The principle of sufficient reason : a reassessment / Alexander R. Pruss.
Pruss, Alexander R.| Call Number | 111 |
| Author | Pruss, Alexander R., author. |
| Title | The principle of sufficient reason : a reassessment / Alexander R. Pruss. |
| Physical Description | 1 online resource (xiii, 335 pages) : digital, PDF file(s). |
| Series | Cambridge studies in philosophy |
| Notes | Title from publisher's bibliographic system (viewed on 05 Oct 2015). |
| Contents | Introduction -- Reflections on some historical episodes -- The causal principle and the PSR -- A modern version of the Hume objection -- The anti-theological argument : that there are no necessary beings -- Modal fatalism -- Free will -- Quantum mechanics -- Turning Leibniz against the PSR -- What survives the criticisms of the PSR? -- Self-evidence -- Three Thomistic arguments -- Modal arguments -- Is the universe reasonable? -- Explanation of negative states of affairs -- The puzzle of the everyday applicability of the PSR -- Inference to the best or only explanation -- Inductive skepticism -- The nature of possibility -- Conclusions. |
| Summary | The Principle of Sufficient Reason (PSR) says that all contingent facts must have explanation. In this 2006 volume, which was the first on the topic in the English language in nearly half a century, Alexander Pruss examines the substantive philosophical issues raised by the Principle Reason. Discussing various forms of the PSR and selected historical episodes, from Parmenides, Leibnez, and Hume, Pruss defends the claim that every true contingent proposition must have an explanation against major objections, including Hume's imaginability argument and Peter van Inwagen's argument that the PSR entails modal fatalism. Pruss also provides a number of positive arguments for the PSR, based on considerations as different as the metaphysics of existence, counterfactuals and modality, negative explanations, and the everyday applicability of the PSR. Moreover, Pruss shows how the PSR would advance the discussion in a number of disparate fields, including meta-ethics and the philosophy of mathematics. |
| Subject | Sufficient reason. |
| Multimedia |
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| Summary | The Principle of Sufficient Reason (PSR) says that all contingent facts must have explanation. In this 2006 volume, which was the first on the topic in the English language in nearly half a century, Alexander Pruss examines the substantive philosophical issues raised by the Principle Reason. Discussing various forms of the PSR and selected historical episodes, from Parmenides, Leibnez, and Hume, Pruss defends the claim that every true contingent proposition must have an explanation against major objections, including Hume's imaginability argument and Peter van Inwagen's argument that the PSR entails modal fatalism. Pruss also provides a number of positive arguments for the PSR, based on considerations as different as the metaphysics of existence, counterfactuals and modality, negative explanations, and the everyday applicability of the PSR. Moreover, Pruss shows how the PSR would advance the discussion in a number of disparate fields, including meta-ethics and the philosophy of mathematics. |
| Notes | Title from publisher's bibliographic system (viewed on 05 Oct 2015). |
| Contents | Introduction -- Reflections on some historical episodes -- The causal principle and the PSR -- A modern version of the Hume objection -- The anti-theological argument : that there are no necessary beings -- Modal fatalism -- Free will -- Quantum mechanics -- Turning Leibniz against the PSR -- What survives the criticisms of the PSR? -- Self-evidence -- Three Thomistic arguments -- Modal arguments -- Is the universe reasonable? -- Explanation of negative states of affairs -- The puzzle of the everyday applicability of the PSR -- Inference to the best or only explanation -- Inductive skepticism -- The nature of possibility -- Conclusions. |
| Subject | Sufficient reason. |
| Multimedia |