continuing self and having many past experiences. Similarly, a subject S_2, having an experience at time T_2, has the belief that it is a continuing self and having many past experiences. In fact, though the two subjects are logically independent, they have the belief that they are one and the same subject. In short, Strawson's argument is that we can analyze things occurring in our mind more accurately by using phrases like "our successive" perceptions.

Here Strawson's argument seems to be as if Hume had accepted that each perception is a subject. Whether Hume would admit this sort of view or not we shall see in the further paragraphs.

And finally, James Giles's response to this particular objection is also noteworthy and thought-provoking. Giles tries to defend Hume's views while using the Buddhist view of using personal pronouns and proper names. His arguments are as follows.[377] He says, according to the Buddhist texts there are two discourses namely, the discourse of "direct meaning" and "indirect meaning". The former type explains the words whose meaning is plain whereas, the latter type would be inferred regarding the former. In the discourse of the latter, words such as "self", or "I" are used to designate some continuing entities. According to Buddha, he says, they are mere expressions and designations which are commonly used in the world. Even though we may use such kinds of words, we should not think they actually designate something. They are just "grammatical devices". These expressions are something that is inferred from the discourse of direct meaning. According to Buddhism, Giles explains further, there are two levels of truths: "conventional" and "ultimate". On the ground of these, all Buddhas have two types of speeches: "conventional" and "ultimate". Proper names such

[376]Galen Strawson, *The Evident Connexion: Hume on Personal Identity* (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2013), 36.
[377]James Giles, "The No-self Theory: Hume, Buddhism, and Personal identity," *Philosophy East and West,* 43, no.2 (April 1993):185-188, http://www.jstore.org/stable/1399612.

as "being", "person", "Hume" and so forth are used as "conventional" level of speech whereas "categories", "elements", "sense-bases" are used as "ultimate" level of speech. Therefore, he continues, they hold that words used by communal agreement are "true" because of worldly agreement. On the ground of mutual agreement, using words like "self", or "I" or any name are true at the conventional level. Therefore, he argues if we think proper names or personal pronouns would refer to something, that is nothing but we are confused by our use of language.[378] Giles argues that though Hume did not explain it elaborately, using this kind of language would not be a threat to his account of mind. We will see Giles's more reflections on this in the further sections.

However, taking these thinkers' counter-arguments into account, we can deduce a point, that is, for our practical purpose we can use personal pronouns and proper names without any problem. In particular, Giles's response seems to be clearer and more effective. As he opines, we can use them as "grammatical devices" without representing any underlying things. Therefore, we can understand that this objection is not a considerable objection to Hume's account of mind.

In the following sub-section, we shall see some responses to the main objection regarding how is it possible a perception without a perceiver.

4.1.2. Responses to the Objection of How a Perception is Possible without a Perceiver

Unlike the objection of using personal pronouns, the second objection seems to be a more serious one to Hume's account. The objection we have seen that if according to Hume mind is a mere "bundle of perceptions" then how is it possible to a mere series or a perception in the bundle to perceive, or memorize, or imagine, or associate, or confuse or form a belief system without the existence or presupposition of an "observer" or "perceiver" or "associator". At first glance, it seems absurd to imagine a perception without an underlying principle.

[378] James Giles's response to Descartes' assertion "I think, therefore I am" is as follows. Giles argues that "Descartes has become led astray by his own language for there is no need for the "I" in "I think" or "I doubt" to refer to anything." He further argues, in this case, Descartes is aware of only thinking but not conscious of I that is doing the thinking. Giles says further that, as Descartes thought, both Hume and Buddha would agree that they are aware of thinking. Accordingly, he argues, "Descartes might just as well said (and should have said if his concern was with ultimate rather than conventional truth) there is thinking, therefore there are thoughts." And such a deduction, if we may call it that, does not suffice to prove the existence of an I." See for more information, James Giles, "The No-self Theory," 188.

Though it seems to be a more effective objection to Hume, some interpreters argued that it is nothing but misrepresentation of Hume's *Treatise*. In the following paragraphs, we shall see some of the counter-arguments regarding this objection.

Firstly, Nathan Brett opines that there is a possibility of escape from the objection when Hume says the mind is a collection of perceptions and they are united by the associative principles. He sees the objection that Hume's association principles merely show the general way in which ideas are joined in the imagination. But, the principles cannot be used to show the true "nature of the mind without failing in precisely this respect."[379] Brett's response to this sort of objection is as follows. He argues that this sort of objections would be grounded on having a misapprehension of these principles. These principles represent mere conditions. Under these conditions, ideas tend to be causally linked to each other. In addition, he stresses, it is clear that Hume explicitly denied the existence of any "power or agency" that helps to unite or connect our ideas. For Hume, he says, these principles are precisely what create "a system" out of our series of perceptions. Therefore, Brett concludes, there is no reason to think that they presuppose an "associator".[380]

Next, Nelson Pike's response is also noteworthy. His response to the objection regarding how it is possible for a particular perception to be aware of itself as a member in the succession of perceptions is like this. First of all, Pike argues, it is not a serious problem for Hume. We have already seen Pike's argument that Hume's actual intention to define mind as a series of perceptions is analyzing the mind but not providing the meaning of "I". On the ground of this, he declares, there is no need for Hume to accept a series of perceptions that could be "aware of" itself as a series. Or, a particular perception could be "aware of" itself as a member of those perceptions. Therefore, Pike opines, this kind of view is merely an "erroneous view".[381]

To show Hume's bundle version of the mind does not uphold the "erroneous" claim, Pike tries to translate some of the "I" statements into the general statements where there is no need of using "I" or "my mind". He translates the statement that "I am aware of a certain perception as being a member of a certain series of perceptions" into "[a]n awareness of a certain perception as being a member of a certain series of perceptions, is occurring in my

[379] Nathan Brett, "Substance and Mental Identity," 121.
[380] Ibid.
[381] Pike, "Hume's Bundle Theory," 163.

mind".[382] In addition, Pike says if we restate the above statement to remove the phrase "my mind", the meaning of statement would not change. His restated statement is as follows: "An awareness of a certain perception as being a member of a certain series of perceptions…is occurring within that series of perceptions." Further, he analyzes, the meaning of this statement as this is that "[a] certain series of perceptions…includes a member A which is of another member B standing in relation to some other members C, D, E…" or alternatively "[a] certain series of perceptions…includes a member A which is of itself (i.e., of A) standing in relation to some other members B, C, D, etc."[383] In Pike's view, among the two alternatives, no one is supporting the claim that a particular perception is "aware of" itself as a member of the series. Rather, both are saying only that the "bundle of perceptions" includes a perception as a member that is having a relationship with some other perception in that series. It is just like, Pike explained with an analogy, a picture collection in an album where a picture is hanging next to some other pictures in that collection.[384]

However, Pike himself mentioned in the title of his article that it is a "limited defense". Therefore, still, there would be a possibility to someone like Reid to ask who is analyzing this bundle if it is just a bundle. Therefore, it might not be an adequate explanation even though the analysis makes us satisfied in some way.

I think Hume's "science of man" might be telling something more than just a bundle and these sorts of explanations which we have seen in the above paragraphs. Therefore, examining other interpretations would help us to know Hume's account in a profound way.

Galen Strawson's responses to this objection seem to be more thoughtful. Particularly, he accuses Reid, Merian, and MacNabb of their misinterpretations of Hume's theory of mind. Strawson says Reid is the first person among the many who "wrongly represent" Hume's theory of mind while stating according to Hume the mind is nothing but a succession of perceptions "*without any subject*". According to Strawson's argument, Reid raised this objection because he had assumed there must be a thinking substance and that substance is beyond all our perceptions and also that must be an unchanging and uninterrupted thing.[385]

According to Strawson, some of the claims, which were proposed by Hume, regarding the notion of self had led and have been leading many thinkers to believe Hume's account of

[382] Pike, "Hume's Bundle Theory," 163.
[383] Ibid.
[384] Ibid.
[385] Galen Strawson, *The Evident Connexion*, 42.

the mind is nothing but a mere bundle, or series, of perceptions. In particular, he says, Hume's most influential claim, namely, "intimate entry into" self gives nothing but a bundle of perceptions is the one that has been leading to this sort of opinion. Merely based on these sorts of claims, many philosophers misunderstood Hume as if he had promoted the view that an experience could occur even when there is "no experiencer". But, he insists, "Hume never entertains any such view, which is sometimes now known as the 'no ownership' view".[386] In addition, Strawson expresses his view in a footnote that this sort of idea that an experience without any experiencer is not even "endorsed by Buddhists".[387] In short, what Strawson's argument here is that we are misunderstanding Hume's account of mind merely based on the particular claims, which are in fact important but do not give the complete picture of Hume's account of mind.

Further, Strawson argues that Hume's usage of the term perception itself does not support the view regarding the possibility of the perception without a perceiver. The reason, he says, is that according to Hume the perception is "an actual happening, an occurrent…conscious event of feeling or thinking"[388]. Therefore, he suggests, we should have to understand a perception "entails" perceiver as a "necessary truth". Additionally, he says, Hume is certain of two things in his *Treatise*: firstly, the certainty of the "subject of experience" no matter what sort of nature it has; and secondly, the certainty of the perceptions which are at present taking place in "his field of consciousness".[389]

Moreover, Strawson argues the actual target of Hume in the section "*Of personal identity*" is not to focus on our belief in the existence of the "subjects of experience" and whatsoever duration it has. Because, he says, Hume nowhere denies the certainty of the existence of the "subject of experience" just as the certainty of the experiences. To support this claim, Strawson shows Hume's Oyster analogy. The analogy is that we can reduce our mind to even a single experience, that is, "thirst or hunger" when we consider our life below the life of an Oyster.[390] What Strawson's argument here is that experiencing a single perception is sufficient to prove the certainty of the "subject of experiences". Therefore, he says, this is not Hume's target. Rather, Hume's principal target is how we would come to have a belief in the "metaphysical" nature of the self, which is something simple and

[386] Galen Strawson, *The Evident Connexion* , 37.
[387] Ibid.
[388] Ibid., 40-41.
[389] Ibid., 42.
[390] Hume, *Treatise*, 634.

continued over time without any changes, and also, holds all experiences in it. Along with this, how we would form a belief in the "epistemological" view that this nature of the self we can know through our experience.[391]

Also, Strawson gives his responses to the objections regarding Hume's other influential claim that "perceptions may exist separately". In fact, he argues, this claim is not suggesting either implicitly or explicitly the way they exist without involving a subject. He says that if perceptions do exist separately in the way we imagined then it implies that there are many distinct subjects of experiences as there are many perceptions. But, it is not suggesting in any way the idea that there is no self at all. Rather, it is only suggesting no persisting self. However, he says, Hume is not suggesting or upholding any view of transient selves.[392] Rather, what Hume's claim is telling here is that when we come to the question of self, we are given in our experience only a succession of perceptions. Those perceptions may exist separately from each other without any underlying single continuing self. In addition, he argues, since Hume's point is "empiricist and epistemological", on the ground of his empiricist principles we can't know how things actually are when the question of self is raised in our mind.[393] Further, Strawson argues that when someone, following Hume, is accepting empiricist principles, that means nothing but, in their view, the origin of the concepts like self must be derived in a direct way from our given experiences. That means, it must be derived from an impression. Therefore, he insists, on the ground of these principles, Hume explicitly says a "true idea of the human mind" is nothing but "a system of different perceptions". In Strawson's view, this is "the only positively, descriptively contentful idea of the mind we can make free use of in philosophy when claiming any knowledge of the nature of the mind, although we can of course freely refer to the mind in ... pointing out that its 'essence… is unknown to us'…."[394]

Strawson's principal argument here is that Hume is not wrong if we look at his theory within the boundaries of empiricist principles because we are given only experiences, which may exist separately. Also, while insisting Hume is certain about the certainty of the existence of the "subject of experiences" as well as the certainty of the experiences in the field of one's own consciousness, Strawson is pointing out that Hume had nowhere

[391] Galen Strawson, *The Evident Connexion*, 43.
[392]Galen Strawson opines that he is attracted to the transient view of mental selves like William James and many others including Buddhists. And moreover, in a footnote, he says "We all think that this may be the best thing to say if one is going to talk about selves at all." See for more information, Ibid., 44.
[393] Galen Strawson, *The Evident Connexion*, 44.
[394] Ibid., 45.

mentioned the possibility of the experience without an experiencer. Hume had only insisted that we have no experience of simple and diachronically continued self which is separate from our experiences.

So far, we have examined two major criticisms and some counter-arguments to those criticisms. Primarily, as Pike, Strawson and James Giles argued, proper names and proper pronouns would not suggest any existence of persisting self. However, as Giles opines, we can use them as "grammatical devices" for our practical purpose. Therefore, it would not be a problem for Hume's account. And secondly, as Pike and Strawson opined, rejecting the idea that a persisting self that is simple and individual is necessary to experience or to analyze our experiences might not be a great threat to Hume's account. The point is clear, as Strawson argued, Hume's main target is not about proving the existence of the perceiver, and rather how we could form the belief about the simplicity and persistence of the self. In his introduction to *Treatise,* Hume clearly mentioned his project that his *Treatise* would give the true nature of man. It makes a point clear that Hume seems to be not denying the existence of an individual who is aware or conscious of his/her perceptions. Throughout his *Treatise,* he tries to explain the way we form beliefs on the ground of some principles (resemblance, contiguity and causation) even though we find loosened perceptions when we introspect. As Strawson argued, though Hume explained in a detailed way how we could form the belief about persisting self on the ground of given relations of resemblance and causation among the perceptions, these relations Hume considers as the felt connections. He seems to need real and observable connections which are not possible in an empiricist account of the nature of mind. However, we shall see Strawson's interpretation, in detail, of Hume's actual problem in a separate section.

However, there are some other objections that give an equal amount of scope to show Hume's account is mistaken. In the following section, we shall examine one of the major criticisms of Hume's account.

4.2. Objection: Hume's Notion of Identity is a Mistaken Notion; Therefore, His Theory of Personal Identity is a Mistaken Theory

One of the serious objections to Hume's account of the mind is that his understanding of the notion of identity is mistaken.

We have seen in the first section MacNabb's objection to Hume's account of the mind. MacNabb also raised another objection. This objection is related to Hume's one of the claims,

namely, if the self is a permanent thing then the impression from which it is derived also appears without any interruption during our course of life but we never find such kind of impression.[395] MacNabb argues that Hume's understanding of the "proper" meaning of the expression "identity" is mistaken.

MacNabb's argument follows like this: since Hume thinks the very idea of the identity is nothing but necessarily having two properties (invariableness and uninterruptedness), he assumes explicitly that our attribution of identity to changing objects such as plants, animals and so on is in a loose sense of attribution but not in a strict sense. Nevertheless, we attribute a strict sense of identity to them because, for Hume, it is the result of the "fiction" of imagination. Hume's this view of identity, MacNabb says, is mistaken. Contrary to Hume's view, he suggests that "the fundamental idea of identity is simply that of the unity of an aggregate. How the members of the aggregate must be related to one another in order to form one aggregate depends on the sort of aggregate in question."[396] To make it clear, he gives different examples: firstly, even though members of the parliament belong to different parties, the members form one parliament. Secondly, a common kind of identity is the "unity of a series". A series is considered the same if and only if the members of the series are related to their antecedent members in a specific way. For example, he gives, the series of whole numbers is one series because each member in that series is greater by one than the earlier member. Considering these examples into account, MacNabb argues, self could preserve its identity even though regular changes and interruptions would occur in its existence. It is just like a play on the stage. We never think of a play as a different play while observing changes of scenes and characters and observing intervals between the play. Rather, we consider it as the same play. It is a fact that we never think or imagine there is a "metaphysical entity" while observing these changes. "It is the substantiality of the self, not its identity, which requires a fiction, if anything does?"[397]

Next, Terence Penelhum's objections are also noteworthy. Penelhum is the one who systematically criticizes Hume's views relating to the notion of personal identity. His main criticism of Hume is that Hume's account of identity itself seems "groundless" when we recognize the mistakes he had committed while giving the notion of identity.[398] Therefore, he

[395] Hume, *Treatise*, 251.
[396] D.G.C. MacNabb, *Hume*, 147.
[397] Ibid., 147-148.
[398] Terence Penelhum, *Hume* (London: The Macmillan Press LTD., 1975), 82.

insists, we can easily get the point how Hume's account of personal identity is a mistaken notion.

Mainly, Penelhum gives two points: firstly, there are some occasions we could ascribe identity to the succession of distinct but related parts. In such cases, there is no contradiction to say they are numerically the same. To support this claim, like MacNabb, he gives some examples. Those are: a "succession of notes" can form one theme, and a "succession of words" can form a sentence. Further, he says, "Whether a thing can have many parts or not depends entirely on what sort of thing it is. Most things (including people) do."[399] So, he concludes, thinking an object is numerically one and the same object and it contains many parts is not a contradiction at all.

And secondly, he argues, Hume committed another mistake, which is related to the first one. The mistake is that Hume thinks the idea of identity is nothing but an idea of an object that remains the same or continues without any changes over time. But, he argues, Hume himself gives two senses of the word "identical" or "the same", namely, "numerical and the specific senses". These two senses Hume had used confusedly.[400] Moreover, Penelhum argues, we can say two things are specifically the same as one another when they are exactly similar in some respect. But still, we consider them as two. On the other hand, if someone says those objects are the same in the numerical sense those objects are said to be not two but one. Therefore, he says, these two senses are clearly distinct notions. In addition, he says, "Now to remain unchanged is to remain same in a specific sense…. But I can remain the same in *numerical* sense without doing so in the specific sense".[401] That means, for him, we are numerically one and the same over time even though changes occurred. In fact, he says, we cannot be said to have changed unless we are numerically one and the same over time. The reason for saying an object is said to be numerically different when a considerable change is observed because by its definition it is an unchanging object.[402] He further argues, there are a number of "class-terms" in the language such as a "horse", "house", or a "person" and so on which allow us to consider they are numerically the same with considerable changes. He says understanding the changes means nothing but the proper understanding of

[399] Terence Penelhum "Hume on Personal Identity" in *Modern Studies in Philosophy: Hume,* ed. V. C. Chappell (New York: Anchor Books Doubleday &Company, INC. Garden City, 1966), 226.
[400] Penelhum., "Hume on Personal Identity," 226.
[401] Ibid., 227.
[402] Ibid.

the terms' meaning.[403] On the ground of these assumptions, Penelhum concludes, to think an object is "numerically the same" and "changed" is not at all a contradiction. He tries to explain it with an analogy. The analogy as follows:

> We do not, and we could not, confuse an invariable and uninterrupted note with a succession of distinct but related notes. But we could, unconfusedly, say that a succession of such notes constituted one continuing tune. We do not, and we could not, confuse an invariable and uninterrupted perception with a succession of distinct but related perceptions. But we could, unconfusedly, say that a succession of such perceptions constituted one continuing mind.[404]

Therefore, Penelhum argues, regarding the above two mentioned points, Hume commits a mistake and gives a mistaken notion of identity which immediately led him to give a mistaken notion of personal identity. This is nothing but, he says, a "short sight" or an "astigmatism" towards the notion.

Moreover, Penelhum argues the mistakes regarding the ascribing identity to the objects as well as a person would occur because Hume has failed to see the different sorts of relationships could provide basic support to our ascription of identity to the "temporally continuous wholes" to which the successive parts actually belong. Or, in other words, Hume has failed to see those relations—"resemblance", "causal interrelatedness", "gradual changes", "conspiracy to a common end"—could constitute "real bonds" among the successive parts of the different sorts of changing objects respectively. Instead of realizing this, he continues, Hume is "forced" to think the given relationships would function as the factors which divert us from the diversity of those successive parts.[405]

So far we have seen the substantial objections to Hume's view on the notion of identity and how his own notion misleads him to give a false notion of personal identity. In the next subsection, we shall see some significant responses to these sorts of objections.

4.2.1. Responses to the Objections to Hume's View on Identity

Though we can see many thinkers' counter-arguments to these sorts of objections, I think, James Giles's responses are noteworthy. In particular, he tries to give counter-arguments to Penelhum's criticisms. We have seen, in Penelhum's view, Hume's idea of identity is a confused notion and he "muddles" two senses of the word "identical" namely, specific and numerical senses. Giles's response to this view is that it is not Hume but "Penelhum who has

[403] Penelhum., "Hume on Personal Identity," 227.
[404] Penelhum, *Hume*, 81.
[405] Ibid., 81-82.

muddled things."[406] In fact, he opines, this sort of misinterpretation generally occurs because of a hasty reading of the section "*Of Personal identity*". Therefore, he suggests that if we would not allow Hume's "claims to be taken out of context", we can easily dissolve many difficulties that cause misunderstanding and misinterpreting Hume's account.[407]

Regarding Penelhum's first point that it is not a contradiction to think the numerical identity of an object has many parts, Giles argues that Hume did not reject this point. Rather, Hume clearly allows that an object may have many parts and also changes and motions within it. Therefore, he says, it would not be a problem for Hume to consider such a kind of object as the same object.[408] But, he continues, it is clear that Hume did not allow attributing identity in numerical sense if parts would come and go. His response to Penelhum's counterexamples that a succession of notes forms one theme (a melody), or a succession of words form one sentence is as follows: he says, these objections are not considerable objections to Hume. The reason he says that they are completely different sorts of objects from what actually Hume was concerned about. First of all, he emphasizes, these sorts of objects, a musical theme, are quite acceptable to Hume. Giles gives two reasons: firstly, Hume never rejected that one object contains several parts; secondly, he says "A melody, by definition, is a temporal sequence of musical notes: it is something whose existence is necessarily spread out over time. It is therefore logically incapable of existing instantaneously in the specious present."[409] But, he says, in the cases of the objects such as trees, ships, or persons, we would not see a logical limitation as we see in the case of a melody. That means, he says, we can imagine the mentioned objects' momentary existence and their immediate disappearance. In short, objects such as trees, ships, or persons exist for a moment in our ideas and disappear; also, their appearance for varying durations of time tends us to believe they are existing objects over a period of time. Whereas, in the case of melodies, they do not exist at a particular moment instantaneously in our ideas, like a tree; but notes in a melody can do. He argues that just because of this significant differentiation between these two different sorts of objects, we are able to ask the identity questions in the cases of trees, or people and so forth whether they are the same objects at two different times or not. The same

[406] James Giles, "The No-Self Theory," 180.
[407] Ibid., 178.
[408] Giles while giving the Hume's example that "Suppose any mass of matter, of which the parts are contiguous and connected, to be plac'd before us; 'tis plain we must attribute a perfect identity to this mass, provided all the parts continue uninterruptedly and invariably the same, whatever the motion or change of place we may observe either in the whole or in any of the parts (T.255)" tries to defend Hume's notion of identity.
[409] James Giles, "The No-Self Theory," 179.

question we cannot ask in the cases of a melody, or a series of numbers.[410] Therefore, he says, this sort of objection to Hume will not be a serious objection.

Giles seems to have rightly said. The reason is that bringing different sorts of things under one umbrella might not be the right way. As Giles explains, the objects such as a series of numbers or a succession of notes is completely different from the objects such as a tree, ship, and a person and so forth. As Giles said, we can imagine an instantaneous existence and disappearance of the latter objects in our ideas whereas it is not the case regarding the former. And it is a fact that Hume mainly raised identity questions in the cases of objects which appeared momentarily in us. Therefore, as Giles expressed, there is no reason for us to question whether a number series is the same or not but we can question whether a person who is appearing at present is the same whom we have seen last night. We can think this response is also applicable to MacNabb's objections what we have seen in the above paragraphs.

Next, regarding Penelhum's second objection that Hume is utterly confused about the idea of identity and using of the terms numerical and specific sense of identity, Giles's counter-arguments follow like this:[411] he argues, if we take Hume's ship example in this particular case, the possibility we could see is that the parts of the ship gradually be replaced. It is also possible that in the end no part of the original ship would remain. Yet, Giles says, there are possibilities to see an exact similarity between the two ships, the present one and the original one. In such cases, we can say the two ships are the same in a specific sense. But, it would be a false assumption to say they are the same in a numerical sense. Contrary to this, he points out, Penelhum assumes numerical identity by definition it is nothing but an unchanging thing that would lose its identity over time. Giles argues, this assumption creates more difficulty since by definition of the ship it seems the two ships—the original and present one—are numerically identical even though there is no single part of the present ship that is shared with the earlier ship. If this is so, he asks "how could we distinguish between the situation where a ship has persisted without changing any of its parts, and the very different situation where it has changed all of its parts?"[412] To answer this question, one possibility he gives is that in a natural way we can make a distinction between the two cases. That is, in the former case, earlier and present ships are exactly one and the same

[410] James Giles, "The No-Self Theory," 179.
[411] Ibid., 180.
[412] Ibid.

(numerically same) whereas in the latter case, both ships are only having a resemblance relation (same in a specific sense). In fact, he argues, Penelhum's account of distinction has failed to draw this clear distinction since the two taken cases have "equal claims". If we uphold Penelhum's version, we would consider both cases as examples of the former sort of identity. However, Giles says, we can make a distinction. That is, in the former case they are identical in a "strongest sense" and in the latter case they are identical in a "weaker sense". This is very clear, he insists, from Hume's text that he allows this distinction but Penelhum does not. Therefore, Giles concludes, it seems Penelhum has "muddled" things, not Hume.

So far counter-arguments of Giles seem to be quite convincing. It is true that Hume talked about two senses of identity. We can understand Hume uses numerical identity in terms of "strict" sense of identity and other sense of identity in terms of a specific or "weaker" sense of identity.

Moreover, Giles also tries to answer the objection regarding what kind of identity one would apply to a tree or a person since a seed becomes an Oak tree and an infant becomes an adult where we could see complete changes. By the definition of numerical and specific senses of identity, we could not say a seed and an Oak tree are numerically the same and also it would not make any sense to say they are specifically the same. It is also applicable in the case of an infant and an adult.

Giles's answer to these sorts of objections is that Hume's central project in his *Treatise* is not about making a distinction between two sorts of identity. Hume makes the distinction between these two sorts of identities only to show how we might come to attribute identity to the objects.[413] While showing a significant argument from Hume's *Treatise* that though "everyone must allow, that in every few years both vegetables and animals endure a total change, yet we still attribute identity to them, while their form, size and substance are entirely" changed[414], Giles tries to make the point clear, that is, when Hume is explaining the identity in any sense he is not mentioning to the "actual identity" of the objects. Rather, only "he is referring to *our attribution* of identity to the tree (that is, our attribution of numerical identity)".[415] In Hume's view, he says, the identity we attribute to the tree despite the observing changes is merely a fictitious identity which is the work of the imagination. In fact, in Hume's view, this identity is "not a property" that belongs to the objects in our mind.

[413]James Giles, "The No-Self Theory," 180.
[414] Hume, *Treatise*, 257.
[415] James Giles, "The No-Self Theory," 182.

Rather, we attribute it to our successive ideas. For Hume, Giles continues, the case is the same for all other objects such as ships, houses, rivers, plants, animals, and persons too.

As Giles says, Hume seems to be never bothered about the justification of the existing things in the world and even "actual identity" of them. But, we can observe in his *Treatise* clearly that he always tries to explain or analyze the psychological process of our different beliefs. If we take this point into account, Hume is right since we attribute identity to successive objects in our minds. But if we consider the actual identity of the objects in the world, Penelhum's definition of numerical identity seems to be acceptable because we see in different instances in course of our life that a seed changes into an Oak tree with the number of changes which we think is the same. However, it is more difficult to justify since we have only perceptions of them.

However, Penelhum's another objection is also noteworthy. He argues that Hume's "diagnosis" regarding the idea of self and its identity is wrong. If we admit Hume's view, he stresses, it implies that a little change is enough to consider a person as literally a different person. If that is so, he claims, it is a great problem to language usage since using a different "proper name" for every small change of the observed object is nothing but creating chaos. In addition, it implies, there is a need for a complete change in "concepts and syntax of our language" which is ridiculous to think. This we can understand with "a little effort of imagination."[416]

Giles's response to this objection is that there is no reason to think Hume's analysis of a person needs different proper names whenever we observe a minute change.[417] He argues that some of Hume's arguments make clear this point: firstly, he shows Hume's explicit view in *Treatise* that we could call a reconstructed church as the same as its predecessor "without breaching of the property of language"[418] even though our assumption that it is the same as its predecessor is merely the outcome of our imagination; secondly, Giles shows Hume's another claim in the same text that all our arguments regarding the identity of succeeding objects are "merely verbal" unless and until the relations amongst succeeding objects would give rise to some fictitious "principle of union".[419] On the ground of Hume's these two claims, Giles argues that unless and until at least someone among the two persons could

[416] Penelhum, "Hume on Personal Identity," 224.
[417] James Giles, "The No-Self Theory," 184.
[418] Hume, *Treatise*, 258.
[419] Ibid., 262.

imagine a fictitious entity which unites two objects as one, two persons' arguments about whether a renovated object is same as earlier one or not is a mere dispute about how the word "same" is using in those conditions. More precisely Giles says,

> They will not be disputing an actual identity but only the linguistic conventions surrounding our use of identity terms. If we imagine that our disputants finally agree that our linguistic conventions permit us to call the two churches the same (a conclusion to which Hume would give assent), then we can see why it is permissible to call two things the same which are in fact different. This is because there are two levels at which the notion of identity can be employed: one which deals with questions about identity at the metaphysical or ultimate level, and one which deals with them at the verbal or conventional level.[420]

Giles's argument in this excerpt is that there is nothing wrong with Hume's view. We can say a renovated object, though it might be different from the original, is the same without breaking the properties of language. In other words, the two objects are at "conventional" or "verbal" level same since our imagination feigns a uniting principle. In the same way, Hume would argue momentary changes would not make trouble to our usage of language even in a person's case. Already we have noticed in the first section of this chapter that Giles takes this idea of "conventional" and "ultimate" level of truth from the Buddhist viewpoint to defend Hume's account. According to Giles, Buddha admits two levels of truth: "conventional" and "ultimate" level. The proper names we can use at the "conventional" level by our mutual agreement. On the other hand, "categories", "elements" and "sense-bases" we can use as "ultimate" level. So, Giles says, in Buddha's view both are true. Giles's point here is that Penelhum's language objection would not affect Hume's view. Moreover, he says, both Buddha and Hume have expressed the same line of thought in the case of the notion of identity. That is, both expressed similarly the view that when we look at our experience, there is nothing permanent rather only coming and going experiences.[421]

What Giles has expressed regarding this particular concept is quite acceptable since, primarily, it is true that Hume did not talk about whether a series of numbers is numerically the same or not. But, his main concern is about what reasons cause our belief that a person or a ship is the same over time even though we can observe interruptions in our perceptions. In order to do that, he explained the psychological process which takes place in our mind to make this kind of justification to our beliefs. He says, we never perceive any real identity but we only see a resemblance relation between our perceptions. Therefore, he concludes, our

[420] James Giles, "The No-Self Theory," 184.
[421] Ibid., 185-186.

justification is false because we mistake resemblance for identity. And moreover, what Giles pointed out is right, that is, Hume's main concern is not making a distinction between two kinds of identities, numerical and specific. Rather, his concern is about why we attribute identity to objects. Another point also is important, that is, Hume himself admits that we can say a changing object is the same without breaking any properties of language since all disputes regarding identity are only verbal unless and until we imagine a uniting principle. It is true as Giles mentioned that unfortunately Hume did not much explore regarding breaking the property of language[422] but if we take Giles's supporting arguments into account then it might not be a problem to Hume's explanations.

In the following section, we shall scrutinize one more significant criticism of Hume's theory of mind.

4.3. Objection: Hume's Theory of Self is Inconsistent in Book 1 and Book 2

There is another important criticism of Hume's account. That is, he had expressed different views regarding the notion of mind in different Books in *Treatise.* Those expressions are, in fact, inconsistent. This objection was raised by Norman Kemp Smith. In Smith's view, the inconsistency is that in Book 1 Hume explicitly rejects the existence of the self while claiming we have no distinct idea or impression of the self. Contrarily, in Book 2 Hume upholds the idea or the impression of the self while claiming self as the object of two contrary passions namely, pride and humility. In addition, he says, Hume had stressed we are always aware of its idea or impression.[423] In short, Smith's argument is that the "awareness of personal identity" in two books is inconsistent with his principles. Hume lately recognizes this when he had reflected on his account in the "*Appendix*". In Smith's view, this reflection makes him confess his failure.[424]

If we look at some of the claims from Hume's Book 1 and Book 2, at the very first glance, they would tend us to think Smith's objection might be true and Hume's views are inconsistent. The claims are:

In the section "*Of Personal identity*", Hume explicitly claims our intimate entry into ourselves cannot catch any idea or impression of self that is simple and continued over time. Rather, we find only a "bundle" or succession of perceptions having some relations.

[422] James Giles, "The No-Self Theory," 184.
[423] Norman Kemp Smith, *The Philosophy of David Hume,* v.
[424] Ibid., 555-558.

Therefore, having such an impression of self is a mere fiction generated by the imagination.[425]

Contrary to the above argument, in some paragraphs of Book 2, Hume seems to have expressed a different view. For instance, he writes: "[It is] evident, that the idea, or rather the impression of ourselves is always intimately present with us, and that our consciousness gives so lively a conception of our own person, that [it is] not possible to imagine that anything can in this particular go beyond it."[426]

The above-mentioned arguments tend us to think Smith's understanding might be right. But, some interpreters' responses on this particular inconsistency issue are also remarkable. They try to argue Smith's interpretation is mistaken. We shall discuss their arguments in the following passages.

4.3.1. Responses to the Objection of Incompatibility

Nelson Pike gives two reasons to show Smith's view is a mistaken view: firstly, Pike says, it is true that at many places in the *Treatise* Hume had mentioned the idea of mind; and secondly, it is also true that Hume explicitly rejected the "idea or impression of the self". Hume discards the notion of self that was encouraged by "some philosophers" who claimed we always have an intimate consciousness of the simple and individual self. Pike argues that this particular kind of idea or impression Hume had rejected. In the section "*Of personal identity*" and in other Books his views are consistent. In both places, Pike insists, Hume had defined the idea or impression of the mind as a succession of perceptions with certain kinds of relations.[427]

Like Pike, Don Garrett, in his article "Hume's self-Doubts about Personal Identity", also has given his response to Smith's criticism in a different way.

Primarily, Garrett argues that "awareness of personal identity" is not the reason for Hume's confession of his failure as Smith opines. Garrett emphasizes the point that Hume is quite satisfied with the relations among personal identity, consciousness, and memory, which

[425] Hume, *Treatise*, 252-253.
[426] Ibid., 317 and 354
[427] Pike, "Hume's Bundle Theory," 161-162. Not only Pike but even Penelhum also says Hume can easily get rid of this sort of "unattractive problems" while giving arguments of Pike and Mercer (see for more information, Penelhum, "The Self of Book 1 and the Selves of Book 2," 281-291). Some other thinkers, for instance, Jane L. McIntyre (1989), Robert S. Henderson (1990), James Giles (1993) try to defend Hume from this inconsistency problem among the three Books. Almost their arguments are on the same par that Hume is committed to his account of self in all three Books.

Hume had explicated in his own theory. He gives a supportive argument for this, that is, Hume explicitly insists in the "*Appendix*" that thought finds personal identity in memory. Moreover, he says, Hume himself admits that this doctrine encourages many philosophers to think personal identity "*arises* from consciousness". And, this "consciousness" in Hume's view is nothing but a "reflected thought". That means, Garrett says, it is nothing but a matter of memory. Therefore, he says Smith has not realized that "reflected thought" refers to memory and argued that the nature of the "reflection" is key element of Hume's dissatisfaction.[428]

Regarding this particular point, Garrett's argument is quite acceptable. The reason is that Hume clearly mentioned in the "*Appendix*" that our "reflected thought" or memory finds personal identity. Moreover, up to this point, Hume thinks his theory of self has "a promising aspect."[429]

Next, Garrett comes to the incompatibility issue. He argues that there is no incompatibility between arguments regarding self in two Books as Smith opined. According to his arguments, neither in the section "*Of personal identity*" nor in the "*Appendix*", Hume has not denied the point that we have the idea or rather impression of ourselves. In both sections, Hume only denies the impression of the self in which we are intimately conscious of the "simplicity" and the "perfect identity" of it. In addition, Garrett added a point that even though for Hume there is no impression of the self that is explained in a particular manner, there may be some "other kind of impressions of ourselves". He says, those "other kind of impressions" would serve as the origin of the "true idea of the human mind" as a bundle of related perceptions.[430]

Garrett tries to explain what Hume's intention is to use the phrase "idea or impression of ourselves" and how some other sort of impressions would serve as the origin. Garrett's interpretation is as follows: On the one hand, it is very clear that Hume is allowed to write both an idea and an impression of ourselves in Book 2. On the other hand, it is also clear that Hume is conscious about his claim which he had mentioned in Book 1. That is, there is no "real idea" of any underlying self. At the same time, Hume admits there must be an idea of mind ("true idea of the human mind") which is nothing but a "bundle of perceptions" related

[428]Don Garrett, "Hume's Self-Doubts about Personal Identity," *The Philosophical Review,* 90, no. 3 (July 1981): 340, http://doi.org/ 10.2307/2184977.
[429]Hume, *Treatise*, 635.
[430] Garrett, "Hume's Self-Doubts," 340.

by the relations of resemblance and causation. Further, Garrett says, Hume upholds the idea of the body also as a part of the bundle, and consequently, he applies a general term to this bundle, namely, "oneself". Furthermore, Garrett says, Hume considered it as an abstract idea.[431]

Even though we have no distinct idea of ourselves, we get the abstract idea of ourselves. Garrett stresses, it is just like Hume's treatment of our ideas of space and time. Even though we have no distinct impressions of space, time and simplicity, our mind can perceive ideas of those. Garrett explains how Hume had treated these ideas. For instance, in the case of space, we see only complex impressions which are in fact "spatially arranged simple impressions".[432] As a result, those complex impressions have the common quality of spatiality. Among the number of ideas of complex impressions, one idea could be predisposed to call up when we have an abstract idea of space. In other words, whenever we have the abstract idea of space, our imagination calls up one idea of a particular impression among the class by custom and tendency. Not only it calls a particular idea of an impression but also it recalls all related ideas to that particular idea. To say, each and every idea of impression in that class would serve as the abstract idea by having the common quality of spatiality. Therefore, Garrett continues, in Hume's view, every idea of such kind of impressions may serve as the particular idea (space) that represents the whole class of resembling things. On the ground of this assumption, we could say we have the impression of space. Here, Garrett tries to make a point clear that Hume's copy principle, which holds every idea must be derived from a corresponding impression, does not require in this case. That means, there is no need that every abstract idea should be preceded by a distinct impression of that quality. In order to generate an abstract idea in our mind, it is adequate that "the idea be preceded by the impressions that are impressions of the quality in the sense of exemplifying it."[433] In this sense, he says, we can understand there are many impressions of space. He continues, this method we can apply to other abstract ideas such as time, simplicity, and moral qualities and so on.

[431]According to Hume, abstract ideas are nothing but "particular ones, *annexed to a certain term,* which gives them a more extensive signification". We apply this general term because of our observation of a resemblance relation among the ideas. This annexed term is directly associated with the determinate idea of a particular instance. However, this idea attains an "extensive signification" because the term also revives the custom or disposition to call up ideas of other particular ones. (See for more information, *Treatise,* 17).
[432] Garrett, "Hume's Self-Doubts," 341.
[433] Ibid., 342.

In the same way, Garrett explains, all the impressions which are part of oneself by having a certain kind of relation—causation or resemblance—would serve as the origin of the abstract idea of oneself. That means, when we have an abstract idea of oneself, one particular idea among the class of ideas of the impressions would be disposed to call up. Also, this idea gets more significance since the term oneself also revives the tendency to call up memories of other connected perceptions. Thus, every impression of the class by having certain features is considered oneself, which is, in fact, an abstract idea. Garrett argues further, in Hume's view our human nature tends to mistakenly think of this idea as an idea of a "perfectly identical" object, just as our human nature tends to think of our "genuine idea of necessary connection as the idea of a real necessary connection in nature."[434] Garrett tries to give the reason why Hume considers this abstract idea of oneself as an impression. He says that since every impression we have is the impression of ourselves, the class of impressions of oneself is broader. If that is the case, Garrett says, to be aware of our own personal identity and to be aware of ourselves from others our idea of oneself needs to be presented to us in a lively manner. As we know, he says, for Hume the mental mechanism of sympathy can be activated only by finding the resemblance relation between ourselves and others. In order for the functioning of sympathy to transfer vivacity to our ideas related to others' behavior, we need an impression of ourselves since a mere idea of ourselves would not do this. Therefore, he says, Hume while classifying our memories as impressions, he upholds that our memories of ourselves as impressions infuse this liveliness or vivacity into our ideas related to others. In other words, the vivacity needed for the mechanism of sympathy is derived from the impressions of ourselves. Therefore, Garrett argues that Hume has to correct himself when he talks to "the idea, or rather impression of ourselves."[435]

So far Garett's story is this. Firstly, Hume did not give two different accounts in different books. That means, for him, Hume's descriptions regarding the self, which is nothing but successive perceptions, in two books are consistent. Secondly, this idea of oneself or ourselves is an abstract idea that is generated in us by observing particular impressions and having a certain kind of features among them, namely, causation or resemblance. It is just like our ideas of space and time and the other abstract ideas, where we have no distinct impressions of them. Thirdly, in Garrett's view, Hume is forced to correct himself while using the idea or impression of ourselves because the mental mechanism of sympathy, which

[434]Garrett, "Hume's Self-Doubts," 340-341.
[435]Ibid., 342-343.

is activated by the recognition of resemblance among ourselves and others, requires the infusion of liveliness into an idea. The requirement is derived only from the memories (impressions) of ourselves.

The observed first two points seem to be quite acceptable but the third point is unconvincing because Hume seems to have used the phrase "idea or rather the impression of self" not only in the case of causal mechanism of sympathy, where the force and vivacity transfer from the impression of ourselves to an idea of others in us, but also in other occasions. For instance, Hume explicitly insists that the idea or impressions of ourselves always presents in our consciousness in a lively manner as the object of pride and humility. In the case of these passions' generation in us, we may not find any major role of the causal mechanism of sympathy. So to say, Hume seems to have used the phrase "impression of ourselves" in a broader sense. Garrett's interpretation might be right to some extent. However, as Garett noticed, memory might play a major role to transpose the vivacity and force to the idea.

James Giles, following Pike and Garrett, also provides the same line of thought regarding Smith's objection. Additionally, he had found a problem in Hume's explanations and tried to solve it while explaining the psychological process that happens in the human mind. We shall discuss his arguments regarding Hume's missing points in a different section. However, the following paragraph tells Giles's response to Smith's objection.

Giles argues that there is no reason to think Smith's arguments are worthy because he is utterly "incognizant" of Hume's view that is expressed in the section regarding personal identity. In addition, Giles says, Hume while discussing the self in Book 2, reminds us of the conclusions that he reached in Book 1, that is, our intimate entry into the self gives merely various successive impressions having certain relations. Therefore, Giles suggests, when Hume says, in Book 2, that the awareness of ourselves is always intimately present to us, we should have to comprehend this in terms of what he had expressed in Book 1. Even, he argues, by the observation of Hume's definition of the self, which is the object of pride and humility, and which is nothing but a succession of particular perceptions, we can understand that Hume had maintained the same definition in two Books.[436]

[436] James Giles, "The No-Self Theory," 189-190.

Pike, Garrett and Giles' response to Smith's objection appears to be convincing. The reason is very clear that Hume clearly expressed in the section "*Of Personal identity*" that we have no idea of the mind "after the manner it is here explained". We have an idea of the mind that is nothing but successive perceptions having resemblance and causal relations among the perceptions.[437] And, in the second book, he says the self is the object of passions of pride and humility. There also he defines the self as "connected succession of perceptions".[438] In both definitions, Hume's views seem to be quite consistent. Therefore, there is no reason to think Hume had provided different accounts in different Books. However, at a very surface-level we can say Smith's understanding of Hume is mistaken. The reason is that based on merely two definitions we cannot say Hume had maintained the same line of thought in the entire *Treatise* because there are some thinkers, for instance, Eugenio Lecaldano, who argue Hume gives different pictures in different books that we shall examine in a separate section.

Before going deeply into such kinds of arguments, discussing Garrett's and Strawson's interpretations regarding Hume's second thought in the "*Appendix*" may give us reasons for Hume's dissatisfaction. In the following section, we shall see Don Garrett's arguments.

4.4. Don Garrett's Objection: The Problem of Representing Ourselves to Ourselves from Other Minds

Don Garrett tries to give the actual reason for Hume's dissatisfaction regarding his own account of personal identity. Garrett's interpretation is as follows: first of all, he says, Hume does not have any problem for admitting the perceptions which are occurring at present as his own. But he felt discomfited to determine why we count "certain past ideas" as belonging to ourselves despite the fact that those ideas had been accessed by "someone" in the past. "Correlatively", he says, Hume finds difficulty to determine what this "he … actually is and how this individual can be conceived in the imagination."[439] Therefore, Hume, in the section "*Of personal identity*", tried to inquiry the association relations among the perceptions which make the perceptions to "count as the mind of one person." Hume tried to explain this whole mental process with the principles of "resemblance" and "causation". But in the "*Appendix*", Hume explicitly expressed his dissatisfaction with his explanations.

According to Garret, the actual problem is not with the two "propositions", namely, 1) all perceptions in the mind are "distinct existences" and 2) "the mind never perceives any real

[437]Hume, *Treatise*, 261.
[438]Ibid., 277.
[439] Garrett, *Cognition and Commitment*, 185.

connections" among the perceptions as Hume supposed but the real problem occurring when we combine certain "propositions"—which play a key role in Hume's project—together. In short, in Garrett's view, those "propositions" are individually not problematic but "jointly inconsistent". He opines this inconsistency might be the cause of Hume's second thought. Garrett thinks along with the two "propositions" above mentioned, the following "list of propositions" together create the actual problem: 3) some perceptions are placeless[440], 4) perceptions belong to the "same mind" if and only if either they are related by the relations of resemblance and cause and effect or there is some observable "real connections" among the perceptions and a distinct substance in which all the perceptions inhere, 5) qualitatively similar objects can only differ either with respect to spatial location or temporal location, and 6) it is not impossible that the occurrence of two numerically different but qualitatively similar perceptions in different individuals at the same time.[441]

Before going to know how the six propositions together would create the problem, it is essential to know Garrett's interpretation of Hume's views on causal determinism and its role in our belief system. Garrett argues that Hume admits "universal determinism" which says like causes produce like effects in like circumstances. He says that Hume admits it not because he finds a "necessary connection" between the objects themselves but because of our repeated experience of "constant conjunction" which gives an adequate proof for our search for "its truth". A simple example makes the point clear: our present belief of the impression of sound, for instance, is necessarily connected with the impression of clap is the result of constant conjunction. Garrett argues that while admitting the significance of the principle of constant conjunction, Hume has committed that our present belief of a certain object is the result of an "enduring background structure" and "background events" relating to the mind. These structures would facilitate the operations of the mind and show the differences in mental capacities among individuals.[442]

Now if we come to our actual point that how these principles together would create the problem, we would find the brilliance in Garrett's argument. Garrett argues that the sixth point is a "commonsense belief" that different people may have qualitatively similar perceptions at the same time. Even Hume would also allow this point without any hesitation.

[440]We have discussed sufficiently regarding the placeless perceptions in the first chapter of this thesis. According to Hume, except visual and tangible perceptions, other perceptions such as sound, taste, smell, passions, and moral reflections are not conjoined with spatial locations. We have seen Hume's specific reasons for this classification.
[441] Garrett, *Cognition and commitment*, 180-181.
[442] Garrett, *Hume*, 82-86.

For the clarification, take the example which we have seen in the above paragraph. If two persons A and B, for instance, observe the perception of clapping and after a small time gap the perception of sound. From this observation, both believe the clap (cause) is followed by the sound (effect). Here the perception of the sound's occurrence in two individuals is qualitatively similar and simultaneous. Garrett argues that these two simultaneous perceptions "share exactly the same resemblance relation with other objects" so they cannot be differentiated with regarding the principle of resemblance. They can only be differentiated with regarding causal relations. But since the two perceptions are qualitatively similar, they can only be differentiated with relating to either spatial location or temporal locations. But then again since they are placeless and simultaneous perceptions, they are not even differentiated with these two conditions. Therefore, Garrett further argues, there is only one possibility that the two similar and simultaneous perceptions either belong to the one mind (or person) or neither of the two perceptions will belong to the mind. It implicitly says a point is that they belong to the only one mind and they do not exist in any other mind. In such cases, Garrett argues, it is very difficult to "represent ourselves to ourselves".[443] That means, in his view, to say this particular perception—among the two simultaneous and similar—is belong to my mind. This sort of difficulty not merely happens with our perceptions related to the physical objects but also related to our passions and other perceptions.

On the ground of these assumptions, Garrett argues that Hume's views about the principles of causation and resemblance are inadequate to "explain adequately the nature of our representation of the human mind" when two similar and simultaneous perceptions would occur in the two minds. In such typical cases, he says, individuation is possible either with respect to "spatial location" or any other "substitute", namely, either all our perceptions must "inhere in mental substance" or the mind has to find "real necessary connections among perceptions." Garrett asserts that since Hume rejects the notion of "spatial location for minds", he correctly thinks these alternative substitutions are the only ways to get rid of this sort of problem.[444] Garrett says this incapability—with the help of the two cognitive principles of resemblance and causation—of the proper explanation of "representation of the self" to oneself is the "heart" of Hume's problem in the "*Appendix*" regarding the notion of personal identity.

[443] Garrett, *Cognition and Commitment*, 182.
[444] Ibid., 186.

The reason Garrett finds out for Hume's dissatisfaction is ingenious. It is not an unaccountable objection. It seems true that the propositions together give an opinion that the two perceptions will belong to one mind; they do not exist in other minds since we are not able to differentiate them relating to spatial or temporal locality or to the relation of resemblance. As Garrett shows this opinion is incompatible with our commonsense belief that several people may have similar perceptions simultaneously. Even if we admit the existence of these simultaneous and similar perceptions in the "same mind", as Garrett shows, either they might be the two simultaneous effects having a single cause or they are the two simultaneous causes of a consequent effect.[445] This is quite objectionable according to Hume's principle of causation because assuming a cause gives two simultaneous and qualitatively similar effects in one mind is not conceivable. But it seems quite difficult to individuate persons if we are in this kind of typical circumstances unless we take into consideration the notion of spatial locality.

Has Hume really faced this problem? If he has really faced this problem, why did he not mention in the "*Appendix*"? Why has he only stressed on the first two principles that we have seen in the above mentioned list of the propositions? In the "*Appendix*", he seems to have expressed the problem is arising with these two particular principles only. Moreover, we can see in the *Treatise* and "*Appendix*" that Hume has maintained that the perceptions in the mind are "distinct existences" and "they are felt to be connected together and naturally introduce each other."[446] We can make clear the point from these sorts of claims is that each perception in the mind is temporally contiguous and we feel a smooth transition from one perception to another. It implies that assuming the occurrence of two simultaneous perceptions that too two similar perceptions in one mind and assuming one perception smoothly introduces another perception—for instance, the simultaneous perception of the sound smoothly introduces another perception of the sound—among the two similar and simultaneous perceptions is unintelligible. Therefore, Hume would not accept this sort of two similar and simultaneous perceptions' occurrence in one mind.

However, Garrett's proposed problem in Hume's account is not easily escapable unless we make clear about Hume's intentions regarding the notion of spatial locality of the perceptions. In order to understand Hume's intentions, we must have to focus on some important points: firstly, in the very introduction of the *Treatise*, Hume clearly expressed the

[445] Garrett, *Hume*, 239.
[446] Hume, *Treatise*, 635.

aim of his project is the understanding of human nature based on "experience and observation."[447] This expression is implicitly suggesting he has presupposed human existence. As a naturalist philosopher, he would not disagree with the point that every human being is an individual and they are different from other individuals with regards to different sorts of properties including spatial positions.

Secondly, already we have discussed Hume's explanations regarding our attribution of "perfect identity" to the external objects on the grounds of the principles of "constancy" and "coherence". This claim makes the point very clear that our attribution is not merely based on the object's properties but also spatial properties of it. Hume's mountain example and the fire example clearly give the hint that the spatial property also plays a key role in our thinking they are the same objects through time respectively.[448] In short, we can see explicitly the role of spatial contiguity in our attribution of identity to external objects.

And thirdly, it is true that in the case of our attribution of sameness to the mind, Hume did not give much importance to spatial contiguity. Already we have discussed Hume's views regarding the placeless perceptions and the perceptions conjoined with space sufficiently in the section "*Of immortality of the soul*". There he explicitly said that enquiring the spatial location of simple perceptions, thought, for instance, lead various "uncertain speculations" such as if they are conjoined with space then which side of the material part, brain, for instance, it occupies. The questions such as whether it occupies right side or left side or front side or back side of the brain or it occupies a single cell or the whole material substance would never give a satisfactory answer. With this sort of explanation, Hume has tried to show the limitations of human understanding. However, he explained our experience of "temporal contiguity" and "constant conjunction" of these sorts of perceptions is sufficient to think they are in the domain of causal relations.

Our discussion so far tells the point clearly is that though, as Hume thinks, we are not able to show the locality of particular perceptions in a human brain but Hume would not say they are occurring in the air. He, as a philosopher who tried to investigate the nature of human being based on experience, would say they belong to a particular human individual

[447] Hume, *Treatise*, "Introduction", xx.

[448] See for more information regarding the principles of "constancy" and "coherence" and their role in our attribution of perfect identity to the objects in the third section of the second chapter of this thesis. There we found the point that we attribute the sameness to the fire at time T_2 even though the fire is not in the same position like time T_1. To attribute sameness to the fire, its spatial location plays a substantial role along with other related ideas.

and that particular human individual is different from other human individuals with regard to different properties including spatial properties. I think Galen Strawson seems to have rightly pointed out that "we can and should take spatial contiguity to be a necessary part of constant conjunction when judging of cause and effect for almost all practical purposes, but we have no reason to insists that it is a necessary condition of causation when we speculate about the ultimate nature of things like mind and body."[449] Hume seems to have explained appropriately with the two principles of how we attribute sameness to the mind without much bothering about the spatial location of it. In addition, already we have discussed sufficiently in the second part of the third chapter of this thesis how Hume has repeatedly insisted the point that a person is always conscious of his/her own mind while focusing on the past perceptions and anticipating future perceptions. Also we have discussed Hume's explanations of how the person is aware of his/her own self from others by communicating with them. These sorts of claims are implicitly suggesting the point that Hume presupposed human existence and the individuation of it before going to investigate human nature based on experience. Therefore, we could think, Hume's worry might not be with the spatial location of the mind as Garrett supposed.

Galen Strawson's interpretation of Hume's problem in the "*Appendix*" is also significant because he partly agreed and partly disagreed with Garrett's view that we shall see in the next section.

4.5. Galen Strawson's Interpretation Regarding Hume's Real Problem in the *Appendix*

Though Strawson admits Garrett's view up to some extent—both agreed on the point that within the empirical domain Hume had tried to explain the underlying principles which cause to form beliefs regarding the persisting self over time and the necessary connection among two objects—but he says, unlike Garrett, Hume's explanation of the problem regarding how we form a belief regarding the simplicity and perfect identity of the self with the association principles is adequate. Therefore, he argues, the problem is not "the Problem of Detail"[450] but a different one. His interpretation of Hume's actual problem is as follows.[451] Strawson says,

[449] Galen Strawson, *The Evident Connexion,* 124-124.
[450]Galen Strawson, *The Evident Connexion,* 136. According to Strawson's argument, many people claimed Hume's problem is the "Problem of Detail." For him, "the Problem of Detail" tells that Hume had failed to explain how these association principles (I-principles) lead us to come to believe in the simplicity and diachronic identity of the self. Strawson argues that Hume explained this process successfully with the "I-principles" therefore Hume had claimed it is "a promising aspect." Therefore, he insists, Hume's problem is not "the problem of Detail." (See for more information, ibid., 117, and 136).
[451]Ibid., 154-156.

in fact, Hume's problem is not unclear as some thinkers assumed. It is clear for Hume that he found only "metaphysically" loosened perceptions when he introspects with an empiricist's eye. Also, the point is explicitly clear that Hume does not uphold that the chance alone could connect those loosened perceptions. Rather, Hume had clearly expressed they are "objectively" related together by particular relations, namely, resemblance and causation. Moreover, he continues, Hume thinks these are the "uniting principles" which bind the distinct and separate perceptions together. Therefore, he says, it clearly implies that Hume is already committed to a "real connection". Hence, Hume's account doesn't really have a problem. Strawson insists, what Hume really needs is an "*observable*" and therefore "intelligible real connection."[452] Hume needs these observable real connections in order to give the legitimate notion of mind. In other words, Hume tries to give a genuine account without giving up the empiricist philosophy. Strawson tries to explain it more clearly that Hume assumes the existence of the mind that has certain faculties. But, he says, the problem is the "principle-governed faculties" can't be observable. Our strict empirically acceptable account of the nature of mind would not provide any place for those faculties except loosened perceptions. Strawson said that Hume had realized and confessed this "ignorance" in the "*Appendix*".[453]

However, Strawson suggests that if Hume would commit to his claim that *I-principles'* existence is the part of the "unknown essence of the mind" and causes of these principles must be resolved into "*original* qualities of human nature"[454] then there would be no problem in Hume's account. He writes: "whatever constitutes the existence of these faculties, Hume may say, is part of the 'unknown … essence' of the mind."[455] This suggestion appears more

[452] Regarding this phrase "real connection", Strawson and Garrett both expressed similar views about what exactly Hume's intention is. The phrase "real connection" means a connection between two objects that is not simply the construction of imagination but an independent relation. To speak, it is a relation more than the association principles. Moreover, Strawson reminds us that Hume did not use this term "real connection" in the *Enquiries* he simply uses "connection" (See Don Garrett, *Cognition and commitment*, 181, and Strawson, *The Evident Connexion*, 103, footnote 3).

[453] Galen Strawson, *The Evident Connexion*, 149.

[454]Ibid., 149. Strawson reminds how Hume had considered these "I-principles" in pre-*Appendix*. According to Strawson, Hume thinks these principles connect the successive perceptions, therefore, they can be "taken as a given" in our experience (see, ibid., p.148). Moreover, he says, Hume thinks these "I-principles" lead human beings, "with the utmost reliability," to believe the continuity of the physical objects and the necessary connection between two objects (cause and effect), and the persisting self by observing the successive perceptions. In other words, these principles help to form a belief, which are "irresistible" principles of the imagination, regarding objects and causation, and the self as if their real continuity is genuine (See for more information, ibid., 114). Also, Strawson said that since Hume comfortably commit that these principles' existence is part of "unknown essence of the mind", he thinks he can explain our beliefs regarding the above-mentioned cases within the "empiricist philosophy" (see for more information, ibid., 149).

[455]Ibid., 156.

or less similar to Penelhum's suggestion, who suggests if we consider the relations such as "resemblance", "causal interrelatedness", "gradual changes", "conspiracy to a common end" as "real bonds" among the successive parts then there would be no problem in our ascription of identity to objects. However, Strawson says, since Hume wants to solve the problem within the empiricist philosophy, it would be difficult to find the place for the faculties, in particular, the faculty of imagination, except for loosened perceptions.

Unlike the many commentators, who try to give various reasons for Hume's dissatisfaction with his own account in the "*Appendix*", Eugenio Lecaldano argues Hume is not expressing dissatisfaction in the "*Appendix*" but suggesting to the readers that in order to understand the complete picture of personal identity one must have to comprehend the notion of self in the other two Books. Lecaldano's arguments regarding this different look we shall examine in the next section.

4.6. Eugenio Lecaldano's Interpretation of Hume's Treatment of Personal Identity with Reference to Sentiments and Morality

Eugenio Lecaldano, in his paper "The Passions, Character, and the Self in Hume", tries to give his arguments in favor of two different accounts of the self. It seems the objection of two different accounts of the self is not clear. Already we have seen Lecaldano's brief suggestion in the introduction of this chapter. That is, in the "*Appendix*" to the First Book, Hume is warning the readers while stressing more "mature reflection" is needed. Lecaldano's principal argument is that Hume had given this "mature" account of the self in the other two Books. Therefore, he opines, Hume, in the "*Appendix*", is giving implicit suggestion to the readers, that one must not stop with personal identity with Book 1 to know the true nature of the self but they must have to consider the importance of the self in other two Books. Lecaldano had raised an objection regarding J. L. McIntyre's view about Hume's theory of the self in two Books. According to McIntyre, he says, Hume had given the same theory of self in two Books, that is, the self is nothing but a "succession of perceptions". Lecaldano argues that this view is not true. According to his arguments, the self that Hume had presented in Book 2 as the object of pride and humility is "a new and original" self[456] whereas, the self which is discussed in Book 1 is the object of "intuition". In other words, as Lecaldano puts it, Hume tries to derive the self, which has the nature of simplicity and continuity over time and also not dependent on anything else, from the action of the mind as an object of "intuition". On

[456] Eugenio Lecaldano, "The Passions, Character, and the Self in Hume," *Hume Studies* Volume XXVIII, no. 2 (November 2002): 179-180. muse.jhu.edu/article/385862.

the other hand, he says, Hume described the self in Book 2 as an object of passions from which the self is not separable. In other words, the self is not independent from the passions. Additionally, he argues that in the case of self as the object of intuition we can reject the possibility of the reality of self in relation to external sense-impression. In short, we can reject the representation of the self as another object. Whereas, the self is an object of passions, which is "simple and original", we can explain the possibility of the reality of the self in connection with the impressions of reflection. In short, he argues, the self in Book 2 exclusively has the relation with the "universe of actions and sentiments."[457]

Additionally, Lecaldano argues that Hume proposed a new ground for morality which is not based on the "speculative metaphysics". The new ground is based on sentiments and passions. Hence, he suggests, one must understand Hume's account of the self from the viewpoint of passions and morality.[458] Unlike the self in Book 1, he argues, Hume's discussions regarding self in Book 2 and 3 leave no space for doubts about the question of "who we are". The reason Lecaldano gives is that Hume had clearly explained the appearance of self in us at the moment these particular passions arise. This appearance is a "simple mental event" with the nature of more vividness. Not only this, Lecaldano continues, the whole problems related to the continuity of the self over time also resolves when these passions arise in us since these passions directly have the relationship with one's own past. Besides this, he says, our awareness of the self gives a "sure indication" to everyone that the things that are related to us and things that relate to other than ourselves.[459] In other words, our awareness tells us which things belong to us and with whom we have the relation. While reminding Hume's claim that the self is an object of pride and humility that is determined by human nature, Lecaldano tries to emphasize a point that our past self appears completely "real and distinct" from other selves whenever we feel proud about things closely related to us. He says,

> The self, then, is the object of pride, a particular object determined by an original and natural instinct. But the self as object of pride is not the same metaphysical self that Hume investigates in Book 1. The self of pride is not, that is, a product of the imagination or of the association of ideas. The ontological nature of the self in Hume is presented not in connection with the metaphysical and epistemological position

[457] Lecaldano, "The Passions," 180.
[458] Ibid. Lecaldano argues that Hume's moral psychology is different from Kant's moral theory though both developed morality in the context of practical activity. He disagrees with Purviance who labeled Hume and Kant's theories as "a fact of Agency Theory". Rather, he named Hume's proposal as a "Fact of *Sentiment* Theory" (see for more information, Ibid. 180).
[459] Ibid., 181.

> advanced in his discussion of intellectual understanding, but rather as an original and primary fact in the emotional world of the passions and morality.[460]

From this interesting quote, Lecaldano is insisting the point clearly that according to Hume's view the self as the object of pride is determined by the natural instinct of human nature. Therefore, it is not the same self as he had discussed in Book 1 and also it is not the product of the imagination or association of ideas, where he tries to prove "simplicity" and "perfect identity" of the self is a fiction. Rather, Lecaldano says, the self as the object of pride is a primary fact. Therefore, he argues further, thinking the reality of the self is either the product of "intellectual understanding" or anything at all is nothing but stopping ourselves from understanding the "reality of the self is, precisely, a matter of passions and sentiments.[461] In addition to that, Lecaldano says, Hume's sharp distinction between two different passions pride and love[462] also gives us a clear picture that the way Hume rejects the wrong standpoint which he had advanced in Book 1, that is, awareness of the self as a process of "representation" of another object. Therefore, Lecaldano argues, it is clear in the case of pride the self appears as a real object without the need of representing anything external. Moreover, he argues, while claiming moral qualities, namely, virtues and vices, are the principal causes of our pride and humility, Hume tries to show the connection between self as the object of pride and moral self. Therefore, through a "contingent and psychological necessity" Hume introduces a necessary connection between the two sorts of selves.[463] Making this connection, he insists, Hume had maintained not only the passions are central to the explanation of the self but personal character, which is shaped by moral qualities, is also central to Hume's explanation of the self. In this Humean view, he argues, our awareness of self as an object of the personal character helps us to look at ourselves from a broader perspective. So to speak, we observe not only our particular state of mind but also our character as a whole. Also, he says, in this view, the awareness of self appears to us more vividly as the personal character that can be understood as "approbation" or "disapprobation" for its moral actions from a general perspective.[464] He further argues, like in the case of passions, our self-awareness as the personal character is not the product of "intellectual understanding" as well as a mere collection of memories. Rather, it is a vivid sentiment that

[460] Lecaldano, "The Passions," 182.
[461] Ibid.
[462] It is true that Hume clearly made a distinction between the two different sets of passions, namely, pride and humility, and love and hate. The Former passions are direct towards one's own self and the latter passions are direct towards other selves. Hume's theory regarding these passions, we have discussed in the second part of chapter three of this thesis (see for more information, 82-89).
[463] Lecaldano, "The Passions," 185.
[464] Ibid.

appears instinctively and originally in everyone's mind. Also, this appearance of the self could not be reducible to anything else. In other words, it is not subject to analysis in parts. Moreover, the awareness of the self is not reducible to mere successive perceptions, rather, the feeling of the endurance of the self "constantly reappears" originally in us whenever we feel a certain passion or have thought about a particular action. This sentiment tends us to attribute identity to the self. It is clear, he argues, Hume had succeeded to show a person's character as being virtuous or vicious is the center of that person's awareness.[465] Besides these arguments, Lecaldano argues that if we make a bridge between our awareness of the self and the moral sentiments moved by the qualities of our character in general, we can understand appropriately the nature of the self, that is, "continuity, stability and the individuality of the self."[466] His explanation is as follows: the moment in which we feel the pride of our virtues the self appears as a character with "continuity, stability and the individuality" that gives importance to our feelings of moral responsibility regarding our actions and choices. He stresses "It is on this system of valuation that we base that minimum of self-esteem necessary to make us proud of ourselves and thus able to go on peacefully with our lives."[467] Not only this, he argues further, but also connecting self-awareness with moral sentiment leads us to reflect on one's own conduct. Also, it allows a person to overcome the violent passions.[468]

However, Lecaldano tries to make a point clear that connecting awareness of one's own self with personal character does not necessarily mean reducing the self to the character. It is because, he says, though Hume told us it is not possible for the mind to alter the character in any considerable views, Hume himself admit that a person may change his/her character. Therefore, in his view, explaining self in terms of the personal character is not a reductionism. In fact, he says, Hume's explanation of the appearance of the self as impression or idea in terms of passions and therefore character "reveals that one of his goals". That is, "to naturalize not only the sentiment of moral responsibility, but the very moral subject itself, understood as a whole."[469]

Regarding Hume's views on our sentiments of moral responsibility and moral subjects, not only Lecaldano but also Don Garrett opined the same. According to Garrett, Hume makes

[465]Lecaldano, "The Passions," 187.
[466] Ibid., 190.
[467] Ibid.
[468] Ibid., 190-191.
[469] Ibid., 190.

moral distinctions on the basis of human psychology. Hume does this because he thinks that challenging and understanding the process of moral assessment within "our own psychology" will help to strengthen our "moral commitments". Consequently, this sort of understanding helps us to disprove the "irregular" and "unstable" impacts on our moral evaluations.[470] In other words, Garrett says, Hume thinks this way of understanding the very subject of morality within our psychology leads us to understand the assessment process "itself is one of which we can and must approve."[471]

As we have seen, regarding Hume's views on moral subjects, both interpretations are telling a common point that Hume thinks connecting our self-awareness with moral sentiments gives a better possibility to a person to reflect on his/her own conduct. Also, it helps us to recognize the "unstable" impacts on our moral evaluations. In that way, a person tries to overcome the violent passions in his/her life.

Though Garrett and Lecaldano's interpretation of Hume's naturalizing the subject of morality on the basis of our own psychology is similar but their interpretations of Hume's account of the self is not similar that we have already seen in the foregoing passages.

However, as Lecaldano emphasized, it might be true that Hume might suggest to his readers that one must have to read three books to get a clear picture of the "science of man".[472] Hume also clearly mentioned in Book 1 that we cannot imagine ourselves without

[470] Garrett, *Cognition and commitment*, 203.
[471] Ibid., 204.
[472] It is true that not only Lecaldano but also many others suggested that in order to understand human nature as a whole, one must not stop reading with the section of personal identity in Book 1, rather, one must have to read the other two Books. For instance, Udo Thiel says that Hume discussed issues related to the problem of personal identity in two Books of the *Treatise* because he wanted to say the issues discussed in two books are an integral part of the "science of human nature". Moreover, unlike Lecaldano, he says, Hume did not give two different theories of personal identity but he explains personal identity, which has two related features, in two different books. Hume tried to deal with the first feature, which explains how we form the belief about personal identity, in the section of personal identity. Since he cannot at the same time deal with the second feature with the first feature of personal identity, he discussed it in the second Book. Moreover, Thiel says that nowhere Hume has mentioned the second theory is needed, rather, he only insisted the clear explanation of this concept needs more space (see for more information, Thiel, *The Early Modern Subject*, 385 and 397-398). Interestingly, Galen Strawson also implicitly insisted on the importance of the second and third books of the *Treatise* in which Hume gives a detailed account of the origin of the self and its relation with passions and moral concerns. In a footnote, Strawson's view is as follows: "Hume later comes to think that Kames gives a better account of the origin of the idea of a persisting self.… I take it that here Hume means Kame's account of the origin of our idea or belief in a persisting self—'man…has an original feeling, or conscious of himself, and of his existence, which for the most part accompanies every one of his impressions and ideas, and every action of his mind and body' (Kames 1751:231-2)—if only because Kames further remarks (e.g. 'this consciousness or perception of self is, at the same time, of the liveliest kind. Self-preservation is everyone's peculiar duty; and the vivacity of this perception, is necessary to make us attentive to our own interest' (1751: 232)) are very close to Hume's own published views in Books 2 and 3 of the *Treatise"* (see for the information, Galen Strawson, *The Evident*

perceptions.[473] Though Hume did not say explicitly as Lecaldano expressed that we may exclude the possibility of the reality of self from sense impressions, he explicitly said the idea of the self generates with two passions. This implies that we can exclude the possibility of the reality of the self from the sense impressions, and at the same time, we can understand the possibility of the reality of the self from secondary impressions. As Lecaldano said, our awareness of passions and personal character gives a strong sentiment of the continuity of the self. Moreover, as he explained, Hume seems to "naturalize" the self while explaining it with reference to passions and personal character. Despite the fact, Lecaldano does not tag Hume as a reductionist while showing some of the textual evidence, for instance, a person can change his/her character. Up to this extent, Lecaldano's arguments seem quite agreeable. But, on the other side of the coin, Lecaldano's some of the arguments appear inconvincible. Firstly, it is evident that Hume had explained the idea of the self as the object of passions is determined by an "original and natural instinct" but he nowhere expressed, as Lecaldano did, the idea or impression of self is "simple".[474] Secondly, it is a fact that Hume had explained the passions' origin consequently the idea of the self with the help of association principles, in particular, the double association principles. Hume himself claimed our faculty of imagination easily transfers one idea to another and one impression to another by using these principles. So to say, Hume explicitly says, the faculty of imagination and passions mutually play a key role in concerning the past as well as future pains and pleasures.[475] Contrary to this, Lecaldano seems to undermine the role of imagination and consequently the association principles in the origin of passions and consequently the idea of self. Finally, Hume's definitions of the self tend us to think Hume might have maintained the same notion in different Books in the *Treatise*. Even in his work *Dialogues Concerning Natural Religion,* Hume appears to maintain the same definition. He writes: "What is the soul of man? A composition of various faculties, passions, sentiments, ideas; united, indeed, into oneself or person, but still distinct from each other."[476] This definition seems to be more or less the same as the definitions in the two books of the *Treatise*.

Connexion, 136-137). Therefore, we can understand the point clearly is that reading Hume's views on personal identity without considering the other two books of the *Treatise* is meaningless.

[473]Hume, *Treatise*, 252.

[474] Ibid., 286.

[475]Hume not only mentioned this point in the section "*Of personal identity*" but also, he explained elaborately in the second book that how the faculty of imagination and passions assist each other and helps us to concern ourselves with past and future pains and pleasures. See for more information, *Treatise*, 261, and 424-438.

[476]David Hume, *Essays and Treatises on Various Subjects: With a Brief Sketch of the Author's Life and Writings to Which are Added Dialogues Concerning Natural Religion (*Boston: J.P. Mendum, 35 Washington Street, 1849), 246, books.google.co.in>books.

It seems the problem of inconsistency is not solved. Because, on the one hand, Lecaldano's arguments supporting as if Hume had given a different account in the other two Books of the *Treatise*, where, according to Lecaldano, Hume explains the notion of self as neither a fiction nor a mere succession of perceptions but it appears in our awareness as a strong sentiment, which is original and natural instinct, with our passions and actions. On the other hand, Hume's definitions regarding the notion of self are supporting as if he did not change his view about the self, which is nothing but a succession of perceptions.

Regarding the unclarity between Hume's explanations, James Giles's interpretation may help us to better understand how the self, as the object of passions, appears in our awareness instantaneously and naturally as a strong sentiment without finding any disturbance in Hume's definition of the self. We shall discuss Giles's explanations in the following section.

4.7. James Giles' Psychological Explanation of How the Self as a Singular Perception Appears Instantaneously and Naturally within Our Awareness

We have seen in the above sections, James Giles's responses to various objections raised by different thinkers. In particular, Giles's response to Smith's objection that Hume had given two different notions regarding self is noteworthy. This objection arose because Hume explicitly used the phrase "idea or rather impression of ourselves" in Book 2 of the *Treatise*. While responding to this, Giles also finds a problem in Hume's explanations. He says it is true that Hume uses the idea or impression of the self as "singular perception" that we experience as the object of the two passions, namely, pride and humility. In addition, as he puts, Hume thinks this perception occurs "instantaneously" within our awareness. So to say in Hume's terminology this perception appears in us as an original instinct. Giles continues, it is also true that Hume told us there is no impression or idea of the self but only the "smooth and uninterrupted progress of thought in our imagination." In such cases, he argues, it is strenuous to understand how this "smooth and uninterrupted progress of thought" could occur suddenly within our awareness as a single perception. According to Giles, the principal reason for this doubt is that the notion of "uninterrupted progress of thought" is a "temporal notion". That means, it occurs over a period of time. Correspondingly, it is not easy to understand how such progress of thought could be an object of pride and humility in an instant.[477]

[477] James Giles, "The No-Self Theory," 190.

Giles claims that this difficulty is a major difficulty therefore it needs to be explained. According to him, Hume is quite aware that he needs different accounts to deal with this problem. This is the reason why Hume might have given two accounts of personal identity, specifically, "as it regards our thought" and "as it regards our passions". In the second Book, Giles says, Hume tries to give a picture of how an awareness of self as an object of passions would occur suddenly when we enter into a certain "emotional state" even though we observe only a train of perceptions. Whereas, in the first Book, Hume declared that the idea of the self and its identity is produced in our imagination when we reflect on successive perceptions. Giles tries to show a significant point here that though Hume does not explain the relation between these two accounts of personal identity, he evidently wants to say the two accounts are talking about the same self that is evident from his explanations of the self in the second Book.[478] Yet, Giles opines "his theory seems to require that the object of the passions be capable of appearing to awareness in a way that does not render it a succession."[479]

Giles tries to propose a suggestion which, he thinks, shows the way to deal with this problem. He says when we enter into a certain emotional state "what we are doing is not reflecting on a succession of related ideas (which could not be done at any one instant); rather we are latching on to a particular collection of some of these ideas which, by virtue of their being related, can instantaneously present themselves in a condensed form to our awareness."[480] In addition, he argues, this "condensed self-image" makes the point clear that even though we may have experiences of ourselves—as a singular perception—in our awareness of certain state of mind on various instances but on a closer inquiry we come to know this object of our awareness brings out nothing more than a compilation of related perceptions. It promotes nothing but a "no-self theory", he says.

In order to explain more clearly, Giles says this notion of "ourself" is born out of an investigation of our states of self-awareness. It is evident that in many instances we have no awareness of what we call self. Giles's example for this is that in our awareness of the activity of listening to music, there is no room for thinking of self. But when we shift our

[478] Regarding the relation between two accounts, Giles' argument is partly right. Because, though Hume does not explicitly explain the relation between two accounts of the personal identity but he implicitly gives, in the section *"Of personal identity"*, the relation between two accounts while saying how the identity "with regards to the passions serves to corroborate that with regard to the imagination" (see, *Treatise*, 261). However, Giles is right because, in the second book, though Hume elaborately discussed our self-concern with regards to passions but he nowhere mentioned explicitly the account of personal identity and its relation with the self that he had discussed in the first Book.
[479] James Giles, "The No-Self Theory," 190.
[480] Ibid., 190-191.

awareness to what we are doing there the awareness of listening to music would change and we enter into a state of "self-awareness". Therefore, he says, this "act of self-awareness" is a "reflective and complicated" action. That means, for him, this action involves two steps: firstly, bringing back our awareness from the flow of experience; secondly, introducing a further element into that particular experience. Taking this account into consideration, he stresses, the "self-awareness" can be called a "secondary phenomenon" because the object of it is not part of the basic framework of experience but "it is something which the experience itself fabricates and then takes as its object."[481] Moreover, Giles considers this self-awareness is a part of the "ontogeny of consciousness".[482]

Giles further argues that understanding of the self-awareness as a "reflective and complicated" process would help us to know the "phenomenology" of the "constructed self-image", which is the object of our self-awareness. Despite the fact that it is the object of self-awareness, in fact, it is made up merely by a collection of fleeting images. According to Giles's argument, the main feature of this object is nothing but the "condensation" of connected experiences. This particular feature helps the "self-image" to act as being a self. Since being a "condensation" of our experience, this "self-image" appears both as a "singular thing" as well as something where all the experiences inhere in it. Moreover, he explains, the reason for having the strong sentiment of continuity of the self—having the idea of identity over time—is that the experiences of "self-image" might be related to the different times of our life.[483]

According to Giles's view, this psychological process of shrinking numerous experiences into a single perception is a common process in our psychology. He writes "The psychological process of condensing several experiences into a single image or idea is not unique to the structure of self-awareness. On the contrary, it is a process commonplace in much of our psychology."[484] So to say, it is a natural process in human beings. Giles explains the possibility of this psychological process with an example. The example is as follows. When we call up an image of our friend we are not presented with a single image of our

[481]James Giles, "The No-Self Theory," 191.
[482]Ibid. Giles tries to explain the role of self-awareness in the "ontogeny of consciousness" while taking the explanations of the developmental psychologist Jerome Kagan who describes a sequence of four psychological functions. For kagan, Giles says, "the difficulty appears with the emergence of the fifth function, namely, the awareness of self as an entity with characteristics." In fact, he says, this is not too difficult if we observe the self as an object with variations. It is just what we have called the "constructed self-image". It is a collation of past experiences which presents itself in a "condensed form" to our awareness (see for more information, ibid., 192).
[483] Ibid., 193.
[484]Ibid.

friend. Rather, we find a number of different images of him/her that have been "collated" and "superimposed" upon one another. And at the same instant, those images would reveal the emotional feelings we have for him/her. In fact, those images are transient. Thus, some of their parts are being introduced, ousted and restored in an instant. However, as far as we keep our awareness of the image of our friend, an indefinite network of component images will continue. In the same way, Giles says, the "constructed self-image" is put together. His explanation is as follows: "When I enter a state of self-awareness, the I that is summoned before my consciousness is not a simple entity that infixes itself changelessly in my mind. It is rather a composite of various fading images which will have some reference to how I see and feel about myself."[485] His example for this is that when a person looks at his/her face in the mirror at a particular point of time, that particular image in the mirror "infused" with the features of his/her previous images of his/her face. The person sees his/her present facial shapes, for instance, cheeks, more like those of his/hers' a few years ago. Or, he/she would imagine the features that include in his/her face after twenty years.[486] This composite image of the person's face might itself be "superimposed" on some other familiar scenes, which occurred in their life. Those familiar scenes related to one's own life cause us to evaluate some emotional situations. Giles continues, like the other "condensed images", the "self-image" also has a momentary existence. Perceptions of it continuously change as new associations. Moreover, Giles says, the constituents of this "self-image" are naturally different from person to person. The reason is, for him, each person would perceive himself/herself in a different way. Therefore, he suggests, if someone wants to know what others "self-image" is they must have to ask them to explain "what it is they are aware of when they are aware of themselves."[487] That means, the idea of the self-image could depend upon the awareness of the thought process at a particular time. Therefore, he stresses, for some people, this "self-image" is an idealized image of their physical appearances, and for some others, it is a mixture of sensations and emotions and for some others, it may be images of how other persons respond to them.

[485] James Giles, "The No-Self Theory," 194.

[486]In Hume's view, thinking about the past and future is a natural quality of imagination. He explained the role of imagination briefly how it relates past and future with the present (see *Treatise*, 427-438). In particular, he says, "'tis obvious, that the imagination can never totally forget the points of space and time, in which we are existent; but receives such frequent advertisements of them from the passions and senses, that however it may turn its attention to foreign and remote objects…"(*Treatise*, 427-428). The point here is that Giles tries to insist that thinking about the past and future is a natural process in our psychology. Moreover, he seems to insist on the role of imagination in the process of self-awareness.

[487] James Giles, "The No-Self Theory," 195.

On the ground of these explanations, Giles concludes that Hume did not give two different accounts of personal identity in two books of the *Treatise*. His account of personal identity as it relating to imagination is, in fact, related to the notion of "constructed self-image" (or personal identity as it relating to passions or self-concern). Giles tries to give a clearer picture regarding this is that on the one hand, we have a strong feeling or belief that we are the same person now and a few years back because of the "smooth and uninterrupted progress of thought." This strong feeling of the continuity of the self is fabricated in our imagination when we reflect on our successive related ideas. Therefore, the self that we observed is "constructed" and its identity is "fictitious". On the other hand, he explains, the reason for our belief about having a perception of self in every moment of self-awareness is that our consciousness is being directed to an object. If we closely observe, the object is nothing more than a "condensed version of extract" from the "collated" and "superimposed" ideas. For him, two points are very clear in both cases: firstly, what we come upon is merely a collection of experiences; and secondly, we won't find any simple and individual self that is beyond the perceptions.[488]

From Giles's elaborative explanations, we can deduce a few noteworthy points. Primarily, unlike Lecaldano, he tried to show Hume does not propose two different sorts of accounts. According to him, the self, which is the object of pride and humility, is not a simple entity but a condensed and constructed image which appears instantaneously in our self-awareness when we enter into a certain state of emotions. If we closely examine, we can understand it is nothing more than a successive and connected perceptions. This particular point is very similar to Garrett's interpretation of Hume's notion of self. As we have seen, for Garrett, Hume uses the term self as an abstract idea. If we closely observe, for him, we find only particular perceptions having some common features, namely resemblance and causal relation. However, Giles explained Hume's notion of self in terms of human cognitive psychology. In Giles's view, this condensation of different perceptions into a single image in our self-awareness is a very common process in human psychology. That is, in the Humean language, we can understand this appearance of self-image as the object of two passions is a natural and original instinct. This feature of condensation helps to self-image to act as a singular perception as well as something that holds all perceptions. Also, we get the strong sentiment of the continuity of the self over time because we observe perceptions, which belong to different stages of our life. Therefore, he argues, personal identity with regards to

[488]James Giles, "The No-Self Theory," 197-198.

thought and personal identity with regards to self-concern is not two separate accounts but related. Two accounts give the same idea regarding the self. Regarding this particular point, Lecaldano might misunderstand Hume's notion while arguing that Hume, in the second Book, had given a different notion of self which is more than a succession of perceptions and not analyzable into parts. Secondly, like Lecaldano, Giles also thinks this self is not independent of the perceptions; therefore, it is a result of a reflective or secondary phenomenon. Therefore, we can exclude the possibility of the reality of the self from sense impressions. Thirdly, like Lecaldano, Strawson, Garrett and Pike, Giles also strongly emphasizes the point that Hume does reject the self, which is narrated by his predecessors who claim self is a simple and individual entity. Finally, unlike Strawson and Garrett who argued Hume's account is a reductionist account, and like Lecaldano who explicitly argued Hume while explaining self in terms of passions and personal character does not reduce self to passions and character, Giles strongly insists that Hume does not reduce self into any specific area such as body, memory and so on.

Regarding this reductionism, Giles's arguments are as follows. He says Hume is not a reductionist philosopher in this particular theory. Rather, he is a "no-self theorist". According to his view, though there is a common agreement between reductionism and no-self theory, that is, both theories explicitly reject the idea of an underlying metaphysical self which exists beyond the compilation of perceptions but they differ in their specific views. That is, he says, the former theory "go on to resurrect the self and consequently its identity in terms of putative psychological relations or various theories of the body."[489] Whereas, the latter theory rejects all such kinds of theories and insists we should not reduce the concepts such as self and personal identity to mere theories of psychology, or bodies. In other words, they "eliminate" the notion of self and its identity in a strict sense and consider it as a fiction. However, Giles argues, "Within the no-self theory we can…eliminate the notion of the self and its identity, and yet on pragmatic grounds continue to permit the use of the language of the personal identity."[490] Additionally, Giles gives another related point which shows a difference between reductionist theory and no-self theory. That is, in Giles's view, since reductionists try to give an account of personal identity, their account already accepts a particular view into which it tries to fix the structure of human existence. In other words, as a reductionist, we kept sufficient presuppositions in our hands before dealing with such kinds

[489] James Giles, "The No-Self Theory," 175.
[490] Ibid., 176.

of problems. Therefore, he argues, this account cannot clarify accounts of how we go through our experience. In short, it leads to disguise. On the other hand, he argues, "no-self theory" has no such anterior agreements. Regarding the flexibility of this theory, Giles says,

> It starts with an examination of experience rather than with an attachment to the project of how to account for personal identity. This does not mean, of course, that the no-self theory need not face the issue of why someone might come to believe in his own identity. For if there is no such thing as personal identity, then it is essential that we can offer some other account of why someone might be led to think there is.[491]

Giles's argument here is that no-self theory examines our experiences and offers explanations—instead of holding specific presuppositions—why someone might come to believe there is identity in a strict sense and there is an entity called self that is simple and individual and holds all experiences in it. Therefore, Giles stresses, one can see in David Hume's writing this sort of tactic to the problem of personal identity.[492]

Though Lecaldano and Giles' interpretations are different in some exceptions, both have expressed the same opinion while insisting a common point that Hume is not a reductionist regarding the concept of personal identity. Also, it appears both think that Hume had tried to explain the impression of self as the "product of process" and its identity is a strong feeling. Moreover, they think, he tried to "naturalize" the role of passions and morality in human life understood as a whole from different aspects.

4.8. Conclusion

From our discussion so far, we can understand clearly a point. The point is that many interpretations regarding Hume's treatment of personal identity are misinterpretations. Reid, Merian, Passmore, Penelhum and Smiths' objections clearly show how Hume's views are misinterpreted. However, as Strawson opined, it is true that if Hume wants real connections among the loosened perceptions, Hume's entire investigation of human nature would become worthless since within his empiricist philosophy it is not possible to find such kind of connections. It might be an actual reason for Hume's dissatisfaction if he really has a problem with his explanation. Nevertheless, Lecaldano's new look of the "*Appendix*" makes us to think about the importance of Hume's project. As Lecaldano suggested, if we understand Hume's theory of self which is discussed in other two books instead of stopping with the first, we can appreciate Hume's explanation of self in terms of passions and moral character

[491] James Giles, "The No-Self Theory," 176.
[492] Ibid.

which are central to his entire project. Moreover, as Lecaldano and Don Garrett opine, we can understand a significant point, that is, Hume thinks connecting our self-awareness with moral sentiments gives a better possibility to a person to reflect on one's own conduct. Also, it helps us to recognize the "unstable" impacts on our moral evaluations. In that way, a person tries to overcome the violent passions in his/her life. We can understand this method of approach towards ourselves is nothing but naturalizing the moral subject itself. And also, as Giles argued, we have to comprehend a point that Hume has proposed only one theory regarding the self, namely, "no-self" theory. Even though he proposed this kind of theory, as Giles thinks, it gives a more scope to investigate why we have strong beliefs regarding the simple, continued and individual self despite of the fact that we have no impression of such kind. In short, if one can understand Hume's theory of self as a whole then the understanding would give a more scope to devalue many illegitimate beliefs in one's own life. Consequently, one can make his/her own life fruitful while evaluating his/her actions in a proper way.

CONCLUSION

As we have seen, the central focus of this thesis is the problem of personal identity, in particular, David Hume's treatment of it. And, we have discussed the related arguments of this problem in four major chapters.

In the first chapter, we have discussed the pre-Humean concept of personal identity since this discussion gives a clue as to what reasons motivated Hume to consider this problem as the most serious one. We have examined two sorts of arguments. The first kind of argument explicitly says a simple, individual and continued self without any changes is the principal criteria for the identity of a person through time. It is neither the body nor anything else constitutes the identity since change is the principal feature of them. We have seen these sorts of arguments are promoted by Rene Descartes, Leibniz, Butler, and Thomas Reid. The second kind of arguments, which is promoted by John Locke, in particular, says we have only simple ideas of the qualities of the mind and body, namely, thought and extension respectively. We have no perception or true knowledge of either the mind or the body. Therefore, assuming self, of which we have no true knowledge, would constitute the identity through time is illegitimate. Even though we assume the same self would continue in a person, if there is no consciousness of one's own past actions then it is meaningless to punish or reward. Since a person is considered a "Forensick" term which tells a person is subject to moral evaluations, assuming the sameness of consciousness alone constitutes the identity through time is a legitimate assumption. From these two sets of arguments, we can say up to some extent Locke's assumptions are noteworthy since as he said without having the true knowledge of the substance of the mind assuming it constitutes the identity of a person and considering it the subject of moral evaluations is illegitimate. However, as Leibniz, Butler and Reid argued, it is absurd to assume a person as different persons if he/she has no memory of his/her past actions. As they argued, it is really a threat to moral evaluations.

With a lot of uncertainty in the proposed solutions to the problem of personal identity, we have examined David Hume's arguments regarding this problem since he has developed a novel theory. In the second chapter, we have discussed Hume's significant arguments regarding some of the important concepts which worked as presuppositions and led Hume to propose a new theory. First of all, we have examined Hume's classification, which is more innovative and unambiguous, of the perceptions into impressions and ideas and further classification of the memory and imagination ideas on the basis of the peculiar feature of

them, namely, vivacity. We can say this precise classification helps Hume to develop the project of the "science of man". Then, we have seen Hume's proposed four important principles on the ground of this peculiar classification, namely, copy principle, separability principle, conceivability principle, and association principle. In order to derive the particular relation between the ideas and impressions, to find the origin of different ideas, to find the possibility of the real existence of the objects, and to find the various relations among the perceptions, these four principles play a key role respectively. Hume seems to have rightly argued that we can investigate the certainty of many established concepts such as the necessary connection between cause and effect, the immateriality or materiality of the substance, inherence of qualities in a simple and individual substance, our ideas of time and space, and our assumptions regarding the question of personal identity and so on with the help of these principles. In particular, the way Hume's explanation regarding the association principles—resemblance, contiguity, and causation—and their specific functions in order to develop different sorts of beliefs in us is more appreciable. In an elaborative manner, we have discussed Hume's critical investigation regarding the most typical problems, namely, the identity of the objects and the substantiality of the soul on the ground of these principles. Hume's arguments are interesting and thought-provoking. As we have seen, according to him, since our repeated observation of constant conjunction between events, we form strong beliefs regarding the real existence of the objects and their continued existence through time. In fact, it is the result of our confusion. On the one hand, our reflection says all objects in our mind are mere successive resembled perceptions. On the other hand, our mind forms the belief they are one and the same. To overcome the unbearable tension between these two stages, the faculty of imagination tends our mind to attribute perfect identity to objects. It is, indeed, a fictitious idea generated by the faculty of imagination. Also, Hume's point seems remarkable when he says philosophers are not exceptional; they ought to think like a common man regarding the existence of the objects and their continuity over time. In the final section of the chapter, we have examined his significant counter arguments regarding the established concept, namely, the concept of the immateriality of the substance and of the inherence of the perceptions in it. The remarkable point we have observed is that he has not only questioned the intelligibility of the arguments which are supporting the concept of immateriality of the soul, but also, he has questioned the intelligibility of the arguments supporting the concept of the materiality of the substance. For him, the principal reason is that we have no impression of the substance, therefore, arguing perceptions inhere in it is meaningless. While showing some perceptions are spatial and some other perceptions are nowhere but exist, Hume tried to

show the unintelligibility of the arguments of materialists as well as immaterialists regarding the nature of substance and the inherence of perceptions in it. We have seen his remarkable conclusion as well as suggestion on the ground of these sorts of claims is that we have to investigate the causal relation between matter and thought without much focusing on the substantiality of the soul and the inherence of the perceptions in it. Also, his phrase that "anything may produce anything" is also noteworthy because he tries to show how the disposition of the body can cause thought process and vice versa. We can comprehend Hume's all these proposed principles and deduced conclusions are worked as the presuppositions to his treatment of personal identity.

In the third chapter, we have discussed Hume's treatment of the problem of personal identity, which is the central focus of this thesis. According to Hume, whenever we introspect to our perceptions, we never find any simple and continued impression of the self throughout our life as some philosophers argue that we are always aware of ourselves and its simplicity and perfect identity. Rather, we find only a succession of perceptions having some relations among them. As we have seen, on the ground of these claims, he gives a controversial definition to the term self, that is, the self is nothing but a bundle of successive perceptions. For him, despite the fact, we have a strong belief of simplicity and the perfect identity of the self. We have seen, Hume has tried to discuss the reasons behind our belief regarding personal identity in two different parts, namely, personal identity with regards to thought or imagination and personal identity with regards to passions. We can say Hume's this decision is appreciable since, as he said, this problem is more complex and important.

From the first part, we have observed Hume's significant conclusions regarding our belief. First of all, the mental process of our attribution of perfect identity to the self is the same as our attribution of perfect identity to the object in the world. Therefore, as he mentioned, the perfect identity of the self is a fictitious notion that is generated by the faculty of imagination. And also, while explaining the limited but substantial role of the faculty of memory in generating the resemblance and causation principles, and consequently, in discovering the personal identity, Hume showed how Locke's account of personal identity is a mistaken one. Also, we have seen another significant conclusion that all our disputes relating to the perfect identity are mere verbal disputes if the faculty of imagination would not feign a "uniting principle" among the successive perceptions. Finally, we have seen the same principles play a key role even in the case of our attribution of simplicity to the self. In

short, in this part, Hume has tried to give a clear picture of how we attribute these particular qualities to the self even though we have no such kind of impressions.

From the second part, we have seen Hume's elaborative explanations of how we concern ourselves with the present, past, and future in particular situations. Hume's examination of the reasons behind our idea or impression of ourselves seems convincible. For him, the indirect passions—in particular, pride and humility—which are caused by pleasurable or painful impressions are the principal cause of this idea of self. These painful or pleasurable impressions we get from the various qualities of subjects either from the qualities of our body or from the mental qualities or from others' views about us. Specifically, the moral qualities of virtue and vice, which play a decisive role in a person's character, show greater importance on these passions and consequently the idea of the self. Whatever it may be the case, we never go beyond ourselves since all these passions (either direct or indirect) and the causes of the passions are related to the self. In short, we are always intimately conscious of our own self at any given point of time whenever the passions of pride and humility arise in us. Hume's simple analogy makes it clear that whenever we get the sensation of hunger, we get the idea of food. Here, the idea of food is the object of the sensation of hunger whereas in the case of passions the idea of the self is the object of the passions. With this analogy Hume tries to show us generating the idea of the self is a natural instinct. It means, no further proof is needed for this. In this whole mechanism, according to Hume, the double association principle—the association between ideas and the association between impressions—plays a significant role. In this way, as Hume thinks, we are concerned with ourselves whenever these particular passions arise in us. Importantly, that self is not independent of the passions of pride and humility. Also, we have examined Hume's remarkable explanations regarding how we are concerned with our past as well as with future interests. Regarding our concern with the past, in Hume's view, in our repeated self-survey our mind finds causal connections among our present pains and pleasures and related passions. And, regarding our concern with the future, our direct passions—for instance, hope and fear—together with "will" and interests we concern with our future which is, in fact, uncertain. In short, we can comprehend a point that the faculty of memory, imagination and the principles of it, and the particular passions together play a key role in our strong belief regarding the self and its perfect identity through time. Hume seems to have explained the whole process successfully from these two parts.

Finally, we have examined Hume's review on the section "*Of personal identity*" which he discussed in the "*Appendix*" to the first book of the *Treatise*. Even though he explicitly accepted the deduced conclusions regarding the self and its simplicity and perfect identity, he seems to appear he is dissatisfied with his own account. He says whatever we find the connections among the successive perceptions are merely felt connections, not real connections. In other words, the mind never finds any real connection among the distinct existences. Therefore, he says, in order to remove the difficulty of the problem of personal identity either we have to admit the simple and individual soul which binds all the distinct perceptions, or our mind has to find the real connection among the perceptions. But, regarding these both options, he seems to have maintained a skeptical attitude and admits that this problem is hard to understand. However, he gives a hopeful scope while saying this is not an "insuperable" difficulty. More mature reflections might solve the contradictions involved in this problem. First of all, it is not clear what exactly Hume's problem is and what that matured reflection is. However, it is true that this sort of dissatisfaction and hopes regarding the problem leaves a greater scope to many thinkers to criticize, or to suggest for a matured theory, or to defend, Hume's treatment of personal identity.

In the final chapter, we have critically discussed various thinkers' criticizing and defending arguments of Hume's treatment of personal identity. In the first section of the chapter, we have examined two important objections, namely, circularity objection and no clarity in Hume's usage of proper names, raised by J.B. Merian, Thomas Reid, etc. We have also examined noteworthy responses to these objections proposed by Nelson Pike, Galen Strawson, and James Giles. Regarding these two objections, as Pike, Strawson, and Giles argued, Hume's views seem to be misinterpreted. As they suggested, using personal pronouns or proper names —I, we, ourselves, Hume, etc.—might not be a problem to Hume's account since, first of all, they are not suggesting any persisting self, and moreover, we can use them for pragmatic purposes in order to analyze the mind in a proper way. And regarding the circularity objection, as Strawson argued, textual evidence suggests Hume never entertained a perception is possible without the perceiver. He only argued we have no perception of a simple and enduring self. Hume's main target is not to prove the certainty of existence but how we would come to have a belief in the "metaphysical" nature of the self, which is something simple and continued over time without any changes, and also, holds all experiences in it. Along with this, how we would form a belief in the "epistemological" view that this nature of the self we can know through our experience. We can think, as Strawson

argued, Hume succeeded in order to explain these beliefs with the help of association principles.

Also, in the second section, we have examined Penelhum's objections against Hume's views on the notion of identity and personal identity. We have also examined James Giles' noteworthy responses to Penelhum's objections. As Giles suggested, we must have to read Hume's arguments within the context otherwise it would lead us to miscomprehend Hume's entire project. As Giles argued, Penelhum does mistake, not Hume, in using the two senses of identity, namely, numerical and specific senses. However, as he said, textual evidence clearly shows Hume's main intention is not to distinguish the two senses of identity but while making the distinction Hume tries to show our attribution of perfect identity to objects in the world as well as to self is not a "strictest sense" of identity. It is a fictitious idea that is generated by the faculty of imagination. However, as Giles pointed out, Hume clearly said that all our disputes regarding the notion of identity are mere "verbal disputes" unless our faculty of imagination feigned a "principle of union", namely, a persisting self that binds all our loosened perceptions.

In the third section of the chapter, we have examined a most important objection that is raised by N. K. Smith. According to him, Hume's views are inconsistent regarding the self. We have observed considerable responses of Pike, Garrett, Giles to this particular objection. As they responded, it is true that even though Hume explicitly claims that we have no idea or impression of the self in the first book and we have always aware of the idea or impression of ourselves in the second book, a point is very clear that Hume's definition of the self in two books is not changed. Hume rejects only the idea or impression of the self that is simple, individual and persists through time. As Garrett suggested, Hume might have used the phrase the "idea or rather the impression" of the self because he considers it as an abstract idea like our ideas of time and space.

Next, in the fourth section, we have examined Don Garrett's interpretation of Hume's dissatisfaction. For Garrett, Hume's resemblance and causation principles failed to explain adequately how one can represent one's own self from another person when the two "numerically distinct" but "qualitatively identical" perceptions occur simultaneously in the minds of two individuals since Hume has not given importance to the spatial contiguity in our attribution of identity to the mind. However, our observation of the textual evidence is suggesting Hume's worry might not be the spatial locality of the mind. Even though Hume

did not give much importance to the role of spatial contiguity in our attribution of the sameness to the mind, he may not accept Garrett's specific reason for his worry. Hume would say every human individual is not only aware of his/her own perceptions and mind but also they are aware of differences between themselves and others by the awareness of different sorts of relations. Strawson's explanation seems quite acceptable regarding the spatial contiguity's role. As he said, the role of it is not "necessary part of constant conjunction" when we deal with subjects like the "ultimate nature of things like mind and body."

In the fifth section, we have examined Galen Strawson's noteworthy response to the interpretations like Hume's principles failed to explain the nature of mind. As Strawson insisted, Hume has successfully explained how we get the ideas of the "simplicity" and "perfect identity" of the self with the help of association principles therefore it is not the actual reason for Hume's dissatisfaction. As Strawson said, the actual reason might be this that Hume wants real connections among the loosened perceptions instead of felt connections. However, as he said, if it is the actual cause, it is very difficult to find these sorts of connections within the empiricist philosophy. Not only this but also Hume's entire project of "science of man" would be meaningless.

However, in the sixth section, we have examined completely a different kind of interpretation of the "*Appendix*" given by Lecaldano. As he said, Hume might have suggested to the reader that one must have to understand the self that is discussed in the three books of the *Treatise* for a matured account of the self. This kind of perspective we get because of the unclarity in the "*Appendix*" that tends us to think in this way. Though Lecaldano's underestimation of the importance of the faculty of imagination and the association principles in getting the idea of the self is inconvincible, most of the other claims are appreciable. In particular, as he said, Hume's explanations of the self in terms of passions and moral character might help us to understand Hume's main goal that is naturalizing the moral subject itself.

In the final section, we have scrutinized James Giles's significant arguments. He said Hume's theory needs some explanation of how a "smooth and uninterrupted progress of thought" could occur suddenly within our awareness as a single perception as the object of passions. From Giles's explanations, we can get some appreciable observations. Firstly, whatever we get the idea of the self as the object of passions from the "uninterrupted progress of thought" is nothing but the constructed self-image which, in fact, is nothing but the

"collated" and "superimposed" related perceptions. This self-image, having the feature of condensation of all related perceptions, acts as a singular perception and tends us to believe all perceptions inhere in it. Moreover, it tends us to believe it is a persisting thing. This sort of awareness of the self is a common process in human psychology. It is sufficient to prove, as he argued, Hume does not entertain two different views of the self; rather, Hume explicitly promoted no-self theory. As we have seen, unlike Garrett and Strawson, and like Lecaldano, Giles insisted Hume's theory of self is not a reductionist theory. Giles's reasons are convincing. The no-self theory, instead of reducing concepts such as self and personal identity to mere psychological theories or theories of the body, examines our experiences and offers explanations—instead of holding specific presuppositions—why someone might come to believe there is identity in a strict sense and there is an entity called self that is simple and individual and holds all experiences in it. As Giles pointed out, we can see this sort of specific approach in Hume's *Treatise*.

Briefly to say, many responses to the discussed objections clearly saying Hume's theory is, indeed, misinterpreted. Unclarity in the "*Appendix*" might be a reason for these sorts of misinterpretations. As Strawson said, if Hume wants real connections among the loosened perceptions, it is difficult to solve the problem of personal identity unless we admit the simple and individual self. If we think we accessed only the loosened perceptions and the relations among the perceptions are mere felt connections then such kinds of assumptions would create nothing but the doubt about one's own faculties and consequently one's own existence. However, as Strawson suggested, if Hume satisfies with the association principles and their significant role in our beliefs regarding the simplicity and identity of the self, we can think somewhat Hume has succeeded to provide the "science of man".

However, as Lecaldano and Giles suggested, if we understand the self in other books, there might be a more scope to get a clear picture of Hume's intentions. Also, I think, a proper understanding of the specific roles of different faculties such as senses, memory, passions, imagination and so on would help us to understand human nature in an appropriative way. In particular, if we take into account Hume's consideration of association principles—which binds the loosened perceptions—as the original qualities of human nature then that would implicitly suggest us these qualities of the mind are sufficient to examine our experiences and reasons of our various sorts of beliefs, and consequently, to devalue the various illegitimate beliefs, and to develop a consistent character in our life by reflecting our own actions.

Even though this particular study of Hume's treatment of personal identity would help us to know Hume's project of "science of man" but it would not give a clear and complete picture of human nature. To get a holistic picture of human nature, a further study, which mainly focused on Hume's treatment of moral principles, is needed. It is true that the same fundamental principles Hume has used to investigate the intelligibility of established moral theories. While arguing moral evaluations are not derived from reason, Hume tries to propose a new sense of moral principles. Therefore, a comprehensive study of his treatment of moral science may help us to understand human nature in a different perspective, consequently, a person's appreciable role in the moral and social world.

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THE CONCEPT OF PERSONAL IDENTITY: A JOURNEY FROM JOHN LOCKE TO THOMAS REID

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ABSTRACT *In the history of philosophy, the concept of personal identity has been continuing as a fresh problem from the period of theseventeenthcentury to till today. The problem is that what gives the identity ofa person over time. In other words, what makes a person at time t1 and the person at time t2 as the same person? Traditionally, there was a strong belief that soul makes a person at different times as the same person since it is simple and identical. But, an empiricist philosopher John Locke gives a new kind of theory that consciousness (memory) constitutes personal identity instead of substantial (soul) identity.Locke's this radical step helped as a boost to the materialist philosophers and at the same timethis stepcauses to make a few philosophers to strongly defend the existence of metaphysical substance or soul.In this paper, I would like to examine four noteworthy philosophers' account of personal identity. Those philosophers areJohn Locke, Leibniz, JosephButler,and Thomas Reid.*

Keywords: *metaphysical substance or soul, consciousness, identity,and personal identity.*

1. Introduction

In the history of philosophy,there are some fundamental problems which have been still continuing asnewborn babies. The problems such as the existence of God, of the external world, and of soul's immateriality etc., are generally philosophers consider as the fundamental problems. In the modern period of time, there was another problem raised in philosophy that what gives the identity of a person over time. So to speak, what makes a person at time t1 and the person at time t2 as the same person?With this question, we can divide philosophy as before Locke and after Locke since Locke was the person who introduced this problem. Before Locke, there was a general opinion that the soul is immaterial and it continues without any changes whereas the bodyis material and change is a very common nature of it.So, answer to the question what makes a person same at different times is that an immaterial soul. The reason for them isthatthe soul is indivisible.This kind of opinion we can clearly see in Descartes's philosophy. Descartes gives an answer to the question of whoam Ithat I am a thinking thing which is indivisible.Contrary to this view, John Locke tries to prove that the substantial identity would not give the identity of a person over time but consciousness gives the identity to the person over time. This explicit and radical expression of Locke on this problem leads to many disputes in the philosophical world among the philosophers.Still today also it is a newborn baby in the hands of philosophers.

In this paper, my major focus on the 17th andthe 18th-century concept of personal identity. In particular, how it was treated by philosophers, namely, John Locke, Leibniz, Butler,and Thomas Reid. In order to that, I will discuss Locke's account of personal identity in the first section. And in the second section,we shall see objections raised by Leibniz, Butler,and Reid and also their account of personal identity. Finally,the conclusion follows.

2. Section 1

2.1.John Locke's Account of Personal Identity

John Locke (1632-1704) in his masterpiece work "*An Essay Concerning Human Understanding",*he devotes one chapter "Of Identity and Diversity" to explain the concept of personal identity. Before giving a clear explanation of this concept, he gives a general account of the notion of identity. According to Locke, the concept of identity is a relative idea. Therefore,he says, the identity of a substance or a thing consists in the relation of the substance with the notion of time and also space. He writes: "When… we demand whether anything be the same or no, it refers always to something that existed such a time in such a place, which it was certain, at that instant, was the same with itself, and no other…"(Locke, 1975:204).And moreover, hesaid that two principles are necessary for the notion of identity:firstly, a thing has only one beginning for its existence in any particular time and place; and secondly, it is not possible for two things having one beginning. It is clear, in his view, thatthe identity of a thing always relates with time and place and the thing in that time and place is individual and identical to itself.

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