Kautilya's Arthashastra and Indian Strategic Culture: A Comparative Study of Two Phases of India's Foreign Policy, 1947-1964 and 1998-2014

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BY

KAJARI SAHAI

(09SPPH13)

Department of Political Science

School of Social Sciences

University of Hyderabad

Hyderabad – 500 046

Telangana, India

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Department of Political Science

CERTIFICATE

This is to certify that the thesis titled '**Kautilya's Arthashastra and Indian Strategic Culture: A Comparative Study of Two Phases of India's Foreign Policy, 1947-1964 and 1998-2014**', submitted by Ms. Kajari Sahai (09SPPH13) for the award of the degree of Doctor of Philosophy in Political Science, is a record of bona fide work carried out by her under my supervision and guidance. This dissertation has not been submitted either in part or in full to any other university or institution of learning for the award of any other degree.

Hyderabad

July 27, 2018

Prof. Prithvi Ram Mudiam

(Supervisor)

Head

Department of Political Science

Dean

School of Social Sciences

Department of Political Science

DECLARATION

I, Kajari Sahai (09SPPH13), hereby declare that the work embodied in this dissertation titled, '**Kautilya's Arthashastra and Indian Strategic Culture: A Comparative Study of Two Phases of India's Foreign Policy, 1947-1964 and 1998-2014**', submitted under the supervision of Prof. Prithvi Ram Mudiam, is a bona fide research work. I also declare that to the best of my knowledge it has not been submitted previously in part or in full to this University or any other university or institution for the award of any other degree or diploma.

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1. **"Kautilya's Arthashastra: Indian Strategic Culture and Grand Strategic Preferences",** ***Journal of Defence Studies*****, Vol. 12, No. 3, July-September 2018, pp. 27-54. ISSN 0976-1004**

2. "**Swaraj in Ideas",** ***Geopolitics*****, Vol. VII, Issue X, March 2017, pp. 51-53**

and has made presentations in the following conferences:

1. "**Exploring the Roots of India's Strategic Culture",** Institute for Defence Studies and Analyses (IDSA), New Delhi, October 5, 2017

2. **"Concept Clusters II – Sadgunyas, Rajamandala and Upayas"**, Workshop of the Graduate Certificate in Strategic Studies (GCSS) organized by Takshashila Instituion, IIC (Annexe), New Delhi, 7th and 8th July, 2018

Further, the student has passed the following courses towards fulfillment of the coursework requirement for Ph.D. and has been exempted from doing coursework (recommended by the Research Advisory Committee) on the basis of the following courses passed during his M.Phil programme and the M.Phil degree awarded to her:

	Course Code	Course Title	Credits	Pass/Fail
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2.	SP601	Research Methodology-II	4	Pass
3.	SP602	Advanced Theories: Public Policy	4	Pass
4.	SP603	Individual Course	4	Pass

Supervisor Head of Department Dean of School

Abbreviations

ARTRAC	Army Training Command
ASEAN	Association of South-East Asian Nations
BARC	Bhabha Atomic Energy Commission
BJP	Bharatiya Janata Party
BRICS	Brazil, Russia, India, China and South Africa
CIA	Central Intelligence Agency
CPEC	China-Pakistan Economic Corridor
CMD	Credible Minimum Deterrence
CTBT	Comprehensive Test Ban Treaty
DAE	Department of Atomic Energy
DND	Draft Nuclear Doctrine
DRDO	Defence Research and Development Organization
FDI	Foreign Direct Investment
FMCT	Fissile Material Cutoff Treaty
FTA	Free Trade Agreement
GDP	Gross Domestic Product
IAEC	Indian Atomic Energy Commission
IAF	Indian Air Force
ICBM	Intercontinental Ballistic Missile
IISS	International Institute for Strategic Studies
ISRO	Indian Space Research Organization
JIC/NSCS	Joint Intelligence Committee/ National Security Council Secretariat

LAC	Line of Actual Control
LOC	Line of Control
MFN	Most Favoured Nation
MTCR	Missile Technology Control Regime
NAM	Nonaligned Movement
NDA	National Democratic Alliance
NFU	No-First-Use
NPT	Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons
NSAB	National Security Advisory Board
POW	Prisoners of War
PPP	Purchasing Power Parity
R&AW	Research and Analysis Wing
SAARC	South Asian Association for Regional Cooperation
SAFTA	South Asian Free Trade Agreement
SCO	Shanghai Cooperation Organization
SIPRI	Stockholm International Peace Research Institute
SLBM	Submarine-Launched Ballistic Missile
UPA	United Progressive Alliance
UN	United Nations
USD	U.S. Dollar
USSR	Union of Soviet Socialist Republics
WMD	Weapons of Mass Destruction
WTO	World Trade Organization

Contents

Preface

This research study has been driven by a number of motives, branching out from the central question about whether there exists in India a coherent set of assumptions about the external security environment and a broad consensus on the preferred ways of dealing with it, the latter logically flowing from the former. In other words, whether there indeed exists an Indian strategic culture strongly anchored in India's ancient past and exercising a perceptible influence on contemporary India's strategic behaviour.

The quest, in essence, is spurred by two factors. One, to illuminate Indian strategic thinking in a manner that, as far as possible, comprehensively and conclusively addresses the various strands of debates on India's strategic culture that have been proffered by scholars, both Indian and Western. Second, which is a function of the first, to broadly gauge and understand contemporary Indian strategic thought through axioms and patterns that have persisted over time and space. The agenda of the study has coalesced my interest and understanding of both ancient Indian texts and contemporary International Relations theory.

India has truly 'crossed the Rubicon.'[1] In tandem with changes at both the international and domestic levels, India has emerged with a distinctly self-assured foreign policy posture post-1998, shedding the uncertainties that marked the early 1990s. The sheer magnitude of the effects of changes and the continuing geostrategic recalibrations, warrant a research on factors that influence India's behaviour. It is indeed important to understand what undergirds the decisions taken by 'Asia's rising giant.' The uniqueness of the path that India has trodden suggests that India's strategic policy making cannot be straitjacketed into any one of the dominant paradigms of modern International Relations (IR) theory. It represents a complex interplay of domestic and international factors and throws the concept of 'strategic culture' into the domain of analysis. It can be contended that unique cultural variables may explain strategic behaviour differently and more accurately than structural explanations alone.

Alastair Iain Johnston's methodological lead is followed to unearth strategic culture from a formative text that is widely understood as the repository of the wisdom of ancient Indian

[1] The idiom "Crossing the Rubicon" means to pass a point of no return, and refers to Julius Caesar's army's crossing of the Rubicon River in 49 BC, which was considered an act of insurrection and treason.

statecraft. The main postulates of ancient Indian strategic thought are codified and commented upon in 323 BCE by Kautilya (also known as Chanakya), the advisor to Emperor Chandragupta Maurya. His work, Kautilya's *Arthashastra*[2], is the ancient classic containing practical advice to the sovereign on strategies of war and peace. It is believed that a large part of the content of this ancient treatise was distilled from the four Vedas and prominent Indian epics, namely the "Ramayana" and the "Mahabharata". The theoretical constructs that emanate out of the text represent the innate bearings of the political philosophy of several antecedent and subsquent ancient texts.

The ideational core is extrapolated from the text and is put to test for consistency and persistence across time and strategic contexts. As a 'foundational text of Political Science and IR theory', it has an intellectual 'eigenvalue', which makes it a classic and thus transcends the context of its origination. The heuristic approach allows a greater flexibility for the application of the central tenets of the text to contemporary political attitudes, beliefs and behaviour.

The last step of the research process is to ascertain the independent explanatory value of the cultural variable in influencing India's contemporary strategic behaviour. Kautilya's Arthashastra is a fitting body of knowledge to draw from because it was written in a political context which was marked by the existence of multiple political units, quite similar to the contemporary multi-polar international system.

However, it may seem rather implausible to some that the basic tenets of an ancient text of statecraft have not only persisted across the vicissitudes of Indian history but still exercise an influence on the conduct of contemporary India's foreign policy in a considerable measure. In fact, the socialization of the modern strategic elite who are the chief decision makers, in ancient Indian strategic thought, itself has been a matter of debate. Therefore, most studies on India's strategic culture have focussed on the writings of the post-independence period while acknowledging the classic ancient text as an important work on statecraft but with little contemporary strategic relevance and value. Interestingly, a recent study on India's strategic culture, which relied on post-Cold War writings of the Indian strategic community as its source, laid out the 'lowest common denominator of Indian grand strategic thought' which, in essence,

[2] Translations of Kautilya's *Arthashastra* by R.P. Kangle and L.N. Rangarajan have been used for the study. Their elucidation of key concepts from their respective foci has helped in understanding the text more comprehensively.

converges with the broad Kautilyan framework.[3] Indeed, the latent, semi conscious, intuitive presence of Kautilyan thought presents a 'longue durée' understanding of strategic culture.[4]

Some recent studies, which have primarly relied on 'expert inetrviews' of the practitioners of foreign and defence policies have shown an encouraging trend and hint towards a Kautilyan influence at both the conscious and subconscious levels.[5] Additionally,some important research works have compared and contrasted the ancient, medieval and modern periods of India and found patterns in statecraft, role of ethics, grand strategic preferences that reveal a broad consistency in spite of the varied political and strategic contexts.[6]

For Johnston, it is important that a significant portion of the decision-making elites of the period selected for the empirical study should display proclivities towards the preference ranking deduced from the formative period in order to credibly establish the relation between culture and behaviour. Additionally, the strategic texts in the form of doctrines, speeches, official papers in the period of interest should also concurrently display a similar disposition as found in the text of a distant past. It is for this reason that personal interviews with the National Security Advisors (NSAs), a few former foreign secretaries, and other important members of the strategic community have been conducted for this study. The research work has chiefly relied on primary sources in the form of official doctrines, official committee reports, annual reports of the Ministries, Parliamentary debates, important speeches and memoirs of statesmen, soldiers, scholars, commentators, and diplomats.

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[3] See Kanti Bajpai, "Indian Grand Strategy: Six Schools of Thought", in Kanti Bajpai, Saira Basit, V. Krishnappa, *India's Grand Strategy: History, Theory, Cases* (New Delhi: Routledge), 2014. It states that the use of force exists as a norm in the state system but should be used as a last resort; negotiated settlements of disputes are always preferable; negotiation and accommodation in bilateral relations with Pakistan and China but continued vigilance and vigorous defence when attacked; suspicion of the US, yet engagement and cooperation.

[4] The *longue durée* ; English: the long term is an expression used by the French Annales School of historical writing to designate their approach to the study of history. It gives priority to long-term historical structures over short-term time-scale.

[5] See Michael Liebig and Subrata Mitra eds., *Kautilya's Arthashastra: An Intellectual Portrait: The Classical Roots of Modern Politics in India* (New Delhi: Rupa Publications, 2017)

[6] Jayashree Vivekanandan has compared the strategic tradition of medieval India with Kautilya's *Arthashastra* and portrays them as similar in terms of preference for negotiation and conciliation as a practical strategy to deal with the political situation of their respective periods. See Jayashree Vivekanandan, *Interrogating International Relations: India's Strategic Practice and the Return of History* (Routledge: London/New York/New Delhi, 2011). Manjeet Pardesi has surveyed five pan-Indian powers – the Mauryas, the Guptas, the Mughals, British India and the Republic of India and concludes that they demonstrate remarkable continuity in strategic thought. See Manjeet Singh Pardesi, "Deducing India's Grand Strategy of Regional Hegemony from Historical and Conceptual Perspectives", WP076, Institute of Defence and Strategic Studies, Singapore, April 2005.

The two time periods that have been chosen for the empirical study are the Nehruvian era (1947-1964) and the more contemporary period between 1998 and 2014. These have been deliberately chosen because they are vastly different in terms of the level of material capabilities, and are perceived to have toed divergent foreign policy approaches; the former hewing to 'idealism' and the latter to 'realism'. The independent explanatory value of strategic culture as a variable can be more credibly established if coherence in strategic thought is proven in these two vastly different time periods. Due to the enormity of data and the risk of study becoming too unwieldy, the period 1964-1998 has been deliberately omitted in the study.

The thesis is organized under six chapters and a conclusion. The first chapter introduces and develops the theme of strategic culture as an approach in strategic studies. It identifies a theoretical framework that is used to delineate the core precepts of the identified 'object of analysis' – Kautilya's *Arthashastra*. Chapter two goes on to apply this theoretical framework to assess ancient Indian strategic thought as embodied in the seminal treatise on statecraft. The objective is to uncover the key assumptions of the central paradigm in Indian strategic thought by focusing on answers to questions about the role of war in human affairs, the nature of conflict with the enemy, and the efficacy of violence in dealing with the adversary. Chapter three discerns the grand strategic preference ranking which flows logically from the central strategic paradigm. This theoretical construct is put to test in the later chapters in two carefully chosen time periods.

Chapter four assesses the Nehruvian foreign policy in the light of the deduced strategic culture, specifically in the context of the policy of nonalignment, bilateral relations with China and Pakistan and the nuclear policy. Chapter five evaluates the grand strategic preference ranking in the time period between 1998 and 2014 under the same sub-sections dealt with in the Nehruvian era. Congruence in the strategic approach in these two distant time periods and consequently diverse domestic and international contexts, credibly establishes the existence of a single strategic culture in India. Chapter six appraises India's nuclear policy in the contemporary period (1998-2014). India's Nuclear Doctrine is examined as the 'strategic-cultural object' to ascertain similarities in strategic disposition with that of the formative text.

This study does not seek to solve all puzzles regarding India's strategic culture. Neither does it make a totalizing claim that all foreign policy actions are rooted in strategic culture derived from

Kautilya's *Arthashastra*. Instead, it attempts to throw light on ancient Indian strategic thought as an important influence on the shaping of modern India's foreign and security policy. The Mauryan empire, which formed the political context of the treatise, was a cohesive geo-cultural space (*chakravartikshetra*) driven by the idea of politically unifying the subcontinent. The study attempts to suggest that the *realpolitik* roots of India's strategic culture run much deeper than what the modern discipline of IR may envisage.

I have a number of individuals and institutions to thank for their invaluable support. I would like to express my deepest gratitude to my supervisor, Prof. Prithvi Ram Mudiam, who has provided the right guidance to rouse my imagination. His measured comments and pertinent suggestions have helped this project come together as one coherent, logical whole.

I am deeply indebted to Prof. Rajen Harshe, Prof. Kanti Bajpai, Prof. Alka Acharya, Prof. Rajesh M. Basrur, Prof. Shrikant Paranjpe, Col. Ali Ahmed and Prof. Rashed Uz Zaman for helping me crystallize the framework of the research study. Col. Ali Ahmed, in particular, has been a mentor throughout the exercise.

My timely and intellectually rich association with the Institute for Defence Studies and Analysis (IDSA) in general and the Indigenous Historical Knowledge Project in particular, has helped the research work significantly. I am extremely indebted to Col. Gautam, Dr. Michael Liebig and Dr. Saurabh Mishra for revealing the deeper undercurrent of Kautilya's Arthashastra. It has helped me develop a robust theoretical construct which has rendered the empirical assessment clear and reliable.

I would also like to especially thank Mr. M.K. Narayanan (former NSA, 2005-2010), Mr. Shivshankar Menon (former NSA, 2011-2014), Mr. Shyam Saran (former Foreign Secretary, 2004-2006), Mrs. Nirupama Rao (former foreign secretary, 2009-2011) and Gen. Prakash Menon (former Military Advisor and Secretary to Governemnt of India, 2011-2014) for their practical and precious inputs.

Finally, I am particularly grateful to my family for providing the much needed encouragement to pursue what seemed to be an insurmountable task to begin with. I would especially thank my father-in-law, Mr. Kamal Kumar, who has indefatigably engaged in numerous discussions with me throughout the course of this study. As a retired police officer and an ex-IB (Intelligence

Bureau) professional, his insights have greatly helped me shape my arguments. I extend my gratitude to my parents who have always believed in me, sometimes undeservedly so. My husband and children have been remarkably patient and have graciously allowed me time to concentrate on my research work.

Chapter 1

Strategic Culture: Concept and Evolution

Western political theory, from the beginning, has advocated the idea that culture influences states' security behavior. The Greek historian Herodotus attributed the victory of Greece in the Greco-Persian wars to "the fruit of wisdom and strong law."[1] In his assessment, it was the unique cultural character of the Greeks that helped them garner courage to defeat the mightier Persian forces. Herodotus' immediate successor, Thucydides, too turned to cultural explanations in his analysis of the Peloponnesian War which can be characterized as "a possession for all time."[2] He explained the conflict between Athens and Sparta as rooted in the temperament of the two rival cities: "the spiritedness of Athens and the passivity of Sparta."[3] Subsequent Western thinkers too employed culture as a variable to fathom the intricacies of various social phenomena.

But it was not just the West which was circumscribed by culture. Ancient treatises like Sun Tzu's *Art of War* and Kautilya's *Arthashastra* are strategically significant in China and India respectively because they proffer cultural explanations of state behavior. It is observed about the ancient Indian strategic thinker that his political thought is "constrained by Hindu society, including classes, castes and customs."[4] While the text was written in a particular political context, it was not a descriptive or historical work about the Mauryan Empire. Instead, the theoretical core of the text offers general principles of inter-state behaviour which lends it a timeless character. Therefore, these great scholarly works of yesteryears are not only testament to the fact that cultural factors play a role in assessing international security behavior, but also convey their potential relevance to contemporary strategic conduct of states.

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[1] Herodotus, *The Histories*, trans. A.D. Godley (Cambridge: Harvard University Press, 1920), 7.102, available at http://www.perseus.tufts.edu/hopper/text?doc=Perseus:text:1999.01.0126. In Ashley J. Tellis, "Overview", in Ashley Tellis, Alison Szalwinski, and Michael Wills ed., *Understanding Strategic Cultures in the Asia-Pacific*, Strategic Asia 2016-17, The National Bureau of Asian Research, Seattle and Washington, D.C.

[2] Thucydides, *The History of the Peloponnesian War*, trans. Richard Crawley (New York: Random House, 1951), 1.1.

[3] Tellis, "Overview", *Understanding Strategic Cultures in the Asia-Pacific*, p. 4

[4] Roger Boesche, *The First Great Political Realist: Kautilya and His Arthashastra* (Lanham, Maryland and Oxford: Lexington Books, 2002), p. 103, in Rashed Uz Zaman, *Strategic Culture and the Rise of Indian Navy*, The University of Reading, unpublished doctoral thesis, p. 22.

However, given the antiquity, what is lamentable is that modern studies in strategic culture have fallen short of providing a viable theory which develops the notion of strategic culture which is intelligible, whose construction can be verified, and whose effects on strategic behaviour can be segregated from the effects of other non-ideational factors. This chapter seeks to review the theoretical evolution of the concept of strategic culture in a manner that throws light on the dim pathways that lead to the "strategy bridge"[5] and help cross it, in the Indian context.

"For the classical theorists from Herodotus to Machiavelli, integrating strategic culture into their larger analyses was not particularly problematic because their philosophical investigations of social behavior naturally accommodated multiple layers of causation."[6] The modern strategic cultural theorists find it more difficult to explicate a viable theory because of their proclivity to reductionist justifications. These approaches, imbued with a positivist agenda, elicit accurately outlined hypotheses to tackle the haziness inherent in the concept. In addition to this, according to Tellis, "it is not clear whether the notion of culture, however defined, and even if applicable as a good explanation in specific cases, can be universalized sufficiently to produce 'covering laws' of the kind required by social scientific approaches that model themselves on the natural sciences."[7]

Furthermore, the value of strategic culture as an independent explanatory variable is difficult to establish. When two or more sufficient and distinct causes (strategic culture and structural explanations) lead to the same effect, the utility of strategic culture as a variable gets diminished. To choose between two initially plausible explanations simply on the basis of parsimony is to make a substantive (and potentially wrong) decision for intellectually aesthetic reason.[8]

Notwithstanding these conceptual and methodological limitations, strategic culture can be understood as an indefinable element which provides "the ultimate values toward which action is orientated" and "shapes a repertoire or 'tool kit' of habits, skills, and styles from which people

[5] Analogy borrowed from Colin S. Gray, *The Strategy Bridge: Theory for Practice*, (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2010). The 'Strategy Bridge' presents and explains the general theory of strategy and demonstrates the relevance of that theory to the real world of practice.
[6] Ashley J. Tellis, "Reconstructing Political Realism: The Long March to Scientific Theory," *Security Studies* 5, no. 2, 1996, pp. 3–94.
[7] Tellis, "Overview", *Understanding Strategic Cultures in the Asia-Pacific*, p.6
[8] Alastair Iain Johnston, *Cultural Realism: Strategic Culture and Grand Strategy in Chinese History*, (Princeton, New Jersey: Princeton University Press, 1995), p. 262.

construct 'strategies of action.'"[9] Academic theorization in the field began during World War II with the U.S. government commissioning "national character" studies of the key Axis powers to understand their attitudes towards war. This first wave of cultural theorizing led by anthropologists faded after the nuclear revolution on the premise that the development and use of nuclear weapons by the US and the Soviet Union would tread a similar strategic discourse. However, "the continuing Soviet nuclear buildup beyond what most agreed was a robust assured destruction capability caused many scholars to question the rational-actor assumptions of much of the general theorizing about the effects of nuclear weapons on statecraft."[10] The cultural theories were back in the reckoning. However, the final outcome of the Cold War proved cultural theorizing wrong but the post Cold-War wave spurred a renewed interest in cultural explanations. With the current shifting balances of power and increased fluidity, incorporating strategic culture as a factor into analyses of foreign policy making, can offer a more nuanced explanation of specific state behavior.

The research so on far cultural and ideational effects on strategic choice – can be divided into three generations.[11] Johnston's classification of the scholarship into three generations is broadly accepted by most strategic culture scholars. Colin S. Gray succinctly summed up Johnston's detailed division by pointing out that "all the generations add up to a small group of people with the first generation scholars being mostly security policy analysts and Soviet-era specialists; the second generation scholars aimed to decipher the cunning coded messages behind the language of strategic studies; and the third generation's objective seems to be mainly researchability."[12]

This research study is an attempt to define, analyze, and test for the effects of strategic culture on state security behavior. In pursuance of this task, the expansive debates and discussions spanning the three generations will be viewed through the lens of researchability. The section which follows will discuss the conceptual and methodological problems that research in this field has been subjected to. However, the selection of the broad themes, and discussions under them, will

[9] Ann Swidler, "Culture in Action: Symbols and Strategies," *American Sociological Review 51*, no. 2 (1986): 273.
[10] Colin S. Gray, "What RAND Hath Worught", *Foreign Policy*, No.4 (Fall 1971), pp. 111-129.
[11] Johnston, *Cultural Realism*, p. 5. According to Johnston, these generations are roughly temporal in sequence, though there is some overlap. Some of the literature that belongs conceptually to the first generation appeared after the emergence of the second generation.
[12] Colin S. Gray, *Modern Strategy* (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1999), footnote 1, p. 129.

be informed by the academic theorization in the field through the generations. The objective is to get a thematic clarity at the conceptual level before applying it to practice.

Defining Strategic Culture

The term 'culture' is defined differently in each of its manifestation thereby limiting the prospect of a definitional consensus. Valerie M. Hudson, observed "that the complexity of defining culture arose not from what to include in a definition of culture, but rather what to exclude…..the vagueness of culture's boundaries is reflected in the all-encompassing but pithy descriptions of the term found in social science literature."[13] According to Raymond Williams, "the word ranks as one of the two or three most difficult in the English language."[14] Together, 'culture' prefixed with 'strategic' makes the term multidimensional. Alastair Iain Johnston too observed how "remarkably undefined" the concept was.[15] Notwithstanding the limitations in defining the term in international security literature, there are a number of features which are common to it. "Whether culture is described in terms of assumptions, attitudes, beliefs, concepts, conceptual models, feelings, ideas, images, knowledge, meanings, mind-sets, norms, orientations, sentiments, symbols, values, world views or some combination of these concepts, it refers to the recurring patterns of mental activity, or the habits of thought, perception, and feeling, that are common to members of a particular group."[16]

The early origins of the culture approach could be traced to "national character studies" of the period after World War II. They broadly relied on anthropological models and sought to establish links between culture and behaviour.[17] Prominent anthropologists were employed by the US Foreign Morale Analysis Division to gain insights into the "national character" of

[13] Valerie M. Hudson, "Culture and Foreign Policy: Developing a Research Agenda", in Valerie M. Hudson (ed.), *Culture and Foreign Policy* (Boulder, CO and London: Lynne Rienner Publishers, 1997), p. 2.
[14] Williams, cited by William H. Sewell, Jr., "The Concept(s) of Culture", in Victoria E. Bonnell and Lynn Hunt (eds), *Beyond the Cultural Turn: New Directions in the Study of Society and Culture* (Berkeley: University of California Press, 1999), pp. 35–61.
[15] Johnston, *Cultural Realism*, p. 1.
[16] John S. Duffield, "Political Culture and State Behavior: Why Germany Confounds Neorealism", *International Organization*, Vol. 53, No. 4, (Autumn 1999), pp. 765-803.
[17] Two of the most prominent scholars of national character were Ruth Benedict, *The Chrysanthemum and the Sword* (Boston: Houghton Mifflin, 1946), and Geoffrey Gorer, *The American People* (New York: W.W. Norton, 1948).

Germany and Japan, in particular.[18] "These works defined the roots of a nation's character, or culture, in language, religion, customs, socialization, and the interpretation of common memories."[19] However, the scholarship of this genre came under tremendous criticism for over-generalizing the concept of culture.

In what has been adjudged "phenomenally influential,"[20] *The Interpretation of Cultures* (1973), Clifford Geertz defined culture as "an historically transmitted pattern of meanings embodied in symbols, a system of inherited conceptions expressed in symbolic form by means of which men communicate, perpetuate, and develop their knowledge about and attitudes towards life."[21] Pamela Ballinger explains that Geertz rejected the cognitivist view that anthropologists should (or ever could) get inside the heads of the natives, and instead asked scholars to focus on culture as a public document.[22] For Geertz, "ideas are not…unobservable mental stuff but envehicled meanings, the vehicles being symbols…not idealities to be stared at but texts to be read."[23]

Ballinger also observed that despite the robust nature of his approach, Geertz has been criticised for privileging the ideational over the material and disengaging culture from social action.[24] Geertz anticipated these criticisms and in his essay "Thick Description" argued that "[b]ehavior must be attended to, and with some exactness, because it is through the flow of behavior – or more precisely, social action – that cultural forms find articulation."[25] Geertz's foray into describing "culture" made the possibility of defining the concept more rigorously, thinkable. "For sure, definitional consensus would, in the nature of things, remain elusive, but some analysts began taking their cues from the cognitive instructions implicit in Geertz's work."[26]

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[18] Leading cultural anthropologists were Geoffrey Bateson, Ruth Benedict, Geoffrey Gorer, Clyde Kluckhohn, Alexander Leighton, and Margaret Mead.
[19] David J. Elkins and Richard E.B. Simeon, "A Cause in Search of Its Effect, or What Does Political Culture Explain?" *Comparative Politics 11*, no.2 (January 1979): 127-128.
[20] Victoria E. Bonnell and Lynn Hunt, "Introduction," in *Beyond the Cultural Turn: New Directions in the Study of Society and Culture*, (Berkeley: University of California Press, 1999), pp. 1-32, quotation at p. 3.
[21] Clifford Geertz, *The Interpretation of Cultures* (New York: Basic Books, 1973)
[22] Zaman, *Strategic Culture and the Rise of the Indian Army*, PhD dissertation, p. 20
[23] Pamela Ballinger, "How to Detect Culture and Its Effects", in Robert E. Goodin and Charles Tilly (eds.), *The Oxford Handbook of Contextual Political Analysis* (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2006), p. 345.
[24] Zaman, *Strategic Culture and the Rise of the Indian Army*, PhD dissertation, p. 20
[25] Geertz, *The Interpretation of Cultures*, p. 17.
[26] David G. Haglund, **"**Let's Call the Whole Thing Off"? Security Culture as Strategic Culture", 15 December 2011, *Contemporary Security Policy*, 32:3, pp. 494-516

Alastair Iain Johnston contends that "there are no glaring contradictions between definitions of culture found in anthropology, sociology, and organization theory, on the one hand, and those found in political science, on the other."[27] Political scientists Almond and Verba (1960s) defined it as "that subset of beliefs and values of a society that relate to the political system."[28] "Political culture manifests itself on at least three levels: the cognitive, which includes empirical and causal beliefs; the evaluative, which consists of values, norms and moral judgments; and the expressive or affective, which encompasses emotional attachments, patterns of identity and loyalty, and feelings of affinity, aversion, or indifference."[29] Parsons described culture as "comprising of 'interpretive codes' including language, values, and even substantive beliefs like support for democracy or the futility of war."[30] According to Elkins and Simeon, "specifically, political culture provides assumptions about the orderliness of the political universe, the nature of causality, principal goals in political life, the relative value of maximax versus minimax strategies, who belongs to the political community, what type of events, actions, and institutions are political, and the trustworthiness of other political actors."[31]

Sociologist Ann Swidler defined culture quite broadly as "consisting of symbolic vehicles of meaning, including beliefs, ritual practices, art forms, and ceremonies, as well as informal cultural practices such as language, gossip, stories, and rituals of daily life."[32] Further, "she contended that interest-driven strategies are significant mediating conditions for state behavior."[33] Johnston sums up that despite differences in the terminology and varied orientations in definitions of culture, there are indeed a fair amount of more-or-less shared elements. "Culture consists of shared decision rules, recipes, standard operating procedures, and decision routines that impose a degree of order on individual and group conceptions of their relationship to their environment, be it social, organizational, or political."[34]

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[27] Johnston, *Cultural Realism,* p. 34.
[28] Gabriel Almond and Sidney Verba, *The Civic Culture: Political Attitudes and Democracy in Five Nations* (Boston: Little, Brown, 1965): 11-14.
[29] John S. Duffield, *World Power Forsaken: Political Culture, International Institutions, and German Security Policy After Unification* (Stanford: Stanford University Press, 1999), p. 23
[30] See Talcott Parsons, *The Social System* (Glencoe, Ill.: Free Press, 1951).
[31] David J. Elkins, Richard E.B. Simeon, "A Cause in Search of Its Effect, Or What Does Political Culture Explain", *Comparative Politics*, 11, 1979, p. 132.
[32] Ann Swidler, "Culture in Action: Symbols and Strategies," American Sociological Review 51, no.2 (April 1986): 273
[33] Max Weber, *The Sociology of Religion* (Boston: Beacon Press, 1946a[1922-3]): 220
[34] Johnston, *Cultural Realism,* p. 35.

The First Generation

The discussions around political culture were brought into the realm of modern strategic studies rather effectively by Jack Snyder in 1977. He understood strategic culture as "the sum total of ideas, conditioned emotional responses, and patterns of habitual behavior that members of a national strategic community have acquired through instruction or imitation and share with each other."[35] "Other important elements of strategic culture, according to Snyder, include the context associated with perceived security threats and technological development; strong cognitive content associated with attitudes and beliefs; historical legacies; and beliefs about the role of the military and concerned institutions in the policy-making process."[36] Snyder, in contrast to other writers of his generation did not see strategic culture as influencing strategic choice but rather as 'coloring debate'. His conception of strategic culture was also distinct because it was not 'monolithic' and did not have deep historical antecedents. Rather, it "sprang from a mixture of recent historical experiences, ideology, high politics, organizational interests, and geography."[37]

"This notion of understanding strategic culture as instrumental rationality bounded by the ideational constraints emerging from a certain national style was extended by other scholars after Snyder, most notably Colin Gray, David Jones, Carnes Lord, and William Kincade."[38] "They located the sources of strategic culture expansively in macro-environmental factors such as geography and factor endowments; in political variables such as history, the character of the state, and state-society relations; in cultural resources such as belief systems, myths, and symbols, as well as textual and nontextual sources of tradition; and in institutional elements, particularly the structure and interests of key military organizations and the character of civil-military relations."[39]

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[35] Jack L. Snyder, "The Soviet Strategic Culture: Implications for Limited Nuclear Operations," RAND Corporation, September 1977, http://www.rand.org/pubs/reports/R2154.html.
[36] Jeffrey S. Lantis, "Strategic Culture and National Security Policy", *International Studies Review,* Volume 4, Issue 3, December 2002, p. 94.
[37] Jack Snyder, "The Concept of Strategic Culture: Caveat Emptor", in Carl C. Jacobson ed., *Strategic Power USA/USSR,* 1990, London.
[38] Tellis, "Overview", p. 13
[39] Ibid. See Colin S. Gray, "National Style in Strategy: The American Example," *International Security* 6, no. 2 (1981): 21–47; Gray, *Nuclear Strategy and National Style*; David R. Jones, "Soviet Strategic Culture," in *Strategic Power USA/USSR*, ed. Carl G. Jacobsen (New York: St. Martin's Press, 1990), 35–49; Carnes Lord, "American Strategic Culture," *Comparative Strategy* 5, no. 3 (1985): 269–93; and William Kincade, "American National Style and Strategic Culture," in Jacobsen, *Strategic Power USA/USSR*, 10–34.

"Gray who borrowed directly from Snyder's conceptual work, defined American strategic culture as modes of thought and action with respect to force, derived from the perception of national historical experience, aspirations for self-characterization (e.g., as an American, what am I?, how should I feel, think and behave?), and from all the many distinctively American experiences of geography, political philosophy, civic culture, and 'way of life' that characterize an American citizen."[40] These inputs, in contrast to Snyder's list had deeper historical and cultural roots. The broad reservoir of the sources of strategic culture in this conception limited its status as a precise explanatory variable. Instead, they admitted that strategic culture consisted principally of "provid[ing] the *milieu* within which strategy is debated"[41]and "a context for understanding, rather than explanatory causality."[42] Gray was influenced by Ken Booth's approach of "cultural relativism" which highlighted the utility of a contextual understanding to "reduce the methodological problems associated with ethnocentrism."[43]

Definitionally, Carnes Lord argued that strategic culture – the "fundamental assumptions governing the constitution of military forces and the ends they are intended to serve" – establishes "a basic framework for, if they do not determine in detail the nature of, military forces and military operations".[44] This basic framework appears to color debate over strategic options by injecting sometimes "unconscious and unsystematic" historically rooted concepts on the nature of war, the necessary preparations for war, and the methods of war.[45] "In an essay on Russian cultural influences on Soviet strategy….Jones argued, that there were three levels of inputs into a state's strategic culture: a macro-environmental level consisting of geography, ethnocultural characteristics, and history; a societal level consisting of social, economic, and political structures of a society; and a micro level consisting of military institutions and characteristics of civil-military relations."[46] "Such a 'culture' presumably affects the whole range of a nation's broad security and more narrow military policies, beginning with the more basic

[40]Johnston, *Cultural Realism,* p. 7
[41] Gray, "National Style in Strategy," pp. 35–37.
[42] Colin S. Gray, "Strategic Culture as Context: The First Generation of Theory Strikes back," *Review of International Studies*, 1999, 25, p. 49.
[43] Ken Booth, *Strategy and Ethnocentrism* (London: Croom Helm, 1979), p. 16, 140.
[44] Carnes Lord, "American Strategic Culture", *Comparative Strategy*, 5:3, 1985, p. 271.
[45] Ibid., p. 289-90.
[46] Johnston, Cultural Realism, p. 9

goals of diplomacy and ending with the 'style' or 'whole series of proclivities' displayed by its armed forces in peace and war."[47]

The efforts made by the above scholars came to be identified as the contribution of the first generation of strategic cultural theories. They, indeed, drew attention to other, unexplored facets of strategy. "Whereas previously culture had been viewed as a residual or secondary explanation for strategic behaviour, the first generation of research sought to include it as a primary explanation for differences in national nuclear strategy."[48]

The Second Generation

The second generation literature departs from the first in a substantial way. It argues that there is a gap between strategic-culture derived declared strategic policy of the state and the actual operational policy. The 1980s saw the works of Reginald Stuart, Robin Luckham, Bradley Klein, and others who were the chief contributors to this generation of scholarship.[49] "Apart from drawing explicitly on Gramscian notions of strategic culture as a tool of political hegemony, the second generation, through its provocative historical research also pointed towards the disjuncture between rhetoric and explanation in strategic choice."[50]

Reginald Stuart's work on the American attitudes towards war reveals "the American war myth" of the post 1815 period. "This myth implies – to use a term Stuart does not – but that fits – that US strategic culture stresses the aberrance of war, but also promotes a crusading anti-Clausewitzian totalistic and moralistic approach to fighting wars."[51] According to Johnston, Stuart's work points towards the possibility of a state's strategic culture existing at the level of myth. "That is, strategic culture may consist of images, stories, and symbols that in their totality

[47] David R. Jones, "Soviet Strategic Culture," in Carl G. Jacobsen, ed., *Strategic Power : USA/USSR*, London, 1990, p. 35
[48] Stuart Poore, "What is the context? A reply to the Gray-Johnston debate on strategic culture", *Review of International Studies*, Vol. 29, No. 2, April 2003, p. 280
[49] For a useful survey of this work, see Stuart Poore, "Strategic Culture," in *Neorealism Versus Strategic Culture*, ed. John Glenn, Darryl Howlett, and Stuart Poore (Aldershot: Ashgate, 2004), pp. 55–57.
[50] Johnston, Cultural Realism, p. 15
[51] Ibid.

serve to legitimize dominant conventions about a state's past, present, and future strategic behavior."[52]

"Bradley Klein's work is clearly the most systematic and theoretically self-conscious in this regard, and anchored as it is in post-structuralist and post-Marxist writings, his arguments reveal both an epistemological and a substantive sophistication that greatly enriches the notion of strategic culture."[53] Klein very succinctly brings out the important gap between a declared strategic policy and an operational one. According to him, strategic culture is a product of historical experience, and therefore, different states exhibit different strategic cultures. However, there is a disjuncture between the declared strategic culture-derived policy and practiced policy. The latter being influenced by state interests of a hegemonic group, consequently, limits strategic choice of the state. "It is, therefore, possible that states speak different strategic-culture languages – as hawkish critics of U.S. MAD concepts stressed about the USSR – but that states' body language (operational doctrine and behavior) are essentially similar."[54]

A slightly different standpoint was proffered by Robin Luckham in his study of "armament culture". In contrast to other writers of this generation, Luckham argued that armament culture is not a product of national historical development, but of global historical processes. As Poore explains, "for Luckham, this influence of the armaments culture 'follows directly from the repressive apparatus of the state and from the consolidation around the armament complex of a class alliance' – including strategists, statesmen, soldiers, and arms manufacturers."[55] This arms culture serves the interests of all stakeholders. Culture, in this sense, is important but not state specific. "It is not unique to ethnocultural systems, but it is unique to a level of global industrialization, militarization, and capitalization."[56]

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[52] Lowell Dittmer, "Political Culture and Political Symbolism", *World Politics*, 29:4, 1977, p. 579, Andrew M. Pettigrew, "On Studying Organizational Cultures", *Administrative Science Quarterly*, 24, 1979, p. 576.
[53] Tellis, "Overview", p. 14. Also see Bradley S. Klein, "Hegemony and Strategic Culture: American Power Projection and Alliance Defence Politics," *Review of International Studies* 14, no. 2 (1988): 133–48; and Bradley S. Klein, *Strategic Studies and World Order: The Global Politics of Deterrence* (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1994).
[54] Johnston, *Cultural Realism*, p. 17.
[55] Stuart Poore, "Strategic Culture", in John Glenn, Darry Howlett, Stuart Poore & Darryl A. Howlett (eds.), *Neorealism Versus Strategic Culture* (Aldershot, Great Britain: Ashgate Publishing Limited, 2004), p. 56.
[56] Robin Luckham, "Armament Culture", *Alternatives*, 10:1, 1984, pp. 1-2.

"Stuart's critique of the American national character, Luckham's focus on the militarization of global politics, and Klein's analysis of how strategic cultures come to be manufactured by elites to serve their own particular interests all share the common goal of unmasking the unjust practices prevailing in national and international politics."[57]

The Third Generation

The utility of cultural explanations of strategic behaviour received a fresh stimulus under Constructivism.[58] Alexander Wendt contended that "state identities and interests can be seen as socially constructed by knowledgeable practice."[59] According to Katzenstein, Keohane, and Krasner, constructivism acknowledges the importance of "intersubjective structures that give the material world meaning, including norms, culture, identity and ideas on state behavior or on international relations more generally."[60] Constructivism steered the way forward for a new research focus in strategic culture theorization.

The third generation develops the concept of strategic culture as an independent variable more rigorously and assesses its influence on strategic behaviour. "Some use military culture, some political-military culture, and others organizational culture as the independent variable, but all take the realist edifice as target, and focus on cases where structural-materialist notions of interest cannot explain a particular strategic choice."[61] Importantly, and making a break from the first generation scholars, their definitions of culture, for the most part, exclude behaviour as an element. "Most interestingly, however, their employment of the scientific approach, with its

[57] Tellis, "Overview", p. 15.
[58] Some of the most influential works in this area for security studies are: Peter J. Katzenstein, ed., *The Culture of National Security: Norms and Identity in World Politics* (New York: Columbia University Press, 1996); Alastair Iain Johnston, "Thinking about Strategic Culture," *International Security* 19, no.4 (Spring 1995): 32-64; Stephen Peter Rosen, "Military Effectiveness: Why Society Matters," *International Security 19*, no.4 (Spring 1995): 5-31; Elizabeth Kier, "Culture and Military Doctrine," *International Security 19*, no.4 (Spring 1995): 65-93; Richard J. Ellis and Michael Thompson, eds., *Culture Matters: Essays in Honor of Aaron Wildavsky* (Boulder: Westview Press, 1997); Yosef Lapid, "Culture's Shop: Returns and Departures in International Relations Theory," in Yosef Lapid and Friedrich Kratochwil, eds., *The Return of Culture and Identity in IR Theory* (Boulder: Lynne Rienner Publishers, 1996).
[59] Alexander Wendt, "Anarchy is What States Make of It: The Social Construction of Power Politics," *International Organization 46*, no.2 (Spring 1992), p. 392.
[60] Peter J. Katzenstein, Robert O. Keohane, and Stephen Krasner, "International Organization and the Study of World Politics," *International Organization 52*, no. 4 (1998), p. 679.
[61] Johnston, *Cultural Realism*, pp. 18-19

commitment to providing testable causal explanations, was harnessed in the service of what is ultimately a constructivist ontology."[62]

As Ashley calls them – "the first school in the third wave – represented by the work of Jeffrey Legro, Elizabeth Kier, and Peter Katzenstein, sought to examine strategic culture at the domestic-organizational level."[63] Kier argues that the roots of doctrinal change in the French and British armies between the two World Wars, lie in changes in the organizational cultures of both militaries, rather than changes in external structures or balances of power. Similarly, Legro looks to military organizational cultures – defined in a similar fashion as "patterns of assumptions, ideas, and beliefs that proscribe how a group should adapt to its external environment and manage its internal structure."[64]Legro contends that a realist explanation would suggest that there should be no restraint on the use of military power to attain state interests defined either as survival or the maximization of power; 'self conscious endogenous limits on the tools of warfare' are few. A similar theme is taken up by Price and Tannenwald in explaining taboos on the use of nuclear weapons in the Cold War period. Instead of invoking organizational culture as an explanation, however, they suggest that the rise of a norm of non-use reinforced perceptions in the United States about the military and political disutility of use.[65] Peter Katzenstein and Nobuo Okawara and Thomas Berger, argue that the unique character of the domestic political attitude towards use of force renders states to take different decisions though similarly placed in the international system.[66]

Johnston's *Cultural Realism: Strategic Culture and Grand Strategy in Chinese History* (1995) exemplifies, in a way, the methodological rigour of the third generation research agenda. The study enquires into Chinese strategic culture by identifying the *Seven Military Classics* as the

[62] Tellis, "Overview", p. 16.
[63] Jeffrey Legro, *Cooperation Under Fire: Anglo-German Restraint during World War II* (Ithaca: Cornell University Press, 1995); Elizabeth Kier, *Imagining War: French and British Military Doctrine between the Wars* (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1997); and Katzenstein, "Introduction."
[64] Legro, *Cooperation Under Fire*, quoted in Johnston, *Cultural Realism*, p.19
[65] Richard Price and Nina Tannenwald, "Norms and Deterrence: The Nuclear and Chemical Weapons Taboos", in Peter J. Katzenstein (ed.), *The Culture of National Security: Norms and Identity in World Politics* (New York: Columbia University Press, 1996), pp. 114-152.
[66] Peter J. Katzenstein and Nobuo Okawara, "Japan's National Security: Structures, Norms and Policies", *International Security*, Vol. 17, No. 4, Spring 1993, pp. 84-118; Thomas U. Berger, "From Sword to Chrysanthemum: Japan's Culture of Anti-militarism", *International Security*, Vol. 17, No. 4, Spring 1993, pp. 119-150; Thomas U. Berger, "Norms, Identity, and National Security in Germany and Japan", in Peter J. Katzenstein (ed.), *The Culture of National Security*, pp. 317-356.

'object of analysis'. Johnston understands the concept of strategic culture as an "ideational milieu that limits behavioral choices," from which "one could derive specific predictions about strategic choice."[67] Critiquing the efforts by Kier and Legro, Johnston focused his attention on demonstrating how "the influences of broader and more deeply historical differences might shape the formation of strategic culture in and across societies and thus explain the culturally conditioned choices of the core decision-making apparatus of the state itself." [68] By characterizing strategic culture as the "ideational milieu which limits behavior choices," he not only sought to investigate "the shared assumptions and decision rules that impose a degree of order on individual and group conceptions of their relationship to their social, organizational or political environment."[69] More determinedly, he distinguished between culture and behaviour and sought to reason how the former might affect the latter.

He therefore, suggests "strategic culture as a 'system of symbols' comprised of two parts: the first consists of basic assumptions about the orderliness of the strategic environment – that is, about the role of war in human affairs (i.e., whether it is aberrant or inevitable), about the nature of the adversary and the threat it poses (i.e., zero-sum or positive-sum), and about the efficacy of the use of force (i.e., about the ability to control outcomes and eliminate threats and about the conditions under which the use of force is useful)."[70] Answers to these three questions constitute the "central strategic paradigm". "The second part of strategic culture consists of assumptions at a more operational level about what strategic options are the most efficacious for dealing with the threat environment as defined by answers to these three sets of questions."[71] The works of the third generation scholars are grouped under four strands of cultural theorizing by Michael C. Desch – organizational, political, strategic and global.

Third generation conceptualization of strategic culture is also reflected in the studies done on Germany and Japan. Berger's *Cultures of Antimilitarism: National Security in Germany and Japan* (1998) focused on "antimilitarist political-military cultures" to understand patterns in the

[67] Johnston, "Thinking about Strategic Culture", p. 46
[68] Johnston, *Cultural Realism*, p. 20. In Tellis, "Overview", p. 16
[69] Johnston, "Thinking about Strategic Culture," p. 45.
[70] Johnston, *Cultural Realism*, p. 37
[71] Ibid.

countries' foreign policy.[72] "Berger noted that while Japan's economic and technological power placed it in a position to become an economic and perhaps even military superpower at the end of the Cold War, the persistent postwar culture of antimilitarism truly defined Japanese security policy in the 1990s."[73] Duffield argued that, "Germany has exercised considerable restraint and circumspection in its external relations since 1990."[74] To Duffield, "[t]he overall effect of national security culture is to predispose societies in general and political elites in particular toward certain actions and policies over others. Some options will simply not be imagined…some are more likely to be rejected as inappropriate or ineffective than others."[75]

Yitzhak Klein's article "A Theory of Strategic Culture" published in 1991, proposed that strategic culture be defined as "the set of attitudes and beliefs held by a military establishment concerning the political objective of war and the most effective strategy and operational method of achieving it."[76] Klein's analysis of the operability of strategic culture is extremely useful to the agenda of this research. He put forward a "paradigm of strategic culture", which essentially is a system of hierarchical concepts each serving to implement those above it.

In a similar vein, Kerry Longhurst while researching on German strategic culture argues that strategic culture comprises three elements:

"Firstly, they are the deeper, basal, qualities that have their origins in primordial or formative phases of a given strategic culture; these are called foundational elements. Extending out of these foundational elements are the observable manifestations of the strategic culture: the long standing policies and practices that actively relate and apply the substance of the strategic culture's core to the external environment, essentially by providing channels of meaning and application. Midway between the foundational elements and regulatory practices are the security

[72] Thomas U. Berger, *Cultures of Antimilitarism: National Security in Germany and Japan* (Baltimore: Johns Hopkins University Press, 1998): 1; See also Berger, "From Sword to Chrysanthemum: Japan's Culture of Anti-militarism," *International Security 17*, no.4 (Spring 1993): 119-150.
[73] Jeffrey Lantis, "Strategic Culture: From Clausewitz to Constructivism", Prepared for Defense Threat Reduction Agency Advanced Systems and Concepts Office, 31 October, 2002, p. 11.
[74] John S. Duffield, *World Power Forsaken: Political Culture, International Institutions, and German Security Policy After Unification* (Stanford: Stanford University Press, 1999): 4; See also Duffield, "Political Culture and State Behavior: Why Germany Confounds Neorealism," *International Organization 53*, no.4 (Autumn 1999): 765-803.
[75] Duffield, "Political Culture and State Behavior," 771.
[76] Yitzhak Klein, "A Theory of Strategic Culture", *Comparative Strategy*, Vol. 10, No. 1, January-March 1991, p. 5.

policy standpoints, the contemporary widely accepted interpretations as how best core values are to be promoted through policy channels, in the sense that they set the preferences for policy choices."[77]

The above discussion on the defining characteristics of strategic culture was aimed to help understand the various formulations, constituents, their sources, and influences on policy making, through the three generations. The wide variety of sources that strategic cultural formulations draw upon, are depicted in a tabular form below.

Physical	**Political**	**Social/Cultural**
Geography	Historical Experience	Myths and Symbols
Climate	Political System	Defining Texts
Natural Resources	Elite Beliefs	
Generational Change	Military Organizations	
Technology		
<----------	(Transnational Normative Pressures)	---------->

Figure 1: "Potential Sources of Strategic Culture"[78]

It would be useful at this juncture to highlight some of the common assumptions that can be identified amidst the literature. Arthur Hoffmann and Kerry Longhurst have drawn out useful points of commonalities in understanding the concept of strategic culture across the three generations.

- "A strategic culture approach emphasizes national specific strategic approaches which dilute the idea of a universal assumed rationality."
- "Strategic culture is about collectives and their shared attitudes and beliefs, whether that be military establishments, policy communities or entire societies."

[77] Kerry Longhurst, Germany and the Use of Force: The Evolution of Germany Security Policy 1990-2003 (Manchester United Press, 2004), p. 17
[78] Lantis, "Strategic Culture: From Clausewitz to Constructivism", p. 17.

- "It is continuities and discernible trends across time and contexts rather than change that are focused upon, change is generally portrayed as gradual in the absence of dramatic shocks and trauma."

- "Strategic culture is seen as an intimate to behavior, acting as a milieu through which information is received, mediated and processed into appropriate responses."[79]

In order to get a fuller understanding of the elusive concept of strategic culture, it is necessary to delve into some other debatable aspects of the concept.

Culture and behavior

Perhaps the relationship between culture and behavior represents one of the deepest of the divides existing in security studies literature today.[80] It is popularly called the "Johnston-Gray debate" or "positivism vs. interpretivism", or even "E'mile Durkheim vs. Max Weber".

The main arguments of the debate between Johnston and Gray stem directly from their respective definitions and understanding of what constitutes strategic culture (discussed in an earlier section of this chapter). Johnston had taken the first generation, especially Gray, to task for invoking an "everything but the kitchen sink" treatment of strategic culture.[81] "Given the all-encompassing nature of strategic culture as an independent variable, there is no possibility in most of the first generation literature for there to be a break or disjuncture between strategic culture and behavior."[82] Johnston also pointed to the "little or no appreciation of the potential instrumentality of strategic culture."[83] Gray answered by providing a "belated development of first generation enquiry."[84] He conceived strategic culture "as a context out there that surrounds, and gives meaning to, strategic behaviour, as the total warp and woof of matters strategic that are

[79] Arthur Hoffmann and Kerry Longhurst, "German Strategic Culture in Action", *Contemporary Security Policy*, Vol. 20 , Iss. 2,1999, pp. 31-49
[80] The debate is specifically addressed in: Stuart Poore, 'What is the Context? A Reply to the Gray– Johnston Debate on Strategic Culture', *Review of International Studies*, Vol. 29 (2003), pp. 279– 84; David Haglund, "What Good is Strategic Culture?: A Modest Defence of an Immodest Concept", *International Journal*, Vol. 59, No. 3 (Summer 2004), pp. 479–501
[81] Johnston, *Cultural Realism*, p. 13.
[82] Ibid., p. 13.
[83] Ibid., p. 14.
[84] Colin S. Gray, "Strategic Culture as context: the first generation strikes back", *Review of International Studies*, Vol. 25, No. 1, January 1999, p. 49-69

thoroughly woven together, or as both." [85] In other words, "strategic culture should be approached both as a shaping context for behaviour and itself as a constituent of that behaviour."[86] In a reply to Gray, Johnston states, "I don't see why it clarifies things to say that an action is influenced by an amorphous cultural context that includes among other things, the class of action itself."[87]

"But Gray has also praised Johnston's criticism of the first generation for raising some important concerns about the field of strategic culture."[88] Gray conceded that Johnston is partially correct in that he warns the scholars of the limitations inherent in a concept of strategic culture that "comprises so extensive a portfolio of ingredients, and is so influential upon behaviour, that it can explain nothing because it claims to explain everything."[89] Gray has suggested that "So limited is the empirical and theoretical scholarship currently available on strategic culture, that we would probably be best advised to look more for complementarities of approach, than to try and elect one or another view the methodological winner."[90]

An interesting compromise position is offered by David Haglund. "He examined the classic German philosophical debate about whether social scientists should seek *verstehen* (understanding) or *erkla¨ren* (explanation) and rejected the strict separation of positivism/interpretivism in favour of seeking 'explicative understanding'."[91] In a similar vein, Duffield constructs a detailed model of how he sees the relationship between culture and behavior. Firstly, culture demarcates the scope of the policy in terms of what should be emphasized; it influences the perception of the external security environment and therefore circumscribes the security problematique; it determines policy-objectives by shaping conceptions of national interest; and it delineates and limits the range of legitimate policy options open to policy-makers.[92]

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[85] Ibid., p. 51
[86] Ibid., p. 50.
[87] Alastair Iain Johnston, "Strategic Cultures Revisited: Reply to Colin Gray", *Review of International Studies* (1999), 25, 519-523
[88] Zaman, *Strategic Culture and the Rise of the Indian Army* - Unpublished PhD Thesis, p. 45. The arguments of the Johnston-Gray debate are discussed at length here.
[89] Alastair I. Johnston, cited in Colin S. Gray, "Strategic Culture as Context", p. 54
[90] Gray, "Strategic Culture as context", p. 50.
[91] David G. Haglund, "What Good Is Strategic Culture? A Modest Defence of an Immodest Concept", *International Journal*, Vol. 59, No. 3 (Summer 2004), pp. 479–501.
[92] For a more detailed exposition see Kerry Longhurst, *Germany and the Use of Force: The Evolution of German Security Policy 1990-2003*, (Manchester University Press, 2004), p. 15.

In the context of culture and behavior, Johnston points to some problems in the second generation too. Bradley Klein points to the important gap between strategic-culture derived declaratory strategic policy and operational policy, but nowhere in the definition is there any hidden assumption about the effect of strategic culture on strategic choices themselves.

Indeed with the rise of constructivism, "researchers have plunged into the gap between structural expectations and security policy realities, with models of culturally bound state behavior."[93] However, there is a growing amount of literature that sees the task of separating culture from behavior to test how the former might causally affect the latter in some falsifiable way, difficult. The compatibility of culture with a positivist approach to social science has been viewed as contentious. As David Liatin notes, "it is not some idea that 'culture does not matter' that has brought research on political culture to a standstill. Rather, the systematic study of culture within political science has been emasculated by the neopositivist tradition, which sets a central methodological requirement that a theory must have general laws that can [be] confirmed."[94]

Keepers of Strategic Culture

Culture has many manifestations and therefore presumably multiple units that embody it. If strategic culture is an important ideational input in deciphering the patterns in a state's strategic behaviour, clarity on how it is maintained over time and by whom becomes important.

"At one extreme are global and world cultural approaches in which the relevant unit of analysis is the global society."[95] However, these are inept to explain differences across units. Another frequently applied approach is that of organization culture, which is shown to have important influence on state's policy actions. Duffield points out the weaknesses of this approach too. "Firstly, few organizations may possess a well-defined culture that clearly sets them apart from other elements of bureaucracy or even the society at large. Secondly, only rarely, will a single organization be in a position to exert decisive influence over national policymaking.[96] Also, as

[93] Michael C. Desch, "Culture Clash: Assessing the Importance of Ideas in Security Studies", *International Security*, Vol. 23, No. 1, Summer 1998, p. 145.
[94] David D. Laitin, *Culture and Hegemony: Politics and Religious Change Among the Yoruba,* (Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1986)
[95] Duffield, "Politcal Culture and State Behavior", p. 776.
[96] Legro offers a useful framework for determining when organizational culture is likely to be influential. Legro, *Cooperation Under Fire*, pp. 26-27.

Kier points out, "the impact of organizational culture will be highly mediated by other unit-level factors such as structure of the decision-making process, the domestic distribution of power, and the broader political culture of society."[97]

Most scholars prefer descriptions of political and strategic cultures as the "property of collectivities rather than simply of the individuals that constitute them."[98] Wilson proposed that, "In the most general sense political cultures are socially constructed normative systems that are the product of both social (for example, rules that coordinate role relationships within the organizations) and psychological (for example, the preferences of individuals) influences but are not reducible to either...A political culture is not simply the sum of individual preferences, nor do preferences, especially those of any given individual, necessarily correspond with normative prescriptions."[99]

To Duffield, "institutional sources of national predispositions are likely to reside in the central governmental organs charged with the formulation and execution of policy; they may shape policy by organizational processes, routines, and standard operating procedures may constraint the types of information to which decision makers are exposed."[100] Berger suggests that "political culture can only be understood as a combination of norms and political institutions which exist in an interdependent relationship."[101] However, "questions remain about when institutions are most inclined to maintain and perpetuate common historical narratives than to 'legitimize' necessary foreign policy behaviors inconsistent with tradition."[102]

This complex web of relationship which "culture" entails is also highlighted by Harry Eckstein. He draws on Talcott Parsons' "action frame of reference." He describes it briefly as:

"(1) ego (an actor) is in a 'situation'- an objective context; (2) ego cognitively decodes that context and invests it with feeling (cathexis)- thus the context comes to have meaning for the actor; (3) the manner of investing situations with meaning is acquired through socialization,

[97] See Kier, *Imagining War: French and British Military Doctrine between the Wars*.
[98] Duffield, *World Power Forsaken*, p. 23.
[99] Richard W. Wilson, "The Many Voices of Political Culture: Assessing Different Approaches," *World Politics* 52(02):246 - 273.
[100] Duffield, *World Power Forsaken*, p. 29.
[101] Thomas U. Berger, *Cultures of Antimilitarism: National Security Policy in Germany and Japan*, (Baltimore, MD: Johns Hopkins University Press, 1998), pp. 11-12.
[102] Lantis, *Strategic Culture and National Security Policy,* p. 108

which consists mainly of early learning – this imparts the modes of understanding and valuing prevalent in societies or subsocieties or both; (4) socialization leads to the internalization of cognitive and affective meanings (viz., the cultural becomes personal) and their institutionalization (the definition of expected behavior in social roles and that of sanctions in case of deviation from expected behavior); (5) cognitions and effective responses to them define goals and ways to pursue them; (6) cognitions, feelings and goals are communicated to alter (another actor) through the use of 'signs' (symbolic expressions of culture that make ego's action intelligible to alter) – but actions also depend on objective facilities that are part of any actor's situation and that independently affect the choice of goals; (7) alter responds, changing the situation in some respect, so that the process resumes."[103]

According to some scholars, public opinion forms an important part of strategic culture, more so in cases where government relies on popular public support. Priyanjali Malik, in the case of India, attempts to examine the public debate which took place among the Indian elite as well as the middle class on India's nuclear policy. According to Dr. Malik, "attentive India mainly comprised upper and middle class Indians who keenly participated in the nuclear debate."[104] Lantis argues on the basis of certain case studies, that public opinion has only a limited effect on the actual scope and timing of security policy behavior and, that public attitudes towards such policies have been mostly mixed. It can also be argued that the elites, or "strategic culture agents" as Longhurst calls them, are reflective of broader societal moves and act as "gatekeepers" of a strategic culture, since they are the key decision makers. Longhurst emboldens the elite preference because it is believed that public opinion is not only problematical to conceptualize, but more importantly, that it is of little importance in connection with security policy-making. "It is also posited here that elite and broader public opinion may not correspond totally, especially at times of great change when elites respond instantly and subsequently will attempt to shore up public support, which may have lagged, in line with their position."[105]

[103] Harry Eckstein, "A Culturalist theory of Political Change", *American Political Science Review*, Vol. 82, No. 3, September 1998, pp. 802-803.
[104] Priyanjali Malik, *India's Nuclear Debate: Exceptionalism and the Bomb (*New Delhi/London: Routledge, 2010)
[105] Longhurst, *Germany and the Use of Force: The Evolution of Germany Security Policy 1990-2000,* p. 22

It can be stated with some certainty that there is a broad agreement in the literature that elites are instrumental in setting the goals of foreign policy and redirecting policy structure in the wake of a fresh challenge. "By keeping the focus on key elites and security managers who oversee national security policy, Johnston's approach in the third generation exhibits continuity with the first and second waves insofar as both view the highest institutions of decision-making within the state as the fundamental locus of the manifestation of a nation's strategic culture."[106] In this context, Gray draws our attention to an interesting aspect of what he calls "strategic expertise" and "strategic education." According to him, modern strategic studies have not performed well as an educator of would-be strategic minds. There are professional politicians, policymakers and professional soldiers but there are no truly professional strategists. Strategists have to be a mixture of theorist, planner, leader, and commander, but the most effective balance among these qualities is particular to time and place. Gray points out that apart from drawing up an operational plan for strategy, the strategist has to be trusted to answer the "so what?" question because doing so would cross the strategy bridge to the realm of politics.[107]

Amenability to Change

An important aspect of understanding strategic culture is to comprehend its amenability to change. Eckstein suggested that "the socialization of values and beliefs occurs over time; past learning becomes sedimented in the collective consciousness and is relatively resilient to change. Lessons of the past, therefore, serve as a tight filter for any future learning that might occur."[108] Johnston has critiqued Jones and others of the first generation literature as treating strategic culture, in essence, as a constant. Gray, in a "belated development of first generation enquiry",[109] asserts that "strategic culture(s) can change over time, as new experience is absorbed, coded, and culturally translated. Culture, however, changes slowly. Scholars who prefer to look only to recent history as the determining influence upon contemporary strategic culture, would be well advised to change concepts. If strategic culture is held to be significantly reshapeable on a year

[106] Tellis, "Overview", p. 16
[107] Colin S. Gray, "The Practice of Strategy" in John Baylis, James L. Wirtz and Colin Gray ed., *Strategy in the Contemporary World: An Introduction to Strategic Studies,* Oxford University Press, 2016, p. 359.
[108] Harry Eckstein, "A Culturalist Theory of Political Change," p. 796.
[109] Gray, "Strategic Culture as context", p. 49.

by year, or even on a decade by decade basis, then culture probably is unduly dignified, even pretentious, a term to characterise the phenomena at issue."[110]

The latest generation of culture studies is recognizing the possibility of strategic cultural change over time. According to Ashley Tellis, "the social construction of strategic culture through these processes also highlights the fact that all ideational frames intended to understand the reality of security competition are never static, even when they appear stable. Rather, their incarnation, being owed to the complex interaction between inherited ideas, intra-societal negotiations, state-society bargaining, and the strength of state interests, illuminates the social bases of their generation while highlighting the possibilities of evolution or change."[111]

It is necessary to consider under which conditions strategic cultures change. According to Alastair Iain Johnston "ahistorical or 'objective' variables such as technology, capabilities, levels of threat, and organizational structures are all secondary importance: it is the interpretive lens of strategic culture that gives meaning to these variables."[112]

Thomas Berger and Jeffrey Legro find that "strategic cultures can change, especially when the external environment provides a severe 'shock' that invalidates prevailing assumptions – like Germany's and Japan's defeat in 1945, after which both nations' strategic cultures essentially switched from a unilateral-expansionist to a more multilateral, even pacifist mode."[113] Yet they ultimately concluded that "strategic cultural continuity is probably a sort of 'default position' because cultural practices and values tend to be quite 'sticky'."[114] Berger says that "change will occur as the 'cultural core' responds to 'historical pressures', and it will be incremental in nature with new institutions not being created *de novo* but being 'likely to follow previously established patterns'."[115]

Duffield too thinks that culture changes very slowly in spite of changing material circumstances; they are largely resistant. "Also, evidence that irrefutably contradicts reigning world views is

[110] Ibid., p. 52
[111] Tellis, "Overview", p. 9.
[112] Johnston, *Cultural Realism*, p. 1.
[113] See Berger, *Cultures of Antimilitarism*, p. 9; Jeffrey Legro, 'The Transformation of Policy Ideas,' *American Journal of Political Science*, Vol. 44, No. 3, 2000, pp. 419–32.
[114] Alan Bloomfield, "Time to Move On: Reconceptualizing the Strategic Culture Debate", *Contemporary Security Policy*, 33:3, 2012, pp. 437-461
[115] Berger quoted in Longhurst, *Germany and the Use of Force*, p. 13

rare in international relations."[116] Kerry Longhurst thinks that change in a strategic culture comes in two principal forms: finetuning and fundamental, with the former variant being the more frequent. Fundamental change in strategic culture is "more abrupt in nature, occurring when trauma is sufficiently severe as to nullify the existing strategic culture, giving rise to the establishment of new core beliefs, leading subsequently to new policies and practices."[117]

Therefore, "changes—including abrupt and fairly dramatic reorientations of security policy behaviour—appear to be possible, and strategic cultural models must be more reflective of the conditions that draw out such changes."[118] "Perhaps, Michael Thompson, Richard Ellis, and Aaron Wildavsky captured this cognitive dissonance argument best when they said that cultures remain vital only if their core principles continue to generate solutions that satisfy human needs and make sense of the world."[119]

Neorealism Vs. Strategic Culture

It is beyond doubt that at the core of the post-Cold War wave of culturalism in security studies lay the fundamental reassessment of the utility of neorealism as the dominant paradigm in International Relations. Johnston who made a noteworthy study of strategic culture in China states at the very outset of his project that "the notion of strategic culture, in principle at least, poses a significant challenge to structural realist claims about the sources and characteristics of state behavior by rooting strategic choice in deeply historical, formative, ideational legacies."[120] According to him, the third generation which surfaced in the 1990s attempted a rigorous conceptualization of ideational independent variable in the forms of military culture, political military culture, and other organizational cultures and took the "realist edifice as the target."[121]

Michael C. Desch, writing in the journal *International Security* has wondered whether cultural theories merely supplemented realist theories or actually threatened to supplant them.[122] Desch, while highlighting the potential challenges to assessing the explanatory power of the third wave

[116] Duffield, "Political Culture and State Behaviour", p. 770.
[117] Longhurst, *Germany and the Use of Force,* p. 18.
[118] Lantis, "Strategic Culture: From Clausewitz to Constructivism", p. 27.
[119] Lantis, "Strategic Culture and National Security Policy", p. 112.
[120] Johnston, *Cultural Realism,* p. ix
[121] Ibid., p. 18.
[122] Desch, "Culture Clash: Assessing the Importance of Ideas in Security Studies", pp. 144-145

of culturalist theories, also contended that cultural theorizing will not supplant realist theories in national security studies because the cases selected do not provide "crucial tests" that enable us to distinguish which theories are better. According to Ashley Tellis, "the quest for a parsimonious explanation—a distinguishing characteristic of contemporary social science—threatens the viability of strategic culture as a self-sufficient explanation of competitive political behavior." [123] Gray answers such critics by pointing out that "there are, and can be, no unencultured realists."[124]

Although Johnston tried to establish a hard causality in his hypotheses, he did not completely reject rationality. "Indeed, strategic culture is compatible with concepts of limited rationality, under which strategic culture-based heuristics are employed to simplify reality; process rationality, under which strategic culture determines the most rational process of choosing between options; and adaptive or learned rationality, under which historical choices, analogies, metaphors, and precedents are invoked to guide choice."[125] Jeffey Legro, an important proponent of cultural theorizing too contends that his "argument is not that structure is unimportant, while culture clears up all puzzles. Rather, it is the combination of culture and structure that matters."[126]

The growing contemporary literature on the concept of strategic culture seems to point to the possibility of what John Glenn describes as "empirical and theoretical cross-fertilization" between strategic culturalists and realists.[127] According to Glenn, culturalists, with their more nuanced explanations, seek to provide a fuller understanding of the inter-state system than the structural realists. "Although initially it appeared that the focus of strategic culture research ruled out research collaboration with realism, recent additions to both sides call for a re-evaluation of this assumption."[128] Ashley Tellis sums it succinctly, "if the focus of strategic culture, rests in the first instance on providing the best understanding of a specific nation's security behavior, rather than attempting to provide abstract universal generalizations that are trained on 'the realist

[123] Tellis, "Overview", p. 7.
[124] Colin S. Gray, "In Praise of Strategy", *Review of International Studies*, Vol. 29, No. 2, April 2003, p. 292.
[125] Johnston, *Cultural Realism*, p. 2.
[126] Legro, "Culture and Preferences in the International Cooperation Two-Step", *American Political Science Review*, Vol. 90, No. 1, March 1996, p. 134.
[127] John Glenn, "Realism versus Strategic Culture: Competition and Collaboration?", *International Studies Review* (2009) 11, 523–551
[128] Desch, "Culture Clash: Assessing the Importance of Ideas in Security Studies", Duffield, "Political Culture and State Behavior: Why Germany Confounds Neorealism".

edifice as [a] target,' it could serve as a vital complement to rational choice formulations of political realism, even if it cannot substitute for the latter entirely."[129]

By and large, the field of strategic cultural studies has contributed to the refinement of existing theoretical explanations to state's strategic policymaking, at one level. At another, more ambitious level, it has, despite the several methodological and epistemological hindrances, attempted to draw a hard causality between culture and behavior in explaining strategic choices. These efforts have enriched the continually evolving field of International Relations in providing answers in more probabilistic expressions e.g. "very likely", rather than precise, eternally valid formulations.

It is against this background of evolving concept of strategic culture that an attempt will be made to identify a suitable theoretical framework to study independent India's foreign policy. The theoretical framework of Johnston will be used to bring to light India's strategic culture. Based on the criteria laid down by him, Kautilya's *Arthashastra* is identified as the 'object of analysis'. Further, attempts are made to uncover the key assumptions or the central paradigm in Indian strategic thought by focusing on answers to questions about the role of war in human affairs, the nature of conflict with the enemy, and the efficacy of violence in dealing with the adversary. A set of ranked grand strategic preferences are then delineated from the central paradigm. These two units (central strategic paradigm and grand strategic preferences) together constitute strategic culture. The objective of the study is to measure the extent of influence, if any, of foundational elements/core beliefs extrapolated from Kautilya's *Arthashastra* on India's foreign policy making. The methodological framework selected will help outline India's strategic culture and evaluate the extent of its influence on India's contemporary strategic behaviour.

This framework will form the basis for the remainder of the thesis, beginning with the identification of the origins of India's strategic culture in the following chapter.

[129] Tellis, "Overview", p. 11

Chapter 2

Kautilya's Arthashastra and Indian Strategic Culture

"[S]urely India could not have been what she undoubtedly was, and could not have continued a cultured existence for thousands of years, if she had not possessed something very vital and enduring, something that was worthwhile."[1]

- Jawaharlal Nehru

Jawaharlal Nehru was independent India's first Prime Minister and undoubtedly the chief architect of its strategic outlook and its subsequent operationalization. It was Nehru's contention that there has been "a cluster of ideas that assumes inner cohesion and continuity"[2], and this idea cluster can be seen to emerge in the very early phase of India's cultural history. The purpose of this research essentially is to uncover, understand and outline India's core beliefs, using the practical tool kit offered by theorization in the field of strategic culture. In the preceding pages of this thesis, a bird's eye view of the notion and concepts of strategic culture as it has evolved in the West, over the decades, has been provided. Scholars belonging to the Global North have offered their insights and even theories to explain the nature of strategic culture. It could be rather imprudent to infer that such insights, formulations and theories would have transnational application. Yet they do offer a guide to formulate our understanding of strategic culture with specific reference to India. As has been clearly stated in the previous chapter, the effort is to seek answers to methodological questions like – "To what sources does one look as repositories or representations of strategic culture? From which time periods should these sources be taken? Why certain historical periods are considered formative sources of strategic culture and other not? How is strategic culture transmitted through time?"[3] – would be informed by Johnston's framework of analysis. The complex mosaic of India's culture will be too challenging

[1] Jawaharlal Nehru, *The Discovery of India*, published by Jawaharlal Nehru Memorial Fund, 1981, p. 50.
[2] Subrata K. Mitra and Michael Liebig, *Kautilya's Arthashastra: An Intellectual Portrait- Classical Roots of Modern Politics in India*, (Baden-Baden, Germany, Nomos, 2016), p. 173
[3] Alastair Iain Johnston, *Cultural Realism: Strategic Culture and Grand Strategy in Chinese History* (Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Press, 1995), p. 39.

theoretically to frame any definitive formulation. In spite of this, using the theoretical insights drawn from the rigorous research done by Johnston, the core beliefs, or in Johnston's parlance, the 'central strategic paradigms' of India's strategic culture, will be delineated in the subsequent sections.

The chapter is divided into three sections. The first would be a review of literature of the scholarly works done in the field of Indian strategic culture. The second section would identify Kautilya's *Arthashastra* as the key strategic-culture object for extrapolating the core beliefs and would state reasons for its selection. The third section would deal with the central strategic paradigms.

Review of Literature

Exploring India's strategic culture has been problematic. The lack of comprehensive and systematic scholarship in this realm is conspicuous. Joel Larus (1979), followed by George Tanham in 1995 and Stephen Rosen in 1997, are some of the early Western scholars who investigated into Indian strategic culture and, in a way, set the Indian minds thinking. Another recent essay is by Rodney Jones published in 2006. All these writers have admitted the complexity in determining India's strategic culture and have then gone on to examine the significant points in India's historical experiences.

Some have been outright dismissive of the existence of a strategic culture in India though Jones has acknowledged that, "Discerning the underlying traits of India's strategic culture, its distinctiveness, and its resonance in India's contemporary actions may take some effort. But it can be done"[4] and goes on to describe it as, "omniscient patrician type".[5] The scholarly works done on Indian strategic culture, both by Indians and Westerners, range from establishing the complete absence of strategic culture to acknowledging its vibrant presence, with shades of ambiguous presence and a dualistic (the symbolic acting as the smokescreen over the operational) presence in the middle. As far as the sources used for their study are concerned, they

[4] Rodney W. Jones, "India's Strategic Culture", prepared for Defense Threat Reduction Agency Advanced Systems and Corporate Office, 31 October, 2006, p.3
[5] Ibid.

range from Gray's approach to that of Johnston's[6]. Interestingly, a scholar following Gray's definition and methodology upholds the importance of an early and formative politico-strategic text emanating from India – the *Arthashastra* as a substantial influence on India's strategic culture[7], and another following Johnston's methodology in his research quest excludes the *Arthashastra* as a factor in the ideational genesis of India's strategic culture.[8]

With the wide array of views and opinions available in the field, it would be worthwhile to get a fairly comprehensive understanding of what they say, what are the sources of their study and the extent to which they acknowledge the influence of Kautilya on Indian strategic thought. It all began with the study done by George K. Tanham, who served as the Vice-President and Trustee of the Rand Corporation of USA, in the year 1991. The RAND project titled "India's Future Strategic Role and Power Potential", was commissioned to focus on the "historical, geographic, and cultural factors influencing Indian strategic thinking: how India's past has shaped present-day conceptions of military power and national security; how Indian elites view their strategic position vis-à-vis their neighbors, the Indian Ocean, and great power alignments; whether Indian thinking follows a reasonably consistent logic and direction; and what this might imply for India's long term capability to shape its regional security environment."[9] The core thesis of Tanham's study was unambiguous in stating the "absence of strategic thinking in India – past and present"[10] The lacunae in strategy and planning derive largely from India's historical and cultural development: "First, because India has lacked political unity throughout most of its history, Indians have not thought in terms of national defense planning. Second, the Hindu concept of time, or rather the lack of a sense of time-Indians view life as an eternal present, with neither history nor future-discourages planning. Third, Hindus consider life as a mystery, largely unknowable and not entirely under man's control."[11]

[6] The sources of strategic culture vary from generation to generation and have been dealt with in the previous chapter.
[7] Rashed Uz Zaman, "Kautilya: The Indian Strategic Thinker and Indian Strategic Culture", *Comparative Strategy*, 25:231-247, 2006.
[8] Kanti Bajpai, "Indian Strategic Culture", in Michael R. Chambers (ed.), *South Asia in 2020: Future Strategic Balances and Alliances* (Carlisle, PA: Strategic Studies Institute, November 2002), pp. 245-303.
[9] George K. Tanham – "Indian Strategic Thought: An Interpretive Essay"- RAND, prepared for the Under Secretary of Defense for Policy, 1992, Preface.
[10] Ibid.
[11] Ibid. p. 50

Some of the findings of Tanham reflect a complete lack of understanding of Indian history and culture. His postulation that the ambiguities in the writings, commentaries, and speeches on Indian strategy are reflective of a culture that accommodates readily to complexity and contradictions, appears quite overstated. In addition, Tanham's understanding of the *Arthashastra*, remained at the level of the Kautilya methaphor.[12] Tanham mentions Kautilya a few times in footnotes referring to the *mandala* cocept: "Kautilya, a Brahmin adviser to the Mauryans, used the mandala concept in describing his work on the art of government"[13]

Commenting on Tanham's essay, Kanti P. Bajpai in his analysis entitled "State, Society, Strategy" argues that "India has had strategy and grand strategy, and one could distil these from Indian pronouncements and behaviour; but it cannot produce a cannon of strategic thought of any great lineage, and certainly not comparable to Europe's".[14] In his commentary: "Raison d' etat or adhocism?" Amitabh Mattoo referring to Tanham's thesis regarding a lack of strategic tradition in India, argues that it is true as far as coordinated military planning in India is concerned. However, in the realm of grand strategy, India has had in her first Prime Minister a very sophisticated grand strategist. He disagrees with Tanham's argument that the absence of strategic thinking is rooted in Indian geography, culture and history. Instead, he attributes the absence of strategic thinking to "bureaucratic inertia, political ineptitude and the state of civil military relations". He is of the opinion that "the absence of strategic thinking as far as the nuclear aspect is concerned is most glaring."[15] However, he does think that this has changed post-1990.

Responding to Tanham's essays, Waheguru Pal Singh Sidhu in his commentary, "Of Oral Traditions and Ethnocentric Judgements", has argued that the notion that "India does not admit to broad generalizations and remains a complex and diverse society is an understatement".[16] He notes that the *Arthashastra* and other texts of formative influence on Indian strategic culture were primarily transmitted orally over more than two millennia. "And when there does not

[12] Mitra and Liebig, *Kautilya's Arthashastra: An Intellectual Portrait*, p. 296.
[13] Tanham, "Indian Strategic Thought", p. 23
[14] See Kanti P. Bajpai and Amitabh Mattoo(eds.), *Securing India: Strategic. Thought and Practice* , Manohar Publishers and Distributors, New Delhi, 1996
[15] Ibid.
[16] Waheguru Pal Singh Sidhu, 'Of Oral Traditions and Ethnocentric Judgements', in Kanti P. Bajpai and Amitabh Mattoo (eds.), *Securing India: Strategic Thought and Practice*, Essays by George K. Tanham with Commentaries, New Delhi, 1996, Manohar, pp. 174-90.

appear to be any document or physical evidence, the inclination is to assume that history was not 'discovered' or that strategy or doctrine 'does not exist'"[17]

K Subrahmanyam concurs with Tanham when he says: "Our government, however, has had no strategic culture, and has never thought and planned ahead and never offensively".[18] He admits that, with Kautilya, India did have an outstanding strategic thinker in ancient times, but he denies that Kautilya has exerted any tangible influence on Indian strategic thought.[19]

From one end of the spectrum marked by scepticism about the existence of a coherent strategic culture in India, we move to the other end where the existence of Indian strategic thinking is acknowledged. In 2006, the US Department of Defense commissioned yet another study on the same subject, titled "India's Strategic Culture" under Rodney W. Jones. His findings were completely in contrast to that of Tanham's. According to Jones, India does have a distinct strategic culture and Kautilya's work is one of the essential components of it. The profile of India's strategic culture has distinctive traits and is rooted in India's ancient culture and heritage. According to Jones, these traits draw from, among other sources, Kautilya's *Arthashastra* which parallels Niccolo Machiavelli's *The Prince*, as an "exposition of monarchical statecraft, realpolitik in inter-state balances of power, and the practices of war and peace."[20]

One of the most prominent Indian exponents of the existence of strategic culture in India, albeit without ancient cultural roots, is Kanti Bajpai. He attempts to delineate Indian strategic culture in the post-Cold War period and suggests at least three different streams of thinking vying for dominance – Nehruvianism, Neo-Liberalism and Hyper-Realism. He follows Johnston's framework of analysis in terms of the definition of strategic culture and its operability at two levels – 'central strategic paradigms' and 'grand strategic preferences'. However, he makes a substantial departure from the framework in turning to post-Cold War writings of some of the most important voices in the Indian strategic community as the written "text" from which cultural traits are inferred. According to him, India does not have canonical texts across which consistency in preference ranking can be assessed. "The researcher on Indian strategic culture

[17] Ibid.
[18] K. Subrahmanyam with A. Monteiro, *Shedding Shibboleths: India's Evolving Strategic Outlook*, (Delhi: Wordsmiths, 2005), p. 16.
[19] Mitra and Liebig, *Kautilya's Arthashastra: An Intellectual Portrait*, p. 297
[20] Jones, "India's Strategic Culture", p. 8.

must, therefore, take a more collage-like approach to textuality, fashioning a composite text out of scattered writings in the press, academic journals and volumes, think tank publications, biographies and autobiographies, and so on."[21]

Kanti Bajpai argues that Kautilya's *Arthashastra* should not be considered a component of India's strategic culture. He is skeptical about the Hindu epics – the *Ramayana*, the *Mahabharata* and *Bhagvada Gita* – constituting canonical texts of antiquity. The key problem identified by him is that it is impossible to prove that the Indian elites who think about national strategy know much about the ancient texts, leave alone understand them. This view runs contrary to one of the essentials of Johnston's methodology of identifying the 'object of analysis'. Johnston notes: "It is important, therefore, that the content analysis of strategic cultural objects begins at the earliest point in history that is accessible to the researcher, where initial strategic culture-derived preference rankings may reasonably be expected to have emerged. From this point one moves systematically forward."[22]

Some other approaches which are less categorical about their conclusions argue that what analysts see as a "lack" of strategic thinking is actually the result of a host of historical, contextual, institutional factors combined with the deliberate choice to minimize the role of force in foreign policy. They contend that this is "the result of a deeply embedded doctrine of "strategic restraint". It was based on the "Indian political leaders deciding that: (1) the international environment was at least somewhat benign…that India had the possibility of politically managing its threat (2) the balance of resource allocation between defense and development had to favour the latter and; (3) there must be an ideological rejection of armed forces as an instrument of state policy."[23] The doctrine of strategic restraint, a policy they thus describe as "not without wisdom," is ascribed to a mix of conscious strategic choices, and cultural and historical factors.

In a similar vein, Shrikant Paranjpe argues that "Indian thinking is, as most of the scholars argue, a product of history, culture and the experiences that the political elite gathered as part of their

[21] Kanti Bajpai, "Indian Strategic Culture", in Kanti P. Bajpai and Harsh V. Pant ed., *India's Foreign Policy: A Reader*, (New Delhi: Oxford University Press, 2013), p. 85.
[22] Johnston, *Cultural Realism*, p. 49
[23] See Stephen Philip Cohen and Sunil Dasgupta, *Arming without Aiming: India's Military Modernization,* (New Delhi: Penguin-Viking, 2012), p. xii

worldview. A kind of ambiguity has emerged in strategic thinking, along with a defensive mindset. This ambiguity may be a product of historical forces; it has, however, over the years, evolved almost as a strategic perspective that has now become somewhat deliberate."[24] This study is of consequence to the present work in two important ways. One, it too sees strategic culture as consisting of two main parts: one relates to the worldview of the nation; the other, the operational aspect of dealing with the world at large in terms of national self-interest. And second, in spite of following the Gray approach in establishing that Indian strategic thinking is a product of historical, cultural, geo-political, socio-economic compulsions, it recognizes Kautilya's *Arthashastra* as an important legacy to Indian strategic culture.

The scholarship of the next group of analysts is characterized by strategic culture resting on two ideational pillars; an inherent dualism owing its origin to two diverse ideational sources. A part of this group sees these diverse cultural strands as working in a mutually exclusive manner, while another part views the symbolic strand acting as a smokescreen for the operational one. In most of these writings, Kautilya is considered an important influence on India's strategic culture, although the relative weight given to Kautilyan thought in comparison with other ideational thoughts varies. Marcus Kim, submitting that Indian understanding of strategic affairs is primarily based on endogenous politico-cultural resources, identifies Kautilyan and Gandhian thoughts as the most important. According to him, "while Kautilya's political thought is primarily rational, pragmatic and strategic, there is also a normative dimension, *rajadharma:* the duty of the kings to secure the welfare of the people."[25] On the other hand, the ideas of Gandhi, he thought, have been influenced by the philosophical and religious thought of the Vedas, Buddhism and Jainism. He thinks that a conflict of ideas exist between the two thoughts.

Waheguru Pal Singh Sidhu too identifies two basic trends of strategic thought in India, both of which originate in antiquity: the idealist tradition which goes back to Ashoka and leads to Gandhi, on the one hand, and a realist tradition that dates back to Kautilya, on the other hand. He thinks that using the *Arthashastra's mandala* theory to study modern Indian policy shows the

[24] Shrikant Paranjpe, *India's Strategic Culture: The Making of National Security Policy*, (New Delhi: Routledge, 2013), p. xv
[25] Mitra and Liebig, *Kautilya's Arthashastra: An Intellectual Portrait*, p. 300

dangers of interpreting the text narrowly. Instead, the relevance of *Arthashastra* is to be found in the "broader and strategic philosophy."[26]

The other set of scholars who propose the existence of two strands of strategic culture, see the Gandhian/Ashokan strand as camouflaging the realist/Kautilyan one; often described by the term 'veiled *realpolitik'*. One important work of this category is that of Rashed Uz Zaman. He explores Kautilya's *Arthashastra* as a significant influence on India's strategic culture, among a variety of other ideational factors. He writes: "Indian strategic culture [therefore] refers to modes of thought and action with respect to force, derived from perception of national historical experience, self-characterization (e.g., as an Indian, what am I?, how should I feel, think, and behave?), and from all of the many distinctively Indian experiences (of geography, political philosophy, civic culture and "way of life") that characterize an Indian citizen."[27] Zaman, while highlighting the tradition of Kautilyan thought provides a detailed exposition of the foreign policy theorems of Kautilya – *vijigishu/chakravartin, matsya-nyaya, mandala, sadgunya and upayas*. However, he notes that the *Arthashastra* may not be seen as a "silver bullet" that will lay the culture bare for us to see. "It offers to persistent and careful readers valuable road signs that will help them in understanding Indian strategic behaviour."[28] Additionally, he thinks that the fixation on the idealism of Buddha and Ashoka concealed the political and strategic Sanskrit literature which, according to Zaman, "bear[s] testimony to the incorrigible militarism of the Hindus and reminds us that few communities have been more warlike and fond of bloodshed"[29]

Ali Ahmed's work on Indian strategic culture is of relevance here because of its recognition of the utility of Johnston's theoretical framework in the Indian case and its complete disengagement with the cultural roots of India's strategic culture.[30] He deduces from Johnston's findings that if a country has a *parabellum* strategic culture, the preference to use force is tempered by one's own capacity and that "operational strategic culture predisposes those socialized in it to act more

[26] Sidhu, 'Of Oral Traditions and Ethnocentric Judgements', p. 175.
[27] Rashed Uz Zaman, "Kautilya: The Indian Strategic Thinker and Indian Strategic Culture", p. 232. He has borrowed this description of strategic culture from Colin S. Gray, "National Style in Strategy: The American Example,"*International Security*, volume 6:2 (Fall 1981): 22.
[28] Ibid.
[29] Ibid. p. 240
[30] See Ali Ahmed, "Indian Strategic Culture", in Kanti Bajpai, Saira Basit, V. Krishnappa ed., *India's Grand Strategy: History, Theory, Cases,* (New Delhi: Routledge 2014)

coercively against an enemy as relative capabilities become more favourable."[31] He thinks this inference for Ming's China holds true for contemporary India. In another piece, he talks about India's "symbolic set" and "operational set" and contends that "India's symbolic set strategic culture does not prefer force, its operational set is not averse to force."[32] Likewise, Pratap Bhanu Mehta views "foreign policy being conducted along two strands: an idealist (Ashokan) one; and, a realist (Kautilayan) one. Stephen Cohen uses the terms, Gandhian and Machiavellian respectively, instead."[33]

This sense of dualism seems to have permeated to some recent works by Western scholars too. Gilboy and Heginbotham, in their book, enquire whether comparative analyses of key ancient texts of India and China, that potentially undergird their respective strategic cultures, reveal sharply opposing strategic traditions. They conclude that "In each tradition, this pragmatism towards the use of force and treachery is balanced by equally pragmatic warnings about the need for caution, including the inherent dangers of resorting to force, and the need to legitimate governance, benevolent rule, and general prosperity."[34] Additionally, they agree with G.D. Bakshi's views that "Whereas the *Arthashastra* emphasizes both political flexibility and military mobility, an older tradition represented by another Indian classic text, the *Mahabharata* continues to have relevance for modern mechanized combat, and its focus on force-on-force attrition warfare still informs elements of modern Indian army doctrine."[35] Further, they affirm that in both cultures there is a strong realist tradition alongside a moralist one; the latter camouflaging the former. However, as far as using these texts as sources to delineate strategic culture which is shown to have a bearing on policy behaviour, the authors are rather skeptical.

Bharat Karnad is clear about his core argument – there is a deep-rooted tradition of politico-strategic realism in India that goes back to the Vedic period. Kautilya has refined this traditional thinking in a scholarly fashion and has codified the idea-contents of our realpolitik legacy. He also contends that this politico-strategic realism is the dominant feature of Indian strategic

[31] Ibid.
[32] Ali Ahmed, "Strategic Culture and Indian Self-assurance," *Journal of Peace Studies*, Vol. 17, Issues 2&3, April-September, 2010.
[33] Ibid.
[34] George J. Gilboy, Eric Heginbotham, *Chinese and Indian Strategic Behavior: Growing Power and Alarm,* (New York: Cambridge University Press, 2012), p. 38-39.
[35] G. D. Bakshi, *The Indian Art of War: The Mahabharata Paradigm (Quest for an Indian Strategic Culture),* (New Delhi, Sharada Press, 2002)

culture. "Out of spirituality, pacifism and non-violence, the leaders of the Indian freedom movement conjured up the idea of a morally superior India professing scruples, having ethical bearings and offering a war-weary world an alternative path to peace and reconciliation. Except that, these attributes were in many ways, antithetical to the traditional Indian culture."[36] He thinks that the existence of a civilization of this antiquity "substantiates the fact of a deep-rooted 'strategic culture' of quite considerable sophistication and merit existing for many thousands of years – but in the last millennium or so, alas, only as palimpsest – overlaid thickly with the subsequent history of internal dissensions facilitating foreign rule when these systems of Hindu thought suffered neglect."[37]

Perhaps, the most comprehensive and the most recent study that has delved in analyzing the *Arthashastra* as an unequivocal 'endogenous politico-strategic thought', and its impact on modern politics in India, has been undertaken by Michael Liebig and Subrata K. Mitra in their book, *Kautilya's Arthashastra: An Intellectual Portrait-Classical Roots of Modern Politics in India*.[38] Interestingly, and making a departure from some of the other acclaimed readings on the *Arthashastra* mentioned earlier, they contend that the *Arthashastra*, a crucial part of India's classical political heritage, constitutes the normative reservoir that underpins modern India's political identity. They argue that the peripheral or marginal understanding of the *Arthashastra* by most analysts in the academic mainstream is lamentable. Among the many positives that this book offers, it would be appropriate to highlight the following points here which will illuminate the methodological direction of this study.

- The first and the most important being that for the analysis of data material on the contemporary relevance of Kautilya's *Arthashastra*, the authors credit the concept of strategic culture, notably in its conceptualization by Alastair Iain Johnston, who ascribes to the early strategic texts a formative influence on foreign and security policy of the modern state. For India, they argue that the *Arthashastra* is such a text.
- Secondly, to establish the strategic cultural continuity across the millennia of India's history, Mitra and Liebig, very innovatively use concepts like Fernand Braudel's *longue*

[36] Bharat Karnad, *Nuclear Weapons and Indian Security: The Realist Foundations of Strategy*, (New Delhi: Macmillan, 2005), p. 1.
[37] Ibid., p. 19.
[38] See Mitra and Liebig, *Kautilya's Arthashastra: An Intellectual Portrait,* 2016.

durée[39] history, the concept of 're-use of the past', and the sociological concept of 'habitus' developed by Pierre Bourdieu. They contend that the *long*ue *durée* of Kautilya's *Arthashastra* is established through its oral and written transmission. Its latent ideational presence is acknowledged by a wide network of expert interviews that the authors conducted as part of their research. This suggests an adequate socialization of the Indian elite in Indian strategic tradition that evolved over centuries.[40]

- Thirdly, Mitra and Liebig link the core ideas and concepts of Kautilya's *Arthashastra* to a document published in 2012 titled: *NonAlignment 2.0 – A Foreign and Strategic Policy for India in the 21st Century*, in line with Johnston's proposed methodology to establish link between strategic culture and behaviour. As a step to prove the connection, Johnston suggests "to test for the presence of and congruence between preference rankings found in a sample of, say, policy documents taken from the decision process in the period of interest, and between these documents and the original objects of analysis."[41]

It is clear from the above review that any work done in the field of Indian strategic culture has referred to Kautilya's *Arthashastra*, either as the foundational basis, or as an important component, or at least as a great treatise on statecraft which has failed to influence the subsequent generations because of India's checkered history. However, very few scholars have attempted to read the original text and grasp its nuances. The next section of this chapter will defend the *Arthashastra* as the 'object of analysis', in line with Johnston's theory of strategic culture in understanding India's strategic antecedents.

Object of Analysis

It has been explained in the previous chapter that in following Johnston's methodology, "the central heuristics and accompanying strategic preferences must be congruent across relevant objects of analysis (e.g. strategic texts representative of a formative period in the development of strategic thought and practice) for a single strategic culture to exist in any society." According to

[39] The *longue durée* (English: the long term) is an expression used by the French Annales School of historical writing to designate their approach to the study of history. It gives priority to long-term historical structures over the short-term time-scale that is the domain of the chronicler and the journalist.
[40] For a fuller explication, see Mitra and Liebig, *Kautilya's Arthashastra: An Intellectual Portrait,* 2016, pp. 250-271
[41] Johnston, *Cultural Realism*, p. 53

Johnston, test for strategic culture in the formative texts of a certain country is important. Some of the Indian scholars have been rather pessimistic about the lack of textual richness in ancient literature on strategic thinking. India has been a disunited entity, with characteristically different historical periods, facing constant invasions and incorporating vast populations, along with fighting wars. However, the existence of *Arthashastra* only proves that there would have been a tradition of thinking about war within the larger understanding of power and sovereignty. The text originated in a specific geo-cultural space and context with the desire and drive to establish a pan-Indian state/empire encompassing it. Ancient Indians seem to have thought systematically and thoroughly about most issues and strategic thinking would be no exception.

Jayashree Vivekanandan, in one of her recent works, tackles the question: "Why does the text command an exalted status in historical narratives? How are textual representations of historical memory theorised, especially in charting their contemporary relevance?" She contends, "By arraying thinkers to constitute a formidable phalanx, the tradition forges an unbroken intellectual lineage that connects the past to the present. Texts codifying the collective wisdom of the ages are regarded as critical to this intellectual exercise."[42] The strategic significance of the *Arthashastra*, the paper argues, is integrally connected to the return of history in such cultural explanations of state behaviour.[43] Taking this point further and making it methodologically useful, Johnston suggests a way of getting around the problem of selecting the texts for analysis from the formidable variety of objects of analyses available. It is pertinent at this stage to examine the criteria that Johnston proposes for the selection of the texts, and the extent to which the *Arthashastra* fits into it.

It is important for Johnston that "the content analysis of strategic cultural objects begins at the earliest point in history that is accessible to the researcher, where initial strategic culture-derived preference rankings may reasonably be expected to have emerged, or where those who use these strategic traditions imply the roots of their thought lie."[44] "It is only this way one can determine whether later strategic culture is a direct descendent of a formative strategic culture, a return to

[42] Jayashree Vivekanandan, "The Text as Tradition: Interpreting India's Strategic History", in Pradeep Kumar Gautam, Saurabh Mishra, Arvind Gupta (eds.), *Indigenous Historical Knowledge: Kautilya and His Vocabulary* Vol. II, IDSA, (New Delhi, Pentagon Press, 2016)
[43] The views are also expressed in the author's book, *Interrogating International Relations: India's Strategic Practice and the Return of History*, (New Delhi: Routledge, 2011)
[44] Johnston, *Cultural Realism*, p. 40.

earlier patterns, a break from recent ones, a reflection of a particular subculture, or simply nonexistent."[45] In the case of India, the *Arthashastra* is the obvious choice. Mitra and Liebig argue that Johnston's approach to identify the strategic culture of a country seems applicable to the Indian case and "that means taking Kautilya's *Arthashastra* as the starting point for ascertaining its basic features."[46]

Johnston alludes to other reasons for analyzing these texts. According to him, the selection of the text should be done on the criteria that they are representative of the larger strategic and philosophical tradition of the country. According to Bharat Karnad, Kautilya "conveyed by then four thousand-year old 'vocal tradition' of the *Vedas* and the *Puranas* into written form – distilling, compiling, collating, interpreting, and commenting on the innumerable issues pertaining to statecraft and society, and culling laws, social norms, policy strictures and organizing principles contained therein and in a host *shastras* (disciplines) and *sutras* (axioms). Tempering this 'received wisdom' with his own hands-on experience of government, he refined the traditional thinking to produce his classic text on *realpolitik.*"[47]

This deduction is plausible because Kautilya himself states explicitly that his *Arthashastra* is based on antecedent *Arthashastras* (which are not available) as well as other antecedent *dharmashastras* and philosophical texts. The fundamental core of the Kautilyan theory of state interweaves the political philosophy of the antecedent texts and is well encapsulated in treatises of later centuries. For instance, the *Manu Samhita*, the *Mahabharata*, the *Ramayana* and the *Matsya Purana* have references to '*matsya-nyaya*' (the strong would devour the weak like fishes in water) which also forms the basis of the political anthology in Kautilya's *Arthashastra*.[48]*Danda* (force) as the fulcrum of the idea of state and the ethical conception of law form the essence of the broader strategic tradition.

Additionally, in Kautilya's *Arthashastra,* emphasis is laid on the king's training and acquaintance with *itihas,* which are the two epics – the *Ramayana* and the *Mahabharata*, and the

[45] Ibid.
[46]Mitra and Liebig, *Kautilya's Arthashastra: An Intellectual Portrait*, p. 294.
[47] Bharat Karnad, *Nuclear Weapons and Nuclear Security*, p. 10.
[48] See Dr. Benoy Kumar Sarkar, *The Political Institutions and Theories of the Hindus: A Study in Comparative Politics* (Calcutta: Chuckerverity Chatterjee and Co. Ltd., 1939), p. 194

Vedas.[49] Therefore, these texts do not lie outside the wider Indian strategic and philosophical framework. Any evidence of strategic culture in them should be seen as representative of the larger intellectual and cultural tradition. For this reason, Johnston contends that "there is in some cases very little difference between the content of these military classics and other texts on statecraft that have been traditionally categorized as philosophical classics."[50]

Another important criterion for the selection of the text is that the work should provide the textual and intellectual basis for much of the extensive writings on military affairs to follow. Although, the *Arthashastra* has been treated by many historians as a description of the Mauryan Empire and administration, Upinder Singh opines that "it is a theoretical treatise, not a descriptive work, and although its core probably dates to the Maurya period, it has interpolations belonging to later centuries."[51] Upinder Singh also throws light on a lesser known ancient military text – Kamandaka's *Nitisara* which also has a *sastric* (normative) nature and is believed to have existed in Gupta or post-Gupta period. This text refers to Visnugupta, alias Kautilya on two occasions as "our guru". The text opens with a salutation to the God *Ganesa*, the king, and Visnugupta, in that order.[52] Therefore the influence of Kautilya's strategies can be shown to have had effect on the writings and thought processes of the later strategists. The *Arthashastra's* embeddedness in India's cultural continuity reveals itself not only through its oral and written transmission but equally so in the work's reception by outstanding figures of India's cultural spheres across the centuries[53] such as

- Kamandaka (approx. 3rd century AD)
- Asvaghosa (approx. 80-150AD)
- Kalidasa (approx. turn of the 4th to the 5th century AD)
- Vishakhadatta (approx. 5th century AD)
- Dandin (approx. 6th century AD)
- Vatsyayana (approx. 3rd century AD)

[49] See Michael Leibig, Saurabh Mishra eds., *The Arthashastra in a Transcultural Perspective*, (New Delhi: Pentagon Press, 2017), p. 210
[50] Johnston, *Cultural Realism*, p. 45.
[51] Upinder Singh, Politics, Violence and War in Kamandaka's Nitisara, *The Indian Economic and Social History Review*, 47, 1 (2010):29-62
[52] Ibid, p.35
[53] Liebig and Mitra, *Kautilya's Arthashastra: An Intellectual Portrait*, p. 37.

Johnston also draws attention to the general critique to such an approach of taking strategic texts written by individuals as objects of analysis for deciphering a nation's strategic culture. On textualism and the alleged "fallacy" of believing that one can learn perennial wisdom from the classic texts, Bhiku Parekh and R. N. Berki in their critique of Skinner's "History of Ideas"[54], contend that "It is not the case that we just endow the so-called 'classic' works of political thought with the attribute of containing 'perennial wisdom', and then just go out and make efforts to apply this wisdom to our political concerns. 'Classic' works are not given, nor have an abstract, independent existence. They are made classic in the first place by the prevalent political interest that informs their reading and interpretation."[55] "The attribution of perennial wisdom, therefore, is not an assumption, but an empirically based, well-considered judgement."[56] Also, from the analysis of the text, it is clear that the consistent strategic precepts that are embodied in these texts have been transmitted and are representative of social norms and value, and not the belief system of an individual.

The final charge which Johnston thinks could be levelled against these texts is that the content may not address grand strategic questions. Do these works explicitly or implicitly discuss the pros and cons of different types of grand strategies? Or are most largely concerned with military strategy, tactics, and training? Bharat Karnad's assessment provides an answer to this in definite terms. He says: "The ancient Indian politico-military thoughts exceptional in its plumbing the big picture as well as the minutiae of almost every aspect of statecraft in exhaustive detail. The use of force in diplomacy, for instance, was scrutinized and war in all its variety and its conduct studied; the nature and the causes of conflict examined; the various factors, including morality that impact on inter-State relations assessed; the requisite weights assigned to military capabilities and paradigms of international relations were conceptualized. And, most importantly, the entire body of knowledge had a policy slant, as if first passed through a fine

[54] Quentin Skinner, "Meaning and Understanding in the History of Ideas." *History and Theory* 8 (1), Wesleyan University, Wiley: 3–53, 1969. Bhiku Parekh and R.N. Berki subsequently provided a critique of Skinner's methodology in the *Journal of the History of Ideas*.
[55] Bhikhu Parekh and R. N. Berki, "The History of Political Ideas: A Critique of Q. Skinner's Methodology", *Journal of the History of Ideas* Vol. 34, No. 2 (Apr. - Jun., 1973), p. 180.
[56] Ibid.

sieve of pragmatic realism. There is nothing elsewhere of comparable vintage, certainly nothing with this vision, complexity and practical value."[57]

It is clear from the above discussion that the ancient Indian classic- the *Arthashastra,* measures up to all the criteria which Johnston has invoked for the selection of a classical text for understanding a country's strategic culture.

The next section will engage in extracting the central elements of strategic culture from the text, if they indeed exist.

Central Strategic Paradigms

In Johnston's methodological framework, answers to three interrelated questions constitute a model of strategic culture, from which logically derived grand strategic preferences flow out. The three questions pertain to role of war in human affairs, nature of the adversary and the role and efficiency of violence or military force. In the case of India, Kautilya's *Arthashastra,* building on earlier political theory of ancient India is an encyclopedic treatment of politics, which systematically presents and assesses all aspects of statecraft and politics. Kautilya demands that a *shastra*[58] text must have a clear and stringent conceptual structure – he speaks of the "skeleton" – which then must be filled with factual content – "flesh and blood" – as he puts it. This had to be done without repetitions, vagueness, digressions and grammatical errors.[59]

"Easy to learn and understand, precise in doctrine, sense and word, free from prolixity of text, thus has his work on Political Science been composed by Kautilya"[60] (KA, I, 1, 19).

Kautilya's *Arthashastra* is also marked by textual rigour, which is exemplified in the systematic character of the work and the employment of various methodological tools. In Book XV of the *Arthashastra*, Kautilya presents a list of 32 categories of his scientific methodology (e.g. 'forward reference', 'practical application', 'interpretation', 'inference', 'universal statement')

[57] Bharat Karnad, *Nuclear Weapons and Indian Security*, p. 3.
[58] The word '*sastra'* has been at times, used as a synonym of *vidya. Vidya* denotes instrument of teaching, manual or compendium of rules, religious or scientific treatise – explicated by D.R. Chattopadhyaya, 'General Introduction' in D.R. Chattopadhyaya (General Ed.), *History of Science, Philosophy and Culture in Indian Civilization*, Voulme X, Part 7, (New Delhi, Sage 2006), pp. xx-xxi.
[59] Mitra and Liebig, *Kautilya's Arthashastra: An Intellectual Portrait*, p. 65.
[60] R.P. Kangle, *The Kautilya Arthashastra-Part II* (Delhi: Motilal Banarssidas Publishers, 2014), p. 5

by which he demonstrates the validity of the principle of sufficient reason and logical consistency in his work.[61]

While congruence and scientific rigour in the text is well established, what could effectively pose a challenge to the researcher is to unravel the "deep structures", the "text's own logic"[62] or the "latent idea content"[63] and use it as a lens to understand the mechanics of politics explicated by Kautilya. It may lead to several readings of the text, absorption of its strong philosophical undercurrent and then making sense of the fusion of theory with practice. In keeping with the focus of this study, this section will dwell on what Kautilya seems to be telling a strategist to do, how to rank choices, and, thus, how to make decisions.

Before venturing into spelling out what Kautilya has to say about each of these aspects, it would be appropriate to understand how the interrelationship of the three questions, which together form the central strategic paradigm, work and how the choices lead to different strategic models. The central paradigms can, at its extremes, take one of the two 'ideal forms'. One is characterized by the assumption that war is preventable, conflict is a variable sum, and highly coercive strategies are less efficacious and are used as last resorts. The other extreme, assumes war as a given, rooted in security dilemma, and the imminent threat from the adversary can be best tackled with application of force.

Lebow has argued that the acceptance of the inevitability of war has led, in a number of cases in international politics, to preferences for preventive war or preemptive strategies.[64] "If war is inevitable, the logic goes, it makes sense to act before the enemy inevitably does."[65] This "cult of offensive" in line with Social Darwinian zero-sum vision of international conflicts, predisposes states to use of force. It is contended here that in the case of Kautilya's *Arthashastra*, the logic between the three questions (typified in the two extremes) does not fit as clearly and consistently as it does with some of the European military doctrines. This contention is elaborated below in the discussion on the central strategic paradigm.

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[61] Ibid., p. 64.
[62] See Donna U. Gregory, "Forward" in James Der Derian and Michael J. Shapiro, ed., *International/Intertextual Relations: Post Modern Readings in World Politics*, (Lexington, Mass, 1989). This is a methodological goal of the post behavioralist.
[63] Phrase used by Mitra and Liebig, *Kautilya's Arthashastra: An Intellectual Portrait*.
[64] Johnston, *Cultural Realism*, p. 61.
[65] Richard Ned Lebow, *Between Peace and War: The Nature of International Crisis*, (Baltimore: John Hopkins University Press, 1981), p. 254-63.

Role of war

A balanced and classical evaluation of the role of war and the use of force as part of statecraft is integral to Kautilya's *Arthashastra*. Before embarking on explicating Kautilya's view on the role of war, it is pertinent to first understand the different planes on which his policy prescriptions in the text operate. Book I of the *Arthashastra* deals with "The requirements to be met by the ruler and the human and institutional resources available to him in the exercise of power". The first five chapters of Book I lay down the requisite training for the ruler to be good and efficient. Herein lies the core of the *Arthashastra's* philosophical tradition. Kautilya states that the future ruler must master four sciences – *Anvikshiki* (translated as "the science of enquiry" and "philosophy" by Dr. Sarvepalli Radhakrishnan and Prof. R.P. Kangle respectively), *Trayi* (the three Vedas – *Rig Veda*, *Yajur Veda* and *Sama Veda*), *Vartta* (economics) and *dandaniti* (science of politics). Together, these are the actual means of knowledge (*vidya*). He considers *anvikshiki* (the science of enquiry) as the "lamp of all sciences", "means of all actions" and as "the support of all *dharma* (laws and duties)".[66] According to Kautilya, among the four enumerated sciences, philosophy takes precedence and helps in the understanding of the latter three sciences, thus acting as a tool. Together, the four sciences make the realization of both *artha* (material good) and *dharma* (moral good) possible. For Kautilya, philosophy consists of the teachings of *Samkhya*, *Yoga*, and *Lokayata*.[67]

A proper understanding of these three schools of philosophy illuminates what could possibly be Kautilya's criteria for their selection as an important component for the ruler's training. *Samkhya* is a Sanskrit word which, depending on the context means, "to reckon, count, enumerate, calculate, deliberate, reason, reasoning by numeric enumeration, relating to number, rational."[68] It considers *pratyakṣa* or *dṛṣṭam* (direct sense perception), *anumāna* (inference), and *sabda* or *aptavacana* (verbal testimony of the sages or shāstras) to be the only valid means of knowledge or *pramana.* Therefore, it is often described as the rationalist school of Indian philosophy. The other important aspect of this school which is relevant here is its strong duality. "*Samkhya* philosophy regards the universe as consisting of two realities; *puruṣa* (consciousness)

[66] R.P. Kangle, *The Kautilya Arthashastra, Part II*, Translation with Critical and explanatory Notes, [1.2.12], (Delhi: Motilal Banarsidass Publishers, 2010)
[67] Mitra and Liebig, *Kautilya's Arthashastra: An Intellectual Portrait*, p. 68.
[68] *Samkhya*, Monier-Williams Snaskrit-English Dictionary, Cologne Digital Sanskrit, Lexicon, Germany.

and *prakrti* (matter). Jiva (a living being) is that state in which *purusa* is bonded to *prakrti* in some form."[69] Possibly, this uncompromising dualism is symbolized in the fusion of the *artha* and *dharma*, the spiritual and the material, and philosophy and practice, through the text. "*Yoga* is mentioned along with *samkhya* in antecedent texts, and for the first time in chapter 6.13 of the *Shvetashvatra Upanishad*,"[70] as *samkhya-yoga-adhigamya* (literally, "to be understood by proper reasoning and spiritual discipline").[71] Kautilya specifically mentions an art of controlling senses as an important training tool for the kings.

In contrast to these two, the *Lokayatas*, were in a sense, the first philosophical pragmatists. They denied the validity of inferences that were made based upon truth claims that were not empirically verifiable. The term "*lokayata*" or "*charvaka*" have historically been used to denote the philosophical school of Indian materialism and "*lokayata*" literally means 'philosophy of the people.' The interplay between these three schools has been succinctly described by Dr. Saurabh Mishra: "*Samkhya* and *Yoga* primarily inform the king about the required attitude towards the conduct of life (*samsara* /material) and the inevitability of *karma* (action), while the *Lokayata* sets the functional and practical activity-oriented fundamentals in the material world. *Lokayata* provides the principles of materialistic interactions that become the guiding principles of the "science of acquisition and protection of earth."[72] Together, these philosophies under the rubric of *anvikshiki*, inform the ruler about the spiritual goodness of the Vedic lore, the material gains and losses in economics, good and bad policies in statecraft as well as the relative strength and weakness of the three sciences. Alighting on knowledge so gained, the ruler would perform his duties.

Interestingly, the fusion of scientific enquiry with tradition, in the context of *Arthashastra*, makes one of the "great debates" in the field of modern International Relations i.e. Science Vs. Tradition superfluous. The traditional approach represented by Hedley Bull, emphasized judgment derived from an intimate experience of history, and philosophy of politics, and the

[69] *Samkhya* – Hinduism, Encyclopedia Britannica, 2014.
[70] Mike Burley, *Classical Samkhya and Yoga - An Indian Metaphysics of Experience,* (London/New York: Routledge, 2012), pp. 15-18.
[71] GJ Larson, RS Bhattacharya and K Potter, The Encyclopedia of Indian Philosophies, Volume 4, (Princeton, New Jersey: Princeton University Press, 2014), pp. 6-7
[72] Saurabh Mishra, "Rajadharma, Legitimacy and Sovereignty in the Arthashastra", in Michael Liebig and Saurabh Mishra eds., *The Arthashastra in a Transcultural Perspective: Comparing Kautilya with Sun-Zi, Nizam al-Mulk, Barani and Machiavelli*, IDSA, (New Delhi, Pentagon Press, 2017), p. 214.

scientific approach, led by Singer, aspired "to a theory of international relations whose propositions are based either upon logical or mathematical proof, or upon strict empirical procedures of verification."[73] *Arthashastra* is indeed exemplary in symbolizing the synthesis of the two realms.

Is war an inevitable phenomenon or is it an aberrant? In the first verse of {6.2} of Kautilya's *Arthashastra*, "'*Sama vyayamau yogakshemayoryonih*'- the welfare of a state [ensuring the security of the state within its existing boundaries and acquiring new territories to enlarge it] depends on adopting a policy of non-intervention or overt action' – establishes the basis for all foreign policy."[74] The policy of non-intervention was essentially to avoid unnecessary foreign engagements in order to strengthen past acquisitions. *Vyayama,* as interpreted by Rangarajan, "implies an active foreign policy, *Yoga,* the objective of enlargement of one's power and influence, and through these, one's own territory."[75]

P.K. Gautam convincingly links *yogakshema* (*yoga* means acquisition and *kshema* means protection and sustenance) to the law of *matsya nyaya* (the big fish swallowing the small one).[76] Since there is no chastiser under the condition of anarchy and *matsya nyaya* consequently prevails, *yogakshema* enjoins the ruler to secure the survival of the state including through resort to war (*danda*). The right use of coercive state power is the central question of statecraft, which Kautilya defines as follows:

"Its [the rod's] right administration constitutes the science of politics, having for its purpose the acquisition of things not possessed, the preservation of things possessed, the augmentation of things preserved and the bestowal of things augmented on a worthy recipient. On it is dependent the orderly maintenance of worldly life (KA, I, 4, 3-4)."[77]

"Another explication of *yogakshema* is through the concept of raison d'e′tat."[78] According to Mitra and Liebig, Kautilyan raison d'e′tat integrates two fundamental value ideas:

[73] Hedley Bull, 'International theory: the case for a classical approach', in Klaus Knorr and James N. Rosenau, eds., *Contending approaches to International Politics* (Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Press, 1969), pp. 21-27.
[74] L.N. Rangarajan, *Kautilya- The Arthashastra*, (New Delhi: Penguin Books, 1987), p. 546.
[75] Ibid.
[76] P.K. Gautam, "Overcoming the Ways of Matsya-Nyaya", *Strategic Analysis*, Vol. 37, No.5, pp. 521-525.
[77] Mitra and Liebig, p. 70.
[78] Mitra and Liebig, p. 132.

- "Maintaining and expanding the power of the state;
- Ensuring the welfare and security of the people"

The first value idea means political rationality that commits the ruler to the optimization of the seven state factors.[79] The second value idea is the solemn commitment of the ruler to strive for the happiness of the people, as laid down in Book I of the *Arthashastra*: "*In the happiness of the subjects, lies the happiness of the king and in what is beneficial to the subjects is his own benefits* (KA, I, 19, 34)."[80] The ruler trained in the four sciences and with a sense of scientific enquiry, would optimize the state factors in accordance with political purposive rationality, and thereby realize the normative imperative for the happiness of the people. The *Arthashastra* also emphasizes on maintaining a balance between the ancient Indian notion of *trivarga* – ethical goodness (*dharma*), wealth and power (*artha*), and pleasure (*kama).* In KA, IX, 7, 60, Kautilya writes: "Material gain, spiritual good and pleasure: this is the triad of gain."[81] Although *artha* is ranked higher, its interconnectedness with *dharma* and *kama* is important. The twin aspects of the political goal of the ruler (conquest/consolidation and welfare of the people), the interplay between political rationality and political normativity, and continuous synergy between *artha* and *dharma*, are all suggestive of a unique dimension of Kautilyan statecraft, quite unparalleled in the Western world.

The pronounced conjunction of *dharma*[82] and *artha* throughout the text dispels some of the myths harboured by Western military historians and cultural relativist theorists. Christopher Coker asserts that the West is unique in secularizing warfare and for the non-Western societies, violence remains the moral essence of the warrior. Taking the example of the *Bhagavad Gita*,

[79] Kautilya builds up his theory of the State as an organic entity on the basis of seven elements, which he describes in his *Arthashastra* as *Saptanga*. They are the *Swami*, the sovereign King; the *Mantrin*, the ministers; the *Janapada*, the people and the territory; the *Durga*, the fortification; the *Kosha*, the treasury; the *Sena* or the *Danda*, the army; and the *Mitra*, the allies.

[80] Ibid.

[81] P.K. Gautam, *Understanding Dharma and Artha in Statecraft through Kautilya's Arthashastra*, IDSA Monograph Series, No. 53, July 2016, p. 9.

[82] Dr. S. Radhakrishnan defines *dharma* as "a code of conduct supported by the general conscience of the people. It is not subjective in the sense that the conscience of the individual imposes it, nor external in the sense that the law enforces it. Dharma does not force men into virtue, but trains them for it. It is not a fixed code of mechanical rules, but a living spirit which grows and moves in response to the development of society. (The Heart of Hinduism, Madras, 1936, pp. 17-18, as quoted by P.K. Gautam, *Understanding Dharma and Artha*, p. 14.

"Coker asserts that for non-Western warriors, violence is existential."[83] Further, it is believed that the "Western tradition of warfare, characterized by technological innovations, rationality, and the absence of religious and cultural ethics as regards the application of violence, gave the West global military superiority during the early modern era."[84]

The foregoing discussion on the four sciences, *yogakshema*, and raison d'e′tat, amply prove that Kautilyan military ethos is firmly rested on political rationality in union with political normativity, discerned through a scientific enquiry, in a highly secular manner. In a recent article, Gurcharan Das commented on Steve Bannon's (President Donald trump's chief strategist and member of his National Security Council) invocation of the Bhagvada Gita to wage a war against Islam to "establish dharma in the world". While answering the intriguing question as to how the moral idea of '*dharma'* can attract both a militarist, Steve Bannon and the pacifist Mahatama Gandhi, Gurcharan Das says, "Gita has something for both. To the warrior it proclaims, do your dharmic duty and fight a just war. To the philosopher and the devotee, it offers the paths of wisdom and love (via *gyana* and *bhakti yoga*)."[85] The secularity of the concept of dharma is established by this definition: "Dharma is appropriateness in thought, action, attitude and judgement to a thing or a happening or a desire or an incident in life."[86] *Rajadharma* (dharma of the king), in the context of the *Arthashastra* is defined as "the traditional, primarily ethical, yardstick for evaluation of the performance of the state and the government."[87]

A complete understanding of Kautilya's *Arthashastra* conveys his insistence not on selectiveness, or fulfillment of one limited and partial aim but the success in all fields. Quite contrary to this is Lebow's explication of the trilogy of human motives that prompts specific approaches to cooperation, conflict and risk-taking, in the context of the ancient Greek civilization. He posits three fundamental motives that reflect universal human needs – appetite,

[83] Kaushik Roy, *Hinduism and the Ethics of Warfare in South Asia: From Antiquity to the Present*, (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2012, p. 4.
[84] Geoffrey Parker (ed.), *The Cambridge Illustrated History of Warfare: The Triumph of the West* (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1995), as quoted in Kaushik Roy, *Hinduism and the Ethics of Warfare in South Asia,* p. 4
[85]Gurcharan Das, "Why Trump's Pro-War Aide Quotes the Gita", Times of India, March 26, 2017.
[86] Sri Sivananda Murthy, Words to Remember, Sayings of Sadhguru, p. 17.
[87] Saurabh Mishra, "Rajdharma, Legitimacy and Sovereignty in the Arthashastra", in Liebig and Mishra, *The Arthashastra in a Transcultural Perspective,* p. 217.

spirit, and reason. According to Lebow, each of these is distinct and often at odds with each other.[88]

In Kautilya's *Arthashastra*, while war is an inevitable phenomenon, the decision to wage a war is based on many inputs and is a well considered decision. Prime among the considerations is that the action should be legitimate and 'righteous'. It is important here to highlight the distinction which Kautilya makes between political normativity and 'general ethics'. If fundamental state interest is at stake, unethical state actions gain a different normative quality. If state actions violate general ethical standards but are congruent with raison d'e′tat, they are legitimate for Kautilya.[89] In inter-state relations, the ultimate expression of *danda* is war. This too is not without normative constraints. Wars are righteous if they serve the purpose of political unification, and 'demoniacal' if they cause plunder or destruction.[90]

The concept of a righteous war pervades the text and also applies to the realm of 'whom to attack'. Between a just king seriously affected and an unjust king with disgruntled subjects but lightly affected, who should be attacked first? Kautilya says, when a just king is attacked, even if he suffers from a serious calamity, his subjects will help him. [On the other hand,] the subjects of an unjust king will be indifferent to the troubles of their ruler; if they are dissatisfied, they can bring down even a strong king (KA, VII, 5, 9-11).[91] In a similar vein, "The gain, being obtained by a righteous [king] from an unrighteous one becomes pleasing to his own people and to others. The reverse rouses to anger" (KA, IX, 4, 10-11). Besides, Kangle argues that it is not quite correct to say that the *Arthashastra* knows 'nothing about fair play' in battle.[92] He draws attention to care being taken to see that certain categories of persons (those who surrender, those who have abandoned their weapons, those who have turned their back on fight) are not attacked by his troops. The text too knows a *dharmishtha yuddha* (KA, X, 3, 26), but it recognizes that on the battlefield, tactics are essential, particularly when one is at a disadvantage.[93]

[88] Richard Ned Lebow, *A Cultural Theory of International Relations*, (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2008)
[89] Mitra and Liebig, *Kautilya's Arthashastra: An Intellectual Portrait*, p. 134.
[90] Ibid., p. 140
[91] Rangarajan, *Kautilya- The Arthashastra*, pp. 572-73.
[92] R.P. Kangle, *The Arthashastra: A Study, Part III*, (Delhi: Motilal Banarsidass Publishers, 7th reprint 2010), p. 260.
[93] Ibid.

Apart from the consideration of righteousness, "The would-be conqueror shall judge the relative strengths and weaknesses of the following aspects [of waging a war], as applicable to him and to his enemy, before starting on a military expedition: power; the place; the time [of the military engagement]; the season for marching; when to mobilize different types of forces; the possibility of revolts and rebellions in the rear; the likely losses, expenses, and gains; and the likely dangers."[94] (KA, IX, 1, 1). The conqueror will undertake the military expedition only if he is superior. Kautilya's categorization of wars is also based on political rationality. *Prakasha yuddha* or 'open fight' is in the place and time indicated, *kuta yuddha*, 'concealed fighting', involves the use of tactics in the battlefield, and *tusnim yuddha* or 'silent fight' implies the use of secret agents. It is stated that when the *vijigishu* is superior in strength and the season and terrain are favourable to him, he should resort to open warfare (10.3.1). In fact, a fight about the place and time of which notice has been given, is considered righteous, *dharmishtha* (KA, X, 3, 26).[95]

Nature of Adversary

The preceding discussion on righteous war throws light on the content of the other two central strategic paradigms proposed to be discussed in this chapter, namely the nature of adversary and the role of violence in state security. The righteous-war doctrine embodies a zero-sum view of the adversary, since it places unrighteous violators of the moral-political order beyond the pale.[96] According to Kautilya, "the most important of a king's neighbour is the 'enemy'. Among the states surrounding a kingdom, there is always one who is the natural enemy."[97] The other neigbours may be hostile (*aribhavi*), friendly (*mitrabhavi*) or vassal (*bhrityabhavi*). "However, the main target of the conqueror is always the designated natural enemy; 'one cannot make peace with the enemy' (KA, VII, 13, 17)."[98] There is only one special case in which peace with the enemy can be made. Peace, as explained in (KA, VII, 1, 32), is only a stage enabling the conqueror to build up his strength before attempting to conquer the enemy.

Before delving further into whether Kautilya thinks that conflicts with enemies tend towards zero-sum stakes or not, it is necessary to understand his widely known concept of the '*mandala'*,

[94] Ibid., p. 627.
[95] Kangle, *The Arthashastra: A Study*, p. 258.
[96] Johnston, *Cultural Realism*, p. 72.
[97] Rangarajan, *Kautilya- The Arthashastra*, 547.
[98] Ibid.

and its dynamics with the three 'text-immanent concept clusters'[99] - the '*saptanga'* (the seven state factors), the '*sadgunya'* (six methods of foreign policy), and the '*upayas'*(the four basic principles of politics). "The would-be conqueror shall apply the six methods of foreign policy [as appropriate] to the various constituent elements of his Circle of States with the aim of progressing from a state of decline to one of neither decline nor progress and from this state to one of progress (KA, VII, 1, 38)."[100]

The foreign policy summed up in the formula of *sadgunya* is associated with, though does not necessarily presuppose, the theory of *rajamandala* or the circle of kings. It was a geopolitical concept conceived to achieve strategic unity in the subcontinent. "The constituents of the *rajmandala* are *vijigishu* (conqueror), *ari* (adversary), *mitra* (ally), *arimitra* (adversary's ally), *mitra-mitra* (ally's ally), *parshnigraha* (adversary in the rear), *aakranda* (ally in the rear), *madhyama* (Middle king), *udhasina* (Neutral king) and *antardhi* (weak intervening king)."[101] "This representation is symbolic, signifying that all states in the *mandala* system face familiar predicament and define relationship in a dynamic manner, which may create opportunities for some and expose others to danger."[102]

In the context of this geographical reality, Kautilya extracts from heterogeneous political reality seven 'basic units' – *prakriti* – that are constitutive of the state: ruler, government, rural population, capital, treasury, armed forces and ally (foreign policy).[103] Kautilya analyzes each of these elements individually and their interdependency. Kautilya also identifies the basic forms of political behaviour which aim at enforcing one's will against the resistance of others. The four *upayas* are – conciliation [*saman*], gifts [*daan*], dissension [*bheda*] and the use of force [*dand*]. The *sadgunya* cluster is considered to be a derivative of this in the realm of foreign policy. "The *sadgunya* cluster consists of *samdhi* (peace), *vigraha* (war), *asana* (staying quiet; neutrality), *yana* (mobilization for war), *samshraya* (seeking shelter), *dvaidhibhava* (dual policy)."[104] Kautilya makes a very important contribution when he applies the temporal domain on the *sadgunyas*. The application of these policies is intrinsically linked to the three phases that the

[99] Mitra and Liebig, *Kautilya's Arthashastra; An Intellectual Portrait*, p. 61.
[100] Rangarajan, *Kautilya- The Arthashastra*, p. 563.
[101] Ibid., p. 557.
[102] Ibid., p. 552.
[103] Mitra and Liebig, *Kautilya's Arthashastra: An Intellectual Portrait*, p. 63.
[104] Liebig and Mishra, *The Arthashastra in a Transcultural Perspective*, p. 7

kingdom passes through – decline, stability and advancement.[105] Kautilya says "when in decline - make peace, when prospering - make war, if equal in strength - remain neutral, depleted in power - seek shelter, with help, seek dual policy and when blessed with excellence - prepare for war."[106] Since the three phases through which the kingdom passes is reflected in its constituent elements (*prakritis*), the *sadgunya* theory is logically and factually connected with the *saptanga* theory. The correlation of forces in terms of the *prakriti* determines which of the six foreign policy options is to be chosen.[107] Thus, the ruler (well trained in the four sciences) using the appropriate foreign policy, makes progress, and contributes to further increase in his power, thereby establishing a dynamic relationship between power and progress, mediated by the right policy, and executed through the instruments of the circle of states. Kautilya frames this normatively too: "The welfare of a state depends on an active foreign policy" (KA, VI, 2, 1).[108] Roger Boesche further elucidates this point. According to him, "Kautilya thought that one must assume that one's neighbours will eventually act in their own interest, and the king would betray one's own people if he did not assume a worst-case scenario."[109]

Relative power is a recurrent theme in the *Arthashastra*. "That the power equation shall make policy is an important Kautilyan contribution."[110] A state's position is determined by its relative progress and relative decline vis-à-vis other states in the neighbourhood. "It is decline for the conqueror if the enemy's undertakings flourish; conversely, the decline of the enemy's undertakings is progress for the conqueror. Parity between the two is maintained when both make equal progress (KA, VII, 12, 29)."[111]

This point is further elaborated by Kautilya metaphorically elsewhere: "For going to war with the stronger; he engages as it were in a fight on foot with an elephant. And [at war] with the equal, he brings about loss on both sides, like an unbaked jar struck by an unbaked jar. [At war] with the weaker, he attains absolute success, like a stone with an earthen vessel (KA, VII, 3, 3-5).[112]

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[105] Roger Boesche calls it the 'Pendulum theory of history', in *The First Great Political Realist: Kautilya and his Arthashastra*, p. 99.
[106] Kangle, *The Kautilya Arthashastra Part II*, pp. 321-322.
[107] Mitra and Liebig, *Kautilya's Arthashastra: An Intellectual Portrait,* p. 64.
[108] Rangarajan, *Kautilya - The Arthashastra*, p. 541.
[109] See Roger Boesche, "Kautilya's "Arthaśāstra" on War and Diplomacy in Ancient India", *The Journal of Military History*, Vol. 67, No. 1 (Jan., 2003), pp. 9-37.
[110] Rangarajan, *Kautilya - The Arthashastra,* p. 543.
[111] Ibid., p. 554.
[112] R.P. Kangle, The Kautilya Arthashastra Part II, Pg. 327.

However, he also draws attention to the fact that these general principles of attacking a weaker king but not an equally strong or stronger, are marked by exceptions. In his view, "A king, whose offer of peace is rejected by an equally powerful king, shall harass the other to the same extent as he is harassed. Just as unheated pieces of iron cannot be welded together, there can be no union without heat [brought about by friction].[113] (KA, VII, 3, 6-9). Similarly, "Peace shall be made with a weaker king who is submissive in all respects"[114] (KA, VII, 3, 10) Kautilya's emphasis on due consideration before policy selection is summed up in this sutra: "After ascertaining the (relative) strength or weakness of powers, place, time, seasons for marching, time for raising armies, revolts in the rear, losses, expenses, gains and troubles, of himself and of the enemy, the conqueror should march if superior in strength, otherwise stay quiet."[115] (KA, IX, 1, 1)

The problem of absolute gains and relative gains has dogged the field of the theory of international relations for a long time.[116] Structural Realism emphasizes relative gains where the gain of one is seen as the loss by another. Liberal institutionalism, on the other hand, assumes that states focus on their individual absolute gains and are not concerned about the gains of others. Kautilya, by this yardstick, surely belongs to the structural realist school.

Kautilya also categorizes the 'antagonist' on the basis of several factors. He defines an antagonist as any king whose kingdom shares a common border with that of the conqueror. Neighbouring kings who are deemed to be antagonists are of different kinds:

- **"Enemy** - a powerful antagonist neighbor [having excellent personal qualities, resources and constituents] is an enemy.
- **Vulnerable adversary** - one who is afflicted by a calamity [to one or more of his constituents].
- **Destroyable antagonist** - one who is weak or without support.
- **Weakened or harassed** - one who has support but can be weakened."[117] (KA, VI, 2, 14-19)

[113] Rangarajan, *Kautilya- The Arthashastra*, Pg. 566.
[114] A number of these well thought out exceptions are mentioned in detail in the chapter on "The Six Methods Adopted to Stronger, Equally Strong or Weak Kings".
[115] Rangarajan, *Kautilya- The Arthashastra*, p. 406.
[116] For a full explication, see Robert Powell, "Absolute and Relative Gains in International Relations Theory", *The American Political Science Review*, Vol. 85, No. 4 (Dec., 1991), pp. 1303-1320.
[117] Rangarajan, *Kautilya- The Arthashastra,* p. 555.

Deepshikha Shahi points out that the philosophical views of Thomas Hobbes, John Locke and Immanuel Kant to theorize three cultures of anarchy, characterized respectively by "enmity", "rivalry" and "friendship", finds a resonance in Kautilya's placement of states in different categories – '*aribhavin'*, '*mitrabhavin'*, and '*bhrtyabhavin*.' She further contends that "The placement of states in different categories by *vijigisu* basically implies the "construction" of the identity of neighbouring states by *vijigisu,* which is subject to change with the changing interactions between states."[118] The inter-state relations are thus reassessed on a constant basis, depending on a kingdom's movement from decline to progress, opening up opportunities for continuous realignment of states.

Despite the fluidity in relationships between states in the *mandala* and continuous reconstruction of identities, Balbir Sihag makes an "important distinction between war as a national necessity for survival, which does not rely on cost-benefit analysis, and the use of war as a matter of choice, where at a certain stage the cost-benefit analysis comes into play."[119] According to him, "a nation had to match or exceed the power of her potential adversary, since national security depended only on relative power."[120] In a similar vein, Rangarajan while laying down Kautilya's basic principles of foreign policy, mentions the first two as being – "(a) a king shall develop his state, i.e., augment its resources and power in order to enable him to embark on a campaign of conquest and (b) the enemy shall be eliminated."[121]

"*An enemy's destruction shall be brought about even at the cost of great losses in men, material and wealth*" (KA, VII, 13, 33)"[122]

To sum up, while war is a relatively frequent phenomenon in the conduct of human affairs, whether one goes to war or not, depends on the adversary and the threat it poses. It is the enemy's disposition that determines the level of threat. If the enemy's disposition is to war, it will propel our own resort to force which will not only be legitimate and necessary (as part of *rajadharma*), but would also not be bound by any moral limits. If the fundamental interests of

[118] Deepshikha Shahi, "Arthashastra beyond Realpolitik The 'Eclectic' Face of Kautilya", *Economic and Political Weekly*, Special Article, October 11, 2014, Vol. XlIX no 41.
[119] Balbir Sihag, "Kautilya on Public Goods and Taxation", as quoted in Sachin More, *Arthashastra: Lessons for the Contemporary Security Environment with South Asia as a Case Study*, IDSA Monograph Series, No. 31, January, 2014, p. 29.
[120] Ibid., p. 725.
[121] Rangarajan, *Kautilya- The Arthashastra*, p. 546
[122]Ibid., p. 541.

the state are at stake, unethical state actions gain a different normative quality.[123] In this highly conflictual environment, when the adversary is ready to use force, the relationship is perceived to be zero-sum. However, if the threat is perceived to be of a less threatening nature, the king could choose to make peace (enter into an agreement with specific conditions); stay quiet (when neither the king nor his enemy can cause harm to the other); prepare for war (by augmenting one's own power); seek protection (support of a stronger king if unable to ruin the enemy's undertakings or protect his own from the enemy's attacks); follow a dual policy (having peace with one enemy and waging war with another). Kautilya notes, "He who is well-versed in the science of politics, should employ all the means, viz. advancement, decline, and stable condition as well as weakening and extermination."[124]

Kautilya also had considered views on when it is right to use a state's coercive power and its relative utility with regard to an array of other non-violent measures enlisted in the *sadgunya*.

Utility of the Use of Force

With war being seen as a recurrent phenomenon, and some incidences of relationship with the adversary tending towards zero-sum, the resultant strategic culture model seems to be veering towards one of the 'extreme ideal forms' discussed earlier in the chapter. It assumes "war is inevitable or extremely frequent; that war is rooted in an enemy predisposed to challenge one's own interests; and that this threat can be handled through the application of superior force."[125] It is essentially in this last link of the trilogy of the central strategic paradigms that Kautilya makes a substantial departure from the extreme ideal form.

Max Weber, in his famous lecture ('Politics as a Vocation') remarked – "Truly radical 'Machiavellianism,' is classically expressed in Indian literature in the *Arthashastra* of Kautilya; compared to it, Machiavelli's The *Prince* is harmless."[126] Kautilya was the key adviser to the Indian king Chandragupta Maurya (c. 317-293 B.C.E.), who defeated the Nanda kings and stopped the advance of Alexander the Great's successors. It was under the Mauryan rule that most of the Indian subcontinent was first unified in to an empire. According to Roger Boesche,

[123] Mitra and Liebig, *Kautilya's Arthashastra: An Intellectual Portrait*, p. 134.
[124] Kangle, *The Kautilya Arthashastra Part II*, p. 384
[125] Johnston, *Cultural Realism*, p. 106.
[126] Max Weber, "Politics as a Vocation," in Weber: Selections in Translation, ed. W. G. Runciman, trans. Eric Matthews (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1978), 212-25, see 220.

"Kautilya thought there was a 'science' of warfare, presumably part of a larger science of politics."[127] He surely knew the "utility of the use of force", among several other measures to pursue political goal. But the real genius of Kautilya lay in his idea of raison d'e′tat: the synthesis of purposive political rationality and political normativity.

Roger Boesche argues that "by using secret agents, assassins, disinformation, and propaganda, Kautilya was ready to use almost any means of violence in fighting a war, and much of this advice violated the tacit code of war found in the great Indian epics."[128] Appadorai quotes the Dharamsastra to prove this point. 'Manu's Dharamsastra categorically stated: "One should not do a good thing by following a bad path."[129] The implication being that the *Arthashastra*, to some extent, lay outside the larger cultural and intellectual tradition of antecedent Hindu texts. According to Giri Deshingkar, "ancient Indian thinkers produced two schools of war, diplomacy and interstate relations; the *dharmayuddha* (ethical warfare) school; and the *kutayuddba* (devious warfare) school."[130] He adds, "at the level of rhetoric, the concept of *dharmayuddha* always reigned supreme…..in practice *kutayuddha* was often the norm."[131] He also points to a strong "religious" base of Indian strategic thought as against a "secular" base of the Chinese.

In response to some of these charges, P.K. Gautam rightly points out that any judgment on Kautilya's morals should be done in the context of *yogakshema*. "Kautilya enjoins the king to adopt policies that would lead the nation to *vriddhi* (gain) and avoid those that result in *kshya* (loss)."[132] This is his *Rajdharma*. To elucidate, he quotes Gupta- "It is important to remember that *dharma* in the literature of *Arthashastra* usually refers to *Rajdharma*, that is *dharma* of the king, and not to *dharma* as a whole. *Rajdharma* is essentially confined to the political domain in which prescription of righteousness applicable to individual do not apply in the same manner."[133] On the break with the *dharamsastras*, Charles Drekmeier contends, "Whereas the *dharamsastras* considered government and political process with reference to the ideals expressed in the Vedic

[127] Boesche, *The First Great Political Realist: Kautilya and his Arthashastra*, p. 22.
[128] Ibid., p. 33.
[129] A. Appadorai, *National Interest and India's Foreign Policy*, (Delhi, Kalinga Publications, 1992), as quoted in Gautam, *Understanding Dharma and Artha*, p. 26.
[130] Giri Deshingkar, "Strategic Thinking in Ancient India and China: Kautilya and Sunzi", *China Report*, Vol. 32, Issue 1, 1996.
[131] Ibid.
[132] Gautam, *Understanding Dharma and Artha*, p. 26.
[133] V.K. Gupta, *Kautilyan Jurisprudence*, New Delhi, self-published printed edition, 1987, p. 1, as quoted in Gautam, *Understanding Dharma and Artha*, pp. 41-42.

canon, the largely secular analysis of *Arthashastra* treats this subject more objectively. In the *arthashastra* literature, the interest of the state, rather than the king's personal fulfillment is of foremost importance."[134] This also takes care of the misinformed opinion that Indian strategic thought, as expressed in the *Arthashastra*, has a "religious" base. However, "the allegation that the *arthashastra* differs from the *dharmashastra* in that it is not dependent on the Vedas for validation must be rejected."[135] Theology was one of the four sciences which were considered important for the king's training.

Arthashastra does not mention the term "*dharmayuddha*" and definitely does not conform to any binary – "*dharmayuddha* and *kutayuddha*." The term "*kutayuddha*" is mentioned with reference to a combat level tactic which contains nothing objectionable from a military point of view.[136] Bharat Karnad quotes Krishna from Mahabharata to highlight the epics' view of morality: "When life is at danger…..or, one's property is at stake, truth become unutterable and so falsehood becomes truth and truth becomes falsehood. He who distinguishes between truth and falsehood in [this] situation can only know what is morality."[137] He goes on to rationalize the use of "unrighteous" means by saying: "When the number of one's foes [become] great, their destruction should be effected by [all] contrivances and means."[138] The *Rajdharma* of the *Shantiparvan* also talks about the "*dharma* of distress" or *Apaddharma*, where recourse to unrighteous means could be justifiably taken. Kautilya only tempered this "received wisdom" to keep pace with the changing politico-military reality, not disrupting the basic framework and contours of the policy prescriptions. Therefore, Kautilya's *Arthashastra* represents an amalgam of both political morality and political rationality – a phenomenon aptly described by Max Weber as the "ethics of responsibility" in politics.

The foregoing discussion clarifies Kautiya's stand on *dharma* and how *artha* and *dharma* are homologous. In this context, it is pertinent to examine what is the relative value of military and non-military options available to the Kautilyan state. Kautilya's *Arthashastra* is completely in conformity with the 'doctrine of *danda*" (punishment, coercion, sanction). According to Benoy

[134] Charles Drekmeier, *Kingship and Community in Early India*, (Bombay: Oxford university Press, 1962)
[135] Ibid.
[136] Kangle, *The Kautilya Arthashastra, Part 3: A Study*, 2010, p. 259.
[137] TB Mukherjee, *Inter-State Relations in Ancient India*, (Meerut, New Delhi, Meenakshi Prakashan, 1967); pp. 72-73, as quoted in Bharat Karnad, *Nuclear Weapons and Indian Security*, p. 9.
[138] Ibid., p. 64.

Sarkar, behind the two "inseparable accidents" of the Hindu theory of the state – the doctrine of *mamatva* ("mine"-ness) i.e. property, and the doctrine of *dharma* (i.e. law and justice), lies the doctrine of *danda*. "*Danda* is an essence of statal relationship and the absence of *danda* tantamounts to *matsya-nyaya*, or the state of nature."[139] The commitment of the ruler to strive for happiness of the people and to prevent *matsya-nyaya* has an intrinsic normative value. Yet this ethical obligation is also an expression of political rationality: only if the people are materially saturated and not politically tormented and oppressed, they will remain content, accept the ruler as legitimate and thus keep the state stable and strong – domestically and in terms of its external security. This symbiotic entanglement of the ethical with the political is the chief ingredient in a king's decision-making framework.

The *Arthashastra* is evidently against the reckless use of force. It advocates desisting from war if other means of settlement of dispute are available; military force is clearly the *ultima ratio.* The preference for minimally violent stratagems as against military force is most succinctly depicted in the following sutra:

"*An archer letting off an arrow may or may not kill a single man, but a wise man using his intellect can kill even reaching into the very womb*" (KA, X, 6, 51)[140]

"*One should neither submit spinelessly nor sacrifice oneself in foolhardy valour. It is better to adopt such policies as would enable one to survive and live to fight another day"* (KA, VII, 15, 13-20, XII, 1, 1-9)

The premium laid on intellect, counsel and intelligence in the conduct of domestic and foreign affairs is probably unparalleled in this genre of literature. For Kautilya, "collecting information and sober, thorough and objective intelligence analysis, and assessment is the condition sine qua non for a foreign policy which meets his strategic (and normative) requirements."[141] This is consistent and in harmony with *anvikshiki* (science of enquiry) discussed earlier and the following sutras further emphasize this aspect.

[139] Dr. Benoy Kumar Sarkar, *The Political Institutions and the Theories of the Hindus: A Study in Comparative Politics*, Chuckervertty Chatterjee & Co. Ltd., Calcutta, 1939, p. 197.
[140] Rangarajan, *Kautilya- The Arthashasta*, p. 675.
[141] Dany Shoham and Michael Liebig, "The Intelligence Dimension of Kautilyan Statecraft and its Implications for the Present", *Journal of Intelligence History*, Vol. 15, No. 2, 2014, p. 12.

"*He who sees the six measures of policy as being interdependent in this manner, plays as he pleases, with kings tied by the chains of his intellect*" (KA, VII, 18, 44).[142]

"*The conqueror shall control the members of his circle of kings using the four methods [sama, dana, bheda, or danda], in accordance with the principles of restriction, option or combination. The weak shall be controlled by sama [conciliation] or dana [placating with gifts], and the strong by bheda [sowing dissensions] and danda [force]."*

"This is the group of four means. Each preceding one in the enumeration is the easier and lighter one. Conciliation is simple. Gifts are twofold being preceded by conciliation. Dissension is three-fold, being preceded by conciliation and gifts. Use of force is four-fold, being preceded by conciliation, gifts and dissension" (KA, IX, 6, 56-61)[143]

"The three constituents of power are: counsel and correct judgment; might, i.e. the actual strength of the fighting forces; enthusiasm and energy. The power of good counsel, [good analysis and good judgment] is superior [to sheer military strength]. Intelligence and [knowledge of] the sciences of politics are the two eyes [of a king]. Using these, a king can, with little effort, arrive at the best judgment on the means, [the four methods of conciliation, sowing dissensions etc.] as well as the various tricks, stratagems, clandestine practices and occult means [described in this treatise] to overwhelm even kings who are mighty and energetic" (KA, IX, 1, 10-15)"[144]

Other examples from the text indicative of the avoidance of war when it cannot bring about relative gains or even when the gains amount to the same as those achieved through peace are mentioned below:

"*When the degree of progress is the same in pursuing peace and waging war, peace is to be preferred. For in war, there are many disadvantages, such as loss of troops, expenditure and absence from home*" (KA, VII, 2, 1-2)[145]

[142] Kangle, *The Kautilya Arthashastra, Part II*, p. 384.
[143] Kangle, *The Kautilya Arthashastra, Part II* , p. 425.
[144] Rangarajan, *Kautilya- The Arthashastra*, p. 628.
[145] Ibid., p. 547.

"*When the benefits accruing to kings under a treaty, irrespective of their status as the weaker, equal or stronger king, is fair to each one, peace by agreement shall be the preferred course; if the benefits are to be distributed unfairly, war is preferable*" (KA, VII, 8, 34)[146]

"*Peace is also the preferred choice when the relative power equation between a king and his enemy is not likely to change as a result of any action, irrespective of whether both make progress, both decline or both maintain the status quo*" (KA, VII, 1, 31)[147]

Kautilya's *Arthashstra*, therefore, advocates that war (in terms of use of military power) is to be undertaken as the last resort, after having done the calculations, tried covert and clandestine methods to weaken the enemy, and having satisfied himself that he is superior to the enemy in all essential respects. This essentially translates into a minimal use of violence since an objective condition for the enemy's defeat already exists.

This leads us to an important question: whether the use of non-violent stratagems which bring about weakening and diminution of the enemy, be considered under the rubric of 'force' or not.

Answers to this question is available in the text itself: "Use of force is capturing the enemy by means of open, deceptive or secret war or by using the methods suggested for capturing a fort" (KA, VII, 6, 3-8).[148] Rangarajan contends that war against an enemy is defined broadly by Kautilya and is not limited to only physical warfare. He draws our attention to *mantrayuddha*, 'war by counsel' meaning the exercise of diplomacy. Kautiya's *Arthashastra* also makes a reference to, *upajapa*, 'psychological warfare', and *gudayuddha*, 'clandestine war', which is using covert methods to achieve the objective without actually waging a battle, usually by assassinating the enemy.[149]

The relative value attached to military and non-military options available to the state may be discerned from the fact that the prescribed diplomatic method in the text is articulated in the discussion on different forms of warfare. The type of war adopting an indirect strategy through guile and stratagem to weaken the enemy was low-cost, low-risk, benefit-maximizing, and vastly preferred.

[146] Ibid., p. 541.
[147] Ibid., p. 547
[148] Ibid., p. 611
[149] Ibid, p. 676.

It is reasonable to argue that in a constantly changing conflict situation, with identities of states in the *mandala* swiftly transforming, a strategist must be prepared to adapt to dangers and opportunities that suddenly appear. For such a situation, Kautilya has laid down a number of military and non-military strategies to respond flexibly to the enemy and thus create conditions for victory. Nevertheless, the preference for non-military strategies is clearly emphasized in the text given the inherent advantages.

To sum up, a review of the writings and commentaries of both Indian and Western scholars on India's strategic culture suggests uncertainty, both in terms of India possessing a coherent strategic culture and the extent of influence Kautilya's *Arthashastra* exercises on Indian strategic thinking. All the same, the debates and discussions point to the fact that the *Arthashastra* is seen as an important work on statecraft which offers a unique contribution to Indian strategic thought. The extent of influence however, remains unmeasured and, therefore, the contours of India's strategic culture remain undefined.

Further, a keen reading of the text has provided answers to three questions which have together formed the central strategic paradigm. The *Arthashastra* has proved to be an eminently worthy 'object of analysis', embedded in the larger cultural and intellectual Indian tradition. It has provided an invaluable insight into this enquiry into India's strategic culture.

Realpolitik is not as is often assumed, as old as statecraft itself.[150] The theory of state as expounded in the *Arthashastra* and its conduct of foreign policy predate the birth of the concept – *Realpolitik*. The *Arthashastra* is unique and as an 'endogenous politico-cultural resource',[151] it lends uniqueness to Indian strategic culture.

The existence of a normative dimension to Kautilyan statecraft which dovetails with hard realism can be further confirmed by charting out the second element of the concept of strategic culture as laid out by Johnston, i.e. 'grand strategic preference ranking'. The basic assumptions about the organization of the international environment should be logically reflected in the preference ranking of the grand strategy employed by a state to achieve political goals. An assessment of grand strategic preference ranking emanating from the text would help translate the core ideas on

[150] John Bew, *Realpolitik: A History*, (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2016), p. 17.
[151] Phrase borrowed from Mitra and Liebig, *Kautilya's Arthashastra: An Intellectual Portrait*, p. 185.

state security and use of force into an operational domain. The following chapter will delineate the grand strategic preference ranking revealed in Kautilya's *Arthashastra*.

Chapter 3

Kautilya's Arthashastra and Grand Strategic Preferences

The existence of grand strategy or its absence in India is a keenly contested space among scholars, both Indian and foreign. It is argued in this chapter that the ancient text on statecraft, Kautilya's *Arthashastra* is a magnum opus on grand strategy, albeit without the literal use of this modern terminology. This question has become ever so important because of India's economic rise at the turn of the century, which has, in turn, kindled its interest in playing a larger international role. How does India perceive its rise and what it means for the world are potent questions looming large on the Asian and global security landscape. Efforts to gain insights into India's rise as a global player has spurned a whole gamut of scholarly literature on India's security and foreign policy decision-making processes.

In the preceding chapter, the central strategic paradigm has been postulated by seeking answers to three pivotal questions. A coherent strategic culture is said to exist when grand strategic-preferences of a state logically flow from the central assumptions about the nature of the international system, character of the adversary and the utility of the use of force. In this chapter, the strategic text will be reexamined to infer the grand strategic preference-ranking and its consistency with the central paradigm will be put to test.

As Morgentahau[1] puts it, "The theory [in other words] must be judged not by some preconceived abstract principle or concept unrelated to reality, but by its purpose: to bring order and meaning to a mass of phenomena that without it would remain disconnected and unintelligible." It must meet a dual test of coherence within the theory and its applicability to reality.

This chapter seeks to achieve the first test – to examine coherence within the theory. The two components of strategic culture i.e. 'central strategic paradigm' and 'grand strategic preferences', should be intrinsically connected and the latter should logically flow from the former. The

[1] See Hans J. Morgenthau, *Politics Among Nations: The Struggle for Power and Peace*, Seventh edition, (New York: McGraw-Hill, 1985), p. 3

enquiry into grand strategic preference-ranking, undertaken in this chapter, will be informed by a working typology of grand strategy offered by Johnston. A discussion on the concept of grand strategy and the various approaches of understanding it are dealt with in the following section.

Grand Strategy: Concept and Typology

A crucial link in establishing the existence of strategic culture in a nation is to attest whether or not strategic culture influences the behaviour of decision makers. To achieve this empirically, grand strategy (as ranked set of preferences) becomes a useful tool. The central strategic paradigm represents the core assumptions about what the security *problematique* is and grand strategic preference ranking (at a more operational level) conveys what strategic options are the most efficacious for dealing with the threat environment. In this context, it is important to first understand what we mean by the term 'grand strategy' and develop a working typology in a manner that it renders the concept applicable to reality.

'Strategy', in the narrow sense of the term was first defined as a military concept. For Clausewitz, "tactics is the art of using troops to win the battle, while strategy is the art of using battles to win the war: 'Strategy is the employment of the battle to gain the end of the War; it must therefore give an aim to the whole military action . . .'"[2] "The development of the concept of 'grand strategy' comes as a continuation of Clausewitz's central insight, i.e. that 'war is the continuation of politics by other means'."[3] "This has temporal validity — war and peace are not necessarily two qualitatively different conditions, it might, on the other hand, be better to plan for them in toto."[4] In a similar vein, eminent military historian B.H. Liddell Hart argues that, "While the horizon of strategy is bounded by the war, grand strategy looks beyond the war to the subsequent peace. It should not only combine the various instruments, but so regulate their use as to avoid damage to the future state of peace – for its security and prosperity."[5]

Grand strategy expanded on the traditional idea of strategy in another important way. "In the introduction to his classic manual on strategy, Edward Mead Earle pointed out that state and

[2] Carl Von Clausewitz, (ed.Anatol Rapaport) ([1832] 1968) *On War*. Harmondsworth: Penguin, p. 241.
[3] John Keegan, A History of Warfare (New York: Alfred A. Knopf, 1993), pp. 3-24.
[4] Iver B. Neumann and Henrikki Heikka, "Grand Strategy, Strategic Culture, Practice: The Social Roots of Nordic Defense", *Cooperation and Conflict* 2005; 40; 5, p. 12
[5] B.H. Liddell Hart, *Strategy*, (London: Faber & Faber, 1967. 2nd rev. ed.) p.322

society had become so intertwined since the Napoleonic wars that 'strategy at this stage must be considered as the art of controlling and utilizing the resources of a nation'"[6] Then he adds: "The highest type of strategy — sometimes called grand strategy — is that which so integrates the policies and armaments of the nation that the resort to war is either rendered unnecessary or is undertaken with the maximum chance of victory."[7] Liddell Hart too points out that the first and foremost goal is to avoid war by drawing on all the other resources that are part of a 'grand strategy'. He emphasizes that, "fighting power is but one of the instruments of grand strategy – which should take account of and apply the power of financial pressure, and, not least of ethical pressure, to weaken the opponent's will. ..."[8]

Clausewitz was also among the first thinkers to draw attention to another important dimension of strategy: the social; the attitude and commitment of the people. "Clausewitz had described war as 'a remarkable trinity', composed of its political objective, of its operational instruments, and of the popular passions, the social forces it expressed."[9]

Another important component of grand strategy was put forward in a later work by Barry Posen. According to him, "A grand strategy must identify likely threats to the state's security and it must devise political, economic, military, and other remedies for those threats. Priorities must be established among both threats and remedies [. . .] ideally, the grand strategy of a state should account for its effects on other states."[10]

Therefore, grand strategy, operating at a higher level, is an expansion of the traditional connotation of strategy in four important ways:

- It expanded strategy beyond military means to include economic, diplomatic, social, cultural, informational factors.
- It included considerations of period of peacetime along with wartime.
- It took into account both the internal and the external components of national security.

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[66] Edward Mead Earle, *Makers of modern strategy : Military thought from Machiavelli to Hitler*; with the collaboration of Gordon A. Craig and Felix Gilbert, (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1943)
[7] Ibid.
[8] Hart, Strategy., p. 322
[9] Michael Howard, "The Forgotten Dimensions of Strategy", *Foreign Affairs*, Summer 1979, Volume 57, No. 5, p. 977
[10] Barry R. Posen, *The Sources of Military Doctrine: France, Britain, and Germany between the World Wars*, (Ithaca, NJ: Cornell University Press, 1984), p. 13, 25.

- It incorporated relative gains and the effect grand strategy would have on other states, into its calculations.

Interestingly, Kautilya deals with the concept of grand strategy (without using the term) as a central theme of his treatise, incorporating each of the above mentioned factors in a manner that lays bare the combinatorial possibilities of grand strategic profiles. The following sub-section will examine Kautilya's *Arthashastra* to identify the references made to the various dimensions of grand strategy discussed above.

Grand Strategy and Kautilya's *Arthashastra*

In order to frame Kautilya as a strategist and his work the *Arthashastra* as a work of grand strategy, the ends-means relationship seems to be the most appropriate framework.[11] The Kautilyan theory of state clearly envisions its end goal and optimally employs all resources available to achieve it. An important concept which has been used extensively by Kautilya to facilitate this end-goal was the concept of *yogakshema* (*yoga* means acquisition and *kshema* means protection and sustenance) – which, as an umbrella concept, ensured the stability of the state.

Yogakshema is not to be understood only as conquest of territory or expansion of the state. It has other aspects of the acquisition, not only by force, but other entrepreneurial means as well, of both material and non-material (spiritual as well as other intangibles) goods for the people; and their protection (*rakshana*).[12] This integration of two fundamental goals of maintaining and expanding the power of the state and ensuring the welfare and security of the people, sets this treatise apart from the essentialism of a realist framework of grand strategy. For the realists, the most important elements of a state's foreign policy are comprehensible in terms of only one goal, security.

The conceptual foundation of Kautilya's theory of state and statecraft, with respect to domestic as well as foreign policy is the *saptanga* theory. In Books VI and VIII of the *Arthashastra*,

[11] Medha Bisht, "Arthashastra: Reflections on Thought and Theory", in Michael Liebig, Saurabh Mishra (ed.), *Arthashastra in a Transcultural Perspective: Comparing Kautilya with Sun Zi, Nizam al-Mulk, Barani and Machiavelli* (IDSA, Pentagon Press, 2017), p. 197

[12] Excerpt from an email conversation with Dr. Saurabh Mishra (Research fellow, Indigenous Historical Knowledge Project, IDSA)

Kautilya expounds the *saptanga* theory which refers to the seven *prakritis* (constituents or state factors). The seven *prakritis* are:

1. "*swami*: the ruler
2. *amatya*: the Minister [counsellors and advisers]
3. *janapada*: territory and the people
4. *durga*: the fortress[13]
5. *kosa*: the treasury [economy]
6. *danda*: armed might
7. *mitra*: the ally [in foreign policy]"[14]

The *saptanga* theory propounds that state power is an aggregate of the material and non-material variables which can be adequately assessed and evaluated. It, therefore, represents a holistic and comprehensive concept of national power. This concept is intrinsically linked to the *sadgunya* (six methods of foreign policy) cluster which outlines the six methods of foreign policy to be adopted. The selection of one of the six methods of foreign policy is wholly dependent on situational factors, yet it follows an inherent logic. The seven parameters of the *saptanga* theory provide objective and substantive criteria for making a sound assessment of the correlation of forces between competing or adversary states and deciding on the course of action in foreign policy. The six methods of foreign policy are:

1. *Sandhi* (peace) > the rival state is stronger and will remain so in the foreseeable future.
2. *Vigraha* (war) > the rival is vastly inferior in power.
3. *Asana* (neutrality) > the correlation of forces is balanced.
4. *Yana* (augmenting resources; preparing for war) > one's own power is rising vis-a-vis the rival state.
5. *Samsraya* (alliance building) > the rival state's power is rising faster than one's own.
6. *Dvaidhibhava* (diplomatic double game) > the constellation among rivals and allies is highly fluid.[15]

[13] The state should have sufficient number of forts across its territory at strategic locations for ensuring defense against foreign invasions.
[14] Liebig and Mishra, *Arthashastra in a Transcultural Perspective,* p. 6
[15] Michael Liebig and Saurabh Mishra, "Introduction", in *Arthashastra in a Transcultural Perspective,* 2017, p. 19

The *sadgunya* cluster can be understood as a continuum of which peace and war are the poles. According to Kautilya, the conduct of foreign policy is restricted to a fixed array of policy options. Further, the concept cluster *upayas* (not original to Kautilya) were the four basic principles of political action which guided the selection of the foreign policy. The four *upayas* (*saman*-conciliation, *dana*–gifts, *bheda*-dissenssion, *danda*-use of force) were ranked; its criterion being the "amount of effort necessary"[16] to enforce one's will on the other.

Kautilya's *Arthashastra* clearly states the fundamental objective of the *vijigisu* (ruler); it identifies crucial constituent elements (both internal and external) which together symbolize comprehensive national power and provide the necessary resources to attain the objective; it outlines the various methods on which foreign policy can be conducted; and it lays down various factors to be considered at the operational and tactical level as well.

Kautilya lists eight factors that need consideration before starting a military expedition. These are: "(1) the relative value of the end compared to likely losses, expenses, and gains; (2) the relative power of the enemy state; (3) the place of operations (primarily geography and terrain); (4) time (primarily duration); (5) season for operations (predominantly weather considerations); (6) composition of suitable forces to be employed in operations; (7) acquiring the support and political will of the population and prior negation of political unrest; and (8) consideration of the dangers that are specific to the campaign at hand, which includes intangible and unpredictable factors."[17] Therefore, Kautilya not only lays out a grand strategy to achieve a political goal but also draws a blueprint, paying attention to the minutest of details to accomplish the stated objective right down to the tactical level.

The figure given below is a diagrammatic representation of Kautilya's formulation of grand strategy. It incorporates all the elements of grand strategy that have come to be associated with the term in the course of its theoretical evolution over millennia.

[16] Subrata K. Mitra and Michael Liebig, *Kautilya's Arthashastra: An Intellectual Portrait- Classical Roots of Modern Politics in India*, (Baden-Baden, Germany, Nomos, 2016), p. 136

[17] Vinay Vittal, Wing Commander, Indian Air Force, "Kautilya's Arthashastra: A Timeless Grand Strategy", Thesis submitted to the Faculty of the School of Advanced Air and Space Studies for Completion of Graduation Requirements, Maxwell Air Force Base, Alabama, June 2011, p. 39-40

Grand Strategy



A Working Typology

The influence of strategic culture on behaviour begins with its effect on how decision makers rank grand strategic preferences. Therefore, we have to know first what grand strategic preferences exist.[18] It is important to develop a working typology of grand strategies to be able to discern patterns from the factual material of foreign policy. How should the range of options available to the decision maker be categorized thereby reflecting the nation's strategic culture?

Johnston contends that "it is not at all clear that in the realm of grand strategy that the potential range of options is great enough for there to be significant differences across societies in the kinds of strategies considered by decision makers."[19] According to him, grand strategies are employed to deal with universal, timeless problems of threats to national security and that one should expect little cross-cultural variation in number and type of strategic options.

Johnston attempts to categorize grand strategy in such a way that a) the distinction between types, while perhaps blurred at the margins, is generally clear and exclusive, and b) all or most plausible politico-military behaviors are included such that the typology is generally exhaustive.[20] He proposes three types of grand strategy[21]:-

1) Accommodationist: This strategy relies primarily on diplomacy, political trading, economic incentives and other strategies that aim at influencing the adversary's behaviour through compromise and concession. Accommodationist grand strategies imply that the ends of policy, while not necessarily well defined, exclude the physical and political elimination of the adversary and the annexation of its territory.
2) Defensive: "This strategy is more coercive in nature than an accommodationist strategy. It relies primarily on static defense along an external boundary. The use of force is not

[18] Alastair Iain Johnston, *Cultural Realism: Strategic Culture and Grand Strategy in Chinese History* (Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Press, 1995), p. 109
[19] Ibid., p. 110
[20] Ibid., p. 112
[21] Johnston discusses typologies offered by Luttwak (*Strategy: The Logic of War and Peace*, 1987, Cambridge, Mass.) and Kupchan (*The Vulnerability of Empire*, 1994, Ithaca, NY). Luttwak suggests two kinds of grand strategy, both of which subsume political goals and grand strategic means under one concept. Johnston points to a problem in Luttwak's typology that it excludes a range of grand strategic means that could, in principle, be used to pursue either grand strategic end (status quo and revisionist). Kupchan identifies three basic strategies: compellence, deterrence, and accommodation. While Kupchan's categorization seems more satisfying because they include a wider range of grand strategic choices, and because they do not limit specific choices to specific state goals, Johnston does not find the distinction between compellence and deterrence useful.

designed to annex territory or to destroy the political leadership or structures of the enemy state."[22] This category captures the notion of deterrence through denial or limited punishment. Security is strengthened through internal mobilization and augmentation of resources.

3) Offensive/Expansionist: This strategy is highly coercive, relying primarily on the offensive, preventive, preemptive, or predominantly punitive uses of military force beyond immediate borders. The strategic goal behind the use of military force is total military victory and the political destruction of the adversary, including annexation of at least some territory. This category of grand strategy makes no assumptions about the political ends of the state, though clearly, by implication, if a state did have revisionist and expansionist political goals, it would presumably prefer this type of grand strategy over a defensive or accommodationist one.[23]

While this categorization proposed by Johnston seems to fit the criteria for both an exhaustive and clear cut ranked preference ranking, the omission of political goals or explicit ends within its ambit does put it at variance with grand strategy dealt with in the *Arthashastra*. In the text, grand strategy, involving the coordinated application of military, economic and diplomatic means subsumes assumptions about political ends, which provides the justification for the coordinated action in the first place.

Johnston does not find the incorporation of political goals useful because of two reasons. One, that there is no a-priori relationship between types of political goals and grand strategic means. Both status-quo and revisionist states can employ any of the three grand strategies based on the particularity of the circumstance. The second reason for leaving political ends out is that by doing so one avoids the complicated problem of defining state goals. Both these problems do not seem to apply to the *Arthashastra*. As far as the determination of the political goal is concerned, Kautilya is very clear about the intrinsic normative quality of state goals. There is no dichotomy in Kautilyan statecraft between enhancing the power of the state and securing the welfare of the people. "Strength is power and happiness is the objective [of using power]."[24] Therefore, the decision to consolidate acquisition or undertake enlargement of the kingdom is driven by the

[22] Johnston, Cultural Realism, p. 113
[23] This useful categorization has been made by Alastair Iain Johnston for his study of Chinese strategic culture.
[24] L.N. Rangarajan, *Kautilya The Arthashastra*, (New Delhi: Penguin Books, 1987), p. 559

larger concern of welfare and happiness of the people, which is an unchanging end goal. "The ends which the *Arthashastra* has in view are the *yogakshema* (protection of what is acquired) and *rakshana* (protection) of subjects."[25]

Similarly, the stated political goals cannot be considered good predictors of the grand strategic means. The latter cannot be logically deduced from the former. The dynamic equation is evaluated on several parameters, as mentioned in the previous sub-section, before the grand strategic means are employed. "The king can achieve progress by making peace with his enemy if he thinks that [he can use the period of peace so that]: (i) he can ruin the enemy's undertakings by using secret methods or occult practices; (ii) he can entice away the people implementing the enemy's projects by offering them higher remuneration, favours or remissions of taxes. (KA, VII, 1, 32).[26] There is thus a dynamic relationship between power and progress, mediated by the right policy, executed through the instruments of the circle of states, oriented towards the attainment of the welfare of the people.

However, in all other respects, the grand strategic categorization proposed by Johnston seems to fit the Indian context well. The range of strategies mentioned in the text (*sadgunya*) collapse into these three categories of grand strategic choice.

The next logical step in the narrative is to consider how these grand strategies are ranked in Kautilya's *Arthashastra* and whether the ranked preference order is logically derived from the central strategic paradigm, outlined in the previous chapter.

Central Paradigm and Grand Strategic Preferences

The central strategic paradigm presents a trilogy of three interrelated aspects which provide the central heuristics of a security environment, unique to a particular strategic culture. A ranked set of strategic preference is logically derived from these central assumptions. As was outlined in the previous chapter, "for Kautilya, conflicts of interest and subsequent non-violent and violent struggles between individuals and social groups (family, clan, tribe or state) are an anthropological constant in human existence."[27] This was elaborated upon under the concept

[25] R.P. Kangle, *The Kautilya Arthashastra Part III*, (Delhi: Motilal Banarsidass, eighth reprint, 2014), p. 272
[26] Rangarajan, *Kautilya The Arthashastra*, p. 552
[27] Liebig and Mishra, *Arthashastra in a Transcultural Perspective*, p. 17

matsya-nyaya or anarchy at the beginning of Book I of the *Arthashastra*: *[T]he law of fishes (matsya-nyaya). For, the stronger swallows the weak in the absence of the wielder of the rod.*[28] (KA, I, 4, 13-14). Therefore, the preponderance of the pursuit of material gains envisaged a conflictual nature of inter-state relations. However, for reasons of purposive political rationality, a policy of achieving political aims without going to war, is preferred by Kautilya, because war inevitably means the destruction of personal and material resources: one's own and the enemy's.

While the text clearly states going to war as the least preferable option, there are a number of strategies suggested which fall under 'accommodationist' and 'defensive' categories. Their use in very specific circumstances, are prescribed keeping all the logistical and operational factors in mind. Kautilya sets forth the *sadgunya* theory: a state has six policy options for the conduct of its foreign policy – no more, no less: "*These are really six measures, because of differences in the situations*" (KA, VII, 1, 5), says Kauäilya.[29] Out of the six foreign policy methods suggested, *sandhi* (peace) and *samsraya* (seeking protection when threatened of a stronger king or taking refuge in a fort) clearly belong to the 'accommodationist' category. *Vigraha* (war) is outrightly 'offensive'. *Yana* (augmentation of power) and *Dvaidhibhava* (dual policy) belong to the 'defensive' category. The latter is the policy of making peace with a neighbouring king in order to pursue, with his help, the policy of hostility towards another.[30] Both these policies relate to enhancement of state factors (*prakritis*), including through the help of an ally. However, when *Yana* and *Dvaidhibhava* are combined with *Vigraha*, these policies acquire an offensive orientation. *Asana* (neutrality) which is a method used in connection with both war and peace, does not neatly belong to any one category. Johnston does express the plausibility of a mix of accommodationist and defensive strategies.

The defensive dimension of Kautilyan grand strategy is evident in the inclusion of the *durga* (fort) and *danda* (army) in the seven constituents of the state. Of these *durga* is more important and is placed earlier than *danda* in the list of *prakritis.* (KA VI, 1, 1) The importance given to a good defence strategy is laid out in the following sutras: "Therefore, he should raise troops keeping in mind 'The enemy has these troops; for them these would be counter-troops.'" "That with elephants, machines and carts at the centre, equipped with lances, javelins, spears, reeds and

[28] R.P. Kangle, The Kautilya Arthashastra Part II, (Delhi: Motilal Banarsidass, eighth reprint, 2014), p. 10
[29] Ibid., p. 321
[30] Rangarajan, *Kautilya The Arthashastra*, p. 549

arrows, is a counter-force against elephant divisions."[31] "Thus he should carry out the raising of troops so as to withstand enemy troops, in conformity with the strength of his own troops, (and) in accordance with the various types of divisions (that may be necessary).[32]

According to Kautilya, making peace includes a variety of advantages: (i) it enables a king to enjoy the fruits of his own acquisition and promote the welfare and development of his state without intervening in any conflict in his neighbourhood (ii) a king may use a peace treaty to strengthen alliances (iii) he may purchase peace by giving a hostage and await a favourable opportunity for pursuing his own interests (iv) he may use it as one arm of a dual policy.[33] Among the three *shaktis, utsaha*, the energy, bravery, personal drive of the king, *prabhava*, material resources consisting of the treasury and army, and *mantra*, good counsel and diplomacy, Kautilya regards *mantrashakti* as the most important. Also, of the four *upayas* which are mentioned alongside the six policies, Kangle finds something in common between *saman* and *samdhi* and between *danda* and *vigraha* combined with *yana*.[34] If there is indeed an overlapping between the *sadgunya* and the *upayas*, and the latter are known to be clearly ranked, *samdhi* emerges as a preferred strategy.

Therefore, the grand strategic preference ranking that seems to emanate logically from the strategic paradigm outlined in Kautilya's *Arthashastra,* can be presented as the following:

1) Preference to defusing security threats internally through moral government and externally through diplomatic maneuvering, alliance-building, conciliation, trade and tributary relations.

2) Next best to rely on slightly more coercive but defensive grand strategy. This could involve static defence measures like fort-building and also occasional punitive expeditions to defuse threats temporarily.

3) The least-preferred way of dealing with a security threat is to use coercive offensive measures which would bring about the political and military destruction of the enemy.

[31]Kangle, The Kautilya Arthashastra Part II, p. 412,413
[32] Ibid.
[33] Rangarajan, *Kautilya The Arthashastra*, p. 548
[34]Kangle, *The Kautilya Arthashastra Part III-A Study*, (Delhi: Motilal Banarsidass, eighth reprint 2014), p. 255

The above narrative establishes that the grand strategic preference-ranking emanating from Kautilya's *Arthashastra* shows a preference for accommodationst strategies over defensive and offensive ones. Also, this predilection is in sync with the basic assumptions about the security *problematique* that states face in an anarchic international system. If force is to be used as the last resort, accommodationist strategies are logically privileged over others. Therefore, the central paradigm and the preference order are coherently interlinked.

Interestingly, it is observed that the process of arriving at a grand strategy as explicated in the *Arthashastra* is akin to a structural-realist model. It is a defining feature of the structural model to make calculations of the expected utility of different strategies in light of the available resources and capabilities. Then, how are the predictions made by strategic-cultural model different from the ones derived from a structural-realist one? This is precisely the concern which theorization in the field of strategic culture aims to address.

It is important to mention here that in Kautilya's scheme of things, the objective indicators (military capabilities, relative strength, economic resources and internal cohesion) are viewed in conjunction with a highly normative dimension – the welfare of the people. This normative element is not rhetorical as is observed by Johnston in the case of the Confucian-Mencian strategic discourse in Ming China. The normative and ethical logic of the text is enshrined in the concept of *rajadharma*, which is essentially *dharma* in the context of the political sphere. It is this moralism that acts as a fine filter to the realist calculations thereby highlighting the potential independent, explanatory capability of a cultural variable.

However, the crucial test of the explanatory power of strategic culture as a variable can be brought about only by assessing its influence on strategic behaviour. The grand strategic choices of a nation's decision elite should be consistent with the behvaiour predicted by the strategic-culturally derived preference ranking. The period soon after India's independence, when the seeds of Indian foreign policy conduct may have presumably be sown, is chosen to test the influence of Indian strategic culture on the behaviour of independent Indian state.

The second part of the 'dual test' mentioned early in the chapter remains to be explored. The two elements of strategic culture, i.e., central strategic paradigm and grand strategic preferences are

shown to be congruent with each other, lending coherence to the theoretical framework. The next task is to explore whether the facts as they actually are, lend themselves to the interpretation the theory has put upon them. Therefore, the theory would put to test the making of India's foreign policy under two carefully chosen time periods – the Nehruvian era (1947-1964) and the more contemporary period between 1998-2014. These time periods have been selected for two important reasons. One, that they are perceived to be demonstrative of substantially different foreign policy approaches, sometimes seen as hewing to as diverse lines as 'realism' and 'idealism'. And two, that the time periods represent vastly different levels of material capability, in the economic, military, and nuclear realms. The strategic culture approach is premised on the existence of certain fundamental or core beliefs which provide a prism, through which the external, material factors are viewed. If the two materially divergent time periods are shown to exhibit constancy in grand strategic preference ranking, the consistency of India's strategic culture can be proven more emphatically. Due to the enormity of data and the risk of study becoming too unwieldy, the period 1964-1998 has been deliberately omitted in the study.

The ranked set of grand strategic preferences will help to approach the factual material of foreign policy with a deduced hypothesis, which in turn (if proven) can give meaning to the facts of India's foreign policy in the Nehruvian era, dealt with in detail in the next chapter.

Chapter 4

Grand Strategic Preferences and the Nehruvian Foreign Policy, 1947-1964: Nonalignment, China, Pakistan and Nuclear Policy

The real potential for the exercise of a grand strategy in the modern Indian context emerged in the post independence period. India, a newly independent nation, had to take stock of its resources and capabilities – military, economic, political, cultural, diplomatic, and moral – and employ them in a manner that served its national interest. It was at this nascent stage of nationhood that India's first Prime Minister, Jawaharlal Nehru took charge and set the tone for what may be called 'India's grand strategy.'

The binary that grand strategy often gets typified into, namely realist and idealist, does not clearly encapsulate Nehru's approach, partly because of the unique style of his statesmanship, and also because of the dynamism associated with this realm. The discussion on the Kautilyan theory of statecraft in the preceding chapters has adequately shown how politically rational decisions can also be normatively sound; idealism and realism are not necessarily incompatible. In fact, like Kautilya, Nehru too made an attempt to reconcile the strands of idealism and realism in the practice of India's foreign policy.

Interestingly, the Nehruvian instinct has been perceived as idealist/pacifist[1] by some and realist[2] by others. There is yet another school of thought that labels Nehru's policies as *moralpolitik*. "Looking at both Gandhi's and Nehru's patterns of thinking and putting policies into action, one

[1] Some analysts who broadly argue the idealist line with some variations in emphasis are - T.T. Poulose, *Perspectives of India's Nuclear Policy*, (Young Asia Publications, 1978), Ashok Kapur, "The Indian Subcontinent: The Contemporary Structure of Power and the Development of Power Relations," *Asian Survey*, 28, No. 7, July 1988, 693-710, Jaswant Singh, *Defending India*, (UK: Palgrave Macmillan, 1999)

[2] Scholars broadly interpreting Nehru's approach to world affairs as *realpolitik* are – Bharat Karnad, *Nuclear Weapons and Indian Security: The Realist Foundations of Strategy*, (New Delhi: Macmillan, 2002), B.R. Nayar and T.V. Paul, *India in the world order: Searching for major power status*, (Cambridge, U.K: Cambridge University Press, 2003), K. Subrahmanyam, *Security in a Changing World*, (New Delhi: BR Publishing Corporation, 1990)

can identify this as a policy of *moralpolitik* – the aggressive use of morality to advance national interests."[3] *Moralpolitik* is a "mixture of calculation, caution and moralizing which informed India's statecraft, especially in the initial decades, and helped in the accretion of means necessary for India to realize its objective of becoming an influential power."[4] However, in Nehru's own words: "Idealism is the Realism of tomorrow. It is the capacity to know what is good for the day after tomorrow or the next year and to fashion yourself accordingly."[5]

However, the purpose of this chapter is to analyze whether Nehru's policies fit into the grand strategic framework which originates from Kautilya's *Arthashastra*. The task is to understand the extent of influence, if any, which Kautilya exercised on Nehru's foreign policy disposition. A reasonable starting point could be to comprehend Nehru's views on Kautilya and his work, as also the larger philosophical, strategic tradition of which the *Arthashastra* is an important component. This chapter will then examine Nehru's policy of nonalignment, his approaches towards China and Pakistan, and his attitude to nuclear issues, to see if they fit in with the grand strategic preference ranking as outlined in the earlier chapters.

Nehru and Kautilya's Arthashastra

Jawaharlal Nehru's assessment of Kautilya makes interesting reading. While he thought that the comparisons made between Chanakya and Machiavelli may be justified to an extent, "He [Chanakya] was a much bigger person in every way, greater in intellect and action."[6] Nehru was aware that the dictum of war being a continuance of state policy by other means (which is associated with the great thinker Clausewitz) was advocated by Chanakya centuries before him. Kautilya's principle of political morality which defined a stateman's objective as "the betterment of the state as a result of war, not the mere defeat and destruction of the enemy"[7] was recognized by Nehru as a higher idea of war which was in line with the larger Indian strategic tradition. Nehru not only dealt with Kautilya extensively in *The Discovery of India,* he also made a

[3] Bharat Karnad, *Nuclear Weapons and Indian Security: The Realist Foundations of Strategy* (New Delhi: Macmillan India Limited, 2002), p. 3
[4] Ibid., p. 62
[5] Jawaharlal Nehru's Speeches, Vol. 2, August 1949-February 1953, Publications Division, Ministry of Information and Broadcasting, Government of India, p. 265 – Speech in reply to debate on Foreign Affairs in Parliament, New Delhi, December 7, 1950
[6] Jawaharlal Nehru, *The Discovery of India,* (New Delhi: Penguin Books, 2004), p. 123
[7] Ibid., p. 125

reference in one of his speeches to Vishakhadutta's play *Mudrarakshasa,* wherein Kautilya plays the protagonist. The play, led by the 'great Indian', brought out the role of war in statecraft and highlighted the point that "fighting a war was only the means of gaining an objective."[8] Interestingly, Nehru also wrote articles under the pseudonym "Chanakya".

Nehru has made several references to the *Arthashastra* in the context of a well developed espionage system and the importance given to information gathering. On March 19, 1952, Nehru in his first address in post-Independent era to Deputy Inspectors General of Police (CID) underlined the importance of Chanakya's "famous" book, *Arthashastra*.[9] He particularly stressed the point that "information in an army is everything." At another such conference held in 1955, Nehru spoke in detail about the 'indirect approach' which entailed weakening the enemy by undermining the morale, spreading propaganda and cutting off communications. Chanakya's advice that the subjects of the defeated enemy be treated magnanimously was also highlighted as important in preventing future enmities and entanglements.

Through his speeches and writings, Nehru has displayed a considerable grasp over Kautilya's views on peace and war, and the ancient Indian philosophical and scientific tradition which runs as an undercurrent through the *Arthashastra.* The following section will spell out Nehru's understanding of the key components of Indian strategic tradition as enunciated by Kautilya's *Arthashastra*.

Indian Strategic Culture and Thought

India is a civilizational state which evolved along distinct lines over millennia. Nehru's remarkable understanding of the strain of statecraft that Kautilya theorized was in part due to his deep knowledge of ancient Indian culture and thought of which the *Arthashastra* was an integral part. Responding to a question on what exactly culture meant, Nehru acknowledged that each nation and each separate civilization developed its own culture which had its roots in generations thousands of years ago. "One sees these nations intimately moulded by the impulse that initially

[8] Jawaharlal Nehru's Speeches, Vol. 2, p. 245 - Speech while presenting the budget demand for the Ministry of External Affairs in Parliament, New Delhi, March 17, 1950.
[9] "Thoughts of Pandit Jawaharlal Nehru on National Security, Intelligence and Policing (1952-1963)", Intelligence Bureau, Ministry of Home Affairs, New Delhi, p. 1

starts a civilization going on its long path."[10] He accepted that no culture was pristine and that there was bound to be an intermingling of cultures through the stages of history. However, he recognizes that despite this, the basic element of a particular national culture remains dominant. "If we leave out what might be called the basic mould that was given to it in the early stages, it is affected by geography, by climate and by all kinds of other factors."[11] But for the 'basic mould' to survive, the culture had to have certain depth, dynamism, inner vitality and an understanding of life. It is these factors, according to Nehru, that has led to remarkable continuity of Indian culture to the present day.

"The central idea of old Indian civilization, or Indo-Aryan culture, was that of *dharma*, which was something much more than religion or creed; it was a conception of obligations, of the discharge of one's duties to oneself and to others."[12] The concept of *dharma* in Indian strategic thought finds its most lucid depiction in Kautilya's *Arthashastra*. It is the foundation of political virtue in statecraft, which binds the ruler and the ruled. Nehru also mentions the *Gita* and its emphasis on ethical and moral principles in statecraft and in life generally. Without this formation of *dharma,* there is no true happiness and society cannot hold together. "The aim is social welfare, not the welfare of a particular group only but of the whole world, for 'the entire world of mortals is a self-dependent organism."[13] "Yet *dharma* itself is relative and depends on the times and the conditions prevailing, apart from some basic principles, such as adherence to truth, non-violence, etc."[14] Nehru acknowledged and appreciated *dharma* as a concept that was capable of being constantly renewed and therefore its relevance for all times to come. It exhibited an "inner quality of earnest inquiry and search, of contemplation and action, of balance and equilibrium in spite of conflict and contradiction."[15] This 'inner quality of inquiry and search' is innate to a dynamic and ever-changing culture and this aspect is explicated well in the *Arthashastra* too.

In a similar vein, Nehru talks expansively on the scientific approach to life's problems. "I suppose it is one of examining everything, of seeking truth by trial and error and by experiment,

[10] Jawaharlal Nehru's Speeches, Vol. 2, p. 356.
[11] Ibid.
[12] Nehru, *The Discovery of India*, p. 84
[13] Nehru, *The Discovery of India*, p. 107
[14] Ibid.
[15] Ibid.

of never saying that this must be so, if one is convinced of it, of accepting it, of having the capacity to change one's notions the moment some other proof is forthcoming, of having an open mind, which tries to imbibe the truth wherever it is found."[16] This is indeed the essence of the science of enquiry that Kautilya elaborates in his work. He considers *anvikshiki* (the science of enquiry) as the "lamp of all sciences", "means of all actions" and as "the support of all *dharma* (laws and duties)".[17] Nehru was also aware of the powerful influence of the materialist philosophy professed in India and that it was included as one of the major philosophies in Kautilya's *Arthashastra*.[18] The above discussion makes it fairly clear that Nehru was not just aware of ancient Indian texts and scriptures but had some understanding of its philosophical undertones too.

Political Goal

In the first verse of {6.2} of Kautilya's *Arthashastra*, "'*Sama vyayamau yogakshemayoryonih*'- the welfare of a state [ensuring the security of the state within its existing boundaries and acquiring new territories to enlarge it] depends on adopting a policy of non-intervention or overt action' – establishes the basis for all foreign policy."[19] Non-intervention is not a policy of doing nothing but the deliberate choice of a policy of keeping away from foreign entanglements, in order to enjoy the fruits of the past acquisitions by consolidating them. Another explication of *yogakshema* is through the concept of raison d'e′tat.[20] According to Mitra and Liebig, Kautilyan raison d'e′tat integrates two fundamental value ideas:

- Maintaining and expanding the power of the state;
- Ensuring the welfare and security of the people

Quite in line with the political objective of the Kautilyan state, Nehru proclaimed: "I wish to emphasize that all of us must understand that our most important objective is the safety and

[16] Jawaharlal Nehru's Speeches, Vol. 2, Speech at the inauguration of the Indian Council for Cultural Relations, New Delhi, April 9, 1950, p. 359
[17] R.P. Kangle, *The Kautilya Arthashastra, Part II*, Translation with Critical and Explanatory Notes, (Delhi: Motilal Banarsidass Publishers, 2010), p. 7
[18] The three schools of philosophy (*samkhya*, *yoga* and *lokayata*) mentioned in Kautilya's *Arthashastra* have been dealt with in detail in the previous chapter.
[19] L.N. Rangarajan, *Kautilya: The Arthashastra*, (New Delhi: Penguin Books, 1987), p. 546.
[20] Subrata K. Mitra and Michael Liebig, *Kautilya's Arthashastra: An Intellectual Portrait- Classical Roots of Modern Politics in India*, (Baden-Baden, Germany, Nomos, 2016), p. 132.

security of India and the prosperity and advancement of her people."[21] "In our foreign policy, we have proclaimed that we shall join no power bloc and endeavour to co-operate and be friendly with all countries. Our position in the world ultimately depends on the unity and strength of the country, on how far we proceed in the solution of our economic and other problems and how much we can raise the depressed masses of India."[22]

For Kautilya, there is no dichotomy between enhancing/consolidating the power of the state and ensuring the welfare of the people. The political rationality had an inherent normative dimension. Kautilya sees the ruler as the 'first servant of the state' and, equally so, as the 'first servant of people'.[23] As early as 1947, Nehru was echoing Kautilya's sentiment when he said, "Today I address you for the first time officially as the First Servant of the Indian people, pledged to their service and their betterment."[24]

Nehru once quoted the Dalai Lama who had said that a union of the spiritual field and other fields of life was difficult. Nehru thought, "Indeed it is difficult and yet I have often wondered if there is any real hope for the world unless there is some kind of combination of the two."[25] Political action within a moral framework gains instant legitimacy. Kautilya too, mentions the uncompromising dualism between *dharma* and *artha*, the spiritual and the material.

Saptanga Theory

Nehru's enduring contribution to national and international politics lay in correlating the nature of India's domestic order and its requirements to the nature and requirements of the international order as he saw them.[26] This resonates the seamless connect between the *saptanga* theory and the *sadgunyas* (six methods of foreign policy) that the *Arthashastra* reveals rather emphatically. Kautilya draws out from diverse political reality seven 'basic units' – *prakritis* – that are constitutive of the state: ruler, government, population, capital, treasury, armed forces and ally

[21] Nehru's Speeches, Vol. 2, p. 4, Translated from speech in Hindi delivered at the Red Fort, August 15, 1949
[22] Ibid., p. 5
[23] Mitra and Liebig, *Kautilya's Arthashastra: An Intellectual Portrait*, p. 132
[24] Jawaharlal Nehru's Speeches, Vol. 1, September 1946-May 1949, Publications Division, Ministry of Information and Broadcasting, Government of India, p. 29, A Message to the Press, New Delhi, August 15, 1947.
[25] Jawaharlal Nehru's Speeches, Vol. 3, 1953-1957, Publications Division, Ministry of Information and Broadcasting , p. 426, Valedictory Address at the Seminar on Buddhism's Contribution to Art, Letters and Philosophy, New Delhi, November 29, 1956.
[26] Prithvi Ram Mudiam, "The Nehruvian Model and the Post-Cold War World", *Word Affairs*, Summer 2006, Vol. 10, No. 2, p. 46

(foreign policy). His *saptanga* theory analyzes these basic units and shows how these impact the power of the state and the welfare of the people. Also, it is the correlation of forces in terms of the *prakritis* that determine the foreign policy action. It can be easily discerned from Jawaharlal Nehru's speeches that he not only understood the importance of the basic units of a state but also grasped the dynamics between these elements and the methods of foreign policy. He states, "The international policy of a country depends ultimately on the domestic state of affairs in that country; the two have to be in line and they cannot be isolated from each other. Indeed it is the internal state of affairs of a country that enables it to speak with some strength, force and authority in the international sphere."[27]

In a speech to garner support from the opposition, Nehru took recognition of the hard reality that the new nation was faced with. He said, "After independence we had gigantic tasks before us and we had constantly to face difficulties, turmoil, and trouble. There were the post-war difficulties due to constant tension with Pakistan. Apart from the natural internal disasters, like earthquakes, floods and drought, of which there were so many, we had to face the Kashmir and Hyderabad issues".[28] In the light of the unique situation that India was in, Nehru thought that "while it is very important to have a theory as the logical basis of our thought, it is not reasonable to apply it by force to all conditions……In practice, however, you have to take the facts of the situation and adapt either yourself or your theory accordingly."[29] This is representative of the inherent flexibility which Kautilya's *saptanga* theory lends to foreign policy formulation. The linkage between the health of the prakritis (thereby allowing greater policy options) and the choice of the *sadungyas* (six methods of foreign policy) is intrinsic.

In a similar vein, because of the impending domestic troubles, Nehru never wished to play a large part in the world affairs. In a speech while presenting the budget demands, Nehru noted that the country's priority lay in building a sound foundation and any distractions (international happenings that do not directly affect India) should be kept away from.

For Kautilya, the economy is the material foundation of the state. The state has the obligation to promote economic development and growth, which in turn would bring greater tax revenues to

[27] Nehru's Speeches, Vol. 3, Speech in Lok Sabha during a debate on the President's Address, February 25, 1955, p. 280
[28] Nehru's Speeches, Vol. 2, p. 26, Speech in the House of the People, New Delhi, May 22, 1952
[29] Ibid., p. 46

the state due to increased economic output. Tax revenue fuels state capacity: government and administration, the armed forces, the legal system and infrastructure. In accordance with Kautilyan raison d'état, the state promotes economic development, notably through the expansion of arable land and infrastructure building.[30] Acccording to Tisdall, Kautilya also envisaged cooperation between the state and the private sector in the agriculture and industry sectors. "This Kautilyan focus on a 'centrally planned (mixed) economic system' that privileged food security, economic security and social responsibility of the State towards its citizens appears to have dominated Indian economic thinking post-independence."[31] Nehru was certain that socialism, as against capitalism, offered greater benefits to a newly independent, poorly developed economy. He thought that socialism was the ethical and moral way to solve India's problems and the 'acquisitive' nature of capitalism was inapt for a 'civilization based on scientific temper and inspired by human values.' Nothing else suited to the 'innate spirituality of the human being.'[32]

Nehru accorded paramount importance to the economy. As a response to a question asked by a Hon. Member of the House on the utility of Five-Year Plans which did not concentrate on defence, Nehru remarked that the Five-Year Plan was the defence plan of the country. "Defence consists today in a country being industrially prepared for producing the goods and equipment of defence."[33] Nehru also thought that foreign policy was the outcome of economic policy, and until "India has properly evolved her economic policy, her foreign policy will be rather vague, rather inchoate, and will be groping."[34] He summed up the importance of the *prakritis* and their interdependence in this one statement, "The equation of defence is your defence forces plus your

[30] Subrata K. Mitra, "Kautilya Redux? Re-use, Hybridity, Trans-cultural Flow", in Michael Liebig and Saurabh Mishra (ed.), *The Arthashastra in a Transcultural Perspective: Comparing Kauäilya with Sun-Zi, Nizam al-Mulk, Barani and Machiavelli*, IDSA, New Delhi, 2017, p. 37

[31] Clem Tisdall, 'A Western Perspective on Kautilya's "Arthasastra": Does it Provide a Basis for Economic Science?', Economic Theory, Applications and Issues, Working Paper 18, University of Queensland, Brisbane, 2003, pp. 2-7

[32] "Address to the Annual Session of the Indian Chambers of Commerce and Industry", 27 March 1960, P.I.B.; Speech in the Rajya Sabha, 6 September 1960, Debates, Vol. 30, pp. 3,630-56; Address to Congress Parliamentary Party, 16 December 1960.

[33] Nehru's Speeches, Vol. 3, Pg 41

[34] Nehru's Speeches, Vol. 1, p. 202, Speech in the Constituent Assembly (Legislative), New Delhi, December 4, 1947

industrial and technological background, plus, thirdly, the economy of the country, and fourthly, the spirit of the people."[35]

Central Strategic Paradigms and Grand Strategic Preferences

Nehru's grand strategic predilections are clear from his speeches and writings. These logically flow from his answers to the core questions of the central paradigm. Nehruvianism which has been identified as a school of thought in Indian grand strategy accepts that "in the international system, without a supranational authority, the threat of war to settle disputes and rivalries is in some measure inescapable."[36] Nehru himself contends that while "war must be avoided at all costs, no country can do away with the apparatus of war."[37] It is for this inevitability of war that Nehru makes defence preparations. He describes the world as 'hard and cruel' and, therefore, one could not afford to depend on good intentions of humans.

As far as the nature of the adversary is concerned, the enemy is not permanent and can be befriended "by means of greater communication and contact with India and Indians, in various informal and formal, inter-state and transnational settings."[38] While this may be true of Nehru's foreign policy in a newly independent India, the realist compulsions behind this thinking cannot be completely disregarded. It was in the self-interest of a nascent economy to privilege cooperation with other neighbours over war; the latter causing suffering and loss of property and wealth.

On the utility of the use of force, Nehruvians contend that, "it is communication and contact between governments and peoples rather than force that will end conflict and make India more secure. Both parties can only be weakened and harmed by a relationship built on force."[39] Nehru has expressed the 'futility and wickedness of war' in several of his speeches.[40] Kautilya too

[35] Ibid., p. 40
[36] Kanti Bajpai, "Indian Grand Strategy: Six Schools of Thought", in Kanti Bajpai, Saira Basit, V. Krishnappa ed., *India's Grand Strategy: History, Theory, Cases,* (New Delhi: Routledge, 2014), pp. 117-118
[37] Nehru's Speeches, Vol. 2, Pg 183, Reply to debate on the President's Address in Parliament, New Delhi, August 11, 1951
[38] See Muchkund Dubey, "India's Foreign Policy: Aims and Strategies", in Nancy Jetly, ed., *India's Foreign policy: Challenges and Prospects* (New Delhi: Vikas, 1999), pp. 23-25 for this kind of view.
[39] Kanti Bajpai, "Indian Grand Strategy: Six Schools of Thought", p. 123
[40] Nehru's Speeches, Vol. 2, p. 104, "Let the People Decide – On Kashmir", Speech in the House of the People, New Delhi, August 7, 1952

regards the unnecessary human suffering and material losses associated with war as ethically reprehensible.

With respect to grand strategic preferences, war as a last resort is established even in Nehru's scheme of things. While he stressed the need to take 'adequate and effective' precautions in terms of maintaining a fine army, navy and air force, warfare was to be resorted to only under forced circumstances, for example in October 1947 in Kashmir.[41] It is argued that Nehru subordinated military spending to economic development and still in 1962, India had the largest army among all countries bordering the Indian Ocean.[42]

In Nehru's grand strategy, unambiguous preference is given to diplomacy. Nehru clearly states that there are two ways of bringing about territorial sovereignty – through war or through diplomatic means. If the first option is to be used as the last resort, the second becomes the clear alternative.[43] This was in the context of problems with Pakistan over Kashmir in the early years after independence. In spite of opposition raised by Syama Prasad Mookerjee, Nehru reiterated the importance of trade pacts with Pakistan to help bring about economic interdependence between the two countries which could eventually manifest in normal bilateral relations.

However, the pursuance of a peaceful policy should not be translated as Nehru's commitment to any kind of pacifism or even *ahimsa*. There have been instances when Nehru resorted to the use of force when a peaceful resolution to the problem proved futile (Kashmir in 1947 and Goa in 1961). After carefully weighing the costs and benefits, Nehru realized that "refusal to take that step seemed….to lead to graver consequences, even in terms of peace and war."[44]

The practice of policy making based on hard realities, oriented towards the welfare of the people, continued to inform Nehru's decisions. The aftermath of the 1962 debacle, India significantly increased its military spending and preparations. The defence budget for 1963-1964 was doubled

[41] Ibid.
[42] Rashed Uz Zaman, "Kautilya: The Indian Strategic Thinker and Indian Strategic Culture", *Comparative Strategy*, Vol. 25, Issue-3, 2006.
[43] Nehru's Speeches, Vol. 2, p. 286, "We Will not Compromise"
[44] Nehru's Speeches, Vol. 4, September 1957- April 1963, Publications Division, Ministry of Information and Broadcasting, Government of India, p. 36, Statement at Press Conference, New Delhi, December 28th, 1961

in February 1963, amounting to 28 percent of the national budget, compared to 15 to 17 percent of the previous years.[45]

Therefore the grand strategic preference ranking during the period of Nehru seems to corroborate with the one discerned from Kautilya's *Arthashastra*. The security *problematique* is also understood on similar lines – an anarchic world order where wars though avoidable are inevitable, and therefore preparations for any eventuality are warranted. The key features that marked the grand strategies of both Kautilya and Nehru were the use of scientific enquiry to understand reality and assess national power, and to then fashion a policy which reflected both political rationality and political normativity. The following three sub sections will look at Nehru's policy of non-alignment, India's relations with China and Pakistan during the period 1947-1964, and Nehru's nuclear policy. The strategies adopted in these spheres would be examined for their consistency with strategic preference ranking discerned from Kautilya's *Arthashastra*.

Nehru's Policy of Nonalignment

Perhaps the single, most important aspect of Nehru's foreign policy is the policy of non-alignment.[46] In a broadcast on 7 September 1946, Nehru, then Vice Chairman of the Interim Government, proclaimed the broad outlines of India's foreign policy. He articulated India's policy of non-alignment thus: "We propose as far as possible, to keep away from the power politics of groups, aligned against one another, which have led in the past to world wars and which may again lead to disasters on an even vaster scales."[47]

It was a policy position that Nehru arrived at as a result of the historical circumstances and there was a certain amount of inevitability to it.[48] India desired not to get involved in foreign entanglements and on the prospect of joining either of the blocs, both Nehru and Krishna Menon

[45] George Perkovich, *India's Nuclear Bomb: The Impact on Global Proliferation*, (Berkeley:University of California Press, 1999), p. 46

[46] C. Raja Mohan makes an important distinction between India's foreign policy of nonalignment and the Non-Aligned Movement (NAM). Nonalignment is defined as the foreign policy orientation of India soon after independence. NAM came much later as a movement towards the end of the Nehru years. It is the policy and not the movement that we will be discussing here.

[47] Jawaharlal Nehru's Speeches, Vol. 1, (September 1946-May 1949), p. 2-3

[48] For an in depth interview of Krishna Menon on World Politics, see Michael Brecher, *India and World Politics: Krishna Menon's View of the World*, (London: Oxford University Press, 1968)

(Indian diplomat and a close aide of Nehru on foreign policy) thought: "Why should we be with anybody."[49] This exercise of state's sovereign freedom of action remained valid in all contexts and came to be seen as a general policy, flexible to the rising situation; exhibiting variations but not deviations.[50] Nehru also emphasized in several speeches that the policy of non-alignment was not merely a neutral or negative policy but a positive one, "naturally helping those forces that we consider right and naturally disapproving of the things that we do not like."[51]

This policy pronouncement which has been the cornerstone of India's foreign and security policy since India's independence has been viewed by some as a typical Kautilyan brand of realism.[52] It is contended that the traditional view of nonalignment was essentially to avoid the bipolar politics of the Cold War, safeguard sovereignty through neutrality and avoid wars and achieve peace.[53] This stated policy goal was used as a smokescreen to ensure security for India at a time when she was building her economy and military and was, in a sense, weak vis-à-vis the powers in the international system.

In fact, India's policy of non-alignment was indeed a 'Kautilyan brand of realism' for reasons more than one. Firstly, with the 'basic units' (*prakritis*) of the state still in a rudimentary stage, it made perfect sense (as Kautilya himself would have suggested) to stay away from external entanglements and concentrate on building internal resources. In Kautilyan matrix of power, the comprehensive national power (CNP) of any state was a sum total of its basic units (prakritis). It was the health of these *prakritis* that determined the state's foreign policy action. A state with greater aggregate power would exercise greater flexibility in choosing a foreign policy course. For a newly independent nation, the healths of all the constituent elements of the state took priority over foreign engagement, especially the ones that could involve war. This had an intrinsic normative dimension too. While optimization of *prakritis* is achieved through 'purposive political calculation', the power of the state manifested in the health of the *prakritis* is 'the precondition for realizing the normative obligation to ensure the welfare of the people.'[54]

[49]Brecher, *India and World Politics*, p. 3
[50] Ibid., pp. 14-15
[51]Nehru's Speeches, Vol. 2, p. 220
[52]Rashed Uz Zaman, *Strategic Culture and the Rise of the Indian Navy*, Ph.D. thesis, Strategic Studies Department of Politics and International Relations, University of Reading, July 2007, p. 109
[53] Ibid., p. 110
[54] Mitra and Liebig, *Kautilya's Arthashastra: An Intellectual Portrait*, p. 133

Secondly, the non-aligned policy did push the prospect of another war at least to a distance. This was in India's self-interest because she was already weak and could not further suffer from the ravages of a war. A 'conceptual reconstruction' of nonalignment is plausible with reference to its gravitational centre, i.e. peace, which in political terms broadly presupposes the absence of war, in general, and avoidance of war with neighbours in particular.[55] As Nehru himself stated, "But the point is the very activity – call it idealistic; I do not think it is purely idealistic; I think it is, if you like, opportunist in the long run."[56] In a sense, the policy of non-alignment combined both – idealistic considerations and national interest. This characteristic stance vis-à-vis foreign policy fit the normative dimension of Kautilyan framework. Kautilya regards avoidable and unnecessary human suffering and material losses as ethically reprehensible. He does not advocate non-violence (ahimsa) in inter-state relations, but his foreign policy is the opposite of 'military adventurism' and Nehru followed in Kautilya's footsteps as independent India's first Prime Minister.

What the policy of non-alignment also earned for India was strategic autonomy to a large extent. For Kautilya, state's freedom of action was of principal importance and a prerequisite to the effective enforcement of a state's national goals and policies in the international arena. This freedom of action could only be ensured with robustness of the constituent elements of the state which in turn provide greater latitude in foreign policy action. Nehru realized that foreign policy is conditioned and controlled by a country's own strength and it has to take into account the capacity of the nation.[57] Krishna Menon, a diplomat and Nehru's close adviser, too thought that external policy is a projection of internal or national policy. This, in essence, is Kautilya's *saptanga* theory.[58] The policy of nonalignment, therefore, was a logical representation of state capacity and provided the right atmosphere for nation's capacity-building.

India's nonaligned policy also kept the option open to seek help from either the United States or Soviet Union or both without getting dragged into world politics or being bullied into following a particular path. Importantly, it 'mirrored' the course undertaken for domestic development.

[55] Rajen Harshe, "India's Non-Alignment: An Attempt at Conceptual Reconstruction", *Economic and Political Weekly*, February 17-24, 1990, p. 399
[56] Nehru's Speeches, Vol. 1, p. 212, Speech in the Constituent Assembly (Legislative), New Delhi, March 8, 1948, in reply to two 'cut' motions moved by Professsor Ranga and Seth Govinddas.
[57] Nehru's Speeches, Vol. 2, p. 324
[58] The *saptanga* theory is discussed at length in the previous chapter and briefly in a previous sub section.

"While India appealed to the United States as the largest democracy, the Soviets were attracted to India's partially planned economy and emphasis on the development of state sector."[59] India's unique path of development did not let it "categorically reject or accept either of the stereotypes represented by the two superpowers".[60]

In this context of seeking help from the superpowers, Nehru made a distinction between the help nations take as part of friendship and another type of help which countries take when they are weak. Nehru only approved of the former and was cautious about the 'strings attached' with the latter. Kautilya has discussed the comparative merits of the six methods of foreign policy (*sadgunya*), which includes seeking help. While peace is preferred to war and a policy of neither peace nor war is preferred to preparing for war, dual policy is preferred to seeking the protection of a stronger king. He explains that in adopting the dual policy, one gives importance to one's own undertakings whereas in seeking protection of another serves only the other's interest, not his own.[61] *Ari* (ally) which is the last of the seven constituent units (prakritis) of the state is to be relied on only temporarily, when the need arises.

Although Kautilya acknowledges that amity with a more powerful king carries great danger for kings, seeking protection when one is engaged in a war with an enemy is prescribed. However, Nehru thought differently – he would rather struggle alone through the crisis than have policies affected in any way by outside pressure.[62] He exhibited this conviction to a large extent in his treatment of Chinese aggression in 1962. Defending the policy of non-alignment in the backdrop of the Chinese aggression, Nehru thought that if India veered from this policy it would lose its prestige and reputation and would throw itself into the 'danger zone.'[63] Responding to the talk about aligning with the Unites States in tackling China, Nehru thought that the Americans could provide India only with a few aircrafts and the price could be that India would be dictated to in the international realm.

However, when the Chinese forces came down to Bomdila and proved threatening to an under-equipped and unprepared Indian army, India did ask for foreign help. Although the quantum of

[59] Harshe, "India's Non-Alignment: An Attempt at Conceptual Reconstruction", p. 400
[60] Ibid.
[61] Rangarajan, *Kautilya: The Arthashastra*, p. 566
[62] Nehru's Speeches, Vol. 3, p. 285
[63] "Thoughts of Pandit Jawaharlal Nehru on National Security, Intelligence and Policing (1952-1963)", Intelligence Bureau, Ministry of Home Affairs, Government of India, New Delhi, 1997

military help that came from the British or even the Americans was relatively small, it had potentially torn a hole in India's policy of nonalignment. In an interview with Krishna Menon, Michael Brecher asked whether Nehru thought that he could take aid and not sacrifice the policy of non-alignment. Menon replied in the affirmative. Nehru had, in an interview in 1961, stated that non alignment was a general policy which governed the thinking and its application to particular circumstances was a matter of judgment.[64] In Nehru's own words, the policy of nonalignment was a vehicle to serve India's interests; the apparatus provided room for seeking military assistance from either of the superpowers to repel an aggression.[65] In many ways, it was a "unique Indian contribution to the western theory and practice of international relations".[66]

Details of India's relations with China leading to the 1962 war will be taken up in the subsequent section.

Nehru's China Policy

A study of India's relations with China under Nehru's prime ministership brings forth the basic guiding principles of India's foreign policy. Dealing with a mighty neighbor harbouring a different set of ideological beliefs proved to be a test for Nehru's statesmanship. The decisions made and the policies chosen provide a vibrant context to draw comparisons with the Kautilyan framework of statecraft.

India's approach to China can be safely characterized as "accommodative". The reasons for following this policy option and the slight deviations made in light of changing political landscape reflect Nehru's predilection in the conduct of foreign affairs. Described as 'an act of political maturity'[67], India recognized the Peking regime in December 1949. It was the second Asian country to offer *de jure* recognition to the People's Republic of China, a move that can arguably be labeled as representing 'ideological accommodation'.

The framework of Sino-Indian relations in the period 1947-1964 was unquestionably regarding Tibet. In the year 1950, China occupied Tibet on India's Northern border. Nehru in a note

[64] Nehru's Speeches, Vol. 4, From television interviews with Mr. Adlai Stevenson and Mr. Arnold Michaelis, Washington, November 12, 1961, p. 384
[65]Harshe, "India's Non-Alignment: An Attempt at Conceptual Reconstruction", p. 401
[66] Mudiam, "The Nehruvian Model and the Post-Cold War World", p. 38
[67] Menon in an interview with Brecher, in Brecher, *India and World Politics*, p. 137

circulated to the Cabinet, regretted that Tibet could not be "saved" but believed it "exceedingly unlikely that India would now face an attack from China."[68] He upheld the essential correctness of seeking an "understanding" with China and drew the attention of the House to the agreement between India and China regarding Tibet, called the *Panchsheel* agreement (1954). The preamble to the agreement states:

(i) "Mutual respect for each other's territorial integrity and sovereignty;

(ii) Mutual non-aggression;

(iii) Mutual non-interference in each other's internal affairs;

(iv) Equality and mutual benefit; and

(v) Peaceful co-existence"[69]

These five principles were in effect policies which India was pursuing with other countries and they laid bare the primary goals of Indian foreign policy – non-aggression and mutual economic benefits. In fact, Menon called it a 'restatement of non alignment.'[70] India recognized the People's Republic of China (PRC) and formally renounced its traditional privileges in Tibet, which it had inherited from the British. Nehru expressed surprise at China's 'liberation' of Tibet and argued that while violence may be justified in the modern world, it should be resorted to only when there was no other way. He did think that there was another way to deal with Tibet. This was an act of 'territorial accommodation' vis-à-vis China, driven largely by India's incapability to challenge the happenings in Tibet. It is important to note here that when China did not show any willingness to withdraw from the territory claimed by India, that it had unlawfully occupied in the year 1961, Nehru let the agreement of 1954 on Tibet lapse. This, along with his border policy of 1961 represented a shift from an accommodative to a defensive policy.[71]

[68] Alka Acharya, *China-India: Politics of Incremental Engagement*, (New Delhi:Har-Anand Publications Pvt. Ltd., 2008), p. 26
[69] http://www.mea.gov.in/Uploads/PublicationDocs/191_panchsheel.pdf
[70] Brecher, *India and World Politics*, p. 143
[71] The grand strategic preference ranking discerned from Kautilya's *Arthashastra* ranks accommodative first, defensive second and offensive last. It is discussed in detail in the previous chapter.

The mid 1950s, saw a "short-lived but extremely friendly and cordial phase of Sino-Indian relations, epitomized in the slogan *Hindi-Chini Bhai-Bhai* (Chinese and Indians are brothers)".[72] This period ended shortly and Dalai Lama sought and obtained political asylum in India in the wake of the Tibetan uprising in 1959. Meanwhile, mutual suspicions were intensifying, both on account of the border, but largely also because of Tibet.[73] Negotiations between India and China throughout 1960-1962 could not achieve any consensual dispute resolution. This entanglement reached a climax in a short war in 1962.

Nehru's foreign policy towards China through the entire period (1947-1964) has been undoubtedly marked by a preference to cooperation and peaceful co-existence. In fact, the prospect of a war with China was not even thought of. The essence of the Panchsheel agreement guided the policy orientation. Nehru, in his annual address to the IGPs in the years 1960, 1961 and 1962 brought up the issue of the Chinese aggression on the border. Justifying his actions vis-à-vis the Chinese, he invoked some of the cardinal principles of Kautilyan statecraft, sometimes with a direct mention of the text and its methods. His emphasis on 'good intelligence' echoes an important dimension of the *Arthashastra* – 'a pioneering text of intelligence studies.'[74]

On March 6, 1960, he drew the attention of the IGPs to the futility of a war with China in the background of Chou En-lai's visit amidst continuing problems on the border. He reiterated his dislike for war and cautioned about the unfavorable terrain and conditions of the high mountains. These practical considerations of conducting a war are laid out in great detail in Kautilya's *Arthashastra*. With reference to the 'place' of war, the text states that from a conqueror's point of view, "the best land is one which is suitable for the operations of his own army and unsuitable for that of his enemy; the converse the worst for him."[75] (KA, IX, 1, 7-12) Nehru understood that the terrain and the mountain conditions were not in India's favour.

Again in his address in the year 1961 to the deputy Inspector-Generals of Police at the annual conference, he took up the suggestion of the people inside and outside the Parliament to drive away the Chinese militarily. While he agreed with them about the need for the Chinese to

[72] Acharya, *India and China: Politics of Incremental Engagement*, p. 27
[73] Ibid., p. 32
[74] For Kautilya's *Arthashastra* as a source for intelligence studies, see Michael Liebig, "Statecraft and Intelligence Analysis in the Kautilya-Arthashastra", *Journal of Defence Studies*, Vol. 8, No. 4 October-December 2014, pp. 27–54
[75] Rangarajan, *Kautilya: The Arthashastra*, p. 628

withdraw, he was cautious about the preparations for doing so and the consequences that it may involve. Importantly, he drew a distinction between a 'military' and a 'political' approach. While he dismissed an attack in a practical military sense, he kept the pressure up by building roads and putting military posts.[76] Responding to Intelligence Bureau reports of the Chinese moving into areas with no Indian presence, Nehru issued a detailed border policy on 2 November 1961 in consultation with the Defence Minister and senior military and civilian officials. Patrolling was ordered up to the border in the western sector, without getting involved in clashes with the Chinese unless it became necessary in self-defence, and "effective occupation" and "filling of gaps" of the middle and eastern sectors by patrolling or by posts.[77] This strategic policy was in line with Kautilya's preference for first accommodationist (Panchsheel) and then a defensive approach.

In January 1962, Nehru reiterated the pointlessness of an aggressive stand vis-à-vis China and this time referred to the famed Sanskrit play – *Mudrarakshasa* which had Kautilya as the chief protagonist. He discussed the 'indirect approach' which stressed on weakening the enemy to a point that war became futile. Nehru was convinced of the goodwill of nations and the superiority of peaceful resolution of problems and was certain that any serious act of aggression by China would elevate the issue from a bilateral one to a world crisis.[78]

Nehru's grand strategic preference was clear. Responding to questions raised by some members of the Parliament on the soft policy adopted vis-à-vis China in 1961, Nehru replied, "one takes stronger action when all other actions are precluded and also when one is prepared for strong action."[79] This echoes Kautilya's *saptanga* theory which takes into account the basic units of the state before arriving at a foreign policy decision. Nehru also clarified that the policy towards China was not a blanket approach and while "minor alignments" could be talked about in a peaceful way through "mediation and conciliation", "there was no compromise on the issue of

[76] Nehru's Address at the Conference of Deputy Inspectors-General of Police, CID, March 6, 1961, *Thoughts of Pandit Jawaharlal Nehru on National Security, Intelligence and Policing (1952-1963)*, Intelligence Bureau, Ministry of Home Affairs, New Delhi.
[77] Sarvepalli Gopal, *Jawaharlal Nehru: A Biography*, Vol. Three: 1956-1964, (Oxford: Oxford university Press, 1984) , p. 208
[78] These themes were discussed by Nehru in his address at the Conference of Deputy Inspectors-General of Police, CID, 6 March, 1962, "Thoughts of Pandit Jawaharlal Nehru on National Security, Intelligence and Policing (1952-1963)", Intelligence Bureau, Ministry of Home Affairs, New Delhi.
[79] Nehru's Speeches, Vol. 4, p. 222, Statement in Lok Sabha, April 1, 1961

security and sovereignty."[80] Commenting on the claim laid down in the Chinese maps, Nehru clarified that, "even a yard of territory, is important if coercively and aggressively taken from us".[81]

Nehru did not have the slightest doubt about the threat that China posed to India. In his private discussions with Mr. B. N. Mullik, he thought of China as the most potent danger India faced. However, his belief in peaceful resolutions (vital for India's economic prosperity) and recognition of the incapacity of India to deal with China on its own, led him to take softer measures. He even made efforts to get China admitted into the United Nations to curb its "aggressive propensities."[82] It was an effort by Nehru to accommodate China in the international order thereby binding it to international norms in the face of stiff American opposition.

While Nehru complied with some of the tenets of Kautilyan statecraft discussed above, his policy measures, especially in the context of the war with China, represented a rupture. He had all the intelligence reports suggesting the advances being made by China but did little to prepare to fight it. "On at least six occasions in the first six months of 1962, Army Headquarters brought to the notice of the Government the low level of stocks of ammunition and all types of necessary equipment."[83] However, their pleas were not heeded. In fact, the Annual Reports of the Defence Ministry suggest a proposed reduction of more than 25 crores in defence expenditure in the year 1959-1960. In 1962-1963, the percentage of defence expenditure from national revenue declined from 28 percent (in 1960-1961) to 24.9 percent (in 1961-1962).[84] Additionally, according to the 'Henderson-Brooks Report'[85], training of Indian troops did not take into consideration a possible war with China. Menon, in an interview with Michael Brecher, made no secret of the fact that they were not prepared for a war with China.[86] Nehru publicly acknowledged that to the egitimate question' as to why India had not been prepared for a border war he did not know of any adequate answer.[87]

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[80] Nehru's Speeches, Vol.4, p. 212, On Chinese Incursions in Ladakh, April 27, 1959
[81] Nehru's Speeches, Vol. 4, India's Borders with China, Reply to Debate in Rajya Sabha, September 10, 1959, P. 212
[82] B.N. Mullik, *My Years with Nehru 1948-1964*, (New Delhi: Allied Publishers, 1972), pp. 79-80
[83] Gopal, *Jawaharlal Nehru: A Biography*, Vol. Three: 1956-1964 , p. 233
[84] Figures on defence spending is taken from Brecher, *India and World Politics*, pp. 150-151
[85] After the reverses in NEFA (North East Frontier Area) and Ladakh, the Indian government conducted an enquiry which has come to be known as the 'Henderson-Brooks Report'
[86] See Brecher, *India and World Politics.*
[87] Speech at Delhi, 29 October, *National Herald*, 30 October 1962, in S. Gopal, *Jawaharlal Nehru: A Biography*, Volume three – 1956-64, p. 224

It was naivety rather than prudence to persist an accommodative approach to an advancing enemy, making inroads into one's territory. Nehru thought it unwise to spend large parts of the revenue on defending the Himalayan border at the cost of economic advancement. He also dismissed the idea of allying with another country to seek military help and mortgaging India's freedom of action. Above all, he was convinced that the trouble would remain limited and the international pressures on China will keep it under check. Unfortunately, the Cuban crisis kept the Soviets engaged and barring a couple of non-aligned nations, responses to Chinese aggression by members of the world community was guarded.[88]

Among the six policy measures suggested by Kautilya, *samsraya* (seeking shelter or alliance building) is advised to weaker kings facing a superior adversary. Ari (ally) though mentioned as the last of the constituent elements, is nonetheless important when the need arises. According to the general principles of "seeking help", amity with a more powerful monarch carries greater danger for kings, except when one is actually at war with an enemy. (KA VII, 2, 8) A king shall seek protection of one who is stronger than the neighbouring enemy. (KA VII, 2, 6) While the risk of seeking shelter is well recognized even by Kautilya and is advised as the least preferable policy measure, it has to be resorted to in times of need. If a king is unable to ruin the enemy's undertakings and is also unable to protect his own from the enemy's attacks, he shall seek the help of a stronger king. [Under this protection] he shall first avert his decline and then move towards progress. (KA VII, 1, 36)[89] Kautilya even suggests how to choose the supporter between two strong kings (quite like the United States and the Soviet Union). According to him, the king shall chose the one more capable or the one for whom he is a buffer or both. (KA VII, 2, 13)[90]

Nehru's failure to respond to the need of the hour cost the country greatly. The years leading up to the 1962 war should have been used to prepare for the eventuality of a war, either indigenously or with appropriate foreign help. S. Gopal is right in pointing out that the government had failed in not importing the minimum of equipment till manufacture in India reached the 'take-off' point.[91] The principle that a second-or-even third-rate weapon

[88]Gopal, *Jawaharlal Nehru: A Biography*, Volume three – 1956-64, p. 223
[89]Rangarajan, *Kautilya: The Arthashastra*, p. 566
[90]Rangarajan, *Kautilya: The Arthashastra*, p. 574
[91]Gopal, *Jawaharlal Nehru: A Biography*, Volume three – 1956-64, p. 233

manufactured at home was better than an imported first-rate weapon,[92] did not serve the purpose. In fact, the events that unfolded after the Chinese aggression made Nehru question himself and his policies. Still adhering to the policy of non alignment as an attribute of state sovereignty, he highlighted the difference between taking help from friendly countries and handing over the nation's defence. "Nehru permitted the United States, in the early months of 1964, to attempt to install a remote sensing device operated by a nuclear battery near the peak of Nanda Devi, in the Himalayas, to secure information about the development of missiles by China."[93] In tandem, "defence expenditure increased from Rs. 309 crores in 1961-62 to Rs. 474 crores in 1962-63 and to Rs. 816 crores in 1963-64."[94] Additionally, the Nuclear Establishment's power and reach were strengthened in 1962 and a revised Atomic Energy Act was adopted.

Nehru's Pakistan Policy

It was the issue of Kashmir that dominated India's relations with Pakistan all through the Nehru years. At the time of independence, Kashmir showed a little hesitancy in acceding either to India or Pakistan. Subsequently, it signed the instrument of accession to India when it was invaded by Pakistani raiders in October 1947. Indian troops had been sent in to prevent an imminent disaster and after a brief period of violence, the matter was referred to the United Nations Security Council for the withdrawal of the Pakistani raiders and nationals in Jammu and Kashmir. India also accepted the proposals of the plebiscite but non-compliance on the part of Pakistan did not help the cause.[95]

In this chain of events mentioned above, two decisions, in particular, have been reviewed and commented upon. These decisions are also critical in understanding the nuances of the operability of Indian strategic culture. These are - India sending in troops to Jammu and Kashmir despite Nehru's foreign policy proclamation to be cooperative and friendly with all countries,

[92] Nehru's address to the Conference on defence production, 31 August, 1959, A.I.R. Tapes, in Gopal, *Jawaharlal Nehru: A Biography*, Volume three – 1956-64, p. 232

[93] Statement of Morarji Desai, Prime Minister, in the Lok Sabha, 17 April 1978. Debates, Sixth Series, Vol. 13, pp. 307-17, in Gopal, *Jawaharlal Nehru: A Biography*, Volume three – 1956-64, p. 255

[94] *Hindu Business Line*, "Highest Ever Rise in Defence Budget", Thursday, March 2, 2000. Accessed on 6th December, 2017 - http://www.thehindubusinessline.com/2000/03/02/stories/010220b7.htm

[95] These developments have been traced from S. Gopal's account in *Jawaharlal Nehru: A Biography, Vol. 2 – 1947-1956*, Oxford University Press, 1979, pp. 19-25. This biography is written from first-hand knowledge of the man whom he served for ten years in the Ministry of External Affairs and from the unlimited access granted to him by Indira Gandhi to her father's private papers.

and seeking the help of the United Nations in resolving the issue later. Let us consider these individually.

Nehru's preference for peaceful resolution of conflicts and the use of force only as the last resort has marked India's policy towards Pakistan vis-à-vis Kashmir. When the Pakistani raiders entered Kashmir and marched towards Srinagar, the Prime Minister of Kashmir requested Nehru for military help. Initially Nehru declined but was persuaded by Patel and Abdullah to agree.[96] At the meeting of the Defence Committee, a couple of days after the attack, Mountbatten's advise against flying troops to Kashmir was overridden by Nehru and the cabinet, strongly backed by Gandhi. On 26 October 1947, the Maharaja signed the Instrument of Accession and joined the Dominion of India.

Very broadly, Nehru had identified the contours on which decisions regarding Kashmir would be made. The measures taken were directed by a nation's "obligations and responsibilities."[97] Nehru referred to a state's primary responsibility of protection of territorial sovereignty and secondly to honour his pledge to the people of Jammu and Kashmir. Therefore, the action was against the aggression and the threat to territorial security as much as it was for the good of the Kashmiri people which continued to drive Nehru's policies towards Pakistan. Importantly, for Nehru, it had the sanction of Gandhi who saw that a government had to "follow its duty, even military obligations, when certain circumstances arose."[98] These were indeed the prime considerations (security and welfare) and they perfectly coincide with the political objectives outlined by Kautilya in the *Arthashastra*.

The war continued for fourteen months and Nehru, in the beginning of 1949 had to decide between continuing the war and reclaiming the lost territory and putting an end to the military activities and seeking a peaceful resolution. Nehru chose the latter. His decision to end active military operations was driven in part by his repugnance towards war because of the ravages caused by it. Also, a large part of the revenues were being used up at the cost of economic development. According to Mr. B.N. Mullik, the ground realities were becoming harsh and Nehru's withdrawal should be seen from that perspective too. The "ill-equipped Indian troops,

[96] M. C. Mahajan, *Looking Back*, Bombay, 1963, pp. 151-2, in Gopal, *Jawaharlal Nehru: A Biography*, Volume Two: 1947-1956, p. 19
[97] Nehru's Speeches, Vol. 2, p. 101, Speech in the House of the People, New Delhi, August 7, 1952
[98] Nehru's Speeches, Vol. 1, p. 69

organizationally considerably weakened due to the ravages of the partition" found it difficult to fight in the wintry conditions of Jammu and Kashmir."[99] Mullik also draws our attention to the conflict portending to be a long-drawn one with the coming in of fresh raiders from Pakistan.

Additionally, India was burdened with the task of rehabilitating refugees coming from West and East Pakistan and could not have practically afforded the persistence of war. This policy of withdrawal to seek a peaceful resolution because of ground realities, finds a parallel in one of the methods of foreign policy (*sadgunya*) enunciated by Kautilya. '*Asana'* or staying quiet is a pause in a policy (concerning peace and war) already initiated. "The pause may be of short duration waiting for some improvement, extended if there has to be a longer wait for the right opportunity and deliberate by not choosing to act when one can do so."[100]

Nehru's action came in for much criticism because it was thought that India should have driven the Pakistanis out and not have agreed to the ceasefire. Again, the prolonged fighting was not in the interest of either India or Pakistan; newly independent countries needed to focus on development. Even the Military Commanders in the field, whom the Government had consulted, had agreed that the cease-fire was the best solution at that stage.[101] It was only in hindsight when the alternative solution boomeranged that the decision came to be questioned.

Nehru believed India's best course of action on the disputed territory of Kashmir was negotiation. He opted for a United Nations adjudication rather than exercise of hard power. It is believed that with the capability of a nascent United Nations uncertain in resolving such matters and a superior Indian force proficient to fight the Pakistanis, Nehru's decision was rather naïve. Gripped in the simultaneity of the situation as he was, Mountbatten succeeded in persuading him to refer the Kashmir problem to the United Nations by arguing that the only alternative was a full-scale war.[102] Nehru drafted a limited reference to the United Nations on Pakistan's aggression. Patel had not been in favour of this and Gandhi too, whom Nehru consulted, consented to it with some reluctance.[103] Nehru later deeply regretted the decision because the

[99] Mullik, *My Years with Nehru*, p. 3
[100]Rangarajan, *Kautilya: The Arthashastra*, p. 549
[101]Mullik, *My Years with Nehru*, p. 7
[102]Gopal, *Jawaharlal Nehru: A Biography*, Vol. Two: 1947-1956, p. 21
[103]Ibid., p. 22

politics played at the hands of both the British and the United States in the Security Council obfuscated any hope of a reasonable resolution to the Kashmir problem.

Nehru's decision on Kashmir was based on his judgment of the prevailing situation. His pronouncement to refer the matter of Pakistani aggression in Kashmir to the United Nations was in a way in line with the Kautilyan framework. It represented a preference for an accommodative policy, especially at a time when the nation was still trying to stand on its feet and the basic units (prakritis) were almost calamitous. The need of the hour was development and not destruction. However, it marked a departure in an important way. Pakistan qualifies as an 'inimical neighbour'[104] in Kautilyan parlance. Any attack by such an enemy on one's territorial integrity should be dealt with by all means at disposal. One of the primary duties of the king was *raksha* or protection of the state from external aggression. However, the *Arthashastra* also states that the king fully conversant with the principles of statecraft shall assess the conditions and choose the appropriate strategic method to weaken or overwhelm the enemy.[105]

While Nehru's decision may or may not have a Kautilyan sanction, the manner in which the decision was arrived at negated the importance of '*mantra shakti*' (good counsel), which is ranked over *prabhava shakti* (material resources) and *utsaha shakti* (energy, bravery). The *Arthashastra* ranks *amatya* (the minister) as the second most important constituent element of the state after *swami* (the ruler). Kautilya believed that a successful rulership can be carried out only with the help of associates. "One wheel alone does not turn…..he should appoint ministers and listen to their opinion."[106] Because of the simultaneity of undertakings, their manifoldness and their having to be carried out in many different places, he should cause them to be carried out by ministers, unperceived (by him), so that there may be no loss of place and time.[107] Nehru clearly did not have all the close ministers on board on the Kashmir issue and trusted his own judgment.

It was true for internal matters too. Nehru believed that he was, by virtue of his office, more responsible than anyone else for the general trends of policy and it was his prerogative to act as

[104] "The soulless neighbor always intent on harming", Rangarajan, *Kautilya: The Arthashastra*, p. 556
[105] Rangarajan, *Kautilya: The Arthashastra*, p. 554 {KA, VII, 18, 43}
[106] Kangle, *The Arthashastra* Part II, p. 14
[107] Ibid., p. 16

coordinator and supervisor with a certain liberty of direction.[108] However, in Patel's view, the role of a Prime Minister was different. It was the responsibility of each Ministry to implement the decisions of the Cabinet and the Prime Minister's task was only to ensure that it was done without any conflict. Nehru was, in Patel's view, acting undemocratically.[109]

Nehru outlined India's relations with Pakistan as "a policy of firmness and adequate preparation but always to maintain a friendly approach."[110] Tackling a question posed by Dr. Syama Prasad Mookerjee about the contradictory policy towards Pakistan (entering into trade pacts with Pakistan at the same time as taking a firm stand on Kashmir), Nehru stated, "It is true that we do both because both are necessary. Though our attitude is logical in a theoretical sense, it postulates two antithetical courses of action. Our policy is, nevertheless, an integral whole."[111]Nehru believed that ties in the economic realm could help bring about normality of relations between the two countries. In this context mention must also be made of agreement on the Indus Canal waters, reached with the help of the World Bank. Nehru went to Karachi in September, 1960 to sign the agreement and was received with warmth. Nehru told his audiences in Pakistan that the signing of the canal waters agreement could prove a symbol of cooperation with psychological and emotional benefits to both countries.[112]

Broadly, India's approach to Pakistan during the Nehru years has worked within the parameters of the Kautilyan theory of state. The grand strategic preference ranking follows the same order and the political objective too is in line with the principles of *yogakshema.*

Nehru's Nuclear Policy

With the independence of India, Nehru, ably supported by Homi Bhabha, was able to create a congenial atmosphere for development of nuclear energy. Nehru and Bhabha, even before independence, collaborated to set up the Atomic Energy Research Committee (AERC). The objective of AERC was to promote research in nuclear physics at Indian higher education

[108]Gopal, *Jawaharlal Nehru: A Biography*, Vol. Two: 1947-1956, p. 37
[109] Patel's note to Gandhi and Nehru, 12 January 1948, in Gopal, ibid., p. 37.
[110] Nehru's Speeches, Vol. 2, p. 133, Reply to debate on the President's Address in Parliament, New Delhi, February 3, 1950
[111] Ibid., p. 289
[112] Speeches at Karachi, 19 September, and Lahore, 22 September, *The Hindu*, 20 and 23 September 1960. In Gopal, *Jawaharlal Nehru: A Biography*, Vol. Three: 1956-1964, p. 143

institutions. Just one year after independence, in August 1948, the Atomic Energy Act (AEA) was passed. This legislation replaced the AERC with the Indian Atomic Energy Commission (IAEC) and accelerated nuclear research and development. In 1954, the Department of Atomic Energy (DAE) was established with Nehru as its first minister and Homi Bhabha as its secretary. In the same year the Indian Government also created the Atomic Energy Establishment, Trombay, which ultimately came to be called the Bhabha Atomic Research Centre (BARC). All these developments signified Nehru and Bhabha's quest to develop a self-reliant nuclear infrastructure.[113]

"Nuclear power" can connote two things. It can mean both production of energy for civilian uses and the development of nuclear weapons. The ambiguity inherent in the term has led many scholars to look at Nehru's nuclear policy with some degree of caution. "It is contended that while India's nuclear programme had an inherent military objective, the supporters consistently highlighted the peaceful nature of the programme."[114] It is interpreted as a "classic Indian style" and a unique characteristic of Indian strategic culture. Some identify this duality as a policy of "*moralpolitik* - the aggressive use of morality to advance national interests."[115]

In a similar vein, some Indian scholars also note that '*publicly'* Nehru opposed nuclear weapons and displayed an opposition to the use of force to resolve disputes, and this partly stemmed from the 'Gandhian legacy of the Indian national movement.' [116] (emphasis added). Nehru's abhorrence of violence and even nuclear weapons has been well noted. According to him, 'death on a colossal scale' and the 'genetic effects' of explosions on present and future generations render all other problems relatively unimportant.[117] In this context, Nehru reiterating his belief that nuclear technology offered the "built-in advantage of defence should the need arise" while

[113] For a description of India's establishment of the nuclear research infrastructure in the 1940s and 1950s, see Bhumitra Chakma, *Strategic Dynamics and Nuclear Weapons Proliferation in South Asia: A Historical Analysis* (Bern: Peter Lang, 2004), pp. 45-47.
[114] Rashed Zaman, "Strategic Culture and the Rise of Indian Navy", The University of Reading, Department of Political Science, July 2007, unpublished thesis. The following discussion on the ambiguity regarding India's nuclear programme under Nehru has been borrowed from Zaman's unpublished thesis.
[115] See Karnad, *Nuclear Weapons and Indian Security: The Realist Foundations of Strategy*, p. 3
[116] Sumit Ganguly, "India's Pathway to Pokhran II: The Prospects and Sources of New Delhi's Nuclear Weapons Program", *International Security*, Vol. 23, No. 4, Spring 1999, p. 150 in Rashed Zaman, "Strategic Culture and the Rise of Indian Navy", The University of Reading, Department of Political Science, July 2007, unpublished thesis, p. 168
[117] Stephen P. Cohen, *India: Emerging Power* (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2001), p. 150

responding to a memorandum by Bhabha as late as 1964, could appear contradictory.[118] Indeed, Nehru's words and actions indicated the ambiguity and tentativeness that characterized India's nuclear programme through to 1997. [119]

It is true that Nehru abhorred the use of nuclear weapons and made a clarion call for disarmament in the world. It is also true that he appreciated the value of nuclear energy for civilian use (especially in a poor, under-developed country), as well as a tool which would ensure security of the nation, should the need arise. As is alleged, the former was not used to mask the latter. He well understood the duality of nuclear know-how and technology and acknowledged that it was a great dilemma for a political leader who could not afford to take risks with the security of his country. While he detested the potential scourge of war that nuclear energy brought with it, he was determined to not let this revolution in technology pass India by (like the industrial revolution). However, he had no 'magical formula' to offer anybody regarding this dilemma.

He often clearly expressed the duality through his speeches. Recalling the Hiroshima and Nagasaki episodes as 'horrendous revolution' in military technology, he pointed to the 'limitless possibilities' that civilian use of nuclear energy offered to human development. "He was certain about his choice between co-destruction and co-prosperity and thought it necessary for the world to outlaw nuclear wars."[120]

This dilemma faced and the path chosen by Nehru, when seen from a Kautilyan lens, appears to be both politically rational and politically normative. It is politically rational in the sense that the potential military deterrent that a nuclear weapon offered would help India keep itself secure from other established nuclear powers in the world, in a self-reliant manner. In the Kautilyan scheme, optimization of the seven constituent elements of the state (*prakritis*) is seen as the prerequisite for a flexible foreign policy action which, in turn, could bring about the welfare and security of the people. The vast potential that the civilian use of nuclear energy offered to humanity made it an alluring prospect to a developing, newly-independent country. The induction of nuclear weapons too would have optimized *danda* (armed might) in the surest

[118] Ashok Kapur, *India's Nuclear Option: Atomic Diplomacy and Decision Making* (New York: Praeger, 1976), pp. 193-194.
[119]Perkovich, *India's Nuclear Bomb*, Pg 14
[120] As quoted in Perkovich, *India's Nuclear Bomb*, p. 15

possible way. In a world where only two countries had nuclear weapon capability, the defence of other countries was rendered inadequate. A self-reliant nuclear arsenal alone could have offered complete security to India.

The pace at which the nuclear programme was pursued is also reflective of an important Kautilyan dimension of statecraft. Nehru did not consider it prudent to divert a major part of the scarce resources of a nascent economy into heavy investment oriented atomic energy programme. Defence was to be thought of concomitantly with the nation's resources, capacity, economic position and industrial potential. While nuclear energy capability was considered strategically and economically important in the long term; it was not considered imperative because of the lack of any imminent threat or need.

Nehru also realized that while atomic energy was critical to developing nations, the countries which have a monopoly over it could stop its use for themselves and the rest of the world if they were convinced of its inutility. This would permanently disadvantage developing countries. These politically rational arguments weighed on Nehru's mind and he did not hesitate from stating that India would use all means at her disposal to defend herself. This enlightened self-interest dovetailed with the politically normative decision to engage in atomic energy; a critical resource for development.

The potential of atomic energy to improve the lot of the people in India was well recognized by Nehru. Atomic science and technology assumed a special place in the overall plans for technological development and modernization of India. "The need to increase the availability of electric power was a paramount objective, and Nehru saw atomic energy as the most dramatic means of achieving it."[121] Also, Nehru had a scientific predisposition and firmly believed that science could transform India from a backward country to a modern one.

Idealism was also reflected in his efforts made towards the process of disarmament. The destructive potential of the atomic energy clearly made it ethically reprehensible. Indeed, every practical consideration also led to the same conclusion; it was in India's own interest that the external environment was pacified through active diplomacy and disarmament. In a confidential memo authored in August 1940, Nehru admitted that India could at best emerge as a third rate

[121] Ibid., p. 15

military power and that too at an unbearable cost; it is therefore essential for India that world disarmament should take place.[122] The simultaneity of Nehru's attempts at disarmament and enhancing domestic capability to harness atomic energy as a crucial resource brings out the different planes on which India's nuclear policy was operating. Declaring nuclear tests as "crime against humanity" in the Parliament on April 2, 1954 and submitting a formal proposal to the UN General Assembly in December 1954 for ending all nuclear tests, Nehru stood firmly with the principle of disarmament. In 1955, work also began on India's first reactor – Apsara, with British assistance. In the same year, after much negotiation, Canada agreed to provide India with a research reactor – the 40 MW Canada-India Reactor (CIR), later called CIRUS. While ridding the world of nuclear weapons was the best case scenario, preparing to use atomic energy as a huge resource for economic development and keeping the prospect of a self-reliant nuclear weapons programme alive was in India's self interest.

In line with the above argument, it is interesting to note that among the three Englishmen[123] who influenced Nehru's strategic thinking, it was Professor P.M.S. Blackett, the 1948 Nobel Laureate in physics, who impressed him the most. Blackett wove three themes – the utility of nuclear weapons, disarmament, and nuclear energy as source of electricity – into his argument which, it turned out, were dear to Nehru.[124] Blackett, like Auchinleck, considered the atomic bomb to be a 'decisive weapon that had revolutionized warfare' and appreciated the deterrent value of even a small number of atomic armaments.[125] Pointing out the difference in the per capita wealth of India or China vis-à-vis the United States was 1:20 and that the per capita generation of energy in India from other than human labor was one-sixtieth of America's, Blackett made the case for India needing to rely on atomic energy for "cheap power."[126]

Therefore Nehru's ideas coalesced around Blackett's notions of a small, independent, affordable, nuclear deterrent that would enable India to be genuinely "neutral" in the U.S.-Soviet rivalry and

[122] Andrew Bingham Kennedy, *The International Ambitions of Mao and Nehru: National Efficacy Beliefs and the Making of Foreign Policy*, (New York: Cambridge University Press, 2011), p. 143
[123] The three Englishmen were Field Marshal Sir Claude Auchinleck, Commander-in-Chief, India, Lieutenant General Sir Francis Tuker, who led India's Eastern army, and Professor P.M.S. Blackett, the 1948 Nobel Laureate in physics.
[124] Karnad, *Nuclear Weapons and Indian Security*, p. 39
[125] P.M.S. Blackett, "America's Atomic Dilemma" in his collection of previously published essays, *Studies of war: Nuclear and Conventional* (New York: Hill and Wang, 1962), quoted in Karnad, ibid.
[126] Karnad, *Nuclear Weapons and Indian Security*, p. 39

to possess the strategic wherewithal for its own protection.[127] Blackett's three themes about nuclear issue – the utility of nuclear weapons, disarmament and its use as a source of electricity helped Nehru evolve his approach to India's nuclear policy in the 1950s. This scheme presented a blend of power politics and morality – the core of a Kautilyan framework.

The task set forth at the beginning of the chapter was to assess the extent to which India's foreign policy orientation under Nehru followed the grand strategic preference ranking delineated from Kautilya'a *Arthashastra*. It is clear from the above assessment that there was a shared preference for accommodationist strategies over either defensive/offensive or even expansionist ones.

Nehru, who was instrumental in formulating India's foreign and security policy, presented a distinct direction to a newly independent nation, which stressed on cooperation rather than the use of force. The importance that he attached to the welfare of the people as a primary consideration in policy formulation, made his decisions both popular and effective. Kautilya emphasizes the importance of moral legitimacy when engaging with an adversary. It is not possible to win if you are seen as unjust.[128] An assessment of the occasions when Nehru resorted to force reveals a broad adherence to this Kautilyan principle. The Goa example is a case in point. Nehru resorted to the use of force in Goa after exhausting other means like economic blockade and international pressure on Portugal. It was a twenty-six hour operation and "the Governor-General of Goa, in defiance of orders from Lisbon, surrendered without a fight."[129] Nehru cited the Goa experience as the 'most striking justification for military action.'[130] It proved the goodwill of the majority of the people of Goa without causing much destruction. The liberation of Goa was received well by the Indian people who saw the Portuguese as an evil force being eliminated.

Nehru's strategic thought is often criticized as naïve; relying on "moral efficacy"[131] to elicit cooperation from other states through diplomacy. Nehru's approach to nuclear weapons and disarmament, seeking UN adjudication to resolve Pakistan aggression in Kashmir, recognizing

[127]Ibid.
[128] Expert Interview with Namrata Goswami, New Delhi, April 26, 2012, in Mitra and Liebig, *Kautilya's Arthashastra: An Intellectual Portrait,* p. 191
[129] Interview with M.A. Vassalo e Silva, the last Portuguese Governor-General of Goa, *India Today* (New Delhi), 1-15 July 1980, in Gopal, *Jawaharlal Nehru: A Biography,* Volume Three: 1956-1964, p. 198.
[130]Gopal, *Jawaharlal Nehru: A Biography,* Vol. Three: 1956-1964, p.199
[131]See Kennedy, *The International Ambitions of Mao and Nehru.*The author introduces the concept of "efficacy beliefs" and identifies two analytically distinct types: "martial" and "moral".

China's absorption of Tibet, and making persistent efforts to deal cooperatively with an advancing Chinese army are cited as examples of this. These, however, only highlight some of the foreign policy decisions made under Nehru. A comprehensive assessment of Nehru's grand strategy should equally engage in his efforts made towards strengthening the constituent elements of the state (*prakritis*) which were considerably weak at the time of independence and, therefore, limited the flexibility with which foreign policy decisions could be executed. Often the decision to avoid use of force was in effect to allow the economy to bloom, science and technology to receive adequate investment, and to ensure the welfare of the people. However, *raksha* (protection) of the territory is also an important political goal (*yogakshema*) and furthers the cause of the well-being of the people. It is the duty of the ruler (fully conversant with the principles of statecraft) to choose the suitable strategic method. In Nehru's case, there was a definite lapse in preparedness to deal with the looming China threat.

Nehru's policy of non alignment, it is argued, was the application of one of the foreign policy options (*sadgunya*) – *asana*- which meant neutrality towards two similarly strong powers.[132] It was a strategic method to overcome one's own relative weakness and to buy time to develop its economic and military strength. The emphasis which Nehru laid on widening the economic and technological base of the country was anchored in Kautilyan tradition of realism.[133]

From the above analysis it is clear that broadly, Kautilya's Arthashastra and the larger Indian philosophical and strategic tradition that it is a part of, had considerable influence on Nehru and his policy making. The grand strategic preference ranking and the formula of arriving at policy decisions largely conformed to Kautilyan prescriptions. This lent a unique character to India's foreign policy in the Nehruvian years.

The material conditions which characterized a newly independent India stand quite in contrast with an economically vibrant, militarily muscular, technologically urbanized, nuclear-weapon capable India of the twenty-first century. The persistence of grand strategic preference ranking outlined from the *Arthashastra* in such a changed environment will undeniably point towards the existence of a robust strategic culture. It will also provide a crucial test to assess the independent,

[132] Mitra and Liebig, *Kautilya's Arthashastra: An Intellectual Portrait*, p. 308

[133] Bharat Karnad, Expert Interview, in Mitra and Liebig, *Kautilya's Arthashastra: An Intellectual Portrait*, p. 308

explanatory power of strategic culture as a variable in policy decision making. The following two chapters will examine India's foreign policy, with special reference to nonalignment, relations with China and Pakistan, and India's nuclear policy in the period 1998-2014 to examine the persistence of the grand strategic predilections of the Nehruvian era which, in turn, had their roots in the Kautilyan statecraft.

Chapter 5

Grand Strategic Preferences and India's Foreign Policy, 1998-2014: Nonalignment, China, and Pakistan

A country's foreign policy conduct is a reasonably good indicator of its national objectives, the availability of resource capabilities at its disposal, and importantly, the nation's proclivity to employ the latter in order to achieve the former. While grand strategy is similarly understood as a combination of national resources and capabilities – military, diplomatic, political, economic, cultural and moral – that are used to secure national interests and security, there is a nuanced difference between the two that warrants explication. Grand strategy serves as a broad framework which guides foreign policy in optimally utilizing the resources to maximize interests. The different pressures that work on foreign policy at the international, state, and individual levels, throw up challenges and opportunities that make real time reappraisal and modification of strategies imperative. This qualifies foreign policy as an 'emergent strategy' as against a coherent long-term 'grand strategy'.[1]

The grand strategic preference ranking that is inferred from Kautilya's *Arthashastra* has been shown to be broadly persistent in the nuclear and foreign policy realms of the Nehruvian years (1947-1964). The period 1998-2014 provides a contrast to the Nehruvian era both in terms of indices of state power and the perceived proclivities of the political leadership. While Nehru was seen by many as an idealist, the leadership of the latter time period has been broadly judged as pragmatic. Therefore, the constancy of the order of grand strategic preferences in this time period would emphatically prove the independent, explanatory capability of strategic culture as a variable in policy making.

[1] For a detailed explication of an 'emergent strategy' different from 'grand strategy', see Ionut Popescu, *Emergent Strategy and Grand Strategy: How American Presidents Succeed in Foreign Policy*, (Baltimore: John Hopkins University Press, 2017)

India's "journey from the uncertainties of the early 1990s to a more self-assured diplomatic posture" is metaphorically referred to as the 'crossing of the Rubicon'.[2] Evidently, the three levels of Kenneth Waltz's framework[3] which provide the contours along which Indian foreign policy decision makers operate, have substantially transformed in the period 1998-2014. Internationally, the transition from stable Cold War bipolarity to a yet uncertain world order has lent fluidity to India's foreign policy approach. The United States' military and diplomatic "pivot" or "rebalance" towards Asia[4] has brought the epicenter of international activities closer home, necessitating India's involvement. Another systemic development which has drawn India out and is partially responsible for America's recalibrated approach is the rapid rise of China in the region. This has, in turn, led to a more frenetic subcontinental experience for India and has put to test the existing theories of international political change.[5]

Domestically, the spurt in India's economic growth and the concomitant enhancement in military capabilities have led to the Central Intelligence Agency (CIA) assessments to conclude that "India will be the fourth most 'capable concentration of power', after the United States, the European Union, and China."[6] Theoretically, growing affluence is seen to inevitably enhance the capacity of a state's armed forces and cause an attendant change in its strategic posture.[7]

Finally, the characteristics and perceptions of the Indian strategic elite and the political leadership at the third level too shape foreign policy formulations. The year 1998 saw the ascendance of the Bharatiya Janata Party (BJP) to power with an evident show of its centre-right

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[2] C. Raja Mohan, *Crossing the Rubicon : The Shaping of India's New Foreign Policy*, (New Delhi: Penguin Books, 2005)

[3] Kenneth N. Waltz, *Man, the State, and War*, (New York: Columbia University Press, 1959)

[4] Hillary Clinton, "America's Pacific Century", *Foreign Policy*, October 2011. (http://foreignpolicy.com/2011/10/11/americas-pacific-century)

[5] Robert Gilpin argues that when a new state climbs the great-power hierarchy, it will "try to expand its economic, political, and territorial control; it will try to change the international system in accordance with its own interests." See, Gilpin, *War and Change in World Politics*, (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1981), pp. 94-95

[6] Ashley J. Tellis, "India as a New Global Power: An Action Agenda for the United States", *Carnegie Endowment for International Peace*, July 2005.

[7] For a full explication of such theories, see Fareed Zakaria, *From Wealth to Power: The Unusual Origins of America's World Role*, (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1998), and Gilpin, *War and Change in World Politics*. Manjeet Pardesi, in a similar vein contends that "as India becomes wealthy, it will work towards maximizing its political and military power and to attain regional hegemony in accordance with the core features of offensive realism". However, he clarifies that India is not an expansionist power and has no territorial designs either in South Asia or beyond. See Manjeet Singh Pardesi, "Deducing India's Grand Strategy of Regional Hegemony from Historical and Conceptual Perspectives", Working Paper Series 076, Institute of Defence and Strategic Studies, Singapore, April 2005, p. 51. The Neorealists, however, emphasize threats over resources (K.N. Waltz, *Theory of International Politics*, (Reading, Mass.: Addison, 1977)).

inclination. Its party manifesto asserted that "India's national interest must be protected and pursued more vigorously" and it sought to achieve a "premier position" for the country in all global fora.[8] The period 2004-2014, in contrast, witnessed the governance of a different political persuasion.

India's foreign policy, in the period of this study, has had to tackle both domestic redirection and radical evolution in the international sphere. While strategic culture is conceived as a consistent set of ranked preferences that persist across time and across strategic contexts[9], it is a truism that decision makers are sensitive to their objective environments. Interestingly, Kautilya's *Arthashastra* emphasizes the importance of the key elements of the state (*prakritis*), which together constitute a state's Comprehensive National Power (CNP), in any grand strategic formulation. The test of strategic culture theory is to prove constancy in ranked preferences in two contrasting time periods. Therefore, the quest of this chapter is to assess the extent to which the basic assumptions of India's strategic culture discerned from Kautilya's *Arthashastra* provide a filter to the objective, material conditions that the decision makers are exposed to. In this context, if India's international behaviour is revealed to broadly conform to the continual grand strategic preference ranking, the existence of a robust strategic culture in India can be credibly established.

India's relations with the United States under the umbrella policy of nonalignment, bilateral interactions with China, Pakistan, and the approach to the nuclear issue are among the chief foreign policy concerns of the period under study. This chapter focuses on nonalignment as a broad policy at the global level portraying India's relations with the United States, and engagement with China at the regional level, and with Pakistan at the subcontinental level from 1998 to 2014. India's nuclear policy for the period 1998-2014 will be discussed in a separate chapter.

[8] BJP Party Manifesto 1998, Chapter 7 – Foreign Policy. Accessed at http://www.bjp.org/documents/manifesto/bjp-election-manifesto-1998/chapter-7

[9] Alastair Iain Johnston, *Cultural Realism: Strategic Culture and Grand Strategy in Chinese History,* (Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Press, 1995), p. 53

The Policy of Non Alignment

The discussion of the policy of Non alignment during the Nehruvian period was deliberately set apart from the discourse on the Nonaligned Movement (NAM). In the period 1998-2014 too, the basic import of the nonaligned policy remained independence of judgment and freedom of action in pursuing one's national interest; albeit termed differently as 'multi alignment'[10] or 'neo-nonalignment'[11]. These broader and deeper axioms remain relevant even when the nature of the international system in which it was conceived has substantially transformed. These defining characteristics are reflected in the document *Nonalignment 2.0* as the 'core strategic principles': "the need to make independent judgments in international affairs without being unduly influenced by ideas and policies set elsewhere; the need to develop the capacity for autonomous strategic action to secure India's own interests without being excessively dependent on, or restrained by, the capabilities and interests of other powers; and the need to work towards a more equitable international order that reflects the shifting balance of aspiration and power".[12]

It is important and relevant to highlight nonalignment as a 'guiding principle' in the conduct of foreign policy. Even Jawaharlal Nehru described it as a 'basic policy' which needed to be applied to particular circumstances through 'matter of judgment" to achieve the 'objective aimed at'.[13] Therefore, it can be categorized as a 'grand strategy' which is amenable to appropriate application on a case-to-case basis. It is this umbrella policy that has largely shaped India's bilateral relations with the United States, China, and Pakistan.

Kautilya and Nonalignment

Before delving into the practice of nonalignment, it would be appropriate to examine the continuing relevance of the core principles of nonalignment through the Kautilyan lens.

[10] Shyam Saran, *How India Sees the World: Kautilya to the 21st Century*, (New Delhi: Juggernaut, 2017), pp. 1-2
[11] See Khilnani et al., *NonAlignment 2.0: A Foreign and Strategic Policy for India in the 21st Century,* Centre for Policy Research, New Delhi, 2012.
[12] *NonAlignment2.0*, 28 February, 2012. Written under the auspices of both the National Defence College and the Centre for Policy Research, it is the product of eight authors drawn from different spheres of life – Sunil Khilnani, Rajiv Kumar, Pratap Bhanu Mehta, Lt Gen (Retd) Prakash Menon, Nandan Nilekani, Srinath Raghavan, Shyam Saran and Siddharth Varadarajan. The well-publicised involvement of the National Security Advisor, Shivshankar Menon, and his deputies in the consultation phases of the project suggests its conclusions have at least some official sanction.
[13] Speeches of Jawaharlal Nehru, Vol. 4, From television interviews with Mr. Adlai Stevenson and Mr. Arnold Michaelis, Washington, November 12, 1961

Arguably, the single most important concept in Kautilya's scheme of foreign policy dispensation, which has also found recognition in Western thought, is the concept of *Mandala/Rajmandala*. It is based on an ideal-type constellation of states. At the centre of the concentric circles is the *vijigisu* as the hub of a wheel. The immediate neighbours grouped around it are seen as the enemy states (*ari*). The second circle of states which are the indirect neighbours of the *vijigisu* are his friends (*mitra*). Similarly, *arimitra* (adversary's ally) and *mitra-mitra* (ally's ally) form the next layers. Beyond the friends and enemies, there is *madhyama* (middle king), *udhasina* (neutral king) and *antardhi* (weak intervening king). It is important to note that the *mandala* concept does not define the friend-foe relationship in a rigid 'geometric'/ 'geopolitical' determination.[14] Instead, the inter-state relationship is marked by fluidity which lends an element of dynamism to the conduct of foreign affairs. The nature of this system is not too different from the indeterminate international order that followed the end of the Cold War. The prime motive of the *vijigisu* is also the central tenet of India's foreign policy – to maximize national interest by minimizing the use of force.[15]

The determinants of the conduct of foreign policy of the vijigisu are clearly laid down in Kautilya's *saptanga* theory.[16] An objective assessment of the seven elements of the state (*prakritis*) – *swamin*, *amatya*, *janapada*, *durga*, *kosa*, *danda*, *mitra* - provides substantive criteria to measure one's power potential (*prakriti* aggregate). However, what is equally important in inter-state relations is ascertaining the ratio of *prakriti* aggregates of one or more states; 'relative strength or weakness of powers'[17] (KA, IX, 1, 1) is crucial. Through these, a reliable assessment of the correlation of forces emerge which determine which of the six foreign policy actions (*sadgunyas*) is to be adopted.

Notably, in the ranking of the constituent elements of the state, *mitra* (ally) is last in order. This is reflective of Kautilya's preference for 'internal balancing' (optimizing the endogenous power capabilities of the first six *prakritis*) over 'external balancing'. Kautilya's recommendation to the ruler is: "First he should care for his own affairs and put his own things on a firm ground, then he

[14] Subrata K. Mitra and Michael Liebig, *Kautilya's Arthashastra: The Classical Roots of Modern Politics in India*, (New Delhi: Rupa, 2017), p. 114

[15] The MEA Annual Report 2006-2007, p. i, for example highlights the pursuit of 'enlightened self-interest' through comprehensive engagement with the world and all major powers to 'create an external environment conducive to peace and stability in the region'.

[16] A detailed explanation of the theory is discussed in an earlier chapter.

[17] R.P. Kangle, *The Kautilya's Arthashastra* Part II, (Delhi: Motilal Banarsidass Publishers, 2014), p. 406

should get resolutely to grips with the affairs of others. (KA, VII, 6, 12). The state factor *mitra* is an 'external' factor and, therefore, should be seen as transient and complementary to the 'internal' factors. The optimization of this 'external' factor is sought only when the 'internal' factors are still underdeveloped or developing, and is done in a manner that adds to one's own power potential. It does not mean strengthening the internal factors of the ally.

Kautilya recommends terminating the alliance when one's foreign policy conduct gets restrained, the development of 'internal' factors is impeded, or importantly, when the correlation of forces tilts towards being favourable. There is no 'normative eigenvalue' in alliance making; it is exclusively driven by 'purposive-rational calculation'.[18] These continue to be the guiding principles of the application of the policy of nonalignment in the conduct of India's foreign policy in the period under study.[19]

NonAlignment 2.0[20]

The Cold War bipolarity and the fear of being dragged into an international conflict with a still nascent economy during the Nehruvian period is no longer the prime driver of India's policy of nonalignment, in the 21st century. The post-Cold War world is marked by increasing interconnectedness and interdependence between countries and economies to meet the rising international challenges. India has had to adjust to global equations and to some the 'alterations needed in the new networked world' has led nonalignment into obsolescence.[21]

However, the need to move towards multipolarity, while 'still adhering to strategic autonomy'[22] has only made the Kautilyan frame of reference more relevant, both in terms of the constituents of the *mandala* (circle of states) and the 'external' opportunities presented to optimize the *prakritis*. Its potential practice in its new avatar in the period of study will highlight the inherent

[18] Mitra and Liebig, *Kautilya's Arthashastra: The Classical Roots of Modern Politics in India*, p. 96
[19] Former Foreign Secretary Shyam Saran in his book, *How India Sees the World*, has argued that the search for strategic autonomy is a continuing theme in India's foreign policy since Independence.
[20] On 28 February 2012, '*NonAlignment 2.0*' was launched as a monograph by two former National Security Advisers of India, Brajesh Mishra and M. K. Narayanan, and their successor in the post, Shivshankar Menon. They felt that it would be both appropriate and timely to revise and recast the original monograph in the form of a book, incorporating some of the very useful suggestion that emerged out of these debates.
[21] M.K. Narayanan, Former National Security Adviser (2004-2010), Expert Interview, May, 2017
[22] Narayanan, ibid., "India does project a more decisive and proactive foreign policy today (2014-2017), but it still adheres to 'strategic autonomy' and prefers to have multiple strategic partners rather than draw too close to any one country or group."

flexibility of this 'umbrella' policy. In fact, it is contended that 'continuity rather than radical change has been the defining characteristic of India's Foreign Policy'.[23]

NonAlignment 2.0 is an important strategy document that lays down the guidelines for the conduct of India's foreign and strategic policy. The engagement of the former National Security Advisers (NSAs) of both the National Democratic Alliance (NDA) and United Progressive Alliance (UPA) governments with this project, suggests that it has some official sanctity. It can be seen as a 'semi-official' document which is reflective of the thought processes of the Indian strategic elite in general.

The Preface to the document states:

"NonAlignment 2.0 is an attempt to identify the basic principles that should guide India's foreign and strategic policy over the next decade. The views it sets out are rooted in the conviction that the success of India's own internal development will depend decisively on how effectively we manage our global opportunities in order to maximize our choices –thereby enlarging our domestic options to the benefit of all Indians."[24]

The underlying Kautilyan echoes are evident; link between 'domestic options' (*prakritis*) and 'global opportunities' (ally-*mitra*) is clearly established. The political goal identified as maximizing choices which would result in the benefit of all Indians is the integration of the two fundamental 'value ideas' in Kautilya: "the power of the state is manifested in optimization of the prakriti which is 'the precondition for realizing the normative obligation of the welfare of the people".[25] The usage of the word 'success' is also in tandem with Kautilya's conception: "Power is (possession of) strength. Success is (obtaining) happiness". [KA VI, 2, 31-32]

Additionally, the document draws on the Kautilyan foreign policy principle with its central concept of 'strategic autonomy'. Global engagements that bring about augmentation of the state capacity only are stressed. A word of caution about 'erosion of strategic autonomy' in formal

[23] Ibid.
[24] Khilnani et al., *NonAlignment 2.0: A Foreign and Strategic Policy for India in the 21st Century*, Preface (iii)
[25] Mitra and Liebig, *Kautilya's Arthashastra: An Intellectual Portrait- Classical Roots of Modern Politics in India*, (Baden-Baden, Germany, Nomos, 2016), p. 133

alliances in the context of India's ties with the US is expressed in the document too. 'Being friends rather than allies' is advised.[26]

The principle that foreign policy evolves in keeping with shifts taking place across the globe is an off-repeated 'truism'. That it takes place in tandem with developments on the domestic front, is more applicable to democracies.[27] The inclusion of a discussion on internal security in a separate chapter highlights the importance of the domestic dimension and points to the fact that "Kautilya's ideas were hovering in the background when ideating for the strategy document".[28] Emphasis on 'internal legitimacy' and a 'rights-based welfare state' as a determinant of state's strategic options also reflects the Kautilyan line. Indeed, it was Kautilya who first talked of "legitimacy through the well-being of your people".[29]

An important theme of the document is the connection drawn between economic development and national security. It promotes a 'mixed economy' model of economic development which tries to balance private sector dynamism and 'etatist-dirigiste' policies.[30] This is reflective of the economic principles laid out in the *Arthashastra* which are invoked to strengthen the economy and thereby increase the capacity of the state.

The division of the chapters into 'The Asian Theatre' and 'India and the International Order' has a striking resemblance to the 'circle of states' in the *rajamandala*. The framework and layout of the document discusses not just the minutiae of foreign policy but proposes a grand strategic formulation too, quite like Kautilya's *Arthashastra*. The discussion in the section on 'Hard Power' clearly indicates the grand strategic preference ranking. The main political objective is identified as ensuring "the creation of a stable and peaceful environment; to facilitate maximum economic development; and 'internal political, social and economic stability."[31] The identified role of 'hard power' is to 'remain ready to be applied externally or internally in pursuit of

[26] *NonAlignment 2.0,* p. 32
[27] M.K. Narayanan, Expert Interview, May 2017. He admitted, "I cannot claim to have any deep knowledge, or understanding, of Kautilya's thought, since I have not made a study of the original treatise. The truth is that Kautilya's Arthashastra - unlike Machiavelli's 'Prince' - is all embracing in character rather than a mere body of doctrine."
[28] Lt. Gen. Prakash Menon (co-author of *NonAlignment 2.0*), E-mail interview, January 2017.
[29] Mr. Shivshankar Menon, Former National Security Adviser, Expert Interview, April, 2017
[30] Mitra and Liebig, *Kautilya's Arthashastra: The Classical Roots of Modern Politics in India* , 2017, p. 279
[31] *NonAlignment 2.0,* p. 38

political objectives'.[32] Therefore, readiness to deal with external threat and internal instability is emphasized in a defensive/deterrent mode. While war is *ultima ratio*, a range of military options in case of aggression is laid open in the document, underlining 'flexible response'. India's bilateral dealings with the United States, China and Pakistan also indicate an accommodative-defensive line as will be explained in the following sections.

The United States

In the context of an uncertain international order necessitating fresh calibrations of India's policy of nonalignment, its bilateral relations with the US is easily the most commented and conjectured upon realm.[33] While India's perspective of being 'treated as an ally without actually being an ally'[34] maybe somewhat clear now, its closening with the US at the turn of the century was variably received.[35] The United States represented one of the poles in Cold War politics and till as late as the mid 1990s the two countries were referred to as 'estranged democracies'.[36] However, the trajectory that they set themselves on at the start of this century progressed linearly through both governments of different political persuasions (National Democratic Alliance-NDA and United Progressive Alliance - UPA).[37] This section will analyze India's relations with the US in the period 1998-2014 from the perspective of the core principle of nonalignment – maximizing interests without compromising on strategic autonomy.[38]

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[32] Ibid.

[33] This section does not claim to do a comprehensive assessment of all issue areas in the bilateral relationship. Instead, it will focus on concerns which fall under the broad purview of India's policy of nonalignment.

[34] See Devin T. Hagerty, "The Indo-US Entente: Committed Relationship or 'Friends with Benefits'", in Sumit Ganguly ed., *Engaging the World: India's Foreign Policy Since 1947,* (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2016)

[35] Shivshankar Menon, in his book - *Choices: Inside the Making of India's Foreign Policy*, (Washington D.C.: Brookings Institution Press, 2016), describes the choices involved in the Civil Nuclear Initiative with the United States, when Prime Minister Manmohan Singh removed the major obstacle to an India- U.S. partnership, staking the fate of his government on a no- confidence vote in Parliament, the only instance in India of a government's fate being pegged to a foreign policy issue.

[36] See Dennis Kux, *India and the United States: Estranged Democracies 1941-1991*, (New Delhi: Sage Publications, 1994)

[37] The Party manifestos of both BJP (1998) and the Congress (2004) seek engagement with the US in 'scientific, technological, strategic and commercial cooperation', on the principle of 'mutual respect, shared values and congruence of interests'. Accessed at http://allindiacongress.com/admin/upload/pdf/Manifesto%202004.pdf and http://www.bjp.org/documents/manifesto/bjp-election-manifesto-1998/chapter-7

[38] "PM's address at the Combined Commanders Conference", October 26, 2004, New Delhi – "Balancing the imperatives of global engagement in an increasingly unstable international environment while maintaining autonomy in decision-making is thus an important challenge of our time."

The United States qualifies as the *udhasina* (neutral king) in the contemporary *mandala* (circle of states). "One outside (the sphere of) the enemy, the conqueror and the middle king, stronger than (their) constituents, capable of helping the enemy, the conqueror and the middle king when they are united or disunited and of suppressing them when they are disunited, is the neutral king." [KA, VI, 2, 22][39] As the 'neutral king', the US can also be considered as the *mitra* (ally), the last of the seven constituent elements of the state (*prakritis*). The inclusion of an ally as a source to augment state capacity, even as the last resort, is unique to Kautilyan statecraft. The caution to be exercised and the motives for invoking the '*mitra'* have been discussed in the previous section. The rationale for India's increased engagement with the US can be inferred from the *Arthashastra* itself.

The excellences (qualities) of the 'ally' are clearly mentioned in the treatise. "Allied from the days of the father and the grandfather, constant, under control, not having a separate interest, great, able to mobilize quickly." [KA, VI, 1, 12] The last three of the enumerated excellences are true for the United States. It is a great power capable of mobilizing quickly and its strategic interests are increasingly converging with that of India's. It is important here to differentiate between an ally as a constituent element of the state and a 'friend'.

Alliances and allegiances among states have no normative eigenvalue for Kautilya.[40] Kautilya's definition of a 'friend' in inter-state relations is clear enough: "Insofar and as long as one can derive benefits from a friend, insofar he is a friend; being of use for oneself, is the characteristic of being a friend" [KA, VII, 9, 12][41] Therefore, temporary alliance to exploit the material resources of an ally is different from 'lasting friendship'. The Kautilyan state's 'best friend' is a state giving up its sovereignty and becoming a vassal state.[42] Clearly, the US does not fall into the 'friend' category of inter-state relations. In this context, let us assess the imperatives from a Kautilyan point of view for the India-US bonhomie in the period of study.

It was the Jaswant Singh (Indian Foreign Minister) and Strobe Talbott (US Deputy Secretary of State) talks soon after the Indian nuclear tests of 1998 that represented a 'turning point in US-

[39] Kangle, *The Kautilya's Arthashastra* Part II, p. 318-319
[40] Mitra and Liebig, *Kautilya's Arthashastra: The Classical Roots of Modern Politics in India,* 2017, p. 96
[41] Ibid., p. 97
[42] Ibid.

Indian relations'.[43] For the Americans, it was the global nuclear order which was at stake and for the Indians it was a question of 'sovereignty, security, and equity'.[44] Jaswant Singh's public explanation of the policy clearly expressed India's steadfastness about strategic autonomy in reconciling US non-proliferation concerns with India's national security objectives and alongside a keenness to develop greater mutual understanding between the two countries in a post Cold-War environment.[45] As Talbott notes, "The Indian government was, from the outset, disinclined to compromise".[46]

The Indian 'stubbornness' stole a march over the US 'persuasiveness', but importantly, it opened the doors for what turned out to be a mutually beneficial and a comprehensive engagement between India and the United States. The convergence of interests was necessitated and facilitated by the volatile international environment where economic and strategic interdependence had led to mushrooming of multiple strategic partnerships.[47] Nonalignment with strategic autonomy had gradually morphed into multi-alignments for economic and strategic gains. However, India's preference for a '*tous azimuts* approach to relationships'[48] with a disinclination to draw too close to any one group continued to represent the original thrust of the nonaligned policy.[49]

[43] See Strobe Talbott, *Engaging India: Diplomacy, Democracy, and the Bomb*, (Washington D.C.: The Brookings Institution Press, 2004)
[44] Ibid., p. 4
[45] The BJP Party Manifesto for 1998 categorically mentions, "The BJP rejects the notion of nuclear apartheid and will actively oppose attempts to impose a hegemonistic nuclear regime by means of CTBT, FMCR and MTCR. We will not be dictated to by anybody in matters of security requirements and in the exercise of the nuclear option." It also states in the same document that it seeks to, "Place relations with the USA on a more even keel based on mutual respect, shared values and congruence of interests. We expect the United States to be more sensitive to India's security and economic interests". Accessed on 2 February, 2018. http://www.bjp.org/documents/manifesto/bjp-election-manifesto-1998/chapter-7
[46] Ibid., p. 5
[47] Constantino Xavier questions the feasibility of remaining 'negatively autonomous', i.e. 'isolated from an increasing interdependent global economy', in Constantino Xavier, "India's Strategic Traditions and Options in the Indo-Pacific Security System", *School of Advanced International Studies,* Johns Hopkins University, Washington DC, Nação e Defesa, 2013.
[48] Rajesh Basrur, "Modi's Foreign Policy Fundamentals: A Trajectory Unchanged", *International Affairs* **93**: 1 (2017) 7–26; doi: 10.1093/ia/iiw006, p. 14
[49] Eswaran Sridharan, the academic director of the University of Pennsylvania Institute for the Advanced Study of India writes that "the most probable future direction for India over the next five to ten years is a continuation of the gradual shift towards the United States and its allies and partners, but still within the context of a search for strategic autonomy via strategic partnerships and without full realignment." Review: *International Affairs* on India's Rise and Foreign Policy, (Volume 93, Number 1, January 2017)

In order to attain a healthy organic state, Kautilya emphasizes the importance of facilitating enhancement of each element of the state (*prakriti*) to reach its respective 'excellences'. "The (king) ever diligent, should take steps right beforehand against that cause because of which he might suffer a calamity of the constituents". [KA VIII, 5, 21][50] . "Enhancing state capacity in all respects must, therefore, be recognized as a basic element of India's strategic conception."[51] Some of the landmark events in the bilateral relationship between India and the US in the period 1998-2014 should be seen in this context.

Realistically, optimization of the *prakritis* through internal balancing to meet the rapidly growing demands of an expanding economy seemed like a rather dubious proposition. "India's energy consumption had almost doubled since 2000 and the potential for further rapid growth was enormous."[52] A well-managed expansion of energy supply alone could feed the country's drive towards urbanization, modernization, better infrastructure and expansion in manufacturing and thereby improve the lot of 1.3 billion Indians. Domestic production had evidently strained to keep pace; reflected in the widening gap between production and consumption of oil as one example (Figure 1). India ranked 81 position in overall energy self-sufficiency at 66% in 2014.[53] "Its reliance on oil imports rises above 90% by 2040, requiring constant vigilance as to the implications for energy security."[54]



Figure. 1

[50]Kangle, *The Kautilya's Arthashastra Part II*, p. 404
[51] *NonAlignment 2.0,* p. 11
[52] "India Energy Outlook", *World Energy Outlook Special Report 2015*, International Energy Agency, France. Accessed on 5 February 2018
https://www.iea.org/publications/freepublications/publication/IndiaEnergyOutlook_WEO2015.pdf
[53] "India-Country Energy Profile", International Energy Agency. Accessed at
http://energyatlas.iea.org/#!/profile/WORLD/IND
[54] Ibid., p. 14

In the defence sector too, "Indian military spending, which in 1998 stood at US$13.95 billion, rose thereafter to a hefty US$42.95 billion in 2015, with India topping the list of global arms importers for the period 2010–2014."[55] In the nuclear realm, the chronic fuel shortages were eased only after India became a party to the Nuclear Suppliers' Group agreement in 2008, allowing access not only to technology and expertise but also reactor parts and uranium. "The average plant load factor rose to over 80% in 2013 (DAE, 2015)"[56], from as low as 40% in 2008, as a consequence. This was made partially possible by the US-India Joint statement of 18 July 2005 (on the occasion of Prime Minister Manmohan Singh's visit to Washington) where the US took upon itself to "persuade its 'friends and allies' to change the guidelines to permit full civil-nuclear cooperation with India."[57]

Therefore, collaboration between the US and India arose in the context of "intense 'requirement for adequate and affordable energy supplies to sustain its (India's) accelerating economic growth rate and as recognition of its growing technological prowess."[58] The process called 'Next Steps in Strategic Partnership' (NSSP), signed between New Delhi and Washington in 2004 had initiated a phased effort to ease restrictions on India's access to US technology in four critical areas: "civilian nuclear activities, civilian space programmes, high-technology trade, and missile defense."[59] April 2005 saw an Indo-US Energy Dialogue that encompassed the entire spectrum of energy options ranging from oil and gas to coal, alternative fuels and civilian nuclear energy. The 'crowning achievement' was the signing of the Indo-US civilian nuclear cooperation in October 2008, which legalized the transfer of 'nuclear-related technology, fuel, reactors, and other equipments' from American companies to India.[60]

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[55] For 1998 spending, see International Institute of Strategic Studies (IISS), *The Military Balance, 2000–01* (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2000), p. 299 (constant 1999 prices); for 2015 spending, see IISS, *The Military Balance, 2016* (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2016), p. 486 (current prices); for import ranking, see Stockholm International Peace Research Institute, *SIPRI Yearbook 2015* (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2015).

[56] Ibid., p. 37

[57] Saran, *How India Sees the World,* p. 228

[58] "Implementation of the India-United States Joint Statement of July 18, 2005: India's Separation Plan", March 07, 2006, accessed on 5 February, 2018, http://mea.gov.in/bilateral documents.htm?dtl/6059/Implementation+of+the+IndiaUnited+States+Joint+Statement+of+July+18+2005+Indias+Separation+Plan

[59] "India and United States Successfully Complete Next Steps in Strategic Partnership", July 18, 2005, Ministry of External Affairs, Government of India. Accessed at http://mea.gov.in/bilateral-documents.htm?dtl/6789/India+and+United+States+Successfully+Complete+Next+Steps+in+Strategic+Partnership

[60] Hagerty, "The Indo-US Entente: Committed Relationships or 'Friends with Benefits'", in Ganguly ed., *Engaging the World,* p. 139

The deal also achieved for India its objective to have a wide set of partners to pursue nuclear commerce and high-technology trade. Russia and France showed keenness to engage in nuclear commerce only when the US had made the unilateral exception for India.[61] Also important, though less emphasized, is the offshoot of the deal that India has concluded "bilateral agreements with Argentina, Australia, Canada, France, Kazakhstan, Namibia and Mongolia covering all aspects of civilian nuclear cooperation, including the supply of nuclear fuel."[62] Therefore, mindful of Kautilya's caution of dependence on an ally for crucial help, India has managed to expand its resources which feed its growing economic and defence requirements.

Optimization of resource capabilities while retaining strategic autonomy is also seen in India's diversification of arms imports.[63] India rejected the Boeing and Lockheed-Martin bids in April 2011, and decided on the French Dassault Rafale in January 2012.[64] "Despite the rapid growth in defence cooperation with the United States, India has been careful about signing foundational agreements which would strengthen military cooperation with America."[65] Also important is the criteria for the selection of the suppliers – generous offset deals.[66] Offsets have become a major import strategy to receive technology that cannot be grown indigenously, thereby boosting domestic capabilities. In a similar vein, in June 2012, India and the US launched the Defense Trade and Technology Initiative, which would move the defence trade from a "vendor/buyer relationship to one of partnership in co-developing and co-producing defense systems."[67] In this

[61] See Saran, How India Sees the World, pp. 223-224.
[62] Ibid., pp. 224-225.
[63] The Indian government is not very open about its imports, but made a public statement in 2014 on how much it had imported from various suppliers between 2011 and 2013. They say that the USA exported to India for 5.3 billion USD (37.9 percent of all imports), while Russia exported for 4.1 billion USD (29.4 percent); France for 1.9 billion USD (14.0 percent); and Israel for 547 million USD (3.9 percent). In total, India imported for 13.9 billion USD. Rahul Bedi, "US overtakes Russia as India's main supplier", *IHS Jane's 360*, August 12, 2014, accessed at http://www.janes.com/article/41867/us-overtakes-russia-as-india-s-main-materiel-supplier.
[64] K.A. Kronstadt and S. Pinto, "India-US Security Relations: Current Engagement", Congressional Research Service Report for Congress no. R42823, Washington DC, 13 November, in Ganguly ed., Engaging the World, 2016.
[65] Basrur, "Modi's Foreign Policy Fundamentals", p. 19
[66] Offsets can be defined as provisions to an import agreement, between an exporting foreign company, or possibly a government acting as intermediary, and an importing public entity, that oblige the exporter to undertake activities in order to satisfy a second objective of the importing entity, distinct from the acquisition of the goods and/or services that form the core transaction. https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Offset_agreement
[67] Department of Defense, 'Media Roundtable with Deputy Secretary of Defense Carter in Delhi, India', 18 September, in Hagerty, "The Indo-US Entente", p. 146.

context, Indo-US bond has been quite appropriately referred to as an 'entente'; substantially different from an alliance.[68]

While the above narrative proves 'US as a quasi-ally held at arm's length diplomatically and militarily as part of a new non-alignment'[69] by India, the reason for strategic convergence between the two countries is quite in order. The key imperatives from the side of the Americans were – bilateral trade, counter-terrorism and regional and maritime security. US needed access to air bases, intelligence cooperation and refueling facilities for counter-terrorist operations in South Asia. Perhaps, the most prominent among the reasons was the challenge of a rising China. The US Department of Defence leaders were upfront about their concern over China's growing power and saw India as an important actor in the regional and global balance of power.[70] The 2011 Obama administration's announcement to '*rebalance'* the US diplomatic and military posture toward the Asia-Pacific region speaks for itself. (emphasis added)

For India, apart from the burgeoning energy and defence needs discussed earlier, a range of global issues needed joint tackling, and most significantly, the threatening rise of an ambitious China could deftly be countered by deepening ties with the US. The emergence of China therefore, in a way, helped the strategic interests of India and the US to converge. The US Department of Defense's (DoD) January 2012 "strategic guidance" highlighted "balance of military capability and presence" and a "rules-based international order" as the prerequisites for peace and stability in the 'Asia-Pacific' region. "The United States is also investing in a long-term strategic partnership with India to support its ability to serve as a regional economic anchor and provider of security in the broader Indian Ocean region."[71] The DoD specifically included coastal South Asia and the Indian Ocean Region (IOR) as part of the geographical scope of 'Asia-Pacific'. Similarly, in the Indian case, successive political leaders have identified the arc from the Persian Gulf to the Straits of Malacca as a "legitimate area of interest . . . for the first quarter of the 21st century."[72] Clearly, with an estimated 50% of world container traffic and 70%

[68]Hagerty, "The Indo-US Entente", p. 140
[69] Kanti Bajpai, Saira Basit, V. Krishnappa (eds.), *India's Grand Strategy: History, Theory, Cases,* (New Delhi: Routledge, 2014), p. 26
[70] See Saran, *How India Sees the World*, p. 202
[71] "Sustaining US Global Leadership: Priorities for 21st Century Defense", US Department of Defense, January 2012. Accessed on 5 february 2018 at http://archive.defense.gov/news/Defense_Strategic_Guidance.pdf
[72] The quote is taken from the Indian Maritime Doctrine (April 2004), p. 56. The Ministry of Defence identifies the same region as "India's security environment." Refer to Annual Report 2006– 2007 (Delhi: Ministry of Defence,

of ship-borne oil and petroleum transit, the Indian Ocean is a highly coveted and therefore contested region.

The three 'excellences' of an 'ally' – 'great', 'able to mobilize quickly', and 'not having a separate interest' fit the case of the Unites States well for the period 1998-2014. "India's partnerships with the US are not alliances but they can become multi-faceted and have tremendous strategic value."[73] While the above discussion may amply prove the rationale for closer ties with the US, India has shown care not to choose a definite side in an unpredictable Sino-US relationship. It has walked a tightrope to maximize interest without incurring the risks of a belligerent China or a coercive US.

The next section will deal with India's bilateral relations with China in the period 1998-2014.

China

The inter-state relations in Kautilya's geostrategic schema (*mandala*) are essentially dynamic and adaptive to changes in relative power equations and threat dispositions of the constituent elements. 'A neighbour who is otherwise inimical can be categorized differently' depending upon the 'complexities and uncertainties' that are inherent in any relationship.[74] Notwithstanding this, it can be stated with some certainty that China, in the period of this study, fits into a 'middle king' category of Kautilya's *mandala*. "One with territory immediately proximate to those of the enemy and the conqueror (*vijigisu*), capable of helping them when they are united or disunited and of suppressing them when they are disunited, is the middle king."[75] (KA VI, 2, 21)

This definition of a 'middle king' is appropriate on a number of counts and illuminates the dynamics of the bilateral relationship between India and China. Territorially, China is proximate to both India and Pakistan and its 'capability' to help Pakistan has, in fact, added soreness to the India-Pakistan relationship resulting in a continued and bitter disunity; thereby increasing its

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2007), p. 2. For similar language from Prime Minister Manmohan Singh, see "Prime Minister's Address," Speech presented at the Combined Commanders Conference, New Delhi, October 26, 2004, accessed on January 12, 2010. Brajesh Mishra, then-National Security Advisor to Prime Minister Atal Bihari Vajpayee, also identified a similar zone of interest in "Global Security: An Indian Perspective," Speech presented at the National Defence Institute, Lisbon, 13 April 2000, accessed on January 12, 2010.

[73] Mrs. Nirupama Rao, former Foreign Secretary, Expert Interview, 1st June, 2018

[74] Mr. Shyam Saran, Former Foreign Secretary, Expert Interview, 6 February 2018

[75] Kangle, *The Kautilya's Arthashastra Part II*, p. 318

chances of 'suppressing' them if it so wants. Further, Rangarajan contends that although the 'middle king' is not directly involved in the conflict between the conqueror and the enemy, it is capable of influencing the course of their conflict.

Optimistically, there also exists a chance of receiving help from the 'middle king'. Although India qualifies as the 'weak king' (vis-à-vis China) in the *mandala*, there could be exceptions to the general policy guidance "that a king shall make peace with an equally powerful king or a stronger king but wage war against a weaker."[76] (KA VII, 3, 2) It is worthwhile to suppose China as the 'conqueror' and analyze the conditions under which it would help its weaker neighbour - India. According to Kautilyan percepts, it would maintain peaceful ties only if (a) "its interest was being furthered in doing so; when the degree of progress is the same in pursuing peace and waging war, peace is to be preferred" (b) one or more of its constituent elements was weak or suffering from a 'calamity' and (c) India did not portray a threatening disposition; "peace is also the preferred choice when the relative power equation between a king and his enemy is not likely to change as a result of his action, irrespective of whether both make progress, both decline or both maintain the status quo."[77] (KA VII, 1, 23, 27, 30, 31)

As for India (weaker king), Kautilya envisages a practical approach to foreign policy. "One should neither submit spinelessly nor sacrifice oneself in foolhardy valour. It is better to adopt such policies as would enable one to survive and live to fight another day."[78] (KA VII, 15, 13-20, KA XII, 1, 1-9) Also important in the relations between India and China is the dictum that "When the benefits accruing to kings under a treaty, irrespective of their status as the weaker, equal or stronger king, is fair to each one, peace by agreement shall be the preferred course; if the benefits are to be distributed unfairly, war is preferable."[79] (KA VII, 8, 34)

It is in this broad framework that India's policies towards China in the period 1998-2014 need to be examined. It can be stated beyond doubt that both India and China have risen substantially since the turn of the century and have contributed significantly to the dubbing of the 21st century

[76] L. N. Rangarajan, *Kautilya: The Arthashastra,* (New Delhi: Penguin Books, 1992), p. 543.
[77] Ibid., p. 547
[78] Ibid., p. 544
[79] Ibid., p. 541

as the 'Pacific century'.[80] The shift of the centre of gravity in international relations to the Asia-Pacific has created both opportunities and challenges for the bilateral relations. On the one hand, the imperatives of economic globalization, complex web of interdependence and collective security have caused a convergence of strategic interests of India and China, in the realms of nonconventional threats, climate change, and open international economic order. On the other, the long standing border dispute and the sharpening balance-of-power politics in the region qualifies India's relationship with China as a 'protracted rivalry'.[81] This inherent paradox of cooperation and conflict has been variably described as 'walking on two legs'.[82]

From the Indian side, the grand strategic preference ranking that is deduced from Kautilya's *Arthashastra*: accommodationist first, defensive second, and offensive last, has been broadly adhered to. There is a slight but notable deviation in terms of the simultaneous use of policies to reach the desired objective.[83] India's rationale for a conciliatory policy preference in some of the key areas of its bilateral relationship with China is examined in the next section.

Border Dispute

The Kautilyan guiding principle in foreign policy conduct draws from the intrinsic connection between the comprehensive national power (*saptanga* theory) and the 'six methods of foreign policy' (*sadgunya* theory)[84]. 'The conqueror (*vijigisu*) should employ the six measures of policy with due regard for his power' (KA, VII, 3, 1). The text clearly states that, "When in decline as compared to the enemy, the ruler should make peace."[85] (KA, VII, 1, 3)

Further, a peaceful resolution of the territorial conflict would help ensure a stable neighbourhood, an important requisite for consolidating gains of an expanding economy. It is

[80] Mark Borthwick, *The Pacific Century: The Emergence of Modern Pacific-Asia*, (Boulder, Colorado: Westview, 1998)
[81] Basrur, "Modi's Foreign Policy Fundamentals", p. 20
[82] Shyam Saran's Review of Raja Mohan's book - *Modi's World: Expanding India's Sphere of Influence,* (Harper Collins, India, 2015)
'A sharp analysis of India's challenges in navigating a rapidly transforming regional and international landscape under Narendra Modi.'
http://indianexpress.com/article/lifestyle/books/book-review-modis-world-expanding-indias-sphere-of-influence/
Published:June 19, 2015 10:17 pm
[83] Shyam Saran, Expert Interview, "Overall, India's policy towards China and Pakistan over the last several years has been a mix of a policy of accommodationist and deterrence".
[84] This has been discussed at length in a previous chapter.
[85] Mitra and Liebig, *Kautilya's Arthashastra: The Classical Roots of Modern Politics in India*, 2017, p. 108

here that the interests of both China and India converged and the 'breakthrough' in the 'boundary logjam' was affected during the first-ever Joint Declaration between India and China which was signed during the visit of Prime Minister Vajpayee in 2003.[86] During this visit, the two sides agreed to appoint special representatives 'to explore the perspective of the overall bilateral relationship the framework of a boundary settlement.' Additionally, "India's recognition of the 'Tibet Autonomous Region as part of the territory of the People's Republic of China', without gaining similar recognition of Sikkim as part of India led to a fairly controversial debate in India."[87]

The purpose here is not to explore the various dimensions of the complex boundary issue but to highlight the efforts made to resolve the dispute "through peaceful and friendly consultations."[88] "The India-China Joint Working Group and the India-China Diplomatic and Military Expert Group continued to work under the agreements of 1993 and 1996." [89] The Special Representatives on the boundary question too maintained their consultations. Clearly, "The common interests of the two sides outweighed their differences."[90] Prime Minister Vajpayee in an address to the Combined Commander's Conference in November 2003 highlighted two points about the boundary entanglement with China. The first was about pragmatic decisions to affect a final resolution to the border dispute and the second that the final solution would free the financial and military energies to more productive uses; both points echoed Kautilyan prudence.

India was also careful about not holding other areas of cooperation hostage to the boundary dispute.[91] In order to promote the "sustainable socio-economic development of India and China"

[86] Alka Acharya, *China and India: Politics of Incremental Engagement,* (New Delhi: Har-Anand Publications, , 2008), p. 130

[87] China describes the merger of Sikkim into the Indian Union as 'India's Illegal Annexation'. Till 2005, China was the only state which did not accept Sikkim as part of India.

[88] Article 1, 'Reaffirming the Declaration on Principles for Relations and Comprehensive Cooperation between India and China', signed on 23 June 2003, Ministry of External Affairs, Government of India.

[89] Ministry of External Affairs, Annual Report 1999-2000, "Outlook for Future Relations". The Seventh Meeting of the India-China Expert Group of Diplomatic & Military Officials, a subgroup of the JWG, was held in New Delhi on November 24, 1999. At these meetings, both sides reiterated their commitment to the maintenance of peace and tranquillity in accordance with the Agreement on the Maintenance Peace & Tranquillity along the Line of Actual Control in the India-China Border Areas (1993) and the Agreement on Confidence Building Measures in the Military Field along the Line of Actual Control in the India-China Border Areas (1996).

[90] 'Declaration on Principles for Relations and Comprehensive Cooperation Between the People's Republic of China and the Republic of India', 23 June 2003.

[91] "The differences on the boundary question should not be allowed to affect the overall development of bilateral relations" – 'Agreement between the Government of the Republic of India and the Government of the People's

the leaders committed themselves to pursuing a 'ten-pronged strategy' which spanned across wide areas like "institutional linkages, commercial and economic exchanges, defence cooperation, trans-border connectivity, science and technology, people-to-people exchanges and cooperation on regional and international stage."[92] The practice of setting the border aside was initiated during Rajiv Gandhi in 1988, greatly invigorated during Vajpayee's visit in 2003, and gathered momentum during the 2005 agreement on political parameters and guiding principles for border settlement.

The signing in January 2012 of the Agreement for the Establishment of a Working Mechanism for Consultation and Coordination on India – China Border Affairs is the latest addition in the series of border agreements. "The peaceful resolution of the face off that took place in April 2013 in Ladakh underlined the strength and utility of the mechanisms in place."[93] India succeeded in getting the Chinese to vacate the Depsang area within three weeks, unlike the Sumdorongchu incident (1986) which had resulted in a seven year standoff.[94]

The conciliatory approach on the border question earned India dividends in a number of fields. The peaceful border allowed India to optimize its resource capabilities and thereby enhance its power aggregate. By avoiding war, India was able to engage a mightier neighbour in areas of common interest which proved mutually beneficial. And importantly, it managed to 'keep peace without ceding ground'.[95] Cognizant of its relative position, India did not try to match the PLA's strength weapon for weapon, acquisition for acquisition, or dollar for dollar'.[96] Instead, recourse to diplomatic efforts was maintained with positive outcomes.

Economic Engagement

India's relationship with China in the period of the study is marked by a "rise in economic engagement; trade between the two countries has risen from US$791 million in 1991 to

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Republic of China on the Political Parameters and Guiding Principles for the Settlement of the India-China Boundary Question', 11 April 2005, Ministry of External Affairs, Government of India.

[92] "Joint Declaration of the Republic of India and the People's Republic of China", 21 November 2006, Ministry of External Affairs, Government of India. Accessed at http://www.mea.gov.in/bilateral documents.htm?dtl/6363/Joint+Declaration+by+the+Republic+of+India+an

[93] India-Foreign Relations 2012, accessed on 1 February 2018, p. xv. Accessed at https://www.mea.gov.in/Images/pdf/India-foreign-relation-2012.pdf

[94] See Menon, *Choices*, p. 23

[95] Ibid., p. 25

[96] Ibid.

US$72.22 billion in 2015."[97] "Despite the overlay of the border dispute, bilateral trade has expanded sixty seven times between 1998 and 2012, and China is India's largest trading partner in goods."[98] The Neo-liberalists would argue that the complex interdependence of trade and economic activities in a dyadic relationship renders force ineffectual and impractical. Rivalry and violence is seen as counterproductive to sustained economic liberalization. The Realists, on the other hand, see the deep trade linkages between states that remain enmeshed in a latent geopolitical rivalry, as a source of exacerbating tensions. However, whether growing economic interdependence can lead to political conciliation remains a critical debate. Kautilya did not think it would.

For Kautilya, the importance of economy is paramount. It is the basis of the ruler's exercise of power both internally and externally; a prosperous economy generates profits which alone can sustain a strong army. 'The administrator should attend to the fort, the country, mines, irrigation works, forests, herds and trade-routes (as the main source of revenue).'[99]Additionally, 'land-routes' and 'water-routes' are referred to as 'trade-routes' which together with other sources constitute the 'corpus of income'.[100]

Also, in Kautilya's political anthropology, it is *artha* (material and political benefits) which is given priority over *dharma* (norm, conformity) and *kama* (pleasure). Therefore, only the material well-being of the people can ensure moral behaviour and political contentment which together lead to sustained political order. Therefore, by Kautilyan logic, trade is seen as a 'vehicle for increasing national wealth' than as a device to attenuate 'power-political rivalry'.[101] The divide between economic interdependence and security can be straddled as long as the two do not come in direct conflict with each other and trade remains mutually beneficial. A more assertive Chinese policy on the border since 2008 despite burgeoning bilateral trade is testament to the fact that trading relations are not a source of collective security. Prime Minister Manmohan Singh, in the context of the Depsang incident, clearly pointed out to Chinese Premier Li Keqiang

[97] For the 1991 figure, see IMF, *Direction of Trade Statistics Yearbook 1995* (Washington DC, 1995), p. 242; and for 2014, see IMF, *Direction of Trade Statistics* (Washington, DC: International Monetary Fund) http://data.imf.org/regular.aspx?key=61013712.
[98] Menon, *Choices*, p. 21
[99] Kangle, *The Kautilya's Arthashastra* Part II, p. 75
[100] Ibid.
[101] Ashley J. Tellis and Michael Wills (eds.), "Trade, Interdependence, and Security", *Strategic Asia* 2006-07, The National Bureau of Asian Research, p. 9

during his visit to India in 2013 that "If peace is disturbed, it impacts all other areas of the relationship."[102] Therefore, bilateral economic ties, while profitable, need not soften political stances on territorial disputes.

Also notable in Prime Minister's meeting with Premier Le Keqiang was his appeal to address the lopsided trade flow between India and China. China has had a clear head-start in opening up the economy and tying up the scarce resources with other nations to meet the growing needs. The growth trajectory of the two countries has only widened by the end of the period of study and trends in bilateral trade have given rise to grave concerns.[103]

Table-1; Trade Statistics between India and China (*Value in USD Million)*

Year	Import	Export	Total Trade	Trade Deficit
I	II	III	IV	V
2011-12	55,313.58	18,076.55	73,390.13	37,237.03
2012-13	37,237.03	13,534.88	65,783.21	38,713.45
2013-14	51,049.01	14,829.31	65,878.32	36,219.70

(Source; DGCI&S)[104]

In the context of the trade deficit, India's ambassador to China drew attention to the issue of market access in China. On India's part, he thought that 'the benefits of Chinese investment which could expand the manufacturing sector required objective consideration'.[105] The document *NonAlignment 2.0* which encapsulates the thinking of Indian strategic elite proffers economic 'levers', as it were, to deal with the trade asymmetry. Limiting Chinese penetration, especially in the infrastructure market, or allowing access with conditions which promote Indian interest is

[102] Indrani, Bagchi, "Peace Raises Ladakh Incursion with Li, says Peace Integral to Ties", *The Times of India*, 20 May , 2013, accessed at https://timesofindia.indiatimes.com/india/PM-raises-Ladakh-incursion-with-Li-says-peace-integral-to-ties/articleshow/20141952.cms, on 12 February, 2018

[103] The issue of trade deficit with China has been raised by India with China from time to time. At the 9th meeting of the Ministerial level *India-China Joint Group on Economic Relations*, Trade Science and Technology (JEG), held in August 2012, in New Delhi, India had raised the issue of growing trade deficit with China.

[104] Press Information Bureau, Government of India, Ministry of Commerce & Industry, Trade Between India and China, 13-August-2014 13:32 IST. Accessed at http://pib.nic.in/newsite/PrintRelease.aspx?relid=108614

[105] Excerpted from the text of the "Keynote Speech" delivered by the Indian Ambassador in China (Subrahmanyam Jaishankar) at the ORF-China Foreign Affairs University Conference in Beijing on 19 August, 2013.

suggested.[106] Therefore, "economic prosperity (the 'tide that lifts all boats')"[107] is seen in both absolute and relative terms.

'Economic statecraft', as part of a wider array of foreign policy instruments uses economic measures along with diplomatic and military and its success depends on "the future expectations of policy makers, the nature of the military balance, and the form that economic interdependence takes."[108] Ultimately, drawing on early 'Nehruvian realism', "the art of conducting the foreign affairs of a country lies in finding out what is most advantageous to the country". [109] The framework for the peaceful settlement of the border dispute and economic engagement with China, in Kautilya's reckoning, should be seen as manifestations of the policy of '*samdhi'* (making peace). It is defined as entering into an agreement with specific conditions i.e. concluding a treaty; importantly, "it enables a king to enjoy the fruits of his own acquisition and promote the welfare and development of his state without intervening in any conflict in his neighbourhood."[110] "Expanding economic relations has also provided a channel of cooperation, as for example, in India's securing oilfields in Central Asia in collaboration with China."[111]

It is these considerations that justify the paradox of Indian diplomacy – 'an ability to work on areas of shared interest with nations with whom it might otherwise have some differences'.[112] China may be an adversary but making it an enemy will not serve India.[113]

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[106] *NonAlignment 2.0*, p. 14

[107] See P. C. Chidambaram, 'India empowered to me is', in A View from the Outside: Why Good Economics Works for Everyone (London: Penguin, 2007).

[108] Michael Mastanduno, "Economic Statecraft", in Steve Smith, Amelia Hadfield, and Tim Dunnel (eds.), *Foreign Policy: Theories, Actors, Cases*, (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2012), p. 204

[109] Dr. Sanjaya Baru (Director for Geo-economics and Strategy, IISS), the keynote presenter, at a panel discussion and conversation on "The Manmohan Doctrine and Narendra Modi's Foreign Policy" hosted by ORF on June 4, 2014.

[110]Rangarajan, *Kautilya: The Arthashastra*, p. 548

[111] Recently, however, India has taken a competitive stance in its global approach to energy security with the establishment of a sovereign fund for the acquisition of energy assets abroad. See Sujay Mehdudia, 'India plans "sovereign fund" to seek energy assets abroad', The Hindu, 1 April 2010.

[112] Excerpt from the keynote speech delivered by the Indian Ambassador in China (Subrahmanyam Jaishankar) at the ORF-China Foreign Affairs University Conference in Beijing on 19 August, 2013.

[113] Nirupama Rao, "China May Be an Adversary, But Making It an Enemy Will Not Serve India", *The Wire*, 6 October 2017, accessed at https://thewire.in/184678/india-china-relations-adversary-enemy/, on 12 February 2018

Multilateral Fora

Trends of economic globalization, regional integration, and multi-polarization have led to the development of a number of multilateral systems with the objective to institutionalize a stable architecture for the conduct of inter-state affairs. More recently, India has shown increasing readiness to participate in these fora for a variety of reasons. Chief among them is the interest to cooperate on economic, commercial, political and strategic fronts to further common interests globally.

The turn of the century saw economic expansion, good governance, physical connectivity, ecological and environmental protection, counter-terrorism, energy conservation and regional development high on the global agenda. Additionally, and also importantly, it allows Indian diplomacy to "develop a diversified network of relations with several major powers to compel China to exercise restraint in its dealings with India, while simultaneously avoiding relationships that go beyond conveying a certain threat threshold in Chinese perceptions."[114] Therefore, India's proclivity to multilateral groupings serves a dual purpose.

The chief objective of India's foreign policy is to "create an external environment that promotes the fulfilment of our economic growth targets and ambitions and promotes a free, fair and open world trading system" which necessitates a stable neighbourhood, balanced relationship with major powers and a "durable and equitable multilateral global order."[115] Therefore, the use of multilateralism is Kautilyan pragmatism to advance national interests and not merely to promote our values.[116]

The multilateral discourse in India-China relations is marked by both competition and collaboration. At the regional level in organizations like SAARC, ASEAN[117] and SCO,[118]

[114] *NonAlignment 2.0*, p. 14

[115] Address by Foreign Secretary Smt. Nirupama Rao at South Asia Initiative, Harvard University on "India's Global Role". Boston, September 20, 2010.

[116] Shivshankar Menon had commented that "We seem to use multilateralism for our values and bilateralism for our interests", in his lecture on "Strategic Culture and IR Studies in India" at the 3rd International Studies Convention held at JNU Convention Centre, New Delhi Dec. 11, 2013. http://www.mea.gov.in/Speeches-Statements.htm?dtl/22632/Address+by+National+Security+Advisor+Shiv+Shankar+Menon+on+Strategic+Culture+and+IR+Studies+in+India+at+the+3rd+International+Studies+Convention+held+at+JNU+Convention+Centre+New+Delhi

[117] China has an observer status in SAARC and has strategic partnerships with ASEAN. China appointed its first resident Ambassador to ASEAN and established its Mission to ASEAN in Jakarta in September 2012.

resource rivalry and struggle for supremacy are evident. At the trans-regional level, BRICS and the BASIC group at the climate summit, addressing the concerns of a multi-polar world vis-à-vis Western influence is prominent, and at the global level, the UN, the IMF and the World Bank, it is the concern of developing countries which marks the narrative. In practice, this translates into increasing engagement with China which helps defuse its strategic challenge multilaterally.

These institutions also ensure regular participation by India and China even when their positions are cleaved in a zero-sum manner on some issues. Outstanding differences persist between the two countries on issues like India's seat in the UN Security Council or the Nuclear Supplier's Group (NSG), the China Pakistan Economic Corridor (CPEC) passing through Pakistan occupied Kashmir and China's refusal to condemn terrorists like Masood Azhar. Also notable is India taking exception to China's connectivity drive (Belt and Road Initiative) on the grounds of 'sovereignty and territorial integrity'.[119] This signals a reiteration of the principle that gains of multilateralism cannot overshadow threats to national sovereignty.

Military Preparedness

A peaceful resolution of the border dispute, increasing trade linkages, and multilateral bonding fit well into India's accommodationist grand strategy. The rationale for the employment of these strategies, both in absolute and relative terms have served India well in the period of study. However, the rising economic, strategic and military clout of China nullifies any assurance of interdependence making violent conflicts in future irrelevant. The increasing incidents of incursions on the border are testament to this. Therefore, to achieve 'transformative national growth and development internally', a 'robust defence strategy' to deal with security challenges becomes imperative.[120] It is in this context that India has pursued a simultaneous and continuous exercise of military modernization as a means to build the nation's defence capabilities.

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[118] India became a full member of the Shanghai Cooperation Organization (SCO) at the Astana Summit on June 8-9, 2017.

[119] Official Spokesperson's response to a query on participation of India in OBOR/BRI Forum, May 13, 2017, Ministry of External Affairs, Government of India. http://www.mea.gov.in/media-briefings.htm?dtl/28463/Official_Spokespersons_response_to_a_query_on_participation_of_India_in_OBORBRI_Forum, accessed on 14th February 2018

[120] Ministry of Defence, Government of India – Annual Report 2013-14**,** accessed at **https://mod.gov.in/sites/default/files/AnnualReport2013-14-ENG.pdf**

Danda (military might) is one of the seven *prakritis* (constituent elements) mentioned in Kautilya's *saptanga* theory. The sum total of the state factors constitutes national power. It is the sixth (ally being the last) in order and the only one that relates to use of force. 'When one has an army, one's ally remains friendly, or (even) the enemy becomes friendly'. However, in a work that can well be performed either by the army or the ally, advantage comes from their strength (and) the attainment of suitable place and time for their own type of warfare'.[121] (KA, VIII, 1,56-57). Two very relevant aspects are highlighted in these sutras which are also seen to guide India's security strategy. The first encapsulates the essence of deterrence and the second that an ally's help can be sought in special circumstances. Importantly, it also comes with the warning that 'an ally looks to the securing of his own interest in the event of the growth of the enemy's power'.[122] India has strengthened its defence capabilities, both in terms of internal competence and by way of strategic partnerships to augment its native efforts. Also, it has relied on 'its own resources when it came to defending its core interests'.[123]

India's total defence budget for the year 2013-2014 stood at $36.3 billion[124] From 2007 to 2017, it plans to spend approximately $220 billion on defense modernization; $100 billion in the 11th Five-Year Plan (2007-2012) and another $120 billion in the ongoing 12th Five-Year Plan (2012-2017).[125] It is among the top five global military spenders and has the world's second largest standing military force. A comprehensive assessment of India's military modernization programme is beyond the scope of this chapter. However, efforts made to strengthen India's defence mechanism vis-à-vis China need due consideration.

According to Reports in 2013, the Indian Army's proposal for the new mountain strike corps against China received the government's in-principle clearance.[126] The new corps would cost

[121]Kangle, *The Kautilya's Arthashastra* Part II, p. 389
[122]Kangle, ibid., (KA, VIII, 1, 59)
'India was alarmed by Washington's vulnerability to Chinese financial surpluses (and its own deficits) during the 2008–2009 global financial crisis, which, for a time, led to a more conciliatory US approach to Beijing', in Rohan Mukherjee and David M. Malone, "Foreign Policy and Contemporary Security Challenges" *International Affairs* 87:1 (2011) 87–104, p. 101
[123] National Security Advisor Shivshankar Menon on "Strategic Culture and IR Studies in India" at the 3rd International Studies Convention held at JNU Convention Centre, New Delhi Dec. 11, 2013
[124] *The Military Balance* 2014, pp. 213-14
[125] CII-Deloitte Report 2010, pp. 5-6, in Harsh V. Pant ed., *Handbook of Indian Defence Policy: Themes, Structures and Doctrines*, (Routledge Inida, 2016), p. 79
[126] See Nitin Gokhale, "Why Mountain Strike Corps Along the India-China Border is Important?", *Vivekanand International Foundation*, 7 October 2013. Accessed on 14th February 2018,

over INR 65,000 crore, and would include fresh accretion of close to 89,000 soldiers and 400 officers. As far as infrastructural development is concerned, the Union Home Ministry chalked out a plan to build forty-eight more strategic roads along the China border.[127] In view of the growing capability of China in the Northern Border, a review of capabilities of the security forces was carried out and the government has "sanctioned the Capability Development Plan aimed at enhancing combat capabilities."[128] In the realm of overseas operations, Indian Navy ships Shakti, Ranvijay and Shivalik were deployed in the South China Sea, Sea of Japan and Western Pacific Ocean in July-August 2014. "The Indian Navy ships undertook two major exercises viz. INDRA 14 with the Russian Navy and Malabar 2014 with the US Navy."[129] This is important in the context of talks of 'theater switching' which means "using India's strength in the Indian Ocean, should China be tempted to use its strength on the land border."[130]

In the nuclear arena, India has successfully tested its Agni V missile capable of reaching Beijing and Shanghai to enhance its deterrent against China. Measures for nuclear parity are on to prevent nuclear coercion by China in light of its nuclear head-start.[131] Efforts are also apace to get the 'triad' in place to enhance second strike capability.

Some analysts have termed military India's preparedness matched by 'strategic restraint' as 'arming without aiming'.[132] They argue that "reticence in the use of force as an instrument of state policy has been the dominant political condition for Indian thinking on the military, including military modernization."[133] It can be argued that the change in material capabilities has only removed the obstacle of the lack of resources but has done little to change India's strategic posture. It is noted that defence acquisition patterns of the recent past have "moved away from threat-based approach to capacity-based approach."[134] The emphasis is on preparedness on the

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http://www.vifindia.org/article/2013/october/7/why-mountain-strike-corps-along-the-india-china-border-is-important

[127]" Indian Army is fully committed to meeting the security needs of the country and the requirement of development of infrastructure in the border areas", Annual Report 2014-2015, Ministry of Defence, Government of India, accessed at - http://ddpmod.gov.in/sites/default/files/Annual%20report%202014-2015.pdf

[128] Ibid., p. 22

[129] Ibid., p. 33

[130]Menon, Choices, p. 25

[131] Ali Ahmed, *National Security in a Liberal Lens*, (New Delhi: Cinnamon Teal Publishing 2016), p. 19

[132] See Stephen P. Cohen and Sunil Dasgupta, *Arming Without Aiming*, (New Delhi: Penguin, 2010)

[133] Ibid., p. 1

[134] Pant (ed.), *Handbook of Indian Defence Policy*, p. 86

entire spectrum of conflict to provide flexibility of military action to the political leadership to respond to different threat scenarios.[135]

In spite of the arms and capability build-up, "India's response to these multiple threats and challenges has always been restrained, measured and moderate; diplomacy remains India's chosen means but effective diplomacy has to be backed by credible military power."[136] "While the importance of defence and deterrence against aggression is overriding, offence and aggression have not traditionally figured in India's armoury except when her sovereignty and territorial integrity is under threat."[137]

India's policy towards China has been a mix of a policy of accommodation and deterrence; the essence lies in finding the right balance.[138] In the case of allies and enemies, success (should be sought) by a combination (of the means[139]) for, the means help each other. And in accordance with the seriousness and lightness of the dangers, there is *restriction* or *option* or *combination* (in the use of means). With this (means) only, not with another: this is *restriction*. With this (means) or with another: this is *option*. With this and with another: this is *combination*.[140] (emphasis added). India's strategy is marked by a 'combination' – "to keep the peace without ceding ground, building up preparedness steadily while pushing for a settlement of the boundary as a whole."[141] Through *realpolitik* balancing behaviour and multilateral participation, India has managed "defense assurance and goodwill at the same time."[142]

Pakistan

According to the precepts of Kautilya's *mandala* system, "one with immediately proximate territory' is the 'natural enemy'; one of equal birth is the enemy by birth; one opposed or in

[135] "India's defence strategy and policies aim at providing a peaceful environment by addressing the wide spectrum of conventional and non-conventional security challenges faced by the country", Annual Report 2014-2015, Ministry of Defence, Government of India
[136] Ministry of Defence, Government of India, Annual Report 2003-2004, p. 8, **https://mod.gov.in/sites/default/files/MOD-English2004.pdf**
[137]Mrs. Nirupama Rao, former Foreign Secretary, Expert Interview (email) 1st June 2018.
[138] Shyam Saran, Expert Interview.
[139] "Means" are the four '*upayas' – Sama*, *Dana*, *Bheda* and *Danda*.
[140] Kangle, *Kautilya: The Arthashastra Part II*, p. 431
[141]Menon, *Choices*, p. 25
[142]Deepa M. Ollapally, "India and the new "Asian" balance of power', *Strategic Analysis*, 22: 4, 1998, pp. 515— 526

opposition is the enemy made (for the time being)."[143] (KA, VI, 2, 19) The discourse on India-Pakistan relations suggest clearly that Pakistan is the natural enemy by birth and stands in clear opposition to India. While Pakistan has equally been heir to Kautilyan tradition of statecraft, its sense of identity post-partition and the calamities (*vyasanas*) that afflicted its leadership soon after, account for a very different narrative.[144]

In this dyadic relationship, unlike with China, India is the stronger power, though not outrightly. The growth trajectories of the two countries post-independence have charted different routes and by the turn of the century the gap between them has only widened, exacerbating Pakistan's insecurity and thereby concretizing the 'intractable rivalry'.[145] By a 2016 estimate, "India's economy is eight times larger than Pakistan's, and may be 15 times larger by 2030."[146] "GDP of India is 8.19 and 8.36 times more than Pakistan at nominal and Purchasing Power Parity (PPP) terms, respectively."[147]

India's military profile too has risen substantially. Between 1995 and 2015, India's defense budget grew, on average, over 5.5 percent annually.[148] While Pakistan uses more of its GDP (Gross Domestic Product) on defence than India, the absolute value spent by the former falls starkly short of that of the latter (Table 1.2).

[143]Kangle, *Kautilya: The Arthashastra Part II*, p. 318
[144] Hasan Saroor, "Making Sense of Pakistan's Identity Crisis", *The Hindu*, June 12, 2009 - "Nowhere is Pakistan's self-inflicted identity crisis more evident than in relation to India, according to Dr. Shaikh. Because of the nature of its creation — a secessionist state born in opposition to the Indian nationalist movement — Pakistan was lumped with an identity, defined in terms of what it was "not" (it was "not India") rather than what it was.
[145]S. Ganguly, *Conflict Unending: India-Pakistan Tensions since 1947*, (New Delhi: Oxford University Press, 2002)
[146] Shane Mason, *Military Budgets in India and Pakistan: Trajectories, Priorities and Risks*, (Washington D.C.: Stimson Centre, 2016), p. 7
[147] Source: International Monetary Fund, World Economic Outlook (April 2015), accessed at http://statisticstimes.com/economy/india-vs-pakistan-gdp.php, on 19th February, 2018
[148] "SIPRI Military Expenditure Database"

Defence Spends of India and Pakistan as Percentage of GDP

	India		Pakistan	
Year	GDP	Amount in USD (millions)	GDP	Amount in USD (millions)
2005	2.8%	35,718	3.7%	7,032
2006	2.5%	36,151	3.4%	7,081
2007	2.3%	41,003	3.1%	6,676
2008	2.6%	48,277	3.1%	6,879
2009	2.9%	48,470	3.1%	7,134
2010	2.7%	48,940	3.1%	7,520
2011	2.6%	48,766	3.3%	7,975
2013	2.4%	50,914	3.3%	8,655
2014	2.5%	51,116	3.3%	9,248

Source: SIPRI

Even if Pakistan spends more with the best possible economic performance, it will lag far behind and the 'conventional military balance will shift inexorably in India's favour'.[149] Despite India's evident military and economic superiority, Pakistan has managed to dilute India's conventional advantage through its nuclear weapons – quite appropriately termed as the 'great equalizer', and by taking recourse to 'asymmetric strategies' and 'external balancing'. Therefore, the effects of nuclear weapons, shifting geo-political landscape and the dynamics of globalization have added a degree of complexity to any credible comparison between the two states.

It is notable that despite the increasing gap in the material capabilities of the two countries in the period of study, India's policy preferences vis-à-vis Pakistan has not veered much from the Nehru years; the preferred solution to the Kashmir problem remains a negotiated one and use or threat of use of instruments of war has been mostly defensive.

[149] Mason, *Military Budgets in India and Pakistan*, p. 10

The complexities and uncertainties that mark the relationship between India and China pose a 'foreign policy challenge' for India to arrive at the 'the best mix of policies'.[150] The 'combined measures on the ground' are to be suitably matched by 'diplomatic initiatives'.[151] This simultaneous use of different strategies is reminiscent of a pre-Kautilyan conception of the methods of politics (*upayas*) which permeates the *Arthashastra.* "This is the group of four means. In that, each preceding one in the enumeration is the easier and lighter one. Conciliation (*saman*) is simple. Gifts (*dana*) are twofold being preceded by conciliation. Dissension (*bheda*) is three-fold, being preceded by conciliation and gifts. Use of force (*danda*) is four-fold, being preceded by conciliation, gifts and dissension." (KA, IX, 6, 56-61). The *upayas* are valid for both intra-state and inter-state relations and the '*sadgunyas'*, i.e. the six methods of foreign policy, are derived from the *upaya* cluster.[152]

This ordering of the upayas is in consonance with the grand strategic preference ranking. However, they are also used in a combination to reinforce each other and thereby help in effecting the strategy. They are the four methods through which states enforce their will against resistance. The following discussion will discern India's preference ranking through an assessment of key bilateral developments organized broadly under the four methods of politics (*upayas*).

(1) Saman

Kautilya defines "conciliation as five-fold: praising of merits, mention of relationship, pointing out mutual benefits, showing (advantages in) the future, and placing oneself at the (other's) disposal".[153] Appreciation of the qualities of the target group and drawing attention to a common relationship in terms of ethnicity, kinship, family and friend softens the stance and conditions conciliation. Also, the counterpart is made to believe that by following a certain path, interests of both parties are served equally. 'If this were done in this way, this will happen to us (both)' this raising of hope is showing (advantages in) the future.[154](KA, II, 10, 52) *Saman* is an important

[150] Ibid.
[151] Menon, *Choices*, p. 69
[152] Mitra and Liebig, *Kautilya's Arthashastra: The Classical Roots of Modern Politics in India*, 2016, p. 63

[153]Kangle, *Kautilya: The Arthashastra Part II,* p. 96

feature of diplomacy and the first of the four methods employed to enforce one's own will on the counterpart.

The trajectory of India-Pakistan relations is fairly described as 'dialogue-disruption-dialogue' in an unending cycle.[155] The disruption is usually caused by tensions at the border or by cross-border terror attacks and the initiative of dialogue, even after being at the receiving end, is mostly taken by India. In May 1998, when both countries became overtly nuclear, a Joint Statement of September 23, 1998 spoke of the need for a "peaceful settlement of all outstanding issues, including Jammu and Kashmir", for creating "an environment of durable peace and security".[156] The nuclear overhang necessitated the thrust on a stable and peaceful security environment in the composite dialogue process.

Prime Minister Vajpayee's initiative to visit Lahore was seen as a "path breaking attempt to reach out to Pakistan and permanently transform our relations."[157] Drawing a line of continuity 'right from the time of Jawaharlal Nehru', Vajpayee 'attempted to make a new beginning' to foster peaceful relations.[158] His visit to Lahore on the inaugural run of the Delhi-Lahore bus service on 20th February 1999, 'received public acclaim' and represented the "overwhelming desire of the peoples of our two countries to break from the confines of past contentions; those which have marred India-Pakistan ties, and to move their relationship to a brighter future."[159] Commitment to the promotion of the welfare of the people of South Asia through "accelerated economic growth, social progress and cultural development" was affirmed. Mutual benefits from the pursuance of a peaceful process and the prospects of a thriving future guided the principles of the Lahore Declaration.[160]

[155] Saran, *How India Sees the World*, p. 80
[156] Joint Statement, September 1998, Ministry of External Affairs. http://www.mea.gov.in/in-focus-article.htm?20157/Joint+Statement+September+1998. The Foreign Secretary of India, Shri K. Raghunath, and the Foreign Secretary of Pakistan, Mr. Shamshad Ahmad, met in New York on 23 rd September, 1998.
[157] Ministry of External Affairs, Government of India, Annual Report 1999-2000, *Outlook for Future Relations*.
[158] Prime Minister Shri Atal Bihari Vajpayee's "Independence Day Address", 2001.
[159] Foreign Affairs Record VOL XLV NO 2 February, 1999, p. 14
[160] Prime Minister Vajpayee and Pakistan Prime Minister Nawaz Sharif signed the Lahore Declaration on 21st day of February 1999. It can be accessed at http://mea.gov.in/in-focus-article.htm?18997/Lahore+Declaration+February+1999

However, "Pakistan responded by making incursions in Kargil which represented "not just an invasion of territory….was a betrayal of the trust" that was built in Lahore.[161] Despite this 'perfidy', Vajpayee extended his hand of friendship yet again by inviting Pakistan President Pervez Musharraf to Agra on 14-16 July, 2001. To further the 'commitment which was demonstrated in Simla and Lahore', Vajpayee called Pervez Musharraf to "walk the high road of peace and reconciliation."[162] Vajpayee highlighted the advantages of using the scarce resources of the two countries in 'improving the lives' of the people instead of spending 'on wars or preparing for wars'.[163] The Agra Summit was another quintessential method of conciliation through a composite dialogue process.

However, this too was reciprocated by the terror attacks on the State Legislature in Jammu and Kashmir (1 October, 2001) and the National Parliament in Delhi (13 December, 2001). This caused 'disruption' yet again in the process of 'dialogue'. In April 2003, in his famous 'Hand of Friendship' speech in Srinagar, Vajpayee extended India's friendship yet again on the condition that 'the hands should be extended from both the sides'.[164] Invoking the commonality between the two countries in 'nature and civilization', Vajpayee conveyed to Pakistan that 'the doors of our heart will always remain open'.[165]

Perhaps, the 'signal achievement' in the dialogue process was the two sides agreeing to a ceasefire along the three segments of the India-Pakistan border – the international boundary, the LoC (Line of Control) and the Siachen area in November 2003.[166] The efforts towards this end were begun by the Vajpayee government and were continued during the United Progressive Alliance Government. It was claimed that the comprehensive dialogue that followed came close

[161] Interview of Prime Minister of India, Shri Atal Bihari Vajpayee with Asharq Alawsat's Amir Taheri Part I and Part II, Ministry of External Affairs Website, August 27, 2002, http://mea.gov.in/in-focus-article.htm?4700/Interview+of+Prime+Minister+of+India+Shri+Atal+Bihari+Vajpayee+with+Asharq+Alawsats+Amir+Taheri+Part+I+and+Part+II

[162] Statement issued by the External Affairs and Defence Minister Shri Jaswant Singh at His Press Conference in Agra July 17, 2001. Verbatim Record of Press Conference of Shri Jaswant Singh, Minister of External Affairs held at 10 00 hours on 17th July, 2001 in Oberoi Hotel Agra.

[163] Prime Minister Shri Atal Bihari Vajpayee's "Independence Day Address", 2001

[164] Shujaat Bukhari, *PM extends `hand of friendship' to Pakistan*, *The Hindu*, 19 April 2003

[165] 'We are Again Extending a hand of Friendship', *Outlook*, 18 April, 2003, accessed at https://www.outlookindia.com/website/story/we-are-again-extending-a-hand-of-friendship/219831, on 22 February, 2018

[166] P. Chidambaram, in a book Launch (Choices by Shivshankar Menon), organized by Penguin Random House, 1 December, 2008.

to a 'major deal'.[167] However, the relative bonhomie soon disappeared when Musharraf was faced with domestic political issues and the Lal Masjid episode surfaced in July 2007.

Manmohan Singh's Pakistan policy too was to build trust. He stated categorically, "India regards a strong, purposeful, peaceful Pakistan to be in our national interest".[168] Trade and travel across the LoC were envisaged as key elements of the Confidence Building Measures (CBMs) between India and Pakistan. The Srinagar-Muzaffarabad bus service was inaugurated on 7 April 2005 and the Poonch-Rawalakote route was opened for travel in June 20, 2006. It is important to note that the modalities for the cross LoC services were painstakingly worked out by the Indian authorities keeping in view that India's sovereignty over the whole erstwhile state of Jammu and Kashmir would not be compromised.[169]

The Mumbai terror attacks of 26 November 2008 and the lack of cooperation shown on part of the government of Pakistan to bring the perpetrators to task affected the bilateral relations temporarily. However, on July 16, 2009, Dr. Manmohan Singh and the Prime Minister of Pakistan Syed Yusuf Raza Gilani had a "cordial and constructive" meeting in Sharm El Sheikh. Both leaders agreed that cooperation was the only way forward and that "terrorism should not be linked to the Composite Dialogue process and these should not be bracketed."[170]

In spite of grave provocations by Pakistan, India has largely shown proclivity towards a strategy of negotiation and containment. Its policy objective is to 'explore ways and means to create a normalized relationship'.[171] It would be appropriate to reiterate here that preference for an accommodative strategy in dealing with the Pakistan challenge is not a result of pacifism or India's perceived affinity to the principle of ahimsa. Instead, it is a well considered policy option in line with the Kautilyan framework.

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[167] Prime Minister Vajpayee of India and President Pervez Musharraf of Pakistan met on the sidelines of the twelfth SAARC summit in Islamabad, and after their talks issued a joint press statement on 6 January 2004. President Musharraf reassured Prime Minister Vajpayee that he will not permit any territory under Pakistan's control to be used to support terrorism in any manner.

[168] Prime Minister Manmohan Singh's Press Conference in Washington, November 25, 2009. Accessed at http://www.mea.gov.in/media-briefings.htm?dtl/4702/prime+ministers+press+conference+in+washington

[169] Saran, How India Sees the World, p. 85

[170] Joint Statement of the Prime Minister of India Dr. Manmohan Singh and the Prime Minister of Pakistan Syed Yusuf Raza Gilani, July 16, 2009. http://mea.gov.in/bilateral-documents.htm?dtl/4855/Joint+Statement+Prime+Minister+of+India+Dr+Manmohan+Singh+and+the+Prime+Minister+of+Pakistan+Syed+Yusuf+Raza+Gilani

[171] Interview with Nirupama Rao- on WTOP News, October 25, 2012 http://www.nirupamamenonrao.net/lectures-and-speeches.html

As the six methods of foreign policy prescribed by Kautilya are derived from the *upayas*, *saman* seems to coincide with the policy of *samdhi*. If the king were to see, "Remaining at peace, I shall ruin the enemy's undertakings by my own undertakings bearing fruits; or, I shall enjoy my own undertakings bearing abundant fruits or the undertakings of the enemy; or, by creating confidence by means of the peace….he should secure advancement through peace."[172] (KA, VII, 1, 32). Kautilya also advises to use peace on one side and war on the other to promote one's own undertakings through a 'dual policy'.[173] (KA, VII, 1, 37) Therefore, India has taken recourse to a wide spectrum of strategies – economic, military, political, and cultural to manage the Pakistan challenge.

(2) Dana

If diplomatic negotiations do not yield results, then making gifts (*dana*) cannot be avoided. *Dana* means that a price has to be paid for the enforcement of one's own will.[174] It is usually combined with *saman* and the two reinforce each other. The gift can also be in the form of a favour done to the counterpart to get him to behave in a certain way.

"Gift is five-fold: 1) relinquishing what's due [because of a predicament or contractually], 2) yielding to what the other has taken already [accepting a loss], 3) return back what one has previously appropriated, 4) bestowal of one's own possessions, 5) transfer to the ally of a share of the expected spoils of war." (KA, IX, 6, 24)

India's economic and trade relations with Pakistan fall under the *saman* and *dana* category. Unlike the thriving economic ties with China, which to a large extent has proved mutually beneficial, ties with Pakistan are abysmally low. "Pakistan's share in India's total exports increased from 0.33 percent in year 2001-2002 to 0.99 percent in year 2010-2011 and imports from Pakistan as percentage of total imports of India, marginally declined from 0.13 percent in 2001-2002 to 0.09 percent in year 2010-2011."[175] India accounted for less than 5 percent of

[172]Kangle, *Kautilya: The Arthashastra Part II*, p. 328
[173] Ibid., p. 324
[174] Mitra and Liebig, *Kautilya's Arthashastra: The Classical Roots of Modern Politics in India,* 2016, p. 137

[175] "Status Paper on India-Pakistan Economic Relations", February 2012, FICCI

Pakistan's trade in 2010-11 and the share of Pakistan in India's trade in 2012 was less than 1 percent.[176]

The figures reveal the level of economic integration and the importance accorded to trade in the bilateral relationship. The sharp decline in the total trade figures after the Mumbai terror attacks also conveys its susceptibility to strained political ties between the two governments.

India-Pakistan Bilateral Trade (in millions US$)

Financial Year	Exports from India	Imports to India	Total Trade	Trade Deficit	% Increase
2003-04	286.94	57.74	344.68	+229.2	
2004-05	521.05	94.97	616.02	+426.08	78.72
2005-06	689.23	179.56	868.79	+454.23	41.03
2006-07	1,350.09	323.62	1,6373.71	+1026.47	92.64
2008-09	1497	370,17	1,810	+1179.83	7.52
2009-10	1573.32	275.94	1,849.26	+1297.38	2.1
2010-11	2039.53	332.52	2,372.05	+1,707.01	28.27
2011 April-2011December	1,125.28	270.67	1,395.95	+854.61	

Source: India Pakistan Relations, Ministry of External Affairs[177]

Optimistically, after the composite dialogue process was initiated in 2004, trade between the two countries spurted (as is shown in the figure above).[178] 2008 saw the opening of trade between the separated parts of Kashmir which brought economic benefits. After the slump caused by the Mumbai terror attacks, the 5th round of India-Pakistan talks on Commercial and Economic Co-operation was held in Islamabad in April 2011. The Commerce Ministers of the two states met a

[176] Ibid.
[177] Accessed at http://mea.gov.in/Portal/ForeignRelation/pakistan-august-2012.pdf
[178] The composite dialogue process has 8 components and Economic & Commercial Cooperation is a major component. The Dialogues have been influenced by the political environment on and off.

couple of times the same year and affirmed their desire to move beyond normalization of trade[179] to a preferential trading arrangement, under the framework of SAFTA (South Asian Free Trade Agreement). To build the confidence of the business community on both sides, several trade agreements were signed and trade infrastructure facilities were improved. Additionally, a large number of items traded between India and Pakistan through informal channels presents the case of potential increase in bilateral trade.

While the economic prospects of bilateral trade are yet to be fully realized, normalization of trade relations and a greater integration of economies have proved advantageous in the political and diplomatic realm. Since India's economy has shifted gears post-liberalization, the instability caused by India-Pakistan hostility has become unaffordable. "Many observers believe increased trade will benefit each country's economy, but also build constituencies for more cooperative bilateral relations—in effect opening the door to progress on core political and security issues."[180]

Therefore, "It is in India's interests to promote trade and economic relations with Pakistan, even if this means some *non-reciprocal* measures from our side" (emphasis added).[181] India had accorded MFN status to Pakistan in 1996. A cabinet decision of November 2011 by Pakistan to reciprocate remains unimplemented. Pakistan, however, "substituted in March 2012 a 'positive list' of a little more than 1950 lines, permitted for import from India, by a 'Negative List' of 1209 lines which cannot be imported from India."[182]

[179] During the 5th round of talks of Commerce Secretaries (the first round in the resumed dialogue), held in Islamabad on April 27-28, 2011, the two sides agreed to make efforts to create an enabling environment for trade on both sides. They also decided to set up a number of Working Groups/ Sub-groups to explore mutual cooperation. These included: Working Group to address sector-specific barriers; Joint Technical Group to oversee progress in development of physical infrastructure at Attari-Wagah Land Customs Station (inauguration of the Integrated Check Post, opening of a dedicated trade gate at Attari/ Wagah); Customs Liaison Border Committee; JWG on Economic Cooperation; sub-Group on Customs Cooperation; Group of Experts on Trade in Electricity; Sub Group/ Group of Experts on trade in petroleum products. All these groups have since held their meetings.

[180] Michael Kugelman and Robert M. Hathaway eds., *Pakistan-India Trade: What Needs to be Done? What Does it Matter?*, The Wilson Centre, 2013, p. 2

[181] Saran, How India Sees the World, p. 100

[182] India-Pakistan Relations 2014, Ministry of External Affairs, Government of India. Accessed at https://www.mea.gov.in/Portal/ForeignRelation/Pakistan_April2014.pdf, on 23 February 2018.

"In August 2012, India announced reduction of 30% in its SAFTA Sensitive List for non-Least Developed Countries, bringing down tariff on 264 items to 5% within a period of three years."[183] This measure benefited Pakistan's exports to India in sectors of key interest to Pakistan. Nonalignment 2.0 also talks about promoting bilateral trade with Pakistan and offering greater access to Indian markets as a positive lever which could be used alongside the negative ones.

The Indus Water Treaty (1960) which was signed between India and Pakistan in September 1960 split the six rivers between the two countries - the 'eastern rivers' Ravi, Beas and Sutlej to India and the 'western rivers' Indus, Jhelum and Chenab to Pakistan. India being the upper riparian state has the leverage to control the flow of the rivers into Pakistan. It is believed that after the Parliament attack of 2001, the Vajpayee government considered abrogating the Treaty as a threat to Pakistan if the Indian demands were not met.[184] "Water is the only tool of leverage India has over Pakistan," says Brahma Chellaney of the Centre for Policy Research, who authored a paper for the Vajpayee-led government on Indus Water Treaty options.[185] However, the treaty has survived inviolate through the wars of 1965, 1971 and the 1999 Kargil episode.

(3) Bheda

There is a fluid transition from the second to the third method of politics which is sowing discord (*bheda*). Bribery which in inter-state terms could imply *dana* (gift) given to 'semi-autonomous clan leaders and tribal leaders', is in Kautilyan understanding, an 'effective policy instrument'.[186] These 'agents of influence' are targeted through selective preferences or discrimination, and are thereby used to destabilize the state. *Bheda* is also a feature of diplomacy that aims at creating dissensions between groups of states that are aligned against one's own interest. It is also important here to understand the concomitant normative constraints prescribed by Kautilya to

[183] Press Information Bureau, Government of India, Ministry of Commerce and Industry, 18th August, 2012. Accessed at http://pib.nic.in/newsite/mbErel.aspx?relid=86345
[184] Kanti P. Bajpai and Harsh V. Pant eds., *India's Foreign Policy: A Reader,* (New Delhi: Oxford University Press, 2013), p. 116
[185] "War by Other Means", India Today, 28 September 2016, https://www.indiatoday.in/magazine/the-big-story/story/20161010-indus-waters-treaty-pm-narendra-modi-pakistan-nawaz-sharif-829651-2016-09-28
[186] Mitra and Liebig, *Kautilya's Arthashastra: The Classical Roots of Modern Politics in India*, 2017, p. 137

overt and covert actions. The purpose of action must be legitimate and 'righteous' and not plunderous or destructive.[187]

There is a broad consensus on the fact that in the period of study (1998-2014), Indian political leaders have found it difficult to fashion credible response options to the problem posed by Pakistan sponsored terrorism. The situation is exacerbated by what Glenn Snyder has described as the "stability-instability paradox".[188] While on one hand, nuclear parity has induced stability at the 'strategic' level which has deterred large-scale conventional wars, frequency of low-intensity conflicts has paradoxically increased, on the other. This dilemma has stimulated the need to expand policy options between the binary – aggression and appeasement.

It is in this context that a former Indian Foreign Secretary, Shyam Saran (2004-2006) draws attention to the importance of developing 'pressure points', for example influence in Balochistan and Afghanistan.[189] In his latest book, he suggests pursuance of India's claims on Gilgit and Baltistan more aggressively, 'highlighting the disaffection within the largely tribal population there'.[190] After all, technically speaking, they should be treated as our own citizens and their welfare should be a matter of concern to us.[191] He even recommends that India 'should not be reluctant to leverage [its] presence in Afghanistan to pressure Pakistan even more'.[192] This could give India a handy 'tool kit of options' or 'levers' to effectively deal with Pakistan.

The document Nonalignment 2.0, which can be perceived as a semi-official report reflective of the thinking of India's strategic elite, mentions 'Pakistan's internal vulnerabilities' and how they could be developed to "put Pakistan diplomatically on the back-foot."[193] Drawing the international community's attention to the human rights violation in Balochistan could help detract Pakistan's public posturing in Jammu and Kashmir. In one of the media briefings in 2005, the official spokesperson of the Indian Ministry of External Affairs responded to a

[187] 'Righteous Vs. Demoniacal' wars have been discussed at length in a previous chapter.
[188] Glenn Snyder in a chapter in Paul Seabury's *Balance of Power*, (Chandler Publishing Company, 1965), has noted that, "The point is often made in the strategic literature that the greater the stability of the 'strategic' balance of terror, the lower the stability of the overall balance at lower levels of violence".
[189] Saran, Expert Interview.
[190] Saran, *How India Sees the World*, p. 98
[191] Ibid.
[192] Ibid., p. 99
[193] *NonAlignment 2.0*, p. 18

question on Balochistan – "we hope that the Government of Pakistan will exercise restraint and take recourse to peaceful discussions to address the grievances of the people of Balochistan'.[194]

While the use of Balochistan as a 'strategic pivot' appears as a suggestion in the public domain in India, the Pakistan government and media have leveled charges against India for 'illegitimate' actions in Balochistan.[195] The inclusion of the reference to Balochistan in the controversial Sharm-el-Sheikh joint statement created much furore within the Indian strategic community which thought that it amounted to accepting Pakistan's allegations.[196] However, Prime Minister Manmohan Singh candidly explained later that "our conduct is an open book" and that India is open to "discuss all issues because we are doing nothing".[197]

While it may be difficult to prove India's covert operations in Pakistan, the use of Balochistan as a lever to put pressure on Pakistan is indeed discussed in official and unofficial circles.

(4) Danda

According to Kautilya, the last of the four methods – *danda* (use of force) is to be used as the last resort. However, in a special case when the king 'were to see success in his work by peace in one place and war in another, then even the stronger should resort to the dual policy'.[198](KA, VII, 3, 19) The 'precise mix' of policies vary as the 'situation evolves'.[199]

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[194] http://www.mea.gov.in/media-briefings.htm?dtl/4834/In+response+to+a+question+on+BalochistanIn response to a question on Balochistan

[195] Syed Irfan Raza, "Rehman Malik Blames India for unrest in Balochistan", *Dawn*, September 3, 2016, https://www.dawn.com/news/1281668
"Former interior minister Rehman Malik has blamed India for fomenting unrest in Balochistan and helping separatists in the province.…He said: "We had taken up the matter with former Indian home minister Chidambaram and he had assured us that they would take notice of it, but later the five-year term of our government ended and we could not pursue the matter."

[196] "Prime Minister Gilani mentioned that Pakistan has some information on threats in Balochistan and other areas…… Prime Minister Singh said that India was ready to discuss all issues with Pakistan, including all outstanding issues. " – excerpt from the Joint Statement of Prime Minister of India Dr. Manmohan Singh and the Prime Minister of Pakistan Syed Yusuf Raza Gilani, Sharm el Sheikh, July 16, 2009. http://mea.gov.in/bilateral-documents.htm?dtl/4855/Joint+Statement+Prime+Minister+of+India+Dr+Manmohan+Singh+and+the+Prime+Minister+of+Pakistan+Syed+Yusuf+Raza+Gilani

[197] "PM introduced Balochistan, terror delink in Egypt statement", *The Times of India*, 25 July 2009, https://timesofindia.indiatimes.com/india/PM-introduced-Balochistan-terror-delink-in-Egypt-statement/articleshow/4817599.cms

[198]Kangle, *Kautilya: The Arthashastra Part II*, p. 328

[199]Menon, *Choices*, p. 67

In the period of study, India has resorted to the use of conventional force against Pakistan once during the Kargil episode (1999). It has also threatened to use force through an exercise of 'coercive diplomacy' during Operation Parakram in 2001-2002. Subsequently, the Indian army has refashioned its response techniques to suit the requirements of a 'limited war' under what has colloquially come to be called the 'Cold Start' strategy. Enhancements and refinements have been apace to fully support and execute the strategy alongside India's diplomatic efforts to 'manage' Pakistan. Therefore, India's conduct towards Pakistan draws from a number of foreign policy methods - *vigraha* (war), *samdhi* (peace), *asana* (neutrality) and *yana* (marching). The simultaneous use of some of these policies has been a characteristic feature of the bilateral relationship.

The aftermath of the Kargil War and Operation Parakram witnessed increased spending on defence modernization. Overall defense spending increased 30 percent between 1999 and 2005, and capital outlays rose from 21 percent to 38 percent of the budget. It is contended that the cumulative effect of the expanding military driven by the 'affluence' set in as a result of a decade long process of economic liberalization, along with the increasing assertiveness of the 'politically conservative' NDA-led government (1998-2004), has 'led to the formulation of an offensive strategic doctrine'.[200] This is contrasted with the more 'pragmatic' response of the United Progressive Alliance (UPA) government to the Mumbai terror attacks of 2008 by means which were not coercive or offensive.

The above assessment makes two assumptions: first that 'the operational strategic culture predisposes those socialized in it to act more coercively against an enemy as relative capabilities become more favourable.'[201] Second, that under the BJP-led government, Indian strategic thinking has 'evolved in a more Hyperrealist direction since September 11 (2001) and particularly after December 13 (2001)'[202] owing to the *Hindutva* ideology's conception of a 'strong India'.[203]

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[200] See Ali Ahmed, "Indian Strategic Culture: The Pakistan Dimension", in Kanti Bajpai, Saira Basit, V. Krishnappa (eds.), *India's Grand Strategy: History, Theory, Cases*, (New Delhi: Routledge, 2014), p. 301

[201] Johnston, *Cultural Realism*, p. x

[202] Kanti Bajpai, "Indian Strategic Culture and the Problem of Pakistan", in Swarna Rajagopalan (ed.), *Security and South Asia: Ideas, Institutions and Initiatives*, (New Delhi, Routledge, 2006), p. 291.

[203] Achin Vanaik and Parful Bidwai, *South Asia in a Short Fuse*, (New Delhi, Oxford University Press, 1999), p. 95

Contrary to the above assumptions, India's strategic culture as discerned from Kautilya's *Arthashastra,* suggests that the objective material conditions while an important factor in decision making, is seen through the prism of the basic assumptions about war, nature of adversary and the utility of force which are reflected in the central strategic paradigm. These basic assumptions are less resistant to change than their operational counterparts – grand strategic preferences, where changes can be expected to be seen more 'quickly and perceptibly'.[204]

The evident shift from deterrence to compellence for a brief period under the Vajpayee government can be seen as a posture adopted to meet the threatening challenge of Pakistan sponsored terrorism. The Agra Summit after Kargil and the famous 'Hand of Friendship' extended by Prime Minister Vajpayee to Pakistan after a tense India-Pakistan stand-off convey the importance of dialogue. The restructuring of the army along the lines of the 'Cold Start' doctrine which had begun under the Vajpayee era continued uninterrupted with the coming in of the Manmohan Singh government, and so did the parallel composite dialogue process.

The following section will review some of the major policy decisions made with regard to the use of force in the period under study to reinforce the foregoing argument.

Kargil (1999)

After the nuclear testing by India and Pakistan in May 1998, the dialogue process was put back on track, on India's initiative, by a series of confidence building measures, including the inaugural Delhi-Lahore bus service and the Lahore Declaration. In this backdrop, Pakistan's intrusion into Indian territory across the LOC (Line of Control) in the Kargil sector in May 1999, represented not just 'an invasion' but a 'betrayal of the trust' that was sought to be built in Lahore.[205] The decision by the Indian government to use force to evict the Pakistani army was quick, clear and unanimous. The events that unfolded were congruous with the precepts of Kautilyan statecraft.

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[204] Kanti Bajpai, "Indian Strategic Culture", in Kanti P. Bajpai and Harsh V. Pant (eds.), *India's Foreign Policy: A Reader,* p. 115

[205] Interview of Prime Minister of India, Shri Atal Bihari Vajpayee with Asharq Alawsat's Amir Taheri Part I and Part II, Ministry of External Affairs Website, August 27, 2002, http://mea.gov.in/in-focus-article.htm?4700/Interview+of+Prime+Minister+of+India+Shri+Atal+Bihari+Vajpayee+with+Asharq+Alawsats+Amir+Taheri+Part+I+and+Part+II

Accordign to Kautilya, *'raksha'* or protection of the state from external aggression is one of the primary duties of the king. References to the defence of the realm are scattered throughout the *Arthashastra*. On asked whether the government overreacted to the Kargil provocation, Prime Minister Vajpayee responded, "to decisively repulse the aggression in Kargil was not overreaction but a necessary act of protection of our national integrity."[206] It "is not just a matter of our having a right…It is our duty".[207]

The process of arriving at the decision was through sound counsel (*mantrashakti*)[208]. The Prime Minister chaired a joint meeting of the National Security Council, the Strategic Policy Group and the National Security Advisory Board to discuss Kargil and the broader question of India-Pakistan relations. Home Minister, Raksha Mantri, External Affairs Minister, Finance Minister and Deputy Chairman, Planning Commission were also present.[209] The decisions revealed complete unanimity.

The use of Indian Navy and the Indian Air Force along with the Indian Army on the ground is reminiscent of Kautilyan emphasis of combined forces (infantry, cavalry, chariots and war-elephants) which are necessary and complementary for waging war. "The Indian Navy's Western Fleet swung into action, carrying out a precautionary deployment on May 22, 1999 to increase surveillance in the North Arabian Sea."[210] The decision to use the Indian Air Force sent a 'strong signal to Pakistan that India would use all available means to evict the intruders'.[211] India defended the allegation of 'extending the theater of operations' by stating that, "It was necessary for our forces to have taken the required defensive measures including remaining in a state of alert".[212]

Also notable was the continued commitment 'to the composite dialogue with Pakistan on issues that had been agreed between the two sides', in conjunction with a combined Army-Air Force operations in Kargil. "The Lahore process should be sustained in the search for a comprehensive

[206] Ibid.
[207] Prime Minister Vajpayee's Address to the Nation on the Subject of Kargil, June 7, 1999, New Delhi.
[208] *Mantrashakti* (good counsel) has been ranked over *Prabhavshakti* (military and economic might) and *Utsahshakti* (morale of the leader) in Kautilya's *Arthashastra*.
[209] Foreign Affairs Record VOL XLV No 6 JUNE 1999, p. 76
[210] *The Kargil Review Committee Report*, (New Delhi: Sage, 1999), p. 101
[211] *The Kargil Review Committee Report*, p. 105
[212] Foreign Affairs Record VoL XLV No 7 JULY 1999, p. 98

improvement in relations with Pakistan."[213] This echoes Kautilya's 'dual policy', discussed earlier. Also, the Indian army's conduct through the Kargil episode displayed 'exemplary restraint' in not crossing the LOC even in the wake of Pakistan army's 'aggressive posture along the International Border with India'.[214]

There were political and military reasons for the risk-averse strategy. Diplomatically, the 'restraint' received acknowledgement and appreciation from the international community which could pressurize Pakistan to withdraw from Kargil heights. Likewise, "the military logic demanded that the war be kept limited to forestall the dangers of escalation and minimize the possibility of a nuclear exchange."[215]

India's treatment of the prisoners of war (POW) too has a Kautilyan echo. As a gesture of goodwill, [India] announced on the eve of the Independence Day of Pakistan (August 13) [its] readiness to hand over the 8 Pakistani Prisoners of War (POWs). "These soldiers were well-cared for in the highest traditions of the Indian Army."[216]

While preference ranking, conduct during war and humanitarian concerns displayed in the Kargil episode are reflective of the Kautilyan tradition to a large extent, India's intelligence failure to detect infiltration across the border certainly marked a break from Kautilya's insistence on a robust intelligence culture. A perusal of the monthly intelligence reports, strategic analyses and JIC/NSCS (Joint Intelligence Committee/ National Security Council Secretariat) paper on militancy as well as the six-monthly assessments of R&AW (Research and Analysis Wing) reveal that the possibility of an offensive by militant groups in the summer of 1999 was indicated.[217] The failure to correctly identify as many as five infantry battalions deployed right across the LOC was a serious lapse.[218] "Kargil highlighted the gross inadequacies in nation's surveillance capability, particularly through satellite imagery."[219]

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[213] Ibid., p. 76
[214] Foreign Affairs Record VoL XLV No 7 JULY 1999, p. 98
[215] "Kargil and Beyond", Talk by Shri. Jaswant Singh, Minister of External Affairs at India International Centre, 20 July 1999; Kanti Bajpai, "Testing the Limits: Indian Restraint Vs. Pak Brinkmanship", Times of India (Mumbai) 6 July 1999; Arpit Rajain, "India's Political and Diplomatic Responses", in *Kargil: The Tables Turned*, pp. 181-203
[216] Foreign Affairs Record VOL XLV No 8 AUGUST 1999, p. 112
[217] *The Kargil Review Committee Report*, p. 146
[218] Ibid., p. 153
[219] Ibid., p. 253

The Kargil Review Committee Report also revealed that "a paucity of resources was per se [not] responsible for any lack of preparedness for the Kargil conflict." In its recommendations, it suggested assertion of the sanctity of the LOC/border, backed up with a 'clear declaratory policy statement that any violation will be treated as aggression and punished at a time and place of India's choosing'.[220] It advised being effective without being provocative. It recommended 'discussions with Pakistan on all outstanding issues, including J&K' within the 'political and military parameters of India's declaratory policy and the accepted Simla-Lahore framework'.[221] These recommendations convey adherence to 'assertion without aggression' and simultaneous compliance with a dialogue process, even in the wake of resource constraints being fairly diminished.

Operation Parakram and the 'Cold Start' doctrine (2001-2002)

For some strategic analysts, Operation Parakram - the full-scale mobilization of Indian armed forces all along the border with Pakistan for a period of seven months (December 2001- June 2002) signified a move from India's doctrine of deterrence to one of compellence[222] or coercive diplomacy.[223] It was undertaken in response to Pakistan sponsored terror attacks on the state assembly in Jammu and Kashmir in October 2001 followed in quick succession by an attack on the Indian Parliament in December the same year. The mobilization of the armed forces intended "to thwart the active promotion of cross-border terrorism and posturing by Pakistan"[224] revealed the inadequacy of the military to quickly marshal its conventional advantage during the crisis.[225] Drawing on the lessons of Operation Parakram, the Indian Army's search for more effective

[220] Ibid., p. 221
[221] Ibid., p. 222
[222] Ali Ahmed, "Indian Strategic Culture: The Pakistan Dimension", in Kanti Bajpai et al eds., opcit., p. 288; See Gaurav Kampani, 'India's Compellence Strategy: Calling Pakistan's Nuclear Bluff Over Kashmir', Monterey Institute for International Studies, June 2002.
[223] C. Raja Mohan, *Crossing the Rubicon: The Shaping of India's New Foreign Policy,* (New Delhi: Viking, 2003), p. 196-203, S. Kalyanaraman, "Operation Parakram: An Indian Exercise in Coercive Diplomacy", *Strategic Analysis*, Vol. 26, No. 4, Oct-Dec 2002.
[224] Ministry of Defence, Government of India, Annual Report 2002-2003, p. 22 https://mod.gov.in/sites/default/files/MOD-English2003.pdf
[225] From the time the mobilization order was given, the armored columns of the strike corps took nearly three weeks to make their way to the international border area.

means to coerce Pakistan led to the formulation of the 'limited war' doctrine -'Cold Start' or officially, 'proactive operations'.[226]

Prior to Operation Parakram, the Indian Army's offensive doctrine employed massive Strike Corps combat potential to advance deep into enemy territory and gain strategic objectives. The 'Cold Start' doctrine instead could launch an offensive on multiple axes within a few days, to achieve limited objectives, keeping the chances of a nuclear escalation minimal. Defence Minister, George Fernandes, at a seminar on limited conventional war stated that there existed strategic space between the low-intensity and high-intensity conventional war; "limited conventional wars would be the wars of the future and the Indian military should prepare to fight and win such wars."[227]

Without a direct mention of the term 'limited war', the Annual Report of the Ministry of Defence (2005-2006) stated that, "The army's strategy of 'Iron fist in a Velvet Glove' is paying rich dividends, since it is focused on conduct of surgical and professional operations based on real time intelligence, which causes minimum inconvenience to the local populace."[228] However, there is little acknowledgment of the 'limited war' doctrine by the Indian government in public domain; "the military prepares while the political leadership exercises caution on the question of use of force."[229]

In order to fully understand the ramifications of the 'Cold Start' doctrine and its influence on India's grand strategic preferences, a clear explication of the difference between 'grand strategy' and military doctrine and strategy is essential. The *Indian Army Doctrine* (ARTRAC 2004) clearly states that while "military strategy is only concerned with military operations, grand strategy must, of necessity, take a long-term view and therefore encompass all elements of national power."[230] Therefore, the military doctrine's offensive reorientation does not necessarily imply an offensive 'grand strategy'. For example, in the UPA era, when the military doctrine was offensive, the strategic doctrine continued to adhere to 'strategic restraint'. Also, *Indian Army*

[226] Cold Start was officially promulgated at an army commanders' conference on April 28, 2004, by Padmanabhan's successor, General N. C. Vij.
[227] "Inaugural Address" by Raksha Mantri at Gulmohar, Habitat Center, New Delhi, 'The Challenges of Limited War: Parameters and Options", National Seminar organized by IDSA, 5 January 2000
[228] Ministry of Defence, Government of India, Annual Report 2005-2006, p. 24 https://mod.gov.in/sites/default/files/MOD-English2006.pdf
[229]Cohen and Dasgupta, *Arming without Aiming,* p. 61
[230] Indian Army Doctrine, 2004, Published by Headquarters Army Training Command, Shimla

Doctrine itself states that "War occurs when diplomatic and other negotiation mechanisms for resolving conflict either fail or are not operative",[231] affirming the grand strategic preference ranking discerned in the earlier chapters of this study.

It is also relevant to investigate into the 'offensive' character of the Indian Army Doctrine (ARTRAC 2004). While the doctrine does talk about a change in the security environment which has "necessitated a transformation in strategic thinking along with a paradigm shift in organization and conduct of operations", emphasis on "capability to operate in the complete spectrum of conflict" remains the undercurrent of the document. It states that, "asymmetric wars cannot replace conventional wars, even though they can very much become an adjunct of and influence conventional wars themselves."[232] Therefore, "the Indian Army's new concept of offensive operations is a combination of 'Cold Start' – the ability to launch quick strikes across the International Boundary (IB) without prior warning by moving rapidly to battle positions from the cantonments – and integrated 'battle groups'."[233]

Military preparedness for new threats and challenges is an exercise recommended by Kautilya too. Continuous optimization of *danda* (military might) based on the availability of resources, and in tandem with revolution in technology, is an important feature of a foreign policy method – *yana* (marching). Marching is described as "augmentation of power".[234] The document NonAlignment 2.0, in line with Kautilyan realism, states, "The role of hard power as an instrument of state is to remain ready to be applied externally or internally in pursuit of political objectives."[235] Optimization of *danda* (armed might) does not necessarily mean its use; the power to hurt is a bargaining power and is exploited through diplomacy.

Strategic doctrine is an embodiment of a state's philosophy to achieve political goals through the employment of available means. In this understanding, the increase in state capacity (elements of power) should automatically lead to devising of more ways to achieve the political objective; without necessarily using them. Therefore, 'heterogeneity of strategic doctrines of states is a function of the political aims along with geographical, technological and political constraints and

[231] Ibid.
[232] Ibid.
[233] Gurmeet Kanwal, "Strike fast and hard: Army doctrine undergoes change in nuclear era", *The Tribune*, 23 June 2006.
[234] Kangle, *Kautilya: The Arthashastra Part II*, p. 321
[235] *NonAlignment 2.0*, p. 38

opportunities it faces'.[236] If strategic doctrines could be divergent based on 'aims, constraints and opportunities', then shift towards a compellent strategy (possibly during Operation Parakram) is justified even by Kautilyan standards. The *prakritis* (elements of the state) were slightly more optimized and, therefore, diluted the constraints; the aggressive stance of Pakistan (Kargil, Parliament and State Assembly attacks) provided the right opportunity, and the grand strategy of accommodation (Bus diplomacy, Lahore Declaration) had failed to achieve the desired results. The twin attacks provided an 'incident of sufficient magnitude to alter the terms of engagement with Pakistan',[237] and 'a more forceful response became necessary[238]'.

Compellence is seen as part of the larger ambit of strategic coercion which has been defined as "the deliberate and purposive use of overt threats to influence another's strategic behaviour."[239] 'Coercive diplomacy' is a subset of compellence and its aim is to persuade the enemy to stop doing something.[240] Importantly, "the threat or use of force is, thus, subordinated to a larger politico-diplomatic strategy and is coupled with appropriate communications to the adversary."[241] For the threat to appear potent and credible, a full-scale mobilization with the Navy and Air Force in tow was indeed necessary. It is argued that the threat to use force was also aimed at the United States to exert pressure on General Musharraf to bring the terrorist groups to task.[242] President Musharraf delivered his "about turn" speech on January 12, 2002[243]. In October 2002, the armed forces were re-deployed from positions on the international border with Pakistan without impairing their capacity to respond decisively to any emergency and without lowering of vigil in Jammu & Kashmir. The dialogue process was reinitiated through the controversial 'Hand of Friendship' speech by Vajpayee in Srinagar (April 2003), placing accommodation as the preferred strategy once again.

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[236] Barry Posen, *The Sources of Military Doctrine: France, Britain and Germany Between the World Wars*, (London: Cornell University Press, 1984), p. 40

[237] "Punishment will be as big as crime: PM", *Times of India* (Mumbai), 19 December 2001

[238] Ministry of Defence, Government of India, Annual Report 2002-2003, p. 4 https://mod.gov.in/sites/default/files/MOD-English2003.pdf

[239] The term was first articulated and defined by Lawrence Freedman, cited in Peter Viggo Jakobsen, *Western Use of Coercive Diplomacy after the Cold War: A Challenge for Theory and Practice*,(St. Martin's Press; New York, 1998), p. 11.

[240]Kalyanraman, "Operation Parakram", p. 479

[241] Ibid.

[242] Ibid.

[243] "Musharraf Speech Highlights," *BBC News*, January 12, 2002, http://news.bbc.co.uk/2/hi/south_asia/1757251.stm.

Mumbai Terror Attacks (2008)

The Mumbai terror attacks of 26 November 2008 once again caused disruption in the composite dialogue process (2004-2008). It is contended that the Manmohan Singh government's restrained response to Pakistan abetted attack stands in sharp contrast to the offensive response meted out to the Parliament attack in 2001 by the Vajpayee government. The attacks in Mumbai represented, in a way, the failure of the 'Cold Start' doctrine to credibly deter such offences. Also, the UPA government consciously decided not to retort to an overt use of force; 'diplomatic, covert, and other means' was thought to be the right choice for 'that time and place'.[244]An evaluation of the strategic preferences under the UPA government with respect to the use of force is indeed necessary to arrive at any conclusion.

In a speech in 2004, Prime Minister Manmohan Singh recognized the 'incrementally emerging challenges for national security' and advised 'enlargement of instrumentalities and capacities to respond to these'.[245] India's defence budget which stood at $11.8 billion in 2000 rose to $30 billion in 2009[246] the single largest year-on-year increase of 34 percent came in that year, but military budgets have been rising steadily since 2007. The figures reflect the growing needs of the army modernization programme that was set in motion by the 'Cold Start' doctrine, sufficiently budgeted by the government's 'Common Minimum Programme'. Additionally, since 2004, "India has held five exercises of varying sizes that tested or demonstrated capabilities required by Cold Start."[247]

Equally fervent were the efforts made to continue the policy initiatives of the previous government on the diplomatic front. The ceasefire along the LOC was continued during UPA and Prime Minister Manmohan Singh came close to 'setting the stage for a changed relationship between these two countries'.[248] Therefore, it can be stated with reasonable conviction that the policies introduced by the NDA (National Democratic Alliance) government with respect to both the composite dialogue process and the optimization of the armed forces were absorbed into the

[244] Menon, Choices, p. 61
[245]PM's address at the Combined Commanders Conference, October 26, 2004, New Delhi
[246] SIPRI Yearbook –accessed at www.sipri.org/tearbook/2008/files/SIPRIYB0805.pdf
[247] Walter C. Ladwig, "A Cold Start for Hot Wars?: The Indian Army's New Limited War Doctrine", *International Security*, Volume 32, Number 3, Winter 2007/08, pp. 158-190
[248] Menon, Choices, p. 75

practice of foreign policy by its successor.[249] The 'choices made at the moment of transition, of a phase change in policy' had been suitably internalized.[250]

The reason behind India's moderate response to Mumbai terror attacks is that "after examining the options at the highest levels of government, the decision makers concluded that more was to be gained from not attacking Pakistan than from attacking it."[251] A number of arguments have been presented in favour of the choice of restraint – economic costs of use of force in the wake of an unprecedented global financial crisis, the limits to the utility of force in responding to cross-border terrorism and nonstate actors, and, perhaps, even the 'feasibility' of a military retaliation.[252]

It can be reasonably argued that the chief political objective of the Indian government in the aftermath of both Parliament and Mumbai attacks was to enforce its will on Pakistan to stop sponsoring cross-border terrorism. The means applied in both these instances were, however, divergent. It nonetheless, helped disprove the proposition that expanding defence budgets would inevitably lead to offensive strategic doctrines.

The ordering of the *upayas* (*saman*, *dana*, *bheda* and *danda*) is based on the 'amount of effort necessary to enforce one's will upon the other party'.[253] The use of one or a combination of means depends upon the objective sought, means available and relative strength. The 'coercive diplomacy' undertaken after the Parliament attack had two sets of audiences – the Pakistani leadership to whom a military escalation had to be presented as a possible and credible threat, and the international community with the US as the target to pressurize Pakistan to disassociate itself from the terror apparatus. Therefore, in a way, the military mobilization was part of the larger politico-diplomatic strategy[254] to enforce India's will on Pakistan. President Bush's

[249] A Status Paper on the Internal Security Situation (01.09.2008), Ministry of Home Affairs, clearly brings out the consensus between the BJP and Congress in dealing with Pakistan. "What BJP promises Congress has already done - Coercive measures, including diplomacy, will be used to deal with countries which promote crossborder terrorism. India will engage with the world in the global war on terror while not compromising on its domestic interests".
[250] Menon, Choices, p. 4
[251] Shivshankar Menon, "Why India didn't attack Pakistan after 26/11 Mumbai attacks", 22 November 2016 http://www.livemint.com/Leisure/29lXP57cHDAloqUf2uJOHM/Why-India-didnt-attack-Pakistan-after-2611-Mumbai-attacks.html
[252] P. Chidambaram who took over as the Home Minister soon after the Mumbai attacks stated at a book launch (Shivshankar Menon's *Choices*) that "our capacity to respond was also extremely poor".
[253] Mitra and Liebig, *Kautilya's Arthashastra: The Classical Roots of Modern Politics in India*, 2016, p. 136
[254] See Kalyanraman, "Operation Parakram", p. 480

comment on December 19, 2001, that a flare-up in the subcontinent "could really create severe problems for all of us that are engaged in the fight against terror"[255], quite conveys the point.

The government of India's objective after the Mumbai attack was also to pressurize Pakistan by leveraging the US, this time with less effort as India, by then, had credibly proven to be America's 'natural ally'. The huge operational costs of Operation Parakram and the admitted military unpreparedness only helped lock the decision. A former Foreign Secretary admits that 'the real success was in organizing the international community, in isolating Pakistan'.[256] On being questioned about the possibility of a repeat of 26/11, Prime Minister Manmohan Singh responded, "I sincerely hope that the combined pressure of the world community including the United States will work to ensure that the ghastly acts of the type that took place on 26/11 do not happen once again."[257]

Therefore, the end result of both sets of responses to the attacks was an increased pressure on Pakistan to address India's concern about cross-border terrorism. The strategies, driven by situational compulsions, to achieve strategic aims may not have been long-lasting[258]; their aims, however, were common and in sync with the predilection of Indian foreign policy.

India's bilateral relationship with Pakistan showcases an engagement of all four methods (*upayas*) of politics simultaneously. The thread of continuity in the application of the modes of policy through different political hues strengthens the strategic cultural argument. The momentary shift in strategic preference ranking represents the dynamism of the concept and highlights the importance of the deeper basic assumptions from which the preference ranking flows.

To sum up, India's foreign policy in the period of study has largely adhered to securing and furthering its interests without being antagonistic or provocative. Perhaps, the strongest

[255] Cited in *The Hindu*. December 22, 2001. At the height of the crises in January and May/June 2002, British Prime Minister Tony Blair, US Secretary of State Colin Powell, US Secretary of Defence Donald Rumsfeld. US Deputy Secretary of State Richard Armitage, Canadian Deputy PM John Manley, UK Foreign Secretary Jack Straw, and Japanese Vice-Foreign Minister Seiken Sugiura, streamed through New Delhi to advise restraint.
[256] Menon, *Choices*, p. 65
[257] Prime Minister's Press Conference in Washington, November 25, 2009, http://www.mea.gov.in/media-briefings.htm?dtl/4702/prime+ministers+press+conference+in+washington
[258] Shivshankar Menon admits in his book, "should another such attack be mounted from Pakistan, with or without visible support from the ISI or the Pakistan Army, it would be virtually impossible for any government of India to make the same choice again".

undercurrent which runs through all its bilateral relations discussed above is strengthening internal capabilities, even by means of seeking help from external allies. India's increased engagement with the outside world has been both facilitated and necessitated by economic liberalization and security interdependence which marks the 21st century world. However, this 'stepping out' has been done cautiously and in accordance with the principles of strategic autonomy. The optimization of the seven elements of the state (*prakritis*) to open up new options and lend flexibility to foreign policy conduct has been a constant endeavour. The preferred grand strategy has been largely accommodationist even with a marked improvement in economic and military capabilities. "As our economic and military capacities grow, we are able to express power more effectively. But the continuity with the past is there, there has been no volte face."[259]

Further, India's relationship with Pakistan and China over the last decade and more suggests a 'mix of policies', which explores the range between aggression and accommodation. It is the whole spectrum of options rather than 'binaries like black-white, true-false' that accounts for strategic edge.[260] The simultaneous use of the methods of politics (*upayas*) is a striking Kautilyan echo.

Therefore, it is fair to argue that Kautilya's analytical categories are extremely sophisticated and wide-ranging and have managed to transcend the limitations of time and space because of their strong theoretical grounding which helped their application in the conduct of India's foreign policy in the first decade of the 21st century.

The next chapter will examine India's nuclear policy in the period 1998-2014 to assess the continued relevance of grand strategic preference ranking in the evolution of India's nuclear strategy.

[259] Mrs. Nirupama Rao, Expert Interview, 1st June, 2018. She completely endorses the view that foreign policy always operates within a framework of continuity and that the core interests of a nation do not change for long periods.
[260] Shivshankar Menon, Speaking at his book launch – *Choices*, New Delhi, 2014

Chapter 6

Grand Strategic Preferences and India's Nuclear Policy, 1998-2014

India's nuclear policy in the Nehruvian period clearly spelled out the importance of the 'second industrial revolution'. At the same time, abhorrence for the use of nuclear weapons underlined India's call for world disarmament. Nehru understood the dual use of nuclear technology and aimed to develop the capability to both strengthen the state in a non-military way and bring about happiness of the people by optimizing resources. *Rakshana* (protection) and *palana* (maintenance) were simultaneously sought to be achieved. The period of study proposed for this chapter i.e. 1998-2014 stands in contrast to the Nehruvian era in all matrix of power – political, economic, military and technological. The persistence of the culturalist assumptions and state's strategic preferences notwithstanding changes in the objective environment, would confirm the robustness of the strategic culture. The objective of this chapter, therefore, is to gauge whether India's Nuclear Policy during 1998-2014 has evolved along the central paradigm discerned from Kautilya's Arthashastra, and to investigate the strategic preference ranking entwined in its doctrinal thrust.

As a result of the reforms set apace in 1991, India has accelerated along the path to acquire material capabilities. With 1.2 billion people and the world's fourth-largest economy, India's growth and development in this period has been one of the most significant of its achievements. Through the Nehru years (1947-1964) India's Gross Domestic Product (GDP) per capita in 1990 international dollars, was 1.8%.[1] In sharp contrast, in 2014 India was the 14th fastest growing nation of the world with GDP growth rate of 7.244%. "GDP in India averaged 509.73 USD billion from 1960 until 2016, reaching an all time high of 2263.52 USD billion in 2016 and a record low of 36.54 USD billion in 1960."[2] Such is the disparity in economic conditions of the two periods under study.

[1] The data is taken from economic historian Angus Maddison's time series on world GDP. The numbers show the compounded annual growth rate (CAGR) for real GDP growth per capita for India.
[2] Source: Tradingeconomics.com, World Bank, https://tradingeconomics.com/india/gdp, accessed on November 5, 2017.

Concomitant with the disproportion at the economic level, defence expenditure too witnessed enormous gaps in the two periods. Until 1962 defense spending was deliberately limited. In the wake of the war with China, defence spending rose from 2.1 percent of the gross national product (GNP) in fiscal year (FY) 1962 to 4.5 percent in FY 1964. "In FY 1994, defense spending was slightly less than 5 percent of gross domestic product (GDP)."[3] "With 3.05 percent of the gross domestic product in 1999, defence spending dropped to between 2.4 percent -2.7 percent in the years 2010-2014."[4] However, "the declining share of defence in GDP can be ascribed, among others, to the strong performance of Indian economy in the recent years; signalling an enhancement of the country's economic ability to afford more on various sectors including defence."[5] Therefore, while there was a decline in defence spending as a percentage of GDP, defence expenditure saw a sharp increase in absolute terms. "India's defense budget rose from $11.8 billion in 2000 to $30 billion in 2009"[6] and "$38.35 billion for 2014-2015."[7]

The capability growth in the nuclear realm is particularly significant. From a country mired in debate on whether to pursue a nuclear weapons programme or not, to an estimated nuclear arsenal of 90-110 nuclear weapons[8], India has come a long way. "As of 2015 India's weapon-grade plutonium stockpile was estimated to be between 0.57 and 0.61 tonnes."[9] This is a huge advancement over an estimate of "between 240 and 395 kg of weapon grade plutonium for weapons production, with a median value of 310 kg at the end of 1999."[10] Since the nuclear tests of 1998, there has been a steady improvement in the number of missiles, delivery platforms and manner in which the nuclear deterrent is being operationalized.

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[3] https://www.globalsecurity.org/military/world/india/budget.htm, accessed on November 5, 2017

[4] SIPRI Yearbook: Armaments, Disarmament and International Security.

[5] Laxman K. Behera, "India's Affordable Defense Spending", *Journal of Defence Studies*, Vol. 2. No. 1, pp. 136-148

[6] Stephen P. Cohen and Sunil Dasgupta, *Arming Without Aiming: India's Military Modernization* (New Delhi: Penguin/Viking, 2010), p. 16

[7] "Budget 2014-15"- Govt raises military spending, eases foreign investment limit in arms industry, *Business Today*, 10 July 2014, New Delhi. Accessed at https://www.businesstoday.in/union-budget-2014-15/budget-news/union-budget-2014-15-defence-budget-raised-by-12-per-cent-arun-jaitley/story/208034.html

[8] SIPRI Yearbook, 2017. This figure is based on calculations of India's inventory of weapon-grade plutonium and the number of operational nuclear-capable delivery systems. Accessed at https://www.sipri.org/research/armaments-and-disarmament/nuclear-weapons/world-nuclear-forces/india

[9] Ibid.

[10] David. Albright, *India's and Pakistan's Fissile Material and Nuclear Weapons Inventories, end of 1999*, 2000, Institute for Science and International Security (ISIS), October 11, 2000. http://www.isisonline.org/publications/southasia/stocks1000.html.

A simultaneous political development - the coming of the BJP to power - has been viewed by many analysts as marking a change in India's political culture, potentially challenging the Nehruvian legacy. It is argued that the effects of these significant developments now seem to be converging like never before: "India [is] slowly developing its material capabilities and for the first time, it is articulating a desire to play that great power role."[11] It has been conjectured by some members of the security community that with the new affluence and increased access to weapons technology which is expected to grow at a steady pace, India is likely to deal with its security challenges more surely and demonstrate national power without an element of 'restraint.' This is in line with the traditional realist affluence model in which wealth and military power go hand in hand.

In such a materially and psychologically changed environment, the test of the existence and persistence of strategic culture as outlined earlier, and traced in the Nehruvian period, would be a necessary exercise to bring to light the explanatory capability of cultural variables. The influence of the core assumptions or fundamental beliefs that provide an interpretive lens to the objective environment can be decisively studied in such contrasting periods. It is important and relevant to mention here that the research on strategic culture which emerged in the early 1980s focused on trying to explain why the Soviets and the Americans thought differently about strategy in the nuclear age. Therefore, it can be argued that the nuclear question is not just a strategic issue, but a cultural one too.[12]

The chapter is divided into four sections. The first briefly charts the important developments in India's nuclear programme from 1964 to 1998. This provides the background for the second section which will deal with the nuclear tests conducted in 1998. This section employs the Level of Analysis (LoA) approach to deal with the range of factors responsible for India going overtly nuclear. The third section will extrapolate the central strategic paradigms and grand strategic preference ranking from the Draft Nuclear Doctrine (DND) (1999) and India's Nuclear Doctrine

[11] Ashley J Tellis, a senior associate at the Carnegie Endowment for International Peace, a Washington-based foreign policy think tank tells *Archis Mohan* that Prime Minister Narendra Modi's call for India to become a leading power represents a change in how the country's top political leadership conceives its role in international politics. But New Delhi will need to do more to increase its material capabilities if it wants to achieve the goal of becoming a "great power" by 2050. Source: http://www.business-standard.com/article/opinion/some-in-bjp-may-stifle-modi-s-reform-agenda-ashley-j-tellis-116040900692_1.html

[12] Sun Tzu, *The Art of War*, Translation and Introduction by S. B. Griffith (London, Oxford University Press, 1963, 1971)

made public on 4th January, 2003, along with a policy paper laid in the Lok Sabha by former Prime Minister Atal Bihari Vajpayee.[13] It will also explicate the main pillars of India's Nuclear Doctrine and how they correspond to the Kautilyan framework. The final section will constitute an assessment of the US-India civilian nuclear deal.

It would be pertinent to note here that nuclear strategy is not entirely a subset of military strategy; "it is equally inter-meshed with political and diplomatic strategy."[14] Michael Howard states: "[T]hese [nuclear related polices and decisions], it was felt, were not questions to be dealt with in profound secrecy by a small group of specialists in the Ministry of Defence. They were not just military but, in the profoundest sense, political. More, they were moral. And more even than that, they were existential."[15] Nuclear policymaking, therefore, can be seen as a collective action of elites at a political and grand strategic level. This renders the Kautilyan framework of strategic culture with a grand strategic orientation suitable for making an assessment.[16]

Evolution of the Indian Nuclear Programme (1964-1998)

As is discussed in the previous chapter, India's indigenous efforts in nuclear science and technology were established remarkably early. Nehru appreciated the peaceful uses of nuclear energy and well understood the manifestations of its military use. "The ambivalent mix of realism and moral principle that permeated Nehru's foreign and defence policies,"[17] blended with the guiding principles of political conduct enshrined in the *Arthashastra*. Through the 1950s and into the 1960s, India's nuclear quest continued apace. In 1962, India and China fought a short border war which had far-reaching effects on India's strategic thinking. "It led to a more 'realistic' appreciation of the threats faced by India and put China on the Indian radar screen as a

[13] Atal Bihari Vajpayee laid a paper entitled "Evolution of India's Nuclear Policy", XII Lok Sabha Debates, Session II, Wednesday, May 27, 1998
[14] Ali Ahmed, "Political Decision-Making and Nuclear Retaliation", 2012, *Strategic Analysis*, 36:4, 511-526
[15] Michael Howard, 'Present at the Creation', Survival, 50(1), 2008, pp. 5–8, quoted in ibid., p. 513.
[16] This addresses the concerns raised by some scholars like Gaurav Kampani who are skeptical about the usefulness of the argument of strategic culture owing to a lack of clarity on whether it applies to a grand strategy or the narrower military strategy. See Gaurav Kampani, "New Delhi's Long Nuclear Journey: How Secrecy and Institutional Roadblocks Delayed India's Weaponization", *International Security*, Vol. 38, No. 4 (Spring 2014), pp. 79–114
[17] Jayantanuja Bandhyopadhyaya, *The Making of India's Foreign Policy*, rev.edn. (New Delhi: Allied Publishers, 1979)

long-term threat."[18] Further, the Chinese nuclear weapons test of 1964, close on the heels of the 1962 war impacted upon Indian strategic thinking and the debate on the nuclear question was thrown open.

The Shastri Years (1964-66)

After Jawaharlal Nehru passed away in 1964, Lal Bahadur Shastri took over as India's Prime Minister. In a classified report on India's Nuclear Policy, submitted by the Director of Central Intelligence, U.S., and approved for release in May 2001, the Shastri government was thought to be 'predisposed to postpone a decision' in return for a 'continued high level of US economic aid, a renewal of military assistance, and a foregoing of pressure on the Kashmir issue.'[19] Other factors that might influence India to hold to its present policy include a combination of severe domestic economic difficulties, meaningful international progress in the field of disarmament, and some Indian progress in securing outside guarantees.[20] "Though Shastri strongly announced his opposition to a weapons programme publicly, there were subtle changes in his announcements which saw him changing his stance from a 'no bomb ever' to a 'no bomb at present' position."[21]

Shastri was also the first Indian leader to float the idea of peaceful nuclear explosives (PNE) and initiated the 'Subterranean Nuclear Explosion Project (SNEP)'. "While the SNEP itself did not manufacture weapons, it implied the option of crossing the nuclear threshold from the foundation of peaceful nuclear explosives."[22]

The Indira Gandhi years (1967-1977 and 1980-1984)

Indira Gandhi, like her father, in the beginning laid emphasis on the primacy of economic development and the inutility of nuclear deterrence and called off the SNEP. Bhumitra Chakma

[18] Ashok Kapur, "Peace and Power in India's Nuclear Policy", *Asian Survey*, Vol. X, No. 9, September 1970, pp. 784-85.
[19] Special National Intelligence Estimate, Number 31-1-65, 21 October 1965, *India's Nuclear Weapons Policy* – Submitted by the Director of Central Intelligence, Approved for release – May 2001
[20] Ibid., p. 7
[21] Rashed Uz Zaman, *Strategic Culture and the Rise of the Indian Navy*, Ph.D. thesis, Strategic Studies Department of Politics and International Relations, University of Reading, July 2007, p. 172
[22] Bhumitra Chakma, "Toward Pokhran II: Explaining India's Nuclearisation Process", *Modern Asian Studies*, Vol. 39, No. 1, 2005, p. 201.

argues that "her initial policy stance was soon modified as strategic developments with enormous implications occurred beyond India's borders. China initiated a series of nuclear explosions and testing of missiles capable of carrying nuclear warheads and hitting targets deep within India."[23] Additionally, progress on the creation of a genuine non-proliferation regime seemed inadequate. The Non-Proliferation Treaty (NPT) concluded in 1968 without satisfactory assurances from the nuclear weapon powers on credible nuclear disarmament within a reasonable time frame. By preventing the emergence of any new nuclear weapons state, the Treaty sought to permanently cleave the world into the 'haves' and 'have nots'. Therefore, it failed to appeal to India and it chose to stay out of the NPT to retain its nuclear option. The 1971 war with Bangladesh, the threatening US-China axis and the presence of the nuclear armed USS Enterprise in the Bay of Bengal during the crisis, heightened India's sense of vulnerability.

In 1974, with a Peaceful Nuclear Explosion (PNE), India entered the nuclear club, albeit without a weaponization programme. In one of her speeches after the tests, Indira Gandhi lauded India's nuclear programme - "Nuclear science is dedicated to development…..and providing the essential for an honourable life for our masses. I repeat that we have no intention of embarking on a nuclear weapons programme."[24] After a brief hiatus (1977-80), Indira Gandhi returned to power in 1980. "In 1983, she launched the Integrated Missile Development Programme, but this was at best an expansion of the nuclear open door: no attempt was made to incorporate nuclear weapons even conceptually into the framework of national security policy."[25]

In the brief period of the Janata Party-led coalition government, Morarji Desai towed the line of nuclear ambiguity. He rejected as discriminatory the concept of a nuclear weapon-free zone, refused to consider signing the NPT and demanded the formulation of a time-bound programme for the elimination of all nuclear weapons.[26]

[23]Chakma, "Toward Pokhran II", p. 75, in Zaman, *Strategic Culture and the Rise of the Indian Navy,* p. 173
[24] "Indira Gandhi lauds India's Nuclear Program", Indian National Congress, Published on May 19, 2017, accessed on 21st September, 2017, https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=t7MagRTpdZY
[25] Rajesh M. Basrur, "Nuclear Weapons and Indian Strategic Culture", *Journal of Peace Research,* vol. 38, no. 2, 2001, Sage Publications (London, Thousand Oaks, CA and New Delhi), p. 186
[26] Ibid. p. 187

The Rajiv Gandhi years (1984-1989)

India's nuclear programme under Rajiv Gandhi typified what some analysts see as the "mixed motives"[27] aspect of India's nuclear quest. According to V. S. Arunachalam, his scientific advisor, he was "genuinely against the bomb", but "did not want India to be found wanting in a crisis either."[28] In 1988 Rajiv Gandhi put forward what came to be known as the Rajiv Gandhi Plan for nuclear disarmament at the Third United Nations Special Session on Disarmament. The Plan called for a comprehensive phased programme of elimination of all nuclear arsenals by the year 2010. However, the Plan received a lukewarm response from the Great Powers. It was only after the failure of this effort [and credible reports of Pakistan's acquisition of nuclear capability] that led Rajiv Gandhi's to authorize a weaponization programme.[29]

Despite the decision to weaponize, there was no effort to create a nuclear force or to incorporate deterrence doctrine into national security planning. On the contrary, "Rajiv Gandhi in early 1989 agreed with his Pakistani counterpart, Benazir Bhutto that their countries would refrain from targeting each other's nuclear facilities in the event of war."[30]

According to a declassified report of the Directorate of Intelligence, U.S., "Indian Prime Minister Rajiv Gandhi…..has persistently drawn attention to the threat that Pakistan nuclear program poses to India's national security [and] would prefer to find a diplomatic and political solution to the nuclear dilemma in the subcontinent, since he does not want to divert scarce Indian resources to a nuclear weapons program."[31]

Decade of the 1990s leading to 1998 Tests

The decade of the 1990s witnessed a serious debate on the issue of India going nuclear. The collapse of the Soviet Union and the emergence of the US as the sole superpower had altered many equations. Additionally, there was a looming fear that China may have tested a Pakistani

[27] See Deepa M. Ollapally, "Mixed Motives in India's Search for Nuclear Status", *Asian Survey*, Vol. XLI, No. 6, November-December 2001
[28] Raj Chengappa, *Weapons of Peace: The Secret Story of India's Quest to Be a Nuclear Power* (New Delhi: HarperCollins, 2000), p. 304
[29] K. Subrahmanyam, "Indian Nuclear Policy - 1964-98 (A Personal Recollection)", in Jasjit Singh (ed.), *Nuclear India* (New Delhi: Know-ledge World, 1998), pp. 26-53.
[30] Basrur, "Nuclear Weapons and Indian Strategic Culture", p. 187
[31] "India: Nuclear Debates and Decisionmakers", Declassified in parts – sanitized copy approved for release 2012/07/27, Directorate of Intelligence, United States.

weapon at the Lop Nor site in 1990. The rise in tension between India and Pakistan in the early 1990s was also a substantial factor. "Pakistan's Foreign Minister Yaqub Khan's visit to Delhi in 1990 is said to have been undertaken to convey the threat of nuclear retaliation against India in case the latter moved its conventional military forces to threaten or to attack Pakistan."[32] Also, the nuclear weapons states moved to enforce a permanent status on the NPT in 1995, thereby, perpetuating the division between the nuclear 'haves' and the 'have nots'. The oblique threat to sanction and penalize countries which opposed the universalization of the NPT too exerted pressure. "The precipitating factor proved to be the effort in 1996 to push through a discriminatory Comprehensive Test Ban Treaty (CTBT), which would have permanently foreclosed India's options to develop a credible and fully tested nuclear deterrent."[33]

Domestically, India had launched its economic liberalization programme and was cautious of international sanctions and pressures that could potentially subvert its progress. According to A.N. Varma, the Principal Private Secretary to Prime Minister Narasimha Rao, "Rao was particularly wary of getting into the kind of situation that the Rajiv Gandhi regime stepped into, namely, of having the country's strategic ambitions outpace the country's ability to afford them."[34] However, efforts were apace to operationalize the nuclear arsenal. "When the Kargil Committee (George Verghese) asked him why the defence budget was cut during his time, Rao replied that was because the nuclear deterrent was under development and that had priority."[35] Rao also submitted to Subrahmanyam that he had an obligation only to one person to discharge to the full and that was 'Atalji' and that he had briefed him fully.[36] Atal Bihari Vajpayee, as the Prime Minister of a coalition government that lasted just thirteen days, acted upon it without much delay and India conducted the Pokhran tests in 1998.

[32] Shyam Saran, "Is India's Nuclear Deterrent Capable?", India Habitat Center, New Delhi, April 24, 2013, p. 4, accessed at http://krepon.armscontrolwonk.com/files/2013/05/Final-Is-Indias-Nuclear-Deterrent-Credible-rev1-2-1-3.pdf
[33] Ibid., p. 5
[34] In an interview with Bharat Karnad in *Nuclear weapons and Indian Security: The Realist foundations of Strategy* (New Delhi: Macmillan, 2005), p. 363
[35] See K Subrahmanyam, "Narasimha Rao and the Bomb", *Strategic Analysis*, Vol. 28, No. 4, 2004. © The Institute for Defence Studies and Analyses, p. 593
[36] Ibid.

Nuclear Tests of 1998

On May 11 and again on May 13, 1998, India conducted a total of five tests including a thermonuclear one.[37] It is seen as the culmination of a long journey marked by ambiguity and obfuscation. While the paper laid by Vajpayee in Lok Sabha regarded national security as the only 'touchstone' that guided the decision, analysts have proffered various arguments. In order to address the phenomenon of multiplicity of factors and influences that are enmeshed, a level-of-analysis approach is employed to assess India's decision to overtly go nuclear at the international, state, and individual level.[38]

International

The international security environment has been considered by many as one of the factors which finally led to testing. According to Shyam Saran, it is the 'security narrative' that drove India to acquire nuclear capability.[39] The then National Security Advisor, Brajesh Mishra, described the rapidly changing world as one in which "the Soviet Union was dead, the Non-Prolifertaion Treaty was extended into perpetuity in 1995, and moves were afoot to push through the Comprehensive Test Ban Treaty (CTBT) and to control fissile material production."[40] The latter represented the choice or dilemma for India to 'use it (the nuclear weapon option) or lose it.'[41]

Perhaps, the most obvious security threat which India had to gear up to was the growing nexus between Pakistan and China. It is contended that a large proportion of Pakistan's conventional armament and almost 90% of its missile production is based on aid extended by the Chinese.[42] The preparedness to deter a nuclear conflict with China and Pakistan should that become

[37] The success of the thermonuclear test is a matter of suspect. K. Santhanam (Project Leader, Pokhran-II) and Ashok Parthasarathi (Science and Technology adviser to the Prime Minister Indira Gandhi) in an article written for *The Hindu*, September 17, 2009, content that "We have hard evidence on a purely factual basis, to inform the nation that not only was the yield of the second fusion (H-bomb) stage of the thermonuclear (TN) device tested in May 1998 was not only far below the design prediction made by the Bhabha Atomic Research Centre (BARC), but that it actually failed."

[38] The usage of this approach has been borrowed from Pant, Harsh V. Pant, "The US-India Nuclear Pact: Policy, Process, and Great Power Politics", 2009, *Asian Security*,5:3, 273— 295. For a detailed explication of this, see Kenneth N. Waltz, *Man, the State, and War: A Theoretical Analysis* (Los Angeles: California University Press, 1959).

[39] See Saran, "Is India's Nuclear Deterrent Capable?"

[40] Bharat Karnad, *India's Nuclear Policy* (New Delhi: Pentagon Press, 2008), p. 64

[41] Ashok Kapur, *Pokhran and Beyond: India's Nuclear Behaviour* (New Delhi: Oxford University Press, 2001), p. 3

[42] Ibid.

necessary, had become an urgent concern to be addressed. Even George Perkovich who otherwise sees security concerns determining proliferation as illusionary, concedes that by the 1990s, "Pakistan and China combined to heighten India's security concerns."[43]

Apart from a threatening international environment, geopolitical developments also necessitated India's decision to go nuclear. The end of the Cold War and the concomitant rise of China presented India with a unique opportunity. The US saw a growing India as both a countervailing power to the expanding Chinese influence in Asia and a lucrative business destination. Additionally, "India's swift emergence as an I.T. power and the rising affluence and influence of the India-American community, reinforced the positive shift in American perceptions about India."[44] This, in fact, was in part, a result of Rao's deliberate policy to 'enmesh' the US and other Western powers so fully into the Indian economy that pursuing a 'punitive' policy vis-à-vis India would be rendered prohibitively expensive for the West.

State

The most important factor at the level of the state, perhaps, was the economic feasibility of weaponization. The 'Guns vs. Butter' debate had dogged India's nuclear quest right from the start. It was only in the latter half of the 1990s that the national security imperatives seemed to be well backed by economic capability. The threatening international environment also reinforced the maxim that 'no price was too high to pay for protecting national security.'[45] These conditions, perhaps, prompted Vajpayee to say that, "economic prosperity and security needs are not mutually exclusive," and that he intended to use national resources "optimally so that the nation is secure and prosperous."[46] The BJP regime was, perhaps, reassured by a study done by the Finance Ministry in 1995-1996 when the government under P.V. Narasimha Rao considered testing. This study concluded that the country would be able to withstand the force of economic sanctions, if any.[47]

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[43] George Perkovich, *India's Nuclear bomb: The Impact on Global Proliferation* (Oxford University Press, 2000), p. 447

[44] Saran, "Is India's Nuclear Deterrent Capable?", p.5

[45] Perkovich, *India's Nuclear Bomb,* p. 451

[46] See "PM Vajpayee's Response in Parliament, August 4, 1998," in Texts and Transcripts of Statements and Debates and Answers to Questions in Parliament on India's Nuclear Tests in May 1998 and Matters Relating Thereto (New Delhi : Ministry of External Affairs, International Security Division, September 1998)

[47] Interview with former Deputy National Security Advisor, Satish Chandra, July 3, 2007 in Karnad, *Nuclear Weapons and India's Security*.

According to George Perkovich, it was the strategic enclave of scientists/technologists that has driven India on the quest for nuclear weapon capability. He points out that India's quest for nuclear weapons capabilities began before a Chinese threat emerged and was driven not by military or national security experts but rather by scientific bureaucrats like Homi Bhabha. "It was also a reflection of India's moral norms and post colonial identity manifested through Nehru's recognition that India could gain international power, standing and a measure of security if she went for nuclear weapons."[48] Ashok Kapur too concedes that 'pretsige' was among the many influencing factors; though he avers that "prestige is not vanity."[49]

This argument seems rather untenable with how the discourse on the nuclear question has shaped since its inception. Bhumitra Chakma argues rather convincingly that "given India's pressing economic problems it is very difficult to imagine that she would invest such huge resources in a nuclear programme merely to satisfy the need for recognition and prestige."[50] Clearly, the overriding factors have been the international security environment (in terms of security threats, developments in the field of Nuclear Arms Control and Disarmament, and geopolitical twists and turns), domestic technological and economic capabilities and welfare and security of the people. Perhaps, what can be seen closest to this argument of prestige is the issue of 'strategic autonomy.' Brajesh Mishra, national security advisor to PM Vajpayee, announced that the Indian nuclear weapons "aimed at providing us the autonomy of strategic choices in the best interest of the country, without fear or coercion in a nuclearized environment."[51]

A notable contribution at this level has been made by Priyanjali Malik who examined the public debate which took place among the Indian elites and the middle class before the tests.[52] She contended that the international pressure on India to sign the NPT and CTBT was seen by 'attentive India' as not only a security threat but also infringement of India's sovereignty. This backdrop of public debate becomes especially important because of the emphasis laid on 'welfare and security of the people' in a Kautilyan framework.

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[48]George Perkovich, "What Makes The Indian Bomb Tick?", in D. R. SarDesai and Raju G. C. Thomas (eds.), *Nuclear India in the Twenty-First Century* (Basingstoke and London: Palgrave-Macmillan, 2002), pp. 26-27.
[49] Kapur, *Pokhran and Beyond*, p. 3
[50] Chakma, "Toward Pokhran II", pp. 234-236
[51] "Opening Remarks by National Security Advisor Mr. Brajesh Mishra at the Release of Draft Indian Nuclear Doctrine," August 17, 1999.
[52] See Priyanjali Malik, *India's Nuclear debate: Exceptionalism and theBomb* (New Delhi: Routledge, 2010)

BJP – Party Ideology

At the lowest level of this approach lies the ideology and the leadership of the party in power when the tests took place. Perkovich argued that Vajpayee as the prime minister was the key representative of India's 'norms and identity' and invoked 'great power status and grammar of security strategy' in justifying the tests. Bharat Karnad had little doubt that Vajpayee's decision to test, at one level, sprang from his 'personal drive to disprove he was a weak leader.'[53]

A large part of the academic work points to a definite shift in political culture with the coming in of the BJP and the Pokhran tests of 1998. C. Raja Mohan figuratively called it "The Crossing of the Rubicon".[54] For Tobias Engelmeier, "Indian foreign policy is becoming increasingly more pragmatic, driven by strategic considerations based on realism."[55] Stephen Cohen similarly contended that the "Nehruvian perspective has been credibly challenged by a 'renascent-conservative-realist perspective and second, a more ideologically driven 'Hindutva' (or revitalist Hindu) viewpoint."[56]

In a similar vein, Runa Das compared how the ideological perceptions of India's leaders, in the post-independence era, have become manifested in different notions of nationalism which are reflected in their insecurities and nuclear policy decisions. In her view, "the political, economic, and developmental insecurities perceived by the Indian state under the Congress Party have become communal / cultural under the Bharatiya Janata Party, thereby, facilitating the BJP's justification of India's nuclear-weapon tests."[57] Ali Ahmed avers that material capability has enabled the shift, though ideology has had a role to play in effecting the strategic doctrine.[58]

While the Bharatiya Janata Party's (BJP) Election Manifesto (1998) stood in line with the arguments proffered above, little change has been brought about to the prevailing nuclear policy

[53]Karnad, *Nuclear Weapons and Indian Security*, p. 392
[54] C. Raja Mohan, *Crossing the Rubicon: The Shaping of India's New Foreign Policy* (New Delhi:Penguin Books, 2005)
[55] Tobias Engelmeier, *Nation Building and Foreign Policy in India: An Identity-Strategy Conflict* (New Delhi: Cambridge University Press, 2009), p. 247.
[56] Stephen Cohen, *India: Emerging Powers* (New Delhi: Oxford University Press, 2001), p.43.
[57] Runa Das, "Explaining India's Nuclearization: Engaging Realism and Social Constructivism", *Asian Perspective*, Vol. 32, No. 1, 2008, pp. 33-70. She explores, "how the BJP, guided by the religious ideology of Hindutva, has re-articulated geopolitical /territorial space called India to a perceived geocultural entity (called the Hindu nation/ rashtra), and in doing in a sharp disjuncture from the past Congress years, drawn "culturally-situated" logic of (in)securities to define the rashtra' s nuclear (in)security."
[58]Ali Ahmed, Email Conversation, August 19, 2017

posture. The Party pledged to "re-evaluate the country's nuclear policy and exercise the option to induct nuclear weapons."[59] However, in practical terms, it has worked within the traditional confines post-1998. As V.K. Saraswat, former Chairman, DRDO succinctly put it: "The change in governments, have had little or no influence on the direction of scientific research over several decades. It is the Narasimha Rao government that gave an impetus to the scientific development which finally saw the light of day in the Pokhran Tests."[60]

The Level of Analysis (LoA) approach has been helpful in understanding the complex basket of arguments rendered to explain the Pokhran tests. Among the contending arguments, the predominant one seems to be based on structural realism. In an anarchical international system, the states have to secure their national interests and would work towards inducting nuclear weapons if their major rivals possess them. However, leading International Relations theorists such as Kenneth Waltz and practitioners such as Henry Kissinger suggested that "India would or should have built a survivable, retaliatory nuclear arsenal long ago given its threat environment."[61]

While the realist explanation may be inadequate to explain the timing of the 1998 tests, it would be imprudent to completely dismiss it. It can be argued that nuclear restraint (due to certain domestic and ideational factors) occurred when the international security environment was not menacingly threatening and nuclear activism was witnessed when the security threats were grave. Therefore, what seems to be at play is an "intermediate structure between the power-acquisition imperative of the structure of the international system and domestic choices on how power is actually constituted."[62] This 'intermediate structure' constitutes strategic culture and is shaped by a "specific congruence of factors: historical context, technological capability, the availability of economic resources and, above all, ethical norms relating to nuclear weapons."[63] According to Basrur, the contours of this strategic culture with respect to nuclear weapons were shaped only in the post-independence period.

[59] Election Manifesto 1998, Bharatiya Janata Party; p. 197
[60] V.K. Saraswat, former Chairman, DRDO, Interview, 5 September, 2013, C.R. Rao Institute of Advanced Mathematics, Statistics and Computers, Hyderabad
[61] Perkovich, *India's Nuclear Bomb,* p. 454
[62] Basrur, "Nuclear Weapons and Indian Strategic Culture", pp. 181-198
[63] Ibid., p. 183

Nevertheless, it is plausible to argue that the Kautilyan framework of means-ends relationship helps comprehend India's nuclear policy programme to a large extent. The end-goal is defined as an integration of maintaining power and ensuring the welfare of the people; quite apart from the realist end-goal which privileges security over everything else. According to neorealists, states reorder their priorities when faced with a threatening environment irrespective of their economic condition.[64] On the other hand, the conceptual foundation of Kautilya's theory of state – the *saptanga* theory (dealt with in the previous chapter) emphasizes the primacy of the seven constituent elements of the state which together represent comprehensive national power. The strength of these *prakritis* (constituent elements) dictates foreign policy action and keeps international behaviour and domestic capabilities in sync with each other. Therefore, ascertaining the level of threat externally (a must in order to ensure security) and assessing domestic capabilities and readiness (economic viability, national consensus and sound counsel by ministers) emerge as two key ingredients in any nuclear policymaking.

Michael Liebig argues that *danda* (armed might of which nuclear weapons is an integral part) is an indispensible part of the *saptanga* aggregate. If, in the *danda* correlation of forces, there are no nuclear weapons and competing states have them, then strategic autonomy is compromised. The weaker the *prakriti* (individually and combined), the fewer options the ruler has. A balanced correlation of forces, notably with respect to nuclear *danda*, generates deterrence. A balanced or favorable correlation of forces enables a prudent pursuit of interests (Kautilya's idea of political prudence: *artha* makes dharma possible). The optimization of the *prakritis* opens up strategic options and strengthens Kautilya's idea of state sovereignty and strategic autonomy.

According to Kautilya, building state strength is a priority and optimizing the seven *prakritis* is Kautilyan normativity: peace is both India's self-interest and ethical goal.[65] It is this symbiotic relationship between power and *dharma* that some of the more recent scholars have failed to come to grips with. Dismissing India's strategic culture as an inadequate explanation for India's slow pace of weaponization, Gaurav Kampani notes that "leaders bound by moral imperatives do not order weaponization."[66] A comprehensive understanding of strategic culture as expressed in

[64] See Kenneth Waltz, *Theory of International Politics* (Reading, Mass.: Addison, 1997)
[65] Michael Liebig, Email Interview, October 15, 2017
[66] Gaurav Kampani in Anit Mukherjee, George Perkovich, Gaurav Kampani, "Correspondence: Secrecy, Civil-Military Relations, and India's Nuclear Weapons Program", *International Security*, Vol. 39, No. 3 (Winter 2014/15), p. 210

Kautilya's Arthashastra suggests that "the power of the state- manifested in the optimization of *prakriti* – is the precondition for realizing the normative obligation to ensure the welfare of the people."[67] Nuclear weaponization became a strategic imperative to ensure the welfare of the people in a nuclearized world. In absolute terms, possession and weaponization of nuclear weapons may be considered morally reprehensible. However, in an international system marked by anarchy, ethical restraint by nuclear powers cannot be assumed and the possibility of 'demoniacal conquerors' (*asuravijaya*) has to be taken into consideration to secure national interests.

In fact, the multicausal explanation (Indian political leaders' moral imperatives, their belief in "existential" deterrence, India's culture of strategic restraint, and the Indian polity's cumulative domestic constraints) offered by George Perkovich together resonate well with the strategic culture outlined in Kautilya's *Arthashastra*. Ironically, Kampani's claim that India's nuclear operationalization programme became the victim of a "hide and bide time"[68] strategy itself echoes Kautilyan strategic thought.

Therefore, the Kautilyan framework incorporates all the levels of analysis and presents the case holistically. While Pakistan and China did present a menacing environment for a long time, it was only when economic constraints on national resources had eased, technological capacities readied, national consensus built, and the threat of the NPT and the CTBT foreclosing India's nuclear option became real in a threateningly nuclearized neighbourhood, that Prime Minister Vajpayee ordered the tests. The party ideology may have facilitated the decision, but it was helped to a great degree by an increasingly permissive domestic environment. This argument assigns a dynamic character to Indian strategic cultural thinking because it relies on real time threat assessment and a variable comprehensive national power. To that extent material capabilities, in the run up to 1998, effected nuclear decisions. However, the episode of 1998 does not mark a complete shift in political culture as is made out to be. The constancy in certain doctrinal themes is reflective of a shared assumption and belief about the organization of the international system which has persisted since the time of Nehru. This will be analyzed in the discussion on the central strategic paradigms in the following section.

[67] Mitra and Liebig, *Kautilya's Arthashastra: The Classical Roots of Modern Politics in India*, 2016, p. 133
[68]Kampani, , "Correspondence: Secrecy, Civil-Military Relations, and India's Nuclear Weapons Program", p. 211

Central Strategic Paradigm and Preference Ranking in India's Nuclear Doctrine

After the nuclear tests of 1998, the National Security Advisory Board (NSAB) published a Draft Nuclear Doctrine (DND) in August 1999. While the then Prime Minister Vajpayee stressed that the DND should not be interpreted as the stance of the Government or the BJP, the official doctrine adopted in January 2003 was based mainly on this draft. These texts (DND and the official Nuclear Doctrine), along with the "Paper Laid on the Table of the House' on 'Evolution of India's Nuclear Policy"[69] will be examined as 'strategic-cultural artifacts.' The objective is to analyze the content of these recent texts and check for congruence in strategic preference rankings with text of a distant past i.e. Kautilya's *Arthashastra,* to attest the existence and persistence of strategic culture. These texts eminently qualify as artifacts because they are produced by "national security elites" and embody their conceptions of war and peace. The fact that the official Nuclear Doctrine has continued without any changes after its adoption in 2003 to this day despite change in governments (NDA-1998-2004, UPA I- 2004-2008, UPA II- 2008-2014), suggests certain constancy in beliefs in the threat perceptions and the appropriate response to them.

The security *problematique* envisioned in Kautilya's *Arthashastra* regarded the international environment as anarchic with relationships tending towards zero-sum. However, the most prudent way of responding to this was not an effective use of violence as would logically flow from the first two, but the use of force as the last resort. These central assumptions are reflected in the texts under study as will be argued in the following section.

The Role of War

At the ideological level, what are the basic assumptions about the orderliness in the international system? Whether war is considered an aberrant or an inevitable phenomenon stems from this general belief about security in the international realm. NSA Brajesh Mishra makes it amply clear in his opening remarks at the release of the DND – "Suffice it to say that this was a step

[69]On 27 May 1998, Prime Minister Vajpayee presented a paper in the Parliament on the evolution of India's nuclear policy. Paper laid on the Table of the House on "Evolution of India's Nuclear Policy", Press Information Bureau, Government of India, accessed at http://www.nti.org/media/pdfs/32_ea_india.pdf?_=1316627913

necessitated by the security environment and our need to ensure for ourselves the element of strategic autonomy."[70] 'Security' and 'strategic autonomy' are, in fact, the watchwords of the DND too: "Autonomy of decision making in the developmental process and in strategic matters is an inalienable democratic right of the Indian people."[71] In an international environment marked by matsya-nyaya (anarchy because the ethical restraint of nuclear powers cannot be assumed), optimization of the *prakritis* (the seven constituent elements which include *danda*) becomes imperative. Having a nuclear option not only optimizes *danda* but also enhances policy choices in the conduct of international affairs. In Kautilya's *Arthashastra*, *mitra* is the last (seventh) *prakrit* which suggests that allies or treaties are the least useful of the elements of national power because they change with changing interests. Therefore, 'strategic autonomy' is crucial and can be brought about by improving the health of the *prakritis*.

The development of nuclear technology has, indeed, transformed the axioms of global security. A nuclear weapons-free world was the most desirable choice to enhance one's security and avert mass destruction in the likelihood of a nuclear war. However, in the 'absence of universal and non-discriminatory disarmament', the nuclearized world is fraught with dangers that has been created by "an arbitrary division between nuclear haves and have nots."[72] In a world where some countries had doctrines that permit the first use of nuclear weapons and were actively engaged in modernizing their nuclear arsenals, "India was left with little choice."[73]

A necessary concomitant of an anarchic and unequal international system is the notion of self defence. Kenneth Waltz calls it the "military logic of self-help"[74] – and "there are no better means of self-protection than nuclear weapons."[75] Consistent with the UN Charter, which sanctions the right to self-defence, the DND states that "India's strategic interests require effective, credible nuclear deterrence and adequate retaliatory capability should deterrence fail."[76]

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[70] Opening Remarks by National Security Advisor Mr. Brajesh Mishra at the Release of Draft Indian Nuclear Doctrine, August 17, 1999.
[71] The Draft Report of National Security Advisory Board on Indian Nuclear Doctrine, August 17, 1999
[72] "Evolution of India's Nuclear Policy", Paper laid on the Table of the House, 1999
[73] Ibid.
[74] Raju G. C. Thomas, ed., *Yugoslavia Unraveled: Sovereignty, Self-Determination, Intervention* (Lanham, MD: Lexington Books, 2003)
[75] See Derek D. Smith, *Deterring America: Rogue States and the Proliferation of Weapons of Mass Destruction* (Washington, DC: The Brookings Institution, 2006)
[76] Ibid., 2.0

In Kanti Bajpai's assessment of Indian strategic culture with respect to nuclear weapons, the three schools of thought (Nehruvians, Neoliberals and Hyperrealists) are aligned in their perception of the international environment. "They believe that nuclear weapons are vital for India's security in a world which shows no signs of moving towards abolition and which is inhabited by regional nuclear powers - China and Pakistan - that threaten India's security."[77] "Neoliberals, like Nehruvians and Hyperrealists, note that the nuclear weapons states (NWSs) continue to reaffirm the fundamental importance of nuclear weapons in their security postures.[78] Rajesh Basrur too delineates Indian strategic culture with reference to nuclear weapons and treats the concept as historically located within the time period of the existence of nuclear weapons. He identifies the 'ideational' component of strategic culture at two levels: the level of basic assumptions and beliefs about the international security environment and the operational level relating to preferences of the state in responding to the threat environment. These broadly correspond with the concepts of 'central strategic paradigm' and 'grand strategic preference ranking'that have been gleaned from Kautilya's *Arthashastra*. In a survey done with official and non-official members of Indian strategic elite[79], Basrur concludes that "reading between the lines, it is clear they are all realists who believe in the primacy of conflict."[80]

Nature of Adversary

In a threatening international security environment where pursuit of self-defence becomes preeminent, relationship with adversaries usually tend towards zero-sum. The then Prime Minister Vajpayee in a letter written to the US President Bill Clinton soon after the tests expressed his concern at the 'deteriorating security environment, especially the nuclear'.[81] He drew Clinton's attention to the 'overt nuclear weapons state' on India's borders which had

[77] Kanti Bajpai, "Indian Strategic Culture", in *South Asia in 2020: Future Strategic Balances and Alliances* (ed.) By Michael R. Chambers, November 2002, p. 282

[78] K. Subrahmanyam, "Nuclear India in Global Politics," *Strategic Diges*t, Vol. 28, No. 12, December 1998, p. 2007.

[79] Basrur examines two sets of sources. The first consists of six detailed expositions by strategic experts on desirable nuclear strategy. Five are individual sources: Vijai K. Nair (1996), Raja Menon (2000), Jasjit Singh (1998), K. Subrahmanyam (1994) and K. Sundarji (1992/93). The sixth is the National Security Advisory Board (1999), which he classifies as non-official because it consists largely of individuals working outside the government. The second category consists of extensive interviews, many confidential, with members of the strategic elite. These are serving and retired individuals, civilian and military, official and non-official.

[80]Basrur, "Nuclear Weapons and Indian Strategic Culture", p. 190

[81] Text of a letter sent on Monday to President Clinton from Indian Prime Minister Atal Bihari Vajpayee.

committed aggression in1962. Explaining the rationale for the tests, mention was also made of the 'material' help given by China to Pakistan in a covert manner which had added to the distrust. The letter also stated that, "The series of tests are limited in number and pose no danger to any country which has no inimical intentions towards India."[82] Friendship and cooperation with the US, in particular, was reaffirmed.

Kautilya's *mandala* theory consists of both hostile and friendly states. All states in the system define their relationship with the other in a dynamic manner based on several factors – relative stage of decline or progress of the state, health of the constituent elements (*prakritis*) and relative power equations. In the realm of India's nuclear policy, the dynamic element is represented well in the DND in the context of 'credible minimum deterrence.' "This is a dynamic concept related to the strategic environment, technological imperatives and the needs of national security."[83]

Concomitantly, the DND states that while the need to induct nuclear weapons may be necessitated by the threatening nuclearized neighbourhood, details of policy and strategy concerning force structure, deployment and nature of deterrence logically flow from these dynamic factors and, therefore, are 'laid down separately' and kept under 'constant review.'[84] A defensive nuclear posture may be easy on the resources but its robustness lies in its ability to accommodate change in the future, is necessary. As Jaswant Singh reasoned, "There's no fixity to minimum, there cannot be, because it is a variable, in technological terms, in terms of physical numbers, it is a variable in terms of the launch capacity."[85] The then National Security Advisor, Brajesh Mishra reinforced the point, "We had a certain threat scenario then and decided what we needed generally –Pakistan, China, and we don't want the USS Enterprise coming again. But we could not have decided then what it is going to be like 10 years, 15 years, 20 years from now."[86] Kautilya too lays emphasis on a constant revision of the threat scenario and suggests the superiority of counsel (*mantra*) over might (*prabhava*) and energy (*utsah*). "For, the king with the eyes of *intelligence* and *science*, is able to take counsel even with a small effort and to over-reach enemies possessed of energy and might…." (emphasis added) (9:1:15)[87]

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[82] Ibid.
[83] Draft Nuclear Doctrine (DND), 2.2
[84] Ibid., 1.6
[85] Interview with Jaswant Singh, April 21, 2007, in Karnad, *Nuclear Weapons and Indian Security*, p. 89
[86] Interview, April 25, 2007, in Karnad, Ibid., p. 89
[87] R. P. Kangle, *The Kautilya Arthashastra Part II: Translation with Critical and Explanatory Notes* (Delhi: Motilal Banarsidass Publishers, 1972), p. 407.

The official nuclear doctrine which was adopted in 2003 differed from the DND in one crucial respect which highlights the point mentioned above. The NSAB drafters had debated whether to include nuclear retaliation to chemical and biological weapons use or not. It was omitted in 1999 because of the technological handicap of not being able to identify clearly the origins of the aggressor country. Some five years later the doctrine was padded with the provision.[88] It was possible because the National Technical Research Organization (NTRO) was formed with the principal focus to "finger-print what was coming from where" in the nuclear sphere and to develop nuclear forensics, keep track of developments in the extended region, and to give advance warning."[89] This is a striking example of a useful incorporation of a technological advancement.

The strategy of deterrence which is at the heart of nuclear weapons is shaped by certain dynamism in a dyadic relationship. Apart from physical nuclear capabilities which are needed to maintain the credibility of the nuclear force, a deterrent strategy is also practiced as a 'mindgame.'[90] The 'quality of deterrent messages' sent out to the public and adversaries reflect the quality of a country's deterrence strategy.[91] In this context, mention must be made of introduction of the notion of 'massive' retaliation to a nuclear attack on India. The 1999 doctrine had only talked of a 'punitive' retaliation that would cause 'unacceptable' damage. The important qualifier in the 2003 Doctrine diluted India's No-First-Use Pledge: "In the event of a major attack against India, or Indian forces anywhere, by biological or chemical weapons, India will retain the option of retaliating with nuclear weapons."[92] Rajesh Rajagopalan chooses to characterize the nuclear doctrine as "assured retaliation" rather than "minimum deterrence".[93]

The above discourse confirms India's perception of the international environment as anarchic. This presupposes adversarial and zero-sum game with hostile nuclear powers. Andrew Latham

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[88] Cabinet Committee on Security Reviews Progress in Operationalizing India's Nuclear Doctrine, 4 January, 2003- "However, in the event of a major attack against India, or Indian forces anywhere, by biological or chemical weapons, India will retain the option of retaliating with nuclear weapons" (2 vi)

[89] Interview with Satish Chandra, July 3, 2007, in Karnad, *Nuclear Weapons and Indian Security*, p. 104

[90] Kapur, *Pokhran and Beyond*, p. 13

[91] Ibid.

[92] The Cabinet Committee on Security Reviews operationalization of India's Nuclear Doctrine, 4 January, 2003. Accessed at http://www.mea.gov.in/press-releases.htm?dtl/20131/The+Cabinet+Committee+on+Security+Reviews+perationalization+of+Indias+Nuclear+Doctrine

[93] Rajesh Rajagopalan, "Assured Retaliation: The Logic of India's Nuclear Strategy," in Muthiah Alagappa, ed., *The Long Shadow: Nuclear Weapons and Security in 21st Century Asia* (Stanford, CA: Stanford University Press, 2008), pp. 188 – 214.

levels the charge that a Kauitlyan paradigm views relationship in a zero-sum format and, therefore, the role of confidence-and-security building measures is seen contrary to India's interests. Any measure that benefits Pakistan (in particular) is seen as antithetical to national interest and all attempts towards a sustained and meaningful confidence-building process are consequently blocked.[94] It would be pertinent to mention here that while the central paradigm delineated from Kautilya's *Arthashastra* does acknowledge inter-state relationships tending towards zero-sum, it is the accommodationst and conciliatory grand strategic preference (rated higher than an offensive one) which has been used to tackle the security *problematique* in relation to Pakistan and China. Rajesh Basrur rightly points out that India has signed a wide range of CBMs with Pakistan and China and that a realist world-view need not prevent arms control. Rajiv Gandhi in early 1989 agreed with his Pakistani counterpart, Benazir Bhutto that their countries would refrain from targeting each other's nuclear facilities in the event of war.

At this juncture, it is appropriate to shift the focus of the narrative to the third leg of the central paradigm triad – 'Use of Force.'

Utility of the Use of Force

Logically, the inevitability of war rooted in enemy's disposition to threaten one's national security should lead to the application of a superior force. Quite to the contrary, the use of force is advised as the last resort in Kautilya's *Arthashastra* and is also the basic premise of India's Nuclear Doctrine, much to the annoyance of the 'maximalists.' It needs to be clarified at the onset that this is a result not of 'religious pacifism' but is based on realist considerations. Kautilya enjoins the king to pursue policies that would lead the nation-state to *vriddhi* (profit) and avoid those that cause *kshya* (loss). The level of mutual destruction associated with nuclear wars makes their use prohibitive and are, therefore, seen as political rather than war-fighting weapons. "India, mindful of its international obligations, shall not use these weapons to commit aggression or to mount threats against any country; these are weapons of self-defence and to ensure that, in turn, India is also not subjected to nuclear threats or coercion."[95] Michael Liebig

[94] For a detailed explication see Andrew Latham, "Constructing National Security: Culture and Identity in Indian Arms Control and Disarmament Practice", *Contemporary Security Policy*, Vol. 19, No. 1, April 1998, "Culture and Security, Multilateralism, Arms Control and Security Building", ed. Keith R. Krause, A Frank Kass Journal, p. 150

[95] Paper laid on the Table of the House, "Evolution of India's Nuclear Policy"

likens this to Kautilyan thought which was against expansionism or imperialism and, therefore, considers a minimum nuclear deterrent adequate.[96]

Shivshankar Menon while trying to identify an Indian doctrine of use of force, suggests that "A simple reading of the Arthashastra suffices to prove how evolved Indian strategic culture was as early as the third century before Christ, and how the use of force was limited both by practical and moral considerations."[97] It is a culture which relies on "augmentation, diplomacy and law before recourse to the use of force."[98] He concedes that the Indian Nuclear Doctrine is reflective of this culture with its emphasis on minimum deterrence, 'No First Use' and commitment to nuclear disarmament.

The DND clearly states that, "The fundamental purpose of Indian nuclear weapons is to deter the use and threat of use of nuclear weapons by any State or entity against India and its forces."[99] The No-First-Use (NFU) clause is probably the clearest manifestation of the political utility of nuclear weapons. "India will not resort to the use or threat of use of nuclear weapons against States which do not possess nuclear weapons, or are not aligned with nuclear weapon powers."[100] The centre-right government adopted this doctrine and all subsequent governments have reiterated this pledge. In the context of a nuclear war, Kautilya's dictum that "The king shall undertake a march when the expected gain outweighs the losses (*kshaya*) and expenses (*vyaya*)" (9.4.3)[101], renders the initiation of a nuclear war irrational.

While this declaration may have an ethical basis, it is also rational because India has a strong enough conventional military force to take care of any adverse eventuality. Concomitantly, the draft doctrine stresses on maintaining an effective conventional military capability so that the threshold to a nuclear war or the threat to use a nuclear weapon is substantially raised. The 'credibility', 'effectiveness' and 'survivability' aspects of the nuclear deterrent are given special attention to so that the threshold is maintained and the deterrence logic prevails. 'Minimum' and

[96] Michael Liebig, Email Interview, October 15, 2017.
[97] Shivshankar Menon, Speech at National Defence College, "The Role of Force in Strategic Affairs", October 21, 2010.
[98] Ibid.
[99] Draft Nuclear Doctrine (DND), 2.3
[100] Ibid.
[101] L. N. Rangarajan, *Kautiya: The Arthashastra* (New Delhi: Penguin Books, 1987), p. 634.

'credible' are the 'watchwords' of the doctrine and from this flows the decision to adopt a NFU posture.[102]

The DND also commits itself to seeking, negotiating and instituting 'appropriate nuclear risk reduction' and 'confidence building measures' in the view of the destructive potential of the nuclear weapons. The three schools of thought outlined by Kanti Bajpai too see the political utility of the weapons, though in varied forms. "Where Nehruvians see nuclearization as a part of a strategy of resistance to a hegemonic world order, neoliberals see it as a way of striking a bargain with the great powers, while hyperrealists perceive the acquisition of nuclear weapons as fundamental to India's status as a great power."[103]

The sample study done by Basrur on beliefs and assumptions of the strategic elites reveals interesting findings. The official preferences reveal that the doctrine has shown no development leading to targeting or other conditions under which nuclear weapons may be used. Among the non-official preferences, half the strategic experts favoured deployment and the others preferred deterrence without deployment. However, without exception, all the experts believed that nuclear weapons should only be used for a second strike.

While India foreswears the use of nuclear weapons, the doctrine "envisages assured capability to shift from peacetime deployment to fully employable forces in the shortest possible time, and the ability to retaliate effectively even in a case of significant degradation by hostile strikes."[104] "The DND, by distinguishing between 'peacetime deployment' and 'full employment' during a crisis, implies some form of pre-deployed posture during normal times."[105]

Grand Strategic Preference Ranking

From the discussion so far, it is evident that the conceptualization of India's Nuclear Doctrine has happened at a grand strategic level. It encapsulates the basic assumptions about the nature of the international environment, the character and scope of nuclear war as a policy instrument, the economic and technological readiness of the country, and the disposition of the chief adversaries,

[102] "Opening Remarks by National Security Advisor Mr. Brajesh Mishra at the Release of Draft Indian Nuclear Doctrine," August 17, 1999.
[103] Kanti Bajpai, "Indian Strategic Culture", p. 284
[104] DND, 1999
[105] Basrur, "Nuclear Weapons and Indian Strategic Culture", p. 192

China and Pakistan. Nuclear policy, therefore, forms an important part of national security and it would be erroneous to view it narrowly in a military sense. The text of the DND conveys in unequivocal terms the grand strategic preference ranking delineated in the *Arthashastra* as explained below.

1)**Accommodationist** – The DND sets out by highlighting nuclear weapons as the 'gravest threat' to humanity. The possession of these on a selective basis legitimized through permanent extension of the Nuclear Non-Proliferation Treaty (NPT) points towards the virtual abandonment of nuclear disarmament. In this context, it states clearly that "India's primary objective is to achieve economic, political, social, scientific and technological development within a peaceful and democratic framework." It states that its overall objective is to 'cooperate with the global democratic trends' and to help advance the international system to a 'just, peaceful and equitable order.' In the same vein, the doctrine also commits to persuade other nuclear weapon powers to join an international treaty banning first-use. Commitment to nuclear risk reduction and confidence building measures are also reaffirmed.

With reference to India's neighbours, the 'Paper Laid on the Table of the House' states, "Our policies towards our neighbours and other countries too have not changed; India remains fully committed to the promotion of peace with stability, and resolution of all outstanding issues through bilateral dialogue and negotiations. The Government will continue to remain engaged in substantive dialogue with our neighbours to improve relations and to expand the scope of our interactions in a mutually advantageous manner."[106]

It is well acknowledged that since the beginning of the nuclear age, India has led the charge for "universal and non-discriminatory disarmament." In this context, the decision to acquire nuclear weapons has been seen by many as a 'nuclear dilemma.' Policy makers describe it as the 'best of the worst' choices facing India and, therefore, the military utility of the weapons are yet to be given shape doctrinally. Nuclear weapons have been considered "morally, legally and politically indefensible."[107] Shivshankar Menon explains the 'apparent paradox': "We do think that we would be more secure in a world that is truly free of nuclear weapons. But until we arrive at that

[106] Paper laid on the Table of the House, "Evolution of India's Nuclear Policy"
[107] Praful Bidwai, "BJP's Nuclear Stance Seen as Undermining Security," *India Abroad*, April 10, 1998.

happy state, we have no choice, and a responsibility toward our own people, to have nuclear weapons to protect them from nuclear threats."[108]

This dilemma has been portrayed more emphatically by Bharat Karnad: "For a self-proclaimed 'Nuclear Weapons State', disarmament is a manifestly counter-productive policy thrust…. Alas, Delhi hangs on to the vestiges of the past by conjoining its imperative to weaponise with the sentimental craving to advance disarmament. This is a somewhat quixotic and contrarian effort, especially in a milieu where military power is the fulcrum of international diplomacy."[109]

Seen from a Kautilyan paradigm, these objectives may not appear very dualistic. While all efforts were made to rid the world of the ethically reprehensible weapons, the permanent legitimation of the existence of these weapons on a select basis cleaved the world and endangered India's national security concerns. It is at this point that the decision to overtly nucleraize was taken.

2)**Defensive** – While, for India, the most preferred option has always been and will always remain a nuclear weapons free world (politically normative choice), the adoption of nuclear weapons (a politically rational decision) and the subsequent nuclear doctrine, adhered to a defensive operational policy. An important component of India's doctrine at the operational level is the use of nuclear weapons for punishment alone. The policy of assured retaliation was incorporated because 'for the purposes of deterrence, the ability to retaliate with certainty is considered more important than the ability to retaliate with speed.'[110] The nuclear doctrine adopted in 2003 states clearly, "Nuclear retaliation to a first strike will be massive and designed to inflict unacceptable damage."[111] There was an inherent dynamism in this posture as what would cause "unacceptable damage" to the adversary needed to be revised based on shifting thresholds. The targeting philosophy of an assured second strike capability to inflict unacceptable damage sensibly, made arms-racing redundant.

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[108] Shivshankar Menon, *Choices: Inside the Making of India's Foreign Policy* (New Delhi: Brookings Institution Press, 2016), p. 119

[109] See Karnad, "A Thermonuclear Deterrent," in Mattoo (ed.), *India's Nuclear Deterrent* (New Delhi: Har-Anand, 1999), p. 114

[110] Ashley J. Tellis, "India's Emerging Nuclear Doctrine: Exemplifying the Lessons of the Nuclear Revolution", Volume 12, Number 2, May 2001, *The National Bureau of Asian Research*, 2001

[111] Cabinet Committee on Security reviews Progress in operationalizing India's Nuclear Doctrine, http://pib.nic.in/archieve/lreleng/lyr2003/rjan2003/04012003/r040120033.html, 4th January, 2003

Another important component of India's operational doctrine is its targeting strategy. "Given the modest capabilities of India's nuclear force, countervalue[112] targets alone can inflict the appropriate level of punishment for any nuclear transgressions against India."[113]

At the heart of this defensive operational policy is the elastic concept of "credible minimum deterrence (CMD)." The doctrine states: "India's nuclear forces will be effective, enduring, diverse, flexible, and responsive to the requirements in accordance with the concept of credible minimum deterrence." The CMD idea provides a flexible policy instrument enabling many diverse views about strategies and tactics, force structures, and nuclear-weapons use, and targeting schemes to compete and coexist under one conceptual umbrella.[114] As early as 1990 when Prime Minister V.P. Singh appointed a committee to submit a report on the nuclear doctrine, the members[115] were unanimous in recommending that the Indian strategy should be based on No-First-Use and Minimum Credible Deterrence (later it was changed to 'credible minimum deterrence' with emphasis on 'credible' rather than 'minimum'). "No one in the Committee would accept a pre-emptive strike, or Launch on Warning or Launch under Attack as a better strategy."[116] This strategy was adopted even before India's nuclear weapon capability became overt.

The deterrence requires that India maintain: "(a) Sufficient, survivable and operationally prepared nuclear forces, (b) a robust command and control system, (c) effective intelligence and early warning capabilities, and (d) comprehensive planning and training for operations in line with the strategy, and(e) the will to employ nuclear forces and weapons."[117] According to Michael Liebig, (a), (b), and (d) denote optimization of *danda* and (c) and (e) have a remarkable similarity to Kautilyan echoes of 'intelligence' and 'will'. Together they correspond to Kautilya's three forms of power: intelligence, military and economic power, and ruler's valor.

[112] Countervalue targeting, also called countervalue strike, in nuclear strategy is the targeting of an enemy's cities and civilian population with nuclear weapons. The goal of countervalue targeting is to threaten an adversary with the destruction of its socioeconomic base in order to keep it from initiating a surprise nuclear attack (first strike).
[113] Tellis, "India's Emerging Nuclear Doctrine", p. 9
[114] Bharat Karnad, *India's Nuclear Policy*, (New Delhi: Pentagon Press, 2008), p. 2
[115] The Committee was headed by Arun Singh and the members were General Sunderji, Dr. Arunachalam, K. Subrahmanyam and K Santhanam as the Member-Secretary to submit a report on nuclear command and control as well as the nuclear doctrine.
[116] K. Subrahmanyam, "Introduction", in General K. Sunderji, *Vision 2100: A Strategy for the Twenty-First Century* (New Delhi: Konark Publishers, 2003), p. xxi
[117] Draft Report of National Security Advisory Board on Indian Nuclear Doctrine, August 17, 1999

"Thus the king, superior in each later one among the powers of energy, might and counsel, over-reaches (the enemy)."[118] (KA, IX, 1, 16) Additionally, the draft mentions that "forces will be based on a triad of aircraft, mobile land-based missiles and sea-based assets in keeping with the objectives outlined above."[119] This resonates Kautilyan emphasis of combined forces (infantry, cavalry, chariots and war-elephants) which are necessary and complementary for waging war. The usage of the term 'deception' too in the DND is a Kautilyan echo.

The survivability of nuclear forces against a first strike and to 'endure repetitive attrition attempts with adequate retaliatory capabilities for a punishing strike which would be unacceptable to the aggressor', forms the bedrock of a credible minimum deterrence. For Kautilya, military strength is based on the army (marching against the enemy) and the 'fort' as assurance for survival. Both '*durga'* (fort) and '*danda'* (armed might) are part of the constituent elements of the state and *durga* is higher in order than *danda*. "After securing a mountain fort or a forest fort in the rear, with means of retreat and reserves, he should fight and encamp on land suitable to him." (10:2:20)[120] In this context, Michael Liebig laments the absence of the mention of Air/Ballistic Missile Defence in the DND and thinks that Kautilya would have done so.[121]

The CMD is seen by many analysts as a compromise policy catering to external pressures and internal pulls simultaneously. Apart from the desired strategic advantage of preventing nuclear blackmail, it lent India with diplomatic benefits in so far as it exemplified "restraint" and in so doing held "the promise of attenuating U.S. nonproliferation pressures on India.[122] Also, importantly, it was a budgetary relief. In a joint seminar held by the Institute for Defence Studies and Analysis and The National Defence University, Washington D.C. in December 1990, Sunderji explained to the Americans: "In the Third World, minimum deterrence has much more meaning than McGeorge Bundy trying to sell the idea to the Unites States. There were really no economic or other compulsions to buy that kind of policy when you could afford to do it in the grander style."[123] He also explained in the seminar that these policies did not require response to be time-critical, thereby reducing costs of Command, Control and Communication.

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[118]Kangle, *Kautilya: The Arthashastra Part II*, p. 407.
[119] Draft Report of National Security Advisory Board on Indian Nuclear Doctrine, August 17, 1999
[120] Kangle, *Kautilya: The Arthashastra Part II*, p. 437
[121] Michael Liebig, Email Interview.
[122]Tellis, "India's Emerging Nuclear Doctrine", p. 9
[123] K Subrahmanyam, "Introduction", in General Sunderji, *Vision 2100*, p. xxii

It must be noted that "While India is committed to maintain the deployment of a deterrent which is both minimum and credible, it will not accept any restraints on building its R&D capability."[124] This is an explicit declaration of strategic autonomy, an important element in the Kautilyan idea of sovereignty.

3)**Offensive** – An offensive use of nuclear weapons requires a large arsenal with a "full spectrum" capability, an accurate delivery system with mated weapons, an effective Command and Control system and a robust strategic defence to counter the retaliatory attack. Evidently, India's nuclear doctrine does not exhibit any approximation to this at a declaratory or an operational level. On the contrary, India foreswears the use of nuclear weapons. The Indian President, K. R. Narayanan, in an address to the nation confirmed this position by solemnly stating that "nuclear weapons are useful only when they are not used. They can only be a deterrent in the hands of a nation."[125] The No-First-Use declaration is a fundamental component of India's nuclear doctrine and essentially highlights a defensive outlook. According to many, it is in line with India's 'traditional attitudes towards nuclear disarmament' and its unwillingness to legitimize the use of nuclear weapons for military purposes.[126] While first strike equals aggression, no-first-use equals deterrence.

While the No-First-Use declaration at one level is axiomatic of a mature, status-quo power like India, it is also based on realist calculations at another level. General Sunderji had reasoned out the adoption of this policy as early as 1990. The retention of the right to strike first is sensible under two conditions: when you believe that your adversary has a huge conventional edge and you don't intend to neutralize it conventionally; and the belief that you have a divine right to police the world. General Sunderji explained that "the first reason does not apply apropos China in so far as deployable forces are concerned…….as far as Pakistan is concerned, there is no inferiority."[127] The second reason does not apply as India does not consider itself as a regional policeman. Therefore, there was no loss; rather it earned India's nuclear doctrine the label of "nuclear restraint." One of Sunderji's favourite quotes was from Professor Kenneth Waltz: "More is not better if less is enough."

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[124] DND

[125] "Address to the Nation by Shri K. R. Narayanan, President of India, on the Occasion of the Closing Function of the Golden Jubilee of India's Independence, Central Hall of Parliament, New Delhi—August 15, 1998," India News, July 16–August 15, 1998, p. 3.

[126]Tellis, "India's Emerging Nuclear Doctrine", p. 54

[127] K. Subrahmanyam, "Introduction", in General Sunderji, *Vision 2100*, p. xxiv

It is pertinent to highlight at this point the importance given to civilian control in nuclear decision making – a political rather than a military decision. "The authority to release nuclear weapons for use resides in the person of the Prime Minister of India, or the designated successor(s)."[128] In the Kautilyan scheme of things too, the ruler (*swami*) has the final say.

Shivshankar Menon, the National Security Advisor avers: "India's primary responsibility is and will remain improving the lives of its own people for the foreseeable future. In other words, India would only be a responsible power if our choices bettered the lot of our people."[129] In pursuance of this goal, a case is made out for India's nuclear strategy to be a combination of deterrence and reassurance in conflict.[130] In case of a lower-order nuclear attack, India should have a 'tit-for-tat' strategy to end the conflict at the lowest possible rung, thereby privileging people over territory and military. 'Being able to respond at an equally low escalatory run has the advantage of permitting early conflict termination; retaining the moral high ground, important for political point scoring; and maintain dominance at the same level of conflict'.[131] The consequence for grand strategy is to privilege conflict avoidance.[132]

However, it is beyond the scope of the chapter to delve into the debates about revising India's nuclear policy posture. The objective is to assess India's basic assumptions and beliefs about the international environment and ranked responses to the security *problematique* thus arrived, as expressed in the doctrines of 1999 and 2003.

India-United States Civil Nuclear Agreement

Seen through a Kautilyan prism, how does the deal fare? Clearly, with the international system marked by anarchy and relationship between states mostly characterized as adversarial, the deal presented a huge opportunity to India to counter a looming threat from a rising China in the neighbourhood. It reflected Kautilya's prudence in tackling a powerful enemy at its border. The nuclear deal presents a case of optimization of the seventh constituent element of the state: *mitra*

[128] DND
[129] Shivshankar Menon, 'Our Ability to Change India in a Globalised World', *Prem Bhatia Memorial Lecture*, 11 August 2011, New Delhi, at http://www.claws.in/index. php?action=master&task=930&u_id=36 (Accessed 13 September 2011).
[130] That the two are twinned is explicated in Michael Howard's, "Reassurance and Deterrence: Western Defence in the 1980s", *Foreign Affairs*, 61(2), 1982/1983, pp. 309–324.
[131] Ali Ahmed, "The Interface of Strategic and War Fighting Doctrines in the India-Pakistan Context", *Strategic Analysis,* 33, no. 5 (2009):708
[132] Ali Ahmed, "Political Decision-Making and Nuclear Retaliation", *Strategic Analysis,* 36:4, 2012, p. 513

(ally). Additionally, the deal saw India break free from the nuclear pariah status and be recognized as a responsible nuclear power. These had several economic and technological advantages.

The economic rationale of the deal is compelling. Perhaps the biggest constraint on India's economic growth has been energy crunch. According to the terms of the agreement, the United States committed itself to uninterrupted fuel supplies and agreed to help India in developing a strategic fuel reserve. India was also allowed to reprocess spent fuel from its civilian reactors in a new facility, which would be subject to IAEA safeguards.

Shyam Saran spells out the technology rationale too. "Indian scientists now have much to bring to the table, especially in areas where they have established technology leads."[133] Highlighting the importance of free technology transfer, Saran mentioned how acquiring a super-computer for weather forecasting had become extremely difficult due to nuclear driven export controls.[134]

According to Prime Minister Manmohan Singh, "India will not be constrained in any way in building future nuclear facilities, whether civilian or military, as per [India's] national requirements," and, "No constraint has been placed on [India's] right to construct new facilities for strategic purposes."[135] M.K. Narayanan (National Security Advisor at the time of the deal) too contends that the agreement was intended primarily to drive the civil-nuclear cooperation programme and that it was not being used as an "excuse to enhance our strategic capabilities."[136]

It is believed by some analysts that the US – India nuclear deal would give India the option to both keep its nuclear weapons program and preserve its access to international nuclear commerce.[137] Shyam Saran reveals that the mandate given to the Indian negotiating team was that "we should not accept any limitation on our nuclear weapons programme."[138] Therefore, all conjectures about India losing strategic autonomy following the nuclear deal were misplaced and grossly exaggerated.

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[133] Shyam Saran, "Indo – US Relations: An Agenda for the Future," Address to the Heritage Foundation, Washington D.C., March 30, 2006, <http://www.indianembassy.org/newsite/ press_release/2006/Mar/43.asp>.
[134] Ibid.
[135] K.Subrahmanyam, "The Nuclear Pact and Minimum Deterrent," *Times of India*, 12 December 2005.
[136] US and India Settle Negotiations on Civilian Nuclear Deal, AP Archive, published on July 21, 2015, accessed on 27th September, 2017, https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=wqpgZqQlmPQ
[137] Rajesh Rajagopalan, , "Assured Retaliation: The Logic of India's Nuclear Strategy", in Muthiah Alagappa (editor), *The Long Shadow: Nuclear Weapons and Security in 21st Century Asia* (Stanford: Stanford University Press, 2008)
[138] Shyam Saran, *How India Sees the World: Kautilya to the 21st Century* (New Delhi: Juggernaut, New Delhi, 2017), p. 203

It is clear from the above discussion that the basic beliefs and assumptions underlying the central strategic paradigm have persisted into the twenty-first century quite unchanged. India's new affluence and access to high grade weapons technology backed by 'political will' of the right wing BJP could have led India to shift from its posture of 'strategic restraint'. However, it chose a more defensive posture with NFU and CMD and stood firm on its chief goal to provide security and welfare to its people at the least possible risk. It is of significance that the prime ministerial candidate of the BJP, Narendra Modi, in early 2014 laid all doubts in the BJP ranks at rest by declaring NFU as a "reflection of our cultural inheritance."[139] Therefore the locus of strategic decisions is rooted in the strategic culture which subsumes the structure and lends meaning to it.

Shyam Saran puts it very succinctly: "India has articulated a nuclear doctrine that is appropriate to the current geopolitical environment, is aligned with its existing and projected levels of technological capabilities and affordability and most importantly, is reflective of India's domestic realities and its value system."[140] Amplifying Saran's views, M. K. Narayanan contends that India's 'nuclear dharma' (to strike only after absorbing the first strike) represents the highest ethical principles of foreign policy.[141] In a similar vein, Shivshankar Menon while acknowledging the contemporary relevance of Kautilya at a conscious and sub conscious level, marvels the notion of 'staying good while being effective'[142] – a theme which can easily be related to India's nuclear policy.

These undercurrents of Indian strategic thought are essentially an amalgam of political normativity and political rationality; "seeking legitimacy through the well-being of the people."[143] Ascribing the success of the 1998 tests to the "underlying national consensus", the policy paper laid on the table of the Lok Sabha proclaimed: "The present decision and future actions will continue to reflect a commitment to sensibilities and obligations of an ancient civilization, a sense of responsibility and restraint, but a restraint born of the assurance of action, not of doubts or apprehension."[144]

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[139] Aditya Kalra, Doug Busvine, and Sanjeev Miglani, "Modi Says Committed to No First Use of Nuclear Weapons," *Reuters*, April 16, 2014.
[140] Saran, "Is India's Nuclear Deterrent Capable?", p. 6
[141] Email interview with M.K. Narayanan
[142] Interview with Shivshankar Menon, 14th July, 2017, New Delhi
[143] Ibid.
[144] Policy Paper laid on the Table of the House, "Evolution of India's Nuclear Policy".

Conclusion

The quest of international relations scholarship has been to understand why states behave the way they do in the international system. Historically, cultural arguments have had profound, though not always measurable, effect on strategic behaviour. Modern theoretical attempts at understanding the precise role of culture in competitive international politics have generated a vast body of literature that has, in a sense, challenged the fundamental assumptions of political realism. Theory of strategic culture has provided a viable framework to develop varying notions of strategic culture, test their formation empirically, and measure their effect on the nation's strategic behaviour.

Following the methodological framework of Alastair Iain Johnston, this study has sought to treat Kautilya's *Arthashastra* (KA) as a formative Indian treatise on statecraft and credibly establish its relevance, across space and time, for India's contemporary conduct of foreign policy. Paradoxically, the text reveals that the complex, yet logical, procedure of arriving at the preference ranking incorporates quintessential 'structural-realist' ideas. They subsume material capabilities, balance of power, and relative power equations. However, it is the robust strategic culture which lends meaning to these objective variables and potentially determines state behaviour in a culturally unique way. In this sense, Kautilya's *Arthashastra* evidently represents the cross-fertilization of realist and culturalist arguments. It exemplifies the possibility of strategic culture having realist underpinnings or, put differently, a realist perspective moderated by cultural moorings.

This synthesis of the seemingly dialectically opposed strands has been the hallmark of India's strategic culture. What undergirds the policy decision making in India, which has credibly established itself as a 'swing state'[1], has become crucial in order to fathom the current behaviour and to make any credible projection. In addition, the effects of economic liberalization, nuclear weaponization and foreign policy 're'orientation in the period 1998-2014 account for a greatly enhanced matrix of power, as compared to the period before this. The evident change in material

[1] Daniel Kliman is a Senior Advisor with the Asia Program at the German Marshall Fund of the United States (GMF). He leads the Global Swing States Project, which focuses on whether four rising democratic powers—Brazil, India, Indonesia, and Turkey—will bolster the prevailing international order.

capabilities has provided an appropriate context to assess the degree of influence of objective variables in the calculations of foreign policy formulations. This study has attempted to develop the notion of strategic culture in India and evaluate its influence on contemporary Indian strategic behaviour.

The concept of strategic culture and the various strands of thinking which have evolved around the idea, have led to three generations of scholarship. A discussion on the broad conceptual and methodological themes that spurred debates and divergences, helped in the selection of the methodology for conducting the research study. The narrative highlights the strength of Alastair Iain Johnston's conception of strategic culture which dovetails with the agenda of the study – to assess the influence of India's strategic culture on its strategic behaviour.

Johnston's definition of strategic culture comprises of two parts. The 'central strategic paradigm' is arrived at by seeking answers to three inter-related questions about the role of war, nature of adversary and the utility of the use of force, which represent the basic assumptions about the strategic environment. The second part, 'grand strategic preference ranking', is a set of ranked preferences for strategic action which is most efficacious for dealing with the threat environment. These correspond to military and strategic culture and strategic behaviour, respectively. Therefore, the empirical referents of strategic culture are the ranked grand strategic preferences; the observable manifestations of strategic culture.

Theoretically, while material capabilities and distribution of power may convincingly provide the macro perspective of competitive interstate relations, it is the interpretive lens of culture that provides the useful and necessary complement in understanding a specific nation's security behaviour. "If rational state behavior is viewed as culturally conditioned in some way—in that the identity of a nation, the values it prioritizes, and the norms of behavior it judges to be desirable all shape how decision-makers approach the tasks of producing and utilizing power in international politics—then it might be possible to integrate instrumental rationality to explain different kinds of outcomes".[2]

[2] Ashley J. Tellis, Alison Szalwinski, and Michael Wills eds., "Understanding Strategic Cultures in the Asia-Pacific", *Strategic Asia,* 2016-2017, p. 11

The review of literature suggests an entire spectrum of scholarly writing ranging from indicating a complete absence of India's strategic culture to its vibrant presence, with shades of a dualistic presence in the middle. Importantly, most writings, whether modeled on Gray's or Johnston's approach, spelled out the significance of Kautilya's *Arthashastra* as a source of Indian strategic culture. Kautilya's *Arthashastra* also fit well with the criteria laid out by Johnston to select the 'object of analysis'. It unambiguously is the earliest work on statecraft that is accessible to the researcher, where strategic-culture derived grand strategic preference ranking may be expected to have emerged. Its sophisticated theoretical constructs make it a classic and therefore transcend the context of its origination. As a 'foundational text on Political Science and IR theory', it has exercised a wide influence over subsequent writings on military affairs and statecraft. It is a magnum opus on grand strategy, albeit without its mention in such terms.

The text is also examined from a theoretical viewpoint and extrapolates answers to three inter-related questions. The deduced central strategic paradigm views war as an inevitable phenomenon in an anarchic (*matsya-nyaya*) external environment, where relations with the adversary may tend towards zero-sum. The third corollary which follows logically from the first two in Johnston's 'extreme ideal type' is the use of superior force. However, Kautilya deviates from the ideal and instead suggests the use of force as the last resort. Therefore, while the possibility of a zero sum game in an anarchic international order is a real possibility, the use of force is considered the *ultima ratio*.

The basic assumptions about the external environment are operable in the realm of grand strategy. The broad understanding of contemporary grand strategy is "the combination of national resources and capabilities – military, diplomatic, political, economic, cultural and moral – that are deployed in the service of national security".[3] Kautilyan theory of statecraft captures the nuances of the approach at all conceivable levels. The end-goal which is defined as *yogakshema* (maintaining and expanding the power of the state and ensuring the welfare of the people) is clearly charted out based on the relative position of decline or progress. Thereafter, state resources in terms of material and non material variables (the seven *prakritis* or state

[3] This grand strategic formulation has been borrowed from Kanti Bajpai, Saira Basit and V. Krishnappa eds., *India's Grand Strategy: History, Theory, Cases*, (New Delhi: Routledge, 2014)

factors) is comprehensively assessed to gauge national power. In between the end-goal and the comprehensive national power lies the *sadgunya* (six foreign policy methods) cluster. The health of the seven constituent elements of the state and the correlation of forces between competing states, decide the requisite foreign policy method.

A cogent strategic culture is said to exist if the grand strategic preference ranking is logically derived from the central strategic paradigm. The basic assumptions and the accompanying preference order should be congruent though the object of analysis. Using the working typology of grand strategy proposed by Johnston, the chapter moves to the next logical step in the narrative to consider how the grand strategies are ranked in Kautiltya's *Arthashastra*. The chapter conclusively suggests that there exists a preference for accommodationist strategies, followed by defensive and offensive, in that order. It may be pertinent at this juncture to make a distinction between a preference for accommodation and the preference being tempered by the relative capacity to act coercively. Vasquez's 'opportunity model' of realpolitik behaviour suggests that states are predisposed to using force unless constrained by contextual variables.[4] In the case of Kautilya's *Arthashastra*, while it was, indeed, considered prudent to rely on conciliation in dealing with a mightier king, recourse to a peaceful alliance (*samdhi*) was advantageous for a host of reasons even when the rival state was vastly inferior in power. Therefore, material capabilities, while important in the calculations of comprehensive national power, were not the sole determining factor in the choice of grand strategy. War, as an exercise, was considered mutually detrimental.

The grand strategic preference ranking is clearly shown to be consistent with the central strategic paradigm. The preference for accommodationist strategy is in conformity with the use of force as the last resort. The two components of strategic culture evidently appear to be coherently interlinked. However, the real test of the independent, explanatory power of strategic culture as a variable is credibly established only when its influence on strategic behaviour is proven.

The theoretical framework sketched from Johnston's model is employed to assess the making of independent India's foreign policy in the Nehruvian era (1947-1964). It examines whether Nehruvian strategic thinking represented an accommodationist grand strategic preference

[4] Vasquez's 'opportunity model' is dealt with in Alastair Iain Johnston, *Cultural Realism: Strategic Culture and Grand Strategy in Chinese History*, (Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Press, 1995), p X

ranking similar to that in the ancient text on strategy. India's policy of nonalignment, bilateral relations with China and Pakistan, and Nehru's nuclear policy are specifically dealt with in order to arrive at a comprehensive assessment. Nehru's understanding of Kautilya's *Arthashastra* and the broader strategic and philosophical tradition that it is a part of is well depicted in his writings and speeches. Nehru's foreign policy typified the combination of Realism and Idealism[5]; a latent idea content in Kautilya's *Arthashastra*. Diplomacy was the preferred instrument of state policy, partly because of deficient state capacity.

Nehru's policy of nonalignment addresses the intrinsic link between the *saptanga* theory (the seven constituent elements of state power are the king, ministers, territory and population, fort, treasury, army and ally) and the *sadgunyas* (the six methods of foreign policy) in the most effective way. The health of the *prakritis* (state factors) in post-independence India prompted a neutral stance which emphasized strategic autonomy. The gravitational centre of the policy is peace, broadly presupposing the absence of war.[6] The promotion of peace through nonalignment subsumed endeavours by India to further economic advancement.[7] Therefore, nonalignment as an umbrella policy mirrored the needs of a still nascent domestic economy. Additionally, the development trajectory that India set itself on did not wholly appeal to either of the superpowers. However, "While India appealed to the US as the largest democracy, the Soviets were attracted to India's partially planned economy and emphasis on the development of the state sector".[8] The partial appeal to both camps helped India further its interests while remaining neutral.

The adoption of the framework of *Panchsheel* in India's bilateral relations with China and the recognition of Tibet are reflective of ideological and territorial accommodation respectively. India also tried to accommodate China in the international order in the face of stiff American opposition. India's support to China's entry into the United Nations while driven by accommodationist strategy, served the purpose of binding China to the international norms. India's policy towards China in the Nehruvian era blended realist aims and conciliatory methods; a foreign policy approach that Kautilya would have prescribed to a relatively weak power.

[5] This is evocative of John Herz's 'Realist liberalism', a fusion of 'Political Realism' and 'Political Idealism'. See John H. Herz, *Political Realism and Political Idealism – A Study in Theories and Realities*, (Chicago: Chicago University Press, 1951)
[6] Rajen Harshe, "India's Nonalignment: An Attempt at Conceptual Reconstruction", *Economic and Political Weekly*, Vol. 25, Issue No. 7-8, February, 1990, p. 399
[7] Ibid.
[8] Ibid., p. 400

Nehru's conciliatory approach towards Pakistan was essentially driven by the motive to maintain a peaceful neighbourhood in the wake of the disastrous effects of partition. The generous Indus Water Treaty (1961), efforts to normalize trade relations and resort to UNSC adjudication in the Kashmir issue are representative of policy measures that sought to reduce external entanglements. However, matters that concerned territoriality and national sovereignty were dealt with more severely, even at the cost of the use of force (1947). This is in line with the Kautilyan zero-sum format.

Nehru's nuclear policy, in particular, is demonstrative of the fusion of idealism and realism and political rationality and political normativity; the conjunction of *artha* and *dharma* in Kautilyan terminology. Nehru described it as the second industrial revolution and fully comprehended the dual use of nuclear technology. The development of nuclear technology was important to both ease the domestic resource base and to develop a nuclear capability to ensure security in a cleaved world of nuclear haves and have nots. Nehru's concerted effort towards world disarmament was not in contravention to his pursuance of nuclear capability, as is commonly made out to be. While a nuclear weapons free world was the preferred choice, a self-reliant nuclear arsenal was the surest way of optimizing *danda* (might).

The test of the theoretical framework and the grand strategic preference ranking order is further extended to a more contemporary period - 1998-2014. The time period is deliberately chosen as it stands in substantial contrast to the Nehruvian period in terms of the objective environment. The fluid international order post-1998 is significantly different from the rigid bipolarity that characterized the Nehruvian era. Domestically, the effects of economic liberalization, military modernization and nuclear weaponization represent more optimized constituent elements of the state as against the previous period. Additionally, with the coming of the National Democratic Alliance (NDA) led by the Bharatiya Janata Party (BJP) to power in 1998, and the promise to pursue national interest more 'vigorously', the possibility of domestic redirection seemed real. The persistence of grand strategic preference ranking in this drastically altered strategic space would establish the explanatory power of strategic culture as a variable more emphatically. Assessment of India's bilateral relations with the US under the policy umbrella of nonalignment, China at the regional level and Pakistan at the sub-continental level, is undertaken.

Nonalignment as a guiding principle in the conduct of foreign policy is seen to be persistently well-entrenched. 'There are certain elements in the model that are of perennial relevance and utility for India because these elements constitute the core values and aspirations not only of the 'modern' Indian state but also that of India's ancient history and civilization.[9] Strategies to develop internal capacities may be seen to be at variance with those adopted in post-independence period, but the strategic goal of autonomous action has persevered even in a multi-polar world order.

The inclusion of *mitra* (ally) as the seventh and last *prakriti* in the *saptanga* theory suggests that while internal balancing is preferred, external balancing can be resorted to to enhance comprehensive national power. There is no normative value in such alliance making and is chiefly driven by purposive-rational action. The 'convergence of interest' between the US and India is particularly seen in the realms of counter terrorism, bilateral trade, regional maritime security and in balancing the rise of China. India has been careful about maximizing its interest without compromising strategic autonomy. In Kautilya's *rajamandala*, the US also qualifies as the neutral king (udhasina). It lies 'outside the sphere of the enemy, the conqueror and the middle king', is stronger than the constituents of the *mandala* and is 'capable of helping the enemy, the conqueror and the middle king'.[10] The gravitation of India towards the US at the turn of the century was under the broad rubric of nonalignment. India sought to leverage the US to develop its indigenous capability for autonomous strategic action without being excessively dependent on it. The persistence of the 'entente' rather than an 'alliance' has been largely due to it being mutually beneficial in the period of study.

China fits into the middle king (*madhyama*) category of the *rajamandala*. India, the weaker neighbour has broadly adhered to Kautilya's practical approach to foreign policy – 'to neither submit spinelessly nor sacrifice oneself in foolhardy valour'. India's bilateral relations with China has witnessed the co-existence of convergences (non conventional threats, climate change, international economic order) and divergences (border dispute, balance-of-power politics) and India's strategy has been aptly described as 'walking on two legs'. However, the ranked

[9] Prithvi Ram Mudiam, "The Nehruvian Model and the Post Cold-War World", *World Affairs*, Summer 2006, Vol. 10, No. 2, p. 36

[10] R.P. Kangle, *The Kautilya's Arthashastra – Part II* (New Delhi: Motilal Banarsidass Publishers, 2014), p. 318-319

preference order in dealing with China has persisted to be accommodationist first, defensive second and offensive last.

India's strategies in dealing with China are assessed under the broad themes of border dispute, economic engagement, multilateral fora and military preparedness. The overriding factor in each of the realms has been to peacefully manage China. The realist undercurrent in the conciliatory approach is reminiscent of the Nehruvian era. India's efforts to modernize militarily and enhance its conventional and nuclear deterrent credibility are seen as optimization of *danda* which increases the flexibility of foreign policy action. It does not suggest war mongering. However, India remains clear that threat to territoriality and national sovereignty would be dealt with a stronger hand.

Bilateral relation with Pakistan has followed the narrative of the *upaya* cluster (*saman*, *dana*, *bheda* and *danda*). These are the four methods against which states use their will against resistance. Their ordering, as per the text, is in line with the grand strategic preference order. India is the stronger power, though not outrightly. Pakistan has access to the 'great equalizer' and takes recourse to asymmetric strategies and external balancing appropriately. The complex nuances of the bilateral relationship have invoked the use of a combination of the *upayas*, a prospect well endorsed by Kautilya.

While conciliation, sometimes also combined with 'gift', has been the preferred strategy, India has developed certain 'pressure points' that act as 'negative levers' in cases where accommodation does not work. The 'stability-instability paradox' has necessitated management of the relationship rather than grand conciliation. However, India has not shied from the use of force in matters that concern territorial aggression and threat to national sovereignty. While the use of force (*danda*) is the last in order, the precise mix of policies varies as the situation evolves. The use of one or a combination of means depends upon the objective sought, means available and relative strength. India's conduct towards Pakistan draws from a number of foreign policy methods - *vigraha* (war), *samdhi* (peace), *asana* (neutrality) and *yana* (marching). The simultaneous use of some of these policies has been a characteristic feature of the bilateral relationship.

India's Nuclear Doctrine is examined as a sample document from a different time period and strategic context to determine the presence of and congruence between preference rankings discerned from the formative text. India's nuclear policy in the period 1998-2014 has been unambiguously accommodationist. India has led the charge for 'universal and non-discriminatory disarmament' because nuclear weapons are considered the 'gravest threat to humanity'. It commits to persuade other nuclear weapons powers to join the international treaty banning first-use and maintains that 'bilateral dialogue and negotiations' remain the means to resolve outstanding issues with neighbours. Due to the 'apparent paradox', while India would be more secure in a weapons free world, protection from nuclear threats in the meantime is state's responsibility. The realist compulsions are, therefore, interwoven with the idealist goals and are not in contradiction with each other. The nuclear No-First-Use and 'credible minimum deterrence' tenets of the doctrine highlight its defensive nature and the threat to 'massively' retaliate and cause 'unacceptable damage' lend to its deterrence credibility. The doctrine states that India would not be restrained on building its R&D capability thereby highlighting its strategic autonomy. The economic rationale of India's nuclear posture and the India-US Civil Nuclear Deal toe the Kautilyan line in terms of maximizing gains at least possible risk. India's Nuclear Doctrine is indeed a unique blend of political rationality and political normativity.

The process of arriving at a grand strategy in Kautilya's *Arthashastra* is, however, similar to that of structural realism. The expected utilities of different strategies based on available resources and capabilities are calculated before arriving at any decision. Then, how are the predictions made by strategic-cultural model different from the ones derived from a structural-realist one? This is precisely the concern which theorization in the field of strategic culture aims to address.

It is important to mention here that in Kautilya's scheme of things, the objective indicators (military capabilities, relative strength, economic resources, internal cohesion) are viewed in conjunction with a highly normative dimension – the welfare of the people. This normative element is not rhetorical. The normative and ethical logic of the text is enshrined in the concept of *rajadharma*, which is essentially *dharma* in the context of the political sphere. Kautilya describes not just the practical utility to the ruler of being seen as practicing ethics, but also argues for a higher form of legitimacy based on dharma. It is this moralism that acts as a fine filter to the realist calculations thereby highlighting the potential independent, explanatory

capability of a cultural variable. The term "realism plus"[11] perhaps captures the essence of Indian strategic thought. Indeed "The Indian realist tradition is one of the few realist traditions in the world that has a place of pride for values".[12]

Therefore, strategic culture as deduced from the *Arthashastra* is not unaffected by objective factors. In fact, a scientific method of enquiry of the objective conditions is itself an inalienable part of the strategic culture. This implies an element of dynamism inherent in the concept. However, there is a set of core philosophical and ethical principles that are deeply embedded in the political culture and are less resistant to change. These constrain the effect that the environmental factors have on a nation's security policy. Put differently, the locus of strategic decisions is rooted in the strategic culture which subsumes the structure and lends meaning to it.

Johnston would identify this conceptualization of the relationship between strategic culture and other exogenous independent variables as one in which the policy makers are sensitive to structural conditions in a culturally unique way. The 'changes in exogenous conditions interact with a constant strategic culture to produce variation in the composite independent variable'.[13]

Kautilya's Arthashastra and Political Realism

The *Arthashastra* is a pre-modern work of Political Science and IR theory. While the antecedent texts like Sun Tzu's (544-496 BCE) *The Art of War* and Thucydides (460-400 BCE) *The Peloponnesian War* contain important realist elements, Kautilya's *Arthashastra* qualifies as the foundational text of the theory of Political Realism. The structural ideas and contents of the *Arthashastra* are also seen as homologous with modern political realism as represented by Machiavelli (1469-1527) and Hans J. Morgenthau (1904-1980).[14] Morgenthau locates the conceptual starting point of his theory of Structural Realism in ancient political philosophy – not

[11] The term "Realism Plus" is coined by K. Subrahmanyam. Shivshankar Menon explains, "What made KS' realism different from the common or garden variety of Western realism was his ability to combine a strong commitment to the basic values of the Indian Republic (of secularism, democracy and pluralism) with his realist pursuit of national interest", *K Subrahmanyam Memorial Lecture*, IIC, February 16, 2012.
[12] Shivshankar Menon, *K Subrahmanyam Memorial Lecture*, IIC, February 16, 2012.
[13] Alastair Iain Johnston, *Cultural Realism: Strategic Culture and Grand Strategy in Chinese History* (Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Press, 1995), p. 53
[14] For a comparison between Machiavelli and Kautilya, see Michael Liebig, "Kautilya and Machiavelli in a Comparative Perspective", in Michael Liebig and Saurabh Mishra (eds.), *Arthashastra in a Transcultural Perspective*, (New Delhi: Pentagon Press, 2017), pp. 113-172

only of Greece, as one would expect, but also of China and India: "Human nature, in which the laws of politics have their roots, has not changed since the classical philosophies of China, India, and Greece endeavoured to discover them. Hence, novelty is not necessarily a virtue in political theory, nor is old age a defect."[15] Morgenthau, the founder of the modern theory of political realism in the 20th century, had a number of conceptual homologies with Kautilya's theory of state. His concept of 'national power' can arguably be correlated with Kautilya's '*prakriti* aggegrate' and the concept of a fixed array of foreign policy action as a 'rational necessity' is shared by both.

There have been a number of comparisons made between Machiavelli's *Prince* and Kautilya's *Arthashastra* too. According to Max Weber: "The classical example of a truly radical 'Machiavellianism', in the popular sense of the word, in Indian literature is found in Kautilya's *Arthashastra*, which dates back to very early pre-Christian times, and is said to be from the time of 'Candra Gupta'. Compared to this, Machiavelli's 'Il Principe' is innocuous."[16] While comparisons of the structural concepts of the two texts reveal remarkable similarity, the foundational groundwork for the realist philosophy was indeed laid by Kautilya 1800 years prior to Machiavelli.

It would be pertinent to draw out the conceptual parallels of the basic tenets of Kenneth Waltz's Neorealism in Kautilya's *Arthashastra* to highlight the latter's contemporary relevance. Nerorealism, often called 'structural realism', presupposes the ordering principle of the international system as anarchic which essentially means the absence of a higher authority. Kautilya similarly describes anarchy through the concept of *matsya-nyaya*, the law of the fishes, where the stronger swallows the weak in the absence of the wielder of the rod.

The second ordering principle that flows from the first is that the international system is essentially a self-help system where states have to fend for themselves in order to keep themselves secure. The states are autonomous units which are functionally undifferentiated, seeking the primary goal of survival. The *vijigisu* (conqueror) in Kautilya's *rajamandala* (circle

[15] Hans Morgenthau, *Politics Among Nations: The Struggle for Power and Peace*, (New York: Knopf, 1978), in Liebig and Mishra (eds.), *Arthashastra in a Transcultural Perspective*, p. 13

[16] Max Weber, *Religion und Gesellschaft. Gesammelte Aufsätze zur Religionssoziologie*. Frankfurt am Main: Zweitausendeins, 2008, p. 203, quoted in Liebig and Mishra (eds.), *Arthashastra in a Transcultural Perspective*, p. 114

of states) too has a defined end-goal; *yogakshema* enjoins the king to maintain and expand the power of the state. *Self-help* is an underlying principle of the Kautilyan theory of state and internal balancing is privileged over external means.

The third distinctive principle of the structure of international politics is the distribution of capabilities. While the states are undifferentiated in terms of functions, the amount of power they possess differentiates them and constraints their conduct in the international system, effectuating variations in state behaviour. This echoes the Kautilyan intrinsic logic between the *saptanga* theory and the *sadgunya* cluster.

These conceptual homologies notwithstanding, Kautilya's theory of state is divergent from neorealism in some crucial respects. Kautilyan state's end-goal had a directionality that was both politically rational and politically normative; maintaining and expanding the welfare of the people dovetailed with the strategic goal of facilitating the political unification of the Indian subcontinent.

In sum, this study undertakes and hopefully accomplishes the task of extrapolating strategic culture from a formative text, in terms of a coherent set of ideas from which strategic-culture based grand strategic preference ranking rationally emerges, and brings it to its logical conclusion by establishing the persistence in preference ranking in a contemporary strategic context. It further argues that there exists an Indian strategic culture; a deeply rooted, consistent set of assumptions about the strategic environment and about the best means of dealing with it. The sound theoretical grounding of Kautilya's treatise on statecraft has withstood the test of time and space and continues to be relevant in the conduct of modern India's foreign policy.

Glossary of Sanskrit/Hindi Terms

aakranda – ally in the rear

apaddharma – 'dharma' of distress

aptavacana – verbal testimony of the sages

amatya – minister and/or senior administrative official

antardhi - weak intervening king

anumana - inference

anvikshiki – the science of enquiry

ari – adversary state

aribhavi – hostile neighbour

arimitra – adversary's ally

artha – wealth, power, means to gain wealth and power

asana – wait and see (in foreign policy)

Bhagvada Gita – epic poem within the Mahabharata

bheda – divide et impera

bhrityabhavi - vassal

chakravartin – ruler of the world – 'world' meaning Indian subcontinent

dana – gifts, making concessions

danda – armed forces; use of force

dandaniti – science of politics

dharma – ethical prescription for right conduct

Dharmashastras – ancient Indian treatises on duties, law and social conduct

dharmayuddha – ethical warfare

dharmishtha - righteous

durga – the ‘fortress’; capital city

dvaidhibhava – diplomatic double-game

gudayuddha - clandestine war

Itihas – the two Epics

janapada – the people

jiva – living being

kama – sensual pleasure

kosa – state treasury

kshya - loss

kutayudhha – irregular warfare

Lokayata/*Charvaka* – atheistic, materialistic philosophy belonging to the heterodox school

madhyama – middle king

Mahabharata – ancient Indian epic ascribed to sage Vyas

mamatva - “mine”-ness

mandala (theory) – configuration of friendly, adversary and neutral states

mantrashakti – good counsel and diplomacy

mantrin – closest political adviser of the ruler in ancient India

Manu-smriti – ancient Indian treatise on duties, law and social conduct ascribed to sage Manu

matsya-nyaya – ‘law of the fishes’; anarchy

mitra (mandala theory) – friendly state, no direct neighbour

mitra (saptanga theory) – allied state

mitra-mitra – ally’s ally

mitrabhavi – friendly neighbour

Mudrarakshasa – classical Indian play by Vishakhadatta with Kautilya as the main protagonist

Nitisara – ancient Indian political treatise by Kamandaka (influenced by Kautilya)

Panchatantra – ancient Indian collection of beast fables (a text for political instruction)

Panchsheel – 'Five Principles of Peaceful Existence'

parshnigraha – adversary in the rear

prabhavashakti - material resources consisting of the treasury and army

prakash-yuddha – regular war

prakriti – the seven (state) factors

pramana - knowledge

pratyaksha – direct sense perception

rajadharma – dharma (duty) of the king

rajamandala – circle of states

rakshana - protection

Ramayana – ancient Indian epic ascribed to the sage Valmiki

saman – conciliation

samdhi – peace

Samkhya – ancient Indian (atheistic) philosophy which assumes the simultaneous existence of *prakrti* (material) and *purusa* (consciousness) in life

samsara – religious doctrine of the cyclicity of life

samshraya – alliance-building

saptanga (theory) – the seven 'state factors': ruler, government, people, capital city, treasury, army, ally in foreign policy.

sadgunya (theory) – the 'six methods of foreign policy': peace, war, wait and see, augmentation, alliance-building and diplomatic double-game

shastra – discipline, compendium, textbook

sutra - axiom

swamin – the ruler or king

trayi – the three Vedas (*Rig Veda, Yajur Veda* and *Sama Veda*)

trivarga - ethical goodness (*dharma*), wealth and power (*artha*), and pleasure (*kama)*

tusnim-yuddha – covert actions

udhasina – distant powerful state; neutral king

upayas – the four methods of politics; sama, dana, bheda and danda

upajapa - psychological warfare

utsahshakti – energy, bravery, personal drive of the ruler

vartta – economics

vidya – knowledge

vigraha - war

vijigishu – conqueror

vriddhi - gain

vyayama – active foreign policy

yogakshema – acquisition and protection of land

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