

“MIND AND LANGUAGE: AN ENQUIRY IN THE THEORY OF MEANING SPECIAL REFERENCE TO JOHN SEARLE.”

*A dissertation submitted to Department of Philosophy, University of Hyderabad in partial
fulfilment of the requirements for the award of the degree of*

MASTER OF PHILOSOPHY IN PHILOSOPHY

Under the Guidance of

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DECLARATION

I, Mohammed Saquib hereby declare that this thesis entitled “**MIND AND LANGUAGE: AN ENQUIRY IN THE THEORY OF MEANING SPECIAL REFERENCE TO JOHN SEARLE**”, submitted by me under the guidance and supervision of Dr. Venusa Tinyi is a bonafide research work which is also free from plagiarism. I also declare that it has not been submitted previously in part or in full to this university or any other university or institution for the award of any degree or diploma. I hereby agree that my thesis can be deposited in Shodhganga/INFLIBNET.

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CERTIFICATE

This is to certify that the thesis entitle **“MIND AND LANGUAGE: AN ENQUIRY IN THE THEORY OF MEANING SPECIAL REFERENCE TO JOHN SEARLE”** submitted by Mr. Mohammed Saquib. bearing Regd. No. 17HPHL08 in partial fulfilment of the requirements for the award of Master of Philosophy in Philosophy is a bonafide work carried out by her under my supervision and guidance which is a plagiarism free thesis.

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**DEDICATED TO MY FATHER,
LATE SHAIKH SADAB**

ACKNOWLEDGMENT

Facing both God and my Guru, whom should I bow to first? First I bow to my Guru because he is the one, who showed me the path to God. In the presence of Guru, Knowledge flourishes, Sorrow diminishes, Joy wells up without any reason, Abundance dawns, and Talent manifests.

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INTRODUCTION

Analytic philosophy has developed at the beginning of the 20th century. In analytic philosophy two trends emerged, namely, ideal language philosophy and ordinary language philosophy. Frege and Russell are ideal language philosophers. Wittgenstein, Strawson, Searle and Austin are ordinary language philosophers. Wittgenstein says all philosophical problems arise due to the misunderstanding of language. In his use theory of meaning, he uses context for determining the meaning. Philosophy of language is broadly and primarily concerned with meaning. The main problem of philosophy of language is the possibility of meaning. Different philosophers give different answers. Wittgenstein says it is through the use of language in a context that we get to know the meaning of our linguistic expressions. There is no fixed meaning of words. Many philosophers generally accept this view and develop their own approaches towards the semantic study of language. In this work, I will engage with the approach taken by John Searle.

After the publication of Gettier's seminal paper [1] two types of theory of knowledge developed. One is internalism and the other is externalism. Searle is a radical internalist. Searle's main philosophical insight is, linguistic philosophy is a branch of philosophy of mind. He says that to understand the meaning of a sentence, we have to understand the intention of the speaker. He accepts J.L. Austin's speech act theory and builds his own theory around it. He says meaning is possible only when we utter words. When someone utters a sentence we know the intention of the speaker. By knowing the intention we know the meaning.

The primary aim of this dissertation is to offer a view of meaning along the line developed by Austin and Searle. Without totally agreeing with them nor disagreeing with them, I have borrowed insights from their works and defended a view which I term it as Moderate Externalism. This view developed after engaging with Hillary Putnam's arguments against Searle's internalist position. In general, I will be looking at some other questions such as how mind relates to the world? How is meaning possible? How language relates to reality? Etc. In order to discuss these questions, I begin with the discussions of Searle's views and approaches. But towards the end of this work, I try to develop and offer my own account.

As noted above, one issue in the study of philosophy of language is the relation of language with mind. Here Searle is of the view that the theory of language is a part of the theory of mind. When it comes to the semantic theory of language, he supports speech acts of theory of Austin in general. Austin's speech act theory is a conventional one. Searle's approach to speech act theory

is intention-oriented. In Austin's speech acts theory, we understand the utterance if we know the conventional meaning of linguistic expressions. In Searle's approach, we understand the utterance of a speaker if we get to know the intention of the speaker. In this work, as noted above, I will be mostly engaging with the works of Searle.

Intentionality plays an important role in the speech act theory of Searle. To know the meaning we have to understand the intention of the speaker. There are many other concepts which we have to understand in order to understand the speech acts. They are illocutionary force, propositional content, conditions of satisfaction, direction of fit, direction of causation, etc. Searle says intentionality and speech acts have an analogous structure. They both have propositional content, psychological state or illocutionary force, conditions of contentment, direction of fit and so on. Searle argues that meaning is possible when the conditions of contentment of intentionality impose on speech act's conditions. The conditions of contentment of speech acts and intentionality are identical. The conditions of contentment of meaning are different from the state of satisfaction of speech acts and intentionality. Meaning conditions can be satisfied even if the world is not in that way. But the conditions of contentment of speech acts and intentionality can be satisfied if and only if the world is in the same way. Here one problem arises as to what conditions the object or the state-of-affairs have to satisfy. Searle does not give adequate answer. But I found this answer from discussions of Searle and Putnam including Amir Horowitz whose view helped me to develop my approach.

Putnam is an externalist. He rejects the thesis of internalism that intention explains extension. For this, he offered his seminal thought experiments, viz., the 'twin earth argument' and the 'elm and beech argument'. In Putnam's "twin earth" argument, microstructure which explains extension and the microstructure is not in the mind but outside the mind. In response to these arguments of Putnam, Searle initially and tentatively accepts these arguments for the sake of discussion but then goes on to show that these arguments do not really prove that intention does not determine extension. Putnam faces this problem because he underestimated mental state which explains extension. In a way, Searle has defended somewhat successfully the criticism of Putnam. The responses of Searle made Putnam to see that his theses face some problem too. So he brings in another concept for defending his theses. The notion is indexicality. Putnam says it is the indexicality of words which determine the extension. Putnam says it is through indexicality that the extension is determined. He says all natural kind words are obviously indexical. He says indexicals are present in the utterance of the speaker. Again, Searle put forth his counter-argument by saying that indexicals do play a role in determining the extension but they are present in the head, not in the external world like rocks and tables. Indexicals come with intention. Accordingly, he concludes that intention determines extension.

Horowitz accepts Searle's claim that indexical comes with intention and at the same time criticized Putnam's view that indexical are in the utterance of the sentence. Then he takes some help from John Perry's articles [2] and "The Problem of Essential Indexicals" which I discuss briefly in the third chapter. Horowitz argues that it is not through the indexical, we know the meaning. He rather says that it is the content or microstructure which determines the extension. Horowitz goes on to argue that it is the object that determines the content unlike the view of the internalists who hold that the content determines the object. He puts a rhetorical question on the internalists: Does intention fully determine extension? To this, he gives his own response that intention does not fully determine extension. There always remains an element of indeterminacy. We need social and physical environment for determination too. It means that he takes both internalists and externalist viewpoints. He says that intention plays a role like an open sentence which finds its way to determine an object. It means that intention determines extension through the content. He accepts the narrow content which is in the head.

I accept Horowitz' views. He accepts both Searle's than Putnam's views. He accepts Searle's contention that "intention sets some conditions for determination of extension". He also accepts the narrow content approach of Searle. But he is not convinced that intention can fully determine extension. It is here that he accepts the views of Putnam (Putnam is an externalism). Like Horowitz, I hold the view that it is not only the object that determines the content but also content determines the object. There is a two way relation in the determination of extension. To understand this two way relationship, I took help from the works of Searle. In belief content, it is the object which determines the content. In desire content, it is the content which determines the object. Suppose I have a belief that it is raining It is an object or state-of-affairs which causes me to believe that it is raining. Suppose I am hungry, I have a desire to take some food. It is my desire that causes me to take some food. These technical relations (upward and downward) are introduced and explained in the second chapter.

Through the speech acts mind relates to the world. The speech act is kind of human action. The strength of speech acts is represents the objects and state-of-matters. It has also the capacity to express the mental states (belief, desire). Speech acts are like object or state-of-affairs. Their strength is not intrinsic but it derived from the intentionality of the mind. Intentionality is intrinsic in the mind. When an agent uses a sentence or make a mark on the paper or ask a question, he does not only use sentences, he expresses his belief, desire, etc. A sentence is only a syntactical object where the representational capacity imposed: belief, desire, etc. All of these facts proves that language is a social phenomenon and intentionality is underlying on it.

While accepting the approach taken by Searle, I find that there is some problem in Searle philosophy- How the content-determination is possible? What is the content? Is it a narrow or

broad content? What are the conditions which an object have to satisfy? Is communication possible without representation? These are not adequately addressed by Searle. Interestingly, I found reasonable answers to the above questions in the works of Putnam and Horowitz. Besides, the exchange of views between Searle and Putnam helped me to understand these questions better. In Horowitz's article, [3], he presents the arguments of Putnam and the responses of Searle. In these arguments and responses, Horowitz tries to point out some problem and the solution of these two philosophers. By these points, he developed a moderate version of externalism, a view I have gradually come to support and embrace in this work. However, Horowitz' moderate version of externalism has some problem too. Though his approach is an internalist approach, he calls his philosophy as moderate externalism. This is confusing. The only difference I find between internalist and Horowitz is that he accepts that the external world plays an important role in content-determination. The rest appears to be an internalist stance. So in my opinion his philosophy may be more appropriately termed as moderate internalism. He believes that what is in the head determines contents and references. He also argued about the indexical. He says that the essential indexical or obviously indexical is not necessarily external. He says that indexical always comes with intention.

To get back to the overall attempt of this thesis, the key concepts of discussion in this work are intentionality, meaning, extension, content-determination, speech acts, and indexicality. Having noted the above, I have organized my thoughts and structured my dissertation as follows:

In my first chapter, I am dealing with speech acts of Searle. I discuss the types of speech acts, illocutionary act, illocutionary force, propositional content, predication, and reference. In the second chapter, I connect the speech acts with the theory of intentionality. Here I explain how intention plays a role in determining meaning, how intentionality connects with the speech acts, etc. Also I explain various terms like the conditions of contentment, direction of fit, direction of causation, and meaning. In third chapter, I examine whether or not the meaning is in the head. There I discuss the arguments of Putnam and the responses of Searle. Following this, I discuss the Horowitz discussion of the views of Searle and Putnam. I basically accept the views of Horowitz. However, I partly deviate from his views to develop my own view of moderate externalism.

CHAPTER 1

SPEECH ACTS

1.1 Introduction:

In this chapter, I mainly concern about Searle's works on speech acts. Though the theory of speech act was originally developed by J.L. Austin and I will refer to some of his works, I will not look into his work in details since John R. Searle accepted Austin's speech act theory in general and the central tenets of speech acts theory which are commonly shared by both of them will be highlighted and explained in this chapter. Important concepts and categories like locutionary act, illocutionary act and perlocutionary acts will be explained. In addition, I will also try to discuss certain other related words like proposition, predication, reference, etc. In short, I will highlight the importance of speech act theory as advocated by Austin and Searle to understand better the semantic question of language.

1.2 Why do we need a speech act?

In the literature, we find many theories of language, especially semantic theories. However, most of them are interested in conventional meanings of sentences. They rarely touch upon issues of what may be called speech acts. Speech acts deal with expressions such as request, apology, order, and so on. In order to deal with such expressions, J.L. Austin and John R. Searle developed their theories of speech act.

Searle claims that "speaking a language is a rule-governed form of behavior. Speaking a language is to know the rules and intentional behavior".¹ In other words, when we speak, we are performing an act which involves rules including intention. Uttering meaningful words will always involve intention or intentional behavior. Intentional behavior in this context means purposeful use of words to achieve or effect certain results or goal and it is directed towards a listener. Examples-the act of making a promise, giving an order, asking a question, etc. When we critically try to understand our use of language, we realize that linguistic communication does not only involve symbols, rules, words or sentence but also the performance of symbols, words and sentences in the form of sounds and bodily expressions of both the listener and speaker. To get this one has to understand the difference between linguistic communication and other non-

¹ Searle John, *Speech Acts: An essay in the Philosophy of Language*, Cambridge University Press, London, UK, 1970, p. 16

linguistic activities of human beings or natural phenomena in the world. Searle says, “when I make a noise or put some mark on a piece of paper as an instance of linguistic communication”,² I assume that this noise or mark on a piece of paper is accompanied by certain kind of intention. For example, suppose you are going out while it is raining without realizing that “it is raining” and I say “It is raining”. Why did I utter those words? I want to convey something meaningfully to affect your behavior or action. It is not simply a truth claim I am making. Rather I intent to communicate to you that you wait for some time till the rain stops or take an umbrella with you. A linguistic communication is not like natural phenomena – book, table, chairs, events, process, etc. What makes linguistic communication unique is the presence of intention in it. Without involving intention, mere sounds or symbols will not by themselves become a language. In other words, intention is the heart and soul of language.

The term “speech act” itself suggests that it is not just sound or symbols; It involves some action or act. It is a performance. It is something done with the involvement of intention. In that sense, it is the intersection of the theory of language and theory of action. As a matter of fact, Searle proposed that a theory of language is better understood as a part and parcel of a theory of action. A language is a rule-governed form of behavior. And since it is a rule-governed activity, a formal study of language is not only possible but necessary. However rules are not to be limited to abstract theory of language that is, symbols, syntax, semantics, etc. Rules are there to be played or to be used. So there is a component of an act or practicality In other words, if Saussurian approach is concerned with ‘langue’ in the more abstract sense (structure, grammatical rule, theory), Searle is more concerned with ‘parole’ (speaking, practice). Searle argues that without adequate theory of langue, speech act is not possible. Searle claims that communication necessary involves speech act. He also claims that “whatever can be meant can be said”.³ This is termed as the “principle of expressibility”. Communication is possible through speech acts. To put it in a stronger wording, without speech acts communication is not possible and vice-versa.

One may ask, is it a meaning theory or a speech acts that Searle has developed? To this, Searle maintains that “there is no two types of semantic study, that is, theory of meaning and theory of speech act. Theory of meaning is a part of speech act theory. A literal utterance of a sentence in certain context would go on to define its meaning”.⁴ It is the performance of speech acts by which meaning becomes possible and dynamic. When we perform a speech act, we are uttering a

² Searle John, *Speech Acts: An essay in the Philosophy of Language*, Cambridge University Press, London, UK, 1970, p. 17.

³ Searle John, *Speech Acts: An essay in the Philosophy of Language*, Cambridge University Press, London, UK, 1970, p. 17.

⁴ Searle John, *Speech Acts: An essay in the Philosophy of Language*, Cambridge University Press, London, UK, 1970, p. 17.

sentence with certain rules and intention and this intention and rules make the meaning possible. When we utter something we mean it. The meaning is possible when we utter the sentence.

To summarize the above point, the study of the speech acts theory and the theory of meaning are not two separate studies; they are one which can be looked at from two different points of view. They are not competing theories but rather they complement each other; one is not possible without the other. They go together.

1.3 Locutionary Acts

A locutionary act is the basic act of producing a meaningful expression through an utterance. For example, someone's utterance "It is raining outside". Normally our expressions or utterances are about something; they refer to something. When we express our thought with reference to something, it can be called a locutionary act. Locutionary act can be explained even in relation Frege's notion of reference or Wittgenstein's notion of picture theory of meaning or Russell's theory of description. Prior to development of Austin's speech act theory, linguistic philosophers in general were mainly concern with locutionary act in that sense. However, locutionary act is not the main concern of speech acts theory though it is a part of this theory. It is simple and requires hardly any explanation since much of the conceptualization was done by thinkers mentioned earlier. However, speech acts theory picks up from there to probe deeper into more subtle and complex aspect of meaning which are categorized as illocutionary and perlocutionary acts. It may be pointed out that a locutionary act could also at the same perform the function of illocutionary act or perlocutionary act. For e.g. I say "I order you to leave the room". When the person whom I addresses to fails to hear me, she will not leave the room. In this case, though I successfully performed a locutionary act, I am unsuccessful in performing the illocutionary act. I am successful in performing locutionary act because I uttered some meaningful expressions. However, if my interlocutor hears me and moved out of the room, then I have certainly succeeded in performing an illocutionary act. The above example explicates the distinction between a normal utterance and performance of an illocutionary act. This distinction can also be seen as a distinction between literal meaning on the one hand and using the illocutionary force on the other hand. Further, if I utter the same expression to insult her, my interlocutor, in front of others, and if she (the hearer) hears the utterance and got ashamed or angry because of the effect of my words in front of others, then this effect in the listener is termed as perlocutionary act. In this sense, perlocutionary act is listener oriented as it is defined by the kind of effect it has on the listener due to my utterance. More will be said on illocutionary and perlocutionary acts in the subsequent paragraphs.

Austin divided the locutionary act into three categories, namely, phonetic acts, phatic acts, and rhetic act. The first one the phonetic acts are the uttering or producing some sound. For e.g.

“Hurrah” or “Hey”. The second one the phatic acts are the uttering some vocabularies using the grammar to express some meaning. For e.g., He said, “The book is on the table”. The rhetic act is uttering some meaningful vocabularies to make certain definite sense and reference. For e.g., He said that the book was on the table. The performance of the locutionary act determines its meaning without any intention. It has only a conventional meaning. When it is mixed with some force, it will become an illocutionary act. Illocutionary act determines its meaning through intention. Locutionary meaning is literal meaning. The meaning is in the utterance, it does not go beyond the utterance.

However, this distinction between locutionary and illocutionary act was not accepted by Searle. He says that what has been termed by Austin as locutionary act is essentially an illocutionary. He only accepts the phonetic and phatic acts in locutionary acts.. Any meaningful performance of a speech act comes with a force. Searle says that any verb phrase of rhetic acts invariably contains an illocutionary verb. For e.g. “He told me to do x”. Here the verb ‘told’ contains a very general illocutionary force. Other verbs related to speech acts like order, command, request, apologize etc. contain illocutionary force too. As a matter of fact, he argues that all rhetic acts verbs have illocutionary force. So rhetic act is invariably contained in the illocutionary act. Searle asserts that every sentence is potentially contained in some illocutionary act. For e.g. interrogative, imperative etc. In holding this view, he does not accept the rhetic act of Austin. He says there is no locutionary utterance which is opposed to or distinct or separable from an illocutionary act.

1.4 Illocutionary Acts

Imagine a speaker and a hearer who are talking with each other and using these following sentences in appropriate situations:-

- 1) Rocky holds the bottle.
- 2) Does Rocky hold the bottle?
- 3) Rocky, hold bottle.
- 4) Would that Rocky hold the bottle.

In the above sentences, one thing is common that all words are in the English language. In the utterance of 1 speaker makes an assertion and in utterance of 2 the speaker is asking a question in the utterance of 3, the speaker is giving an order and in the utterance of 4, the speaker is expressing a wish. There is something common in these sentences: the speaker refers to a person called Rocky. Also the speaker predicates an expression ‘holds bottle’ to Rocky. In the above examples, the reference and predication are same but the occurrence of reference and predication are different in that they occur as part of the speech act. In general, speech act can thus be called

as illocutionary act. Austin provides “a list of verbs that denote illocutionary act such as commanding, stating, ordering, wishing, desiring, etc”.⁵

In the above examples the speaker is performing three acts.

- i. He is uttering the sentences in English.
- ii. He is referring and predicating.
- iii. He is performing an illocutionary act like stating, ordering and so on.

In the first case/act, the speaker is performing an utterance act and in second, the speaker is performing a propositional act. When someone performs an illocutionary act, he characteristically performs both utterance act and propositional act just like a person performs both mental activity and physical activity when he writes. The activities are different from each other and they can occur independent of each other too. For instance, one can perform utterance act without performing propositional act; this happens when one simply utters a word, say “yeah”, without intent to say anything or to perform any of the three acts mentioned above. In the meantime, we can perform the same propositional act for performing different illocutionary acts as just noted above. In the above examples, propositional acts are same but illocutionary acts and utterance acts are different. Propositional act includes predication and reference.

5) Priya holds the bottle for a while.

In 5, the utterance act is different because the sentence contains some different words. It is different above all four. Here the propositional act is also different because of different reference which is referred by the term ‘Priya’. The illocutionary act is the same as 1. The speaker is making an assertion.

If the same sentence is uttered by a difference person, it will be a different utterance acts. The voice, tone of the voice to be more precise, can differ from person to person depending on the context and purpose. Suppose a person utters the sentence “She has a beautiful hair” (normally) and the same person utters it snugly, then it calls as different speech acts. In the utterance act, we are dealing with language, voice tone, speaking style, etc. The utterance act is simply uttering the words. Searle says, “the illocutionary acts and propositional act consist characteristically in

⁵ Urmson J. O., Marina Sbisa, (Ed.) *How To Do Things With Words*, Oxford University Press, New York, USA, 1962.

uttering words in sentences in certain contexts, under certain conditions and with certain intentions”.⁶ Searle also says, “the propositional act cannot occur alone. It always comes with an illocutionary act”.⁷ The reference and predication cannot be performed without any illocutionary act. When someone asserts something, that something can be meaningful for that assertion. It means the propositional act cannot occur without an illocutionary act. It is like Frege concept of context-principle. Frege meant that “only in the context of a sentence a word is meaningful”. The same is the case with the speech of act in that reference expression is possible only when one says something in a context. When one utters a sentence, it consists of an illocutionary act which control referring expression and that referring expression is meaningful.

1.4.1 Predication

Before Searle, predication is about attributing some characteristics to the subject. So for Frege, predication is a reference to a property, that is, a concept or a thought. Predication is possible when a predicate refers to a concept. For e.g “Sam is drunk”. Here “drunk” is a grammatical predicate which refers to a property or concept that is “drunkenness” which is predicated to “Sam”. Frege’s predication is possible only in assertive proposition. Frege’s predication is possible when abstraction is possible.

In “term theory” of proposition, P.F. Strawson says that “both subject and predicate are non-linguistic terms. And the relation between them is “non-relational tie” because one is particular and another one is universal”.⁸ The former is present in the world and the latter is not present in the world. The subject is non-linguistic in the sense that it is a material object and its existence is a contingent fact. The predicate is non-linguistic. The predicate term with meaning is a linguistic entity. When the predicate expression is particular (which is present in the factual world), we identify it by reference of the world. But when it is a universal concept we identify in our mode of representing the world. Universal is not a fact in the world. So we identify it through our utterance of expression which has relevant meaning. Frege uses reference for predication but Strawson uses identification for predication. The difference between subject term and predicate term is that the former identifies an object in the world while the latter identifies a universal attribute such as *redness*.

⁶Searle, J. R., *Speech Act: An Essay in the Philosophy of Language*, Cambridge University Press, London, 1970, p. 17.

⁷ Ibid. 18.

⁸ Strawson P, F., *Indivisuals*, London, 1959, p. 88.

Searle describes the nature of predication in the speech act. Here predication is very important which includes reference and illocutionary act. Without predication, speech act is not possible. This can be described by considering the below examples-

1. You are going to leave.
2. Will you leave?
3. Leave!
4. I suggest you leave.

In all utterances of these sentences, the predicate and reference are the same. The predicate is “leave”, reference is you. The predicate “leave” of you is different in every sentence because of the different illocutionary act. The different illocutionary force indicating device determines in which mode “leave” is predicated of you. The illocutionary forces in sentences are (1) stating (2) questioning (3) surprise (4) suggest. While the term “suggest” in sentence 4 is explicitly functioning as a force term, the force terms in the other sentences are implicit. These force terms play an important role in predication. They operate on the predicate terms for determining the mode in which the predicate terms relate to the reference terms. If the sentence is interrogative, the force term is questioning either the predicate term true or false of the object referred to by the reference term. If the sentence was imperative, the illocutionary force provided by the force term determine the object which is referred to by the reference term is doing something and this action determines the predicate term.

The illocutionary force indicating device determines in which mode the predicate expression is true or false as well as it also determines the object referred to by the subject (it’s a relation between force term and reference term). The illocutionary force does not affect the reference term. The reference term is always neutral. But predication always comes with illocutionary force. Though reference is an abstraction but it is not like the predication. It is a separate speech act from the total illocutionary act. It does not depend upon illocutionary force. Predication is an abstraction but not like the reference. It is a part of the illocutionary act. Here a question arises why we need a separate act? It is because we saw before that though sentences may have the same content, they will have different illocutionary acts. To show that illocutionary force is different and separable from content, we need this. By predication, we determine the mode in which the content is applied to the object referred to by the subject expression.

1.4.2 Reference:

A reference serves to identify objects, individuals, actions, events etc. Searle calls it as reference expression or singular definite referring expression. If the reference expression starts with indefinite article 'a man' and it is being used in the utterance of the sentence 'a man came', it might serve the singular definite referring expression but it cannot identify the speaker's intention. If the reference expression uses definite article 'the man' and is being used in an utterance of the sentence 'the man came', it must serve both to identify the definite object of person and the speaker's intention. It is the difference between singular indefinite referring expression and singular definite referring expression. Similarly, we will discuss plural definite referring expression 'the boys' and plural indefinite referring expression 'some boys'. Searle says that referring expression does not mean an expression which refers to something. As said earlier, reference is speech act and a speech act is performed by a speaker. Speech act is performed when a speaker utters some words. A speech act is not words or sentences. It is the act of utterance. We identify reference when a speaker performs some utterance.

1.4.3 Proposition

In different illocutionary acts, if the same reference and same predication are used in different expressions, Searle holds that those different expressions are the same proposition. In the above 4 examples I used above, they have the same reference and same predication and so they are one and the same proposition. Searle says, "a proposition is to be sharply distinguished from an assertion or statement it. A proposition is not an act. The acts are stating, asserting etc. According to Searle, a proposition is what is apologized by the act of apologizing, or what is promised by the act of promising etc. The expression of a proposition is a propositional act, not an illocutionary act. Illocutionary act is the whole statement. The propositional act is only a part of the illocutionary act".⁹ Searle holds that one cannot express a proposition without any illocutionary act. The propositional act cannot occur alone. It always presupposes illocutionary act. A proposition always comes with illocutionary acts. In a sentence, the speaker expresses a proposition with an illocutionary act which expresses how the proposition occurs in the sentence. If someone says 'there is the bottle', the speaker is 'stating' in this sentence. By this act of stating he express the proposion. That expression is called as a propositional act where the proposition is expressed. A propositional act includes reference and predication and so without stating reference and prediction, it cannot occur. If we include all of this, it is a complete speech act.

Searle distinguishes between propositional indicator and illocutionary force indicator in a sentence to show how a proposition is to be taken. When a speaker utters something or illocutionary act, he uses an illocutionary act. He uses an illocutionary force which determines

⁹ Ibid. 18.

how the sentence is to be taken. A speaker uses illocutionary force indicator by which he starts the sentence. Examples- 'I apologize', 'I warn', 'I promise', etc. Where the speaker does not use the illocutionary force indicator, the context of the sentence makes clear what illocutionary force has to be taken. It is not need to take explicit illocutionary force indicator. This distinction between these two indicators does not lie in all situations. If someone says "I promise to do it". Here we cannot distinguish between illocutionary force indicator and propositional indicator. We can differentiate it if its syntax is like 'I promise that I will do it'. Here the illocutionary force indicator is 'I promise' and the propositional indicator is 'I will do it'. If we go into the depth of the previous sentence "I promise to do it", we can find this. In the deep structure of all sentence, we can find the difference between illocutionary force indicator and propositional indicator. This distinction is useful latter where we will analyze the structure of illocutionary act. There are some rules for expressing a proposition. Searle represents this distinction symbolically F (P) where 'F' stands for illocutionary force and 'P' stands for expressing the propositions. It would not fit in all illocutionary act, for e.g. "Hurrah, for team India".

1.4.4 Structure of Illocutionary Act

As the fundamental concepts of the illocutionary act has been introduced and explained above, I will now look into the structure of illocutionary act as worked out by Searle. He takes promise as an initial problem or example to explain the structure of illocutionary act. In his analysis, Searle basically wants to clarify what it means to perform a successful and non-defective promise. He gives "necessary and sufficient conditions making a successful and non-defective promises".¹⁰ His notion of defectiveness is similar to Austin's notion of 'infelicity'.

Through these conditions, we can draw out a set of rules of using illocutionary force indicator. To play an illocutionary act is like playing a chess game. One who does not know the rules of chess cannot play chess. In order to play chess, one has to learn from others who know the rules of chess or who know how to play chess. Likewise, in order to understand the how to perform successfully an illocutionary act, we must know the rules or structure governing it. In what follows, I will present the formulations of those rules one by one.

For his analysis, Searle takes only explicit promises and ignores promises which are performed through hints, metaphor, etc. He only deals with categorical promises, not the hypothetical ones, because these are simple and easily analyzable. This model is called constructive idealized model. It is analogous with the theory of construction. He also gives a list of conditional by means which we can perform illocutionary acts successfully and non-defectively.

¹⁰ Ibid. p. 26

Suppose a speaker S utters a sentence T in front of a hearer H, in the utterance of T, S sincerely, successfully and non-defectively makes a promise, if and only if the following conditions are satisfied:-

a) Input and output method

Here Searle uses 'input' and 'output' not in the sense of computer input and output method. He uses these in literally sense where he deals with linguistic communication. The output means the condition for speaking and input means the condition of understanding. In present stage, both the hearer and the speaker know the language and know how to communicate with this language. They are conscious of what they are doing.

b) S expresses of T the speaker uses an illocutionary act of P..

Speaker wants to focus on promising which is a peculiar kind of illocutionary act (I will not repeat the definition of illocutionary act here since the basic definition or notion is given earlier).

c) S predicts a future act A in the expression of P.

In promise, illocutionary force indicating device includes a proposition. The act must be predicated on the speaker. It is not a past action nor something that might have been done. I cannot promise someone else to do it; I can make a promise only with reference to a present moment. I can promise not to do something and also I can promise to do something repeatedly. I can promise to remain in a certain state and condition. Searle asserts that the conditions a and b as propositional conditions since they are expressions of a promisor, not the acts predicated of objects. In promise the speaker predicates an expression on himself or herself.

d) H prefers that S will do A not H will do A and S also believes that H prefers S to do A, not H will do A.

There is a difference between a promise and a threat. The former means that when a speaker makes a promise, it is on him to do something. In contrast, a threat is a pledge on hearer not to the speaker. A promise is defective if the promisor does not have the intention to do. It is also defective if the promisor does not want to keep the promise. In promise, the situation or occasion or conditions must be considered. It is not to be clubbed or confused with a warning or a threat, or a swearing, etc. In promise, one expresses a wish (needs, desires) and the promisor must be aware of that fact. Even if one uses the word "promise" and sounds like a promise, it need not be

a promise; for instance; suppose, I say to a borrower who borrowed some money from me, 'if you do not give me the money, I promise, I will tell your father'. This utterance is not a promise but expression of an intention or a commitment; this is kind of warning or threat. Here I use the word 'promise' to not make a promise. I am basically using the word 'promise' to emphasize the degrees of my commitment. Take another instance where the hearer makes an assertion by using the phrase 'I promise'. Suppose I accuse you of having copied my assignment saying, "You copied, didn't you?" and you reply "No I didn't, I promise you, I didn't". Here the hearer is not making a promise but making an assertion instead.

e) It is not the fact that S and H that S will do A in future.

It is a general condition that all illocutionary acts must have some point. Example- It is pointless and defective to request someone to do something if he has already done it or he is doing it or he will be doing this independently of the request. In a speech act situation where the listener know the rules of performing the illocutionary act, what is obvious has no illocutionary force. Likewise, what is impossible to do also lacks illocutionary force. To function as an illocutionary act, an act should not be obvious. Suppose in a class you say "Look here, Priya, be attentive to what I am saying". We assume that Priya has not paid attention in class; or it is not the fact that Priya is attentively listening in the class and so this speech act is needed. In short, to be a non-defective speech act, it is not the fact that the hearer is doing or will do that thing which is requested.

f) S intends to do A.

There is a distinction between sincerely and insincerely promise. In sincerely promises, the speaker want to keep the promise. He will keep the promise. In insincerely promises, the speaker does not want to keep the promise and to do that act. Searle calls this condition as sincerity condition. Even if I promise someone a diamond gift on his birthday and if I know that cannot afford the gift, then I am not sincere in my promise.

g) In the utterance of T, S intends which place him to do A.

There is a characteristic of promise that it undertakes an obligation to do an act. The promisor must do that act. If the promisor does not intend to do that act then the promise is not a promise. Intention is necessary to make a promise. But that is not sufficient. There must be an obligation on the part of the promisor to fulfill his promise and failure to uphold his promise should result in something unpleasant for the promisor. Example- Mr. Parker did not give money to the NGO despite his assurance because he was in no obligation to give money to an NGO.

h) S intends to produce knowledge in H by the utterance of T which place him in an obligation to do A.

S wants to produce knowledge in H by letting H recognize the intention. To recognize this intention, H needs to recognize the meaning of the utterance T. Here the speaker makes a promise in the utterance and getting H to realize his intention by virtue of the promise. The speaker produces an illocutionary effect upon the hearer, so as to enable the hearer to realize the speaker's intention. Speaker assumes the semantic rules by which he undertakes an obligation. The semantic rule of uttered sentence T by S and H is successfully, non-defectively and with sincere uttered if and only if a-h conditions are obtained.

i) Taken together all the conditions, 1-8, the sentence which was uttered to make a promise is clear by the semantic rules of language. It may be specifically mentioned that both S and H must share the same linguistic dialect too in order for the promise to have its full effect.

Searle broadly describes condition 1, then he describes how the hearer understands the utterance, that is, b-i. Condition 8 is of utmost importance because it is here that the hearer recognized the illocutionary effect by means of his knowledge or recognition of the meaning of T as well as the intention of S.

1.4.4.1 Insincere Promise

We have just considered what it means to make a sincere promise. Now we will discuss how the speaker can manipulate a sincere promise into an insincere one. An insincere promise is that when a speaker is making a promise, he lacks appropriate intention to do that act. He purports that he has the intention which he does not have. In other words, the speaker does not want to take responsibility of his expressed intention. This is as absurd as saying "I promise to do that act but I do not intend to do that act". When the speaker says "I promise to do that act", he has to take responsibility for intending to do that act. To avoid this absurdity, Searle give a condition in 6.a): "S intends that the utterance of T will make him responsible for intending to do A".

1.4.5 Rules for use of illocutionary force indicating device:

Searle sets some conditions, a set of rules, for use of illocutionary force indicating device. Condition a, h and i are applicable for general illocutionary acts. Conditions a-g are particularly applicable for promise only. The illocutionary force indicating device of promise symbolically use as Pr.

- 1) Pr only uttered whatever the context of T. Utterance act produces a future act of S.. Searle calls this condition as “propositional rules” conditions because this is derived from propositional context.
- 2) Pr has to be uttered only when the hearer H would prefer to that act A. S believes that H would prefers that S will do A and not that hearer H will not do A.
- 3) Pr has to be uttered only if S will do A. Searle calls rules 2 and 3 as “preparatory rules” because it is derived from “preparatory conditions d and e”. Speaker assumes the semantic rules which determine the meaning that creates an obligation.
- 4) Pr has to be uttered only if S intends to do A.. This is called sincerity condition.
- 5) When Pr uttered it, S undertakes an obligation to do A. Searle calls it as the essential condition.

In “preparatory condition”, it is revealed that the speaker has the authority. Take an example: an order. The preparatory condition includes the fact that the speaker has a authority over hearer while the sincerity condition includes the speaker wants the order act to be done. In the essential condition, the speaker intends to make the hearer understand that he will do the act.

There are some general hypotheses concerning illocutionary act.

- 1) Whenever someone utters something in a sincerity condition, this performance has a psychological state that determines whether that performance is sincere or insincere. This law holds that the speaker wants to do that act or not.
- 2) This hypothesis is converse of the first. If we count that the psychological state expression is insincere like a promise, an apology one can insincerely perform it; but in the case of greeting, one cannot insincerely perform it.
- 3) We can perform an utterance without using explicit illocutionary force indicating device. In this sentence the context of the sentence makes clear what the illocutionary force has to be taken. How can the speaker knows that a hearer takes it in a right way. For e.g. can you switch off the fan? It may be a request or an interrogative question. The speaker may be characteristically a subjunctive question concerning your abilities.

1.4.6 Illocutionary force

As Searle says, “an illocutionary act is a complete speech act”.¹¹ When we made a typical utterances it will consist of all things that are parts of the speech acts we have discussed above. It has a propositional content which is comprised of reference and prediction. Illocutionary act contains a particular kind of illocutionary force – assertion, suggestion, promise, vows etc. Illocutionary force refers to the intention of the speaker in giving an utterance. It is a type of

¹¹ Ibid. p. 46

illocutionary act which speaker performs. An illocutionary act is characteristically performed by an illocutionary force. Some example, someone might ask “How is that curry made?” Or “Is the curry ready yet?” (Politely) as if he is making a query about the curry, but his main intention might be to make the waiter bring the curry promptly. So here the illocutionary force is not to inquire of the progress of curry but to demand the waiter to bring the curry.

Searle argued that every utterance has an illocutionary force. Every single word of English has a certain kind of illocutionary force. That is why illocutionary force is a part of meaning which cannot be ignored or overlooked. Searle gives seven components of illocutionary force. They are as follows:

1. Illocutionary point

Every illocution has a purpose. It is insight to the act. The point tells us how a thing is. The point of a promise or a vow commits the speaker for doing the act. The point of order is committing the people to do that act what they order. Searle opines that to perform a successful speech act, it is necessary to achieve the point or purpose. Illocutionary point makes possible an illocutionary act. It is essential for an act. Some illocutionary force has the same illocutionary point like – promise/vows, request/order, etc. Illocutionary point is different from the proposition and it has done by the propositional content.

2. The illocutionary point has degree of strength.

Illocutionary acts could have same point but they have vary in degree of strength. Example- if I request to do something to someone, its strength may be less than if I insist that he does it by any means.

3. Mode of achievement

Some illocutionary acts sets certain conditions in which the point has achieved in that speech acts.. Example- when a speaker who has the authority to make a command and another speaker who gives a request, they have the same point, but the former will achieve its purpose more effective because of his position of authority. When a judge and a common man utter these words “I sentence you to life imprisonment”, the utterance of the judge will command greater authority than that of a common man by virtue of his office or the mode by which he performs his speech act.

4. Propositional content condition

Most illocutionary acts are in the form of F(P) where F means force and P means propositional content. In many case force term imposes certain conditions on content. For e.g. when one makes a promise, the promise must be performed by the speaker in future. One cannot make a promise with reference to the past or for someone else.

5. Preparatory condition

For an illocutionary act to be successful and non-defective, we need certain kinds of conditions. For e.g. One can utter a promise but it will be defective if the promise made by the speaker is not to the interest of the hearer or the hearer did not want him to do it. In making a promise the speaker must presuppose that he can fulfill his promise and also serve the interest of the hearer. Such conditions are called preparatory conditions. There are also some other preparatory conditions that need to be obtained. For e.g. when someone utters, "John has beaten his wife", here we are presupposing that John has indeed beaten her. It may also be an answer to a query if John beats his wife.

6. Sincerity condition

When one performs an illocutionary act, that person has a psychological state with certain kind of content. Thus when one makes a promise he expresses an intention; when one makes a command, he expresses a desire or want. By this psychological state, we can determine sincerity and insincerity of speech acts. An insincerity speech act is one when a speaker utters a statement without a psychological state. For e.g. a lie. An insincere apology is one when the speaker does not have any sorrow or regret. It is paradoxical when one performs an illocutionary act and deny simultaneously the point of that act. For instance, one cannot meaningfully say "I apologize but I am not sorry".

7. Degree of strength of sincerity condition

Just like the same illocutionary point has different degrees of strength, the same psychological state has different degree of strength. A speaker who makes a request to do something to the hearer will have the same psychological state with that of a person who begs a hearer to do something but the latter will command stronger degree of sincerity than the former.

An illocutionary force is determined by the above seven components. Two illocutionary force is equal if these seven components are equal. A question may arise as to how we can use the above elements of illocutionary acts successfully and non-defectively. Here a point may be noted before we address this question. Whether or not an utterance has illocutionary force is a matter of

intention. However, whether or not an utterance has been successfully and non-defectively performed is a matter which involves more than intention; there are many other conditions which must be satisfied. Austin called as “illocutionary uptake”. Assuming that the above conditions are satisfied, the seven features of illocutionary force may be reducible to four conditions; an illocutionary act in form of F(P) is successfully and non-defectively performed iff

- 1) The illocutionary point of F of what the speaker performed on the proposition P succeeds on mode of achievement and degree of strength of illocutionary point of F.
- 2) The speaker expresses a proposition P which satisfies the propositional content condition.
- 3) Speaker, expressing psychological state which satisfies the sincerity condition.
- 4) Preparatory condition must be satisfied.

1.5 Conclusion:

We have noted that illocutionary act constitute an essential part of a theory of meaning. As a matter of fact, Searle is of the view that without it, semantic theory is not possible. In this respect, he even goes a step further to claim that a distinction cannot be drawn between Austin’s notions of locutionary act an illocutionary act. A speech act must have illocutionary act. We have seen what makes illocutionary act possible and non-defective by looking at some conditions of illocutionary force. These conditions are important not only to highlight the indispensability of speech act theory but also to understand and mark the difference amongst various illocutionary forces and acts.

CHAPTER 2

INTENTIONALITY AND SPEECH ACTS

2.1 Introduction

In this chapter, the focus of my discussion will be intention and intentionality as defined used by Searle. In order to explain these concepts, I look into its cognate and related concepts such as action, causation, and meaning. Within the concept of intention, Searle makes an divergence in between prior intention and intention-in-action. This distinction has been very crucial to understand his works on action, meaning and speech acts theory in general. Towards the end of the chapter, I discussed some problems involving intention and meaning.

2.2 Intentionality

Intentionality is directedness. It is a kind of mental states, which stands for something different from it. For example, I have a desire for something which has its existence in the external world. Put it in simple language, intentionality is something which implies “intending”. For example, “I intend to go to my bedroom now”.

There are some problems with traditional notion of intentionality. According to them, all mental states are intentional. However, Searle states that some mental states are intentional while some are not. For e.g. desire, fear, belief etc. are intentional. If I say I have a desire or a belief, then one might ask, “What is your belief about?” Then I cannot say I have a belief but I cannot say what kind of belief it is since my belief always stands for something. Therefore Searle holds that if something is intentional, it must be directed towards something. However there are certain mental states which need not be a about anything in particular; in other words, it may not be directed towards anything in the world. For example, nervousness or anxiety, or even elation need not be intentional because it is not necessary that they should be directed towards something. It may be a very subjective experience.

2.3 Intentional states and speech acts

With regard to intentional states and speech acts, Searle says that “both consist of a propositional content and a psychological state or illocutionary force, sometimes the propositional content is the whole proposition”.¹²¹ And these two, which is called speech acts and Intentional states has an analogous structure. In speech acts, we can say there is a propositional content and an illocutionary force. In intentional state there is psychological state and a propositional content or representational content. For instance, speech acts like ‘I desire to leave the room’ and then in other word ‘I hope to leave the room’ and again in an another sense ‘I believe that you leave the room’. There is a propositional content in each and every case, there is a propositional content “leave the room” and a psychological state. Every speech act contains some kind of order, suggestion, command, etc. In intentional state, a form of belief, desire, hope, etc. is present. Symbolically it is represented as S(P), where S represents the psychological state and P represents the propositional content. There are some intentional states which do not have propositional content but they have psychological state. For e.g. John loves Suzy, John hates Suzy, represented as: Love(Suzy), Hate(Suzy)

2.4 Conditions of satisfaction and direction of fit

In Intentional states and speech acts both have conditions of satisfaction and direction of fit. In certain cases, psychological states or illocutionary force with the propositional content can be each of two represent or fail to meet the state of affairs. How they are alleged to meet the reality is acknowledged by the mode of psychological or illocutionary force. For e.g. belief is either false or true basing on whether or not the content corresponds to the state of affairs. Desire and belief stand opposite to each other. The truth value of it is determined by whether existing reality meets the content or not. And we find the same difference between statement and order in speech acts. We need to understand the notions like ‘conditions of satisfaction’ and ‘direction of fit’ first, then we can understand the facts.

Where there is direction of fit in there conditions of satisfaction apply to both speech acts and intentional states. For e.g. a statement is satisfied, if it is true, and a statement is not satisfied, if it

¹² Searle John, *Rationality in Action*, MIT Press, London, UK, 2001, p. 45

is false. A desire is satisfied, if it is true, and it is not satisfied, if it's false. A promise is satisfied, if it kept. An intention is satisfied, if it is carried out. According to Searle, "the speech acts will be satisfied if and only if the expressed psychological states are satisfied and the condition of satisfaction of speech act and expressed psychological state are identical".¹³ It means my order is satisfied if my desire is fulfilled and my statement is satisfied if the expression of the statement is true. The condition of satisfaction is external because the order is fulfilled in the external world. A statement is true or false decided by whether or not it corresponds to a fact in the external world. Every intentional state upholds of an intentional content and a psychological mode in the equal manner that of speech act which has a propositional content and illocutionary force. Both represent the objects or state-of-affairs. E.g. I have a belief that Saumya is in the library. It represents in the world a state-of-affairs. I have a statement that "The atmosphere inside the reading room is healthy". This represents a state-of-affairs.

The usage of the word "representation" is somewhat different from the ordinary usage. Representation is possible by contents with certain psychological states. Psychological mode determines the direction of fit and Content regulate the conditions of satisfaction.¹⁴ Through this process, a belief or desire represent the world outside. Searle says, "in intentional state content, psychological state and direction of fit represent its conditions of satisfaction. In speech act content, illocutionary force and direction of fit represent its conditions of satisfaction".³ By the content Conditions of satisfaction are to be determined and they obtain if that content is fulfilled. Let's take an example, if I have a belief that "It is raining outside", then in order to confirm my belief, if I go outside and find that it is raining then I can say that "yes", the conditions are satisfied because it is indeed raining outside. It seems there is a process-product ambiguity between "requirement" and "thing required". If I have a belief that the book is on the table, then it should be the case that the book is on the table (requirement). If my belief is true then I can come to see the book on the table. Searle says, "this ambiguity does not harm the conditions of satisfaction but helps to clear the ideas. Let me summarize from the above point: that for representation the conditions of satisfaction is necessary. Every intentional state has a direction of fit which is a representation of its conditions of satisfaction".¹⁵⁴

¹³ Searle J. R., *Intentionality: An Essay in the Philosophy of Language*, Cambridge University Press, London, 1983, P. 11

¹⁴ Searle J. R., *Intentionality: An Essay in the Philosophy of Language*, Cambridge University Press, London, 1983, P. 11

¹⁵ Searle J. R., *Intentionality: An Essay in the Philosophy of Mind*, Cambridge University Press, London, 1983, P. 13

The world with a different direction of fit is represented by the Conditions of satisfaction. In speech acts there are four types of direction of fit;

- i. world-to-word,
- ii. word-to-world,
- iii. null direction of fit,
- iv. word-to-world-to-word.

Likewise, there are four types of direction of fit in intentional state:

- i. mind-to-world,
- ii. world-to-mind,
- iii. null direction of fit and
- iv. mind-to-world-to-mind.

Statements, descriptions, assertions of speech acts are word-to-world direction of fit is coming under the assertive class of speech acts. If it fails to meet the independent existing world, and to match the world we can change our statements, descriptions or assertions. But we cannot change the world to fit with our members of the assertive class of speech acts. If the statement turns out to be false, it is the statement which is false, not the world. On the other hand the directive class of speech acts such as orders, apologies, commands etc. and the commissive class of speech acts like promises, vows, pledges etc. are world-to-word direction of fit. These are not supposed to match the world but rather supposed to change the world to meet the propositional content. Here we are not supposed to say that they are either true or false but rather we should say that they are disobeyed or obey, broken or kept, carried out or not carried out. Here if the order is not obeyed, it is not the order *per se* but the world where the person disobeys the order.

Intentional states have these kinds of distinction: If my belief turns out to be wrong, it is not the world but the belief I have which is fault. I can mess it up by telling that it's a false belief. In case of desire, it is not like a belief which is true or false but a matter of whether or not it is carried out. If I fail to meet the desire, I cannot fix it up by changing my desire, like in the case of belief; by changing the world I can fix it up. So one say clearly see that while belief is statement "mind-to-world" direction of fit, desire or order is "world-to-mind" direction of fit.

There are many entities in the world having direction of fit and condition of satisfaction but not in mind and language. Example, the diagrammatic representation of University of Hyderabad may match or mismatch with the university campus. It is map-to world direction of fit. The

blueprint of a building is either not followed or followed. It is direction of fit of world-to-mind. As per the blueprint the contractor should build the building. Requirement, obligation, needs are world-to-mind direction of fit. For example: I am in need of some food. So my need will be fulfilled if and only if I take some food or it will remain incomplete if I do not take some food. Belief, statement, map is “language-to-world” or “mind-to-world” it is called “direction of fit”.

2.5 Intentional causation

Intentional states, sometimes function causally and are called as intentional causation. Some of them are self-caused by their own conditions of satisfaction. In common language, Causation stands for the action of causing something. Intentional states are the cause of its conditions of satisfaction. For example, if I am hungry, then my desire for having food causes me to take some food. If I have a belief that it is a sunny day then the state-of-affairs of the world causes me to believe that it is a sunny day.

To understand the relation between intentionality and world direction of fit is essential that we have already seen. Direction of causation is opposite of direction of fit. Let’s take an example, a desire is “world-to-mind” (upward) direction of fit. Direction of causation of a desire is “mind-to-world” (downward) direction of causation. In Aristotelian terminology, there are four kinds of cause, namely, efficient, material, formal and final. Searle accepts efficient cause only. The efficient cause has a subcategory which is mental causation. The mental causation too has a subcategory which is intentional causation; intentional states cause its conditions of satisfaction cause intentional states. Put it in a different way, in intentional causation, intentional states cause state-of-affairs or vice versa, for example- when I am hungry, I have a desire to take some food. This desire causes me to take some food. This is intentional causation. If I see a book on the table, it causes my visual experience. The case that a book is on the table which is the part of conditions of satisfaction causes my intentional states of visual experience.

The direction of fit is essential to connect intentional states and the real world that I already mentioned in my above lines; likewise direction of causation is essential for this connection. I have already maintained that a desire is “world-to-mind” direction of causation is different from direction of fit. If the visual perception is veridical and matches the world, it is “mind-to-world” direction of fit. If the visual experience is genuinely satisfied then state-of-affair causes the mind to perceive causes and hence it is “world-to-mind” direction of causation. This example pointing

towards a subclass of intentional causation where the parts of the conditions of satisfaction cause itself to satisfy the conditions of fully satisfaction.

Intentional causation has a further sub-class which is self-referential. It causes itself for producing its respective conditions of satisfaction if it is to be fulfilled. For instance, intention and action. Unlike desire, belief, the action itself caused by intention which is already in the content of intention. Seale says, “if the action is not caused by intention, the intention is not carried out. In such case, conditions of satisfaction are self-referential”.¹⁶⁵ Perceptual experience, memories and intention are causally reference himself.

2.6 Intention and action

Just as my belief is satisfied if and only if the state-of-affairs obtains which is represented by the content, so also my intention is fulfilled if the action is performed which is represented by the content of intention. For example-

1. I believe that I will vote for Modi.
2. I have the desire to give my vote to Modi.
3. I intend to vote for Modi.

The respective way in which action and intention are fixed is different from desire and belief. The action which is done intentionally are only conditions of fulfillment of intention. Suppose you have an intention to complete the project by Diwali. Your intention shall not be fulfilled by mere saying that I have an intention to complete the project by Diwali; rather you have to work to fulfill your intention. Here a set of questions arises: What do you mean by intention? and What is an action? What kind of relation holds between them? The answer to the third question is that both are of conditions of satisfaction for each other. Action is related to intention. If fact, the latter is the necessary condition for the former. Intention is integral part of an action. However, intention is not related to belief and desire in the way it is related to action. My belief will be satisfied if and only if the required state-of-affairs obtain. My desire will be satisfied if and only if my desire obtains. Belief and desire do not necessarily need performance of action in this sense. In the meantime, intention needs an action to be satisfied. Searle accepts something as an action only if it is intentional. He only deals with intentional actions. However, there are cases

¹⁶ Searle John, *Rationality in Action*, MIT Press, London, UK, 2001, p. 46.

of asymmetrical relations between intention and action, intentional states and their conditions of satisfaction.

Let us imagine scenario where a husband who always spend money in buying lottery tickets but never wins any lottery prize. His wife wants to make him realize that wasting money on buying lottery tickets can lead to many difficulties. So one day, she decides to buy a lottery ticket, and fortunately she wins a prize. Her intention was not to win the prize but something else. In other words, winning a lottery ticket is not intentional at all but she performed the action of buying the lottery tickets. In this way, we can find some difficulty in establishing symmetric relation between the two. In order to clarify this, we shall discuss the distinction between what is termed as intention-in-action and prior intention. An intention is termed as prior intention if the agent or the subject knows what he is going to do and also why he is going to do.

When someone says he is going to perform certain work A, he will do A. when he is performing his action A, he is carrying out his prior intention. However, there are certain actions which do not involve prior intention, like the action of the wife buying and willing a lottery ticket. But it cannot be said that her action lacks intention. It is an intentional action. Such type of intention in an action is called intention-in-action. And this actions are inseparable. E.g. suppose I am sleeping and thinking of my family and suddenly I get up and start walking in the room. The action of walking in the room is an intentional action. However I do not have any prior intention to do that. If someone asks me “Why are you doing this?” I will simply have to say “Just like that.” When we are doing a prior intentional action, we are also doing many other actions. Suppose I have a previous intention to beat Saroj. To do that I walk towards him; my walking towards him is intentional but it is not there in the prior intention. All the actions which is done intentionally have the intention-in-action but not all intentional actions have prior intention. Both the previous intention and intention-in-action are causally self-referential.¹⁷

The word “carrying out” means intention causal relation with action. Here the question arises as to why they are self-referent. We will talk about it later. For now we will try to understand the relation with the help of an analogy – the relation between perception and action. There are two elements in perception and action. When we see a table, there is visual experience (seeing the table) and the object or state-of-affair (the table itself). Likewise, in intentional action also, we have two parts of experience. For e.g., when I rise my hand, the first one is experience of raising my hand, and the second is the bodily movement of raising my arm. This first one is intentional component (experience of raising my hand while the latter is the condition of satisfaction (bodily behavior). Both are not independent. If both are satisfied then the intentional state must be satisfied, otherwise it is too difficult. As far as intentionality is distressed both the mind-to-world

¹⁷ Searle J. R., *Intentionality: An Essay in the Philosophy of Mind*, Cambridge University Press, London, 1983, P 85

direction of fit (perception and action) and the direction of causation which is world-to-mind. When I perceive a table, but there is no real table in front of me, I might say I was mistaken. So it is the later one. The intentional content of the intention-in-action and experience of action are identical.¹⁸ If they are identical, why do we need two notions? Searle's answer is that the "experience of acting is a conscious experience with an intentional content and intention-in-action is a intentional component, regardless of whether it contains any conscious experience of action."⁸ Sometimes we do intentional action without being conscious about it.

Now the problem is, is there any relation between previous intention, and in other word intention-in-action, bodily movement and actions? Suppose I have a prior intention to raise my arm in air and then I also raise my arm. How does it work? It is because I carry out my intention. The prior intention makes the whole action as a unit. As I have mentioned before, action has two parts: experience of action and bodily behavior. As I mentioned before, intentional content or the work which is done by intentionally, of which intention-in-action and experience of bodily behavior are identical. Now he will clarify the relation between intention-in-action and prior intention. But one should remember the fifth point where we have identified intentional content with direction of fit; one may ask oneself as to how an intentional content is satisfied. For this, one can identify the intentionality by its conditions of satisfaction.

The content of previous intention and in other sense we can say the content of intention-in-action are different. The prior intention represents the whole action. Intention-in-action is only the presentation, but not a representation. In prior intention the whole action is for the intentional object but in intention-in-action, the movement is only for the intentional object. Now, if both of these are different then how come they are related. Searle replies, both are self-referential and both are caused by itself. If they are different, we can analyze them separately. The prior intention causes intention-in-action and intention-in-action causes both intention-in-action and bodily movement.

The diagram to this

Prior intention-◇◇

intention in action◇◇bodily behavior

¹⁸ Searle J. R., *Intentionality: An Essay in the Philosophy of Mind*, Cambridge University Press, London, 1983, P. 91

Since action has two parts, experience of raising my hand and bodily behavior and prior intention is self-referential, prior intention causes by their own conditions of satisfaction. We can separately represent each component of prior intention. Previous intention causes intention-in-action and then it turns into causes bodily behavior. Prior intention causes intention-in-action which causes my arm to go up.

Deliberation leads to the action which is done intentionally by means of previous intention. Take a simple case of deliberation of belief and desire which have different direction of fit and different direction of causation. They lead to the occurrence of prior intention which has world-to-mind direction of fit and vice versa. The action consists of intention-in-action and bodily behavior. The intention-in-action causes the whole action deliberation of belief or desire $\Diamond$ prior intention $\Diamond$ intention-in-action $\Diamond$ bodily movement (action=intention-in-action+bodily behavior)

2.7 Intentional structure of cognition and its volition.

Intentional structure of cognition and we can say volition are the opposite from one another while direction of fit and direction of causation stand opposite to each other. We see the symmetry and asymmetry of action, and perception includes visual experience of objects or state-of-affairs and objects or the previous one itself. If we see the successful performance of perception, the direction of fit is mind-to-world (downward) and in another way we will see the direction of causation is world-to-mind (upward). Both are exactly parallel but opposite to each other. Likewise, the action consists of two component intention-in-action and bodily movement. The previous one causes me to step my foot.

Cognition				Volition		
	Belief	Memory	Perception	Desire	Prior intention	Intention-in-action
Direction of fit	Downward	Downward	Downward	Upward	Upward	Upward
Direction of causation determined by condition of satisfaction	None	Upward	Upward	None	Downward	Downward
Causally self-referential	No	Yes	Yes	No	Yes	Yes

Generally, cognition and violation are the symmetrical and asymmetrical relation between perception and action. We have already seen that mind-to-world direction of fit is memory and perception and world-to-mind direction of causation. But the previous intention and intention-in-action has world-to-mind direction of fit and mind-to-world direction of causation. Intention carried out of the world comes to be what intention is represented. Intention has direction world-to-mind of fit and mind-to-world direction of causation. Intention will be fulfilled if it causes itself to achieve the former one of the above line is direction of fit. Prior intention causes the whole action. The whole action consists of two states: Intention-in-action and bodily behavior. Intention-in-action causes bodily behavior. Cognition and violation are mentioned in the table. Mind-to-world (downward) world-to-mind(upward)

There are three gaps within the structure of volition. When we deliberate a belief or desire or order, there is a gap between deliberation and prior intention. Is that person a boy or girl? I have confusion whether the person I am referring to is a boy or a girl. In prior intention, this confusion is eradicated. There is already a gap between intention-in-action and prior intention; this gap between actually and deciding doing; deciding to do the act or actually doing the act. If it is a lengthy act, then the intention-in-action is not sufficient to guarantee that it continues throughout

the action till its completion. In contrast my prior intention normally continues throughout the whole action. The prior intention represents and causes the whole action while intention-in-action presents and causes only the bodily behavior which may be a part of the prior action.

2.8 Network and Background of Intentional states.

Intentional states determine its conditions of satisfaction.¹⁹ A state itself, given its position in a network and against its background, is neither intentional nor under conditions of satisfaction. To understand this, we are considering some examples. Suppose in a court, the judge gave his judgment: “I sentenced you to ten years imprisonment”. The judge may have certain types of mental states and he realized his desire and then uttered this. Suppose I have the same mental states like the judge and said: “I sentenced you to ten years imprisonment”. I have only the same kind of mental states which corresponded to judge’s desire. I utter the phonetics sequence which the judge uttered. However, I do not have the mental state to sentence you for ten years, since the situation does not allow me to do so. It means that when the judge utters the sentence, he is in the courtroom. And when I utter it, I am with my friends or with anyone anywhere (assuming I am not a judge and passing a judgment). To pass a judgment like the above, that desire has to be embedded within the whole network of other intentional states. There are many other intentional states in the network, some of which are logically related and some are not.

When someone has an intentional state the whole related notions of that intentional state is in the network. The judge’s desire is supported by lots of belief such as he is a judge of a court, he weighs the evidence that proves that you are the criminal, etc. These intentional states have their own conditions of satisfaction. The network only functions against a background of what I will call non-representational mental capacities.²⁰

Here Searle made two claims. First one is that “intentional states are in general parts of Network of Intentional states and only have their conditions of satisfaction relatively to their position in

¹⁹ Searle J. R., *Intentionality: An Essay in the Philosophy of Mind*, Cambridge University Press, London, 1983, p. 19.

²⁰ Searle J. R., *Intentionality: An Essay in the Philosophy of Mind*, Cambridge University Press, London, 1983, p. 20.

Network”.²¹ Generally, this position is popularly known as holism in contemporary philosophy. The second claim in addition to the Network of representations says that “there is also a Background of non-representational mental capacities and in general, representations only function, they only have the conditions of satisfaction that they do, against this non-representational Background”.²²

2.9 Meaning

Meaning is possible by imposing conditions of satisfaction on conditions of satisfaction. In the analyses of meaning, Searle uses the notions of action and intention which are analyzed in the foregoing account. These two notions are crucial to understand his speech act theory which in turn is understand his general theory of mind and action. Meaning is a kind of intentionality and speech act is a kind of act. What distinguishes them from one other is kind of intentionality and action respectively. In the previous point, I have discussed intentional action which contains the bodily behavior. Prior intention causes intention-in-action and it causes bodily behavior. This bodily movement which is caused by intention-in-action is its conditions of satisfaction. But not all intention and action are simple. When a person intends to kill a bird, first he picks the arrow, fix it in the bow, pulls the bow string, take aim and finally release the arrow. Every complex action need not necessarily involve gradual steps like this example of shooting an arrow. A man who is asked to leave the room may leave the room, not because of he was ordered but because anyway he has to leave the room. This bodily behavior is not caused by intention unlike the case of shooting a bird. In order to understand the intentional meaning, we have to understand prior intention, intention-in-action, causal, non-causal etc. In order to understand the meaning of intention, we have to discuss some other features of intentionality which is called as conditions of adequacy,

Intentional states(belief, desire)	Intentional content	Conditions of satisfaction
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²¹ Searle J. R., *Intentionality: An Essay in the Philosophy of Mind*, Cambridge University Press, London, 1983, p20,21

²² Searle J. R., *Intentionality: An Essay in the Philosophy of Mind*, Cambridge University Press, London, 1983, P. 21

Illocutionary force(states, orders)	Illocutionary content	Conditions of satisfaction
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Before explaining the fact that there is a two level of intentionality in the performance of illocutionary act, it needs to be understood that when one performs an illocutionary act, he also expresses an intentional state; for example, when one makes a statement that “It is a sunny day”, he expresses a belief that “It is a sunny day”. But the conditions of fulfillment of intentional state and speech acts are identical. A statement is true if the expressed belief is true. An order is true if and only if the expressed desire is satisfied. But still, we have to keep in mind that making a statement is different from making a true statement. I have already mentioned that the conditions and satisfaction of intentional state and speech act are identical. Meaning intention is to see whether mental intention imposes the same conditions of satisfaction in the physical expression.

Mind imposes its conditions of satisfaction on physical expression for its meaning. We have seen, there is a two level of intentionality-mental state, speech act. Let's call them as “sincerity condition” and “meaning intention”. Here our task is to determine meaning intention. We have already discussed conditions of satisfaction of sincerity condition and speech acts are identical. But the conditions of satisfaction of meaning intention are different from both the conditions of satisfaction of sincerity conditions and speech acts. For instance, making a statement is different from making a true statement. But still, when someone is trying to make a statement, he also commits to make a true statement. He must have imposed the belief on the statement. We have to understand the fact that he is expressing his beliefs in the statement. Conditions of fulfillment of meaning intention are totally different from conditions of satisfaction of speech acts and sincerity condition still the account of meaning explain how it comes about that, furthermore, the content of meaning intention determines the conditions of satisfaction of speech acts and veracity condition. For example; if I say “It is a sunny day”, the conditions of satisfaction of meaning intention satisfied even if it is not a sunny day, nevertheless it determines my speech acts will be satisfied if and only if it is a sunny day; my expressing belief will be satisfied if and only if it is a sunny day.

We need to know about the distinction between representation and communication. When someone intends to state something, he represents some objects or state-of-affairs as well as communicates the representation with the hearer. That represented intention is not the same as communication intention. The communication intention is to make some effect on the hearer. Representation intention is to represent something regardless of the effect to make him understand. Representation is prior to communication. One cannot communicate without representation. But one can represent something without communicating to others.

Searle classified illocutionary action into five types: assertive, directives, commissive, declaration and expressions. Intentionality not only creates the possibility of meaning but also limits its forms. For example, when we are apologizing, ordering, stating, we are performing it by just uttering words. But when I want to boil water, I am not doing that by just uttering words; I am boiling the water in actuality. Here the question arises how is it possible? Searle gives the answer of this question by illustrating an example; in a class when students raise their hands, it implies that they know the answer. When one student raises his hand in a classroom, the other students who are sitting in the classroom come to understand that he knows the answer. The answer as intention-in-action causes my hand to rise up and its required conditions are satisfied with the direction of fit mind-to-world . Meaning is possible while the mind appoints intentionality on the entities which are not intrinsically intentional.²³ How is it possible? The answer is when I utter something; the utterance itself has conditions of satisfaction. The belief itself has condition of satisfaction. Here the belief is that ‘I know the answer’ and it gets transformed to the utterance by an intentional act. Because of this, the utterance act here is resulting in raising the hand which counts as the expression of belief. The meaningful action is that which has the conditions of satisfaction which is intentionally imposed. It means an action is meaningful when it satisfies the conditions of satisfaction which is imposed by an intention.

Most of the meaning intention is an intention in representation. The intention in representation is an intention about the physical events which constitute the parts of the conditions of satisfaction. Suppose I say “It is a sunny day” (requirement), this is causally connected with my intention. The relation between representation intention and communication intention is a means which enables the hearer to understand that, the act is performed with the representation intention. When I say “It is a sunny day”, the hearer should recognize my intention with representation intention. (My intention-in-action causes me to say “It is a sunny day” which has conditions of fulfilment with the mind-to-world direction of fit that it is a sunny day.)

Here, there is a problem with meaning. When I express my belief or when I make a statement, it may not produce any effect on my audience. It is possible that one may tell a lie. When we make a statement, we express our belief, no matter whether the audiences believe it or not. Put it in a different way, what is the difference between ‘saying something and meaning it’ and ‘saying something and don’t mean it’? Wittgenstein often asks this question. Searle says when I say

²³ Searle J. R., *Intentionality: An Essay in the Philosophy of Mind*, Cambridge University Press, London, 1983, p. 19 p. 167

something and mean it, it implies that my utterance has conditions of satisfaction. When I say something and don't mean it, it does not have any such condition of satisfaction. For e.g. if I say "It is a sunny day" at night time, it does not match with conditions of satisfaction. If I say "It is a sunny" during day time, then it is relevant. It is relevant because it is supported by conditions of satisfaction which is intentionally imposed in utterances. But then when I utter "Does God exist?" here I am communicating something and it is meaningful too. But it does not represent anything specific out there in the world which means that it is possible to communicate even if what we communicate does not represent anything.

The second problem is that how can we realize intentional state. Searle accepts the identical theory which states that mind-body problem is not a problem at all. I think Searle accept this theory to avoid the above question. So the question 'how intentional states can be realized' is not a relevant question for Searle. What makes belief a belief? What is a belief? Searle says a belief is a propositional content which contains psychological mode. How can we realize a belief? Searle says that the meaning is not a notion of intentionality. It is a notion of linguistic acts. So Searle gives this question a different direction by asking how linguistic act can be realized. Are the speech acts identical with physical phenomena? The answer is in the negative. Speech acts have a logical structure and speech acts have representations but it is not certain whether or not the physical phenomena have any structure.

The famous problem about intention of Wittgenstein is: "I raise my hand, and if I debar the fact that my hand goes up, then what else has left?".²⁴ The result is simple, "is left" is the intentional content. 'I raise my arm in air' is the intention-in-action in certain intentional mode. We are not satisfied with the answer because we are still in search of something concrete which could relate to "intention". Here we do not need its ontological category, rather we need to know about its direction of fit, conditions of satisfaction, psychological mode and propositional contents, etc. Another question is that may be asked is this: "What is an intentional object?" According to Searle, the peculiar quality of an intentional object is its intentional state. For example, Soumya admires Priya. Here the intentional object of Soumya is Priya. Searle asserts that if there is no referred object, then speech act and intentional object would not be satisfied. In case of fantasy, imagination and fictional discourse, all these are intentional states but there is no referred object for them and so they cannot be satisfied. Searle says that these all are assertive intentional states. These are not like normal assertive. The speaker has not committed to the truth of his assertion. The belief does not have any representative content. Accordingly, Searle thinks that Russell's

²⁴ Ludwig Wittgenstein, *Philosophical Investigation* (Oxford University Press, 1953)

example of “The king of France is bald” is false because there is no king of France who can be attributed with baldness.

2.10 Conclusion

In this chapter, we have tried to understand what is intention by looking at its two sub-categories, viz., intention-in-action and prior intention. We also looked at the structure of intention and various other related which are important to explain the general framework within which Searle work out his speech act theory, including philosophy of action and philosophy of mind.

CHAPTER 3

ARE MEANINGS IN THE HEAD ?

3.1 Introduction

In this chapter, I am discussing about the arguments of Putnam and Searle responses to that arguments and see the what sort of knowledge we can gain from the arguments and counter arguments or responses. I shall discuss some important grain of truth from that responses what Searle overlooked. In the meantime I shall show that Searle gives some important points in this matter. The clarification of Searle's points and his problem gives us to see better some products of truth in the study of semantics.

I believe in middle path in between internalism. It is a type of externalism which makes room for narrow content. I believe what Stich and Fodor say, “psychology should be solipsistic and constructing belief-desire psychology as constructing psychology of narrow contents is the only way for defending the externalism threat”.²⁵ I believe in internalist view “what is in the head determines extension”. In my discussion of indexical I will show that if we deny the the descriptivism that does not go to externalism. I shall show that indexical which are not descriptive, their contents are not only external but also internal. In order to be a thought whether it is indexical or non-indexicals depends upon descriptive elements. I divide this chapter into two parts. In the first part I explain the works of Putnam and Searle and in the second part I will explain and present my take on moderate version of externalism. For developing my standpoint, I have mainly relied on the work Amir Horowitz’ “Putnam, Searle and Externalism”.

3.2 Putnam and Searle: A discussion

In this section I discuss the arguments of Putnam and subsequent responses of Searle to them. The purpose of this discussion is primarily to extract some truth for the developing my view of moderate externalism. One of the most fundamental questions in philosophy is this: How does language relate to reality? Searle attempts to answers this question by holding a view that a speaker relates language with the world or reality through linguistic acts, speech acts to be more precise. He reduces this question into another; that is, how does mind relate to the reality? He reduces this to analyze intentionality of mind. The reduction is attempted in this way: language is reducible to various speech acts, speech acts are reducible to mind and its various states and activities which in turn are reducible to intentionality. There is a double level of intentionality one is intentional states and another one is speech acts. Where there is a speech act there must be an intentional state; for e.g., if I am stating that “It is raining” it is in speech acts. A speech act has an “illocutionary force” and a “propositional content”. Similarly in intentional state there is

²⁵ Amir Horowitz, externalism and narrow content,

“psychological state” and a “propositional content”. The psychological states of “it is raining” is belief. First I have to believe then state something.²⁶ He takes help of Fregean concept of ‘sense’ for extending the analysis. He takes only two approaches of Frege’s accounts of the relation of expressions and objects. First, expression refers to an object because the sense associated is with the object. Second, he fights against psychologists that sense exists in the third realm (third realm means the third world where the ‘sense’ supposedly exists). Searle accepts the first one and rejects the second. Linguistic reference is a kind of intentional reference. Searle says, “intentional reference is sufficient to satisfy a condition; it is a way of satisfaction”.²⁷ There is no need to postulate the third realm for communication. Searle gives this explanation for avoiding Fregean concept of the third realm. If I think evening star under some mode of presentation and another person thinks about evening star under the same mode of presentation, we are sharing the same abstract entity in common. The shared abstract entity is an intentional content. This shared intentional content does not need a metaphysical realm.

3.2.1 Meaning in the head

Searle considered Putnam’s argument that “meanings are not in the head”²⁸ and responded to it. Searle thinks that “meanings are in the head” – there is no place where meaning to be. In addition he also thinks that Putnam’s argument does not show that meanings are not in the head. So what is the argument Putnam put forth against the internalist, the view that says that meanings are in the head? He described their views as following:

1. If we know the meaning that means that word is in a certain psychological state.
2. Internalist believes that “meanings (intention) determines extension.
3. Therefore, psychological states determines extension.

²⁶ See my discussion in chapter 2 point 2.2.

²⁷ Searle John, *Intentionality; An Essay in the Philosophy of Mind*, in Cambridge University Press, London, UK, 1983, p. 198

²⁸ Putnam, H., “The meaning of ‘meaning’”, in *Philosophical Papers*, Cambridge University Press, Vol. 2, Mind, Language and Reality 1975, pp. 215-71.

To the above, Putnam says that “we cannot accept both (1) and (2) together and that (3) is false”.²⁹ He rejects both (1) and (3) and accepts a different version of (2), that is, meaning (external or microstructure) determines extension. Before discussing these two philosophers’ views, it may be noted that both Searle and Putnam subscribe to meaning holism. Putnam tries to construct an argument where same psychological state identifies different extensions. Putnam gives two arguments to prove this view. I shall briefly explain them for now with intent to provide a more detailed explanation later on.

The first argument concerns what Putnam gives a name of it as “linguistic division of labour”. Here he says that “in any linguistic community some people have better knowledge of language than the others”.³⁰ They apply linguistic terms better than others. For example, in a community where some people have better knowledge about trees and some do not know much about trees. So they can tell which one is elm tree and which one is beech tree. Suppose I do not know the difference between beech and elm trees. All that I know is limited to some similarities between them such as, they have big branches, black brown leaves, etc. They are not different for me. So, according to Putnam “my idiolect” or “intention” of both trees are same but the extension is different. In other words, the concepts of beech trees and elm trees are same in my head but in the external world both trees are different. The same psychological state determines different extensions. This brief account will suffice to make the point for now. But more of it will come a little later.

Searle believes that the traditional thinkers might think that this argument is imperfect because the speaker does not know the meaning perfectly. That type of speaker is not getting any relevant extension. In such a case it is true that “extension in the idiolect” has no applicability. This is because the speaker does not know the meaning of the word. Frege also says that intention does not grasp extension. It only shows that some speaker does not grasp perfectly. So Searle defends his position by saying that extension fails where one does not know the meaning of the word.

To make his point, Putnam says intentional states of all speakers including the expert’s do not identify the extension. If this argument is based on linguistic or factual ignorance then we refute this from the first because if the speaker is ignorant then he can appeal to the experts because his intention is inadequate to determine extension. Suppose that what Putnam believes is valid, we have something more to prove that this argument is inconsistent. Searle points out that Putnam’s intuition is wrong by the argument given below:

²⁹ Ibid. p. 49

³⁰ Putnam, H., “The meaning of ‘meaning’”, in *Philosophical Papers*, Cambridge University Press, Vol. 2, Mind, Language and Reality 1975. P. 80

1. Searle's concept of elm and beech are not equal..
2. The extension of both trees are different.
3. Searle knows that both trees are different.

Searle knows because he knows that beeches are different from elms. One may have imperfect knowledge of these two concepts, but he has the conceptual knowledge about these two trees that they are different. So the number (3) states a conceptual knowledge. On the contrary, number 1 is not a conceptual knowledge (Searle concept of 'elm' = Searle concept of 'beech'). Therefore, it is false.

Now let us consider Putnam's second argument. This argument – "Twin Earth" – is relatively more important and better known. In this argument, he tries to show that it is insufficient to determine extension by speakers' intentional states. He opines that it is possible to have the same intentional states but with different extensions. Putnam supposes that somewhere else in our galaxy, there is another planet exactly same as earth in all perceptual level which is called as "twin earth". The environment of the twin earth is exact the same as earth. Their star same as earth's star. In twin earth, there is twin of every things and person. There is a single difference between these two earths: there is a different kind of liquid called "water" in twin earth. It is perceptually identical with water on earth, but its chemical composition is different. It is not H₂O; rather its chemical composition is "XYZ". When twin Oscar (a person who is staying in twin earth) says water, he refers to the water which is composed of 'XYZ'. When Oscar (a person who is staying in earth) says water, he refers to water, which is 'H₂O'. Finally the crux of the thought experiment is this: when Oscar says water, that utterance refers to "H₂O" and when twin Oscar says water, it denotes to "XYZ". Now Oscar and twin Oscar have same mental states but it refers to different extension. So Putnam concludes that the contents of brain are not sufficient to determine the meaning. Here the mental states are same. But the extensions are different. If the mental states are sufficient to determine the extension, the extension will not be the two rather it would be one. So Putnam summarized that meanings are not in the head.

Most of the people who criticized Putnam's theory of meaning, they criticized Putnam's thought experiment of twin earth. The same is true of Seale. He first accepts his arguments for discussion and then argues that it fails to show that "meanings are not in the head". To argue this argument Searle says, when the residents of earth and twin earth do not know that the liquid which is called "water" were "H₂O" and "XYZ" respectively, the people of both earth have identical experience. Now the question is, when both Oscars say water, do they mean same "water"? both Oscar and twin Oscar minds, ideas and everything are identical. When Oscar utters "water", by this utterance he refers to "water" that is "H₂O" and when twin Oscar says "water" he refers by this utterance to "XYZ". Searle thinks that this argument would go like this. Till 1750 the water on earth and twin earth had the same extension. After 1750 the scientists discovered that there are two different water which chemical composition are "H₂O" and "XYZ". We would define

water as “H₂O” on earth and water as “XYZ” on twin earth or we would have say there are two types of water that is “H₂O” and “XYZ”.

Indeed, there are some supports of this intuition. Suppose there are so much going and coming between earth and twin earth and because of that the people of earth and twin earth know that water which is called as nephrite and jadeite as Putnam’s example are different. So there are two kinds of water as H₂O and XYZ. Searle says we pay a high price for the stuff of twin earth which is called as water, the water on twin earth lacks a property of water. Searle says, “If their water is not water then their mud is not mud, their snow is not snow, their ice-cream is not ice-cream; if our driving cars produce H₂O, CO and CO₂. What kind of chemical emission takes place while driving a car on twin earth? Surely it will not be the same as that of the earth”.³¹ For all this reason, Searle argues that a supporter of traditional view might think that it is odd that Putnam believes ‘H₂O’ is fixed and the water is problematic on twin earth. It is lack of property of water. We might assume that the water on twin earth is slightly different from H₂O which is on earth. However Searle does not want to dismiss this alternative intuition of Putnam; rather he accepts it and builds on this to argue that extension is certainly determined.

Searle says in Putnam’s viewpoint, the extension of natural term like “water”, only deals with natural term which is determined by indexical. Searle says that we perceptually identify a substance such as water in a certain perceptual level. These features are like colorless, tasteless, liquid, flows from upward to downward etc. Then the extension of the word ‘water’ is determined which is identical in structure with this structure, whatever that structure is. In this point of view, the ‘water’ of twin earth is different extension from the ‘water’ which is on earth, because they both are identified by different structure. The structure of ‘water’ on earth and twin earth are different. The word ‘water’ is simply defined as whatever bear the relation “same L” to that stuff. Now from the point of view of traditional theorists, what exactly does this argument achieve? Suppose that Putnam is right in his intuition. All he has shown is to substitute intentional content. Traditional theorists say Putnam has substituted indexicals from the concept of intentional content. It means that the meanings in the head which determine the extension. In fact Putnam’s approach is like the traditional approach: a word ostensibly denotes whatever bears the identical relation to the denotation of the original ostentation. The word ‘water’ is explained as what is identical with the structure. If this characterization is correct, then this is no different from the others which accept that intention determine extension.

³¹ Searle John, *Intentionality; An Essay in the Philosophy of Mind*, in Cambridge University Press, London, UK, 1983, p. 198

According to Locke, a water is a concept in a nominal sense. The word ‘water’ means liquid, colorless, tasteless etc. In Putnam’s view water are defined in real essence. The water is defined indexically by identifying something that satisfies the nominal essence then he declares that water is something which satisfy the real essence as the stuff so identified. This is an improvement of Locke theory but it still does not show that meanings are not in the head. Searle believes that Putnam would not give any adequate response to the traditional theorists. This shows that he does not take any proposing variation of the traditional view that meanings are in the head, but to reject the traditional view altogether.

Searle distinguishes three theses which are as follows:

- 1) The meanings which are in the head do not identify the extension..
- 2) The indexicals are not determining the extension.
- 3) Then what is in head which does not identify extension..

(3) does not follow from (1) and (2). If we accept that it follows then we must assume that indexicals are not insight our head. The question is this: Why does he think so? Searle believes that he takes the fallacious move because since we do not grasps the microstructure and that microstructure determines extension. If this is the case then what is in our head that does not determine extension? Searle regards that what Putnam believes is a false move. He will show that mistake by considering an example. One who utters the sentence “the writer of Republic” has an intention and that intention determines extension of “the writer of Republic”. The intention of writer of Republic determines its extension though it is a fact about the world who writes the Republic. For someone who does not know who wrote the Republic, the extension of the expression “the writer of Republic” exists even though he does not know who the writer is. The same can be applied to Putnam’s argument: “the structure of the stuff identified “indexically” and which is in the intentional content determines extension even though we do not know what the structure is.” This confirms to the theory that holds that intention determines extension. This theory states that intention has set some sort of conditions and in order for something to be a part of that intention, the extension must satisfy the conditions. The extension must be matched with the conditions in order to a part of its relevant intention. That conditions are defined Putnam’s example too – the indexical definitions. The indexical definitions of water has an intentional content which sets certain conditions and so in order to be a part of that intention, the extension must satisfy those conditions. Searle says “the intention sets certain conditions which any potential sample has to meet of in order to be is to be part of the extension of relevant intention”.³²

³² Searle John, *Intentionality; An Essay in the Philosophy of Mind*, Cambridge University Press, London, UK, 1983, P. 207.

The same is the case of the intention of the expression “the writer of Republic” sets some conditions which has to satisfy by an extension in order to part of that intention. In both cases, it is a fact of the world, even though whether or not the extension satisfy the intentional content. Therefore it is a mistake that intention does not determine extension.

There is a second reason why Putnam thinks that meaning in the head does not determine extension. He makes a difference between intentional contents and indexical definitions, especially how intentional content relates to indexical definition. This emerges when he says,

Suppose I have a doppelganger in twin earth. Let us also suppose that when I think my stomach is upset and he is thinking that my stomach is upset. In my utterance of my refers to me and in his expression of my is himself. So here we have different idiolects and different extension.

Searle believes that both these assumptions are false. He says if “intention” means intentional content then the intention of an indexical definition determines extension. Secondly, Searle says “if a man and his doppelganger have type-identical mental states, they both have different intentional content and conditions of satisfaction”.³³ He explains it by an example,

Suppose that John who habitats the earth in 1750 identifies “water” indexically. Likewise, twin John who lives on twin earth identifies “water” indexically. Let us also suppose that they both have type-identical of everything, their intentional contents, indexical definitions and their perceptual experiences. Since they have type identical structure, they give type-identical definition of ‘water’ which is defined as what the structure which is identical with the stuff, because they have type-identical perceptual experience. As Putnam says, we cannot identify the extension in terms of mental states.

Now Searle’s question is this: If John and twin John experience the same “water” how is it possible that they have different mental contents? And if they experience different “water”, how is it that they have the same mental content? They do not have identical types of mental content but they have token difference. Because intentional content is self-referent as explained in chapter 2. Their intentional content is different. The indexical definition of “water” as experienced by John on earth can be analyzed as whatever the structure causes John to have (visual) experience. Likewise, the same can be said of twin John: it is whatever the structure causes twin John’s experience. They both have type-identical experience but they both have different mental contents and their mental contents are different because the perceptual experience is self-referential in nature. Finally, Searle concludes that this theory does not have

³³ Searle John, *Intentionality; An Essay in the Philosophy of Mind*, in Cambridge University Press, London, UK, 1983, p. 198.

any result, that different speakers on earth do not mean different thing by “water”. Most of the people intend to use words what community at large mean and refer to. If one uses such public baptisms then he would normally involve the participant’s visual and other experience. Thus he concludes that though he accept Putnam’s argument, the argument put forth by the latter does not show that meanings are not in the head.

3.3 Moderate Version of Externalism

Externalism is widely spread in today’s philosophy. This thesis widely spread after article “the meaning of ‘meaning’” has published. In this article, Putnam criticizes the thesis meaning are internal to the mind and argues that “meanings are not in the head”. This thesis presents that “the meaning of many words, the contents of many concepts and propositional attitude are not determined by our mental states alone, rather the physical and social environment play a very important role for determining meaning”.³⁴ It follows that our mental states and its contents are not supervene on the brain states and its contents.

According to Frege sense determines reference. Sense is an abstract entity. It exists in third world. The sense is grasped by mind though. This view is perceived by many including Searle as problematic. If the ‘sense’ is an abstract entity and it exist in the third world, how can it be grasped? If grasping it is a difficulty, then how can it determine reference? Carnap says “the ontological status of intention is like sense”. Searle interprets as asserting that “intentions, that which is in the head set some conditions which anything has to meet in order to be part of the extension of the relevant intention”.³⁵ I will try to point out some stronger interpretation because of this thesis because of which intention is said to fully determine the conditions. I am using the expression “fully determination” as used by Amir Horowitz who says that “fully determination” means that intention does not leave any inadequacy for determination. As Searle says about this thesis, I believe that this is analytically true.³⁶ If the meaning is external and intention is in the

³⁴ Putnam, H., “The meaning of ‘meaning’”, in *Philosophical Papers*, Cambridge University Press, Vol. 2, Mind, Language and Reality 1975. P. 80.

³⁵ Searle John, *Intentionality; An Essay in the Philosophy of Mind*, Cambridge University Press, London, UK, 1983, P. 207.

³⁶ I use the expression “analytically true” because Searle uses “intention” for both “intentional content” (what is in the head) and meaning.

head then it is not such that it is analytically true. In what follows, I shall discuss where Putnam successfully presents the case where intention does not fully determine the conditions thereby exposing the vulnerability of the thesis advocated by Searle.

3.3.1 Twin earth argument (1)

In twin earth argument Putnam depicts a case where there is two identical “heads” it means that two people with same mental states. In this context, mental states are understood in its ‘narrow sense’. Putnam calls this as “methodological solipsism” (MS) in this sense mental states only determines its subject whom that mental state ascribed. “No mental states presupposes for the existence of any extensions”.³⁷ If it is the case then “what is in the head does not determine extensions”. I have described it earlier. I have already discussed Putnam's “Twin Earth” argument. So I will not repeat here. Thus here we have identical mental states and their extensions are different. According to Putnam content which determines extension is not in the head. Therefore the extension are not wholly determine by the intentionality of some mental states. So internalism is not true. Putnam says, “the difference of reference and content is because of environmental difference between these two situations”. In the first case Oscar's chemical structure of the ‘water’ is H₂O, where as in the second situation twin Oscar's microstructure of water is XYZ. I understand only because of microstructural differences which make both the reference and content differ.

Putnam believes that twin Oscar does not think about water that is H₂O. Some philosophers say he does think about H₂O while some other holds the opposite view. What is the reason for thinking that twin Oscar does not think about H₂O? Sometimes Putnam takes it for granted that twin Oscar does not refer to H₂O. However, he latter on thinks about it with an assumption that the natural kind of words like “water” are indexical in nature. He says the word “water” is obviously indexical an word like this, that, now, then etc. By this indexicality he criticized internalist thesis “intention determines extension”. Putnam claims that because of indexicality of ‘water’, we cannot say that it is the intention which determines extension. He says we do not apply indexicality for this thesis. The word “water” has an unnoticed component. Therefore the theory intention determines extension is false. We cannot index words like “I” as mentioned earlier. Like many other philosophers, Putnam believes that the theory that “intention determines extension” does not apply to indexical because the indexical is present in the utterance of the

³⁷ Putnam does not uses the term MS. I shall describe it in the last section.

speaker and the extension is determined by this indexical. He says, “their extension varies from context to context or token to token”.

I examine Putnam’s ‘indexical’ latter and show how his natural kind word like ‘water’ externally identified, I want to examine the obvious kinds of indexical. I will discuss about the essential indexical in the section 3.3.3.

3.3.2 Indexicality

Roughly speaking, an indexical is a linguistic expression whose meaning change from context to context, token to token. Example- ‘you’, ‘I’ ‘this’, ‘that’ etc. The indexical of ‘you’ may refer to my friend in one context but it may refer to another friend in another context. If two speakers- John and Sugy utter ‘I am happy’. John says that he is happy whereas Sugy says that she is happy. Many philosophers believe that indexicals have two sorts of meaning. The first one is called as ‘linguistic meaning’ or ‘character’ and second one is due to David Kaplan.³⁸ The second sort of meaning is often called ‘content’. By using this terminology, we can say “every indexical has a single unvarying character, but vary in context to context, token to token”. Indexicality has some similarities with Wittgenstein’s use theory of meaning in that its indexicality, like meaning, is determined by its context of use or utterance.

Considering Devid’s case,³⁹ let us suppose Devid is sitting on a chair in his room and there is a ball is before him. He is thinking about his ball. His indexical thought is “This ball is red”. Suppose in another situation he is thinking about his sister’s ball which is not different from his own and he says “This ball is red”. Here we have identical thoughts (non-intentionally described) and different thoughts (intentionally described) so “intention does not determine extension”.⁴⁰

I think that this is not a reasonable explanation for refuting the thesis “intention determines extension”. As Searle says, “it is a matter of fact about the world, whether or not some existing

³⁸ Kaplan, Devid, *Demonstratives: An Essay on the Semantics, Logic, Metaphysics, and Epistemology of Demonstratives and Other Indexicals*, The Pacific Division of the American Philosophical Association, 1989.

³⁹ Horowitz, Amir, “Putnam, Searle and Externalism” in *Springer, Philosophical Studies: An International Journal for Philosophy in the Analytic Tradition*, Vol. 81, No. 1, 1996.

⁴⁰ When I use “non-intentionally described” I discuss in Putnam’s view point. When I use “intentionally described” I discuss in Searle’s view point.

entities satisfy the intentional content”.⁴¹ My ball is red falls under an extension of the intention if and only if the world is such that my ball is red. As Horowitz says, whether it is red or not, it is a matter of fact. It is not up to intention whether or not the ball falls under the extension. This is different from Devid’s case. Devid’s intention determines the extension of ball because Devid’s intention about the ball and it relate to to that ball. But what is charecteristic of “this”. What Devid’s “this” concept refers to. Searle’s analyses of the content of such thought is that we have to be aware of the context of the utterance. The word ‘this’ is a relational informative word. It has a relation with the speaker or thinker or thinker location. The ball might be in front of thinker or thinker is pointing to the ball by his finger (in some cases where we select out intentional object by gesture). In Devid’s case the ball is in front of him. It is a fact about the world not a matter of utterance or intentional content or any indexicality. Due to the fact that ball is red, likewise the ball before Devid is an object of intention of ‘this’ thought. It is due to the matter of fact that the ball possesses the property of “in front of Devid”. One might say the ball is a relation with Devid, other might say it is a matter of context of the utterance. We can also think that the ball which is in front of Devid was kicked by Messi’s foot in the match against Spain. There is no problem on the side of properties by means of which we refer to the objecct. One might say the ball might be in different place or the ball might be yellow.

Does the intention really determine extension? Horowith says no because the intention is different and extension is different. There must be a relation between the intention and extension and what the intention has must be matched with the extension. In the above case, Horowitz finds no certain jjustification to conclude that “intention of an indexical thought does determine its extension”.⁴²

2. Let us recall the Devid’s case. He is sitting on a chair in his room and his ball is before him and he is thinking about his ball and said, ‘This ball is red’. Counterfactually let us suppose that he is in sister’s room and her ball is before him which is indistinguishable from his ball. And he says ‘This ball is red’. So it is same case of twin story as identical mental states and different extension. Let us now consider some objections. One objection is, What is reason for being an intentional object of Devid’s ‘this’ thought? It is because the ball is in front of him. Let us suppose that it is in different place P. If the ball is in P then the thesis “intention does not determine extension”. Since the intention of ‘this’ thought determines being in front of Devid. It means that external factor participate in the determination. The external factor of Devid’s location and his orientation does not determine by intention of ‘this’ thought. So as the iHorowitz

⁴¹ ⁴¹ Horowitz, Amir, “Putnam, Searle and Externalism” in *Springer, Philosophical Studies: An Intentnational* for Philosophy in the Analytic Tradition, Vol. 81, No. 1, 1996,p.22.

⁴² Horowitz, Amir, “Putnam, Searle and Externalism” in *Springer, Philosophical Studies: An Intentnational* for Philosophy in the Analytic Tradition, Vol. 81, No. 1, 1996,p.22.

says, “intention of the thought does not fully determine the property of object for being an intentional object”.⁴³

However, Horowitz thinks that this challenge is problematic. It is not the that the ball is in a certain place because of that it is intentional object. If the ball will move from that place to other than the ball is not object of intention of same thought because the ball is not before Devid. It might be an intentional object of a different thought or of a different intention. It is the property which makes the ball an intentional object. This shows that the ball is an intentional object while moving from one place to another place. But still we do not find strong justification to conclude that “the intention of indexical thought does not determine its extension”.

3.3.3 Indexical thoughts are singular thought.

Thought is single if it involves the object. The thought lacks its content when the object is not there. Some philosophers says “indexical thoughts are singular thoughts”. They are dependent upon object even if someone is hallucinating and thinks, “This dog is cute”. We cannot attribute his belief because there is no dog. This is not because of ‘this’. There might be the case where they do in which case we could have ascribed by saying that ‘That dog is cute’. Horowitz thinks that hallucinating does not suffer lack of content but it is false because he presupposes an existence of a dog in that place. We cannot ascribe these types of ascriptions because the ascriptions of belief has indexical which concerned an identity with the intentional objects and there is no intentional objects. Therefore we do not ascribe such types of belief while there where no object. This does not says that if someone says that, “This dog is cute”, either veridically or non-veridically he does not have belief. It is the belief-ascription which is transparent. The truth-condition depends on the world. The truth-condition of this belief is, there must be a dog in front of him and it be cute. One might protest that this explanation is existential while the belief is not. The truth-condition of belief does not determine by what is going on in the subjects’ mind. Explication of contents need not the description of first-person’s experience of the objects or state-of-affairs which the subject experiences. The contents are the property of the objects or state-of-affair by means of which the objects or states-of-affairs experience. The truth or falsity of every belief depends upon that object.

There is an objection of this discussion that we cannot explicate “This dog is cute”, because “the dog is rigid or directly referential”.⁴⁴ “This dog is cute” does not mean that the dog is in front of

⁴³ Horowitz, Amir, “Putnam, Searle and Externalism” in *Springer, Philosophical Studies: An Intentnational* for Philosophy in the Analytic Tradition, Vol. 81, No. 1, 1996,p.22.

⁴⁴ Kaplan uses the term “direct referential” for an expression whose semantical rules determine that its referentin all possible situations is its actual world. (Kaplan, 1989), Kripke uses ‘rigid’ in the same way.

me. It may refer to a dog which is in front of me in this world or any other possible worlds; it may be the case that the dog is before me in every possible world if it not in the actual world. The property of being before me (by means of which the object or dog referred to by “this”). It is not the property by which object has referred to by ‘cthis’.

This theory of rigidity seems to Horowitz as a singular thought if the belief is rigid. The dog is my intentional object, if there is a dog in front of me. It is my intentional object, if there had been another dog; that dog would have been in my intentional object. If there had been no dog, there would not have been any intentional object, and so there would be no content. We must observe the external world. The proposition what we get depends upon the world. Here it means “object determines content” unlike the view of internalists who hold that content determines object.

I also think that the object is what causes the content. As Searle says “in direction of causation- a belief has world-to-mind direction of causation and a desire has mind-to-world direction of causation. “It is the objects or state-of-affairs which cause the belief. But in desire, it is the desire itself which causes objects or state-of-affairs”.⁴⁵

This view of rigidity is problematic in my opinion. I would like to offer my argument as follows: The belief “This dog is cute” has content whether or not there is a dog before me in the actual world. In general, a belief has content whether or not the referred object exists. Let us assume that indexical function is rigid. If so, then they do not refer to something for being in front of someone. They may be true as far as referent is concern. If I say “This dog is cute” then it means that there is a dog in front of me and it is to be cute. This is only concerned with actual world referent and not in property or conditions (the object must satisfy in order to be referent) of constitutive content. There might be someone who accept that the which explains the objects is not the property which makes object as an intentional object. The protestors claim that this is an artificial move. What makes the object of the actual world to be an intentional object is not the fact that they are identical with the object in front of the subject but that the fact is the object is in front of the subject.

The above objection is wrong and not artificial at all. Horowitz believes that this seems to be artificial because we tend to conflate two role of external world. The first rule serves as context of what we of designator. The reference and truth-condition of sentence is fixed in all world. I refer Tom because Tom is before me. This is “the context of acquisition”. Second one is “context of evaluation” where truth condition of the sentence may differ from world to world. Tom is cute is one possible world and Tom is not cute in another possible world.

⁴⁵ See my discussion in chapter 2 point 2.4.

3. John Perry in his article gives an examples of “Hume and Haimson”.⁴⁶ Let us examine this example: “Suppose that Hume and Haimson have same sense and think same thought but the difference is that they do not apprehend the same thought when they entertain the same sense. For instance, when Heimson entertains the thought that “I am the author of the *Treatise*” and when Hume entertains the thought and say “I am the author of the *Treatise*”, Hume is right and Heimson is wrong or crazy. Thoughts are different in the world and these thoughts have different intentional object. Here same intention is there but extensions are not same. Here the indexical is “I”. Perry calls it as essential indexical. Perry says, “we can replace Hume and Heimson’s thought ‘I wrote the *Treatise*’ by ‘The author of the *Inquiry* wrote the *Treatise*’”.⁴⁷ But we cannot replace an indexical to non-indexical expression without thought losing its sensitivity which completes the determination and which determines the speaker and also the intentional objects. (Here the sensitivity is identity of the speaker.) Perry in his article “The problem of essential indexicals” shows that “essentiality of ‘I’ to the explanation of behavior”.⁴⁸ Perry explains it through an example,

Once he was following a sugar trail on a supermarket floor and looking for a shopper with a torn bag for telling him that he was making a mess. But he was unable to find that man. Latter he saw that he was holding a bag and he was the shopper and he was trying to catch himself. He believe that the shopper with torn bag was making a mess. But he was not believe that he is shopper. Then he stopped to follow the trail and rearrange the trail. His believe “I am the shopper” make him to do so.

Horowitz says that the essential indexical thoughts can differ in extension while sharing intention. It is not possible that same intentions explain different extension, it may be token difference that is indexicals. He says if the types of thoughts cannot explain extension then thoughts may be token difference.

In the above case of Hume, what is supposed to complete the determination? It is Hume thought which completes the determination. The content determination presupposes Hume. The content-determination also presupposes something other than the intention of Hume’s thought of “I wrote the *Treatise*”. This does not establish the viewpoint of externalism. The intention of the the speaker does not identify extension. It only determines the individual who is the thinking subject. This proves that meaning can be determined solipsistically. Thus the essential indexical like “I”

⁴⁶ Perry, John, “Frege on Demonstratives” in *Duke University Press*, Vol. 86, No. f4, 1977, P.488.

⁴⁷ Ibid., p. 487

⁴⁸ Ibid.p. 488

does not refer to any external things. Its reference is solipsistic. So Horowitz says, “The essential indexical thoughts are not external”.⁴⁹

The property that the extension has to satisfy if it to be intentional object of above Hume and Heimson’s thought is that whom thought belongs to. It looks alone. Here one question arises, who thinks above thought? This question has two level role: it asks how an object becomes an intentional? And what does object possess property? If we know the answer of the second and third question we know the answer of the first question. Here one might assume that the first question is asking about the thinker not about the property. The answer is the above all questions are asking for the identity of the thinker. If we do not know the intentional object, how would we know about the thinker. The oddness is because of the essentiality of “I”. If we place it with a non-indexical without violating the sensitivity of context, it will solve the problem of identity of thinker.

3.3.4 Twin Earth Argument (ii)

Now I am discussing about indexicality of Putnam. He takes the relation of ‘same L’ to determine extension. Putnam says that when anyone point to a finger to bucket of water and utters, “This is water”, he presumes the liquid identical with the “same L’ relation. In this community, the other speakers called that stuff as ‘water’. According to Putnam “x is water if and only if it bears the same L relation to that stuff call ‘water’ in the actual world”.⁵⁰ In order to establish externalism (the theory that believes in external thought). They must accept that the meaning of ‘water’ is determined ostensibly. This theory claims, an entity called as water if that entity identical with existing object in external world what subject denotes to by ‘this’. This is called as indexical in Putnam’s view.

We have seen that the indexicality comes with certain mental states. Putnam is unable to convince us with his ‘same L’ relation. If the ‘same L’ designates the observable property of water as H₂O (or XYZ) then the Putnam’s twin earth argument will not establish externalism because the reference of both Oscars are same. Here Putnam uses the microstructure for

⁴⁹ Horowitz, Amir, “Putnam, Searle and Externalism” in *Springer, Philosophical Studies: An International Journal for Philosophy in the Analytic Tradition*, Vol. 81, No. 1, 1996, p. 38.

⁵⁰ Putnam, H., “The meaning of ‘meaning’”, in *Philosophical Papers*, Cambridge University Press, Vol. 2, Mind, Language and Reality 1975. P. 80.

determination of its extension. If so then H₂O is water while not XYZ. Because it simply absence of property of H₂O. I have a question as to why Putnam takes only microstructure for determining extension. Perhaps that is the way of the scientists and I believe nothing can prevent them to define 'water' by using its microstructure. If someone ask me what water is, perhaps I can also define it by using its microstructure. But if I do not know about chemistry, I can define water by its observable properties. Here I wants to say that this or that way is possible. One has free to explain 'water' by its chemical structure or by any perceivable property. There cannot be any restriction as to how we define our words or concepts. All that is needed is perhaps the explicitness or objectivity of the subject's description of his belief.

I support Horowitz who believes that Searle thesis 'intention determines extension' is inadequate. Searle interprets his thesis as "intention sets certain conditions which anything has to meet in order to be the part of the extension of the relevant intention".⁵¹ This appears trivial in that it does not clearly tell us whether the intention determines those conditions; I mean if the intention can fully determine the conditions. By fully, I mean whether or not it leaves any question open; it should not. In other word, does it leave any indeterminacies? I am convinced that just by setting conditions, the intention can fully determine the extension. So the thesis 'intention determines extension' does not mean intention fully determines extension. If it is not, then Searle's position can, at best, be interpreted or treated only trivially. As Horowitz interprets, if this thesis is to be interpreted non-trivially, then it is not true.

As opposite to the intention of "the writer of Republic", Intention of "identical structure with this stuff" not fully explain object. It leaves some indeterminacy, namely, the structure of 'this' stuff. Here we are not concerned about the knowledge of the subject but we are concerned about the structure of "this" stuff. We argued that the intention of "the identical structure with this stuff" not fully explain property of which the extension has to obtain if it has to fall under its extension. What about Putnam's TE story? I mean what finishes determination in the case of the TE story? There, "these" stuffs mean "the structure of H₂O and the structure of XYZ". If Oscars knew about H₂O and XYZ, then they would use the knowledge when they think about their respective "water" in which case their intentions would determine extension. Here the intention is no longer the "identical structure with this stuff", but with the context, environment, in general, the actual world facts which complete the determination. Here the intention "identical structure with this stuff" and extra-mental facts fully determine its extension.

Now let us imagine God's viewpoint. If God looks into Oscar's head when he is thinking about "the stuff which microstructure of this is wet". Will he think about water or gin? Assume that Oscar knows the microstructure of both water and gin. In order to know whether Oscar is

⁵¹ Searle John, *Intentionality; An Essay in the Philosophy of Mind*, Cambridge University Press, London, UK, 1983

thinking about water or gin, God has to look at his mind and the world as well for know what Oscar refers to by 'this'. God looks at Oscars' mind to see what he is thinking and looks at the world to know about the microstructure of the "water" and "gin". God cannot know the content of what Oscars are thinking because the content is not there in their heads. Thus the extra-mental facts is that by virtue of that completes explanation of extension of thought. Here Horowitz is not saying, as Searle says, that it is a matter of fact that which is possessed by an object to meet the conditions set by intention in order to be a part of the extension of that intention. Here Horowitz is rather saying that the property of the object is a matter of fact (external). What *the property* is is itself (partly) a fact of world. It is not determined by intention. Thus, the meanings are not fully determined by external facts, sometime it is in the head.

Horowitz at first accepts Searle's point which states that the extension of an intention is a set of things which it has to satisfy to be a part of extension of that intention. Here we can talk about "whatever test" of Horowitz which are of two type. The first 'whatever' is the "property of object" which is defined as 'water' that is identical with the form of "this". The first 'whatever' signify fact of the world whether object is in extension of intention. It is like internalism. The second 'whatever' concerns about property which has to be satisfied by an object in order to part of the extension of that intention. Here the property means what is the chemical structure that an extension has to possess if it is to be an object of intention of thought. This property support by the form of "this". The property also depends upon external facts. The first 'whatever' is the structure of 'this' which is the content which is in the head. And the second 'whatever' is the property itself, the conditions which the object has to satisfy. It is external to the mind. So the second 'whatever' is incompatible with externalism. It is the intention which determines which possible fact can complete the determination. Intention determines the context of the content which completes the determination. Here intention is like an open sentence which finds the way to complete the determination.

In the "twin earth" argument, intention plays a role to determine the microstructure of "water" which completes the content-determination. Here the content is the microstructure of "water". Intention is in mind in sense that mental states supervene brain-states which play important role for explaining the content. This approach of content determination is like the intuition of narrow-content. According to Fodor, "determination of extension is relative to context" and the narrow content is explained by the context of the reference. But in my opinion, everything cannot be determined by the context alone. In narrow content, this is narrow content itself which identify context. But in our case context is an fact of world among the possible facts that is explained by the intention.

If we sum up the above views, we get what may be termed as a middle path in between internalism and externalism, more flexible than Putnam's externalism. In our version, narrow content which is in mind explains the possible facts, one among them completes the reference

explication. Moreover, it also explains whether thought is external or internal. Putnam externalism does not give this type of middle path. In Putnam's writing we find that he rejects the notion of narrow content. Narrow content is not referential but a semantic. So it needs a strong interpretation for its relation with the environment. Narrow content determines a certain limited facts which determine reference. I shall defend this view later on in last section.

Putnam claims that it is the indexicals of Oscars' thoughts which determine their referents. But in Putnam's externalism, "indexicality is neither a sufficient condition nor a necessary condition"⁵². It is not sufficient condition because we have known that indexicality does not depend upon external facts. This is only true when we use indexicals. To know the indexical property of "I", does not involve the external world. Indexical thoughts can be external. Recall the Devid's example, "This" is a thought of the ball; indexical could be external if it involves descriptive element. The descriptive element decides whether or not the indexical is external.

Putnam does involve indexical in the "twin earth" argument. It is not because thoughts are external, but because both Oscars share the same intention and different extension. There is no way, as I maintained before, thoughts of same intention can result in different extension. If different type of thoughts do not explain extension then thought would have different in token. It must be different tokens. The extension may be numerically different or token different. If there were no microstructure difference then there would be no different extension. It is the contents (microstructure of 'this') that determine the extension. The determination is possible through microstructures. In other words, at times, determination is possible without indexical. So indexicality is not necessary for externalism.

3.3.5 The elm and beech argument.

Let's see the elm and beech argument of Putnam and Searle's response to it. The concepts of 'elm' and 'beech' are same in Putnam's idiolect but the extension of both trees are different in the external world. So we have here the same case as TE: same intention and different extension. Searle says that Putnam knows, the extension of both trees are different because Hillary (the speaker) knows that both trees are different. According to Searle, this knowledge is conceptual. It means that Putnam knows that the concept of 'elm' is different from the concept of 'beech'. In Putnam's intuition since the concept of 'elm' and 'beech' are identical, Horowitz says, "it should refer to a real psychological item not a semantic item".⁵³ In Searle's intuition, the concepts of

⁵² Horowitz, Amir, "Putnam, Searle and Externalism" in *Springer, Philosophical Studies: An International Journal for Philosophy in the Analytic Tradition*, Vol. 81, No. 1, 1996, p. 38.

⁵³ It is Horowitz opinion, he uses 'should refer' not 'refer' because he wonders when Seale says conceptual knowledge he (Searle) has in mind something semantic. He (Amir) gives his view below. He thinks that Putnam is guilty for his similar confusion.

‘elm’ and ‘beech’ are different. Both Searle and Putnam assume that these two concepts are different. They do not argue about, what that concept have? It seems that Searle is correct. They both quarrel about how these concepts determine extension. It is simply not possible that an identical concepts (non-intentional described) of a thinker in same all respect (linguistic, physical, psychological etc.) have different extensions. Nothing can explain the difference. Even if it is taken for granted that Putnam’s ‘elm’ and ‘beech’ are determined by the experts’ use of ‘elm’ and ‘beech’, when Putnam appeals to botanist’s ‘elm’ and ‘beech’, the concepts of Putnam will be different because the concepts of botanist are different and these concepts determine different extension. When Putnam appeals to botanist, he (botanist) does not give him wrong answer. He does not say these two are identical. He has different concepts of ‘elm’ and ‘beech’. So Putnam’s concepts (non-intentionally describe) of both trees are different.

Putnam responds to the above claim: “there is no difference in mental representation of elm and beech, only the difference is in phonetic names”.⁵⁴ Searle is ready to accept this claim but insists that it does not refute his contention that “it is not possible for two identical mental representation to differ in contents in same environment in all respects ... difference in phonetic shape is difference in mental representation ... it is the individualistic of Putnam’s head which determines extension and it is due to his ignorance that he has the same contents. An ignorant content is not a content at all”.⁵⁵ In fact, Putnam has content of ‘elm’ in his head, but it need not represents the elms, rather it may represent beech because there is no connection between the content ‘elm’ and beech.

As Searle says it is the concept that is responsible for the representation of different extension. The experts have distinct concepts of both trees. Putnam’s concepts of ‘elm’ and ‘beech’ are only in difference in type. When the Putnam’s concept of ‘elm’ appeal to the experts’ concept of ‘elm’ and knows that the concepts of both trees are different. These different concepts determined extension. The different extensions would not have determined, if there had been no difference between the concepts. As I say before intention determines which possible facts match with the intentional objects. It is the phonetic shapes which is different in Putnam intuition. So the intention of Putnam’s ‘elm’ determines the experts’ usage of ‘elm’ and intention of Putnam’s ‘beech’ explains usage of experts’ ‘beech’. That different usage determine the extensions of ‘elm’ and ‘beech’. In this case the intention is the narrow content. In Horowitz view “....(narrow

⁵⁴ Putnam Hillary, 1988 p. 29

⁵⁵ Horowitz, Amir, “Putnam, Searle and Externalism” in *Springer, Philosophical Studies: An International Journal for Philosophy in the Analytic Tradition*, Vol. 81, No. 1, 1996, p. 38.

content) meaning of ‘elm’ used by Putnam is like that which is called elm by English speaker”.⁵⁶ If it is the case then we can say the meaning of Hindi word ‘chirabel’ is “the species of tree what the Hindi speaker call as ‘chirabel’”. It is mistaken by translate ‘elm’ and ‘chirabel’. The translation of words of different language is different from translation of words which is used by different language speakers. In this case we only know the explicit meaning of that word. We cannot know what is going on in their head. If we request the English, Hindi speaker experts then we will not face this type of problem of translation. However, the question is still not clear, whether the meaning of Putnam’s ‘elm’ is same as ‘chirabel’ of Hindi speaker who is also knowledgeable about Botany. “It looks absurd”.⁵⁷ Different language speakers can think about the same thought and can represent the same thing. I think that Putnam’s ‘elm’ mean that what is English speaker calls as ‘elm’ and other language speaker language speaker translate ‘elm’ in their language. This must be correct because no English speaker can represent elm by saying beech.

Putnam gives another argument for criticizing the thesis ‘intention determines extension’ without any assumption of identical concepts. This argument depends on social and physical environment. In this argument, Putnam tells us to suppose molybdenum and aluminum pots and pans are indistinguishable save by experts. The aluminum pots and pans are made of molybdenum in twin earth. Furthermore, on twin earth ‘aluminum’ calls as molybdenum and vice versa. So when both Oscars utter term ‘aluminum’, they have identical mental states. When Oscar uses the term ‘aluminum’ he means ‘aluminum’ whereas, when twin Oscar uses the term ‘aluminum’ he means molybdenum. Thus meanings, contents do not determined solipsistically. Horowitz says, “what is responsible for different meanings and contents? Here the psychological states and concepts are not responsible. It is because of their linguistic community that the meanings are different. It means that Oscars communities are responsible for different meanings”.⁵⁸

⁵⁶ Amir says that Hilary may have known that elm is deciduous tree or he may have seen something which is resembles with elm.

⁵⁷ To know the meaning of an we have to realize what is going on in the head. Then we can translate the ‘elm’ to ‘chirabel’ because we know the explication of ‘elm’ and we know it is applicable for explication of ‘chirabel’.

⁵⁸ Here we can ignore the physical and social environment for influencing to determine the meaning.. Putnam does not give any explanation what is the relation between social and physical environment for determining the meaning. In this case what one means by any word is determined by his linguistic community.(introduction to Petit and McDowell, 1986, p. 8)

This argument does not clear the idea whether we have same psychological states with distinct language communities or different mental states with same linguistic community. As Searle says, when he overlooked regarding elm and beech argument, “what is in the head regarding elms and beeches does not suffice for making one think about elms and beeches, external factors (external to Hilary’s mind, in this case) must play a role”. Searle observes that Putnam must assume the experts’ intentions of elm and beech to determine the extension of elm and beech.⁵⁹ In my opinion, regardless of Searle’s response, he does not fully refute the above argument nor defend his position. Considering the above discussions, I am inclined to think that there are some thoughts whose content in the head cannot fully determine extension. To this extent, I believe that externalism in the moderate sense is both defensible and plausible.

3.4 Conclusion

In this chapter, I have taken a position that neither Searle nor Putnam is wholly correct in their respective views. But again neither is fully wrong in their views. When we consider their arguments, especially the thought experiments of Putnam and the responses of Searle, there are elements of truth that can be gained from both. Accordingly, I have taken a view which can be termed as moderate externalism.

⁵⁹ Searle John, *Intentionality; An Essay in the Philosophy of Mind*, Cambridge University Press, London, UK, 1983, PP. 201-202.

CONCLUSION

We have noted that Searle's theory of language is related to his theory of mind. His works in the philosophy of language is therefore better read as a branch of the philosophy of mind. For developing his theory of language, he initially supported the speech act theory of Austin. However, he developed further the speech act theory by critically analyzing Austin's works. While Austin's approach is a conventional one, Searle's approach to speech acts is intentional. In Austin's approach, we understand the utterance of words if we know the conventional meaning. In Searle's approach, we understand an utterance if we understand the intention of the speaker.

We have noted that intentionality plays the central role in the speech act theory of Searle. To know the meaning we have to know the intention of the speaker. There are many other concepts which we have to know in order to understand the speech acts. They are illocutionary force, propositional content, conditions of satisfaction, direction of fit, direction of causation and so on.

For Searle, intentionality and speech acts have an analogous structure. They both have propositional content, psychological state or illocutionary force, conditions of satisfaction, direction of fit. They both have propositional content, psychological state or illocutionary force, conditions of satisfaction, direction of fit and so on. Searle argues that meaning is possible when the conditions of satisfaction of intentionality impose on the conditions of satisfaction of speech acts. The conditions of satisfaction of speech acts and intentionality are identical. The conditions of satisfaction of meaning are different from the conditions of satisfaction of speech acts and intentionality. Meaning conditions can be satisfied even if the world is not in that way. But the conditions of satisfaction of speech acts and intentionality can be satisfied if and only if the world is in the same way. Here one problem arises as to what conditions the object or the state-of-affairs have to satisfy. Searle does not give adequate answer. But I found this answer from discussions of Searle and Putnam including Amir Horowitz whose view helped me to develop my approach

Putnam being an externalist, he rejects the thesis of internalism that 'intention determines extension'. For this, he offered his seminal thought experiments, viz., the 'twin earth argument' and the 'elm and beech argument'. In Putnam's "twin earth" argument, it is the microstructure which determines extension and the microstructure is not in the mind but outside the mind. In response to these arguments of Putnam, Searle initially and tentatively accepts these arguments for the sake of discussion but then goes on to show that these arguments do not really prove that intention does not determine extension. Putnam faces this problem because he underestimated what is in the head that determines extension. In a way, Searle has defended somewhat successfully the criticism of Putnam. The responses of Searle made Putnam to see that his theses face some problem too. So he brings in another concept for defending his theses. The notion is

indexicality. Putnam says it is the indexicality of words which determine the extension. Putnam says it is through indexicality that the extension is determined. He says all natural kind words are obviously indexical. He says indexicals are present in the utterance of the speaker. Again, Searle put forth his counter-argument by saying that indexicals do play a role in determining the extension but they are present in the head, not in the external world like rocks and tables. Indexicals come with intention. Accordingly, he concludes that intention determines extension.

Horowitz accepts Searle's claim that indexical comes with intention and at the same time criticized Putnam's view that "indexicals are present in the utterance of the speaker". We have seen the argument of Horowitz that it is not through the indexical, we know the meaning. He rather says that it is the content or microstructure which determines the extension. Horowitz goes on to argue that it is the object that determines the content unlike the view of the internalists who hold that the content determines the object. He puts a rhetorical question on the internalists: Does intention fully determine extension? To this, he gives his own response that intention does not fully determine extension. There always remains an element of indeterminacy. We need social and physical environment for determination too. It means that he takes both internalists and externalist viewpoints. He says that intention plays a role like an open sentence which finds its way to determine an object. It means that intention determines extension through the content. He accepts the narrow content which is in the head.

I have taken side with Horowitz. He not only pointed out the weak points of both Searle and Putnam but also capitalized on their strong points. Somewhat taking clues from Horowitz, I hold the view that it is not only the object that determines the content but also content determines the object. There is a two way relation in the determination of extension. While accepting the approach taken by Searle, I find that there is some problem in Searle philosophy- How the content-determination is possible? Or what are the conditions which an object have to satisfy? These are not adequately addressed by Searle. Interestingly, I found reasonable answers to the above questions in the works of Putnam and Horowitz. Besides, the exchange of views between Searle and Putnam helped me to understand these questions better. Horowitz points out defects in these two philosophers and offered his solutions as well. By these points, he developed a moderate version of externalism, a view I have gradually come to support and embrace in this work. However, Horowitz' moderate version of externalism has some problem too. Though his approach is an internalist approach, he calls his philosophy as moderate externalism. This is confusing. The only difference I find between internalist and Horowitz is that he accepts that the external world plays an important role in content-determination. The rest appears to be an internalist stance. So in my opinion his philosophy may be more appropriately termed as moderate internalism as opposed to my own view, which is moderate externalism.

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Mind and Language: An Enquiry in the Theory of Meaning Special Reference to John Searle

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Introduction

Analytic philosophy has developed at the beginning of the 20th century. In analytic philosophy two trends emerged, namely, ideal language philosophy and ordinary language philosophy. Frege and Russell are ideal language philosophers. Wittgenstein, Strawson, Searle and Austin are ordinary language philosophers. Wittgenstein says all philosophical problems arise due to the misunderstanding of language. In his use theory of meaning, he uses context for determining the meaning. Philosophy of language is broadly and primarily concerned with meaning. The main problem of philosophy of language is the possibility of meaning. Different philosophers give different answers. Wittgenstein says it is through the use of language in a context that we get to know the meaning of our linguistic expressions. There is no fixed meaning of words. Many philosophers generally accept this view and develop their own approaches towards the semantic study of language. In this work, I will engage with the approach taken by John Searle.

After the publication of Gettier's seminal paper [1] two types of theory of knowledge developed. One is internalism and the other is externalism. Searle is a radical internalist. Searle's main philosophical insight is, linguistic philosophy is a branch of philosophy of mind. He says that to understand the meaning of a sentence, we have to understand the intention of the speaker. He accepts J.L. Austin's speech act theory and builds his own theory around it. He says meaning is possible only when we utter words. When someone utters a sentence we know the intention of the speaker. By knowing the intention we know the meaning.

The primary aim of this dissertation is to offer a view of meaning along the line developed by Austin and Searle. Without totally agreeing with them nor disagreeing with them, I have borrowed insights from their works and defended a view which I term it as Moderate Externalism. This view developed after engaging with Hillary Putnam's arguments against Searle's internalist position. In general, I

will be looking at some other questions such as how mind relates to the world? How is meaning possible? How language relates to reality? Etc. In order to discuss these questions, I begin with the discussions of Searle's views and approaches. But towards the end of this work, I try to develop and offer my own account.

As noted above, one issue in the study of philosophy of language is the relation of language with mind. Here Searle is of the view that the theory of language is a part of the theory of mind. When it comes to the semantic theory of language, he supports speech acts of theory of Austin in general. Austin's speech act theory is a conventional one. Searle's approach to speech act theory is intention-oriented. In Austin's speech acts theory, we understand the utterance if we know the conventional meaning of linguistic expressions. In Searle's approach, we understand the utterance of a speaker if we get to know the intention of the speaker. In this work, as noted above, I will be mostly engaging with the works of Searle.

Intentionality plays an important role in the speech act theory of Searle. To know the meaning we have to understand the intention of the speaker. There are many other concepts which we have to understand in order to understand the speech acts. They are illocutionary force, propositional content, conditions of satisfaction, direction of fit, direction of causation, etc. Searle says intentionality and speech acts have an analogous structure. They both have propositional content, psychological state or illocutionary force, conditions of contentment, direction of fit and so on. Searle argues that meaning is possible when the conditions of contentment of intentionality impose on speech act's conditions. The conditions of contentment of speech acts and intentionality are identical. The conditions of contentment of meaning are different from the state of satisfaction of speech acts and intentionality. Meaning conditions can be satisfied even if the world is not in that way. But the conditions of contentment of speech acts and intentionality can be satisfied if and only if the world is in the same way. Here one problem arises as to what conditions the object or the state-of-affairs have to satisfy. Searle does not give adequate answer. But I found this answer from discussions of Searle and Putnam including Amir Horowitz whose view helped me to develop my approach.

Putnam is an externalist. He rejects the thesis of internalism that intention explains extension. For this, he offered his seminal thought experiments, viz., the 'twin earth argument' and the 'elm and beech argument'. In Putnam's "twin earth" argument, microstructure which explains extension and the microstructure is not in the mind but outside the mind. In response to these arguments of Putnam, Searle initially and tentatively accepts these arguments for the sake of discussion but then goes on to show that these arguments do not really prove that intention does not determine extension. Putnam faces this problem because he underestimated mental state which explains extension. In a way, Searle has defended somewhat successfully the criticism of Putnam. The responses of Searle made Putnam to see that his theses face some problem too. So he brings in another concept for defending his theses. The notion is indexicality. Putnam says it is the indexicality of words which determine the extension. Putnam says it is through indexicality that the extension is determined. He says all natural kind words are obviously indexical. He says indexicals are present in the utterance of the speaker. Again, Searle put forth his counter-argument by saying that indexicals do play a role in determining the extension but they are present in the head, not in the external world like rocks and tables. Indexicals come with intention. Accordingly, he concludes that intention determines extension.

Horowitz accepts Searle's claim that indexical comes with intention and at the same time criticized Putnam's view that indexical are in the utterance of the sentence. Then he takes some help from John Perry's articles [2] and "The Problem of Essential Indexicals" which I discuss briefly in the third chapter. Horowitz argues that it is not through the indexical, we know the meaning. He rather says that it is the content or microstructure which determines the extension. Horowitz goes on to argue that it is the object that determines the content unlike the view of the internalists who hold that the content determines the object. He puts a rhetorical question on the internalists: Does intention fully determine extension? To this, he gives his own response that intention does not fully determine extension. There always remains an element of indeterminacy. We need social and physical environment for determination too. It means that he takes both internalists

and externalist viewpoints. He says that intention plays a role like an open sentence which finds its way to determine an object. It means that intention determines extension through the content. He accepts the narrow content which is in the head.

I accept Horowitz' views. He accepts both Searle's than Putnam's views. He accepts Searle's contention that "intention sets some conditions for determination of extension". He also accepts the narrow content approach of Searle. But he is not convinced that intention can fully determine extension. It is here that he accepts the views of Putnam (Putnam is an externalism). Like Horowitz, I hold the view that it is not only the object that determines the content but also content determines the object. There is a two way relation in the determination of extension. To understand this two way relationship, I took help from the works of Searle. In belief content, it is the object which determines the content. In desire content, it is the content which determines the object. Suppose I have a belief that it is raining. It is an object or state-of-affairs which causes me to believe that it is raining. Suppose I am hungry, I have a desire to take some food. It is my desire that causes me to take some food. These technical relations (upward and downward) are introduced and explained in the second chapter.

Through the speech acts mind relates to the world. The speech act is kind of human action. The strength of speech acts is represents the objects and state-of-matters. It has also the capacity to express the mental states (belief, desire). Speech acts are like object or state-of-affairs. Their strength is not intrinsic but it derived from the intentionality of the mind. Intentionality is intrinsic in the mind. When an agent uses a sentence or make a mark on the paper or ask a question, he does not only use sentences, he expresses his belief, desire, etc. A sentence is only a syntactical object where the representational capacity imposed: belief, desire, etc. All of these facts proves that language is a social phenomenon and intentionality is underlying on it.

While accepting the approach taken by Searle, I find that there is some problem in Searle philosophy- How the content-determination is possible? What is the

content? Is it a narrow or broad content? What are the conditions which an object have to satisfy? Is communication possible without representation? These are not adequately addressed by Searle. Interestingly, I found reasonable answers to the above questions in the works of Putnam and Horowitz. Besides, the exchange of views between Searle and Putnam helped me to understand these questions better. In Horowitz's article, [3], he presents the arguments of Putnam and the responses of Searle. In these arguments and responses, Horowitz tries to point out some problem and the solution of these two philosophers. By these points, he developed a moderate version of externalism, a view I have gradually come to support and embrace in this work. However, Horowitz' moderate version of externalism has some problem too. Though his approach is an internalist approach, he calls his philosophy as moderate externalism. This is confusing. The only difference I find between internalist and Horowitz is that he accepts that the external world plays an important role in content-determination. The rest appears to be an internalist stance. So in my opinion his philosophy may be more appropriately termed as moderate internalism. He believes that what is in the head determines contents and references. He also argued about the indexical. He says that the essential indexical or obviously indexical is not necessarily external. He says that indexical always comes with intention.

To get back to the overall attempt of this thesis, the key concepts of discussion in this work are intentionality, meaning, extension, content-determination, speech acts, and indexicality. Having noted the above, I have organized my thoughts and structured my dissertation as follows:

In my first chapter, I am dealing with speech acts of Searle. I discuss the types of speech acts, illocutionary act, illocutionary force, propositional content, predication, and reference. In the second chapter, I connect the speech acts with the theory of intentionality. Here I explain how intention plays a role in determining meaning, how intentionality connects with the speech acts, etc. Also I explain various terms like the conditions of contentment, direction of fit, direction of causation, and meaning. In third chapter, I examine whether or not the meaning is in the head. There I discuss the arguments of Putnam and the responses of Searle. Following this, I discuss the Horowitz discussion of the views of Searle and

Putnam. I basically accept the views of Horowitz. However, I partly deviate from his views to develop my own view of moderate externalism.

Chapter 1

SPEECH ACTS

1.1 Introduction:

In this chapter, I mainly concern about Searle's works on ⁴speech acts. Though the theory of speech act was originally developed by J.L. Austin and I will refer to some of his works, I will not look into his work in details since John R. Searle accepted Austin's speech act theory in general and the central tenets of speech acts theory which are commonly shared by both of them will be highlighted and explained in this chapter. Important concepts and categories like locutionary act, illocutionary act and perlocutionary acts will be explained. In addition, I will also try to discuss certain other related words like proposition, predication, reference, etc. In short, I will highlight the importance of speech act theory as advocated by Austin and Searle to understand better the semantic question of language.

1.2 Why do we need a speech act?

In the literature, we find many theories of language, especially semantic theories. However, most of them are interested in conventional meanings of sentences. They rarely touch upon issues of what may be called speech acts. Speech acts deal with expressions such as request, apology, order, and so on. In order to deal with such expressions, J.L. Austin and John R. Searle developed their theories of speech act.

Searle claims that "speaking a language is a rule-governed form of behavior".¹ Speaking a language is to know the rules and intentional behavior".² In other words, when we speak, we are performing an act which involves rules including intention. Uttering meaningful words will always involve intention or intentional behavior. Intentional behavior in this context means purposeful use of words to achieve or effect certain results or goal and it is directed towards a listener. Examples-the act of making a promise, giving an order, asking a question, etc. When we critically try to understand our use of language, we realize that linguistic communication does

London, UK, 1970, p. 16

not only involve symbols, rules, words or sentence but also the performance of symbols, words and sentences in the form of sounds and bodily expressions of both the listener and speaker. To get this one has to understand the difference between linguistic communication and other non-linguistic activities of human beings or natural phenomena in the world. Searle says, “when I make a noise or put some mark on a piece of paper as an instance of linguistic communication”,³ I assume that this noise or mark on a piece of paper is accompanied by certain kind of intention. For example, suppose you are going out while it is raining without realizing that “it is raining” and I say “It is raining”. Why did I utter those words? I want to convey something meaningfully to affect your behavior or action. It is not simply a truth claim I am making. Rather I intent to communicate to you that you wait for some time till the rain stops or take an umbrella with you. A linguistic communication is not like natural phenomena – book, table, chairs, events, process, etc. What makes linguistic communication unique is the presence of intention in it. Without involving intention, mere sounds or symbols will not by themselves become a language. In other words, intention is the heart and soul of language.

The term “speech act” itself suggests that it is not just sound or symbols; It involves some action or act. It is a performance. It is something done with the involvement of intention. In that sense, it is the intersection of the theory of language and theory of action. As a matter of fact, Searle proposed that a theory of language is better understood as a part and parcel of a theory of action. A language is a rule-governed form of behavior. And since it is a rule-governed activity, a formal study of language is not only possible but necessary. However rules are not to be limited to abstract theory of language that is, symbols, syntax, semantics, etc. Rules are there to be played or to be used. So there is a component of an act or practicality. In other words, if Saussurian approach is concerned with ‘langue’ in the more abstract sense (structure, grammatical rule, theory), Searle is more concerned with ‘parole’ (speaking, practice). Searle argues that without adequate theory of langue, speech act is not possible. Searle claims that communication necessary involves speech act. He also claims that “whatever can be meant can be said”.⁴ This is termed as the “principle of expressibility”. Communication is possible through speech acts. To put it in a stronger wording, without speech acts communication is not possible and vice-versa.

One may ask, is it a meaning theory or a speech acts that Searle has developed? To this, Searle maintains that “there is no two types of semantic study, that is, theory of meaning and theory of speech act. Theory of meaning is a part of speech act theory. A literal utterance of a sentence in certain context would go on to define its meaning”.⁵ It is the performance of speech acts by

which meaning becomes possible and dynamic. When we perform a speech act, we are uttering a sentence with certain rules and intention and this intention and rules make the meaning possible. When we utter something we mean it. The meaning is possible when we utter the sentence.

To summarize the above point, the study of the speech acts theory and the theory of meaning are not two separate studies; they are one which can be looked at from two different points of view. They are not competing theories but rather they complement each other; one is not possible without the other. They go together.

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1.3 Locutionary Acts

A locutionary act is the basic act of producing a meaningful expression through an utterance. For example, someone's utterance "It is raining outside". Normally our expressions or utterances are about something; they refer to something. When we express our thought with reference to something, it can be called a locutionary act. Locutionary act can be explained even in relation Frege's notion of reference or Wittgenstein's notion of picture theory of meaning or Russell's theory of description. Prior to development of Austin's speech act theory, linguistic philosophers in general were mainly concern with locutionary act in that sense. However, locutionary act is not the main concern of speech acts theory though it is a part of this theory. It is simple and requires hardly any explanation since much of the conceptualization was done by thinkers mentioned earlier. However, speech acts theory picks up from there to probe deeper into more subtle and complex aspect of meaning which are categorized as illocutionary and perlocutionary acts. It may be pointed out that a locutionary act could also at the same perform the function of illocutionary act or perlocutionary act. For e.g. I say "I order you to leave the room". When the person whom I addresses to fails to hear me, she will not leave the room. In this case, though I successfully performed a locutionary act, I am unsuccessful in performing the illocutionary act. I am successful in performing locutionary act because I uttered some meaningful expressions. However, if my interlocutor hears me and moved out of the room, then I have certainly succeeded in performing an illocutionary act. The above example explicates the distinction between a normal utterance and performance⁵ of an illocutionary act. This distinction can also be seen as a distinction between literal meaning on the one hand and using the illocutionary force on the other hand. Further, if I utter the same expression to insult her, my interlocutor, in front of others, and if she (the hearer) hears the utterance and got ashamed or angry because of the effect of my words in front of others, then this effect in the listener is termed as perlocutionary act. In this sense, perlocutionary act is listener oriented as it is defined by the kind of effect it has on the listener due to my utterance. More will be said on illocutionary and perlocutionary acts in the subsequent paragraphs.

Austin divided the locutionary act into three categories, namely, phonetic acts, phatic acts, and rhetic act. The first one the phonetic acts are the uttering or producing some sound. For e.g. "Hurrah" or "Hey". The second one the phatic acts are the uttering some vocabularies using the grammar to express some meaning. For e.g., He said, "The book is on the table". The rhetic act is uttering some meaningful vocabularies to make certain definite sense and reference. For e.g., He said that the book was on the table. The performance of the locutionary act determines its meaning without any intention. It has only a conventional meaning. When it is mixed with some force, it will become an illocutionary act. Illocutionary act determines its meaning through intention. Locutionary meaning is literal meaning. The meaning is in the utterance, it does not go beyond the utterance.

However, this distinction between locutionary and illocutionary act was not accepted by Searle. He says that what has been termed by Austin as locutionary act is essentially an illocutionary. He only accepts the phonetic and phatic acts in locutionary acts.. Any meaningful performance of a speech act comes with a force. Searle says that any verb phrase of rhetic acts invariably contains an illocutionary verb. For e.g. "He told me to do x". Here the verb 'told' contains a very general illocutionary force. Other verbs related to speech acts like order, command, request, apologize etc. contain illocutionary force too. As a matter of fact, he argues that all rhetic acts verbs have illocutionary force. So rhetic act is invariably contained in the illocutionary act. Searle asserts that every sentence is potentially contained in some illocutionary act. For e.g. interrogative, imperative etc. In holding this view, he does not accept the rhetic act of Austin. He says there is no locutionary utterance which is opposed to or distinct or separable from an illocutionary act.

1.4 Illocutionary Acts

Imagine a speaker and a hearer who are talking with each other and using these following sentences in appropriate situations:-

- 1) Rocky holds the bottle.
- 2) Does Rocky hold the bottle?
- 3) Rocky, hold bottle.
- 4) Would that Rocky hold the bottle.

In the above sentences, one thing is common that all words are in the English language. In the utterance of 1 speaker makes an assertion and in utterance of 2 the speaker is asking a question in the utterance of 3, the speaker is giving an order and in the utterance of 4, the speaker is expressing a wish. There is something common in these sentences: the speaker refers to a person called Rocky. Also the speaker predicates an expression 'holds bottle' to Rocky. In the above examples, the reference and predication are same but the occurrence of reference and predication

are different in that they occur as part of the speech act. In general, speech act can thus be called as illocutionary act. Austin provides “a list of verbs that denote illocutionary act such as commanding, stating, ordering, wishing, desiring, etc”.⁶

In the above examples the speaker is performing three acts.

- i. He is uttering the sentences in English.
- ii. He is referring and predicating.
- iii. He is performing an illocutionary act like stating, ordering and so on.

In the first case/act, the speaker is performing an utterance act and in second, the speaker is performing a propositional act. When someone performs an illocutionary act, he characteristically performs both utterance act and propositional act just like a person performs both mental activity and physical activity when he writes. The activities are different from each other and they can occur independent of each other too. For instance, one can perform utterance act without performing propositional act; this happens when one simply utters a word, say “*yeah*”, without intent to say anything or to perform any of the three acts mentioned above. In the meantime, we can perform the same propositional act for performing different illocutionary acts as just noted above. In the above examples, propositional acts are same but illocutionary acts and utterance acts are different. Propositional act includes predication and reference.

5) Priya holds the bottle for a while.

In 5, the utterance act is different because the sentence contains some different words. It is different above all four. Here the propositional act is also different because of different reference which is referred by the term ‘Priya’. The illocutionary act is the same as 1. The speaker is making an assertion.

If the same sentence is uttered by a different person, it will be a different utterance acts. The voice, tone of the voice to be more precise, can differ from person to person depending on the context and purpose. Suppose a person utters the sentence “She has a beautiful hair” (normally) and the same person utters it snugly, then it calls as different speech acts. In the utterance act, we are dealing with language, voice tone, speaking style, etc. The utterance act is simply uttering the words. Searle says, “the illocutionary acts and propositional act consist characteristically in uttering words in sentences in certain contexts, under certain conditions and with certain

intentions”.⁷ Searle also says, “the propositional act cannot occur alone. It always comes with an illocutionary act”.⁸ The reference and predication cannot be performed without any illocutionary act. When someone asserts something, that something can be meaningful for that assertion. It means the propositional act cannot occur without an illocutionary act. It is like Frege concept of context-principle. Frege meant that “only in the context of a sentence a word is meaningful”. The same is the case with the speech of act in that reference expression is possible only when one says something in a context. When one utters a sentence, it consists of an illocutionary act which control referring expression and that referring expression is meaningful.

1.4.1 Predication

Before Searle, predication is about attributing some characteristics to the subject. So for Frege, predication is a reference to a property, that is, a concept or a thought. Predication is possible when a predicate refers to a concept. For e.g “Sam is drunk”. Here “drunk” is a grammatical predicate which refers to a property or concept that is “drunkenness” which is predicated to “Sam”. Frege’s predication is possible only in assertive proposition. Frege’s predication is possible when abstraction is possible.

In “term theory” of proposition, P.F. Strawson says that “both subject and predicate are non-linguistic terms. And the relation between them is “non-relational tie” because one is particular and another one is universal”.⁹ The former is present in the world and the latter is not present in the world. The subject is non-linguistic in the sense that it is a material object and its existence is a contingent fact. The predicate is non-linguistic. The predicate term with meaning is a linguistic entity. When the predicate expression is particular (which is present in the factual world), we identify it by reference of the world. But when it is a universal concept we identify in our mode of representing the world. Universal is not a fact in the world. So we identify it through our utterance of expression which has relevant meaning. Frege uses reference for predication but Strawson uses identification for predication. The difference between subject term and predicate term is that the former identifies an object in the world while the latter identifies a universal attribute such as *redness*.

Searle describes the nature of predication in the speech act. Here predication is very important which includes reference and illocutionary act. Without predication, speech act is not possible. This can be described by considering the below examples-

1. You are going to leave.
2. Will you leave?
3. Leave!
4. I suggest you leave.

In all utterances of these sentences, the predicate and reference are the same. The predicate is “leave”, reference is you. The predicate “leave” of you is different in every sentence because of the different illocutionary act. The different illocutionary force indicating device determines in which mode “leave” is predicated of you. The illocutionary forces in sentences are (1) stating (2) questioning (3) surprise (4) suggest. While the term “suggest” in sentence 4 is explicitly functioning as a force term, the force terms in the other sentences are implicit. These force terms play an important role in predication. They operate on the predicate terms for determining the mode in which the predicate terms relate to the reference terms. If the sentence is interrogative, the force term is questioning either the predicate term true or false of the object referred to by the reference term. If the sentence was imperative, the illocutionary force provided by the force term determine the object which is referred to by the reference term is doing something and this action determines the predicate term.

The illocutionary force indicating device determines in which mode the predicate expression is true or false as well as it also determines the object referred to by the subject (it's a relation between force term and reference term). The illocutionary force does not affect the reference term. The reference term is always neutral. But predication always comes with illocutionary force. Though reference is an abstraction but it is not like the predication. It is a separate speech act from the total illocutionary act. It does not depend upon illocutionary force. Predication is an abstraction but not like the reference. It is a part of the illocutionary act. Here a question arises why we need a separate act? It is because we saw before that though sentences may have the same content, they will have different illocutionary acts. To show that illocutionary force is different and separable from content, we need this. By predication, we determine the mode in which the content is applied to the object referred to by the subject expression.

1.4.2 Reference:

A reference serves to identify objects, individuals, actions, events etc. Searle calls it as reference expression or singular definite referring expression. If the reference expression starts with

indefinite article 'a man' and it is being used in the utterance of the sentence 'a man came', it might serve the singular definite referring expression but it cannot identify the speaker's intention. If the reference expression uses definite article 'the man' and is being used in an utterance of the sentence 'the man came', it must serve both to identify the definite object of person and the speaker's intention. It is the difference between singular indefinite referring expression and singular definite referring expression. Similarly, we will discuss plural definite referring expression 'the boys' and plural indefinite referring expression 'some boys'. Searle says that referring expression does not mean an expression which refers to something. As said earlier, reference is speech act and a speech act is performed by a speaker. Speech act is performed when a speaker utters some words. A speech act is not words or sentences. It is the act of utterance. We identify reference when a speaker performs some utterance.

1.4.3 Proposition

In different illocutionary acts, if the same reference and same predication are used in different expressions, Searle holds that those different expressions are the same proposition. In the above 4 examples I used above, they have the same reference and same predication and so they are one and the same proposition. Searle says, "a proposition is to be sharply distinguished from an assertion or statement it. A proposition is not an act. The acts are stating, asserting etc. According to Searle, a proposition is what is apologized by the act of apologizing, or what is promised by the act of promising etc. The expression of a proposition is a propositional act, not an illocutionary act. Illocutionary act is the whole statement. The propositional act is only a part of the illocutionary act".¹⁰ Searle holds that one cannot express a proposition without any illocutionary act. The propositional act cannot occur alone. It always presupposes illocutionary act. A proposition always comes with illocutionary acts. In a sentence, the speaker expresses a proposition with an illocutionary act which expresses how the proposition occurs in the sentence. If someone says 'there is the bottle', the speaker is 'stating' in this sentence. By this act of stating he express the proposon. That expression is called as a propositional act where the proposition is expressed. A propositional act includes reference and predication and so without stating reference and prediction, it cannot occur. If we include all of this, it is a complete speech act.

Searle distinguishes between propositional indicator and illocutionary force indicator in a sentence to show how a proposition is to be taken. When a speaker utters something or illocutionary act, he uses an illocutionary act. He uses an illocutionary force which determines how the sentence is to be taken. A speaker uses illocutionary force indicator by which he starts the sentence. Examples- 'I apologize', 'I warn', 'I promise', etc. Where the speaker does not use the illocutionary force indicator, the context of the sentence makes clear what illocutionary force has to be taken. It is not need to take explicit illocutionary force indicator. This distinction

between these two indicators does not lie in all situations. If someone says “I promise to do it”. Here we cannot distinguish between illocutionary force indicator and propositional indicator. We can differentiate it if its syntax is like ‘I promise that I will do it’. Here the illocutionary force indicator is ‘I promise’ and the propositional indicator is ‘I will do it’. If we go into the depth of the previous sentence “I promise to do it”, we can find this. In the deep structure of all sentence, we can find the difference between illocutionary force indicator and propositional indicator. This distinction is useful latter where we will analyze the structure of illocutionary act. There are some rules for expressing a proposition. Searle represents this distinction symbolically F (P) where ‘F’ stands for illocutionary force and ‘P’ stands for expressing the propositions. It would not fit in all illocutionary act, for e.g. “Hurrah, for team India”.

1.4.4 Structure of Illocutionary Act

As the fundamental concepts of the illocutionary act has been introduced and explained above, I will now look into the structure of illocutionary act as worked out by Searle. He takes promise as an initial problem or example to explain the structure of illocutionary act. In his analysis, Searle basically wants to clarify what it means to perform a successful and non-defective promise. He gives “necessary and sufficient conditions making a successful and non-defective promises”.¹¹ His notion of defectiveness is similar to Austin’s notion of ‘infelicity’.

Through these conditions, we can draw out a set of rules of using illocutionary force indicator. To play an illocutionary act is like playing a chess game. One who does not know the rules of chess cannot play chess. In order to play chess, one has to learn from others who know the rules of chess or who know how to play chess. Likewise, in order to understand the how to perform successfully an illocutionary act, we must know the rules or structure governing it. In what follows, I will present the formulations of those rules one by one.

For his analysis, Searle takes only explicit promises and ignores promises which are performed through hints, metaphor, etc. He only deals with categorical promises, not the hypothetical ones, because these are simple and easily analyzable. This model is called constructive idealized model. It is analogous with the theory of construction. He also gives a list of conditional by means which we can perform illocutionary acts successfully and non-defectively.

Suppose a speaker S utters a sentence T in front of a hearer H, in the utterance of T, S sincerely, successfully and non-defectively makes a promise, if and only if the following conditions are satisfied:-

a) Input and output method

Here Searle uses 'input' and 'output' not in the sense of computer input and output method. He uses these in literally sense where he deals with linguistic communication. The output means the condition for speaking and input means the condition of understanding. In present stage, both the hearer and the speaker know the language and know how to communicate with this language. They are conscious of what they are doing.

b) S expresses of T the speaker uses an illocutionary act of P..

Speaker wants to focus on promising which is a peculiar kind of illocutionary act (I will not repeat the definition of illocutionary act here since the basic definition or notion is given earlier).

c) S predicts a future act A in the expression of P.

In promise, illocutionary force indicating device includes a proposition. The act must be predicated on the speaker. It is not a past action nor something that might have been done. I cannot promise someone else to do it; I can make a promise only with reference to a present moment. I can promise not to do something and also I can promise to do something repeatedly. I can promise to remain in a certain state and condition. Searle asserts that the conditions a and b as propositional conditions since they are expressions of a promisor, not the acts predicated of objects. In promise the speaker predicates an expression on himself or herself.

d) H prefers that S will do A not H will do A and S also believes that H prefers S to do A, not H will do A.

There is a difference between a promise and a threat. The former means that when a speaker makes a promise, it is on him to do something. In contrast, a threat is a pledge on hearer not to the speaker. A promise is defective if the promisor does have the intention to do. It is also defective if the promisor does not want to keep the promise. In promise, the situation or occasion or conditions must be considered. It is not to be clubbed or confused with a warning or a threat, or a swearing, etc. In promise, one expresses a wish (needs, desires) and the promisor must be aware of that fact. Even if one uses the word "promise" and sounds like a promise, it need not be a promise; for instance; suppose, I say to a borrower who borrowed some money from me, 'if you do not give me the money, I promise, I will tell your father'. This utterance is not a promise but expression of an intention or a commitment; this is kind of warning or threat. Here I use the

word 'promise' to not make a promise. I am basically using the word 'promise' to emphasize the degrees of my commitment. Take another instance where the hearer makes an assertion by using the phrase 'I promise'. Suppose I accuse you of having copied my assignment saying, "You copied, didn't you?" and you reply "No I didn't, I promise you, I didn't". Here the hearer is not making a promise but making an assertion instead.

- e) It is not the fact that S and H that S will do A in future.

It is a general condition that all illocutionary acts must have some point. Example- It is pointless and defective to request someone to do something if he has already done it or he is doing it or he will be doing this independently of the request. In a speech act situation where the listener know the rules of performing the illocutionary act, what is obvious has no illocutionary force. Likewise, what is impossible to do also lacks illocutionary force. To function as an illocutionary act, an act should not be obvious. Suppose in a class you say "Look here, Priya, be attentive to what I am saying". We assume that Priya has not paid attention in class; or it is not the fact that Priya is attentively listening in the class and so this speech act is needed. In short, to be a non-defective speech act, it is not the fact that the hearer is doing or will do that thing which is requested.

- f) S intends to do A.

There is a distinction between sincerely and insincerely promise. In sincerely promises, the speaker want to keep the promise. He will keep the promise. In insincerely promises, the speaker does not want to keep the promise and to do that act. Searle calls this condition as sincerity condition. Even if I promise someone a diamond gift on his birthday and if I know that cannot afford the gift, then I am not sincere in my promise.

- g) In the utterance of T, S intends which place him to do A.

There is a characteristic of promise that it undertakes an obligation to do an act. The promisor must do that act. If the promisor does not intend to do that act then the promise is not a promise. Intention is necessary to make a promise. But that is not sufficient. There must be an obligation on the part of the promisor to fulfill his promise and failure to uphold his promise should result in something unpleasant for the promisor. Example- Mr. Parker did not give money to the NGO despite his assurance because he was in no obligation to give money to an NGO.

- h) S intends to produce knowledge in H by the utterance of T which place him in an obligation to do A.

S wants to produce knowledge in H by letting H recognize the intention. To recognize this intention, H needs to recognize the meaning of the utterance T. Here the speaker makes a promise in the utterance and getting H to realize his intention by virtue of the promise. The speaker produces an illocutionary effect upon the hearer, so as to enable the hearer to realize the speaker's intention. Speaker assumes the semantic rules by which he undertakes an obligation. The semantic rule of uttered sentence T by S and H is successfully, non-defectively and with sincere uttered if and only if a-h conditions are obtained.

i) Taken together all the conditions, 1-8, the sentence which was uttered to make a promise is clear by the semantic rules of language. It may be specifically mentioned that both S and H must share the same linguistic dialect too in order for the promise to have its full effect.

Searle broadly describes condition 1, then he describes how the hearer understands the utterance, that is, b-i. Condition 8 is of utmost importance because it is here that the hearer recognized the illocutionary effect by means of his knowledge or recognition of the meaning of T as well as the intention of S.

1.4.4.1 Insincere Promise

We have just considered what it means to make a sincere promise. Now we will discuss how the speaker can manipulate a sincere promise into an insincere one. An insincere promise is that when a speaker is making a promise, he lacks appropriate intention to do that act. He purports that he has the intention which he does not have. In other words, the speaker does not want to take responsibility of his expressed intention. This is as absurd as saying "I promise to do that act but I do not intend to do that act". When the speaker says "I promise to do that act", he has to take responsibility for intending to do that act. To avoid this absurdity, Searle give a condition in 6.a): "S intends that the utterance of T will make him responsible for intending to do A".

1.4.5 Rules for use of illocutionary force indicating device:

Searle sets some conditions, a set of rules, for use of illocutionary force indicating device. Condition a, h and i are applicable for general illocutionary acts. Conditions a-g are particularly applicable for promise only. The illocutionary force indicating device of promise symbolically use as Pr.

- 1) Pr only uttered whatever the context of T. Utterance act produces a future act of S.. Searle calls this condition as "propositional rules" conditions because this is derived from propositional context.

- 2) Pr has to be uttered only when the hearer H would prefer to that act A. S believes that H would prefer that S will do A and not that hearer H will not do A.
- 3) Pr has to be uttered only if S will do A. Searle calls rules 2 and 3 as “preparatory rules” because it is derived from “preparatory conditions d and e”. Speaker assumes the semantic rules which determine the meaning that creates an obligation.
- 4) Pr has to be uttered only if S intends to do A.. This is called sincerity condition.
- 5) When Pr uttered it, S undertakes an obligation to do A. Searle calls it as the essential condition.

In “preparatory condition”, it is revealed that the speaker has the authority. Take an example: an order. The preparatory condition includes the fact that the speaker has a authority over hearer while the sincerity condition includes the speaker wants the order act to be done. In the essential condition, the speaker intends to make the hearer understand that he will do the act.

There are some general hypotheses concerning illocutionary act.

- 1) Whenever someone utters something in a sincerity condition, this performance has a psychological state that determines whether that performance is sincere or insincere. This law holds that the speaker wants to do that act or not.
- 2) This hypothesis is converse of the first. If we count that the psychological state expression is insincere like a promise, an apology one can insincerely perform it; but in the case of greeting, one cannot insincerely perform it.
- 3) We can perform an utterance without using explicit illocutionary force indicating device. In this sentence the context of the sentence makes clear what the illocutionary force has to be taken. How can the speaker knows that a hearer takes it in a right way. For e.g. can you switch off the fan? It may be a request or an interrogative question. The speaker may be characteristically a subjunctive question concerning your abilities.

1.4.6 Illocutionary force

As Searle says, “an illocutionary act is a complete speech act”.¹² When we made a typical utterances it will consist of all things that are parts of the speech acts we have discussed above. It has a propositional content which is comprised of reference and prediction. Illocutionary act contains a particular kind of illocutionary force – assertion, suggestion, promise, vows etc. Illocutionary force refers to the intention of the speaker in giving an utterance. It is a type of illocutionary act which speaker performs. An illocutionary act is characteristically performed by an illocutionary force. Some example, someone might ask “How is that curry made?” Or “Is the curry ready yet?” (Politely) as if he is making a query about the curry, but his man intention

might be to make the waiter bring the curry promptly. So here the illocutionary force is not to inquiry of the progress of curry but to demand the waiter to bring the curry.

Searle argued that every utterance has an illocutionary force. Every single word of English has a certain kind of illocutionary force. That is why illocutionary force is a part of meaning which cannot be ignored or overlooked. Searle gives seven components of illocutionary force. They are as follows:

1. Illocutionary point

Every illocution has a purpose. It is insight to the act. The point tells us how a thing is. The point of a promise or a vow commits the speaker for doing the act. The point of order is committing the people to do that act what they order. Searle opines that to perform a successful speech act, it is necessary to achieve the point or purpose. Illocutionary point makes possible an illocutionary act. It is essential for an act. Some illocutionary force has the same illocutionary point like – promise/vows, request/order, etc. Illocutionary point is different from the proposition and it has done by the propositional content.

2. The illocutionary point has degree of strength.

Illocutionary acts could have same point but they have vary in degree of strength. Example- if I request to do something to someone, its strength may be less than if I insist that he does it by any means.

3. Mode of achievement

Some illocutionary acts sets certain conditions in which the point has achived in that speech acts.. Example- when a speaker who has the authority to make a command and another speaker who gives a request, they have the same point, but the former will achieve its purpose more effective because of his position of authority. When a judge and a common man utter these words “I sentence you to life imprisonment”, the utterance of the judge will command greater authority than that of a common man by virtue of his office or the mode by which he performs his speech act.

5. Propositional content condition

Most illocutionary acts are in the form of F(P) where F means force and P means propositional content. In many case force term imposes certain conditions on content. For e.g. when one makes

a promise, the promise must be performed by the speaker in future. One cannot make a promise with reference to the past or for someone else.

6. Preparatory condition

For an illocutionary act to be successful and non-defective, we need certain kinds of conditions. For e.g. One can utter a promise but it will be defective if the promise made by the speaker is not to the interest of the hearer or the hearer did not want him to do it. In making a promise the speaker must presuppose that he can fulfill his promise and also serve the interest of the hearer. Such conditions are called preparatory conditions. There are also some other preparatory conditions that need to be obtained. For e.g. when someone utters, "John has beaten his wife", here we are presupposing that John has indeed beaten her. It may also be an answer to a query if John beats his wife.

7. Sincerity condition

When one performs an illocutionary act, that person has a psychological state with certain kind of content. Thus when one makes a promise he expresses an intention; when one makes a command, he expresses a desire or want. By this psychological state, we can determine sincerity and insincerity of speech acts. An insincerity speech act is one when a speaker utters a statement without a psychological state. For e.g. a lie. An insincere apology is one when the speaker does not have any sorrow or regret. It is paradoxical when one performs an illocutionary act and deny simultaneously the point of that act. For instance, one cannot meaningfully say "I apologize but I am not sorry".

8. Degree of strength of sincerity condition

Just like the same illocutionary point has different degrees of strength, the same psychological state has different degree of strength. A speaker who makes a request to do something to the hearer will have the same psychological state with that of a person who begs a hearer to do something but the latter will command stronger degree of sincerity than the former.

An illocutionary force is determined by the above seven components. Two illocutionary force is equal if these seven components are equal. A question may arise as to how we can use the above elements of illocutionary acts successfully and non-defectively. Here a point may be noted before we address this question. Whether or not an utterance has illocutionary force is a matter of intention. However, whether or not an utterance has been successfully and non-defectively performed is a matter which involves more than intention; there are many other conditions which must be satisfied. Austin called as "illocutionary uptake". Assuming that the above conditions

are satisfied, the seven features of illocutionary force may be reducible to four conditions; an illocutionary act in form of F(P) is successfully and non-defectively performed iff

- 1) The illocutionary point of F of what the speaker performed on the proposition P succeeds on mode of achievement and degree of strength of illocutionary point of F.
- 2) The speaker expresses a proposition P which satisfies the propositional content condition.
- 3) Speaker, expressing psychological state which satisfies the sincerity condition.
- 4) Preparatory condition must be satisfied.

1.5 Conclusion:

We have noted that illocutionary act constitute an essential part of a theory of meaning. As a matter of fact, Searle is of the view that without it, semantic theory is not possible. In this respect, he even goes a step further to claim that a distinction cannot be drawn between Austin's notions of locutionary act and illocutionary act. A speech act must have illocutionary act. We have seen what makes illocutionary act possible and non-defective by looking at some conditions of illocutionary force. These conditions are important not only to highlight the indispensability of speech act theory but also to understand and mark the difference amongst various illocutionary forces and acts.

Chapter 2

INTENTIONALITY AND SPEECH ACTS

2.1 Introduction

In this chapter, the focus of my discussion will be intention and intentionality as defined used by Searle. In order to explain these concepts, I look into its cognate and related concepts such as action, causation, and meaning. Within the concept of intention, Searle makes an divergence in between prior intention and intention-in-action. This distinction has been very crucial to understand his works on action, meaning and speech acts theory in general. Towards the end of the chapter, I discussed some problems involving intention and meaning.

2.2 Intentionality

Intentionality is directedness. It is a kind of mental states, which stands for something different from it. For example, I have a desire for something which has its existence in the external world. Put it in simple language, intentionality is something which implies “intending”. For example, “I intend to go to my bedroom now”.

There are some problems with traditional notion of intentionality. According to them, all mental states are intentional. However, Searle states that some mental states are intentional while some are not. For e.g. desire, fear, belief etc. are intentional. If I say I have a desire or a belief, then one might ask, “What is your belief about?” Then I cannot say I have a belief but I cannot

say what kind of belief it is since my belief always stands for something. Therefore Searle holds that if something is intentional, it must be directed towards something. However there are certain mental states which need not be about anything in particular; in other words, it may not be directed towards anything in the world. For example, nervousness or anxiety, or even elation need not be intentional because it is not necessary that they should be directed towards something. It may be a very subjective experience.

2.3 Intentional states and speech acts

With regard to intentional states and speech acts, Searle says that “both consist of a propositional content and a psychological state or illocutionary force, sometimes the propositional content is the whole proposition”.¹ And these two, which are called speech acts and Intentional states, have an analogous structure. In speech acts, we can say there is a propositional content and an illocutionary force. In intentional state there is a psychological state and a propositional content or representational content. For instance, speech acts like ‘I desire to leave the room’ and then in other words ‘I hope to leave the room’ and again in another sense ‘I believe that you leave the room’. There is a propositional content in each and every case, there is a propositional content “leave the room” and a psychological state. Every speech act contains some kind of order, suggestion, command, etc. In intentional state, a form of belief, desire, hope, etc. is present. Symbolically it is represented as S(P), where S represents the psychological state and P represents the propositional content. There are some intentional states which do not have propositional content but they have a psychological state. For e.g. John loves Suzy, John hates Suzy, represented as: Love(Suzy), Hate(Suzy)

2.4 Conditions of satisfaction and direction of fit

In Intentional states and speech acts both have conditions of satisfaction and direction of fit. In certain cases, psychological states or illocutionary force with the propositional content can be each of two represent or fail to meet the state of affairs. How they are alleged to meet the reality is acknowledged by the mode of psychological or illocutionary force. For e.g. belief is either false or true basing on whether or not the content corresponds to the state of affairs. Desire and belief stand opposite to each other. The truth value of it is determined by whether existing reality meets the content or not. And we find the same difference between statement and order in speech acts. We need to understand the notions like 'conditions of satisfaction' and 'direction of fit' first, then we can understand the facts.

Where there is direction of fit in there conditions of satisfaction apply to both speech acts and intentional states. For e.g. a statement is satisfied, if it is true, and a statement is not satisfied, if it is false. A desire is satisfied, if it is true, and it is not satisfied, if it's false. A promise is satisfied, if it kept. An intention is satisfied, if it is carried out. According to Searle, "the speech acts will be satisfied if and only if the expressed psychological states are satisfied and the condition of satisfaction of speech act and expressed psychological state are identical".² It means my order is satisfied if my desire is fulfilled and my statement is satisfied if the expression of the statement is true. The condition of satisfaction is external because the order is fulfilled in the external world. A statement is true or false decided by whether or not it corresponds to a fact in the external world. Every intentional state upholds of an intentional content and a psychological mode in the equal manner that of speech act which has a propositional content and illocutionary force. Both represent the objects or state-of-affairs. E.g. I have a belief that Saumya is in the library. It represents in the world a state-of-affairs. I have a statement that "The atmosphere inside the reading room is healthy". This represents a state-of-affairs.

The usage of the word "representation" is somewhat different from the ordinary usage. Representation is possible by contents with certain psychological states. Psychological mode determines the direction of fit and Content regulate the conditions of satisfaction. Through this process, a belief

or desire represent the world outside. Searle says, “in intentional state content, psychological state and direction of fit represent its conditions of satisfaction. In speech act content, illocutionary force and direction of fit represent its conditions of satisfaction”.³ By the content Conditions of satisfaction are to be determined and they obtain if that content is fulfilled. Let’s take an example, if I have a belief that “It is raining outside”, then in order to confirm my belief, if I go outside and find that it is raining then I can say that “yes”, the conditions are satisfied because it is indeed raining outside. It seems there is a process-product ambiguity between “requirement” and “thing required”. If I have a belief that the book is on the table, then it should be the case that the book is on the table (requirement). If my belief is true then I can come to see the book on the table. Searle says, “this ambiguity does not harm the conditions of satisfaction but helps to clear the ideas. Let me summarize from the above point: that for representation the conditions of satisfaction is necessary. Every intentional state has a direction of fit which is a representation of its conditions of satisfaction”.⁴

The world with a different direction of fit is represented by the Conditions of satisfaction. In speech acts there are four types of direction of fit;

- i. world-to-word,
- ii. word-to-world,
- iii. null direction of fit,
- iv. word-to-world-to-word.

Likewise, there are four types of direction of fit in intentional state:

- i. mind-to-world,
- ii. world-to-mind,
- iii. null direction of fit and
- iv. mind-to-world-to-mind.

Statements, descriptions, assertions of speech acts are word-to-world direction of fit is coming under the assertive class of speech acts. If it fails to meet the independent existing world, and to match the world we can change our statements, descriptions or assertions. But we cannot change the world to fit with our members of the assertive class of speech acts. If the statement turns out to be false, it is the statement which is false, not the world. On the other hand the directive class of speech acts such as orders, apologies, commands etc. and the commissive class of speech acts like promises, vows, pledges etc. are world-to-word direction of fit. These are not supposed to match the world but rather supposed to change the world to meet the propositional content. Here we are not supposed to say that they are either true or false but rather we should say that they are disobeyed or obey, broken or kept, carried out or not carried out. Here if the order is not obeyed, it is not the order *per se* but the world where the person disobeys the order.

Intentional states have these kinds of distinction: If my belief turns out to be wrong, it is not the world but the belief I have which is fault. I can mess it up by telling that it's a false belief. In case of desire, it is not like a belief which is true or false but a matter of whether or not it is carried out. If I fail to meet the desire, I cannot fix it up by changing my desire, like in the case of belief; by changing the world I can fix it up. So one say clearly see that while belief is statement "mind-to-world" direction of fit, desire or order is "world-to-mind" direction of fit.

There are many entities in the world having direction of fit and condition of satisfaction but not in mind and language. Example, the diagrammatic representation of University of Hyderabad may match or mismatch with the university campus. It is map-to world direction of fit. The blueprint of a building is either not followed or followed. It is direction of fit of world-to-mind. As per the blueprint the contractor should build the building. Requirement, obligation, needs are world-to-mind direction of fit. For example: I am in need of some food. So my need will be fulfilled if and only if I take some food or it will remain incomplete if I do not take some food. Belief, statement, map is "language-to-world" or "mind-to-world" it is called "direction of fit".

2.5 Intentional causation

Intentional states, sometimes function causally and are called as intentional causation. Some of them are self-caused by their own conditions of satisfaction. In common language, Causation stands for the action of causing something. Intentional states are the cause of its conditions of satisfaction. For example, if I am hungry, then my desire for having food causes me to take some food. If I have a belief that it is a sunny day then the state-of-affairs of the world causes me to believe that it is a sunny day.

To understand the relation between intentionality and world direction of fit is essential that we have already seen. Direction of causation is opposite of direction of fit. Let's take an example, a desire is "world-to-mind" (upward) direction of fit. Direction of causation of a desire is "mind-to-world" (downward) direction of causation. In Aristotelian terminology, there are four kinds of cause, namely, efficient, material, formal and final. Searle accepts efficient cause only. The efficient cause has a subcategory which is mental causation. The mental causation too has a subcategory which is intentional causation; intentional states cause its conditions of satisfaction cause intentional states. Put it in a different way, in intentional causation, intentional states cause state-of-affairs or vice versa, for example- when I am hungry, I have a desire to take some food. This desire causes me to take some food. This is intentional causation. If I see a book on the table, it causes my visual experience. The case that a book is on the table which is the part of conditions of satisfaction causes my intentional states of visual experience.

The direction of fit is essential to connect intentional states and the real world that I already mentioned in my above lines; likewise direction of causation is essential for this connection. I have already maintained that a desire is "world-to-mind" direction of causation is different from direction of fit. If the visual perception is veridical and matches the world, it is "mind-to-world" direction of fit. If the visual experience is genuinely satisfied then state-of-

affair causes the mind to perceive causes and hence it is “world-to-mind” direction of causation. This example pointing towards a subclass of intentional causation where the parts of the conditions of satisfaction cause itself to satisfy the conditions of fully satisfaction.

Intentional causation has a further sub-class which is self-referential. It causes itself for producing its respective conditions of satisfaction if it is to be fulfilled. For instance, intention and action. Unlike desire, belief, the action itself caused by intention which is already in the content of intention. Seale says, “if the action is not caused by intention, the intention is not carried out. In such case, conditions of satisfaction are self-referential”.⁵ Perceptual experience, memories and intention are causally reference himself.

2.6 Intention and action

Just as my belief is satisfied if and only if the state-of-affairs obtains which is represented by the content, so also my intention is fulfilled if the action is performed which is represented by the content of intention. For example-

1. I believe that I will vote for Modi.
2. I have the desire to give my vote to Modi.
3. I intend to vote for Modi.

The respective way in which action and intention are fixed is different from desire and belief. The action which is done intentionally are only conditions of fulfillment of intention. Suppose you have an intention to complete the project by Diwali. Your intention shall not be fulfilled by mere saying that I have an intention to complete the project by Diwali; rather you have to work to fulfill your intention. Here a set of questions arises: What do you mean by intention? and What is an action? What kind of relation holds between them? The answer to the third question is that both are of conditions of satisfaction for each other. Action is related to intention. If fact, the latter is the necessary condition for the former. Intention is integral part of an action. However,

intention is not related to belief and desire in the way it is related to action. My belief will be satisfied if and only if the required state-of-affairs obtain. My desire will be satisfied if and only if my desire obtains. Belief and desire do not necessarily need performance of action in this sense. In the meantime, intention needs an action to be satisfied. Searle accepts something as an action only if it is intentional. He only deals with intentional actions. However, there are cases of asymmetrical relations between intention and action, intentional states and their conditions of satisfaction.

Let us imagine scenario where a husband who always spend money in buying lottery tickets but never wins any lottery prize. His wife wants to make him realize that wasting money on buying lottery tickets can lead to many difficulties. So one day, she decides to buy a lottery ticket, and fortunately she wins a prize. Her intention was not to win the prize but something else. In other words, winning a lottery ticket is not intentional at all but she performed the action of buying the lottery tickets. In this way, we can find some difficulty in establishing symmetric relation between the two. In order to clarify this, we shall discuss the distinction between what is termed as intention-in-action and prior intention. An intention is termed as prior intention if the agent or the subject knows what he is going to do and also why he is going to do.

When someone says he is going to perform certain work A, he will do A. when he is performing his action A, he is carrying out his prior intention. However, there are certain actions which do not involve prior intention, like the action of the wife buying and willing a lottery ticket. But it cannot be said that her action lacks intention. It is an intentional action. Such type of intention in an action is called intention-in-action. And this actions are inseparable. E.g. suppose I am sleeping and thinking of my family and suddenly I get up and start walking in the room. The action of walking in the room is an intentional action. However I do not have any prior intention to do that. If someone asks me "Why are you doing this?" I will simply have to say "Just like that." When we are doing a prior intentional action, we are also doing many other actions. Suppose I have a previous intention to beat Saroj. To do that I walk towards him; my walking towards him is intentional but it

is not there in the prior intention. All the actions which is done intentionally have the intention-in-action but not all intentional actions have prior intention. Both the previous intention and intention-in-action are causally self-referential⁶.

The word “carrying out” means intention causal relation with action. Here the question arises as to why they are self-referent. We will talk about it later. For now we will try to understand the relation with the help of an analogy – the relation between perception and action. There are two elements in perception and action. When we see a table, there is visual experience (seeing the table) and the object or state-of-affair (the table itself). Likewise, in intentional action also, we have two parts of experience. For e.g., when I rise my hand, the first one is experience of raising my hand, and the second is the bodily movement of raising my arm. This first one is intentional component (experience of raising my hand while the latter is the condition of satisfaction (bodily behavior). Both are not independent. If both are satisfied then the intentional state must be satisfied, otherwise it is too difficult. As far as intentionality is distressed both the mind-to-world direction of fit (perception and action) and the direction of causation which is world-to-mind. When I perceive a table, but there is no real table in front of me, I might say I was mistaken. So it is the later one. The intentional content of the intention-in-action and experience of action are identical⁷. If they are identical, why do we need two notions? Searle’s answer is that the “experience of acting is a conscious experience with an intentional content and intention-in-action is a intentional component, regardless of whether it contains any conscious experience of action.”⁸ Sometimes we do intentional action without being conscious about it.

Now the problem is, is there any relation between previous intention, and in other word intention-in-action, bodily movement and actions? Suppose I have a prior intention to raise my arm in air and then I also raise my arm. How does it work? It is because I carry out my intention. The prior intention makes the whole action as a unit. As I have mentioned before, action has two parts: experience of action and bodily behavior. As I mentioned before, intentional content or the work which is done by intentionally, of which intention-in-

action and experience of bodily behavior are identical. Now he will clarify the relation between intention-in-action and prior intention. But one should remember the fifth point where we have identified intentional content with direction of fit; one may ask oneself as to how an intentional content is satisfied. For this, one can identify the intentionality by its conditions of satisfaction.

The content of previous intention and in other sense we can say the content of intention-in-action are different. The prior intention represents the whole action. Intention-in-action is only the presentation, but not a representation. In prior intention the whole action is for the intentional object but in intention-in-action, the movement is only for the intentional object. Now, if both of these are different then how come they are related. Searle replies, both are self-referential and both are caused by itself. If they are different, we can analyze them separately. The prior intention causes intention-in-action and intention-in-action causes both intention-in-action and bodily movement.

The diagram to this

Prior intention-◇◇

intention behavior	in	action◇◇bodily behavior
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Since action has two parts, experience of raising my hand and bodily behavior and prior intention is self-referential, prior intention causes by their own conditions of satisfaction. We can separately represent each component of prior intention. Previous intention causes intention-in-action and then it turns into causes bodily behavior. Prior intention causes intention-in-action which causes my arm to go up.

Deliberation leads to the action which is done intentionally by means of previous intention. Take a simple case of deliberation of belief and desire which have different direction of fit and different direction of causation. They lead to the occurrence of prior intention which has world-to-mind direction of fit and vice versa. The action consists of intention-in-action and bodily behavior. The intention-in-action causes the whole action deliberation of belief or desire $\diamond$ prior intention $\diamond$ intention-in-action $\diamond$ bodily movement (action=intention-in-action+bodily behavior)

2.7 Intentional structure of cognition and its volition.

Intentional structure of cognition and we can say volition are the opposite from one another while direction of fit and direction of causation stand opposite to each other. We see the symmetry and asymmetry of action, and perception includes visual experience of objects or state-of-affairs and objects or the previous one itself. If we see the successful performance of perception, the direction of fit is mind-to-world (downward) and in another way we will see the direction of causation is world-to-mind (upward). Both are exactly parallel but opposite to each other. Likewise, the action consists of two component intention-in-action and bodily movement. The previous one causes me to step my foot.

Cognition				Volition		
	Belief	Memory	Perception	Desire	Prior intention	Intention-in-action
Direction of fit	Downward	Downward	Downward	Upward	Upward	Upward

Direction of causation determined by condition of satisfaction	None	Upward	Upward	None	Downward	Downward
Causally self-referential	No	Yes	Yes	No	Yes	Yes

Generally, cognition and violation are the symmetrical and asymmetrical relation between perception and action. We have already seen that mind-to-world direction of fit is memory and perception and world-to-mind direction of causation. But the previous intention and intention-in-action has world-to-mind direction of fit and mind-to-world direction of causation. Intention carried out of the world comes to be what intention is represented. Intention has direction world-to-mind of fit and mind-to-world direction of causation. Intention will be fulfilled if it causes itself to achieve the former one of the above line is direction of fit. Prior intention causes the whole action. The whole action consists of two states: Intention-in-action and bodily behavior. Intention-in-action causes bodily behavior. Cognition and violation are mentioned in the table. Mind-to-world (downward) world-to-mind(upward)

There are three gaps within the structure of volition. When we deliberate a belief or desire or order, there is a gap between deliberation and prior intention. Is that person a boy or girl? I have confusion whether the person I am referring to is a boy or a girl. In prior intention, this confusion is eradicated. There is already a gap between intention-in-action and prior intention; this gap between actually and deciding doing; deciding to do the

act or actually doing the act. If it is a lengthy act, then the intention-in-action is not sufficient to guarantee that it continues throughout the action till its completion. In contrast my prior intention normally continues throughout the whole action. The prior intention represents and causes the whole action while intention-in-action presents and causes only the bodily behavior which may be a part of the prior action.

4.1 Network and Background of Intentional states.

Intentional states determine its conditions of satisfaction.⁹ A state itself, given its position in a network and against its background, is neither intentional nor under conditions of satisfaction. To understand this, we are considering some examples. Suppose in a court, the judge gave his judgment: “I sentenced you to ten years imprisonment”. The judge may have certain types of mental states and he realized his desire and then uttered this. Suppose I have the same mental states like the judge and said: “I sentenced you to ten years imprisonment”. I have only the same kind of mental states which corresponded to judge’s desire. I utter the phonetics sequence which the judge uttered. However, I do not have the mental state to sentence you for ten years, since the situation does not allow me to do so. It means that when the judge utters the sentence, he is in the courtroom. And when I utter it, I am with my friends or with anyone anywhere (assuming I am not a judge and passing a judgment). To pass a judgment like the above, that desire has to be embedded within the whole network of other intentional states. There are many other intentional states in the network, some of which are logically related and some are not.

When someone has an intentional state the whole related notions of that intentional state is in the network. The judge’s desire is supported by lots of belief such as he is a judge of a court, he weighs the evidence that proves that you are the criminal, etc. These intentional states have their own conditions of satisfaction. The network only functions against a background of what I will call non-representational mental capacities.¹⁰

Here Searle made two claims. First one is that “intentional states are in general parts of Network of Intentional states and only have their conditions of satisfaction relatively to their position in Network”.¹¹ Generally, this position is popularly known as holism in contemporary philosophy. The second claim in addition to the Network of representations says that “there is also a Background of non-representational mental capacities and in general, representations only function, they only have the conditions of satisfaction that they do, against this non-representational Background”.¹²

2.8 Meaning

Meaning is possible by imposing conditions of satisfaction on conditions of satisfaction. In the analyses of meaning, Searle uses the notions of action and intention which are analyzed in the foregoing account. These two notions are crucial to understand his speech act theory which in turn is understand his general theory of mind and action. Meaning is a kind of intentionality and speech act is a kind of act. What distinguishes them from one other is kind of intentionality and action respectively. In the previous point, I have discussed intentional action which contains the bodily behavior. Prior intention causes intention-in-action and it causes bodily behavior. This bodily movement which is caused by intention-in-action is its conditions of satisfaction. But not all intention and action are simple. When a person intends to kill a bird, first he picks the arrow, fix it in the bow, pulls the bow string, take aim and finally release the arrow. Every complex action need not necessarily involve gradual steps like this example of shooting an arrow. A man who is asked to leave the room may leave the room, not because of he was ordered but because anyway he has to leave the room. This bodily behavior is not caused by intention unlike the case of shooting a bird. In order to understand the intentional meaning, we have to understand prior intention, intention-in-action, causal, non-causal etc. In order to understand the meaning of intention, we have to discuss some other features of intentionality which is called as conditions of adequacy,

Intentional states(belief, desire)	Intentional content	Conditions of satisfaction
Illocutionary force(states, orders)	Illocutionary content	Conditions of satisfaction

Before explaining the fact that there is a two level of intentionality in the performance of illocutionary act, it needs to be understood that when one performs an illocutionary act, he also expresses an intentional state; for example, when one makes a statement that “It is a sunny day”, he expresses a belief that “It is a sunny day”. But the conditions of fulfillment of intentional state and speech acts are identical. A statement is true if the expressed belief is true. An order is true if and only if the expressed desire is satisfied. But still, we have to keep in mind that making a statement is different from making a true statement. I have already mentioned that the conditions and satisfaction of intentional state and speech act are identical. Meaning intention is to see whether mental intention imposes the same conditions of satisfaction in the physical expression.

Mind imposes its conditions of satisfaction on physical expression for its meaning. We have seen, there is a two level of intentionality-mental state, speech act. Let’s call them as “sincerity condition” and “meaning intention”. Here our task is to determine meaning intention. We have already discussed conditions of satisfaction of sincerity condition and speech acts are identical. But the conditions of satisfaction of meaning intention are different from both the conditions of satisfaction of sincerity conditions and speech acts. For instance, making a statement is different from making a true statement. But still, when someone is trying to make a statement, he also commits to make a true statement. He must have imposed the belief on the statement. We have to understand the fact that he is expressing his beliefs in the statement. Conditions of fulfillment of meaning intention are totally different from conditions of satisfaction of speech acts and sincerity condition still the

account of meaning explain how it comes about that, furthermore, the content of meaning intention determines the conditions of satisfaction of speech acts and veracity condition. For example; if I say “It is a sunny day”, the conditions of satisfaction of meaning intention satisfied even if it is not a sunny day, nevertheless it determines my speech acts will be satisfied if and only if it is a sunny day; my expressing belief will be satisfied if and only if it is a sunny day.

We need to know about the distinction between representation and communication. When someone intends to state something, he represents some objects or state-of-affairs as well as communicates the representation with the hearer. That represented intention is not the same as communication intention. The communication intention is to make some effect on the hearer. Representation intention is to represent something regardless of the effect to make him understand. Representation is prior to communication. One cannot communicate without representation. But one can represent something without communicating to others.

Searle classified illocutionary action into five types: assertive, directives, commissive, declaration and expressions. Intentionality not only creates the possibility of meaning but also limits its forms. For example, when we are apologizing, ordering, stating, we are performing it by just uttering words. But when I want to boil water, I am not doing that by just uttering words; I am boiling the water in actuality. Here the question arises how is it possible? Searle gives the answer of this question by illustrating an example; in a class when students raise their hands, it implies that they know the answer. When one student raises his hand in a classroom, the other students who are sitting in the classroom come to understand that he knows the answer. The answer as intention-in-action causes my hand to rise up and its required conditions are satisfied with the direction of fit mind-to-world . Meaning is possible while the mind appoints intentionality on the entities which are not intrinsically intentional.¹³ How is it possible? The answer is when I utter something; the utterance itself has conditions of satisfaction. The belief itself has condition of satisfaction. Here the belief is that ‘I know the answer’ and it gets transformed to the utterance by an intentional act. Because of this, the

utterance act here is resulting in raising the hand which counts as the expression of belief. The meaningful action is that which has the conditions of satisfaction which is intentionally imposed. It means an action is meaningful when it satisfies the conditions of satisfaction which is imposed by an intention.

Most of the meaning intention is an intention in representation. The intention in representation is an intention about the physical events which constitute the parts of the conditions of satisfaction. Suppose I say "It is a sunny day" (requirement), this is causally connected with my intention. The relation between representation intention and communication intention is a means which enables the hearer to understand that, the act is performed with the representation intention. When I say "It is a sunny day", the hearer should recognize my intention with representation intention. (My intention-in-action causes me to say "It is a sunny day" which has conditions of fulfilment with the mind-to-world direction of fit that it is a sunny day.)

Here, there is a problem with meaning. When I express my belief or when I make a statement, it may not produce any effect on my audience. It is possible that one may tell a lie. When we make a statement, we express our belief, no matter whether the audiences believe it or not. Put it in a different way, what is the difference between 'saying something and meaning it' and 'saying something and don't mean it'? Wittgenstein often asks this question. Searle says when I say something and mean it, it implies that my utterance has conditions of satisfaction. When I say something and don't mean it, it does not have any such condition of satisfaction. For e.g., if I say "It is a sunny day" at night time, it does not match with conditions of satisfaction. If I say "It is a sunny" during day time, then it is relevant. It is relevant because it is supported by conditions of satisfaction which is intentionally imposed in utterances. But then when I utter "Does God exist?" here I am communicating something and it is meaningful too. But it does not represent

anything specific out there in the world which means that it is possible to communicate even if what we communicate does not represent anything.

The second problem is that how can we realize intentional state. Searle accepts the identical theory which states that mind-body problem is not a problem at all. I think Searle accept this theory to avoid the above question. So the question 'how intentional states can be realized' is not a relevant question for Searle. What makes belief a belief? What is a belief? Searle says a belief is a propositional content which contains psychological mode. How can we realize a belief? Searle says that the meaning is not a notion of intentionality. It is a notion of linguistic acts. So Searle gives this question a different direction by asking how linguistic act can be realized. Are the speech acts identical with physical phenomena? The answer is in the negative. Speech acts have a logical structure and speech acts have representations but it is not certain whether or not the physical phenomena have any structure.

The famous problem about intention of Wittgenstein is: "I raise my hand, and if I debar the fact that my hand goes up, then what else has left?"¹⁴ The result is simple, "is left" is the intentional content. 'I raise my arm in air' is the intention-in-action in certain intentional mode. We are not satisfied with the answer because we are still in search of something concrete which could relate to "intention". Here we do not need its ontological category, rather we need to know about its direction of fit, conditions of satisfaction, psychological mode and propositional contents, etc. Another question is that may be asked is this: "What is an intentional object?" According to Searle, the peculiar quality of an intentional object is its intentional state. For example, Soumya admires Priya. Here the intentional object of Soumya is Priya. Searle asserts that if there is no referred object, then speech act and intentional object would not be satisfied. In case of fantasy, imagination and fictional discourse, all these are intentional states but there is no referred object for them and so they cannot be satisfied. Searle says that these all are assertive intentional states. These are not like normal assertive. The speaker

has not committed to the truth of his assertion. The belief does not have any representative content. Accordingly, Searle thinks that Russell's example of "The king of France is bald" is false because there is no king of France who can be attributed with baldness.

2.9 Conclusion

In this chapter, we have tried to understand what is intention by looking at its two sub-categories, viz., intention-in-action and prior intention. We also looked at the structure of intention and various other related which are important to explain the general framework within which Searle work out his speech act theory, including philosophy of action and philosophy of mind.

Chapter 3

Are meanings in the head?

3.1 Introduction

In this chapter, I am discussing about the arguments of Putnam and Searle responses to that arguments and see the what sort of knowledge we can gain from the arguments and counter arguments or responses. I shall discuss some important grain of truth from that responces what Searle overlooked. In the meantime I shall show that Searle gives some important points in this matter. The clarification of Searle's points and his problem gives us to see better some products of truth in the study of semantics.

I believe in middle path in between internalism. It is a type of externalism which makes room for narrow content. I believe what Stich and Fodor say, "psychology should be solipsistic and constructing belief-desire psychology as constructing psychology of narrow contents is the only way for defending the externalism threat".¹³ I believe in internalist view "what is in the head determines extension". In my discussion of indexical I will show that if we deny the the descriptivism that does not go to externalism. I shall show that indexical which are not

descriptive, their contents are not only external but also internal. In order to be a thought whether it is indexical or non-indexicals depends upon descriptive elements. I divide this chapter into two parts. In the first part I explain the works of Putnam and Searle and in the second part I will explain and present my take on moderate version of externalism. For developing my standpoint, I have mainly relied on the work Amir Horowitz' "Putnam, Searle and Externalism".

3.2 Putnam and Searle: A discussion

In this section I discuss the arguments of Putnam and subsequent responses of Searle to them. The purpose of this discussion is primarily to extract some truth for the developing my view of moderate externalism. One of the most fundamental questions in philosophy is this: How does language relate to reality? Searle attempts to answers this question by holding a view that a speaker relates language with the world or reality through linguistic acts, speech acts to be more precise. He reduces this question into another; that is, how does mind relate to the reality? He reduces this to analyze intentionality of mind. The reduction is attempted in this way: language is reducible to various speech acts, speech acts are reducible to mind and its various states and activities which in turn are reducible to intentionality. There is a double level of intentionality one is intentional states and another one is speech acts. Where there is a speech act there must be an intentional state; for e.g., if I am stating that "It is raining" it is in speech acts. A speech act has an "illocutionary force" and a "propositional content". Similarly in intentional state there is "psychological state" and a "propositional content". The psychological states of "it is raining" is belief. First I have to believe then state something.¹⁴ He takes help of Fregean concept of 'sense' for extending the analysis. He takes only two approaches of Frege's accounts of the relation of expressions and objects. First, expression refers to an object because the sense associated is with the object. Second, he fights against psychologists that sense exists in the third realm (third realm means the third world where the 'sense' supposedly exists). Searle accepts the first one and rejects the second. Linguistic reference is a kind of intentional reference. Searle says, "intentional reference is sufficient to satisfy a condition; it is a way of satisfaction".¹⁵ There is no need to postulates the third realm for communication. Searle gives this explanation for avoiding Fregean concept of the third realm. If I think evening star under some mode of presentation and another person thinks about evening star under the same mode of presentation, we are sharing the same abstract entity in common. The shared abstract entity is an intentional content. This shared intentional content does not need a metaphysical realm.

3.2.1 Meaning in the head

Searle considered Putnam's argument that "meanings are not in the head"¹⁶ and responded to it. Searle thinks that "meanings are in the head" – there is no place where meaning to be. In addition he also thinks that Putnam's argument does not show that meanings are not in the head. So what is the argument Putnam put forth against the internalist, the view that says that meanings are in the head? He described their views as following:

1. If we know the meaning that means that word is in a certain psychological state.
2. Internalist believes that "meanings (intention) determines extension.
3. Therefore, psychological states determines extension.

To the above, Putnam says that "we cannot accept both (1) and (2) together and that (3) is false".¹⁷ He rejects both (1) and (3) and accepts a different version of (2), that is, meaning (external or microstructure) determines extension. Before discussing these two philosophers' views, it may be noted that both Searle and Putnam subscribe to meaning holism. Putnam tries to construct a argument where same psychological state identify different extension. Putnam gives two arguments to prove this view. I shall briefly explain them for now with intent to provide a more detailed explanation latter on.

The first argument concerns what Putnam give a name of it as "linguistic division of labour". Here he says that "in any linguistic community some people have better knowledge of language than the others".¹⁸ They apply linguistic terms better than others. For example, in a community where some people have better knowledge about trees and some do not know much about trees. So they can tell which one is elm tree and which one is beech tree. Suppose I do not know the difference between beech and elm trees. All that I know is limited to some similarities between them such as, they have big branches, black brown leaves, etc. They are not different for me. So, according to Putnam "my idiolect" or "intention" of both trees are same but the extension is different. In other words, the concepts of beech trees and elm trees are same in my head but in the external world both trees are different. The same psychological state determines different extension. This briefly account will suffice the make the point for now. But more of it will come a little later.

Searle believes that the traditional thinkers might think that this argument is imperfect because the speaker does not know the meaning perfectly. That type of speaker is not getting any relevant extension. In such a case it is true that "extension in the idiolect" has no applicability. This is

because the speaker does not know the meaning of the word. Frege also says that intention does not grasp extension. It only shows that some speaker does not grasp perfectly. So Searle defends his position by saying that extension fails where one does not know the meaning of the word.

To make his point, Putnam says intentional states of all speakers including the expert's do not identify the extension. If this argument is based on linguistic or factual ignorance then we refute this from the first because if the speaker is ignorant then he can appeal to the experts because his intention is inadequate to determine extension. Suppose that what Putnam believes is valid, we have something more to prove that this argument is inconsistent. Searle points out that Putnam's intuition is wrong by the argument given below:

1. Searle's concept of elm and beech are not equal..
2. The extension of both trees are different.
3. Searle knows that both trees are different.

Searle knows because he knows that beeches are different from elms. One may have imperfect knowledge of these two concepts, but he has the conceptual knowledge about these two trees that they are different. So the number (3) states a conceptual knowledge. On the contrary, number 1 is not a conceptual knowledge (Searle concept of 'elm' = Searle concept of 'beech'). Therefore, it is false.

Now let us consider Putnam's second argument. This argument – "Twin Earth" – is relatively more important and better known. In this argument, he tries to show that it is insufficient to determine extension by speakers' intentional states. He opines that it is possible to have the same intentional states but with different extensions. Putnam supposes that somewhere else in our galaxy, there is another planet exactly same as earth in all perceptual level which is called as "twin earth". The environment of the twin earth is exact the same as earth. Their star same as earth's star. In twin earth, there is twin of every things and person. There is a single difference between these two earths: there is a different kind of liquid called "water" in twin earth. It is perceptually identical with water on earth, but its chemical composition is different. It is not H₂O; rather its chemical composition is "XYZ". When twin Oscar (a person who is staying in twin earth) says water, he refers to the water which is composed of 'XYZ'. When Oscar (a person who is staying in earth) says water, he refers to water, which is 'H₂O'. Finally the crux of the thought experiment is this: when Oscar says water, that utterance refers to "H₂O" and when twin Oscar says water, it denotes to "XYZ". Now Oscar and twin Oscar have same mental states but it refers to different extension. So Putnam concludes that the contents of brain are not sufficient to determine the meaning. Here the mental states are same. But the extensions are different. If the mental states are sufficient to determine the extension, the extension will not be the two rather it would be one. So Putnam summarized that meanings are not in the head.

Most of the people who criticized Putnam's theory of meaning, they criticized Putnam's thought experiment of twin earth. The same is true of Seale. He first accepts his arguments for discussion and then argues that it fails to show that "meanings are not in the head". To argue this argument Searle says, when the residents of earth and twin earth do not know that the liquid which is called "water" were "H₂O" and "XYZ" respectively, the people of both earth have identical experience. Now the question is, when both Oscars say water, do they mean same "water"? both Oscar and twin Oscar minds, ideas and everything are identical. When Oscar utters "water", by this utterance he refers to "water" that is "H₂O" and when twin Oscar says "water" he refers by this utterance to "XYZ". Searle thinks that this argument would go like this. Till 1750 the water on earth and twin earth had the same extension. After 1750 the scientists discovered that there are two different water which chemical composition are "H₂O" and "XYZ". We would define water as "H₂O" on earth and water as "XYZ" on twin earth or we would to have say there are two types of water that is "H₂O" and "XYZ".

Indeed, there are some supports of this intuition. Suppose there are so much going and coming between earth and twin earth and because of that the people of earth and twin earth know that water which is called as nephrite and jadeite as Putnam's example are different. So there are two kinds of water as H₂O and XYZ. Searle says we pay a high price for the stuff of twin earth which is called as water, the water on twin earth lacks a property of water. Searle says, "If their water is not water then their mud is not mud, their snow is not snow, their ice-cream is not ice-cream; if our driving cars produce H₂O, CO and CO₂. What kind of chemical emission takes place while driving a car on twin earth? Surely it will not be the same as that of the earth".¹⁹ For all this reason, Searle argues that a supporter of traditional view might think that it is odd that Putnam believes 'H₂O' is fixed and the water is problematic on twin earth. It is lack of property of water. We might assume that the water on twin earth is slightly different from H₂O which is on earth. However Searle does not want to dismiss this alternative intuition of Putnam; rather he accepts it and builds on this to argue that extension is certainly determined.

Searle says in Putnam's viewpoint, the extension of natural term like "water", only deals with natural term which is determined by indexical. Searle says that we perceptually identify a substance such as water in a certain perceptual level. These features are like colorless, tasteless, liquid, flows from upward to downward etc. Then the extension of the word 'water' is determined which is identical in structure with this structure, whatever that structure is. In this point of view, the 'water' of twin earth is different extension from the 'water' which is on earth, because they both are identified by different structure. The structure of 'water' on earth and twin earth are different. The word 'water' is simply defined as whatever bear the relation "same L" to that stuff. Now from the point of view of traditional theorists, what exactly does this argument achieve? Suppose that Putnam is right in his intuition. All he has shown is to substitute intentional content. Traditional theorists say Putnam has substituted indexicals from the concept

of intentional content. It means that the meanings in the head which determine the extension. In fact Putnam's approach is like the traditional approach: a word ostensibly denotes whatever bears the identical relation to the denotation of the original ostentation. The word 'water' is explained as what is identical with the structure. If this characterization is correct, then this is no different from the others which accept that intention determine extension.

According to Locke, a water is a concept in a nominal sense. The word 'water' means liquid, colorless, tasteless etc. In Putnam's view water are defined in real essence. The water is defined indexically by identifying something that satisfies the nominal essence then he declares that water is something which satisfy the real essence as the stuff so identified. This is an improvement of Locke theory but it still does not show that meanings are not in the head. Searle believes that Putnam would not give any adequate response to the traditional theorists. This shows that he does not take any proposing variation of the traditional view that meanings are in the head, but to reject the traditional view altogether.

Searle distinguishes three theses which are as follows:

- 1) The meanings which are in the head do not identify the extension..
- 2) The indexicals are not determining the extension.
- 3) Then what is in head which does not identify extension..

(3) does not follow from (1) and (2). If we accept that it follows then we must assume that indexicals are not insight our head. The question is this: Why does he think so? Searle believes that he takes the fallacious move because since we do not grasps the microstructure and that microstructure determines extension. If this is the case then what is in our head that does not determine extension? Searle regards that what Putnam believes is a false move. He will show that mistake by considering an example. One who utters the sentence "the writer of Republic" has an intention and that intention determines extension of "the writer of Republic". The intention of writer of Republic determines its extension though it is a fact about the world who writes the Republic. For someone who does not know who wrote the Republic, the extension of the expression "the writer of Republic" exists even though he does not know who the writer is. The same can be applied to Putnam's argument: "the structure of the stuff identified "indexically" and which is in the intentional content determines extension even though we do not know what the structure is." This confirms to the theory that holds that intention determines extension. This theory states that intention has set some sort of conditions and in order for something to be a part of that intention, the extension must satisfy the conditions. The extension must be matched with the conditions in order to a part of its relevant intention. That conditions are defined Putnam's example too – the indexical definitions. The indexical definitions of water has an intentional content which sets certain conditions and so in order to be a part of that intention, the extension must satisfy those conditions. Searle says "the intention sets certain

conditions which any potential sample has to meet of in order to be is to be part of the extension of relevant intention".²⁰

The same is the case of the intention of the expression "the writer of Republic" sets some conditions which has to satisfy by an extension in order to part of that intention. In both cases, it is a fact of the world, even though whether or not the extension satisfy the intentional content. Therefore it is a mistake that intention does not determine extension.

There is a second reason why Putnam thinks that meaning in the head does not determine extension. He makes a difference between intentional contents and indexical definitions, especially how intentional content relates to indexical definition. This emerges when he says,

Suppose I have a doppelganger in twin earth. Let us also suppose that when I think my stomach is upset and he is thinking that my stomach is upset. In my utterance of my refers to me and in his expression of my is himself. So here we have different idiolects and different extension.

Searle believes that both these assumptions are false. He says if "intention" means intentional content then the intention of an indexical definition determines extension. Secondly, Searle says "if a man and his doppelganger have type-identical mental states, they both have different intentional content and conditions of satisfaction".²¹ He explains it by an example,

Suppose that John who habitats the earth in 1750 identifies "water" indexically. Likewise, twin John who lives on twin earth identifies "water" indexically. Let us also suppose that they both have type-identical of everything, their intentional contents, indexical definitions and their perceptual experiences. Since they have type identical structure, they give type-identical definition of 'water' which is defined as what the structure which is identical with the stuff, because they have type-identical perceptual experience. As Putnam says, we cannot identify the extension in terms of mental states.

Now Searle's question is this: If John and twin John experience the same "water" how is it possible that they have different mental contents? And if they experience different "water", how is it that they have the same mental content? They do not have identical types of mental content but they have token difference. Because intentional content is self-referent as explained in chapter 2. Their intentional content is different. The indexical definition of "water" as experienced by John on earth can be analyzed as whatever the structure causes John to have (visual) experience. Likewise, the same can be said of twin John: it is whatever the structure causes twin John's experience. They both have type-identical experience but they both have different mental contents and their mental contents are different because the perceptual

experience is self-referential in nature. Finally, Searle concludes that this theory does not have any result, that different speakers on earth do not mean different thing by "water". Most of the people intend to use words what community at large mean and refer to. If one uses such public baptisms then he would normally involve the participant's visual and other experience. Thus he concludes that though he accept Putnam's argument, the argument put forth by the latter does not show that meanings are not in the head.

3.3 Moderate Version of Externalism

Externalism is widely spread in today's philosophy. This thesis widely spread after article "the meaning of 'meaning'" has published. In this article, Putnam criticizes the thesis meaning are internal to the mind and argues that "meanings are not in the head". This thesis presents that "the meaning of many words, the contents of many concepts and propositional attitude are not determined by our mental states alone, rather the physical and social environment play a very important role for determining meaning".²² It follows that our mental states and its contents are not supervene on the brain states and its contents.

According to Frege sense determines reference. Sense is an abstract entity. It exists in third world. The sense is grasped by mind though. This view is perceived by many including Searle as problematic. If the 'sense' is an abstract entity and it exist in the third world, how can it be grasped? If grasping it is a difficulty, then how can it determine reference? Carnap says "the ontological status of intention is like sense". Searle interprets as asserting that "intentions, that which is in the head set some conditions which anything has to meet in order to be part of the extension of the relevant intention".²³ I will try to point out some stronger interpretation because of this thesis because of which intention is said to fully determine the conditions. I am using the expression "fully determination" as used by Amir Horowitz who says that "fully determination" means that intention does not leave any inadequacy for determination. As Searle says about this thesis, I believe that this is analytically true.²⁴ If the meaning is external and intention is in the head then it is not such that it is analytically true. In what follows, I shall discuss where Putnam successfully presents the case where intention does not fully determine the conditions thereby exposing the vulnerability of the thesis advocated by Searle.

3.3.1 Twin earth argument (1)

In twin earth argument Putnam depicts a case where there is two identical “heads” it means that two people with same mental states. In this context, mental states are understood in its ‘narrow sense’. Putnam calls this as “methodological solipsism” (MS) in this sense mental states only determines its subject whom that mental state ascribed. “No mental states presupposes for the existence of any extensions”.²⁵ If it is the case then “what is in the head does not determine extensions”. I have described it earlier. I have already discussed Putnam's “Twin Earth” argument. So I will not repeat here. Thus here we have identical mental states and their extensions are different. According to Putnam content which determines extension is not in the head. Therefore the extension are not wholly determine by the intentionality of some mental states. So internalism is not true. Putnam says, “the difference of reference and content is because of environmental difference between these two situations”. In the first case Oscar's chemical structure of the ‘water’ is H₂O, where as in the second situation twin Oscar's microstructure of water is XYZ. I understand only because of microstructural differences which make both the reference and content differ.

Putnam believes that twin Oscar does not think about water that is H₂O. Some philosophers say he does think about H₂O while some other holds the opposite view. What is the reason for thinking that twin Oscar does not think about H₂O? Sometimes Putnam takes it for granted that twin Oscar does not refer to H₂O. However, he latter on thinks about it with an assumption that the natural kind of words like “water” are indexical in nature. He says the word “water” is obviously indexical an word like this, that, now, then etc. By this indexicality he criticized internalist thesis “intention determines extension”. Putnam claims that because of indexicality of ‘water’, we cannot say that it is the intention which determines extension. He says we do not apply indexicality for this thesis. The word “water” has an unnoticed component. Therefore the theory intention determines extension is false. We cannot index words like “I” as mentioned earlier. Like many other philosophers, Putnam believes that the theory that “intention determines extension” does not apply to indexical because the indexical is present in the utterance of the speaker and the extension is determined by this indexical. He says, “their extension varies from context to context or token to token”.

I examine Putnam's ‘indexical’ latter and show how his natural kind word like ‘water’ externally identified, I want to examine the obvious kinds of indexical. I will discuss about the essential indexical in the section 3.3.3.

3.3.2 Indexicality

Roughly speaking, an indexical is a linguistic expression whose meaning change from context to context, token to token. Example- 'you', 'I' 'this', 'that' etc. The indexical of 'you' may refer to my friend in one context but it may refer to another friend in another context. If two speakers- John and Sugy utter 'I am happy'. John says that he is happy whereas Sugy says that she is happy. Many philosophers believe that indexicals have two sorts of meaning. The first one is called as 'linguistic meaning' or 'character' and second one is due to David Kaplan.²⁶ The second sort of meaning is often called 'content'. By using this terminology, we can say "every indexical has a single unvarying character, but vary in context to context, token to token". Indexicality has some similarities with Wittgenstein's use theory of meaning in that its indexicality, like meaning, is determined by its context of use or utterance.

Considering Devid's case,²⁷ let us suppose Devid is sitting on a chair in his room and there is a ball is before him. He is thinking about his ball. His indexical thought is "This ball is red". Suppose in another situation he is thinking about his sister's ball which is not different from his own and he says "This ball is red". Here we have identical thoughts (non-intentional described) and different thoughts (intentionally described) so "intention does not determine extension".²⁸

I think that this is not a reasonable explanation for refuting the thesis "intention determines extension". As Searle says, "it is a matter of fact about the world, whether or not some existing entities satisfy the intentional content".²⁹ My ball is red falls under an extension of the intention if and only if the world is such that my ball is red. As Horowitz says, whether it is red or not, it is a matter of fact. It is not up to intention whether or not the ball falls under the extension. This is different from Devid's case. Devid's intention determines the extension of ball because Devid's intention about the ball and it relate to to that ball. But what is characteristic of "this". What Devid's "this" concept refers to. Searle's analyses of the content of such thought is that we have to be aware of the context of the utterance. The word 'this' is a relational informative word. It has a relation with the speaker or thinker or thinker location. The ball might be in front of thinker or thinker is pointing to the ball by his finger (in some cases where we select out intentional object by gesture). In Devid's case the ball is in front of him. It is a fact about the world not a matter of utterance or intentional content or any indexicality. Due to the fact that ball is red,

likewise the ball before Devid is an object of intention of 'this' thought. It is due to the matter of fact that the ball possesses the property of "in front of Devid". One might say the ball is a relation with Devid, other might say it is a matter of context of the utterance. We can also think that the ball which is in front of Devid was kicked by Messi's foot in the match against Spain. There is no problem on the side of properties by means of which we refer to the object. One might say the ball might be in different place or the ball might be yellow.

Does the intention really determine extension? Horowitz says no because the intention is different and extension is different. There must be a relation between the intention and extension and what the intention has must be matched with the extension. In the above case, Horowitz finds no certain justification to conclude that "intention of an indexical thought does determine its extension".³⁰

2. Let us recall the Devid's case. He is sitting on a chair in his room and his ball is before him and he is thinking about his ball and said, 'This ball is red'. Counterfactually let us suppose that he is in sister's room and her ball is before him which is indistinguishable from his ball. And he says 'This ball is red'. So it is same case of twin story as identical mental states and different extension. Let us now consider some objections. One objection is, What is reason for being an intentional object of Devid's 'this' thought? It is because the ball is in front of him. Let us suppose that it is in different place P. If the ball is in P then the thesis "intention does not determine extension". Since the intention of 'this' thought determines being in front of Devid. It means that external factor participate in the determination. The external factor of Devid's location and his orientation does not determine by intention of 'this' thought. So as the Horowitz says, "intention of the thought does not fully determine the property of object for being an intentional object".³¹

However, Horowitz thinks that this challenge is problematic. It is not the that the ball is in a certain place because of that it is intentional object. If the ball will move from that place to other than the ball is not object of intention of same thought because the ball is not before Devid. It might be an intentional object of a different thought or of a different intention. It is the property which makes the ball an intentional object. This shows that the ball is an intentional object while moving from one place to another place. But still we do not find strong justification to conclude that "the intention of indexical thought does not determine its extension".

3.3.3 Indexical thoughts are singular thought.

Thought is single if it involves the object. The thought lacks its content when the object is not there. Some philosophers says "indexical thoughts are singular thoughts". They are dependent upon object even if someone is hallucinating and thinks, "This dog is cute". We cannot attribute his belief because there is no dog. This is not because of 'this'. There might be the case where they do in which case we could have ascribed by saying that 'That dog is cute'. Horowitz thinks that hallucinating does not suffer lack of content but it is false because he presupposes an existence of a dog in that place. We cannot ascribe these types of ascriptions because the ascriptions of belief has indexical which concerned an identity with the intentional objects and there is no intentional objects. Therefore we do not ascribe such types of belief while there where no object. This does not says that if someone says that, "This dog is cute", either veridically or non-veridically he does not have belief. It is the belief-ascription which is transparent. The truth-condition depends on the world. The truth-condition of this belief is, there must be a dog in front of him and it be cute. One might protest that this explanation is existential while the belief is not. The truth-condition of belief does not determine by what is going on in the subjects' mind. Explication of contents need not the description of first-person's experience of the objects or state-of-affairs which the subject experiences. The contents are the property of the objects or state-of-affair by means of which the objects or states-of-affairs experience. The truth or falsity of every belief depends upon that object.

There is an objection of this discussion that we cannot explicate "This dog is cute", because "the dog is rigid or directly referential".³² "This dog is cute" does not mean that the dog is in front of me. It may refer to a dog which is in front of me in this world or any other possible worlds; it may be the case that the dog is before me in every possible world if it not in the actual world. The property of being before me (by means of which the object or dog refered to by "this"). It is not the propriety by which object has refered to by 'cthis'.

This theory of rigidity seems to Horowitz as a singular thought if the belief is rigid. The dog is my intentional object, if there is a dog in front of me. It is my intentional object, if there had been another dog; that dog would have been in my intentional object. If there had been no dog, there would not have been any intentional object, and so there would be no content. We must observe the external world. The proposition what we get depends upon the world. Here it means "object determines content" unlike the view of internalists who hold that content determines object.

I also think that the object is what causes the content. As Searle says "in direction of causation- a belief has world-to-mind direction of causation and a desire has mind-to-world direction of

causation. "It is the objects or state-of-affairs which cause the belief. But in desire, it is the desire itself which causes objects or state-of-affairs".³³

This view of rigidity is problematic in my opinion. I would like to offer my argument as follows: The belief "This dog is cute" has content whether or not there is a dog before me in the actual world. In general, a belief has content whether or not the referred object exists. Let us assume that indexical function is rigid. If so, then they do not refer to something for being in front of someone. They may be true as far as referent is concern. If I say "This dog is cute" then it means that there is a dog in front of me and it is to be cute. This is only concerned with actual world referent and not in property or conditions (the object must satisfy in order to be referent) of constitutive content. There might be someone who accept that the which explains the objects is not the property which makes object as an intentional object. The protestors claim that this is an artificial move. What makes the object of the actual world to be an intentional object is not the fact that they are identical with the object in front of the subject but that the fact is the object is in front of the subject.

The above objection is wrong and not artificial at all. Horowitz believes that this seems to be artificial because we tend to conflate two role of external world. The first rule serves as context of what we of designator. The reference and truth-condition of sentence is fixed in all world. I refer Tom because Tom is before me. This is "the context of acquisition". Second one is "context of evaluation" where truth condition of the sentence may differ from world to world. Tom is cute is one possible world and Tom is not cute in another possible world.

3. John Perry in his article gives an examples of "Hume and Haimson".³⁴ Let us examine this example: "Suppose that Hume and Haimson have same sense and think same thought but the difference is that they do not apprehend the same thought when they entertain the same sense. For instance, when Heimson entertains the thought that "I am the author of the *Treatise*" and when Hume entertains the thought and say "I am the author of the *Treatise*", Hume is right and Heimson is wrong or crazy. Thoughts are different in the world and these thoughts have different intentional object. Here same intention is there but extensions are not same. Here the indexical is "I". Perry calls it as essential indexical. Perry says, "we can replace Hume and Heimson's thought 'I wrote the *Treatise*' by 'The author of the *Inquiry* wrote the *Treatise*'".³⁵ But we cannot replace an indexical to non-indexical expression without thought losing its sensitivity which completes the determination and which determines the speaker and also the intentional objects. (Here the sensitivity is identity of the speaker.) Perry in his article "The problem of

essential indexicals” shows that “essentiality of ‘I’ to the explanation of behavior”.³⁶ Perry explains it through an example.

Once he was following a sugar trail on a supermarket floor and looking for a shopper with a torn bag for telling him that he was making a mess. But he was unable to find that man. Latter he saw that he was holding a bag and he was the shopper and he was trying to catch himself. He believe that the shopper with torn bag was making a mess. But he was not believe that he is shopper. Then he stopped to follow the trail and rearrange the trail. His believe “I am the shopper” make him to do so.

Horowitz says that the essential indexical thoughts can differ in extension while sharing intention. It is not possible that same intentions explain different extension, it may be token difference that is indexicals. He says if the types of thoughts cannot explain extension then thoughts may be token difference.

In the above case of Hume, what is supposed to complete the determination? It is Hume thought which completes the determination. The content determination presupposes Hume. The content-determination also presupposes something other than the intention of Hume’s thought of “I wrote the *Treatise*”. This does not establish the viewpoint of externalism. The intention of the the speaker does not identify extension. It only determines the individual who is the thinking subject. This proves that meaning can be determined solipsistically. Thus the essential indexical like “I” does not refers to any external things. Its reference is solipsistic. So Horowitz says, “The essential indexical thoughts are not external”.³⁷

The property that the extension has to satisfy if it to be intentional object of above Hume and Heimson’s thought is that whom thought belongs to. It looks alone. Here one question arises, who thinks avobe thought? This question has two level role: it asks how an object becomes an intentional? And what does object possess property? If we know the answer of the second and third question we know the answer of the first question. Here one might assume that the first question is asking about the thinker not about the property. The answer is the avobe all questions are asking for the identity of the thinker. If we do not know the intentional object, how would we know about the thinker. The oddness is because of the essentiality of “I”. If we place it with a non-indexical without violating the sensitivity of context, it will solve the problem of identity of thinker.

3.3.4 Twin Earth Argument (ii)

Now I am discussing about indexicality of Putnam. He takes the relation of 'same L' to determine extension. Putnam says that when anyone point to a finger to bucket of water and utters, "This is water", he presumes the liquid identical with the "same L' relation. In this community, the other speakers called that stuff as 'water'. According to Putnam "x is water if and only if it bears the same L relation to that stuff call 'water' in the actual world".³⁸ In order to establish externalism (the theory that believes in external thought). They must accept that the meaning of 'water' is determined ostensibly. This theory claims, an entity called as water if that entity identical with existing object in external world what subject denotes to by 'this'. This is called as indexical in Putnam's view.

We have seen that the indexicality comes with certain mental states. Putnam is unable to convince us with his 'same L' relation. If the 'same L' designates the observable property of water as H₂O (or XYZ) then the Putnam's twin earth argument will not establish externalism because the reference of both Oscars are same. Here Putnam uses the microstructure for determination of its extension. If so then H₂O is water while not XYZ. Because it simply absence of property of H₂O. I have a question as to why Putnam takes only microstructure for determining extension. Perhaps that is the way of the scientists and I believe nothing can prevent them to define 'water' by using its microstructure. If someone ask me what water is, perhaps I can also define it by using its microstructure. But if I do not know about chemistry, I can define water by its observable properties. Here I wants to say that this or that way is possible. One has free to explain 'water' by its chemical structure or by any perceivable property. There cannot be any restriction as to how we define our words or concepts. All that is needed is perhaps the explicitness or objectivity of the subject's description of his belief.

I support Horowitz who believes that Searle thesis 'intention determines extension' is inadequate. Searle interprets his thesis as "intention sets certain conditions which anything has to meet in order to be the part of the extension of the relevant intention".³⁹ This appears trivial in that it does not clearly tell us whether the intention determines those conditions; I mean if the intention can fully determine the conditions. By fully, I mean whether or not it leaves any question open; it should not. In other word, does it leave any indeterminacies? I am convinced that just by setting conditions, the intention can fully determine the extension. So the thesis 'intention determines extension' does not mean intention fully determines extension. If it is not, then Searle's position can, at best, be interpreted or treated only trivially. As Horowitz interprets, if this thesis is to be interpreted non-trivially, then it is not true.

As opposite to the intention of "the writer of Republic", Intention of "identical structure with this stuff" not fully explain object. It leaves some indeterminacy, namely, the structure of 'this' stuff.

Here we are not concerned about the knowledge of the subject but we are concerned about the structure of “this” stuff. We argued that the intention of “the identical structure with this stuff” not fully explain property of which the extension has to obtain if it has to fall under its extension. What about Putnam’s TE story? I mean what finishes determination in the case of the TE story? There, “these” stuffs mean “the structure of H₂O and the structure of XYZ”. If Oscars knew about H₂O and XYZ, then they would use the knowledge when they think about their respective “water” in which case their intentions would determine extension. Here the intention is no longer the “identical structure with this stuff”, but with the context, environment, in general, the actual world facts which complete the determination. Here the intention “identical structure with this stuff” and extra-mental facts fully determine its extension.

Now let us imagine God’s viewpoint. If God looks into Oscar’s head when he is thinking about “the stuff which microstructure of this is wet”. Will he think about water or gin? Assume that Oscar knows the microstructure of both water and gin. In order to know whether Oscar is thinking about water or gin, God has to look at his mind and the world as well for know what Oscar refers to by ‘this’. God looks at Oscars’ mind to see what he is thinking and looks at the world to know about the microstructure of the “water” and “gin”. God cannot know the content of what Oscars are thinking because the content is not there in their heads. Thus the extra-mental facts is that by virtue of that completes explanation of extension of thought. Here Horowitz is not saying, as Searle says, that it is a matter of fact that which is possessed by an object to meet the conditions set by intention in order to be a part of the extension of that intention. Here Horowitz is rather saying that the property of the object is a matter of fact (external). What *the property is* is itself (partly) a fact of world. It is not determined by intention. Thus, the meanings are not fully determined by external facts, sometime it is in the head.

Horowitz at first accepts Searle’s point which states that the extension of an intention is a set of things which it has to satisfy to be a part of extension of that intention. Here we can talk about “whatever test” of Horowitz which are of two type. The first ‘whatever’ is the “property of object” which is defined as ‘water’ that is identical with the form of “this”. The first ‘whatever’ signify fact of the world whether object is in extension of intention. It is like internalism. The second ‘whatever’ concerns about property which has to be satisfied by an object in order to part of the extension of that intention. Here the property means what is the chemical structure that an extension has to possess if it is to be an object of intention of thought. This property support by the form of “this”. The property also depends upon external facts. The first ‘whatever’ is the structure of ‘this’ which is the content which is in the head. And the second ‘whatever’ is the property itself, the conditions which the object has to satisfy. It is external to the mind. So the second ‘whatever’ is incompatible with externalism. It is the intention which determines which possible fact can complete the determination. Intention determines the context of the content which completes the determination. Here intention is like an open sentence which finds the way to complete the determination.

In the “twin earth” argument, intention plays a role to determine the microstructure of “water” which completes the content-determination. Here the content is the microstructure of “water”. Intention is in mind in sense that mental states supervene brain-states which play important role for explaining the content. This approach of content determination is like the intuition of narrow-content. According to Fodor, “determination of extension is relative to context” and the narrow content is explained by the context of the reference. But in my opinion, everything cannot be determined by the context alone. In narrow content, this is narrow content itself which identify context. But in our case context is an fact of world among the possible facts that is explained by the intention.

If we sum up the above views, we get what may be termed as a middle path in between internalism and externalism, more flexible than Putnam’s externalism. In our version, narrow content which is in mind explains the possible facts, one among them completes the reference explication. Moreover, it also explains whether thought is external or internal. Putnam externalism does not give this type of middle path. In Putnam’s writing we find that he rejects the notion of narrow content. Narrow content is not referential but a semantic. So it needs a strong interpretation for its relation with the environment. Narrow content determines a certain limited facts which determine reference. I shall defend this view later on in last section.

Putnam claims that it is the indexicals of Oscars’ thoughts which determine their referents. But in Putnam’s externalism, “indexicality is neither a sufficient condition nor a necessary condition”⁴⁰. It is not sufficient condition because we have knew that indexicality does not depend upon external facts. This is only true when we use indexicals. To know the indexical property of “I”, does not involves the external world. Indexical thoughts can be external. Recall the Devid’s example, “This” is a thought of the ball; indexical could be external if it involves descriptive element. The descriptive element decides whether or not the indexical is external.

Putnam does involve indexical in the “twin earth” argument. It is not because thoughts are external, but because both Oscars share the same intention and different extension. There is no way, as I maintained before, thoughts of same intention can result in different extension. If different type of thoughts do not explain extension then thought would have different in token. It must be different tokens. The extension may be numerical different or token different. If there were no microstructure difference then there would be no different extension. It is the contents (microstructure of ‘this’) that determine the extension. The determination is possible through microstructures. In other words, at times, determination is possible without indexical. So indexicality is not necessary for externalism.

3.3.5 The elm and beech argument.

Let's see the elm and beech argument of Putnam and Searle's response to it. The concepts of 'elm' and 'beech' are same in Putnam's idiolect but the extension of both trees are different in the external world. So we have here the same case as TE: same intention and different extension. Searle says that Putnam knows, the extension of both trees are different because Hillary (the speaker) knows that both trees are different. According to Searle, this knowledge is conceptual. It means that Putnam knows that the concept of 'elm' is different from the concept of 'beech'. In Putnam's intuition since the concept of 'elm' and 'beech' are identical, Horowitz says, "it should refer to a real psychological item not a semantic item".⁴¹ In Searle's intuition, the concepts of 'elm' and 'beech' are different. Both Searle and Putnam assume that these two concepts are different. They do not argue about, what that concept have? It seems that Searle is correct. They both quarrel about how these concepts determine extension. It is simply not possible that an identical concepts (non-intentional described) of a thinker in same all respect (linguistic, physical, psychological etc.) have different extensions. Nothing can explain the difference. Even if it is taken for granted that Putnam's 'elm' and 'beech' are determined by the experts' use of 'elm' and 'beech', when Putnam appeals to botanist's 'elm' and 'beech', the concepts of Putnam will be different because the concepts of botanist are different and these concepts determine different extension. When Putnam appeals to botanist, he (botanist) does not give him wrong answer. He does not say these two are identical. He has different concepts of 'elm' and 'beech'. So Putnam's concepts (non-intentionally describe) of both trees are different.

Putnam responds to the above claim: "there is no difference in mental representation of elm and beech, only the difference is in phonetic names".⁴² Searle is ready to accept this claim but insists that it does not refute his contention that "it is not possible for two identical mental representation to differ in contents in same environment in all respects ... difference in phonetic shape is difference in mental representation ... it is the individualistic of Putnam's head which determines extension and it is due to his ignorance that he has the same contents. An ignorant content is not a content at all".⁴³ In fact, Putnam has content of 'elm' in his head, but it need not represents the elms, rather it may represent beech because there is no connection between the content 'elm' and beech.

As Searle says it is the concept that is responsible for the representation of different extension. The experts have distinct concepts of both trees. Putnam's concepts of 'elm' and 'beech' are only

in difference in type. When the Putnam's concept of 'elm' appeal to the experts' concept of 'elm' and knows that the concepts of both trees are different. These different concepts determined extension. The different extensions would not have determined, if there had been no difference between the concepts. As I say before intention determines which possible facts match with the intentional objects. It is the phonetic shapes which is different in Putnam intuition. So the intention of Putnam's 'elm' determines the experts' usage of 'elm' and intention of Putnam's 'beech' explains usage of experts' 'beech'. That different usage determine the extensions of 'elm' and 'beech'. In this case the intention is the narrow content. In Horowitz view "... (narrow content) meaning of 'elm' used by Putnam is like that which is called elm by English speaker".⁴⁴ If it is the case then we can say the meaning of Hindi word 'chirabel' is "the species of tree what the Hindi speaker call as 'chirabel'". It is mistaken by translate 'elm' and 'chirabel'. The translation of words of different language is different from translation of words which is used by different language speakers. In this case we only know the explicit meaning of that word. We cannot know what is going on in their head. If we request the English, Hindi speaker experts then we will not face this type of problem of translation. However, the question is still not clear, whether the meaning of Putnam's 'elm' is same as 'chirabel' of Hindi speaker who is also knowledgeable about Botany. "It looks absurd".⁴⁵ Different language speakers can think about the same thought and can represent the same thing. I think that Putnam's 'elm' mean that what is English speaker calls as 'elm' and other language speaker language speaker translate 'elm' in their language. This must be correct because no English speaker can represent elm by saying beech.

Putnam gives another argument for criticizing the thesis 'intention determines extension' without any assumption of identical concepts. This argument depends on social and physical environment. In this argument, Putnam tells us to suppose molybdenum and aluminum pots and pans are indistinguishable save by experts. The aluminum pots and pans are made of molybdenum in twin earth. Furthermore, on twin earth 'aluminum' calls as molybdenum and vice versa. So when both Oscars utter term 'aluminum', they have identical mental states. When Oscar uses the term 'aluminum' he means 'aluminum' whereas, when twin Oscar uses the term 'aluminum' he means molybdenum. Thus meanings, contents do not determined solipsistically. Horowitz says, "what is responsible for different meanings and contents? Here the psychological states and concepts are not responsible. It is because of their linguistic community that the meanings are different. It means that Oscars communities are responsible for different meanings".⁴⁶

This argument does not clear the idea whether we have same psychological states with distinct language communities or different mental states with same linguistic community. As Searle says, when he overlooked regarding elm and beech argument, “what is in the head regarding elms and beeches does not suffice for making one think about elms and beeches, external factors (external to Hilary’s mind, in this case) must play a role”. Searle observes that Putnam must assume the experts’ intentions of elm and beech to determine the extension of elm and beech.⁴⁷ In my opinion, regardless of Searle’s response, he does not fully refute the above argument nor defend his position. Considering the above discussions, I am inclined to think that there are some thoughts whose content in the head cannot fully determine extension. To this extent, I believe that externalism in the moderate sense is both defensible and plausible.

3.4 Conclusion

In this chapter, I have taken a position that neither Searle nor Putnam is wholly correct in their respective views. But again neither is fully wrong in their views. When we consider their arguments, especially the thought experiments of Putnam and the responses of Searle, there are elements of truth that can be gained from both. Accordingly, I have taken a view which can be termed as moderate externalism.

Conclusion

We have noted that Searle’s theory of language is related to his theory of mind. His works in the philosophy of language is therefore better read as a branch of the philosophy of mind. For developing his theory of language, he initially supported the speech act theory of Austin. However, he developed further the speech act theory by critically analyzing Austin’s works. While Austin’s approach is a conventional one, Searle’s approach to speech acts is intentional. In Austin’s approach, we understand the utterance of words if we know the conventional meaning. In Searle’s approach, we understand an utterance if we understand the intention of the speaker.

We have noted that intentionality plays the central role in the speech act theory of Searle. To know the meaning we have to know the intention of the speaker. There are many other concepts which we have to know in order to understand the speech acts. They are illocutionary force, propositional content, conditions of satisfaction, direction of fit, direction of causation and so on.

For Searle, intentionality and speech acts have an analogous structure. They both have propositional content, psychological state or illocutionary force, conditions of satisfaction, direction of fit. They both have propositional content, psychological state or illocutionary force, conditions of satisfaction, direction of fit and so on. Searle argues that meaning is possible when the conditions of satisfaction of intentionality impose on the conditions of satisfaction of speech acts. The conditions of satisfaction of speech acts and intentionality are identical. The conditions of satisfaction of meaning are different from the conditions of satisfaction of speech acts and

intentionality. Meaning conditions can be satisfied even if the world is not in that way. But the conditions of satisfaction of speech acts and intentionality can be satisfied if and only if the world is in the same way. Here one problem arises as to what conditions the object or the state-of-affairs have to satisfy. Searle does not give adequate answer. But I found this answer from discussions of Searle and Putnam including Amir Horowitz whose view helped me to develop my approach

Putnam being an externalist, he rejects the thesis of internalism that 'intention determines extension'. For this, he offered his seminal thought experiments, viz., the 'twin earth argument' and the 'elm and beech argument'. In Putnam's "twin earth" argument, it is the microstructure which determines extension and the microstructure is not in the mind but outside the mind. In response to these arguments of Putnam, Searle initially and tentatively accepts these arguments for the sake of discussion but then goes on to show that these arguments do not really prove that intention does not determine extension. Putnam faces this problem because he underestimated what is in the head that determines extension. In a way, Searle has defended somewhat successfully the criticism of Putnam. The responses of Searle made Putnam to see that his theses face some problem too. So he brings in another concept for defending his theses. The notion is indexicality. Putnam says it is the indexicality of words which determine the extension. Putnam says it is through indexicality that the extension is determined. He says all natural kind words are obviously indexical. He says indexicals are present in the utterance of the speaker. Again, Searle put forth his counter-argument by saying that indexicals do play a role in determining the extension but they are present in the head, not in the external world like rocks and tables. Indexicals come with intention. Accordingly, he concludes that intention determines extension.

Horowitz accepts Searle's claim that indexical comes with intention and at the same time criticized Putnam's view that "indexicals are present in the utterance of the speaker". We have seen the argument of Horowitz that it is not through the indexical, we know the meaning. He rather says that it is the content or microstructure which determines the extension. Horowitz goes on to argue that it is the object that determines the content unlike the view of the internalists who hold that the content determines the object. He puts a rhetorical question on the internalists: Does intention fully determine extension? To this, he gives his own response that intention does not fully determine extension. There always remains an element of indeterminacy. We need social and physical environment for determination too. It means that he takes both internalists and externalist viewpoints. He says that intention plays a role like an open sentence which finds its way to determine an object. It means that intention determines extension through the content. He accepts the narrow content which is in the head.

I have taken side with Horowitz. He not only pointed out the weak points of both Searle and Putnam but also capitalized on their strong points. Somewhat taking clues from Horowitz, I hold the view that it is not only the object that determines the content but also content determines the object. There is a two way relation in the determination of extension. While accepting the approach taken by Searle, I find that there is some problem in Searle philosophy- How the content-determination is possible? Or what are the conditions which an object have to satisfy? These are not adequately addressed by Searle. Interestingly, I found reasonable answers to the above questions in the works of Putnam and Horowitz. Besides, the

exchange of views between Searle and Putnam helped me to understand these questions better. Horowitz points out defects in these two philosophers and offered his solutions as well. By these points, he developed a moderate version of externalism, a view I have gradually come to support and embrace in this work. However, Horowitz' moderate version of externalism has some problem too. Though his approach is an internalist approach, he calls his philosophy as moderate externalism. This is confusing. The only difference I find between internalist and Horowitz is that he accepts that the external world plays an important role in content-determination. The rest appears to be an internalist stance. So in my opinion his philosophy may be more appropriately termed as moderate internalism as opposed to my own view, which is moderate externalism.

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Introduction

Analytic philosophy has developed at the beginning of the 20th century. In analytic philosophy two trends emerged, namely, ideal language philosophy and ordinary language philosophy. Frege and Russell are ideal language philosophers. Wittgenstein, Strawson, Searle and Austin are ordinary language philosophers. Wittgenstein says all philosophical problems arise due to the misunderstanding of language. In his use theory of meaning, he uses context for determining the meaning. Philosophy of language is broadly and primarily concerned with meaning. The main problem of philosophy of language is the possibility of meaning. Different philosophers give different answers. Wittgenstein says it is through the use of language in a context that we get to know the meaning of our linguistic expressions. There is no fixed meaning of words. Many philosophers generally accept this view and develop their own approaches towards the semantic study of language. In this work, I will engage with the approach taken by John Searle.

After the publication of Gettier's seminal paper [1] two types of theory of knowledge developed. One is internalism and the other is externalism. Searle is a radical internalist. Searle's main philosophical insight is, linguistic philosophy is a branch of philosophy of mind. He says that to understand the meaning of a sentence, we have to understand the intention of the speaker. He accepts J.L. Austin's speech act theory and builds his own theory around it. He says meaning is possible only when we utter words. When someone utters a sentence we know the intention of the speaker. By knowing the intention we know the meaning.

The primary aim of this dissertation is to offer a view of meaning along the line developed by Austin and Searle. Without totally agreeing with them nor disagreeing with them, I have borrowed insights from their works and defended a view which I term it as Moderate Externalism. This view developed after engaging with Hillary Putnam's arguments against Searle's internalist position. In general, I

will be looking at some other questions such as how mind relates to the world? How is meaning possible? How language relates to reality? Etc. In order to discuss these questions, I begin with the discussions of Searle's views and approaches. But towards the end of this work, I try to develop and offer my own account.

As noted above, one issue in the study of philosophy of language is the relation of language with mind. Here Searle is of the view that the theory of language is a part of the theory of mind. When it comes to the semantic theory of language, he supports speech acts of theory of Austin in general. Austin's speech act theory is a conventional one. Searle's approach to speech act theory is intention-oriented. In Austin's speech acts theory, we understand the utterance if we know the conventional meaning of linguistic expressions. In Searle's approach, we understand the utterance of a speaker if we get to know the intention of the speaker. In this work, as noted above, I will be mostly engaging with the works of Searle.

Intentionality plays an important role in the speech act theory of Searle. To know the meaning we have to understand the intention of the speaker. There are many other concepts which we have to understand in order to understand the speech acts. They are illocutionary force, propositional content, conditions of satisfaction, direction of fit, direction of causation, etc. Searle says intentionality and speech acts have an analogous structure. They both have propositional content, psychological state or illocutionary force, conditions of contentment, direction of fit and so on. Searle argues that meaning is possible when the conditions of contentment of intentionality impose on speech act's conditions. The conditions of contentment of speech acts and intentionality are identical. The conditions of contentment of meaning are different from the state of satisfaction of speech acts and intentionality. Meaning conditions can be satisfied even if the world is not in that way. But the conditions of contentment of speech acts and intentionality can be satisfied if and only if the world is in the same way. Here one problem arises as to what conditions the object or the state-of-affairs have to satisfy. Searle does not give adequate answer. But I found this answer from discussions of Searle and Putnam including Amir Horowitz whose view helped me to develop my approach.

Putnam is an externalist. He rejects the thesis of internalism that intention explains extension. For this, he offered his seminal thought experiments, viz., the 'twin earth argument' and the 'elm and beech argument'. In Putnam's "twin earth" argument, microstructure which explains extension and the microstructure is not in the mind but outside the mind. In response to these arguments of Putnam, Searle initially and tentatively accepts these arguments for the sake of discussion but then goes on to show that these arguments do not really prove that intention does not determine extension. Putnam faces this problem because he underestimated mental state which explains extension. In a way, Searle has defended somewhat successfully the criticism of Putnam. The responses of Searle made Putnam to see that his theses face some problem too. So he brings in another concept for defending his theses. The notion is indexicality. Putnam says it is the indexicality of words which determine the extension. Putnam says it is through indexicality that the extension is determined. He says all natural kind words are obviously indexical. He says indexicals are present in the utterance of the speaker. Again, Searle put forth his counter-argument by saying that indexicals do play a role in determining the extension but they are present in the head, not in the external world like rocks and tables. Indexicals come with intention. Accordingly, he concludes that intention determines extension.

Horowitz accepts Searle's claim that indexical comes with intention and at the same time criticized Putnam's view that indexical are in the utterance of the sentence. Then he takes some help from John Perry's articles [2] and "The Problem of Essential Indexicals" which I discuss briefly in the third chapter. Horowitz argues that it is not through the indexical, we know the meaning. He rather says that it is the content or microstructure which determines the extension. Horowitz goes on to argue that it is the object that determines the content unlike the view of the internalists who hold that the content determines the object. He puts a rhetorical question on the internalists: Does intention fully determine extension? To this, he gives his own response that intention does not fully determine extension. There always remains an element of indeterminacy. We need social and physical environment for determination too. It means that he takes both internalists

and externalist viewpoints. He says that intention plays a role like an open sentence which finds its way to determine an object. It means that intention determines extension through the content. He accepts the narrow content which is in the head.

I accept Horowitz' views. He accepts both Searle's than Putnam's views. He accepts Searle's contention that "intention sets some conditions for determination of extension". He also accepts the narrow content approach of Searle. But he is not convinced that intention can fully determine extension. It is here that he accepts the views of Putnam (Putnam is an externalism). Like Horowitz, I hold the view that it is not only the object that determines the content but also content determines the object. There is a two way relation in the determination of extension. To understand this two way relationship, I took help from the works of Searle. In belief content, it is the object which determines the content. In desire content, it is the content which determines the object. Suppose I have a belief that it is raining. It is an object or state-of-affairs which causes me to believe that it is raining. Suppose I am hungry, I have a desire to take some food. It is my desire that causes me to take some food. These technical relations (upward and downward) are introduced and explained in the second chapter.

Through the speech acts mind relates to the world. The speech act is kind of human action. The strength of speech acts is represents the objects and state-of-matters. It has also the capacity to express the mental states (belief, desire). Speech acts are like object or state-of-affairs. Their strength is not intrinsic but it derived from the intentionality of the mind. Intentionality is intrinsic in the mind. When an agent uses a sentence or make a mark on the paper or ask a question, he does not only use sentences, he expresses his belief, desire, etc. A sentence is only a syntactical object where the representational capacity imposed: belief, desire, etc. All of these facts proves that language is a social phenomenon and intentionality is underlying on it.

While accepting the approach taken by Searle, I find that there is some problem in Searle philosophy- How the content-determination is possible? What is the

content? Is it a narrow or broad content? What are the conditions which an object have to satisfy? Is communication possible without representation? These are not adequately addressed by Searle. Interestingly, I found reasonable answers to the above questions in the works of Putnam and Horowitz. Besides, the exchange of views between Searle and Putnam helped me to understand these questions better. In Horowitz's article, [3], he presents the arguments of Putnam and the responses of Searle. In these arguments and responses, Horowitz tries to point out some problem and the solution of these two philosophers. By these points, he developed a moderate version of externalism, a view I have gradually come to support and embrace in this work. However, Horowitz' moderate version of externalism has some problem too. Though his approach is an internalist approach, he calls his philosophy as moderate externalism. This is confusing. The only difference I find between internalist and Horowitz is that he accepts that the external world plays an important role in content-determination. The rest appears to be an internalist stance. So in my opinion his philosophy may be more appropriately termed as moderate internalism. He believes that what is in the head determines contents and references. He also argued about the indexical. He says that the essential indexical or obviously indexical is not necessarily external. He says that indexical always comes with intention.

To get back to the overall attempt of this thesis, the key concepts of discussion in this work are intentionality, meaning, extension, content-determination, speech acts, and indexicality. Having noted the above, I have organized my thoughts and structured my dissertation as follows:

In my first chapter, I am dealing with speech acts of Searle. I discuss the types of speech acts, illocutionary act, illocutionary force, propositional content, predication, and reference. In the second chapter, I connect the speech acts with the theory of intentionality. Here I explain how intention plays a role in determining meaning, how intentionality connects with the speech acts, etc. Also I explain various terms like the conditions of contentment, direction of fit, direction of causation, and meaning. In third chapter, I examine whether or not the meaning is in the head. There I discuss the arguments of Putnam and the responses of Searle. Following this, I discuss the Horowitz discussion of the views of Searle and

Putnam. I basically accept the views of Horowitz. However, I partly deviate from his views to develop my own view of moderate externalism.

Chapter 1

SPEECH ACTS

1.1 Introduction:

In this chapter, I mainly concern about Searle's works on ¹speech acts. Though the theory of speech act was originally developed by J.L. Austin and I will refer to some of his works, I will not look into his work in details since John R. Searle accepted Austin's speech act theory in general and the central tenets of speech acts theory which are commonly shared by both of them will be highlighted and explained in this chapter. Important concepts and categories like locutionary act, illocutionary act and perlocutionary acts will be explained. In addition, I will also try to discuss certain other related words like proposition, predication, reference, etc. In short, I will highlight the importance of speech act theory as advocated by Austin and Searle to understand better the semantic question of language.

1.2 Why do we need a speech act?

In the literature, we find many theories of language, especially semantic theories. However, most of them are interested in conventional meanings of sentences. They rarely touch upon issues of what may be called speech acts. Speech acts deal with expressions such as request, apology, order, and so on. In order to deal with such expressions, J.L. Austin and John R. Searle developed their theories of speech act.

Searle claims that "speaking a language is a rule-governed form of behavior".¹ Speaking a language is to know the rules and intentional behavior".² In other words, when we speak, we are performing an act which involves rules including intention. Uttering meaningful words will always involve intention or intentional behavior. Intentional behavior in this context means purposeful use of words to achieve or effect certain results or goal and it is directed towards a listener. Examples-the act of making a promise, giving an order, asking a question, etc. When we critically try to understand our use of language, we realize that linguistic communication does

London, UK, 1970, p. 16

not only involve symbols, rules, words or sentence but also the performance of symbols, words and sentences in the form of sounds and bodily expressions of both the listener and speaker. To get this one has to understand the difference between linguistic communication and other non-linguistic activities of human beings or natural phenomena in the world. Searle says, “when I make a noise or put some mark on a piece of paper as an instance of linguistic communication”,³ I assume that this noise or mark on a piece of paper is accompanied by certain kind of intention. For example, suppose you are going out while it is raining without realizing that “it is raining” and I say “It is raining”. Why did I utter those words? I want to convey something meaningfully to affect your behavior or action. It is not simply a truth claim I am making. Rather I intent to communicate to you that you wait for some time till the rain stops or take an umbrella with you. A linguistic communication is not like natural phenomena – book, table, chairs, events, process, etc. What makes linguistic communication unique is the presence of intention in it. Without involving intention, mere sounds or symbols will not by themselves become a language. In other words, intention is the heart and soul of language.

The term “speech act” itself suggests that it is not just sound or symbols; It involves some action or act. It is a performance. It is something done with the involvement of intention. In that sense, it is the intersection of the theory of language and theory of action. As a matter of fact, Searle proposed that a theory of language is better understood as a part and parcel of a theory of action. A language is a rule-governed form of behavior. And since it is a rule-governed activity, a formal study of language is not only possible but necessary. However rules are not to be limited to abstract theory of language that is, symbols, syntax, semantics, etc. Rules are there to be played or to be used. So there is a component of an act or practicality. In other words, if Saussurian approach is concerned with ‘langue’ in the more abstract sense (structure, grammatical rule, theory), Searle is more concerned with ‘parole’ (speaking, practice). Searle argues that without adequate theory of langue, speech act is not possible. Searle claims that communication necessary involves speech act. He also claims that “whatever can be meant can be said”.⁴ This is termed as the “principle of expressibility”. Communication is possible through speech acts. To put it in a stronger wording, without speech acts communication is not possible and vice-versa.

One may ask, is it a meaning theory or a speech acts that Searle has developed? To this, Searle maintains that “there is no two types of semantic study, that is, theory of meaning and theory of speech act. Theory of meaning is a part of speech act theory. A literal utterance of a sentence in certain context would go on to define its meaning”.⁵ It is the performance of speech acts by

which meaning becomes possible and dynamic. When we perform a speech act, we are uttering a sentence with certain rules and intention and this intention and rules make the meaning possible. When we utter something we mean it. The meaning is possible when we utter the sentence.

To summarize the above point, the study of the speech acts theory and the theory of meaning are not two separate studies; they are one which can be looked at from two different points of view. They are not competing theories but rather they complement each other; one is not possible without the other. They go together.

1.3 Locutionary Acts

A locutionary act is the basic act of producing a meaningful expression through an utterance. For example, someone's utterance "It is raining outside". Normally our expressions or utterances are about something; they refer to something. When we express our thought with reference to something, it can be called a locutionary act. Locutionary act can be explained even in relation Frege's notion of reference or Wittgenstein's notion of picture theory of meaning or Russell's theory of description. Prior to development of Austin's speech act theory, linguistic philosophers in general were mainly concern with locutionary act in that sense. However, locutionary act is not the main concern of speech acts theory though it is a part of this theory. It is simple and requires hardly any explanation since much of the conceptualization was done by thinkers mentioned earlier. However, speech acts theory picks up from there to probe deeper into more subtle and complex aspect of meaning which are categorized as illocutionary and perlocutionary acts. It may be pointed out that a locutionary act could also at the same perform the function of illocutionary act or perlocutionary act. For e.g. I say "I order you to leave the room". When the person whom I addresses to fails to hear me, she will not leave the room. In this case, though I successfully performed a locutionary act, I am unsuccessful in performing the illocutionary act. I am successful in performing locutionary act because I uttered some meaningful expressions. However, if my interlocutor hears me and moved out of the room, then I have certainly succeeded in performing an illocutionary act. The above example explicates the distinction between a normal utterance and performance⁸ of an illocutionary act. This distinction can also be seen as a distinction between literal meaning on the one hand and using the illocutionary force on the other hand. Further, if I utter the same expression to insult her, my interlocutor, in front of others, and if she (the hearer) hears the utterance and got ashamed or angry because of the effect of my words in front of others, then this effect in the listener is termed as perlocutionary act. In this sense, perlocutionary act is listener oriented as it is defined by the kind of effect it has on the listener due to my utterance. More will be said on illocutionary and perlocutionary acts in the subsequent paragraphs.

Austin divided the locutionary act into three categories, namely, phonetic acts, phatic acts, and rhetic act. The first one the phonetic acts are the uttering or producing some sound. For e.g. "Hurrah" or "Hey". The second one the phatic acts are the uttering some vocabularies using the grammar to express some meaning. For e.g., He said, "The book is on the table". The rhetic act is uttering some meaningful vocabularies to make certain definite sense and reference. For e.g., He said that the book was on the table. The performance of the locutionary act determines its meaning without any intention. It has only a conventional meaning. When it is mixed with some force, it will become an illocutionary act. Illocutionary act determines its meaning through intention. Locutionary meaning is literal meaning. The meaning is in the utterance, it does not go beyond the utterance.

However, this distinction between locutionary and illocutionary act was not accepted by Searle. He says that what has been termed by Austin as locutionary act is essentially an illocutionary. He only accepts the phonetic and phatic acts in locutionary acts.. Any meaningful performance of a speech act comes with a force. Searle says that any verb phrase of rhetic acts invariably contains an illocutionary verb. For e.g. "He told me to do x". Here the verb 'told' contains a very general illocutionary force. Other verbs related to speech acts like order, command, request, apologize etc. contain illocutionary force too. As a matter of fact, he argues that all rhetic acts verbs have illocutionary force. So rhetic act is invariably contained in the illocutionary act. Searle asserts that every sentence is potentially contained in some illocutionary act. For e.g. interrogative, imperative etc. In holding this view, he does not accept the rhetic act of Austin. He says there is no locutionary utterance which is opposed to or distinct or separable from an illocutionary act.

1.4 Illocutionary Acts

Imagine a speaker and a hearer who are talking with each other and using these following sentences in appropriate situations:-

- 1) Rocky holds the bottle.
- 2) Does Rocky hold the bottle?
- 3) Rocky, hold bottle.
- 4) Would that Rocky hold the bottle.

In the above sentences, one thing is common that all words are in the English language. In the utterance of 1 speaker makes an assertion and in utterance of 2 the speaker is asking a question in the utterance of 3, the speaker is giving an order and in the utterance of 4, the speaker is expressing a wish. There is something common in these sentences: the speaker refers to a person called Rocky. Also the speaker predicates an expression 'holds bottle' to Rocky. In the above examples, the reference and predication are same but the occurrence of reference and predication

are different in that they occur as part of the speech act. In general, speech act can thus be called as illocutionary act. Austin provides “a list of verbs that denote illocutionary act such as commanding, stating, ordering, wishing, desiring, etc”.⁶

In the above examples the speaker is performing three acts.

- i. He is uttering the sentences in English.
- ii. He is referring and predicating.
- iii. He is performing an illocutionary act like stating, ordering and so on.

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In the first case/act, the speaker is performing an utterance act and in second, the speaker is performing a propositional act. When someone performs an illocutionary act, he characteristically performs both utterance act and propositional act just like a person performs both mental activity and physical activity when he writes. The activities are different from each other and they can occur independent of each other too. For instance, one can perform utterance act without performing propositional act; this happens when one simply utters a word, say “yeah”, without intent to say anything or to perform any of the three acts mentioned above. In the meantime, we can perform the same propositional act for performing different illocutionary acts as just noted above. In the above examples, propositional acts are same but illocutionary acts and utterance acts are different. Propositional act includes predication and reference.

5) Priya holds the bottle for a while.

In 5, the utterance act is different because the sentence contains some different words. It is different above all four. Here the propositional act is also different because of different reference which is referred by the term ‘Priya’. The illocutionary act is the same as 1. The speaker is making an assertion.

If the same sentence is uttered by a difference person, it will be a different utterance acts. The voice, tone of the voice to be more precise, can differ from person to person depending on the context and purpose. Suppose a person utters the sentence “She has a beautiful hair” (normally) and the same person utters it snugly, then it calls as different speech acts. In the utterance act, we are dealing with language, voice tone, speaking style, etc. The utterance act is simply uttering the words. Searle says, “the illocutionary acts and propositional act consist characteristically in uttering words in sentences in certain contexts, under certain conditions and with certain

intentions”.⁷ Searle also says, “the propositional act cannot occur alone. It always comes with an illocutionary act”.⁸ The reference and predication cannot be performed without any illocutionary act. When someone asserts something, that something can be meaningful for that assertion. It means the propositional act cannot occur without an illocutionary act. It is like Frege concept of context-principle. Frege meant that “only in the context of a sentence a word is meaningful”. The same is the case with the speech of act in that reference expression is possible only when one says something in a context. When one utters a sentence, it consists of an illocutionary act which control referring expression and that referring expression is meaningful.

1.4.1 Predication

Before Searle, predication is about attributing some characteristics to the subject. So for Frege, predication is a reference to a property, that is, a concept or a thought. Predication is possible when a predicate refers to a concept. For e.g “Sam is drunk”. Here “drunk” is a grammatical predicate which refers to a property or concept that is “drunkenness” which is predicated to “Sam”. Frege’s predication is possible only in assertive proposition. Frege’s predication is possible when abstraction is possible.

In “term theory” of proposition, P.F. Strawson says that “both subject and predicate are non-linguistic terms. And the relation between them is “non-relational tie” because one is particular and another one is universal”.⁹ The former is present in the world and the latter is not present in the world. The subject is non-linguistic in the sense that it is a material object and its existence is a contingent fact. The predicate is non-linguistic. The predicate term with meaning is a linguistic entity. When the predicate expression is particular (which is present in the factual world), we identify it by reference of the world. But when it is a universal concept we identify in our mode of representing the world. Universal is not a fact in the world. So we identify it through our utterance of expression which has relevant meaning. Frege uses reference for predication but Strawson uses identification for predication. The difference between subject term and predicate term is that the former identifies an object in the world while the latter identifies a universal attribute such as *redness*.

Searle describes the nature of predication in the speech act. Here predication is very important which includes reference and illocutionary act. Without predication, speech act is not possible. This can be described by considering the below examples-

1. You are going to leave.
2. Will you leave?
3. Leave!
4. I suggest you leave.

In all utterances of these sentences, the predicate and reference are the same. The predicate is “leave”, reference is you. The predicate “leave” of you is different in every sentence because of the different illocutionary act. The different illocutionary force indicating device determines in which mode “leave” is predicated of you. The illocutionary forces in sentences are (1) stating (2) questioning (3) surprise (4) suggest. While the term “suggest” in sentence 4 is explicitly functioning as a force term, the force terms in the other sentences are implicit. These force terms play an important role in predication. They operate on the predicate terms for determining the mode in which the predicate terms relate to the reference terms. If the sentence is interrogative, the force term is questioning either the predicate term true or false of the object referred to by the reference term. If the sentence was imperative, the illocutionary force provided by the force term determine the object which is referred to by the reference term is doing something and this action determines the predicate term.

The illocutionary force indicating device determines in which mode the predicate expression is true or false as well as it also determines the object referred to by the subject (it’s a relation between force term and reference term). The illocutionary force does not affect the reference term. The reference term is always neutral. But predication always comes with illocutionary force. Though reference is an abstraction but it is not like the predication. It is a separate speech act from the total illocutionary act. It does not depend upon illocutionary force. Predication is an abstraction but not like the reference. It is a part of the illocutionary act. Here a question arises why we need a separate act? It is because we saw before that though sentences may have the same content, they will have different illocutionary acts. To show that illocutionary force is different and separable from content, we need this. By predication, we determine the mode in which the content is applied to the object referred to by the subject expression.

1.4.2 Reference:

A reference serves to identify objects, individuals, actions, events etc. Searle calls it as reference expression or singular definite referring expression. If the reference expression starts with

indefinite article 'a man' and it is being used in the utterance of the sentence 'a man came', it might serve the singular definite referring expression but it cannot identify the speaker's intention. If the reference expression uses definite article 'the man' and is being used in an utterance of the sentence 'the man came', it must serve both to identify the definite object of person and the speaker's intention. It is the difference between singular indefinite referring expression and singular definite referring expression. Similarly, we will discuss plural definite referring expression 'the boys' and plural indefinite referring expression 'some boys'. Searle says that referring expression does not mean an expression which refers to something. As said earlier, reference is speech act and a speech act is performed by a speaker. Speech act is performed when a speaker utters some words. A speech act is not words or sentences. It is the act of utterance. We identify reference when a speaker performs some utterance.

1.4.3 Proposition

In different illocutionary acts, if the same reference and same predication are used in different expressions, Searle holds that those different expressions are the same proposition. In the above 4 examples I used above, they have the same reference and same predication and so they are one and the same proposition. Searle says, "a proposition is to be sharply distinguished from an assertion or statement it. A proposition is not an act. The acts are stating, asserting etc. According to Searle, a proposition is what is apologized by the act of apologizing, or what is promised by the act of promising etc. The expression of a proposition is a propositional act, not an illocutionary act. Illocutionary act is the whole statement. The propositional act is only a part of the illocutionary act".¹⁰ Searle holds that one cannot express a proposition without any illocutionary act. The propositional act cannot occur alone. It always presupposes illocutionary act. A proposition always comes with illocutionary acts. In a sentence, the speaker expresses a proposition with an illocutionary act which expresses how the proposition occurs in the sentence. If someone says 'there is the bottle', the speaker is 'stating' in this sentence. By this act of stating he express the proposon. That expression is called as a propositional act where the proposition is expressed. A propositional act includes reference and predication and so without stating reference and prediction, it cannot occur. If we include all of this, it is a complete speech act.

Searle distinguishes between propositional indicator and illocutionary force indicator in a sentence to show how a proposition is to be taken. When a speaker utters something or illocutionary act, he uses an illocutionary act. He uses an illocutionary force which determines how the sentence is to be taken. A speaker uses illocutionary force indicator by which he starts the sentence. Examples- 'I apologize', 'I warn', 'I promise', etc. Where the speaker does not use the illocutionary force indicator, the context of the sentence makes clear what illocutionary force has to be taken. It is not need to take explicit illocutionary force indicator. This distinction

between these two indicators does not lie in all situations. If someone says “I promise to do it”. Here we cannot distinguish between illocutionary force indicator and propositional indicator. We can differentiate it if its syntax is like ‘I promise that I will do it’. Here the illocutionary force indicator is ‘I promise’ and the propositional indicator is ‘I will do it’. If we go into the depth of the previous sentence “I promise to do it”, we can find this. In the deep structure of all sentence, we can find the difference between illocutionary force indicator and propositional indicator. This distinction is useful latter where we will analyze the structure of illocutionary act. There are some rules for expressing a proposition. Searle represents this distinction symbolically F (P) where ‘F’ stands for illocutionary force and ‘P’ stands for expressing the propositions. It would not fit in all illocutionary act, for e.g. “Hurrah, for team India”.

1.4.4 Structure of Illocutionary Act

As the fundamental concepts of the illocutionary act has been introduced and explained above, I will now look into the structure of illocutionary act as worked out by Searle. He takes promise as an initial problem or example to explain the structure of illocutionary act. In his analysis, Searle basically wants to clarify what it means to perform a successful and non-defective promise. He gives “necessary and sufficient conditions making a successful and non-defective promises”.¹¹ His notion of defectiveness is similar to Austin’s notion of ‘infelicity’.

Through these conditions, we can draw out a set of rules of using illocutionary force indicator. To play an illocutionary act is like playing a chess game. One who does not know the rules of chess cannot play chess. In order to play chess, one has to learn from others who know the rules of chess or who know how to play chess. Likewise, in order to understand the how to perform successfully an illocutionary act, we must know the rules or structure governing it. In what follows, I will present the formulations of those rules one by one.

For his analysis, Searle takes only explicit promises and ignores promises which are performed through hints, metaphor, etc. He only deals with categorical promises, not the hypothetical ones, because these are simple and easily analyzable. This model is called constructive idealized model. It is analogous with the theory of construction. He also gives a list of conditional by means which we can perform illocutionary acts successfully and non-defectively.

²³ Suppose a speaker S utters a sentence T in front of a hearer H, in the utterance of T, S sincerely, successfully and non-defectively makes a promise, if and only if the following conditions are satisfied:-

a) Input and output method

Here Searle uses 'input' and 'output' not in the sense of computer input and output method. He uses these in literally sense where he deals with linguistic communication. The output means the condition for speaking and input means the condition of understanding. In present stage, both the hearer and the speaker know the language and know how to communicate with this language. They are conscious of what they are doing.

b) S expresses of T the speaker uses an illocutionary act of P..

Speaker wants to focus on promising which is a peculiar kind of illocutionary act (I will not repeat the definition of illocutionary act here since the basic definition or notion is given earlier).

c) S predicts a future act A in the expression of P.

In promise, illocutionary force indicating device includes a proposition. The act must be predicated on the speaker. It is not a past action nor something that might have been done. I cannot promise someone else to do it; I can make a promise only with reference to a present moment. I can promise not to do something and also I can promise to do something repeatedly. I can promise to remain in a certain state and condition. Searle asserts that the conditions a and b as propositional conditions since they are expressions of a promisor, not the acts predicated of objects. In promise the speaker predicates an expression on himself or herself.

d) H prefers that S will do A not H will do A and S also believes that H prefers S to do A, not H will do A.

There is a difference between a promise and a threat. The former means that when a speaker makes a promise, it is on him to do something. In contrast, a threat is a pledge on hearer not to the speaker. A promise is defective if the promisor does not have the intention to do. It is also defective if the promisor does not want to keep the promise. In promise, the situation or occasion or conditions must be considered. It is not to be clubbed or confused with a warning or a threat, or a swearing, etc. In promise, one expresses a wish (needs, desires) and the promisor must be aware of that fact. Even if one uses the word "promise" and sounds like a promise, it need not be a promise; for instance; suppose, I say to a borrower who borrowed some money from me, 'if you do not give me the money, I promise, I will tell your father'. This utterance is not a promise but expression of an intention or a commitment; this is kind of warning or threat. Here I use the

word 'promise' to not make a promise. I am basically using the word 'promise' to emphasize the degrees of my commitment. Take another instance where the hearer makes an assertion by using the phrase 'I promise'. Suppose I accuse you of having copied my assignment saying, "You copied, didn't you?" and you reply "No I didn't, I promise you, I didn't". Here the hearer is not making a promise but making an assertion instead.

- e) It is not the fact that S³⁸ and H that S will do A in future.

It is a general condition that all illocutionary acts must have some point. Example- It is pointless and defective to request someone to do something if he has already done it or he is doing it or he will be doing this independently of the request. In a speech act situation where the listener knows the rules of performing the illocutionary act, what is obvious has no illocutionary force. Likewise, what is impossible to do also lacks illocutionary force. To function as an illocutionary act, an act should not be obvious. Suppose in a class you say "Look here, Priya, be attentive to what I am saying". We assume that Priya has not paid attention in class; or it is not the fact that Priya is attentively listening in the class and so this speech act is needed. In short, to be a non-defective speech act, it is not the fact that the hearer is doing or will do that thing which is requested.

- f) S intends to do A.

There is a distinction between sincerely and insincerely³⁸ promise. In sincerely promises, the speaker wants to keep the promise. He will keep the promise. In insincerely promises, the speaker does not want to keep the promise and to do that act. Searle calls this condition as sincerity condition. Even if I promise someone a diamond gift on his birthday and if I know that cannot afford the gift, then I am not sincere in my promise.

- g) In the utterance of T, S intends which place him to do A.

There is a characteristic of promise that it undertakes an obligation to do an act. The promisor must do that act. If the promisor does not intend to do that act then the promise is not a promise. Intention is necessary to make a promise. But that is not sufficient. There must be an obligation on the part of the promisor to fulfill his promise and failure to uphold his promise should result in something unpleasant for the promisor. Example- Mr. Parker did not give money to the NGO despite his assurance because he was in no obligation to give money to an NGO.

- h) S intends to produce knowledge in H by the¹⁷ utterance of T which place him in an obligation to do A.

S wants to produce knowledge in H by letting H recognize the intention. To recognize this intention, H needs to recognize the meaning of the utterance T. Here the speaker makes a promise in the utterance and getting H to realize his intention by virtue of the promise. The speaker produces an illocutionary effect upon the hearer, so as to enable the hearer to realize the speaker's intention. Speaker assumes the semantic rules by which he undertakes an obligation. The semantic rule of uttered sentence T by S and H is successfully, non-defectively and with sincere uttered if and only if a-h conditions are obtained.

i) Taken together all the conditions, 1-8, the sentence which was uttered to make a promise is clear by the semantic rules of language. It may be specifically mentioned that both S and H must share the same linguistic dialect too in order for the promise to have its full effect.

Searle broadly describes condition 1, then he describes how the hearer understands the utterance, that is, b-i. Condition 8 is of utmost importance because it is here that the hearer recognized the illocutionary effect by means of his knowledge or recognition of the meaning of T as well as the intention of S.

1.4.4.1 Insincere Promise

We have just considered what it means to make a sincere promise. Now we will discuss how the speaker can manipulate a sincere promise into an insincere one. An insincere promise is that when a speaker is making a promise, he lacks appropriate intention to do that act. He purports that he has the intention which he does not have. In other words, the speaker does not want to take responsibility of his expressed intention. This is as absurd as saying "I promise to do that act but I do not intend to do that act". When the speaker says "I promise to do that act", he has to take responsibility for intending to do that act. To avoid this absurdity, Searle give a condition in 6.a): "S intends that the utterance of T will make him responsible for intending to do A".

1.4.5 Rules for use of illocutionary force indicating device:

Searle sets some conditions, a set of rules, for use of illocutionary force indicating device. Condition a, h and i are applicable for general illocutionary acts. Conditions a-g are particularly applicable for promise only. The illocutionary force indicating device of promise symbolically use as Pr.

- 1) Pr only uttered whatever the context of T. Utterance act produces a future act of S.. Searle calls this condition as "propositional rules" conditions because this is derived from propositional context.

- 2) Pr has to be uttered only when the hearer H would prefer to that act A. S believes that H would prefer that S will do A and not that hearer H will not do A.
- 3) Pr has to be uttered only if S will do A. Searle calls rules 2 and 3 "preparatory rules" because it is derived from "preparatory conditions d and e". Speaker assumes the semantic rules which determine the meaning that creates an obligation.
- 4) Pr has to be uttered only if S intends to do A.. This is called sincerity condition.
- 5) When Pr uttered it, S undertakes an obligation to do A. Searle calls it as the essential condition.

In "preparatory condition", it is revealed that the speaker has the authority. Take an example: an order. The preparatory condition includes the fact that the speaker has a authority over hearer while the sincerity condition includes the speaker wants the order act to be done. In the essential condition, the speaker intends to make the hearer understand that he will do the act.

There are some general hypotheses concerning illocutionary act.

- 1) Whenever someone utters something in a sincerity condition, this performance has a psychological state that determines whether that performance is sincere or insincere. This law holds that the speaker wants to do that act or not.
- 2) This hypothesis is converse of the first. If we count that the psychological state expression is insincere like a promise, an apology one can insincerely perform it; but in the case of greeting, one cannot insincerely perform it.
- 3) We can perform an utterance without using explicit illocutionary force indicating device. In this sentence the context of the sentence makes clear what the illocutionary force has to be taken. How can the speaker knows that a hearer takes it in a right way. For e.g. can you switch off the fan? It may be a request or an interrogative question. The speaker may be characteristically a subjunctive question concerning your abilities.

1.4.6 Illocutionary force

As Searle says, "an illocutionary act is a complete speech act".¹² When we made a typical utterances it will consist of all things that are parts of the speech acts we have discussed above. It has a propositional content which is comprised of reference and prediction. Illocutionary act contains a particular kind of illocutionary force – assertion, suggestion, promise, vows etc. Illocutionary force refers to the intention of the speaker in giving an utterance. It is a type of illocutionary act which speaker performs. An illocutionary act is characteristically performed by an illocutionary force. Some example, someone might ask "How is that curry made?" Or "Is the curry ready yet?" (Politely) as if he is making a query about the curry, but his man intention

might be to make the waiter bring the curry promptly. So here the illocutionary force is not to inquiry of the progress of curry but to demand the waiter to bring the curry.

Searle argued that every utterance has an illocutionary force. Every single word of English has a certain kind of illocutionary force. That is why illocutionary force is a part of meaning which cannot be ignored or overlooked. Searle gives seven components of illocutionary force. They are as follows:

1. Illocutionary point

Every illocution has a purpose. It is insight to the act. The point tells us how a thing is. The point of a promise or a vow commits the speaker for doing the act. The point of order is committing the people to do that act what they order. Searle opines that to perform a successful speech act, it is necessary to achieve the point or purpose. Illocutionary point makes possible an illocutionary act. It is essential for an act. Some illocutionary force has the same illocutionary point like – promise/vows, request/order, etc. Illocutionary point is different from the proposition and it has done by the propositional content.

2. The illocutionary point has degree of strength.

Illocutionary acts could have same point but they have vary in degree of strength. Example- if I request to do something to someone, its strength may be less than if I insist that he does it by any means.

3. Mode of achievement

Some illocutionary acts sets certain conditions in which the point has achieved in that speech acts.. Example- when a speaker who has the authority to make a command and another speaker who gives a request, they have the same point, but the former will achieve its purpose more effective because of his position of authority. When a judge and a common man utter these words “I sentence you to life imprisonment”, the utterance of the judge will command greater authority than that of a common man by virtue of his office or the mode by which he performs his speech act.

5. Propositional content condition

Most illocutionary acts are in the form of F(P) where F means force and P means propositional content. In many case force term imposes certain conditions on content. For e.g. when one makes

a promise, the promise must be performed by the speaker in future. One cannot make a promise with reference to the past or for someone else.

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6. Preparatory condition

For an illocutionary act to be successful and non-defective, we need certain kinds of conditions. For e.g. One can utter a promise but it will be defective if the promise made by the speaker is not to the interest of the hearer or the hearer did not want him to do it. In making a promise the speaker must presuppose that he can fulfill his promise and also serve the interest of the hearer. Such conditions are called preparatory conditions. There are also some other preparatory conditions that need to be obtained. For e.g. when someone utters, "John has beaten his wife", here we are presupposing that John has indeed beaten her. It may also be an answer to a query if John beats his wife.

7. Sincerity condition

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When one performs an illocutionary act, that person has a psychological state with certain kind of content. Thus when one makes a promise he expresses an intention; when one makes a command, he expresses a desire or want. By this psychological state, we can determine sincerity and insincerity of speech acts. An insincere speech act is one when a speaker utters a statement without a psychological state. For e.g. a lie. An insincere apology is one when the speaker does not have any sorrow or regret. It is paradoxical when one performs an illocutionary act and deny simultaneously the point of that act. For instance, one cannot meaningfully say "I apologize but I am not sorry".

4
8. Degree of strength of sincerity condition

4
Just like the same illocutionary point has different degrees of strength, the same psychological state has different degree of strength. A speaker who makes a request to do something to the hearer will have the same psychological state with that of a person who begs a hearer to do something but the latter will command stronger degree of sincerity than the former.

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An illocutionary force is determined by the above seven components. Two illocutionary force is equal if these seven components are equal. A question may arise as to how we can use the above elements of illocutionary acts successfully and non-defectively. Here a point may be noted before we address this question. Whether or not an utterance has illocutionary force is a matter of intention. However, whether or not an utterance has been successfully and non-defectively performed is a matter which involves more than intention; there are many other conditions which must be satisfied. Austin called as "illocutionary uptake". Assuming that the above conditions

are satisfied, the ¹seven features of illocutionary force may be reducible to four conditions; ¹an illocutionary act in form of F(P) is successfully and non-defectively performed²⁹ iff

- 1) The illocutionary point of F of what the speaker performed on the proposition P succeeds on mode of achievement and degree of strength of illocutionary point of F.
- 2) The speaker expresses a proposition P which satisfies the propositional content condition.
- 3) Speaker, expressing psychological state which satisfies the sincerity condition.
- 4) Preparatory condition must be satisfied.

1.5 Conclusion:

We have noted that illocutionary act constitute an essential part of a theory of meaning. As a matter of fact, Searle is of the view that without it, semantic theory is not possible. In this respect, he even goes a step further to claim that a distinction cannot be drawn between Austin's notions of locutionary act and illocutionary act. A speech act must have illocutionary act. We have seen what makes illocutionary act possible and non-defective by looking at some conditions of illocutionary force. These conditions are important not only to highlight the indispensability of speech act theory but also to understand and mark the difference amongst various illocutionary forces and acts.

Chapter 2

INTENTIONALITY AND SPEECH ACTS

2.1 Introduction

In this chapter, the focus of my discussion will be intention and intentionality as defined used by Searle. In order to explain these concepts, I look into its cognate and related concepts such as action, causation, and meaning. Within the concept of intention, Searle makes an divergence in between prior intention and intention-in-action. This distinction has been very crucial to understand his works on action, meaning and speech acts theory in general. Towards the end of the chapter, I discussed some problems involving intention and meaning.

2.2 Intentionality

Intentionality is directedness. It is a kind of mental states, which stands for something different from it. For example, I have a desire for something which has its existence in the external world. Put it in simple language, intentionality is something which implies “intending”. For example, “I intend to go to my bedroom now”.

There are some problems with traditional notion of intentionality. According to them, all mental states are intentional. However, Searle states that some mental states are intentional while some are not. For e.g. desire, fear, belief etc. are intentional. If I say I have a desire or a belief, then one might ask, “What is your belief about?” Then I cannot say I have a belief but I cannot

say what kind of belief it is since my belief always stands for something. Therefore Searle holds that if something is intentional, it must be directed towards something. However there are certain mental states which need not be about anything in particular; in other words, it may not be directed towards anything in the world. For example, nervousness or anxiety, or even elation need not be intentional because it is not necessary that they should be directed towards something. It may be a very subjective experience.

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2.3 Intentional states and speech acts

With regard to intentional states and speech acts, Searle says that “both consist of a propositional content and a psychological state or illocutionary force, sometimes the propositional content is the whole proposition”.¹ And these two, which is called speech acts and Intentional states has an analogous structure. In speech acts, we can say there is a propositional content and an illocutionary force. In intentional state there is psychological state and a propositional content or representational content. For instance, speech acts like ‘I desire to leave the room’ and then in other word ‘I hope to leave the room’ and again in an another sense ‘I believe that you leave the room’. There is a propositional content in each and every case, there is a propositional content “leave the room” and a psychological state. Every speech act contains some kind of order, suggestion, command, etc. In intentional state, a form of belief, desire, hope, etc. is present. Symbolically it is represented as S(P), where S represents the psychological state and P represents the propositional content. There are some intentional states which do not have propositional content but they have psychological state. For e.g. John loves Suzy, John hates Suzy, represented as: Love(Suzy), Hate(Suzy)

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2.4 Conditions of satisfaction and direction of fit

In Intentional states and speech acts both have conditions of satisfaction and direction of fit. In certain cases, psychological states or illocutionary force with the propositional content can be each of two represent or fail to meet the state of affairs. How they are alleged to meet the reality is acknowledged by the mode of psychological or illocutionary force. For e.g. belief is either false or true basing on whether or not the content corresponds to the state of affairs. Desire and belief stand opposite to each other. The truth value of it is determined by whether existing reality meets the content or not. And we find the same difference between statement and order in speech acts. We need to understand the notions like ‘conditions of satisfaction’ and ‘direction of fit’ first, then we can understand the facts.

Where there is direction of fit in there conditions of satisfaction apply to both speech acts and intentional states. For e.g. a statement is satisfied, if it is true, and a statement is not satisfied, if it is false. A desire is satisfied, if it is true, and it is not satisfied, if it's false. A promise is satisfied, if it kept. An intention is satisfied, if it is carried out. According to Searle, “the speech acts will be satisfied if and only if the expressed psychological states are satisfied and the condition of satisfaction of speech act and expressed psychological state are identical”.³ It means my order is satisfied if my desire is fulfilled and my statement is satisfied if the expression of the statement is true. The condition of satisfaction is external because the order is fulfilled in the external world. A statement is true or false decided by whether or not it corresponds to a fact in the external world. Every intentional state upholds of an intentional content and a psychological mode in the equal manner that of speech act which has a propositional content and illocutionary force. Both represent the objects or state-of-affairs. E.g. I have a belief that Saumya is in the library. It represents in the world a state-of-affairs. I have a statement that “The atmosphere inside the reading room is healthy”. This represents a state-of-affairs.

The usage of the word “representation” is somewhat different from the ordinary usage. Representation is possible by contents with certain psychological states. Psychological mode determines the direction of fit and Content regulate the conditions of satisfaction. Through this process, a belief

or desire represent the world outside. Searle says, “in intentional state content, psychological state and direction of fit represent its conditions of satisfaction. In speech act content, illocutionary¹⁰ force and direction of fit represent its conditions of satisfaction”.³ By the content **Conditions of satisfaction are to be determined and** they obtain if that content is fulfilled. Let’s take an example, if I have a belief that “It is raining outside”, then in order to confirm my belief, if I go outside and find that it is raining then I can say that “yes”, the conditions⁷ are satisfied because it is indeed raining outside. It seems there is a **process-product ambiguity between “requirement” and “thing required”**. **If I** have a belief **that** the book is on the table, then it should be the case that the book is on the table (requirement). If my belief is true then I can come to see the book on the table. Searle says, “this ambiguity does not harm the conditions of satisfaction but helps to clear the ideas. Let me summarize from the above point: that for representation the conditions of satisfaction is necessary. Every intentional state has a direction of fit which is a representation of its conditions of satisfaction”.⁴

The world with a different direction of fit is represented⁴⁵ by the Conditions of satisfaction. In speech acts there are four types of **direction of fit**;

- i. **world-to-word**,
- ii. **word-to-world**,
- iii. **null direction of fit**,
- iv. **word-to-world-to-word**.

Likewise, there are four types of direction of fit in intentional state:

- i. **mind-to-world**,
- ii. **world-to-mind**,
- iii. **null direction of fit and**
- iv. **mind-to-world-to-mind**.

Statements, descriptions, assertions of speech acts are ²⁸ word-to-world direction of fit is coming under the assertive class of speech acts. If it fails to meet the independent existing world, and to match the world we can change our statements⁵, descriptions or assertions. But we cannot change the world to fit with our ⁵ members of the assertive class of speech acts. If the statement turns out to be false, it is the statement which is false, not the world. On the other hand the ⁵ directive class of speech acts such as orders, apologies, commands etc. and the ⁴³ commissive class of speech acts like promises, vows, pledges etc. are world-to-word direction of fit. These ³ are not supposed to match the world but rather supposed to change the world to meet the propositional content. Here we are not supposed to say that they are either true or false but rather we should say that they are disobeyed or obey, broken or kept, carried out or not carried out. Here if the order is not obeyed, it is not the order *per se* but the world where the person disobeys the order.

Intentional states have these kinds of distinction: If my belief turns out to be wrong, it is not the world but the belief I have which is fault. I can mess it up by telling that it's a false belief. In case of desire, it is not like a belief which is true or false but a matter of whether or not it is carried out. If I fail to meet the desire, I cannot fix it up by changing my desire, like in the case of belief; by changing the world I can fix it up. So one say clearly see that while belief is statement "mind-to-world" direction of fit, desire or order is "world-to-mind" direction of fit.

There are many entities in the world having direction of fit and condition of satisfaction but not in mind and language. Example, the diagrammatic representation of University of Hyderabad may match or mismatch with the university campus. It is map-to world direction¹ of fit. The blueprint of a building is either not followed or followed. It is ¹ direction of fit of world-to-mind. As per the blueprint the contractor should build the building. Requirement, obligation, needs are world-to-mind direction of fit. For example: I am in need of some food. So my need will be fulfilled if and only if I take some food or it will remain incomplete if I do not take some food. Belief, statement, map is "language-to-world" or "mind-to-world" it is called "direction of fit".

2.5 Intentional causation

Intentional states, sometimes function causally and are called as intentional causation. Some of them are self-caused by their own conditions of satisfaction. In common language, Causation stands for the action of causing something. Intentional states are the cause of its conditions of satisfaction. For example, if I am hungry, then my desire for having food causes me to take some food. If I have a belief that it is a sunny day then the state-of-affairs of the world causes me to believe that it is a sunny day.

¹ To understand the relation between intentionality and world direction of fit is essential that we have already seen. Direction of causation is opposite of ¹ direction of fit. Let's take an example, a desire is "world-to-mind" (upward) direction of fit. Direction of causation of a desire is "mind-to-world" (downward) direction of causation. In Aristotelian terminology, there are four kinds of cause, namely, efficient, material, formal and final. Searle accepts efficient cause only. The efficient cause has a subcategory which is mental causation. The mental causation too has ³¹ a subcategory which is intentional causation; intentional states cause its conditions of satisfaction cause intentional states. Put it in a different way, in intentional causation, intentional states cause state-of-affairs or vice versa, for example- when I am hungry, I have a desire to take some food. This desire causes me to take some food. This is intentional causation. If I see a book on the table, it causes my visual experience. The case that a book is on the table ¹ which is the part of conditions of satisfaction causes my intentional states of visual experience.

The direction of fit is essential to connect intentional states and the real world that I already mentioned in my above lines; likewise direction of causation is essential for this ³ connection. I have already maintained that a desire is "world-to-mind" direction of causation is different from direction of fit. If the ³ visual perception is veridical and matches the world, it is "mind-to-world" direction of fit. If the visual experience is genuinely satisfied then state-of-

3 affair causes the mind to perceive causes and hence it is “world-to-mind” direction of causation. This example pointing towards a subclass of intentional causation where the parts of the conditions of satisfaction cause itself to satisfy the conditions of fully satisfaction.

Intentional causation has a further sub-class which is self-referential. It causes itself for producing its respective conditions of satisfaction if it is to be fulfilled. For instance, intention and action. Unlike desire, belief, the action itself caused by intention which is already in the content of intention. Seale says, “if the action is not caused by intention, the intention is not carried out. In such case, conditions of satisfaction are self-referential”.⁵ Perceptual experience, memories and intention are causally reference himself.

2.6 Intention and action

Just as my belief is satisfied if and only if the 16 state-of-affairs obtains which is represented by the 39 ntent, so also my intention is fulfilled if the action is performed which is represented by the content of intention. For example-

1. I believe that I will vote for Modi.
2. I have the desire to give my vote to Modi.
- 42 3. I intend to vote for Modi.

The respective way in which action and intention are fixed is different from desire and belief. The action which is done intentionally are only conditions of fulfillment of intention. Suppose you have an intention to complete the project by Diwali. Your intention shall not be fulfilled by mere saying that I have an intention to complete the project by Diwali; rather you have to work to fulfill your intention. Here a set of questions arises: What do you mean by intention? and What is an action? What kind of relation holds between them? The answer to the third question is that both are of conditions of satisfaction for each other. Action is related to intention. If fact, the latter is the necessary condition for the former. Intention is integral part of an action. However,

intention is⁵ not related to belief and desire in the way it is related to action. My belief will be satisfied if and only if the required state-of-affairs obtain. My desire will be satisfied if and only if my desire obtains. Belief and desire do not necessarily need performance of action in this sense. In the meantime, intention needs an action to be satisfied. Searle accepts something as an action only if it is intentional. He only deals with intentional actions. However, there are cases of asymmetrical relations between intention and action, intentional states and their conditions of satisfaction.

Let us imagine scenario where a husband who always spend money in buying lottery tickets but never wins any lottery prize. His wife wants to make him realize that wasting money on buying lottery tickets can lead to many difficulties. So one day, she decides to buy a lottery ticket, and fortunately she wins a prize. Her intention was not to win the prize but something else. In other words, winning a lottery ticket is not intentional at all but she performed the action of buying the lottery tickets. In this way, we can find some difficulty in establishing symmetric relation between the two. In order¹² to clarify this, we shall discuss the distinction between what is termed as intention-in-action and prior intention. An intention is termed as prior intention if the agent or the subject knows what he is going to do and also why he is going to do.

When someone says he is going to perform certain work A, he will do A. when he is performing his action A, he is carrying out his prior intention. However, there are certain actions which do not involve prior intention, like the action of the wife buying and willing a lottery ticket. But it cannot be said that her action lacks intention. It is an intentional action. Such type of intention in an action is called intention-in-action. And this actions are inseparable. E.g. suppose I am sleeping and thinking of my family and suddenly I get up and start walking in the room. The action of walking in the room is an intentional action. However I do not have any prior intention to do that. If someone asks me “Why are you doing this?” I will simply have to say “Just like that.” When we¹⁰ are doing a prior intentional action, we are also doing many other actions. Suppose I have a previous intention to beat Saroj. To do that I walk towards him; my walking towards him is intentional but it

is not there in the prior intention. All the actions which is done intentionally have the intention-in-action but not all intentional actions have prior intention. Both the previous intention and intention-in-action are causally self-referential⁶.

The word “carrying out” means intention causal relation with action. Here the question arises as to why they are self-referent. We will talk about it later. For now we will try to understand the relation with the help of an analogy – the relation between perception and action. There are two elements in perception and action. When we see a table, there is visual experience (seeing the table) and the object or state-of-affair (the table itself). Likewise, in intentional action also, we have two parts of experience. For e.g., when I rise my hand, the first one is experience of raising my hand, and the second is the bodily movement of raising my arm. This first one is intentional component (experience of raising my hand while the latter is the condition of satisfaction (bodily behavior). Both are not independent. If both are satisfied then the intentional state must be satisfied³⁵ otherwise it is too difficult. As far as intentionality is distressed both the mind-to-world direction of fit (perception and action) and the direction of causation which is world-to-mind. When I perceive a table, but there is no real table in front of me, I might say I was mistaken. So it is the later one. The intentional content of the intention-in-action and experience of action are identical⁷. If they are identical, why do we need two notions? Searle’s answer is that the “experience of acting is a conscious experience with an intentional content and intention-in-action is a intentional component, regardless of whether it contains any conscious experience of action.”⁸ Sometimes we do intentional action without being conscious about it.

Now the problem is, is there any relation between previous intention, and in other word intention-in-action, bodily movement and actions? Suppose I have a prior intention to raise my arm in air¹⁰ and then I also raise my arm. How does it work? It is because I carry out my intention. The prior intention makes the whole action as a unit. As I have mentioned before, action has two parts: experience of action and bodily behavior. As I mentioned before⁷ intentional content or the work which is done by intentionally, of which intention-in-

action and experience of bodily behavior are identical. Now he will clarify the relation between intention-in-action and prior intention. But one should remember the fifth point where we have identified intentional content with direction of fit; one may ask oneself as to how an intentional content is satisfied. For this, one can identify the intentionality by its conditions of satisfaction.

The content of previous intention and in other sense we can say the content of intention-in-action are different. The prior intention represents the whole action. Intention-in-action is only the presentation, but not a representation. In prior intention the whole action is for the intentional object but in intention-in-action, the movement is only for the intentional object. Now, if both of these are different then how come they are related. Searle replies, both are self-referential and both are caused by itself. If they are different, we can analyze them separately. The prior intention causes intention-in-action and intention-in-action causes both intention-in-action and bodily movement.

The diagram to this

Prior intention-◇◇

intention	in	action◇◇bodily
behavior		

Since action has two parts, experience of raising my hand and bodily behavior and prior intention is self-referential, prior intention causes by their own conditions of satisfaction. We can separately represent each component of prior intention. Previous intention causes intention-in-action and then it turns into causes bodily behavior. Prior intention causes intention-in-action which causes my arm to go up.

Deliberation leads to the action which is done intentionally by means of previous intention. Take a simple case of deliberation of belief and desire which have different direction of fit and different direction of causation. They lead to the occurrence of prior intention which has world-to-mind direction of fit and vice versa. The action consists of intention-in-action and bodily behavior. The intention-in-action causes the whole action deliberation of belief or desire $\diamond$ prior intention $\diamond$ intention-in-action $\diamond$ bodily movement (action=intention-in-action+bodily behavior)

2.7 Intentional structure of cognition and its volition.

Intentional structure of cognition and we can say volition are the opposite from one another while direction of fit and direction of causation stand opposite to each other. We see the symmetry and asymmetry of action, and perception includes visual experience of objects or state-of-affairs and objects or the previous one itself. If we see the successful performance of perception, the direction of fit is mind-to-world (downward) and in another way we will see the direction of causation is world-to-mind (upward). Both are exactly parallel but opposite to each other. Likewise, the action consists of two component intention-in-action and bodily movement. The previous one causes me to step my foot.

Cognition				Volition		
	Belief	Memory	Perception	Desire	Prior intention	Intention-in-action
Direction of fit	Downward	Downward	Downward	Upward	Upward	Upward

Direction of causation determined by condition of satisfaction	None	Upward	Upward	None	Downward	Downward
Causally self-referential	No	Yes	Yes	No	Yes	Yes

Generally, cognition and violation are the symmetrical and asymmetrical relation between perception and action. We have already seen that mind-to-world direction of fit is memory and perception and world-to-mind direction of causation. But the previous intention and intention-in-action has world-to-mind direction of fit and mind-to-world direction of causation. Intention carried out of the world comes to be what intention is represented. Intention has direction world-to-mind of fit and mind-to-world direction of causation. Intention will be fulfilled if it causes itself to achieve the former, one of the above line is direction of fit. Prior intention causes the whole action. The whole action consists of two states: Intention-in-action and bodily behavior. Intention-in-action causes bodily behavior. Cognition and violation are mentioned in the table. Mind-to-world (downward) world-to-mind(upward)

There are three gaps within the structure of volition. When we deliberate a belief or desire or order, there is a gap between deliberation and prior intention. Is that person a boy or girl? I have confusion whether the person I am referring to is a boy or a girl. In prior intention, this confusion is eradicated. There is already a gap between intention-in-action and prior intention; this gap between actually and deciding doing; deciding to do the

act or actually doing the act. If it is a lengthy act, then the ¹⁰intention-in-action is not sufficient to guarantee that it continues throughout the action till its completion. In contrast ⁵⁰my prior intention normally continues throughout the whole action. The prior intention represents and causes the whole action while intention-in-action presents and causes only the bodily behavior which may be a part of the prior action.

4.1 Network and Background of Intentional states.

Intentional states determine its conditions of satisfaction.⁹ A state itself, given its position in a network and against its background, is neither intentional nor under conditions of satisfaction. To understand this, we are considering some examples. Suppose in a court, the judge gave his judgment: “I sentenced you to ten years imprisonment”. The judge may have certain types of mental states and he realized his desire and then uttered this. Suppose I have the same mental states like the judge and said: “I sentenced you to ten years imprisonment”. I have only the same kind of mental states which corresponded to judge’s desire. I utter the phonetics sequence which the judge uttered. However, I do not have the mental state to sentence you for ten years, since the situation does not allow me to do so. It means that when the judge utters the sentence, he is in the courtroom. And when I utter it, I am with my friends or with anyone anywhere (assuming I am not a judge and passing a judgment). To pass a judgment like the above, that desire has to be embedded within the whole network of other intentional states. There are many other intentional states in the network, some of which are logically related and some are not.

When someone has an intentional state the whole related notions of that intentional state is in the network. The judge’s desire is supported by lots of belief such as he is a judge of a court, he weighs the evidence that proves that you are the criminal, etc. These intentional states have their own conditions of satisfaction. The network only functions against a background of what I will call non-representational mental capacities.¹⁰

Here Searle made two claims. First one is that “intentional states are in general parts of Network of Intentional states and only have their conditions of satisfaction relatively to their position in Network”.¹¹ Generally, this position is popularly known as holism in contemporary philosophy. The second claim in addition to the Network of representations says that “there is also a Background of non-representational mental capacities and in general, representations only function, they only have the conditions of satisfaction that they do, against this non-representational Background”.¹²

2.8 Meaning

Meaning is possible by imposing conditions of satisfaction on conditions of satisfaction. In the analyses of meaning, Searle uses the notions of action and intention which are analyzed in the foregoing account. These two notions are crucial to understand his speech act theory which in turn is understand his general theory of mind and action. Meaning is a kind of intentionality and speech act is a kind of act. What distinguishes them from one other is kind of intentionality and action respectively. In the previous point, I have discussed intentional action which contains the bodily behavior. Prior intention causes intention-in-action and it causes bodily behavior. This bodily movement which is caused by intention-in-action is its conditions of satisfaction. But not all intention and action are simple. When a person intends to kill a bird, first he picks the arrow, fix it in the bow, pulls the bow string, take aim and finally release the arrow. Every complex action need not necessarily involve gradual steps like this example of shooting an arrow. A man who is asked to leave the room may leave the room, not because of he was ordered but because anyway he has to leave the room. This bodily behavior is not caused by intention unlike the case of shooting a bird. In order to understand the intentional meaning, we have to understand prior intention, intention-in-action, causal, non-causal etc. In order to understand the meaning of intention, we have to discuss some other features of intentionality which is called as conditions of adequacy,

Intentional states(belief, desire)	Intentional content	Conditions of satisfaction
Illocutionary force(states, orders)	Illocutionary content	Conditions of satisfaction

Before explaining the fact that there is a two level of intentionality in the performance of illocutionary act, it needs to be understood that when one performs an illocutionary act, he also expresses an intentional state; for example, when one makes a statement that “It is a sunny day”, he expresses a belief that “It is a sunny day”. But the conditions of fulfillment of intentional state and speech acts are identical. A statement is true if the expressed belief is true. An order is true if and only if the expressed desire is satisfied. But still, we have to keep in mind that making a statement is different from making a true statement. I have already mentioned that the conditions and satisfaction of intentional state and speech act are identical. Meaning intention is to see whether mental intention imposes the same conditions of satisfaction in the physical expression.

Mind imposes its conditions of satisfaction on physical expression for its meaning. We have seen, there is a two level of intentionality-mental state, speech act. Let’s call them as “sincerity condition” and “meaning intention”. Here our task is to determine meaning intention. We have already discussed conditions of satisfaction of sincerity condition and speech acts are identical. But the conditions of satisfaction of meaning intention are different from both the conditions of satisfaction of sincerity conditions and speech acts. For instance, making a statement is different from making a true statement. But still, when someone is trying to make a statement, he also commits to make a true statement. He must have imposed the belief on the statement. We have to understand the fact that he is expressing his beliefs in the statement. Conditions of fulfillment of meaning intention are totally different from conditions of satisfaction of speech acts and sincerity condition still the

account of meaning explain how it comes about that, furthermore, the content of meaning intention determines the conditions of satisfaction of speech acts and veracity condition. For example; if I say “It is a sunny day”, the conditions of satisfaction of meaning intention satisfied even if it is not a sunny day, nevertheless it determines my speech acts will be satisfied if and only if it is a sunny day; my expressing belief will be satisfied if and only if it is a sunny day.

We need to know about the distinction between representation and communication. When someone intends to state something, he represents some objects or state-of-affairs as well as communicates the representation with the hearer. That represented intention is not the same as communication intention. The communication intention is to make some effect on the hearer. Representation intention is to represent something regardless of the effect to make him understand. Representation is prior to communication. One cannot communicate without representation. But one can represent something without communicating to others.

Searle classified illocutionary action into five types: assertive, directives, commissive, declaration and expressions. Intentionality not only creates the possibility of meaning but also limits its forms. For example, when we are apologizing, ordering, stating, we are performing it by just uttering words. But when I want to boil water, I am not doing that by just uttering words; I am boiling the water in actuality. Here the question arises how is it possible? Searle gives the answer of this question by illustrating an example; in a class when students raise their hands, it implies that they know the answer. When one student raises his hand in a classroom, the other students who are sitting in the classroom come to understand that he knows the answer. The answer as intention-in-action causes my hand to rise up and its required conditions are satisfied with the direction of fit mind-to-world. Meaning is possible while the mind appoints intentionality on the entities which are not intrinsically intentional.¹³ How is it possible? The answer is when I utter something; the utterance itself has conditions of satisfaction. The belief itself has condition of satisfaction. Here the belief is that ‘I know the answer’ and it gets transformed to the utterance by an intentional act. Because of this, the

utterance act here is resulting in raising the hand which counts as the expression of belief. The meaningful action is that which has the conditions of satisfaction which is intentionally imposed. It means an action is meaningful when it satisfies the conditions of satisfaction which is imposed by an intention.

Most of the meaning intention is an intention in representation. The intention in representation is an intention about the physical events which constitute the parts of the conditions of satisfaction. Suppose I say “It is a sunny day” (requirement), this is causally connected with my intention. The relation between representation intention and communication intention is a means which enables the hearer to understand that, the act is performed with the representation intention. When I say “It is a sunny day”, the hearer should recognize my intention with representation intention. (My intention-in-action causes me to say “It is a sunny day” which has conditions of fulfilment with the mind-to-world direction of fit that it is a sunny day.)

Here, there is a problem with meaning. When I express my belief or when I make a statement, it may not produce any effect on my audience. It is possible that one may tell a lie. When we make a statement, we express our belief no matter whether the audiences believe it or not. Put it in a different way, what is the difference between ‘saying something and meaning it’ and ‘saying something and don’t mean it’? Wittgenstein often asks this question. Searle says when I say something and mean it, it implies that my utterance has conditions of satisfaction. When I say something and don’t mean it, it does not have any such condition of satisfaction. For e.g., if I say “It is a sunny day” at night time, it does not match with conditions of satisfaction. If I say “It is a sunny” during day time, then it is relevant. It is relevant because it is supported by conditions of satisfaction which is intentionally imposed in utterances. But then when I utter “Does God exist?” here I am communicating something and it is meaningful too. But it does not represent

anything specific out there in the world which means that it is possible to communicate even if what we communicate does not represent anything.

The second problem is that how can we realize intentional state. Searle accepts the identical theory which states that mind-body problem is not a problem at all. I think Searle accept this theory to avoid the above question. So the question 'how intentional states can be realized' is not a relevant question for Searle. What makes belief a belief? What is a belief? Searle says a belief is a propositional content which contains psychological mode. How can we realize a belief? Searle says that the meaning is not a notion of intentionality. It is a notion of linguistic acts. So Searle gives this question a different direction by asking how linguistic act can be realized. Are the speech acts identical with physical phenomena? The answer is in the negative. Speech acts have a logical structure and speech acts have representations but it is not certain whether or not the physical phenomena have any structure.

⁵ The famous problem about intention of Wittgenstein is: "I raise my hand, and if I debar the fact that ⁵ my hand goes up, then what else has left?"¹⁴ The result is simple, "is left" ⁵ is the intentional content. 'I raise my arm in air' is the intention-in-action in certain intentional mode. We are not satisfied with the answer because we are still in search of something concrete which could relate to "intention". Here we do not need its ontological category, rather we need to know about its direction of fit, conditions of satisfaction, psychological mode and propositional contents, etc. Another question is that may be asked is this: "What is an intentional object?" According to Searle, the peculiar quality of an intentional object is its intentional state. For example, Soumya admires Priya. Here the intentional object of Soumya is Priya. Searle asserts that if there is no referred object, then speech act and intentional object would not be satisfied. In case of fantasy, imagination and fictional discourse, all these are intentional states but there is no referred object for them and so they cannot be satisfied. Searle³⁶ says that these all are assertive intentional states. These are not like normal assertive. The speaker

has not committed to the truth of his assertion. The belief does not have any representative content. Accordingly, Searle thinks that Russell's example of "The king of France is bald" is false because there is no king of France who can be attributed with baldness.

2.9 Conclusion

In this chapter, we have tried to understand what is intention by looking at its two sub-categories, viz., intention-in-action and prior intention. We also looked at the structure of intention and various other related which are important to explain the general framework within which Searle work out his speech act theory, including philosophy of action and philosophy of mind.

Chapter 3

Are meanings in the head?

3.1 Introduction

In this chapter, I am discussing about the arguments of Putnam and Searle responses to that arguments and see the what sort of knowledge we can gain from the arguments and counter arguments or responses. I shall discuss some important grain of truth from that responces what Searle overlooked. In the meantime I shall show that Searle gives some important points in this matter. The clarification of Searle's points and his problem gives us to see better some products of truth in the study of semantics.

I believe in middle path in between internalism. It is a type of externalism which makes room for narrow content. I believe what Stich and Fodor say, "psychology should be solipsistic and constructing belief-desire psychology as constructing psychology of narrow contents is the only way for defending the externalism threat".¹³ I believe in internalist view "what is in the head determines extension". In my discussion of indexical I will show that if we deny the the descriptivism that does not go to externalism. I shall show that indexical which are not

descriptive, their contents are not only external but also internal. In order to be a thought whether it is indexical or non-indexicals depends upon descriptive elements. I divide this chapter into two parts. In the first part I explain the works of Putnam and Searle and in the second part I will explain and present my take on moderate version of externalism. For developing my standpoint, I have mainly relied on the work Amir Horowitz' "Putnam, Searle and Externalism".

3.2 Putnam and Searle: A discussion

In this section I discuss the arguments of Putnam and subsequent responses of Searle to them. The purpose of this discussion is primarily to extract some truth for the developing my view of moderate externalism. One of the most fundamental questions in philosophy is this: How does language relate to reality? Searle attempts to answers this question by holding a view that a speaker relates language with the world or reality through linguistic acts, speech acts to be more precise. He reduces this question into another; that is, how does mind relate to the reality? He reduces this to analyze intentionality of mind. The reduction is attempted in this way: language is reducible to various speech acts, speech acts are reducible to mind and its various states and activities which in turn are reducible to intentionality. There is a double level of intentionality one is intentional states ¹³ and another one is speech acts. Where there is a speech act there must be an intentional state; for e.g., if I am stating that "It is raining" it is in speech acts. A speech act has an "illocutionary force" and a "propositional content". Similarly in intentional state there is "psychological state" and a "propositional content". The psychological states of "it is raining" is belief. First I have to believe then state something.¹⁴ He takes help of Fregean concept of 'sense' for extending the analysis. He takes only two approaches of Frege's accounts of the relation of expressions and objects. First, expression refers to an object because the sense associated is with the object. Second, he fights against psychologists that sense exists in the third realm (third realm means the third world where the 'sense' supposedly exists). Searle accepts the first one and rejects the second. Linguistic reference is a kind of intentional reference. Searle says, "intentional reference is sufficient to satisfy a condition; it is a way of satisfaction".¹⁵ There is no need to postulates the third realm for communication. Searle gives this explanation for avoiding Fregean concept of the third realm. If I think evening star under some mode of presentation and another person thinks about evening star under the same mode of presentation, we are sharing the same abstract entity in common. The shared abstract entity is an intentional content. This shared intentional content does not need a metaphysical realm.

3.2.1 Meaning in the head

Searle considered Putnam's argument that "meanings are not in the head"¹⁶ and responded to it. Searle thinks that "meanings are in the head" – there is no place where meaning to be. In addition he also thinks that Putnam's argument does not show that meanings are not in the head. So what is the argument Putnam put forth against the internalist, the view that says that meanings are in the head? He described their views as following:

1. If we know the meaning that means that word is in a certain psychological state.
2. Internalist believes that "meanings (intention) determines extension.
3. Therefore, psychological states determines extension.

To the above, Putnam says that "we cannot accept both (1) and (2) together and that (3) is false".¹⁷ He rejects both (1) and (3) and accepts a different version of (2), that is, meaning (external or microstructure) determines extension. Before discussing these two philosophers' views, it may be noted that both Searle and Putnam subscribe to meaning holism. Putnam tries to construct a argument where same psychological state identify different extension. Putnam gives two arguments to prove this view. I shall briefly explain them for now with intent to provide a more detailed explanation latter on.

The first argument concerns what Putnam give a name of it as "linguistic division of labour". Here he says that "in any linguistic community some people have better knowledge of language than the others".¹⁸ They apply linguistic terms better than others. For example, in a community where some people have better knowledge about trees and some do not know much about trees. So they can tell which one is elm tree and which one is beech tree. Suppose I do not know the difference between beech and elm trees. All that I know is limited to some similarities between them such as, they have big branches, black brown leaves, etc. They are not different for me. So, according to Putnam "my idiolect" or "intention" of both trees are same but the extension is different. In other words, the concepts of beech trees and elm trees are same in my head but in the external world both trees are different. The same psychological state determines different extension. This briefly account will suffice the make the point for now. But more of it will come a little later.

Searle believes that the traditional thinkers might think that this argument is imperfect because the speaker does not know the meaning perfectly. That type of speaker is not getting any relevant extension. In such a case it is true that "extension in the idiolect" has no applicability. This is

because the speaker does not know the meaning of the word. Frege also says that intention does not grasp extension. It only shows that so ⁴¹ speaker does not grasp perfectly. So Searle defends his position by saying that extension fails where one does not know the meaning of the word.

To make his point, Putnam says intentional states of all speakers including the expert's do not identify the extension. If this arg⁴¹ument is based on linguistic or factual ignorance then we refute this from the first because if the speaker is ignorant then he can appeal to the experts because his intention is inadequate to determine extension. Suppose that what Putnam believes is valid, we have something more to prove that this argument is inconsistent. Searle points out that Putnam's intuition is wrong by the argument given below:

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1. Searle's concept of elm and beech are not equal..
2. The extension of both trees are different.
3. Searle knows that both trees are different.

Searle knows because he knows that beeches are different from elms. One may have imperfect knowledge of these two concepts, but he has the conceptual knowledge about these two trees that they are different. So the number (3) states a conceptual knowledge. On the contrary, number 1 is not a conceptual knowledge (Searle concept of 'elm' = Searle concept of 'beech'). Therefore, it is false.

Now let us consider Putnam's second argument. This argument – "Twin Earth" – is relatively more important and better known. In this argument, he tries to show that it is insufficient to determine extension by speakers' intentional states. He opines that it is possible to have the same intentional states but with different extensions. Putnam supposes that somewhere else in our galaxy, there is an another planet exactly same as earth in all perceptual level which is called as "twin earth". The environment of the twin earth is exact the same as earth. Their star same as earth's star. In twin earth, there is twin of every things and personn. There is a single difference between these two earths: there is a different kind of liquid called "water" in twin earth. It is perceptually identical with water on earth, but its chemical composition is different. It is not H₂O; rather ²⁶ chemical composition is "XYZ". When twin Oscar (a person who is staying in twin earth) ²⁶ says water, he refe²⁶s to the water which is composed of 'XYZ'. When Oscar (a person who is staying in earth) ⁴⁹ s water, he refers to water, which is 'H₂O'. Finally the crux of the thought experiment is this: when Oscar says water, that utterance refers to "H₂O" and when twin Oscar says water, it denotes to "XYZ". Now Oscar and ²² n Oscar have same mental states but it refers to different extension. So Putnam concludes that the contents of brain are not sufficient to determine the meaning. Here the mental states are same. But the extensions are different. If the mental states are sufficient to determine the extension, the extension will not be the two rather it would be one. So Putnam summarized that meanings are not in the head.

Most of the people who criticized Putnam's theory of meaning, they criticized Putnam's thought experiment of twin earth. The same is true of Seale. He first accepts his arguments for discussion and then argues that it fails to show that "meanings are not in the head". To argue this argument Searle says, when the residents of earth and twin earth do not know that the liquid which is called "water" were "H₂O" and "XYZ" respectively, the people of both earth have identical experience. Now the question is, when both Oscars say water, do they mean same "water"? both Oscar and twin Oscar minds, ideas and everything are identical. When Oscar utters "water", by this utterance he refers to "water" that is "H₂O" and when twin Oscar says "water" he refers by this utterance to "XYZ". Searle thinks that this argument would go like this. Till 1750 the water on earth and twin earth had the same extension. After 1750 the scientists discovered that there are two different water which chemical composition are "H₂O" and "XYZ". We would define water as "H₂O" on earth and water as "XYZ" on twin earth or we would to have say there are two types of water that is "H₂O" and "XYZ".

Indeed, there are some supports of this intuition. Suppose there are so much going and coming between earth and twin earth and because of that the people of earth and twin earth know that water which is called as nephrite and jadeite as Putnam's example are different. So there are two kinds of water as H₂O and XYZ. Searle says we pay a high price for the stuff of twin earth which is called as water, the water on twin earth lacks a property of water. Searle says, "If their water is not water then their mud is not mud, their snow is not snow, their ice-cream is not ice-cream; if our driving cars produce H₂O, CO and CO₂. What kind of chemical emission takes place while driving a car on twin earth? Surely it will not be the same as that of the earth".¹⁹ For all this reason, Searle argues that a supporter of traditional view might think that it is odd that Putnam believes 'H₂O' is fixed and the water is problematic on twin earth. It is lack of property of water. We might assume that the water on twin earth is slightly different from H₂O which is on earth. However Searle does not want to dismiss this alternative intuition of Putnam; rather he accepts it and builds on this to argue that extension is certainly determined.

Searle says in Putnam's viewpoint, the extension of natural term like "water", only deals with natural term which is determined by indexical. Searle says that we perceptually identify a substance such as water in a certain perceptual level. These features are like colorless, tasteless, liquid, flows from upward to downward etc. Then the extension of the word 'water' is determined which is identical in structure with this structure, whatever that structure is. In this point of view, the 'water' of twin earth is different extension from the 'water' which is on earth, because they both are identified by different structure. The structure of 'water' on earth and twin earth are different. The word 'water' is simply defined as whatever bear the relation "same L" to that stuff. Now from the point of view of traditional theorists, what exactly does this argument achieve? Suppose that Putnam is right in his intuition. All he has shown is to substitute intentional content. Traditional theorists say Putnam has substituted indexicals from the concept

of intentional content. It means that the meanings in the head which determine the extension. In fact Putnam's approach is like the traditional approach: a word ostensibly denotes whatever bears the identical relation to the denotation of the original ostentation. The word 'water' is explained as what is identical with the structure. If this characterization is correct, then this is no different from the others which accept that intention determine extension.

According to Locke, a water is a concept in a nominal sense. The word 'water' means liquid, colorless, tasteless etc. In Putnam's view water are defined in real essence. The water is defined indexically by identifying something that satisfies the nominal essence then he declares that water is something which satisfy the real essence as the stuff so identified. This is an improvement of Locke theory but it still does not show that meanings are not in the head. Searle believes that Putnam would not give any adequate response to the traditional theorists. This shows that he does not take any proposing variation of the traditional view that meanings are in the head, but to reject the traditional view altogether.

Searle distinguishes three theses which are as follows:

- 1) The meanings which are in the head do not identify the extension..
- 2) The indexicals are not determining the extension.
- 3) Then what is in head which does not identify extension..

(3) does not follow from (1) and (2). If we accept that it follows then we must assume that indexicals are not insight our head. The question is this: Why does he think so? Searle believes that he takes the fallacious move because since we do not grasp the microstructure and that microstructure determines extension. If this is the case then what is in our head that does not determine extension? Searle regards that what Putnam believes is a false move. He will show that mistake by considering an example. One who utters the sentence "the writer of Republic" has an intention and that intention determines extension of "the writer of Republic". The intention of writer of Republic determines its extension though it is a fact about the world who writes the Republic. For someone who does not know who wrote the Republic, the extension of the expression "the writer of Republic" exists even though he does not know who the writer is. The same can be applied to Putnam's argument: "the structure of the stuff identified "indexically" and which is in the intentional content determines extension even though we do not know what the structure is." This confirms to the theory that holds that intention determines extension. This theory states that intention has set some sort of conditions and in order for something to be a part of that intention, the extension must satisfy the conditions. The extension must be matched with the conditions in order to a part of its relevant intention. That conditions are defined Putnam's example too – the indexical definitions. The indexical definitions of water has an intentional content which sets certain conditions and so in order to be a part of that intention, the extension must satisfy those conditions. Searle says "the intention sets certain

conditions which any potential sample has to meet of in order to be is to be part of the extension of relevant intention".²⁰

The same is the case of the intention of the expression "the writer of Republic" sets some conditions which has to satisfy by an extension in order to part of that intention. In both cases, it is a fact of the world, even though whether or not the extension satisfy the intentional content. Therefore it is a mistake that intention does not determine extension.

There is a second reason why Putnam thinks that meaning in the head does not determine extension. He makes a difference between intentional contents and indexical definitions, especially how intentional content relates to indexical definition. This emerges when he says,

Suppose I have a doppelganger in twin earth. Let us also suppose that when I think my stomach is upset and he is thinking that my stomach is upset. In my utterance of my refers to me and in his expression of my is himself. So here we have different idiolects and different extension.

Searle believes that both these assumptions are false. He says if "intention" means intentional content then the intention of an indexical definition determines extension. Secondly, Searle says "if a man and his doppelganger have type-identical mental states, they both have different intentional content and conditions of satisfaction".²¹ He explains it by an example,

Suppose that John who habitats the earth in 1750 identifies "water" indexically. Likewise, twin John who lives on twin earth identifies "water" indexically. Let us also suppose that they both have type-identical of everything, their intentional contents, indexical definitions and their perceptual experiences. Since they have type identical structure, they give type-identical definition of 'water' which is defined as what the structure which is identical with the stuff, because they have type-identical perceptual experience. As Putnam says, we cannot identify the extension in terms of mental states.

Now Searle's question is this: If John and twin John experience the same "water" how is it possible that they have different mental contents? And if they experience different "water", how is it that they have the same mental content? They do not have identical types of mental content but they have token difference. Because intentional content is self-referent as explained in chapter 2. Their intentional content is different. The indexical definition of "water" as experienced by John on earth can be analyzed as whatever the structure causes John to have (visual) experience. Likewise, the same can be said of twin John: it is whatever the structure causes twin John's experience. They both have type-identical experience but they both have different mental contents and their mental contents are different because the perceptual

experience is self-referential in nature. Finally, Searle concludes that this theory does not have any result, that different speakers on earth do not mean different thing by "water". Most of the people intend to use words what community at large mean and refer to. If one uses such public baptisms then he would normally involve the participant's visual and other experience. Thus he concludes that though he accept Putnam's argument, the argument put forth by the latter does not show that meanings are not in the head.

3.3 Moderate Version of Externalism

Externalism is widely spread in today's philosophy. This thesis widely spread after article "the meaning of 'meaning'" has published. In this article, Putnam criticizes the thesis meaning are internal to the mind and argues that "meanings are not in the head". This thesis presents that "the meaning of many words, the contents of many concepts and propositional attitude are not determined by our mental states alone, rather the physical and social environment play a very important role for determining meaning".²² It follows that our mental states and its contents are not supervene on the brain states and its contents.

According to Frege sense determines reference. Sense is an abstract entity. It exists in third world. The sense is grasped by mind though. This view is perceived by many including Searle as problematic. If the 'sense' is an abstract entity and it exist in the third world, how can it be grasped? If grasping it is a difficulty, then how can it determine reference? Carnap says "the ontological status of intention is like sense". Searle interprets as asserting that "intentions, that which is in the head set some conditions which anything has to meet in order to be part of the extension of the relevant intention".²³ I will try to point out some stronger interpretation because of this thesis because of which intention is said to fully determine the conditions. I am using the expression "fully determination" as used by Amir Horowitz who says that "fully determination" means that intention does not leave any inadequacy for determination. As Searle says about this thesis, I believe that this is analytically true.²⁴ If the meaning is external and intention is in the head then it is not such that it is analytically true. In what follows, I shall discuss where Putnam successfully presents the case where intention does not fully determine the conditions thereby exposing the vulnerability of the thesis advocated by Searle.

3.3.1 Twin earth argument (1)

In twin earth argument Putnam depicts a case where there is two identical “heads” it means that two people with same mental states. In this context, mental states are understood in its ‘narrow sense’. Putnam calls this as “methodological solipsism” (MS) in this sense mental states only determines its subject whom that mental state ascribed. “No mental states presupposes for the existence of any extensions”.²⁵ If it is the case then “what is in the head does not determine extensions”. I have described it earlier. I have already discussed Putnam's “Twin Earth” argument. So I will not repeat here. Thus here we have identical mental states and their extensions are different. According to Putnam content which determines extension is not in the head. Therefore the extension are not wholly determine by the intentionality of some mental states. So internalism is not true. Putnam says, “the difference of reference and content is because of environmental difference between these two situations”. In the first case Oscar's chemical structure of the ‘water’ is H₂O, where as in the second situation twin Oscar's microstructure of water is XYZ. I understand only because of microstructural differences which make both the reference and content differ.

Putnam believes that twin Oscar does not think about water that is H₂O. Some philosophers say he does think about H₂O while some other holds the opposite view. What is the reason for thinking that twin Oscar does not think about H₂O? Sometimes Putnam takes it for granted that twin Oscar does not refer to H₂O. However, he latter on thinks about it with an assumption that the natural kind of words like “water” are indexical in nature. He says the word “water” is obviously indexical an word like this, that, now, then etc. By this indexicality he criticized internalist thesis “intention determines extension”. Putnam claims that because of indexicality of ‘water’, we cannot say that it is the intention which determines extension. He says we do not apply indexicality for this thesis. The word “water” has an unnoticed component. Therefore the theory intention determines extension is false. We cannot index words like “I” as mentioned earlier. Like many other philosophers, Putnam believes that the theory that “intention determines extension” does not apply to indexical because the indexical is present in the utterance of the speaker and the extension is determined by this indexical. He says, “their extension varies from context to context or token to token”.

I examine Putnam's ‘indexical’ latter and show how his natural kind word like ‘water’ externally identified, I want to examine the obvious kinds of indexical. I will discuss about the essential indexical in the section 3.3.3.

3.3.2 Indexicality

Roughly speaking, an indexical is a linguistic expression whose meaning change from context to context, token to token. Example- 'you', 'I' 'this', 'that' etc. The indexical of 'you' may refer to my friend in one context but it may refer to another friend in another context. If two speakers- John and Sugy utter 'I am happy'. John says that he is happy whereas Sugy says that she is happy. Many philosophers believe that indexicals have two sorts of meaning. The first one is called as 'linguistic meaning' or 'character' and second one is due to David Kaplan.²⁶ The second sort of meaning is often called 'content'. By using this terminology, we can say "every indexical has a single unvarying character, but vary in context to context, token to token". Indexicality has some similarities with Wittgenstein's use theory of meaning in that its indexicality, like meaning, is determined by its context of use or utterance.

Considering Devid's case,²⁷ let us suppose Devid is sitting on a chair in his room and there is a ball is before him. He is thinking about his ball. His indexical thought is "This ball is red". Suppose in another situation he is thinking about his sister's ball which is not different from his own and he says "This ball is red". Here we have identical thoughts (non-intentional described) and different thoughts (intentionally described) so "intention does not determine extension".²⁸

I think that this is not a reasonable explanation for refuting the thesis "intention determines extension". As Searle says, "it is a matter of fact about the world, whether or not some existing entities satisfy the intentional content".²⁹ My ball is red falls under an extension of the intention if and only if the world is such that my ball is red. As Horowitz says, whether it is red or not, it is a matter of fact. It is not up to intention whether or not the ball falls under the extension. This is different from Devid's case. Devid's intention determines the extension of ball because Devid's intention about the ball and it relate to to that ball. But what is characteristic of "this". What Devid's "this" concept refers to. Searle's analyses of the content of such thought is that we have to be aware of the context of the utterance. The word 'this' is a relational informative word. It has a relation with the speaker or thinker or thinker location. The ball might be in front of thinker or thinker is pointing to the ball by his finger (in some cases where we select out intentional object by gesture). In Devid's case the ball is in front of him. It is a fact about the world not a matter of utterance or intentional content or any indexicality. Due to the fact that ball is red,

likewise the ball before Devid is an object of intention of 'this' thought. It is due to the matter of fact that the ball possesses the property of "in front of Devid". One might say the ball is a relation with Devid, other might say it is a matter of context of the utterance. We can also think that the ball which is in front of Devid was kicked by Messi's foot in the match against Spain. There is no problem on the side of properties by means of which we refer to the object. One might say the ball might be in different place or the ball might be yellow.

Does the intention really determine extension? Horowitz says no because the intention is different and extension is different. There must be a relation between the intention and extension and what the intention has must be matched with the extension. In the above case, Horowitz finds no certain justification to conclude that "intention of an indexical thought does determine its extension".³⁰

2. Let us recall the Devid's case. He is sitting on a chair in his room and his ball is before him and he is thinking about his ball and said, 'This ball is red'. Counterfactually let us suppose that he is in sister's room and her ball is before him which is indistinguishable from his ball. And he says 'This ball is red'. So it is same case of twin story as identical mental states and different extension. Let us now consider some objections. One objection is, What is reason for being an intentional object of Devid's 'this' thought? It is because the ball is in front of him. Let us suppose that it is in different place P. If the ball is in P then the thesis "intention does not determine extension". Since the intention of 'this' thought determines being in front of Devid. It means that external factor participate in the determination. The external factor of Devid's location and his orientation does not determine by intention of 'this' thought. So as the Horowitz says, "intention of the thought does not fully determine the property of object for being an intentional object".³¹

However, Horowitz thinks that this challenge is problematic. It is not the that the ball is in a certain place because of that it is intentional object. If the ball will move from that place to other than the ball is not object of intention of same thought because the ball is not before Devid. It might be an intentional object of a different thought or of a different intention. It is the property which makes the ball an intentional object. This shows that the ball is an intentional object while moving from one place to another place. But still we do not find strong justification to conclude that "the intention of indexical thought does not determine its extension".

3.3.3 Indexical thoughts are singular thought.

Thought is single if it involves the object. The thought lacks its content when the object is not there. Some philosophers says “indexical thoughts² are singular thoughts”. They are dependent upon object even if someone is hallucinating and thinks, “This dog is cute”. We cannot attribute his belief because there is no dog. This is not because of ‘this’. There might be the case where they do in which case we could have ascribed by saying that ‘That dog is cute’. Horowitz thinks that hallucinating does not suffer lack of content but it is false because he presupposes an existence of a dog in that place. We cannot ascribe these types of ascriptions because the ascriptions of belief has indexical which concerned an identity with the intentional objects and there is no intentional objects. Therefore we do not ascribe such types of belief while there where no object. This does not says that if someone says that, “This dog is cute”, either veridically or non-veridically he does not have belief. It is the belief-ascription which is transparent. The truth-condition depends on the world. The truth-condition of this belief is, there must be a dog in front of him and it be cute. One might protest that this explanation is existential while the belief is not. The truth-condition of belief does not determine by what is going on in the subjects’ mind. Explication of contents need not the description of first-person’s experience of the objects or state-of-affairs which the subject experiences. The contents are the property of the objects or state-of-affair by means of which the objects or states-of-affairs experience. The truth or falsity of every belief depends upon that object.

There is an objection of this discussion that we cannot explicate “This dog is cute”, because “the dog is rigid or directly referential”.³² “This dog is cute” does not mean that the dog is in front of me. It may refer to a dog which is in front of me in this world or any other possible worlds; it may be the case that the dog is before me in every possible world if it not in the actual world. The property of being before me (by means of which the object or dog refered to by “this”). It is not the propriety by which object has refered to by ‘cthis’.

This theory of rigidity seems to Horowitz as a singular thought if the belief is rigid. The dog is my intentional object, if there is a dog in front of me. It is my intentional object, if there had been another dog; that dog would have been in my intentional object. If there had been no dog, there would not have been any intentional object, and so there would be no content. We must observe the external world. The proposition what we get depends upon the world. Here it means “object determines content” unlike the view of internalists who hold that content determines object.

I also think¹³ that the object is what causes the content. As Searle says “in direction of causation- a belief has world-to-mind direction of causation and a desire has mind-to-world direction of

causation. "It is the objects or state-of-affairs which cause the belief. But in desire, it is the desire itself which causes objects or state-of-affairs".³³

This view of rigidity is problematic in my opinion. I would like to offer my argument as follows: The belief "This dog is cute" has content whether or not there is a dog before me in the actual world. In general, a belief has content whether or not the referred object exists. Let us assume that indexical function is rigid. If so, then they do not refer to something for being in front of someone. They may be true as far as referent is concern. If I say "This dog is cute" then it means that there is a dog in front of me and it is to be cute. This is only concerned with actual world referent and not in property or conditions (the object must satisfy in order to be referent) of constitutive content. There might be someone who accept that the which explains the objects is not the property which makes object as an intentional object. The protestors claim that this is an artificial move. What makes the object of the actual world to be an intentional object is not the fact that they are identical with the object in front of the subject but that the fact is the object is in front of the subject.

The above objection is wrong and not artificial at all. Horowitz believes that this seems to be artificial because we tend to conflate two role of external world. The first rule serves as context of what we of designator. The reference and truth-condition of sentence is fixed in all world. I refer Tom because Tom is before me. This is "the context of acquisition". Second one is "context of evaluation" where truth condition of the sentence may differ from world to world. Tom is cute is one possible world and Tom is not cute in another possible world.

3. John Perry in his article gives an examples of "Hume and Haimson".³⁴ Let us examine this example: "Suppose that Hume and Haimson have same sense and think same thought but the difference is that they do not apprehend the same thought when they entertain the same sense. For instance, when Heimson entertains the thought that "I am the author of the *Treatise*" and when Hume entertains the thought and say "I am the author of the *Treatise*", Hume is right and Heimson is wrong or crazy. Thoughts are different in the world and these thoughts have different intentional object. Here same intention is there but extensions are not same. Here the indexical is "I". Perry calls it as essential indexical. Perry says, "we can replace Hume and Heimson's thought 'I wrote the *Treatise*' by 'The author of the *Inquiry* wrote the *Treatise*'".³⁵ But we cannot replace an indexical to non-indexical expression without thought losing its sensitivity which completes the determination and which determines the speaker and also the intentional objects. (Here the sensitivity is identity of the speaker.) Perry in his article "The problem of

essential indexicals” shows that “essentiality of ‘I’ to the explanation of behavior”.³⁶ Perry explains it through an example.

Once he was following a sugar trail on a supermarket floor and looking for a shopper with a torn bag for telling him that he was making a mess. But he was unable to find that man. Latter he saw that he was holding a bag and he was the shopper and he was trying to catch himself. He believe that the shopper with torn bag was making a mess. But he was not believe that he is shopper. Then he stopped to follow the trail and rearrange the trail. His believe “I am the shopper” make him to do so.

Horowitz says that the essential indexical thoughts can differ in extension while sharing intention. It is not possible that same intentions explain different extension, it may be token difference that is indexicals. He says if the types of thoughts cannot explain extension then thoughts may be token difference.

In the above case of Hume, what is supposed to complete the determination? It is Hume thought which completes the determination. The content determination presupposes Hume. The content-determination also presupposes something other than the intention of Hume’s thought of “I wrote the *Treatise*”. This does not establish the viewpoint of externalism. The intention of the the speaker does not identify extension. It only determines the individual who is the thinking subject. This proves that meaning can be determined solipsistically. Thus the essential indexical like “I” does not refers to any external things. Its reference is solipsistic. So Horowitz says, “The essential indexical thoughts are not external”.³⁷

The property that the extension has to satisfy if it to be intentional object of above Hume and Heimson’s thought is that whom thought belongs to. It looks alone. Here one question arises, who thinks avobe thought? This question has two level role: it asks how an object becomes an intentional? And what does object possess property? If we know the answer of the second and third question we know the answer of the first question. Here one might assume that the first question is asking about the thinker not about the property. The answer is the avobe all questions are asking for the identity of the thinker. If we do not know the intentional object, how would we know about the thinker. The oddness is because of the essentiality of “I”. If we place it with a non-indexical without violating the sensitivity of context, it will solve the problem of identity of thinker.

3.3.4 Twin Earth Argument (ii)

Now I am discussing about indexicality of Putnam. He takes the relation of 'same L' to determine extension. Putnam says that when anyone point to a finger to bucket of water and utters, "This is water", he presumes the liquid identical with the "same L' relation. In this community, the other speakers called that stuff as 'water'. According to Putnam "x is water if and only if it bears the same L relation to that stuff call 'water' in the actual world".³⁸ In order to establish externalism (the theory that believes in external thought). They must accept that the meaning of 'water' is determined ostensibly. This theory claims, an entity called as water if that entity identical with existing object in external world what subject denotes to by 'this'. This is called as indexical in Putnam's view.

We have seen that the indexicality comes with certain mental states. Putnam is unable to convince us with his 'same L' relation. If the 'same L' designates the observable property of water as H₂O (or XYZ) then the Putnam's twin earth argument will not establish externalism because the reference of both Oscars are same. Here Putnam uses the microstructure for determination of its extension. If so then H₂O is water while not XYZ. Because it simply absence of property of H₂O. I have a question as to why Putnam takes only microstructure for determining extension. Perhaps that is the way of the scientists and I believe nothing can prevent them to define 'water' by using its microstructure. If someone ask me what water is, perhaps I can also define it by using its microstructure. But if I do not know about chemistry, I can define water by its observable properties. Here I wants to say that this or that way is possible. One has free to explain 'water' by its chemical structure or by any perceivable property. There cannot be any restriction as to how we define our words or concepts. All that is needed is perhaps the explicitness or objectivity of the subject's description of his belief.

I support Horowitz who believes that Searle thesis 'intention determines extension' is inadequate. Searle interprets his thesis as "intention sets certain conditions which anything has to meet in order to be the part of the extension of the relevant intention".³⁹ This appears trivial in that it does not clearly tell us whether the intention determines those conditions; I mean if the intention can fully determine the conditions. By fully, I mean whether or not it leaves any question open; it should not. In other word, does it leave any indeterminacies? I am convinced that just by setting conditions, the intention can fully determine the extension. So the thesis 'intention determines extension' does not mean intention fully determines extension. If it is not, then Searle's position can, at best, be interpreted or treated only trivially. As Horowitz interprets, if this thesis is to be interpreted non-trivially, then it is not true.

As opposite to the intention of "the writer of Republic", Intention of "identical structure with this stuff" not fully explain object. It leaves some indeterminacy, namely, the structure of 'this' stuff.

Here we are not concerned about the knowledge of the subject but we are concerned about the structure of “this” stuff. We argued that the intention of “the identical structure with this stuff” not fully explain property of which the extension has to obtain if it has to fall under its extension. What about Putnam’s TE story? I mean what finishes determination in the case of the TE story? There, “these” stuffs mean “the structure of H₂O and the structure of XYZ”. If Oscars knew about H₂O and XYZ, then they would use the knowledge when they think about their respective “water” in which case their intentions would determine extension. Here the intention is no longer the “identical structure with this stuff”, but with the context, environment, in general, the actual world facts which complete the determination. Here the intention “identical structure with this stuff” and extra-mental facts fully determine its extension.

Now let us imagine God’s viewpoint. If God looks into Oscar’s head when he is thinking about “the stuff which microstructure of this is wet”. Will he think about water or gin? Assume that Oscar knows the microstructure of both water and gin. In order to know whether Oscar is thinking about water or gin, God has to look at his mind and the world as well for know what Oscar refers to by ‘this’. God looks at Oscars’ mind to see what he is thinking and looks at the world to know about the microstructure of the “water” and “gin”. God cannot know the content of what Oscars are thinking because the content is not there in their heads. Thus the extra-mental facts is that by virtue of that completes explanation of extension of thought. Here Horowitz is not saying, as Searle says, that it is a matter of fact that which is possessed by an object to meet the conditions set by intention in order to be a part of the extension of that intention. Here Horowitz is rather saying that the property of the object is a matter of fact (external). What *the property is* is itself (partly) a fact of world. It is not determined by intention. Thus, the meanings are not fully determined by external facts, sometime it is in the head.

Horowitz at first accepts Searle’s point which states that the extension of an intention is a set of things which it has to satisfy to be a part of extension of that intention. Here we can talk about “whatever test” of Horowitz which are of two type. The first ‘whatever’ is the “property of object” which is defined as ‘water’ that is identical with the form of “this”. The first ‘whatever’ signify fact of the world whether object is in extension of intention. It is like internalism. The second ‘whatever’ concerns about property which has to be satisfied by an object in order to part of the extension of that intention. Here the property means what is the chemical structure that an extension has to possess if it is to be an object of intention of thought. This property support by the form of “this”. The property also depends upon external facts. The first ‘whatever’ is the structure of ‘this’ which is the content which is in the head. And the second ‘whatever’ is the property itself, the conditions which the object has to satisfy. It is external to the mind. So the second ‘whatever’ is incompatible with externalism. It is the intention which determines which possible fact can complete the determination. Intention determines the context of the content which completes the determination. Here intention is like an open sentence which finds the way to complete the determination.

In the “twin earth” argument, intention plays a role to determine the microstructure of “water” which completes the content-determination. Here the content is the microstructure of “water”. Intention is in mind in sense that mental states supervene brain-states which play important role for explaining the content. This approach of content determination is like the intuition of narrow-content. According to Fodor, “determination of extension is relative to context” and the narrow content is explained by the context of the reference. But in my opinion, everything cannot be determined by the context alone. In narrow content, this is narrow content itself which identify context. But in our case context is an fact of world among the possible facts that is explained by the intention.

If we sum up the above views, we get what may be termed as a middle path in between internalism and externalism, more flexible than Putnam’s externalism. In our version, narrow content which is in mind explains the possible facts, one among them completes the reference explication. Moreover, it also explains whether thought is external or internal. Putnam externalism does not give this type of middle path. In Putnam’s writing we find that he rejects the notion of narrow content. Narrow content is not referential but a semantic. So it needs a strong interpretation for its relation with the environment. Narrow content determines a certain limited facts which determine reference. I shall defend this view later on in last section.

Putnam claims that it is the indexicals of Oscars’ thoughts which determine their referents. But in Putnam’s externalism, “indexicality is neither a sufficient condition nor a necessary condition”⁴⁰. It is not sufficient condition because we have knew that indexicality does not depend upon external facts. This is only true when we use indexicals. To know the indexical property of “I”, does not involves the external world. Indexical thoughts can be external. Recall the Devid’s example, “This” is a thought of the ball; indexical could be external if it involves descriptive element. The descriptive element decides whether or not the indexical is external.

Putnam does involve indexical in the “twin earth” argument. It is not because thoughts are external, but because both Oscars share the same intention and different extension. There is no way, as I maintained before, thoughts of same intention can result in different extension. If different type of thoughts do not explain extension then thought would have different in token. It must be different tokens. The extension may be numerical different or token different. If there were no microstructure difference then there would be no different extension. It is the contents (microstructure of ‘this’) that determine the extension. The determination is possible through microstructures. In other words, at times, determination is possible without indexical. So indexicality is not necessary for externalism.

3.3.5 The elm and beech argument.

Let's see the elm and beech argument of Putnam and Searle's response to it. The concepts of 'elm' and 'beech' are same in Putnam's idiolect but the extension of both trees are different in the external world. So we have here the same case as TE: same intention and different extension. Searle says that Putnam knows, the extension of both trees are different because Hillary (the speaker) knows that both trees are different. According to Searle, this knowledge is conceptual. It means that Putnam knows that the concept of 'elm' is different from the concept of 'beech'. In Putnam's intuition since the concept of 'elm' and 'beech' are identical, Horowitz says, "it should refer to a real psychological item not a semantic item".⁴¹ In Searle's intuition, the concepts of 'elm' and 'beech' are different. Both Searle and Putnam assume that these two concepts are different. They do not argue about, what that concept have? It seems that Searle is correct. They both quarrel about how these concepts determine extension. It is simply not possible that an identical concepts (non-intentionally described) of a thinker in same all respect (linguistic, physical, psychological etc.) have different extensions. Nothing can explain the difference. Even if it is taken for granted that Putnam's 'elm' and 'beech' are determined by the experts' use of 'elm' and 'beech', when Putnam appeals to botanist's 'elm' and 'beech', the concepts of Putnam will be different because the concepts of botanist are different and these concepts determine different extension. When Putnam appeals to botanist, he (botanist) does not give him wrong answer. He does not say these two are identical. He has different concepts of 'elm' and 'beech'. So Putnam's concepts (non-intentionally describe) of both trees are different.

Putnam responds to the above claim: "there is no difference in mental representation of elm and beech, only the difference is in phonetic names".⁴² Searle is ready to accept this claim but insists that it does not refute his contention that "it is not possible for two identical mental representation to differ in contents in same environment in all respects ... difference in phonetic shape is difference in mental representation ... it is the individualistic of Putnam's head which determines extension and it is due to his ignorance that he has the same contents. An ignorant content is not a content at all".⁴³ In fact, Putnam has content of 'elm' in his head, but it need not represents the elms, rather it may represent beech because there is no connection between the content 'elm' and beech.

As Searle says it is the concept that is responsible for the representation of different extension. The experts have distinct concepts of both trees. Putnam's concepts of 'elm' and 'beech' are only

in difference in type. When the Putnam's concept of 'elm' appeal to the experts' concept of 'elm' and knows that the concepts of both trees are different. These different concepts determined extension. The different extensions would not have determined, if there had been no difference between the concepts. As I say before intention determines which possible facts match with the intentional objects. It is the phonetic shapes which is different in Putnam intuition. So the intention of Putnam's 'elm' determines the experts' usage of 'elm' and intention of Putnam's 'beech' explains usage of experts' 'beech'. That² different usage determine the extensions of 'elm' and 'beech'. In this case the intention is the narrow content. In Horowitz view "... (narrow content) meaning of 'elm' used by Putnam is like that which is called elm by English speaker".⁴⁴ If it is the case then we can say the meaning of Hindi word 'chirabel' is "the species of tree what the Hindi speaker call as 'chirabel'". It is mistaken by translate 'elm' and 'chirabel'. The translation of words of different language is different from translation of words which is used by different language speakers. In this case we only know the explicit meaning of that word. We cannot know what is going on in their head. If we request the English, Hindi speaker experts then we will not face this type of problem of translation. However, the question is still not clear, whether the meaning of Putnam's 'elm' is same as 'chirabel' of Hindi speaker who is also knowledgeable about Botany. "It looks absurd".⁴⁵ Different language speakers can think about the same thought and can represent the same thing. I think that Putnam's 'elm' mean that what is English speaker calls as 'elm' and other language speaker language speaker translate 'elm' in their language. This must be correct because no English speaker can represent elm by saying beech.

Putnam gives another argument for criticizing the thesis 'intention determines extension' without any assumption of identical concepts. This argument depends on social and physical environment. In this argument, Putnam tells us to suppose molybdenum and aluminum pots and pans are indistinguishable save by experts. The aluminum pots and pans are made of molybdenum in twin earth. Furthermore, on twin earth 'aluminum' calls as molybdenum and vice versa. So when both Oscars utter term 'aluminum', they have identical mental states. When Oscar uses the term 'aluminum' he means 'aluminum' whereas, when twin Oscar uses the term 'aluminum' he means molybdenum. Thus meanings, contents do not determined solipsistically. Horowitz says, "what is responsible for different meanings and contents? Here the psychological states and concepts are not responsible. It is because of their linguistic community that the meanings are different. It means that Oscars communities are responsible for different meanings".⁴⁶

This argument does not clear the idea whether we have same psychological states with distinct language communities or different mental states with same linguistic community. As Searle says, when he overlooked regarding elm and beech argument, “what is in the head regarding elms and beeches does not suffice for making one think about elms and beeches, external factors (external to Hilary’s mind, in this case) must play a role”. Searle ²⁰ serves that Putnam must assume the experts’ intentions of elm and beech to determine the extension of elm and beech.⁴⁷ In my opinion, regardless of Searle’s response, he does not fully refute the above argument nor defend his position. Considering the above discussions, I am inclined to think that there are some thoughts whose content in the head cannot fully determine extension. To this extend, I believe that externalism in the moderate sense is both defensible and plausible.

3.4 Conclusion

In this chapter, I have taken a position that neither Searle nor Putnam is wholly correct in their respective views. But again neither is fully wrong in their views. When we consider their arguments, especially the thought experiments of Putnam and the responses of Searle, there are elements of truth that can be gained from both. Accordingly, I have taken a view which can be termed as moderate externalism.

Conclusion

We have noted that ¹ Searle’s theory of language is related to his ¹² theory of mind. His works in the philosophy of language is therefore better read as a branch of the philosophy of mind. For developing his theory of language, he initially supported the speech act theory of Austin. However, he developed further the speech act theory by critically analyzing Austin’s works. While Austin’s approach is a conventional one, Searle’s approach to speech acts is intentional. In Austin’s approach, we understand the utterance of words if we know the conventional meaning. In Searle’s approach, we understand an utterance if we understand the intention of the speaker.

We have noted that intentionality plays the central role in the speech act theory of Searle. To know the meaning we have to know the intention of the speaker. There are many other concepts which we have to know ⁷ in order to understand the speech acts. They are illocutionary force, propositional content, conditions of satisfaction, direction of fit, direction of causation and so on.

For Searle, intentionality and speech acts have an analogous ¹⁴ structure. They both have propositional content, psychological state or illocutionary force, conditions of satisfaction, ⁴⁷ direction of fit. They both have propositional content, psychological state or illocutionary force, conditions of satisfaction, direction of fit and so on. Searle ¹ argues that meaning is possible when the conditions ²⁴ of satisfaction of intentionality impose on the conditions of satisfaction of speech acts. The conditions of satisfaction of speech acts ⁵ and intentionality are identical. The conditions of satisfaction of meaning are different from the conditions of satisfaction of speech acts and

21 intentionality. Meaning conditions can be satisfied even if the world is not in that way. But the conditions of satisfaction of speech acts and intentionality can be satisfied if and only if the world is in the same way. Here one problem arises as to what conditions the object or the state-of-affairs have to satisfy. Searle does not give adequate answer. But I found this answer from discussions of Searle and Putnam including Amir Horowitz whose view helped me to develop my approach

Putnam being an externalist, he rejects the thesis of internalism that 'intention determines extension'. For this, he offered his seminal thought experiments, viz., the 'twin earth argument' and the 'elm and beech argument'. In Putnam's "twin earth" argument, it is the microstructure which determines extension and the microstructure is not in the mind but outside the mind. In response to these arguments of Putnam, Searle initially and tentatively accepts these arguments for the sake of discussion but then goes on to show that these arguments do not really prove that intention does not determine extension. Putnam faces this problem because he underestimated what is in the head that determines extension. In a way, Searle has defended somewhat successfully the criticism of Putnam. The responses of Searle made Putnam to see that his theses face some problem too. So he brings in another concept for defending his theses. The notion is indexicality. Putnam says it is the indexicality of words which determine the extension. Putnam says it is through indexicality that the extension is determined. He says all natural kind words are obviously indexical. He says indexicals are present in the utterance of the speaker. Again, Searle put forth his counter-argument by saying that indexicals do play a role in determining the extension but they are present in the head, not in the external world like rocks and tables. Indexicals come with intention. Accordingly, he concludes that intention determines extension.

Horowitz accepts Searle's claim that indexical comes with intention and at the same time criticized Putnam's view that "indexicals are present in the utterance of the speaker". We have seen the argument of Horowitz that it is not through the indexical, we know the meaning. He rather says that it is the content or microstructure which determines the extension. Horowitz goes on to argue that it is the object that determines the content unlike the view of the internalists who hold that the content determines the object. He puts a rhetorical question on the internalists: Does intention fully determine extension? To this, he gives his own response that intention does not fully determine extension. There always remains an element of indeterminacy. We need social and physical environment for determination too. It means that he takes both internalists and externalist viewpoints. He says that intention plays a role like an open sentence which finds its way to determine an object. It means that intention determines extension through the content. He accepts the narrow content which is in the head.

I have taken side with Horowitz. He not only pointed out the weak points of both Searle and Putnam but also capitalized on their strong points. Somewhat taking clues from Horowitz, I hold the view that it is not only the object that determines the content but also content determines the object. There is a two way relation in the determination of extension. While accepting the approach taken by Searle, I find that there is some problem in Searle philosophy- How the content-determination is possible? Or what are the conditions which an object have to satisfy? These are not adequately addressed by Searle. Interestingly, I found reasonable answers to the above questions in the works of Putnam and Horowitz. Besides, the

exchange of views between Searle and Putnam helped me to understand these questions better. Horowitz points out defects in these two philosophers and offered his solutions as well. By these points, he developed a moderate version of externalism, a view I have gradually come to support and embrace in this work. However, Horowitz' moderate version of externalism has some problem too. Though his approach⁵³ is an internalist approach, he calls his philosophy as moderate externalism. This is confusing. The only difference I find between internalist and Horowitz is that he accepts that the external world plays an important role in content-determination. The rest appears to be an internalist stance. So in my opinion his philosophy may be more appropriately termed as moderate internalism as opposed to my own view, which is moderate externalism.

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