Financial crisis, corporate governance and bank capital / Sanjai Bhagat.
Bhagat, Sanjai| Call Number | 331.2/8133210973 |
| Author | Bhagat, Sanjai, author. |
| Title | Financial crisis, corporate governance and bank capital / Sanjai Bhagat. |
| Physical Description | 1 online resource (xv, 242 pages) : digital, PDF file(s). |
| Notes | Title from publisher's bibliographic system (viewed on 20 Mar 2017). |
| Summary | In the aftermath of the 2007–8 crisis, senior policymakers and the media have blamed excessive risk-taking undertaken by bank executives, in response to their compensation incentives, for the crisis. The inevitable follow-up to this was to introduce stronger financial regulation, in the hope that better and more ethical behaviour can be induced. Despite the honourable intentions of regulation, such as the Dodd–Frank Act of 2010, it is clear that many big banks are still deemed too big to fail. This book argues that by restructuring executive incentive programmes to include only restricted stock and restricted stock options with very long vesting periods, and financing banks with considerably more equity, the potential of future financial crises can be minimized. It will be of great value to corporate executives, corporate board members, institutional investors and economic policymakers, as well as graduate and undergraduate students studying finance, economics and law. |
| Subject | Banks and banking United States. Bankers Salaries, etc. United States. Bank capital United States. Corporate governance United States. Finance Government policy United States. Financial crises United States. |
| Multimedia |
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$a In the aftermath of the 2007–8 crisis, senior policymakers and the media have blamed excessive risk-taking undertaken by bank executives, in response to their compensation incentives, for the crisis. The inevitable follow-up to this was to introduce stronger financial regulation, in the hope that better and more ethical behaviour can be induced. Despite the honourable intentions of regulation, such as the Dodd–Frank Act of 2010, it is clear that many big banks are still deemed too big to fail. This book argues that by restructuring executive incentive programmes to include only restricted stock and restricted stock options with very long vesting periods, and financing banks with considerably more equity, the potential of future financial crises can be minimized. It will be of great value to corporate executives, corporate board members, institutional investors and economic policymakers, as well as graduate and undergraduate students studying finance, economics and law.
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| Summary | In the aftermath of the 2007–8 crisis, senior policymakers and the media have blamed excessive risk-taking undertaken by bank executives, in response to their compensation incentives, for the crisis. The inevitable follow-up to this was to introduce stronger financial regulation, in the hope that better and more ethical behaviour can be induced. Despite the honourable intentions of regulation, such as the Dodd–Frank Act of 2010, it is clear that many big banks are still deemed too big to fail. This book argues that by restructuring executive incentive programmes to include only restricted stock and restricted stock options with very long vesting periods, and financing banks with considerably more equity, the potential of future financial crises can be minimized. It will be of great value to corporate executives, corporate board members, institutional investors and economic policymakers, as well as graduate and undergraduate students studying finance, economics and law. |
| Notes | Title from publisher's bibliographic system (viewed on 20 Mar 2017). |
| Subject | Banks and banking United States. Bankers Salaries, etc. United States. Bank capital United States. Corporate governance United States. Finance Government policy United States. Financial crises United States. |
| Multimedia |