BIOLOGICAL WEAPONS TREATIES

• Biological Weapons Convention
• US-UK-Russia Biological Weapons Trilateral Statement
  

• Signatory States: 162
• 144 Ratifications
• Opened for Signature in 1972
• Entered into Force in 1975

At the Eighteen-Nation Disarmament Committee in 1969, the UK, supported by the US, called for the elimination of only biological weapons. The U.S., as a result of increasing protests for its use of herbicides during the Vietnam War, banned the development, production, and stockpiling of BW and announced its intent to ratify the Convention. The Convention was opened for signature in 1972 after the U.S. and the Soviet Union reached agreement on the text of the Convention.

Biological Weapons (BW) project, disperse, or disseminate biological agents or toxins and have distinct characteristics that enhance their effectiveness as weapons: 1) the projection, dispersal, or dissemination of small amounts of biological agents is sufficient to cause disease or illness among the targeted population; and 2) the small incubation periods (hours to days) makes it difficult to determine the time, location, and direction of attack before signs are manifested among the targeted population.

Note: Biological Agents, defined in the treaty as microbial or other biological agents, are naturally occurring microorganisms (virus, bacteria, fungus) or toxins that can cause death or disease in a targeted population.

TREATY OVERVIEW

The Biological Weapons Convention (BWC) prohibits Parties from developing, producing, stockpiling, acquiring, or retaining:

(1) Biological agents or toxins of types and in quantities that have no justification for prophylactic, protective or other peaceful purposes, and

(2) Weapons, equipment or means of delivery designed to use such agents or toxins for hostile purposes or in armed conflict.

The BWC obligates Parties to destroy all such material within nine months of the BWC's entry into force, but it permits Parties to conduct defensive biological research. It does not, however, contain measures for verification of any BWC provision.

As pointed out above, the treaty defines BW "as microbial or other biological agents" but fails to define "agents." The term usually refers to living organisms or infective material (or their synthetic equivalent) obtained from them, which multiply inside the person, animal, or plant attacked. Toxins, also not defined by the treaty, are substances that act like chemical agents but ordinarily are produced by biological or microbic processes.

The Convention has unlimited duration and originally called for only one review conference, held in 1982. After the UN called on State signatories to establish compliance procedures, several review conference have since been held and a "Ad Hoc" working group has been working hard to develop a compliance protocol to the Convention. The fifth Review Conference is scheduled for November 2001. These review conferences have:

• Strengthened procedures for consultation over compliance concerns.
• Established an Ad Hoc group of experts (known as VERTEX - verification experts) who worked-out a total of 7 confidence building measures (CBM), the first of which was an annual data exchange of biological research. Other CBMs include:

o Declarations of high containment facilities, including those related to defense programs and facilities

o Reporting of unusual breakouts of diseases

o Encouraged publishing results of biological research directly related to the Convention

o Provision of information concerning visits to biological research centers

o Declaration of domestic implementation legislation

o Declarations of past activities in offensive and defensive R&D programs

o Declarations of vaccine production facilities

• Established that future review conferences would be held every five years.

RECENT TREATY ACTIVITIES:

The fifth BWC review conference is scheduled to begin November 19, 2001 and pressure mounts for reaching agreement on the additional protocol. Signatories to the BWC are reaching end-game negotiations on the legalization and requirements for mandatory declarations, visits, and investigations to military and private facilities.

A review of US policy concluded that the US will not support any Protocol based on the current negotiating mandate. The Bush Administration has rejected the latest draft of an additional protocol intended to strengthen the Biological Weapons Convention.

At a July 2001 meeting of the Ad Hoc Group negotiating the final text of the verification protocol that would attempt to strengthened the BWC, U.S. Ambassador Donald Mahley announced that "the U.S. would not support a draft protocol intended to strengthened the BWC" because it "would not improve our ability to verify compliance with the treaty's global ban on biological weapons and would put national security and confidential business information at risk."

It was also announced that the U.S. "would pursue alternative ways to enforce the BWC that do not pose risks for U.S. bio-warfare defense preparations, sensitive commercial information and multilateral export regimes."

NAVY CURRENT AND FUTURE ACTIVITIES:

The DON will participate in the future development of BWC verification alternatives.

The DON will continue to provide annual submissions under provisions of the BWC confidence building measures.

TECHNICAL REVIEW:

Last review for technical accuracy: August 2001.

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