

STATE AND FEMINIST NEGOTIATIONS IN POST- ARAB SPRING EGYPT: AN ANALYSIS

*A Dissertation submitted to the University of Hyderabad in partial fulfilment of
the requirements for the award of*

Master of Philosophy

in Political Science

By

Sharon Susan Koshy

Reg. No.: 18SPHL03



**Department of Political Science
School of Social Sciences**

**University of Hyderabad
(P. O.) Central University, Gachibowli
Hyderabad, 500 046
Telangana
India
June, 2019**



CERTIFICATE

This is to certify that the dissertation entitled “*State and Feminist Negotiations in Post-Arab Spring Egypt: An Analysis*” submitted by Ms. Sharon Susan Koshy bearing Regd. No. 18SPHL03 in partial fulfilment of the requirements for the award of Master of Philosophy in Political Science is a bonafide work carried out by her under my supervision and guidance which is a plagiarism free dissertation.

The dissertation has not been submitted previously in part or in full to this or any other University or institution for the award of any degree or diploma.

Dr. S. Shaji
Supervisor

Head
Department of Political Science

Dean
School of Social Sciences

DECLARATION

I, Sharon Susan Koshy bearing Regd. No. 18SPHL03, hereby declare that this dissertation entitled “State and Feminist Negotiations in Post-Arab Spring Egypt: An Analysis” submitted by me under the guidance and supervision of Dr. S. Shaji is a bonafide work and is also free from plagiarism. I also declare that it has not been submitted previously in part or in full to this or any other university or institution for the award of any degree or diploma. I hereby agree that my dissertation can be deposited in Shodhganga/INFLIBNET.

Originality report from the University Librarian is enclosed.

Date:

Sharon Susan Koshy

Place:

18SPHL03

Dr. S. Shaji

Supervisor

ACKNOWLEDGEMENTS

This research would not have been possible without the encouragement of a number of people. First and foremost, I must thank my supervisor Dr. S. Shaji whose guidance, critique and encouragement have been extremely pertinent in the completion of this work. I must also thank the Head of the Department of Political Science and my RAC member Prof. Manjari Katju, whose suggestions and critiques have enriched this study. I must also thank Prof. A. K. Ramakrishnan, Centre for West Asia Studies, JNU, for his valuable suggestions which added to the theoretical and conceptual framework of the study. I also extend my gratitude to Dr. Navaneetha Mokkil, Center for Gender Studies, JNU with whom my discussions on Feminist methods have been extremely fruitful towards the development of the theoretical framework. I also extend my gratitude to Prof. M. S. John and Dr. Uma Purushothaman, Department of International Relations and Political Science, Central University of Kerala, for their personal and professional support which helped me towards the completion of this dissertation.

I extend my gratitude to the librarians of University of Hyderabad, Jawaharlal Nehru University, South Asian University and Central University of Kerala and department librarian of Mahatma Gandhi University who granted me permission to use the books/journals/online database at their university and department libraries.

I feel grateful and extremely honoured to have been able to tell the stories of women and feminist activists of Egypt whose resilience and perseverance in the face of repression inspire me abundantly. I would like to extend my utmost gratitude to Omnia Al Desoukie, Noha Mohammed, Maro Youssef, Nadine Abou el Atta, Mai Shams, Salma El-Naqqash and others who would like to remain anonymous who entrusted me with information that was pivotal for the research, particularly the case studies.

I feel extremely fortunate and grateful to have Sanjith S. as a part of my life. This thesis or my time in Hyderabad wouldn't have been the same without your love, patience and support. Jilu Maria David, you have played a pivotal role in my mental health by giving me emotional support whenever I needed it the most. Micah Thambi, I have derived so much courage and perseverance from your abundant love and honest and nourishing criticism. I thank you for the friendship and camaraderie. I must also thank Visakh Visawambaran, who has been crucial in my personal and

academic growth, for believing in me and making me realise that there is limitless growth in places of passion. Aby Abraham, I have learnt so much from you, academic and personal; thank you for being a great friend in challenging times.

My academic experience at the University of Hyderabad has been an intellectually and personally nourishing because of a few people I'm grateful to call friends. Debomita Sandhya, Shivam Goswami Mitaja Chakraborty, Ananthu R A, Solanki Chakraborty, Ajith K, Thufail Korankulangara, Anan Ashraf, I cannot thank you enough for the love and support you showered at my lowest and highest of times; without you my past one year in Hyderabad would not have been the same. I also extend my gratitude to Akhil who spared time to proofread portions of this work. I'm extremely grateful to Dickey Lama who has been a real comrade and true friend in this endeavour.

And lastly, I thank the unconditional love, trust and support showered upon me by my family, especially my mother. Without she being there to love me or believing in me I wouldn't be finishing this thesis which I dedicate to her.

This study expanded my perception and knowledge regarding feminist struggles in the Arab world amidst governmental persecution and societal ostracization. I cannot express in words how the personal accounts of feminist activists in the face of repressive circumstances have inspired me to further my humble part in the larger feminist struggle. I extend my heartfelt gratitude to those brave souls who came before me and made the world a better place for future generations of women to live in.

List of Abbreviations

ANHRI- Arab Network for Human Rights Information

ASWA- Arab Women's Solidarity Association

IRT- International Relations Theory

WANA- West Asia And North Africa

CEWLA- Center for Egyptian Women's Legal Assistance

CEDAW- Convention of Elimination on All Forms of Discrimination Against Women

ECOSOC- United Nations Economic and Social Council

ECWR- Egyptian Center for Women's Right

EFU- Egyptian Feminist Union

EIPR- Egyptian Initiative for Personal Rights

FGM- female genital mutilation

FJP- Freedom and Justice Party

ICPD- United Nations International Conference on Population and Development

IMF- International Monetary Fund

LJP- Lawyers for Justice and Peace

MB- Muslim Brotherhood

NAM- non-alignment movement

NCW- National Council for Women

OpAntiSH- Operation Anti-Sexual Harassment

SAP- Structural Adjustment Programmes

SCAF- Supreme Council for the Armed Forces

VAW- Violence Against Women

WCWG- Women and Constitution-Working Group

WCD- Women and Constitution Document

WHRD- Women Human Rights Defenders

WHRDP- Women Human Rights Defenders and Sexual Violence

WPPA- Women's Political Participation

WWCC- Wafdist Women's Central Committee

CONTENTS

Acknowledgements

Abbreviations

Preface

Chapter 1	Feminist Perspectives in International Relations: An Overview	3-31
Chapter II	The History of Feminist Movement in Egypt	32-63
Chapter III	State and Feminist Negotiations in Post-Arab Spring Egypt	64-95
Chapter IV	State of Feminist Organisations in Post-Arab Spring Egypt: Analysis of Two Case Studies	96-130
	Conclusions	131-135

Bibliography

Preface

Feminist scholars and activists across the world have been trying to develop their own theoretical tools, away from Western discourses, to analyse the subjectivity of the female and the subaltern in their settings. The particularities in the subjective experiences of women in the Global South are emphasised by non-Western feminists, especially in the West Asia and North Africa (WANA) region whose histories and realities have not been adequately represented in mainstream and white/western feminist International Relations (IR) discourses. Epistemological obsession of mainstream International Relations, concurrent with predominance of Western bias in the discipline, with macro concepts like power, security, national interest and so on and negligence of subjective experiences of women have reflected in their conceptualisation of what counts as progress in terms of women's rights and radical social change. Such discussions have gained currency in the past decade, especially in the context of civil unrest and democratic transitions in WANA region in the aftermath of the 2011 Arab uprisings. Departing from such 'superior' notions as well as Western feminist ideals, the current study seeks to initiate a Feminist IR investigation into the state of women's rights in Egypt in the post-Arab spring context.

In general, the current study titled "State and Feminist Negotiations in Post-Arab Spring Egypt: An Analysis" traces the engagement of various strands of contemporary Egyptian feminist movements with the state actors of post-Arab spring Egypt by raising three research questions: One, what are the different strands of feminist thought in International Relations, and how did feminist perspectives and movements evolve in Egypt? Two, how did the democratic transition process and post-Arab spring regimes engage with and accommodate women's rights? Three, what are the methods/strategies followed by feminist movements and organisations in negotiating with the Egyptian state? By posing these questions, the study seeks to explore how Islamic and secular feminist strands manifest in women's rights in post-Arab spring Egypt; to examine state's engagements with women's rights by analysing the constitutions, legislations, public policies and campaigns since Arab spring through gender lens; to understand strategies employed by Egyptian women, movements and organisations to negotiate specific objectives and rights with the post-Arab spring regimes.

The study is organised into five chapters: The first chapter discusses various feminist perspectives in mainstream International Relations as well as the important strands of feminist

thought in WANA; the second chapter examines the evolution of feminist movements in Egypt prior to Arab spring by periodizing the events into Beginnings (1919-1952), Nasser period (1952-1970), Sadat period (1970-1981), and Mubarak period (1981-2011); the third chapter discusses the negotiations between state actors and feminist movements/organisations in post-Arab spring contexts by examining the transitional engagements, constitutional provisions, legislations and policies pertaining to women's rights, women's public participation and the state of feminist organisations; the fourth chapter undertakes the case studies of two feminist NGOs to get a better understanding of their antagonistic relationship with the state. The section on conclusions juxtaposes the research questions with the findings of the study and sums up the main arguments.

This study employs historical and empirical methods of research by analysing the various aspects of women's rights and feminist movements in post-Arab spring Egypt through a gendered perspective. The 2012 and 2014 constitutions, legislations and amendments, and policies and online interviews/email correspondence with journalists, academicians, and women human rights defenders (WHRDs) are used as primary sources of data. The research has also drawn material from scholarly works such as books and journals, newspaper articles, interviews, documents and reports of international organisations as secondary sources.

Chapter I

Feminist Perspectives in International Relations: An Overview

Among the different theoretical paradigms in International Relations, Feminism in IR launches a thorough investigation into aspects of different social relations and analyses engagement among states, individuals, and communities through a gender-sensitive lens. The feminist question is even more pertinent when it comes to studying the non-West, particularly the Arab region. Against this understanding, the scheme of this chapter is as follows: problematising the domination of Western scholars and ideas in International Relations Theory (IRT), relevance of Feminist IR and critiques of mainstream IR concepts and theories by Feminist IR scholars, suggested alternative interpretations and perspectives on international relations, emergence of non-Western Feminist IR and their critique of Western feminist perspectives, Arab feminism and its engagement in Egypt, reflection of Islamic feminist thought on Arab Spring in terms of women empowerment.

The shortcomings in the understanding of contemporary world mostly originate from intellectual spaces that are dominated by Western narratives without leaving room for non-Western perspectives to interpret their own realities. This intellectual silencing has been problematised by postcolonialists and feminists in their effort to take back the power in narrating and interpreting their own histories. They argue for significance of interpreting realities as intersectional sites of multiple inequalities so that discourses of non-Western peoples are no longer silenced or attempted to be incorporated into the mainstream Western framework. Western intellectual inclinations and presumptions pertaining to indigenous cultures, religion and so on that are propagated by Western dominated popular media, magazines, books, advertisements and speeches of Western leaders are often coloured by biased notions. Such impositions of values and Western originated definitions of progress are contested by non-Western scholars in order to reclaim the authority to interpret their own histories in making. Committing to this effort of epistemological departure from mainstream understanding of IR, and at the same time adhering to context specific readings of women's experiences, this study seeks to look into the post-Arab Spring lives and realities of women in Egypt. In order to understand the Egyptian experiences, it is essential to understand the feminist perspectives of the non-West/Third World/Global South.

Relevance of Feminist perspectives in IR

International Relations as a discipline has been mostly dominated by Western scholars who centred the analysis on the West, from the time of its inception shortly after the first world war. As a discipline, its growth and theoretical contributions could be traced to the establishment of the Woodrow Wilson Chair at the University College of Wales in 1919. The scholarship of IR and its evolution in the United States were integrated with the foreign policy analysis at an application level which led to the investment in area studies for their own self-interest, privileging Western, masculine values and propaganda much through the 1940s and 50s¹. Mainstream IR project consisted of Realist and Liberalist theoretical preoccupations which centered their narratives on those macro-level concepts that were beneficiary to the Western domination of global politics, such as power/cooperation amongst states, national interest, national security and so on without giving much attention to those rudimentary questions about the affectations of lives of the poor, women, and underprivileged classes in the realm of international, the significance of the domestic and, in many instances, blurring of the boundaries of the two. Hence, Feminist perspectives in IR takes issues with mainstream IR's theoretical preoccupations with concepts such as dichotomisation, predominance of power, inevitability of anarchy, obsession with grand narratives, and universalism.

Intellectual and cultural capitalisation implied not only deliberate forgetfulness of histories and realities of the subaltern sections in both Western and non-Western world and thereby, having a linear theorization of world politics, but also the misinterpretation of these subjectivities by forcing them into Western theoretical framework. Because the issues, everyday realities, challenges, and subjectivities of people in the Third World/Global South countries are different from that of the Western world, postcolonial, feminist, and critical theorists such as Gayatri Chakravathy Spivak, Chandra Mohanty Talpade, Amitav Acharya, Barry Buzan and Robert Cox have widely criticised Western originated theories as inadequate and inappropriate to be used as analytical frameworks to study Third World realities. As argued by Acharya and Buzan², it is only

¹ Vicente Rafael, "The Cultures of Area Studies in the United States." *Social Text*, No. 41 (Winter, 1994): 1, accessed April 28, 2019, <https://www.jstor.org/stable/466834>

² Amitav Acharya and Barry Buzan, "Why Is There No Non-Western International Relations Theory? An Introduction," *International Relations of the Asia-Pacific* 7, no. 3 (September 2007): 299-301, accessed April 22, 2019, doi:10.1093/irap/lcm012.

fitting that theories that are context specific be developed with tools to understand the complexities and nuances of the third world rather than relying on Western interpretative framework. The fundamentals of searching for an alternative approach is the Coxian injunction that knowledge is not neutral, it is always made by someone for someone for some purpose³. Knowledge production in a patriarchal world is always tilted to the benefit of privileged sections of white males. The Western bias in the discipline was such that efforts of non-Western theorists to bring new perspectives were derided as unauthorised intrusions into their intellectual territory.⁴ Acknowledging the power dynamics in theory making and narrating history is crucial to accepting alternative theories as the most relevant and appropriate to local and particular contexts.

With the emergence of post-positivist theories in IR following the Fourth Great debate, departure of theoretical understanding to develop a more inclusive and emancipatory conceptual framework and epistemological engagement resulted in subaltern perspectives being increasingly used not only in analysing global politics, but also revolutionising what counts as relevant topics in international relations. Post-positivist in nature, Feminist IR widely criticises mainstream IR theories' obsession with positivist approach. Tickner, in particular, in her *A Voyage through Feminist International Relations* criticises the quantitative approach for the limitations and politics of data collection. Instead, while maintaining a critical gender perspective, Feminist IR focuses on the micro level and offers a holistic vision on multiple layers of inequalities and injustices projecting women not as insignificant domestic cogs in the system but as influential international actors. For the very same reason, feminism is celebrated to be part of dissident/critical IR⁵ and women as part of its margins, for Feminist IR thinkers urged to change the thinking in academia which was hitherto preoccupied with promoting a particular set of masculinities, one way of seeing the world, one way of thinking and doing and one way of analysing the effects.

What Feminist IR scholars Tickner, Enloe and Elshtain sought to accomplish is to show how conventional IR privileges certain sets of values and downplays certain others which pushes certain

³ Robert Cox, "Social Forces, States and World Orders: Beyond International Relations Theory," *Millennium: Journal of International Studies* 10, no. 2 (June 1, 1981): 128, accessed March 25, 2019, doi:10.1177/03058298810100020501.

⁴ Yale H. Ferguson and Richard W. Mansbach, "Between Celebration and Despair: Constructive Suggestions for Future International Theory," *International Studies Quarterly* 35, no. 4 (December 1991): 383, April 22, 2019, accessed March 24, 2019, doi:10.2307/2600946.

⁵ In a 1990 special issue of *International Studies Quarterly* edited by Richard Ashley and R B J Walker

social relations and sections of the society to the margins. As argued poignantly by Cynthia Enloe⁶, the invisibility of women from mainstream narratives of IR and even within the third world narratives owes a great deal to the patriarchal power dynamics at play which thrives on discrediting history of larger underprivileged sections of the society. More often than not, in international politics, the stories of women are, mistakenly, projected as progressive narratives, without substantial engagement with feminist questions and historiography. Interestingly, this is done by making patriarchy sustainable and adaptable by certain seemingly innocuous strategies such as using updated language, appearing to be modern in ideas, acts of tokenism, and practice of cooptation.⁷

The antagonistic relationship between mainstream IR and Feminist IR owes to these ontological and epistemological differences: when traditional IR theories are focused on concepts like power, autonomy, state, citizenship, nationality and security, as well as conventional theorizing of international relations in abstract and unitary terms, feminist investigations are more interested in studying different social relations including race, class, religion, sexuality and regionality as well as fundamentalisms and colonial history of IR. It is interesting that when Feminist IR began to gain ground and make appeal, there have been instances where mainstream theories attempted to co-opt/absorb it into their own analysis. However, the fundamental differences in their understanding the world obliterated any possibilities of reconciliation⁸.

Mainstream IR sets Westphalian system as the *telos* for third world nations, many of which are still on their path to democratisation, with autonomy, power and sovereignty becoming the ideals to uphold. Feminist IR problematizes this casual going back to the Westphalian system as the origin of modern world and rather urges to focus on the histories of imperialism, genocide and dispossession. Focusing on Treaty of Westphalia and subsequent evolution of modern nation-state system do not necessarily match with the origin and evolution of state systems in Third World/Global South. For instance, state formation in most of the non-Western regions is rooted in

⁶ See Cynthia H. Enloe, *"Bananas, Beaches and Bases: Making Feminist Sense of International Politics"* (Berkeley: University of California Press, 1990).

⁷ (ibid), xvii

⁸ Feminist IR scholars declined Keohane's offer to become an ally of neoliberal institutionalism citing how 'institutionalist cooperation and reciprocity parted company with feminist understandings of these processes'. Christine Sylvester, *Feminist International Relations: An Unfinished Journey* (Cambridge, U.K.: Cambridge University Press, 2002), 12.

nationalist struggle against imperialism, while some yet remain stateless nations. Thereby, when mainstream IR does not recognise this paramount difference, it is only ignoring the history of majority of population, and imposing a set of foreign values and ideals alien to them.

Hence, this leads to the question as to what forms the crux of Feminist ontology in IR. One of the most poignant answers to this question is from Peter Beckman and Francine D'Amico⁹ who characterise gender understanding of Feminist IR and mainstream IR as *gender-as-power*¹⁰ and *gender-as-difference*¹¹ respectively, for feminist projects seek to call out the unhealthy and unequal power relations among various social structures and relations. They look at the process of 'gendering' rather than the construction of the product 'gender'. This would differentiate Feminist IR from positivist and traditional approaches as well as other post-positivist approaches which merely seek to 'add in' women to the narrative. Different from conventional ways of doing international relations whereby top-down approaches are imposed on local actors, feminist IR weighs the lived experiences and subjectivities of female domestic workers, local women who are street vendors, wives of diplomats, female factory workers, women soldiers and plantation workers just as important as the actions and thoughts of diplomats, world leaders, politicians, and statesmen.

Feminism as a critique of mainstream concepts

J. Ann Tickner¹² was one of the first scholars to problematize IRT, particularly Realism, focused on men, state and war. The popular conception of international politics as highly masculine had the dangers of ignoring all other aspects of politics that contribute to international relations. Realism is the most inhospitable to gender scrutiny. How inadequate this theory is in

⁹ Peter R. Beckman and Francine D'Amico, *Women, Gender, and World Politics: Perspectives, Policies and Prospects* (Westport, CT: Bergin Et Garvey, 1995), 6.

¹⁰ Gender-as-power reveals the power relations within and between societies, and is able to describe the historical roots and eventual outcomes of the public-private divide. Gender-as-power seeks to break down traditional binaries, and understand gender as an ongoing series of hierarchical relations. Here, when examining wartime rape, we would look into the meaning of motherhood, of community, of human relations to see how the act of rape in wartime is a power play that transcends the individual involves, and affects the victimised society more broadly. (Maruska 2010, 4)

¹¹ Gender-as-difference tends to keep intact the binary between sex and gender, men and women, femininity and masculinity. Gender understood as difference is a static characteristic socially constructed but not relational.

¹² See J. Ann Tickner, "Hans Morgenthau's Principles of Political Realism: A Feminist Reformulation," *Millennium: Journal of International Studies* 17, no. 3 (December 1988), accessed February 11, 2019, doi:10.1177/03058298880170030801.

explaining the contemporary world is quite evident from the decadent assumptions about global politics put forth by the classical realist Hans Morgenthau¹³, which are golden rules for realists even today, such as the predominance of power as the national interest in foreign policy formulations, governance of objective laws, separation of values and ethics from politics, and subordination of morality to autonomous sphere of politics. In this context, it is worth noting some of the prominent critical ideas of feminist IR on Realist perceptions of International Relations

Power and national security

Power in IR theory is understood as power-over something/someone to do something as it assumes power with reference to someone as being autonomous from the power of others, which makes it impossible to share, much less co-operate. Morgenthau does not accept any kind of relations in global politics outside the pursuit of power as relevant to international relations. Later preoccupations of structural realism¹⁴ with the concept of power project it as an end in itself for states to achieve security in the anarchic international order. Feminist IR finds fault with this state-centric, power-centric approach of realism, particularly because it leaves no room for explaining social relations, and transnational organisations and non-governmental organisations as actors in the international relations.

The obsession of Realism with national interest as a pursuit of power is criticised as one-dimensional, for today's world demands cooperative rather than zero-sum solutions to a variety of issues like nuclear war, unequal wealth distribution and environmental degradation¹⁵. Interestingly, Tickner¹⁶ urges to think national interest multi-dimensionally and in terms of state's specific context because no universal law can govern the subjective needs of the national population. Power for feminists is a relationship of mutual enablement, hence they find it difficult to accept Realism's conceptualization of power as dominance alone. For Tickner, Realists'

¹³Hans J. Morgenthau and Alfred Knopf, *Politics among Nations: The Struggle for Power and Peace*. 5th Ed (New York: A.A. Knopf, 1973), 4-15.

¹⁴ When defensive realism theories that states seek to maximise security, offensive realism favours power maximisation. Power as an end in itself, not just the means to achieve stability or security is a problematic stance for feminist IR.

¹⁵ See J. Ann. Tickner, *Gender in International Relations: Feminist Perspectives on Achieving Global Security* (New York: Columbia Univ. Press, 1998), 37

¹⁶ Tickner elaborates on the pitfalls of realism in her 1988 critique of Morgenthau's six principles on classical realism.

obsession with conflictual nature of international relations only serves “to de-emphasise elements of co-operation and regeneration”.¹⁷ Neorealism and Realism are proponents of self-help strategies rather than cooperation and even within their own conceptual framework, the gender question is not properly addressed. In addition to this, as a reflection of its affinity for hypermasculinity and androcentrism, Realism measures the capability of a nation in terms of economic and military strength which in fact only projects partial images and assumptions.¹⁸ Power must be analysed multi-dimensionally which would help academia to think of international relations in the light of avenues of cooperation and co-existence, an aspect which is quite downplayed by Realist thinkers.

Realist position on power as national interest gives rise to the dichotomous positioning of anarchy/order- international as anarchic/state as security guarantors - which Feminist IR finds problematic. When states assume the role of security providers, in the contemporary world, the lines between order and anarchy seems to be blurred. The protectors themselves turn into perpetrators of violence. Tickner opines that the definition of violence must encompass the atrocities committed by states against its people by sustaining heavy military budgets at the expense of welfare money during peacetime.¹⁹ State-sponsored violence is an unexplored terrain as far as Realism is concerned, not to mention its gendered dimensions. Another challenge to the idea of domestic order and law is threatening one's own population quite common during civil wars, as well as internal strives. When majority of casualties since World War II is civilians, the basic Realist argument that men fight wars to protect women and children fall flat. Enloe²⁰ points out the instances of unhealthy sexual relations between men and women in and around military bases. Harassment cases are reported from within the military societies, a place which breeds hypermasculinity. Domestic violence in military families is a highly reported crime. Brothels which function around military bases of foreign countries also breed a certain type of superiority on the basis of gender, race, class and geography.

¹⁷ Hans J. Morthengau, "Hans Morgenthau's Principles of Political Realism: A Feminist Reformulation," *Millennium: Journal of International Studies* 17, no. 3 (December 1988): 432, accessed April 11, 2019, doi:10.1177/03058298880170030801.

¹⁸ Jacqui True, "Feminism," in *Theories of International Relations*, 3rd ed. (New York: Palgrave Macmillan, 1996), 225.

¹⁹ J. Ann. Tickner, *Gendering World Politics: Issues and Approaches in the Post-Cold War Era* (New York: Columbia University Press, 2001), 62.

²⁰ Cynthia H. Enloe, *Bananas, Beaches and Bases: Making Feminist Sense of International Politics* (Berkeley: University of California Press, 1990), 125-173.

Critical theorist Barry Buzan²¹ broadens the meaning of the term security to include freedom from societal, economic and environmental threats, because in today's world, unconventional security threats like cyberterrorism, climate change, and poverty cannot be tackled with conventional understanding of national security. This combined with Johan Galtung's use of the term 'structural violence'²² in security literature opens up new avenues of discussion hitherto missing from security studies. Ecofeminists like Vandana Shiva and Carolyn Merchant challenge the security perspective of Realism whose mechanistic view of nature is incapable of accounting for environmental threats in the modern times, instead argues that what is required is a non-hierarchical, equilibrical view of nature,- each part dependent on the whole- which is a shared philosophical thread that connects environmental movements and women's movements. Feminist IR scholars' concern regarding the discipline lies in the non-inclusion of these unconventional ideas of security. This is in coherence with the agenda of post-Realist, post-Positivist emancipatory notion of security which promises the maximization of living options and improvement of all humankind: 'security studies of inclusion rather than exclusion'.²³ Hence, one of the first endeavours of feminist IR scholars was to counter the Realist ontology of anarchy/order with a broader conception of security, to encompass economic, ecological, political as well as military dimensions. Thus, in feminist understanding, security means the elimination of all kinds of violence, including unjust social relations.²⁴ Such security notions also question the role of state as security providers and attempts to understand how security of individuals and categories of individuals are compromised by direct and structural violence.

Contrary to Realist observations of war in terms of who gained significant power in the global dynamics, or who is trailing behind whom, or who incurred more loss with regards to their national capacity, Feminist IR undertakes microscopic level of assessment of its impact on women as well as other underprivileged sections of the society. Unlike the Realist dichotomisation of war/peace, end of war doesn't automatically guarantee peace, especially for women as they still

²¹ Barry Buzan, *People, States and Fear* (Sussex: Harvester Press Group, 1983), 245-257.

²² Johan Galtung, "Violence, Peace, and Peace Research," *Journal of Peace Research* 6, no. 3 (1969): 171, accessed February 21, 2019, doi:10.1177/002234336900600301.

²³ J. Ann. Tickner, *Gendering World Politics: Issues and Approaches in the Post-Cold War Era* (New York: Columbia University Press, 2001), 54

²⁴ Gülşen Aydın, "Feminist Challenge to the Mainstream IR," *European Journal of Multidisciplinary Studies* 2, no. 1 (2016): 7, accessed March 15, 2019, doi:10.26417/ejms.v2i1.p62-69.

undergo other kinds of violence and lack of security as the aftermath of war. Elshtain's²⁵ elaborate engagement with the concept of war establishes how women no less than men could be intimately involved in war even if they are not physically present on the battlefield carrying weapons and arms, and also challenges the wartime gender stereotyping of women as caregivers and men as brave souls in the battlefield.

Autonomy

Man's autonomy is a central idea to both Realism and Liberalism. Neoliberalism excludes analysis of gender regimes which denies women's autonomy and thus prevents certain aspects, mostly feminine, from entering international relations. Feminism differs by illustrating avenues of cooperative, interdependent and interconnected relations as well as room for autonomy for the actors in international politics.²⁶ Standpoint feminists²⁷ like Cynthia Enloe question the privilege and ownership of this autonomy and how it is used as a gendered tool for oppression. For instance, those who could afford autonomy from the structures in the society enjoy privileges with regards to certain aspects which may not be available for others. Financially independent women, urban women, women who are breadwinners of the family, women who are educated and so on, enjoy some degree of freedom and independence compared to those who are uneducated, poor, or rural women. Sometimes, to gain access to these freedoms, women are forced to work in sectors that offer little to no security to their integrity, and physical and mental health. In the Third World, such exploitative practices and gender hierarchy are normalised and institutionalised. Mainstream IR neglects such experiences of women at the micro level, particularly because of its theoretical obsession with meta-narratives and grand analysis of the world politics, which reflects in de-emphasising of women's issues in policy making.

²⁵ Jean Elshtain, *Women and War* (Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1987)

²⁶ Jacqui True, "Feminism," in *Theories of International Relations*, 3rd ed. (New York: Palgrave Macmillan, 1996), 223

Also see J. Ann Tickner, "Han's Morthengau's Principles of Political Realism: A Feminist Reformulation," in *Gender and International Relations*, by Rebecca Grant and Kathleen Newland (Bloomington: Indiana University Press, 1991), 25.

²⁷ See Cynthia H. Enloe, *Bananas, Beaches and Bases: Making Feminist Sense of International Politics* (Berkeley: University of California Press, 1990), 174-211

Citizenship and nationalism

Citizenship, democratisation, state and nationalism are gendered concepts which discredit women's work at a political, social and cultural level. When status quo masculinism privileges and applauds men working overtime to earn livelihood and contribute to the economy of the country, women toiling away at the homes are not acknowledged, and even worse, considered as fulfilling their familial roles. It is also important to expand what is considered to be political, for women's work usually lay on the margins of 'political' which is masculine, male-dominated space of high politics. Enloe²⁸ tries to illustrate this through the example of the diplomat's wife who carries out the important job of building domestic setting where most of the informal diplomatic exchanges and trust building between engaging parties take place. The wives who travel with their diplomat husbands would be sacrificing their own career opportunities in exchange for unpaid and undervalued job which is most often expected of them and exploited by the home governments. The larger implication here is how discriminatory principles of political spaces between the labour of men and women reflect on their respective access to citizenship and nationality.

Historically, men and women gained access to citizenship differently: men through their roles and activities in the public sphere and women through their domestic/private activities. At a sociological level, 'formal' and 'substantive' modes of citizenship exist to distinguish between enjoying the legal status of membership of a state and enjoyment of the rights and obligations associated with membership respectively. Members of a society enjoy varying degrees of substantive citizenship depending on factors like gender, race, class and sexuality. Privileged sections like upper-class, white, heterosexual males are most likely to reap benefits in this regard as women are historically associated with and relegated only to the private sphere and hence considered unfit for taking up responsibilities of political citizenship.²⁹ Their participation in formal labour market and politics are constrained by domestic responsibilities as nurturers of husband and children and caregivers of the elderly.

Participation of women in ethnic and national processes are also gendered: as biological reproducers; as reproducers of national group boundaries because of marital restrictions like

²⁸ (ibid)

²⁹ Lister Ruth, *Towards a Gendered Political Economy*, ed. Joanne Cook, Jennifer Roberts, and Georgina Waylen (Palgrave Macmillan, 2000), 99.

endogamy; as participants in national struggles; as producers and transmitters of national culture; and as symbolic markers of national differences.³⁰ Women are often considered transferers of cultural, national and ethnic identities in their gender-specific roles as mothers, daughters, wives etc, rather than as political participants in their individual/collective capacities. Such gendered principles of citizenship and nationality privileges masculine consolidation of power, status, authority and resources not only at the national level but also in their capacities as patriarchal heads of households and citizens contributing heavily in the private sphere as well. While mainstream IR paints this compelling narrative by portraying masculinity as the champion of international relations, undervaluing feminine capacities of social and biological reproduction places their bodies in a precarious position endangered by state intervention and control.³¹ Charlton et al (1989) categorize the link between state action and gender relations with regards to policies and impacts³². The price paid by women in exchange for national recognition as citizens and patriots are, in a way, to let their bodies and choices be restrained and controlled by the state as evident from the common theme in all of the gender policies.

Meta-narrative

Feminist scholars find problems with the self-assumed universalist or meta-narrative persona of mainstream IR. Feminist ontology mostly focuses on the very opposite of universalism - how experiences of each individual in international relations differs from the other. When realism talks about maximising one's security/power options, it has to be contextually placed, and in this case, the context is West with relatively better standard of living, per capita income, overall literacy rate, resource allocation and so on compared to the non-West. Contextually-contingent analysis would produce alternative approaches to almost all concepts of mainstream IR so that it is relevant to non-Western subjectivities as well. The solution that feminist scholars like Tickner³³ suggest is to

³⁰ Floya Anthias and Nira Yuval-Davis, *Women-Nation-State*, 1st ed. (Basingstoke, Eng.: Palgrave Macmillan, 1989), 7.

³¹ Anne Sisson Runyan and V. Spike Peterson, *Global Gender Issues in the New Millennium*, Dilemmas in World Politics (Boulder: Westview Press), 89, 2014, accessed April 14, 2019, <https://www.worldcat.org/title/global-gender-issues-in-the-new-millennium/oclc/866923702>.

³² The three categories are policies focusing on so-called protective legislation and reproduction, policies that deal with relations between men and women, general policies that are supposedly sex neutral but have different impact on men and women. See, S. Charlton, J. Everett, and K. Staudt, *Women, State and Development* (Albany: SUNY Press).

³³ J. Ann Tickner, "Knowledge Is Power: Challenging IR's Eurocentric Narrative," *International Studies Review* 18, no. 1 (March 2016): 157-159, accessed April 24, 2019, doi:10.1093/isr/viv026.

think in North-South terms. For instance, in the Global South, for the majority of population, national security also means, access to basic material needs to which there are gendered consequences.

Enloe³⁴ delves into the exclusionary politics of international political economy, diplomacy, security as well as sovereignty all of which figure in Realism as value-free, rational concepts. Jacqui True³⁵ argues that conventional, metaphorical portrayal of state behaviour in the anarchical international system as rational and self-interested cannot be generalised: State 'is a masculine agent derived from a context of unequal gender relations, where women's primary care work supports the development of autonomous male selves, making cooperation for them a daily reality and relieving men of these necessities'. Therefore, state excludes most of the times aspects which are not masculine according to scholars like Enloe.

The problem with dichotomisation

Feminist scholars generally dislike dichotomisation since it makes it an essentialist aspect of global politics and omits any other possibility of being. Their scholarship is devoted to dismantling the same to expose intersectionality in each of these seemingly fool proof concepts. Feminist IR finds it distasteful to alienate subject from object and resort to abstract thinking because it is unsuitable to study human subjects with objective, value-free and rational perspective. Objectivity, culturally defined, is associated with masculinity. Hence, building objective laws would be a partial explanation of human nature which is constitutive of both masculine and feminine elements. As a plausible alternative to realism's obsession with objective laws, Tickner³⁶ proposes what Evelyn Fox Keller would call 'dynamic objectivity' which utilizes the consciousness of the self to arrive at effective objectivity.

In general, the feminist scholarship points to the direction that Realism is built on the strict divisions of private/public/international realms which prove that it is ignorant of the gender politics which doesn't follow stringent boundaries. The public/private divide constructs essentialist ideas

³⁴ Cynthia H. Enloe, *Bananas, Beaches and Bases: Making Feminist Sense of International Politics* (Berkeley: University of California Press, 2014).

³⁵ Jacqui True, "Feminism," in *Theories of International Relations*, 3rd ed. (New York: Palgrave Macmillan, 1996), 224.

³⁶ J. Ann Tickner, "Hans Morgenthau's Principles of Political Realism: A Feminist Reformulation," *Millennium: Journal of International Studies* 17, no. 3 (December 1988): 432, accessed April 1, 2019, doi:10.1177/03058298880170030801.

of femininity and masculinity. Even though scholars like Richard Ashley challenged such dichotomous notions from within the discipline, it was only Cynthia Enloe who highlighted the dangers of treating these divisions as mutually exclusive, with her famous phrase “personal is international”.³⁷ She traces the ‘private’ lives of military wives, diplomatic wives, military bases sex workers, migrant domestic workers and so on to show how much they are affected and affect the international politics, and how lack of gender-sensitive policy scrutiny³⁸ further marginalises their stories. This would also necessitate an investigation into things that are central to the state, but traditionally considered personal, such as ‘the politics of marriage, violence against women, cheapening of women’s labour, ideologies of masculinity, sexually transmitted diseases and homophobia’.

Elshtain³⁹ also explores the gendered nature of public/private dichotomy by tracing its origins back to the Greeks. Man is considered public and woman private in Realism, whose separation brings legitimacy to what is considered rational activities (in the public sphere) and belittles natural activities (in the private sphere). It did not matter in the high politics of masculinity what women did in their ‘assigned roles’ in the domestic, thus marginalising women’s work from being considered political. This was especially true in the Third World where, following the Western tradition of political thought, private sphere was neither discussed, nor notions concerning it challenged. Even in the West, at a time when a few women like Margaret Thatcher or Indira Gandhi or Michelle Bachelet or Condoleezza Rice were involved in high politics, they were thought to be acting/doing like a man because women are culturally associated with peace symbolism. This, in turn, excluded them from participating in matters of war and national security.⁴⁰ Broader definitions of political are necessary to comprehend the important roles played by women in politics and to understand them not as appendages but integral parts of the whole shaping and shaped by them

³⁷ Cynthia H. Enloe, *Bananas, Beaches and Bases: Making Feminist Sense of International Politics* (Berkeley: University of California Press, 1990), 343

³⁸ ‘Governments’ immigration policies, the lack of publicly funded child care, the subtleties of racism, stereotypes that place some women on pedestals and others in the gutter, militarism’s nurturing of fear and distorted notions of security, corporations’ escalating production demands, and unaccountable labour contractors’. (ibid), 347.

³⁹ Jean Bethke Elshtain, *Public Man, Private Woman* (Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Press, 1981).

⁴⁰ J. Ann Tickner, “Han's Morthengau's Principles of Political Realism: A Feminist Reformulation,” in *Gender and International Relations*, by Rebecca Grant and Kathleen Newland (Bloomington: Indiana University Press, 1991), 37.

However, with the onslaught of Western feminist waves in intellectual disciplines including IR, there was an overwhelming tendency to subsume different forms of feminist thought into a singular category for the sake of convenience of study. But, the presumed homogeneity is problematic because there exists a diversity in the realm of race, country, geographical region, caste, religion and class cutting across national boundaries. Even within feminist theoretical framework in IR, the intersection of race, gender, region, religion and culture are often overlooked because of it being dominated by Western middle-class white feminist perspectives oblivious of forms of oppression along the lines of race, class, sexuality and so on. This is counterproductive to the objective of feminist theory to be inclusive and progressive so that different perspectives could be accommodated.

Off late, through their own explanations of women's oppression and proposed solution to these issues, different strands in feminist thought have been making innovative attempts to contest the monolithic nature of Western-originated feminism and iron out the insufficiency and bias of previous feminist movements. The intersectional, interdisciplinary and interlocking nature of feminism is reinforced by new trends in feminism such as Black feminism, Arab feminism, Transnational feminism, Ecofeminism, Postmodern feminism, African feminism, Islamic feminism and so on.

Black feminism and Latin American feminism are Coloured feminisms⁴¹ which problematise the racial othering of black women and Latino women respectively, and address the multiple forms of oppression through emphasising on intersectionality. Sojourner Truth, Patricia Hill Collins, bell hooks, Audre Lorde and so on are some of the theoreticians who have contributed towards developing coloured feminism. Ecofeminists draw parallels between human domination of the non-human world and patriarchal domination of women and criticise human-centred environmentalism. They urge for radical reshaping of basic socio-economic relations and underlying values of modern industrial societies. Postmodern feminism problematizes the text and language of communication and calls for deconstruction exercises in order to evidence intrusions of foreign values and principles into indigenous contexts. Transnational feminism examines the

⁴¹ Coloured feminisms encompass those strands of feminist thought which are based on the racial identity of non-white women. They emphasise on the uniqueness of female experience of all kinds of women of colour. See, Rosemarie Tong and Tina Fernandes. Botts, *Feminist Thought: A More Comprehensive Introduction* (New York: Westview Press, 2017), 8.

meaning of nationhood, gender, class and sexuality in global contexts. It stands in conflict with global feminism whose universalising language ‘colonizes the material and historical heterogeneities of woman’ in the Third World.⁴² African feminisms urge for women’s emancipation rooted in the specific cultures of the African nations which have been misrepresented by the West through their hegemonic ideas and cultural capitalism. Arab feminism developed in West Asia as a reaction to the popular brand of secular and global feminisms developed in the non-West after the first wave of Western-originated feminism. It was an effort to address the feminist question of bargaining for rights while rooted in one’s culture and socio-political backgrounds as well as deconstruct orientalist notions about being part of the Arab world. Islamic feminism which is sometimes used nowadays as synonym to Arab feminism calls for gender equality through radical re-interpretation of Qu’ran.

Even within these labels, it is difficult to find, for certain, singularity of women’s experiences which are found to exist as layered subjectivities. This drives home the point that it is necessary to let women speak rather than universalist language of academicians and activists in faraway lands speaking for them. This is a frequent accusation levelled against secular feminist thought prevalent in Muslim countries in Asia and Africa in the early 20th century. Gender activists who belong to Islam as well as other religions in these newly decolonised countries relied on nationalist and humanitarian ideas and expanded it to inculcate modern Islamic values to develop feminist thought in their respective countries so that they were local and context specific. They were focused on enhancing women’s participation in public sphere, increase the responsiveness of the governments to the citizens regardless of their gender and religion, and reducing the influence of religious ideologies on formal politics. However, they were rather silent on religious issues that affected women within and outside the public sphere. Although emergence of secular feminism in non-Western contexts was a relief in contrast to the universalist assumptions of Western-originated feminism, it was still considered as a renewed attempt at Westernisation because of its dismissal of Islamic influence completely from its philosophy. The authenticity and indigeneity of secular feminism were questioned⁴³ because of the supposed incompatibility between feminism and Islam

⁴² Chandra Talpade Mohanty, "Under Western Eyes: Feminist Scholarship and Colonial Discourses," *Boundary 2*, no. 12 (Spring 1984): 334, accessed April 9, 2019, <https://www.jstor.org/stable/302821>.

⁴³ See Mir-Hosseini, "Muslim Womens Quest for Equality: Between Islamic Law and Feminism," *Critical Inquiry* 32, no. 4 (Summer 2006), accessed February 27, 2019, doi:10.2307/3877129; Amina Wadud, *Inside the Gender*

and denial of Islamic cultural and political significance on the philosophy of women's being and doing in these countries. The need for developing a feminist perspective in the West Asia and North Africa (WANA) region where majority of population is Muslim was imminent, and it was in this context that Islamic feminism as a new strand in feminist thought emerged in the late 20th century. It was upon the Islamic feminists at the time to develop a discourse that advocated gender equality and emancipation of women within the framework of Islam.

Islamic Feminism in WANA region

Non-Western feminist thought and its recent marriage with IR theories have resulted in initiating discussions on subjectivities of women in non-Western societies and developing newer tools to understand and analyse their realities better. Feminisms in general in WANA emerged against the late postcolonial context of developing new identities and subjects out of shifting configurations between national, ethnic, religious and class affiliations, as part and parcel of the Islamic revival movement in the late 20th century.⁴⁴ The fundamental differences between Islamic and secular feminism in WANA pertain to its ideological scope: secular feminisms adopt a more secular nationalist, modern Islamist and general humanitarian approach to women's rights whereas Islamic feminism is built upon the single framework of Qu'ran as the basis of women's liberation. There are feminist scholars like Margot Badran who emphasise on the frequent exchanges between the two feminist strands whereas others like Leila Ahmed view them as incompatible and often in tension with each other. Ahmed⁴⁵ comments that the dichotomy between secular and religious feminist paradigms are irreducible, given the initial debates between Islamic and secular feminists because of the fact that the latter discounted state structures for its ambivalent and authoritarian stance on feminist movements and women's organizations during the earlier emergent phases. at the same time, Badran⁴⁶ finds avenues of collaboration and cooperation between the two for the common goal of emancipation of women in the region.

Jihad: (New Delhi: Viva Books, 2006); Fatima Mernissi, *The Veil and the Male Elite: A Feminist Interpretation of Women's Rights in Islam* (Perseus Books Publishing, 1991).

⁴⁴Margot Badran, "Between Secular and Islamic Feminism/s: Reflections on the Middle East and Beyond," *Journal of Middle East Womens Studies* 1, no. 1 (Winter 2005): 7, accessed March 28, 2019, doi:10.2979/mew.2005.1.1.6.

⁴⁵ In Leila Ahmed, *Women and Gender in Islam: Historical Roots to a Modern Debate* (Yale University Press, 1992).

⁴⁶ Margot Badran, "Between Secular and Islamic Feminism/s: Reflections on the Middle East and Beyond," *Journal of Middle East Womens Studies* 1, no. 1 (Winter 2005): 9-15, accessed March 28, 2019, doi:10.2979/mew.2005.1.1.6.

As Badran notes, the coincidence of several factors led to the emergence and spread of the new feminism in the region: deep-seated dissatisfaction with the incumbent regimes to deliver democracy and economic prosperity; re-emergence of Islamic movements and internal marginalization of Muslim women; replacement of secular nationalist and Islamic modernist rhetoric with gender conservative and religious fundamentalist rhetoric.⁴⁷ Interestingly, just as secular feminism evolved at a time when religion and state were enmeshed with each other (predominantly religious society), the origin of Islamic feminism was at a time when the separation of the two was the ideal (predominantly secular society). Hence, the inception and growth of Islamic feminism owes to both well-established secular values and strengthening gender conservative Islamist precepts. The endeavour implied women shaping their discourse *as women* from their own perspective rooted in their own space and time.⁴⁸

Islamic feminism also originated at the time when secular feminism in Egypt was facing an impasse⁴⁹ in terms of tools to carry out feminist negotiations with the state. They had previously employed, without much success, modernist Islamic rhetoric within the framework of the nation-state system to demand reforms of personal laws. It was this gulf that Islamic feminism filled, and in turn, it borrowed the Islamic modern narrative and perfected the understanding of gender equality. The departure of Islamic feminism from secular feminism is in terms of asserting full equality of women across private and public spheres vis-à-vis latter's acceptance of women's complementarity to men and hierarchical gender roles in the private sphere.⁵⁰ In addition to state intervention into private sphere which included family laws, Islamic feminists argued for the integration of religious discourses into politics.

⁴⁷ (ibid), 7-10.

⁴⁸ Moghadam in Margot Badran, "Between Secular and Islamic Feminism/s: Reflections on the Middle East and Beyond: Reflections on the Middle East and Beyond," *Journal of Middle East Womens Studies* 1, no. 1 (Winter 2005): 9, accessed March 28, 2019, doi:10.2979/mew.2005.1.1.6.

⁴⁹ Nadjé Al-Ali, *Secularism, Gender and the State in the Middle East: The Egyptian Women's Movement*. (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2000), 134-135

⁵⁰ Margot Badran, "Between Secular and Islamic Feminism/s: Reflections on the Middle East and Beyond," *Journal of Middle East Womens Studies* 1, no. 1 (Winter 2005): 13-15, accessed March 28, 2019, doi:10.2979/mew.2005.1.1.6.

One of the notable characteristics of Islamic feminism was the close participation of both women and men who believed in the emancipation of women through Islam.⁵¹ In one of the first visible movements, women in post-Khomeini Iran, along with some young male clerics employed the language of Qu'ran to articulate the feminist project which Mir-Hosseini calls stretching limits in order to demand gender justice.⁵² The fundamental understanding nurtured by Islamic feminists in WANA is the significance of culture and religion in public and private dimensions of lives of women in the region. Consequently, private sphere or family is one of the prime focuses of Islamic feminists in the Arab region as it is a frequent venue of injustices affecting women. Familial as well as social circumstances obstruct women's autonomy and justice by shaping and imposing traditional gender roles, unlike the popular conception of it being an ordination of divine/natural will. This understanding of gender and gender roles as a social construct rather than divinely ordained phenomenon is the very basis of fighting inequalities and emphasising on gender justice within Islam and its scriptures.

Islamic feminists argue that Islamic texts by themselves have elements of gender justice in them which must be reinterpreted in the light of changing times. Modern reformist Islam forms one of the striking characteristics of this new Islamic discourse which argues that historical reading of Islamic sources could reinforce women's socio-political and economic equality in public and private spheres. Such exercises include critical reading and hermeneutics of Qu'ran grounded in *ijtihad* which is logical reasoning rather than *taqlid*, blind imitation of tradition. The aim is to relativize their legal consequences and thereby deconstruct the legitimacy of traditional patriarchal concepts like *qiwama*.⁵³ However, new and context-sensitive readings of Islamic texts acknowledge women's key role as contributors to the family income, national economy, and equal rights as the male counterparts in both private and public spheres. This calls for the much-ignored reform of family laws which reduce women's status to caregivers and nurturers alone. Mir-Hosseini, additionally, seeks to reinterpret the hadiths of imams using logic which forms the crux

⁵¹ See Mir-Hosseini reiterating male Islamic scholar and champion of gender equality in Islam Hojjat al-Islam Sai'dzadeh in Ziba Mir-Hosseini, *Islam and Gender the Religious Debate in Contemporary Iran* (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1999), 224.

⁵² Margot Badran, "Between Secular and Islamic Feminism/s: Reflections on the Middle East and Beyond," *Journal of Middle East Womens Studies* 1, no. 1 (Winter 2005): 10, accessed March 28, 2019, doi:10.2979/mew.2005.1.1.6.

⁵³ *Qiwama* mandates that it is the responsibility of the man to look after the woman so that she won't be burdened with additional responsibilities. See, "Quranic Concepts on Gender Relations," Dr. Zainab Alwani, August 2013, accessed April 30, 2019, <http://www.zainabalwani.com/quranic-concepts-on-gender-relations/>.

of Islamic feminist project across the Arab world. She contests the universal validity of the hadiths by emphasising that the credibility of a hadith depends on its logic, and reasoning and not on the authority of the imam or the utterer.⁵⁴ She also reiterated that since hadiths are utterances based on the specific contexts of reinterpretation, they have to be considered ‘pseudo-universal-propositions’. Such interpretations are largely connected to the time and space the issuing imams lived in the past who lack imagination of the future contexts, hence render universalist claims redundant and inappropriate. In fact, Mir-Hosseini finds it insufficient as a legal provision to extend the interpretations of an erstwhile reality to another epoch altogether.⁵⁵ She also endorses the view that theologians and Islamic jurists cannot detach themselves from their own interpretations and worldviews while interpreting Islamic texts and doctrines.

A hermeneutic exercise that Islamic feminists undertake is to investigate the *fiqh* (Islamic jurisprudence) on issues such as women being judges or women driving vehicles, by placing them in the *fiqh* contexts by examining the different opinions of the jurists and imams and reviewing them with reference to Qu’ran as well as practices and customs of the particular period in question. As reiterated by Mir-Hosseini, there are certain principles from which the equality framework of Islamic feminism is derived. The principle of contractual nature of jurisprudence emphasises on the human nature of rulings as opposed to them being natural or innate. Principle of reason is frequently employed by feminists in the analysis of logic and reasoning of *fiqh*, rather than its blind adaptation. Principle of separation of givens and interpretations takes a hermeneutic position which distinguishes between the principles of the god’s commands and the utterances or commands of imams, religious leaders and so on.

As argued by Islamist feminists from different countries in WANA like Kawakid Al-Mulham, Khawlah al-Atiqi, Saba Mahmood, Fatima Mernissi, Amina Wadud, Ziba Mir-Hosseini, Lara Deeb, Margot Badran, Fariba Adelkhah and Dalal al-Bisri religious platforms functioned as an emancipatory tool for many Muslim women whose first attack was in fact launched against conservative readings of Islamic texts and *hadith*.

⁵⁴ Ziba Mir-Hosseini, *Islam and Gender the Religious Debate in Contemporary Iran* (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1999), 224.

⁵⁵ (ibid), 225.

As far as feminism in Egypt is concerned, it developed along with the independence movement in the 1940s which has been a pioneering social and intellectual project in the country as well as in WANA region. Egyptian feminist discourses have been dominated for a long time by secularists with rapid secularisation policies of Nasser following independence. However, towards the end of Sadat regime, resistance toward his liberalisation policies gave rise to a massive wave of Islamist feminist tendencies which advocated for liberation of women within the framework of Qu'ran. This was a significant departure from the secular feminist narratives that dominated Egypt's progressive spheres. For those Muslim women who are seeking to reconcile their commitment to their faith and religious tradition with their pursuit of justice and dignity, this was epistemologically empowering.

The possibilities of feminisms in Egypt to be sensitive to cultural, religious and social contexts and not necessarily stand contradictory to each other were emphasised as an innovative stance in Egypt by the pioneering efforts of Islamic feminist Zainab Al-Ghazali. Since the fundamental reasons for perpetuating injustices along the lines of gender and class and other social relations in modern Egypt owed to corrupt and repressive governments, the culmination of this accumulated dissatisfaction manifested in one of the most powerful civil uprisings in modern history of WANA- the Arab uprisings of 2011. Islamic feminists like Mozn Hassan, Saba Mahmood, Omaima Abou-Bakr and Zahra Ali highlights how Arab Spring furthered the Islamic feminist movement in the aftermath of overthrowing one of the most oppressive dictators in the history of pre-Arab spring Egypt. Especially because a clear-cut gender agenda was absent from the revolution, it was pertinent for many women's organisations, scholars and feminist activists to recognise shared grievances, build solidarity networks and, above all, the overwhelming need to include the gender question in post-Arab spring political processes to ensure access to decision-making processes, political participation and opportunities.

Incidence of Arab Spring

Politically speaking, the outburst of Arab Spring in 2011 is a significant marker in the history of Arab region. It was a revolution in its own capacity powerful enough to depose two incumbent rulers from power- Zine El Abidine Ben Ali in Tunisia and Hosni Mubarak in Egypt. The general economic and socio-political backdrop of West Asia signifies shared dissatisfaction by general

populace against the regimes across the region⁵⁶. Corruption, systematic marginalisation and discrimination removed majority of population from the redistribution chain and the institutional language that was necessary to demand their rights. Such structural violence only culminates in a situation where the citizens look for an opportunity to retaliate rather than respond immediately to the stimulus.

The protests started with the unfortunate event of a vendor, Mohammed Bouazizi, in central Tunisia, immolating himself on 17 December 2010 after a municipal officer slapped him and confiscated his wares. The fatal act was a symbolic protest against the repressive government of Zine el-Abidine Ben Ali of Tunisia which sparked an unprecedented civil and social unrest with the neighbouring countries following suit, like a domino effect.⁵⁷ Within weeks, the popular uprisings, civil war and mass civil uprisings engulfed the whole of WANA region, spreading to Syria, Libya, Jordan, Bahrain, Lebanon, Yemen, Algeria and other Arab states where dismal socioeconomic conditions and ethnic and sectarian divisions provided complex backdrop for the revolution.

A noticeable feature in Tahrir Square, where the revolt was focused, in Egypt, was the close participation of women and men as compatriots in bringing down the corrupt regime. Women came out to the streets in large numbers and fulfilled their roles as slogan raisers, coordinators, caretakers, thus actively participating in the politics of their time from which they were prevented until then. This political participation and utilisation of public sphere were hailed by feminists like Mozn Hassan⁵⁸ as a victorious moment in the history of Arab world, implying the hope and expectations of the trend continuing to post-Arab spring times. In the aftermath of the revolution in Egypt, Hosni Mubarak was deposed from power and replaced by the Supreme Council of the Armed Forces (SCAF) to supervise the post-revolutionary transition process. But what followed in terms of women's rights in the post-Arab spring Egypt is quite a desolate alternative reality of

⁵⁶ This understanding is crucial in contextualising the outbreak of a revolution in a region that was considered impregnable for democracy and its values, resonating with what Johan Galtung (1996) says: "Peaceful societies" need not experience war or direct violence, but at the same time need not necessarily be at peace too. This should also explain why the immediate cause of the revolt was not accumulated resentment against governments, but rather the social and political opportunity that favoured its outbreak.

⁵⁷ Julia Krickl, *"Freedom, Dignity & Equality" for Tunisian Women*, (Master's thesis, University of Twente, 2015), 1, accessed March 29, 2019

⁵⁸ Sharon Otterman, "Women Fight to Maintain Their Role in the Building of a New Egypt," *The New York Times*, March 05, 2011, accessed April 28, 2019, <https://www.nytimes.com/2011/03/06/world/middleeast/06cairo.html>.

what was expected of the revolution in terms of social justice, economic equality and justice. The disappointing case of women's activism and feminist movement in Egypt in post-Arab spring period owes to the re-installment of conservative/authoritarian regimes.

Islamic Feminist Perspective on Arab Spring

As far as Islamic feminism is concerned, there were three emergent themes in the context of Arab spring which shaped the future of the movement in Egypt: access to political participation and decision-making, resource mobilisation, and strategies of countering state violence.

Women's representation in pre-Arab spring Egypt was limited to top-down approaches of the state, mostly as a strategy of co-opting feminist movement in Egypt. Although previously most of Islamic feminism's intellectual preoccupations in Egypt have focused on ensuring gender equality in the private sphere as well as the question of veiling⁵⁹, by giving newer, temporal readings of holy texts⁶⁰, Arab spring presented newer challenges practically and philosophically. Participation of women in public sphere was visibly under attack which most Islamic feminists foresaw as a trend to be followed post-revolution. This was a hard realisation for many regarding the representation of women in mainstream politics and decision-making bodies. It is in this light that the shift in Islamic feminist focus to more practical initiatives like training and supporting female candidates in the upcoming elections following Mubarak's resignation. Intellectually and otherwise, Islamic feminist movement in Egypt flourished in the absence of a state mechanism, not least because of lack of surveillance or systemic attacks, but because of the lack of an entity for redress. The formation of a feminist coalition to guide the constituent assembly in terms of women's rights is significant in two ways: it was the aftermath of understanding how important female representation is in the parliament for making laws concerning women's rights, and the significance of solidarity building and networking among feminists, activists, NGOs as well as independent researchers for a common goal.

It was a critical point in the time of Islamic feminist movement to produce discourses that reinforced the faith and hope by countering attacks of state structures. Mobilising resources in the

⁵⁹ See Leila Ahmed, *A Quiet Revolution: The Veil's Resurgence from the Middle East to America* (New Haven: Yale University Press).

⁶⁰ See Saba Mahmood, *Politics of Piety: The Islamic Revival and the Feminist Subject* (Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Press, 2005).

forms of culture and technology was of paramount importance to Islamic feminists at the time of the revolution and also afterwards. State propaganda and defamatory attempts to marginalise Islamic feminists from mainstream Egyptian society were countered by constant counter-narratives produced by Islamic feminists as well as organisations⁶¹. And for this, Islamic feminists utilised technologically advanced, less expensive and widely reachable medium of digital media, much more influential than mobilising concrete cultural resources like music, literature, video, magazines etc. As argued by Maravankin⁶², both types of mobilisation had its part to play: the one-sidedness of cultural mobilisation spread awareness among Egyptians while technological mobilisation enabled the conversation of new participants and allies to the cause of Islamic feminist movement and women's emancipation.

Attacks and threats on Islamic feminism at the time of Arab spring have been both targeted at women protestors in general as well as feminist activists and organisations in particular. The perpetrators of violence in the context of state breakdown during the uprising was not state per se but, persistent elements of state's patriarchal values and structures manifesting as security personnel, the Egyptian army, and the general patriarchal culture in Egypt at large. As argued by Nazra for Feminist Studies, a secular feminist NGO, the sexual harassment cases were instances of reinforcing gender hierarchy in the public sphere by scaring women away and punish women for their participation.⁶³ One of the strategies that Islamic feminists have employed in fighting the stereotyping and exclusion of assaulted women is to break the taboo by talking about it. Nazra as well as several other feminist NGOs like Harassmap, OpAntiSH records incidents of sexual harassment in public spheres and testimonies of survivors and share them online as a challenge to the state's denial of such cases. They present the discussions with actual figures and subjective narratives that the state could be held accountable by international pressure and media.

The Arab revolution had three major implications on Islamic feminist discourses: firstly, through solidarity built by the courage of collective action exhibited by women who had gathered

⁶¹ See Fatma Emam, *Critical Review Of the Statements of Manal Abul Hassan About the Women's March and Her Perspective on Women's Rights Issues*, publication (Nazra for Feminist Studies, 2012).

⁶² Stephanie Maravankin, "Arab Feminism in the Arab Spring: Discourses on Solidarity, the Socio-Cultural Revolution, and the Political Revolution in Egypt, Tunisia, and Yemen," *Clocks and Clouds* 7, no. 2 (2017) accessed March 19, 2019, <http://www.inquiriesjournal.com/articles/1632/arab-feminism-in-the-arab-spring-discourses-on-solidarity-the-socio-cultural-revolution-and-the-political-revolution-in-egypt-tunisia-and-yemen>.

⁶³ Fatma Emam, *Critical Review Of the Statements of Manal Abul Hassan About the Women's March and Her Perspective on Women's Rights Issues*, publication (Nazra for Feminist Studies, 2012), 5

at Tahrir Square demanding change, Islamic feminists gathered new adherents to the cause of movement. It was through this frame of action that women in Egypt sustained their pressure on the government throughout the period of the revolution. Collective desire for equality had led many women to build inclusive alliances at a time when differences did not matter.⁶⁴ It is interesting that the ideological divisions between secular and Islamic feminism at this juncture had been fluid which was pivotal to the future of feminist movement in Egypt. Secondly, socially and culturally, Arab spring was an opportunity for women to come out of exclusion, a cause to which Islamic feminists had largely devoted their efforts in the pre-Arab spring period. Contingent to the resource mobilisation framework, women challenged the socio-cultural norms rooted in Islamic fundamentalism, by marching beside men, conducting sit-in protests, and raising slogans against the patriarchal state, all of which were considered un-Islamic. Such actions were symbolic and confrontational at the time, as the emergent women's movement contested the patriarchal bindings that hindered women's rights as well as marked a visible symbolic reform of Islamic culture⁶⁵. Thirdly, there was a political dimension to the demands raised by women protestors at Tahrir Square.⁶⁶ Following solidarity building and protesting, increased participation and representation figured as a major political objective for Islamic feminism as a consequential agenda, in order to sustain the momentum during and after democratic transition.

The political scrutiny and process that ensued in Egypt after the toppling of regimes failed to be informed by the democratic fervour and revolutionary spirit of the uprising. The reality of Egypt was quite disappointing in the sense that the presence of fundamental elements in the society took the mantle of power initially once there was a political vacuum, only to be deposed by the army which assumed the leadership and managed to thwart any future plans of a democratically elected secular government coming to power. The case of Egypt is particularly interesting because in the history of Arab resistance, it is one of the avenues where the success of Arab spring gets questioned with the emergence of infamous records of human rights violations in the aftermath of

⁶⁴ Stephanie Maravankin, "Arab Feminism in the Arab Spring: Discourses on Solidarity, the Socio-Cultural Revolution, and the Political Revolution in Egypt, Tunisia, and Yemen," *Clocks and Clouds* 7, no. 2 (2017) accessed April 28, 2019, <http://www.inquiriesjournal.com/articles/1632/arab-feminism-in-the-arab-spring-discourses-on-solidarity-the-socio-cultural-revolution-and-the-political-revolution-in-egypt-tunisia-and-yemen>.

⁶⁵ (ibid)

⁶⁶ "Between Trauma and Resistance: Feminist Engagement with the Arab Spring," Heinrich Böll Stiftung Middle East, January 2017, accessed April 28, 2019, <https://lb.boell.org/en/2017/01/18/between-trauma-and-resistance-feminist-engagement-arab-spring>.

the uprisings as compared to the Mubarak period. The factor that led the focus of this research on to Egypt is the very fact that toppling of regimes did not, however, guarantee any kind of improvement in the lives of Egyptian women on political, social or economic fronts. Then the question ensues as to what is the qualifier to consider a spontaneous uprising a revolution and whether it is enough to look at stepping down of an autocratic ruler or change of government as a determinant of post-revolutionary dynamics in the country.

In the Hobbesian sense of selfishness, a state-centred/structural model critically reduces gender equality in political life. In such an arrangement, women activism, women holding office and women's overall political participation is largely influenced by state preferences and not societal demands. Non-democratic countries do not function along the lines of democratic values like efficacy, legitimacy and autonomy, which results in declining women representation.⁶⁷ Instead, they advocate right-wing traditional values including conservative notions of women's roles such as traditional gender roles in the family laws. Waylen⁶⁸ argues that a small number of authoritarian regimes try to incorporate women into the state mechanism in a semi-formal basis based on its perception of women in the traditional roles. This phenomenon often called state feminism is employed to control and patronise women's rights movement. Intrinsically 'masculine' in nature, the co-opted version of feminism does not aim at transforming women's traditional roles but attempted to tie their responsibility again to the patriarchal family structure.

State bureaucracy is an arena where feminists could work within the state to change its structure and influence its policies. State feminism has therefore emerged as a key strategy to increase women's substantive representation and the representation of their interests (however defined) within the state.⁶⁹ However, the validity of this theory in relation to autocratic and authoritarian regimes such as in Egypt's case has to be explored. In addition to this, Hatem argues that since class figures as another avenue of discrimination, even the possible benefits of state feminism only reaches upper-middle-class women and some bourgeoisie women. The trickle-

⁶⁷ Wafaa Alaradi, "Religion, Electoral Rules and Women's Representation: A Cross National Examination" (PhD diss., University of South Carolina, 2012) 60, accessed April 17, 2019, <https://scholarcommons.sc.edu/etd/1770/>.

⁶⁸ Georgina Waylen, *Engendering Transitions: Womens Mobilization, Institutions, and Gender Outcomes* (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2007), 54.

⁶⁹ Dorothy McBride and Amy Mazur, *Comparative State Feminism* (Thousand Oaks, CA: Sage Publications, 1995), 290.

down effect does not concern poor, uneducated and financially dependent rural women. Alaradi⁷⁰ opines that states which are inherently autocratic are primarily interested in promoting women's roles in politics because of the incentives involved such as international financial aid, international recognition and also because of fear of sanctions. This is counterproductive to the idea of political participation of women from bottom-up movements. The advisable method for transitioning democracies should be a balance of both bottom-up and top-down approaches.

The youth-driven, leaderless, and social media backed⁷¹ movement have been of interest to transitologists and democratization theorists given its political implications on region's mostly autocratic regimes. Discussing the revolutionary proceedings of twenty-first century, Beissinger⁷² and Nepstad⁷³ concede that revolutions of the contemporary times take ousting of an incumbent ruler as the measure of revolutionary success, rather than transformation of political, social or economic conditions. The definition of revolution has expanded to assimilate and adapt newer adjectives like "non-violent", "negotiated", "electoral", "unarmed" and "democratic"⁷⁴, and differing from the idea of temporality as found in traditional revolution theories and Marxian, historical materialist perspectives. In fact, as argued by Tilly in Ketchley⁷⁵, for the very reason that revolutions which unwind through the pathways of state breakdown are only sustained by the dual force of coherent organizations and innovative tactics to challenge the regime's repressive apparatus, revolutionary outcomes are extraordinary and exceptional events.

⁷⁰ Wafaa Alaradi, "Religion, Electoral Rules and Women's Representation: A Cross National Examination" (PhD diss., University of South Carolina, 2012), 61, accessed April 24, 2019, <https://scholarcommons.sc.edu/etd/1770/>.

⁷¹ Fatima Sadiqi, "Introduction: The Centrality of Women's Movements in the Post-revolution Dynamics in North Africa," in *Women's Movements in Post-"Arab Spring" North Africa*, ed. Fatima Sadiqi, Comparative Feminist Series (New York: Palgrave Macmillan, 2016), 2.

⁷² Mark R. Beissinger, "The Semblance of Democratic Revolution: Coalitions in Ukraine's Orange Revolution," *American Political Science Review* 107, no. 3 (2013):574-578, accessed April 29, 2019, doi:10.1017/s0003055413000294.

⁷³ Sharon Erickson. Nepstad, *Nonviolent Revolutions: Civil Resistance in the Late 20th Century* (New York: Oxford University Press, 2011).

⁷⁴ (ibid), 486; Neil Ketchley, *Egypt in the Time of Revolution: Contentious Politics and the Arab Spring*, Cambridge Studies in Contentious Politics (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2017), 23

⁷⁵ Neil Ketchley, *Egypt in the Time of Revolution: Contentious Politics and the Arab Spring*, Cambridge Studies in Contentious Politics (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2017), 6.

Htun and Weldon⁷⁶ emphasise the importance of women's civil society organizing and lobbying for specific rights and demands. According to Maxine Molyneux⁷⁷, historically and cross-culturally, there are three prototypes of women's organizations: independent, associational and directed based on the direction in the transmission of authority. Women's organizations in Egypt are not independent as they come directly under the control of Ministry of Social Solidarity. To mobilise women on a large scale, there are some organizational prerequisites like pre-existing formal/informal networks and discourses that views exclusionary practices and general issues of oppression through gender lens.⁷⁸ This theory says that autonomous women's groups in the state play active roles to ensure that gender issues remained on the resistance as well as post-revolutionary agenda.

Even though there are several studies on nonviolent movements as in the case of Arab Spring⁷⁹, research on social non-movements as Asef Bayat⁸⁰ calls it, needs to be engaged to further map the aftermath of such movements. This is especially true in the case of Egypt where resistance had to be carried out in non-overt ways. Conventional theorists while studying the post-2011 events try to gauge the successes in terms of institutional change and regime transformation. The problem, however, with this narrow, not to mention traditional, way of looking at revolution is that the analogies do not take into consideration what goes on at a ground level: what kind of rights are being denied and who are being denied these rights? What are the stories of different sections of the society who are not bureaucratic males and other privileged groups? And, what survival and resistance strategies do they adopt under the repressive regime? What qualifies as politics and resistance need to be addressed from a critical epistemology as well in order to distance from the traditional point of view of resistance as mass protest gatherings and demonstrations?

⁷⁶ Mala Htun and S. Laurel Weldon, "When Do Governments Promote Womens Rights? A Framework for the Comparative Analysis of Sex Equality Policy," *Perspectives on Politics* 8, no. 1 (March 2010): 208-212, accessed March 25, 2019, doi:10.1017/s1537592709992787.

⁷⁷ Maxine Molyneux, "Analysing Women's Movements," *Womens Movements in International Perspective*, December 2001, accessed April 23, 2019, doi:10.1057/9780230286382_7.

⁷⁸ Lisa Baldez, "Womens Movements and Democratic Transition in Chile, Brazil, East Germany, and Poland," *Comparative Politics* 35, no. 3 (April 2003): 253, accessed March 24, 2019, doi:10.2307/4150176.

⁷⁹ Peter Ackerman and Christopher Kruegler, *Strategic Nonviolent Conflict: The Dynamics of People Power in the Twentieth Century* (Westport, CT: Praeger, 1994); Erica Chenoweth and Maria Stephen, *Why Civil Resistance Works: The Strategic Logic of Nonviolent Conflict* (Columbia: Columbia University Press, 2012).

⁸⁰ Asef Bayat, *Life as Politics: How Ordinary People Change the Middle East* (Stanford, CA: Stanford University Press, 2013), 96-115.

However, studying the phenomenon of transitional and post-transitional women's movement in the backdrop of authoritarian regimes through conventional epistemologies presents critical researchers with considerable challenges. 'Adding' women as an analytical category when studying the revolutionary situation⁸¹ has a limiting effect on their struggles, visibility and roles played before and after the Arab spring, thus discrediting the whole picture. It is this very ungendered and sexless narrative that feminist researchers are wary of while rewriting history by venturing into terrains hitherto considered supremely male-dominated. Bringing back women at the centre of the contemporary Arab history exposes such pitfalls because at any given point in time, ignoring the lived experiences of half, and thus a significant portion, of the population, and discrediting their fight to achieve equal footing in the society hinders ontological investigations.

The idea of social non-movement⁸² based on the "collective action of dispersed and unorganized actors" is crucial in the context of Egypt where such "claim-making practices are made and realized mostly through direct actions, rather than through exerting pressure on to authorities to concede. In a sense, the non-movements emerge as an un-articulated strategy to reduce the cost of mobilisation under the repressive conditions." Social non-movements occupy the vacuum left by the repression and ineffectiveness of social movements to tackle specific issues. These unorganized and dispersed actors which include youth, urban poor and women engage in such contentious practices to "enhance their life chances".

Against this background, this study proposes some critical entry points to approach women's rights in post-Arab Spring Egypt. Using conventional concepts of politics to analyse post-Mubarak dynamics and women's rights in Egypt would yield skewed results primarily because of the very nature of regimes that were eventually installed wherein traditional politics did not have enough space to manoeuvre and negotiate with the state. This necessitates a study of everyday resistance of women, thus to undo the erasure and invisibility, conventional concepts of politics render them. Contextualising the ordinary lives of women within the socio-political and cultural backgrounds of Egypt would yield substantial analysis as to how actions of ordinary women accumulate into

⁸¹ Ketchley explains the situation as a necessary condition where alternative claims to sovereignty in the name of the people were prevalent which mobilised huge numbers of people to Tahrir Square and other protest sights across North Africa and West Asia. See, Neil Ketchley, *Egypt in the Time of Revolution: Contentious Politics and the Arab Spring*, Cambridge Studies in Contentious Politics (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2017), 5.

⁸² Asef Bayat, *Life as Politics: How Ordinary People Change the Middle East* (Stanford, CA: Stanford University Press, 2013), 96-115.

social transformation and change overtime. On the other hand, it is pertinent to look at the confrontation between the state and women's rights movement and civil society organizations in order to critique state's commitment to promoting women's rights. This should be useful to fully comprehend the vastness and severity of state-sponsored violence unleashed on non-state institutions and structures as a disabling strategy and how despite controversies and hurdles, they complement and supplement the welfare activities which are supposed to be carried out by the state. The division between secular and Islamic feminists poses another challenge to campaigning for women's rights. Their differences and similarities should be gauged against the reality of Egyptian women to find room for areas of cooperation and dialogue.

Concluding remarks

Marginalisation of third world subjectivities and their socio-cultural sensitivities in mainstream IR played a pivotal role in the emergence of subaltern perspectives in the discipline. The efforts to distance theory from the tendency to universalise and impose experiences of the West on the non-West led to feminist intellectual exercises that focused on multiple sources of oppression along the lines of class, gender, religion, culture, sexuality etc. Feminist IR shuns the obsession of narrow mainstream conceptualisations of IR in abstract terms like power, anarchy, hegemony, and security in order to advance a qualitative ground level observation of social relations, giving rise to various strands of feminist thought that are contextually, culturally, socially, politically and regionally rooted. Arab feminism and Islamic feminism have been fighting the orientalist stereotyping of Muslim women as passive, domesticated and dependent and illustrated the possibilities of women empowerment within the paradigm of Qu'ranic texts. This intellectual and activists' endeavour reached a pivotal point with the incidence of Arab spring which further shaped the momentum and intellectual direction of the movement.

Chapter II

The History of Feminist Movement in Egypt

Egyptian feminist movement is one of the earliest feminist movements in West Asia and North Africa (WANA), developed in the late 19th and early 20th centuries as a response to British colonial rule and calls for self-determination. The inception of feminist consciousness¹ and its evolution into a full-fledged feminist movement have been closely linked to the socio-political and cultural setting of Egypt. This chapter traces the history of feminist movements in Egypt against the social and political contexts by chronologically parsing into four periods: the beginnings (1919-1952) which constitute the years following the independence of Egypt from colonial rule, Nasser's period (1952-1970), Anwar Sadat period (1970-1981) and Mubarak period (1981-2011).

Feminist consciousness in Egypt formed in the early 19th century against the backdrop of rapid modernisation of the society under the then ruler Mohammed Ali Pasha (1805-48) and his capitalist, secular vision of state. Mohammed Ali pursued a systematic plan to modernise and industrialise Egyptian society which brought the country to the forefront in the region. It was succeeded by British occupation of Egypt (1882-1914) as a veiled protectorate and autonomous province under Ottoman empire, followed by the official British protectorate (1914-1922) culminating in the declaration of Egypt's independence. International as well as domestic events in the early 20th century were pivotal in initialising and catalysing the independence movement.

As a British colony, the breakout of the First World War (1914-1918) had huge bearings on Egypt's political economy. Peasantry population were forcibly recruited as soldiers to Egyptian Labour Corps to represent the Allied Forces in the war². The presence of soldiers in large numbers in Egypt's military bases had gendered implications. For instance, when Egypt became a military base for the Allied Forces, military prostitution around the bases flourished³. Concurrently, the war was putting Egyptian economy under duress which was reeling under inflation. It was at this juncture, towards the end of the war that a delegation of nationalist

¹ Feminist consciousness can be defined as the state of being conscious of aware of the position of inequality and discrimination attributed by virtue of one's gender, and the readiness to resist it.

² Ellis Goldberg, "Peasants in Revolt - Egypt 1919," *International Journal of Middle East Studies* 24, No. 2 (May, 1992): 262-263, accessed 24 May, 2019

³ Hanan Hammad, "Between Egyptian 'National Purity' and 'Local Flexibility': Prostitution in al-Mhalla al_kubra in the First Half of the 20th Century," *Journal of Social History* 44, No. 3 (Spring 2011): 751-783, accessed March 24, 2019

politicians like Saad Zaghlul⁴ approached the British officials to grant permission to travel to London⁵. The objective of the team was to participate in the Paris Conference and represent the interests of the Egyptian people to be independent of British rule. Zaghlul was greatly inspired by Woodrow Wilson's speech on self-determination⁶, although it mostly targeted European countries⁷. Zaghlul and his team were arrested in March 1919 and later exiled to Malta, which sparked the Egyptian revolution of 1919⁸.

During the initial phase of British occupation, Egypt was accelerating technologically, fostering a generation of peasantry as well as upper-class educated elites frustrated with the British who ruled according to their own self-interest and disregarded the interests of indigenous population. Education opportunities, first restricted to upper-class elites and later open to middle-class women by late 19th century, was pivotal in producing thought-provoking literary works rooted in feminist and nationalist consciousness. As Hatem⁹ observes, this was particularly because British supported the two-tier education system in Egypt which taught Arabic to majority of the population and English and Arabic both to the elites to prepare them for serving in the British governed bureaucracy. Middle-class women at the time were in the forefront of feminist cause as writers, editors, publishers and so on, and highlighted the need for women's rights through their publications in magazines, newspapers, pamphlets, novels, and poetry predominantly in Arabic¹⁰. Rising female literacy rate which manifested in the Arabic publishing industry¹¹ was pertinent in emphasising and furthering 'female awakening'

⁴ Egyptian revolutionary and leader of the Wafd Party. Served as the Prime Minister of Egypt from January 1924 to January 1926.

⁵ Saba Mahmood, "Religious Freedom, the Minority Question, and Geopolitics in the Middle East," *Comparative Studies in Society and History* 54, No. 2 (April 2012): 434-435.

⁶ Delivered in his famous Fourteen Points speech before the Congress on January 8, 1918 as a program for world peace.

⁷ Amira Howeidy, "1918: Before the storm in Saad Zaghloul's memoirs," *ahramonline*, November 11, 2018, accessed February 11, 2019. <http://english.ahram.org.eg/NewsContentP/1/316144/Egypt/-Before-the-storm-in-Saad-Zaghloul%E2%80%99s-memoires.aspx>

⁸ Ellis Goldberg, "Peasants in Revolt - Egypt 1919," *International Journal of Middle East Studies* 24, No. 2 (May, 1992): 261

⁹ Mervat Hatem, "The 1919 Revolution and Nationalist Reconstructions of the Lives and Works of Pioneering Women Writers," In *Literature, Gender and National-building in Nineteenth-Century Egypt*, ed. Arthur Goldschmidt and Amy J. Johnson (Cairo: American University of Cairo Press, 2005), 205

¹⁰ Margot Badran, "The feminist vision in the writings of three turn- of- the- century Egyptian women," *British Society for Middle Eastern Studies. Bulletin* 15, no. 1-2, (February 2007): 20, accessed February 19, 2019. DOI: 10.1080/13530198808705469

Also see, Beth Baron, "Conclusion," in *The Women's Awakening in Egypt: Culture, Society and the Press* (New Haven: Yale University Press, 1994) 188

¹¹ Arabic press started flourishing in the country from 1870s onwards. Censorship and control over press was mostly relinquished after the British occupation of Egypt in 1882. Financial investments in the press was also profitable for the elite with the burgeoning of magazines, books and newspapers. It was also a unifying factor that enabled communication and mobilisation once political ideas gained vogue.

or *al-nahda al-nisa'iyya*, a phrase which was used by female intellectuals in the broader meaning of increased social mobility and mobilisation of women in the country.

With the emergence of private publishing in the 1890s, there was an increase in the literature that particularly catered to women audience who were interested in reading more about women's affairs¹². This was a major shift in the cultural aspect of the society which had frowned upon female literacy as more women started writing and reading about political matters such as veiling and seclusion, marriage, relationships, divorce and so on¹³. Therefore, as Baron argues¹⁴, the early feminist literary works emphasised the ideas of secularism, nationalism and Islamism by talking about domestic affairs, entertainment and interesting political content. The heightened sense of feminist and nationalist causes was fostered by and paralleled with the emergence of an independence movement and subsequent revolution of 1919 which was significant in the continuation of the feminist movement in Egypt.

First wave of feminism: The origins (1919-1952)

Although Egyptian women's movement gained substantial momentum with the 1919 revolution, seeds of women's liberation and feminist consciousness were already sown after French campaign under the rule of Muhammed Ali Pasha when modern intellectuals such as Refaa El-Tahtawi¹⁵ and Qasim Amin¹⁶ advocated for women's rights and liberation¹⁷. They were educated abroad and happened to be the first men to champion women's education, although rooted in notions of motherhood and closely linked with educated woman's role in family life. Additionally, newspapers and journals such as *Anis al-Jalis* and *al A'ila*

¹² Nabila Ramdani, "Women in the 1919 Egyptian Revolution: From Feminist Awakening to Nationalist Political Activism," *Journal of International Women's Studies* 14, no. 2 (March 2013): 41, accessed March 26, 2019.

¹³ Beth Baron, "The Community of Readers," in *The Women's Awakening in Egypt: Culture, Society and the Press* (New Haven: Yale University Press, 1994) 82.

¹⁴ (ibid)

¹⁵ Educated in France and Egypt, Refaa El-Tahtawi was an Egyptian enlightener who talked at length about notions like nation, nationhood, citizenship, homeland, lawfulness, equality, freedom. He was also one of the pioneering champions of women's rights (Kutelia 2011, 83-93)

¹⁶ Qasim Amin was one of the strongest advocates of the notion of motherhood. Education of women was linked to their childbearing skills and intellectual education of the male members of the family for the betterment of the nation. Linking women's education to the development of nation, along with unveiling and end of seclusion was one of the most radical thoughts of the time as written in his 1899 work "The Liberation of Women". Tahar Haddad put forth ideas of women's liberation as a humanitarian concern in his 1930 book *Our Women in the Shari'a and Society*. He was against the Islamic rule, for in his view it repressed women.

¹⁷ Lila Abu-Lughod and Rabab El-Mahdi, "Beyond the "Woman Question" in the Egyptian Revolution," *Feminist Studies* 37, no. 3 (Fall 2011): 685

Also see Assim Alkhawaja, *Complexity of Women's Liberation in the Era of Westernization: Egyptian Islamic and Secular Feminists in Their Own Context*, PhD diss., University of San Francisco, 2015 (2015), 63-69, accessed April 30, 2019. <https://pdfs.semanticscholar.org/b9e2/3bf2e390e4e3f222d04232a825bac172f968.pdf>.

established, owned and edited by women as early as 1892 all aimed at defending women's rights and expressing a gendered point of view¹⁸. The literature succeeding this period is considered renaissance literature in Egypt as it concerned itself with public issues and addressed women's rights and issues in the writings one way or another¹⁹ reflects the society at large. Modern Egyptian literature characterised by political overtones which were a product of the renaissance literature was enriched by the spread of political awareness during this period.

Spread of Western education played a huge role in shifting the focus in such literary works to the state of women and related issues like work, education, childbearing, appearance and their relationship to nationalist movement, particularly because of the growing nationalist concern with the British colonization²⁰. Because growth was accelerated by Western education and since most of the women active in public spaces at the time had imbibed a lot of Western values, Western woman was placed as the ideal to be. The first reformers belonged to both Islamist and liberal schools of thought and adopted concepts of modernity informed by Western cultural superiority and concept of development which gauged progress in linear terms.²¹ The adoption of tradition/modernity dichotomy juxtaposed Egyptian woman with their Western ideals in terms of education, behaviour, clothing style, and more, in literature, newspapers and magazines as the public discourse. This idea of superiority of the Western woman was inculcated into the early feminist movement in Egypt, which manifested in their adherence to secular outlook and rejection of all religious symbols²². For instance, unveiling was introduced as a desirable way of clothing in public which became popular among different religions at different periods in history²³. For example, unveiling became common among Copts, Syrian Christians and Jews whereas Muslim women continued veiling until late 1930s²⁴. The pioneers of project of Westernisation of Egyptian women may have initialised the issue that still lingers

¹⁸ See Beth Baron, "Pioneers of Women's Press," in *The Women's Awakening in Egypt: Culture, Society and the Press* (New Haven: Yale University Press, 1994) 20.

¹⁹ Radwa Ashour, Ferial Ghazoul and Hasna Reda-Mekdashy, "Arab Women Writers: A critical Guide, 1873-1999" Cairo: The American University Press in Cairo, 2008) 98-162.

²⁰ See Assim Alkhawaja, *Complexity of Women's Liberation in the Era of Westernization: Egyptian Islamic and Secular Feminists in Their Own Context*, PhD diss., University of San Francisco, 2015 (2015), 25, accessed April 11, 2019. <https://pdfs.semanticscholar.org/b9e2/3bf2e390e4e3f222d04232a825bac172f968.pdf>.

²¹ Hoda El Sadda, *Gender, Nation and the Arabic Novel: Egypt 1892-2008* (Edinburgh: Edinburgh University Press, 2012), 67.

²² Hoda Elsadda, "Imagining the "New Man": Gender and Nation in Arab Literary Narratives in early Twentieth-Century," *Journal of Middle East Women's Studies* 3, no. 2 (Spring, 2007): 38

²³ Beth, Baron, "Unveiling in Early Twentieth Century Egypt: Practical and Symbolic Considerations," *Middle Eastern Studies* 25, no. 3 (July 1989): 370-386, accessed April 21, 2019. <https://www.jstor.org/stable/4283318>.

²⁴ Nikki Keddie, *Women in the Middle East*, (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 2007), 90.

when talking about women's emancipation in Egypt- linking the appearance and status of women to the development of the modern society. However, it must be emphasised that the dichotomy of Western/traditional was informed by women's patriarchally assigned responsibility of representing the modernizing Egyptian society through the way they dressed and appeared at least in the public²⁵.

Nevertheless, national liberation movement created an environment for increased contemplation on society and identity, through discussions on issues like polygamy, marriage, divorce, education, work and child custody²⁶. Feminised spaces like upper-class women salons with cultural and literary flux offered intellectual space for elite, educated women to debate on social, political, economic and cultural topics. Such exercises reinforced the importance of formal education and higher education in the emancipation project, which led many women to protest for increased rights to education. Formal university education which was denied to women at the time became a matter of contention with the formation of Women's Educational Association in 1914. As a mode of protest, women gathered in lecture halls of the Egyptian University²⁷ in large numbers against preventing women from taking classes and enrolling as students. Consequently, women were allowed to be university students in 1928 and the first batch of students graduated in 1933 which was a significant step in launching women in academia beyond the fields of nursing or schooling²⁸, as was common at the time.

However, most of these women²⁹ hailed from upper-class families whose primary concern was personal freedoms besides nationalist goals. They primarily focused on charitable work without the intent to produce radical changes for the benefit of women in the society³⁰.

²⁵ Initially, this debate of Westernisation versus indigeneity initiated by feminists and women scholars in an effort to reclaim the expression of their subjective experiences was appropriated by statesmen and religious leaders at different points in the history of Egypt in order to discredit the objectives and struggles of the movement. A major theme that has emerged out of the relationship between state and women's movements in Egypt is the state imposition of a set of values as feminist ideals favourable to the state and coopting women's struggles, not out of genuine concern for women's rights, but arising out of their necessity to please the West.

²⁶ See Beth Baron, "The Rights of Women," in *The Women's Awakening in Egypt: Culture, Society and the Press* (New Haven: Yale University Press, 1994), 105

²⁷ Established in 1908.

²⁸ Nikki Keddie, *Women in the Middle East*, (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 2007), 67-68.

²⁹ Including Labiba Hashim, Nabawiya Musa and Malak Hifni Nasif (Elsadda, 1981:110)

³⁰ See Hala Kamal, "A Century of Egyptian Women's Demands: The Four Waves of the Egyptian Feminist Movement," in *Gender and Race Matter: Global Perspectives on Being a Woman*. (Emerald Group Publishing Limited, 2016), 9

Also see, Nadjie Al-Ali, *Secularism, Gender and the State in the Middle East: The Egyptian Women's Movement*. (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2000), 66 and Margot Badran, *Feminists, Islam, and Nation Gender and the Making of Modern Egypt* (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1995), 63.

They failed to identify the concerns of poverty-stricken women, labour exploitation³¹ as well as appalling living and working conditions³² of women workers. However, as Kamal argues³³, this direction and visibility of women were helpful for the feminist movement at large in four ways: one, it gave women the mobility to transverse across private/public spheres; two, breaking out of the confines of the home while still taking up responsibilities of problem-solving and offering solutions in their homes; three, running newspapers and magazines equipped women with the necessary skills political tools to bargain and negotiate their space; and four, women's roles in the public helped them to create networks amongst like-minded women. This led to solidarity-building amongst different classes of women and consequently, expression of their subjective struggles through nationalist goals.

Poor urban working-class women were the first to rebel against repression in their own sectors by striking and occupying factories, demanding freedom and dignity, and work hours controlled by law.³⁴ They also fought for maternity leave so that no more women have to hide their pregnancy or leave their newborns to starve while they were working. Shafika Mohammed and Hamid Khalil Camalia were some of the notable working-class women in the industrial areas and rural locations who died martyrs after participating in the revolution. Many mainstream historians in Egypt leave out their names and bring the focus of the history³⁵ to

³¹ A 1914 census shows that only 20,000 women formed part of the wage-earning workforce at the time in Egypt. Whereas there were several thousand others who formed the category of unpaid labour, those who earned wages were underpaid and comprised mostly of women and girls who were forced by poverty to seek jobs in mills, factories besides their household responsibilities. They had to work for more than fourteen hours for meagre pay in exhausting and debilitating conditions that they were dismissed from those jobs in four or five years, with poor health which prevented them from being fit to seek out another job. (Nordwell, 2008, El Saadawi, 1993)

³² No maternity leave was granted. A working woman had to return to her job immediately to the factory to keep her job. Working women would never mention that they were married to their employers as unmarried girls were preferred for many jobs. If a woman got pregnant, she would have to hide her pregnancy as if she was committing some crime. Many tried unhealthy and illegal methods of abortion leaving the woman with severe health defects like bleeding and infection. Women dying from such cases wasn't rare in Egypt at the time. (El Saadawi, 1993)

³³ Hala Kamal, "A Century of Egyptian Women's Demands: The Four Waves of the Egyptian Feminist Movement," in *Gender and Race Matter: Global Perspectives on Being a Woman*. (Emerald Group Publishing Limited, 2016), 9

³⁴ Mervat Fayeze. Hatem, *Literature, Gender, and Nation-building in Nineteenth Century Egypt: The Life and Work of Aisha Taymur* (New York: Palgrave Macmillan, 2011), 2.

³⁵ The collective memory of the revolution and its iconic importance in the history of women's movement was fractured along the lines of gender. Many historians praised women for their role but concluded that they were physically weak hence mocked the British's victory over them as it was not a victory against strong men. Some narratives reduced women to secondary roles like taking care of children and the sick, supporting and mobilising men during the revolution. Nermin Allam (2017, 34) proposed the term "domestication of female public bravery" to better describe the ways in which women's struggle were framed by historians in the 1919 revolutionary accounts. This is in congruence with the parallels Cynthia Enloe (1990) draws between nationalism and masculinity where women have subsidiary roles and men are hailed as the real performers.

upper-class women and men³⁶. The integration of feminist agenda with nationalist goals provided space for a large number of underprivileged women to participate in the national struggle, which prompts Allam to comment that the revolution was led by women³⁷. Women's demonstration during the 1919 revolution was also a symbolic claims-making of the public sphere³⁸, whereas activism prior to the revolution was mostly concerned with signing petitions to launch boycott campaigns. Although there are many studies which analyse this moment in history as a realisation of intellectual struggles of male reformers like Qasim Amin, Muhammad Abduh and Gamal Al-Din for women's liberation, many feminist historians and scholars like Badran³⁹ and Hatem⁴⁰ find it discrediting and discounting Egyptian women's role in the independence struggle.

Noted feminists of that time such as Sharaawi and so on Following the revolution, Wafdist Women's Central Committee (WWCC) was established and elected Huda Shaarawi, a pioneering feminist and member of the Wafd Party, as its president. WWCC challenged the dominance of men in politics, and criticised the policies pertaining to Egypt's foreign relations and continuing presence of the British in Egypt⁴¹. Towards the end of 1920, women activists were quite vocal and public in criticising male Wafdist leaders for ignoring their opinions and views on Egypt's political direction⁴². WWCC's genuine and pioneering attempts to democratise and feminise Egypt's political and public landscape were often faced with criticisms from male leaders for their independent and adamant behaviour⁴³. Shaarawi and many notable feminists like Cesa Naballawi and Nabaweya Mousa resigned from WWCC and

³⁶ Class lens was used to analyse the events of 1919 by many historians. This was also a tactic used by the British in their choice of method of discipline. The lower- and middle-class women who participated in the movement were killed by the British whereas the upper class women were spared after small punishments like making them stand under the sun for hours (Badran 1988, 15-17 and El Saadawi 1997, 224-229). Many martyrs were indeed from lower classes and El Saadawi says the erasure of their memories is a deliberate move.

³⁷ Nermin Allam, *Women and the Egyptian Revolution: Engagement and Activism during the 2011 Arab Uprisings* (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2017), 32

³⁸ Nawal El Saadawi and Adele Newson-Horst, *The Essential Nawal El Saadawi: A Reader* (London: Zed Books, 2013), 139.

³⁹ Margot Badran, *Feminists, Islam, and Nation Gender and the Making of Modern Egypt* (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1995), 19

⁴⁰ Mervat Fayeze. Hatem, *Literature, Gender, and Nation-building in Nineteenth Century Egypt: The Life and Work of Aisha Taymur* (New York: Palgrave Macmillan, 2011), 2.

⁴¹ Huda Shaarawi wrote an open letter in the newspaper Al-Akhbar in which she disagreed with Saad Zaghloul who was the leader of the Wafd party at the time and supervising the independence agreement from the Egyptian front, on his failure to oust British troops completely from Egypt.

⁴² Margot Badran, "Competing Agenda: Feminists, Islam and the State in Nineteenth- and Twentieth-Century Egypt," in *Women, Islam and the State*, ed. Deniz Kandiyoti (London: Palgrave Macmillan, 1991), 201-236. accessed April 21, 2019. doi:10.1007/978-1-349-21178-4_8

⁴³ Nermin Allam, "Women and Egypt's National Struggles," in *Women and the Egyptian Revolution*, (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2017):36

jointly established Egyptian Feminist Union (EFU) on March 16, 1923, on the fourth anniversary of the first women's public demonstration during 1919 revolution⁴⁴. The demands of the feminist movement in Egypt was expressed thereafter through the struggles of EFU which advocated for personal law reforms, women's political rights, and equal education and employment opportunities for women. The feminist agenda of EFU and patriarchal nationalism that state propagated were at odds with each other which translated to the 1923 constitution. It denied women their political rights, including suffrage rights⁴⁵, precisely because independence of the country did not automatically guarantee women's rights⁴⁶. In a way, the 1923 constitution reinforced and privileged state's maleness and authority⁴⁷ without guaranteeing gender equality or other political rights of women.

EFU was disillusioned by the state's exclusion of feminist agenda post-independence notwithstanding the critical roles played by women in the revolution, at which point they sought support from the International Woman Suffrage Alliance Congress in Rome in May 1923. It was in this return journey after attending the Congress that Shaarawi, Mousa and Naballawi threw their veils in the sea in public, breaking their ties with the Islamic religion.⁴⁸ This symbolic departure from all aspects of Islam was a determining factor in the nature of mainstream feminist politics in Egypt for a long time. The secular feminist agenda of the feminist movement influenced by the values of Islamic modernism and nationalism inclusive of the interests of women from different religious backgrounds translated into a set of thirty-two nationalist and feminist demands which included right to vote, full independence of Egypt, ban on prostitution⁴⁹, economic and health reforms, and educational opportunities proclaimed jointly by WWCC and EFU on the day of the opening of the 1924 parliament⁵⁰.

⁴⁴ Margot Badran, "Competing Agenda: Feminists, Islam and the State in Nineteenth- and Twentieth-Century Egypt," in *Women, Islam and the State*, ed. Deniz Kandiyoti (London: Palgrave Macmillan, 1991), 208. accessed April 21, 2019. doi:10.1007/978-1-349-21178-4_8

⁴⁵ The Law of Election of 10th April 1923 stipulated that only men are allowed to vote.

⁴⁶ Beth Baron, *Egypt as a Woman: Nationalism, Gender and Politics* (California: University of California Press, 2007), 80

⁴⁷ Nikki Keddie, *Women in the Middle East*, (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 2007), 95.

⁴⁸ Beth, Baron, "Unveiling in Early Twentieth Century Egypt: Practical and Symbolic Considerations," *Middle Eastern Studies* 25, no. 3 (July 1989): 371, accessed April 21, 2019. <https://www.jstor.org/stable/4283318>.

⁴⁹ Prostitutes were primarily ex-slaves, or poor women. Although state-regulated prostitution was abolished in Britain in 1886, it was implemented in its colonies including Egypt. Although weekly medical examinations and photo permits were issued, the law was not meticulously implemented. It wasn't until 1949 that state-licensed brothels were ordered to be closed. After the 1952 revolution, it was outlawed.

⁵⁰ Nermin Allam, *Women and the Egyptian Revolution: Engagement and Activism during the 2011 Arab Uprisings* (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2017), 17; Nikki Keddie, *Women in the Middle East*, (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 2007), 93; Beth Baron, *Egypt as a Woman: Nationalism, Gender and Politics* (California: University of California Press, 2007), 170

A significant political development in the initial phases of Egyptian women's movement which would later create political, social and cultural implication is the growth of Islamism in the interwar period (1919-1952). Islamists in Egypt were greatly influenced and inspired by Palestinian struggle and threatened by the perception of the same as Western and Zionist crusade against Muslims⁵¹. Their cause of politically institutionalising Islam was realised through the establishment of Muslim Brotherhood by Hassan Al-Banna in 1928 which also had a significant number of women affiliates. At the same time, several philanthropic efforts were initiated during the inter-war period, challenging the monopoly of Muslim institutions in this sector⁵². The high demands of volunteers created by the new charitable establishments played a significant role in ending the seclusion of women and coming out to get involved in social work. As Baron⁵³ argues, one of the notable themes in vogue at the time among women in households was 'scientific domesticity' which emphasised the importance of good education, although to bring up educated males, and adopt healthy practices in home-making as well as take up newer responsibilities.

Women's political activism

Women's education proved to be a significant determinant of their increased public and political participation, enabling women to mobilise for legal reform and radical social change. In the advent of 1940s, women activism branched out in their objectives and scope, constituting associations and organisations that fostered different ideologies. Heterogenous feminist activism is characteristic of the last decade of the first wave of feminism in Egypt which exhibited a shift from upper-class salon centred charity groups to more politically driven groups pioneered and formed by different classes of women.

The Egyptian Women's Party in 1942 was the first secular women's party to advocate gender equality in fields like education, employment, citizenship and political participation. Doria Shafik founded another feminist organization in 1948 called the *Bint al-Nil Union* (Daughter of the Nile Association) which engaged with the issues of middle-class women to advance women's full political rights. Towards this cause, they conducted literacy programmes, helped poor women in terms of social, cultural and economic services including

⁵¹Nadje Al-Ali, *Secularism, Gender and the State in the Middle East: The Egyptian Women's Movement*. (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2000), 66

⁵² Beth Baron, "The Advent of Associations," in *The Women's Awakening in Egypt: Culture, Society and the Press* (New Haven: Yale University Press, 1994) 169

⁵³ Beth Baron, "Rethinking Work and the Family," in *The Women's Awakening in Egypt: Culture, Society and the Press* (New Haven: Yale University Press, 1994) 158-167

childcare⁵⁴. Although Shafik was perceived as French-influenced and too Western and upper-class oriented by other women activists like Latifa Zayyad, the autonomous nature of her organisation as opposed to the directed⁵⁵ EFU under the Wafd Party offered them more independence in terms of their activism and decision-making. In an open confrontation with the state, Shafik and her organisation led a demonstration to the parliament in 1951 demanding the right to vote, and later organised women's hunger strike in Cairo and Alexandria in 1954 demanding an inclusive constitutional process in the aftermath of the 1954 revolution.

Feminist activists such as Inji Aflatoun⁵⁶, Ceza Nabarawi and Latifa Zayyad⁵⁷ who were influenced by socialist ideologies established *Lagnat al-Shabaat* (Committee of Young Women) which contested class discrimination prevalent in Egyptian society and advocated for social justice and equality⁵⁸. They aimed at attracting other pro-communist women in Egypt and retain the purpose of EFU from fading⁵⁹. In 1936, Zainab al-Ghazali left EFU to form Muslim Women's Society which focused on welfare work and women's education in Islam. The organization merged with Muslim Brotherhood by virtue of their common political objective to implement the Shari'a in 1948 when several members of the Brotherhood were arrested⁶⁰. She was able to command attention and respect in the Brotherhood particularly because of her exposure to the feminist discourse from the early twentieth century.

Personal Laws

Personal laws which were passed over a series of years in the 1920s reinforced the patriarchal setting of the private sphere, granting male heads of the family complete control of their families with minimum state intervention⁶¹. In the personal status laws, marriage was largely considered as a financial arrangement that could be liquidated in the absence of male

⁵⁴ Nadjé Al-Ali, *Secularism, Gender and the State in the Middle East: The Egyptian Women's Movement*. (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2000), 64

⁵⁵ Referring to Maxine Molyneux's three typologies of women's organisations: directed, associational and autonomous. Maxine Molyneux, "Analysing Women's Movements," *Women's Movements in International Perspective*, December 2001, 226, accessed April 18, 2019. doi:10.1057/9780230286382_7.

⁵⁶ Feminist activist and painter, she was a pioneering figure in the Marxist-feminist movement in Egypt

⁵⁷ Belonged to the radical left ideology and was increasingly at odds with mainstream feminist movements in Egypt

⁵⁸ Nadjé Al-Ali, *Secularism, Gender and the State in the Middle East: The Egyptian Women's Movement*. (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2000), 65

⁵⁹ (ibid)

⁶⁰ Nadjé Al-Ali, *Secularism, Gender and the State in the Middle East: The Egyptian Women's Movement*. (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2000), 66

⁶¹ Mervat Hatem, "The Enduring Alliance of Nationalism and Patriarchy in Muslim Personal Status Laws: The Case of Modern Egypt," *Feminist Issues* 6, no. 1 (March 1986): 26, accessed April 20, 2019. doi:10.1007/bf02685635.

consent or support. According to the marriage law (within the personal laws) passed in 1923, marriageable ages were fixed to be sixteen for women and eighteen for men and required families to provide proof for the daughter's age. This requirement was reduced to a testimony by the girl's father by the elected government of 1924 led by Saad Zaghlul⁶². The laws did not mention the grounds on which a man could divorce his wife leaving room for males to take the law for granted, whereas specifically mentioned the grounds for the wife to initiate the divorce like the husband's irreversible illness⁶³. Husbands were given provisions to appeal the judges to order forcible return of their wives who leave the marriage without permission⁶⁴. This was also evidence of the fact that neither the laws nor the society valued women's social and physiological needs in marriage. Although the 1929 law provided that "harm" of the wife could be a reason for divorce, it did not define what qualifies as harm and mostly left it to the discretion of male judges.

The personal laws viewed women as a part of the organization that is family not as individuals with independent rights. However, the moderate critique of feminist activists did not challenge the essence of the laws which were gender discriminatory in nature. Their concept of secularism endorsed the separation of private and public, consenting to religious gendering of roles in the family sector⁶⁵. They only questioned the male abuse of power to oppress women within their specific gender roles as opposed to the radical critique of the very basis of hierarchical gender relations in the private sphere. Their idea of equality was limited to public sphere and did not translate to equal rights in the private sphere. The secular line of argument that the feminists proposed followed the narrative of a united family for a united nation no matter the gender cost of keeping the family united.

Employment

In the 1940s and 1950s, employment opportunities for middle-class women diversified, and women engaging in paid jobs was threatening to the androcentric society in two ways: it challenged the concept of men as the head and breadwinners of the families, and it also challenged their monopoly of workplaces. The initial stigma with nursing that women would come into contact with unknown men was soon dispersed by 1930s as women began to study

⁶² Nikki Keddie, *Women in the Middle East*, (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 2007), 93

⁶³ (ibid), 38

⁶⁴ Women's obedience or *al-ta'a* refers to the right of the house to resort legally to bring back his wife forcibly by proving her disobedience to the marital house or *bayt al-ta'a*. This law changed only in 1967

⁶⁵ Margot Badran, *Feminists, Islam, and Nation Gender and the Making of Modern Egypt* (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1995), 125

medical sciences abroad and start their careers in Egypt⁶⁶. Concurrently, EFU played a significant role in training women in handicrafts. Gradually, sectors wherein women sought employment started diversifying, with many working in sugar refineries, tobacco and textile factories⁶⁷. In a country where women were discouraged culturally and socially to be judges, Women were taking the bar exam to be lawyers in the 1930s as the laws were secularised⁶⁸. Egypt also had a pioneering film industry which launched women singers like Umm Kulthum along with the rise of other women in the entertainment industry, although mostly remained traditional in nature⁶⁹. Professional journalism and central sector jobs were also taken up by quite a number of women during this period.⁷⁰

There were considerable improvements in the labour laws which regulated women's working hours and conditions. The labour laws of 1933 which followed the recommendations of the International Labour Organisation mission appointed to Egypt in 1932, prohibited child labour and stipulated that women were not allowed to work more than nine hours, or in environments that were polluting or had heavy machinery, or in the nights⁷¹. According to the law, women were allowed one day of rest weekly, in addition to provisions that safeguarded pregnant working women and granted maternity leave⁷². However, the laws had loopholes and little practical implication as it was continually being abused by the employers. Nevertheless, the 1933 laws compared to 1909 labour laws were an improvement and an acknowledgement of women's labour rights.

The first wave of feminism in Egypt originated from a rapidly industrialising, modernising country immersed in nationalist fervour for independence and rooted in anti-colonial sentiments. The spread of feminist consciousness at the time was aided by increasing access to education for upper- and middle-class women whose literary works were also political in nature. There was an increase in public participation and mobilisation of women during this period who called for legal reforms and radical social change favourable for women. Although

⁶⁶Judith Tucker, "Egyptian Women in the Work Force: An Historical Survey," *MERIP Reports*, no. 50 (August 1976): 7, accessed April 27, 2019. doi:10.2307/3010883.

⁶⁷ Nikki Keddie, *Women in the Middle East*, (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 2007), 94

⁶⁸ (ibid), 94

⁶⁹Sandra N Mokalled, *Faces of Feminism in Early Twentieth Century Egypt*, PhD diss., Graduate School of Clemson University, 2016 (Clemson University, 2016), 109-129.

⁷⁰ Judith Tucker, "Egyptian Women in the Work Force: An Historical Survey," *MERIP Reports*, no. 50 (August 1976): 6, accessed April 21, 2019. doi:10.2307/3010883.

⁷¹ *The Struggle for Worker Rights in Egypt*, technical paper (Washington DC: Solidarity Center, 2010), 7, accessed April 1, 2019. [http://hrlibrary.umn.edu/research/Egypt/The Struggle for Workers rights.pdf](http://hrlibrary.umn.edu/research/Egypt/The%20Struggle%20for%20Workers%20rights.pdf).

⁷² Nikki Keddie, *Women in the Middle East*, (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 2007), 94

initially secular in nature, the first half of 20th century witnessed the emergence of diverse strands of feminist thought influenced by Marxist-socialist, liberal, secular, and Islamic ideologies. The overall progressive approach to women's rights, although limited to the public sphere, in the first half of the twentieth century is manifested in the legislations and constitution at the time.

The second wave of feminism: Nasser period (1952-1970)

Second wave of Egyptian feminism started off with the Free Officer's⁷³ Revolution of July 23, 1952. It was a military coup initiated by those who were disillusioned by Egypt's poor performance in the 1948 war with Egypt and blamed King Farouk for the defeat. The revolution led by Mohammed Naguib and Gamal Abdel Nasser sought to overthrow the monarchy and establish Egypt as a republic, put an end to the dominance of aristocratic classes in Egyptian politics and society, and end the presence of British in Egypt for good. In 1954, Naguib who had become the first president of Egypt was replaced by Nasser who envisioned Egypt as a leading beacon of Arab nationalism. He was quite enamoured by the international trend of non-alignment movement (NAM) rooted in anti-imperialist sentiments. The imperialist powers, particularly the British and French, who were already under tremendous pressure because of the ongoing war with Israel were wary of the rising nationalist fervour in Egypt and the Free Officers' continuing support for Palestinians. In 1956, such issues converged in the invasion of Suez Canal by British and French forces. However, securing unquestioned authority of Suez Canal offered the political opportunity for Nasser to strengthen his position and national legitimacy as the saviour of Egypt. This officially marked the defeat of imperialism in Egypt which inspired many other African nations like Algeria and Kenya to rebel against colonial powers in their respective countries⁷⁴. The 1952 revolution and its political implications in WANA brought Egypt to the forefront of regional leadership championing ideals of Arab nationalism as well non-alignment.

By the 1960s, Arab socialism emerged as a prominent theme in Nasser's rule manifesting as widespread agrarian reforms⁷⁵ and infrastructure building programs and urbanisation with a

⁷³ Free officers were a group of politically motivated military officers in Egypt and Sudan

⁷⁴ Antony Best et al, *International History of the Twentieth-Century and Beyond* (New York: Routledge, 2004), 468-471

⁷⁵ Leila Ahmed, *Women and Gender in Islam: Historical Roots to a Modern Debate* (New Haven: Yale University Press, 1992), 209.

centrally planned economy⁷⁶. The state also underwent a series of nationalisation reforms pertaining to minimum wage laws, rent control, nationalisation of all major businesses in the industrial sector and foreign business interests, and the introduction of social welfare schemes⁷⁷. Centralised control was maintained in all sectors citing security reasons like fear of rise of religious extremism, Western counter-revolutionary attempts and communist infiltration, which played out in the prohibition of multi-party system and political opposition⁷⁸. Such totalitarian tendencies of Nasser had implications on autonomous women's movements and organisations in the second half of the twentieth-century.

Laws and reforms

When Nasser took over the state rule, he accommodated women in the nationalist discourse as expected of a modernizing nationalist ruler. The 1956 constitution promulgated by Nasser allowed women to vote⁷⁹, although with an additional requirement of registration which male voters weren't mandated to follow, and run for political office. The Nationalist Charter of 1962 which was Nasser's blueprint for Egypt's socialist transformation endorsed equality and equal opportunity for women in education, employment and medical care⁸⁰. Educational sector was reformed to grant free education in primary and secondary education to all the citizens resulting in increased enrolment of women to schools and universities⁸¹. Women's enhanced access to education reflected in their pattern of employment, the number of educated women and the diverse choices of employment opportunities in professional, technical, scientific, teaching and health-related sectors now available to women⁸². By 1985, 15 per cent of wage labour was formed by women which were 4 per cent in 1962⁸³. This heightened participation of women in the labour force also owes to the reformed labour laws

⁷⁶ "Egypt: Arab Nationalism and Socialism under Nasser (1952-1970)," EISA Egypt: Arab Nationalism and Socialism under Nasser (1952-1970) accessed April 25, 2019, <https://www.eisa.org.za/wep/egyoverview7.htm>.

⁷⁷ Leila Ahmed, *Women and Gender in Islam: Historical Roots to a Modern Debate* (New Haven: Yale University Press, 1992), 209.

⁷⁸ Boundless, "Boundless World History," Lumen, accessed April 25, 2019, <https://courses.lumenlearning.com/boundless-worldhistory/chapter/egypt/>.

⁷⁹ Nermin Allam, *Women and the Egyptian Revolution: Engagement and Activism during the 2011 Arab Uprisings* (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2017), 40.

⁸⁰ Leila Ahmed, *Women and Gender in Islam: Historical Roots to a Modern Debate* (New Haven: Yale University Press, 1992), 209-210; Nikki Keddie, *Women in the Middle East*, (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 2007), 123; and Mervat Hatem, "Egyptian Discourses on Gender and Political Liberalization: Do Secularist and Islamist Views Really Differ?" *Middle East Journal* 48, no. 4 (Autumn 1994): 667, accessed April 25, 2019. <https://www.jstor.org/stable/4328746>.

⁸¹ Leila Ahmed, *Women and Gender in Islam: Historical Roots to a Modern Debate* (New Haven: Yale University Press, 1992), 209.

⁸² (ibid), 211

⁸³ (ibid)

of 1963 which guarantee state jobs to all university graduates and diploma holders without discrimination on any grounds. However, even the progressive stipulations on the 1962 Charter did not have protective authority as the employers increasingly subverted the labour laws and preferred male employees in order to avoid investing in day-care centres or maternity leaves⁸⁴. Even central sector jobs were biased towards male candidates in their advertisements citing reasons like reduced female productivity after marriage to blame women for the economic problems in the country. Women were mostly missing from higher echelons of political positions and bureaucracy contrary to the progressive spirit of the Charter, because, as Hatem notes⁸⁵, it had increased legal commitment to rights in the future than at present.

Family planning program was introduced for the first time in Egypt as a part of the Charter which was endorsed initially by Aziza Hussein, a champion of social welfare, family planning and women's rights. In 1966, National Family Planning Program was launched according to the Charter which opened child and women health clinics in different parts of Egypt and birth control pills were made available on demand⁸⁶. It was a collaborative effort of both the Ministry of Public Health and Ministry of Social Affairs who directed staff to conduct counselling sessions for women and men on the benefits of birth control and family planning⁸⁷. However, the 1962 Charter did not recognise women as political actors and citizens with political rights, instead endorsed their social roles as mothers⁸⁸. State campaigns which aimed at encouraging women's economic participation were often accompanied by discussions directed at women on how to balance home and work whereas largely being silent on the familial duties of men⁸⁹. Interestingly, Hoodfar critiques Nasser's encouragement of women's participation in the workforce as a devaluation of their domestic work⁹⁰. Allam discusses⁹¹

⁸⁴ Most employers stopped short of employing hundred women which the law stipulated as the criteria to be fulfilled in order to start a day-care facility in the workplace.

⁸⁵ Mervat F. Hatem, "Economic and Political Liberation in Egypt and the Demise of State Feminism," *International Journal of Middle East Studies* 24, no. 2 (May 1992)

⁸⁶ Laura Bier, *Revolutionary Womanhood: Feminisms, Modernity, and the State in Nasser's Egypt*, Stanford Studies in Middle Eastern and Islamic Societies and Cultures (Stanford, 2011: Stanford University Press), 128.

⁸⁷ (ibid), 128-129

⁸⁸ This image is important in integrating women in the nationalist discourse by portraying Egypt as a maternal figure from 1960s.

⁸⁹ Laura Bier, *Revolutionary Womanhood: Feminisms, Modernity, and the State in Nasser's Egypt*, Stanford Studies in Middle Eastern and Islamic Societies and Cultures (Stanford, 2011: Stanford University Press), 65.

⁹⁰ Homa Hoodfar, *Between Marriage and the Market: Intimate Politics and Survival in Cairo* (Berkeley: University of California Press, 2005), 106-107.

⁹¹ Nermin Allam, *Women and the Egyptian Revolution: Engagement and Activism during the 2011 Arab Uprisings* (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2017), 43

various tensions between women's work outside and inside the homes by consolidating the literature, newspaper columns, articles, art and movies at the time.

Personal Status Laws

The Personal Status Law of Nasser's time was a dual-legal system, as Bier calls it⁹², with laws inspired by both religiosity and secularism were official attempts of state feminism played out. Religious jurisdiction governed domestic matters like marriage, divorce, alimony, child custody, and inheritance which makes the domestic political as a repository of group identity by virtue of their religious affiliation⁹³. In this sense, the code was a preservation of the personal laws of 1920s and 1930s and undermined gender equality in the private sphere. Its provisions bestowed males with the control of the family and regulated women's position as submissive to male authority⁹⁴. Aziza Hussein, among many other women, challenged the unilateral right of man to initiate divorce and demanded that courts must be involved in divorce, child custody, choosing the second wife and compensation for divorced women⁹⁵. In the 1950s and 1960s, as a measure to curb the political and economic clout of ulema and exercise centralised control, court system of different communities was unified⁹⁶. This largely undermined the legal autonomy of confessional communities like Christians and Jews. The new system nationalised the hierarchies within gendered citizenships, from the status of being confessional by unifying the court system without a uniform civil code⁹⁷. The paradox between conservative family law governing the private sphere and progressive outlook of women's rights in the public sphere was reflective of the state's noncommitment to dismantle nationalist and personalised patriarchal system.

State-feminism under Nasser

Top-down paternalistic approaches of Nasser's regime paralleled the absence of autonomous women's movements. In 1954, Nasser banned independent feminist activism and

⁹² Laura Bier, *Revolutionary Womanhood: Feminisms, Modernity, and the State in Nasser's Egypt*, Stanford Studies in Middle Eastern and Islamic Societies and Cultures (Stanford, 2011: Stanford University Press), 105-108

⁹³ (ibid), 104.

⁹⁴ (ibid), 110.

⁹⁵ Leila Ahmed, *Women and Gender in Islam: Historical Roots to a Modern Debate* (New Haven: Yale University Press, 1992), 260.

⁹⁶ Laura Bier, *Revolutionary Womanhood: Feminisms, Modernity, and the State in Nasser's Egypt*, Stanford Studies in Middle Eastern and Islamic Societies and Cultures (Stanford, 2011: Stanford University Press), 107

⁹⁷ (ibid), 109.

autonomous organizations and appropriated women's rights, which Hatem⁹⁸ calls "state feminism", wherein women's rights are co-opted by the state to give the outlook of a modernising state without effecting changes in the hierarchical social relations in the society. It had the least desirable effect of reproducing gender hierarchies by fostering organised forms of public patriarchy and preserving personal dependency of women on male heads of families through public and personal status laws⁹⁹. For instance, in 1967, the Egyptian Family Planning Association was brought under the control of Ministry of Social Affairs which appropriated women's issues by addressing them as social welfare issues.¹⁰⁰ Nasser's strategy of state feminism to appropriate and monopolise women's rights was evidence to the fact that promotion of women's rights was only secondary to consolidation of power in Nasser's regime.

During this period, Doria Shafik's Daughter of the Nile Association was first among many other autonomous organizations to be disbanded. Huda Shaarawi's EFU was only permitted to function as a social welfare society, disabling its political functions. Doria Shafik,¹⁰¹Inji Aflatoun,¹⁰²and Zeinab al-Ghazzali¹⁰³ were imprisoned or put under house arrest during Nasser's rule. Weakening of autonomous women's movements in Egypt further removed them from grassroots level activities which had once harnessed huge momentum. However, Nasser had a huge number of supporters among secular women who appreciated his efforts to exclude and control Islamic discourses, constituencies and organisations¹⁰⁴. Women's movement at this juncture was "directed" according to Molyneux's categorisation of movements because women in Egypt largely supported Nasser's ideologies and made propaganda for the regime in return for improvement in their political situation. Instead of addressing the patriarchal, religious and cultural structures that inform the traditional family set-up, Nasser's political objective was to project the public sphere image of Egypt's working woman (*al-mar'a al-'amela*) as a symbol of state's modernisation project.

⁹⁸ In *Economic and Political Liberation in Egypt and the Demise of State Feminism* (1992)

⁹⁹Mervat F. Hatem, "Economic and Political Liberation in Egypt and the Demise of State Feminism," *International Journal of Middle East Studies* 24, no. 2 (May 1992): 233, accessed April 16, 2019. doi:10.1017/s0020743800021541.

¹⁰⁰ Nikki Keddie, *Women in the Middle East*, (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 2007), 123

¹⁰¹ Shafik was put under house arrest in 1960 after she carried out a hunger strike against Nasser. Her name was banned from appearing in all Egyptian texts and most of her original documents and scripts were destroyed. She later committed suicide by jumping off a multi-storeyed building in 1975.

¹⁰² Imprisoned in 1959

¹⁰³ Imprisoned in 1975

¹⁰⁴Nadje Al-Ali, *Secularism, Gender and the State in the Middle East: The Egyptian Women's Movement*. (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2000), 67.

Second wave of feminist movement in Egypt is perhaps considered the most secular phase of all periods: increased access to education, better healthcare facilities and employment opportunities resulted in overall increase in standard of living of women in Egypt. Women were granted constitutional equality in public spaces while the personal laws still governed the private sphere. The centralising nature of Nasser's rule was reflected in the co-optation strategies he adopted such as banning autonomous women's organisations; and implementing the regime's concept of women's rights rather than taking an inclusive approach. State's denial of women's influential role as public as much as private actor was a trend to be continued by the succeeding regimes which emphasised more on women's familial roles than perceiving women as full social and political actors with citizenship rights.

Third wave of feminism: Sadat period (1970-1981)

After Nasser's death in 1970, his vice president and a Free Officer, Anwar Sadat became president. Although initially considered weak by political opponents, Sadat outmanoeuvred his political rivals in what he calls Corrective Revolution of 1971. Besides this domestic challenge, his regime was soon faced with a war at its international borders, with Israel. The 1973 Yom Kippur war was pivotal in Egypt's diplomatic relations with the Soviet Union whose advisors were asked to leave Egypt because of Soviet refusal to sell arms to the Arabs¹⁰⁵. The United States eventually relinquished its neutral stance and started supplying arms to Israel in the war. Not only did Egypt lose the western part of Suez Canal to Israeli occupation, the peace treaty with Israel was viewed as treason by majority of Egyptians as well as other Arab nations which cost Egypt its membership in the Arab League¹⁰⁶. It was at this juncture that Sadat announced his policy of *infitah* or open-door policy whereby he liberalised the economy hoping for economic reconstruction of Egypt¹⁰⁷. The new policy coincided with the distancing of regime from Soviet Union and rapprochement with the United States. It reduced the role of state as the agent of change by withdrawing from policies of social equality and liberalising the economy for foreign investments which resulted in increased participation of the private sector, involvement of multinational corporations and decentralisation, a move quite opposite to Nasser's. After consolidating power, Sadat suppressed socialists and Nasserists and cut off ties with Soviet Russia to pursue a liberal approach to Egyptian economy by establishing a closer

¹⁰⁵ Antony Best et al, *International History of the Twentieth-Century and Beyond* (New York: Routledge, 2004), 476

¹⁰⁶ (ibid), 478

¹⁰⁷ Nadje Al-Ali, *Secularism, Gender and the State in the Middle East: The Egyptian Women's Movement*. (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2000), 71

relationship with the West. The newly introduced capitalist orientation of Egypt significantly widened the income gap between the rich and poor.¹⁰⁸

One of the first political steps taken by Sadat was to foster Islamist movements in order to keep leftist and Nasserists in check who was constantly criticising Sadat for undermining Nasser's commitment to social equality. Sadat encouraged Islamists to organise their supporters and continue their activities which Nasser had previously banned, by disseminating idioms of religious nature with the political discourse. Secular groups were harassed with arrests and shutting down of their activities as an aftermath of strengthening the Islamists. Limited political liberalization characterized by selective exclusion and inclusion of groups in Egypt's politics is a key feature of what Sadat and Mubarak's brand of democratization¹⁰⁹. What was interesting is that Islamist publications later functioned as a vehicle of dissent and discontent against Sadat especially after the peace treaty with Israel in 1979. Once the Islamists gained popularity and legitimacy it was difficult for even Sadat to stop them because he was wary of the charge of being anti-Islamic as they resonated with millions of Egyptians¹¹⁰. The relationship between the state and Islamist groups started becoming conflictual in the 1977 after the Islamists killed the Minister of Religious Affairs in July. The hostility between Sadat administration and Islamists were no more a secret at which juncture Sadat increasingly imprisoned not just secularists and leftists, but Islamist activists also which ultimately culminated in Sadat's assassination in 1981 by a member of a militant Islamist outfit.

Infitah and women's rights

The open-door policies reversed many women's rights gains of Nasser's regime, particularly that of integration of women into the workforce because of decreasing employment opportunities available for women, reduced demand for female labour and worsening working conditions¹¹¹. These economic policies and increased dependence on the West brought Egypt

¹⁰⁸ High inflation, shortage of shelter and wages, reduced employment opportunities and dismal working conditions were the outcomes of state's departure from its commitment to social equality and equal opportunity.

¹⁰⁹ Mervat F. Hatem, "Economic and Political Liberation in Egypt and the Demise of State Feminism," *International Journal of Middle East Studies* 24, no. 2 (May 1992): 240, accessed April 21, 2019. doi:10.1017/s0020743800021541.

¹¹⁰ Mervat Hatem, "The Enduring Alliance of Nationalism and Patriarchy in Muslim Personal Status Laws: The Case of Modern Egypt," *Feminist Issues* 6, no. 1 (March 1986): 36, accessed April 21, 2019. doi:10.1007/bf02685635.

¹¹¹ Mervat F. Hatem, "Economic and Political Liberation in Egypt and the Demise of State Feminism," *International Journal of Middle East Studies* 24, no. 2 (May 1992): 233, accessed April 21, 2019. doi:10.1017/s0020743800021541.; Nadjé Al-Ali, *Secularism, Gender and the State in the Middle East: The Egyptian Women's Movement*. (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2000), 72

to near bankruptcy at which point Sadat was forced to seek financial assistance from the International Monetary Fund (IMF). The Structural Adjustment Programmes (SAP) of the IMF further fractured the social welfare system because of reduced subsidies in healthcare and education coupled with lesser and lesser employment opportunities¹¹². State's withdrawal from welfare activities had implications on the lives of many Egyptians, particularly women, who were dependent on the state for employment, healthcare, education and provisions of basic needs, and culminated in the 1977 riots¹¹³. The dire economic conditions in Egypt caused males of the family to migrate to the Gulf countries for better employment which forced women to take up the jobs previously done by their husbands¹¹⁴. As Hatem argues¹¹⁵, although the feminisation of workforce provided some women with the autonomy and decision-making power in families, most of the families left back by the males had to go through the social and emotional effects of migration.

The open-door policies attracted investment only to service sector ventures like tourism and banking which did not translate to development and growth for the majority of Egyptians. However, a small minority of Westernised Egyptians amassed more wealth, particularly from international commerce. The benefits that women reaped during Sadat's period had a class dimension to it¹¹⁶. Upper-class and upper-middle-class women rapidly benefited from consumerism and led to accumulation of wealth and luxurious lifestyle whereas the lower-class and working-class women were further lowered to poverty. *Infitah* policies largely undermined the integration of poor, working-class women into the economy during Nasser's period. This gulf between the rich and poor also gave impetus to Islamic groups gaining foothold in rural parts of Egypt which manifested in middle-class women reintroducing veil in their clothing-symbolizing the attempt to revive and protect the Islamic culture from Western forces.

¹¹² Nikki Keddie, *Women in the Middle East*, (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 2007), 124

¹¹³(ibid), 124

¹¹⁴ Nadjie Al-Ali, *Secularism, Gender and the State in the Middle East: The Egyptian Women's Movement*. (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2000), 72; Mervat F. Hatem, "Economic and Political Liberation in Egypt and the Demise of State Feminism," *International Journal of Middle East Studies* 24, no. 2 (May 1992): 233, accessed April 27, 2019. doi:10.1017/s0020743800021541.

¹¹⁵ See Mervat F. Hatem, "Economic and Political Liberation in Egypt and the Demise of State Feminism," *International Journal of Middle East Studies* 24, no. 2 (May 1992)

¹¹⁶ Mervat F. Hatem, "Economic and Political Liberation in Egypt and the Demise of State Feminism," *International Journal of Middle East Studies* 24, no. 2 (May 1992): 236, accessed April 27, 2019. doi:10.1017/s0020743800021541.; Mervat Hatem, "The Enduring Alliance of Nationalism and Patriarchy in Muslim Personal Status Laws: The Case of Modern Egypt," *Feminist Issues* 6, no. 1 (March 1986): 33, accessed April 29, 2019. doi:10.1007/bf02685635.

Women, constitution and laws

The rise of Islamist groups indirectly resulted in considerable damage and reversal of gains of women's rights achieved during Nasser's time as they scorned upon women who work outside the traditional roles prescribed by religion¹¹⁷, as it is reflected in the 1971 constitution.¹¹⁸ It removes the idea of family as a mutual obligation of man and woman, emphasising the traditional gender roles in the private sphere, and conditionally supports women's rights only when it didn't contradict *Shari'a*.¹¹⁹ However, Sadat also initiated some reforms which were favourable to women's rights.

In 1970, the Personal Status Laws were amended, and although they did not challenge male privilege, the laws enhanced women's rights pertaining to child custody, divorce, alimony, polygamy and so on. Under the reformed laws, mothers could have the custody of sons until they are ten and daughters until they are twelve, and fathers were to give child support until they become adults¹²⁰; husbands were required to register divorces and inform their wives; divorced mothers could keep the apartment they were living in, and wives who didn't want to return to the marital homes were granted divorce; and the husbands couldn't enter into polygamy without the consent of the first wives¹²¹. In addition to this, gender quotas were announced to increase women's representation in parliament and regional councils. Women's right to work was asserted and equal pay was also maintained in the laws that were passed in 1970s. It also freed women from taking the husband's permission to travel.

In 1979, a series of laws passed by Sadat's wife Jinan without any consultation with the representatives of women's groups, came to be ridiculed as Jihan's laws¹²². The marriageable

¹¹⁷ Kristina Nordwall "Egyptian Feminism: The Effects of the State , Popular Trends and Islamism on the Women's Movement in Egypt." (2008): 4

¹¹⁸ Rule 9 of the constitution states: The family is at the base of the society and is shaped by religion, ethics, and nationalism. The state pledges to preserve this genuine character of the Egyptian family, the customs and values it represents and to generalise them to the rest of the society. Rule 11 states that "The state pledges its support for women in reconciling their duties to the family and work in society. It also guarantees women's equality to men in political, social and cultural arenas provided this does not contradict the rules of Islamic law.

¹¹⁹ Margot Badran, "Competing Agenda: Feminists, Islam and the State in Nineteenth- and Twentieth-Century Egypt," in *Women, Islam and the State*, ed. Deniz Kandiyoti (London: Palgrave Macmillan, 1991), 225. accessed April 24, 2019. doi:10.1007/978-1-349-21178-4_8

¹²⁰ Nikki Keddie, *Women in the Middle East*, (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 2007), 124

¹²¹ Margot Badran, "Competing Agenda: Feminists, Islam and the State in Nineteenth- and Twentieth-Century Egypt," in *Women, Islam and the State*, ed. Deniz Kandiyoti (London: Palgrave Macmillan, 1991), 225, accessed April 23, 2019, doi:10.1007/978-1-349-21178-4_8

¹²² (ibid), 224.

age of women was increased from sixteen to eighteen¹²³. Although, Jihan had set up several welfare organizations for women, Islamists and Egyptians in general perceived her work as attempt to Westernisation and discredited the efforts, and feminists criticised her work as an extension of state feminism. According to Hatem,¹²⁴ although the regime was ideologically against women who work outside homes, Sadat's compromise in the form of women's rights reforms was a concession owing to the fear that if the state withdraws its commitment to women's work, it was going to further squeeze the middle-class in Egypt which was already falling apart under extreme economic policies and political decisions.

In addition to this, Sadat ratified the UN Convention of Elimination of All Forms of Discriminations against Women (CEDAW) in 1980.¹²⁵ The UN Decade for Women in 1975 was perceived by Sadat administration as an opportunity to improve women's rights in Egypt to be recognised internationally¹²⁶. He thus established the Egyptian Women's Organization and National Commission for Women (NCW) to deal with what the regime predominantly perceived as women's issues such as child welfare, family planning and illiteracy¹²⁷. Although several formal and informal women's groups and associations emerged during Sadat's liberalisation policy, limited democratisation caused organisational issues for women's movement to flourish as independent activism¹²⁸. The state was also lacking in programmes and campaigns to ensure perpetuity of women's rights which is proof to the inference that Sadat's desired effect from the reforms was to get the international recognition which he crucially needed with the kind of economic and political adversities in the country, especially by showing the United States that his reforms could foster secularism in the country¹²⁹. However, at the domestic level, reforms were perceived by Islamists as internal and international mobilisation to undermine their legitimacy and influence in Egyptian society

¹²³Nadje Al-Ali, *Secularism, Gender and the State in the Middle East: The Egyptian Women's Movement*. (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2000), 71

¹²⁴Mervat Hatem, "The Enduring Alliance of Nationalism and Patriarchy in Muslim Personal Status Laws: The Case of Modern Egypt," *Feminist Issues* 6, no. 1 (March 1986): 31, accessed April 26, 2019. doi:10.1007/bf02685635.

¹²⁵ Ann Mayer, "Rhetorical Strategies and Official Policies on Women's Rights: The Merits and Drawbacks of the New World Hypocrisy," *AL-Raida Journal* 14, no. 80 (Winter 1998): 13-21, accessed April 25, 2019, doi:http://dx.doi.org/10.32380/alrj.v0i0.705.

¹²⁶ Nadje Al-Ali, *Secularism, Gender and the State in the Middle East: The Egyptian Women's Movement*. (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2000), 74

¹²⁷ Mervat F. Hatem, "Economic and Political Liberation in Egypt and the Demise of State Feminism," *International Journal of Middle East Studies* 24, no. 2 (May 1992): 241, accessed April 27, 2019. doi:10.1017/s0020743800021541.

¹²⁸ (ibid)

¹²⁹Nadje Al-Ali, "The Women's Movement In Egypt, With Selected References To Turkey," *UNRISD* (April 2002):8

which intensified the split between Sadat and them. According to Hatem,¹³⁰ although the regime was ideologically against women who work outside homes, Sadat's compromise in the form of women's rights reforms was a concession owing to the fear that if the state withdraws its commitment to women's work, it was going to further squeeze the middle-class in Egypt which was already falling apart under the extreme economic policies and political decisions.

Rise of Islamists and women's rights

Veiling as a practice re-emerged in the Egyptian society first through middle-class women from rural areas coming to the cities for education¹³¹. Several Muslim groups on campuses also served as support groups for these women who were dealing with the cultural shock in a new environment¹³². Older married and working women found veil as a comfort instead of spending money and time on cosmetics, fashionable clothes or hairdressers, compelled more so because of declining incomes and economic crisis rather than only by choice¹³³. The public acceptance of veil was a slow process in the 1970s and the harassment gradually stopped when more and more women started to be comfortable wearing it, and with it came the normalisation of the traditional gender roles¹³⁴. But, there are scholars who differ with this decadent view on Islamic feminism and veiling by citing statistics and facts that show that return to traditional roles and practices need not necessarily be a return to older ideas.

The re-emergence of veiling also marks the beginning of Islamic feminist movements, which reinterpreted Islamic texts and sought liberation of women through a new Islamic framework. Their aim was to challenge the patriarchal reading of the scriptures and emphasise on the ideals of gender equality through a religious discourse. This new trend signifies the process of figuring out where women fit in the Egyptian society from the perspective of an Islamic discourse, removed from Western notions. 1970s mark the emergence of tensions between secular and Islamic feminisms particularly because of the former's Western-oriented thinking that deems veiling as a retrogressive practice and symbol of cultural backwardness.

¹³⁰ Mervat Hatem, "The Enduring Alliance of Nationalism and Patriarchy in Muslim Personal Status Laws: The Case of Modern Egypt," *Feminist Issues* 6, no. 1 (March 1986): 31, accessed April 20, 2019. doi:10.1007/bf02685635.

¹³¹ Leila Ahmed, *A Quiet Revolution: The Veil's Resurgence from the Middle East to America* (New Haven: Yale University Press), 85-92.

¹³² Nikki Keddie, *Women in the Middle East*, (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 2007), 125

¹³³ Kristina Nordwall "Egyptian Feminism: The Effects of the State, Popular Trends and Islamism on the Women's Movement in Egypt." (2008): 6

¹³⁴ Mervat Hatem, "The Enduring Alliance of Nationalism and Patriarchy in Muslim Personal Status Laws: The Case of Modern Egypt," *Feminist Issues* 6, no. 1 (March 1986): 34, accessed April 21, 2019. doi:10.1007/bf02685635.

Mahmood¹³⁵ also hints at the possibility that the bringing back of Islam to feminist discourse could be used a clarion call for the West to launch attacks using Orientalist notions. Ahmed¹³⁶ discusses the results from opinion surveys and researches of two researchers to elucidate on the general unpopularity with veiling as a Saudi imposed practice and not a question of choice.

The third wave of Egyptian feminist movement witnessed the strengthening of Islamic movements and with it the emergence of Islamic feminist thought. Religious symbols like veiling were increasingly becoming common in public spaces, and the rapidity of it was determined by middle-class and low-income women gaining access to such spaces. Islamization of the initial phase of Sadat period was replaced by liberalisation policies which had gender implications too, by widening the income gap and class divide which was another motivating factor for the majority of Egyptian women to adhere to a way of life they are comfortable and familiar with. The latter part of Sadat period was comparatively much more progressive with the amendments of constitution bringing in provisions favourable to women's rights.

Fourth wave of feminism: Mubarak era (1981-2011)

After Sadat's assassination, Hosni Mubarak became president who exercised strict control over the state more than his predecessors. His foreign policy attitude was remarkable such that the balance between maintaining peace with Israel and friendship with the United States ensured the return of western Sinai to Egypt. His focus on strengthening the national security was key in crushing Islamist insurgency and continuing peace with Israel, bringing the regime closer to the West.¹³⁷ Although there were no political reforms before 2005, Mubarak's early attempts at reforming economic sector resulted in overall growth and development in the country, although poverty eradication remained a failed objective and later, motivation for the 2011 uprisings. Mubarak, in the beginning, seemed like a reformist because of some welfare policies like reintroducing bread subsidies, development of better sewage facilities and new roads, as well as political measures like freeing Sadat's political prisoners and lifting restrictions on freedom of speech.

¹³⁵ Saba Mahmood, *Politics of Piety: The Islamic Revival and the Feminist Subject* (Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Press, 2012), 119.

¹³⁶ Leila Ahmed, *A Quiet Revolution: The Veil's Resurgence from the Middle East to America* (New Haven: Yale University Press), 84

¹³⁷ "The Middle East in Revolt," *Time*, February 22, 2011, accessed June 27, 2019, http://content.time.com/time/specials/packages/article/0,28804,2045328_2045338_2048789,00.html.

Domestic issues in the 2000s like economic failure and popular unrest for reforms were compounded by international pressure in 2005 from the US¹³⁸, pressing Egypt for holding democratic elections while at home, people were clamouring for political reforms. Although elections were held bowing to the pressure, it was rigged and political opposition mostly imprisoned or spied on¹³⁹. Mubarak took over the mantle of power at a time when Islamism was growing popular across Egypt as the champion of cultural nationalism. Islamic organizations had gained legitimacy at grassroots level bringing Mubarak increasingly in confrontation with the Islamists if he were to go against their demands.¹⁴⁰ This trend started in the 1960s when middle-class citizens, as well as intellectuals, gradually leaned towards moderate versions of Islam ever since the defeat of Nasser by Israel in 1967 and the signing of peace treaty by Sadat.¹⁴¹ Mubarak launched a fight against religious extremism first through targetted arrests and clampdown on groups like al-Jihad and Gamaat al-Islamiyah who were involved in Sadat's assassination, from early 1980s.¹⁴² Although Mubarak was successful to some extent in suppressing militant Islamists, non-violent forms of Islam became more entrenched in the society especially through social establishments like educational institutions, charity organizations etc.¹⁴³ This led Mubarak to promote popular narratives through media to distinguish and create a divide between mainstream Islam and religious extremists.

Mubarak faced increased confrontation with Islamists in the case of Personal Law of 1979 which the Islamists perceived as anti-Islamic and in contradiction with Shari'a.¹⁴⁴ It became a contentious set of rules which was ultimately nullified in May 1985 on the grounds that the laws were passed by presidential decree and not by the vote of the representatives. They were replaced by reform laws in July 1985 by the constitutional court, however, with

¹³⁸ Neil Macfarquhar, "Mubarak Pushes Egypt to Allow Freer Elections," *The New York Times*, February 27, 2005, accessed June 27, 2019, <https://www.nytimes.com/2005/02/27/world/middleeast/mubarak-pushes-egypt-to-allow-freer-elections.html>.

¹³⁹ Yolande Knell, "The Complicated Legacy of Egypt's Hosni Mubarak," *BBC News*, January 25, 2013, accessed June 27, 2019, <https://www.bbc.com/news/world-middle-east-21201364>.

¹⁴⁰ Hesham Al-Awadi, "Mubarak and the Islamists: Why Did the "Honeymoon" End?" *The Middle East Journal* 59, no. 1 (Winter, 2005): 79, accessed June 21, 2019. doi:10.3751/194034605783996934.

¹⁴¹ Yolande Knell, "The Complicated Legacy of Egypt's Hosni Mubarak," *BBC News*, January 25, 2013, accessed June 27, 2019, <https://www.bbc.com/news/world-middle-east-21201364>.

¹⁴² Hesham Al-Awadi, "Mubarak and the Islamists: Why Did the "Honeymoon" End?" *The Middle East Journal* 59, no. 1 (Winter, 2005): 74, doi:10.3751/194034605783996934.

¹⁴³ (ibid)

¹⁴⁴ "Women, Shari'a, and Personal Status Law Reform in Egypt after the Revolution," Middle East Institute, October 1, 2011, accessed June 27, 2019, <https://www.mei.edu/publications/women-sharia-and-personal-status-law-reform-egypt-after-revolution>.

significant compromises on the legal rights of women with regards to alimony, divorce and marriage laws, reintroducing unequal gender hierarchy.¹⁴⁵

Under the reformed laws, the wife of a husband seeking a second wife is no longer eligible for divorce unless it was clear to the judges that there exists material or non-material harm to smooth marital relations. The conditions of the “harm” are decided upon by a male judge (women are not allowed to be judges) who would only grant divorce if he failed to reconcile the couple, a process that could prolong for however long. The law also has a class dimension to it indicating that there are different definitions of harm for women from different classes. It is not this particular stipulation that is controversial but the person who gets to decide what is harmful to whom¹⁴⁶. The new law also asks the man to provide separate accommodation for the wife and children within three months, and if the man fails to do so, the mother and children are directed to live in the same house where they lived before the divorce. The freedom of choice is clearly in favour of the man instead of the mother. The role of judges as arbiters to enforce the new law, instead of the executor, had the danger of jeopardizing the very purpose of the laws.

During the discussions of the Personal Law in 1985, there was an actual split in the women’s movement with one camp wanting to defend the 1979 laws and the other preferring to do away with it. The former was constitutive of the Arab Women’s Solidarity Association (ASWA) and latter Progressive Women’s Union affiliated with Tagammu, a leftist party, along with Islamists who also wanted the law gone. The split between the two camps was indicative of the fact that the problem was with Sadat’s policies in general, not the substance of the laws at stake¹⁴⁷. The stark difference between the two camps blurred at some point for them to forge a new coalition called Committee for the Defense of the Rights of the Woman and the Family which comprised of leftists, Wafdists, Nasserists, Arab Lawyers’ Union, ASWA, enlightened Islamists and others who were interested. Their primary objective was to pressure the government to bring an alternative law that would address the concerned issues of the annulled

¹⁴⁵ (ibid)

¹⁴⁶ Mervat F. Hatem, "Economic and Political Liberation in Egypt and the Demise of State Feminism," *International Journal of Middle East Studies* 24, no. 2 (May 1992): 244, accessed April 21, 2019. doi:10.1017/s0020743800021541.

¹⁴⁷ (ibid), 245

law¹⁴⁸. The Committee launched its lobbying efforts at a time when there was an increasing demand from Islamist revivalist groups for immediate imposition of the Islamic law.

The coalition was significant in several fronts: one because it showed the potential of forging solidarities across political and ideological differences among those individuals who sought women's liberation; two, they departed from the usual discourse that connects women's rights to nationalism alone while the rights in the private sphere lay ignored. This was a significant breakthrough in women's rights discourse in the post-infatih period which challenged the perception of women's rights discussions as only limited to that of public sphere¹⁴⁹. The political experiences many women had experienced in the patriarchal political parties were disheartening which led to the establishment of several autonomous women groups in the 1980s; the disintegration of the student movement of the 1970s and general crisis of the political left being other reasons.

Responding to lobbying efforts, divorce law was reformed in 2000, and the new law granted Egyptian women the right to file for divorce on the basis of incompatibility and in the case of unregistered marriages, without having to provide evidence of harm, however, in return for relinquishing their financial rights within the marriage. In 2002, another law was passed which directed courts to accept the wife's divorce petition in return for financial compensation to the husband, even if the husband does not agree to the divorce. The nationality law of 2004 (Law no. 154) extended nationality rights to children of Egyptian mothers and non-Egyptians fathers. Law 10 and 11 of 2004 established family courts system and Family Insurance Fund through which women could collect court-ordered alimony and child support. In 2008, Child Law was amended to raise the minimum legal age of marriage for girls to eighteen, criminalise FGM and grant children the right to adopt their mother's family name if their paternity is not proven. Mother's legal custody of children until they reach the age of fifteen was also included in the amendments¹⁵⁰. In 2010, according to the UN Millennium Development Goals, gender quota in the parliament was reinstated. However, these reforms led to huge uproar from conservative cohorts of the society as well as some conservative members of the judiciary.

¹⁴⁸Nadje Al-Ali, *Secularism, Gender and the State in the Middle East: The Egyptian Women's Movement*. (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2000), 79

¹⁴⁹Nadje Al-Ali, "The Women's Movement In Egypt, With Selected References To Turkey," *UNRISD* (April 2002):10

¹⁵⁰ Nadje Al-Ali, *Secularism, Gender and the State in the Middle East: The Egyptian Women's Movement*. (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2000), 83; Hala Kamal, "A Century of Egyptian Women's Demands: The Four Waves of the Egyptian Feminist Movement," in *Gender and Race Matter: Global Perspectives on Being a Woman*. (Emerald Group Publishing Limited, 2016), 14

Despite these advances in women's rights, there were more than a few setbacks for women's rights under Mubarak. The regime reversed the gender quota system in 1986 on the grounds of "preferential treatment" which resulted in a drop in the number of women in parliament.¹⁵¹ The NGO law of 2003 continued to put further restrictions on voluntary organizations on the grounds of security and gives the Ministry of Social Affairs the right to dissolve these organisations and place its representatives in the NGO's board of members.¹⁵² In 2000, Mubarak constituted a governmental body called National Council for Women (NCW) to tackle women's rights issues by the Presidential Decree 90¹⁵³, in response to the international visibility of women's rights issues and general vocality of the women's movement in Egypt¹⁵⁴. Suzanne Mubarak, Hosni Mubarak's wife was named the chairperson, a position she held until 2011. However, Suzanne Mubarak was the receiving end of huge backlash because women's rights provisions initiated by the regime in her behalf were seen as attempts to Westernise the population yet again, and this was reflective of the widespread distrust in the regime.¹⁵⁵ They perceived Suzanne as no different from the other first ladies like Jihan preceding her, and perceived her attempts to further women's rights as an attack against their cultural ethos. In actuality, NCW was a governmental effort to counter the increasing credibility of civil society organizations which represented the women's rights issues and also to gain support from international agencies who had been cooperating with the non-governmental entities to tackle these issues¹⁵⁶. NCW was also directed to supervise the activities of women's rights NGOs, alongside Ministry of Social Affairs.¹⁵⁷ Although women's organizations were wary of measures of co-optation and neo-liberal undertones in their policies, some of them moved closer to the regime in the face of monetary and other advantages.

¹⁵¹ Kathleen Howard-Merriam, "Guaranteed Seats for Political Representation of Women: The Egyptian Example," *Journal of Women, Politics & Policy* 10, no. 1 (October 2008): 19, doi:10.1080/1554477x.1990.9970558.

¹⁵² *Egypt: Margins of Repression State Limits on Nongovernmental Organisation Activism*, technical paper no. 8 (E), vol. 17, 1-45, accessed May 1, 2019. <https://www.hrw.org/reports/2005/egypt0705/egypt0705.pdf>.

¹⁵³ "Egyptian Feminist Movement: A Brief History," OpenDemocracy, March 2017, accessed June 27, 2019, <https://www.opendemocracy.net/en/north-africa-west-asia/egyptian-feminist-movement-brief-history/>.

¹⁵⁴ Hala Kamal, "A Century of Egyptian Women's Demands: The Four Waves of the Egyptian Feminist Movement," in *Gender and Race Matter: Global Perspectives on Being a Woman*. (Emerald Group Publishing Limited, 2016), 13

¹⁵⁵ Mariz Tadros, "The Pitfalls of Disentangling Women's Agency from Accountability for Gender Equality Outcomes," *Feminist Dissent*, no. 3 (2018): 75-76, accessed May 1, 2019. doi:10.31273/fd.n3.2018.307.

¹⁵⁶ Hala Kamal, "A Century of Egyptian Women's Demands: The Four Waves of the Egyptian Feminist Movement," in *Gender and Race Matter: Global Perspectives on Being a Woman*. (Emerald Group Publishing Limited, 2016), 13

¹⁵⁷ *Social, Economic and Legal Empowerment of Egyptian Women*, Joint Programme Proposal (UNDP, 2013), 2, accessed April 17, 2019, [https://www.undp.org/content/dam/egypt/docs/Women_Empowerment/Women_Empowerment_Swedish_Proposal_26Nov2013_\(2\).pdf](https://www.undp.org/content/dam/egypt/docs/Women_Empowerment/Women_Empowerment_Swedish_Proposal_26Nov2013_(2).pdf).

In the 2006-2008 workers' protests, known as April 6 movement,¹⁵⁸ for better pay and working conditions, women were active participants by camping out or sleeping inside their factories as part of worker occupations and strikes. Interestingly, it was the social media posts of a woman called Esraa Adbelfattah calling for protests that inspired many women to join the April 6 movement¹⁵⁹; a pattern which was to repeat a few years later and culminate in Arab Spring. Although the women's movement in Egypt was scattered and isolated from each other, their networking and association lasted for a brief periods of time during issues of common concern like the Palestinian *intifadah* and Gulf war. Women also participated in the Kifaya movement of 2004 through "The Street is Ours" campaign which was however marred by several harassment issues against the protestors.¹⁶⁰ Though short-lived, there was a new movement called "Women for Democracy" that took shape alongside it, an alternative to the traditional "Women and Democracy" approach which had focused primarily on empowering women without much emphasis on integrating them into the mainstream.

Two other opportunities utilised by women's movement at the time were the United Nations International Conference on Population and Development (ICPD) in Cairo in 1994 and the Fourth World Conference on Women in Beijing in 1995.¹⁶¹ The preparations for the Cairo conference brought together isolated activists who were until then research oriented for a more fruitful project-oriented activism. Feminist and human rights organizations in the 1990s included new areas of women's rights such as sexuality rights,¹⁶² honour killings, virginity tests in addition to FGM and reproductive rights in their agendas as was reflected in ICPD Program of Action¹⁶³. It was a giant but necessary leap for the feminist activism in Egypt to acknowledge and take up discussions on women's bodies as an integral part of their activism which continued into the 2000s as well as later.

¹⁵⁸ Elham Gheytaichi and Valentine Moghadam, "Women, Social Protests, and the New Media Activism in the Middle East and North Africa," *International Review of Modern Sociology* 40, no. 1 (Spring 2014): 11-12, accessed May 1, 2019. <https://www.jstor.org/stable/43496487>.

¹⁵⁹ "Esraa Abdel Fattah," Front Line Defenders, October 08, 2018, accessed May 27, 2019, <https://www.frontlinedefenders.org/en/profile/esraa-abdel-fattah>.

¹⁶⁰ Nadine Sika and Yasmin Khodary, "One Step Forward, Two Steps Back? Egyptian Women within the Confines of Authoritarianism," *Journal of International Women's Studies* 13, no. 5 (October 2012): 96, accessed May 21, 2019. <http://vc.bridgew.edu/jiws/vol13/iss5/9>.

¹⁶¹ Nadjé Al-Ali, *Secularism, Gender and the State in the Middle East: The Egyptian Women's Movement*. (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2000), 70

¹⁶² Susan A. Cohen and Cory L. Richards, "The Cairo Consensus: Population, Development and Women," *Family Planning Perspectives* 26, no. 6 (December 1994): 150-154, accessed May 15, 2019, doi:10.2307/2135895.

¹⁶³ Nadjé Al-Ali, *Secularism, Gender and the State in the Middle East: The Egyptian Women's Movement*. (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2000), 80

The groups of women volunteers and activists who were constituted for the preparations for ICPD was met with hurdles in the future: the national committee nominated to organise International Women's Forum in Beijing in September 1995 put restrictions on the participating NGOs by circumventing the legal definitions to those officially registered with the Ministry of Social Affairs¹⁶⁴. The political climate in Egypt was such that many organizations refused to register themselves as NGOs as they came under disproportionate control of the Ministry, instead chose to register as civic non-profit companies or research centres with the Office of Property and Accreditation.¹⁶⁵ The new regulation led to the exclusion of groups like New Women's Research Centre, among many others.

Although lobbying may have been successful in getting the administration to orally agree to their demands, these promises did not translate to improvement in women's issues, as the government's enthusiasm soon dwindled after the conference in the face of severe attacks by Islamists. Banning of FGM was a prioritised topic discussed at the Cairo Conference¹⁶⁶ to which Mubarak responded positively at the time. However, with the Al-Azhar and Islamist groups challenging the government's stand, Ministry of Health was forced to withdraw its commitment to ban the practice¹⁶⁷. One exception to this trend of inciting cultural and religious norms to launch attack on women's rights was the reform laws of July 1985¹⁶⁸, which were passed two months before the Nairobi conference marking the end of the UN Decade for Women, as a result of international lobbying efforts.

Law 32 of 1964¹⁶⁹ or the law of association, a legacy of Nasser's time, continued to regulate the activities of organisations, associations and voluntary groups and brought them under the supervision of Ministry of Social Affairs. The law directed activists to function as informal groups or officially register under the ministry at the expense of their autonomy: to conduct public meetings, marches or rallies, approval of the Interior Ministry was necessary; "private organizations" could be dissolved by the ministry, and no organizations are allowed

¹⁶⁴ Nadje Al-Ali, *Secularism, Gender and the State in the Middle East: The Egyptian Women's Movement*. (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2000), 79

¹⁶⁵ (ibid), 80

¹⁶⁶ "Cairo Declaration on FGM 5 High Level Meeting 14 – 15 December 2008 Cairo, Egypt," Cairo Declaration on FGM 5 High Level Meeting 14 – 15 December 2008 Cairo, Egypt | No Peace Without Justice, accessed May 27, 2019, <http://www.npwj.org/FGM/Cairo-Declaration-FGM-5-High-Level-Meeting-14---15-December-2008-Cairo-Egypt.html>.

¹⁶⁷ Nadje Al-Ali, "The Women's Movement In Egypt, With Selected References To Turkey," *UNRISD* (April 2002):12

¹⁶⁸ Dawoud S. El Alami, "Law No. 100 of 1985 Amending Certain Provisions of Egypt's Personal Status Laws," *Islamic Law and Society* 1, no. 1 (1994): 117-130, accessed May 27, 2019. doi:10.2307/3399433.

¹⁶⁹ Modifications through amendments in 1999 and 2002

to carry out religious or political activities¹⁷⁰. However, alterations were made to this law in 1999¹⁷¹, put stronger restrictions in place. Although joint campaigning proved these laws unconstitutional, Egyptian government continued introducing stricter regulations in the following years.

The paradoxical approach of public integration of women while affirming patriarchal family laws is not coincidental but reflective of the widespread acceptance of cultural and political nationalism, even amongst the women in Egypt. Perpetuation of patriarchy is justified as a protective attitude against the Western-imposed ideas and agendas. Kandiyoti¹⁷² comments on this contradiction between civic forms of nationalism and cultural forms of nationalism as typical of postcolonial state formation. Women activists are forced to fight a three-front battle in Egypt: the general obstacles to women's rights, the conservative religious attitude, and the patriarchal state which itself it caught between Islamist groups and international pressure. They are also dealt with the herculean task of working against the system from within the system.

In the years preceding the Arab uprisings, feminists were forced to fight both the secular forces represented by the state and its supporters and conservative forces of the fundamentalist Islamists. Additionally, both forces try to influence the other, or Islamist forces more so on the state by bringing middle-class and lower-class people to their cohorts. This has significant cultural, political and social implications as Islamists do not concern themselves with women's issues but place their priorities on issues like foreign policy attitudes, economic deprivation, class divide etc. Women's affairs are considered alien and unimportant in the rising rates of unemployment of poverty, and feminist organizations and ideas are labelled elitist, especially when such organizations fail to produce grassroots level activities. Connell¹⁷³ makes an interesting observation that gender relations and state are constitutive of each other: state is constructed by gender dynamics, the same as state is implicated in gender relations. This essentially gives the state authority to enforce reforms to challenge or consolidate existing gender relations. On the other hand, activities and campaigns that promote gender rights from within civil society organizations could also lead to changes in the higher hierarchies of the

¹⁷⁰ The government refused to grant license for the Egyptian Organisation for Human Rights (EOHR) because of its political activities.

¹⁷¹ "NGOs Lose Ground in Sisi's Egypt," OpenDemocracy, October 2014, , accessed May 27, 2019, <https://www.opendemocracy.net/en/north-africa-west-asia/ngos-lose-ground-in-sisis-egypt/>.

¹⁷² Deniz Kandiyoti, "Identity and Its Discontents: Women and the Nation," *Millennium: Journal of International Studies* 20, no. 3 (1991): 440, accessed May 1, 2019. doi:10.1177/03058298910200031501.

¹⁷³ R. W. Connell, "The State, Gender, and Sexual Politics," *Theory and Society* 19, no. 5 (October 1990): 519, accessed May 19, 2019. doi:10.1007/bf00147025.

state. These two possibilities are not mutually exclusive, for one without the other would just result in unending criticisms and a society in disarray.

One of the most disabling debates regarding women's rights and women's movement in Egypt is the clash between what is perceived as the inculcation of Western ideas and the need to safeguard authentic culture. Much of this debate owes to the close relationship Egypt's successive regimes maintained with the West, pro-Israel policies and the top-down secularisation initiated by Nasser. History of women's movement validly points out how forced secularization and subsequent rise of Islamism during Sadat's period cultivated anti-West sentiments which were increasingly reflected in the rejection of "feminist" ideals by a majority of Egyptian women. Women's activism is continually being judged in terms of their levels of authenticity or Westernness. Therefore, culturalisation of politics and widespread acceptance of cultural nationalism has been at the expense of progressive debates and discussions on women's rights. Interestingly, the cause of cultural nationalism has united ideologically disparate groups like Islamists and nationalist-leftists against several women's rights issues because of their unequivocal ideological stance against Westernization.

Concluding Remarks

Egyptian feminist movement emerged parallel to the nationalist movement in early 19th century, rooted in anti-imperialist and modernist ideals, aided by rapid urbanisation and burgeoning of press. In line with the global trend, the initial phase of Egyptian feminism was secular in nature rejecting the relevance of religious values in public sphere. The separation of public and private spheres is institutionalised such that even the early feminist activists adhered to the mainstream gender roles. With the emergence of Islamic feminism in Egypt along with strengthening of Islamist groups under Sadat, reforming private sphere and personal laws became a matter of contention. However, successive governments while co-opting women's issues to project the image of being progressive, suppressed autonomous women's movements. Moreover, legal and constitutional space for women to claim their rights were extremely constrained Egypt before the Arab spring.

Chapter III

State and Feminist Negotiations in Post-Arab Spring Egypt

Feminist movement in Egypt which leaned more towards Islamic framework of women's rights exhibit the feature of adapting to and manoeuvring the socio-political and cultural hurdles of the time. The challenges feminist activists and movements face after the Arab spring were different from pre-2011 events (there was a heightened feeling of revolutionary euphoria and hope for change in the air during that time). Against this context, the chapter discusses post-Arab spring women's rights in two sections. First section deals with the initial demands of feminist movements in the transitional period, responses of two governments to these demands by juxtaposing the constitutional rights, legal rights and so on, as embedded in two constitutions drafted by two different governments. The next section analyses the social and gender indicators pertaining to status of women in Egypt since the end of Arab spring.

The transitional process after the Arab spring began with the taking over of power by Supreme Council of the Armed Forces (SCAF), a military formed panel to oversee the regime transition through democratic elections. In November 2011, the election was fixed to be held in late June 2012 after it consulted with the Muslim Brotherhood (MB) which had an influential support base at the time. Even after Mohammed Morsi of MB won the elections to become the President on June 30, 2012, SCAF maintained its influence in the governance. The constitution of 2012 was implemented in December 2012 after a referendum; but the government and the constitution were met with massive protest which began on 30 June 2013, demanding early presidential elections. The massive protests were spearheaded by liberals, women's rights activists, opposition parties and civil society organizations who were dissatisfied with Morsi's policies. The 2012 constitution was subsequently suspended in July 2013 and General Abdel Fattah El-Sisi ended the rule of the first democratically elected government in Egypt. Subsequently, a political road map was drawn after consulting with various political parties and movements including Rebel movement, Salafist Nour party, Al-Azhar, the Coptic Church and civil society organizations, and insisted on a new and more representative Constitutional Committee¹. The 2014 constitution (the second after the Arab Spring) was inaugurated in January 2014 with the head of Supreme Constitutional Court acting as interim president.

¹Al Jazeera, "Key Players in Egypt's Politics," News | Al Jazeera, July 04, 2013, , accessed April 28, 2019, <https://www.aljazeera.com/news/middleeast/2013/07/20137312219878492.html>.

Rise and Fall of Political Islam

The political landscape of post-Mubarak Egypt was fluid and plural in nature². For the first time since its inception eighty years ago, Muslim Brotherhood (MB) and other Islamist political movements were allowed to form political parties and compete in the national elections. The MB and ultra-conservative Salafists established Freedom and Justice Party and Al Nour party respectively. El Wasat was established by a group of people who broke away from the MB but kept to their Islamist roots and ideologies. Gama'at Islamiyya which has a history of militant tendencies also established their own political parties³. The rise of Islamist parties to power through 2011-2012 parliamentary elections can be traced to the fact that they had an understanding with the SCAF regarding the political process in the transitional period by excluding the progressive forces which include liberal parties, trade unions and feminist activists.⁴ As Arafat argues,⁵ because of this exclusivity tactics, there were immense tensions between the political actors and progressive forces preferring a “constitution first” approach and elections be postponed, wherein the MB and SCAF⁶ agreed on conducting the elections first. The 2011-2012 elections were an avenue of power struggle between the various political actors at the time. In the power vacuum that was created following the resignation of Mubarak and the dissolution of 1971 constitution along with the dissolution of both chambers of parliament, SCAF, MB and other Islamist parties began to compete for power which lasted in the entire two transitional periods- first, from February 2011- July 2012 and the second, from July 2012 to July 2013 until the military took over by removing Morsi and MB from power.

In fact, the agreement reached between SCAF and MB was a turning point. The SCAF was trusted by the people and the progressive forces, at least in the beginning of the post-revolution who were seen as the guardians of Egypt and was entrusted with the job of leading Egypt through the transition⁷. However, the military ultimately wanted to put someone in power whom they could control in the long run, while, in the short run, fill the void created by Mubarak⁸. It was in this context that the two camps came to a tactical understanding to support

²Mariz Tadros, "Egypt's Tale of Two Constitutions," *Women as Constitution-Makers*, March 2019, 316, accessed April 28, 2019, doi:10.1017/9781108686358.008.

³"Political Islam After the Arab Spring," *Foreign Affairs*, December 01, 2017, , accessed April 28, 2019, <https://www.foreignaffairs.com/reviews/review-essay/2017-10-16/political-islam-after-arab-spring>.

⁴Alaa Al-Din Arafat, *The Rise of Islamism in Egypt* (Cham, Switzerland: Palgrave Macmillan, 2017), 165.

⁵See (ibid).

⁶ This was also supported by what was left of the dissolved National Democratic Party of Mubarak.

⁷Michael Robbins and Mark Tessler, "What Egyptians Mean by Democracy," *Foreign Policy*, September 20, 2011, accessed May 28, 2019, <https://foreignpolicy.com/2011/09/20/what-egyptians-mean-by-democracy/>.

⁸Alaa Al-Din Arafat, *The Rise of Islamism in Egypt* (Cham, Switzerland: Palgrave Macmillan, 2017), 167

each other in the immediate elections as it was in the best of their interests at the time. It implied that for SCAF it was to briefly relinquish power and pass on the blame to MB who they can eventually tackle. And for MB, it was an opportunity to win political power after being repressed since its inception in 1929.

The Islamists in Egypt could be divided into five: first, the MB who also happened to be part of the opposition before the uprisings; two, the Salafist Call; three, Al-Wasat party modelled after the Justice and Development Party in Turkey; four, the conservative Al-Nour party who advocated the imposition of Sha'ria; and five, the Islamic Group and the Al-Jihad Group⁹. Due to widespread networking and grassroots level activities, as well as their prior experience competing in parliamentary elections, Muslim Brotherhood was the most powerful and influential of these actors, followed by the Salafists. The MB is comprised of three generations, the most critical of them being the youngest who participated in the revolution and many a time, rebelled against the leadership¹⁰. The Salafists who grabbed control were ultra-conservatives whose financial support came from Salafis outside Egypt¹¹. The popularity with their literal and conservative readings of Quran was enhanced by the weakening of al-Azhar at the time of Mubarak. In the elections, they ran only for 50 per cent of the parliamentary seats and did not declare a presidential candidate particularly because they did not want to look threatening to the army to avoid a crackdown as it happened after the 1954 revolution. They also portrayed themselves as a pro-democracy party modelled after the promises given by the post-Islamic parties in Turkey. The same strategies were followed by Salafists who avoided tensions with the SCAF in order to end thirty years of exclusion from politics¹². On the other side of the elections were the revolutionary forces who were the real agitators of the revolution who lacked competency, organization and grassroots level acceptance as that of the Islamists. The liberal and secular front were mostly traditional political parties¹³ who existed in opposition to Mubarak, as well as new secular and liberal parties established after the toppling of Mubarak.

⁹(ibid)

¹⁰Doha Samir, "The Muslim Brotherhoods Generational Gap: Politics in the Post-Revolutionary Era," *AlMuntaqa* 1, no. 2 (August 2018): 30-34, accessed May 21, 2019, doi:10.31430/almuntaqa.1.2.0032.

¹¹Karim El-Gawhary, "Salafists in Egypt: Exploiting the Weakness of the People," Qantara.de, January 2012, , accessed June 28, 2019, <https://en.qantara.de/content/salafists-in-egypt-exploiting-the-weakness-of-the-people>.

¹²Ashraf El-Sherif, "The Egyptian Muslim Brotherhood's Failures," Carnegie Endowment for International Peace, July 2014, accessed June 28, 2019, <https://carnegieendowment.org/2014/07/01/egyptian-muslim-brotherhood-s-failures-pub-56046>.

¹³See Bahgat Korany and Rabab El-Mahdi, *Arab Spring in Egypt: Revolution and beyond* (Cairo: American University in Cairo Press, 2014).

In the 2011-2012 parliamentary elections, Islamists, most notably the MB, won more seats than their actual support base: 47 per cent of all the seats in Egyptian parliament, enabling them to dominate the constitution drafting procedures as well, followed by al-Nour winning 34 per cent of all the seats¹⁴. The radical party- Al Gama'a Al-Islamiyya won more votes than the liberal parties combined: about 23 per cent. The Islamists had actually worked together to avoid competition between themselves and prevent splitting of votes¹⁵. They had agreed upon a "charter of honour" which encouraged candidates to withdraw if they were competing against other Islamists. However, towards the end, there was a clear rift between Salafists and the Brotherhood¹⁶. The experience in electoral politics since 1980s, logistical facilities at hand such as schools, youth movement, clinics and several charity works, secret funding, the immediacy of elections and lack of time for preparation for liberals and secular parties and the large electoral bases in rural Egypt helped MB win the elections¹⁷. According to Arafat, a noted scholar¹⁸, using religious symbols as well as the favourable political climate aided by fragmented opposition in the face of their conflicting ideologies and little political experience fueled the win for Islamists.

The general expectations of Morsi's government were to deliver the demands of the revolution by eliminating authoritarianism and guiding Egypt in its democratic transition, and construct an independent foreign policy departing from the influence of the West and Israel. MB's failure to capitalise on the popular vision resulted in damage to its credibility and being perceived as politically incompetent¹⁹. Their political failure translated into ideological struggle. As argued by Monier and Ranko²⁰, MB and Morsi in particular were deemed to exploit religion for their political agenda and came to be associated with the phrase *tujjar al-din* implying religious exploitation for personal gain.

Morsi's rule exposed MB's lack of political experience, rigidity, short-sightedness, and lack of exercise of political power which was played against them by the military to engineer

¹⁴Afp, "Egypt's Brotherhood Wins 47% of Parliament Seats," Egypt Independent, January 21, 2012, accessed May 28, 2019, <https://www.egyptindependent.com/egypts-brotherhood-wins-47-parliament-seats/>.

¹⁵Alaa Al-Din Arafat, *The Rise of Islamism in Egypt* (Cham, Switzerland: Palgrave Macmillan, 2017), 177

¹⁶Bahgat Korany and Rabab El-Mahdi, *Arab Spring in Egypt: Revolution and beyond* (Cairo: American University in Cairo Press, 2014): 218

¹⁷ Alaa Al-Din Arafat, *The Rise of Islamism in Egypt* (Cham, Switzerland: Palgrave Macmillan, 2017), 184; Bruce K. Rutherford, *Egypt after Mubarak: Liberalism, Islam, and Democracy in the Arab World* (Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Press, 2014), xliii.

¹⁸Alaa Al-Din Arafat, *The Rise of Islamism in Egypt* (Cham, Switzerland: Palgrave Macmillan, 2017), 178

¹⁹(ibid), 186

²⁰ Elizabeth Iskander Monier and Annette Ranko, "The Fall of the Muslim Brotherhood: Implications for Egypt," *Middle East Policy* 20, no. 4 (2013): 116, accessed April 28, 2019, doi:10.1111/mepo.12050.

the coup of July 2013. From the beginning, Morsi was divisive, only loyal to his own party and interested in serving their Islamist interests. Naturally, liberals, secularists, as well as other revolutionary forces viewed his actions with caution especially after he granted himself full executive powers in order to bypass judicial sanctions to put the Islamist constitution to a public vote²¹. Besides, Morsi's government was far removed from the revolution's original demands, and for the Islamists the tally of votes was what counted as legitimacy rather than fulfilling election promises, hugely undermining public intelligence. The public perception of Morsi government soon shifted when the hollow promises were proven to be electoral tactics or rhetoric rather than actual commitments resulting in the lack of any developmental projects or economic growth²². The interests of the country were compromised to advance the self-interests of the Muslim Brotherhood, sometimes even at the expense of state welfare²³. Reforming the security forces was one of the important expectations from Morsi government to prevent the kind of surveillance mechanisms that Mubarak used to adopt during his rule. However, Morsi government did not dismiss the corrupt officials from the state apparatus, instead maintained them in order to serve the Brotherhood²⁴. Rather than selecting qualified and meritorious individuals, the Morsi government installed loyal in the ranks who were incompetent as advisors. Egyptian society also witnessed one of the most polarised rules under Morsi with torture, violence and political detentions arising in an unprecedented manner²⁵. Morsi was seen increasingly as a delegate of the MB who handed over the reins of the government to Muslim Brotherhood Guidance Bureau, a non-legal body loyal to International Muslim Organisation²⁶. It could be gathered that more than popular dissatisfaction, it was

²¹ David, "Morsi Spurned Deals, Seeing Military as Tamed," The New York Times, July 06, 2013, accessed April 28, 2019, <https://www.nytimes.com/2013/07/07/world/middleeast/morsi-spurned-deals-to-the-end-seeing-the-military-as-tamed.html>

²² Patrick Poole, "Egyptian Media Outraged by Muslim Brotherhood Leaders' Visit to State Department," Islamist Watch, May 2019, accessed June 28, 2019, <https://www.meforum.org/islamist-watch/58529/egyptian-media-outraged-by-muslim-brotherhood>.

²³ Ashraf El-Sherif, "The Egyptian Muslim Brotherhood's Failures," Carnegie Endowment for International Peace, July 2014, accessed June 28, 2019, <https://carnegieendowment.org/2014/07/01/egyptian-muslim-brotherhood-s-failures-pub-56046>.

²⁴ Patrick Poole, "Egyptian Media Outraged by Muslim Brotherhood Leaders' Visit to State Department," Islamist Watch, May 2019, accessed June 28, 2019, <https://www.meforum.org/islamist-watch/58529/egyptian-media-outraged-by-muslim-brotherhood>.

²⁵ Ashraf El-Sherif, "The Egyptian Muslim Brotherhood's Failures," Carnegie Endowment for International Peace, July 2014, accessed June 28, 2019, <https://carnegieendowment.org/2014/07/01/egyptian-muslim-brotherhood-s-failures-pub-56046>.

²⁶ Patrick Poole, "Egyptian Media Outraged by Muslim Brotherhood Leaders' Visit to State Department," Islamist Watch, May 2019, accessed June 28, 2019, <https://www.meforum.org/islamist-watch/58529/egyptian-media-outraged-by-muslim-brotherhood>.

eventually the power struggle within the circles of political elites and general suspicion of Islamists that led to Morsi's downfall.

General Abdul Fateh El-Sisi emerged as the crusader of people's rights and the leader who took over political control from Morsi government and Muslim Brotherhood. He set the tone for a country in crisis, ready to strike back at the twin menace of terrorism and religious fascism through a speech in which he directly addressed millions of supporters who turned up in the streets who were disappointed with the Morsi rule²⁷. The discourse perpetuated by El-Sisi portrayed Brotherhood as the enemy of the revolution as well as a terrorist threat to the national security. The defeat of political Islam in Egypt can also be attributed to its underestimation of the alliance of liberal/secular forces with the army and subsequent policies of unprecedented repression and elimination policy undertaken by El-Sisi after he assumed office as president.

In the realm of women's rights, the differences in ambition and principles between 2012 and 2014 constitutions drafted under Morsi and El-Sisi governments respectively, exhibited varying degrees of accommodation of women's rights. The analysis of the constitution alongside the fact that women's organisations and movements lobbied for the inclusion of a gender agenda in both constitutions shed some light over the position of the feminist movement vis-à-vis the direction of the regimes post Arab spring.

Constitutional Rights and Gender Equality

Constitutions are comprised of functional and aspirational elements, the former stand for state institutions and rules for governance, whereas the latter articulates the commitment of the state to higher principles and ideas that it seeks to adhere to or attain²⁸. According to Colm Regan²⁹, the composition and nature of post-Arab spring governments along with the scale and robustness of local support for change in the gender agenda would shape the political space and social empowerment of Arab women [it is crucial that activities are initiated at the grassroots for sustainable social change, especially given the tendency to reject feminist values as alien to the local culture. The idea is to integrate not just women who lie in the margins of

²⁷ "Egypt and the Coup: Inside the 11 Days That Toppled Morsi," Middle East Eye, July 2018, accessed June 28, 2019, <https://www.middleeasteye.net/news/egypt-and-coup-inside-11-days-toppled-morsi>.

²⁸ John Liolos, "Erecting New Constitutional Cultures: The Problems & Promise of Constitutionalism Post-Arab Spring," 36 *Boston College International & Comparative Law Review* 219, April 2014, 1, accessed May 2, 2019.

²⁹ Colm Reagan, "Women, Citizenship and Change: The Role of the Women's Movement in the Arab World" (2012):231-254

the system or even the feminist movements in Egypt, but incorporate local actors in order to challenge the very basis of patriarchy].

As far as regime transition is concerned, women's rights were a divisive and controversial issue, especially with Islamists. They in fact, wanted to roll back on the gains made by the women's activists and civil society organisations in the past. This issue figured largely in the political debates preceding the constitution drafting and lawmaking processes³⁰. During the drafting of the 2012 constitution, the very drafting of the constitution itself became a source of conflict. The most important conflicts were revolved around the timing, its sequential position in comparison to other milestones in the transition, the composition of the constituent assembly, as well as the duration of the drafting process³¹. Power struggle between and among the political actors- military, Islamists, and the secular/liberal forces- was precipitated in the constitution drafting process. Their differences in ideology and political objectives were manifested in four ways: the composition of the Constituent Assembly and the selection criteria, the nature of the state, form of governance, and the role of military in politics³².

SCAF and secularists wanted an inclusive Constituent Assembly, however, it was dominated by Islamists. The Islamists had an overwhelming majority in the parliament with 72 per cent of the seats in People's Assembly³³ and 83 per cent in Shura Council³⁴. The first Assembly included 66 Islamist members out of a total of 100. It had only six women members out of which four belonged to MB and two were Christians³⁵. Subsequently, the Cairo Administrative Court suspended the Constituent Assembly because it was unrepresentative of Egyptian society and its formation was unconstitutional. The second Constituent Assembly formation was marred by the schism between Islamists and the rest of the Egyptian society and it also fell apart as soon as it was formed when SCAF members withdrew their

³⁰ Alaa Al-Din Arafat, *The Rise of Islamism in Egypt* (Cham, Switzerland: Palgrave Macmillan, 2017), 217; Moushira Khattab, *Women's Rights Under Egypt's Constitutional Disarray*, publication, Middle East Program, Wilson Center, Viewpoints No. 15 (Wilson Center), 4, accessed April 29, 2019. ; Magda Shahin and Yasmeen El-Ghazaly, "The Impact of Notions of Nationalism on Women's Rights in Egypt," *Studies in Ethnicity and Nationalism* 17, no. 2 (December 2017): 182, accessed April 28, 2019, doi:10.1111/sena.12250.

³¹ Alaa Al-Din Arafat, *The Rise of Islamism in Egypt* (Cham, Switzerland: Palgrave Macmillan, 2017), 217

³² (ibid)

³³ "2012 Egyptian Parliamentary Elections," Carnegie Endowment for International Peace, January 2015, accessed June 28, 2019, <https://carnegieendowment.org/2015/01/22/2012-egyptian-parliamentary-elections-pub-58800>.

³⁴ (ibid)

³⁵ "INFOGRAPHIC: Egypt's Constituent Assembly," Reuters, September 04, 2013, accessed April 28, 2019, <https://www.reuters.com/article/idUS132263253520130904>.

representatives³⁶. The third constituent assembly was yet again dominated by Islamists, but before it was dissolved Morsi exploited his presidential power to draft the constitution as quickly as possible before a court ruling could be made. In the 85-member assembly, there were only seven women, five of whom were from the MB³⁷. Valentine Moghadam³⁸ calls the contrast between active and engaged roles women played during the protests and their lack of visibility in subsequent negotiations as “democracy paradox”.

Various feminist non-governmental organisations, including both leftists and liberals formed Egyptian Coalition of Feminist Organizations who worked closely with newly emerging liberal and secular political parties and groups to ensure the inclusion of feminist agenda in the new constitution by suggesting selection criteria to the constitution-drafting committee; conducting surveys to deeply understand the vision of Egyptian women about their constitutional rights; framing women’s rights in constitutional language synchronising with the constitutional tradition of Egypt; and campaigning for women’s constitutional rights through the implementation of Convention on the Elimination of all Forms of Discrimination Against Women (CEDAW)³⁹. Provisions of CEDAW figures in constitutions of several democratic countries like India and Tunisia to ensure state’s commitment to gender equality⁴⁰.

Women and Constitution-Working Group (WCWG) formed by Women and Memory Forum in May 2011, who were also stakeholders in the Feminist Organisations Coalition and independent women’s rights activists in them, supervised the activities of the coalition and

³⁶Marina Ottaway, "Egypt: Death of the Constituent Assembly?" Carnegie Endowment for International Peace, June 2012, accessed June 28, 2019, <https://carnegieendowment.org/2012/06/13/egypt-death-of-constituent-assembly-pub-48501>.

³⁷Abdel-Rahman Hussein, "Egyptian Assembly Passes Draft Constitution despite Protests," The Guardian, November 30, 2012, accessed May 28, 2019, <https://www.theguardian.com/world/2012/nov/30/egypt-constitution-morsi>.

³⁸ Valentine Moghadam, "Engendering Democracy after the Arab Spring," *Journal of the Indiana Academy of the Social Sciences* 15, no. 1 (2012): 2-8, accessed June 28, 2019, <http://digitalcommons.butler.edu/jiass/vol15/iss1/2>.

³⁹ Hala Kamal, "Inserting Women’s Rights in the Egyptian Constitution: Personal Reflections," *Journal for Cultural Research* 19, no. 2 (2015): 156, accessed June 8, 2019, doi:10.1080/14797585.2014.982919.

⁴⁰ Articles 14 and 15 of the Indian constitution, provides equality as a fundamental right and prohibition of discrimination on the basis of gender, sex, caste, creed etc., and Article 15(3) provides for affirmative action for underprivileged women. The constitution also declares the precedence of fundamental rights before all other laws which include personal laws. Tunisian constitution acknowledged the supremacy of international law ratified by the Parliament in Article 20. The 2014 Tunisian constitution removes all previous reservations to CEDAW and commits the state to ensuring elimination of all forms of discrimination against women. See Rangita De Silva De Alwis, Anware Mnasri, and Estee Ward, "Women and the Making of the Tunisian Constitution," *Faculty Scholarship*, 2017, 134, accessed April 8, 2019, doi: <https://dx.doi.org/10.15779/Z38B56D41P>; Bhavana Rao, "Reservations Based on Personal Laws to CEDAW: A Study on Effect of the Status of Equality of Women in India by Comparing it With Afghanistan," *ILI Law Review*, Winter 2016, 63, accessed April 8, 2019, http://ili.ac.in/pdf/p5_bhavana.pdf.

coordinated and collaborated with other initiatives like Let's Write Our Constitution group⁴¹. In addition to this, New Women Research Centre coordinated with Constitution for All Egyptians Front politically by defining the process of drafting and criteria of selecting the members of Constituent Assembly, and Centre for Egyptian Women's Legal Assistance and the Egyptian Centre for the Development of Communication Methods jointly conducted surveys on women's demands to be included in the constitution. Their close monitoring of the drafting process, especially by focusing on the composition of the drafting committee was to ensure inclusion of women's rights in the emerging draft in consonance with the values of gender equality endorsed by CEDAW. Women and Constitution Committee of the Coalition of Egyptian Feminist Organisations discussed the proposed amendments and published an open letter critiquing the phrasings and suggesting alternatives⁴². Women and Constitution Document (WCD) was submitted in March 2012 by the 'Women with the Revolution' alliance bringing together various feminist organizations, women's groups and individuals, and it was endorsed by the Coalition, the Constitution for All Egyptians Front and the emerging Egyptian women's movement⁴³. WCD merged women's rights along with revolutionary demands, for instance, the feminist engagement with women's rights involved issues like violence against women, gender-based discrimination and political participation which resonated with the revolutionary demands of "justice, freedom and dignity".

WCD lobbied the state to ensure equal opportunities for all the citizens and take appropriate legislative measures to protect vulnerable groups and individuals, criminalising all forms of discrimination in relation to creed, class, religion, language, marital status, race, sex, ethnicity or even pregnancy. It stresses on equal representation of all social groups in the political process, and women are given *munaasafa* or 50 per cent representation⁴⁴. It also upheld the women's rights clauses in the 1954 and 1971 constitutions. They had also pushed for the inclusion of socio-economic rights, equal pay, decent wages, human security, recognition of all forms of labour such as formal, informal, seasonal and so on with equal

⁴¹Hala Kamal, "Inserting Women's Rights in the Egyptian Constitution: Personal Reflections," *Journal for Cultural Research*19, no. 2 (2015): 157, accessed April 2, 2019, doi:10.1080/14797585.2014.982919

⁴² See "A Solidarity Statement from the Egyptian Feminist Organisations Coalition with Nazra for Feminist Studies," Nazra for Feminist Studies, March 2016, accessed April 28, 2019, <https://nazra.org/en/2016/03/solidarity-statement-egyptian-feminist-organisations-coalition-nazra-feminist-studies>.

⁴³ Mariz Tadros, "Egypt's Tale of Two Constitutions," *Women as Constitution-Makers*, March 2019, 325-326, accessed April 28, 2019, doi:10.1017/9781108686358.008.

⁴⁴Hala Kamal, "Inserting Women's Rights in the Egyptian Constitution: Personal Reflections," *Journal for Cultural Research*19, no. 2 (2015): 157, accessed April 12, 2019, doi:10.1080/14797585.2014.982919.

financial, medical and social insurance for all, and reforms in discriminatory laws pertaining to private sphere and establishing an entity to ensure gender accountability in the conduct of the constitution⁴⁵. It also suggested that free education and health services be provided to all the citizens and necessary care for the deprived. Freedoms mentioned in the document referred to both personal and public freedoms, obliging the government to respect citizens' right to privacy and ensure physical and psychological well-being by criminalising torture and violence in public and private spheres.

The pushback of feminist activists against the Islamist gender agenda in 2012 constitution was with the understanding that this was a critical political moment to be seized by the women's movement to counter any provisions that curtail possibilities of gender-progressive legislations in the future, as well as to ensure as many gender-related constitutional guarantees as possible⁴⁶. The Islamists were interested in ensuring constitutional commitment to Sharia in terms of gender division of labour, and gendered rights and responsibilities. Such gender views were supported by radical Islamists like Salafists and non-Islamist right-wing parties like Wafdist and Ghad el Thawra who were allies of Islamists in the parliamentary elections.

However, there was strong retaliation to explicitly mentioning gender to be treated non-discriminately. Wherever equality was mentioned it was subjected to Islamic qualifiers⁴⁷. For example, Article 68 of the proposed 2012 constitution provided for equality of sexes as long as it did not contravene the provisions of *Sha'ria*, a verbatim adoption of 1971 constitution. Such provisions followed the principle of *qiwama*⁴⁸, in contradiction with full gender equality commitment of CEDAW pertaining to matters like inheritance, divorce and marriage. In the end, however, the entire clause was removed along with the Islamic qualifier in a move to appease both Salafists as well as women's activists⁴⁹. Article 145 stipulates that "*no treaty contrary to the provisions of the Constitution can be approved*" which establishes the supremacy of Islamic law above international law.

⁴⁵ Mariz Tadros, "Egypt's Tale of Two Constitutions," *Women as Constitution-Makers*, March 2019, 325, accessed April 28, 2019, doi:10.1017/9781108686358.008.;

Hala Kamal, "Inserting Women's Rights in the Egyptian Constitution: Personal Reflections," *Journal for Cultural Research* 19, no. 2 (2015): 157, accessed May 20, 2019, doi:10.1080/14797585.2014.982919.

⁴⁶ Mariz Tadros, "Egypt's Tale of Two Constitutions," *Women as Constitution-Makers*, March 2019, 324, accessed April 28, 2019, doi:10.1017/9781108686358.008.

⁴⁷ (ibid), 338

⁴⁸ Qiwama essentially says that women are not to be burdened with financial matters or leadership positions as men shall be responsible for it.

⁴⁹ Ellen McLarney, "Women's Equality: Constitutions and Revolutions in Egypt," POMED, March 11, 2016, accessed April 12 2019, https://pomeps.org/womens-equality-constitutions-and-revolutions-in-egypt#_edn6

The Constituent Assembly's lack of commitment and conviction to insert provisions to criminalise violence against women was deemed as necessary by women's activists on the grounds of state forces condoning violence against women⁵⁰. Article 10 of 2012 constitution stipulates protection and care of female breadwinners of families. However, this did not challenge power relations between men and women but engages with women only through needs-based rather than rights-based framework. Article 219 has implications on gender rights which was proposed by Salafists and kept at the very end of the constitution to deflect attention from it: *The principles of Islamic Sharia include general evidence, foundational rules, rules of jurisprudence, and credible sources accepted in Sunni doctrines and by the larger community*. Resistance to this article was particularly from women's activists because there were innumerable discriminatory practices in Sunni doctrines endorsed by religious hardliners. The limitation of the article also pertains to the fact that women's rights were not accorded priority as part of the overall progressive political project. The central idea in the 2012 constitution was a contract between not only the state and the people but also between the people and the God.

However, the liberal ambitions of Morsi government were reflected in fifth provision of the Preamble of 2012 constitution which establishes explicitly "*equality and equal opportunity for all citizens, men and women, without distinction, favouritism, or partiality, in rights or duties*". It⁵¹ also mentions that respect of women should be defining character of Egypt. However, the same provision recognises women in their relational roles as sisters and national roles as partners, instead of individuals and important persons in private spheres also⁵². Equality is elucidated five times in the main body of the constitution in Articles 6⁵³, 8⁵⁴, 9⁵⁵,

⁵⁰ Mariz Tadros, "Egypt's Tale of Two Constitutions," *Women as Constitution-Makers*, March 2019, 327, accessed March 18, 2019, doi:10.1017/9781108686358.008.

⁵¹ The referendum of November 2012 passed the constitution with much less support base for Islamists this time than during the elections. The governorates that voted "no" headed the protests that led to the removal of Morsi from power a few months later. See Hala Kamal, "Inserting Women's Rights in the Egyptian Constitution: Personal Reflections," *Journal for Cultural Research* 19, no. 2 (2015): 158, accessed April 28, 2019, doi:10.1080/14797585.2014.982919.

⁵² The dignity of the individual is part and parcel of the dignity of the homeland. And a country in which women are not respected has no dignity; for women are the sisters of men and partners in national gains and responsibilities.

⁵³ The political system is based on the principles of democracy and consultation, citizenship (under which all citizens are equal in rights and public duties), political and multi-party pluralism, the peaceful transfer of power, the separation and balance of powers, the rule of law, and respect for human rights and freedoms. All of the foregoing is as provided in the Constitution. It is prohibited to form a political party that discriminates between citizens, whether on the basis of gender, origin or religion.

⁵⁴ The state guarantees the means to achieve justice, equality and freedom, and is committed to facilitating the channels of charity, social support and solidarity between members of society. The state ensures the protection of persons, dignity and property, and works toward achieving sufficiency for all citizens. The foregoing is within the limits of the law.

⁵⁵ The state commits to ensuring safety, security and equal opportunity for all citizens without discrimination.

33⁵⁶ and 64⁵⁷. Interestingly, additional phrasings like “within the limits of the law” and “in public sphere” were to constrain the scope of equality between all citizens to the jurisprudence of Islamic law and outside private sphere.

However, such liberal ambitions were merely a rhetoric without substance to desperately prove that gender equality is not incompatible with the rule by an Islamist party⁵⁸. As Kamal argues⁵⁹, the emphasis on the importance of Shari’a (Article 2)⁶⁰ in the constitution mirrors the patriarchal and conservative outlook of the government in areas like polygamy, court testimony, and divorce. It aims to assert the traditional roles of women by bringing Islamic interpretations, offering a hazy idea of public morality as the concern of the state (Articles 8, 11, 12 and 71). Article 10 of the constitution reiterates the centrality of family by providing free services for mothers and children, emblematic of its focus on family, and was received as the Islamic ploy to relegate women to the familial roles. It also says that it “*guarantees reconciliation between duties of a woman toward her family and her work*” (Article 10), which says nothing about man’s duty to the family whereas connecting the familial role traditionally to women. Article 33 set aside personal rights where most cases of gender-based discrimination occur, and instead emphasises only on equality of citizens before law in public rights and duties. The constitution has no mention of ‘equality of sexes’, nor does it explicitly prohibit discrimination on specific grounds of gender and sex.

The constitution was short-lived as it was finally suspended in the massive unwavering protests of June 2013 which culminated in the removal of Morsi as president. The then Minister of Defense Abdel Fattah El-Sisi installed Adly Mansour, the head of the Supreme Constitutional Court, as Interim President until the next presidential elections. Feminists were divided on the issue of a new constitution- some problematized the military take over as a threat to Egyptians and boycotted the drafting process, whereas others who conceived the impending new constitution as an opportunity to insert feminist agenda chose to remain engaged with the

⁵⁶ All citizens are equal before the law. They have equal public rights and duties. There can be no discrimination between them in that regard

⁵⁷ Work is a right, duty and honor for every citizen, guaranteed by the state on the basis of the principles of equality, justice and equal opportunities.

⁵⁸ *Women in Egypt’s Islamic Awakening– A Conversation with Ellen McLarney*, Video, Project on Middle East Political Science, 2016, accessed April 13, 2019, <https://pomeps.org/women-in-egypts-islamic-awakening-a-conversation-with-ellen-mclarney>

⁵⁹ Hala Kamal, "Inserting Women’s Rights in the Egyptian Constitution: Personal Reflections," *Journal for Cultural Research* 19, no. 2 (2015), accessed April 12, 2019, doi:10.1080/14797585.2014.982919.

⁶⁰ Article 2 asserts principles of shari’a as the source of legislation. This also means that the religious clerics will decide the finality of the interpretation of the law

policy dialogue⁶¹. Mansour constituted two constitutional bodies to review and amend the 2012 constitution: the Experts Committee and Constitutional Committee. The former comprised of ten members of the judiciary with no women representation in it, whereas the latter had five women out of fifty members, including the Mervat Tallawy (Chair of NCW), Dr. Aza al-Ashmawy (Chair of National Council for Motherhood and Childhood), Hoda Elsadda and feminist lawyer Mona Zulficar (National Council for Human Rights), representing and several other male members who supported the cause of women's rights. Egyptian feminist activists worked closely to monitor the drafting process in both form and content focusing on both the composition of the Committee of Fifty and the inclusion of women's rights in the constitution.

When the draft was issued, the Women and Constitution Committee within the feminist Coalition deliberated and discussed the proposed amendments from a gender perspective and issued an open letter which critiqued the five gender-concerned articles and suggested alternative phrasing for clarity as well as listed several other demands. The draft constitution was ratified and approved in June 2014. However, feminist activists were divided on Article 198⁶² and Article 204⁶³ of 2014 constitution which allowed military trials for civilians and granted the military-economic privileges, as it could result in grave human rights violation and bestow the military with disproportionate power. As argued by Tadros⁶⁴, contrary to the political opportunity and unity of Feminist bloc that prevailed in 2011, the political climate in 2013 was such that secular and Islamic feminists were polarised, the former supporting military as the saviour from conservative Islamist rule while the latter deemed the return of military as a counter-revolution to Arab spring.

The Preamble of 2014 constitution dwells upon equality and prohibition of discrimination on the basis of sex, gender, religion, class or geographical affiliation as well as endorsed general principles of equality of all citizens before the law in terms of their rights,

⁶¹Mariz Tadros, "Egypt's Tale of Two Constitutions," *Women as Constitution-Makers*, March 2019, 330, accessed April 2, 2019, doi:10.1017/9781108686358.008.

⁶² Civilians shall not stand trial before military courts except for crimes that harm the Armed Forces. The law shall define such crimes and determine the other competencies of the military judiciary

⁶³ Civilians cannot stand trial before military courts except for crimes that represent a direct assault against military facilities, military barracks, or whatever falls under their authority; stipulated military or border zones; its equipment, vehicles, weapons, ammunition, documents, military secrets, public funds or military factories; crimes related to conscription; or crimes that represent a direct assault against its officers or personnel because of the performance of their duties.

⁶⁴ Mariz Tadros, "Egypt's Tale of Two Constitutions," *Women as Constitution-Makers*, March 2019, accessed April 2, 2019, doi:10.1017/9781108686358.008.

responsibilities and freedoms⁶⁵. Because, the 2012 constitution's Islamist framework of gender raised the bar for the 2014 secular constitution to aim higher in terms of democratic values, the latter revoked Islamic qualifiers of 2013 constitution without challenging the dominance of Sharia's jurisprudence as the principal legal document in Egypt⁶⁶. To the credit of the 2014 constitution, several gender-sensitive provisions such as a result of active lobbying efforts of several feminist activists, which include Article 53⁶⁷ endorsed gender equality and prohibited discrimination on the basis of gender⁶⁸, Article 11⁶⁹ committed the state to guarantee women and men equal constitutional rights in several sectors including public offices and legislative bodies, as well as provided for the protection of women from all forms of violence. It granted women the right to assume high positions in the state mechanism like judiciary, without discrimination, and called for equal representation in the parliament. Article 6⁷⁰ provides for constitutional enshrinement of the passing on of citizenship rights to children irrespective of gender. Article 180⁷¹ stressed on gender quota as a constitutional right for women in local bodies. Contrarily, Article 11 did not challenge the patriarchal nature of division of labour by addressing women in terms of her duties to the family while being completely silent on the man's duty yet again⁷². The needs-based framework instead of rights-based framework of

⁶⁵ Hala Kamal, "Inserting Women's Rights in the Egyptian Constitution: Personal Reflections," *Journal for Cultural Research* 19, no. 2 (2015): 159, accessed April 28, 2019, doi:10.1080/14797585.2014.982919.

⁶⁶ 1980 amendment to the 1971 constitution added sharia as *the* principal source of legality unlike the 1956 constitution which mentioned it as *a* source of legislation (Tadros 2019,333)

⁶⁷ Citizens are equal before the law, possess equal rights and public duties, and may not be discriminated against on the basis of religion, belief, sex, origin, race, color, language, disability, social class, political or geographical affiliation, or for any other reason.

⁶⁸ as reiterated in 1956 and 1971 constitutions

⁶⁹ The State shall ensure the achievement of equality between women and men in all civil, political, economic, social, and cultural rights in accordance with the provisions of this Constitution. The State shall take the necessary measures to ensure the appropriate representation of women in the houses of representatives, as specified by Law. The State shall also guarantee women's right of holding public and senior management offices in the State and their appointment in judicial bodies and authorities without discrimination.

⁷⁰ Citizenship is a right to anyone born to an Egyptian father or an Egyptian mother. Being legally recognized and obtaining official papers proving his personal data is a right guaranteed and organised by law. (Article 6, 2014 constitution)

⁷¹ The law regulates other conditions for candidacy and procedures of election, provided that one quarter of the seats are allocated to youth under 35 years old, one quarter is allocated for women, workers and farmers are represented by no less than 50 percent of the total number of seats, and these percentages include a proper representation of Christians and people with disability.

⁷² The state commits to the protection of women against all forms of violence, and ensures women empowerment to reconcile the duties of a woman toward her family and her work requirements. (Article 11, 2014 constitution)

providing welfare was a legacy from the 2012 constitution⁷³. Moreover, Article 93⁷⁴ stipulated the state's commitment to international law, conventions, and covenants like CEDAW, International Covenant on Economic Social and Cultural Rights⁷⁵ and the International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights⁷⁶.

Interestingly, both 2012 and 2014 constitutions are outcomes of negotiations their respective governments have with liberal ideas and their interpretations of the secular/religious divide are expressed through their respective formulations of women's rights in public and private spheres. Coalition politics of the constituent assembly worked out towards insertion of constitutional provision for gender quota in elections. MacLarney⁷⁷ also comments the 2014 constitution is a natural progression of 2012 constitution in terms of increased political rights for women. Counter-intuitively, Tadros⁷⁸ contests MacLarney's argument of natural progression and highlights that the gender outcomes of the two constitutions were radically different. Because, firstly, Article 2 of 2014 constitution which establishes Sharia as *the* source of legislation, as well as the overall language, establishes the supremacy of Islamic law. Secondly, the absence of a uniform civil code entrusted local Islamic clergy with the power to rule over private matters. Thirdly, 2014 constitution was a departure from 2012 constitution, not a continuation as it was not built upon the latter in El-Sisi's commitment to de-brotherhoodisation and de-Islamisation.

Legislations

Sixty-four promises of Mohammed Morsi to be achieved within the first one hundred days of his rule concerned with traditional and family roles as mothers and caretakers without any reference to women as independent citizens⁷⁹. After the 2011-2012 parliamentary elections, with the possession of political power, FJP, al-Nour Party as well as the Islamists' "Muslim Sisterhood" pressurized to impose the precedence of Shari'a over any other law that

⁷³ The state ensures care and protection and care for motherhood and childhood, and for breadwinning, and elderly women, and women most in need. (Article 11, 2014 constitution)

⁷⁴ The state is committed to the agreements, covenants, and international conventions of human rights that were ratified by Egypt. They have the force of law after publication in accordance with the specified circumstances. (Article 93, 2014 constitution)

⁷⁵ Ratified in 1982 with reservations that it doesn't contradict Sh'aria

⁷⁶ Ratified in 1982

⁷⁷ Ellen McLarney, "Women's Equality: Constitutions and Revolutions in Egypt," POMED, March 11, 2016, accessed April 2019, https://pomeps.org/womens-equality-constitutions-and-revolutions-in-egypt#_edn6

⁷⁸ In *Egypt's Two Constitutions* Mariz Tadros, "Egypt's Tale of Two Constitutions," *Women as Constitution-Makers*, March 2019, 342, accessed April 18, 2019, doi:10.1017/9781108686358.008.

⁷⁹ Miwa Kato, "Women of EGYPT: Why Empowerment Requires Changes in Social Norms As Well As Laws," *Cairo Review* 24 (2017):46-47, accessed May 12, 2019.

were favourable to women like the Khula law, right of women to travel alone, provisions in the penal code that safeguards women from sexual harassment, raising girls' legal age of marriage, prohibiting female genital mutilation (FGM), the new family law that grants women children's legal custody till they attain 15 years, and the nationality law that would pass on Egyptian citizenship to children born to non-Egyptian fathers and Egyptian mothers⁸⁰. They dismissed CEDAW as blasphemous and a manifestation of atheism and tried to mobilise women for its abolition from the Egyptian legislation. Instead, they advocated for women's rights in terms of family and traditional gender roles. One of the primary strategies followed by Islamists was to replace the NCW's women's rights agenda with a "family agenda" because they view women's rights as contingent and not dissimilar from family rights.⁸¹ They also abhorred other international charters and agreements while formulating the laws and policies.

In May 2013, the Interior Ministry constituted a unit with ten female members to draft a comprehensive law to prevent sexual abuse and all forms of violence against women in Egypt. However, the draft law submitted in June 2013 by the unit lacked adequate study or consultation with civil society organizations that engage with women's issues at grassroots level.⁸² After the dismissal of Morsi, parliament was dissolved and the law stalled amidst political upheaval and uncertainty. In June 2014, interim President Adly Mansour penalised sexual harassment, a first in the history of Egypt⁸³ through Decree No. 50 to make sexual harassment punishable by six-month jail term and fine of 3,000 Egyptian pounds. A hotline was also created for women to report sexual assault cases as a part of the law⁸⁴. However, honour killings, domestic violence, anal rape, and marital rape still did not come under the mandate of punishable crimes. In fact, the definition of sexual harassment in Egyptian law is given as "when a man follows or stalks a woman and communicates sexual or pornographic content" which is narrow enough to exclude several other forms of harassment like verbal abuse, groping, so on and so forth⁸⁵. Criminalising sexual assault in Egypt was a long pending

⁸⁰ Camilo Gomez-Rivas, "Women, Shari'a, and Personal Status Law Reform in Egypt after the Revolution," Middle East Institute, October 2011, accessed June 28, 2019, <https://www.mei.edu/publications/women-sharia-and-personal-status-law-reform-egypt-after-revolution>.

⁸¹ Miwa Kato, "Women of Egypt: Why Empowerment Requires Changes in Social Norms As Well As Laws," *Cairo Review* 24 (2017):46-47, accessed May 12, 2019.

⁸² Mariam Kirolos, "Sexual Violence in Egypt: Myths and Realities," *Jadaliyya*, July 2013, 144, accessed June 18, 2019, http://www.jadaliyya.com/pages/index/13007/sexual-violence-in-egypt_myths-and-realities-.

⁸³ Throughout history, Egypt set a minimum sentence as a means of deterrence which criminology experts refer to as "deterrence through sentencing" hypothesis. (Doob, Webster and Gartner quoted in Kirolos 2016)

⁸⁴ "Egypt: Epidemic of Sexual Violence," Human Rights Watch, April 17, 2015, accessed May 20, 2019, <https://www.hrw.org/news/2013/07/03/egypt-epidemic-sexual-violence>.

⁸⁵ Neil Sadler, "Myths, Masterplots and Sexual Harassment in Egypt," *The Journal of North African Studies* 24, no. 2 (January 05, 2018): 13, accessed April 28, 2019, doi:10.1080/13629387.2017.1419872.

mechanism to be implemented especially because of the rampancy of the issue and its lack of grievance redressal mechanism in the country⁸⁶. Interior Ministry in May 2015 announced that it will increase the number of patrols and hire women doctors to look into cases of sexual harassment survivors as a nation-wide strategy to address cases of sexual harassment⁸⁷. However, how the different governmental policies with regard to guarantee and safeguard of women's rights have played out in post-Arab spring Egypt is a matter beyond legal stipulations. The enforcement and implementation of laws and constitutional principles were contingent on the general social, cultural and religious context of the country as well as the governments' commitment to institute state apparatus, and redress framework as well as follow up mechanisms.

The National Council for Women (NCW) have been functioning with a non-committed attitude in advancing women's rights and state's surveillance mechanism. In 2017, NCW organised campaigns to spread awareness on women's political rights as a strategy to increase women's representation in local and municipal councils, fight stereotypes that hinder women's participation and visibility in politics. However, such nascent initiatives were more or less pointless because of their lack of in-depth understanding of the local picture as much as that of civil society organisations from whose association the campaigns could have benefitted in sectors such as addressing mental and physical health of sexual abuse survivors, sexuality education in schools, investigations into rights violations, suiting women empowerment narrative to local contexts and so on. The campaigns did not deal with real hindrance to women's security and empowerment while continuing a narrative that is lacking in realistic engagement. NCW's failure to recognise violence against women perpetrated by security personnel and policemen is evidence to its ambiguous position pertaining to state-sponsored violence: NCW's mandate and function are increasingly influenced by state agenda and functions as an extension of the state's interests than as an empowered body with its own mandate and autonomy. The split between state apparatus and feminist organisations is a worrying factor in advancing women's rights in this regard.

⁸⁶ Al Jazeera, "New Law to End Sexual Harassment in Egypt," Egypt News | Al Jazeera, June 12, 2014, accessed April 28, 2019, <https://www.aljazeera.com/news/middleeast/2014/06/new-law-end-sexual-harassment-egypt-2014612101924323684.html>.

⁸⁷ Mariam Kirollos, "'The Daughters of Egypt Are a Red Line'," *Sur* 2413, no. 24 (December 10, 2016): 145, accessed April 28, 2019, <https://ssrn.com/abstract=3028752>.

Outcomes and responses

Although post-Arab spring politics cannot be viewed as a singular or linear set of events, given there were two political dispensations with two different core ideologies, the state of women's affairs in both these terms seems to indicate a lack of engagement with ground level realities. Apart from this, what is noticeable is a visible apathy from Morsi government for women's rights whereas El-Sisi's initial enthusiasm to engage with them did not originate from genuine concern for women's rights, but rather from the need to project a certain progressive image internationally. Such non-committal stance of both governments reflected in their respective constitutions, laws and overall attitude towards women's rights normalised and fostered retrogressive public and private attitudes towards women.

Political participation of women

Amidst the power-mongering between different political actors of the transitional period, women's rights were ignored and trampled upon by the powerful political actors at the time. SCAF's long-term and short-term goals were primarily to acquire the power position it coveted and the agenda showed complete negligence to the idea of an inclusive transitional period as is evident from its informal alliances and commitments. With the political reins now in hand, to exercise complete political control, SCAF chose to marginalise women's rights first by the constitutional declaration of March 2011 that removed the gender quota of 66/508 seats⁸⁸. Instead, Rule 38 of the Constitutional Declaration stipulates that "the law regulates the right of candidacy to the People's Assembly and Shura Council in accordance with any electoral system which may be determined that includes a minimum of participation of women in both houses". This rule was amended in September 2011 to abolish the gender quota system and political parties were required in their district candidate lists for 46 districts to nominate at least one woman. Apart from these, challenges like norms of male leadership in families and in public sphere, domestic roles of women, nature of their lives influenced by educational, institutional factors as well as economic conditions, norms of political parties and so on posed hurdles for women to contest in Egyptian elections.

⁸⁸ The Law 38 of 1972 regarding the Egyptian People's Assembly or Lower House was amended in June 2009 to reserve 64 seats for women in the parliament. In 2007, Article 36 of Egyptian constitution was amended to stipulate a minimum representation of women to People's Assembly, the Shura Council and local councils. In 1979, 30 out of 360 seats were reserved for women, but this was cancelled in 1986.

In the elections that followed immediately after the revolution, neither Islamic nor secular political parties offered any advanced positions to women, and the newly sworn-in parliament only had one woman representative. In the parliamentary elections in December 2011 and January 2012, Islamists secured majority of seats in parliament and sought to reinstate traditional gender roles. This political birth and electoral success were viewed with much suspicion and caution by the liberal parties who were united under the alliance “Positive movement” which won less than one-third of the total seats. Only eight women were elected which brought the women representation to 2 per cent in the lower house and 2.8 per cent in the upper house of the parliament. Later, two more women were appointed by SCAF making women representation 2.2 per cent in the 508-seat parliament. Besides, out of 26 ministers in the 2012 Ministerial Council, only three were women. As argued by Sika et al⁸⁹, the lack of gender quota system and the reluctance of the political parties to field women in important and competitive positions reflected in grave under-representation of women in parliament which was indicative of a dearth of feminist agenda during the regime transition.

Even after the promulgation of the progressive 2014 constitution which enshrined increased rights for women, there have been significant gaps between the constitutional commitment to gender rights and its implementation to challenge gender hierarchy in Egyptian society reflected in encroachments on civil liberties and return to authoritarian rule. However, affirmative action of election gender quota as stipulated by Article 14 of the 2014 constitution has been pivotal in increasing women’s representation in the parliament. Fifty-six seats in parliament in addition to half of presidential appointed seats (amounting to fourteen) were reserved for women, raising the total representation to 14.9 per cent. This is in the context that the Constituent Assembly did not adhere to a quota system for any other section of the society. In 2015 elections, gender quota was implemented using Law No. 46 which mandates party lists to include the stipulated number of women candidates.

⁸⁹ See Laila El Baradei and Dina Wafa, "Women in the Second Egyptian Parliament Post the Arab Spring: Do They Think They Stand a Chance?" *Journal of International Women's Studies* 14, no. 3 (July 2013):58, accessed April 18, 2019, <https://vc.bridgew.edu/jiws/vol14/iss3/4>; Nadine Sika and Yasmin Khodary, "One Step Forward, Two Steps Back? Egyptian Women within the Confines of Authoritarianism," *Journal of International Women's Studies* 13, no. 5 (October 2012):98, accessed January 18, 2019, <http://vc.bridgew.edu/jiws/vol13/iss5/9>.

Employment opportunities for women

In the general state of poverty, unemployment, economic crisis etc, ordinary women in Egypt carry out their daily struggles to meet ends. It is important to understand the process of solidarity-building among non-collective actors like ordinary women in the politically closed and technologically limited settings of rural Egypt. An effective method to demand an analytical innovation that rejects the “exceptionalism” narrative about West Asia, as well as ushers in a critical perspective and new analytical tools rooted in the local Arab context, would be examining the contentious politics and social non-movements as Bayat suggests⁹⁰. Against the backdrop of state’s intolerance for collective actors as well as any forms of organised and independent dissent, and the state’s focus on huge economic endeavours across the region has forced women to take matters into their own hands by conquering areas of employment, occupation, religiosity and the general public sphere, entry to which was denied previously. Such instances where resistance forms an important part of women’s lives is also the story of agency which circumvents binaries like “active/passive, individual/collective, or civil/political resistance”. Several rural women are breadwinners in their families after working as street vendors in the cities selling homegrown vegetables, cheese, eggs, and so on defying societal norms that women shouldn’t travel alone, or work so far from home. Women’s presence in sectors such as professional driving, entrepreneurship, athletics, weight lifting and so on are considered unconventional for women in Egypt. Defying norms also entail cultural shunning from the community, however, braving in the face of such difficulties have been motivated by factors such as dire unemployment issues and poverty which resulted in many women to be self-employed.

In an interview via Skype with Noha Mohamed, a journalist at Egypt Today, she says that women enter the workforce more and more each year, engaging in sectors that are pertinent to women affairs like cosmetics or naturally made products. They cannot afford to choose a profession which further relinquishes them from their private sphere. For, their work life and private sphere are fused together “so that the vocation very well fits into their daily lifestyle without having to abandon their roles as mothers, wives or daughters in the families”. Mohamed says that most women entrepreneurs come from affluent families since they are helped out through financial back ups or through networking. But those from the middle class

⁹⁰Asef Bayat, *Life as Politics: How Ordinary People Change the Middle East* (Stanford, CA: Stanford University Press, 2013), 49.

are majorly men and the few women who run their own business try to practise the delicate balance between the personal professional lives.

Women are generally missing from high profile positions, jobs and discussions that particularly concern women's rights⁹¹. Mai Shams, a journalist with Reuters based in Egypt, comments that the problem is not lack of visibility, because women are visible, but the issue is lack of influence. Women lack access to powerful decision-making jobs which could cater to all sections of the society by integrating feminist agenda into the policies. However, constitutional enshrinement of right to equality of opportunity has resulted in increased representation of women in higher positions in Egypt from 2015 onwards. In June 2015, twenty-six new female judges were sworn into office as a result of implementing the non-discrimination provision in the 2014 constitution raising the total number of female judges in a country where it is condemned for women to be judges to eighty⁹². In 2014, a female lawyer challenged the rejection of her application to the position of State Council judge as a violation of her constitutional right of equal opportunity⁹³. Besides, 16 female judges were promoted to higher judiciary positions in August 2018. Egyptian government currently has eight women cabinet ministers in the ministries of Social Solidarity, Tourism, Health, Environment, Culture, Immigration and Expatriate Affairs, Planning, and Investment and International Cooperation. Two female governors were appointed in Beheira and Damietta provinces in 2017 and 2018 respectively.

The increased visibility of women in social and political spheres where they were not conventionally found is a welcome change in Egypt. Although these changes may have been initiated because of top-down approaches, the general attitude towards employed women, especially women who work away from home, has to change at a cultural and societal level. Increased presence of women in the public sphere has encouraged more women to join the labour force and run for political offices as well as several private sector positions where there are more chances of equal opportunity than in public sector⁹⁴.

⁹¹ Erin Fracolli, "Women and Quotas in Egypt's Parliament," TIMEP, May 2017, accessed March 28, 2019, <https://timep.org/commentary/analysis/women-and-quotas-in-egypts-parliament/>.

⁹² Al-Masry Al-Youm, "26 New Female Judges Take Oath," Egypt Independent, June 16, 2015, accessed April 15, 2019, <https://www.egyptindependent.com/26-new-female-judges-take-oath/>.

⁹³ Farah Tawfeek, "Appointing Women State Council Judges 'a Matter of Time': State Council Pres.," Egypt Independent, October 09, 2018, accessed April 28, 2019, <https://www.egyptindependent.com/appointing-women-state-council-judges-a-matter-of-time-state-council-pres/>.

⁹⁴ Mai Shams, Skype interview with the researcher, 17 March 2019

Violence against women

Domestic violence, verbal abuse, sexual assault, psychological torture, wife beating and so on are normalised in Egyptian society and reflects the existing gender hierarchical treatment in general. According to a UN survey report from April 2013⁹⁵, 99.3 per cent of women in Egypt are subjected to sexual violence. The first shocking account of violence against women in post-Arab Spring Egypt was that of women being beaten up and picked up for virginity tests by the soldiers, and subjected to sexual assault at Tahrir Square⁹⁶. The brutal rape of South African journalist and CBS News correspondent Lara Logan by a mob on the night of Mubarak's resignation sent the message that it is important to engage feminist agenda with the transitional political realm if women's rights are to be achieved⁹⁷. Less than a month later, on International Women's Day, the marchers were surrounded by men with slogans such as "the people want to bring down women", resonating with the January 25 slogan "the people want to bring down the regime"⁹⁸. On the second anniversary of the revolution, nineteen women were sexually assaulted in Tahrir Square⁹⁹.

The attitude within the elected Islamist-dominated parliament in 2012 was problematic such that they blamed intermingling of men and women as the prime cause of sexual violence¹⁰⁰. Victim blaming and shaming is normalised because it is normalised for the representatives in the parliament to find fault lines with the women who want to publicly protest and participate rather than condemning those who perpetrate violence. Omnia Al Desoukie, an international journalist based in the Middle East, comments¹⁰¹ that the attitude of the government regarding women's rights is accurate from the statements of the cabinet ministers

⁹⁵Bouthaina El Deeb, *Study on Ways and Methods to Eliminate Sexual Harassment in Egypt*, report, accessed March 28, 2019, https://dgvn.de/fileadmin/user_upload/DOKUMENTE/English_Documents/Sexual-Harassment-Study-Egypt-Final-EN.pdf.

⁹⁶"'Virginity Tests' for Egyptian Women Protesters," Amnesty International USA, March 23, 2011, accessed March 28, 2019, <https://www.amnestyusa.org/virginity-tests-for-egyptian-women-protesters/>.

⁹⁷Glynnis MacNicol, "Lara Logan Describes Horrific Sexual Assault In Egypt: 'You Cannot Imagine What They Did To Me'," Business Insider, May 02, 2011, accessed April 28, 2019, <https://www.businessinsider.com/lara-logan-rape-egypt-60-minutes-interview-video-2011-5?IR=T>.

⁹⁸Caroline Davies, "Tahrir Square Women's March Marred by Rival Protest," The Guardian, March 08, 2011, accessed April 28, 2019, <https://www.theguardian.com/world/2011/mar/08/rival-protesters-clash-women-tahrir>.

⁹⁹"Egypt: 'Women Face Rape and Even Death When They Participate in Public Gatherings'," Amnesty International, November 2013, accessed April 28, 2019, <https://www.amnesty.org/en/latest/campaigns/2013/11/egypt-women-face-rape-and-even-death-when-they-participate-in-public-gatherings/>.

¹⁰⁰"Shura Council Members Blame Women for Harassment," Coptic Solidarity, February 2013, accessed March 28, 2019, <https://www.copticsolidarity.org/2013/02/13/shura-council-members-blame-women-for-harassment/>.

¹⁰¹Omnia Al Desoukie, Skype interview with the researcher, 13 March, 2019

who would rather normalise violence and exclude women from public participation. Although women's rights organisations protested the nonsensical view of the law makers, they lacked the political will to bring about any substantial change¹⁰².

In July 2013, while covering the protests to bring down Morsi, a Dutch journalist was raped at the Square¹⁰³. On 4th June 2014, on the occasion of Abdel Fattah El-Sisi's inauguration as president, a teenage girl was raped, the video of which was distributed on social media¹⁰⁴. The competence of anti-sexual harassment law was questioned when cases of mob sexual harassment were reported from Tahrir Square on the celebratory occasion of El-Sisi's election inauguration. The sudden arrests and sentencing of the arrested men are considered by some activists as the politics of human rights rather than politics for human rights¹⁰⁵. The fact that El-Sisi was utilising the event to score political points is evident from his initial response to the assault allegations that it could be the propaganda of human rights activists.

The legislations and policies of the Egyptian government to combat sexual violence are highly ineffective particularly reflecting the regime's lacklustre attitude towards the issue. In an experiment conducted by the progressive media outlet, Egyptian Streets found that 95 per cent of the calls that reach the hotline is being ignored or not attended to¹⁰⁶. The inefficiency of state apparatus to combat sexual harassment cases has led several NGOs and voluntary groups to start initiatives with similar motives, but with more grassroots level activities and fieldwork¹⁰⁷. Several public educational institutions like Cairo University created anti-sexual harassment units to address the issue effectively¹⁰⁸. NGOs, volunteer groups and civil society organisations in Egypt acted as filler of the vacuum produced by lack of action from the

¹⁰² Leslie Garvey, "Egyptian Government Deals With Sexual Attacks on Female Protesters by Blaming the Victims - FPIF," Foreign Policy In Focus, February 21, 2013, accessed April 30, 2019, https://fpif.org/egyptian_government_deals_with_sexual_attacks_on_female_protesters_by_blaming_the_victims/.

¹⁰³ Seth Abramovitch, "Dutch Journalist Sexually Assaulted by Protesters in Tahrir Square," The Hollywood Reporter, July 02, 2013, accessed April 30, 2019, <https://www.hollywoodreporter.com/news/dutch-journalist-sexually-assaulted-by-578661>.

¹⁰⁴ "Egypt's Al-Sissi Apologizes to Victim of Sexual Assault," Haaretz.com, June 10, 2014, accessed April 30, 2019, <https://www.haaretz.com/al-sissi-apologizes-to-sexual-assault-victim-1.5251494>.

¹⁰⁵ Mariam Kirolos, "Sexual Violence in Egypt: Myths and Realities," *Jadaliyya*, July 2013, 146, accessed March 23, 2019, http://www.jadaliyya.com/pages/index/13007/sexual-violence-in-egypt_myths-and-realities-.

¹⁰⁶ "Egypt Harassment Hotline Ignores 95% of Calls," Middle East Monitor, November 29, 2018, accessed March 14, 2019, <https://www.middleeastmonitor.com/20181129-egypt-harassment-hotline-ignores-95-of-calls>.

¹⁰⁷ Angie Abdelmonem and Susana Galán, "Action-Oriented Responses to Sexual Harassment in Egypt," *Journal of Middle East Womens Studies* 13, no. 1 (March 20, 2017): 159, doi:10.1215/15525864-3728767.

¹⁰⁸ Fatma Khaled, "Cairo University's Anti-Sexual Harassment Unit Dabble in Arts and Sports," Mada Masr, March 2017, accessed March 18, 2019, <https://madamasr.com/en/2017/03/15/feature/society/cairo-universitys-anti-sexual-harassment-unit-dabble-in-arts-and-sports/>.

government in order to defend the victims and assist them in legal redress and rehabilitation. CEWLA, Harassmap and AntiOpSH are organisations that systematically recorded instances of sexual violence during protests in Tahrir Square. *I Saw Harassment*¹⁰⁹ and *Dignity Without Borders*¹¹⁰ were volunteer-based initiatives which also recorded and addressed sexual assault incidents in public spaces in Egypt¹¹¹. HarassMap¹¹² formed in 2010 is an initiative aimed at addressing sexual harassment cases effectively and take measures to create a harassment-free environment. Operation Anti Sexual Harassment (OpAntiSH) is another initiative whose main mission is to “save victims exposed to such incidents and also make the experience less severe by observing the Square and [physically] intervening in case of the formation of such mob assaults”¹¹³. Tahrir Bodyguards, El-Nadeem Center for Rehabilitation of Victims of Violence and Torture, Nazra, and Egyptian Initiative for Personal Rights (EIPR) are initiatives aimed at protecting women protestors in public spaces following the widespread sexual violence after the fall of Mubarak regime¹¹⁴.

Feminist NGO Nazra for Feminist Studies and sexual assault intervention groups such as OpAntiSH and Tahrir Bodyguard recorded 186 sexual assault cases and rapes in the vicinity of Tahrir Square between 28 June and 7 July 2013, during the protests to bring down Morsi¹¹⁵. After the new law was enacted in 2014, Harassmap launched an impressive campaign *Al-Mutaharish Mugrem* (the harasser is a criminal), which circulates videos and posters to motivate people to take action in sexual assault cases¹¹⁶. Although there are several legal clauses that promote women’s rights in Egypt than perhaps ever in its history, the ground reality is absolutely abysmal. Gendered-violence has been used as a state tactic against the agency of

¹⁰⁹ "I Saw Harassment," Cairo Urban Initiatives Platform, , accessed March 10, 2019, <https://www.cuipcairo.org/en/directory/i-saw-harassment>.

¹¹⁰ ""Dignity without Borders", " Egyptian Streets, accessed March 12, 2019, <https://egyptianstreets.com/tag/dignity-without-borders/>.

¹¹¹ Unreported World, "The Fight against Sexual Harassment in Egypt | Unreported World," YouTube, February 24, 2019, accessed March 21, 2019, <https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=RfNQalkT3Uc>.

¹¹² Cairo University honoured HarassMap with an award in 2017 for its excellent work towards preventing sexual harassment.

¹¹³ "Op Anti-Sexual Harassment/Assault الجماعي الإعتداء الجنسي التحرش/الإعتداء الجنسي," Facebook, accessed May 30, 2019, <https://www.facebook.com/opantish/>.

¹¹⁴ Bel Trew, "Egypt's Sexual Assault Epidemic," Egypt | Al Jazeera, August 14, 2013, accessed March 09, 2019, <https://www.aljazeera.com/indepth/features/2013/08/201381494941573782.html>.

¹¹⁵ Yasmin El-Rifae, "What the Egyptian Revolution Can Offer #MeToo," The Nation, January 24, 2018, accessed May 6, 2019, <https://www.thenation.com/article/what-the-egyptian-revolution-can-offer-metoo/>

¹¹⁶ Mariam Kirolos, "The Daughters of Egypt Are a Red Line", *Sur* 2413, no. 24 (December 10, 2016): 147, accessed April 15, 2019, <https://ssrn.com/abstract=3028752>.

women in protest sites, making women's bodies battlegrounds and fields of contestation¹¹⁷. This could be read in line with El-Sisi's warning that criticism on the national security forces could be treated as high treason as evidence to the power held and its abuse by the army. Violence against women protestors of Tahrir square mirrors the abusive treatment of women in streets and homes, and this must be viewed as contingent with how their bodies are treated as objects of state-violence. *I Saw Harassment* initiative reports that in the first hundred days of El-Sisi's rule there was an increase in the cases of sexual harassment in Egypt¹¹⁸. However, El-Sisi have been persecuting women activists, human rights groups and those who speak up and threaten the government's claim of "Egypt being safe for women" have been under constant criticism, many of their activities and research were targeted and forcefully shut down. One such incident reports that in 2016, a woman named Zubeida was arrested, detained and physically tortured, alleging that she has connections with banned groups. She was later admitted to a mental health hospital by her family to recover from the trauma underwent in the police custody¹¹⁹.

Female genital mutilation (FGM) remains a widespread practice in Egypt even after it was banned in 2008. According to the 2015 Demographics and Health Survey in Egypt¹²⁰, 93.1 per cent of ever-married between the ages 15-49 undergo FGM. Although this is down from 92 per cent and 95.2 per cent in 2014 and 2013 respectively, Egypt still remained one of the top countries in world in which FGM is widely practised. To juxtapose this reality with an already existing legal framework that banned the practice since 2008 shows how dysfunctional and bifurcated law and practice in today's Egypt is, particularly because after the anti-FGM laws were instituted, regimes were interested only in cosmetic changes and lacked the political will to eliminate the root cause of the problems¹²¹. In 2015, Raslan Fadl was convicted in the case of killing a 13-year-old girl he had performed FGM on. In 2016, the Egyptian parliament criminalised FGM by amending Article 242 of the Penal Code which only treated FGM as a

¹¹⁷ Lucia Sorbera, "Body Politics and Legitimacy: Towards a Feminist Epistemology of the Egyptian Revolution," *Contending Legitimacy in World Politics*, June 19, 2016, accessed April 21, 2019, 14, doi:10.4324/9781315174426-16.

¹¹⁸ "Egypt: Take Concrete Action to Stop Sexual Harassment, Assault," Human Rights Watch, June 13, 2014, , accessed May 28, 2019, <https://www.hrw.org/news/2014/06/13/egypt-take-concrete-action-stop-sexual-harassment-assault>.

¹¹⁹ "Zubeida", A New Story Tells The Tragedy of Human Rights in Egypt," Middle East Observer, February 28, 2018, , accessed April 10, 2019, <https://www.middleeastobserver.org/2018/02/28/zubeida-a-new-story-tells-the-tragedy-of-human-rights-in-egypt/>.

¹²⁰ *Egypt: Health Issues Survey 2015*, publication (Rockville: DHS Program, 2015), 104, accessed May 23, 2019, <https://dhsprogram.com/pubs/pdf/FR313/FR313.pdf>.

¹²¹ Nancy Okail, "De-orientalizing Sexual Violence and Gender Discrimination in Egypt," *Global Discourse* 7, no. 2-3 (January 18, 2017): 2, accessed April 26, 2019, doi:10.1080/23269995.2016.1253288.

misdeemeanour punishable by two months to two years in prison. The amended article punishes the offender by five to seven years in prison and accomplices by one to three years¹²². It also has provisions to punish the offender by fifteen years in prison if the act leads to the victim's death. However, according to activists, Egyptians consider FGM an integral part of their culture more than a part of their religion and more often than not bow down to the societal pressure to conform to the evil practice leaving their girls traumatised with physical and psychological pain. Hence, eradicating FGM from Egyptian society needs much more than punishments and legal protection whose enforcement itself stays flawed on top of persecuting those who speak up against the practice.

Child marriage rates in Egypt is quite high despite laws prohibiting it. According to UNICEF, Egypt has the 13th highest rate of child marriage in the world¹²³, and Demographics and Health survey shows that 13 per cent of women are married between ages 15 and 19 in Egypt. Omnia Al Desoukie who worked extensively on this topic says that poverty, economic indicators, safety of children and culture are general motivators to marry girls early in Egypt¹²⁴. Examining the geographical concentration of this trend to the social indicators make it clear that poverty is a decisive factor in early marriage¹²⁵. This has implications on the health of young girls and women, about 10 per cent of whom bear children before they are 19 years of age¹²⁶. The numbers also coincide with lack of education beyond primary levels, and rural areas, and increasing cost of living generally in Egypt compounded by inflation, refugee crisis and unemployment¹²⁷. The larger picture here is that despite laws and punishments introduced that advance women's rights in the country, it is important to search for the root cause of cultural and social practices like child marriage and FGM in order to effect complete eradication.

Domestic violence is a common practice in Egypt and wife beating is accepted in many Egyptian households if the wife refuses to have sex, argues, goes out without telling, neglects

¹²² George Sadek, "Global Legal Monitor," Egypt: New Law Enhancing the Penalties for FGM Approved by Parliament | Global Legal Monitor, September 14, 2016, accessed May 23, 2019, <https://www.loc.gov/law/foreign-news/article/egypt-new-law-enhancing-the-penalties-for-fgm-approved-by-parliament/>.

¹²³ *Egypt: Health Issues Survey 2014*, report (Rockville: DHS Program, 2015), accessed May 16, 2019, <https://dhsprogram.com/pubs/pdf/fr302/fr302.pdf>.

¹²⁴ Skype interview with the researcher, March 13, 2019

¹²⁵ Omnia Al Desoukie, "Child Marriage and Pregnancy in Egypt," Women's Media Center, August 2018, accessed May 28, 2019, <http://www.womensmediacenter.com/fbomb/child-marriage-and-pregnancy-in-egypt>.

¹²⁶ *Egypt: Health Issues Survey 2014*, report (Rockville: DHS Program, 2015), , accessed May 16, 2019, <https://dhsprogram.com/pubs/pdf/fr302/fr302.pdf>.

¹²⁷ Omnia Al Desoukie, Skype interview with the researcher, March 19, 2019

the children or burns the food. 30 per cent of married women between the ages 15 and 49 reports they have been physically/sexually/psychologically/verbally abused by their intimate partners: 25 per cent subjected physical violence, 19 per cent to emotional abuse and 4 per cent to sexual violence¹²⁸, sometimes ending up with serious injuries physically and mentally. One-third of women were physically harmed during pregnancy¹²⁹.

It is questionable as to whether top-down approaches to social change would have any significant effect on the public perception of the society. According to Al Desoukie, ‘there are two components that are totally unrelated in Egypt: governance and the society’¹³⁰. So, for example, there are laws that strictly prohibit child marriage, but the society does not follow these laws, especially in rural parts of Egypt where cultural and traditional practices taking precedence. She also adds that such places do not exist in the government’s radar, until the next elections. Amending articles and passing laws without adopting a holistic approach and philosophy to women’s rights is counter-productive. Although it must be acknowledged that more and more discussions on taboo topics like sexual assault, marital rape, female genital mutilation etc are a significant gesture and action of change in the right direction, there are instances where those who speak out against it is also being persecuted. The list of the persecuted extends to human rights defenders, anti-sexual harassment activists, anti-child marriage activists, and feminist scholars because they as well as rights groups and organizations also problematise cases committed by police personnel being brushed under the rug. They are also concerned about the conservative mindset of law enforcers who harass the survivors forcing them to produce detailed accounts of the incident or look down upon them and discourage them from filing cases.

Krook¹³¹ gives three possible explanations as to why top-down approaches are initiated towards women empowerment: One, quotas are supported by international norms and spread through transnational sharing; Two, political elites adopt quotas for strategic reasons; and three, women mobilise for quotas to increase women’s representation. All three reasons have contributed to the advancing of women’s rights in Egypt at different points in history: international norms and pressure have sustained reforms in women’s rights to some extent in

¹²⁸ *Egypt: Health Issues Survey 2014*, report (Rockville: DHS Program, 2015), 229, accessed May 16, 2019, <https://dhsprogram.com/pubs/pdf/fr302/fr302.pdf>.

¹²⁹ (ibid)

¹³⁰ Skype interview with the researcher, March 17, 2019

¹³¹ Mona Lena Krook, "Electoral Gender Quotas," *Comparative Political Studies* 47, no. 9 (July 19, 2013): 1275-1277, accessed May 15, 2019, doi:10.1177/0010414013495359.

Egypt which continues even today. Western media and aid are too important for Egypt to compromise. Ever since gender quotas have been introduced, there has been manipulation of the system to field female candidates as proxies for male family members and representing political parties¹³². As for the third reason, throughout the history of Egypt, lobbying efforts of women's rights organisations have emerged into laws and reforms favourable for women's rights aided by transnational networks of human rights defenders. However, the recent crackdown on civil society organisations and feminist associations under El-Sisi and his disregard for women's rights demand signal at the impending danger of the state of women's affairs in Egypt.

Crackdown on dissent and civil society organisations

Using Maxine Molyneux's categorisation of prototypes of women's movements, Egyptian women's movement, given its socio-political and cultural background, is found to not fit into any category, for they are neither completely autonomous, nor officially linked with fellow organizations, nor overseen by a supervising entity. Although feminist organisations exhibit elements of second and third categories, the space to manoeuvre even within associational and directed atmosphere is infinitesimally small with restrictive NGO laws, no freedom of speech and state surveillance. Egyptian women's movement and civil society groups include gender initiatives within NGOs, independent groups and organizations, women's committees within political parties, and women's groups. They transverse the boundaries of Molyneux typology because the repressive treatment is such that they are not given enough time and space to fully develop into organized civil society groups and organizations.

The trend of presenting and promoting women's rights as what the regime perceived by preserving traditional gender roles continued until 2011 under different autocrats. Such projections failed to engage with the intersectional inequalities and plurality of women's affairs. It also failed to bring plausible solutions to violence against women as their priority was not problem-solving but to maintain the image of the regime by denying such accusations. State feminism was succeeded by NGO feminism as early as the 1990s with the growing

¹³² Erin Fracoli, "Women and Quotas in Egypt's Parliament," TIMEP, May 2017, , accessed March 28, 2019, <https://timep.org/commentary/analysis/women-and-quotas-in-egypts-parliament/>; Mariz Tadros, "To Politically Empower Women on a Global Scale We Need More than Quotas | Mariz Tadros," The Guardian, March 08, 2012, accessed May 21, 2019, <https://www.theguardian.com/global-development/poverty-matters/2012/mar/08/political-empower-women-egypt>.

legitimacy as well as outreach of women's civil society organizations. They actively championed and lobbied for women's rights at a time when the regime perceived gender as a decorative rather than a functional tool¹³³. The suppression of NGOs started when they posed the threat of mobilising against the regime. For instance, feminist NGOs like Harassmap and OpAnti-SH published statistics of sexual harassment and other forms of violence against women which threatens the international image of women's improving rights in Egypt. The earlier tactics of covering up the figures or denying the data don't prevent the data reaching millions online with the surge of new media and international women's rights networking groups, and this leads to governmental surveillance, persecution of threatening organisations and increased repressive measures.

The implementation of 2014 law of NGOs, which stipulated all organizations, research centres and institutions to register with the Ministry of Social Affairs and gain their approval to function, was a pivotal shift from other laws that governed NGOs tightening the grip around those groups that the state deemed threatening.¹³⁴ The requirements to get the approval from the Ministry was such that many organisations had to modify their statuses or else suffer from their funds and resources getting frozen. Organizations like Nazra are under attack today by state classification of their foreign funding and resources as a threat to the national security and conflict of national interest¹³⁵. In 2013, a new law was passed banning public protests to crackdown any political dissent¹³⁶. According to this new law, prior approval and permission is required before organising protests or demonstrations and stipulates that marches or rallies with more than ten people were allowed only for non-political purposes, thus legalising the use of violence against peaceful protests and demonstrations and punishments by fine for more than 70,000 Egyptians Pounds. It also gives security forces unlimited authority to disperse protest gatherings and to use rubber pellets and tear gas proportionate to the threat. The law which largely undermines the democratic right to assembly also sanctions use of lethal force by security personnel on crowds of protestors.

¹³³ Maha El Said, Lena Meari, and Nicola Pratt, *Rethinking Gender in Revolutions and Resistance: Lessons from the Arab World* (London: Zed Books, Limited, 2015), 36

¹³⁴ Farah Najjar, "Why Is Egypt's New NGO Law Controversial?" Middle East | Al Jazeera, May 2017, accessed June 29, 2019, <https://www.aljazeera.com/indepth/features/2017/05/egypt-ngo-law-controversial-170530142008179.html>.

¹³⁵ "In Solidarity with Egyptian Human Rights Defender Mozn Hassan," Global Fund for Women, October 23, 2018, , accessed April 29, 2019, <https://www.globalfundforwomen.org/mozn-hassan-stop-repression-human-rights-defenders-egypt/>.

¹³⁶ "Egypt: Deeply Restrictive New Assembly Law," Human Rights Watch, November 26, 2013, accessed March 11, 2019, <https://www.hrw.org/news/2013/11/26/egypt-deeply-restrictive-new-assembly-law>.

Feminist movement in Egypt at the time of Mubarak had been concerned with rights in the public sphere which more or less advanced through a state feminist fashion, sanctioned by Suzanne Mubarak, the wife of Hosni Mubarak. However, things changed radically post-Arab Spring with the emergence of young feminist activists to the movement calling for their rights and reforms in the law at a more visible level. Unfortunately, the stronger the resilience of the movement, the tougher repressive measures from the government have been. Direct state violence unleashed against women activists in public sphere is testament of state's commitment to demolish independent women's activism. It has also stopped taking an active interest in reforming laws that concern women's rights, the last one being the criminalisation of sexual harassment, that too without proper redress mechanisms. The general apathy shows government's lack of interest to empower women on a progressive agenda. Mai Shams, a journalist with Egypt Today comments¹³⁷ that the current regime's vision of women is limited to their domestic roles inside homes like mothers of the martyrs, mothers of the children of the future etc,' rather than considering them active political participants and citizens contributing to the socio-political dynamics of the country.

Today's feminism in Egypt still wages war on the issues of political representation, non-discrimination and confrontation against all forms of violence, demanding what youth and women stood for during the revolution: justice, dignity and freedom¹³⁸. And unless the integration of all sectors of the society is initiated, a permanent and effective solution to gender inequality would not be credible. The feminist struggle and movement in Egypt stand in sharp contrast to the idea that women's rights need not be given priority over socio-political agendas since establishing a democracy necessarily gives women their rights as well. Feminists have been asked by national leaders to postpone their focus to "more important" national concerns instead of social justice, for gender-specific objectives get pushed to the margins of revolutionary ideologies¹³⁹. Witnessing betrayal and denial of their rights over and over again, one regime after another, one revolution after another, calls for a tedious yet inevitable effort to keep the movement alive and vibrant rather than giving up. Feminist movement is political such that it acknowledges the imbalance in gender relations and power structures as well as its overlapping with other kinds of oppression. The priority it gives for women's affairs- to

¹³⁷ Whatsapp interview with the researcher, March 17, 2019.

¹³⁸ Hala Kamal, "Inserting Women's Rights in the Egyptian Constitution: Personal Reflections," *Journal for Cultural Research* 19, no. 2 (2015): 159, accessed April 28, 2019, doi:10.1080/14797585.2014.982919.

¹³⁹ Selma Botman, *Engendering Citizenship in Egypt: The History and Society of Modern Middle East* (New York: Columbia University Press, 1999), 9.

empower women and improve their lives- is a result of the aforementioned stories of betrayal and disappointment in mainstream movements which utilises the woman's struggle only to forget their demands later on.

The complete or selective erasure of women's struggle and feminist movements is a patriarchal political strategy to exclude them from the collective memory. Women are more often than not projected in history as a symbol rather than rational political actors¹⁴⁰, and this is achieved through emphasising on their traditional gender roles using familial and domestic concepts.¹⁴¹ Because these feminine characteristics are not expected to disturb the patriarchal structure or challenge existing gender dynamics. Another noticeable pattern in the history of women's rights in Egypt is the removal of the discourse of women's rights away from the grassroots and bring it toward the gender in power. Such efforts mustn't be taken for granted as the state's commitment to promoting gender rights, but rather as an attempt to exercise increased surveillance and control. Projection of women as the markers and symbols of culture and bearers of cultural identity of the national is contrasted with women's portrayal as the victims of the nation's underdevelopment which usually forms the justification for introducing reforms in the public sector while emphasising on the female's role in the private sector.¹⁴² Intertwining nationalism and cultural identity is a patriarchal strategy to eliminate individuality and diversity of women's voices in Egypt. Egypt's nationalist history is in open confrontation with the history of women's movement at many times including the 1952 Free Officers' revolution, or the 1919 revolution. Those rights masqueraded as women's liberation are actually a promotion of gender-specific roles within the framework of cultural nationalism. The construction of images of male and female citizens is contingent upon the gendered relations as reflected in the state structure¹⁴³, which is why instead of promoting meaningful economic and political rights of the woman, Egyptian state has always been committed to granting women maternalist citizenship rights.

Interestingly, as far as the feminist movement is concerned, the differences between secular and Islamic feminism have increasingly blurred against the background of state

¹⁴⁰ Beth Baron, *Egypt as a Woman: Nationalism, Gender and Politics* (California: University of California Press, 2007), 117

¹⁴¹ Nermin Allam, *Women and the Egyptian Revolution: Engagement and Activism during the 2011 Arab Uprisings* (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2017), 45

¹⁴² Maha El Said, Lena Meari, and Nicola Pratt, *Rethinking Gender in Revolutions and Resistance: Lessons from the Arab World* (London: Zed Books, Limited, 2015), 38

¹⁴³ Nermin Allam, *Women and the Egyptian Revolution: Engagement and Activism during the 2011 Arab Uprisings* (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2017), 40

repression. Both strands of feminist thought are considered threatening by the state in Egypt today, as both their organisations are being targetted by state indiscriminately. Mai Shams comments that there are no visible differences between the two movements because both take progressive stands when it comes to religious rights and political rights influencing and supporting each other¹⁴⁴. Collaborations between scholars and independent organisations of the two strands have added tremendously to the knowledge production. However, views that are progressive are always condemned by the society as well as the regime in Egypt. One of the avenues where both movements collude is the equal inheritance campaign which hasn't become a matter of discussion yet in Egypt. However, the waves of protest and campaigns in neighbouring Tunisia has initiated discussion in the feminist intellectual circles in Egypt which is considered heresy by the regime.

Concluding Remarks

In contemporary Egypt the isolation and non-cooperation and lack of discussion among three critical components in social welfare such as the regime, religious authorities and feminist organisations is a serious issue that challenges the advancement of women's rights in Egypt. If Mubarak period is characterised by co-optation of women's rights and minimal space for independent women's movement, El-Sisi's period is distinguished by institutionalisation of state surveillance. The trajectory of women's rights after the Arab spring is not linear: Islamist parliament that was elected reversed women's rights gains of the previous regime, while El-Sisi followed his predecessor Mubarak to bring back these curtailed rights but with lesser autonomy for feminist organisations. The hope and enthusiasm of feminist activists after the fall of Mubarak in 2011 was replaced by resilience and perseverance to fight the retrogressive laws and repressive measures of Morsi and El-Sisi government respectively. El-Sisi's election was a defining moment for Egyptian feminist movement because it united Islamic and secular feminist movements together to protest the repressive measures of the regime.

¹⁴⁴ Whatsapp Interview with the researcher, March 17, 2019

Chapter IV

State of Feminist Organisations in Post-Arab Spring Egypt: Analysis of Two Case Studies

Civil society organizations play an important role in perpetuating democratic values in a country, through its advocacy and awareness programmes, creation of dissent, and lobbying efforts, all of which contribute to the legitimacy of the state as well as keeping the state's authority in check. The degree of freedom that these organizations could afford has come to depend upon the political climate in the state through the years. As a part of the larger effort to suppress dissent, the current regime in Egypt targets human rights defenders and organisations, which have increasing implications on women's rights activities of these NGOs as well as feminist NGOs. Given this context of crackdown on civil society organisations, this chapter deals with the broad study of the state of civil society organisations in Egypt today. First, the general nature and background of civil society organisations in Egypt are examined, followed by an examination of crackdown and its implications under El-Sisi. The second section of the chapter examines the cases of two feminist NGOs: Nazra for Feminist Studies, a secular feminist research-oriented NGO and Center for Egyptian Women's Legal Assistance (CEWLA) Foundation, a legal support-based Islamic NGO followed by an analysis of their state of affairs against the context of increased state repression on feminist organisations in Egypt.

Contemporary feminist organisations in Egypt deal with a variety of issues pertaining to women's rights, welfare, political participation, healthcare, work, education, sexual and reproductive rights, legal awareness, alleviation of poverty etc. Their project to raise feminist consciousness is linked to several grassroots level developmental projects that aim at increasing access of women to public goods like quality education and health services, enhancing financial independence of women by assisting them through credit and loan programmes to start business, and providing legal awareness through workshops, as well as research-oriented programmes that seek to eradicate cultural practices and amend patriarchal laws that are detriment to women's rights¹. It is common in the history of Egyptian women's movement for independent researchers, or activists who are affiliated with different groups or organizations to form ad hoc committees or groups which come together on specific issues for a brief period

¹ Nadjé Al-Ali, *Secularism, Gender and the State in the Middle East: The Egyptian Women's Movement*. (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2000), 11

and get dissolved eventually². There are also organizations with diverse political orientations, human rights centres, and professional organizations. The activities of Egyptian CSOs are also largely tied with knowledge production through academic and intellectual exercises engaged with publishing books, magazines, reports and journals.

Professionalism, careerism, open rivalry and competition for resources and ideological fissures, besides state co-optation, prevented autonomous feminist organisations from realising its full potential prior to 2011³. However, the post-Arab spring Egypt presented feminist NGOs with a different set of challenges. Although state's attitude toward CSOs has been confrontational in the past, post-Arab spring period has become the most repressive environment for feminist organisations in Egypt in decades. The primary motivation for exercising this level of control on the part of the state is to ensure that civil mobilisation does not threaten the ruling regime⁴. However, the natural succession from state co-optation of feminist movement in pre-Mubarak period to absolute antipathy towards women's rights post-Arab spring must be understood against contemporary political context of expanding authoritarianism.

From the history of interaction and confrontation between the state and feminist organizations, there are certain patterns the state exhibits in order to suppress their activities and make their existence redundant. Egyptian security forces employ different methods and tactics to contain the influence and growth of civic space through a slew of laws and restrictions: criminalising public forms of dissent such as protests and demonstrations under the guise of counterterrorism strategies and national security reasons; tightening security by legalizing extrajudicial repressive measures through legal reform and decrees; and targeted attacks on human rights and feminist organizations, activists and so on⁵. One of the arguments reignited by successive regimes to patronise and misrepresent feminist agenda is the cultural-nationalist questioning the indigeneity of the objectives of feminist organisations, especially those receiving funds from foreign donors, thereby casting suspicion on the authenticity of

²Nadje Al-Ali, "The Women's Movement In Egypt, With Selected References To Turkey," *UNRISD* (April 2002):12-18.

³Nadje Al-Ali, *Secularism, Gender and the State in the Middle East: The Egyptian Women's Movement*. (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2000), 81

⁴Michelle Nicholasen, "Sociologist Recalls Academic Crackdown In Cairo". *The Harvard Gazette*. April 19, 2019, accessed May 24, 2019, <https://news.harvard.edu/gazette/story/2019/04/sociologist-recalls-academic-crackdown-in-cairo/>

⁵ Amy Austin Holmes, "Tightening The Noose On Egypt'S Civil Society," *Carnegie Endowment For International Peace*, June 1, 2017, accessed May 14, 2019, <https://carnegieendowment.org/sada/70146>.

women's movement in Egypt at large⁶. This line of argument coupled with the supposed threat to national security, unity, public morality and order usually made the case for security agencies' harassment⁷ of feminist organisations which was legally justified and ranged from bureaucratic delaying of registration process and applications for funding to dissolution of organisations⁸. Many feminist NGOs filled the gap after state's retraction from welfare activities⁹, special developmental groups, business associations, charitable groups and welfare projects invested in healthcare and education had some reprieve from such harassments whereas organisations concerned with politically sensitive issues were regularly harassed.

The enthusiasm and higher levels of involvement of civil society organizations in the Arab Spring fostered the hope that post-Arab Spring period would be characterised by proliferation of independent organizations without the fear of governmental repression. And, indeed, democracy promotion ramped up international donors and necessitated the involvement of NGOs to focus on issues such as voter registration campaigns and parliamentary training programs¹⁰. They also served as political chroniclers by pointing out regime's pitfalls and filling gaps created by state structures. However, post-Arab Spring period witnessed massive changes to repressive strategy in which confrontation between the state and the CSOs has transformed into open hostility and outright repression. The immediate shift in the attitude of Supreme Council of the Armed Forces (SCAF) owes to the threatening

⁶ Authenticity versus indigenization debate prominently figured whenever women's organisations emphasised on the necessity to adhere to international conventions. The close working relationship between local organisations and international and transnational feminist organisations and human rights organisations added to this scrutiny. the distrust Egyptian people have against western education and western values was reflected in their suspicious attitude towards women's rights and negatively affected the goals of feminist NGOs in creating a gender just and gender equal space in Egypt. See, Nadjé Al-Ali, *Secularism, Gender and the State in the Middle East: The Egyptian Women's Movement*. (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2000), 17. See Margot Badran. 2005 "Between Secular and Islamic Feminism/s: Reflections on the Middle East and Beyond". *Journal of Middle East Women's Studies* 1, no. 1(2005): 6-28, accessed May 23, 2019, doi:10.2979/mew.2005.1.1.6. Also see Al-Ali, Nadjé. *Secularism, Gender and the State in the Middle East: The Egyptian Women's Movement*. (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2000), 56-59.

⁷ NGOs were frequently under the surveillance of the State Security Investigations Sector which belongs to the Interior Ministry (Brechenmacher 2017, chap. 3)

⁸ Catherine Herrold and Mona Atia, "Competing Rather Than Collaborating: Egyptian Nongovernmental Organisations In Turbulence," *Nonprofit Policy Forum* 7, no. 3(2016):389-407, accessed May 30, 2019, doi:10.1515/npf-2015-0033.

⁹ Following the "open door" policies of Sadat in 1980s and 1990s.

Also see Angie Abdelmonem and Susana Galán, "Action-Oriented Responses To Sexual Harassment In Egypt," *Journal Of Middle East Women's Studies* 13, no. 1(2017): 154-167, accessed June 1, 2019, doi:10.1215/15525864-3728767.

¹⁰ "NGOs embark on pre-election monitoring measures," *Egypt Today*, March 20, 2018, Accessed 19 April 2019 from <http://www.egypttoday.com/Article/2/45750/NGOs-embark-on-pre-election-monitoring-measures>

popularity of democratic values¹¹. The army was also wary of the collaborative efforts of feminist organisations and resources to accomplish shared goals like insertion of feminist agenda in the new constitution, reform of laws, rehabilitation and redress of sexual harassment survivors, and demanding trial for abuses of power by the military.

The initial tensions between the state and CSOs occurred when the authorities paid no heed to the demands and recommendations of the civic space. Although SCAF eased the registration requirements and procedures, much of the repressive tools remained in place through the 2002 law, resulting in delaying projects and funding¹². The anti-Western and nationalistic sentiments were exploited by SCAF by portraying CSOs as foreign agents to foster instability in the country¹³ and used this as an excuse to install surveillance. A commission of inquiry to look into foreign funding of CSOs was established in July 2011¹⁴. State apparatus including pro-government newspapers, judiciary, and legislation worked relentlessly in the years that followed Arab Spring to persecute organizations thereby divulging all transactions of sixty-three human rights activists and organizations in November 2011¹⁵. Raids were ordered against seventeen offices of several foreign and domestic organizations such as Freedom House, National Democratic Institute, and the Konrad-Adenauer-Stiftung. They were ultimately shut down with several employees charged with criminal cases for working without required license¹⁶.

The Muslim Brotherhood (MB) which came to power in 2012 brought in more restrictive provisions in a new draft law in 2013 concerning foreign funding of NGOs which proposed setting up a committee with members from all agencies and ministries to deal with all matters

¹¹Jeff Martini and Julie Taylor, "Commanding Democracy in Egypt: The Military's Attempt to Manage the Future," *Foreign Affairs* 90, no.5 (September/October 2011), 127-137

¹² Catherine E Herrold, "NGO Policy in Pre- and Post-Mubarak Egypt: Effects on NGOs' Roles in Democracy Promotion," *Nonprofit Policy Forum* 7, no. 2 (2016): 189-212, accessed May 12, 2019, DOI 10.1515/npf-2014-0034

¹³ The US government promised aid worth 65 million dollars for pro-democracy groups. This only added to the popular suspicion. Transitional authorities argued that bypassing state institutions for fund approval and transfer is a violation of Egypt's sovereignty.

¹⁴ Stephen Macinerney, "SCAF's Assault on Egypt's Civil Society," *The Washington Post*, September 28, 2011, accessed April 28, 2019 from <https://foreignpolicy.com/2011/09/28/scafs-assault-on-egypts-civil-society/>

¹⁵ Saskia Brechenmacher, "Institutionalized Repression in Egypt," in *Civil Society Under Assault: Repression and Responses in Russia, Egypt and Ethiopia*, (Washington DC, Carnegie Endowment for International Peace, 2017) 37-64

¹⁶"Freedom House Condemns Raids of NGOs in Egypt," *Freedom House*, December 29, 2011, accessed March 23, 2019, <https://freedomhouse.org/article/freedom-house-condemns-raids-ngos-egypt>

related to foreign-funded organizations¹⁷. It had provisions that stipulated the treatment of NGO assets as “public funds” which was eventually removed owing to public backlash.

In June 2012, forty-three foreign NGO workers in Egypt were sentenced and forcibly closed several international organizations sent warning signals to those who were operating CSOs using foreign funds¹⁸: many Egyptian organizations turned down foreign funding fearing governmental interference and reprisals; some organizations who were involved in political activities retracted to less controversial activities and projects; foreign donors either completely withdrew from Egypt or reversed their funding from political projects¹⁹. Despite this, even health and education projects faced difficulties getting government approval²⁰. Towards 2013, the political tensions between Morsi government and military played out in the civic space, albeit this time in favour of it. Morsi’s intransigent style of leadership and shrinking political avenues of participation led to the emergence of new NGOs supported by the army which alliance played a significant role in deposing Morsi from power in July 2013²¹. Contrary to popular belief, military takeover under El-Sisi that followed was a return to authoritarian rule once again, with the most repressive tactics and strategies employed against the civic space in the history of Egypt. El-Sisi’s project to centralise power in Egypt, which originated from his totalitarian ambitions, along with institutional continuity proved to be the biggest hurdle in transforming Egypt structurally.

Unlike in the past, the current regime in Egypt did not distinguish between political and non-political charitable groups. Any civil society entity was deemed threatening especially if they are widely known and accepted, and had amassed legitimacy²². This was the case with the initial crackdown on CSOs who were one of the best levellers of the service gap in areas which lie outside institutional trickle down of redistributive benefits. Social and political implications

¹⁷ The first draft submitted by FJP in early 2012 was more in favourable of the international conventions and Egyptians CSOs. However, after the election of Morsi and formation of his government, the new draft submitted in 2013 considered the general civil society as a threat to the nation and ensured constant surveillance (el-Sirgany 2019).

¹⁸ Louisa Loveluck, “Egypt convicts US NGO workers,” *The Guardian*, June 4, 2013, accessed April 14, 2019, <https://www.theguardian.com/world/2013/jun/04/egypt-convicts-us-ngo-workers-sam-lahood>

¹⁹ Kenneth Roth, “Egypt’s NGO Funding Crackdown,” *Human Rights Watch*, April 9, 2013, accessed March 19, 2019, <https://www.hrw.org/news/2013/04/09/egypts-ngo-funding-crackdown>.

²⁰ “Egypt: Unprecedented Crackdown on NGOs,” *Amnesty International*, March 23, 2016, accessed March 26, 2019, <https://www.amnesty.org/en/latest/news/2016/03/egypt-unprecedented-crackdown-on-ngos/>

²¹ Catherine E Herrold, “NGO Policy in Pre- and Post-Mubarak Egypt: Effects on NGOs’ Roles in Democracy Promotion,” *Nonprofit Policy Forum* 7, no. 2 (2016):207, accessed May 12, 2019, DOI 10.1515/npf-2014-0034

²² Amy Austin Holmes, “Civil Society from Alexandria to Aswan: Survival Strategies,” *The Tahrir Institute for Middle East Policy*, May 31, 2018, accessed May 24, 2019, <https://timep.org/commentary/analysis/civil-society-from-alexandria-to-aswan-survival-strategies/>

of the crackdown are most felt in rural and urban areas of Egypt differently, as rural areas face a dearth of state machineries to address the issues of the population. State apathy to unemployment and poverty, domestic violence and sexual harassment, besides the general disregard for women's rights like divorce, alimony, child custody and so on were being compensated by the activities of feminist NGOs. The relevance of feminist NGOs in Egypt today is heightened against the context of marginalisation of women from state benefits. Crackdown on them make the communities more vulnerable and excluded from mainstream. Local NGOs that work with communities in Upper and Lower Egypt as well as Christian, Muslim and Nubian population represent the diversity of Egyptian society²³.

Stricter NGO laws have resulted in the shrinking of civic space, and with it the space to negotiate with the state. One of the remarkable examples of authoritarian elements still persisting in the upper echelons of political structures would be that of Faiza Abou el-Naga who was a minister in Mubarak's government with strong opinions on foreign funding²⁴. Naga and her allies in the government launched the attack against foreign-funded civil society organizations and those that promoted democratic activities in the countries which culminated in the 2011 raids of CSOs²⁵.

Crackdown under El-Sisi

Although the very first target of crackdown was undoubtedly on the MB which was deemed the immediate threat²⁶, the narrative changed to exploit the nationalist fervour and growing fear of terrorism looming in the Sinai region to persecute journalists, activists and protestors for national security reasons²⁷. This significantly crippled local charity works in Egypt and affected a lot of welfare projects in rural Egypt negatively. It is alarming that the Ministry of Social Solidarity shut down more than 1,500 religious charity groups, 121 childcare

²³ Amy Austin Holmes, "Civil Society from Alexandria to Aswan: Survival Strategies," *The Tahrir Institute for Middle East Policy*, May 31, 2018, accessed May 24, 2019, <https://timep.org/commentary/analysis/civil-society-from-alexandria-to-aswan-survival-strategies/>

²⁴ Ernesto Londono, "Architect of Egypt's NGO crackdown is Mubarak holdover," *The Washington Post*, February 7, 2012, accessed March 24, 2019, https://www.washingtonpost.com/world/middle_east/architect-of-egypts-ngo-crackdown-is-mubarak-holdover/2012/02/07/gIQAk9mgxQ_story.html?noredirect=on&utm_term=.8f45f459f5cc

²⁵ (ibid)

²⁶ The year following Morsi's ouster, 40,000 people were arrested. Direct violence was unleashed on pro-Morsi supporters. Cairo Court for Urgent Matters ruled in September 2013 to ban all activities of MB and froze its assets. The military, four months later, designated MB as a terrorist organisation, and shut down several charity organisations and projects with little to no evidence of ties with the MB (Monier and Ranko 2013, 119-120).

²⁷ Barbara Zollner, "Surviving Repression: How Egypt's Muslim Brotherhood has Carried on," *Carnegie Middle East Center*, March 11, 2019, accessed 19 March 2019, <https://carnegie-mec.org/2019/03/11/surviving-repression-how-egypt-s-muslim-brotherhood-has-carried-on-pub-78552>

centres and nurseries alleging ties with the MB²⁸. In some cases, the funds of the targeted organizations were channelled into ministerial funds to support those civil society groups that are legally recognised. In November 2013, a protest law was passed which gave security apparatus unprecedented powers to cancel any public meetings, demonstrations or processions based on evidence related to security threats²⁹. It was a severe blow to the Egyptian culture of street protest and politics with police and army gaining free reign to use direct violence against protesters. The presidential decree of October 2014 placed civilian infrastructure under the jurisdiction of the army which necessarily meant that trials for those protesting outside of such buildings are to be conducted in military courts³⁰.

After El-Sisi's election in 2014, smear campaigns were launched to weaken organised civic space by portraying them as spies allied with MB and terrorists and foreign agencies to realise foreign agendas³¹. They successfully portrayed international and domestic advocacy groups as threats to national security and created divisions in the country along sectarian lines. The government's effort to bring all organizations under control was initiated by directing them to register within forty-five days or face shutdown under the existing NGO law targeting those groups which had evaded registration during Mubarak's period³². Although the ultimatum was not enforced owing to local and international backlash, many groups remained in legal limbo, making them vulnerable to future enforcement³³.

El-Sisi institutionalised foreign funding restrictions in September 2014, with an amendment to Article 78 of the penal code which banned receiving foreign funds for activities that are deemed harmful to national interests or compromising national unity, with life sentence as the punishment for noncompliance³⁴. The vague definition of national interest meant that

²⁸Nicholas Linn and Emily Crane Linn, "Egypt's war on charity," *Foreign Policy*, January 29, 2015, accessed 19 March 2019, <https://foreignpolicy.com/2015/01/29/egypts-war-on-charity-morsi-muslim-brotherhood/>

²⁹"Egypt: Deeply Restrictive New Assembly Law," *Human Rights Watch*, November 26, 2013, accessed March 19, 2019, <https://www.hrw.org/news/2013/11/26/egypt-deeply-restrictive-new-assembly-law>

³⁰George Sadek, "Egypt: Decree Allowing Armed Forces to Assist Law Enforcement Agencies in Protecting Government and Public Facilities," *Library of Congress*, November 6, 2014, accessed March 26, 2019, <https://www.loc.gov/law/foreign-news/article/egypt-decree-allowing-armed-forces-to-assist-law-enforcement-agencies-in-protecting-government-and-public-facilities/>

³¹"Journalists discredited, censored and jailed under Egypt's Sisi," *Reporters Without Border*, March 23, 2018, accessed March 25, 2019, <https://rsf.org/en/news/journalists-discredited-censored-and-jailed-under-egypts-sisi>

³²Ola Kubbara, "NGOs lose ground in Sisi's Egypt," *Open Democracy*, October 21, 2014, accessed 27 March 2019, <https://www.opendemocracy.net/en/north-africa-west-asia/ngos-lose-ground-in-sisis-egypt/>

³³(ibid)

³⁴Amr Hamzawy, "Legislating Authoritarianism: Egypt's New Era of Repression," *Carnegie Endowment for International Peace*, March 16, 2017, accessed 30 March 2019, <https://carnegieendowment.org/2017/03/16/legislating-authoritarianism-egypt-s-new-era-of-repression-pub-68285>

government would be the ultimate interpreter of these laws and wielded full authority in the enforcement of such laws, and questioning state's authority in prosecuting innocent people accused of foreign and terrorist ties, and human rights abuses in the name of counterterrorism could itself be termed terrorist activities and harmful to national security.

After this initial crackdown, further legal and extralegal restrictions clipped the activities of prominent human rights organizations through bureaucratic delays, funding issues, interrogations, raids, travel bans, asset freezes, digital attacks and sometimes even, criminal charges and office closures. Ever since 2015, El-Sisi has increasingly made use of case 173, referred to as foreign funding case³⁵, which is a legal hurdle the state is using to target feminist and human rights organizations as a part of the larger state agenda to exercise control and surveillance over civil society organizations in Egypt. The case's history and origin could be traced back to 2011 when security personnel started raiding the headquarters of foreign NGOs and sentencing many local and foreign staff on charges of receiving foreign money and potentially causing harm to national security, or threaten the independence and unity of the country and operating without a license. The second phase of the case started in February 2016, with several domestic civil society organizations coming under attack by freezing their assets and the names of the researchers and activists associated with the organizations added to the travel ban list. In this extended version of state's harassment from 2016, NGO workers are denied the freedom of mobility by banning them from travelling outside the country. Case 173, also known in media as the foreign funding case, has been used by the state to pursue new forms of nonviolent and legally valid forms of harassment which are consistent with the crackdown during Mubarak era. Under this case, since 2011, more than 40 Egyptian organizations have been booked, many of its directors and staff charged with offences such as receiving foreign funds and working without permission, followed by asset-freeze, travel bans and sometimes forced closure of offices. The new wave of raids and interrogations culminated in court ruling in September 2016 which froze personal assets of five prominent human rights advocates and three NGOs and imposition of travel bans on twelve rights activists³⁶. Amongst the five activists whose personal assets were frozen were Hossam Bahgat who was the founder

³⁵ Formed after publication of the report from a fact-finding committee instituted by the Ministerial Cabinet in July 2011. The committee comprised of members from Ministries of Finance, Social Solidarity, the Central Bank and the Tax Administration (Nazra, 2016).

³⁶ El-Sayed Gamal El-Din, "Egypt court upholds asset freeze against 5 rights activists in NGO funding case," *ahramonline*, September 17, 2016, accessed 20 March 2019, <http://english.ahram.org.eg/NewsContent/1/64/244093/Egypt/Politics-/Egypt-court-upholds-asst-freeze-against--rights-ac.aspx>

of Egyptian Initiative for Personal Rights (EIPR) and Gamal Eid, head of Arab Network for Human Rights Information (ANHRI); and the NGOs were Cairo Institute for Human Rights Studies, Hisham Mubarak Law Center and Egyptian Center for the Right to Education.

The travel ban affected up to thirty-seven organizations which were either democracy organizations or women's rights associations dependent on foreign funds³⁷. Four months after this court ruling, Azza Soliman was the first in this case to be arrested, her personal and organizational assets frozen and banned from travelling abroad³⁸. In February 2017, El Nadeem Center for Rehabilitation of Victims of Violence was shut down and issued a gag order preventing media from reporting on Case 173³⁹. From June 2014 to November 2016, around eighty-four cases of travel bans were imposed against activists, lawyers and academicians. Human rights investigators, international researchers and staff of international organisations were also banned from entering the country⁴⁰. Previously, travel bans could only be implemented attached to a court order. But, under El-Sisi, they worked as arbitrary sanctions without declaring reasons officially. Detention and interrogations of activists on spurious charges and using relatives as hostages for the activists to turn themselves in were some of the tactics used by the official state security forces in Egypt⁴¹. Protest law was widely misused to imprison activists such as Yara Sallam of EIPR and Sanaa Serif of *No to Military Trials for Civilians* who were sentenced to three years in jail for participating in a demonstration. Summoning organizations for financial audits and accusing them of tax evasion and money laundering was another legal hurdle in their smooth functioning⁴². Large scale phishing has

³⁷ "Egypt court freezes assets of rights defenders and NGOs," *Al Jazeera*, September 17, 2016, accessed March 29, 2019, <https://www.aljazeera.com/news/2016/09/egypt-court-freezes-assets-rights-defenders-ngos-160917144339206.html>

³⁸ "Egypt: Travel ban and assets freeze for Azza Soliman," November 23, 2016, *International Federation for Human Rights*, accessed March 20, 2019, <https://www.fidh.org/en/issues/human-rights-defenders/egypt-travel-ban-and-assets-freeze-against-azza-soliman>

³⁹ Elissa Miller and Margaret Suter, "Case No. 173: The State of Egypt's NGOs," *Atlantic Council*, March 29, 2016, accessed March 29, 2019, <https://www.atlanticcouncil.org/blogs/menasource/case-no-173-the-state-of-egypt-s-ngos>

⁴⁰ "Egypt court freezes assets of rights defenders and NGOs," *Al Jazeera*, September 17, 2016, accessed March 29, 2019, <https://www.aljazeera.com/news/2016/09/egypt-court-freezes-assets-rights-defenders-ngos-160917144339206.html>

⁴¹ Mohamed Ramadan, a human rights lawyer, was forced to turn himself in after the security officials raided the house of his mother and brother and held them as hostages

⁴² Amr Hamzawy, "Legislating Authoritarianism: Egypt's New Era of Repression," *Carnegie Endowment for International Peace*, March 16, 2017, accessed 30 March 2019, <https://carnegieendowment.org/2017/03/16/legislating-authoritarianism-egypt-s-new-era-of-repression-pub-68285>

also been reported to target the digital communication of those organizations which are under governmental radar and involved with case 173⁴³.

Forced disappearances of activists, students and suspected dissidents for weeks or months through extrajudicial methods was another common practice at the time. Between April and June 2015, 160 people were forced into hiding without legal protection and communication according to *Freedom for the Brave* reports. Another report from Egyptian Commission for Rights and Freedoms documented 187 cases between August and November 2016, and El Nadeem reported 110 cases in February 2017⁴⁴. The primary objective of such disappearances was to intimidate and create an atmosphere of fear for activists who are likely to criticise the government. More often than not, the immediate targets are youth movements, MB, and liberal activists. Although prominent human rights defenders were mostly spared, those who document and speak out against human rights violations of the government seem to be at risk. Mohamed Sadek, a human rights lawyer and researcher working on the forced disappearances in Egypt, went missing for three months before he reappeared in November 2016⁴⁵. In February and August 2015, two anti-terrorism laws were passed by Egyptian government to organize a list of terrorists and terrorist entities, and impose fines on those spread 'false' accounts of anti-terror operations and protect state apparatus from being held accountable for their human rights abuse⁴⁶. The laws did not entail right of the accused to contest the evidence and defend themselves against the charges. They vaguely defined the terms terrorism and left the meaning open for the state itself to interpret. This unlimited power position was utilised by the government to charge many of its political opponents as terrorists, impose travel ban, cancel their passports, freeze their assets and curtail their political rights. Besides, gag orders, physical and psychological torture, poor prison conditions, persecutions and deaths have become the reality for any activist venturing into critiquing the regime. In addition to this, women activists

⁴³ John Scott-Railton et al. "Nile Phish: Large-Scale Phishing Campaign Targeting Egyptian Civil Society," *The Citizen Lab*, February 2, 2017, accessed March 27, 2019, <https://citizenlab.ca/2017/02/nilephish-report/>

⁴⁴ "Accounting for Egypt's 'disappeared'," *The Arab Weekly*, February 5, 2016, accessed March 20, 2019, <https://the arabweekly.com/accounting-egypts-disappeared>

⁴⁵ In addition, two other researchers who worked with Egyptian Commission for Rights and Freedoms who spearheaded "stop enforced disappearances" campaign were also detained and charged for being involved in terrorism activities. See Saskia Brechenmacher, "Institutionalized Repression in Egypt," in *Civil Society Under Assault: Repression and Responses in Russia, Egypt and Ethiopia*, (Washington DC, Carnegie Endowment for International Peace, 2017), 46.

⁴⁶ "Egypt: Counterterrorism Law Erodes Basic Rights," *Human Rights Watch*, August 19, 2015, accessed March 29, 2019, <https://www.hrw.org/news/2015/08/19/egypt-counterterrorism-law-erodes-basic-rights>

in prison are subjected to gender-based violence from sexual harassment to threats of rape⁴⁷, the same kind of violence against which they spoke up which landed them in jail in the first place.

A new NGO law was passed in November 2016, and ratified by El-Sisi in May 2017, to replace Law 84 of 2002 representing the most repressive law till date to be passed in Egypt⁴⁸. Previously, when registration processes proved to be cumbersome and led to compromising their autonomy, many CSOs registered themselves as law firms or local branches of international organizations, thus allowing them to access foreign funds without approval. The new law tightens state control and surveillance over domestic NGOs by expanding their powers to intrude into the internal decisions of the NGOs and inspect documents and activities. Explicit permission must be taken to collaborate with local or foreign entities and the courts could dissolve any organization with no right to appeal⁴⁹. Article 72 of the law establishes a National Authority for regulating the activities of NGOs with representatives from the Ministries of Foreign Affairs, Defense, Justice, the Interior, and Social Solidarity, General Intelligence Services, the Central Bank of Egypt and anti-money laundering units to approve requests to receive foreign funding⁵⁰. If the surveillance of foreign funding was unofficial previously, this law institutionalised the practice.

Domestic funding also required approval and explicit permission. It also banned NGOs from interfering in labour unions and professional syndicates in order to break the association of civil society with advocacy-based groups. The law only allows social development projects in line with the national development plan and prohibits what the state deems as political projects or what it perceives as harmful to the national interest⁵¹. Using donated money for any kind of political activity was also banned. Breaking this law could lead to at least five years in prison and a fine of up to one million Egyptian Pounds. But, in some other instances, receiving foreign funding without permission could lead to life imprisonment. Greater restrictions are in

⁴⁷ Mozn Hassan, "What has Azza done?: Azza Soliman, a unique feminist at risk," *Open Democracy*, December 1, 2016, accessed April 21, 2019, <https://www.opendemocracy.net/en/north-africa-west-asia/what-has-azza-done-azza-soliman-unique-feminist-at-risk>

⁴⁸ "Egypt: New Law Will Crush Civil Society," *Human Rights Watch*, June 2, 2017, accessed March 24, 2019, <https://www.hrw.org/news/2017/06/02/egypt-new-law-will-crush-civil-society>

⁴⁹ Farah Najjar, "Why is Egypt's new NGO law controversial?" *Al Jazeera*, May 31, 2017, accessed March 29, 2019, <https://www.aljazeera.com/indepth/features/2017/05/egypt-ngo-law-controversial-170530142008179.html>

⁵⁰ (ibid)

⁵¹ Ahmed Aboulenein, "Egypt issues NGO law, cracking down on dissent," *Reuters*, May 29, 2017, accessed April 2, 2019, <https://www.reuters.com/article/us-egypt-rights/egypt-issues-ngo-law-cracking-down-on-dissent-idUSKBN18P1OL>

place for foreign NGOs which require them to get prior approval to operate in Egypt, the permit costing them 20,000 US dollars with a 20 per cent increase every five years⁵². They were required to gain approval to open bank accounts, and had a cap of 10,000 Egyptian pounds as the upper limit to not need prior approval⁵³.

The gradual ascension in the scale of repression in Egypt paralleled El-Sisi's rising totalitarian ambitions. The initial years of El-Sisi's rule in Egypt could be seen as an attempt to secure his power position without opposition. He promoted an environment where source of violence is decentralised quite paradoxical to his political ambitions. However, this must be viewed as a careful and clever tool for gaining legitimacy. By decentralising violence and agents of surveillance to local guardians of security in the state such as the police there are two implications: one, local dissent is kept in check; two, being part of the state apparatus in unleashing violence legitimises state repression and use of force is normalised. El-Sisi also religiously followed the lessons learnt from the 2011 uprisings that civil society organizations cannot be allowed to function and citizen mobilisation must be hindered at any cost. This motivation is indeed reflected in the laws and policies at the time.

Implications

The immediate impact of the crackdown was the looming uncertainty and lack of cohesion felt by organizations, researchers and activists alike. Initially, this issue was compounded by an earlier fissure in the feminist movement with the secular feminists supporting the military as the saviour from Islamist rule while the Islamic feminism deemed military takeover as a counter-revolution to Arab spring⁵⁴. However, the indiscriminate crackdown on civic space eventually unified feminist cause with the new common goal to challenge the autocratic rule of El-Sisi and increasing human rights violations under him⁵⁵.

After those groups which focused on providing services to the poor and marginalised were banned, there was an increasing gap in service provision whereby marginalised groups and the poor could not get access to basic needs that must have been provided by the

⁵² "Egypt: New Law Will Crush Civil Society," *Human Rights Watch*, June 2, 2017, accessed March 24, 2019, <https://www.hrw.org/news/2017/06/02/egypt-new-law-will-crush-civil-society>

⁵³ George Sadek, "Egypt: President Ratifies NGO Law," *Library of Congress*, June 9, 2017, accessed April 19, 2019, <https://www.loc.gov/law/foreign-news/article/egypt-president-ratifies-ngo-law/>

⁵⁴ Hind Ahmed Zaki, "El-Sissi's Women? Shifting gender discourses and the limits of state feminism," *Égypte/Monde arabe* [Online] 13, no. 1 (November, 2015):39-53, accessed April 29, 2019, DOI : 10.4000/ema.3503

⁵⁵ Omnia Al Desoukie, Skype conversation with the researcher, March 13, 2019

government⁵⁶. Defamation campaign, fund cuts and excessive surveillance reduced the scope of activities of feminist NGOs, forcing them to rollback and focus only on top priority areas⁵⁷. Rather than looking into development matters that could build the future of Egypt, most of their resources were spent fighting the draconian NGO law and case 173⁵⁸. Available pool of resources significantly shrunk, pushing organizations to raise funds locally. Yet, carrying on daily activities like resource allocation for projects, paying the staff members or even paying the rent became incredibly difficult for many organizations which pushed them to close physical offices and work online⁵⁹. Travel bans affected these organizations in such a way that the human rights community became isolated from international fora as they were not allowed to travel outside of Egypt to attend conferences or symposia. Cross-regional coalitions formed in the wake of Arab Spring could not be continued and collaborations with international organizations became quite impossible to carry out⁶⁰.

In such a tumultuous climate, feminist organizations were forced to adapt to the stifling conditions if they were to continue their activities as independent cultural and social development organizations⁶¹. The looming fear of persecution dissuaded several activists from projects and sectors that demand less attention and scrutiny from the government, whereas some other organisations downsized their staff and started working on a voluntary basis. For instance, in November 2014, seven human rights groups pulled out of Egypt's Universal Periodic Review because they were offered better treatment by the Ministry of Foreign Affairs if they did so⁶². To counter the government's crackdown on civic space, both international and domestic platforms⁶³ launched several counter-strategies with moderate success rate. Although

⁵⁶ Amy Austin Holmes, "The Attack on Civil Society Outside Cairo," *Carnegie Endowment for International Peace*, January 26, 2017, accessed April 15, 2019, <https://carnegieendowment.org/sada/67810>

⁵⁷ Saskia Brechenmacher, "Institutionalized Repression in Egypt," in *Civil Society Under Assault: Repression and Responses in Russia, Egypt and Ethiopia*, (Washington DC: Carnegie Endowment for International Peace, 2017), 54-57.

⁵⁸ Mai Shams (Reuters journalist), Whatsapp message to author, March 15, 2019

⁵⁹ A researcher at Nazra for Feminist Studies, email to author, March 17, 2019

⁶⁰ Saskia Brechenmacher, "Institutionalized Repression in Egypt," in *Civil Society Under Assault: Repression and Responses in Russia, Egypt and Ethiopia*, (Washington DC: Carnegie Endowment for International Peace, 2017), 53-54.

⁶¹ (ibid), 54-57.

⁶² (ibid)

⁶³ Apart from civil society groups, student movements also pose critical resistance against authoritarianism in Egypt. Elections in universities since 2011 have been won by coalitions that are anti-authoritarian and revolutionary and continue to bring hope for change in the country. Trade unions, and professional associations of doctors and journalists have also participated in anti-government protests clashing with the security officials and goons of the regime. Protests in the wake of specific events like police brutality have been sometimes led by citizens without any organising or prior planning which has resulted in the arrest of security officers involved in abuse of power and influence. See Nadine Abdalla, "Youth movements in the Egyptian transformation: strategies

to some extent they could fight back against fund cuts, proposal rejections and office closures, Case 173 and charges under it have severely crippled resistance strategies. However, rather than scattering, the persecutions and atmosphere of fear had a unifying effect on the civil society groups. Relocating offices and staff abroad, finding new funding models and sharing functions and activities with non-institutionalised groups, solidarity building amongst new and old groups, and mobilising locally have been some effective strategies in combating government repression⁶⁴.

To study the implications of Case 173 on feminist organisations, their activities and the feminist movement in Egypt and the strategies they have adopted to counter state repression are looked into through the cases of two feminist NGOs: Nazra for Feminist Studies, an Islamic feminist NGO and CEWLA, a secular feminist organisation, both based in Cairo. The two organisations were pivotal in advancing the goals of the feminist movement in Egypt even before Arab spring working with poor, rural and uneducated women across Egypt. They were influential organisations which directed the current of women's movement by operationalising the general objective of emancipating women in Egypt. Under case 173, these two organisations were particularly targeted because of the political implications of their work which brings out statistics and fact-sheets that contradict state's claim of being progressive, gender-equal and democratic. Repressive state measures which included media smear campaigns had a direct hit on their activities and general perception in the society forcing them to opt for alternative strategies to counter state repression. Although successful to some extent, the scope and means of activities have been drastically reduced by tightening grip of state surveillance and legal restrictions. At this juncture, it must be acknowledged that the majority of the population in Egypt are starved from basic needs in the absence of both state mechanisms as well as NGOs that were active previously to compensate the dearth. The socio-political implications of harassment of feminist organisations are looked into using the cases of these two NGOs, both of which have been active in advocating for women's rights. The following case studies follow the scheme of examining the objectives, vision, activities, campaigns, relevance, and scope of the organisations, followed by a study of their confrontation with state

and repertoires of political participation," *Mediterranean Politics* 21, no. 1(October 2015): 44-63, accessed March 15, 2019, DOI: 10.1080/13629395.2015.1081445

⁶⁴ Saskia Brechenmacher, "Institutionalized Repression in Egypt," in *Civil Society Under Assault: Repression and Responses in Russia, Egypt and Ethiopia*, (Washington DC: Carnegie Endowment for International Peace, 2017), 54-57.

and state actors, and social and political implications of this on them as feminist NGOs and participants of the women's movement in Egypt.

Case Study 1: Nazra for Feminist Studies and Mozn Hassan

Nazra was established in 2005 and registered under Ministry of Social Solidarity as an association in 2007 to advance specific goals of the feminist movement in Egypt. It has gained special consultative status with the United Nations Economic and Social Council (ECOSOC) since January 2014. The organisation holds the integral view that women's rights is a political and societal issue and tries to integrate it into the larger developmental and welfare problems in the society. They pursue a rights-based approach rooted in the discourse of freedom, autonomy, integrity and dignity in social, political and cultural spheres⁶⁵. Nazra functions as a research organization as well as advocacy group in ensuring that issues are analysed through gender perspective, hierarchical social relations and structures are problematised and its impact on political, social and economic situation of women are qualitatively evaluated⁶⁶. Elaborating on the goals of the organization, Mozn Hassan, an Egyptian lawyer and activist, and the director and founder of Nazra is of the opinion that the involvement of both young men and women are required in the gender debate in the region. Nazra's composition speaks volumes about its commitment to finding pragmatic solutions to taboo topics in the Egyptian society and giving them greater visibility by treading terrains that mainstream media refuse to explore.

Ideological underpinnings of Nazra

Nazra's encapsulates the feminist vision relevant to regional context of West Asia and North Africa (WANA) region in addition to the local context of Egypt. This originates from the understanding that development of these societies is challenged by unequal gender relations sustained by patriarchal and culturally retrogressive values and practices. Some of the underlying thoughts that reflect in all the activities of the organisation pertaining to the blurring of boundaries of private/public spheres, and the significance of supporting youth groups in their endeavours to integrate and address gender-related issues⁶⁷. Since one of the prime objectives of Nazra is the continuity of feminist movement in Egypt, it increasingly advocates for making and integrating women into the public sphere with equal social and political citizenship rights. Nazra perceives hurdles to women's political participation in the public sphere as a

⁶⁵ Nazra, "About us," Nazra for Feminist Studies, accessed 28 April 2019, <https://nazra.org/en/about-us>

⁶⁶ (ibid)

⁶⁷ (ibid)

continuation of violence and discrimination faced in the private sphere, hence launches holistic fight against sexual harassment among other kinds of violence faced by women in both public and private contexts.

Undertaking feminist perspective has aided Nazra and its feminist cause to ascertain the role of hierarchical social relations in determining social, economic and cultural position of women in Egyptian society today. This is manifested in the efforts to integrate men into Nazra's endeavours by emphasising on the fact that patriarchal proceedings of the society have implications on gender roles and privileges certain versions of masculinity, and that men have much to gain from advancing feminist causes and queries. The organization has initiatives to enhance the participation of young women and men and spread women's rights awareness and feminist culture. Nazra has a vibrant network of young social workers, independent researchers and young feminist groups that support the feminist movement, emphasising on the importance of decentralising activities and benefits to local levels⁶⁸. Apart from this, Nazra contributes to feminist knowledge production in the region specifically contextualising intersectional identities of women. The research-oriented activities of Nazra aim at production of knowledge on gender and feminism by documentation, monitoring and analysis, as well as development of Arabic terminology⁶⁹ related to women's issues to articulate feminist agenda and demands locally. Although localising linguistics of feminist agenda was a priority always, it transformed into a necessity during post-Arab spring period against the context of constitution drafting procedures and newly formed governments.

Campaigns and activities

Nazra involves itself in regional and local events that require feminist attention, especially those related to freedoms and physical integrity of women. Its vision is to ensure and enhance the role of women in public spheres as it acknowledges the overlapping of social and political consolidation of democratic values and feminist causes⁷⁰. During the transition period⁷¹, Nazra was part of the Egyptian Feminist Organizations Coalition and the Women and Constitution Committee formed soon after the removal of Mubarak. Apart from being actively involved in the legal suggestions that the coalition submitted to the Constituent Assembly, they

⁶⁸ Salma El-Naqqash, email correspondence with author, March 17, 2019

⁶⁹(ibid)

⁷⁰(ibid)

⁷¹ Gulsah Torunoglu, "Feminism in Egypt: New Alliances, Old Debates," *Origins* 9, no. 11(August 2016), accessed April 24, 2019, <http://origins.osu.edu/article/feminism-egypt-new-alliances-old-debates>

were also involved in ensuring the passage of amendments to the penal code to include the term “sexual harassment” and define sexually violent crimes in a broader sense, and works on law projects related to Anti-Discrimination Committee formed according to the Egyptian Constitution as well as legislations related to Municipality Administration to enhance the representation of women in the municipal elections.

Apart from issue-based advocacy campaigns, Nazra conducts policy research and lobbies for legal reforms favourable for women's rights. Nazra has three main programs working on Women's Political Participation (WPPA), Women Human Rights Defenders and Sexual Violence (WHRDP), and Young Feminist Initiatives Program. The WPPA works on women's political participation through monitoring elections (syndicates, parliament, and so on) from a gendered perspective, mentoring women politicians, issuing knowledge production related to policies and laws linked to women's political participation. WHRDP works on the question of violence against women human rights defenders (WHRDs) through documenting the cases, providing psychological, medical and legal services survivors, issuing knowledge production, and engaging in campaigns. The Young Feminist Initiatives Program works on mentoring young feminists and young feminist groups in different governorates outside Cairo. Nazra has also involved in strategic litigation for gender issues within the Egyptian, regional and international legal system as well as working on policy research and legal reform from a feminist perspective.

Nazra's advocacy campaigns are designed as legal, cultural, political and social action plan which spearheads the attitude that gender issues cannot be treated as a watertight compartment of rights and demands. They deal with issues related to cultural, social, religious and, sometimes, legal reinforcement of gender stereotypes and roles by enhancing women's representation in higher positions of the judiciary, parliament, decision-making bodies, political parties, and employment sectors that are considered untraditional for women. Nazra has been engaged in campaigns supporting and mentoring women candidates in local and parliamentary elections⁷²: sixteen candidates from underprivileged parts of Egypt were mentored in the 2011 parliamentary elections⁷³ and five female candidates in 2015 elections.

⁷²“Profile: 16 Female Candidates for the People's Assembly Elections 2011/2012,” *Nazra for Feminist Studies*, September 2012, 1-17, accessed April 24, 2019, https://nazra.org/sites/nazra/files/attachments/candidates_profiles_people_assembly_elections_2011_2012_en.pdf

⁷³*She and Elections: Mentoring on the Ground With the Candidates 2011/2012*, report, April 2012, 1-15, accessed April 21, 2019, https://nazra.org/sites/nazra/files/attachments/nazra_she_and_elections_report_april2012_en.pdf.

In the 2011 elections, Nazra trained independent as well as party-affiliated female candidates contesting from the Egyptian Social Democratic Party⁷⁴, Socialist Popular Alliance Party⁷⁵, El Tagamo Party⁷⁶ and Party of Masr El Horeya⁷⁷. Besides, Nazra conducted training programs for women from various political parties to educate them about women's rights, their relevance and how to mainstream these rights in not just the parliament and legislations, but also in the internal decision making of the parties.

Gender mainstreaming in public sphere has been a concern of Nazra since the transition period when it lobbied for increased representation of women not only in the parliament through gender quota but also the procedures that result in a new electoral process⁷⁸. Nazra has also conducted seminars, workshops and roundtables to engage young men and women on women's issues and development of skills to address these issues in different governorates in Egypt. Nazra's 2016 campaign called *Heya was al-Manasa* (Her and the Bench) supports the cause of women's representation in the judiciary⁷⁹ as women becoming judges as frowned upon as untraditional and unIslamic in Egypt⁸⁰. It spread awareness on the underrepresentation of women in Egyptian judiciary as well as the discrimination faced by women in selection procedures⁸¹. The campaign sought to call attention to the importance of solving hurdles for women to be judges in the country.

Violence against women is seriously dealt with at Nazra through its research projects, rehabilitation activities as well as an advocacy programme in collaboration with other feminist organizations⁸². Since sexual harassment in public places is a threat to the free political participation of women, Nazra seeks the state to promote a safe and secure environment, free from discrimination, misogyny, exclusion by integrating gender perspectives into all their

⁷⁴ Social liberal party

⁷⁵ Leftist party

⁷⁶ Socialist party, also called Nationalist Progressive Party

⁷⁷ Socially and economically liberal, also known as Free Egypt Party.

⁷⁸ "Nazra's Statement on the Continuity of Applying the Quota System in the Upcoming Elections," April 10, 2011, accessed April 7, 2019, <http://nazra.org/en/node/41>

⁷⁹ Kamal Tabbika, "Nazra campaign seeks to remove obstacles for women judges," *Egypt Independent*, September 5, 2016, accessed April 3, 2019, <https://www.egyptindependent.com/nazra-campaign-seeks-remove-obstacles-women-judges/>

⁸⁰ See Monika Lindbekk, "Women Judges in Egypt: Discourses and Practices," in *Women Judges in the Muslim World: A Comparative Study of Discourse and Practice*, ed. Nadia Sonneveld and Monika Lindbekk (Leiden: Brill, 2017): 284-317

⁸¹ As of August 2018, Egypt has 66 female judges out of 17,000 judges in total.

⁸² "Violence Against Women," *Nazra for Feminist Studies*, accessed April 29, 2019, <https://nazra.org/en/terms/violence-against-women>

activities⁸³. Since 2011, Nazra has been an active participant in the 16 Days of Activism Campaign⁸⁴ conducted annually from November 25, International Day to Combat Violence against Women to December 10, International Human Rights Day. That same year, Nazra along with The Egyptian Initiative for Personal Rights, The New Woman Foundation, El-Nadeem Center for Rehabilitation of Victims of Violence, and the Women and Memory Forum launched a campaign called “Challenging Militarism and Ending Violence Against Women” to combat the violent treatment of women’s bodies under military rule⁸⁵. This was against the context of rising harassment of female protesters and forced virginity tests conducted by the military in March 2011. Feminist organisations who were willing to be a part of the campaign largely participated in the sit-in protests against the military as a part of the campaign.

In 2014, Nazra along with CEWLA initiated the “Qanun Nashaz” campaign which held that “behind every abused woman, there is a law”. The campaign sought to address the issue of sexual harassment by highlighting the flawed provisions of the penal code such as Article 17 and Article 60 which justified and legitimised domestic violence against women both in public and private spheres. This was in the context of promulgation of amended harassment laws Article 306 bis A and 306 bis B in June 2014 in which sexual harassment was defined inadequately and the precept of it was highly flawed⁸⁶. The campaign sought to do away with all kinds of legal hindrance to achieving gender equality in Egypt by the implementation of a national strategy of action⁸⁷. As a part of the campaign, Nazra organised a series of online and offline activities such as curating a graffiti gallery, posting caricatures and features on problematic articles of the penal code such as Article 17, 60, 274, 267 and 277 and organising open mic and storytelling sessions for women. Besides, social media platforms like Twitter and

⁸³ Nazra for Feminist Studies, *March Newsletter* 1 (March 2012): 1, accessed April 18, 2019, https://nazra.org/sites/nazra/files/attachments/nazra_newsletter_issue1_march_2012_en.pdf.

⁸⁴ It is an international campaign initiated in 1991 by Women’s Global Leadership Institute to combat violence against women, starting from November 25, the International Day for the Elimination of Violence against Women and ending on December 10, Human Rights Day. Egyptian civil society has been largely taking up the initiative ever since 2011 after the events of Arab Spring. See <https://16dayscwg.rutgers.edu/>

⁸⁵ “Egyptian Human Rights Organisations Stops their Participation in an International Campaign Against Gender Based Violence,” *Nazra for Feminist Studies*, November 24, 2011, accessed April 20, 2019, <http://nazra.org/en/node/48>

⁸⁶ The campaign recommended the removal of a clause which measured the intensity of the crime on the basis of sexual satisfaction sought by the perpetrator. See ‘*Circles of Hell*’: *Domestic, Public and State Violence Against Women in Egypt*, report (January 2015), 46, accessed May 4, 2019, https://www.amnestyusa.org/files/mde_120042015.pdf.

⁸⁷ “As part of the Events of the 16-Day Campaign for the Elimination of Violence against Women, Nazra For Feminist Studies And the Center For Egyptian Women's Legal Assistance (CEWLA) Launch “Qanun Nashaz” For The Elimination Of Legalized Violence Against Women,” *Nazra for Feminist Studies*, November 19, 2014, accessed April 9, 2019, <http://nazra.org/en/node/381>

Facebook, Nazra's headquarters, Cairo Swizz Club and Al-Madina Studio in Alexandria functioned as locations for the activities⁸⁸. The events were designed in such a way that discussions and debates on gender issues were integrated into artistic interpretations which could be carried on to the daily lives of the audience.

In 2015, as a part of the 16 Days of Activism Campaign, Nazra launched “#Wa7ed_Mitr_Morabba3” (One-Meter Squared), in collaboration with Shakmagia Comic Book, American University of Cairo, Cairo University, Harassmap and New Basma for Development which emphasises on women's right to privacy, bodily integrity and right to personal space⁸⁹. The activities of the campaign included publishing on social media comic strips related to the theme of the campaign, conducting seminars and workshops on how to combat sexual harassment in collaboration with Cairo University's anti-sexual harassment unit as well as organisations such as Harassmap and New Basma for Development⁹⁰. In 2016, Nazra along with human rights NGOs such as CEWLA, El-Nadeem Center, and New Women Foundation organised a joint campaign called “It Happens” which focused on the issue of rape in an attempt to map instances, spaces, victims and perpetrators, whether it be at night or day, by fathers or friends or uncles or husbands or strangers, in public or private spaces, or of old or young women. This year's campaign coincided with the foreign funding Case 173 whereby organisations were restrained from conducting any activities. Instead, they released certain recommendations pertaining to the rehabilitation and privacy of the survivors as well as legal redress and policies⁹¹. They also highlighted the issue of civil society clampdown in a joint statement released during the closing of the campaign.

⁸⁸ See “Schedule of Events, “Qanun Nashaz” Campaign: Behind Every Abused Woman, There is a Law – In the context of the 16-day Campaign for the Elimination of Violence against Women, from November 25th to December 10th 2014,” *Nazra for Feminist Studies*, November 14, 2015, accessed March 25, 2019, <https://nazra.org/sites/nazra/files/attachments/nashaz-law-campaign-event-schedule.pdf>

⁸⁹ “As part of the Events of the 16-Days of Activism Campaign to Combat Violence against Women, Nazra For Feminist Studies Launches “Wa7ed Mitr Morabba3” (One Meter Squared) to Assert Women's Right to Privacy, Personal Space and Bodily Integrity,” *Nazra for Feminist Studies*, November 25, 2015, Press Release, accessed April 19, 2019, <https://nazra.org/sites/nazra/files/attachments/one-meter-squared-campaign.pdf>

⁹⁰ “Calendar of Activities for #Wa7ed_Mitr_Morabba3 - The 16 Days of Activism Campaign to Combat Violence against Women and Gender-Based Violence,” *Nazra for Feminist Studies*, November 25, 2015, accessed April 3, 2019, <https://nazra.org/sites/nazra/files/attachments/calendar-activities-one-meter-squared-campaign.pdf>

⁹¹ “Closing Statement for “It Happens” Campaign,” *Nazra for Feminist Studies*, December 12, 2016, accessed April 14, 2019, <https://nazra.org/sites/nazra/files/attachments/closingstatementforithappenscampaign.pdf>

In 2017, the campaign “Fantasy or Reality” lobbied for National Council for Women (NCW) to implement National Strategy to Combat Violence against Women issued in 2015⁹². The events of 2017 campaign included publishing research papers and graphic designs to spread awareness and a press conference which announced the draft of a law to combat violence against women. “You Have no Right”, the 2018 edition of the 16 Days of Activism Campaign focused on violence faced by women journalists and lawyers by publishing testimonials and videos from focus group discussions participated by interested lawyers and media persons⁹³. The deeper understanding that violence against women cannot be dissociated from everyday struggle for democracy, dignity and justice is reflected in all these campaigns and support programmes.

One of the most remarkable endeavours that Nazra had undertaken was to document the cases of sexual harassment in Tahrir Square which gained much media attention and later warranted the repressive treatment by SCAF and later governments⁹⁴. Between 2012 and 2014, Nazra documented more than 500 cases of sexual abuse during the protests in the public sphere⁹⁵. As a part of the Feminist Organization Coalition, Nazra held protests and demonstrations against cases of mob sexual abuses, gang rapes in the Tahrir Square as well as forced virginity tests on women protestors⁹⁶. The organization also played significant role in bringing together different anti-sexual harassment groups like Operation Anti-Sexual Harassment (OpAntiSH), Harass-map, Tahrir Bodyguard and together with them organised support groups, rescue teams, providing psychological and medical assistance to the victims

⁹²“Closing Statement of ‘Fantasy or Reality’ Campaign,” *Nazra for Feminist Studies*, December 10, 2017, accessed April 19, 2019, <https://nazra.org/sites/nazra/files/attachments/closing-statement-fantasy-or-reality-campaign.pdf>

⁹³“Closing Statement of ‘You Have no Right’ Campaign,” *Nazra for Feminist Studies*, December 10, 2018, accessed April 19, 2019, <https://nazra.org/sites/nazra/files/attachments/closingstatment-youhavenoright.pdf>

⁹⁴ See “Testimony from a Survival of Gang Rape on Tahrir Square Vicinity,” *Nazra for Feminist Studies*, blogpost January 26, 2013, accessed April 14, 2019, <https://nazra.org/en/2013/01/testimony-survival-gang-rape-tahrir-square-vicinity>.

⁹⁵ “First Verdict in Cases of Mob-Sexual Assault and Gang Rape in Tahrir Square is No End to the Story; All Previous Crimes of Sexual Violence must be Investigated,” *Nazra for Feminist Studies*, joint statement, July 19, 2014, accessed April 24, 2019, <http://nazra.org/en/node/342>

Also see Elisabeth Johansson-Nogués, “Gendering the Arab Spring? Rights and (in)security of Tunisian, Egyptian and Libyan women,” *Security Dialogue* 44, no. 5/6 (October-December 2013):407, DOI: 10.1177/0967010613499784. Also see “Testimonies on the Recent Sexual Assaults on Tahrir Square Vicinity,” *Nazra for Feminist Studies*, June 13, 2012, accessed April 24, 2019, <https://nazra.org/en/2012/06/testimonies-recent-sexual-assaults-tahrir-square-vicinity>

⁹⁶ See “We Pledge to Continue the Pursuit of All Involved in this Crime and Attempted Cover-Up: Military ‘Virginity Testing’ Verdict: Not the Last Battle,” *Nazra for Feminist Studies*, joint statement, March 12, 2012, accessed April 25, 2019, <https://nazra.org/en/2012/03/military-virginity-testing-verdict-not-last-battle>

and initiated programmes to raise public awareness⁹⁷. The campaign, statements and anti-sexual harassment discourses initiated by Nazra addressed the issue of sexual harassment not as exceptional but as a part of the broader issue of deficiency of democracy in Egypt and a replication of violence and abuse, women undergo elsewhere in Egypt.

In another campaign from 2018 called the “Free Wave” campaign, Nazra advocated against all sorts of violence, discrimination that restricts the autonomy of female bodies and independent activities of female persons⁹⁸. The 9-day campaign documented the evolution of feminist movement in Egypt and highlighted issues like violence against women by publishing testimonies of assault survivors and conducting educational sessions on how to combat sexual violence; public sphere representation of women by analysing statistics; and the condition of women human rights defenders by documenting their struggle. Solidarity building and collaborative efforts of the organisation has been manifested in legal, psychological and medical support to activists, particularly women human rights defenders.

Nazra and Case 173

Nazra was added to Case 173 during its second phase of persecutions in February 2016 when several domestic civil society organizations came under state crackdown. In March 2016, Mozn Hassan and three staff members of Nazra were summoned⁹⁹ at the New Cairo Court for interrogation by the investigative judge on charges related to receiving foreign funding¹⁰⁰ which came after several defamation campaigns by the state and publication ban on the organisation. However, Hassan’s interrogation was postponed indefinitely, until she was summoned again in June 2018 and charged with a fine of 30,000 Egyptian Pounds. Hassan was the first civil society activist to be officially interrogated under the case in Egypt. The latest charge imposed on her could lead to life imprisonment according to article 78 of the penal code¹⁰¹. It is interesting that the charges on Hassan were not disclosed showing how

⁹⁷ Jon Nordenson, *Online Activism in the Middle East: Political Power and Authoritarian Governments from Egypt to Kuwait*, (New York: Bloomsbury Publishing, 2017), 68-69

⁹⁸ “Closing Statement of “Free Wave” Campaign,” *Nazra for Feminist Studies*, March 17, 2018, Press Release, accessed April 2, 2019, <https://nazra.org/sites/nazra/files/attachments/closing-statement-free-wave-campaign.pdf>

⁹⁹ “Official Interrogation of Nazra for Feminist Studies in the “Foreign Funding Case” and Summoning of Team Members,” *Nazra for Feminist Studies*, March 20, 2016, accessed March 30, 2019, <http://nazra.org/en/node/461>

¹⁰⁰ “Mozn Hassan Officially Summoned and Charged in the “Foreign Funding Case,” *Nazra for Feminist Studies*, March 22, 2016, accessed April 12, 2019, <http://nazra.org/en/node/463>

¹⁰¹ Nazra for Feminist Studies, *Submission in Light of the 20th Anniversary of the Human Rights Defenders (HRD) Declaration (A/RES/53/144) with Focus on Situation of Women Human Rights Defenders (WHRD) in Egypt*, issue brief (OHCHR), accessed April 24, 2019, https://ohchr.org/Documents/Issues/CivicSpace/20Anniversary/42.NGO_NFS.pdf

deliberations and discussions to thwart the activities of CSOs happen behind closed doors without any transparency in the legal procedures whatsoever. In addition, a gag order has been issued on the media for coverage on foreign funding case preventing any form of scrutiny and discussion on the topic publicly. In June 2016, after the imposition of travel ban which was not communicated prior¹⁰², Hassan was stopped at the airport from travelling to Beirut to attend the Executive Committee of the Regional Coalition for Women Human Rights Defenders in the Middle East and North Africa by an order in relation to Case 173 issued by the General Prosecutor.

Several petitions were signed to clear Hassan, amongst many other WHRD, of all the charges by more than 40 civil society organizations including the Feminist Organisations Coalition and 130 academics and activists from the West Asia and North Africa region¹⁰³. In another petition directed at the National Council for Women, nine human rights and feminist organizations including Women Development Forum, Women and Memory Foundation, Al Nadeem Centre etc, appealed to the director of NCW, Maya Morsy to intervene in the recent incidents of attacks on feminist and human rights NGOs as well as WHRDs. Hassan says that “the question of women human rights defenders is a rising question from 2011, and women have been paying the price for their demands. Egyptian women and activists are facing the violations, from arrest to enforced disappearances. In addition, they are facing gender-based violence like sexual harassment, sexual violence by the state and non-state actors, and defamation, in addition to working in the context of systematic closure of the public sphere”.

Nazra's assets and the personal assets of Mozn Hassan in the form of liquid, movable and real estate were frozen in December 2016- January 2017 at the request of the investigative judge in relation to the case¹⁰⁴. Due to these circumstances, and in particular the asset freeze, Nazra closed its office in March 2018. However, despite losing access to the physical office,

¹⁰² “Feminist Activist and Woman Human Rights Defender Mozn Hassan Banned from Travel,” *Nazra for Feminist Studies*, June 27, 2016, accessed April 24, 2019, <https://nazra.org/sites/nazra/files/attachments/feminist-activist-and-woman-human-rights-defender-mozn-hassan-banned-travel.pdf>

¹⁰³ “130 Academics express their solidarity with: Mozn Hassan and Nazra for Feminist Studies,” *Nazra for Feminist Studies*, March 27, 2016, accessed April 23, 2019, https://nazra.org/sites/nazra/files/attachments/solidarity-statement-en_0.pdf

Also see “A Solidarity Statement from the Egyptian Feminist Organisations Coalition with Nazra for Feminist Studies,” *Nazra for Feminist Studies*, March 28, 2016, accessed March 19, 2019 <https://nazra.org/sites/nazra/files/attachments/solidarity-statement.pdf>

¹⁰⁴ “Feminist Activist and Woman Human Rights Defender Mozn Hassan and Nazra for Feminist Studies Included in Asset Freeze Case Associated with Case 173 for the Year 2011 Known as the “NGO Foreign Funding Case,” *Nazra for Feminist Studies*, December 12, 2016, accessed April 14, 2019, <https://nazra.org/sites/nazra/files/attachments/mozn-hassan-and-nazra-asset-freeze-statement.pdf>

Nazra did not shut down, and still operates and conducts their activities and publishing articles without having an office¹⁰⁵. Despite having no space to negotiate with the state, the continuous state targeting has been, to some extent, dealt with successfully by working on a smaller scale with different tools like trying to carry out the same activities but with minimum cost and work on a voluntary basis. The attack directed at Hassan and other WHRDs are more brutal and intensified because as women and feminists they pose a direct challenge to the patriarchal state and its structures. Although limiting themselves to an online space instead of having a physical office has its own benefits and disadvantages, the current political and social environment in Egypt serves as a critical determinant in such a decision.

Implications and strategies arising out of state intervention

Because Nazra worked on projects that enhance gender mainstreaming through awareness programs, campaigns, workshops and seminars, the implications of being ostracised in the mainstream media controlled by the state have been detrimental to their reputation¹⁰⁶. The organisation has been finding it extremely difficult to carry out their activities, at least in the scale they used to, without access to funds and other logistical resources such as event venues and technical amenities. Downsizing their staff, and working on smaller scale has had implications on the scope of their work being restricted to Cairo¹⁰⁷. However, Nazra's online presence was useful in an environment where increasing injustices against women needed to be recorded through whatever modes of communication were available without much governmental duress on their activities. Interestingly, after 2016, although campaigns were launched on the side-lines of 16 Days of Activism Campaign, the campaigns have remained mostly online as an exercise of academic publishing, instead of working according to a schedule on the ground level as they did prior to 2016 when they had access to funds and resources. The situation has only worsened in the succeeding years with 2018 being the year with the most number of women human rights defenders and CSOs being targeted and faced with judicial harassment.

Responding to the increasing state attack on the organization, Nazra is of the opinion that the crackdown is a result of state feeling being threatened because of the political implications of the organization's activities. The human rights perspective that the organizations undertake

¹⁰⁵ Salma El-Naqqash, email correspondence with the researcher, March 19, 2019

¹⁰⁶ (ibid)

¹⁰⁷ (ibid)

poses visible challenges to the patriarchal structures of the state. The relentless struggle that these women go through to realise the vision in the face of utmost pressure and repression is an honourable task and hints at the significance of collaborating with other WHRDs and CSOs in order to build a democratic space.

Case Study 2: Center for Egyptian Women's Legal Assistance (CEWLA) and Azza Soliman

CEWLA was established in 1995 by Egyptian lawyer and activist Azza Soliman as a non-governmental organization in a low income and densely populated area in Cairo called Beaulac el Dakrour. It was established as a part of the fourth wave of feminism (Mubarak period) against the context of lessening restrictions on civil society organisations¹⁰⁸. It is a legal assistance group that works with underprivileged women who do not have the resources to address their issues legally. Beaulac el Dakrour is an area predominantly inhabited by those who have immigrated from rural Upper Egypt to find jobs in the city. This includes a large number of women who are uneducated and working on daily-wage basis who are culturally and socially conditioned to normalise injustices in sectors like employment, family law, sexual health etc.. CEWLA has been mostly engaged in educating such underprivileged women about rights and legal provisions to demand these rights within the system.

Ideological Underpinnings of the Organisation

CEWLA envisions a society in which both sexes are treated equally and believes that change is possible through the same system that seeks to discriminate on the basis of gender and economic position. In fact, as an Islamic feminist organisation, CEWLA tries to integrate feminist perspective rooted in Islamic values into their narratives and activities by acknowledging the fact that they cannot move forward neglecting a major section of the society. CEWLA perceives women's rights as integral to human rights and pertinent to both private and public spheres. In fact, it holds the view that fight against violence against women in public sphere is not separate and should not be exclusive of the same in the private sphere.

¹⁰⁸ Hala Kamal, "A Century of Egyptian Women's Demands: The Four Waves of the Egyptian Feminist Movement," in *Gender and Race Matter: Global Perspectives on Being a Woman*. (Emerald Group Publishing Limited, 2016) 12

CEWLA functions on the basis of two concerns¹⁰⁹: one, pertains to the legal nature of the organisation by providing legal support and assistance to poor urban women pertaining to their rights in accordance with international law and guaranteed by the Egyptian legislations and constitution, as well as lobbying for reforms in the discriminatory provisions in the law in Egypt, through collaborative lobbying efforts with other human rights as well as feminist organisations such as Nazra, EIPR and so on. For CEWLA, the fight against discriminatory provisions within the system starts with in-depth understanding of the legal nuances. This understanding has manifested in the multitude of CEWLA's campaigns and workshops in disseminating legal knowledge and skills to women from underprivileged backgrounds as well as to legal bodies and NGOs. Moreover, CEWLA was a part of the Feminist Coalition and Women and Constitution Committee which worked relentlessly to mainstream gender in the 2012 constitution¹¹⁰. The second concern of the organisation pertains to the activist nature of the organisation which monitors the statistics of violence against women (VAW) such as female genital mutilation (FGM), dowry deaths, marital rapes, honour crimes¹¹¹, and so on through ground-level research as well as in collaboration with other organisations and groups, and launches legal as well as awareness campaigns against such crimes.

Activities, services and campaigns

CEWLA has eight units to carry out their activities: Legal Cases unit functions as a provider of legal services by representing women in court and providing legal advice in the case of family law matters like divorce, housing, child custody, etc¹¹². The group supports women who are in need of legal assistance to whom it may otherwise be unavailable especially because of their social, political and economic position. Documentation and Publishing unit launches fight against discriminatory laws to ensure legal equity and equal treatment of women in the society¹¹³. They also collect and disseminate information regarding women's and children's issues focusing on the elimination of all forms of violence against women from

¹⁰⁹ Fatma Khafagy, *Honour Killings in Egypt*, report (Women's Watch, 2015), 2-4, accessed April 21, 2019, <https://www.un.org/womenwatch/daw/egm/vaw-gp-2005/docs/experts/khafagy.honorcrimes.pdf>.

¹¹⁰ Mohamed Al Agati, *Women and Equal Citizenship: Analysis of the New Constitution of Egypt*, Arab Forum for Citizenship in Transition, International Peace Institute, December 2012, 17-24, accessed March 13, 2019, <https://www.ipinst.org/images/pdfs/women-and-constitution-egypt-english3.pdf>.

¹¹¹ Centre for Egyptian Women's Legal Assistance (CEWLA), "'Crimes of honour' as violence against women in Egypt, in *Honour': Crimes, paradigms and violence against women*, ed. . Welchman L. and Hossain S. (London: Zed Books, 2005) 137-159

¹¹² *Women's Empowerment through Stage Animated Awareness and Lobbying "WESAL,"* report (UN Women, 2012), 63.

¹¹³ See Fatma Khafagy, *Honour Killings in Egypt*, report (Women's Watch, 2015), 2-4, accessed 19 April, 2019, <https://www.un.org/womenwatch/daw/egm/vaw-gp-2005/docs/experts/khafagy.honorcrimes.pdf>.

honour killings to domestic abuse to FGM, in order to pressurise the government to frame women's rights in accordance with the international laws and conventions. Social Research and Survey Unit studies the problems faced by women in the society and prioritises these issues by suggesting redress through legal methods as well as their rehabilitation¹¹⁴. Legal Services unit helps women and children to get official documents such as identity cards and birth certificates which are necessary so that they are integrated into the service and public distribution sector and have access to healthcare and education¹¹⁵. In addition, Research and Studies Unit examines and reports on women's rights issues in Egypt. The initial research on honours crimes originated from the realisation that there is a dearth of data and awareness at the official and societal level which includes civil society actors regarding crimes of honour¹¹⁶. Official records of the phenomenon were missing, normalising the practice outside the framework of law and order which prompted the organization to bring forth the issue to the front of their feminist agenda. The research unit undertakes a systematic approach to research¹¹⁷ on sensitive issues like honour crimes by collecting news articles; examining court sentences on murderers; cases that were convicted or not convicted; conducting discussions with legislators and policy makers, and interviewing victims or their families. Literacy and Continuing Education unit conducts basic literacy and continuing education classes for men and women to impart them additional life skills. Developmental projects are a core program of CEWLA based on the idea that education and services would improve the social standing of women in Egypt¹¹⁸. Training and Awareness Unit is one of the core units that disseminate knowledge on legal rights to women as well as educate them on the discriminatory practices within the legal system. They also conduct seminars and classes that educate women on their legal rights as well as how to take care of their sexual health. Their classes and seminars deal with taboo topics of sexual rights and sexual health which are more often than not skipped in

¹¹⁴ Sarah Baraket, *The Cost of Justice: Exploratory Assessment on Women's Access to Justice in Lebanon, Jordan, Egypt and Yemen*, report (Oxfam, 2018), 19-20, accessed 29 April, 2019, <https://oxfamlibrary.openrepository.com/bitstream/handle/10546/620488/rr-womens-access-to-justice-mena-040618-en.pdf?sequence=4>

¹¹⁵ *Women's Empowerment through Stage Animated Awareness and Lobbying "WESAL"*, report (UN Women, 2012), 63.

¹¹⁶ *Egypt Violence Against Women Study: Summary Report*, report (USAID, 2009), 59, accessed 29 April, 2019, https://www.cepal.org/mujer/noticias/paginas/7/42837/internal_link_EGYPT_VIOLENCE.pdf.

¹¹⁷ See Fatma Khafagy, *Honour Killings in Egypt*, report (Women's Watch, 2015), 2-4, accessed 19 April, 2019, <https://www.un.org/womenwatch/daw/egm/vaw-gp-2005/docs/experts/khafagy.honorcrimes.pdf>.

¹¹⁸ Centre for Egyptian Women's Legal Assistance (CEWLA), "'Crimes of honour' as violence against women in Egypt, in *Honour': Crimes, paradigms and violence against women*, ed. . Welchman L. and Hossain S. (London: Zed Books, 2005) 137-159

school curriculum¹¹⁹ as lack of awareness among young girls and women is an important determinant of cultural conformity. Additionally, there is an International Relations Unit which is involved in coordinating funds from domestic as well as international donors.

CEWLA's functioning has been both independent and associational in nature, adapting to the demands of the situation, focusing on both macro-level demands such as legal reforms and microlevel demands such as representing women in courts, conducting educational and training sessions and so on. Accordingly, CEWLA focuses on local communities through independent as well as associational methods of activism to empower women by addressing violation of women's rights by raising awareness on how to legally gain social, political, economic and cultural rights. CEWLA has been networking with grassroots actors by identifying positive deviants (those who do not carry out and vocally opposed to practices like FGM) and conducting focus group discussion amongst them to strengthen their perspective on the gains of discontinuing old practices¹²⁰. Participants of the discussions were also encouraged to speak to families and individuals who still supported FGM in an effort to demystify the belief that FGM is a religious and medical requirement.

CEWLA's associational endeavours with media persons, lawyers, judges, local leaders, religious leaders and NGOs like Egyptian Center for Women's Right (ECWR), Nazra, El-Nadeem and New Women's Research Center¹²¹ has enabled inclusive discussions and roundtables pertaining to micro-level and macro-level feminist questions. CEWLA was also a pioneering member of the NGO network Alliance for Arab Women which collectively deals with the issue of VAW in collaboration with other NGOs, independent activists, academics, journalists, lawyers, social workers, local leaders, and religious leaders. Interestingly, reflective of its Islamic feminist underpinnings, CEWLA's emphasis on integrating religious leaders into emancipatory discourse and activities originates from the holistic view of progress situated within a majorly Islamic society. The organisation subscribes to the idea that Islam is a religion

¹¹⁹ "Taking back justice with grassroots women in Egypt," Global Fund for Women, accessed 19 April, 2019, <https://www.globalfundforwomen.org/grassroots-women-in-egypt-take-back-justice/>

¹²⁰ Julia M. Masterson and Julie Hanson Swanson, *Female Genital Cutting: Breaking the Silence, Enabling Change*, report (International Center for Research on Women and The Centre for Development and Population Activities, 2000), 1-35, accessed April 30, 2019, <https://www.icrw.org/wp-content/uploads/2016/10/Female-Genital-Cutting-Breaking-the-Silence-Enabling-Change.pdf>

¹²¹ Angie Abdelmonem, "Anti-Sexual Harassment Activism in Egypt: Transnationalism and the Cultural Politics of Community Mobilization" (PhD diss., Arizona State University, 2016) 4.

of justice¹²² and that room for gender justice can be made within it through gendered reinterpretation of the scriptures.

If CEWLA were initially involved in both individual cases of empowerment¹²³ as well as macro-level legal changes, in the months immediately succeeding the revolution it had mostly relocated its focus and resources to macro-level legal campaigns associationally, calling for increased political representation of women and inclusion of gender agenda in post-Arab spring government¹²⁴. For instance, CEWLA along with other members of the Egyptian Feminist Organisations Coalition submitted a set of recommendations and suggestions to the Constituent Assembly pertaining to implementation of CEDAW, supremacy of international law and human rights provisions and so on¹²⁵. The Feminist Coalition document recommended gender inclusive selection criteria for the Constituent Assembly representative of the diversity of Egyptian society. They called for respect of cultural, political, environmental, civil, social and economic rights as stipulated in the human rights charters as well as representation of women of all ages, employment sectors, and identities based on class, creed, religion, ethnicity and origin¹²⁶. Concurrently, alongside organisations like Harassmap, EIPR and Nazra, CEWLA has been an active co-coordinator of annual activities of 16 Days of Activism Campaign which seeks to spread awareness on VAW, thematizing a different aspect of the issue each year.

Just as CEWLA's research and campaigns contribute to the continuation of women's rights in Egypt, its position as an activism-oriented organisation is perceived by the regime as a threat to its authoritarian endeavours. Over the years, CEWLA has been successful in striking balance between upholding a strong feminist discourse without compromising their agency and providing assistance and services to women. However, the consequence of genuine research and activism has been repressive clampdowns and targeted state attacks that cripple the functioning of the organisation.

¹²² Azza Soliman, "An Interview with Azza Soliman- Women's Rights Defender," interviewed by Nadine Ghoury, *ActionAid UK*, Soundcloud, September 29, 2015, audio, 10:50, accessed May 13, 2019, <https://soundcloud.com/actionaid-uk/an-interview-with-azza-soliman>

¹²³ (ibid), 4:17

¹²⁴ One such notable efforts was to reform flawed provisions in the penal code such as Article 17, a legally redundant clause which was increasingly used to discount or waiver punishment for VAW.

¹²⁵ Mohamed Al Agati, *Women and Equal Citizenship: Analysis of the New Constitution of Egypt*, Arab Forum for Citizenship in Transition, International Peace Institute, December 2012, 17-21, accessed March 13, 2019, <https://www.ipinst.org/images/pdfs/women-and-constitution-egypt-english3.pdf>.

¹²⁶(ibid)

CEWLA and Case 173

The organization was included under Case 173 in 2016 as a culmination of 30 years of surveillance and targeted attacks on Azza Soliman, leading feminist lawyer and CEWLA's founder. She has played a pivotal role in linking poor underprivileged women to legal assistance and services and increasing the legal accountability for perpetrators of VAW. She was first among many to propose equal nationality laws irrespective of gender as well as a civil law instead of Sha'ria to govern marriage, alimony, divorce, inheritance and custody issues for both Muslims and Christians. In January 2015, Soliman's position as a witness to the killing of WHRD Shaimaa El-Sabbag who was protesting peacefully in Cairo was later converted into that of a defendant in the case for protesting illegally¹²⁷. Although she was acquitted later that year, state surveillance followed as bureaucratic delays. Later, based on a judicial order dating November 17, 2016 when she was on her way to Jordan to participate in a training programme by Musawah movement on women's rights in Islam, Soliman was banned from travelling and later her personal assets and those of CEWLA and her law firm Lawyers for Justice and Peace (LJP) were frozen in December 2016 in the context of Case 173. She was arrested on 7 December 2016, a first in this case, and released on bail amounting 20,000 Egyptian Pounds. The events followed the same pattern as that of other instances of state crackdown, however, the arrest signified escalation of action against WHRDs and feminist NGOs¹²⁸. The accusations leveled against Soliman during the interrogation are establishment of an entity that conducts activities as those of registered organizations, obtaining foreign funds to harm national security and interest, and tax evasion¹²⁹. According to article 78 of the penal code, these could be charges enough for life imprisonment which criminalises receiving foreign funding without state's permission.

After being included under the foreign funding case, CEWLA has faced difficulties in different fronts. Funding requests have been denied by the Ministry which prevents access to

¹²⁷ Update: a Prominent Egyptian Lawyer and Woman Human Rights Defender (WHRD) Azza Soliman Officially Declared a Defendant for Giving her Testimony on the Killing of WHRD Shaimaa ElSabbagh, (Nazra, 2015), accessed April 24, 2019, <https://nazra.org/sites/nazra/files/attachments/ua-whrd-azza-soliman-march-23rd-2015.pdf>

¹²⁸ Soliman had faced prosecution in 2015 when she approached the judiciary as a witness of the fatal shooting and death of a protester by the security personnel, in January 2015 in a peaceful demonstration. The case, however, was turned against her by the prosecutors accusing Soliman and 16 other protestors for protesting without taking prior permission. The court acquitted them of all charges in October 2015.

¹²⁹ "Women Human Rights Defenders International Coalition urges Egyptian authorities to drop charges against Azza Soliman," *Frontline Defenders*, April 3, 2015, accessed April 21, 2019, <https://www.frontlinedefenders.org/en/case/arrest-azza-soliman#case-update-id-756>

resources without which legal and logistical activities of the organization came to a standstill. The procedures to obtain permission to carry on their activities and implement projects as well as gain access to the venues for events have been deliberately prolonged and bureaucratically delayed¹³⁰. State repression which also manifested as smear campaigns, defamatory narratives and national security propaganda has had the effect of local women and communities being hostile to their activities¹³¹. This has negative implications on the overall activities of the organization which has several advocacy programmes as well as grassroots level research networks which prevents linking lawyers and social workers with women facing legal problems such as divorce, custody cases, inheritance issues, alimony and so on.

Interestingly, after being included in the foreign funding case by the government, CEWLA's activities have increasingly come to follow the associational-macro level framework. For, plausibility of independent feminist activism and room for micro-level activism has become extremely constrained. The organisation faced challenges even entering universities like they previously did to conduct research, or renting venues for events, especially if its a political party's venue¹³². The fund cuts and constant media slandering have resulted in downsizing their employees from 32 to 20 and the number of cases from 3000 cases a year to 300 or 500¹³³. The government had closed down several shelters that CEWLA had been using to rehabilitate women who had been survivors of violence¹³⁴. Relocating these women to safe houses so that they can have custody of their children, and securing them legal as well as other services required financing which the organisation was getting depleted of.

The case studies of Nazra and CEWLA are symbolic of the fight put up by civil society organisations and, by extension, Egyptian women's rights movement, representing the most persecuted feminist NGOs to date. Although the registration of the organisations with the Ministry can be seen as a strategic outcome of patriarchal bargain¹³⁵, the results have not been favourable to the organisations in any sense. The general goal of repressive measures initiated

¹³⁰ "Taking back justice with grassroots women in Egypt," Global Fund for Women, accessed April 19, 2019, <https://www.globalfundforwomen.org/grassroots-women-in-egypt-take-back-justice/>

¹³¹ (ibid)

¹³² S. Mohammed, "Under the State's Gaze: Repression Against Women's Rights Organisations In Egypt," *TIMEP*, May 28, 2018, accessed April 24, 2019, <https://timep.org/civil-society/under-the-states-gaze-repression-against-womens-rights-organisations-in-egypt/>

¹³³ "Azza Soliman: Raised on justice and kindness," *Amnesty International*, June 21, 2018, accessed April 19, 2019, <https://www.amnesty.org.uk/azza-soliman-raised-justice-and-kindness>

¹³⁴ "Women Survivors of Violence: Where to Go?" *Nazra for Feminist Studies*, August 15, 2016, accessed April 20, 2019, <https://nazra.org/sites/nazra/files/attachments/women-survivors-violence-where-go-en.pdf>

¹³⁵ Deniz Kandiyoti, "Bargaining With Patriarchy," *Gender & Society* 2, no. 3 (September 1988): 278-281, accessed April 23, 2019, doi:10.1177/089124388002003004.

by the state has been to ameliorate autonomous feminist movement which stands as a threat to the state's claim to unlimited authority in Egypt.

Periodization of repression after Arab Spring

In a general post-Arab spring periodization of repression into Morsi and El-Sisi period, despite the fact that Morsi had not particularly encouraged NGOs, it was undoubtedly a much liberal space for feminist NGOs. This is evident from the trajectory of Case 173 as used by both SCAF¹³⁶ and El-Sisi government in 2011 and from 2013 respectively to gradually fasten the grip of state control around CSOs. The years in between the first wave of raids in 2011 and the sentencing in 2013 were largely silent on the issue not least because of the Islamist regime's progressive perception of civil society but largely because of its indifference to it. Different regimes throughout the authoritarian history of Egypt has followed more or less similar methods of repression but the scale of surveillance under El-Sisi is so disabling such that any attempt to have a conversation about it is thwarted.

What marks El-Sisi from other dictators before him is the obliteration of his political opponents to which he had devoted most of the initial years of his rule. The crackdown was so systematic that any possibility of circumventing the restrictions are being tackled logistically as well as psychologically. The appeal of El-Sisi and by extension, the army, as the guardians of the country from external terror and extremist threats in the Sinai region legitimises the use of violence against civil society whose progressive politics is still deemed alien and a threat to Egyptian culture, values and sovereignty¹³⁷. This is aided by the narratives propagated through state media and suppression of independent journalism¹³⁸. However, it would be wrong to say that the state actively pursued to demolish women's rights movement and feminist organisations in Egypt. Paradoxically, antagonising feminist movements and organisations originated not from direct hostility towards women's rights, but from the overlapping nature of the feminist politics in Egypt which is intersectional, and vouches for overall - political, cultural, social and economic - emancipation of women. However, patriarchal and masculine features of the state figure in its attitude, first in its denial of women's rights as a pertinent topic

¹³⁶“Egypt: A Year of Attacks on Egypt's Freedom of Expression,” *Human Rights Watch*, February 11, 2012, accessed April 28, 2019, <https://www.hrw.org/news/2012/02/11/egypt-year-attacks-free-expression>

¹³⁷ Dina Rezek, “Sisi's Attempts to Entrench Authoritarianism in Egypt Reveal Regime's Fear,” *The Globe Post*, March 15, 2019, accessed April 14, 2019 <https://theglobepost.com/2019/03/15/egypt-sisi-authoritarianism/>

¹³⁸Todd Ruffner, *Under Threat: Egypt's Systematic Campaign Against NGOs*, POMED, March 2015, 7-19, accessed March 24, 2019, <https://pommed.org/wp-content/uploads/2015/03/Under-Threat-Egypt-Systematic-Campaign-against-NGOs.pdf>.

of discussion in the constitution drafting processes and consequently in policy-making in contemporary Egypt.

Legitimacy of Repression and Distrust of NGOs

The increasingly hostile environment in Egypt for feminist organisations after 2014 reflects the general patriarchal conservative tendencies in the country which is fed by the narratives of state media. Because, authoritarian rule cannot sustain itself through fear alone, but ultimately seeks legitimacy through inciting meta-narratives of national security and national interest which is polarising in effect¹³⁹. The defamation campaigns against Nazra and CEWLA in state-controlled media was a key tool in perpetuating this narrative that evokes values like cultural nationalism and the fear of national security breach to portray feminist NGOs as potential threats to national interest. It is worth mentioning that, because patriarchy is a very diffused form of power, the works of WHRDs are challenged not only at the state level structures but also by many societal actors such as family, religious institutions, community structures, law, media, school systems etc. who would rather believe the defamatory stories than rethink the patriarchal norms that the feminist activists challenge. The emancipatory and advocacy programmes of Nazra and CEWLA as well as the WHRDs affiliated to them are thus being antagonised both by state and societal actors and forced to face different forms of violations vis a vis their male colleagues¹⁴⁰. What follows is lack of legitimacy for the organisations and their activities at the grassroots level without which their very existence becomes questionable.

Both Nazra and CEWLA have faced persecution under Case 173 since 2016 with immediate implications on their activities and reputation in the public eye. Azza Soliman of CEWLA was imprisoned and interrogated, and her, as well as her organisations' assets, frozen and travel ban imposed. The scope of CEWLA's activities was severely reduced after shortage of resources forced them to downsize the number of staff as well as the number of cases they were taking up each year widening the legal services gap they were able to narrow prior to 2016. Nazra also faced a shortage of resources forcing them to search for alternative methods to function although in small scale. Director and founder of Nazra, Mozn Hassan as well as three of its staff were summoned by the court and interrogated. Hassan was banned from travelling followed by freezing of personal assets as well as the assets of the organisation.

¹³⁹ (ibid)

¹⁴⁰ Mai Shams, Whatsapp message to the researcher, March 19, 2019

Nazra was forced to shut down their physical office but continued their activities online. It has significantly reduced the number of training programs and workshops Nazra used to conduct largely to train young people on gender related issues and skill development. Considering the kind of work involved in by Mozn Hassan and Azza Soliman at regional level, state also targets networking, solidarity building and collaborative projects among different organizations and WHRDs in the WANA region. Persecuting powerful and influential figures like Soliman and Hassan is also a tactic used by the state to instil fear in other WHRDs who could possibly speak up against the regime¹⁴¹. Besides, both Nazra and CEWLA are increasingly monitored by state apparatus which significantly curtails their freedom of expression and knowledge production. Because research and grassroots level activities publish factsheets and statistics that expose and question the repressive nature of state, individual's as well as organisation's works have increasingly become the target by the state apparatus.

Figuring of religion and Arabness

The dynamics between religion and feminist movements in post-Arab spring Egypt is interesting and subjected to the political context of the country. Against the background of weakening of Muslim Brotherhood and Islamic charity groups, CEWLA, as an Islamic feminist organisation, tries to take an inclusive approach to religious leaders and religion by extension as allies to the feminist agenda while conducting workshops, seminars and roundtable. Islamic feminist thought has largely manifested in the activities of CEWLA which calls for the reform of personal status laws, rooted in gender perspective. Such an approach to women's rights originates from the acknowledgement that dialogue and discussions on women's rights issues must be inclusive of all sections of the society to achieve real, effective and sustainable progress. Nazra and CEWLA have been fighting gendered crimes like FGM, sexual harassment, violence against women and honour killings which are so rampant in WANA, and particularly in Egypt. It has been pivotal for both organisations to undertake a culturally progressive as well as sensitive stance to resist the perpetuation of such practices as well as educate the vast majority of Egyptians who conform to it for cultural reasons.

Concluding remarks

Hassan and Soliman are striking examples of state's war against WHRDs, freedom of expression, feminist organisations and feminist movement in general. Post-Arab Spring Egypt,

¹⁴¹ Salma EL-Naqqash, email correspondence with researcher, March 19, 2019

particularly under the rule of El-Sisi, is a period in which clampdown on civil society organizations has become institutionalised. Criminalisation of civil society for expressing their critical views against the state has come to pass on as the norm in today's Egypt. Undoubtedly, the context of harassing WHRDs in Egypt is only a reflection of the societal attitude of violence against women in general. Because their speaking up against gendered injustices committed in homes and streets, perpetrated by family members, state and non-state actors is not in line with the state's vision of women's rights, the state dismisses their activities as 'irresponsible liberation'. Defamation campaigns have resulted in more damage than direct attacks on civil society in the years following El-Sisi's rule as loss of target audience implies a rejection of the politics that they stand for, which translates to rejection of feminist agenda and women's rights too. However, the determination of Nazra and CEWLA as well as many other feminist organisations to carry on their activities in the face of atrocities has become a true testament to the strength in solidarity-building and resilience to persist. The vicious cycle of state apparatus and state media catering to certain retrogressive elements in the society, reinforcement of legitimacy of authoritarianism and patriarchy, and the silencing of dissident sections make the case for one of the most repressive periods in Egypt for women's rights as well as feminist movement in general.

Conclusions

As one of the earliest women's rights movement in West Asia and North Africa, feminist movement in Egypt and its negotiations with the state in post-Arab spring contexts highlights the pitfalls and shortcomings of the vision of the 2011 Arab uprisings in Egypt and by extension, post-uprising transitional processes. Based on the literature of feminist resistance, women's rights movements and post-revolutionary state-breakdowns, this study is an attempt to map feminist resistance strategies applied by ordinary women, feminist activists, women human rights defenders and feminist organisations in Egypt in their engagements with the Egyptian state after the 2011 Arab spring.

The major research questions that the study tried to address were: what are the different feminist perspectives in International Relations, and how did feminist perspectives and movements evolve in Egypt? How did the democratic transition process and post-Arab spring regimes engage with and accommodate women's rights? And, what are the methods/strategies followed by feminist movements and organisations in negotiating with the Egyptian state? Contextualising the evolution of feminist movements in Egypt provides the socio-political and cultural backgrounds to the nature of feminist struggles, legacies of feminist demands and negotiation strategies and the emergence of different trends and tendencies in the feminist movements in contemporary Egypt. The engagement of various strands of feminist ideologies with the society and regimes in Egypt before and after the Arab spring was pertinent to gauge their legitimacy, contextualise their relevance and choice of strategies. This study traced the trajectories of women's rights in post-Arab spring contexts, by analysing the feminist gains and defeats in terms of women's political rights, personal freedoms and organizational autonomy under the two governments in power after the Arab spring. The space of state-feminist negotiations is studied at a closer level by a broad analysis of two case studies of feminist NGOs who were at the receiving end of state-sponsored civil society clampdown by highlighting their responses and strategies in the face of state repression.

The study began by presenting a critique of mainstream International Relations Theories (IRT) with reference to its theoretical preoccupations with concepts of power, national interest, anarchy, security and so on. From the discussions on IRT, one can draw the inference that Realist and Liberalist theories neglects the intersection of social relations, especially gender, while

interpreting international politics, resulting in the emergence of Feminist IR scholarship, firstly in the West and later in the non-Western contexts. Feminist discussions in the non-Western countries, particularly the Global South, which was also a result of Western feminists' predominance in the discipline concerned with developing a perspective to analyse the subjectivities of women of Global South. An interesting strand of feminist thought that developed in the context of West Asia and North Africa (WANA) region is Islamic feminism which calls for the emancipation of women within the Islamic framework through rigorous feminist reinterpretations of the Quranic texts, which also problematise the Western imposition of what is considered progress in terms of women's rights. Such discussions have increasingly become pertinent in the aftermath of Arab spring which offered women in WANA with the opportunity to assert their rights and freedoms.

The study further examined the historical evolution of the feminist movements in Egypt, tracing the evolution from the inception of feminist consciousness and development of women's movements in pre-independence period up to the resignation of Hosni Mubarak as president in 2011, in four periods. The formation of feminist consciousness and its development into a full-fledged movement paralleled the liberation struggle of Egypt against British colonialism in late 19th and early 20th centuries. Feminist movement at that time benefited from the rapid industrialising and modernising state imbibing nationalist, secularist and anti-colonial values, aided by the exposure to educational opportunities. This was followed by Nasser's period of centralised welfare state under which there were diverse opportunities for women's public participation. The period was also crucial in the women's movement with the emergence of heterogeneous women's activism influenced by socialist, secular, liberal and Islamic ideologies. However, the appropriation of women's rights by Nasser's secular state challenged the growth of autonomous women's movements in Egypt. Anwar Sadat's policies to support Islamist groups in Egypt were pivotal in the development of Islamic feminism as an important strand in Egyptian feminist movement, although detrimental to secular and socialist feminisms. His later policies to support women's rights through personal law reforms and implementation of international conventions pertaining to women's rights without addressing the issue of hierarchical gender relations in private sphere were largely seen as strategy of state feminism. Mubarak followed similar strategies in co-opting women's rights in public participation while making cosmetic changes in personal laws without challenging the male privilege embedded in them. The growth and legitimacy of feminist organisations in Egypt in turn led to confrontations with the state, as

many organisations were increasingly catering to Egyptian women as service providers in the dearth of state welfare activities.

The study went on to throw light on the negotiations of feminist movement with the post Arab Spring political dispositions. The military takeover of post-revolutionary transitional processes excluded gender agenda in the formation of constituent assembly, despite the united lobbying efforts of different feminist organisations of diverse ideological dispositions. Morsi's election and the subsequent Islamic constitution relegated women's rights to the margins by emphasising on women's traditional roles which was criticised as retrogressive by both Islamic and secular feminists. Military takeover headed by El-Sisi was a divisive factor in the feminist movement, with secular feminists initially supporting the military as the saviour of Egyptians from conservative Islamist rule although Islamic feminists viewed it as a counter-revolution to the democratic gains of the Arab spring. However, totalitarian ambitions and centralisation of power under El-Sisi which manifested as indiscriminate crackdown on all autonomous feminist organisations constrained the space of feminist negotiations with the state. This had a unifying effect on secular and Islamic strands of feminisms whose activism and objectives have been shaped by the struggle against state paternalism.

Further, the study presented the case studies of two feminist organisations: Nazra, a secular feminist NGO and CEWLA, an Islamic feminist NGO, who have been conducting independent research and grassroots level activities as instances of how feminist organisations have been constrained by state repression and the strategies and methods adopted by them to negotiate with the state. To a large extent, these two organisations are pivotal in furthering the objectives of feminist movement in Egypt in post-Arab spring period. Nazra conducted campaigns and workshops to train women for public political participation as well as launched comprehensive fight against violence against women in both private and public spheres. CEWLA's legal efforts and inclusive approach to women's emancipation by incorporating religion into the awareness activities and programmes were substantial and gathered grassroots level legitimacy. The activities of both Nazra and CEWLA challenged the progressive outlook and centralised authority of the state which led to them being included under Case 173 or foreign funding case. The specific case constrained the feminist organisations from receiving funds and grants. Though bureaucratic delays, asset freezing, travel bans and interrogations severely constrained their activities to some

extent, the state sponsored defamation campaigns weakened their grassroots level activities. The crackdown was supplemented by narratives of national security threats and foreign intervention, and catered to the patriarchal and nationalist mindset of majority of Egyptians.

Women's movements, feminist organisations and women's rights activism in post-Arab spring Egypt has an interesting trajectory. Although there was a retrogression of women's rights after the election of Mohammed Morsi of Muslim Brotherhood in 2012, it was the clampdown on individual activism under the rule of El-Sisi that was more debilitating and detrimental to feminist organisations in Egypt as one could draw from the case studies. Restrictive laws prior to the military take over and NGO laws of 2014 prompted women's organisations and groups to engage in a patriarchal bargain with the state by registering with the Ministry of Social Solidarity in return for room for activism. However, Kandiyoti's concept of patriarchal bargain is irrelevant pertaining to the post-2014 contexts, as neither productive negotiations nor measurable gains were achieved. Whereas patriarchal bargains pertain to the exchange of autonomy for responsibility, post-Arab spring contexts exhibit one-sided imposition of patriarchal values in exchange for lesser benefits rather it was before. Hence, rather than safeguarding/maintaining already gained rights, the organisations enter into feminist negotiations with the state only to lose more autonomy and submit to state surveillance.

In this context, post-Arab spring women's organisations in Egypt fit into the directed typology endorsed by Molyneux whereby women's groups, associations and feminist organisations are directly brought under the control and surveillance mechanisms of an outside entity, here the state, and leaves no room for negotiation. Case 173 as well as other restrictions have acutely limited the scope of feminist activism in post-Arab spring Egypt which makes associational nature of women's activism impossible to the scenario prior to 2014 NGO laws. In spite of women gaining access to political participation, and promulgation of the 2014 constitution as a departure from the 2012 Islamist constitution, the absence of state's commitment to women's rights is evidence to the political agenda of progressive rhetoric with no concrete actions.

Post-Arab spring contexts also witnessed the blurring of divisions between secular and Islamic feminist movements in Egypt, evident from the overlapping of objectives and strategies against the common threat which is the state, as inferred from the case studies. Both secular and Islamic feminist organisations in Egypt attempt to retain grassroots level legitimacy and integrate

sections of the society which previously lay outside the purview of NGO activities. Departing from the erstwhile concept of separation of private and public sphere, and non-interference of state in personal laws, secular feminism in post-Arab spring contexts is characterised by expanding the scope of their activities to private sphere and increased advocacy for personal and public rights and freedoms of women (echoes of the objectives of Islamic feminism). This change in direction and objectives is not only a derivative of the repressive political context of post-Arab spring Egypt, but also because of the increased transactions with Islamic feminist organisations which confronts patriarchy both in public as well as personal fronts.

In sum, throughout the history of feminist movements in Egypt, feminist activism has been increasingly antagonised by paternalist state actors as well as retrogressive cultural elements in the society. In the post-Arab period, especially under Morsi, the patriarchal structures of state and religion, manifested in a united fashion. In the second phase of post-Arab spring under El-Sisi, though the supremacy of religious authority in society was weakened, cultural and patriarchal values inculcated in society through religious discourses have continued to trigger the state to further the crackdown on feminist activism. Though in the past, different strands of feminists (most notably, secular and Islamic) had to engage with the twin menace of patriarchal state and conservative religion, the most important common threat that has emerged is the patriarchal and authoritarian state in contemporary Egypt.

Bibliography

Books and Journals

- Abdelmonem, Angie, and Susana Galán. "Action-Oriented Responses to Sexual Harassment in Egypt." *Journal of Middle East Womens Studies* 13, no. 1 (March 20, 2017): 154-67. Accessed June 1, 2019. doi:10.1215/15525864-3728767.
- Acharya, Amitav, and Barry Buzan. "Why Is There No Non-Western International Relations Theory? An Introduction." *International Relations of the Asia-Pacific* 7, no. 3 (September 2007): 287-312. Accessed April 22, 2019. doi:https://doi.org/10.1093/irap/lcm012.
- Ackerman, Peter, and Christopher Kruegler. *Strategic Nonviolent Conflict: The Dynamics of People Power in the Twentieth Century*. Westport, CT: Praeger, 1994.
- Ahmed, Leila. *A Quiet Revolution: The Veil's Resurgence from the Middle East to America*. New Haven: Yale University Press, 2011.
- Ahmed, Leila. *Women and Gender in Islam: Historical Roots to a Modern Debate*. Yale University Press, 1992.
- Al-Awadi, Hesham. "Mubarak and the Islamists: Why Did the "Honeymoon" End?" *The Middle East Journal* 59, no. 1 (Winter, 2005): 1-19. Accessed June 21, 2019. doi:10.3751/194034605783996934.
- Alami, Dawoud S. El. "Law No. 100 of 1985 Amending Certain Provisions of Egypts Personal Status Laws." *Islamic Law and Society* 1, no. 1 (1994): 116. Accessed May 27, 2019. doi:10.2307/3399433.
- Arafat, Alaa Al-Din. *The Rise of Islamism in Egypt*. Cham, Switzerland: Palgrave Macmillan, 2017.
- Aydın, Gülşen. "Feminist Challenge to the Mainstream IR." *European Journal of Multidisciplinary Studies* 2, no. 1 (2016): 62. Accessed March 15, 2019. doi:10.26417/ejms.v2i1.p62-69.
- Anthias, Floya, and Nira Yuval-Davis. *Women-Nation-State*. 1st ed. Basingstoke, Eng.: Palgrave Macmillan, 1989.
- Badran, Margot. *Feminists, Islam, and Nation:gender and the Making of Modern Egypt*. Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1995.

- Badran, Margot. "BETWEEN SECULAR AND ISLAMIC FEMINISM/S Reflections on the Middle East and Beyond." *Journal of Middle East Womens Studies* 1, no. 1 (Winter 2005): 6-28. Accessed March 28, 2019. doi:10.2979/mew.2005.1.1.6.
- Baldez, Lisa. "Womens Movements and Democratic Transition in Chile, Brazil, East Germany, and Poland." *Comparative Politics* 35, no. 3 (2003): 253. Accessed March 24. doi:10.2307/4150176.
- Baron, Beth. "Readers and the Womens Press in Egypt." *Poetics Today* 15, no. 2 (Summer 1994): 217. Accessed March 24, 2019. doi:10.2307/1773165.
- Bayat, Asef. *Life as Politics: How Ordinary People Change the Middle East*. Stanford, CA: Stanford University Press, 2013.
- Beckman, Peter R. *Women, Gender, and World Politics: Perspectives, Policies and Prospects*. Westport, CT: Bergin Et Garvey, 1995.
- Beckman, Peter R., and Francine D'Amico. *Women, Gender, and World Politics: Perspectives, Policies and Prospects*. Westport, CT: Bergin Et Garvey, 1995.
- Beissinger, Mark R. "The Semblance of Democratic Revolution: Coalitions in Ukraines Orange Revolution." *American Political Science Review* 107, no. 3 (2013): 574-92. Accessed April 29, 2019. doi:10.1017/s0003055413000294.
- Bier, Laura. *Revolutionary Womanhood: Feminisms, Modernity, and the State in Nasser's Egypt*. Stanford Studies in Middle Eastern and Islamic Societies and Cultures. Stanford, 2011: Stanford University Press.
- Booth, Marilyn. "Woman In Islam: Men And The "Womens Press" In Turn-Of-The-20Th-Century Egypt." *International Journal of Middle East Studies* 33, no. 2 (May 2001): 171-201. Accessed May 26, 2019. doi:10.1017/s002074380100201x.
- Botman, Selma. *Engendering Citizenship in Egypt: The History and Society of Modern Middle East*. New York: Columbia University Press, 1999.
- Buzan, Barry. *People, States and Fear*. Sussex: Harvester Press Group, 1983.
- Charlton, S., J. Everett, and K. Staudt. *Women, State and Development*. Albany: SUNY Press.
- Chenoweth, Erica, and Maria Stephen. *Why Civil Resistance Works: The Strategic Logic of Nonviolent Conflict*. Columbia: Columbia University Press, 2012.
- Cohen, Susan A., and Cory L. Richards. "The Cairo Consensus: Population, Development and Women." *Family Planning Perspectives* 26, no. 6 (December 1994): 272. Accessed May 15, 2019. doi:10.2307/2135895.

- Connell, R. W. "The State, Gender, and Sexual Politics." *Theory and Society* 19, no. 5 (October 1990): 507-44. Accessed May 19, 2019. doi:10.1007/bf00147025.
- Cox, Robert. "Social Forces, States and World Orders: Beyond International Relations Theory." *Millennium: Journal of International Studies* 10, no. 2 (June 1, 1981): 126-55. Accessed March 25, 2019. doi:10.1177/03058298810100020501.
- De Silva De Alwis, Rangita, Anware Mnasri, and Estee Ward. "Women and the Making of the Tunisian Constitution." *Faculty Scholarship*, 2017. Accessed April 8, 2019. doi: <https://dx.doi.org/10.15779/Z38B56D41P>.
- El Baradei, Laila, and Dina Wafa. "Women in the Second Egyptian Parliament Post the Arab Spring: Do They Think They Stand a Chance?" *Journal of International Women's Studies* 14, no. 3 (July 2013): 43-63. Accessed April 18, 2019. <https://vc.bridgew.edu/jiws/vol14/iss3/4>.
- Elshtain, Jean Bethke. *Public Man, Private Woman*. Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Press, 1981.
- Elshtain, Jean. *Women and War*. Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1987.
- Enloe, Cynthia H. "Bananas, Beaches and Bases: Making Feminist Sense of International Politics". Berkeley: University of California Press, 2014.
- Ferguson, Yale H., and Richard W. Mansbach. "Between Celebration and Despair: Constructive Suggestions for Future International Theory." *International Studies Quarterly* 35, no. 4 (December 1991): 363-86. Accessed March 24, 2019. doi:10.2307/2600946.
- Galtung, Johan. "Violence, Peace, and Peace Research." *Journal of Peace Research* 6, no. 3 (1969): 167-91. Accessed February 21, 2019. doi:10.1177/002234336900600301.
- Gheyntanchi, Elham, and Valentine Moghadam. "WOMEN, SOCIAL PROTESTS, AND THE NEW MEDIA ACTIVISM IN THE MIDDLE EAST AND NORTH AFRICA." *International Review of Modern Sociology* 40, no. 1 (Spring 2014). Accessed May 1, 2019. <https://www.jstor.org/stable/43496487>.
- Hatem, Mervat. "The Enduring Alliance of Nationalism and Patriarchy in Muslim Personal Status Laws: The Case of Modern Egypt." *Feminist Issues* 6, no. 1 (March 1986): 19-43. doi:10.1007/bf02685635.
- Hatem, Mervat F. "Economic and Political Liberation in Egypt and the Demise of State Feminism." *International Journal of Middle East Studies* 24, no. 2 (May 1992): 231-51. doi:10.1017/s0020743800021541.

- Hatem, Mervat. "Egyptian Discourses on Gender and Political Liberalization: Do Secularist and Islamist Views Really Differ?" *Middle East Journal* 48, no. 4 (Autumn 1994): 661-76. Accessed April 20, 2019. <https://www.jstor.org/stable/4328746>.
- Hatem, Mervat Fayez. *Literature, Gender, and Nation-building in Nineteenth Century Egypt: The Life and Work of Aisha Taymur*. New York: Palgrave Macmillan, 2011.
- Hoodfar, Homa. *Between Marriage and the Market: Intimate Politics and Survival in Cairo*. Berkeley: University of California Press, 2005.
- Howard-Merriam, Kathleen. "Guaranteed Seats for Political Representation of Women: The Egyptian Example." *Journal of Women, Politics & Policy* 10, no. 1 (October 2008): 17-42. Accessed April 13, 2019. doi:10.1080/1554477x.1990.9970558.
- Htun, Mala, and S. Laurel Weldon. "When Do Governments Promote Womens Rights? A Framework for the Comparative Analysis of Sex Equality Policy." *Perspectives on Politics* 8, no. 1 (March 2010): 207-16. Accessed March 25, 2019. doi:10.1017/s1537592709992787.
- Kamal, Hala. "Inserting Women's Rights in the Egyptian Constitution: Personal Reflections." *Journal for Cultural Research* 19, no. 2 (2015): 150-61. Accessed June 8, 2019. doi:10.1080/14797585.2014.982919.
- Kandiyoti, Deniz. "Bargaining With Patriarchy." *Gender & Society* 2, no. 3 (September 1988): 274-90. accessed April 21, 2019. doi:10.1177/089124388002003004.
- Kandiyoti, Deniz. "Identity and Its Discontents: Women and the Nation." *Millennium: Journal of International Studies* 20, no. 3 (1991): 429-43. Accessed May 1, 2019 doi:10.1177/03058298910200031501.
- Kato, Miwa. "Women of EGYPT: Why Empowerment Requires Changes in Social Norms As Well As Laws." *Cairo Review* 24 (2017): 42-51. Accessed May 12, 2019.
- Ketchley, Neil. *Egypt in the Time of Revolution: Contentious Politics and the Arab Spring*. Cambridge Studies in Contentious Politics. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2017.
- Khattab, Moushira. *Women's Rights Under Egypt's Constitutional Disarray*. Publication. Middle East Program, Wilson Center. Viewpoints No. 15. Wilson Center. 1-8. Accessed April 29, 2019.
- Kirollos, Mariam. "'The Daughters of Egypt Are a Red Line'." *Sur* 24 13, no. 24 (December 10, 2016): 137-53. Accessed April 15, 2019. <https://ssrn.com/abstract=3028752>.

- Korany, Bahgat, and Rabab El-Mahdi. *Arab Spring in Egypt: Revolution and beyond*. Cairo: American University in Cairo Press, 2014.
- Lemons, Katherine. "Sharia Courts and Muslim Personal Law in India: Intersecting Legal Regimes." *Law & Society Review* 52, no. 3 (2018): 603-29. Accessed March 30, 2019. doi:10.1111/lasr.12351.
- Liolos, John. "Erecting New Constitutional Cultures: The Problems & Promise of Constitutionalism Post-Arab Spring." *36 Boston College International & Comparative Law Review* 219, April 2014, 1-36. Accessed May 2, 2019.
- Mahmood, Saba. *Politics of Piety: The Islamic Revival and the Feminist Subject*. Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Press, 2005.
- Mahmood, Saba. *Politics of Piety: The Islamic Revival and the Feminist Subject*. Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Press, 2012.
- Maravankin, Stephanie. "Arab Feminism in the Arab Spring: Discourses on Solidarity, the Socio-Cultural Revolution, and the Political Revolution in Egypt, Tunisia, and Yemen." *Clocks and Clouds* 7, no. 2 (2017). Accessed March 19, 2019. <http://www.inquiriesjournal.com/articles/1632/arab-feminism-in-the-arab-spring-discourses-on-solidarity-the-socio-cultural-revolution-and-the-political-revolution-in-egypt-tunisia-and-yemen>.
- Mayer, Ann. "Rhetorical Strategies and Official Policies on Women's Rights: The Merits and Drawbacks of the New World Hypocrisy." *AL-Raida Journal* 14, no. 80 (Winter 1998): 12-21. Accessed April 25, 2019. doi:<http://dx.doi.org/10.32380/alrj.v0i0.705>.
- McBride, Dorothy, and Amy Mazur. *Comparative State Feminism*. Thousand Oaks, CA: Sage Publications, 1995.
- McLarney, Ellen Anne. *Soft Force: Women in Egypt's Islamic Awakening*. Princeton: Princeton University Press, 2015.
- Mernissi, Fatima. *The Veil and the Male Elite: A Feminist Interpretation of Women's Rights in Islam*. Perseus Books Publishing, 1991.
- Mir-Hosseini, Ziba. "Muslim Women's Quest for Equality: Between Islamic Law and Feminism." *Critical Inquiry* 32, no. 4 (Summer 2006): 629. Accessed February 27, 2019. doi:10.2307/3877129.
- Mir-Hosseini, Ziba. *Islam and Gender the Religious Debate in Contemporary Iran*. Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1999.

- Moghadam, Valentine. "Engendering Democracy after the Arab Spring." *Journal of the Indiana Academy of the Social Sciences* 15, no. 1 (2012): 1-20. Accessed March 28, 2019. <http://digitalcommons.butler.edu/jiass/vol15/iss1/2>.
- Mohanty, Chandra Talpade. "Under Western Eyes: Feminist Scholarship and Colonial Discourses." *Boundary 2*, no. 12 (Spring 1984): 333-58. Accessed April 9, 2019. <https://www.jstor.org/stable/302821>.
- Molyneux, Maxine. "Analysing Women's Movements." *Womens Movements in International Perspective*, December 2001, 140-62. Accessed April 23, 2019. doi:10.1057/9780230286382_7.
- Monier, Elizabeth Iskander, and Annette Ranko. "The Fall of the Muslim Brotherhood: Implications for Egypt." *Middle East Policy* 20, no. 4 (2013): 111-23. Accessed April 9, 2019. doi:10.1111/mepo.12050.
- Morgenthau, Hans J., and Alfred Knopf. *Politics among Nations: The Struggle for Power and Peace*. 5th Ed. New York: A.A. Knopf, 1973.
- Nepstad, Sharon Erickson. "Nonviolent Resistance in the Arab Spring: The Critical Role of Military-Opposition Alliances." *Swiss Political Science Review* 17, no. 4 (2011): 485-91. Accessed March 12, 2019, doi:10.1111/j.1662-6370.2011.02043.x.
- Nepstad, Sharon Erickson. *Nonviolent Revolutions: Civil Resistance in the Late 20th Century*. New York: Oxford University Press, 2011.
- Okail, Nancy. "De-orientalizing Sexual Violence and Gender Discrimination in Egypt." *Global Discourse* 7, no. 2-3 (January 18, 2017): 1-4. Accessed April 26, 2019. doi:10.1080/23269995.2016.1253288.
- Rafael, Vicente L. "The Cultures of Area Studies in the United States." *The Cultures of Area Studies in the United States*, no. 41 (Winter 1994): 91-111. Accessed April 28, 2019. <https://www.jstor.org/stable/466834>.
- Rao, Bhavana. "RESERVATIONS BASED ON PERSONAL LAWS TO CEDAW: A STUDY OF EFFECT ON THE STATUS OF EQUALITY OF WOMEN IN INDIA BY COMPARING IT WITH AFGHANISTAN." *ILI Law Review*, Winter 2016, 49-64. Accessed April 8, 2019. http://ili.ac.in/pdf/p5_bhavana.pdf.
- Runyan, Anne Sisson, and V. Spike Peterson. *Global Gender Issues in the New Millennium. Dilemmas in World Politics*. Boulder: Westview Press. 2014. Accessed April 14, 2019. <https://www.worldcat.org/title/global-gender-issues-in-the-new-millennium/oclc/866923702>.

- Ruth, Lister. *Towards a Gendered Political Economy*. Edited by Joanne Cook, Jennifer Roberts, and Geeorgina Waylen. Palgrave Macmillan, 2000. 98-117.
- Rutherford, Bruce K. *Egypt after Mubarak: Liberalism, Islam, and Democracy in the Arab World*. Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Press, 2014.
- Saadawi, Nawal El, and Adele Newson-Horst. *The Essential Nawal El Saadawi: A Reader*. London: Zed Books, 2013.
- Sadda, Hoda El. *Gender, Nation and the Arabic Novel: Egypt 1892-2008*. Edinburgh: Edinburgh University Press, 2012.
- Sadiqi, Fatima. "Introduction: The Centrality of Women's Movements in the Post-revolution Dynamics in North Africa." In *Women's Movements in Post-"Arab Spring" North Africa*, edited by Fatima Sadiqi, 1-13. Comparative Feminist Series. New York: Palgrave Macmillan, 2016.
- Sadler, Neil. "Myths, Masterplots and Sexual Harassment in Egypt." *The Journal of North African Studies* 24, no. 2 (January 05, 2018): 247-70. Accessed April 28, 2019. doi:10.1080/13629387.2017.1419872.
- Said, Maha El, Lena Meari, and Nicola Pratt. *Rethinking Gender in Revolutions and Resistance: Lessons from the Arab World*. London: Zed Books, Limited, 2015.
- Samir, Doha. "The Muslim Brotherhoods Generational Gap: Politics in the Post-Revolutionary Era." *AlMuntaqa* 1, no. 2 (August 2018): 32. Accessed May 21, 2019. doi:10.31430/almuntaqa.1.2.0032.
- Shahin, Magda, and Yasmeen El-Ghazaly. "The Impact of Notions of Nationalism on Womens Rights in Egypt." *Studies in Ethnicity and Nationalism* 17, no. 2 (December 2017): 177-92. Accessed April 28, 2019. doi:10.1111/sena.12250.
- Sika, Nadine, and Yasmin Khodary. "One Step Forward, Two Steps Back? Egyptian Women within the Confines of Authoritarianism." *Journal of International Women's Studies* 13, no. 5 (October 2012): 91-100. Accessed May 21, 2019. <http://vc.bridgew.edu/jiws/vol13/iss5/9>.
- Sorbera, Lucia. "Body Politics and Legitimacy: Towards a Feminist Epistemology of the Egyptian Revolution." *Contending Legitimacy in World Politics*, June 19, 2016, 169-88. Accessed April 21, 2019. doi:10.4324/9781315174426-16.
- Sylvester, Christine. *Feminist International Relations: An Unfinished Journey*. Cambridge, U.K.: Cambridge University Press, 2002.

- Tadros, Mariz. "The Pitfalls of Disentangling Women's Agency from Accountability for Gender Equality Outcomes." *Feminist Dissent*, no. 3 (March 27, 2018): 57-87. Accessed May 1, 2019. doi:10.31273/fd.n3.2018.307.
- Tadros, Mariz. "Egypt's Tale of Two Constitutions." *Women as Constitution-Makers*, March 28, 2019, 314-50. Accessed April 28, 2019. doi:10.1017/9781108686358.008.
- Tickner, J. Ann, and Kathleen Newland. "Han's Morthengau's Principles of Political Realism: A Feminist Reformulation." In *Gender and International Relations*, by Rebecca Grant. Bloomington: Indiana University Press.
- Tickner, J. Ann. "Hans Morgenthau's Principles of Political Realism: A Feminist Reformulation." *Millennium: Journal of International Studies* 17, no. 3 (December 1988): 429-40. Accessed February 11, 2019. doi:10.1177/03058298880170030801.
- Tickner, J. Ann. *Gender in International Relations: Feminist Perspectives on Achieving Global Security*. New York: Columbia Univ. Press, 1998.
- Tickner, J. Ann. *Gendering World Politics: Issues and Approaches in the Post-Cold War Era*. New York: Columbia University Press, 2001.
- Tickner, J. Ann. "Knowledge Is Power: Challenging IR's Eurocentric Narrative." *International Studies Review* 18, no. 1 (March 2016): 157-59. Accessed April 24, 2019. doi:10.1093/isr/viv026.
- Tong, Rosemarie, and Tina Fernandes. Botts. *Feminist Thought: A More Comprehensive Introduction*. New York: Westview Press, 2017.
- True, Jacqui. "Feminism." In *Theories of International Relations*, 213-34. 3rd ed. New York: Palgrave Macmillan, 1996.
- Tucker, Judith. "Egyptian Women in the Work Force: An Historical Survey." *MERIP Reports*, no. 50 (August 1976): 3. Accessed April 27, 2019. doi:10.2307/3010883.
- Beth, Baron. "Unveiling in Early Twentieth Century Egypt: Practical and Symbolic Considerations." *Middle Eastern Studies* 25, no. 3 (July 1989). Accessed April 18, 2019. <https://www.jstor.org/stable/4283318>.
- Wadud, Amina. *Inside the Gender Jihad*. New Delhi: Viva Books, 2006.
- Waylen, Georgina. *Engendering Transitions: Womens Mobilization, Institutions, and Gender Outcomes*. Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2007.
- Women in Egypt's Islamic Awakening– A Conversation with Ellen McLarney. Video. Project on Middle East Political Science, 2016. Accessed April 13, 2019.

Reports and Documents

- Al Agati, Mohamed. Women and Equal Citizenship: Analysis of the New Constitution of Egypt. Arab Forum for Citizenship in Transition. International Peace Institute. December 2012. Accessed March 13, 2019. <https://www.ipinst.org/images/pdfs/women-and-constitution-egypt-english3.pdf>.
- Alaradi, Wafaa. "Religion, Electoral Rules and Women's Representation: A Cross National Examination." PhD diss., University of South Carolina. 2012. Accessed April 24, 2019. <https://scholarcommons.sc.edu/etd/1770/>.
- Alkhawaja, Assim. Complexity of Women 's Liberation in the Era of Westernization: Egyptian Islamic and Secular Feminists in Their Own Context. PhD diss., University of San Francisco, 2015. 2015. 63-69. Accessed April 30, 2019. <https://pdfs.semanticscholar.org/b9e2/3bf2e390e4e3f222d04232a825bac172f968.pdf>.
- Deeb, Bouthaina El. Study on Ways and Methods to Eliminate Sexual Harassment in Egypt. Report. Accessed March 28, 2019. https://dgvn.de/fileadmin/user_upload/DOKUMENTE/English_Documents/Sexual-Harassment-Study-Egypt-Final-EN.pdf.
- Egypt: Health Issues Survey 2014. Report. Rockville: DHS Program, 2015. 1-342. Accessed May 16, 2019. <https://dhsprogram.com/pubs/pdf/fr302/fr302.pdf>.
- Egypt: Health Issues Survey 2015. Publication. Rockville: DHS Program, 2015. Accessed May 23, 2019. <https://dhsprogram.com/pubs/pdf/FR313/FR313.pdf>.
- Egypt: Margins of Repression State Limits on Nongovernmental Organization Activism. Technical paper no. 8 (E). Vol. 17. Accessed May 1, 2019. <https://www.hrw.org/reports/2005/egypt0705/egypt0705.pdf>.
- Emam, Fatma. Critical Review Of the Statements of Manal Abul Hassan About the Women's March and Her Perspective on Women's Rights Issues. Publication. Nazra for Feminist Studies, 2012. 1-5.
- Khafagy, Fatma. Honour Killings in Egypt. Report. Women's Watch, 2015. 1-9. Accessed April 21, 2019. <https://www.un.org/womenwatch/daw/egm/vaw-gp-2005/docs/experts/khafagy.honorcrimes.pdf>.
- Krickl, Julia. "Freedom, Dignity & Equality" for Tunisian Women. Master's thesis, University of Twente, 2015. 2015. 1-42. Accessed March 29, 2019.

Krook, Mona Lena. "Electoral Gender Quotas." *Comparative Political Studies* 47, no. 9 (July 19, 2013): 1268-293. Accessed May 15, 2019. doi:10.1177/0010414013495359.

Nazra for Feminist Studies. March Newsletter 1 (March 2012): 1-4. Accessed April 18, 2019. https://nazra.org/sites/nazra/files/attachments/nazra_newsletter_issue1_march_2012_en.pdf.

Ruffner, Todd. Under Threat: Egypt's Systematic Campaign Against NGOs. POMED. POMED. March 2015. Accessed March 24, 2019. <https://pomед.org/wp-content/uploads/2015/03/Under-Threat-Egypt's-Systematic-Campaign-against-NGOs.pdf>.

Sandra N Mokalled. Faces of Feminism in Early Twentieth Century Egypt. PhD diss., Graduate School of Clemson University, 2016. Clemson University, 2016. 1-161.

She and Elections: Mentoring on the Ground With the Candidates 2011/2012. Report. April 2012. Accessed April 21, 2019. https://nazra.org/sites/nazra/files/attachments/nazra_she_and_elections_report_april2012_en.pdf.

SOCIAL, ECONOMIC AND LEGAL EMPOWERMENT OF EGYPTIAN WOMEN. Joint Programme Proposal. UNDP, 2013. 1-47. Accessed April 17, 2019. [https://www.undp.org/content/dam/egypt/docs/Women_Empowerment/Women_Empowerment_Swedish_Proposal_26Nov2013_\(2\).pdf](https://www.undp.org/content/dam/egypt/docs/Women_Empowerment/Women_Empowerment_Swedish_Proposal_26Nov2013_(2).pdf).

Nazra for Feminist Studies. Submission in Light of the 20th Anniversary of the Human Rights Defenders (HRD) Declaration (A/RES/53/144) with Focus on Situation of Women Human Rights Defenders (WHRD) in Egypt. Issue brief. OHCHR. Accessed April 24, 2019. https://ohchr.org/Documents/Issues/CivicSpace/20Anniversary/42.NGO_NFS.pdf

The Egyptian Experience of the Muslim Brotherhood in Power 2012-2013. Technical paper. June 3, 2015. Accessed June 1, 2019. <http://egyptevidence.com/wp-content/uploads/2015/12/Report-II.9BRi.Muslim-Brotherhood-in-Power.pdf>.

The Struggle for Worker Rights in Egypt. Technical paper. Washington DC: Solidarity Center, 2010. Accessed April 1, 2019. [http://hrlibrary.umn.edu/research/Egypt/The Struggle for Workers rights.pdf](http://hrlibrary.umn.edu/research/Egypt/The%20Struggle%20for%20Workers%20rights.pdf).

'Circles of Hell' Domestic, Public and State Violence Against Women in Egypt. Report. January 2015. Accessed May 4, 2019. https://www.amnestyusa.org/files/mde_120042015.pdf.

Online sources

""Dignity without Borders"." Egyptian Streets. Accessed March 12, 2019. <https://egyptianstreets.com/tag/dignity-without-borders/>.

- "'Egypt Harassment Hotline Ignores 95% of Calls'." Middle East Monitor. November 29, 2018. Accessed March 14, 2019. <https://www.middleeastmonitor.com/20181129-egypt-harassment-hotline-ignores-95-of-calls>.
- "'Virginity Tests' for Egyptian Women Protesters." Amnesty International USA. March 23, 2011. Accessed March 28, 2019. <https://www.amnestyusa.org/virginity-tests-for-egyptian-women-protesters/>.
- "2012 Egyptian Parliamentary Elections." Carnegie Endowment for International Peace. January 2015. Accessed June 28, 2019. <https://carnegieendowment.org/2015/01/22/2012-egyptian-parliamentary-elections-pub-58800>.
- "A Solidarity Statement from the Egyptian Feminist Organizations Coalition with Nazra for Feminist Studies." Nazra for Feminist Studies. March 2016. Accessed April 28, 2019. <https://nazra.org/en/2016/03/solidarity-statement-egyptian-feminist-organizations-coalition-nazra-feminist-studies>.
- Abramovitch, Seth. "Dutch Journalist Sexually Assaulted by Protesters in Tahrir Square." The Hollywood Reporter. July 02, 2013. Accessed April 30, 2019. <https://www.hollywoodreporter.com/news/dutch-journalist-sexually-assaulted-by-578661>
- Afp. "Egypt's Brotherhood Wins 47% of Parliament Seats." Egypt Independent. January 21, 2012. Accessed May 28, 2019. <https://www.egyptindependent.com/egypts-brotherhood-wins-47-parliament-seats/>.
- Al Jazeera. "Key Players in Egypt's Politics." News | Al Jazeera. July 04, 2013. Accessed April 28, 2019. <https://www.aljazeera.com/news/middleeast/2013/07/20137312219878492.html>.
- Al Jazeera. "New Law to End Sexual Harassment in Egypt." Egypt News | Al Jazeera. June 12, 2014. Accessed April 28, 2019. <https://www.aljazeera.com/news/middleeast/2014/06/new-law-end-sexual-harassment-egypt-2014612101924323684.html>.
- Al-Youm, Al-Masry. "26 New Female Judges Take Oath." Egypt Independent. June 16, 2015. Accessed April 15, 2019. <https://www.egyptindependent.com/26-new-female-judges-take-oath/>.
- Baker, Lauren. "Women's Equality: Constitutions and Revolutions in Egypt." Project on Middle East Political Science. April 28, 2016. Accessed June 28, 2019. <https://pomeps.org/womens-equality-constitutions-and-revolutions-in-egypt>.
- "Between Trauma and Resistance: Feminist Engagement with the Arab Spring." Heinrich Böll Stiftung Middle East. January 2017. Accessed April 28, 2019.

<https://lb.boell.org/en/2017/01/18/between-trauma-and-resistance-feminist-engagement-arab-spring>.

Boundless. "Boundless World History." Lumen. Accessed April 25, 2019. Accessed April 25, 2019. <https://courses.lumenlearning.com/boundless-worldhistory/chapter/egypt/>.

"Cairo Declaration on FGM 5 High Level Meeting 14 – 15 December 2008 Cairo, Egypt." No Peace Without Justice. Accessed May 27, 2019. <http://www.npwj.org/FGM/Cairo-Declaration-FGM-5-High-Level-Meeting-14---15-December-2008-Cairo-Egypt.html>.

"Morsi Spurned Deals, Seeing Military as Tamed." The New York Times. July 06, 2013. Accessed April 28, 2019. <https://www.nytimes.com/2013/07/07/world/middleeast/morsi-spurned-deals-to-the-end-seeing-the-military-as-tamed.html>.

Davies, Caroline. "Tahrir Square Women's March Marred by Rival Protest." The Guardian. March 08, 2011. Accessed April 28, 2019. <https://www.theguardian.com/world/2011/mar/08/rival-protesters-clash-women-tahrir>.

"Egypt and the Coup: Inside the 11 Days That Toppled Morsi." Middle East Eye. July 2018. Accessed June 28, 2019. <https://www.middleeasteye.net/news/egypt-and-coup-inside-11-days-toppled-morsi>.

"Egypt's Al-Sissi Apologizes to Victim of Sexual Assault." Haaretz.com. June 10, 2014. Accessed April 30, 2019. <https://www.haaretz.com/al-sissi-apologizes-to-sexual-assault-victim-1.5251494>.

"Egypt: 'Women Face Rape and Even Death When They Participate in Public Gatherings'." Amnesty International. November 2013. Accessed April 28, 2019. <https://www.amnesty.org/en/latest/campaigns/2013/11/egypt-women-face-rape-and-even-death-when-they-participate-in-public-gatherings/>.

"Egypt: Arab Nationalism and Socialism under Nasser (1952-1970)." EISA Egypt: Arab Nationalism and Socialism under Nasser (1952-1970). Accessed April 25, 2019. <https://www.eisa.org.za/wep/egyoverview7.htm>.

"Egypt: Deeply Restrictive New Assembly Law." Human Rights Watch. November 26, 2013. Accessed March 11, 2019. <https://www.hrw.org/news/2013/11/26/egypt-deeply-restrictive-new-assembly-law>.

"Egypt: Epidemic of Sexual Violence." Human Rights Watch. April 17, 2015. Accessed May 20, 2019. <https://www.hrw.org/news/2013/07/03/egypt-epidemic-sexual-violence>.

"Egypt: Take Concrete Action to Stop Sexual Harassment, Assault." Human Rights Watch. June 13, 2014. Accessed May 28, 2019. <https://www.hrw.org/news/2014/06/13/egypt-take-concrete-action-stop-sexual-harassment-assault>.

- "Egyptian Feminist Movement: A Brief History." OpenDemocracy. March 2017. Accessed June 27, 2019. <https://www.opendemocracy.net/en/north-africa-west-asia/egyptian-feminist-movement-brief-history/>.
- El-Gawhary, Karim. "Salafists in Egypt: Exploiting the Weakness of the People." Qantara.de. January 2012. Accessed June 28, 2019. <https://en.qantara.de/content/salafists-in-egypt-exploiting-the-weakness-of-the-people>.
- El-Rifae, Yasmin. "What the Egyptian Revolution Can Offer #MeToo." The Nation. January 24, 2018. Accessed May 6, 2019. <https://www.thenation.com/article/what-the-egyptian-revolution-can-offer-metoo/>.
- El-Sherif, Ashraf. "The Egyptian Muslim Brotherhood's Failures." Carnegie Endowment for International Peace. July 2014. Accessed June 28, 2019. <https://carnegieendowment.org/2014/07/01/egyptian-muslim-brotherhood-s-failures-pub-56046>.
- "Esraa Abdel Fattah." Front Line Defenders. October 08, 2018. Accessed May 27, 2019. <https://www.frontlinedefenders.org/en/profile/esraa-abdel-fattah>.
- Fracolli, Erin. "Women and Quotas in Egypt's Parliament." TIMEP. May 2017. Accessed March 28, 2019. <https://timep.org/commentary/analysis/women-and-quotas-in-egypts-parliament/>.
- Garvey, Leslie. "Egyptian Government Deals With Sexual Attacks on Female Protesters by Blaming the Victims - FPIF." Foreign Policy In Focus. February 21, 2013. Accessed April 30, 2019. https://fpif.org/egyptian_government_deals_with_sexual_attacks_on_female_protesters_by_blaming_the_victims/.
- Gomez-Rivas, Camilo. "Women, Shari'a, and Personal Status Law Reform in Egypt after the Revolution." Middle East Institute. October 2011. Accessed June 28, 2019. <https://www.mei.edu/publications/women-sharia-and-personal-status-law-reform-egypt-after-revolution>.
- Hussein, Abdel-Rahman. "Egyptian Assembly Passes Draft Constitution despite Protests." The Guardian. November 30, 2012. Accessed May 28, 2019. <https://www.theguardian.com/world/2012/nov/30/egypt-constitution-morsi>.
- "I Saw Harassment." Cairo Urban Initiatives Platform. Accessed March 10, 2019. <https://www.cuipcairo.org/en/directory/i-saw-harassment>.

- "In Solidarity with Egyptian Human Rights Defender Mozn Hassan." Global Fund for Women. October 23, 2018. Accessed April 29, 2019. <https://www.globalfundforwomen.org/mozn-hassan-stop-repression-human-rights-defenders-egypt/>.
- "INFOGRAPHIC: Egypt's Constituent Assembly." Reuters. September 04, 2013. Accessed April 28, 2019. <https://www.reuters.com/article/idUS132263253520130904>.
- Khaled, Fatma. "Cairo University's Anti-Sexual Harassment Unit Dabble in Arts and Sports." Mada Masr. March 2017. Accessed March 18, 2019. <https://madamasr.com/en/2017/03/15/feature/society/cairo-universitys-anti-sexual-harassment-unit-dabble-in-arts-and-sports/>.
- Kirollos, Mariam. "Sexual Violence in Egypt: Myths and Realities." Jadaliyya, July 2013. Accessed March 23, 2019. http://www.jadaliyya.com/pages/index/13007/sexual-violence-in-egypt_myths-and-realities-.
- Knell, Yolande. "The Complicated Legacy of Egypt's Hosni Mubarak." BBC News. January 25, 2013. Accessed June 27, 2019. <https://www.bbc.com/news/world-middle-east-21201364>.
- Macfarquhar, Neil. "Mubarak Pushes Egypt to Allow Freer Elections." The New York Times. February 27, 2005. Accessed June 27, 2019. <https://www.nytimes.com/2005/02/27/world/middleeast/mubarak-pushes-egypt-to-allow-freer-elections.html>.
- MacNicol, Glynnis. "Lara Logan Describes Horrific Sexual Assault In Egypt: "You Cannot Imagine What They Did To Me"." Business Insider. May 02, 2011. Accessed April 28, 2019. <https://www.businessinsider.com/lara-logan-rape-egypt-60-minutes-interview-video-2011-5?IR=T>.
- McLarney, Ellen. "Women's Equality: Constitutions and Revolutions in Egypt." POMED. March 11, 2016. Accessed April 2019. https://pomeps.org/womens-equality-constitutions-and-revolutions-in-egypt#_edn6.
- Najjar, Farah. "Why Is Egypt's New NGO Law Controversial?" Middle East | Al Jazeera. May 2017. Accessed June 29, 2019. <https://www.aljazeera.com/indepth/features/2017/05/egypt-ngo-law-controversial-170530142008179.html>.
- Nazra for Feminist Studies. "Nazra's Statement on the Continuity of Applying the Quota System in the Upcoming Elections." News release, April 10, 2011. Nazra for Feminist Studies. Accessed April 24, 2019. <https://nazra.org/en/2011/04/nazras-statement-continuity-applying-quota-system-upcoming-elections>.

"NGOs Lose Ground in Sisi's Egypt." OpenDemocracy. October 2014. Accessed May 27, 2019. <https://www.opendemocracy.net/en/north-africa-west-asia/ngos-lose-ground-in-sisis-egypt/>.

Omnia Al Desoukie. "Child Marriage and Pregnancy in Egypt." Women's Media Center. August 2018. Accessed May 28, 2019. <http://www.womensmediacenter.com/fbomb/child-marriage-and-pregnancy-in-egypt>.

"Op Anti-Sexual Harassment/Assault الإعتداء الجنسي الجماعي." Facebook. Accessed May 30, 2019. <https://www.facebook.com/opantish/>.

Ottaway, Marina. "Egypt: Death of the Constituent Assembly?" Carnegie Endowment for International Peace. June 2012. Accessed June 28, 2019. <https://carnegieendowment.org/2012/06/13/egypt-death-of-constituent-assembly-pub-48501>.

Otterman, Sharon. "Women Fight to Maintain Their Role in the Building of a New Egypt." The New York Times. March 05, 2011. Accessed April 28, 2019. <https://www.nytimes.com/2011/03/06/world/middleeast/06cairo.html>.

"Political Islam After the Arab Spring." Foreign Affairs. December 01, 2017. Accessed April 28, 2019. <https://www.foreignaffairs.com/reviews/review-essay/2017-10-16/political-islam-after-arab-spring>.

Poole, Patrick. "Egyptian Media Outraged by Muslim Brotherhood Leaders' Visit to State Department." Islamist Watch. May 2019. Accessed June 28, 2019. <https://www.meforum.org/islamist-watch/58529/egyptian-media-outraged-by-muslim-brotherhood>.

"Q & A: Background on Case No. 173 - the 'Foreign Funding Case'." Nazra for Feminist Studies. March 21, 2016. Accessed April 27, 2019. <https://nazra.org/en/2016/03/q-background-case-no-173-foreign-funding-case>.

"Quranic Concepts on Gender Relations." Dr. Zainab Alwani. August 2013. Accessed April 30, 2019. <http://www.zainabalwani.com/quranic-concepts-on-gender-relations/>.

"Quranic Concepts on Gender Relations." Dr. Zainab Alwani. March 16, 2016. Accessed June 28, 2019. <http://www.zainabalwani.com/quranic-concepts-on-gender-relations/>.

Robbins, Michael, and Mark Tessler. "What Egyptians Mean by Democracy." Foreign Policy. September 20, 2011. Accessed May 28, 2019. <https://foreignpolicy.com/2011/09/20/what-egyptians-mean-by-democracy/>.

Sadek, George. "Global Legal Monitor." Egypt: New Law Enhancing the Penalties for FGM Approved by Parliament | Global Legal Monitor. September 14, 2016. Accessed May 23,

2019. <https://www.loc.gov/law/foreign-news/article/egypt-new-law-enhancing-the-penalties-for-fgm-approved-by-parliament/>.
- "Shura Council Members Blame Women for Harassment." Coptic Solidarity. February 2013. Accessed June 28, 2019. <https://www.copticsolidarity.org/2013/02/13/shura-council-members-blame-women-for-harassment/>.
- Tadros, Mariz. "To Politically Empower Women on a Global Scale We Need More than Quotas | Mariz Tadros." The Guardian. March 08, 2012. Accessed May 21, 2019. <https://www.theguardian.com/global-development/poverty-matters/2012/mar/08/political-empower-women-egypt>.
- Tawfeek, Farah. "Appointing Women State Council Judges 'a Matter of Time': State Council Pres." Egypt Independent. October 09, 2018. Accessed April 28, 2019. <https://www.egyptindependent.com/appointing-women-state-council-judges-a-matter-of-time-state-council-pres/>.
- "Testimony from a Survival of Gang Rape on Tahrir Square Vicinity." Nazra for Feminist Studies (blog), January 26, 2013. Accessed April 14, 2019. <https://nazra.org/en/2013/01/testimony-survival-gang-rape-tahrir-square-vicinity>.
- "The Middle East in Revolt." Time. February 22, 2011. Accessed June 27, 2019. http://content.time.com/time/specials/packages/article/0,28804,2045328_2045338_2048789,00.html.
- Trew, Bel. "Egypt's Sexual Assault Epidemic." Egypt | Al Jazeera. August 14, 2013. Accessed March 09, 2019. <https://www.aljazeera.com/indepth/features/2013/08/201381494941573782.html>.
- "Women, Shari'a, and Personal Status Law Reform in Egypt after the Revolution." Middle East Institute. October 1, 2011. Accessed June 27, 2019. <https://www.mei.edu/publications/women-sharia-and-personal-status-law-reform-egypt-after-revolution>.
- World, Unreported. "The Fight against Sexual Harassment in Egypt | Unreported World." YouTube. February 24, 2019. Accessed March 21, 2019. <https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=RfNQalkT3Uc>.
- "'Zubeida', A New Story Tells The Tragedy of Human Rights in Egypt." Middle East Observer. February 28, 2018. Accessed April 10, 2019. <https://www.middleeastobserver.org/2018/02/28/zubeida-a-new-story-tells-the-tragedy-of-human-rights-in-egypt/>.



DEPARTMENT OF POLITICAL SCIENCE
SCHOOL OF SOCIAL SCIENCES
UNIVERSITY OF HYDERABAD



National Seminar on
Indian Democracy at Crossroads
January 23-24, 2019

Certificate of Appreciation

This certificate is presented to *Sharon Susan Kashy*

for outstanding dedication and commitment in the organisation of the Two Day National Seminar under the
auspices of the Centre for Advanced Studies (CAS) I, Department of Political Science, University of
Hyderabad funded by the University Grants Commission (UGC) and ICSSR, Southern Regional Centre,
Hyderabad.

Prof. Arun Kumar Patnaik
Coordinator, UGC-CAS I

Prof. Manjari Katju
Head, Department of Political Science

State and Feminist Negotiations in Post-Arab Spring Egypt: An Analysis

by Sharon Susan Koshy

Submission date: 30-Jun-2019 01:57PM (UTC+0530)

Submission ID: 1148050125

File name: (1.09M)

Word count: 44067

Character count: 246132

State and Feminist Negotiations in Post-Arab Spring Egypt: An Analysis

ORIGINALITY REPORT

3%

SIMILARITY INDEX

2%

INTERNET SOURCES

2%

PUBLICATIONS

2%

STUDENT PAPERS

PRIMARY SOURCES

1

carnegieendowment.org

Internet Source

<1%

2

Kamal, Hala. "Inserting women's rights in the Egyptian constitution: personal reflections", *Journal for Cultural Research*, 2015.

Publication

<1%

3

www.thecaireview.com

Internet Source

<1%

4

link.springer.com

Internet Source

<1%

5

Tadros, Mariz. "The Politics of Mobilising for Gender Justice in Egypt from Mubarak to Morsi and Beyond", *IDS Working Papers*, 2014.

Publication

<1%

6

www.unrisd.org

Internet Source

<1%

7

www.emeraldinsight.com

Internet Source

<1%

8	Submitted to University of Sheffield Student Paper	<1 %
9	"Towards a Gendered Political Economy", Springer Nature, 2000 Publication	<1 %
10	Submitted to Sultan Qaboos University Student Paper	<1 %
11	Mariz Tadros. "Negotiating Women in Egypt's Post-Mubarak Constitutions (2012–2014)", Politics & Gender, 2019 Publication	<1 %
12	Submitted to University of Kent at Canterbury Student Paper	<1 %
13	sur.conectas.org Internet Source	<1 %
14	Submitted to Syracuse University Student Paper	<1 %
15	Submitted to Europa Universitat Viadrina Student Paper	<1 %
16	www.idsa.in Internet Source	<1 %
17	Submitted to University of Sussex Student Paper	<1 %
18	register.consilium.europa.eu	

<1 %

19

Gamal M. Selim. "The International Dimensions of Democratization in Egypt", Springer Science and Business Media LLC, 2015

Publication

<1 %

20

Submitted to School of Oriental & African Studies

Student Paper

<1 %

21

Ruth Lister. "Citizenship: Feminist Perspectives", Springer Nature, 2003

Publication

<1 %

22

Submitted to Township High School District 113

Student Paper

<1 %

23

Submitted to University of Westminster

Student Paper

<1 %

24

Mona Lena Krook. "Reforming Representation: The Diffusion of Candidate Gender Quotas Worldwide", Politics & Gender, 2006

Publication

<1 %

25

Jesmin, Syeda S., and Cynthia M. Cready. "Can a woman refuse sex if her husband has a sexually transmitted infection? Attitudes toward safer-sex negotiation among married women in Bangladesh", Culture Health &

<1 %

Sexuality, 2014.

Publication

26	apps.who.int Internet Source	<1 %
27	www.opendemocracy.net Internet Source	<1 %
28	asiantribune.com Internet Source	<1 %
29	Azza M. Karam. "Women, Islamisms and the State", Springer Nature, 1998 Publication	<1 %
30	www.interfaithpeaceinitiative.com Internet Source	<1 %
31	english.ahram.org.eg Internet Source	<1 %
32	lgbtnet.dk Internet Source	<1 %

Exclude quotes On

Exclude matches < 14 words

Exclude bibliography On

State and Feminist Negotiations in Post-Arab Spring Egypt: An Analysis

ORIGINALITY REPORT

5%

SIMILARITY INDEX

3%

INTERNET SOURCES

3%

PUBLICATIONS

3%

STUDENT PAPERS

PRIMARY SOURCES

1	Kamal, Hala. "Inserting women's rights in the Egyptian constitution: personal reflections", Journal for Cultural Research, 2015. Publication	1%
2	carnegieendowment.org Internet Source	<1%
3	www.thecaireview.com Internet Source	<1%
4	www.unrisd.org Internet Source	<1%
5	link.springer.com Internet Source	<1%
6	sur.conectas.org Internet Source	<1%
7	scholar.cu.edu.eg Internet Source	<1%
8	Submitted to University of Sheffield Student Paper	<1%

9	Tadros, Mariz. "The Politics of Mobilising for Gender Justice in Egypt from Mubarak to Morsi and Beyond", IDS Working Papers, 2014. Publication	<1 %
10	Submitted to University of Kent at Canterbury Student Paper	<1 %
11	Submitted to Sultan Qaboos University Student Paper	<1 %
12	Mariz Tadros. "Negotiating Women in Egypt's Post-Mubarak Constitutions (2012–2014)", Politics & Gender, 2019 Publication	<1 %
13	Submitted to University of East London Student Paper	<1 %
14	"Towards a Gendered Political Economy", Springer Nature, 2000 Publication	<1 %
15	Submitted to Europa Universitat Viadrina Student Paper	<1 %
16	Ruth Lister. "Citizenship: Feminist Perspectives", Springer Nature, 2003 Publication	<1 %
17	www.equalitynow.org Internet Source	<1 %

Submitted to American University in Cairo

18

Student Paper

<1 %

19

Submitted to Syracuse University

Student Paper

<1 %

20

Submitted to University of Westminster

Student Paper

<1 %

21

Submitted to School of Oriental & African Studies

Student Paper

<1 %

22

northernsong.wordpress.com

Internet Source

<1 %

23

Gamal M. Selim. "The International Dimensions of Democratization in Egypt", Springer Science and Business Media LLC, 2015

Publication

<1 %

24

Submitted to University of Surrey

Student Paper

<1 %

25

www.jadaliyya.com

Internet Source

<1 %

26

dar.aucegypt.edu

Internet Source

<1 %

27

pard-lb.org

Internet Source

<1 %

28

Afiya S. Zia. "Review Essay: Feminism, Gender

and Social Policy", Global Social Policy: An
Interdisciplinary Journal of Public Policy and
Social Development, 2008

Publication

<1 %

29

www.idsa.in

Internet Source

<1 %

30

Submitted to University of Sussex

Student Paper

<1 %

31

www.mei.edu

Internet Source

<1 %

32

Azza M. Karam. "Women, Islamisms and the
State", Springer Nature, 1998

Publication

<1 %

33

Submitted to Kenyatta University

Student Paper

<1 %

34

Submitted to British University in Egypt

Student Paper

<1 %

35

www.du.edu

Internet Source

<1 %

36

www.tandfonline.com

Internet Source

<1 %

37

www.atlanticcouncil.org

Internet Source

<1 %

38

Submitted to Township High School District

<1 %

39

Alaa Al-Din Arafat. "The Rise of Islamism in Egypt", Springer Nature, 2017

Publication

40

Submitted to London School of Economics and Political Science

Student Paper

41

Jesmin, Syeda S., and Cynthia M. Cready. "Can a woman refuse sex if her husband has a sexually transmitted infection? Attitudes toward safer-sex negotiation among married women in Bangladesh", Culture Health & Sexuality, 2014.

Publication

42

www.mea.gov.in

Internet Source

43

apps.who.int

Internet Source

44

iassr2.org

Internet Source

45

www.opendemocracy.net

Internet Source

46

asiantribune.com

Internet Source

<1 %

<1 %

<1 %

<1 %

<1 %

<1 %

<1 %

<1 %

47	www.interfaithpeaceinitiative.com	<1 %
----	--	------

Internet Source

48	english.ahram.org.eg	<1 %
----	--	------

Internet Source

49	lgbtnet.dk	<1 %
----	--	------

Internet Source

50	Submitted to Middle East Technical University	<1 %
----	---	------

Student Paper

Exclude quotes Off

Exclude bibliography On

Exclude matches < 14 words