

**Mind-Body Dualism: A Critical Study with Special
Reference to Descartes and Spinoza**

*A dissertation submitted to Department of Philosophy, University of Hyderabad in
partial fulfilment of the requirements for the award of the degree of*

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by

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
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DECLARATION

I, Liza mayee Pradhan, hereby declare that this dissertation entitled “**Mind-Body Dualism: A Critical Study with Special Reference to Descartes and Spinoza**”, submitted by me under the guidance and supervision of Dr. B. Ananda Sagar is a bonafide research work which is also free from plagiarism. I also declare that it has not been submitted previously in part or in full to this university or any other university or institution for the award of any degree or diploma. I hereby agree that my thesis can be deposited in Shodhganga/INFLIBNET. A report on plagiarism statistics from the University Librarian enclosed.

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CERTIFICATE

This is to certify that the dissertation entitles “**Mind-Body Dualism: A Critical Study with Special Reference to Descartes and Spinoza**” submitted by Ms. Liza mayee Pradhan bearing the Regd. No. 17HPHL05 in partial fulfilment of the requirements for the award of Master of Philosophy in Philosophy is a bonafide work carried out by her under my supervision and guidance which is a plagiarism free dissertation.

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MIND-BODY DUALISM: A CRITICAL STUDY WITH SPECIAL REFERENCE TO DESCARTES AND SPINOZA

INTRODUCTION

One of the fundamental or we can say core problems in the philosophy as well as in present-day sciences is that understanding the true nature of the mind and its relation to the body. Where exactly thoughts as well as feelings locate and how they influence body and how body influences the mind are the questions that always either discourage or encourage a thinker while finding the answers. It discourages because deeper searching may give lots of puzzles and it encourages because every puzzle increases the curiosity in us. To understand the relationship between mind with body, people from East and West, irrespective of region, tirelessly has been exercising from the ancient period. However, among their various conclusions, we could find out an explicit disagreement which always leads to the unsettlement of the problem. Since this problem has a long history, specifically, it has been discussing under the heading of mind-body problem.

Though there are philosophers who discussed the mind and body relationship in the course of philosophical history, for instance, Plato and Descartes. Descartes a French philosopher is the first person systematically discussed by using the method of doubting as a tool and concluded that mind and body both are two different and independent substances. Thought along with extension are the two essential properties of them. However, he tries to prove there is an interaction between them. Many philosophers raised their objections to this theory of body along with mind interaction. Spinoza is the most influential philosopher who criticised explicitly Descartes' notion of interactionism. Contrary to Descartes theory, Spinoza developed a non-dualistic theory that says mind and body are nothing but, both are two attributes out of one substance, namely, God in other words Nature. To put it in another way, Descartes initiated this discourse in the school of rationalism and Spinoza later responded to his work.

The central objective of this thesis is to scrutinize the mind and body relationship. So majorly, I examine Descartes' interactionism and Spinoza's parallelism and compare and contrast their perspectives on the rapport between the mind-body. And also, I tried to examine difficulties in and possible resolutions to their theories.

The discussion will develop in three chapters. The first chapter deals with Descartes' views on mind-body dualism, where I explained the nature of mind, Cartesian dualism, mind-body interaction. Before introducing Descartes' views, I briefly discussed the historical account of the nature of mind with various interpretations such as dualism, materialism, physicalism, behaviorism, idealism, functionalism, nominalism and phenomenalism.

In the second chapter, I dealt with Spinoza's 'mono substance'. Here, I briefly discussed the philosophical history of substance, in particular, Aristotle and Descartes' views on substance. And then, I have gone through Spinoza's views on substance, and mind-body problem. And finally, I discussed his novel account of 'mind-body parallelism' where he explicitly argued that God or Nature which is not two different substances as like mind and body which explains the composition of one and the same substance.

In the final chapter, called 'Descartes versus Spinoza: mind and body', primarily, I discussed how Spinoza criticizes Cartesian dualism. In the second and third sections, I had discussed some prominent criticisms raised by different philosophers to both Descartes and Spinoza's account of mind-body problem respectively. The principal reason to do this is that there are two opposite groups of people who strongly defend Descartes and offend Spinoza's views and offend Descartes and defend Spinoza's views. And then, I discussed similarities as well as the contrast between two theses, namely, 'interactionism' and 'parallelism'.

And finally, I critically evaluated two theses and I take a stand with the theory of mind-body parallelism of Spinoza. Since the analysis regarding mind and body explains the composition of a single substance, Nature, which is more conceivable and agreeable.

CHAPTER-I

DESCARTES ON MIND-BODY DUALISM

1.0 Introduction

The philosophy of mind is about the nature of our thoughts and their content, and how and why we think. Understanding the nature of mind gives us some widely applicable rules to comprehend clearly about ourselves, other people, animals, and even artifacts also, for instance, a computer.

Many questions are asked about the concept of mind.

What is mind? The biggest question of all the direct answers is that we do not have any clue yet, or to be more compassionate, we are still far from a complete picture. In both western and eastern cultures for the millennium idea of the mind has been conceptualized.

Is the mind inside our brain? Can we know minds of others? Is the mind objective, subjective or something else? Is the mind different from matter? The nature of mind is a comprehensive and clear introduction to the main subjects in philosophy of mind. It carefully detects contradictory situations arising within the debate and detects the argument within their context.

1.1 The Nature of Mind

Generally, it is said that man is different from animals and other living beings, because of his consciousness, which is one of the properties of mind.

Consciousness, intentionality, subjectivity and mental state are the main attributes or characteristics of the mind or soul. We think ourselves as conscious and rational beings. We do not have to take any training to think of our mental phenomena, this is something which we essentially learn as we learn a language. Mental phenomena make our mental life. We cannot know ourselves as thinking beings neither the mental phenomena.

Both mind and consciousness are informal and to some extent, they are overlapping terms that denote the wider collection of interconnected phenomena. Speaking in a general sense, the term mind is a broader term that involves consciousness with memory and understanding.

The mind is a historical term that used vividly in debates in philosophy as well as in clinical psychology. As we have seen just before, it usually includes consciousness and memory which helps to accurate introspection and also helps to identify ourselves as an agency. And also, it has the ability to voluntarily control over thoughts and actions.

In other words, our mind enables us to know, think, and feel, aware of our external world and experiences. And also, it is the set of mental faculty or mental ability of consciousness, understanding, thinking, reasoning, sense, intellect, mentality, perception, and judgments, by which one can think, will imagine, desire, pursue etc.

If we try to understand the historical background of the mind, then it will show us chronological development of eight important movements in the history of philosophy of mind. They are dualism, materialism, physicalism, behaviourism, idealism, functionalism, nominalism and phenomenism. The following points give us brief knowledge of different movements.

- (a) Dualism: As stated by Descartes' dualism, of two substances that is mind and body are real. The former one is mental or spiritual thing whereas the latter one is a material or extended thing. And again, former one can be known only through introspection whereas latter things can be known through intelligent observation. Introspection tells the reality of mental substances which is only accessible privately as the two substances can be considered separately, so it is possible that they are different
- (b) Materialism: The philosophical form of monism that holds matter refers as the nature of substances. This includes mental aspects and consciousness, are physical interaction. Generally, materialists emphasise on matter and physical laws, where the mind and consciousness become the most reliable guide for nature. For materialism, the mind is a part of the physical world. And, there is nothing in mind and mental state but there are some categories of behavior. Like other material things, mental incidents are physical processes, therefore, they should be described in a similar manner that in terms of laws of nature. The intentions, fear, and belief of mental

states are inclined to behave in just a few ways or states of the brain. Many contemporary philosophers think that the important way to about mind is to understand regarding discoveries and the concepts of modern science related to the mind. But according to modern science, the mind is nothing but the physicochemical mechanism.

- (c) Physicalism: “Physicalism about the mind is the metaphysical view that all mental phenomena are ultimately physical phenomena, or necessitated by physical phenomena. There are various mental-physical relations proposed by physicalists to account for their claim. One relation is identity. Identity-based physicalism about the mind takes two forms: token physicalism (which asserts that all token mental states are identical to a physical or neural state), and type physicalism (according to which all types of mental states are identical to types of physical or neural states). Another proposed relation is supervenience. Supervenience based physicalism about the mind is a form of type physicalism and it takes two main forms: a priori physicalism (the view that mental truths are a priori deducible from the totality of physical truths) and a posteriori physicalism (the view that mental truths are aposteriori or empirically necessitated by the totality of physical truths)”.¹
- (d) Behaviourism: According to Descartes, the thought is the nature of the mind and is that the nature of something defined as its form is essential for its existence. But it was rejected by the behaviourists. They say that all statements about the mind, mental life or mental incidents can be expressed in terms of behaviour otherwise, such situations are nonsense.
- (e) Idealism: According to idealism, only the mind and their thoughts or ideas are real. In idealism, mind and consciousness are first-order realities. And according to the Concrete Idealistic view or personalistic theory, the mind or the self is an active and aware or conscious person, a self-conscious and self-reliant spirit; it is a principle of unity in various experiences which are coordinated and organized in its entirety

¹ (Aranyosi, 2001)

consolidated by its power of synthetic activity. This active and aware or conscious person is the source and organizer of all mental states and processes. The mind is a solid or concrete integrated principle and active organizing power that keeps the manifold experiences together and creates harmony. The mind self-expresses its own concrete nature and receives its own living unity through self-conscious and self-determining spirit through the various fleeting experiences such as thoughts, feelings, desires, etc. They have their own manifestations.

(f) Functionalism: It is the theory in the philosophy of the mind is said that what makes a particular kind of mental state does not depend on its internal constitution, but instead it works, or plays a role, in which system it is a part. This theory has been implicated in the Aristotle understanding of the soul, and Hobbes' notion of mind is in the form of a 'calculating machine', but it has become completely clear (and popularly only in the last third of the 20th century. It says that a mind is an act that manipulates symbols according to program rules (such as computer software) to produce easy production.

(g) Nominalism: According to the nominalism, the mind or self is a non-material spiritual substance, it is an irreversible (unchangeable), permanent entity or substance behind and beyond the variable and fleeting activities of various mental states like thinking, feeling, desire etc. The mind is considered as a uniform, permanent and irreversible spiritual substance, which is a mere receptacle or support of different and discrete changing experiences. Unconscious matter cannot be the basis or ground of mental attributes and activities like thinking, feeling, desire, etc., because unconscious matter cannot think, feel and desire. Therefore, in the form of support or receptacle these mental experiences, there should be a non-material conscious spiritual substance, and that spiritual substance is called "mind" or "self".

(h) Phenomenalism: According to Phenomenalism, the mind is a mere aggregate or a collection of different and discrete mental states, and in the process, there is no inherent and enduring spiritual substance or conscious person underlying the states and processes as a ground or

support of them. Whatever we call the mind or ourselves, it is nothing but the flow of changing or fleeting of mental phenomena. Hume, who holds the empirical approach of self, says that mind is nothing but a mere "heap or collection of different assumptions"; it is a series of mental states and processes that succeed with each other with an inconceivable rapidity and continuous flow and movement. There is no convertible or changeless and permanent substance beyond this series of changing mental states. The self is not a substance, in which these changing states are; it is the changing states themselves. According to the laws of association, different and discrete mental phenomena can be added together into a bundle or group of experiences, but this does not show the underlying fundamental unity of the self.

In general, the mind or self is different from the body; which retain in spaces and is possess to the rest of the mass, is especially different from the energy. And in another sense materialize some abstract physical things, which are lifeless (deceased). However, as I said in the above paragraph the mind is a mental aspect, which possess thought in addition to consciousness, but the body is related the physical process of the brain neurons and it is also, said that in which way the mind is structured and creates the dualism of mind-body and how two interact, what are those function?

In philosophy of mind, there is a central question arises that if the mind is a part of the body then how body and mind can interact? Human beings are the physical objects, we have weights, and we have perseverance and various types of solids, liquids, and gases.

Nevertheless, humans have the ability to make decisions and cause their existence like other physical objects. It means we have a mind. "A thing that doubts, understands, affirms, denies, is willing, unwilling, and also imagines and has sensory perceptions".²

Descartes tries to know if there is at least one known subject and he recognizes himself to know. He comes by this truth in his methodical doubt, with this

² (Descartes, 1996)

kind of doubts, and he was informed that the whole knowledge and ideas received from both the senses and general and compulsory truths such as the mathematical proposal - is wrong.

1.2 The Nature of Body

What is a body, and how is the body understood in the history of Western thought? In one sense, a body is the most natural and self-evident thing in the world, in another, it is the object of the most intense scrutiny, subject to various techniques, whose purpose is fashioning and discipline. Philosophy has often enhanced the soul, spirit or mind at the cost of the body; but in recent thought that the body has come to centre stage. We find this devaluation of the body in the Western tradition and examine some of the methods that have returned to philosophical thought in the 20th and 21st centuries. How has the body been formed in connection with opposing mind, soul or spirit? How and why has the concept of body changed in Western history? How does the body appear as an entity both natural and technical? How is the body tolerant of psychological, social, political and philosophical significance in so far as they are sexed, gendered, raced, able and disabled, desiring and desired, bearers of ideality or disgusting places? How are the bodies like personal, cultural and political practices like dieting, body modification, imprisonment, torture, and medicine?

“Since the word ‘body’ is one that we all use in everyday discourse, it is not surprising to find that those who treat the problem of other minds at the level of bodies give little attention to the introduction of this key term. The concept of the human body seems to be perfectly clear; it is obvious that we all do have bodies, and there is no great mystery about their nature, as there is about the nature of minds. Even those who criticize the whole enterprise of trying to give a general justification of the belief in the existence of other minds continue to suppose that the concept of a body which they accept from the tradition is perfectly in order”.³

Now then the question arises that:

³ (Long, 1964)

“What is the human body? This is the first question to be asked. To begin with, one might answer it like this. The human body is the whole human being from top to toe in the way it appears to us in our immediate experience. And so it was from the very beginning of time. At that time, the body was nothing more or other than nakedness and nature. We may, for example, think of *Ie bon sauvage*, the good savage, in Jean Jaques Rousseau's writings on the state of nature. This was man before he was tempted to eat the fruit of the tree of knowledge and was adapted to civilization. After that, the image of the body was radically changed: it was not naked anymore.”⁴

If we considered the history, for example, ancient Greece, the science of cure, then the image of changing body from a natural event to a cultural phenomenon. Conceivably, it was one of the first philosophical questions asked by humans: the inside looks of the body and how does it work? In reality, this question was very important in the body's view, because there was a split in different parts of the human body: the inside and outside, the head and the rest of the body. Considering, that time, science has organized a part of the body, inside, philosophical mind, and has revived the organism and also the art have regulated other parts of body, outside, with different types of artists, poets, dancer, painters, sculptors etc., especially interested in outside the head, faces and its expressions, and outside the body, in the limbs and their movements.

The human body plays a vague role in the cultural categorizations - from the universe of ancient societies to practices of modern western civilization. This most distinct and visible 'thing' perceived, and still disappears in relation towards the outer world. The suspicious nature of the body can be prepared for binary opposition. The body appears to be rotating between presence and absence, which feels the feelings in the form of emotions and sensations.

According to C.D Broad, "when we see anything which has the characteristic shape, size, appearance, and movements of a human body, we treat it as if it were animated by a mind like our own. This suggests that he regards a human

⁴ (Bjurvill, 1991)

body as a physical body that is distinguishable from other physical bodies by the fact that it has a particular shape, size, and so on, and that it moves in ways that other material bodies do not. To be really serviceable, of course, a definition of the phrase human body would have to specify the required shape, structure, and material of composition (and possibly origin) in enough detail so that one could pick out a class of material bodies each member of which would be an acceptable candidate for the role of body of a person".⁵

Philosophers believed body considers our perception as any material object. Its original properties are size, mass, and irreversibility. Phenomenologist separates the human body, which is called body -subject; because it is related to the subject matter. The classic question is the relation between body and soul.

1.3 Cartesian Dualism

Plato and Aristotle argued about the human mind (soul) cannot be determined with the body. Descartes was the first person who prepared it in the form of mind-body problem as it exists today. And he is the first to recognize the mind with the clear self-awareness and to separate or distinguishes it from the brain, which, he thinks, was the 'physical seat' of the intellect. And, he realized that he might have doubts that his body could be in dreaming or it could be an illusion that is created by an evil demon. In spite of that, he is certain about a point that he had no doubt that he had a mind. Therefore, Descartes explicitly proposed that the mind and the body must be distinctive substances.

Generally, a man is seen as the combination of both the mind and body which are non-physical and physical respectively. It is acknowledged as dualism. Dualism upholds that both mind and body are real. So, it is believed that there are two types of the reality of dualism in metaphysics that is material and immaterial.

Recalling the first meditation experiences, Descartes doubts his existence. He thinks he has no physical body, no sense organs and accordingly the experiential. There is no certainty about the physical world. However, to doubt whatever he could, he must be in existence. To be misguided by an evil demon,

⁵(Long, Douglas. C, 1964)

he must be in existence to be misled. All he could doubt except that he thinks. In according to Descartes "cogito" argument, the mind is something that can know itself with certainty so that it can know other things with certainty. In this speculation, the mind ceases to be something inside which we are locked. Descartes argument is that even if the devil deceives us as much as it can this is only possible with the existence of my being. On the grounds of it, he reached the conclusion about the certainty of his existence and claimed "I think therefore I exist".

And further, Descartes concluded that he not only thinks, comprehends things and desires but also imagines and senses. Despite of the fact that he may dream, or be cheated by a demon, he can still imagine, here, and see things. Even if sense perceptions might be falsidical, but it is certain that a part of the one and the same mind that thinks.

The so far arguments seem to tell that only mind's existence is certain and the existence of material world is a mere imagination since our sensory perceptions may be a mere dream. Is this true for Descartes? No. To prove the certainty of the existence of material substances Descartes prepared a wax argument to give a clear and specific idea of "I", in his view, the mind. He writes that "material things whose images are framed by knowledge, and which the senses themselves imagine are much more distinctly known than this mysterious 'I' which does not fall within the imagination".⁶

Descartes takes the instances of a 'piece of wax' to prove his argument. There are some visual properties of wax; it has the taste of honey, that gives smells of flowers. And, it has a definite size, colour and shape. And also, it is hard to touch and cold, and it emits a particular kind of sound. In spite of the fact, all these sensible characteristics will disappear after it takes into the fire. Though all the characteristics disappear, there are some essential properties, namely, extension, changeability and movability, remain with which we still call the wax as the same wax.

On the grounds of these reasons, Descartes has concluded that what appeared to the senses was not the wax. Wax has many properties such as extension,

⁶ (Descartes, 1996).

flexibility, which is tacit by the mind. Therefore, the wax is not only sensible thing since it is equally included in all forms of wax in different forms. Wax concept is not an imagination but it is an inspection of the mind. Therefore, he concluded that external objects are 'known' by the systematic inspection of the mind but not experienced by the senses. The knowledge of material objects should not be in mind and should not be done by our senses. So, to think about our thoughts are similar external objects, there is an error.

This argument proves that physical objects are seen through not by our senses and not by our imagination but only through our intellect. To put it in other way, physical objects themselves are not considered in a proper manner by our senses. It is possible only by the intellect only.

The reason he says is that bodies can be seen and touched, but they understand through our mind only. Even though we see them but we cannot believe them since they might be just a dream or we might be deceived by God. In this critical situation, Descartes makes a fascinating deviation that the existence of physical bodies resolves to prove God's existence in one hand and the other, it proves that he is not a cheater.

The following two quoted paragraphs give Descartes' views on the mind as well as the body where he had tried to discuss their nature:

"The next thought was that I was nourished, that I moved about, and that I engaged in sense-perception and thinking; and these actions I attributed to the soul. But as to the nature of this soul, either I did not think about this or else I imagined it to be something tenuous, like wind or fire or ether, which permeated my more solid parts. As to the body, however, I had no doubts about it but thought I knew its nature distinctly. If I had tried to describe the mental conception I had of it, I would have expressed it as follows".⁷

"By the body I understand all that which can be defined by a certain figure: something which can be confined in a certain place, and which can feel a given space in such a way that every other body will be excluded from it, by which it is touched [and from which it receives impressions]: for to have the power of self-movement, as also of feeling or of thinking, I did not consider to appertain

⁷(Descartes, 1996)

to the nature of body: on the contrary, I was rather astonished to find that faculties similar to them existed in some bodies.”⁸

We perceived very clearly that extension is the attributive of the body. It explicitly implies that colour, sound, taste, smell, heat and cold are not the properties of a body since we cannot imagine it clearly and distinctly, they are confused. These qualities could not give the real reality of the body. An extension is nothing but attributes of the body and the two are identical. An extension is a spatial continuation of three dimensions, namely, length, breadth and thickness. Accordingly, each body is a three-dimensional magnitude (significance). There is no vacuum, whatever the place is there, there is body. Space is infinitely divisible; there are no final parts of space. Therefore, the matter is infinitely divisible. The smallest part of the bodies is still divided. That means that they are not atoms, but they are molecule particle. The extension cannot stop anywhere, because the physical world is infinite.

According to the above arguments, it is proved regarding the nature of the mind and the body are fully contrary. To say, in Descartes view, mind is a thinking thing which is un-extended in addition to indivisible whereas bodies are extended and divisible. The nature of the body along with the realization regarding the mind reveals that they cannot be equal.

I think the concept of mind and the body is different; such a conceptual difference does not deny that there may be a mind which extended. Of course, the phrase ‘extended mind’ is a theoretically inconsistent in Descartes' structure, nevertheless, he does not use this phrase, at least it means when he asserts that the mind which is united in addition to the whole human body.

The thing about Descartes is that if we connect mind to extended matter, even such kind of union should be taken as a causal account, because the mind differs from an attribute of extension, except the mind. To claim thought and extension are two different sorts Descartes means that there is a conceptual or logical plausibility of their separate existence. While asserting the difference between the mind and body, Descartes explicitly or implicitly does not repudiate that they can exist together. To put it in another way, while giving a

⁸(LL.D, CH. and Ross, G.R.T. 1970)

conceptual comparison among the extension (body) including thought (mind), he does not deny the empirical or accidental identity of them, such as tables and wood which are evenly different, can be equally evenly identical. However, in Descartes' view, the empirical or accidental identity of the body and mind does not mean that they are actually equal.

In reality, thinking to be combined with nature or united with expressions. Mind cannot probably be independent of the body in the real world. It is perhaps Descartes observation means that they do not affect the truth of the necessity of the power required for their individual existence that they are different. Perhaps what is needed for their separate existence is omnipresent of God. That means he argues, God can create a world in which the mind and body will be in existence and independent of each other. It is in a world where the laws of nature are different, the mind can work independently from the body, but considering nature's laws on the real world, the mind is not in existence and can function independently from the body. So to speak, for Descartes, their separate existence is only a logical possibility.

Instead of simply giving credit for all human thoughts and being God, Descartes' logic placed a ground-breaking foundation for truth and certainty: the rational and thinking mind of the subject, or "I". This new understanding of self-reliance was based on radical skepticism or the ability of doubt. With this ability of doubt, we can able to recognize that all the empirical stimuli which arise from the physical world through the senses, can always mislead the mind.

In the famous maxim of Descartes dualism, that upholds dualist epistemology to this day: 'I think therefore I am'. With help of maxim, we can certain about our thinking, as are different from our sensory objects since the mind can misinterpret our body wrongly: Which he thought he had seen with my eyes, he really understood completely through the faculty of judgment, which is in my mind. What does his body say to me that the mind and the physical body are completely two different types of substances and they are also interacting with each other? He argued that the body can be divided into parts, but the mind is not that it is inseparable. In his words "the great difference between the mind and body, in as much as the body is by its very nature always divisible, while the mind is utterly indivisible. For when I consider the mind or

myself in so far as I merely a thinking thing, I am unable to distinguish any parts within myself; I understand myself to be something quite single and complete”.⁹

We know that there are many physical bodies outside us, but how can they exist, and how do we know their existence? We have the feeling of happiness (pleasure) and pain, hunger and appetites and sensations, which is instinctively expressed by physical reasons (bodily causes). But as sensations cheat us and our desires and hunger often misguide, we cannot prove the existence of bodies with the existence of such experiences.

When Descartes talks about mind and body, he first expresses what substance is. He says that substance exists independently. It is a thing which has no requirements other than itself in addition to exist. Such an independent thing is called substance. Descartes says that substance in the absolute sense, there is one real being, that is God and the substance in the view of relative sense, there are two entities- namely mind and body. It is relative because it depends on God, and these two exist independently different from each other. They are known for only their attributes. The essential characteristics of the substance are that which necessarily got inherited in it. Substance perhaps cannot exist without the attribute but it can conceive without modes. But, a mode cannot conceive without these two because we cannot imagine the figures without extension, nor the emotions of will or desire, except for the things of thinking.

According to Descartes, an attribute is the essential property of the substance and we cannot separate it from the substance. A mode is not an essence of substance but any... property of substance. He writes:

"But Descartes' went on to assign to each kind of substance a principal attribute which he proceeded to identify to all intents and purposes with the substance itself. For his way of determining what is the principal attribute of a given type of substance is to ask what it is that we perceive clearly and distinctly as an indispensable attribute of the thing so that all other attributes, properties and qualities are seen to presuppose it and depend upon it. And the

⁹ (Descartes, 1996)

conclusion seems to be that we cannot distinguish between the substance and its principal attribute. They are to all intents and purposes identical”.¹⁰

For Descartes, thinking is the main (‘essence’) property of mind (‘spiritual substance’). He was arranged to make sure that it is always in a few sense is thinking. Under other condition, extensions are the main aspect of the physical substance. Without extension we cannot imagine figures or movements; but without figures and actions, we can imagine extension. Accordingly, the length, breadth and extension and so on constitute the nature of the physical objects. In his view, it is a principal attribute that differentiates a substance from other substances. In other words, what sort of substance is a given substance would solely depend upon its principal attribute?

In defining the physical substance in terms of extension, Descartes is making sure that physics can be dissolved from the study of ‘geometry’. And he thinks strongly that all properties of a substance can be described by appealing the properties of geometric figures.

And further, for Descartes, substances are the most rudimentary units of existence. The ‘essence’ of substance was that property which made the substance in the form of substance that it was. There was no relation of the properties ahead of substance with the essence. For instances, the principal character of the man is his rationality. However, the man has other qualities such as tall, pale and so on but these qualities have nothing to do with this essence. Apart from this, according to scholastics, the substance can escape the loss of its essence, although not in the form of naturally the same kind of substance. Therefore, for example, if a person loses his rationality, then he will cease to be a man, but he will not cease to be a substance. He will be just a different kind of substance. Descartes is capable of reducing the number of substances in the world by showing a strong connection between the principal attribute and the substance. If a substance cannot be imagined without its essence, then there are fewer candidates for the essence and there are some things to be consistent with the substance. Only those things which we cannot imagine are rationally impossible.

¹⁰ (Frederick, 1964)

Hence, the principle of the body and mind is an addition and thought respectively. Hence the fact is that the principle of the body is constituted by an addition and it follows three things:

1. Without the body there can be no extension of the universe, there is no space, no atoms, nor body without extension.
2. The extension cannot be conceived as a boundary (limits) that is why the physical world is unknown or the physical world cannot be conceived.
3. That body is speaking rigorously there is no centre, which is naturally eccentric and its motion is centrifugal, a mathematical point for the centre and the mathematical point is in extended.

So, extension assets have divisibility, ease, and nobility. But divisibility is only a movement of dissolution and union. Therefore, properties of extension and consequently are in motion. There is no other proposal that the motion in the extension, local motion or change of location (place).

Apart from this the motion cannot originate themselves in the bodies, they cannot be asked to do themselves more and more, to establish themselves in motion and to continue it in themselves; for bodies are only extended, even its small parts, and completely devoid of internal doctrine, the centre of motion and itself (impulsion) what we call soul or ego.

Hence, they are completely inactive; they do not take (moved) themselves at all, but go ahead with external causes. We cannot even say that they are heavy if we understand the tendency to move towards the centre of the earth with loads, that is a kind of natural activity in the matter.

The mind is connected with the body that is they are essentially active and free as soon as the body does not extend, there is nothing in the mind that has not been thought, in-extended and immaterial. The body is everything which is not as mind, that which is not as mind that which is the body is completely prohibited of everything. Both substances completely extinguish each other; they are completely opposing each other: the body is absolutely soulless and the soul is absolutely immaterial. And man is a composite entity, aggregate of soul and body. The occasion that is related to excitations, the soul receives its

sensible thoughts from its nature. On the other hand, the body is an automaton whose movement is through the desires of the soul.

The body and the soul go towards different life, the body is subject to necessarily, but the mind is received by free will (endowed with free will), is independent of the body, it services from its destruction.

1.4 Mind-body interaction

According to Descartes, every human being even idiots and infants possess both “mind” and “body”. For him, both “mind” and “body” are two independent, individual substances. Every human being is a combination of these two substances. In addition, he says, the 'mind' is lodged in the 'body' but the relation between the two is contingent, i.e. not necessary. Because mind, even after the death of the body, continues to exist. Accordingly, he concludes, both 'mind' and 'body' are independent of each other. Further, he opines that 'mind' is an active and conscious substance as having ‘thinking’ as its essential attribute. Both 'mind' and 'body' possess two different exclusive properties in the form of 'consciousness' and 'extension', respectively. Thus, what was considered as ‘essence’ in traditional view gets termed by Descartes into a substance having its own specific essence”.¹¹

Descartes' logic for the Dualism, I am debating, should be understood to support the ideological discrimination between the mind and the body only. With the ideological distinction, we mean that there is a logical possibility of their separate existence. He clearly, talks of mind as a substance, which exists and works independently of the body. In short, mind is different from the body. Regardless of the distinction, Descartes says that with a specific mind a particular body is united. While talking about the composition of mind and the body, the word 'body' is used in a specific sense. It means that the structure and organization of particular limbs.

In Descartes views, mind and body association is known with the cognizance of physical sensations such as thirst, hunger, pain. Which are misled with ideas, which he calls modes of thoughts? And, it is believed that the idea of its

¹¹ Descartes concept of Mind, chapter 2, p.30

nature is very clear and different. Accordingly, delusional ways of thinking, if someone thinks thinking cannot be born in the mind but can be caused by joining with something else, such as the body. Thus, for Descartes, the human being is a complete unit, in which the mind and body are involved. The whole unit exists as if it is a subject, therefore, they can be described as one and equal. This unity is not the unity of nature, but of the structure. In the case of pre-unity, joint things cannot be considered independent of each other, while in the case of unity of structure, they can be considered different from each other. Thus, the ground for the distinction between the mind and the body is that each one is complete in itself and both can be considered independent of each other. Yet they can be considered another. That means, the mind exists in a specific body with a specific structure and organization, such as a quality that is contained in a substance.

But what is the status of simple primary belief of mind and body union? Should the notion of mind-body union is understood as one-third of the main feature, in which there are sensations and other body-dependent thinking modes? If it is taken as another main feature, such as the idea (through which we understand latent substances) or expansion (through which we know the physical substances), would not a compliance that the comparison of our knowledge of events related to the mind-body union will be similar to the different views of our mind and body? The main feature for Descartes is the nature of one thing, which we can 'clearly' and 'distinctly' comprehend, related to the essence of that thing.

Descartes emphasizes that all the physical bodies that are accepted in the context of all the conception are understood based on the notion of extension, which cannot be analysed: it is irreducible. It is for the thoughts that appear in our knowledge of intellectual things. The third primitive perception, through which we should understand the union of the mind and boy, is not a separate attribute, merely inadequate in the same way. It is given with our experience of mind-body contact (affecting and influencing the body and its motion) and it cannot be understood in terms of more ancient ideas, which means that its expanse or reference to the terms cannot be analyzed in thinking. For him, in general mind and pure intellectual things can only be visualized by the pure

intellect. The body and the extension can be clearly and distinctly explained only by pure intellect or it attained by imagination (geometry). Both ideas and extensions can be known in a 'clear' and 'distinct' manner due to the primary thoughts. Due to primary thoughts, both thoughts and expansions can be 'clearly' and 'distinctly' known, which represent the main characteristic of those substances to which they are related. As a union amid between the mind and the body and which is related to this union, it can only be known by obscurely with the help of pure intellect or imagination, but it is very clear through the senses can be known. So to speak, the union of the mind-body cannot be seen clearly and distinctly by intelligence and understanding, but it is sometimes doing not clearly perceived by the senses: it is a real fact of experience.

In addition, on the one hand, Descartes insists, since all human bodies exist in space and they are subject to instinctive laws. On the other hand, keeping in mind, he says that "space does not exist" and is the subject of non-mechanical laws. Its functioning cannot be seen by other observers. The human body is public because it is a subject of space, outer, external, physical, and therefore, a subject of mechanical laws, such as the law of gravity, the uniformity of nature, the law of causation, etc. The nature of the 'mind' is personal, it is mental, inner, non-spatial, etc. This distinction between the mind and the body also clarifies regarding two types of existence

Physical and mental existence. Hence, it is demonstrating the two theses:

- (i) Physical bodies exist, and
- (ii) Physical body in nature is real and completely different from minds.

For Descartes, the mind and the body direct causal relationship which is impossible to negotiate. Because both mind and body are mutually exclusive. The body is in space and in public. It can be extended and the mechanically explained. On the other hand, mind is not in space, but only in time. It is not extended and therefore, it cannot be inspected. However, Descartes acknowledges that there is some kind of relationship between the two

substances. Then he says that the compound of the soul is intuitively known to the body. Whenever something happens in the mind, is a matter of mental opportunity and there are physical opportunities with the body.

According to Descartes animated 'body' or 'machines' or inanimate substances are of the same type but they are different in degrees. The animated body is complex and displays greater similarity between its component granules. Descartes says that a person's body is an idol or machine made from the earth, which was later approved by Leibniz when he said that: the place of a person or an animal is a mechanical mechanism of taking in the body, which is in a clock. This means that the body which has motion can be animated and therefore destructible. And, human bodies are animated because we go from one part of the space to the other part of the space, and this cannot be the mammalian body, e.g. stone, etc.

Descartes believes that body and mind acts on each other. We can take Descartes' account of sense perception as the following consideration.

In the first place, a chain of events that connects to the causes, which are present in the existing 'body' and include those that stimulate the sensory organs of the sensor's body and the sense organs. In the second place, a conclusion of the series of movements spread through the affected organs with nerves and ends in the 'pineal gland', located in the centre of the brain. And finally, an impression is generated on the land, on which the physical effect is a conscious task, and the apparent action of mind and the matter.

- (a) Descartes says that, choosing the pineal gland as a single, ultimate and central recipient, for which there are all clear movements in the human body and all the influential people depart from it.
- (b) Identifying the gland with the seating of the soul, Descartes says that the pineal gland is simple in structure and therefore duplicate was not suitable for the unity of the operation of the mind, adding all the data to a centre of consciousness.

- (c) Explaining purely the mechanical movements, which explain the physical changes in the flow of animal spirits which explain the psychological change.

Descartes says clearly with an analogy of how the interaction is possible between the mind and the body. The analogy says:

"I am not only lodged in my body as a pilot in a vessel, but that I am very closely united to it, and so to speak so intermingled with it that I seem to compose with it one whole. For it that were not the case, when my body is hurt, I, who am merely a thinking thing, should not feel pain, for I should perceive this wound by the understanding only, just as the sailor perceives by sight when something is damaged in his vessel."¹²

This proves that although a person is primarily a thoughtful thing, it is sufficient unity with the body. Therefore, Descartes did not deny the cooperation among the two substances, mind and body, but tried to find out the way they interact.

Descartes gives a mechanistic interpretation of the body which is different from the scholastic mechanism, where the soul or mind is seen as the essence of the body, and at the same time where the activity is completely or partially refused to the body. Therefore, the body cannot be processed. There is no internal activity in their body, rather it is only external activity and it can only be defined as locomotion (mobility, movement). Descartes, on the contrary, the mind is not considered as the essence of the body but as a substance in itself. Thus, a person is a combination of two individual things for body and mind. Apart from this, the relation between the two is not related to the substance and essence, but rather in the form of the 'extension' and 'consciousness' respectively, two different independent substances are related, those who have their own essence. Now, to understand the Cartesian idea of the mind, we have to investigate the concepts that emerge as the difference

¹² (Descartes, 1996)

between “mind and body”. These concepts can be considered as the norms of establishing the uniqueness of the mind.

1.5 Conclusion

The mind-body is a very deep and broad philosophical implication of dualism. They are widely considered as in the form of contrary substances. The bodies cannot think, but are extended and passive. The minds can think and active, but are not extended. Both domains follow their freedom of laws. Due to such kind of alienation, the nature and functioning of the body can be fully interpreted in automated terms. To understand the function of the physical world, physics progresses with its own laws. The rules of mechanics can be applied to physical world; consequently, the human body and animal body are conceived in the form of a machine that supports the rules of mechanics. There is a dynamic principle in the nerves, heart is the organs of the sensation and muscles are the limbs of motion. The human body works like a machine.

Chapter-II

SPINOZA'S MONO SUBSTANCE

2.0 Introduction

“Substance’ is one of those philosophical terms of art that have entered the vernacular, undergoing quite considerable changes of sense in the process while yet retaining something of its original meanings”¹³. In the century, it will be true to say that the concept of substance has been philosophically more fashionable than ever before in its long history.

In general, we talk about different things such as being substantial like a tree or stone, etc. and being insubstantial like rainbows or shadows which classify certain nouns as being substantive such as humans, sun and water. Like the original, each of these is familiar with the non-philosophical use of a substance. Like the original, each of these materials is familiar with the non-philosophical use.

There is no point to be a purely historical one about the philosophical interest in the substance.

The term ‘substance’, all the same understanding of the philosophical use, undoubtedly requires perhaps more than in the case of any other philosophical term, more than the superficial knowledge of its history. The concept of substance has been widely used in the history of philosophy from the Greeks. Apart from this, even though philosophers now fight with some extent the term substance, the problem surrounding the substance is spread through the history of philosophy. The question is often asked is that, what is substance of? And can there be substance without its attributes?

2.1 Philosophical History of Substance

The history definitely starts with the Greeks and with Aristotle above all: In fact, almost everything that has been said about the substance and focuses on a group of philosophical problems which is their origin particular in Aristotle's

¹³ (Lowe, E.J. *Substance*. 1988)

philosophy. He uses the expression of 'substance' is a Greek word, *ousia*, derives from the Greek verb 'to be' that is adequate in Latin and is more extensive in substance application in English. "From the Latin *sub* (under) and *stare* (to stand), a translation of the Greek term *hypostasis* from *hypo* (under) and *histanthai* (to stand)".¹⁴ Thus the word refers to the underlying, supporting substratum of change. But the idea of the substance also contains the individual subject of change. The Greek words that occupy the best on this meaning are *ousia* and *hypokeimenon*.

In turn, however, the meaning of *ousia* is "both 'substance' and 'essence' and *hypokeimenon* mean, the 'concrete thing', the 'substratum' and 'subject' ".¹⁵ And its English translation comes to us through its Latin translation as *substantia*.

Aristotle's view on substance:

In the history of philosophy, the most influential account of substance was developed by Aristotle. He said that the word 'substance' can be taken in the context of four different things: universal, genus, the essence and subject. But since the primary reference to the word is the subject of predication, which cannot be predicted by any other thing, the four meanings can be reduced to two: "the first substance (*ousia prōte*), the subject of prophecy and the second substance (*ousia deutera*) and that is, other references, all of which are common words which are only able to fully represent the first substance."¹⁶ The distinction between substances and the other categories and its existence is for Aristotle self-evident.

"The term 'being' denotes first the 'what' of a thing, i.e., the individuality; and then the quality or quantity or any other such category. Now of all these senses which 'being' has, the primary sense is clearly the 'what', which denotes the substance (because when we describe the quality of a particular thing we say that it is 'good' or 'bad', and not 'five feet high' or 'a man'; but when we describe what it is, we say not that it is 'white' or 'hot' or 'five feet high', but that it is 'a man' or 'a god'), and all other things are said to 'be' because they

¹⁴(Reese, L William. 1980)

¹⁵*Ibid.* p.556

¹⁶*Ibid.* p. 556

are either quantities or qualities or affections or some other such thing.”¹⁷By two main senses he started to distinguish between primary substance and secondary substance. In the first sense, the substance is the primary in all sense of the word which is a particular concrete object, such as 'man' and 'animal'. In the second sense, it is a form or the essence that is in the first sense of substance. "By a primary substance, Aristotle seems to mean, quite simply, a concrete individual thing, such as a particular man or a particular tree. By secondary substances he means the various kinds- species and genera- to which such concrete individuals belong: such as the species man or the genus animal".¹⁸The genera and species would not exist without the primary substance and that is secondary, to which the individual thing belongs to, on which they can apply. The word substance is applied for both essence, universal, the genus is particular and ultimately considered to be the substance of the substrate.

According to Aristotle, the substrate means that the rest has been predicted, but it is not dedicated to anything else. The primary substrate is the substance. He defines that the composite of both the matter and the form is called a substrate. "By matter I mean, for instance, bronze; by shape, the arrangement of the shape, the arrangement of the form; and by the combination of two, and the concrete thing: the statue".¹⁹Now we have to move on the nature of substance and that is what other things have been predicted, and not that we have predicted a subject. It is beyond our thinking then what else is that if we say that matter is substance. Only the matter remains when everything is clearly removed and nothing will remain. Because, affections, products, and potencies are all other things of the body, and the only type of quantity are the "length", "breadth", and "depth", but not the substance, instead, these primary affections are known as substances.

But we can say that matter must be the only substance in the sense that when we see that there is nothing left except for length, breadth, and depth unless it is the something bounded by them, only in this sense. "By matter, I mean that

¹⁷(Aristotle, 1933).

¹⁸"An Encyclopaedia of Philosophy". (1988).

¹⁹(Aristotle, 1933)

which in itself is neither a particular thing nor a quantity nor designed by any of the categories which define being"²⁰

If we accept that the matter is a substance, then it belongs reparability and individuality of especially to substance.

Therefore, it would seem that the substance cannot be matter. Matter too is in sense evident. It is more likely to be formed.

Our question is, always like, what makes the matter into a particular thing? "The answer is that the presence of essence of the particular thing, which is not another element in the thing alongside of its material components".²¹ When we talk about the meaning and the application of term substance we the "essence of each thing is that which it is said to be *per se*. 'To be you' is not 'to be cultured', because you are not of your own nature cultured. Your essence then is that which you are said to be of your own nature"²²

For instance, in the statement 'Socrates is a man', 'man' is predicated of the individual man. Aristotle seems to have the more qualities they comprise, the more substantial they really are and the idea here those essences or natures are substances. To underlie the distinction between primary substances and various qualities and relations which can be predicted about it and the ontological primacy of the concrete individual is also taken by Aristotle.

Descartes' view of substance:

The notion of substance is in the origin of Descartes' metaphysics. He acknowledged many aspects of the medieval theology of the substance, despite the apparent dismissal attitude towards both Aristotle and scholastics.

Descartes defines a substance as an existing thing; there is not needed for anything other than oneself to exist, by giving his metaphysical approach to the substance. And the second way to say this is that the substance is the most basic thing of reality that can exist independently on its own. Therefore, for him, substances are of two types, that is, God, which he called the absolute substance and he called relative substances are mind and matter on the ground,

²⁰*Ibid.* P.319.

²¹ (Ross, Sir David, 1923)

²²(Aristotle, 1933)

which they need nothing but the concurrence of God for their existence. According to him, a relative substance is one that from God it derives its existence and depends on nothing for its existence other than God. Therefore, Descartes thus uses the term 'substance' in a less restricted sense and calls mind is a "thinking substance" and body as "extended substance", that is in the view that its existence requires only God and solely the aid of God.

Thus, in Descartes, we get two types of substances, one of which depends on its existence nothing else. And second, which is not completely self-existent, yet it is not dependent on anything other than God for its existence God is the most basic thing, in the sense that it exists without needing anything. God or in other words, He exists alone through himself and through Himself if does not include the existence of anything else, as I stated above. "By the God I understand a substance that is infinite, eternal, immutable, independent, supremely intelligent, and supremely powerful and which created both myself and everything else that exists".²³ Besides God there is also mind and matter. Apart from God, there is also the mind and the matter. Now the mind and the matter are not speaking basic like God, God, because He created both of them and both depend on Him for their existence. Clearly, each of them can be exists without the other and they have fewer grades of existence.

This characteristic or the essential property of the substance is known as attribute. "A substance, however, is known not simply from its being a thing which exists independently, but also from any of its attributes; and although any attribute is sufficient to lead us to the knowledge of substance."²⁴The "thought" and the "extension" are the essential qualities of the mind and matter respectively. For Descartes, extension is the primary or fundamental property, in which divisibility, figurability and mobility are modifications and this 'extension' only means having length, breadth and depth. Even the smallest particles of bodies are still capable of further division because space or extension is infinitely divisible. So there is no such thing as an absolute atom. This division consists of the movements of separation and union.

²³(Descartes, 1996)

²⁴Pati, R. P.62

The endless divisibility of space or extension gives rise to separation and union as a result of various forms of matter and its different parts. Therefore, all forms of matter and different prosperities of extension depend on motion. In more colloquial language, we can say that only space is taken to be extended or to have volume. Descartes just means by 'thinking substance' is 'mind'. In Descartes view, the opinion of the 'mind is absolutely discrete from the body. The former is absolutely immaterial and the latter being soulless.

Although Descartes only discusses these two attributes. Nevertheless, Descartes is often called substance dualistic, because the tradition has described Descartes as saying that the created substances are of only two types. Descartes said that all created or finite spiritual substances share the same essence), which is the thought or consciousness and all material things share the same essence (extension). "But it is clear that he would not accept that God could be conceived of in terms of extension since the extension is not infinitely perfect for Descartes. This is because extended matter is divisible, and it is clear that God cannot be. Why does the divisibility of matter imply imperfection for Descartes? This is because divisibility is the destruction of matter, and destruction is an imperfection".²⁵

Descartes notion of substance and attribute is made impossible to understand by the vagueness of the notion, through which he wants to clarify the idea of substance. It is not that all attributes are attributes of substances, if 'attribute' means 'property or relation'. This modifications of the attribute which we called as mode, and manifests itself in many ways. Since the modes of thought is sensation or imagination and the modes of extension is figure or motion. "As for all the other elements which make up the ideas of corporeal things, namely extension, shape, position and movement, these are merely modes of a substance."²⁶ Without the substance and attribute, the mode cannot exist, but without the modes, the substance and attributes can exist.

"Descartes held that the term 'substance' is used univocally of all substances, both mental and physical, though it is used slightly different sense in referring to the uncreated or self-created substance, God must have their nature their

²⁵(Curley,1988)

²⁶(Descartes, 1996)

nature explained in terms of one of these essential attributes; indeed, Descartes says that a substance is different from its essential attributes: all properties of thinking things are ways of thinking; all properties of physical things, ways of being extended".²⁷He maintains that the 'principal attributes' of matter and mind is 'extension' and 'thought' respectively: "Each substance has one principal property which constitutes its nature or essence and to which all its other properties are referred. Thus, extension in length, breadth and depth constitutes the nature of corporeal substance and thought constitutes the nature of thinking substance. Everything else which can be attributed to body presupposes extension and merely a mode of an extended thing; and similarly, whatever we find in mind is simply one of the various modes of thinking".²⁸

From the substances these principal attributes are not separable and they have their qualities. Nonetheless there are some modifications that are eligible for separation, not in the view that they can be different from those substances whose modifications they are. For example, the latter is a different thought successively, though thinking is essential to the mind. And though this extension is essential for corporate substance, similarly although thought cannot exist without this or that particular thought. The figure and size of a body can be different and also there is no particular quantity or shape. And the thought as well as extension are the variable modifications of attributes which are called by Descartes 'Modes'.

"Figure and motion is the mode of extension, as sensation or imagination is the mode of thought. The mode cannot exist without the substance and its attribute, but substance and attributes can exist without the modes".²⁹The primary or the universal or primary cause of motion is God and these figure and motion are deduced from Him. "He preserves in the universe the original quantity of motion and rest".³⁰According to Descartes, motion varies in individual bodies, but it is constant throughout the world. He believes that there are two substances in a normal human being; one is body and another is mind, which is defined in the context of extension and thought or

²⁷(Edwards, 1967)

²⁸(Cottingham, 1988)

²⁹(Masih, 1994)

³⁰Pati, R. "*History of modern European philosophy*".

consciousness. So human essentially consists of two substances, so this substance is a form of dualism.

2.2. Spinoza on Substance

“Monism” is the distinctive characteristic of Spinoza's system. But I will revisit to Descartes, before discuss about Spinoza's notion of substance, through which Spinoza was evidently influenced.

“The Cartesian notion of substance, appealing though it was on logical, scientific and metaphysical grounds, gave rise to problems that steadily increased in significance as their depth was perceived. What is the relation between substance construed as individual and substance construed as matter or stuff? There are a lot of questions answered by Descartes and Cartesians, none of them felt to be satisfactory. Spinoza was quick to observe that the concept of substance is, nevertheless, the cornerstone of Cartesian metaphysics”.³¹

The most prominent and influential source of Spinoza is the metaphysical structure of Descartes, and the Aristotelian conception of the substance receives the logical as well as ontological features of it. He says, the term ‘substance’ smears to “everything, in which whatever we perceive immediately resides, as in a subject or to everything by means of which whatever we perceive exists”.³² However, Descartes is more interested about the fact that a substance is one that is self-evident: “nothing other than a thing which exists in such a way as to depend on no other thing for its existence”.³³ Strictly speaking, for Descartes, because only God requires absolute ontological independence, this implies that alone God is the substance. God do not depend on nothing for His existence, whereas the mind and the body which he has given the name of any other substance depend on Him for their existence.

Spinoza gives his own view, on the Descartes view of substance and his account of substance, we mean, according to his definition, “I understand substance to be that which is in itself and conceived through itself: I mean that,

³¹(Scruton, 1981)

³²Aristotle. “*Categories*”. 2a10, 3a5

³³(Descartes, 1985)

the conception of which does not depend on the conception of another thing from which it must be formed”³⁴, that is the concept of which not needed any concept, so that it should be constitute. The substance of Spinoza, due to themselves, self-caused and imagined as self-explanatory. These features are related to Spinoza's metaphysical rationalism. So basically, in his primary meaning of substance, is a self-subsisting individual thing. He clearly works on the self-determining criterion of the matter when he defines a substance as "conceived through itself". This shows that we have been notified that the substance is a certain notion that can be made without require for any other concept. Concerned with Spinoza, it appears that after a substance is completely independent and detached. “A true idea should agree with its ideal, i.e., what it conceives”.³⁵ means the corresponding thought or notion of that substance should also be as independent and self-reliant.

Spinoza's substance of definition is found in his demonstration of substance is that that it cannot be composed by something else, “a substance cannot be produced from anything else, it will therefore be its own cause that is its essence necessarily involves existence or existence appertains to the nature of it and therefore from its mere definition its existence appertains to the nature of substance”.³⁶

In the latter phase, when he claimed that there is one and only substance which is ‘eternal’ and ‘infinite’ substance, that is God, Spinoza proceeds to the same line of thought that “except God no substance can be granted or conceived”.³⁷It is easy to show that there can be one being in the whole universe. Therefore, Spinoza equated the substance with God and Nature. By definition in his own words, "I understand that to because of itself (*Causa Sui*) whose essence involves existence and whose nature cannot be conceived unless existing”³⁸, which independent of any other causes.

³⁴(Spinoza, 1910)

³⁵*Ibid.* Ax.6. p. 2

³⁶*Ibid.* Prop.7. p. 4

³⁷*Ibid.* Prop.14. p.11

³⁸*Ibid.* Def. 1. p. 1

Spinoza now goes ahead to prove that a defined substance cannot be finite. If it were finite, “it would then be limited by some other substances”³⁹ and hence, it depends on them. It is obvious from this that there can be only one substance because if there were two or more substance, they would limit one another, and would thereby cease to be self-determining, and, therefore; to be substances. Henceforth, Spinoza concludes, there is only one substance. It does not depend on anything but everything depends on it.

Here, Spinoza swerves from the Descartes’ philosophy. According to Descartes, there are three substances instead of one. He is reluctant to apply the word substance to objects which do not exist by themselves. Moreover, his position is that only one substance exists in itself and conceives in itself, i.e., God. Therefore, for him, God alone is substance and substance is nothing but God.

With the same attribute, there cannot be two or more substances possessing. The reason is that if there were two or more substances, they must be distinct from one another. Moreover, they must have to hold different properties. Without properties, there can be no substance. However, they may be essential or accidental. The former attributes define a substance, without which the substance would cease to be a substance and the latter defines the attributes are those variable characters which a substance can also without ceasing to be what it is. By property or attribute, “I understand to be that which the intellect perceives as constituting the essence of a substance” (def. iv). This description tells us that, if these two substances would possess same properties, they must have to have the same essence. So, there must be “two substances having different attributes, have nothing common between them, and of two things nothing in common between them, one cannot be the cause of the other”. (Prop. II, III). For example, “the knowledge of the effect depends on the knowledge of its cause. For example, water is the cause of rain. Rain depends on water, both in terms of its being and in terms of the true understanding of it: there is no being of rain without the prior being of water and you cannot fully know what rain is without knowing what water is. The being and knowledge of the

³⁹Ibid. prop. 8. C. p.4

effect (rain) depend on the being and the knowledge of the cause (water)".⁴⁰ In this way, the causal relationship with something outside is refused for this type of substance.

However, "substance has defined in such a way that it cannot be said of it that it is the effect of an external cause. We must come in the end to a being which is 'cause of itself', its own explanation."⁴¹ Further, Spinoza goes on to prove that substance is determined as, which cannot be finite because "finite" has been explained as that which can be "limited by something else of the same nature"(def.2). It revealed before that no two substances having the same nature. "All substance is necessarily infinite"(Prop.8). Subsequently, "this self-causing infinite substance is defined with God"⁴². He is the one and only substance for Spinoza. He is also the centre of the philosophy of Descartes. Without giving the evidence of God's existence, his whole metaphysics will fail. Nevertheless, to a lesser degree, it is still a theological principle of God. Spinoza considered God as a "separate and transcendent" in correlation to the world. Contrary to Descartes view that finite substance divided among thought and extension, Spinoza writes "God is the indwelling and not the transient cause of all things" (prop.18). From the metaphysics of Spinoza only, we can understand, because of concluding the inevitability of there being only the substance from principles of Descartes. That is why it is not just a simple matter of Spinoza to reject Descartes' philosophy, but it shows that following his own doctrines, he should also admit that there is merely one substance can be made and this substance should be God. By Spinoza's language, "whatever is, is in God, and nothing can exist be conceived without God" (prop. 15).

Spinoza asserts that the God has infinite attributes known as 'thought' and 'extension' and each of which is infinite. Under the attributes of thought, 'finite minds' are the modes of substance or God. And under the attributes of extension 'finite bodies' are also the modes of the one substance or God.

"Nature is not ontologically distinct from God; and the reason why it cannot be ontologically distinct that God is infinite. He must comprise in Himself all

⁴⁰(Lord,B. 2010)

⁴¹(Frederick Coplestone, S.J. 1963)

⁴²(Contingham, 1988)

reality.”⁴³ But the relation between modes and substance is in Spinoza’s doctrine, such that one finds an explanation about finite world’s existence and its relation to the infinite.

According to Spinoza “by mode I understand the modification of substance or that which is in something else through which it may be conceived”. (def. 5)⁴⁴ For him, modes are the affections of the attribute of substance or God and except substance and modes, nothing exists. Because apart from substance, a mode cannot understand, of which it is a mode. "From this, it is evident, that according to Spinoza, modes cannot exist without the substance, nor can they be conceived without it; and to be affection or modification of substance is the same thing as to be an affection or modification of the of the attributes."⁴⁵ In other words, modes are but different modifications or forms in which the universal substance manifests itself through this or that attribute. Hence the world of finite particular objects is, according to him, a world of modes. In fact, all finite bodies and minds, all ideas and physical phenomena, in a word, all the particular things of the world, are included in the class of modes. Corresponding to the two attributes, thought and extension, we get in his system two classes of modes: first one is “modes of thought”; and the second one is “modes of extension”. So, for Spinoza, the thought and the extension are two attributes of the one and the same substance.

It should be noted here, Spinoza distinguishes between infinite and finite modes. The two modes are infinite and necessary modes, whereas the finite individual bodies and minds are called by him finite modes. In the other words, movement and rest intellect and will have no beginning and no end. Therefore, they are infinite modes. The eternal, infinite substance expresses itself forever in definite ways in an eternal and necessary system of ideas, the totality of all ideas, Spinoza call the absolutely infinite intellect and such a system of modes of the extension he calls motion and rest. The two together constitute the face of the whole universe.

⁴³(Frederick Coplestone, S.J. 1963)

⁴⁴ (Spinoza, B. translated by Boyle, A. 1910)

⁴⁵Pati, R. P.105

Spinoza again distinguishes between two kinds of infinite modes: one kind of infinite modes that follows immediately from attributes and another kind follow from attributes which already modified. He writes modes “which follow from the absolute nature of any attribute of God must exist for ever and infinitely, or must exist eternally and infinitely through that same attribute”.⁴⁶ In other words, former kinds of modes derive directly from the attributes of God and latter kind is a modified one.

From all this we see that the distinction between the finite modes and the substance is rather apparent than real. Both are nature in different aspects. God is the nature in the two senses. In the first sense, He is the universal world essence, the active principle (*Natura naturans*) and in the second sense, He is also the sum total of finite things (*Natura naturata*). “We must understand by active and passive nature (*naturanaturans* and *natura naturata*)”⁴⁷

‘*Natura naturans*’ mentioned God or nature creates actively Himself and in his infinite attribute and in the innumerable modes of two attributes. And ‘*Natura naturata*’ or ‘*nature natured*’ mentioned “Nature conceived in its passive capacity, as an established system.”⁴⁸ Thinking of God as a unique creator that is *Natura Naturans* and thinking of a unique creation that is *Natura naturata* is equally true. This is not just the truth, but without the other as the concept of nature, it is not necessary to include the complementary meaning neither being complete or even to the possibility. “Whatever is in God and without God nothing can be or be conceived.”⁴⁹ Hence time and number are mere fictitious entities, forms of the imagination under which we conceive phenomenal things. These seemingly arise and pass away, while their inner essence, the eternal infinite substance abides. Hence, according to Spinoza, God or Nature is the cause of these modes. All, therefore, is God. The *naturanaturans* is active in the *Natura naturata* at all points.

⁴⁶(Spinoza, B. translated by Boyle, A. 1910)

⁴⁷*Ibid.* P.24

⁴⁸(Hampshire, S. 1951)

⁴⁹(Spinoza, B. translated by Boyle, A. 1910)

2.3 Spinoza on Mind and Body

Spinoza's thinking about the metaphysics of the mind and the body should be understood against the background of the philosophical revolution initiated by Descartes.

Descartes claims that the world is neatly divided into two realms: mental and physical. Both of these areas are fundamentally different and nothing is common between them. But dismissing Descartes' view, Spinoza establishes his own view by saying that the world is fundamental unity. It is alone infinite substance, that which known as God or Nature.

This infinite substance is the most real and the most fundamental thing, but this is not the only thing. There are also finite things that depend on it. In Spinoza's terminology, these finite things or modes stand for infinite substance as the waves stand to the waters of the ocean. Just as a wave is nothing more than water, it is in the form of moving itself in a certain way; a finite thing is an infinite substance, which satisfies a certain condition in itself. Under various attributes, these modes can be conceived. Ideas comprehended under the attributes of "thought" and bodies comprehended under the attributes of "extension".

Spinoza upholds reality is nothing but a single absolutely infinite substance which contains attributes in infinite numbers. Among the infinite, each attribute is infinite in its kind. Those attributes establish the definitive divisions of reality. They conceived through themselves. Further, Spinoza emphasises, only two attributes, thought and extension, are known to the human mind. The human mind corresponds to the human body in a parallel mode. In other words, the relationship between mental events and bodily events is a parallel.

In addition, he considers the two attributes, mind and body, as manifestations of these attributes which are expressions of God. The mind is nothing as Spinoza says but the idea of the body. Moreover, it is equivalent to the idea of modes of extension, the body. "By body, I understand that mode which expresses in a certain determined manner the essence of God in so far as he is

considered as an extended thing.”⁵⁰ However, the body is composed of several parts. Each and every part confirm to an idea. It follows that “the idea which constitutes the formal being of the human mind is not simple, but composed of many ideas”.⁵¹

Spinoza defines that “The first thing that constitutes the actual being of a human mind is nothing but the idea of a singular thing which actually exists”⁵². He explicitly postulates what is that called ‘singular thing’. He writes “the essence of man is constituted by certain modes of thinking, of all which the idea is prior in nature, and this idea being granted the remaining modes must be in the same individual. Therefore, the idea is the first thing that constitutes the being of the human mind.”⁵³ Therefore, for him, the human mind is one of many infinite ideas - which is in accordance with the mode of all the attributes - which creates the infinite intellect of God.

"The human mind is a part of the infinite intellect of God, and thus when we say that the human mind perceives this or that, we say nothing else than that God, not in so far as he is infinite, but in so far as he is explained through the nature of the human mind, or in so far as he constitutes the essence of the human mind, has this or that idea: and when we say that God has this or that idea not only in so far as he constitutes the nature of the human mind, but also in far as simultaneously with the human mind as he has also the idea of another thing, then we say that the human mind perceives the thing only in part or inadequately”.⁵⁴

Spinoza strikes many theses about the nature of the mental. First of all, like Descartes, Spinoza not admits the claim that the mind is a substance. Just as wave stands to the ocean, the human mind stands to God because he is a “thinking thing”. In the same manner, the human body also stands to God as an extended object

In addition, for him, the mind is, as it were, a wave on the ocean of thought. “Whatever happens in the object of the idea constituting the human mind must

⁵⁰(Spinoza, B. translated by Boyle, A. 1910)

⁵¹ (Spinoza, B. translated by Boyle, A. 1910)

⁵²*Ibid.* Prop.11, (part.2). P. 45

⁵³*Ibid.* P.46

⁵⁴*Ibid.* P.46

be perceived by the human mind, or the idea of that thing must be necessarily be found in the human mind: that is, if the object of the idea constituting the human mind be the body, nothing can happen that body which is not perceived by the mind”.⁵⁵

“The body is the object of the mind. What you think of as your mind really God’s idea of a certain extended finite mode. Hence it follows that man consists of mind and body, and the human body exists according as we feel it”.⁵⁶

We have noted that the mind is one of the modes under the attribute of thought; mind asserts the essence of the substance. Also, we noted that body is one another mode. Under the attribute of extension, it expresses the essence of the equal substance. These two modes of the mind and the body are not the modes of two different substances but one and the same. It reveals because of the properties of thought and extension. The mind and the body are the modes of the same substance but only the fact is that former is mode according to mental attributes and the latter is the mode according to a physical attribute. Nevertheless, both are related one and the same substance. Then, what is Spinoza's theory of the existence of the human mind and body? Spinoza's answers to this question is that these two are the modes under the attributes of thought and extension. The qualities thinking and extension are the qualities of the same substance as the substance perceived through one attribute. Therefore, "for Spinoza, mind and body are one individual expressed through the attribute of thinking and extension".⁵⁷ So to speak, we can consider these two modes as two ways in which a substance is seen just as our observation through two different lenses. Further, he writes, “The mind and the body are one and the same individual, which is conceived now under the attribute of thought, now under the attribute of extension. Wherefore the idea of the mind and the mind itself are one and the same thing and are conceived under one and the same attribute, namely, thought”.⁵⁸

⁵⁵ Ibid. P.46

⁵⁶ Ibid. P.47

⁵⁷ (Lord, B. 2010)

⁵⁸ (Spinoza, B. translated by Boyle, A. 1910)

Thus, Spinoza discards the Descartes assertion that the subject of mental predicates and the subject of physical predicates are not equal. The terms 'mind' and 'body' should have a different meaning. The reason is that their use comprises understanding things under various attributes. Nevertheless, they are still consolidated. Spinoza's stand excludes, the Hume that a minds are the collection of mental state, though they are not related to any subject. Nevertheless, it is integrated in any way and connected to a given body.

It is believed that sometimes he can make the mind a accumulation of conception of several parts of the body, which may be combined with some other mental states. Then, even if he has such an idea, he makes each collection is identical with the body, and because of being similar to some other body, is a matter of 'corporeal predicates'. For example, in his view, "motion", "divisibility" and "extension", are one which is exists in one substance.

According to Spinoza, "the mind is nothing but an idea of the body". The human mind is just the idea that describes the human body. There is, for him, an idea in the thinking substance that represents each body in the property of extension. Just as Spinoza calls the idea that describes the human body the human mind, so too we might call the ideas that represent all the other bodies the minds of those bodies. For instance, I perceive a pen on my table. The idea of the pen affects my mind and in the same way the image of that idea of the pen also affects my body. Put it in another way, it is nothing but a particular mode of extension that literally exists. Spinoza argues if the human body would not the object of the human mind our ideas regarding the modifications of the body would not be in merit of God creating human mind. Rather, it is in morality of his establishing the mind of something else. Spinoza says "The object of the idea constituting the human mind is the body, or a certain mode of extension actually existing and nothing else. Which clarifies that now if the body is not the object of the human mind, the ideas of the modifications of the body would not be in God in so far as he constitutes our mind but the mind of some other thing, that is the ideas of the modification of the body would not be in our mind in our mind. But we have ideas of the modification of the body.

Therefore, the object of the idea constituting the human mind is the body, and that actually exists."⁵⁹

However, for him, the body is a composition of many parts, and in every part of that composition corresponds to an idea. Apart from “the idea of the body”, the mind corresponds to 'the idea of mind'. The reason he gives that man can make an idea of his mind. If we talk about the relationship among these two, the mind and the idea of the mind, is one to one relation just as the one to one relationship between minds to the body. Thus, this relationship says nothing but one mental event follows the other mental event. If we look at the connection among mind and body as parallelism, then the correlation between the mind and the idea of mind should be considered as parallelism. If mind is the idea of body, then it implies that the completion of the mind and the completion of the body parallel notions. This is most likely another method for saying that we rely on conception for our ideas.

Being a substance, normally with a continuous activity independent of the body, your mind is an expression in the idea of the living states of your body; in the body, there are similar relations to the causes, because my mind is the idea of my body. Spinoza opines that, the familiar theory that bodily changes produce mental change. To say, there is no causal relation between the state of the mind and the state of body. Rather, he is insisting a point that every physical or bodily change is a mental change and vice versa. The reason is that there is only one nature. An order of natural events (causes) is apprehended by us through the two attributes. Spinoza did not think that the mind and body are two different things or substances. For him, these are two aspects of the same reality or one and the same substance they are conceived under the qualities of thoughts and extensions. In this way, Spinoza said that there is no causation link between the two entities, which are part of the same reality because one does not determine the other when in fact they are simultaneously in action. Regarding the union of its sub-parts of his Monism, Spinoza upholds clearly that the human mind is nothing but the idea of the human body as it is found in God.

⁵⁹(Spinoza, B. translated by Boyle, A. 1910)

Further, when Spinoza says the following statement that “in God there is necessarily an idea that expresses the essence of this or that human body, under a species of eternity”⁶⁰, his meaning is clear. The human mind is eternal for the essence of mind. It is an idea of the human body which is ceaselessly understood by God in infinite intellect. Moreover, he argues, the idea does not consist of anything correlated to the real existence of the body and its duration. Consequently, it does not include any mental things, such as experiences, imaginings, and memories and so on, attached to the individual's continuation existence. Rather, the essence of the human mind is the idea of the fundamental constitutive connection of the body. This is the idea of an essential relationship that is perpetual and infinite.

2.4. Spinoza's system of mind-body Parallelism:

We have seen Descartes conclusion that mind (thinking being) is distinct from body (an extended being). It tells nothing but there are two aspects. Those two aspects directly related to two substances. To say, thinking is the essence of mental substance (mind), and extension is the essence of physical substance (body). Descartes considers the mind and the body are two separate and independently existing substances. Even though he strongly claimed these are two independent substances, he admits the two substances interact. While claiming the two substances would interact, he tries to prove the relation between mind and body. For him, the mind and the body impact each other. However, he believes, the mind is always superior to the body.

Descartes' problem of the mind-body interaction was ably rejected by Spinoza. His criticism to Descartes' theory is that it was not able to offer a substantial clarification of how mind and body would interact when they are assumed to be two distinct kinds of substance without any common properties. Spinoza claims that the causal structure of the mind and body are the same. This is acknowledged as the parallelism doctrine. According to this doctrine, each body is associated with an idea that represents it. Likewise, there is a body for every idea. If an idea in the mind of God signifies a body, then that body exists. The parallelism doctrine further states that there is a complete

⁶⁰(Lord, B. 2010)

description of the causal order of the world in terms of ideas as well as of bodies. The causal structure indicated by these two descriptions is the same.

For Spinoza, in this explanation, the problem does not arise like in the case of interaction. “First, mind and body are not substances at all; second, the causal interaction between the attribute of thinking and attribute of extension is ruled out. There can be no interaction between minds (a mode in the attribute of thinking) and body (a mode of in the attribute of extension). But mind and body perfectly correspond to one another, because everything happens in the body happens also in the mind. The mind comprehends everything that happens to the body but does not cause any effects on the body. And the body's experiences do not cause ideas in the mind, but these experiences are directly and truly known by the mind”.⁶¹ Just as going up against the appearance that mentality is disturbed irregularly throughout the physical world, Spinoza should likewise confront the way that inside systems that irrefutably do have mental as well as physical aspects there seems to be a causal interaction between the two.

Jonathan Bennett, who interprets Spinoza's parallelism, claims that the mind and the body are not ‘identical’.⁶² He rejects the numerical identity explanation of parallelism on the basis of the claim that it compels Spinoza to a conflict. Bennett claims “there is no causal interaction between minds and bodies. If he then claimed that minds and bodies are identical, then he would apparently be committed to the following contradiction, if mind ‘M’ causally interacts with mind ‘N’ and ‘body 1’ is identical with mind ‘M’, then it seems as though ‘body 1’ must also causally interact with mind ‘N’”.⁶³

The very rich literature on the philosophy of Spinoza deals extensively, which we refer to as the mind-body question. Often, Spinoza's system about mind and body unity is known as "parallelism". It famously states that the order and affiliation of ideas and of things is parallel. Generally, it means that "union of mind and body" is similar of order or structure, or which is called sometimes "isomorphism" or, more precisely, "parallelism" of the mind and body.

⁶¹(Lord, B. 2010)

⁶²(Bennett, 1948)

⁶³*Ibid.*, P.158

Everything that presents - and now we should be confined within the realm of material things and mental things- comes under one or two of the two recognized attributes.

Indeed, whatever exists, it is another substance that reveals its power under each of the attributes. So this is the reason why those things are the modes of that substance. "Thought and extension are two of God's attributes, or two of the most general natures of things in the universe. There are, in fact, infinitely many such attributes, but these are the only two of which we have any knowledge".⁶⁴

Spinoza calls the modes of thought as "singular ideas". In addition; he also calls them "ideas" and "minds". He states an idea as "the concept of mind". The mind persists because it is a matter of thinking. So he claims, ideas are not necessarily an idea that they are familiar psychological material about their mental life. The familiar psychological content of our mental life is not considered in the necessary ideas in thought. Neither all ideas like human ideas nor all ideas belong to human minds. It is very clear that the finite modes of the extension are singular bodies and their interactions with other singular bodies and finite modes of thought are singular ideas and their interaction with other ideas. However, there has always been quite a bit of controversy in Spinoza scholarship as to how infinite modes are to be understood.

For Spinoza, infinite modes are not like psychological entities, for instance, conceptual forms but they are the ideas of the attribute of thought which involves all singular thoughts. In his view, those infinite modes, indeed, constitute complete and adequate knowledge of the objects which are existence in nature.

The principal point is that, for him, these ideas have familiar with cognitive states that belong to things. Moreover, there is something special about the idea which separates its modes from other attributes. Thoughts are unique, which philosophers are called 'intentionality'. Spinoza says that whatever is followed by the infinite nature of God, in the same order, it follows in his own view God adheres to it fairly and is worth the same connection

⁶⁴(N, Steven. 2006)

“The idea, that all the attributes must be conceived through the attribute of thinking. Because thinking is one of God’s attributes there is necessarily ‘in God’ an idea of its own essence and of everything that necessarily follows from it. There are comprehended by the infinite intellect. Infinite intellect contains and expresses the idea of extension, and infinite other attributes; and the ideas of every mode of extension, every mode of thinking, and every mode of the infinite other attributes. So every attribute, and for every mode in every attribute, there exists an idea in the infinite intellect”.⁶⁵

The principle of infinite attributes follows the deduction from the definition of substance. But due to its adequacy in solving the problem of mind-body relationship; Spinoza may be more satisfied with it. Descartes had organized the mind and body to be relative and independent substances. Despite its usefulness in removing the conflict between science and religion, mechanism and grace, Descartes' dualism did not work well. First of all, there may be only one substance and if there were more than one, then they will limit each other and destroy their mutual substantiality. According to Spinoza's relative substances, it seemed self-contradictory. Second, Descartes himself could not help their mutual interaction which went against his dualism.

According to this principle, the extension is not the cause for thought and on the contrary, but each other has an opportunity. However, it was maintained that God intervened in bringing changes in mind and body on such occasions. Spinoza did not take part in this continuous appeal to the irreversible will of a mythical God. For this reason, Spinoza rejected Cartesian dualism and rejected the mind and body's adequacy. Spinoza thinks they are inseparable aspects of one reality. Therefore, he continues, being a co-existent attribute of the substance, thought and extension could not be negotiated or interact.

Spinoza makes out that there is something distinct about thought that separates its modes from of the other attributes. The idea is alone because "thinking is always thinking" about something. Spinoza writes "whatever follows formally from the infinite nature of God, it follows also invariably objectively from the

⁶⁵(Lord, B.2010)

idea of God in the same order and connection, in God".⁶⁶ "Ideas do not cause bodies and bodies do not cause ideas. That means that God's ideas of things are not the basis of their production; nor do human ideas cause physical effects. Ideas are not caused by physical bodies themselves. Perhaps most startlingly, there would seem to be no causal interaction between our minds and our bodies".⁶⁷

This defines that the ideas of the body and the body itself are not extrinsically related series which are correlated with each other. Rather, every idea of the body appears at the basic level, with which the body is an idea. Therefore, they are one and the same thing manifesting itself in two different ways. He writes "We already know that bodies and ideas have an entirely separate stream of causality. And we already know that God has an idea of every mode of extension. Spinoza is now claiming that bodies and ideas have parallel streams of causality; that the order of causality is the same in the attribute of thinking as it is in the attribute of extension".⁶⁸

It follows in such a way that Spinoza asserts the chain of ideas under the attribute of thought and the chain of bodies under the attribute of extension is another series. They express in two separate means. This signifies that the order and connection in an expression must be similar to the order and connection in the other expressions. It is not a matter whether it is under the nature or attribute of the extension, or under the attribute of the idea, or any other attribute. We would understand the one and the same thing, order, or connection of cause. That means things follow one another. Therefore, he says, thoughts and expansions would be nothing more than those approaches which we take upon things. But they are not the actual essences of things in the universe.

One remarkable argument for parallelism is between modes of thought and of other attributes not provided by Spinoza. The argument is that no one can see a spinozistically motivated philosopher would argue that there is a one-to-one relationship. There is also co-relation in the order amongst ideas and bodies

⁶⁶(Spinoza, B. translated by Boyle, A. 1910)

⁶⁷(Lord, B.2010)

⁶⁸(Lord,B. 2010)

and other modes. The reason is that there is a fundamental relationship amongst them. That is, conceivably there is an idea that corresponds to the body because the body causes the idea of itself in the attribute of thought. However- and this is an important aspect of their spiritual elements – Spinoza clearly gives a causal chain between any modes of any on the attribute, there can be no cause activity between the attribute and the other nor the methods of one attribute and another attribute. The modes within the realm of an attribute only follow from that attribute and its other methods. Consequently, within the realm of extension, one body causally interacts with another one. On the other hand, in the realm of attribute of thought, ideas causally interact with other ideas. A thought event becomes the cause of the physical phenomenon.

So how are they related? Both, therefore, cannot negotiate or interact, but they run parallel to each other. They are infinite but are independent of each other, each able to express themselves to God in infinity. God is extended as well as thinking. These are two inseparable features of the same thing just as the two features, convex and concave, of the same lens, without any other, no aspect can exist. Is each mode of extension respectively a mode to consider the agreement? But the above-described parallelism does not include idealism as well as materialism, because the substance cannot explain the mind, or the mind to explain this matter.

The formal existence of the “idea of the circle” can be observed only through the mode of thinking because it is the proximate or closest cause. And, then through those modes other and other through the other, and so on to infinity.

Therefore, on Spinoza's view, so long as things are expressed as modes of thinking, we should be understood things only because of the attribute of thought to order the connection of the entire nature or cause. Similarly, as it is believed as the modes of extension, the order and of the whole nature should be explained only through the attribute of extension. To say, a body should be considered only through the principles of motion and extension and its relation with other bodies. Likewise, mind or idea should be determined only through the doctrine of thinking and the relationships with other thoughts. Therefore, he concludes, each attribute signifies a closed and unique method for a reason.

In Spinoza's view, the complete existence of the ideas accepts God or Nature as the only one cause. The reason is, it is considered as a thought-provoking or a thinking thing. Also, it is not considered, it has been explained by the attribute, i.e., ideas. The attributes of God and the “singular things” both do not accept the objects itself. Or, not accept things as their effectual cause, nevertheless God, Himself as it is a matter of thinking. In the modes of each of the attribute, Also God is unaware of their ground or cause since he is believed under that attribute in which they are modes. These modes are not considered under any other attribute.

Spinoza's logic depends on the fact that he has established a relation that tells about the epistemology of causation. That means that when one thing is a cause of another, imaging latter one is impossible without the former one. Our knowledge of an effect would depend on this cause and it is included. The mode is only considered through the attribute in which it is a mode. But not through the medium itself or through any other. Nonetheless, if there is a mode due to any other attribute other than the attribute of a mode, then it needs the conception of an attribute. This is the reason why Spinoza says "a body which moves or is at rest must be determined to motion or rest by another body, which has also been determined to motion or rest by another, and that again by another, and so on, to infinity".⁶⁹ Spinoza argues that physical events are on no occasion caused by the thought effects and vice versa. Closing the scope of this realm will play a key role in human beings in the realm of physical and thought. So far our scrutiny shows how Spinoza's system goes beyond Descartes' theory.

Spinoza's theory discards the Descartes' dualism theory by creating manifestations of mind and the matter, the soul and the body, of common theory. This is completely divided by all the ideal content. Moreover, a particular intellectual order of things and incorporeal entities which is different from the real universe. It considers later by the realm of “pure thought”. For Spinoza, universe is one. However, there are two elements, thought and matter, that are completely different elements. Furthermore, it is not possible

⁶⁹ (Spinoza, 2016)

to explain them in terms of each other. Though these two elements are different they are indivisible. The reason is that they are not substances. Rather, they are merely the attributes of one and the same substance. Each modification of infinite extension is an idea. Moreover, it is impossible to think a thought without matter or matter without thought. Spinoza's doctrine clearly specifies the close parallel relation between the two elements. But he argues explicitly against identifying those two elements as materialism and as idealism from the opposite viewpoint.

Chapter: III

DESCARTES VERSUS SPINOZA: MIND AND BODY

3.0 Spinoza's critique of Cartesian Dualism:

In the account of modern philosophy, a variant on this narrative is centred on a separate but linked problem, and hence Spinoza further responds towards the stress brought about by the Cartesian dualism. This time, though, stress is not among the dualism principle as well as the causal interaction, but it is a question of the unity of human being and between the theories of dualism. Spinoza, on his account, denies substance dualism and really separate substances, that is, material bodies and immaterial minds. According to the famous dualistic theory of Descartes, human beings were composed of two different substances, i.e., physical bodies and immaterial minds. Spinoza was not agreed with his opinion and argued that the body and mind are not two distinct substances, but two modes of the alike substance. For Descartes' view, mind is a thinking thing. But in Spinoza's thought it was wrong. In what sense Spinoza said about the mind and body, he was deluded with the philosophy of Descartes, he shows himself deeply linked to Cartesian thoughts. Spinoza was largely approved of; as Descartes claimed that the variety and multiplicity of physical events near us were explained as a set of 'mode' or modifications of extension. Hence, Spinoza's argument is that all the different bodies we observe nearby us be "distinguished with respect to motion or rest, quickness or slowness".⁷⁰

For the Cartesian theory of mind and body distinctness, he, by all means, rejects that the body and the mind are separate substances. In opposing the opinion of a different substance of mind, "however Spinoza rejects the fundamental Cartesian thesis that corporeal substance is divisible. For Descartes, the extension automatically implies divisibility: to be extended is to have dimensions, and this in turn implies that we are dealing with such and

⁷⁰ (Spinoza, B. translated by Boyle, A. 1910)

such quantity of matter; and where there is quantity, there is always the possibility of division. This in Descartes physics the notion of 'corporeal substance', 'extension', 'quantity', and 'space' are virtually interchangeable. It is explicitly stated that whatever possesses a determinate extension can always be divided into two".⁷¹ From based on this point of view that, substance is all-embracing, infinite and can be only single, Spinoza argues "no attribute of a substance can be truly conceived, from which it would follow that substance can be divided into parts".⁷² Nevertheless the corporal substance is indivisible, even after its extension.

Spinoza was verified extended periods and for his beliefs about it was ignored. As an alternative Descartes was eternalized as a visionary. The rationalist theory of him became a part of the cultural base and shaped the course of modern philosophy. "So Spinoza is not a substance dualist. He appears as the property dualist or sometimes called dual aspect theorist (there are two aspects of reality)."⁷³ However, it is difficult to ignore strong arguments of Spinoza about mind-body relations, and in particular, his opinion is that the strength of one must first understand what body is.

"In this apparent inequality, with the powers of mind grounded in the powers of the body, has led one scholar to suggest that Spinoza is actually a type of materialist about the mind. This commentator, who is fully sensitive to the distinctness and irreducibility of the mental aspects of reality in Spinoza, suggests that if we follow the consequences of Spinoza's identification of mind and body. We will see that its fundamental emphasis is materialistic rather than dualistic. It is not the general powers of the mind that appears to be functions of powers of the body, but it is also a real episode function as well. Spinoza never suggests that the direction of understanding can go from the mind to the body; it is always from body to mind. And unlike the view of Descartes, in which there are pure intellectual thoughts, that have no basis in the body, there is no state of mind for Spinoza which is not correlated with

⁷¹(Contingham, J. 1988)

⁷² (Spinoza, B. translated by Boyle, A. 1910)

⁷³ (N,Steven. 2006)

indeed identical to! - Some aspects of our physical existence. This will certainly not be elimination materialism, because Spinoza does not suggest anywhere that the range of mental category is confusing or dispensable. In fact, this category is absolutely essential to describe a whole aspect of the universe - that, aspect is represented by attribute thought. And despite the fact that the mental objects, the modes of thought, are explained by their extended objects, material terms and descriptions are not reducible to physical terms and descriptions."⁷⁴ One might think that the theory of Spinoza resembles the central state materialism (for example, the mind-body identity theses), accordance with to that each and every intellectual or mental state is similar to the condition of the body and in an external or superficial sense this happens: he clearly states that the mode of thinking and extension is ultimately the same and the only thing is.

“That the mind is united to the body we have shown from the fact that the body is the object of the mind; and therefore by that same reason the idea of the mind is united to its object, that is the mind itself, in the same manner as the mind is united to the body”.⁷⁵ We can understand this proposition more clearly if we understood proposition 13. “For there we showed that the idea of the body and the body itself, that is the mind and body, are one and the same individual, which is conceived now under the attribute of extension. Wherefore the idea of the mind and the mind itself are one and the same thing and are conceived under one and the same attribute, namely, thought”.⁷⁶

Thus for Spinoza the one thinking substance is identical with the one extended substance. The modes of thought, which include all the particular, finite thinking things, and the modes of extension, which include the entire particular, finite extended things, are not themselves substances, but are somehow dependent on the one substance. When Spinoza introduces his claim about identity of modes, he seems to be drawing an inference from the identity of the thinking and the extended substance to the identity the modes of thought

⁷⁴ N,Steven. (2006).

⁷⁵(Spinoza, B. translated by Boyle, A. 1910)

⁷⁶*Ibid.*, P.58

and extension. “The thinking substance and the extended substance are one and the same substance, which is now comprehended under this attribute, now under that. So also a mode of extension and the idea of that mode are one and the same thing, but expressed in two ways”.⁷⁷

Nevertheless, by the central view of materialism, the mental states only refer to the physical states, and it is something that could not allow with Spinoza. The mind and body can eventually, at a deep abstract level, be one and the same thing, but the idea of the body – are separate and unchangeable modes; the reference to one of them is not the reference of the other. Consistent with the traditional story, both textbooks and scholarly articles were often told in the literature; Spinoza left the basic model for his distinctive account due to the philosophical problems that influenced cartesian dualism and its liability to interaction.

If we think about the material world close to us, then Spinoza's thesis strongly looks per-seated, because we can clearly imagine the number of extended stuff separated into parts. Spinoza responds, perhaps in some obscure way, that his perception is established on our simple sensational conception or visible imagination. We imagine the quantity in two ways: in an abstract or superficial form, as we imagine it, or in the form of substance, that is done only by the intellect. "If then, we look at quantity as it is in the imagination, which we often and very easily do, it will be found to be finite, divisible, and composed of parts; but if we look at it as it is in the intellect and conceive it, in so far as it is a substance. This distinguishes between the imagination and the intellect will be quite clear: more specifically if attention is paid to this, that matter is the same everywhere, and its parts cannot be distinguished one from the other except in so far as we conceive matter to be modified in different modes, whence its parts are distinguished one from the other in mode but not in reality".⁷⁸ Then Spinoza accept, “water in so far as water, can be made

⁷⁷*Ibid.*, p

⁷⁸(Spinoza, B. translated by Boyle, A. 1910)

destroyed, but in so far as it is substance it can neither be made nor destroyed".⁷⁹ So it will be found inseparable, infinite unique and unique.

One important result follows from Spinoza's view that the thinking and the extended substances are no longer characteristic of contradictory terms. But thinking stuff for Descartes is by nature is indivisible, also by the nature of extended stuff is divisible, accordingly, both are not only separate but are completely alien and contradictory natures. "For Spinoza, by contrast, there is no necessary contradiction between the proposition 'X is thinking and 'X is extended'; there is therefore no bar, as there would be for a Cartesian, to the supposition that the attributes of extension and thought characterise the same".

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Is there a problem with the mind-body, either due to its causal interpretation or its "substantial union" version, the impulse for Spinoza's desertion of Cartesian dualism? Spinoza clearly denies that the two things are not commonplace can usually interact; this is one of the first propositions of ethics. This is a good way to explain Spinoza, which gives priority to unity of human being and divide it through two different modes by the two different attributes of thought and extension, what he say in IIP 14. Descartes consider that by division mind from the corrupt bodies, his fundamentalist dualism provided the best potential defence of clarification for the immortality of the soul.

Spinoza's explanation about this criticism is that "the body cannot determine the mind to think, or the mind the body to remain in motion, or at rest, or any other state".⁸¹ Therefore, in physical and mental events, there is no causal relation between them. Hence, if any explanation is required because of some explanation, you will also not get the interpretation of your thoughts, while referring to the properties of cell membrane permeability, sodium ions and synthetic intervals. . Nor will you get an explanation of how you think or how

⁷⁹*Ibid.* P.14

⁸⁰(Contingham, J. 1988)

⁸¹(Spinoza, B. translated by Boyle, A. 1910)

you feel, citing the fact, the motion of your body or brain. The relation or lack of mental events and the concept of physical events has been explained partly by Spinoza. Under the material, or attribute of the extension, a physical phenomenon should be explained in the form of judgment or any other physical phenomenon, a mental incident should be considered by any other mental event. The clear and obvious argument of Spinoza to deny the causal interaction depends on the claim that every attribute of God is imagined through one's own self and without the other, thus, the concept of any other attribute is not included a mode of one attribute. According Spinoza is saying here is that there is no definite reduction of mental as well as physical conception or from physical to mental conceptions possible. The concept of mental and physical events is independent of each other.

But how does it help in establishing that there is no causation relationship among them?

It is answered that - if a mental event has given birth to a physical event, then it will depend on the concept of physical phenomena and its cause will be involved. A similar result will obtain if it the physical events create mental events. "The thesis is that if x causes y, then there should be a nomological or strict law that would allow one to deduct one from the other. The thesis is that there is no causal traffic between mental and physical, so it is not inconsistent with the claim that the mental is the physical (vice versa)".⁸² Refusal of the interaction asserts the claim that phenomenon are considered as physical and vice versa. It includes that there is no use in the interpretation of a mental event to explain the occurrence of a physical phenomenon. However, it is not mandatory that mental phenomena are considered to be physical, cannot cause the physical phenomena, which is considered material.

⁸²(Segal, G and Yovel Y. Spinoza. 2002)

There is no surprise about the elementary definition of Spinoza's human being: "man consists of a mind and body, and that the human body exists according as we feel it".⁸³

"Spinoza, of course, is not a substance dualist".⁸⁴ In order to avoid the difficulties of dualism and interactionism, Spinoza introduced the idea of universal parallelism or parallelistic monism. The human being is not only a substance in itself, but the mind and body which is the constituent part of it are not substance at all.

There is only one substance, God or nature and thus the human mind and the human body must like all "ideas" and all the bodies are only attributes of this substance. God is the one and only substance, but the mind and body of humans are like 'ideas' of all bodies, there are only modes of an attribute of this substance. These two are not distinct substances, but two parallel attributes of one substance. The mind and matter are relative aspects, internal and external, one and the same substance, which is neither a mind nor matter but appears in its two parallel attributes of thought and extension. Therefore, for every change in the body, there is a similar change in the mind and every change in mind, is the similar interchange in the body. There is a thorough going correspondence between thought and extension, mind and body, mental processes and physical processes. There is a complete correspondence between mind and body, thought and extension, mental attribute and physical attribute. Thus, parallelistic monism tells the connection between the mind and the body in the same substance by their co-adherence.

"The essence of man is constituted by certain by certain modes of attributes of God".⁸⁵ But denying the dualism of Descartes is beyond rejecting the substantiality to the mind and body. He rejected the entire concept of a human being of Descartes because to join one of two components which is contrasting to the end of the building a union. "There is a fundamental identity between

⁸³(Spinoza, B. translated by Boyle, A. 1910)

⁸⁴(N,Steven. 2006)

⁸⁵(Spinoza, B. translated by Boyle, A. 1910)

the mind and the body for Spinoza and thus a fundamental unity to the human being - which becomes deeper than any difference there may be between them. The human mind as the idea of a particular body as Spinoza defines".⁸⁶ So that, the mind which is finite modes of thought, and their objects are the finite modes of extension.

"The first thing that constitutes the actual being of a human mind is nothing else than that the idea of an individual thing actually existing"⁸⁷ and he specifies what individual thing is: "the object of the idea constituting the human mind is the body or a certain mode of extension which actually exists, and nothing else".⁸⁸ In this way, a human mind is one of the infinitely many ideas – all related to the modes of the attributes - which make up the infinite intellect of God, (as we have seen) is itself the immediate infinite mode under the attribute thought. "The human mind is a part of the infinite intellect of God".⁸⁹ When the idea of the mind actually exists, then the mind also exists.

"In this respect, the human mind is not completely different from any other finite mode of thought. All the bodies of any basic integrity are corresponding modes in thought; correlation ideas are similar with the parallelism doctrine. The human brain, therefore, is speaking formally, like the ideas of other extended bodies, all of which form the infinite intellect of God – along with all the ideas of all the modes of unknown attributes".⁹⁰

According to Spinoza means that God possess the sufficient idea of all bodies, in extension, of every singular of true knowledge. Regarding the modes of extension, and the body may be, as our thoughts in the infinite intellect of God. "In this way, Spinoza can be read by saying that humans being, animals, plants and possibly inanimate objects all have some level of thought that correspondence their physical component. It does not necessarily mean that, in

⁸⁶ (Steven. 2006)

⁸⁷ (Spinoza, B. translated by Boyle, A. 1910)

⁸⁸ Ibid, Prop. 13

⁸⁹ Ibid. Prop.11 C. P. 46

⁹⁰ (Steven. 2006)

each case, its brain or soul includes conscious thinking, or even sensation or animation; it means only that the idea (in God or nature) or the idea of everybody and that constitute adequate or sufficient knowledge of that body. The purpose of the idea of the mind is the human body, and thus the elaboration and excellence of mind is a function of the elaboration and excellence of the human body".⁹¹

In fact, there are exceptionally large numbers of parts of the human body and in this way, it is extremely complex compared to any other type of body. In countless ways it can be acted upon by them as well as other bodies. "It can act on other bodies and can be acted upon by them in countless ways. In order to keep it in more familiar terms, the human body - with its nervous system, sensory mechanism, brain function, creative compatibility etc. - can do and experience more things in more diverse ways than other bodies." ⁹² This indicates that human mind enjoys more consideration than that the idea of any other extended body. "The human mind is apt to perceive many things and more so according as its body can be disposed of in more ways. Now the body is affected by external bodies in many ways. But the human mind must perceive all things which happen in the human body. Therefore the human mind is apt to perceive many things, and more so, etc".⁹³ This is because that the composition of the mind is an expression of the composition of the body. This mind can obtain only thing which the mind is actually involved in the idea of an existing body.

Hence, the understanding of the mind extends to it only when the body has absorbed this idea within itself, or which follows therefrom. Now in this idea of the body expresses thought and extension than other attributes of God. Thus, the human mind and body are not two distinct things. Now in this thought of the body, thoughts and expansions are expressed in comparison to other characteristics of God. Consequently, these are not separate substances at all. They are two different expressions- unusual and independent expression, to

⁹¹*Ibid.* p 137

⁹²*Ibid.* 140

⁹³ (Spinoza, B. translated by Boyle, A. 1910)

ensure - one and the same thing. "The mind and the body are one and the same individual, which is conceived now under the attribute of thought and now under the attribute of extension".⁹⁴ An extension is the attribute of the human body; this is how the man is in his physical prospect. "The human mind or the idea of the human body is the expression of the human being under the attribute of thought; it is what that person is in his mental or thinking aspect. Similarly, to take the analysis down to a finer level, the cutting of my finger and the pain I feel are two different expressions of one and the same event in a human being. This event in me expresses itself in the extended realm as the cutting as a pain. The pain is the idea in my mind that corresponds to the state of my body 'finger-being-cut' or better to use Spinoza terms, it is the idea of that state of my body".⁹⁵

Even though it is important for Spinoza that the mind and body (two aspects of reality) are different, that is of the order of things and the order of ideas. Each of the attributes involved is "conceived through itself". "Despite the perfect match between any given mode of extension and any given mode of thought, each set of modes can be fully adequately understood without reference to the other. In one sense this is in accordance with Cartesian orthodoxy: thought and extension are quite distinct and self-contained notions. But by rejecting Descartes' thesis that they are incompatible notions, Spinoza is able to go on to construct a radically unc cartesian picture of reality".⁹⁶

3.1 Criticisms of Descartes

Descartes, regarded as the founding of modern philosophy. But, in spite of all its merits, there are many flaws in his system, which gave birth to successful systems of philosophy, such as Spinoza, one of his main critics.

⁹⁴ *Ibid.* Prop.21 C. P. 58

⁹⁵ (Steven. 2006)

⁹⁶ (Contingham, J. 1988)

Descartes' accounted the mind and the body relationship involves a contradiction. If, as he says, mind and body are absolutely separate substances having nothing with each other, then the action of the one upon the other, of body on mind in generating sensation, and on the substance producing movements in the body will be impossible. In Sixth Meditation, it is explained: "the mind is not immediately affected by all parts of the body, but only by the brain".⁹⁷ By Descartes. "He posits that the brain receives the neural signals from parts of the body after which brain gives the mind its signal of having a certain sensation in the particular region and this sensation stimulates the mind to do its best to get rid of the cause of pain".⁹⁸ This means, "This is problematic because the causal relationship between mind and body is still mysterious and Descartes fails to explain or give an account of the interaction that can be tested empirically".⁹⁹

Nevertheless, Descartes holds that such an interaction occurs at a single unextended point in the pineal gland, and thus goes against the conclusions to which his original position logically leads.

Apart from this, to believe that there is a mind and body interaction at one place in the pineal gland, it is to indicate as Hoffding remarks, the soul pushes the body and it is pushed through the gland, and therefore, to think of it as material. But with the hypothesis the soul is immaterial. So this is the contradiction. Thus we see that the Descartes' clarification of the relationship among the mind and the matter is distracted by the contradiction. For this reason his followers like Geulincx and Malebranche were not satisfied with his interpretation, and sometimes tried to solve the difficulties with another hypothesis, which is in accordance with the fundamental or occasional cause, according to which between the mind - body interaction is not possible, but through the interaction of the omnipresent power of God is made to make each other consistent with one another. "No doubt, Malebranche's occasionalism avoids the problem of Descartes' speculations, and no experience can possibly

⁹⁷ (Descartes, 1996)

⁹⁸ (Emptinez, 2013)

⁹⁹(Emptinez, 2013)

disprove it. Descartes had insisted upon holding both to the complete separation of mind and body to their interaction. By eliminating the latter, Malebranche is able to hold to the former without encountering contradictions. Malebranche's occasionalism can be made to account for literally everything since God is always employed as producing a certain effect in one realm when something else happens in the other".¹⁰⁰ He defines, as we have seen, the divine substance, which has its existence within itself, and the mind and matter in the form of substances, though they trust on God for their existence, regarding continual exercise of His power for being to maintain in existence, existence is not dependent on anything else than God.

Therefore, properly speaking, cannot be drawn, as was done by Descartes, on each other, a line of absolute distinction between absolute substance and relative or created substances, and on one side between God and on the side mind and matter. Nevertheless, Descartes tries to keep two types of substances separate from each other by giving the relative substances an independent existence outside the absolute substance. Therefore, on the position of Descartes, on outline analysis, to include double dualism, viz., a dualism between the absolute or divine substance and the created or between the absolute substances, and there is a similar dualism among the relative substances themselves among the mind and the body. "This is two-fold dualism vitiates his system by what Frank Thilly calls a 'double contradiction', which may be explained thus. If he says, God is the absolute substance, then beyond Him and independently of Him nothing can exist, for otherwise the absolute substance would cease to be so, as it would then be limited by something existing outside it".¹⁰¹

Nevertheless, despite his admission of the mind and the body, Descartes accepts the existence of absolute substance. Alternatively, the mind and body, as he maintains, is completely different from each other, no interaction is possible between them, and yet he consumes this type of interaction as a fact.

¹⁰⁰ (Mohammed, Akomolafe A, 2012)

¹⁰¹Pati, R. *History of modern European philosophy*.

So this is a double contradiction. His two followers, Geulincx and Malebranche, tried to remove these inconsistencies from his system with their occasionalism, but in vain-as soon as two-fold dualism remained intact their hands. However, Spinoza reconstructed the philosophy of Descartes regarding the so-called substances, mind and matter, not as substances at all, “but simply as different functions of one and the same absolute substance, and thereby eradicated the double effect involved in his predecessor’s system. To put the matter otherwise, the dualistic system of Descartes, on account of its inherent difficulties, gave way to the monistic system of Spinoza”.¹⁰² There are other critics have also given their objections against Descartes' interactionism, is that how can two diverse substances ever act on surplus? How can the mental substance, which is not in space, interact with the extended matter?

Gilbert Ryle dismissed Cartesian dualism. His idea is that, “Descartes believes that every human being possesses a body and mind. But it is doubtful whether idiots or infants have minds. Human bodies, though it is subject to destruction, occupies an important place while the man is alive. It governs all other bodies in space because it is superior to other bodies. It occupies space and is subject to mechanical laws. As it is externally perceivable, so its states and processes can be observed by other persons”.¹⁰³ So as the life of, reptiles, crystals, animals, trees and planets, the physical life of man is publicly observable and subject to public affairs. But the brains are not openly viewable because it does not capture space and is not subject to driven laws.

Nobody knows what's going on in the other’s mind. Someone's mental state and processes are fully and directly understood by one who maintains them.

“It is a matter of controversy is even if a person is aware of the events of his mind, either in whole or in part. The official theory states that one's mental incidents can be codified by him alone, although not much of it, at least some

¹⁰²*Ibid.* p.79

¹⁰³ (Nath S., 2013)

of it, without any doubt, directly. In introspection, anyone should be aware of the present occurring of their mind. A person may be completely ignorant about the events of the physical world but he is fully aware of the events of his mind, in the least parts”.¹⁰⁴

So, Ryle saw that Descartes divides into two halves of a person's life, which is named as external and internal. Whereas human bodies, are related to the external world and the states and the processes of one's own mind are internal. "But Ryle maintains that this antithesis of outer and inner the world is nothing but metaphor because if the spatial existence of the mind is denied then it is not possible to speak of the mind as being spatially inside something".¹⁰⁵ However, Ryle asserts that this paradox of the internal and external world is nothing but a metaphor. This is because if the spatial existence of the mind has been rejected then it is not conceivable to call the mind as something "inside".

According to Ryle “They can be inspected neither by introspection nor by laboratory experiment. They are theoretical shuttlecocks which are forever being bandied from the physiologist back to the psychologist and from the psychologist back to the physiologist.”¹⁰⁶

Ryle mention to the conception of a man of Descartes as a ”dogma of the ghost in the machine”, that is, that is, in the body like a ghost in the machine. Further, Ryle, comments that Descartes commits a ‘category mistake’. The mind and the body constitute different 'categories'. Gilbert Ryle says that by filling the mind in the body, Descartes is making a category mistake. For example, to fit the mind in the body in that a way is similar to saying like that Sunday is sleeping, i.e., it is just absurd. He says, Descartes wrongly believe that as soon as physical body requires for physical acts, similarly it is require for the mind to thinking and posits a separate spiritual substance other than the physical substance. According to Ryle, the mind is not a functional name of all mental concepts and all mental conception can be explained in terms of factual

¹⁰⁴ Gilbert ,2009)

¹⁰⁵*Ibid.* p.1

¹⁰⁶(Gilbert, 2009)

behavior or dispositional behavior. Being a spirit soul does not need a seat like any physical body. So it is wrong to say that the pineal gland is the seat of the soul. If this is the meaning of the soul, then it can capture the pineal gland, there is no reason why it should not occupy the whole body.

3.2 Criticisms of Spinoza's Theory

But for all his merits as a systematic thinker, his system will be explained by the following observations: It seems that attempts have been made to achieve perfection and gaining thoroughness in the consistency and harmonious development of all the trends inherent in it. The threads have been developed directly without assembling in a harmonious whole.

For the first time, the human mind is conceived by him but an indivisible modes of infinite substance without any independent existence of itself, but at the end of his ethics it is concluded with an indiscerptible individuality, competent of knowing both itself and God, and to become one with God and thus to receive conscious Excellency and righteousness of its own.

In addition to these contradictions, there are some other difficulties in Spinoza's assumptions and are reasoning them. "For instance, we are not told how to account for the infinity of attributes inherent in the substance and why Spinoza suddenly abandons this infinity of attributes and limits himself only to two, viz., thought and extension. It is not clear why God's infinite power assumes all these various modes. How are we to account for all these particular forms of nature and life? Spinoza does nothing merely assuming dogmatically that it all rises out of the nature of God by mathematical necessity. But it may be said that mere assumption is not an explanation".¹⁰⁷

Then, holding one and the same thing i.e., substance extended and substance thinking or in-extended, Spinoza, as Webber has commented, 'flagrantly

¹⁰⁷Pati, R. *History of modern European philosophy*.

violates the law of contradiction', according to which two contradictory qualities are not true and the same thing.

And when we come to his parallelism theory, we insist that psychological processes and mental processes do not interfere with each other but move along in perfect correspondence with each other. It neither diminishes matter to mind like spiritualism, nor mind to matter as materialism, but believes both of them as real. Spinoza considers them as parallel attributes of the divine substance.

Firstly, he reduces their concomitance by identifying substance. Second, the doctrine of Spinoza ends in pan-psychism. He believes that wherever there is thought, there is an extension and wherever there is an extension there is thought. But it is not confirmed by scientific evidence.

According to Spinoza for each finite mode of extension, there exists a finite mode of thought which corresponds with it and this is not really separate from it. More broadly, it commits him to the thesis; (a) There exists a simple idea for every simple body which is in accordance with it and from which it is not really different and (b) there is a composite idea for each composite body which is in accordance with it and from which it is really different, composed, as it were, about the ideas that correspond to each of the bodies of which the composite body is composed. Spinoza calculates all these ideas, whether simple or composite, as minds. In this respect, he does not believe the human mind to be unique. This is the only idea that corresponds to the human body.

There can be no doubt that Spinoza made a significant influence upon Leibniz's philosophy. But this mainly occurred through the opposition. From the beginning, Leibniz was keen to show that despite some points of agreement, his position was basically different. This sharp disagreement that separates Leibniz from Spinoza and as a result connects the gulf among their philosophical systems, which at first glance has an insignificant disagreement about fictions and unrealised states of affairs.

What is the basis for these dangerous "paradoxes"? What is the underlying difference between Spinoza and Leibniz which results in such different logical, epistemological, and metaphysical theories when there are points of agreement between them? substance as unitary, simple, persistent and indivisible these are characterised by both philosopher; whereas Spinoza explains about one substance, while Leibniz has explain about infinite number of simple substances. What is the difference between them which accounts for Leibniz derogation of Spinoza and his eventual "refutation" of Spinoza?

I shall argue that the basis for Leibniz' disagreement with Spinoza is to be found in their very different concepts of substance. "Both philosophers are systematic, and both construct their philosophies on a theory of substance which pervades their philosophies. Whether one starts from his logic, or from his epistemology, or his metaphysics, one is ultimately confronted with Leibniz view of substance. The epistemological theory known as the concept containment theory of truth is an analogue of the logical theory that predicates are "in" subjects and the metaphysical theory that attributes "inhere in", or "belong to", substances. These inter-related theories constitute one set of fundamental pre-suppositions for Leibniz, and they lead to the principle of sufficient reason, the belief in contingent beings, and the acceptance of possible truths".¹⁰⁸For Leibniz, the fundamental concept of a substance depends not on the identity thesis but rather on the inherence or containment thesis, on the principle of sufficient reason, on implicit identities. In this view, the substance, or subject, is of a different category than the attribute or predicate. The ultimate decomposition set of a concept must always leave the subject or substance as an unknown remainder, something in which the known and knowable attributes or predicates inhere. This notion of inherence is fundamental for Leibniz and pervades his philosophy, even though there are situations where he stresses the identity theory.

Mental actions are not dependent on physical ones, and the same is not dependent like mental ones. Their nature is working together. Separated from

¹⁰⁸Hart, A. *Leibniz on Spinoza's Concept of Substance*, Franz Steiner Verlag. P.74

Spinoza, Leibniz explains about the mind and the body do not affect one another, they are not interacting. Just like the clock said the same time but they do not have to interact. The same kind of substance likes mind and body, but they are altered. However, Leibniz explains about only one kind of substance in the world, which is ultimately made up of the same kind of substance and he believed that the mind and the body are theoretically separate.

According to this system, the body acts as if there was no soul (although this is impossible); and the soul acts like this, if there was no body; and both act as if each affects the other. They have reason to interact pre-established harmony between "monads". Monads are substantial forms of being. They are eternal, independent and cannot act on each other because they are windowless. Everything is made of these monads.

Strawson, another critic of Spinoza, opposed Spinoza's theory by his famous person theory. The individual theory is considered like a modified interpretation of the double aspect theory, and Spinoza's brain-body theory is also in the form of double aspect theory and from this point of their similarity, I want to discuss what the differences among them are. . But these two principles are similar, by holding both mental and physical properties. Strawson rejected both materialism and Cartesian dualism in the form of Spinoza prepared in the 17th century, these theories are compromised by the two philosophers.

Nevertheless, there are many issues on which Strawson has to not agree with Spinoza. He states that mental and physical theories are conceptually independent. As far as the present knowledge is implicated, the apprehension of mind relies upon an understanding of body. Hence Spinoza, to keep satisfactory independent science of the mind, he says science has not yet developed enough. Therefore without trusting on knowledge of the body, our impermanent situation does not allow us to acquire knowledge of the mind. Here Strawson claims for the dependence of the physical upon the mental, is a time of logical dependency: "One does genuinely ascribe one's states of

consciousness to something, viz., oneself, and this kind of ascription is precisely such as the theorist finds unsatisfactory, i.e., is such that it does not seem to make sense to suggest, for example, that the identical pain which was, in fact, one's own might have been another's. We do not have to seek far in order to understand the place of this logically non-transferable kind of ownership in our general scheme of thought. For if we think of the requirements of identifying the reference, in speech, to particular states of consciousness, or private experiences, we see that such particulars cannot be thus identifying referred to except as the states or experiences of some identified person".¹⁰⁹

Now we can see the viewpoints of Strawson, that by attributing the experiences to a "person", we can defend particular states of consciousness. "Even so, although Spinoza and Strawson, both of them maintain that we can get access to mental by giving access to physical, Spinoza says that it is currently true, but not necessary, while it is essential for Strawson. Spinoza, in fact, does not really make the mental on the physical, which is in contrast to Strawson, who argues for logical reliance of the mental on the physical".¹¹⁰ There is another distinction related to the cause and the descriptive hindrance. Douglas Odegard introduced a difference among Spinoza and Strawson:

"A less deeply metaphysical, but more interesting, difference, however, lies in the distinction between the Strawsonian remarks".¹¹¹ "A man is a single subject of both mental and corporeal predicates and the Spinozistic remark a man is a subject of mental predicates when conceived under thought and a subject of corporeal predicates when conceived under extension".¹¹² Also, comments mean that there is only one subject however unlike the first comment, another comment warns us that we do not mix our mentalistic and physicalistic things arbitrarily.

¹⁰⁹ Park Sam-Yel, P.218

¹¹⁰ (Douglas O. 1975)

¹¹¹ Park Sam-Yel, P.218

¹¹² Ibid. P.218

The non-mix attributes of Spinoza's philosophy have not been accordant with person theory of Strawson. Spinoza does not admit causal and interpretive interdependence between the mind and the body in opposition to Strawson, who actually necessitates it.

This is a significant distinction between "double aspect theory" and "person theory" from my perspective, and that's the reason as a double aspect theorist Strawson should not be classified.

Apart from this, "some P predicates for Strawson are involved with the physical. Strawson's calculation is 'smiling' as a P prediction, for example, it applies to others on the basis of observation, yet it means the existence of consciousness. Not all p-predicates are like this: ... 'Is thinking about Christmas', cannot be applied to others on the basis of observation, and that is completely mental in that sense. Spinoza would not allow the first kind of P-predicates. And so the structures of their theories are not along with the same line, because Spinoza is the identity of the mental and physical within tokens or events as opposed to Strawson who finds identity within an ancient concept".¹¹³

3.3 Interactionism vs. Parallelism: a comparative study:

In the past centuries, the mind and the body has been a leading subject debated by philosophers. Philosophers have certified to discover the truth after the distinction between mind and body. But even with the broad amount of debate and thinking put into this problem, it still appears that it is debatable.

It is a difficult time for us to understand such an abstract idea in the human mind, so making it even more difficult to put this view in perspective. There are two philosophers, Rene Descartes and Benedict de Spinoza who debate on this topic. Descartes was one of the few early thinkers who had to dissection and assess the problem of mind and body with his argument for dualism.

¹¹³ibid.p219

Unlike Descartes, Benedict De Spinoza, who provides a counterexample to Descartes' dualism.

By analyzing the views of both philosophers, we can see which argument seems more practical. Descartes first proposed his argument for dualism in his work meditations which published in 1641. Spinoza responds with an opposing idea, which questions "Dualism".

"The ultimate source of the conceptual distinction between the mental and physical is a never ending controversy in the interpretation of Spinoza".¹¹⁴ Spinoza determined with a theory by which there can be only three possible types of differences - real, modal and conceptual. It is indisputable that there is a theoretical distinction among attributes. I think, there are only three possible types of differences which Spinoza was determined that is modal, real and conceptual and that are conceptual distinction between attributes which are certain. "According to Spinoza, concept - and our concept of thought - is different from our concept of extension, and neither concept is reducible to the others. What is in the dispute is that thoughts and extension are really different. If they are, then it is difficult to see why they will not have different substances or what is almost harmful for Spinoza, why the division of additional intellectual into substances and modes is not incomplete".¹¹⁵

The central problem in the twentieth century has suffered materialism, from the establishment of its identity theory. In the beginning, it emerged from the efforts of Australian physicists to take the sensation and mind processes as a causal truth. It seems that, the establishment of the mental and the physical objects requisite a distinction among the mental and the physical properties. Then why is this "property dualism" not to replace "object" dualism? In order to reject the mental and the physical objects in dualistic account comes to need a property dualism, such as for the various argument, Spinoza's description of the thinking substance and the extended substance, and the identification of the

¹¹⁴ (Segal, G and Yovel Y. Spinoza, 2002)

¹¹⁵ *Ibid.*

minds and the bodies, seems to demand that the attribute of thought be different from the attribute of extension.

"Although the contingency character of the identity theory well denied, the problem of relations between mental and physical properties remains. And in response, it has proved to be a temptation to refuse the existence of mental properties or to reduce them, i.e. to identify them with physical properties. Since properties are taken as a correlation of predicates, therefore, materialists are often believed that there is no real content must be expressible in the terms of physical ultimately in the vocabulary of physics. In Spinoza's words, it is equivalent to the claim that either the thought does not exist, or the concept of thought is reducible to the concept of extension." ¹¹⁶ According to Davidson, the idea that all the objects of individual are the physical phenomena, where there is a type or universal - physically possible, so no recognition or identification of "mental properties".

At first sight, there is no clear inconsistency in the state of Spinoza, if the influence of physical phenomenon is similar to some mental phenomenon, then the mental phenomenon influences the effect of the physical phenomenon. It can also be illustrated by claiming that if the cause of any physical event is similar to some mental event, then the mental phenomenon is the cause of a physical event. These two physical events are denied Spinoza because there are mental phenomenon causes physical ones.

3.4 Critical Evaluation

The link between the brain structures and process and especially the problem of the intercourse between the mind and the body in one hand and mental disposition, on the other hand, is an exceedingly difficult one.

According to Spinoza, the relationship with the mind and the bodywork with equal principles with such understanding can be explained. According to

¹¹⁶*Ibid.*

Spinoza, human relationships with the mind and body- function with similar principles and can be induced with a certain understanding. Extension is the mode of human body. Spinoza believed that the human body is the most obscure mode of extension and the complexity of body is seen in parallel modes of thought about the human mind.

“They do not overlap nor affect one another yet are present in each human. Thus it is to be understood that a person’s mind and body are somewhat like two sides of the same coin. In line with his general theory, Spinoza understood humans to be composed of two modes, derived from two attributes which are expressions of the one substance, God or Nature. Humans, in body and in mind are to be understood as being composed of one substance”.¹¹⁷

Descartes' dualist approach of substance differs from the monist understanding of the substance, the relationship among the mind and the body. Descartes understands that the human mind and body are two separate substances by which human to be composed, and the whole reality was made of material and immaterial. Mind and God are believed as non-material. Thus, instead of understanding the mind and body of a person as different aspects of the same substance, he took the idea, that they are completely separate substances.

“This is where I see Descartes main challenge arising from and why I believe Spinoza’s view is an improvement on Descartes’. If the human body and mind are composed of two separate substances – and according to Descartes, it is the mind which affects the body, a major issue is raised: How can an immaterial soul have any effect on a material body”?¹¹⁸

Descartes saw that the immaterial soul and the physical body were through the pineal gland, the seat of common sense as well as imagination. He claims that the soul will transfer the pineal gland - and in doing so, interacts and controls

¹¹⁷(Emma,2012)

¹¹⁸(Emma,2012)

with the body. It increases more problems because animals also have pineal glands. Nevertheless, he claims that humans are the only living things with an immaterial soul. But he has never argued that there is a lack of pineal gland in non-human animals, he claimed that pineal gland is a unique task of working as an intermediary amidst the physical with the non-physical. Although there is no scientific support in this idea, neither Descartes has argued why it should be accepted as reasonable basis.

The pineal gland concept of Descartes runs between mind and body and raise more questions than its answer. It is highly intricate to understand that by the non-extended mind, an extended body is potentially affected and they are being various substances in the understanding of Descartes.

Instead, I will debate that Spinoza agreement of the relationship between the mind and body is more reasonable, is made up of the same substance and as individual expression. I will also debate that the common understanding of Descartes' belief of reality of being made from two substances is weaker than the reality of Spinoza being made of a substance. This is the reason why I argue is that it is ridiculous to believe that the universe is made of two substances, created by God, yet only one substance that is immaterial, for that God itself to be composed.

It is very difficult to understand how a physical substance can be produced from an immaterial god; (such as it is very difficult to understand by the immaterial soul the physical body is influenced). I think the realization of the reality of substance (as it is made of a substance: God) is completely different from and is more logical than the idea of God that has made two different substances, one of them (extensions or materials), which is nevertheless the substance is dependent on its existence. I consider that Spinoza's thoughts over this case as advancement in Descartes, only for this strong argument, when it applies to the relationship of the mind and the body.

3.5 Conclusion

Throughout the history of western history, Descartes' dualism is the most debatable philosophical principles. Descartes and other succeeding philosophers were hard to explicate to their explicit union and collaboration. Various explanations have come about from various thinkers, but no one can give a satisfactory solution to the world's separation in two independent domains. Nevertheless for a thinker who then arose as soon as the new science was about to bring a radical change between the man and the rest, man and man of the world, in the form of autonomy of physical world and its sufficient domain.

Philosophers are plague by the problem of mind-body is asking what their relationship is? By the various physical and mental properties human beings are exhibit. By observation, appearance, and physical ability their physical properties can be described, but by observing the same kind of objective observation, their mental properties cannot be described.

The problem of mind-body always seeks an answer to answer the question that, in physical and mental property is there any difference between them?

Mind-body problem looks many different subcategories include to answer this question, but it is not limited to, the issue of consciousness, the definition of self and the relationship between physical and mental status. For dualists, both mental and physical conditions are different and real. The mental and physical, which is the essence of dualism, is separate components of a being, but not all the dualists deal with this problem in the same way.

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