

AGAINST FOUNDATIONALISM: TOWARDS QUINE'S NATURALIZED EPISTEMOLOGY

A THESIS SUBMITTED FOR THE DEGREE OF
DOCTOR OF PHILOSOPHY

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CERTIFICATE

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
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I hereby declare that the thesis entitled "Against Foundationalism: Towards Quine's Naturalised Epistemiology" submitted by me for the degree of Doctor of Philosophy, in the Department of Philosophy, School of Humanities, University of Hyderabad, has not been submitted to any other university or institute for this or any other purpose.



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ABBREVIATION

- FLPV From a Logical Point of View, 2nd. (*End.*) Revised,
 University Press Cambridge, Massachusetts 1961,
- OR *Ontological Relativity and Other Essays*, Columbia
 University press, New York, 1969.
- PL *Philosophy of Logic*, 3rd Indian Reprint in Prentice
 Hall of India , New Delhi, 1987, (Prentice Hall, Inc,
 Englwood Cliffs, U. U.S.A. (1970)
- RR *The Roots of Reference* Open Court, La Selle, III,
 1973.
- TT *Theories and Things*, Harvard University Press,
 Cambridge, Massaeusetts, 1981,
- WB *The Web of Belief*, 2nd (*End.*) Random House, New York,
 1978, (1st End. 1960).
- WO Word and Object, MIT Press, Cambridge Massachusetts,
 1960.
- WP *Hays of Paradox and Other Essays*,(revised Edn.) Harvard
 University press, Cambridge, Massachusetts, 1976, (1st
 Edn. 1966.)

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PREFACE

This work is against foundationalism. Foundationalism as a system of philosophical investigations can be roughly characterized as an investigation which presupposes a distinction in kind, not in degrees, between epistemological investigations and the investigations of natural sciences in general. It presupposes a methodological distinction between philosophy and science which is defended by a supporting presupposition that an epistemological inquiry is completely normative in character as opposed to the descriptive nature of the inquiry of natural sciences. In other words, if we understand a guiding norm as to be the method of an inquiry and the guided descriptions as to be the theories of that inquiry, a method is distinguished from the theory through which it is expressed. And, consequently, scientific theories are distinguished from the epistemological theories for the reason that the methods adopted into the former are founded on, determined by or evaluated in terms of a unique method which stands as the subject matter of epistemological investigations. Epistemological theories are alleged to be the theories of that unique method. Thus foundationalistic theses presuppose a distinction, in kind, between "method" and "theory".

This work adopts Quine's anti-foundationalistic *qua* naturalistic method to argue against foundationalism. In other words, the theory it defends is the method it undertakes in defending that theory. It does not presuppose a distinction between "method" and "theory". The *prima facie* circularity- the circularity of building a theory by adopting a method which, in turn, is defended by a theory - disappears in the

inseparability of a method and a theory. The circularity which normally threatens to such an undertaking is based on a false presupposition (namely, the separation of a method and a theory) which has been criticized throughout this work.

One of the primary motives of this work is to establish that Quine's anti-foundationalism is not 'a far cry' against contemporary foundationalism. In this respect, it is important to understand that "Against Foundationalism" does not mean against the foundationalism *per se* (if, at all, there is any !). It is against certain uncritically accepted theses which express foundationalism. It is not scientific to claim that an unexpressed something *is* there which has been refuted. It is only an expressed something which is refutable. It is equally unscientific to claim that a particular thesis has been refuted without going against the methodology adopted in upholding that thesis. Because, such a claim leads to the acceptance of a 'Method-Theory' distinction. In other words, if foundationalism is a method of epistemological investigation, foundationalism as a separable method of epistemological theories is not dead because never it is born; and, foundationalism as an inseparable method of epistemological theories is not dead because death can never occur to it.

Thus, strictly speaking, foundationalism and naturalism do not nullify each other. If it is rigidly accepted that there is no separation of a method from a theory and, hence, there is no unique method of investigation in philosophy or epistemology, foundationalism is as much a method as naturalism. What is nullified or, rather,

rectified in one particular methodological investigation is one or another of the theses upheld in carrying out that methodology. There seems to be no meta-level of understanding. One system can be interpreted or understood even if you are not exclusively involved in the system. And, more importantly, these interpretations or understandings are not reductionistic. There remains no method as to reduce one methodological bearing of a theory to that of another. Separation of theories by methodological criterion is fruitless if the separation is meant to be something like a 'category' and 'subclass' division. Consequently, indeterminacy of method is inevitable. But this is not an obstacle for our intellectual progress, nor an obstacle for philosophical analysis or clarification. It appears to be an obstacle, to be a block to our intellectual progress, if we are in need of a meta-method to determine the methodological bearing of a theory or to reduce (instead of interpreting or reinterpreting) that into that of another. We do not need that and, hence, we are not in search of that. For the searching of a meta-method is based on the false presupposition that a method is separable from the theory or system which reveals or expresses it. Note that, as there is no meta-method to separate two theories, epistemological and that of natural science, on some methodological ground, so also, there is no meta-theory to separate two methods on some theoretical ground. Consequently, an epistemological theory cannot be found to be a metatheory so as to separate epistemology as a method quite distinguished from the methods of natural sciences. An investigation purported to build meta-theories to evaluate the methods of different theories and an investigation purported to discover a meta-method to evaluate the theories undertaking different methods are on the same

frail footing: the separability between 'method' and 'theory'.

With the above understanding of anti-foundationalism, Quine's naturalised epistemology has been advanced here so as to be identified with anti-foundationalism. However, even if one can find it to be potentially there, the above said conception of anti-foundationalism *qua* naturalism is not explicitly there in Quine's three seminal theses on Analyticity, Translation and Ontology. Moreover, I am doubtful about a general acceptance of a presentation of Quine's naturalized epistemology *qua* anti-foundationalism in terms of the distinction between 'method' and 'theory'. For, Quine's sayings are not explicit enough to claim that foundationalism does survive as an epistemological investigation though some uncritical aspects which are dogmatically accepted by the foundationalists are refuted by Quine's naturalism. But, if naturalism does survive, naturalism survives on refuting the uncritical acceptances which really constitute foundationalism and which really compete with naturalistic theses in a more and more sophisticated way. Viewing from this angle, the foundationalistic ingredient associated with a Cartesian mind is, if I am allowed to say, a bit more naturalized by Kantian transcendentalism which, in turn, is further naturalized by the Carnapian "intension". Those naturalisations conceivable of the classical, transcendental and analytical foundationalism are nothing but the very anti-foundationalistic moves they undertake against the preceding systems although they inevitably leave some foundationalistic ingredient for the succeeding systems to naturalize but not to naturalize in an absolute manner. For the meaning of naturalization is quite incompatible with that of Absolutism.

However, even if I suspect the general acceptance of my view, one can be confident enough to claim that Quine is antifoundationalistic as well as naturalistic. To put antifoundationalism and naturalism together, in an integrated manner, is the crux of the problem I have undertaken. Thus I shall discuss on Quine's anti-foundationalistic methodology *qua* naturalized epistemology in terms of his explicitly said and well argued notions like 'scientific skepticism' and 'reciprocal containment' refraining myself from the suspicion arising due to the use of the notions like 'method' and 'theory'. Nevertheless, I believe, one may find it appropriate to employ these notions, especially, one who is more inclined to view Quine's enterprise as a critic of Carnap's distinction between 'method of intension' and 'method of extension'. But as I see the matter, Quine's naturalised epistemology can be directed against any version of foundationalistic theses though his works like 'Two Dogmas', 'Indeterminacy' and 'Ontological relativity' seem to be directly against the Carnapian enterprise. In fact I have attempted to integrate these two ways of understanding, from Carnap to Quine and from Quine to Carnap, understanding naturalism in terms of the anti-foundationalistic theses and understanding the antifoundationalistic theses in terms of the important features of naturalized epistemology. That is, to wit, I have tried to visualise the anti-foundationalistic theses (which are commonly known to be something like anti-Carnapian) in terms of Quine's naturalized epistemology and, further more, the anti-Carnapian thrust is retained throughout this work by presenting Carnap as the representative of a variety of foundationalism which is more sophisticated than Kantian foundationalism and less complicated than that of the present days.

The varieties of foundationalism I have considered in terms of their development in time are the traditional, modern and contemporary foundationalisms which can be named as the traditional (or transcendental), analytical and justological respectively.

Both foundationalism and coherentism, the two rival approaches to knowledge and justification, are considered here under one name, i.e., "justology", so as to distinguish them from naturalized epistemology. To put them together, as it has been found that they have a common false presupposition which is antagonistic to Quine's naturalized epistemology, I have employed and defended Kornblith's notion of 'The Arguments-on-Paper Thesis'¹, in chapter I of this work. Thus, unless it is specifically told in relation to coherentism, the term "foundationalism" is used in the rest of the chapters as covering both foundationalism and coherentism notwithstanding the rivalry they convey. In this chapter, "The Conceptual Backgrounds of Foundationalism, Coherentism and Naturalism", I attempt to show that the rivalry between foundationalism and coherentism is fundamentally based on the structure of a good account of justification and naturalism is antagonistic to the very presupposition of a good account of justification irrespective of the structure one can propose in that regard. Above all, a possible understanding of Quine's anti-foundationalism and naturalized epistemology as one integrated

1

Kornblith, H. (1980) "Beyond Foundationalism and the Coherence Theory", *The Journal of Philosophy*, 77, pp. 597-612. Also in Kornblith, H. (Ed.) (1985) *Naturalising Epistemology*, The MIT Press, Cambridge, Massachusetts, London, England, pp. 115-128.

thesis has been hinted through the discussions of the conceptual backgrounds for the foundationalistic questions and naturalistic questions, in the same chapter, i.e., chapter I.

In chapter II, "Foundationalism beneath the Analytic- Synthetic Distinction", naturalized epistemology can be identified in Quine's anti-foundationalistic arguments against the Analytic-Synthetic Distinction. The insufficiency of the clarification needed for that distinction is shown to be the result of the Cartesian doubt. The epistemological import of the Analytic-Synthetic distinction presupposes the Cartesian doubt which is criticised in Quine's naturalized epistemology. Abandonment of Cartesian doubt and acceptance of a 'scientific doubt' is clearly a fundamental feature of Quine's naturalised epistemology. Moreover, Carnapian foundationalism is considered to be 'one more variant of Kantian philosophy' without succumbing to the 'epistemological nihilism'²⁷ of Richard Rorty. It is done in view of the fact that the variation is considered to be more on the point of responding to the Cartesian skepticism than on the point of Rorty's idea of "representation" itself. On the former point, the variation is on the conception of a *a priori* - Kantian conceptual *a priori* and the analytic philosopher's linguistic *a priori*. On the later point, the variation is from Kantian transcendentalism to the analytic philosophers 'linguistic representation of reality.

2

Sometimes it is called as "revolutionary nihilism" in order to distinguish it from "revolutionary naturalism". See, for instance, Haack, S (1990) "Recent Obituaries of Epistemology", *American Philosophical Quarterly*, 27, pp. 199-212.

The anti-foundationalism *qua* Quine's naturalised epistemology is found to be there in Quine's other two seminal theses. The two seminal theses are discussed in two different chapters, III and IV, entitled "Indeterminacy of Translation : A Refutation of Foundationalistic Semantics" and "Ontological Relativity: An Antithesis to Linguistic Absolutism" respectively. The former is purported to establish the dependency of language on reality in order to forbid any system or method to be foundational on a semantical ground. The latter is purported to establish the dependency of reality on language in order to forbid any system or method to be foundational on an ontological ground. The combination of the two is supposed to be establishing the interdependence between language and reality, between language and theory (theory, because reality is theory-relative but without being absolutely determined by the theory). This move runs parallel to that of the "reciprocal containment" between epistemology and natural science, between epistemology and ontology, advocated in Quine's naturalised epistemology.

Whether it is semantical or ontological, a foundation on either of these grounds is tenable only when the separation between language and reality, semantics and ontology, belief and experience, a conceptual framework and the rules governing that framework or, in general, between a method and the theory which undertakes that is plausible. This separation is made, in turn, to respond a Cartesian doubt.

On semantical ground, foundationalism can be upheld through the

determinacy of meaning. The meaning is allegedly retained to be the 'reference point' such that the Cartesian doubt can be appropriately responded in terms of that indubitable 'reference point'.

Refutation of *the meaning*, the semantical 'reference point', is the well known anti-foundationalistic theme advanced by Quine in his indeterminacy thesis. The integration, I have tried to bring about, owes to the notion of 'scientific skepticism' advocated in Quine's naturalized epistemology. The anti-foundationalistic theme as well as the naturalistic theme of the indeterminacy thesis are found to be on the same footing, namely, the replacement of 'philosophical skepticism' (i.e., the Cartesian doubt) by 'scientific skepticism'. Consequently, as a result of this integration, it has been shown that foundationalistic semantics has to be replaced by naturalized semantics.

Ontological relativity is found, in chapter IV, to be an antithesis to linguistic Absolutism. The Carnapian 'method of intension' has been refuted by means of Quine's criticism against quantification of modal contexts. Indeterminacy of reference is shown to be against absolute semantical determination of ontology as much as against traditional Absolutism and essentialism. The importance of objectual interpretation *contra*, substitutional interpretation of variables is emphasised to integrate the anti-foundationalistic theme against an 'intentional' method and the naturalistic theme against a Cartesian mind. Consequently, as a result of this integration, though it has not been said explicitly, a naturalised ontology is brought about to replace linguistic Absolutism.

The replacement of 'philosophical skepticism' by 'scientific skepticism' and the 'reciprocal containment' of epistemology and natural science are the two fundamental features of Quine's naturalised epistemology. In the preceding three chapters, these two features are found to be working against the foundationalistic theses—the Analytic-Synthetic Distinction, determinancy of meaning and Absolutism (traditional as well as linguistic). In chapter V, "Quine's Naturalised Epistemology: Its methodological Perspective", these two fundamental features along with some others are discussed in a more elaborated way.

Barry Stroud's criticism against Quine's "scientific skeptic", Richard Rorty's nihilistic stand-point and Alvin Goldman's reliabilism are taken into account in chapter V. This is primarily meant to lay down the methodological bearing of Quine's naturalized epistemology and, hence, not to fight against Stroud., Rorty or Goldman. However, as Stroud's standpoint is directly against the core of the method of a scientific doubt, I have tried to argue against Stroud but that is also by interpreting Quine's arguments in favor of observation sentences and logical truths as an argument for the integration of anti-foundationalism and Quine's naturalized epistemology.

The methodological bearing of Quine's naturalized epistemology becomes more clear when it is distinguished from Rorty's epistemological nihilism and Goldman's reliabilism. However, this has been made in continuation with Stroud's arguments. Quine's reply to Stroud is very sketchy in the sense that Quine has not argued for his

naturalized epistemology and, instead, retaining his naturalistic spirit he has argued for the consistency in his own views on observation sentences and logical truths vis-a-vis the anti-foundationalistic theme he advocates. Stroud's arguments leave us in a dilemma : If you denounce the philosophical skepticism then it leads to nihilism, if you announce philosophical skepticism then you are a foundationalist or, at best, a reliabilist who announces normativity along with descriptivity. An attempt to overcome this dilemma has been made in this chapter by distinguishing the methodological bearing of Quine's naturalized epistemology from that of Rorty's epistemological nihilism and Goldman's *epistemics* (reliabilism).

The last but one chapter is meant to present Quine's anti-foundationalism *qua*. naturalism as an investigation to argue against contemporary foundationalistic theses in epistemology. The foundationalistic theses of these days have been conceived of under one name, i.e., justology, in face of the *prima facie* rivalry between foundationalism and coherentism outlined in the first chapter.

Almost half of the discussions of this chapter owes to Lehrer's³ exposition of the conditions of knowledge. Besides showing the insufficiency of those conditions which Lehrer takes into account as a groundwork for his proposed 'fourth condition', I have attempted to show the foundationalistic ingredients underlying those conditions and

how Lehrer is also not escaped from that trap. This has been attempted with the belief that the discussions on the integration of Quine's anti-foundationalism qua naturalism are clear enough. And, consequently, any appeal to some unexplained foundationalistic conception by using truth, belief, justification or complete justification as 'instruments' for philosophical analysis or clarification is refuted.

Gettier's⁴ problem has been accounted as a paradigm case of the problem of contemporary foundationalists who attempt to answer that problem. These foundationalists are no less victimized by Quine's anti-foundationalism qua naturalism than the traditional and analytical (Carnapian) foundationalists are due to their attempts to respond the Cartesian doubt.

Ketchum's argument against justology has been taken into account to show the unscientific method adopted in justology. In continuation with that, the role of "scientific skepticism" and "reciprocal containment" between epistemology and natural science is shown to be appropriate for a scientific epistemological investigation.

4

Gettier, E.L. (1963) "Is Justified True Belief Knowledge?", *Analysis*, 23, pp. 121-123. In Griffiths, A.P. (Ed.) (1967) *Knowledge and Belief*, Oxford University Press, London, pp. 144-146. In Feigl, Sellars and Lehrer (Eds.) (1972) *New Readings in Philosophical Analysis*, Appleton Century-Crofts (Educational Division), Meredith Corporation, New York, pp. 317-319.

5

Ketchum, R.J. (1991) "The Paradox of Epistemology: A defense of Naturalism", *Philosophical Studies*, 62, pp. 45-68.

The concluding chapter, "Against Foundationalism: Towards Quine's Naturalised Epistemology", is an outcome of the whole work and stands as a proposal for the abandonment of foundationalism. However this abandonment has been proposed with the conviction that foundationalism is not to be seen as a method separable from the foundationalistic theses. And, consequently, foundationalism is not nullified, rather, the foundationalistic theses are refuted by Quine's anti-foundationalism *qua* naturalism. Barring the inclinations to interpret Quine's writings in any fragmented way, as there are a plethora of available interpretations which concentrate on particular facets of Quine's writings without attempting for the integration of his early and later writings, the proposal made here is through an integration of Quine's anti-foundationalism and naturalism.

However, the conclusion has also been presented in Quinean terminology. The abandonment of foundationalism is urged by showing the 'doctrinal' incompleteness. In other words, it is described as "The Humean predicament is the human predicament"⁶.

6

OR, p. 72.

CHAPTER I

THE CONCEPTUAL BACKGROUNDS OF FOUNDATIONALISM, COHERENTISM AND NATURALISM

Foundationalism and coherentism are often considered to be two/rivalaccounts of justification of beliefs. Naturalism is more widely known to be anti-foundationalistic than anticoherentistic. To put foundationalism and coherentism together notwithstanding their well known rivalry and to distinguish naturalism from foundationalism are the two points I discuss in this chapter. I borrow Kornblith's notion of "The Arguments-on-Paper Thesis" and defend his account of showing the common false presupposition of foundationalism and coherentism. This defense is particularly against Robert Audi's criticisms.² To distinguish naturalism from foundationalism, though I start the discussion with Kornblith's three questions³ given below, I rehearse in extending Kornblith's questions in order to hint it from the beginning that a genuine naturalist can neither help the survival of foundationalism nor help fighting against it.

To begin with, consider the following three questions.

¹ Kornblith, H. (1980). Also in Kornblith, H. (Ed.) (1985), pp. 115-128.

² Audi, R. (1983), "Foundationalism, Epistemic Dependence, and Defeasibility". *Synthese*, 55, pp. 119-139.

³ Kornblith, H. (Ed.) (1985), p.1

CD How ought we to arrive at our beliefs?

How do we arrive at our beliefs?

(3) Are the processes by which we do arrive at our beliefs the ones by which we ought to arrive at our beliefs?

The "ought" of question (1) represents a normative account, an account that presupposes a norm or standard to evaluate and, thereby, a conception of beliefs or knowings to be essentially evaluative or normative in character. That is, the "ought" epitomizes the method of normative sciences such that a normative account is presupposed for any answer to (1). Similarly, a descriptive account stands for any answer to (2) in consideration of "do" in that question. The third question is of more importance because it seeks an answer about the relation between the two methods supposed to be undertaken for the two types of answers to those two questions, (1) and (2).

The significance of framing these three questions in face of a plethora of epistemological questions which have literally tormented many philosophers, of the past as well as of this century, is to shift or, rather, to introduce the shift undertaken in recent years. The shift is, roughly speaking, from an epistemological investigation to a meta-epistemological investigation. That is, from the traditional problems of epistemology to the currently undertaken methodological problems over the methodology of epistemology. It is a kind of 'local methodology', a local methodology of epistemology. The current undertakings of epistemological problems suggest that we learn better how to do epistemology by doing epistemology.

The plethora of epistemological problems that traditionally come to the forefront are the problems⁴ like the distinction between knowledge and true belief, evidence for knowledge-claims, criteria of knowing, knowledge and truth of reason, relation between conditions of truth and criteria of evidence and so on. When these are viewed as the problems of the philosophers and, more importantly, exclusively of the philosophers, epistemology is construed to be a normative science. The questions as well as the answers are invariably with the import of an "ought". Accordingly, to state in an explicit form., the above mentioned problems can be reread as "What ought to be the distinction between knowledge and true belief?", "What ought to be the evidence for knowledge-claims?" , "What ought to be the criteria of knowing?" and so on. Thus the underlying theme is, to wit, the acceptance of answers which are exclusively normative in character. Such a view on epistemological questions is, what Kornblith calls, "The traditional view".⁵ From this traditional view-point,(1) is answered independent of the available answers for (2) and it is presumed "Question 1 is in the bailwick of philosophers; question 2 in the bailwick of psychologists, and the answer to question 3 is produced by comparing the answers to questions 1 and 2 "⁶.

4

A brief account of the differences underlying these problems can be found in Chisholm, R.M. (1977), *Theory of knowledge* Printice Hall of India, see pp. 1-4.

⁵ Kornblith, H.(Ed.) (1985), p.1.

⁶ *Ibid.*, p.2.

The turn has already been made in the very consideration of the three questions. Instead of grappling with the epistemological problems said, disputed and unsolved traditionally, attempt has been made to look into the general nature of the inquiries.

Contemporary epistemology is mainly a battle between its descriptive model and normative model, on a battle-field away from that of traditional epistemology. It is a fight between the foundationalists who try to perpetuate the normative model and, thereby, to nourish the underlying theme of traditional epistemology and the naturalist who try to annihilate or, at least, condemn foundationalistic approaches. Thus the major epistemological problems of the day are not epistemological in its traditional sense, nor in its future sense (which would mean either in a normative sense or in a descriptive sense exclusively if, at all, the battle is over) but in its peculiar sense of this day that really pertains to epistemology-beyond, meta-epistemological in its transitional period.

Questions (1) and (2) of Kornblith become secondary now. What remains primary is the question he introduces in (3). It is neither the foundationalistic approach nor the naturalistic approach that becomes primary in the debate. On the contrary, examination of the conflict between the descriptive and normative epistemology will enable us to arrive at a final answer overcoming the crisis posed by the two models of epistemology.

One may argue that question (3) is really significant when it is meant to be potential enough to generate the questions of the

following kind and when it is not meant to be formulated in support of naturalistic approach by putting the "Are" in the beginning of the question and, thereby, when a descriptive account of the relation between (1) and (2) has not been presupposed. The relation between (1) and (2) is questioned in (3) by keeping a descriptive matrix, i.e., are, between two different (the descriptive are and the normative *ought*) approaches such that it seems the answer must be in support of a naturalistic approach if it is affirmative and in support of a foundationalistic approach if it is negative. Thus question (3) helps to distinguish the two approaches in a simple manner but it does not explain the true battle that survives between the two, nor it exhausts the other possible relations between 1 and 2. The following four more questions one may put forward in this regard.

(4) How "the process by which we *do* arrive at our beliefs' *ought* to determine "the ones by which we *ought* to arrive at our beliefs'?

(5) How "the processes by which we *ought* to arrive at our beliefs' *ought* to determine "the ones by which we *do* arrive at our beliefs'?

(6) How "the processes by which we *do* arrive at our beliefs'are to determine 'the processes by which we *ought* to arrive at our beliefs'?

(7) How "the processes by which we *ought* to arrive at our beliefs'are to determine "the processes by which we *do* arrive at our beliefs'?

In (4) and (5) the matrix is normative (*ought*) but this

normativity is over another normative inquiry determined by a descriptive one in (4) whereas this normativity is over a descriptive inquiry determined by another normative inquiry in (5). In (6) and (7), the matrix is descriptive (are), the description is a determination of a normative inquiry in (6) and determination of a descriptive inquiry by a normative inquiry in (7). That is, the relationship between the descriptive model and the normative model can be constructed in descriptive terms as well as in normative terms (viz; in terms of (4) and (5) as well as in terms of (6) and (7)) as one determining the other (viz (4) and (6) ask the descriptive model and (5) and (7) ask the normative model to determine the respective opposing models).

One may add to it that the interest of framing four more questions is basically an interest of a neutral observer, a viewpoint of someone looking from outside the battle-field. Accordingly, one may argue, if Kornblith at all minds to accept these questions to be potentially there in question (3) and claims (1) (2) and (3) as the three major questions of epistemology of which the third one is of more importance at present, then either Kornblith is advocating naturalistic epistemology in a biased manner or he has taken the task of "introduction" so rigidly that, for him, it is too hard to include the contemporary foundationalistic standpoint in epistemology. For the relation between the normative questions and the descriptive questions cannot be expected now, in a transitional period, to be exclusively in descriptive terms (as it is superficially meant by (3)) or in normative terms. Neither the descriptive nor the normative can be held to be exclusively determining the other (although it is superficially

meant by (3) that the descriptive model exclusively determines the normative one). The answer for the inquired question is to be expected from both the groups, from the foundationalists as well as from the naturalists.

In fact, there are many versions of foundationalism as well as that of naturalism. The stronger versions of both the kinds afford no relaxation and rigidly stick either to a naturalistic determination over normative models by naturalistic terms or to a foundationalistic determination over descriptive models by foundationalistic terms. These stronger types correspond to (5) and (6) of the questions extended for foundationalism and naturalism respectively. Modest foundationalism and modest naturalism afford due importance to certain naturalistic view points and normative view points respectively. Questions (4) and (7) roughly correspond to these types but, interestingly enough, (4) corresponds to weaker versions of naturalism though the matrix is normative (*ought*) and (7) to that of modest foundationalism though the matrix is descriptive (*are*). (4) can be associated with Goldman's *epistemics* which aims at studying epistemology parallel to the study of natural sciences but keeping the normativity of epistemology intact. That is, psychology is to replace epistemology only for the latter's development and thus to an extent that 'the processes by which we do arrive at our beliefs' can determine 'the processes by which we *ought* to arrive at our beliefs' but this determination is not evaluated in descriptive terms. It is a normative standard that evaluates this very way, no matter, far to what psychology can replace epistemology.

This outlining of the standard account of epistemological questions could have been adequate enough by the exposition of (1), (2) and (3) had it been interpreted that (1) and (2) are exclusively associated with foundationalism and naturalism and that (3) is a question regarding their relation. But Kornblith gives importance to an affirmative answer to (3) and, hence, to focus on naturalism through (3). It can be noticed that in the way the three questions are interpreted and furthered to (7), in the same way, it can be furthered indefinitely. If (1) and (2) are said to be the two possible approaches to knowledge then (3) is as much foundationalistic as naturalistic if, at all, (3) questions the relation between a descriptive model and a normative model. One cannot avoid a foundationalistic relation simply by showing (3) to be answered negatively by foundationalism. For the basic disagreement remains that question (3) can be turned to

(3): "*Ought* 'the processes by which we *do* arrive at our beliefs' be the ones by which 'we *ought* to arrive at our beliefs?'"

The two approaches fundamentally differ in such a way that it seems impossible to have a methodological compromise. This uncompromisable point between foundationalism and naturalism, between normativity and descriptivity, is an encouraging point for a foundationalist. For, it is the least to say about their uncompromising point, a point of separation is good enough to argue that foundationalism wins the game. If foundationalism and naturalism are two separable methods, one does not admit the other in any manner since those are two levels of understanding, one is bound to be the

right method or both are bound to be wrong so as to yield some other method of epistemology to be the right one. Supposing that foundationalism and naturalism are not two methods since epistemology is a study of methods, if no method is employable into epistemological investigations, then a meta-method can be appropriately employable in that respect. Both the alternatives are suitable for a foundationalist. Both the alternatives presuppose a point which is exactly the underlying theme of foundationalism - that is, the separation of the method from a theory, a system's standard rules from the descriptions carried out in terms of those rules, the "intension" of a language from the "extensions" of a language built up on the basis of that intension. This presupposed separation enables a foundationalist to separate epistemology from natural sciences on the ground that epistemology is an investigation over the methods, constitutive rules or "intensions" etc., which are foundational to the theories, conceptual frameworks or language systems advocated by the natural scientists.

Thus, in a sense, the uncomprcmisable point between foundationalism and naturalism turns to be the result of a foundationalistic upholding of epistemological investigations. The kind of regression anticipated in relation to Kornblith's third question becomes a threat to a foundationalist who, in response, turns back to a foundation, possibly a meta-foundation, to stop the regression. A naturalist is no more a naturalist if he is threatened by that regression and puts forward naturalise (a pseudo one) at the bottom of that investigation in order to stop that regression- On the other hand, a genuine naturalist is not threatened by that regression

and does not attempt to stop that. Because, for him, the question of that regression does not arise at all. It arises only when a method is separated from a theory. When a foundationalistic method is differentiated from a foundationalistic theory and a naturalistic method is differentiated from a naturalistic theory, it becomes plausible to ask for a (meta) method to determine one of the two methods to be the correct or justified one. If neither foundationalism nor naturalism are so separable from their respective theories, then only it becomes plausible to ask the correctness or adequacy of either of the two methods without appealing to a meta-method. For, in that case, the theories or theses advanced by the methods are subject to examination, not the methods themselves, because, there is no method itself separately there. Thus a naturalist is anti-foundationalistic in the sense that he refutes the foundationalistic theories, not that he refutes foundationalism as such. Because, for him, there is no foundationalism *per se* and, even, no naturalism *per se*. There is no *determinacy of method*.

My purpose of employing Kornblith's three questions and rehearsing a foundationalistic regression, a regression which threatens to ascertain or determine something as well as tempts to adhere some unclarifiable notions like foundationalism *per se* and naturalism *per se* (and the notions like 'analyticity', 'meaning', 'intension' and 'justification' which are to be discussed in the subsequent chapters) as the foundation in order to stop the regression, is to explain the conceptual background of foundationalism and naturalism. The threatening regression is an outcome of a Cartesian doubt which works in almost all foundationalistic theses we come across. Untenability of

this doubt and its replacement by a 'scientific doubt' are shown in all the subsequent chapters. Thus, as we have discussed, when we say naturalism is anti-foundationalistic we mean that naturalism is against the theories or theses of foundationalism. That is, a foundationalistic theory or thesis, not a foundationalism *per se*, is refuted by naturalism. Accordingly, when we say anti-foundationalism *qua* naturalism, anti-foundationalism *qua* Quine's naturalised epistemology, it is meant that naturalism is against foundationalism only in the sense that it is against foundationalistic theses like 'analyticity', 'meaning', 'intension' and 'justification'. Thus a typical foundationalistic criticism against naturalism is also defended here. Any criticism against naturalism appealing to a regression of methods in epistemology, that naturalism is inadequate by the very fact that it advocates indeterminacy of method, is not an acceptable criticism. For, naturalism refutes the very presupposition, presupposition of the separability of methods from the theories, behind such a criticism.

In connection to Analyticity, Meaning, Intension and Justification one may argue, for example, that a naturalist's acceptance of syntheticity, stimulus-meaning, extension and explanation is self stultifying because this is an employment of naturalistic method in the face of the fact that a naturalist advocates for the indeterminacy of method. This argument is ill-based. It presupposes a distinction, a method-theory distinction, which stands as the target of a naturalist's criticism against the foundationalistic thesis. Unless that false presupposition is upheld, as we have discussed, such an argument that the determinacy of method

is indispensable for the tenability of naturalism does not come into force.

Thus, by going against foundationalism, one is to argue against the foundationalistic theses. Quine's criticism against Analyticity, Meaning and Intention can be construed as anti-foundationalistic *qua* naturalistic. Before discussing those criticisms (which are in fact discussed in succeeding chapters) another point about foundationalism may be clarified here. It is about the relation between foundationalism and coherentism. It is about the common false presupposition of foundationalism and coherentism which puts them together as antagonistic to naturalism.

Foundationalism and Coherentism are just two "rival" methods of the same kind when epistemological methods are broadly divided into just two kinds -foundationalistic and naturalistic- on the basis of the normativity and the descriptivity of epistemological questions. Before unifying foundationalism and coherentism into a single theory on the basis of their common false presupposition, their rivalry can be noted down. The important points for which the contrast is well received are as it follows.

(i) Coherentism emphasizes on the *consistency* of beliefs and, since justification is supposed to be nowhere from without but in the believes themselves being consistent, it makes justification "ultimately inferential". It is reason or inference, not experience or perception, in terms of what the consistency is examined. There is no self-justified beliefs because every belief has to be justified by

some other beliefs.

Foundationalism rebuts it on the ground that it leads to circularity and infinite regression. A fixed set of finite beliefs can be consistent but each belief being dependent on other beliefs for its justification, justification becomes circular. An infinite number of beliefs can be allowed to break the circularity but, being beliefs alone, it leads to infinite regression. Foundationalists attempt to avoid these fatal consequences and thus keep certain *basic* beliefs to break the possibility of circularity as well as that of infinite regression.

(ii) If *initial credibility* is maintained to be necessarily there with every belief to be credible and hence to be necessarily there for justification, then coherentism accepts a *democratic* theory of initial credibility whereas foundationalism accepts an *aristocratic* theory of initial credibility.⁷ The democratic theory holds *equal* initial credibility with each belief of a subject, S, and to the more number of beliefs a particular belief is suitably related, the more credibility that belief gains and becomes justified. To the fewer number a particular belief suits so, the less credibility it gains and becomes unjustified. On the other hand, the aristocratic theory extends privileged status to certain beliefs, the foundational or

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This distinction of 'democratic' and 'aristocratic' initial credibility of beliefs is borrowed from Meyers, R.G. (1988), *The Likelihood of knowledge*, Kluwer Academic Publishers, p. 135.

basic ones, supposed to be possessing *a priori* highest possible initial credibility and need no justification because these are self-justified and epistemically prior to all other beliefs. Other beliefs are justified only on the basis of those foundational ones or in terms of the beliefs already justified so. However, coherentism can work without any presupposition of initial credibility. Strictly speaking, if the democratic theory is true then it seems that no belief has any initial credibility if we accept that two contradictory propositions cannot possess the same initial credibility. If *p* is believed by *S* and has initial credibility, how could *p* possess the same initial credibility if *S* should have believed $\sim p$, instead of *P*? To what coherentism, thus, significantly emphasises is that 'the only way to increase the warrant of a belief is by its inferential relations to other beliefs, i.e., by coherence'.⁸

(iii) Coherentism, as Pollock says, holds knowledge to be 'a vast nebula within which no beliefs are in any more basic than any others and in which the process of justification goes around and around without terminating any where'.⁹ Further he says that this theory 'cuts justification off from the world' since nowhere are *S*'s beliefs 'tied down in any way to the evidence of *S*'s senses'¹⁰. On the other hand, Sellars insists "that the metaphor of 'foundation' is

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Meyers, R. G.(1988), p.136.

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Pollock, J. (1974), *Knowledge and Justification*, Princeton, N.J., p. 26.

¹⁰

Ibid., p.28.

misleading in that it keeps us from seeing that if there is a logical dimension in which other empirical propositions rest on observation reports, there is another logical dimension in which the latter rests on the former". This "another logical dimension" appeals to inference or reason. Whatever the feature, q, may be, if it is due to q that the basic propositions are called basic and, thereby, q warrants the justification of the basic beliefs and q must be accepted with good reasons, then a "basic belief" becomes meaningless unless it is justified that "a belief B has feature q" and that "beliefs having feature q are highly likely to be true".¹²

Instead of observing the situation which is approximating an exchange of terms, it would be better to summarize this issue in neutral terms. Foundationalism and coherentism differ in providing the structure of justification, not in their basic account of a

11 Sellars, W. (1963), *Science, Perception and Reality* Humanities Press, New York, p. 170, (Adapted from Alston, W.P. (1983) "What's Wrong with Immediate Knowledge?" *Synthese*, 55, pp. 73-95. See p. 81.

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Bonjour's argument against the possibility of "basic beliefs" largely depends on this line of argument. Cf. Bonjour, L. (1978), "Can Empirical Knowledge Have a Foundation?". *American Philosophical Quarterly*, 15, pp. 1-13. Alston, W.P. (1983) concludes that 'in Bonjour, as in Sellars, the contention that putatively immediate knowledge really rests on higher-level reasons itself rests on a foundation of sand' (p.91). Alston's account is a defence of foundationalism which presupposes levels of 'reason'. Shatz criticizes such accounts of foundationalists those accept that the classic regress argument for foundationalism does not go through' and, yet, defend in other ways mainly by upholding "a sharp distinction between first - and second - level justifiedness". Shatz, D. (1983), "Foundationalism, Coherentism, and the Levels Gambit" *Synthese*, 55, pp. 97-118.

methodology which endorses a normative model. This structural difference remains intact, both in connection to arguments regarding the feasibility/defeasibility of basic statements and in connection to arguments regarding the reliability/unreliability of cognitive mechanism independent of the basic beliefs. But, above all, it is a structural difference of accounting justification and it can be well treated as a unified theory against a naturalistic account which bothers the least about the normative arguments, least to say about the structure of such arguments.

Behind the structural differences, a common presupposition is that justification of a belief needs certain epistemological (normative) argument and every belief has two distinct parts -a form and a content. Beliefs are not causally dependent. An epistemic dependency is alleged to be there by means of certain rules of inference owing to the forms of beliefs *contra*, the belief contents. This noncausal dependency is 'hierarchical' in case of foundationalistic account whereas it is 'webby' in case of coherentism.

Foundationalistic arguments deny the primacy of reason and put forward basic beliefs with the rationale that a system of statements must be related to reality and the fact that justification without a foundation leads to either infinite regression or vicious circularity, there must be basic statements which represent reality in the highest possible correct manner. The coherentist arguments deny basic beliefs and put forward the primacy of reason with the rationale that a system of statements is a system only due to certain relations among the

statements themselves. And, since no particular statement is system-free, no justification can be endowed on a statement without accounting its dependency to the other statements of the system. A basic statement is untenable largely due to its representation of that impossible endowment.

Viewing from the organism's cognitive mechanism, the arguments can be summarised as it follows. The reliability of the cognitive mechanism can be justified on the basis of its potentiality to generate more and more number of true beliefs. With this rationale a coherentist can argue that a supposed basic belief is bound to be justified as being believed by a highest possible reliable cognitive mechanism, because, otherwise it amounts to say that there are true beliefs without any relation to the subject who believes. Again, it must be justified that the justified true beliefs have certain organic/physical feature which must be possessed by the basic beliefs. But the requirement of such justifications simply denies the tenability of basic beliefs. On the other hand, a foundationalist would argue against the reliability of a mechanism independent of the basic beliefs. For whatever biological features a cognitive mechanism does possess for its higher reliability, this reliability cannot be justified by those biological features but by the beliefs it has generated or supposed to generate. These generated beliefs must presuppose basic beliefs because the beliefs justifying the reliability of the cognitive mechanism cannot be mere ordinary true beliefs said to be true by being generated by the supposed reliable mechanism.

The rivalry between foundationalism and coherentism seems to be putting us into a dilemma. If you support a foundationalist you are most likely to stand on a dry land of foundational statements. If you support a coherentist, you are jumping into an open sea of statements. But your cognitive mechanism seems to be meaningless unless either you stand on that dry land or you jump into that open sea of statements. For reliability of cognitive mechanism seems to be justifiable either by the basic beliefs or by the cohering true beliefs. The modest versions of both foundationalism and coherentism attempt to get over this dilemma. Modest foundationalism holds that even if there are basic beliefs which are non-derivative and thus depend on no other beliefs for their justification, yet those are not incorrigible or indefeasible. This development from indefeasibly non-derivative beliefs to defeasibly nonderivative beliefs is a development from "omnitemporal justification" to "momentary justification" keeping intact the appeal to 'regress argument'. And concern to the cognitive mechanism seems to be evident on the ground that the cognitive mechanism is liable to getting change of certain basic beliefs at any moment. Thus there cannot be an "omnitemporal" but "momentary" justification of any belief and, thereby. the corrigibility or defeasibility of basic beliefs is also acceptable. On the other hand, the modest version of coherentism would hold that even if there cannot be any non-derivative or basic beliefs, yet justification is not purely inferential; it owes to experience too. This development from 'reason from beliefs alone' to 'reason from beliefs related to sense experience' is largely due to a development of *experience based belief content' over 'abstract belief content' but keeping intact the appeal to arguments for justifying the belief content of every

proposition such that no non-derivative proposition and, thereby, no non-derivative beliefs can be possible. Its seeming concern with cognitive mechanism is grounded on that a cognitive mechanism is indispensably accounted for our experiences and, hence, for the experience- based-belief contents.

The rivalry does not end up with such developments, nor any of the developments tend them to be naturalistic, though a superficial concern to human cognitive mechanism is accounted by both the modest versions. Their rivalry becomes more pin-pointed from their insistence to two antagonistic structures of belief dependency and the non-naturalistic programme is evident from their common acceptance of an apsychological account of justification. This apsychoogical account encompasses both of the conflicting structures but becomes an antithesis to the causal dependency of beliefs. The point of conflict on the structure of belief dependency has already been discussed. To explain the apsychological account and, thereby, to explain foundationalism and coherentism to be a unified single theory; I would put forth Kornblith's 'The Arguments-on-Paper Thesis',

The Arguments-on-paper Thesis (APT)¹³ is proffered to represent an apsychological account of justification, to unify foundationalism and coherentism into a single theory of justification, on the ground that both of them share a common false presupposition. This thesis says that a proposition, p, is justified to be true for the subject,

¹³ Hereafter "APT" stands for "The Arguments-on-Paper Thesis".

S. if S believes that p and that either it requires no argument, or a good argument can be given for it which takes, as premises, certain other propositions on the list that accounts all that S believes. The crucial point of this thesis is the account of "good argument" and since both the foundationalists and the coherentists subscribe this crucial point and provide us with rival accounts of what is to be a "good argument", both parties endorse this thesis.

The importance of a "good argument" for this thesis is this: Whatever an argument it is, if the conclusion is derived solely from the premises which are logically related but without any causal relation, the argument can be well noted down on a piece of paper. For a causal relation can impose certain natural flexibility to the rigid logical relation, the premises are not causally related. An exact conclusion cannot be expected when flexibility survives through the relation among the premises. And, obviously, such an account of a "good argument" where the premises are the propositions one believes and the inference rules are the rules of certain logical rigidity¹⁴ and the premises are related in a rigid manner, it can be well on a piece of paper. For example, $((p \rightarrow q) \ \& p) \rightarrow q$ can be an acceptable rule of inference for both the foundationalists and coherentists and endorsing

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It is not necessarily the rigidity of deductive logical conclusion. Cf. Pollock, J. (1970), "The Structure of Epistemic Justification", *American Philosophical Quarterly Monograph Series*, 4, pp. 62-73. Pollock distinguishes "conclusive" logical reasons from 'prima facie' logical reasons and argues in support of the latter. Nevertheless he upholds the fundamental foundationalistic distinction between logical reasons and a posteriori reasons in order to advance his theory of prima facie logical reasons.

the AFT they would hold that if S believes that $(p \rightarrow q)$ and S believes that p then, S is justified in believing that q.

What is surreptitiously distinguished here is an epistemic dependence of beliefs from a causal dependence. The epistemic dependence is supposed to be *a priori* in the sense that the rule of *modus ponens* enables q to be justified for S, without questioning that whether S really believes in *modus ponens* or not. If the dependence of beliefs were construed to be without any such apriority and put into a test for their actual relation when S believes something, then a question would have become necessary regarding S's belief on *modus ponens*. The urge of such a question is not felt when belief dependence is accounted in terms of belief contents as such. It is presupposed, as it is so, also, in case of the Analytic-Synthetic distinction and the determinacy of translation, that a *form* of a belief remains absolutely distinguished from the *content* it has and a belief content becomes unquestionably justified if its form is justified. Thus a subject's believing or not believing certain propositions does not come into account when the belief content is justified by itself due to its privileged form and, the presupposition that belief content is the means to account belief dependency enables one to explore epistemic justification apsychologically.

What exactly makes the APT to be false is that it goes against the fact that the 'notion of belief dependence cannot be accounted for in terms of the contents of the various beliefs held'. Belief dependence "must be accounted for by looking at the belief status of persons and, in particular, at the relations among them". Questions

about justification of beliefs are, argues Kornblith, "intimately tied to questions about the sorts of processes responsible for the presence of these beliefs"¹⁵. S may very well 'distrust' *modus ponens* and yet believe in q for different reasons such that q cannot be said to be justified for S. Accounting epistemic dependence of beliefs in terms of the contents of the beliefs and construing* certain rules of inference to be universally acceptable and, when applied to certain forms of beliefs, the beliefs are true *a priori* whatever the content they may have; the foundationalists and the coherentists provide rival accounts of good argument. It is not just "arguments" but "good arguments", and not even "what is a good argument?" but "what *ought* to be a good argument?", are important for the APT. What vindicates it to be so is that it essentially considers nothing causal to epistemic dependence of beliefs for justification but accounts certain contents of beliefs along with certain rules of inference and, thereby, with a provision for a normative account of justification. Arguments become purely apsychological when "good" is accepted in its normative sense. When "good" is construed to be descriptive in the sense that even a psychological account can be said as "good" or "bad", "what is a good argument?" is not normative but "what *ought* to be a good argument."?¹⁶

¹⁵ Kornblith, H. (Ed.) 1985, p.119.

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Cf. Pollock's distinction between "good logical reasons" and "good *a posteriori* reasons", Pollock, J. (1970), pp. 66-71.

Kornblith's standardization of the accounts provided by foundationalisms and coherentists into an apsychological account is seriously criticized by Robert Audi (1983). Audi counts "reasons" to overshadow "arguments" of the APT. Characterizing *treasons* of different kinds with different necessary conditions, he refutes Kornblith's standardization which seems him to be based on an unique interpretation of "arguments". Audi distinguishes a *reason to believe p* from a *reason which S has For believing p* and, further, these two from a *reason for which S believes p*. Again, all these three are distinguished from a *reason why S believes p*.¹⁷ Let these "reasons" to be symbolized as R_1qp , R_2qp , R_3qp and R_4qp . The necessary condition for R_1qp is some warranting relation, say W , from q to p . R_2qp necessitates that S believes q besides Wqp , i.e., S believes the relation W from q to p . The conditions for the characterization of R_3qp are (a) Bsp , that is, S believes that p ; (b) Bsq , that is, S believes that q ; (c) $Bsp \rightarrow Bsq$, that is, S believes that p , partly because of he believes that q ; (d) $Wqp \vee Wqp(s)$, that is, either q bears some warranting relation to p or S takes q to be so. On the other hand, R_4qp explains why S "actually" believes p and, thus, presupposes no such conditions to be fulfilled to produce p . It rules out "non-operative factors" (i.e., conditions conceptually presupposed) and keeps "actual" factors which operate in producing p . Thus Audi's characterization of the four kinds of "reasons" can be symbolised to

¹⁷ Audi, R. (1983), pp.122-128.

1. $R_1qp \rightarrow Wqp$
2. $R_2qp \rightarrow Wqp \ \& \ Bsq$
3. $R_3qp \rightarrow ((Wqp \vee Wqp(s)) \& (Bsp \rightarrow Bsq) \ \& (Bsp \ \& \ Bsq))$
4. R_4qp presupposes no such conditions.

Now, replacing "arguments" by "reasons", the AFT can be constructed as "S's belief that p is justified if and only if either p is such that S needs no more reason for ("justifiably) believing it, or S has at least one good reason for believing it"¹⁸ The importance of "good reason" calls for the distinctions made about reasons. The importance is regarding the kind of reason that can, at all, replace the importance of "arguments" in the APT. As it appears to Audi, R_2qp can replace so and criticism against the APT is based on Kornblith's holding of R_3qp to be a necessary condition for R_2qp . Kornblith's thematic conclusion in connection to the APT is that the normativity of "good arguments" provided by foundationalists and coherentists leads to a *standard* apychological account but such an account is untenable because there is a causal dependence of beliefs which must be accounted in psychology. From " $Bsp \ \& \ Bsq$ and $Bs(q \rightarrow p)$ " we cannot conclude that Jsp (i.e. S is justified in believing p). For it may be the case that $Bs(\sim)((q \rightarrow p) \ \& \ q \rightarrow p)$. Now this thematic conclusion of the APT can be said in terms of "reasons" that R_2qp is not a good reason. R_2qP is a good reason only if R_3qp . If R_2qp is said to be an *inferential epistemic dependence* of p on q, then R^*_2qp can be said to be the *causal dependence* of p on q. And what is responsible for this

18 This is derived by replacing 'good argument' of APT by 'good reasons'. See Audi, R. (1983), p. 124. and p. 127.

'*'on R_2qp is the necessary condition R_3qp made on

Audi argues that the APT is 'mistaken' because it 'cannot, after all, be represented in terms of reasons'.¹⁹ There must be certain conditions or restrictions which needs due consideration over and above the conditions which characterize a reason to be a good reason in relation to the APT offered by Kornblith. That is, in a sense, Kornblith mischaracterizes the "good reason" of foundationalists and coherentists. If we accept the APT, we permit S to believe and disbelieve p. A noncausal construction of arguments can allow S to have good reasons (eg., R_2qp) for believing p and good reasons for disbelieving p (eg. $R_2r\sim p$) where q and r are two independent reasons. But, surely, 'S's reasons for believing p are not *defeated by* reasons S has for believing $\sim p$ '. Hence there must be certain restrictions for S's *actually* believing $\sim p$ or believing $\sim p$ over and above the reasons, R_2qp or $R_2r\sim p$, construed to be good ones in accordance to the APT.

If q and r are two independent reasons and both can justify p, then it is neither on q nor on r that p is causally dependent. For S's believing either of the two independent reasons plays an actual role in sustaining his belief that p. Hence, even if the APT entails that R^*qp is a causal relation between R_2qp and R_3qp played by S's believing that q, it does not entail the *causal dependence* of S's belief that p on S's belief that q. The APT is so constructed due to an easy overlooking of the difference between R_2qp and R_3qp . Again,

¹⁹ Audi, R. (1983), p.127.

there remains the question that whether R_2QP can be R^*_2QP where Q is anything (e.g., experiences) on what P , as a foundational belief, depends.

Audi argues further that the APT is misattributed to Chisholm, Firth and Lehrer and others because the APT is concerned with "justified beliefs actually held by S " whereas the philosophers' concern is mainly with " S 's being justified *in believing* p ".²⁰ If it is taken seriously that "the reasons *for* which S believes p " to be a factor in epistemic justification (as it is presented in the construction of the APT by Kornblith) then "we are unlikely to infer, from S 's being justified in believing p by a reason (or other factor), that if S does believe p , this belief is justified. S might, e.g; come to believe it for *other* reasons including bad ones".²¹

Another point that Audi marks is the ambiguity in Kornblith's characterization of "modest foundationalism" as a theory that holds "some beliefs, though not incorrigible, are justified independently of their relations to other beliefs."²² The expression "justified independently" may mean to concern with "momentary justification" as well as with "omnitemporal justification". In other words, "justified independently" being equal to "justified non-derivatively",

²⁰*Ibid.*

²¹ *Ibid.*, pp.127-128.

²²Kornblith, H. (Ed.) (1985), p. 122. Audi, R. (1983), p.129.

justification may be meant to be "defeasibly non-derivative" as well as "indefeasibly non-derivative". The former being consistent to "momentary justification" and the latter being consistent to "omnitemporal justification", Audi claims that Kornblith's position is against "indefeasibly non-derivative" whereas modest foundationalism is committed to "defeasibly non-derivative". This difference between "defeasibility" and "non-defeasibility" is what importantly marks the difference between foundationalism and modest foundationalism although both appeal to regress argument and, thereby, both claim to non-derivative beliefs called as foundational beliefs. Modest foundationalism "takes justification to require that at any given time there are unmoved movers, but it does not tie justification to the possibility of unmovable movers".²³ Defeasibility does not entail derivativeness or dependency of foundational beliefs on other beliefs because the said dependency is far away from the *structure* of justification in relation to what a belief can be said to be non-derivative at a particular time. It is defeasibly non-derivative. Since it is the "structure, not the content, of a body of knowledge or beliefs" on what foundationalists and coherentists are mainly interested, defeasibility and non-derivability can go together. Accordingly, modest foundationalism becomes neutral to skepticism. Skepticism questions the certainty of knowledge and, thereby, the content of knowledge. Modest foundationalism is concerned with the structure of justification, not the certainty attainable by

23 Audi, R. (1983), pp. 130-131.

justification.

Finally, Audi apprehends that Kornblith might have overlooked the distinction between epistemological theories which are *conceptually naturalistic* and those which are *substantively naturalistic* and, again, between *epistemological questions* and *epistemic questions*²⁴. A conceptually naturalistic theory is not empirical because, even if it "uses only non-normative concepts", 'its principles, at least, its major principles' are not factual and thus in a certain sense not 'empirical'²⁵. But epistemological questions, not divorced from psychological questions, strongly suggest the empirical character of epistemological questions and, thereby, pertain to "substantive naturalism". Hence, according to Audi, Kornblith's reliabilism is conceptually naturalistic and comes closer to modest foundationalism although Kornblith has taken reliabilism to be non-normative and modest foundationalism to be normative and, hence, the two to be antagonistic by keeping reliabilism as naturalistic.

An "epistemological question" is conceptual in the sense, even if it concerns with psychological concepts, it does not entail to be empirical. On the other hand an epistemic question is substantive in the sense, even if it advances concepts such as knowledge or "justified belief, it entails to be empirical. Overlooking of this distinction, as Audi seems to argue, Kornblith assimilates

²⁴*Ibid.*, pp. 135-136.

²⁵ *Ibid.*

epistemological questions of modest foundationalism and coherentism to the epistemological questions of foundationalism and coherentism and, again, he overlooks the epistemological character of reliabilism by emphasising certain psychological process as to be indispensably accounted for reliabilistic justification.

Now, from Audi's defensive account of modest foundationalism, it seems that certain versions of foundationalism, coherentism and naturalism can pace together (all being neutral to skepticism). Foundationalism and coherentism are concerned with the "structure, not the contents of a body of knowledge and belief and thus neutral to skepticism. Naturalism is neutral to skepticism and , more importantly, a *conceptual naturalism* (the sense allegedly attributed to reliabilism) can be advanced to approximate the broader epistemological features of foundationalism and coherentism.

Although Kornblith's proffered APT and his reliabilism has some *prima facie* obscurity, his approach is clearly naturalistic. The APT is aimed at representing an apsychological account common to both foundationalism and coherentism such that these two theories are clearly opposed to a psychological account i.e., naturalism. I would attempt to show that Audi's notion of the 'conceptual naturalism' is untenable and, thereby, naturalism cannot be approximating foundationalism and coherentism. And, even if foundationalism and coherentism are confined to the "structure" of knowledge or belief justification, these apsychological accounts lose their identity if they become neutral to skepticism. If I am right in showing these two points, it amounts to that naturalism and the two apsychological

accounts can be well distinguished as antagonistic to each other and Kornblith's aim in the APT is considerably fulfilled. Hence, as the AFT becomes a rightly taken standardisation, foundationalism and coherentism can be reaffirmed of sharing a common false presupposition that distinguishes both from naturalism as an opposing model.²⁶

Conceptual naturalism is untenable because the basic distinction between conceptual naturalism and substantive naturalism would be quite dogmatic in naturalism parallel to the dogma of the ASD in empiricism. As the dogma of the ASD affords a privileged *a priori* status to certain statements, so also the dogma of this distinction in naturalism would afford a privileged status to certain inquiries on the ground that they are allegedly based on pure conceptual grounds. But, on the other hand, due emphasis can be given to Kornblith's belief that what he favours as 'a psychological approach to questions about knowledge and justification is the naturalized epistemology of W.V. Quine and Alvin Goldman'²⁷. Considering Quine's naturalism it can be said that Audi's proposed distinction is dogmatic. Attribution of substantive naturalism to Quine is a lift to smash down Quine's

²⁶ The sense of "antagonistic" as well as "opposing" should not be confused with "annihilating" or "nullifying". For, as it has been discussed earlier, the two methods are not independent of their respective theories. Thus the best it can be conceived of naturalism, considering its theory dependence, is that naturalism is neither nihilistic nor it annihilates any method but it is refomistic and advocates for the indeterminacy of method. Note that we are against meta-foundationalism that may be suggested by Lehrer, K. (1988), "Metaknowledge: Undefeated Justifications", *Synthese*, PP. 329-347.

²⁷*Op. Cit.*, p. 115.

naturalism as much as the dogma of the ASD is a lift for logical empiricism to smash down empiricism itself. Secondly, considering the *epistemics* of Alvin Goldman, the structure-content distinction can be well refuted.

The distinction between conceptual naturalism and substantive naturalism can, however, be plausible if it is simply meant to be a distinction of two parts of one study. That is, one study as a whole and, the parts being inseparable from one another, a sharp distinction is impossible. Such a construal does not lead to the fatal consequences of conceptual naturalism which tends to be foundationalistic in disguise. Even if Audi gives no explanation of the existence of the said distinction, his observation is well connected with the differences of 'reasons' he points out. The differences he points out in order to criticize Kornblith's APT are foundationalistic. R_2qp and $(R_2qp \rightarrow R_3qp)$ are supposed to be representing two different approaches such that R_3qp tends to be naturalistic without any causal import whereas R_2qp is bereft of a naturalistic import, it is neither conceptual nor casual (or substantive). But such a distinction between R_2qp and $(R_2qp \rightarrow R_3qp)$ is untenable.

R_2qp and R_3qp are not two different kinds of justification if the difference is accounted in terms of the methods adopted for justification. Both are apsychological and in accordance to the APT. The non-empirical spirit is common to both. What is R_1qp to R_2qp , R_2qp is to R_3qp . The warranting relation from q to p of R_1qp is further believed by S in R_2qp . So also, in R_3qp , to believe that

$R_2qp \vee qp(s)$ is added further as a disjunctive to Wqp and Bsq as a necessary condition for Bsp . Very much consistent to it, Audi rightly points out that $(R_2qp \rightarrow R_3qp)$ does not entail a *causal dependence* of p on q , hence, not a psychological account. Yet he believes $(R_2qp \rightarrow R_3qp)$ to be an inferential epistemic dependence as well as a causal relation, at least, in part. That is, he distinguishes between a causal inferential epistemic dependence from a causal dependence. He claims that the former does not entail the latter. This seems to give sense to the distinction between conceptual naturalism which can subscribe a causal inferential epistemic dependence and substantive naturalism which can subscribe causal dependence. But this causal inferential epistemic dependence is implausible owing to the basic obscurity that a causal relation of epistemic dependence has been equated with a conditional relation between two "reasons" which are apychological. It is not this conditional relation but the untenability of such a relation demands a causal dependence. Perhaps, Audi thinks of Kornblith's position otherwise and finds a fault with Kornblith. Precisely, the untenability of "reasons", the search of what Audi advocates, is refuted by Kornblith. If both R_2qp and R_3qp are Pertinent to apychological reasons, $(R_2qp \rightarrow R_3qp)$ is no less an apychological approach. Distrust to *modus ponens* cannot be extended from $((q \rightarrow p) \& q) \rightarrow p$ to that of $((R_2qp \rightarrow R_3qp) \& R_2qp) \rightarrow R_3qp$ only when $(R_2qp \rightarrow R_3qp)$ is not apychological in the way $(q \rightarrow p)$ is apychological. It can be so only when the "reason" construed in R_2qp and R_3qp are not apychological. But the "reasons" are apychological in character because those are *evidential* as distinguished from *causal* ones. "Argument" of a "good argument" is meant to provide an *evidence*, a

'good argument' is supposed to be a good evidence. It is true that premises for a good evidence or the propositions accounted in evidential reason may play an important role in causal reasons but, more importantly, the events or states of the person who has the belief are accounted for causal reasons. That is, the talk of believed (or known) *propositions* is appropriate in case of evidential reason whereas the events or states of the person who has the belief or who believes those propositions are appropriate for causal reason. For propositions are not entities which can be causally related to other entities, they can at best represent beliefs. The relations among themselves can be the representations of relations among beliefs, not of relations among belief states of a person. Thus, although 'reason' construed as an explanatory ground for justification is common to both evidential reason and causal reason, the explanation is with a non-empirical spirit and apsychological in case of evidential reason whereas it is with an empirical spirit and psychological in case of causal reason. The former, the apsychological one, pertains to the APT and the latter pertains to naturalism. And, since evidential reason cannot pertain to naturalism, conceptual naturalism is untenable. Audi keeps evidential reason as the 'reasons' to account epistemic justification, even if he distinguishes different kinds of reasons by different conditions and, hence, $(R_2 \text{qp} \rightarrow R_3 \text{qp})$ becomes a conceptual account of epistemology even if this condition demands certain causal relation (but, not a causal relation between the belief-that-q and the belief-that-p). That is, conceptual naturalism gets sense only on the basis of 'evidential reason'. But the untenability of such a reason, in general, that the APT represents, proves the untenability of conceptual naturalism. Of

course, $(R_2qp \rightarrow R_3qp)$ can be construed as a (label) designation of the belief states of a person who believes $R_2qp \rightarrow R_3qp$ and thus, as the designations can be accounted into a conceptualistic model, $(R_2qp - R_3qp)$ can be accounted for conceptual naturalism instead of for an expression of naturalism. But, thereby, it is not naturalism that becomes conceptualistic. The substantive elements responsible for the beliefs are supposed to be having certain general features. It is as much as a horse is different from the word or meaning of 'horse'. The worst is done when a hypothetical universal relation is construed to be exclusively conceptualistic. Parallel to the fatal consequence of the Analytic-synthetic distinction of the \rightarrow (ASD), by construing analyticity to be a truth *a priori* due to the non-empirical *a priori* relations of concepts or meanings of the statements, runs the fatal consequences of the distinction between conceptual naturalism and substantive naturalism. In case of this distinction, conceptual or evidential reasons are construed to be unrevisable and justified unquestionably due to the non empirical *a priori* relation of reasons of two different arguments or evidences. Designation of the relation between two states of beliefs does not entail a conceptual framework of states of beliefs any more than designation of two belief states does entail so. The belief states are not propositions, their relations cannot be accounted in terms of evidential reasons. Thus there cannot be a sense of conceptual naturalism. Belief states and their relations cannot be divorced from psychology. There remains no chance of a version of naturalistic epistemology divorceable from psychology. There is no sense of an exploration of epistemic justification, conceptually naturalistic, such that a privileged status can be conferred to certain 'reasons'. No 'reason' is conceded in naturalism that can completely or

adequately justify beliefs *a priori* very much like the privileged foundational beliefs considered alike analytic truths in relation to their frameworks. This alleged apriority is revealed in Audi's distinction between the structure of justification and the content of justification.

Epistemics is 'the relation between epistemology and cognitive science'.²⁸ It is 'significantly continuous with traditional epistemology' in the sense that it seeks *to regulate or guide our intellectual activities.'²⁹ It contrasts with traditional epistemology because it has a 'close alliance with the psychology of cognition.' The aim of *epistemics* is 'the genuine improvement of intellectual practices'. Since it is the genuine improvement of intellectual practice, its rules must be *executable rules* as opposed to *ideal rules*. *Epistemics* ultimately aims at formulating executable rules or principles.³¹ Thus the structure of knowledge cannot be held here in any ideal sense except that it is a generalisation over regularly observed instances of the particular pattern of beliefs produced or processed by our cognitive mechanism. The structure is found

28 Goldman, A.I. (1986) *Epistemology and Cognition*, Harvard University Press, Cambridge, Massachusetts, and London, England p. vii.

29 Goldman, A.I. (1978) "*Epistemics: The Regulative Theory of Cognition*" *The Journal of philosophy*, 75, pp. 509-523, also in Kornblith, H. (Ed). (1985) pp. 217-230. See Kornblith, H., (Ed.) (1985), p. 217.

30 *Ibid.*

31 *Ibid.*, p.211.

legitimately, in confirmation to the *executable rules* of our intellectual practice. This legitimization of the structure owes to psychological exploration on belief or belief dependence, it is concerned with a causal dependence of beliefs. It is not an *a priori* legitimacy of a structure by means of sheer conceptual analysis of beliefs nor belief dependencies are in confirmation to certain *ideal rules* of our intellectual practice.

A claim of epistemic questions as to be distinguished from epistemological and skeptical questions is appreciable on the ground that the very matrices of these two types of questions are different. The former's matrix roughly demands an '*is*' whereas the latter's that of '*ought*'. But Audi's claiming for the difference is ill founded: he maintains a significant gap between 'structure' and 'content' of knowledge such that *epistemics* is confined to the former and the latter is meant for epistemological and skeptical investigations. For him, epistemological and skeptical inquiries are oriented to certainty and doubt respectively whereas the structure (being separated from the content which is liable to be certain or doubtful, either solely on the basis of the structure or on the basis of experience) remains as an exclusive concern of epistemic question. And thus *epistemics*, being distinguished from epistemological questions, remains neutral to skepticism. In other words, Audi's modest foundationalism as well as coherentism are alleged to be a version of epistemics which need not demand a causal account of justification but neutral to skepticism due to its confined concern to 'structure'.

This bifurcation of knowledge into its 'structure' and 'content'

gets support from the distinction of 'defeasible non-derivatives' and 'indefeasible non-derivatives'. Questions on the structure of a body of knowledge or beliefs are mainly the questions on the way a belief is dependent on other beliefs. An investigation confined to 'structure' can maintain the defeasibility of non-derivatives. Strictly speaking, it can be neutral to the questions of defeasibility and indefeasibility. Modest foundationalism maintains defeasibility of non-derivatives instead of being neutral, because, its confinement to 'structure' does not cut it off from a psychological account which holds the defeasibility of non-derivatives. In other words, modest foundationalism tends to be foundationalistic only in connection to the 'structure' such that it becomes a rival thesis to coherentism which holds no non-derivatives. It tends to be naturalistic if it is supposed to be concerned with the 'content'. However, it is no more naturalistic when naturalism keeps up its conceptualistic stand-point by alienating itself from substantive naturalistic stand-point.

If substantive psychological ground is kept as the reason behind the neutral position of modest foundationalism towards the skeptic, then naturalism and modest foundationalism cannot be distinguished, at least, in connection to their relation with skepticism. Thus the ground is supposed to be conceptual naturalism or conceptual analysis of psychological concepts. But we have already observed the untenability of the above said distinction of the two grounds.

Giving up the said distinction, an explanation can be attempted for defeasible non-derivatives in avoidance of a naturalistic approach. Perhaps, this explanation should exactly suit to what Audi

views as the stand-point of modest foundationalism: That the non-derivatives are indispensable due to the *argument of regression* and indefeasibility is dispensable due to the *ineffectiveness of background beliefs*. If a non-derivative is certainly changed by certain changes in the content of background beliefs, then it is no more a non-derivative although it becomes defeasible. And, if it is defeasible but non-derivative, then changes in the contents of background beliefs must not affect it. But such an explanation becomes circular. 'Structure' and 'content' are separated and, thus, the structure of a body of beliefs determines its content in such a way that its content is not affected from outside, even, not by its background beliefs. The structure is endowed with a privileged status of determining the content. Lest the content would have been changed by the change occurred in background beliefs. Ineffective backgrounds entail that the structure of a body of beliefs remains intact without any consideration of the content of the beliefs. Effectiveness could have established defeasibility but the independence of certain beliefs on other beliefs would not be possible. Besides this circularity, it can be noted, if there remains no such theory independent structure as that dependency can be inferred from Quine's thesis of ontological relativity, then the distinction cannot be claimed too.

Before concluding this chapter it can be mentioned that the two issues taken up here, the relation between 'is' and 'ought' as well as the ATP, are meant to show the plausibility of a particular understanding of foundationalism, coherentism and naturalism. Plausibility of this understanding has been supposed to be sufficing the groundwork for the main thesis; *Against Foundationalism: Towards*

Quine's Naturalized Epistemology. "Against Foundationalism" is meant to be against the foundationalistic theses, not against foundationalism *per se*. For, as the basic argument runs throughout this work, there is no theory-independent method of investigation, whether the investigation is epistemological or that of natural sciences. Naturalized epistemology, "an epistemological investigation continuous with the investigation of natural sciences, does not permit one to have a theory-independent method. Thus the 'ought' which stands as a conceptual representation of foundationalism is not completely independent of 'is', though 'is' represents naturalism. For the representation of naturalism in terms of 'is' is basically due to its descriptive import which is associated with 'theory'.

A general or a neutral understanding of the conceptual backgrounds of foundationalism, coherentism and naturalism could have been an exposition with an orientation of distinguishing or, rather, separating one from the others. In other words, it would have been an exposition emphasizing the differences between the linear and non-linear chains of beliefs as well as between the 'is' and 'ought'. It is clear, I think, these distinctions are not untouched but subdued by two other distinctions in support of an understanding of foundationalism, coherentism and naturalism presented in this essay. The distinction between 'is' and 'ought' has been subdued by a distinction, roughly speaking, between 'ought-in-is' and 'ought~outside-is' in order to focus on the relation between 'is' and 'ought', that is, between naturalism and foundationalism. Similarly, the distinction between a "psychological account" and an 'apsychological account' has been emphasized instead of emphasizing

the structural rivalry pertinent to theories of both the accounts, especially to the rival theories of the latter account.

An understanding supporting the relation between foundationalism and naturalism as two quite separable methods, even the methods are separable from the theories through which they are expressed, is argued here as an understanding of a foundationalist. The relation between foundationalism and naturalism is argued here from the view of point of a genuine naturalist. Hence, as a naturalist argues for the interdependence of method and theory, arguing against the possibility of any meta-method or meta-theory, foundationalism and naturalism are understood as two antagonistic investigations no more than two methods of investigations offering two systematically conflicting or antagonistic theories. They do not conflict by themselves because they are nothing by themselves devoid of the associated theories. Thus the anti-foundationalism of Quine consists in the refutation of the foundationalistic theses like analytic-synthetic distinction, determinacy of meaning, method of intension or Absolute reference in terms of semantics or linguistic analysis. An understanding of anti-foundationalism as 'against foundationalistic theses' instead of 'against foundationalism *per se*' enables to extend Quine's naturalism to refute justology. The common false presupposition of foundationalism and coherentism, argued in terms of Kornblith's notion of APT, can be taken for an analogy of Justology. Justology as a foundationalistic thesis has been refuted in the last but one chapter of this work. The unifying of foundationalism and coherentism is aimed at the plausibility of justology and thus the refutation of justology amounts to . that Quine's anti-foundationalism *qua*.

naturalism is not a 'far cry against contemporary foundationalism.'

CHAPTER II

FOUNDATIONALISM BENEATH THE ANALYTIC-SYNTHETIC DISTINCTION

The general theme of this chapter can be indicated in the following terms.

(i) There is foundationalism beneath the Analytic - Synthetic Distinction (ASD)¹.

(ii) ASD is untenable because it lacks sufficient explanatory basis.

(iii) The underlying epistemological import of the ASD can be established only when ASD can be sufficiently explained.

<iv) Thus the untenability of the ASD questions the viability of foundationalism which is presupposed there in the ASD.

Kant is sparsely spared whenever there is any discussion on the ASD. It seems to be ironical that the search for 'synthetic *a priori*', instead of the ASD, forms the core of Kant's epistemological enterprise undertaken in his *Critique*.² However, although synthetic *a priori* is explicitly said³ to be the genuine problem under consideration, a particular conceptual framework is implicitly presupposed for the ASD which, in turn, supports the possibility of

Hereafter 'Analytic-Synthetic Distinction' is abbreviated as 'ASD'.

²References to *Critique* are from Smith, N.K. (trans.) (1929), *Immanuel Kant's Critique of Pure Reason*, The Macmillan Press Ltd., [(1980) reprint of (1933) second impression].

³In the *Critique* B-19, Kant says "the proper problem of pure reason is contained in the question: How are *a priori* synthetic judgments possible"?

synthetic *a priori*.⁴

If analytic truths are simply truths independent of experience and *a priori* knowledge⁵ is just prior to experience, the compound '*analytic a priori*' is not problematic. Synthetic truths and *a posteriori* knowledge being the opposite of analytic truths and *a priori* knowledge, the compound '*synthetic a posteriori*' also creates no problem. It goes without saying that the truths independent (or dependent") of experience are known prior (or posterior) to experience. The possibility of '*synthetic a priori*' goes against such an *exclusive* bipartite division: '*analytic a priori*' and '*synthetic a posteriori*'.

⁴ Note it from the beginning (a) that '*a priori*' and '*a posteriori*' are, as Bennett. J. (1966), *Kant's Analytic*, Cambridge University Press, p.8 says, 'Kant's hardest worked technical terms' (b) that Kant provides no clear-cut theoretical account of the distinction between analytic and synthetic *a priori* and, hence, one [particularly, an eminent philosopher like Strawson, P. F. (1966), *The Bounds of Sense : An Essay on Kant's Critique of Pure Reason*, Methuen & Co. Ltd., 1982 reprint, p.43] can go to the extreme of saying 'Kant really has no clear and general conception of the synthetic *a priori* at all'; (c) that, even if it is true that (b), it is clear that '*Synthetic a priori*' has "a distinctive character or status, and Kant's Copernican theory is an attempt to explain that status" [*Ibid.*, p.443 such that the '*a priori* character of analytic proposition presents no profound philosophical problem, it is far otherwise with a *priori* synthetic proposition' [*Ibid.*, p.43]; (d) that the immediate purpose of discussing the synthetic *a priori* is two fold: to show it as an answer to a Cartesian doubt, and to show the support it obtains from the ASD and; (e) that the later purpose is to show that this profound philosophical problem, as a foundationalistic problem, of the synthetic *a priori* remains in analytic philosophy. Of course, it remains in a different way.

Considering the above mentioned points of note-4, besides the point that there is ambiguity in using propositions, statement, sentence or judgment to be analytic or *a priori* (though Kant mainly uses 'judgment'), I have used 'truth' and 'knowledge' to be analytic or synthetic and *a priori* or *a posteriori* respectively.

Thus, if 'synthetic *a priori*' is possible, either the analytic truths are not simply truths independent of experience or an *a priori* knowledge is not just a knowledge prior to experience. It is, for Kant, both that the analyticity and the apriority are uniquely qualified on their own grounds over and above their insulation from the world of experience. In other words, the reasons behind (or the conditions determining) analyticity's becoming independent of experience and that of apriority's becoming prior to experience are so different that it is possible to compound experience dependent truth (synthetic) with a knowledge prior to experience (*a priori*).

The *a priori* concerned is due to the transcendental⁶ categories of human understanding that underlies any construction of proper knowledge about the external world. The syntheticity concerned is due to the significance⁷ or non-triviality sustained in any scientific claim of knowledge. Since scientific knowledge essentially requires some stuff anew and syntheticity of a statement fulfills it and further more, apriority guarantees the universal validity as well as necessity of a knowledge claim owing to the transcendental categories; synthetic *a priori* is construed to be the 'true scientific knowledge'.

⁶ "Transcendental" is obviously distinct from "transcendent". The former is the kind of investigations made to track on the framework of ideas and principles (the categories) which limit the human understanding. Transcendental categories are construed to be the conceptual structures presupposed in all empirical inquiries. On the other hand, "transcendent" is metaphysical and inaccessible to empirical experience.

⁷ If syntheticity can be called as 'the principle of significance', apriority can be called as "the principle of universalization". The former calling is due to Strawson, (Op. Cit).

Of course, the universalization is made by virtue of delimitation: delimiting human understanding to the categories or frameworks of ideas and, then, demanding a knowledge claim (to be a proper knowledge claim) to fit into those categories or frameworks which are said to be already there with every human being's understanding. Again, of course, the significance is made by virtue of 'containment'⁸: presuming, more or less, the significant meaning of a concept and, then, observing a concept (predicate) not to be contained in another concept (subject) in order to render significance of the statement they belong to. Yet, barring these drawbacks, the advantage of Kant's epistemological analysis is that it tries to justify our belief in the objective world by investigating the experiences⁹ (to lay out the conceptual framework that limits human understanding and to find space and time as the preconditions of any sense experience).

If the conventional rules of a language (ordinary, formal or artificial) is employed as the criterion to determine the status of the truth of a statement, i.e., analytically true or synthetically true, and if the criterion for the distinction between *a priori* and *a posteriori* is retained as that of knowing something prior to experience or posterior to experience; then, Kant assimilates a logico-linguistic distinction with an epistemological distinction. The reverse would be true of logical positivism, it espouses a 'linguistic

⁸Cited by many, including Quine (*FLPV*, p. 21), with the comment that this term is 'metaphorical', vague or obscure.

⁹Kant views that to question as well as to answer, to doubt as well as to prove, something beyond experience is a 'scandal to philosophy and human reason'. See *Critique*, Bx1.

theory of *a priori*'¹⁰.

" $5 + 7 = 12$ ", for example, would be analytically true if the conventional rules of arithmetic constitute the criterion of the ASD for any statement of arithmetic. But, for Kant, " $5 + 7 = 12$ " is synthetic. "All mathematical judgments, without exception, are synthetic".¹¹ However, even if the term 'containment' is metaphorical, it is the term 'containment' that gives some sense (though an obscured or vague one) of making " $5 + 7 = 12$ " synthetic. It is synthetic because the concept of the sum of two numbers (5 and 7) does not contain the concept of one number (12) resulted out of the sum. And, of course, the sense of 'containment' is quite metaphorical.

On the other hand, if to adopt a convention is a natural or psychological phenomenon with human being and a convention is a matter of fact or experience, the logical positivists are no less in trouble. If the conventional rules of arithmetic are not prior to experience^{*} but a matter of experience then, the knowledge of " $7 + 5 = 12$ " is not *a priori*. But the logical positivists would accept " $7 + 5 = 12$ " to be *a priori*.

If by '*synthetic a priori*' Kant illegitimately conflates a linguistic distinction (the ASD) with an epistemological distinction (the *a priori* - *a posteriori* distinction) then the logical positivists' denial of the synthetic *a priori* is no less grounded on

¹⁰ Which holds that a truth is *a priori* because it is analytic and, all *a priori* truths being analytic, there is no possibility of '*synthetic a priori*'.

¹¹ Critique, B-14.

an illegitimate conflation. The positivists conflate the epistemological distinction with the linguistic distinction.

The "If ..., then, ..." said above is due to the untenability (yet to be shown) of the ASD and, hence, with every doubt to the categorization made, from the beginning, for the two distinctions under the name of "linguistic" and "epistemological". However, even if the ASD is untenable, the initial categorization we have made hints it well that the Carnapian foundationalism is more sophisticated than the Kantian foundationalism. The former emphasizes on the *a priori* itself such that the syntheticity cannot be completely a linguistic kind and the latter emphasizes on a linguistic framework such that the epistemic *a priori* becomes identified with linguistic *a priori*. If, like Kant, the positivists urge apriority for the sake of epistemic normativity, presupposing a privileged status for epistemological norms and principles, they presuppose the same in a sophisticated manner.

Kant's use of "judgment" instead of sentence, statement, proposition, belief or truth veils the assimilation he maintains. So also is the case with positivists' use of "truth" in connection to a *priori*. A judgment is more epistemological than linguistic, unlike a sentence, such that it can have an *a priori* foundation as well as the possibility of conveying synthetic truths. So also, for the positivists, a truth being founded on meaningfulness (i.e. on a linguistic ground) *a priori* (in its linguistic sense) epistemic norms can be maintained,

The foregoing discussion aims at an initial clarification of ASD's epistemological import: connecting the ASD with Kant's

epitomised epistemological problem of 'synthetic *a priori*' which roughly runs parallel to the positivists' 'linguistic *a priori*', and showing the obscurity of the ASD due to the conflation illegitimately¹² made to uphold *a priori* epistemic normativity. *A priori*, as an epistemic concept, is the epistemic necessity that urges the foundation.- transcendental or linguistic - that renders the distinctiveness of epistemic norms. The conceptual clarification or explanation of that distinctiveness is supposed to be obtained by means of the ASD.¹³

Using Kantian terminology, if analyticity is the relation of 'identity' between the subject and predicate of a judgment, the fact independent 'necessity' of that judgment 'contains' no ingredient of 'significance'. On the other hand, since syntheticity is a 'contingent' connection between the subject and predicate of a judgment, 'syntheticity' does not 'contain' the kind of 'necessity' embodied with the relation of 'identity'. But, even if a true scientific judgment is more than just the relation of 'identity' between the subject and the predicate, it is no less necessarily true (i.e. it 'contains' no less fact independent 'necessity' associated with analyticity or the relation of 'identity'}). Hence, if the *a priori* is adduced to go beyond fact independent 'necessity' as well as

¹²Although the illegitimate conflation is in reverse directions - epistemology to language and language to epistemology - both are foundationalistic.

¹³Kant says: "analytic judgments are very important and indeed necessary, but *only for obtaining that clearness* in the concepts which is requisite for such a sure and wide synthesis" (i.e. for a *a priori* synthesis) [Emphasis added] *Critique*, A-10.B-14.

to open the possibility of 'significance' in terms of 'synthesis', it is analytically true that a true scientific judgment is a synthetic *a priori* judgment. The subject, "true scientific judgment", 'contains' the predicate (i.e. synthetic *a priori*) and the relation becomes a 'necessity' of the kind associated with 'identity'. For the conceptual analysis of "true scientific judgment" enables to derive both the 'necessity' and 'significance' associated with 'synthetic *a priori*'.

If this argument is correct, if the Kantian explanation (of true scientific knowledge) ultimately amounts to an analytic truth, then Kantian explanation becomes self stultifying. For, by *identifying* knowledge with synthetic *a priori*, the analytic judgment it presupposes fails to be an instance of true scientific knowledge due to its very nature of being analytic (instead of being 'synthetic *a priori*'). Thus a block to the scientific pursuit of truth, to the objective of significance, is created in the very way of the epistemological analysis which results into a so called analytic truth.

The said block unravels the self created fatal consequence of a foundationalistic approach's response to a Cartesian doubt. The doubt allegedly knocks down every knowledge claim and, hence, to dissipate that doubt from any knowledge claim is to search for a unique foundation. That uniqueness consists of the epistemic normativity: something which is not a knowledge claim but stands as a norm to every knowledge claim such that it allays the Cartesian doubt. Thus the response to the Cartesian doubt, an epistemic normativity placed outside a 'Neurath's boat' must be *a priori* – transcendental or linguistic – not simply due to a sort of fact-independent truth it requires but, more importantly, due to the very nature of the doubt it

attempts to respond.

Granted that the Cartesian doubt wins the epistemological game and foundationalism loses, we cannot claim that we know that we know something. For 'knowing' of something is, first of all, defeated; it leaves no ground to know of a 'knowing'. And, again, adding to that that we cannot know that we are 'believing' something; it results into a pernicious situation that we cannot distinguish 'knowing' from 'believing'. Similarly, it can be said of 'thinking', having an 'opinion', being 'convinced' of something and so on that we meaningfully distinguish from 'knowing' as, for example, in cases like "I think so but I am not sure", "I believe it to be so but I don't know," "I am convinced by your arguments but I doubt" and so on. Thus if we let the Cartesian 'rot to begin, and once it is allowed to start, it cannot be prevented from going on indefinitely'.¹⁴

This indefinite going on is two fold: doubting each of the criteria that can be linearly adduced for knowledge and distinguishing one of the indefinite possible concepts simulating 'knowledge'. A line representing the justification of one criterion for a true claim of knowledge by another (meta) criterion and that, in turn, by another (meta-meta) criterion gets no end unless a particular criterion is granted to be the foundation. Such a grant is prevented once the Cartesian doubt is allowed to start. The other indefinite going on can be constructed as a corollary to the first one since a clear cut distinction of knowledge and its kindred depends on a prior acceptance

¹⁴Prichard, H. A. (1950), "Knowing and believing" in Griffiths, A. P. Ed., (1967) p.65.

of a criterion for knowledge. But, more importantly, the second fold of the indefinite going on pertains to the conceptual dimension of epistemology whereas that of a 'criterion' pertains to the doctrinal dimension - i.e., to the explanatory and justificatory aspects respectively. Nevertheless, since the two aspects are complementary to each other, the 'indefinite going on' of one aspect supports and is supported by the other.

The foundationalists (Kantian or Carnapian) attempt to have foundation (transcendental or linguistic) in order to stop that indefinite going on but it is done so at the cost of the reciprocal support that an explanation and a justification do have. Before discussing how the reciprocal support is checked in the very way of a defensive response made against the Cartesian rot's threat, we can put forward Carnap's distinction between internal and external questions for the sake of some ground work.

The ASD gets its epistemological import in a more sophisticated and stronger way in Carnap's distinction between internal questions and external questions. In his paper "Empiricism, Semantics and Ontology" he suggests that a philosopher should work for the development of semantical analysis, to know the reality of the world. "Appeal to ontological insight will not carry much weight."¹⁵ It is the system or the framework of language that determines ontology. Our language says what there is. Thus what we can say, at all, about an

¹⁵Carnap, R. (1950), "Empiricism, Semantics, and Ontology", in Feigl, Sellars and Lehrer Eds., (1972). See P.596. Also in Carnap, R. (1947), *Meaning and Necessity*, 2nd edn.(1956), University of Chicago Press, Chicago and London, P- 211.

ontological question is predetermined by our language itself.

Questions 'of the existence of certain entities of the new kind within the framework' are called the internal questions and 'questions concerning the reality of the system of entities as a whole' are called the external questions. For example, "Is there a piece of white paper on my desk?" is an internal question in the framework of a thing language. Its answer is testable, said to be right or wrong, by empirical investigation. On the other hand, since the validity of the empirical investigation is no less questioned in questioning the things of the world as a whole, "Is the thing world real?" cannot be answered by empirical investigation; it is an external question in relation to the thing world. Once a system itself is questioned, its regulating or constituting rules are also questioned.

An internal question is a theoretical question; it is committed to the ontology of the theory. The answer can be tested, to be right or wrong, on the basis of their abidance or violation of the grounding laws, definitions or rules constituting that theory. No relation to the grounding semantics that determines the ontology amounts to say that the answers are untestable and, thereby, the question is not meant to obtain any right or wrong answer. Thus an external question is a pseudo question and any answer produced, defended, refuted or problematized on that ground turns to be a fake of our intelligence. It is not scientific; it hovers in air without any ontological commitment. The best we can describe it is that it is a practical question; though it has no theoretical significance, it is a question on the adequacy of a system taken as a whole and their adequacy is quite dependent on our practical considerations of taking up a theory.

Thus a bifurcation is created in the epistemic status of statements. The statements pertinent to an internal question become cognitively contentful. The other-class of statements, related to the external questions, are alleged to be cognitively contentless. For the respective questions themselves, internal and external, are cognitively meaningful and cognitively meaningless.¹⁶

Kant's characterisation of an analytic judgment as a judgment empty of 'significance' simulates Carnap's characterisation of a statements's becoming empty of cognitive content. When the former emptiness is due to the 'identity' relation between the subject and predicate, the latter is due to an 'external' relation between the statement and a particular linguistic framework. The difference between the two varieties of emptiness is something like the difference between the truth of "a - a" and "(a = b) is true in a language L for any value of 'a' and 'b'."¹⁷ That is, in a sense, the difference between absolute identity and linguistic absolute identity.

By "for any value of 'a' and 'b'" it is meant that the meaning postulation decided for 'a' and 'b' in a language is not dependent on any knowledge or belief of 'a = b'. On the contrary, it is on the

¹⁶ Cf. Carnap's characterization of 'cognitive meaning' in Carnap, R. (1947) p.237. It is suggested to be roughly characterized as "the meaning component which is relevant for the determination of truth" (and the non-cognitive meaning is important for 'the psychological effects of a sentence on a listener' though it is irrelevant for 'questions of truth and logic'). Thus the class of statements completely scrutinizable as being true or false turns to be cognitively contentful and the counterpart is cognitively contentless.

¹⁷ Not quoted. Interpreted with somewhat over simplifying Carnap's view that 'L-truth in L is the explicatum for analyticity'. See Carnap, R. (1947) p.226.

basis of that decision we are holding that 'a = b'.

How does one know, for example, that the 'properties' of bachelor (B) and married (M) are incompatible and that therefore has to lay

Thus it is the decision or the 'method of intension' that stands at the root of a statement's becoming analytically true unlike the Kantian 'identity' relation itself. Nonetheless the import of this relation is sustained by making it to be language-relative or system-relative but relative in an absolute sense.

Now, let us resume our discussion about the mutual support between explanation and justification (truth) . A conceptual framework provides some scientific explanation of a 'judgment', 'statement', 'propositon' or a 'sentence' that we make in effect of knowing something. This knowing something becomes unscientific if it lacks a conceptual framework in its background. And, of course, it is the constituting rules of that framework which can be necessarily (supposed to be 'analytically') true and therefore justified, in relation to that framework but, without any scientific explanation unless another conceptual framework is adopted as the background of the former one. But, on the other hand, any belief can obtain an explanation from the system or background system it or its system belongs to but this explanation is without any sense of justification

¹⁸Carnap, R. (1947), p.225.

unless there are certain explicit constitutive rules of that framework confirming to what a belief can be said to be justified.

Thus a conceptual framework provides the theoretic reason as well as the relative justification obtainable for a belief belonging to that framework. But, more importantly, the relative-justification cannot derive any conceptual explanation unless another background system of beliefs is there. For the relative-justification is obtained due to the basic (constitutive) rules of the framework which, in turn, cannot be explained by the framework itself but instead by another framework (the former's background) as much as a question cannot be explained by the framework to what it is external but only to what it is internal. On the other hand, since a justification is no less relative to the basic rules of a framework than an explanation is so to the whole body of beliefs in the system, the explanatory import of a conceptual scheme runs arbitrarily unless certain basic rules do govern¹⁹ that system.

The above said mutual support is broken down, in response to Cartesian doubt, by the foundationalists. And, since the mutual support is very natural and scientific,²⁰ the foundationalists as the defenders of epistemology against the Cartesian doubt adopt some artificial or unscientific move to deviate themselves from their scientific pursuit of truth or knowledge. The rot of indefinite going on threatened them and forced to have a self-created obstacle on their

¹⁹ If not determine that system. Cf. Hylton, P. (1982) "Analyticity and the Indeterminacy of Translation", *Synthese*, 52, pp. 167-184. See p. 175.

²⁰ This point is further discussed, in details, in Chapter V.

way to conceptual clarification or scientific investigation.

We have already discussed about the blocking made by transcendental foundationalism. It epitomizes epistemology as the problem of synthetic *a priori* and, a meta-epistemological looking into it shows that in doing so it amounts to an unscientific investigation based on a so called analytic truth. Carnapian foundationalism or 'Linguistic Absolutism'²¹ suffers on a parallel way. An internal question obtains some scientific explanation but, since a conceptual framework is supposed to be absolutely determining the truth of a proposition in terms of the semantic rules, the relative-justification obtainable for an answer to the internal question is not explained, further, by a back-ground system. This conceptually unexplained relative-justification concedes a limited number of statements and their 'interpretations' an epistemic privilege of becoming analytically true in relation to a language. Thus the theoretic reason for the analytics is not there, they lack conceptual explanation.

It is precisely this lack of conceptual explanation that fundamentally destroys the foundationalistic moves. To point out that lacking is the central epistemological theme that underlies Quine's refutation of the ASD.

²¹Romanos distinguishes 'Linguistic Absolutism' from early Wittgenstein's 'picture theory'. It is with the reason that the latter is compatible with 'metaphysical Absolutism' when the former is not so. For Wittgenstein leaves reality independent of language although it is language through what we comprehend reality. Carnap concedes no independent status to 'reality'. See Romanos, G. D. (1983) *Quine and Analytic Philosophy*, The MIT Press, pp. 31-40.

It is well received that Quine argues, in "Two Dogmas of Empiricism" (TDE),²² against the ASD that analyticity as well as its family concepts like 'synonymy' and 'semantical rules' lack sufficient explanation. Explication or explanation of any of these concepts becomes viciously circular in view of its presupposition of one or other concept of the same family.

If a genuine explanation of a concept is said to be circular by means of a pessimistic allegation that, since each and every other concept in terms of what a concept can be explained belongs to the same family, no concept can be explained without any circularity, then Quine's position can be made clear as it follows.

All systems of definitions must, in a sense, be ultimately circular, and, hence, the complaint is against 'vicious circularity'. It is against foundationalistic connections between meaning and knowledge; between the ASD and the synthetic *a priori*, between the ASD and the semantic determination of ontology. It is true that the allegation of 'circularity' is tenable only when it is made in relation to some view point on the basis of what the 'family-membership' is to be determined. On the same coin, an explanation is genuine only in relation to a conceptual framework. The view point accounted in Quine's TDE is purely epistemological. In other words, the complaint is that each of those proposed definitions or explications of analyticity presuppose the same epistemological blunders that analyticity does - 'in every case the definitions

²² Hereafter "Two Dogmas of Empiricism" is abbreviated as "TDE".

invariably involves the same epistemological problems that the definiendum was subjected to'.²³ It is a 'confusion' to think that the ASD's explanation can be brought about in terms of explicit 'semantical rules' by discarding the vagueness of ordinary language which might be making the distinction hazy. For the clarification required is the conceptual clarification of ASD itself and not of any mechanical classification, say, ticking some statements to be analytic and others as synthetic. When Quine says he • does not understand whether the statement "Everything green is extended" is analytic; "the trouble is not with 'green' or 'extended' but with 'analytic'".²⁴ Moreover, it goes without saying, one can understand some distinction (say, the ASD) if he fails to decide a particular sentence, S, is analytic or synthetic. An instance of indecisiveness to classify something does not amount to say that such a classification cannot be understood.²⁵

Using Frege's terminology²⁶, if neither the sense nor the reference of the ASD can be available then; it is no wonder that Quine does not understand the ASD and; hence, he does not understand that "Everything green is extended" is analytic. Granted that by referring

²³ Hornstein, N. (1982) "Foundationalism and Quine's Indeterminacy Thesis", *Social Research*, 49, pp. 32 - 67. See p.42.

²⁴ FLPV, p. 32.

²⁵ Cf. Mates, B. (1951) "Analytical Sentences", *The Philosophical Review*, 60, pp. 525 - 534. See p. 529. For example, from "Jones is not able to decide whether Fermat's conjecture is a theorem" it would be paradoxical to conclude "Therefore, Jones does not understand the term 'theorem'".

²⁶ Due to Mates, B. (1951), However Mates interprets the matter in a different way and criticizes Quine's stand point. See pp 527-529.

the ASD it is not meant to refer sheer noting down of sentences under two columns - analytic and synthetic - on a piece of paper such that repeatedly going through that can create different 'feelings' or 'attitudes' towards analytics and synthetics²⁷, a conceptual framework must be referred to bring about the distinction. So also, it is not the sense of the sentences themselves but, the conceptual framework which feeds the ASD must be having some sense.

Again, to go with Frege, the need of a *Begriffsschrift* or a 'conceptual notation'²⁸ of the ASD, without any other suppressed tacit assumptions like transcendental *a priori* conceded in the way of some metaphorical saying like 'containment' to explain the ASD, calls for a conceptual framework. The ASD, like a number, is not a 'property of external things' like written or uttered sentences or that of a man (bachelor and unmarried, sitting on that chair). Nor is it 'an object of psychology' which can be established by our sheer strong feeling or attitude of accepting the ASD. A conceptual framework is to be assumed for the ASD if, at all, the ASD amounts to serve any epistemological interest of bifurcating the epistemic status of our statements. It is precisely an argument for the unavailability of any such conceptual framework for the ASD underlies Quine's complaint of the 'vicious

²⁷Appeal to such feelings and attitudes is an important factor in Mates' criticism.

²⁸'conceptual notation' and 'conceptual framework' should not be confused. The former presupposes the latter, not the *vice versa*. The Fregean enterprise of 'conceptual notation' has "produced the profound discoveries in formal logic upon which Frege's posthumous fame ultimately rests: the theory of quantifiers and variables and the modern theory of propositional operators". Quoted from Harrison, B. (1979) *Introduction to the Philosophy of Language*, MacMillan Press, London, p. 52.

circularity' in relation to the explanation of analyticity.

Separating 'meaning' from 'reference' - that is, meaning of a singular concrete or abstract term is not the 'object' it refers to and that of a general concrete or abstract term is not the 'extension' of the term to what it is true of - the ASD can be thought of as based on "synonymy". But, as Quine argues, synonymy is 'best understood only by dint of a prior appeal to analyticity itself.'

Prima. facie, "No bachelor is married" seems to be changed into the logical truth "No unmarried man is married" by replacing "bachelor" with its synonym, i.e., "unmarried man". But this notion of synonymy needs clarification. Appeal to lexicography serves no purpose in this respect. For lexicographical substitutes are not the synonyms we are concerned here. Lexicographical substitutes are meant for 'teaching the use of sentences'²⁹ and, thereby, the lexicographer presupposes the knowledge of the use of the substitutes made for the entries. It is roughly that knowledge, the two different status of knowing two different connections - between the substitutes and between the non-substitutes - maintained in analytic and synthetic truths, on the basis of what the lexicographer is supposed to work it out is our concern.

Again, synonymy cannot be explained in terms of interchangeability *salva. veritate*, i.e., interchangeability of two linguistic forms in all contexts without the change of truth value.

²⁹See Quine, S.V.O. Pursuit of Truth (PT)

"Cordates"³⁰ and "renates", "man" and "feather less biped" etc., are interchangeable *salva veritate* due to mere accidental agreements and, thereby, are not the required interchangeable synonyms in terms of what analyticity can be explained or defined.

Analyticity can be proposed to be defined in terms of synonymy as it follows. If 'A' is cognitively synonymous with 'B' (where 'A' and 'B' are two predicates) then 'A is B' is analytic. 'A' is said to be cognitively synonymous with 'B' if 'A' is substitutable *salva veritate* for 'B'.

If 'A' is extensionally equivalent to 'B' then 'A' is substitutable every where for 'B' and *vice versa*,. But the ASD cannot be sufficiently explained in terms of such extensional equivalences. For example, in both (i) 'All bachelors are unmarried men' and (ii) 'All cordates are renates' 'A' and 'B' are extensionally equivalent- and, hence, 'A' is substitutable everywhere for 'B' and *vice versa*. But '(i)' is supposed to be analytic whereas '(ii)' is not supposed to be so. Thus the extensional equivalence between 'A' and 'B' is not a sufficient condition for the ASD. That is, no difference can be made about the epistemological status of '(i)' and '(ii)', about *how* the two happen to be true in two different ways - analytically and synthetically - in an extensional language. What exactly accrues the ASD as well as its explication in terms of synonymy is the insufficient explanation of that supposed epistemological distinction.

³⁰"Cordates" is not to be confused with "Chordates". *FL*, P. 8, fn.

The problem is not overcome in an intensional language (where provision for modal contexts like 'necessarily ...', 'possibly ...' etc. are laid down) too. Take the adverb "necessarily" for meaning something as in "Necessarily all and only 'A's are A and an intensional language is the union of the extensional language, L , and the set of formulae obtained by prefixing sentences with the adverb "necessarily". In short, it is $L \cup \{ \text{'necessarily'} \}$. By the help of this intensional system it can be said that "Necessarily all cordates are cordates" is true but it cannot be said that "Necessarily all cordates are renates". For if, at all, it is said so due to the co-extensiveness of "cordates" and "renates" it damages the supposed epistemological distinctiveness retained in "Necessarily all cordates are cordates". ($L \cup \{ \text{'necessarily'} \}$) is a good test of "synonymy" but, unfortunately, the term 'necessarily' demands explanation. It is a good test because it attempts to qualify the "coextensiveness" with an epistemic distinctiveness of a kind that concerns us for the "synonymy". But the qualifying term, "necessarily", is in need of explanation. Properties of predicates like "necessarily" cannot be characterized independent of notions like true by meaning as opposed to contingently true.

It is neither in an extensional language nor in an intensional language that the ASD can be explained. It cannot be explained in an artificial language too. For example, if L_0 is an interpreted first order calculus containing both the name 'John' and the meaning postulate

$$P_1 \quad (x) \quad ((x \text{ is a bachelor}) \Rightarrow x \text{ is unmarried}),$$

then the sentence, S , "If John is a bachelor, then John is unmarried" can be passed off as analytic for L_0 .

However, S cannot be passed off as analytic for- L where L stands for $L_0, L_1, L_2 \dots L_n$, i.e., for an n number of languages. For the meaning postulate, P_1 , is confined to L_0 and to discover a meaning postulate which can govern over all languages is self-stultifying besides the fact that there is no such discovery till today.' It is self-stultifying because it tends to be absolutistic, it makes no sense of a 'decision' which really matters the most for meaning postulations.

Thus analyticity cannot, in general, be defined in terms of semantical rules though it can be defined separately in different particular languages. And, again, the possible definitions undertaken with the strategy of meaning postulates can be construed to be arbitrary or non-arbitrary. It can be arbitrary in the sense that there may not be any constraint for keeping a particular statement in a particular framework. For the said rules are artificial (contra natural), it can be revised accordingly, for an arbitrary inclusion of any statement in the framework. Thus what is defined as analytic-in- L_0 is arbitrarily defined and it can be defined as synthetic with some changes in L_0 . On the other hand, it can be construed to be defined non-arbitrarily in the sense that the completeness of a framework or language system, L_0 , objectively determines the truth of a statement (although the semantical rules constituting the completeness of L_0 can be arbitrarily fixed so due to their sole dependence on our decision or intensional method). The objective determination of truth by the semantical rules of L_0 without presupposing the belief or knowledge of any thing experienced in this world amounts to say that a sentence, S , determined so is analytic-for- L_0 because any interpretation of S in confirmation to L_0 becomes true. But such a strategy makes the definition 'viciously

circular'. The sense of 'objective determination' which enables to turn any interpretation of S to be true presupposes the ASD instead of explaining the epistemological problem that what really makes sense of such a fact-independent 'objective determination' of truth as distinguished from the contingent truths.

Thus the explanation of the ASD attempted in terms of synonymy (accounting an intensional, extensional or an artificial language) is proved to be circular. Verification theory of meaning (VTM)³¹ may be called for breaking the circularity.

In Section 5 of the TDE, Quine asks to look beneath the VTM - the 'catch word' of logical empiricism - 'for a possible key to the problem of meaning and the associated problems' in relation to the ASD. The key, immediately comes to hand, is that a statement is analytic if and only if it is confirmed 'no matter what' because (i) "the meaning of a statement is the method of empirically confirming or infirming it' and (ii) a statement is supposed to be analytic if its truth is determined solely by its meaning such that it is true 'no matter what' happens in this empirical world.

The advantage of this strategy - to define analyticity in terms of the VTM - is that it is not circular and it seems to be more empirical in spirit, than the system relative determination of meaning, due to the notion of 'confirming' a statement with empirical observation. The circularity is avoided by avoiding an explanation in

³¹Hereafter "Verification Theory of Meaning" is abbreviated as "VTM".

terms of any concept or notion which, in turn, depends on the explanation of meaning (as it is with 'synonym') or system of language (as it is the case with semantical rules) in order to distinguish the statements true in terms of meaning or language from contingent statements and, thereby, explaining the epistemic discrimination that can be made out of the ASD. It is an attempt to explain the notion of meaning itself.

It is fine as far as it can avoid the circularity but, in fact, this theory is not correct and; hence, the given possible definition (i.e. S is analytic if and only if S is confirmed 'no matter what') is untenable. Tenability of such a theory is dependent upon the tenability of reductionism in empiricism. In other words, a statement can be said to be analytic if it is confirmed 'no matter what' but whether the statement can be confirmed so (individually in isolation from the other statements of the language system) is a question to what the reductionists affirm and the VTM is largely indebted to reductionism. Quine counts reductionism - 'the belief that each meaningful statement is equivalent to some logical construct upon terms which refer to immediate experience'³² - as the second dogma of empiricism. Thus, in effect, recourse to VTM for the explanation of the ASD means to explain one dogma in terms of, not even another dogma but, a dogmadependent theory.

The two dogmas - the ASD and reductionism - are intimately connected, supporting each other: If it can be significantly talked

³²FLPV, p. 27.

about an isolated (system independent) statement as having been individually confirmed or infirmed, it makes enough sense of talking about a particular limited class of statements to be 'vacuously confirmed, *ipso facto*, come what may; and such a statement is analytic' as distinguished from synthetic. On the other hand, if the ASD is tenable, the presupposition of the duality that each individual statement has a linguistic component and a factual component becomes indispensable to conceive of certain statements as being devoid of factual content (to become analytically true). Once this duality inside a statement is there, it makes enough sense of confirming or infirming of individual statements and, thereby, the ASD supports the dogma of reductionism.

Thus, from an epistemological point of view, the root of the two dogmas lies in the belief of individual statements as the units of truth or verification in isolation from the system, language or theory to what the statement belongs.

"The two dogmas are, indeed, at root identical... it is nonsense, and the root of much nonsense, to speak of a linguistic component and a factual component in the truth of individual statement. Taken correctly, science has its double dependence upon language and experience; but this duality is not significantly traceable into the statements of science taken one by one."³³

In fact, sentences meet experience as a 'corporate body'. In

³³FLPV, pp.41-42.

positivist's framework the relation between theory and experience (or, in general, between language and experience) is carried out in terms of a "mixture account" of truth. That is, an additive account of sentences (like particles of a mixture)³⁴ comprising a theory (the mixture) assigns each sentence, individually, with a truth value by the method of each one's confirming or infirming some fixed individuated ranges of experiences of the world. Contrary to it, a "compound account" of truth advocated by Duhem and Quine considers language or theory as the unit of truth.³⁵ Given this latter account, it makes no sense of confirmation or information of a statement in isolation from the system of statements it belongs to and, hence, no epistemological foothold on which rests the ASD.

Universal revisability becomes a natural outcome of the rejection of empirical reductionism in favour of the epistemological holism³⁶ common to Duhem and Quine. Since no statement is granted of the so called truth based on one-by-one verification of isolated statements due to the rejection of empirical reductionism, truth of a particular statement depends upon the truth of its fellow statements as much as it depends upon the world outside. Once this interdependence is accepted, no statement can have an absolute truth for itself. No statement is true or false by itself, solely by its own individual confirmation or infirmation to the experience, any statement can be

³⁴ Hornstein, N. (1982), p. 48.

³⁵ Note that this "system-relativeness" is more advanced than that of Carnap. For further discussions see chapter IV.

³⁶ Epistemological holism is distinguished from semantical holism. See Gochet, P. (1986), *Ascent to Truth: A Critical Examination of Quine's Philosophy*, Philosophia Verlag Miinchen Wein, p. 35.

made true or false by making adjustments in the system for the required confirmation or infirmation. Thus 'any statement can be held true come what may, if we make drastic enough adjustments elsewhere in the system.,... no statement is immune to revision.'³⁷ And, consequently, any statement can be made analytic if unrevisability of the truth is what characterizes analyticity. Thus the ASD becomes meaningless.

Quine's seminal paper, "TDE", has provoked many to defend against his refutation of the ASD but the most important one is that of Grice and Strawson (GS)³⁸ Even revisionists of Quineanism, like Putnam³⁹ do refer and commend GS. For GS do not render mere counter examples against the refutation of ASD but, what is not found in majority of the criticisms against Quine's refutation of the ASD, a theoretic reason is supplied by them in their arguments in defence of the ASD.⁴⁰

³⁷FLPV, p.43.

³⁸Grice H.P. and Strawson, P.P. (1956). "In Defence of a Dogma", *The Philosophical Review*, Vol. 65, no. 2, pp. 141 - 158. Hereafter 'GS' stands for 'Grice and Strawson'.

³⁹Putnam, H. (1975). *Mind, Language and Reality*, Cambridge University Press: Cambridge. See.pp. 34-35.

⁴⁰GS's attempt to provide a theoretic reason is explicit from the very way they begin their arguments in saying that 'Quine's objection is not simply to the words "analytic" and "synthetic", but to a distinction which they are supposed to express, ... so Quine is certainly at odds with a philosophical tradition which is long and not wholly disreputable'. GS (1956) *Op. Cit.*, p. 142. Again, in the light of the theoretic reasons they provide, they amend Quine's thesis by saying that it 'might be better represented not as the thesis that there is no difference at all marked by the use of these expressions (i.e. "Analytic" and "Synthetic"), but at the thesis that the nature of, and reasons for, the difference or differences are totally misunderstood by those who use the expressions, that the stories they tell themselves about the difference are full of illusion' [*Op cit.*, p.143]. [Cf. Putnam's saying, "I do not understand what it would mean to say that a distinction

The main arguments of GS can be pointed out as

- i) the argument from consensus
- ii) the argument for intelligibility
- iii) the argument in terms of concrete counter-example
- iv) the argument for the definition of synonymy by verification
- v) the argument for the compatibility of the ASD and Quine's 'universal revisability'.

The argument from consensus is roughly an appeal to the agreement of the philosophers, to the ASD in their application of "analytic" and "synthetic", from a long philosophical tradition to present day. This argument is fruitfully directed to the epistemological issue in question by means of a distinction between 'open class' and 'closed class' - the former class potentially contains an infinite membership whereas the latter class does not. The ASD is an open class distinction, it is preserved till today and, hence, a common

between two things that different does not exist" However, those who agree with Putnam's revisionistic thesis of Quine 'have often overlooked', as Putnam apprehends, the fact that Quine can be wrong in his most 'shocking' thesis and still right about very important and very pervasive epistemological issues. Putnam tries 'to reconcile the fact that Quine is overwhelmingly right in his critique of what other philosophers have done with the analytic-synthetic distinction with the fact (as Putnam holds) that Quine is wrong in his literal thesis, namely, that the distinction itself does not exist *at all*'. Thus the thesis Putnam defends is "ignore the analytic-synthetic distinction, and you will not be wrong in connection with any philosophical issues not having to do specifically with the distinction. Attempt to use it as a weapon in philosophical discussion, and you will consistently be wrong". (Putnam, *op cit.*, pp. 36, 54, 42 and 36 respectively)].

characteristic or a theoretical reason (rationale) must be behind it to sustain and perpetuate discussions, disputes and developments over it.

Thus the argument displays that there must be a rationale behind the ASD even if we fail to supply that. This is the consequence faced by many 'philosophers who do not agree with Quine'. This is a position., as Putnam aptly describes, that 'they know that there is an analytic - synthetic distinction but they are unable to give a satisfactory account of its nature.'⁴¹ It is, after all, that presupposed rationale (even if it is construed to be hidden there though not clarified) that Quine challenges when he challenges against the ASD. The question is on the **point* of the game' we play by the ASD and, not on the game played in terms of 'meaning' and understanding.⁴² Moreover, the existence of a game is not guaranteed by an illusion that we are playing that game. The ASD as well as the theoretic reason presupposed for the ASD due to the fact that it is an open class distinction are dogmatic.

Misconception of a non-existing epistemological distinction to be an open class distinction can be well traced out of the positivistic ingredient retained in the ASD. Except some border line cases, the class of statements belonging to mathematical truths, logical truths and theoretical science can be distinguished from the class of

⁴¹Op. at., P. 35.

⁴²This analogy of game is due to Putnam, *Op. Cit.*, p.38.

⁴³Following Pigden, C. (1987), "Two Dogmatists", *Inquiry*, 30, pp. 173 - 193. See pp. 181 - 182.

statements belonging to simple observations like "It is raining", "The book is on the table" etc. And, statements of metaphysics are "swept under carpet" due to its unsuitability to belong to any of the above said classes. But even if one claims that analytic truths consists of mathematical, logical and highly theoretical truths this claim makes sense only when the open subclasses of mathematical truths, logical truths etc. are bound together by some common characteristic feature. Without some common characteristic, to bind the open subclasses but claiming it to be one open class, amounts to an arbitrary class of statements devoid of any rationale behind that.

The argument for the intelligibility of the ASD finds Quine's requirement of sufficient explanation or clarification too hard to make out anything. 'Too many words would fail', it is argued, "to meet Quine's standards of intelligibility."⁴⁴

We have already discussed that the Quinean requirement of sufficient explanation for the ASD is an epistemological obligation, it is the 'point of the game' for what we play the ASD and not the usual way of playing it that requires the explanation; it is an extended sense of 'synonymy' that needs explanation and not its ordinary sense. Appeal to ordinary usage for the explanation of synonymy in which "bachelor" and "unmarried man" are safely believed to be synonymous can be ruled out of consideration. For the notion of synonymy employed to define 'analytic' is in an extended sense, beyond its ordinary usage. Its ordinary use does not seek for the coextensive

⁴⁴Cf. GS, *Op. Cit.*, p. 152.

range of verification, nor is it assured of a reductionistic account of viewing statements in isolation of its fellows and, thereby, it does not have the potentiality of explaining certain statements which are alleged to be true 'what may come'. Thus GS's argument against Quine's standard for clarification or explanation is uncalled for. They argue it in terms of the ordinary use of 'synonymy' but 'synonymy' is introduced in an extended sense with certain epistemological interest.

There are two possible ways in which a counter-example can have an epistemological interest against Quine's refutation of the ASD: (a) breaking the circularity in an inductive manner, i.e. rendering some concrete examples for sufficient elucidation of any of the concepts in the same family such that instancing more and more of that kind of elucidatory examples one can inductively prove that the concept is sufficiently clarified to break the circularity; (b) breaking the circularity by certain conceptual clarification of any of the concepts of the 'family' and extend some concrete examples in support of the conceptual clarification,

GS's argument in terms of the example of logical impossibility, vis., "My neighbour's three year child is an adult" is aimed in the first possible way because the second way is almost blocked by Quine, Consider GS's example of logical impossibility. Consider the following two cases:

⁴⁵GS, *Op. Cit.*, p. 150.

1. 'My neighbour's three-year-old child is an adult'.
2. "My neighbour's three-year-old child understands Russel's theory of Types.

By a freak of nature,⁴⁶ (1) becomes true if the neighbour's child happens to be well counted as an adult. Even if it is born Just three years back, its unbelievable physical and mental growth can enable it to be well counted as an adult provided that there holds no *rigid* synonymy between "more than three-years-old" and "adult". But GS explicitly exclude 'freak of nature' from their example. On the same ground, they cannot allow the chances of a three year old child's becoming an adult by being victimized by a sorcerer or by being a sibling of a 'bermmy' or by becoming a time traveller or by the law of a state (that whoever understands Russell's Theory of types is an adult) etc; because such chances do really amount to be the counterexamples to the examples they provide to elucidate the notion of logical impossibility. GS have tried to reduce logical impossibility (i.e., it is analytic that not ...) to logical contradiction through the substitution of synonym ("three- year-old" and "not-an-adult"). But the notion of 'synonymy' is no less in need of clarification than the notion of logical impossibility accounted to explain the ASD.

GS attempt to defend synonymy, admitting no determinate range of verification conditions (i.e., refraining from a reductionistic view point), by keeping *certain* assumptions for what a candidate pair of

⁴⁶Pigden (*Op. Cit.*, p. 186) considers such freaks of nature.

statements are equally confirmed or infirmed- This is not acceptable. Any two consistent statements (e.g.; 'X is a renate' and 'x is a cordate') can be turned to be synonymous by means of *certain* assumptions (e.g., coextensiveness). On the other hand, if the definition is amended and '*any* assumption' is taken into account, instead of '*certain* assumptions', then the definition becomes too tight to allow any synonymy. For, in such an amended account, even the paradigm cases like "bachelor" and "unmarried men" fail to be synonymous. If, in an island, or even in our society in some future, the wedding ceremony happens among the monkeys and the monkeys get the legal and social status of what the married couples do get, the unmarried male monkeys are well counted as bachelors, "bachelor" cannot be synonymous to "unmarried man". Unmarried male monkeys are there to be called as bachelors too. Thus neither '*any* assumption' nor '*certain* assumption' can explain the 'synonymy', because, there is no such 'synonymy' but dogmatically held to be there along with analyticity.⁴⁷

GS's argument for the compatibility of 'analyticity' and 'universal revisability' consists of the following steps.

- a) There is a difference between 'rejecting a proposition' and 'dropping the concepts involved.'⁴⁸
- b) When a formerly analytic statement is dropped, the form of words in question changes from expressing an analytic statement to

⁴⁷Cf. Pigden's example of 'bachelor bemmies', *Op. Cit.*, pp. 187-188

⁴⁸GS, *Op. Cit.*, pp. 156 - 158

expressing a synthetic statement, that is, the analytic is 'metamorphosed' into a synthetic falsehood.

c) If the concepts of formerly analytic statement is revised, the statement or its equivalent would again be true.

The difference between 'rejecting a proposition' and 'dropping the concepts involved' is roughly like a difference between ' $(2 + 2 = 5)$ is false' and 'it is meaningless to talk about our currently used concepts like 'plus' and 'equal to' if it is true that $(2 + 2 = 5)$ '.⁴⁹ The former interpretation is in relation to a particular conceptual framework currently held from generations and, accordingly, $(2 + 2 = 5)$ is rejected in relation to that conceptual framework. The latter interpretation is in relation to a possible framework in which $(2 + 2 = 5)$ becomes true and, accordingly, the age-old concepts expressing '+' and '=' is dropped and revised for the sake of that possible framework. Thus ' $(2 + 2 = 5)$ ', or any proposition to that effect of having a truth condition, can be interpreted in two different ways which can be resulted into true (false) in relation to a currently held framework and false (true) in relation to a revised (conflicting) framework.

GS argue that if a proposition is analytic then it cannot be rejected, it can be 'revised-in-principle'. And, at the same time, the proposition that becomes synthetic in relation to the revised conceptual framework remains analytic in relation to the formerly held conceptual scheme. Thus revisability makes sense only when a sense is

⁴⁹Cf. Camap's distinction between 'internal questions' and 'external questions'.

made of conceptual schemes and the sense of the latter, in turn, makes sense of the ASD. That is, coinciding GS's terminology with Carnapian terminology, a 'method of intension' is vital for the 'dropping' of concepts to 'revise' a proposition; a 'method of extension' is employed for the 'rejection' of a proposition. However, if such a distinction is shown to be untenable, the compatibility between the ASD and the thesis of universal 'revisability' (of Quine) becomes unviable.

In the 4th Chapter, among other things, it can be found that Carnap's 'method of intension' is unviable. Before that, in the 3rd Chapter, it is attempted that a wholehearted positivistic method of empirical investigations prevents determinacy of meaning and on that ground it can be safely concluded that, since no determinacy of meaning is possible, there is no truth determined solely by virtue of meaning and, thereby, no ASD is tenable. It is argued that the indeterminacy thesis is neither a doubt on *the meaning* nor a sheer positivistic assertion of empirical meaning. It is a thesis of empirical meaning by the method of scientific doubt and, thereby, a thesis for naturalistic semantics. The scientific doubt, analogous to the scientific doubt in naturalized epistemology., replaces a Cartesian doubt in semantics. Another important problem that Quine's indeterminacy thesis solves, shown in the 3rd chapter, is the problem that if 'determinate meaning' is there then how to overcome the 'intimate' relationship between reductionism and the ASD?

The holism Quine advocates is undoubtedly antagonistic to the system-neglecting VTM but in TDE he has not extended sufficient reasons for the untenability of VTM and, hence, for the acceptance of the Duhem-Quine thesis (i.e., epistemological holism) even though he

explicitly expresses that the VTM is false. From his indeterminacy thesis it can be observed that it is not only a thesis towards naturalism but also a thesis that can be suitably 'employed' for the falsification of VTM, with an epistemological point of view, in order to completely destroy foundationalism beneath the ASD. For the two dogmas - ASD and reductionism - are intimately related and VTM is dependent on reductionism. Thus what is accomplished so far, in our anti-foundationalistic move is, in a sense, a partial maturation of the anti-foundationalistic theme potentially there in Quine's TDE.

CHAPTER III

INDETERMINACY OF TRANSLATION: A REFUTATION OF FOUNDATIONALISTIC SEMANTICS

The task undertaken against foundationalism, in this chapter and in the next chapter, is to show that foundationalism has two fundamental false presuppositions. Determinacy of meaning in language, one of the two false presuppositions, is to be refuted in this chapter. Thus this chapter can be viewed as an exposition of Quine's indeterminacy thesis but an exposition with an orientation against foundationalistic semantics. Or, to put it in positive terms, the thrust is basically on a conclusion that semantics is to be naturalised analogous to naturalized epistemology. That is, to be more precise, it is an anti-foundationalistic *qua* naturalistic interpretation of Quine's indeterminacy thesis. An absolute determination of reality, the other fundamental false presupposition of foundationalism, is to be refuted in the next chapter.

A lay man's conception of Indeterminacy of Translation (IT) would be the conception that a manual of translation cannot be correctly constructed and all available manuals are wrongly constructed. He can easily refute IT by his own ground that we find many manuals of translation which are correctly constructed. The philosophical insight sustained in IT, the insight that literally haunts many philosophers, is that no manual of translation can, in

¹Hereafter "indeterminacy of Translation" is abbreviated as "IT"

principle, be said to be *the* correct one.

Refutation of the. IT amounts to accept that a manual of translation can be constructed as the 'reference point'² for the evaluation of other alternative manuals which might have been supposed to be correctly constructed for our practical purposes but none is *the* correct one. Such an acceptance tends to be foundationalistic. The tendency to uphold an absolute "reference point", even if it is neither a traditional metaphysical one to determine reality nor a Kantian transcendental one to determine true scientific knowledge but an analytical or semantic one to determine meaning, compels it to be foundationalistic. For reality and knowledge are construed, by these adherents of the 'reference point', to be determined and justified by language. If the 'reference point' is tenable, reality can be absolutely determined as well as a complete justification of a knowledge claim is possible. The IT argues against the possibility of such a 'reference point' and espouses that 'there is no fact of the matter', there is nothing objectively there, about which a translation can be right or wrong.

In short, if a lay man's mocking at IT is due to the fact that many manuals of translation are there and supposed to be correctly constructed, a philosopher's seriousness is due to a methodological dispute based on the question that whether a 'reference point' is possible or not for those available manuals to be evaluated as right

²An introductory exposition of IT in terms of 'reference point' can be found in Roth, P.A. (1978), "Paradox and Indeterminacy", *Journal of Philosophy*, 75, pp.347-367.

or wrong. The IT advocates that there is no such 'reference point' and right translations can sharply diverge'.³

The methodological dispute - between foundationalism and naturalism - is epistemological. It is, to wit, whether epistemology can set *a priori* epistemic principles to evaluate any knowledge claim (as being a justified or unjustified one) or not. An apriority of epistemological normativity is sought by semantic absolutism through the determinacy of meaning. Viability of semantic absolutism is completely dependent upon the tenability of determinacy of meaning.

Determinacy of meaning and the possibility of a 'reference point' *qua* the correct manual of translation are closely associated. So also is the association between IT and meaning-skepticism. A manual of translation connecting the linguistic elements of a source language to that of a target language connects 'meanings' associated with the respective linguistic elements. To accept an absolute determination of the former connection in terms of a linguistic or extra linguistic 'reference point' amounts to accept determinacy of 'meaning'. It illegitimately licenses a curious entity between a linguistic element and what is meant or communicated by that element. No such entity is called for the explanation of 'linguistic activity' when

³Commenting on Katz's "The Refutation of Indeterminacy" Quine Writes, "the fact remains that lexicography lives, and is important. Translation is important, often right, often wrong. The indeterminacy thesis denies none of this, but tells us that right translations can sharply diverge". [In Barrett, R.B. and Gibson R.F. (Eds.) (1990) *Perspectives on Quine*, Basil Blackwell, p.198 (Hereafter references to this book is mentioned as PQ)] .

meaning-skepticism is advocated.⁴ It explains in behaviouristic terms and a behaviouristic explanation of our linguistic activity establishes IT more explicitly than the theoretical ground on what IT is established as a 'natural conclusion' of Peircean thesis and Duhemian thesis.

The IT is a thesis of naturalized epistemology as well as an antithesis to foundationalism. The former aspect is worked out by a behaviouristic explanation of IT. The antithesis is made out of the theoretical explanation of IT which, precisely, consists of the following argument:

"If we recognize with Peirce that the meaning of a sentence turns purely on what would count as *evidence* for its truth, and if we recognize with Duhem that *theoretical sentences* have their evidence not as single sentences but only as larger blocks of theory, then the indeterminacy of *theoretical sentences* is the natural conclusion".⁵

⁴Quine's notion of 'Scientific skepticism' which remains vital for his naturalized epistemology can be put forward here to explain meaning skepticism advocated in terms of the IT. An analogy can be drawn between the two varieties of skepticism. Bar-on Droit (1990), "Scepticism: The External World and Meaning", *Philosophical Studies*, 60, pp.207-231[^] argues 'that, not only is such analogous treatment possible', between external world skepticism and meaning skepticism, 'but that it may be philosophically more interesting'. However, here, our immediate concern is to establish 'meaning skepticism'. Hence what follows is Quine's arguments in favour of that.

⁵OR, pp.80-81 (Emphasis added).

The importance of recognizing Peirce, the originator of pragmatism, is not merely historical but has some conceptual affinity with the empiricism of Quine. The empiricism Peirce represents through his pragmatic brand, unlike the traditional empiricism, permits thought or reason to be an indispensable factor of our growth of knowledge. However, admitting that thought is void without observation and observation is blind without thought (which comes parallel to Kant's saying: "thoughts without content are empty, intuitions without concepts are blind"⁶), he is not committed to the 'architectonic' theory of philosophy/knowledge. On the contrary, having a "laboratory mind", *contra* "seminary minds" of most professional philosophers, he regards a question or solution significant only when it can be 'brought' to the test of some observations or experiments such as we find in the research practices and techniques of scientists and analysts. . Peircean empiricism, unlike logical empiricism, does not commit the mistake of accepting single isolated theoretical sentences for their confirmation to empirical evidence. It avoids 'single experiments or of single experimental phenomena' accepting '*general kinds* of experimental phenomena'.⁸ For what an experiment signifies has its bearings only in relation to the future predictions made out of it. And the suitability that holds for the future on the basis of present or past, between a belief or theory (by observation or experiment) and the empirical world we have around, cannot be conceived of by isolated

⁶*Critique*, A-51/B/75.

⁷Wiener Philip, P. (1358). (Ed.) *Chalres S. Peirce Selected Writings*, [Dover Publications (1966)3. See p.XIV.

⁸*Ibid.*, p.144.

single experiments.

Thus the empiricism represented by Peirce sustains a naturalistic flavour of the Quinean kind as far as it pleads for no verification in terms of experiment or observation of *isolated* kinds and aspires for an investigation with a 'laboratory mind', upholds no *a priori* foundational doctrines but some revisable (hypothetical) statements made on the basis of 'sensible' effects of observation. However the objectivity retained of truth on the basis of experimental agreement in Peircian pragmatism (distinguished from Jame's conception of a subjective psychological satisfaction in relation to pragmatic truth) is acceptable in a Quinean framework only with some reservation. "Scientific method is the way to truth, but it affords even in principle no unique definition of truth."⁹ The method to be adopted in epistemology is scientific par with methods applied in natural sciences and, thereby, meaning of a sentence ultimately depends upon the evidence of its truth parallel to the significance of a hypothesis (made in natural sciences) depends upon the evidence of its truth made out on experimental basis. But the experimental basis cannot afford an hypothesis to be uniquely true because many possible alternative hypotheses may become true on experimental basis. So also, our observation or experience cannot provide us any sentence with an uniquely determined meaning; because, on the basis of some observational data many possible alternative meanings can be put up equally. Thus the constraint to the Peircean pragmatism is that no truth can be incorrigible and, thereby, no meaning can be uniquely

determined although it is firmly endorsed that truth must be having some evidence (the 'sensible' effects by observation or experience) and 'meaning' ultimately depends upon the evidence of truth.¹⁰

Now what Quine denies of Peircian pragmatism and, hence, of any pragmatism that uniquely determines meaning is based on his recognition of Duhemian holism. The Duhemian holism basically argues against the so called "crucial experiment" which is supposed to provide a conclusive evidence against one hypothesis as well as a supporting evidence for another. Duhem argues that the two conditions presupposed for the tenability of 'crucial experiment' which, in turn, simultaneously falsify one hypothesis and verify another cannot be fulfilled. The two conditions are (i) that an unambiguous falsification procedure exists (ii) that *reductio ad absurdum* methods be applicable to scientific inference.

If unambiguous falsification procedure exists, that is, if an hypothesis, H, is refuted by an observation, $\sim O$, then it is presupposed that scientific reasoning follows the simple schema H

¹⁰ In a sense, from here, Davidson's holism deviates from Quinean holism. The former emphasizes more on 'truth' than on 'evidence' such that, even if 'meaning' is determined only in relation to a system of language L, it is 'determined by the best theory of truth for L' that maximises the 'truth' of what the respective speakers say and believe. On the otherhand Quinean 'immanent holism' emphasizes more on 'evidence' than on 'truth' and, accordingly, 'meaning' is determined in relation to L but 'by the translation from L into our own language that maximizes our agreement with speakers of L'. A good discussion of this difference between Davidson's 'transcendent holistic approach' and Quine's 'Immanent holistic approach' can be found in Harman Gilbert (1990) "Immanent and Transcendent approaches to the Theory of Meaning" in PQ, pp. 144-157 (See pp. 153-154).

$\rightarrow 0$, and falsification is represented by $[(H \rightarrow 0) \& \sim 0] \rightarrow \sim H$. But scientific reasoning does not follow it. For every scientific prediction is based on several hypotheses, not on a single hypothesis. The scientific reasoning follows the complex schema, $[(H_1 + H_2 + \dots + H_n) \rightarrow 0]$; not the simple schema, $H \rightarrow 0$. Thus by confronting a recalcitrant experience, ~ 0 , we cannot falsify a single hypothesis, H , but the conjunction of several hypotheses (i.e. $H_1 + H_2 + \dots + H_n$). Thus there exists no unambiguous falsification procedure.

Reductio ad absurdum methods be applicable to scientific inference means that one hypothesis can be said to be verified on the basis of a contradiction inferred from the acceptance of another hypothesis. For, it is supposed here, falsification of one particular hypothesis implies the acceptance of an alternative one. Duhem argues that, even if a particular hypothesis is said to be falsifiable (which is not possible at all), there is neither such implication (said above) nor one can enumerate the possible alternative hypotheses which can explain an event. The falsification of a particular hypothesis, H , does not imply the acceptance of another particular hypothesis, $\sim H$, but the acceptance of several assumptions, hypotheses, even theories, on which $\sim H$ is based. Furthermore, the alternative assumptions, hypotheses and theories on which $\sim H$ can be based to explain an event is not fixed, nor it can even be fixed so. Since there can be no such fixity of alternatives and falsification of an hypothesis, $\sim H$, means verification of no particular hypothesis but an indefinite number of hypotheses, *reductio ad absurdum* method cannot be applicable to scientific inference.

Quine does not claim the Duhemian arguments against *crucial

experiment' to be correct; nor he **is** interested enough to show the non-triviality of such arguments. On the contrary, in a letter to Grunbaum,¹¹ he admits that he has 'probably' used the Duhemian thesis in a 'trivial' way although, arguments apart, the thematic conclusion abstracted from Duhemian thesis is very much persuasive to Quinean holism that makes the ground for his challenge against the 'cleavage between meaning and fact'. "Actually", he writes, "my holism is not as extreme as those brief vague paragraphs at the end of "Two Dogmas of Empiricism" are bound to sound."¹²

The problem ahead is, then, what exactly is Quine's holism? To show, in connection with the Duhemian thesis, what is the restricted version of Duhemian thesis that Quine does uphold? The restriction is put forward in view of the fact that observation sentences are immune from revision even if it is said that 'no statement is immune to revision'.¹³ Quine explicitly expresses that 'the Duhemian thesis would be wrong if understood as imposing an equal status on all the statements in a scientific theory as thus denying the strong presumption in favour of the observation statements'.

The strong presumption is that the 'observation sentence is the

¹¹See Sandra, H. (Ed.) (1970), *Can Theories be Refuted?* (Dordrecht; Reidal), p.132.

¹² Ibid.,

¹³ *FLPV*, p.43.

¹⁴Quine, W.V.O. (1975), "On Empirically Equivalent Systems of the World", *Erkenntnis*, 9, pp.313-328. See pp.314-315.

corner stone of semantics'.¹⁵ For it fundamentally acts as 'the repository evidence for scientific hypothesis'¹⁶ and as 'the only entry to a language'.¹⁷ These two fundamental roles are directly connected with epistemology in view of the fact that the two basic aspects - the doctrinal aspect and the conceptual aspect - are mainly concerned with truth (or evidence) and meaning (or analysis of language). The naturalistic orientation that observation sentence does highlight is clear from its primacy in both the dimensions - doctrinal and conceptual - of epistemology explored with an 'enlightened empirical spirit'. Its primacy in doctrinal aspect is made out of its becoming 'the repository evidence for scientific hypothesis'. It is 'the repository evidence' by virtue of the fact that it is the 'minimal verifiable aggregate' having empirical content of all its own. Like an occasion sentence, for example, "there goes John's old tutor." it is intersubjectively observable and it has no truth value apart from the occasion. And, at the same time, it possesses the general adequacy to elicit assent to the sentence (e.g. "There goes an old man"). Being occasion dependent for its truth it is distinguished from standing sentences which are true 'regardless of occasion of utterance' and having the 'general adequacy to elicit assent' it is a distinct kind of occasion sentence.

¹⁵OR p.S9.

¹⁶OR, p.88.

¹⁷OR, p.89.

¹⁸In Quine's words: It [the occasions sentence] is a sentence like 'This is red' or 'It is raining', which is true on one occasion and false on another; unlike 'Sugar is

However, even if the observation sentences are the minimal verifiable aggregates, they are not compounded to justify the truth of all other sentences (eternal or non-eternal standing sentences, for example,¹⁹ like '3 + 3 = 6' and 'The post man has passed by'). They are incompatible with Russell's atomism. Although Russell's atomism is naturalistic to the extent the atomic sentences, even if they are not about experience, acquire their use 'by direct conditioning to the stimulation of sensory reports',²⁰ the connection between observation sentences and other sentences and the connection between atomic sentences and other sentences differ profoundly. This connection in logical atomism is simple conjunctional and put forward to have a

sweet', whose truth value endures regardless of occasion of utterance., "Nature of Natural knowledge" (in Guttenplan (Ed.) (1975) *Mind and Language* See p.72.) [Hereafter this paper is abbreviated as "NNK"]. Such, then, is an observation sentence, it is an occasion sentence whose occasion is not only intersubjectively observable but is generally adequate, moreover, to ellicit assent to the sentence from any present witness conversant with the language ["NNK" p.73].

¹⁹This example is from Gochet, P. (1986). *Assent to Truth : A Critical Examination of Quine's Philosophy*, p.45. The table below is due to Gochet, P. (1986) *Op.cit.*, p.45. Quine's classification of sentences can be presented in the following manner.

Standing Sentences		Occasion Sentences	
eternal	3 + 3 = 6 The postman passes (tenseless) by on the 9-8-1980, at 9 A.M. GMT	Dog (Here- is-a-dog) Rabbit (Here-is-a-rabbit)	Observa- tional
non-eternal	The crocuses have come out. The postman has passed by.	Spy (Here-is-a-spy) Bachalor (Here-is-a -bachelor)	non- obser- vational

²⁰*TT*, p. 181.

foundational approach to epistemology whereas the 'connection with the observation sentences is more tenuous and complex'²¹ and put forward to have a naturalistic approach to epistemology.

Observation sentence's primacy in conceptual aspect of epistemology is made out of the fact that it is "the only entry to a language." It is an 'amorphous unstructured unit' and it is an 'intersubjective unit'. The observation sentences, for example, 'This-is-red', 'It-is-raining', 'That-is-a-dog' etc.; are not learnt as different structured wholes out of the words like "This", "That", "is", "it", "a", "raining", "red", "dog", etc. Those are learnt by ostension, by the reception of natural stimulations to the nerve endings of the subject, as unstructured units. And, not only that they are received as unstructured wholes but received so also by all the speakers of English happen to be present there. That is, an observation sentence is true (or false) in a situation if all speakers would assent to (or dissent from) it when asked in that situation. This 'intersubjective' character of observation sentences well indicates the social character of Quine's conception of language. And the character of 'unstructured whole' amounts to say that the observation sentences are learnt individually taken as wholes.

They stand for the 'sentences at the periphery' in the metaphor Quine extends in his argument for universal revisability. An adjustment in the interior of the theory can save an observation

²¹ *Ibid.*

sentence (peripheral statement) conflicting with experience. Quine acknowledges:

'the experimental periphery in "Two Dogmas" takes form in *Word and Object* as the triggering of nerve endings' and 'statements near the periphery are recognizable in *Word and Object* as the observation sentences.'²²

Naturally 'the triggering of nerve endings', in response to the physical objects outside, amounts to the basic factor of what it is traditionally known as empirical experience. And, statements made of those basic experiences are observation sentences. But our language is not so crude that one can venture to put the observation sentences sanctified and, at the same time, make up a theory by observation sentences. What the observation sentences make up is the intermediate between bare physical objects and the statements interior to a theory; what a theory tends to express or explain becomes impossible without the observation sentences. The natural connection between a theory and the observation sentences makes truth immanent in a theory. But the certainty of the theory is not warranted because the observation sentences are never theory independent.

The natural relation between a theory and the observation sentences enables the possible transition of each other's traits. Truth of a theory, which explains some aspect of the observable world

²²*TT*, p. 180.

outside, becomes immanent in the theory itself. And, the certainty is denied even of the observation sentences which really stand as the closest possible linguistic items to the physical objects experienced outside. For 'immanent truth, a la Tarski, is the only truth'²³ that Quine recognizes and we cannot know one theory to be true with certainty and infallibility.

Thus the conception of an observation sentence avoids a full-blooded holism of the Duhemian kind - acceptance of what does impel, to abandon the special status assigned to observation sentences. In fact acceptance of an unrestricted Duhemian thesis amounts to accept, what Dummett describes, an 'explosive mixture' of two conflicting views that (i) all sentences are theory-laden to a certain extent (Holism) and that (ii) some sentences, namely observation sentences, are the checkpoints for all theories of the world (empiricism). "If the system confronts experience only as wholes", argues Dummett, "then there is no periphery and no interior".²⁴ If there exists, in a strict sense, two kinds (not of degrees) of susceptibility to experimental conditions and, there by, the interior and periphery of a theory; then, in fact, holism cannot be intact. For the truth conditions of the periphery statements being directly connected with experience negates the holistic claim that no sentence's meaning, thereby, also the truth conditions, is possible without being related to the other

²³ *Ibid.*

²⁴ Dummett, M. (1973), *Frege, Philosophy of Language*, 2nd Edn. Duckworth, London, p.594.

associated statements of the theory.

But the restricted form of the Duhemian thesis allows degrees of susceptibility to experimental conditions. The observation sentences are privileged to have such susceptibility to the highest degree in the sense that they are in the periphery of a theory-circle and experience directly impinges on them. The privilege of getting the highest degree of susceptibility is obviously different from the privilege of getting a different kind of susceptibility such that it exists invulnerably.

In the context the observation statement is said to be immune from revision is different from the context in which it is said to be otherwise. The difference is, precisely, the difference between structured observation sentences and the structureless observation sentences. The former aspect can be well instanced when it is a part of a theoretical sentence, the latter aspect can be exemplified when it is beyond such theoretical participation. For example,²⁵ (a) 'lo! water' is a structureless whole whereas (b) 'water is H₂O' is a structured whole, though the observational term 'water' occurs in both sentences. When the term 'water' belongs to a structured whole i.e.; 'water is H₂O', it can be changed to another structured whole. If, for example, in remote future, scientific discoveries establish that it is not water but some other basic element of our atmosphere that really causes to calculate, mistakenly, one hydrogen as two hydrogens

²⁵Gochet, p.(1986)., p.33.

in water molecule; then, it would be said that 'water is H_2O .' Or, suppose, the imagined element is named as 'Gibon', then it would be said that 'Gibon-water is H_2O '. However 'LO! water' cannot be changed so because it is structureless. Another very common example can be cited for illustration. A straight stick seen as bent in water can elicit the observational sentence 'This-is-a-bent-stick' but becoming aware of the illusion we put it to a structured whole and can say 'The immersed stick in water is not bent'. The point is that the sentence is theory dependent in the latter case whereas it is not so in the former case. But the former case is also related to a theory in the sense that unless until we master the former use we cannot understand or use the latter. The conceptual difference between the two aspects - structureless wholes and part of a structured whole - of observation sentences is very common in the sense that we step to the structured whole only after crossing the unstructured wholes and what makes sense of 'changing' a, whole is the 'structure' that changes. So a structureless whole has to be shifted to a structured whole to have a change. Such shifting is essentially made in relation to certain theoretical constraint. Viewing from such an angle every thing can be seen as theoretical. That is why Quine says ".... I see all objects as theoretical".²⁶

An unrestricted Duhemian holism corresponds to an extended sense of the term 'theory' whereas the restricted sense supports the

²⁶TT. p.22).

naturalistic epistemology in terms of a technical sense of 'theory'.²⁷ A theory, in its extended sense, contains all sentences observational and standing - with an equal susceptibility of their meaning and truth to the theory as a whole. Thus it counts nothing called as unstructured wholes. In this sense there is no distinction between 'language' and 'theory'. For all the sentences of a natural language which enjoy community-wide acceptance turns to be the constituents of a theory. The observation sentences do characteristically enjoy a community-wide acceptance as well as all other sentences of the natural language do. Such contexts where the distinction between language and theory is insensitive, are the contexts where Quine speaks of language or theory as a fabric or 'network of sentences associated to one another and to external stimuli by the mechanism of conditioned response'.²⁸ But it becomes sensitive once a language is construed to be containing many theories, once we allow different structures to accommodate different aspects of the world for explanation, "when we allow the imaginary man full logical acumen".²⁹ In this technical sense a set of sentences can be characterized as a theory iff 'it consists of some subset S of sentences together with all the further sentences that are logically improved by S and do not exceed the vocabulary of S'.³⁰ The contained

²⁷For the detail explanation of the two senses of 'theory' see Roth, P.A., (1993), "Theories of Nature and Nature of Theories", *Mind*, 79, pp.431-438.

²⁸In Davidson, D. and Hintikka, J. (1979) *Words and Objections*, D. Reidel Publishing Company, Dordrecht-Holland, Boston-USA, (Revised Edn. 1975), p.310.

²⁹ *Ibid.*

³⁰Quine, W.V.O. (1975), "On Empirically Equivalent Systems of

sentences are well defined and so also their implied sentences, the structureless observation sentences are not being implied by any theoretical sentences, a theory is not susceptible to indeterminacy though it is underdetermined by the data given. For indeterminacy makes sense only when there are alternative ways of relating the observation, the unstructured observation sentences to the theory, so as to construct alternative but incompatible theories by means of shifting the structureless wholes to certain mutually conflicting structured wholes those are compatible to the unstructured wholes.

Stimulus meaning plays a major role in IT's behaviouristic explanation. It is 'meaning' defined in terms of sensory stimulations and verbal reactions. The name itself suggests the empirical import sustained in this theory of meaning provided that 'stimulation' is not meant as a mental content.³¹ For 'stimulation'

the World", *Erkenntnis*, 9. See p.318.

³¹It is notable that a philosopher like Searle misunderstands the IT on this ground that, even if he views language is indeed public and it is not a matter of meaning-a-introspectable-entities, private objects, privileged access or any of the Cartesian paraphernalia, he views that it is a mistake to think 'that the understanding a speaker is a matter of constructing a 'theory' that the theory is based in 'evident', and that the evidence must be 'empirical' [John R. Searle (1987), "Indeterminacy, Empiricism, and the First Person," *The Journal of Philosophy*, 84, pp.123-46; See p.146]. He does so in favour of his notion of 'intentional content'. In this connection, to defend Quine against Searle's criticism, the importance of 'evidence' and 'holism' - the two factors corresponding to the Peircian thesis and the Duhemian thesis - of the theoretical explanation cannot be overlooked. Particularly, it is the 'evidential behaviourism' (as Follesdal distinguishes it from 'ontological behaviourism') that gets the central importance in IT. For detail clarification of this point and for a defence of Quine against Searle's criticisms see Follesdal, D. (1990) "Indeterminacy and mental

conceived of so spoils all the interest this theory keeps to ensure. The primary interest kept by Quine in envisaging such a theory is a behaviouristic explanation of 'meaning' which, in turn, ensures the indeterminacy of empirical meaning and translation.

The affirmative stimulus meaning of a sentence S for a speaker a at time t is defined as 'the class of all the stimulations', f , 'that would prompt' a 's 'assent' at t . The negative stimulus meaning of S is likewise "the class of all the stimulations", f^1 , 'that would prompt' a 's "dissent" at t . And stimulus meaning is defined as the ordered pair of affirmative stimulus meaning and negative stimulus meaning, (z, z^1) .

(z, z^1) signifies the *unit of* stimulations, relative to a limit or modulus (of time), that has two mutually exclusive aspects. That is, if a speaker would assent to (or dissent from) S in the presence of z then he would dissent from (or assent to) S in the presence of z^1 . It is conspicuous that understanding of a sentence consists in its proper use and reaction to such proper uses in all possible circumstances. Proper use cannot be sensed of unless it is contrasted to improper uses. However, as a particular proper use cannot determine all the improper uses, nor it is so conversely; so also, 'the affirmative and the negative stimulus meaning do not determine each other'.³² But a stimulation must not be conceived 'as a

states" in *Perspectives in Quine* (ed.) Robert B. Barrett and Roger F. Gibson (Basil Blackwell) pp.98-139.

³²WO, p.33.

dated particular event but as a universal, a repeatable event form' parallel to the fact that from a particular use of a token of sentence it must not be conceived that the use of the sentence is exhausted, the sentence can be used repeatedly, it is a *type* of what innumerable tokens can be instanced. Thus it is not to be said 'that two like stimulations have occurred, but that the same stimulation has recurred'.³³ The strong conditional "that would prompt" in the definition of stimulus meaning signifies the dispositional character of stimulus meaning. A disposition is a physical trait (e.g. solubility in water) which can be disjunctive in the sense that 'like effects can come of unlike mechanisms' (e.g. solubility in water can be of salt or sugar or any thing like that). And 'what makes it a disposition is no significant character of its own, but only the style in which we happen to specify it'³⁴ (e.g.; solubility in water can be described "in terms of the relative positions of small particles", it can also be described by putting an object in water and see if it dissolves). In short, a disposition is a specification of disjunctive physical trait. In stimulus meaning, the specification is carried out by assent-dissent mechanism and the physical trait under consideration is the sensory stimulations given to the subject.

'It is primarily by querying sentences for assent and dissent that we tap the reservoirs of verbal dispositions'.³⁵ Without being queried, for example, "This is red" cannot be affirmed whenever 'red'

³³WO, p.34.

³⁴Quine, W.V.O. (1975), "Mind and Verbal Dispositions" in Guttenplan, S. (Ed.) (1975), pp.83-95. See p.90.

³⁵*Ibid.*, p.88.

is present nor it can be denied wherever 'red' is absent. This querying (for assent/dissent) signifies that the disposition in question is basically under social assessment, bound to be communicable. If communicability would have been lacking in this primary verbal dispositions then language could not have been handed down from generation to generation, nor there could have any hope for 'breaking into newly discovered language'.

The said behavioral disposition is a correlation between assent and the presence of stimulations of the object and between dissent and the absence of stimulations of the object. "In experimentally equating the uses of 'gavagai' and 'Rabbit' it is stimulations that must be made to match, not animals'.³⁶ Since the particular occasion of querying that really amounts to extend the verdict on the sentence in question, standing sentences cannot bear such a verdict directly from the occasion of querying. Thus understanding as well as equivalent of meaning of a standing sentence cannot be identified with a particular occasion of assent/dissent disposition. Thus 'a proper semantical analysis of standing sentences, in terms of behavioural disposition will be primarily occupied with the interrelations of sentences rather than standing sentences one by one'.³⁷ In view of the fact that different systems of such interrelations is possible and there exists no objective reference to claim a particular system to be *the* correct one, IT becomes inevitable.

³⁶WO, p.31.

³⁷ "Mind and Verbal Dispositions", p.89.

Although 'dispositions are indeed physical states', at the level of behavioural explanation, Quine identifies them with their behavioural manifestation when he illustrates the notion of stimulus meaning. However, he concludes his discussion in "Mind and Verbal dispositions" with the remark that 'the so called identity theory of mind: mental states are the states of body' is what he looks ahead of the present epistemological investigations. That is what he aims to further in future days of investigations.

Nonetheless, he expresses cautions against the construal of identity theory as a repudiation theory. That is, behavioural explanation is not to be repudiated due to the fact that it does not specify actual physiological terms. For, as Quine remarks, "To cite a behavioural disposition is to posit an unexplained neural mechanism, and such posits should be made in the hope for their submitting some day to a physical explanation."³⁸ Thus to what really a behaviouristic explanation of meaning or language via the notion of stimulus meaning (and, thereby, via the IT that indispensably keeps stimulus meaning in it's behaviouristic explanation) aims at is to submit the philosophical problems, especially epistemological problems, to a physical explanation with a naturalistic spirit. Philosophers who fail to appreciate behaviouristic explanation and move towards the mentalistic explanation by means of their dogmatic adherence to an unanalyzed notion of meaning are primarily so interested due to their 'despair' of a naturalistic trend in philosophy.

³⁸*Ibid.*, p.95.

By the help of stimulus meaning we can try for 'radical translation' instead of normal translation; because, the former kind of translation explains the rudimentary stages of working out a normal translation. Moreover, the latter kind cannot be directly connected with stimulus meaning due to the fact that it is mostly carried out in terms of non-eternal standing sentences. Radical translation is the 'translation of the language of a hitherto untouched people'³⁹ where the possibility of 'help of interpreters is excluded' and, moreover, the assumption of a 'shared culture' between that of the translator and of the native speakers is forbidden. Thus the only way left for the translator is behaviouristic as well as naturalistic. That is, on the basis of certain observable behaviour the translator has to formulate certain hypotheses which are, in turn, confirmed or infirmed in the way of developing the translation manual.

A radical translation is fruitlessly undertaken by the field linguists if there exists a 'shared culture common to the speaker of each and every possible pair of languages or if there exists, at least, one interpreter to help the translators for every possible pair of languages. However, the philosophical point concerned here is not about the controversy over the existence or non-existence of such common 'shared culture', nor about that of such an interpreter. The interesting consequence (to be shown) is that the least of language 'can be made sense of in terms of its stimulus conditions' and the most is left for 'empirically unconditioned variation in one's

³⁹WO, p.28.

conceptual scheme'.⁴⁰ In other words, indeterminacy of translation roughly starts from the notion of 'radical translation' if one faithfully adheres the tools available for stimulus meaning.

Let us consider the scheme of radical translation with the help of Quine's famous example of the "Gavagai". "Yes" and "No" are the two words conceded to be the translation of corresponding native words in order to have a working hypothesis, to allow the linguist to settle on native signs of assent and dissent. Having the working hypothesis in hand, the linguist translates "Gavagai" to the sentence "Rabbit" on the basis of accumulating inductive instances - that is, 'roughly that the native will assent 'Gavagai?' under just those stimulations under which we, if asked, would assent to 'Rabbit?'; and correspondingly for dissent'⁴¹

Supplemented by prior collateral informations, in many possible ways, the native speaker may be prompted to assent or dissent by the stimulation unusual for the linguist. This completely disrupts the linguist's aspiration of a stimulus synonymy between "Gavagai" and "Rabbit". What discrepancy the collateral information creates is basically the difference of positions (spatial, temporal, cultural etc.) between the native speaker and the linguist such that the linguist is not in a position to correlate the information he gathers from the environment with the truth that there is a rabbit nearby whereas the native speaker is in a position to correlate so. For

⁴⁰WO, p.26

⁴¹WO, p.30.

example,⁴² as Davidson imagines, it is possible for the native speaker to assent to 'Gavagai?' just by having the poor glimpse of the long wings and erratic movements of a local 'rabbit fly' unknown to the linguist. Again, collateral information can be provided by native kibitzer and such a 'verbal intervention' of a by-stander gets no place in stimulus meaning of 'Rabbit' (of the linguist) but it gets a significant place in that of 'Gavagai' (of the native speaker). It is also possible that an alert speaker may be stunned, due to certain, stimulations such that he *would* be precluded to any assent to or dissent from the ensuing 'Gavagai?' at time *t*. In this case, the stimulations do not belong to the affirmative stimulus meaning, nor to the negative stimulus meaning of 'Gavagai' for him at *t*.

Thus the discrepancy observed between the stimulus meanings of 'Gavagai' and 'Rabbit' on the basis of collateral information, helpful for the native speaker but not for the linguist, shows that translation is not made on the basis of 'identity of stimulus meaning', nor on the basis of 'sameness of stimulus meaning', but on the basis of "significant approximation of stimulus meaning".⁴⁴ Such is the implication we get from 'collateral information' mainly due to two reasons. One reason is that 'stimulus meaning' is the only 'objective reality' that the linguist has to probe when he undertakes radical translation. For stimulus meaning of an occasion sentence is by definition the native's total battery of present dispositions to be

⁴²WO, p.37.

⁴³*Ibid.*

⁴⁴WO, p.40.

prompted to assent to or dissent from the sentence; and these dispositions are just what the linguist has to sample and estimate'.⁴⁵ Since we find discrepancy, in stimulus meanings, when we hope for stimulus synonymy on the basis of identity in stimulus meaning; due to the examination of possible collateral informations said above, the best we can hope for is 'significant approximation of stimulus meaning'. The second reason adduces to such significant approximation. The reason is, roughly speaking, the linguist can 'dismiss' collateral information 'as effects of unidentified interferences (as in the case of 'rabbit fly' and 'kibitzer') or by 'varying his times and informants'⁴⁶ (as in case of 'stunning').

The difficulty is aggravated if we hope for synonymy of terms, translating 'gavagai' to 'rabbit' as two terms instead of two occasion sentences 'Gavagai' and 'Rabbit', For 'who knows but what the objects to this term [gavagai] applies are not rabbits at all, but mere stages, or brief temporal segments, of rabbits? In either event the stimulus situations that prompt assent to 'gavagai' would be the same as for rabbit'.⁴⁷ It can be the same, even, for rabbit hood. For the 'distinction between concrete and abstract object as well as between general and singular term, is independent of stimulus meaning'.⁴⁸

Thus, even if there is uncertainty, we can have 'significant

⁴⁵WO, p.39.

⁴⁶WO, p.40.

⁴⁷WO, pp.51-52.

⁴⁸WO, p.52.

approximation of stimulus meanings' in case of observation sentences like 'Gavagai' and 'Rabbit'. For there exists 'an objective matter to be right or wrong about'; although there are situations of uncertainty due to the collateral informations those can be overcome in various ways. Thus translation of observation sentences is possible.

By this querying of assent and dissent on selective native sentences after the passive observation of native utterances and circumstances, the linguist can select and succeed for the translation of truth functions like negation, conjunction and alternation.⁴⁹ The semantic criterion on which it is possible by means of the assent-dissent mechanism is as follows:

The semantic criterion of negation is that it turns any short sentence to which one will assent into a sentence for which one will dissent and vice versa. That of conjunction is that it produces compounds to which (so long as the component sentences are short) one is prepared to assent always and only when one is prepared to assent to each component. That of alternation is similar with assent changed twice to dissent.⁵⁰

Stimulus-analytic sentences can be recognized, so also the stimulus contradictory sentences – the former kind commands

⁴⁹For the details of Translating Truth functions, see pp.57-61.

⁵⁰WO, pp.57-58.

irreversible assent and the latter kind commands irreversible dissent. However the said kinds are 'not behaviouristic reconstruction of intuitive semantics, but only a behaviouristic ersatz'.⁵¹ For, in this 'behaviouristic ersatz', analyticity applicable "as well to 'There have been black dogs' as to ' $2 + 2 = 4$ ' and 'No bachelor is married'".⁵²

In view of the fact that standing sentences lack stimulus meaning, to translate them otherwise, the linguist can take all the standing sentences into account and make certain hypotheses by confirming the conditions already availed as the secondary data in hand. These hypotheses are called as analytic hypotheses. For these are the assumptions for equivalents between sentences of the source language and sentences of the target language with no legitimacy within his hitherto accepted procedure. The conditions or the secondary data in hand are (i) observation sentences <ii) truth functions and (iii) sentences those are stimulus-analytic or stimulus-contradictory. These are said to be the conditions because an analytic hypothesis is to confirm these in the way of providing certain clues for consistent translation. For these conditions nearly exhaust the part of a language that can be translated on the basis of stimulus meaning.

But 'the most notable thing about the analytic hypotheses is that they exceed anything implicit in any native's disposition to speech

⁵¹WQ p.66.

⁵²Ibid..

behaviour.'⁵³ For the main function of such hypotheses is to inter-
animate the sentences of a language for translation. Inter-animation
is the provision of certain internal structure to the sentences of a
language such that they can be related and, thereby, inter-animate
each other. The meaning of one particular sentence can be understood
by the help of its structure which cannot be independent of the
structures of other sentences. This internal structure can never be
found in any native's disposition to speech behaviour. For the
native's disposition to speech behaviour is essentially external in
the sense that whatever he responds he responds so by certain speech
behaviour always made out of the external stimulations. He uses his
language, not a so called meta-language. For, on the basis of
stimulus meaning, when he is unable to convey *the* meaning of the
standing sentences it is conspicuous that he cannot convey the
internal structure of these sentences.

From the illustration of radical translation, it is fairly
understood that, if at all, with a true positivistic spirit, one can
determine the meanings of sentences singly, then the only tools which
he has to adhere faithfully is exclusively that of the assent-dissent
mechanism. And such a mechanism runs smoothly for the observation
sentences and also, with little difficulty, for the occasion sentences
and truth-functional connectives. It breaks down for standing
sentences and analytic hypothesis comes to rescue. But use of
analytic hypothesis amounts to assume a non-empirical basis for the
determination of cognitive meaning and, thereby, contradicts to the

positivists' notion of empirical meaning. That is, indispensability of analytic hypothesis proves the dispensability of the method of verification - the VTM which credits a sentence's meaningfulness on the basis of its being confirmed or infirmed by observable verification.

In fact, if VTM is correct then language becomes derivative in the sense that a statement's meaning consists in its being confirmed or infirmed by experience and presupposes no infrastructure of a language that is non-empirically inbuilt in language. The use of analytic hypothesis shows that language is not derivative and presupposes certain infrastructure which is non-empirically inbuilt in it. However, 'non-empirical' does not ensure a mentalistic basis. As it is discussed before, Quine views a mentalistic explanation as a superficial level of explanation.

The inbuilt infrastructure is there on a pragmatic basis with a naturalistic spirit. That is, neither it is empirical by which it can bifurcate truth to analytic and synthetic, nor it is non-empirical by which it can explain language in terms of certain innate holistic principles which cannot be based on correlation with empirical stimulations. On the other hand, it is naturalistic like all other principles of natural sciences - concede, first of all, certain non-empirical assumptions or hypotheses on pragmatic ground as well as exclude anything unviable to correlate with environmental stimulation on an empirical ground. This pragmatic empiricism, distinguished from logical empiricism, is called by Quine as the "enlightened empiricism".

The fact that analytic hypotheses exceed anything implicit in any native's disposition to speech behaviour and, thereby, exceeds the given empirical data: a translation-manual being highly dependent on such hypotheses has no objective ground to be judged as the 'correct' one. For many such different incompatible hypotheses can be made with confirmation to the conditions availed by the given empirical data. For example,⁵⁴ to decide between 'rabbit' and 'rabbit stages' for the translation of the 'Gavagai', 'if by analytic hypothesis we take 'are the same' as translation of some construction in jungle language we may succeed in translating 'Gavagai' to 'rabbit' by knowing that it is the sameness of gavagais or rabbits that the native is disposed to assent. But equally fits the rival analytical hypothesis vis. 'are stages of the same animal' to the same data and. putting forward the same questions to the native to assent or dissent as it would have been done before to succeed in translating 'gavagai' to 'rabbit' we can succeed in translating 'gavagai' to 'rabbit stages'.

Note that the success obtainable for the two different translations 'rabbit' and 'rabbit stages', of 'gavagai,' owes more to the corresponding analytical hypotheses, 'are same' and 'are stages of the same animal', than to the fact that we are at loss to scrutinise what object the native really refers to. For even if we cannot scrutinise the reference, logically equivalent translations can be found on the basis of some analytical hypothesis such that there can

⁵⁴WO, p.72.

be no question of Indeterminacy. Consider the case, for example,⁵⁵ that A and B are two linguists who are prefacing 'yeg' or 'neg' and the mappings they give are

<u>A's Mapping</u>	<u>B's Mapping</u>
Yeg = Yes	Neg = Yes
Neg = No	Yeg = No
Rabbit = Rabbit	Rabbit = Non-rabbit
V = V	V = &
(3x) = (3x)	(3x) = (x)
(x) = (x)	(x) = (3x)

When the native speaker utters "Yeg; (3x) (Rabbit x)", A's translation would be "It is the case that (3x) (Rabbit x)" whereas B's translation would be "It is not the case that (x) (non-rabbit x)". It is an example of the inscrutability of reference, not an example of indeterminacy of translation. A and B have the rival theses about the reference of all general terms - when A maps "rabbit", B maps 'non-rabbit' - but they give logically equivalent translations. This shows that A and B are in illusion when they want to scrutinise the reference of 'Yeg; (3x) (Rabbit x)'. But, more importantly, they would be in more illusion if they would have taken the analytical hypotheses 'are the same' and 'are stages of the same animal' to succeed in translating 'gavagai' into "rabbit" and 'rabbit stage' and yet, want to determine whether A is correct or B is correct.

⁵⁵Cf. Massey, G. (1978), "Indeterminacy, Inscrutability, and Ontological Relativity", *American Philosophical Quarterly*, *Monograph Series*, 12, pp.43-55. see pp.50-52.

Meaning is illusive and, in a sense, it is more illusive than the illusion of an immersed stick in a glass of water. For there is nothing stick like that can be layed bare before us as *the meaning*. This is the striking sense in which under-determination of a scientific theory is distinguished from indeterminacy of translation.⁵⁶ Translation manuals, unlike the scientific theories, are not the alternative descriptions of the structural relations of the objects in this world but the alternative descriptions of the correlation among those scientific descriptions: "Rabbit" and "Rabbit stages" are not the descriptions of the correlation among rabbit and stages of rabbit, when "gavagai" is translated into either of those two, these are the descriptions of what a native really describes by 'gavagai'. Thus a translation, a correlation between 'gavagai' and 'rabbit', is a correlation of two linguistic descriptions; it is not a relation between words and objects but a correlation among words themselves. The illusion of *the meaning* arises when a fundamental misunderstanding of this correlation is adhered.

The false presumption that 'gavagai', for example, has *the same meaning* that 'rabbit' has leads to say that translation from one language to another is *determinate*. For the determinacy of translation is nothing but the correlation of linguistic expressions belonging to any two different languages (or, even, that of any two different expressions belonging to one language) but having the same meaning. *The same meaning*, sameness of two linguistic expressions on

⁵⁶Cf. Follesdal, D. (1975), "Meaning and Experience", in Guttenplan, S. (Ed.) (1975), pp.25-44. **See** pp.32-33.

the ground that they *have the same meaning*, and, determinacy of translation due to a misunderstood correlation of two expressions (that a viable linguistic or extra linguistic 'reference point' determining *the meaning* stands as the intermediate factor for the correlation) are all in the same boat. All of them rely on an impossible fact that a 'reference point' is there for meaning determination.

Note that the point emphasized here is not, for example, "The sky is blue" itself owns nothing to be called as *the meaning*. The point to be emphasized is that there is nothing to be called as *the meaning* owned or disowned by "The sky is blue". It is very clear that there is nothing extra linguistic in "The sky is blue" itself to mean something but the meaningless ink marks on the piece of plain paper. The point is that there is nothing called to be *the meaning* owned by the utterance or by an utter or, even, by the language the utterer uses and the utterance belongs to. For there is nothing to be called as *the meaning*., the question of owning or disowning *the meaning* does not arise at all. Thus, even if we do and can ever mean something by an utterance only in relation to that language the utterance belongs to, or in relation to that system of beliefs in which the belief communicated through that utterance belongs to, there is no sense of a claim that some thing we meant by that utterance is *the meaning* (that we or our language, though not the utterance itself, have ever possibly determined it to be so). There is no determinacy of meaning.

A doubt on *the use* of an utterance is due to an acceptance of meaning determination along with a recognition that each linguistic

expression functions in a multifarious ways. My utterance of "The sky is blue", for example, is intended to initiate a conversation yet to be started between me and my fiancée near a dining table. One can doubt on *the use* of my utterance, "The sky is blue", amounts to that the use of "The sky is blue" must be made in a determinate way, that "The sky is blue" has a determinate meaning, which conflicts with the way (circumstances) in which I have used that utterance.

Since a particular utterance can be used in different circumstances to convey different things, like a particular ray of light can be passed through different combinations of dissimilar mediums to produce different angles of refraction, a particular use can be doubted and this doubt is no less scientific than the doubt on the bending of a stick in water, brought about by everyday experience or scientific experiments. But, to distinguish it precisely, it is a scientific doubt on *the use* of an utterance and not on *meaning* of an utterance. It presupposes the determinacy of meaning and, recognizing that meaning is in use instead of in the utterances themselves, it doubts on a particular use. What it recognises is an antithesis to essentialistic meaning determination, a thesis of relativistic (language-game relative) meaning determination. This thesis makes it scientific in the sense that, to the extent use is plausible notwithstanding the indeterminacy of meaning, plausibility of relativization of meaning ensures the plausibility of doubt on a particular use of an utterance.

A true scientific doubt on meaning advocates that any account of meaning determination, essentialistic or relativistic, is untenable

because, in principle, there is no determinacy of meaning. On the contrary, a Cartesian doubt on meaning advocates determinacy of meaning. It is a doubt on every possible empirical meaning, analogous to its epistemological counterpart that doubts the very possibility of knowledge, it doubts on every possibility of determinate meaning in semantics. An essentialistic or a relativistic account of meaning determination runs as an appropriate response to the Cartesian doubt on meaning. Granted that a Cartesian doubt on meaning is a pseudo doubt in semantics, that there is no sense of a doubt on every possible empirical meaning, there is no need of any metaphysical or transcendental principles (rules) which can presumably determine *the meaning* and govern over every possible empirical meaning. In this sense, analogous to foundationalism in epistemology, any system that concedes a Cartesian doubt in semantics and seeks after *the meaning* can be described as foundationalistic semantics. Thus the indeterminacy thesis can be described as a thesis for naturalized semantics.

A naturalised semantics begins the thought experiment in the reverse way.⁵⁷ Instead of doubting every possible empirical meaning with the presumption that there must be a *determinate* meaning for a linguistic expression, it relies on empirical meaning and comes to the conclusion that there can be no *determinate* meaning for any linguistic expression. Since the indeterminacy of meaning is the conclusion of its thought experiment, the doubt it can impose on empirical meaning is not a pseudo doubt. It cannot doubt on every possible empirical

⁵⁷Bar-On, D. (1990), has indicated this point,

meaning in order to find out any principle (rule) to determine *the meaning*, it maintains that 'there is no fact of the matter' to determine that and thus it is hopeless to find out any such principle: What it can doubt instead are particular instances of empirical meanings in order to find more clarity or explanation for the nature of empirical meaning communicated in the network of a particular language or different languages. Thus the philosopher working on meaning or language can legitimately use the theories and methods of natural sciences, especially, that of psychology, anthropology and linguistics in order to clarify his doubts on empirical meaning itself. A semanticist and a natural scientist are in the same boat (if we remember Neurath's boat for the philosophers and natural scientists).

One of the important misunderstandings on indeterminacy that becomes hazardous to this move of naturalized semantics is that the indeterminacy can hardly be true in case of 'normal meaning' though it perfectly works for empirical meaning.⁵⁸ This conception of indeterminacy narrows the implications of IT by maintaining it to be a conclusion for a particular empirical theory of meaning instead of for any empirical theory of meaning. In a sense it is an acceptance of IT to be true of verificationistic theory of empirical meaning but false for many other alternative theories of empirical meaning. Such an acceptance is based on the idea that even if the formula "*Duhem* plus

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Cf. Qvarnstrom, B. (1985). 'Indeterminacy of Meaning' in Dorn, G., Weingartner, P. (Eds.) (1985) *Foundation of Logic and Linguistics : Problems and their solutions*, Plenum Press, New York and London, pp.665-689.

Peirce yields *indeterminacy*'⁵⁹ is correct, the premise associated with Peirce is too narrow to give the conclusion that indeterminacy accrues to meaning determined by any empirical theory of meaning. Consequently, it is mistaken, the stimulus response theory of meaning advanced by Quine in its behaviouristic fashion is a trivial one on the ground that in no way it undermines an empirical theory of meaning determination which is neither verificationistic nor behaviouristic. The sense of 'normal meaning', taken up here, is really very crucial for the indeterminacy thesis when the sense is not identified with an implausible mentalistic account of meaning and, hence, nor with 'the museum myth theory of meaning'.⁶⁰ The sense expressed here does approximate to what is *standardly* known as meaning, that is, to meaning as something in mind; but it threatens to the indeterminacy when the standard account is somehow claimed to be supported by empirical evidence.

This sense of 'normal meaning' is considered to be an important misunderstanding because its removal results in seeing the IT afresh in its broader perspective. Thus what is to be shown below are the arguments extendable against the viability of a distinction between normal meaning and empirical meaning; accounting Quine's naturalized epistemology as the broader perspective in that regard. To the extent the arguments can be satisfactory it becomes worth pursuable to draw an analogy between naturalized epistemology and naturalised

⁵⁸Follesdal, D. (1975), p.30.

⁶⁰Cf. *OR*, p.27.

⁶¹Cf. Bar-On, D. (1990), pp.213-216.

semantics, besides the fact that the indeterminacy is true for any semantic inquiry in general. For the basic idea behind the said analogy is that a scientific doubt on meaning has to be maintained parallel to a scientific doubt on knowing. That is, in other words, 'meaning skepticism' and 'external world skepticism' are undertaken in a scientific way, not in its Cartesian way and, thus, indeterminacy advocates for the 'scientific meaning skepticism'.

First of all, there is no sense of a normal meaning with some normative ingredient of its own that can govern on but, by no chance, be governed by an empirical theory of meaning. Such a sense (a normative one) of normal 'meaning is untenable on the ground that it dogmatically adheres a Cartesian doubt on meaning. Normativity, imputed transcendently or conventionally, is supposed to be *a priori* in character if it must govern over every possible conveyance or understanding we do through linguistic expressions. But this conception of apriority is already shown to be untenable in course of our discussion on the untenability of the ASD. A Cartesian doubt on meaning presupposes determinacy which may, in turn, tempt one to adhere an *a priori* normative ingredient intrinsic to meaning. Abandonment of such a doubt in semantics results in indeterminacy of meaning and, there by, acceptance of no such a *a priori* normative ingredient.

Moreover it can be inferred from Quine's arguments for naturalized epistemology that no such *a priori* normativity is possible. Upholding Quine's argument to be right, a genuine doubt to know something can be proved to be pertinent only to the descriptive

aspect of knowing and, hence, to the meaning of an utterance. No normative aspect, if there can be any at all, can be genuinely doubted, nor can that be answered as well. Thus the normative sense ascribable to normal meaning becomes unscientific, such a meaning is neither doubttable nor answerable and, thereby, held without sufficient explanation. Consequently, as a criticism to analyticity, analytic truths can be shown to be implausibly distinguished from synthetic truths. No normative ingredient can plausibly be there in meaning so as to extend a privileged epistemic status to any sentence even if it is granted that analytic truths are truths by virtue of meaning. Quine's argument against the ASD is not to be identified with a charge merely against the well known vicious circularity he has explicitly pointed out against the definitions of analytics. For it should not be overlooked that the root of much nonsense is in the acceptance of a semantic normativity, the acceptance of a linguistic conception of a *priori*, alleged to be conferring that privileged epistemic status to the analytic sentences.

Secondly, if there exists no epistemic distinction between a language and a theory, it makes no sense of a normal meaning even if empirical meaning is allegedly identified with a verificationist theory of meaning. S is meaningful, by a verificationist theory of meaning, if there can be possible differentiable experiences corresponding to $\sim S$ and $\sim S$. But neither S nor $\sim S$ can face the 'tribunal of experience' in isolation from the system of beliefs they belong to. That is why, for the sake of holism, Quine considers the verificationist theory of meaning to be false. Nevertheless he finds that certain aspects of the verificationist theory of meaning are

indispensable. For it is 'empirical meaning and nothing more' which is "basic to translation and the learning of one's own language"⁶² and empirical meaning of a sentence is completely dependent on 'what would count as *evidence* for its truth'.⁶³

The restricted versions of Peircean thesis and Duhemian thesis maintained in a Quinean framework are due to the emphasis Quine gives on *evidence* rather than on truth itself. Any scientific study is a relation between our sensory stimulation and a systematic theory and this relation is an evidential one. That is, an 'evidential support' instead of the so called truth *qua* certainty is sought through a scientific study and this 'evidential support' is nothing but the 'relation of stimulation to scientific theory'. Since a theory is a logical connection of sentences, requirement of an 'evidential support' amounts to a requirement of a relation between stimulations and some sentences. The sentences those come very nearer for such a relation are observation sentences. In fact the notion of observation sentences can be substituted for the notion of *evidence*'.⁶⁴

It is not only that the observation sentences serve 'as vehicles of scientific evidence' but also that they serve 'as entering wedge into language'.⁶⁵ We have already discussed on these two epistemological perspectives, the doctrinal perspective and the

⁶²OR, p.81.

⁶³OR, p.80.

⁶⁴PT, p.2.

⁶⁵PT, p.5.

conceptual perspective, of observation sentences. Thus evidential support' associated with any scientific study can be explained in terms of observation sentences. However, since observation sentences are indispensably associated with both the scientific evidence and language learning, the said 'evidential support' cannot be equated with a truth or certainty determined by language. Evidence and explanation, experience and language, go together. An evidential support cannot be made determinate by language because, not that language lacks some such determinacy that otherwise could have been made possible, evidence is indeterminate by its very nature. The notion of observation sentence *alias* the notion of evidence plays a crucial role in a Quinean framework mainly due to its double function which, in turn, characterizes Quine as a modest foundationalist.⁶⁶

Although observation sentences serve as 'entering wedge into language' they are, in a sense, barrier to the determinacy of meaning. For, instead of generating the truth or certainty, they simply serve as the vehicles of evidence. If certainty could have been attained in place of the finding of sheer evidence, the stimulus response theory of meaning would have been failed to demonstrate the indeterminacy of meaning. The field linguist's 'rabbit' for 'gavagai' would not have been a translational relation supported by some evidence he could get through the assent dissent mechanism but, instead, an identity relation like 'rabbit' = 'gavagai' which would be independent of the native's disposition to the assent or dissent because the observation sentences would have somehow guaranteed their relations by themselves.

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For Quine's acknowledgement see *PQ*, p. 128.

" 'Same' 'another', 'that'. 'it' and the plurals 's'" and many others which can be accounted for individuation "are inaccessible at the level of observation sentences".⁶⁷ Thus the truth or certainty about the descriptions, informations or knowledge of the objects *qua* individuated things of the external world is not claimed in an observation sentence, it provides the evidential support to the theories as well as beliefs of systems that allegedly claim of a truth which falls short of certainty. It is notable that by bringing the observation sentences into force, into the center of epistemological investigation, the pursuit of truth has accordingly become a pursuit of evidential support and thus pluasibly a scientific pursuit.

On the other hand, though observation sentences, unlike the analytic sentences, do not become true by their linguistic elements themselves; whatever guarantee we make out for a theory or system of beliefs or, even, for a theoretical sentence or a belief of a system is ultimately dependent on the evidential support provided by the observation sentences which are, in turn, the entry to language. That is, in a sense, observation sentences become foundational to our scientific evidence as well as to our linguistic activity. But the foundation retained is of a peculiar kind. Neither it puts forward a semantic absolutism by keeping language as the foundational base to represent the reality in a determinate way, nor does it put forward any doctrinal account so as to concede certain privileged epistesiiic status to certain statements or beliefs based on intuition, reasoning, rules of inference, rules of language or, even, on pure observation.

⁶⁷*RR*,p.ix.

That is, observation sentences **are** neither the determining factors of meaning nor the ultimate certainty-endowing elements of any statement. They are, in fact, basic but evidential to both meaning and truth. Since they are basic to both meaning and truth, to language as well as to knowledge, language and knowledge go together. Language does not have an upper hand over knowledge. Thus the foundationalistic move in terms of a determinacy of meaning results into nowhere.

The foregoing discussion on evidence *qua* the primacy of observation sentences, in language as well as in theory or scientific knowledge, does indicate the untenability of an epistemic distinction between language and theory. Since no apriority is conceded to any linguistic function, nothing is left for language so as to be intrinsically there *per se* independent of a theory or system of beliefs to convey something. Language cannot be epistemically distinguished as to be providing the so called *a priori* norms of a theory. The dependency on a theory is *rooted* from the primacy of observation sentences. Besides the fact that both a language and the evidence for a theory ultimately get the support from observation sentences, both become meaningless if they are independent of each other.

If meaning were determinate then theories would have no problem for unique comparisons in order to bring about the viability of an absolute truth expressed by the best of the possible theories. For determinate meanings could have enabled us to translate [determinately] one theory into another and, also, to translate determinately, one theory into its back-ground theory. Such

determinate intertranslations between theories could have easily facilitated the viability of determining the best possible theory and, thereby, the Absolute truth too. Thus a theory is completely dependent on language, it has to pay for its dependency, the indeterminacy of meaning restrains it to claim anything to be absolutely true. It simply, therefore, seeks for an evidential support.

On the other hand, language depends on systems of beliefs. If meaning of a linguistic expression were independent of every possible system of beliefs then, in fact, either there would have been the possibility of the extreme of determinacy of meaning or there would have been the negative extreme of nothing to be meant by any linguistic expression.⁶⁸ Since neither of the alternatives is tenable it becomes evident that language is dependent on theories *qua* systems of beliefs.

A *Prima facie* distinction between language and theory, in terms of their superficial range of application, that the former subsumes the latter whereas the latter does not, is not a qualitative distinction and, thereby, it cannot support an argument for semantic foundationalism. For semantic foundationalism, to speak it in a rough way, separates language from scientific theories with the false

⁶⁸Even the *Transitivity Law* could have held good for the 'general fluency of dialogue' from L_1 to L_n . [Tanji, N. points out this to show the 'quasi-sameness' of language. Tanji, N. (1989), "Quine on Theory and Language", *British Journal of Philosophy of Science*, 40, p. 233-247.

presupposition that a look into the deep of language can enable one to provide the *a priori* norms of scientific theories because language allegedly determines reality which is described by the theories. That, language comprises of all the theories and no theory is coextensive with language but every theory is a part of language makes "no epistemic distinction between language and theory. Both do get the same epistemic status being dependent on each other and having the observation sentences as the evidential support from the root.

The indeterminacy thesis clearly shows the dependency of language on systems of beliefs and thus the untenability of foundationalistic semantics. The other part of the interdependency between language and theory is the dependency of theory on language. This is to be discussed in the next chapter. It is to be found that, as a result of that dependency, Linguistic Absolutism is untenable apart from the fact that Absolutism is untenable due to the dependency of reality on language.

CHAPTER IV

ONTOLOGICAL RELATIVITY: AN ANTITHESIS TO LINGUISTIC ABSOLUTISM

It is not only that an object cannot be known absolutely. because no object is independent of a theory, but also that an object cannot be determined, by a theory, in an absolute manner because no theory is absolutely justified (in determining so) by the evidence given in the external world. This is to be shown, in this chapter, in discussing Quine's notion of ontological relativity. This discussion is anti-foundationalistic in its orientation. It attempts to refute the ontological basis on which foundationalism may otherwise stand erect by adhering to essentialism or Carnapian linguistic Absolutism. The positive ontological perspective is, precisely, an advocacy for Quine's scientific realism: reality is retained but without entering into the 'metaphysical jungle of Aristotelian essentialism'¹ and, even if reality is made out in terms of language, it is retained with an enlightened empiricistic spirit such that Language fails to devour every thing of reality. In other words, neither the 'universals' are real nor that the reality can be made out in 'modal contexts'.

To make it more clear, in connection with the discussions made in previous chapters and to be done later, the following can be briefly mentioned. That the 'reciprocal containment' between epistemology and

¹WP, p. 176.

ontology is an important feature of Quine's naturalized epistemology² and, hence, absolute determination of ontology has to be refuted so as to make ontology to be contained in epistemology. The other aspect of this reciprocal containment, ontology contains epistemology, is discussed in the fifth chapter but arguments in that respect are evident from a refutation of justology (presented in the sixth chapter). Another fundamental feature of Quine's naturalized epistemology is the acceptance of scientific doubt in place of a Cartesian doubt. A parallel move is undertaken in connection with ontological discussions. The Cartesian mind, 'the ghost in the machine',³ is replaced by the notion of 'conceptual frameworks'. But, more importantly, this notion of 'conceptual framework', unlike that of Carnap, does not adhere the bifurcation in terms of extension and intension. Construed from a Quinean angle, a Carnapian notion of intension is a logico-linguistic version of the Cartesian mind. For, if the Cartesian mind is nothing but a characterization of the essence of human thought *contra* the body associated with the extension of man, a Cartesian dualism is no better than an Aristotelian essentialism. Thus this essentialism is perpetuated in Carnap's bifurcation of ontological discussions into the 'method of intension' and the 'method of extension'. This logico-linguistic version of essentialism is refuted in showing the untenability of the notion of 'necessity' as a modal 'sentence operator'. Refutation of

²This point is discussed in the 5th chapter.

³It is in its Rylean sense. However, even if Ryle criticizes the Cartesian mind, as far as his analysis is dependent on the adequacy of later Wittgensteinian conception of 'meaning' determinacy, he is no less victimized by Quine's refutation of *the meaning* and by that of linguistic Absolutism.

this "necessity" stands as a refutation of the notion of analyticity too. And, furthermore, to visualize this discussion in the perspective of the interdependence between language and theory, mentioned in the third chapter, ontological relativity directly shows the dependency of theory on language whereas that of language on theory is shown in indeterminacy of translation. Thus the anti-foundationalistic stance on ontological discussions is made here to demolish linguistic Absolutism as well as metaphysical Absolutism parallel to the discussions advanced in indeterminacy thesis to refute foundationalistic semantics. It is not only that 'meaning' as an "instrument of philosophical clarification and analysis"⁴ is to be abandoned but, also, 'belief and 'experience' are 'ill-suited for use as instruments' in that regard. Thus belief and experience have to be looked into afresh to get rid of the dogmatic undertaking of Absolutism - metaphysical or linguistic - facilitated by an account of belief and experience as instruments to tackle philosophical puzzlements upheld in a Cartesian way. That is, speaking positively, ontological questions are to 'end up on a par with questions of natural science'.⁵

The metaphysical havoc on ontology reached on its peak in post-Kantian days and got remarkable set-back by the positivists. After Kant, as Etomanos describes, the metaphysicians 'freed from the conceptual strictures within which scientists were now believed destined to toil, look to a higher level of understanding or

⁴TT, p. 185.

⁵WP, p. 211.

cognition by which they might grasp the ultimate nature of reality itself metaphysical systems proliferated on a grandeur and more vigorous scale than ever, limited only by the capacity of each individual philosopher's imagination'.⁶ Observing the 'debaucheries' of post-Kantian metaphysics, in their manifesto of 'elimination of metaphysics', the logical positivists undermined the metaphysical statements as meaningless but, at the same time, they interpreted the ontological claims as of sheer linguistic significance. Contemporary philosophers interested in linguistic analysis aimed at the discovery of the proper logical form of ordinary language which was supposed to be misleading and, thereby, causing the metaphysical problems. Thus the analysis of language took a major role in philosophy.

The Principia Mathematica had tremendous impact on such programs. For the early positivists, as Romanes views,⁷ who had thought of a complete reduction of the physical world to immediate experience had the ideal to do so for physics in terms of analysis parallel to what *Principia Mathematica* was thought to have done for mathematics by constructing basic mathematical concepts out of purely logical ones by means of analysis. Russell's well known theory of definite description had no less impact. So also was the impact of Wittgenstein who had viewed philosophy as a "critic of language" and "the deepest philosophical problems" as, in fact, "not problems at all".⁸

⁶ Romanes, G.D. *Op. Cit.*, p.5.

⁷ *Ibid.*, p.8

⁸ Wittgenstein, L. (1922) *Tractatus Logico-Philosophicus*,

But in the presence of various conflicting systems of linguistic analysis, which can be construed to be very much in the line of metaphysical claims of idealism, realism, phenomenism and nominalism; although those are in a linguistic disguise, it is not possible to select or prefer any of the systems arbitrarily. For each such system of analysis has its own framework (the syntactic rules + the semantic rules + the variables) and in reference to the respective frameworks each one is acceptable. At this juncture we are supposed to adopt Carnap's *Principle of Tolerance*. At this stage, ontological claims are viewed as mere linguistic proposals - the proposals for the acceptance of certain frameworks such that once the rules of these frameworks are explicitly defended, the ontological claims are supposed to be true or, rather, trivially true in relation to the respective frameworks. The principle of tolerance is adopted because "It is not our business to set up prohibitions, but to arrive at conventions ... In logic there are no morals. Every one is at liberty to build up his own logic, i.e. his own form of language as he wishes. All that is required of him is that, if he wishes to discuss it, he must state his methods clearly, and give syntactical rules instead of philosophical arguments".⁸

This Principle of Tolerance can be appreciated once it is made clear that the ontological claims in linguistic disguise are really based on a mistaken belief that, as Carnap says, 'only after making sure that there really is a system of entities of the kind in question

4.003, 4.0031.

⁹ Carnap, R. (1937) *The Logical Syntax of Language* pp. 51-52
(Adapted from Romanes *Op. Cit.*, p. 16).

are we justified in accepting the framework by incorporating the linguistic frameworks into our language,'¹⁰ whereas, infact, 'appeal to ontological insight will not carry much weight.'¹¹ Carnap tries to make this point clear in his "Empiricism, Semantics and, Ontology"-

Carnap emphasizes to distinguish two kinds of questions of existence or reality. (A) Questions concerning the existence or reality of certain entities within a system of language or framework and (B) Questions concerning the existence or reality of the system of language or the framework itself. In relation to a particular framework, the questions of kind (A) are internal questions and the questions of kind (B) are external questions. Further he claims that the internal questions are theoretical whereas the external questions are not theoretical but practical. For acceptance of a system or framework amounts to the acceptance of the entities inside the system, not the acceptance of a belief in the reality of the system itself. In his words, "To be real in the scientific sense means to be an element of the system, hence this concept cannot be meaningfully applied to the system itself."¹² Thus a theoretical question is a question regarding the elements in the theory. A question regarding the theory itself is not theoretical, no better than a fictional one (if one likes to accept a fictional system of language). Thus external questions are pseudo questions, a genuine question is an

¹⁰Carnap, R. (1950) "Empiricism, Semantics and Ontology" , See Feigl, Sellars, and Lehrer (Ed.) *New Readings in Philosophy*, p. 593.

¹¹*Ibid.*, p. 596.

¹²*Ibid.* , p. 586.

internal question. For the belief in reality, i.e. the ontology, is determined by the system of language or framework, it is only such questions regarding certain entities determined by the framework are internal questions.

In relation to Thing Language- the languages for 'the spatio-temporally ordered system of observable things and events'¹³ - the internal questions would be like "Is there a white piece of paper on my desk?", "Did king Arthuer actually live?", "Are unicorns and centaurs real or merely imaginary?" etc. and the answers are made by empirical investigation. Evaluation of observation-results is made in accordance to certain rules as confirming or disconfirming evidence for possible answers. For, here, 'the concept of reality is an empirical, scientific, non-metaphysical concept'. The main epistemological task is to 'lay down explicit rules for the evaluation'¹⁴. But to question the whole of entities determined by the Thing Language is to question the Thing Language itself and, thereby, the rules governing the system have been questioned too.

A question like "Is the world of things real?" is external to Thing Language. The rules governing Thing Language are also questioned here, the evaluation based on empirical investigation in accordance to the accepted rules is also questioned. Thus the purported answer to

¹³ *Ibid.*

¹⁴For the "acceptance of a new kind of entities is represented in the language by the introduction of a framework of new forms of expressions' and these new forms of expressions are 'to be used according to a new set of rules'. [Carnap, R-(1950), *Op.Cit.*, p. 591.]

"Is the world of things real?" cannot be an answer in terms of "Yes" or "No" because such an answer is possible only when there exists an unquestioned objective set of rules for investigation or evaluation. The answer is to be made on a practical decision, by evaluating the efficiency, fruitfulness and simplicity of 'Thing' Language; and it turns to be made in terms of the "degree of its acceptability with reference to practical consideration".

However, foundationalism is deep-rooted in Carnap's emphasis on the division of ontological questions to 'internal' and 'external' questions. It sets forth the epistemological task of laying down the rules of a framework as a foundation to evaluate (empirically, logically or mathematically) entities determined by the respective frameworks. It approves special status of the core-statements, the purported answers of external questions of a framework, as opposed to the statements evaluated by those core statements. With the status of being foundational, those core statements are analytically true by virtue of the meaning of the terms contained in those statements. For, otherwise, the change of the meaning of those statements would amount to the change of the framework. On the other hand, the remaining statements' truth is dependent on their confirmity to the core statements as well as to the method of investigation - factual, logical or mathematical - hence, those are revisable and synthetic in character.

Thus the questions of ontology and analyticity are epistemologically related by the question of the status that can be afforded to different statements. If the epistemological status

afforded varies in *degrees* then ontology cannot be determined by language in a determinated way, nor 'analyticity can be true what may come'¹⁵. The consequence of such a relation supports naturalism where all statements - of natural science as well as of philosophy- are in 'the same boat'. If the status afforded varies in *kind* by dividing all statements to two classes - analytic and synthetic - a bifurcation is made to the ontological questions. The effect of such a bifurcation is antinaturalistic. The theoretical ontological questions or the internal questions turn to be scientific and the practical ontological questions or the external questions turn to be philosophical. And when the answeres to the external questions are constructed to be treated as answers to internal questions, those become analytically true.

Thus epistemology is kept foundational to all sciences with the presupposition that the method of linguistic analysis, as the legitimate philosophical inquiry, can provide the real structure,

¹⁵In fact, the misgivings of the ASD are incurred by the distinction of internal/external question as far as the epistemological import of both the distinctions is concerned. Cf. Wp. p. 211.

From an ontological point of view, considering our reports about the existence of objects, there is no such difference in kind. "Within natural science", observes Quine, "there is a continuum of gradations, from the statements which report observations to those which reflect basic features say of quantum theory or the theory of relativity . . . statements of ontology or even of mathematics or logic form a continuation of this continuum, . . . The differences here are in my view *differences only in degree and not in kind*" [WP, p. 211, emphasis added]. Quine expects that 'tables and sheep are, in the last analysis, on the much the same footing as molecules and elctrons'. That is, 'the notion of microscopic objects, tables and sheep, differs from that of molecules and electrons mainly from an *epistemological. point of view*, in point of degree of antiquity' (WP P. 223, Emphasis added).

meaning or conceptual import of the claims made by natural sciences as well as by metaphysics. The latter claims are kicked off as being meaningless and the former are kept to be explained or explicated as being suited to the results of the epistemological investigation- It is done so with the strong foundationalistic belief on an availability of a determinated meaning, a definite structure or conceptual import, of every statement with reference to a particular framework of language.

This strong belief is sustained in both the realistic and conventionalistic analysis of language when language is used as an instrument of philosophical analysis and clarification. The Russellian realism puts forth an extralinguistic reality which is to be pictured by language. A 'metaphysical objectivity' is presupposed and, further, as an ideal language is aimed at, an 'absolutism' has been presupposed too. Thus the 'picturing', interpreted as a developed conceptual framework of logical atomism, is viewed as being ineffable even if there is an extralinguistic reality because picturing is supposed to be more or less like a transcendental relation between language and reality. It has the epistemological priority over all the truths parallel to Kantian transcendentalism where the categories of understanding are founded *a priori* and kept foundational to all scientific language. Such a realistic analysis is hazardous in two ways. In a sense it presupposes the traditional metaphysics in claiming some absolute extralinguistic reality and, at the same time, it surreptitiously accepts a Kantian transcendentalism in the name of 'logical form'. On the other hand, conventionalism keeps metaphysics immanent in language. The 'picturing' is said to be made in a 'logical

space' where language and reality go together even if they are separate by themselves. Thus the ineffability of 'logical form' is not essentially due to the inseparability between language and reality. It is due to essentialism, the essence of language and the essence of reality are supposed to be having the same logical base. The 'picturing' is shown to be possible by the constitutive rules of language and, since these rules are the essence of language, the form of reality is supposed to be based on the form of those rules. This form of those rules is called as the logical form. Thus 'logical form' is said to be immanent in language and enables language to determine reality by 'picturing'. The achievement made by the programme of linguistic analysis is just to provide a linguistic mask to the old ghost of metaphysics. For, in the words of Romanes, "inquiry into what we really say (or may say) about the world thus systematically replaced inquiry into the world as it really is"¹⁶, meaning construed as an 'instrument' for philosophical analysis yields the conception of a conceptual framework or system of language - artificial, ideal or ordinary - as to be determining the reality referred to in terms of that language. Quine's thesis of ontological relativity is against any such absolute determination of reality. Thus if analytic philosophy is identified with an enterprise to discover, formalistically or informalistically, the proper logic or grammar of our language as to determine reality in an absolute manner, it can be safely said that a Quinean enterprise goes beyond that of the analytic philosophy.

¹⁶Romanos, G.D. *Op. Cit.* , p. 34.

A Quinean stimulus-response mechanism goes beyond the positivists' theory of sense data, so far as the epistemological point is concerned, by adopting scientific skepticism as opposed to the Cartesian skepticism. Retaining the insight that 'any evidence for science has its end points in the senses' but fearing for the circularity (which is an outcome of Cartesian skepticism) of getting evidence for physical science from physical science itself, the theorists of sense data want 'to posit a realm of sense data, situated somehow just me-ward of the physical stimulus'¹⁷. On the otherhand, accepting Neurath's 'mariner who must rebuild his ship plank by plank while continuing to stay afloat on the open sea'¹⁸, Quine urges to recognise 'that the science of science is a science'¹⁹ and puts forward physical stimulation in place of sense data. The notion of sense datum is an abstraction, a bit more conjuctural than the notion of object, an output of a kind of epistemological sophistication. To respond the Cartesian doubt, since an indubitable foundation is required, the me-ward sensation is advocated. It is, in a sense, a reconcilation of the sensation of the notion of sense

¹⁷ WP, p. 225.

¹⁸ WP, p. 223.

¹⁹ WP, P. 226.

experience with the rationalist's *cogito* though some logical construction is allegedly put forward to avoid the Cartesian *cogito*. In "Quality q is at point instant $x_i y_i z_i$ t", "is at" is undefinable but it remains as the core of understanding reference and ontology. Instead of accepting the indeterminacy of reference, to determine reality as to refute a Cartesian doubt on reality, the sense data theorists posit sense datum as the basic evidence and try to see the physical world in terms of the logical construction of sense experiences. Although a Russellian atomism is restrained from this reductivistic attitude, although it does not reduce the physical objects into some logical construction of sense experience, it appeals for a logical relation between language and reality such that an ideal language analogous to protocol statements becomes foundational. Whether it is sense-data or atomic fact, though they differ in being related to language by being reduced into language save sense experience and by being pictured into language, their relation to language is such that reality is determined by language. This yielding to language is basically due to an intensional or metaphysical essence yielded to meaning, logic or language itself. Even philosophers who proffer informalistic approach to linguistic analysis are no less committed to some such metaphysical or intensional elements so as to infuse an intrinsic 'necessity' to language if, at all, they are not refrained from determining reference or ontology in terms of language. For, there is no sense of necessity available in an extensional language. Thus to deny the intensional language as to be referring the reality amounts to refute the linguistic determination of reality.

Carnap's division of theory of extension and theory of intension,

the basis of his entire enterprise of 'semantical method'²⁰, developed in *Meaning and Necessity* is a paradigm case of subduing the world under semantical rules. The division is purported to divide the relation between language and what it is about (i.e. the world or the reality) into a contingent and a necessary relation.²¹ This bifurcated relation is stretched along the ASD, and its epistemological import seems to be more significant. Synonymy and analyticity are alleged to be definable in terms of intension (as of having 'the same intension' for two predicates of a sentence's being "true by virtue of the intensions of the expressions occurring in it"²²). The foundationalistic theme shown, in the first chapter, as to be beneath the ASD is significantly there in this division of intension and extension which, in turn, can be construed to be implicitly retained there in the division of the ontological questions into internal and external questions. It significantly contains the ASD because the linguistic criterion for the ASD is tenable only if the purported epistemological significance of the 'intension' distinguished from 'extension' is viable. The epistemological significance of 'intension' owes to two relations: the relation ontology has with epistemology (i.e.; the reciprocal containment between ontology and epistemology) and the relation ontology has with semantics. If the

²⁰Carnap acknowledges it in his "Meaning and Synonymy in Natural Languages" in Moravcsik, J.M.E. (Ed.) (1974) *Logic and Philosophy for Linguistics*, Mouton & Co., B.V. Publishers, The Hague. (American Edition, Humanities Press. Inc., Atlantic Highlands, N.J.), p. 33, fn.

²¹*Ibid.*, p. 33.

²²*Ibid.*, p. 34. And, again, to say it in terms of 'language relativity', 'Two expressions are SYNONYMOUS in the language L for x at time t if they have the same intension in L for x at t. A sentence is ANALYTIC in L for x at t if its intension (or range of truth-condition) in L for x at t comprehends all possible cases.' (p.43).

first relation holds good then epistemology becomes foundationalistic or naturalistic, roughly, on the basis of the nature of semantics. If ontology is built on semantics and intension is the foundation of semantics, then epistemology becomes foundationalistic. On the otherhand if ontology is relative to semantics and it is only the extension that matters into semantics then epistemology is naturalistic. Extension concedes nothing foundationalistic but demands the dispositional character of human language in an undertaking of semantics along with the investigations pursued in natural sciences. Here the description of language is not supposed to 'begin with the theory of intension' in order to build the theory of extension on its basis.²³

The contrast between the two approaches does not compel to have a contrast of accepting and rejecting pragmatics. On the other hand both the approaches have been purported to be scientific and pragmatic.²⁴ Thus, to note the whole scenario, in brief, it can be said that the contrast is between the 'pragmatical concept of intension' and the 'pragmatical concept of extension'²⁵. Success of the former undertaking confers a privileged epistemic status to language or system of languages over ontology or systems of ontology. It keeps 'intension' foundational to 'extension' and, there by, to the core of

²³*Ibid.*, p. 34.

²⁴ 'The purpose' of the paper entitled "Meaning and Synonymy in Natural Languages" is, Carnap says, 'to clarify the nature of the pragmatical concept intension in natural languages and to outline a behaviouristic operational procedure for it'. (P-35).

²⁵The former is associated with Carnap and the latter is associated with Quine.

semantics which, in turn, determines reality. More over, viewing from this angle, the distinction between language and theory becomes very clear even if we identify a theory as to be determining the ontology because it is the intension or the foundational semantical rules which constitute the core of a language. And a scientific theory itself, being extensional in character, fails to determine reality in an absolute way. It can succeed in doing so only if the 'extension' is founded or built on the basis of the 'intension'. Thus it has also been said, understanding it from the angle of this linguistic Absolutism, that the Quinean enterprise accounts the extension as the "theory of reference" and the theory of intension as the "theory of meaning".²⁶ Consequently, viewing from the same angle, indeterminacy of reference is acceptable if reference is independent of meaning. But, since it is founded on meaning and, more importantly, on the designative component of meaning (i.e. on intension) reference is determinate. On the other hand, viewing from the Quinean angle, indeterminacy of reference is not only due to the indeterminacy of meaning but also due to the unavailability of the so called intensions or, in other words, due to the extensional character of reality. That is why indeterminacy of reference can occur in cases where there is no indeterminacy of meaning, i.e. when two logically equivalent manuals of translation are there and, thus, where the question of choice between the two so as to determine one to be right/wrong does not arise.²⁷ Ontology is neither independent of semantics nor it is absolutely determined by semantics. The former dependence owes to the

²⁶Cf Carnap's interpretation in his "Meaning and Synonymy in Natural Languages", P. 33.

²⁷This has already been discussed in chapter III.

'containment' of ontology in epistemology. 'What is there' is nothing but 'what is said to be there' which, in turn, is 'what is known to be there'; for the 'knowing' is forbidden to be founded on *the* 'saying' and their interdependence is advocated through the refutation of foundationalistic semantics. The latter, the denial of semantical absolute determination, owes to the other aspect of the reciprocal containment, the aspect that envisages the containment of epistemology in ontology: 'What is known to be there' is not metaphysical but, it is there and *said* to be there because we cannot refer otherwise but *say* what is there. Thus to revive metaphysics in terms of. 'intension' is to miss the very significance of 'what is *said* to be there', instead of 'what *is* there' and, thereby, to lose the scientific effort one makes in achieving the replacement. Thus, to be pragmatic and scientific, to retain that replacement of "what is there" by "what is said to be there" one has to follow the same line of thought and depend on the *background saying* of "what is *said* to be there" instead of enquiring into the very rules which fit into 'what is *said* to be there.' There is no need of a linguistic inquiry, which runs parallel to the pretensions of speculative metaphysics, which nourishes the 'creatures of darkness' (i.e. intensions) to get access to extralinguistic reality. For those rules just *fit* into what is said, not that they guide our sayings in such a way that we cannot but obey those rules to read the reality. Anticipation of these kinds of rules to be discovered is well imaginable, not only from the Carnapian theory of intension to build an absolutely determinable 'extensions' and the Russellian logical analysis of language to build an ideal language so as to achieve a perfect view of the world but, also, from the Chomskian enterprise of universal grammar and the later Wittgensteinian's notion of the constitutive rules of a language game

provided they are understood at par with Carnap's semantical rules. Thus, to repeat, Quine goes beyond analytic philosophy if analytic philosophy is identified as a system of theories about the proper logic of our language to determine the reality in any absolute sense.

Quine views that ontology is doubly relative: relative to a background language and relative to a choice of translation from background language to the language in question.

It is relative to a background language or background theory mainly because of 'referential inscrutability*' which, in turn, counterfeits the claim that an object can be absolutely committed to, by a particular theory. This disclaimer amounts to the thesis that a theory is dependent on a background theory for the commitment it does to the objects. There is no rule or method, semantical or intensional, that can enable a theory itself to determine the reality it commits to. For above all there is no such determinacy. Reference is inscrutable. That is, parallel to indeterminacy of meaning, there is indeterminacy of reference.

Referential inscrutability or indeterminacy of reference supports the point that 'what makes sense is to say not what the object, of a theory are absolutely speaking, but how one theory of objects is interpretable or reinterpretable in another'.²⁹ That is, it supports the point of appealing to a background language or background theory.

²⁸OR, P. 55.

²⁹OR, p. 50.

It is scientific to appeal to background theories instead of appealing to a method which is purported to obtain an absolute determination of objects referred by the theory. For there is no such possibility of absolute determination. Thus the question of 'interpretation and reinterpretation' is scientifically associated with inscrutability of reference.

So far, in our discussion on ontology, it is observed that Carnap's method of intension which is alleged to be building up the 'extension' and Carnap's bifurcating of the ontological questions into 'internal' and 'external' questions are foundationalistic. It is also observed that the untenability of Carnapian linguistic Absolutism calls for naturalism, calls for the reciprocal containment of epistemology and natural science (ontology). The indeterminacy of reference is shown to be, like the indeterminacy of meaning, anti-foundationalistic as well as naturalistic. This is actually what we need to defend the thesis. Against foundationalism, from an ontological point of view, does not mean to nullify foundationalism *per se* when we advocate for ontological relativity. On the other hand, it means that the foundationalistic theses like 'essentialism', 'absolutism' and 'linguistic Absolutism' are to be refuted. And, more importantly, this refutation must amount to the upholding of naturalism so as to establish the thesis that a Quinean anti-foundationalism is nothing but naturalism so far as the methodological perspective is concerned. That is, becoming an antithesis to absolutism - metaphysical or linguistic - ontological relativity turns to be naturalistic. This naturalistic import is clearcut when we observe that there is 'reciprocal containment' between epistemology and ontology (natural science). However, even if

this is the scenario we can visualize, it all depends on how the foundationalistic theses are to be refuted.

Unless the Carnapian division of internal and external question is refuted it cannot be claimed that no statement has a privileged epistemic status to be foundational, it cannot be claimed that all statements are revisable and synthetic. If the Carnapian method of intension is not refuted, it cannot be claimed that there is no sense of a 'necessity' derivable even on a semantical ground. That is, extension or the reality of the external world cannot be claimed to be relative and indeterminate. For a sense of 'necessity' can be identified with a sense of determinacy of an absolute kind which is supposed to be viable by an 'intensional method'. Moreover, if the 'necessity' or 'linguistic Absolutism' is granted to be viable on the basis of an intensional method, it can be argued³⁰ that an extra-extensional, metaphysical, absolutism of some kind or other is not unviable.

Thus the rest of this chapter's discussion is meant to refute the above mentioned Carnapian theses, the foundationalistic theses, in order to show that a foundationalistic conception of ontology has to be replaced by a naturalistic ontology. Needless to say that the arguments are originally Quine's arguments because our main concern is with Quine's anti-foundationalism *qua*. naturalism. And, his arguments have the naturalistic bearing which can also be observed in the

³⁰ I do not mean that Carnap has argued it. He is obviously against metaphysics. But Quine's arguments against Carnap's conception of ontology shows that acceptance of any method other than the extensional one is no better than an acceptance of a metaphysical method.

following discussions.

Carnap's internal and external questions can be phrased to 'category' and 'subclass' questions. For the Carnapian dichotomy is basically a "dichotomy between questions of the form "Are there so-and-sos?" where the so-and-sos purport to exhaust the range of a particular style of bound variables and questions of the form "Are there so-and-sos?" where the so-and-sos do not purport to exhaust the range of particular style of bound variable.³¹ That is, for example, "Are there black swans?" and "Are there swans"? are the 'subclass' and 'category' questions corresponding to the internal and external questions of a framework accounting 'swans' as the objects of its reference.

If two styles of bound variables cannot be so separated as to be referring two different kinds of objects that each style exclusively ranges over, if some particular objects can be the value of the variables of different styles, the 'category' and 'subclass' division does not hold good. Consequently, the division of internal and external questions does not hold. Two styles of bound variables cannot be so separated. For the acceptance of a particular style is very trivial so far as the reality of an object is concerned. For example, if the question is whether 'x' and 'y' of(x) (x is a swan) and (y) (y is a black swan) are referring to the same *kind* of objects or not then it is clear that the objects bounded by the variables 'x' exhaust the class of swans whereas it is not exhausted by the variable

³¹ WP, p. 207.

'y'. But this does not mean that the *kind* of objects bounded by y, the black swans, are different in *kind* when the same black swans are also bounded by x. The reference itself is of the same kind, it does not vary with the variation of 'class' and 'subclass'. The number of objects vary in accordance to the variation of the range of the variable but the variation is not at all affective to *reference* such that the objects bounded by y can be said to be a reference of a different kind when the same objects are referred by x. It cannot be claimed that there is a division of reference, two referential aspects of reality, like 'class reference' and 'sub-class reference'. For the supposed difference vanishes when it is construed that (z) (z is a bird) such that the import of the bound variable (x) as a 'class reference' vanishes into a 'subclass-reference' in relation to the 'class-reference' of (z). In the similar way, to get a 'class reference' of the variable (y) which is otherwise construed to be a 'sub-class reference' in relation to (x), physical instances of black swans can be styled with variables like 'a,b,c,d ... n'. Thus, 'whether the statement that there are black swans should be put on the same side of the dichotomy, or on the opposite sides, comes to depend on the rather trivial consideration of whether we use one style of variables or two for physical objects and classes.³² It is a trivial consideration because the difference between "x is such that x is a black swan" and "a,b,c,d...n are black swans" is negligible. If the reference to an object is expressed in terms of a variable, if an object is an object by being subject to reference, then 'to be is to

³²WP, p. 208.

be a value of a variable.³³ It matters the least whether the object is the value of a variable of one style or of a different style so far as the reality of the object is concerned.

The emphasis on the style of a variable in connection with the reality of an object is a futile exercise based on a mistaken presupposition that the reality of an object referred to by two different styles varies in kind. It is a misconception, Quine would argue, that the reality of 'a black swan referred in terms of a style of variable like (x) (x is a black swan)' can be of a different kind of reality of 'a black swan referred in terms of a style of variable like a,b,c,d,...n are black swans.' It is a misconception that a black swan as the value of the variable x when x ranges over all swans, (x) (x is a swan), is of a different kind of object when it is the value of the variable y and y ranges over the blackswans alone, i.e., (y) (y is a black swan). The same black swan as a value of the variables 'x' 'y' and 'z' of the three styles like <x) (x is a swan) (y) (y is a black swan) and (z) (a,b,c,d...n are black swans and z = a,b,c,d...n) does not vary in its objectual reality.

It is true that variable is "the essence of ontological idiom, the essence of the referential idiom."³⁴ But the rigidity on a particular style of variable so as to differentiate a value with some determinate reality from a value without determinate reality, even if the object referred to is the same, is a misconception. No

³³WP, p. 199.

³⁴WP, P. 272.

determinate reality is possible, no necessity can be adduced in terms of a particular style of variable in order to make the reference determinate. A conception of determinacy of reference in terms of special styles of variables is a misconception of the very dictum that 'to be is to be a value of a variable.'³⁵ 35

A variable which is 'the essence of ontological idiom' is, for Quine, a bindable objectual variable. Bound variable 'plays a role analogous to pronouns' to secure cross-references. Singular terms play a role of referring the objects, analogous to that of proper names referring to individuals. Thus the unbindable general terms which are likely to be called as the 'universals' are neither referred nor cross referred. An *objectual interpretation* of variables is opposed to a *substitutions1 interpretation* of variables. Quine upholds the former interpretation. For a 'quantification over individuals is seen most naturally as objectual.'³⁶

An *objectual interpretation* appeals to the values of the variables: ' $(x) fx$ ' is interpreted as "For all objects x in the domain, D , Fx ' and, accordingly, ' $(\exists x) fx$ ' as "for at least one object x in the domain, D , Fx '. On the other hand, a *substitutional interpretation* appeals to the *substituends* for the variables: ' $(x) Fx$ ' is interpreted as "All substitution instances of ' $F...$ ' are true and, accordingly, ' $(\exists x) fx$ ' as "at least one substitution instance of ' $F...$ '

³⁵ W P, p. 199.

³⁶ WP, p. 273.

is true'³⁷. In its *substitutional interpretation* , a variable is strictly a placeholder for the constants that can be substituted for it',³⁸ the substituends need not be the names at all. In its *objectual interpretation*, 'the variable refers to objects of some sort as its values'³⁹ though the objects need not be 'separately specifiable by name or description'.

A *substitutional interpretation* of a variable suits for the significance mistakenly imposed on styles of variables. If an object need not be the substituent of a variable, it can be plausible of talking about a sense of 'necessity' in terms of some special style of variable. For, even if an object cannot be referred in any absolute sense, a substituent can be claimed to be necessarily true by means of a special style of variable because it is not an object and thus need not be inscrutable. If $(x) (y) (x \text{ is a swan and } y \text{ is a black swan})$ then $(x) (y) (y \rightarrow x)$. If, for example, a crow is instanced for y , instead of a black swan, then the crow is *necessarily* a swan. Note that the emphasis is on the 'necessity' and not with the crow or swan. Needless to tell about the non existents like Pegasus, unicorns or centaurs as they can be the appropriate instances of some variables. On the other hand, in its objectual interpretation, there is no such 'necessity' involved in relation to the reference of objects. Even if a black swan itself becomes the value of the variable y and the style $(x) (y) (y \rightarrow x)$ is retained by putting swans as the value of x , yet

³⁷ This distinction between substitutional interpretation and objectual interpretation can be related to the 'psychogenesis' of reference. See RR, PP.84 - 131.

³⁸ RR, P. 98.

³⁹ *Ibid.*

$\langle y \rightarrow x \rangle$ is *contingently* true and thus it is also *contingently* true that that black swan is a swan.⁴⁰ Thus, if a variable is interpreted objectually, it is trivial that whether one adopts one or two style(s) of variables to refer the object(s) ranged over by the variable-Whatever style is adopted it amounts to be revisable, indeterminate or contingent. On the other hand, in its *substitutional interpretation* the style of a variable of one kind is alleged to be functioning as a determinate reference whereas another kind gets the reference in an indeterminate way. For example, the above mentioned ' $\langle x \rangle \langle y \rangle \langle y \rightarrow x \rangle$ ' is a determinate reference for a swan whereas a change of its style to ' $\langle a, b, c, d, \dots n \rangle$ ' are swans as well as black objects" makes each of ' $\langle a, b, c, d, \dots n \rangle$ ' indeterminately referring to a swan. For there is no necessity, which is alleged to be there with $\langle y \rightarrow x \rangle$ due to the universal quantification of x and y , that any of ' $\langle a, b, c, d, \dots n \rangle$ ' is a swan.

A swan is a swan, a black swan is a black swan. A black swan is neither a crow nor something else other than a swan. The point is not to ponder over this clear cut concrete situation. It is in the face of all clear cut situations like this, the point to ponder over is the *relation* among the objects of this external world we conceive or *talk about*. 'If it is a black swan then it is a swan', the relation is between two concepts 'black swan' and 'swan' and, thereby, the investigation undertaken regarding such relations is known to be an epistemological relation. It is quite clear for us that the black swan is one physical object, it is not two -a black physical object

⁴⁰ Here this discussion of 'necessity' and 'contingency' is taken in its epistemological perspective, analogous to the discussions already carried out in relation to the ASD.

and a swan. The most it can be claimed is that is a two -in -one.

It is too much of nonsense to say that a philosopher does not accept such crystal clear facts, for examples, a black swan is a swan, a bachelor is an unmarried man, $2+2 = 4$, $a=a$ and so on.⁴¹ The problem before them is, in fact, how do we know such crystal clear facts? That is, how do we know the relation between a black swan and a swan, a bachelor and an unmarried man, $(2+2)$ and (4) and, above all, the relation of identity⁴², i.e, $A - A$?

It has already been discussed in connection to ASD that these relations are viewed to be conceptual or linguistic by the foundationalists. In fact, foundationalism does not go wrong and it is not antagonistic to a naturalist by claiming this much, by saying it to be a conceptual or linguistic relation. It goes wrong in saying something more by keeping this conceptual or linguistic relation separate from the factual relations, by creating a dichotomy between 'form' and 'content' or between 'meaning' and 'experience' so as to get something foundational to the knowledge-claims associated with 'content' or 'experience'. Even in saying that the job of a philosopher is conceptual analysis or linguistic analysis a foundationalist does not move on a wrong track. It is the objective,

⁴¹This statement is due to Dilman Ilham who has criticized Quine in saying that Quine has misunderstood what Berkeley meant when he said 'we ought to think with the learned and speak with the vulgar.' [Dilman, I.(1984) *Quine on Ontology, Necessity and Experience :A Philosophical Critique*, Macmillan Press, London, p.6.

⁴²Interesting philosophical discussions on this problem of identity can be found in Griffin, N. (1977) *Relative Identity*, Clarendon Press, Oxford.

'the point of the game', that he dogmatically upholds, matters the most. The point of separating 'form' from 'content' is a presupposition that a contentless pure form is indubitable and principles working for such 'pure forms' can be lay down as the foundation for all empirical knowledge. Similarly, the false presupposition behind separating meaning from experience is to get truths solely on the basis of meaning in order to find out the principle or semantical rules working for such pure truths that can be lay down as the foundation. Untenability of these separations is shwon in the refutaion of the ASD and in the IT.

Thus a conceptual analysis or a linguistic analysis itself is not criticised by Quine's anti-foundationlism. The objective of any such analysis to find out *a priori* (transcendental or linguistic) epistemic principles is criticized and, hence, separation of 'form' from 'content' or that of 'meaning' from 'experience' which functions as a means for that unviable objective is criticized. A conceptual analysis or a linguistic analysis is upheld by Quine with a naturalistic spirit. No contentless pure forms and no 'meaning' independent of experience are acceptable but 'form' and 'meaning' relative to 'content' and 'experience' are acceptable in order to explore the problem 'how do we know the external world'? For, even if there is no pure forms and pure meaning, conceiving of the external world or experiencing the external world is possible only in terns of concepts, languages or theories. There is no independent reality as such to be understood or conceived. And, unless we understand or conceive the external world in one way or other it is impossible to explore the problem 'how do we know?'.

The essence of the anti-foundationalistic claim in discussing on ontology is, precisely, the refutation of all theses those advocate a separation of 'form' from 'content', 'meaning'-from 'experience', from an ontological point of view. That is, it refutes such separations which are supported in terms of the foundationalistic theses of (traditional or linguistic) absolute reference. The significance of *objectual Interpretation* of variables is that it forbids a variable to bear any import other than an objectual import, forbids any sense of 'necessity' or 'determinacy' due to the fact that it is only the *value* (objects) of a variable that gets significance in ontological discussions.

A swan or a black swan, any object in this world, is referred in terms of 'words' and only in terms of 'words'. In other words, no reference is independent of a system of language, a conceptual framework or a theory. The crucial problem is, beyond this stand-point common to Carnap and Quine, that whether there is any element discoverable in a conceptual framework, language or theory that really builds up but quite independent of the object referred. Carnap answers affirmatively and, accordingly, undertakes the 'method of intension' to find out that. Quine answers negatively and, upholding 'extension', refutes the "method of intension".

The significance of *substitutional interpretation* of a variable. for a foundationalism is that such an interpretation concedes a non-objectual value of the variable. That is, an epistemic import independent of experience is conceded through the variable, through "the essence of the referential idiom". This concession is not granted by an anti-foundationalist. Thus an anti-foundationalist

emphasizes on the *objectual interpretation* of a variable.

When we refer to a black swan we are no less referring to a swan. But two reasons can be provided for this business of reference. A foundationalist's reason is that the very semantical rules which determine that it is a black swan, also, determines that it is a swan. So it is necessary that if it is a black swan then it is a swan. For there is no other ground but the semantical ground on which reference is made possible and the basic semantical rules determining both the 'black swan' and 'swan' are the same. An anti-foundationalist's reason is that when we refer to a black swan our referring is inscrutable and so, also, the referring of the swan is inscrutable. Thus, of course, we refer to a swan when we refer to a black swan but, more importantly, it is not necessary that it is the swan we must refer in order to refer to a black swan. Both the references, to the black swan as well as to the swan, are indeterminate. Thus, since the reference of the swan is inscrutable, it cannot be claimed that a swan is necessarily referred to when a black swan is referred.

The two reasons differ on the point of 'reference' itself, not on the point that when we see a black swan whether we see a swan or we do not. For, if reference is inscrutable, we do not refer a black swan in an absolute manner but see a black swan. If reference is scrutable, determinate, we refer a black swan in an absolute manner and, also, see a black swan. In the former case, seeing of a swan due to seeing of a black swan is not necessary. The 'due to' is not a

⁴³The threat of a Cartesian doubt can be avoided on an ontological ground too.

'necessary due to'. It is a causal connection. In the latter case it is supposed to be an *a priori* epistemic connection.

Now we are back to the problem of reference. A variable itself does not solve the problem that whether there is determinacy of reference or not. For a variable itself is interpretable in two ways, namely, by *substitutional interpretation* and *objectual interpretation*. Determinacy of reference is viable, if reference is epitomised by variable and *substitutional interpretation* of variable is viable. Again, when reference is epitomized by variable, indeterminacy of reference can be established if and only if *substitutional interpretation* of a variable is not viable. That is, only if it is established that the only viable interpretation of a variable is the *objectual interpretation*. But, it is worth mentionable here, this is a foundationalist's argument. To claim that one of the interpretations is *the* right one is a meta-ontological answer, if ontology is strictly a scientific saying of how or what entities are there. Leaving this issue here we can switch on to inscrutability of reference. For, if inscrutability of reference is a thesis which can establish that one of the above said two interpretations is *the* correct one, then what I mentioned as a foundationalistic argument does not hold good. And, of course, it is assumed here and hardly any one has questioned the claim that the thesis of inscrutability of reference is anti-foundationalistic.

Inscrutability of reference substantially owes to the possibility of equally compatible references made in terms of various conflicting conceptual frameworks or linguistic scheaaes. The 'Gavagai' example cited in relation to IT is not the 'proof' of IT but 'at best,' as

Quine acknowledges, 'an example only of the inscrutability of terms'⁴⁴ His example of the Japanese classifiers⁴⁵ shows that inscrutability of reference, besides being exemplified in real life, unlike the 'Gavagai' example, 'need not always bring indeterminacy of sentence translation in its train'⁴⁶. The Japanese classifier example pin points that, in principle; 'there is no fact of the matter' to decide a term (viz; a classifier) whether it is an 'individuative term' or 'a mass term'. The classifier can be attached to numerals to count distinct type of objects (e.g; 'five-animal' oxen and five-slim things chopsticks). It can be attached to the substantive terms e.g; five 'animal oxen' and five slim things-chopsticks). In the former case, as the part of the compound numerals, it gives a divided reference. It amounts to referring each of the five animals as an ox and, consequently, 'five animals' oxen really refer to five oxen. In the latter case, the substantive constitutes a part of the mass term, 'five head of cattle,' which really refers to the same five oxen. Thus the physical ground or the concrete reference point of 'five oxen' remains the same, even if there are different view points of describing the objects referred to, and 'there is no question of right or wrong'⁴⁷ view point out of the two. For both are equally compatible to the physical data (viz; 'five oxen') and, more importantly, there remains no objective fact to distinguish one view point from the other

⁴⁴Quine, W.V.O (1970) "On the Reasons for Indeterminacy of Translation", *The Journal of Philosophy*, 67, pp. 178-183. See p. 182.

⁴⁵OR, p. 35

⁴⁶Quine, W.V.O (1970), "On the Reasons for Indeterminacy of Translation", p. 182

⁴⁷OR, pp. 37-38.

though the difference between the two is conspicuous. As far as the issue undertaken is scientific in the sense that whatever conceptual framework is adopted it comes under the scrutiny of empirical environment, inscrutability of reference becomes the natural outcome of a study of reference.

The fact that reference is inscrutable in face of two different conceptual frameworks, no particular framework determines what the objects are really referred to, in an absolute manner. For, otherwise, there would have been some sense in questioning *the* right or wrong conceptual framework of reference in referring the objects really are. Such a question does not arise because no conceptual framework or theory can absolutely determine what there are. Thus it makes no sense to say 'what the objects of a theory are'. Had it been possible to make sense of 'what the objects of a theory are', either a theory would have determined its objects in an absolute manner or there would have some objectivity to determine *the* correctness of one theory in stead of the other. That is, there would have different objective facts of the matter for different theories or there would have one ideal objective fact of the matter. Since neither of the alternatives is possible, 'what the objects of a theory are' makes no sense.

What makes sense is 'how one theory of objects is interpretable or reinterpretable in another'⁴⁸. For interpretation or reinterpretation of the objects means that the objects *are* not there but *said* to be there and, more importantly, the objects *said* to be

⁴⁸OR, p.48.

there in relation to a particular theory can be *said* to be there in relation to a broader theory or background theory which includes or feeds back that particular theory. Since 'reference is nonsense except relative to a coordinate system'⁴⁹, a frame of reference or background language, searching for "reference in any more absolute way' is just 'like asking absolute position or absolute velocity, rather than position or velocity relative to a given frame of reference'⁵⁰.

Thus 'reference is nonsense except relative to a coordinate system', not because 'inscrutability of reference is the inscrutability of fact'⁵¹, because 'there is no fact of the matter'⁵² A senseful or meaningful reference which is relative to a language or coordinate system becomes inscrutable because there can be, in principle, indefinite alternative languages or coordinate systems which are 'mutually incompatible and equally correct'⁵³ in the sense that a particular *said* object *can* be equally referred by different conflicting theories.

However, one may argue, if reference is relative to a background

⁴⁹OR, p.49

⁵⁰OR, p.47

⁵¹ *Ibid.*

⁵²OR, p.43,

⁵³OR, p.49

language then it leads to infinite regression ⁵⁴. That is, "the background language makes sense", in turn, only relative to a further background language which, in turn, makes sense only relative to a further background language and so on. However this problem of regression is not a hindrance to Quine's naturalized epistemology and, it is worth mentionable here, such a problem is foundationalistic. Quine cautions against the temptation for accounting 'universals'. That is, against the temptation that a 'question of the form "what is an F?" can be answered only by recourse to a further term, "An F is a G".⁵⁵ For, according to an anti-foundationalist, "the answer makes only relative sense: sense relative to the uncritical acceptance of "G"⁵⁶. The point to emphasise is not the 'universe' corresponding to 'G' which may or may not be wider than that of 'F', the emphasis is on the terra 'G' itself. For what is accountable in relation to ontology is not the 'universe' referred to, since reference to an 'universe' is meaningless, but the language in relation to what the terms become meaningful and so, also, the extension of the terms. The fact that reference is inscrutable makes it clear that the extension of terms cannot be determined absolutely, it can be determined in an uncritical way of accepting its language-relativeness but, at the same time, accepting a particular language or accepting more than one language and defining a term in circular ways. There is no need of 'universals' or 'intensions' in order to obtain the alleged 'necessity' in terms of the true relations between two universals or two 'intensions'. For

⁵⁴Cf. *OR*, p. 53.

⁵⁵*Ibid.*

⁵⁶*Ibid.*

the required 'necessity' itself is ill-grounded.

An alleged epistemic necessity of a true relation between two 'universals', for example, between 'black swan' and 'swan' of the relation that 'all black swans are swans' largely depends on an imputation of reality over and above the extension of the two classes of individuals, 'black swans' and 'swans'. This engenders the problem of other worlds which is known as *Plato's beard* that frequently dulls "the edge of Occam's razor"⁵⁷. For the alleged reality beyond the extension of classes facilitates the imputation of reality to non-existent entities like Pegasus, unicorns and centaurs which are not the objects of a theory but conceded to be real, unlike the atoms or electrons, due to the acceptance of theory independent realities. Thus over populating of ontology is carried out through the theory of 'universals' as well as by the theory of 'intension'. It is not only that mutual support is there between 'universals' and 'ideas' and between 'meaning' and 'intension' but also, it is there between the former supporting and the latter supporting. 'Ideas', construed as the abstract essences of the particular objects or as the relatives common to particular classes of objects, support that 'universals' must be there to be the name of those essential entities. 'Universals', construed as the names of the variables *exhaustively* ranging over the classes of objects, support that 'ideas' are there so as to get the 'universals' meaningful; as to get the 'universals' referentially transparent, that is, 'ideas' stand as the entities named by the 'universals'. 'Meaning', construed as an entity

⁵⁷FLPV, P.2.

mediating between the linguistic expressions and the objects or facts denoted or described by those expressions, supports that a theory of intention must be there so as to order those entities beyond the extensional scope, 'Intention as a tenable method of semantical investigations, supports that 'meaning' can be an entity beyond 'extension'. So also, the relation between 'ideas' and 'universals' on the one hand and that of between 'meaning' and 'intension' on the other support each other. An uncritical upholding of a relation of 'necessity' is common to both. One is metaphysical, another is linguistic, but both are from an epistemic point of view and both are based on absolutism or determinacy of ontology though the former conception of ontology is epitomized as 'what is there' and that of the latter is 'what is said to be there'.

It is notable that Carnap distinguishes his semantical analysis of extension and intension from that of Frege's 'nominatum' and 'sense'. While the general aim, namely, 'the construction of a pair of concepts suitable as instruments for semantical analysis', is the same the specific aims are different⁵⁸. The specific aim of Carnap is to explicate 'denotation- connotation* distinction which is different from, as Carnap observes, the 'name-relation' distinction adopted by Frege. Ofcourse Carnap admits that the distinction between 'extension' and 'intension' as to be the instrument for his 'semantical analysis' instead of arguing 'semantical analysis' itself to be the instrument for 'epistemological investigation,' nevertheless he uses 'semantical analysis' itself as an instrument for

⁵⁸*Meaning and Necessity*, p. 128,

philosophical clarification and explanation. For ontology is explored by him solely on a semantical basis which, in turn, proves that epistemology is also founded on semantics. Because, there is no possibility of a separation between ontology and epistemology and, as Quine argues, there is the 'reciprocal containment' between the two. Quine's thesis against foundationalism of the analytical variety, his theses against the conception of linguistic *a priori* and determinacy of meaning and determinacy of reference are antagonistic to that specific end-use of semantics as an instrument. It has already been discussed, more or less in relation to the ASD, that the distinction between 'intension' and 'extension' has a foundationalistic import. And, more importantly, 'semantical analysis' itself takes a major role so far as foundationalism is found to be there beneath the ASD which is supposed to be defined in terms of a distinction between intensional language and extensional language.

Thus, since Carnap's differentiation of the two specific ends does not save him from Quine's criticisms against the objective of using meaning as an instrument for philosophical explanation and clarification, the difference between the two pairs of concepts is not worth pursuing with any hope for defending the method of intension. In other words, the difference between 'name-relation' and 'denotation-connotation' is significant if ontology is independent of epistemology but such an independent status is not concedable either to ontology or to epistemology.

An expression, in a well constructed language system, always has the same 'extension' and the same 'intension' but in some contexts it has its ordinary nominatum and its ordinary sense, in other contexts

Carnap distinguishes his 'extension' and 'intension' from Frege's 'nominatum' and 'sense' respectively⁵⁹. He is not against Frege's distinction of nominatum and sense as far as these two concepts are meant to explicate name-relation. For name-relation is different from denotation connotation. But he shows the disadvantages of the 'method of name-relation' and views that Quine's ontological discussions subscribe this method. However we are not concerned here about the question how 'name-relation' incurs those disadvantages, nor about the question how does Quine subscribe a Fregean 'name-relation' distinction and, at the same time, refutes the possibility of any object in an oblique context. On the other hand, our concern is how to refute the method of intension. Thus we have recognised Carnap's criticism against the method of 'name-relation' in order to recognize the untenability of oblique contexts. If the method of intension is purported to explain certain concepts which are bound to be involved in oblique contexts, method of intension is untenable.

An oblique context is an opaque context of reference, A context is referentially opaque when it obstructs the transparency of a term which is otherwise purely referential. That is, in short. 'a context is referentially opaque if it can render a referential occurrence non-referential'⁶⁰. Quotation is a paradigm case of such contexts. "Cat", for example, in "Cattle" is an orthographic accident and to say that cat is in cattle is to obstruct the transparency of the term

⁵⁹*Ibid.*, p.125.

⁶⁰WP, P. 161.

its oblique nominatum and its oblique sense. This is the way in which Carnap distinguishes his 'extension' and 'intension' from Frege's 'nominatum' and 'sense' respectively⁵⁹. He is not against Frege's distinction of nominatum and sense as far as these two concepts are meant to explicate name-relation. For name-relation is different from denotation connotation. But he shows the disadvantages of the 'method of name-relation' and views that Quine's ontological discussions subscribe this method. However we are not concerned here about the question how 'name-relation' incurs those disadvantages, nor about the question how does Quine subscribe a Fregean 'name-relation' distinction and, at the same time, refutes the possibility of any object in an oblique context. On the other hand, our concern is how to refute the method of intension. Thus we have recognised Carnap's criticism against the method of 'name-relation' in order to recognize the untenability of oblique contexts. If the method of intension is purported to explain certain concepts which are bound to be involved in oblique contexts, method of intension is untenable.

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⁵⁹*Ibid.*, p.125.

⁶⁰WP, p.161.

"cat" occurring in contexts like 'the cat is on the mat'. "9", for example, in " $9 > 7$ " is purely referential but "9" in "' $9 > 7$ ' contains three characters" is not purely referential. As the context of quotation is construed to be the paradigm case of referential opacity, the following features can be clearly made out of the the context of quotation so as to understand the untenability of the modal sense of 'necessity' which is one of the opaque contexts.

a. The fundamental confusion in saying 'cat is in cattle' is the confusion of use and mention. It is quite harmless to say "cat" is in "cattle" but it is wrong to say "cat is in cattle". In the latter case, mentioning has been confused with use. It is a confusion between *in the way in which we say things' and 'the things we talk about'⁶¹.

b. Occurances of statements within quotations are not truth functional. If s_1 is a part of a larger statement s , then s_1 is truth functional if any other statement s_2 having the same truth value of s_1 can replace s_1 without changing the truth value of s . ' $9 > 7$,' for example, cannot be truth functional in "' $9 > 7$ ')" contains just three characters" because this whole statement becomes false when ' $9 > 7$ ' is replaced by another statement, 'Napoleon escaped from Elba,' which has the same truth value of ' $9 > 7$ '.

c. Miscarriage of quantification⁶² is another point of referential

⁶¹WP, p. 176.

⁶²FLPV, p. 149.

opacity. The grotesque example⁶³ in this regard for the context of quotation is

(3x) ('six' contains 'x').

Analogous to 'quotation', 'necessity' incurs the above said confusions. '9', for example, mentioned as in '9 is necessarily greater than 7' is harmless and the statement is true. But '9' being used in "The number of planets is necessarily greater than 7" creates the confusion and the statement is false. The role of 'necessity', analogous to 'quotation', is unproblematic as far as it creates no confusion of 'mention' and 'use'. But the purpose of advancing necessity for philosophical explanation and clarification, especially, for a 'semantical analysis' of reference in support of foundationalism, in support of linguistic Absolutism, is to 'obtain necessity' as a plausible qualification of epistemic norms. The plausibility of 'necessity' can enable one to conceive of certain foundational epistemic principles as to be necessarily true and unrevisable. But, analogous to 'quotation', 'necessity' makes reference opaque when confusion of 'use' and 'mention' occurs. Mentioning of '9' in '9 is necessarily greater than 7' concedes no privileged epistemic status to 'necessarily greater than 7', it is no less accidentally true than "cat" is in "cattle". For 'the number of planets is necessarily greater than 7' is no less false than 'cat is in cattle'. "'9' is greater '7'" happens to be mathematically true while " 'cat' is 'cattle'" happens to be phonetically true, but, both are accidental true. The 'necessity' operating for ' $8 > 7$ ' is responsible for confusing 'mention' with 'use'.

⁶³*FLPV*, p. 150.

The above said confusion, due to 'necessity', becomes more clear when it is shown that statements in the context of 'necessity' are not truth functional. '9 > 7' and 'the number of planets is greater than 7' have the same truth value but their truth value differs in the context of 'necessity': '9 is necessarily greater than 7' is true whereas 'the number of planets is necessarily greater than 7' is false.

Analogous to the miscarriage of quantification by quotation (e.g., $(\exists x) ('six' \text{ contains } 'x')$) miscarriage of quantification is observed in the modal contexts. $(\exists x) (x > 7)$, for example, is an existential quantification of the variable 'x' which can have any number greater than 7 as the value. The number of planets is greater than 7. Thus $(\exists x) (x \text{ is the number of planets and } x > 7)$ is true. But this is not true that $(\exists x) (x \text{ is the number of planets and } x \text{ is necessarily greater than } 7)$. That is, the miscarriage of ' $\exists x$ ' is observed when 'necessity' is quantified. $(\exists x) (x \text{ is necessarily greater than } 7)$ can be inferred from (9 is necessarily greater than 7) only when 'to be necessarily greater than 7' is a trait of the number 9. But to be necessarily greater than 7 is not a trait of a number but depends on the manner of referring to the number'⁶⁴. If it is a trait of number, for example, of the number of planets, then it would have not been false that the number of planets is necessarily greater than 7. When we refer to some thing objectually, for example, to the number of planets as 'necessarily greater than 7' the consequence is invariably false. For there is no determinacy of reference, there is

⁶⁴FLFV, p. 148.

no sense of necessity in an extensional context and reference is of no sense in a non-extensional context.

Thus, since reference is indeterminate in an extensional context and there is no sense of an intensional reference, reference is indeterminate. And, more importantly, granted that there is no method of investigation but, broadly dividing in a Carnapian way, the method of intension and the method of extension, then indeterminacy of method is the 'natural conclusion. A genuine naturalist, a Quinean naturalist, upholds the indeterminacy of method but it is not on the ground that he accepts the Carnapian division. On the contrary, he refutes the method of intension and it is very clear that a method of extension inevitably results into an indeterminacy of method. However, analogous to IT, this indeterminacy does not refute the *manuals of* methodological studies. It refutes the possibility of any method which can be accounted as *the* correct method in face of many other alternatives equally befitting the data on what the theories are built, though the alternatives may be incompatible to each other.

Even if we stick to the point that the division Carnap makes is primarily for the replacement of ontological discussions by semantical discussions, yet the indeterminacy of method is the conclusion we get. For, speaking in a nutshell, there is no possibility of a foundationalistic semantics. Failure of linguistic absolutist Beans failure of a method to be called as foundational from an ontological point of view when ontology is primarily conceived as language dependent. Failure of foundationalistic semantics means failure of a method to be called as foundation from a semantical point of view when

semantics is primarily concerned with meaning, translation and language. Both the failures make it clear that foundationalism cannot be upheld in some way or other, neither it can be advanced on an ontological basis nor can it be on a semantical basis. A determinacy of method, a foundationalistic method in epistemology, especially a Carnapian one, presupposes one or other of the two determinacies in order to separate epistemology from natural sciences. For natural science is viewed to be *built up by*, instead of being *continuous with*, a language system or conceptual framework and to obtain the foundational norms of a language system or conceptual framework is to obtain a method of determining the theories.

We observe that natural science is coextensive with ontology because there is no possibility of an intensional method and extensional method is coextensive with natural science. As a contrary view to our observation, a foundationalist observes that natural science is not coextensive with ontology because ontology can be determined by an intensional method even if extensional method is coextensive with natural science. However, if we look into a foundationalist's view point by making ontology and natural science coextensive, we can observe him upholding the thesis that ontology is contained in epistemology but epistemology is not contained in ontology.

Thus, looking into our view point, a foundationalist can observe that we are upholding the thesis that there is reciprocal containment', between epistemology and ontology. This has been discussed, in the next chapter, as a fundamental feature of Quine's

CHAPTER V

QUINE'S NATURALIZED EPISTEMOLOGY: ITS METHODOLOGICAL PERSPECTIVE

Simulated versions of naturalized epistemology are quite seductive. For, even if the adherents of those versions make claims of doing epistemology, interestingly enough, often those versions tempt us to give up the age old epistemological problems. Some of those versions plead for the annihilation of epistemology and many of those versions try to 'contain' epistemology in natural science without containing natural science in epistemology. Quine's Naturalized Epistemology (QNE¹) is quite distinct in this respect in that it advocates for the 'reciprocal containment' of epistemology and natural science. Obviously, QNE is not nihilistic. But the optimism it professes is not by means of a complete surrender by either epistemology to natural science, or *vice versa*. Epistemologists and natural scientists are kept in the same boat, to wit, Neurath's boat is the only boat in the waters of man's wisdom.

Richard Rorty's epistemological nihilism and Goldman's *epistemics* can be viewed as the strong representatives of the above mentioned, broadly divided, two groups of simulated versions of naturalized epistemology. For Rorty's view point outrightly denies the possibility of any fruitfully pursued subject as a successor to

¹Hereafter "Quine's Naturalised Epistemology" has been abbreviated as "QNE".

epistemology; instead of simply denying the viability of epistemological enterprises currently undertaken or traditionally taken care of. In case of *epistemics*, though natural science 'contains' epistemology, epistemology 'contains' philosophical doubt in the sense that 'scientific doubt' is neglected in *epistemics*. Consequently, instead of maintaining epistemology as to be completely descriptive and non-evaluative, *epistemics* is advanced as a descriptive (contra non-prescriptive) but evaluative (*qua* normative) enterprise. Thus epistemological nihilism can be viewed as the best of all simulated versions of naturalised epistemology those attempt to annihilate epistemology. It argues for the impossibility, in principle, of epistemology. So also, *epistemics* can be viewed as the best among those of the group which attempts to 'contain' epistemology in natural science because, to advance optimism in epistemology, it attempts to retain the normativity though the enterprise is primarily a descriptive one.

In order to highlight the methodological perspective of QNE, in this chapter, QNE has been distinguished from Rorty's epistemological nihilism and Galdman's *epistemics*. However, as the main thrust is to specify QNE'S methodological reorientation from first philosophy to philosophy as science par excellence, it should not be considered as a comparative study between QNE and *epistemics* or between QNE and epistemological nihilism; or an argument for the refutation of *epistemics* and epistemological nihilism. The discussions on epistemogial nihilism and *epistemics* are accounted here in order to explain the methodological bearing of the fundamental features like "reciprocal containment" and 'scientific skepticism' which play a

vital role in the methodological perspective of QNE- Especially, it is to argue in favor of scientific skepticism which *ipso facto* supports the 'reciprocal containment'.

The most significant feature of QNE, to distinguish it from some simulated versions, is that it investigates the old epistemological problem in a different manner. "Given only the evidence of our senses", Quine asks in the first page itself of *RR*, "How do we arrive at our theory of the world?". And, "a description of the three dimensional external world and its history"² is made out of "the sensory information that would reach"³ us at our sensory surfaces. For "we know external things only mediately through our senses". "Physical things generally, however remote, become known to us only through the effects which they help to induce at our sensory surfaces"⁴.

Thus "the problem is on the relation between the meager input and the torrential output"⁵. But this relation itself is a part of this world and, hence, to be studied like any other phenomenon of this world. No *a priori* presuppositions are to be believed dogmatically to make out their relation to be fixed *a priori*. Repugnance to apriority

²*OR*, p.33.

³*RR*,p.2.

⁴*WO*, p.1.

⁵*OR_r* p.83.

is not offensive to our 'conceptual sovereignty' because the wide gap between the 'data' and the 'knowledge' of the external world is deciphered more scientifically by the assertion of the 'underdetermination' of theories by data. Man is seen as a part of this world and we can investigate to 'find out cues he could have of what goes on around him. Subtracting his cues from his world view, we get man's net contribution as the difference- This difference marks the extent of man's conceptual sovereignty - the domain within which he can revise theory while saving the data'⁶.

The interesting aspect of this investigation is that it addresses the old epistemological problem in a different terminology, a terminology commonly supposed to be pertinent to natural sciences. It seems to be deteriorating the austerity of the old epistemological problem by expressing the problem of our knowledge of the external world as a problem between 'data' and 'theory', as if it is a computed relation of the 'input' and 'output'. But this seeming deterioration is, infact, an 'enlightenment' to a genuine empiricistic theory of knowledge and the alleged austerity turns to be dogmatic. The problem itself is not dogmatic but the way it is undertaken. Quine's undertaking is enlightening, he repudiates that dogmatic looking into the epistemological problems and reorients them to their scientific perspective. This reorientation is not a matter of sheer terminological adoption. It is an explanation of the scientific endeavour suggested over the utter failure of a dogmatic outlook about

⁶WO, p.5.

our knowledge of the external world. The problem remains the same but, instead of putting forward futile efforts on the basis of certain vague and dogmatic presuppositions, a different approach is recommended altogether. The futility of the earlier approach, the foundationalistic one, is shown in the way of repudiating the ASD and advocating for the indeterminacy of meaning and reference. Now we can switch on to the various important aspects of looking towards the same problem in a scientific way.

The first variation in its outlook that QNE keeps, unlike a foundationalistic approach, is the emphasis on the web of beliefs. An epistemic import of a belief, for example, the world is full of demons, amounts to nonsense unless the origin or growth of such a belief is not examined. The same belief can be held by a child, a grand mother, a lunatic and even by a philosopher. But the considerations of the external world made out of the experiences they encounter in their environment can be quite different and, even, contrasting in nature. Thus to understand their knowing of this external world and to evaluate the belief they hold, one is to study the origin and growth of their beliefs. This requirement leads to have an alliance with psychology and epistemological questions about beliefs are turned to be genetic questions.

Genetic questions are the questions concerning the origin, growth, endurance and deterioration of our beliefs. Growth of knowledge is commonsensically adjudicated as the quantitative rise of the number of persons of society who confirm in their actions to a particular *standard* of beliefs which is prescribed as the best for the

quality-evaluation. When a particular standard is prescribed and adopted without objection, evaluation of the growth of knowledge is not a debatable issue, on ordinary parlance. But the kind of standard taken up varies from conservatives to liberalists, from idealists to pragmatists and so on. With the variation of these orientations varies the determination of the quality (developed or undeveloped) because such a determination is dependent on the *standard* undertaken. Such a scenario is generally observed on certain crucial stages of social progress. However, the growth of knowledge pertinent to the genetic questions in epistemological perspective does not vary in that way.

A foundationalistic account does advocate certain *standard* though the *standard* is meant for the evaluation of the truth/certainty of beliefs instead of for the evaluation of the social progress or social wellbeing. Emphasis is extended to certain basic foundational principles supposed to be the *standard* or 'touch stone' of certainty/truth, in their prescriptions. An *a priori* epistemic status is conceded to these beliefs (foundational) such that one cannot meaningfully question that prescription. Thus what bothers then the most is to justify that privileged status of an account they prescribe. This quest for justification, not of the belief one holds, but of a standard's privileged epistemic status on the basis of what a belief is alleged to be justified/unjustified, keeps the foundationalists going on a wrong track.

A genetic question in QNE is neither a question about the austerity of a method nor about the certainty or truth of a framework with a prescriptive base. It is a non-prescriptive or descriptive

question about the beliefs in view of the fact that an epistemological comment cannot be passed over a belief without the understanding of its nature of origin, growth and endurance. The value of truth, morality, aesthetics or of legal procedures as such is not the point to ponder over. The norms determining such values are based on certain orientation of a theorist or a society. This orientation is significantly dependent on the conceptual framework adhered. Thus the truth value of a belief, or its certainty, is quite dependent on the framework taken into account.

But neither a particular framework can explain what *really* is the nature of the external world, nor any of the possible alternative frameworks can determine what we *exactly* know about the external world. Hence there is no possibility of an explanation of reality *per-se*, nor there is any justification of the framework wise determined truth. If either of the two were possible, the other could have been worked out. Reality being explained finally, by any particular framework, could have enabled to make out the truth justified by a framework; and, *vice versa*. But the futility of a search for these reality and truth is shown by the establishment of ontological relativity and IT.

An answer to a genetic question is distangled from the Carnapian framework-business by keeping a descriptive role in explaining the nature of beliefs about the external world. What importantly enlightens is its impetus to a scientific search in depth to solve the old epistemological problem. Once the IT and ontological relativity are accepted as scientific findings of an epistemological programme

such that the gap between the 'meager input' and the 'torrential putput' cannot be explained in terms of particular frameworks, it naturally turns to be a scientific search if a remedy is sought after, in that regard, instead of carrying out epistemological programmes on the same level that remains unfruitful due to IT and ontologies! relativity. The remedy a genetic answer can suggest is this: Understand the underlying organic and social mechanism of beliefs or belief systems such that the network of beliefs in a framework can be understood in depth to make out the above said gap in a better way. For what stands responsible for a wrong diagnosis of the relation between a belief and a framework and, thereby, for the incurable diseases - IT and ontological relativity - is the misunderstanding of the nature of the belief itself. We must suffer from the seeming incurable disease, we need not cry in vain, because it is a blessing in disguise.

The genetic question about beliefs blurs the Carnapian distinction between internal questions and external questions. No special status is conceded to the beliefs supposed to be foundational to a framework. Those are ones among all the beliefs we can possibly uphold and, thus, vulnerable to tests conductable for any belief's origination, growth, endurance and deterioration. So also, the ASD becomes meaningless under a genetic inquiry. The *kind* of truth does not matter because there is no such difference in kind, not that there is a difference in kind and it is neglected. What does matter is the belief's nature which is alleged to be analytically true or synthetically true. And the nature of a belief cannot be conceded with any privileged epistemic status *a priori*, since a belief is

naturally produced by a belief processing mechanism apart from the fact that this mechanism is conditioned in various ways. It is not only that a genetic inquiry disparges the ASD, the ASD's refutation also encourages a genetic inquiry. Untenability of the ASD entails the untenability of the epistemic import of the internal and external distinction and this, in turn, precludes the question of certainty or any other appraisal of knowledge in some absolute terms. Impossibility of an evaluation in some absolute terms refutes or discourages a normative investigation and thus the genetic inquiry is supported.

An immediate corollary to the IT is that an uttered⁷ belief is indeterminate. A belief can be uttered in an indefinite possible ways, even in conflicting or contrary ways, there remains no 'fact of the matter' to utter the belief in *the* correct way such that the audience would avail a determinated meaning. This refutation of linguistic absolutism prevents a search of the meaning of an utterance or the belief pinned down. Thus a philosophical inquiry based on such a linguistic absolutism becomes enviable and what is left open is either an inquiry based on non absolutistic determination of meaning or an inquiry of beliefs where meaning gets less importance. Both the alteratives are cogneal and naturalistic. The former falls in

⁷
"Utterance" is used in its wider sense, following Grice, H.P. (1971), "Utterance meaning Sentence meaning and Word meaning" in Searle, J.R. (Ed.) *The Philasobhy of Language* Clarendon Press, Oxford, See p . 55

linguistics and the latter in psychology. The psychological inquiry is directly linked with the genetic inquiry. In a sense, etymology turns to be a part of etiology; both are genetical but with different perspectives.

Viewing a belief from an ontological point, the reality of belief is dependent on the system of beliefs it belongs to and also on a background system of beliefs. Thus the analysis of the belief itself, in isolation of the system it belongs to and the background system of beliefs, is completely blocked. Thus a Cartesian establishment of a belief's distinctness and clearness becomes meaningless since it looks into a belief without the systems. And, a foundationalistic evaluation on an ontological footing is a myth since the standard belief allegedly prescribed to be the core of a good argument does not stand relativistically, it is kept there in isolation of the system or background beliefs. The encouragement a genetic inquiry gains from such blocks is that the background of the beliefs can be studied genetically. Instead of putting certain metaphysical standards to ascertain the reality of a belief, our cognitive mechanism can be studied to find out the history of a belief in order to identify a genuine background system.

Genetic questions cannot be answered by mentalistic semantics which hopes for any 'understanding of the workings of language in mentalistic terms. For the question is ultimately aimed at a 'physical explanation' on the basis of a settled behavioural explanation' of our beliefs and understandings. That is; the affinity of mind and language' can be acknowledged and worked out from

language to mind, not from mind to language, by an examination of the disposition of verbal behaviour.⁸ *Prima facie*, a mentalistic approach is not an answer for the questions about beliefs because it tries to explain the workings of our language, not the workings of our beliefs. The fact that an understanding of the workings of our language can enable to have a clearer and more substantial understanding of our mind or beliefs generated in mind, it could have had a hope. But it begs the question by adhering a mentalistic explanation of language. Instead of answering questions about the beliefs, in a sense, it answers the questions about language in terms of beliefs understood in the capacity of mental instruments.

From the above considerations of the genetic approaches one may misconceive that a true belief is not distinguished from ordinary beliefs. The distinction is there but with no concession of an epistemic apriority for any true belief. Gradualism - from ordinary beliefs to true beliefs and from true beliefs to truer beliefs and from truer to more truer and so on - underlies a genetic approach. A true belief is no less a belief and no better than any other belief so far as a genetical epistemic inquiry is made over it. What I said so far about the genetic questions can be thematically visualized like this: In the way of going against foundationalism by means of refuting the ASD and accepting the IT as well as the ontological relativity, one

⁸Quine, W.V.O. (1975) 'Mind and Verbal Dispositions', in Guttenplan, S. (Ed.) (1975). pp. 83-95. See p. 95.

supports a genetic approach. And, more importantly, it is not only that a genetic approach endorses to anti-foundationalism but also that it finds a viable way out of the epistemological discomforts. However it attempts to suppress the discomforts in view of the fact that no eternal relaxation is possible in epistemological investigations.

"No eternal relaxation" is an other way of saying that Cartesian doubt is untenable. For a Cartesian doubt demands a truth in a *priori* or truth that survives for ever as unrevisable so as to provide an eternal relaxation for the epistemologists. A genetic inquiry pleads for a scientific doubt. It pleads for a doubt based on certain background knowledge and the clarification of the doubt is further susceptible to another doubt. That is, a scientific doubt works on a clarification of an earlier scientific doubt and when it is clarified it stands as a genesis of later scientific doubt. "Illusions are illusions only relative to a prior acceptance of genuine bodies with which to contrast them."⁹ It is baseless to doubt the reality unless one is aware of illusion. "The basis of skepticism is the awareness of illusion, the discovery that we must not always believe our 'eyes'.¹⁰ Knowledge of the fact that sticks do not bend by immersion compels a skeptic to offer the "example of the seemingly bent stick". So also, 'his examples of images, after-images, dreams and the rest are

⁹"NNK" , p.67.

¹⁰*Ibid.*

parasitic upon positive science however primitive'. Thus reality and illusion are distinguished on the basis of 'rudimentary physical science'.

Cartesian doubt is not the proper starting point. It does not permit to have any scientific assumption that would enable to have a scientific doubt. It requires a complete detachment from science, to start with an *a priori* epistemic evidence and to end in justifying the truth (certainty) of our beliefs about the external world on the basis of that evidence (criterion). It is unscientific. For the method of doubt it envisages goes beyond science, its origin is unscientific. Doubt to all of science amounts to the preservation of non scientific spring-board. For the vital point of a scientific doubt is that it must be based on a prior acceptance of certain belief system or frame work of knowledge. There is a 'curious interplay between doubt and knowledge'.¹² Strictly speaking, doubt is meaningless unless it is based on knowledge.

Cartesian doubt becomes meaningless if one identifies a doubt's meaningfulness with a doubt's becoming scientific. But let 'meaning' to be conceived in what ever broadest sense possible. Cartesian doubt falls outside the realm of scientific doubts even if it is not meaningless. However the nature of doubts envisaged in QNE is not just a terminological reformulation of "meaningfulness". It proclaims

¹¹ *Ibid.*, p.68.

¹²*Ibid.*, p.67.

that there is no sense of a non scientific doubt. The refutation of the ASD and the establishment of the IT together can enable to say that a Cartesian doubt is quite dogmatic and unviable. There is no ASD and all our beliefs being classified under synthetic statements entails that there is no meaningful doubt to all synthetic statements altogether. For to doubt something is to believe something else or, at least, to believe something to be false and there is no belief beyond syntheticity. Again if there is no determinacy of meaning and, thereby, there is no framework core statements to legitimize a meaning to be determinate, there is no possible transcendental or linguistic *a priori* core statements of a framework that could extend meaning to such a doubt.

In QNE, the claim that skeptical doubts are scientific doubts play a major role in explaining the sense in which epistemology is a part of natural science and, thereby, for an explanation of how an epistemologist can make free use of a scientific theory. It explains how epistemology is continuous with natural science. That is, how the philosopher and the natural scientist are in the same boat (reminding Neurath's metaphor). A hurdle to this explanation is the misunderstanding of the legitimate licence QNE issues for a skeptic's *reductio ad absurdum*. The misunderstanding recurs here, again, due to the uncritical acceptance of the Cartesian doubt. However the point is more deep in the sense that the charge is not directly against a scientific doubt's identification with a meaningful doubt. The charge is not on a semantical ground, it is against the epistecological reorientation altogether. The reorientation of identifying Skeptical doubts with scientific doubts is disparaged with a misconception that

such a reorientation is no more epistemological. The charge is, similar to the previous charge against a scientific doubt, that a mere terminological variation of 'psychologism' has been made by a naturalist to do epistemology while no epistemological problem is considered at all. This problem can be outlined as it follows

That from

(i) Skeptical doubts are scientific doubts

how does it follow that

(ii) Epistemology is a part of natural science

and (iii) An epistemologist can make free use of a scientific theory?

If the skeptic is allowed to argue by *redactio ad absurdum* then, the challenger says, (ii) and (iii) do not follow from (i).

This problem's solution takes care of the following dilemma.
Either

(a) you adhere epistemology without skepticism and, thereby, an epistemology completely delinked from traditional epistemological questions such that it actually turns into "physiology of belief formation'. Or,

(b) you accept an epistemology which roots out skepticism and, thereby, an epistemology completely on line with traditional epistemological problems such that it actually makes no sense of being named as 'naturalism' except that it uses such terms like 'stimulation', 'observation,' 'data', 'hypotheses', 'theory' and so on pertinent to natural sciences without having any methodological significance of the old epistemological problems.

Both the horns of the dilemma identify 'skepticism' with 'radical skepticism', with skepticism which over reacts after getting the license of *reductio ad absurdum*. Thus the dilemma can be overcome by holding the two horns if that identification¹³ can be examined so critically that the over reaction can be suppressed down.

The formulation of the *reductio ad absurdum* (RAA) can be maintained, following Stroud,¹⁴ that no belief about the external world on the basis of the assumption that 'science is true and it gives us knowledge' is true and no belief about the external world on the basis of the assumption that it (science) is not true and it does not give us knowledge is true. That is, for example, assuming S we can infer K to be true and assuming $\sim S$ we can infer K to be true too. Consequently we cannot assert K because it would lead to a contradiction i.e. $(S \ \& \ \sim S)$. We cannot assert that we know something about the external world with certainty, it would lead to the contradiction that science is true and gives us knowledge as well as science is not true and it gives nothing amounting knowledge.

However there can be two different conceptions of RAA in relation to its epistemic status. An epistemic position completely independent of any ontological commitment is quite different from an epistemic

¹³ That is, the identification of a doubt **with a Cartesian** doubt.

¹⁴Stroud, B. (1984) *The Significance of Philosophical Scepticism*, Clarendon Press, Oxford, See p.228.

position dependent on an ontological commitment. RAA employed from that purely epistemic level, without any ontic ground, can be called as RAA external and the other one as RAA internal. Strend's argument can be destructive to QNE if the RAA external is possible at all. It is possible if there can be any epistemology completely delinked from an ontology. That is, say, if we can know or doubt something transcendently such that there is no reality of the object that we know or doubt. Can there be a knowledge or doubt about an unreal? And, can there be a reality that does not come under the purview of natural science (present or future)? To answer these questions negatively is to answer that RAA external is untenable.

Of course our doubt follows a belief which is illusive, we doubt on an illusive object. When the reality is believed to be something else other than what is believed to be true now, then we start doubting. Or, at least, after we fail to understand certain features of the nature/external world in terms of a believed reality, we doubt that reality. In a sense, we do doubt about the unrels (illusive realities) but it is either with a background of some reality that conveys the illusive character of that unreal or, without any particular reality's knowledge, with a background of the reality of certain features encountered in the external world/nature. Thus. in general, the unrels susceptible to any doubt are the unrels with certain ontological backgrounds. It is a commitment either to a definite alternative ontology or to an indefinite ontology of the external world. If we don't have any such ontological commitment then there cannot be a knowledge of reality, nor a doubt on unreality. But with such a commitment, a doubt on an unreality really Beans a

presupposition of some other reality. That is, there is no unreality without a supposed real background and there is no supposed reality without an element of unreality in it.

Reality beyond the purview of natural science is of no sense. For natural science concerns the whole of this world and one cannot find reality outside the world. Despite of this what attracts one to go beyond is the underdetermination of theories by the data given. One would be attracted for a search of certainty. But this certainty is a myth. No 'cosmic exile' is possible. To go beyond the reality under the purview of natural science is to stand nowhere. There is no reality without an element of unreality in it. One can doubt natural science of this day as a whole but, thereby, he cannot be said of possessing an external position. To doubt natural science itself is a 'deliverance of natural science'. Such a legitimate doubt is nothing but an assertion of an alternative set of natural sciences altogether. Otherwise, it is just like an arbitrary "No" issued nonsensically towards natural science. Or, it is an arbitrary "Yes" issued nonsensically towards a kind of natural science which reads no reality. To, wit, it is nothing but physics that really reads reality.

Ontology is coextensive with epistemology. For about what we know or doubt is a 'posit' and there cannot be any sense of knowing something absolutely. And, the ontology of a 'posit' is relative to the background beliefs, hence, relative to an epistemology. Thus there regains no ontology independent of an epistemology and there remains no epistemology independent of ontology.

Since there remains no sense of ontology beyond the purview of natural science and there is no epistemology independent of ontology, epistemology is quite dependent on natural science. Natural science is also dependent on epistemology. For ontology is meaningless if it is bereft of having any relation with epistemology. In other words, there is a 'reciprocal containment' between 'natural science' and 'epistemology'. Natural science contains epistemology and epistemology contains natural science. Of course the former 'containment' is viewed from an Ontological point. That the reality over what epistemological problems arise is a part of the reality under the purview of natural science. The latter 'containment' is viewed from an epistemological point. That the knowledge of any reality studied in natural science presupposes a background knowledge of that reality and, thereby, comes under epistemology since epistemology is concerned with all the possible levels of knowledge about a reality. These two view points cannot be independent of each other amounts to ' that the 'reciprocal containment' is inevitable.

The root of that dependency is the fact that ontology and epistemology cannot be separable in any clearer way. Infact, this inseparability brings about the indeterminacy of meaning as well as the thesis of under determination of scientific theories. If ontology were separable from epistemology then there would not be the problem of a relation between the 'meager input' and the 'torrential output.' The gap would have been there without creating any problem because the input's status could have been left on an ontological level and that of the output on an epistemological level.

Although an understanding of this reciprocal containment between natural science and epistemology can enable to overcome the problem that how in QNE it is both (1) The skeptic is "quite within his rights in assuming science in order to refute science"¹⁵ and (2) the problem of the relation between the 'meager input' and the 'torrential output' is really an epistemological problem. Stroud's objection can be traced back to his objection¹⁶ that Quine affords a privileged, epistemic status to the logical truths and observation sentences.

If logical truths are conceded to unrevisability then an *a priori* epistemology can be beyond natural science as well as independent of ontology. So also, if the observation sentences are indubitable due to their immediate evidential base on sense experience or stimulations of the stimulus-response mechanism, then natural science is no more contained in epistemology as well as ontology gets absolute freed in from epistemology. However no such concession is offered in QNE such that epistemology and ontology can be absolutely separated from one another, nor the reciprocal containment between natural science and epistemology can be damaged altogether. In QNE, logical truth is after all a convention¹⁷ and, thereby, it is not immune to revision.

¹⁵"NNK", p.68.

¹⁶In Stroud, B. (1969) "Conventionalism and the Indeterminacy of Translation", in Davidson and Hintikka, J. Eds. *words and Objections* pp.82-96.

¹⁷Quine, W.V.O. (1963) "Replies (to Stroud)" in Davidsan and Hintikka, H. (Eds.), *Op. Cit.* p.318.

What is really meant by "some logical truth" which are not to be revised is that logical truths are not to be revised for the sake of 'amateur psychology' but only in 'extreme' case of deviation from all 'general psychological similarities'. So also, even 'what to take as the natives signs of assent and* dissent is a *decision* by the linguist so that it 'has much the quality of analytical hypothesis, even though it underlies stimulus meaning'¹⁸ that an observation sentence's evidential status owes to that decision (which is more pertinent to epistemology than ontology). Thus, after all, observation sentences are revisable when they are in relation to a theory since the service they extend are no less based on epistemological grounds. They are no less uncertain than the analytical hypotheses. And, there is no meaning of revisability unless those are related to a theory. Thus what is really meant by the 'starting point of scientific theory' and therefore by 'those are unrevisable' as well, is that observation sentences are not to be revised for the sake of a theory itself but only in extreme cases:

"an extreme case, the theory may consist in such firmly conditioned connections between sentences. . . . The tail thus comes. in an extremity, to wag the dog"¹⁹

No statement is immune to revision. Observation sentences, sentences on the periphery²⁰ of a theory and, even, logical truths are

¹⁸ibid,p.317.

¹⁹WO, pp. 18-19.

²⁰Quine, W.V.O. (1969) "Replies (To Stroud)" pp. 316-317. Quine acknowledges that what he alludes as periphery in TDE stands parallel to 'stimulus' in WO.

revisable though *in* extreme cases. The three important characteristic features I said so far of the QNE can be described, precisely, as the genetic approach, the scientific 'skepticism' and the thesis of reciprocal containment. It is also shown that these three are interdependent and supporting to each other. One of the broader issues that gets support from all these three is that epistemology is not withered by QNE. The other broader issue that needs explanation is that epistemology is continuous with natural science. The above said reciprocal containment does provide a methodological base, in this regard, but what I want to discuss further is the way in which the methodology must be carried out without any damage to QNE. This can be shown in distinguishing QNE from Rorty's 'revolutionary nihilism' and Goldman's 'historical reliabilism'. Before pointing the distinctions let me say about the continuity: between epistemology and natural science.

The IT established on an account of stimulus response mechanism recommends a genetic approach in the study of language learning. The negative proclamation in construction of the IT is that one hopelessly attempts to determine meaning. There is no 'fact of the matter' [i.e. no independent ontology]²¹. The positive proclamation is the availability of 'intersubjectively verifiable adequate occasion sentences' i.e. the observation sentences. These sentences, being intersubjectively observable, work as the 'starting-points in the

²¹ Notice the move of dependency between semantics and ontology parallel to that of between epistemology and ontology,

learning of language* and, also, as 'the starting-points and the checkpoints of scientific theory'²². Thus, from the root-point, from the level of observation sentences accounted in stimulus-response mechanism begins 'a partnership between the theory of language learning and the theory of scientific evidence'²³. This partnership from its rudimentary level 'must continue'²⁴ and this recommends 'a strategy for the scientific study of scientific method and evidence' known as the genetic approach.

The partnership must continue mainly because of the fact that the "channels by which, having learned observation sentences, we acquire theoretical language are the very channels by which observation lends evidence to scientific theory. It all stands to reason; for language is man-made and the locutions of scientific theory have no meaning but what they acquired by our language to use them"²⁶. What recommends the genetic approach is the requirement of an investigation in details of these channels and what guarantees its viability is that 'the learning of language goes on in the world and is open to scientific study'.²⁷

The import of the partnership between the theory of language learning and the theory of scientific evidence, in relation to our

²²"NNK", p.73.

²³*Ibid*, P.74.

²⁴ *Ibid*.

²⁵*Ibid.*, p.75.

²⁶*Ibid.*, P.74.

²⁷*Ibid.*, p.75.

characterisation of the distinctiveness of QNE, is that semantics turns to be naturalistic and provides an impetus to the genetic approach in QNE such that, the analytical foundationalism is repudiated for its philosophical misorientation yet, unlike Forty's repugnance to the theory of language, QNE finds a viable way for semantics as well as for epistemology. That is, it naturalises semantics as well as epistemology. Rorty indentifies knowledge with 'social justification of belief and repudiates any attempt in search of an 'accuracy of representation'²⁸. He attributes 'epistemological behaviourism' to Quine, Sellars, Dewey and Wittgenstein and by 'epistemological behaviourism' he really means the social authority over our epistemic explanations contrary to the foundationalistic subscription of the epistemic authority over the social or natural explanations ²⁹. Rorty considers two ways of viewing knowledge: Knowledge as the "relation to propositions" and knowledge as the "relation to objects those propositions are about". In the former case, justification is a relation between the proposition in question and other propositions from which the former may be inferred. In the latter case, justification is a previledged relation to the objects. Against the first view, Rorty makes an anti-foundationalistic appeal

²⁸Rorty explicitly says, "We understand knowledge when we understand the social justification of belief and thus have no need to view it as accuracy of representation". (Rorty, R. (1979), *Philosophy and the Mirror of Nature*, Princeton University Press. (Basil Blackwell, Oxford, p.170.

²⁹Cf. Rorty, R. (1979), p. 174. He says Explaining rationality and epistemic authority by reference to what society lets us say, rather than the latter by the former, is the essence of what I shall call "Epistesulogical bahaviourism" an attitude common to Dewey and Wittgenstein .

to the argument of infinite regression about "propositions-broughtforward- in-defence-of- other-prepositions"

'Thus a social justification is called for on the ground that this "would be foolish to keep conversation going on the subject [i.e. the study of justification as a relation to propositions] once every one, or the majority, or the wise, are satisfied, but of course we can"³¹ Against the second view his remark is this: "We will want to get behind reason to causes, beyond argument to compulsion from the object known, to a situation in which argument would be not just silly but impossible. To reach that point is to reach the foundations of knowledge"³².

Both the views do not cohere with QNE. The second view runs something like this: That there are physical objects in themselves which do compell one to know them as we do know them and, thereby, there is no need of any argument and, even, there is no possibility of any argument. In other words, epistemology has an independent ontological foundation such that knowledge is a 'compulsion', a knower is compelled to know that p under the compulsion of (the object/fact) what p is about. No 'sovereignty' or 'creativity' of a knower is recognizable. Hence, it is argued, there is no possibility of an argument.

³⁰Op. Cit., p. 159.

³¹Ibid.

³²Ibid.

Quine does accept the reality of the physical objects of 'people, stick, tables, atoms and so on'³³. They are all posits in the sense that there is no independent reality. There is ontological relatively. Thus, even if justification/knowledge is a relation between the object and the proposition about that, this relationship is not at all asymmetrical. It is symetric in the sense that an object is an object of knowledge only when there is a proposition about it and a proposition is epistemologically significant only when it is about an object, reality *gust* a 'posit'.

The first view is more interesting. It is against foundationalism but foundationalism accounted in a narraower sense³⁴. It is not just proposition-relations that matters in foundatinalism. What matters, more importantly, is those supposed relations, themselves, whether those are mere proporitions or beliefs or anything with epistemological significance. Quine's anti-foundationalistic stance can be highlighted here again in its wider perspective. The untenability of the ASD is not merely a charge against the bifurcationary status of propositions or statements themselves. It has the larger implication of going against any analogous bifurcation concerning beliefs, thoughts, imaginations, memory³⁵ and, even, about

³³TT, p.2.

³⁴Cf. Goldman's review of Rorty, R. (1979) in *The Philosophical Review* 90, 1981, pp. 424-429.

³⁵Cf. Sosa's discussin of 'clairvoyance' as an example of doxastic ascent. He proposes that 'comprehensive coherence' can promise "as a source of episteaic authority' against the "challenge of doxsstic ascent'. In other words, the reliable faculties like preception, memory, introspection and

the mechanisms of cognition itself. The IT is not only a skepticism about the meaning of sentences but also about the sense of beliefs, thoughts, imaginations, memory and, even, of the mechanisms of cognition. Similar is the case with his ontological relativity that the existence of anything real- objects, facts, events; mechanical, physical, biological, chemical and physiological processes etc.,-are all relative, in fact, 'doubly relative'.

It is not only that Rorty's construal of Qune's 'epistemological behaviorism' is incoherent with QNE, his general procedure of justification by social legislation also seems to be foundationalistic³⁶. If traditional foundationalism confused 'caustion with justification', Rorty confuses 'convention (social) with justification'³⁷. If traditional foundationalism embarks a 'potentially infinite regression of proposition-brought forward-in-defence-of-other proposition', then Rorty embarks potentially infinite regression of 'social approvals-brought forward-in-defence-of-other social approvals'. Thus his account, carried out any step ahead, may prove our confusion and foolishness

inference has to be comprehensively cohered over and above the beliefs themselves. Otherwise, an ascent of any of the faculties, by any chance (e.g. clairvoyance), makes the epistemic authority helpless. Sosa, E. (1983) "Nature Unmirrored, Epistemology Nturalised", *Synthese*, 55, pp. 49-72 See. pp. 57-59 for the discussion on 'clairvoyance',

³⁶ "That is outright foundationlism" argues Sosa, "even if what provides authority at the foundation is not the taxing of the given but the approval of society and even if what permits the erection of the superstructure is social justification" *Op. Cit.* p. 57.

³⁷In Sosa's words, "If traditional foundationlaism were refuted by a charge of confusing causation (Mirroring Nature with justification, conventionalistic foundationalism would seen equally well refuted by a charge of confusing convention (direct social approval) with justification" - *Op. Cit* ,

as much as a traditional foundationalism may do.

However Rorty cannot be blamed of advocating foundationalism because, even if the epistemological justification he advances is in terms of social legislation, his view on epistemology leads to be nihilistic rather than foundationalistic. For his account of social justification can be modestly construed as an account of repugnance towards traditional foundationalism without any rigid commitment to epistemological problems. Thus, unlike the QNE, Rorty does not maintain any positive reformistic step towards epistemological problems. On the other hand, he gives up the epistemological problems and advocates for "hermeneutic"³⁸

In fact, instead of observing the 'reciprocal containment' and 'scientific skepticism', Rorty observes the emptiness of epistemology as such and for that reason he observes the emptiness of philosophical skepticism too. He is not a naturalist in the sense Quine is. Nevertheless he is a naturalist in the sense that he is an anti-foundationalist. But, it can be noted here, he cannot be considered as a successful anti-foundationalist. It is only the foundationalistic theses which a successful anti-foundationalist qua naturalist refutes. His arguments presuppose foundationalism per se because he does not observe the 'reciprocal containment' However instead of calling him as a foundationalist, it is better to call him as a naturalist who is an anti-foundationalist but, since he is not an

³⁹Rorty, R. (1979), pp.315-322.

antifoundationalist in the capacity of a naturalist, an anti-Quinean naturalist too. A Quinean naturalism is not separable from its anti-foundationalism. Quine, unlike Rorty, goes against foundationalism in the capacity of a naturalist. Rorty's attribution of epistemological behaviourism to Quine and Rorty's anti-foundationalistic stance may mislead one to mistake QNE for nihilism. As it has already been discussed, QNE is anti-foundationalistic but it is not nihilistic, it is reformistic. Again; this reformation is over the epistemological methodology as well as over the systematic way the epistemological problems are traditionally put forward.

In the systematic way it is traditionally put forward is normative in character. Goldman's historical reliabilism' is an exemplar of how naturalistic epistemology is done'³⁹ in confirmation to a naturalistic epistemology's methodology but it is conjured by the way traditional epistemology systematically put the questions of epistemology. Reorientation from First Philosophy to philosophy as science *par excellence* in a non-nihilistic perspective does not really lead to a reliabilistic reformation which preserves the evaluative character of epistemology in carrying out the epistemological enterprise in a naturalistic programme.

³⁹In a 'Critical Notice' of Goldman's *Epistemology and Cognition*, Audi(1989) aptly concludes that that book should be read not only as a contribution to epistemology but as an exemplar of how naturalistic epistemology is done "Critical Notices (Epistemology and Cognition. Alvin I. Goldman)", *Philosophy and Phenomenological Research* pp. 733-737. See, p 737.

Goldman aims at a non-prescriptive, explanatory, theory of *justified belief*. Emphasis on "justified belief" signifies his enterprise's importance on ordinary accounts of justification instead of pondering over Cartesian "justification". A Cartesian sense of justification requires an 'ideal' account for any belief's test for "justification" and, thus, a prescription of different standards of justification far beyond the ordinary sense given to a belief's justifiedness. Goldman is not offering any such standard which can be counted as an alternative ideal standard, hence, his theory is non-prescriptive. He undertakes a genetic approach and attempts to provide executable justification of concrete beliefs. However this non-prescriptively approved search of an ideal standard is not meant to demolish the normative character of epistemological justification. It is just a reorientation from 'ideal' to 'executable' standard of justification.

A search of executable guidelines for epistemological justification naturally tends to have an alliance with cognitive researchers. For the scope and perspectives of execution is directly linked with the ability and capacity of a knower's cognitive mechanism. Findings about the ability and capacity of a cognitive mechanism does assist in delimiting the inquiry to an executable level but it leaves open to explore on 'justification on that level itself. For, above all, 'Justification is a term of appraisal'⁴³. There can be

⁴⁰Goldman, A.I. (1979) in Kornblith, H. Ed. 1985 p. 91.

different manuals of justification on the executable level itself. It all depends upon the kind of conditions laid down for "justification" in view of the fact that alternative executable conditions can be possible on the basis of the same findings taken from the cognitive scientist.

Goldman wants to provide certain substantive (necessary and sufficient) conditions for justification although the executability of those conditions are confirmed by the findings of cognitive science. To what does these conditions amount is not that those are foundation to justification but the explanation of justifications or, rather, of justified beliefs. Since 'justified belief retains an epistemic value, it has to be explained in non-epistemic terms accounting the findings of cognitive science. The non-epistemic terms like 'believes that', 'is true', 'is probable', 'cause', etc; are to be balanced with the cognitive findings of belief-processing, memory and problem solving etc

A non-prescriptive but evaluative account of knowledge and justification is obviously different from QNE.⁴² QNE is purely descriptive, it is non-prescriptive as well as non-evaluative or non-normative. Yet Goldman's account is naturalistic and it would be an utter misconception to throw it into a foundationalistic boggy simply because it preserves the evaluative role of epistemology. For.

⁴¹*Ibid.*, p.92.

⁴² Goldman explicitly acknowledge it. See Godran, A.I. (1986), p. 92.

first of all, the evaluative role he proposes is admittedly non-prescriptive and; hence, it is against the prescriptive and evaluative traditional epistemological theories. It is against foundationalism . Secondly, the evaluation is neither metaphysically made *a priori* nor it is positivistically characterized as a criterion to tell *how* a system of justification is right, nor the rules of justification are derived from logic or statistics. On the otherhand, justification in relation to these three levels⁴⁴- the level of framing a principle, or the level of framework principle, the level of criterion and the level of justifications-rule (J-rule) system -is empiricistic and pragmatic. The framework is quite against metaphysical principles, the criterion is a criterion of *satisfaction*⁴⁴ and the rules must be derived from cognitive processes. Yet it differs from QNE as well as from the traditioal evaluative constraints in general and, thus, it differs from both on account of skepticism, ontology and semantics in particular.

In order to have a balanced perspective, Goldman extends more weight to knowledge and justification and less weight to skepticism-the significance of what is exaggerated by traditional epistemology⁴⁵. Thus, similar to the preservation of the strong

⁴³Goldman, A. I. (1986), pp.58-80.

⁴⁴*Ibid.* p.65.

⁴⁵*Ibid.*, P.41.

evaluative constraint, philosophical skepticism of a Cartesian type is kept in the framework though with an insignificant support for its preservation.⁴⁶ But, unlike the evaluative constraint's inevitable role in knowledge and justification, skepticism is not taken as an indispensable factor. On the contrary, skepticism is taken as 'only one concern of epistemology'⁴⁷ and; knowledge and justification are viewed to be of having an 'independent interest, quite apart from the tenability of skepticism'⁴⁸.

So far as skepticism's 'significance should not be blown out of proportions'⁴⁹, Goldman's epistemics joins with QNE to condemn a skeptic's 'over-reacting'⁵⁰. But, unlike Goldman's enterprise, QNE puts skepticism as an indispensable concern of epistemology. Of course, the skepticism indispensable is scientific skepticism and there is no sense of a skepticism beyond the scientific corpus. For, as it has

⁴⁶*Ibid.*, pp.39-41.

⁴⁷*Ibid.*, p.39.

⁴⁸*Ibid.*

⁴⁹ *Ibid.*

⁵⁰ In accordance with Quine's reflection on knowledge, a skeptic is "reasoning within the overall scientific system rather than somehow above or beyond it. The same applies to my statement", says Quine, "... that 'I am not accusing the skeptic of begging the question, he is quite within his rights in assuming science in order to refute science'. The sceptic repudiates science because it is vulnerable to illusion on its own showing; and my only criticism of the sceptic is that he is overreacting'. Quine, W.V.O. 1981 "Reply to Stroud" *Midwest Studies in philosophy*, vi, p. 475. Adapted from Gibson, R.F. (1989) "Stroud on Naturalised epistemology", *Metaphilosophy*, 23, pp. 1-11. See pp. 3-4.

already been discussed, there is a 'reciprocal containment' between epistemology and natural science such that one cannot have a 'cosmic exile', a step out side the scientific corpus to evaluate or doubt a knowledge-claim.

Thus the skeptics under consideration vary, the philosophical skeptic is with Goldman but without any significant role in the enterprise of knowledge and justification, the scientific skeptic with Quine is supposed to be as much significant as a natural scientist. Accordingly, characterization of the naturalistic epistemology varies: For the former it is evaluative but non-prescriptive such that the philosophical skeptic can at best be a silent observer since the evaluation is neither *a priori* nor an ideal one. A skeptic need not be called for any comment. For the latter it is non-evaluative and descriptive such that a scientific skeptic has to participate.

Thus the 'no role' of the skeptic in an evaluative but non-prescriptive account is not a contrast with the 'significant role of the scientific skeptic in a non-evaluative and descriptive account. Whether the skeptic wins or loses the game, in the former case, it does not matter to that account because if he wins then the epistemologist's task remains "to identify the comparatively reliable process, to discriminate the better from the worse and if he loses then the task is of "specifying the *good* procedures . For what the skeptic can importantly establish, if at all he can establish, is that

⁵¹Goldman, A. I. (1986), p.40.

there is no guarantee of the availability of "sufficiently reliable processes to make knowledge and Justified belief possible"⁵². Or; if he loses, what becomes the consequent of the fight with him is that such processes' availability is guaranteed. The scientific skeptic of the QNE comes into scene very much in either of these two tasks. Hence the two skeptics are quite different in nature and, there by, they need not enforce their respective accounts of epistemesiology to contrast each other.

Such a difference mainly runs due to Goldman's *partial* acceptance of Quine's notion of 'reciprocal containment' as well as his 'partial agreement'⁵³ with Quine's view that 'skeptical doubts are scientific doubts'. The partial agreement is resulted from Goldman's substantive naturalism and, obviously, not from any kind of foundationalism. This substantive naturalism can be best construed as a substantial explanation of how a methodology of QNE can be carried out further. That is, to say precisely, Goldman's enterprise is 'an exemplar of QNE'. Skepticism, knowledge and justification are separable, for Goldman, on behalf of a balanced perspective. It presupposes that epistemology's concern with the processes or procedures of our belief-forming mechanism is the only relevant logic of knowledge and justification. In other words, it endorses to Quine's view that 'epistemology falls as a chapter of psychology except with its confusion that epistemology includes a non-scientific doubt although this inclusion is not inevitable for knowledge and justification. That

⁵²*Ibid.*, p.41.

⁵³*Ibid.*, p.57.

is, in a sense, epistemology is no more exhausted as a theory of knowledge and justification than as a theory of knowledge and doubt.

In relation to doubt, we can understand three different senses of epistemology. QNE, which espouses a scientific doubt, is antagonistic to the traditionally overworked foundationalistic epistemology which finds a Cartesian doubt or a philosophical doubt very significant and attempts to root out that. Goldman's epistemics finds the least significance with philosophical doubt but, at the same time, it fails to espouse a scientific doubt whole heartedly. In relation to the notion of 'reciprocal containment' which is coextensive with a scientific doubt, 'reciprocal containment' (between epistemology and natural science) finds no place for a philosophical doubt because such a doubt demands that epistemology 'contains' natural science and natural science must not 'contain' epistemology. Goldman's *epistemics* is clearly an instance of how natural science contains epistemology. But it is different from QNE's notion of 'reciprocal containment' which demands epistemology to contain natural science as much as it demands natural science to contain epistemology. *Epistemics* fails to uphold the former 'containment' largely due to its overlooking of the vital role a scientific doubt plays in epistemology. Abandoning a philosophical doubt, *epistemics* obtains the virtue of becoming an instance of naturalised epistemology but the vice it incurs is notably due to the carried over of a scientific doubt by a philosophical doubt. Consequently, if we consider Stroud's criticisms, it is true that *epistemics* is not nihilistic but it falls into the trap of Stroud's criticism by neglecting scientific skepticism. *Epistemics* seems to be a redefined epistemology. It seems to be indifferent to an

epistemology defined in traditional philosophical discussions.

The foregoing discussions show the distinctiveness of QNE. It is observed that QNE is neither nihilistic nor a redefinition of epistemology. It is reformistic as well as scientific. And, more importantly, scientific skepticism and 'reciprocal containment' between epistemology and natural science play the vital role in advancing that reformistic scientific move. It may be reminded that these two features are invariably found to be potentially there in Quine's anti-foundationalism, in his refutation of ASD, determinacy of meaning and determinacy of reference.

CHAPTER VI

AGAINST CONTEMPORARY FOUNDATIONALISM QUA JUSTOLOGY:

AN EXTENSION OF QUINE'S THREE GENERAL THESES

The thematic bearing of contemporary foundationalism as justology that puts the foundationalists of these days under one umbrella is their unviable objective: the establishment of a 'doctrinal' or justificatory completeness. This unviable objective presupposes an illegitimate license: an epistemologist is an authority over any knowledge-claim, he gives the verdict of justification. And, accordingly, the task kept (*exclusively* for an epistemologist) is to explore the nature and limits of justification. Thus, viewing the nature of the task, epistemology is nothing but justology - study of the nature and limits of any type of justification (extendable for knowing of anything in this world). Analysis of 'knowledge' is replaced by analysis of 'justification'; that is, justology takes the place of epistemology.

Justology runs against the thematic bearing of Quine's naturalized epistemology. The core of naturalized epistemology is the 'reciprocal containment' between epistemology and natural science. Justology is a damage to that core. A justificatory completeness goes beyond the conceptual schemes of natural sciences. The 'doctrinal dimension' of epistemology becomes independent of the 'conceptual dimension'. Once these two dimensions are segregated from each other.

'reciprocal containment' loses its meaning. For, precisely, this reciprocity is due to scientific skepticism: doubt having certain knowledge (conceptual scheme) such that the doubt can be clarified and become a base for further doubts and further knowledge (doubt-clarifying, doubt-generating conceptual schemes). A doctrinal completeness is an implausible, misguided, response to a mistaken doubt (a Cartesian doubt). The fundamental reason behind this mistaken doubt is the mostly imbibed and often perpetuated idea of a theory of knowledge (epistemology) which can be independent of all possible man-made conceptual schemes (natural sciences). To look into the man-made conceptual schemes is not a sin. The sin is committed when one aspires to go beyond all the man-made schemes in order to look into those schemes. Justologists commit this sin and, more importantly, they advocate it as the virtue of an epistemologist.

A justologist's analysis of justification cannot be completely dissociated from traditional epistemological problems surrounding truth, belief, certainty, evidence and so on. On the contrary, even if the approach he makes is explicitly directed towards the problem of justification, his approach darkens the darkside of those epistemological problems. The dark side is, in general, an effect of the wall of doubt erected by a Cartesian demon. Truth, belief, evidence, certainty and all other epistemic concepts are employed to overcome that wall and, since that wall is a sheer myth, all efforts in that respect fail to overcome that in a scientific way. For, it is unscientific to say of overcoming a problem if there is no problem as such.

This chapter is aimed at a refutation of justology. Almost half of it is devoted to account 'truth', 'belief and 'justification' which are generally employed as the conditions of knowledge. When these conditions are foundationalistically employed, employed to discover the ideal nature of knowledge in terms of an ideal nature of (some or all of) these conditions, knowledge is generally equated with certainty. This 'certainty' can be construed to be a crude name of 'doctrinal completeness'. Justology upholds a sophisticated version of 'certainty'. A good account of those conditions, in their foundationalistic orientation of equating knowledge with certainty, is found in Lehrer's *knowledge*.

Lehrer's account of those conditions of knowledge serves as a ground work for the development of his "fourth condition of knowledge. Accordingly he maintains some restrictions to the ideal nature of knowledge. However, he is no less committed to accept the foundationalistic idea of availing a 'doctrinal completeness'. For, even if the *fourth condition' is a development over the three conditions, it is a development on the same line, that is, an unscientific response to an unscientific doubt .

Let us start, following Lehrer, with the following equivalence relation as the proper/final analysis of knowledge

S knows that p if and only if

- (i) it is true that p,
- (ii) S believes that p

(iii) S is completely justified in believing that p, and
(iv) S is completely justified in believing that p in some way that does not depend on any false statement.¹

((i) - (iv)) is a set of necessary and sufficient conditions for S knows that p. Each of them can be named separately as it follows.

- (i) Truth conditions ((iT) for short)
- (ii) Belief conditions ((iB) for short)
- (iii) Justification condition ((iJ) for short)
- (iv) Dependence condition ((iD) for short)

If it is false that p, then one cannot know that p. Whatever justification one puts forth that becomes superfluous in view of the fact that it is not that p. If you say or claim to know that my height is 10 feet 10 inches then you don't know my height whatever justification you offer for your claim². And if, at all, you know that I am 10 feet 10 inches then it is a necessary condition that I am 10 feet 10 inches i.e., I must be 10 feet 10 inches in height. Such is a relation that prevails between truth and knowledge! Undoubtedly, the exclusion of false beliefs, illusions or hallucinations etc. by truth condition, is helpful. But the question is whether you can provide in

¹Lehrer, K.(1974) *Knowledge*, Clarendon Press, Oxford, p 21.

²It can be noted down here that the analysis of knowledge concerned here, is quite different from an analysis of knowing. [cf. Lehrer, Op.Cit., pp.3-93- Hence any temptation against this condition by accounting the application of "know" to a context where it can be said that I am 13 feet 10 inches, for example, in a big picture on a wall, cannot be accounted as a counter-example.

some way or other some invincible and invisible procedure to claim it genuinely that if you *know* that p , then, by its epistemic autonomy, it is true that p ³. Many unbelievable wonderful things can be included. In other words, as a necessary condition of knowledge, (iT) is helpful in forbidding false beliefs approximating knowledge yet it cannot be the sufficient condition in that respect due to the possibility that unbelievable things can be counted as being known by someone. What is believed to be an 'electron' today was quite unbelievable earlier when there was no knowledge of 'electron' and, hence, if truth-condition is a sufficient condition for knowledge then it follows that there was no electron as such at that time.

Note that the move I am making here is not the usual claim for the insufficiency of truth-condition. The usual charge is that S can know that p , if (iT) is a sufficient condition for knowledge, even if S does not believe that p . Thus (iB), in this way, is based on a presupposition that S must believe that p if, at all, S knows that p . (iB) can be hardly said as an explanation for knowledge in this respect. The same is true of (iT). It is presupposed that a knowledge-claim must be a claim of something which is true. Why should it be true? Remember that one cannot explain it by means of a pragmatic theory of meaning, that in the practical instances we use the word, 'know', we do use in places where what we know is true as well as we believe that. The purpose here of undertaking the analysis of knowledge is quite independent of the assistance one can obtain

³ 'It is true that p if and only if p ' is a logical truth. Hence 'If S knows that p , then it is true that, p ' becomes equivalent to 'If S knows that p , then p ' without loss of logical content. Cf. Lehrer, K., *Op. Cit.*, pp.24-25

from a theory of meaning.

What is intended in ray move towards the charge that unbelievable things can amount to knowledge-claims, if (iT) becomes sufficient, is that the partial explanation (iB) can provide for S knows that p is the exclusion of false beliefs from knowledge-claims. Knowledge becomes unwanted and vague if every believable and unbelievable amounts to knowledge. And, it is a fact, what is believable and unbelievable at a particular time is independent of the truth condition (iT). Hence the insufficiency of (iT) and the requirement of (iB) becomes plausible. (iB) excludes the unbelievables from knowledge, including the true (absolute) unbelievable (relative). For example, it is (iB) that explains the exclusion of "electrons" in the set of objects known to the people of the ancient days as well as that of 'phlogistons' in the set of objects known to the people of this age. The latter is an exclusion of something satisfied by iT and the former is that of something unsatisfied by (iT), at present. But, if (iB) is an explanatory condition only in relation to a relativistic conception of truth (i.e., related to the subject and place and time then what is it actually explained by (iT) itself? iT itself does not explain anything unless (iB) is accounted. This becomes a circular account of (iT) and (iB) so far as their explanatory efficiency is questioned.

The insufficiency of (iT) plus (iB) calls for another necessary condition, namely, (iJ). The wonder of turning unbelievables unto reality through knowledge-claims is mitigated by (iB) that S must believe what he claims to knew. Bat a further troubling factor is that

the sufficiency of true beliefs, the identity between knowledge and true beliefs, can include unjustified things. For example, the chalk is on the table and you believe that the chalk is on the table but you believe it so without seeing or touching it and just by listening my words. In this case you can claim that you know that the chalk is on the table if (iT) and (iB) are sufficient for knowledge. But, in fact, you don't know that the chalk is on the table. And, for this reason, the (iJ) is called for.

Now what is really explained by (iJ)? It explains that how the false knowledge-claims cannot be accounted as knowledge even if those are true beliefs. This is the negative explanation, the exclusion of false claims of true beliefs, that (iJ) can at least provide. Now, if it is just this negative explanation that is purported in terms of (iJ), then why can we not just say that knowledge is true beliefs with the exception of false claims? The positive aspect of (iJ) can be maintained only when we can distinguish true claims from false claim, of knowledge in terms of (iJ). And, for such a distinction to be drawn meaningfully, (iJ) presupposes (iT) and (iB).

Furthermore, the consideration of the (iD) cannot be helpful for the explanation in this direction. (iD) gets core currency after Gettier's challenge that there can be justified true beliefs deduced from false premises. That is, even if iT , iB and iJ are satisfied, it is not sufficient for S knows that p For example, if I claim to know that someone assassinated Rajiv Gandhi, which is true and I believe it and I believe it justifiedly yet., however, the justification I endorse can be quite dependent on a false premise that

it was Mrs. Jean from the Indian Army who assassinated Rajiv Gandhi whereas the real assassin is the lady belonging to the LTTE- But whoever be the assassin, someone is the assassin and I claim to know that someone assassinated Rajiv Gandhi. Thus it is a true belief and the justification I can endorse in this respect can be factors like she is a lady, a committed one, a courageous one, a well-trained one, having connection with spies, even with the police personnel of Tamil Nadu government and so on and, besides these contingent empirical evidences I can maintain that It is my intuition that the lady belongs to the Indian Army. Even If I endorse any such justification to complete my justification trail, yet I do not know that Rajiv Gandhi was assassinated by someone. For the 'someone' I deduce is based on the premise that the lady (Mrs. Jean) belonging to the Indian Army committed assassination. Consider another example, often cited in philosophical literature in connection to Gettier's problem, that a teacher knows that someone in his class owns a car of brand-X because he is completely justified in believing that Nogot owns a car of brand-X, and, in fact, it is not Nogot but Havit who owns that car of brand-X.

The general form of the problem is something like this. Let F be the evidence for T. Whether you justify T by adopting a foundationalistic approach or a coherentistic approach, the evidential support is obtained from F. Now, if F is false, then the justification is not a correct one. But there is every chance that F can be false and yet you deduce (foundationalistically or coherenttistically that T. For, it is not at all improbable that you do not know that F is false, yet your justified true belief (satisfying iT and iB is

luckily true for you due to the fact that T is really having an evidential support from Q which is genuinely true but unknown to you and $(F \vee Q)$ entails that T.

(iD) is called for functioning as a negative explanation for the exclusion of false claims of knowledge, to the effect that it is only justified true beliefs independent of false premises that can amount to knowledge. What else can (iD) itself explain? It explains nothing positively in relation to knowledge unless it presupposes (iT), (iB) and (iJ). The negative explanation it provides just amounts to say that S would not have claimed that T if he could have known that it is not that p. For, the p, he claims to know, is based on a false premise q, he could have known p independent of q and dependent on r (the right or true premise on what p can depend) had it been the case that knowing p is possible without any justification or the (iJ).

What is attempted till now is the circularity found from (iT to (iD). Now the same is again true from knowledge to (iT) The explanation purported in terms of (iT) is possible only when knowledge is presupposed as something objectively there. It is in the 'informative sense'⁴ of 'know', rather than in its competence sense that the analysis of knowledge is undertaken. This construal of knowledge (as an information) is closely associated with the prepositional form, articulation of the analysis of knowledge and, thereby, with an objective truth presupposed for a preposition In short, what is concealed with an explanatory foundationalist's

⁴Lehrer, K. *Op. Cit.*, pp. 1-7.

treatment of justification and truth is that (i) knowledge is information (ii) information is an information of something objectively there to be described and (iii) this description of the objectivity is constituted in the proposition of a knowledge-claim itself.

The point attempted in the foregoing discussion suggests that the stand of the varieties of foundationalistic approaches is nowhere unless a very queer notion of knowledge is presupposed. For, it is true that the varieties of foundationalistic stand point arise with respect to the varieties of approaches they put forward for justification, but justification being a condition for the analysis of knowledge it is neither independent of the other necessary conditions (viz. (iT) and (iB) if (iD) is kept as a corollary to (iJ) of a knowledge-claim, nor does it by itself explain anything non-trivially

The case with the analysis of knowledge, if you claim that you know that p then you cannot claim that you do not know that p, is parallel to the triviality of analyticity proclaimed of the sentences like $(2 + 2 = 2+2)$, $a - a$, 'All unmarried men are unnamed men' which are actually the instances of identity and, thereby, vacuously true. The equivalence that S knows that p if and only if S knows that it is not $\sim p$ is very trivial parallel to the triviality mentioned in connection to the ASD. If it is not trivial because it is a separate case viz., an epistemic case, then it leads to a sort of absolutisms. It is the adherence to an absolute knowledge which requires that S must know that p as well as whatever is not that p in order to claim that he knows that p.

What makes the ASD philosophically interesting is, to repeat, the acceptance of a conceptual necessity or linguistic necessity associated with analyticity such that the presupposed necessity can entail an epistemic apriority for a set of statements to obtain the privilege of being quite distinguished as the foundational principles or truths as opposed to every other kind of assertions or knowledge-claims. And, having the privileged access to these guiding foundational truths, philosophers keep themselves sacred of and away from the mundane factual sciences.

This necessity derived from the alleged conceptual bearings or the semantical bearings associated with particular terms, words or sentences is not philosophically interesting if it is identified with vacuous truths. The philosophically interesting point is to identify those bearings with an epistemically *a priori* standard such that a kind of non-vacuous truth by means of analysing the concept or meaning of words or sentences alone can be obtained. The job of the philosophers is supposed to search those fact-independent yet, not vacuous) truths based on a conceptual or linguistic foundation which can be the foundation to all other truths or knowledge-claims about the external world. It is this conceptual or linguistic analysis that presupposes either a transcendental metaphysics of Kantian kind or a linguistic metaphysics (of the Carnapian kind when the search is meant for the concepts and the prepositional meanings abstracted from objects and sentential meanings respectively. And, of course the search is, in turn, meant for the alleged conceptual identity or 'containment' and for the alleged determinate meaning or synonymy of

meanings. The tenability of these alleged notions can only enable one to talk of analyticity in a philosophically significant way to distinguish it from syntheticity.

Parallel to the vacuousness of the equivalence in the analysis of analyticity, runs the vacuousness of the equivalence. in the analysis of knowledge, that S knows that p if and only if S knows that it is not that $\sim p$. Equivalences made by appropriate supplanting of 'true', 'believe', 'justified belief and even that of 'false-premise independent justification' in place of 'know' shows the vacuousness of the proposed equivalence. For example, we can have the equivalences in terms of an epistemic belief, that S believes that p if and only if S believes that it is not that $\sim p$. Again, for examples, that P is true if and only if it is not the case that $\sim p$ is true; S is completely justified in believing that p if and only if S is completely justified in believing that it is not that $\sim p$; S is completely justified, without depending on any false premise (q) that p if and only if S is completely justified, without depending on any false premise (r) that it is not that "p. And, it follows from the law of *double negation* that $p = \sim \sim p$. Thus vacuousness of the truth $p = \sim \sim p$ constitutes the vacuousness of the above said equivalences.

The variation in the two moves is: a = a kind of analyticity becomes philosophically interesting in terms of meaning determinancy or synonymity, whereas $p = \sim \sim p$ kind of equivalents of knowledge analysis becomes philosophically interesting in terms of truth belief or 'justification'. The notable difference between the two moves though both are attempts to turn a vacuum into a philosophically interesting

thesis, is the emphasis they give on the two different parts: the former emphasizes the equivalence part itself and the latter emphasizes the ' \sim ' part of $\sim(\sim p)$. Hence the interests differ; one is the interest of determinacy or synonymy of meaning to make that equivalence out of conceptual or linguistic analysis, the other is the concealed interest of a negative explanation in terms of a set of explicitly said conditions [viz. $\{(iT), (iB) (iJ) \text{ and } (iD)\}$] like that of truth, belief, justification or false-premise independent justification made out of epistemological analysis. The untenability of the purported epistemological analysis, as we have seen previously, is vitiated by circularity and renders no positive explanation for knowledge-claims. Thus the unexplained objectivity of knowledge, parallel to the unexplained necessity of an analytic truth, is weakened to provide a conceptual clarification for the commitment of the foundationalistic move.

Let us consider the conditions, expecting some positive explanations, in relation to the analysis of knowledge such that the conditions can fulfill the two important restraints on themselves: (i) the analysans of a condition must not contain the very same condition in the analysandum and (ii) the analysans must not be trivial and must have certain explanatory bearing on the analysis of knowledge.

Truth Condition (iT) :

Consider the logical truth

(A) It is true that p if and only if p ;

as being distinguished from the semantic definition of truth

(B) *S* is true *in L* if and only if *p*.

That is, for example,

(E₁) It is true that snow is white if and only if snow is white; as being distinguished from

(E₂) "Snow is white" is true in English if and only if snow is white.

The former is known as the absolute conception of truth and the latter is known as the semantic conception of truth. Truth is directly associated with the external world of objects in the first case. In the second case, truth is directly connected with the sentences describing the external world of objects. Hence, construing a distinction between levels of language, it can be safely said that the absolute conception of truth is associated with an object language whereas the semantic conception of truth is associated with a meta-language, that is, with a language about an object language. Critical evaluations regarding the advantages and disadvantages of maintaining a level-distinction in language is enormous and our concern, at this point, is somewhat different. Granted that such a distinction has the advantage of maintaining the non-triviality of a semantic conception of truth over the triviality of the logical truth the task before us is to examine a reduction: whether the semantic conception can be reduced to the absolute conception of truth, in an analysis of knowledge, without loss of any logical content. This task is purposefully made so with the hope that the non-informative, vacuous, logical truth can be made informative if we can have certain manoeuvre over the semantic conception of truth which is obviously not as trivial as the logical truth. This manoeuvre is purported to

establish a relation between truth and reality without any help from propositional meaning. But, in doing so, the informativeness of the semantic conception of truth is no less supposed to be infused into the absolute conception of truth.

What can make (A) informative and, thereby, make sane links with the analysis of knowledge purported to provide certain positive explanatory bearing out of the conditions like 'truth', 'belief' and 'justification' etc.? Whatever that factor may be, the task it must accomplish is to weaken the vacuousness of (A) and, at the same time, maintain an equivalence relation between truth and reality without any loss of the logical content of truth (A). This particular accomplishment is made in terms of a reduction, namely, the reduction of semantic conception of truth into the absolute conception of truth. The result of the reduction - that is, reducing E2 to E1 or, in general, from (B) to (A) - would be something like:⁵

(E₃) "Snow is white" in English is true and "Snow is white in English means that snow is white if and only if snow is white, or, in more general terms it would be like

(C) S is true in L and S means in L that p if and only if p

However, the problem remains, in this manoeuvre, is that neither a propositional sense of 'meaning' nor a belief-condition dependent determination of meaning is allowed. The former restriction is due to the fact that a propositional sense of meaning is no less disputable than the *informative equivalents* sought through this reduction. The

⁵Cf. Lehrer, K. *Op. Cit.*, pp.28-30.

latter restriction is there due to our concern with an analysis of knowledge that keeps 'belief as a necessary condition. To infuse an explanatory bearing into one of the conditions, our appeal to another condition is not objectionable provided that the latter does not lack the required explanatory bearing.

Now consider the futility of the employment of this reduction in the analysis of knowledge.⁶ The absolute conception employed in

(iT) : If S knows that p, then it is true that p

turns (iT) to

(iTA) : If S knows that p, then p,

because, it is a logical truth that it is true that p if and only if p. The semantic conception

(iiT): If S knows that the sentence Q is true in L, then Q is true,

turns to

(iiTA): If S knows that p and the sentence Q means that p, then p;

if the employment of the sane logical truth is formed into.

The above said steps are precisely what constitutes the wanted manoeuvre. Before evaluating its accomplishment, let us find what it conveys, to wit it, as a successful reduction of the semantic conception of truth to the absolute conception of truth

⁶*Ibid.*, pp.33-37.

First of all, it gains a direct connection between the truth that S knows of and the reality that manufactures the truth - irrespective of the consideration whether it is 'correspondence' or 'coherence' that is employed for the manufacturing. Secondly, the informativeness of the semantic conception is retained in the hybrid absolutistic semantic truth to suffice the absolute truth with some material for the immunization against vacuousness. However, 'meaning' being the crucial factor to facilitate all these moves, 'meaning' has to be kept aloof from its prepositional sense since, even if a prepositional sense of meaning aspires for a determinate sense of information, its connection with reality is not appropriately cemented. And; it is precisely that cementing of a kind associated with truth and reality is presupposed and enquired for its discovery when the semantic conception is reduced to the absolute conception of truth

The tension is for manufacturing of truth, by the dead reality along a lively information: neither the reality itself makes the truth nor the prepositional meaning constitutes it, it is manufactured by the subjective 'believing' but not without the reality. A provision must be there to bind the subjective beliefs with reality. Such a cemented 'belief-reality' can complete the job but unfortunately, though this cementing is the real problem for what the manoeuvre starts with truth-conditions in order to eliminate truth in its analysis, the manoeuvre ends in reducing semantic conception of truth into the absolute conception of truth instead of binding truth with beliefs.

Neither 'correspondence' nor 'coherence' comes to rescue. Both of them are employed either as mere verifying principles, when truth is already taken for being justified in terms of correspondence or coherence, or as the justifying principles when truth is yet to be justified in either of the ways. Both add nothing more significant in the explanation of 'what is truth?' than that of the manoeuvre undertaken for the analysis of truth.

Correspondence, as a theory of truth, can be articulated as 'S is true if and only if S corresponds to the fact that p'. Now, whatever may be this relation of correspondnece between 'S' and 'the fact that p', this theory won't be fruitful if 'S' in L does not mean that p. A mediating entity between the sentence 'S' and the fact corresponding to 'S' is presupposed. Thus this theory presupposes that S is true if and only if S means that p and it is true that p. And, further, by substituiting 'p' for 'it is true that p' on the basis of the logical truth, that 'It is true that p if and only if p', we obtain the articulation; 'S is true if and only if S means that p and p'. The final articulation, putting 'correspondence,' would be like S is true if and only if S means that p and p corresponds to the fact that p .

'p corresponds to the fact that p' is either trivial, as trivial as 'it is true that p and p', or, else, it really seeks a justification of a belief that p on the basis of the fact that p. In other words, it seeks a relation between language and reality to justify one's belief-expression, 'that p'. Otherwise if it amounts to nothing but a verification of 'S' in *terms* of correspondence, it presumes at least the answers to 'what is meant by S? and How to

relate the fact with the meaning?'

Similar is the case with 'coherence'. There is no set of sentences which can be said as *the* correct set of cohering sentences in the face of the fact that some other sets are equally coherent. Again, a sentence may not satisfy the 'coherence' in relation to one set of sentences but can satisfy it with respect to another.

Thus, 'S' and '~S' can be true simultaneously, though in relation to two different sets of sentences. Any way, the objections or the defences of these do not concern us here. Like the correspondence theory, a coherence theory does rely on 'meaning'. It must be satisfied, whether it is 'correspondence' or 'coherence', that 'If S is true then S means p and p'. And, as an outcome, their explanatory bearing completely depends on an explanation of a prepositional sense of 'meaning' or that of a 'belief-condition'. As (iT) shows the untenability of such an account of meaning, let us examine the belief-condition.

Belief Condition (iB):

If S knows that p, then S believes that p

Two special kinds of instances can be immediately put forward against the above said condition. First is the 'rhetoric emphasis', the other is the emphasis on 'performatives' such that the descriptive sense determinable for the 'belief that p' has to boil down to a non-descriptive account of the 'belief that p'. The conditional 'If S knows that p, then S believes that p' keeps both the antecedent and

the consequent parts on an object language level of a description, 'p', about an object or fact of the world. And It conditions S's knowing (associated with that description) by S's believing (associated with that description) such that knowing, In a sense, necessarily contains believing.

The 'rhetoric emphasis' is made out of the distinction between 'what Is said by S' and 'what is Implied by what S did say'. For example, a difference Is there between S's saying that it is a triangle and the implication that it has three sides when he said that it is a triangle. And, on the basis of this distinction, it can be made out that S may know that it is a triangle even if he does not believe that it has three sides. For, S may not believe what is implied by what he said. What is implied and what he believes are two distinct things. If these two are not distinct, then we lose the sense of the genuine rhetoric cases like "I do not believe that it is a triangle; I know that it is a triangle" when one emphasizes on know to mean that It is not his mere blind belief but a belief with certain reasons (say, for example, it has three sides) to say that it is a triangle.

This emphasis is quite meaningless unless what is said and 'what is implied by saying so' are two distinct things S said I don't believe that it is a triangle; I know that it is a trianlge" and S implied "It is not that I believe blindly but I believe it with certain reasons that it Is a triangle". If what S said and what S implied are not two distinct things then it is not only that the rhetoric emphasis is lost but also that S's saying becomes meaningless

due to the contradiction he makes in saying something like he believes and, at the same time, he does not believe it to be a triangle.

A rhetoric emphasis does stand as a counter-example to (iB) and it can be overcome only when the rhetoric can be individuated completely and, then, 'beliefs' used in this sense are excluded from the analysis of knowledge as those are to be the irrelevant cases of belief-assertions. This, however, requires a more dangerous task of a semantical setting for the epistemological analysis. It can be done by showing the inconsistency in what is said and making out a consistency of implication out of that saying. This can be shown clearly only when the 'reasons' implicit in the consistency or inconsistency are alleged to be tending towards analyticity. The inconsistency between believing that it is a triangle' and "not believing that it has three sides becomes explicit only when the synonymity between "a triangle and 'three sides joined together with one another's ends' is made explicit. This semantical analysis of the 'reasons' behind those consistency and inconsistency has to be avoided due to the fact that we have already shown the untenability of analyticity based on synonymity. Another expectable explanation is through an identification of those 'reasons' with epistemic 'justification'. But justification itself is yet to be explained as a necessary condition of knowledge.

The emphasis on performatives, when extended to *known*, stands as a case to counter (iB). As in saying "I promise to come here in time" the promise is performed and no promise is described therein, so also it can be argued that the utterance "I knew that P is a performative

of something like "I give my authority to others about the fact that p" and there is no description of it made therein. And, since "I know that p" is not a description, there is no sense of a belief description "I believe that p" countable as a necessary condition for knowledge.⁷

To overcome this problem one can argue against the provision made here for the performatives to preclude the descriptive use of the words along with their performative use. The above argument suggests that 'knowing' and 'believing' are two distinct performatives such that each can be furnished without the other. 'Knowing' does not entertain 'believing', as much as 'believing' does not entertain 'knowing', to be the necessary condition. On the other hand, the claim of knowledge that concerns in epistemological analysis is not a performative. It is a description of a knowledge-claim and hence the description of a belief, which is contained in the description of knowledge, is not repudiated by the emphasis made on performatives. However, the crux of the problem remains unexplained: the knowledge-claims must be descriptive instead of being performatives. What answer can we give to the question: "How can you give sense of the description over knowledge-claims and belief-assertions when those are purely non-descriptives (or performatives)?" Chisholm⁸ would answer it that such a question is based on 'performative fallacy', that is, the fallacy of precluding the descriptive use of words on the basis of their performative use. A performative and a descriptive can go

⁷Cf. Austin, J. L. "Other Minds". *Flew, A* (1953). *Logic and Language*, pp.123-158.

⁸Chisholm R. M. (1977), *Theory of Knowledge*, p. 17.

together.

It is true that a performative and a descriptive can go together as in the case, for example, "I promise to come here in time; by 7,33 P.M", I perform the promise and describe the time at which I have to come. However, the point is not about this compatibility of performative and descriptive use of different words in the same utterance. On the other hand, the question is whether the compatibility of the performative and descriptive uses of a particular word, at a particular time, in a particular utterance, "I promise to come here in time; by 7.30 P.M." can be a performative and a descriptive at the same time. It can be answered affirmatively if it is supposed that even if 'promising' is something different from the description of the time (i.e., 7.30 P.M.), yet the description is implied there (if the exact time is not described, at least, the place is described) in the promise. Likewise, even if 'belief' is a distinct performative, "I believe that p" is implied in case of I know that p". If it is not implied so, then the performative "knowing ("giving the authority to others")is meaningless. To give the authority to others" makes no sense unless one believes that p and believes justifiedly that it is p⁹.

Again we face the previous problem of the distinction between 'what is said by S' and 'what is implied by what is said by S' although it is a case with the performative instead of the rhetoric emphasis (which may be conceived as being a performative too for

⁹Cf. Lehrer, K. *Op. Cit.*, pp.53-55.

example, as a performative of emphasizing the claim of knowing).

Lehrer's account of the distinction between "what is said by S" and "what is implied by what is said by S" is meant for the exclusion of objections or counter-examples against (iB). Such objections or counter-examples are irrelevant for the analysis of knowledge because, as he views, those are grounded on a confusion between the two distinct meanings of an utterance of a knowledge-claim: the said and the implied - the literal and the rhetoric, the performative and the descriptive. The said literal meaning of "I don't believe that p; I know that p" is inconsistent and does not amount to a claim of knowledge and, hence, it is irrelevant for the analysis of knowledge and it hardly counterfeits the (iB). The implied, rhetoric, meaning of "I don't believe that p; I know that p" is consistent and does amount to a claim of knowledge and, hence, it is relevant for the analysis of knowledge and it supports (iB) in hinting that justified belief, not merely a lucky belief, that amounts to knowledge. The said meaning or what is therein saying) of the performative "I know that p" precludes any description of believing something along with the 'ritual' of knowing or 'giving the authority to others' and, hence, it does not amount to a claim of knowledge (in its 'informative sense which is essentially a kind of information that p; and so, it is irrelevant to analysis of knowledge. The implied meaning of the performative "I know that p" (to wit, 'giving the authority to others keeps I believe that p" as a necessary condition, it supports the descriptive status of a knowledge-claim and, thus, it is relevant to the analysis of knowledge (in the 'informative' sense of 'know')

The purpose behind my putting these two special cases - rhetorics and performatives - of counter-examples should not be confused with that of Lehrer¹⁰. He puts those to preclude any sense of "know" other than the 'information' sense for the analysis of knowledge and, accordingly, tries to show those cases to be mere semantical misapprehensions without any proper epistemic bearing to counterfeit (iB). My purpose is to show that those semantical misapprehensions can be found in case of the 'information' sense of knowledge and, thereby, the alleged 'information' sense cannot have the privilege of being the knowledge-claim proper. Thus what follows is the discussion of the semantical misapprehensions of the accepted counter-examples to (iB), though not accepted to be the successful counter-examples, parallel to the semantical misapprehensions shown in case of the rhetorics and performatives.

The form of the acceptable counter-examples to (iB) would be something like "S knows that p but S does not believe that p" For example, Ravi knows that Mahatma Gandhi died in 1948 but Ravi does not believe that Mahatma Gandhi died in 1948. The form of the supposed unacceptable examples is something like 'S knows that p but he says that he does not believe that p'. For example, Pavi knows that Mahatma Gandhi died in 1948 but he says that he does not believe that Mahatma Gandhi died in 1948. Since Ravi's saying so is very much plausible when he says so with rhetoric emphasis [that he is not guessing or believing it blindly but claiming it strongly on the basis of his

¹⁰*Ibid.*, pp. 49-55.

thorough going through history-text that Gandhi died in 1948]or, when he says so with the performative emphasis [that he is giving his authority to others (imagine that Ravi is a teacher and teaching history to the students)]. Ravi's saying of not believing does not affect here because what is implied by his saying so does not weaken the (iB), rather, it supports (iB). On the other hand, in case of the supposed acceptable counter-examples, there is no such distinction of 'saying' and 'implying'. Hence these counter-examples cannot be cancelled by showing their compatibility with (iB) on the ground that the 'implied' meaning of what S says is the true meaning of the rhetorics and performatives.

What I attempt to show now against the above mentioned difference of the counter-examples [acceptable and unacceptable] is that the supposed knowledge-claims, along with the supposed acceptable counter-examples, are not pertinent to epistemological analysis on the very same ground that the arguments provided for the supposed unacceptable counter-examples along with their supposed pseud claims of knowledge are not pertinent. As the supposed unacceptable counter-examples can be cancelled due to their ill-grounding on some semantical confusions, the supposed acceptable counter-examples can be cancelled on the same ground. Otherwise if those [acceptable counter-examples] are tackled on some epistemic ground, either it leads to a circularity or it is based on some untenable semantic ground.

Ravi knows that Mahatma Gandhi died in 1948 but Ravi does not believe that Mahatma Gandhi died in 1948- This is possible if it is

possible for any S to know something correctly but not to know, at the same time, that what is known is correct. When Ravi knows it correctly that Mahatma Gandhi died in 1948 but does not know that what he knows is correct, then Ravi may not believe that Mahatma Gandhi died in 1948. Such occasions may arise in many occasions of guessing or forgetting. If Ravi says it correctly, when asked in a quiz-contest, that Mahatma Gandhi died in 1948, and if he has not known it from any reliable persons (teachers, parents or friends who know that) nor from any book but he guesses it to be 1948 on the only ground that India got freedom in 1947 and Gandhi died after India's freedom, Ravi's statement, "Gandhi died in 1948" is a correct one but, as Ravi is not sure of it [he does not know that what he knows is correct] he does not believe that Gandhi died in 1948. But, in the context of the quiz-contest, it can be safely said that Ravi knows that Gandhi died in 1948.

The case of forgetting is more interesting in the sense that it takes into account both the subject and the time, rather than merely a subject of a knowledge-claim. Suppose that Ravi has read from his history books but has forgotten, at the time of the quiz, that Gandhi died in 1948. When the quiz contest is over, he remembers and says that Gandhi died in 1948. Ravi knows but does not know, at the time of the quiz-contest, that he knows that Gandhi died in 1948. He knows that he knows that Gandhi died in 1948, only after the quiz-contest is over. If 'believing' is a necessary condition for 'knowing' 'not knowing that you know it' means that not believing that you know it'. And, thus, even if you knew that p, it is possible that you forget that p and, thereby, you don't believe but know that p. S can know

that p without believing that p. Before the time of remembering, Ravi knows but does not believe that Gandhi died in 1948. After remembering, Ravi knows and believes that Gandhi died in 1948.

Ravi's guess of the year in which Gandhi died can entertain his 'knowing without believing' that Gandhi died in 1948 only when a confusion between two meanings of "knowing" or "believing" is entertained: One is that of "knowing" or "believing" *with conviction*, and the other is that of "knowing" or believing" *without conviction*. If a claim of knowledge is relevant for our discussion only when that claim is made with certain conviction then Ravi, at the time of that quiz contest, does not know that Gandhi died in 1948 and he does not believe that. If a claim of knowledge can be entertained even if S lacks the conviction and 'readiness to report', then Ravi does know and believe that Gandhi died in 1948. For neither his 'knowing' nor his 'believing' requires any conviction in that case. Now, if we confuse the two meanings, if 'knowing' is possible without conviction whereas 'believing' is not, Ravi knows but does not believe that Gandhi died in 1948.

When S has forgotten that p, S lacks the conviction and readiness to report that p. He gains that conviction and is ready to report that p when he remembers that p. When Ravi has forgotten and remembered afterwards that Gandhi died in 1948, he gains his lost conviction and readiness to report that Gandhi died in 1948. Till then, due to the fact that "knowing" is meant to be possible without the conviction and the readiness to report whereas "believing" is meant to be necessarily made with the conviction and the readiness to report, Ravi knows but

does not believe that Gandhi died in 1948. If there is no such confusion of meanings, either it is the case (when Ravi has forgotten) that he neither knows nor believes that Gandhi died in 1948, or it is the case (when Ravi remembers) that he does know and believe that Gandhi died in 1948.

Granted that the ground of the supposed acceptable counter-examples is the above said semantical confusions, it could be argued that the 'conviction and readiness to report' must be associated with "believing" as well as "knowing" such that no knowing is possible without believing. But such a recourse is fatal to the epistemological analysis on the ground that it appeals to the notion of 'conviction' which is epidemically no less clarified than the notion of 'belief'.

A semantical setting in terms of prepositional meaning can't be adduced to remove the counter-examples because the sense of a prepositional meaning is untenable due to the IT. Otherwise it could have been argued that Ravi could speak out the sentence "Mahatma Gandhi died in 1948" and Ravi would not be able to assert the proposition that Mahatma Gandhi died in 1948 unless he was convinced [unless he knew that he knew it correctly that Gandhi died in 1948]. And because the counter-examples are based on what Ravi said [the sentence "Mahatma Gandhi died in 1948"], instead of what Ravi asserted [the proposition 'that Gandhi died in 1948'] the counter-examples do not defeat the (iB) of the analysis of knowledge. For the analysis of knowledge undertaken here takes into account the prepositional sense of meaning, not the sentential meaning, of a knowledge-claim.

Since a proposition must be either true or false, assertion of a proposition entails the responsibility of accepting the truth of that proposition. This epistemic responsibility behind an assertion of a proposition forces one to produce a proposition [not just a sentence] with conviction. This conviction is necessarily associated with a belief for a proposition. Thus, if a knowledge-claim is understood as a claim of a proposition being true, the proposition must be believed by the subject.

However, a truth itself does not require a conviction because there is no truth *per se*, it is the assertion of the proposition that requires the conviction because an assertion is entitled to take the epistemic risk of becoming true or false. Undertaking of this epistemic risk is otherwise known as the conviction associated in believing a proposition. Note that it is only when a sense of propositional meaning is there, an assertion requires the kind of conviction which is employed to remove the counter-examples to (iB). For the epistemic risk of a sentence's becoming true or false can be undertaken without any conviction that has to be necessarily associated with knowing something. For example "Mahatma Gandhi died in 1948" can be said to be known by Ravi [even if he has forgotten it] though he does not report it now and is not convinced and does not believe it.

The epistemological determination of the and of conviction required for the above said counter-examples may be provided in terms of justification: S's ability to provide sufficient, justification for

knowing or believing which can convince him that he knows that he knows something. But 'justification' is shown, in our following discussion, that it is an unviable instrument for the analysis of knowledge.

'The conviction and readiness to report that p' cannot be explained in terms of 'truth' or 'belief' because it would lead to circularity [as 'belief' is taken into account to explain "truth", and 'conviction' is taken into account to explain 'belief']. Thus, we cannot define conviction as "S's readiness to report that p only when S knows it correctly that p, and S knows it correctly that he knows it correctly that p". Here "correctly" stands as a synonym of "truth". We can not also say that S is convinced of p only when S knows and believes that p. For "knowing" and "believing" cannot be entertained if we are not to beg the question.

JUSTIFICATION:

Various formulations of 'justification' can be put forward to provide a *prima facie* answer to "what is knowledge?" in terms of justification with the presupposition that this question amounts to nothing more and nothing less than "what is a justified true belief?"

Syntactic variations can be made in active terms or passive terms like (i) S justified his belief in p or (ii) S's belief in p is justified by S. This variation in voice does not affect the epistemic analysis

¹¹Cf. Kvanvig, J.L. and Menzel, C. (1990) "The Basic Notion of Justification," *Philosophical Studies*, 59, pp. 235-261. See

What does affect is the variation in the semantic contents of the expressions which are closely associated with epistemic terms. For example, "for believing p" in 'S has a justification for believing p' can be meant differently to convey different epistemic implications as in 'S has a justification for a belief that p' and 'S has a justification behind his believing in p' (i.e., 'S justifiedly believes that p'). 'S has a justification for a belief that p' does not entail that S believes p whereas 'S justifiedly believes that p' does entail that S believes p. In the former case, 'justification' takes an independent role of being epistemologically prior to all actual beliefs such that S's having a 'justification' for p does not entail that S actually believes that p. S may or may not believe that P, yet S can have a justification for p. On the other hand, when S justifiedly believes that p, 'justification' takes the role between 'S's believing that p' and 'the belief p' such that it is necessary for S to believe that p if the justification has any point to act. The variations generally available in this respect are like (a) B is a justified belief; (b) S's belief that p is justified; (c) p is justified for S; (d) S is justified in believing that p; (e) S justifiably believes that p; (f) there is a justification for S to believe p and; (g) S has justification for believing that p.

Note that the variations we are accounting here are not to highlight on the variations of their entailments (hopefully) describable *in* terms of belief or disbelief, truth or falsity. For, the condition of justification is accounted in our thesis to examine

its explanatory efficiency in the epistemological analysis of a *justified true belief*, and it is already shown that truth and belief are not satisfactorily explained in their foundationalistic perspectives. Thus, what we would attempt to show is that different types of justifications have some common untenable presuppositions though they entail different epistemic commitments describable in terms of truth and belief. The common untenable presuppositions to be shown are (1) that a reductive analysis is possible from one type of justification to another and (2) that a justification can be made equivalent to some sufficient and necessary conditions.

From the meaning that we can make out of the expressions in various syntactic forms for 'justification', the role of justification can be broadly categorised under the following three types (A) Personal justification (B) Doxastic justification and (C) Prepositional justification.¹²

¹²Kvanvig and Menzel (1990) have provided a good account of categorising the various formulations of justification into personal, doxastic and prepositional in the introductory remarks of their argument in favour of identifying 'prepositional justification' as the 'basic notion of justification'. They have considered and responded to some possible objections against the necessity and sufficiency of a prepositional justification's becoming the basic one - the reduction of the other two types is argued to be possible to the prepositional type. They have overlooked the possible objections against the 'equivalence relation' admitting that such objections can be adduced against 'certain types of foundationalism' (*Op. Cit.* p.240). The program they have undertaken is mainly against reliabilistic theories 'committed to constructing a theory of justification with doxastic justification as the basic notion of justification' (*Op. Cit.* p.259). Although Goldman's (1986) enterprise can be directly criticised, if Kvanvig and Menzel are correct, Lehrer's (1974) 'subjective doxasticism' cannot be so. For the subjective doxasticism Lehrer advances is neither reliabilistic nor it is free from the criticisms expectable against the 'equivalence relation' Kvanvig and Menzel have overlooked. In our framework, the 'equivalence relation' is

When the semantic outcome of any syntactic form keeps the *subject* as the cardinal point upon what 'justification' meaningfully rests, when the form is roughly like "*5 is justified* in believing that *p*", it is a case of personal justification. Similarly, for a doxastic justification and a prepositional justification, keeping *belief* and *proposition* as the respective cardinal points, the forms can be roughly extended as "*S's believing p is justified*" and "*p is justified for S*".

Although justification hinges upon the subject, *S*, in case of *5 is justified* in believing that *p*', *S*'s 'believing' and the proposition '*p*' are no less important. For the question of whether *5 is justified*, or not, is implausible unless it is asked in relation to the *proposition*, *p*, that *S* believes. Similarly, in case of *S's believing p is justified*" and "*p is justified for S*", the personal as well as the prepositional and the doxastic as well as the personal ingredients of justification are not completely ignored, respectively, though the cardinal points are 'belief' and 'proposition'.

Granted that the personal, doxastic and prepositional elements have, more or less, inseparable bearings on any account of justification, that does not prevent one to distinguish one type of justification from the others. Of course, it is so possible because, the *cardinals* are supposed to be independent of the *ordinals* as far as the *evaluation* itself is under consideration. If the evaluation is

argued to be untenable and the normativity alleged to be embodied in that relation is shown to be lacking the 'conceptual' (explanatory) clarity required in the analysis of justification.

made in terms of one standard, some other associated factors can be construed as theoretically dispensable though those may be indispensable both in practical purposes and in the rival theoretical frames themselves. And, further more, if a particular standard can account for the theoretical benefits or the explanatory goal obtainable in other conceptual frameworks, without losing any significance of its own scheme, reductive analysis of the rival standards' cardinals is plausible in terms of that particular standard.

If propositional justification is a mere function of the truth of a belief and the reliability of a subject's cognitive mechanism such that the functional outcome is equivalent to the degree of justification that a determined proposition possesses, propositional justification depends on the personal and doxastic elements [See Fig.1]. Similarly, it can be construed of personal and doxastic justifications that their other two respective ingredients have indispensable bearings on justification [See Fig.2 and Fig.3 respectively] .




Fig. 1




Fig. 2




Fig. 3

If the determined propositional meaning along with certain

conditions, C ' independent of the personal and doxastic ingredients can constitute the epistemic normativity - the justificational account, then propositional justification need not owe any thing to the personal and doxastic elements [See Fig.4]. Similarly, the sacredness of personal and doxastic justifications can be advanced by putting certain conditions, C, which can presumably serve both the purposes of dissociating justification from the indispensable factors of the rival accounts and sufficing the particular account undertaken [See Fig.5 and Fig.6].




Fig. 4




Fig. 5





Fig. 6

[Description of the figures:

P, S and B stand for proposition, subject and belief respectively. PJ, SJ and BJ are the functional lines - considering 'justification' as a function of PB and PS, SB and SP, BS and BP respectively. PJ_1 , SJ_1 , and BJ_1 are also the functional lines of justification. However, PC, SC and BC are quite independent of PJ, SJ and BJ such that PB and PS, SB and SP, BS and BP have no bearings on

PC, SC and BC respectively. That is, if representation of Fig.1 - 6 are accepted, the following representation by means of Fig.7, 8 and 9 is forbidden.



In other words, PJ_1 , SJ_1 , and BJ_1 are not the functions of PJ and PX , SJ and SX . BJ and BX respectively. PX , SX and BX represent gradual perfections of meaning determination, subjective cognitive mechanism and the conviction embodied with a belief to be true, respectively. In short, the difference between Figs. (1,2,3) and Figs. (4,5,6) is that an absolute determination of meaning, reliability on a subject, and truth of a belief is presumed in the former cases but it is not so presumed in the latter cases. In the latter cases, meaningfulness of a proposition varies from P to X , adequate reliability on a subject's cognitive mechanism varies from S to X , the conviction for a truth of a belief varies from B to X . Thus what precisely differentiates J -kind justifications (PJ , SJ and BJ) from J_1 -kind justifications (PJ_1 , SJ_1 and BJ_1) is the difference between the sense of an absolutely perfect point and a gradual line of points - the difference between P and PX , S and SX , B and BX associated with J and J_1 respectively. And, for the same reason, Figures 7, 8 and 9 are forbidden. If a sense of a proposition is strictly construed to be an absolutely perfect point,

its conjoining with an account where proposition has no sense without being construed as being determined with gradual perfection cannot be accommodated. The same reasons can work against any attempt for the compatibility between SJ and SJ- as well as between BJ and BJ₁.]

It is clear that PJ is different from PJ₁, so also, SJ from SJ₁ and BJ₁ from BJ₁. And, the difference is such, any of the types associated with one kind (J-kind or J₁-kind) cannot be reduced to the same type of the other kind. In other words, the strong kind (the J-kind) cannot be reduced to the modest kind (the J₁-kind) and vice versa. Thus what can be hopefully attempted is the reduction of one type to the other associated with the same kind. However, any of the types associated with J-kind is untenable and, precisely, for that reason, the reduction attemptable is a futile one. The untenability of PJ, SJ and BJ can be made out of the antithesis to the ASD and the theses of indeterminacy and ontological relativity, besides out of the truth and belief conditions discussed earlier. A point-proposition is tenable only when absolute determination of truth is presupposed epistemically prior to any other belief. Refutation of the ASD amounts to the refutation of such a point-proposition. So also, the IT refutes the P of PJ if p is attempted on a linguistic ground instead of being attempted on a conceptual analysis plausible before the linguistic turn. Further more, the ontological relativity refutes any point R to coincide with P, S or B such that no objective reference of PJ, SJ and BJ is tenable on an ontological ground. Again, to add further against PJ, SJ and BJ, what is discussed under the truth and belief conditions of knowledge suffices to refute SJ and BJ on the ground that there remains no sense of an absolutely perfect point like S or B on what J

can hinge. And, it is notable here, those discussions owe a lot to the refutation of the ASD and the theses of IT and ontological relativity.

The moderate accounts of justification which allow corrigibility, fallibility or uncertainty due to the very fact that the meaning of a proposition, a subject's cognitive mechanism and the truth of a belief are quite vulnerable to questions of their perfection-point, may attempt for a reductive analysis. However, the analysis they can provide must be on a comparative ground; not in terms of their respective gradual lines of perfection but in terms of the conditions constituting the justifications. The purported reduction can be represented through either of the following three figures where the base line J_1P , J_1S or J_1B stands as the basic notion of justification in terms of what the other two can be explained. However, as it will be found in our discussion, the fate of J_1 remains equally vulnerable to criticisms as that of the points P , S and B of figure 1,2 and 3 respectively.




Fig. 10




Fig. 11




Fig. 12

We came back to the problem from where we started. In order to explain justification we took recourse to the kinds of justification,

and to seek a basic notion of justification we are back to the point of justification itself that we are supposed to explain.

J_1 itself is to be satisfactorily explained, if any reductive analysis is attempted for any one of J_1P , J_1S and J_1B to any one of the other two. The explanation can be attempted in terms of the analysis of justification that can provide the conditions said to be necessary and sufficient for justification.

Richard J. Ketchum¹³ argues that 'there is no theory, analysis or definition of justification'. What he means by "theory, analysis or definition of justification" is "a clarifying, lawlike statement of the form,

G: (S) (p) [S is justified in believing p
true.... if and only if p S]'¹⁴

A 'clarifying analysis' must not be trivial, it should be 'informative' although it 'may be false; it may be vague; it may even be analytic'.¹⁵ Lawlike sentences are those universally quantified sentences which (1) are supported by their instances and (2) themselves support corresponding counter-factual and subjunctive conditionals¹⁶. Ketchum identifies "lawlikeness sentence" with

¹³ KetchDm, R.J.(1991) "The paradox of Epistemology: A defense of naturalism", *Philosophical Studies*, 62, pp.45-86. See pp.46-59.

¹⁴ *Ibid.* p.46. Ketchum claims that his "definition of 'analysis of justification' as a clarifying lawlike sentence of the form, G, is broad enough to include all actually proposed analyses as well as any likely to be proposed", *Op. Cit.* p.48.

¹⁵ *Ibid.* . p.47.

¹⁶ *Ibid.*

sentences satisfying '(2)' to allow analytic sentences to be the candidate analyses. And the version of the argument he defends is this:

"Let P be any clarifying sentence of the form, G, let L be a person who believes P true and let $q \supset LP$ be the *analysans* of P instantiated with names of L and P. L cannot become rationally convinced that he is justified in believing P true by means of the following argument:

P

$q \supset LP$

Therefore, L is justified in believing P true.

For, this argument begs the question. Since L cannot use this argument to justify its conclusion, P does not support the subjunctive conditional, "If it were the case that $q \supset LP$, L would be justified in believing P true". So, P does not support a relevant corresponding subjunctive conditional. So, P is not lawlike. So, P is not an analysis, definition or theory and is thus not an analysis, definition or theory of justification."¹⁷

If Ketchum's argument is correct, then it can be safely said that the conceptual aspect, *a la*. Quine, of epistemology gains no support from the conceptual analysis of justification because there is really no conceptual analysis of justification. All the three types of justification obviously come under this argument. With respect to propositional justification, for example, it can be formulated as

¹⁷*Ibid.*, p.43.

follows:

JP if and only if $q \supset P$

$q \supset P$

Therefore, JP.

Similarly, it can be argued for SJ and BJ (i.e., for personal justification and doxastic justification respectively). So also it can be argued from the J_1 -kind justification of any type (PJ_1 , SJ_1 or BJ_1) as it follows, for example, in connection to the PJ_1 type.

J_1P if and only if $y \supset P$

$y \supset P$

Therefore, J_1P

The difference between $q \supset p$ and $y \supset p$ is the difference between whatever conditions employed as necessary and sufficient for PJ and PJ_1 respectively though it is the *proposition*, P , that takes the central role in connection to what is to be justified. For, as a consequence of our earlier discussion, the difference between PJ and PJ_1 shows that $\langle \text{fin} \rangle$ entertains personal and doxastic ingredients whereas $y \text{ ing}$ does not.

An immediate objection expectable against the above said thesis for the repudiation of the justification-condition is that it approximates a radical skeptic's stand point whereas naturalism advocated by Quine demands for a scientific skepticism. However, as Ketchum also clarifies, there is a difference between the claim that *there is no true clarifying sentence of the form, G' and the claim

that 'sentence of the form, G, is lawlike'¹⁸. The former claim approximates radical skepticism, the latter claim does not. Ketchum says, "If a skeptical argument is an argument which is intended to cast doubt on the truth of epistemic claims, claims of the form "S is justified in believing P true", then the arguments I have to offer are not skeptical. I do not argue that sentences of this form are all false. The conclusion of my argument is that no sentences of the form G, is lawlike."¹⁹ In other words, the thesis is against the doctrinal guarantee a doctrine itself aspires to provide in terms of its conceptual analysis. That is, it is against the conceptual insufficiency and inadequacy of a justification-condition which is advanced with the doctrinal orientation that the analysis of "S is justified in believing p" must be satisfied if, at all, S knows p - whatever knowledge is expressed through "p". The doctrinal aspect of epistemology incurs the 'Human predicament' and the 'justification-condition' is no less vulnerable to this predicament. 'Justification' is not meaningless; 'justification' is pertinent to philosophy as much as epistemology. As epistemologists must not keep a sacred distance from natural science so also justologists need not be far away with the dogmatic aspiration of becoming an authority over the justification of the natural scientist's claims. Just as truth and belief, justification can also be studied with an (enlightened) empirical spirit instead of mishandling it as an instrument for becoming an epistemic authority over natural sciences.

In the foregoing discussions we find that there is no objectivity

¹⁸*Ibid.*, P.54.

¹⁹*Ibid.*

of knowledge which would be hopefully analysable in terms of any objective account of truth, belief and justification beyond the semantic account of truth belief and justification. Again, the analysis available by means of a semantic setting for an epistemology suggests that the presupposed objectivity, qualified with the epistemic normativity embodied with any proper knowledge-claim, boils down to the problem of objectivity of meaning. Thus the establishment of IT foils the whole semantic manoeuvre. An informative sense of knowing importantly avoids the vacuousness of a true knowledge-claim. It approximates the epistemic weightage of analyticity, An analysis of justification is supposed to be non-trivial but the analysts sought to that respect are viewed to be losing no epistemic weightage of an epistemic 'complete justification'.

This epistemic dignity is presupposed by the philosophically interesting distinction of the ASD. An analyticity of the form "All bachelors are bachelors" is vacuously true and philosophically uninteresting. The interest lies with the form "All bachelors are unmarried men" which is not vacuously true but supposed to be undeniable as much as the vacuous truth. And what comes to support that is the semantic manipulations over synonymy. Parallel runs the force behind analysis of 'justification'. The necessary and sufficient conditions sought for justification are not intended to be turning out as a trivial truth like 'A = A', yet it is supposed to be undeniable very much like 'A = A' though, instead of being a logical truth, it becomes an epistemic truth through a semantic manipulation. Here the semantic manipulation is not made in terms of synonymy facilitating a kind of necessity supposed to be endowed on analyticity when the

truth is dependent on meaning alone. It is understood in terms of proposition, belief or truth. Accordingly, 'justification' is construed variably so as to bring about an epistemic apriority of the equivalence between the analysandum and the analysans of 'justification'.

My endorsement to Ketchum's thesis is precisely because of his consideration that an analysis of justification accountable in a non-naturalistic framework fails to be lawlike. That is, any account of the analysis of 'justification' undertaken with a presupposition that it would function as an *a priori* epistemic guideline to every exploration of just knowledge is utterly disqualified due to the fact that, whether or not the equivalence between the analysandum and the analysans is analytically true, the analysis cannot be lawlike. The requirement of the 'lawlikeness' is the requirement of the equivalence as a support to counterfactuals and disjunctive conditionals such that, even if the equivalence is analytically true, it is not trivially true. Since the concession of analytically true equivalent relations between the analysandum and the analysans is distinct from the construal of any equivalent relations of the analysis of justification as an approximation of analytical truth, Ketchum's strategy is different from that of ours.

In his strategy, analyticity gets a concession of being a candidate to be lawlike. Since no equivalence of the analysis of justification is lawlike, analyticity of that equivalence (if at all there is any) cannot be lawlike too. Thus, the untenability of the ASD bears no importance in the refutation of the normativity of

'justification', rather, the refutation of the normativity (supposed to be associated with the conception of 'lawlikeness' in relation to the analysis) extends support to the refutation of analyticity's becoming a fruitful normative equipment for the doctrinal aspect (or justificatory aspect of epistemology). A strategy can be made in the reverse way: the untenability of the ASD leads to the refutation of an *a priori* normativity alleged to be there with certain true sentences of equivalence. Since the equivalence supposed to be there in the analysis of justification is a candidate true sentence of that kind, the equivalence is untenable. Ketchum's strategy is disputable on the ground that Quine's naturalism is supported by the untenability of the ASD whereas Ketchum concedes analyticity as a candidate to lawlikeness so that analyticity's refutation is supported by the refutation of the analysis of justification (where 'analysis' is supposed to be providing a 'lawlike' statement). And the equivalence derivable on a non-naturalistic ground out of the alleged analysis is not 'lawlike'. Hence it makes no difference whether the equivalence is an analytic statement or not. Thus, in Ketchum's strategy, analyticity has no explicit import on the doctrinal asset a non-naturalist attempts to preserve in terms of an analysis of 'justification'. He finds the ASD as a thesis of non-naturalism displayed in Carnap's programme where the stance is quite foundationalistic. But 'a non-naturalist', Ketchum says, 'may not even have a non-naturalistic stance to defend'²⁰. However, the discussions we have undertaken is mainly concerned with non-naturalism irrespective of its 'stance of defence' - naturalistic or non-naturalistic. The variant 'stance of defence' can be well

²⁰*Ibid.*, p.45.

associated with the variations found in different versions of contemporary foundationalism, especially, between strong foundationalism and modest foundationalism, and, more importantly, between a reliabilistic modest foundationalism and a non reliabilistic modest foundationalism.²¹ Thus, the 'stance of defence' need not be determining the strategy of offence. We can attempt to get the result Ketchum finds- the untenability of the normativity allegedly there with the equivalence between the analysandum and the analysans of the analysis of 'justification' in support of Quine's naturalism- on a Quinean anti-foundationalistic ground.

Consider the difference"²² between 'to seek the truth' and 'to obtain the truth' parallel to a difference supposed to be there between a truth-pretender and the (genuine) truth itself. Truth-pretenders, if at all construed very liberally, can be said to be the trials committed as the necessary sins for the sacred game of wining the truth itself. The difference between 'seeking' and 'obtaining' of truth can be similarly construed: 'seeking' is the trial-process for 'obtaining'. Thus 'to seek the truth' can never be called as a guarantee of wining the truth, one wins only when one obtains that.²³

²¹A version of modest foundationlism "consistent with reliabilism' is extesnively argued by Robert Audi (1383) in response to Kornblith's (1980) argument that reliabilism goes against the Arguments-on-Paper Thesis which represents non-naturalism of any kind-foundationalistic as well as coherentistic. We have alread responded, in Chapter-I, to Audi's criticism over Kornblith.

²²Cf. Lehrer, K. *Op. Cit*, p.213.

²³Cf. Hintikka's (1968, 1969) proposal of a language game which approximates a game of 'searching and finding'. Quine's (1969) respone to Hintikka's proposal (that is, a language game can be 'a behavioural criterion for the translation of quantification) is mainly made in terms of Quine's reemphasis on "objectual quantification' which is

If a justified true belief is simply an outcome, at a particular phase of 'seeking' the truth, that never amounts to knowledge, then the epistemic normativity alleged to be there with 'justification' becomes futile. Epistemic normativity makes no sense unless a set of norms can be suggested for the evaluation of knowledge-claims. If the epistemic certainty or reliability of a knowledge-claim cannot be evaluated in terms of justification, justification being supposed to be constituting the set of norms itself, the certainty or reliability on what epistemic normativity can be exercised becomes meaningless. An account of justification constitutes an alleged set of norms because, if a justified true belief is identified with knowledge, the epistemic evaluation of a true (ex *hypothesi* a truth-pretender) belief is made in terms of the degrees (or an absolute point, if at all, achievable) that it satisfies the necessary conditions extendable in an analysis of justification.

Consequently, considering the above said difference between 'seeking' and 'obtaining' of truth as well as the futility of a kind of association possible between 'justification' and 'seeking' of truth, two escape routes can be formulated. One is the abandonment of justification as an epistemic asset of normativizing knowledge-claims. The other is to put certain further conditions to enable 'justification' to be freight with that asset. The former way out is obviously eschewed by the foundationalists as well as by the coherentists because it is fundamentally for that asset they fight against the naturalists. Thus the second way out is left for them.

The condition they require would be the fourth condition for distinguished from 'substitutional quantification'. Hintikka's attempt is based on a presupposed viability of 'substitutional quantification' which is argued by Quine (1969, 1976) as having 'no bearing on ontology'. Thus an attempt of 'obtaining' the ideal truth, if expectable on the basis of an objectivity sought through Hintikka's proposal, can be avoided. 266

knowledge, the other three being truth, belief and justification. It is required due to the fact that justification is not a simple procedure which can be based on true or false premise and, at the same time, turned into a term of epistemic-appraisal.

Normativity of epistemology requires 'justification' to function as an 'appraisal-term' whereas the analysis of knowledge keeps justification along with truth and belief as a necessary condition to prevent erroneous knowledge. Assimilation of the two aspects – the normative and the conditional – of justification into a unified one creates the invincible problem for the foundationalists. Otherwise, if it is only the normative aspect that is counted for justification, then there could be justified true beliefs based on false premises (i.e., there can be erroneous 'justified true beliefs'). And, if it is only the conditional aspect counted for justification, then the justified true beliefs being without any epistemic normativity extend no bearing on 'justology'. For, a justogist, unlike a hydrologist, is supposed to be 'uniquely qualified to evaluate his own claims to be justified.'²⁴

If it is only the normativity that counts for justification then it can be based on false premises without incurring any harm to the evaluation itself. For a procedure is permitted of being based on true or false premises if the concern is confined to the process itself, with no concern for the ends of the process. Thus, if justification is merely a procedure to evaluate the truth of a knowledge-claim, then,

The comparison between a justologist and a hydrologist, between the two scientists supposed to be studying 'the nature and extent' of justification and water respectively can be found in Ketehum (1991), *Op. Cit.*, pp51-53.

as a claim itself can be evaluated as being true without the consideration of the basis on what the claim is made, justified true beliefs can be based on false premises. This possibility of justified true beliefs, justified and true but without becoming identified with knowledge, is well known as the Gettier's problem. The solution to this problem can be called as the fourth condition of knowledge if we consider the above discussions.

Gettier's problem displays the theoretical impossibility of identifying knowledge with 'justified true belief' on the ground that there is every possibility of an erroneous knowledge -that is, of a true claim being based on some false premise(s)- if knowledge is identified with justified true belief.

It is easy to imagine that the knowledge of p is erroneous, even if it is true that p, if it is false that q and one's knowing of p is dependent on his/her knowing of q. For example²⁵, it is my erroneous knowledge of "someone of my class-mates owns a car", even if it is true that someone of my class-mates owns a car, if I know that Ravi owns a car whereas it is not Ravi but Kavi who really owns the car that Ravi is used to drive regularly. The notable *prim facie* superficiality of this imagined situation is the clever use of "someone" to compensate the lack of the enough conviction required to claim "Ravi owns a car" and the notorious ambiguity in the use of "know" facilitates the seeming contradiction between "I know that Ravi owns a car" and "I don't know that Ravi own a car".

²⁵Cf. Gettier, E. (1963) "Is Justified True Belief Knowledge?-, *Analysis*, 23, pp. 121-123.

The epistemic mettle of this problem becomes explicit once we remove the *prima facie* superficiality. First of all, it has already been argued that the required sense of 'conviction' as well as of 'the readiness to report' in relation to a qualified sense of the 'belief-condition' of knowledge are untenable. The fact that a belief itself, no matter to whatever highest possible extent it convinces me to accept, can not entitle me to claim that I know that someone of my class-mates owns a car; it is neither my (supposed to be) unconvincing belief that Ravi owns a car nor my (supposed to be) convincing belief that Ravi owns a car that can enable me to claim that I know that someone of my class-mates owns a car. The apprehension that cleverly I have used an expression like "someone", instead of a name, turns to be a misapprehension once you suppose that I am no less convinced of Ravi's owning the car than that you can be so of Ravi's owning the car. The fact that no amount of conviction itself can exactly determine the genuine truth, it can well permit one to suppose so. Secondly, with the supposition that I have not cleverly used "someone", the charge that I appeal to an ambiguous use of "know" is removed on the ground that I can know of Ravi's owning the car on some independent grounds²⁶. If the set of reasons $\{r_1, r_2, \dots, r_p\}$ behind my knowing of Ravi's owning the car amounts to claim that **someone of my** class-mates owns a car, if the set of reasons $\{s_1, s_2, \dots, s_p\}$ behind my knowing of Ravi's owning the car amounts to the same claim that one of my class-mates owns a car; then, my use of "knowing" is not at all ambiguous if it is a fact that $\{r_1, r_2, \dots, r_p\}$ and $\{s_1, s_2, \dots, s_p\}$ are independent of each other. Thus the use of my "knowing" does not

²⁶ Cf, Lehrer, K. *Op. Cit.* p. 220.

permit a seeming contradiction that Ravi owns the car and Ravi does not own the car. It simply allows me to assert that Ravi owns the car as well as Kavi owns the car but allows me to assert so, such two different assertions, on two independent grounds. Thirdly, the insufficiency of the explanation of the 'truth-condition' and the 'belief condition' prevents one to appeal those conditions to come to the rescue. Whatever qualifications or conditions to be added to 'true belief' would be absorbed into the 'justification condition'. Thus, if independent reasons can be provided to justify my knowing of Ravi's owning the car and my knowing of Kavi's owning the car, the same claim (that I know that) 'someone of my class-mates owns a car' is justified in relation to each of my knowing cases though on different grounds. Finally, one cannot argue that unless until I am justified in believing of Ravi's owning the car I cannot be justified in deducing the conclusion "someone of my class-mates owns a car" and. hence, my conclusion is not a justified true belief²⁷. For the conclusion "someone of my class-mates owns a car" can be non-deductively inferred from $\{r_1, r_2, \dots, r_p\}$ which completely justifies me in believing of Ravi's owning the car.

Removal of the charge that Gettier's problem is superficial, displays its real foundationalistic nettle. The charge is largely due to the misapprehension that the problem is a problem of semantic confusions. The epistemic nettle is, precisely, the impossibility of an account of complete justification that a non-naturalist could hopefully try to avail in order to gain the genuine epistemic

²⁷Thalberg, I. (1969) argues on this line. Thalberg, I. (1969) "In Defense of Justified True Belief", *Journal of Philosophy*, 66, pp. 794-803.

authority over each and every knowledge-claim. Now, before showing this problem's relation with Quine's naturalistic position, let us examine Lehrer's response to this problem.

Lehrer's response is examined on the ground that he concentrates on this problem with the belief that the problem is neither a superficial one, being grounded on semantical confusions, nor an attempt conjured with unacceptable moves; unlike many other philosophers, he tries to tackle the epistemic point. His response is, as he calls, 'the fourth condition of knowledge'. It is formulated as it follows:

"If S knows that p, then S is completely justified in believing that p in some way that does not depend on any false statement"²⁸

Believing that p in some way that does not depend on any false statement is thought to be possible and, accordingly, analysed in terms of 'verific alternative to corrected doxastic system of S'. That is,

"S is completely justified in believing that p in a way that does not depend on any false statement if and only if S is completely justified in believing that p in the verific alternative to the

²⁸The same can be formulated in terms of defeasibility:

"If S knows that p, then S is completely justified in believing that p in some way that is not defeated by any false statement". Lehrer, *Op.Cit.*, p. 215.

The verific alternative, V, to a corrected doxastic system, D, is such that V retains all true statements belonging to D and, also, retains the denial of all false statements belonging to D³⁰. And a corrected doxastic system of S is the system of statements describing the beliefs of S with the exception of those statements S would not retain as an impartial and disinterested truth-seeker- as a 'veracious man'³¹

If I am a veracious man, I cannot be completely justified in believing 'either Ravi owns the car or Kavi owns the car' if I know it to be false that Ravi owns the car. However, it does not prevent me (as a veracious man) to be completely justified in believing *someone of my class-mates owns the car' even if I know that Ravi is not the owner but Kavi is. And, of course, my believing in "someone of my class-mates owns the car" is partially based on my false belief that Ravi is the owner.

Note that if I am not a veracious man then the doxastic system, representing all that I believe (true or false), retains many irrelevant beliefs like 'our class starts at 10 A.M'; "Prof. Rammurthy teaches Indian philosophy', 'the car has four wheels', and so on . No justification of my belief of Ravi's owning the car is possible (so also, of Ravi's not owning the car) if it is necessary that the belief

²⁹Lehrer, K. *Op.Cit.*, p. 224.

³⁰*Ibid.*

³¹*Ibid*, p. 214.

to be justified must cohere with every statement of the doxastic system. The coherence test won't find an end point here. But, as a veracious man, I have a corrected doxastic system in the sense that I would be considering the relevant beliefs. And, as the story goes, since I am already having a true belief that someone of my class-mates owns the car I am supposed to consider the competitors to this true belief. Now, even if the belief that Kavi owns the car becomes true, yet it is not a competitor. Infact, I have a true belief which is not defeated by any of its competitors and, thereby, I am justified in believing that someone of my class-mates must own the car. The problem is whether I can be so justified even if I know that Ravi does not own the car when my justified true belief is partially dependent on a false knowing that Ravi owns the car.

Lehrer's response shows that I cannot be so justified unless I believe that Ravi does not own the car. And, in order to neutralize the unhappy situation of knowing a logical contradiction "Ravi owns the car and Ravi does not own the car" to be true, he employs a subjunctive reasoning like "If it were false that Ravi owns the car then I would have changed the belief that Ravi owns the car is true". The possibility of this change allows me to be justified in believing that someone of my class-mates owns the car when I know that Kavi, instead of Ravi, is the owner. But the truth of this change is supposed to be neither logical nor factual but, on the other hand, a logically contingent necessary truth. A logical necessity of "If Ravi owns the car then it is false that Ravi does not own the car" itself contributes nothing to the possible change of my belief. For, above all, a logical necessity *itself* is supposed to be unaffected and

unaffected the concrete world and the possibility of my changing the belief is obviously a possible event of this world. In other words, speaking in relation to language, the meaning of two sentences do affect each other but not to the state of affairs, though the possible state of affairs to what those meanings correspond do affect each other, and if the necessity is determined by the meanings then the necessity does not affect the possible changes. However, the possible changes in my doxastic system cannot be purely factual as much as that cannot be purely logical. For, granted that it is contingent, the supposed epistemic certainty expected from a justification-condition stands nowhere. Since the contingency of my belief or the change of my one belief to another would turn the epistemic principle, expressed in terms of that change, into a contingent truth; the change of my belief from one to the other must represent a necessary relation, though not logical. Perhaps, like a law, the change is inevitable without being mere logical. The relation is a relation of . necessity but the necessity of two state of affairs and, of course, the two are in the possible worlds. The possibility of my knowing Ravi's owning the car becomes sufficient for the possibility of my belief that it is false that Ravi own's the car. Or, saying in terms of 'necessity', 'the possibility of my belief that it is false that Ravi owns the car' becomes necessary for 'the possibility of my knowing of Ravi's not owning the car'. Thus we are back to the problem of "belief-condition" except the fact that this condition is further complicated by the unclarified notion of 'possibility'. But the concept of possibility or 'possibly true' is epistemically untenable if it is meant to be equivalent with 'not necessarily false' and, at the same time, it is meant for any conceptual analysis of

epistemological problem of necessity, certainty, analyticity etc. Thus the conceptual perspective of the 'verific alternative to the corrected doxastic system of S' has to be subsumed under the conceptual perspective of a necessity associated with natural laws. But, as we have already observed it, no statement of equivalence representing the analysis of justification is lawlike. Thus to stick to the lawlikeness of the change expected of my believing p, instead of q, when it is false that q; it is not a proper answer to Gettier's question.

Gettier's counter-example is meant for the insufficiency of a justification condition along with the belief condition and the truth condition, against the identification that knowledge is a justified true belief, when knowledge is construed to be certain, at least, of the *kind* that becomes significantly distinguished from its pretenders. And, hence, justification is construed to be determining that distinctiveness to maintain itself as the term of epistemic appraisal recruitable for the test of normativity, if not absolute certainty, of every knowledge-claim.

Thus the doxastic justification preferred by Lehrer is trapped into the Gettier's problem. Justification in terms of any condition, including the fourth condition of Lehrer, falls short of lawlikeness and Gettier's problem can be solved only when the necessary sufficient conditions of justification are not lawlike. But a condition's necessity cannot be both contingent and analytic. The epistemic necessity, what is infused in an alleged *a priori* epistemic norm, is not scientific.

Identifying justified true belief with knowledge, if one attempts to provide any condition for justification it can be criticized on the ground that the very identification presupposed of knowledge and justification is either trivial or, if purported to be scientific, it is untenable. This is quite analogous to the triviality of $A = A$, to the untenability of the ASD. An attempt to explain the conditions is roughly a futile attempt to explain how that identification, analogous to that of the analytic truth, is not trivial but epistemologically viable. Those conditions accounted for justification are no better on a status than the status of synonymy and semantic rules accounted for the ASD.

Although *I* have not argued sufficiently, it can be claimed that the doxastic, prepositional and subjective justification ultimately rests on absolutism, *the meaning* and transcendentalism respectively. Of course, in this regard, two points are to be established. One is about the identification of justified true belief with knowledge that justologists invariably appeal to in order to get hold of their alleged epistemic normativity. The other point is about the nature of the conditions of justification that those ultimately rest on the traditionally upheld conditions like belief, truth or experience such that those conditions presuppose the untenable notion of 'intension', 'the meaning' or something transcendental in order to identify knowledge with justification. The root of these presuppositions is that foundationalists separate meaning from experience, intension from extension, analytic from synthetic and , more importantly, these separations are done so as to demarcate levels of investigation: philosophical and that of natural sciences.

There is no sense of a doctrinal (justificatory) theme independent of a conceptual (explanatory) theme. There is no sacrosanct conceptual theme so as to enable us to obtain an absolute verdict of justification from a conceptual analysis itself. Hence, in principle, no doctrinal 'completeness' is possible. The Human predicament is the human predicament'¹.

A doctrinal completeness can be distinguished from an absolute certainty. The former can be said to be framework dependent whereas the latter is framework independent. In other words, an absolute certainty has no bearing of a conceptual theme, it is something like 'intuitively distinct and clear'. A doctrinal completeness can be said to be complete only in relation to a conceptual framework. It is something like conceptually, semantically or conditionally complete.

But this distinction is fruitlessly employed if one attempts to defend contemporary foundationalism in terms of this distinction. For doctrinal completeness is just a variation of absolute certainty and the latter is no less untenable than the former. A set of 'transcendental categories', a set of 'intensional semantic rules' or a set of 'necessary and sufficient conditions of justification' is a set of epistemic norms. These epistemic norms are supposed to be limiting, building or conditioning the whole framework of knowledge so as to enable an epistemologist (Kantian, Camapian or a contemporary

¹ OR, p.72.

foundationalistic one) to give the verdict of justification on any claim of knowledge by holding those epistemic norms. Thus the 'intuitively distinct and clear' has been replaced by 'conceptually', 'intensionally' or 'justifiedly' distinct and clear. For this 'distinctness and clearness' is a pseudo response or an unscientific response to a pseudo or unscientific doubt, namely, the Cartesian doubt. In response of that doubt, the variation runs from an appeal to 'intuition' to the appeals to 'concept' 'intension' and 'justification'.

The positive point is, of course, the recognition of a conceptual theme. It is the epistemic bearing of the categories, semantical rules or the justificatory conditions that really is the positive point of a doctrinal dimension of our epistemological inquiry as far as doctrinal dimension is dependent on the conceptual dimension envisaged in terms of categories, language or epistemic conditions. But this recognition of the conceptual dimension of our inquiry becomes fruitless if we go back enquiring the doctrinal dimension. That is, if we look into the categories, language or epistemic conditions in order to go back to some unexplained and unclear 'intuitively distinct and clear'. This going back to the doctrinal side is done, precisely, by upholding the unexplained and untenable notions like 'transcendental', 'intensional' and epistemic normativity', A 'transcendental *a priori*', a 'linguistic *a priori*' and an 'apriori epistemic normativity' are all in the same boat, in a foundationalist's boat, opposed to that of Neurath. They are all after absolute certainty but, interestingly enough, they run surreptitiously because they are running back to the darkness they

have left behind.

The variations made out of the foundationalistic approaches, construed as three stages of development of foundationalism, can be roughly summarized as foundationalism varying from a nonsensical one to a conditional meaningful one through a 'meaning' made out of the nonsensical one. A Carnapian move is a meaningful Kantian move and, stretching it further, a justological move is a conditional meaningful Kantian move. A Carnapian inquiry of the normative semantic rules is replaced by a justologist's inquiry of the justificatory (normative) conditions of knowledge. This normativity of conditions is professed by both the foundationalists and the coherentists of these days and thus bound to suffer from the misgivings of a justological move. The underlying methodological outfit of both the contemporary foundationalists and coherentists, though their outflows display an explicit rivalry, presupposes the 'doctrinal' completeness.

Transcendental foundationalism -epistemic normativity in terms of an *a priori* characterised as 'absolutely independent of all experience'-²is after an absolute certainty to defend epistemology against Cartesian skepticism. It is untenable due to the meaninglessness of a framework independent doctrinal theme it upholds. If every experience we inclucate is dependent on a 'conceptual'³ framework we have adopted beforehand, an *a priori* independent of all experience amounts to an *a priori* independent of all conceptual frameworks.

² *Critique, b-3.*

³ *Contra transcendental.*

The Carnapian move of a language relative completeness of the semantic and syntactic rules, a move that professes a theory-relative completeness of epistemological normativity to subdue the talk of ontological sovereignty, is good but not good enough. It overlooks reality; the world is missed into the words. A Quinean enterprise aspires to track the reality, to track the world out of the words.

The tracking is made with an 'enlightened' empirical spirit, the spirit that a natural scientist uptakes to look into the reality or the external world, even if, the world he looks into is the world interpreted in terms of his theory. The interpreted world is not a fiction. Interpretation is hinged on some background beliefs and what generates those beliefs is the rudimentary links we have between our five sense organs and the world outside.

An instance of doubt on the service of our five sense organs is intelligible only when it presupposes a knowledge which, in turn, is nothing but another instance of a bridging between the 'meager input' at our sensory surfaces and the 'torrential output' in the form of acceptable true sentences about the external world. A doubt is not a doubt on the eyes, for example, but on the illusive knowledge of a bent stick with the presupposition of the reality of straight stick which, in turn, can imply no doubt on the eyes but very much on the knowledge of the straight stick due to some different background beliefs (Suppose, for example, the density of the liquid in which the stick is partially immersed is, somehow, exactly the same as that of the air in the surrounding environment and the stick happens to be a

bent one. Thus the knowledge of the straight stick is dependent on the background belief that the density of that liquid is not same with the density of the air). Thus the starting point of our knowledge is not to be a Cartesian doubt and, hence, the epistemological search is not to be identified with a response to philosophical skepticism. 'Doubt prompts the theory of knowledge, yes, but knowledge, also, was what prompted the doubt. Skepticism is an offshoot of science'.⁴

The problem before Cartesian skepticism is quite philosophical⁵ -a two pronged general question about knowing reality, i.e., "what is reality?" and "what is real knowledge?"- a metaphysical and an epistemological one.⁶ But the approach to that problem, the method of a philosophical doubt, is mistaken for *the* correct approach and adopted, more or less, implicitly or explicitly, by many since those days to till today. With no reality for itself to stand on, it dreams of diving into the reality of every sort. The requirement of an ontological base for an epistemological investigation is overlooked because, though epistemology is rightly kept as a base for ontological investigations, it is dogmatically kept as a foundational base by overlooking the 'reciprocal containment' that holds good between epistemology and ontology. And, precisely, this overlooking concedes

⁴ "NNK", p.67.

⁵In its neutral sense it is neither foundationalistic nor naturalistic.

⁶ Cf. Megee. B. and Quine W.V.O. (1978) "The ideas of Quine, Dialogue with W.V. Quine" *Men of Ideas some Creators of Contemporary Philosophy*, British Broadcasting Corporation, London, pp. 168-179. See, p.171.

a philosophical doubt.⁷

A mistaken conception of the nature of a philosophical - metaphysical or epistemological - question enforces into the dream of an answer which is exclusively under the purview of a philosopher. A genuine metaphysical question, "what is reality?", demands an answer that can account "what sorts of things there are" and, since no sort of thing can be meaningfully accounted without a conceptual framework which, in turn, is dependent on some background knowledge, " what is reality?" presupposes "knowledge" of something. Thus a doubt that presupposes no knowledge of anything cannot be identified with a meaningful ontological question, "what is reality?" (i.e. with a question about "what sorts of things there are"). "What is reality?" makes no sense if it amounts to a Cartesian doubt; if it is identified as a doubt against everything that is said to be there.

The empty dream recurs in Carnap's conventionalistic relaxation. The best achieved through relaxing on a conceptual framework, conventionally adopted and choiced with some practical considerations, is the giving up the idea of an absolute reality independent of a theory or a conceptual framework of language. In other words, a meaningful metaphysics or 'ontology' replaces a meaningless metaphysics; the problem being unchanged remains "what is reality?". But, on the other hand, linguistic absolutism replaces Absolutism and the former incurs no less misgivings than that of the latter though

⁷ The overlooking of this reciprocal containment is shown, throughout our discussion against foundationalism, as the fundamental mistake in foundationalistic theses.

they vary in the degree of their sophistication like transcendental *a priori* and linguistic *a priori* do.⁸

The good of a Carnapian move into "What is reality?" consists in its making sense of "What is reality?". "What is reality?" or "what there is" is clarified to mean "What is said to be real?" or "What is said to be there?" and this move suggests to explore on 'existence' *qua* reality of anything (concrete or abstract) through a conceptual framework and, hence, through the fundamental rules governing the conceptual framework. Lacking of the said sense permits one to say of anything on reality, to say of anything to be real, due to the lack of the ontological commitment one is supposed to have on a theoretical basis. An implicit assumption of 'no ontological commitment' implies an assertion of anything to be real as much as an assertion of contradictory premise validly implies an assertion of any conclusion to be true.

The worse about the move is, though it paves the way to make sense of reality, it misses reality in the way itself. The irony of its semantical determination of ontology is that it puts semantics as making sense of reality and, at the same time, leaves no reality to be made any sense of. Semantics is mistaken for an ideal instrument to the philosophical problems on reality. It is good of a semantical method that we can make sense of reality only when reality is not independent of language because the sense of reality is nothing but

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Note that the transformation to "What we say to be there" from "What there is" is mainly due to the same kind of urgency, the theoretical urgency, of explaining reality.

the reality said to be there and; moreover, a *saying* pertains to semantical rules. But language is no less dependent on ontology than ontology is dependent on language. No conceptual framework, no particular system of beliefs, hails from the blue but depends on some background system of beliefs which, in turn, represents an ontology, i.e., *saying of* certain things to be there.

The inbuilt scientific bearing of the existence of a framework or theory dependent object is the conceptual or theoretical explanation it does have. This scientific bearing is abandoned once we abandon the search of the background beliefs of the conceptual framework or theory. This search is abandoned, not only if we are complacent enough to our currently achieved fallible conceptual frameworks and mistake it as being infallible but, also if we are dogmatic enough to believe an absolute determination of any ontology. Linguistic absolutism is no better than metaphysical absolutism except that the latter makes no sense of reality whereas the former makes no sense of the senseful reality (i.e., no sense in its very way of making sense of reality). If the metaphysical absolutism is an utter unscientific approach to reality due to the conceptual or theoretical explanation it lacks in overlooking the conceptual or theoretical bearing a thing has; then even if linguistic absolutism unravels that pitfall, it is no less unscientific in overlooking the background systems on what the systems representing the ontology do depend.

Representation makes nothing unscientific, it is absolutistic representation that does. Absolutistic representation is conspicuously held by an adherent of Kantian transcendental *a priori*. Such a

conspicuous holding is shadowed by the ASD. The absolutistic representation becomes more sophisticated when it is made in terms of the completeness of the semantical rules that govern the representing framework. This completeness is shadowed by determinacy of meaning.

Translation being indeterminate, the inbuilt requirement (of a choice) of translation retains the indeterminacy of an ontology, represented by a conceptual framework, language or theory. Of course both the indeterminacies, of a translation and of a conceptual framework *qua* an ontology *contra*, metaphysics, resulted from an approach quite behaviouristic; in particular, or naturalistic, in general. The demand of behaviourism or naturalism is not at all arbitrary. It is due to the very urgency of the scientific search over the background beliefs as well as over the beliefs themselves.

The theoretical drawback of linguistic absolutism is revealed in its blocking of the scientific pursuit of truth, in its complacent move of upholding independent conceptual frameworks which are alleged to be perfectly determining the reality they account. The behaviouristic explanation is a theoretical explanation to start with from where the scientific pursuit of truth is blocked due to a Cartesian threat of gaining nothing philosophical unless you gain something beyond the conceptual frameworks. The pursuit is based on the finding of a partnership between language and ontology, between beliefs *saying* an 'ontology' and ontology *saying* the (back ground) beliefs.

Since it is their partnership, not the foundationalistic

upholding of semantics' upper hand over ontology that theoretically holds good - holds good for the conceptual or explanatory consistency urged in answering "What is said to be there?"⁹-a study of the framework explaining their partnership is urged. This partnership is traced back from their respective rudimentary stages- the learning of our language and individuating the objects of our external world- such that it may explain further, in future, through a physicalistic framework, "What is *said* to be there?". The partnership found through a behaviouristic framework is expected to be explained in physicalistic terms.

Note that the question "What is said to be there?" is trasformed into "What is *objectually* said to be there?" which is distinguished from "What is *substitutionally* said to be there?" With the conceptual clarification of the misleading of pseudo names due to a mistaken presupposition of direct one-to-one relation between names and objects, quantifiers are placed to function parallel to the pronouns such that only the values of variables bound by a quantifier meaningfully amounts to be the objects parallel to the subjects or objects replaceable for the corresponding pronouns. So also runs the development from variables in general to the *objectual interpretation* of *variables* in particular, parallel to the distinguished function of an identifiable pronoun (*contra* an unidentifiable pronoun that becomes true of any substitutional value).

⁹ In this work, both conceptions of the *a priori*, are shown to be the foundationalistic responses to the Cartesian doubt in epistemology and both overlook the "reciprocal containement" between epistemology and ontology.

The partnership between language and reality, in a behaviouristic framework, observing the untenability of linguistic absolutism, leads to naturalized epistemology: the thematic current of what upholds the 'reciprocal containment' of epistemology and natural science (ontology)¹⁰. Natural Science *qua* fallible theories or frameworks on natural phenomena *qua* the relativistic ontology of the concrete and abstract objects posited to understand the natural phenomena contains epistemology and epistemology contains natural science.

The subject predicate unit, the statement instead of a term, a sentence instead of a word, is well adopted as the minimal unit of any instance of a significant/meaningful use of language in human communication. The subject-part roughly stands for the ontology, the predicative one is for the epistemology and, hence, no significant philosophy without the unity-in-difference of the two, without the intercurrency conceptualized between the two.

Ontology is the study of what sorts of things are said to be there and epistemology is the study of "What sorts of things can be said about the sorts of things said to be there".¹¹ The cleavage between the two '*sayings*', a detachment between ontology and epistemology, by a misconstrual of the latter (i.e. *saying* associated with epistemology) as superior to the former (i.e., *saying* associated

¹⁰ Because the true sense of ontology is nothing but the scientific way of saying "what there is", the relation is "saying of what there is" in relation to a theory or conceptual framework.

¹¹ Magee, B. and Quine. W. V. O, (1978) , P. 171.

with ontology) allures one for foundationalistic spading on epistemology. A foundationalist's appeal to semantics is meant for spading on the '*saying*' itself of the epistemological kind which, in turn, is alleged to provide the foundation (linguistic one).

However, in both the investigations, ontological and epistemological, '*saying*' of some sorts of things is the main concern. And, of course, it is not just a meaningful *saying* of our ordinary language.¹² It is a framework's accounting of certain things. But, more importantly, since no such account is absolute, it is futile to spade on '*saying*' itself (i.e. on semantics itself) to gain a philosophical uphold of an ideal (determined) '*saying*' for the doctrinal completeness. This completeness is available neither for semantics to make linguistic absolutism tenable nor for any conceptual framework or theory to make justology *qua* contemporary foundationalistic and coherentistic study of justification tenable. On the other hand, since there is an intercurrency between the ontological '*saying*' and the epistemological '*saying*', a systematic study of the intercurrency is required with an 'enlightened' empirical spirit. This spirit's requirement is due to the availability, the only availability, of some empirical ground on what the said intercurrency's rudimentary stages can be studied.

¹² Needless to say that philosophy is not ordinary language, nor it is about ordinary language itself. And, no doubt, ontology is philosophical. Ontological discussions, for Quine, are not about the the rules or principles guiding the ordinary language. Nor, they are just the ordinary way of speaking that there are trees, tables, men and animals. There are in fact the questions on how we say about those objects but the answers are not based on any intensional semantical rules.

No conceptual clarity is available, neither on ontological ground nor on semantical ground, which could have satisfactorily explicated the ASD such that the ASD would have foundationalistically demarcated a clear-cut distinction between philosophical (*contra* naturalized) epistemology and the natural sciences. Ontological reactivity shatters any faint hope for an analyticity's privileged ontological status and the IT does the same on semantical grounds. Thus no privileged status can be, ontologically or semantically, conceded to some statements (alleged to be analytically true) distinguished from all other statements (alleged to be non-analytically or synthetically true). On the other hand, intercurrency among all the statements (the so called analytics as well as the synthetics) enables one to pursue the matter naturalistically.

The matter at hand is epistemological. To specify further, it is the 'conceptual dimension' of epistemology. It is to provide an adequate explanation for our knowing of anything (concrete or abstract) in this world. It is the explanation and, remember, not the justification what we are to search for.

It is typically an illusion of the apriority (transcendental, linguistic or conditional) of normativity alleged to be indispensably associated with epistemology, as if eternally infused in epistemology, accrues to the hope imbibed for justology. The Humean predicament is vainly attempted for its removal. But, to repeat, the 'Humean predicament is the human predicament'.

Justology undertaken by the contemporary foundationalists and

coherentists presupposes an epistemic normativity parallel to that of the Carnapian enterprise. The versions prominent in these days do immunize themselves against the charge, by which the traditional foundationalists were victimised, that if certainty *qua* incorrigibility can be entrusted on any knowledge claim then their certainty or incorrigibility must be extended either in an arbitrary manner or in an obscured manner of what there is no sense. For the independence that such certainty *qua* incorrigibility requires on behalf of the conceptual frameworks is shown to be untenable. Thus the stronger versions of contemporary foundationalism are criticised on the ground that they uphold framework independent truth, belief or propositional meaning in their analysis of knowledge.

The modest versions resist, against the above said usual criticism, mainly by distinguishing 'indefeasibility' from 'incorrigibility'. However, *a priori* epistemic normativity is upheld in both the cases (stronger and modest) with the difference that the truth, belief or propositional meaning are framework independent in case of the stronger versions whereas those are framework dependent in case of the modest versions. (Parallel to the difference between the traditional foundationalists' Absolutism and the Carnapian foundationalists' linguistic absolutism).

The Gettier's problem, the problem of identifying 'knowledge' with 'justified true belief, replaces the Cartesian problem of 'indubitable' knowledge. Consequently, as a response to Gettier's problem - parallel to any response to the Cartesian problem- justology is no less vulnerable than the traditional foundationalism and the

Carnapian foundationalism are shown to be vulnerable to the criticisms provided against the ASD, determinacy of meaning and absolutic determination of ontology.

Justology is untenable on the ground that its very objective of providing necessary and sufficient conditions for "justified true belief " is unviable. Knowledge identified with 'justified true belief in order to lay down the epistemic norms in terms of the conditions necessary and sufficient for "justified true belief is untenable. For, precisely, the required epistemic normativity is unviable. It matters the least whether a subjective or a propositional or a doxastic account of justification is upheld. So also, if that epistemic normativity is upheld, it matters the least whether those accounts are relative to certain conditions or not. For the supposed relativity is just a bit of sophistication added to the old absolutic conception of knowledge and justification identified with an absolutic conception of truth, belief or meaning that plays the vital role in the analysis of knowledge or justification.

Thus, as far as I succeed in showing the absolutic character of truth, belief or meaning as to be the fundamental requirement of a justological move, I succeed in advancing Quine's anti-foundationalism *qua*. naturalism as a critic of contemporary foundationalism. Quine's anti-foundationalistic theses themselves do go against the absolutic, essentialistic or metaphysical account of truth, belief and meaning. But neither the theses of contemporary foundationalism are explicit enough to be claimed as absolutic nor the Quinean anti-foundationalistic theses are explicit on that any fora of

absolutism can be criticised.

The reciprocal containment between epistemology and natural science (ontology) and the scientific skepticism in place of Cartesian skepticism, both together, can explain the above said implicit bearings. Truth, belief and meaning are not independent of experience precisely because epistemology is not independent of natural science. Cartesian doubt is the root cause of the requirement of that independent status.

Thus finding two fundamental features of Quine's naturalized epistemeolgy inside his anti-foundationalistic theses I would like to claim that an independent status conceded to any form of concepts, beliefs, truths, meanings or conditions so as to be epistemically prior to experience can be criticized by Quine's anti-foundationalism *qua* naturalism. And, to speak against the other side, I would like to claim that the traditional foundationalists, analytical foundationalisms and the contemporary foundationalists do illegitimately concede some form of belief, truth, meaning or conditions so as to make them epistemically prior to experience. For, as I have tried to show, foundationalists uphold the separation of epistemilogy from natural science as well as the incompatibility between knowledge and doubt; and these two features play a major role for that illegitimate concession.

Thus Quine's anti-foundationalism *qua*. naturalism is a genuine epistemological investigation which is worth pursuable in philosophy, not only for its *prims facie* arguments against absolutism but also for

its naturalistic ingredient antagonistic to any version of foundationalism. Both the moves -the anti-foundationalistic and the naturalistic- plead for an indeterminacy which can be called as the indeterminacy of method, the fourth indeterminacy. Indeterminacy of translation, inscrutability of reference and underdetermination of scientific theory are the three indeterminacy theses conspicuously figured in Quine's writings. The fourth indeterminacy, the indeterminacy of method, works for and resulted from the three indeterminacies. For anti-foundationalism is nothing but naturalism and the three conspicuously figured indeterminacy theses have been shown to be against foundationalism. And, it has also been shown that a genuine naturalism, a Quinean naturalized epistemology, advocates for the indeterminacy of method. Thus it can be said that to go against foundationalism is nothing but to go towards Quine's naturalized epistemology.

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