

ENTRANCE EXAMINATION, 2021
PhD PHILOSOPHY

A-62

Hall Ticket No. _____

Time: Two Hours

Maximum Marks: 70

Instructions

1. The questions in **Part-A** (30 Marks) should be answered in the OMR answer sheet following the instructions provided therein.
2. The questions in **Part-B** (40 Marks) should be answered in the answer book provided.

Part A

Answer questions 1-30 on the OMR sheet

[30 Marks]

1. By analysis, we mean
 - A. breaking something complex into its component elements.
 - B. deducing specific conclusions on the basis of observations.
 - C. interpretation of data collected in a study.
 - D. explanation of a phenomenon by appealing to a theoretical framework.
2. By a paradigm in science, Kuhn meant
 - A. a model in an area of scientific research that can be emulated in the allied areas.
 - B. a pattern that is replicated in science by a community of practitioners.
 - C. a theoretical framework containing both laws and observations.
 - D. a scientific achievement which is a foundation for further practice of science.
3. The ordinary language philosophy and the ideal language philosophy differ in that
 - A. the ideal language philosophy aims at resolving philosophical problems whereas the ordinary language philosophy aims at merely describing natural language.
 - B. the ideal language philosophy attempts to disclose the deep structure of the world while the ordinary language philosophy deals with meanings of the expressions of natural language.
 - C. in their orientation, the ideal language philosophy is analytic while the ordinary language philosophy is constructive.
 - D. the ideal language philosophy is normative while the ordinary language philosophy is positive.

A-62

4. What, according to Kautilya, is the foundation of Sāmkhya, Yoga and Lokāyata?

- A. *Vitandā*
- B. *Tarka*
- C. *Anvikṣiki*
- D. *Dharma*

5. Which of the following statements are correct on the difference between *tantra* and *mantra*?

- I. *Tantra* is associated with the realization of the self through techniques and *mantra* is associated with the realization of the self through the cognition of truth.
 - II. *Tantra* follows magico-religious practice and *mantra* is concerned with chanting to attain spirituality.
 - III. *Tantra* is materialist and *mantra* is non-materialist.
 - IV. Non-conceptual awareness predominates in *tantra* and conceptual awareness predominates in *mantra*.
- A. I, and IV
 - B. I and II
 - C. III and IV
 - D. I, III and IV

6. *Pūrva-pakṣa* is a method of establishing a philosophical position by

- I. stating the opponent's position.
 - II. ignoring the opponent's position.
 - III. addressing the opponent's position.
 - IV. showing the fallibility in the opponent's position.
- A. I, II and IV
 - B. II, III and IV
 - C. I, III and IV
 - D. III and IV

7. Match the following and select the correct answer from the codes given below.

- | | |
|------------------------|------------------------------------|
| I. <i>Rāja Yoga</i> | 1. Higher knowledge |
| II. <i>Bhakti Yoga</i> | 2. From the body to spirituality |
| III. <i>Jñāna Yoga</i> | 3. Renunciation through detachment |
| IV. <i>Hatha Yoga</i> | 4. Salvation through attachment |
| V. <i>Karma Yoga</i> | 5. From the mind to spirituality |

- A. I-2, II-3, III-4, IV-1, V-5
- B. I-3, II-2, III-1, IV-5, V-4
- C. I-4, II-5, III-2, IV-1, V-3
- D. I-5, II-4, III-1, IV-2, V-3

8. In a recent study, using bibliometric analysis, Maximilian Noichl has pointed out that the citation practices in philosophy do not reveal analytic philosophy as an identifiable cluster. Noichl's study is an instance of
- metaphysical research.
 - meta-philosophical research.
 - epistemological research.
 - logical research.
9. In a recent discussion, Prof. Ashok Gulati and Prof. Reetika Khera registered a disagreement. According to Gulati, in the Indian context, one ought to define large farmers as people with holdings over 4 hectares. Otherwise, the large farmers will be limited to a mere 1%. However, according to Khera, one must stick with the standard definition of large farmers as people with holdings over 10 hectares because that is the definition employed by the Government.

What kind of disagreement is there between Prof. Gulati and Prof. Khera?

- Syntactic
 - Factual
 - Semantic
 - Scientific
10. Stipulative definition is useful to
- resolve grammatical disputes.
 - settle factual disputes.
 - limit the scope of a term.
 - introduce new terms.
11. Which type of propositions have existential import in modern logic?
- Both A and E
 - Both I and O
 - Both A and I
 - Both E and O
12. If a formal system is incomplete, then
- there is at least one well formed formula (WFF) whose truth value is undecidable.
 - there is no WFF whose truth value is undecidable.
 - there is at least one WFF which is always false.
 - there is at least one set of WFFs which is inconsistent.
13. Which of the following is meant to express that the entities should not be multiplied beyond necessities?
- Ockham's Razor
 - Hume's Fork
 - Plato's Cave
 - Kant's Transcendentalism

14. Match the following and select the correct answer from the codes given below.

- | | |
|----------------------|---|
| I. Buddhism | 1. Both <i>prāmāṇya</i> and <i>aprāmāṇya</i> are <i>svataḥ</i> |
| II. Sāmkhya | 2. Both <i>prāmāṇya</i> and <i>aprāmāṇya</i> are <i>parataḥ</i> |
| III. Nyāya-vaiśeṣikā | 3. <i>Svataḥ prāmāṇya</i> and <i>parataḥ aprāmāṇya</i> |
| IV. Mimāṃsā | 4. <i>Svataḥ aprāmāṇya</i> and <i>parataḥ prāmāṇya</i> |

- A. I-4, II-3, III-2, IV-1
 B. I-3, II-4, III-2, IV-1
 C. I-2, II-3, III-1, IV-4
 D. I-4, II-1, III-2, IV-3

15. The form of a transcendental argument is

- A. P is true. Q is necessary for P to be possibly true. Therefore, Q.
 B. P is true. Q is necessary for P to be possibly true. Therefore, P.
 C. P is true. It is impossible that not-P and Q are true. Therefore, P.
 D. P is true. It is impossible that both not-P and not-Q are true. Therefore, Q.

16. Which of the following statements are true of Bentham's version of hedonistic utilitarianism?

- I. Happiness can be calculated.
 II. Happiness is pleasure and absence of pain.
 III. Some pleasures are more valuable than others.
 IV. Happiness is the only good.
- A. I, II, III
 B. II, III, IV
 C. III, IV, I
 D. IV, I, II

17. Match the following and select the correct answer from the codes given below.

- | | |
|----------------------------|--|
| I. Eliminative Materialism | 1. Being about or directed at something. |
| II. Intentionality | 2. The mental and the physical are two aspects of the same thing. |
| III. Embodiment | 3. Neurobiological terms are eventually translatable into folk psychological vocabulary. |
| IV. The Unconscious | 4. The mental has physical manifestation in the world. |
| | 5. Falsification of the idea of incorrigibility. |

- A. I-2, II-5, III-4, IV-3
 B. I-3, II-1, III-2, IV-3

- C. I-3, II-1, III-4, IV-5
D. I-2, II-5, III-4, IV-3
18. According to Kant, the inquiry of reason that has been on the secure course of a science from its very inception is
- Logic.
 - Mathematics.
 - Natural Science.
 - Metaphysics.
19. Functionalism defines a mental state as
- a state that causes a mental state, stimuli, and behaviour.
 - a state that is caused by a mental state, and causes stimuli and behaviour.
 - a state that causes another mental state and is caused by stimuli or behaviour.
 - a state that is caused by stimuli and causes another state and/or a behaviour
20. Match the following and select the correct answer from the codes given below.
- | | |
|------------------------------------|---|
| I. Contingent <i>a priori</i> | 1. Water is H_2O . |
| II. Synthetic <i>a priori</i> | 2. The grass is green. |
| III. Necessary <i>a posteriori</i> | 3. $1+1=2$. |
| IV. Synthetic <i>a posteriori</i> | 4. The Standard meter bar in Paris is one meter long. |
- I-4, II-3, III-1, IV-2
 - I-4, II-3, III-1, IV-2
 - I-4, II-3, III-1, IV-2
 - I-2, II-3, III-1, IV-4
21. Match the following and select the correct answer from the codes given below.
- | | |
|--|-----------|
| I. Sense-Reference Distinction | 1. Grice |
| II. Refutation of Analytic-Synthetic Distinction | 2. Austin |
| III. Natural Meaning and Non-Natural Meaning Distinction | 3. Searle |
| IV. Locutionary Acts and Illocutionary Acts Distinction | 4. Frege |
| V. Refutation of the Locutionary-Illocutionary Distinction | 5. Quine |
| VI. Primary Qualities and Secondary Qualities Distinction | 6. Locke |
- I-4, II-5, III-1, IV-2, V-3, VI-6
 - I-4, II-1, III-5, IV-2, V-3, VI-6

C. I-5, II-4, III-1, IV-3, V-6, VI-2

D. I-1, II-5, III-4, IV-6, V-2, VI-3

22. Match the following and select the correct answer from the codes given below.

- | | |
|---------------------------------------|-----------------|
| I. The Open Question Argument | 1. Descartes |
| II. The Dream Argument | 2. Berkeley |
| III. The Master Argument | 3. Locke |
| IV. The Ontological Argument | 4. St. Anselm |
| V. The Third Man Argument | 5. Plato |
| VI. Argument against Private Language | 6. G. E. Moore |
| | 7. Wittgenstein |

A. I-6, II-1, III-2, IV-4, V-5, VI-7

B. I-5, II-7, III-3, IV-2, V-4, VI-6

C. I-3, II-2, III-4, IV-6, V-5, VI-7

D. I-6, II-1, III-5, IV-2, V-7, VI-3

23. If we follow Hume, we can imagine that

- 2+2 is not equal to 5.
- a thing to be and not to be at the same time.
- there is a world in which the triangles have ten sides.
- there is a world in which human beings are not walking at all.

24. Match the following and select the correct answer from the codes given below.

- | | |
|----------------|-----------------------------|
| I. Spinoza | 1. Intellectual love of God |
| II. Leibnitz | 2. Unmoved Mover |
| III. Aristotle | 3. Metaphysics of Nature |
| IV. Kant | 4. Pre-established Harmony |

A. I-4, II-3, III-1, IV-2

B. I-2, II-3, III-4, IV-1

C. I-1, II-4, III-2, IV-3

D. I-1, II-4, III-3, IV-2

25. Which of the following statements concerning Nyāya-vaiśeṣika view of *sāmānya* is/are correct?

- The individual alone is real and there is no universal other than particular objects of experience.
 - The universal is the basis of the notion of sameness that we have with regard to all the individuals of a certain class.
 - There is no universal subsisting in another universal.
- 2 only
 - 2 and 3

- C. 3 only
D. 1 and 3

26. Match the following and select the correct answer from the codes given below.

- | | |
|--------------------------|-----------------------------|
| I. Yogācara Buddhism | 1. <i>asatkhyātivāda</i> |
| II. Nyāya-vaiśeṣika | 2. <i>akhyātivāda</i> |
| III. Mādhyamika Buddhism | 3. <i>ātmakhyātivāda</i> |
| IV. Prābhākara Mīmāṃsa | 4. <i>anyathākhyātivāda</i> |
- A. I-3, II-4, III-1, IV-2
B. I-4, II-3, III-2, IV-1
C. I-3, II-4, III-2, IV-1
D. I-2, II-1, III-4, IV-3

27. Match the following and select the correct answer from the codes given below.

- | | |
|----------------------|-------------|
| I. <i>Mokṣa</i> | 1. Jaina |
| II. <i>Nirvāṇa</i> | 2. Sāmkhya |
| III. <i>Apavarga</i> | 3. Nyāya |
| IV. <i>Kaivalya</i> | 4. Buddhism |
- A. I-4, II-1, III-2, IV-3
B. I-1, II-4, III-3, IV-2
C. I-1, II-2, III-3, IV-4
D. I-3, II-4, III-1, IV-2

28. What is the correct sequence of the following links according to the Buddhist theory of dependent origination?

1. *Trṣṇa*
2. *Vedanā*
3. *Sparsa*
4. *Upādāna*
- A. 1-2-3-4
B. 2-3-1-4
C. 3-2-4-1
D. 3-2-1-4

29. Select the correct sequence.

- A. *Prakṛti, Mahat, Ahamkāra, Bhūta*
B. *Puruṣa, Prakṛti, Ahamkāra, Bhūta*
C. *Prakṛti, Mahat, Ahamkāra, Tanmātra*
D. *Prakṛti, Ahamkāra, Bhūta, Tanmātra*

30. Match the following on the basis of the different types of meanings of *Gangāyām ghoṣaḥ* (house on the Ganges) and select the correct answer from the codes given below.

- | | |
|---|--------------------|
| I. House in a holy and peaceful place. | 1. <i>Lakṣanā</i> |
| II. House on the bank of the river Ganges | 2. <i>Dhvani</i> |
| III. House in the stream of Ganges | 3. <i>Abhidhā</i> |
| | 4. <i>Vyañjanā</i> |

- A. I-2, II-3, III-4
 B. I-4, II-1, III-3
 C. I-2, II-1, III-4
 D. I-3, II-4, III-2

Part-B

Answer the questions on the booklet provided.

[40 Marks]

31. **Read the following passage carefully. Formulate one each of the five types of questions given in parenthesis and answer them in one or two sentences. (Five types: explanatory, descriptive, evaluative, informative and critical)**

[10 Marks]

Let me attempt to formulate the basic difficulty as I see it. In its very simplest terms, Popper's account of scientific knowledge involves generalisations and their observational tests. If we find a *bonafide* counterexample to a generalisation, we can say that it has been deductively refuted. To be sure, as Popper explicitly acknowledges, there may be difficulties in some cases in determining whether certain observations constitute genuine counterexamples to a generalisation, but that does not undermine the claim that a genuine counterexample yields a deductive refutation. According to Popper, negative instances provide rational grounds for rejecting generalisations. If, however, we make observations and perform tests, but no negative instance is found, all we can say deductively is that the generalisation in question has not been refuted. In particular, positive instances do not provide confirmation or inductive support for any such unrefuted generalisation. At this stage, I claim, we have no basis for rational prediction. Taken in themselves, our observation reports refer to past events, and consequently they have no predictive content. They say nothing about future events. If, however, we take a general statement as a premise, and conjoin to it some appropriate observation statements about past or present events, we may be able to deduce a conclusion which says something about future occurrences and which, thereby, has predictive content. Popper himself gives this account of the logic of prediction (Schilpp [1974], p. 1030).

The problem of rational prediction concerns the status of the general premise in such an argument. One may claim, as Popper does, that we ought not to use a generalisation which has actually been refuted as a premise in a predictive argument of this sort, for we are justified in regarding it as false. We ought not to employ premises which are known to be false if we hope to deduce true predictions. The exclusion of refuted generalisations does not, however, tell us what general premise should be employed.

Typically there will be an infinite array of generalisations which are compatible with the available observational evidence, and which are therefore, as yet, unrefuted. If we were free to choose arbitrarily from among all the unrefuted alternatives, we could predict anything whatever. If there were no rational basis for choosing from among all of the unrefuted alternatives, then, as I think Popper would agree, there would be no such thing as rational prediction. We are not in this unfortunate situation, Popper contends, for we do have grounds for preferring one unrefuted generalisation to another:

My solution of the logical problem of induction was that we may have preferences for certain of the competing conjectures; that is, for those which are highly informative and which so far have stood up to eliminative criticism (Schilpp [1974], p. 1024).

Popper's concept of corroboration is designed to measure the manner in which conjectures have stood up to severe criticism, including severe testing. This, I take it, is the crucial thesis—that there is a rational basis for preferring one unrefuted generalisation to another for use in a predictive argument. If that is correct, then Popper can legitimately claim to have solved the problem of rational prediction.

(Wesley C. Salmon (1981). 'Rational Prediction', *The British Journal for the Philosophy of Science*)

32. **Read the following passage carefully and answer questions given at the end of the passage in one or two sentences.** [10 marks]

Doubts about whether some particular hypothesis is true can often be settled by following the ordinary, well-known ways of establishing matters of so-called empirical fact. But the skeptic maintains that the whole structure of practices and beliefs on the basis of which empirical hypotheses are ordinarily "supported" has not itself been shown to be reliable. As long as we have a public objective world of material objects in space and time to rely on, particular questions about how we know that such-and-such is the case can eventually be settled. But that there is such a world of material objects at all is a matter of contingent fact, and the skeptic challenges us to show how we know it. According to him, any justification for our belief will have to come from within experience, and so no adequate justification can ever be given. Transcendental arguments are supposed to demonstrate the impossibility or illegitimacy of this skeptical challenge by proving that certain concepts are necessary for thought or experience; but before trying to see exactly how they are thought to do this it will be instructive to consider a possible objection to what has been said so far.

If transcendental arguments are meant to answer the skeptic's question and if, as many believe, that question makes no sense, then there will be little point in considering the exact nature of these alleged arguments. This line is reminiscent of that taken by Carnap. He, like Kant, distinguishes between two types of questions—ordinary empirical questions on the one hand, which are raised and answered from "within" a framework of concepts, beliefs, and recognized procedures of confirmation, and, on the other hand, questions raised by the skeptic or metaphysician about this framework, raised, so to speak, "from outside." To ask whether there are any objects more than ten billion miles from the earth is to ask an "internal" question to which there is an objectively right answer. It is a genuine "theoretical" issue which can be settled by discovering the truth of certain empirical statements. But to ask simply whether there are any objects at all is to ask an "external" question about the existence of the system of spatiotemporal material objects as a whole, and this is not a "theoretical"

question with an objectively right answer at all. It is a “practical” question, a request for a decision as to whether or not we should think and talk in terms of material objects. Since there is no set of true propositions that would answer an “external” question, the issue cannot be settled by gathering evidence.

The belief that “external” questions must be answered in the same way as ordinary empirical questions is what leads the epistemologist to the skeptical impasse. Carnap avoids skepticism by denying this and claiming that statements like ‘There are material objects’ assert nothing about the world at all and, hence, that we couldn’t conceivably lack knowledge of their truth value. They have no truth value—they merely serve to express a policy we have adopted or a convention with which we comply.

If this conventionalist line is to be successful there must be no need for us to conceive of the world in terms of material objects in space and time; it must be perfectly possible for us to find the world and our experience intelligible in other terms. But transcendental arguments are supposed to prove that certain particular concepts are necessary for experience or thought; they establish the necessity or indispensability of certain concepts. Therefore conventionalism of this sort will be refuted if a sound transcendental argument can be produced. If there are particular concepts that are necessary for thought or experience then it is false that, for every one of our present concepts, we could dispense with it and still find the world or our experience intelligible. A sound transcendental argument therefore would show that it is wrong to think (with the conventionalist) that the only possible justification of our ways of thinking is “pragmatic” or practical, and equally wrong to think (with the skeptic) that they can be justified only by collecting direct empirical evidence of their reliability. Although these look like difficult demands to meet, they represent the minimum conditions that Kant set for the success of a transcendental argument.

(Barry Stroud (1968). ‘Transcendental Arguments’, *The Journal of Philosophy*)

Questions

- (a) What is the skeptic’s challenge to the existence of the external world?
- (b) How does Carnap answer the skeptic?
- (c) How do transcendental arguments answer the skeptic?
- (d) Why can’t an external question be answered?
- (e) How do transcendental arguments refute conventionalism?

33. **Answer any one of the following in 500 words.** [10 Marks]

- (a) What is the problem of consciousness? Explain with your own reason whether consciousness can be scientifically explained ?
- (b) According to Kant, space is neither a thing that subsists on its own nor a property of things-in-themselves, but the form of human sensibility. Critically examine Kant’s argument in support of this view of space.
- (c) What, according to Karl Popper, is the problem of demarcation? Explain how his criterion distinguishes between science and metaphysics on the one hand and science and pseudo-science on the other?
- (d) Explain and examine Foucault’s archeological method.
- (e) Do you agree with Wittgenstein’s statement that the aim of philosophy is ‘to show the fly way out of the fly bottle’? Explain your answer.

- (f) We tend to suppose that correct conclusions cannot be obtained by valid reasoning from false assumptions, though only the reverse is the case – that is, incorrect conclusions cannot be logically deduced from true assumptions.”

(Stillman Drake, *Galileo: A Very Short Introduction*).

Do you accept Drake’s reasoning? Explain your answer with an example.

- (g) Respond to the following paradox that Plato formulated in Meno.

It’s impossible for a man to search either for what he knows or for what he doesn’t know: he wouldn’t be searching for what he knows, since he knows it and that makes the search unnecessary, and he can’t search for what he doesn’t know either, since he doesn’t even know what it is he’s going to search for.

(Meno 80e)

(Clue: Plato has offered a dilemma and there are only three ways to respond to a dilemma)

- (h) For Leibnitz physical objects are composed of unextended and indivisible monads. How, then, does Leibnitz account for the extension of the physical objects around us?

34. Answer any one of the following in 500 words.

[10 Marks]

- (a) How does the concept of *pramā* upheld by a system determine its accepted *pramānas*? Discuss.
- (b) What do you understand by *Kalpanāpoḍam pratyakṣam*? Distinguish it from ‘*Kalpanāpoḍambhrāntam pratyakṣam*’.
- (c) What is the difference between *lakṣanā* and *vyañjanā*? Which one of them do you think is more appropriate for poetic communication?
- (d) What is the difference between *puruṣārtha* and *param puruṣārtha*? Why do Cārvākas reject *mokṣa* as a *param puruṣārtha*?
- (e) How is *śrotra pratyakṣa* (auditory perception) different from *śabda pramāna*? Can *śabda pramāna* be reduced to *anumāna*? Explain your answer.
- (f) How do we distinguish *Brahman* from *Māya* when both are *anirvacaniya*?
- (g) How is Rāmānuja’s conception of *Ātman* (self) distinguished from Śankara’s conception of *Ātman* (self)?
- (h) How do we know a negative fact or the absence of a thing? Discuss the viewpoints of Naiyāyikas and Kumārila.

University of Hyderabad
Entrance Examinations - 2021

School/Department/Centre : PHILOSOPHY
Course/Subject : Ph. D

Q.No.	Answer	Q.No.	Answer	Q.No.	Answer	Q.No.	Answer
1	A	26	A	51		76	
2	D	27	B	52		77	
3	B	28	D	53		78	
4	C	29	C	54		79	
5	B	30	B	55		80	
6	C	31		56		81	
7	D	32		57		82	
8	B	33		58		83	
9	C	34		59		84	
10	D	35		60		85	
11	B	36		61		86	
12	A	37		62		87	
13	A	38		63		88	
14	D	39		64		89	
15	A	40		65		90	
16	D	41		66		91	
17	C	42		67		92	
18	A	43		68		93	
19	D	44		69		94	
20	A or B or C	45		70		95	
21	A	46		71		96	
22	A	47		72		97	
23	D	48		73		98	
24	C	49		74		99	
25	B	50		75		100	

Note/Remarks :