Decentralized authoritarianism in China : the Communist Party's control of local elites in the post-Mao era / Pierre F. Landry.
Landry, Pierre F. (Pierre Francois), 1967-| Call Number | 320.80951 |
| Author | Landry, Pierre F. 1967- author. |
| Title | Decentralized authoritarianism in China : the Communist Party's control of local elites in the post-Mao era / Pierre F. Landry. |
| Physical Description | 1 online resource (xv, 295 pages) : digital, PDF file(s). |
| Notes | Title from publisher's bibliographic system (viewed on 05 Oct 2015). |
| Contents | Authoritarianism and decentralization -- Organizing decentralization -- Promoting high-level generalists: the management of mayors -- Organizational power: the view from within -- Explaining cadre rank -- The impact of village elections on the appointment of party branch secretaries -- Conclusion. |
| Summary | China, like many authoritarian regimes, struggles with the tension between the need to foster economic development by empowering local officials and the regime's imperative to control them politically. Landry explores how the Chinese Communist Party (CCP) manages local officials in order to meet these goals and perpetuate an unusually decentralized authoritarian regime. Using unique data collected at the municipal, county, and village level, Landry examines in detail how the promotion mechanisms for local cadres have allowed the CCP to reward officials for the development of their localities without weakening political control. His research shows that the CCP's personnel management system is a key factor in explaining China's enduring authoritarianism and proves convincingly that decentralization and authoritarianism can work hand in hand. |
| Subject | Decentralization in government China. Central-local government relations China. Authoritarianism China. Privatization China. Zhongguo gong chan dang. |
| Multimedia |
Total Ratings:
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$a China, like many authoritarian regimes, struggles with the tension between the need to foster economic development by empowering local officials and the regime's imperative to control them politically. Landry explores how the Chinese Communist Party (CCP) manages local officials in order to meet these goals and perpetuate an unusually decentralized authoritarian regime. Using unique data collected at the municipal, county, and village level, Landry examines in detail how the promotion mechanisms for local cadres have allowed the CCP to reward officials for the development of their localities without weakening political control. His research shows that the CCP's personnel management system is a key factor in explaining China's enduring authoritarianism and proves convincingly that decentralization and authoritarianism can work hand in hand.
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| Summary | China, like many authoritarian regimes, struggles with the tension between the need to foster economic development by empowering local officials and the regime's imperative to control them politically. Landry explores how the Chinese Communist Party (CCP) manages local officials in order to meet these goals and perpetuate an unusually decentralized authoritarian regime. Using unique data collected at the municipal, county, and village level, Landry examines in detail how the promotion mechanisms for local cadres have allowed the CCP to reward officials for the development of their localities without weakening political control. His research shows that the CCP's personnel management system is a key factor in explaining China's enduring authoritarianism and proves convincingly that decentralization and authoritarianism can work hand in hand. |
| Notes | Title from publisher's bibliographic system (viewed on 05 Oct 2015). |
| Contents | Authoritarianism and decentralization -- Organizing decentralization -- Promoting high-level generalists: the management of mayors -- Organizational power: the view from within -- Explaining cadre rank -- The impact of village elections on the appointment of party branch secretaries -- Conclusion. |
| Subject | Decentralization in government China. Central-local government relations China. Authoritarianism China. Privatization China. Zhongguo gong chan dang. |
| Multimedia |