Cognitive Sciences - Publications

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Browsing Cognitive Sciences - Publications by Author "Basu, Prajit K."
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    Nanoscience and nanotechnology: Ethical, legal, social and environmental issues
    ( 2009-03-01) Patra, Debasmita ; Ejnavarzala, Haribabu ; Basu, Prajit K.
    The present article attempts to understand the debate over nanoscience and nanotechnology regarding its potential benefits to the society. One view in this debate is that nanoscience and nanotechnology has a revolutionary potential and will have significant economic benefits, while the other view is skeptical about its potential in the context of ethical, legal, social and environmental (ELSE) issues and values such as equity and justice. In some developed countries, discussion on the ELSE issues of nanoscience and nanotechnology has already begun. Hence, there is a need to take a cue from the debate in the developed countries and focus our attention on these issues in the Indian context. The ELSE issues should be addressed right from the beginning of the development of nanoscience and nanotechnology, so that it is possible to make informed policy decisions.
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    Theory-ladenness of evidence: A case study from history of chemistry
    ( 2003-06-01) Basu, Prajit K.
    This paper attempts to argue for the theory-ladenness of evidence. It does so by employing and analysing an episode from the history of eighteenth century chemistry. It delineates attempts by Joseph Priestley and Antoine Lavoisier to construct entirely different kinds of evidence for and against a particular hypothesis from a set of agreed upon observations or (raw) data. Based on an augmented version of a distinction, drawn by J. Bogen and J. Woodward, between data and phenomena it is shown that the role of theoretical auxiliary assumptions is very important in constructing evidence for (or against) a theory from observation or (raw) data. In revolutionary situations, rival groups hold radically different theories and theoretical auxiliary assumptions. These are employed to construct very different evidence from the agreed upon set of observations or (raw) data. Hence, theory resolution becomes difficult. It is argued that evidence construction is a multi-layered exercise and can be disputed at any level. What counts as unproblematic observation or (raw) data at one level may become problematic at another level. The contingency of these constructions and the (un)problematic nature of evidence are shown to be partially dependent upon the scientific knowledge that the scientific community possesses. © 2003 Elsevier Science Ltd. All rights reserved.