Knowledge, thought, and the case for dualism / Richard Fumerton, University of Iowa.

Fumerton, Richard A., 1949-
Call Number
147/.4
Author
Fumerton, Richard A., 1949- author.
Title
Knowledge, thought, and the case for dualism / Richard Fumerton, University of Iowa.
Knowledge, Thought, & the Case for Dualism
Physical Description
1 online resource (xv, 283 pages) : digital, PDF file(s).
Series
Cambridge studies in philosophy
Notes
Title from publisher's bibliographic system (viewed on 05 Oct 2015).
Contents
Preface -- 1. Setting the stage -- 2. Distinctions: versions of physicalism and dualism -- 3. Ontological priorities: taking phenomenology seriously -- 4. Knowledge arguments revisited -- 5. Indirect thought and informative identity -- 6. An ontologically liberating skepticism: the last hope for physicalism -- 7. Objections and replies -- 8. The ubiquitous self: a brief postscript.
Summary
The relationship between mind and matter, mental states and physical states, has occupied the attention of philosophers for thousands of years. Richard Fumerton's primary concern is the knowledge argument for dualism - an argument that proceeds from the idea that we can know truths about our existence and our mental states without knowing any truths about the physical world. This view has come under relentless criticism, but here Fumerton makes a powerful case for its rehabilitation, demonstrating clearly the importance of its interconnections with a wide range of other controversies within philosophy. Fumerton analyzes philosophical views about the nature of thought and the relation of those views to arguments for dualism, and investigates the connection between a traditional form of foundationalism about knowledge, and a foundationalist view about thought that underlies traditional arguments for dualism. His book will be of great interest to those studying epistemology and the philosophy of mind.
Subject
DUALISM.
MATERIALISM.
MIND AND BODY.
Multimedia
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$a The relationship between mind and matter, mental states and physical states, has occupied the attention of philosophers for thousands of years. Richard Fumerton's primary concern is the knowledge argument for dualism - an argument that proceeds from the idea that we can know truths about our existence and our mental states without knowing any truths about the physical world. This view has come under relentless criticism, but here Fumerton makes a powerful case for its rehabilitation, demonstrating clearly the importance of its interconnections with a wide range of other controversies within philosophy. Fumerton analyzes philosophical views about the nature of thought and the relation of those views to arguments for dualism, and investigates the connection between a traditional form of foundationalism about knowledge, and a foundationalist view about thought that underlies traditional arguments for dualism. His book will be of great interest to those studying epistemology and the philosophy of mind.
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Summary
The relationship between mind and matter, mental states and physical states, has occupied the attention of philosophers for thousands of years. Richard Fumerton's primary concern is the knowledge argument for dualism - an argument that proceeds from the idea that we can know truths about our existence and our mental states without knowing any truths about the physical world. This view has come under relentless criticism, but here Fumerton makes a powerful case for its rehabilitation, demonstrating clearly the importance of its interconnections with a wide range of other controversies within philosophy. Fumerton analyzes philosophical views about the nature of thought and the relation of those views to arguments for dualism, and investigates the connection between a traditional form of foundationalism about knowledge, and a foundationalist view about thought that underlies traditional arguments for dualism. His book will be of great interest to those studying epistemology and the philosophy of mind.
Notes
Title from publisher's bibliographic system (viewed on 05 Oct 2015).
Contents
Preface -- 1. Setting the stage -- 2. Distinctions: versions of physicalism and dualism -- 3. Ontological priorities: taking phenomenology seriously -- 4. Knowledge arguments revisited -- 5. Indirect thought and informative identity -- 6. An ontologically liberating skepticism: the last hope for physicalism -- 7. Objections and replies -- 8. The ubiquitous self: a brief postscript.
Subject
DUALISM.
MATERIALISM.
MIND AND BODY.
Multimedia