

# **Causation in Buddhism: a conceptual analysis**



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**by**

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## CHAPTER-1

### Causality in Indian philosophy

Causality is one of the central problem in Indian philosophy. It is an inquiring about the problem of change in the world. Because we perceive a constant change in the world. The philosophers explain world in terms of cause and effect, and the whole world is considered to be operating because of this cause and effect relationship.

Some of the changes are perceptible and some are imperceptible. “Perceptible changes are due to some efforts of a perceptible active agent e.g. a potter turns the clay into a pot with the help of his rod and wheel. Sometimes the changes are not perceptible, which is without the efforts of some perceptible agent e.g. the snows of the mountains melt into the water of the rivers and run towards the sea.”<sup>1</sup> All these changes are sometimes happening in a short time so we can see them happening and some changes are slow that we can only infer the change by seeing the objects changed after the temporary failure of considerable time. But sooner or later everything is found to be changed. The term cause and effect is co-relative with each other. The word ‘cause’ is co-relative to effect when we consider an object ‘Y’ is regarded as taking place in the consequence of action of another thing ‘X’. Then we can understand that ‘X’ is to be the cause ‘Y’ and ‘Y’ is the effect of ‘X’. However we can say that ‘to be a cause is to produce an effect and to be an effect is to be produced by a cause’.<sup>2</sup>

Firstly, we have to know the importance of the concept of causation then we consider the theories about the change and the problem involved in the concept. There are two type of questions: Is reality inherently active (changing by itself) for example: the Parkṛti of Sāṃkhya or is it inherently passive as the atoms of Nyāya-vaiśeṣika and acted upon by some other active agency? These are the questions which are closely attached with the reality of change, and also connected with the notion of causation. If we are able to experience for the change so we are really capable of knowing the nature of reality. Moreover, our inference is based on causation. The validity of inference depends, on the validity of the law of causation. It has been conceived some connection

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<sup>1</sup> *Causation in Indian philosophy*, Mahesh Chandra Bhartiya, (vimal parkashan, Ghaziabad, U.P, 1972), p.3.

<sup>2</sup> “*Emergence of purpose*”, in *The Journal of Philosophy*, Bahm, vol.xlv, (university of Denver) 1947, p.633.

between two occurrences, if one event occurs the other necessarily follows. When the latter occurs, the former must have preceded. Thus, the causation is utilized even now. Sometimes in the name of 'functional dependence'.

## Indian viewpoints on causality

There is many discussion about causal theory and almost all schools of Indian philosophy have investigated the relation between cause and effect through their metaphysical assumptions. Those who believe in the concept of causation of the universe they believe that there must be a real cause of it. But those who refute the world, they deny the existence of cause. There are many types of causes: material, efficient, instrumental and accidental. Some schools of Indian philosophy accept the same cause as material and efficient also but other schools accept them dissimilarly. Some accept the efficient cause (*nimitta kāraṇa*) as material (*upādāna kāraṇa*) also while that with the instrumental and accidental causes is taken as efficient for the other. As we say Indian thinkers mainly focused on material cause so this material cause has appeared in different types of different schools of Indian philosophy.

In Sāṅkhya, an effect is not a new beginning or a newly creation but only an explicit manifestation of that which was implicitly exist in its material cause. This causation theory of Sāṅkhya is called *satkāryavāda*. But in Nyāya-vaiśeṣika, the effect is a new formation, the effect does not already exist in its material cause. They are called *asatkārya-vāda* that is also known as *ārambha-vāda* and also followed by the Hinayāna, Mīmāṃsā, and pratītya-samutpāda-vāda, advocated by Buddhist. Hinayāna Buddhist believe in the *anītya-parmāṇu-vāda* or *ksanabhanga-vāda*, Nyāya-vaiśeṣika and few followers of Mīmāṃsā in *nītya-parmāṇu-vāda*. Cārvāka follows *svabhāvavāda*, they are called materialist and they denies the causality. There is another theory of causation which follows the middle way of the two, called *sad-asatkārya-vāda* is advocated by Jains. In Indian philosophy there is basic question whether the effect is real transformation or unreal transformation of it cause?

### Two main theories:

There is an important role of these two main theories in the concept of causality. Philosophers accept the concept of causality as one of the main topics of study. The problem of essence of effect

is the main problem of Indian thinkers. As the matters of fact, the whole of the division of Indian theories of causation is based on its consideration. According to the Indian thinkers, there are the two possibilities with regard to the effect, either an effect drives its essence from its cause or it does not. This is the two main divisions of the Indian theories of causation. There are two main theories regarding the cause (*kāraṇa*) and effect (*kārya*) relation (*sambandha*). These are *satkāryavāda* (the theory of existent effect) and *asatkārya-vāda* (the theory of the non-existent effect). There are two forms of *satkāryavāda* 1. *Pariṇāmavāda* (*pariṇāma* – real modification) 2. *Vivartāvāda* (*vivartā* – unreal appearance). Some Indian schools who believe that the effect is a real transformation or modification of its cause are called *Pariṇāmavāda*. Sāṃkhya-Yoga and Rāmānuja believe in *Pariṇāmavāda*. The view of Sāṃkhya-Yoga is called *Parkaṭi-Pariṇāmavāda*, [*Parkaṭi* (cause) is really transformed into the world (effect)] while the view of Rāmānuja is called *Brahma-Pariṇāmavāda*. According to the latter, the effect is the apparent transformation of the cause. The Advaita Vedanta believes in the *Vivartāvāda*. They say, the effect is only an apparent transformation of the cause, e.g., the rope only appears as the snake, Brahman (cause) only appears as the world (effect). Nyāya-vaiśeṣika and Buddhist are believe in *asatkārya-vāda*. These are two main theories which I explain below.

### 1- *Satkāryavāda*:

The main supporter of the *satkāryavāda* is Sāṃkhya. The Sāṃkhya theory of causation is called *parkaṭi pariṇāmavāda* because the cause really changes into the effect. Sāṃkhya says, the effect is already exist in the cause as a potential condition. The effect is not a new beginning or a new creation as a Nyāya-vaiśeṣika holds. The doctrine of Sāṃkhya is that the effect is really exist in cause which is called *satkāryavāda*. No amount of effort of a thing could bring a non-existent effect into existence. ‘Nothing comes out of nothing’. For milk cannot produced from oil. The curd is already exist in the milk. Here we see that effect is already exist in the cause that is called the invariable relation between cause and effect. So the Sāṃkhya advocate the doctrine of *satkāryavāda* distinguished from the Nyāya-vaiśeṣika doctrine of *asatkārya-vāda* or *ārambha-vāda*.



Argument of Nyāya against *satkāryavāda*.

- i. If the effect is already exist in the cause, there is no point to saying that the effect is produced.
- ii. If again, an effect already existed in the cause, why should we require the efficient cause for the production of the effect? But we require the agency of the potter for the production of a jar out of clay.
- iii. If the effect will already exists in its material cause then it would lead that the effect is not distinguishable from the cause end that we should call the same name for both and that the same purpose would be served by both.
- iv. If it is urged that it is only distinguished in form between the effect and its material cause. Because of that we should admit that there is something in the effect which was not in the cause. Hence we cannot said that the effect is already contained in the cause before to its production.

## 2-Asatkāryavāda:

*Asatkārya-vāda* is mainly upheld by the Nyāya-vaiśeṣika. According to this concept the effect does not exist before in the cause. The effect is a new creation, a new beginning (*ārambha*). This view is also known as *ārambha-vāda* or theory of new beginnings. The effect is different from its cause and it can never be the same. According to this theory effect is originates freshly.

The Nyāyaikas defines the effect as the counter-entity of its prior non-existence. It means that the effect is an entity which did not exist in the cause before it come into the being. Come into being of the effect means the negation of its prior non-existence. Cause and effect are both real. The Nyāyaikas puts forward the following arguments in favor of *asatkārya-vāda* or the theory of prior non-existence of the effect in the cause.

1. If the effect really pre-exist in the cause, so there is no point in saying that the effect is produced.
2. If, again the effect already existed in the cause, why should we require the efficient cause for the production of the effect? But we require the agency of the potter for the production of a jar out of clay.

3. Accepting that the effect existed in the cause prior to its coming into being, the effect must have been existing undistinguished in the cause. In that case both the cause and the effect should be designated by the same name, and they should also serve the same purpose. But the clay and the jar are separately designated, and the purpose served by the jar is not served by the clay.
4. The effect does not exist before in the cause. We do not perceive a cloth in the threads. The effect is not modification or a transformation of the cause. Milk cannot be said to be transformed into curds. When milk changes into curds, there is disruption of the component elements of milk. The re-arrangement of these elements brings the curds into existence. This clearly shows that milk as such is destroyed, and a new thing, curd is produced.

Some philosophers try to take the middle course and claim that an effect is both existent and non-existent with its cause. This is the position of the Jainas. The effect is existent with respect to its matter and non-existent with respect to its aspects. The view of the theistic schools of Vedānta is also like that of Jainas.

## **Cārvāka view on causation**

Cārvāka are the materialists which holds that matter is the only reality. Cārvāka believe that perception as a means of right knowledge, propounding the reality of only that which is perceptible and they reject the reality of inference. They also reject the authority of the Vedas and the supremacy of Brahmins. They are known as naturalists, accidentlists and they deny final causes and universality of causation. Because cause and effect cannot be established on the basis of perception. According to them only gross matter is the reality of this world. According to Cārvāka, the area of perception is very limited. So the causal relation is a kind of vyāpti (invariable concomitance) and perception is not enough satisfactory to establish this invariable concomitance between cause and effect. According to Cārvāka there is no necessary connection between cause and effect. There is only accidental conjunction of an antecedent and consequent. The two events are found together on numerous occasions and therefore produce an expectation in the mind that they will always go together. There is no certainty of their co-presence.

Thus, Cārvāka do not believe in any other means of valid knowledge except perception. Perception which is the only source of human knowledge, does not help us to establish a universal proposition.

## Svabhāvavāda (naturalism)

Many philosopher have given their point of view on the *svabhāva* theory, it is also considered as common man's theory (*lokāyāts*). Cārvāka system is known as *lokāyata-draṣana*. *Svabhāvavāda* or *yadṛacchā-vāda* is upheld by the Cārvāka system. This concept is very old and it is found in the Śvetāśvatara Upaniṣhad that *svabhāva* (nature) is the cause of the world. A reference to *yadṛacchā-vāda* (accidentals) is to be seen in Śvetāśvatara Upaniṣhad. Where Śaṅkara explain it as the doctrine of accidental production of effects. The effects are produced merely due to change. Śaṅkarānanda explains it as the doctrine of accidental conjunction of two events. Production of an effect appears due to its sudden appearance. So it is called *ākasmikatva-vāda* or the doctrine of emergence. *Ākasmikatva-vāda* is another name of *yadṛacchā-vāda*.

Śaṅkarānanda explain in Śvetāśvatara Upaniṣhad that things have the natural powers which is inherent in them. It is said that the heat of fire, the redness of fair. Śaṅkarānanda assume that everything have the capacity to producing their particular effect. The sun has the natural power of heat and water for following downwards. *Svabhāvavāda* is discuss also in the *sarvadarśana-saṅgraha* where they explain that things have the inherent nature to produced effect spontaneously it is the phenomenon of the world. Cārvāka said: “the fire is hot, the water is cold, and refreshing coolness of the wind. By whom this variety? From their own nature was it born”?<sup>3</sup> It is said that the heat of fire, coolness of water, refreshing coolness of wind etc. are all come into existence because of their own nature. There is no creator of this phenomena.

Cārvāka believe that there are some entities eternal, non-eternal and some others are of assorted nature (*vichitra*). These property of the entities are manage by their nature inherent in them. Hence Cārvāka believe that everything have their own nature to produce some effect. It is all about the natural power inherent in them. Clothes is produced from the threads naturally and

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<sup>3</sup> *Sarvadarśana-saṅgraha*, ch.-1

not pot, the earth produce pot not clothes. So Svabhāvadins philosopher maintain that all things of this world are produced by nature.

## **Metaphysics**

Cārvāka deny the relation of cause and effect because it cannot be establish on the basis of perception. Cārvāka metaphysics is the outcome of its epistemology. The metaphysics of Cārvāka is dependent on its epistemology. In its epistemology Cārvāka accepts only perception as a source of valid knowledge. According to him through perception we find only the knowledge of four kinds of material elements. Matter is the only reality, because it alone is perceived. These material elements are the fundamental stuff behind the origin of this universe. Cārvāka accepts a number of material elements (earth, water, fire, air) as fundamental realities, that's why there view is called pluralistic materialism. Cārvāka does not accept the atomic form of these elements because atoms cannot be perceived. In its metaphysical discussion, Cārvāka accepts only the reality of material world because it is perceived. Spiritual world cannot be perceived. Therefore, it does not exist. Everything which exist in this universe is the combination of these four elements. Their combinations undergo production and dissolution, but these elements are eternal. Cārvāka unlike the other philosopher does not accept the existence of ether (*ākasha*) because it is not perceived but inferred and inference is not a source of valid knowledge.

These four kinds of material elements combine with one another and produce their effects by their very nature. They do not require the supernatural intervention of God or any other transcendental reality. Every material element has got its fixed nature. It is by their own nature, they combine in different proportion and form the world. For this reason the Cārvāka theory is called as naturalism (*svabhāvavāda*).

## **Sāṃkhya and Yoga view on causation**

Sāṃkhya and Yoga schools are two allied system of Indian philosophy. Yoga is closely associated with Sāṃkhya. They are the two sides of the same coin. Sāṃkhya is the theory, yoga is the practice. Hence it is sometimes called '*śeśvara-sāṃkhya*' or 'theistic Sāṃkhya'. It is one of the parts of orthodox system. Patanjali increase his philosophy of Yoga in his significant work Yoga sutra. The theory of causation of the two schools is called *satkāryavāda*, *pariṇāmovāda* or *vikaravāda*.

The *satkāryavāda* theory is basically ascribed by Sāṃkhya. According to Sāṃkhya effect is already exist in the cause in a potential condition. The yoga acquire the Sāṃkhya metaphysics. It is called the theistic Sāṃkhya. The Yoga identify the reality of *parkṛti* and it evaluates, innumerable individual souls (*puruṣa*). They state that *parkṛti* is the material cause of this world and the efficient cause is God. The main explanation of the Sāṃkhya and Yoga system has been based on the Sāṃkhya-kārikā, Sāṃkhya-sutra. The Sāṃkhya-kārikā is written by Īśvarakṛṣṇa. The Sāṃkhya believe in the reality of twenty five principles and Yoga assumes the reality of twenty five principles and they add the principle of God to them. This is the main difference between the Yoga and the Sāṃkhya system.

## Satkāryavāda

*Satkāryavāda* theory is one of the central feature of the Sāṃkhya system. This system has particularly concentrated their interest upon the problem of creation, among the six orthodox schools of Indian philosophy. The Sāṃkhya metaphysics, mainly its doctrine of *parkṛti* is based on the theory of causation. Sāṃkhya argues, the effect is already existent in its cause in a potential condition. The effect is a modification (*pariṇāma*), manifestation, development, and redistribution of the cause. The Nyāya-vaīśeṣika have the negative point of view. They believe that an effect is completely a new entity, it does not exist in its cause in any form. But according to Sāṃkhya, the effect is not a new beginning or a new creation as the Nyāya- vaīśeṣika holds. “The effects is exist in its material cause, and the effect is only an explicit manifestation of that which was implicitly exist in its material cause.”

Sāṃkhya believes in *satkāryavāda*. All material effects are the modification (*pariṇāma*) of *parkṛti*. They are already exist in the eternal bosom of *parkṛti* and at the time of creation they are simply come out of it and at the time of dissolution they are return to it. There is not a new production of an effect and nor total destruction. Production means development or manifestation of the effect. Destruction means envelopment or dissolution. Here production is evolution and destruction is involution. Except *Puruṣa* the whole world is real modification of *parkṛti* which is accepted here as material cause.

## Pariṇāmavāda

The Sāṃkhya theory of causation is called *pariṇāmavāda* or *vikaravāda* because an effect is a real transformation of its material cause through a causal process and a material cause changes in its shape, but the essence of material cause does not change. The essence continues to be the same through the whole cause-effect process. So an effect does not dissimilar from its cause. A cloth is the cause of threads so cloth is not dissimilar from its cause the threads, a jar is not differ from the clay, a wooden chair is not differ from wood. Therefore Sāṃkhya emphasis upon the identity of cause and effect and also emphasis that effect is not a new entity.

Sāṃkhya-Yoga philosopher accepts *pariṇāmavāda*. Because according to the Sāṃkhya-Yoga, Parkṛti (cause) is really transformed into the world (effect). It is called *parkṛti-pariṇāmavāda*. There is the verse in *Sāṃkhya-Kārikā* where the Sāṃkhya offers the following arguments to prove the prior existence of the effect in the cause:

“*Asadkāraṇāt upādāna-grahanāt sarva-sambhavābhāvāt*

*Saktasya sakya-kāranāt kārana-bhāvat ca sat-kāryam*”.<sup>4</sup>

### 1- Asadkāraṇāt:

If the effect does not already exist in its material cause, it could never be brought into existence by anybody. For example, the production of oil from sand. Nothing in this universe comes out from the non-existence of something. According to Vacaspati misra in his commentary on Sāṃkhya-kārikā maintain that a thousand artist cannot turn blue into yellow.<sup>5</sup> According to him, if the effect is produced from something where it is not present before then anything can be produced from anything. Therefore we see that arising due to the fact of being produced. For the manifestation of the statue that already hidden in the midpoint of the stone, by the operation of sculptor rise from the stone by his hummer. So the manifestation of effect is dependent on the manifestation of the effect. It is assimilate that is effect is already exist in the cause before the causal process in an un-manifested state.

<sup>4</sup> *Sāṃkhya-kārikā or Sāṃkhya Yoga*, Īśvarakṛṣṇa, Indological book house, Delhi, 1978, p.44.

<sup>5</sup> Ibid p.37.

## 2- Upādāna-grahanāt:

Vacaspati misra explains the term that upādāna as cause and grahanāt as relation. The effect is just a manifestation of its material cause, because the effect is invariably connected with its material cause. The effect must be causally connected to its material cause. A jar can be produced out of clay only, cloth can be produced out of the threads only. This proves that effect are pre-existed in their causes in a latent condition.

## 3- Sarva-sambhavābhāvāt:

If we do not accept the relation between cause and effect, then every effect would produce from every cause and this is not possible because everything cannot be produce out of everything. This suggest that every effect is related with its particular cause. This means only certain effects can be produced from certain causes. For example: curd can be got only out of milk rather then got from water. A cloth only out of threads rather then got from wood. This implies that the effect exist in its cause even before its production.

## 4- Saktasya sakya-kāranāt:

Sāṃkhya argues that causal efficiency belongs to that thing which has the necessary potency to produce the effect. Therefore, only an efficient cause can produce that effect for which it is potent. This shows that before the manifestation of the effect, it is potentially exist in its material cause. If, it is not that curd can be produce from oil, cloth from water etc. Hence the effect must be pre-existent in its potent cause only.

## 5-kāraṇa-bhāvat:

The effect is essentially identical with the material cause and is not different from its cause. Without cause the effect is impossible (*kāraṇa-bhāvat*). According to Vacaspati Misra, “the cloth is not different from the threads in its essence.”<sup>6</sup> In fact, the effect and the cause are explicit and the implicit states of the same substance. So the effect must be already exist in its material cause. Thus, from all these arguments, the Sāṃkhya School makes the conclusion, is that the effect pre-exist in its material cause (*satkāryavāda*).

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<sup>6</sup> Sankhya-kārikā or sāṅkhya-yoga, Indological book house, Delhi 1978, p.50.

## **Vedānta view on causation**

Vedānta is the concluding part of the Veda, ‘the end of the Vedas’, the highest point of the Vedic teachings and wisdom. Vedānta is originally the name given to the Upanishad. The views of the Upanishads also constitute ‘the essence of the Vedas’. In Upanishad a number of philosophical thoughts and teachings are present in scattered form. To systematize the different teachings of the Upanishads, in order to bring out the harmony underlying them Bādrāyana had written Brahma-sutra also known as Vedānta-sutra, Shāriraka -sutra. Śaṅkara figured in the Vedanta teachings so prominently that the word ‘Vedānta’ came to denote only the teachings of the Śaṅkara Vedanta. Actually, Śaṅkara’s teachings form only the central part of the vast literature which is known by the term Vedanta. There are the several schools of Vedanta. Śaṅkara’s Vedanta is called Advaita-vāda. The other schools are *visistādvaita-vāda* of Ramanuja, *Dvaita-vāda* of Madhvacarya, *dvaitādvaita-vāda* of Nimbārka and *shuddhādvaita-vāda* of Vallabha. We shall discuss the theory of causation of Śaṅkara.

### **Śaṅkara’s theory of causation**

Śaṅkara’s theory of causation is called *Vivartāvāda*. This is the one form of *satkāryavāda*. According to the Śaṅkara the world is the illusory modification of Brahma. *Adhyāsa* is that process of the imaginary attribution something to where it does not exist. And it state that in all illusion there is such projection (*adhyāsa*) that the world is appeared through imagination on Brahma. So Brahma does not change into the world at all Brahman (cause) only appears as the world (effect).

According to him, the effect is non-different from the cause. The object and its material cause is invariably related. The effect cannot exist without a cause. Curd cannot separate from milk. It is an illusion to assume that the effect has been newly born and which is something new which was non-existent before. The substance can change one form to another. If the real could come out of the unreal oil should be pressed from the sand. Causal relation is not a real change. The changing world is merely a reflection. This reflection is due to *adhyāsa*. *Adhyāsa* is due to *avidyā*.



## Pratibimba-vāda

Pratibimba vāda is the theory of reflection between the jiva and Brahman.

*“Brahma satyam jagat mithyā jivo brahmaiva naparah”*

“Brahma is the only reality, the world is ultimately false and the individual soul is non-difference from Brahman”.

The reflection of infinite consciousness in the mirror of avidyā is jiva. Śaṅkara suggests the theory of reflection in the commentary of the Badrayanaka Upanishad. As the appearance of the sun and the moon in water is a mere reflection and nothing real, since on removal of the water, the sun and the moon only remain unchanged. And Śaṅkara argues that even the elements and the individual selves are reflections of the one reality in *avidyā* and nothing real. Brahman or atman is the original (*bimba*) and the individual self is the reflection (*pratibimba*). The aim to understand the appearance of the individual selves on the similarity of images is known as the theory of reflection.

## Theory of causation in visistādvaita-vāda

The philosophy of Rāmānuja is known as visistādvaita (qualified non-dualism). Rāmānuja is also follow the pariṇāmavāda. The writers of this school regard this world as the real transformation of Brahman and as such they come to accept pariṇāmavāda as their theory of causation. Rāmānuja view of causation is called Brahma pariṇāmavāda. For Bhaskara, effect is a modification of its cause, both being real. Effect is both identical and different from cause. But according to Rāmānuja, cause and effect both are identical as well as real. Śaṅkara believe that cause and effect are identical because he assume that effect is only illusory that is unreal appearance. Rāmānuja argues against the Śaṅkara’s view, Rāmānuja explain that “these who assume the non-difference of cause and the effect on the basis of the theory of the effect’s unreality. They are unable to prove that true and false cannot possibly be one. If these two were one, it would follow either that Brahman is false or that the world is real”.<sup>7</sup>

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<sup>7</sup> Causation in Indian philosophy, Bhartiya, p.84.

Rāmānuja, like Śāṅkara, subscribes to the theory of the prior existence of effect in its cause (*satkāryavāda*). But unlike Śāṅkara, he believes that cause is really transformed into the effect (*pariṇāmavāda*). Prior to creation, he state that Brahman remains with pure matter and the bodiless souls in an unmanifested form during the state of dissolution. It is a subtle state when they do not possess the qualities by which they are ordinarily known. And when there is no distinction of individual name and form and also when matter is unevolved is called the subtle state. In this state Brahman is to be in a causal condition (*kāraṇavastha*). Brahman of this state is said to be is Brahman as the cause (*kārṇa Brahma*). The subtle matter becomes gross and the souls enter into connection with material bodies this process is going on when the creation takes place on the account of the will of Brahman. When these subtle matter becomes gross and souls come into the connection to these material bodies are corresponding to the merit or demerit acquired by them in previous forms of existence. Brahman, with souls and matter thus manifested, is said be in the effect condition (*kāryavastha*). When the objects are created, Brahman becomes manifested as the world of objects and embodied souls. Brahman is here in the manifested form and is said to be Brahman as the effect (*kārya Brahma*). Rāmānuja state that these causes and its effects are, in essence, identical. Brahman in the causal state is transformed into Brahman in the effect-state. The former in the causal state called Brahman and the latter in the effect-state is called the world of objects and embodied souls. Thus the world is manifestation of Brahman. We also see that causality is so essential for explain metaphysics.

## **Jaina's theory of causation**

The Jainas outlook of causation is directly based on its notion of substance. There are two kinds of features which is found in substance: essential and accidental. Essential ones remain as long as the substance remains (for e.g. soul has consciousness). Accidental character come and go, succeed one another (desire, volition, pleasure and pain for soul substance). The former is known as *guna* while latter are known as *prayaya* (modes). Qualities or attributes (*gunas*) are the permanent essence of the substance. Modes are changing and accidental.

*“Guna-paryāyavad dravayam”.*

”A substance is defined, therefore as that which possesses attributes (*qualities or gunas*) as well as modes (*paryayas*).”

The world is create by different kinds of substance. The Jainas hold that change and permanence are both real. In so far the world is permanent when the necessary natures of the ultimate substances are abiding, and the world is also changes when the accidental characters undergo modifications. Change and permanent are both real. A substance is real and reality consist of three factors, production (*utpāda*), destruction (*uyay*) and permanence (*dhrovya*)

“*Utpāda-vyaya-dhrauvya-samyuktam sat*”<sup>8</sup>

Substance has not change. It has unchanging essence and therefore is permanent. But it also has its changing modes and therefore is subject to origination and decay. Therefore all the three elements that characterize reality are there in a substance. To emphasis only one particular aspect (*ekānta*) to the exclusion of other aspects would lead us to commit the fallacy of *ekāntavāda*. The Jainas hold the following views as one-sided and dogmatic. Buddhist view, everything is impermanent nothing really permanent in the world and that changes from moment to moment (*ksanika-vāda*). Vedantins view, change is unreal and that reality is absolutely unchanging (*nitya-vāda*). Jainism does not accept their views because each of them looks at one side of reality only and thus commits the fallacy of exclusive predication

Jainas argues that change and permanence are not unreal, both are real. Change is true of the substance in one way (point of view of modes) whereas permanence is true in another way (point of view of gunas). Jainas rejects the Buddhist view that reality consist in causal efficiency that an object is real if it is capable of causing an effect. The Buddha criterion is faulty on the account of Jainas that according to even an illusory snake must be called real as it can cause effects like fear, flight, etc. so causal efficiency cannot be a mark of reality. Jainas is also disagree with Vedanta in holding an absolutely permanent reality. But reconcile both by holding that the reality is partly permanent and partly temporary. So Jainas disagree both concept *satkāryavāda* and *asatkārya-vāda* because sāṅkhya and Vedanta advocate *satkāryavāda* on the one hand and Nyāya-vaiśeṣika and Buddha advocate *asatkārya-vāda*. *Satkāryavādin* hold that effect already existent in the cause. *Asatkāryavādin* is against *Satkāryavādin*, they hold that effect is absolutely non-existent in the cause. If it is existent in the cause, there is no need to produce the effect. *Satkāryavādin* criticize this argument and they hold that if effect is non-existent in its cause so anything produce

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<sup>8</sup> *Utpāda vyayadhravya samyuktam, Quoted in syād-vāda-manjarī, text, p.13.*

from anything. E.g. curd have been produce from water and also non-existent thing such as here's horn could also have been produced.

But Jainas reconcile both and assume that both these criticism against each other are true. "According to Jainas view on causation thus is that cause and effect are partly identical and partly distinct and therefore an effect is partly existent in its cause and partly non-existent. Particular cause has a potency to produce a particular effect, and thus an effect is existent in its cause in the form of this potency."<sup>9</sup> Thus Jaina on the basis of some point of view agrees with satkāryavāda and some point of view agrees with asatkārya-vāda. In fact, Jainas is close to Sāṃkhya satkāryavāda as Satkāryavādin maintain that effect is exist in its cause in a latent form and requires a manifestation. The only difference is that Sāṃkhya does not admit that effect is newly emergent, while Jaina do.

Like Sāṃkhya and Nyāya-vaiśeṣika, Jainas also mention three types of causes namely-

- 1- Material cause (*upādāna*)
- 2- Instrumental cause (*kārṇa or sadhāna*)
- 3- Efficient cause (*kartā*)

The special form of Jaina in the classification of causes is that of making a distinction between instrumental causes and accomplishing cause. Sāṃkhya and Nyāya-vaiśeṣika include both these causes in only instrumental cause (*nimitta-kārṇa*).

## **Theory of causation in the Mīmāṃsā philosophy**

Mīmāṃsā is based on the earlier section of the Vedas that's why it is called Purva Mīmāṃsā or Karma Mīmāṃsā. The purpose of the Purva Mīmāṃsā is to analyse the nature of dharma. Jamini attempts the work of systematizing the rules of mīmāṃsā and establishing their validity in this Mīmāṃsā sutra. Purva Mīmāṃsā is more practical than speculative.

The Mīmāṃsā view of causation is very much similar to Nyāya-vaiśeṣika causation. It means Mīmāṃsā is accept the theory of *asatkārya-vāda*. But there is some minor difference

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<sup>9</sup> Causation in Indian philosophy, Bhartiya, p.108

between the two. Mīmāṃsā accepts the doctrine of potency. But Nyāya-vaiśeṣika refutes the idea of potency. So the doctrine of potency is the difference between them. Mīmāṃsā believe the doctrine of potency in the cause. Mīmāṃsā define cause in the same way as Nyāyaikas do. According to Ganga Bhatta define cause as ‘an invariable and unconditional antecedent.’ The adjectives of ‘antecedent are also justified in the same way as done by Nyāyaikas,’

The word ‘invariable’ is added to ward off a condition that is accidentally present in the cause. There is an example: a donkey in the production of a pot. The word ‘unconditional’ (*anyathā-sidha*) is attach to ward off particular donkey in respect of a particular pot. According to Mīmāṃsā there is two type of classification of causes. According to one the cause is of two kinds: first one is *svarūpa-yogya*. Second one is phalopahita. *Svarūpa-yoga* is that which has the capacity to produce the effect, for example: a stick in a forest. Phalopahita is that which has actually produce or is producing the effect. *Svarūpa-yogya* defined as that which does not produce its effect due to the absence of other helping and the second is that which is aided by arising other.

There is another classification of cause which is three-fold classification of Nyāya-vaiśeṣika, 1. Inherent cause (*samavāyin*) 2. Non-inherent cause (*asamavāyin*) 3. Instrumental (*nimitta*).

Prabhākara accepts the two kinds of causes which is inherent (*samavāyin*) and non-inherent (*asamavāyin*). The non-inherent cause all the condition which, in conjunction with an inherent cause, result in an effect. It may exist either in the inherent cause or in the inherent cause of that cause. For example: the colors of mat, the colors of the threads which cause of that mat exist in the threads, which are the inherent cause of the mat. This classification is same as the Nyāya-vaiśeṣika. This classification has been accepted only by Prabhākara. Kumarila does not accept the category of inherence, for Kumarila this category of inherent and non-inherent is meaningless. There is the third type of cause that is instrumental cause (*nimitta kāṛṇa*) which is accepted by Mīmāṃsākas though it has neither been advocated anywhere nor refuted. Mīmāṃsākas do not accept all types of causes to be necessary in the production of an effect. Mīmāṃsā believe that one kind of cause is sufficient, to explain an effect.

Nyāya introduce about three type of causes: material (*upādāna*), efficient or instrumental (*nimitta*) and non-inherent (*asamavāyin*). Nyāya says that the absence of any one cause, there is no possibility a thing produce an effect. According to Mīmāṃsākas, these three fold causes are not

equally important to produce an effect. The production of an effect would be justified only if there were no cause at all. Mīmāṃsākas says that an effect can be produced in the absence of any of them.

There is another difference between Mīmāṃsākas and Nyāya-vaiśeṣika. According to Nyāya-vaiśeṣika, non-existence of a contracting agency is regarded as a nimitta kārṇa but Mīmāṃsākas says that non-existence cannot be a cause. It is clear in the concept of potency (*śakti*). Mīmāṃsākas suppose that a potency in cause through which it produces its effect. Potency is distinct from the causal substance if potency is obstructed then causal substance cannot-produce its effect. An Mīmāṃsākas says that the power of burning in fire is a potency distinct from fire. But Nyāyaikas says that it is a nature of fire.

## **Asatkārya-vāda in the Mīmāṃsākas philosophy**

Mīmāṃsā support *asatkārya-vāda*. According to *asatkārya-vāda* effect is non-existent before its production. Anupalabdhi that is the non-perception of a things is taken to be a means of valid knowledge in Mīmāṃsā. In that case Gita says that “there is no being, of the existent there is no non-being”. According to Sāṅkhya philosophers, the non-existent of anything cannot be the object of any activity. It must have existence before it comes into being in the shape of the material. If it is not exist before then anything produces from anything. Causal efficiency belongs to that which has the necessary potency and effect is of the same nature as the cause.

## **The concept of whole (*avayavin*)**

The concept of *avayavin* plays the most significant role in Nyāya’s theory of causation. According to Nyāyaikas *avayavin* (*whole*) is different from its *avayavas* (parts). But Buddhist philosophers denies this conception and explain that there is an identity between parts and whole. According to Mīmāṃsākas, a whole is in one sense different and another sense not different from its constituents parts. The followers of Kumarila do not accept the category of inherence (*samavāya*), they accept an identity between those things where Nyāya relates them by inference. According to Nyāya, the relation between parts and whole is due to inherence. But Mīmāṃsākas of Kumarila’s school, they are not agree with this view and hold that identity is the only concepts in that relation. Prabhākara

says that inherence and whole both are not different and identical with its parts, but would only be different. His view occur simultaneously with Nyāya.

## The concept of potency (*śakti*)

Potency is the most important doctrine in the Mīmāṃsā view on causation. Kumarila and Prabhākara both accepted that potency is distinct from substance. According to Prabhākara potency is a distinct category. Its existence proved by inherence. We see that fire normally burns. But under the influence of a fire-extinguishing gem it does not burn. There is some power or potency in the fire which distinct from itself, which causes burns and which obstructed under the influence of gem. All substances have such potency. Words also have the potency to denote a meaning. This potency is eternal in eternal things and transient in transient things.

Kumarila view is different, according to him potency is not separate category but only a quality. Kumarila says that it is not known by inference, it is known only by the presumption (*arthāpati*) and Vedic testimony. Potency is of two kinds one is worldly (*lokika*) and scriptural (Vedic). First one is known by presumption. For example, power of burning in fire. The second one is known by Vedic injunctions. For example, the potency of sacrifice. According to Kumarila, potency live in substances, actions and qualities.

Thus as we see that much of the Mīmāṃsā view of causation is borrowed from Nyāya-vaiśeṣika. Their only difference is case of potency and causal power. The only point is that whether it is different or non-different from the substance. So the theory of non-existent effect (*asatkārya-vāda*) is accepted here also as in Nyāya-vaiśeṣika.

Causation is essential to explain metaphysics. Mīmāṃsā does not accept the existence of God. And they does not admit that God is the creator and destroyer of the world. Though the universe is made up of parts and because of that there is no reason to suppose that the world had ever any beginning in time. They does not believe that any God created the world. Every things in this world produce the effect by their potency without the operation of any God. So, Mīmāṃsā philosophy holds that the world has ever been running in the same state, without any new creation or dissolution.

## **The Nyāya-vaiśeṣika view on causation**

The Nyāya and the Vaiśeṣika system are two orthodox (*astika*) schools of Indian philosophy. The Nyāya and the Vaiśeṣika are the allied system or *samana-tantra*. They both recognize the reality of God. And they both also accept the reality of individual souls, mind, physical things, atoms of earth, water, fire, and air, ether, space and time. They advocate a similar view of the nature of individual souls and their liberation. They both advocate realism and pluralism. They hold the same deistic conception of God.

They differ on two main points. The Nyāya recognizes four means of valid knowledge. The Vaiśeṣika, on the other hand, recognizes only two, perception and inference, and have brought comparison and testimony under inference. Secondly, the Nyāya recognizes sixteen categories (*padartha*), while the vaiśeṣika recognizes only seven categories. The Nyāya categories are logical categories and form the subject-matter of logic. The Vaiśeṣika categories are the main kinds of objects of knowledge. The Nyāya emphasizes logic and epistemology, while the Vaiśeṣika emphasizes ontology or metaphysics. As Nyāya-vaiśeṣika are allied system so both system's theory of causation is known as *asatkārya-vāda*. Here we explain the theory of causation.

### **Asatkārya-vāda**

The Nyāya-vaiśeṣika theory of causation is known as *asatkārya-vāda*. According to *asatkārya-vāda*, the effect is a new beginning (*ārambha*), literally means 'the theory of non-existent effect'. "Pragabhava pratiyogi". It means that the effect immediately jump into existence by set an end to its prior non-existence. The effect does not have any existence before its production. It is not exist before and not in any shape or form before it actually comes into being. The effect appears from a state of non-existence into the state of existence because the effect is a new production. "Antecedent non-existence has no beginning but it has an end". When the effect produces and it comes into existence it does so by putting an end to its antecedent non-existence. Nyāya did not support this view that effect already exist in the cause. Here we explain this view through example: A wooden chair is not exist before its actual production. It is not exist in the wood of which it comes to the made later. The real fact is that the human effort is essential to make chair, it is shows that chair is a new production in every sense and not simply the manifestation of something which



already exist in an unmanifested condition. If effect is already exist in the cause then there should be no need to say that effect is produce from the cause. But we do put forth effort. Therefore Nyāya did not accept that effect is already exist sin the cause. The effect come out suddenly from nothing. Nyāya hold that the effect is something new. Which also known as *ārambha-vāda*. This doctrine denies that the effect is already existent in the cause. But they are accept the dependence of the effect on its material cause.

## Kinds of causes

1. **Samavāyi** (material): The material cause or the inherent cause is the substance or stuff out of which the effect is produced. For instance threads are the inherent cause of the cloth.

2. **Asamavāyi** (non-inherent): Cause that which inheres in the material cause, and whose efficiency is well known. It is always a quality or an action. For example conjunction of the threads is the non-material cause of the cloth. The color of threads is the non-inherent cause of the color of the cloth. The non-inherent cause is always a quality or an action (*guna or karma*).

3. **Nimitta** (efficient): It is the efficient cause. It is the power that helps the material cause to produce the effect. For example: the potter is the efficient cause to make the pot.

Nyāya and vaiśeṣika are two separate schools originally, but their thought or belief is similar. Nyāya's more stress on logic and the second one on metaphysics. Nyāya-vaiśeṣika adopted the metaphysics same as that of vaiśeṣika. Nyāya-vaiśeṣika holds that causal relation is a general metaphysical perspective of the system. Nyāya-vaiśeṣika holds that cause and effect is like a substance and attribute. They are separate entities but connected by a relation which is called *samavāya*, and these are also eternally related. Therefore, Nyāya-vaiśeṣika advocate that cause and effect are externally related. And in the state of causal process the idea of the earlier growing or developing into the latter is completely extrinsic to the system. According to Nyāya, movement only means change of place not change of form. It has no idea that a thing may continue to exist where it is and yet may undergo change of form. A leaf which is green at one time becomes yellow at another time. Here Nyāya hold that change in time not in place. So Nyāya-vaiśeṣika perspective of causal relation is very limited. Because Nyāya does not explain temporal change, it explains the spatial change. Therefore, Nyāya does not apply any condition where change is inner and not external.

## **The theory of causation in Buddhism**

Buddhist theory of causation is called *pratītya-samutpāda-vāda* or dependent origination. Buddhist's concept of causation is probably based upon observation. In this world everything is going to change and our mind is the flux of ideas. According to the Buddhist theory of causation, everything that happen in the mental or physical world is dependent on something. The existence of everything is conditional, dependent on some cause. When the cause and conditions disappear, the effect also disappear. The causal formula is: *asmin sati, idam bhavti*. It means, this being that arises i.e. '*Depending on the cause, the effect arises*'. Thus according to Buddhism every object of thought and the object of this world is necessarily relative and dependent. And because it is relative, it is neither absolutely real because it is subject to death and nor absolutely unreal because it appears to rise.

Buddhist is also the exponent of *asatkārya-vāda*, as the Nyāya-vaiśeṣika. But here is the difference between their theories of *asatkārya-vāda*. As Nyāya-vaiśeṣika support that the cause in the form of parts of effect. So cause always exist after the appearance of effect. But Buddhist support the other position and proclaim that cause is completely destroy after gives rise to its effect. Reality is momentary. These moments follows each other in progression giving rise to each other moments in their place and themselves disappear. Nyāya-vaiśeṣika theory of causation is called *asatkārya-vāda* but besides it, their theory is also known as *ārambha-vāda*. Which follows that an effect is a new beginning, a fresh existence and the effect has no existence before. Although Buddhist theory also indirectly the same but the title is only given to the Nyāya-vaiśeṣika theory. The technical name for Buddhist theory is *pratītya- samutpāda-vāda* that is the theory of dependent origination. Its support that the emergence of one moment of reality depending on the emergence of the other and the prior emergence when the later dies out.

### **Conclusion:**

In this chapter we have explained the general concept of causation. Here we have particularly discuss about the two main concepts of causation *Satkāryavāda* and *Asatkāryavāda*. Broadly, we have discussed the notion of causation from the viewpoint of the other schools of Indian philosophy.

## Chapter -2

# The Centrality of Causation in Buddhism

In previous chapter we discussed the two main theories of causality and explained the Indian viewpoints on causality. In this chapter we will discuss causation according to different schools of Buddhism (Vaibhāṣika, Sautrāntika, Yogacāra, and Mādhyamika). We explained the different conceptions of reality from the point of view of causation. We firstly focus on Four Noble Truths, which tells us that the causality is the central concept behind it. The things that proceed from a cause and their causes, Tathagata (an honorific title of Buddha) has told and their cessation also. It indicates the importance between cause and effect relationship.

So in order to understand causation which consists of Second Noble Truth, we will discuss in brief about The Four Noble Truths. Buddha delivered his first sermon at Sarnath, which is known as “*Dhamma-chakka-pavattana*” means “setting the wheel of dharma in motion”. It is also called the first turning of the wheel of dharma. And it is more simply called the Four Noble Truths because it comprises its essence. This is the first teachings of the Buddha. These are like the medicine for our suffering and teach us how we have to overcome from all pain. The whole teaching of the Buddha is based upon that making ourselves perfectly free from sorrows and live an absolute blissful life. They had to annihilate from all lust, desires, and mental clinging to cease suffering.

### 1- There is suffering (*Dukkha*):

The term *Dukkha* in Pali or Sanskrit language is composition of two words, ‘du’ and ‘kha’. The letter ‘du’ in the sense of ‘vile’. It denotes that something ‘bad’ or ‘unfavorable’, disagreeable and ‘kha’ signifies as ‘empty’. Thus *dukkha* signifies that is vile and empty. Buddhaghosa (5<sup>th</sup> century Indian Theravada Buddhist philosopher) in *vishuddimagga* (The Path of Purification) states that the things are impermanent, unfavorable and devoid of substantiality are characterized otherwise by people through ignorance, which leads to pain and misery. Therefore, these are called *dukkha*.

Life is full of suffering. Everything in this world is connected with the pain, even pleasure is also connected with pain. Birth, old age, sickness etc. is suffering. Our unrequited wishes is suffering; we love something and not getting that thing is suffering. Separation from the pleasant is suffering.

Selfishness, meanness, greed, anger, hatred, bickering, exploitation and conflict is also suffering. Suffering is one of the central topics taken for analysis in Buddhism and therefore we find a large body of literature on the same. The primary aspect that all schools of Buddhism emphasize is on the need to understand suffering properly. It is only logical that since suffering is compared to an affliction, one cannot administer any therapy without understand the nature of affliction. We need to really understand it. So in the *Samyutta Nikaya*<sup>10</sup> different types of dukkha were categorized by Buddhist sources into three categories. The typologies of suffering are many manifold and in the Buddhist understanding they are divided in the following three categories. “Suffering caused by pain (*Dukkha-Dukkata*), suffering caused by change (*Viparinama Dukkata*) and suffering caused by impressions (*Sanṅkhāra Dukkata*).” These all are the root causes of all sufferings, is a solid explanatory framework from which one can understand the typologies of suffering and how they surface with regard to specific instances of suffering.

The first forms of dukkha is called *Dukkha – Dukkata*. This kind of dukkha or pain primarily arise from the bodily attachment. Our body is responsible for this kind of pain. *Dukha-Dukkata* is the compound of ‘one misery follows another misery’ as Buddhaghosa analyzed. Our body is the aggregations of five *khandhas* and the bodily pain starts, from the moment we born or at the time of our birth (*Jāti*). According to Buddhaghosa, firstly, this body of aggregation of khandhas is responsible for our misery. Our birth manifest miseries such as disease, grief, lamentation, sorrow etc. This bodily sufferings can be the origin of some mental sufferings also. When we physically suffer, we start thinking about it too much such as “why should one ever fall ill?”; “when should I be cured?” etc.; and this form of thought imply a state of mind called unsatisfactoriness of ‘annoyance’ with both body and the mind.

The second type of suffering is called *Viparinama Dukkha*. The word *viparinama* means “change”. *Viparinama* dukkha is related to change. This kind of suffering arise because of the nature of change. Buddhism holds that there is nothing in this universe which is not undergoing change. Everything is changing in every moment. Nothing is permanent. The pleasant state which we experience is not for a long period as the whole universe is changing in every moment. The moment we experience a pleasant state, we may experience a state of sorrow or suffering right after the pleasant moment. Therefore Buddhism holds that pleasure is also a state of pain which is

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<sup>10</sup> Samyutta-Nikaya, Vol 4, pp-259

inherent in the impermanence nature of the universe. According to Buddhaghosa this change is change towards worse. For him the change brings unsatisfactoriness in life. The change to worse will be intelligible for us only if we know the impermanence nature of the universe. The nature of sentient being involves birth, young, adulthood, middle age and old age which involves factors of pain.

The third type of dukkha is *saṅkhāra dukkata* or suffering caused by impression. Sankhara has two different meanings in Buddhism. First one is, one of the khandhas namely *saṅkhāra khandha* which means mental formations. It deals with how a person views the world and how actively one is involved in it. The second meaning is that *saṅkhāra* is the all conditioned things. It signifies all conditioned things and *dukkha* is identified with the all actual process of one's existence. It implies an unenlightened mode of existence which means the present mode of existence is nothing but a wastage of one's resources on fleeting pleasure of samsara. It has a deep sense and this deep sense arises for the one who cannot see the things in the world as they are. They fail to see the threefold characteristics of the world namely, impermanence (*anicca*), grief inflicting or suffering (*dukkha*) and no permanent substance so called soul or essencelessness (*anattā*). From here we can have a conclusion that one's mode of existence is misunderstood and misdirected, and that is why we are unable to see the truth.

Therefore, we can say that the First Noble Truths tells us how there is a natural tendency for people to defeat the unpleasant realities of life, and also find out the different sources of happiness that exist in the life along with those of pain. There is a general tendency of living beings to avoid pain and seek happiness but do not know where the real source of happiness lies. Hence, the first noble truth explains the nature of suffering.

## 2- There is a cause of suffering (*Dukh Samudaya*):

In the Second Noble Truth Buddha found that there is a cause of suffering. Everything in this world has a cause. Everything is relative, conditioned and dependent. There is suffering so there must be the cause of that. It is ignorant craving that leads to rebirth and is related to desires, attachment, lust and pleasures. So Buddha diagnoses that desire and ignorance is the root cause of our suffering, and because of desire the cycle of birth and re-birth is continued,

*“Asmin sati idam bhavti”*

For Vasubandhu, the above mentioned phrase means “if something appears, such and such result will follow”<sup>11</sup>. Which is already propounded by the Buddha in the popular form of “the laws of causation” which is the twelve stages in the ever revolving stream of life from birth to death. This is the law of origination through dependence which is called the doctrine of dependent origination. In the twelve links, we will see how the process which produce the impressions of nature, are conditioned and will follow one by another. All phenomena in the world have some causes and conditions and are dependent on them and thus cannot have any independent origin. According to Buddhism this idea of origination shows the relativity and limitation of all phenomena. Since the origination is dependent, therefore there is a sense of relativism that is already present.

Similarly, our suffering or misery must also be related to certain conditions. Therefore, Buddha introduces here the twelve links of dependent origination which is also known as the causal wheel of dependent origination. The theory of dependent origination is broadly explained as twelve hold series which illustrates the principle causation. According to Buddha, “Life is suffering which is called *Jarā-maraṇa*, it is because there is birth (*Jāti*). Birth is due to the will to be born (*bhava*). Bhava is the cause of life after death. The force of the predisposition to be born causes our birth. The cause of this tendency is our mental clinging (*upādāna*) to the object of the world. This mental clinging is owing to our thirst (*tṛṣṇā*) to enjoy objects. Previous sense experience tinged with a pleasant feeling (*Vedāna*) is the cause of our thirst.” But the question arises why we have sense-experience. “It is because of sense-object contact (*sparśa*). It is explained that this contact again would not arise had there not been the six sense organs (*ṣaḍāyatana*). These six sense organs depend for their existence on the psychophysical organism (*nāma-rūpa*) which constitutes the perceptible being of man. Again the question arises why do we have this organism? It is because of the initial consciousness of the embryo (*Vijñāna*). This consciousness of the embryo is because of our predispositions or impressions of Karma (*Saṃskāra*) of our past existence. The impressions which make for rebirth are owing to ignorance (*avidya*) about truth.” Hence ignorance is the root cause of all our suffering.

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<sup>11</sup> The central conception of Buddhism and the meaning of Dharma, Th. Stcherbatsky, Motilal banarsidass, Delhi, 1970, first published: London, 1923, Pp-28.

Out of these twelve chain, last two are related to the **Past Life**, the first two to the **Future** and the rest to **Present**. So the twelve chain cover the past, the present and the future like which are causally connected.

### 3- There is a possibility of the cessation of suffering (*Dukkha nirodhā*):

According to this Noble Truth, it is the complete destruction of craving or will to live. It is the putting an extinction to ignorance, craving, giving up all desires, attachments and leaving the pleasures seeking and appetite for life. All these craving, desires, sensual pleasure is because of our ignorance which is Buddha said that the root cause of our suffering. So in the Second Noble Truth, we observed that if we break the causal chain of dependent origination forever or come out of this chain by the right knowledge, we cease the flow of worldly existence and end of our suffering from ignorance, as a result of the succeeding links of chain removed forever.

Accordingly, the Third Noble Truth declares that the state of being free from suffering is called Nirvana- the total extinction from suffering from decay and death. Nirvana is the state of complete desirelessness. The desire for this life and the next life are extinguished in it. And the way of the liberation (Nirvana) will be discussed in the Fourth Noble Truth which leads to the cessation of suffering called eightfold path.

### 4- There is a way to the cessation of suffering (*Dukkha-nirodhā-gamini pratipada*):

In this Noble Truth Buddha told about the way to the extinction of suffering or the path that leads to the ending of sorrow. This path followed by Buddha and similarly other people can also practice to reach a state free from suffering which is called Nirvana (liberation). This path consists of eight categories or divisions and should be followed step by step. It is explained in the given below eightfold path-

#### 1- Right Vision or right Understanding

“Right understanding” is difficult to define as there exists a difference between the common sensical and a deeper understanding of this topic in the case of the four noble truths. In academic parlance we may understand this not as an independent variable but an understanding that includes the origin, meaning and the cessation of suffering. This also includes the path to the cessation of suffering as suffering is now approached from a holistic perspective. Wrong view (mithyadirsti)

about the self and this universe is the root cause of our sufferings. Such an understanding leads us to a new threshold level and as the frames through which we understand the world have obscured many realities and thus right knowledge or right vision gives us a different understanding of the world. This understanding of the world is of an objective reality that suffering is on prevalent and not as our subjective creation of the world that we wish it to be. Right understanding leads us towards nirvana, which is the final goal.

## 2- Right Determination

Right determination is the second step of the eight fold path. “What we are because what we think”. Our thought guides us to perform an action which is determined by our mind. That is why right determination is the key factor for our actual activity. Logically we can say that the right determination will always imply a right action. On the other hand wrong determination will lead to wrong action. Therefore we should have right determination.

## 3- Right Speech

Right speech consist in abstention from lying, abstention from unkind words and abstention from frivolous talks. We should not speak harshly to others because each of us has experienced disappointment when we heard harsh criticism. Again, we are also likely to have felt good when kind words said to us. For the Buddha right speech is further divided into four parts and they stem from the negative injunctions of abstinence. These are the avoidance of false hurtful, slanderous and other forms of talk that do not have any meaning. The implication is that these actions have an effect on the listener causing grief or some disturbance. Further, the speaker also is generating bad karma and therefore the actions for the speaker are not right actions.

## 4- Right Conduct/Action

Right conduct includes the Panca-sila or five precepts. These five precepts are not killing, not stealing, not indulging in any kind of sexual misconduct, staying away from lying and not taking any intoxication. Our world is inhabited by a multitude of sentient beings, some of which potentially be impacted by our actions. Therefore, before acting one has to consider the ethics of an action in the sense of what effect it would have on others. The first precepts includes not taking the life of others as Buddha indicates that the development of kindness and being compassionate for others including animals. It means that we should avoid hurting and taking life of others and



must have a heart which is full of sympathy. The second precept is abstaining from taking what is not given, which means not take away anything with thievish intent, which is like stealing, robbery, snatching etc. The third precept says that we must avoid sexual misconduct. We should not force anyone to fulfill our own desire particularly sexual desire. Unless and until the other person is not ready we must not drag her or him to have sexual intercourse. That would be an unethical activity. Therefore we must abstain ourselves from sexual misconduct. The fourth precept is that we must not lie. Telling lie is an unethical activity and it may lead to disaster consequences. The fifth precept says that we must not take any kind of intoxication such as alcohol, drug and other means. It has so many negative consequences which can make a person mad. Having intoxication is harmful for our mind as well as for body.

#### 5- Right Livelihood

Right livelihood is concerned with ensuring that one should earn his livelihood in a noble way. And the basis of all life is the need to fulfil basic necessities that are material in nature. In the pursuit of these material goods that lie at the base of sustaining oneself and society, there is ethical dilemma. In the Buddhist view it is a means and not the ends that justify the proper sustenance of life. Certain types of actions and livelihood that cause violence and bring about suffering were discouraged by the Buddha. The effect of certain negative actions are taken seriously as they would do more harm not only to the human beings but to the other living beings and bring about more suffering to all.

#### 6- Right Effort

Right effort consists in the motivation to perform certain actions that are free of any negative characteristics. Some of these characteristics like bad thoughts, hatred and anger serve as motivational factors and lead to the prosperity of some people temporarily. Such prosperity or success is abhorred as the motivating factors are themselves wrong. There are innumerable examples to convey this. Acquiring a means of livelihood honestly is not bad but the motivation to hoard and acquire through means negates the hard work. Therefore, right effort should be one that emanates from positive actions.

#### 7- Right Mindfulness

Right mindfulness is presence of mind, attentiveness or awareness, lays down that the aspirant never be absent minded and should always be aware of the larger reality. One should know that the phenomena that we see is temporary and unreal and reveals the perishable nature of things. This is necessary for keeping detachment from the things and the pain of their loss. The Dhamma, which means seeing the things as they are really is. It is further available to us and the place where it is to be realized is within oneself. One has to be focused on the present and not the past or future and be aware of the present moment. It is only then that we find the subject to be alert and focused by observing the present moment.

## 8- Right Concentration

Among the eight fold path the most difficult is right concentration. And is difficult to achieve for a variety of reasons. The subject has to first understand, reason out and then proceed to investigate. It is only then the idea of pure thinking as an activity that stems from the individual effort through a rational application of faculties begins leading to a joyous state of pure thinking. There are four stages in this process of right concentration and we had only outlined the first stage. In the next stages meditation is free from reasoning leads to a state of peace which is followed by another state of detachment even. In the final state or the fourth intense concentrations leads to the detachment from the human body and open the doorway to this state of nirvana or perfect wisdom characterized by a sense of calmness and indifference.

These Eight Fold Path to liberation are categorized into three essential elements 1. Moral conduct (*Sila*) 2. Mental discipline (*Citta or Samādhi*) 3. Wisdom (*prajñā*).

When we come to the question of moral (*sila*) that is also translated as ethical conduct has an application which is not independent. Here, ethical conduct is to be exercised as a union of mind coupled with concentration. The importance of this exercise is revealed in the fact that any deeds performed by us have the possibility of causing harm and thereby becoming an agent of defilement. In this light moral conduct sets the background or the wholesome mental purification and leads the practitioner away from the unwholesome state of mind.

The second is the mental discipline (*Citta or Samadhi*) that can also be understood that concentration (*dhyana*) though it does not exhaust the meaning. Such a state that is experienced by the subject is described as a state of calmness and serenity. This state of higher consciousness

is a precondition to attain through wisdom. It is the sense of mindfulness, self-possession, equanimity, emancipation from the obstacles, and the initial exercise for the development of one-pointedness of mind. The eightfold path and more importantly efforts and concentration along with the sense of mindfulness that are the constituents of the eightfold path are the steps that one is expected to adhere to for cultivating mental discipline.

And the last is wisdom (prajñā) which is the ultimate state of three-fold division. It provides the sense to understand the direction with its conceptual understanding of the things as they really are. It is designed to awaken the faculty to know about the nature of the things of universe. In the last stage, when the mind has been clarified by the exercise in moral conduct. Another element along with this concentration through the path of right knowledge. It is only then that right knowledge will have effect and transform the subject to a higher view. At times there may be doubts and tendencies to slacken and therefore the determination is also emphasized to the eightfold path.

In this way mind is completely liberated from the attraction of the world and directed to complete realization. It leads every aspirant to the complete extinction of suffering through practice of these eightfold paths. It is a purification of our body, mind and self-development, self-discipline. It is a way of life to be followed by every person. It is the way through which we realize ultimate reality and the complete freedom from suffering, and grasped the peace.

## **Causation in other Schools of Buddhism**

### **Hinayāna and Mahayana**

In course of time Buddhist followers were divided into two schools Hinayāna and Mahayana and spread across South-Asia and East-Asian countries. Hinayāna well spread in Sri Lanka, Burma, and Thailand etc. The later sect established in Korea, Japan, Tibet, China, and Mongolia etc. So Buddha philosophy has been formulated into four main schools. Hinayāna or Theravada consist of two schools namely, Sautrāntika and Vaibhāṣika. Mahayana consist of the other two schools that is Mādhyamika or Śūnyavādin and Yogacāra or Vijñānavāda.

These four schools have been classified on the basis of answers to two chief questions. First one is metaphysical and another one is epistemological. The first question is metaphysical or concerning the reality that “Is there any reality at all, mental or non-mental?” The second question is epistemological or concerning the system of knowing the reality that “How the reality can be known to exist?”

Here are the four answers to these questions:

(a) Mādhyamika holds that there is no reality, mental and non-mental. It means that the knower, known and the knowledge are mutually dependent on each other. If one is false, the other two must be false. Hence the knower or mind knows an object and that object turns into the false so its knowledge also becomes false. E.g. the perception of a snake into the rope. Thus all that we perceive within or without our perception and the percipient mind are unreal like objects of dreams. The real nature of the things cannot be describable. If a thing is real, it cannot depend on anything else for its existence and origination. And things which we know are dependent on some conditions. Accordingly it cannot be real. But again, we cannot say unreal because an unreal thing cannot come into existence. Therefore it is both real and unreal or neither real nor unreal, it would be unintelligible. According to them, everything is void (śūnya) and this is the only reality. It essentially means the reality is indefinable and indeterminable which is the real nature of the things and that thing must be dependent. It will be seen that the indescribable nature of the things is the fact for being dependent on conditions or the other things, is called dependent origination. Here Dharma (character) is śūnyata because dharma of the things is dependent on other condition and its origin. His means of śūnyata is the constant changeable nature of the things and their conditionality, indescribability, indeterminability. It is called the middle path, because they assert the conditional existence of things and refuses their absolute reality and absolute unreality. According to Nāgārjuna, śūnyavāda is called the middle path and it implies in the theory of dependent origination.

(b) The Yogacārā is a subjective idealist or Vijñānavādin, therefore, they hold that only the mental world is real. In this system of belief the mind is given a role to make correct thinking possible as this school is of the view that mind is the only reality. Deriving from this they understand that all phenomena outside of mind are the mental creations. For them the examples of dreams and hallucinations come in handy as these examples substantiate the fact that the other realities created

by them are figments of imagination. The existence of external thing and the consciousness of the thing is not perceived separately because existence of the thing cannot be proved without its consciousness. The existence of the thing cannot be shown different from its consciousness. The blue color and its consciousness are indistinguishable, because they are not perceived to exist separately.

(c) The Sautrāntika holds that the external objects are not directly perceived, but these external objects are inferred from our perceptions, which are representations or copies of external objects. Hence they accept the reality of the external objects and the mind also. They state that if one never has the presumption of some external object it is too difficult to explain even the illusory appearance of the external object. When we perceive a cup, the pot is felt as external and the consciousness of it in the mind. In the starting the pot were different and not identical with our consciousness. If the perception of a cup is identified with the subject the perceiver would have to say that I am the cup. So there must be the reality of external objects because without the supposition of the external objects, the difference between consciousness of a cloth and consciousness of a cup, could not be describe. Therefore when we perceive the external objects, they produce their ideas in our mind and on the basis of these ideas we infer the existence of external objects. They state that what mind directly knows is called the copy or representation of the object in its own consciousness. But from this it can be inferred that the object without the copy will not arise.

(d) The next is Vaibhāṣika, which holds that the external objects are directly perceived. Vaibhāṣika agreeing with Sautrāntika, but they state that unless we admit that the existence of external objects are perceived by us it cannot be known in any different ways. We cannot infer anything without having prior perception of the both which we are inferring and basing on what we inferred. We must perceive both together in the past at least once.

These are the philosophical perspective of these four schools of Buddhist philosophy. Here we explain the conception of causation of these schools, but we feel that firstly we should give a brief concept of Buddhist theory of dependent origination (*pratītyasamutpāda*). *Pratītyasamutpāda* is the principle that conditionality of all things is originate and due to certain conditions it passes away. Everything in this universe is relative, conditional and dependent. This dependent origination we see in the twelve chain in which each link gives rise to the next link.

**1-Jarā-maraṇa 2-Jāti 3-Bhava 4- Upādāna 5-trṣṇā 6-vedanā 7-sparśa 8-ṣaḍāyatana**

**9-nāmarūpa 10-Vijñāna 11-Saṃskāra 12-avidya**

Therefore, ignorance is the root cause of all our suffering. These are the twelve chain according to Buddhism which are responsible for our birth and death cycle. These links dependent on each other.

In the Buddhist theory of causation, we have seen that the central focus is on the things of the world which are dependent, impermanent and also the products of suffering. We all know that most of the philosophical inquiries talked about the removal of suffering. Buddha says, “Who sees *pratītya* sees dharma, who sees dharma sees *pratītya samutpāda*”. So for the removal of suffering, firstly, we need to understand the real nature of Dharma. Which I broadly explained in the third chapter.

## **Concept of Causality in Vaibhāṣika School**

Vaibhāṣika is the first school of the four Buddhist schools and its approach by Tibetan Buddhist tradition. By definite law of causation all elements are connected with one another or operates together. The world process is controlled by the strict law of causation of the plurality of elements. Elements and its co-operations are momentary. Because of that elements appear and disappear sometimes. One moment always followed by another. The preceding moment is called the cause and its consequent is the effect. Therefore we can understand the nature of the world which is discontinuous continuing process of the momentary elements. The law of causation controls the world. For Vaibhāṣika cause and effect are two sides of one thing. For example, water is the common substance of ice and steam. Here water as substratum is permanent. Vasubandhu says “If something appears such and such result will follow (*asmin sati idam bhavti*)”.<sup>12</sup> Aryadeva also says, “The cause never perishes, but only changes its name when it became an effect having changed its state. For example, clay becomes the jar having changed its state, and this name jar arises.”<sup>13</sup> According to Vaibhāṣika the law of causation is nothing but the actions of elements. The existence of the past, present and future are the results of karma of momentary elements. For

<sup>12</sup>The central conception of Buddhism, Th Stcherbatsky, p.24

<sup>13</sup> Indian philosophy, vol 1, S. Radhakrishnan, p.614-615.

Buddhism there is a distinction between (1) causation among elements of dead matter, where the law of homogeneity between cause and result reigns (2) causation in the organic world, where we have the phenomena of growth and (3) causation in the animate world, where the operation of moral causation is superimposed upon the natural.

. As Vaibhāṣika state that causation is the actions of elements they suggest that there is ultimate elements which can be divided into two type of faculties namely, “cognitive faculties (subjective) and object of cognitive (objective). Cognitive faculties are six and correspondingly there are six objects of cognition. The six cognitive faculties are; 1-Sense of vision (*cakṣur-indriya-āyatana*) 2-Sense of audition (*śroter-indriya-āyatana*) 3-Sense of smell (*ghrāṇ-indriya-āyatana*) 4-Sense of taste (*jihv-indriya-āyatana*) 5-Sense of touch (*kāy-indriya-āyatana*) 6-Faculty of the intellect consciousness (*mana-indriya-āyatana*). The six objects of cognition; 7-Color and shape (*rūpa-āyatana*) 8-Sound (*śabda-āyatana*) 9-Odour (*gandha-āyatana*) 10-Taste (*rasa-āyatana*) 11-Tangibles (*spraṣṭavya-āyatana*) 12-Non- sensuous objects (*dharma-āyatana or dharmāḥ*).”<sup>14</sup> These twelve elements are together called Ayatnas. Vasubandhu has defined the term ayatnas as the way of production in his Abhidharmakosa. Vasubandhu explains that the production of consciousness is dependent which means consciousness cannot be produced independently. There should be sense organs and sense objects to produce it. Consciousness is a non-eternal element and also non-eternal mental component. The existence of these twelve Ayatnas in the universe and everything exists under these Ayatnas or nothing can exist which is not included under any of these. These twelve Ayatnas are produced out of the functioning of sense organs and sense-object. In the same way, consciousness is also produced out of sense organs and sense objects so consciousness caused by the inner-sense organ and inner-sense object is called manovijñāna-dhātu. These ayatnas or elements are also called Dharma. So when we take up the issue from an objective perspective the whole universe is a creation of interchangeable composition of Dharma. Dharma has been classified into two parts. 1- Samskirta Dharma 2- Asamskirta Dharma.

#### 1- Samskirta Dharma:

Vasubandhu suggests that Samskirta dharma consists of the five *skandhas* that are 1-*Rūpa* (matter) 2-*Vedanā* (feeling) 3-*Samjñā* (perception) 4-*Samskāras* (impression) 5-*Vijñāna* (consciousness).

<sup>14</sup> *The central conception of Buddhism*, Th. Stcherbatsky, Motilal Banarsidas, 1970, p.7

Samskirta dharma are those elements which are active, perishable, conditioned, changing, unite mutually to manifest in the cosmic world. In Pitakas, Samskirta dharma has been called the ordinary way of the world through which we have Sin in the past, followed at present time and through this path we will go in the future. So all the composite objects are included under five skandhas and all these composite objects are produced because of an aggregate of cause and conditions. And there are many causes, it is not by a single cause. They all have the ability to free from all the bondage of samsara and have been in existence from the past and will continue in the future.

## 2- Asamskirta dharma:

Asamskirta dharma are those elements which are unconditional and unchanging, constant, uncaused, imperishable, motionless, spiritual and transcendental and they are not merged or joined to each other to produce anything. They are totally unchangeable dharma. Sthaviravadins who is also called Theravādins taught that it is required for all humans to aim for Arahantship and those shows that Asamskirta dharma is called Nirvana which is realized through the complete destruction of the cause and conditions which leads to birth and death and release from this constant chain of rebirth (samsara). All these are pure and unmixed and are called anasaravas which are free from *raga*, *devesa*, *moha*. These are not depending upon any cause and conditions because these are existing independently. These are not subject to any change. Therefore these are the way of truth (*margasatya*) to the one concerning about the path leading to the cessation of suffering.

## **Concept of Causality in Sautrāntika School**

Here is the second realist school of Buddhism known as Sautrāntika. So here we explain the idea of Vaibhāṣika which is Sautrāntika explained differently. They suggest that particulars or elements are never perceived in any distinct way. Experience is a procedure in which two or more things are connected. But Vaibhāṣika claims that both of these realities have their independent existence, they take the idea of causal procedure besides their claim of the separate entities (*dharma*s). Sautrāntika presumes that Vaibhāṣika jumped into another theoretical claim to disconnect oneself from the causal procedure to analyse the 'unconditional experience' (*Nirvana*) rather than drawing attention towards the procedure of claims of the dharmas in association or dissociation from the causal procedure. Sautrāntika defines the real place of the Buddha where there is normally an



association of a presented sequence of the 'conditioned experience', which can be triadic discipline mentioned by the Buddha. They submit that the presented sequence of the conditioned experience is the area of consequent relationship. They never believe that the universe even through correlative, phenomenal or conditional experience a void.

Sautrāntika examine the procedure of the most efficient method of *pratyakṣa* and *anumāna*. In the procedure of the verification of truth, the term *pratyakṣa* is the base of the Sautrāntika philosophy. They also believe that the external world exists but we cannot perceive it directly through our senses, it is deduce out of the many forms through which our consciousness experience the world. They suggest that through inference we cognize the reality of this external world. All the forms are seen on Citta (mind) and Citta perceives these forms. And as forms cannot come to exist, on the Citta without correlating with objects in the external world, they show that form enters the Citta through sense-organ. We are never seen or verified an object directly and by sensation, is dismissed as mere verbal (*śabda*) or conceptual (*kalpana*). According to them only senses give the right information about the five object which are real and made up with the collection of atoms. While Sarvastivādins believe in the aggregation (*samyoga*) of the atoms and Sautrāntika endorse the togetherness (*samyoga*) of atom. So Sautrāntika does not accept the conception of unchanged moment. And the other side, they accept the theory of indirect perception. Because they assert that we cannot perceive the object directly, we only cognize an impression of the likeness of the object, when we see an object, firstly, only the impressions come in our mind not the object. So we only infer the object on the basis of sense impression. This theory is called representative theory of perception.

The early Buddhism and this later school have a different interpretation about the acceptance of the theory of moments which made it tough for the scholastic causal continuousness. For Sarvastivādin, the appearance of the conception of substance is the most important to explain the problem of continuousness of the event, which they examine into momentary existence. There are four prominent teachers of Sarvastivāda who gave the four different theories for supporting this argument. Dharmatrata endorses a theory of change of existence. Dharmatrata maintains that dharma passes through three periods. He suggests that there is no changing in substance, it remains always the same. But there is a change of existence. For example, water which may be seen in various forms, shapes like solid, liquid and gas but the water itself remain unchanged. Secondly,

there is Ghasaka who accepted the theory of change of past dharma. He contended that the past dharma possessed the characteristic of pastness but give it away the characteristic of pastness and futurity. Thirdly Vasumitra here suggests a theory of change of condition. He says that “the dharma passing through the three periods of time, past, present and future which is resolute by the causal movement”. He said that if causal efficiency is present, it is called the present. And he state that if the causal efficiency is no more, it is called past, if the causal efficiency is not yet manifested it is called future, and in the last, Buddha deva advocates a theory of change. He maintained that dharma is to be passed with respect to the present, future, while present is connected to the past, future and future with respect to the past and present. For example, as we saw that a female who may be called both a mother and daughter, mother in relation to her children and a daughter in relation to her own mother”.<sup>15</sup>

All these theories maintained that the substance is not changed or the existence of everything remains unchanged and existed in all three periods of time, past, present and future. But Sautrāntika did not accept these theories. All these schools of later Buddhism accept the concept of momentariness. So they had refuted the theory of substance and accepted the theory of moments because it admits that existence is only in present. Existence is simply a series of moments, one moment succeeding another without cease and gape. Existence comprises in causal efficiency. Because only momentary cause produces the effect and they have the capacity to produce an effect. Here they mean that permanent entities are not capable to produce any effects. For example, a stone cannot produce a tree. As we say that existence is only in present, if the permanent entities produce an effect at present time then it also has the capacity to produce an effect in the past and future. But if it is incapable to produce an effect in the present time, it is also incapable to produce effects in the past and future also; and for what does not producing an effect at a particular time is not capable of producing it at that time. A permanent entity is not capable of causal efficiency and not producing the effect simultaneously and in succession. Causal efficiency can exist with production. The only momentary entity is capable of causal efficiency. Every object in this world is undergoing change or destruction in every moment. There is no identity or permanence of external things which is not undergoing destruction. It is only our identity illusion of momentary entities. We only think that they appear to be the same, even they change from

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<sup>15</sup> *The central conception of Buddhism*, Stcherbatsky, Appendix 1, pp.78-80.

moment to moment. Identity is a series of similarity and continuity. For example, the stream of water and the flame of a lamp.

Sautrāntika emphasizes the notion of the self as a series of momentary apprehensions. Jadunath Sinha in his book, *Outlines of Indian Philosophy*, says that ‘there is no permanent self behind the continuous series of momentary cognitions. The preceding cognition leaves an impression which modifies the succeeding cognition.’ Here the self is only a series of momentary cognitions. Perceive something leaves an impression in our mind and this impression modifies the succeeding cognition. Because impression is transferred from one moment to another which appears in the memory or accounts for memory. Memory is a substratum of the impressions and the recollections of that objects or something we perceived in the past. Memory does not require the permanent self. In the future, the same series of an object remembers the past momentary object which is perceived in the past of that same series. As Jadunath Sinha mentions that recognition is the collection of perception and recollection. It neither requires a permanent self nor does it recognize a permanent object. Thus the self and external objects are the series of momentary entities. These are not permanent nor identical.

So we conclude that Sautrāntika mentions that things are always changing and they never remain constant. Some things disappear as soon as it emerges. They assert that one real thing cannot exist at the same time anywhere, neither can some reality be real at different times. Because for them, the existence is in the present moment only and things in the past and future are only imaginary that is also called non-existence. Only subtly momentary things in the present are real which also enter into the past. So their view about the existence of the things connects with the common image of the mind.

## **Concept of causality in Yogacārā School**

Yogacārā belongs to the Mahayana school and it is the influential idealistic school of Buddhism which is also called Vijñānavādin. They do not believe the reality of the external object and declares that the realization of the idea of inner perception of the highest truth through the practice of yoga. By this yoga, they came to realize the reality of the nature of consciousness. It is the discipline of the mind in order to realize the absolute truth and eliminate all belief in the external world. Yogacārā believes that consciousness (mind) is only the ultimate reality and non-mental

devoid of reality. Nothing can exist except mind and their perceptions or ideas. A person experience material things, but their existence is dependent of the perceiving mind. They argues that material things are only the perceptions and their existence dependent on the perceiving mind. The appearance of a form of consciousness as something objective and independent is illusory. As mentioned in the *lankavatara-sutra* that 'all things are nothing but mind'. The perceptible phenomena around us are produced by the mental effect within. They are like clouds, appear and disappear rapidly.

Yogacārā is the supporter of Vijñāna or consciousness, deny all real existence. According to them, the objective world and the subjective egos are the only manifestation of the universal consciousness or *Alaya Vijñāna*. *Alaya Vijñāna* is an ever-changing stream of consciousness. But in *lankavatarasutra*, he explained that *Alaya Vijñāna* is a permanent, immortal and never changing storehouse of consciousness. It is the key concept of the Yogacārā or Vijñānavāda. In *lankavatarasutra*, it is mentioned that external objects are unreal and false like daydreams, illusions, etc. It considers them as the modification of the *Alaya Vijñāna* and it sometimes been called cosmic mind, which is mixed up into the waves of mental modes. The cognition of objects is the manner or way of the cosmic mind. The objects are hard to define without cognitions and no objects apart from cognition. The cognition of the objects arises from the *Alaya Vijñāna* or storehouse of consciousness.

The Vijñānavādin assert that the non-existence of the external things on the basis of momentariness. Besides this, things are known only after their creation, but they appear for some moment and disappear in the very next moment of creation. Accordingly the creation of the things and their knowledge in the same moment. So here we see that the thing is the cause of knowledge and effect is the knowledge but in the same period of time the cause and effect cannot be the same. The effect should be previous to cause. As other school Nyāya maintain that cause always exist even after the appearance of the effect. But in Buddhism, the things are completely destroyed after giving rise to its effect and Yogacārā school of Buddhism also accept this concept. So the knowledge of the external things is not possible. Therefore the things which are external should be taken as mental conception.

Yogacārā also employ the concept of causality in understanding the self and also nirvana. Individual *Pravṛtti-Vijñānas* is the manifestation of the *Alaya*. The *Alaya* is also called the

*Tathagata garbha*, *tathagat garba* or womb. The notion of Tathagata is explained in the Mahayana *Mahayanaparivṛta* sutra to refer to the ‘true self’ from the Tathagata womb (*tathagatagarbha*) the soul as birth and death comes forth, the ultimate reality. But the perishable and imperishable conflict with each other, despite the fact that they are different and not dual either. Therefore when the pure soul infer a correlative aspect by its self-assertion and is called the preserve mind (*Alaya Viññāna*). It holds the two prepositions 1. Enlightenment 2. Non-enlightenment.

There are two different laws of causation which is relevant to *samsāra* and *nirvana*. The Sarvastivādin School try to explain it by establishing its concept of two distinct laws of causation. So here is the first part *samudayasatya* and *dukkhasatya* which represent the law of cause and effect in the world. According to them, *samudayasatya* is the cause of *samsāra* and *dukkhasatya* is the effect. The second part is a group of *Nirodhasatya* and *Margasatya*. These laws represent cause and effect in the domain of Nirvana. Here *margasatya* is the cause of nirvana (liberation) and the effect is *nirodhasatya*.

Mādhyamika School state that *pratītyasamutpāda* referred to a motionless world which has merely an elusive reality. But Yogacārā School supports that *pratītyasamutpāda* means motion and it refers to a cosmos which is essentially depending on movement for its effect.<sup>16</sup>

## **Concept of Causality in Mādhyamika School**

Mādhyamika is the school of the middle way which began about the 2<sup>nd</sup> century. Mādhyamika holds that subject and objects are relative and conditional, and accordingly essence less. They propound that *śūnyata* is eternal and absolute. It is called the reality of *śūnyata*. The theory of *pratītyasamutpāda* holds a key position in Mādhyamika and Yogacārā schools. It is the central and main part of Buddhism. The Mādhyamika School states that *pratītyasamutpāda* as relativity and relativity implies the *śūnyata*, the unreality of the different elements. Nāgārjuna maintains in Mādhyamika *kārikā* that through a dialectical criticism the inner contradiction of all view on causation is possible. And also conclude that causation is not possible in an absolute sense. The relation of cause and effect is formulated in different ways. For example Sāṅkhya view of causality is called *satkāryavāda*. It maintains that the identification between cause and effect and establishes

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<sup>16</sup> Buddhist logic, F.Th. Stcherbatsky, vol1, Dover publication, 1962, pp.141.

the theory of self-becoming through which things are produced out of themselves. But Buddhist and nyāyaikas have a different view and they conclude that there is a difference between cause and effect. According to them the effect is a new beginning, a new entity (asatkārya-vāda). But from the ceaseless and emerging aspect of the effect, Jaina philosopher combines the two views.

***“Hetoh phalasya caikatvaṃ na hi jātūpapadyate***

***Hetoh phalasya cānyatvaṃ na hi jātūpapadyate”<sup>17</sup>***

‘It means that it is not possible, indeed, for a cause and an effect to be identical. But again, it is not possible indeed for them to be different.’

As Mādhyamika asserts about the relativity as pratītyasamutpāda so the world is said to be a net-work of relations. But here relations are incomprehensible. They believe that relationships can exist between two distinct things. But these things cannot distinct from each other. For example a seed and sprout relation. According to them a thing which is produced from another thing, cannot exist apart from it. So here we see sprout which came out from the seed that cannot exist apart from seed and therefore sprout is not distinct also from the seed. And we also say that there are two stages of the same entity. But as Sāṅkhya causation, the seed is the cause of the sprout which is potentially in seed and therefore sprout is the self-caused. So, if they are not ultimately distinct from each other, they cannot be related to each other and if they are identical with each other, they are not related to each other. Because identity and relation cannot exist together. Even two things which are distinct from each other and these things cannot relate with each other. Two self-existent and unrelated things cannot be related to each other. If the distinctness of X is independent of Y, then the distinctness of Y is also independent of X. They are independent of each other. Therefore they mean that there are no relations and relations are unintelligible and phenomenal. They are not ultimately real. As I mentioned in the starting that relativity implies the śūnyata, the unreality of the different elements. Because of the relativity, Mādhyamika denies the plurality of external objects and internal cognitions. All elements have relative and contingent reality. Because Mādhyamika believes that śūnya only has absolute reality. Nāgārjuna’s concept is the middle way or path between existence and non-existence. And also between essenceless and the essence of

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<sup>17</sup> NĀGĀRJUNA A Translation of his Mūlamadhyamkakārikā with an Introductory Essay, Kenneth K. Inada, sri satguru publications, Delhi, 1993, p.123 (verse 19).

being. They state that śūnyata is not produced by other causes, it is absolute. They refute all the views accept the reality of the śūnya and use this word in two senses the relative and absolute. So Nāgārjuna view is that dharmas are relative (śūnya) but they are based on absolute (śūnya). Relativism is not absolute truth. This is the way to reach the absolute because without the help of relativism we cannot attain the absolute and without knowing the absolute Nirvana cannot be attained.

Relativism is like an illusion, unreal. But it has some reality which is empirical and contingent reality. This reality is not the practical purpose of our life. Because it is unreal in relation to the absolute and all these relative and contingent phenomena vanished in the absolute. Absolute is that which we cannot express. We do not call it śūnya or *aśūnya*, or both, or neither, but it is called śūnya in order to specify its nature. Absolute is beyond the four empirical categories and it is neither existent nor non-existent, nor both. So śūnyata is that beyond thought or conception, which has no cause, not produced, not born and which is without compute.

Mādhyamika states that in the world of experience śūnyata means the ever-changing state of the phenomenal world. The pratītyasamutpāda theory is the nature of dharmas to be produced by simultaneousness causes, and which is produced is not produced in itself means, that produced by another thing and does not exist in itself, it is only shown that the actually existent things are not ultimately real. So here śūnya means the production by causes or dependence. Radhakrishnan mentions in his book *Indian Philosophy vol.1* that 'all is declared śūnya, empty because there is nothing that is not the product of universal causation'. Śūnyata is the only feature of the dependent nature of things. This is the nature of the things which is indescribable that the fact of their being dependent on other things or conditions. Therefore Nāgārjuna says 'we call the fact of dependent origination śūnyata'. All dharma of the things is dependent on some other condition concerning its origination. So there is no dharma which is not śūnyata. Because all dharmas are essenceless and relatives and contingent. Therefore, śūnya is the only means to the conditional nature of the things and their ever changeability and they are undefinable.

On some point of view, Mādhyamika philosophers criticized asatkārya-vāda. Asatkārya-vāda includes Sarvastivādin's view and in some cases, they follow the Nyāya's view. So Mādhyamika criticizes only Sarvastivādin's view and says that a single entity which has the independent existent is not the cause of an effect. If cause and effect are completely different and

independent with each other than nothing should be able to produce anything or nothing should be produced from anywhere. All these perspective are one-sided but these are totally comprehensive in the explanation of the causal relation. Demolition, origination is also neither self-caused nor brought about by others. In this regard, Nāgārjuna concludes that causation is a mystery. And he also states that it is the nature of *māya* or a dream. Causation is like the magical power with no difference between it. Because of this Nāgārjuna and Śāṅkara have much in common that the force of Avidya which is also called *māya* introducing the phenomenal world, is admitted by both. Things are *anirvacaniya* or indescribable and Mādhyamika *vṛtti* state that they are *nishsvabhava* or devoid of essence. To be indescribable and to be featureless are after all the same with the Buddhist's point of view to the unseen Nāgārjuna admits the absolute reality, he does not reside much on the positive absolute.

In the schools of Buddhism, Vaibhāṣika begins with a dualistic metaphysics and hold that the object are directly perceived. Sautrāntika establishes that the idea is the way through which the reality is perceived. Thus Sautrāntika built a screen between mind and things. The Yogacāra quite consistently put an end to the things behind the images and bring down all experiences that are a series of ideas in our mind. The Mādhyamika also dissolved mind into a mere idea and left us with loose units of ideas and perceptions about that which we can say everything is indefinite. From the metaphysical perspective, the two substance theory of Vaibhāṣika is filled up on the side of mind when we came to the Sautrāntikas. The Yogacāra denies the external world and puts the mind in the center of things, and Mādhyamika asserts that there is nothing to be ultimately real, neither individual selves nor material objects because the reality is absolute. The Yogacāra assert the concept of self-consciousness to the absolute and here the Mādhyamika examine that self as well as not-self to be equally unreal.

In Mādhyamika kārikā, Nāgārjuna state that, Buddha said about the principle of pratītyasamutpāda according to which there is no plurality, no distinction, neither beginning nor end, no motion neither here nor there.<sup>18</sup> In Buddhist logic according to Stcherbatsky, “there are three formulas disclosing the meaning of the term ‘dependent origination’. The first is expressed in the words, ‘this being, that appears’. The second says ‘there is no real production, there is only

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<sup>18</sup> Buddhist logic vol 1, F. th. Stcherbatsky, Dover publication, 1962, p.141



interdependence'. The third says 'all elements are forceless'<sup>19</sup>. Here are different theories of causation in Indian philosophy which explain differently the creative principles of the world. So in all these conceptions the Buddhist answer was that 'Not from one' own self, not from another self, not unplanned are the things produced. A thing is, in fact, not produced at all; it arises in functional dependence upon its causes'.

### **Conclusion:**

In the above chapter we have discussed the notion of Four Noble Truths and the concept of causality which is related to it. Here we have explained the notion of causality in details according to the four different major schools of Buddhism namely Vaibhāṣika, Sautrāntika, Yogacāra and Mādhyamika.

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<sup>19</sup> Ibid, p. 121.

## Chapter-3

### A conceptual Analysis

In previous chapter, we explained several interpretations of the term causality in different schools of Indian philosophy and also in Buddhist schools. Before we consider all their interpretations, we shall see the literal meaning and basic conception of Buddhist causality (*pratītyasamutpāda*). Th. Stcherbatsky mention in his book Buddhist logic vol 1, Kamalasīla “among all the excellent teachings of Buddhist philosophy, its theory of causation is the chief jewel”.<sup>20</sup> The term *pratītyasamutpāda* comprise of two words, *pratītya* and *samutpāda*. “*Pratītya*” means ‘reaching’ in the sense of ‘dependent’ or ‘relative’. The word ‘*samutpāda*’ it means ‘appearance’, ‘manifestation’. The total meaning of this term *pratītyasamutpāda* is ‘the manifestation of separate entities as relative to their causes and conditions’ (*hetu-pratyayāpekso bhāvānām utpādaḥ pratītyasamutpādārthaḥ*)”<sup>21</sup>. The concept of *pratītyasamutpāda* is basically a moral formation which we see in our life. There is a stream of suffering in our life and *pratītyasamutpāda* is the only way to tell us about the arising of suffering by way of the chain of twelve factors. Everything happens because of cause and conditions, if X happens therefore Y arise so X is caused by Y. If one thing arises depending upon another thing because there must be the cause and condition, nothing can exist as an independent entity. Everything has a cause and conditions as well. For example, oxygen dry surface, these are the positive conditions for fire as well as these are the causes of fire. So from here we can understand that there are causes of an effect and as well as there are various conditions to produce an effect. And these causes are themselves destroyed after giving the effects because everything has the momentary existence. Buddhist concept of causation is a direct consequences of the theory of momentariness. Everything comes into existence just for a moment gives birth to its effect and is exhausted. Things exist not even for short period of time but exist for one part less moment only. Hence everything is impermanent. Everything is becoming, change and flux. For everything, there is a product of an antecedent or ‘cause’. Thus, for Buddhists, this is dependent origination. Everything has the cause these causes themselves are

<sup>20</sup> *Buddhist logic vol 1*, Th. Stcherbatsky, Dover publication, Inc. New York, 1962, PP-119.

<sup>21</sup> *The conception of Buddhism Nirvāna (with Sanskrit text of Madhyamaka-karika)*, Th. Stcherbatsky, Motilal Banarsidas Delhi, 1968, P.78.

not everlasting and are not stable but dependent on each other. But antecedent aspect of the same ceaseless becoming, every event is the result of a process; neither being nor non-being but becoming. So there is only becoming in the process of causation. Buddhists advocate that everything becomes that is happens by the law of cause and effect. The law of cause and effect is inseparably connected with the theory of impermanence, for nothing in this world without cause. If we thought things existed independently from the cause and conditions so they would be permanent and unchanging but it is impossible to conceive a things that continuous without change. It is the phenomena that things are impermanent and capable of change, they must arise on dependence certain causes and conditions. So here *pratītyasamutpāda* is the principle that conditionality of all things is originate and due to certain conditions it passes away. Everything in this universe is relative, conditional and dependent. The Buddhist logicians support the theory of momentariness by a logical argument called *Arthakryā-kāritva* or **the efficiency of production**. They maintain that the criterion of existence is its capacity to produce some effect. An existent thing must produce an effect. A seed produces a plant. It means that seed exists because it has capacity to produce a plant. Only a non-existent thing like here's horn or a sky-flower cannot produce any effect because they are non-existent. Hence the Buddhist logicians deduce that a thing is momentary and impermanent. If a thing has the capacity to produce some effect, it must change. Hence change is the stuff of reality. It is impossible to conceive a thing that continuous without change. Buddhism denies unity in the sense of identity, but recognizes continuity in its place. From this it can be validity deduce that if a thing is exist then it must be momentary.

In Majjhima Nikaya, “mentioned these four features of causation constitute the theory of *pratītyasamutpāda*, these characteristics defines the general formula:

*“Imasmim sati idam hoti Imass uppādā idam upajjati*

*Imasmim asati idam na hoti imasssa nirodhā idam nirujjhatī”*

“When this is present, that comes to be; from the arising of this that arises, when this is present that does not come to be; on the cessation of this, that cease.”<sup>22</sup>

It states that cause is completely ceased after giving rise to its effects. Reality is momentary. These moments follows each other in progression giving rise to each other moments in their place and

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<sup>22</sup> *Majjhima Nikaya* 79, 32: SN 12, 21, London: Pali text society (P.T.S)

themselves disappear. "Reality is in the form of point instants (*kṣaṇas*) of efficiency and these point-instants, according to *pratītyasamutpāda*, arise in functional dependence upon the point-instants which are their causes. As Stcherbatsky writes, the term *pratītyasamutpāda* means that every point-instants of reality arises in dependence upon a combination of point-instants to which it necessarily succeeds; it arises in functional dependence upon 'a totality of causes and conditions' which are its immediate antecedents".<sup>23</sup>

This we see in the twelve links in which each and every links gives rise to the next link. Even every link in the process arises in dependence upon numerous causes and conditions. Such as for every individual consciousness under the influence of ignorance, impressions and result of the deed entering into contact with the world receiving these feeling of pleasure or pain leading to action or grasping producing a new-becoming.

## **Chain of twelve links of interdependent co-arising: wheel of existence (Bhava chakra)**

The theory of dependent origination (*pratītyasamutpāda*) is mainly describe as twelve-limb representing the phenomenal life and which illustrates the principle causation. These are divided into three parts, past, present, future which are causally connected. The twelve members shown as in the following order:

### **Past life**

**Ignorance** (*avidyā*) is leads to **Impressions of karmic force** (*saṃskāra*) after that

### **Present life**

**Consciousness** (*Vijñāna*) and when it take one step it becomes the cause of **Name and form** (*nāma-rūpa*) after because of this, **Six sense organs** (*ṣaḍāyatana*) because of this **Contact** (*sparsa*) **Feeling** (*vedanā*) **Craving** (*trṣṇā*) **Clinging or attachment** (*upādāna*)

### **Future life**

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<sup>23</sup> *Buddhist logic vol-1*, Th. Stcherbatsky, Dover publications, inc. New York, 1962, pp-119

**Becoming** (*bhava*) **Birth or rebirth** (*jāti*) **Old age and death** (*jarā-maraṇa*) in this way all links depend on each other.

Some understanding of the twelve links, and the order in which they are usually enumerated may help us to grasp the implications of *pratītyasamutpāda*. As we saw that first is *avidyā*, ignorance which means that it is the activity of the past life, done under the spell of greed, aversion and wrong knowledge that directly leads to the emergence of the present life. It is because of wrong knowledge and wrong perspective of things that once regards worldly objects as permanent and runs after them, thereby giving a constant push to the wheel of life to take more and more rounds of birth and death. This ignorance leads to the second link which is *saṃskāra* or the effect of the blind activity of the past. The effect of the activity of the past life acts as the energy to bring forth a new life and a new series of existence. *Vijñāna*, the third link, means embryonic consciousness. It arises at the first moment of conception. This *Vijñāna* then takes one more step and becomes the causes of *nāma-rūpa*, the fourth link, or the mind-body of embryonic life. The six sense organs develop in the next stage as the fifth link but they are not used in the embryonic stage, *sparsā* or contact, the sixth link, refers to the early stage of infancy when the sense-organs of the newly formed life begin to come in touch with the objects of this world. *Vedanā*, the seventh link, means the feelings of pleasure, pain and indifference. When the individual grows in age, he becomes familiar with the feelings of pleasures and pains. By *sparsā* he gains knowledge of the external world whereas *vedanā* awakens him to feel and enjoy various emotions of life, Desire, the eighth link, depends on *vedanā*. When the individual experiences pleasure, he grows eager to have this feeling again and again in his life. This is the stage of desire and it breeds attachment. It is the pursuits of desire that leads a man astray and weaves around him a net-work of births and deaths, miseries and sufferings. *Upādāna*, the ninth link, means clinging to existence or making efforts to retain the object of pleasure. *Upādāna* produces *bhava* or the will to be, the tenth link. An individual will not be able to experience the pleasures of life unless he is born. “The will to be” thus becomes the ground of our repeated existences. So *bhava* leads to *jāti*, birth, the eleventh link which produces the twelfth and last link which is old age, death, sorrows etc.

These are the twelve factors considered by Buddhism as being responsible for the emergence of life and its variegated sense-experiences and emotions. These different stages are knitted together as if in a chain and every prior stage is the ground of the posterior one. So long as we

remain in darkness and ignorance, the wheel remains in motion and whenever there is conflict and maladjustment, the wheel moves with jerks and as a consequence we become discontented and unhappy. The past, present and future are linked together in such a way that while enjoying in the present life the fruits of the past, one sows seeds for the future. Time does not flow in a straight line. It moves in a circle with no beginning or end. Death does not mean the end of life. Withering away of one life means the blossoming forth of another. When one series finishes, a new series at once springs up. *Samṣāra*, means series of lives moving in circles. Each wheel is small circle of one life and the series of the wheel of life is *saṃsāra*.

In the Buddhist theory of causation, we have seen that the central focus of this theory is the things of the world which are dependent and impermanence and also productive of suffering. We all know that most of the philosophical inquiries are talked about the removal of suffering. Buddha says “who sees *pratītya* sees *dharma*, who sees *dharma* sees *pratītya samutpāda*”. So for the removal of suffering firstly, we need to understand the real nature of Dharma. This term Dharma has been used in many ways. According to Buddhism the term dharma means the ultimate reality of any entity either material or mental which possesses having specific characteristic of its own, and they are produced out of causes and conditions. For example fire has the eternal characteristic of burn. The mental and the material entities having own specific characteristics are non-eternal and all these entities move towards their demolition. Even, for example, consciousness (*Citta*), as a mental entity is momentary and is destroyed in every moment of its production. Thus Buddhists have explained that the term dharma is the unchangeable nature of things. It is the reality about the non-eternal entities which is everyone has to realize it in this life. If all human beings realized this conditioned nature of the things, it would be the solution to the problem of life and the world.

The Buddhists have a unique and peculiar stand regarding causation, because their interpretation of causation is different than that of *satkāryavāda* and *asatkāryavāda*, which are the other theories of causation of the orthodox schools. According to the Buddhist the effect is neither a manifestation of a cause nor a new creation but it only replaces the cause. The effect arises in functional dependence upon which is the causes and conditions, which are its immediate antecedents. A simultaneous existence of cause and effect is impossible. By the dependence of effect upon its cause is meant that it replaces the previous entity, which is the cause. The cause is thing – itself or *svalakṣana* or the reality. Hence the Buddhist belief is, all things are caused. The

Buddhist conceptions of impermanence, universal change, are the different aspects of the Buddhist Theory of Causation.

Sāṃkhya system assumes that the cause and the effect are only the two stages of one thing, this only implies that there is no real causation in the sense of one entity causing another. There is no relation of logical necessity between the cause and effect. The cause being there, the effect may arise, or it may not; i.e. the evolution is dependent on the proximity or the presence of the Puruṣa. Puruṣa is an external agency and it is never explained by Sāṃkhya what causes Puruṣa to be near the Prakṛti. Hence, the causal relation remains at the contingent level.

The Nyāya-vaiśeṣika system defines cause as that which invariably precedes the effect. This definition can be split up into two parts:

- 1- Cause should immediately precedes the effect, and
- 2- It should not be Anyathā-Sidha (proved wrongly)

The cause and effect relation is defined in terms of temporal succession and not in terms of the nature of the cause itself. This means that time is an extra factor in causation as distinct from the ontological status of the cause. Similarly, effect is defined by the Nyāya-vaiśeṣika system as the counter entity of antecedent negation.<sup>24</sup> There are two factors in the production of an effect, viz. 1- the ontological nature of the thing called cause, and 2- the time which contains that thing.

### **The Relationship between the Ontological Status of Cause and the Ontological Status of Effect**

The Nyāya believes in the doctrine of the *asatkāryavāda*. The *asatkāryavāda* implies that the effect is a new creation and it does not exist before its production. Therefore, the ontological status of effect has no relation with the ontological status of the cause. As the effect does not exist before its production the effect is ontologically independent of its cause. In the ontological status there is no relation, but, there is relation between the time of the cause and the time of the effect. For Nyāya-vaiśeṣika time is one and its division is artificial. The basis for the relation between the cause and the effect is time, or the relation is temporal in nature. The only type of temporal relation that could be there between the cause and the effect is that of succession.

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<sup>24</sup> *Tarkasamgraha of Ānambhaṭṭa* (Ed. Athaley and Bodas, Bombay Sanskrit Series No. LV. Poona 1963), P.196.

The succession is of two types, namely 1- where the succession is from the standpoint of the preceding moment, e.g. 'A therefore B', and 2- where the succession is from the standpoint of the succeeding moment, e.g. 'B because A'. In the first case when it is said, 'since there is cause, therefore, there will be an effect', it only refers to a possible occurrences of an effect, because at the causal level, the effect is not ontologically involved. From the point of view of the preceding moment, there is only a possibility of the succeeding moment. That means even temporally there is only a possibility and no necessity. In the second case, 'since this is the effect, there must have been a cause of it.' From the point of view of the succeeding moment when something occurs then the notion of prior time also comes. But, nothing can be said about the ontologically non-existent effect in that prior time. This means that even at the level of the effect, the effect is bound with its cause only through time. That means time is the only factor that binds a cause and effect. There is nothing common between the cause and effect, except the factor of time. Therefore, just as at the level of the cause, relation between the cause and time was contingent; similarly, at the level of effect, the relation between effect and time is also contingent.

The notion of *Anyathā-sidha* pertains to the prior time, when an effect was ontologically non-existent. Therefore, the idea of the *Anyathā-sidha* relates to the time aspect of the effect which alone binds the effect with its cause. While talking of the prior time of an effect, the question may be asked, 'How far are we going back in time from the production of the effect?' A limit will have to be put to our going back in time, when it is said, 'Thus far, no further.' But, this limit will always be arbitrary, as any limitation of time, according to Nyāya-vaiśeṣika, is artificial. This is more so, because the ontological status of cause has no bearing on the ontological status of the effect. This means that the relation between the cause and effect being contingent, the notion of *Anyathā-sidha* is used only to minimize the scope of the relation. In other words, the very idea of *Anyathā-sidha* suggests that anything prior in time to the effect could be causally related to it. Had the causal relation between the cause and the effect been necessary, the so-called *Anyathā-sidha* would have been automatically eliminated.

In Nyāya-vaiśeṣika the cause does not change itself into an effect, as in Sāṃkhya. Moreover, in itself the cause has no force to produce an effect. The cause stands in need of cause an external agent to move it. Thus, the creative force of cause is accidental. It may produce an effect, or it may not, depending upon an agent. The agent may be man or God i.e. a conscious being. Because a



conscious being has a free will, he may act or he may not. The creative forces does not produce the necessary effect. That is why it is contingent.

In Nyāya-vaiśeṣika metaphysics there are some eternal realities. One reality is not responsible for the existence of the reality, for example, the soul is not responsible for the existence of matter. Each reality exists in its own right. That is why any kind of relationship between two eternal realities will be incidental. One atom does not depend on the other atom. It is only incidentally that two realities come in contact. Therefore, cause and effect relation, and for that matter any kind of relation involving co-presence of two things is always contingent in the sense that the two things may not be inter-dependent and their alleged co-presence may be due to certain external factors, like the will of God, which, being free, is again, accidental. Any kind of co-presence in the metaphysics of Nyāya-vaiśeṣika is contingent and not necessary.

Here Advaita Vedanta brings forth a new idea of causation, i.e. the cause produces the effect without itself undergoing any change whatsoever. In fact Śaṅkara has evolved his whole doctrine of non-duality on the notion of the inapplicability of causality to the ultimate reality. Śaṅkara's objective is to establish Vivartāvāda or Māyāvāda, which implies that the world is a phenomenal appearances of Brahman. Brahman does not evolve but only gives rise to appearance, which, though entirely depending on it, does not affect it. Brahman is the cause and world is the effect. The relation between Brahman and world which is maya according to them, is inexplicable. The world is due to Māyā. Brahman is always the locus of Māyā, but remains untouched by it. The relation between Brahman and Māyā cannot be placed under any one of the logically recognized categories. The origin of Māyā cannot also be explained. Brahman has no intrinsic relation with it. Whatever change takes place, it is in Māyā and is superficial. The Brahman, which is the cause, remains unaffected by it. This leads to the idea that causal relation is contingent.

## **According to the Buddhists**

Causality exists between two moments, when examined from the empirical point of view, it rests on inference. Inference is possible on two types of relation, 1- Tādātmya 2- Tadupatti. By Tādātmya is implied that there is the relation of identity between two things. The concept of one involves that of the other and ultimately both the concepts refer to one thing (svalakṣaṇa), for example- Asoka is a tree. It is an inference in which there is no difference between the tree and the Aśoka-tree in the underlying point of reality. The Asoka is existentially identical with the tree.

This relation is founded on identity, but identity is here not so much existential as conceptual. Hence in the case of Tādātmya it is a logically necessary or analytical relation. Here, necessity is rooted in the very concept of Asoka, which existentially involves also the concept of a tree.

In the case of Tadupatti, a tree is characterized as produced from a seed. Here the causal relation is between the last moment of the seed and the first moment of the sprout. This relation between two realities, two underlying point-instants, is causal, as one thing is produced from the other. It is the linking of two things (one of them is present and the other one was in the past) under one concept of causality. It is a concept that involves relation. In this two things are placed under one concept. By analysing the concept of effect one can arrive at the concept of cause. By seeing the tree which is an effect, it is inferred that there must be something that caused it. Hence, from the effect we can infer the idea of the cause which shows that the relation between the cause and the effect is a logically necessary relation. The main distinction between the Tādātmya and Tadupatti is that in the first case two concepts are applied to one thing, whereas in the second case two things are placed under one concept.

The Buddhist philosophy goes deeper, analyzing the issue of causality. According to the Buddhists, one entity does not produce or influence another entity out of itself. There is simple coordination between the moments following one another in an uninterrupted flux. There is the general implication of the law of pratītyasamutpāda, because there is neither duration nor any stabilized entity. The Buddhist idea of the concomitance of two things is that it represents an invariable and necessary bond on the basis of Tādātmya and Tadupatti. The realistic ontology of the Buddhist required that some real relation must exist between the terms of the inference. It should be actual and knowable. The actual relation is that where one of the two things so related does not exist without the other. Both, the relations of Tādātmya and Tadupatti, are existentially determined (Svabhāva Pratibadha). Here, determination implies that ‘a thing cannot be otherwise’, and not that a thing ‘is not otherwise’, as in the case of Nyāya. Only leads the Buddhist to conclude that all inferences are necessary. Determination is the only condition which makes an inference valid. This determination is called Svabhāva Pratipaddha by Dharmakrīti. The inference can either be in the form of identity or causality, as it is between two concepts of one thing or one concept of two things, respectively. In both the case it is a logically necessary relation.

The logical necessity is also imparted to the Buddhist theory of causality by the ontological standpoint. The whole system requires two entities, or two moments. The first is the cause which obviously leads to the second and thus causality is a consecution of discrete moments in an uninterrupted flux of reality. Thus the relation between cause and the effect is a logically necessary relation according to the Buddhist. This makes their position just opposed to that of the non-Buddhists or the orthodox schools, Sāṃkhya, Nyāya-Vaiśeṣika and Vedānta (Advaita) where the relation between cause and effect is contingent and not a logically necessary relation.

The pre-Buddhist thinkers state that the theory of causation by assuming an unchangeable basis such as *atman*, hence they consider cause and effect as being identical in essence. This view of cause and effect was accepted by the Sāṃkhya School and thus called as *Satkāryavāda*. Buddhists rejected this view because it has a metaphysical basis which is not verifiable by observation. The Sāṃkhya doctrine of *satkāryavāda* is accepted by the Vedāntins also. The Advaita Vedānta, however goes still deeper into the problem. It holds that not only the effect is a manifestation or appearance of what we call the material cause of the effect, but the later also in its turn is a manifestation or appearances, so that causes and effect are both appearances connected by way of unconditionally invariables antecedents and consequences. The Buddhists also subscribe to such a view cause and effect are phenomenal appearances, according to Buddhism, but the appearances called cause must totally cease to exist or come to non being (*asat*) before the appearance called effect jumps into a momentary existence *Asatah sat jāyate*- it is from non being that being come out. The Advaita Vedāntins do not agree with the Buddhist on their doctrine of non-being (*śūnyavāda*). They on the other hand, hold that the appearances are not the appearances of non- being (*śūnya*) but of some being which underlies the appearances. Take the instance of Vapour-water-ice chain of appearances. Here the underlying reality X appearing as Vapour is changed into water on account of the influences of accessory causes on it, and so also X appearing as water is changed into ice Vapour, water and ice are really the forms in which their underlying essence X successively appears. The change is only a change in the forms, X remains unchanged throughout. This view is called *Vivartā-vāda*, the doctrine of appearances.

Here Buddhists hold that the preceding cause-moment is annihilated totally without leaving any residue to be transferred to its effect-moment which comes into existence as an altogether new entity. The cause (threads) is annihilated and its effect (cloth) is an altogether new entity to which

the threads have not passed even a whit of their essence. According to the Sāṃkhya, the essence of the threads and that of the cloth is the same. The same essence-stuff first appear in the form of threads and later in that of the cloth. The essence-stuff is an abiding substance, it changes from one aspect into another, for example, from threads (the cause-aspect) into cloth (the effect-aspect). Against the Sāṃkhya view, the early Nyāya-vaiśeṣika school held that the destruction of the cause-substance was a necessary condition of the origination of the effect. The opposite views of the two schools are due to their different conception of reality. To Sāṃkhya, there runs an abiding stuff through the changing conditions called cause and effect, and that abiding stuff alone is the reality. The changing conditions are not separate realities, but are only different aspects of that abiding stuff and are identical with it. For instance, a ring, a bracelet, or an ear-ring are only different aspects of the substance called gold. If an earring is made out of a bracelet, the latter is only another form of the real substance gold which continues in the state of the effect, viz., the earring. According to the early Nyāya-vaiśeṣika school, however, the bracelet, the ear-ring, etc., are separate substances, and as such the bracelet must be destroyed before is effect, viz., the earring, is originated. The Buddhist contends: “if the cause is destroyed before the effect comes into existence, it will mean that the effect is arise from the elimination of the cause that is from the void. Vatsyayana answers that “when the old arrangements of parts is disturbed and, consequently, the cause-substance which was born of that arrangement disappears, the effect is produced from the new arrangement of parts which comes into being and not from the void”. It will thus appear that, although the cause-substance is destroyed, the parts of the cause substance is arranged in a different manner and produce the effect.”<sup>25</sup> But according to Nyāya-vaiśeṣika theory, the effect is not merely a new substance produced by that new arrangement. The cause-substance is destroyed according to this theory as well as that of the Buddhist. The difference between the two is this. According to the Buddhist, the cause is wholly destroyed without leaving any residue or any kind of continuity, while according to the early Nyāya-vaiśeṣika school, although the cause is destroyed, it leaves its part behind; it is not a case of destruction without any kind of continuity. Both Uddyotakara and Vācaspatimiśra point out to the Buddhist, almost in the manner of the Sāṃkhya, that if a rice seed is destroyed without leaving any residue, its destruction will not be different

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<sup>25</sup> *Philosophy of nyaya-vaishesika & its conflict with the Buddhist Dignaga shool*, Dharmendra nath Shastri, Bhartiya vidya parkashan, 1964. P.263

from that of the barely seed, and if the destruction is held to be the cause of the effect, a rice-seed, by its destruction, may produce even a barely-sprout.

The Navyanyaya approach and their analysis of causation arouses multifaceted interests. As Matilal explains, “The notion of invariable sequence is explained as holding between generalities rather than between particular events. Thus, Sasadhara defined a cause as one belonging to a class, individual members of which invariably precede individual members of another class, the relevant effect-class (*karyaniyatapurvavrtti-jarlyatva*).”<sup>26</sup> One of the examples may be advanced to make this point more clearly is using the examples of the relation between the potter and potter’s wheel. It is explained in the following quote, “A potter’s wheel is said to be a cause of a particular pot because it belongs to the class of those wheels, members of which are seen to precede invariably the production of members of the pot-class. The notion of invariable sequence is, however, to be derived from experience, from what is called anvaya and vyatireka (seeing cases of association and absence). Although in rejecting the notion of ‘efficacy’ or ‘power’ Nyāya resembled the position of David Hume, the doctrine of invariable sequence was not propounded here exactly in Humean spirit. For Hume, it is only the mind that spreads itself on external objects and conjoins them as cause and effect while nothing really exists between them to be so conjoined.”<sup>27</sup>

We may also extend this more closely to the Buddhist view more than the Nyāya view. How do we account for this? Once again Matilal comes to the question of how the universal though modified still maintains certain specificities that are in the form of class characteristics. “This is more like the Buddhist view than the Nyāya view. For Nyāya, invariable sequence is discovered by the mind but it exists between extra mental realities like universals or class characters. Perhaps Nyāya shuns the Humean empiricism while it asserts its doctrine of real universals. In fact, although the early Nyāya-Vaiśeṣika doctrine of universal was modified by Navyanyaya, it still maintained that certain class-characters were real in order to explain, among other things, the relation of cause and effect. Thus, it was felt in Navyanyaya that the criterion of invariable sequence was not enough for distinguishing causal conditions of a particular effect. For example, the production of a pot is preceded invariably not simply by potter’s wheel but also the color and

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<sup>26</sup> *Causality in the Nyāya-Vaiśeṣika school*, Bimal Krishna Matilal, University of Hawai’i press, June 1975.

<sup>27</sup> *Ibid*

circularity of the potter's wheel. But the color of the wheel is immaterial and irrelevant to the production of the pot. To exclude such irrelevant items from being considered as causes of the particular effect in question, such Navyanyaya authors as Sasadhara and Gangesa introduced the notion of what they called *ananyathasiddhatva* 'unconditionality'.”<sup>28</sup>

In operational terms there is a small difference in the way the relationship between the potter's wheel and pot and the color it produces are related. There may be some complexities arising out of certain process like the appearance for the donkey which is external to the sequence. Matilal takes up this example and illustrates it as follows. “The invariable presence of the color of the wheel before the pot is produced is conditioned by the presence of the wheel itself, and hence it need not be taken into account while we consider the relevant (causal) conditions for the effect in question. By same token Navyanyaya excludes the cause of a cause from being considered as a cause of a particular effect. This takes care also of a conceivable case where each time a pot is produced on the potter's wheel, a donkey always walks by immediately before the event. Experience of invariable sequence may demand that we construe the two events as causally related. But Nyāya claims that the 'unconditionally' criterion can save the situation since it is possible to find a reasonable explanation of each case of such appearances of a donkey. If such reasonable explanation is found, the donkey's appearance will no longer be an 'unconditional' antecedent.”<sup>29</sup>

Moreover, Buddhists claim that their one-cause theory is simpler than other theories of causality. According to all other systems of philosophy there are many causes of an effect. These causal conditions have been classified into different types by using different principles of classification. In addition to the many-cause theory, some systems of Indian philosophy have accepted one ultimate cause. The Sāṃkhya claims that the ultimate cause is *Parkaṭi* (nature), but the followers the Advaita Vedānta claim it to be Consciousness which appears to qualified by *Maya* (cosmic nescience or ignorance). Since the Buddhists do not accept any ultimate cause or the many-cause theory, there is simpler than other theories of causation. As regards the nature of causation, the critics have raised a serious objection. Since, according to the Buddhists, everything is momentary, the cause ceases to exist when the effect comes into being. For example, the sprout comes into being when the seed is destroyed. Hence the destruction of the seed is to be considered

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<sup>28</sup> *ibid*

<sup>29</sup> *Causality in the Nyāya-Vaiśeṣika school*, Bimal Krishna Matilal, University of Hawai'i press, June 1975.

as the real cause of the sprout. Since destruction is a negative entity or an absence, it cannot give rise to something positive. In order to avoid this objection if the Buddhists suggest that the destruction of the cause and the origination of the effect are simultaneous, then there cannot be any cause-effect relation. Since both the cessation of the cause and the origination of the effect happen at the same time, one does not depend upon the other. Since causation implies dependence, this view goes against the very conception of it. The difference between these two views may be stated in the following way: Suppose the seed which produces the sprout comes into being at s1. According to the former view, the seed ceases to exist or is destroyed at s2, and the sprout comes into being at s3. But according to the latter view the seed ceases to exist at s2 and the sprout is also produced at s2. Since none of the views is plausible, the Buddha conception of causality is not tenable. In reply, the later Buddha philosophers, such as Sāntarakṣita and Kamalaśīla, claim that there is no gap between the cause and the effect. In other words, they have rejected the former view which claims that first there is destruction of the cause, then there is origination of the effect. According to their positive view the effect begins to appear the cause begins to disappear. The analogy of a weighing scale may be used to illustrate this point. As one side of a scale goes down the other side goes up; similarly, as the cause ceases to exist the effect comes into being. This is how they have tried to avoid the above objections of the critics.

Buddha was not willing to abandon all the actions realizing the impossibility of doing so. He maintained that neither perception nor conception is as pure as is assumed by the pre-Buddhist Indian thinkers. His conception of the truth-value of the propositions is very different from the method adopted by the essentialist or absolutist systems. They maintain that there is no new production, no creative causation but just a manifestation of already existing stuff. Both causes and effects are two moments in a continuous process. In the first state the phenomenon is known as cause and second state, it is called effect. Buddha contended that cause of the other evaluates may itself be uncaused. This is contradiction view inherent in the Sāṅkhya conception of casual relation. It seeks to show that effect is non-different from the cause but does not follow up the line of reasoning. On the other hand, the theory of *Asatkāryavāda* of Nyāya-Vaiśeṣika is not fully criticized but some similarities and distinctions have been pointed out. They hold that effect suddenly leaps into existence by putting an end to its previous non-existence. It does not exist in shape or form before it actually comes into being. It emerges from a state of non-existence into the state of existence. As for instance, a Table is non-existence before its actual production. The fact

is that human effort is necessary to make the table, show that it is new production in every sense and not simply the manifestation of something which is already existing in the unmanifested condition. According to Buddhism effect is not on the pattern of Nyāya-vaiśeṣika viz. passive cause is acting upon by some active agent. Buddha himself said that from the arising of that this arises or when one thing vanishes, another is born or when this comes, it is then that becomes. In this respect, effect did not exist in the cause it come into being not as the result of the transformation of the effect of some external substance inside the cause. When a cause perishes, effect arises. The relation to each other was only that one preceded or followed the other. In short, Buddhist theory does not support any mutual help but they only exist before the production of the result. This is the early position in Buddhism who denied all such theories that were more popular at the time of Buddha. The main focus was to know how the evolution of the World did take place, nothing else. At that time, Buddha established his own theory of *Pratītyasamutpāda* in purely scientific manner to solve the real problem of human suffering. With the help of this theory, he was to not only explain the arising of suffering but also the way to overcome this problem of suffering and attain the highest state of bliss.

Once again we may conclude that Buddha criticize all such theories of causation which were more prevalent at that time. However, the intention of Buddha was not demolishing their thought. However, he wanted to demonstrate the futility of all those doctrines, which were not fruitful in the practical life of human beings. According to Buddhist philosophy, the law of causation strictly determines both the material and spiritual realms. There is nothing without a cause. The cause necessarily produces an effect. The effect in its turn was transformed into a cause and vice-versa. This process is infinitely continuous and ongoing. The Universe aroused without a known Beginning and would remain there under the impact of cause and effect.



## Conclusion

The world is the complex structure and the constituents of the world are connected each other. The relation is much more complex than its idea. Causality is one of the controlling force of the world. There have been various debates regarding the notion of causality by the different streams of study, such as science, philosophy etc. Here we have taken an account of the philosophical explanation regarding the complex nature of causality. We have divided the dissertation into three different chapters, the first chapter includes the general idea of causality particularly in Indian philosophy (Cārvāka, Sāṅkhya, Vedānta, Jaina, Mīmāṃsā, Nyāya-vaiśeṣika, and Buddhism). It states that there are two main categories of causality firstly, *Satkāryavāda* which means an effect is already pre-existing in its cause. Secondly, *Asatkāryavāda* which means an effect does not pre-exist in the cause.

As outlined earlier the first chapter the background of Indian philosophy with special reference to the causation is attempted. The basic problem is regarding the cause (*kāraṇa*) and effect (*kārya*) relation (*sambandha*). The basic question is whether effect pre-exists in its cause or not. There are two main theories those who accept that effect already exist in its cause and these are called *Satkāryavādin*s and those who deny that effect does not exist in its cause are called *Asatkāryavādin* (the theory of the non-existent effect). Further, *Satkāryavāda* has a split of argument and there are two forms of *satkāryavāda*. These are *Pariṇāmavāda* (*pariṇāma* – real modification) and *Vivartāvāda* (*vivartā* – unreal appearance). Those who believe that the effect is a real transformation or modification of its cause are called *Pariṇāmavāda*. Sāṅkhya-Yoga and Rāmānuja believe in *Pariṇāmavāda*. The view of Sāṅkhya-yoga is called *Parkaṭi* – *Pariṇāmavāda*, [*Parkaṭi* (cause) is really transformed into the world (effect)] while the view of Rāmānuja is called *Brahma-Pariṇāmavāda*. According to the latter, the effect is the apparent transformation of the cause. The Advaita Vedānta believes in the *Vivartāvāda*. They say, the effect is only an apparent transformation of the cause, e.g., the rope only appears as the snake, Brahman (cause) only appears as the world (effect). Nyāya-vaiśeṣika and Buddhist believe in *asatkārya-vāda*.

After explaining these main two theories we have explained the notion of causation according to the all schools of Indian Philosophy. But the central focus of this dissertation is the

Buddhist concept of causality. That is why in the second chapter we have given an elaborate explanation of the notion of causation from the view point of the four major schools of Buddhism namely Vaibhāṣika, Sautrāntika, Yogacāra, Mādhyamika. The root to causation as spelled out by the Buddha is a long and tedious exercise. One is aware of the travels of the Buddha for almost twelve years while trying to find out the causes of human misery. The Buddha also immersed himself firstly in the *astika* not as an adherent but as a seeker of the truth. Therefore, Buddha's engagements with different schools of philosophy and different forms and practices of spiritual exercises took him only familiar paths. In trying to resolve these issues, the Buddha is set to have propounded a new path. Ultimately the solution to human misery required a rational explanation and only then the same can be mitigated. This exercise therefore led to the search for how *dukkha* originates and the causal chain of the same. Thus, a clear understanding of the causes was propounded as the theory of dependent origination. With the development of Buddhism and the rise of new schools, the ideas of causality became more elaborate. Such an exercise was reflective of the changes that led to the rise of four main traditions. These are the Vaibhāṣika, Sautrāntika, Yogacāra, and Mādhyamika. There is no disagreement on the idea of causality that remains the cornerstone of Buddhism but there are changes in perspective. These changes are primarily related to the question of whether the mind is a co-constituent of reality or whether an objective reality exists which cannot be fully grasped by the mind. These philosophical shifts brought about the ideas of causation to be examined in detail. The Buddhist notion of causation is one of the well-established logical explanation of the complex nature of causality in a simple way. Buddhist logicians support the theory of momentariness by a logical argument called *Arthakryā-kāritva* or ***the efficiency of production***. They maintain that the criterion of existence is its capacity to produce some effect. An existent thing must produce an effect. A seed produces a plant. It means that seed exists because it has capacity to produce a plant. Only a non-existent thing like hare's horn or a sky-flower cannot produce any effect because they are non-existent. Hence the Buddhist logicians deduce that a thing is momentary and impermanent. If a thing has the capacity to produce some effect, it must change. Hence change is the stuff of reality. It is impossible to conceive a thing that is continuous without change. Buddhism denies unity in the sense of identity, but recognizes continuity in its place. From this it can be validly deduced that a thing having existence must be momentary. According to Buddhism impermanency is one of the characteristics of the world. It means nothing is permanent, nothing lasts forever. Everything exists for a particular moment. It

means each and every elements or object depends on some other elements this is called the dependent origination. Buddhism accepts momentariness or *ksanika-vāda* and with the help of momentariness they explain the existence of each and every element of the world. Though there are minor differences among all the Buddhist schools regarding the nature of causality but primarily they accept the idea of momentariness to explain the nature of the world. In this chapter we have discussed the concept of causality in details according to the above mentioned schools of Buddhism. Primarily, we have explained causality in Buddhism and its importance to explain the world.

In the third chapter, which is the last chapter of the dissertation we have attempted a conceptual analysis of causation. Here we have explained the Buddhist theory of causation which is *pratītyasamutpāda* or dependent origination in order to strengthen the arguments outlined in the earlier chapter in-depth. Again we have discussed the various debates among the different schools of Indian Philosophy such as Sāṅkhya-Yoga, Nyāya-vaiśeṣika, Advaita Vedanta and Buddhism. All schools have argued and justified their positions and provided philosophical arguments. There are debates between Sāṅkhya-yoga and Nyāya-vaiśeṣika where Sāṅkhya accepts *satkāryavāda* and have shown why they justify *satkāryavāda* to explain the material reality. Again in contrast to *satkāryavāda* Nyāya-vaiśeṣika accepts the *Asatkāryavāda* theory of causation. For them, effect is never pre-existing in its cause rather it is a new beginning which they call *ārambha-vāda*. Again, Advaita-Vedanta stands in support of Sāṅkhya because Vivartāvāda is another form of *satkāryavāda*. And Vivartāvādins holds that the world is the unreal transformation (*pariṇāma*) of the ultimate reality called Brahman. It means the world is nothing but the vivartā of its cause Brahman. According to Advaita this theory is called *Brahma-pariṇāma-vāda*. On the other hand Buddhism goes against *satkāryavāda* and accepts *asatkāryavāda*.

We have concluded the dissertation by showing the importance of Buddhist notion of causality and its relevance to the existence of the world. Buddhism gives a better logical explanation of the concept of causality which is easily comprehensible not only for the philosopher but also for a lay men. Buddhism criticizes all other theories and have shown why their theory of causation is very much relevant to explain the complex nature of elements and its togetherness with others. Therefore, causation remains one of the cornerstones of Buddhist philosophy that gives an explicatory framework of how the world operates and do the individual comprehend the

same. The idea of change as a permanent feature is one of the important causes that would lead to certain effects undoubtedly. For the layman this was convincing enough but for the philosopher a deeper analysis only elaborated the same but did not dismantle any aspects of the theory of causation. Thus the idea of *pratītyasamutpāda* is accepted by all schools of Buddhist thought and the importance lies in this treatment of causality.

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